

The London School of Economics and Political Science

Understanding Refugee Resettlement Admissions: An Exploration of the Perceived Relationship between Admissions, Domestic Responsibility Sharing, and Voluntary Sector Advocacy in the United States and Canada

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Declaration

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Abstract

In its most recent global report, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reported that the number of individuals in need of protection had reached a “record” of 68.5 million persons, including 25.4 million refugees. The customary and international laws that comprise the international refugee regime delineate a number of avenues through which individuals can potentially obtain protection, including asylum and the three durable solutions of voluntary repatriation, local integration, and resettlement. However, individuals may encounter barriers in attempting to seek asylum, and the legal, economic, and social conditions that are conducive to local integration and voluntary repatriation are not necessarily present in all host communities.

Furthermore, there are some individuals for whom resettlement is the only possible durable solution. Nevertheless, resettlement is neither a right nor an obligation under customary and international law, and there appear to be persistent cross-national differences in resettlement contributions. Indeed, an analysis of resettlement arrivals demonstrates that the United States and Canada were among the largest—if not *the* largest—contributors to resettlement in both absolute and relative terms between 1980 and 2016. This observation raises the question: why have the United States and Canada voluntarily adopted generous resettlement admissions policies?

Scholars have proposed many explanations for why some countries adopt a more generous approach to refugee protection and have cited the influence of ‘partialist’ and ‘impartialist’ ideologies, foreign policies, perceived public and (or) private benefits, and structural factors, among other possible explanations. Though these perspectives could help us understand how some governments determine which refugees to resettle, they do not offer a fulsome explanation of why the United States and Canada have voluntarily adopted generous resettlement admissions policies. Furthermore, the majority of the extant literature is state-centric in focus and ignores domestic factors such as the longstanding and extensive mechanisms for domestic responsibility sharing with ‘voluntary sector’ organisations in the United States and Canada. In addition, scholars neglect the involvement of many voluntary sector organisations in advocacy and how such efforts could impact resettlement admissions.

This thesis attempts to understand why the United States and Canada have voluntarily adopted generous resettlement admissions policies through an inductive exploration of perceptions on (a) the motivations for resettlement and its benefits, (b) the nature of government-voluntary sector relations, (c) the potential relationship between resettlement admissions and domestic responsibility sharing with voluntary sector organisations, and (d) the potential relationship between resettlement admissions and voluntary sector advocacy.

In the United States, qualitative interviews with senior government officials and ‘voluntary agency’ representatives indicate that the government is perceived to engage in resettlement for humanitarian and normative reasons and that contributing to this durable solution is consistent with the history and values of the United States and confers reputational and cultural benefits. One could interpret this perception as consistent with the literature on refugee protection as an impure public good and the economic literature on public goods more generally. Interviews also indicate that the government and voluntary agencies perceived their relationship as both ‘complementary’ and ‘supplementary’ in nature. One could interpret this perception as consistent with the dominant taxonomy on government-voluntary sector relations, and with the historical evolution of relations between these parties. Furthermore, all

but one of the interviewees perceived that domestic responsibility sharing with voluntary agencies had enhanced resettlement admissions in the United States. One could interpret the extensive mechanisms for domestic responsibility sharing as consistent with the dominant approach to the provision of public goods and services, though scholars continue to debate why government-voluntary sector partnerships are such a prominent feature in this area. Finally, a government official indicated that the government is open to interest representation efforts and many voluntary agency representatives believed their advocacy efforts had a positive impact on resettlement admissions and funding. One could interpret these perceptions as consistent with the dominant taxonomy on government-voluntary sector relations and the structure of interest representation in the United States. Though preliminary research indicates that ethnic community-based organisations may play a limited role in voluntary sector advocacy on resettlement, further research is required. However, the bipartisan consensus that has traditionally underpinned resettlement to the United States could be at risk, and the context and salience of resettlement could condition the impact of advocacy efforts.

In Canada, qualitative interviews with senior government officials and private sponsors indicate that the government is perceived to engage in resettlement for humanitarian and normative reasons and that contributing to this durable solution confers reputational and cultural benefits. One could interpret this perception as consistent with the literature on refugee protection as an impure public good and the economic literature on public goods more generally. Interviews also indicate that the government and private sponsors perceived their relationship as complementary in some ways and as supplementary in other ways. One could interpret this perception as consistent with the dominant taxonomy on government-voluntary sector relations, and with the historical evolution of relations between the government and voluntary sector groups in Canada. Furthermore, all but one of the interviewees perceived that domestic responsibility sharing with voluntary agencies had enhanced resettlement admissions in Canada. One could interpret the extensive mechanisms for domestic responsibility sharing as consistent with the historical pattern of public service delivery in Canada. However, some private sponsors expressed concerns about two operational and programmatic changes in resettlement and worried that the government is engaging in responsibility shifting. On the matter of advocacy, two government officials stated that there were recently tensions between the government and certain private sponsors, while private sponsors appeared divided on whether and how best to engage in advocacy. One could interpret these perceptions as consistent with the dominant taxonomy on government-voluntary sector relations, but these perceived tensions could also impact the potential effectiveness of advocacy efforts on resettlement. Though preliminary research indicates that few ethnic community organisations engage in advocacy on resettlement in Canada, further research is required—especially given the growing inclusion of ethnic minorities in Canadian politics. Finally, though immigration has often been a low salience issue, the Canadian public has not always welcomed persons in need of protection, and so advocacy efforts may be conditioned by the issue context surrounding resettlement.

The author concludes with a brief summary and comparative analysis between the US and Canada, before drawing attention to possible implications and future research prospects.

Dedication

This thesis is dedicated first and foremost to my husband, Ian. Your willingness to embark on another overseas adventure and your unwavering love, encouragement, patience, and support made this journey possible. À ma fille Emily: tu nous apportes tellement de joie et ta naissance m'a montré ce qui est réellement important dans la vie. *Je t'aime!* This thesis is also dedicated to my parents, Garry and Viviane. Though I have missed far too many birthdays, holidays, and countless other moments, the love, encouragement, and reassurance that you have always offered so freely has made me the person I am today. In addition, the work ethic and sense of perseverance that you instilled in me have carried me through some difficult moments in both my academic and professional life. I also want to convey my sincere thanks to my in-laws, Jean and David, and to my sister-in-law Catriona and her husband Ted, for their encouragement and support, as well as their generous hospitality in both Canada and the United Kingdom.

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Chapter One: Introduction

1.1 Research Problem and Question

In its most recent global report, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) reported that the number of individuals in need of protection had reached a “record” of 68.5 million persons in 2017, including 25.4 million refugees (UNHCR 2018, 2). That year, 44 per cent of all refugees originated from just three countries: Syria (6.3 million refugees), Afghanistan (2.6 million refugees), and South Sudan (2.4 million refugees) (UNHCR 2018, 2 own calculation).

The customary and international laws that comprise the international refugee regime delineate a number of avenues through which individuals can potentially obtain protection, including asylum and the three durable solutions of voluntary repatriation, local integration, and resettlement (United Nations General Assembly 1948, sections 13 and 14; United Nations General Assembly 1951, section 1; United Nations General Assembly 1967, section 1; UNHCR 2011, 3). In contrast to local integration or voluntary repatriation, resettlement involves the “transfer of refugees from the country in which they have sought asylum to another State that has agreed to admit them as refugees and to grant them permanent settlement and the opportunity for eventual citizenship (UNHCR 2011, 9).”

Though customary and international law offers a framework through which individuals can seek protection, these individuals may encounter barriers in attempting to avail themselves of these solutions. For example, the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* affords individuals the right to leave their home countries in search of asylum (United Nations General Assembly 1948, sections 13 and 14). Though state parties to the 1951 *Convention relating to the Status of Refugees* have a “de facto duty” to admit asylum seekers and to consider their claims for protection in order to minimise the risk of *refoulement* (Hathaway 2005, 300-1), there is no requirement to actually grant refugee protection (Boed 1994, 8-14). Furthermore, not everyone has the ability and means to seek asylum, and those who do face a number of potential risks, including dangerous journeys, *refoulement*, prolonged detention, and destitution, among many others (c.f. Goodwin-Gill 1986, 202-5; Goodwin-Gill 2011, 450-51; Kissoon 2010, 5-6 and 12-25; UNHCR 2014, no pagination).

Furthermore, though the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* also grants individuals the right to return to their respective countries, some asylum seekers and refugees are discouraged or prevented from doing so due to persistent conflict and political instability in their respective countries of origin (United Nations General Assembly 1948, section 13; UNHCR 2016, 3-6). In addition, while the 1951 *Convention relating to the Status of Refugees*

stipulates that governments must grant lawfully present refugees favourable treatment with respect to the provision of particular economic and social rights (United Nations General Assembly 1951, sections 4, 13, 15, 17, 18, 19, 21, and 22), local integration is a complex and lengthy process and the legal, economic, and social conditions that are conducive to this process are not necessarily present in all host communities (UNHCR 2011, 7).

Though these barriers are formidable, they are not necessarily insurmountable. In 2016, the most recent year for which data was available, a total of 899,980 asylum seekers were granted Convention refugee status or another complementary form of protection (UNHCR 2018, 51 own calculation). That same year, 23,018 refugees obtained citizenship in their respective host countries, and 552,230 persons of concern returned home (UNHCR 2018, 21). Nevertheless, access to protection remains uncertain for many, as 2,837,117 asylum applications were pending at the end of 2016, and the total population of refugees and individuals in a “refugee-like” situation reached 16,533,748 by the end of that year (UNHCR 2018, 10).


Though local integration and voluntary repatriation may be feasible options for many refugees, there are some individuals for whom resettlement is the only possible durable solution. These include individuals and groups of refugees whose lives or other human rights are under threat in their respective countries of asylum (UNHCR 2011, 3). Indeed, the UNHCR (2011, 1) has argued that resettlement has “grown even more vital as a durable solution” given that the protracted nature of many conflicts has constrained opportunities for voluntary repatriation and countries of first asylum are already “heavily burdened” and thus “reluctant to expand possibilities for local integration.”

Resettlement has been an essential component of refugee protection since the end of World War I. In 1923, the League of Nations implemented the first large-scale international repatriation and resettlement efforts in collaboration with governments and voluntary sector organisations (Holborn 1939, 126 and 130; Loescher, 1993, 37-38). Over time, organisations including the International Labor Organization, the International Refugee Organization, and the UNHCR have resettled millions of refugees from Europe and countries and regions as diverse as Uganda, Chile, and Southeast Asia, among many others (Holborn 1939, 126-30; UNHCR 2011, 47-50). Appendix Table 1 displays the total number of resettlement arrivals each year between 1980 and 2016, the most recent year for which data was available. Table 1 demonstrates that there have been considerable variations in resettlement admissions during this period, from a high of 277,070 in 1980 to a low 51,031 in 2002, following the decision of the United States (US) to dramatically reduced admissions after the terrorist attacks of 11

September, 2001. The mean number of resettlement admissions between 1980 and 2016 was 117,215 (see table for sources).

However, these aggregate figures conceal a considerable degree of cross-national variation in resettlement admissions. First, a glance at the list of countries that participated in resettlement in 2016 demonstrates that few members of the international community contribute to this durable solution. Figure 1 depicts the countries that resettled refugees in 2016, the most recent year for which data was available:

Figure 1 – Participating Countries in Resettlement, 2016



Created with mapchart.net ©

Figure 1 demonstrates that most countries of resettlement are located in Europe, though North America, Oceania, and parts of East Asia also resettled refugees in 2016 (UNHCR 2018, 206).¹ Though these are not the only countries to resettle refugees, European, North American, and Oceanian states are among the oldest and most consistent contributors to this durable solution. For example, Sweden adopted a formal resettlement programme and quota in 1950, making it the oldest country of resettlement in Europe (Ostling and Joseph 2013, 1). Decades later, a range of countries adopted resettlement programmes, including Australia in 1977, Canada in 1978, Denmark in 1979, and the US in 1980 (UNHCR 2016, 2; UNHCR 2018, 2; UNHCR 2018, 2).

Though countries in Europe, North America, and Oceania are among the most consistent participants in resettlement, one can observe considerable cross-national differences in the absolute and relative number of refugees resettled around the world. Figure 2 illustrates the range in the absolute number of refugees resettled in 2016, the most recent year for which data was available at the time of research:

¹ The 30 countries that resettled refugees in 2016 were: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Cambodia, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Latvia, Lithuania, Monaco, Norway, New Zealand, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the US.

Figure 2 – Number of Resettlement Arrivals by Country, 2016




Figure 2 demonstrates that Australia, Canada, Norway, the United Kingdom, and the US each resettled more than 2,001 refugees in 2016, making them the largest absolute contributors to resettlement that year (UNHCR 2018, 206). France, Germany, and Sweden each resettled between 1,001 and 2000 refugees in 2016, while Finland, Italy, the Netherlands, New Zealand, and Switzerland resettled between 500 and 1,000 refugees that year (UNHCR 2018, 206). For their part, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, and Spain each resettled between 500 and 1,000 refugees in 2016, while Brazil, Cambodia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Iceland, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Monaco, and South Korea resettled between 1 and 100 refugees that year (UNHCR 2018, 206). The median number of refugees resettled in 2016 was 333, indicating that most countries made small contributions relative to the 373,942 refugees estimated to be in need of resettlement that year (UNHCR 2018, 206 own calculation).²

Detailed figures on the absolute number of refugees resettled reinforce the observation concerning the cross-national variations in resettlement contributions. Appendix Table 2 shows the total number of resettlement arrivals for all 30 countries that participated in resettlement in 2016, the most recent year for which data was available at the time of research. Table 2 demonstrates that there were considerable differences in resettlement contributions among participating states in 2016. Indeed, resettlement contributions ranged from one refugee resettled in Cambodia to 84,994 refugees resettled in the US (UNHCR 2018, 206).

The fact that some countries resettled more refugees than others in 2016 does not appear to be an aberration but part of a consistent pattern that has emerged since 1980. Tables 3 to 5 in the appendix demonstrate that the US resettled the largest number of refugees *each and every year* between 1980 and 2016 (see table for sources). In total, the US resettled 2,966,585 of the 4,336,960 refugees granted this durable solution between 1980 and 2016, representing 68.4 per cent of the total (see table for sources). Notably, the US retained its position as the largest contributor to resettlement even after significantly reducing resettlement admissions following the terrorist attacks of 11 September, 2001.

Canada resettled the second-largest number of refugees in 23 of the 37 years between 1980 and 2016, and the third-largest absolute number of refugees in 14 of the remaining years during that period (see table for sources).³ In other words, Canada ranked as the second- or

² The author used the median as Australia, Canada, and the US resettled considerably more refugees than the other 27 participating countries.

³ Canada was the second-largest contributor to resettlement in 1980, 1984 through 1993, 1997, 2000 to 2002, 2007, 2009 to 2012, and 2014 to 2016. It resettled the third-largest number of refugees between 1981 and 1983, 1994 to 1996, 1998 to 1999, 2003 to 2006, 2008, and 2013.

third-largest resettlement country each year between 1980 and 2016. In total, Canada resettled 658,153 of the 4,336,960 refugees granted this durable solution between 1980 and 2016, representing 15.1 per cent of the total (see table for sources).

Australia rounds out the list of the top three largest contributors to resettlement. It resettled the second-largest absolute number of refugees in 13 of the 37 years between 1980 and 2016 (see table for sources).⁴ This antipodean country was also the third-largest contributor to resettlement in 23 of the 37 years between 1980 and 2016. In total, Australia resettled 438,124 of the 4,336,960 refugees granted this durable solution between 1980 and 2016, representing 10.1 per cent of the total (see table for sources).

Cumulatively, these three countries resettled 3,920,579 of the 4,176,252 refugees granted this durable solution between 1980 and 2016, representing 93.8 per cent of the total (see table for sources). The only exception to this pattern occurred in 1999 when Germany elected to resettle 15,000 Kosovar refugees on an *ad hoc* basis, making it the second-largest absolute contributor to resettlement that year, and pushing Canada and Australia to third and fourth place, respectively (UNHCR 2004, 40). Nevertheless, the figures presented above illustrate and reinforce the observations concerning the significant cross-national differences in resettlement contributions.

One can also observe substantial cross-national differences in the relative number of refugees resettled. Figure 3 shows the range of refugees resettled per 1 million residents in 2016, the most recent year for which data was available at the time of research:

⁴ Australia was the second-largest contributor to resettlement between 1981 and 1983, 1994 to 1996, 1998, 2003 to 2006, 2008, and 2013. It resettled the third-largest number of refugees in 1980, 1984 to 1993, 1997, 2000 to 2002, 2007, 2009 to 2012, and 2014 to 2016.

Figure 3 – Resettlement Arrivals per 1 Million Residents, 2016




Figure 3 demonstrates that Australia, Canada, Finland, Iceland, Monaco, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, and the US each resettled more than 101 refugees per 1 million residents in 2016 (UNHCR 2018, 206; World Bank 2018, no pagination own calculation). Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom resettled between 11 and 100 refugees per 1 million residents in 2016, while the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, and Spain resettled between 1.1 and 10 refugees per 1 million residents that year (UNHCR 2018, 206; World Bank 2018, no pagination own calculation). For their part, Brazil, Cambodia, Japan, and South Korea each resettled between 0.01 and 1 refugee per 1 million residents in 2016 (UNHCR 2018, 206; World Bank 2018, no pagination own calculation). These governments resettled a median number of 40.4 refugees per 1 million residents in 2016, indicating that resettled refugees constitute a small part of the total population of each participating country (UNHCR 2018, 206; World Bank 2018, no pagination own calculation).⁵

Detailed figures on the relative number of refugees resettled per capita reinforce the observation concerning the cross-national variations in resettlement contributions. Appendix Table 6 shows the number of resettlement arrivals per 1 million residents in 2016, the most recent year for which data was available at the time of research. Table 6 demonstrates that there were considerable differences in resettlement contributions among participating states in 2016. Indeed, resettlement contributions ranged from 0.06 refugees resettled per 1 million residents in Cambodia to 1287.8 refugees resettled per 1 million residents in Canada (UNHCR 2018, 206 own calculation; World Bank 2018 no pagination). From this, it is apparent that some countries have made substantially larger contributions to resettlement per capita than other members of the international community.

In addition, a more detailed analysis of historical data on resettlement admissions per capita reveals a pattern in which some countries have consistently resettled more refugees per capita than other states between 1980 and 2016. Tables 7 to 9 in the appendix demonstrate that though the US, Canada, and Australia also made relatively generous contributions to resettlement between 1980 and 2016, Scandinavian countries such as Denmark, Norway, and Sweden, as well as occasional outliers such as New Zealand and Liechtenstein made meaningful contributions as well.

⁵ The author used the median as some countries, such as Australia, Canada, and Norway, resettled considerably more refugees per capita than the other 27 participating countries.

Though the US has never been the largest relative contributor to resettlement, it was the second-largest contributor in relative terms in 1981 and the third-largest contributor in 17 of the 37 years between 1980 and 2016 (see table for sources).⁶ Canada was the largest relative contributor to resettlement in 12 of the 37 years between 1980 and 2016, the second-largest contributor in 21 of the 37 years, and the third-largest contributor in a further three years between 1980 and 2016 (see table for sources).⁷ Australia was the largest relative contributor to resettlement in 23 of the 37 years between 1980 and 2016, and the second-largest relative contributor to resettlement in 11 of the 37 years during this period (see table for sources).⁸ Australia was also the third-largest relative contributor to resettlement in 2016 (UNHCR 2018, 206; World Bank 2018, no pagination).

The considerable variation in resettlement admissions is perhaps unsurprising given that resettlement is neither a right nor an obligation under customary and international humanitarian law (UNHCR 2011, 36). During the crisis in Southeast Asia, many governments began to experience “resettlement fatigue” and to perceive resettlement as the “least desirable solution (Fredriksson and Mougne 1994, 5-6).” This “disenchantment with resettlement” prompted many governments to reduce resettlement admissions and to emphasise voluntary repatriation and local integration instead (Milner 2003, 56).

In response to the disillusionment with resettlement, the UNHCR attempted to “revitalize [sic] the international protection regime” in 2000 through the Global Consultations on International Protection, which recommended in part that the organisation examine how to implement resettlement in a strategic manner (UNHCR 2003, 1-2). Three years later, the UNHCR Working Group on Resettlement (2003, 2) published a discussion paper that reframed resettlement as a strategic instrument for protection that has direct and indirect benefits for refugees, host countries, receiving countries, and the international refugee protection regime. The Working Group explained that “a substantial increase in the global resettlement capacity is required” to successfully implement the strategic use of resettlement (UNHCR 2003, 7). To achieve this, the Group argued that more countries must resettle refugees and also made an

⁶ The US was the third-largest contributor to resettlement in relative terms in 1980, between 1982 and 1992, and in 1996, 1998, 2005, 2010, and 2013.

⁷ Canada resettled the largest number of refugees per capita in 1980, between 1987 and 1992, between 2000 and 2001, and in 2012 and 2015, respectively. It resettled the second-largest number of refugees per capita between 1982 and 1986, from 1995 to 1998, from 2002 to 2011, and from 2013 to 2014. Canada resettled the third-largest number of refugees per capita in 1981, 1993, and 1999.

⁸ Australia resettled the most refugees per capita between 1981 and 1986, in 1993, from 1995 to 1998, between 2006 and 2011, and from 2013 to 2014. It resettled the second-largest number of refugees per capita in 1980, between 1987 and 1991, in 1994, between 1991 and 2001, and in 2012.

implicit connection between the number of resettlement countries and the number of resettlement places (UNHCR 2003, 8).⁹

Though the number of resettlement countries has grown progressively to 30 in 2016 (UNHCR 2018, 206 own calculation), the observations presented above concerning the considerable cross-national variations in the absolute and relative number of resettled refugees raises the question that forms the central research question explored in this thesis: *why have the US and Canada adopted generous resettlement admissions policies?* In the general context of the literature on refugee protection, scholars have advanced a range of explanations for why some countries are more generous in granting protection than others, and the author offers an analysis of the central tendencies in the literature in section 1.2. However, observations concerning the structure of resettlement programmes in most participating countries raise a different and potentially complementary explanation concerning the role of domestic responsibility sharing with voluntary sector organisations and the potential for these organisations to influence admissions through advocacy.

Indeed, domestic responsibility sharing appears to be the *modus operandi* of most resettlement programmes in Europe, North America, and Oceania. Appendix Table 10 illustrates the current involvement of voluntary sector organisations in three phases of the resettlement process: first, in the delivery of pre-departure activities, including the identification, referral, and (or) submission of resettlement applications (ID), pre-departure cultural orientation programmes (PDCO), and the provision information sessions for receiving communities (INFO); second, in the provision of reception services, including meeting refugees at the airport (REC) and offering short-term housing (STH); and third, in the supply of orientation and integration services. This may include the delivery of post-arrival orientation programmes (ORI), translation and (or) interpretation services (TR/IN), advice and (or) referrals to other service providers (AD/RE), assisting refugees in locating long-term housing (LTH) and employment opportunities (EMP), and delivering language classes (LANG). The table also captures the involvement of volunteers (VOL), who may play a variety of roles such as befrienders or mentors.

Table 10 demonstrates that 20 of 22 current and recent resettlement countries in Europe, North America, and Oceania have adopted one or more mechanisms for domestic responsibility sharing with voluntary sector organisations. Indeed, the information available at the time of

⁹ The Working Group also cited the need to expand the geographic distribution of resettlement countries, to facilitate collaboration between current and emerging resettlement countries, and to amend UNHCR managerial and operational practices, among other proposed changes (UNHCR 2003, 8).

research indicates that only the Hungarian and Polish governments have not involved voluntary sector organisations in any aspect of the resettlement process. Table 10 also illustrates how the depth and breadth of mechanisms for domestic responsibility sharing differ across countries. For example, voluntary sector organisations in the US and Canada contribute to multiple aspects of the pre-departure, reception, and orientation and integration phases of resettlement, whereas engagement in resettlement was limited to the identification of Iraqi refugees in 2011 (Scharf 2013, 3-4). In some cases, voluntary sector engagement in resettlement has expanded, thanks in part to the recent introduction of private sponsorship initiatives (either as pilots or as annual programmes) in Germany, Ireland, and New Zealand (International Catholic Migration Commission 2017, 26 and 28-31; Office of the Minister of Immigration 2017, 5). This analysis is not all-encompassing but it indicates the cross-national variation in the structure of government-voluntary sector relations in resettlement.

The existence of mechanisms for domestic responsibility sharing in resettlement is not a new phenomenon. In 1981, Wright (157) observed that there were 15 countries in which resettlement “was accomplished through some combination of the efforts of government and voluntary agencies.” Despite the prevalence and persistence of such arrangements and the burgeoning literature on the involvement of voluntary sector organisation in the provision of public goods and services, few academics have analysed (or theorised) the involvement and impact of voluntary sector organisations in resettlement, as discussed in greater detail in section 1.2.

The observations concerning both the considerable cross-national variations in the absolute and relative number of resettled refugees and the existence and structure of mechanisms for domestic responsibility sharing present a compelling academic puzzle. However, the situation may also impact human security since resettlement is intended to protect persons whose human rights are at risk in their respective countries of asylum as well as groups threatened by deportation and *refoulement*, as previously noted (UNHCR 2011, 37-38). Understanding the potential reasons for why the US and Canada have voluntarily adopted generous resettlement admissions policies appears particularly essential since the UNHCR acknowledges that the number of refugees in need of resettlement still “vastly outnumber” the number of available places (UNHCR 2016, 13).

The gap between resettlement needs and admissions is not new. In 1994, Fredriksson and Mougne (51) noted, “In recent years, there has been a discrepancy of between 40 and 60 percent [sic] between projected numbers and numbers actually resettled.” Though this phenomenon is not novel, the cross-national differences in resettlement contributions remain

salient in light of the unprecedented scale of displacement and the significant number of refugees in need of resettlement. In 2019, the UNHCR estimates that 1,428,011 refugees will need of resettlement in the medium-term (UNHCR 2018, 12). The organisation estimates that Syrians are the largest group in need of resettlement, totalling 601,152 individuals or 42.0 per cent of all refugees in need of resettlement in 2019 and beyond (UNHCR 2018, 59 own calculation). The majority of Syrian refugees in need of resettlement live in Turkey, where approximately 400,000 individuals, or 66.5 per cent, reside (UNHCR 2018, 66 own calculation). Though data on the exact locations of Syrian refugees in Turkey was unavailable at the time of research, the largest concentrations of Syrian refugees are in the bordering provinces of Gaziantep, Hatay, and Sanliurfa, as well as in Istanbul (UNHCR 2018, 1). In contrast to many other refugee populations, 94 per cent of Syrian refugees in Turkey do not live in camps (European Commission 2018, 1). Disaggregated demographic information on Syrian refugees in need of resettlement from Turkey was unavailable at the time of research, but 53.1 per cent of Syrian refugees in Turkey are men, and the largest plurality of male (28.4 per cent) and female (23.7 per cent) refugees were adults aged 18-59 (UNHCR 2018, no pagination). Besides the Syrians in Turkey, approximately 97,000 Syrian refugees in need of resettlement live in Lebanon, 64,883 Syrian refugees reside in Jordan, and approximately 23,000 Syrians live in Iraq at present (UNHCR 2018, 66).

Refugees from the Democratic Republic of Congo comprise the second-largest group in need of resettlement, totalling 163,448 persons or 11.4 per cent of all refugees who will need resettlement in 2019 and beyond (UNHCR 2018, 60 own calculation). The largest number of displaced persons have sought refuge in Tanzania, where 80,808 individuals have sought protection in the Nyarugusu camp located in the province of Kigoma in western Tanzania (UNHCR 2018, 1). Of Congolese refugees living in Tanzania, approximately 50,800 are refugees in need of resettlement, representing 31.0 per cent of the total number of Congolese refugees in need of resettlement (UNHCR 2018, 64 own calculation). Though disaggregated demographic information on Congolese refugees in need of resettlement from Tanzania was unavailable at the time of research, 49.1 per cent of all Congolese asylum seekers and refugees in Nyarugusu are female, 50.9 per cent are male, and a plurality of male (21.3 per cent) and female (20.9 per cent) refugees are adults aged 18-59 (UNHCR 2018, no pagination). In addition to the Congolese refugees in Tanzania, approximately 34,000 Congolese refugees in need of resettlement live in Uganda, while another 28,418 Congolese refugees reside in Burundi and a further 17,157 Congolese refugees live in Rwanda at present (UNHCR 2018, 61-64).

Refugees from South Sudan constitute the third-largest group who will need resettlement, totalling 158,474 individuals or 11.0 per cent of all refugees in need of this durable solution in 2019 and beyond (UNHCR 2018, 59 own calculation). The largest number of South Sudanese refugees in need of resettlement live in Uganda, where approximately 115,000 individuals or 72.5 per cent reside (UNHCR 2018, 64 own calculation). Though data on the exact locations of South Sudanese refugees in need of resettlement from Uganda was unavailable at the time of research, the majority of South Sudanese refugees in Uganda have sought shelter in some of the northern districts of the country. In particular, 287,801 individuals or 27.0 per cent of the South Sudanese population live in the Yumbe district in northern Uganda, 268,720 refugees or 25.2 per cent live in the Arua district, and a further 235,420 South Sudanese or 22.1 per cent live in the Adjumani district (UNHCR 2018, no pagination). Though disaggregated demographic information on South Sudanese refugees in need of resettlement from Uganda was unavailable at the time of research, information indicates that those who have succeeded in fleeing to Uganda are “highly vulnerable” and includes many women who have suffered sexual and gender-based violence (UNHCR 2017, 23). In addition, 65 per cent of the South Sudanese population in Uganda are children (UNHCR 2017, 23). In addition to the South Sudanese refugees in Uganda, approximately 25,000 South Sudanese in need of resettlement live in Ethiopia, while 10,450 South Sudanese refugees reside in Kenya at present (UNHCR 2018, 62-63).

The humanitarian rationale for exploring the potential relationship between resettlement admissions, domestic responsibility sharing with voluntary sector organisations, and voluntary sector advocacy is further reinforced by the fact that the number of refugees in need of resettlement has grown steadily since 2012 (UNHCR 2011, 9; UNHCR 2012, 10; UNHCR 2013, 9; UNHCR 2014, 9; UNHCR 2015, 12; UNHCR 2016, 14; UNHCR 2017, 11; UNHCR 2018, 12). Indeed, the number of refugees in need of resettlement increased by 149.6 per cent from 2012 to 2018 (UNHCR 2011, 9; UNHCR 2017, 11 own calculation). If governments are unable or unwilling to increase resettlement admissions, the number of refugees in need of this durable solution could rise even further.

Obtaining a better understanding of the potential reasons why the US and Canada have voluntarily adopted generous resettlement admissions policies is also salient given that resettlement serves two strategic purposes. First, resettlement encourages governments in countries of first asylum to continue admitting individuals in need of protection and to enhance their procedures and standards of protection, thereby also benefitting refugees for whom resettlement is not an appropriate solution (UNHCR 2011, 38). Second, resettlement enables

other governments to demonstrate solidarity with countries of first asylum through international responsibility sharing (UNHCR 2011, 38).

Finally, the desire to understand the potential reasons why the US and Canada have voluntarily adopted generous resettlement admissions policies through an examination of the potential relationship between resettlement admissions and domestic responsibility sharing with voluntary sector organisations and between resettlement admissions and voluntary sector advocacy is salient given efforts by the UNHCR to promote the involvement of voluntary sector organisations in the provision of this durable solution. Since 1995, the UNHCR has organised the Annual Tripartite Consultations on Resettlement to facilitate dialogue between resettlement countries, voluntary sector organisations, and the UNHCR itself (UNHCR 2018, para. 1 of 4).

However, the UNHCR has recently augmented efforts to promote collaboration with voluntary sector organisations—especially since the author originally submitted this thesis for examination in September 2015. On 3 September, 2015, media organisations around the world broadcast images of three-year-old Syrian Alan Kurdi, his brother Galib, and mother Rehana. The Kurdi family had attempted to travel to the Greek island of Kos in search of asylum, but the young boys and their mother sadly drowned on route—joining the more than 3,700 individuals who perished while attempting to cross the Mediterranean that year (International Organization for Migration 2016, para. 1 of 16). The images raised global awareness of the suffering in Syria and also galvanised public opinion in favour of government action (BBC News 2015, para. 1 and 3 of 12). On 4 September, 2015, the UNHCR released a statement which called the existing European response to the outflow of asylum seekers and refugees “untenable” but praised the “selfless generosity of private citizens and civil society organizations reaching out to welcome and help the new arrivals (UNHCR 2015, para. 3 of 11).” The UNHCR called on the European Commission to mobilise the resources of its member states and to work in partnership with international and civil society organisations to ensure asylum seekers and refugees are “welcomed into a safe and caring environment (UNHCR 2015, para. 6 of 11).”

In addition to these measures, the UNHCR (2015, para. 9 of 11) called on governments around the world to “make some fundamental changes to allow for larger resettlement and humanitarian admission quotas [...].” In particular, the UNHCR has promoted the expansion of humanitarian admissions programmes and the adoption of additional ‘admissions pathways’ for Syrian refugees—that is, legal channels for protection above and beyond existing obligations on asylum (UNHCR 2016, 5). In March 2016, the UNHCR hosted a conference

that enabled participants to share best practices on the admission of Syrian refugees (UNHCR 2016, 1). In his closing remarks, Filippo Grandi, the High Commissioner for Refugees, noted that many attendees had “underlined the need to forge a partnership between private and public initiatives,” and acknowledged that “private sponsorship programmes [...] have proven very successful (UNHCR 2016, 2).”

This conference served as the precursor to a high-level meeting of the United Nations General Assembly on 19 September, 2016, which culminated in the adoption of the New York Declaration on for Refugees and Migrants. Part of the declaration includes provisions for the development of a “comprehensive refugee response framework” founded on a “multi-stakeholder approach” that seeks to involve not only national and local governments but also civil society and faith-based organisations, among many others (UNHCR 2016, 16).

This framework constitutes the foundation of a “global compact” on refugees that members of the international community are formulating in 2018 (UNHCR 2016, 5). In that context, the Government of Canada and the UNHCR, in collaboration with the University of Ottawa, the Radcliffe Foundation, and the Open Society Foundation, launched the Global Refugee Sponsorship Initiative in December 2016. The Initiative seeks to augment the number of resettlement places and the quality of resettlement programmes, as well to strengthen receiving communities and to promote a more positive discourse on refugee protection, through training and information dissemination, “championing” the adoption of private sponsorship programmes outside Canada, and the provision of both capacity building and technical assistance services (Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship Canada 2017, para. 11 and 14 of 14).

Furthermore, the UNHCR organised talks on how “harnessing the goodwill of citizens” can contribute to responsibility sharing in November 2017 (UNHCR 2017, para. 1 of 29). Though participants underlined the “discretionary nature of resettlement,” the thematic discussions also underscored the importance of a “whole of society approach” to resettlement and the potential of ‘civil society’ organisations to assist in the delivery of resettlement programmes and to build public awareness and support for this durable solution (UNHCR 2017, 2 and 5). Though these developments have taken place since the author originally submitted this thesis in September 2015, they reinforce the salience of exploring the potential reasons why the US and Canada have voluntarily adopted generous resettlement admissions policies.

In sum, though resettlement admissions have fluctuated over time, a more detailed analysis demonstrates that there are also considerable cross-national differences in resettlement

contributions. While the UNHCR has sought to help resettlement countries to overcome their “fatigue” and to expand participation in the provision of this durable solution, the figures presented above indicate that the US, Canada, and Australia have consistently been among the largest—if not *the* largest—contributors to resettlement in both absolute and relative terms since 1980. Having outlined the research problem and question and rationalised this approach in both academic and humanitarian terms, section 1.2 offers a critical analysis of the current literature on why some countries adopt generous refugee protection policies.

1.2 Potential Explanations for Differences in Resettlement Admissions

The observations presented in the preceding section on the structure of resettlement programmes provide a clear rationale for examining the potential relationship between resettlement admissions and domestic responsibility sharing with voluntary sector organisations, and between resettlement admissions and voluntary sector advocacy. However, other factors may also help explain why countries like the US and Canada voluntarily resettle more refugees than other states. The academic literature on refugee protection is vast, and scholars have proposed a broad range of reasons why governments choose to grant protection. In a meta-analysis, Meyers (2004, 6-7) describes several general theoretical approaches to the study of immigration control policies, including “cultural-based” theories and international relations.¹⁰ From a cultural perspective, the ‘partialist’ or ‘impartialist’ perspectives on belonging may influence immigration control policies. Gibney (2004, 19 and 23) explains that for partialists, including communitarian, conservative, and constitutional realist theorists, countries are “distinct cultural communities possessing a right to self-determination which justifies priority for the interests of citizens over those of refugees in entrance decisions.” This cultural distinctiveness motivates governments to develop admissions policies that place the interests of citizens above those of refugees (Gibney 2004, 19 and 23). This perspective implies that admitting large numbers of refugees could endanger the cultural interests of citizens and their right to self-determination as a community, thus providing a rationale for limiting admissions.

Culture can also circumscribe those that belong to the community and those that do not. The influential communitarian theorist Michael Walzer (1983, 50) elaborates on the fundamental characteristics that shape the boundaries of belonging, arguing that, “[...]

¹⁰ In a separate article, Meyers (2000, 1246) defines immigration control as policies concerning the “admission and selection of permanent immigrants, temporary migrant workers and refugees, as well as attempts to restrict illegal immigration.”

communities must have boundaries; and however these are determined with regard to territory and resources, they depend with regard to population on a sense of relatedness and mutuality.” This is not to say that bounded communities have no obligations towards non-members. Indeed, Walzer (1983, 48-49) admits that “Toward some refugees, we may very well have obligations of the same sort that we have toward fellow nationals.”

On the surface, the communitarian philosophy appears generous in defining the scope of obligations towards individuals from other communities. For example, Walzer (1983, 48-49) argues that a community that perpetuates conflict in another community must protect those that flee as a result of the hostilities. Walzer (1983, 48-49) also acknowledges that communities may choose to grant protection for less tangible reasons and suggests:

“[...] We can also be bound to help men and women persecuted or oppressed by someone else—if they are persecuted or oppressed because they are like us. Ideological as well as ethnic affinity can generate bonds across political lines, especially, for example, when we claim to embody certain principles in our communal life and encourage men and women elsewhere to defend those principles.”

Nevertheless, communitarians like Walzer envision limits on the admission of refugees. Walzer (1983, 49-50) argues that the principle of mutual aid only applies when the number of refugees is small, and if the flow of refugees increases, then countries should select those for whom the state feels ideological or ethnic “affinity.”

In the context of resettlement to the US and Canada—the two case studies examined in this thesis—the partialist approach may explain how these governments have decided which refugees to resettle. In the US case, its involvement in conflicts in Southeast Asia, Kosovo, and Iraq (among others) may potentially explain why it resettled refugees from these areas. The decision to resettle refugees from these regions and countries may have been motivated in part by a sense of duty or a desire to assist those attempting to reject communism or authoritarianism. However, the data on resettlement admissions indicates that resettlement admissions are not guided exclusively by these considerations, as the US has also resettled refugees from countries in which there has been no recent military engagement and from states in which the sense of “ethnic affinity” is arguably less clear than Walzer implies (1983, 49-50) (e.g. Refugee Processing Center 2018, no pagination).

Canada has been less interventionist than its southern neighbour and, excluding large-scale conflicts such as World War I and World War II, military engagement has traditionally been more limited due to public reticence and lower defence spending. This is not to say that the Canadian government has never resettled refugees fleeing conflicts in which it participated, but interviews with senior government officials and members of the Private Sponsorship of

Refugees (PSR) programme indicate that part of the perceived motivation for engaging in resettlement is to demonstrate a commitment to the norms embedded in the 1951 *Convention relating to the Status of Refugees* and its 1967 *Protocol*—especially the norm of responsibility sharing. Chapter four, section 4.5 discusses this theme in greater detail. Furthermore, the data on resettlement admissions shows that Canada resettles refugees from a broad range of countries—not just those from states in which it has engaged in military conflict or peacekeeping operations, or with which it feels a sense of “ethnic affinity” (Walzer 1983, 49-50) (Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship Canada 2016, no pagination; Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship Canada 2018, no pagination).

Furthermore, the partialist approach does not necessarily explain why both the US and Canada are consistently among the largest—if not *the* largest—contributors to resettlement in absolute and relative terms. Thus, though the partialist approach may tell us more about how governments decide which refugees to resettle, in this case, it appears to offer an incomplete understanding of why the US and Canada have voluntarily adopted generous resettlement admissions policies (Carens 1992, 33; Singer and Singer 1988, 120).

In contrast, Gibney (2004, 20 and 23) explains that for impartialists, including utilitarians and liberals, governments are “cosmopolitan moral agents [...] the only legitimate admissions policy is one that takes into equal account the interests (or rights) of refugees and citizens.” The utilitarian theorists Singer and Singer (1988, 116-17) question whether immigration policies that distinguish between residents and non-residents are compatible with the belief in human equality. Instead, Singer and Singer (1988, 121-22) argue that immigration and refugee policies “should be based on the interests of all those affected [...]. Where the interests of different parties conflict, we should attempt to give equal consideration to all interests, which would mean that more pressing or more fundamental interests take precedence [...].” Though Singer and Singer (1988, 127) do not prescribe the number of refugees that governments should resettle, they contend that governments should continue admitting refugees until “the adverse consequences that are now only speculative possibilities would become probabilities or virtual certainties.” Singer and Singer (1988, 128) conclude by recommending that states “gradually increase their refugee intakes,” while monitoring the consequences of these increases, thereby enabling them to balance moral, political, and community interests.

Conversely, the renown liberal theorist Joseph Carens (1987, 260 and 268) argues that governments should welcome immigrants based on their right to equal treatment in the public sphere, and he only supports those (minimal) restrictions that are necessary to maintain public

order. Though Carens (1987, 270) acknowledges that there are differences between “aliens and citizens,” he argues that excluding individuals who have expressed a desire to join the community is incompatible with the “idea of equal moral worth.” Carens (1987, 270) succinctly concludes that “If people want to sign the social contract, they should be permitted to do so.” In other words, though impartialist scholars have emphasised the importance of equal treatment, they appear divided in their attitudes towards refugee protection; whereas Singer and Singer (1988) envision limits on resettlement admissions at the margins, Carens (1987) suggests such constraints are anathema to the principle of equality.

In the US, the President establishes an annual ceiling on resettlement admissions following recommendations from the departments of State, Homeland Security, and Health and Human Services and following consultations with Congress (US Department of State, US Department of Homeland Security, and US Department of Health and Human Services 2014, 6). The ceilings are designed as firm limits rather than as “goals” to be achieved (Martin 2005, 16). Furthermore, though the US does not use selection criteria in its Resettlement Admissions Program, the programme does emphasise the importance of learning English and achieving “economic self-sufficiency” as soon as possible (UNHCR 2017, 9-10). The UNHCR and employees from the Department of Homeland Security also convey the importance of language skills and obtaining employment to resettlement applicants at the referral and interview stages, so that refugees clearly understand their responsibilities if they are resettled in the US (Limón 2013). Though the US was the largest contributor to resettlement in absolute terms and was also among the largest contributors to resettlement in relative terms between 1980 and 2016, these contributions remain small relative to its total population. Thus, while the US appears less selective than other contributors to this durable solution, its firm limits on resettlement admissions could be interpreted as inconsistent with the utilitarian perspective outlined by Singer and Singer (1988) and the open borders vision articulated by Carens (1987).

In Canada, the Minister of Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship adopts annual targets for each of the four resettlement programmes, following departmental consultations and engagement with stakeholders and members of the public (UNHCR 2018, 4). These targets establish a lower and upper bound for resettlement admissions through these programmes and, as such, they are in principle more flexible than the quotas used in most other resettlement countries. Though the figures presented in section 1.1 demonstrate that Canada was among the largest contributors to resettlement in both absolute and relative terms between 1980 and 2016, the fact that the government adopts these targets indicates that there are still limits on resettlement admissions. Furthermore, Canada is one of only seven governments that use

selection criteria as part of the resettlement application process.¹¹ Though officials can waive these criteria for the most vulnerable refugees, their existence suggests that officials are concerned about resettling refugees who can adapt to the country, rather than resettling any refugee willing to “sign the social contract (Carens 1987, 270).”

Impartialist theorists offer compelling normative arguments for why governments *should* admit more refugees. However, though the governments of the US and Canada have made important voluntary contributions to resettlement, both countries use ceilings and targets to limit admissions even though resettlement needs continue to exceed the available number of resettlement places. Furthermore, though both governments appear to fundamentally respect protection considerations when considering applications for resettlement (UNHCR 2018, 3-4; UNHCR 2017, 3), they also tend to seek out refugees who possess particular qualities, such as language skills and employment experience. One could interpret these strategies as inconsistent with impartialist arguments on equality and, therefore, this approach also offers an incomplete perspective on why the US and Canada have voluntarily adopted generous resettlement admissions policies.

In addition to the partialist and impartialist schools of thought, other academics have emphasised the relationship between refugee protection and foreign policies, which can “facilitate or to restrain” refugee admissions (Teitelbaum 1984, 433 and 439-40). The refugee crisis in Southeast Asia is a useful example, as numerous countries resettled large numbers of refugees from this region and their efforts are exceptionally well-documented. In the US, there is ample evidence that foreign policies influenced its approach to resettlement from Southeast Asia. Koehn (1989, 79) captures the influence of foreign policy in his explanation that “A sense of obligation to those affected by U.S. actions in Indochina certainly accounts for the exceptionally high number of admission slots this country has consistently awarded to refugees from that region.” Though this observation appears consistent with the partialist framework, the literature also indicates that other factors including humanitarianism, advocacy efforts, and strategic considerations, influenced resettlement admissions. As the administration became aware of the delicate political situation in countries of first asylum such as Malaysia and Singapore, the US agreed to resettle 30,000 ‘boat people’ between June 1978 and April 1979—even though the number of refugees living on land was considerably higher (Government Accounting Office 1979, ii and v). Furthermore, the government agreed to resettle 33,000

¹¹ Countries that use selection criteria include Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, and Romania (UNHCR 2016, 4; UNHCR 2016, 4; UNHCR 2016, 3; UNHCR 2016, 4; UNHCR 2016, 2-3; UNHCR 2018, 3-4; UNHCR 2018, 4-5).

Cambodian refugees living in inadequate conditions in Thailand following pressure from American officials in the region and the media (Robinson 1998, 133 and 156 footnote 18). Concurrently, officials were keen to reframe the crisis as a global problem and so the American government may have assumed a leadership role in resettlement in order to encourage other countries to adopt generous admissions policies as part of the Comprehensive Plan of Action (Betts 2006, 42; Government Accounting Office 1979, iii-iv and 24). In total, the US resettled 1,287,399 Southeast Asian refugees between 1975 and 1997 (Robinson 1998, appendix 2). This contribution represented 65.9 per cent of all refugees resettled from Southeast Asia during this period (own calculation).

In the Canadian case, there is evidence that foreign policy considerations may have shaped its approach to resettlement at first, but it appears that humanitarian concerns became more influential from 1977 onwards. Though the government initially hesitated to resettle refugees due to negative public attitudes towards the Vietnam War, it agreed to resettle up to 3,000 Cambodian and Vietnamese refugees between 1975 and 1977 in order to demonstrate “token solidarity” with the US and to encourage other countries to contribute to this durable solution (Adelman 1982, 32-34 and 170 footnote 1). However, Adelman (1982, 34) explains that the government agreed to resettle 50 families per month in 1977 as it “began to realize [sic] that the continuing flow of refugees from Vietnam was not a direct result of the conclusion of the Vietnam War.” Similarly, the government volunteered to resettle approximately 600 of the roughly 2,500 refugees rescued from the *Hai Hong* in 1978 (Adelman 1982, 35).¹² That same year, the government enacted a new Immigration Act that pledged to “uphold Canada’s humanitarian tradition with respect to the displaced and persecuted” and provided the legislative framework for the PSR programme (Adelman 1982, 36). The programme proved to be extremely popular; in June 1979, the government announced its intent to resettle 4,000 refugees through this new programme (Adelman 1982, 37).¹³ One month later, the government increased the PSR target to 21,000 refugees in response to intense public interest and agreed to match every application received, thereby raising the total resettlement target for 1979-1980 to 50,000 refugees (Adelman 1982, 38).¹⁴ In total, Canada resettled 202,178 refugees from

¹² Adelman (1982, 35) argues Canada resettled 608 of the 2,500 refugees aboard the *Hai Hong*, while Robinson (1998, 138) states Canada resettled 604 of the 2,450 refugees aboard.

¹³ In addition, the government pledged to resettle 8,000 refugees from Southeast Asia through the Government Assisted Refugees programme (Adelman 1982, 37).

¹⁴ The UNHCR awarded the people of Canada a Nansen medal in 1986 in recognition of their contribution to resettlement (Beiser 1999, 41-42).

Southeast Asia between 1975 and 1997, representing 10.3 per cent of all refugees resettled from Southeast Asia during this period (Robinson 1998, appendix 2 own calculation).

Though the US and Canada may have adopted generous resettlement admissions policies for refugees from Southeast Asia due to the influence of foreign policies, one should not overstate this relationship. Gibney (2004, 133) argues that “in the early 1980s, the Reagan administration ignored the supposed foreign policy benefits of anti-communist refugees and began actively interdicting Cubans on their way to the US. Moreover, the US accepted more refugees during the 1990s than in any other decade since the 1940s, despite the end of the Cold War. If ideological and strategic considerations have always been important in refugee and asylum policy, other factors have also played a role.” Indeed, the academic scholarship indicates that humanitarian considerations also shaped resettlement admissions from Southeast Asia.

In addition to the potential explanations outlined above, some scholars have drawn on the theory of public goods to attempt to understand why some countries are more (or less) generous in granting protection to asylum seekers and refugees (e.g. Betts 2003; Hatton 2012; Suhrke 1998; Thielemann 2003; Thielemann and Dewan 2006; Thielemann and El-Enany 2010; see also Roper and Barria 2010). Private goods have benefits that are fully excludable and rival, meaning that whoever provides the good can prevent others from benefiting from it, and once one actor has enjoyed the good, no one else can (Cornes and Sandler 1996, 8-9 and 30). Conversely, public goods are non-excludable and non-rival, meaning that whoever provides the good cannot prevent others from benefiting from it, and one actor can appreciate the good without diminishing the ability of others to take pleasure in it as well (Cornes and Sandler 1996, 8-9). However, private markets are discouraged from providing a Pareto efficient level of a public good due to the incentives for free riding,¹⁵ and numerous economists have argued that this behaviour creates a case for government intervention in the provision of the good or service (e.g. Chamberlain 1974; Friedman 1962, chapter 12; Hochman and Rodgers 1969; Olson 1965, part I; Warr 1982).

However, Cornes and Sandler (1996, 6 and 241) argue that public goods exist along a “spectrum” between purely public and purely private and these impure public goods can be

¹⁵ Perloff (2011, 322) explains that a Pareto improvement occurs when a change in the allocation of goods and services “makes one person better off without harming anyone else [...].” The distribution of goods and services is Pareto efficient when “any possible reallocation would harm at least one person (Perloff 2011, 588).” Thus, for example, a change that allows a country to resettle more refugees for the same amount of money (or less) would be a Pareto improvement. Cornes and Sandler (1996, 22) note that the Pareto criterion is a normative one, not a positivist one.

more (or less) rival and excludable than others. Furthermore, Cornes and Sandler (1996, 9) explain that the provision of public goods sometimes generates joint products, which are “multiple outputs, some of which can be private, others purely public, and still others impurely public.” Therefore, though governments can also fail to provide a Pareto efficient level of a public good (Gruber 2011, 197-98; Perloff 2011, 590-91),¹⁶ the potential existence of excludable benefits may induce governments to overcome the incentives for free riding.

Suhrke (1998) was the first to conceptualise refugee protection as a public good, and she appears to be the only author to focus on resettlement. Drawing on the theories of public goods and collective action, Suhrke (1998, 396-415) analyses why collective action is more difficult to achieve in refugee protection than in other public goods such as defence. Suhrke (1998) proposes several reasons why governments may participate in international responsibility sharing schemes. She suggests that governments may do so because they believe that international law creates a collective “moral duty” and “obligation” to assist refugees and that assisting persons in need of protection reduces global inequality and minimises the incentives for economically disadvantaged countries to restrict access to asylum (Suhrke 1998, 398). In many ways, her perspective aligns with the norms embedded in the 1951 *Convention relating to the Status of Refugees* and efforts by the UNHCR to “revitalize [sic] the international protection regime” in 2000 (UNHCR 2003, 1-2). However, though Suhrke analyses three examples of international cooperation on resettlement, she does not offer a detailed discussion of whether and how to conceptualise resettlement as a public good or how such an approach could impact resettlement admissions.

Thielemann has explored the issue of asylum as a public good in several papers, focusing mainly on the dynamic of free-riding and international responsibility sharing (e.g. Thielemann 2003; Thielemann 2018; Thielemann and Dewan 2006; Thielemann and El-Enany 2010). For example, Thielemann (2003, 253-73) analyses why some European states accept responsibility for more asylum seekers and refugees than others. Through an analysis of the Humanitarian Evacuation Programme for Kosovar refugees, Thielemann (2003, 265-59) finds a positive relationship between the number of relocated refugees and a commitment to norms such as solidarity and the protection of human rights. Thielemann (2003, 270) concludes that countries may accept responsibility for asylum seekers and refugees based on a cost-benefit

¹⁶ Governments can also fail to provide public goods in alliance scenarios. However, since the author focuses on domestic responsibility sharing rather than international responsibility sharing, a discussion of collective action failures is beyond the scope of this thesis. For a discussion of why small and large groups and organisations underprovide public goods and an overview of the theory of collective action, see Olson (1965, 9-16 and 22-36).

calculation and for normative reasons, but that “the relation between the two is often subtle.” This perspective suggests that governments may have complex, multifaceted motivations for granting protection.

Betts (2003, 286) also deepens our understanding by conceptualising the decision to grant protection to asylum seekers as an impure public good that could generate joint products for receiving countries. Betts (2003, 276, 286-87, and 292) analyses the excludable benefits of protection for asylum seekers and theorises that some European governments offer protection to more asylum seekers because they derive altruistic benefits from “fulfilling either ethical or legal norm” and because they obtain ‘prestige’ benefits that they can leverage in other policy areas due to issue linkages. Conversely, Betts (2003, 292) speculates that other governments offer protection to fewer asylum seekers because they derive greater private security benefits from limiting access to protection and minimising flows. Though Betts (2003, 286-88) uses statistical methods to support his arguments about the nature of refugee protection as a public good and the perceived private security benefits, his analysis of excludable prestige and altruistic benefits is limited to a discussion of the economic and international relations literature, as well as the literature on humanitarian norms.

Hatton (2012, 1-30) also adds value to our conceptual understanding of refugee protection as a public good through his analysis of asylum policy in the European Union. Hatton (2012, 2-7 and 25) conceptualises asylum as a local public good and develops a mathematical model of the demand for asylum in a given country based on the openness of its asylum policy and the proportion of asylum seekers who prefer that particular country. Hatton (2012, 4) demonstrates that “asylum policies are more generous for both countries when the public good [sic] effects are taken into account through cooperative policy setting.” This perspective suggests that countries may be motivated to grant protection based on some perceived benefit (or benefits) and that examining these perceived benefits may help us understand why some countries adopt generous refugee protection policies.

These authors have made influential contributions to the conceptualisation of refugee protection as a public good and the relationship between refugee protection and responsibility sharing. Collectively, they demonstrate that refugee protection can generate a broad range of public and private benefits, which suggests that refugee protection could be an impure public good. Furthermore, these authors illustrate how responsibility sharing can influence the provision of refugee protection in certain circumstances.

Though the contributions from Thielemann, Betts, and Hatton have served to elaborate the concept of refugee protection as a public good, these scholars focus exclusively on asylum.

Given that governments have a “de facto duty” to admit asylum seekers and to consider their applications for protection but no obligation to resettle refugees (Hathaway 2005, 300-301; UNHCR 2011, 36), the rationale for being more (or less) generous in granting protection may be fundamentally different from the rationale for being more (or less) generous in offering resettlement.

Finally, this aspect of the literature is limited insofar as the overwhelming majority of scholars focus on international responsibility sharing in refugee protection and ignore domestic structures for responsibility sharing in this area (e.g. Betts 2003; Cook 2004-2005; Fonteyne 1978-1980; Hathaway and Neve 1997; Noll 2003; Schuck 1997; Suhrke 1998; Thielemann 2003; Thielemann and Dewan 2006). Though van Selm (2003, 157-74) analyses public-private partnerships in resettlement in the US and select European countries, her discussion is mainly descriptive, and her analysis concentrates on the relationship between welfare regimes and the strength of the partnerships, rather than on the relationship between resettlement admissions and domestic responsibility sharing.

In addition to qualitative work on asylum and refugee protection policies, a small number of academics use quantitative methods in an attempt to better understand why some countries receive more asylum applications than others and why some states adopt more (or less) generous refugee protection policies than others. Though many scholars include the rate of asylum seekers granted refugee protection as an independent variable (e.g. Böcker and Havinga 1998; Hatton 2005; Hatton 2009; Havinga and Böcker 1999; Keogh 2013; Neumayer 2005; Thielemann and Dewan 2006), few examine the rate of asylum seekers granted refugee protection as a dependent variable—the approach most relevant to this thesis (Holzer et al. 2000; Neumayer 2005; Sicakkan 2008; Toshkov 2014; Toshkov and De Haan 2013; Vink and Meijerink 2003). Furthermore, there is no consensus among these scholars on whether the rate of asylum seekers granted refugee protection is genuinely correlated to factors such as the number of asylum applications received, Gross Domestic Product, and unemployment, among other factors (c.f. Neumayer 2005; Toshkov 2014; Toshkov and De Haan 2013). However, there is evidence that these quantitative indicators may be more useful in explaining differences *between* countries as opposed to variations *within* states (Toshkov 2014, 207-8). Furthermore, scholars also suggest that fixed effects which are specific to the receiving country may conflate the rate of asylum seekers granted refugee protection (Neumayer 2005, 62-63; Toshkov 2014, 205). Given the limited size of this scholarship, one cannot draw any definitive conclusions at this stage. However, the potential influence of fixed effects suggests that examining the role of domestic factors could potentially contribute to a better understanding of why some countries

voluntarily adopt generous refugee protection policies as the US and Canada have in resettlement.

In light of the findings presented above and the focus on domestic responsibility sharing in this thesis, one cannot help but discuss an interesting paper from Holzer et al. (2000), who analyse the relationship between asylum recognition rates and the decentralisation of power, using Switzerland as a case study. More precisely, Holzer et al. (2000, 261) examine whether cantons that adopt a centralised approach to the administration of accommodation for asylum seekers are more (or less) likely to be more generous in granting protection than cantons that have opted to delegate this responsibility to ‘nonprofit’ organisations. Based on an analysis of 181,100 asylum applications lodged in Switzerland between 1988 and 1996, the authors find a negative relationship between recognition rates and government centralisation that is statistically significant at the 0.05 level, *ceteris paribus*. More precisely, a centralised accommodation system is estimated to decrease the odds of having one’s asylum application recognised by a magnitude of 0.899 (Holzer et al. 2000, 267). These results hold when controlling for key canton characteristics, including language, size, the share of the foreign-born population, and attitudes towards foreigners (Holzer et al. 2000, 267).

Holzer et al. (2000) theorise that asylum recognition rates increase when cantons delegate the administration of asylum accommodation to non-profit organisations, but provide no concrete rationale for this conjecture, citing only a research seminar which indicated that “Involving the communes or nonprofit organizations has proven beneficial for all persons involved in the asylum domain, not the least for the asylum seekers themselves (Holzer et al. 2000, 261).” They imply that asylum seekers in cantons with decentralised administration systems are less anonymous (Holzer et al. 2000, 268) but do not test this in their model. This supposition suggests that further research into the mechanisms through which domestic responsibility sharing can impact admissions decisions could be advantageous.

Finally, Sicakkan (2008) examines the potential relationship between the rate of asylum seekers granted protection and cooperation between governments and ‘non-governmental organisations’ in 17 European Union Member States. Sicakkan (2008, 211) argues that domestic “sovereignty-sharing” arrangements may have a powerful impact on recognition rates and that “international, transnational and domestic non-state as well as intergovernmental actors have gained considerable decision power (Sicakkan 2008, 206).” Sicakkan (2008, 219) explains that governments deliberately include ‘non-governmental organisations’ on asylum appeal boards because they are “supposed to be more competent and less impartial” in their approach to decision-making. His multivariate regression analysis demonstrates that

cooperation between governments and ‘non-governmental organisations’ increases the rate of asylum seekers granted Convention refugee protection by a magnitude of 0.017, *ceteris paribus* (Sicakkan 2008, 217). However, this relationship was not statistically significant. Conversely, cooperation increases the rate of asylum seekers granted protection rates by a magnitude of 0.349 when considering both Convention and subsidiary forms of protection, *ceteris paribus* (Sicakkan 2008, 217). This relationship was significant at the 0.001 level, and the results were robust when controlling for cases in which ‘non-governmental organisations’ are not involved in the asylum appeal process (Sicakkan 2008, 220). On that basis, Sicakkan (2008, 229) concludes that “When correct institutional settings are established to facilitate effective sovereignty-sharing and cooperation between states and different refugee-protecting agencies, the result is higher rates of asylum recognition.” Though Sicakkan’s analysis concerns the provision of asylum, his findings suggest that domestic responsibility sharing with voluntary sector organisations may have a positive impact on protection, underscoring the value of exploring the potential relationship between resettlement admissions and domestic responsibility sharing in the US and Canada.

In sum, academics have proposed a broad range of explanations for why some countries are generous in granting refugee protection, though the body of both qualitative and quantitative literature remains small at present. However, the extant literature is limited by its overwhelmingly state-centric focus. The focus on the role of governments in determining the size and composition of refugee admissions is unsurprising given that states are the backbone of the international refugee regime as they retain authority and discretion over admissions decisions, including resettlement. However, this emphasis ignores the longstanding involvement of voluntary sector organisations in this area. Indeed, the League of Nations only became involved in resettlement following a direct appeal from voluntary sector organisations led by the International Committee of the Red Cross (Holborn 1939, 124). In countries such as the US and Canada, voluntary sector involvement in resettlement predates the establishment of formal resettlement programmes (Haines 2010; Robinson 1998).

Furthermore, the focus on states neglects the burgeoning scholarship on government-voluntary sector relationships and the roles that these organisations often play in the administration and implementation of resettlement programmes. In his influential taxonomy on government-voluntary sector relations, Young (1999; 2000) suggests that government-voluntary sector relations can be ‘complementary,’ ‘supplementary,’ and (or) ‘adversarial’ in nature (Young 1999; Young 2000; see also Coston 1998; Kramer 1998; and Najam 2000). In the complementary model, governments and voluntary sector organisations create partnerships

in which the government finances the voluntary sector provision of public goods and services (Young 1999, 33; Young 2000, 150). In the process, governments and voluntary sector organisations form a ‘symbiotic’ and relationship which produces advantages for both partners (Grønbjerg 1987, 66; see also Young 2000, 150). In the supplementary model, voluntary sector organisations fill gaps in the demand for provision of public goods and services that are “unsatisfied by government (Young 1999, 33; Young 2000, 150).” In addition to this taxonomy, economists, political scientists, and sociologists have all sought to advance our understanding of government-voluntary sector relations, the reasons for their emergence and persistence, and some of the potential risks of collaboration (e.g. Hansmann 1987; Moulton and Anheier 2001; Salamon 1987; Salamon and Anheier 1998; Steinberg and Gray 1993; Weisbrod 1975 [1986]).

Despite the growing body of literature on government-voluntary sector relations, scholars of refugee protection have largely ignored the active involvement of voluntary sector organisations in the provision of public goods and services in the US and Canada, including those utilised by resettled refugees in various phases of their resettlement. Where academics acknowledge the role of voluntary sector organisations in this process, it is more as an aside than a central feature of the analysis. Indeed, most of the extant literature consists of descriptive accounts of the structure of government-voluntary sector relations in resettlement, or the analysing the impact of their involvement in the integration of resettled refugees. This scholarship provides useful background information, and in light of the nature of resettlement as a durable solution, there is no doubt that finding ways to facilitate the integration of resettled refugees is of crucial importance.

Nevertheless, in light of the current scale of human displacement, the persistent gap between resettlement needs and available places, and the observations concerning the cross-national differences in resettlement contributions, there is a clear rationale for conducting a deliberate and detailed exploration of the nature of government-voluntary sector relations in the US and Canada and the potential relationship between resettlement admissions and domestic responsibility sharing with voluntary sector organisations in these countries.

Finally, the current academic literature on refugee protection has devoted inadequate attention to advocacy, and it appears that no scholar has attempted to explore the potential relationship between resettlement admissions and voluntary sector advocacy. This *lacuna* is problematic for two reasons: first, the inattention to advocacy ignores the reality of public policymaking in advanced liberal democracies such as the US and Canada. Though individuals and groups do not always have sufficient or equitable resources to support their advocacy

efforts and may not always succeed in their attempts to influence policies and legislation, many voluntary sector organisations in both the US and Canada regularly express their views on an array of resettlement issues, including admissions levels. Though not all voluntary sector organisations have the desire or resources necessary to engage in advocacy, many of these organisations are not only service providers—they may also be active members of civil society who employ a range of strategies in an effort to have their voices and views heard by policymakers in the US and Canada.

Indeed, Young (1999; 2000) acknowledges that relations between governments and voluntary sector organisations are not necessarily limited to service provision alone. Young (2000, 151) argues that government-voluntary sector relations can also take on an “adversarial” character when voluntary sector organisations press governments to enact policy changes. Young does not conceptualise this as a static or unidirectional process, but instead, as a dynamic process in which governments may regulate the behaviour of advocacy organisations but also potentially collaborate with them in pursuit of a common goal. Similarly, Seibel (1990, 46) has also encouraged scholars to move beyond the conceptualisation of voluntary sector organisations as service providers and to acknowledge that these groups can also serve as “important factors of social and political coordination.”

The broader structure of interest representation in the US and Canada and the particular characteristics of the resettlement policymaking process in these countries also condition the impact of advocacy efforts. However, the literature on voluntary sector advocacy on resettlement to the US and Canada was underdeveloped at the time of research and, as with the literature on domestic responsibility sharing, few scholars have deliberately sought to analyse the advocacy efforts of voluntary sector organisations in resettlement. Furthermore, though many ethnic communities have formed voluntary sector organisations and could potentially engage in advocacy on resettlement issues, few scholars have explored this avenue—potentially due in part to fundamental challenges in identifying and classifying what constitutes an ‘ethnic community-based organisation’ (e.g. Gleeson and Bloemraad 2012). Nevertheless, the potential of voluntary sector organisations to shape resettlement admissions policies through advocacy creates a clear rationale for exploring this potential relationship in the context of the US and Canada.

Overall, Martin (2005, 2) makes the point that “Refugee admissions cannot be based solely on any single-factored analysis.” However, given the limitations of the existing literature outlined above and the longstanding neglect of the potential influence of domestic factors, this thesis suggests that internal factors such as the extensive mechanisms for responsibility sharing

found in the US and Canada could offer *complementary* insights into the question of why these countries have voluntarily adopted generous resettlement admissions policies. On that basis, section 1.5 describes the research design employed in this thesis and addresses key issues related to epistemology, ontology, methods, and ethics.

1.3 Research Design

To better understand the potential reasons why the US and Canada have voluntarily adopted generous resettlement admissions policies, the author conducted two qualitative case studies of resettlement admissions. This section discusses how the research was designed, including the ontological, epistemological, and methodological foundations of the study. In addition, the author presents the methods used and sets out the rationale for selecting the US and Canada as case studies. The section concludes with a discussion of the procedures used to ensure reliability and validity.

1.3.1 Ontological and Epistemological Framework

From an ontological perspective, the research presented in this thesis is informed by relativism, which is more of a mixture of “loosely interconnected doctrines” than a cohesive ontological stance (Baghramian 2010, 31-36). The contemporary approach to relativism is grounded in the ideas of Kant, Hegel, and Nietzsche (Baghramian 2010, 39). Kant introduced the idea that individuals cannot see the ‘true’ nature of the world as space and time mediate their experiences, and this perspective contributed to the relativist argument that individuals should not privilege “one conception of truth, rationality, or knowledge” as there may be multiple explanations for a given belief or phenomenon (Baghramian 2010, 40-42). Furthermore, the Hegelian emphasis on historicism influenced the relativist argument that attitudes and other perspectives must be examined in their proper historical context (Baghramian 2010, 43-44). However, Nietzsche has exerted perhaps the greatest influence on contemporary relativism through his rejection of absolute truth, stating: “The world with which we are concerned is false, that is it is not a fact but a fable and approximation on the basis of a meagre sum of observations; it is ‘in flux’ a something in a state of becoming, as a falsehood always changing but never getting near the truth: for—there is no ‘truth’ (Nietzsche 1968, subsection 616).” This contention has influenced postmodern relativists like Foucault, who claims that every society has its own “truth and moral imperatives” which change according to the historical and political context (Baghramian 2010, 46).

The author adopts a subjectivist epistemological stance since interviewees in the US and Canada may have diverse perspectives on the perceived motivations for resettlement and its benefits, the perceived nature of government-voluntary sector relations, the potential

relationship between resettlement admissions and domestic responsibility sharing, and the potential relationship between resettlement admissions and voluntary sector advocacy. This approach holds that individual experiences, interpretations, perceptions, ethical principles, and material and social conditions influence their worldview (Demirdirek 2010, 904; Ratner 2008, 839-41). Though similar historical and social constructs can lead to subjectivities that are remarkably alike, subjectivism argues that ‘reality’ is unknowable and that any ‘truths’ that may emerge are “local truths” shaped by the subject in question (Demirdirek 2010, 904; Ratner 2008, 841).

These ontological and epistemological perspectives have influenced this thesis in several ways: first, as noted in section 1.4, the author acknowledges that there may be multiple potential explanations for why the US and Canada have voluntarily adopted generous resettlement admissions policies. Nevertheless, the author endeavours to complement extant explanations by conducting an inductive exploration of the potential relationship between resettlement admissions and domestic responsibility sharing with voluntary sector organisations, and between resettlement admissions and voluntary sector advocacy. Second, given that relativism and subjectivism both accord great importance to historical context, the author has endeavoured to provide rich background information on the history of resettlement, government-voluntary sector relations, and advocacy in the US and Canada to help contextualise the analysis. This is complemented by a discussion of the political context surrounding the provision of this durable solution in these two countries. Furthermore, since the individual experiences and subjective perceptions of each interviewee may have influenced their responses, biographical information on each respondent is provided in the appendix to add some perspective to their comments. Finally, though the author conducts a comparative analysis of the findings in chapter six, the author does not claim that the findings in one case study can inherently be generalised to other cases.

The ontological and epistemological foundations of this thesis have also informed the decision to adopt an idiosyncratic approach to the use of terminology on what some refer to as the ‘voluntary sector.’ This decision is not unusual in the context of the academic literature in this area, as there is no scholarly consensus on how to refer to organisations that are neither part of the government nor for-profit, and the use of terms varies according to discipline and national context (Hall and Banting 2000, 4-5). Indeed, Steinberg and Gray (1993, 298) challenge the presumption that universal taxonomies should exist in this sector, and argue that

“There is no self-evident reason that the same definition should be applied in different countries with different traditions.”¹⁷

In the case of the US and Canada, the analysis presented in chapters two through five indicates that these countries use different terms despite their similar histories of immigration, the development and evolution of government-voluntary sector partnerships in resettlement, and the structure of interest representation. In the academic scholarship on the US and Canada, scholars often use the terms ‘voluntary sector’ and ‘voluntary sector organisations.’ However, resettlement organisations in the US refer to themselves as ‘voluntary agencies’ or, more colloquially, as ‘volags.’ In Canada, the federal government and the organisations that implement resettlement use more functional and officious titles such as ‘Service Provider Organizations,’ ‘Sponsorship Agreement Holders,’ and ‘Private Sponsors,’ though they commonly abbreviate the former two titles as ‘SPOs’ and ‘SAHs.’ In keeping with the relativist and subjectivist perspectives embedded in this thesis, the author strives to use these distinctive terms when discussing the particular groups involved in resettlement to the US and Canada. However, the author also incorporates the terms ‘voluntary sector’ and ‘voluntary sector organisations’ when discussing the literature and when referring to these organisations in a more general, less sector- or country-specific manner.

Finally, the epistemological and ontological frameworks that form the foundations of this thesis have informed the choice to adopt an inductive approach to the analysis. Inductive research begins with observations about a given phenomenon and uses these observations to develop explanations for the phenomenon in question (Chambliss and Schutt 23-24). These explanations can potentially generate novel “insights” and hypotheses to test through subsequent deductive research (Chambliss and Schutt, 23-24).

In the case of the present study, the author seeks to generate insights about the potential relationship between resettlement admissions and domestic responsibility sharing with voluntary sector organisations and between resettlement admissions and voluntary sector advocacy through an interpretivist approach. Given the epistemological and ontological frames used in this thesis, the goal of employing an interpretivist approach is to gain a meaningful understanding of the views articulated by the interviewees by trying to “make sense” of their views in relation to the broader context surrounding government-voluntary sector relations, advocacy, and resettlement in the US and Canada—in other words, to obtain a meaningful understanding of their views in their particular context.

¹⁷ For a useful overview and critical analysis of different terms, see Morris (2000, 25-43).

1.3.2 Methodology

The ontological and epistemological frameworks that ground this thesis have informed the decision to conduct two qualitative case studies to better understand the potential reasons why the US and Canada have voluntarily adopted generous resettlement admissions policies. Yin (2014, 17 original emphasis) argues that this methodological approach can “excel in accommodating a *relativist perspective*” because it enables researchers to recognise that there are “multiple realities having multiple meanings [...].” Demidirek (2010, 904) adds that this approach is also congruent with subjectivism and asserts that case studies are a “source of methodological strength and reflexivity and contributes to the building of theory itself.” Since this thesis adopts an inductive approach that endeavours to propose rather than test theories, the case study is a suitable methodological choice. Nevertheless, given the inductive approach utilised in this thesis, some prospective hypotheses are suggested in the conclusion in chapter six.

That said, the use of case studies as a methodological approach is not uncontested in academia. Indeed, Gerring (2007, 5-8) acknowledges that there is a “paradox” between how some scholars perceive case studies and actual practice since some academics doubt the strength of inference, the level of impartiality, and the degree of external validity that case studies offer (Flyvbjerg 2011, 302). This paradox is linked to the “dichotomization of research methods” that imposes rigid divisions between qualitative and quantitative methodologies and between experimental, observational, and small-*n* and large-*n* research designs (Gerring 2007, 10-12).

In an effort to balance the desire to offer deep insight about the potential reasons why the US and Canada have voluntarily adopted generous resettlement admissions policies with the need for methodological rigour, this thesis adopts a small-*n* approach through an exploration of the potential relationship between resettlement admissions and domestic responsibility sharing with voluntary sector organisations, and between resettlement admissions and voluntary sector advocacy in the US and Canada. To select the case studies, the author first analysed the involvement of voluntary sector organisations in 22 resettlement countries in Europe, North America, and Oceania. In particular, the author examined the involvement of these organisations in four phases of the resettlement process:

- 1) In the identification and selection of refugees for resettlement, and in the delivery of pre-departure activities (including the dissemination of information);
- 2) In the reception of refugees in their country of resettlement;

- 3) In the provision of post-arrival orientation programmes; and,
- 4) In the delivery of a broad range of integration services.¹⁸

The author then constructed a simple scoring mechanism and assigned each country one point for every area in which they involved voluntary sector organisations in resettlement, up to a maximum of 12 points. The author then added the scores for each country and ranked them from highest to lowest. Finally, the author eliminated countries that had resettled refugees on an *ad hoc* basis or through a pilot programme, as their limited involvement in resettlement could make it difficult to generate theories about the prospective relationship between resettlement admissions, domestic responsibility sharing, and voluntary sector advocacy. The author excluded countries that recently adopted resettlement programmes for the same reason.

The comparative analysis demonstrated that at the time this thesis was originally submitted in September 2015, both the US and Canada had developed the most extensive mechanisms for domestic responsibility sharing. Since 1980, the US has resettled refugees through the Resettlement Admissions Program, which it implements through a complex institutional structure based on partnerships between the federal and state governments and organisations known as ‘voluntary agencies’ or ‘volags.’ These organisations are involved in most aspects of resettlement, from offering input on populations in need of resettlement and processing applications to delivering pre-departure cultural orientation programmes and post-arrival reception, orientation, and integration services (Cultural Orientation Resource Center 2015, see section entitled ‘Who Provides Overseas CO?’; US Department of State, US Department of Homeland Security, and US Department of Health and Human Services 2014, 2, 7, and 18-20).

The US is a compelling case study due to the purported relationship between resettlement admissions and domestic responsibility sharing. In their analysis of the involvement of faith-based resettlement agencies in the US, Eby et al. (2011, 587) argue that voluntary agencies are “powerful advocates” and that “the United States has become the leading refugee resettlement country in the world particularly because of the long-standing active engagement and support of communities of faith in refugee resettlement and local integration.” Though their analysis is limited to the involvement and advocacy efforts of Church World Service, their arguments and analysis raise questions about whether government officials and other voluntary agencies have similar perceptions, and provides a clear rationale for analysing the potential relationship between resettlement admissions and domestic

¹⁸ For further details on the involvement of voluntary sector organisations, please refer to appendix Table 10.

responsibility sharing with voluntary agencies and between resettlement admissions and voluntary agency advocacy in greater depth.

In Canada, domestic responsibility sharing is a core component of its four resettlement programmes. In the case of the PSR programme—the primary focus of chapters four and five—the scheme was deliberately created in order to enhance resettlement admissions through the involvement of voluntary sector organisations and members of civil society (Canadian Council for Refugees 2014, 1; Tait 1978, 3). Since 1979, these groups have assumed responsibility for the identification of refugees in need of resettlement, and they offer numerous post-arrival services, including airport reception, short-term accommodation, and orientation and integration services, among other duties (Citizenship and Immigration Canada 2015, 9-10).

However, academics, practitioners, and advocacy groups have long expressed concern that the programme serves more as a vehicle for ‘burden shifting’ than for ‘burden sharing,’ and certain recent policy and programme changes have reinforced these concerns (Canadian Council for Refugees 1996, para. 1 to 4 of 4; Canadian Council for Refugees 2014, 1; Dirks 1984, 299; Treviranus and Casasola 2003, 184-85). This point of contention makes Canada an appealing case study and provides a clear rationale for exploring the potential contemporary relationship between resettlement admissions and domestic responsibility sharing through the PSR programme. In addition, the active involvement of some private sponsors and the Canadian Council for Refugees in advocacy on resettlement issues supports the decision to explore the potential relationship between resettlement admissions and advocacy.

In addition to the US and Canada, the analysis of resettlement programmes indicated that Australia has a long history of government-voluntary sector partnerships in their “offshore” resettlement programme (UNHCR 2018, 2). Though the Australian government leads the provision of pre-departure and post-arrival services for most resettled refugees, the Special Humanitarian Program enables individuals and community organisations to “propose” the resettlement of individuals who are not recognised as refugees within the meaning of the 1951 *Convention relating to the Status of Refugees* or its 1967 *Protocol* but who have suffered a “gross violation of their human rights” in their respective countries of origin (Department of Immigration and Border Protection 2017, 10 and 14). The Program was established in 1981 and proposers must meet the resettled individuals at the airport upon arrival, organise permanent accommodation, and facilitate their orientation to life in Australia (Department of Home Affairs 2018, see section entitled ‘Proposer Obligations’; Department of Immigration and Border Protection 2017, 14). However, the Australian government funds the provision of

social assistance and other forms of orientation and integration support (Department of Home Affairs 2018, see section entitled ‘Proposer Obligations’).

In 2013, when research for this thesis was already well underway, the Australian government introduced the Community Proposal Pilot to enable individuals and community groups to identify and sponsor refugees for resettlement (Refugee Council of Australia 2015, 3). The pilot programme was modelled on the Canadian PSR programme and ran until 2017, when the government introduced the Community Support Program (Hoang 2017, para. 1, 5, and 13 of 19).¹⁹ Since 2017, the Community Support Program has enabled individuals, groups, and businesses to propose up to 1,000 refugees for resettlement, under the umbrella of an Approved Proposing Organisation (UNHCR 2018, 3). In contrast to the Special Humanitarian Program, the Community Support Program mandates that proposers be responsible for the full costs of resettlement, including the application fee, medical examinations, travel, accommodation, and financial support for 12 months (UNHCR 2018, 11-12). Though the Australian government funds the provision of health care and social security for all resettled refugees (Department of Human Services 2018, para. 3 of 5), proposers also assume responsibility for assisting resettled refugees with their orientation and integration into Australian society, including assistance in finding employment (UNHCR 2018, 11-12).

This brief overview indicates that there are many parallels between the design of resettlement programmes in the US, Canada, and Australia. Furthermore, these three countries share similar histories of immigration and similar structures of interest representation. In addition, as demonstrated in section 1.1, Australia was also among the largest contributors to resettlement in both absolute and relative terms between 1980 and 2016. For these reasons, it could make for an interesting and insightful case study that would complement the analysis of the US and Canada.

However, in the interest of transparency, it should be noted that the author originally designed the present study as an analysis of resettlement admissions, domestic responsibility sharing, and voluntary sector advocacy in North America and Europe. It is for this reason that Australia was not selected as a case study. To achieve this, the author conducted extensive research on resettlement in Denmark and the United Kingdom—two countries that resettle fewer refugees and also have comparatively fewer mechanisms for domestic responsibility sharing with voluntary sector organisations. To support the discussion, the author interviewed

¹⁹ This initiative is sometimes called the Community Support Program and at other times it is called the Community Support Programme.

eight individuals, including an official from the Danish Immigration Service (*Udlændingestyrelsen*), four representatives from the Danish Refugee Council (*Dansk Flygtningehjælp*) (one of whom had formerly held a senior position in the Danish Immigration Service), two former representatives from the Danish Refugee Council, and a Scandinavian official with knowledge of the Danish case in December 2014. In the United Kingdom, the author met with a senior official for the Home Office, officials from two of the three local authorities that welcomed refugees resettled through the Gateway Protection Programme at the time, and four representatives from the two of the three voluntary sector organisations involved in the implementation of the Gateway Protection Programme in December 2014. In addition, the author was invited to conduct an in-person observation of the reception and orientation of a family of refugees in the Bolton area in January 2015. Given contemporary efforts by the European Union to promote responsibility sharing on resettlement, the author also interviewed a representative from the European Commission and three prominent voluntary sector organisations in Brussels in November 2014. However, the author was advised to eliminate these two cases, and so they do not appear in the current study. Nevertheless, the author wishes to express her deepest thanks to the individuals who generously gave their time and shared their views to support this aspect of the research. Finally, the author would be pleased to share this material with anyone who might be interested, in the hope that it may be useful someday.

1.3.3 Methods

To obtain a better understanding of the potential reasons why the US and Canada have voluntary adopted generous resettlement admissions policies, the author conducted semi-structured interviews with a total of 33 senior government officials and voluntary sector representatives from the US and Canada. Field research began with a series of 15 interviews conducted in four cities in the US in April 2013. The author approached most individuals directly, but obtaining an interview with a representative from the Department of State proved more challenging, and the author only secured a meeting thanks to the assistance of another interviewee.

The author then conducted 18 interviews in three Canadian cities in December 2013. To arrange interviews with government officials, the author first contacted a senior official known to the author through her previous work as a Policy Analyst at Citizenship and Immigration Canada (now Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship Canada). The author and the official met informally before the author began research for this thesis, and the official later agreed to a formal interview and helpfully suggested other officials who might be of assistance. Reaching private sponsors was more difficult due to the limited contact information available

at that time. In addition to cold-calling Sponsorship Agreement Holders (SAHs), the author contacted an independent consultant for the UNHCR whom she had met at an academic conference. This individual generously volunteered to put the author in contact with private sponsors in the Toronto, Ontario area. One of these individuals then offered to solicit interest among other private sponsors at a regional meeting, and this yielded several more contacts.

In both the US and Canada, the majority of interviews took place at government headquarters or the office of each voluntary agency or SAH. In one interview in Canada, the author was kindly invited to meet the interviewee at their home. In another Canadian interview, the author and the interviewee spoke over the telephone due to circumstances beyond their control. The author took audio recordings of most interviews and supplemented these recordings with handwritten notes. The author did not record three interviews out of respect for their personal preferences and took handwritten notes instead.

The author adopted a semi-structured approach to the interviews by posing a combination of open and closed questions. The process of formulating the interview questions was an iterative one; though the author asked all respondents about the perceived motivations for resettlement and its benefits and about the division of responsibilities between the government and voluntary agencies or private sponsors, interviewees in the US also expressed a keen and unprompted desire to discuss their advocacy efforts on resettlement. This prompted the author to include questions about advocacy in subsequent interviews in both the US and in Canada. Following the interviews, the author personally transcribed the discussions but lost the bulk of the transcripts in a burglary in July 2014. Nevertheless, the author meticulously reviewed the original audio files and notes to ensure that the material—including direct quotes—is accurate and correctly represents the views of the respondents.

Though some academics contend that interpretivist research is “undisciplined (Lewis 2009, 5)” in comparison to quantitative methods, the author has taken deliberate steps to attempt to ensure the quality of the research presented in this thesis. Guba and Lincoln (1985, 294-301; 1989, 245-50) have developed benchmarks to assist in evaluating the ‘quality’ of constructivist research, including credibility, transferability, dependability, and authenticity. These standards are intended to be comparable to the touchstones of internal and external validity, reliability, and objectivity used in other research paradigms (Seale 1999, 45). The researcher and the participants construct credibility through the development of a consensus between them (Lincoln, Lynham, and Guba 2011, 114). To that end, the author has attempted to ensure the credibility of the analysis through the member check method. Guba and Lincoln (1985, 236) explain that, in this approach, the researcher shares the provisional analysis with

participants so that they can scrutinise the report. Guba and Lincoln (1985, 314) argue that this tool is the “most crucial technique for establishing credibility” in interpretivist research. Following Cho and Trent (2006, 321-24), the author adopted a transactional approach (that is, interactive as opposed to emancipatory) to the member check to achieve a “relatively higher level of accuracy and consensus” on the final product.

In particular, the author asked interviewees to consider whether she had accurately represented their views, whether there were any factual errors, or whether the individual had any comments about the interpretation or wanted to add anything that they had not already had the opportunity to discuss. Given the close relationships between government and voluntary sector organisations in resettlement to the US and Canada, the author protected the privacy of other respondents during the member check process by assigning each interviewee a generic identifier and redacting long quotes to minimise the risk of revealing the identity of the speaker at that stage. The member check enabled respondents to clarify their previous statements and to correct minor factual errors made by the author. Though one Canadian official indicated that the author had initially misinterpreted their perceptions on the nature of relations between the government and private sponsors (Deans 2015), none of the other interviewees raised any concerns regarding the interpretation.

However, the use of member checking does not automatically guarantee the validity of the analysis (Seale 1999, 66). Therefore, the author also endeavours to enrich the discussion by attempting to triangulate and interpret the interview material in relation to the extant literature. Seale (1999, 61) argues that triangulation can “enhance the credibility of a research account by providing an additional way of generating evidence in support of key claims.” The use of triangulation is consistent with other theses on migration that also use qualitative case studies (e.g. Boucher 2011).

Despite these steps, the author acknowledges that small studies nevertheless have certain limitations. In particular, the nature of small-*n* research means that such studies generally have limited external validity (Gerring 2007, 43). Though Guba and Lincoln (1985, 316) note that academics cannot assess the external validity of ‘naturalistic’ research in the same way as in quantitative studies, scholars can offer thick description to enable others to ascertain if they can transfer the findings to other cases. Therefore, the author attempts to offer rich descriptions of the history and structure of resettlement programmes, government-voluntary sector relations, and advocacy in the US and Canada. In addition, the author endeavours to provide a rich description of the political context surrounding resettlement in these two countries, in the hope that it may facilitate future comparative research efforts.

That said, LeCompte and Goetz (1982, 35) argue that assuring reliability is one of the most difficult tasks confronting qualitative researchers. Though this thesis adopts a subjectivist epistemological perspective, the author has nevertheless attempted to ensure that the research is dependable by including a detailed and transparent account of the methods used in this thesis so that other academics who adopt a more positivist stance can potentially replicate the research (Guba and Lincoln 1985, 316-18; Seale 1999, 157-58).

Finally, the author aims to offer an ‘authentic’ exploration of resettlement admissions by demonstrating fairness in the analysis. Lincoln, Lynham, and Guba (2011, 122) explain that fairness is “a quality of balance; that is, all stakeholder views, perspectives, values, claims, concerns and voices should be apparent in the text,” and they warn that omitting contradictory views biases the narrative. In addition, Yin (2014, 36) highlights the importance of analysing alternative explanations. Therefore, the author offers both an analysis of rival explanations for resettlement admissions (namely cultural theories and foreign policy) and endeavours to include a broad range of views. In particular, the author strives to call attention to instances where there is a lack of consensus among interviewees and where respondents expressed contradictory views.

1.3.4 Ethics

Qualitative research often raises questions about the respect for ethics—especially when the author uses observational or participatory methods. Hesse-Biber (2010, 58-59) identifies a number of questions that researchers should ask themselves before and during the research process, such as how to communicate the purpose of the research to participants, how to protect their privacy and “emotional well-being” throughout the study, how to obtain informed consent, and how the research material will be stored and disseminated. Drawing on Hesse-Biber, the author distributed an informed consent sheet to each interviewee. Participants were invited to read the document and to ask any questions before giving their consent. The document discussed how information gleaned from the interviews would be recorded, stored, and disseminated. The sheet offered participants the opportunity to raise concerns related to confidentiality, and every effort was made to accommodate and respect these concerns. Notably, only one interviewee requested to remain anonymous, though the choice was made available to all. Furthermore, the author advised respondents that they could refuse to answer any questions or withdraw from the interview at any time without penalty. Notably, the form also advised interviewees that the author had been employed at Citizenship and Immigration

Canada and that the department had funded her research.²⁰ Following the ethics policy developed by the London School of Economics and Political Science (2014, 1-6), the author completed the School's ethics checklist but did not identify any issues that required review by the Research Ethics Committee.

1.4 Originality and Expected Contributions

This thesis makes three principal contributions to the literature: first, though some scholars have explored the nature of refugee protection as a public good, and particularly, as an impure public good, no scholar has yet developed a conceptualisation of resettlement as a public good. Though this thesis adopts an exploratory approach, it contributes to the literature by considering how the perceived motivations for resettlement and the benefits of providing this durable solution could be seen as an impure public good in a more concrete way than in the existing scholarship, and incorporates qualitative interviews into the analysis. In particular, the author suggests that resettlement could be an impure public good that generates joint products in the form of private human security benefits for refugees and warm glow, reputational, and cultural benefits for receiving countries. In doing so, this thesis deepens the scholarship on refugee protection as a public good and extends it to the sphere of cultural public goods—a potential benefit that has not been explored in this aspect of the literature to date. Second, this thesis adds to our understanding of the structure of government-voluntary sector relations in resettlement. Though there is a burgeoning scholarship in this area, especially in the US, no scholar has attempted to analyse the structure of government-voluntary sector relations in resettlement. Furthermore, this thesis adopts the novel approach of analysing whether and how resettlement admissions have been enhanced through domestic responsibility sharing with voluntary sector organisations—an issue that has not been explored in the literature to date and which could complement existing explanations. Finally, the thesis takes the original approach of examining the relationship between resettlement admissions and voluntary sector advocacy—an area which is also unexplored in the literature to date despite the potentially ‘adversarial’ nature of relations and the agency that voluntary sector organisations can exert. In these ways, this thesis endeavours to complement existing explanations and shed light on why the US and Canada have voluntarily adopted generous resettlement admissions policies.

²⁰ The author was employed as a Policy and Programs Analyst at Citizenship and Immigration Canada (now Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship Canada) between 2008 and 2010, when she took academic leave. Though the department funded the author's tuition between 2010 and 2013, officials have had no input on any aspect of the research, and this thesis does not reflect the views of Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship Canada or the Government of Canada.

1.5 Outline of the Thesis

The remainder of the thesis is structured as follows: chapter two explores resettlement admissions in the US. The chapter first describes the history of resettlement to the US, then presents data on the size and composition of resettlement flows. A brief narrative account of the current structure of resettlement programmes in the US follows this discussion. This descriptive background sets the stage for the analytical approach adopted throughout the remainder of the chapter, in which the author explores the perceived motivations for resettlement and its benefits, the perceived nature of government-voluntary sector relations, and perceptions on the potential relationship between resettlement admissions and domestic responsibility sharing through interviews with senior government officials and voluntary agency representatives. The author then interprets these views in relation to the extant literature. Chapter three explores resettlement advocacy in the US. The chapter first describes the history of resettlement advocacy in the US, before exploring the perceived relationship between resettlement admissions and advocacy through interviews with senior government officials and voluntary agency representatives. Once again, the author endeavours to interpret the views articulated by interviewees in relation to the existing literature, and also examines the recent political context on resettlement in the US.

The thesis then turns its attention to resettlement in Canada. Chapter four first describes the history of resettlement to Canada, then presents data on the size and composition of resettlement flows. A brief narrative account of the current structure of resettlement programmes in Canada follows this discussion. This descriptive background sets the stage for the analytical approach adopted throughout the remainder of the chapter, in which the author explores the perceived motivations for resettlement and its benefits, the perceived nature of relations between the government and private sponsors, and perceptions on the potential relationship between resettlement admissions and domestic responsibility sharing through interviews with senior government officials and private sponsors. The author then interprets these views in relation to the extant literature. Chapter five explores resettlement advocacy in Canada. The chapter first describes the history of resettlement advocacy in Canada, before exploring the perceived relationship between resettlement admissions and advocacy through interviews with senior government officials and private sponsors. In keeping with the research design, the author seeks to interpret the views of interviewees in relation to the existing literature, and also explores the recent political context surrounding resettlement in Canada.

Finally, chapter six summarises the research presented in this thesis and discusses certain similarities and differences between perceptions on the motivations and benefits of

resettlement, the nature of government-voluntary sector relations, the potential relationship between resettlement admissions and domestic responsibility sharing with voluntary sector organisations, and the potential relationship between resettlement admissions and voluntary sector advocacy in the US and Canada. The chapter then identifies some similarities and differences between the US and Canadian cases, and discusses some potential implications for the voluntary sector and the international refugee regime. The chapter concludes by proposing some potential hypotheses and other issues for future research.

Chapter Two: Resettlement Admissions and Domestic Responsibility Sharing in the United States

2.1 Introduction

Chapter one presented a number of observations concerning contributions to resettlement and the structure of resettlement programmes. Included among those observations were figures demonstrating that the US was the largest contributor to resettlement in absolute terms between 1980 and 2016, and was also among the largest contributors to resettlement in relative terms during this same period. Chapter one also observed that, in addition to the considerable cross-national differences in resettlement contributions among members of the international community, there are notable differences in how these countries structure their resettlement programmes. Finally, chapter one highlighted the need to explore the potential relationship between resettlement admissions and domestic responsibility sharing with voluntary sector organisations, and between resettlement admissions and voluntary sector advocacy given the unprecedented scale of human displacement at present, the persistent gap between resettlement needs and the number of available places, and the limitations of the predominantly state-centric qualitative and quantitative research in this area.

This chapter attempts to better understand why the US has voluntarily adopted generous resettlement admissions policies. The chapter begins descriptively by offering an overview of the history of refugee resettlement in the US in section 2.2. The chapter then presents data on the size and composition of resettlement flows to the US in section 2.3, to offer a picture of the size and nature of its contribution to resettlement. These empirical observations indicate that, though the US is the largest absolute contributor to resettlement, the size and composition of resettlement flows has fluctuated over time. This account is followed by a brief narrative account of the current structure of the Resettlement Admissions and the Reception and Placement programmes in section 2.4—the two main avenues through which the federal government, state governments, and voluntary agencies collaborate in the resettlement of refugees to the US.

This descriptive background sets the stage for the analytical approach adopted throughout the remainder of the chapter. Section 2.5 presents the views of senior government officials and voluntary agency representatives on the perceived motivations for resettling refugees in the US and its benefits and, in accordance with the ontological and epistemological foundations of this thesis, attempts to interpret these perceptions in relation to the available literature. Though the academic literature indicates that governments may have a range of reasons for granting protection, as discussed in chapter one, one could interpret the particular

views articulated by the government officials and voluntary agency representatives as consistent with the scholarship on refugee protection as an impure public good, and the economic literature on public goods more generally. Section 2.6 presents their views on the perceived nature of government-voluntary agency relations in resettlement, and endeavours to interpret these perceptions in relation to the extant literature. One could interpret their views could be interpreted as consistent with the dominant conceptual frameworks on government-voluntary sector relations in the US. Furthermore, certain comments could align with academic work on the potential perils of government-voluntary sector partnerships. Section 2.7 presents the views of government officials and voluntary agency representatives on the perceived relationship between resettlement admissions and domestic responsibility sharing, and seeks to interpret these perceptions in relation to the existing literature and the political context surrounding resettlement in the US. The perception among most interviewees that domestic responsibility sharing has enhanced resettlement admissions could be interpreted as consistent with the academic literature on the role of voluntary sector organisations in providing public goods and services. However, though voluntary agencies have played an important historical and contemporary role in resettlement, the historical literature on resettlement to the US demonstrates that admissions have also been influenced by political vagaries. Despite the tradition of broad, bipartisan support for resettlement, the election of Republican President Donald Trump could indicate increasing political polarisation and discord on resettlement that may impact resettlement admissions in the future. Section 2.8 concludes with a summary.

Before proceeding, the author would like to highlight an important limitation to the discussion and analysis in this chapter. Due to resource constraints at the time, the author did not approach any local affiliates of the nine voluntary agencies interviewed as part of this thesis. Therefore, the analysis reflects the views of federal government officials and representatives from the nine voluntary agencies that implement the Resettlement Admissions and Reception and Placement programmes. However, given that some respondents highlighted the local character of resettlement (Kekic 2013; Robinson 2013), this could offer a worthwhile avenue for future research.

2.2 History of Resettlement in the United States

The US has a long history of offering refugee protection. This section offers an overview of the history of refugee resettlement to the US, to enrich the discussion and analysis that follows in the remainder of this chapter. In general, the literature indicates that the US historically adopted an *ad hoc* approach to resettlement and its attitude towards refugees has

wavered between reticence and welcome (Brown and Scribner 2014, 102; Haines 2010, 1; Hutchinson 1981, 521; Zucker 1983, 172).

In the nineteenth century, the US government demonstrated generosity towards certain groups of refugees. In particular, the government welcomed German liberals and Polish exiles who had been forced to flee due to political oppression and their involvement in failed independence movements, respectively (Hutchinson 1981, 522). In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the US government also facilitated the admission of persons in need of protection from religious and political persecution by exempting them from existing financial and literacy requirements (Hutchinson 1981, 523-24).

The US also adopted generous resettlement admissions policies for certain groups of refugees in the early twentieth century. Following the end of World War I, the government adopted liberal admissions policies for those who had been displaced by the conflict and established emergency legislation to facilitate the resettlement of particular groups including Armenian refugees (Hutchinson 1981, 525-28). However, racism and xenophobia also gained ground during this period and the Republican President Calvin Coolidge institutionalised these attitudes through the *Immigration Act* of 1924. This legislation (also known as the Johnson-Reed Act) barred all immigrants from Asia and established a system of quotas to limit immigration from other countries and regions to two per cent of the total number of immigrants who were in the US at the time of the 1890 census (Office of the Historian no date, para. 1 of 8). President Coolidge stated at the time that “America must remain American,” and the legislation had a profound impact on immigration from Asia and Southern and Eastern Europe (Fisher 2017, para. 8 of 23).

In this context, it is unsurprising that the US adopted an illiberal approach to the admission of Jewish refugees. Though approximately 85,000 Jewish refugees succeeded in reaching the US following the German annexation of Austria in March 1938 and the events of the *Kristallnacht* in November of that same year (US Holocaust Memorial Museum no date A, para. 5 of 13), the US maintained a miserly attitude towards these refugees. In February 1939, the Democratic Senator Robert F. Wagner and the Republican Representative Edith Rogers introduced a bipartisan bill to admit up to 20,000 (predominantly Jewish) children who had fled Germany (US Holocaust Memorial Museum no date B, para. 1 and 10 of 22). However, the Democratic President Franklin D. Roosevelt refused to support the bill due in part to the popularity of anti-Semitic views at the time, concern that such a decision would lead to an “army of people who speak foreign languages” to seek entry into the US, and concerns regarding the scale of domestic unemployment at that time (Loescher and Scanlan 1986, xiv).

The US persisted in its efforts to restrict the admission of Jewish refugees throughout the spring and early summer of 1939. Notably, the US refused to allow approximately 900 Jewish passengers from the infamous *S.S. St. Louis* to disembark (US Holocaust Memorial Museum no date A, para. 6 of 13).²¹ Cuba refused the passengers entry (Abella and Troper 1979, 178), and the ship was forced to proceed onwards to the US in the hopes that it would grant the passengers refuge. Following refusals from the governments of both the US and Canada, the ship was obliged to return to Europe, and 254 of its passengers were ultimately killed in the Holocaust (US Holocaust Memorial Museum no date A, para. 6 of 13).

President Roosevelt appeared to have a change of heart in the summer of 1939 and invited other members of the international community to a conference in Evian, France in July of that year. Though the US encouraged other governments to make commitments towards resolving the crisis, its response was muted. Indeed, the US merely committed to assisting Jewish refugees by agreeing to “fill its entire German-Austrian quota of 27,730” for that year (Abella and Troper 1979, 195). This approach sent a powerful signal to other governments—including the Nazi government in Germany—that most of the world had limited interest in assisting Jewish refugees (Abella and Troper 1979, 196).

However, the end of World War II precipitated an important change in the approach of the US towards persons in need of protection. The massive influx of displaced persons fleeing to West Germany and the unique needs of those who had survived the Holocaust placed considerable pressure on the Allied and American forces that occupied West Germany (Loescher and Scanlan 1986, 1-2). In response to this particular situation and out of a humanitarian desire to assist the survivors who found themselves in dire straits, President Roosevelt and his successor, the Democratic President Harry S. Truman, launched a plan to “rescue” the displaced—though ostensibly on a “temporary” basis (Loescher and Scanlan 1986, 4). President Truman authorised officials to allocate unused quota places to Jewish refugees and other displaced persons. This measure enabled approximately 40,000 displaced persons (of whom approximately 28,000 were Jewish) to obtain visas to immigrate to the US between the spring of 1946 through the summer of 1948 (Loescher and Scanlan 1986, 6).

Though this approach succeeded in expediting the resettlement of those in need of protection, the measure soon led to an “untenable” situation as tens of thousands of Jews, Eastern Europeans, and German exiles flowed into West Germany (Loescher and Scanlan

²¹ There appears to be no consensus on the exact number of passengers aboard the *S.S. St. Louis*; some sources indicate that 907 passengers were aboard, others suggest there were 908 or 930 passengers, and still others state that 937 passengers were on the ship.

1986, 6-8). In response, the American Council on Judaism and the American Jewish Committee lobbied for the creation of a special visa programme to facilitate the resettlement of up to 100,000 Jewish refugees (Loescher and Scanlan 1986, 9). Rather than focus on the protection needs of Jewish refugees, the American Council on Judaism and the American Jewish Committee emphasised the need to assist the displaced as a whole and developed a campaign which emphasised their employment skills and integration potential (Loescher and Scanlan 1986, 11). Though the campaign encountered persistent anti-Semitic attitudes and opposition from unions, these advocacy efforts attracted the support of some Congressmen who believed the US had “ideological” obligation to be “champions of freedom (Loescher and Scanlan 1986, 11-19).” Their campaign proved partially successful insofar as it influenced the creation of the *Displaced Persons Act* of 1948 which authorised the admission of up to 202,000 European refugees—places which were mortgaged on future annual quotas (Loescher and Scanlan 1986, 19). Subsequent amendments eliminated provisions that privileged the admission of displaced persons from Baltic countries and individuals with agricultural skills and extended the number of places to 351,000 (Loescher and Scanlan 1986, 20).

Though the number of displaced persons gradually declined, the US soon had another opportunity to demonstrate generosity towards refugees. Following the uprisings in Hungary in 1956, the government under Republican President Dwight D. Eisenhower quickly announced the provision of humanitarian assistance and launched a large-scale resettlement programme to resettle approximately 30,000 Hungarians to the US in just three months (Pastor 2016, 199-200).²² Though the revolution failed, President Eisenhower was keen to capitalise on reports of Soviet brutality during the revolution as a means of embarrassing the communist regime in Moscow (Pastor 2016, 199). President Eisenhower may have also been motivated by a sense of responsibility, as agents trained by the Central Intelligence Agency helped ‘instigate’ the revolution, and the US also broadcast messages of support to Hungarian listeners through Radio Free Europe (Steinbock 2003, 978). Whatever the cause, this generous response to the crisis contributed to an emotive response from many members of the American public—the renowned Time magazine even awarded its ‘Man of the Year’ title to the “Hungarian Freedom Fighter (Pastor 2016, 199).” In total, the US resettled 38,121 Hungarian refugees (Loescher and Scanlan 1986, 52).

Despite adopting a liberal approach towards the resettlement of Hungarian refugees, the events of 1956 had an important and unintended impact on refugee admissions policies in

²² In total, the US resettled 38,121 Hungarian refugees (Loescher and Scanlan 1986, 52).

the US. In particular, the failure of the revolution discouraged the US from continuing to promote uprisings as a means of ‘liberating’ European countries still under Soviet control (Loescher and Scanlan 1986, 50). This decision was primarily attributed to the unwillingness of President Eisenhower to commit additional military resource to such efforts (Loescher and Scanlan 1986, 60). Thus, when the USSR repressed the uprising in Czechoslovakia in 1968, forcing as many as 60,000 Czechoslovakians to flee in search of asylum, the US government adopted a far less public approach to offering protection. Indeed, the government chose not to create a special admissions programme for Czechoslovakians—though approximately 12,000 Czechoslovakians succeeded in entering the US as refugees (thanks to the assistance of voluntary agencies) or through more mainstream immigration channels (Loescher and Scanlan 1986, 87).

However, as the geopolitical and geostrategic situation between the US, the USSR, and their respective allies became increasingly tense, resettlement admissions policies often contained a “double standard” that benefited some refugees and disadvantaged others (Loescher and Scanlan 1986, 69 and 85). Though the US no longer encouraged individuals living in communist regimes to “vote with their feet” in the same explicit manner as it had in Hungary (Zucker and Zucker 1996, 89), many members of Congress continued to support an ideological approach to the selection of refugees for resettlement which privileged the admission of individuals from communist regimes above those living in authoritarian states controlled by right-wing governments (Loescher and Scanlan 1986, 69).

Between the adoption of the *Immigration Act* of 1952 and the *Refugee Act* of 1980, foreign and refugee policies were so enmeshed that legislation defined a ‘refugee’ as someone “from a Communist-dominated country or area, or from any country within the general area of the Middle East (*Immigration and Nationality Act*, Section 203(a)(7) (repealed) cited in Teitelbaum 1984, 430).” The privileging of the anti-Communist doctrine in refugee protection was further reinforced in the *Immigration and Nationality Act* of 1965, which established “preference” categories for the admission of a broad range of immigrants, and allocated up to six per cent of all immigrant visas to “Refugees from communist countries or communist-dominated countries or the general area of the Middle East (Centre for Migration Studies 1992, 168).”

The ideological orientation of resettlement admissions policies at the time also contributed in part to the voluntary establishment of generous admissions policies for Southeast Asian refugees. In 1975 alone, the US resettled approximately 135,000 refugees from Vietnam (Robinson 1998, 133). The US subsequently scaled back resettlement efforts and resettled an

average of approximately 15,000 Southeast Asian refugees per year between 1976 and 1979, when the Democratic President Jimmy Carter authorised the resettlement of 168,000 refugees from that region over the next fiscal year (Robinson 1998, 133). In total, the US resettled 1,287,300 refugees from Southeast Asia between 1975 and 1997 (Robinson 1998, appendix two).

This ideological approach partially explains why the US adopted a restrictive approach to the treatment of black Haitians fleeing the repression and violence carried out by François Duvalier and his associates, and why the US limited the size of its parole programme for Chilean refugees fleeing the widespread human rights violations perpetrated by the government of Augusto Pinochet (Loescher and Scanlan 1986, 69). In a quest to “eradicate Marxism,” the US supported a number of right-wing governments in Central America, even when those governments “massacred, tortured, and intimidated” their citizens (Zucker and Zucker 1996, 90). Indeed, the Republican President Ronald Reagan argued that if the US allowed “anti-American Marxist dictatorships” in Central America to survive, a “tidal wave of refugees” could be “swarming into our country seeking a safe haven from Communist repression to our south (Reagan 1983, cited in Teitelbaum 1984, 435).”

However, one cannot attribute the generosity of the US towards Southeast Asian refugees to foreign policies alone. Indeed, there was an influential “symbiosis” between ideological and humanitarian considerations that—in combination with ardent advocacy efforts—contributed to the decision to establish handsome admissions policies for these refugees (Loescher and Scanlan 1986, 213). The complementarity between political and humanitarian considerations also encouraged the government to be lenient in its treatment of other groups of refugees, including Ugandans, Nicaraguans, and Iranians (Loescher and Scanlan 1986, 213). The influence of both strategic and humanitarian considerations remains in evidence in the new millennium as well, as manifested through the creation of special resettlement programmes for Afghan and Iraqi personnel but also the important contributions made by the US towards the resettlement of Burmese, Bhutanese, and Burundian refugees whose limited knowledge of English and employment experience presented a challenge with respect to their orientation and integration into life in the US (Bruno 2011, 19).

One could partially attribute the shift towards humanitarianism to growing frustration with the *realpolitik* approach advocated by Henry Kissinger, who served as both Secretary of State and National Security advisor to Republican presidents Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford (Loescher and Scanlan 1986, 86). This *realpolitik* approach resulted in the privileging of admissions asylum seekers from Cuba, but the desire to achieve a *détente* with the USSR meant

the government resisted applying a similar approach to the treatment of Jewish refugees from the USSR (Loescher and Scanlan 1986, 86). During this period, both ‘liberal’ and ‘conservative’ members of Congress became disillusioned with this *realpolitik* approach, which they deemed to be “morally deficient (Loescher and Scanlan 1986, 86-88).” Consequently, Congress adopted several resolutions to pressure the Department of State to adopt a more humanitarian approach to the conduct of foreign policy, and it also became more engaged in the “framing of refugee admissions (Loescher and Scanland 1986, 86).” Loescher and Scanlan (1986) attribute this change to advocacy efforts by human rights, religious, and other advocacy groups, who pressed Congress to consider granting protection to individuals whose admission “served no clear foreign policy interest” or even those whose admittance “ran counter to the prevailing cold war [sic] ideology (Loescher and Scanlan 1986, 86).”

Overall, the history of resettlement admissions in the US suggests that the government has, at times, adopted a discriminatory and occasionally hypocritical approach to resettlement admissions in which it has chosen to privilege the admission of certain groups above others to serve its strategic objectives. Conversely, at other times, the US has pursued a far more welcoming approach and sought to welcome refugees from a broad range of origins and backgrounds, without any apparent ulterior motive except the desire to ‘rescue’ those in greatest need of protection. This narrative account could be interpreted as an affirmation of the complex and evolving nature of resettlement admissions policies. In that context, the literature also suggests that voluntary agencies have been a constant presence in the lives of refugees arriving in the US. For this reason, an exploration of the potential relationship between resettlement admissions and domestic responsibility sharing with voluntary agencies is all the more salient.

2.3 Size and Composition of Resettlement Flows

This section presents the available data on the size and composition of resettlement flows to the US between 1980 and 2017 to enrich the analysis of its resettlement programmes. In particular, this section provides figures on the annual resettlement ceiling determined by the President, the total number of admissions in each fiscal year, as well as the available information on the nationality, age, and gender of refugees resettled to the US. The author also presents some data on the resettlement of unaccompanied minors, though the information on the flow of these refugees was limited at the time of research. These empirical observations indicate that, though the US is the largest absolute contributor to resettlement, the size and composition of resettlement flows have fluctuated over time.

Chapter one demonstrated that the US resettled the largest absolute number of refugees between 1980 and 2016, and was also among the largest relative contributors to this durable solution during the same period. However, global comparisons of resettlement contributions mask changes in the resettlement ceilings (or quotas) established each year. Therefore, appendix Table 11 shows the annual resettlement ceilings between fiscal years 1980 and 2018. Table 11 demonstrates that the resettlement ceilings peaked in fiscal year 1980 and there was a net decline in the proposed ceilings between 1981 and 2018. However, this decline masks changes in the ceilings over time. Though the annual resettlement ceilings declined from 1981 to 1986, the ceilings grew in the late 1980s and continued to rise until 1992. Table 11 then shows that there was a second period of decline in resettlement ceilings, as they fell from 142,000 in 1992 to 78,000 in 1997. Nevertheless, the government made another course correction in the late 1990s as admissions ceilings resumed their upward trajectory, climbing to a peak of 91,000 in 1999 before declining somewhat to 90,000 in 2000 and then experiencing a more substantial fall to 70,000 in 2001. The annual resettlement ceilings remained at 70,000 throughout most of the 2000s, rising to 80,000 in 2008. Table 11 demonstrates that the resettlement ceiling remained at this new equilibrium for several years until 2012 when the government once again adopted lower ceilings. This decline proved short-lived, as the resettlement ceiling rose in 2016 to 85,000, and increased again to 110,000—a figure which mirrors the resettlement ceilings adopted in the mid-1990s. Nevertheless, it must be noted that the recent decision to reduce the resettlement admissions ceiling to 45,000 in fiscal year 2018 marks a historic low for the Refugee Admissions Program and is far below the average of 94,941 during the past 39 years (Martin 2005, 17; Mayorga and Morse 2017, see table 1; US Department of State, US Department of Homeland Security, and US Department of Health and Human Services 2015, 5; US Department of State, US Department of Homeland Security, and US Department of Health and Human Services 2016, 5; US Department of State, US Department of Homeland Security, and US Department of Health and Human Services 2017, 6 own calculation).

To better understand the scope of resettlement contributions in the US, it is also instructive to examine the actual number of refugees resettled since the inception of the Resettlement Admissions Program. Appendix Table 12 provides a detailed account of the number of refugees resettled between fiscal years 1980 and 2017. Like the data on resettlement ceilings, Table 12 demonstrates that there has been considerable variation in the number of refugees resettled each fiscal year since 1980 and the number of refugees resettled to the US peaked in 1980. There was a steady decline in resettlement admissions throughout most of the

1980s, but the flow of resettled refugees grew again between 1988 and 1990. Resettlement admissions remained well above 100,000 refugees per year throughout the early 1990s, before falling in the latter part of the decade and rebounding again just before the turn of the millennium. Nevertheless, Table 12 clearly shows that there was a dramatic decline in resettlement admissions in the early 2000s—especially following the terrorist attacks of 11 September, 2001. Though resettlement admissions gradually increased from 2004 onwards, the flow of refugees continued to fluctuate for several years until gradually increasing towards the end of the noughties. Finally, there was a marginal decline in resettlement admissions at the beginning of the current decade, followed by a steady increase in the flow of resettled refugees until 2017 when admissions fell to 53,716. In total, the US welcomed 3,060,295 refugees through the Refugee Admissions Program between 1980 and 2017 and an average of 78,469 refugees per year during this period (Refugee Processing Center 2018, see annual tables; US Department of Homeland Security 2017, table 13).

The considerable fluctuations observed above raise questions about whether and to what extent the annual resettlement ceilings and admissions have evolved in parallel. Appendix Chart 1 illustrates the correspondence between resettlement ceilings and admissions between fiscal year 1980 and 2017. Chart 1 shows that the annual resettlement ceilings and admissions usually followed a similar trajectory between fiscal years 1980 and 2017. One can also observe that the US has never met or exceeded its established admissions ceiling in the history of the programme.²³ The government has occasionally come close to surpassing the ceiling. There was less than a two per cent gap between the ceiling and admissions in 1984 and 1990, and less than a one per cent gap between 2013 and 2016. There could be many reasons why the US has never met or exceeded its resettlement admissions ceilings (Martin 2005, 19-20), the fact that the US has never exceeded this threshold is also indicative. Martin (2005, 16) notes that the ambitious resettlement ceilings established at the inception of the Refugee Admissions Program were “truly a ceiling, not a goal.”

The data presented above illustrates the broad pattern of resettlement admissions to the US but tells us little about the composition of flows. To enrich our understanding of resettlement admissions in the US, appendix Table 13 presents the numbers and nationalities of the five largest groups of refugees resettled to the US between fiscal years 1980 and 1989. Table 13 demonstrates that there was a clear pattern in resettlement admissions during the first decade of the programme. Throughout most of the decade, Vietnam represented the largest

²³ This takes into account the revised ceilings issued in 1988, 1989, and 1999, respectively.

source country for refugees resettled to the US and, in a manner consistent with its obligations under the Comprehensive Plan of Action, the US also resettled large numbers of refugees from Cambodia and Laos. Other prominent groups include refugees from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and other countries in Central and Eastern Europe—namely Poland and Romania. Table 13 indicates that resettlement efforts were not limited to these two regions alone, as the US also resettled thousands of refugees from countries further afield, including Afghanistan, Cuba, Ethiopia, and Iran. Towards the end of the decade, resettlement admissions from the USSR increased dramatically and surpassed the flow of refugees from Southeast Asia.

To continue shedding light on the composition of resettlement admissions in the US, appendix Table 14 presents the numbers and nationalities of the five largest groups of refugees resettled in the US between fiscal years 1990 and 1999. Table 14 demonstrates that the USSR remained the top source country for resettled refugees between 1990 and 1994, and again in 1996 and 1997. The US continued to resettle large numbers of refugees from Southeast Asia, including not only those from Vietnam and Laos but also individuals of American and Southeast Asian descent who had faced discrimination in Vietnam (Hirayama and Cetingok 1995, 69). Resettlement admissions then became more diverse as the US resettled tens of thousands of refugees from Yugoslavia, as well as Iraqis, Liberians, and Somalis in need of this durable solution.

Appendix Table 15 presents the numbers and nationalities of the five largest groups of refugees resettled to the US between fiscal years 2000 and 2009. Table 15 demonstrates that despite the collapse of the USSR almost a decade prior, the US continued to resettle large numbers of refugees from this region. This could be attributed to the Lautenberg Amendment, which was introduced in 1990 to enable the US to resettle individuals from certain religious minorities from particular countries who do not meet the formal definition of a refugee but who are nevertheless deemed to require protection. The Amendment facilitates the resettlement of Jews, evangelical Christians, members of the Ukrainian Catholic church, and members of the Orthodox faith (US Department of State, US Department of Homeland Security, and US Department of Health and Human Services 2017, 10). Since 2004, an amendment to the Lautenberg Amendment has also enabled the government to resettle religious minorities from Iran, including Bahá'ís, Christians, Jews, Mandeans, and Zoroastrians. Table 15 also demonstrates that the composition of resettlement flows to the US became even more diverse in the new millennium as the country admitted refugees from Bhutan, Iraq, Myanmar, Liberia, Somalia, and Sudan, among others.

Finally, appendix Table 16 presents the numbers and nationalities of the five largest groups of refugees resettled in the US between fiscal years 2010 and 2017. In the period between fiscal years 2010 and 2017, the US has resettled substantial numbers of refugees from parts of Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. Though no country remained the top source for resettled refugees for long, refugees from Bhutan and Myanmar comprised a large proportion of refugees resettled in the US during this period. Most recently, the US resettled thousands of refugees from the Democratic Republic of Congo, Iraq, and Syria—reflecting the growing protection needs of refugees from those countries. This suggests the consolidation of trends from previous decades.

Information on the age and gender of refugees resettled to the US could add further detail to our understanding of the composition of resettlement flows but information was limited at the time of research.²⁴ Appendix Table 17 shows the total number of refugees resettled alongside the number of adults and children resettled to the US between fiscal years 2005 and 2015, the most recent period for which data was available. The author calculated the figures for children by adding the number of refugees resettled under the age of 16 to the number of refugees resettled between the ages of 16 and 20. The figures for adults reflect the number of refugees resettled over the age of 21, as given in the source. These figures reflect the way in which the data was disaggregated in the source.

The data presented in Table 17 demonstrates that the US resettled marginally more men than women during each year between 2005 and 2015. Though the gap between the number of men and women was somewhat larger in 2009, 2010, 2012, and 2013, this could perhaps be attributed to the unique characteristics of the individuals and groups in need of protection and may not necessarily indicate a systematic bias against female refugees. Though the US does not have a particular quota for the resettlement of women-at-risk, the Preferred Communities programme administered by the Office of Refugee Resettlement and implemented by nine voluntary agencies builds capacity in receiving communities to enable them to offer longer-term support to especially vulnerable refugees, including female heads of household (UNHCR 2014, 1; US Department of State 2017, 20).

²⁴ Between 1997 and 2004, the Department of Homeland Security published information on the number of children resettled as part of its annual statistical yearbooks. Though the number of resettled adults could be estimated by subtracting the total number of resettled refugees by the number of resettled children, there were considerable discrepancies between the total admissions figures provided in the statistical yearbooks for 1998, 1999, and 2002 yearbooks and the total admissions figures reported for each of these years in the 2015 yearbook. Due to these inconsistencies and the unreliability of such estimates, the author opted to exclude this data from Table 17.

Table 17 also demonstrates that the US resettled more adults than children between 2005 and 2015. However, the US historically resettled many unaccompanied minors—especially from Southeast Asia. Though little information on the nationalities of these unaccompanied minors was available at the time of research, the US resettled a total of 5,071 unaccompanied minors from Southeast Asian between fiscal years 1980 and 1985, and also welcomed approximately 300 more unaccompanied minors from Southeast Asia in 1986 (Office of Refugee Resettlement 1981, 14; 1982, ii; 1983, ii; 1984, ii; 1985, 39; 1986, 40; 1987, 41).²⁵ In 1994, the Office of Refugee Resettlement provided more detailed information on the nationalities of the unaccompanied minors, noting that children from Southeast Asia, Bosnia, Cuba, Haiti, Iraq, Liberia, Rwanda, and Sudan were resettled in the US (Office of Refugee Resettlement 1995, 26).

Between 1984 and 1995, the US published information on the sum of unaccompanied minors that had been under government care since 1979—that is, children who had not been emancipated or reunited with members of their family in the US—as well as the total number that remained under care each year. Beginning in 1987, the US offered information on the average number of unaccompanied minors resettled each month in a given year. Though these figures do not provide an exact account of the flow of unaccompanied minors resettled in the US, they nevertheless shed some light on efforts to protect these vulnerable refugees. Appendix Table 18 presents the sum of unaccompanied minors under care in the US since fiscal year 1979, the number that remained under care in a given year, and the average number of unaccompanied minors arriving each month (when available) between fiscal years 1984 and 1995.

The figures presented in Table 18 demonstrate that the total number of unaccompanied minors grew steadily, indicating that unaccompanied minors formed a consistent part of the flow of refugees resettled to the US during this period. However, the number of unaccompanied minors in care gradually declined—perhaps as these individuals reached the age of majority or reunited with members of their extended family. The table also shows that the monthly flow of unaccompanied minors remained somewhat steady throughout the mid- to late-1980s, but progressively fell before rising again in 1995. Future research could potentially explore whether this flow of unaccompanied minors was in some way related to the flow of Amerasian refugees resettled in the US.

²⁵ The data on unaccompanied minors did not disaggregate by country.

More contemporary efforts to resettle unaccompanied minors have concentrated on children from Central America. Though the number of unaccompanied minors detained at the border by Customs and Border Protection gradually increased from approximately 15,000 in 2011 to approximately 40,000 in 2013, the number of arrivals surged in 2014, rising to approximately 69,000 (Hipsman and Meissner 2015, 3). To minimise the number of children undertaking “dangerous” journeys in order to reach relatives in the US, and as a means of responding to the pressure on government services and the considerable level of public attention directed towards the issue, the government established the Central American Minors programme in November 2014 to process resettlement applications for eligible children from the three main source countries of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras (Hipsman and Meissner 2015, 2 and 4).

Between December 2014 and November 2017, the US received more than 14,000 applications for resettlement through the Central American Minors programme, and resettled 3,238 children under its auspices (Finnegan 2017, para. 6 of 16). However, in November 2017, the government announced its intention to eliminate the Central American Minors programme in fiscal year 2018, as “the vast majority of individuals accessing the programme were not eligible for refugee resettlement (US Department of State 2017, para. 3 of 6; US Department of State, US Department of Homeland Security, and US Department of Health and Human Services 2017, 43).” Hipsman and Meissner (2015, 1 and 12) note that the US has previously introduced in-country resettlement programmes in response to “conditions of extreme danger, loss of life, and sizeable numbers” in Cuba, Haiti, and Vietnam. However, these programmes proved “controversial” among both proponents and opponents of refugee protection, as the 1951 *Convention relating to the Status of Refugees* defines refugees as persons outside their country of origin or habitual residence, and concerns related to the effectiveness of such programmes depending on the admission criteria, the structure and speed of the application process, and the ability of such programmes to effectively protect individuals in hard-to-reach locations (Hipsman and Meissner 2015, 12).

In addition to efforts to protect unaccompanied minors, the US does not limit the resettlement of refugees with medical needs, and 2,388 refugees with medical needs were resettled in the US in 2016 (UNHCR 2017, 74; UNHCR 2017, 2).

Overall, the data presented above affirms that though the US has made considerable contributions to resettlement in both absolute and relative terms between fiscal years 1980 and 2017, its resettlement ceilings and total admissions have fluctuated over time. Nevertheless, the figures indicate that the US has been generous in its approach to admissions, resettling

refugees from a broad range of countries over time and admitting relatively equal numbers of male and female refugees. The US has also voluntarily resettled thousands of the most vulnerable of all refugees, including thousands of children (both accompanied and unaccompanied) and refugees with medical needs. This descriptive account sets the stage for a more detailed exploration of the structure of the Resettlement Admissions and Reception and Placement programmes in section 2.3.

2.4 Organisational Structure of Resettlement in the United States

To better understand the potential reasons why the US has voluntarily adopted generous resettlement admissions policies, a brief discussion of the structure of the Resettlement Admissions and Reception and Placement programmes is necessary. The *Refugee Act* of 1980 and the *Immigration and Nationality Act* of 2013 institutionalise resettlement in the US and also integrate the UNHCR definition of a refugee, establish the procedure for determining the level of admissions, and provide for the admission of refugees “of special humanitarian concern to the United States (*Immigration and Nationality Act* 2013 paragraphs 201(a), 207(a)(2), and 207(a)(3) 8 USC 1157).” The *Immigration and Nationality Act* of 2013 also stipulates that the government must provide “sufficient resources” for employment training and placement programmes, English language classes, and financial assistance to help refugees achieve “economic self-sufficiency (*Immigration and Nationality Act* 2013, 412(a)(1) 8 USC 1157).”

The Refugee Admissions Program is the channel through which refugees may be resettled in the US. The programme has a complex structure based on considerable domestic responsibility sharing between the federal and state governments and voluntary agencies. The Department of State Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration coordinates and manages the Refugee Admissions Program (US Department of State, US Department of Homeland Security, and US Department of Health and Human Services 2014, 6). Following consultations with the Department of Homeland Security, the Office of Refugee Resettlement at the Department of Health and Human Services, and voluntary agencies, the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration develops a proposal on the annual resettlement ceiling and selection priorities for approval by the President (US Department of State, US Department of Homeland Security, and US Department of Health and Human Services 2014, 6).

The US has three horizontal resettlement priorities: the P-1 category was created to enable the resettlement of refugees referred by the UNHCR, an American embassy, or a trained voluntary agency (US Department of State, US Department of Homeland Security, and US Department of Health and Human Services 2014, 7). The P-2 category is designed to facilitate the resettlement of groups of refugees designated by the Department of State in consultation

with the Department of Homeland Security, voluntary agencies, and the UNHCR (US Department of State, US Department of Homeland Security, and US Department of Health and Human Services 2014, 8). Finally, the P-3 category is intended to facilitate the resettlement of refugees from certain designated countries who already have relatives in the US (US Department of State, US Department of Homeland Security, and US Department of Health and Human Services 2014, 11). The Department of State determines the annual list of designated countries in consultation with the Department of Homeland Security (US Department of State, US Department of Homeland Security, and US Department of Health and Human Services 2014, 11). In 2018, individuals from 15 countries, including Burundi, Central African Republic, Iraq, Sudan, and Syria are eligible for resettlement through the P-3 category (US Department of State 2017, 13).

Organisations must transmit resettlement referrals to a Resettlement Support Center overseas, and Church World Service, HIAS, and the International Rescue Committee operate three of these centres, respectively (Cultural Orientation Resource Center 2015, para. 1 to 3 of 7). There, members of staff pre-screen applications, interview prospective candidates, and enter biographical data to initiate the security screening process that is conducted by the departments of Homeland Security and State, in collaboration with the Federal Bureau of Investigations and the National Counterterrorism Center (US Department of State 2017, 1; US Committee for Refugees and Immigrants 2017, 1).

Since the terrorist attacks of 11 September, 2001, certain refugees—including those from countries designated as State Sponsors of Terrorism—must undergo further intergovernmental security checks known as Security Advisory Opinions (Refugee Council USA 2017, 1). In addition, applications from Syrian refugees are subject to an “enhanced review” process by the Refugee Affairs division at the US Citizenship and Immigration Service (US Department of State 2017, 1). These security screening measures are “recurrent” procedures that continue until refugees are ready to travel to the US (US Committee for Refugees and Immigrants 2017, 1). The US Citizenship and Immigration Service also conducts in-person interviews and assesses the credibility of each claim for protection and the admissibility of the refugee to the US (US Department of State 2017, 1). The organisation may then issue a ‘conditional approval’ for resettlement which is dependent on the completion of three biometric security checks administered by the departments of Defense and Homeland Security as well as the Federal Bureau of Investigation (US Committee for Refugees and Immigrants 2017, 2). Refugees who have received a conditional approval must also pass a medical exam to determine whether they suffer from a communicable disease which would

render them inadmissible to the US (US Committee for Refugees and Immigrants 2017, 2). Given these extensive measures, it is perhaps unsurprising that the Department of States asserts that refugees resettled to the US are “screened more carefully than any other type of traveler [sic] (US Department of State 2017, 1).”

Once the US Citizenship and Immigration Service conditionally approves an application for resettlement, refugees can participate in a pre-departure cultural orientation programme delivered by a Resettlement Support Center (US Department of State 2017, 1). Refugees are also matched with one of nine voluntary agencies who determine where they settle in the US (US Committee for Refugees and Immigrants 2017, 2). These nine voluntary agencies include Church World Service, Episcopal Migration Ministries, the Ethiopian Community Development Council, HIAS, the International Rescue Committee, the Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Service, the US Conference of Catholic Bishops, the US Committee for Refugees and Immigrants, and World Relief.

If refugees pass the security and medical checks, the Department of State issues a final approval and the International Organization for Migration begins the process of organising transportation to the US (US Department of State 2017, 1). The Department of State, through the International Organization for Migration, issues interest-free loans to refugees who cannot afford the cost of airfare to the US (US Department of State 2017, 18). Refugees must repay the loan in full within a period of 42 months, and both the US Conference of Catholic Bishops and the US Committee for Refugees and Immigrants are authorised to collect repayments on behalf of the International Organization for Migration (US Committee for Refugees and Immigrants 2017, no pagination; US Conference of Catholic Bishops 2018, para. 2 of 4; Westcott 2015, para. 4 of 10). Once refugees arrive in the US, the final decision on admissibility rests with the US Customs and Border Protection agency (US Committee for Refugees and Immigrants 2017, 2).

The federal government, state governments, and voluntary agencies collaborate in the delivery of financial assistance and reception, orientation, and integration services for refugees through the Reception and Placement Program. The Department of State funds the programme and the nine aforementioned voluntary agencies are responsible for its implementation (US Department of State, US Department of Homeland Security, and US Department of Health and Human Services 2014, 17). Through their collective network of 328 local affiliates in 191 communities located in 49 of 50 states, these voluntary agencies arrange housing for the refugees, provide clothing, food, and furniture, and also offer an array of services including cultural orientation and employment assistance, among others (US Department of State, US

Department of Homeland Security, and US Department of Health and Human Services 2014, 18; US Department of State 2017, 18).

In addition to collaborating in the identification, processing, reception, orientation, and integration of resettled refugees, the Department of State provides funding to support the work of voluntary agencies through a fixed ‘per capita’ grant of US\$2,075 for every refugee they resettle (Bruno 2017, 4). Voluntary agencies are required to spend US\$1,125 of this grant on behalf of the refugee (Bruno 2017, 4). Though the grants are designed to help refugees meet their basic needs during the first 30 to 90 days following arrival, there is a clear expectation that voluntary agencies will draw on their own financial and in-kind resources to help refugees fulfil their needs during this period (US Department of State, US Department of Homeland Security, and US Department of Health and Human Services 2014, 18; UNHCR 2014, 10).

Once refugees have completed the first phase of the orientation and integration process through the Reception and Placement programme, they can access employment and English language instruction services offered by a number of ethnic community-based organisations and funded by the Office of Refugee Resettlement (Office of Refugee Resettlement 2016, 1). The Office of Refugee Resettlement limits funding to voluntary agencies in which at least 60 per cent of board members are current or former refugees (Office of Refugee Resettlement 2016, 1). Furthermore, these ethnic community-based organisations can only serve refugees who have resided in the US for more than 90 days but less than five years (Office of Refugee Resettlement 2016, 1). However, access to these supplementary services is far from universal; in 2015, the Office of Refugee Resettlement provided funding to 27 ethnic community-based organisations, located in 17 states even though refugees are resettled in 49 states (Office of Refugee Resettlement 2015, no para.).²⁶ One ethnic community-based organisation, the Ethiopian Community Development Council, is also contracted to provide orientation and integration services through the Reception and Placement programme.

In addition to providing financial support to voluntary agencies and funding some integration services, the Office of Refugee Resettlement funds the delivery of up to eight months of cash and medical assistance for resettled refugees who are ineligible for mainstream social assistance programmes (US Department of State, US Department of Homeland Security, and US Department of Health and Human Services 2014, 19). Though state and municipal governments usually allocate these funds, 12 state governments have partially or entirely

²⁶ For a discussion on the “lottery effect” generated by the current approach to refugee placement and by the variation in the availability of services, see Brick et al. (2010, 12-13).

withdrawn from the provision of these assistance programmes for resettled refugees (US Department of State, US Department of Homeland Security, and US Department of Health and Human Services 2014, 19).²⁷ Instead, voluntary agencies administer the provision of cash and medical assistance through an alternative service delivery model called the Wilson/Fish Alternative Programme, which encourages refugees to obtain employment as soon as possible (Office of Refugee Resettlement 2017, 1). The city of San Diego has also adopted this model, making it the only municipality in the country to maintain a resettlement programme that is separate from the state.²⁸ Five other state governments provide cash assistance to resettled refugees through other forms of public-private partnerships (Office of Refugee Resettlement 2015, 16).²⁹

From this, it is apparent that the Resettlement Admissions and Reception and Placement programmes feature extensive mechanisms for domestic responsibility sharing with voluntary agencies. Voluntary agencies are involved in all phases of the resettlement process, from the identification and processing of applications for resettlement to receiving refugees at the airport and assisting refugees as they begin the process of orientation and integration in the US. This narrative account, in conjunction with the figures presented in section 2.3, set the stage for an analysis of the perceived motivations for resettlement and its benefits in section 2.5. These partnerships raise questions about why and how mechanisms for domestic responsibility sharing emerged in the US, and whether and to what extent these partnerships have influenced resettlement admissions—matters discussed in section 2.6.

2.5 The Perceived Motivations and Benefits of Resettlement in the United States

The data provided in section 2.3 paints a picture of a country that has resettled millions of refugees from diverse countries and backgrounds since 1980, though the size and composition of these flows have fluctuated over time. Furthermore, the descriptive account provided in section 2.4 demonstrates that the US has developed a complex resettlement programme founded on extensive domestic responsibility sharing with voluntary agencies working in all but the state of Wyoming.

²⁷ The 12 states that have withdrawn include: Alabama, Alaska, Colorado, Idaho, Kentucky, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Nevada, North Dakota, South Dakota, Tennessee, and Vermont (Office of Refugee Resettlement 2015, 17).

²⁸ For a comparative analysis of the effectiveness of resettlement through the San Diego Wilson-Fish programme compared to municipal employment programmes, see both Sargent, Hohm, and Moser (1999) and Hohm, Sargent, and Moser (1999).

²⁹ These five states include Maryland, Minnesota, Oklahoma, Oregon, and Texas (Office of Refugee Resettlement 2015, 16).

This narrative background sets the stage for the analytical approach adopted throughout the remainder of the chapter. To better understand the potential reasons why the US has voluntarily adopted generous resettlement admissions policies, this section presents the views of senior government officials and voluntary agency representatives on the motivations for resettling refugees in the US and its benefits. In accordance with the ontological and epistemological foundations of this thesis, the author attempts to interpret these perceptions in relation to the extant literature. Though academics have proposed a range of explanations for the motivations for providing refugee protection, one could interpret the views articulated by government officials and voluntary agency representatives as consistent with the scholarship on refugee protection and public goods.

In April 2013, the author travelled to four cities in the US to conduct in-person interviews with two senior government officials and 13 representatives from each of the nine voluntary sector agencies that implement the Resettlement Admissions and Reception and Placement programmes. The author first travelled to New York City to conduct interviews with representatives from Episcopal Migration Ministries, HIAS, and the International Rescue Committee. The author then travelled to Washington, DC and Arlington, Virginia to meet with senior officials from the Department of State and Office of Refugee Resettlement, as well as representatives from the Ethiopian Community Development Council, the US Conference of Catholic Bishops, and the US Committee for Refugees and Immigrants. The author subsequently returned to New York City to meet with a representative from Church World Service. Finally, the author travelled to Baltimore, Maryland to speak with representatives from the Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Service and World Relief. The author conducted the interviews at the office of each respondent. The appendices provide biographical information about each interviewee.

To better understand why the US has voluntarily adopted generous resettlement admissions policies, the author asked interviewees about the perceived motivations for resettlement and its benefits. The author deliberately phrased this question in a general manner to minimise priming effects and invite a broad range of spontaneous responses. During the interviews, government officials and many voluntary agency representatives argued that resettlement has a humanitarian function, preserves access to countries of first asylum, and contributes to international responsibility sharing (Carey 2013; Gershowitz 2013; Gnaho 2013; Mitchell 2013; Nesheim Bullock 2013; Kosten 2013; Robinson 2013; Scott 2013; Stein 2013).

On 10 April, 2013, the author met with Ambassador David M. Robinson, then the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for

the Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration. Ambassador Robinson argued that resettlement “saves lives” and explained that the provision of this durable solution “meets a basic humanitarian goal of the United States government to provide relief and hope and assistance to people who find themselves in a dire situation in which they cannot return home [...].” Ambassador Robinson (2013) added that resettlement also contributes to international responsibility sharing by relieving some of the pressure on countries of first asylum, thereby encouraging these states to continue admitting persons in need of protection.

Numerous voluntary sector representatives also contended that resettlement serves a humanitarian purpose and expresses a commitment to international responsibility sharing. On 9 April, 2013, the author met with Greg Scott, the Associate Director of Grants and Program Administration at the US Conference of Catholic Bishops. Mr Scott articulated a similar to view to that expressed by Ambassador Robinson, and argued that resettlement has a life-saving function and that refugees “are not people coming here for economic benefit, they’re coming here to survive. Because if they stay where they are, there’s a good chance they won’t see tomorrow.”

Regarding international responsibility sharing, the author met with Aaron Gershowitz, then the Associate Vice President of Global Program Operations at HIAS, on 4 April, 2013. Mr Gershowitz argued that resettlement offers a “relief valve” for countries of first asylum and asserted that the US derives satisfaction from “knowing that we have the capacity and the ability to help people who are in need.” On 5 April, 2013, the author met with Bob Carey, then the Vice President of Resettlement and Migration Policy at the International Rescue Committee. Mr Carey asserted that resettlement demonstrates a commitment to responsibility sharing. Mr Carey (2013) also contended that the strategic use of this durable solution could preserve access to asylum by encouraging countries to keep their borders open. In that context, Mr Carey (2013) noted that resettlement has been “very helpful in many instances, whether you’re talking about Tanzania or Jordan or Turkey or whatever, in ensuring that borders remain open for fleeing populations, or in, you know, ensuring that refugees are not *refouled*, or supporting that, and demonstrating international support for not just the resettlement population but the entire population of refugees in a given country or region.” One could interpret these perceptions as consistent with the norms embedded in the 1951 *Convention relating to the Status of Refugees* and its 1967 *Protocol*, as well as contemporary UNHCR efforts to strategically use resettlement. One could also interpret these responses as reminiscent of the humanitarian desire to ‘rescue’ individuals displaced by World War II.

In addition to the perceived humanitarian and normative motivations, a number of respondents indicated that contributing to resettlement aligns with the history, identity, and values of the US (Kosten 2013; Limón 2013; Mitchell 2013; Negash 2013; Robinson 2013; Scott 2013; Stein 2013). Ambassador Robinson (2013) argued that resettlement reflects “our most profound national values,” and that, as a country founded on immigration, resettlement is “part and parcel of who we are” and so contributing to this durable solution “sustains who we are as a people.” Furthermore, Mr Scott (2013) asserted that the provision of resettlement “resonates with the values that the US espouses” in terms of ensuring the protection of human rights by granting refuge to the persecuted. In addition, Mr Scott (2013) asserted that providing resettlement is consistent with the history of the US as an immigrant-receiving country and summarised his view in the following way: “to me, it’s very simple: it’s who we are. It’s how this country started. The only people who are from the United States are the Indians. Everybody else is from somewhere else.”

For others, participating in resettlement is also a concrete expression of religious values. On 16 April, 2013, the author met with Dan Kosten, then Senior Vice President of US Programs at World Relief. Mr Kosten also contended that resettlement reflects the national values of the US, stating that resettlement has an “intrinsic value, and one that if lost, would mean that, in essence, we call into question our very origin as a country and as a nation.” Furthermore, Mr Kosten (2013) explained that resettlement is also an expression of religious conviction, noting that, “if I go back to a religious faith basis, there seems to be a direct correlation between receiving blessing and receiving others. So what that blessing is, is not necessarily measurable, but I believe a nation at large receives blessings through the very act of welcoming others into its culture.” One could interpret the particular views expressed by Mr Kosten as consistent with the evangelical Christian orientation of the organisation he represented at the time of the interview. However, six of the nine voluntary agencies that implement the Resettlement Admissions and Reception and Placement programmes are faith-based organisations, indicating that religious value may underpin and provide a rationale for the involvement of these voluntary agencies in resettlement.

In addition to relating resettlement admissions to matters of history, identity, and values, several respondents contended that participating in resettlement and making sizeable contributions to the provision of this durable solution demonstrates global leadership (Gershowitz 2013; Robinson 2013; Young 2013). Ambassador Robinson (2013) explained, “We recognise that there is a need for resettlement as one of the durable solutions. And yet, there is greater need than there is availability. So one of our goals has been to increase the

number of nations that participate in resettlement. We can't do that unless we lead the way. And so we have seen it as in our interest, in terms of responsibility and burden-sharing [...] it's important that the United States put its money where its mouth is." Ambassador Robinson (2013) added that resettling large numbers of refugees "gives us the policy and the moral grounding to assert a leadership role in this effort."

Some voluntary agency representatives echoed this view. On 9 April, 2013, the author met with Ambassador Johnny Young, then the Executive Director of Migration and Refugee Services at the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops. Ambassador Young explained that the government encourages its allies to "take a stronger and more active lead in resettling refugees." To that end, Ambassador Young (2013) explained that contributing to resettlement "demonstrates leadership, and by demonstrating that leadership, it encourages other countries to also take measures to follow the US lead." For his part, Mr Gershowitz (2013) argued that participating in resettlement has clear reputational benefits for the US because it concretely demonstrates a commitment to international responsibility sharing with countries of first asylum and a commitment to refugee protection.

Finally, many respondents contended that resettlement has cultural benefits for the US (Gershowitz 2013; Gnaho 2013; Kosten 2013; Mitchell 2013; Nesheim Bullock 2013; Robinson 2013; Sok 2013). Ambassador Robinson (2013) argued that resettlement "enriches communities" and explained that "it brings something unique to the United States in terms of diversity, particularly in communities where they have never been in contact with people other than those who look like everybody else in those communities." Though Ambassador Robinson (2013) acknowledged that resettlement can have social costs for receiving communities as they adapt to newcomers, he nevertheless argued that "it's the nature of the United States to absorb this and to change with it, and to allow ourselves not only to welcome refugees and immigrants but to be changed by them. And that's part of what I think, frankly, is the dynamism of this place."

Voluntary agency representatives also underscored the cultural benefits of resettlement. Mr Gershowitz (2013) asserted that resettlement has a "net benefit" for the US as it brings "different perspectives, different skills, different experiences that contribute to the overall mix." Similarly, in an interview on 15 April, 2013, Michael Mitchell, then the Vice President for Programs and Protection at the Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Service, contended that resettlement "enriches" American society and that "every different culture introduces new ways of thinking and problem-solving." In that same interview, Sovanna Sok, a Placements Coordinator and a former resettled refugee, explained that resettlement contributes to greater

openness in American society, and noted that “having refugees coming from different backgrounds, different ethnic groups, and different views, different ways of thinking, it helps open up the community to have a better understanding of other people, other ethnic groups, populations other than what we see here in the US.” The responses articulated by interviewees indicate that the US is perceived to have a complex and overlapping range of motivations for contributing to resettlement, including humanitarian and normative motivations, as well as motivations and benefits rooted in the history, identity, and religious values of the US.

Nevertheless, all respondents acknowledged that resettlement generates financial costs for the US (Carey 2013; Famini 2013; Gershowitz 2013; Gnaho 2013; Kekic 2013; Kosten 2013; Limón 2013; Mitchell 2013; Negash 2013; Nesheim Bullock 2013; Robinson 2013; Scott 2013; Sok 2013; Stein 2013; Young 2013). Still, many interviewees argued that resettlement has economic benefits for the US. For example, both Ambassador Robinson (2013) and Mr Carey (2013) asserted that resettled refugees had helped “revitalize *sic]*” economically deprived communities such Lewiston, Maine and Utica, New York. Many voluntary sector representatives also contended that refugees are highly entrepreneurial (Carey 2013; Kekic 2013; Kosten 2013; Mitchell 2013; Stein 2013). In an interview on 2 April, 2013, Deborah Stein, the Director of Episcopal Migration Ministries, noted that the US “was built on the strength of immigrants coming to this country and bringing their talents, their education, their initiative, and their drive to succeed and to make a better life for themselves and their families.”

To better understand the potential reasons why the US has voluntarily adopted generous resettlement admissions policies, this thesis now seeks to interpret the response articulated above in relation to the extant literature. First, the responses articulated by government officials and voluntary agency representatives appear consistent with the observation from Haines (2010, 5-6) that the desire of the US to resettle its “fair share” of refugees represents a moral commitment to the principle of international responsibility sharing.

One could also interpret the responses articulated by interviewees as consistent with the literature on refugee protection as an impure public good. Chapter one explained that private goods have benefits which are fully excludable and rival, meaning that whoever provides the good can prevent others from benefiting from it, and once one actor has enjoyed the good, no one else can (Cornes and Sandler 1996, 8-9 and 30). Conversely, public goods are non-excludable and non-rival, meaning that whoever provides the good cannot prevent others from benefiting from it, and one actor can appreciate the good without diminishing the ability of others to take pleasure in it as well (Cornes and Sandler 1996, 8-9).

However, some economists have attempted to push beyond this binary characterisation of goods and instead propose an alternative conceptualisation that views goods along a “spectrum” between purely public and purely private, where some of these “impure” public goods are more rival and excludable or less rival and excludable than others (Cornes and Sandler 1996, 6 and 241). Cornes and Sandler (1996, 9) explain that the provision of impure public goods sometimes generates joint products, which are “multiple outputs, some of which can be private, others purely public, and still others impurely public.”

In the context of resettlement, one could interpret this durable solution as excludable and rival in certain ways. Resettlement could be seen as excludable because only individuals recognised as refugees within the meaning of the 1951 *Convention relating to the Status of Refugees* and the 1967 *Protocol* are eligible for resettlement. In this way, resettlement could generate excludable and rival humanitarian protection benefits for resettled refugees. Furthermore, resettlement is only appropriate for refugees who are unable to integrate locally or voluntarily return to their respective countries of origin. In addition, since governments (including the US) retain full discretion over admissions, not every refugee referred by the UNHCR or other organisations will be offered resettlement. One could also interpret the provision of resettlement as rival, since the gap between resettlement needs and admissions means that each refugee who obtains resettlement diminishes the availability of resettlement places for other refugees. However, the responses articulated by government officials and voluntary agency representatives indicate that contributing to resettlement is perceived to benefit both refugees and the US more generally, suggesting that resettlement may not be a private good.

If resettlement is not a private good, then one could potentially interpret this durable solution as a public good. If the provision of resettlement is perceived to benefit refugees *and* other parties, then it could be non-excludable and non-rival since whoever offers resettlement could find it all but impossible to prevent others from benefiting from it, and other actors could appreciate the provision of this durable solution without diminishing the ability of others to do the same (e.g. Cornes and Sandler 1996, 8-9). However, the theory of public goods predicts that actors will not provide a Pareto efficient level of pure public goods because the non-excludable, non-rival nature of these goods creates an incentive for actors to free ride on the anticipated contributions of others (Cornes and Sandler 1996, 22-23; Gruber 2011, 188; Samuelson 1954, 388).

In the context of resettlement, this suggests that governments should face a classic Prisoner’s Dilemma in which they have no incentives to provide this durable solution. Instead,

governments should have a powerful incentive to free ride on the anticipated contributions of other states, confident that they can still benefit from the positive externalities generated from others providing this durable solution. Though this could partially explain the underprovision of resettlement places, there is little evidence that the US engages in free riding—especially since the evidence demonstrates that it made the largest absolute contributions to resettlement between fiscal years 1980 and 2016. The US was also among the largest relative contributors to resettlement during this period. These observations indicate that the US may have found the incentives necessary to overcome the impetus for free riding, suggesting that resettlement is not a pure public good.³⁰

One could interpret the responses articulated by government officials and voluntary agency representatives as consistent with the literature on resettlement as a public good (e.g. Suhrke 1998). First, as noted in chapter one, Suhrke (1998) develops a general conceptualisation of resettlement as a public good and does not elaborate on the nature of this good. Nevertheless, the responses concerning the perceived influence of humanitarianism and the norms of international responsibility sharing and the strategic use of resettlement could be interpreted as consistent with her argument that governments contribute to refugee protection because they believe that international law creates a collective “moral duty” and “obligation” to assist refugees and that assisting persons in need of protection reduces global inequality and minimises the incentives for economically disadvantaged countries to restrict access to asylum (Suhrke 1998, 398).

Second, these perceptions could be interpreted as consistent with the more recent literature on the provision of refugee protection through asylum as an impure public good (e.g. Betts 2003; Hatton 2012; Thielemann 2003; Thielemann and Dewan 2006). The responses concerning the perceived influence of humanitarianism and the norms of international responsibility sharing and the strategic use of resettlement could be interpreted as consistent with the arguments from Betts (2003, 266-88), who contends that governments could be more generous in granting protection to asylum seekers because they derive excludable ‘altruistic’

³⁰ This does not negate the possibility that other countries engage in free riding or other forms of Pareto inefficient behaviour, such as the exploitative behaviour identified by Olson (1965, 29; see also Olson and Zeckhauser 1966). However, an examination of these behaviours is beyond the scope of this thesis, given that this thesis concentrates exclusively on the US and Canada. Nevertheless, it should be noted that Thielemann and Dewan (2006, 358) analyse decisions to grant protection to asylum seekers in 15 OECD countries and found “no evidence of systematic exploitation of the big by the small.”

benefits from these acts.³¹ In particular, Betts (2003, 266-88) suggests that these countries may be more generous because they derive a “warm glow” from demonstrating a commitment to “ethical or legal norms” such as fairness and the protection of human rights. Similarly, Thielemann (2003, 255, 257-58, and 265-69) contends that governments may have been more generous in their contributions to the Humanitarian Evacuation Programme for Kosovar refugees because of the perceived “excludable” benefits they derived from demonstrating a commitment to the norms of international responsibility sharing and solidarity with countries of first asylum.

One could also interpret the perceived humanitarian and normative motivations for resettlement as consistent with the economic literature on contributions to public goods. Historically, many academics argued that actors can overcome the purported incentives for free riding and contribute to public goods for purely unselfish reasons (Becker 1974; Coleman 1966; Collard 1978, chapters one and 10; Margolis 1982, chapter two; Roberts 1984). However, other economists later challenged these claims on both theoretical and empirical grounds (e.g. Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian 1986; Sugden 1982).

In response, Margolis (1982) attempted to add nuance to our understanding of altruism through his distinction between ‘participation altruism’ and ‘goods altruism.’ Margolis (1982, 21) argues that individuals could be motivated to contribute to the provision of public goods because they derive “satisfaction from helping others,” especially if they believe that they are contributing to a “socially useful” cause. Furthermore, Margolis (1982, 23) contends that individuals could contribute to public goods if they believe that their contribution made at least a marginal impact on the total supply of that good. These behaviours are not mutually exclusive but mutually reinforcing, as utility maximisation depends on both the act of giving and the amount given (Margolis 1982, 24).

Similarly, Andreoni (1989, 1448-49) theorises that individuals contribute to public goods because they demand a higher level of provision and based on the perception that they derive “some private goods benefit from their gift per se, like a warm glow.” On that basis, Andreoni (1989, 1449) develops a model in which individuals have impurely altruistic motives for contributing to the provision of public goods, and he theorises that “the warm glow is an increasing function of what is given.”

³¹ Some clarification on terminology may be useful here. In his article, Betts appears to use the terms “altruistic benefit” and “warm glow” interchangeably. However, a closer reading of the economic literature on impure altruism demonstrates that altruism is one of the factors that motivates individuals to contribute to a public good, while the warm glow is the benefit they derive from this charitable act (Andreoni 1990, 465-468).

These contributions suggest that individuals can derive a partially excludable benefit from *their* contribution, not just the contributions of others. Furthermore, their arguments on the interactive relationship between contributions and benefits suggest that the more individuals donate, the more of a ‘warm glow’ they receive in return (Andreoni 1989; Margolis 1982). These contributions are important because the nature of impure public goods can also impact their provision. Cornes and Sandler (1984, 595) demonstrate that joint products have a privatising effect “not unlike the establishment of property rights.” Given that privatisation is one of the strategies that can be used to eliminate free riding, the existence of joint products could dissuade actors from free riding (Cornes and Sandler 1984, 589-90; Perloff 2011, 590). For this reason, Cornes and Sandler (1984, 589-90) argue that free riding is “not an inevitable feature of public goods models.”

One could interpret the provision of resettlement as an impure public good that generates joint products in the form of excludable, rival protection benefits for refugees as well as impurely public ‘warm glow’ benefits for the US. This warm glow could be seen as excludable but non-rival joint product since only residents of the US could derive a warm glow from the decision to welcome refugees into their country or from demonstrating a commitment to the norms and principles embedded in the 1951 *Convention relating to the Status of Refugees*, but one individual may derive a warm glow from this act without diminishing the potential ability of other citizens to enjoy this warm glow as well.

In addition to the perceived humanitarian and normative motivations for resettlement, one could interpret the perceived reputational benefits of resettlement as consistent with aspects of the literature on refugee protection as an impure public good. Chapter one mentioned that Betts (2003, 276 and 286-87) theorises that some European governments are generous in granting protection to asylum seekers because they derive ‘prestige’ benefits from granting protection that they can leverage in other policy areas due to issue linkages. Though Betts (2003, 287) argues that governments are unlikely to grant protection to asylum seekers for the sole purpose of obtaining reputational benefits, his proposition appears consistent with functional regime theory, which argues that governments can potentially improve their reputations by demonstrating compliance with international regimes—especially when the regime creates a perceived moral obligation (Keohane 1984, 105-06 and 126-27).

Reputational gains are valuable because this quality can provide an actor with essential information about the possible behaviour of other actors that, in turn, may influence their own actions (Axelrod 1984, 151). Similarly, Keohane (1984, 127) adds that compliance with rules and principles that are perceived to create moral obligations can have an especially positive

reputational effect because “adhering to a moral code may identify an actor as a political cooperator, part of a cluster of players with whom mutually beneficial agreements can be made [...].” Conversely, if countries shirk their commitments (particularly those that are perceived to be moral obligations) their reputation could suffer and they may find it more difficult to secure agreements later on, thus increasing transaction costs (Keohane 1984, 105-06 and 126-27).

In the context of resettlement, participation is not a matter of compliance *sensu stricto* because countries are not obligated to resettle refugees (UNHCR 2011, 36). However, one could interpret the participation of the US in resettlement as an expression of voluntary compliance with the norms embedded in the 1951 *Convention relating to the Status of Refugees* and the *Multilateral Framework of Understandings on Resettlement*, including refugee protection, international responsibility sharing, and solidarity. In addition to citing the influence of norms, some respondents mentioned the perceived importance of resettling large numbers of refugees and indicated that there is a perceived link between these sizeable contributions and the credibility and legitimacy of the US as an international humanitarian actor.

The US could benefit from this demonstration of voluntary compliance and from making sizeable contributions to resettlement insofar as it could leverage its reputation for compliance to secure concessions such as encouraging other countries to adopt resettlement programmes or promoting a more strategic use of this durable solution. Such an approach could prove advantageous since Loescher and Milner (2011, 203-04) argue that “resettlement represents an important and growing area of cooperation between UNHCR and states [and] an important area of future innovation within the global governance of refugees.” One could interpret this perceived reputational gain as an excludable, non-rival joint product of resettlement because only the US can enjoy the reputational benefits of demonstrating voluntary compliance with the norms and principles of the international refugee regime.³² However, the US can derive reputational gains without diminishing the ability of other governments to demonstrate their voluntary compliance and enjoy the same reputational benefits.

Finally, one could also interpret the responses on the perceived cultural benefits of resettlement as consistent with literature on culture as a public good. Throsby (2010, 172) explains that “the variety of cultures and cultural expressions are seen as [...] having qualities

³² For a general discussion of the characteristics of reputation as a public good, see Phelan (2009, 16).

that are valued as a part of the ‘human mosaic.’” In this way, Throsby (2010, 172) conceptualises cultural diversity as a public good that has “existence value” because individuals “gain benefit from the knowledge that biodiversity and cultural diversity in all their richness are simply there.”

Though the current literature on refugee protection as a public good does not discuss this benefit, Singer and Singer (1988, 123) argue that residents of a receiving country may benefit from the admission of refugees in that they “may enjoy the more cosmopolitan atmosphere created by new arrivals from other countries” including new shops and restaurants. In addition, Singer and Singer (1988, 123) indicate that the increased cultural diversity resulting from resettlement can also have longer-term advantages insofar as refugees may introduce “different ideas and ways of living.” One could interpret the perceived cultural benefits articulated by interviewees as an excludable, non-rival joint product of resettlement because only residents of the US can benefit from increased cultural diversity, but one person’s enjoyment of this diversity does not prevent other residents from enjoying these benefits as well.

To be sure, not all Americans welcome cultural diversity. Since the mid-nineteenth century, ‘nativists’ have argued that immigrants cannot or will not adopt the democratic values of the US (Citrin and Sides 2008, 35). In 1986, a public opinion poll found that one third of respondents believed that the “biggest problem” associated with immigration was the “negative cultural or personality traits” of immigrants, such as their perceived inability to communicate in English and different ideological beliefs (Day 1990, no pagination cited in Espenshade and Hempstead 1996, 540). There are also similar concerns at the political level, where some officials fear that undocumented immigrants will undermine American culture by maintaining their own “private cultures” instead (Cornelius 1982, no pagination cited in Espenshade and Calhoun 1993, 192; see also Harwood 1986, 204-05). The 2016 election of Republican President Donald Trump and some of the measures he has taken to restrict resettlement in the US indicate that participation in resettlement and the perceived benefits of contributing to this durable solution remain contested today.

However, more recent research demonstrates that the US is more accepting of cultural and religious heterogeneity than any European country that participated in the European Social Survey (Citrin and Sides 2008, 37). One could interpret the disconnect between these views and those of the general public as a reflection of the longstanding tension between assimilation and pluralism in the US. Though a detailed analysis of this debate is beyond the scope of this thesis, the US historically adopted an assimilationist conceptualisation of immigrant

integration embodied in the Emersonian image of the melting pot, which became a “political symbol used to strengthen and legitimize the ideology of America as a land of opportunity where race, religion, and national origin should not be barriers to social mobility (Glazer 1993, 125; Hirschman 1983, 398).” Though Hirschman, Kasinitz, and DeWind (1999, 129) contend that the assimilationist approach began to lose credibility during the civil rights movement given the mounting empirical evidence that “ethnicity remained an important reference point for urban politics,” Brubaker (2001, 533) argues that readers should not be overzealous in “consigning assimilation to the dustbin of history” as immigrants may demonstrate assimilation in some aspects of their lives and a more pluralist approach to integration in others.

How could this conceptual approach contribute to our understanding of why the US has voluntarily adopted generous resettlement admissions policies? Interpreting resettlement as an impure public good that generates joint products including private protection benefits and perceived excludable, non-rival warm glow, reputational, and cultural benefits could help us better understand (a) why the US resettles refugees as opposed to free riding on the contributions of others, and (b) why the US has voluntarily adopted generous resettlement admissions policies. The US could voluntarily contribute to resettlement (as opposed to free riding on the contributions of other states) because of an impurely altruistic perception that it derives a ‘warm glow’ from ‘rescuing’ or ‘saving the lives’ of persecuted individuals and from actively demonstrating its respect for norms and principles such as international responsibility sharing and preserving access to asylum. Furthermore, the US could have voluntarily adopted generous resettlement admissions policies because making significant contributions to this durable solution is perceived to generate an even greater sense of satisfaction. Likewise, the US could voluntarily contribute to resettlement because the government believes it derives valuable reputational gains that it can leverage in other areas of the international refugee regime (especially because of the credibility and legitimacy it derives from resettling large numbers of refugees), and excludable cultural benefits for many of its citizens due to its sizeable contributions in this area.

In sum, this section attempted to achieve a better understanding of the potential reasons why the US has voluntarily adopted generous resettlement admissions policies through an exploration of the perceived motivations for resettlement and its benefits. Interviews with senior government officials responsible for resettlement policymaking in the US and with representatives from the nine voluntary agencies that implement the Resettlement Admissions and Reception and Placement programmes indicated that there is a perceived humanitarian motivation for contributing to resettlement, as it can be a lifeline for individuals whose safety

and other fundamental rights are at risk in their respective countries of first asylum. Furthermore, the responses articulated by these interviewees suggests that there a perceived normative motivation for contributing to resettlement, as participating in this durable solution is consistent with the norms of international responsibility sharing embedded in the 1951 *Convention relating to the Status of Refugees*. In addition, some interviewees highlighted the important role of resettlement in preserving access to countries of first asylum. One could interpret this point of view that as consistent with contemporary UNHCR efforts to strategically utilise resettlement. Many of the interviewees also suggested that contributing to resettlement is consistent with the history, identity, and the religious and secular values of the US, and generates cultural benefits for receiving communities.

To better understand the potential reasons why the US has voluntarily adopted generous resettlement admissions policies, and in a manner consistent with the epistemological and ontological foundations of this thesis, these views were interpreted in relation to the existing literature on refugee protection. The author suggested that the perceptions articulated by interviewees could be interpreted as consistent with the literature on refugee protection as an impure public good. Contributing to resettlement and, in the process, demonstrating a commitment to the norms embedded in the international refugee regime and gaining cultural diversity, could be interpreted as an impure public good which accrues to the US through its contributions to this durable solution. One could interpret the generosity of resettlement admissions policies in the US as consistent with the literature on participation and goods altruism.

To be sure, not all citizens share the views articulated by these interviewees, and there is growing evidence of contestation in resettlement policy. Nevertheless, the responses do offer a sense of how senior officials responsible for setting policy and voluntary agencies responsible for implementation perceive the motivations for resettlement and its benefits, helping us move towards a better understanding of why the US has voluntarily adopted generous resettlement admissions policies. This discussion sets the stage for an exploration of the perceived nature of government-voluntary sector relations in resettlement in section 2.6, and an exploration of the potential relationship between resettlement admissions and domestic responsibility sharing with voluntary agencies in section 2.7.

2.6 The Perceived Nature of Government-Voluntary Sector Relations in Resettlement

In the preceding section, interviewees articulated their perceptions on the motivations for resettling refugees in the US and its benefits. Their responses paint a nuanced picture in which the humanitarian and normative rationale for providing resettlement complement

explanations concerning the history, identity, and values of the US as well as perceived reputational and cultural benefits. This section presents the views of senior government officials and voluntary agency representatives on the perceived nature of their relationship in resettlement, and endeavours to interpret these perceptions in relation to the literature. One could interpret the views articulated by these respondents as consistent with the dominant taxonomy on government-voluntary sector relations and the historical evolution of government-voluntary sector relations in the provision of public goods and services in the US. However, though government officials and many voluntary agency representatives indicated that both parties benefit from collaboration through the Resettlement Admissions Program, others suggested that this partnership has certain pitfalls. One could interpret these views as consistent with aspects of the literature on the perils of government contracting to voluntary sector organisations, and points to the complexity of domestic responsibility sharing arrangements in resettlement.

During the interviews, the author asked respondents to describe the perceived nature of government-voluntary agency relations in resettlement to the US. The author asked this question to better understand how government officials and voluntary agency representatives view their relationship in their own words. In response, many representatives from both government and voluntary agencies emphasised the collaborative nature of their relationship in the provision of this durable solution (Gershowitz 2013; Famini 2013; Kekic 2013; Kosten 2013; Negash 2013; Robinson 2013; Scott 2013; Stein 2013; Young 2013). In an interview on 10 April, 2013, Eskinder Negash, then the Director of the Office of Refugee Resettlement, characterised the nature of government-voluntary agency relations in resettlement as a partnership. Similarly, Ambassador Robinson (2013) argued that voluntary sector organisations are “equal partners in the program” and characterised their involvement in resettlement as “essential,” adding that “we could not do this without those organizations [sic]—that goes without saying.”

Many voluntary agency representatives described the nature of their relationship with the federal government in similar terms. Ambassador Johnny Young (2013) argued that government-voluntary agency relations are “truly a partnership. I think that’s why it works so well.” Ambassador Young added that voluntary agencies “don’t substitute for what the government does, and they don’t substitute for what we do.” In the same interview, Mr Scott (2013) articulated a similar view and indicated that there is a fundamental interdependence between the government and voluntary sector organisations in resettlement to the US, calling their relationship “symbiotic.” Notably, in an interview on 12 April, 2013, Erol Kekic, the

Executive Director of Church World Service’s Immigration and Refugee Program, also described government-voluntary agency relations as “symbiotic.” He explained that the provision of resettlement “really is a joint endeavour,” adding that it “really is something we plan for together and we implement together.”

Despite emphasising the perceived collaborative nature of relations in resettlement, government officials and many voluntary agency representatives indicated that the federal government has a finite role in the financing and implementation of this durable solution. From a financial perspective, Ambassador Robinson (2013) argued that the federal government is “the largest financial supporter” of the Resettlement Admissions and Reception and Placement programmes, and that it is “the federal dollar that let’s those services happen, up to a certain point.” Nevertheless, Ambassador Robinson acknowledged that voluntary sector organisations also contribute financial and human resources or “sweat equity” to the resettlement process.

Mr Negash (2013) also acknowledged the limited role of government in resettlement, though his views diverged somewhat from those expressed by Ambassador Robinson. More precisely, Mr Negash argued that because the per capita grant provided to voluntary organisations through the Reception and Placement Program is insufficient to cover the full costs of resettlement, voluntary agencies contribute more to the resettlement process than they receive from the government.

Many representatives from voluntary sector organisations also argued that they contribute additional (and often unique) resources to the resettlement process (Carey 2013; Gnaho 2013; Famini 2013; Kekic 2013; Kosten 2013; Limón 2013; Nesheim Bullock 2013; Scott 2013; Sok 2013; Stein 2013; Young 2013). Mr Scott (2013) explained that, though the government provides the “overwhelming majority” of funding for resettlement, there is an “unofficial expectation that there will be private resources contributed. Simply because if you just relied on the federal money, you couldn’t do the job. It just wouldn’t be sufficient.” Mr Carey (2013) agreed that “We bring a lot of private resources to the process,” including financial resources as well as volunteers who offer tutoring assistance, transportation, language instruction, and other essential services. For this reason, Mr Carey (2013) described voluntary agencies as the “core” of the Resettlement Admissions Program. Ambassador Young (2013) also highlighted the important role of volunteers in the resettlement process and suggested that these volunteers play a ‘supplementary’ role insofar as they help local affiliates locate in-kind donations such as furniture and assist refugees in finding employment, among other “essential” services.

In addition to contributing funds and providing services and other forms of assistance that are perceived to be beyond the capacity of government, some voluntary agency representatives implied that voluntary agencies can deliver more specialised services. Ms Stein (2013) argued that the Department of State does not have the human resources to provide settlement and social services, nor can they offer “culturally or linguistically appropriate” services in the same way as local affiliates, who often employ former refugees. Ms Stein (2013) further argued that it was more cost-effective, pragmatic, and better for refugees for the government to delegate this function to voluntary agencies as these organisations contribute their respective resources to the resettlement process and have a wider reach through their local affiliates, who can more effectively build relationships with refugees. This perspective suggests that voluntary agencies may be perceived to enjoy a comparative advantage in the provision of resettlement thanks to their ability to draw on the knowledge and skills of local affiliates, including former resettled refugees.

These responses suggest that government officials and voluntary agency representatives perceive their relationship as a partnership. This partnership appears to be an interdependent one in some respects, but there also appears to be a pragmatic acknowledgement that government support for resettlement is finite and that voluntary agencies must contribute their respective resources in order to support the effective reception, orientation, and integration of refugees through the Resettlement Admissions and Reception and Placement programmes.

To better understand the perceived structure of government-voluntary agency relations in resettlement, this chapter now seeks to interpret the views articulated by government officials and voluntary agency representatives in relation to the literature. Despite the enduring and extensive nature of government-voluntary sector relations in the provision of social services in the US, few academics have studied this pattern of service provision (Salamon 1987; c.f. Kramer 1981). In a widely cited paper, Salamon (1987, 29) laments that, “Few facets of the American welfare state have been so thoroughly overlooked or so commonly misunderstood as the role of the nonprofit sector and the relationships between nonprofit organizations [sic] and government.” Fortunately, many scholars have since taken up the challenge of achieving a better understanding of government-voluntary sector relations, and a number of taxonomies have emerged in recent years. Though some academics categorise government-voluntary sector relations along a unidimensional spectrum (Coston 1998), the more common approach has been to create discrete but potentially overlapping taxonomies that distinguish between cases in which governments and voluntary sector organisations have no

formal relationship, instances in which governments and voluntary sector organisations collaborate as partners or situations in which governments and voluntary sector organisations have developed an antagonistic relationship (Kramer 1981; Najam 2000; Saidel 1989; Young 1999; Young 2000).

One could interpret the responses articulated above as consistent with the dominant taxonomy on government-voluntary sector relations. In his influential taxonomy, Young (1999; 2000) argues that government-voluntary sector relations can be ‘complementary,’ ‘supplementary,’ or ‘adversarial.’³³ Drawing on the economic literature and, in particular, the seminal work of Burton Weisbrod (1975 [1986]) on the role of voluntary sector organisations in the provision of public goods, Young (1999, 33; 2000, 150) suggests that governments and voluntary sector organisations may develop complementary relationships when the provision of public goods and services would ordinarily require an extensive bureaucratic apparatus, when there is a strong likelihood of free riding, and (or) when public opinion supports alternative service delivery models. In response to these circumstances, governments and voluntary sector organisations can elect to forge a partnership in which the government finances the voluntary sector provision of public goods and services (Young 1999, 33; Young 2000, 150).

In the process, governments and voluntary sector organisations form a ‘symbiotic’ relationship which produces advantages for both partners (Grønbjerg 1987, 66; see also Young 2000, 150). Though contracting out the provision of public goods and services to voluntary sector organisations may be more cost-effective, developing complementary relationships with these organisations can also enable government to overcome informational asymmetries and enable them (through voluntary sector organisations) to provide goods and services that are more tailored to the needs of the individual communities they serve (Young 2000, 154). Though Young does not articulate the precise benefits that voluntary sector organisations derive from complementary relationships, other scholars have argued that governments can provide voluntary sector organisations with a comparatively stable source of funding, thus helping to attenuate the ‘resource dependence’ problem that is endemic in the voluntary sector (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978, 2; Froelich 1999, 247). In the context of immigration, the provision of financial support to immigrant-serving community organisations can enhance organisational capacity in these groups (Bloemraad 2006, 165-70).

³³ Coston (1998), Kramer (1981), and Najam (2000) all use similar conceptual frameworks and terminology.

In the supplementary model, voluntary sector organisations fill gaps in the demand for provision of public goods and services that are “unsatisfied by government (Young 1999, 33; Young 2000, 150).” Consequently, as government funding for a particular public good or service declines, private contributions—and thus the level of voluntary sector involvement—are anticipated to increase (Young 2000, 150). Conversely, as government funding increases, the level of private donations and voluntary sector involvement is expected to decline.³⁴

However, Young (1999, 35) is keen to emphasise that the nature of government-voluntary sector relations is not necessarily static. In addition, these categories are not mutually exclusive. Bremner (1988, 216) argues that the nature of government-voluntary sector relations can “shift from time to time to meet changing circumstances and needs,” while Young (2000, 151) adds that government-voluntary sector relations may be simultaneously complementary, supplementary, and (or) adversarial. Government-voluntary sector relations in a particular sector are thus perhaps best understood as being potentially dynamic, with overlaps between complementary, supplementary, and adversarial. In the case of the US, Young (2000, 150) has argued that all three lenses—that is, complementary, supplementary, and adversarial—have been continually relevant throughout history, though one lens may dominate over others at certain times.

One could also interpret the characterisation of government-voluntary sector relations as ‘complementary’ and ‘supplementary’ as consistent with the historical development of relations between these parties in the US. The history of government-voluntary sector relates dates back to the colonial period when governments began to provide funding for “private educational institutions (Salamon 1987, 31-32).” Voluntary sector organisations were so pervasive during this period that Alexis de Tocqueville (1840 [1969], 513) observed in his famous study of American society that “Americans of all ages, all stations of life, and all types of dispositions are forever forming associations. [...] In every case, at the head of any new undertaking, where in France you would find the government or in England some territorial magnate, in the United States you are sure to find an association.” More than one hundred years later, the Commission on Private Philanthropy and Public Needs—more commonly known as the Filer Commission—made a similar observation concerning the deep-seated role of

³⁴ This is consistent with economic arguments that government funding of public goods can partially ‘crowd out’ private contributions (e.g. Abrams and Schmitz 1986; Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian 1986; Bernheim, 1986; Coates 1998; Kingma 1989; Roberts 1984; Warr 1982; Warr 1983). However, the existence and extent of ‘crowding out’ remains contested in the literature, as others contend that governments can provide an incentive for individuals to contribute to the provision of public goods through mechanisms such as charitable grants (e.g. Andreoni 1990; Rose-Ackerman 1986).

voluntary sector organisations in the US. In particular, the Commission noted that “Few aspects of American society are more characteristically, more famously American than the nation’s array of voluntary organizations [sic], and the support in both time and money that is given to them by its citizens (Commission 1977, 9 cited in Dobkin Hall 1987, 11).”

This pattern of government funding for the private, voluntary provision of public goods continued into the nineteenth century when both state and local governments increasingly sought the assistance of voluntary sector organisations to “help relieve the suffering occasioned by rapid urbanization and industrializations [sic] [...] (Salamon 1987, 32).” Kramer (1981, 59) partially attributes the extensive involvement of voluntary sector organisations in the provision of social services during this period to the belief that these organisations “should be encouraged” to alleviate the “burden” of government in this sector. In particular, prominent nineteenth-century philanthropists like Andrew Carnegie promoted a “powerful ideology of voluntarism” based on the belief that private charitable organisations could be a “superior substitute” to government action (Salamon 1997, 287). Many philanthropists also believed that government-funded social assistance programmes promoted dependence (Smith and Lipsky 1993, 48-50; Young 1999, 45). In addition, many voluntary sector organisations opposed government intervention because they believed that the local community should bear responsibility for assisting those in need (Smith and Lipsky 1993, 50). When the government did fund voluntary sector organisations, its contribution was limited, and there was an expectation that these groups would draw upon their private resources to make up any shortfall (Smith and Lipsky 1993, 47-48).

Voluntary sector organisations maintained a “substantial” role in the provision of social services throughout the development and expansion of the welfare state from the Progressive era until the Great Depression (Salamon 1987, 33-35; Salamon 1997, 288). Though the Republican President Herbert Hoover initially encouraged charitable organisations to assist individuals in need, the scale and scope of economic dislocation prompted Democratic President Franklin D. Roosevelt to intervene in the provision of relief through the enactment of the 1935 Social Security Act and the New Deal programme (Kramer 1981, 65; Salamon 1997, 288; Young 1999, 46). Though these developments did not fully displace the voluntary sector, these organisations turned their attention towards identifying needs and developing innovative solutions to address those requirements (Kramer 1981, 66; Salamon 1997, 288).

Following the end of World War II, the nature of government-voluntary sector relations began to change as the federal government augmented funding for social services (Smith and Lipsky 1993, 50). However, access to entitlement programmes remained “patchy and

incomplete” during this period (Anheier 2005, 28). In the face of complaints regarding the standard of care and in response to public pressure to expand access to ‘entitlement’ programmes, the federal government substantially increased funding for social services during the era which later became known as the ‘Great Society’ period (Salamon 1997, 289; Smith and Lipsky 1993, 53-54). In the process, the federal government adopted the “novel” approach of encouraging states to contract out the delivery of services to voluntary sector organisations (Smith and Lipsky 1993, 55). This decision marked a watershed moment in government-voluntary sector relations in the US and amendments to the *Social Security Act* of 1967 institutionalised this approach (Smith and Lipsky 1993, 55).

Salamon (1997, 289 original emphasis) argues that during the “Great Society” period, the links between the government and voluntary sector were so deep that “non-profit organisations were delivering a larger share of *government-financed* human services than all levels of government combined, and government support had outdistanced the support these institutions received from private charitable organizations by a factor of almost two to one.” Though the extensive federal support for voluntary sector organisations benefited many organisations that had faced financial struggles, some voluntary sector representatives expressed concern that increased federal funding would “compromise and undermine their mission” and constrain their ability to engage in advocacy (Smith and Lipsky 1993, 57-58).

However, extensive federal funding for voluntary sector organisations proved short-lived. Following his election in 1981, the Republican President Ronald Reagan adopted extensive retrenchment measures that had a profound impact on many voluntary sector organisations that depended on government funding (Salamon 2001, 23; Smith and Lipsky 1993, 62-63 and 66). President Reagan pursued this “fundamental reordering of institutions” based on the belief that the federal government is a “parasite usurper of the private sector” and that control over governance should be given back to state and local governments and accompanied by economic deregulation (Dobkin Hall 1987, 12). Though subsequent governments have increased federal funding for social services and voluntary sector organisations, the current level of financial support remains lower than in the 1960s and 1970s (Salamon 2012, 23).

In the context of the US, Young (2000, 157-58 and 168) argues that government-voluntary sector relations have been “substantially mixed” relations have been “weighted toward the complementary mode” due to the “strong emphasis not only on free speech and religious freedom and diversity but also a strong popular predilection toward limiting government.” In the context of the US, the supplementary model appears to have dominated

during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, when the government played a “very modest” role in social policy and voluntary sector organisations assumed much of the responsibility for providing social assistance during this period of large-scale immigration and industrialisation (Young 2000, 157). Since the 1980s, government-voluntary sector relations in the US have taken on a more supplementary character, as fiscal conservatism has prompted the government to assume a more “passive” role in the provision of public goods and services, while ‘expecting’ the voluntary sector to fill the gaps by raising funds and supplying volunteers (Young 2000, 158).

He contends that the complementary lens is most useful for understanding the pattern of government-voluntary sector relations since the end of World War II when the government assumed a more active role in social policy but sought to minimise the size of its administrative and operational apparatuses. Though Young (2000, 158) argues that the scope of government-voluntary sector partnerships in the US has expanded since the 1980s, he contends that the nature of this relationship has shifted away from complementary towards supplementary as the federal government has withdrawn its financial support for a number of social services. Young (2000, 168) concludes that “Thus, despite historical ebbs and flows, the US has always nurtured a stream of voluntary activity parallel to and independent of government, as well as a substantial adversarial component to its nonprofit sector.”

The interpretation of current government-voluntary sector relations as moving from supplementary to both complementary and supplementary also appears to align with the historical evolution of government-voluntary agencies in resettlement. Before World War II, the government and voluntary agencies had a clear division of responsibilities insofar as the government established admissions policies and voluntary agencies safeguarded against refugees becoming a “public burden” following their arrival in the US (Haines 2010, 143).

However, the onset of World War II proved to be formative for the development of partnerships between the government and voluntary agencies. During World War II, President Roosevelt created the War Relief Control Board to coordinate efforts by government bodies and voluntary agencies to provide humanitarian relief overseas (Brown and Scribner 2014, 103). In many ways, the activities of the War Relief Control Board simply extended the domestic assistance that voluntary agencies had long provided to new immigrants to the US (Zucker 1983, 173). Nevertheless, the creation of the Board also precipitated the formation of the American Council of Voluntary Agencies in Foreign Service—an interfaith organisation of Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish groups who coordinated the efforts of participating voluntary

agencies and served as an “interlocutor” with the federal government (Brown and Scribner 2014, 104).

Despite this new initiative, the federal government and voluntary agencies did not immediately form partnerships. Though voluntary agencies lacked sufficient resources to effectively address a crisis of this scale, the federal government initially declined to offer financial assistance as some “influential government officials” opposed efforts by President Roosevelt and President Truman to resettle European refugees in the US (Brown and Scribner 2014, 104). The Corporate Affidavit Program introduced in 1946 required voluntary agencies to fund travel costs for each resettled refugee and to provide financial support to refugees following their arrival—a measure which ensured that these refugees could be admitted to the US while circumventing requirements designed to ensure that no immigrant would become a “public charge (Zucker 1983, 173; see also Brown and Scribner 2014, 104 and Hutchinson 1981, 529).” Though the division of responsibilities under the Program was less than equal, the Corporate Affidavit Program constitutes the first institutionalised form of collaboration between the federal government and voluntary agencies on resettlement to the US. In this way, the Corporate Affidavit Program sowed the “seeds” which would grow throughout the second half of the twentieth century and become fully fleshed out and institutionalised in the *Refugee Act* of 1980 (Brown and Scribner 2014, 103).

However, the *Displaced Persons Act* of 1948 precipitated a notable change in government-voluntary sector relations. The *Act* established the US Displaced Persons Commission to identify and select refugees in need of resettlement in the US (Genizi 1993, 114-15). The Commission granted 19 voluntary agencies responsibility for locating American citizens willing to offer jobs and housing to the refugees (Genizi 1993, 116 and 119). In addition, state-level Displaced Persons commissions worked with the voluntary and private sectors to raise awareness about the crisis and to facilitate the integration of refugees following their arrival (Genizi 1993, 120). Though operational problems hampered the implementation of the *Act*, the Commission nevertheless succeeded in resettling nearly 400,000 refugees between 1948 and 1952 (Genizi 1993, 127).

During the Hungarian refugee crisis, the voluntary sector assumed a more prominent role in resettlement (Loescher and Scanlan 1986, 59). However, their increased role can be attributed more to the lack of federal capacity to respond to the sudden outflow of refugees than to a deliberate decision to involve the voluntary agencies more in refugee protection (Loescher and Scanlan 1986, 59). Nevertheless, voluntary agencies took on the responsibility of selecting refugees for resettlement, as well as continuing their role in offering reception and

integration support to refugees after arrival (Loescher and Scanlan 1986, 59). For its part, the government funded the transportation of some of the Hungarian refugees, and also assisted them in finding employment and housing, as well as raising awareness and building community support for resettlement through the President's Committee for Hungarian Refugee Relief (Loescher and Scanlan 1986, 60).

Though unrelated to resettlement, the increase in Cuban asylum seekers from 1960 onwards prompted a “major change” in government-voluntary sector relations in refugee protection as it marked the first time that the government agreed to provide funding to directly support the work of voluntary sector organisations (Haines 2010, 144). In 1960, President Eisenhower created the Cuban Refugee Emergency Center in Miami, Florida to help voluntary agencies coordinate their assistance efforts (García 1996, 21; Sargent, Hohm, and Moser 1999, 404). The administration characterised the arrival of Cuban asylum seekers as a unique and temporary situation, and so it declined to provide any direct financial assistance to voluntary agencies, which remained responsible for collecting clothing and food for asylum seekers and helping them access health services (García 1996, 21).

However, the Democratic President John F. Kennedy soon began to characterise Cubans as victims of the Cold War and claimed that the US had a duty to admit them (García 1996, 22). In 1961, President Kennedy established the Cuban Refugee Program which funded their resettlement and basic needs including food, medical care, employment training, and adult education (García 1996, 23; Sargent, Hohm, and Moser 1999, 404). Gibney (2004, 149) notes that federal intervention alleviated state and local budgetary pressures while offering a “level of services for Cuban refugees that was at the time unprecedented even for US citizens.” In 1962, President Kennedy introduced the Migration and Refugee Assistance Act. Holman (1992, 7-8) notes that this “was the first legislation specifically authorising a broad array of domestic assistance and services for refugees within the US and the funds to pay for them.”

The structure of government-voluntary agency relations which evolved during the Cuban ‘asylee’ crisis became a model which the government replicated during the Southeast Asian refugee crisis. That is, the government assumed responsibility for the processing of resettlement applications for these refugees and offered federal funding to state and local governments, while voluntary agencies provided the practical post-arrival assistance and services required to help refugees adjust to their new environment (Haines 2010, 145). In particular, the federal government contracted nine voluntary agencies to provide “reception and

placement” services for these refugees (Robinson 1998, 130).³⁵ In exchange, the federal government provided voluntary agencies with a per capita grant of US\$500 (Robinson 1998, 130).

During this period, voluntary agencies had considerable discretion in how they utilised these grants and delivered services. For example, whereas the International Rescue Committee allocated the funds on an *ad hoc* basis in response to particular refugee needs (such as the purchase of winter clothing), the US Conference of Catholic Bishops offered refugees an upfront payment of US\$300, supplemented by in-kind assistance (Robinson 1998, 131). In addition, some faith-based organisations secured ‘sponsorships’ from their constituent churches, who agreed to undertake “financial and personal responsibility” for refugees for up to two years following their arrival in the US (Loescher and Scanlan 1986, 115; Robinson 1998, 131). Other agencies, such as HIAS, “relied on professionally trained social workers and staff to do the bulk of the resettlement work (Robinson 1998, 131).”

However, the increasing scale of resettlement admissions from Southeast Asia to the US revealed inconsistencies in both the legislative framework on resettlement and the delivery of services for resettled refugees (Haines 2010, 145). Indeed, the legislation and delivery of services was a patchwork of policies and programmes that varied by voluntary agency and refugee origin (Haines 2010, 145). The absence of a cohesive refugee programme prompted Senator Edward Kennedy to organise congressional hearings on the establishment of a new legislative basis for resettlement, which became the *Refugee Act* of 1980 (Haines 2010, 146).

When interpreted in relation to the dominant typology on government-voluntary sector relations, these developments suggest that government-voluntary agency relations in resettlement have evolved from supplementary to more complementary over time, though this evolution has not always been a linear one, and there are still ‘supplementary’ elements in the structure of relations under the Resettlement Admissions and Reception and Placement programmes, as evident in both the structure of these programmes and in the statements articulated by interviewees.

The extensive connections between the federal government and voluntary agencies in resettlement could facilitate the development of an increasingly complementary relationship between these parties. Kramer (1981, 224) notes that there are often close connections between the government and voluntary sector organisations in the US. Dobkin Hall (1987, 17) notes

³⁵ Five of the voluntary agencies cited by Robinson (1998, 130) continue to implement the Reception and Placement Program today. They include Church World Service, HIAS, the Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Service, the International Rescue Committee, and the US Conference of Catholic Bishops.

that there is often “interpenetration” between the government and non-profit sectors, such that government officials often work in the voluntary sector at some point in their career, and vice versa.

In the context of resettlement, there appears to be some “interpenetration” between some government officials and voluntary agency representatives who previously held leadership positions in this area. In addition to the case of Ambassador Young, Lavinia Limón, the former President and Chief Executive Officer of the US Committee for Refugees and Immigrants, is also a former Director of the Office of Refugee Resettlement. Furthermore, Bob Carey, the former Vice President of Resettlement and Migration Policy at the International Rescue Committee, is currently the Director of the Office of Refugee Resettlement. In addition, Eskinder Negash, the former Director of the Office of Refugee Resettlement, is now the Acting Chief Executive Officer at the US Committee for Refugees and Immigrants. In a further illustration of the close interconnection between the government and voluntary sector organisations working on resettlement in the US, former Assistant Secretary Eric Schwartz was appointed President of Refugees International in June 2017. Refugees International is a charitable organisation based in Washington, DC that advocates for “assistance and protection (Refugees International 2018, no pagination).”

In addition to contributing additional resources, whether financial, in-kind, or services provided by volunteers, several respondents indicated that voluntary agencies play a unique role in local communities. Mr Carey (2013) described voluntary agencies as “the bridge to the communities.” Mr Kekic (2013) underlined the important role of local affiliates in building a “crucial link” between resettled refugees and the receiving community, arguing that the programme could not function as well as it does without community “engagement” and “ownership.” In an interview on 16 April, 2013, Ruth Famini, the Director of National Resettlement Programs at World Relief explained that the government has delegated the implementation of the Reception and Placement programme to voluntary agencies, who have developed a dual role as both as the “agents” of government in resettlement and the “liaison between government and receiving communities.”

For some, voluntary agencies also play an important role in providing social support to resettled refugees. Mr Kosten (2013) explained that “I believe from a faith perspective that we’re called to welcome people. And welcoming people means also meeting certain needs. They may be social needs, just relational, you know? Befriending them. Oftentimes, I think, when we think of needs, we think of immediately financial resources, but there are psychological, emotional, you know, social needs that society at large can meet that I don’t

think that government can meet.” These views are consistent with the views that Mr Kosten expressed in the preceding section on the nature of resettlement as an expression of religious faith. This perspective suggests that faith not only guides how some representatives at World Relief perceive the motivations for resettlement but also how the organisation may perceive its role in the Resettlement Admissions and Reception and Placement programmes.

The responses concerning the role of voluntary agencies in creating links to receiving communities could be interpreted as consistent with the literature on voluntary sector organisations and democracy. Once voluntary sector organisations emerge, they become an inalienable component of robust democratic systems. Robert Dahl, the eminent political scientist known for his influential theory of power, argued that voluntary associations are “necessary to the functioning of the democratic process itself,” as organisational pluralism preserves political liberty and guards against government coercion (Dahl 1982, 1). Voluntary associations also contribute to democratic stability by providing a mechanism through which to accommodate divergent citizen preferences, and the interests and values embedded within these preferences (Dahl 1982, 42). In this way, Douglas (1987, 47) argues that a robust voluntary sector “addresses the central paradox of democracy—that the people are sovereign but many: there is not one will of the people but several, sometimes contradictory wills.” However, Anheier (2005, 21-22) also contends that the deep involvement of voluntary sector organisations is connected to the “cultural self-understanding” of the American people, who view their country as an “ongoing ‘experiment’ in civility, community, democracy, and self-governance.” Kramer (1981, 75) attributes this to the ideological conflict between “Social Darwinism, laissez-faire, individualism, free enterprise, and a distrust of government [and] human liberalism and a belief in progress and in governmental intervention to achieve security and equality,” and to the perception that voluntary sector organisations are a crucial component of representative democracy.

The comments articulated by Ambassador Young (2013) and Ms Famini (2013) on the nature of voluntary agencies as “implementers” and “agents” are interesting when contrasted against observations from Mr Negash (2013). In particular, Mr Negash (2013) observed that government contracting could be ‘hazardous’ for voluntary agencies insofar as it places pressure on these organisations and can lead them to become ‘government agents.’ Mr Negash (2013) argued that this can lead to mission drift, and noted that voluntary agencies must be careful to maintain a balance in their relationship with government and the communities they serve.

Though none of the voluntary agency representatives interviewed as part of this thesis raised concerns about mission drift, some observed that the nature of government-voluntary agency relations are fluid and suggested voluntary agencies now have less discretion than they once did (Gershowitz 2013; Kekic 2013; Limón 2013). For example, Mr Gershowitz (2013) noted that the government has become more “prescriptive” in its approach to resettlement in recent years, and voluntary agencies now have less discretion to determine the placement of refugees. Mr Gershowitz (2013) added that reporting requirements have also increased due to concerns raised by elected officials and members of the press. Similarly, in an interview on 9 April, 2013, Ms Limón, then the President and Chief Executive Officer of the US Committee for Refugees and Immigrants, noted that the programme has become more prescriptive and professionalised since the Southeast Asian refugee crisis, and that voluntary agencies have much less discretion in how they deliver services today. Indeed, the Department of State requires voluntary sector organisations to sign a ‘cooperative agreement’ which establishes the resources and services that these organisations must provide through the Reception and Placement Program and the standards they must meet in doing so, among other stipulations (for an example of this agreement and an oversight report, see Department of State 2001 and Lutheran Social Services 2017). However, Ms Limón argued that the detailed nature of the cooperative agreements leaves very little discretion for voluntary agencies. Ms Limón asserted, “You can’t leave it up to the volunteer to even furnish the apartment—the agreement tells you how many forks you have to have and how many chairs you have to have, and you know, it’s kind of ridiculous.” Ms Limón argued that these “stringent” requirements had “changed the character” of the Reception and Placement program.

Though government funding generally represents a stable source of revenue for voluntary sector organisations, scholars continue to debate whether this source of funding can induce “goal displacement” or mission drift (Froelich 1999, 255). Though the empirical evidence on mission drift appears mixed and none of the voluntary agency representatives interviewed for this thesis raised such concerns, there is “overwhelming evidence” that government funding induces “professionalization, bureaucratization, and loss of administrative autonomy (Froelich 1999, 256; see also Eikenberry and Kluver 2004 and Kramer 1981, 165).” To be sure, some monitoring is necessary as governments must ensure that organisations meet the necessary legislative requirements. However, Froelich (1999, 256) notes that ‘bureaucratization’ can reach extremes, in which “Even minute procedural details are specified, leading to high administrative overhead and limited management discretion.” These measures can result in “Responsiveness to the needs of clients is subordinated to equitable treatment of

the public, effectiveness is superseded by accountability, program [sic] and method variety are lost to standardization, and the nonprofit's discretion is tightly constrained by government contract expectations (Froelich 1999, 257)." Ultimately, Froelich (1999, 257) warns there is a risk that "procedures rather than outcomes dominate nonprofit actions."

In the case of resettlement, voluntary agencies must sign detailed cooperative agreements with the Department of State which set standards on the provision of housing and furnishings, food, clothing, and other essential items that voluntary agencies must provide through the Reception and Placement Program (US Department of State 2001, 1-5). Many of these requirements appear designed to ensure that refugees live in safe, affordable accommodation and to ensure that all refugees—who may have very few possessions—have the necessities to live in a modicum of comfort.

However, the comments from Mr Negash on the potential 'hazards' of government-voluntary sector partnerships and the observations from Mr Gershowitz and Ms Limón on the increasing prescriptiveness and drive towards professionalisation also align with some of the literature in this area. In the US, determining voluntary sector reliance on government funding can be challenging, but it is not uncommon for voluntary sector organisations to depend more on government funding and private charitable donations for their survival than other voluntary sector organisations (Boris and Mosher-Williams 1998, 494-95; Froelich 1999, 255; Jenkins 2006, 310).

Nawyn (2005, 59) attests to the potential vulnerability of voluntary agencies in resettlement. Since federal budget appropriations for resettlement vary according to the resettlement ceiling established each fiscal year, the grants and contributions allocated by the federal government to voluntary agencies can also vary from year to year. Thus, a decrease in the resettlement ceiling and funding may force voluntary agencies to reduce their staff (Nawyn 2005, 64). Many voluntary agencies also struggled to stay afloat following the decline in resettlement admissions after the terrorist attacks of 11 September, 2001. The attacks precipitated a change in budget priorities and also coincided with a period of economic stagnation. These developments further constrained the budget for resettlement and the grants and contributions allocated to voluntary agencies, forcing many to downsize their staff (Nawyn 2005, 65). The introduction of enhanced security screening measures also contributed to a backlog in applications, particularly for refugees seeking resettlement from countries in Africa and the Middle East, and consequently, voluntary agencies that primarily resettled refugees from these regions were particularly affected by these circumstances (Nawyn 2005, 65). This change indicates that voluntary agencies may be vulnerable due to their dependence on

government grants and contributions, which can change according to changes in spending priorities and unexpected events.

Recent developments in the US illustrate the potentially negative implications of voluntary agency dependence on government funding. In February 2017, World Relief announced that it was obliged to close the offices of five local affiliates and layoff more than 140 members of staff as a “direct result” of the executive order issued the previous month (World Relief 2017, para. 1 of 4). The potentially negative implications of government-voluntary agency partnerships have also manifested themselves in the recent cuts to the resettlement ceiling and the concomitant reduction in appropriations for the Refugee Admissions and Reception and Placement programmes. In December 2017, the Department of State announced that voluntary agencies that planned to resettle fewer than 100 refugees through local affiliates would no longer be permitted to do so, as a means of lowering administrative costs (Torbati and Rosenberg 2017, para. 6 and 10 of 21). The decision means that “several dozen” local affiliates across the US may be forced to close, and the loss of services may adversely affect the integration of refugees and other immigrants already settled in those communities (Torbati and Rosenberg 2017, para. 8 and 9 of 21). For this reason, further research that examines voluntary agency dependence on government funding in greater detail and that considers the potential implications in relation to the broader context of government-voluntary sector relations could be beneficial.

In sum, interviews with senior government officials and voluntary agency representatives indicate that these parties perceive their relationship as collaborative, with a sense of interdependence between them. Government officials and voluntary agency representatives also acknowledged that there are constraints on the involvement of the federal government in resettlement to the US, and voluntary agencies contribute financial and in-kind resources that are perceived to extend beyond what the federal government can offer. These views could be interpreted as consistent with categorisations of government-voluntary sector relations as ‘complementary’ and ‘supplementary,’ and suggests that the structure of the Resettlement Admissions and Reception and Placement programmes enables the federal government and voluntary agencies to leverage their respective comparative advantages. Despite the positive characterisations conveyed by government and voluntary agency representatives alike, some interviewees raised concerns about the impact of government funding and the declining discretion afforded to voluntary agencies in the implementation of these programmes. This nuanced picture of the perceived nature of government-voluntary

sector relations sets the stage for an exploration of the potential relationship between resettlement admissions and domestic responsibility sharing below.

2.7 The Perceived Relationship between Resettlement Admissions and Domestic Responsibility Sharing

In the preceding section, interviews with senior government officials and voluntary agency representatives indicated that government and voluntary sector organisations have a collaborative relationship, which one could interpret as both complementary and supplementary in nature. This section presents the views of government officials and voluntary agency representatives on the perceived relationship between resettlement admissions and domestic responsibility sharing. Most interviewees indicated that domestic responsibility sharing with voluntary agencies has enhanced resettlement admissions, and one could interpret this perception as consistent with the academic literature on the role of voluntary sector organisations in providing public goods and services. Though voluntary agencies have played an important historical and contemporary role in resettlement, the literature on resettlement to the US indicates that political vagaries have also influenced admissions. Despite the tradition of broad, bipartisan support for resettlement, recent developments could indicate increasing political polarisation and discord on resettlement that may impact resettlement admissions in the future.

When asked about the potential relationship between resettlement admissions and domestic responsibility sharing, the majority of interviewees indicated that the involvement of voluntary agencies had enhanced resettlement admissions to the US (Carey 2013; Gnaho 2013; Famini 2013; Kekic 2013; Kosten 2013; Limón 2013; Nesheim Bullock 2013; Scott 2013; Stein 2013; Young 2013). Many voluntary agency representatives were unequivocal in their responses. Ms Stein (2013) argued that resettlement admissions have “undoubtedly” increased through domestic responsibility sharing with voluntary sector organisations. In a joint interview on 11 April, 2013, Anam Gnaho, the Self-Sufficiency Programs Manager, and Emily Nesheim Bullock, the Refugee Resettlement Program Manager at the Ethiopian Community and Development Council, explained that resettlement capacity is augmented through domestic responsibility sharing, as local affiliates help expand the number of receiving communities and build community support for the programme. For his part, Mr Kekic (2013) succinctly stated that, “Voluntary agencies *are* the capacity of the US to resettle refugees, period.”

In addition, both Ms Limón (2013) and Mr Scott (2013) argued that the government simply cannot resettle refugees without the involvement of voluntary agencies. Ms Limón (2013) argued that “there’s no way that government could do what we do” as individuals who

work for voluntary agencies perceive it as a “mission” and so staff demonstrate a unique level of commitment to assisting refugees. Mr Scott (2013) reiterated his view that the government and voluntary agencies have a partnership in resettlement, explaining, “The government knows that it can’t do this on its own. [...] One cannot survive without the other. I mean, we couldn’t do it because the government has to bring in the refugees, but the government couldn’t bring in the refugees without the agencies.” These views appear consistent with the responses articulated in section 2.6 on the interdependence of the federal government and voluntary agencies, and could be interpreted as consistent with the literature which suggests these parties have developed a relationship of “mutual dependence” in which the government depends on voluntary sector organisations to deliver social services, while these groups rely on government contracts and grants in order to sustain themselves (Smith and Lipsky 1993, 4).

Furthermore, some interviewees suggested that the US could adopt generous resettlement admissions policies due in part to a perception that domestic responsibility reduces the federal share of costs for resettlement (Carey 2013; Kekic 2013; Limón 2013; Scott 2013; Stein 2013). Mr Carey (2013) argued that resettlement admissions had “absolutely” increased through domestic responsibility sharing with voluntary sector organisations due in part to the fact that these organisations “leverage the federal monies to maximum effect.” Similarly, Mr Scott (2013) argued, “The agencies certainly stretch that government dollar much further than the government could, that’s for sure.” In addition, Mr Kekic (2013) explained that the Resettlement Admissions Program is structured “in a way to allow us to do this and to do it at the level where we’re doing it. If government had to fund all these services, we would probably have an admission program [sic] of five thousand people a year.”

However, one interviewee stated that he perceived no relationship between resettlement admissions and the existence of mechanisms for domestic responsibility sharing through government-voluntary agency partnerships in resettlement to the US. In particular, Mr Gershowitz (2013) argued that resettlement admissions decisions are “much more of a political decision than it is—I mean, it is to some extent economics now with the budgetary issues—but most of the trends that we’ve seen in the program [sic] over the last 20, I would say, or even 30 years even, are political or also responding to crises overseas.” One could interpret the view articulated by Mr Gershowitz as consistent with the literature which highlights the relationship between resettlement admissions and foreign policy, as discussed in chapter one.

Though most respondents argued that resettlement admissions have increased through domestic responsibility sharing, some respondents maintained that the US could resettle an even larger number of refugees (Kosten 2013; Young 2013). Mr Kosten (2013) argued that

“our current numbers are woefully inadequate for the need.” Similarly, Ambassador Young (2013) contended that the US should “take a stronger position in admitting more refugees” and explained:

“We can do more—a lot more. I mean, it’s a country of 325 million now, or what have you. A vast land. And when you travel over this country and you see all the land that’s there, there’s no question in my mind that we can take more. You know, people wanted to cut down on the numbers years ago, and we brought them in, they integrated, they’ve done well, they’re making their contribution to the US...we can do much more, much more.”

The responses articulated indicate that the majority of respondents perceive that resettlement admissions have been enhanced through domestic responsibility sharing with voluntary agencies and contribute to our understanding of why the US has voluntarily adopted generous resettlement admissions policies. However, in the hope of achieving a more meaningful understanding of these views, it is useful to consider some of the potential explanations for why collaboration between the federal government and voluntary sector organisations has become such a prominent feature in the delivery of public goods and services in the US. This question has attracted the attention of economists, sociologists, and political scientists, and there is no consensus in the literature to date.

Burton A. Weisbrod (1975 [1986]) was the first economist to develop a theory on the emergence of voluntary sector organisations. Kingma (1997, 135) describes his work as “a cornerstone in the literature on the economics of non-profit organisations,” and his ideas have exerted considerable influence on political scientists and taxonomies on government-voluntary sector relations. In his model of a three-sector economy, Weisbrod (1975 [1986], 3 and 8-9) assumes that individual characteristics such as income, education, ethnicity, and religion influence preferences concerning the provision of private and “collective consumption” goods. Because governments provide collective consumption goods at a level that corresponds to the preferences of the median voter, Weisbrod (1975 [1986], 8-9) theorises that a segment of the population will be dissatisfied with the government provision of a particular collective consumption good.³⁶ On that basis, Weisbrod (1975 [1986], 15) theorises that when the government or private sector organisations provide collective consumption goods at a level that leaves a segment of the population ‘unsatisfied,’ those individuals will seek out additional goods from the voluntary sector.

³⁶ Billis and Glennerster (1998), Grønbjerg (1998), Najam (2000), Salamon (1987), Salamon and Anheier (1998), and Young (1999; 2000) refer to this as “government failure.”

This demand-driven theory is not the only economic theory on voluntary sector provision of public goods and services. Drawing on principal-agent theory and the concept of ‘contract failure,’ Hansmann (1987, 29) theorises that individuals turn to the voluntary sector when they have asymmetric information about public goods and services and fear that private sector organisations could exploit their ignorance. Hansmann (1987, 29) suggests that individuals turn to the voluntary sector because they perceive these organisations as more trustworthy due to the ‘nondistribution constraint’—a concept which suggests that voluntary sector organisations can pursue profit-oriented activities but do not benefit from their revenue, thus minimising the risk of consumer exploitation.

Steinberg and Gray (1993, 29) build on the “seminal” work of Hansmann and attempt to explain why individuals turn to the voluntary sector as opposed to the government, and why these organisations respond to public demands to provide goods and services. Steinberg and Gray (1993, 299) argue that individuals turn to the voluntary sector when the government fails to provide adequate public goods and services due to bureaucratic or political factors, including constraints imposed by median voter preferences. In this way, their analysis mirrors the arguments advanced by Weisbrod in his renowned 1975 paper. In addition, Steinberg and Gray (1993, 300) contend that ‘entrepreneurs’ may be motivated to form voluntary sector organisations in response to instances of contract failure for pragmatic reasons or ideological reasons, such religious groups who form voluntary sector organisations because their values are incongruent with a profit motive.

However, some political scientists have expressed doubt about these economic arguments. Salamon (1987, 36) argues that the fact that governments regulate the behaviour of voluntary sector organisations indicates that these organisations are not fundamentally more trustworthy than for-profit enterprises. Second, Salamon (1987, 36) argues that governments have a strong incentive to maintain public trust and government action is constrained by legislation and regulations, so individuals should rely more on government-provided goods and services than on those offered by voluntary sector organisations. Though contract failure theory may help us understand why private markets fail to provide public goods and services (Grønbjerg 1998, 139), Salamon (1987, 35-36) argues that this approach does not explain extensive government financing for the voluntary provision of public goods and services.

In the context of resettlement, it is possible that median voter preferences in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries opposed government provision of public goods and services for groups including immigrants, asylum seekers, and (or) refugees. In response, a small number of individuals may have approached voluntary sector organisations to request

their assistance in this area, believing that voluntary sector organisations would be less likely to exploit newcomers to the US. It is also possible that ‘entrepreneurial’ individuals may have formed voluntary sector organisations to address these demands, or that existing voluntary sector organisations may have responded to these needs for ideological reasons. Given that many of the voluntary agencies that originally provided assistance to resettled refugees were faith-based organisations, religious beliefs may have been a powerful motivator during this period. Though these could be plausible suppositions, further research on public attitudes towards government involvement in immigration, asylum, and refugee protection and on the origins of the voluntary agencies that first began providing services for immigrants and persons in need of protection would be needed to better ascertain the validity of these economic explanations.

Sociologists have also sought to understand the emergence of voluntary sector organisations. Much of this literature stems from the work of Helmut K. Anheier, Dean of the Hertie School of Governance and a comparative sociologist who has devoted much of his career to the study of voluntary sector organisations. In a joint paper, Salamon and Anheier (1998, 213) argue that one can best understand the development of voluntary sector organisations in the provision of public goods and services by considering how these organisations are “embedded” within “broader social, political, and economic realities.” This approach can complicate the analysis of voluntary sector organisations, but may also remedy the “sweeping and one-dimensional” nature of many influential theories of the voluntary sector (Salamon and Anheier 1998, 213). Considering how the broader socio-economic and political context shapes voluntary sector organisations is especially important given that many voluntary sector organisations are not merely service providers but also centres for the coordination of political and social action (Salamon and Anheier 1998, 227). In the context of resettlement, Nawyn (2006, 36-39) acknowledges that voluntary sector organisations are “not merely extensions of the state social welfare apparatus” and argues that these organisations can act as refugee advocates and offer spaces in which refugees can celebrate their respective cultures and faiths (Nawyn 2006, 40).

In contrast to economists and political scientists, sociologists tend to characterise the emergence and persistence of government-voluntary sector partnerships in the delivery of social goods and services as more of an unintended consequence than a deliberate component of institutional design (Moulton and Anheier 2001, 1). More precisely, scholars suggest that government-voluntary sector partnerships emerged as a consequence of the demand-driven nature of social policy in the US and the “tension” between “deeply seated notions of American

individualism and self-reliance” and “commitments to community, formal equality, justice and civic virtues [...] (Moulton and Anheier 2001, 3).” The comparatively small size of the federal government in relation to other countries, as well as the small size of local and state governments, means that the US has limited capacity—both in terms of human and financial resources—to deliver the services demanded by its citizens (Moulton and Anheier 2001, 3).

Some scholars further link the emergence of voluntary sector involvement in the provision of public goods and services to attitudes on the separation of powers and perceived values. Anheier (2005, 22) argues that the rejection of both absolutist rule and close links between church and state has fuelled the growth of the voluntary sector since the earliest days of the republic. However, Anheier (2005, 21-22) also connects the deep involvement of voluntary sector organisations to the “cultural self-understanding” of the American people, who view their country as an “ongoing ‘experiment’ in civility, community, democracy, and self-governance.” Similarly, Kramer (1981, 75) argues that this can be attributed to the ideological conflict between “Social Darwinism, laissez-faire, individualism, free enterprise, and a distrust of government [and] human liberalism and a belief in progress and in governmental intervention to achieve security and equality,” and to the perception that voluntary sector organisations are a crucial component of representative democracy.

Finally, political scientists have also attempted to understand the emergence of government-voluntary sector partnerships in the provision of public goods and services. Salamon (1990, 222) argues that the US has developed a peculiar form of “third party government” in which the federal government formulates policy and funds the provision of services, which are then delivered by other institutions, including the voluntary sector. Salamon (1997, 281-83) contends that this organisational structure emerged out of the pragmatic need to serve a geographically dispersed population and due to ideological opposition to excessive concentrations of power and widespread support for individualism. Therefore, Salamon (1990, 222) asserts that this approach enables the government to ensure that citizens have widespread access to social assistance and services “without unduly enlarging the administrative apparatus of the state.” In other words, one could interpret the development of ‘third party government’ as a pragmatic response to the realities of governing a large, low-density federal system and to ideological views on the appropriate role of government in society (Salamon 1987, 37).

Other academics adopt a different approach to examining the development of voluntary sector involvement in the provision of public goods and services by exploring the role of voluntary sector organisations in embodying and giving life to the diverse preferences of citizens in democratic societies. In the civil society literature, scholars such (Anheier 2009,

1085) characterise the emergence of such organisations as a pre-condition for the development of democratic institutions. Anheier (2009, 1085-86) argues that voluntary sector organisations act as a locus of civic participation and thus enable individuals to build and further develop the inclusive bonds of social trust and reciprocity that constitute the foundation of democratic institutions. Furthermore, DiMaggio and Anheier (1990, 151) contend that voluntary sector organisations can also serve as extra-governmental centres for organisation and influence among the disenfranchised.

Once voluntary sector organisations materialise, they become an inalienable component of robust democratic systems. Robert Dahl, the eminent political scientist renowned for his influential theory of power, argued that voluntary ‘associations’ are “necessary to the functioning of the democratic process itself,” as organisational pluralism preserves political liberty and guards against government coercion (Dahl 1982, 1). In addition to acting as centres for civic participation, voluntary sector organisations can serve as a “bulwark” against excessive government power by disseminating information and contributing to deliberative democracy through the aggregation and representation of a diverse range of public views (Anheier 2009, 1086; Warren 2003, 46-47).³⁷

The role of voluntary sector organisations in representing a variety of public views also reflects their role in representing the diverse preferences and interests of citizens. Dahl (1982, 42) argues that voluntary associations contribute to democratic stability by providing a mechanism to accommodate divergent citizen preferences and the interests and values embedded within these preferences.³⁸ Douglas (1987, 47) argues that a robust voluntary sector “addresses the central paradox of democracy—that the people are sovereign but many: there is not one will of the people but several, sometimes contradictory wills.” This representative role appears important in the US, where citizens have paradoxical preferences regarding the provision of public goods and the size of government (Salamon 1987, 37).

In light of their role in representing diverse interests, many social scientists have argued that voluntary sector organisations also play an important experimental role in developing new and innovative approaches (Anheier 2009, 1092; DiMaggio and Anheier 1990, 151; Dobkin Hall 1987, 17-18; Douglas 1987, 48; Salamon 1987, 37-38). Of course, if the innovative

³⁷ This complements Young’s (1999; 2000) influential taxonomy on government-voluntary sector relations, which acknowledges the potentially ‘adversarial’ nature of relations between these parties. This framework is discussed in further detail in chapter three.

³⁸ There are interesting parallels between Dahl’s view on voluntary associations and Weisbrod’s assumptions concerning the heterogeneity of public preferences and the implications for voluntary sector involvement in the provision of public goods and services.

practices adopted by voluntary sector organisations prove successful and there is sufficient public demand for such goods or services, the government is free to institutionalise these practices (Douglas 1987, 48).

However one chooses to interpret the responses concerning the perceived relationship between resettlement admissions and domestic responsibility sharing, and regardless of how one chooses to view the broader rationale for government-voluntary sector partnerships in the US, recent political developments indicate that the provision of resettlement and the involvement of voluntary agencies in this process is not uncontested.

Many academics, members of the media, and voluntary agencies assert that resettlement has historically enjoyed ‘bipartisan support’ from both Democrats and Republicans (c.f. Amos 2017, para. 3 and 18 of 35; International Rescue Committee 2017, 1; Orchard 2017, para. 1 and 17 of 31; Rhodan 2017, para. 6 of 13; US Committee for Refugees and Immigrants 2017, para. 15 of 21). Indeed, the *Refugee Act* of 1980 was the product of a bipartisan Senate bill (S. 643) put forward by Senator Kennedy and co-sponsored by 14 other Senators, including Jacob Javits, the Republican Senator for New York and Mark Hatfield, the Republican Senator for Oregon (US Congress no date, no pagination). The bill received the unanimous support of all 85 Senators (US Congress no date, no pagination). Though the House of Representatives was more divided on the issue of refugee protection, the House conducted “repeated negotiations” that eventually resulted in a coherent bill which was approved by the House of Representatives by a vote of 207 to 192 (Kennedy 1981, 144; US Congress no date, no pagination).

The politics of refugee protection and refugee resettlement in the US are more complex than belied by the bipartisan support for the *Refugee Act* of 1980. In the nearly forty years since Democratic President Jimmy Carter enacted this legislation, Republican and Democratic presidents have at times adopted a more permissive approach to refugee protection and resettlement, and at times pursued more restrictive policies in these areas. Despite his unwillingness to grant protection to asylum seekers from the Caribbean Basin and Central America, Republican President Ronald Reagan created the Private Sector Initiative to enable the US to resettle an additional 10,000 refugees, through the support of private organisations (Bier and La Corte 2016, 1). In total, this programme facilitated the resettlement of an additional 16,016 refugees between 1988 and 1993 (Bier and La Corte 2016, 12).³⁹

³⁹ The Private Sector Initiative bears strong resemblance to the Canadian PSR programme, which the author analyses in detail in chapter four. However, the Private Sector Initiative faltered as many sponsors struggled to pay for unexpected medical costs (Bier and La Corte 2016, 13), and as an executive initiative, the programme had little grassroots support (van Selm 2003, 39).

His successor, the Republican President George H. W. Bush, interdicted and returned many Haitians fleeing political instability and violence without ensuring adequate respect for the principle of *non-refoulement* (Frelick 1993, 678). Though legal injunctions forced President Bush to cease this practice, he then chose to intern thousands of Haitians in Guantanamo Bay rather than allow them to reach American soil (Frelick 1993, 678). Nevertheless, President Bush also authorised repeated increases in the resettlement ceiling during each of his four years in office, raising the ceiling from 116,500 in 1989 to 142,000 in 1992 (Martin 2005, 17).

In his campaign for President, Democrat Bill Clinton advocated against the forced repatriation of Haitians, but continued this policy following his election and adopted a more restrictive approach to the admission of Cuban asylum seekers (Gomez 2017, para. 4 of 20; Sciolino 1993, para. 1 and 3 of 22). Furthermore, Clinton refused to intervene in the conflict in Rwanda or to support multilateral efforts to stem the genocide against the Tutsi minority (Bon Tempo 2008, 198). Nevertheless, the Clinton administration did take action in Kosovo and, in addition to engaging in military action, resettled 14,161 Kosovar refugees in 2000—over and above the existing resettlement ceiling of 78,000 for fiscal year 1999 (DeYoung 2001, para. 7 of 8; Refugee Processing Center 2018, see annual table; Robinson 2000, 3 and 6-7).

Following the terrorist attacks of 11 September, 2001, Republican President George W. Bush suspended the Resettlement Admissions Program for three months, due in part to a perception among officials that resettlement was “particularly vulnerable to security problems (Schoenholtz 2005, 324).” However, the administration authorised the resumption of resettlement in December 2001, following the introduction of new security screening measures, including more detailed background checks and a requirement that all refugees must be fingerprinted and photographed (Walsh 2002, para. 14 of 22). Though resettlement admissions in fiscal years 2002 and 2003 were the lowest since the formal establishment of the programme in 1980, President Bush authorised a resettlement ceiling of 70,000 for fiscal year 2002. This decision reduced the ceiling by 10,000 places but reflected a desire to provide better quality services to resettled refugees (DeYoung 2002, para. 5 of 8).

Following his election in 2008, the Democratic President Barack Obama raised the annual resettlement ceiling to 80,000 and maintained this level of admissions until 2012 (Mayorga and Morse 2017, table 1). Between 2012 and 2015, the resettlement ceiling was lowered to 76,000 in 2012 and then 70,000 between 2013 and 2015 (Mayorga and Morse 2017, table 1). However, in response to the unprecedented number of refugees in need of protection, the Obama administration raised the annual resettlement ceiling and dramatically augmented its efforts to resettle Syrian refugees, increasing the total from just 31 Syrians resettled in 2012

to 12,587 Syrians resettled in 2016 (Zong and Batalova 2017, figure 1). However, the Obama administration has also taken actions which have contributed to a slowdown in the resettlement of Iraqi refugees. In May 2011, two Iraqi refugees that had been resettled to the US were arrested and later convicted of attempting to funnel money and weapons from the US to al Qaeda in Iraq, as well as orchestrating terrorist attacks against American military personnel stationed in Iraq (Willingham 2017, para. 2 of 10). In response, the Obama administration ordered a review of 58,000 Iraqi refugees previously resettled in the US and required new, more detailed background checks for all Iraqi refugees destined for resettlement in the US (Kessler 2017, para. 5 and 6 of 27). These new measures resulted in a temporary slowdown in processing for Iraqi refugees who intended to be resettled in the US which lasted for approximately six months (Kessler 2017, para. 3 of 27; Sapong 2017, para. 7 of 10).

These measures indicate that both Republican and Democratic Presidents have taken steps to both facilitate and occasionally restrict the flow of persons in need of protection to the US, and that security concerns have been a major fixture of these policies. Nevertheless, Martin (2005, 17-18) notes that, historically, “refugee admissions have drawn strong support from a coalition that cuts across party lines and across the divisions that mark out competing camps on other issues. [...] This evolution has come about in significant part because of what this nation has learned about the human value of refugee admissions.”

Despite the long tradition of bipartisan support for resettlement, the rhetoric adopted by Republican Donald Trump as part of his campaign to become President (and since assuming office) has contributed to the inflammatory tone of discourse on resettlement in certain media outlets in the US. Mr Trump campaigned in part on a conservative immigration platform centred on three core principles: the construction of a wall along the border between the US and Mexico, increased enforcement of existing immigration laws, and an approach to immigration that seeks to “improve jobs, wages and security for all Americans (Trump no date, 1).” During an early campaign speech in Keene, New Hampshire on 30 September, 2015, Mr Trump articulated his intent to return Syrian refugees already resettled in the US. Mr Trump stated that it “could be possible” that the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (commonly known as ISIS) is sending agents posing as Syrian refugees in need of resettlement, and stated “[...] if I win, they’re going back! (Vitali 2015, para. 4 and 5 of 10).” In a policy statement on immigration delivered in Phoenix, Arizona on 31 August, 2016, Mr Trump pledged to “suspend” immigration from certain Middle Eastern and North African countries such as Syria and Libya, and to “stop the tens of thousands” of Syrian refugees arriving in the US (Trump 2016, no pagination). During a campaign speech in Minneapolis, Minnesota on 6 November,

2016, Mr Trump argued that “faulty refugee vetting” had caused “problems” in Minnesota and claimed that some Somali refugees resettled in the state had “are joining ISIS and spreading their extremist views all over our country and all over the world (Bouie 2016, para. 5 of 11).” Mr Trump further claimed that his rival Hillary Clinton “wants virtually unlimited immigration and refugee admissions, from the most dangerous regions of the world, to come into our country [...]. Her plan will import generations of terrorism, extremism, and radicalism into your schools and throughout your community (Bouie 2016, para. 4 of 11).”

These remarks indicate that President Trump views refugee protection and resettlement through the lens of securitization. The securitization of discourse on immigration and refugee protection in the US is not new, as the previously noted remarks from President Reagan concerning forced displacement from Central America.⁴⁰ However, this paradigm has gained increasing salience in public discourse since the terrorist attacks of 11 September, 2001 (Adamson 2006, 165; Castles 2004, 857). Though neither refugees nor Syrians perpetrated these attacks, President Trump has associated refugee resettlement with terrorism and claimed that “more than 300” resettled refugees are “currently the subject of counterterrorism investigations (Lee 2017, para. 1 of 33)” in order to rationalise the decision to temporarily suspend the Resettlement Admissions Program and bar travellers from predominantly Muslim countries.

Certain media outlets have also adopted this inflammatory tone on resettlement. Breitbart News—the far-right media organisation whose co-founder and former Executive Chairman, Steve Bannon, served as Chief Strategist to President Trump until January 2018—has long been critical of government funding for voluntary agencies, the role of voluntary agencies in resettlement, and the close connection between the federal government and some current and former voluntary agency representatives. For example, Breitbart called the Clinton and Obama administrations a “revolving door” due to the fact that Ms Limón previously served as Director of the Office of Refugee Resettlement under President Clinton, while Mr Negash and Mr Carey both served under President Obama (Leahy 2016, para. 1, 2, 3, and 8 of 41). Breitbart attributed the increase in the budget of the Office of Refugee Resettlement to the claim that “Democratic appointees Limon [sic], Negash, and Carey have worked tirelessly to expand both the budget of ORR and the party’s far-left, pro-refugee agenda (Leahy 2016, para.

⁴⁰ One could potentially interpret this as consistent with Betts’s (2003) arguments concerning the perceived private security benefits from limiting access to refugee protection.

17 of 41).⁴¹ The organisation has also referred to refugee resettlement in the US as an “industry (Leahy 2016, para. 8 and 36 of 41)” indicating a perception that voluntary agencies profit from resettlement. Elsewhere, Breitbart has called federal funding for voluntary agencies a “gravy train” and has claimed that voluntary agencies “benefit immensely” from these partnerships (Leahy 2015, para. 1 and 24 of 24).⁴² However, the allegations from Breitbart ignore the fact that eight of the nine voluntary agencies that implement the Resettlement Admissions and Reception and Placement programmes are registered charities and not for-profit entities.

As President, Mr Trump has attempted to curb resettlement admissions and to impose discriminatory admissions policies. On 27 January, 2017, one week after being inaugurated as President of the United States, Republican President Donald J. Trump issued an executive order which placed a moratorium on all resettlement admissions for a period of 120 days so that his officials could examine the possible introduction of additional security screening measures to “ensure that those approved for refugee admission do not pose a threat to the security and welfare of the United States (subsection 5(a), Exec. Order No. 13769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (1 February, 2017)).”⁴³ In a separate provision, President Trump declared the admission of Syrian refugees “detrimental to the interests of the United States” and therefore also suspended resettlement from that country (subsection 5(c), Exec. Order No. 13769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (1 February, 2017)).” The order further stipulated that no more than 50,000 refugees should be admitted to the US in fiscal year 2017 (subsection 5(d), Exec. Order No. 13769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (1 February, 2017)). Much as with the provision blocking the resettlement of Syrian refugees, President Trump declared that “the entry of more than 50,000 refugees in fiscal year 2017 would be detrimental to the interests of the United States [...].” Despite the perceptions articulated by most interviewees, this suggests that political vagaries can substantively impact resettlement admissions.

2.8 Conclusion

This chapter began with an overview of the history of resettlement admissions in the US. The analysis suggests that the government sometimes adopted a discriminatory and contradictory approach to resettlement by privileging the admission of certain groups of

⁴¹ Breitbart neglects to mention that Republican President George W. Bush appointed Roger P. Winter Assistant Administrator of the US Agency for International Development in 2001 (Peters and Woolley 2001, para. 7 of 7). Mr Winter previously served as Director of the Office of Refugee Resettlement under the Carter and Reagan administrations (Ronayne 2001, 207), then became Director of the US Committee for Refugees and Director of Immigration and Refugees of America before returning to public service.

⁴² For an analysis of the relationship between advocacy, resource dependence, and organisational survival, see Lowery (2007).

⁴³ This executive order was only the fifth such order he had issued since taking office and was symbolically signed at the Pentagon.

refugees above others to serve its strategic objectives. At other times, the government has been more welcoming towards refugees and admitted refugees from a broad range of origins and backgrounds without any apparent ulterior motive.

This assessment appears consistent with the data on the size and composition of resettlement flows between 1980 and 2017, which demonstrated that the United States has resettled thousands of refugees from strategic locations such as the USSR, Southeast Asia, and Iraq but also offered a durable solution to refugees from Burma, Somalia, Sudan, and Syria, among many others.

The chapter then adopted a more analytical approach by exploring the motivations for resettlement and its benefits through interviews with senior government officials and representatives from the nine voluntary agencies that implement the Resettlement Admissions and Reception and Placement Programmes. Interviewees indicated that the US has a humanitarian motivation for resettling refugees and that contributing to this durable solution is perceived as consistent with the norms of international responsibility sharing and efforts to preserve access to countries of first asylum. Some respondents further indicated that contributing to resettlement—and especially making sizeable contributions to this durable solution—enhances the reputation of the US which it can leverage to encourage other governments to increase their resettlement admissions. Though interviewees acknowledged that resettlement has financial and potentially social costs for the government and receiving communities, many interviewees argued that resettlement benefits the US through increased cultural diversity. The author suggested that one could interpret these views as consistent with the literature on refugee protection as an impure public good and the economic literature on public goods more generally.

The author then explored the perceived nature of relations between the government and voluntary agencies. Both government and voluntary agency representatives emphasised the collaborative nature of their relationship. Though respondents acknowledged that the government has a finite role in resettlement and that voluntary agencies contribute essential financial and human resources to the resettlement process, responses also suggest that there is an element of interdependence between the government and voluntary agencies insofar as the participation of both government and voluntary agencies is necessary to effectively implement the Resettlement Admissions and Reception and Placement programmes. The author suggested that one could interpret this as consistent with the dominant taxonomy on government-voluntary sector relations, which indicates that relations can be complementary and (or) supplementary in nature. However, some voluntary agencies argued that relations with the

federal government had become more prescriptive over time and they had less discretion than they once did. One could interpret these concerns as consistent with aspects of the literature on the potential perils of government contracting, including ‘bureaucratization.’

Finally, this chapter explored perceptions concerning the potential relationship between resettlement admissions and domestic responsibility sharing with voluntary agencies. Though a representative from one voluntary agency indicated that foreign policies are the main determinant of resettlement admissions, the majority of respondents indicated that domestic responsibility sharing had enhanced resettlement admissions to the US. Though scholars continue to debate the reasons why government-voluntary sector partnerships are such a prominent feature in the US, the author nevertheless suggested that one could interpret this as consistent with the longstanding role of voluntary sector organisations in the provision of public goods and services in the US. However, the election of Republican President Donald Trump and his efforts to suspend the Resettlement Admissions Programme and the subsequent limits he imposed on resettlement admissions could undermine the longstanding bipartisan consensus on resettlement in the US. Overall, the discussion and analysis in the chapter indicate that resettlement admissions could be influenced by a range of factors, possibly including domestic responsibility sharing. However, the analysis also highlights the importance of a contextualised, nuanced approach to the analysis of resettlement admissions policies.

Chapter Three: Resettlement Admissions and Voluntary Advocacy in the United States

3.1 Introduction

Chapter one presented a number of observations concerning resettlement admissions, government-voluntary sector partnerships in resettlement, and current resettlement needs. In particular, chapter one highlighted the absolute and relative cross-national differences in resettlement admissions and the widespread existence of government-voluntary sector relationships in resettlement, as well as the cross-national variations in the scope of these relationships. The chapter also highlighted the need to better understand the relationship between resettlement admissions and domestic responsibility sharing through government-voluntary sector partnerships given the unprecedented number of persons in need of protection at present, including the extensive need for resettlement. Moreover, the chapter identified several limitations and *lacunae* in the existing literature, focusing particularly on observations that much of the scholarship ignores the influence of domestic factors such as the extensive mechanisms for domestic responsibility sharing with voluntary agencies and the potential capacity of these agencies to influence resettlement admissions through advocacy.

Chapter two offered an overview of the history of resettlement in the US and provided detailed figures on the size and composition of resettlement flows to the US between 1980 and 2017. To better understand the potential reasons why the US has voluntarily adopted generous resettlement admissions policies, the chapter also explored perceptions on the motivations for resettlement and its benefits, the nature of government-voluntary sector relations, and the potential relationship between resettlement admissions and domestic responsibility sharing with voluntary sector organisations, through interviews with senior government officials and representatives from the nine voluntary agencies that implement the Resettlement Admissions and Reception and Placement programmes. Interviewees indicated that the US is perceived to engage in resettlement for humanitarian and normative reasons, and the provision of this durable solution is also thought to be consistent with the history and values of the US and to confer reputational and cultural benefits for the US. The author suggested that one could interpret these perceptions as consistent with the literature on refugee protection as an impure public good, and the economic literature on public goods more generally. Interviews also indicate that the federal government and voluntary agencies in the US are perceived to have a relationship that is both complementary and supplementary nature. These perceptions could be interpreted as consistent with the historical development of government-voluntary sector relations in the US, and the dominant taxonomy in this area. Furthermore, the overwhelming majority of respondents indicated that domestic responsibility sharing with voluntary agencies

had enhanced resettlement admissions. Given that academics continue to debate the reasons why government-voluntary sector partnerships have become such a significant feature of the provision of public goods and services in the US, further research in this area is required to more fully understand the origins and implications of government-voluntary agency partnerships in resettlement within the broader context of social service provision.

Though these findings may help us better understand why the US has voluntary adopted generous resettlement admissions policies, resettlement admissions may also be shaped by advocacy efforts. Indeed, as noted in chapter one, many interviewees expressed a keen and unprompted interest in discussing their advocacy work on resettlement. This chapter first offers an overview of the history of voluntary sector advocacy on resettlement in the US in section 3.2. It then adopts a more analytical approach by exploring the perceived relationship between resettlement admissions and voluntary sector advocacy in section 3.3 through interviews with senior government officials and representatives from the nine voluntary agencies that implement the Resettlement Admissions and Reception and Placement programmes. During the interviews, a federal official indicated that the government is open to advocacy efforts and voluntary agency representatives stated that they actively engaged in advocacy on resettlement issues. These efforts were perceived to have contributed to a rebound in resettlement admissions following the terrorist attacks of 11 September, 2001 and were also thought to have prevented funding cuts to resettlement programmes in the US. One could interpret the perception of government being open to advocacy efforts and the active role of voluntary agencies in advocacy on resettlement as consistent with the literature on the structure of interest representation in the US,⁴⁴ and the dominant taxonomy of government-voluntary sector relations which suggests that voluntary sector organisations are not merely service providers but can also take on an “adversarial” role in which they press governments to enact policy changes (Young 2000, 151).

Whereas voluntary agencies were actively engaged in advocacy on resettlement issues, preliminary research indicates that few ethnic community-based organisations may pursue advocacy in this area. Though this assessment could be interpreted as consistent with the small literature in this area, it may also reflect limitations in current academic knowledge and understanding of ethnic community-based organisations in the US. That said, the changing

⁴⁴ The literature uses the terms ‘advocacy,’ ‘interest representation,’ and ‘lobbying’ interchangeably, and the author follows this established practice.

issue context since the election of President Trump may have a deleterious impact on voluntary agency advocacy efforts on resettlement to the US.

Before proceeding, the author would like to highlight an important limitation to the discussion in this chapter. The analysis on advocacy is limited insofar as it does not capture the views of representatives from Refugee Council USA, a coalition of voluntary sector agencies that engages in advocacy on asylum and refugee issues and also serves as the “principal consultative forum for the national refugee resettlement and processing agencies as they formulate common positions, conduct their relations with the U.S. government and other partners, and support and enhance refugee service standards (Refugee Council USA 2015, para. 3 of 3).” Though the author requested to meet with a representative from the organisation, no response was received. Therefore, the discussion in this chapter is limited to the efforts of the nine voluntary agencies responsible for the implementation of the Resettlement Admissions and Reception and Placement programmes.

3.2 History of Resettlement Advocacy in the United States

Many voluntary sector organisations in the US have long served as advocates for their constituents. This section offers an overview of the history of voluntary sector advocacy on resettlement to the US to enrich the discussion and analysis that follows in the remainder of this chapter. Though few academics have directly explored this topic, the available literature indicates that voluntary sector organisations and agencies only occasionally succeeded in their efforts to augment resettlement admissions.

Voluntary sector involvement in advocacy dates back to at least the nineteenth century when philanthropic organisations drew on their experiences as service providers to ‘attest’ to the need for government action (Kramer 1981, 213). However, interest groups did not become “methodically” involved in lobbying until the end of World War II (Wilson 1993, 131). Though voluntary sector organisations appear to adopt a range of strategies to advance their views, interest groups often direct their efforts towards Congress, as a large proportion of legislation related to social services is formulated by the federal government (Kramer 1981, 71). The emphasis on targeting Congress is also a pragmatic decision as the federal structure in the US offers interest groups multiple competing channels for access and contributes to a weaker party system which means that legislators are particularly open to representations from their constituents (Wilson 1993, 139-43).

Historical accounts of voluntary sector advocacy efforts on resettlement are limited, and much of the available evidence comes from Loescher and Scanlan, whose 1986 book *Calculated Kindness* provides a comprehensive account of American asylum and refugee

policies since the end of World War II. Though they do not focus on voluntary advocacy efforts specifically, they weave many accounts of these efforts into their book. Loescher and Scanlan (1986, 213) argue that the US Congress has occasionally paid “considerable heed to humanitarian organizations [sic] like Amnesty International and lobbying groups like the American-Israel Public Affairs Committee [sic]” and has gone so far as to establish resettlement programmes despite White House opposition. Following the end of World War II, voluntary sector organisations and agencies, the media, and sympathetic officials pressed the government to adopt a more liberal approach to the admission of defectors from the USSR (Loescher and Scanlan 1986, 35-37). In that respect, Leo Cherne, then the Chairman of the International Rescue Committee, played a particularly influential role in advocacy on the admission of Hungarian refugees. Following reports of the uprisings, Mr Cherne travelled to Budapest to meet with prominent figures in that city (Loescher and Scanlan 1986, 54). Upon returning to the US, Mr Cherne began to build financial and “moral” support for the “freedom fighters” through appearances on the popular television programme The Ed Sullivan Show and at a rally in Madison Square Garden in New York City (Loescher and Scanlan 1986, 54). Though Loescher and Scanlan (1986, 54) argue that President Eisenhower would have resettled Hungarian refugees regardless, they conjecture that “the scope of the U.S. resettlement program [sic] might have been smaller” in the absence of pressure. These efforts—especially appeals from the International Rescue Committee—contributed to the decision to resettle 38,121 Hungarian refugees following the failed revolution in 1956 (Loescher and Scanlan 1986, 52).

In the 1970s, voluntary sector organisations played an influential role in convincing the government to resettle more Jewish refugees from the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), despite executive concerns that criticising the human rights situation in the USSR could threaten the *détente* in their relations at the time (Loescher and Scanlan 1986, 85-95). In particular, representatives from the influential American Israel Public Affairs Committee leveraged their relationships with senior congressional aides and adopted adversarial strategies such as threatening to mount hostile election campaigns against opponents to secure policy changes in this area (Loescher and Scanlan 1986, 93). In addition, their efforts to raise public awareness about the plight of Soviet Jewish refugees helped minimise public opposition to their admission, even as annual admissions climbed into the tens of thousands (Loescher and Scanlan 1986, 94).

The International Rescue Committee also proved to be an influential advocate during the refugee crisis in Southeast Asia, when Mr Cherne called on both the President and Congress to demonstrate global leadership by dramatically increasing the number of resettlement

admissions and encouraging other countries to do the same (Loescher and Scanlan 1986, 142-43). Loescher and Scanlan (1986, 144) argue that, “President Carter bowed to appeals by religious and refugee groups, as well as by many members of Congress, his own administration, and the international community, and took several important initiatives prior to the Geneva meeting to insure [sic] that the major industrialized nations would assume responsibility for the resettlement of large numbers of the refugees.” Voluntary sector pressure also proved influential in convincing the government to resettle Cambodian refugees fleeing persecution by the Khmer Rouge regime during this period (Loescher and Scanlan 1986, 152-53 and 162-66).

However, voluntary sector organisations were less successful in convincing the government to resettle Chilean refugees following the 1973 *coup d'état* by General Augusto Pinochet (Loescher and Scanlan 1986, 95). Though churches, secular organisations like Amnesty International, and sympathetic members of Congress such as Senator Edward Kennedy convinced the government to establish parole programmes for these refugees, admissions remained low due to the political imperatives of the time (Loescher and Scanlan 1986, 95-100).

Haines (2010, 3 and 7) suggests that various “constituencies” have persuaded the government to admit particular groups of refugees and argued that “this theme of rejecting or accepting refugees based on their specific identity has been a continuing one in the U.S. refugee program. Those refugees with strong constituencies have fared better. Those who could unite multiple constituencies have fared best of all, for example, by appealing to the humanitarian impulses of the left, the anticommunist impulses of the right, and the communitarian impulses of co-ethnics and co-religionists. [...] Without strong constituencies, the numbers admitted are likely to drift downward.” For example, Haines (2010, 145) suggests that the “political heft” voluntary sector organisations such as HIAS ensured that the government continued to fund programmes for the resettlement of refugees from the USSR.

3.3 The Perceived Relationship between Resettlement Admissions and Advocacy

The history of advocacy on resettlement in the US indicates that voluntary agencies and other advocacy groups have long pressed the government to augment resettlement admissions or to consider resettling particular groups in need of protection, but these efforts have not always been successful. Nevertheless, during the first series of interviews conducted among voluntary sector representatives in the US, interviewees expressed a keen and unprompted desire to discuss their involvement in advocacy on resettlement issues. In response, the author

amended the original interview questions to accommodate this organic theme and enable respondents to share their views in a more fulsome manner.

Therefore, this section presents the views of senior government officials and voluntary agency representatives on the perceived relationship between resettlement admissions and voluntary agency advocacy. The responses reveal a perception that the federal government is open to interest representation efforts by voluntary agencies—a view which one could interpret as consistent with the literature on interest representation in the US. Furthermore, there is a perception among voluntary agency representatives that their advocacy efforts contributed to the gradual recovery in resettlement admissions following the terrorist attacks of 11 September, 2001. Some voluntary sector representatives also indicated that their advocacy efforts prevented substantial reductions in appropriations for resettlement programmes in the US. Though voluntary agencies are not the only organisations to engage in advocacy on resettlement issues, preliminary research indicates that few ethnic community-based organisations may pursue advocacy in this area. While one could interpret this assessment as consistent with the small literature in this area, it may also reflect limitations in current academic knowledge and understanding of ethnic community-based organisations in the US. Despite the ardent efforts described by voluntary agency representatives, issue salience and context may condition the impact of advocacy efforts on resettlement to the US.

During the interviews conducted as part of this case study, government officials and voluntary agency representatives spoke at length about the perceived impact of advocacy on resettlement admissions (Carey 2013; Famini 2013; Kekic 2013; Kosten 2013; Limón 2013; Robinson 2013; Scott 2013; Stein 2013; Young 2013). Among government officials, Ambassador Robinson (2013) argued that the federal government is “particularly open to advocacy groups and folks.” Ambassador Robinson (2013) explained that the Department of State determines the annual resettlement admissions ceiling based in part on input from voluntary agencies. Ambassador Robinson (2013) added that the process involves a “negotiation” that takes into consideration the number of refugees that voluntary agencies believe they can resettle, the number of refugees that the Department of State feels that voluntary agencies can resettle, and the capacity of the receiving communities, from which the Department of State also solicits input.⁴⁵ In addition, Ambassador Robinson (2013) asserted that voluntary agencies can influence resettlement priorities by calling attention to groups in

⁴⁵ Ambassador Robinson (2013) noted that, in some cases, the Department of State encourages voluntary agencies to resettle more refugees than they had originally requested based on the department’s assessment of the organisation’s capacity.

need of resettlement, and explained that the Department of State engages in a “real dialogue” with voluntary sector organisations on the implementation of the Resettlement Admissions Programme.

Though the structure of interest representation in resettlement (and refugee protection more generally) may change over time, interviewees attested to the active role of voluntary agencies in advocating on resettlement issues in the US. Indeed, several voluntary sector representatives indicated that their organisations have endeavoured to influence the composition of refugee flows in this way (Kekic 2013; Scott 2013; Stein 2013; Young 2013). Ms Stein (2013) affirmed that Episcopal Migration Ministries offers input to the Department of State and the UNHCR on populations that could benefit from resettlement. Furthermore, Mr Kekic (2013) explained that Church World Service advocates for the resettlement of particular groups of refugees that it identifies through its international development and relief work overseas. Elsewhere, Mr Scott (2013) and Ambassador Young (2013) explained that the US Conference of Catholic Bishops had successfully lobbied the government to resettle Burmese and Bhutanese refugees.

Many interviewees also spoke of their role in lobbying legislators to increase resettlement admissions and funding for the Resettlement Admissions Programme (Carey 2013; Famini 2013; Kekic 2013; Scott 2013; Stein 2013; Young 2013). For example, Mr Scott (2013) explained that the US Conference of Catholic Bishops has a dedicated Government Relations department that is responsible for advocacy. In that context, Ambassador Young (2013) explained that his organisation advocates for the “highest number” of resettlement admissions possible, explaining, “We think that this country can absorb a lot more refugees than made by the annual Presidential determination.”

In addition to advocating for increased admissions, some voluntary agencies stated they have also pressed the government to augment funding for resettlement. Ambassador Young (2013) and Mr Scott (2013) explained that their organisation appeals for more funding for the Resettlement Admissions Program. Mr Scott (2013) noted that government agencies cannot advocate for funding themselves and so they encourage voluntary sector agencies to utilise their agenda-setting influence to lobby members of the House of Representatives and the Senate to increase funding for the programme. Ambassador Young (2013) elaborated on this point, stating, “We’ll actually get calls for assistance from the federal government where they will say to us, ‘We hear you,’ or ‘This is what we need, and we need you to help us on this.’ That means, ‘We want you to go to the Hill, we want you to go to [the Office of Management

and Budget], we want you to, you know, use whatever influence you can to help us get what we need on a particular issue.”

Ambassador Young (2013) added that his organisation had successfully lobbied to prevent budget cuts to the Resettlement Admissions programme and explained that:

“We learned that we were going to lose US\$110 million out of the refugee budget for this year because of the increased number of unaccompanied children who are coming into the United States. [...] So, you know, we all got together and did our marches to the White House and to the Congress and to OMB, and on and on and on, and it was a success. The money was found to continue the refugee program [sic] at the levels that had been projected for this year, and to obtain the increased funding to take care of these children who are coming in.”

However, the US Conference of Catholic Bishops is not the only voluntary sector organisation that has engaged in advocacy on resettlement admissions or funding. Ms Famini (2013) explained that World Relief has actively appealed for the government to resettle more refugees and noted that, in the absence of such efforts, the government could theoretically choose to determine resettlement admissions ceiling based on budgetary considerations alone. In the case of the International Rescue Committee, Mr Carey (2013) argued that the voluntary sector has advocated “very passionately” for federal funding for resettlement, both directly and through their local affiliates. Mr Carey (2013) explained that the organisation and its local affiliates lobbied members of Congress and White House officials to appropriate funding for the Department of State and the Department of Health and Human Services, while also endeavouring to communicate the “humanitarian imperative” and global implications of resettlement in order to “put a human face” on appropriations.

In addition to describing their advocacy efforts on resettlement admissions and appropriations, some respondents argued that resettlement admissions have increased due to voluntary sector advocacy (Kekic 2013; Kosten 2013; Young 2013). Both Ambassador Young (2013) and Mr Kekic (2013) argued that voluntary sector organisations energetically lobbied for increased admissions following the terrorist attacks of 11 September, 2001 (see also Eby et al. 2011, 601). Indeed, Haines (2010, 20 endnote 1) notes that the Refugee Admissions Program “effectively shut down for four months” following the attacks, and admissions declined from 69,886 in 2001 to 27,131 the following year (Refugee Processing Center 2018, see annual tables). Resettlement admissions did not begin to recover until 2004, when 52,873 refugees were resettled (Refugee Processing Center 2018, see annual tables). In that context, Ambassador Young (2013) argued:

“The numbers of admissions made by the Presidential determinations would not be as high as they are if we had not continued our strong advocacy for high numbers. All you have to do is look at the numbers following 9/11 when they dropped down to a very, very low number. [...] It was only—I hate to use the word agitation, I think advocacy is a cleaner word—but it was only through our advocacy individually and as a group as part of this Refugee Council USA that we continued the pressure on the government to up, and up, and up.”

Ambassador Young (2013) noted that the US Conference of Catholic Bishops had also engaged in advocacy on security screenings and stated that “we worked with all the government agencies on coming to an understanding on this security concern, but those numbers wouldn’t be there if we as a group of resettlement offices and others who advocate on behalf of refugees hadn’t kept the pressure on.”

Similarly, Mr Kekic (2013) argued that voluntary sector organisations “single-handedly saved the program [sic] after 9/11,” and added that “the program [sic] would have been dead without voluntary agencies.” Mr Kekic (2013) explained that the attacks sent “waves of panic through the federal government” and fed public xenophobia towards immigrants. Mr Kekic (2013) explained that voluntary sector organisations like Church World Service engaged in “vigorous, vigorous, vigorous advocacy” with members of Congress and the administration, and also sought to raise awareness about the resettlement process to assuage concerns regarding the security of the Resettlement Admissions Program. Though Mr Kekic (2013) acknowledged that admissions declined dramatically following the attacks, he noted that resettlement arrivals have gradually increased and concluded that the progressive recovery in admissions is “really a testament to how strong this community is.” Mr Kosten (2013) attested to the perceived influence of voluntary agencies following the terrorist attacks and argued, “I think this program [sic] would have died long ago in the US if it wasn’t for the advocacy of the likes of resettlement agencies and like organizations that find it to be of extreme value. Or perhaps not lost, but minimized. I think it would have shrunk significantly in terms of its size.”

In addition to pressing the government to augment admissions and preserve funding for resettlement, several voluntary agency representatives indicated that they work to build community awareness and support for resettlement (Kekic 2013; Kosten 2013; Scott 2013; Stein 2013; Young 2013). Ms Stein (2013) explained that part of the mission of Episcopal Migration Ministries is to raise awareness about refugee issues and to help communities become more “welcoming” towards refugees. Ms Stein (2013) explained that the organisation strives to “strengthen communities to be receptive and welcoming of refugees.” To achieve this, Ms Stein (2013) explained that staff “go out and talk to people about who refugees are, and why they should care, and why they’re important to this country, and what they contribute.”

Mr Kosten (2013) also underscored the importance of building community support for resettlement. Mr Kosten (2013) described “constituency engagement” as a “critical” element of voluntary agency work on resettlement, and explained “[...] The more we engage churches, the more we explain the value of such a program, the reason why we think it’s of such value, we also increase our capacity within those areas.” In addition to building capacity in receiving communities, Mr Kosten (2013) indicated that these efforts may be fundamental to the survival of the Resettlement Admissions Program. Mr Kosten (2013) suggested that “if the public at large doesn’t advocate, then the legislators can say you know, ‘We’re going to reduce our appropriations, we’re going to cap the number of people resettled,’ and the only people screaming about it would be, you know, us, the resettlement agencies, who then it would like we’re in this simply because of the financial benefit or whatever [...].” This view suggests that voluntary agencies endeavour to build support for resettlement due in part to their aforementioned belief in the local character of resettlement, but also as a means of aggregating and leveraging support for their advocacy efforts on admissions and funding.

One voluntary agency representative connected advocacy and building community support for resettlement to democratic values. In particular, Mr Kekic (2013) explained that “we feel that it’s our place to exercise our democratic rights to ask our elected officials to—what their constituency want them to do—and in our instance that is to continue to grow and enhance the refugee resettlement program. And the best way to show how committed they are to growing and enhancing this program [sic] here is to really appropriate adequate funding for it.” One could interpret Mr Kekic’s statement as consistent with the argument from Sherry (1971), who characterises voluntary sector involvement in advocacy as fundamental.

However, Ms Limón (2013) suggested that voluntary sector organisations have fewer opportunities to engage in advocacy than they once did. More precisely, Ms Limón (2013) explained that voluntary agencies historically played a greater role in overseas processing than they do today. Ms Limón (2013) explained that voluntary agencies were “advocates for the refugees, both in individually and collectively. In other words, their representatives, whoever they were, would feed information back to the headquarters who would then advocate on the Hill, or with the State Department or whatever, on behalf of a given group of refugees. [...] When they did the processing, they were looking for ways that the refugee actually met the criteria of being a refugee, promoting those people for approval into the United States by the immigration authorities.” However, Ms Limón (2013) contended that there may have been a perception among some Department of State officials that voluntary agencies had a “financial interest” in resettling refugees (due to the provision of per capita grants), and suggested that

the Department began contracting out overseas processing to the International Organization for Migration in order to “sever that relationship.”⁴⁶

To achieve a better understanding of the potential reasons why the US has voluntarily adopted generous resettlement admissions policies, this thesis now seeks to interpret the responses articulated above in relation to the extant literature. Interpreting the potential relationship between resettlement admissions and voluntary agency advocacy efforts is challenging as few authors have explored this dynamic, and those that have tend to discuss advocacy as an aside rather than as a central feature of their analysis (e.g. Winkler 1981; Wright 1981; c.f. Eby et al. 2011; Nawyn 2005; Nawyn 2006).

Nevertheless, the active involvement of voluntary agencies in advocacy on resettlement issues appears consistent with some scholarly works that attest to the perceived importance of such efforts—especially following the terrorist attacks of 11 September, 2001. Nawyn (2005) explains that most of the voluntary agencies she interviewed as part of her study of faith-based and secular resettlement organisations identified advocacy as an essential component of their work. Indeed, Nawyn (2005, 43) states that “Every NGO in my sample valued refugee advocacy to some extent” and “nearly every interview participant mentioned the importance of advocacy for refugees.” In addition to advocating for the admission of particular groups of refugees and calling on officials to complete security screening procedures faster, Nawyn (2005, 46) finds that many voluntary agencies in her sample devoted a “great deal” of their advocacy efforts towards augmenting resettlement admissions. Notably, Nawyn (2005, 146) observes that many of the voluntary agency representatives “considered low admissions as the top problem in the resettlement system.” Nawyn (2005, 66-68) particularly finds that voluntary agencies ‘substantially increased’ their advocacy efforts on resettlement in response to the dramatic decline in admissions following the terrorist attacks in September 2001. However, Nawyn (2005, 73-74) indicates that, for many voluntary agencies, the increase in advocacy had a perceived impact on their relationship with government officials, noting that while “nearly all” of her interviewees indicated their relationship with the federal government was “still amicable,” the increase in advocacy had also rendered their relationship more “adversarial” than it once was.⁴⁷

Eby et al. (2011, 587) also affirm the importance of advocacy among voluntary agencies, and describe faith-based voluntary agencies as “powerful advocates for the

⁴⁶ These comments are interesting when evaluated in relation to the aforementioned articles from Breitbart—some of which have attacked Ms Limón in particular.

⁴⁷ This finding parallels the taxonomy developed by Young (1999; 2000).

development and improvement of policies that affect refugees domestically and internationally, including expanding access to resettlement for refugees in countries of first asylum [...].” Eby et al. (2011, 601) argue that voluntary agencies have conducted “extensive advocacy” to augment the annual resettlement ceiling, and that an “intensive advocacy campaign” by voluntary agencies coupled with grassroots mobilisation within the Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish communities was “successful in raising admissions” following the terrorist attacks of 11 September, 2001. Though their account does offer some support to the accounts given by interviewees and to the findings presented by Nawyn (2005), it is limited insofar as Eby et al. (2011) primarily examine the involvement of Church World Service. Nevertheless, the responses articulated by interviewees, combined with the arguments advanced by Eby et al. could provide a useful basis for a more detailed analysis that seeks to trace the process of developing the annual resettlement ceiling and the junctures at which voluntary agencies could potentially exert influence.

The perceptions articulated by Ambassador Robinson concerning the openness of the federal government appears consistent with the literature on interest representation in the US. However, scholars and political leaders have long debated the appropriateness of interest representation in policymaking. Informed by the work of French philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Republicans conceptualised society as a single, unified body and characterised interest groups as a threat to popular democracy (Erne 2017, 247-48). Though Republicans acknowledged that interest groups have a role in the political process—especially as the political system grows—they favoured strict regulations on interest group behaviour to ensure that no one group could exert a dominant influence (Erne 2017, 248). Conversely, liberals perceived interest groups as an “essential source of liberty” and guard against the tyranny of the majority (Erne 2017, 248-49). Consequently, liberals believed that the state should guarantee the right of association and so they supported limited government regulation of interest groups (Erne 2017, 249).

There have been concerns regarding the potential influence of interest groups since the earliest days of the republic. In the November 1787 edition of *The Federalist Papers*, James Madison Junior, a founding father and the fourth president of the United States, expressed concern about the potential influence of “factions” in the legislative process (Madison 1787, para. 15 of 23). However, Madison (1787 para. 7 of 23) also believed that interest groups are a natural consequence of the human condition and the differing opinions, interests, and “passions” that each individual possesses. Madison (1787, para. 1 of 23) further noted that “measures are too often decided, not according to the rules of justice and the rights of the minor

party, but by the superior force of an interested and overbearing majority.” In order to balance the desire to preserve the freedom of association and the perceived risks of interest group influence, Madison firmly believed that a republican form of government that delegated decision-making authority to a small number of elected representatives would ensure that no one interest would dominate and ultimately lead to policies that are in the public good (Berry and Wilcox 2016, 3). In this way, one could interpret the pluralist nature of interest representation in the US as a legacy of institutional design.

Despite government efforts to constrain the influence of interest groups, academics have long debated the structure of interest representation in the US and the dominant perspectives on this issue have evolved. Following the end of World War II, Truman (1951, 65) advanced the group theory of interest representation, which conceptualised group politics as a “dynamic process” that is “constantly changing” according to the degree of relative influence that each group enjoys. Truman and other group theorists envisioned politics as “balanced, active, and responsive” contest between interest groups, and argued that the proper role of government should be “limited to acting as a neutral arbiter (Baumgartner and Leech 1998, 48).” This more holistic, behavioural approach to the study of politics marked an important departure from the “narrow institutionalism” of extant literature, which ignored interest group influence based on the assumption that the state is sovereign, not the people (Baumgartner and Leech 1998, 44 and 47-48).

However, the influence of group theory proved relatively short-lived. In his seminal book *Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City*, Dahl (1961, chapter one) argued that group theorists placed too much emphasis on the influence of interest groups, and so they failed to capture the intricacies of the American political system. In response, Dahl presented his theory of power, in which he distinguished between direct and indirect spheres of influence and contended that though only a small group of individuals can exercise direct agenda-setting influence, many constituents can exert indirect influence on their elected leaders who can also respond to (and shape) these interest representation efforts in return (Dahl 1961, 163-65).

His theory soon became the leading theoretical lens on interest representation and governance in democratic systems more generally (Levi 2009, 1; McFarland 2010, 40). His book also stimulated the development of new literature on a form of interest representation that has since become known as pluralism. Pluralists believed that interest groups advocated for the “narrow interests of their members,” but that these groups could also represent the broader interests of constituents in the name of the public good (Berry and Wilcox 2016, 4). The active

competition between interest groups prevented any single group from exerting disproportionate influence, and also served as an important check upon executive power (Hix 1999, 188-89). These scholars thought that the competitive nature of interest representation would lead to policies “produced by compromise and consensus (Berry and Wilcox 2016, 4).” In short, many pluralists saw interest groups as integral components of the Madisonian ideal—aggregating and representing democratic interests and acting as countervailing forces against excessive state power (Berry and Wilcox 2016, 4; Hix 1999, 188-89).

However, pluralists soon faced a barrage of criticism on a range of grounds. Though the broad heading of ‘pluralism’ subsumed many academic contributions during this period, there was considerable conceptual and theoretical diversity in the literature, and many scholars rejected this label (Baumgartner and Leech 1998, 50). Indeed, the scholarship at the time resembled more of a “set of ideas” about the characteristics of the political system of the US than a coherent theory on politics and the policymaking process (Baumgartner and Leech 1998, 50).

Second, critics challenged the assumption that groups naturally mobilised in response to “threats” to the status quo (Baumgartner and Leech 1998, 54-55). In his renowned 1965 book *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups*, Olson (chapter two) articulated the barriers that can frustrate mobilisation and collective action—especially among large groups pursuing public benefits as opposed to private returns. In response, many academics began to explore the issue of interest group mobilisation in earnest to explain the apparent (and contradictory) proliferation of non-economic interest groups (Hojnacki et al. 2012, 383; Mahoney and Baumgartner 2008, 1254). In that context, some scholars argued that individuals could be motivated to mobilise and engage in collective action for non-material reasons (e.g. Clark and Wilson 1961; Salisbury 1969).⁴⁸

Scholars also lambasted pluralism for the common assumption that all groups had “equal access to the political system (Hix 1999, 188-89).” In particular, the American civil rights movement and empirical observations concerning the unequal resources of different interest groups demonstrated that not all groups have equal representation in American politics, and not all groups enjoy the same level of influence in policymaking, thereby undermining the validity of the pluralist theory (Berry and Wilcox, 11). Notably, Lowi (1964, 680 and 694-95)

⁴⁸ Olson (1971, 160n) later acknowledged that selective incentives do not necessarily need to be material in nature. Much of the contemporary literature on mobilisation now acknowledges that individuals can also derive “psychological” benefits from participating in collective action (Baumgartner and Leech 1998, 71). This could be interpreted as consistent with the literature on altruism and public goods. Further research could explore the incentives and barriers to collective action among resettlement advocates.

argued that pluralists do not adequately appreciate the importance of elites in the policymaking process—particularly in the development of distributive policies—which are often characterised by stable coalitions. Lowi (1979, 31-42 and 50-63) later revised his elite-driven perspective on policymaking to argue that government expansion has proceeded despite the relative weakness of executive leadership due to the considerable discretion granted to the bureaucracy, which enables interest groups to exert influence in both policymaking and implementation.

Though these criticisms prompted many pluralists to turn their attention away from interest groups and focus instead on the study of political institutions, others attempted to develop new, more refined theories of interest representation (Baumgartner and Leech 1998, 64). In particular, neo-pluralists adopt a much more “contingent” approach to the study of interest representation and attempt to account for the influence of “contextual factors” such as the nature, size, and relative strength of interest groups, the institutional and political environment, the extent to which governments are receptive to interest representation efforts, and the salience of the issue at hand (Hojnacki et al. 2012, 383-89; Lowery and Gray 2004, 164 and 171). Similarly, though neo-pluralists maintain that multiple interest groups shape the policymaking process, they acknowledge that there may be barriers to collective action which mean that some interest groups may be overrepresented and others underrepresented in the policymaking process (McFarland 2007, 54 and 59). In this way, neo-pluralist scholarship departs from its pluralist origins insofar as interest representation efforts are no longer necessarily seen as fully representative but rather “imperfectly constrained by democratic politics (Lowery and Gray 2004, 171).” Thus, the neo-pluralist scholarship recognises that democratic societies grant everyone the common right to participate, but not all groups necessarily have the ability to do so.

Though there is an extensive body of academic literature on interest representation in political science, few scholars have analysed the involvement of voluntary sector organisations in advocacy (Berry with Arons 2003, 25). However, several scholars have made implicit references to the ‘pluralist’ nature of the political system. Indeed, for many of these scholars, it is the pluralist nature of the political system which has provided the foundation for extensive collaboration between the government and voluntary sector organisations. Salamon (1987, 37) argues that the extensive pattern of government-voluntary sector collaboration in the provision of social services is “also encouraged by the country’s pluralistic political structure.” Similarly, Moulton and Anheier (2001, 4) argue that government-voluntary sector partnerships partially reflect the “pluralistic tenets of the political structure.” In the particular context of advocacy,

Anheier (2009, 1091) suggests that when one views government-voluntary sector relations through the lens of accountability, voluntary sector organisations act as a “countervailing force” that “reflects the diversity, pluralism, and dynamism of modern society.” Similarly, DiMaggio and Anheier (1990, 151) argue that voluntary sector organisations “contribute to pluralism by creating centers [sic] of influence outside the state and provide vehicles through which disenfranchised groups may organize [sic].”

Given the ‘embeddedness’ of voluntary sector organisations in the pluralist institutional structure of the political system, one could interpret these two features as fundamentally inseparable and mutually reinforcing. More precisely, government-voluntary sector partnerships might not exist—at least not to the same extent that they do—without an acceptance of pluralism, and the pluralist political structure might potentially not exist or be as strong without the deep involvement of voluntary sector organisations, who fulfil a vital role as service providers but who also reinforce the pluralist nature of the political system and structure of interest representation through their advocacy efforts.

Sherry (1971, no pagination quoted in Kramer 1981, 212) conveys the essentialness of interest representation through his argument that the *raison d'être* of voluntary sector organisations is to advocate for social change. Sherry (1971, no pagination quoted in Kramer 1981, 212) explains:

“The primary role of voluntary associations in American life is to continually shape and reshape the vision of a more just social order, to propose programs [sic] which might lead to the manifestation of that vision, to argue for them with other contenders in the public arena, and to press for adoption and implementation. For voluntary associations to do less than that is to abdicate their civic responsibility.”

Similarly, Rothschild and Milofsky (2006, 137) argue that “Nonprofit organizations [...] are the organizational expression of their members’ ethical stance toward the world: nonprofit organizations, by way of their very existence and practices, convey a public statement of what their members see as a better, more caring, or more just world. This is why they come into being in the first place (Rothschild and Milofsky 2006, 137).” When considered in relation to the humanitarian and normative motivations that many voluntary agency representatives articulated in chapter two, section 2.5, and the perceived links between resettlement admissions and the history and values of the US as well as the perceived reputational and cultural benefits, the argument advanced by Rothschild and Milofsky (2006) may shed further light on why voluntary agencies have been such ardent advocates on resettlement to the US.

Though the neo-pluralist paradigm dominates the current literature on interest representation in the US and many academics also appear to perceive the structure of politics

as pluralist in nature, some immigration scholars suggest that the picture is more complex. In his influential 1995 paper, Freeman (886-87) argues that interest representation efforts on immigration in “settler societies” like the US are characterised by an “expansionary bias” that does not accurately reflect the “restrictionist” preferences of the broader public. Building on the influential classification of interest representation developed by political scientist James Q. Wilson (1980), Freeman (1995, 885) attributes this to the fact that office-seeking politicians have a powerful incentive to follow the preferences of interest groups, and to the “antipopulist norm” prevalent in the US that discourages politicians from attempting to “exploit racial, ethnic or immigration-related fears in order to win votes.”⁴⁹ Freeman (1995, 886-87) argues that interest groups enjoy outsized influence in immigration policymaking due to the poorly “articulated” nature of public opinion on immigration and to the clientelistic nature of interest representation on immigration policy.

Freeman (1995, 887) explains that in this model, “small and well-organized [sic] groups intensely interested in a policy develop close working relationships with those officials responsible for it.” Freeman (1995, 887) further adds that “These interactions take place largely out of public view and with little outside interference.” In a 2006 paper, Freeman attempts to develop a more nuanced approach that distinguishes between different models of interest representation and different kinds of immigration policies, including resettlement. Freeman (2006, 239) argues that resettlement has strong distributive characteristics, and argues that humanitarian organisations are the main beneficiaries of these policies, thus contributing to the development of “client politics.” Freeman (2006, 239) claims that these organisations “enjoy privileged access to the policy formulation process” but “exert less influence than those actors organised around migrant streams where significant material interests are at stake.”

One could perhaps interpret some features of resettlement policymaking as ‘clientelistic’ in nature. Federal officials and voluntary agency representatives regularly meet to discuss how to allocate resettlement files to each voluntary agency and where to resettle refugees in the US (Kekic 2013; Robinson 2013). Furthermore, as Ambassador Robinson (2013) noted, the Department of State consults with voluntary agencies as part of the process of formulating the annual resettlement admissions ceilings. One could potentially interpret the close and frequent interaction between federal officials and voluntary agencies could facilitate communication and enable voluntary agencies to influence resettlement admissions as

⁴⁹ Freeman’s 1995 statement is striking when evaluated in relation to the contemporary political context in the US.

‘clientelistic.’ However, as Ambassador Robinson (2013) explained, the Department also consults state governments and local communities before submitting its recommendation on the annual resettlement admissions ceiling. In other words, the Department of State welcomes input from voluntary agencies alone but it also solicits input from state and local governments as well as providers of public goods including education and healthcare.

Moreover, though Freeman (1995) describes immigration policymaking as ‘clientelistic,’ he does not offer any empirical evidence to concretely support the implication that politicians receive electoral benefits from listening to immigration advocates. Since eight of the nine voluntary agencies that implement the Resettlement Admissions and Reception and Placement programmes are registered charities, the US tax code bars these organisations from endorsing or opposing candidates for political office (paragraph (c)(3) of 26 USC 501). This constraint calls into question his characterisation of the nature of interest representation on immigration (and resettlement) in the US.⁵⁰

Irrespective of how one characterises the nature of interest representation in the US and in resettlement in particular, the active involvement of voluntary agencies in advocacy on resettlement issues appears consistent with elements of the academic literature on government-voluntary sector relations that acknowledge that voluntary sector organisations may not exclusively be service providers, but can also be independent agents in their own right (e.g. Young 1999; Young 2000). Though governments and voluntary sector organisations are not always in conflict, Young (1999, 33) argues that relations between the government and voluntary sector organisations can be ‘adversarial’ when these organisations advocate for policy changes. In this model of government-voluntary sector relations, governments regulate the behaviour of voluntary sector organisations but also respond to voluntary sector advocacy efforts, such as campaigns to create new government policies and programmes or calls to improve the efficiency or expand current programmes and services (Young 2000, 151). For example, voluntary sector organisations can call on the government to introduce policy changes or seek to convey the views of minority groups whose needs have not been fully met by the government (Young 1999, 33 and 38). In addition, Young (2000, 155) envisions cases in which

⁵⁰ In a separate paper, Freeman and Birrell (2004, 538) argue that the ‘clientelistic’ nature of interest representation on immigration had faced “serious challenges” in the US. Much of their analysis indicates that throughout much of the 1990s, there was a high degree of competition between groups who favoured a more liberal approach to immigration policy, and those who pressed for more restrictive measures (Freeman and Birrell 2004, 538-40). Freeman and Birrell (2004, 539) therefore conclude that interest representation efforts were more “contested” during this period, though they claim that this phenomenon was temporary and limited to “a few issues.” Nevertheless, the authors do not indicate when interest representation on immigration policy supposedly returned to its clientelistic roots.

governments themselves could potentially become advocates by attempting to “encourage, prod, and stimulate private, voluntary activity in support of social goals” or circumstances in which governments and voluntary sector organisations collaborate to build support for new legislation or to raise public awareness about a particular issue. Thus, though government-voluntary relations can be antagonistic, these two actors can also be united as advocates.

The federal government regulates the interest representation efforts through the US Internal Revenue Code, which allows voluntary sector organisations registered as charitable organisations under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code to engage in advocacy (National Council of Nonprofits 2018, para. 1 of 16). The Code also allows charitable organisations to engage in certain forms lobbying, provided that organisations do not devote a “substantial part of its overall activities” to such efforts or spend more than US\$500,000 on lobbying activities in a given fiscal year (Internal Revenue Service 2018, para. 1 of 4; Internal Revenue Service 2018, see table). As mentioned above, the Johnson Amendment bars charitable organisations from proclaiming their endorsement of—or opposition to—candidates for political office (paragraph (c)(3) of 26 USC 501).⁵¹

The views articulated by Ms Limón concerning the perceived constraints of government-voluntary sector partnerships on advocacy has been the subject of considerable debate in the scholarly literature, and there is no consensus at present on whether and to what extent government funding and regulatory regimes for voluntary sector organisations exert a deleterious effect on voluntary sector advocacy (c.f. Chaves, Stephens, and Galaskiewicz 2004; Guo and Saxton 2010; Mosley 2012; Neumayr, Schneider, and Meyer 2015; Reid 2006; Salamon and Lessans Geller with Lorentz 2008; Schmid, Bar, and Nirel 2008; Silverman and Patterson 2011). For example, in a 2007 survey of 174 charitable organisations in the state of Arizona, Guo and Saxton (2010, 14) find a negative, statistically significant relationship between the percentage of government funding allocated to charitable organisations and the scope of advocacy efforts by charitable organisations, indicating that the provision of government funding may narrow the number and range of advocacy activities undertaken by these groups. However, Guo and Saxton (2010, 14) find no statistically significant relationship between government funding and the intensity of advocacy activities. In a longitudinal study of advocacy efforts by 229 registered charitable organisations in the Minneapolis-St. Paul area

⁵¹ In a February 2017 speech at the annual National Prayer Breakfast, President Trump pledged to repeal the Johnson Amendment (Trump 2017, para. 16 of 28). Though President Trump issued an executive order directing the Department of Treasury to be ‘lenient’ in its interpretation of the Internal Revenue Code (Valverde 2017, para. 13 of 31), the Internal Revenue Code remained unchanged at the time of submission.

between 1984 and 1994, Chaves, Stephens, and Galaskiewicz (2004, 305-12) find mixed evidence concerning the potential relationship between government funding and voluntary sector advocacy; in some models, Chaves, Stephens, and Galaskiewicz (2004, 309-12) found a positive, statistically significant relationship between the provision of government funding and voluntary sector engagement in advocacy, but in other models, the inclusion of additional control variables neutralised the significance of the effect. In a national survey of the advocacy and lobbying activities of 311 registered charitable organisations, Salamon and Lessans Geller with Lorentz (2008, 8) found that only a quarter of organisations surveyed reported no engagement in lobbying or advocacy due to concerns about contravening laws or regulations governing such activities, while only 20 per cent expressed concern that engaging in such activities could jeopardise the receipt of public funding. Conversely, 70 per cent of organisations they surveyed indicated that they did not engage in advocacy or lobbying due to time constraints, while 45 per cent did not engage in such activities due to the absence of organisational expertise amongst staff (Salamon and Lessans Geller with Lorentz 2008, 8). The diversity of findings highlights the absence of consensus on the potential impact of government funding on voluntary sector advocacy, though this does not obviate the possibility that some organisations may view regulations surrounding voluntary sector advocacy and the receipt of public funds as a constraint on their desire to engage in advocacy and their choice of strategies.

The active involvement of voluntary agencies in advocacy on resettlement appears consistent with the literature on government-voluntary sector relations, this form of engagement, alongside with efforts to disseminate information and build grassroots support, also align with the literature that views voluntary sector organisations as fundamental components of civic life in democratic societies. In particular, Warren (2003, 46) argues that voluntary sector organisations can “develop the democratic capacities of citizens” through information dissemination and educational outreach activities which can help develop “civic virtues such as tolerance, reciprocity, and trust.” In addition, voluntary sector organisations may give different groups a “public voice” and “providing representations of difference and commonality in ways that underwrite and focus public deliberation (Warren 2003, 46-47).” Furthermore, voluntary sector organisations may serve an “institutional” purpose by offering “representation and voice” within government institutions or, at times, a “means of resistance” when interest representation efforts prove unsuccessful (Warren 2003, 46-47). In these ways,

voluntary sector organisations contributed to the development of an “active, self-confident, and informed citizenry” that is essential for good democratic governance (Warren 2003, 48).⁵²

That said, the nine voluntary agencies responsible for the administration and implementation of the Resettlement Admissions and Reception and Placement programmes are not necessarily the only organisations to engage in advocacy on resettlement issues. Chapter two noted that the Office of Refugee Resettlement contracts out the provision of follow-on employment and English-language instruction services to refugees that have completed the initial period of settlement through the Reception and Placement programme to 27 ethnic community-based organisations.

Preliminary research indicates few ethnic community-based organisations may include advocacy as part of their respective organisational missions. Indeed, this research suggests that only seven of the 27 ethnic community-based organisations contracted by the Office of Refugee Resettlement prioritise advocacy in this way.⁵³ Of these seven organisations, only the Arab Community Center for Economic and Social Services of Dearborn, Michigan published any statements on resettlement issues. In December 2015, the Arab Community Center for Economic and Social Services issued a press release alerting the media of an event featuring local and state representatives as well as other ethnic community-based organisations and civil liberties groups opposed to House Resolution 4038. The Center organised the event to raise awareness of existing efforts to challenge the resolution, and called on members of the public to “contact local, state and national elected leaders to keep doors open to refugees (Arab Community Center for Economic and Social Services published its views on resettlement issues 2015, para. 3 of 10).” The organisation subsequently issued a press release in which it expressed its opposition to “the anti-refugee rhetoric and legislation that is causing Michigan and local communities to deny humanitarian efforts to refugees,” and argued that House Resolution 4038 “only serves to further divide us and increases unfounded fears of refugees and immigrants (Arab Community Center for Economic and Social Services 2015, para. 2 and 4 of 9).”

⁵² For a discussion of the role of voluntary sector organisations in facilitating the mobilisation and political participation of immigrants or refugees, see Bloemraad (2006), Bloemraad and Gleeson (2012), and Nawyn (2005).

⁵³ The seven organisations include the Pars Equality Centre, the Somali American Community Center, the Burmese American Community Institute, the Ethnic Minorities from Burma Advocacy and Resource Center, the Arab Community Center for Economic and Social Services, the Somali American Parent Association, and the Bhutanese Nepali Community of Columbus.

Though the Arab Community Center for Economic and Social Services appears to be the only ethnic community-based organisation to include advocacy as part of its mission, a preliminary analysis indicates that a further four organisations contracted by the Office of Refugee Resettlement have used their online presence to express their views on recent developments in this area.⁵⁴ In 2017, the Iraqi Mutual Aid Society of Chicago, Illinois issued two press releases in response to the executive orders which placed a moratorium on resettlement admissions and the admission of travellers from certain predominantly Muslim countries. The Society called the measures “inhumane, unnecessary, and counterproductive,” and further argued that the orders “will have harmful consequences for tens of thousands of innocent individuals seeking refuge from war, persecution, and terrorism (Iraqi Mutual Aid Society 2016, para. 10 of 18).” Similarly, in response to the executive orders, the Immigrant and Refugee Community Organization of Portland, Oregon, urged residents to “remain supportive of those who are persecuted internationally and seek peace, safety and freedom in the United States” and called on supporters to contact their representatives and convey their support through social media networks such as Twitter and Facebook (Immigrant and Refugee Community Organization 2018, para. 2 and 5 and of 9).

One cannot interpret the preliminary research presented above as conclusive evidence on the level of engagement of ethnic-community based organisations in advocacy on resettlement. Representatives from these 27 organisations and their allies could engage in other forms of advocacy, such as drafting petitions, meeting local, state, and federal officials, or they may pursue forms of direct action that they cannot document as easily online. These organisations could also potentially lack the human and financial resources necessary to maintain an active presence online and to raise awareness of their advocacy efforts through these channels. Though it seems reasonable to assume that the 27 ethnic-community based organisations contracted by the Office of Refugee Resettlement could well have views on resettlement matters, this does not obviate the possibility that other ethnic community-based or voluntary agencies are not actively engaged in advocacy on resettlement in the US.

Determining and interpreting the potential role of ethnic community-based organisations in advocacy on resettlement is also challenging due to the dearth of academic scholarship in this area (Vu et al. 2017, 200; c.f. de Leon et al. 2009, Hung 2007, and Newland, Tanaka, and Barker 2007). De Leon et al. (2009, 20) argue that ethnic community-based

⁵⁴ In addition to the Arab Community Center for Economic and Social Services, Women Watch Afrika, the Iraqi Mutual Aid Society, the Immigrant and Refugee Community Organization, and EMBARC have also issued press releases on resettlement issues.

organisations are “uniquely positioned to represent their constituents and propose policy and programmatic responses, being attuned to the needs and concerns of individuals and families.” However, their analysis of the activities of 533 ethnic community-based organisations located in the Washington, DC area found that despite their proximity to the Capitol, only 13 organisations (or 2.4 per cent) primarily engaged in the promotion of civil rights or advocacy (de Leon et al. 2009, 9).

Though de Leon et al. (2009) document a range of advocacy efforts undertaken by other organisations in their sample, their analysis indicates that many of these organisations have multifaceted missions and few ethnic community-based organisations have staff dedicated to the pursuit of advocacy. De Leon et al. (2009, 21-22) observe that “many nonprofit organizations [sic] do not have the capacity, resources, or opportunity to participate in direct advocacy” and those that many senior representatives “do most direct advocacy-related activities themselves, often on their own time and using social capital within their networks.”⁵⁵ Furthermore, de Leon et al. (2009, 24) observed that the Latino community was more engaged in advocacy and had been established longer than the Asian and African community-based organisations in the Washington, DC area. Thus, factors including human and financial resources, the length of time an ethnic community has been established in a given area, and cultural differences may condition the advocacy efforts of ethnic community-based organisations.

However, other scholars suggest that ethnic community-based organisations may be more engaged in advocacy on resettlement than it appears at first glance. Nawyn (2005) conducted a mail-in survey of 188 resettlement agencies in the US, including 152 local affiliates of the nine voluntary agencies interviewed as part of this thesis, and eight “mutual assistance associations” representing a range of ethnic communities.⁵⁶ Of those eight mutual assistance organisations, six engaged in advocacy (Nawyn 2005, 39). Though Nawyn does not document the advocacy efforts of these eight mutual assistance associations in detail, she notes (2005, 131) that these associations are “not as tightly connected to federal and state government agencies” as voluntary agencies, which gives them more “freedom to act without government

⁵⁵ This finding parallels an observation from Vu et al. (2017, 2000), who find that ethnic community-based organisations tend to have fewer staff and lower revenues than ‘mainstream’ community organisations (Vu et al. 2017, 200).

⁵⁶ The Office of Refugee Resettlement now refers to mutual assistance associations as ethnic community-based organisations (California Department of Social Services, 2016, 1).

restrictions.⁵⁷ Though these eight organisations represent only a fraction of the total number of mutual assistance organisations, and there may be a self-selection bias in terms of which organisations elected to respond to the mail-in survey, it is clear that further research is needed to better ascertain the nature and level of engagement in advocacy among ethnic community-based organisations in resettlement.

In the time since the author conducted interviews in the US, voluntary agencies have been active advocates on a range of issues related to resettlement, opposing efforts to impose further security screening requirements on refugees bound for resettlement, pressing for increased resettlement admissions, and vigorously campaigning for the repeal of the executive orders issued by President Trump in 2017. Many voluntary agencies have also expressed their opposition to the decision to limit resettlement admissions to a historic low of 45,000 in fiscal year 2018. The Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Service condemned the move as “callous and tragic” and out of alignment with the history and values of the US (Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Service 2017, para. 2 of 8). The International Rescue Committee also derided the “drastic” reduction in the resettlement ceiling and argued that this “arbitrary” decision was a “tragic and misguided error” that would both ruin and cost lives (International Rescue Committee 2017, para. 1 and 2 of 9). The US Conference of Catholic Bishops argued that resettled refugees “bring strength and richness” to American society and pressed the government to “restore America’s historic leadership as a refuge for those fleeing persecution (US Conference of Catholic Bishops 2017, para. 5 and 6 of 6).” For their part, the US Committee for Refugees and Immigrants argued the decision “signals the U.S. retreat from global leadership (US Committee for Refugees and Immigrants 2017, para. 1 and 2 of 4).”

The executive orders adopted by President Trump in both January and March 2017 prompted a range of responses from voluntary agencies, including open letters and press releases to public demonstrations and legal advocacy. In February 2017, World Relief published an open letter to President Trump and Vice President Mike Pence in the Washington Post in response to the first executive order which established a moratorium on resettlement to the US. Co-signed by evangelical leaders from 50 states, the letter argued that the ‘dramatic’ decrease in resettlement admissions would deprive refugees of “hope and a future” and could also “cost them their lives (World Relief et al. 2017, para. 5 of 6).”

⁵⁷ If one accepts Freeman’s (1995; 2006) characterisation of the ‘clientelistic’ nature of interest representation on immigration policymaking in the US, then the absence of a close relationship with federal officials could potentially hamper the effectiveness of ethnic community-based advocacy efforts.

HIAS has consistently spoken out against the executive orders issued by President Trump to stem the flow of refugees to the US. For example, Mark Hetfield, President and Chief Executive Officer of HIAS, released a statement arguing that “With the stroke of a pen, Donald Trump has abdicated American values and American leadership on welcoming refugees,” and further noting that “to deprive refugees of safe haven is to scapegoat vulnerable human beings, and to confuse those who flee terror with terror itself (HIAS 2017, para. 2 of 5).” Mr Hetfield particularly highlighted the “deep and tragic irony” of issuing the executive order on International Holocaust Remembrance Day, recalling the ‘dark period’ when the US “shut their doors to millions of innocent people (HIAS 2017, para. 5 of 5).”

The US Conference of Catholic Bishops has also been an outspoken critic of the executive orders issued by President Trump on refugee resettlement. In response to the executive order issued in January 2017, the organisation issued a press release in which it expressed its ‘strong disagreement’ with the decision to impose a moratorium on resettlement, calling resettlement “an act of love and hope (US Conference of Catholic Bishops 2017, para. 3 of 7).” However, the organisation was careful to note that it was not attempting to “enter the political arena” but merely seeking to remind Christians of biblical teachings concerning the protection of refugees (US Conference of Catholic Bishops 2017, para. 6 of 6).

In response to the second executive order issued in March 2017, the organisation issued a press release in which it noted that the US has historically demonstrated “leadership” in refugee protection and argued “Resettling only 50,000 refugees a year, down from 110,000, does not reflect the need, our compassion, and our capacity as a nation. We have the ability to continue to assist the most vulnerable among us without sacrificing our values as Americans or the safety and security of our nation (US Conference of Catholic Bishops 2017, para. 8 of 8).” Similarly, the US Committee for Refugees issued a press release in which it stated that the decision had “shattered” the history of the US as a “nation of refugees and immigrants (US Committee for Refugees and Immigrants 2017, para. 1 of 6).”

World Relief has expressed its opposition to the recent executive orders on a number of occasions through both press statements and open letters signed by other evangelical leaders. For example, in January 2017, the organisation issued a press release in which it expressed its “dismay” at the decision to suspend the Refugee Admissions Program, and called on the administration to rescind the executive order and restore a programme which “represents the historic compassion and courage of the American people (World Relief 2017, para. 4 and 5 of 8).” The organisation also castigated the third executive order issued in October 2017 and

argued that the order represents a “further abdication” of the country’s history as “the global leader in compassion (World Relief 2017, para. 4 of 4).

However, the organisation was forced to defend its public position on the executive order, noting that it had been both “praised and criticized [sic] for taking a public stand” on the matter (World Relief 2017, para. 1 of 14). The organisation stated that they “never have and never will” endorse a particular political party or candidate, but that they believe they have an “obligation” and a “biblical call” to engage in advocacy (World Relief 2017, para. 4 and 5 of 14).” In a religious context, the organisation argued that Christians have helped advance numerous social movements and social policy changes in the history of the US, and argued that “our Christian faith [does not excuse] us from the public policy discourse but in fact demands it (World Relief 2017, para. 6 of 14).”

The language used in these statements appears to parallel the language used by government officials and voluntary agencies to describe the motivations for resettlement and its benefits, as set out in chapter two. These statements could indicate that voluntary agencies continue to perceive humanitarianism, norms, history, values, and leadership as motivations for resettling refugees in the US today.

That said, any discussion of advocacy would be incomplete without considering two important, non-institutional factors that condition the impact of advocacy efforts: issue context and issue salience. Issue context relates to both the scope of the policy and the degree of contestation surrounding this policy (Mahoney 2007, 40). Groups are more likely to exert influence in the policymaking process when the scope of the issue is relatively narrow and uncontested (Mahoney 2007, 40).

Evaluating the issue context surrounding the Resettlement Admissions and Reception and Placement programmes is somewhat challenging. On the one hand, as previously noted, Freeman (2006, 239) characterises resettlement as a distributive policy that has concentrated benefits for resettled refugees and diffuse costs for the country of resettlement. However, once the federal government discharges its financial responsibility under the Reception and Placement Program, states and local communities must absorb the ongoing costs of resettlement and provide education and access to any other entitlements for which resettled refugees may be eligible. Though the US resettles the largest absolute number of refugees and is among the largest contributors to resettlement in relative terms, resettled refugees constitute a small proportion of the total US population, as tables 7 to 9 in the appendix demonstrated. Nevertheless, given that resettled refugees may have unique needs related to their refugee

experience, it seems plausible that the scope of resettlement and the impact on receiving communities and state governments may be somewhat larger than Freeman (2006) envisioned.

Evaluating the degree of contestation surrounding resettlement is also challenging. As previously noted, academics, voluntary agencies, and the media have argued that there has traditionally been a bipartisan consensus surrounding resettlement to the US Republicans (c.f. Amos 2017, para. 3 and 18 of 35; International Rescue Committee 2017, 1; Orchard 2017, para. 1 and 17 of 31; Rhodan 2017, para. 6 of 13; US Committee for Refugees and Immigrants 2017, para. 15 of 21). However, public opinion polls demonstrate that members of the public have rarely supported resettlement. Historically, the US adopted policies that conformed to public attitudes on refugee protection, whether these were more liberal or more restrictive (Harwood 1986, 201-2). However, governments gradually began to pursue a more permissive approach to refugee protection despite public opposition (Harwood 1986, 210-11). The divergence between government policies and public attitudes on resettlement is apparent when one examines public opinion polls on this issue. In 1948, a Gallup poll found that 57 per cent of respondents opposed a proposal to resettle approximately 10,000 displaced persons from Europe, but the US House of Representatives and Senate authorised the resettlement of 415,000 individuals under the auspices of the *Displaced Persons Act* of 1948 (Desilver 2015, para. 6 of 13 but c.f. Gibney 2004, 135). Similarly, a 1958 Gallup poll found that 55 per cent of respondents disapproved of a proposal to resettle 65,000 Hungarian refugees (Desilver 2015, para. 7 of 13), yet the government adopted the *Hungarian Refugee Act* which eventually facilitated the resettlement of 38,121 Hungarian refugees (Loescher and Scanlan 1986, 52).

Public opinion polls also demonstrate that there was a deep divide in public attitudes towards refugees from Southeast Asia; a 1975 Harris poll found 49 per cent of respondents opposed the government's decision to admit refugees from Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam, while 37 per cent supported their resettlement and 14 per cent did not know (Desilver 2015, para. 8 of 13). In 1979, a CBS/New York Times poll found that a full 62 per cent of respondents opposed subsequent plans to increase resettlement of Indochinese refugees to 14,000 individuals a month, but Democratic President Jimmy Carter nevertheless approved the decision to double the monthly admissions of Indochinese refugees in July of that year (Desilver 2015, para. 9 of 13).

This is not to say that the American public has never supported resettlement. One notable exception to the pattern of divergence between government policy and public opinion occurred during the conflict in Kosovo. In an unusual reversal of circumstances, the Department of State and the UNHCR opposed the resettlement of Kosovar refugees at first

(Robinson 2000, 2 and 4-6). However, extensive domestic media coverage of the US bombing campaign in Kosovo fuelled public support for a humanitarian response, and a 1999 Gallup poll found that 66 per cent of respondents supported the decision to resettle several hundred Kosovar Albanian refugees (Desilver 2015, para. 13 of 13; Robinson 2000, 3). Though congressional advocacy efforts by voluntary agencies also exerted some impact, a research paper by Ambassador Robinson suggests that public opinion had an important influence on the decision to resettle 14,161 Kosovar refugees in 2000 (Refugee Processing Center 2018, see annual table; Robinson 2000, 3 and 6-7).

Though the Kosovar case marks a noteworthy exception to the pattern of opposition to resettlement, there are indications that public opinion on the resettlement of particular groups of refugees remains divided. Such divisions are apparent in American public attitudes towards Syrian refugees. In September 2015, a national NBC News/Wall Street Journal poll of 1,000 randomly selected adults found that 35 per cent of respondents agreed that President Obama's proposal to resettle 10,000 Syrian refugees constituted the "right amount," while 24 per cent favoured resettling no refugees, 21 per cent believed that the US should resettle more Syrian refugees and 17 per cent thought that the government should resettle fewer Syrians (Hart Research Associates 2015, 22). Conversely, a national ABC News/Washington Post survey of 1,004 randomly selected adults found that 54 per cent of respondents opposed resettling Syrian refugees while 43 per cent supported the provision of this durable solution (Langer Research Associates 2015, 5). Similarly, a national Quinnipiac University poll of 1,140 registered voters found that 51 per cent opposed resettling Syrian refugees while only 43 per cent supported resettling these refugees (Quinnipiac University 2015, 5).⁵⁸

However, a slightly different picture emerges when exploring polls that employed more complex questions which incorporated references to the security screening process for resettled refugees. In November 2015, a national CBS News poll of 1,205 randomly selected adults found that 50 per cent believed that the US should not resettle any Syrian refugees, while 47 per cent responded that the US should resettle Syrian refugees provided they undergo a "security clearance process (CBS News 2015, 1)." Conversely, a December 2015 national Public Religion Research Institute poll of 1,003 randomly selected adults found that 53 per cent favoured resettling Syrian refugees provided that refugees are screened, while 41 per cent responded that the US should not resettle any Syrian refugees (Public Religion Research Institute 2015, 7). Similarly, a May 2016 national Brookings Institute survey of 1,580

⁵⁸ Quinnipiac University is among the largest independent, academic polling centres in the US.

individuals found that 56 per cent of respondents agreed the US should resettle Syrian refugees provided that the government conducts “extensive background checks” to eliminate the risk of terrorism, while 43 per cent expressed that no Syrian refugees ought to be resettled even with such measures in place (Brookings Institute 2016, 10).

One must also place these attitudes in the broader context of the increasing political polarisation of the US electorate on immigration. Between 1994 and 2017, the nonpartisan Pew Research Center conducted repeated polls which revealed a net increase in positive attitudes towards immigrants. In 1994, 63 per cent of respondents agreed that immigrants “burden [the] country by taking jobs, housing, [and] health care,” compared to 31 per cent who believed that immigrants “strengthen [the] country with their hard work and talents (Pew Research Center 2017, 38). Conversely, in 2017, only 26 per cent of respondents agreed that immigrants were a burden, compared to 65 per cent who believed that immigrants strengthened the US (Pew Research Center 2017, 38).

Though their survey indicates that public attitudes towards immigrants have improved, current views among Democrats and Republicans (or those who lean Democrat or Republican) may be more polarised than ever before. In 1994, 32 per cent of Democrats and those who lean Democrat agreed immigrants strengthen the country, compared to 30 per cent of Republicans or those who lean Republican (Pew Research Center 2017, 38). The proportion of Democrats and Republicans who held positive views of immigrants followed a similar trajectory between 1994 and 2006 but began to diverge thereafter. In 2017, 84 per cent of Democrats or those who lean Democrat agreed immigrants strengthen the US, compared to 42 per cent of Republicans or those lean Republican (Pew Research Center 2017, 38). During the 2016 Presidential election, only 32 per cent of individuals who supported the Democratic candidate Hillary Clinton believed that immigration was the “most important issue” for the US, compared to 64 per cent of those who voted for Donald Trump (Huang et al. 2016, no pagination). These attitudes indicates that Democrats hold far more favourable views of immigrants than Republicans at present and that immigration is a far less salient issue for Democrats than it is for Republicans.⁵⁹

⁵⁹ Though public opinion polls indicate that Democrats and Republicans are divided in some aspects of immigration, the disparity should not be overstated. Though Gallup polls conducted between 2001 and 2008 and again between 2012 and 2016 indicate that a smaller percentage of Democrats support reducing the overall number of immigrants admitted to the US than Republicans, there was a net decline in the percentage of *both* Democrats and Republicans that supported lower admissions between 2002 and 2008 (Gimpel 2017, 2). There was also a dramatic decline in the percentage of both Democrats and Republicans favouring lower admissions from 2012 to 2013, though attitudes have since diverged (Gimpel 2017, 2).

There are indications that public attitudes towards resettlement are also politically polarised. In a May 2016 poll of 1,580 Americans conducted by Nielsen International for the Brookings Institute and the University of Maryland, 59 per cent of respondents agreed the US should resettle refugees from Syria and other countries in the Middle East, provided the government “screens refugees for security risks (University of Maryland 2016, 2).” However, 77 per cent of Democrats agreed the government should resettle these refugees, whereas 63 per cent of Republicans and 77 per cent of those who identified themselves as supporters of President Trump opposed such a decision (University of Maryland 2016, 2).

Though one could interpret these findings as evidence of party sorting rather than political polarisation (Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope 2008), there are also indications that the strength and direction of public sentiment towards resettlement are diverging according to political affiliation. In a poll conducted among 660 residents of the state of Pennsylvania between August and October 2016, the University of Pennsylvania found that 54 per cent of respondents agreed that the US should resettle Syrian refugees “after screening them for security” and 39 per cent of respondents disagreed with that statement (University of Pennsylvania 2016, 1). Of those who agreed with that statement, 29 per cent strongly agreed, and 25 per cent somewhat agreed (University of Pennsylvania 2016, 1). Conversely, among those who disagreed with that statement, 27 per cent strongly disagreed, and 12 per cent somewhat disagreed (University of Pennsylvania 2016, 1). However, 43 per cent of Democrats strongly agreed that the US should resettle Syrian refugees, whereas only 10 per cent of Republicans felt the same way (University of Pennsylvania 2016, 1). In contrast, 45 per cent of Republicans strongly opposed the statement, while only 12 per cent of Democrats expressed the same sentiment (University of Pennsylvania 2016, 1). These findings indicate that a majority of respondents expressed a ‘strong’ opinion about the question and that a plurality of Democrat and Republican respondents held ‘strong’ but opposing views on the issue. The small size and limited geographic scope of this particular poll make it difficult to draw generalisations regarding the implications of its findings. Nevertheless, Democrat and Republican attitudes towards Syrian refugees appear to diverge in strength and direction in this poll, raising the spectre of polarisation in certain districts.

Issue salience can also impact the degree of influence exerted by interest groups, insofar as policymakers are more likely to consider the views of a range of groups when issues are

high salience (Mahoney 2007, 40; see also Klüver 2011).⁶⁰ While public opinion polls suggest that the American public has rarely supported refugee resettlement efforts, the general domain of immigration has usually held modest salience for the electorate (Newport and Brands 2016). Longitudinal data on public attitudes towards immigration is rare—particularly polls which ask the same question over a sustained period. However, an analysis of Gallup polls that have repeatedly asked respondents to identify the “most important problem facing this country today” indicates that only a small percentage of respondents identified immigration as the “most important” issue between 1994 and 2016 (Newport and Brands 2016, para. 3 of 26). Indeed, immigration only appeared in the top five “most important” issues in 52 of the 190 months over which these polls were conducted (Newport and Brands 2016, para. 3 of 26).

However, there are indications that the salience of immigration has increased since the turn of the millennium (Newport and Brands 2016, figure 1). On average, five per cent of respondents identified immigration as the “most important” issue each month between January 2001 and February 2018 (Newport 2018, para. 7 of 17). However, this belies occasionally peaks in the salience of immigration. For example, in April 2006, 19 per cent of respondents identified immigration as the “most important” issue (Newport 2018, para. 9 of 17). This poll was taken in the same month that a Republican-controlled Congress introduced the *Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act* of 2006, which provoked widespread protests against its perceived restrictive measures (Newport 2018, para. 9 of 17). Similarly, there was a marked increase in the percentage of respondents who identified immigration as the “most important” issue, rising from 5 per cent in May 2007 to 15 per cent in June 2007 (Newport 2018, para. 10 of 17). This change coincided with Congressional debates on the *Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act* of 2007 (Newport 2018, para. 10 of 17), a revised version of the bill introduced the previous year. One can observe a similar change in 2014, when the percentage of respondents who identified immigration as the “most important” issue rose from just 2 per cent in the spring to 17 per cent in July 2014, when large numbers of unaccompanied minors from Central America began to arrive in search of asylum (Newport 2018, para. 11 of 17). On average, there appears to have been a marginal increase in the salience of immigration since 2014, which has persisted so far in 2018 (Newport 2018, para. 12 of 17).

These developments highlight the potential influence of “focusing” events, which can draw attention to a particular issue and can help or hinder advocates, depending on their

⁶⁰ Mahoney (2007, 40) notes that, ironically, this could undermine the influence of groups which have sought to augment the salience of that particular issue.

perspective and the response the focusing event generates among the wider public (Kingdon 1995, 94-99). However, focusing events are unlikely to fuel policy change in and of themselves (Kingdon 1995, 94-99). Though recent academic research indicates that the framing of media discourse on refugee protection can have a powerful positive (or negative) impact on public attitudes towards those in need of protection (De Poli, Jakobsson, and Schüller 2017; Ferwerda, Flynn, and Horiuchi 2017; Hickerson and Dunsmore 2016; see also Gabrielatos and Baker 2008), public opinion polls in the US indicate that events such as the drowning of three-year-old Syrian Alan Kurdi and the terrorist attacks in Paris in November 2015, precipitated a shift in attitudes towards Syrian refugees. Following the global circulation of images of Alan Kurdi, who drowned on 2 September, 2015 along with his brother Galib and mother Rehana after his family attempted to travel to the Greek island of Kos in search of asylum, a majority of respondents to a CNN/ORC poll conducted between 4 and 6 September, 2015 found that 55 per cent of respondents supported the idea of resettling some refugees in response to the “migrant crisis in Europe.” Following President Obama’s decision to resettle 10,000 Syrian refugees, a Pew Research Center poll conducted between 22 and 27 September, 2015 found that 51 per cent of respondents approved of the decision, with a plurality (44 per cent) believing that the US should do even “more” in this regard (Pew Research Center 2015, 1).

However, multiple public opinion polls indicate that public attitudes shifted in the weeks immediately following the attacks in Paris on 13 November, 2015 (see Neufeld 2017, figure 1). For example, a CBS News/New York Times poll conducted between 19 and 22 November, 2015 found that 50 per cent of respondents agreed the US should not resettle Syrian refugees who had undergone security screening, compared to 47 per cent who favoured resettling refugees (CBS News 2015, 1). Of those who opposed resettlement, 68 per cent identified as Republican and 36 per cent identified as Democrat (CBS News 2015, 1). Conversely, among those who expressed support for resettlement, 63 per cent identified as Democrat and 27 per cent as Republican (CBS News 2015, 1). Similarly, a Quinnipiac University poll conducted between 16 and 20 December, 2015 found that 51 per cent opposed resettling Syrian refugees in the US, compared to 43 per cent who supported resettlement (Quinnipiac University 2015, 5). Of those who opposed resettling these refugees, 82 per cent identified as Republican and 22 per cent identified as Democrat (Quinnipiac University 2015, 5). Conversely, among those who supported resettlement, 74 per cent identified as Democrat and 13 per cent as Republican (Quinnipiac University 2015, 5).

While voluntary agencies spoke of their efforts to raise awareness and build community support for resettlement, pinpointing the influence of issue salience can be challenging due to

its endogeneity. In short, issues rarely become salient naturally—they are frequently made salient directly as a result of advocacy efforts (Baumgartner et al. 2009, 121). However, advocates are more likely to respond to a change in the salience of a particular issue than they are to succeed in making an issue prominent in the public sphere, and advocates cannot fully control the level of salience that a particular issue ultimately achieves (Baumgartner et al. 2009, 121). Furthermore, interest groups do not necessarily perceive salience in the same way; whereas some advocates might want to raise the profile of an issue, others would prefer to keep the profile of the matter low (Baumgartner et al. 2009, 121).

The success of advocacy efforts may also depend to an extent on whether advocates are appealing to preserve the status quo or whether such groups are pressing for policy change (Mahoney 2007, 41). In particular, advocates who favour the “current regulatory environment” are “more likely” to succeed in their efforts than groups who path dependence makes it “more likely” that advocates who favour the “current regulatory environment” will be successful than those attempting to move to a new “equilibrium,” so to speak (Mahoney 2007, 41). In the context of resettlement admissions, recent changes in the resettlement ceiling have been relatively modest, and constitute an attempt to amend an existing policy, rather than an effort to abolish a policy or create a new one. Voluntary agencies may have been successful in lobbying for recovery in admissions post-9/11 and preserving funding because this is essentially returning to the status quo. However, this suggests that voluntary agencies may find it more difficult to advocate for increased admissions.

3.4 Conclusion

This chapter began with a discussion of the history of advocacy on resettlement in the US. Though few scholars have directly explored this topic, the available literature indicates that voluntary sector organisations such as the International Rescue Committee successfully advocated for the government to resettle large numbers of Hungarian refugees. However, voluntary organisations struggled to convince the government to adopt similarly generous resettlement admissions policies for Chilean refugees.

The chapter then explored perceptions concerning the potential relationship between resettlement admissions and voluntary sector advocacy through interviews with government officials and representatives from the nine voluntary agencies that implement the Resettlement Admissions and Reception and Placement programmes. A federal official indicated that the government is open to advocacy efforts and voluntary agency representatives stated that they actively engaged in advocacy on resettlement issues. These efforts were perceived to have contributed to a rebound in resettlement admissions following the terrorist attacks of 11

September, 2001 and were also thought to have prevented funding cuts to resettlement programmes in the US. The author suggested that one could interpret these responses as consistent with the dominant taxonomy on government-voluntary sector relations which argues that relations between these parties can be adversarial in nature. The author further suggested that one could interpret these responses as consistent with the neo-pluralist structure of interest representation in the US, which suggests that organisations have a common right to influence the policymaking process, though not all groups are necessarily represented equally in this process. Some elements of the structure of relations between the government and voluntary agencies could also be interpreted as clientelistic in nature, though this approach has certain notable limitations. Nevertheless, some respondents indicated that advocacy could not only help build community support for resettlement but also reflected the democratic values of the US. While preliminary research indicates that few ethnic community-based organisations may be engaged in advocacy, the limitations of the existing literature create a strong rationale for further research to better ascertain efforts by ethnic community-based organisations in this area.

Though voluntary agencies perceived success in some of their advocacy efforts on resettlement, the analysis indicated that issue context and salience could condition the impact of voluntary sector advocacy efforts. Though the potentially narrow scope of resettlement could facilitate voluntary sector advocacy efforts in this area, public opinion polls suggest that the American public has rarely supported resettlement in the US, and that attitudes towards resettlement may be becoming more polarised—especially given the resurgence in securitised discourse on refugee protection since Donald Trump was elected President in November 2015. Though the US was among the largest contributors to resettlement in absolute and relative terms between 1980 and 2016, the contested nature of resettlement could potentially constrain the impact of advocacy efforts, even though immigration has rarely been a salient issue for voters outside focusing events.

Overall, though the perceived openness of the government to interest representation and the positive outcomes identified by voluntary agency representatives offer an indication of the potential relationship between resettlement admissions and voluntary sector advocacy, further research that traces the process through which the US develops its annual resettlement ceilings and appropriates funding, and which considers the influence of issue context and salience, is required.

Chapter Four: Resettlement Admissions and Domestic Responsibility Sharing in Canada

4.1 Introduction

Chapter one presented a number of observations concerning contributions to resettlement and the structure of resettlement programmes. Included among those observations were figures demonstrating that Canada was among the largest contributors to resettlement in both absolute and relative terms between 1980 and 2016. Chapter one also observed that, in addition to the considerable cross-national differences in resettlement contributions among members of the international community, there are notable differences in how these countries structure their resettlement programmes. Finally, chapter one highlighted the need to explore the potential relationship between resettlement admissions and domestic responsibility sharing with voluntary sector organisations, and between resettlement admissions and voluntary sector advocacy given the unprecedented scale of human displacement at present, the persistent gap between resettlement needs and the number of available places, and the limitations of the predominantly state-centric qualitative and quantitative research in this area.

This chapter continues to pursue the themes explored in chapter two and attempts to better understand why Canada has voluntarily adopted generous resettlement admissions. The chapter begins descriptively by offering an overview of the history of refugee resettlement in Canada in section 4.2. The chapter then presents data on the size and composition of resettlement flows to Canada in section 4.3, to offer a picture of the size and nature of its contribution to resettlement. These empirical observations indicate that, though Canada is among the largest contributors to resettlement in both absolute and relative terms, the size and composition of resettlement flows have fluctuated over time. The author follows this account with a description of the current structure of resettlement programmes in Canada in section 4.4.

This descriptive background sets the stage for the analytical approach adopted throughout the remainder of the chapter. Section 4.5 presents the views of senior government officials and private sponsors on the perceived motivations for resettling refugees in Canada and its benefits and, in accordance with the ontological and epistemological foundations of this thesis, attempts to interpret these perceptions in relation to the extant literature. Though the academic literature indicates that governments may have a range of reasons for resettling refugees, one could interpret their perceptions as consistent with the academic literature on refugee protection as an impure public good, and the economic literature on public goods more generally. Section 4.6 presents the views of government officials and private sponsors on the perceived nature of their relationship and suggests that one could interpret their views as consistent with the dominant taxonomy on government-voluntary sector relations as well as

the historical pattern of public service delivery in Canada. Furthermore, one could also interpret comments from certain interviewees as consistent with scholarly work on the potential perils of government-voluntary sector partnerships in Canada. Section 4.7 presents the views of government officials and private sponsors on the potential relationship between resettlement admissions and domestic responsibility sharing and seeks to interpret these perceptions in relation to the literature. One could interpret the perception among most interviewees that domestic responsibility sharing has enhanced resettlement admissions as consistent with the academic literature on the role of voluntary sector organisations in providing public goods and services. Section 4.8 concludes with a summary.

Before proceeding, the author would like to highlight an important limitation to the discussion and analysis in this chapter. Though of the four resettlement programmes in Canada features some degree of domestic responsibility sharing, the author concentrates on analysing whether domestic responsibility sharing through the PSR programme enhances resettlement admissions due to time and resource constraints. Though few scholars have discussed this programme in their analyses of resettlement, none have analysed the potential relationship between this form of domestic responsibility sharing and resettlement admissions in an explicit manner. Since the principle of ‘additionality’ is a core component of the PSR programme, this initiative could offer useful insights into the potential reasons why Canada has voluntarily adopted generous resettlement admissions policies. The decision to focus on the PSR programme is also topical given current UNHCR efforts to promote private sponsorship as a complementary mechanism for the protection of Syrian refugees (UNHCR 2014, 1). Nevertheless, the author acknowledges that an analysis of the perceived relationship between resettlement admissions and domestic responsibility sharing through the Government Assisted Refugees (GAR), Joint Assistance Sponsorship (JAS), and Blended Visa Office-Referred (BVOR) programmes could offer an interesting avenue for further research.

4.2 History of Refugee Resettlement in Canada

Canada has a long history of offering refugee protection. This section offers an overview of the history of refugee resettlement to Canada, to enrich the discussion and analysis that follows in the remainder of this chapter. In general, the literature that the country has long been a destination for refugees, but it has not always welcomed these immigrants with open arms. In the late nineteenth century, the government adopted a *laissez-faire* attitude towards immigration and admitted numerous groups of refugees, including Doukhobor, Jewish, and Mennonite refugees fleeing persecution in the Russia Empire (Knowles 2007, 71-78 and 94). During this period, the government was so unconcerned with the arrival of refugees that the

first Immigration Act adopted in 1869 contained no provisions on refugees (Canadian Council for Refugees 2009, no pagination).

However, the government soon abandoned this *laissez-faire* approach. In the early twentieth century, Canada was reluctant to make any formal commitments towards refugees, and in some cases, even enacted legislation designed to restrict migration (Canadian Council for Refugees 2009, no pagination). Following the conclusion of World War I, Canada declined to resettle the displaced because the government would then be unable to deport stateless persons if they later committed a crime and it refused to admit any person who possessed a Nansen passport for the same reason (Kelley and Trebilcock 2010, 205-6). In 1923, Canada adopted a regulation which denied entry to persons of Asian descent and resettled fewer than 1,300 Armenian refugees because the government categorised these individuals as Asian (Canadian Council for Refugees 2009, no pagination; Kelley and Trebilcock 2010, 205).

Though Canada admitted more than 20,000 Mennonite refugees between 1923 and 1930 (Canadian Council for Refugees 2009, no pagination), the government generally maintained a restrictive approach towards refugee protection during the interwar period due to the Great Depression, growing concerns about communism, and undisguised anti-Semitism (Adelman 1991, 188; Kelley and Trebilcock 2010, chapter six; Knowles 2007, 135). This approach sometimes had dire consequences for those in need of protection. In 1938, Canadian representatives attended the conference convened by US President Theodore Roosevelt in Evian, France but they declined to establish a formal resettlement programme and ultimately resettled far fewer Jewish refugees than other members of the international community (Canadian Council for Refugees 2009, no pagination).

The following year, the government refused to admit any passengers from the infamous *S.S. St. Louis* despite direct appeals from prominent members of society (Abella and Troper 1979, 179; Knowles 2007, 144). Frederick Blair, then the Director of the Immigration Branch, advised Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King that allowing passengers disembark in Canada would precipitate the arrival of other ships (Abella and Troper 1979, 180). Mr Blair argued that no country could accommodate the “hundreds of thousands of Jewish people who want to leave Europe,” and stated that “the line must be drawn somewhere (Abella and Troper 1979, 180).” As noted in chapter two, following refusals from the governments of both the US and Canada, the ship was obliged to return to Europe, and 254 of its passengers were ultimately

killed in the Holocaust (US Holocaust Memorial Museum no date, para. 6 of 13).⁶¹ This decision prompted Knowles (2007, 144) to conclude that “When she was most required to show compassion, Canada shut herself off from the world and strenuously fought any attempt by desperate refugees, especially Jewish refugees, to breach the wall of restrictive legislation [...].”

Following the end of World War II, the government gradually adopted a more liberal approach to immigration and refugee protection due in large part to increased public pressure to relax existing restrictions. Between 1946 and 1962, the government admitted almost 250,000 European refugees and introduced the Assisted Passage Loan Scheme to assist those who could not otherwise afford the journey (Kelley and Trebilcock 2010, 342; Knowles 2007, 171). Nevertheless, the government remained reluctant to make any formal commitments on refugee protection, including through international law. Indeed, the government instructed delegates to the Conference of Plenipotentiaries not to sign the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees due to concerns that the document would prevent authorities from deporting “bona fide” refugees if these individuals presented security concerns (Dirks 1977, 180). Due to these concerns, Canada did not accede to the 1951 *Convention relating to the Status of Refugees* and its 1967 *Protocol* until 4 June, 1969 (UNHCR 2015, 2).

Nevertheless, this stance did not prevent the government from resettling tens of thousands of refugees—including Palestinian, Hungarian, Czechoslovak, Ugandan Asian, Chilean, and Tibetan refugees—on an *ad hoc* basis until the adoption of the 1976 Immigration Act, which established the legislative basis for asylum and refugee protection in Canada (Kelley and Trebilcock 2010, 353-54; Knowles 2007, 171-76). Two years later, the government introduced the *Immigration Regulations*, which provided a framework for the government to designate the groups of refugees eligible for resettlement in Canada, including those from the former Indochina, Latin America, and individuals forced into exile from countries such as Czechoslovakia and the German Democratic Republic, among others (Indochinese Designated Class Regulations 1978; Latin American Designated Class Regulations 1978; Self-Exiled Persons Designated Class Regulations 1978).

The *Regulations* also provided the framework for the PSR programme. More precisely, the regulations enabled groups of at least five Canadian citizens or permanent residents and corporations to become sponsors, provided they signed a written undertaking with the Minister

⁶¹ As noted in chapter two, there appears to be no consensus on the exact number of passengers aboard the S.S. *St. Louis*; some sources indicate that 907 passengers were aboard, others suggest there were 908 or 930 passengers, and still others state that 937 passengers were on the ship.

in which they agreed to provide “lodging, care, maintenance and resettlement assistance” for the refugees for at least one year (Immigration Regulations 1978, 7(2)(c)). Furthermore, sponsors were required to organise the reception of the refugees, to demonstrate “sufficient financial resources and expertise to fulfil the undertaking,” and to prove they had never defaulted on a previous sponsorship (Immigration Regulations 1978, 7(2)(d) and 7(2)(e)(ii)). Though the government eventually deemed the designated classes regulations impractical and inefficient, this regulatory framework enabled the government and private sponsors to resettle more than 60,000 Southeast Asian refugees between 1979 and 1980 alone (Kelley and Trebilcock 2010, 398).

Since then, Canada has resettled refugees from a broad range of countries, including Afghanistan, Bhutan, Iraq, and Nepal, among many others (Citizenship and Immigration Canada 2007, para. 1 of 9; Citizenship and Immigration Canada 2015, para. 2 of 18; Foreign Affairs, Trade, and International Development Canada 2015, para. 13 of 19; Kelley and Trebilcock 2010, 400).

4.3 Size and Composition of Resettlement Flows to Canada

This section presents the available data on the size and composition of resettlement flows to Canada 1980 and 2016 to enrich the analysis of its resettlement programmes. In particular, this section provides figures on resettlement admissions through the Government Assisted, PSR, and Blended Visa Office-Referred programmes. This section also presents data on the annual resettlement targets established by the Canadian government, and the available information on the nationality, age, and gender of resettled refugees. These empirical observations indicate that though Canada ranked as the second- or third-largest resettlement country each year between 1980 and 2016, the size and composition of resettlement flows has fluctuated over time.

Chapter one demonstrated that Canada was among the largest contributors to resettlement in both absolute and relative terms between 1980 and 2016, global comparisons of resettlement contributions mask changes in its annual resettlement targets. Therefore, Appendix Table 19 shows the annual resettlement targets for the GAR programme between 1990 and 2019 and demonstrates that targets for the GAR programme have fluctuated at times and been remarkably stable at other times. Between 1990 and 1995, resettlement targets remained constant at 13,000 refugees per year. Resettlement targets then fell to 7,000 refugees per year, but the government maintained this target between 1996 and 2001. In 2005, the government abandoned the practice of establishing a single target and adopted ranges instead. Between 2005 and 2009, the established target for resettlement through the GAR programme

ranged from 7,300 to 7,500. Citizenship and Immigration Canada then increased the upper bound of the range to 8,000 refugees between 2010 and 2012. The table further demonstrates that the government subsequently lowered the targets between 2013 and 2015 to reduce its share of the costs for resettlement. However, the government substantially increased its targets in 2016, reflecting Prime Minister Justin Trudeau's commitment to resettle Syrian refugees. However, targets for 2017 through 2019 appear to have returned to the status quo.

Appendix Table 20 shows the annual resettlement targets for the PSR programme between 1990 and 2019 and demonstrates that resettlement targets for this programme have evolved at times and been stable at other times. Between 1990 and 1995, targets were high but gradually decreased. In 1996, the government introduced ranges for this programme and substantially lowered the target to between 2,700 and 4,000 refugees. The range for resettlement admissions remained relatively stable, ranging from approximately 3,000 refugees to approximately 4,500 refugees until 2009. In 2010, the government increased the upper bound to 6,000 refugees per year, and the upper bound for the targets has grown since then. In 2019, the government plans to admit up to 21,000 refugees through the PSR programme.

It is also important to capture targets for resettlement through the Blended Visa Office-Referred programme launched by the Conservative government under Prime Minister Stephen Harper in 2012. In 2013, the government established a modest target of 200 to 300 refugees resettled through this programme (Refugee Sponsorship Training Program 2015, 1). The following year, the government augmented the target to between 400 and 500 refugees (Refugee Sponsorship Training Program 2015, 1). In 2015, the target ranged from 700 to 1,000 refugees (Refugee Sponsorship Training Program 2015, 1). In 2016, the target ranged from 2,000 to 3,000 refugees (Citizenship and Immigration Canada 2015, no pagination). Most recently, the government has established targets of between 1,000 and 3,000 for each year between 2017 and 2019 (Citizenship and Immigration Canada 2016, no pagination; Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada 2017, no pagination).

To better understand the scope of resettlement contributions in Canada, it is also instructive to examine the actual number of refugees resettled since the inception of the GAR, PSR, and BVOR programmes. Appendix Table 21 shows the total number of refugees resettled through the GAR programme between 1980 and 2016 and demonstrates that resettlement admissions through the GAR programme progressively declined from their peak of 19,233 refugees in 1980. Nevertheless, the level of admissions remained stable throughout the 1980s, before declining to approximately 7,000 refugees per year in the mid- to late-1990s. Though resettlement admissions increased to 10,671 refugees in 2000, this was a temporary

phenomenon as admissions once again declined to approximately 7,000 refugees per year for most of the first decade of the new millennium—a trend which persisted between 2010 and 2013. However, Table 21 demonstrates that there was a notable decline in resettlement through the GAR programme in 2012 and 2013, due in part to government austerity measures discussed in greater detail in section 4.7. The demonstrable increase in admissions in 2015 and 2016 could potentially be attributed to government commitments to resettle Iraqi and Syrian refugees, as noted above.

Appendix Table 22 shows the total number of refugees resettled through the PSR programme, between 1980 and 2016 and demonstrates that private sponsors resettled a large number of refugees in 1980, but resettlement admissions through this programme subsequently declined and remained comparatively low throughout the first half of this decade. However, resettlement admissions rose again towards the end of the 1980s and reached their peak in 1991, when private sponsors resettled 35,893 refugees. Resettlement admissions then precipitously declined in the early- to mid-1990s and remained stable until the end of the first decade of the new millennium. Thereafter, resettlement admissions through the PSR programme increased to between 4,000 and 6,000 refugees per year and remained at this new equilibrium until 2015 and 2016, when admissions rose yet again.

It is also important to capture the small number of refugees resettled through the Blended Visa Office-Referred programme. In 2013, the government and private sponsors resettled 155 refugees through this programme (Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship Canada 2018, no pagination). The following year, resettlement arrivals increased to 177 refugees (Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship Canada 2018, no pagination). In 2015, the number of refugees resettled through the Blended Visa Office-Referred programme increased substantially to 811 refugees (Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship Canada 2018, no pagination). The most recent data indicates that the government and private sponsors resettled 4,434 refugees under the auspices of this programme in 2016 (Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship Canada 2018, no pagination). Though statements from certain private sponsors indicate that the Blended Visa Office-Referred programme is controversial, these figures indicate that the programme is increasingly popular.

Finally, Appendix Table 23 shows the total number of refugees resettled to Canada each year between 1980 and 2016. Total resettlement admissions peaked at 40,344 refugees resettled in 1980 and then fell dramatically in 1981. The flow of resettled refugees remained steady throughout the early 1980s, before rising steadily between 1986 and 1991. Thereafter, resettlement admissions declined once again, dropping to 9,699 in 1998 before rising again in

1999 and the early 2000s. Resettlement admissions remained steady throughout most of the first decade of the new millennium, but as the data in Table 23 demonstrates, there was a slight increase in resettlement admissions in most years between 2009 and 2014 (excluding 2012). The most recent data indicates that there has been a substantial increase in the number of refugees resettled in 2015 and 2016. One could attribute this development in part to the commitment made by Liberal Prime Minister Justin Trudeau—initially made as a campaign promise—to resettle up to 25,000 Syrian refugees (Canadian Broadcasting Corporation 2015, para. 2 of 28). In total, the federal government resettled 21,751 Syrian refugees through the GAR program, 14,274 Syrians through the PSR programme, and 3,923 Syrian refugees through the Blended Visa Office-Referred programme (Government of Canada 2017, see section 2).

The considerable fluctuations observed above raise questions about whether and to what extent the annual resettlement ceilings and admissions have evolved in parallel. Appendix Chart 2 illustrates the correspondence between resettlement ceilings and admissions between 1990 and 2016, the only period for which information was available at the time of research.⁶² Chart 2 shows that resettlement targets and admissions through the Government Assisted, PSR, and Blended Visa Office-Referred programmes were quite close during this period. Though resettlement targets for the GAR programme were far above actual admissions between 1991 and 1993, targets and admissions have grown closer in recent years. Conversely, targets for the PSR programme were far below actual admissions in 1991, when private sponsors resettled 35,893 refugees through this programme.

To shed further light on the composition of resettlement flows to Canada, Appendix Table 24 illustrates the number of refugees resettled in Canada according to the top five countries of nationality, between 1981 and 1989 and demonstrates that Canada predominantly resettled refugees from Asia and Europe during the early 1980s. This pattern continued throughout most of the decade, as the government resettled thousands of Vietnamese and Polish refugees. However, the table demonstrates that Poland became the top source country for resettled refugees in 1987, moving Vietnam to second place. In addition, Canada welcomed thousands of refugees from El Salvador, Cambodia, and Laos during this period. Towards the mid- to late-1980s, the flow of resettled refugees grew more diverse, when the government began resettling Ethiopian and Iranian refugees.

Appendix Table 25 illustrates the number of refugees resettled in Canada according to the top five countries of nationality, between 1990 and 1999 and demonstrates that Canada

⁶² From 2005 onwards, the table shows the upper bound of the target for each programme.

continued to resettle thousands of Polish and Vietnamese refugees in the early 1990s. However, in 1992, Canada dramatically increased the admission of Sri Lankan refugees and continued resettling large numbers of refugees from this South Asian country throughout the decade. In 1994, Canada began resettling thousands of refugees from Bosnia, which remained the top source country for resettled refugees until 1999. In addition, the figures show that the Canadian government resettled large numbers of refugees from Afghanistan, Iraq, and Somalia in the latter part of the decade.

Appendix Table 26 shows the number of refugees resettled to Canada by the top five countries of nationality and year, between 2000 and 2009. Citizenship and Immigration Canada ceased to provide disaggregated data on the nationalities of most refugees resettled (except those from the US) in 2003 so only information on the regions of origin of resettled refugees is presented from this year onwards.⁶³ Nevertheless, the table indicates that some of the trends which emerged in the 1990s persisted in the new millennium. In particular, Canada continued to resettle thousands of refugees from South Asian countries including Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka, and also welcomed substantial numbers of refugees from Iran and Colombia. Table 26 also shows that Canada increased its commitment to resettling refugees from the Asia and Pacific region in the middle of the noughties. However, Canada continued to accept refugees from countries in the Americas, Africa and the Middle East, Europe, and the US during this decade.

Finally, Appendix Table 27 shows the number of refugees resettled to Canada by the top five regions of origin between 2010 and 2016. The most recent figures indicate that the Asia and Pacific region remains an important source of refugees resettled to Canada. However, Canada has augmented resettlement admissions from the Americas, and this region represents the top source region for resettlement in 2011 and between 2013 and 2016. In addition, Canada has continued to resettle several hundred refugees from countries in Africa and the Middle East, Europe, and from the US during this period. Overall, these tables indicate that Canada has long resettled refugees from a diverse range of countries, resettlement admissions have also been characterised by periods of stability, as when the government consistently resettled large numbers of refugees from Vietnam, Poland, Bosnia, Sri Lanka, and other countries in the Asia Pacific region.

⁶³ The figures on resettlement from the US likely refer to children born in the US to parents of other nationalities.

In addition to examining the origins of refugees resettled to Canada, one can also explore the limited data on the number of men and women, as well as the number of adults and children, resettled to Canada. Since 1994, the Canadian government no longer provides data that disaggregates resettlement flows resettlement programme, gender, and age. Nevertheless, the available figures contribute to a greater understanding of the populations arriving in Canada.

Appendix Table 28 shows the total number of refugees resettled to Canada by year, age, and gender, between 1980 and 1994 and demonstrates that Canada has generally resettled more male refugees than female refugees. Though a detailed analysis how Canada selects refugees for resettlement is beyond the scope of this thesis, could one link this pattern in resettlement admissions to the use of selection criteria? Paragraph 139(1)(g) of the *Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations* establishes the criteria which government officials consider when determining whether to accept an application for resettlement to Canada. The decision is predicated in part on a determination of whether the principal applicant and their family members will be able to become “successfully established” in Canada, based on factors including their “resourcefulness,” family members present in the community in which the refugee would like to settle, their “potential for employment in Canada” which is related to an assessment of their education, professional experience and skills, and their ability to learn one of Canada’s two official languages. These criteria do not apply to asylum seekers, to recognised refugees deemed to be “vulnerable” or in “urgent need of protection,” or to refugees admitted through the One-year Window family reunification programme (UNHCR 2016, 4).⁶⁴

Though Canada uses selection criteria to ensure that refugees can become “self-sufficient” approximately three to five years following their arrival, such policies could privilege the selection of male refugees given that men and women do not always have equal access to educational and employment opportunities. In that context, it must be noted that though Canada accepts applications from women-at-risk, it has “no specific allocation” for such cases (UNHCR 2016, 2) and has no programmes which proactively facilitate the resettlement of female refugees.

In addition, Table 28 also shows that Canada consistently resettles a substantially larger number of adults than children. This observation is unsurprising given that Canada generally does not resettle unaccompanied minors unless they already have family in Canada (UNHCR

⁶⁴ In an interview on 5 December, 2013, Shelley Duffin, then a Senior Policy Analyst in Refugee Affairs, suggested that these criteria are applied on a “sliding scale,” according to the vulnerability of the refugee.

2016, 2). As noted above, the use of selection criteria may also further discourage Canadian officials from resettling unaccompanied minors, as these children may not yet have had the opportunity to acquire the education or experience that would enable them to demonstrate their ability to become self-sufficient in Canada.

Though information on the number of disabled refugees resettled to Canada would add further nuance to the picture of resettlement flows to Canada, this data was unavailable at the time of research. Canada accepts referrals for refugees with medical needs but stipulates that no more than five per cent of all referrals should be for these individuals (UNHCR 2016, 2). In 2016, Canada resettled 724 refugees with medical needs (UNHCR 2017, 74).

4.4 Organisational Structure of Resettlement to Canada

To better understand the potential reasons why Canada has voluntarily adopted generous resettlement admissions policies, a brief discussion of the structure of its resettlement programmes is necessary. Canada has a complex resettlement programme structure that involves extensive responsibility sharing between the government, voluntary sector organisations, and members of civil society.⁶⁵ The lead federal department is Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada, known as Citizenship and Immigration Canada until 2015. The department develops resettlement policies and admissions targets in consultation with the provinces and territories, the public, and stakeholders. Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada also administers the four resettlement programmes described below. The Canada Border Services Agency conducts criminal and security checks in collaboration with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and the Canadian Security and Intelligence Service. Provincial governments also fund education and health care for all residents. Under the 1991 Canada-Québec Accord Relating to Immigration and the Temporary Admission of Aliens (section II, subsections 17 through 20), the ministry of Immigration, Diversity, and Inclusion Québec (*Immigration, Diversité et Inclusion Québec*) assumes a unique role in deciding which immigrants and refugees can settle in the province—so long as these individuals are admissible in accordance with federal legislation.

Canada has four resettlement programmes at present: the GAR, PSR, JAS Sponsorship, and Blended Visa Office-Referred programmes. The GAR programme is designed to facilitate

⁶⁵ The civil society groups permitted to sponsor refugees for resettlement include Constituent Groups, Groups of Five, and Community Groups (Citizenship and Immigration Canada 2015, 6-7). SAHs can designate Constituent Groups, who are then generally responsible for the sponsorship and providing resettlement assistance to the refugee following arrival (Citizenship and Immigration Canada 2015, 6-7). For example, an Anglican diocese could be a SAH but may designate one or more churches as Constituent Groups. However, the SAH remains solely (or jointly) liable for the sponsorship, and criteria for designating Constituent Groups may vary by SAH (Refugee Sponsorship Training Program 2014, 6).

the resettlement of Convention refugees (Citizenship and Immigration Canada 2011, 1). The federal government is responsible for the selection, screening, and processing of applications for resettlement through this programme, as well as destining refugees to one of 23 communities across the country (Citizenship and Immigration Canada 2011, 4). The International Network branch at Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada allocates targets for the GAR programme based on consultations with UNHCR and operational capacity overseas (Duffin 2013). In the case of the PSR programme, targets are allocated based on sponsor demand and operational capacity (Duffin 2013).

Refugees who are not financially independent receive income assistance through the Resettlement Assistance Program for up to one year or until they become self-sufficient, whichever occurs first (Citizenship and Immigration Canada 2011, 4). Refugees receive the same level of income assistance as Canadian residents on social assistance, though a government evaluation questioned whether this level of support was adequate given that refugees may have additional needs (Citizenship and Immigration 2011, 54-55). The Resettlement Assistance Program also funds the delivery of reception, orientation, and integration services through voluntary sector organisations known as Service Provider Organizations (SPOs) (Citizenship and Immigration Canada 2011, 7).

The PSR programme exists to facilitate the resettlement of Convention refugees as well as members of the Country of Asylum Class (Citizenship and Immigration Canada 2015, 5).⁶⁶ SAHs, one of their designated Constituent Groups, a for-profit or non-profit Community Sponsor, or a group of five Canadian citizens or permanent residents over the age of 18 are eligible to sponsor refugees through this programme (Citizenship and Immigration Canada 2015, 6-8). Sponsors can nominate the refugee(s) they wish to sponsor, thus enabling them to play a direct role in the identification of refugees for resettlement (Citizenship and Immigration Canada 2015, 11). Sponsors play an integral role in orientation and integration and must also bear the full cost of resettlement, including any costs for food, accommodation, and utilities, among other expenses (Citizenship and Immigration Canada 2015, 9).⁶⁷ Sponsors are normally expected to support the refugee for one year or until the refugee becomes self-sufficient, but in

⁶⁶ The Country of Asylum Class is intended to facilitate the resettlement of refugees who have fled their countries of citizenship or habitual residence because they are “seriously and personally affected” by civil war, armed conflict, or human rights violations (Citizenship and Immigration Canada 2015, 5).

⁶⁷ In 2018, the estimated cost of resettling a refugee through the PSR programme ranged from CAD\$16,500 per year for a single refugee to CAD\$35,500 per year for a family of six, plus an estimated CAD\$2,700 for each additional refugee (Refugee Sponsorship Training Program 2018, 1).

exceptional circumstances, they may extend the period of sponsorship up to 36 months (Citizenship and Immigration Canada 2015, 9).

Canada also has two smaller resettlement programmes which also involve partnerships between the government and voluntary sector organisations. The Blended Visa Office-Referred Program is intended to facilitate the resettlement of Convention refugees from priority groups or countries (Citizenship and Immigration Canada 2015, 25). Under this programme, the UNHCR refers refugees to a Canadian embassy or High Commission and the federal government then matches refugees with a SAH or a designated Constituent Group (Citizenship and Immigration Canada 2015, 25). The federal government provides financial support for up to six months through the Resettlement Assistance Program, while private sponsors provide another six months of financial support plus emotional and social support to the refugee for up to one year (Citizenship and Immigration Canada 2015, 25).

Similarly, the JAS programme is designed to facilitate the resettlement of especially vulnerable Convention or Country of Asylum refugees, such as the elderly, the disabled, and refugees with large families, among others (Citizenship and Immigration Canada 2015, 28). The federal government is responsible for the identification and selection of refugees and also matches refugees with a SAH or Constituent Group (Citizenship and Immigration Canada 2015, 28). The government also provides income assistance to refugees resettled through the JAS programme, while SPOs deliver reception and orientation services through the Resettlement Assistance Program (Citizenship and Immigration Canada 2004, 29). For their part, private sponsors offer emotional support to the refugees and may also provide reception, orientation, and integration assistance (Citizenship and Immigration Canada 2004, 6). In this case, sponsors usually support JAS refugees for two years, but this can be extended up to 36 months in exceptional circumstances (Citizenship and Immigration Canada 2015, 27).

From this, it is apparent that Canada has developed extensive mechanisms for domestic responsibility sharing in all four of its resettlement programmes. Voluntary sector organisations are involved in all phases of the resettlement process, from the identification and processing of applications for resettlement to receiving refugees at the airport and assisting refugees as they begin the process of orientation and integration in Canada—especially through the PSR programme. This narrative account, in conjunction with the figures presented in section 4.3, set the stage for an analysis of the motivations for resettlement and its benefits in section 4.5. These partnerships raise questions about why and how mechanisms for domestic responsibility sharing emerged in Canada, and whether and to what extent these partnerships have influenced resettlement admissions—matters discussed in section 4.6.

4.5 The Perceived Motivations and Benefits of Resettling Refugees in Canada

The data provided in section 4.3 demonstrates that Canada has resettled hundreds of thousands of diverse origins and backgrounds since 1980, though the size and composition of these flows have fluctuated over time. Furthermore, the descriptive account provided in section 4.4 demonstrates that Canada has developed a complex resettlement programme founded on extensive domestic responsibility sharing with SPOs, SAHs, and private sponsorship groups alike.

This narrative background sets the stage for the analytical approach adopted throughout the remainder of the chapter. To better understand the potential reasons why Canada has voluntarily adopted generous resettlement admissions policies, this section presents the views of senior government officials and private sponsors on the perceived motivations for resettling refugees in Canada and its benefits. In accordance with the ontological and epistemological foundations of this thesis, the author attempts to interpret these perceptions in relation to the extant literature. Though academics have proposed a range of explanations for the motivations for providing refugee protection, one could interpret the views articulated by government officials and private sponsors as consistent with the scholarship on refugee protection as an impure public good, and the economic literature on public goods more generally.

In December 2013, the author travelled to three Canadian cities in order to interview four senior government officials, 13 representatives from 12 SAHs, and a representative from a Constituent Group called Hospitality House Refugee Ministry.⁶⁸ The author first travelled to Ottawa, Ontario to meet representatives from Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship Canada (then Citizenship and Immigration Canada), as well as representatives from the Incorporated Synod of the Diocese of Ottawa and World University Service Canada. The author then travelled to Toronto, Ontario to meet with representatives from the Afghan Women's Counselling and Integration Community Support Organization, the Anglican United Refugee Alliance, the Christian and Missionary Alliance in Canada, Christie Refugee Welcome Centre, the Governing Council of the Salvation Army, the Presbyterian Church in Canada, and World Renew. Finally, the author travelled to Winnipeg, Manitoba to meet with representatives from Hospitality House Refugee Ministry, the Manitoba Interfaith Immigration Council, the

⁶⁸ Hospitality House Refugee Ministry sponsors refugees for resettlement under the auspices of the Sponsorship Agreements held by the Anglican Diocese of Rupert's Land and the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Winnipeg (Refugee Sponsorship Training Program 2015, 6).

Mennonite Central Committee Canada, and the Anglican Diocese of Rupert's Land.⁶⁹ The author conducted most interviews in person at the office of each respondent. However, the author conducted an interview with one senior government official over the telephone in Ottawa. In addition, the author was generously invited to meet the representative from the Incorporated Synod of the Diocese of Ottawa at his home. The appendices provide biographical information about each interviewee.

To better understand why Canada has voluntarily adopted generous resettlement admissions policies, the author asked interviewees about the perceived motivations for resettling refugees in Canada and its benefits. As mentioned in chapter two, the author deliberately phrased this question in a general manner in order to minimise priming effects and invite a broad range of spontaneous responses. During the interviews, many government officials and private sponsors argued that resettlement has a humanitarian function and enables Canada to demonstrate its commitment to the international norms of refugee protection and responsibility sharing (Boxhill 2013; Chahal 2013; Deans 2013; Dekker 2013; Denton 2013; Duffin 2013; Manks 2013; Niazi 2013; Shropshire 2013; Smith 2013; Wiebe 2013; Woolaver 2013). On 5 December, 2013, the author conducted a joint interview with Derrick Deans, then the Assistant Director of Refugee Affairs at Citizenship and Immigration Canada, and Shelley Duffin, who was then a Senior Policy Analyst in Refugee Affairs. Speaking in a personal capacity, Mr Deans (2013) shared his belief that Canada resettles refugees based on a desire to assist those in need of protection, rather than to derive particular benefits. Ms Duffin argued that resettlement is a humanitarian instrument that saves lives, and agreed that Canada is not motivated to resettle refugees for self-interested reasons. In a separate interview on 5 December, 2013, Wally Boxhill, the Director of Functional Guidance and Policy Engagement at Citizenship and Immigration Canada, affirmed that Canada's participation in resettlement is consistent with its "humanitarian tradition." However, Mr Boxhill (2013) suggested that Canada does derive some benefits from resettling refugees, noting that "we feel good when we help others."

Numerous private sponsors articulated similar views concerning the humanitarian motivation for contributing to resettlement. On 4 December, 2013, the author met Don Smith, the Chair of the Refugee Working Group at the Incorporated Synod of the Diocese of Ottawa. Mr Smith (2013) explained that resettlement expresses a commitment to humanitarian

⁶⁹ The author organised interviews with two further SAHs, but one representative did not attend the interview and the other indicated they were unable to answer the author's question given the organisation's limited experience in resettlement.

protection and enables Canada to meet its international obligations in a manner that is consistent with its “humanitarian tradition.” Mr Smith (2013) added that Canadians derive “satisfaction” and a “moral high ground” from the provision of this durable solution, though he noted that the Conservative government rhetoric on “bogus refugees” which prevailed at the time might have undermined this sentiment. In an interview on 9 December, 2013, Ellen Woolaver, the Refugee Sponsorship Administrator at the Christie Street Refugee Welcome Centre, explained that though resettlement is not an obligation under the 1951 *Convention relating to the Status of Refugees*, providing this durable solution nevertheless enables Canada to “fulfil its humanitarian obligations.” In an interview on 17 December, 2013, Tom Denton, the Executive Director of Administration and Sponsorship for Hospitality House Refugee Ministry, argued that resettlement enables Canada to ‘rescue’ individuals in need of protection. In addition, in an interview on 16 December, 2013, Ed Wiebe, then the National Refugee Program Co-ordinator for the Mennonite Central Committee Canada, contended that Canadian participation in resettlement expresses its commitment to international responsibility sharing.

However, some interviewees indicated that Canada participates in resettlement for reasons beyond humanitarianism. More precisely, two government officials indicated that contributing to resettlement is perceived to enhance the reputation of the Canadian government (Boxhill 2013; Deans 2013). Mr Deans (2013) observed, “We’re well regarded internationally in terms of what we do for refugees, and that stands us in good stead in terms of other efforts we might be making internationally. We’re looked at as caring for people.” Similarly, Mr Boxhill (2013) contended that resettlement “shows that Canada cares,” and added that the provision of this durable solution, “also fosters that notion of Canada being concerned, being a compassionate nation.”

In addition to the perceived humanitarian motivation for engaging in resettlement, several private sponsors argued that contributing to resettlement enables Canada to demonstrate global leadership in the provision of this durable solution (Chahal 2013; Dyck 2013; Niazi 2013). On 16 December, 2013, the author met Rita Chahal, the Executive Director of the Manitoba Interfaith Immigration Council. Ms Chahal (2013) argued that Canada is a “global leader in terms of understanding and responding to the human need that’s out there,” adding, “that kind of commitment isn’t seen globally as much as could or should be seen.” Similarly, in an interview on 16 December, 2013, Brian Dyck, then the National Migration and Resettlement Program Coordinator for the Mennonite Central Committee Manitoba and Chair of the Canadian Refugee SAH Association, asserted that Canada has previously shown “tremendous leadership” on resettlement and expressed hope that the country will remain a

forerunner in this area. Mr Dyck (2013) also contended that Canadian involvement in resettlement shapes how citizens perceive their place in the world and suggested that these programmes are “an important part of the Canadian identity.”

Finally, many respondents contended that resettlement generates cultural benefits for Canada (Deans 2013; Dekker 2013; Denton 2013; Duffin 2013; Manks 2013; Marshall 2013; McBride 2013; Niazi 2013; Richardson 2013; Schnabl 2013; Shropshire 2013; Wiebe 2013). Ms Duffin (2013) argued that resettlement through the PSR programme contributes to greater openness in Canadian society, explaining, “I think because we have such a unique program, with the sponsors engaged, it gives a really Canadian connection to people that are coming, and creates more openness to the ‘other,’ to immigration, to refugees, and I think that’s a really important component of Canada’s program.”

Similarly, many private sponsors argued that resettlement ‘enriches’ Canadian society and enables citizens to learn about other cultures as well as refugee issues (Dekker 2013; Manks 2013; Niazi 2013; Richardson 2013; Schnabl 2013; Shropshire 2013). On 12 December, 2013, the author met Paula Marshall, the Consultant for Immigrant and Refugee Services at the Salvation Army of Canada. Ms Marshall (2013) argued that resettlement enhances cultural diversity in Canada, explaining, “Because we’re supposed to be a multicultural country, and our whole identity seems to be around welcoming and helping, it just makes sense to bring those people who need our help—who need to be resettled and find a permanent, safe place to live.” In addition, Mr Wiebe (2013) asserted that the close connection between sponsors and resettled refugees promotes greater openness and enables sponsors to draw on their experiences in working with resettled refugees to challenge negative stereotypes about immigrants. In an interview on 17 December 2013, Gail Schnabl, the Refugee Coordinator for the Diocese of Rupert’s Land, explained, “I personally think diversity is of value. It’s something to—it’s a good outcome. And I think, because refugees come from a variety of backgrounds, it opens Canadians’ minds to different ways of thinking and different ways of living, different cultures, and it enhances our lives.”

To better understand the potential reasons why Canada has voluntarily adopted generous resettlement admissions policies, this thesis now seeks to interpret the responses articulated above in relation to the extant literature. First, one could interpret the views articulated by government officials and private sponsors as consistent with the literature on refugee protection as an impure public good. Chapters one and two explained that private goods have benefits which are fully excludable and rival, meaning that whoever provides the good can prevent others from benefiting from it, and once one actor has enjoyed the good, no one

else can (Cornes and Sandler 1996, 8-9 and 30). Conversely, public goods are non-excludable and non-rival, meaning that whoever provides the good cannot prevent others from benefiting from it, and one actor can appreciate the good without diminishing the ability of others to take pleasure in it as well (Cornes and Sandler 1996, 8-9).

However, chapter two noted that some economists have attempted to push beyond this binary characterisation of goods and instead propose an alternative conceptualisation that views goods along a “spectrum” between purely public and purely private, where some of these “impure” public goods are more rival and excludable or less rival and excludable than others (Cornes and Sandler 1996, 6 and 241). Cornes and Sandler (1996, 9) explain that the provision of impure public goods sometimes generates joint products, which are “multiple outputs, some of which can be private, others purely public, and still others impurely public.”

In the context of resettlement, chapter two suggested that one could interpret this durable solution as excludable and rival in certain ways. Resettlement could be seen as excludable because only individuals recognised as refugees within the meaning of the 1951 *Convention relating to the Status of Refugees* and the 1967 *Protocol* are eligible for resettlement. In this way, resettlement could generate excludable and rival humanitarian protection benefits for resettled refugees. Furthermore, resettlement is only appropriate for refugees who are unable to integrate locally or voluntarily return to their respective countries of origin. In addition, since the Canadian government (and others) retain full discretion over admissions, it may not offer resettlement to every refugee referred by the UNHCR or other organisations. One could also interpret the provision of resettlement as rival, since the gap between resettlement needs and admissions means that each refugee who obtains resettlement diminishes the availability of resettlement places for other refugees. However, the responses articulated by government officials and private sponsors indicate that contributing to resettlement is perceived to benefit both refugees and Canada more generally, suggesting that resettlement may not be a private good.

Chapter two also suggested that if resettlement is not a private good, then one could potentially interpret this durable solution as a public good. If the provision of resettlement is perceived to benefit refugees *and* other parties, then it could be non-excludable and non-rival since whoever offers resettlement could find it all but impossible to prevent others from benefiting from it, and other actors could appreciate the provision of this durable solution without diminishing the ability of others to do the same (e.g. Cornes and Sandler 1996, 8-9). However, the theory of public goods predicts that actors will not provide a Pareto efficient level of pure public goods because the non-excludable, non-rival nature of these goods creates

an incentive for actors to free ride on the expected contributions of others (Cornes and Sandler 1996, 22-23; Gruber 2011, 188; Samuelson 1954, 388).

In the context of resettlement, this suggests that governments should face a classic Prisoner's Dilemma in which they have no incentives to provide this durable solution. Instead, governments should have a powerful incentive to free ride on the anticipated contributions of other states, confident that they can still benefit from the positive externalities generated from others providing this durable solution. Though this could partially explain the underprovision of resettlement places, there is little evidence that Canada engages in free riding—especially since the evidence presented in the appendix and discussed in chapter one demonstrates it has made significant contributions to resettlement in both absolute and relative terms. These observations indicate that Canada may have found the incentives necessary to overcome the impetus for free riding, suggesting that resettlement may not be a pure public good.⁷⁰

One could interpret the responses articulated by government officials and private sponsors as consistent with the literature on resettlement as a public good (e.g. Suhrke 1998). As noted in chapter one, Suhrke (1998) develops a general conceptualisation of resettlement as a public good and does not elaborate on the nature of this good. Nevertheless, one could interpret the responses concerning the perceived influence of humanitarianism and the norms of international responsibility sharing as consistent with Suhrke's (1998) argument that governments contribute to refugee protection because they believe that international law creates a collective "moral duty" and "obligation" to assist refugees and that assisting persons in need of protection reduces global inequality and minimises the incentives for economically disadvantaged countries to restrict access to asylum (Suhrke 1998, 398).

Second, these perceptions could be interpreted as consistent with the more recent literature on the provision of refugee protection through asylum as an impure public good (e.g. Betts 2003; Hatton 2012; Thielemann 2003; Thielemann and Dewan 2006). The responses concerning the perceived influence of humanitarianism and the norms of international responsibility sharing and the strategic use of resettlement could be interpreted as consistent with the arguments from Betts (2003, 266-88), who contends that countries could be more generous in granting protection to asylum seekers because they derive excludable 'altruistic'

⁷⁰ As noted in chapter two, the fact that certain countries have succeeded in overcoming the incentives for free riding does not negate the possibility that other countries engage in free riding or other forms of Pareto inefficient behaviour, such as the exploitative behaviour identified by Olson (1965, 29; see also Olson and Zeckhauser 1966).

benefits from these acts.⁷¹ In particular, Betts (2003, 266-88) suggests that these countries may be more generous because they derive a “warm glow” from demonstrating a commitment to “ethical or legal norms” such as fairness and the protection of human rights. Similarly, Thielemann (2003, 255, 257-58, and 265-69) contends that governments may have been more generous in their contributions to the Humanitarian Evacuation Programme for Kosovar refugees because of the perceived “excludable” benefits they derived from demonstrating a commitment to the norms of international responsibility sharing and solidarity with countries of first asylum.

One could also interpret the perceived humanitarian and normative motivations for resettlement as consistent with the economic literature on contributions to public goods. Historically, many academics argued that actors can overcome the purported incentives for free riding and contribute to public goods for purely unselfish reasons (Becker 1974; Coleman 1966; Collard 1978, chapters one and 10; Margolis 1982, chapter two; Roberts 1984). However, chapter two noted that other economists later challenged these claims on both theoretical and empirical grounds (e.g. Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian 1986; Sugden 1982).

In response, Margolis (1982) attempted to add nuance to our understanding of altruism through his distinction between ‘participation altruism’ and ‘goods altruism.’ Margolis (1982, 21) argues that individuals could be motivated to contribute to the provision of public goods because they derive “satisfaction from helping others,” especially if they believe that they are contributing to a “socially useful” cause. Furthermore, Margolis (1982, 23) contends that individuals could contribute to public goods if they believe that their contribution made at least a marginal impact on the total supply of that good. These behaviours are not mutually exclusive but mutually reinforcing, as utility maximisation depends on both the act of giving and the amount given (Margolis 1982, 24).

As noted in chapter two, Andreoni (1989, 1448-49) theorises that individuals contribute to public goods because they demand a higher level of provision and based on the perception that they derive “some private goods benefit from their gift per se, like a warm glow.” On that basis, Andreoni (1989, 1449) develops a model in which individuals have impurely altruistic motives for contributing to the provision of public goods, and he theorises that “the warm glow is an increasing function of what is given.”

⁷¹ As noted in chapter two, Betts appears to use the terms “altruistic benefit” and “warm glow” interchangeably. However, a closer reading of the economic literature on impure altruism demonstrates that altruism is one of the factors that motivates individuals to contribute to a public good, while the warm glow is the benefit they derive from this charitable act (Andreoni 1990, 465-468).

Chapter two noted that these contributions suggest that individuals can derive a partially excludable benefit from *their* contribution, not just the contributions of others. Furthermore, their arguments on the interactive relationship between contributions and benefits suggest that the more individuals donate, the more of a ‘warm glow’ they receive in return (Andreoni 1989; Margolis 1982). These contributions are important because the nature of impure public goods can also impact their provision. Cornes and Sandler (1984, 595) demonstrate that joint products have a privatising effect “not unlike the establishment of property rights.” Given that privatisation is one of the strategies that can be used to eliminate free riding, the existence of joint products could dissuade actors from free riding (Cornes and Sandler 1984, 589-90; Perloff 2011, 590). For this reason, Cornes and Sandler (1984, 589-90) argue that free riding is “not an inevitable feature of public goods models.”

One could interpret the provision of resettlement as an impure public good that generates joint products in the form of excludable, rival protection benefits for refugees as well as impurely public ‘warm glow’ benefits for Canada. This warm glow could be seen as excludable but non-rival joint product since only Canadian residents could derive a warm glow from the decision to welcome refugees into their country or from demonstrating a commitment to the norms and principles embedded in the 1951 *Convention relating to the Status of Refugees*, but one individual may derive a warm glow from this act without diminishing the potential ability of other residents to enjoy this warm glow as well.

In addition to the perceived humanitarian and normative motivations for resettlement, one could interpret the perceived reputational benefits of resettlement as consistent with aspects of the literature on refugee protection as an impure public good. Chapters one and two mentioned that Betts (2003, 276 and 286-87) theorises that some European countries are generous in granting protection to asylum seekers because they derive ‘prestige’ benefits from granting protection that they can leverage in other policy areas due to issue linkages. Though Betts (2003, 287) argues that governments are unlikely to grant protection to asylum seekers for the sole purpose of obtaining reputational benefits, his proposition appears consistent with functional regime theory, which argues that governments can potentially improve their reputations by demonstrating compliance with international regimes—especially when the regime creates a perceived moral obligation (Keohane 1984, 105-06 and 126-27).

As suggested in chapter two, reputational gains are valuable because this quality can provide an actor with essential information about the possible behaviour of other actors that, in turn, may influence their own actions (Axelrod 1984, 151). Similarly, Keohane (1984, 127) adds that compliance with rules and principles that are perceived to create moral obligations

can have an especially positive reputational effect because “adhering to a moral code may identify an actor as a political cooperator, part of a cluster of players with whom mutually beneficial agreements can be made [...].” Conversely, if countries shirk their commitments (particularly those that are perceived to be moral obligations) their reputation could suffer and they may find it more difficult to secure agreements later on, thus increasing transaction costs (Keohane 1984, 105-06 and 126-27).

As previously noted, participation in resettlement is not a matter of compliance *sensu stricto* because countries are not obligated to resettle refugees (UNHCR 2011, 36). However, one could interpret Canadian participation in resettlement as an expression of voluntary compliance with the norms embedded in the 1951 *Convention relating to the Status of Refugees* and the *Multilateral Framework of Understandings on Resettlement*, including refugee protection, international responsibility sharing, and solidarity.

Canada could benefit from this demonstration of voluntary compliance and from making sizeable contributions to resettlement insofar as it could leverage its reputation for compliance to secure concessions such as encouraging other countries to adopt resettlement programmes or promoting a more strategic use of this durable solution. Such an approach could prove advantageous since Loescher and Milner (2011, 203-04) argue that “resettlement represents an important and growing area of cooperation between UNHCR and states [and] an important area of future innovation within the global governance of refugees.” One could interpret this perceived reputational gain as an excludable, non-rival joint product of resettlement because only the Canadian government can enjoy the reputational benefits of demonstrating voluntary compliance with the norms and principles of the international refugee regime.⁷² However, Canada can derive reputational gains without preventing other members of the international community from demonstrating their voluntary compliance and enjoying the same reputational benefits.

Though section 4.2 noted that Canada did not sign the 1951 *Convention relating to the Status of Refugees* or its 1967 *Protocol* until 1969, it has since become an active contributor to the international refugee regime. In 2003, Canada and the UNHCR co-chaired the resettlement “strand” of the Convention Plus initiative that attempted to develop a “normative framework for global burden-sharing” that would enable the international refugee regime to better address protection needs through the creation of “generic multilateral agreements” covering a range of

⁷² As mentioned in chapter two, Phelan (2009, 16) offers a general discussion of the characteristics of reputation as a public good.

issues, including the strategic use of resettlement (UNHCR no date, 1; UNHCR 2003, 1; Zieck 2009, 387). In that capacity, Canada led the development of the non-binding Multilateral Framework of Understandings on Resettlement which “intended to strengthen the international refugee protection system through a more strategic use of resettlement for the benefit of a greater number of refugees (UNHCR 2004, 1).” Though some scholars have called the Convention Plus initiative a “futile attempt at piecemeal engineering” that was “doomed to fail from the outset” as it did not articulate a clear motivation for responsibility sharing, the Multilateral Framework of Understandings on Resettlement also proved to be the most developed document to emerge from the process (Zwieck 2009, 387 and 405).

Contemporary developments indicate that Canada has continued to develop its position as a global leader in resettlement since the author conducted these interviews. Chapter one noted that the Government of Canada and the UNHCR launched the Global Refugee Sponsorship Initiative in December 2016, in collaboration with academia and philanthropic foundations. As previously mentioned, this Initiative seeks to augment the number of resettlement places and the quality of resettlement programmes, as well strengthen receiving communities and promote a more positive discourse on refugee protection, through training and information dissemination, “championing” the adoption of private sponsorship programmes outside Canada, and the provision of capacity building and technical assistance services (Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship Canada 2017, para. 11 and 14 of 14). Though further research and analysis is required, one could potentially interpret these developments as examples of Canada leveraging its longstanding leadership role in resettlement to attempt to augment the availability of resettlement places.

Finally, one could also interpret the responses on the perceived cultural benefits of resettlement as consistent with the literature on culture as a public good. As explained in chapter two, Throsby (2010, 172) explains that “the variety of cultures and cultural expressions are seen as [...] having qualities that are valued as a part of the ‘human mosaic.’” In this way, Throsby (2010, 172) conceptualises cultural diversity as a public good that has “existence value” because individuals “gain benefit from the knowledge that biodiversity and cultural diversity in all their richness are simply there.”

Though the current literature on refugee protection as a public good does not discuss this benefit, chapter two referred to the work of Singer and Singer (1988, 123) who argue that residents of a receiving country may benefit from the admission of refugees in that they “may enjoy the more cosmopolitan atmosphere created by new arrivals from other countries” including new shops and restaurants. In addition, Singer and Singer (1988, 123) indicate that

the increased cultural diversity resulting from resettlement can also have longer-term advantages insofar as refugees may introduce “different ideas and ways of living.” One could interpret the perceived cultural benefits articulated by interviewees as an excludable, non-rival joint product of resettlement because only Canadian residents can benefit from increased cultural diversity, but one person’s enjoyment of this diversity does not prevent other residents from enjoying these benefits as well.

It is perhaps unsurprising that many interviewees identified cultural diversity as a benefit of resettlement given that the Canadian government has endeavoured to promote and protect multiculturalism since 1971 and has entrenched this policy in the 1982 Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the 1988 Canadian Multiculturalism Act (Kymlicka 2007, 138). These efforts appear to have been successful, as public opinion surveys affirm that Canadians have adopted the “ethos” of multiculturalism (Kymlicka 2007, 140). A 2010 study found that 86 per cent of respondents believed that multiculturalism was a “very important” or “somewhat important” component of national identity (Environics Institute 2010, cited in Reitz 2011, 15). The same survey also found that there is a strong positive correlation between support for immigration and the importance accorded to multiculturalism which was statistically significant at the 0.01 level, *ceteris paribus* (Environics Institute 2010, cited in Reitz 2011, 12).

Though Bloemraad (2012, 1-3) argues that there is an element of “Canadian exceptionalism” in public support for immigration and multiculturalism, some members of the public dispute this policy. Public opinion surveys associate support for immigration with support for assimilation rather than support for maintaining cultural distinctiveness. In the same public opinion study cited above, 80.0 per cent of respondents agreed that “Ethnic groups should try as much as possible to blend into Canadian society and not form a separate community (Environics Institute 2010, cited in Reitz 2011, 15).” Lukewarm attitudes towards multiculturalism are not new; a 1976 survey found that respondents supported immigrants maintaining their respective cultures, so long as this did not displace Canadian culture (Reitz 2011, 16). The tension between multiculturalism and assimilation in immigration could be rooted in the broader debate on whether and how Canada can or should attempt to reconcile the ‘two solitudes’ of English Canadian federalism and French Canadian (and specifically Québécois) nationalism (e.g. Taylor 1993, chapter two).

Some scholars have also castigated the treatment of immigrants and visible minorities in multiculturalism legislation. Bissoondath (2004, 372-79) argues that the Canadian Multiculturalism Act “treats newcomers as exotics and pretends that it is both proper and

sufficient” and has contributed to the oversimplification and marginalisation of cultures in Canadian society. Bannerji (1994, 105-08) argues that multiculturalism imposes a “binary cultural identity” and ignores the influence of colonialism, class, and race in the development of nationhood and renders visible minorities, “an ambiguous presence, our existence a question mark in the side of the nation [...].” In a similar and equally notable vein, MacDonald (2014, 66-67) notes that the Canadian Multiculturalism Act failed to acknowledge the cultural distinctiveness and rights of Canada’s many Aboriginal, First Nations, Inuit, and Métis communities, and thus implicitly privileged the incorporation of immigrants into the “dominant” English and French colonial legacies and cultures. Consequently, some Aboriginal, First Nations, Inuit, and Métis community leaders have expressed ‘suspicion’ towards multiculturalist policies that reinforce the “power dynamics” of the colonial state (MacDonald 2014, 78).

Thus, though Mr Dyck (2013) argued that private sponsors serve as “cultural bridges” for resettled refugees, these critiques suggest that the perceived cultural benefits of migration (including resettlement) are perhaps more easily captured by some Canadian residents than others. Though one could interpret his view and those of other respondents as expressions of the “existence value” of cultural diversity in Canada (Throsby 2010, 172), these views must also be seen in the light of a “multicultural ideology which both needs and creates ‘others’ while subverting demands for anti-racism and political equality (Bannerji 1994, 110).”

While interviewees articulated a range of perceived motivations for resettlement and a variety of benefits, some respondents acknowledged that resettlement generates costs for receiving communities. Nevertheless, respondents appeared divided on the degree to which financial costs are perceived to impact Canada’s participation in resettlement. Though Mr Deans (2013) and Ms Duffin (2013) believe that the government does not view its contribution to resettlement through the lens of costs and benefits, they both acknowledged that the government incurs costs in all managed migration programmes. Nevertheless, Mr Deans (2013) highlighted the importance of cost-effectiveness in refugee protection, stating, “You want to stretch your dollar as far as it can go, because there are so many people in need.” From this perspective, one could interpret domestic responsibility sharing through the PSR programme as a mechanism for extending value for money in resettlement which may thus enable the Canadian government to resettle more refugees.

Likewise, many voluntary sector representatives affirmed that resettlement generates both short- and long-term costs (Chahal 2013; Dekker 2013; Denton 2013; Dyck 2013; Manks 2013; McBride 2013; Niazi 2013; Richardson 2013; Schnabl 2013; Shropshire 2013; Smith

2013; Wiebe 2013; Woolaver 2013). For example, several respondents noted that governments and private sponsors incur some costs in resettlement, such as financing the cost of housing and delivering language classes (Chahal 2013; Dyck 2013; Niazi 2013; Shropshire 2013). In the longer term, Mr Smith (2013) explained that while private sponsors usually cover the full costs of resettlement for up to one year, provinces and municipalities are responsible for any subsequent costs related to education, medical care, and social care. Nevertheless, in an interview on 11 December, 2013, Adeena Niazi, the Founder and Executive Director of the Afghan Women's Counselling and Integration Community Support Organization, characterised these costs as an “investment,” a sentiment echoed by Ms Dekker (2013). Many respondents also indicated that resettlement has long-term economic benefits for Canada (Chahal 2013; Deans 2013; Dekker 2013; Denton 2013; Dyck 2013; McBride 2013; Niazi 2013; Richardson 2013; Schnabl 2013; Shropshire 2013; Smith 2013; Wiebe 2013).

Overall, the responses articulated by interviewees indicate that Canada is perceived to have a complex and overlapping range of motivations for contributing to resettlement. In particular, many interviewees suggested Canada contributes to resettlement as it is perceived to be consistent with its “humanitarian tradition”—a perception that invokes the influence of history and commitments to international humanitarian norms. Furthermore, several government officials and private sponsors suggest that resettlement confers reputational benefits on Canada, while others suggested that participation has cultural benefits for Canada.

4.6 The Perceived Nature of Government-Voluntary Sector Relations in Resettlement

In the preceding section, interviewees articulated their perceptions on the motivations for resettling refugees in Canada and its benefits. Their responses paint a nuanced picture in which the humanitarian rationale for providing this durable solution is accompanied by perceived reputational and cultural benefits. This section presents the views of senior government officials and private sponsors on the perceived nature of government-voluntary agency relations in resettlement, and endeavours to interpret these perceptions in relation to the literature. Many of the interviews indicate that relations between the federal government and private sponsors are characterised by elements which are both complementary and supplementary in nature, and one could interpret these perceptions as consistent with the dominant taxonomy on government-voluntary sector relations and the historical evolution of government-voluntary sector relations in Canada. However, some interviewees perceived deep tensions between the federal government and certain private sponsors, indicating that relations may be collaborative but not necessarily cordial. Certain interviewees also expressed concern that the introduction of the Blended Visa Office-Referred programme may constitute an

example of burden shifting, and one could interpret these perceptions as consistent with aspects of the literature on power dynamics in government-voluntary sector relations in Canada.

During the interviews, respondents were asked to describe how they perceive the nature of relations between the government and private sponsors in resettlement to Canada. The author asked this question to better understand how these two groups perceive their relationship in their own words. Government officials characterised their relationship with private sponsors as a partnership (Boxhill 2013; Deans 2013, Duffin 2013). For example, Mr Deans (2013) shared his belief that, “this as a partnership. I don’t see it as one doing one and another doing another, or one replacing another. It’s a partnership where we work together.” Similarly, Mr Boxhill (2013) characterised government-voluntary sector relations as complementary and indicated that sponsors play “crucial” role in resettlement—especially in the orientation phase—and added that their involvement in the provision of this durable solution “relieves some of the burden from the government.” However, Ms Duffin (2013) indicated that private sponsors play a more supplementary role in resettlement, noting that they can offer more personalised support than the government. Ms Duffin explained, “It’s a unique program [sic] that we have and they do provide an impressive range of services and support to the refugees that they receive, but it’s not necessarily that all the things they’re doing are something that we think the government should—or can—realistically do.”

In addition, there was no consensus among private sponsors on the nature of government-voluntary sector relations in resettlement. Indeed, most interviewees indicated that their organisations complement the functions of government and SPOs in the GAR programme, but suggested that private sponsors also supplement the role of government and other voluntary sector organisations in other respects (Chahal 2013; Dekker 2013; Dyck 2013; Manks 2013; McBride 2013; Niazi 2013; Richardson 2013; Smith 2013; Wiebe 2013; Woolaver 2013). In the pre-arrival phase of resettlement, many interviewees argued that since private sponsors are involved in the identification of refugees for resettlement through the PSR programme, they complement the role of the federal government and UNHCR in identifying and referring refugees for resettlement through the GAR, BVOR, and JAS programmes (Dekker 2013; Dyck 2013; McBride 2013; Niazi 2013; Smith 2013; Wiebe 2013).

However, private sponsors appeared more divided when discussing the perceived nature of relations in the post-arrival phase of resettlement. Certain private sponsors asserted that their involvement in the delivery of orientation and integration services to privately sponsored refugees complemented the role of government-funded SPOs in this area (Chahal 2013; Dyck 2013; McBride 2013; Smith 2013; Wiebe 2013). Conversely, other interviewees

contended that private sponsors have a supplementary role in the orientation and integration process—especially when private sponsors are involved in the resettlement of particularly vulnerable refugees or when the government ‘destines’ refugees outside major urban centres where fewer government-funded services are available (Dekker 2013, Marshall 2013; Niazi 2013; Richardson 2013; Shropshire 2013; Woolaver 2013).

Interviewees also expressed a range of views concerning the perceived nature of relations in the provision of financial and in-kind assistance to refugees—another important element of the orientation and integration process and a feature that differentiates resettlement programmes in Canada at present. Though the federal government does not fund resettlement through the PSR programme, certain private sponsors argued that private sponsors complement the role of the federal government in cases where the two groups collaborate in the resettlement of refugees through the JAS Program, as the government provides financial assistance through the Resettlement Assistance Program and private sponsors offer in-kind assistance (Chahal 2013; Wiebe 2013). Other respondents asserted that private sponsors have both a complementary and a supplementary role in the Blended Visa Office-Referred programme, as the federal government provides six months of financial support for the refugee followed by six months of private support (Marshall 2013; McBride 2013; Shropshire 2013). Still others contended that private sponsors have an exclusively supplementary role as the federal government does not provide any direct funding to them, and private sponsors play a unique role in the delivery of in-kind assistance to resettled refugees (Dekker 2013; Dyck 2013; Manks 2013; Niazi 2013; Richardson 2013; Smith 2013; Woolaver 2013).

Though many interviewees suggested that relations between the federal government and private sponsors are complementary in some ways, several private sponsors spontaneously questioned whether the government and private sponsors have a genuine partnership (Dekker 2013; Marshall 2013; Niazi 2013). Ms Marshall (2013) argued that, in principle, the two groups should have a partnership because this form of collaboration is the most effective way to maximise resettlement admissions. However, Ms Marshall (2013) noted that, in practice, this partnership was not “played out in its fullest potential.” Ms Niazi (2013) argued that the government has far “more power” than private sponsors in resettlement. In addition, in an interview on 10 December, 2013, Rose Dekker, then the Refugee Coordinator at World Renew and member of the Overseas Protection and Sponsorship Working Group at the Canadian Council for Refugees, exclaimed, “It’s not a partnership if one partner makes all the rules, and the other one just has to do what they say!”

To better understand the perceived structure of government-voluntary agency relations in resettlement, this chapter now seeks to interpret the views articulated by government officials and voluntary agency representatives in relation to the literature. First, one could interpret the comments regarding the perceived ‘complementary’ and ‘supplementary’ nature of relations between the government and private sponsors as consistent with the dominant taxonomy on government-voluntary sector relations. As mentioned in chapter two, Young (1999, 33; 2000, 150) draws on the work of Burton Weisbrod (1975 [1986]) to suggest that governments and voluntary sector organisations may develop complementary relationships when the provision of public goods and services would ordinarily require an extensive bureaucratic apparatus, when there is a strong likelihood of free riding, and (or) when public opinion supports alternative service delivery models. In response to these circumstances, governments and voluntary sector organisations can elect to forge a partnership in which the government finances the voluntary sector provision of public goods and services (Young 1999, 33; Young 2000, 150).

In the process, governments and voluntary sector organisations form a ‘symbiotic’ relationship which produces advantages for both partners (Grønbjerg 1987, 66; see also Young 2000, 150). Though contracting out the provision of public goods and services to voluntary sector organisations may be more cost-effective, developing complementary relationships with these organisations can also enable government to overcome informational asymmetries and enable them (through voluntary sector organisations) to provide goods and services that are more tailored to the needs of the individual communities they serve (Young 2000, 154). Though Young does not articulate the precise benefits that voluntary sector organisations derive from complementary relationships, other scholars have argued that governments can provide voluntary sector organisations with a comparatively stable source of funding, thus helping to attenuate the ‘resource dependence’ problem that is endemic in the voluntary sector (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978, 2; Froelich 1999, 247). In the context of immigration, the provision of financial support to immigrant-serving community organisations can enhance organisational capacity in these groups (Bloemraad 2006, 165-70).

In the supplementary model, voluntary sector organisations fill gaps in the demand for provision of public goods and services that are “unsatisfied by government (Young 1999, 33; Young 2000, 150).” Consequently, as government funding for a particular public good or service declines, private contributions—and thus the level of voluntary sector involvement—

are anticipated to increase (Young 2000, 150). Conversely, as government funding increases, the level of private donations and voluntary sector involvement is expected to decline.⁷³

In the Canadian context, the federal government does not provide direct funding to private sponsors. However, the responses from government officials and private sponsors suggest that the perceived nature of relations in resettlement may not depend on the structure of funding arrangements *sensu stricto*, but perhaps more on whether the government funds the delivery of similar services in other resettlement channels. One could also potentially link the diversity of responses among government and private sponsors to the increasing range of resettlement programmes, such as the JAS and BVOR programmes, which have augmented opportunities for collaboration between the federal government and private sponsors but also rendered the division of responsibilities more complex.

The heterogeneous nature of the responses concerning the perceived nature of relations between the government and private sponsors also triangulates with the academic literature. Chapter two noted that scholars do not assume that the nature of government-voluntary sector relations is static (Young 1999, 35), nor do scholars perceive these categories as mutually exclusive. Furthermore (Bremner 1988; Young 2000). Bremner (1988, 216) argues that the nature of government-voluntary sector relations can “shift from time to time to meet changing circumstances and needs,” while Young (2000, 151) adds that government-voluntary sector relations may be simultaneously complementary, supplementary, and (or) adversarial.

Similarly, one could interpret the perception among certain respondents that relations between the government and private sponsors are both complementary and supplementary as a feature of institutional design intended to leverage their respective comparative advantages (Coston 1998; see also Billis and Glennerster 1998). Whereas the government has a comparative advantage in raising revenue and also has democratic legitimacy in setting policy priorities, private sponsors have an informational advantage that gives them an edge when delivering goods and services to resettled refugees (see Coston 1998, 371).

However, certain government officials and private sponsors indicated that relations between the two groups had evolved (Boxhill 2013; Denton 2013; Schnabl 2013; Shropshire 2013). Notably, Mr Boxhill (2013) argued that relations between the government and private

⁷³ As noted in chapter two, this assertion is consistent with economic arguments that government funding can partially ‘crowd out’ private contributions (e.g. Abrams and Schmitz 1986; Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian 1986; Bernheim, 1986; Coates 1998; Kingma 1989; Roberts 1984; Warr 1982; Warr 1983). However, as previously noted, the existence and extent of ‘crowding out’ remains contested in the literature, as others contend that governments can provide an incentive for individuals to contribute to the provision of public goods through mechanisms such as charitable grants (e.g. Andreoni 1990; Rose-Ackerman 1986).

sponsors have become more formalised over time, and that the resettlement process has become more “bureaucratic” in order to preserve programme integrity and the safety of refugees. In a letter to SAHs on file with the author, the Honourable Jason Kenney (2011, 2), the former Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, argued, “The ongoing viability of the PSR program [sic] continues to face serious challenges. Large backlogs have developed as we continue to face spikes in applications submitted that are not in line with the number of resettlement places available.” In response, Minister Kenney (2011, 2) announced his intention to limit the number of private sponsorship applications each SAH can submit, excluding those located in Québec (Manks 2013). In addition, Citizenship and Immigration Canada restricted the number of applications which SAHs can submit to the Canadian High Commissions in Nairobi, Kenya, Pretoria, South Africa, and Islamabad, Pakistan as well as to the Canadian Embassy in Cairo, Egypt, among other changes (Canadian Council for Refugees 2013, 1-2).

Many private sponsors denounced these changes due to the perception that it violates the right of private sponsors to identify (or ‘name’) refugees in need of resettlement, irrespective of their location (Dekker 2013; Denton 2013; Manks 2013; Marshall 2013; Woolaver 2013; for a brief discussion of the naming principle, see Canadian Council for Refugees 2015, 1). In an interview on 6 December, 2013, Michelle Manks, Manager of the Student Refugee Program at the World University Service of Canada, noted that most private sponsors had opposed these restrictions and argued that the changes had reduced the flexibility of sponsors. Similarly, Ms Woolaver (2013) also commented that the cap on private sponsorship applications had restricted the flexibility of private sponsors in identifying refugees in need of resettlement. Elsewhere, Ms Dekker (2013) contended that the changes had contributed to the development of a more “adversarial” relationship between the government and private sponsors, while Ms Marshall (2013) argued, “Sponsorship Agreement Holders are definitely being limited in our ability to help those that we want to help. And the government seems to be restricting us more and more.” Though the Liberal government eliminated the cap following its election in 2016, the limitations on individual private sponsors—and thus the perceived constraints on them—persist (Canadian Unitarian Council 2018, para. 4 and 7 of 28; see also Citizens for Public Justice 2017, 11-12).

One could interpret the perceived changes in the relationship between the federal government and private sponsors as consistent with the dominant taxonomy on government-voluntary sector relations. Chapter two noted that, according to Bremner (1988, 216), the nature of government-voluntary sector relations can “shift from time to time to meet changing circumstances and needs,” while Young (2000, 151) adds that government-voluntary sector

relations may be simultaneously complementary, supplementary, and (or) adversarial. One could thus interpret the relationship between the federal government and private sponsors as possibly dynamic, with potential overlaps between complementary, supplementary, and adversarial relations.

One could also interpret the potential shift in government- private sponsor relations as consistent with the broader historical pattern of government-voluntary sector relations in Canada, including in resettlement. During the colonial period, authorities delivered social assistance and services in accordance with the dominant models in France and the United Kingdom at the time (Elson 2011, 17-25). Authorities in New France adopted a paternalistic approach to the provision of social assistance and services, and the Catholic Church monopolised the provision of public goods and services until the Quiet Revolution (*la Révolution tranquille*) in the 1960s (Elson 2011, 19-21). In the British colonies in Eastern Canada and Upper Canada, governments adopted a two-pronged approach to the provision of social assistance and services which differentiated between the ‘deserving’ and ‘underserving’ poor (Elson 2011, 17-18). The government limited assistance to deserving individuals and during emergencies, and contracted out the provision of relief for the undeserving to charitable organisations, which it perceived as “more efficient and cost-effective (Elson 2011, 18-26).” In keeping with the dominant taxonomy on government-voluntary sector relations (Young 1999; Young 2000), one could interpret the use of contracting as an indication that voluntary sector organisations had a more complementary role in the delivery of social assistance and services in Eastern and Upper Canada at the time.

Following confederation, the federal government maintained a *laissez-faire* approach to social policy until the Great Depression, when it began offering financial assistance to the unemployed and consigned voluntary sector organisations to a supplementary role focused on the provision of in-kind assistance (Elson 2011, 39). However, Elson (2011, 60) indicates that the federal government and voluntary sector soon forged a more complementary relationship that was driven by the development of a universal welfare state following the end of World War II.

Government-voluntary sector relations began to shift following the election of a Progressive Conservative government led by Prime Minister Brian Mulroney in 1984, which attempted to address the fiscal crisis and recession by cutting “government waste” through the introduction of New Public Management principles and a considerable reduction in social spending (Elson 2011, 89-90). Concurrently, the federal government encouraged voluntary sector organisations to assume a more active role in the delivery of social assistance and

services by expanding competitive bidding for contracts that were firmly linked to government priorities (Elson 2011, 74 and 89-92).

In the 1990s, the Liberal government led by Prime Minister Jean Chrétien embarked on a “historically unique” programme of retrenchment at all levels of government in order address ongoing fiscal problems (Stanford 2001, 147). During this period, the government cut funding to a broad range of organisations but also increased the use of contracts for voluntary sector organisations, which it perceived as “dedicated and low-cost” service providers (Elson 2011, 103-04; Pross and Webb 2003, 66-67 and 80). The government also assumed that the voluntary sector would naturally take on a supplementary role in delivering the social assistance programmes and services no longer funded by the government, without considering whether these organisations had the capacity to meet the increased demand (Elson 2011, 104; Phillips 2003, 26-27; Pross and Webb 2003, 65).

These decisions caused government-voluntary sector relations to reach a “low point” characterised by “considerable suspicion” and “marked antagonism (Phillips 2003, 26).” In 1995, a coalition of voluntary sector organisations established the Voluntary Sector Roundtable and later commissioned a Panel on Accountability and Governance to analyse how government-voluntary sector relations could be ameliorated, among other issues (Phillips 2003, 24). In 1999, the Panel issued a series of recommendations that drew on the findings of the Deakin Commission in the United Kingdom, including the suggestion to create a government-voluntary sector compact (Phillips 2003, 24).

During that period, the government also expressed interest in improving government-voluntary sector relations as part of a broader effort to move away from a model of ‘government’ towards a paradigm of ‘governance’ that favoured closer and more horizontal collaboration between the government and voluntary sector (Phillips 2003, 17-18 and 25; Phillips 2011, 230). The 2000 launch of the Voluntary Sector Initiative constituted one attempt to strengthen government-voluntary sector relations and also marked the first time that the federal government had attempted to engage the voluntary sector on a “more strategic level (Brock and Banting 2001, 10).” However, participants focused more on operational and procedural issues rather than broader matters such as those related to financing and advocacy (Phillips 2011, 230). Furthermore, though the process produced an Accord, there were few enforcement mechanisms attached to the agreement (Phillips 2011, 230). Following the election of a Conservative government led by Prime Minister Stephen Harper in 2006, the government “abandoned” the Accord and continued to pursue the same neoliberal policies implemented by the preceding Liberal governments, which further institutionalised the contract

culture and led to the “commodification of the voluntary sector (Elson 2011, 107 and 113; Phillips 2011, 230).”

In the context of resettlement, the academic literature on the involvement of voluntary sector organisations in resettlement—especially detailed accounts of the role of voluntary sector organisations—was limited at the time of research. However, interviewee responses appear to be consistent with the available evidence concerning the history of government-voluntary sector relations in this area, which indicates that their relationship has evolved from supplementary to complementary over time. During World War II, it appears that government-voluntary sector relations in resettlement may have been more supplementary in character. For example, the government agreed to resettle up to 100 families from Portugal and Spain—but only on the condition that voluntary sector groups such as the Canadian Jewish Congress and the Canadian National Committee on Refugees assumed full responsibility for their care and maintenance (Dirks 1977, 96).

In the post-war period, it appears that government-voluntary sector relations may have gradually assumed a more complementary nature. Initially, the federal government expressed reluctance to enter into formal partnerships with voluntary sector organisations (Dirks 1977, 161-62). However, this did not prevent umbrella organisations such as the Canadian Christian Council for the Resettlement of Refugees and the Canadian Council of Churches from sending representatives to Europe in order to identify and refer refugees for resettlement (Dirks 1977, 161-62; Hawkins 1988, 303-04). In 1951, the government relented and granted the Canadian Christian Council for the Resettlement of Refugees CAD\$10,000 per month to support their work until the end of that year (Dirks 1977, 161-62; Hawkins 1988, 304). The government also began providing grants to other voluntary sector organisations to support the delivery of services such as those related to reception (Hawkins 1988, 308-10). Two years later, as part of a broader effort to professionalise its approach to migration management, the federal government created the Approved Church Program, which gave four religious organisations the unprecedented authority to select and process applications of resettlement (Hawkins 1988, 304-5; Kelley and Trebilcock 2010, 344). In 1986, the UNHCR offered the people of Canada the Nansen award in recognition of their contribution to refugee protection, marking the first time the organisation bestowed the award on an entire country (Knowles 2007, 223).

During the Hungarian refugee crisis of 1956, the World University Service played an important role in the selection of Hungarian refugees in Austria (Dirks 1977, 206). Furthermore, the federal government and voluntary sector organisations collaborated in finding accommodation and employment as well as in the delivery of integration assistance to the

37,718 Hungarian refugees resettled between 1956 and 1957 (Dirks 1977, 202; Knowles 2007, 176). Similarly, during the Ugandan Asian refugee crisis, the federal and provincial governments funded ‘assistance committees’ composed of both paid employees and volunteers, who collaborated in helping the refugees to find accommodation and employment and also offered integration assistance (Dirks 1977, 243-44).

Perhaps the best-known example of government-voluntary sector partnerships occurred during the refugee crisis in Southeast Asia. In a comprehensive account of the early history of Canadian efforts to resettle refugees from this region, Adelman (1982, especially chapters 3, 7, and 8) attributes the success of resettlement efforts from this region to a combination of government leadership (at the federal, provincial, and municipal levels), media interest, and support from grassroots and religious organisations who provided direct reception, orientation, and integration services for resettled refugees. These efforts enabled Canada to resettle a total of 202,178 refugees from Southeast Asia between 1975 and 1997 (Robinson 1998, appendix two).

Finally, one could also interpret the concerns expressed by some interviewees regarding the balance of power between the federal government and private sponsors as consistent with aspects of the (small) literature on government-voluntary sector relations in Canada. Owen (2000, 132) notes that the 1994 United Nations International Conference on Population and Development allocated an entire chapter to the merits of government-voluntary sector partnerships, and acknowledged the “comparative advantage” of voluntary sector organisations, as well as their “innovative, flexible, and responsive” approach to programme implementation and design and the close connection between these organisations and the “constituencies” they serve. Owen (2000, 132) notes that, in this way, voluntary sector organisations can act as effective “bridge-builders” between the host community and “traditionally disenfranchised” populations such as immigrants and refugees. Conversely, governments have a “comparative advantage” in raising revenue, ensuring accountability and quality, and balancing both “complementary and competing” priorities (Owen 2000, 133).

However, governments and voluntary sector organisations that have contracts for service delivery do not necessarily have an equitable partnership. Indeed, Owen (2000, 134) suggests that there a fundamental imbalance in power between the government and voluntary sector organisations. From an organisational perspective, the federal government is orders of magnitude larger than voluntary sector organisation, commands far more financial and human resources, and dictates the terms of accountability and reporting requirements (Owen 2000, 134). In the context of migration, the government also controls admissions and decides who is

permitted to remain in the country (Owen 2000, 134). Though voluntary sector organisations are an “important bridge between those with power and those without,” they also fundamentally hold far less power than the federal government (Owen 2000, 134). In addition to the fundamental imbalance between the federal government and voluntary sector organisations, the latter do not always make ‘effective’ use of their memberships in coalitions, and even when voluntary sector organisations do seek to leverage this such forms of ‘power,’ it is not always recognised (Owen 2000, 134). For these reasons, Owen (2000, 134) argues that “there has to be some semblance of equity in the relationship between partners” in order for the government and voluntary sector organisations to forge a genuine partnership.

The concerns expressed by certain interviewees regarding the perceived imbalance in power relations between the federal government and private sponsors—as well as the comments concerning perceived responsibility shifting through the Blended Visa Office-Referred programme—also aligns with elements of the work Richmond and Shields, who analyse government-voluntary sector relations in the delivery of orientation and integration services in Canada. Richmond and Shields (2005, 514) note that though the Canadian government and voluntary sector organisations have endeavoured to promote the country’s “distinct” approach to the delivery of orientation and integration services through government-voluntary sector partnerships, this ‘model’ is in crisis and merits critical examination. In particular, Richmond and Shields (2005, 518) argue that the government has followed a neoliberal, New Public Management-driven approach to contracting in which, “The community-based service providers are deliberately underfunded, supposedly to allow the public to choose which services to support through their charitable giving and voluntary activities. [...] The whole system also depends on new “partnerships,” which are not true alliances, but rather alternate funding and service delivery relationships, the terms and conditions of which are dictated largely by the terms of funding contracts).”⁷⁴ In addition, decades of “government downloading” has placed further pressure on voluntary sector organisations and had a potentially deleterious effect on integration outcomes (Richmond and Shields 2005, 518-20).

Though Richmond and Shields (2005) concentrate on the provision of orientation and integration services by government-funded SPOs, the perceptions articulated by some

⁷⁴ For a detailed analysis of Canadian government retrenchment measures under both Conservative and Liberal governments, and the concomitant impact of these policies on voluntary sector capacity, see Brock (2003), Brock and Banting (2001), Elson (2011, chapter five); Evans, Richmond, and Shields (2005), Hall and Banting (2000), Phillips (2003; 2003; 2011), and Pross and Webb (2003).

interviewees regarding the impact of government-imposed caps on applications for resettlement through the PSR programme suggests that governments can potentially constrain private sponsors even though they do not receive government funding. Given contemporary efforts to promote the Canadian PSR programme, further research that critically examines the perceived structure of relations between the government and private sponsors, the formal mechanisms through which these relations are constituted, and the real and perceived constraints imposed upon private sponsors may be beneficial and contribute to a better understanding of the implications of government-voluntary sector partnerships in resettlement.

4.7 The Perceived Relationship between Resettlement Admissions and Domestic Responsibility Sharing

In the previous two sections, interviewees articulated their perceptions on motivations for resettlement and its benefits and the perceived nature of relations between the federal government and private sponsors. Their responses paint a nuanced picture in which the humanitarian rationale for providing this durable solution is accompanied by perceived reputational and cultural benefits. Though many government officials and private sponsors expressed similar views concerning the perceived motivations for resettlement and its benefits, respondents appeared divided in their opinions on the perceived nature of relations with one another. In addition, a government official acknowledged that relations between the federal government and private sponsors had been tense in the recent past, and several private sponsors spoke of a perceived power imbalance and raised concerns about efforts to constrain their ability to identify refugees in need of resettlement and to maximise their contributions to this durable solution.

This important contextual information sets the stage for an exploration of the potential relationship between resettlement admissions and domestic responsibility sharing. This section presents the views of government officials and private sponsors on the perceived relationship between resettlement admissions and domestic responsibility sharing through the PSR programme. One could interpret the perception among most interviewees that domestic responsibility sharing through the PSR programme has enhanced resettlement admissions as consistent with the academic literature on the role of voluntary sector organisations in providing public goods and services.

During the interviews, three of the four federal government officials expressed the belief that resettlement admissions have been augmented through domestic responsibility sharing through the PSR Programme (Boxhill 2013; Deans 2013; Duffin 2013). Mr Deans (2013) and Ms Duffin (2013) were unequivocal in their agreement that this form of

responsibility sharing had increased resettlement admissions. In particular, Ms Duffin (2013) explained that, without private sponsors, “there is no program, there are not these additional refugees that come to Canada.” Similarly, Mr Boxhill (2013) argued resettlement capacity had “beyond a doubt” increased through this form of domestic responsibility sharing.

The overwhelming majority of private sponsors also indicated that the contributions of private sponsors enhanced resettlement admissions (Chahal 2013; Dekker 2013; Dyck 2013; Manks 2013; Marshall 2013; Niazi 2013; Schnabl 2013; Smith 2013; Wiebe 2013; Woolaver 2013). Ms Marshall (2013) suggested that the contribution of private sponsors is rooted in the principle of additionality, and stated, “We’re able to add to that total number by a significant amount, whereas if it was all left up to the government to handle, we wouldn’t be able to bring in as many people as we are because they wouldn’t have the means to help them settle.” Ms Woolaver (2013) also asserted that resettlement admissions have increased through domestic responsibility sharing because private sponsors must fund the costs of resettlement themselves. In addition, Ms Woolaver (2013) highlighted the mutually beneficial nature of collaboration between the federal government and private sponsors, explaining that, “I think it’s a program [sic] that Canada—the governments—have generally seen as a win-win situation. You know, they get people here and somebody else pays for it.” Nevertheless, Mr Denton (2013) argued that the demand for resettlement through this programme “far exceeds the supply of places.” At the time of the interview, Mr Denton (2013) explained that his organisation had been obliged to decline requests to sponsor approximately 5,000 refugees in the past year.

That said, not all respondents agreed that domestic responsibility sharing through the PSR programme had enhanced resettlement admissions. In an interview on 4 December, 2013, a senior official from Citizenship and Immigration Canada argued that certain private sponsors had intentionally submitted large numbers of applications. By 2012, a backlog of 23,200 applications for resettlement through the PSR application had accumulated (Alboim and Cohl 2012, 37), and the official noted that this strategy had consequently compelled the government to introduce the aforementioned cap on private sponsorship applications and had thus decreased the capacity of the programme.⁷⁵

A Constituent Group representative confirmed this perception. Mr Denton (2013) affirmed that his organisation had “deliberately” adopted this approach and “wrecked the program [sic] by putting too many cases in” in an attempt to force the government to increase

⁷⁵ To clarify, it would appear these actions decreased the capacity of the government to process applications for resettlement through the PSR programme.

admissions targets for privately sponsored refugees. Mr Denton (2013) and Ms Schnabl (2013) also argued that a municipal assurance programme for private sponsors in Winnipeg might have contributed to the issue by allowing organisations to “sponsor with impunity,” as they could recoup any financial losses if the sponsor-refugee relationship disintegrated. Nevertheless, Mr Denton (2013) maintained that his strategy had been successful as large numbers of resettled refugees were arriving in Winnipeg.⁷⁶

Though private sponsors agreed domestic responsibility sharing through the PSR programme enhanced resettlement admissions, many also expressed concern that some recent policy changes constitute examples of responsibility shifting. Concerns about responsibility shifting have been present from the beginning. As Adelman (1982, 85) explains, “[...] many of the large church organizations [sic] disliked the legal status of the private sponsorship agreement and suspected that the government intended to use the plan as a means of dumping its responsibilities for refugees onto the private sector.”

During the interviews, many interviewees expressed concerns about two issues: healthcare for resettled refugees and the introduction of the BVOR programme. First, several interviewees were concerned about the curtailment in Interim Federal Health coverage for privately sponsored refugees (Dekker 2013; Manks 2013; Shropshire 2013; Smith 2013; Woolaver 2013). In Canada, individuals are generally required to reside in a province or territory for a prescribed period (up to three months) before they are eligible for government-funded health insurance. Though resettled refugees are exempt from this requirement, the federal government established the Interim Federal Health programme in 1957 to ensure that immigrants received medical care while awaiting their documentation (Enns et al. 2017, 27).

In June 2012, the Conservative government attempted to curtail the cost of the Interim Federal Health programme by introducing changes to the level of coverage given to refugees and other persons in need of protection. These changes occurred in an environment in which the Conservative government led by Prime Minister Stephen Harper attempted to address and mitigate “perceived fraud” in refugee admissions and an increasing emphasis and distinction between ‘bogus’ and ‘genuine’ asylum seekers, refugees, and other persons in need of protection (Barnes 2013, 1). Before 2012, all asylum claimants, recognised refugees, and other

⁷⁶ Historical evidence suggests that this approach has been effective in the past. Following the end of World War II, many Canadians appealed to the government to resettle their ethnic German relatives living in the USSR (Dirks 1977, 137). Though the government was initially reluctant to do so, Dirks (1977, 137-38) explains, “[...] the Canadian relatives of European refugees continued to make application until an enormous backlog forced the government into announcing a program [sic] beneficial to both the recognized displaced persons and the *Volksdeutsch* whose refugee status was problematical.”

persons in need of protection received the same coverage under the Interim Federal Health programme, regardless of their status in Canada or their country of origin (Norquay 2013, 3). The changes enabled refugees resettled through the GAR, JAS, and BVOR programmes to continue to access ‘basic’ and ‘expanded’ forms of coverage under the Interim Federal Health programme, including treatment by family physicians and hospitals and supplemental services not usually covered by the provinces and territories such as dental and vision care, prescriptions, and psychotherapy, among others (Canadian Council for Refugees 2013, 1; Enns et al. 2017, 27).⁷⁷ Conversely, refugees resettled through the PSR programme (alongside certain asylum seekers and other persons in need of protection) could only access ‘basic’ services if the government deemed their needs “urgent or essential,” and these individuals could only obtain prescription medications and vaccinations if they presented a “risk” to public health or safety (Enns et al. 2017, 27).⁷⁸

The changes prompted a deluge of opposition from a broad cross-section of Canadian society, including private sponsors, medical professionals, academics, and members of the general public, amongst others (Enns et al. 2017, 28-32). Ms Woolaver (2013) argued that this measure constituted a “huge blow” that has made it “much more precarious” for groups and organisations to participate in resettlement due in part to the prospect that sponsors may be obliged to bear unforeseen costs if resettled refugees develop health issues in the immediate period preceding or following arrival. In July 2014, the Federal Court invalidated the changes as they were “inconsistent with the *Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms* (*Canadian Doctors for Refugee Care et al. v. Attorney General of Canada and Minister of Citizenship and Immigration* 2014, at para. 1089 original emphasis).” Citizenship and Immigration appealed the ruling (Ireton 2015, para. 7 of 13), but benefits were eventually restored following the election of a Liberal government in 2016 (CBC News 2016, para. 11 and 12 of 28).

One could interpret the concerns articulated by these private sponsors as consistent with some of the findings from a survey conducted by Citizens for Public Justice, a national coalition of Christian organisations and registered charity. In 2017, the organisation reported that “many” of the 32 SAHs that participated in the survey were “very concerned” about the decision to eliminate Interim Federal Health coverage for refugees resettled through the PSR

⁷⁷ In principle, refugees resettled through these three programmes maintained their eligibility for both ‘basic’ and ‘expanded’ services. However, the Canadian Council for Refugees (2015, 7-8) documented a range of cases in which Government Assisted Refugees were denied partial or total access to both ‘basic’ and ‘expanded’ services.

⁷⁸ For a more detailed description and critical analysis of the changes as they relate to different categories of persons in need of protection, see Enns et al. (2017, 27).

programme (Citizens for Public Justice 2017, 3). Furthermore, some SAHs reported that the decision had contributed to a “decline in sponsorship interest” in their communities (Citizens for Public Justice 2017, 3). This development suggests that while the federal government provides no funding to SAHs or their constituent groups, and plays a limited role in the operation of the PSR programme, the broader regulatory environment surrounding resettlement could directly or indirectly constrain voluntary sector organisations operating in this sphere.

In addition to expressing concerns about the changes in health coverage for refugees resettled through the PSR programme, some private sponsors expressed concern about the impact of the Blended Visa Office-Referred programme (Dekker 2013; Dyck 2013; Marshall 2013; Woolaver 2013). Both Ms Woolaver (2013) and Ms Marshall (2013) argued that the government was “pushing” private sponsors to participate in the Blended programme.⁷⁹ Ms Woolaver (2013) added that she felt the government was “directly downloading” responsibility for resettlement onto sponsors. Ms Dekker (2013) also argued that the government was “downloading” costs onto private sponsors through the new programme, and contended that this had undermined the principle of additionality, stating, “I really feel that, particularly with the Blended program, it’s limiting and decreasing—shrinking—the program.” Similarly, Mr Dyck (2013) expressed concern that the Blended programme could contribute to the ‘erosion’ of additionality, stating, “There is certainly concern that this is something of an offloading of Canada’s commitment to the UNHCR numbers onto the private sector.”

However, officials explained that the programme was introduced to help cut departmental expenditures as part of a government-wide effort to reduce spending (Citizenship and Immigration Canada 2012, see section entitled ‘Deficit Reduction Action Plan’). To that end, the department reallocated 1,000 resettlement places from the GAR programme to the Blended Visa Office-Referred programme (Citizenship and Immigration Canada 2014, 45). Mr Deans (2013) explained, “It was felt that if the government was only providing half of the Resettlement Assistance Program or support for half the time, we could still bring in the same number of people without, you know—by stretching those dollars. So that’s one example of where there is a link between targets and financial cost. [...] This program [sic] was created to

⁷⁹ In a resettlement programme for Ismaili refugees from Afghanistan, the government provided three months of financial assistance and orientation services, while the Ismaili Council for Canada and FOCUS Humanitarian Canada provided assistance for the subsequent nine months (Treviranus and Casasola 2003, 189). In total, approximately 1,800 Ismailis benefited from this “cost-effective” programme between 1994 and 1998 (Treviranus and Casasola 2003, 189). The government also employed the same ‘3/9’ model during the crisis in the former Yugoslavia, and this approach enabled the government to increase the number of refugees resettled from 90 to 198 (Treviranus and Casasola 2003, 190).

sort of see how can we stretch those settlement dollars further by encouraging sponsors to step up to the plate while the government still provides some support.”

Though some private sponsors expressed reservations about this programme, two of their colleagues support the programme. In an interview on 13 December, 2013, Rob Shropshire, the Program Coordinator for Refugee Sponsorship and Special Projects at the Presbyterian Church in Canada, argued that the Blended Visa Office-Referred programme may be attractive for some sponsors due to the division of financial responsibility and faster processing times which mean that refugees arrive in a matter of months, rather than years. Mr Shropshire (2013) explained that the programme was attractive for his organisation, as church attendance has declined and the average age of churchgoers has also increased, making it more difficult to fundraise and to convince members of the congregation to wait several years for the refugee to arrive. In a separate interview on 13 December, 2013, Ian McBride, Manager of the Anglican United Refugee Alliance, explained that he supported the Blended Visa Office-Referred programme and had personally lobbied the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration in support of its creation. Mr McBride (2013) argued that, while his organisation sponsored refugees through a variety of programmes, he felt that the BVOR programme was a more efficient use of their limited organisational resources.

Nevertheless, concerns about responsibility shifting persist, and some politicians and advocacy organisations have suggested that the government has shifted most of the responsibility for resettling Syrian refugees onto private sponsors without their consent (Campion-Smith 2015, para. 16 and 19 of 22). In 2015, the Conservative government led by Prime Minister Stephen Harper committed to resettling an additional 10,000 Syrian refugees, but indicated that the government would only assume responsibility for 40 per cent of these refugees (Mas 2015, para. 1 and 3 of 26)—placing most of the responsibility for resettlement on private sponsors. During the 2015 federal election campaign, the Liberal Party pledged to resettle 25,000 Syrian refugees through the GAR programme by the end of 2015, and stated its intent to “work with private sponsors” to augment admissions further (Liberal Party of Canada 2015, 2). The Liberal government subsequently adjusted their commitment and promised to resettle 25,000 refugees through both the Government Assisted and PSR programme by February 2016, including a pledge to support the resettlement of 15,000 refugees (The Canadian Press 2016, para. 5, 19, and 21 of 27). In addition, the Liberal government pledged to resettle an additional 10,000 refugees through the GAR programme by the end of 2016, raising their total commitment to 25,000 refugees (The Canadian Press 2016, para. 26 of 27). In total, Canada resettled 40,081 Syrian refugees between 4 November, 2015 and 29 January,

2017, including 21,876 refugees resettled through the GAR programme, 14,274 refugees resettled through the PSR programme, and a further 3,931 refugees resettled through the Blended Visa Office-Referred programme (Government of Canada 2017, no pagination).

These perceptions also raise broader questions about the reasons that voluntary sector organisations and government-voluntary sector partnerships have emerged in the first place in Canada. Such a task is made more difficult by the limited nature of academic scholarship on government-voluntary sector relations in Canada. Indeed, Hall and Banting (2000, 4) explain that “Despite the growing interest in the nonprofit sector, we know surprisingly little about it and the role that it plays in our society. Research on the nonprofit sector lags well behind that on the public and private sectors in virtually all countries, but this is especially true in Canada.”

The academic literature on government-voluntary sector relations in Canada concentrates on two themes: first, a small number of academics have analysed efforts to increase accountability in the voluntary sector following controversies in the 1990s and early 2000s (e.g. Phillips 2003; Phillips and Graham 2000; Phillips and Levasseur 2004). Though this aspect of the literature demonstrates how accountability regimes can impact voluntary sector capacity, at best, these works only offer tangential insight into whether domestic responsibility sharing with voluntary sector organisations can influence policy outcomes such as resettlement admissions.

That said, most scholars have examined how attempts by Progressive Conservative (now Conservative) and Liberal governments to address deep fiscal problems have impacted the nature and structure of government-voluntary sector relations since the 1980s (e.g. Brock 2003; Brock and Banting 2001; Elson 2011, chapter five; Evans, Richmond, and Shields 2005; Hall and Banting 2000; Phillips 2003; Phillips 2003; Phillips 2011; Pross and Webb 2003). This segment of the literature illustrates how the federal government engaged in an extensive programme of public sector restructuring that combined profound cuts in social spending and significant responsibility shifting onto the voluntary sector, thereby reducing its capacity.

This literature suggests that one could interpret the current pattern of relations between the federal government and private sponsors as an emblem of the legacy of federal government retrenchment efforts. However, the progressive reshaping of relations between the federal government and the Canadian voluntary sector more generally could also potentially be seen as a broader attempt by the federal government to encourage the “entrepreneurship of autonomous actors” including individuals, groups, and corporations (all of whom are eligible to sponsor refugees under the PSR programme) in order to build “stronger, more resilient”

communities through the pursuit of ‘community government’ (Cappe 1999, 2 cited in Ilcan and Basok 2004, 135; Rose 1999, 139 cited in Ilcan and Basok 2004, 131).

To achieve this, governments in advanced liberal democracies like Canada retreat from their prototypical role in the provision of social services and instead focus on “enabling, inspiring, and assisting citizens to take responsibility for social problems in their communities (Ilcan and Basok 2004, 132).” Whereas the Canadian government historically assumed responsibility for the collective well-being of Canadian society through the establishment of national health and social assistance programmes, Ilcan and Basok (2004, 133) argue that the pursuit of community government through contracting out to voluntary sector organisations has placed responsibility for caring for “disadvantaged people” on voluntary sector organisations and volunteers. This process of “responsibilization” has re-oriented the basis of citizenship away from the government downwards to the community level, but this role has also constrained the capacity of voluntary sector organisations to engage in advocacy (Ilcan and Basok 2004, 132-33).

In the context of resettlement to Canada, the regulations which established of the PSR programme predate the retrenchment measures introduced by the Progressive Conservative Prime Minister Brian Mulroney and adapted by his some of his Conservative and Liberal successors. Nevertheless, the “governmentality” lens adopted by Ilcan and Basok (2004, 130) could offer an insightful paradigm through which to critically assess the organisation, implementation, and implications of the PSR programme, especially given the extensive involvement of volunteers and the concerns articulated by some private sponsors concerning perceptions of responsibility shifting.

4.8 Conclusion

This chapter began with an overview of the history of resettlement admissions in Canada. The analysis suggests the government adopted a discriminatory approach to resettlement admissions and declined to resettle Jewish and Armenian refugees during the interwar period due to the prevailing anti-Semitic and racist views at the time. Though the government adopted a more generous approach to the admission of some groups including Hungarian, Ugandan Asian, and Chilean refugees, its approach to resettlement remained *ad hoc* until the introduction of the 1978 Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations. This legislation provided the framework for the PSR programme and facilitated the resettlement of thousands of Southeast Asian refugees as well as persons in need of protection from Central and Latin America. This assessment appears consistent with the data on the size and composition of resettlement flows between 1980 and 2016, which demonstrated that Canada

resettled refugees from a diverse range of countries including Bosnia, El Salvador, Iran, Poland, Sri Lanka, and Vietnam, among many others.

The chapter then adopted a more analytical approach by exploring the perceived motivations for resettlement and its benefits through interviews with senior government officials and 14 private sponsors in Ottawa, Toronto, and Winnipeg. Interviewees indicated that Canada has a humanitarian motivation for resettling refugees and that contributing to this durable solution is perceived as consistent with the norms of international responsibility sharing. Some respondents further indicated that contributing to resettlement enhances the reputation of Canada as a humanitarian actor, and is also perceived to confer cultural benefits for Canada. The author suggested that one could interpret these views as consistent with the literature on refugee protection as an impure public good and the economic literature on public goods more generally. However, though interviewees identified perceived cultural benefits, an analysis of the literature suggests not all Canadians welcome multiculturalism in the same way.

The author then explored the perceived nature of relations between the government and private. Both government and private sponsors indicated that they perceived their relationship as both complementary and supplementary in certain respects, though there was no consensus on which aspects of their relationship were complementary and which were supplementary. The author suggested that one could interpret this as consistent with the dominant taxonomy on government-voluntary sector relations, which indicates that relations can be complementary and (or) supplementary in nature. One could also interpret this assessment as consistent with the broader evolution in government-voluntary sector relations in Canada. However, some private sponsors expressed concern about responsibility shifting through the introduction of the Blended Visa Office-Referred programme, while others questioned whether their relationship with the federal government is a genuine partnership.

Finally, this chapter explored perceptions concerning the potential relationship between resettlement admissions and domestic responsibility sharing through the PSR programme. Though a senior government official indicated that some private sponsors had created a large backlog in applications and ultimately undermined the capacity of the PSR programme, the majority of respondents perceived that this form of domestic responsibility sharing enhanced resettlement admissions in Canada. Despite these views and the fact that the programme is founded on the principle of ‘additionality,’ statements from some private sponsors suggest that this principle may not be sacrosanct and that the government is perceived to have engaged in responsibility shifting during periods of fiscal retrenchment and through the creation of the Blended Visa Office-Referred programme. One could interpret these concerns as consistent

with the historical literature on government-voluntary sector relations, which indicated that the government previously engaged in responsibility shifting during periods of austerity. These concerns are arguably important to bear in mind given contemporary efforts by the Canadian government and the UNHCR to promote private sponsorship. These views suggest that the introduction of mechanisms for domestic responsibility sharing could be insufficient to augment admissions. Instead, a genuine increase in resettlement admissions might only be achieved through an active, ongoing commitment to ‘additionality’ from both the government and members of civil society.

Chapter Five: Resettlement Admissions and Voluntary Advocacy in Canada

5.1 Introduction

Chapter one presented a number of observations concerning resettlement admissions, government-voluntary sector partnerships in resettlement, and current resettlement needs. In particular, chapter one highlighted the absolute and relative cross-national differences in resettlement admissions and the widespread existence of government-voluntary sector relationships in resettlement, as well as the cross-national variations in the scope of these relationships. The chapter also highlighted the need to better understand the relationship between resettlement admissions and domestic responsibility sharing through government-voluntary sector partnerships given the unprecedented number of persons in need of protection at present, including the extensive need for resettlement. Moreover, the chapter identified several limitations and *lacunae* in the existing literature, focusing particularly on observations that much of the scholarship ignores the influence of domestic factors such as the extensive mechanisms for domestic responsibility sharing with voluntary agencies and the potential capacity of these agencies to influence resettlement admissions through advocacy.

Chapter four offered an overview of the history of resettlement in Canada and provided detailed figures on the size and composition of resettlement flows to Canada between 1980 and 2016. To better understand the potential reasons why Canada has voluntarily adopted generous resettlement admissions policies, the chapter also explored perceptions on the motivations for resettlement and its benefits, the nature of government-voluntary sector relations, and the potential relationship between resettlement admissions and domestic responsibility sharing with voluntary sector organisations, through interviews with senior government officials and private sponsors. Interviewees indicated that Canada is perceived to engage in resettlement for humanitarian and normative reasons, such as contributing to international responsibility sharing. In addition, interviewees suggested that resettlement is perceived to have reputational and cultural benefits for Canada. The author suggested that one could interpret these perceptions as consistent with the literature on refugee protection as an impure public good, and the economic literature on public goods more generally. Interviews also indicate that the federal government and Sponsorship Agreement Holders perceive their relationship as complementary in some aspects and supplementary in other ways. The author proposed that one could interpret these perceptions as consistent with the dominant taxonomy on government-voluntary sector relations and the historical pattern of public service delivery in Canada. Furthermore, the overwhelming majority of respondents indicated that resettlement admissions had been enhanced through domestic responsibility sharing with Sponsorship

Agreement Holders. Though one could interpret this perception as consistent with the academic literature on the role of voluntary sector organisations in providing public goods and services, some private sponsors also raised concerns about responsibility shifting.

Though these findings may help us better understand why Canada has voluntary adopted generous resettlement admissions policies, advocacy efforts could also shape resettlement admissions. This chapter first offers an overview of the history of voluntary sector advocacy on resettlement in Canada in section 5.2. It then adopts a more analytical approach by exploring the perceived relationship between resettlement admissions and voluntary sector advocacy in Canada through interviews with senior government officials and representatives from 13 Sponsorship Agreement Holders. During the interviews, a federal official spoke at length about perceived tensions between the government and certain private sponsors. This official also suggested that the SAH Council does not speak with a “single voice.” Though some private sponsors actively engaged in advocacy on resettlement admissions and perceived some success in this area, efforts by other organisations appeared less successful. Furthermore, interviewees indicated there are some tensions among private sponsors on whether and how they should engage in advocacy, and whether the SAH Council should pursue advocacy as well.

One could interpret these perceptions as consistent with the dominant taxonomy on government-voluntary sector relations, which suggests that voluntary sector organisations are not merely service providers but can also take on an “adversarial” role in which they press governments to enact policy changes (Young 2000, 151). However, one could also question whether the perceived absence of a “single voice” among private sponsors could impact the effectiveness of their advocacy efforts. These questions appear especially salient when considered in relation to the potential structure of voluntary sector interest representation in Canada. While there appears to be no consensus in this area, one could potentially interpret the structure of relations between the government and private sponsors as a policy community, which are exclusive groups situated in a broader policy network.

In addition, preliminary research indicates that few ethnic community organisations in Canada may engage in advocacy on resettlement issues. However, this initial assessment could reflect limitations in capturing certain forms of advocacy or limitations in the financial and human resources of these organisations, which could constrain their ability to publicise their advocacy efforts. Given the gradual inclusion of ethnic minorities in Canadian politics, further research is needed to more fully ascertain their involvement in resettlement advocacy.

Finally, the analysis highlights the potential influence of issue context and salience on the effectiveness of advocacy efforts. Though the scope of resettlement admissions policies in Canada is relatively limited (especially regarding admissions through the PSR programme) and public attitudes towards immigration and refugee protection have improved somewhat over time, public opinion polls indicate that Canadians have not always welcomed persons in need of protection. However, some public opinion polls suggest that many Canadians have adopted more favourable views towards the resettlement of Syrian refugees—a salient issue in 2015. This context may have created an environment conducive to advocacy on resettlement admissions, though further research is required.

Before proceeding, the author would like to highlight an important limitation to the discussion and analysis presented below. In particular, this chapter does not capture the views of representatives from the Canadian Council for Refugees, a leading advocate on migration, asylum, and refugee issues that also acts as an umbrella organisation for many groups involved in asylum and refugee protection, including in resettlement (Canadian Council for Refugees 2013, para. 1 of 24). Though the author twice requested to meet with a representative from the organisation, the organisation declined both requests. Therefore, the discussion of their advocacy efforts on resettlement is limited to secondary source information.

5.2 History of Resettlement Advocacy in Canada

The academic literature on the relationship between resettlement admissions and advocacy efforts indicates that voluntary sector organisations have occasionally succeeded and struggled in their quest to augment resettlement admissions. During the interwar period, groups such as the Canadian National Committee on Refugees (CNCR) could not convince the government to adopt a more generous admissions policy for refugees (Dirks 1977, 56-58 and 61-65; Kelley and Trebilcock 2010, 256-60; Knowles 2007, 148). Following the 1973 *coup d'état* in Chile, organisations such as the Canadian Council of Churches struggled to induce the government to resettle Chilean refugees due to concerns related to the perceived “ideological stance of many of the refugees” and the fact that the UNHCR favoured local integration for refugees from that region at the time (Dirks 1977, 250; Treviranus and Casasola 2003, 186). However, mounting public pressure eventually forced the government to relax admissions criteria and to resettle refugees more expediently (Dirks 1977, 247-49).

Despite these failures, voluntary sector organisations occasionally succeeded in their quest to augment resettlement admissions. During the interwar period, the CNCR convinced the government to resettle Thomas Bata, a shoemaker who fled Czechoslovakia following German annexation and later became a renowned entrepreneur in Canada (Knowles 2007, 148).

During the war, the organisation also induced the government to abandon the “rigid exclusiveness” of its immigration regulations in order to resettle refugees from Portugal and Spain (Dirks 1977, 95-96; Knowles 2007, 148).

In the postwar period, the Canadian Christian Council for the Resettlement of Refugees (CCCCR) persuaded the government to expand the categories of refugees eligible for resettlement in order to facilitate the admission of ethnic Germans who were outside the mandate of the International Refugee Organization (Dirks 1977, 163-64; Kelley and Trebilcock 2010, 344). In 1956, extensive political and public pressure from organisations such as the Canadian Council of Churches and the Jewish Immigration Aid Service convinced the government to resettle nearly 40,000 Hungarian refugees with remarkable expediency (Dirks 1977, 195-97; Knowles 2007, 173-75). Pressure from the Jewish Immigrant Aid Service to resettle larger numbers of refugees from the USSR was also instrumental in the creation of the designated classes system, which provided the foundation for the PSR programme (Adelman 1982, 85).

During the refugee crisis in Southeast Asia, increased media coverage of the situation led to a dramatic rise in public interest in assisting these refugees, and organisations such as the Canadian Medical Association called on the government to increase resettlement admissions from 8,000 to 30,000 refugees per year (Adelman 1982, 37). However, grassroots organisations such as Operation Lifeline, which was formed with the explicit intention of pressuring the government to resettle more Southeast Asian refugees, gradually found themselves co-opted into government (Adelman 1982, 96). Instead, the organisation discovered that the government did not need to be persuaded to increase admissions; indeed, the federal government dispatched two officials to attend the first meeting of Operation Lifeline, and civil servants continued to attend meetings “in order to provide information, advice, and assistance (Adelman 1982, 97).” Over time, the organisation assumed more of a role as a government liaison than as a pressure group, though it resisted full co-optation by declining to join the Ontario government’s Settlement Planning Group (Adelman 1982, 97). The organisation also declined to use traditional advocacy strategies such as raising awareness of the issue in the media—even once it became clear that the Conservative government would not fulfil its pledge to match every private sponsorship application—due to concerns that this could elicit opposition from anti-immigrant groups (Adelman 1982, 97).

5.3 The Perceived Relationship between Resettlement Admissions and Advocacy

The history of advocacy on resettlement in Canada indicates that voluntary sector organisations have long been engaged in advocacy on resettlement issues, but these groups have only occasionally succeeded in augmenting resettlement admissions. Nevertheless, this section presents the views of senior government officials and private sponsors on the perceived relationship between resettlement admissions and voluntary sector advocacy. Though some private sponsors discussed their advocacy efforts, some federal government officials and several private sponsors spoke more generally about the quality of their relationship. The responses indicate that there were perceived tensions between the federal government and certain private sponsors until recently, and there also appear to be tensions among private sponsors concerning the pursuit of advocacy efforts and the nature of strategies employed when engaging in advocacy. Though one could interpret these perceptions as consistent with the dominant taxonomy on government-voluntary sector relations, these views also raise questions about the potential effectiveness of advocacy efforts on resettlement. As noted in the introduction, preliminary research indicates that few ethnic community organisations may engage in advocacy on resettlement in Canada, but further research is required to better ascertain the involvement of ethnic community organisations in this area, especially given the growing inclusion of ethnic minorities in Canadian politics. Finally, an analysis of the literature and public opinion data indicates that issue context and salience may condition the impact of advocacy efforts on resettlement.

Chapters one and three noted that during the interviews in the US, voluntary agencies expressed a keen and unprompted desire to discuss their advocacy efforts. Therefore, the author also enquired about advocacy efforts by private sponsors and the perceived impact of these measures in Canada. However, when asked about the perceived impact of voluntary sector advocacy efforts on resettlement, government officials spoke mainly about their relationship with private sponsors. More precisely, two government officials indicated that relations between the federal government and certain private sponsors had been tense in the recent past. In an interview on 5 December, 2013, Derrick Deans explained that relations between officials from Citizenship and Immigration Canada and representatives from the SAH Council had not always been positive.⁸⁰ In an interview on 6 December, 2013 Wally Boxhill elaborated on this

⁸⁰ The SAH Council is composed of eight elected members of the Canadian Refugee SAH Association (Canadian Refugee SAH Association 2018, para. 1 of 1). Members of the Council are elected annually and must have at least two years of experience as SAHs (Canadian Refugee SAH Association 2018, para. 1 of 1). The Council has the “overall responsibility to work towards the fulfillment [sic] of the mission and mandate” of the SAH Association (Canadian Refugee SAH Association 2018, para. 1 of 1).

perceived issue, and explained that officials from Citizenship and Immigration Canada and some members of the SAH Council were frequently “at loggerheads.” Mr Boxhill (2013) indicated that tensions emerged during a period of programmatic change, and explained that “[...] folks weren’t comfortable with the direction and the nature of the changes that they were starting to see.” Mr Boxhill (2013) added “Sometimes you’d sit and they’d be playing ‘gotcha politics,’ looking for the one thing that CIC might not be doing right, waiting for that to come up, and then pounce on that.” Mr Boxhill (2013) suggested that the tensions had a perceived impact on the resettlement through the PSR programme insofar as they made “[...] the management of the program [sic] somewhat challenging [...].”

Mr Boxhill (2013) explained that relations became so fraught during this period that Jason Kenney, then the Minister of Citizenship, Immigration, and Multiculturalism, offered conflict resolution training for both government officials and private sponsors. However, Mr Boxhill (2013) indicated that relations had improved since 2009, and officials from Citizenship and Immigration Canada once again enjoy a good relationship with private sponsors. Mr Deans (2013) affirmed that relations between government officials and private sponsors had improved over time and commented that the two groups have since developed a “constructive relationship” built on “frank, honest communications.”

When the author asked private sponsors about their advocacy efforts, some interviewees explained that their organisations engaged in advocacy but few indicated that they had appealed for increased resettlement admissions (Denton 2013; Wiebe 2013). Of those who indicated they advocated for increased admissions, Mr Wiebe (2013) explained that he and other sponsors spent two years calling on the government to resettle Palestinian refugees living in Iraq, and eventually succeeded in bringing some of these refugees to Canada through the PSR programme. In addition, Mr Denton (2013) explained that, as a former journalist, part of his approach to advocacy involves media engagement through writing letters and publishing articles and editorials on asylum and refugee protection in local media outlets. In 2011, Mr Denton prepared two editorials which called on the government to increase resettlement admissions from the Horn of Africa and to remove the caps on private sponsorship applications, respectively (Denton 2011; Denton 2011).

In addition to these efforts, the Canadian Council for Refugees is one of the few organisations that has openly appealed for greater resettlement admissions. Formed in 1978, the Council is an umbrella organisation that represents approximately 170 voluntary sector organisations across the country (Canadian Council for Refugees 2008, 1; Office of the Commissioner of Lobbying of Canada 2015, see section entitled ‘In-house Organization

Details’). The Council operates according to a set of five core beliefs, including the conviction that “Canada and Canadians have responsibilities for the protection and resettlement of refugees from around the world (Canadian Council for Refugees 2013, para. 3 of 24).”

To that end, the Council has engaged in a broad range of advocacy efforts on resettlement, including advocating for increased admissions. In 2003, the Council called on the government to allocate at least eight per cent of its total immigration targets to resettlement (Canadian Council for Refugees 2003, para. 6 of 7). In 2013, the Council called on the government to dedicate at least 10 per cent of its overall admissions targets to resettlement (Canadian Council for Refugees 2013, para. 1 of 2). Furthermore, the Council has pressed the government to resettle more Burmese refugees living in Thailand and more Iraqi refugees, among other efforts (Canadian Council for Refugees 2008, 6 and 8-9; Canadian Council for Refugees 2008, 1).

Since 2013, the Canadian Council for Refugees has called on the government to facilitate the resettlement of Syrian refugees. In a 2013 press release, the organisation pressed the government to resettle more Syrian refugees through the GAR programme and, in light of the large number of Syrians living in Turkey, to eliminate the ban which prevented private sponsors from submitting applications for refugees living in Turkey (Canadian Council for Refugees 2013, para. 4 of 5). In July 2014, the organisation called on the government to increase the number of Syrian refugees resettled through the GAR Programme by 5,000 individuals (Canadian Council for Refugees 2014, para. 4 of 7). Following the death of three members of the Kurdî family, including three-year-old Alan, the Council issued a press release which lambasted the Canadian government for its “inaction” and argued the government should resettle at least 10,000 Syrians through the GAR programme and lower barriers to private sponsorship (Canadian Council for Refugees 2015, para. 1 and 4 of 5).

The public information available at the time of research suggests that these efforts have produced results. In 2009, Minister Kenney announced that Canada planned to resettle a total of 12,000 Iraqi refugees over a period of two years and later agreed to resettle a further 8,000 Iraqi refugees between 2012 and 2013 (Citizenship and Immigration Canada 2010, para. 6 and 9 of 18). In January 2015, Chris Alexander, then the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, announced that the government planned to resettle an additional 10,000 Syrian refugees—but as noted in chapter four, the government only intended to resettle 40 per cent of these individuals through the GAR Programme (Mas 2015, para. 1 and 3 of 26). The government has also increased the proportion of immigration targets allocated to resettlement; in 2019, the government announced plans to resettle up to 33,000 refugees through the GAR, Blended Visa

Office-Referred, and PSR programmes, representing 9.4 per cent of all immigration places (Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship Canada 2017, no pagination own calculations).

However, most private sponsors indicated that the bulk of their advocacy efforts focus on raising awareness about refugee issues and campaigning for operational and policy changes. Many interviewees explained that they disseminate information about refugee issues in their local communities or raise awareness about the PSR programme among their constituents (Dekker 2013; Manks 2013; Marshall 2013; McBride 2013; Niazi 2013; Richardson 2013; Schnabl 2013). Furthermore, some respondents lobbied their Members of Parliament and officials from Citizenship and Immigration Canada on matters related to the age of dependents eligible for resettlement, health care for privately sponsored refugees, and processing times for resettlement applications, among other matters (Dekker 2013; Niazi 2013; Schnabl 2013; Shropshire 2013; Woolaver 2013).

In addition to these strategies, some private sponsors used legal advocacy in an attempt to secure policy changes. Ms Schnabl (2013) explained that she and Mr Denton sued the federal government following changes to Interim Federal Health Coverage for privately sponsored refugees. Ms Schnabl (2013) explained, “the diocese initiated a lawsuit against the government on the basis that a contract had been breached with Sponsorship Agreement Holders—that when Sponsorship Agreement Holders signed on, they understood that these benefits were part of the package, and now, the government had stopped this.”

The applicants further charged that the changes were inconsistent with immigration legislation and regulations, and not only “breached the duty of fairness owed to them” but also violated the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (*Hospitality House Refugee Ministry Incorporated and Synod of the Diocese of Rupert’s Land v. Attorney General of Canada* 2013, at para. 2). However, the Honourable James W. O’Reilly dismissed the lawsuit (with costs) on the basis that the agreement between the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration and SAHs does not require the government to offer a particular level of health care for resettled refugees (*Hospitality House Refugee Ministry Incorporated and Synod of the Diocese of Rupert’s Land v. Attorney General of Canada* 2013, at para. 10). Furthermore, Justice O’Reilly ruled that the changes were not *ultra vires* and did not breach a duty of fairness given the relatively small number of affected individuals, among other findings (*Hospitality House Refugee Ministry Incorporated and Synod of the Diocese of Rupert’s Land v. Attorney General of Canada* 2013, at para. 13 and 19).

Though some private sponsors engaged in advocacy on resettlement, other responses suggest that not all private sponsors agree on how best to conduct advocacy. In particular,

responses indicate that whereas some private sponsors were comfortable using conspicuous advocacy strategies, others appeared to prefer a less ‘public’ approach to advocacy. For example, though some interviewees indicated at their organisations had endeavoured to engage the media on refugee issues (Dekker 2013; Shropshire 2013), others were more hesitant (Dyck 2013; Wiebe 2013). Mr Wiebe (2013) explained that the Mennonite Central Committee Canada is on the call list for local and national media outlets. However, Mr Wiebe (2013) noted that his organisation does not deliberately seek out such opportunities and is mainly interested in ensuring that media professionals have accurate background information. Mr Dyck (2013) affirmed that the Mennonite Central Committee “rarely” engages with the media on resettlement issues and always exercises caution when doing so in order to avoid “burning bridges.” One could interpret these views as consistent with the approach adopted by many other Canadian voluntary sector organisations who tend to favour an inconspicuous approach to advocacy to ensure they continue to have a seat at the table (Pross 1992, 82).

Mr McBride (2013) also took issue with the advocacy strategies adopted by some private sponsors. In particular, Mr McBride (2013) contended that some private sponsors viewed resettlement as a form of advocacy in itself and contended that this approach “came close to destroying the program.” Mr McBride (2013) noted that his organisation favours a gradual, consistent, and less adversarial approach to advocacy. In that context, Mr McBride (2013) described his approach to advocacy in the following way: “I believe effective advocacy is researched, it’s thought through, it’s mindful of the needs of both sides—if there are only two—or three or four if there are more, but still brings forth a point of view in a reasoned fashioned. That’s advocacy.”

One could interpret the diversity of views on advocacy as consistent with an October 2014 report from the Centre for Public Justice, a nonpartisan Christian organisation formed in 1977. The Centre surveyed members of the Canadian Refugee SAH Association and found that while a majority of respondents were engaged in some form of advocacy, there are divisions between sponsors who prefer a “cooperative approach” to advocacy and those who pursue “adversarial” strategies (Chapman 2014, 12).

Other interviewees indicated that they prefer not to engage in advocacy at all (Chahal 2013; Manks 2013). During the interviews, a SAH representative indicated that her organisation prefers not to engage in advocacy. In an interview on 16 December, 2013, Rita Chahal, Executive Director of the Manitoba Interfaith Immigration Council, explained that her organisation prefers to maintain a collaborative relationship with the federal government because they are working towards the same goals. A representative from another SAH

indicated that her organisation also avoided advocacy—though for a far different reason. In an interview on 6 December, 2013, Michelle Manks indicated that the World University Service of Canada generally does not press for changes in resettlement policies or targets since they are a development organisation that “depends on funds for programming.”

Though the view articulated by Ms Manks suggests that some private sponsors are concerned that advocacy could negatively impact the government funding they receive, Ms Schnabl (2013) and Mr Denton (2013) argued that private sponsors have an advantage when engaging in advocacy because the absence of government funding means that there are no constraints on their advocacy efforts. Ms Schnabl (2013) explained, “There’s conditions, in that only a very small amount of your budget can be spent on advocacy, the role of advocacy, so if you don’t actually get federal money, you’re not in that position.” Mr Denton (2013) argued that receiving federal funding “compromises” private sponsors, while operating without such funding offers organisations “much more freedom of action.”

In addition to these views, there appears to be a perception among certain government officials that private sponsors do not necessarily share the same views on resettlement issues. In particular, Mr Boxhill (2013) observed that there appears to be “dissent” among members of the SAH Council on operational and policy issues related to resettlement, and suggested that the Council does not always speak with a “single voice.” Mr Boxhill (2013) contended that this raises questions about whether the SAH Council genuinely represents the views of the sponsorship community.

The concerns articulated by Mr Boxhill could potentially have broader implications for advocacy efforts on resettlement in Canada. First, the perception that the SAH Council does not speak with a “single voice” could potentially undermine its advocacy efforts. Given that there were 108 SAHs in Canada at the time of submission, it does not appear unreasonable to assume that members of the sponsorship community have diverse preferences and attitudes. Indeed, in an interview on 9 December, 2013, Ellen Woolaver characterised private sponsors as a “motley group” with different objectives, though it is important to note that she did not express any concerns about this. However, there is an implicit assumption in the literature that advocacy organisations engage in interest representation in order to achieve a clear objective (e.g. Hojnacki et al. 2012; Owen 2000, 133-34). The potential absence of a cohesive stance on matters such as the controversial Blended Visa Office-Referred programme could impact the effectiveness of advocacy efforts among those concerned about responsibility shifting.

On the matter of representativeness, the SAH Council could be representative in both the descriptive and formal sense of the term (Guo and Musso 2007, 312) given that the SAH

Council is elected annually. However, the concerns articulated by Mr Boxhill (2013) indicate that some government officials might not see the SAH Council as representative in the substantive sense of the term—that is, these government officials may not perceive the concerns raised by the SAH Council as “congruent” with the views of the wider sponsorship community (Guo and Musso 2007, 312). If some government officials do not view the SAH Council as substantively representative or as the “legitimate” representative of the sponsorship community (Guo and Musso 2007, 312), members of the Council may find it challenging to effectively advance their agenda.

The perceptions articulated by Mr Boxhill (2013) could parallel disagreements among private sponsors regarding the purpose of the Council. The official mission of the Canadian Refugee SAH Association is to be a “collective voice” for members of the sponsorship community (Canadian Refugee SAH Association 2018, para. 1 of 1). The Association has a broad mandate, which includes raising awareness about the PSR programme, ensuring the well-being of refugees resettled through the programme, as well as developing “cohesiveness and collective approaches” between SAHs, representing their views, and collaborating with Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship Canada to “further the goals of the PSR program [sic] (Canadian Refugee SAH Association 2018, para. 2 of 2).

Despite this clear mission, some private sponsors disagree on whether and to what extent the Council should engage in advocacy. Several interviewees contented that the Council is not a forum for advocacy (Shropshire 2013; Dyck 2013; Wiebe 2013). In an interview on 13 December, 2013, Rob Shropshire characterised the Council as a “forum for policy dialogue.” Similarly, in an interview on 16 December, 2013, Ed Wiebe explained that the Council enables SAHs to better understand the government’s perspective on policy issues. Others indicated that the Council has a more pragmatic purpose; in a separate interview on 16 December, 2013, Brian Dyck explained that the Council is useful for addressing “nuts and bolts” issues to ensure that the government and private sponsors effectively implement existing policies.

Conversely, some respondents argued that the SAH Council should become more involved in advocacy on resettlement (Manks 2013; Richardson 2013; Shropshire 2013). In an interview on 12 December, 2013, Serena Richardson, the representative for the Christian and Missionary Alliance in Canada, argued that the SAH Council should assume “a bigger responsibility for advocacy,” particularly on accountability issues such as application processing times. However, if members of the Association are unable to agree on the core mission of the Association, the organisation may struggle to effectively advance concerns and other issues raised by its members.

These issues aside, some interviewees expressed scepticism about their ability to exert influence on resettlement policies and programmes (Manks 2013; Woolaver 2013). Ms Manks (2013) commented that the government had implemented the aforementioned cuts to Interim Federal Health coverage for privately sponsored refugees and limited the number of private sponsorship applications despite widespread opposition and advocacy against these measures. Similarly, though Ms Woolaver (2013) argued that the SAH Council advocates for changes to the PSR programme and to identify and raise awareness of changes which could affect private sponsors, she noted, “sometimes it feels like it doesn’t really go anywhere.”

To obtain a more meaningful understanding of the responses articulated by interviewees, the author now seeks to interpret the responses provided above in relation to the literature. First, one could interpret the perceived tensions highlighted by Mr Boxhill and Mr Deans as consistent with the dominant taxonomy on government-voluntary sector relations. Chapters one and three noted that some academics have pressed other scholars to move beyond taxonomies that categorise voluntary sector organisations as service providers alone. In particular, Young (2000, 151) argues that government-voluntary sector relations may be adversarial in nature. As explained in chapters one and three, governments regulate the behaviour of voluntary sector organisations but also respond to voluntary sector advocacy efforts, which may include campaigns to create new government policies and programmes or calls to improve the efficiency or expand current programmes and services (Young 2000, 151). Though Young (2000, 151) describes this relationship as ‘adversarial,’ he acknowledges that governments and voluntary sector organisations are not necessarily always at odds with one another; in the ‘complementary’ lens, governments and voluntary sector organisations may collaborate with one another to build support for new legislation or to raise public awareness about a particular issue (Young 2000, 155). Furthermore, governments themselves may assume an ‘advocacy’ role by attempting to “encourage, prod, and stimulate private, voluntary activity in support of social goals (Young 2000, 155).” Similarly, as noted in chapter one, Seibel (1990, 46) has encouraged scholars to move beyond the conceptualisation of voluntary sector organisations as service providers and to acknowledge that these groups can also serve as “important factors of social and political coordination.”

In the Canadian context, Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship Canada regulates the responsibilities of SAHs in subsection 152(2) of the *Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations*, which enables the Minister to establish sponsorship agreements with approved organisations. These agreements encompass provisions on a range of pertinent issues, including assistance offered by the federal government, expectations concerning the conduct

of sponsors, the financial and reporting requirements that private sponsors must fulfil, and a ‘settlement’ plan for refugees resettled through the PSR programme (*Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations* 152(2)). Though Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship Canada monitors the conduct of SAHs, the agreement is the product of “years of consultation” and negotiations between the federal government and members of the sponsorship community (Canadian Council for Refugees 1998, 20; for a more detailed historical review of preceding agreements between the federal government and private sponsors, see Janzen 2011).

The federal government also regulates charities through the *Income Tax Act* (subsection 149(1)). In 1978, the Canada Revenue Agency (the federal organisation responsible for administering tax law *and* regulating charities) published an information circular which warned that voluntary sector organisations risked losing their charitable status if they expressed support for a political party, lobbied officials, or participated in public demonstrations, among other activities (Elson 2011, 64-65). This circular, alongside other regulatory and political changes, contributed to an “advocacy chill” among voluntary sector organisations in the 1980s and 1990s (Elson 2011, 107; Harvie 2002, 15-17; Phillips 2003, 37).

Under the leadership of the Progressive Conservative Prime Minister Brian Mulroney, the government amended the regulations on advocacy to allow charitable organisations to engage in a broader range of political activities (Elson 2011, 70-72). Today, charities are exempt from income tax requirements so long as they have “exclusively charitable purposes” and do not serve “political purposes (Canada Revenue Agency 2003, see section 4).” Though charities can engage in some political activities, these efforts must advance its charitable mission (Canada Revenue Agency 2003, see section 6). To that end, charities can communicate their view about a certain decision, law, or policy, urge members of the public to contact politicians or officials regarding a particular decision, law, or policy, and publish materials about a specific decision, law, or policy—provided that these efforts are nonpartisan and “subordinate to the charity’s purpose (Canada Revenue Agency 2003, see section 6).”

Though the federal government permits some nonpartisan political activities, Phillips (2003, 36-37) suggests that the government still maintains a “much greater aversion to advocacy and tighter restrictions on it than most other countries” because interest representation is “interpreted and understood based on tax rules, rather than according to broader principles of democracy.” Consequently, the regulatory environment surrounding advocacy continues to create a “difficult terrain” for many voluntary sector organisations today (Pross and Webb 2003, 64). Though the concerns articulated by Ms Manks relate to the potential impact of advocacy on government funding for other WUSC programmes rather than

concerns about running afoul of income tax regulations, this regulatory framework could nevertheless discourage some private sponsors and other stakeholders from pursuing advocacy on resettlement issues.

However, one could interpret the concerns voiced by Ms Manks as consistent with aspects of the literature on voluntary sector advocacy. As noted in chapter three, there is no consensus at present on whether and to what extent government funding and regulatory regimes for voluntary sector organisations exert a deleterious effect on voluntary sector advocacy (c.f. Chaves, Stephens, and Galaskiewicz 2004; Guo and Saxton 2010; Mosley 2012; Neumayr, Schneider, and Meyer 2015; Reid 2006; Salamon and Lessans Geller with Lorentz 2008; Schmid, Bar, and Nirel 2008; Silverman and Patterson 2011). In a 2007 survey of 174 charitable organisations in the state of Arizona, Guo and Saxton (2010, 14) find a negative, statistically significant relationship between the percentage of government funding allocated to charitable organisations and the scope of advocacy efforts by charitable organisations, indicating that the provision of government funding may narrow the number and range of advocacy activities undertaken by these groups. However, Guo and Saxton (2010, 14) find no statistically significant relationship between government funding and the intensity of advocacy activities.

In a longitudinal study of advocacy efforts by 229 registered charitable organisations in the Minneapolis-St. Paul area between 1984 and 1994, Chaves, Stephens, and Galaskiewicz (2004, 305-12) find mixed evidence concerning the potential relationship between government funding and voluntary sector advocacy; in some models, Chaves, Stephens, and Galaskiewicz (2004, 309-12) found a positive, statistically significant relationship between the provision of government funding and voluntary sector engagement in advocacy, but in other models, the inclusion of additional control variables neutralised the significance of the effect. In a national survey of the advocacy and lobbying activities of 311 registered charitable organisations, Salamon and Lessans Geller with Lorentz (2008, 8) found that only a quarter of organisations surveyed reported no engagement in lobbying or advocacy due to concerns about contravening laws or regulations governing such activities, while only 20 per cent expressed concern that engaging in such activities could jeopardise the receipt of public funding. Conversely, 70 per cent of organisations they surveyed did not engage in advocacy or lobbying due to time constraints, while 45 per cent did not engage in such activities due to the absence of organisational expertise amongst staff (Salamon and Lessans Geller with Lorentz 2008, 8).

Though political scientists debate the impact of government funding on advocacy by voluntary sector organisations, the literature on immigrant- and refugee-serving voluntary

sector organisations indicates that government funding need not “crowd out” these groups nor constrain the ability of these organisations and their clients to “resist” the state (Bloemraad 2005, 866; Nawyn 2010, 150). Indeed, government provision of material and symbolic support through funding and legislation on multiculturalism can not only encourage ethnic communities to form organisations but also help sustain their activities (Bloemraad 2005, 872).⁸¹ Given the range of views found in the literature, one cannot reach a definitive conclusion concerning the impact of advocacy on government funding. Nevertheless, the response from Ms Manks suggests that this is perceived to be a concern and highlights the need for further research in this area.

The perceptions articulated by government officials and private sponsors and the potentially ‘adversarial’ nature of their relations in resettlement also raise questions about the broader structure of interest representation on resettlement in Canada. Scholarly interest in advocacy in Canada is a recent phenomenon, and the scope of the literature on interest representation remains limited at present (Kobayashi 2000, 233; Pross 1992, 67). Though there is some evidence that the neo-pluralist mode of interest representation characterises interest representation in some sectors in Canada (see the chapter from Skogstad 2014 on agricultural politics in Canada), the policy communities approach has gained particular traction among Canadian political scientists and academics who study the voluntary sector (e.g. Pross 1992; Skogstad 2008).

The policy communities approach holds that Canadian government policies are formulated through “regularized patterns of interaction between state actors and representatives of societal interests,” known as policy communities or networks (Skogstad 2008, 207-8). Traditionally, academics have not conceptualised policy communities and networks as discrete structures but as opposing poles on a spectrum, in which policy communities are “integrated, stable, and exclusive” and policy networks are more “loosely connected” and potentially “conflict-ridden” (Skogstad 2008, 209). However, scholars have adapted these terms to the Canadian context, such that the term ‘policy communities’ carries the connotation of actors who share an interest in the development of policy in a given issue area, while the term ‘policy networks’ encompasses the uneven structure of power between members of the network and individuals and groups excluded from this sphere of influence for whatever reason (Skogstad 2008, 208).

⁸¹ This argument appears consistent with Pross’s (1992) work on policy communities, and with the views articulated by Mr Boxhill (2013).

From a historical perspective, the development of advocacy groups mirrors the growth of the federal government (Pross 1992, 66). In the 1960s, the rapid expansion in the size of government contributed to the diffusion of power from the Cabinet to the civil service, thereby creating additional space for interest representation (Pross 1992, 66). In the 1970s, business groups, social movements, and trade unions took advantage of the “tug-of-war” between the executive and the civil service in order to exert considerable influence in policymaking (Pross 1992, 67-70).

During this period, the government also encouraged the participation of underprivileged groups and “considered it in the public interest to take a hand in group formation, identifying latent and solidary interests and encouraging them to organize [sic] themselves [...] (Pross 1992, 68).” To that end, many government departments endeavoured to build ‘policy communities’ through the provision of financial and “moral” support or, in some cases, outright coercion (Pross 1992, 71).

The active role of government in building and supporting policy communities had a profound impact on advocacy. As Pross (1992, 82) explains:

“As government expanded and the role of the bureaucracy in policy formation became more pronounced, restrained behind-the-scenes lobbying became the norm. Mass meetings, marches on Ottawa, demonstrations, and appeals to the media occurred but they came to be seen as the last resort of groups that had exhausted every other avenue of persuasion, or did not understand the policy process. The most influential groups eschewed publicity, accepting instead the norms of acceptable behaviour laid down by government.”

Despite this, politicians began to worry that the close relationship between the civil service and advocacy groups had undermined their neutrality as well as the democratic legitimacy of the public policymaking process (Pross 1992, 73-75).

In the 1980s, the Progressive Conservative government led by Prime Minister Brian Mulroney government attempted to build a “more effective relationship” with the voluntary sector but fiscal retrenchment negatively affected advocacy capacity (Elson 2011, 90). Furthermore, the pursuit of a contract culture accorded greater importance to the role of the voluntary sector as service providers than as advocates (Elson 2011, 92). In addition, the Liberal Party eliminated funding for ‘special interest’ groups—that is, groups whose views did not align with those of the government (Elson 2011, 103; Phillips 2003, 22-23). Consequently, organisations that did not share the same views as the government were “ostracized [sic]” from the policymaking process (Elson 2011, 104). When the government did consult voluntary sector organisations, meetings frequently devolved into “show and tell” sessions rather than opportunities for genuine dialogue (Phillips 2003, 39).

In the context of resettlement, one could interpret the relationship between Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship Canada and private sponsors a policy community existing in a broader policy network. Much as the government sought to build and support advocacy efforts by underrepresented groups in the 1960s, Mr Boxhill (2013) explained that Citizenship and Immigration Canada spent “a lot of time and energy trying to create a community of interest” in resettlement.

The department has also established and funded dedicated forums through which SAHs can offer input on resettlement policies and issues. In particular, the department organises an annual conference for government officials and members of the Canadian Refugee SAH Association (Chapman 2014, 10). The department provides funding to ensure that these geographically dispersed organisations can participate in the conference and also pays for the ongoing administrative expenses of the Association (Chapman 2014, 10; Kenney 2011, 1-2). One could view the Canadian Refugee SAH Association as an integral part of the resettlement policy community due to its representative mission and mandate, and the formal role of the SAH Council in advocating and communicating with Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship Canada (Canadian Refugee SAH Association 2018, para. 3 of 7). Though SAHs only formally incorporated the Association in 2011, the Association has persisted throughout the intervening seven years and is the product of periodic discussions since 2000 (Canadian Refugee SAH Association 2018, para. 7 and 10 of 11). Furthermore, the Association welcomes organisations representing all faiths and ethnicities, and currently counts 86 of the 113 SAHs as members at present (Canadian Refugee SAH Association 2018, para. 5 of 5; Canadian Refugee SAH Association 2018, para. 3 of 7), indicating that it enjoys a broad membership base. However, membership is also exclusive insofar as only organisations that have been designated as SAHs by the Minister of Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship are eligible for membership (Canadian Refugee SAH Association 2018, para. 3 of 7).

Furthermore, departmental officials and the eight elected members of the SAH Council meet several times per year under the auspices of the NGO-Government Committee on the PSR, which examines operational issues related to the programme and provides a forum to “exchange ideas, address areas of concern, and develop suitable solutions (Chapman 2014, 10; *Humanitarian Designated Class Regulations 1997*, 30).”⁸² In addition, government officials

⁸² Treviranus and Casasola (2003, 188) explain that the NGO-Government Committee was established in 1994 following an appeal from the Canadian Council for Refugees, and they note that the Committee has been “closely involved in every significant aspect of the policy developments and legislative review process relating to private sponsorship since 1994.”

and SAH Council representatives hold a monthly teleconference which offers further opportunities for dialogue on resettlement (Chapman 2014, 10; Deans 2013; Dyck 2013).

Though one could interpret the connections between Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship Canada, private sponsors, the Canadian Refugee SAH Association, and the SAH Council as a policy community thanks to their active interest and role in the formulation and implementation of resettlement policies and programmes in Canada, it is also worth reflecting on the possible existence of a broader policy network. Indeed, as explained in chapter four, resettlement to Canada involves a broad range of actors, including not only Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship Canada and other federal and provincial governments but also voluntary sector organisations including SAHs, SPOs, and, in the case of the PSR programme, the constituent groups who have a hands-on role in assisting resettled refugees in the orientation and integration process.

The department holds annual consultations in which members of the public and other stakeholders can offer input on the level and composition of annual admissions targets, including for resettlement (Citizenship and Immigration Canada 2012, 1). In this way, the resettlement policy network in Canada could also potentially encompass the “attentive public”—that is, individuals who attempt to influence resettlement policies but do not actually participate in the policymaking process (Skogstad 2008, 208). However, the department solicits “input” on a pre-determined levels plan and it rarely releases the results of these annual consultations to the public.⁸³ Furthermore, while Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship Canada acknowledges that it consults provinces and territories and seeks “input” from stakeholders in its annual report to parliament, it is unclear whether and to what extent feedback from these consultations have a substantive impact on the actual levels plan adopted by the department.

In his influential 1995 paper, Freeman (886-87) argues that interest representation efforts on immigration in “settler societies” like Canada are characterised by an “expansionary bias” that does not accurately reflect the “restrictionist” preferences of the broader public. Chapter two explained that Freeman (1995) builds on the influential classification of interest representation developed by political scientist James Q. Wilson (1980) and attributes this divergence to the fact that office-seeking politicians have a powerful incentive to follow the

⁸³ Only the results of the 2014 and 2017 consultations were available at the time of submission (see Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship Canada 2017 and Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship Canada 2017).

preferences of interest groups, and to the “antipopulist norm” prevalent in Canada that discourages politicians from attempting to “exploit racial, ethnic or immigration-related fears in order to win votes (Freeman 1995, 885).”⁸⁴ Freeman (1995, 886-87) argues that interest groups enjoy outsized influence in immigration policymaking due to the poorly “articulated” nature of public opinion on immigration and to the clientelistic nature of interest representation on immigration policy.

As explained in chapter two, Freeman (1995, 887) argues that interest representation on immigration policymaking is dominated by, “small and well-organized [sic] groups intensely interested in a policy develop close working relationships with those officials responsible for it.” Freeman (1995, 887) further adds that “These interactions take place largely out of public view and with little outside interference.” In a 2006 paper, Freeman attempts to develop a more nuanced approach that distinguishes between different models of interest representation and different kinds of immigration policies, including resettlement. Freeman (2006, 239) argues that resettlement has strong distributive characteristics, and argues that humanitarian organisations are the main beneficiaries of these policies, thus contributing to the development of “client politics.” Freeman (2006, 239) claims that these organisations “enjoy privileged access to the policy formulation process” but “exert less influence than those actors organised around migrant streams where significant material interests are at stake.”

In the Canadian context, Freeman (2006, 222) argues that advocacy organisations in Canada are “directly integrated into the elaborate, if relatively formalistic, consultative processes at each stage of policy formulation.” As previously noted, Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship Canada does seek out the input of stakeholders and members of the public on the annual number of immigrant and refugee admissions each year. However, the regular contact that SAHs enjoy by virtue of their participation in the NGO-Government Committee on the PSR suggests they could potentially have “privileged access” (Freeman 2006, 239) and thus potentially more opportunities to exert influence than other advocacy groups or members of the “attentive public (Skogstad 2008, 208).” That said, though Freeman (1995) describes immigration policymaking as ‘clientelistic,’ he does not offer any empirical evidence to concretely support the implication that politicians receive electoral benefits from listening to immigration advocates. Furthermore, given the responses articulated by private sponsors and

⁸⁴ Freeman’s 1995 statement is striking when evaluated in relation to the contemporary political context in the US.

the aforementioned constraints on political activities by charitable organisations, the resettlement policymaking process may not be clientelistic in nature.

Though some private sponsors indicated they were active advocates on resettlement issues, these groups do not necessarily have a monopoly over advocacy in this area. However, preliminary research indicates that few ethnic community organisations may be engaged in advocacy on resettlement. A survey of the 33 members of the Canadian Ethnocultural Council in 2015 found that only 21 members had an online presence and only 12 included advocacy as part of their respective organisational missions.⁸⁵ Of these 12 organisations, only the Christian Cultural Association of South Asians mentioned advocacy for immigrants as part of its mission, stating that it seeks to “promote positive recognition of immigrants and their contributions to Canadian society (Christian Cultural Association of South Asians 2009, no para.).” None of the other organisations referred to serving or advocating on behalf of asylum seekers or refugees. However, in December 2015, the Vietnamese Canadian Federation organised a fundraiser in Calgary, Alberta for Syrian refugees, with the proceeds going towards assisting recently resettled Syrian refugees with housing and living expenses, as well as the provision of employment and other integration services (Vietnamese Canadian Federation 2015, no para.).

The author also conducted preliminary research on advocacy among SPOs located in Ottawa, Toronto, and Winnipeg. These organisations are contracted by Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship to provide orientation and integration services to immigrants, including refugees resettled through the GAR, PSR, JAS, and BVOR programmes. There were 229 SPOs in Toronto alone at the time of research, and 13 of these organisations are ethnic community organisations.⁸⁶ Of these, seven organisations mentioned advocacy or synonyms such as ‘represent’ or ‘promote’ as part of their respective organisational missions.⁸⁷

⁸⁵ This is the most recent year for which membership information was available. The 12 organisations that included advocacy as part of their respective missions were: the Armenian National Committee of Canada, the Canadian Hispanic Congress, the Canadian Hellenic Congress, the Centre for Israel and Jewish Affairs, the Canadian-Polish Congress, the Christian Cultural Association of South Asians, the Latvian National Federation in Canada, the National Association of Japanese Canadians, the Jamaican Canadian Association, the Ukrainian Canadian Congress, the United Macedonians Organization of Canada, and the Vietnamese Canadian Federation.

⁸⁶ The 10 organisations were: the Afghan Women’s Organization, the Black Coalition for AIDS Prevention, the Canadian Ukrainian Immigrant Aid Society, Chinese Family Services of Ontario, COSTI, the Jewish Vocational Service of Metropolitan Toronto, Jewish Immigrant Aid Services, the Kababayan Multicultural Centre, KCWA Family and Social Services, the Somali Immigrant Aid Organization, the Arab Community Centre of Toronto, the Vietnamese Association Toronto and VWAT Family Services.

⁸⁷ The seven organisations were: the Afghan Women’s Organization, COSTI, Jewish Immigrant Aid Services, Kababayan Multicultural Centre, the Somali Immigrant Aid Organization, the Arab Community Centre of Toronto, and the Vietnamese Association Toronto.

Though three of these organisations—COSTI, Jewish Immigrant Aid Services, and the Arab Community Centre of Toronto—had organised events for Syrian refugees, there was little indication that these groups had engaged in advocacy on resettlement issues.⁸⁸ Indeed, the only example available at the time of research was a press statement issued by Jewish Immigrant Aid Services in response to developments in the US. In the undated statement, the organisation argued that governments have an “imperative” to show “compassion for the most vulnerable, including refugees [...] (Jewish Immigrant Aid Services no date, para. 2 of 3).” The organisation praised Prime Minister Trudeau’s “principled statement” on the issue and argued that there was a “Canadian consensus” on the importance of offering protection to Syrian refugees (Jewish Immigrant Aid Services no date, para. 3 of 3).

In Ottawa, there were 33 SPOs at the time of research, of which four were ethnic community organisations.⁸⁹ Of these organisations, only the Jewish Family Services of Ottawa and the Lebanese and Arab Social Services Agency mention advocacy as part of their organisational missions. However, though Jewish Family Services of Ottawa offers counselling services for Syrian refugees (Jewish Family Services of Ottawa 2018, no pagination), an assessment of its website revealed no indication of any advocacy efforts on this issue or other matters related to resettlement.

In Winnipeg, there were 49 SPOs at the time of research, of which only one—the Jewish Child and Family Service—was an ethnic community organisation. However, its mission does not include advocacy.

Given the preliminary nature of this research, one cannot reach a definitive conclusion on whether and to what extent Canadian ethnic community organisations engage in advocacy on resettlement. As noted in chapter three, ethnic community organisations could engage in forms of advocacy, such as drafting petitions, meeting local, state, and federal officials, or they may pursue forms of direct action that they cannot document as easily online. These organisations could also potentially lack the human and financial resources necessary to maintain an active presence online and to raise awareness of their advocacy efforts through these channels. In addition, the academic literature offers little insight as there has been precious little research on advocacy by ethnic community organisations. Chapter three noted that academics have found it difficult to even identify the number of immigrant-serving voluntary sector organisations and the representation of immigrants on the governing boards

⁸⁸ Jewish Immigrant Aid Service is also a SAH.

⁸⁹ The five organisations were: Jewish Family Services of Ottawa, the Lebanese and Arab Social Services Agency, the Ottawa Chinese Community Service Centre, and the Somali Centre for Family Services.

of voluntary sector organisations, with clear implications for our understanding of the ability and capacity of these organisations to engage in advocacy (Gleeson and Bloemraad 2012, 347).

However, the history of ethnic minorities in Canada suggests that the political inclusion of these groups has gradually improved over time. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, ethnic communities exerted limited political influence in Canada due to the structure of the political environment and prevailing public attitudes towards immigration. In the late nineteenth century, many immigrant groups including Russian Jews and immigrants from Finland and Ukraine were small in size and geographically diffuse, which constrained their ability to organise and mobilise (Palmer 1991, 3-5). In other cases, the poverty and geographic isolation of groups such as the Africans living in Nova Scotia limited their capacity to exert political influence (Palmer 1991, 4). Over time, as the number of Jewish immigrants and arrivals from Finland and Ukraine grew and individuals increasingly congregated in urban centres in Manitoba, Ontario, and Québec, members of these groups began to organise and mobilise to campaign for improved labour rights—including participating in forms of direct action such as the influential Winnipeg General Strike (Palmer 1991, 8-9).

However, ideological orientation and race also shaped opportunities for political engagement. The participation of some European immigrants in “socialist” campaigns contributed to a souring of public attitudes towards these “un-Canadian” immigrants in the early twentieth century, and led to the deportation of some “immigrant radicals” from Central and Eastern Europe and to the introduction of restrictive admissions policies for individuals from these regions (Palmer 1991, 8-9). Furthermore, during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the Canadian government denied economic, civil, and political rights to many immigrants from China, Japan, and India (Palmer 1991, 10). Though these restrictions did not prevent some immigrants from participating in forms of direct advocacy such as boycotts and strikes, others chose to focus their attention on diaspora politics in an attempt to influence developments in their respective countries of origin (Palmer 1991, 8-10).

During the interwar period, many immigrants became more politically engaged and some groups of immigrants including those of Jewish and Ukrainian origin gained political representation in the House of Commons in constituencies where there was a geographic concentration of immigrants from these groups (Palmer 1991, 11). However, Palmer (1991, 11) argues that “nativist attitudes continued to have a strong impact on public policy” during this period. Consequently, representatives from these ethnic groups exerted limited influence in parliament on issues such as immigration and failed to convince the federal government to

adopt more permissive, less discriminatory immigration policies or to admit Jewish refugees (Palmer 1991, 11).

Though some fascist groups made inroads among both ‘native’ Canadians and immigrants during the interwar period, a larger proportion of European immigrants began to express support for socialist and Communist parties in Canada (Palmer 1991, 13-15). Following the outbreak of World War II, Canadians and the government became suspicious of immigrants who originated from “enemy” countries—particularly those from Germany, Italy, and Japan (Palmer 1991, 17). The government responded to these concerns by banning Nazi and fascist groups, and also outlawed many left-wing publications in June 1940 (Palmer 1991, 17). In addition, the government arrested and interned hundreds of German and Italian Canadians and, following the attack on Pearl Harbour in the US, the government also expropriated the assets of more than 22,000 Japanese Canadians living on the coast of British Columbia before forcing them into internment camps elsewhere in the country (Palmer 1991, 17).

However, World War II and the Holocaust prompted a change in public attitudes towards immigration. More precisely, the public began to favour extending political rights to immigrants and adopting more liberal immigration policies (Palmer 1991, 17-18). Business groups also joined members of the public in pressing for more liberal immigration policies, while ethnic and religious groups called on the government to adopt more generous resettlement policies for refugees in Europe (Palmer 1991, 18). This more permissive public and political environment facilitated a surge in the admission of immigrants and refugees. Between 1945 and 1961, Canada admitted more than 2.1 million immigrants and immigrants soon comprised a full 25 per cent of the population (Palmer 1991, 18).

The dramatic change in the composition of Canadian society also impacted the structure of Canadian politics. Though the Liberal Party had cultivated relations with immigrant communities since Prime Minister Wilfred Laurier led the country between 1896 and 1911, the Progressive Conservative Party had historically attracted little support from these communities due to their emphasis on “British-Canadian nationalism (Palmer 1991, 5).” The Liberal Party continued to attract the support of many immigrants throughout the postwar period, and immigrant support solidified following the introduction of the *Citizenship Act* in 1947 (Palmer 1991, 20), which created the first legal basis for Canadians to take up their own distinct nationality.

The increasing diversity of the Canadian population forced the Progressive Conservatives to reconsider their approach towards immigrants. In 1957, a plurality of

Canadians elected the Progressive Conservative candidate John Diefenbaker Prime Minister due in part to his experience as Member of Parliament for the multicultural constituency of Prince Albert, Saskatchewan (Palmer 1991, 20-21). In 1960, the Diefenbaker government passed the *Canadian Bill of Rights*, which institutionalised a broad range of human rights and freedoms, and barred “discrimination by reason of race, national origin, colour, religion or sex (SC 1960, C. 44, section 1).” During this period, a small but growing number of individuals representing immigrant communities gained political representation, including Douglas Jung, the first Chinese-Canadian Member of Parliament Cabinet (Palmer 1991, 20-21). In addition, politicians of Jewish and Ukrainian descent gained positions of political influence as Senators or members of Cabinet (Palmer 1991, 20-21).

Though the growing number of immigrants, their increasing incorporation into politics, and an improvement in the socio-economic status of many immigrants enabled members of these groups to exert greater political influence, the role of immigrant communities in the political sphere did not consolidate until the late 1960s, when the federal government began to pursue multiculturalism in tandem with efforts to entrench recognition of bilingualism (Palmer 1991, 22). In pursuit of its multicultural agenda, the federal government assisted Chinese, Italian, and South Asian Canadians in forming ethnic community organisations, and provided funding to support specific activities which also legitimated these organisations (Palmer 1991, 23-24).⁹⁰ However, acceptance of multiculturalism and the increasing diversity of the Canadian population did not proceed evenly across the country. In Québec, immigration—and in particular, the growing number of non-Francophone immigrants—presented a dilemma for the province, as the governing Parti Québécois was intent on defending the province’s *société distincte* yet needed immigration due in part to the declining birth rate occurring within the broader context of *la Révolution tranquille* (Palmer 1991, 23-24).

The context surrounding the politics of immigration at the federal level continued to change throughout the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, and political parties made a more concerted effort to engage with ethnic groups during leadership contests and election campaigns (Palmer 1991, 23). The pursuit of multiculturalism also offered another avenue through which individuals could voice their views on immigration policies. As Canada welcomed immigrants from further afield, including from low- and middle-income countries and states with both left-wing and right-wing governments such as Chile, Ethiopia, India, and Vietnam, Canadians pressed the government to adapt its resettlement admissions policies to reflect a more balanced

⁹⁰ One could interpret this as consistent with Pross’s (1992) work on policy communities.

approach that did not discriminate by political ideology (Palmer 1991, 24). Though political engagement by ethnic groups has varied according to group, class and across space and time in Canada, the historical evidence indicates that the political context surrounding immigration and the political integration of non-British, non-French immigrants has shifted and become more welcoming, thus offering a more conducive environment for these groups to exert influence on immigration and refugee policies. These observations provide a strong rationale for conducting further research into the potential engagement of ethnic community organisations in advocacy on resettlement.

However, as noted in chapter three, any discussion of advocacy would be incomplete without considering two important, non-institutional factors that condition the impact of advocacy efforts: issue context and issue salience. Issue context relates to both the scope of the policy and the degree of contestation surrounding this policy (Mahoney 2007, 40). Groups are more likely to exert influence in the policymaking process when the scope of the issue is relatively narrow and uncontested (Mahoney 2007, 40).

Evaluating the scope of resettlement in Canada is challenging due to the complexity of its resettlement programmes. On the one hand, as noted in chapter three, Freeman (2006, 239) characterises resettlement as a distributive policy that has concentrated benefits for resettled refugees and diffuse costs for the country of resettlement. However, once the federal government discharges its financial responsibility for resettlement, provinces and municipalities must absorb the ongoing costs of resettlement and provide education, health care, and access to any other social services to which resettled refugees may be eligible. Though chapter one indicated that Canada was among the largest contributors to resettlement in absolute and relative terms between 1980 and 2015, resettled refugees form a small proportion of its total population, as appendix tables 7 to 9 demonstrated. Nevertheless, given that resettled refugees may have unique needs related to their refugee experience, the scope of resettlement and the impact on provinces and municipalities could be larger than Freeman (2006) envisioned. Conversely, in the case of the PSR programme, private sponsors bear the full costs for resettlement, so while the government still incurs costs related to the processing of resettlement applications, the post-arrival costs are more concentrated than in other programmes, which could narrow the scope of the issue and potentially facilitate advocacy efforts.

On the matter of issue context, chapter four noted that Bloemraad (2012, 1-3) argues that there is an element of “Canadian exceptionalism” in public support for immigration and multiculturalism. In addition, Bloemraad (2012, 2) argues that “Canada is a striking outlier”

with respect to public attitudes towards immigration and that “Canadians are by far the most open to and optimistic about immigration.” However, while the government has constructed the country as a “safe haven, peacekeeper, and supporter of human rights (Krishnamurti 2013, 139), chapter four and section 5.2 in this chapter indicate that the admission of refugees has long been contested and public opinion on immigration, asylum, and refugee issues appears complex.

Chapter four noted that the Liberal government under Prime Minister William Lyon Mackenzie King adopted a staunchly restrictionist approach to the admission of Jewish refugees in the early 1930s, driven in part by the moribund state of the national economy, existing legislation which prioritised the admission of immigrants by ethnicity, and outright anti-Semitism (Abella and Troper 1979, 182-85). While the small number of Jewish Members of Parliament and civil society organisations including the Canadian Jewish Congress and the Jewish Immigrant Aid Society persistently called on the government to relax its admissions criteria for Jews fleeing Austria and Germany, large segments of the news media and population firmly opposed any such decision (Abella and Troper 1979, 186). In Québec, where multiple newspapers expressed their opposition to the resettlement of Jewish refugees, and more than 128,000 members of the nationalist *Société St-Jean-Baptiste* signed a petition calling on parliament to end all forms of immigration and bar the admission of Jews from Europe (Abella and Troper 1979, 188-89). Québécois opposition to immigration was politically salient at the time as the province elected a *Union Nationale* government in 1936, ending the longstanding dominance of the Liberal Party (Abella and Troper 1979, 180). Prime Minister Mackenzie King feared that acquiescing to the Jewish community could further threaten national unity, so his government remained steadfast in its desire to limit the admission of Jewish refugees until the catastrophic events of the *Kristallnacht* prompted a change of heart (Abella and Troper 1979, 190 and 198). The controversy surrounding the admission of Jewish refugees meant that Canada only resettled approximately 4,000 Jewish refugees in the period between 1933 and 1939—a derisory figure when compared to the 10,000 resettled in Australia or the 140,000 admitted to the US during that same period (Abella and Troper 1979, 181).

Public opinion polls indicate that immigration remained a contested issue through the 1990s. In a longitudinal study of public opinion polls, Simon and Lynch (1999, 459) indicate that a larger percentage of Canadians surveyed between 1975 and 1993 favoured increasing immigration than Americans, but no more than 17 per cent of respondents expressed this view

at any one time.⁹¹ In addition, the percentage of respondents who supported reduced admissions declined in the mid-to-late 1980s and early 1990s, bottoming out at 32 per cent in 1990 before rising again to 45 per cent in 1991, 46 per cent in 1992, and 45 per cent in 1993 (Simon and Lynch 1999, 461). These findings indicate that while the percentage of Canadians who wanted to reduce immigration fluctuated during this period, a sizeable proportion of the Canadian population nevertheless supported a restrictive approach to admissions during this period.

Other studies have also pointed to the variability in public attitudes towards migration in Canada. Wilkes and Corrigall-Brown (2011) conduct a longitudinal analysis of Environics polls asking Canadians for their views on the level of immigration and the perceived characteristics of refugees between 1987 and 2008. The results of the analysis by survey period indicate that until the late 1990s, a majority of Canadians believed “there is too much immigration to Canada (Wilkes and Corrigall-Brown 2011, 83).” Public opinion began to shift around the turn of the millennium, and the more recent surveys in their panel indicate that fewer than 40 per cent of Canadians expressed such views (Wilkes Corrigall-Brown 2011, 83). In addition, the data indicates that a majority of Canadians consistently believed that “too many refugees are coming in as fake refugees (Wilkes and Corrigall-Brown 2011, 83).” Between the late 1980s until the late 1990s, at least 80 per cent of respondents believed that “fake refugees” were a problem in Canada (Wilkes and Corrigall-Brown 2011, 83). Though attitudes began to soften around the turn of the millennium, at least 50 per cent of the population held negative views about refugees during each survey period (Wilkes and Corrigall-Brown 2011, 83). While the authors find evidence of an “ideological shift” in Canadian attitudes towards immigration, immigrants, and refugees, negative attitudes persist among a sizeable proportion of the population (Wilkes and Corrigall-Brown 2011, 89 and 94).

Contemporary developments indicate that public attitudes towards persons in need of protection remain complex. In 1999, four boats carrying 599 Chinese passengers arrived on the coast of British Columbia. A public opinion poll conducted in the days immediately following the arrival of the Chinese “boat people” indicated that 97 per cent of respondents in Victoria, British Columbia favoured repatriating them to China without delay (Greenberg 2000, 518). Many also expressed concern that these individuals could strain federal and provincial social support services at the expense of Canadian users whom they perceived as “legitimate (Greenberg 2000, 518).” The news media played an important role in framing these events and reports became “increasingly critical and hyperbolic” as subsequent ships arrived (Greenberg

⁹¹ Disaggregated data on attitudes towards refugees was not included in their research.

2000, 518; see also Greenberg and Hier 2001). Some reports resurrected the characterisation of Chinese people as carriers of disease and portrayed them as “bogus” asylum seekers who constituted threats to national security (Mountz 2004, 324 and 335). Of the 599 individuals who arrived, 492 lodged claims for asylum, and 429 of these asylum claimants were kept in long-term detention for up to 18 months as their claims were processed and adjudicated (Mountz 2004, 335). The subsequent deportation of at least 321 individuals who were refused refugee protection constituted one of the largest mass deportations in recent Canadian history (Mountz 2004, 337).

The second contemporary example concerns a group of Tamil asylum seekers from Sri Lanka who arrived in British Columbia in August 2010. The arrival of a boat carrying asylum seekers from South Asia was not unprecedented; in 1914, the *Komagata Maru* attempted to land in Vancouver carrying 376 passengers—most of whom were Sikh (Global News 2016, para. 4 of 18). In an illustration of the racist character of Canadian immigration policy at the time, the government refused to allow the passengers to disembark as they did not meet the “continuous journey” requirement which effectively barred the entry of travellers from India due to the absence of direct travel routes between India and Canada at the time (Global News 2016, para. 5 of 18). Following a two-month “stand-off,” the ship was escorted out of Canadian waters and forced to return to Calcutta, India (Global News 2016, para. 13 of 18). Upon arrival in Calcutta, British officials boarded the ship in search of “Sikh radicals,” and 19 of the passengers were killed when the British opened fire on them (Lewis 2016, para. 6 of 8).⁹²

In August 1986, two lifeboats carrying 155 Tamil men, women, and children were found adrift off the coast of Newfoundland, where human traffickers abandoned them (Anandasangaree 2016, para. 1 of 19). Many of the passengers had originally travelled to Germany in search of protection from the Sri Lankan civil war, but the perceived “draconian” nature of German asylum policies at the time prompted these individuals to seek protection elsewhere (Anandasangaree 2016, para. 11 of 19). This revelation prompted many members of the Canadian public to denounce the Tamils as ‘fraudsters’ and ‘queue jumpers’ (Anandasangaree 2016, para. 11 of 19).⁹³

These negative characterisations also appeared following the arrival of 492 Sri Lankan asylum seekers aboard the *M.V. Sun Sea* in August 2010. Canadians were familiar with the conflict in Sri Lanka due in part to a sizeable diaspora and multiple protests held in Toronto in

⁹² Prime Minister Trudeau finally issued a formal apology for the incident on 18 May, 2016.

2009 (Bradimore and Bauder 2011, 638).⁹³ However, many Canadians were unreceptive to the arrival of these asylum seekers. In a representative poll of 1,007 Canadians conducted by Angus Reid between 2 and 3 September, 2010 found that 50 per cent of Canadians agreed that the passengers should be ‘deported’ to Sri Lanka, while 32 per cent indicated the government should grant them refugee protection and 17 per cent of respondents were unsure (Angus Reid 2010, 7). Much of the media discourse about these asylum seekers was negative, and both centrist and right-wing mainstream publications characterised the Sri Lankans as ‘queue jumpers,’ ‘terrorists,’ and since some of the women aboard the ship were pregnant, as ‘breeders’ (Krishnamurti 2013, 146-52). Statements from Conservative politicians like Monte Solberg, a former Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, reinforced the perceived illegitimacy of these asylum seekers. Despite his experience and presumed knowledge of customary and international law on refugee protection, Mr Solberg complained that “The Tamils will now butt in ahead of thousands of others who have applied to come to Canada through the normal legal means (Solberg 2010 cited in Krishnamurti 2013, 146).” These attitudes may have also been conditioned by broader Conservative government efforts at the time to distinguish between ‘genuine’ and ‘bogus’ asylum seekers and the adoption of the *Balanced Refugee Reform Act* in June 2010, which introduced expedited processing measures for asylum claimants from ‘designated countries of origin.’

Negative characterisations of asylum seekers and refugees are not uncommon in the Canadian media. In a discourse analysis of five large Canadian English-language news media outlet reports on immigration between 1996 and 2004, Bauder (2008, 300) finds that ‘danger’ is a common theme in much of the news coverage on immigration in Canada, with many articles using concerns about security to convey opposition to immigration.⁹⁴ However, humanitarianism was also a prominent theme in the media, used in both a positive and negative context (Bauder 2008, 300). While the publication of a December 1997 Auditor General’s report raised concerns about the asylum adjudication process for being “slow and open to abuse,” the provision of humanitarian protection is closely intertwined with Canada’s identity as a “compassionate and caring” country (Bauder 2008, 292 and 295; Dauvergne 2005, 75).

⁹³ The arrival of the *M.V. Sun Sea* was preceded by the *M.V. Ocean Lady*, which landed in British Columbia in October 2009 with 76 Sri Lankan asylum seekers aboard.

⁹⁴ While Bauder (2008) examines ‘danger’ as one of several frames in his analysis, Esses, Medianu, and Lawson (2013) highlight how Canadian news organisations regularly contribute to the ‘dehumanization’ of immigrants and refugees by characterising these individuals as terrorists and carriers of disease. Their experimental approach offers important insights into the impact of media framing on public attitudes towards immigrants and refugees.

This aspect of the discourse also links to another prominent theme of media attention, namely, Canada's international reputation as a humanitarian actor. This theme has been invoked both at times when the government sought to restrict access to asylum, as when it announced that it would no longer accept Somali passports as proof of identity for asylum seekers, or at times when Canada's asylum and refugee policies were perceived to be a "soft touch," and as a result, attracted "economic migrants" from the US, Europe, and other non-traditional source countries (Bauder 2008, 87). In this way, media discourse on immigration, asylum, and refugee protection has been instrumental in "constructing" both the boundaries of compassion in Canada and characterisations of members of these groups (Bauder 2008, 87-90).

Other prominent themes of discourse in these publications include the role of culture, which was historically associated with expressions of racism but is more contemporarily associated with discussions and debates on multiculturalism, both from those who express support for immigration due to its capacity to diversify Canadian culture, and those (including immigrants) who express concerns about the divisiveness of this policy (Bauder 2008, 293; see also Breton 2015 and Citrin, Johnston, and Wright 2012). One must also acknowledge the influence of economic considerations and, in particular, longstanding government efforts to emphasise the need for immigrants in order to improve the competitiveness of the (neoliberal) Canadian economy (Abu-Laban 1998, 205; Bauder 2008, 291-92). Given the role of media discourse in 'reformulating' established norms in society (Bauder 2008, 290), it could be that these modes of discourse could be linked in some way to the shift in attitudes identified by Wilkes and Corrigall-Brown (2011).

Though the Canadian Council for Refugees has pressed the government to facilitate the resettlement of Syrian refugees since September 2013, public opinion surveys conducted in the summer of 2015 revealed that Canadians remained divided in their attitudes towards refugees. In a national survey conducted by Environics in June 2015, only 11 per cent of respondents indicated that they "strongly" favoured resettling refugees in Canada, while an additional 29 per cent indicated that they "somewhat" favoured such a policy (Gravelle 2017, 7). Conversely, 25 per cent of respondents stated they "somewhat" opposed the admission of refugees, while 25 per cent expressed "strong" opposition to the question (Gravelle 2017, 7).

Since the government scheduled a federal election for autumn 2015, the Environics survey also captured voting intent, and probabilistic models suggest that there a correlation between attitudes towards refugees and voting intention. More precisely, Gravelle (2017, 10) finds that the predicted probability of supporting the acceptance of refugees (either moderately

or strongly) was 0.31 for those who intended to vote for the Conservative Party, 0.38 who planned to vote for the Liberal Party, and 0.48 for those who signalled their desire to cast a ballot for the New Democratic Party. In other words, those intended to vote for a right-wing party were the least likely to support resettlement, compared to those who intended to vote for a centrist or left-wing party.

However, the images of three-year-old Syrian Alan Kurdi, his brother Galib, and his mother Rehana shocked the Canadian public and attracted considerable public attention, due in part to the revelation that the Kurdi family had a connection to Canada. Following the release of the images, it was revealed that Abdullah Kurdi has a sister, Tima Kurdi, who lives in the small city of Coquitlam, British Columbia (CBC News 2015, para. 3 of 22). Ms Kurdi applied to resettle another brother through the PSR programme, but the government rejected the application and Ms Kurdi did not have the financial resources to apply to sponsor Abdullah and his family (CBC News 2015, para. 6 of 22). She appealed for assistance from Fin Donnelly, her Member of Parliament, and Mr Donnelly agreed to write to the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration on her behalf. Unfortunately, the effort proved fruitless (CBC News 2015, para. 9 to 11 of 22).

In response to these events and the Syrian crisis more generally, a representative online poll of 1,447 Canadians conducted on 3 September, 2015 by the Angus Reid Institute found that 54 per cent of respondents agreed the Canadian government should “take in more refugees (Angus Reid Institute 2015, 15).” However, 63 per cent of respondents felt that private sponsorship groups should take a more active role in resettling Syrian refugees (Angus Reid Institute 2015, 15). The Angus Reid poll also revealed a divergence in attitudes according to voting intention for the 2015 general election. When asked whether the Canadian government should admit more refugees, only 39 per cent of those who expected to vote for the Conservative Party agreed, compared to 62 per cent of those who intended to vote for the Liberal Party and 62 per cent of those who planned to vote for the New Democratic Party (Angus Reid Institute 2015, 15). When asked about increasing admissions through the PSR programme, 55 per cent of those who expected to vote Conservative favoured the idea, compared to 69 per cent of those who intended to vote Liberal and 69 per cent of those who planned to vote for the New Democrats (Angus Reid Institute 2015, 15).

Though a majority of Canadians expressed openness to the idea of welcoming “boatloads of migrants” if the country found itself in the same position as Europe (Angus Reid Institute 2015, 17), respondents appeared divided on the best response to the situation at hand. In response to the question of “how many refugees should Canada sponsor and resettle over

the next year?” a plurality of respondents (25 per cent) indicated that the country should resettle between 5,000 and 10,000 refugees (Angus Reid Institute 2015, 19). In addition, 21 per cent of respondents favoured resettling between 1,000 and 5,000 refugees, while 16 per cent of respondents supported the third most popular option of resettling no refugees (Angus Reid Institute 2015, 19). Of those who indicated that Canada should resettle between 5,000 and 10,000 refugees, 30 per cent expressing support for this option compared to 23 per cent of those who planned to vote for the Liberals and 24 per cent of respondents who planned to vote for the New Democrats (Angus Reid Institute 2015, 19).

In addition to the heterogeneity in responses about the preferred level of resettlement admissions, respondents were also divided about a specific proposal to augment resettlement through the GAR programme. When asked whether the government should resettle 20,000 refugees at the cost of CAD\$100 million (or CAD\$3 per person), a plurality (29 per cent) of respondents indicated that they “moderately support” this idea, while 25 per cent indicated they “strongly oppose” this suggestion (Angus Reid Institute 2015, 20). In addition, 24 per cent of respondents stated that the “moderately oppose” this notion, while only 22 per cent of respondents stated that they “strongly support” this idea (Angus Reid Institute 2015, 20). Of those who expressed ‘moderate support’ for increased government involvement in resettlement, 32 per cent were Liberal voters, 29 per cent of New Democratic voters choosing this option, and 28 per cent intended to vote for the Conservatives (Angus Reid Institute 2015, 20).

The desire of Canadians to provide assistance through resettlement was also evident in a representative poll of 2,506 Canadians conducted between 4 and 6 September, 2015 by the Mainstreet polling firm. When asked to evaluate Conservative Prime Minister Stephen Harper’s existing response to the Syrian crisis, 48 per cent of respondents indicated that they “somewhat” or “strongly” disapproved of the government’s approach (Mainstreet 2015, 5). Conversely, 35 per cent of respondents stated that they “somewhat” or “strongly” approved of the government’s response at the time (Mainstreet 2015, 5). Of the four age cohorts used in the survey, respondents aged 50 to 64 expressed the most disapproval of the Harper government’s response, with 22 per cent indicating that they “somewhat disapprove” of the response and 29 per cent stating that they “strongly disapprove (Mainstreet 2015, 5).” However, examining attitudes by gender presents a marginally different picture than the findings of the Angus Reid Institute poll. More precisely, the largest plurality of men (29 per cent) indicated that they “strongly disapprove” of the government’s response, though a further 25 per cent stated they “strongly approve (Mainstreet 2015, 5).” Though men appeared divided in their view of the

government's response, 52 per cent of women either "somewhat" or "strongly" disapproved of the response at the time (Mainstreet 2015, 5). In addition, a plurality of respondents favoured generous admissions policies for Syrian refugees. When given information on the number of refugees resettled from Hungary, Uganda, Southeast Asia, and Kosovo, 48 per cent of respondents agreed that Canada should resettle more than 30,000 Syrian refugees (Mainstreet 2015, 6).

The support for generous resettlement admissions policies for Syrian refugees also appears consistent with Mainstreet's findings concerning perceived roles and responsibilities in the crisis. When asked whether Canada is "doing its fair share," 48 per cent of respondents indicated that Canada is not bearing adequate responsibility for the impact of the conflict in Syria (Mainstreet 2015, 10). The sense that Canada could assume more responsibility and be more generous in responding to the humanitarian crisis emanating from Syria could also be interpreted as consistent with the views articulated by many federal government officials and private sponsors in the discussion in chapter 4 on the perceived motivations for resettlement and its benefits.

However, subsequent polls indicate that the liberal attitudes expressed by many Canadians towards the admission of Syrian refugees were short-lived. In a representative poll of 909 Canadian adults conducted by Forum Research on 18 November, 2015, 51 per cent of respondents stated they did not approve of newly elected Liberal Prime Minister Justin Trudeau's plan (and campaign promise) to resettle 25,000 Syrian refugees (Forum Research 2015, 8). Given that Forum Research conducted the poll in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks in Paris, France on 13 November, 2015, it is perhaps unsurprising that a clear majority (58 per cent) of respondents agreed that "there is a security risk in settling [sic] Syrian refugees in Canada (Forum Research 2015, 9)."

Notably, as with the Angus Reid Institute poll conducted in September 2015, the Forum Research poll identified a clear partisan divide regarding the Liberal government's plan to resettle 25,000 Syrian refugees, and in the views of many respondents on the perceived security threat presented by these refugees. Indeed, 80 per cent of respondents who supported the Conservative Party in the 2015 general election opposed the plan to resettle 25,000 Syrian refugees, compared to 39 per cent of respondents who voted for the Green Party, 36 per cent of New Democratic Party supporters, and 30 per cent of respondents who cast their ballots for the Liberal Party (forum Research 2015, 8). Opposition was also strong among those who voted for the Bloc Québécois (Forum Research 2015, 8). In response to the question on security and Syrian refugees, 85 per cent of Bloc supporters and 77 per cent of Conservative voters agreed

that there is a perceived security risk in resettling Syrian refugees, compared to 52 per cent of Green and New Democratic Party supporters (respectively) and 46 per cent of Liberal voters (Forum Research 2015, 8). These findings appear consistent with the broad pattern of partisanship identified in the Angus Reid Institute survey conducted in September 2015.

However, a different survey suggests that Canadians favoured the plan to resettle 25,000 refugees. In a random poll of 1,000 Canadian adults conducted between 21 and 24 November, 2015 by Nanos, 65 per cent of respondents said they “support” or “somewhat support” the Liberal government’s plan to resettle 25,000 Syrian refugees as one among several possible responses to the crisis (Nanos 2015, appendix page 5). Respondents aged 18 to 29 favoured the plan the most, with 69.8 per cent of individuals in that cohort expressing their support, compared to 67.1 per cent of persons over 60, 65.5 per cent of respondents aged 50 to 59, 61.4 per cent of those aged 30 to 39, and 56.4 per cent of individuals aged 40 to 49 (Nanos 2015, appendix page 5). When examining the findings by gender, the survey found that 60.6 per cent of men and 67.7 per cent of women supported the measure (Nanos 2015, appendix page 5).

Though Bloemraad (2012, 5) suggests that immigration has rarely been salient in Canada, the Syrian crisis appears to have attracted public attention. In a representative online poll of 1,447 Canadians conducted on 3 September, 2015, the Angus Reid Institute asked respondents “how closely” they had followed the Syrian crisis (Angus Reid Institute 2015, 10). In response, a plurality (38 per cent) indicated that they had seen “some coverage” on the issue and had “the odd conversation” about the developments (Angus Reid Institute 2015, 10). Furthermore, 27 per cent of respondents stated that they had actively followed the issue and had discussed the matter with both family and friends (Angus Reid Institute 2015, 10). Conversely, 26 per cent of respondents had only ‘scanned the headlines’ on the issue, while 10 per cent of respondents had not “seen or heard anything about it (Angus Reid Institute 2015, 10).” Those who expected to vote Conservative in the 2015 general election also appeared highly informed, with 31 per cent of those voters indicating that they had actively followed the issue, compared to 30 per cent of those who intended to vote for the Liberals and 23 per cent of those who planned to support the New Democrats (Angus Reid Institute 2015, 10). Though only a small proportion of respondents had no knowledge of the issue, the largest plurality of those respondents included women, millennials, and those who expected to vote for the New Democrats (Angus Reid Institute 2015, 10).

The salience of the Syrian issue was also apparent in a representative poll of 2,506 Canadians conducted between 4 and 6 September, 2015 by the Mainstream polling firm. When

asked “how closely have you been following stories involving Syria’s refugee crisis?” a plurality (37 per cent) of respondents indicated that they had watched the news on this topic “very closely,” while an additional 33 per cent stated that they had watched the news “somewhat closely (Mainstreet 2015, 3).” Conversely, 15 per cent responded that they had not followed the news “too closely” and 13 per cent stated that they had followed the news “not at all closely” on this topic (Mainstreet 2015, 3). Only 3 per cent of respondents indicated that they were wholly unaware of the issue (Mainstreet 2015, 3). Of those who indicated that they were “very closely” following the issue, the largest plurality (40 per cent) were respondents aged 65 and older. However, similar percentages of other age cohorts indicated that they had “very closely” followed the issue, with 32 per cent of those aged 50 to 64, 31 per cent of those aged 35 to 49, and 30 per cent of those aged between 18 and 34 responding in this way (Mainstreet 2015, 3). However, the poll suggests that the issue was more salient for men than women, as 38 per cent of men indicated they followed the issue “very closely” compared to 28 per cent of women (Mainstreet 2015, 3).

Given the relatively positive attitudes expressed by many Canadians, the extensive support for resettlement, and the salience of the Syrian issue, one could interpret the conflict in Syria and the deaths of the Kurdî brothers and their mother Rehana as a “focusing” event (Kingdon 1995, 94-99). As explained in chapter three, these events can draw attention to a particular issue and can help or hinder advocates, depending on their perspective and the response the focusing event generates among the wider public (Kingdon 1995, 94-99). However, as previously noted, focusing events are unlikely to fuel policy change in and of themselves (Kingdon 1995, 94-99). Therefore, further research on the potential impact of this focusing event on Canadian public opinion and government policy could be advantageous.

5.4 Conclusion

The discussion and analysis in this chapter indicate that voluntary sector organisation have a long history of advocacy on resettlement issues, including efforts to augment resettlement admissions. Though the literature and empirical observations suggest that these efforts have produced mixed results, one could interpret the active involvement of voluntary sector organisations in advocacy on resettlement as consistent with the dominant taxonomy on government-voluntary sector relations which highlights the potentially ‘adversarial’ nature of relations between these parties.

Interviews with government officials and private sponsors indicate that relations between government officials and some private sponsors have occasionally been adversarial in the literal sense of the term. Though government officials indicated that tensions with certain

private sponsors had abated, the perceptions articulated by Mr Boxhill (2013) in particular concerning cohesion and representation in the SAH Council raise questions about whether such views could impact of the effectiveness of advocacy efforts.

Interviews with private sponsors also revealed tensions among these stakeholders concerning whether and how best to engage in advocacy. Though some interviewees indicated that they were actively engaged in advocacy on resettlement, others indicated that they preferred not to engage in interest representation due to perceived concerns that such activities could impact their relationship with government officials or funding for other programmes. Though academics continue to debate the impact of government funding on voluntary sector advocacy and some scholars suggest that government funding might even encourage advocacy on immigration issues, there are indications that the regulatory environment governing charities in Canada could dissuade some groups from pursuing activities that could be perceived as inconsistent with their charitable status. Though the 108 SAHs that currently participate in the PSR programme likely have diverse origins, missions, preferences, and opinions on resettlement, the views articulated by private sponsors raise questions about whether these disagreements could impact the effectiveness of any such efforts.

Though there is no consensus regarding the structure of interest representation in Canada, one could interpret the relationship between the government and private sponsors as a policy community existing within the broader policy network on immigration in Canada. Interviews indicate that the government long encouraged the development of a sponsorship community and continues to support the SAH Association in a variety of ways. However, the exclusive nature of policy communities also raises questions about the potential impact of perceived tensions (past or present) and disagreements within the sponsorship community itself.

In addition, the discussion highlighted the potential influence of issue context and salience. Public opinion polls indicate that there has been an “ideological shift” in Canadian attitudes towards persons in need of protection (Wilkes and Corrigall-Brown 2011, 89 and 94). However, polls also suggest that a considerable proportion of the Canadian population favours a restrictive approach to refugee protection. Despite the perceived humanitarian and normative motivations articulated by government officials and private sponsors in chapter four, alongside the perceived reputational and cultural benefits of resettlement, many Canadians have expressed less than welcoming views on certain persons and groups in need of protection, such as Jewish refugees fleeing Nazi persecution and asylum seekers from China and Sri Lanka. The analysis also indicates that media outlets and politicians have also expressed negative attitudes

towards persons in need of protection. Furthermore, there could be an association between focusing events such as the deaths of Alan, Galib, and Rehana Kurdî and the November 2015 terrorist attacks in Paris, France and public attitudes on the resettlement of Syrian refugees. In addition, the Syrian refugee crisis appeared salient for many Canadians, especially among those who intended to vote Conservative in the 2015 general election.

Overall, the discussion and analysis indicate that interest representation on resettlement is a complex topic, and ascertaining the perceived impact of interest representation efforts is far from straightforward. However, given the exploratory nature of this thesis, one cannot reach any definitive conclusions concerning the perceived or substantive impact of the efforts described in this chapter. In addition to the potential avenues for further research identified above, research that further explores the ‘adversarial’ nature of governments and voluntary sector organisations could be beneficial—especially given the limited size of the current literature and particularly given the dearth of information and studies on the involvement of ethnic community groups in advocacy on resettlement and refugee protection more generally. Scholars could also consider exploring potential issues related to representation and legitimacy in the sponsorship community as a means of better understanding the factors which can condition the impact of advocacy efforts. Similarly, studies that attempt to situate advocacy on resettlement in the broader context of the structure of interest representation in Canada appear sorely needed. However one chooses to approach the topic, it appears to be a complex, contested, and engaging subject for analysis.

Chapter Six: Conclusion

6.1 Summary

To better understand why the US and Canada have voluntarily adopted generous resettlement admissions policies, this thesis explored a broad range of potential factors, including perceptions concerning the motivations and potential benefits of resettlement, the nature of government-voluntary sector relations, the potential relationship between resettlement admissions and domestic responsibility sharing, and the potential relationship between resettlement admissions and voluntary sector advocacy. Given the ontological and epistemological foundations of this thesis, the author attempted to obtain a more meaningful understanding of the responses provided by senior government officials and voluntary agency representatives in the US and senior government officials and private sponsors in Canada by interpreting their responses in relation to the existing literature. Though much of the academic scholarship on refugee protection and voluntary sector organisations is rooted in political science, the author also drew on scholarship from economics and sociology in an effort to obtain an ‘authentic’ understanding of the topic in a ‘fair’ and ‘balanced’ way (Lincoln, Lynham, and Guba 2011, 122). On that basis, this section summarises the research, discussion, and analysis presented in the preceded five chapters, and this discussion sets the stage for a comparative analysis of resettlement in the US and Canada in section 6.2.

Chapter one presented a range of observations concerning the current number of persons in need of protection, the number and nationalities of refugees in need of resettlement, and cross-national differences in resettlement contributions. These observations indicate that the US and Canada were among the largest—if not *the* largest—contributors to resettlement between 1980 and 2016. The author suggested that there is both an academic and a humanitarian rationale for obtaining a better understanding of why the US and Canada have voluntarily adopted generous resettlement admissions policies, given that resettlement is neither a right nor an obligation under customary and international law. The chapter explored potential explanations in the existing literature, including studies on the influence of ‘partialist’ and ‘impartialist’ ideologies, foreign policies, perceived public and (or) private benefits, and structural factors, among other possible explanations. The author suggested that some of these works could help us understand how the US and Canada determine which refugees to resettle but that they offer an incomplete understanding of why these two countries have voluntarily adopted generous resettlement admissions policies. In that context, the author suggested the state-centric focus found in much of the literature limits the existing scholarship because it ignores observations concerning the longstanding mechanisms for domestic responsibility

sharing in the US and Canada, and fails to acknowledge the burgeoning scholarship on government-voluntary sector relations and the potential involvement of these organisations in advocacy. The chapter then discussed the research design for the thesis, including its relativist ontology and subjectivist epistemology, and presented the methodology and methods used as well as ethical issues. The chapter concluded with a discussion of expected contributions and an overview of the structure of the thesis.

Chapter two explored resettlement admissions in the US and began with an overview of the history of resettlement admissions in the US, which suggested that the government adopted a discriminatory approach at times in order to serve its strategic objectives but also demonstrated a more welcoming and humanitarian approach to resettlement at other times. One could interpret this as consistent with data on the size and composition of resettlement flows to the US and its contributions regarding the resettlement of unaccompanied minors and refugees with medical needs. The chapter then attempted to understand why the US has voluntarily adopted generous resettlement admissions policies through an exploration of the perceived motivations for resettlement and its benefits. Interviewees cited humanitarian and normative motivations for contributing to this durable solution and identified perceived reputational and cultural benefits which one could interpret as consistent with the literature on refugee protection as an impure public good and the economic literature more generally. Respondents perceived their relationship as collaborative, with elements of mutual interdependence. One could interpret this as consistent with the dominant taxonomy on government-voluntary sector relations and the historical evolution of relations between these parties. One could also interpret the perceived interdependence as an example of governments and voluntary sector organisations leveraging their respective comparative advantages. However, perceptions of increasing prescriptiveness could be consistent with the literature on the potential perils of government contracting, including the prospect of ‘bureaucratization.’ Finally, chapter two explored perceptions concerning the potential relationship between resettlement admissions and domestic responsibility sharing with voluntary agencies. Though a representative from one voluntary agency indicated that foreign policies are the main determinant of resettlement admissions, the majority of respondents indicated that domestic responsibility sharing had enhanced resettlement admissions to the US. While there is no consensus on why government-voluntary sector partnerships are such a prominent feature in the US, one could interpret the perceptions articulated by interviewees as consistent with the longstanding role of voluntary sector organisations in the provision of public goods and services in the US. Though the securitisation of discourse on refugee protection in the US is not new, contemporary political

developments could erode the longstanding bipartisan consensus on resettlement and impact its contributions to this durable solution.

Chapter three began with a discussion of the history of advocacy on resettlement in the US, which indicated that such efforts produced mixed results. Though the International Rescue Committee convinced the government to resettle large numbers of Hungarian refugees, voluntary organisations struggled to convince the government to be generous towards Chilean refugees. The chapter then explored perceptions concerning the potential relationship between resettlement admissions and voluntary sector advocacy. A federal official highlighted government openness to advocacy efforts, and voluntary agency representatives perceived that their ardent advocacy efforts were consistent with democratic values and contributed to a rebound in resettlement admissions following the terrorist attacks of 11 September, 2001 and prevented funding cuts to resettlement programmes. One could interpret these responses as consistent with the dominant taxonomy on government-voluntary sector relations which argues that relations between these parties can be adversarial in nature. One could also interpret these responses as consistent with the neo-pluralist structure of interest representation in the US, though some aspects could be clientelistic in nature. Though preliminary research indicates that few ethnic community-based organisations may be engaged in advocacy, one cannot reach any definitive conclusions at this stage due to the limitations of the existing literature. The chapter concluded by examining the potential influence of issue context and salience of resettlement and suggested that the contested nature of resettlement could potentially constrain the impact of advocacy efforts.

Chapter four explored resettlement admissions in Canada and began with an overview of the history of resettlement admissions in Canada, which suggested that the government adopted a discriminatory approach at times due in part to the influence of anti-Semitism and racism but also demonstrated a more welcoming and humanitarian approach to resettlement at other times. One could interpret this as consistent with data on the size and diversity of resettlement flows to Canada. The chapter then attempted to understand why Canada has voluntarily adopted generous resettlement admissions policies through an exploration of the perceived motivations for resettlement and its benefits. Government officials and private sponsors cited humanitarian and normative motivations for contributing to this durable solution and suggested that resettlement generates reputational and cultural benefits which one could interpret as consistent with the literature on refugee protection as an impure public good and the economic literature more generally. Respondents perceived their relationship as complementary and supplementary in some respects, though there was no consensus on which

aspects of their relationship fit these characteristics. One could interpret this as consistent with the dominant taxonomy on government-voluntary sector relations and the historical evolution of relations between the government and voluntary sector organisations in Canada. Finally, chapter four explored perceptions concerning the potential relationship between resettlement admissions and domestic responsibility sharing with voluntary agencies. Though a senior government official indicated that some private sponsors had created a large backlog in applications and ultimately undermined the capacity of the PSR programme, other respondents perceived that this form of domestic responsibility sharing enhanced resettlement admissions in Canada. However, some private sponsors raised concerns about responsibility shifting which one could interpret as consistent with the historical literature on government-voluntary sector relations. The chapter concluded that concerns about respect for the principle of ‘additionality’ are salient not only in Canada but also internationally given Canadian and UNHCR efforts to promote private sponsorship.

Finally, chapter five began with a discussion of the history of advocacy on resettlement in Canada, which indicated that such efforts produced mixed results. The chapter then explored perceptions concerning the potential relationship between resettlement admissions and advocacy. Interviews indicated that some private sponsors had engaged in advocacy on resettlement, and believed some of their efforts had borne fruit, as in the case of efforts to resettle Palestinian refugees living in Iraq. Interviews with government officials and private sponsors indicated that relations between government officials and some private sponsors had been tense in the recent past. Though government officials stated that these tensions had dissipated, the perceptions articulated by certain interviewees nevertheless raise questions about the potential impact on the effectiveness of advocacy efforts by private sponsors and the SAH Council, as well as the broader impact that these tensions may have had on trust between government officials and private sponsors. Interviews with private sponsors also revealed tensions among members of the sponsorship community on whether and how best to engage in advocacy. Though academics still debate the impact of government funding on voluntary sector advocacy, the regulatory environment governing charities in Canada could dissuade some groups from pursuing activities that could be perceived as inconsistent with their charitable status. One could interpret these responses as consistent with the dominant taxonomy on government-voluntary sector relations which highlights the potentially ‘adversarial’ nature of relations between these parties. Furthermore, one could also interpret the structure of relations between the government and private sponsors as a policy community existing within the broader immigration policy network in Canada, though Freeman (1995; 2006) suggests that

the refugee policymaking process is clientelistic. The chapter also presented preliminary research which suggests that ethnic community organisations may have a limited role in advocacy on resettlement issues. Nevertheless, their gradual political incorporation suggests that there is scope for these organisations to exert influence in this area, and further research could be beneficial. The chapter concluded by examining the potential influence of issue context and salience of resettlement and suggested that the contested nature of resettlement could potentially constrain the impact of advocacy efforts.

Given the exploratory nature of this thesis, the author cannot reach any definitive conclusions about why the US and Canada have voluntarily adopted generous resettlement admissions policies. Indeed, given the ontological and epistemological underpinnings of this thesis, the author acknowledges that there could be multiple explanations for why these countries have adopted generous resettlement admissions policies. Furthermore, the author acknowledges that there may not be a single ‘truth’ about US and Canadian resettlement policies and any such ‘truth’ is probably localised and dependent on the historical and social constructs unique to those countries. To be sure, many interviewees perceived that resettlement benefited their respective countries and that domestic responsibility sharing and advocacy enhanced resettlement admissions, and one could interpret many of these responses as consistent with elements of the literature on refugee protection, government-voluntary sector relations, voluntary sector advocacy, and the history of government-voluntary sector partnerships in resettlement. On that basis, the responses and the discussion and analysis presented in the preceding five chapters could offer complementary insight into the question of why the US and Canada have voluntarily adopted generous resettlement admissions policies. Nevertheless, as the quote from Martin (2005, 2) in chapter one suggests, resettlement admissions policies are likely influenced by a complex range of factors, rather than one factor alone.

6.2 Comparative Analysis

The preceding section noted that the factors which potentially influence resettlement admissions could be unique to the US and Canada, respectively. Nevertheless, this section engages in some comparative analysis through the identification of some similarities and differences between these two cases as a means of integrating the research, discussion, and analysis presented in chapters two through five. Though chapter one noted that similar historical and social constructs can lead to subjectivities that are remarkably alike, the outcome of research on resettlement admissions in the US cannot necessarily be generalised to Canada and *vice versa*.

On the perceived motivations for resettlement and its benefits, US and Canadian interviewees cited humanitarian and normative motivations for contributing to this durable solution. Similarly, US and Canadian interviewees indicated that resettlement confers perceived reputational benefits. Furthermore, some respondents in the US indicated that the government derives reputational benefits from contributing to resettlement and resettling large numbers of refugees. Officials in both countries suggested they could leverage these reputational gains in the international refugee regime. US and Canadian respondents also perceived cultural benefits from resettlement, though an analysis of the literature indicates that diversity is contested in both countries. However, US interviewees uniquely perceived resettlement as consistent with their history, identity, and values.

The author suggested that one could interpret these perceptions as consistent with the literature on refugee protection as an impure public good, and the economic literature on public goods more generally (e.g. Andreoni 1989; Betts 2003; Margolis 1982; Suhrke 1998; Thielemann 2003). Since no scholar has proposed a detailed conceptualisation of resettlement as a public good, the author suggested that this durable solution could be an impure public good that generates joint products in the form of private security benefits for resettled refugees and an excludable, non-rival ‘warm glow’ for residents of the US and Canada (e.g. Andreoni 1989; Betts 2003; Cornes and Sandler 1996). This warm glow could be excludable because only residents of the receiving country could derive satisfaction from voluntarily contributing to a durable solution that saves lives and supports international responsibility sharing, solidarity, and preserves access in countries of first asylum (e.g. Betts 2003; Thielemann 2003). In the US case, the warm glow could be a function of both participation in resettlement and the number of refugees resettled in the US—an interpretation consistent with the concepts of participation and goods altruism (Margolis 1982; see also Andreoni 1989). However, this warm glow could be non-rival insofar as all US and Canadian residents can theoretically enjoy the ‘warm glow’ from resettlement without preventing others from doing the same.

Though governments are unlikely to grant protection for the sole purpose of obtaining reputational benefits (Betts 2003, 287), the author suggested that one could also interpret the perceived reputational benefits of resettlement as an excludable, non-rival joint product of resettlement. Though resettlement is neither a right nor an obligation under customary and international law, the reputational benefits could be excludable insofar as only resettlement countries such as the US and Canada can derive reputational gains from demonstrating their voluntary compliance with the perceived “moral obligations” arising from the norms embedded in the *1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees* (e.g. Keohane 1984, 105-06 and 126-

27; see also Axelrod 1984). However, these benefits could be non-rival in that the US and Canadian governments could enhance and potentially leverage their reputations without preventing other resettlement countries from doing the same.⁹⁵

Similarly, given that resettled refugees constitute a relatively small proportion of the total number of immigrants admitted to the US and Canada, it seems unlikely that these governments participate in resettlement simply to enhance cultural diversity. Nevertheless, the author suggested that the perceived cultural benefits of resettlement could be an excludable, non-rival joint product of resettlement (e.g. Throsby 2010). This joint product could be excludable because only US and Canadian residents could benefit from the more “cosmopolitan atmosphere (Singer and Singer 1988, 123),” but one person could enjoy the increased cultural diversity without preventing others from doing the same. Though the cultural benefits of resettlement can theoretically accrue to everyone in the US and Canada, the contested nature of cultural diversity suggests that not all Americans and Canadians might perceive this as a benefit.

Conceptualising resettlement as an impure public good that potentially generates joint products in the form of private human security benefits for refugees and excludable, non-rival warm glow, reputational, and cultural benefits could help us better understand why the US and Canada voluntarily participate in resettlement and why these governments have voluntarily adopted generous resettlement admissions policies. Though the theory of pure public goods predicts that actors will not provide a Pareto efficient level of these goods because their non-excludable, non-rival nature creates an incentive for actors to free ride on the anticipated contributions of others (Cornes and Sandler 1996, 22-23; Gruber 2011, 188; Samuelson 1954, 388), joint products have a privatising effect “not unlike the establishment of property rights (Cornes and Sandler 1984, 595).” In other words, the US and Canada may have overcome the incentive to free ride and voluntarily chosen to resettle refugees because they potentially derive excludable benefits from this durable solution. Since the ‘warm glow’ the US and Canada could

⁹⁵ Following the law of diminishing returns, the perceived reputational gains obtained by the US and Canada could decline as the number of resettlement countries rises. However, even if all members of the international community voluntarily participate in resettlement, they could still derive reputational benefits as any government that stopped resettling refugees would become an outlier and could be seen as shirking its perceived “moral obligations” under the Convention (e.g. Keohane 1984, 105-06 and 126-27). In other words, governments could still derive marginal reputational benefits from demonstrating their voluntary compliance in the international refugee regime, even if all countries choose to resettle refugees.

receive is an “increasing function” of their contributions, this could potentially explain why these countries have voluntarily adopted generous resettlement admissions policies.⁹⁶

On the perceived nature of relations between the federal government and voluntary agencies and between the federal government and private sponsors, interviewees in the US and Canada suggested that their relationship features both complementary and supplementary elements. One could interpret this as consistent with the dominant taxonomy on government-voluntary sector relations (e.g. Young 1999; Young 2000) and the historical pattern of government-voluntary sector partnerships in these countries. Though US and Canadian officials saw the involvement of both government and voluntary sector organisations as necessary, suggesting a perception of interdependence, this theme appeared more prominent in the US. One could potentially interpret this as a reflection of differences in funding; whereas the US government provides contributions and grants to each of the nine voluntary agencies that implement the Resettlement Admissions and Reception and Placement programmes, the Canadian government does not provide any direct funding to private sponsors.

Though interviewees in the US acknowledged the finite role of government in resettlement, some private sponsors expressed concern about perceived responsibility shifting and worried that the government was “downloading” or “offloading” its responsibilities under the GAR programme to private sponsors and also questioned whether their relationship with government was a genuine partnership (Dekker 2013; Dyck 2013; Marshall 2013; Niazi 2013; Woolaver 2013). Though the US and Canada share similar histories regarding collaboration between governments and voluntary sector organisations in the provision of public goods and services influenced by prevailing British attitudes towards social assistance, one could potentially interpret these diverse responses as a reflection of perceived differences in the appropriate role of government in the delivery of public goods and services (as is evident in the different size and scope of the welfare state in these countries) (e.g. Anheier 2005; Dahl 1982; Salamon 1987; Salamon 1990). The Canadian responses could also be a manifestation of the legacy of New Public Management approaches in immigration policy in Canada (Richmond and Shields 2005, 518-20).

⁹⁶ Conceptualising resettlement in this way could have powerful implications for the provision of this durable solution. If members of the international community and the UNHCR can emphasise the excludable benefits of resettlement for receiving countries, governments could augment their contributions or more governments could adopt resettlement programmes. This could narrow the gap between resettlement needs and places, thereby benefiting those so desperately in need of protection. However, the author assumes the perceived motivations for resettlement and its benefits are idiosyncratic and dependent on the particular context in each state.

Regarding perceptions of the potential relationship between resettlement admissions and domestic responsibility sharing, nearly all US and Canadian interviewees indicated that involving voluntary sector organisations in resettlement enhanced admissions. Though differences in the structure of resettlement programmes in the US and Canada mean that one should not draw direct comparisons between the two, these perceptions could help us understand why the US and Canada have voluntarily adopted generous resettlement admissions policies. However, the decision of President Trump to reduce the resettlement admissions ceiling and appropriations for fiscal year 2018, alongside the history of fiscal retrenchment in resettlement in Canada and the concerns regarding perceived responsibility shifting, indicate that perceived impact of domestic responsibility sharing is not necessarily static and may be influenced by political vagaries.

Finally, there were considerable differences in responses concerning the potential relationship between resettlement admissions and voluntary sector advocacy. Whereas a US official indicated that the government is receptive to interest representation, two Canadian officials referred to recent (though resolved) tensions with some private sponsors. Though certain voluntary agency representatives and private sponsors perceived that some of their advocacy efforts enhanced resettlement admissions, voluntary agencies in the US appeared more engaged in interest representation. Conversely, private sponsors appeared divided on whether and how best to engage in advocacy, and whether the SAH Council should concentrate on information dissemination or also engage in advocacy.

Though one could interpret voluntary agency and private sponsor advocacy efforts as consistent with the potentially ‘adversarial’ nature of government-voluntary relations (e.g. Young 1999; Young 2000), one could potentially attribute these different responses to the distinct structure of interest representation in these countries. In particular, the author suggested that while Freeman (1995; 2006) views the refugee policymaking process in these two countries as ‘clientelistic,’ the literature on interest representation suggests the US has a neo-pluralist system of interest representation (e.g. Anheier 2009; Hojnacki et al. 2012; Lowery and Gray 2004; Moulton and Anheier 2001; Salamon 1987) and that policymaking in Canada could be structured around policy communities embedded in broader policy networks (e.g. Pross 1992; Skogstad 2008). Despite the contested nature of interest representation in the US (e.g. Madison 1787), some view interest representation as an essential feature of democratic societies and the *raison d'être* of voluntary sector organisations (Dahl 1982; Erne 2017; Sherry 1971 quoted in Kramer 1981). Conversely, though the development of policy communities has facilitated access for underrepresented groups, some suggest it has also imposed constraints on

what is deemed to be ‘appropriate’ advocacy (Pross 1992; see also Phillips 2003). The historical and social context surrounding advocacy, alongside factors such as issue context and salience (Mahoney 2007), could potentially explain these divergent responses and condition the impact of their advocacy efforts.

6.3 Potential Implications

Throughout this thesis, the author has attempted to obtain a more meaningful understanding of why the US and Canada have voluntarily adopted generous resettlement admissions policies by interpreting the interview responses in relation to the literature. Following that theme, this section considers some potential implications of the research and analysis presented in chapters two through five.

In the US case, the perceived motivations and benefits identified by interviewees in 2013 now appear at odds with the inflammatory statements issued by President Trump on resettlement, public opinion polls which indicate divisions in the US public, and the potentially increasing political polarisation on resettlement. If the perceived motivations and benefits of resettlement change, the size and composition of resettlement flows to the US could also change. Indeed, as previously noted, President Trump adopted a substantially lower resettlement admissions ceiling for fiscal year 2018 and attempted to augment the resettlement of persecuted (that is, Christian) religious minorities through the executive order he signed on 27 January, 2017 (subsection 5(b), Exec. Order No. 13769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (1 February, 2017)). One could potentially interpret these decisions as a reflection of the desire to obtain greater private security benefits (Betts 2003, 292) or to adopt a more ideologically informed approach to resettlement admissions (e.g. Walzer 1983).

Chapter two discussed how government-voluntary sector relationships are a prominent and longstanding feature of the provision of public goods and services in the US. Though the structure of government-voluntary agency relations in the Resettlement Admissions and Reception and Placement programmes appears unchanged, the reduction in the resettlement admissions ceiling and budget appropriations for fiscal year 2018 could negatively impact voluntary agencies and their local affiliates. Some voluntary agencies like World Relief downsized in response to these changes, and many local affiliates could close as a result. Furthermore, on 6 March, 2017 President Trump directed the Department of State to report on the long-term federal, state, and local costs of resettlement and to development “recommendations about how to curtail those costs (US Department of State 2017, 54).” This could potentially signal a desire to reduce the costs of resettlement in the US and might impact the perceived nature of relations between the government and voluntary agencies in this area.

More precisely, if the government wants to reduce the costs of resettlement, it could cut the per capita grant allocated to voluntary agencies (in real or relative terms) which could force voluntary agencies to assume a more supplementary role in order to continue delivering the same services. If such changes materialise, retrenchment in this area could have a deleterious impact on the orientation and integration of refugees resettled in the US.

During the interviews, a federal official indicated the government is open to advocacy and the literature generally indicates that the US has a neo-pluralist system of interest representation that supports competition among advocacy groups. Conversely, Freeman (1995; 2006) characterises the policymaking process in refugee protection as clientelistic, suggesting that voluntary agencies have “privileged access to the policy formulation process (Freeman 2006, 239).” During his campaign for president, Donald Trump pledged to “drain the swamp”—a reference to the perceived influence of lobbyists in previous administrations (Meyer 2017, para. 1 and 3 of 35). This pledge, alongside negative characterisations of voluntary agencies in influential far-right media organisations like Breitbart, could indicate that government officials and members of Congress are less receptive to voluntary agency advocacy efforts.

For voluntary agencies, the assessment of their advocacy efforts in chapter two and especially chapter three indicated that these organisations continue to believe that the US has a humanitarian and normative imperative to resettle refugees and that contributing to this durable solution is perceived to confer cultural benefits and is seen as consistent with US history and values. However, the aforementioned inflammatory statements issued by President Trump and the divided and potentially more politically polarised nature of public opinion on resettlement indicate that these organisations will need to continue their ‘vigorous’ efforts to raise awareness and build grassroots support for resettlement across the country. Though voluntary agencies cannot endorse or oppose political candidates, the midterm elections scheduled for November 2018 could enable these organisations and their allies to take advantage of a potential increase in the salience of immigration policy to disseminate information about resettlement and to encourage citizens to exercise their democratic rights.

However, if the structure of interest representation in resettlement changes, voluntary agencies could face increased competition from other stakeholders and may find it more challenging to advance their individual and collective agendas in this area. Therefore, voluntary agencies might need to allocate more resources to interest representation and leverage their close proximity to Washington, DC to augment engagement with politicians and policymakers.

This could prove difficult in the face of cuts to federal contributions and grants, and such efforts may continue to be mediated by the issue context and salience of resettlement.

In Canada, much of the literature emphasises the role of policy communities in public policymaking (e.g. Pross 1992, Skogstad 2008). Though Freeman (1995, 2006) suggests that refugee policies are shaped through a clientelistic process that gives “privileged access” to those who favour liberal admissions policies, both approaches suggest that the federal government has a close relationship with certain stakeholders. However, as discussed in chapter five, two government officials indicated that their relations with some private sponsors were tense in the recent past. Though both officials indicated the tensions were resolved, the author questioned whether these sentiments could have a broader impact. Though advocacy is adversarial in nature, could members of the community choose to marginalise or exclude members who adopt strategies or stances that conflict with the preferences of other organisations? Could this impact the effectiveness of their advocacy efforts? These are arguably compelling questions, but given the exploratory nature of this thesis, they remain unanswered at present.

Furthermore, these tensions and the concerns articulated by some private sponsors regarding perceived responsibility shifting could have implications for trust between these parties. Owen (2000, 135) highlights the importance of trust and communication between governments and immigrant-serving organisations, arguing that these qualities are essential for delivering services effectively. Owen explains:

“Trust also allows for respectful and honest dialogue in which criticism aimed at improving programming is seen as just that. [...] It is important to examine how partnerships can build space for the various forms of advocacy in which organizations [sic] engage. While advocacy may create debates that bring partners into conflict, it is important for maintaining strong and autonomous elements of civil society. When this debate can take place within agreed formats and with mutual respect, it improves trust (2000, 135).”

If tensions between the government officials and private sponsors re-emerge at some future date, or if concerns about responsibility shifting persist, there may be negative implications for the integrity of the PSR programme. In other words, such an environment could potentially dissuade individuals and groups from becoming private sponsors or discourage existing SAHs, Constituent Groups, and other stakeholders from sponsoring more refugees in the future. This could ultimately undermine the perceived relationship between domestic responsibility sharing and resettlement admissions.

The research, discussion, and analysis presented in this thesis could also have implications for the international refugee regime. Since this thesis was originally submitted in

September 2015, the UNHCR has augmented efforts to promote collaboration with voluntary sector organisations. Chapter one noted how the UNHCR is promoting the expansion of humanitarian admissions programmes and the adoption of additional ‘admissions pathways’ for Syrian refugees, including the creation of private sponsorship programmes (UNHCR 2016, 5). In December 2016, the Government of Canada and the UNHCR, in collaboration with academia and civil society organisations, launched the Global Refugee Sponsorship Initiative to augment the number of resettlement places and the quality of resettlement programmes, while strengthening receiving communities and promoting a more positive discourse on refugee protection (Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship Canada 2017, para. 11 and 14 of 14). Filippo Grandi, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, even declared that private sponsorship programmes are a “powerful tool to help the bridge the ever-widening gap between resettlement needs and places available (Global Refugee Sponsorship Initiative 2017, 3).”

One could interpret these efforts as consistent with the analysis presented in chapter four which suggested that domestic responsibility sharing through the PSR programme is perceived to enhance resettlement admissions. Though the Initiative remains in its infancy, these efforts could potentially transform domestic responsibility sharing from an idiosyncratic feature of certain resettlement programmes into a core feature of the international refugee regime. However, the concerns articulated by certain private sponsors about perceived responsibility shifting should serve as cautionary tale for governments and voluntary sector organisations who are interested in adopting a private sponsorship programme or expanding their existing partnerships with voluntary sector organisations. In other words, domestic responsibility sharing can only meaningfully enhance refugee protection if governments genuinely respect the principle of additionality and avoid using such programmes to shift their responsibilities onto civil society.

That said, greater engagement with voluntary sector organisations could potentially challenge the dominant role of states and state power in the international refugee regime. In a series of personal observations about the process of formulating the ExCom Conclusion on Children at Risk, Fresia (2014, 518 and 525) notes that ‘non-governmental organisations’ were permitted to attend the Executive Committee of the UNHCR’s plenary session, but these organisations were not invited to informal meetings in which substantive issues were discussed and deliberated throughout the year and their overall involvement in the process was “peripheral.” In the context of refugee protection, the UNHCR decides which voluntary sector organisations to invite and whether these observers can speak after member states have issued their statements. However, observers cannot vote or “participate in decision-making UNHCR

(UNHCR 2017, para. 21 of 21)." Indeed, epistemic communities have wielded limited influence in the international refugee regime (Milner and Wojnarowicz 2017, 13). However, if the UNHCR continues its efforts to engage voluntary sector organisations, if more governments adopt or expand existing mechanisms for domestic responsibility sharing, and if these voluntary sector organisations leverage their 'power' in the implementation of refugee protection (Milner and Wojnarowicz 2017, 14), the privileged role of the state in the international refugee regime could change and voluntary sector organisations might take on a more active, meaningful role in the development and implementation of refugee protection policies.

6.4 Future Research Prospects, Potential Hypotheses, and Concluding Remarks

The author has suggested potential avenues for research throughout the thesis. However, many of these suggestions were quite specific in nature. Therefore, this section presents some more general suggestions for future research that relate to the themes explored in this thesis. Given the exploratory nature of this, the author has been unable to test any specific propositions about why the US and Canada have voluntarily adopted generous resettlement admission policies. Thus, this section also introduces some potential hypotheses which readers could use as the basis for future studies. Finally, the author presents some concluding remarks.

Since resettlement is neither a right nor an obligation under customary and international law, obtaining a better understanding of the perceived motivations for resettlement and the benefits of contributing to this durable solution could strengthen UNHCR efforts to expand the number of resettlement countries and the number of resettlement places. Though research on this topic could be qualitative or quantitative in nature, academics who adopt a qualitative approach may find it challenging to explore more than two or three cases, while scholars who adopt a quantitative approach may find the scope of their research limited by the availability of public opinion data and the methodological difficulties inherent in comparing different surveys.

Future research could also explore the perceived nature of government-voluntary sector relations in resettlement. This research could add to the small but burgeoning scholarship on government-voluntary sector relations, including taxonomies such as those developed by Coston (1998), Kramer (1981), Najam (2000), Saidel (1989), and Young (1999; 2000). Given the distinction between complementary, supplementary, and adversarial relations, future research could explore whether and how the perceived nature of government-voluntary sector

relations impacts resettlement admissions. A potential hypothesis might be “Complementary relationships enhance resettlement admissions.” However, any research undertaken in this area should ideally ‘embed’ the analysis in the historical, social, and political context of that particular country.

Furthermore, future research could explore perceptions on the potential relationship between resettlement admissions and domestic responsibility sharing in countries such as Australia. Like the US and Canada, Australia has a long history of immigration and refugee protection, and it is among the oldest countries of resettlement. However, refugee protection appears contested and salient in Australia, and the government is known to use its contributions to resettlement to offset protection for asylum seekers. Furthermore, chapter one noted that the government introduced the Community Proposal Pilot in 2013, and formalised this mechanism for domestic responsibility sharing in 2017. Whereas the structure of resettlement programmes in the US and Canada have remained largely unchanged since 1980 and 1979, respectively, academics could explore whether this new programme has substantively enhanced resettlement admissions in Australia. This approach could be extended to other countries that have recently introduced private sponsorship programmes. To that end, a potential hypothesis might be “Private sponsorship programmes based on additionality enhance resettlement admissions.”

Finally, future research could explore the potential relationship between resettlement admissions and voluntary sector advocacy. To that end, research that uses process tracing techniques to understand how a particular legislative, operational, or policy change occurred could generate some useful insights. Scholars could draw on detailed interviews with government officials and voluntary sector representatives and complement this with primary source documents. However, any such study should ideally situate these advocacy efforts in the broader context of interest representation in that country and consider the potential influence of issue context and salience. Given the different models of interest representation that exist in resettlement countries, a potential hypothesis might be “Voluntary sector advocacy enhances resettlement admissions in neo-pluralist societies.”

Overall, it is apparent that there are still many avenues for prospective research which could further enhance the reliability of the findings presented in this thesis and potentially offer additional insights into why the US and Canada have voluntarily adopted generous resettlement admissions policies. Though resettlement is neither a right nor an obligation under customary and international law, the current scale of displacement and the number of refugees in need of resettlement creates a strong case for governments, civil society, the UNHCR, and other members of the international community to continue searching for innovative solutions that

could reduce or even close the persistent gap between resettlement needs and admissions. Human security and the ongoing viability of resettlement as a durable solution could well depend on it.

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
Robert (Bob) Carey
Ruth Famini
Aaron Gershowitz
Anam Gnaho
Erol Kekic
Dan Kosten
Lavinia Limón
Michael (Mike) Mitchell
Eskinder Negash
Emily Nesheim Bullock
David M. Robinson
Greg Scott
Sovanna Sok
Deborah Stein
Johnny Young

Interviewees from Canada

Wally Boxhill
Rita Chahal
Derrick Deans
Rose Dekker
Tom Denton
Shelley Duffin
Brian Dyck
Michelle Manks
Paula Marshall


Ian McBride
Adeena Niazi
Gail Schnabl
Rob Shropshire
Donald (Don) Smith
Ed Wiebe
Ellen Woolaver
Senior Official from Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship Canada

Chart 1 – Total Refugee Resettlement Ceiling and Admissions in the United States by Fiscal Year, 1980 to 2017



Sources: Martin (2005, 17); Mayorga and Morse (2017, see table 1); Refugee Processing Center (2018, see annual tables); US Department of Homeland Security (2013, table 13); US Department of State, US Department of Homeland Security (2017, 6).

Chart 2 – Total Refugee Resettlement Targets and Admissions in Canada by Year, 1990 to 2016



Sources: Citizenship and Immigration Canada (2012, no pagination; 2013, no pagination; 2014, no pagination; 2015, no pagination); Labman (2016, 71).

Table 1 – Total Number of Resettlement Arrivals by Year, 1980 to 2016

Year	Number	Year	Number	Year	Number	Year	Number
1980	277,070	1990	179,943	2000	100,023	2010	100,814
1981	201,722	1991	172,168	2001	93,581	2011	84,834
1982	139,449	1992	162,410	2002	51,031	2012	81,093
1983	97,426	1993	150,677	2003	55,612	2013	102,103
1984	104,433	1994	151,519	2004	84,745	2014	102,771
1985	102,703	1995	133,964	2005	80,812	2015	110,483
1986	97,538	1996	102,232	2006	71,718	2016	160,970
1987	101,598	1997	92,084	2007	75,318	Total 4,336,960	
1988	119,570	1998	103,065	2008	88,814		
1989	160,896	1999	134,326	2009	107,426		

Sources: Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship (2016, no pagination; 2018, no pagination); Refugee Processing Center (2018, no pagination); UNHCR (2000, 122-23; 2004, 40; 2005, 34; 2005, 7-9; 2007, 84-86; 2008, 8-13; 2008, 71-73; 2009, 160; 2010, 150; 2011, 152; 2013, 153; 2013, 163; 2015, 192; 2017, 198; 2018, 206); US Department of Homeland Security (2013, table 13). Own calculations.

Table 2 – Total Number of Resettlement Arrivals by Country, 2016

Country	Number of Resettlement Arrivals	Country	Number of Resettlement Arrivals
Australia	10,586	Japan	18
Austria	201	Latvia	6
Belgium	452	Lithuania	25
Brazil	31	Luxembourg	52
Cambodia	1	Monaco	4
Canada	46,703	Netherlands	700
Czech Republic	32	New Zealand	971
Denmark	309	Norway	3,291
Estonia	11	South Korea	41
Finland	943	Spain	289
France	1,415	Sweden	1,890
Germany	1,239	Switzerland	621
Hungary	15	United Kingdom	5,181
Iceland	56	United States	84,994
Ireland	356	Total 160,970	
Italy	537		

Source: UNHCR (2018, 206). Own calculations.

Country	Table 3 – Number of Resettlement Arrivals in Select Countries by Year, 1980 to 1989									
	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989
AT	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
BE	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
CZ	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
DE	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
DK	440	370	370	490	280	280	380	310	540	800
ES	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
FI	20	-	10	140	60	10	120	290	400	400
FR	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
HU	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
IE	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
IT	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
LU	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
NL	1,440	1,140	610	410	480	440	370	560	700	490
PL	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
PT	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
RO	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
SE	-	-	-	1,370	1,060	670	1,390	1,460	1,480	1,560
UK	6,850	2,750	810	1,220	800	530	830	440	720	720
CAN	40,344	14,980	16,933	13,968	15,360	16,729	18,942	21,290	26,557	36,636
US	207,116	159,252	98,096	61,218	70,393	67,704	62,146	64,528	76,483	107,070
AUS	19,950	21,850	21,920	17,050	14,770	14,850	11,840	11,100	11,080	10,890
NZ	910	1,380	700	680	560	720	680	530	650	1,060

Sources: Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship (2016, no pagination); Refugee Processing Center (2018, no pagination); UNHCR (2000, 122-23) US Department of Homeland Security (2013, table 13). Own calculations.

Country	Table 4 – Number of Resettlement Arrivals in Select Countries by Year, 1990 to 1999									
	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999
AT	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
BE	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
CZ	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
DE	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	15,000
DK	750	860	550	3,206	3,757	20,18	601	501	444	501
ES	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
FI	640	460	670	585	651	642	840	627	304	543
FR	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	8,000
HU	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
IE	-	-	-	-	650	-	-	-	-	1,032
IT	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	-
LU	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	25	-
NL	600	520	570	457	498	492	475	187	524	11
PL	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
PT	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
RO	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
SE	1,460	1,730	3,400	937	7,431	1,956	1,629	1,180	1,130	546
UK	650	490	620	510	260	70	20	-	-	-
CAN	39,727	44,779	30,822	17,427	11,148	11,749	11,057	10,453	9,699	9,791
US	122,066	113,389	115,548	114,181	111,680	98,973	74,791	69,276	76,181	85,076
AUS	11,950	7,750	7,160	10,930	13,557	15,412	11,100	7,816	12,558	8,398
NZ	810	680	620	412	737	822	780	527	677	1,135

Sources: Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship (2016, no pagination); Refugee Processing Center (2018, no pagination); UNHCR (2000, 122-23; 2004, 40); US Department of Homeland Security (2013, table 13). Own calculations.

Country	Table 5 – Number of Resettlement Arrivals in Select Countries by Year, 2000 to 2015															
	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
AT	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4	388	758
BE	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	47	-	29	-	100	34	14
CZ	-	-	-	-	-	15	-	10	-	17	48	-	25	1	5	-
DE	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2,069	469	63	307	293	280	481
DK	464	531	490	509	508	483	530	474	552	433	495	516	476	515	344	592
ES	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	80	-	-	-
FI	756	739	571	562	735	766	547	657	749	724	541	584	731	674	1,089	1,007
FR	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	37	-	407	116	62	89	110	-
HU	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-
IE	40	52	23	54	63	117	198	114	101	192	20	45	39	76	96	176
IT	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	191	58	-	9	-	-	96
LU	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	28	-	-	-	-	28	46
NL	204	223	155	173	323	419	497	569	693	369	431	538	429	311	791	-
PL	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	16	-	-	-
PT	-	-	-	-	-	-	17	-	11	30	33	30	27	6	14	-
RO	-	-	-	-	-	-	38	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	40	-
SE	1,501	1,089	1,042	942	1,801	1,263	2,376	1,845	2,209	1,936	1,786	1,895	1,873	1,902	1,971	1,902
UK	-	-	-	-	150	175	378	515	722	955	715	454	1,039	966	787	1,864
CAN	13,605	12,273	10,550	10,768	10,535	10,401	10,665	11,160	10,808	12,466	12,099	12,947	9,653	12,209	12,875	20,045
US	72,143	69,886	27,131	28,409	52,873	53,813	41,223	48,282	60,191	74,654	73,311	56,424	58,238	69,926	69,987	69,933
AUS	7,330	6,659	9,172	11,855	15,967	11,654	13,439	9,628	11,006	11,080	8,516	9,226	5,937	13,169	11,570	9,399
NZ	699	749	674	653	825	741	703	739	741	727	631	497	781	682	737	808

Sources: Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship (2016, no pagination); Refugee Processing Center (2018, no pagination); UNHCR (2000, 122-23; 2004, 40; 2005, 34; 2005, 7-9; 2007, 84-86; 2008, 8-13; 2008, 71-73; 2009, 160; 2010, 150; 2011, 152; 2013, 153; 2013, 163; 2015, 192; 2017, 198); US Department of Homeland Security (2013, table 13). Own calculations.

Table 6 – Number of Resettlement Arrivals per 1 Million Residents, 2016

Country	Resettlement Arrivals per capita	Country	Resettlement Arrivals per capita
Australia	437.2	Italy	8.8
Austria	23.0	Japan	0.1
Belgium	39.8	Latvia	3.0
Brazil	0.1	Lithuania	8.7
Cambodia	0.0	Luxembourg	89.3
Canada	1287.8	Monaco	103.8
Czech Republic	3.0	Netherlands	41.1
Denmark	53.9	New Zealand	206.8
Estonia	8.3	Norway	628.7
Finland	171.6	South Korea	0.8
France	21.1	Spain	6.2
Germany	15.0	Sweden	190.4
Hungary	1.5	Switzerland	74.1
Iceland	166.9	United Kingdom	78.9
Ireland	74.8	United States	262.8

Sources: UNHCR (2018, 206); World Bank (2018, no pagination). Own calculations.

Country	Table 7 – Number of Resettlement Arrivals (per 1,000,000 people) in Select Countries by Year, 1980 to 1989									
	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989
AT	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
BE	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
CZ	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
DE	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
DK	85.9	72.2	72.3	95.8	54.8	54.8	74.2	60.5	105.3	155.9
ES	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
FI	4.2	-	2.1	28.8	12.3	2.0	24.4	58.8	80.9	80.6
FR	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
HU	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
IE	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
IT	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
LU	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
NL	101.8	80.0	42.6	28.5	33.3	30.4	25.4	38.2	47.4	33.0
PL	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
PT	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
RO	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
SE	-	-	-	164.5	127.2	80.2	166.1	173.9	175.4	183.7
UK	121.6	48.8	14.4	21.7	14.2	9.4	14.6	7.7	12.6	12.6
CAN	1,640.5	601.6	671.9	548.7	597.6	644.9	722.9	801.9	987.4	1338.1
US	911.5	694.0	423.4	261.8	298.5	284.6	258.8	266.3	312.8	433.8
AUS	1,357.9	1,463.8	1,444.2	1,109.4	950.2	942.4	739.1	682.5	670.2	647.7
NZ	292.3	441.6	221.8	212.5	173.5	221.7	209.5	161.9	198.0	321.3

Sources: Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship (2016, no pagination); Refugee Processing Center (2018, no pagination); UNHCR (2000, 122-23) US Department of Homeland Security (2013, table 13); World Bank (2018, no pagination). Own calculations.

Country	Table 8 – Number of Resettlement Arrivals (per 1,000,000 people) in Select Countries by Year, 1990 to 1999									
	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999
AT	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
BE	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
CZ	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
DE	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	182.7
DK	145.9	166.9	106.4	617.9	721.6	385.6	114.2	94.8	83.7	94.1
ES	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
FI	128.3	91.7	132.9	115.5	127.9	125.7	163.9	122.0	59.0	105.1
FR	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	132.2
HU	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
IE	-	-	-	-	181.0	-	-	-	-	274.8
IT	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.1	-
LU	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	58.9	-
NL	40.1	34.5	37.5	29.9	32.4	31.8	30.6	12.0	33.4	0.7
PL	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
PT	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
RO	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
SE	170.6	200.8	392.2	107.5	846.3	221.6	184.3	133.4	127.7	61.6
UK	11.4	8.5	10.8	8.8	4.5	1.2	0.3	-	-	-
CAN	1,429.5	1,589.5	1,080.7	604.4	382.9	400.3	372.6	348.6	320.7	321.0
US	489.0	448.2	450.5	439.3	424.4	371.7	277.6	254.1	276.2	304.9
AUS	700.3	448.4	409.3	618.7	759.3	852.8	606.2	422.1	671.2	443.7
NZ	243.3	194.6	175.6	115.3	203.6	223.8	209.0	139.4	177.5	296.0

Sources: Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship (2016, no pagination); Refugee Processing Center (2018, no pagination); UNHCR (2000, 122-23; 2004, 40); US Department of Homeland Security (2013, table 13); World Bank (2018, no pagination). Own calculations.

Country	Table 9 – Number of Resettlement Arrivals (per 1,000,000 people) in Select Countries by Year, 2000 to 2015															
	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015
AT	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	47.7	45.4	87.8
BE	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	4.4	-	2.6	-	8.9	3.0	1.2
CZ	-	-	-	-	-	1.5	-	1.0	-	1.6	4.6	-	2.4	0.1	0.5	-
DE	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	25.3	5.7	0.8	3.8	3.6	3.5	5.9
DK	86.9	99.1	91.1	94.4	94.0	89.1	97.5	86.8	100.5	78.4	89.2	92.6	85.1	91.7	61.0	104.2
ES	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1.7	-	-
FI	146.1	142.4	109.8	107.8	140.6	146.0	103.9	124.2	141.0	135.6	100.9	108.4	135.0	123.9	199.4	183.8
FR	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.6	-	6.3	1.8	0.9	1.3	1.7	-
HU	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.1	-	-
IE	10.5	13.4	5.8	13.5	15.5	28.1	46.3	25.9	22.5	42.3	4.4	9.8	8.5	16.5	20.8	37.6
IT	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3.2	1.0	-	0.2	-	-	1.6
LU	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	56.2	-	-	-	-	50.3	80.8
NL	12.8	13.9	9.6	10.7	19.8	25.7	30.4	34.7	42.1	22.3	25.9	32.2	25.6	18.5	46.9	-
PL	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.4	-	-	-
PT	-	-	-	-	-	-	1.6	-	1.0	2.8	3.1	2.8	2.6	0.6	1.3	-
RO	-	-	-	-	-	-	1.8	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2.0	-
SE	169.2	122.4	116.8	105.2	200.3	139.9	261.7	201.7	239.6	208.2	190.4	200.5	196.8	198.3	203.3	194.1
UK	-	-	-	-	2.5	2.9	6.2	8.4	11.7	15.3	11.4	7.2	16.3	15.1	12.2	28.6
CAN	442.2	394.9	336.4	339.9	329.3	321.9	327.4	339.3	325.1	370.7	355.8	377.0	277.7	347.3	362.2	559.2
US	255.7	245.2	94.3	97.9	180.6	182.1	138.2	160.3	197.9	243.4	237.0	181.1	185.5	221.2	219.7	217.9
AUS	382.7	343.0	466.7	595.9	793.3	571.4	649.3	462.3	517.9	510.8	386.5	413.0	261.3	569.3	493.2	395.1
NZ	181.2	193.0	170.7	162.1	201.8	179.2	168.0	174.8	173.6	168.5	144.5	112.8	176.2	152.5	163.4	175.8

Sources: Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship (2016, no pagination); Refugee Processing Center (2018, no pagination); UNHCR (2000, 122-23; 2004, 40; 2005, 34; 2005, 7-9; 2007, 84-86; 2008, 8-13; 2008, 71-73; 2009, 160; 2010, 150; 2011, 152; 2013, 153; 2013, 163; 2015, 192; 2017, 198); US Department of Homeland Security (2013, table 13); World Bank (2018, no pagination). Own calculations.

Table 10 – Current Involvement of Voluntary Sector Organisations in Resettlement to Selected Resettlement Countries

Country	Pre-departure			Reception		Orientation and Integration						
	ID/SEL	INFO	PDCO	REC	STH	ORI	TR/IN	AD/RE	LTH	EMP	LANG	VOL
AT	✓											
BE		✓		✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		
CZ		✓					✓	✓			✓	
DE	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
DK	✓	✓							✓	✓	✓	✓
ES				✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	
FI		✓		✓				✓		✓	✓	✓
FR			✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	
HU												
IE	✓			✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
IT				✓				✓				
LU	✓				✓				✓		✓	
NL		✓		✓		✓		✓		✓	✓	✓
PL												
PT	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	
RO			✓			✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	
SE	✓							✓				✓
UK	✓			✓		✓	✓	✓	✓			✓
CAN	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
US	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
AUS	✓			✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓		✓
NZ	✓					✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Note: The table is intended to capture the main roles played by voluntary sector organisations in resettlement, but the list is not exhaustive. Furthermore, the scope of voluntary sector involvement in resettlement may vary by organisation. Post-arrival orientation programmes in some countries may be more formal than in others, and their content may also vary. For further details, please refer to the sources cited below.

Sources: Csehi and Barna (2013, 6-10); Australian Government Department of Immigration and Border Protection (2014, see section entitled ‘Proposer Obligations’; 2015, 10); Ekholm, Magennis, and Salmelin (2005, 26, 40, 105, and 123); Gray (2008, 29-32 and 82-83); International Catholic Migration Commission (2013, 242 and 277-81; 2017, 26 and 28-31); Office of the Minister of Immigration (2017, 5); Refugee Council of Australia (2012, 3); Scharf (2013, 4); Silga (2013, 4); Silska (2013, 5); UNHCR (2014, 10-11; 2014, 13-16; 2014, 13; 2014, 8-11).

Table 11 – Refugee Resettlement Ceilings in the United States by Fiscal Year, 1980 to 2018

1980	231,700	1990	125,000	2000	90,000	2010	80,000
1981	217,000	1991	131,000	2001	80,000	2011	80,000
1982	140,000	1992	142,000	2002	70,000	2012	76,000
1983	90,000	1993	132,000	2003	70,000	2013	70,000
1984	72,000	1994	121,000	2004	70,000	2014	70,000
1985	70,000	1995	112,000	2005	70,000	2015	70,000
1986	67,000	1996	90,000	2006	70,000	2016	85,000
1987	70,000	1997	78,000	2007	70,000	2017	110,000
1988	87,500	1998	83,000	2008	80,000	2018	45,000
1989	116,500	1999	91,000	2009	80,000		

Notes: The US originally adopted a resettlement admissions ceiling of 72,500 for 1988 but later increased the limit to 87,500 (Martin 2005, 17). Similarly, the US established a ceiling of 94,000 in 1989 and 78,000 in 1999 but raised those annual quotas to 116,500 and 91,000, respectively (Martin 2005, 17).

Sources: Martin (2005, 17); Mayorga and Morse (2017, see table 1); US Department of State, US Department of Homeland Security, and US Department of Health and Human Services (2015, 5; 2016, 5; 2017, 6).

Table 12 – Total Number of Refugees Resettled in the United States by Fiscal Year, 1980 to 2017

1980	207,116	1990	122,066	2000	72,143	2010	73,311
1981	159,252	1991	113,389	2001	69,886	2011	56,424
1982	98,096	1992	115,548	2002	27,131	2012	58,238
1983	61,218	1993	114,181	2003	28,403	2013	69,926
1984	70,393	1994	111,680	2004	52,873	2014	69,987
1985	67,704	1995	98,973	2005	53,813	2015	69,933
1986	62,146	1996	74,791	2006	41,223	2016	84,994
1987	64,528	1997	69,276	2007	48,282	2017	53,716
1988	76,483	1998	76,181	2008	60,191	Total: 3,060,295	
1989	107,070	1999	85,076	2009	74,654		

Sources: Refugee Processing Center (2018, see annual tables); US Department of Homeland Security (2013, table 13). Own calculations.

Table 13 – Number of Refugees Resettled to the United States by Top Five Countries of Origin and Fiscal Year, 1980 to 1989

Year	Origin (1)	Number Resettled	Origin (2)	Number Resettled	Origin (3)	Number Resettled	Origin (4)	Number Resettled	Origin (5)	Number Resettled
1980	Laos	32,769	Vietnam	30,072	Cambodia	9,295	USSR	8,136	Cuba	1,784
1981	Vietnam	65,537	Cambodia	38,194	Laos	19,777	USSR	11,151	Afghanistan	4,456
1982	Vietnam	27,396	Poland	6,559	Cambodia	6,246	Ethiopia	4,019	Laos	3,616
1983	Vietnam	22,819	Cambodia	13,041	Poland	5,508	Romania	3,741	Laos	2,907
1984	Vietnam	24,856	Cambodia	19,727	Laos	7,218	Poland	4,300	Romania	4,293
1985	Vietnam	25,222	Cambodia	19,175	Laos	5,195	Romania	4,456	Iran	3,421
1986	Vietnam	21,703	Laos	12,313	Cambodia	9,845	Poland	3,577	Iran	3,203
1987	Vietnam	19,661	Laos	14,597	Iran	6,235	USSR	3,458	Poland	3,406
1988	USSR	20,020	Vietnam	17,571	Laos	14,597	Iran	6,235	Cuba	3,365
1989	USSR	39,387	Vietnam	21,924	Laos	12,560	Amerasian	8,720	Iran	4,835

Note: For fiscal years 1980, 1981, and 1982, only data on the number of resettlement applications approved was available at the time of research. The term ‘Amerasian’ refers to individuals of American and Southeast Asian descent, and reflects the terminology used in the original source documents.

Sources: Office of Refugee Resettlement (1986, appendix table 7; 1996, appendix table 1).

Table 14 – Number of Refugees Resettled to the United States by Top Five Countries of Origin and Fiscal Year, 1990 to 1999

Year	Origin (1)	Number Resettled	Origin (2)	Number Resettled	Origin (3)	Number Resettled	Origin (4)	Number Resettled	Origin (5)	Number Resettled
1990	USSR	49,742	Vietnam	27,796	Amerasian	13,916	Laos	8,715	Cuba	4,706
1991	USSR	38,496	Vietnam	28,385	Amerasian	16,580	Laos	9,232	Romania	4,533
1992	USSR	61,018	Vietnam	26,856	Amerasian	17,140	Haiti	10,440	Laos	7,285
1993	USSR	48,354	Vietnam	31,405	Amerasian	11,220	Laos	6,945	Cuba	6,870
1994	USSR	43,125	Vietnam	34,107	Cuba	15,468	Yugoslavia	7,418	Laos	6,211
1995	Cuba	37,037	USSR	35,509	Vietnam	32,250	Yugoslavia	9,872	Laos	3,682
1996	USSR	29,270	Vietnam	16,116	Yugoslavia	12,020	Somalia	6,440	Cuba	3,517
1997	USSR	26,748	Yugoslavia	21,374	Iraq	9,365	Vietnam	6,611	Somalia	4,948
1998	Yugoslavia	30,823	USSR	23,257	Vietnam	10,266	Somalia	2,952	Liberia	1,637
1999	Yugoslavia	38,620	USSR	16,913	Vietnam	9,622	Somalia	4,321	Liberia	2,493

Note: The term ‘Amerasian’ refers to individuals of American and Southeast Asian descent, and reflects the terminology used in the original source documents. Between 1996 and 2009, the source documents distinguish between Cuba (refugees) and Cuba (entrants). Cuban ‘entrants’ have been excluded from the figures presented above, as this classification refers to asylum seekers rather than resettled refugees.

Sources: Office of Refugee Resettlement (1996, appendix table 1; 2001, table 1).

Table 15 – Number of Refugees Resettled to the United States by Top Five Countries of Origin and Fiscal Year, 2000 to 2009

Year	Origin (1)	Number Resettled	Origin (2)	Number Resettled	Origin (3)	Number Resettled	Origin (4)	Number Resettled	Origin (5)	Number Resettled
2000	Yugoslavia	22,548	USSR	14,576	Somalia	6,022	Iran	5,099	Sudan	3,831
2001	Yugoslavia	15,763	USSR	14,868	Iran	6,581	Sudan	5,950	Somalia	4,939
2002	USSR	9,951	Yugoslavia	5,438	Vietnam	3,049	Cuba	1,922	Iran	1,524
2003	USSR	8,730	Liberia	2,940	Yugoslavia	2,523	Iran	2,452	Sudan	2,092
2004	Somalia	12,813	USSR	8,788	Liberia	7,107	Laos	5,995	Sudan	3,479
2005	USSR	11,272	Somalia	10,106	Laos	8,487	Cuba	6,359	Liberia	4,221
2006	USSR	10,452	Somalia	10,330	Cuba	3,142	Vietnam	3,002	Iran	2,785
2007	Myanmar	9,776	Somalia	6,958	Iran	5,474	USSR	4,583	Burundi	4,525
2008	Iraq	13,755	Myanmar	12,852	Thailand	5,279	Iran	5,257	Bhutan	5,244
2009	Iraq	18,709	Myanmar	18,272	Bhutan	13,317	Iran	5,374	Cuba	4,800

Note: Between 1996 and 2009, the source documents distinguish between Cuba (refugees) and Cuba (entrants). Cuban ‘entrants’ have been excluded from the figures presented above, as this classification refers to asylum seekers rather than resettled refugees.

Sources: Office of Refugee Resettlement (2001, table 1; 2006, table 1; 2010, appendix table 1).

Table 16 – Number of Refugees Resettled to the United States by Top Five Countries of Origin and Fiscal Year, 2010 to 2017

Year	Origin (1)	Number Resettled	Origin (2)	Number Resettled	Origin (3)	Number Resettled	Origin (4)	Number Resettled	Origin (5)	Number Resettled
2010	Iraq	18,016	Myanmar	16,693	Bhutan	12,363	Somalia	4,884	Cuba	4,818
2011	Myanmar	16,972	Bhutan	14,999	Iraq	9,388	Somalia	3,161	Cuba	2,920
2012	Bhutan	15,069	Myanmar	14,148	Iraq	12,233	Somalia	4,921	Cuba	1,948
2013	Iraq	19,000	Myanmar	16,000	Bhutan	9,000	Somalia	8,000	Cuba	4,000
2014	Iraq	20,000	Myanmar	15,000	Somalia	9,000	Bhutan	8,000	DR Congo	5,000
2015	Myanmar	18,386	Iraq	12,676	Somalia	8,858	DR Congo	7,876	Bhutan	5,775
2016	DR Congo	16,370	Syria	12,587	Myanmar	12,347	Iraq	9,880	Somalia	9,020
2017	DR Congo	9,377	Iraq	6,886	Syria	6,557	Somalia	6,130	Myanmar	5,078

Note: In 2013 and 2014, the source documents only provided rounded estimates of the total number of refugees resettled by nationality.

Sources: Office of Refugee Resettlement (2010, appendix table 1; 2011, appendix chart II-4; 2012, appendix table II-6; 2013, 82-83; 2014, 80; 2015, 83; 2016, 8); Refugee Processing Center (2018, see annual tables).

Table 17 – The Total Number of Refugees Resettled to the United States by Year, Age, and Gender, Fiscal Years 2005 to 2015

Year	Total Admissions	Men	Women	Adults	Children
2005	53,738	27,477	26,261	27,544	26,194
2006	41,094	21,188	19,962	21,666	19,484
2007	48,218	25,201	23,016	25,622	22,595
2008	60,107	30,939	29,169	34,229	25,879
2009	74,602	38,491	36,111	44,425	30,177
2010	73,293	38,624	34,669	43,051	30,242
2011	56,384	29,436	26,948	33,464	22,920
2012	58,179	31,380	26,799	35,693	22,486
2013	69,909	37,792	32,117	42,022	27,887
2014	69,975	36,767	33,208	41,032	28,943
2015	69,920	36,584	33,335	38,026	31,894

Note: In 2006, there is a small discrepancy between the total number of refugees resettled (41,094) and the total number of adults and children resettled (41,150). This does not appear to be due to a miscalculation by the author, but could potentially be due to a mistake in the number of children resettled (either under 16 or between the ages of 16-20) reported in the original source.

Sources: US Department of Homeland Security (2006, 42; 2007, 42; 2008, 42; 2009, 42; 2010, 42; 2011, 42; 2012, 42; 2013, 42; 2014, 42; 2016, 42, 2016, 42).

Table 18 – Total Number of Refugees Resettled and Sum of Unaccompanied Minors under Care in the United States since 1979, Fiscal Years 1984 to 1995

Year	Total Resettlement Admissions	Sum of Unaccompanied Minors Under Care Since 1979	Number of Unaccompanied Minors Remaining Under Care	Average Number of Unaccompanied Minor Arrivals (monthly)
1984	70,393	5,733	3,694	Unavailable
1985	67,704	6,895	3,828	Unavailable
1986	62,146	7,637	3,812	48
1987	64,528	8,069	3,381	36
1988	76,483	8,620	3,204	50
1989	107,070	9,456	2,989	45
1990	122,066	10,155	2,861	40
1991	113,389	10,350	2,461	14
1992	115,548	10,638	2,149	6
1993	114,181	10,729	1,651	4
1994	111,680	10,934	1,162	5
1995	98,973	11,221	1,079	20

Sources: Office of Refugee Resettlement (1985, 2; 1986, 2; 1987, 10; 1988, 50-51; 1989, ii; 1990, 38-39; 1991, ii; 1992, 23; 1993, i; 1994, 27; 1995, 26; 1996, 11-12).

Table 19 – Targets for Resettlement through the Government Assisted Refugees Programme by Year, 1990 to 2019

1990	13,000	2000	7,300	2010	7,300-8,000
1991	13,000	2001	7,300	2011	7,400-8,000
1992	13,000	2002	7,500	2012	7,500-8,000
1993	13,000	2003	7,700	2013	6,800-7,100
1994	13,000	2004	7,400	2014	6,900-7,200
1995	13,000	2005	7,300-7,500	2015	5,800-6,500
1996	7,300	2006	7,300-7,500	2016	24,000-25,000
1997	7,300	2007	7,300-7,500	2017	5,000-8,000
1998	7,300	2008	7,300-7,500	2018	6,000-8,000
1999	7,300	2009	7,300-7,500	2019	7,000-9,000

Note: The targets for 1990 through 1995 include members of Designated Classes. The targets for 2013 and 2014 may not include plans to resettle 200 Syrian refugees through the Government Assisted Refugees programme, over and above existing targets.

Sources: Citizenship and Immigration Canada (1997, 55; 1998, 22; 2000, 34; 2001, 46; 2002, 16; 2003, 22; 2004, 25; 2005, 43; 2006, 28; 2007, 32; 2008, 37; 2009, 20; 2009, 18; 2011, 23; 2012, 18; 2013, no pagination; 2014, no pagination; 2015, no pagination; 2016, no pagination); Employment and Immigration Canada (1990, 9); Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada (2017, no pagination); Labman (2016, 71).

Table 20 – Targets for Resettlement through the Private Sponsorship Refugees Programme by Year, 1990 to 2019

1990	24,000	2000	2,800-4,000	2010	3,300-6,000
1991	23,500	2001	2,800-4,000	2011	3,300-6,000
1992	20,000	2002	2,900-4,200	2012	3,800-6,000
1993	20,000	2003	2,900-4,200	2013	4,000-6,500
1994	15,000	2004	3,400-4,000	2014	4,500-6,500
1995	15,000	2005	3,000-4,000	2015	4,500-6,500
1996	2,700-4,000	2006	3,000-4,000	2016	15,000-18,000
1997	2,800-4,000	2007	3,000-4,500	2017	14,000-19,000
1998	2,800-4,000	2008	3,300-4,500	2018	16,000-20,000
1999	2,800-4,000	2009	3,300-4,500	2019	17,000-21,000

Note: The targets for 1990 through 1995 include members of Designated Classes. The targets for 2013 and 2014 may not include plans to resettle up to 1,100 Syrian refugees through the Private Sponsorship of Refugees programme, over and above existing targets.

Sources: Citizenship and Immigration Canada (1997, 55; 1998, 22; 2000, 34; 2001, 46; 2002, 16; 2003, 22; 2004, 25; 2005, 43; 2006, 28; 2007, 32; 2008, 37; 2009, 20; 2009, 18; 2011, 23; 2012, 18; 2013, no pagination; 2014, no pagination; 2015, no pagination; 2016, no pagination); Employment and Immigration Canada (1990, 9); Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada (2017, no pagination); Labman (2016, 71).

Table 21 – Total Number of Refugees Resettled in Canada by Year, 1980 to 2016

1980	40,344	1990	39,727	2000	13,605	2010	12,098
1981	14,980	1991	44,779	2001	12,273	2011	12,947
1982	16,933	1992	30,822	2002	10,550	2012	9,653
1983	13,968	1993	17,427	2003	10,768	2013	12,209
1984	15,360	1994	11,148	2004	10,535	2014	12,873
1985	16,729	1995	11,749	2005	10,401	2015	20,046
1986	18,942	1996	11,057	2006	10,665	2016	46,703
1987	21,290	1997	10,453	2007	11,158	Total: 658,143	
1988	26,557	1998	9,699	2008	10,807		
1989	36,636	1999	9,791	2009	12,461		
Sources: Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship Canada (2016, no pagination; 2018, no pagination). Own calculations.							

Table 22 – Total Number of Refugees Resettled Through the Government Assisted Refugees Programme by Year, 1980 to 2016

1980	19,233	1990	15,493	2000	10,671	2010	7,266
1981	10,593	1991	8,886	2001	8,697	2011	7,363
1982	11,056	1992	6,419	2002	7,506	2012	5,425
1983	9,755	1993	6,928	2003	7,516	2013	5,722
1984	11,343	1994	7,635	2004	7,417	2014	7,625
1985	12,851	1995	8,203	2005	7,425	2015	9,488
1986	13,742	1996	7,868	2006	7,327	2016	23,624
1987	13,857	1997	7,711	2007	7,571	Total: 361,145	
1988	14,279	1998	7,432	2008	7,295		
1989	15,055	1999	7,443	2009	7,425		

Note: The figures above include refugees resettled under the Joint Assistance Sponsorship programme (Grégoire 2017, 4). Disaggregated data on resettlement arrivals through this programme was unavailable at the time of research.

Sources: Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship Canada (2016, no pagination; 2018, no pagination). Own calculations.

Table 23 – Total Number of Refugees Resettled Through the Private Sponsorship of Refugees Programme by Year, 1980 to 2016

1980	21,111	1990	24,234	2000	2,934	2010	4,832
1981	4,387	1991	35,893	2001	3,576	2011	5,584
1982	5,877	1992	24,403	2002	3,044	2012	4,228
1983	4,213	1993	10,499	2003	3,252	2013	6,332
1984	4,017	1994	3,513	2004	3,118	2014	5,071
1985	3,878	1995	3,546	2005	2,976	2015	9,747
1986	5,200	1996	3,189	2006	3,338	2016	18,645
1987	7,433	1997	2,742	2007	3,587	Total: 291,421	
1988	12,278	1998	2,267	2008	3,512		
1989	21,581	1999	2,348	2009	5,036		

Sources: Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship Canada (2016, no pagination; 2018, no pagination). Own calculations.

Table 24 – Number of Refugees Resettled to Canada by Top Five Countries or Regions of Origin and Year, 1981 to 1989

Year	Origin (1)	Number Resettled	Origin (2)	Number Resettled	Origin (3)	Number Resettled	Origin (4)	Number Resettled	Origin (5)	Number Resettled
1981	Asia	8,571	Europe	5,159	South America	77	Africa	55	Caribbean	5
1982	Europe	9,281	Asia	5,668	South America	72	Africa	64	Caribbean	18
1983	Asia	5,123	Europe	4,192	North and Central America	291	South America	122	Africa	107
1984	Vietnam	3,405	Poland	2,064	El Salvador	2,030	Cambodia	1,492	Laos	863
1985	Vietnam	4,210	El Salvador	2,491	Poland	2,209	Cambodia	1,593	Iran	819
1986	Vietnam	3,783	Poland	3,620	El Salvador	2,459	Cambodia	1,665	Ethiopia	905
1987	Poland	4,545	Vietnam	3,890	El Salvador	2,368	Cambodia	1,546	Iran	994
1988	Poland	6,801	Vietnam	4,637	El Salvador	2,091	Iran	1,919	Cambodia	1,492
1989	Poland	12,393	Vietnam	6,378	El Salvador	2,263	Ethiopia	2,136	Iran	1,993

Note: data for 1980 was unavailable at the time of research. Between 1981 and 1983, only information on the number of refugees resettled by geographic region was available at the time of research. The figures presented for these years reflect the number of “designated class” refugees resettled, in keeping with the legislative structure of resettlement and terminology used at the time. As there were multiple designated classes, some of the figures above represent totals calculated by the author.

Sources: Employment and Immigration Canada (1981, 74; 1982, 11; 1983, 11; 1984, 8; 1985, 9; 1986, 9; 1987, 9; 1988, 9).

Table 25 – Number of Refugees Resettled to Canada by Top Five Countries of Nationality and Year, 1990 to 1999

Year	Origin (1)	Number Resettled	Origin (2)	Number Resettled	Origin (3)	Number Resettled	Origin (4)	Number Resettled	Origin (5)	Number Resettled
1990	Poland	11,902	Vietnam	5,279	El Salvador	3,750	Ethiopia	2,174	Iran	2,019
1991	Poland	10,123	El Salvador	5,646	Sri Lanka	4,166	Iran	4,065	Vietnam	3,158
1992	Sri Lanka	7,972	Poland	4,872	Somalia	4,701	Iran	4,323	El Salvador	4,009
1993	Sri Lanka	3,894	Somalia	2,514	Iraq	2,437	Vietnam	2,020	Bosnia	1,653
1994	Bosnia	4,468	Sri Lanka	2,206	Iraq	1,447	Vietnam	1,229	Somalia	735
1995	Bosnia	5,964	Sri Lanka	4,792	Iraq	1,276	Iran	1,263	Afghanistan	1,094
1996	Bosnia	4,963	Sri Lanka	3,612	Afghanistan	1,799	Iran	1,725	Iraq	1,347
1997	Bosnia	3,677	Sri Lanka	2,564	Afghanistan	1,674	Iran	1,665	Somalia	729
1998	Bosnia	3,590	Sri Lanka	2,132	Iran	1,477	Afghanistan	1,354	Croatia	1,285
1999	Bosnia	2,698	Sri Lanka	2,611	Afghanistan	1,816	Iran	1,447	Somalia	1,381

Sources: Citizenship and Immigration Canada (1998, 57; 1999, 57; 2000, 62; 2001, 62); Employment and Immigration (1990, 9; 1991, 9; 1992, 9; 1993, 12; 1994, 12; 1995, 12).

Table 26 – Number of Refugees Resettled to Canada by Top Five Countries or Regions of Origin and Year, 2000 to 2009

Year	Origin (1)	Number Resettled	Origin (2)	Number Resettled	Origin (3)	Number Resettled	Origin (4)	Number Resettled	Origin (5)	Number Resettled
2000	Yugoslavia	3,834	Sri Lanka	3,235	Afghanistan	2,538	Iran	1,503	Pakistan	1,237
2001	Afghanistan	2,917	Sri Lanka	2,504	Pakistan	2,111	Yugoslavia	1,747	Iran	1,474
2002	Afghanistan	2,743	Sri Lanka	2,207	Pakistan	1,237	Colombia	1,729	PR China	1,249
2003	Asia and Pacific	2,636	Europe	2,054	Americas	1,937	Africa	1,293	United States	1,276
2004	Asia and Pacific	1,858	Americas	1,756	Africa and Middle East	1,444	Europe	1,366	United States	691
2005	Asia and Pacific	1,919	Americas	1,630	Africa and Middle East	1,562	Europe	1,121	United States	538
2006	Asia and Pacific	2,246	Africa and Middle East	1,210	Americas	1,203	Europe	787	United States	175
2007	Asia and Pacific	1,718	Americas	1,355	Africa and Middle East	1,272	Europe	807	United States	206
2008	Asia and Pacific	1,472	Americas	984	Africa and Middle East	885	Europe	708	United States	226
2009	Asia and Pacific	1,267	Americas	992	Africa and Middle East	805	Europe	575	United States	142

Sources: Citizenship and Immigration Canada (2012, 22); Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship Canada (2018, no pagination).

Table 27 – Number of Refugees Resettled to Canada by Top Five Countries or Regions of Origin and Year, 2010 to 2016

Year	Origin (1)	Number Resettled	Origin (2)	Number Resettled	Origin (3)	Number Resettled	Origin (4)	Number Resettled	Origin (5)	Number Resettled
2010	Asia and Pacific	1,067	Americas	943	Africa and Middle East	845	Europe	491	United States	133
2011	Americas	1,035	Asia and Pacific	981	Africa and Middle East	771	Europe	439	United States	152
2012	Asia and Pacific	1,420	Asia and Pacific	1,192	Africa and Middle East	756	Europe	464	United States	201
2013	Americas	1,329	Asia and Pacific	674	Africa and Middle East	549	Europe	429	United States	272
2014	Americas	1,364	Asia and Pacific	701	Africa and Middle East	656	Europe	381	United States	258
2015	Americas	1,707	Africa and Middle East	703	Asia and Pacific	642	Europe	512	United States	264
2016	Americas	1,607	Africa and Middle East	644	Asia and Pacific	483	Europe	386	United States	292

Source: Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship Canada (2018, no pagination).

Table 28 – The Total Number of Refugees Resettled to Canada by Year, Age, and Gender, 1980 to 1994

Year	Total Admissions	Males	Females	Adults	Children
1980	40,344	22,697	17,651	28,022	12,326
1981	14,980	8,444	6,536	10,866	4,114
1982	16,933	9,781	7,146	12,665	4,262
1983	13,968	8,410	5,559	10,456	3,513
1984	15,360	9,271	6,071	11,420	3,922
1985	16,729	10,063	6,697	12,322	4,438
1986	18,942	11,387	7,760	14,181	4,966
1987	21,290	12,824	8,741	16,163	5,402
1988	26,557	15,889	10,947	20,222	6,614
1989	36,636	21,823	15,181	28,389	8,615
1990	39,727	23,714	15,975	30,486	9,203
1991	44,779	32,859	20,542	42,562	10,839
1992	30,822	31,795	20,080	41,652	10,223
1993	17,427	17,449	12,933	23,674	6,708
1994	11,148	10,735	8,354	14,686	4,403

Note: the original source provided data on the number of male and female refugees resettled by various age groups, ranging from 0-4 to 65 and older. The author calculated the total number of male and female refugees by adding together the figures for each age group. The author also calculated the total number of adults resettled by adding together the figures for the number of males and females aged 20 to 65 and older. Finally, the author calculated the total number of children resettled by adding together the number of male and female refugees aged 0 to 19. The number of males and females and adults and children may not equal the figures given in the total admission column, as the source data captures both 'refugees' (asylum seekers) and 'members of designated classes' (resettled refugees).

Sources: Employment and Immigration Canada (1985, 9; 1990, 9; 1995, 12).

Robert (Bob) Carey

Bob Carey is the former Vice President of Resettlement and Migration Policy at the International Rescue Committee, a post he held between 2009 and 2014. Prior to that appointment, Mr Carey spent 10 years as the Vice President for Resettlement at the International Rescue Committee (Ethiopian Community Development Council 2015, para. 4 of 4). However, his involvement in resettlement dates back to the 1980s, when he accepted a position with the Tolstoy Foundation which involved preparing and screening resettlement applications for Cambodian refugees (Office of Refugee Resettlement 2015, para. 3 of 5). Mr Carey was the Chair of Refugee Council USA between 2009 and 2011, and in 2015, he succeeded Eskinder Negash as Director of the Office of Refugee Resettlement where he worked until 2017 (LinkedIn 2018, no pagination).

Ruth Famini

Ruth Famini is the Director of National Resettlement Programs at World Relief. Ms Famini joined the organisation in 1997 as a Coordinator for the Match Grant Program, and later became the Match Grant Program Manager (LinkedIn 2018, no pagination).

Aaron Gershowitz

Aaron Gershowitz is the former Associate Vice President of Global Program Operations at HIAS. He is now Associate Vice President of Program Operations and, in that capacity, is responsible for establishing and overseeing HIAS's domestic resettlement and immigration services (LinkedIn 2018, no pagination). Mr Gershowitz has been with the organisation for more than 18 years, and previously served as the Director of Refugee and Immigrant Services. Prior to joining HIAS, Mr Gershowitz represented clients called to appear before immigration courts in New York City (LinkedIn 2018, no pagination).

Anam Gnaho

Anam Gnaho is the former Self-Sufficiency Programs Manager at the Ethiopian Community Development Council, and has since been appointed Associate Director of Self-Sufficiency Programs (Ethiopian Community Development Council 2018, para. 1 of 13). Ms Gnaho has also worked for other voluntary sector organisations, as well as international organisations and in the public sector (Ethiopian Community Development Council 2018, para. 1 of 13).

Erol Kekic

Erol Kekic is the Executive Director of Church World Service's Immigration and Refugee Program. Mr Kekic—a former refugee from Bosnia—joined Church World Service in 2000, and served as the Associate Director of the Immigration and Refugee Program prior to his appointment as Executive Director in 2008 (Church World Service 2015, para. 4 of 6; PRI and WNYC 2015, para. 3 of 5). Mr Kekic has also held management positions at the Lutheran Family and Community Service and the Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Service (Church World Service 2008, para. 5 of 6).

Dan Kosten

Dan Kosten is the former Senior Vice President of US Programs at World Relief. Born to missionaries working in Taiwan, Mr Kosten worked in Africa as part of the Peace Corps, and joined World Relief in 2001 (Houghton College 2017, para 1 and 2 of 16). In June 2017, Mr Kosten was appointed Policy and Advocacy Assistant Director for Skills and Workforce Development at the National Immigration Forum (National Immigration Forum 2018, para. 1 and 2 of 3), an organisation which, since 1982 has advocated for “the value of immigrants and immigration” and “worked to advance sound federal immigration solutions through its policy expertise, communications outreach and coalition building work [...] (National Immigration Forum 2018, para. 2 of 8).”

Lavinia Limón

Lavinia Limón is the former President and Chief Executive Officer of the US Committee for Refugees and Immigrants. She has 43 years of experience working in refugee assistance, including 16 years working with the US Committee for Refugees and Immigrants (Alfred 2016, para. 10 of 13; US Committee for Refugees and Immigrants 2008, 7). Ms Limón began her career in 1975, assisting resettled Indochinese refugees arriving at Camp Pendleton in California (SourceWatch 2007, para. 3 of 4). Ms Limón has considerable field experience, and has worked with refugees in countries as diverse as Costa Rica, Saudi Arabia, and Thailand (SourceWatch 2007, para. 3 of 4). In the 1980s, Ms Limón became the Executive Director of the International Institute of Los Angeles, and co-founded the Coalition for Humane Immigrant Rights of Los Angeles (Gutierrez 2012, para. 3 of 8). In 1993, President Clinton appointed her Director of the Office of Refugee Resettlement, where she served for six years (International Institute of Los Angeles 2016, para. 33 of 86). Ms Limón has also worked for Church World Service and the International Rescue Committee (US Committee for Refugees and Immigrants 2008, 7). In June 2017, Ms Limón announced her intention to retire in September 2018 (US Committee for Refugees and Immigrants 2017, para. 1 of 8).

Michael (Mike) Mitchell

Mike Mitchell is the former Vice President for Programs and Protection at the Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Service, which he joined in 2012 (Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Service 2015, 1). Mr Mitchell spent his childhood in countries as diverse as Afghanistan, Indonesia, and South Africa, but attended university in the US (Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Service 2015, 1). Thereafter, he forged a career working for the Governor of Virginia and former Vice President Al Gore before moving into the voluntary sector (Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Service 2015, 1). Mr Mitchell is now Associate Vice President of U.S. Programs at HIAS (HIAS no date, para. 1 of 2).

Eskinder Negash

Eskinder Negash is the former Director of the Office of Refugee Resettlement, a post he held between 2009 and 2015. Mr Negash has said that he has a “very personal” commitment to refugees and other migrants due to his own experience fleeing Ethiopia in 1980 (International Rescue Committee 2011, at 0:58; Office of Refugee Resettlement 2009, para. 1 of 4; Teich 2016, para. 4 of 7). The International Rescue Committee later sponsored his application to immigrate to the US, and he soon began working at the International Rescue Committee office in Los Angeles, California (International Rescue Committee 2011, para. 3 and 4 of 5). Mr Negash’s career spans nearly 40 years, and during this time he has developed considerable experience working with immigrants and refugees, managing voluntary sector organisations, and taken on a leadership role in the public sector (US Committee for Refugees and Immigrants 2017, para. 3 and 4 of 8). Prior to his appointment as Director of the Office of Refugee Resettlement, he served as the Vice President and Chief Operating Officer of the US Committee for Refugees and Immigrants (US Committee for Refugees and Immigrants 2017, para. 4 of 8). For 15 years, Mr Negash served as the Vice President and Chief Administrative Officer for the International Institute of Los Angeles, an organisation founded in 1914 whose mission is to “help families become self-sufficient, and to promote cross-cultural understanding (Beloit College 2017, para. 1 of 2; International Institute of Los Angeles 2016, no pagination).” The International Institute has historically provided reception and integration services for a broad range of resettled refugees, including Hungarian, Vietnamese, and Hmong refugees, among others (International Institute of Los Angeles 2016, para. 16, 24, and 34 of 86). Mr Negash has also acted as chair of the Joint Voluntary Agencies Committee of California, chaired the California State Refugee Advisory Council, and served as a board member of the Coalition for Human Immigrant Rights of Los Angeles (Beloit College 2017, para 2 of 2). Later, as Director of the Office of Refugee Resettlement, Mr Negash oversaw the delivery of

benefits and services to more than 850,000 refugees and other persons in need of protection, including more than 400,000 resettled refugees (US Committee for Refugees and Immigrants 2015, para. 1 of 3). In April 2015, Mr Negash returned to the US Committee for Refugees and Immigrants as Vice President for Global Engagement, and he has since become the Acting Chief Executive Officer (US Committee for Refugees and Immigrants 2017, para. 2 of 8).

Emily Nesheim Bullock

Emily Nesheim Bullock is the former Refugee Resettlement Program Manager at the Ethiopian Community Development Council, but she has since been appointed Associate Director of the Refugee Resettlement Program (Ethiopian Community Development Council 2018, para. 5 of 13). Ms Nesheim Bullock previously served as the Immigration Services Coordinator for the Refugee Resettlement Department at the Lutheran Social Service of Minnesota (Ethiopian Community Development Council 2018, para. 5 of 13).

David M. Robinson

Ambassador David M. Robinson is a career diplomat who has served in numerous conflict zones and so become a ‘specialist’ in migration and refugee issues (Department of State 2017, para. 1 of 3). At the time of the interview, Ambassador Robinson was the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration—a post he held between 2009 and 2013. Following his tenure in the Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration, Ambassador Robinson served as the Assistant Chief of Mission at the American Embassy in Afghanistan until 2013, when he became the Principal Deputy High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina and assumed a leading role in the implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement (Department of State 2017, para. 2 of 3). In March 2017, the former Ambassador became the Executive Director of Jesuit Refugee Service USA, an organisation that “accompanies, serves and advocates for the rights of refugees and other forcibly displaced persons (Jesuit Refugee Service 2017, para. 1 of 5).” Ambassador Robinson has stated that he developed a “lasting commitment” to refugees and other migrants while at the Department of State, which also enabled him to acquire experience working with refugees from Africa as well as Afghanistan, Macedonia, and Syria (Jesuit Refugee Service 2017, para. 3 of 5).

Greg Scott

Greg Scott is the Associate Director of Grants and Program Administration at the US Conference of Catholic Bishops, a position he has held since 2012 (LinkedIn 2018, no pagination).

Sovanna Sok

Sovanna Sok is a Placements Coordinator at the Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Service (Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Service 2013, para. 2 of 8). Ms Sok is a former refugee from Cambodia who was initially resettled in Utica, New York (Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Service 2011, para. 6 of 11).

Deborah Stein

Deborah Stein is the Director of Episcopal Migration Ministries, a position she held between 2000 and 2016 (LinkedIn 2018, no pagination). Ms Stein has more than 20 years of experience working with refugees, both in the US and in Croatia and Macedonia, having worked at a number of voluntary agencies including Church World Service, HIAS, the International Rescue Committee, and Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Service (Torrey 2016, para. 2 of 9). In 2017, Ms Stein utilised her considerable experience in resettlement to act as the Lead Consultant for the Syrian Refugee Resettlement Project at Harvard Law School (LinkedIn 2018, no pagination).

Johnny Young

Ambassador Johnny Young is the former Executive Director of Migration and Refugee Services at the US Conference of Catholic Bishops, a position he held from 2007 until his retirement in February 2015 (Catholic News Service 2015, para. 1 of 20). Born into impoverished circumstances in Savannah, Georgia, he joined the US Foreign Service in 1967 and became one of only a handful of black Americans in the Foreign Service (Kennedy 2005, para. 4 and 33 of 86). Mr Young's first posting was in Madagascar, and he later served at the American embassies in Guinea—where he was detained following a failed Portuguese-led coup d'état in November 1970—as well as in Kenya, Qatar, and Barbados (Kennedy 2005, para. 2. 33, and 51 to 77 of 86). In 1989, Mr Young was appointed Ambassador to Sierra Leone, where he “worked with Liberian refugees (Catholic News Service 2015, para. 15 of 20).” Ambassador Young said the experience showed him “firsthand what it means to be a refugee (Catholic News Service 2015, para. 15 of 20).” He later served as Ambassador to Togo, Bahrain, and Slovenia before retiring from the Foreign Service in 2005 (Kennedy 2005, para. 1 and 2 of 86). In recognition of his “especially distinguished service,” Ambassador Young was conferred the rank of Career Ambassador in 2004 (Department of State, no date, para. 1 of 1).

Wally Boxhill

Wally Boxhill is the Director of Functional Guidance and Policy Engagement at Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship Canada, where he has served since 2006 (Refugee Sponsorship Training Program 2015, 1). In 1978, Mr Boxhill graduated from Carleton University with a Master of Arts degree in international affairs (Refugee Sponsorship Training Program 2015, 1). His interest in international affairs led him to a position at the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, where he acted as a Technical Assistance Expert (Refugee Sponsorship Training Program 2015, 1). In addition to working at Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship Canada, Mr Boxhill served at the Public Service Human Resources Management Agency of Canada, Statistics Canada, and the Treasury Board Secretariat (Refugee Sponsorship Training Program 2015, 1). He is the author of several publications, including reports on immigration and minorities in Canada (Refugee Sponsorship Training Program 2015, 1).

Rita Chahal

Ms Chahal has been the Executive Director of the Manitoba Interfaith Immigration Council, the “largest settlement agency” in the province, since 2013 (LinkedIn 2018, no pagination). Before becoming Executive Director at the Manitoba Interfaith Immigration Council, Ms Chahal served as General Manager of the Manitoba Chambers of Commerce, the largest business and community interest group in the province (LinkedIn 2018, no pagination; Canadian Race Relations Foundation 2016, para. 1 of 4). Ms Chahal herself is an immigrant to Canada, having emigrated from India with her family to Gander, Newfoundland in December 1966 (Canadian Museum of Immigration at Pier 21 2015, no pagination).

Derrick Deans

Derrick Deans is the former Assistant Director of Refugee Affairs at Citizenship and Immigration Canada and is now the Assistant Director of the PSR programme at Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship Canada. Mr Deans spoke to the author in a personal capacity.

Rose Dekker

Rose Dekker was the Refugee Coordinator at World Renew from 2004 until her retirement in 2014 (Dekker 2017, para. 5 of 10). She previously served as the Co-chair of the Overseas Protection and Sponsorship Working Group at the Canadian Council for Refugees, and represented the Canadian Council for Refugees at the UNHCR's Annual Tripartite Consultations on Resettlement in 2012 (Canadian Council for Refugees 2012, para. 3 of 3).

Tom Denton

Tom Denton is the Executive Director of Sponsorship at Hospitality House Refugee Ministry—a position he has held since 2006 (Refugee Sponsorship Training Program 2015, 6). Trained as a lawyer, Mr Denton became involved in resettlement in 1979 when he applied to resettle a refugee through the newly created PSR programme (Refugee Sponsorship Training Program 2015, 6). In 2015, Mr Denton managed more than 1,300 applications for resettlement through the PSR programme, representing approximately 3,000 refugees (Refugee Sponsorship Training Program 2015, 6). In addition to his work with Hospitality House Refugee Ministry, Mr Denton previously served as Executive Director of the International Centre in Winnipeg—now the Manitoba Interfaith Immigration Council (Refugee Sponsorship Training Program 2015, 6). He has also served on the SAH Council, and played a formative role in the formation of the Canadian Refugee Sponsorship Agreement Holders (Refugee Sponsorship Training Program 2015, 6).

Shelley Duffin

Ms Duffin is a former Senior Policy Analyst in Refugee Affairs at Citizenship and Immigration Canada. In that capacity, Ms Duffin attended the 2006 meeting of the Executive Committee of the High Commissioner's Programme as part of the Canadian delegation (United Nations 2006, 8). Since the interview, Ms Duffin has been appointed Senior Policy Analyst in the Social Immigration Policy and Programs Division at Immigration, Refugees, and Citizenship Canada. Ms Duffin is also currently a member of a private sponsorship group called Ottawa Welcomes, which has sponsored a family of Syrian refugees who arrived in Ottawa in November 2016 (Ottawa Welcomes 2017, para. 1 of 8).

Brian Dyck

Brian Dyck is the former Refugee Assistance Program Coordinator at the Mennonite Central Committee in Winnipeg, Manitoba. At the time of the interview, Mr Dyck was also Chair of the SAH Council—a position he held for three years (Refugee Sponsorship Training Program 2015, 1). Before joining the Mennonite Central Committee, Mr Dyck worked as a pastor in isolated communities in the province and also served as a missionary in South Africa (Refugee Sponsorship Training Program 2015, 1). Since February 2015, Mr Dyck has been the National Migration and Resettlement Program Coordinator for the Mennonite Central Committee (Refugee Sponsorship Training Program 2015, 1).

Michelle Manks

Michelle Manks is the Manager of the Student Refugee Program at World University Service Canada—a role she has held since 2008 (Refugee Sponsorship Training Program 2015, 4). In that capacity, Ms Manks she endeavours to engage university students in refugee resettlement and integration issues and provides training and support to the 65 Constituent Groups located at universities across Canada (Refugee Sponsorship Training Program 2015, 4). Ms Manks also manages the World University Service Canada programmes that operate in countries of asylum in Africa, the Middle East, and in Southeast Asia (Refugee Sponsorship Training Program 2015, 4).

Paula Marshall

Paula Marshall is the Immigrant and Refugee Services Liaison for the Salvation Army of Canada—a position she has held since 2012 (Refugee Sponsorship Training Program 2015, 5). In that capacity, Ms Marshall manages applications for resettlement through the PSR programme and provides information and support to Constituent Groups operating under the umbrella of the Salvation Army’s Sponsorship Agreement (Refugee Sponsorship Training Program 2015, 5). In addition to working with the Salvation Army, Ms Marshall was Chair of the Southern Ontario Sponsors Group in 2015 and has pursued studies in immigration and refugee law (Refugee Sponsorship Training Program 2015, 5).

Ian McBride

Ian McBride is the Executive Director of the Anglican United Refugee Alliance (AURA)—a position he has held for more than 15 years (Hutchinson 2015, para. 1 of 5). Prior to becoming the Executive Director, Mr McBride sat on the Board of Directors of AURA (Hutchinson 2015, para. 3 of 5).

Adeena Niazi

Adeena Niazi is the founder and Executive Director of the Afghan Women's Counselling and Integration Community Support Organization. Born in Afghanistan, Ms Niazi lectured at Kabul University before fleeing the country following the invasion by Soviet forces in 1979 (Afghan Women's Counselling and Integration Community Support Organization 2018, para. 1 of 3). Ms Niazi immigrated to Canada in 1989 and began working with refugees at the Afghan Association of Ontario (Afghan Women's Counselling and Integration Community Support Organization 2018, para. 2 of 3). Ms Niazi founded the Afghan Women's Organization in 1990 to "draw greater attention to the plight of Afghan women" and she remains an ardent advocate on "gender issues within the Afghan community" today (Afghan Women's Counselling and Integration Community Support Organization 2018, para. 3 of 3).

Gail Schnabl

Gail Schnabl is the Refugee Coordinator for the Anglican Diocese of Rupert's Land in Winnipeg, Manitoba (Diocese of Rupert's Land 2018, para. 6 of 6). In addition to her diocesan work, Ms Schnabl is a member of the Board of Hospitality House Refugee Ministry—one of its Constituent Groups (Hospitality House Refugee Ministry 2018, no pagination).

Rob Shropshire

Rob Shropshire is the Program Coordinator for Refugee Sponsorship and Special Projects at the Presbyterian Church in Canada—a position he has held since 2013. In this capacity, Mr Shropshire manages and supports Presbyterian churches in the process of applying to resettle refugees through the PSR programme (Refugee Sponsorship Training Program 2015, 5). Mr Shropshire has long been active in resettlement; in 1985, he joined a group of five Canadians seeking to resettle refugees through the PSR programme (Refugee Sponsorship Training Program 2015, 5). Between 1987 and 1990, Mr Shropshire worked for the Working Group on Refugee Resettlement—now the Anglican United Refugee Alliance (AURA) (Refugee Sponsorship Training Program 2015, 5).

Donald (Don) Smith

Don Smith is the Chair of the Refugee Working Group at the Incorporated Synod of the Diocese of Ottawa. In this role, Mr Smith has facilitated the resettlement of more than 100 refugees to the Ottawa area, including refugees from Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rwanda, Vietnam, and most recently, Syria (Griffiths 2017, para. 13 of 26). Mr Smith is also an Executive Member of a grassroots organisation known as Refugee 613, which describes itself as a “coalition of citizens, settlement agencies, sponsorship groups and community partners working to provide refugees with the building blocks of successful integration [...] (Refugee 613 no date, para. 1 of 19).”

Ed Wiebe

Ed Wiebe is the former National Refugee Program Co-ordinator for the Mennonite Central Committee Canada. He retired from his position in January 2015.

Ellen Woolaver

Ellen Woolaver is the Refugee Sponsorship Administrator at the Christie Street Refugee Welcome Centre. Ms Woolaver is a member of the Community Advisory Committee for Lifeline Syria—a voluntary sector organisation formed in 2015 to “recruit, train and assist sponsoring groups to welcome and support refugee families during their first year in the [Greater Toronto Area] (Lifeline Syria 2017, no pagination; Lifeline Syria 2017, para. 5 of 5).” In addition, Ms Woolaver sits on the Steering Committee for Lifeline Syria (Lifeline Syria 2017, no pagination).

Senior Official from Citizenship and Immigration Canada

This senior official from Citizenship and Immigration Canada had more than 30 years of experience on immigration and refugee issues at the time of the interview, including in the field and in policymaking. This official had also represented Canada at various UNHCR for a on resettlement.