The London School of Economics and Political Science

Of Military and Militancy

Praetorianism and Islam in Pakistan

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Declaration

I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the MPhil/PhD degree of the London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work other than where I have clearly indicated that it is the work of others (in which case the extent of any work carried out jointly by me and any other person is clearly identified in it).

I declare that my thesis consists of **97,963** words.

I have followed the Chicago Manual of Style, 16th edition, for referencing. However, in keeping with British practice, I have used single rather than double quotation marks. I have also used British spelling except in cases of quoted text that originally appears in American English, official names or titles.

Abstract

This thesis examines the emergence of praetorianism in Pakistan and its relationship with militant Islamism from the establishment of Pakistan since independence in 1947. It analyses the evolution of civil-military relations in Pakistan, paying particular attention to the processes of state construction, inherent weaknesses of the country's political and economic institutions, impact of significant regional events such as the Soviet-Afghan war, and chronic hostility with India. It focuses specifically on how these aspects of Pakistan's historical experience impacted firstly, the phenomenon of military interventionism and, secondly, its evolving relationship with militant Islamism.

This thesis also seeks to demystify the controversial relationship between the Pakistani military and Islamist militancy through a historically and conceptually grounded analysis. It does so by exploring the interface between praetorianism and militant Islamism in Pakistan through the lens of path dependency within a conceptual framework derived from historical institutionalism. Here it looks at the persistence of patterns in the course of the country's institutional development as a reflection of the role of key players, their interests and strategies and the distribution of power amongst them. It factors in ideas of critical junctures, historical causation and increasing returns, to help to foment a deeper understanding of praetorianism and its evolving association with Islamism over time.

Finally, it examines the constraints placed by Islamists, a combination of religio-political parties and militant groups, on the military's expanding practical and political influence within the state. By bringing to light the historical role accorded to religious ideology within the Pakistani polity, it analyses the codification of a pervasive Islamist discourse within domestic and foreign policy. It reveals how powerful military regimes adopted and intensified the recourse to Islamism to augment their strategic and institutional ambitions, but in doing so were handicapped by this very dependence. Taken together the insights gleaned from this approach sets the thesis apart from the bulk of scholarship on civil-military relations in Pakistan, which has to date focused upon the overarching idea of military as a *colossus* or hegemon with few limitations on its power.

This thesis advances two key arguments. First, it argues that the rise and entrenchment of praetorianism in Pakistan was based essentially upon the path-dependent trajectory of civil-military relations, incorporating Islamism as a self-reinforcing feature, to meet political, administrative and strategic needs. Second, it posits that this dependence in the long run served to limit the military's power and influence over the state.

By essentially re-contextualising the understanding of civil-military relations in Pakistan and situating the issue of Islamist militancy within this framework therefore, this thesis provides fresh insights on the contentious relationship between the Pakistani military and Islamist militancy.

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Above all I would like to thank my parents – my father for being the bedrock of my moral and intellectual compass and my mother for being my peace, strength and sanctuary. Without their faith and unflinching support, this PhD would have not been possible. It is therefore to my parents that I dedicate this PhD with eternal gratitude.

Transliteration

The system of transliteration adopted in this thesis for Arabic is a simplified version of that recommended by the International Journal of Middle East Studies (IJMES). It employs IJMES' transliteration of consonants and vowels but omits all diacritics. The plural of words is formed by adding an 's' to the singular, with the exception of Arabic broken plural forms such as *'ulama'* and *'madaris'*. Other exceptions include some personal names titles or words that appear as cited in particular works or texts in western languages. Words transliterated from Arabic are italicised.

The transliteration of Urdu used in this thesis comes from the 'Dictionary of Urdu, Classical Hindi and English' by John T. Platts. The plural of words is used in Urdu form. All translations from Urdu to English are my own unless otherwise stated.

List of Abbreviations

AIML – All India Muslim League

AKMC – Azad Kashmir Muslim Conference

APS – Army Public School

C-in-C – Commander in Chief

CENTO – Central Treaty Organisation

CJCS – Chairman Joint Chief of Staff

CMLA – Chief Martial Law Administrator

COAS – Chief of Army Staff

CSP – Civil Service of Pakistan

CSS – Central Superior Services

DCC – Defence Committee of the Cabinet

DG – Director General

EBDO – Elected Bodies Disqualification Act

FATA – Federally Administered Tribal Areas

FIA – Federal Investigation Agency

FO – Foreign Office

FOIA – Freedom of Information Act

FSC – Federal Shariat Court

FSF – Federal Security Force

GHQ – General Headquarters

GID – General Intelligence Directorate

HJI – Harkat Jihad-e-Islami

HuA – Harkat-ul-Ansar

HuM – Hizb-ul-Mujahidin

IJI – Islami Jamhoori Ittihad

IPRI – Islamabad Policy Research Institute

IPS – Institute of Policy Studies

IRS – Institute of Regional Studies

ISS – Institute of Strategic Studies

IJT – Islami Jamiat-i-Tulaba

ISI – Inter Services Intelligence

ISS – Institute of Strategic Studies

JCO – Junior Commissioned Officer

JeM – Jaish-e-Muhammad

JI – Jamaat-i-Islaami

JKLF – Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front

JUH – Jamiat-Ulama Hind

JUI – F – Jamiat-Ulama-i-Islam (Fazl-i-Haq Group)

JUI – S - Jamiat-Ulama-i-Islam (Sami-ul-Haq Group)

JUP – Jamiat Ulama-e-Pakistan

KANUPP – Karachi Nuclear Power Plant

KPK – Khyber Pukhtoonkhwa

LeJ – Lashkar-e- Jhangvi

LeT – Lashkar-e-Tayyiba

LFO – Legal Framework Order

LOC – Line of Control

MI – Military Intelligence

MMA – Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal

MODA – Ministry Of Defence Affairs

MQM – Muttahida Qaoumi Movement

MRD – Movement for the Restoration of Democracy

NA – National Assembly

NAB – National Accountability Bureau

NACTA – National Counter Terrorism Authority

NAP – National Awami Party

NCO – Non-commissioned Officer

NRB – National Reconstruction Bureau

NRO – National Reconciliation Ordinance

NSC – National Security Council

NWFP – North West Frontier Province

PA – Provincial Assembly

PATA – Provincially Administered Tribal Areas

PCO – Provisional Constitutional Order

PDA – Pakistan Democratic Alliance

PMA – Pakistan Military Academy

PML (Q) – Pakistan Muslim League (Quaid-e-Azam Group)

PML-N – Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz Sharif Group)

PNA – Pakistan National Alliance

PNA – Pakistan National Alliance

PODO – Public Offices Disqualification Order

PRODA – Public and Representative Office Disqualification Act

RCO – Revival of the Constitutional Order

PPP – Pakistan Peoples Party

SASSI - South Asian Strategic Stability Institute

SEATO – South East Asia Treaty Organisation

SMP – Sipah-e-Muhammad Pakistan

SPDC – Social Policy and Development Centre

SSG – Special Services Group

TJ – Tablighi Jamaat

TJP – Tehrik-e-Jafaria Pakustan

TNSM – Tehrik-e-Nifaaz Shariat-e-Muhammadi

TTP - Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan

UP – Uttar Pradesh

Introduction

16 December 2014 began as an ordinary school day for the pupils of the Army Public School in the north-western city of Peshawar. As they filed into the auditorium after the morning assembly nothing would prepare them for the unspeakable horror that lay ahead. Located within the supposedly secure precinct of the military cantonment, half-a-dozen men in Pakistani paramilitary Frontier Corps uniforms making an appearance at the school did not seem out of place. As the first visitor blew himself up at the gates, however, the peace of the morning was irrevocably shattered. Forcing their way into the school, the remaining assailants designated the school auditorium as the main execution site of what later became known as the Peshawar Massacre. The interminable ordeal ended only after a methodical commando operation conducted by the Pakistani Army's Special Services Group (SSG) post-nightfall. Amidst the pools of blood and heaps of rubble, 144 young lives, mostly between the ages of 14 and 16, were forever extinguished that day. A faction of the *Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)* claimed responsibility for the attack – the deadliest in the history of Pakistan, as retribution for Pakistan's military operation *Zarb-e-Azb* (Strike of the Sword of the Prophet Muhammad) launched in June that year against militant strongholds.

Having for decades lived with sectarian violence amidst rising socio-economic tensions, Pakistanis were no strangers to terrorist outrages. The scale and cold-blooded nature of the APS massacre, however, resonated across the country. Alongside the overwhelming grief and searing anger, which united the disparate sections of Pakistani society, arose the determination to prevent similar tragedies from occurring again. It prompted the normally languid civilian government to briefly emerge from its stupor and react to the surge of public fury. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif announced three days of national mourning proclaiming:

This was a national tragedy, unleashed by savages. No one should be in any doubt: this struggle, this war will continue. The government started the anti-terrorist operation in conjunction with the army and it is now showing results. It will continue until terrorism is rooted out from this land. I appeal to the nation to show unity at this critical juncture. No one should have doubts about our determination to fight terrorism. We will take revenge for each and every drop of our children's blood that was spilled today.[1]

But therein lay a glaring irony: the Prime Minister of the country taking credit for an operation neither conceived nor implemented by his government. That this announcement was followed swiftly by the lifting of a moratorium on judicial executions in terrorist cases and an amendment to the country's constitution allowing cases of civilian terrorists to be tried in military courts was telling. A day after the attack, the Chief of Army Staff (COAS) General Raheel Sharif flew to Afghanistan to discuss a joint strategy with the Afghan President. The fact that it was the Army Chief, accompanied by the head of the country's premier intelligence agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), and not the Prime Minister of Pakistan to meet the Afghan President and the NATO Commander General in Afghanistan reiterated the impotence of the country's civilian administration in the times of national crisis.

Events in 2009 had demonstrated an escalation in domestic insurgency specifically targeting military personnel. In October the military's General Headquarters (GHQ) came under siege by gunmen wearing military uniforms and taking civilian and military personnel hostage within a secure compound in Rawalpindi – one of the most heavily guarded cities in Pakistan. The humiliating lapse in security saw the SSG deployed for the hostage rescue operation but unable to prevent 23 deaths. December that year saw another frenzied assault at a mosque frequented by senior army officers and their families, again in Rawalpindi, five

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[1] Peter Popham, 'Peshawar school attack: "I will never forget the black boots...it was like death approaching me,"' *The Independent,* 16 December 2014. Retrieved 25 August 2015, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/peshawar-school-attack-i-will-never-forget-the-black-bootsit-was-like-death-approaching-me-9929563.html

minutes from the GHQ. Amongst the 40 dead were two serving generals and four senior officers. The brazen nature of this suicide attack, claimed by yet another faction of the Pakistan *Taliban*, was unprecedented since it occurred during Friday prayers, on the holiest day of the week. Combined with the Peshawar massacre, these tragedies were a glaring reminder that militant groups, historically patronised as formidable *strategic assets* by the Pakistani state, had definitively turned rogue. It also also underscored the necessity of understanding the peculiar nature of the military's relationship with Pakistani state and society and thereby its divergent interface with Islamism in its various guises.

The predominance of the Pakistani military in state affairs has generated much debate and controversy, particularly with regards to its relationship with Islamist militancy in recent years. Notable scholarly works on civil-military relations largely present an unfettered, hegemonic nature as a key attribute of the Pakistani military establishment thereby holding it predominantly responsible for impeding the evolution of democratic institutions in the country. This thesis scrutinises some of the prevailing arguments in existing literature for presenting the military as a *colossus* in the Pakistani polity. It establishes that differences highlighted in existing scholarship between the *modus operandi* of the civilian and military regimes in Pakistan may be overstated. Instead it looks at overlaps and continuities between both civilian and military governments in Pakistan i.e. in their reliance on unrepresentative, orthodox religious, socio-political as well as economic networks of patronage for political survival.

An important element of the civil-military symbiosis under consideration in this thesis therefore is thus the chronic dependence of the country's civilian leadership on the military establishment in state affairs and its implications on the institutional

trajectory of the polity. At the same time it explores a critical aspect of the army's centrality to Pakistan's future – that of its relationship with Islamist extremists. Existing scholarship presupposes a complementary relationship between the military and militant Islamist groups. However this neglects an important aspect of their dichotomous relationship i.e. the constraints inadvertently placed on the military's power, political as well as strategic, due to its need to engage with established networks of religious and socio-political patronage.

Arguments

The central contention of this thesis is that despite its formidable role within the state the Pakistani military suffers significant limitations to its power due to its reliance upon conventional networks of patronage for political and strategic influence. In particular the military's dependence on religio-political parties to derive ideological legitimacy and on militant groups to support its strategic ambitions has served to progressively empower the Islamist lobby and as such enabled them to challenge the writ of the praetorian state. To make this case the thesis establishes and connects its two central tenets: the path to military predominance, and the role of conventional networks of socio-economic and religious patronage in first enabling and then delimiting its extended influence. The idea that the Pakistani military's hegemony has to contend with limitations sets this thesis apart from the bulk of scholarship on the topic, which has to-date focused predominantly upon idea of military as a *colossus* with few restrictions. Keeping this point paramount, this thesis advances three arguments to expound how and why the emergence of praetorianism incorporated within it such constraints.

Firstly it is argued that, the rise and entrenchment of praetorianism in Pakistan was based essentially on a path-dependent trajectory of civil-military relations with an associated deployment of religion to meet its political and strategic needs. Much of the discussion in this thesis focuses on the specific ways in which the combined concerns of state survival, threat perception and political legitimacy in formative decades of the country's existence led decision-makers to strengthen one institution of the state (the army) and one ideology (Islam) over others. This resulted in a symbiotic process where the reliance of political leadership on the coercive arms of the state directed resources towards defence, whereby military involvement in the country's political and administrative affairs provided the necessary exposure and impetus for it to play an active part in state construction. This *quid pro quo* means that the military also had to operate within prevailing national paradigms dictated by the demands of its existential insecurities and constricting ideological underpinnings.

Secondly it is argued that the uniqueness of praetorianism in Pakistan lies in the parallels or continuities it shares with democratic regimes in utilising conventional networks of religio-political and socio-economic patronage to attain and maintain salience. The transitory nature of the post-colonial political system in Pakistan was characterised by reliance upon non-representative avenues of political and socio-economic support, such as the landed gentry, rural aristocracy and religious clergy for salience. The same informal networks were subsequently employed by military regimes to gain and maintain political authority. However this very dependence placed veritable constraints upon the military, which had to acquiesce to many of the demands of such pressure groups in order to garner support for its civilianisation drives.

The third and final argument concentrates this broader analysis to explain that even through the military had patronised both political and militant Islamist groups in differing ways, its relationships with both elements imposed significant constraints upon its extended influence. The emergence of praetorianism in Pakistan thus incorporated within it significant handicaps of having to work with religio-political parties that constantly demanded an increasing role in the organisation of state and society. In the short run these parties enabled military regimes to derive some semblance of legitimacy outside of the constitutional process. In the longer run however Islamist parties failed to translate this discretionary advantage into achieving wider public consensus on issues of national significance or gaining effective representation in the political system. Their inability to reconcile ideological imperatives with the needs of political organisation proved to be a significant obstacle for the consolidation of praetorian influence.

The military's recourse to militant Islamist groups to gain strategic advantages, particularly in Afghanistan and Kashmir, also proved counter-productive in the long run. Despite its pivotal role in arming and training militant Islamist cadres, the Pakistani military was unable to maintain its influence on their operations and goals. A paradoxical combination of its institutional and strategic interests meant that the military establishment was seen to be co-opting militant groups in some instances whilst confronting them at others. This fundamental dichotomy eventually manifested in the increasingly anti-state, and within that capacity, anti-military, character of militant Islamist groups. It is thus emphasized, despite contemporary scholarship's emphasis on the complementarity of the military's relationship with political and militant Islamist groups, that in the longer term this relationship cumulatively limited the consolidation of praetorian power over the state.

Originality

This thesis shows that the historical development of praetorianism cannot be understood outside of the structural evolution of the Pakistani state. Such a depiction belies perceptions of the Pakistani military as an innately hegemonic establishment, a colossus that intercedes and intervenes in the national politics and foreign policy at will, with few, if any limitations upon its exercise of power. This thesis shows that far from being unfettered, the praetorian military system in Pakistan is constrained by the very extra-constitutional avenues of support that it utilizes to gain ascendance in the first place. Its symbiosis with the ideological underpinnings of the state, evolving in response to national and international developments, therefore incorporate within it significant dichotomies that serve to counter its unencumbered power over the state. Hence it advances a more balanced characterisation of praetorianism and its relationship vis-à-vis Islamism in the polity. By explicating the relevance of path-dependence to the study of civil-military relations in Pakistan in general, and the military-Islamist interface in particular, this PhD contributes tangibly towards an emerging theoretical narrative that enriches a scholarly understanding of praetorianism in Pakistan.

In this way the research presented here challenges the implicit reductionism of dominant works on civil-military relations in Pakistan that look at military interventionism in Pakistan as intentional, pre-meditated and systematic. Specifically it augments the understanding of praetorianism in Pakistan, presenting it both as a product and producer of history. Such an assessment provides an important counter to tendencies that present the Pakistani military as an independent behemoth, a 'parallel state' that intervenes to remove civilian governments when they are perceived to be

undermining its institutional interests.[2] Instead it demonstrates how military regimes in Pakistan rely on co-optation of, more than confrontation with, civilian elites in order to maintain political salience. This is evidenced during every period of direct military rule with the inclusion of civil bureaucracy, select political leadership and religio-political parties in attempts at civilianization.

By re-contextualising the trajectory of civil-military relations in Pakistan this thesis also re-casts the role played by Islamist forces in the organisation of the praetorian system. It complicates the conventional understanding of the military-*mullah* alliance by differentiating systematically between the military's relationship with Islamist political parties and militant groups. Contemporary scholarship views the relationship between the Pakistani military and Islamist forces in a monolithic, complementary manner. The military's sponsorship of Islamist forces is thus often presented as a coherent, well-organised and well-directed strategy. This thesis challenges such unitary assumptions by examining the ideological fault lines between political and militant Islamism, as well as the violent disjunctions between militant groups and their military benefactors. It thus fills gaps that exist in recognising the much-varied manifestations of militant Islamism by highlighting divergent trajectories of prominent militant groups, emerging not just from the conflict in Afghanistan and Kashmir, but also in the heartlands of Punjab and elsewhere across the country.

This thesis also assesses the reciprocal effects of Islamism on military professionalism. The idea that radical Islamism permeates the strict professionalism of the Pakistani officer corps has been speculated on in contemporary scholarship. A

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[2] Mazhar Aziz, *Military Control in Pakistan: The Parallel State* (Abingdon, Oxfordshire: Routledge, 2008).

re-assessment of Islamism amongst the military high command therefore carries significant implications in understanding what drives and challenges its *esprit de corps.* This thesis demystifies this phenomenon by elucidating the most notable instances of Islamism amongst the senior military leadership and its fall-outs upon domestic and foreign policy as well as military professionalism. In doing so it concludes that military leadership does not countenance any challenge or dissention from within its ranks, even based on religious ideology, and therefore is quick to root out any such dissident elements.

Finally the significance of this research transcends disciplinary boundaries. It is relevant not only to understanding praetorianism in Pakistan, but also to the broader scholarship on civil-military relations, Islamist militancy and contemporary *jihadism,* within the emerging school of path-dependence and historical institutionalism. In particular it stands as a pertinent examination of the rise of praetorianism in poly-ethnic, post-colonial societies that are characterised by low degrees of social cohesion and political consciousness.

Analytical Framework

This thesis draws upon civil-military relations theory, concepts of path dependence, and historical institutionalism as the basis for its analytical framework. It analyses praetorianism in Pakistan and its symbiotic relationship with Islamism through the ideas of critical junctures, historical causation and increasing returns.

At the core of the problem of civil-military relations lies the balance between forces that shape the military institutions of any society: 'a functional imperative stemming from the threats to the society's security and a societal imperative arising

from the social forces, ideologies, and institutions dominant within the society.' [3]

Perlmutter's description of the modern praetorian state provides a useful starting point

to understand the basic features of the praetorianism in Pakistan.

> the military tends to intervene and *potentially* could dominate the political
> system. The political processes of the state *favour* the development of the
> military as the core group and the growth of its expectations as a ruling class;
> its political leadership (as distinguished from bureaucratic, administrative, and
> managerial leadership) is chiefly recruited from the military, or from groups
> sympathetic, or at least not antagonistic, to the military. Constitutional
> changes are effected and sustained by the military, and the army frequently
> intervenes in the government. In a praetorian state, therefore, the military
> plays a dominant role in political structures and institutions. [4]

That 'a modern praetorian government may develop when civilian institutions lack

legitimacy or are in a position to be dominated by the military'[5] is of particular

relevance in this case. Historically the Pakistani military has on different occasions

operated in the guise of praetorian 'moderators,' 'guardians' and 'rulers.'[6] This thesis

goes a step further by arguing that in Pakistan's case the function of the praetorian

military is not limited to each distinction instead it alternates amongst these roles

whilst responding to the demands of Pakistan's chronic socio-political and economic

challenges.

Perlmutter, [7] Schiff, [8] Nordlinger and Finer, [9] incorporate the rise of

praetorianism in their analysis of civil-military relations more broadly. The

examination of the public rationale of praetorianism in terms of civilian performance

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[3] Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: Theory and Politics of Civil Military Relations* (London: Harvard University Press, 1957).

[4] Amos Perlmutter, "The Praetorian State and the Praetorian Army: Toward a Taxonomy of Civil-Military Relations in Developing Polities," *Comparative Politics* 1, no. 3 (1969), 301.

[5] Perlmutter, 363.

[6] Eric A. Nordlinger, *Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Governments* (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1977).

[7] Amos Perlmutter, *The Military and Politics in Modern Times: Professional Praetorians and Revolutionary Soldiers* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979).

[8] Rebecca L. Schiff, *The Military and Domestic Politics: A Concordance Theory of Civil Military Relations* (London: Routledge, 2009).

[9] Samuel Finer, *The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics* (New Brunswick: Transaction, 2002).

failures and transgressions into the professional military's domain and a departure from 'liberalism's unqualified preference for democratic rule and civilian supremacy' particularly in 'instances in which popularly elected governments are themselves acting arbitrarily and illegally as they move towards the abrogation of democratic constitutions lends itself pertinently to the Pakistani case.[10] Kukreja utilizes this conceptualisation of praetorianism as referring to the general politicisation of social forces in the absence of 'autonomy, complexity, coherence and adaptability of political structures' – in one word the lack of 'political institutionalisation.'[11]

This thesis utilises elements of the ideas presented by Perlmutter, Nordlinger, Feaver and Kukreja to contextualise the uniqueness of Pakistani praetorianism. The social conditions Perlmutter identifies, i.e., low degree of social cohesion, existence of fratricidal classes, social polarity unconsolidated middle class, low levels of recruitment for group social action and for mobilisation of material resources, as well as corresponding political conditions such as the relationship between the centre and the periphery, low levels of political institutionalisation and lack of sustained support for political structures, weak and ineffective political parties, and frequent civilian intervention in the military, apply pertinently to the Pakistani case.

The protection of civil liberties such as freedom to practice religion, of speech, recourse to just legal processes, in addition to electoral competition and representative institutions, can distinguish liberal democracies from simply electoral democracies.[12] This thesis demonstrates that the uniqueness of the Pakistani polity lies in its evolution into a state of an 'illiberal' or 'praetorian democracy' – a state that lies somewhere between authoritarian regimes and liberal democracy, that combines

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[10] Nordlinger, *Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Governments*.
[11] Veena Kukreja, *Civil-Military Relations in South Asia: Pakistan, Bangladesh and India* (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1991), 27.
[12] Robert Dahl, *On Democracy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998).

military control with popular participation.[13] In other words there exists a need to look beyond the rigid conceptualisation of liberal democracy and dictatorships to understand the existence of a diminished sub-type of democracy that is epitomised in Pakistan's case. Thus within the arbitrary generalisations of *democracy* the distinction between liberal, electoral and praetorian becomes increasingly significant.

Historical Institutionalism and Path Dependence

Path-dependence implies 'lasting legacies that reproduce political forces invested in extant institutional arrangements and "increasing returns", whereby actors reinforce the model's logic, alternatives are dismissed and institutions magnify existing patterns of power distribution.[14] This concept plays a vital role in analysing the asymmetries of power characterising civil-military relations in Pakistan. By deploying a historical institutionalist perspective this thesis situates the continuities and persistence of institutional patterns compelling military intervention in the political system.

By studying institutions to distinguish patterns of behaviour and change over time, the significance of this approach lies in moving beyond the reductionism of a single source explanation of power and history (e.g. states). Instead by delineating institutions as comprising multiple forms i.e. formal bureaucratic structures as well as ideologies, socio-political norms and informal groups, thereby attributing agency to varied social groups and behaviours[15] this thesis contends against the conventional view by positioning the Pakistani military as a disparate entity.

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[13] Fareed Zakaria, "The Rise of Illiberal Democracy," *Foreign Affairs* 76, no. 6 (1997): 22–43; Chitram Singh and Michael Bailey, "Praetorian Democracy, Illiberal but Enduring: Pakistan as an Exempler," *South East Review of Asian Studies (SERAS)* 35 (2013): 103–26.
[14] Martha; Finnemore and Judith Goldstein, eds., *Back to Basics: State Power in a Contemporary World* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013).
[15] James C. Scott, *Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance*, 12th ed. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985).

Critical Junctures or Developmental Pathways

Critical junctures, or developmental pathways as they are also known, refer to 'moments when existing political and institutional structures fail to provide either adequate solutions to pressing problems, or explanations or challenging events, and thus lose governance legitimacy and their ability to determine action and interpretation, creating opportunities for actors of all sorts to play greater roles in developing new institutions'.[16] The critical junctures presented in this thesis are instances such as the first few years of independence where Pakistan's political framework was in its infant stage and therefore undetermined, the war of 1971 with the break-up of the country that could have led to a potential recalibration of the civil-military dynamic, the return of democratic politics under Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto's populist movement and then again after General Zia-ul-Haq's death etc. During these times structural constraints that were previously faced by actors in the path dependent phase were substantially relaxed[17] and presented opportunities to affect a change in the trajectory of civil-military relations in Pakistan. This thesis argues that failure to capitalise on these opportunities to establish civilian primacy and truly representative democratic institutions effectively created the space for praetorian involvement.

Historical Causation

Historical causation thus refers to 'dynamics triggered by an event or process at one point in time [which] reproduce themselves, even in the absence of the recurrence of the original event or process.'[18] This thesis modifies the concept of historical causation to explain what some in contemporary scholarship refer to as Pakistan's

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[16] Andre Sorensen, "Taking Path Dependence Seriously: An Historical Institutionalist Research Agenda in Planning History," *Planning Perspectives* 30, no. 1 (2015): 17–38.
[17] Sorensen.
[18] Paul Pierson and Theda Skocpol, *Political Science: The State of the Discipline*, ed. Ira Katznelson and Helen V. Milner, 3rd ed. (New York: Norton, 2002).

persistent state of revisionism. Specifically the dependence of political leadership on force, based on internal and external existential fears faced by the polity immediately after its creation led to the inadvertent strengthening of its coercive arms. This emphasis on building military capacity then continued to reproduce itself even in times of relative peace with India and during democratic transitions, thereby serving as a precursor to praetorianism.

At the same time historical causation also lends credence to Islamism as an ideological imperative that attained significance during the independence struggle but continued to exert influence incrementally even after the threat of Hindu domination had diminished and a Muslim majority Pakistan had been created.

Increasing Returns

This thesis links the idea of historical causation with the concept of increasing returns to infer the 'probability of further steps along one path increasing with each move along the same path'.[19] Specifically here such increasing returns are taken as the gradually expanding recourse to religion as a tool for political and strategic advantage. The intensification and diversification of Islamism in both its political and militant guises is linked back to the initial resort to an Islamic idiom to define Pakistani nationhood. Once engaged Islamist forces progressively gained influence within state and society, owing their significance to their mobilising potential for both political and military regimes. The self-reinforcing element of Islamism made it increasingly difficult to switch to another plausible alternative, such as the establishment of secular norms in political and executive space.

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[19] Paul Pierson, "Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics," *The American Political Science Review* 94, no. 2 (2007): 251–67.

By combining the above concepts to derive a theoretical framework for the arguments presented in this thesis, a path dependent approach goes a long way in explaining the trajectory of praetorianism and its interface with Islamism. It helps to understand the persistence of patterns in institutional bevaviour, especially when they embody powerful relations by privileging certain positions e.g. military leadership, and certain courses of action, e.g. revisionism, over others – they express patterns of "distributional advantage".'[20] The entrenchment of certain institutional arrangements, such as the involvement of military in domestic and foreign relations and deployment of religion as a self-reinforcing formula for socio-political cohesion, therefore make the costs of reversal very high. In Pakistan, the operational parallels between the military and civilian establishment had the aggregate effect of 'maximising power of particular governmental institutions, particular social classes, and particular constitutional form'.[21] Feaver refers to this dynamic as a *continuum*: a strategic interaction in which civilian principals get military agents to carry out their orders, particularly with regards to the use of force.[22] Path dependence helps situate such continuities in the civil-military political tradition in Pakistan and can help re-assess the long-term implications of the military-*mullah* relationship.

Terminology: Islamist Vs. Islamic

References to 'Islamist' rather than 'Islamic' militancy throughout this thesis are deliberate and meant to distinguish between the real and perceived nature of their religious rationale. Indeed it is misleading to label as Islamic all radical organisations claiming to derive their inspiration from Islam, since the application of Islam differs

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[20] Vivien Lowndes, *Theories of Urban Politics*, ed. Jonathan S. Davies and David L. Imbroscio (Los Angeles: Sage Publications, 2009).
[21] Vivien Lowndes, 84.
[22] Peter D. Feaver, *Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight and Civil-Military Relations* (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2003), 58.

from one group to another according to their socio-economic roots as well as sectarian and financial affiliations. Pakistani *madaris* (religious seminaries), generally perceived as '*jihad* factories'[23] or 'incubators of violent extremism,'[24] are usually affiliated with one of five distinct *wafaq* (religious educational boards) distinguished by sectarian affiliation. Each *wafaq* represents a *maslak* (singular for *masalik* meaning 'paths' or 'ways') – the particular interpretive and sectarian tradition of the board. Four of these boards, i.e., *Deobandi* (*Wafaq-ul-Madaris-al-Arabiya Pakistan)*, *Barelvi* (*Tanzeem-ul-Madaris-al-Arabiya*), *Ahl-i-Hadith* (*Wafaq-ul-Madaris-al-Salafia*), and *Jamaat-i-Islami* (*Rabita-tul-Madaris-al-Islami*) follow the *Sunni* tradition in differing ways and one (*Wafaq-ul-Madaris-al-Shi'a*) belongs to the minority *Shi'a* sect in Pakistan. Each school teaches its curriculum as *the* only avenue of legitimate Islamic instruction whilst denouncing the beliefs and methodologies of the others. Most militant groups identify themselves loosely if not firmly with one or another of these dominant sects and thus their application of Islam also varies significantly. Using the generic label of *Islamic* militancy would therefore undermine the existence of fundamental differences that direct the divergent course of militant Islamism in Pakistan.

Historiography

Studies on the Pakistan Army generally fall under three broad categories according to their normative tilt and political leanings, i.e., pro-military, anti-military and generalist works. Pro-military works such as those by Cohen,[25] Cloughly[26] and

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[23] Sushant Sareen, *The Jihad Factory: Pakistan's Islamic Revolution in the Making* (New Delhi: Har-Anand Publications, 2005).
[24] *The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office). Retrieved 4 January 2017, http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/index.htm.
[25] Stephen P. Cohen, *The Idea of Pakistan* (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2004).

Nawaz[27] present a sympathetic view of the army's involvement in domestic politics and foreign policy. Their ideas revolve around the general failure of effective civilian governance as being responsible for the military's rise to ascendency in national as well as political affairs. The military's relationship with Islamist militancy is presented here as a necessary evil, one that is predicated essentially on geo-strategic security imperatives.

On the other hand, authors such as Siddiqa,[28] Rashid,[29] Haqqani,[30] Hussain,[31] Shah,[32] Paul,[33] Fair[34] and Datta and Sharma[35] reflect the considerable body of literature that advances an anti-establishment stance. For instance, whereas Siddiqa attributes the military's predominance over state affairs directly to its overarching corporate and economic interests, Haqqani, Hussain and Rashid do so in relation to its overriding political ambitions. Shah, Fair and Paul look at political hegemony of the military through the lens of adversarial civil-military relations and situate their analysis within the state's geo-strategic ambitions. A common theme in such anti-military literature is the presentation of the ISI as a rogue organisation – a *state within*

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[26] Brian Cloughley, *A History of the Pakistan Army: Wars and Insurrections* (London: Oxford University Press, 2000).

[27] Shuja Nawaz, *Crossed Swords: Pakistan, Its Army, and the Wars Within* (London: Oxford University Press, 2008).

[28] Ayesha Siddiqa, *Military Inc.: Inside Pakistan's Military Economy* (London: Pluto Press, 2007).

[29] Ahmad Rashid, *Taliban: The Story of the Afghan Warlords* (New York: Pan MacMillan, 2001); Ahmad Rashid, *Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002); Ahmad Rashid, *Descent Into Chaos: How the War Against Islamic Extremism Is Being Lost in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Central Asia* (London: Allen Lane, 2008).

[30] Hussain Haqqani, *Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military* (Islamabad: Vanguard Books, 2001).

[31] Zahid Hussain, *Frontline Pakistan: The Path to Catastrophe and the Killing of Benazir Bhutto* (London: I.B. Taurus and Company, 2007).

[32] Aqil Shah, *The Army and Democracy: Military Politics in Pakistan* (London: Harvard University Press, 2014).

[33] T. V. Paul, *The Warrior State: Pakistan in the Contemporary World* (London: Oxford University Press, 2015).

[34] Christine Fair, *Fighting to the End: The Pakistan Army's Way of War* (London: Oxford University Press, 2014).

[35] S.K. Datta and Rajeev Sharma, *Pakistan: From Jinnah to Jihad* (Lucknow: UBS Publishers, 2002).

a state – that propagates Islamist militancy as a means of asserting discretionary political control – a perception this thesis intends to contest.

In the same analogy, Shafqat provides an emphatic, yet deeply problematic, account of what he terms the 'military hegemonic political system.'[36] His critique of Pakistan's military establishment, a veritable partnership of military and bureaucratic elites, hinges on three central assumptions: a) their monopolization of positions of power, b) the anti-politician attitude of the military, and c) an intentional, gradual, systematic and premeditated in the Pakistani political system. However, Shafqat's analysis on all three counts incorporates several glaring omissions. His primary focus on the decades of political flux post-1951, which neglects to situate developments in the context of post-partition politics, for instance, ignores the role of essential and deterministic factors in the early-trajectory of the Pakistani polity. Assertions that a militarily strong Pakistan was enough of an imperative to encourage military elites to participate in the political arena are also too simplistic to account for the overarching failures of participatory politics. Shafqat attempts to show that the military-hegemonic system is built on coercion and suppression of dissent, yet concedes at the same time that civilian political parties have been unable to resist adopting extra-constitutional methods to settle political differences.[37]

This thesis argues on the contrary: that the praetorian military system relies on co-optation and cooperation from civilian elites in order to maintain its longer-term political salience. The contradictions in Shafqat's argument are therefore too significant to ignore. Whilst he asserts that the civilian regime of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto attempted to use the constitution to establish civilian primacy and eliminate the

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[36] Saeed Shafqat, *Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan: From Zulfikar Ali Bhutto to Benazir Bhutto* (Colorado: Westview Press, 1997).
[37] Shafqat.

hegemonic position of the military, he at the same time concedes that Bhutto was 'perhaps the most articulate civilian leader in promoting military interests'[38] and advancing Pakistan's revisionist agenda vis-à-vis India. Ultimately, Shafqat admits that civilian political leaderships failed to capitalise on the opportunity to establish parliamentary democracy and a multiple-party system instead deployed their party as an instrument of patronage. This thesis proves that this fundamental intolerance of dominant civilian parties towards legitimate, representative political opposition, and the use of coercive arms of the state to establish authoritarian style governance provided the opportunity for a political intervention by the military junta.

More balanced works that look at civil-military relations specifically in Pakistan, which expanded exponentially post-9/11, include contributions made by Abbas,[39] Cohen,[40] Bennet-Jones,[41] Talbot[42] and Ziring.[43] Whilst these works provide a significant repository of facts and historical developments, their content aims to facilitate a broader understanding of the dynamics and history of the Pakistani state and society. There are also several works that fall in between these two schools such has those by Jalal[44] and Askari-Rizvi.[45] Whereas Jalal looks at the origins of Pakistan's political economy of defence, Askari-Rizvi undertakes to explain the roots of the political disposition of the military corps in Pakistan.

Such works on Pakistan take a wide-spectrum view of the country's socio-political power dynamics. Talbot's insightful work questions whether Pakistan was

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[38] Shafqat, 170.

[39] Hassan Abbas, *Pakistan's Drift Into Extremism: Allah, the Army, and America's War on Terror* (London: M.E. Sharpe, 2005).

[40] Stephen P. Cohen, *The Future of Pakistan* (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2011).

[41] Owen Bennet Jones, *Pakistan: Eye of the Storm* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002).

[42] Ian Talbot, *Pakistan: A Modern History* (New York: Hurst and Company, 2009).

[43] Lawrence Ziring, *Pakistan: At the Crosscurrent of History* (Islamabad: Vanguard Books, 2004).

[44] Ayesha Jalal, *The State of Martial Rule: The Origins of Pakistan's Political Economy of Defence* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

[45] Hasan Askari-Rizvi, *Military State and Society in Pakistan* (London: Macmillan, 2000).

intended to be a land of opportunity for Muslims or a nation of Muslims realising its destiny of an Islamic state.[46] He emphasizes historical inheritances from the colonial era as playing a fundamental role in the development of Pakistan's political culture and national environment. Within this framework he identifies inherent tensions between ethnic identities and nationalism, between the Muslim League and their powerful provincial opponents, as well as problems arising from chronic social inequalities.

Cohen also provides a historical narrative of the idea and the state of Pakistan by examining the structural development of the state post-independence.[47] He charts the metamorphosis of Jinnah's secular, integrative vision for the state of Pakistan to the restrictive, *Sunni*-dominated Islamism that characterized its socio-political organization in later years. Cohen traces back the roots of the praetorian structure of governance in Pakistan to the failure to establish credible and enduring political institutions capable of implementing Jinnah's vision for Pakistan, 'which viewed Islam (broadly) as a civilization and culture, a social order, and a source of law, rather than a set of punitive, regulative and extractive codes.'[48]

Similarly, Ziring provides an account of the Pakistani state's political and institutional evolution over the decades. By his own admission, Ziring intends to produce an easy-to-read narrative of history, rather than analysis of the intricacies of institutional deficit in Pakistan. He too attributes the rise of the military establishment to the inability of the founding fathers, specifically Jinnah, to effectively mitigate the internecine fighting amongst the political leadership of the Muslim League. Ziring goes on to outline the expansion of the military's functions into national affairs and its

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[46] Talbot, *Pakistan: A Modern History*.
[47] Cohen, *The Idea of Pakistan*.
[48] Cohen, 45.

evolution into a parallel system of state governance. All three authors, despite providing a useful overview of the evolution of the Pakistani state, do not purport to explore the intricacies of the praetorian system and its relationship with militant Islamism.

The rise of Pakistan's praetorian military in particular is examined detail by Haqqani, Abbas, Nawaz and Askari Rizvi. Haqqani explores how the debilitating partnership of expediency between the military and Islamists developed in response to perceptions of both internal and external threats to Pakistan. He rests the responsibility of building Pakistan's national identity on the basis of religion squarely upon the shoulders of what he calls the national security institutions i.e. the military and its intelligence services.[49] He then attempts to prove that the 'political commitment to an ideological state gradually evolved into a strategic commitment to a *jihadi* ideology.'[50]

Haqqani's views are echoed by Abbas, who focuses on how the Pakistani Army, *jihadi* actors and the United States shaped the development of the state post-independence. In contrast, Nawaz and Rizvi emphasize the impact of regional events and patronage politics rather than the Islamist ideology on the Army's predominance in state affairs. All employ a chronological approach providing a good starting point to compare and contrast competing views on the cause and effect of Pakistan army's significance in national politics, economics and foreign policy.

Arguably, Jalal has conducted the most penetrating analysis of the praetorian nature of the Pakistani state.[51] According to Jalal, Pakistan's systemic woes began with the dismemberment of the British-sponsored central administrative structure and

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[49] Haqqani, *Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military,* 3.
[50] Haqqani.
[51] Jalal, *The State of Martial Rule: The Origins of Pakistan's Political Economy of Defence.*

the absence of a suitable alternative for Pakistan. She emphasizes the lack of organizational linkage between politicians at the helm with masses at the grass-roots level as being the root cause of the centralization of state authority. Structural issues were further complicated by the professed Islamic ideology of the state and its implications for integrating Pakistan's multi-ethnic constituent units. In the same analogy the praetorian state's preoccupation with maintaining a political economy of defence disproportionate to its resource capacity reflected its narrow strategic perceptions:

> Since Pakistan was constitutionally a federation of provinces, the absence of a nationally based political party providing a two-way channel of communication between government and different levels of society was to become a serious impediment to the integration of its diverse constituent units.[52]

Jalal pays particular attention to the influence of the United States within the Cold War context on shaping the emerging structure of the state. With access to recently declassified documents, Jalal provides a credible and significant contribution towards a better understanding of the peculiar political and institutional trajectory of the Pakistani state at inception. However, where Jalal's contribution to the existing body of literature on the rise of the praetorian military in Pakistan is formidable, it does not situate this analysis within a broader analytical framework of civil-military relations theory, which this thesis addresses. Jalal does not examine in detail the symbiotic nature of the relationship between Islamist forces and political leadership, both civilian and military. More importantly, she does not look at the strategic culture of patronage as a common factor in both the civilian and military establishments and its implications for the rise of Islamist extremism.

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[52] Jalal, 61.

Some recent scholarship asserts that the role of the military in Pakistani politics is distinctive due to its involvement in the 'construction' of other elites. For instance Shafqat [53] assumes that whilst the masses may help in sustaining democracy, the *construction* of democracy is a function of the elites. Through a birds-eye-view of transformative processes undergone by Pakistani elites, comprising military and civil bureaucracy, political party leadership, religious clergy and emerging middle-class intelligentsia, he aims to demonstrate the ways in which 'each military regime has patronised a new set of individuals to construct political elites who would adopt the political system that the military favoured.'[54] This thesis challenges such assumptions due the presence of inherent contradictions. For instance the legitimate return to party-based 'representative' government remains a dubious claim since at the same time it is conceded that the traditional political elites based on landowners, tribal leaders, business families, religious clergy and a 'sprinkling of the middle classes' continue to dominate the political spectrum.[55]

At the same time it is noted that longer periods of military rule elicit stronger public resistance movements and the weakening of military regimes thereafter paves the way for transition to civilian governance though elections. To account for this phenomenon Shafqat claims the military deliberately encouraged confrontation amongst civilian political elites to take advantage of such discord and maintain its own primacy. This thesis contends however that praetorian politics in Pakistan have historically been underscored by cooptation and cooperation instead of confrontation, as evidenced by both its direct and indirect interventions in the political system. Ultimately Shafqat does accept that an informal power-sharing system exists between

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[53] Saeed Shafqat, *Pakistan: Beyond the Crisis State*, ed. Maleeha Lodhi (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2011).
[54] Shafqat, 97.
[55] Shafqat.

civil-military elites in Pakistan, whereby the military's primacy in decision-making on strategic issues is conceded by civilian regimes, in return for which it is expected to support the political agendas of civilian regimes.[56]

Alternative perspectives on the nature of civil-military relations in the Pakistani context presented in contemporary works by Richter,[57] Kukreja,[58] and Waseem[59] seem to have more complementarity with some of the path-dependency based conceptual foundations of this thesis. For instance, Richter contends that instead of premeditation, the entrenchment of the praetorian system under General Zia was characterised by 'inadequate planning, unforeseen difficulties and unintended consequences.'[60] He demonstrates how the Zia regime's shifting priorities were facilitated by the consequences of Bhutto's patrimonial strategy in attempting to create an arbitrary post-military state. Richter thus charts shifts in the military regimes priorities from elections (as an initial primary objective) to accountability (arising gradually in response to demands of civilian opposition parties) and finally to economic reform and social reorganization (including dismantling Bhutto's personalised power structure), Islamisation of society and introduction of more fundamental constitutional changes to legitimize extended rule by the military government.

Similarly, Kukreja posits that civilian political parties must also bear responsibility for the recurrent political crises in Pakistan due to their 'failure in establishing legitimate and robust political authority that is ultimately dependent on

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[56] Shafqat, 112.
[57] William L. Richter, "Persistent Praetorianism: Pakistan's Third Military Regime," *Pacific Affairs* 51, no. 3 (1978): 406–26.
[58] Veena Kukreja, *Military Intervention in Politics: A Case Study of Pakistan* (New Delhi: NBO Publishers, 1985).
[59] Mohammad Waseem, *Pakistan in Regional and Global Politics*, ed. R Jetley (Abingdon, Oxfordshire: Routledge, 2009).
[60] Richter, "Persistent Praetorianism: Pakistan's Third Military Regime", 425.

the consent of the governed.'[61] She asserts that the legitimacy deflation that led to repeated military interventions in Pakistan was predominantly fuelled by the unconstitutional actions of political leaders, which created a constitutional vacuum.[62] In fact she contends that the first military coup was 'no more than a formalization' of an existing situation 'undertaken by a group that was already a participant in the existing political processes.'[63] However the first military coup's modernization drive created the opportunity for further interventions by prioritizing economic over political developments. Kukreja also traces the dynamics of Pakistan's unique praetorian model i.e. with the military's shifts from ruler (under Ayub) to arbitrator (under Yahya) to dictatorship (under Zia), demonstrating how each successive military regime attempted to learn from the mistakes of the previous ones to rationalize its rule. Kukreja's analysis resonates with some of the conceptual foundations of this thesis in the emphasis it places on the continuities of political tradition in Pakistan i.e. in establishing supremacy of the executive over the legislature.[64] It also provides a starting point to explore the significance of patronage, in terms of the civilian and military regimes' dependence on undemocratic channels of socio-political influence such as landlords and industrialists, on state construction.

This thesis challenges presuppositions that assert 'the constellation of powers ruling Pakistan has a stable policy agenda and ideological orientation'[65] as presented by Waseem, however it does concur with idea that the military practically retained its political initiative by a combination of direct military rule and effective military presence behind a civilian government. It is argued that the 'reserved domains' of

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[61] Kukreja, *Civil-Military Relations in South Asia: Pakistan, Bangladesh and India*.
[62] Kukreja, *Military Intervention in Politics: A Case Study of Pakistan*, 58.
[63] Kukreja, 72.
[64] Kukreja, 121.
[65] Waseem, *Pakistan in Regional and Global Politics*, 207.

power and privilege in the transitions from military to civilian rule, which involved 'security mechanisms that would keep the ultimate policy choices in strategic areas in its own hands' was not simply due to a premeditated praetorian agenda. It was instead a combination of structural and institutional inadequacies plus regional security dynamics that account for the civilian leadership's chronic dependence on the military as a reinforcing mechanism. Waseem's perspective is nevertheless useful in looking at the military's political ascendency in the way it identifies 'its institutional interests with national interests both symbolically and ideologically.'[66]

Whilst there are some overlaps with existing scholarly examination of the issues underlying Pakistani state formation, this thesis aims to take these concepts further to include the contemporary evolution of civil-military relations with a distinctive focus on its interface with Islamism. The question of whether inherent shortcomings of Pakistani political leadership created suitable opportunities for the forging of the military-bureaucratic alliance or whether overwhelming strategic concerns facilitated the inevitable rise of the praetorian military structure comes under particular scrutiny. It also challenges arguments that pit the military and civilian bureaucracy against politicians and political parties, instead positing that a fateful combination of geo-strategic insecurity and failure of the country's civilian leadership to transcend short-sighted political ambitions facilitated the emergence of praetorianism and its interface with Islamist forces.

A different perspective that looks at the military's relationship with the Pakistani state and evolution of Islamic ideology in national discourse is the Marxist one presented by Ali,[67] Gardezi and Rashid.[68] Ali questions the Islamic basis of the

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[66] Waseem, 194.
[67] Tariq Ali, *Pakistan: Military Rule or People's Power* (Worcester: Trinity Press, 1970).

demand for Pakistan and credits class contradictions as creating the conditions for a separate Muslim state. He believes that the general economic and political mediocrity of Muslim bourgeoisie was responsible for their consensus on the need for a separate state, 'a territory where there would be no non-Muslim competition and where they could develop unhindered by Hindu commerce.'[69] According to Ali, military rule in later years was simply an extension of class rule as epitomized by its bureaucratic political forerunners such as the Muslim League.

Gardezi and Rashid expound further on this angle and focus on how 'the ruling coalition of the army, bureaucracy, landed aristocracy and prospering 'comprador bourgeoisie' pursued their economic interests regardless of considerations of social justice.[70] In this case again, expanding military alliances with western powers are presumed to represent a structural continuity in the capitalist Pakistani state and its military-bureaucratic oligarchy. This thesis integrates elements of such socio-economic roots of Pakistan's structural problems and Islamic rationale however it does not subscribe to the idea of praetorianism as based primarily on class-conflict.

With regards to militant Islamism, several publications cover the rise of Islamist militancy and the associated socio-political developments demonstrating Pakistan's elevation onto the global media centre-stage post-September 11, 2001. Having had the rare privilege of interviewing key *Taliban* leaders as well as American and Pakistani authorities in his journalistic capacity, Ahmad Rashid authored three significant works on *Taliban* and radical Islam in the region. His first book *Taliban: The Story of the Afghan Warlords* became an instant best seller due to its timely, insightful analysis and detailed coverage of the emergence of the *Taliban* in

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[68] Hasan Gardezi and Rashid Jamil, eds., *Pakistan: The Roots of Dictatorship. Political Economy of a Praetorian State* (London: Zed Press, 1983).
[69] Gardezi and Jamil, 29.
[70] Gardezi and Jamil.

Afghanistan. As the name of his book suggests, Rashid does not expound on the Pakistani *Tehrik-e-Taliban* (TTP), neither does he delve into the rise of other extremist groups within Pakistan, their relationship with the military or the involvement of foreign powers in the unfolding crisis in Pakistan. His references to Pakistan are solely within the context of the *Taliban* in Afghanistan.

In *Decent Into Chaos*[71] Rashid is flagrant with criticism of the Pakistani military's predominance over foreign policy: 'Even as the ISI helped the CIA run down al Qaeda leaders in Pakistani cities, Pakistani Islamist militants, with quiet ISI approval, were attacking Indian troops in Kashmir or helping the *Taliban* regroup in Pakistan.'[72] Since this book deals with the larger issue of Islamic extremism in Central Asia, Afghanistan *and* Pakistan however, Rashid provides only a summary account of the dealings between the CIA, ISI and Islamic extremists in Pakistan. He does not go into further details about the dynamic relationships of these groups with the Pakistani military establishment or their evolution since the Zia era. His study is limited to Al Qaeda and the Afghan *Taliban*, and does not detail the plethora of Islamic extremist groups in Pakistan.

Abbas on the other hand looks more specifically at the rise of Islamic extremism in Pakistan. He evaluates the historical development of militant Islamism under different Pakistani governments. Abbas does attribute the rise of Islamic extremism in Pakistan to the failures of political leadership, both civilian *and* military, to nurture independent and effective state-building institutions. In particular his assessment of General Zia's convictions towards his professed Islamisation goals is pertinent i.e.

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[71] Ahmed Rashid, *Descent Into Chaos: How the War Against Islamic Extremism is Being Lost in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Central Asia* (London: Allen Lane, 2008), XLVIII.
[72] Ibid, 155.

> It did not take him long to hijack the Islamic slogan of the anti-Bhutto agitation and make it his very own…He was a practicing Muslim more due to force of habit than temperament…Indeed, he seemed totally committed to the formal and visual performance of all religious rites while being quite flexible on the deeper issues of morality itself.[73]

His observation, 'Not only did it divide the country along lines of minority and majority sects, it divided the majority [dominant *Sunni* sect) into mutually hostile factions of its own,'[74] is a very important factor in understanding differences between various Islamist groups within Pakistan and associated rise in sectarian violence. Although Abbas describes the activities and allegiances of some of these *jihadi* outfits – he only looks at four such groups i.e. *Sipah-e-Sahaba*, *Lashkar-e-Jhangvi*, *Dawatul-Irshad* and *Lashkar-e-Tayyiba*. According to a report however, in 2003 there were 245 religious parties in Pakistan. Of these, 28 were openly taking part in politics, 104 claimed to focus on *Jihad* and 82 on sectarian concerns, and 20 parties were involved in *tabligh* (proselytization). The remaining 23 were involved in activities of a mixed nature.[75] Thus, Abbas' analysis of the four *jihadi* groups only skims the surface of the plethora of radical groups in Pakistan and needs further elaboration to comprehend the scale and scope of the military's dealings with Islamist groups.

Lastly, whilst Abbas does periodically discuss the role of the international community, especially the US, in influencing Musharraf's, and before him Zia's, dealings with extremist organisations, he does not tie it in with an analysis of America's broader foreign policy shifts in the region. He also does not trace the impact of other foreign influences, i.e., Saudi Arabia and Iran in providing the ideological impetus as well as funding to fuel diametrically opposed *Sh'ia* and *Sunni* extremist groups in Pakistan.

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[73] Abbas, *Pakistan's Drift Into Extremism: Allah, the Army, and America's War on Terror*, 99.
[74] Abbas, 103.
[75] Amir Rana, '245 Religious Parties in Pakistan,' *The Daily Times*, 11 April 2003.

Amongst journalists Hussain makes a significant contribution to the study of Islamic extremism in Pakistan. He provides an account of how different Pakistani governments facilitated the spread of Islamism, sometimes as political leverage against their opposition, other times as a buffer against perceived foreign threats and more commonly as a combination of both. His analysis is therefore important in understanding the magnitude of instability created in Pakistan by extremist organisations in recent times and the inability of local law enforcement agencies to counter this threat.

Haqqani, one-time Pakistani Ambassador to the United States, journalist and trusted advisor to ex-Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, also renders a knowledgeable synopsis of 'how perceptions of Pakistan's external and domestic threats have produced a debilitating partnership of expediency between Islamists and the military.'[76] Though well researched and informative, Haqqani's account is basically a narrative of the history of Pakistani statehood. He looks at the erosion of social cohesion and the slow destruction of state institutions by attributing its motives to the military's insatiable desire for hegemony: 'Religious groups have benefitted from the patronage of the military and the civil bureaucracy, which have seen them as useful tools in perpetuating the military's control over foreign and domestic policy.'[77] Whilst Haqqani skims the impact of Zia and Musharraf on the spread of Islamic extremism in Pakistan, he does not undertake a comparative analysis of the associated structural changes made to state institutions during their respective tenures. Also conspicuously absent is an assessment of foreign funding in co-opting pro-Islamist policies during

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[76] Haqqani, *Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military,* vii.
[77] Haqqani, 315.

both Zia and Musharraf's. Haqqani's analysis therefore leaves some important questions unanswered, which this thesis aims to address.

Besides the literature that deals with the plethora of existential problems and socio-political issues that Pakistan has dealt with since inception, there are several books that look exclusively at the Pakistan Army. Shuja Nawaz, Brian Cloughley, Stephen Cohen and Ayesha Siddiqa have written on different aspects of the military in Pakistan. The normative component of civil-military relations appears predominant particularly in Siddiqa and Cloughley's work.

Cohen has conducted one of the most detailed and pertinent studies of the Pakistan army to present an insightful analysis of the internal institutional dynamics of the military establishment supported by extensive empirical research. Keeping in sight significant challenges posed by the country's strategic position as well as the incipient dangers of turbulent internal politics, Cohen attempts to balance these issues with the prevailing criticisms regarding the disproportionate size and costs of the Pakistan army. His particular contribution lies in providing a systematic analysis of the demographic (i.e. predominantly Punjabi) composition of the officer corps, especially the role of ideology in influencing the ethos of the military thinking. Even though Cohen's analysis looks at the implications of Zia's Islamisation drive on the ideological impetus derived by the army, it does not attempt to tie this together with its wider implications on the Pakistani polity, particularly in relevance to the development of the praetorian state. Moreover, Cohen does not delve into the more convoluted space of civil-military relations that this thesis aims to consolidate.

Shuja Nawaz, brother of ex-Army Chief General Asif Nawaz (1991-1993), also provides an overview of military in Pakistani affairs i.e. its corporate activities, organisational structure, ideological development, socio-economic impact, political

functions and power over domestic and foreign policy. Nawaz skims the surface of the civil-military divide in Pakistan. His analysis regarding the emergence of Islamism within the army needs further examination since he overlooks its significance in the context of the military professionalism. He also omits to consider the army's deployment of an Islamist ideology in the service of its geo-strategic goals – issues this thesis covers comprehensively.

Ayesha Siddiqa, on the other hand, projects an intrinsically *hegemonic* face of the Pakistan Army, i.e. looking at the 'political economy of the business activities or the personal economic stakes of military personnel as a driver of the armed forces' political ambitions.'[78] Linking the increase in the military's power over state affairs directly with its increasing financial autonomy Siddiqa's analysis overlooks its social and political association with religious extremism and therefore misses a significant factor influencing the evolution of the country's civil-military relations. Critically, as a polemicist, Siddiqa tends to overstate, exaggerate and occasionally even fabricate data to substantiate her claims. For example, she states that the military's internal economy hampers the growth of Pakistan's free market economy, while in reality under General Musharraf, Pakistan's free market economy burgeoned from $75 billion in 1999 to become $160 billion in 2007.[79] Siddiqa's amplification of the military's economic predominance is illustrated by the fact that the presence of 'Milbus' companies, in Pakistan's free economy of $160 billion comes only to a maximum of 0.8 per cent. [80]

In contrast to the overabundance of material on Pakistan's military establishment, it is rare to find formal literature practically analysing the dynamics of

[78] Siddiqa, *Military Inc.: Inside Pakistan's Military Economy*, 1.
[79] Afreen Baig, 'Ayesha Siddiqa's *MILITARY INC*: A Deflective and Derogatory Book,' 28 October 2008. Retrieved 2 January 2017, http://presidentmusharraf.wordpress.com.
[80] Baig.

extremist Islamist groups. Mir,[81] Jalalzai,[82] Amir Rana,[83] Gul[84] and Ahmad[85] have made contributions in investigating the nature of extremist militant organisations in Pakistan. They provide overviews of militant organisations based in Pakistan, their political, religious and military affiliations, strategic goals as well as tactical methodologies. A thorough examination of these works provides some grounding of the Islamists' dealings with the Army from the other end of the spectrum.

Sources and Methodology

This thesis is an empirical study, which draws significantly upon oral history. Oral history in the form of interviews presents and preserves insights that cannot be gleaned from print or electronic media alone. Interviews allow individuals at the forefront of formative events and institutional developments an opportunity to provide a personal assessment of the historical events they were a part of, to directly revisit records, clarify or justify their conceptualization of facts, and discuss their own motivations and those of other actors. The use of oral history thus provides a clearer understanding of the intentions and motivations of participants in the historical process, which may be difficult to infer from official sources or third-party accounts alone.

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[81] Amir Mir, *The True Face of Jihadis* (Lahore: Mashal Books, 2004); Amir Mir, *Talibanization of Pakistan* (New Delhi: Pentagon Press, 2009).
[82] Musa Khan Jalalzai, *The Roots of Islamic Fundamentalism in Pakistan* (Lahore: Sham-Kay-Baad Publications, 1998); Musa Khan Jalalzai, *Sectarianism in Pakistan* (Lahore: A.H.Publishers, 1992); Musa Khan Jalalzai, *The Foreign Policy of Pakistan: Sectarian Impacts On Diplomacy* (Lahore: Dua Publications, 2000); Musa Khan Jalalzai, *Sectarianism and Politico-Religious Terrorism in Pakistan* (Lahore: Tarteeb Publishers, 1993); Musa Khan Jalalzai, *The Taliban Insurgency in Pakistan and Afghanistan: Violence, Suicide Attacks and the Search for Security in the Region* (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publications, 2008).
[83] Amir Rana, *A to Z of Jehadi Organizations in Pakistan* (Lahore: Mashal Books, 2009).
[84] Imtiaz Gul, *The Al-Qaeda Connection* (New Delhi: Penguin Books, 2009).
[85] Khaled Ahmad, *Pakistan: Behind the Ideological Mask* (Lahore: Vanguard Books, 2000); Khaled Ahmad, *Pakistan: The State in Crisis* (Lahore: Vanguard Books, 2001).

Nearly forty one-to-one interviews and informal conversations with key military personnel and members of the civilian political leadership therefore facilitated the perspectives presented in this thesis. Extensive networking within military, political and journalistic circles helped to gain access to individuals who had retired from public scrutiny and were generally averse to discussing controversial issues openly. The interviews themselves were loosely structured in order to attain substantial qualitative insights.

Since 'the role played by personalities in foreign policy construction provides an important context for the specific policies themselves,'[86] this thesis incorporates the personal angles provided by individuals in key positions, both military and civilian. In some cases, there were follow-up questions and second interviews conducted to fill gaps in understanding. Some interviewees also shared written material and unofficial statistics, which were used to corroborate accounts and cross-reference factual validity. Since many of the military personnel interviewed had retired from service, they were able to provide information and insights into praetorian policy imperatives previously deemed confidential and inaccessible.

Interviews conducted for this thesis followed the prescribed format for qualitative research, i.e., repeated face-to-face encounters between the researcher and their informants directed towards understanding informants' perspectives on their lives, experiences or situations as expressed in their own words. However, the use of oral sources in research does come with a significant responsibility, i.e. to balance the historian's own subjective and normative leanings in creating 'historical evidence.'[87]

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[86] Chris Alden and Amnon Aran, *Foreign Policy Analysis: New Approaches* (Hoboken: Taylor and Francis, 2011), 23-25.
[87] Donald A. Ritchie et al., "Interviews as Historical Evidence: A Discussion of New Standards of Documentation and Access," *The History Teacher* 24, no. 2 (1991): 227.

Because interviews are 'pieces of evidence which historians create and produce,'[88] they contain an implicit risk of personal value-judgements of the interviewer or potential misrepresentation of the interviewee's point of view clouding an objective analysis. The challenge of analysing such oral histories was to remain as impartial as possible given a personal experience of both the Pakistani military life and civilian institutions, whilst directing the line of inquiry to retain focus on areas of interest and without disturbing the content of narrative.

In order to mitigate this, not only were the majority of interviews recorded on tape, their salient points transcribed in writing and cross-referenced with newspaper, journal and archival sources. Directors of influential think tanks in Pakistan such as Islamabad Policy Research Institute (IPRI), Institute of Regional Studies (IRS), Institute of Policy Studies (IPS), Pakistan Institute of National Affairs, Pakistan Institute of International Affairs, Social Policy and Development Centre (SPDC), South Asian Strategic Stability Institute (SASSI), Pak Institute of Peace Studies (PIPS) and the Institute of Strategic Studies (ISS), also provided access to their normally restricted archives. The ultimate objective was to record factual, albeit subjective, record of history that was both original and salient.

Additionally several Pakistani leaders published accounts and memoirs detailing their experiences in and out of office. Whilst these often serve as self-absolving biographies, exaggerating political, economic and diplomatic exploits, and blurring the line between 'historical truth and personal apologia,'[89] they nevertheless provided useful reference points. For instance, General Pervez Musharraf published

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[88] Ritchie et al.

[89] George Egerton, *Political Memoir: Essays on the Politics of Memory* (London: Frank Cass and Company, 1994).

his memoirs, *In the Line of Fire*,[90] whilst still in office in 2006, emulating a previous military ruler, General Ayub Khan (1907-1974) who also wrote his biography, *Friends Not Masters*,[91] during his tenure. Benazir Bhutto, the two-time Prime Minister of Pakistan, also wrote several books albeit whilst out of office, of which the most recent one, *Reconciliation: Islam, Democracy and the West*,[92] was published after her assassination.

This thesis also makes use of material held in a number of different military and state archives, as well as national newspapers archives and think tanks. In Pakistan, the *Dawn*, *The News*, *Frontier Post* newspapers, and *Newsline* and *The Herald* investigative journals hold significant physical repositories of information from the 1980s through the early 2000s relating to the Army's dealings with Islamist groups such as the Afghan *Mujahidin*, *Taliban,* Kashmiri *Mujahidin* and other groups. Journalistic coverage of foreign influences and their impact on regional politics provide a valuable source of information within these records. Newspaper archives proved useful not only in helping to establish chronological accuracy but also in providing vital insights into prevailing perspectives and public discourse on the evolving dynamics of civil-military relations over time.

Within Britain, the National Archives and the British Library proved invaluable for access to primary source material comprising diplomatic exchanges, official letters and transcripts of speeches and public pronouncements from British and Muslim leadership in the pre-partition era of the Indian subcontinent. The Curzon Papers and Mountbatten Papers, for instance, reflect key developments in British

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[90] Parvez Musharraf, *In the Line of Fire: A Memoir* (New York: Free Press, 2006).
[91] Mohammad Ayub Khan, "Friends Not Masters: A Political Autobiography" (New York: Oxford University Press, n.d.).
[92] Benazir Bhutto, *Reconciliation: Islam, Democracy and the West* (New York: Harper Perennial, 2008).

foreign policy during the last decades of the Raj that had a formative political and economic impact on the emerging Pakistani polity. These archives provide an insight into the acceleration of communalism, and therefore the rise in religio-political activism as a consequence of the colonial British policies. Thus, these archives helped to provide a consolidated backdrop against which the emergence of praetorianism as well as militant Islamism in Pakistan could be situated.

Whilst a solid body of information was obtained from civilian and military sources in Pakistan, it was more challenging to gain direct access to material from Islamist sources. Even though critical security concerns prevented personal interaction with militant organisations, this was mitigated in several ways. One way in which this was done was by liaising with eminent journalists and military intelligence officials who had personally dealt with militant Islamist leaders, for instance Colonel Amir Sultan and journalists Saleem Shahzad who had interacted with senior leadership of militant groups such as the Taliban, al-Qaeda and TTP. Both were eventually assassinated, highlighting the inherent dangers of working in this field. Their personal accounts, however factor prominently in this thesis to provide vital insights into the workings of militant Islamists and the changing nature of their relationship with the Pakistani military establishment.

Another key primary resource was in the form of propaganda materials circulated in local languages and distributed by militant organisations, which helped in assessing their divergent trajectories. These materials proved to be a rich resource in gauging the rationale behind specific branding, marketing and public mobilisation tactics of different militant groups. Radical Islamist literature circulating on the streets ranged from propagating *takfiri* (deemed worthy of excommunication) violence against religious minorities to other groups of Muslims, from declaring war against

perceived Western hegemony to that against the Pakistani army and state, and from declaring affiliation with or divergence from other militant groups. Indeed it is intriguing that such a critical source of information, capable of providing a range of insights into the goals and motivations of militant groups, has remained thus far unexplored in contemporary scholarship. Material was gathered from a combination of online and local sources, particularly in Urdu and Pashto, and used to provide a critical perspective on the divergent goals and strategies of militant groups in Pakistan within a common *jihadist* arena. Notwithstanding their diversity, such propaganda materials highlight a common preoccupation with local socio-economic and political grievances and their role in mobilising radical forces for sectarian violence.

The online archives of the US Department of State and various White House archives provided invaluable evidentiary support in the form of diplomatic missives, official press releases, and state addresses between Pakistani political leadership and US. Since foreign powers have had a significant impact on the ascendance of praetorianism as well as militant Islamism in Pakistan, these sources constitute an important resource for documenting and supporting arguments that contextualise the role of foreign powers in the rise of the praetorian system and its evolving relationship with Islamist militancy.

Thesis Structure

This thesis makes use of a combination of chronological and thematic approaches. The broad chronology caters for a consolidated analysis of its two main components. The rise of Islamist mobilisation for political ends is traced back to its function in an independence struggle based on a shared communal identity. Its role in the construction of the new state thereafter is then examined thematically. Similarly, the

rising dominance of the military in political and administrative matters is analysed in the context of post-partition institutional development of the state over time. The path-dependent trajectory of civil-military relations in the country is then examined by looking at parallels, and variances, of different regimes and administrations – military and civilian – through historical experience.

Chapter one sets the background for understanding the rationale behind and implications of the ambiguities inherent in Pakistan's ideological foundation. It analyses the short-term utility as well as long-term fall-outs of using religion to transcend deep socio-political fissures pervading divergent Muslim communities of the sub-continent. In doing so it examines the roots of religio-political activism in the struggle for independence and its implications in the construction of the new state. It is argued that by soliciting support from Islamist groups to mitigate socio-economic and political challenges from the very beginning, Pakistan's political leadership inadvertently provided space for the eventual institutionalisation of religious intolerance and militancy.

Chapter two looks at a deterministic combination of existential challenges combined with significant political inadequacies of civilian institutions in formative years to that established the foundations of Pakistan's dominant security narrative – the reasons behind its 'persistent revisionism.'[93] It argues that the development of a political culture characterised by the discretionary exercise of patronage, personalisation of power and centralisation of authority, led to socio-political empowerment of the religious lobby and parallel marginalisation of democratic institutions. This chapter specifically examines the path dependant nature of the Pakistani state including its proclivity towards centrism and authoritarianism that set

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[93] Fair, *Fighting to the End: The Pakistan Army's Way of War*.

the basis for the rise of praetorianism. It argues that political schisms present within the country's early civilian leadership compounded its inability to mitigate centrifugal forces of territorial irredentism, economic inequality and demographic divergence. Thus it argues that the roots of praetorianism in Pakistan lay within the inadequacies of civil governance at critical junctures of the institutional development of the state.

Chapter three focuses on the peculiar trajectory of civil-military relations in the first three decades of the Pakistani state. It looks at how the critical failures of political leadership to establish robust democratic credentials and mitigate deep ethnic and socio-economic fissures in these formative years fostered the rise of praetorianism as well as political and militant Islamist groups and eventually facilitated expedient liaisons between them. This chapter examines early military regimes under Generals Ayub and Yahya and then the civilian regime of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto in this regard. Thus this chapter presents a comprehensive analysis of the insidious nature of bureaucratic authoritarianism and associated recourse to Islamism by political leadership that set the tone for the dichotomous military-militant relationship in later years.

Chapter four looks specifically at the fortification of praetorianism under General Zia ul Haq and his orchestration of an all-pervasive Islamisation programme, which served to inextricably weave religious discourse into the country's body politic. Its formative role in fostering a symbiotic relationship between the army and radical Islamists and the entrenchment of praetorianism in state affairs renders the Zia decade pivotal in understanding the course of civil-military relations in Pakistan. It is argued that Zia's Islamisation programme was motivated by dominant considerations of political opportunism as opposed to ideological conviction. Additionally a concentrated analysis of the role of ideology and foreign sponsorship during the

Soviet-Afghan war during this period situates the military-militancy nexus within a geo-political context.

Chapter five expounds on the praetorian state's developing relationship with militant Islamism by analysing the ideological and practical fall-outs of the Soviet-Afghan war of the 1980s and Kashmir *jihad* in the 1990s. More specifically this chapter focuses on the deployment of Islamist militancy as a veritable, albeit unrestrained, instrument of defence and strategic policy. This chapter departs slightly from the chronological approach of previous chapters, in analysing the different manifestations of Islamist militancy thematically. This serves to establish the both the divergent characteristics of contemporary Islamist militancy in Pakistan and at the same time engender an appreciation of its scope in limiting the power and influence of the military leadership over internal affairs. Crucially it makes use of original propaganda materials from a range of militant organisations to demonstrate the relationship between the military establishment and militant Islamists as subject to divergent ideological and strategic stresses and consequently its constraining fall-outs.

Chapter six draws together the central themes of patronage and praetorianism by looking at the return of democratic politics in Pakistan and the recurrent failures in establishing civilian primacy. The argument revolves around the unwillingness of democratically elected leaderships to countenance the devolution of power and allow space for viable political opposition to engender a healthy institutional dialogue. Without such critical institutional discourse, a turn towards the Islamist lobby as an alternative means of expressing dissent gained traction. Similarly, the discretionary use of intelligence agencies for political ends, and dependence on the coercive arms of the state to forcibly impose the writ of the government contributed tangibly towards undermining the establishment of a robust and representative political

culture. This chapter builds upon the idea of path-dependent civilian reinforcement of praetorianism, invariably culminating into the return of direct military rule under General Musharraf.

Chapter seven ultimately draws together various aspects of Islamisation as a function of the praetorian system in Pakistan. It examines the influence of Islamism on overall military professionalism, particularly amongst notable members of the high command. This chapter situates the broader theme of patronage as a common feature of civil-military relations in Pakistan and argues that in the battle of civil-military supremacy, Islamist forces, political as well as militant, have been the most opportunistic beneficiaries. At the same time this chapter analyses a fundamental shift in the military's relationship with Islamist militants post-9/11, and looks at its implications for the sanctity of the Pakistani state. It is argued that political considerations leading to General Musharraf's public disavowal of the military's conventional pro-*jihadi* stance were at the same time responsible for appeasing the religio-political lobby. It follows then that this dichotomy in the military regime's dealings with political and militant Islamist groups accurately demonstrates its proclivity for regime survival, thus reflecting a similar partiality towards political patronage as the country's civilian leadership. It also highlights the fact that military regimes, due to their reliance on the much the same networks of socio-political influence as their civilian predecessors, face formidable limitations on their exercise of long-term power, and this is repeatedly evidenced even in their differing approaches towards civilianization and Islamization.

This thesis concludes with a consolidation of the key arguments presented, with a summary of praetorianism in Pakistan, including its turbulent association with Islamist militancy. An overarching national policy tripod comprising 'India as

Pakistan's eternal enemy, Islam as the national unifier, and the United States as the country's provider of arms and finances'[94] emerging within the first few years of Pakistan's independence resulted in extensions and slight variations of the same basic, often overlapping, policy imperatives during both civilian and military regimes, which accounts for the essentially path-dependent trajectory of the polity.

This thesis aims to resolve some of the contradictions prevalent in current literature regarding the role and character of the Pakistan Army in national affairs, its impact on the evolution and development of state institutions as well as its interaction with Islamist forces. It intends to amalgamate discernable continuities in Pakistan's asymmetrical political trajectory, both civil and military, whilst analyzing the pertinence of its professed strategic imperatives and the evolution of Islamic extremism in its various guises, as grounded in the peculiar praetorian culture that is unique to Pakistan.

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[94] Haqqani, *Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military*, 43.

Chapter 1

Islam and Pakistan

Hindus and the Muslims belong to two different religions, philosophies, social customs and literature… Their concepts on life and of life are different…Mussalmans are a nation according to any definition of nation.[95]

In his address to the members of the Pakistan Constituent Assembly just three days before partition, Pakistan's founding father Muhammad Ali Jinnah clearly outlined his vision:

> You may belong to any religion cast or creed – that has got nothing to do with the business of the state…We are starting with this fundamental principle that we are all citizens and equal citizens of one State…Now I think we should keep that in front of us as our ideal and you will find that in course of time Hindus will cease to be Hindus and Muslims would cease to be Hindus not in the religious sense, because that is the personal faith of each individual but in the political sense as citizens of the State.[96]

Combining the idea of a just, democratic homeland for the increasingly marginalised Muslims of the Indian subcontinent with the slogan of Muslim nationalism, and Islamic ideals proved to be a powerful mobilising tool that helped achieve the dream of Pakistan.

This chapter looks at the role of Islam and the conceptualisation of the new state with its divergent manifestations as a precursor to its divisive role in the Pakistani polity. It expounds on the idea of *historical causation* – the deployment of a religious rationale that emerged with the rise of communal separatism and went on to reproduce itself in various guises even after the goal of independence had been achieved. It also examines the how, once deployed, Islamism began to produce

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[95] 'Founder of Pakistan, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, speaking at the historic annual session of the All India Muslim League, 22 March 1940, at Minto Park Lahore' in I.A. Malik, ed., *Muslim League Session 1940 and the Lahore Resolution: Documents* (Islamabad: Islamabad: National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research, 1990), 156-157.

[96] Jamil ud Din Ahmad, ed., *Speeches and Writings of Mr Jinnah, Volume 2* (Lahore: Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 1976), 400-4.

increasing returns in the incremental ways it came to be applied and codified within the fabric of the state. It critically analyses the key features of emerging Pakistani statehood i.e. its Islamic *raison d'etre* with its inherent ideological dichotomies as a fateful combination of political and administrative failures of the new administration. This provides essential background for analysing the eventual institutionalisation and intensification of Islamism in the country's political and strategic trajectory.

The first part of this chapter substantiates the function of Islam in the struggle for independence as designed to practically unite divergent Muslim communities, and *not* the creation of an Islamic Republic. This section examines the scale and scope of doctrinal divergences between various Islamist groups in the Indian sub-continent and their support (or the lack thereof) for a separate Muslim state. It goes on to look at the causes and consequences of the politicisation of the *'ulama* during the independence movement in order to contextualise their eventual capitulation in favour of the new state and increasing demands for influence in its socio-political processes thereafter.

This second section looks at the institutional weakness of the founding party, the Muslim League, as characterised by hasty, expedient relationships forged with provincial forces, subsequently becoming accentuated with divergent ethnic and socio-political pressures. The League's recourse to the Islamist idiom therefore reflected the absence of a cohesive national consciousness and the inadequate provision of a suitable alternative. It is argued that a chronic failure to define the role of religion in the construction of state at this critical juncture inadvertently sowed the seeds of religious bigotry in the country's body politic and institutionalized its enduring politico-ideological aberrations.

Stirrings of Separatism

It is important to take stock of the scale and diversity of Muslim societies across India in order to understand the complexity of pre-partition communal politics of the sub-continent. Marxist scholars such as William Cantwell Smith took a socially differentiated view of Indian society emphasising the role of class conflict, and stressed that the inability of Muslim middle-class to match their Hindu counterparts in securing positions of political and economic power eventually engendered communal separatism amongst Muslims. [97]

On the other hand Francis Robinson examined more broadly the divide and rule policy of colonial Britain. [98] She believed that an inherent feature of British imperial rule, neutralising some social divisions and accentuating others, played a fundamental role in engendering a separate Muslim identity in Indian politics. Contrary to Hunter's[99] critique of Muslims backwardness, Robinson believed 'If anything it was the threat of becoming backward, rather than backwardness itself, which encouraged UP Muslims to organise for politics'.[100] Despite a shared Muslim identity fostered by common experience under the British Raj therefore, Robinson reiterated the importance of viewing Indian Muslim communities as a diverse collection of cultural, religious, ethnic, and doctrinal influences.

Contemporary writers such as Seal[101] and Jalal[102] show that prevailing political exigencies compelled Muslim leaders to project Indian Muslims as a

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[97] Wilfred Cantwell Smith, *Modern Islam in India: A Social Analysis* (Lahore: Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 1946).

[98] Francis Robinson, *Separatism Among Indian Muslims 1860-1923* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1974).

[99] William W. Hunter, *The Indian Musalmans* (London: Trubner, 1871).

[100] Robinson, *Separatism Among Indian Muslims 1860-1923*, 346.

[101] Anil Seal, *The Emergence of Indian Nationalism: Competition and Collaboration in the Late Nineteenth Century* (London: Cambridge University Press, 2009).

homogenous society misleadingly since Muslim communities incorporated major variations in doctrinal and religious beliefs as well as economic and social circumstances. Seal asserts that by replacing traditional economic and bureaucratic structures with modern Western ones, the British Raj slowly edged Muslims out of previously held positions of power in the subcontinent. Thus Seal, like Robinson, believed that Muslim separatism was not simply a product of general socio-economic backwardness. Rather, it was in consequence of a combination of discretionary features of British imperial policy. Muslim separatism could therefore be seen as a reaction to the changing socio-economic as well as political landscape in the Indian sub-continent.

From Indian to Muslim Nationalism

Communalism became more intense after the final failed attempt at cooperation between the Muslim-dominated *Khilafat* movement and the Hindu-dominated Non-Cooperation movement in the 1920s. After the failure of the non-cooperation movement, the strongly communalist Hindu *Maha Sabha* and *Swaraj* parties gained popularity. Their scheme for Hindu supremacy was reflected in the new agenda of the Hindu *Maha Sabha*:

> [T]he Hindu race has but one history, and its institutions are homogenous. But the Musalmans and the Christians are far removed from the confines of Hinduism, for their religions are alien and they love Persian, Arabic and European institutions…Thus just as one removes foreign matter from the eye, Shuddhi must be made of these two religions…if Hindus want to protect themselves, they must conquer Afghanistan and the Frontiers and convert all of the mountain tribes. [103]

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[102] Ayesha Jalal, *The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, the Muslim League and the Demand for Pakistan* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1985).
[103] Javed Iqbal, *Islam and Pakistan's Identity* (Lahore: Vanguard Books, 2003).

In response to the intensification of the communal sentiment, the Muslim ʿulama recognised a pressing need to transcend their individual ideological differences to unite on one platform and created the *Jamiat al-Ansar*, in 1910 led the alumni of the *Darul Uloom* Deoband, as the first such organisation with this agenda. This organisation stressed religious and cultural revival as its main goals and encouraged activities to that end.

ʿUlama proved indispensable to the cause of Muslim activism due to their exceptional lobbying power and proved this by their significant contributions (both ideological and financial) towards the activities of the *Khilafat* movement in the 1920s. During this time the ʿulama played a key role in reaching out to the urban and rural populace, helping to construct an overtly unified religio-political identity for Indian Muslims and practically mobilizing the masses to come out on the streets through *khutba* (religious sermons), *fatawa*, conferences, public pronouncements and fund-raising activities. Religious terminology was increasingly deployed to underscore political statements, capitalising on the prevailing pan-Islamic sentiment of the time to unite the divergent Muslim communities of the sub-continent. This multi-dimensional influence is what made the ʿulama critical for the mobilisation of the Muslim community in general and the politicisation of the Islamic identity in particular.

Rethinking Islam

The emerging Western-educated Muslim intelligentsia on the other hand viewed the role of Islam in modern-day life of the Indian subcontinent very differently. Their modern, more conciliatory approach towards socio-economic emancipation involved a fundamental reinterpretation of traditional Islamic beliefs and clashed strongly with

the dogmas of conventional religious scholarship. Perhaps the greatest credit for politicising the hitherto stagnant urban Indian Muslim community should go to Sir Syed Ahmad Khan and his brainchild, the Aligarh University. Recognising the significance of religion in engendering communal solidarity amongst Muslims, much of Sir Syed's energy was devoted to contributing towards the process of religious reinterpretation and reform: 'to grasp the transitory, the politic and the expedient.'[104]

The Islamist clergy in return considered Sir Syed's religious heterodoxy both damaging and heretical for Muslim society. Maulvi Abdul Hai, a leading ʿalim (scholar) of Firangi Mahal denounced him as a follower of Satan,[105] while 'in every town village and *fatawa* were issued by the Maulawis which declared him to be a Kafir' (infidel).[106] This disjuncture between modernist and traditionalist Muslim leadership was significant since it would continue to feature chronically in discourse on the role of religion in the polity for years to come.

The Idea of Pakistan

Thirty-two years after his death, the poet-philosopher Muhammad Iqbal (1877-1938) – the chief ideologue the Pakistan Movement – contextualized Sir Syed's incredible contribution towards Islamic reinterpretation into a separate and distinct identity for the Muslims of the Indian subcontinent in what eventually came to be known as the Two-Nation Theory. Implying that Muslims in the Indian subcontinent derived their primary identity through religion, rather than language or ethnicity, the Two Nation Theory composed the founding principle of the Pakistan Movement.

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[104] Abdul Hamid, "Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan and the Genesis of the Muslim Separatist Movement in Politics: An Interpretation" (University of Punjab, Lahore, 1950), 119.
[105] Robinson, *Separatism Among Indian Muslims 1860-1923*.
Firangi Mahal was one of the oldest and most important religious schools in Northern India at that time.
[106] Robinson, 109.

For Iqbal, as for Sir Syed Ahmad Khan, the cultural reform of Muslims was linked inextricably with religious reform. In his letter to the Nawab of Bhawalpur in September 1937 he explained his disillusionment with orthodox ʿulama,

> I have spent thirty years of my life to provide a correct interpretation of the foundational principles of Islam…It is evident from the conduct of those ʿulama of Islam who participate in the politics of India, that they have not even the remotest perception of the position of Muslims. In fact those ʿulama who happen to be more knowledgeable than others, in reality, proved to be far more stupid than them.[107]

Iqbal argued that the only way to preserve Muslim rights, culture and identity would be by allowing them to form a single, consolidated, self-governing Islamic state – a 'Muslim India within India.'[108] He envisioned such a state to epitomise his ideal of an Islamic society, whereby Islamic law, culture, education and tradition could be freely practiced and further developed. 'The life of Islam, as a cultural force, in this country very largely depends on its centralization in a specified territory.'[109] His letter to Mohammad Ali Jinnah in June 1937 therefore stated,

> A separate federation of Muslim Provinces, reformed on the lines I have suggested above, is the only course by which we can secure a peaceful India and save Muslims from the domination of Non-Muslims. Why should not the Muslims of North-West India and Bengal be considered as nations entitled to self-determination just as other nations in India and outside India are.[110]

In the following years, however, Iqbal realised the futility of such a goal within a Hindu-dominated political system and escalated the demand for an entirely sovereign, distinct, geographical polity in the form of Pakistan.

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[107] Javed Iqbal, *Zinda Rood* (Lahore: Sh. Ghulam Ali and Sons, 1979), 289.
[108] Sir Muhammad Iqbal's 1930 Presidential Address to the 25th Session of the All-India Muslim League Allahabad, 29 December 1930, Columbia University South Asian Study Resources. Retrieved 6 January 2017, http://www.columbia.edu/itc/mealac/pritchett/00islamlinks/txt_iqbal_1930.html.
[109] Muhammad Iqbal, *Speeches and Statements of Iqbal*, ed. Shamloo (Lahore: Al Manar Academyt, 1948), 54.
[110] Ghulam Hussain Zulfiqar, ed., *Pakistan: As Visualized by Iqbal and Jinnah* (Lahore: Bazm-i-Iqbal Publishers, 1997), 38.

Jinnah's vision of a separate homeland for Muslims was undeniably influenced by Iqbal's conceptual framework for the establishment of a definitive Islamic identity, the construction of a progressive Islamic future, and a rejuvenation of the Indo-Muslim culture. Before joining the cause of Muslim separatism, Jinnah had spoken in terms of minority representation, constitutional reform and safeguards, and separate electorates, using cogent rationalism and legal references in his arguments. Once firmly converted to Iqbal's philosophy, however, he increasingly began to use Islamic culture and symbolism to rally Indo-Muslims behind the cause of Pakistan.

His speeches after 1937 contained numerous references to Islam as a fundamental component of Muslim character and destiny. He called Islam 'the guide and complete code of life,' the 'bedrock and sheet-anchor'[111] for Muslims and stressed the necessity of Pakistan to ensure freedom for Muslims and the greater 'glory of Islam.'[112] Jinnah urged students to help organise 'our nation' in the cause of independence and so that Muslims may organise their lives according to the tenets of Islam.[113]

Jinnah's appeal to religion as a rallying point was kept deliberately ambiguous, focusing mainly on the universal *humanism* of Islam. This was partly due to the broad spectrum appeal of religion amongst divided Muslim communities, and partly because Jinnah's own secular ideology was loathe to hand over the fate of the community to the orthodox ʿ*ulama* with their sectarian agendas and internal feuds. Jalal emphasises 'Jinnah's only refuge was to keep the "Pakistan demand" as

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[111] Jamil-ud-din Ahmad, *Some Recent Speeches and Writings of Jinnah, Vol. 1*, 5th ed. (Lahore: S.M. Ashraf, 1952).
[112] Ahmad.
[113] Ahmad.

unspecific as possible, and hope against hope that the forces of communalism would not combine to destroy his purposes at the centre.'[114]

Jinnah's conceptualisation of Islam was therefore less of a religious ideology and more of a political imperative for a self-governing Muslim society. He was against the theocratic rule of ʿulama and the imposition of their specific interpretations of religion on the masses.

> The injunctions of the Qurʾan are not confined to religious and moral duties. The Qurʾan is a complete code for the Muslims – a religious, social, civil, commercial, military, judicial, criminal and penal code…Our Prophet has enjoined on us that every Mussalman should possess a copy of the Qurʾan and be his own priest.[115]

The ʿulama reacted violently to such perceived encroachments on their hitherto unquestioned moral and cultural leadership of Muslim society. They considered the Western-educated political leaders to represent a philosophy at odds with the true Islamic path, for instance asserting that 'the West did everything to reshape Muslim thought in accordance with the patterns established under the West's dominance, especially by transplanting a Western education system, resulting in the production of a new "elite" in society alienated from its own history and values.'[116]

By serving as agents of progress and change, and assuming de facto leadership of the Muslim community thus, the modern Muslim intelligentsia challenged the traditionally dominant role of the ʿulama. Reacting aggressively to these new power dynamics the ʿulama blamed the modernisers

> with the spread of Western hegemony, secularism also began to began to be universalised. The world at large seems to have had no difficulty in accepting the Western way of keeping politics and religion apart…But not Muslims.

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[114] Jalal, *The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, the Muslim League and the Demand for Pakistan*, 120.

[115] Liaquat H. Merchant, *Jinnah: A Judicial Verdict* (Karachi: East and West Publishing Company, 1990), x.

[116] Abu'l A'la Maududi, *The Islamic Movement: Dynamics of Values, Power and Change* (New Delhi: Markazi Maktaba Islami Publishers, 2001).

Their experience has nothing in common with the West so they have been plunged into a soul rending conflict.[117]

With the triumph of Muslim reformists led by Jinnah over the Islamist clergy in the elections of 1946 the responsibility for directing and articulating the processes of the imminent new state went to a secular political party, the All India Muslim League (AIML), leaving Islamist clerics floundering for a foothold in the formation of the new state. Despite previously being its most aggressive opponent Maulana Abu'l A'la Maududi, ideologue-in-chief of the dominant religio-political party, i.e., the *Jamaat-i-Islami (JI),* therefore re-directed his efforts towards establishing socio-political ascendency of the clergy by declaring Islamist credentials a pre-requisite for legitimate leadership of the new state:

> [I]t is in the nature of *iman* (Faith), then, that those who surrender themselves to God should strive to wrest control of all centres of power and authority from those in rebellion against God, not for themselves but to bring them under God. For "ungodly leadership is at the root of the evils afflicting humanity.[118]

Muslim Pakistan or Islamic Pakistan

The chronic failure of the *Jamaat* and indeed other religio-political parties to perform in Pakistani elections year after year reflected a critical inability to translate popular religious sentiment into effective political participation. An understanding of the divergent agendas of the various components of the Islamist spectrum in Pakistan is therefore necessary to understand their collective failure as a political group, and consequent recourse to street mobilisation, not only in the early years of Pakistan's independence but throughout its historical experience.

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[117] Maududi, 26.
[118] Maududi, 11.

Historically, Muslims across the subcontinent reflected tremendous variations in their doctrinal affiliations, ideological beliefs and socio-economic conditions. The most influential schools of *Sunni* Islam were the orthodox Deobandi school (founded in 1866), the revivalist Barelvi school (founded in 1880), the politically inclined Firangi Mahal school and the militant *Faraizi* movement (1830-1857), to name a few. Their differences ranged from rituals to ideological emphasis on various elements of the Islamic faith and interpretation of canon law, and were the cause of much antagonism and acrimony.

In spite of their differences, however, *Sunni ʿulama* stood united in their opposition to the *Shi'a* Muslim sect. *Sunni*s were predisposed to accepting the Caliphate, i.e., the Ottoman Sultan of Turkey as the supreme spiritual and temporal sovereign of the Islamic world, in accordance with the tradition of an overarching elected Caliph that was established after Prophet Muhammad's death, whereas the *Shi'a* would only accept the descendants of the Prophet via Ali (his son-in-law and companion) as the *imam* (spiritual guides) of the Muslim *umma* (nation). In addition the *Shi'a* challenged *Sunni* belief in a theocratic model of governance. In 1931 *Sunni ʿulama* founded a militant seminary in Lucknow called *Dar al-Mublaghin,* with the explicit goal of controverting *Shi'a* doctrines.

The *Shi'a* community in itself however was also divided along doctrinal variations, such as the *Isma ʿili, Khoja* and *Bohra*. The mainstream *Shi'a* belonged to the Twelver sect, believing in 12 divinely ordained leaders known as the Twelve Imams with the *Mahdi* being none other than the returned Twelfth Imam who disappeared and was believed to be in occultation.

Besides the *Shi'a* and *Sunni* sects, there was another Muslim sect founded in the Indian subcontinent by Mirza Ghulam Ahmad in 1889, known as the *Ahmadiyya*.

This sect digressed significantly from both *Sunni* and *Shi'a* in that its founder claimed himself to be a Prophet, a *Mahdi* and a Messiah all at the same time. Mirza Ghulam Ahmad claimed to be *zilli-nabi* (shadow prophet), receiving *ilham* (divine inspiration) and revelations directly from Allah. He claimed to be divinely ordained to interpret Islamic law, to free it from all corruption and return Islam to its true essence and pristine form via a peaceful *Jihad*. The *Ahmadiyya* (also called the *Qadianis*) were viewed by most *Sunni* sects, especially the puritanical Wahhabis and Deobandis, with great contempt and considered heretical due to their departure from the critical *khatam-i-naboowat* (finality of the Prophet Muhammad) article of the Islamic faith. The *Shi'a* opposed them due to Mirza Ghulam Ahmad's claim of being the *Imam-i-Zamana,* the anticipated *Mahdi* of the present time. Such transgressions by *Ahmadiyya* community attracted strident reprisals from the dominant Muslim sects particularly during the socio-economic dislocations engendered by the creation of Pakistan. At the forefront of the charge Maulana Maududi berated,

> On the one hand all the *Qadianis*, holding high offices, are recruiting their co-religionists in every governmental department and on the other hand they are helping to make their economic positions as strong as possible so that Muslims in spite of possessing an independent state of their own may not be able to do anything that might adversely affect the interests of *Qadianis*.[119]

Islamists Against Pakistan

Islamist groups such as the JUIH and later the *Jamaʿat-i-Islami* initially opposed the idea of Pakistan as a separate, geographical, political entity, calling it 'akin to barbarianism.'[120] Despite harbouring deep concerns about the preservation of cultural and religious rights of Muslims in the future constitutional framework of an

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[119] Abu'l A'la Maududi, *The Qadiani Problem* (Lahore: Islamic Publications (Pvt.) Ltd., 1953), 39.
[120] Abu'l A'la Maududi, "Tumhe Yaad Ho Keh Na Yaad Ho," *Tarjuman Ul Quran* 31, no. 59 (November 2016).

independent India the JUIH remained resolutely against the territorial partition of the subcontinent.

> Hence it is imperative for the Muslim Party for reasons of both general welfare of humanity and self-defence that it should not rest content with establishing the Islamic System of Government in one territory alone, but to extend the sway of Islamic System all around as far as its resources can carry it.[121]

Claiming to represent the interests of the Indian *Mussalmaan,* the *Jamaʿat-i-Islami* (JI) emerged from within the ranks of the JUIH around the same time. Under Maududi this new organisation aimed to combine the religious ideals of the JUIH and with a political proclivity similar to the AIML.

Maulana Maududi (1903-1979) led the *Jamaʿat-i-Islami* for 31 years (1941-1979). Whilst bitterly critical of Muslims who acquiesced to Hindu political ascendency by supporting the Congress, Maududi also opposed the Muslim League due to a combination of its liberal, secular orientation and the threat it presented to his own political ambitions. He proclaimed

> No trace of Islam can be found in the ideas and politics of Muslim League…[Jinnah] reveals no knowledge of the views of the Qurʾan, nor does he care to research them…yet whatever he does is seen as the way of the Qurʾan…All this knowledge comes from Western laws and sources…His followers cannot be but *jamaʿat-ijahiliyah* [party of pagans].[122]

Also that, 'Mohammad Ali Jinnah's rightful place is not as a respected leader but in the stands of a court of law as a traitor (to the Muslim community).'[123]

Inspired by Jinnah's meteoric rise to power and popularity despite his Westernized outlook, Maududi was convinced of his own rightful place at the forefront of Muslim politics. He saw himself as *the* only political leader capable of

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[121] Abu'l A'la Maududi, *Jihad in Islam* (Beirut: The Holy Quran Publishing House, 1980), 23.

[122] Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, *The Vanguard of the Islamic Revolution: The Jamaat-i-Islami of Pakistan* (London: I.B. Taurus and Company, 1994), 20.

[123] Abu'l A'la Maududi, *Musalman Aur Maujooda Siyasi Kashmakash (Muslims and the Present Political Turmoil)*, 3rd ed. (Pathankot: Tarjuman al Quran, 1942).

saving the Indian Muslim community from socio-political annihilation by differentiating between 'God-Worshipping Revolutionary Leaders and the general run of the world revolutionary leaders.'[124] The latter's 'outlook is heavily biased in favour of one class and bears hatred and resentment for another class. They prescribe a remedy for tyranny which is itself tyrannical and is revengeful in effect,' whereas the former would 'not effect social reconstruction so as to secure the dominance of one class over the other but establish a just pattern of society which afforded equal opportunities to all human beings for self improvement and for obtaining material and spiritual excellence.'[125] He talked about creating an Islamic utopia and the return to a pure unadulterated version of Islam, where

> the army, police, judiciary, tax authorities and all other government functionaries are God-fearing and consider themselves accountable to Him in the Hereafter, where all government policies and laws are formulated on the basis of Divine guidance, where unjust actions have no place, where evil is quickly rectified by a government constantly ready to promote virtue with all its power and resources. Such a government will quickly be able to reform the people; it will shut the door against oppression, exploitation, immorality and other prevalent vices; it will reform education to develop the right kind of thinking and attitudes.[126]

Ironically, there were significant overlaps between the political ideas of Maududi and those of Jinnah and the AIML particularly in using 'democratic and constitutional means to organise the public opinion and bring about necessary pressure upon rulers to concede to the people's demand. Public education and not violent agitation, free discussion and not civil disobedience, ballot and not bullet.'[127] It came as no surprise then that the AIML was the target of Maududi's most aggressive criticism. Therefore, the *Jamaat's* creation was predicated on its function as a 'counter-League,'

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[124] Maududi, *Jihad in Islam*, 16.
[125] Maududi.
[126] Abu'l A'la Maududi, *Let Us Be Muslims* (Leicester: The Islamic Foundation, 1985), 290.
[127] Abu'l A'la Maududi, *The Islamic Law and Constitution* (Lahore: Islamic Publications (Pvt.) Ltd., 1960), 25.

challenging the secular politics of the League, with the assumption that its Islamist nature would enable it to replace the League for the religio-political leadership of the Muslim community.

> Calling the bluff of Muslim League leaders, who had continuously appealed to Islamic symbols to mobilise support for Pakistan, Maududi now demanded an Islamic state where he had once dreamed of an Islamic empire. His program was no longer to save Islam in India but to have it conquer Pakistan.[128]

Despite his strident criticism of the League, Maududi's politicisation of Islam was more akin to a political strategy than orthodox ʿulama's (e.g. JUIH) religious one. For instance, despite his contradictory stance towards the *Ahmadiyya* community, he accepted that Muslims could practice the Islamic faith in different ways,

> But some people take these issues of detail in *Shari'a* as fundamental issues of *Din* (Islamic way of life) itself. They have therefore established their own separate congregations and their own mosques. They have abused each other, forcibly driven their opponents from mosques, fought legal battles and split the Prophet's Ummah into various sects. When even this was not enough to satisfy them, they started, on the slightest pretexts, labelling each other as Kafir, sinner and heretic. They are not happy unless they impose their understanding on everyone else.[129]

Like Iqbal, he advocated a comprehensive reinterpretation of Islam tailored towards modern-day life, albeit with a more narrow, restrictive adherence to the *shariʿa*. Maududi significantly diverged from orthodox ʿulama in his denunciation of traditional Islam and its antiquated institutions by advocating a need to reform the *madrassa*, labelling Islamist conservatism as antiquated, incorporating 'elements of dictatorship' and argued against reviving the 'cult of obedience to the *Amir*.'[130]

Where he diverged sharply from the AIML's agenda was in the separation of religion from the state. He considered political power to be an intrinsic and integral

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[128] Maududi, 7.
[129] Maududi, *Let Us Be Muslims*, 131.
[130] Maududi, *The Islamic Law and Constitution*, 125.

component of the Islamic faith, therefore advocating a thorough reconstruction and reinterpretation of Islamic thought with emphasis on consolidating political power.

> Hence this party (the JI) is left with no other choice except to capture State Authority, for an evil system takes root and flourishes under the patronage of an evil government and a pious cultural order can never be established until the authority of the government is wrested from the wicked and transferred into the hands of the reformers.[131]

Maududi's 'Revolutionary' Ideology

The creation of the *Jamaʿat* was intended to serve a dual purpose: it was designed to spread the message of Maududi's *enlightened* understanding of 'true' Islam and to catapult Maududi himself into a strong position of influence with the aim of replacing Jinnah as the political and spiritual head of the Muslim masses. His ideas provided formative for the vast majority of extremist groups and militant organisations in Pakistan in later years ,especially his conceptualisation of *Jihad* that was adopted and expanded by militant Islamist groups such as the *Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan*. He impressed:

> [W]herever you are, in whichever country you live in, you must strive to change the wrong basis of government and seize all powers to rule and make laws from those who do not fear God. You must also provide leadership to God's servants and conduct the affairs of their government in accordance with God's laws…The name of this striving is *Jihad*.[132]

According to Maududi, the only way for Muslims to progress against the onslaught of Western secular influences and Hindu dominance was through an inseparable fusion of religion, society and politics. He provided the rationale for this all-encompassing version of the Islamic faith. '*Din* (faith) therefore means the same thing as state and government; *Shari'ah* is the law of that state and government; and *Ibadah* (worship)

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[131] Maududi, *Jihad in Islam*, 19.
[132] Maududi, *Let Us Be Muslims*, 290.

amounts to following and complying with that law.'[133] Nasr analyses Maududi's methodology in the following way: 'He reinterpreted concepts and symbols, giving them new meanings and connotations. This allowed him to set down a political reading of Islam, in which religious piety was transformed into a structure of authority. Faith became ideology and religious works social action.'[134]

Once Maududi saw the inevitability of a territorial partition of the subcontinent, he devoted himself to opposing the secular vision of the Muslim League for the new Pakistani polity, declaring:

> As a Muslim, I do not believe in the idea of "government of the people, by the people, for the people"…The most important question for me is whether the system of government in this Pakistan of yours will be based on the sovereignty of God or on the sovereignty of the people… In the sight of God Muslim nationalism is just as cursed as Indian nationalism.[135]

His vision of an Islamic state prescribed a model government that would derive its inspiration exclusively from the *shariʿa* in a system he referred to as a 'Theo-democracy'.[136] He used the idea of a political party, in his case the *Jamaat*, as an organisational *weapon* designed to politicise the power of an ideological perspective[137] and used it to perpetuate religio-political activism. He prescribed using education and propaganda as the desired means to 'further the cause of revolution … reinforce group solidarity within the party, forming the basis of a well-knit administrative party and a network of cadres.'[138]

His amorphous combination of religious leadership with socio-political activism blurred the lines between an Islamically revitalized community and a

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[133] Maududi, 295.
[134] Nasr, *The Vanguard of the Islamic Revolution: The Jamaat-i-Islami of Pakistan.*
[135] Maududi, *Musalman Aur Maujooda Siyasi Kashmakash (Muslims and the Present Political Turmoil)*, 79.
[136] Maududi, *The Islamic Law and Constitution*, 139.
[137] Nasr, *The Vanguard of the Islamic Revolution: The Jamaat-i-Islami of Pakistan.*
[138] Philip Selznick, *The Organisational Weapon: A Study of Bolshivik Strategy and Tactics* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1952), 11.

political party geared towards social action. The consequences of Maududi's ambiguity regarding the *Jamaat's* ultimate aims, and the limitations of a purely propagandist strategy were exposed after independence when the ideological imperatives of the *Jamaat* came into conflict with the socio-political realities of the new country. Maududi's misunderstanding of actual political dynamics – for example, in not understanding the bearing of cultural norms on the Muslim psyche – led him to presume that only Islam would form the core of Muslim politics and by default bestow overarching legitimacy to those claiming to represent its ideals. This proved to be the source of much speculation regarding the place of the *Jamaat* within Pakistan's modern, political system and even the effectiveness of its professed socio-political agenda in the years to come.

This overview of the *Jamaat's* political trajectory is pertinent since it demonstrates many deterministic precedents followed by contemporary religio-political parties in Pakistan. Three shortcomings of the Islamist clergy – the inability to agree on a common working definition of key Islamic precepts, failure to consolidate ideological imperatives with political realities, and the unwillingness to transcend sectarian differences to unite on a common socio-political platform – accounts for their chronic failure in maintaining political relevance through the ballot box.

The subsequent creation and sponsorship of militant and student wings by religio-political parties in Pakistan therefore reflected the resort to extra-political avenues to assert social and political influence over the Pakistani polity. Besides helping to exert pressure to meet their demands, such loose associations also enabled Islamist parties to maintain an element of deniability particularly with regards to the frequent security transgressions of militant groups. Thus, despite their conspicuous

political inaptitude the Islamist clergy in Pakistan still managed to exert and maintain a certain level of influence over the state by using their formidable street power.

The Muslim League

The All India Muslim League (AIML) began its political journey in 1906 as an elitist platform to express political dissent against the British government's discretionary imperial policies. From its inception, however the League had an exclusive culture and its high subscription rates reflected the founders' intention to restrict its membership to 'men of property and influence.'[139] Indeed, the organisation was financially dependent upon the subventions of princes such as the Agha Khan and the Nawab of Arcot.[140] The majority of those able and willing to join the League therefore belonged to the ranks of aristocrats, landlords, educated professionals and retired government servants. Similarly, the allocation of membership to different provinces was also based on political power and influence.

In order to extend the organizational base of the League to include grass-roots support, a decision was eventually made to establish regional branches in Punjab, Bihar, Madras, East Bengal, Bombay, West Bengal, and the United Provinces between 1907-1909. Without prescriptions on the nature of control over local branches in the League's constitution, the provincial Leagues were free to frame their own constitutions according to local circumstances and political allegiances. At the same time the loose nature of the League's confederacy embodied many variations of province-specific political complexions and thus goals divergent from those of the central body. Much of Pakistan's later dissonance between the centre and its

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[139] Matiur Rahman, *From Consultation to Confrontation: A Study of the Muslim League in British Indian Politics 1906-1912* (London: Luzac, 1970), 52.
[140] Peter Hardy, *The Muslims of British India* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1972).

peripheries stemmed from these divergent needs and concerns, which remained

unaddressed through critical institutional development.

Ultimately it was asserted that:

> No constitutional plan would be workable in this country or acceptable to the
> Muslims unless it is designed on the following basic principles, viz., that
> geographically contiguous units' are demarcated into regions which should be
> constituted, with such territorial readjustments as may be necessary that the
> areas in which the Muslims are numerically in a majority as in the North
> Western and Eastern Zones of (British) India should be grouped to constitute
> Independent States in which the constituent units should be autonomous and
> sovereign.[141]

Not only did the federal nature of the Resolution mask potential discord embedded in

divergent ideas regarding provincial autonomy, its deliberately ambiguous

phraseology alluded to the differing nature of the Indian Muslim body politic and a

critical need to appease its various constituents. At the same time the rise of local

political parties, particularly in Muslim majority provinces, also served as counter-

weight to the power of the League. In the Punjab, for instance, Fazl-i-Hussain's

Unionist party vied for political supremacy by brokering an alliance between Muslim,

Hindu, and Sikh landholding interests.[142] In Bengal, another significant Muslim

majority-province, the anti-feudal *Krishak Praja Smiti* party gained popularity by

championing the cause of poor tenants and agricultural workers suffering economic

and social oppression under the feudal *zamindari* system. The Muslim League,

dominated as it was by landholding aristocracy, therefore could not establish a strong

foothold in rural Bengal.[143] In the North West Frontier Province, the Congress-

dominated Red Shirts party (also called the *Khudai Khidmatgars*) challenged the

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[141] Sharifuddin Pirzada, ed., "AIML Resolution of 23 March 1940," in *Foundation of Pakistan: The All-India Muslim League Documents: 1906-1947, Vol. II* (Karachi: National Institute of Historical and Cultural Studies, 1970).
[142] Pirzada.
[143] R. Suntharalingham, *Indian Nationalism: An Historical Analysis* (Chennai: Vikas Publishing, 1983).

League's power. Their popularity stemmed partly from their radical social programmes aimed at fighting feudal oppression and partly due to their Congress-sponsored anti-British campaigns such as the Civil Disobedience movement. Even the absence of a pro-Congress Muslim body did not guarantee the League's political dominance, for instance in Sindh, where local parties such as the Sindh United Party, the Azad Party and the Muslim Political party, represented local factional interests and therefore had little incentive to join a League with marginal regional significance.

The political weakness of the League was exacerbated by failure to expand its popular base to include Muslim masses at the grassroots level, for example women, youth, ʿulama, factory-workers, peasants, and artisans. The Congress in contrast, had recognised the importance of widening its membership to include individuals from all social classes early on. The significance of such grassroots support became painfully obvious with the results of the 1937 all-India elections.

The first elections to be held under the Government of India Act of 1935 proved to be nothing short of an embarrassment for the League. Unable to even contest a significant number of seats reserved specifically for Muslims, the League only won 109 out of the 482 seats reserved for Muslims, securing just 4.6 percent of the total Muslim vote. In the Punjab, the League won two out of 84 seats reserved for Muslims (out of the seven that it contested); in Bengal, 39 out of 117 (via Fazl-ul-Haq's coalition); in Sindh, three out of 33; and in the North-West Frontier province it won no seats at all.[144]

The 1937 elections rendered a decisive blow to the League's claim to speak for all Indian Muslims. They highlighted the League's organisational inadequacies as

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[144] Akbar S. Ahmed, *Jinnah, Pakistan and the Islamic Identity: The Search for Saladin* (London: Routledge, 1997), 112.

well as the futility of its claim of political exclusivity. The results of these elections did show, however, that the League was considerably more popular in the Muslim-minority provinces, where Muslims feared overwhelming political marginalization by the Hindu-dominated Congress party.

At this critical juncture the new strategy of the League, as unveiled by Jinnah at its annual session in October 1937, derived its impetus from the need for unity and organisation.

> No settlement with majority community is possible as no Hindu leader speaking with any authority shows any concern or genuine desire for it…Offers of peace by the weaker party always mean confession of weakness and invitation to aggression. Politics mean power and not relying only on cries of justice or fairplay or goodwill.[145]

With the aim of winning a mass following and gaining recognition as the sole representative political organization for Muslims, Jinnah began to reorganize the League and reformulate its outreach strategy. The League attempted to emulate the structure of the Congress as a multi-tiered organization with a network of branches linking the provinces, divisions, districts, and villages to the central body. Jinnah made his mark as a master political strategist with an ambitious campaign to popularize the League by highlighting local class fears, social insecurities, and cultural sensibilities of the different sections of Muslim society. In the aftermath of the 1937 elections and the associated defeat of the Agriculturist party in the United Provinces, for example, the League gained popularity amongst Muslim landlords. Threatened by the prospects of Congress-inspired tenancy legislation, the League served to assuage the class fears of Muslim landlords. The emergence of the new 'grassroots' Congress activists, openly propagating Hindu values such as the use of

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[145] Ahmad, *Some Recent Speeches and Writings of Jinnah, Vol. 1*, 33.

Hindi as common speech, non-western clothing, and Gandhi caps, served to accentuate differences between the two communal groups.

In Muslim majority provinces such as the Punjab and Bengal, the popularity of the League was both coerced and contrived. Sensing the danger of marginalization at the all-India level, Muslim politicians in majority provinces eventually recognised the importance of representation at the centre. For instance, Fazl-i-Hussain's successor as the leader of the Unionist Party, Sir Sikandar Hayat Khan, agreed to let to Jinnah represent Punjab at the centre and follow official League policy on all-India questions. However, since the Punjab Muslim League Parliamentary Board was dominated by the members of the Unionist party, the Muslim Unionists were not in any way subservient to the dictates of the AIML even after the agreement. In fact, in return for allowing this limited mandate to represent their interests at the centre, Sikander insisted the AIML have no say in Punjabi affairs.[146]

In Bengal, Fazl-ul-Haq, leader of a minority group in the coalition ministry under the Krishak Praja party, looked towards a similar arrangement with the centre. Haq agreed to advise his remaining Muslim followers in the Krishak Praja party to 'follow' the League's policy at the centre.[147] For all intents and purposes, however, the Bengal ministry remained independent.

At his end, Jinnah was becoming increasingly conscious of the desperate need for Indian Muslims to project some semblance of unity as a separate and significant political entity within the existing constitutional setup. In order to lend credence to the League's claim over the representation of all Indian Muslims, therefore, Jinnah had no option but to accept nominal allegiance as equal to those who had committed fully

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[146] Jalal, *The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, the Muslim League and the Demand for Pakistan.*
[147] Jalal, 40.

to the party in the past. What also worked in his favour was that for the first time Muslim politicians in both the minority and majority provinces finally recognized the need to back an all-India Muslim party in order to avoid political and economic marginalization in the constitutional system of the 1935 Act.[148]

'Pakistan' Resolution

AIML's new constitution (coming into effect on February 1938) attempted to streamline political activity and impose centralized authority over the League's provincial branches. Thus far, the League's hard-core support had come from the Muslim-minority provinces, as reflected by their dominance in the League's central Working Committee. In order to legitimize its claim to represent *all* Indian Muslims and need to secure broad-based support across the country, however, the League needed to accommodate the majority provinces in a commensurate way. Iqbal went a step further in his correspondence with Jinnah by saying that the Muslims of North-West India and Bengal

> ought at present to ignore Muslim [minority] provinces… It will therefore be better to hold the coming session of the League in the Punjab, and not in a Muslim minority province…. The interest in the All-India Muslim League is rapidly growing in the Punjab, and the holding of the coming session in Lahore is likely to give a fresh political awakening to the Punjab Muslims.[149]

The minority versus majority debate was of critical importance both to the all-India legitimacy of the AIML and for the political and economic futures of Indian Muslims. Muslims living as minorities, those in UP in particular, were most vocal and steadfast in their support for the League and eventually its demand for a sovereign Pakistan. However, the AIML's desperate need to secure recognition as the sole representative

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[148] Under the Act, provincial portfolios were to be placed in charge of ministers enjoying the support of the provincial legislatures conferring limited authority upon them subject to British approval.

[149] Ghulam Allana, ed., "Lahore Resolution Passed at the Annual Session of the All India Muslim League, 22nd-24th March 1940, at Minto Park Lahore," in *Pakistan Movement: Historical Documents* (Islamic Book Service, 1940).

organization of all Indian Muslims and to counter formidable Congress' overtures towards Muslim constituencies, made it imperative to pander to the whims of the majority provinces. Jinnah's best recourse to balance the divisive needs of the regional components of the League was therefore to keep the League's official policy as ambiguous and generalised as possible.

The phraseology of the Lahore Resolution passed in March 1940 by the League bore testimony to these ambiguities. It neither specified exact geographical boundaries, nor mentioned partition of India, the creation of Pakistan, or refer to federal system of governance for the proposed geographically contiguous units in which Muslims were numerically in majority. In a bid to appease the Muslim-majority provinces, the resolution stipulated that those areas should be 'grouped to constitute Independent States in which the constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign.'[150]

The transformation of an obscure demand for a loose federation of autonomous Muslim-majority states within the all-India context into a specific demand for a sovereign Pakistan thereafter seemed to have occurred spontaneously. In March 1939 the League appointed a special committee to look into various schemes proposing to address the issue of Indian Muslim independence. Reflecting the divergent interests and agendas of different factions in the Muslim body politic, these schemes had 'little in common with each other except the assertion, explicit or implicit, that Indian Muslims, whatever their differences, and however defined, were a nation'.[151]

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[150] Pirzada, "AIML Resolution of 23 March 1940."

[151] Jalal, *The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, the Muslim League and the Demand for Pakistan*, 53.

Being the most viable base for consolidation of Muslim support it was the Punjab-inspired strategy advocating the loosest of federations with weak central control over regional 'blocs' of provinces, which featured most prominently in the Lahore resolution.[152] The ambiguities of the Resolution were designed to allow room for Jinnah to maneuver around the need to articulate demands in communal terms appealing to Muslims in the minority provinces versus the necessity of maintaining communal harmony in the majority provinces. Again, this marked a glaring contradiction within the Indian Muslim body politic that Jinnah had chosen to obfuscate in order to maintain some semblance of organization and recognition as the 'sole spokesman' for Indian Muslims.[153] Jinnah's vision for Pakistan reflected this emphasis:

> the question of a division of India, as proposed by the Muslim League, is based on the fundamental fact that there are two nations- Hindus and Muslims- and the underlying principle is that we want a national home and a national state in our homelands which are predominately Muslim and compromise the six units of the Punjab, the N.W.F.P., Sindh, Baluchistan, Bengal and Assam.[154]

However, when presented with the partition plan by the British viceroy Lord Mountbatten on 2 June 1947, his fears of receiving a 'truncated,' 'mutilated,' and 'moth-eaten' Pakistan were realised.[155] Much to Jinnah's dismay, the proposal for independence included the partition of two key Muslim majority provinces (Bengal and Punjab), which he had so vehemently opposed. Jinnah's begrudging acceptance of the plan bore testimony to his painful recognition of the constraints faced by the League due to the particularisms of its provincial constituents and the careless haste with which the British were to abandon the sub-continent. It was decided that the final

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[152] Jalal.

[153] Jalal.

[154] Muhammad Jinnah, 'Speech by Muhammad Jinnah on the partition of Bengal and the Punjab,' 4 May 1947, FO 371/63533, The National Archives, London.

[155] Ibid.

'Dominion of Pakistan' was to comprise a federation of five Muslim-majority provinces including East Bengal, also called East Pakistan (later to become Bangladesh), West Punjab, Baluchistan, Sindh, and the North-West Frontier Province (recently renamed Khyber Pukhtunkhwa or KPK). The Princely States amalgamated within these provinces would also join the federation. On 14 August 1947, the sovereign state of Pakistan was born, with Mohammad Ali Jinnah at its helm as the first Governor-General.

Ravages of Independence

Ironically, the roots of Pakistan's chronic institutional frailty can be traced back to two fundamental factors i.e. ideology and nationhood, and the ambiguities inherent therein that had proved so vital in its creation in the first place. Despite using Islam to legitimize the demand for a separate Muslim state, Jinnah's vision for Pakistan was akin to the idea of a territorially defined Pakistani nation inclusive of all its religious communities. In his 11 August address to the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, he clearly outlined his vision:

> If you change your past and work together in a spirit that every one of you, no matter to what community he belongs, no matter what relations he had with you in the past, no matter what is his colour, cast, creed, is first, second and last a citizen of the State with equal rights, privileges and obligations there will be no end to the progress you will make…You may belong to any religion, or cast or creed – that has got nothing to do with the business of the State. We are starting with this fundamental principle that we are all citizens, and equal citizens of one State.[156]

Jinnah's iconic words exemplified his support for a secular rather than an ideological Pakistan that had been impressed upon the Muslim masses during the independence movement. It was clear, therefore, that Jinnah envisioned Pakistan as a Muslim country primarily because the majority of its population followed the Islamic faith in

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[156] Ahmad, *Some Recent Speeches and Writings of Jinnah, Vol. 1.*

some way or another. The implied framework for the state, its political life, and constitution, however, were to be modern and democratic.

At the same time Jinnah's intention to hold the office of Pakistan's first Governor-General reflected his concerns about the League's ability to guarantee the autonomy and territorial integrity of Pakistan. A visceral mistrust of the Congress and fear of the potentially disastrous inherited provincial particularisms accounted for Jinnah's focus on establishing strong central governance. By making even the office of Prime Minister subservient to that of the Governor-General: 'In my position it is I who will give the advice and others will act on it',[157] Jinnah aimed to stave off imminent, domestic power wrangling that seemed inevitable amongst Pakistan's disparate political constituencies. Thus, Jinnah had compelling practical reasons for what Mountbatten considered his 'megalomania'.[158]

Difficulties faced by Pakistan throughout its short history practically exemplified many of Jinnah's fears regarding the combination of domestic and foreign existential threats that it would face. Challenges of administrative governance and nation building were compounded by the separation of half the country by hundreds of miles of hostile Indian territory. Its relentless preoccupation with the expansion of military power, therefore, reflected Pakistan's deep-seated insecurities regarding the inadequacies of its strategic defences from its early years. Three subsequent wars with India (1965, 1971, and 1999), and the Indian-assisted secession of East Pakistan into the independent state of Bangladesh in 1971, which may have presented opportunities as critical junctures, only served to heighten an acute sense of threat perception. The military's dominance over national affairs, both economic and

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[157] Mountbatten's report no. 11, 4 July 1947 (as cited in Jalal, *The Sole Spokesman*, 292-296).
[158] Ibid.

political, in the decades following independence was therefore predicated on the historical causation of Indian hostility and accentuated by the overarching need to fortify its territorial and strategic defences.

The centrality of the military to the survival of the Pakistani state and its role in state-building in the critical years following independence served as a precursor to the military-bureaucratic *combine* that emerged within the first decade of Pakistan's existence. An increasing symbiosis between the military and non-elected elites played out the phenomenon of increasing returns in terms of providing increased salience for both elements in state affairs. The development of expedient relationships forged between ruling military regimes and religio-political parties in Pakistan in subsequent years therefore reflected parallels with those of the country's civilian administrators. This implicitly meant that military regimes had to deal with many similar constraints as their civilian counterparts having to capitulate to traditional networks of patronage to establish primacy. Thus, as a veritable legacy of pre-partition politics, after first facilitating the rise of the praetorian system, Islamist and socio-political networks of patronage eventually served to challenge its consolidation over the state.

Chapter 2

The State of (In)Security

Post-colonial nation-states such as Pakistan proved to be unstable, characterised by central powers having inadequate legitimacy and crucially lacking in universal symbols and structures of authority. 'Typically the centre will make an unsuccessful effort to subordinate peripheral ethnicity and cultural pluralism. Support for the regime and the authority is weakened by the conflict and separation between centre and periphery.'[159] Indeed, Jinnah's steadfastness with regards to the establishment of a strong central government reflected his and the League's lack of certitude over Pakistan's ability to survive the initial phase of independence. Having lost the battle for an undivided Punjab and Bengal, the League was painfully aware of the drastic curtailment of available resources even prior to independence. Thus, entirely lacking in the mature administrative and political infrastructure bequeathed to India, much of Pakistan's early existence was dominated by issues pertaining to the practical construction and consolidation of a complex new state.

This chapter analyses in greater detail the main elements compounding Pakistan's critical problems with both state- and nation-building, as a precursor to the emergence of praetorianism and its relationship with Islamism. It argues that political schisms present within Pakistan's civilian leadership compounded the fragility of its control over the insidious forces of territorial irredentism, economic divergence, and socio-cultural dissent in the provinces. Whilst the previous chapter highlighted institutional shortcomings of the Muslim League as a political party, this chapter builds upon the argument with a detailed analysis of the practical stresses between the

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[159] Perlmutter, "The Praetorian State and the Praetorian Army: Toward a Taxonomy of Civil-Military Relations in Developing Polities", 28.

central and provincial governments, i.e., the centre and peripheries. It looks particularly at the existential challenges to territorial sovereignty and socio-economic cohesion that beset the country from infancy, which combined with the fragility of its political system, provided the basis for the rise of praetorianism. In doing so, this chapter challenges the notion that the Pakistani military establishment is inherently hegemonic, arguing instead that the inadvertent rise of praetorianism and the historical causation behind Pakistan's persistent revisionism had its roots in structural and institutional inadequacies at critical junctures of state formation.

Viewed through the lens of historical institutionalism 'choices that are made early in the history of any polity subsequently develop into institutionalized commitments and determine subsequent decisions'.[160] In Pakistan's case this meant that the early trajectory of state construction and socio-economic architecture during such critical junctures played a formative role in grounding the army as an institution and making it an inescapable part of the political process. The path dependent nature of the polity meant that threat perceptions acquired through experience and knowledge, such as external territorial aggressions by India or internal socio-economic upheavals, would demonstrate increasing returns by translating into a function of legitimacy.[161] This chapter demonstrates how these experiences account for the primary decisions taken by early civilian leadership, which inculcated a political culture based on authoritarianism and ultimately created the space for direct military intervention.

In terms of historiography this chapter aims to address a contentious issue that lies at the heart of debates on civil-military relations in Pakistan, i.e. the

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[160] Guy B. Peters, *Institutional Theory in Political Science: The 'New Instiutionalism'* (London: Pinter, 1999), 19.
[161] Aziz, *Military Control in Pakistan: The Parallel State,* 29.

preoccupation of the ruling elite with defence and national security imperatives –
Pakistan's chronic revisionism, and its implications for state construction. It
challenges notions such as a 'hyper-realpolitik world view' that prioritizes narrow
military security as an end in itself.[162] Whilst this does not absolve the military
establishment of its constitutionally deviant behavior in later years, this is presented
as a fall-out, and not the source of its enduring democratic institutional failures.

Contemporary scholars largely fixate upon the persistent revisionism of the
Pakistani military establishment as an end in itself. Islamist militancy is by extension
portrayed as 'central component of Pakistani grand strategy' i.e. 'nothing less than the
centrepiece of a sophisticated asymmetric warfare campaign, painstakingly developed
and prosecuted since Pakistan's founding'.[163] Whilst there is some merit in the
argument that the state utilised Islamist militancy as a means of redressing its strategic
weaknesses vis-a-vis a much larger rival India, the idea of religion as primary driver
of the Pakistani state's domestic and foreign policy undermines the many
complexities of a post-colonial, secessionist reality interspersed with spontaneous
regional events.

Haqqani actually alleges that Pakistani military establishment deliberately
exploited regional developments to 'cast Afghanistan as an additional significant
threat to Pakistan's national security, which justified continued military expenditures
and helped maintain Pakistan's status as a garrison state.'[164] He charges the military
establishment with deliberate political manipulation: 'Pakistan's history made it easy
to find political disorder or contrive it with the help of the country's megalomaniacal

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[162] Paul, *The Warrior State: Pakistan in the Contemporary World*.
[163] S. Paul Kapur and Sumit Ganguly, "The Jihad Paradox: Pakistan and Islamist Militancy in South Asia," *International Security* 37, no. 1 (2012), 113.
[164] Haqqani, *Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military*, 103.

politicians and weak civilian institutions.'[165] In the same analogy, Shah, Fair and

Paul situate their analysis within the context of a misplaced threat perception, blaming

the military for deepening Pakistan's structural problems, if not creating them in the

first place, and impeding efforts to reach solutions through political and democratic

processes.

This chapter aims to challenge such unilateral determinism that emphasises

the inherently hegemonic nature of the Pakistani military establishment, by

demonstrating the potency of existential threats faced by the emerging state. It goes

against scholarship that places religion at the heart of the state's support for Islamist

militancy, and challenges claims that attribute that 'salience of the Kashmir dispute,

which was rooted in Pakistan's identity as a Muslim state and its opposition to "Hindu"

India, grew further as a result of Pakistan's post-Bangladesh Islamisation

processes.'[166] Using a combination of original documents and communiqués from

archives, and contemporary secondary source material it demonstrates the legitimacy

of the Pakistani state's existential insecurities as primary drivers of its chronic

'strategic myopia' with the recourse to Islamist militancy.[167]

State Construction, Political Processes, and National Identity

As the once vehement, later estranged, supporter of the Pakistan's nationalist cause

Sindhi separatist leader G.M. Sayed explained:

> Do not forget that the Islamic society actually in existence is that in which the
> religious head is an ignorant Mullah, the spiritual leader an immoral Pir,
> political guide a power intoxicated feudal landlord…their cry of "Islam is in
> Danger" became a cloak for dark deeds and reactionary moves, complacency

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[165] Haqqani.

[166] Kapur and Ganguly, "The Jihad Paradox: Pakistan and Islamist Militancy in South Asia," 123.

[167] Ahmad Faruqui, *Rethinking the National Security of Pakistan: The Price of Strategic Myopia* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003).

and tyranny…Such is the extent to which mockery can be made of Islam in these days of capitalist subterfuge and commercialized politics.[168]

A combination of territorial insecurity, underdeveloped democratic institutions, socio-economic challenges, and systemic failures of the state in the construction of an effective civil society facilitated the predominance of the Pakistani military in state affairs. Janowitz refers to this type of phenomenon as 'reactive militarism' where the military's political behavior is 'in part generated by the weakness of civilian institutions and the direct pressure of civilian groups which seek to co-opt and enlarge the role of the military establishment' to mitigate internal political crises.[169] Finer attributes such institutional weaknesses to pronounced 'local particularisms,' where

> national and local politics operate at separate levels; politics is fought out between urban elites over the heads of the peasants; rooted in one's social influence and power, it is a struggle to secure or expand such influence and power at the national level, and in terms of personal followings.[170]

The social prerequisites of praetorianism, applicable pertinently in Pakistan's case, include the lack of political experience and symbols of authority on part of the civilian rulers, which runs parallel to the absence of informal structures able to foster social cohesion. In such a state of social disorganization, 'institutions do not develop readily or operate effectively; social control is ineffective; and channels for communication are few. Furthermore, there are no meaningful symbols to bind the society together.'[171] A syndrome typical, he says, of a state in which the previous patterns of social cohesion have broken down without being replaced by new patterns. The post-colonial legacy that accounts for much of Pakistan's socio-economic

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[168] G. M. Sayed, *Struggle for New Sindh: A Brief Narrative of the Working of Provincial Autonomy in Sindh during a Decade, 1937-1947* (Karachi: Sind Observer Press, 1949), 218.
[169] Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait* (Glencoe: Free Press, 1960).
[170] Finer, *The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics*, 113.
[171] Perlmutter, "The Praetorian State and the Praetorian Army: Toward a Taxonomy of Civil-Military Relations in Developing Polities," 96.

inheritance reflects such fallouts from the failure to establish alternative patterns of social cohesion, despite a publically proclaimed, overarching Islamic rationale.

The existing body of literature on the civil-military relations in Pakistan can be broadly differentiated into two camps: One arguing that the emergence of the praetorian military system was an unavoidable consequence of the necessary prioritization of matters of national security [172] - the contemporary historical institutionalist school, and the other, more commercially popular one presenting the predominance of the institutional interests of the military, economic and political, as the root cause of the damage caused to national institutions.[173] This debate generally revolves around whether the country's gargantuan military expenditures and overall predominance over state affairs are justified in the face of legitimate threats to national security or whether these threats were deliberately overstated in order to protect the military's political and economic interests.

Haqqani[174] and Hussain[175] look towards the political designs of the military high command as a deterministic for its chronic state of interventionism. Contemporary works by Shah,[176] Fair[177] and Paul[178] project the Pakistani military as a quasi state-within-a-state establishment, intent upon dominating civilian institutions, political processes and foreign policy and Siddiqa[179] presents the corporate interest of the military as a primary driver of its praetorian agenda. Siddiqa, Haqqani, Hussain,

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[172] Abbas, *Pakistan's Drift Into Extremism: Allah, the Army, and America's War on Terror*; Jalal, *The State of Martial Rule: The Origins of Pakistan's Political Economy of Defence*; Askari-Rizvi, *Military State and Society in Pakistan*; Anatol Lieven, *Pakistan: A Hard Country* (London: Penguin Books, 2012).

[173] Haqqani, *Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military*; Shah, *The Army and Democracy: Military Politics in Pakistan*; Fair, *Fighting to the End: The Pakistan Army's Way of War*.

[174] Haqqani, *Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military*.

[175] Hussain, *Frontline Pakistan: The Path to Catastrophe and the Killing of Benazir Bhutto*.

[176] Shah, *The Army and Democracy: Military Politics in Pakistan*.

[177] Fair, *Fighting to the End: The Pakistan Army's Way of War*.

[178] Paul, *The Warrior State: Pakistan in the Contemporary World*.

[179] Siddiqa, *Military Inc.: Inside Pakistan's Military Economy*.

Shah, Fair and Paul therefore reflect the various angles of the popular anti-praetorian school, whereas scholars such as Jalal, Talbot,[180] Bennett-Jones,[181] Abbas,[182] and Lievan[183] avoid assuming premeditation to present a more balanced analysis.

Indeed, well-nuanced assessments regarding the trajectory of military ascendency as a function of the 'dialectic between state construction and political processes' during the first decade of independence are few and far between.[184] The *State of Martial Rule* stands as a notable exception providing critical insights into the plethora of problems complicating the already arduous state-building processes in Pakistan. Jalal's work serves as a useful starting point for understanding the background of the Pakistani state's insecurity and development of the peculiar strategic culture of defence.

State Formation versus Political Consolidation

Given its vulnerable strategic position – sharing 3,250 miles of border with a palpably hostile India, East Pakistan surrounded on three sides by Indian territory, as well as approximately 1,350 miles of the shared border with Afghanistan – the external defence of Pakistan was an immense task for an ill-equipped, understaffed military. Incorporating two major land frontiers of the Indian subcontinent, Pakistan faced the formidable challenge of defending two geographically separate wings, keeping unruly tribes in its north western regions in check and maintaining internal law and order all at the same time. Partition had by default deprived Pakistan of the bulk of arms, ammunition and military stores, as well as all 16 of the ordinance factories

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[180] Talbot, *Pakistan: A Modern History*.
[181] Bennet Jones, *Pakistan: Eye of the Storm*.
[182] Abbas, *Pakistan's Drift Into Extremism: Allah, the Army, and America's War on Terror*.
[183] Lieven, *Pakistan: A Hard Country*.
[184] Jalal, *The State of Martial Rule: The Origins of Pakistan's Political Economy of Defence*.

modernized during the Second World War, because they were located within Indian territory.

Pakistani leadership viewed the lack of essential military assets with grave concern since as Prime Minister Liaquat Ali lamented 'an Army without equipment was as much use as tin soldiers.'[185] According to some estimates, in order to assure adequate strategic and defence capability, Pakistan would need to maintain roughly the same size of army and air force as India, but without the benefit of indigenous industrial or military installations.[186] During the 1948 Kashmir war, General Gracey, first Commander in Chief of the Pakistan army, provided a sobering assessment of the threats to Pakistan's security:

> If Pakistan is not to face another serious refugee problem with about 2,750,000 people uprooted from their homes, if India is not to be allowed to sit on the doorsteps of Pakistan to the rear and to the flank at liberty to enter at its will and pleasure; if the civilian and military morale is not to be affected to a dangerous extent; and if subversive political forces are not to be encouraged and let loose within Pakistan itself, it is imperative that the Indian army is not allowed to advance beyond the general line Uri-Poonch-Naoshera.[187]

Along with the difficulty of rehabilitating the relentless flood of refugees pouring into the country on a shoestring budget, the divergence in economic and political priorities between the centre and provinces also proved to be a formidable challenge for the maintenance of law and order. Near-anarchical conditions bred by the shortages in basic necessities such as food, housing, and clothing, along with widespread hoarding, smuggling, and black-marketeering, combined with unpopular taxation measures to offset the provincial deficits recorded in 1948-49, engendered widespread discontent against the centre's defence-centric economic policies. Instead of essential investment into social welfare and economic development, the expansion of administrative

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[185] Jalal, 42.
[186] Jalal, 50.
[187] Jalal, 143.

bureaucracy to consolidate its hold over provincial affairs thus became the state's primary preoccupation in these formative years.

The fact that the Muslim League had blundered into independence with the barest semblance of alliances in the constituent provinces served to thwart its assimilationist ambitions. Not only did local political actors command significant grassroots support, in provinces such as Punjab and KPK, historical precedents had established deeply entrenched social networks of power and patronage. As soon as the goal of independence had been achieved, cracks began to appear in the League's relationship with its provincial affiliates due to the centre's assimilationist efforts conflicting with escalating demands for provincial autonomy. Relationships brokered for political expediency before independence began to fray under the burden of increased economic extractionism and political coercion by the centre to finance the heightened expenditure on defence. The absence of a broad-based national mandate and reciprocal communication between the centre and the provinces therefore proved to be a formidable impediment in the path of national consensus.

Notwithstanding Jalal's ideas regarding the deliberate derailment of Pakistan's political processes during its first decade by senior bureaucratic and military officials, it is important to remember that the League's position in the Muslim majority provinces constituting Pakistan had already been arbitrary in the years leading to partition. For instance, as early as 1945 leaders of the League ministry in Sindh had to be dismissed due to allegations of incompetence and corruption. Around the same time, the League's NWFP ministry stood accused of widespread inefficiency, corruption, and exercise of differential patronage, with ministers allegedly

> trying to please their partisans by doing them favours, which included appointments of relatives to the administration, the grant of export permits to

friends and the allocation of state funds to certain villages that were seen to support the ruling ministry.[188]

The Frontier League ministry was also eventually dismissed in March 1945. In an attempt to consolidate influence in Punjab, Jinnah advised the Unionist Party to be renamed the Muslim League Coalition Party in April 1944. His overtures were met with strident resistance, leading to a withdrawal of the League's support for the Unionist ministry. In Bengal, too, Premier Fazl-ul-Haq's resentment of the League's centrist tendencies resulted in his formation of a new coalition ministry. His expulsion from the League in March 1943, paved the way for the installation of another League ministry under Sir Khawaja Nazimuddin.

It was of critical significance, therefore, that the party that won the right to govern Pakistan possessed only nominal influence in the territories that came with it. Finer explains this syndrome as typical to 'poly-ethnic' post-colonial societies, for 'once independence has been won, it becomes clear that the principles of nationality and popular sovereignty are insufficient to promote national consensus.'[189] In fact, he suggests that, instead of facilitating national consensus, the dogma of popular sovereignty does exactly the opposite. Finer's theoretical explanation for such a fundamental challenges states:

> Hatred of the imperial power is not the same as national consciousness, and beyond this political consciousness is very low. In these circumstances popular sovereignty accentuates provincial particularism, communalism, tribalism and lays the westernizing elites by the heels…The result is confusion and tension over legitimacy – over what form of rule, which political values are duty-worthy.[190]

Reflecting this dynamic, resistance of provincial ministries to central League directives had already emerged in varying guises prior to Pakistan's independence.

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[188] Suntharalingham, *Indian Nationalism: An Historical Analysis*, 422.
[189] Finer, *The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics*, 224.
[190] Finer, *The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics*, 225.

Tensions over the apportionment of power between the centre and the provinces were only to become more severe when the administrative, economic and demographic dislocations of partition became tangible. Post-independence these factors compounded the organizational weaknesses of the League, and epitomized its failure to integrate provincial governing bodies into a strong, representative organisation necessary to build an enduring, national political authority. In fact, Jinnah's insistence on heading the office of Governor-General took into consideration the necessity of enforcing compelling central authority over Pakistan's provinces per force if necessary.[191]

In order to gain sufficient influence in the provinces thus, the League had to neutralize its local political opposition and saw wisdom in exploiting the established networks of local patronage. In exchange for their cooperation local leaders such as the *Malik* or *Khan* in KPK and the *Pirs* and *Zamindar* in Punjab could be enticed with economic benefits such as government subsidies, favourable policies towards tenancy reforms, and influence in the national legislature. In urban areas the benefits of state patronage could translate into allotments of housing, commercial, and industrial units, which had been left vacant by fleeing non-Muslims. In provinces such as East Pakistan, Sindh, and Baluchistan the central government resorted to more direct intervention, marginalizing provincial representation by arbitrarily awarding political appointments, and in some cases even imposing direct governor rule from Karachi.

A pervasive culture of patronage in Pakistan's formative political years undermined the development of effective representative institutions of governance. It also simultaneously facilitated the rise of a tradition of bureaucratic authoritarianism characterized by 'paternalism, wide discretionary powers and the personalization of

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[191] Jalal, *The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, the Muslim League and the Demand for Pakistan*.

authority.'[192] Change and cultural diversity, seen as threatening the existing balance of power by the ruling elite gave rise to the ruthless repression of individual freedoms. In addition, deteriorating socio-economic conditions provided the perfect opportunity for emerging religio-political groups to vie for political prominence through sheer street power.

As the disconnect grew between central and provincial imperatives, so too did the centre's reliance on the coercive arms of the state to suppress growing discontent in the provinces. The central government's recourse to the army to bring discordant elements in the provinces to heel thus marked the beginning of a symbiotic relationship between the administration and its military high command. An early example of such collusion came during the 1948 disturbances in East Bengal where the army had to be called in to stamp out a revolt by policemen striking against delays in the receipts of pay. In Baluchistan, the military was deployed to secure the accession of divergent princely states after independence and in Punjab it was brought in to contain the anti-*Ahmadiyya* disturbances of 1953.

Theoretical notions of path dependence connote that the specific patterns of timing and sequence matter. Krasner suggests that 'policies are path dependent and on that path they continue along until some sufficiently strong political force deflects from it.'[193] This chapter grounds this idea in the Pakistani context by analysing how the assertions of military predominance and pervasive Islamism that resulted from a set of contingent events and particular actions taken by early policy-makers were rendered 'virtually impossible to reverse'.[194] That these forces eventually served to challenge the power of praetorian regimes was due to their local significance to the

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[192] Talbot, *Pakistan: A Modern History*, 64.
[193] Peters, *Institutional Theory in Political Science: The 'New Instiutionalism'*, 19.
[194] Aziz, *Military Control in Pakistan: The Parallel State*.

central administration and in the civilianising role they played to provide a cover of legitimacy for military rule.

Ittihad, Iman, Nazm (Unity, Faith, Discipline)[195]

Much of Pakistan's early existence was dominated by issues pertaining to the construction and consolidation of a complex new state. India on the other hand already had, as a gift of inheritance from the British Raj, a well-established central government infrastructure with its formal seat in New Delhi. The Congress in India began its official tenure with the definitive advantage of inheriting British India's unitary centre complete with well-established links with provincial and district administrations. Nehru therefore began his term as India's first Prime Minister without many of the encumbrances of a seceding polity that Jinnah had to face at Pakistan's helm.

A promising new body of material in the historiography of the post-partition period led by substantive works by scholars such as Talbot and Singh, Chatterji, Sherman, Gould and Ansari[196] emerging in recent years reflects a shift away from the conventional focus of Partition studies on 'high politics, with its emphasis on the causes of division', to its 'human consequences' in which there is greater reliance on subjective individual and collective experiences drawn from oral testimonies and personal memories.[197] Talbot and Singh in particular situate the intersectionality of trans-local issues, concerns and interests within the context of broader developments framing the Partition and post-Partition processes. They chart the parallel processes of

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[195] These *Asool-e-Amal,* or guiding principals, symbolise Pakistan's ideological foundations introduced and adopted upon independence by its founder, Mohammad Ali Jinnah.

[196] William Gould, Taylor C. Sherman, and Sarah Ansari, "The Flux of the Matter: Loyalty, Corruption and the Everyday State in the Post-Partition Government Services of India and Pakistan," *Past & Present* 219, no. 1 (2013): 237–79.

[197] Ian Talbot and Guharpal Singh, *Region and Partition: Bengal, Punjab and the Partition of the Sub-Continent* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).

ethnic consolidation amongst some displaced groups and transfer of local and regional loyalties amongst other groups towards extreme forms of officially sanctioned ideological nationalism such as *Hindutva* or *Islamism.*

A common theme in both post-Partition polities therefore was the high level of centralisation and drafting of new rules for managing ethnic and religious conflicts. Another commonality in both states was a marked 'closure' i.e. zero tolerance policy towards any further *partitions*. Potentially troublesome alternatives, such as localised ethnic or secessionist movements, challenging the 'foundational myths' of independence therefore would not be entertained.[198] This would explain Indian intransigence over the contested state of Jammu and Kashmir, and more significantly Pakistan's heavy-handedness towards its provincial particularisms.

Recent scholarship also posits that Pakistan and India shared significant similarities in the ways that they dealt with the violent upheavals of Partition. Chatterji suggests that despite the division along religious lines, this process 'secularised both states simultaneously in specific, admittedly partial, but remarkably similar ways.'[199] She uses the term secularisation to 'represent a tendency towards differentiation' between the state and its various ideological and practical components: religion, society, community, and social stratification along the lines of class. Chatterji's observations are pertinent are in the context of adoption of policies that broadly promoted stability, domestic security and order, irrespective of communal divisions, by both states. In doing so Chatterji presents that the authorities in both India and Pakistan attempted to distinguish between the interests of the state, property and citizens as distinct from the religious communities that underscored the

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[198] Talbot and Singh.
[199] Joya Chatterji, "Secularisation and Partition Emergencies: Deep Diplomacy in South Asia," *Economic and Political Weekly* XLVIII, no. 50 (2013), 42.

basic premise of partition along communal lines. In the interest of restoring order on both sides of the border, minority communities in particular regions, such as East and West Bengal were encouraged to stay and evacuees who had fled were encouraged to return to their homes.[200] Similarly arrangements were made to protect the economic interests of 'propertied groups' belonging to vulnerable minority communities. Thus in the Inter-Dominion Conference held in Calcutta in April 1948, both Indian and Pakistani representatives concurred on three fundamental imperatives: the importance of stemming cross border flows, restoration of order and security and official distancing from responsibility of communal violence. Chatterji does concede however that this process of 'secularisation' was 'ideologically incoherent'[201] – an amalgamation of varying rationales and interests that even at times contradicted each other. Chatterji's idea of such differentiation is useful for the purpose of thesis in contextualising the ways in which elites in both states shared the commitment to preserving social hierarchy and state authority by co-optation and even coercion if necessary. Of course in Pakistan's case the chronic and sustained recourse to coercion ultimately manifested in the rise of its praetorian tendencies.

Another area of overlap between the two states has been contextualised in the form of similarities in public expectations from the both post-colonial governments i.e. 'call for a complete renegotiation of the contract between government, its servants and the people.'[202] Gould, Sherman and Ansari explore how the transition to independence subjected administrators and security personnel to extreme pressures, characterised by a persistent sense of insecurity on both sides of the border. Certainly there were discernable parallels as a result of the fluid nature of events and ideas in

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[200] Chatterji, 44.
[201] Chatterji, 49.
[202] Gould, Sherman, and Ansari, "The Flux of the Matter: Loyalty, Corruption and the Everyday State in the Post-Partition Government Services of India and Pakistan".

both post-colonial entities, especially in terms of the socio-economic stresses of mass migration, communalism, dislocation and shifting demographics. This thesis argues however that the differing capabilities of the Indian and Pakistani governments post-partition could be distinguished by their ability to call upon grass-roots level support to support the demands of state construction. Despite significant similarities in the challenges taking place in the 'everyday state'[203] in both polities therefore, critical differences in the capacity of the Congress as a long established, representative political party versus the Muslim League as a coterie of disparate and discordant socio-political voices lay at the heart of their divergent political trajectories.

Ansari also provides fascinating insights into the significance of quotidian conceptions of belonging and how citizenship in the postcolonial states were shaped not at the constitutional level but also by the extent to which social forces reciprocally penetrated the state system. [204] In doing so even though Pakistan and India shared the experience of the transition from colonial rule to independence, she concedes that a substantial difference existed in the speed with which the responsibilities of the post-colonial state vis-à-vis those of the people were articulated. Whilst India codified these 'rules of engagement' in its constitution of 1950, for Pakistan it did not happen till 1956 and then too it was short-lived. As a result in the first two decades of its existence 'the Pakistan state lacked much of the authority associated with its Nehruvian counterpart, a situation exacerbated by the fact that its newly created citizens were still coming to terms with the impact on their identity that independence combined with partition had produced.'[205]

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[203] Gould, Sherman, and Ansari.

[204] Taylor C Sherman, William Gould, and Sarah F. D Ansari, *From Subjects to Citizens: Society and the Everyday State in India and Pakistan, 1947-1970* (Delhi: Cambridge University Press, 2014).

[205] Sarah Ansari, "Everyday Expectations of the State During Pakistan's Early Years: Letters to the Editor, Dawn (Karachi), 1950–1953," *Modern Asian Studies* 45, no. 1 (2011): 159–78.

In Pakistan these challenges were amplified by the unevenness of administrative and economic fallouts of partition, for instance due to large influxes of migrants from India concentrated in some areas. These incidents were then accompanied with issues of resettlement and rehabilitation, food and water shortages, smuggling and black-marketeering and the 'persistent abuse of bureaucratic power'.[206] Through a selection of excerpts drawn from letters to editors of contemporary newspapers in the nascent state, Ansari shows how the absence of a political framework to facilitate the airing of grievances from ordinary Pakistanis on a regular basis fuelled a tangible sense of frustration and discontent with state administrators. This chapter demonstrates that without such a critical avenue of channelling public grievances into representation at local and higher administrative levels, repeated attempts by authorities to diffuse mounting tensions through appeals to patriotic sentiment, future promises or religious appeals ultimately impacted the 'discursive construction of the state in public culture.'[207] In other words the extent to which the reality of Pakistan was failing to live up to the expectations that had been raised by its creation were palpable, and compounded by the restricted democratic processes at work.[208]

Strategic Burdens

The boundary demarcation line between India and Pakistan, announced on 17 August 1947 – two days *after* the official partition of the Indian sub-continent, was decided by a person not familiar with the geographic and demographic peculiarities of the subcontinent. Sir Cyril Radcliffe, chairman of the Boundary Commissions and

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[206] Ansari, 173.

[207] Akhil Gupta, "Blurred Boundaries: The Discourse of Corruption, the Culture of Politics, and the Imagined State," *American Ethnologist* 22, no. 2 (1995): 375–402.

[208] Ansari, "Everyday Expectations of the State During Pakistan's Early Years: Letters to the Editor, Dawn (Karachi), 1950–1953."

architect of the India-Pakistan border, had never set foot in the region prior to his arrival on 8 July 1947. He was given the odious task of ensuring the equitable division of 175,000 square miles of territory between the two new states, all within the astoundingly short span of five weeks.

It is perhaps important to be mindful of the challenges faced by a characteristically judicious Radcliffe in making what could be considered a *fair* boundary award to both polities. In a detailed study of factors that would ultimately affect the final boundary between the two states, Chester reveals the extent of Radcliffe's difficulties in navigating the prepositions of multiple political interest groups, fairly rigid terms of reference that would not take defence or strategic assets into account as well as the provision of much-varied and fairly subjective cartographic information regarding the territories under consideration.[209] Radcliffe's original priority was establishing administrative, as opposed to natural boundaries, leaving rivers outside of the commission's defining terms of reference. Indeed it seems his hopes that the two nations would coexist peacefully and even form cooperative relationships were based on preserving the integrity of the well-established colonial infrastructure, including the intricate irrigation network that had been designed to function under a single administration.[210] Ultimately however by design or default, Radcliffe's award of the economically important province of Punjab in particular was kinder to India than Pakistan.[211] Cutting the well-developed irrigation system through the middle, the Radcliffe line left the canal headworks on the Indian side, while the canals they fed ended up in Pakistan.

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[209] Lucy P. Chester, *Borders and Conflict in South Asia: The Radcliffe Boundary Commission and the Partition of Punjab* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2009).
[210] Chester.
[211] Chester.

The complexity of deterministic factors, the remarkable haste with which the Radcliffe Line had to be drawn, and the delay in its official publication until *after* the actual fact of partition (post-Sir Radcliffe's departure on the day), ensured the longevity of border disputes between the two hostile states. Paranoia of reincorporation into the Indian union was lent credence by India's military action in Junagardh (1947) and Hyderabad (1948), leading to their consequent re-integration with India immediately after independence. Prospective Indian aggression towards Pakistani territories featured prominently even in the British government's confidential reports on Kashmir: 'there was a feeling that India's successful action in Hyderabad had rather gone to their head. That there was a boastful and vainglorious attitude becoming widespread and that India was developing aggressive intentions towards Pakistan, and as a result Pakistan was becoming increasingly apprehensive.'[212] The cornerstone of Pakistan's strategic insecurity could thus be attributed to its interminable dispute with India over Kashmir.

Kashmir

The dispute between Pakistan and India over the picturesque valley of Kashmir is in part due to its strategic and economic significance. The meeting of the Himalaya, Hindu Kush, and Karakoram mountain ranges in Kashmir with their uniquely high peaks and narrow valleys historically served as natural deterrents against enemy aggression. Under the Radcliffe award, India won the tactical benefit of access to Kashmir via direct land route and therefore possessed a significant logistical advantage in case of military offensive against Pakistan. At the same time the idea of

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[212] Inward Telegram to Commonwealth Relations Office from UK High Commissioner in India, 5 November 1948, Document No. DO-142-521_41, UKNA. Retrieved 15 January 2017, http://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r/C3735149.

a common, contiguous border between India and Afghanistan, should Kashmir be taken over by India in entirety, was a worrying prospect for Pakistani leadership. Given the historical legacy of Afghanistan's irredentist claims on Pakistan's north-western territories, the prospect of an Indo-Afghan 'pincer movement' [213] to dismember the state therefore seemed frighteningly real. Kashmir's proximity to NWFP and Punjab accentuated Pakistan's vulnerability to Indian aggression from the north. In the majority of interviews conducted with senior military officials, this perception of strategic vulnerability often featured as a predominant concern.

At the time of partition, the annexation of the largest princely state of Jammu and Kashmir, with its predominantly Muslim population and territorial contiguity, was confidently anticipated by Pakistan. Its Hindu ruler, Maharaja Hari Singh, however, sought to remain independent and resisted accession at the time. With the departure of the British from the subcontinent, rising Muslim disaffection in the state, and communal violence following the partition of Punjab, the political situation in Kashmir deteriorated rapidly. As early as July 1931, popular anger against Hari Singh's rule had begun to manifest itself in calls for an uprising by Muslim activists. The maharaja's own son admitted: 'Quite clearly, my father was much happier (horse) racing than administering the state.'[214]

Discontent amongst impoverished Muslim masses in Kashmir gained momentum with the communal violence unleashed during partition. In the western part of Jammu, the city of Poonch erupted in a popular Muslim uprising against the maharaja's rule. Close religious and economic ties to the contiguous Pakistani regions

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[213] Interview with Lieutenant-General Mahmood Ahmed, Director General Military Intelligence (1995-1998), Director General Inter-Services Intelligence of Pakistan (1999-2001), Islamabad, 29 December 2010; Interview with Major General Naseerullah Inspector-General Pakistan Frontier Corps (1973–1976) and Federal Interior Minister (1993-1996), Peshawar, 9 April 2006.
[214] Karan Singh, *Heir Apparent: An Autobiography* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1983), 31.

of Rawalpindi, Jhelum, and Gujarat, and news of the indiscriminate slaughter of Muslims in East Punjab, fuelled resentment within the powerful Muslim lobby supporting the accession of Kashmir to Pakistan. The Maharaja reacted by sending a large number of his Hindu Dogra armed forces for a brutal crackdown upon Muslim civilians. The disaffected Poonchis with the benefit of prior martial experience (approximately 60,000 soldiers from Poonch had served in the Second World War) [215] responded in kind. Around the same time, the Maharaja's state police and Dogra armed forces orchestrated large-scale communal massacres of Muslims in the villages of Jammu, forcing hundreds of thousands of Kashmiri Muslims to flee their homes in September 1947 and take refuge in the neighbouring Pakistani city of Sialkot in West Punjab. [216]

The harrowing experiences of refugees fleeing Kashmir along with their traumatic accounts inspired a sympathetic response from tribes settled in neighbouring North West Frontier Province in Pakistan. In reaction 'an announcement from Lahore dated 13 November claims that leading Muslim *ulema*…have issued a *fatwa* declaring Azad Kashmir war for liberation of the state to be a true *jehad* '[217] and under the pretext of fighting alongside their Muslim brethren, several thousand tribesmen from the NWFP crossed into Kashmir on 21 October 1947. The Pakistani government provided indirect logistical and tactical support to the rebels in order to influence Kashmir's accession and prevent potentially catastrophic mass migration of refugees into Pakistan. This marked the beginning of the enduring Kashmir *jihad* and the sponsorship of irregular militant groups by the Pakistani state.

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[215] Nawaz, *Crossed Swords: Pakistan, Its Army, and the Wars Within*.
[216] Talbot, *Pakistan: A Modern History*.
[217] Inward Telegram to Commonwealth Relations Office from U.K. High Commissioner in Pakistan, 18 November 1948, Document No. DO-142-521_19-20, UKNA. Retrieved 15 January 2017, http://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r/C3735149.

The sequence of events preceding the signing of the Instrument of Accession to India is one of the major factors complicating the Kashmir issue. Conflicting Indian accounts about the exact timing of Hari Singh's signature on the Instrument of Accession to India and doubts about whether India deployed troops before or after the act continue to fuel the debate over the legality of the accession to this day. Nevertheless, as recent archival evidence demonstrates 'the Indian case is built on the assumption that Kashmir is a part of India and that consequently the Pakistan troops there are aggressors'[218] thereby attesting to the fact that 'India does not want a settlement by negotiation as they feel confident of securing one wholly in their favour by military means.'[219]

Pakistani commentators contend that if the instrument of accession were signed *after* Indian military deployment in Kashmir, it would make India's *invasion* and subsequent occupation of parts of the state illegal.

> Had the map of Punjab been drawn differently, Kashmir could have ended up with road access only to Pakistan and a natural mountainous frontier with India. This would have precluded any effective Indian claim on the princely state.[220]

Another point of contention is the intransience of the Indian government in disallowing a 'free and impartial plebiscite'[221] according to the will of the people despite Prime Minister Nehru's assurance to Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan:

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[218] Inward Telegram to Commonwealth Relations office, UK National Archives (UKNA), Document, No. DO-142-521_13. Retrieved 15 January 2017, http://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r/C3735149

[219] Extract from Confidential Letter of 10 October 1948 from Major General Cawthorn, UKNA, Document No. DO-142-521_47. Retrieved 15 January 2017, http://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r/C3735149

[220] Haqqani, *Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military*, 28.

[221] UN Security Council Resolution of 21 April 1948, stating that 'the question of the accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India or Pakistan should be decided through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite.' Subsequent UNSC Resolutions reiterated the same stand. UNCIP Resolutions of 3 August 1948 and 5 January 1949 reinforced UNSC resolutions. Retrieved from Pakistan Mission to the United Nations, 12 January 2017, http://www.pakun.org/kashmir/history.php.

> I should like to make it clear that the question of aiding Kashmir in this emergency is not designed in any way to influence the State to accede to India. Our view, which we have repeatedly made public, is that the question of accession in any disputed territory or State must be decided in accordance with the wishes of people and we adhere to this view.[222]

Nehru's duplicity with regards to Kashmir was exposed in recently declassified documents:

> He put forward the proposition that either Pakistan should accept the UN Commission's resolution of 13th August (1948) without any proviso regarding conditions of a free and impartial plebiscite, or should accept the existing line of division between Azad Kashmir and the rest of the State as permanent. These two alternatives really mean the same thing since if the Commission's resolution is accepted without any qualification regarding a free and impartial plebiscite, the existing line of division will in fact become permanent…It was quite clear that Pandit Nehru was opposed to a free and impartial plebiscite.[223]

A draft telegram to the UK delegation in Paris, New York and embassy in Washington from Karachi outlined the gravity of the Indian threat in Kashmir, including:

> (a) Influx into West Punjab of even one or two hundred thousand refugees from Kashmir would crack provincial economy and mean collapse of Pakistan. Any Indian advance in Poonch and Mirpur starts and exodus, which has already begun. This is Pakistan's over-riding anxiety;
> (b) Indian military success in Kashmir would stultify efforts to secure agreement on plebiscite under fair conditions.
> (c) India would deny Pakistan waters of Jhelum and Chenab and turn West Punjab into a desert. Our irrigation experts confirm that this danger is real.[224]

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[222] Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru's telegram to Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan on 27 October 1947. Retrieved 15 January 2017, https://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/sasia.htm

[223] Inward Telegram from UK High Commissioner in Pakistan to Commonwealth Relations office, 11 November 1948, Document DO 142/521 33, UKNA. Retrieved 15 January 2017, http://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r/C3735149.

[224] Correspondence between the UK government, including a personal memo from Prime Minister Clement Attlee, and the newly formed United Nations. The correspondence discusses the facilitation of an agreement between Prime Ministers Liaquat Ali Khan of Pakistan and Jawaharlal Nehru of India for a ceasefire in the disputed region of Kashmir and the possibility of conducting an independently monitored plebiscite to supersede the decision of the Maharaja of Kashmir to join India. Document DO 142/521 19, n.d. [ca. November 1948], UKNA. Retrieved 15 January 2017, http://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r/C3735149.

Lending credence to such fears, the deployment of Indian troops in Kashmir on 27 October 1947 triggered a chain of events that led to the first of three wars (1947, 1965, and 1999) between India and Pakistan over the issue.

Resource Wars

In his comprehensive analysis of the significance of Indus Basin rivers in the making of India and Pakistan Haines presents a compelling analysis of the complex conceptual and practical interface between rivers, territory and state space. He highlights the challenges associated with deriving Pakistani nationalism as a combination of a typical West Phalian territorial state and the 'logic of nationalist solidarity that transcended the mere legal domains of states.'[225] By exemplifying the Kashmir issue as a case in point, Haines demonstrates how the tangled relationship between sovereignty, territory and water pervaded both Kashmir's importance in the Indus Water dispute and in overall relations between the two hostile neighbours. The challenges 'hydro-logics' present to physical notions of state sovereignty by flowing across borders, underscores the fact that a state's ability to control the flow of water into and out of its territory can be seen as a vital marker of its ability to govern.[226] Thus Haines contends that the water dispute was actually not about water itself but an expression of the perceived vulnerability rendered by Pakistan's down-stream position. Kashmir's centrality to the water dispute was a reflection of Pakistan's claims in terms of both 'hydraulic geography' and its professed historical and cultural ties to the region.[227] The authorities therefore framed India's riparian aggression as an attack on Pakistan's very existence as an independent, sovereign state.

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[225] Daniel Haines, *Rivers Divided: Indus Basin Waters in the Making of India and Pakistan* (London:Hurst and Company, 2017), 64.
[226] Haines, *Rivers Divided: Indus Basin Waters in the Making of India and Pakistan,* 36.
[227] Haines, 66.

Compounding the conflict in Kashmir, the dispute over distribution of the Indus waters served to magnify Pakistan's existential insecurities. A visit to India and Pakistan in 1951, prompted David Lilienthal (former head of the Tennessee Valley Authority in the United States) to highlight the explosive nature of the Indus water dispute by calling it 'pure, dynamite, a Punjab powder keg.'[228] He also articulated the associated fears of the Pakistani leadership:

> With no water for irrigation [West Pakistan] would be desert. 20,000,000 acres would dry up in a week, tens of millions would starve. No army with bombs and shellfire, could devastate a land as thoroughly as Pakistan could be devastated by the simple expedient of India's permanently shutting off the sources of water that keep the fields and people of Pakistan alive.[229]

Commonly referred to as Pakistan's jugular vein and housing the headwaters of the river Indus plus two of its five major tributaries, Jhelum and Chenab, Kashmir was strategically crucial for the maintenance of Pakistan's primarily agrarian economy. In a country where more than 92 per cent of land was arid or semi-arid, [230] the Indus provided key water resources. This was particularly significant for the *breadbasket* province of Punjab, which accounted for most of West Pakistan's agricultural production. The word Punjab itself connotes *ab* (water) of *Punj* (five) rivers, consisting of the Jhelum, Chenab, Ravi, Beas, and Sutlej, all of which ultimately merge into the mighty Indus that runs through the length of the country. As the mainstay of West Pakistan's economy, agriculture depended almost entirely on irrigation by canals drawn from the Indus River and its five tributaries as the country's main supply of potable water and support for many heavy industries.

The partition of Punjab had cut across the canals and rivers of the Indus Basin irrigation system, which had originally been conceptualized to function under a single

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[228] Chaudhry Muhammad Ali Ali, *The Emergence of Pakistan* (New York: Colombia University Press, 1967).
[229] Ali, *The Emergence of Pakistan*, 325.
[230] Ayesha Siddiqi, "Kashmir and the Politics of Water," *Al-Jazeera*, October 19, 2014.

administration. It rendered India the upper riparian with control over the head-works

of Pakistan's main water sources, and Pakistan the lower riparian dependent upon the

principle of 'equitable apportionment'[231] for sustenance. Given the mutual hostility

between the two countries, Radcliffe's assumption 'with confidence that any

agreements…as to sharing of water from these canals or otherwise will be respected

by whatever Government hereafter assumes jurisdiction over the head works

concerned'[232] would prove wishful. A confidential admission of the UK High

Commissioner in Pakistan testified to the unrealistic nature of such post-colonial

idealism:

> India appears now to be seeking a military solution of the Kashmir issue with
> relentless determination…it is possible for India to destroy Pakistan by action
> in Kashmir alone…[Pakistan] have good grounds for fearing also, in view of
> India's claim to control the head works of the Sutlej and Ravi rivers, that if
> India were also to control the vital head works of Chenab and Jhelum rivers
> the whole of the West Punjab would become a desert in a very few years. The
> four-fifths of the present population of the West Punjab who might expect to
> die of hunger then would certainly prefer to die fighting now.[233]

Whether it was due to sheer paucity of time given to Radcliffe to decide upon the

boundary, or his very rudimentary practical knowledge of the territorial peculiarities

of the sub-continent, or whether Mountbatten allegedly influenced his decision,[234] the

final version of the Radcliffe Award ended up handing two key Muslim majority

areas to India i.e., the district of Gurdaspur, which provided the only feasible and

direct land-link between India and Kashmir, and the strategically important district of

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[231] Equitable apportionment is an internationally recognised principle regulating the rights of states having a common river basin. It includes a rule that an upper riparian can take no action that will interfere with existing irrigation of the lower riparian.

[232] Cyril Radcliffe, 'Report of the Punjab Boundary Commission, Para 10, Delhi,' 12 August 1947, MB1/D267, The Mountbatten Papers Database, University of Southampton.

[233] Inward Telegram to Commonwealth Relations Office, 18 November 1948, Document DO 142/521 23, UKNA. Retrieved 15 January 2017, http://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r/C3735149.

[234] Jalal, *The State of Martial Rule: The Origins of Pakistan's Political Economy of Defence*.

Ferozpur, home to the only ready-made military arsenal Pakistan could have hoped to gain at partition. Both districts contained within them important irrigation head-works.

Indeed, immediately after the expiry of the Standstill Agreement on 01 April 1948, under which the allocation of water between India and Pakistan had been fixed, the Indian East Punjab government did cut off water supply to every canal crossing into Pakistan. Not only did this create a scarcity of drinking water in large areas where sub-soil water was brackish and deprived Lahore of its main water supply, it also jeopardized the sowing of the *kharif* (autumn harvest) crop in West Pakistan at a crucial time in the agricultural year.[235] Canals upon which the irrigation of 1.66 million acres in Pakistan depended dried up as a result. India claimed Pakistan had no right to any water flowing from Indian territory and demanded seigniorage charges as a condition for reopening the canals. In the meantime, millions of Pakistani farmers faced drought-like conditions ruining crops, losing cattle herds and faced starvation due to water scarcity.[236] Even though bilateral negotiations between the two countries led to a limited resumption of water supply eventually, it was with a noticeable reduction in canal water due to India's construction of new canals and increasing capacity of the Bhakra dam.

Much of Pakistan's obsession with the goal of attaining military parity with India and its prioritization of administrative over political owes its impetus to such early insecurities regarding its bigger neighbour. In his address to the nation on 8 October 1948 Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan reiterated: 'The defence of the State is our foremost consideration…and has dominated all other governmental activities. We will not grudge any amount on the defence of our country', thereby justifying up to 70

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[235] Talbot, *Pakistan: A Modern History*, 112.
[236] Ali, *The Emergence of Pakistan*, 320.

per cent of the national budget to defence. [237] The desperate need to raise revenues to increase its defence potential also compelled the central government to expand its administrative machinery exponentially and establish stronger its control over provincial constituents.

Pakistan or *Pashtunistan*

A classic dilemma faced by post-colonial states such as Pakistan is expressed by Perlmutter in the following way:

> The frontiers of the colonial states were defined by conquest and guaranteed by the imperial powers, in accordance with the classical nineteenth-century balance-of-power concept. Once the imperial powers withdrew, the colonial boundaries did not prove to be viable. The struggle over the frontier was mainly internal – a struggle over central authority, ethnicity, cultural pluralism and the control of the military establishment. [238]

Compounding its strategic burdens across its volatile frontiers, Pakistan inherited another volatile neighbour at partition with irredentist claims on parts of its North West Frontier Province. When Sir Mortimer Durand drew the modern-day boundary with Afghanistan in 1893, it was designed to mitigate the violent and sustained resistance of restive Pashtun tribes to British colonial presence in the region. The Durand line had been deliberately created as an administrative tool to divide Pashtun territory by defining the spheres of political influence between Afghan King Abdur Rahman and British India. Indigenous Pashtun tribes, however, never really abided by the division, and the border remained porous enough for their unencumbered movement. Instead of alienating Pashtuns from their neighbouring tribes, the British divide and rule policy fostered a deep anti-colonial sentiment and the desire for the creation of an independent and integrated *Pashtunistan*.

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[237] Ali, *The Emergence of Pakistan*, 376.
[238] Perlmutter, "The Praetorian State and the Praetorian Army: Toward a Taxonomy of Civil-Military Relations in Developing Polities", 28.

At the time of partition, the government in Kabul strongly opposed the incorporation of Pashtun areas into Pakistan, refusing to extend the Anglo-Afghan border treaty to the new state and supported the idea of a sovereign *Pashtunistan*. In 1947, the Afghan Prime Minister Hashim Khan even proposed 'if an independent Pukhtunistan cannot be set up, the Frontier Province could join Afghanistan.' [239] Significantly, Afghanistan was the only country to vote against Pakistan's admission to the United Nations after independence, declaring Anglo-Afghan border treaties null and void with the exit of the British patrons. Even though Britain's insistence upon the validity of its treaties for the lawful successor state and the lack of military or political means to enforce its demands prevented Afghanistan from securing international support for its Greater Afghanistan claim, it continued to contest Pakistan's authority over Pashtun areas east of the Durand Line (including parts of Baluchistan). During the *Jashn-i-Kabul* (Festival of Kabul) in 1950 for instance, Pashtunistan 'flags' were hoisted and anti-Pakistan leaflets were dropped by the Afghan Air Force, followed by armed Afghan raids into Pakistani territory in September 1950. [240] Diplomatic relations between the two states ruptured twice within the first 25 years of Pakistan's independence. The first rift appeared in 1955 with Afghanistan's objection to the merger of NWFP into a single West Pakistan province under General Ayub Khan's One-Unit scheme. Public demonstrations against the move resulted in attacks on the Pakistani Embassy in Kabul as well as the consulate in Jalalabad. Relations soured to such an extent that the two countries recalled their ambassadors.

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[239] Mujtaba Rizvi, "The Military and Politics in Pakistan," *The Statesmen*, June 1947, 54.
[240] Rizvi, "The Military and Politics in Pakistan."

The next crisis in Pakistan-Afghanistan relations occurred in 1961 following anti-Pakistan propaganda launched by Afghan authorities through Kabul Radio [241] and raids by armed Afghan *lashkars* (militant groups), most notably on the Pakistani side of the Durand Line. Afghan troops reportedly crossed the frontier in the mountains past the Bajaur area, about 70 miles north of Peshawar and the Khyber Pass [242] leading Pakistan to withdraw its ambassador from Kabul again in September 1961. Diplomatic relations between the two countries were only restored due to the mediation of the Shah Iran following the Tehran Accords in May 1963. The Afghan government, however, still continued to celebrate *Pashtunistan* Day and Afghan representatives referred to the question of *Pashtunistan* in their speeches in the General Assembly of the United Nations, in 1965, 1968, and 1969. [243]

Post-independence, the idea of *Pashtunistan* continued to plague Pakistan's improvised nation-building efforts. For instance in September 1964, a *Loya Jirga* (Grand Assembly) at Kabul passed a resolution in support of '*Pakhtunistan*'.[244] Similarly the presence of Ghaffar Khan in Kabul after his release from prolonged detention in Pakistan and participation in pro-*Pashtunistan* activities continued to play a divisive role. Thus, even though Afghanistan did not present a direct political or military threat towards Pakistan's continued existence, its lingering rhetoric in support of *Pashtunistan* complicated the arduous nation-building processes faced by the fledgling state and preyed upon the nerves of its insecure administration.

According to Chaudhri Muhammad Ali (Pakistan's first Secretary General, second Finance Minister (1951-55) and later Prime Minister (1955-56)), the idea of the independent frontier state of *Pashtunistan* was popularised by Indian Congress

[241] Ali, *The Emergence of Pakistan*, 381.
[242] Mujtaba Rizvi, *The Frontiers of Pakistan* (Karachi: National Publishing House, 1971), 163.
[243] Rizvi,.
[244] Rizvi,.

leaders as a part of their anti-secessionist agenda. He was convinced that behind this demand 'was the far-reaching strategy of reabsorbing the Province at a later stage after contiguity with it had been gained through the state of Jammu and Kashmir.' [245]

Nehru was even quoted by Mountbatten as remarking 'about Khan Sahib wishing to join the Union of India at a subsequent stage.' [246] Despite the lack of public support for Afghanistan's claims on the border areas, the strategic insecurities of Pakistani leadership therefore fuelled paranoia of alleged Indian *grand designs*. Stephen articulates such insecurities: 'if on Pakistan's birth coordinated movements opposed to her could be produced in Kashmir and Afghanistan, both of them predominantly Muslim territories and near to one another, the new state might be still-born, sort of crushed by a sort of pincer movement.' [247] Much of Pakistan's subsequent obsession with an expansive military setup therefore stemmed from its compelling desire to achieve 'strategic depth' against India through an allied regime in Afghanistan. [248]

The North West Frontier

In NWFP, the Muslim League had derived support for Pakistan predominantly from the big landlords, the *Khans*, who had previously served as the local liaison between British rulers and the local population. Consequently, the referendum that had proved decisive for the accession of KPK to Pakistan was also borne out of a symbiotic relationship between the *Khans* and Muslim League officials. The centre's hard-line stance against the Congress ministry of Dr Khan Abdul Jabbar Khan (popularly known as Dr Khan Sahib), brother of Abdul Ghaffar Khan of the 'Red Shirt' fame,

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[245] Ali, *The Emergence of Pakistan*, 164.
[246] Ali.
[247] Ian Stephens, *Horned Moon: An Account of a Journey through Pakistan, Kashmir and Afghanistan* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1955), 108.
[248] General Naseerullah Babar interview.

with a history of advocating Pashtun autonomy from the Pakistani state and mobilizing peasant support therefore aimed to cement the mutually beneficial alliance between the League and the *Khans*. The socialist roots of Ghaffar Khan's Red Shirts (*Khudai Khidmatgar*) movement designed to empower the smaller landlords and mobilise peasant support against the predominance of the *Khans* in the province made Dr. Khan Sahib's congress-backed ministry appear as a threat to the officially sanctioned administrative privileges of the *Khans*. Moreover, since the *Khans* had provided the bulk of support for the Muslim League's demand for Pakistan with the intention of maintaining administrative status quo a historical precedent for their collaboration had already been set.

Within eight days of partition, Jinnah dismissed the elected government of Dr Khan Shahib and replaced his Congress ministry with a League one under Khan Abdul Qayum Khan. In order to maintain the centre's influence and secure his political futures in the strategically important province the League ministry continued to pander to the administrative whims of the *Khans*. In the short term, the ministry survived the convoluted dynamics of Pashtun politics by playing off competing political interests against one another 'giving free reign to the alliance between the big landlords and local officials, by pressuring Congress members to join the Muslim League and by hedging his bets on the long term policies of his government.'[249]

In the longer term, however, the dismissal of an elected government by the central administration and tacit acceptance of alliances forged between governing and administrative powers based on personal discretion set a damaging precedent. The symbiotic liaison between the provincial governor and *Malik* in FATA and between the provincial ministry and the big *Khans* elsewhere in the province reflected the

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[249] Jalal, *The State of Martial Rule: The Origins of Pakistan's Political Economy of Defence* 91.

prioritisation of a dominant social group over representative institutional development and as such had implications for provincial representation at the centre.

Sindh

Sindh was particularly vulnerable to the loss of revenue from excise taxation due to the concentration of prosperous Hindu communities in the province pre-partition. Adding significantly to the provincial deficit was the burden of housing hundreds of thousands of refugees. Establishment of the central government's headquarters in Sindh and formal declaration of Karachi as the federal capital placed under the centre's administration, fuelled further resentment between indigenous Sindhis and the non-Sindhi populace. The central government's logistical demands, particularly in the form of housing and office space, already infringed upon provincial government's financial sensibilities. With dwindling resources the province became increasingly unsympathetic towards the centre's defence procurement efforts. The dual anxiety of losing a major commercial hub and its separation from the provisional government, without the payment of any compensation, in addition laid the groundwork for enduring Sindhi resentment against the centre.

East Pakistan

The central administration's heavy-handed approach towards its provincial constituents was especially pronounced its dealong with the East Bengal province. Joining the federation as an ethnically distinct and socially differentiated provincial entity, East Pakistanis contrasted sharply with West Pakistan in the important areas of religious composition, population density, language, climate as well as topography. It had a large Hindu minority population – 23%, according to the 1951 census of Pakistan, in contrast with West Pakistan's 3% - which invariably implied a differing

emphasis on the centrality of Islam. In addition East Pakistanis reflected a very different socio-economic dynamic from the feudal politics of large, landed families from Sindh and Punjab in West Pakistan. East Pakistan's agrarian economy was characterized primarily by 'peasant proprietors', which accounted for under half of the cultivable area owned by families having five acres or less. [250]

Given such divergent social and economic realities in its two wings, the new Pakistani state inevitably faced significant challenges in national integration. The sitting of the central government in West Pakistan, declaration of Urdu as a singular national language, a predominantly unrepresentative provincial government, stark inter-wing economic imbalances, more than 1,000 miles of separation between the two wings, combined with the centre's relentless defence procurement drive for what was considered West-Pakistan's Kashmir problem served to rapidly exacerbate the East wing's disaffection.

Thus, despite constituting an overall majority East Bengal struggled to make its political voice heard and interests recognized in the capital. In 1948, East Pakistanis held only 11 per cent of jobs in Pakistan's civil service reflecting their nominal influence on civil bureaucracy and hence over affairs of state. Their presence in the military, at 1.5 per cent, was even smaller.[251] The share of East Pakistanis in private business was no more than 3.5 per cent of the assets of all private Muslim firms.[252]

The skewed assimilation strategy towards East Pakistan was also reflected in its cultural policy, at the heart of which lay the Urdu-Bengali language controversy.

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[250] Talbot, *Pakistan: A Modern History,* 25.
[251] Anita Weiss, ed., *Islamic Reassertion in Pakistan: The Application of Islamic Laws in a Modern State* (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1986), 43.
[252] Rounaq Jahan, *Pakistan: A Failure in National Integration* (New York: Colombia University Press, 1972), 27.

By declaring official the language spoken only by minority (7 per cent)[253] of the Pakistani population, as opposed to a large majority (over 50 per cent)[254] who spoke Bengali as their mother tongue, the central government in Karachi stoked much discontent in the Eastern wing. Jinnah outlined the demand for national assimilation through a single language: '[L]et me make it very clear to you that the State Language of Pakistan is going to be Urdu and no other language. … Without one State Language, no nation can remain tied up solidly together and function.'[255]

The language controversy erupted in 1948 in East Pakistan as the first serious internal upheaval to shake the foundations of the new polity. Bengalis, the largest ethnic group of the country, demanded that Bengali be declared the national language alongside Urdu – a demand largely ignored by the central government. By 1952, Bengali's 'linguistic nationalism' manifested itself in violent student demonstrations in East Pakistan.[256] When the then-Prime Minister of Pakistan Khwaja Nazimuddin reiterated Jinnah's stance on unity through a single national language at a public meeting in Dhaka in the same year, the fall-out from his speech provoked a general strike and riots, thereby giving the Bangla ethno-linguistic movement its first martyrs.

The failure to appreciate the extent and intensity of discontent in Bengal led to the centre's dismissal of legitimate political grievances in Bengal as general law and order problems. As a result, and without genuine, adequate representation at the centre, Bengali grievances rapidly gathered pace leading to the crushing defeat of the League, which won only 10 out of 309 seats contested in the 1954 provincial elections. By the time the central government constitutionally recognized both Urdu and Bengali as national languages in 1956, it had inadvertently facilitated the mobilization

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[253] Talbot, *Pakistan: A Modern History*, 24.
[254] Bennet Jones, *Pakistan: Eye of the Storm*, 146.
[255] Ahmad, *Some Recent Speeches and Writings of Jinnah, Vol. 1*, 490.
[256] Jahan, *Pakistan: A Failure in National Integration*.

of the emerging Bengali intelligentsia, urban as well as rural, against national assimilation. Still, the centre's heavy-handed approach towards East Pakistan continued with the dismissal of Fazl-ul-Huq's democratically elected provincial government and replacement by direct rule from Karachi in the same year.

Baluchistan

Provincial challenges for the central government also came from Baluchistan, the most politically and socio-economically underdeveloped province of Pakistan. Spanning nearly 40 per cent of West Pakistan's landmass, and sharing a border with Iran and Afghanistan, Baluchistan's predominantly tribal social system persistently resisted any attempts of administrative control from the centre. Its peculiar administrative legacy included the presence of four princely states: Kalat, Kharan, Las Bela, and Makran, as well as vast swathes of area controlled by a scattered network of local tribal chiefs, the *Sardars*. Much like its neighbouring FATA areas in the NWFP, pre-partition Baluchistan was administered by an agent to the Governor-General, supervised by a centrally commissioned governor instead of a representative provincial government

Even before power was transferred from the British Crown, the princely states most notably Kalat, the largest and most powerful one, began advancing claims for their own independence. Things came to head during partition in 1947 when the *Khan* of Kalat declared independence from the Pakistani state. Even though the accession of Kalat along with the three other princely states and the rest of Baluchistan was eventually secured by the Pakistani government, it came 225 days after partition, and even then through forced a military operation and incarceration of the Khan.

The violent means with which central government succeeded in securing the territory constituting Baluchistan fed Baluch resentment against the centre. As a society deriving its ethno-nationalistic fervour from resistance to external aggression, the central government's approach fuelled Baluch separatism. In subsequent years, particularly 1958, 1962, and 1973, discontent between Baluch tribes and Pakistani paramilitary forces repeatedly surfaced and threatened the centre's nominal control. The possibility of a large-scale revolt was eventually countered by the centre's strategy of divide and rule, based on doling out economic patronage 'in which the *sardars* and other tribal leaders were played off against each other, or co-opted with contracts, grants and the power to control the allocation of resources flowing from the centre to their population.'[257]

Punjab

The earliest institutionalization of patronage emerged most discernibly in the populous and wealthy province of western Punjab. Control of this economically and strategically important province was fundamental to the League's consolidation of administrative control in early Pakistan. The cross-communal Unionist Party dominated by the members of the Punjabi Muslim landed oligarchy had been at the helm of Punjabi politics since the 1920s. Political expediency during partition facilitated the development of an uneasy relationship between the Unionist Party and the League into a symbiotic alliance that was based upon the loosest of commitments.[258] Being the most viable base for consolidation of Muslim support it was important for the League to have, at the very least, nominal representation in

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[257] Cohen, *The Idea of Pakistan*, 221.
[258] This was first outlined in a published scheme of Unionist Party leader Sardar Sikandar Hayat Khan in 1939. The scheme envisaged state-like sovereignty buttressed by autonomy for Punjab, with minimal interference from a centre, and based on its majority population and well-developed economic infrastructure, the Punjabi domination of regional affairs.

Punjab. Similarly, with a view to protecting their economic and political interests at such a turbulent time, the Muslim landed gentry in the Unionist Party saw wisdom in joining forces with the League to secure Punjabi futures within the new polity.

Fissures in the fragile League-Unionist alliance began to appear even before independence, as a precursor to rampant factionalism that was to plague the pivotal Punjab constituency and consequently overall Pakistani politics for years to come. Patronage, historically a cornerstone of Punjabi politics and used to secure allegiances of rural notables and *biradari*[259] networks comprising local bosses – *zamindars,*[260] and *pirs*[261] or *sajda nashins,* came to play a pivotal role in the province after independence.[262] The Unionist Party, itself predominantly a coalition of leading Punjabi notables, served to protect the interests of the landed gentry and therein lay its utility. As soon as it appeared to have lost its competitive advantage, the Party saw a rapid exodus of its erstwhile benefactors to the League.

The shift in allegiances of the leaders, owing to the strength of *biradari* links, also saw a corresponding shift in support of the League by entire clans. The League's lack of influence over rural Punjabi masses meant that it could not significantly threaten the hitherto established networks of socio-political power in Punjab, which proved attractive to rural notables interested in maintaining status quo. Thus the rise

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[259]*Biradari,* or brotherhood, refers to a system of patronage based on kinship.

[260] *Zamindar,* or 'feudal,' connotes leading members of important landed families. *Zamindars* typically hold vast tracts of land, inherited from their ancestors and possess an almost aristocratic status in rural society. They may also possess informal judicial powers and the right to extract tribute from the peasants that work their fields. Thus, the larger *Zamindar* can hold tremendous sway over the lives of peasants that live on their lands.

[261] *Pirs,* also known as *Gaddi Nashins* or *Sajda Nashins,* claim to be descendants of the Sufi saints who had first brought Islam to rural Punjab. Due to the reverence accorded to them by the local populations, the *Pirs* benefitted from tributes both in cash and in kind and wielded significant influence in the area. They often owned land and in some parts of rural Punjab this meant that their interests often overlapped with the interests of the local *zamindar.* For a comprehensive view of the strength of these religio-political networks in Punjab, see David Gilmartin, 'Religious leadership and the Pakistan Movement in the Punjab,' *Modern Asian Studies* (1979), Vol. 13, No. 3.

[262] Jalal, *The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, the Muslim League and the Demand for Pakistan*, 140.

of the League in Punjab was not so much a reflection of its local popularity but a manifestation of the traditional Punjabi politics characterised by a continuation of patronage networks and landed interests, which dictated the shift in the League's political fortunes. The fact that neither the Unionist Party nor the League attempted to undercut the predominance of the rural elite in the province in order to establish their own political writ, reflects a tacit acceptance of the strength of established, traditional networks of social control. Thus, the political battle in the Punjab was an internecine one for socio-political leadership, without the prospect of representation for the masses.

The timely defections of landed notables to the League ensured its electoral success in 1946 and the symbolic show of political strength in the key Muslim majority province of Punjab in the run up to independence. The League swept provincial legislative assembly seats in Punjab, winning 73 out of a total of 175 seats, thereby eclipsing Unionist Party's win of only 20 seats.[263] Following independence, the League assumed government under Iftikhar Hussain Khan Mamdot as Chief Minister of the part of Punjab that had gone to Pakistan. His cabinet included members from the leading rural families: Mumtaz Daultana, Shaukat Hayat Khan, Mian Muhammad Iftikharuddin, and Sheikh Karamat Ali. However, internecine wrangling over administrative portfolios resulted in factional battles almost immediately. Over a disagreement on an important part of his portfolio i.e. the refugee policy – Iftikharuddin left the ministry. Shaukat and Daultana, both political beneficiaries, continued to accept League patronage and resisted conforming to

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[263] Suntharalingham, *Indian Nationalism: An Historical Analysis,* 431.

provincial cabinet discipline. Shaukat later temporarily left the League, joining Iftikharuddin to form another political party, the Azad Pakistan Party.[264]

Even more damaging to the credibility of the provincial government was the pre-existing political rivalry within its upper echelons, especially between Chief Minister Mamdot and the Finance Minister Daultana. Mamdot was favoured by conservative elements whereas Daultana, owing to his competence and progressive views, was preferred by Jinnah and Liaquat at the centre but was unpopular with the orthodox landed gentry and religious lobby.[265] Mamdot's sphere of influence included several top civil servants and factions of the local press. In direct opposition to Mamdot were Daultana's supporters in the provincial League and civil service.

In order to combat its rival provincial forces, the centre fell back on the integral feature of Punjabi politics: patronage. With Daultana's nomination as the Chief Minister of the Punjab after the 1951 elections and the appointment of his preferred candidates by the governor as provincial advisors, the centre had 'shown no willingness to allow opposition groups to develop freely at the expense of the Muslim League, it was ready to resort to coercion if the ruling party's position in the province was even remotely endangered.'[266]

Thus, even though independence saw West Punjab governed under a League banner, in reality the ministry was comprised of ex-Unionists, reflecting a continuation of the traditional predominance of landed notables over Punjabi politics. The resilience of the established system of social control under *Zamindars* and *Pirs* could be seen in the enduring political legacies of the landed families, which continued to feature prominently in Pakistani politics. Of special significance amongst

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[264] Craig Baxter, "The People's Party Versus The Punjab "Feudalists"," *Journal of Asian and African Studies* 8, no. 3 (1973).
[265] Jalal, *The State of Martial Rule: The Origins of Pakistan's Political Economy of Defence*, 81.
[266] Jalal 45.

these were the landed families of Hayats, Noons, Tiwanas, Daultanas, Gilanis, Legharis, Mazaris, Qureshis, and Dastis, as well as various *Pirs* of influence.[267] The scions of such notable families invariably found their way into legislative assemblies, both provincial and federal, over subsequent years.

At the heart of the endemic challenges in the development of effective, representative institutions of governance in Pakistan thus lay the fragile relationship between the centre and the provinces. The League's mandate over a demographically diverse Indian-Muslim constituency prior to independence was superficial at best. Its professed authority over the representation of all Indian Muslims glossed over fundamental inconsistencies in the League's organizational prowess as well as its power to influence regional socio-economic powers into compliance. The ravages of a violent truncation and consequent widespread socio-economic dislocation along with very real existential threats posed by hostile neighbouring states accentuated the League's administrative and financial frailties. Territorial disputes, resource wars, contested distribution of military and industrial assets, and the insurmountable demands of relocating vast numbers of refugees complicated what was already an overstretched, underfunded administrative machinery. Given this harrowing scenario, the centralizing demands of the incipient government reflected a desperate attempt to mitigate disruptive socio-political elements within the Pakistani polity.

The fact that the League had blundered into independence with the barest semblance of alliances in the constituent provinces served to consistently thwart its assimilationist ambitions. Not only did local political actors command significant grassroots support, in provinces such as Punjab and KPK, historical precedents had established deeply entrenched social networks of power and patronage. Once the goal

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[267] Herald, "The Cost of Kin(g)Ship," *The Herald* (Karachi, May 2013).

of independence had been achieved, cracks began to appear in the League's relationship with its provincial associates due to the centre's consolidating actions directly conflicting with escalating demands of provincial autonomy. Relationships brokered for political expediency before independence began to fray under the burden of increased economic extractionism and political coercion by the centre to finance heightened expenditure on national defence and economic policy. The administration's reliance on the coercive arms of the state, defence, and security institutions in these early years, served to forcibly establish its writ in the provinces without allowing a space for a representative, democratic discourse to take root. This approach, viewed through the lens of historical institutionalism, accounts for the eventual dominance of one institution i.e. military at the cost of others, thereby creating the political space for the subsequent rise of praetorianism.

Chapter 3

Civil-Military Relations and Islam in Pakistan (1947-1977)

Faced with the difficult choice of building a national political party out of shaky relationships with provincial powerbrokers and in the absence of real grass-roots support, the need for creating an effective revenue-extracting administrative system eventually cost the Muslim League its political salience. Without the advantage of established structures of central governance, the pressing need to raise revenues fed directly into an expansion of the administrative functions of the civil bureaucracy. In the wake of rampant political factionalism, widespread civilian discontent and overarching strategic insecurity, the largely titular office of Governor General assumed a central role in the construction of the new state. Compounded by the bureaucratic traditions and political culture of patronage inherited from the colonial era, the democratic evolution of Pakistan's nascent parliamentary system had thus already incorporated serious handicaps. Finer attributes this feature as characteristic of post-colonial states that attained independence without a 'genuine and significant historical "formation" in civilian politics and self-government.'[268] For such new states, economic, ethnic, and religious cleavages previously concealed and repressed by authoritarian colonial rule broke free with the end of the colonial regime. In fact, they were

> often exacerbated by the dogmas of nationalism and popular sovereignty through which independence had been won and which sapped the traditional basis of society without supplying a moral equivalent. Thus many of the new states faced independence with a passionate nationalism on the one hand and a need for a strong central government on the other: a sure invitation to military intervention.[269]

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[268] Finer, *The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics*, 209.
[269] Finer, 210.

Ultimately, the failure of elected leadership to reconcile the dictates of a long standing a culture of patronage with the demands of a growing urban intelligentsia for progressive, representative institutional development, served the dichotomous role of both empowering and constraining the influence of military regimes. [270]

Contemporary works by scholars such as Fair, Shah and Paul posit Pakistan's persistent revisionism to be *the* root cause of its institutional failures. Referring to Pakistan as a 'garrison' state, Paul refers to it as inherently a 'warrior' state, paranoid and dysfunctional and at war with itself. [271] He attributes perpetual war preparation as a function of military dominance, which enables it to siphon off the country's scarce resources and divert attention from critical economic and structural reforms. Fair goes a step further in asserting that the Pakistani military establishment uses the country's foundational ideology of Islam and the perceived existential threats presented by India to maintain its salience in the state. She attempts to show that the military deliberately constructs and sustains Pakistan's security profile in order to undermine civilian supremacy. [272]

Shah uses a slightly different tact to account for the military establishment's predominance over the Pakistani political system. He focuses on the entrenched mind-set of the officers' corps as a deterministic factor to account for the military's political ascendency and expanded role into civilian sectors. According to Shah, the Pakistani military establishment through a concentrated articulation of its intended role and self-image as well as a thinly veiled disdain of civilian leaders and political processes, engenders repeated interventions against civilian authority. He reiterates the 'army's tutelary beliefs and norms, its paternalistic attitudes, and the lingering drag of the

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[270] Interview with Dr. Maliha Lodhi, Pakistan Ambassador to United States (1999-2002) and Pakistan High Commissioner to United Kingdom (2003-2008), Islamabad, 31 December 2010.
[271] Paul, *The Warrior State: Pakistan in the Contemporary World.*
[272] Fair, *Fighting to the End: The Pakistan Army's Way of War.*

inherited vice regal system as democratically corrosive, underwriting the prevalence of authoritarian rule and steady erosion of civilian institutions.[273]

This chapter provides an alternative analysis of the incipient weaknesses of the Pakistani political system. It builds upon Talbot and Singh's ideas about the 'military-bureaucratic combine' as being rooted in competing visions of Pakistan itself and the particular circumstances of Partition that led to the 'crafting of a centralised polity able to ward off challenges from provincial political elites.'[274] Decisions made during this critical juncture then laid the foundations of the Pakistani centre's domination of the provinces, with historical causation providing the rationale behind the enduring centralisation of political power and authority.

Moreover the socio-economic polarisation of Pakistani society, involving a clash between the traditional institutions inherited by post-colonial Pakistan and modern institutions that the urban intelligentsia sought to introduce in the new polity also lay at the heart of the chronic dependency on the politics of patronage. Therefore this chapter sets the basis for the argument that military regimes in Pakistan, right from the beginning, were constrained by much the same political and administrative forces as their civilian counterparts despite being facilitated by them in their rise.

Feaver's rationalist Principal-Agent model provides a useful framework for situating the failures of Pakistan's civilian leadership in establishing their supremacy

> the civilian principal contracts with the military agent to develop the ability to use force in defence of the civilian's interests…the civilian principal seeks to ensure that the military agent does what civilians want while minimising the dangers associated with a delegation of power.[275]

Kukreja provides further context for this argument by delineating the political resources of the military as the degree of its integration with civilian power structures

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[273] Shah, *The Army and Democracy: Military Politics in Pakistan*, 49.

[274] Talbot and Singh, *Region and Partition: Bengal, Punjab and the Partition of the Sub-Continent*, 141.

[275] Talbot and Singh, 57.

i.e. the extent to which soldiers participate in civilian decision-making bodies, the extent to which it has socio-economic links of friendship, kinship etc. with political power groups and therefore the amount of diffuse political support it can generate for its social legitimacy.[276] The idea of increasing returns then infers that once introduced and based on its ability to deliver short-term results, military involvement continues to be expanded as a stopgap to mitigate the administrative and institutional shortcomings of the state.

Within a historical institutionalist framework, when the military is brought in to assist civilian authorities administer the state, it heralds the beginning of the military's accumulation of skills and experiences in managing state affairs.[277] In Pakistan's case these steps laid the foundation of the institutionalisation of the military-bureaucratic nexus.[278] Viewed through the lens of path-dependency this rationale proposes that without substantive alternative actions taken by political leadership to provide alternatives to the prevalent model of governance and due to its potential of increasing returns, praetorian institutionalisation would continue to develop progressively. Thus the failure of the political leadership to capitalise on the opportunities provided by critical junctures i.e. major national upheavals, crises and political developments, such as the wars of '65 and '71 and sporadic return to democratic politics, was reflected in their choices made during such transitions. The postponement of drafting a constitution or holding new elections at such critical junctures for instance 'made it especially difficult for the polity to reach agreement on the rules of competition and cooperation that are basic to any type of democracy.'[279] The inability to allow the development of viable political opposition, a chronic

[276] Kukreja, *Civil-Military Relations in South Asia: Pakistan, Bangladesh and India*.
[277] Aziz, *Military Control in Pakistan: The Parallel State*.
[278] Aziz, 36.
[279] Aziz, 35.

shortcoming of Pakistani politics, thereby undermines a basic foundational feature of a representative, democratic system.

In order to situate the unfolding relationship between the praetorian state and militant Islamism in Pakistan within this context, this chapter re-examines the national political environment post-independence, factoring in the evolution of critical institutions, wider socio-economic factors and foreign policy in the analysis. It explains the civilian leadership's penchant for bureaucratic authoritarianism as eventually paving the way for direct military intervention. The use of Islamic symbolism and rhetoric in the construction of the state including its incorporation in the constitution is also factored in due to its implications for the patronage of religious groups. Secondly this chapter, links patronage as a means of securing political viability, by both military and civilian leaders, to the rising influence of Islamist groups in the country's body politic. Thirdly this chapter establishes specific connections between the institutionalisation of political authoritarianism and the introduction of direct military rule. Within this framework, Pakistan's complex relationships with its foreign benefactors, particularly the United States, is examined. By focusing on the historical precedents of formative interaction between the political and military leadership thus this chapter aims to provide context for the rise of praetorianism within the Pakistani state and the inherent dichotomies of its relationship with Islamist forces.

Unrepresentative Politics

Jinnah's untimely death a mere year after independence threw the country into further turmoil. His hapless successor, Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan, was at once confronted and confounded by the peculiarities of provincialism and political

intrigues of the ruling elite. His intention to depoliticize the office of Governor General however reflected his commitment towards constitution making in order to introduce a democratic, parliamentary political system in Pakistan. Unfortunately, Liaquat's attempts to facilitate a formal contract between the centre and periphery were cut short by his assassination in October 1951. The loss of both its first Governor-general and Prime Minister within four years of independence contributed tangibly towards a virtual collapse of the already beleaguered federal government.

The centre-province dissonance was also accentuated by diverging socio-economic priorities: whilst the central government focused on reinforcing federal reserves by extracting revenues from provinces, the provinces struggled to mitigate their own demographic and economic dislocations. As Jalal notes

> There was 'open disrespect for the Centre' in Western Punjab; the Sindhis had long been fighting a losing battle to retain Karachi as their provincial capital; the east Bengalis were outraged by the directives used by a centre ignorant of the stark realities in their province; the Baluchis had no regard for their self-proclaimed leaders in Karachi; and as for the Pathans, they were befuddled by a provincial ministry in which two chosen individuals shared all the portfolios.[280]

The lack of an industrial base meant that revenues that had to be extracted invariably came from the agricultural sector, largely the purview of the landed gentry i.e. '7 per cent of the landowners of west Pakistan owned 51 per cent of the land, while the upper crust of 1 per cent owned 30 per cent of the land.'[281]

Not only did these landed families wield significant control over the provincial Leagues in West Pakistan, they also comprised the majority of leadership at the centre, which led to a direct clash of interests between the fiscal mechanisms needed by the government to secure revenues and the economic and political concerns of the

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[280] Jalal, *The State of Martial Rule: The Origins of Pakistan's Political Economy of Defence*, 75.
[281] Jalal, 67.

powerful elite. This was an area where the government found it expedient to expand the state's administrative capacities. By relying strongly on the better-organised administrative bureaucracy, Liaquat Ali Khan's government aimed to ensure effective centralised control over the provincial agrarian economy. As a result the administrative bureaucracy was pitted against the landed political elite and this marked the beginnings of a chronic struggle for control at the centre between the two factions.

Thus, provincial politics based on the patronage of traditional patriarchs, painstakingly reined in through Jinnah's personal efforts and Liaquat's attempts to codify a strong centre-province relationship, began to fray after their deaths. In the absence of a coherent, representative central government and a coercive centre-province relationship, provincial forces began to re-exert their centrifugal tendencies.

Bureaucratic Authoritarianism, the Precursor to Military Intervention

The first signs of such disjuncture emerged with the nomination of Ghulam Muhammad, a former bureaucrat, as Governor General. Hand-picked by Jinnah himself, Ghulam Muhammad had already proven to be an able administrator as Pakistan's first Minister of Finance. At the same time the new Prime Minister Khawaja Nazimuddin assumed office with all the political encumbrances of the Muslim League.

The weaknesses in this administration were quickly exposed in the increasingly tense events of the 1952 language riots in Bengal and the anti-*Ahmadiyya* Punjab disturbances of 1953. Nazimuddin's adherence to Jinnah's 'one-nation, one language' stance in East Bengal quickly alienated his native Bengali constituency. At the same time, his ethnic Bengali status, propensity to procrastinate over important

issues, and his personal conservative leanings handicapped his political appeal to the Punjab constituency. The subsequent escalation of violence prompted the central government to call in the Army and impose martial law in Punjab in 1953. An increasingly irate Governor General promptly dismissed the Nazimuddin, thereby dissolving his entire cabinet.

Prime Minister Nazimuddin's dismissal by Ghulam Ahmad, in violation of constitutional norms, albeit in the absence of a formal constitution, set several significant precedents for Pakistan's institutional traditions. It demonstrated the civil bureaucracy's power over the country's faltering political leadership and introduced a trend of bureaucratic authoritarianism within the country's nascent institutional set-up. At the same time the support Ghulam Muhammad received from the armed forces, particularly from Field Marshal General Ayub Khan, the Defence Secretary Major General Iskander Mirza, and Secretary General of the Civil Service Chaudhri Mohammad Ali marked the emergence of a formidable bureaucratic-military bloc at the centre.[282] Also of significance here was the supreme judiciary's inaction against the unceremonious dismissal of an elected prime minister despite appeals by Muslim League politicians, which set a damaging precedent that manifested repeatedly during the country's political upheavals in subsequent years.

In terms of foreign relations, the selection of Muhammad Ali Bogra, formerly Pakistan's ambassador to the United States, as the next Prime Minister revealed the civil-military establishment's desire to establish an economic and military relationship with the superpower. Bogra's well-established relationship with the American administration reassured the Pakistani military high command of a more secure footing in both foreign policy and the procurement of military aid. For the United

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[282] Ziring, *Pakistan: At the Crosscurrent of History*.

States, in turn, such an alliance in the Cold War environment was a strategically sound investment, 'a welcome gain as far as U.S. interests are concerned.'[283] Thus, Bogra's elevation to the post of Prime Minister reflected three fundamental features of the emerging Pakistani polity: the civil bureaucracy, the military, and economic patronage of a dominant foreign power.

Bogra's tentative attempts to render some credence to the budding parliamentary system in Pakistan were reflected in his efforts to tackle the immensely damaging deadlock over the overdue Pakistani constitution. For the domineering Governor-General Ghulam Ahmad, however, the curtailment of his powers as head of state that was implicit in the constitution were entirely unacceptable and provoked the dissolution of yet another Constituent Assembly in 1955. Again, the superior courts maintained a stony silence over the forced political dismissal, reflecting their culpability in curtailing the establishment of a just political process.

Thus the eventual promulgation of Pakistan's first constitution in 1956 incorporated all the inconsistencies and aberrations of its early leadership, for instance conferring upon the President sweeping authority to dissolve the National Assembly before the expiry of its five-year term (Article 50) and appointing a prime minister on personal discretion.[284] At the same time, the incipient influence of religious forces within the country's political gamut became discernible in the ideological concessions made for them in the constitution. In time this patronage of religious forces by insecure ruling regimes, both civilian and military, emerged as a major continuity between the county's estranged political forces.

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[283] Dennis Kux, *The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000: Disenchanted Allies* (Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson Centre Press, 2001), 9.
[284] National Assembly of Pakistan, *Constitution of Pakistan.* Article No. 50. Retrieved 12 January 2016 on http://na.gov.pk/uploads/documents/1333523681_951.pdf

Military Intervention and Militant Islamism

Pakistan's chronic civil-military dilemma has been captured by Talbot and Singh in the following way

> the contestation between supporters of a state for Muslims and an Islamic state – against the backdrop of the failure of democracy – has become so entrenched that it has produced a praetorian-bureaucratic polity with Islam as a surrogate for effective legitimacy, resulting in wild oscillations between the modernist and conservative strains within the idea of Pakistan. [285]

Previously violently opposed even to the idea of Pakistan, the forces of Islamism were nevertheless empowered by socio-economic disturbances of early Pakistan. Islamists thereafter not only presented incessant challenges towards the development of a secular democracy, they also demonstrated a formidable ability to wield socio-political influence by channelling popular dissent and inducing sectarian discontent on the streets. The 1953 anti-*Ahmadiyya* agitation led by the hard-line *Majlis-i-Ahrar* exemplified such an approach.

Having facilitated the dismissal of the previous Punjab legislature of his political rival Iftikhar Mamdot in 1949, Mumtaz Daultana allied with the *Ahrar* movement to gain electoral victory in 1951. Soon afterwards, the *Ahrar* along with other religious organisations saw further value in using prevailing economic conditions, particularly food shortages, to gain political prominence and began cultivating popular dissent. The *Ahrar* and their allies, including the vociferous Maududi at the helm of the *Jamaat-i-Islami*, portrayed the apparent prosperity of the minority *Ahmadiyya* community as precipitating economic hardships for the masses at large. This was exemplified by the dogged vilification of foreign minister Zafarullah Khan, a well-respected *Ahmadi* diplomat. Using the popular appeal of religious orthodoxy, the *Ahrar* condemned the *Ahmadiyya* community for digressing from

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[285] Talbot and Singh, *Region and Partition: Bengal, Punjab and the Partition of the Sub-Continent,* 150.

orthodox Islamic beliefs, demanding Zafarullah Khan be dismissed from office -

specifically:

> To demand unanimously the expulsion in a constitutional manner of the Qadianis from the Muslim Community, for they are like a cancer eating up and gradually consuming the vitals of the Muslim Society. They also demand the removal of Sir Zafarallah Khan from Foreign Ministership because he is the main prop of the Qadiani mission and is misusing his high position both in Pakistan and abroad for the spread of the Qadiani influence.[286]

Of special significance in this episode were the actions of the supposedly progressive

Daultana ministry in Punjab, which demonstrated the early proclivity of patronage

extended towards Islamist forces by a civilian leadership for political consolidation.

In a bid to extend his influence in the central government, Daultana tacitly

encouraged the increasing momentum of the *Ahrar* agitation by publically demanding

that the issue of declaring the *Ahmadiyya* community as a minority should be taken up

by the constituent assembly.[287]

This endorsement of their activities emboldened not only the *Ahrar* but also

other radical religious groups from across the country, including Maududi's *Jamaat-i-Islami*, the *Jamiat-Ulema-i-Pakistan*, and *Jamiat-Ulema-i-Islam*. The extent and

disruptive potential of such militant Islamism eventually compelled Defence

Secretary Iskander Mirza to issue a note of caution to Prime Minister Khwaja

Nazimuddin, stating: '[T]he problems created by your personal enemies including the

Mullahs, if not dealt with firmly and *now*, will destroy the administration and the

country.'[288] His prophecy saw fulfilment in the rising political influence of Deobandi

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[286] Maududi, *The Qadiani Problem*, 40.
[287] Maududi, 153.
[288] Abbas, *Pakistan's Drift Into Extremism: Allah, the Army, and America's War on Terror*, 23.

groups such as the SSP in later years, owing much to the precedent set by the *Majlis-i-Ahrar,* which acted as a veritable instrument of Islamist mobilisation in Punjab.[289]

Daultana's opportunistic collusion with religious zealots led to the eventual dismissal of his ministry and arrest of the key religious leaders involved in the disturbances including Maududi, but the restoration of peace came only after the imposition of martial law in the province in March 1953. The fact that death sentences handed out to Maududi and other leaders of the agitation were later reprieved by the Supreme Court, demonstrated that despite a lack of political salience, the religious lobby wielded significant social influence.

The restoration of public order by military intervention in the domestic sphere at such a critical juncture marked a formative event in the developing relations between state and society, and highlighted the institutional frailties of the emerging political system. The Punjab Disturbances, as they came to be known, were significant for their role in giving both the Islamist lobby and the military high command a taste of power. The importance of this event thus lay in the precedent set for the dependence of weak political leadership on both the religious lobby and the military establishment for legitimacy. Eventually such political shortsightedness and administrative ineptitude also lay at the heart of popular disdain harboured by military personnel towards civilian leaderships – a notion that was to gained intensity in coming years.

Islam in the Constitution

Despite the lack of a political mandate, the 1953 Punjab Disturbances illustrated the power of the religious lobby in selectively mobilising popular support under the

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[289] Jawad Syed et al., eds., *Faith-Based Violence and Deobandi Militancy in Pakistan* (London: Palgrave, 2016).

banner of Islam. The religious establishment had already made its presence felt after independence by dominating the debate on the role of Islam in the new state. The astute statesman in Jinnah had foreseen the destructive potential of religious bigotry and already alluded to this in his inaugural address to the first Constituent Assembly of Pakistan on 11 August 1947: 'In the course of time Hindus would cease to be Hindus and Muslims would cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense because that is the personal faith of each individual but in the political sense as citizens of the state.' [290]

Jinnah's early demise and the weaknesses in Liaquat Ali's political acuity may account partly for the League's shift away from their intended vision of secular democracy. In the absence of a strong constituency and plagued by the factional politics of provincial power-brokers, the ʿulama and religio-political parties such as the *Jamaat-i-Islami* and their affiliates seized upon the opportunity to carve a hitherto elusive political role for themselves. Maududi prepositioned:

> The responsibility for the administration of the Government in an Islamic state is entrusted to an *Amir* (leader) who may be likened to the President or the Prime Minister in a Western democratic state….The basic qualifications for the election of an *Amir* are that he should command the confidence of the largest number of people in respect of his knowledge and grasp of the spirit of Islam; he should possess the Islamic attribute of fear of God; he should be endowed with the quality of statesmanship.

Furthermore,

> Legislation in an Islamic state should be within the limits prescribed by the *Shariʿah.* The injunctions of God and His Prophet are to be accepted and obeyed and no legislative body can alter or modify them or make any new laws which are contrary to their spirit. [291]

Religious forces lobbied to define the role of Islam in the state by articulating two key principles outlined in the Objectives Resolution of 1949, which were adopted by the

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[290] Ahmad, *Some Recent Speeches and Writings of Jinnah, Vol. 1*, 403-404.
[291] Abu'l A'la Maududi, *The Islamic Way of Life* (Leicester: The Islamic Foundation, 1986), 21.

Constituent Assembly, but which also reflected their inherent dissonance with secular, democratic forces. The first constraint to be imposed on the power of political authorities specified: 'Sovereignty belongs to Allah alone but He has delegated it to the state of Pakistan through its people for being exercised within the limits prescribed by Him as a sacred trust.' [292] The second principle – that 'Muslims shall be enabled to order their lives in the individual and collective spheres in accordance with the teachings of Islam as set out in the Quran and *Sunnah*' [293] – was also significant since it specified an active institutional role for the clergy, the traditional channels for facilitating this understanding of the Quran and *Sunnah*.

The first constitution of Pakistan thus reflected the rising Islamist influence on state formation. Islamist clauses in this Constitution included a formal declaration of Pakistan as an Islamic Republic, mandatory condition of being Muslim to qualify for the office of President, good relations with Muslim countries as a primary objective of Foreign Policy and establishment of a democratic state based on Islamic principles of social justice as outlined in the Objectives Resolution. Despite its lamentably short lifetime (only thirty-one and one-half months) the first Constitution of Pakistan nevertheless bore testimony to the growing influence of the Islamists in the construction if the new state. It also served as a precursor to the incongruity manifesting in what Qasmi calls the 'legal and ontic' identities of religious minorities such as the *Ahmadiyya* community. [294]

The 1956 Constitution was also significant in the damage caused to emerging institutions by codifying patronage-based political liaisons. During the document's

[292] Government of Pakistan, "The Constituent Assembly of Pakistan Debates," in *The Constituent Assembly of Pakistan Debates, V* (Karachi: Government of Pakistan, 1964).

[293] Pakistan, "The Constituent Assembly of Pakistan Debates."

[294] Ali Usman Qasmi, *The Ahmadis and the Politics of Religious Exclusion in Pakistan* (London: Anthem Press, 2015), 215.

brief lifetime, Pakistan had four Prime Ministers, all heading weak coalition ministries. Its replacement by successive Constitutions in 1962 and 1973 and the countless, often contradictory, constitutional amendments promulgated thereafter also reflected a chronic lack of consensus in the ideological as well as political agenda of the country's divided leadership.

Patronage – the Hallmark of Pakistani Politics

The political trajectory of Pakistan differed from that of neighbouring India in significant ways. Despite being plagued by its own host of problems following independence, including communal rioting, food shortages, a cholera epidemic and Gandhi's assassination in 1948, India had benefitted from the existence of consistent and effective political machinery from the very beginning. The Congress, possessing grassroots support the likes of which the Muslim League never managed to achieve, was therefore better prepared to meet the immediate challenge of representative institution-building. By 1950, the Constituent Assembly, elected before the transfer of power at independence, had successfully framed India's first and final constitution. More importantly, this constitution provided a clear framework for establishing democratic governance and incorporated institutional provisions for a flexible, representative political structure guaranteeing the articulation and safety of basic human rights. Under these secular, democratic and republican prescriptions for the structure of the new state, the first elections were held in India 1952, bringing the Congress party under Nehru into power with a popular mandate.

Unlike India, the party at the helm of an independent Pakistan failed to make a successful transition from a popular movement to a political institution capable of effective governance. Lacking the strength of popular mandate such as that of the

Congress, Muslim League's vacillating political constituencies not only made it difficult to meet the socio-economic challenges of partition, they also fostered the entrenchment of a damaging political culture based essentially on patronage. With such personalization of power and concentration of authority at the centre came the need to implement selective legislations to protect it.

The Constitution of 1956 demonstrated this subordination of democratic imperatives to the centralisation of power. Governor-General Iskander Mirza signed the Constitutional Bill only after guaranteeing his own nomination as the provisional President of the newly christened 'Islamic Republic of Pakistan.'[295] Under this framework, the discretionary powers awarded to the President included high-level appointments into the armed forces since as supreme commander he was responsible for selecting the three Commanders-in-Chief of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. The president possessed executive authority to transfer provincial power back to the centre, appoint the Prime Minister and dissolve the National Assembly at will. He was exempt from both a direct mandate of the people and nomination through an organised political system. The president was accorded unprecedented powers with the exclusive privilege of selecting all members of the cabinet as well as state and deputy ministers from amongst the members of the National Assembly. The constitution actually prevented ministers from interfering with key political matters such as the appointment of the Prime Minister. The only caveat marginally constraining the President's powers stipulated the appointment of a member of the national assembly most likely to command a majority in the house as Prime Minister.[296] Ultimately whilst the president was equipped to interfere with the

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[295] Constituent Assembly, *Constitution of Pakistan*, Karachi, 1956. Retrieved 5 February 2017, http://pakistanspace.tripod.com/archives/56_00.htm.
[296] *Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan*, Karachi 1956, Articles 3, 4, 5, and 7.

workings of the cabinet, he was not compelled by the constitution to follow its prescriptions.

As a civil administrator, Iskander Mirza's influence over the constitution-making process was also apparent in prioritising state-consolidation over the establishment of viable political processes. In doing so the constitution ran counter to the intended federal structure that had been outlined in the Pakistan Resolution of 1940. It gave sweeping powers to the centre enabling it to reign in provincial autonomy via presidential decree. The executive authority in the provinces, almost identical in nature and scope to that of the President, was vested in the office of the Governor. Chosen by the President himself, provincial Governors were expected to superimpose the centre's influence over provincial matters. The central government was empowered to direct provincial administrations on how to run their affairs.[297] Similarly, appointments, transfers, and dismissals of all the members of the Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP) were to be supervised by the president, to whom they were directly answerable. Since these CSP officers dominated key jobs in the provinces, together with the Governors, they could in turn ensure the centre's dominance. Provisions were included in the Constitution to enable the President to intervene in provincial affairs and take over its administration, either directly or indirectly through the nominated governor.

This authority over provincial affairs was stipulated under the ambiguously themed articles relating to *emergency* conditions. Article 191, for instance, stipulated that the President could declare a state of emergency if 'the security or economic life of Pakistan (or any of its constituents) were…threatened by war…external aggression…or internal disturbance…beyond the power of a Provincial Government

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[297] Ibid, Article 126.

to control.'[298] Article 193 allowed the president to instruct the governor to dismiss or suspend the provincial cabinet and assume direct control of the cabinet, should he claim an inability to administer the province in accordance with the constitution. A vital element of this article, invoked often in the years to come, was known as the President's Rule. This proclamation enabled the president to assume power over the provincial legislature by temporarily suspending it. In theory, the President's Rule could only remain in force for a period of two months. However, practically, the National Assembly could extend its life. Similarly, Article 194 related to threats presented towards the financial security of the state or its provinces, empowering the federal government to issue prescriptions for running financial affairs in its constituent units. The threat of President's Rule gave the centre formidable coercive powers over provincial governments and the ambiguities inherent in the unspecified conditions of 'emergency' brought into question the federal credentials of the 1956 constitution.

|The tendency towards political repression and authoritarianism at the centre initially manifested itself in the enactment of the Public and Representative Offices (Disqualification) act (PRODA) by the civil government in 1949. PRODA authorised the Governor General, and by extension the provincial governors to instigate legal proceedings against elected representatives or holders of public offices on charges of corruption, misuse of office and maladministration. In theory, the PRODA was designed to check the rampant corruption and nepotism pervading the Pakistani body politic. However, in practice it served as a useful political weapon for the Governor General and the Prime Minister to wield against their party rebels or political opposition.

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[298] *Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan*, Karachi 1956, Article 191(1).

Under the PRODA, political opponents were arrested and jailed, their public meetings and processions banned, and potential dissenters forced to conform to the centre's orders. Eventually, due to its arbitrary application PRODA's efficacy in its stated goals was rendered obsolete. For instance, between 1948 and 1954 the Kuhro ministry in Sindh was dismissed and reappointed three times at the Governor General Ghulam Muhammad's personal discretion. Similarly, the Fazl-ul-Haq ministry under the United Front in East Pakistan was dismissed by the Muslim League government at the Centre after only a few weeks of its election in 1954, under a vague charge of making statements against the integrity of Pakistan. In 1955, this charge was repealed by his appointment as Interior Minister in the Central Government and in 1956 as Governor of East Pakistan in return for a promise of his party's support for the Prime Minister. When the first constituent assembly attempted to curtail the arbitrary powers of the Governor General by repealing the PRODA, the Governor General reacted by dissolving the Constituent Assembly in 1954.

Combined with the extension of patronage in the form of financial, political, and material rewards in exchange of political loyalty, these instances reflected a certain level of arbitrariness creeping into the workings of the Pakistani state in its formative years. At the same time, the involvement of the military in state affairs began with its first forays into provincial governance during the Punjab Disturbances in the early fifties. The concurrent appointment of a serving army Commander in Chief General Mohammad Ayub Khan as Defence Minister, a former General and civil servant Iskander Mirza as Interior Minister, and another former civil servant Chaudhury Mohammad Ali as Finance Minister by Governor General Ghulam Muhammad in 1955 thereafter marked the beginnings of a symbiotic relationship between the bureaucracy and the military. The quasi-democratic nature of the 1956

Constitution therefore held no surprises in its impact on the development of the Pakistani political system. During this time, Pakistan saw four Prime Ministers heading weak coalition ministries with no common ideological basis or political programme each lasting, on average, eight months.[299] The shortest ministerial tenure under I.I. Chundrigarlasted only 55 days.

Under these circumstances, the promised general elections suffered repeated delays while the country was administered in an ad-hoc manner by an interim National Assembly. By September 1958, however, the inability of various factions of the coalition government to work together descended into physical violence during a debate in the East Pakistan Legislative Assembly in Dhaka, resulting in the death of the Deputy Speaker. Against the backdrop of growing industrial dissent fuelled by rising inflation, the cacophony of opposition parties demanding early elections and strident criticism of the regime's pro-Western foreign policy, the President abandoned any remaining pretence of working for the cause of parliamentary democracy. On 7 October 1958, President Iskander Mirza abrogated the constitution, dissolved the central and provincial assemblies, dismissed the central and provincial cabinets, banned all political parties, postponed elections indefinitely, placed members of the central cabinet under house arrest, declared Martial Law and appointed General Ayub Khan as the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces and Chief Martial Law Administrator (CMLA).

The idea that parliamentary democracy was wholly unsuited to the Pakistani polity had already been floated earlier by Mirza and Ayub to the US ambassador James Langley and the British High Commissioner, Sir Alexander Symon. Curiously,

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[299] Hasan Askari-Rizvi, *The Military and Politics in Pakistan: 1947-1997*, ed. Sang-e-Meel Publishers (Lahore, 2000).

Mirza claimed that the takeover was 'designed to prevent an army seizure of power in Pakistan.'[300] Any illusions he possessed about his ability to steer the course of history thereafter should have been tempered by Ayub's very telling interview to the *Daily Mail*: 'We both came to the conclusion that the country was going to the dogs and I said to the president, "Are you going to act or are you not going to act? It is your responsibility to bring a change about. If you do not, we (the Army) will force a change."'[301]

It is of vital significance that during the critical juncture of the post-independence decade, Pakistan witnessed seven Prime Ministers and eight cabinets, with demonstrable consistency only in the office of the Commander in Chief of the Army. Mohammad Ayub Khan initially appointed for a four-year term in January 1951, was re-appointed for another four-year term until 1959 and in June 1958 granted another two-year extension in office. That the Prime Minister held the defence portfolio meant that he would invariably maintain close interaction with the Army Chief over matters of national security and foreign policy. Not only did this ensure heightened involvement of the military in national decision-making, it also facilitated an increase in the military high command's political influence and its associated disregard for the vagaries of civilian politics. Thus, when Iskander Mirza, attempted to 'sort Ayub Khan in a few days'[302] by mobilizing then Chief of Air Staff as well as some of Ayub's rivals within the army, it backfired stupendously. Just 20 days after Iskander Mirza had somewhat unwittingly shifted the balance of political power in favour of the military with the abrogation of the constitution and declaration of Martial Law, he too was forced to resign from the office of the President. On 27

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[300] Jalal, *The State of Martial Rule: The Origins of Pakistan's Political Economy of Defence*, 274.
[301] "President Ayub's Interview," *Daily Mail*, October 10, 1958.
[302] Mohammad Asghar Khan, *Generals in Politics: Pakistan 1958-1982* (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing, 1983), 8.

October 1958, Field Marshal General Ayub Khan assumed the dual offices of the President and CMLA of Pakistan.

This particular pattern of civil-military relations, where civilian patronage of higher military echelons used initially to legitimise and fortify weak political regimes eventually undermines their own authority, assumed a cyclical nature in the annals of Pakistani history. Nordlinger refers to this as a type of civilian performance failure, which provides the military with a pretext to intervene as: the inability to maintain order that 'affects the decision to intervene insofar as it may require the officers to act as policemen while highlighting the government's total dependence upon the military.'[303]

Of Military Regimes and Martial Laws

On many counts, Ayub's military coup appears as what Morris Janowitz refers to as reluctant or 'reactive militarism' i.e. 'the expansion of military power that results from the weakness of civilian institutions and the pressures of civilians to expand the military role.'[304] Thus despite having refused an earlier offer by Governor-General Ghulam Mohammad to take power in 1954, Ayub Khan claimed his hand had been forced by rapidly worsening socio-economic and political conditions in the country when he finally did take over. He blamed aberrations in the new Constitution, which

> could be used to promote political intrigues and bargaining. No one knew any longer who belonged to which party. It was all a question of swapping labels: a Muslim Leaguer today, a Republican tomorrow; and yesterday's 'traitors' were tomorrow's Chief Ministers, indistinguishable as tweedledum and tweedledee! [305]

He also justified the inevitability of his actions by predicting 'stand-up fights':

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[303] Nordlinger, *Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Governments*, 86.
[304] Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait,* 161.
[305] Khan, "Friends Not Masters: A Political Autobiography", 55.

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There would be large-scale disturbances all over the country, and civil authority, already groaning under the heels of the politicians, would be incapable of dealing with the situation. Whether the army liked it or not it would get embroiled, because in the final analysis it would become a question of maintaining some semblance of law and order in the country. [306]

Ironically, he was also concerned about 'how, if the army once got drawn into political life – and this seemed inevitable – it could withdraw itself from the situation'considering its negative institutional impact and the widespread international condemnation it would incur at a time when Pakistan desperately needed foreign benefactors. [307]

Therefore, even as the army moved into all the major cities taking control of key points and government buildings, measures were taken to minimise the overt appearance of military on the streets and disruption to civilian life. Educational institutions, government and semi-government offices all continued to function as normal and without a single shot fired. Reluctant to expose the military directly to the depravities of civilian statecraft, Ayub Khan removed most visible signs of military presence, including its withdrawal from direct Martial Law duties within a month. However top military brass continued to play a decisive role within the new regime behind the scenes to ensure its longevity.

Despite abrogating the constitution, abolishing political parties and banning all political activity Ayub issued a Continuance in Force Order (1958) declaring Pakistan be governed as closely as possible in accordance with the abrogated constitution. In an act that would set the precedent for the legal sanction of successive military regimes in Pakistan, the Supreme Court put its stamp of approval on Ayub's rule. A ruling by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court that 'a victorious revolution or a successful *coup d'état* is an internationally recognized legal method of changing a

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[306] Khan, "Friends Not Masters: A Political Autobiography", 57.
[307] Khan, "Friends Not Masters: A Political Autobiography."

constitution'[308] in spite of the suspension of fundamental civil rights, cast a serious long term shadow over the salience of the Pakistani judicial system. Eventually even though the Supreme, High and Lower Courts were allowed function, no decision of the Military Courts or order of Martial Law could be challenged in any court of law.

The potential of increasing returns was reflected in Ayub's methodology for suppressing political opposition being strikingly similar to his civilian predecessors. In what appeared to be a continuation, indeed an expansion of the PRODA, Ayub promulgated two new orders – the Public Offices Disqualification Order (PODO) and the Elective Bodies Disqualification Order (EBDO) in 1959. The PODO applied to those who held public office anytime since independence and were found guilty of *misconduct* or corruption by an independent tribunal. Should they be found guilty, the person could be disqualified from holding public office for fifteen years and liable for any loss in public revenue caused by their actions. The main difference between the PRODA and PODO was an exemption of the condition requiring a cash deposit for members of the general public to apply for investigation against any former public servant. The EBDO, serving as an extension of the PODO, entailed a simplified procedure for bringing to account members of the legislature who had never held public office. A person found guilty under the EBDO for 'misconduct' applied, *inter alia*, to corruption, bribery, nepotism, favouritism, and wilful mal-administration, was either disqualified from holding elective office or given the option to retire voluntarily for a period of six years. In the absence of official figures, an unofficial estimate of the number of political leaders (including prominent names such as Mumtaz Daultana and Firoz Khan Noon) disqualified from public office touched four hundred. [309]

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[308] The State Vs. Dosso and another P.L.D. 1958, Supreme Court, 533-70, cited in Askari-Rizvi, *Military State and Society in Pakistan,* 91.
[309] Askari-Rizvi, *Military State and Society in Pakistan*, 89.

Reflecting his disdain for civilian politics Ayub remarked: 'The biggest weapon of a politician is his tongue, which we have controlled. I think things are going to be quiet for a while.'[310] Ayub's attitude towards the country's civilian leadership illustrated the pertinence of Nordlinger's rationalisation of military intervention i.e. 'In part civilian failures strengthen the resolve to intervene…They heighten the soldier's disrespect and disdain for the civilian governors; officers are more likely to act upon their interventionist motives against incumbents whom they hold in contempt.'[311]

Ayub also took punitive action, ranging from dismissal and demotion to compulsory retirement against government servants on the charges of corruption, misconduct, inefficiency and insubordination. Approximately 1662 officials, including those from Civil Service, Foreign Office and Police Service of Pakistan were convicted under these charges.[312] This sort of arbitrary accountability of civil servants played an important role in the administration of the Ayub regime. It ensured obeisance of the civil servants, based on the threat of possible reprisal. The civil servants in turn benefitted from the opportunity to exercise greater power under the cover of Martial Law, obliging the regime by implementing unquestionably its directives and covering its administrative requirements.

Basic Democracies

Ayub continued with his civilian predecessors' trend towards greater centralization of state power albeit within his proposed system of controlled democracy 'of the type

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[310] *The New York Times,* 19 October 1958, cited in Jahan, *Pakistan.*
[311] Nordlinger, *Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Governments,* 86.
[312] Askari-Rizvi, *Military State and Society in Pakistan*, 100.

that people can understand and work.'[313] Deeming the Pakistani populace not yet ready for Western-style democracy, he declared in a memorandum entitled 'A Short Appreciation of Present and Future Problems of Pakistan,' that democracy in Pakistan should be 'of a type that suits the genius of the people.'[314] His proposed system of government, the *Basic Democracies* (BD) system, was thereafter introduced on the first anniversary of the coup. It essentially comprised a five-tiered, and after the introduction of the new constitution in 1962, a four-tiered, semi-representative system of governance, derived by direct elections under adult franchise taking place only at the lowest tier. Representation in the upper tiers could only proceed via indirect election. As an introduction to self-government the BD system comprised rural representation in the union councils and urban in union committees, then the divisional and district councils, and finally the provincial legislature dominated by senior members of the civil service. This system of top-down management, with representation of adult franchise only at the lowest levels consolidated the regime's control by extending its power-base into the rural areas.

At the same time, the preoccupation with legitimizing his rule both domestically and internationally manifested in Ayub's contrived *election* to the office of President. On 14 February 1960, a presidential referendum was staged asking the Basic Democrats forming the Electoral College to express their confidence in the Ayub administration. With over 95 per cent of votes cast in his favour, Ayub promptly assumed the mantle of Pakistan's first *elected* CMLA.[315] In this, Ayub set a

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[313] Transcript of 'General Ayub Khan's First Broadcast to the Nation,' 8 October 1958, Rizvi, *Military State and Society in Pakistan,* 290-294.
[314] 'A Memorandum Written by General Ayub Khan, C-in-C of the Army: October 4, 1954,', Rizvi, *The Military and Politics in Pakistan: 1947-1997* (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publishers)*,* 282-287.
[315] Askari-Rizvi, *Military State and Society in Pakistan*, 98.

precedent that fits in with Nordlinger's description of praetorian legitimization as a 'constitutional-democratic façade' characterised by

> a national legislature that can do little more than discuss and approve legislation introduced by the government; elections for national, state, and local offices that are restricted to officially approved candidates, elections for the presidency featuring a single candidate; plebiscite in which the government asks for and 'receives' the approval of more than 90 per cent of those who cast their ballots and the 'civilianization' of the regime whereby the head of government sheds his uniform in order to look more like a constitutional president or prime minister. [316]

As a precursor to the civilianization of his rule, Ayub appointed a Constitution Commission to formulate a new constitution within a few hours of taking oath. The new constitution produced in March 1962, however, deviated significantly even from the restrictive recommendations of the Commission. Instead of a federal structure with executive authority vested in the centre balancing demands for greater provincial autonomy with Ayub's centrist agenda, the Constitution imposed a quasi-federal structure. It introduced the Presidential system of government, with extensive executive, legislative, and financial powers granted to the President.

The constitution of 1962 also codified the central network of patronage supporting the Ayub regime, including the army, the civil bureaucracy, and the Basic Democrats. The President, as Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, was authorized to 'raise and maintain the Defence Service of Pakistan and the Reserves of those Services; to grant Commissions in those services; to appoint chief commanders of those services and determine their salaries and allowances.'[317] By rewarding senior military personnel with sought-after diplomatic roles, lucrative positions in the public and private sector, and accelerated promotions within the army, the Ayub regime fostered patronage much like his civilian predecessors.

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[316] Nordlinger, *Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Governments*, 134.
[317] *The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1962,* Article 17.

At the same time, the civil bureaucracy benefitted from growing influence due to the Ayub regime's need to utilize their well-entrenched administrative expertise and provide a civilian cover for the military regime. The bureaucrats in turn extracted substantial concessions in their terms of employment such as extensions of service beyond retirement and successfully resisted reform of the Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP) as recommended by the Pay and Services Commission.[318] In other instances the provincial Chief Secretaries instead of the most senior cabinet minister were arbitrarily appointed as Acting Governors to preside over cabinet meetings and exercise powers as heads of the provisional administration. Such predominance of the civil bureaucracy in state administration eventually undermined the military regime's goal of establishing a quasi-democratic, representative base at the rural and township level.

In extending the scope of bureaucratic patronage through the Basic Democrats (BDs), Ayub aimed to bypass the inconvenience of dealing with parties and politicians with established provincial bases of support. Under the 1962 Constitution the BD's constituted the electoral college responsible for electing members of the National and Provincial assemblies in the party-less elections of 1962. The BD's loyalties were therefore established by the bureaucracy, thereby undermining the legitimacy of Ayub's entire programme of controlled democratic emancipation at the grassroots level. Thus, the parliament that emerged after the 1962 'elections' represented the same landowner class and *biradari* (community) networks that had dominated the Pakistani political system since independence and revealed the

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[318] Askari-Rizvi, *Military State and Society in Pakistan*.

regime's expediency-based political alliance with the landed political elite with all its associated encumbrances.[319]

Our American Friends

Under Ayub the military had begun to exhibit independence from civilian control in the arena of foreign policy as early as 1952. As the first indigenous Commander-in-Chief (C-in-C) of the Pakistan Army in 1951, Ayub had been a keen participant in talks on military cooperation and assistance with the United States, which had been initiated by then-Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan. Being acutely conscious of strategic vulnerability and resource scarcity vis-à-vis its hostile neighbours, Ayub was preoccupied even before his coup with the goal of expanding Pakistan's military capacity. However he intended to keep this within the purview of the military high command commenting 'these civilians cannot be trusted with such sensitive matters of national security.'[320] Accordingly therefore he tasked Brigadier Ghulam Jilani, Pakistan's first military attaché to Washington, with procuring military equipment from the Pentagon without involving the Pakistani foreign office or ambassador in the process.

In 1953, Ayub sought to deal directly with the US again, ahead of a visit by Pakistan's civilian Foreign Minister and Governor-General, to broker an arrangement 'whereby Pakistan could – for the right price – serve as the West's eastern anchor in an Asian alliance structure.' [321] Asserting 'Our army can be your army if you want,'[322] he aimed to capitalize on US preoccupation with establishing its influence

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[319] Talbot, *Pakistan: A Modern History*, 156.
[320] Mushahid Hussain and Akmal Hussain, *Pakistan Problems of Governance* (New Delhi: Konark Publishers, 1993), 30.
[321] Shirin Tahir-Kheli, *The United States and Pakistan: The Evolution of an Influence Relationship*, ed. Praegar (New York, 1982), 3.
[322] Kux, *The United States and Pakistan, 1947-2000: Disenchanted Allies*, 9.

over Asian security in the aftermath of the Korean War. As a frontline state, Pakistan could potentially play a key role in the US policy of containment against communist expansionism. In October 1954, Pakistan signed the Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement, receiving initially $171 million in the form of military training and equipment from the United States.[323] In the same year, Pakistan joined the Eisenhower administration's Cold War containment alliance, via the Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO) in the Middle East and the Southeast Asian Treaty Organisation (SEATO) in Southeast Asia. Within the country, American aid began to build up defence infrastructure in the form of training facilities, airfields, and military cantonments, as well as the expansion of recruitment, sophistication and the stock of modern weaponry. Pakistani army officers also benefitted from strategic and tactical training in the United States in modern warfare concepts between 1954 and 1965.

The army's dealings with the Pentagon, and the economic assistance from the United States not only bolstered its military and organizational capacity, it marked the beginning of the military's independent forays into the arena of foreign policy. Pakistan's geostrategic value in America's anticipated clash against the Soviet Union ensured economic and military support for decades of military regimes from the 1950s to the 1980s. Thus, even though 'the US favoured democratic government over authoritarian government [however] there may be exceptions which can be justified for limited periods.'[324] By prioritizing its regional interests over strengthening democratic infrastructure, the United States demonstrated its culpability in fostering praetorianism in Pakistan. In fact, former Army Chiefs openly admit that to this day 'the Pentagon continues to maintain direct and independent links with the serving

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[323] Shah, *The Army and Democracy: Military Politics in Pakistan*, 70.
[324] Nawaz, *Crossed Swords: Pakistan, Its Army, and the Wars Within*, 153.

Army chiefs and top military brass, regardless of which government is in power at any given time.'[325] It goes without saying that this preferential treatment is welcomed, embraced and reciprocated openly by the praetorian leadership in Pakistan.

Quest for Security

The praetorian reinforcement of what contemporary scholars refer to as Pakistan's chronic revisionism vis-a-vis neighbouring India, became accentuated when Ayub's foreign policy drift began to face significant challenges after the election of US President John F. Kennedy in 1960. Whilst Pakistan felt that the United States was not providing enough support to achieve a favourable resolution of the Kashmir dispute, the United States had also begun to lean towards a closer alliance with India partly intending the regional containment of China. The Sino-Indian border conflict in October 1962 played a significant role in accentuating strains within the US-Pakistan alliance. The conflict saw repeated skirmishes followed by military escalation between Chinese and Indian troops across the disputed McMahon Line including territory in the north-western frontier region and a portion of the Ladakh region in Kashmir. Indian recourse to the Western world for the containment of China saw military support pour in not only from the United States, but also countries like Great Britain, Australia, Canada, and even the Soviet Union. For the United States, the Sino-Indian conflict presented a good opportunity 'to snap Nehru out of his obsession with peaceful coexistence' – that is, to move India away from its hitherto unaligned stance and closer to the West. [326]

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[325] Interview with Lieutenant-General General Mirza Aslam Beg, (Chief of Army Staff (1988-1991), Rawalpindi, 5 January 2011.
[326] Askari-Rizvi, *Military State and Society in Pakistan*, 108.

Viewing the rapid expansion of Indian military capacity as a precursor to a shift in the regional balance of power, the Ayub regime began to revisit its economic reliance on the US. It was around this time that the dynamic young Minister for Water and Power, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, was authorized to sign the first agreement with the Soviet Union for oil and gas exploration in Pakistan. Bhutto's support for a non-aligned foreign policy and stronger ties with China, found increasing purchase in the Ayub administration and his elevation to Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1963 served to strengthen this relationship.

Tensions in Pakistan's military alliance with the United States finally peaked during the second India-Pakistan war (1965) and the subsequent imposition of an arms embargo by the United States. The 1965 war proved to be a watershed for the Ayub regime and the emerging praetorian system in several ways. It marked the beginning of an arms race between Pakistan and India, and reinforced the idea of a perpetual existential threat posed by the hostile Indian neighbour. It also intensified Pakistan's defence and security requirements whilst putting additional pressure on its fragile economy. Moreover, it further alienated East Pakistan by leaving it practically undefended during the conflict.

Return of Party Politics

The border skirmishes that erupted in April 1965 between Pakistani and Indian soldiers in Rann of Kutch[327] rapidly escalated into a full-blown conflict between the two countries. Won over by Foreign Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto's compelling argument in favour of a 'bold and courageous stand' that could 'open up greater possibilities for a negotiated settlement' in Kashmir, General Ayub had authorised the

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[327] Disputed territory situated between the Indian state of Gujarat and Sindh area of West Pakistan.

commencement of armed infiltration into Indian-held Kashmir. [328] Launched in

August 1965, *Operation Gibraltar,* as it came to be called, reflected Pakistan's

growing military confidence bolstered by support from China as well as the first of

several attempts to find a military settlement of the Kashmir issue. Pakistani

expectations of a limited war in Kashmir, however, proved to be a gross

underestimation of Indian reprisals. As India responded in kind with a three-pronged

attack in the Punjab sector of the India-West Pakistan border involving the army and

the air force, the conflict escalated. Ultimately, even though the 1965 war lasted only

17 days and ended in a stalemate, followed by a UN mediated ceasefire signed by

leaders of both countries in Tashkent, it had far reaching implications for the

longevity of the Ayub regime in Pakistan.

Widely convinced of the triumph of their armed forces due to a fairly

successful state propaganda campaign, Pakistani populations saw the Tashkent

Agreement as an unfavourable compromise after a supposedly hard-won military

victory. Additionally, since the agreement made no mention of Pakistan's demand for

a plebiscite in Kashmir, disgruntled Pakistani populations equated it with the Ayub

regime selling out to India on the issue. Sharply opposed to what he perceived as a

political surrender at Tashkent, Ayub's Foreign Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto resigned

from the cabinet and organized a new political party of his own, calling it the Pakistan

People's Party (PPP). His vociferous anti-India stance, virulent criticisms of Ayub's

policies, and capitalization of mounting popular socio-economic grievances against

the regime gained increasing popularity with the masses.

Boosted by the rising anti-government sentiment, other political parties also

began to reassert their opposition to the regime at the same time. With the

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[328] Abbas, *Pakistan's Drift Into Extremism: Allah, the Army, and America's War on Terror*, 44.

introduction of the new Constitution in 1962 and revival of party politics, several attempts had been made by leaders of the opposition parties to forge a broad-based coalition advocating the return of parliamentary democracy and a federal political structure. These efforts began to gain momentum with the end of the period of disqualification for politicians under the EBDO in December 1966 after which they returned to join the political ranks of the opposition.

Rapid increase in the number of educated jobless in urban centres, rampant inflation, food shortages, simultaneous decrease in foreign aid, and decline in industrial production in the late 1960s, strengthened by seething public anger over the Tashkent agreement, fuelled rising political opposition against the Ayub regime. Calls for provincial autonomy, particularly in opposition to the growing economic disparities between the East and West Pakistan wings as well as the marginalization of Bengalis in civil bureaucracy and the army, served as a further catalyst to the civil discontent.

Despite the claimed successes of the Ayub regime, his development strategy had been premised on ensuring the success of the Basic Democracies system by extending differential patronage and by prioritizing economic growth through private enterprise instead of wealth redistribution. Thus, as wealth generated by Ayub's policies was concentrated into the upper stratum of society, the state played a critical role in accentuating socio-economic deprivations of the urban proletarian and lower classes. Indeed the arbitrary distribution of socio-economic privilege was reflected in an estimate by the Chief Economist of the Planning Commission, Dr. Mahboob-ul-

Haq, disclosing that in 1968 'twenty families controlled 66 per cent of the entire industrial capital, 80 per cent of the banking and 97 per cent of insurance capital.'[329]

The final months of the Ayub regime were characterised by increasing state suppression, political detentions and crackdown on the urban mass movements of students, industrial labour, low-ranking government employees, ʿulama, and other salaried classes, which escalated into pitched battles between the police and the army leaving an estimated 250 dead in East and West Pakistan.[330] The final nail in the coffin for the Ayub regime ultimately came with the refusal of the army, specifically by Ayub's handpicked C-in-C General Yahya Khan, to support his call to impose Martial Law. On 25 March 1969 General Ayub Khan quietly resigned from office–handing over the reins of power to another his second in command, General Yahya Khan.

Round Two – The Second Military Regime

By the time General Yahya came to power, the praetorian military ethos had been inextricably woven into the fabric of Pakistani politics. Despite significant divergences from Ayub's political ambitions, Yahya's short tenure as head of state demonstrated a congruity of sorts in the army's faith (or lack thereof) in the efficacy of civilian politics. Yahya demonstrated confluence with Ayub's low estimation of civilian political forces in relying primarily on 'Defence Forces of Pakistan, which today represent the only effective and legal instrument, to take the full control of the affairs of this country.' [331]

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[329] *Dawn,* April 25, 1968; Akbar Zaidi, *Issues In Pakistan's Economy* (Michigan: Oxford University Press, 2005).

[330] Jalal, *The State of Martial Rule: The Origins of Pakistan's Political Economy of Defence*, 308.

[331] Ayub's Letter to General Yahya Khan, March 24, 1969, in Altaf Gauhar, *Pakistan's First Military Ruler* (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publications, 1993).

A key difference in Yahya's opening stance from that of Ayub's lay in his emphasis on the transitional nature of his regime and commitment towards the transfer of power to civilian representatives via free and fair general elections. He also declared his support for the framing of a new constitution by the people's chosen representatives at the earliest possible opportunity.. This was marked initially by a visible distancing of the inherited civilian bureaucratic apparatus from the regime's decision-making processes. Notwithstanding the stated differences in his political approach, however, Yahya's brief stint in power demonstrated a consolidation of the military's influence over politics in Pakistan

On the same premise, instead of following the constitutional provision stipulating that the Speaker of the National Assembly would assume the role of acting President in the event of the existing President's resignation,[332] Yahya claimed the presidency for himself. Upon assuming power, Yahya also abrogated the Constitution, banned all political activity, dissolved assemblies (national as well as provincial), dismissed central and provincial cabinets, and imposed Martial Law across the country. Going a step further than Ayub Khan, he chose to concentrate three of the most powerful offices – the President, Commander-in-Chief, and Chief Martial Law Administrator – under his own charge. Martial Law regulations were re-introduced with minor modifications, and a Provisional Constitutional Order (PCO) was issued stipulating that Pakistan be governed as closely as possible to the 1962 constitution.

This PCO gave additional overarching powers to the military President, authorising 'such provision, including constitutional provisions, as he may deem fit, for the administration of the affairs of the state.'[333] Special, summary military courts,

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[332] Constituent Assembly, *The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan*, Karachi, 1962 – Article 16(1). LSE Library Government Publications 54 PAK (168)
[333] 'Full text of the Provisional Constitutional Order,' in *Pakistan News,* 15 April 1969, London.

above reproach from any ordinary court of law, were set up to ensure enforcement of Martial Law directives. At the same time, Fundamental Rights under the Constitution were also suspended, disallowing any court to challenge any order of the CMLA or the Martial Law authorities.

His distrust of the civilian bureaucracy was clear in Yahya's allocation of the most influential positions in government to military leadership. The dual position of Principal Staff Officer to the President and Chief Martial Law Administrator effectively as *de facto* capacity Prime Minister, three Deputy Chief Martial Law Administrators and various lower positions dealing with martial law and civilian affairs, all went into the hands of military officials. Even the appointment of a civilian cabinet, the Council of Ministers, in August 1969 did not change the military-heavy nature of the regime. Yahya himself held on to the powerful portfolios of Defence, Foreign Affairs, as well as Economic Affairs and Planning.

At the same time, Yahya echoed Ayub's rationale for taking over the reins of power, stating 'The Armed Forces could not remain idle spectators to this state of near anarchy (administrative laxity, strikes and violence). They have to do their duty and save the country from disaster…' adding further that the 'Armed Forces belong to the people. They have no political ambitions and will not prop up any individual or party.'[334] However, the subsequent promulgation of the Legal Framework Order (LFO) by the regime proved contrary to his supposedly apolitical intentions. Like the Ayub regime, Yahya also sanctioned administrative reforms, including targeting the bureaucracy for disciplinary action, and introduced new labour and wage policies to counter rising student and labour agitation. Like Ayub, Yahya claimed to be a custodian of the fundamental rights to life, property, and freedom of the people,

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[334] S.G.M Badruddin, "Election Handbook 1970" (Karachi, 1970).

compelled to take charge to prevent the country slipping further into anarchy. This demonstration of what Nordlinger calls the 'public rationale of praetorianism' became a recurring theme in subsequent military takeovers thereafter:

> The praetorians portray themselves as responsible and patriotic officers, these public-spirited qualities leaving them little choice but to protect the constitution and the nation from the unhappy consequences of continued civilian rule. Foremost responsibility is not due to the men who happen to be occupying the seat of government. Their overriding responsibility is to constitution and nation.[335]

Yahya unveiled his plans for a transfer of power to civilian representatives through direct adult franchise in November 1969. Under Yahya military praetorianism morphed in to a military regime which 'seeks external (in relation to the military) political support and is sincere in the exercise of restrictive elections, even if the choice is limited to the military-supported executive.'[336] Pakistan's first General Elections were thereby scheduled for the autumn of 1970.

The proclamation of the LFO in March 1970 sketching an operational framework for the general elections and new constitution provided an insight into the conditional nature of Yahya's plans for a civilian handover. The LFO reflected the regime's intention to *manage* the political process, ensuring minimal devolution of actual state power from military control. It gave Yahya the power to veto any document, including the authentication of a constitution produced by the elected national assembly.[337] This concentration of power was also codified in the proviso that the final decision regarding any questions or doubts presented in the interpretation of the LFO would be decided by the President alone. Yahya expected that the lack of cohesion amongst political parties would prevent any one political

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[335] Nordlinger, *Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Governments*, 19.
[336] Perlmutter, "The Praetorian State and the Praetorian Army: Toward a Taxonomy of Civil-Military Relations in Developing Polities," 95.
[337] Ministry of Information and National Affairs, "White Paper on the Crisis in East Pakistan" (Karachi, 1971).

party from gaining an overwhelming majority in the polls, thereby ensuring the military's continued significance as a major power broker in the political process.

When two parties – Sheikh Mujibur Rahman's Awami League in East Pakistan and Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto's PPP in West Pakistan – swept the polls therefore, it came as a shock to the Yahya regime. Awami League's emergence as a dominant power bloc in the national assembly, securing as many as 160 out of 162 seats from East Pakistan, boded ill for the West Pakistan-dominated intelligentsia in the bureaucracy and the military.[338] Central to the Awami League manifesto was the contentious topic of provincial autonomy, posing a direct challenge to the regime's centrist agenda. East Pakistani grievances over economic disparities, marginalization of developmental needs and under-representation in the higher echelons of the military and civil bureaucracy featured prominently in Awami League's manifesto. Such simmering resentments against West Pakistan were a major factor in the popularity of the Awami League's anti-West Pakistan rhetoric.

Initially presented in 1966, Mujibur Rahmans's Six-Point Formula, comprising the Awami League's electoral manifesto in 1970, advocated a broad-based devolution of power from the federal government – 'basic principles' which would facilitate a resolution of 'inter-wing political and economic problems' and guarantee legitimate rights along with maximum autonomy for East Pakistan.[339] Proposing a loose federation, the Six-Point Formula imposed limitations on the absolute power exercised by the federal government over East Pakistan's economy and administrative affairs. It also proposed separate, albeit freely convertible, currencies for East and West Pakistan, an indigenously produced fiscal policy for

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[338] Jalal, *The State of Martial Rule: The Origins of Pakistan's Political Economy of Defence*, 310.
[339] Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, "6-Point Formula: Our Right to Live" (Dhaka, 1966).

each wing, separate accounts for foreign exchange earnings, representation in the federal legislature on the basis of population, and the maintenance of independent militia or paramilitary force.

In West Pakistan, particularly amongst the military and civil bureaucracy, the success of the Awami League stoked the fears of provincialism and went against the grain of the military regime's consolidation of power. Having expected to retain its salience over the political system as mediator amongst an equally balanced collage of parties, the Yahya regime was shaken by the unprecedented outcome of the elections. Mujib's intransigence towards any compromise on the Six-Point Formula after his election victory at the same time became an insurmountable obstacle in the negotiation of a parliamentary settlement with West Pakistan's leading political figure, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto.

For Bhutto, having gained a landslide victory in the Western wing, Awami League dominance in the national assembly and potential premiership of the country were unacceptable. The military's interest in maintaining a strong central government coincided closely with his opposition to East Pakistan's predominance over the federal legislature. The political stalemate between Bhutto and Mujib eventually culminated in Yahya's postponement of the scheduled National Assembly session on 3 March 1971 at Bhutto's behest. This perceived delay in handing over power of the federal legislature to the expectant Awami League, fed into the intense anti-West Pakistan sentiment simultaneously stirred into frenzy by Mujib's virulent rhetoric.

The Awami League's propaganda also capitalized on tumultuous public dissent in East Pakistan caused by the centre's delay in relief efforts against the catastrophic devastation of a cyclone in 1970. It now fanned the fires of secession by calling for a mass civil disobedience movement suspending all contact with the centre.

Overwhelming support for the establishment of an independent state, and Mujib's assumption of *de facto* control over the whole of East Pakistan in the form of parallel government, further hardened his demands. Bolstered increasingly by its militant ranks, the Awami League, suggested framing a separate constitution for East Pakistan, demanded an immediate withdrawal of martial law and handover of power to their own elected representatives. Yahya's subsequent decision to use military force (termed *Operation Searchlight*) to suppress the rebellion in East Pakistan thus marked the beginning of an all-out civil war between the pro-Pakistan military supporters and the pro-Bangladesh supporters of the Awami League.

The resultant pitched battles between secessionist guerrilla force, the *Mukti Bahini*, and the Pakistani military provided the ideal opportunity for its Indian neighbour to escalate the crisis. Indian involvement in East Pakistan had already begun with indirect political support to the Bangladeshi secessionist movement at the beginning of hostilities. The transition from indirect to direct military support began with allowing *Mukti Bahini* groups to establish base-camps on Indian soil, providing them with equipment and weapons as well as facilitating their recruitment, organisation and training via the Indian Army and the Border Security Force (BSF).[340] Eventually the limited military intervention morphed into a full-fledged invasion of East Pakistan by Indian troops, culminating into the second India-Pakistan war on 21 November 1971 and eventually led to the dismemberment of the country.

The defeat suffered by the Pakistani military and the devastating loss of East Pakistan at the hands of the Indian army, along with the detention of some 93,000 Pakistani POWs in India, heralded the unceremonious exit of Pakistan's second military regime. During the two-week war, Pakistan lost half its navy, a third of its

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[340] Askari-Rizvi, *The Military and Politics in Pakistan: 1947-1997*, 203.

army, and a quarter of its air force.[341] Within the Pakistan Army there was rising anger amongst junior officers towards military high command and mass civil protests on the streets. Its military credentials thoroughly discredited, the military rulers retreated to the barracks. At the military high command's behest Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, the elected leader of the PPP in West Pakistan, emerged as the President and first civilian CMLA of the now-truncated state of Pakistan in a formal ceremony on 20 December 1971.

Boasting the creditable achievement of holding Pakistan's first free and fair elections, Yahya's brief rule was nonetheless marred by the military government's inability to consider any devolution of power from its stranglehold. In attempting to retain dominance over political process, the Yahya regime exhibited continuity with Ayub's in the state's emerging praetorian propensity. Similarly, his extension of differential patronage to cooperative political parties also demonstrated the attempted civilianization of military rule, a tendency that would be repeated by successive military regimes in Pakistan.

Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto (1971-1977) and the Army

When Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto swept into the Presidency on a wave of popular support he was the first civilian ruler in Pakistan in thirteen years and the very first civilian Chief Martial Law Administrator. The timing was fortuitous in several ways. The military debacle in East Pakistan had dealt a devastating blow to the army's claim over the necessity of wielding state power. At the same time, the Supreme Court reversed its earlier decision legitimizing Ayub Khan's 1958 *coup d'état*, and by its precedent Yahya Khan's in 1969. In 1972, the Court denounced Yahya's assumption of power

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[341] Talbot, *Pakistan: A Modern History*, 212.

as an 'act of usurpation' and therefore 'illegal and unconstitutional.'[342] Emboldened by both the rising public dissent and legal judgment passed against the military establishment, Bhutto's government was ideally placed at this critical juncture to reappraise the military's role in Pakistani politics. The PPP with its overwhelming mandate in the National Assembly as well as the Punjab and Sindh provincial assemblies now possessed considerable strength to enforce its writ on the political process.

Notable scholarly works on Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto's impact on Pakistani politics by Wolpert,[343] Burki[344] and Taseer[345] provide key insights into the formative role played by Bhutto as one of Pakistan's most mercurial civilian political leaders. Wolpert's coverage of Bhutto's rise and fall from grace, through a personalized sketch of his dichotomous personality, encapsulates the recurring theme of '*siasat*', the Sindhi term for politics 'derived from the feudal code of honour whose most important attributes were loyalty and vengeance'.[346] He shows how Bhutto may have tangibly contributed towards Pakistan's trajectory of military revisionism due to his virulent personal antipathy towards India, whilst undermining the development of democratic institutional processes by his megalomaniacal domestic, political war-gaming. Taseer reinforces this feature of the Bhutto regime by showing how it epitomized the feudal politics of patronage at the national level, underlining his dubious commitment to democratic politics. At the same time Burki renders a structural understanding of Bhutto's regime by referring to the 'idiosyncratic element' in Bhutto's political decision-making as being symptomatic of the 'clash between the

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[342] Askari-Rizvi, *The Military and Politics in Pakistan: 1947-1997*, 209.
[343] Stanley Wolpert, *Zulfi Bhutto of Pakistan: His Life and Times* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1993).
[344] Shahid Javed Burki, *Pakistan Under Bhutto 1971-1977* (London: Macmillan, 1988).
[345] Salmaan Taseer, *Bhutto: A Political Biography* (Reading: Ithaca Press, 1999).
[346] Wolpert, *Zulfi Bhutto of Pakistan: His Life and Times*, 12.

traditional institutions that the country inherited and the modern institutions that some groups sought to develop.'[347]

In many ways Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto served to epitomise the centrifugal forces characterising Pakistan's struggle with democratic governance. He had served as one of General Ayub's closest aides and advised on the constitution and 'how best to manage Pakistan's transition from autocratic military rule to "democratic" government with at least some patina of popular political support' under Ayub's Basic Democracies schema.[348] As General Ayub's Minister of Democracies, Bhutto helped prepare the ground for Ayub's first election, through an incontrovertible referendum where some seventy–five thousand Basic Democrats would express their support for the political leadership of General Ayub Khan.

Bhutto had benefitted significantly by deliberately aligning with General Ayub's in his initial ascent. It was he who had suggested Ayub elevate himself to the rank of 'Field Marshal' from General 'since it was essential for him to be head and shoulders above the others'.[349] Ayub then went on to appoint Bhutto in charge of the ministries of Information and Broadcasting, Village Aid, Basic Democracies, Tourism and Minorities. In 1960 he gave him the additional ministries of Kashmir Affairs, Fuel, Power and Natural Resources and made him the Head of Projects Division. When he came to power himself nearly a decade later Bhutto continued to demonstrate this penchant for concentrating power into his own hands.

Coming at the back of the humiliating debacle of the 1971 war, Bhutto was lauded for his seemingly indefatigable energy and drive that would help Pakistan survive the existential crisis it faced with the severance of its Eastern wing. Without

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[347] Burki, *Pakistan Under Bhutto 1971-1977*, 6.
[348] Wolpert, *Zulfi Bhutto of Pakistan: His Life and Times*, 92.
[349] Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, "White Paper: The Performance of the Bhutto Regime, Volume. I, Mr. Z. A. Bhutto, His Family and Associates" (Islamabad, 1979).

prior experience at the helm of a leading administration, Bhutto ran a one-man government as President, Chief Martial Law administrator, Foreign Minister, Interior Minister and Minister for Inter-Provincial Coordination – rapidly taking an iron hold on the reins of power. [350] He preferred to retain the arbitrary advantage of the CMLA position instead of traversing the vagaries of the slower democratic processes. He also issued orders and pronouncements covering a wide range of issues such as the seizure of the passports of the country's leading industrialists and their families, rescindment of industrial sanctions granted during the Yahya government, and the stoppage of foreign travel. However, it was his sponsorship of discretionary para-military and intelligence organisations set up to monitor his political opponents, ambitious military officials and even members of his own party, that would serve as a portend of his 'relentless scrutiny' and dubious commitment to democratic process. [351]

Initially Bhutto's took substantive measures to cut the military down to size and purged the army's top ranks. According to an estimate, a total of 43 senior military officers were relieved of their service in the first four months of Bhutto's rule.[352] He demanded to be present during the army's internal promotion boards and suggested the screening and surveillance of military personnel by members of the civilian police force. On another occasion, Bhutto attempted to utilize support from the army and air force to break up strikes by the police force in Peshawar city. The refusal of the two service chiefs to countenance Bhutto's circumvention of the military's established chain of command in this regard served as a catalyst to their forced resignations.

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[350] Taseer, *Bhutto: A Political Biography*, 130.
[351] Taseer 131.
[352] Taseer, 213.

Bhutto also attempted to restructure the military high command. Designations of the three Service Chiefs were changed from Commander-in-Chief to the Chief of Staff. The Service chiefs were put under the command of a new permanent position, the Chairman Joint Chief of Staff Committee (JCSC). The President was to assume the role of Commander-in-Chief. Ultimate authority under the new defence and security arrangements was to be vested with the Prime Minister, a post Bhutto assumed himself after the promulgation of the 1973 Constitution, which also incorporated special provisions to restrict the role of the military in state affairs. The Cabinet and the Defence Committee of the Cabinet (DCC) were to assist the Prime Minister in the formulation of the national defence and strategic policy. Its implementation would be ensured by the Defence Council, headed by the Defence Minister as well as the JCSC, three Service Chiefs, and Service Headquarters.[353]

To his credit, Bhutto successfully implemented the framing of a new constitution within a year of assuming power by working pragmatically with opposition parties. The 1973 Constitution reintroduced a parliamentary system of government, specifying a federal system with provisions for provincial autonomy, an emphasis on adult franchise, and guarantee of fundamental rights, independent judiciary, and support for representative politics. It also provided constitutional safeguards ensure the primacy of civilian institutions of the state.

In an attempt to restrict the military's scope of political influence, the constitution clearly specified its main functions for the very first time. Article 245 stipulated that the military's primary purpose was to 'defend Pakistan against external aggression or threat of war, and subject to the law, act in aid of civil power when called upon to do so'thereby placing the military under the aegis of the civil federal

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[353] Taseer, 214.

government. [354] Constitutional safeguards to protect the sanctity of civilian institutions included a definition of high treason as any attempt or conspiracy to abrogate or subvert the constitution 'by use of force or show of force or by any other unconstitutional means'[355] punishable by death or life imprisonment. Additionally, the constitution also laid down an oath for all military personnel specifically precluding them from involvement in any political activities whatsoever.

To reduce dependency on the military in matters of internal security, the Bhutto government expanded and strengthened the police force, streamlined existing intelligence apparatus and created two new intelligence outfits – the Federal Intelligence Agency (FIA) and the elite Federal Security Force (FSF). The FSF was allegedly created as a well-equipped task force under federal control to assist the police in maintaining law and order. Another organization called the People's Guards – a PPP organization resembling a private militia – together with the FSF caused much antagonism within the ranks of the conventional military due to Bhutto's discretionary utilisation. His arbitrary use of law enforcement eventually resulted in the rapid conflagration of opposition to Bhutto's regime.

In the foreign policy arena the Bhutto administration provided a lifeline for a psychologically dejected and internationally isolated Pakistan. The amputation of East Pakistan had not only exacerbated the state's already acute sense of strategic vulnerability, the military's brutal crackdown on Bengali separatism also garnered its widespread condemnation in international media. Moreover, the very limited and belated support that came from China during the 1971 war, in both military and economic terms, reflected the changing configuration of international diplomacy and

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[354] *The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan*, 1973 Article 6 (1 &2).
[355]*Constitution of Pakistan*, Article 6 (3).

its dire implications for Pakistan's national security concerns. In these circumstances, Bhutto used the benefit of his prior experience as foreign minister in Ayub's cabinet, to affect a fundamental reorientation of Pakistan's foreign policy.

Bhutto managed to extract astonishing concessions from victorious India after the peace talks in 1972. In the Simla Accords with Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, Bhutto managed to secure 5,139 square miles of occupied Pakistani territory from Indian possession, mutual agreement to resume trade and communications between the two countries, convert the ceasefire line in Kashmir as the official Line of Control (LOC), and importantly resolve to settle differences 'by peaceful means through bilateral negotiations.'[356] In 1974, after formally recognizing Bangladesh as a sovereign entity, he also managed to secure the release of the 93,000 Pakistani POWs. The fact that he did so without acceding to Indian demands of accepting status quo in Kashmir as a formal solution to the dispute spoke volumes about his diplomatic skills.

At the same time, Bhutto also decided to embark on a bold strategy based on the principle of non-alignment. This fundamental reorientation of Pakistan's foreign policy implied a reduction in Pakistan's military and economic dependence on Western allies, particularly the United States – leaving the British Commonwealth and SEATO in 1972, and drawing closer links with the Islamic world including the Middle East and Iran. By hosting the Islamic Summit in Lahore in 1974, and standing on the same platform as leading figures of the Muslim world, including Yasser Arafat, Colonel Gaddafi of Libya, King Faisal of Saudi Arabia, Presidents Assad of Syria, Sadat of Egypt, and Boumedienne of Algeria, Bhutto reclaimed not only some desperately needed national pride but also significant economic support for Pakistan.

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[356] Ministry of External Affairs '*The Simla Agreement, July, 02 1972*', Government of India. Retrieved September 12, 2017 from https://mea.gov.in/in-focus-article.htm?19005/Simla+Agreement+July+2+1972

Financial support, particularly from Saudi Arabia and Libya, were essential for Bhutto's ultimate goal of securing nuclear deterrence for Pakistan. The completion of the magnificent Karakorum Highway in 1978 epitomized the strategic value of Sino-Pakistan cooperation and connected Pakistan's Northern Areas with the Chinese Xinjiang province via direct road link.

However, Bhutto's considerable foreign policy achievements were eclipsed by fatal domestic failures. He compromised the democratic spirit of the very constitution he had sanctioned by abdicating the constitutionally weak position of President and assuming the all-powerful office of Prime Minister for himself. Since his party the PPP dominated the National Assembly, it also arbitrarily ignored constitutional stipulations regarding dissolution of the National Assembly and holding of new elections after the promulgation of the constitution. Being educated in the harsh school of 'wadera' politics and Ayub Khan's 'democracy', Taseer posits that Bhutto's respect for democratic norms was shifting and cynical.[357]

Bhutto's increasingly autocratic tendencies manifested themselves in his sponsorship of significant amendments to the constitution between 1975 and 1976, limiting the recourse of political opposition parties to judicial redress. For instance, the third amendment extended the period of preventative detention from one to three months and the fourth amendment restricted the power of the High Courts to grant pre-arrest or post-arrest bail should the government invoke preventative detention laws. The fifth and sixth amendments constrained the independence of the superior judiciary by enabling the government to change the Chief Justices of High Courts at its discretion and retain the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court in office even beyond the age of retirement.

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[357] Taseer, *Bhutto: A Political Biography*, 119.

Bhutto's inadvertent contribution towards the reassertion of the praetorianism was ultimately both far-reaching and pervasive despite his initial attempts to contain the military's influence. After calling in the army to quell language riots and labour disturbances in Sindh in 1972, he authorised a military operation in Baluchistan in 1973. The dismissal of the elected Baluchistan government of the National Awami Party (NAP) under the accusation of a planned revolt against the federal government led to an imposition of direct federal rule over the province. Bhutto's reaction to the armed tribal insurgency that broke out in protest was to send in a large deployment (approximately 80,000) army troops. This military operation ended up tying down Pakistani troops in Baluchistan until the next military coup in 1977. When the NAP-JUI coalition cabinet in the North West Frontier Province also resigned in protest. Bhutto ruthlessly punished the political opposition, taking the main NAP leadership into custody, charging them with treason, and bringing them to trial. Tellingly during 1972-77 period the Bhutto regime resorted to the army's help in the domestic security on seven different occasions.[358]

Around the same time, Sardar Daoud's new government across the border in Afghanistan reignited the *Pashtunistan* issue by declaring its support for the NAP cause and providing sanctuary to the Baluch rebels. The seizure of large quantities of arms and ammunition, communications equipment as well as anti-Pakistan propaganda literature in NWFP and Baluchistan between 1973-74 by Pakistani law-enforcement agencies further fuelled Bhutto's fear of secessionist movements in the provinces. In what was to become a lingering issue for subsequent governments as well, support for Baluch nationalists seemed to come from several foreign sources

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[358] Naseerullah Babar interview.

particularly the Soviet Union, India, and even Iraq as part of its on-going campaign against Iran according to the Pakistani intelligence agencies.[359]

Concurrently Bhutto also attempted to secure the military's support for implementing of his strategic ambitions – both internal and external. He allocated a significant portion of the country's resources to the expansion and modernization of defence capabilities. According to an estimate, between 1970 and 1977 Pakistan's defence expenditure rose by more than 200 per cent.[360] Employing his significant diplomatic skill, Bhutto secured further support from the United States and China for actual military hardware as well as increasing indigenous defence production capabilities, setting up new and modernizing existing ordinance and ammunition factories. He also authorised an increase in the pay, allowances, and other benefits for both commissioned and non-commissioned ranks of the military. Thus, a significant portion of Pakistan's GNP, rose from an average of 5% in 1968-71 to 6.6% in 1973-74, with a further increase in military allocations by 14.5% in 1977.[361] With his pervasive antipathy towards India never far behind, Bhutto also championed the cause of nuclear deterrence and inaugurated the Karachi Nuclear Power Plant (KANUPP-1) towards the end of 1972.

Much like the country's military rulers before him, Bhutto's increasing personalisation of authority and extension of differential patronage in return for political support began to trigger factionalism within the ranks of the ruling party and growing resentment amongst opposition groups. Having been schooled by his father to recognise the advantages of patronage-based politics as a young Sindhi feudal, Bhutto soon turned to these familiar tools to consolidate power. He began by

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[359] Interview with Lieutenant General Ali Jan Aurakzai, Governor Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (2006-2008), Islamabad, 25 December 2010.
[360] Talbot, *Pakistan: A Modern History*, 223.
[361] Shah, *The Army and Democracy: Military Politics in Pakistan*, 126.

attempting to assert personal control over the bureaucracy by abolishing the well-established framework of the Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP) in 1973 and introducing a linear all-Pakistan grading structure. He was advised against any drastic reforms by Qamar ul Islam, president of CSP's central association, who argued against divesting its apolitical nature, 'suggesting that the efficient working of the new economic order was contingent on the maintenance by the state of a politically independent bureaucratic system.'[362]

Determined not to tolerate any bureaucratic challenges to his administrative reforms, Bhutto dismissed Islam and moved the Planning Commission to become a *division* of the Ministry of Finance, thereby politicising what was once an effective administrative mechanism. He then used this new system to centralize decision-making by distributing political appointments, starting with his Minister of Finance Mubashir Hasan, creating special posts and arbitrarily recruiting civil servants according to personal discretion. According to Burki 'some of these changes suited his political purpose, some appealed to his temperament. Accordingly he went along with them.'[363] However, with one sweep this act took away both the ability of the bureaucracy to exert administrative control and thereby the support it could provide to the central government to consolidate power over the peripheries, thus proving entirely counterproductive.

His actions in the political arena followed a similar pattern. Failure to convert a broad-based coalition movement into well-organised political machinery was apparent in his preference of personal loyalties over meritocratic institutional appointments. The re-entry of the landed gentry and tribal elders, the rural notables of

[362] Burki, *Pakistan Under Bhutto 1971-1977*, 113.
[363] Burki.

yore, into the party alienated party workers hitherto devoted to working towards establishing an effective organisational network. His selection of candidates to represent PPP in the 1977 elections included a wide selection of old landed families: the Noons and Tiwanas of Sargodha, the Maliks of Mianwali, the Qureshis of Multan, the Hayats of Rawalpindi and Campbellpur, the Legharis and Mazaris of Dera Ghazi Khan.[364] By 1976 Bhutto's party decision-making had become so centralized, he personally selected the higher office-bearers of the PPP including members of his secretariat, and even district level officials and below. The allocation of much sought-after party tickets became a point of contention within different sections of the PPP. Having extended its influence into the rural areas via support from the landed gentry and tribal elders, the ruling party was therefore directly affected by their traditional *biradari* rivalries. Such blatant clientalism cut against the grain of the PPP's populist appeal and exacerbated factional divisions within the Bhutto administration.

The cacophony of political opposition against Bhutto reached a crescendo in 1977 with the formation of the nine-party Pakistan National Alliance (PNA). In a display of remarkable oversight, Bhutto misjudged the level of resentment his autocratic style of governance had generated and announced the next general elections a year ahead of time in January 1977. Such a formidable opposition block, comprising a broad spectrum of political orientations, caught the still buoyant Bhutto by surprise. Having anticipated an easy victory over a scattered opposition, the Prime Minister now had to reckon with huge, enthusiastic crowds gathering for the PNA public meetings. The rural peasants having bought into the promised *roti*, *kapra* and *makaan* (food, clothing, and shelter) by Bhutto's initial populist rhetoric felt cheated by the entry of the controlling landed notables back into the fray of power. The Urdu-

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[364] Burki.

speaking *Muhajir* community in Sindh resented PPP's blatant patronage of ethnic Sindhi communities by the introduction of the quota system in both education and federal employment, as well as nationalization of large industrial houses owned by the *muhajir* (immigrants) community. Bhutto's nationalization policies had antagonized thousands of small business owners and his nationalization of private schools and colleges had undermined the credibility of the most competitive institutions of the education sector. Labour unions, having been empowered by Bhutto government's early reforms, were also soon subjected to discipline by the army.

Rising popular agitation against the Bhutto regime fed into the PNA movement's growing popularity with the masses – exacerbated by the regime's intensive use of propaganda and government agencies for political intimidation. Thus, when the PPP gained a landslide victory (winning 155 seats out of 200) in the 1977 polls, allegations of widespread rigging took root. Even though Bhutto's PPP was expected to win comfortably in the elections, the sheer magnitude of their victory shocked and inflamed the opposition parties. The PNA responded by calling for nationwide strikes, demonstrations and anti-government agitations leading to heavy crackdown by the government forces. Bhutto's recourse to the FSF and police force to contain the agitation led to a large number of civilian casualties (between 250 and 296 dead) and thousands wounded and arrested within the first two months (April and May 1977). [365]

Growing desperate with the increasing momentum of the PNA mass movement and the simultaneous erosion of his political influence, he eventually fell back on military support for the maintenance of law and order and to salvage the last vestiges of his rule. During this period his frequent meetings with the military's top

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[365] Khan, *Generals in Politics: Pakistan 1958-1982*, 122-123.

brass to discuss the country's internal situation facilitated a re-politicisation of the military high command. Bhutto's decision to impose Martial Law on 22 April 1977 in five different cities thereafter marked another turning point. By justifying the imposition of martial law through a constitutional amendment made without consulting the CJCS, Bhutto effectively relinquished state authority into the hands of the military high command. His confidence in being able to wrest control back from the military once the political crisis was resolved also proved to be fatally misplaced.

Having thus extended differential patronage towards the military brass, Bhutto unwittingly struck the death knell for his regime. He had personally nominated General Tikka Khan (labelled the *Butcher of Bengal* for his role in massacres of Bengali civilians in East Pakistan) as Army Chief from 1972-76 and handed him the position of Defence Minister upon retirement as reward for his deferential service. Not only did this set the dangerous precedent of exempting members of the military top brass from accountability for their actions whilst in uniform, Tikka's elevation to office based on Bhutto's personal discretion undermined the merit-oriented criterion of higher level military promotions.

Nordlinger attributes powerful interventionist motives to such civilian infringements upon military autonomy.[366] Perlmutter also indicates the implications of such civilian interference for military's professional conduct: 'When army affairs have become intertwined with politics, appointments and promotions are made on the basis of the officer's political affiliations rather than on his professional qualifications. In order to advance in the military hierarchy, an officer is obliged to establish political alliances with civilian superiors.'[367] Thus, Bhutto repeated the gesture the second time

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[366] Nordlinger, *Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Governments*, 47.
[367] Perlmutter, "The Praetorian State and the Praetorian Army: Toward a Taxonomy of Civil-Military Relations in Developing Polities", 103.

for an apparently apolitical and servile General Zia ul Haq, superseding half a dozen more senior and qualified officers with his promotion to Army Chief in March 1976, without an appreciation of its possible repercussions.

One way of considering the recurrent crises in Pakistan's history would be to view it as a clash of various interest groups vying for a foothold in the new political and economic space. Burki marks the 1948-53 period as being characterised by the domination of urban professional classes achieved through institutional channels such as quasi-modern political party, trade and industrial associations, family-run business houses and financial institutions. Due to their shaky representative credentials, once the groups excluded from power under the previous framework found an opportunity to reassert their influence, it caused yet another crisis in the country's body politic. This could be seen post-1953 when the powerful section of the 'landed aristocracy that had been excluded from the political and economic arenas returned to challenge the monopoly of the urban professionals'. [368]

Bhutto epitomised such socio-political aberrations in the way he personalised statecraft. His feudal background and origins from a backward Sindhi region, combined with the experience of an uninstitutionalised role played by the Sindhi rural middle class may have taint his professed commitment to democracy. The decline of the multiparty system before and after Bhutto's rise to power was therefore both stark and paradoxical. During the 1970 elections twelve major political parties had fielded candidates for seats allocated to West Pakistan. Under Bhutto in 1977 only three major groupings made it to the electoral field. In 1970 the electorate could choose between four serious candidates, whereas in 1977 it was a contest essentially between two parties – Bhutto's PPP and its rival PNA.

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[368] Burki, *Pakistan Under Bhutto 1971-1977*, 34.

The deepening political crisis and accompanying divisions within the army over the credibility of the Bhutto regime provided the Army Chief General Zia-ul-Haq with the ideal pretext to justify the impending military take-over. Demonstrating a manifest continuity with previous military coups, 'the events that led to the clamp-down by Zia only vindicate the army's old argument – that Pakistan's politicians are unable to rule without the help of the armed forces.'[369] On 5 July 1977, in a classic *coup d'état,* General Zia ul Haq, Chief of the Army Staff assumed power and took over as Pakistan's fourth Chief Martial Law Administer (CMLA).

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[369] Zafar Abbas, 'Night of the Generals,' *The Herald*, July 1989.

Chapter 4

Islamisation and the Afghan Jihad (1978-1988)

No analysis of Pakistani history is complete without a basic understanding of the formative decade of praetorian consolidation under General Zia ul Haq. Not only did this decade render a decisive entrenchment of a praetorian military system under an ideological premise, it also accentuated the institutionalisation of religio-political patronage within the state – building on the concept of increasing returns in both these aspects. General Zia demonstrated discernible political continuities with his civilian predecessors, but went a step further by bringing religious parties into the fold of state patronage. During Zia's rule the relationship between the Pakistani army, particularly through its intelligence wing – the ISI – and militant Islamists crystalized. Thus, the significance of the Zia decade lay in its deep-seated impact on the state by institutionalising the political role of the military and codifying the use of religious ideology within its body politic.

This chapter analyses the emergence and spread of Islamism as a derived function of the praetorian state, what Huntington terms as 'subjective civilian control,' i.e., maximizing of the power of some particular civilian group or groups, in this case Islamists, whereby subjective civilian control achieves its end by civilianising the military, making them mirrors of the state.[370] Despite the idea that 'military profession exists to serve the state' and that it must serve only as 'an effective instrument of state policy' there may be to instances where 'considerations of strategy must then give way to the considerations of policy.'[371] This overlap between strategy and policy was exemplified in Pakistan during the Soviet-Afghan

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[370] Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: Theory and Politics of Civil Military Relations*, 83.
[371] Huntington.

war, where the deployment of Islamism served as a strategic instrument of foreign policy. The Islamic rationale presented by military regimes, particularly that of General Zia ul Haq, is therefore posited as an ideologically motivated extension of the public rationale of praetorianism.

Arguing that Zia 'played the role of a facilitator rather than a perpetrator' and that a fatal combination of Bhutto's failure to effectively cultivate the middle classes as a political constituency and large-scale public disillusionment with the reorientation of the economic priorities of his government, Burki argues thst Bhutto made military intervention inevitable.[372] He in fact posits that Zia did not harbour political ambitions prior to the coup and was compelled to act in response to a consensus amongst the military high command that the army was on the verge of mutiny.[373] His *coup d'état* was therefore motivated by pressure from the military top brass 'more as an operation to restore political calm than as a scheme to install a new political system in the country'.[374] In saying so, Burki echoes a rationale for praetorian intervention that still dominates much of the military discourse in Pakistan. Thus whilst this exoneration of Zia may be arguable, his ability to launch a successful coup and then remain in power for the nearly a decade was augmented by critical political and economic failures of the Bhutto regime.

The other formative feature of the Zia decade – his experiment with Islamization – can also be seen as being facilitated by the failure of Bhutto's *Islamic Socialism*. Whilst the demise of Bhutto's brand of populism may not account for the all-encompassing nature of Zia's Islamization programme, the rise of leftist politics particularly amongst the middle class and their subsequent disillusionment with his

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[372] Burki, *Pakistan Under Bhutto 1971-1977*, 217.
[373] Lawrence Ziring, *Pakistan: The Enigma of Political Development* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1980), 198.
[374] Burki, *Pakistan Under Bhutto 1971-1977*, 208.

regime may explain their turn towards activist religio-political parties such as the *Jamaat-i-Islami*. This claim is also borne out by White's exhaustive analysis of Islamist politics in the Frontier province.[375] White traces the entry of religious parties formally into the political fold with the electoral victory of leftist Deobandi leader Mufti Mahmud of the JUI. Winning the hotly contested National Assembly seat from Dera Ismail Khan against Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto in 1970, Mahmud's political stature amongst JUI *ulama* paid off by compelling Bhutto to broker a Tripartite Agreement between himself, Mahmud and Wali Khan (son of the Red Shirt movement leader Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan). Even though the joint JUI-NAP government did not last more than ten months, the fact that Mufti Mahmud had gained entry into the political sphere in the powerful position of Chief Minister of the province set the tone of JUI politics for the next three decades – including the propagation of increasingly sweeping and stringent Islamist legislations.

Shapiro and Fair provide further insights into the support derived by the militant Islamism from the public sphere in Pakistan. One of their key empirical findings states that the support for small militant organisations amongst urban Pakistanis occurs in response to perceived strategic environment i.e. when organisations use violence in support of political goals that individuals care about, and when the violence makes sense as a way to achieve these goals given an individuals understanding of the strategic environment.[376] Shapiro and Fair conclude that underlying political considerations seem to be driving support for militant groups in Pakistan. This finding is borne out by the strategic utilization of religio-political activism by the country's leading political parties as well as its military rulers.

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[375] Joshua T. White, *Pakistan's Islamist Frontier: Islamic Politics and U.S. Policy in Pakistan's North West Frontier Province* (Arlington: Center on Faith & International Affairs, 2008).
[376] Jacob Shapiro and Christine Fair, "Understanding Support for Islamist Militancy in Pakistan," *International Security* 34, no. 3 (2010), 83.

General Zia-ul-Haq, in particular, epitomised this deployment of Islamist forces in his decade-long quest for political supremacy. Under Zia, Islamism, and with it Islamist extremism, moved from the fringes of national life into the mainstream. Not only did this facilitate the formative politicisation of religion in the country's body politic, it also contributed towards the reconceptualisation of national and foreign policy in Pakistan with a decidedly religious tilt. This was especially pertinent in re-framing the Kashmir conflict along communal lines.

This chapter analyses the formative intensification of praetorian influence on the country's foreign and strategic policy under Zia, particularly in the deployment of militant Islamism for its implementation. In this context, there may exist some overlaps with a considerable body of scholarly literature on Islamisation in Pakistan. The original contribution of this chapter however lies in the use of insights gained from primary sources, particularly oral histories, which remained thus far untapped. By combining one-on-one interviews with key military leaders, particularly various directors general of Pakistan's intelligence agencies, as well as ex-Army Chiefs and decades worth of dusty newspaper archives in Pakistan, this chapter aims to add depth to the analysis of praetorianism in Pakistan and its dichotomous relationship with militant Islamism. Whilst subsequent chapters entail a broader examination of the military's evolving relationship with militant Islamism, this chapter looks specifically at the political consolidation of praetorianism under General Zia, including attempted civilianization of his rule, and the quest to secure domestic and international legitimacy for an undemocratic, military regime by deploying Islamism into most areas of statecraft.

Consolidating the Praetorian Military System

When Zia came to power in July 1977, his coup was unremarkable in its originality. Like the 1958 and 1969 coups, it was as nonviolent as it was unconstitutional. He too emphasised his lack of political ambition by reiterating how his hand was forced to save the country from destruction. He even went to the extent of assuring Bhutto: 'in ninety days I will hold new elections. You will be elected Prime Minister again, of course, Sir, and I will be saluting you'.[377]

Like previous military rulers, Zia projected himself as a reluctant ruler, forced into drastic, unsavoury, and undemocratic action to save the country from imploding. In doing so, he epitomised what Nordlinger refers to as the praetorian's 'basic public rationale' – a crucial mission that transcends their obligations to existing authorities. This is where 'coups are justified by charging the former civilian incumbents with a shorter or longer list of performance failures,' and where 'civilian incumbents are commonly accused of having acted contrary to the national interest by allowing subversive groups to threaten the country's internal security.'[378]

Assuming executive power as a serving Chief of Army Staff, General Zia immediately imposed Martial Law across the country, appointed himself Chief Martial Law Administrator, dissolved federal and provincial legislatures, and placed Prime Minister Bhutto, cabinet members, and leading opposition leaders under what he called protective custody. Being acutely mindful of Ayub's problems in justifying the legality of his rule, he suspended the constitution without abrogating it, thus officially retaining its basic political framework. This bizarrely meant that the

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[377] Wolpert, *Zulfi Bhutto of Pakistan: His Life and Times*, 302.
[378] Nordlinger, *Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Governments*, 20.

Supreme Court was allowed to function even as the constitution that gave it authority was held in abeyance.

In a throwback to the arbitrary behaviour of Pakistan's senior judiciary during Governor General Ghulam Mohammad's dissolution of the National Assembly in 1954, the Supreme Court again provided legal cover for Zia by invoking the 'Doctrine of Necessity'granting emergency powers to the CMLA. [379] In doing so, not only was the Supreme Court complicit in undermining civilian authority by rendering Martial Law superior to the country's constitution, it also gave Zia additional powers to make constitutional amendments at his discretion.

Since the biggest challenge to his regime arose from a fundamental lack of legitimacy, Zia articulated a precursor to his strategy for staying in power in his inaugural address to the nation on 5 July 1977: 'Pakistan, which was created in the name of Islam, will continue to survive only if it sticks to Islam. That is why I consider the introduction of Islamic system as an essential prerequisite for the country.'[380] A few years later he used a similar pretext to justify the military's continued role in national politics, by essentially re-working the original ideological rationale for Pakistan. He went on to say that the armed forces were responsible not only for safeguarding the country's territorial integrity, but also its ideological frontiers and Islamic character.[381]

Zia's carefully considered formula for the entrenchment and extension of his rule was the application of an all-pervasive Islamisation programme. In his quest to attain socio-political legitimacy, he questioned the ideological compatibility of

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[379] Leslie Wolf-Phillips, "Constitutional Legitimacy: A Study of the Doctrine of Necessity," *Third World Quarterly* 1, no. 4 (1979).
[380] General Zia Ul Haq, Inaugural Address to the Nation, July 5, 1977. Retrieved February 2, 2017, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0izmvN_rTH0 at 14.10 minutes.
[381] Amir Mir, "Coup de Grâce," *The Herald* (Karachi, May 2004).

Islamic values with democratic norms: 'if, in the pursuit of Islamisation, democratic values had to be abandoned, the people of Pakistan had a duty to offer this sacrifice.'[382] Islamisation was the catchall term applied to the measures with which he chose to legitimise his rule, banish political opposition, ensure the absolute personalisation of state power within his office and counter popular dissent.

Formally his Islamisation programme covered the areas of economic, educational, and judicial reform and introduction of the parallel *Shari'a* (Islamic penal code) system in Pakistan. Due to the questionable legality of his coup, under which he could have been considered culpable for treason under Article 6 of the 1973 constitution, Zia's most urgent focus was on overhauling the country's superior judiciary and constitutional framework. The Islamisation of courts thus had to be undertaken as a matter of urgency in order to codify new laws coming into the statute books.

Initially, Zia reconstituted the Council of Islamic Ideology, charging it with advising the government on matters related to Islamisation. Subsequently, he decided to overhaul the national judicial structure by issuing a Provisional Constitutional Order (PCO) under which Pakistan's higher judiciary including all judges of the four Provincial High Courts and the Supreme Court were required to take a fresh oath of office, affirming their loyalty to the new constitutional order and by inference to General Zia's regime. Consequently, a number of constitutional challenges to Zia's rule pending before the Supreme Court were annulled. Article 15 of the PCO clearly stated:

> all presidential orders of the CMLA, including other orders amending the (1973) constitution made by the president or by the CMLA, martial law regulations, martial law orders and all other orders made on or after the 5th

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[382] A Rahman, "Zia Ul Haq: Master of Illusion," *The Herald* (Karachi, September 1995).

day of July 1977 are hereby declared, notwithstanding any judgment of any court, to have been validly made by competent authority and shall not be called in question in any court on any ground whatsoever.[383]

That the PCO also outlawed political parties, with the exception of the *Jamaat-i-Islami*, and allowed political activity to resume only at the President's discretion raised a public outcry amongst lawyers, journalists and political parties. The Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD) therefore emerged in 1981 as a leftist political alliance, dominated by the PPP, demanding the withdrawal of martial law, restoration of an independent judiciary, and civil, and political rights. It underscored a major challenge for Zia's regime – that of its dubious legitimacy.

Fearing a popular resurgence of the PPP, especially following the widespread condemnation of Bhutto's dubious trial and execution, Zia made his own contingency plans. He augmented Ayubian scepticism about the unsuitability of Western-style democracy to the Pakistani psyche, by reverting to his mantra of Islam and claimed that 'Islam did not believe in the rule of majority and therefore if the majority made a wrong decision, it could be turned down. Only a 'correct' decision needed to be honoured in Islam even if was supported by a minority.'[384]

Zia's formula for legitimizing his military dictatorship therefore was based on two central tenets: consolidation of his military rule and its Islamic justification. Accordingly despite of his initial announcement in August 1983 to hold elections and transfer power to elected representatives within two years General Zia declared his intention to continue as President the following year. By October he added another caveat to his prescribed political process, stating that instead of transferring power to elected representatives he was willing to *share* it with them provided they could

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[383] Provisional Constitutional Order, Chief Martial Law Administrator's Order No. 1 of 1981 (Pak.), reprinted in *Constitution of Pakistan* (Lahore: PLD Publishers, 1981), 183-91.
[384] Askari-Rizvi, *Military State and Society in Pakistan*, 169.

assure him that the 'present process of Islamisation would continue.'[385] In December 1984 he attempted to justify his decision to continue as President for a further five-year period even after national elections by issuing a cleverly worded referendum. Instead of seeking a vote of confidence for himself, Zia's phraseology stipulated a validation of his Islamisation programme as a prelude to the controlled transfer of power:

> Whether the people of Pakistan endorse the process initiated by General Mohammad Zia ul Haq, the President of Pakistan, to bring in laws of Pakistan in conformity with the injunctions of Islam as laid down in the Holy Quran and Sunnah of the Holy Prophet (Peace Be Upon Him) and for the preservation of the ideology of Pakistan, for the continuation and consolidation of that process for the smooth and orderly transfer of power to the elected representatives of the people.[386]

The choice of words used in the referendum deliberately made it difficult to oppose since it would put into question the very *raison d'être*, the Islamic rationale, behind Pakistan's creation. The result of the referendum thereafter was as predictable as it was undemocratic, showing a staggering 97.7 per cent votes in its favour.[387] Thus assured, Zia then scheduled the controlled elections to the National and Provincial Assemblies to be held in February 1985.

Even so, intense regulation of the election campaign included an introduction of new electoral rules such as prohibiting the use of loudspeakers, public meetings, or processions as well as the exclusion of political parties from the electoral process. The resulting *party-less* elections effectively prevented the inclusion of a potentially formidable, elected MRD coalition from the parliamentary process. All was justified in the name of creating a supposedly egalitarian, Islamic system capable of withstanding the vagaries and uncertainties of democratic politics. The arbitrary

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[385] General Zia Ul Haq Interview, *Dawn*, October 24, 1984
[386] AP, "A Leaf from History: Zia's Referendum," *Dawn*, August 2, 2015.
[387] Askari-Rizvi, *The Military and Politics in Pakistan: 1947-1997*, 261.

nature of these elections, besides providing an easy path for the JI (the party most closely affiliated with the regime), also facilitated the re-entry of those anachronisms of socio-political patronage from past political legacies – the traditional rural/feudal landed elite – back into the political system.

Following in the footsteps of his predecessors Ghulam Mohammad, Ayub, and Bhutto, Zia recognised the benefits of brokering mutually expedient relationships with the dominant powerhouses of the rural landed gentry. By excluding representative political parties from the electoral process, Zia inadvertently facilitated the resurgence of traditional *biradari*, feudal and religious forces, back into the assemblies. Their lack of political commitment and dogged focus on safeguarding the existing system of agrarian relations to ensure personal, socio-economic predominance made them ideal collaborators for the military regime. In return for their political support, the civil and military bureaucracy ensured that no changes were made in the land tenure system to safeguard the existing system of agrarian relations and ensure status quo. The ensuing scramble for government ministries by rural elites included tribal and pseudo-religious leaders, such as the *pirs* and *sajjada nashins*, in a bid to add political influence to augment their social ascendancy in rural society. In some instances, the rural elite not only wielded religious influence, they also happened to be influential landlords, exploiting both advantages to ensure their electoral success. The composition of new assemblies after the party-less elections of 1985 therefore resembled

> an exclusive club of the country's landed gentry. The National Assembly, the four Provincial Assemblies, even the Senate, overwhelmingly dominated by landowning families: the Noons, Gilanis, Qureshis, Gardezis, Mazaris, Legharis, and Makhdooms of Punjab; The Soomros, Talpurs, Mirs, Pirs, Syeds and Khuhros from Sindh; the Khattaks, Hotis and Khans from the Frontier; the Jamalis and Jams from Baluchistan. Nearly 75 per cent of the 847 members of

these bodies are big landlords. Forty traditionally ruling families are now ruling the roost.[388]

Thus, there was a discernible continuity between Zia's entrenchment of existing patronage networks, particularly the reintroduction of landed families and religio-political groups into the fray of national politics, with that of past civilian and military governments. As General Ayub and Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto had found it useful to award political and economic privileges, in the form of ministries and agricultural settlements, to secure political allegiances, so did General Zia.

Despite fomenting such a controlled parliamentary composition, Zia aimed to rationalise the legal basis for his dictatorial rule by further mutilating the 1973 Constitution. The next stage of his civilianization process therefore began with the promulgation of a *Revival of the Constitution Order* (RCO) in March 1985. The RCO included the amendment or substitution of 57, addition of 6, and deletion of 2 articles of the 1973 Constitution. Essentially, the RCO retained a parliamentary system of government, but reversed Bhutto's elevation of the Prime Minister's office as the chief power-wielder of state authority. Under the infamous Eighth Amendment, clauses of the RCO swung back the balance of power decisively into the President's office, awarding him overarching discretionary powers that undermined the basic foundations of the 1973 Constitution and subverted the office of Prime Minister entirely to his will.

Under the RCO, the President was empowered to appoint and remove the Prime Minister, as well as the Army, Navy, and Air force service chiefs, Provincial Governors, Chief Justice, and judges of the Supreme Court, High Courts and Federal *Shariat* Courts. Another article (270-A) catered for the parliamentary validation of all presidential orders made by Zia, including martial law rules and regulations including

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[388] Mariam Mufti, "Divided They Rule," *The Herald* (Karachi, April 1985).

the judgments of the military courts. The most controversial aspect of the Eighth Amendment, the introduction of Article 58-2(b), gave the President overriding discretionary powers to dismiss the federal government and dissolve the National Assembly where he felt that 'a situation has arisen in which the Government of the Federation cannot be carried on in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution and an appeal to the electorate is necessary.'[389] In addition, Zia secured constitutional cover for his presidential referendum, and authorisation to retain the position of the Army Chief even after the official withdrawal of martial law. Despite having ushered in the new party-less Parliament in early March, Zia eventually only felt confident enough to lift martial law in December 1985, after guaranteeing his absolute authority.

In this way, Zia contributed decisively to the entrenchment of the praetorianism in Pakistan. The carefully phased process included an institutionalisation of the military's participatory role in national politics and the extension of economic and bureaucratic patronage to servicemen as well as ex-servicemen. Appeasement of the higher echelons of the military via extension of bureaucratic patronage had already begun in Bhutto's time with the award of the position of Defence Minister to ex-Army Chief General Tikka Khan post-retirement, and awarded diplomatic assignments in Austria and Spain to ex-Army Chief General Gul Hassan and ex-Air Chief Rahim Khan, respectively.

In addition, Zia's regime expanded the military's role within state administration and the economy. Military officers were offered top positions in civil administration, semi-government, and independent corporations. Diplomatic posts particularly those of Foreign Service and elite positions in the civil administration via the Central Superior Services (CSS) were also arbitrarily granted to military men. A

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[389] National Assembly, *Constitution of Pakistan* 1973, Article 58-2(b), Islamabad.

rapid expansion of the military's economic activities included the establishment of a military industrial complex comprising welfare organisations for ex-service men such as the Fauji Foundation (Army), Bahria Foundation (Navy), and Shaheen Foundation (Air Force). Heavily subsidized schools and medical care were set up for families of military personnel. Other material benefits provided to serving and retired officers included the allotment of agricultural, commercial, and private pieces of land at highly subsidized prices. Thus, budgetary allocations for the *defence* sector continued to escalate in the Zia era.

Such expansion of the military economy led authors such as Siddiqa to postulate that the Pakistani military invariably shaped the country's socio-political and economic due to corporate greed.[390] Siddiqa explores the scale and scope of the military industrial complex or *milbus,* as she calls it, and its formative impact on undermining civilian institutional development. She asserts that the military establishment derives political strength in large part due to its financial autonomy and the ability raise resources independently through profitmaking ventures, which reduces its dependence on the government and private sector. Whilst there is some merit in this argument, Siddiqa admits that it is the symbiotic relationship between the military and political power, the defacto role accorded to the military as arbitrator, which places it at the centre of negotiations between competing political interests or factions. She reiterates this as being the primary rationale for civilian politicians never seriously challenging the use of military force in politics.

The most notable legacy of the Zia era, however, was the fortification of an expedient relationship between the Pakistan Army and Islamist forces. Zia's blatant patronage of religio-political parties particularly the *Jamaat-i-Islami* and to a lesser

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[390] Siddiqa, *Military Inc.: Inside Pakistan's Military Economy*.

extent the *Jamiat-Ulema-i-Islam* played an important role in fomenting a façade of Islamic legitimacy for the military dictatorship. At the same time, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan soon after the military *coup d'état* proved fortuitous in garnering international acceptance of the military dictatorship. The sudden shift in US foreign policy and elevation of Pakistan as a frontline US ally in the Soviet-Afghan conflict played a major role in ensuring the longevity of Zia's rule by consolidating his Military-*Mullah* nexus.

With enormous funds suddenly flowing in from Saudi and US sources, the ISI also experienced a significant expansion of its internal and external operational capabilities during the Zia decade. Virtually exclusive control over the funds being channelled into the Afghan resistance, allowed the ISI to exercise discretion in the patronage of religio-political parties such as the JI and JUI as well as other radical, militant groups to fuel and man the Afghan *jihad*. The military's experience in organizing guerrilla force and the associated nexus of organizational links fostered with radical militant groups during the Afghan *jihad* contributed towards the regularisation of Pakistan's covert, often spontaneous, support for unconventional militant forces as an instrument of strategic policy going forward.

Ideology and the Praetorian System

Whilst General Zia ul Haq is widely seen as *the* architect of Pakistan's Islamist malaise thus there exists a discernible continuity in the use of the Islamic idiom throughout Pakistan's history. The use of Islamic ideology in the consolidation of the political regimes was not specific to military rulers, rather it embodied a continuity of sorts in the recourse to religion as a means of securing popular support in an intrinsically divided socio-political context. Indeed, the ideological ambiguity

underscoring Pakistan's nation-building processes from its very early years was more often than not plugged with the use of Islamic metaphor to obscure latent ethno-nationalistic fissures. Pakistani leadership, both military and civilian, thus invariably utilised the call to Islam to serve political interests, culminating with its most pervasive application in the Zia era.

The emergence of Islamist militancy as a function of the country's defence and strategic policy reflected an alternative methodology for exercising socio-political influence on both internal and external policy matters. The earliest signs of collusion between the military establishment and Islamist organisations, both political and militant, could be traced to General Yahya's regime. His intended strategy for national integration revolved around the adoption of an Islamic ideology to confer legitimacy upon military rule and ensure its predominance over the country's political system. During the country's first general elections in 1970, the military authorities distributed funds to election-related activities of Islamist parties through the civilian Intelligence Bureau (IB) to ensure the desired diversification of political forces. As a result, the JI spearheaded a campaign 'for the protection of the ideology of Pakistan,' with Islamist vigilantes 'violently confronting secular rivals on university campuses and trade unions… state and privately owned media were purged of leftists and secularists by the military authorities and replaced by JI cadres.'[391]

When civil disturbances broke out in East Pakistan after the elections, the strategic doctrine of 'defence of East Pakistan lies in West Pakistan' combined with logistical difficulties of combatting the rapidly escalating Bengali insurgency

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[391] Haqqani, *Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military*, 58.

compelled military authorities to look at other avenues of support.[392] The army thus turned to the pro-Pakistan Islamist groups, particularly JI, and its student wing, the *Islami Jamiat-i-Tulaba* (IJT), to join its counterinsurgency efforts in East Pakistan. The resultant army of *Jamaat-i-Islami* nominees primarily comprising a large number of IJT recruits and a paramilitary force of approximately 50,000 *razakaars* (volunteers) joined the military operation in May 1971. Two special Islamist brigades, *Al-Shams* and *Al-Badr,* symbolising the sun and crescent of Islamic revival in South Asia, and loosely linked with the JI later continued to carry out military operations in support of the Afghan resistance during the Soviet-Afghan war.[393]

What began in Yahya's time ostensibly as an expedient alliance between the military and Islamist forces evolved eventually into an enduring policy of patronising Islamist forces in the organization of both domestic and foreign affairs. Internally, General Zia entrusted the JI with the implementation of his Islamisation programme, including its pervasive introduction into the country's educational, judicial, political and economic systems as well as civil administration and bureaucracy. He insisted that an all-encompassing Islamisation programme was essential to Pakistan's survival, the 'importance of the Muslim *ummah* (universal community) and saw in its Pakistani realization the raison d'être of the state as well as the unity and strength of the nation.'[394] Finer's 'dogma of popular sovereignty,' through which the military 'can seize power and legitimize itself in the name of the sovereign people' by claiming to represent 'if not the actual observed will of the people, then its "real" will – what is in

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[392] Shafaat Ullah Shah, "Fall of East Pakistan Remembered," *Hilal* (Karachi, December 2014), http://hilal.gov.pk/index.php/layouts/item/487-fall-of-east-pakistan-remembered.
[393] Interview with Saleem Shahzad, Senior Investigative Journalist and Pakistan Bureau Chief of *Asia Times Online* (2010) and author of *Inside Al-Qaeda and the Taliban: Beyond Bin Laden and 9/11*, Islamabad, 22 December 2010.
[394] Lawrence Ziring, "Public Policy Dilemmas and Pakistan's Nationality Problem: The Legacy of Zia Ul Haq," *Asian Survey* 28, no. 8 (1998): 797.

its true interest, or what represents its higher morality,' manifested clearly in Zia's Islamisation project. [395]

Unholy Laws

For Islamists, Zia's reconstitution of the secular legal system guaranteed irrevocable traction within the country's institutional framework. Arguably one of the most enduring legacies of Islamisation under Zia, the amendments promulgated to the Blasphemy Law in the Pakistani Penal code (originally introduced in 1860 by the British Government), provided ideal cannon fodder for the forces of Islamist militancy in the years to come. Within the original secular blasphemy law in the British constitution, Section 295 provided protection to the places of worship of *all* classes and religions in the subcontinent thereby maintaining equality of all before the law.[396] In response to religious rioting in pre-partition India that law was extended in section 295-A (1927) to include 'deliberate and malicious acts intended to outrage religious feelings of any class by insulting its religion or religious beliefs.'[397]

Under General Zia, however, this important piece of legislation underwent a drastic metamorphosis through a series of Presidential Ordinances. The first of these in 1982 added section 295-B stipulating life imprisonment for anyone who 'wilfully defiles, damages or desecrates a copy of the Holy *Qur'an* or of an extract therefrom or uses it in any derogatory manner or for any unlawful purpose.'[398] The fact that the law applied only to the Quran and not scriptures or religious texts any other faiths served as a precursor to the increasing dominance of Islamist forces. Blasphemy against the

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[395] Finer, *The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics*, 208.
[396] '*Blasphemy Laws: Ending the Abuse of Blasphemy Laws,*' Pakistan Blasphemy Laws. Retrieved 22 January 2017, http://www.pakistanblasphemylaw.com/?page_id=15.
[397] 'Blasphemy Laws'.
[398] Pakistan Penal Code, Section 295-B. Retrieved 22 January 2017, http://www.pakistani.org/pakistan/legislation/1860/actXLVof1860.html.

Prophet Muhammad was added to the act in 1986 and further amended by the judgment of the Federal *Shariat* Court to include the death penalty. The wording of this addition also proved decisive for the institutionalisation of Islamist extremism: 'whoever by words, either spoken or written, or by visible representation or by any imputation, innuendo, or insinuation, directly or indirectly, defiles the sacred name of the Holy Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) shall be punished with death, or imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine.'[399] Additionally, for the first time a stipulation was added to the Pakistan Penal Code that only a Muslim Judge may hear the case under this section of the law.

The discriminatory nature of the amendments made to the Blasphemy Law did not simply marginalise the religious rights of minority groups. Rather, their broad applicability provided ample opportunity for Islamist groups to carry out rampant miscarriages of justice by settling social and political scores with each other as well as minority groups. The rise in victimization of the *Ahmadiyya*, Christian and Hindu communities, particularly at the hands of domestic militant groups post-Afghan *jihad* served as a direct manifestation of the blatant abuse of the arbitrary law. 'From 1984 to 2004, 5,000 cases of blasphemy were registered in Pakistan and 964 people were charged and accused of blasphemy; 479 Muslims, 340 *Ahmadis*, 119 Christians, 14 Hindus and 10 others. Thirty-two people charged with blasphemy had been killed extra-judicially. Eighty-six per cent of all the cases were reported in Punjab.'[400]

Zia's mutilation of the Pakistani legal system in appeasement of the radical Islamists also extended to the marginalization of women's rights under the notorious *Hudood* ordinances. As part of his Islamisation drive, Zia authorised the replacement

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[399] '*Of Offences Related to Religion: Use of derogatory remarks, etc. in respect of the Holy Prophet.*' Pakistan Penal Code, Section 295-C. Retrieved 22 January 2017, http://www.pakistani.org/pakistan/legislation/1860/actXLVof1860.html.
[400] 'Blasphemy Laws.'

of sections of the Pakistan Penal Code, particularly relating to sexual offences with the *Zina* (extramarital sex) and *Qazf* (false accusation of fornication) ordinances. Projected as bringing the country's legal system into 'conformity with the injunctions of Islam'new criminal offences relating to adultery and fornication, and new punishments of whipping, amputation, and stoning to death were added.[401] The law relating to *zina* was so heavily biased against women it was considered intrinsically misogynistic. It left victims widely susceptible to conviction of adultery/fornication even if they reported a case of rape, since their report would be treated as a confession. In addition, the judicial application of this law made it easier for the perpetrators to escape accountability for crimes such as honour killings and general degradation and humiliation of women in society.[402] The addition of this law served to legitimize the subjugation of woman as propagated by the religious clergy and as an instrument of control within the traditionally patriarchal Pakistani society.

> [T]hanks to the subjective interpretations of the Quran (almost exclusively by men), the preponderance of the misogynist mullahs and the regressive Shariah law in most "Muslim" countries, Islam is synonymously known as a promoter of misogyny in its worst form… we may draw a line between the Quranic texts and the corpus of avowedly misogynic writing and spoken words by the mullah having very little or no relevance to the Quran.[403]

With regards to the economy, the intended Islamisation process entailed a gradual elimination of interest-based banking and making the deduction of *zakat* (obligatory Islamic alms) from the deposit accounts of Muslims as compulsory. For the first time in Pakistani history, the government assumed the responsibility of collecting religious taxes through the issuance of the *zakat* and *usher* (tax levied on the yield of

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[401] The Offence of *Zina* (Enforcement Of *Hudood*) Ordinance No. VII of 9 February 1979. Retrieved 23 January 2017, http://www.pakistani.org/pakistan/legislation/zia_po_1979/ord7_1979.html.
[402] 'The Hudood Ordinances,' *Dawn*, 7 May 2011. Retrieved 23 January 2017, http://www.dawn.com/news/626858/the-hudood-ordinances.
[403] Taj Hashmi, 'Popular Islam and Misogyny: A Case Study of Bangladesh.' Retrieved 10 September 2016, https://gold.mukto-mona.com/Articles/taj_hashmi/Popular_Islam_and_Misogyn1.pdf.

agricultural land in cash or kind) ordinance in 1980. This resulted in the introduction of an elaborate system of provincial, district and village level *zakat* committees.

Ironically, the Zia regime ignored Quranic injunctions stipulating that *zakat* could not be used for mosques or education[404] and used this ordinance to extend differential financial sponsorship to its *madaris* of choice, as they were critical in establishing the credibility of Zia's Islamisation programme. [405] The *Darul Uloom Haqqania* of Akora Khattak, later held responsible for spawning notorious 'miscreants' such as the Pakistani *Taliban*, was amongst the 100 or so such Deobandi and *Jamaat-i-Islami madrassas* constituting the main support-base of the Afghan *jihad.* [406]

In the field of education, the Islamist policy outlined by Zia's regime in 1979 incorporated enticements such as the establishment of a National Committee for *Deeni Madaris* (religious seminaries) to incorporate *madaris* as an 'integral part of our educational system.'[407] By declaring the higher *sanad* (diploma) from *madaris* equivalent to a university degree, Zia's military government also paved the way for the entry of *madaris* graduates into government jobs. Islamisation in the education sector in particular therefore accorded a significant ideological role of the religious lobby. JI's student militia, the *Islami Jamiat Tulaba* (IJT), served as a veritable enforcement mechanism for Zia's ideological purge of the education and social sector

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[404] 'The alms are only for the poor and the needy, and those who collect them, and those whose hearts are to be reconciled, and to free the captives and the debtors, and for the cause of Allah, and (for) the wayfarers,' *The Quran*, 9:60 Translation of Muhammad Marmaduke Pickthal (Tahrike Tarsile Qur'an, 2001).

[405] Jamal Malik, *Colonialisation of Islam: Dissolution of Traditional Institutions in Pakistan* (Lahore: Vanguard Books, 1996).

[406] Interview with Colonel Samrez Salik, Personal Staff Officer to President Parvez Musharraf (2002-2005) and Chief Instructor National Defence University (2010), Islamabad, 3 January 2011; ICG Asia Report, "Pakistan: Madrassas, Extremism and the Military," *International Crisis Group*, 2002.

[407] 'The Ministry of Religious Affairs hand-out,' January 17, 1979, cited in Malik, *Madrassas in South Asia,* 132.

from leftist and secular influences within Pakistan and played a key role in mobilizing public support for the Afghan war.

Using Islamisation as a means of attaining domestic legitimacy to undermine the modern, mainly secular political elite comprising his opposition, Zia introduced several state-controlled Islamic bodies providing patronage to the religious lobby. The Council of Islamic Ideology was established to suggest measures to proscribe parliamentary democracy as a 'Western and therefore non-Islamic model.'[408] A *Majlis-e-Shura* (Council of Theologians), giving representation to *ulama* from all sects, was set up in 1980 as a rubber-stamp parliament to provide political legitimacy and religious credibility for Zia's Islamisation drive.

Under Zia's patronage, religious leaders and clerics predominantly from the JI rose to influence in the country's civil administration and bureaucracy through increased interaction with higher government echelons, in the legal system as judges of the Federal *Shariat* Court and as journalists in the state-owned media and newly launched newspapers and magazines. The extension of state patronage to religio-political parties was justified in the name of services rendered defining Pakistani nationhood in terms of religious identity and legitimizing the military as the custodian of this critical process.

Needless to say, the damage to secular, democratic values that was inflicted by Zia's Islamisation programme was both wide-ranging and deep-rooted. It institutionalised religious bigotry in the very fabric of the state and empowered Islamist forces to subvert a multifaceted civil society, particularly its vulnerable constituents, through multiple channels. The fact that these changes were made in the

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[408] Mohammad Waseem, *Politics and the State in Pakistan* (Islamabad: National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research, 1994).

name of Islam rendered an irrevocable quality to them since a repeal of such laws (for instance the *Zina* ordinance) could be tantamount to the removal of an Islamic law from the legal system, and considered as violating the constitutional provision to enable all Muslims to order their lives individually and collectively in accordance with Islam.[409] By inference, therefore, any decisive reversal of laws introduced under the banner of Islamisation would negate the reason for the creation of Pakistan, and would thus undermine the justification for the very existence of Pakistan.[410]

Islamisation and the Praetorian State

The growth of an unrestricted and largely unregulated relationship between the Pakistani military, its intelligence services, and Islamic groups during the 11 years of Zia's rule served to exacerbate pre-existing socio-political and institutional imbalances in Pakistan. Internally, General Zia's Islamisation campaign brought the army and Islamists together like never before. Political expediency rendered significance to the continuing support of religio-political parties to extend and expand praetorian influence. As a reward for their ideological support, religious parties in turn attained significant power in a quasi-democratic system without suffering the travails of electoral politics, which generally proved elusive to them. Externally, the institutionalisation of the army's role in formulating and implementing foreign policy effectively undermined the ability of civilian institutions to do so. Moreover, the army's extension of differential patronage to religious parties and by extension the militant groups associated with them during the Soviet-Afghan war contributed towards the intensification of sectarian fissures within Pakistani society.

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[409] Constitution of The Islamic Republic of Pakistan, Articles. 227–31. Retrieved October 10, 2016, http://www.pakistani. org/pakistan/constitution/part9.html
[410] Martin Lau, "Twenty-Five Years of Hudood Ordinances - A Review," *Washington and Lee Law Review* 64, no. 4 (2007): 1291–1314.

Pakistan's Afghan Jihad

> The word *Jihad* conjures up the vision of a marching band of religious fanatics with savage beards and fiery eyes brandishing drawn swords and attacking the infidels wherever they meet them and pressing them under the edge of the sword for the recital of *Kalima*.[411]

During the Zia decade, *jihad* was adopted as a central tenet of Pakistan's forward policy in Afghanistan. Even before him however, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto had begun to extend his strategic efforts into Afghanistan in order to counter President Daoud's irredentist *Pashtunistan* claims. In a top-secret directive, he authorised Inspector General Frontier Corps Naseerullah Babar to finance and train amenable elements in the Afghan opposition to oppose Daoud. Some of these dissident elements, notably Gulbeddin Hekmatyar and Burhanuddin Rabbani, continued to feature in Pakistan's forward policy in Afghanistan during Zia's rule and gained particular notoriety during the Afghan *jihad*.[412] The Afghan *Jamiat-i-Islami* led by Burhanuddin Rabbani was in fact modelled along the lines of Pakistan's *Jamaat-i-Islami* and inspired by the ideas of Maulana Maududi.

Zia revived the Afghan Cell, initially created in 1973 as part of the Bhutto regime's Foreign Office in Pakistan and used by the ISI to 'conduct intelligence missions in Afghanistan' after his *coup d'état* in 1978.[413] According to General Babar, Bhutto had the foresight to appreciate the necessity of having influence in Afghanistan for Pakistan's strategic interests. President Daoud's increasingly socialist influence and anti-Pakistan stance also compelled Bhutto to sanction covert intervention in the Afghan political system. Daoud long a proponent of a united *Pashtunistan* had previously supported militias along the Durand Line, thereby exacerbating Bhutto's security concerns. General Babar claimed he was authorised by

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[411] Maududi, *Jihad in Islam,* 1.
[412] General Naseerullah Babar interview.
[413] Haqqani, *Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military*, 177.

Bhutto to approach and train specific individuals in the Afghan opposition to challenge President Daoud's influence in the political arena. The level of secrecy for this directive was such that only four people – Bhutto, General Babar, then army chief General Tikka Khan and the foreign minister Aziz Ahmad Hoti – knew of the initiative.[414] General Babar's admission thus provides further challenges to claims in scholarly works such as Fair's that emphasise the predominance of ideology in the military's revisionist programme. It demonstrates instead that concerns with national security formed an integral part of Pakistani revisionism, even under civilian leadership.[415]

Subsequent events, particularly the signing of Soviet-Afghan treaty of friendship in 1978, encouraged the evolution of the Afghan Cell's primary function into coordinating the resistance to communist rule in Afghanistan. When Soviet troops landed in Afghanistan on December 1979, however, it provided an ideal opportunity for General Zia to gain much-needed international legitimacy for his regime. Under the pretext of supporting the US-backed *jihad* against Soviet occupation, Zia could intensify the Pakistan-sponsored Islamist opposition already being fostered in Afghanistan. Funding from the United States to expand an Islamist *jihad* would serve the dual purpose of ensuring continued political support for Zia's regime by Islamist groups as well as from within the Pakistani military establishment. The political experiences of Ayub, Yahya, and Bhutto had impressed upon Zia the importance of retaining the powerful military leadership's support to ensure regime survival.

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[414] General Naseerullah Babar interview.
[415] Fair, *Fighting to the End: The Pakistan Army's Way of War*.

By agreeing to wage America's war against communism at the height of the Cold War, 'Zia stood to gain enormous prestige with the Arab world as a champion of Islam and with the West as a champion against communist aggression.'[416] Taking the military option, Zia tasked his ISI Chief, General Akhtar Abdul Rahman, to lead America's proxy war against the Soviet Union, thereby securing large sums of American military and economic aid. Under his orders, the Pakistan Army covertly supplied Afghan resistance – the *Mujahidin* – with arms and ammunition, funds and intelligence, military training and operational advice – bolstered by nearly uncapped economic and military funding from the United States and its close ally Saudi Arabia.

Zia also generously opened up the border areas of NWFP and Baluchistan as sanctuary to both Afghan refugees and the *Mujahidin* fighters – since a secure, cross-border base was essential for the success of the anti-Soviet campaign.[417] Due to the porous nature of the Pak-Afghan border and the inevitable mass of refugees that sought sanctuary, this act unleashed a flood of administrative and socio-economic challenges the country was ill prepared to deal with. Combined with the geographic proximity and ethnic kinship shared by Pashtun tribes settled on both sides of the border, the lifting of immigration requirements for Afghan refugees meant they could move in, out and across Pakistani cities with virtually no restriction. Zia therefore did not put any contingency plans in place to mitigate the large-scale humanitarian crisis and social instability that Pakistan would inherit as a consequence of its involvement in the war. By the end of 1980, approximately 1 million Afghan refugees, most of

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[416] Brigadier Mohammad Yousaf, *Afghanistan, the Bear Trap: The Defeat of a Superpower* (Barnsley: Leo Cooper, 2001), 26.
[417] Yousaf.

whom were women and children, had fled to Pakistan. By 1998, this figure had multiplied into more than 3 million.[418]

Suffering from economic mismanagement, Pakistan was ill equipped to deal with such a large influx of refugees and therefore accommodated them in desolate camps outside its border towns in NWFP and Baluchistan. Eventually, the refugee camps that intended to house only 10,000 refugees per settlement ended up holding up to 100,000, even 125,000 refugees – making it the biggest concentration of refugees in the world at the time.[419]

During this time, General Zia also encouraged the proliferation of Islamic *madaris* (seminaries) along the Afghan border to serve several aims: to provide an outlet for young Afghan refugees, *schooling* them as well as Pakistanis in Islamic precepts, and to inject the extremist religious fervour needed to fuel the anti-communist *jihad*. Upon Zia's request, Saudi charities built and funded hundreds of *madaris*, providing a social outlet and religious instruction to students, along with free food, shelter, military training, and a small stipend to send back to their families. The lack of any alternative options rendered these *madaris* extremely popular amongst the Afghan refugees. Thus, whilst there were only 900 *madaris* in the entire country before the war, by the summer of 1988 these had multiplied into 8,000 official *deeni madaris* and an estimated 25,000 unregistered ones, mainly clustered along the Pakistan-Afghan frontier and funded by wealthy patrons from Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states.[420]

[418] Haqqani, *Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military*, 188.
[419] Interview with Major General Jamshed Ayaz, Additional Secretary for Defence Production in the Ministry of Defence and President of the Institute of Regional Studies (2004-2008), Pakistan, Islamabad, 5 April 2006
[420] Rashid, *Taliban: The Story of the Afghan Warlords*, 89.

Under Zia, therefore, the apparatus to foster a proactive *jihadist* strategy was decisively established. The religio-political parties JI and JUI constituted the backbone of Pakistan's contribution to Afghan resistance by fostering the vast majority of its human capital. The JI developed close links with hard-line Afghan *Mujahidin* groups such as Gulbedddin Hekmatyar's *Hizb-i-Islami* and Burhanuddin Rabbani's *Jamiat-i-Islami*, which shared its political and Islamist beliefs. Hekmatyar and Rabbani's militias were the two most-favoured beneficiaries amongst the coalition of seven *Mujahidin* groups patronized by Pakistan's military regime due to their strongly Islamist nature and associated support for the Zia government.

The ISI used the JI as an active conduit in the distribution of financial and military aid to the preferred Afghan *Mujahidin*. It achieved that with the help of *Operation Cyclone*, one of the longest and most expensive covert CIA operations in history, beginning with approximately $20-$30 million of funding per year from 1980 and escalating to around $630 million per year by 1987. At the same time, organisations such as *Jamaat-i-Islami's Rabita-ul-Madaris* were also created in Pakistan specifically to produce *jihadi* literature, mobilise public opinion and to recruit and train *jihadi* forces.[421]

Despite being marginalized by the Zia regime in comparison to the JI, the JUI also managed to tap into unrestricted funds coming in from Saudi Arabia and the Middle Eastern during the Afghan *jihad*. The Saudis were keen to direct their funding towards *madaris* and political parties espousing beliefs similar to their puritanical *Wahhabi* creed and the JUI with their radical interpretation of Islam matched the criteria well. With this funding, the JUI set up hundreds of *madaris* in NWFP and Baluchistan, located mostly in rural areas and Afghan refugee camps on the Pakistani

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[421] Peter Bergen, *Holy War Inc* (New York: Free Press, 2001).

side of the border. Run predominantly by semi-educated mullahs having little or no understanding of the original Deobandi curriculum, these *madaris* inculcated in their students a rigid adherence to a specific, radical interpretation of Islam. At the same time, an interpretation of *Shari'a* heavily influenced by the tribal code of *Pashtunwali*, rendered the JUI *madaris* immensely popular in the Pashtun belt along the border, indoctrinating Afghani and Pakistani Pashtuns alike. 'By teaching their students how to interpret *Shari'a*, they aimed to harmonize classical *Shari'a* text with current realities' observed Bergen.[422]

Occurring around the same time the Iranian Revolution mobilized the sectarian identity of Pakistan's *Shi'a* populations, which combined with the ideological and material resources flowing in from Iran, began to accelerate socio-political activism amongst the Pakistani *Shi'a*. As part of its intention to export the *Shi'a* revolution, Iran provided money to the Pakistani *Shi'a* community, built cultural centres, sponsored the education of Pakistani *Shi'a* in Iran, and even funded *Shi'a madaris* in Pakistan. As a result, the number of *Shi'a madaris* in Pakistan also increased from around 70 in 1979 to 116 in 1983-84.[423]

The Saudi-Pakistan military alliance that had already begun to take root in the 1970s gained strength after the Iranian Revolution. The presence of significant *Shi'a* communities in both Pakistan and Afghanistan, representing approximately 15 to 20 per cent and 20 to 25 per cent of the population, respectively, further motivated the Saudi decision to counter potential Iranian influence in South East Asia. At the same time, General Zia's military regime faced a formidable and direct challenge from the Pakistani *Shi'a* population against his strictly *Sunni* brand of Islamisation.

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[422] Bergen, 88.
[423] Christophe Jaffrelot, *Pakistan: Nationalism without a Nation*, ed. Christophe Jaffrelot (London: Zed Press, 2002).

As a major step in his Islamisation programme, he had controversially introduced the government collection of *zakat*, a 2.5 per cent annual levy on assets, obligatory on Muslims to donate to charity ostensibly to help alleviate poverty. These *zakat* funds ended up being arbitrarily used by the government to establish an extensive network of patronage for militant Islamist groups and *madaris* actively engaged in the Afghan conflict and in indirectly countering regional *Shiʿa* influence.

Saudi support for the predominantly *Sunni* Afghan *Mujahidin* was an intrinsic part of its policy to fund anti-*Shiʿa* Islamist groups in Pakistan. In addition to direct military channels, Saudi intelligence also used religious charities to fund the *jihad*, using what it termed 'humanitarian' aid to build *madaris* with a distinctly *Sunni*, Wahhabi orientation along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. Its ideological closeness to the Zia regime granted the Islamist *Jamaat-i-Islami* party in Pakistan access to direct funding from the Saudi government as well as the Saudi-sponsored charity *Rabita al-ʿAlami al-Islami* (World Muslim League), which it then redistributed amongst its militant wings and affiliated madrassas. Donations from unofficial or private channels were actually estimated to be higher in total than official Saudi funding for the Afghan *Jihad*. These donations came from wide variety of sources, including religious charities, mosques, private individuals, businessmen, and even individual members of the royal family.[424] During this time, thus, Saudi charities built and funded hundreds of *madaris*, providing social outlet and religious instruction, along with free food, shelter, military training, and a small stipend for their students to send back to their families.

Significantly, many of the so-called *madaris*, such as Maulana Sami-ul-Haq's infamous madrassa *Haqqania* at Akora Khattak, created during this period were from

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[424] Rana, *A to Z of Jehadi Organizations in Pakistan*.

their very inception conceived and operated as militant training camps.[425] These militias were specifically designed to provide manpower and religious legitimacy for *jihadist* operations and solicit funds from all over the Muslim world, rather than function as purely religious, educational institutions.[426] It actually was from these JUI *madaris* that the majority of the Afghan *Taliban* leadership emerged in 1994.

Intelligence and the Afghan *Jihad*

Two principal civilian intelligence agencies, the Intelligence Bureau (IB) and the Federal Intelligence Agency (FIA), and two military intelligence agencies, the Inter-Services Intelligence agency (ISI) and Military Intelligence (MI) agencies, comprise Pakistan's primary intelligence services apparatus. Operating within the purview of the civilian government, the IB was initially responsible for strategic and foreign intelligence as well as counter-espionage and internal security. Theoretically, the IB came under the direct control of the Pakistani Chief Executive – either the President or the Prime Minister, depending on their political relevance at the given time, and reported to the Interior Ministry. The FIA, created in 1975, was ostensibly responsible for investigating organized crime such as smuggling, human trafficking, immigration offences, corruption and, from the 1980s onwards, terrorism.

On the other hand, Pakistan's military intelligence agencies consisted of the internal MI and the semi-military ISI. The MI was exclusively a military intelligence wing, composed of officers in uniform reporting directly to the Army Chief and tasked with investigating military espionage, foreign agents and associated anti-state elements, as well as counter-insurgency. The ISI reported to both military and civilian

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[425] Sami-ul-Haq's *Haqqania* madrassa in Akora Khattak, near the city of Peshawar, was one of the largest and most influential *madaris* during the Afghan-Soviet War. More recently, it gained notoriety due to its support for the creation and ascendency of the Afghan Taliban.

[426] Mumtaz Ahmed, *Religious Radicalism and Security in South Asia*, ed. Satu P. Lamiaye, Robert G. Wirsing, and Mohan Malik (Honolulu: Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, 2004).

authorities on particular issues and was staffed by a combination of military and civilian personnel.

Considered Pakistan's largest, premier intelligence agency, the ISI's wide-ranging remit included an internal wing, dealing with counter-intelligence and political issues; an external wing handling external issues; and an Analysis and Foreign Relations wing. The Director General ISI is almost always a serving army General appointed on recommendation of the Army Chief (COAS) and by the Prime Minister's. Technically, the DG-ISI was meant to report to the Prime Minister, however since the Army Chief was his official superior, the chain of command inadvertently rested with him. In interviews several former DG ISIs and a former COAS rejected the idea of the ISI as a rogue organisation, operating outside of the aegis of the military high command is misplaced. [427] This is supported by the fact that nearly 80% of ISI personnel are drawn from the three military services, most of them on deputation from the army, and only include a small cadre of civilians. Its primary directives therefore come from the top echelons, mainly the COAS and the DG ISI, (who do not entertain deviations from the strict chain of command). [428]

The ISI supplanted the IB soon after Pakistan's independence to cater for strategic and foreign intelligence focusing particularly on India, but also on Afghanistan, Iran, and other regional actors. Even though the ISI saw limited expansion of its role during General Ayub's military regime, particularly after the 1965 Indo-Pakistan war, it was not until Pakistan's involvement in Afghanistan that it gained particular notoriety. The role of the ISI expanded into counterinsurgency

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[427] Isambard Wilkinson, "ISI: Pakistan's Rogue Military Intelligence Agency," *The Telegraph*, August 22, 2008.
[428] Interview with Lieutenant-General Asad Durrani, Director General Military Intelligence (1998-1990) and Director General Inter-Services Intelligence of Pakistan (1990-1992), Islamabad, 30 December 2010. General Mirza Aslam Beg; General Mahmood Ahmed interviews.

during the 1971 war when it employed services of Islamist groups for militant operations in East Pakistan. When Bhutto came to power after the war, he substantially expanded the budget as well as ISI's scale of operation in both domestic affairs and foreign policy. Under Bhutto, thus, the ISI began to support and train the anti-Daoud opposition in Afghanistan as early as 1973.[429] From 1979 onwards under General Zia's military regime, Pakistan's strategic alliance with the CIA proved decisive for the operational expansion of the ISI. With direct funding coming in from Saudi Arabia and the United States, ISI's resources, influence, and foreign contacts as well as links with Islamist militants grew exponentially. The economic and military aid that started streaming into Pakistan to support the Afghan *Mujahidin* soared

> from about $30 million in fiscal 1981 to about $200 million in fiscal 1984. Under an agreement between the Saudi royal family and President Reagan – designed to seal the anti-Communist, oil-smoothed alliance between Washington and Riyadh – Saudi Arabia effectively doubled those numbers by agreeing to match the CIA's aid dollar for dollar.[430]

Enormous funds were channelled solely through the ISI to the different fronts of the anti-Soviet campaign – including *madaris* in Pakistan that doubled up as military camps. ISI personnel often directly led, supervised and organized the training of thousands of *Mujahidin* fighters, while staying in regular contact with their benefactors in the CIA. Robert Gates, former US Secretary of Defence categorised the CIA's role as the 'quartermaster of the war', which relied heavily upon the ISI to provide the leadership, strategy and tactics for the Afghan *Mujahidin*. As an active ISI operative, Colonel Imam as an instructor for *mujahidin* training camps that spread across the suburbs Quetta to Peshawar claimed to have organized military training, including training in sabotage, guerrilla tactics, and advanced weapons, for over

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[429] General Naseerullah Babar interview.
[430] Steve Coll, *Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan and Bin Laden, From the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001* (New York: Penguin Books, 2004), 65.

95,000 *mujahideen* fighters over the decade of the war.[431] Ex-CIA veteran Bruce Riedel corroborated Colonel Imam's assertion by admitting that the US avoided suffering any casualties in the Soviet- Afghan war because it did not take any risks and let ISI lead the front-lines of the offensive.[432]

The importance of religious fervour to the Afghan war was reflected in the preferential treatment of radical *Mujahidin* groups, such as Hekmatyar's *Hizb-i-Islami*, and JUI *madaris* such as Maulana Sami-ul Haq's *Haqqania* in Akora Khattak (Pakistan), by the Pakistani state, a fact corroborated by insiders such as Colonel Imam.[433] Invariably the most radical of the Afghan factions received most aid and support, since they were the fiercest fighters and the most willing to lay their lives as *shuhada'* (martyrs) for the religious cause of defeating the *Godless communists*.

Weapons of Mass Instruction? [434]

At the height of the Cold War, the Soviet invasion presented the perfect opportunity for the United States to create a much-desired 'bleeding wound' in collusion with the Zia's military regime in Pakistan. A strong military and economic alliance between the US and Zia administration was designed to alleviate concerns that 'Another military regime might be more than likely to adopt a conciliatory policy towards Moscow and Kabul…(whilst) A Leftist civilian government – which is least likely to

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[431] Interview with Colonel Imam, Pakistan-Afghan Bureau Inter-Services Intelligence (1974-1989) and Consul-General of Pakistani Embassy in Herat (1994-2001), Rawalpindi, 6 April 2006.

[432] Bruce Riedel, *What We Won: America's Secret War in Afghanistan 1979–89* (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2014).

[433] Colonel Imam interview.

[434] Andrew Coulson, "Education and Indoctrination in the Muslim World," *Policy Analysis* 11, no. 11 March (2004).

come to power in the next five years – would be more willing to reach agreements with Moscow and Kabul.'[435]

Between 1984 and 1994 therefore the US Agency for International Development (USAID) allocated over $51 million at the University of Nebraska Omaha to develop and design textbooks, to print in Pakistan to provide religious endorsement for armed struggle. Over 13 million of these textbooks were distributed at Afghan refugee camps and *madaris* in Pakistan 'where students learnt basic math by counting dead Russians and Kalashnikov rifles.'[436] These textbooks remained in circulation in Afghan schools and Pakistani *madaris* long after the end of the Soviet occupation, and provided inspiration for countless *jihadi* publications issued by militant *tanzeems* (e.g. the *Markaz al-Dawa al-Irshad)*[437], *madaris,* and even Islamist political parties. By cloaking the Afghan conflict in religious terms, thus, the United States successfully mobilised Muslim sensibilities to support its Cold War strategy and provided both the impetus and the resources[438] for the unprecedented growth and politicisation of *madaris* in the region.

The politicisation of religion in *madaris* in the decades following the Soviet war made these institutions susceptible to influences from their patron religio-political parties within Pakistan (such as the JI, *Deobandi* JUI, *Barelvi* JUP), having gained centre-stage in politics due to their contribution, both ideological and physical, during

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[435] 'CIA National Intelligence Estimate,' *The Soviet Presence in Afghanistan: Implications for Regional Powers and the United States*, April 1985. Retrieved January 23, 2017. https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0005445963.pdf.

[436] Joe Stephens and David Ottaway, "The ABC's of Jihad in Afghanistan," *The Washington Post*, March 23, 2002.

[437] *Markaz al-Dawa al-Irshad* is an Ahl-i-Hadith organisation, headquartered in central Punjab (Muridke). It is the parent organisation for the Kashmir-based militant organisation *Lashkar-i-Tayiba.*

[438] Coll, *Ghost Wars*, 65. US Government allocated over $2 billion of resources and funds through the CIA to support the anti-Soviet forces in Afghanistan between 1980-89. In 1984, the 'petro-dollar' agreement was formed between US President Ronald Reagan and the Saudi Royal family – where Saudi's pledged to match US contributions to the Afghan jihad. CIA also estimated that by the mid-1980s another $25 million were being sent by NGO's situated in various Arab Gulf states.

the Afghan resistance. The transformation of a benign tradition of *Radd* into the institutionalisation of refutation and extremist rhetoric during the war contributed towards creating a 'violent social context where sectarian identity has become militarized, the negative bias created through the texts used in *madrassas* and vilification of others' beliefs regularly through speeches bound to produce anger and militancy.'[439]

At the same time *askari tanzeems* (militant organizations) created by various parties to partake the Afghan *jihad* were also able to utilise the material and human resources present at *madaris* sympathetic to their causes.[440] Since the puritanical *Deobandi* sect was more in line with General Zia ul Haq's orthodox beliefs, their expansion significantly exceeded the rest. According to a government estimate in 1988, out of a total of 2,891 *madaris,* 717 belonged to *Barelvi*s, 47 to *Shi'a*, 161 to the *Salafi Ahl-i-Hadith,* and the rest were all *Deobandi*.[441]

Significantly, one of the most influential Islamist political parties in Pakistan, the *Jamiat-Ulema-Islam* (JUI), was a recognised *Deobandi* sectarian organisation, with high-level political leaders receiving their education from *Deobandi madaris*. Many of the JUI politicians were also *Deobandi*-trained *ulama.*[442] In fact, two factions of the *Deobandi* political party, JUI-Fazlur Rehman and JUI-Sami-ul-Haq, reportedly run over 65 per cent of all *madaris* in Pakistan.[443]

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[439] Ali Riaz, "Global Jihad, Sectarianism and the Madrassas in Pakistan," August (Singapore, 2005).
[440] Kaja Borchgrevink and Kristian Berg Harpviken, "Teaching Religion, Taming Rebellion: Religious Education Reform in Afghanistan" (Oslo, 2010).
[441] ICG Asia Report, "Deeni Madaris Report," 1988.
[442] Christine Fair, *The Madrassa Challenge: Militancy and Religious Education in Pakistan* (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2007), 57.
[443] ICG Asia Report, "Pakistan: The Mullahs and the Military" (Islamabad/Brussels, 2003).

Islamisation and Civilianisation

Utilising popular Islamist sentiment stirred by the anti-Bhutto PNA movement, Zia described himself as a *Soldier of Islam* in his very first speech as Chief Martial Law Administrator.[444] As a precursor to the expedient relationship he intended to forge with religious parties, he praised the spirit of Islam as projected by the PNA movement: 'It proves that Pakistan, which was created in the name of Islam, will continue to survive only if it sticks to Islam. That is why I consider the introduction of Islamic system as an essential pre-requisite for the country.'[445] He further extended the legitimacy derived from this 'divine' mission, claiming he was only accountable to God for his actions to having 'no intention of leaving power till the accomplishment of our objectives of Islamisation of the national polity and induction of decency in politics. Until then neither I will step down, nor will let anyone rise.'[446]

Support from the *Jamaat-i-Islami* to neutralise any political opposition to Zia's rule was critical in the initial months after the coup. Even when Zia banned all political activity, JI was the only party exempt from official censure. As a part of Zia's cabinet, the JI played a crucial role in endorsing Bhutto's controversial trial that led to his execution in 1979. The party's founder and spiritual leader Maulana Abu'l Al'a Maududi personally endorsed Zia's Islamisation programme. The JI remained in Zia's cabinet as a part of the PNA government for nearly a year after the coup, benefiting from state patronage and political influence. During this period, JI members controlled key government ministries, such as the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Production, Water and Power, and Natural Resources. They also escaped censorship in the press, enjoying unfettered access to mass media.

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[444] General Zia ul Haq's *Address to the Nation*, 5 July 1977.
[445] ibid
[446] AP, "Press Conference by General Zia Ul Haq," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, July 15, 1977.

Politics of Intelligence

Intriguingly the use of intelligence agencies (particularly the ISI) for political leverage was codified by the administration of civilian Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto as corroborated by authors such as Shuja Nawaz and even Bhutto's closest advisor General Naseerullah Babar:

> The original sin was committed by Bhutto when he gave a political role to the ISI. This privilege was subsequently enjoyed by all regimes that came after him be it Zia ul Haq, Benazir Bhutto, Nawaz Sharif, or Parvez Musharraf. Their indiscriminate use of the ISI for political purpose engendered its reputation of being able to make or break a government and precipitated its impression as becoming a 'state within a state'.[447]

Bhutto's use of intelligence agencies to undermine political opposition was typified by his use of the FIA against the right-wing PNA movement and by creating the insidious political wing of the ISI in 1975 to spy on political opponents.[448] Simultaneously, he incorporated the 'Afghan Cell' into the ISI (1973) to expand Pakistan's regional influence even prior to the Soviet invasion.[449]

Eventually, the very agencies Bhutto had used to spy on his political opponents used their expanded powers to depose him practically manifesting what Feaver refers to as the 'moral hazard' pervading a symbiotic civil-military relationship: 'How do we know that the military is serving the interests of the country and not parochial interests, either of individual officers or of some larger group (such as a service or a branch)? 'Control and monitoring mechanisms' such as intelligence agencies, which could be used by civilians to 'direct the military and thereby mitigate the adverse selection and moral hazard problems inherent in delegation,' were

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[447] General Naseerullah Babar interview; Nawaz, *Crossed Swords: Pakistan, Its Army, and the Wars Within*.
[448] General Mahmood Ahmed interview; Askari-Rizvi, *Military State and Society in Pakistan,* 192.
[449] General Naseerullah Babar interview; Haqqani, *Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military*, 103.

undermined by Bhutto's undemocratic political behaviour and arbitrary appointment of General Zia ul Haq as the Army Chief. [450]

Out of the two federally controlled spy agencies, the civilian Intelligence Bureau (IB) and the military Inter Services Intelligence bureau (ISI), the ISI was directly responsible for Bhutto's political entrapment. In the events that transpired, Bhutto was overthrown by his own Army Chief and Director-General ISI – General Zia and his close confidante Lieutenant General Ghulam Jilani Khan. As per one political commentator, Pakistani intelligence agencies contrive

> a secret and untouchable ring of informants [that] gradually grows around the prime minister…Within a few months, he gets totally isolated and is at the mercy of his informants, good, bad, or indifferent, but all religiously dedicated to preserving the system which has placed intelligence agencies on such a high pedestal.[451]

His successor, General Aslam Beg, claimed that General Zia utilised the same political wing of the ISI extensively to consolidate his authority, using it in tandem with the MI and the IB, to gather potentially incriminating personal and professional information on military as well as civilian leadership, in an attempt to co-opt and curtail potential opposition. According to Beg, the information collected by Zia included intimate details of personal lives, familial links, financial affairs, and property transactions as well as associations with political organisations and social networks. Under Zia, the ISI's internal wing then acted covertly to buy off and intimidate local politicians, undermine support for opposition parties, and bolster Islamist groups to help them gain political legitimacy, which would in turn reinforce the Zia regime. [452]

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[450] Feaver, *Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight and Civil-Military Relations*, 75.
[451] Mubashir Hasan, *Mirage of Power: An Inquiry Into the Bhutto Years 1971-1977* (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2000), 202.
[452] General Mirza Aslam Beg interview.

Extensive, often personal, relationships forged between ISI operatives, such as Colonel Imam, and Islamist groups during Pakistan's extended involvement in the Afghan War had far-reaching implications for the developing praetorian military system and its strategic policies. Religio-political parties played a significant role in facilitating the relationship between the ruling military regime and militant Islamist groups. On the one hand, this meant that religio-political groups benefitted from direct state patronage in return for supporting the military regime's ideological justification for legitimacy; |On the other it led to the co-optation of militant groups as a veritable tool of strategic policy.

The nearly seamless transition of militant Islamist veterans from the Afghan war into the Kashmir conflict served to reinforce the utility of irregular militias to compensate for relative weaknesses in Pakistan's military capability vis-à-vis its larger Indian adversary. Thus, when the Hercules C-130 carrying President-COAS General Zia ul Haq, crashed four minutes after take-off on 17 August 1988 bringing an end to the longest period of uninterrupted military rule it did not result in a corresponding cessation of the use of Islamist militancy as a veritable tool of Pakistan's geo-strategic policy. This was a potential critical juncture that presented opportunities for an essential recalibration of the country's political and strategic focus. The subsequent period of civilian rule however played out the phenomenon of historical causation in the continued deployment of Islamism in politics and foreign policy, and that of increasing returns in the proliferation and intensification of militancy in the country. Moreover the legacy of praetorian involvement with militant Islamism, forged during Zia's time, began to show its limitations soon after. The military establishment having settled firmly into its praetorian role now began to

experience significant challenges to its authority from the same militant Islamist groups it had cultivated during the Afghan conflict soon after it ended.

Chapter 5

Afghanistan to Kashmir

> Mercenaries and auxiliaries are at once useless and dangerous, and he who holds his State by means of mercenary troops can never be solidly or securely seated. For such troops are disunited, ambitious, insubordinate, treacherous, insolent among friends, cowardly before foes, and without fear of God or faith with man. Whenever they are attacked defeat follows; so that in peace you are plundered by them, in war by your enemies.
>
> Niccolo Machiavelli (*The Prince*)[453]

The Zia decade proved pivotal for both the entrenchment of praetorian involvement in the state and its use of Islamism as an instrument of political and strategic influence. At the same time contradictions inherent in the military's sponsorship of militant groups in Afghanistan and then Kashmir, began to manifest in the autonomy these groups began to assert from military control. Islamist militancy and terrorism can therefore be reflected as a product of the 'insecurity state's' efforts to manage nationalist aspirations to institutionalist interests.[454] Despite significant efforts expended towards directing the course of militancy after the Afghan *jihad,* the praetorian system's fundamental dependency on the Islamist lobby to shore up domestic political support served as the most formidable impediment to establishing its broad-based influence.

At the same time, the transformation of a benign tradition of *Radd* (refutation) into the institutionalisation of extremist rhetoric, began to demonstrate increasing returns by generating a 'violent social context where sectarian identity has become militarized, the negative bias created through the texts used in *madrassas* and

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[453] Niccolo Machiavelli, *The Prince* (London: Penguin Classics, 2003), 23.
[454] Talbot and Singh, *Region and Partition: Bengal, Punjab and the Partition of the Sub-Continent*, 152.

vilification of others' beliefs regularly through speeches bound to produce anger and militancy.'[455]

The latent dangers concealed in the incorporation of the praetorian state's dichotomous political and geostrategic policy, unleashed during the Afghan *jihad* and fostered during both civilian and military rule thereafter are examined in this chapter. As critical feature of praetorian relations in Pakistan this fact is borne out by admissions made by practitioners such as CIA and US National Security Council veteran Bruce Riedel, whose definition of the ISI's alleged links to militant groups as 'fighting some, tolerating others and patronizing a few'.[456] The fallouts of such dualism are demonstrated thematically in this chapter to explain the military's faltering influence over the militant Islamist landscape. Much of the Pakistani state's policies post-Afghan *jihad* practically demonstrated the idea of historical causation behind the use of Islamist militancy.

Moreover, the nearly seamless transition of *jihadist* veterans of the Afghan war into the Kashmir conflict served to reinforce the strategic utility of using irregular militias to compensate for the relative weaknesses in Pakistan's military capability vis-à-vis its larger Indian adversary. According to an estimate, in 2000 India had approximately 400,000 troops in Indian-held Kashmir, a force over two-thirds as large as Pakistan's active army.[457] Thus Pakistan's growing support for the *Taliban* in many ways reflected the same policy considerations as for the *Mujahidin* before them.

Within current literature on the subject, several scholarly works deal with various general features of *jihadism,* sectarian militancy and political Islam in Pakistan. Mariam Abou Zahab and Olivier Roy examine the connections between

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[455] Riaz, "Global Jihad, Sectarianism and the Madrassas in Pakistan" 21.
[456] Bruce Riedel, "The ISI Is Not a Rogue Agency," *Dawn*, June 6, 2009.
[457] Jessica Stern, "Pakistan's Jihad Culture," *Foreign Affairs* 79, no. 6 (2000): 116.

jihadist movements in Central Asia, Afghanistan, and Pakistan in a brief but comprehensive treatise on the transnational nature of Islamist networks - mapping the divergent manifestations of Islamist organisations that share *jihadist* and *salafist* elements whilst incorporating localized ambitions. [458] Farzana Shaikh, on the other hand, views the rise of Islamist militancy as inevitably grounded in ideological ambiguities surrounding the meaning of Pakistan and *being Pakistani*. [459] Whilst her analysis shares some overlaps with an earlier emphasis upon the impact of Pakistan's ideological conundrum on national cohesion, this chapter situates such ideas specifically within the trajectory of the emerging praetorian state.

Accordingly this chapter analyses the implications of Pakistan's extensive involvement in the Afghan *jihad* on militant Islamism, particularly with respect to the subsequent outbreak of the Kashmiri resistance movement. It traces the evolution of the praetorian state's Afghan Policy from the *Mujahidin* to the *Taliban* and the associated inspiration rendered to the spread of divergent manifestations of Islamist militancy within Pakistan. In this context, the implications of foreign sponsorship as well as internal socio-economic and political factors in the proliferation of Islamist militancy, particularly through the radicalisation of sectarian identities, is examined.

Some of the most prolific and arguably systematic attempts to analyse the trajectory of militant Islamism, including its impact on state and society in Pakistan, have been undertaken by Christine Fair. Using data from a national survey of urban Pakistanis Fair debunks 'conventional wisdoms' regarding the support for Islamist militancy. Her analysis shows that support for small militant organisations amongst urban Pakistanis occurs when these organisations use violence in support of political

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[458] Mariam Abou Zahab and Olivier Roy, *Islamist Networks: The Afghan-Pakistan Connection* (London: Hurst and Company, 2004).
[459] Farzana Sheikh, *Making Sense of Pakistan* (Hurst and Company, 2009).

goals that the individual cares about and when violence is used as a means to achieve those goals 'given the respondent's understanding of the strategic environment.' In doing so, Fair focuses on the 'demand for militancy' rather than the 'supply of militants'. Fair's analysis provides key insights into the politics of Islamist militancy as fundamentally based upon strategic considerations of political advantage.[460] This chapter utilises elements of Fair's analysis to support the distinctions it makes between political and militant Islamist organisations, arguing against the perceived homogeneity of militancy in Pakistan and therefore accounting for the varying degrees of influence that the military is able to exert on particular Islamist groups.

Fair undertakes a further regression analysis to examine the support for sectarian violence in Pakistan i.e. projecting Islamist militancy and terrorism as a manifestation of localised political violence.[461] Her findings support the arguments made in this chapter, which uses empirical evidence from original militant propaganda materials to prove the expedient deployment of militancy as protecting local political and economic interests of Islamist groups. At the same time, their association with mainstream Islamist political parties provides militant groups with significant levels of political and economic patronage thereby compounding the problems associated with any action taken against them by the (praetorian) state.[462] Fair's research also underscores continuities demonstrated by both civilian and military elites in their ambivalence towards sectarian militancy, by using it as a tool of political influence and hence strengthens one of the core themes of this thesis.

This chapter demonstrates what Stern refers to as a typical 'principal-agent problem' where the interests of Pakistani military (the principal) and those of the

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[460] Shapiro and Fair, "Understanding Support for Islamist Militancy in Pakistan."
[461] Shapiro and Fair, 81.
[462] Christine Fair, "Explaining Support for Sectarian Terrorism in Pakistan: Piety, Maslak and Sharia," *Religions* 6 (2015): 1137–67.

militant groups (the agent) fall out of alignment.[463] In this context, it examines the varying goals of different sectarian outfits. By doing so it provides substance to the claim that the political power of the Pakistani military establishment was curtailed by the very elements it had fostered to augment its influence over domestic politics and foreign policy. Divergent tendencies of militant groups as reflected in their propaganda materials continues to prevent the military from consolidating its influence over informal but significant networks of localised power and authority.

The sheer magnitude of militant organisations in Pakistan, both in terms of number and divergent goals, underlines the challenges of attaining a comprehensive understanding of their activities within Pakistan. In this regard, interviews with the officials at National Association for Counter Terrorism Activities (NACTA) in Islamabad proved indispensable in providing a snapshot of some of the most potent militant organisations in the country, including their multifarious splintering and organizational overlaps. At the same time, this chapter makes significant contributions towards understanding the trajectory of militancy through an as yet untapped resource of original propaganda materials. These include fliers, posters, announcements and missives from a range of militant groups with varying goals and tactics across the country. A critical analysis of these materials will demonstrate the divergent ways in which different groups operate and interact with each other as well as the state and civil society at large. The particular language and content of the materials is analysed under the broader themes of sectarian, anti-state, Kashmiri nationalist and cross-network affiliations in order to render insights into their points of convergence and divergence. These resources demonstrate that the sheer diversity of militant groups emerging in Pakistan after the Afghan-Soviet war reflected a wide

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[463] Stern, "Pakistan's Jihad Culture."

range of strategic goals, tactics and interests. This not only highlights the lack of homogeneity amongst the various strands of militant groups but also associated challenges faced by the military establishment in containing their activities and consequently in extending its own influence.

Mujahidin to the *Taliban*

Pakistan's direct involvement in Afghanistan could be linked to the failure of a Pakistan-sponsored coup under Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto in the spring of 1974, after which its Afghan perpetrators, including future *Mujahidin* commanders Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, Burhanuddin Rabbani, and Ahmad Shah Masud, fled to Pakistan. There they established their own political parties and began to organise a large-scale anti-communist resistance in exile guided by Naseerullah Babar (then Brigadier and Commander of the paramilitary Frontier Corps) under Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto's directives. [464] An ethnic Pashtun, Babar would in the coming years prove to be the most influential advocate of what was called Pakistan's 'forward policy' in Afghanistan. By his own admission he 'told Bhutto we must have some elements to influence events in Afghanistan in case there was trouble'. [465]

Pakistan's informal forward policy, confirmed by both civilian and military sources during this research, comprised three key elements: a) Internal stability, b) economic emancipation, and c) strategic depth against India. [466] Internal stability referred to countering the secessionist threat of an independent *Pashtunistan*, the associated rejection of the Durand Line and potentially dire implications for an ethnically diverse Pakistan. Pakistani leaders were acutely conscious that tribal and

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[464] General Naseerullah Babar and Colonel Imam interviews.
[465] Ibid.
[466] Interviews with Dr Ayesha Siddiqa-Agha, Independent Security Analyst and Author of *Military Inc., and Pakistan's Arms Procurement and Military Buildup 1979-1999 – In Search of a Policy*, Islamabad, 5 April 2006; General Aslam Beg interview.

ethnic loyalties of the Pashtuns often took precedence over their loyalty towards the Pakistani state. An ethnic Pashtun ally in Afghanistan was therefore considered vital in helping Pakistan to assimilate Pashtun clans within its borders.

Secondly, the ethnic affinity of a Pashtun dominant government in Afghanistan could foster a stable relationship to provide the economically struggling Pakistan with opportunities by opening up trade routes to the newly independent Central Asian Republics (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan). Pakistani leadership was drawn to the prospect of tapping into Central Asian markets for securing economically efficient energy sources and exporting Pakistani goods to bolster its faltering domestic economy. Gaining access to the Central Asian markets could potentially render Pakistan more competitive in the regional power game with Iran and India.

Thirdly, Pakistani leaders had since independence felt the need to gain strategic depth and a military advantage against neighbouring India. On her eastern flank, Pakistan shared a border with India with whom it had gone to war thrice already. Across its western frontier stood Afghanistan and a threatening Soviet military presence from 1979 in disconcertingly close proximity. Should they join forces against Pakistan, India and the Soviet Union could pose a potentially dangerous situation for the country's security profile. Thus, Pakistan's military contingency plans initially drawn up on the basis of fighting India had to include plans to counter the Soviet threat as well. According to a National Intelligence Survey Report by the CIA:

> The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 increased Pakistan's sense of vulnerability and led it to reassess its security policy and foreign relations…The Pakistanis fear that, if the Soviets consolidate their control over Afghanistan, they eventually will attempt to split Baluchistan from

Pakistan or even collaborate with India in a coordinated invasion to destroy Pakistan as an independent state.[467]

In the decades following General Zia's rule, this forward policy continued under successive military and civilian governments with some variations.

By the time Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto's daughter Benazir Bhutto came to power in 1993, however, Pakistan's costly Afghan policy had begun to look like an exercise in futility. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the newly independent Central Asian Republics presented Pakistan with a much-needed opportunity for economic emancipation. Benazir wanted to 'market Pakistan internationally as…the crossroads to the old silk roads of trade between Europe and Asia.' [468] Eager to carry forward her father's vision of opening up the trade routes to Central Asia, Benazir also enlisted the help of Bhutto's chief advisor on Afghan Policy – the now retired General Naseerullah Babar. 'Benazir was like a daughter to me, I had been very close to her father [Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto] and she trusted me explicitly. Therefore when she came to power I had virtually a free reign on directing her new Afghan Policy,' affirmed the formidable General during interview.[469] This ensured that despite the return of civilian government to Pakistan, there was continuity in the state's interest in maintaining influence in the Afghan diaspora, and in the political military-civilian symbiosis.

In 1994, however, Afghanistan was burning and access to the emerging Central Asian markets through the Afghan territories was constrained by fierce fighting between different factions of *Mujahidin* post-Soviet exit. The Afghan *jihad* had been instrumental in arming all ethnic groups in the country. The opportunity to

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[467] CIA National Intelligence Estimate, 1985.
[468] Coll, *Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan and Bin Laden, From the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001*, 290.
[469] General Naseerullah Babar interview.

rule the country had turned these former allies into bitter rivals. As early as 1992, internecine fighting was noticeable, with the capital Kabul being surrounded by militia belonging to different *Mujahidin* factions.

Thus far, the ISI had supported Hekmatyar in a bid to help his Pashtun majority group to power and to establish a Pakistan-friendly government in Afghanistan. However, Hekmatyar had clearly outlived his usefulness by conceding major territory to Rabbani, and grew steadily unpopular even within his own faction due to his extremist religious views. The former *Mujahidin*, titled 'freedom fighters'[470] by US President Ronald Reagan, had now turned into brutal warlords – unscrupulously and frequently switching both sides and loyalties. 'Kabul rapidly disintegrated into a battlefield, split into factional areas of control. Rival *Mujahidin* faced off against each other, sometimes no further apart than at opposite corners of the same street.'[471] Similarly, southern Afghanistan and Kandahar had descended into utter lawlessness under numerous petty-warlords and bandits. It was around this time that that the ISI began to realise the military and political implications of the emerging *Taliban* movement in Afghanistan.

The name *Taliban* came to be adopted by the Afghan students receiving religious instruction in *madaris* in Pakistan – particularly in the Pushto-speaking belt along the border with Afghanistan. The literal translation of the Arabic word *Talib,* 'one who seeks,' is derived from *Talab,* meaning 'to seek.' *Taliban*, is the Arabic and Pashto plural of *Talib* – further derived from the Urdu phrase *Talib-i-Ilm*, meaning 'one who seeks knowledge.' Many of these *Taliban*, like their leader Mullah Omer,

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[470] President Ronald Reagan, 'Remarks at the Annual Dinner of the Conservative Political Action Conference,' 1 March 1985, The American Presidency Project. Retrieved 23 January 2017, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=38274.
[471] Kathy Gannon, *I Is for Infidel – From Holy War to Holy Terror: 18 Years Inside Afghanistan* (New York: Public Affairs, 2005), 12.

were from amongst the *Mujahidin* cadres trying to return to a life of normalcy after the Soviet departure from Afghanistan. Most of these veterans were familiar with each other from their shared experiences in Pakistani *madrassas* during the war.

Significantly, that many of these so-called *madaris* such as the *Jamiat-Ulama-Islam* (JUI) Maulana Sami-ul-Haq's infamous madrassa (*Haqqania*) were from their very inception conceived and created as militant training camps. These paramilitary groups were specifically designed to provide manpower and religious legitimacy for *jihadist* operations during the Soviet-Afghan conflict and solicit funds from all over the Muslim world, instead of providing religious, educational instruction alone.[472] It was from these JUI-sponsored *madaris* that the majority of the *Taliban* leadership emerged in 1994.

Following their initial success in Kandahar, the *Taliban* were rapidly joined by thousands of young Afghan volunteers from Pakistani *madaris* in NWFP and Baluchistan. Pakistani volunteers sharing the Taliban's vision of a pure Islamic state from the same madaris augmented their numbers. By 1995 some 20,000 Afghans and hundreds of (mainly Pashtun) Pakistani madrassa students had crossed the border to join the *Taliban* ranks. By the end of 1996, the *Taliban* controlled of 22 of the 31 Afghan provinces, including the historically Pashtun stronghold, Kabul. The indomitable Mullah Omer, leader of the *Taliban*, then proudly declared: "War is a tricky game. The *Taliban* took five months to capture one province but then six provinces fell to us in only ten days. Now we are in control of 22 provinces including Kabul."[473]

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[472] Ahmed, *Religious Radicalism and Security in South Asia*, 115.
[473] Rahimullah Yousafzai, "The Leader Nobody Knows," *The News*, March 30, 1997.

By this time the ISI's relationship with Hekmatyar had become convoluted with his repeated failure to capture Kabul amidst funding shortages. At the same time Pakistan had also begun to wage a low level war of attrition with India in the disputed territory of Kashmir at the start of the 1990s and relied heavily on Islamist training camps in the territories under Hekmatyar's control to support its new covert *jihad*. Under instructions from General Babar thus, General Javed Ashraf Qazi, the new Director-General ISI, invited an Afghan *Taliban* delegation to the ISI headquarters in Rawal Pindi to discuss potential avenues of cooperation.[474] Due to the closeness of ISI operatives such as Colonel Imam and senior military commanders such as General Naseerullah Babar the *Taliban* were came to be perceived as 'Babar's Private Army,' a titled proudly claimed by both Imam and Babar in interview.[475] The *Taliban* requested logistical support, showed an interest in importing fuel from Pakistan, and sought exemptions from trade rules – demands to which the General acceded.[476]

This marked the beginning of ISI's direct, albeit covert, support for the *Taliban* in Afghanistan. In the following months, Benazir began to receive increasing requests from the ISI for covert aid to the *Taliban*. In an interview she later admitted:

> I became slowly slowly sucked into it…It started out with a little fuel, then it became machinery, and spare parts for the *Taliban*'s captured airplanes and tanks. Next ISI made requests for trade concessions…then it became money direct from the Pakistani treasury. [477]

Forged over nearly two decades of life as refugees and social dislocation engendered by war, the *Taliban*'s links with the Pakistani state and society were diverse and pervasive. The shared Pashtun culture from the tribal milieu settled along the

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[474] General Naseerullah Babar interview.
[475] Interview with Hameed Haroon, Editor-in-Chief (2004-2008) and Chief Executive Officer (2008-Current), *Dawn* Group of Newspapers, Karachi, 3 April 2006.
[476] Coll, *Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan and Bin Laden, From the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001*, 291.
[477] Coll, 293.

Pakistan-Afghanistan border fostered these links. Indeed, many of the *Taliban* carried Pakistani identity cards, even voting in the 1997 Pakistani elections in Baluchistan for their favourite Islamist party – the *Jamiat-e-Ulama-i-Islam* (JUI). Of significance was also the ideological and practical inspiration derived by indigenous Pakistani militant groups from the relative successes of the *Taliban* in Afghanistan.

From *Jihad* Without to *Jihad* Within

Jihadi organisations and training camps continued to operate in Pakistan and established their networks deep into major urban centers such as Karachi and cities in Punjab after the Soviet-Afghan war.[478] When the United States performed a speedy exit from the region, having attained its strategic goal with the defeat of the Soviets in Afghanistan, it did so without dismantling the militant infrastructure and *jihadist* discourse it had helped generate. A number of militant outfits were diverted by the Pakistani state to the disputed Kashmir territories in order to continue the *jihad* against Indian forces[479] as soon as the Afghan *jihad* had ended. Other splinter groups such as the Deobandi *Sipah-e-Sahaba-Pakistan* (SSP) looked inwards to counter the rising social and economic influence of their sectarian rivals (particularly the *Shiʿa* community) within Pakistan. The fact that almost all terrorist groups in Pakistan eventually emerged from within the Deobandi school of thought is significant in understanding the intersection of sectarian violence with the conventional networks of socio-economic influence, especially in Punjab.[480]

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[478] ICG Asia Report, "Pakistan: Madrassas, Extremism and the Military."

[479] Deobandi Kashmir-oriented militant organisations include *Jaish-e-Mohammad* (JM) and *Harkat-ul-Ansar/Harkat-ul-Mujahidin (*HUA/HUM) and their splinter groups. Kashmiri groups have operational and personnel linkages with Deobandi anti-*Shiʿa* groups as well as the Deobandi political party *Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam* (JUI). Groups operating in Kashmir under the *Jamaat-i-Islami* (JI) banner include *Hizb-ul-Mujahidin, al Badr*, and related factions. Similarly, the *Lashkar-e-Tayyiba* (LeT), which began its operations in Kashmir in 1986, is affiliated with the *Ahl-i-Hadith* sub-sect.

[480] Syed et al., *Faith-Based Violence and Deobandi Militancy in Pakistan*, 94.

With the post-Zia democratic era in political disarray, the articulation of Pakistan's national security agenda continued to be dominated by the military establishment. Contributions of the US-Saudi-financed and Pakistani-backed militia towards the success of the Afghan *Mujahidin* went a long way in proving their value as a formidable strategic asset against the threat of Indian aggression. Around the same time, public discontent in Kashmir began to simmer with the corrupt, Indian congress-backed Chief Minister Farooq Abdullah coming to power through allegedly rigged elections in 1987.

ʿAskari / Jihadi Tanzimat

The military experience rendered by the conflict in Afghanistan and then Kashmir, the ideological impetus provided by the Pakistani, Arab, Iranian, and US governments, and the patronage of local religio-political groups in Pakistan all facilitated the diversification and multiplication of numerous militant organisations operating in Pakistan. For instance, students from the large Deobandi, Binori Town *madrassa* in Karachi (*Jamiat-ul-Uloom-ul-Islamia*) were actively engaged in the Afghan resistance and subsequently developed connections with *jihadist* groups such as the *Hizb-i-Islami* under Younis Khalis and Jalaluddin Haqqani (of the infamous Haqqani network).

Fair underscores the difficulty of analysing support for *askari tanzeems*, complicated by the fact that even though they may not adhere to the same interpretive traditions, theological divisions between militant groups do not match their patterns of cooperation. [481] Deobandi militant groups usually share overlapping membership with other groups such as the Afghan Taliban, the Pakistani Taliban, and Kashmir-focused

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[481] Fair, "Explaining Support for Sectarian Terrorism in Pakistan: Piety, Maslak and Sharia."

groups such as *Jaish-e-Muhammad* (JeM). They on occasion even served as sub-contractors for al-Qaeda in Pakistan. For instance organisations such as LeJ (Ahl-e-Hadith) and SSP (Deobandi) are seen primarily as sectarian, however they were also been involved in anti-state suicide attacks in FATA and against western targets in Afghanistan.[482] There are also instances of cross-network cooperation despite overt hostility between support for groups that follow the Deobandi creed and those that follow the *Ahl-e-Hadith* school for instance such as the LeT and LeJ based upon shared strategic interests.

A thematic overview of the organisational and operational trajectories of some of the most prominent militant groups in Pakistan can help engender a better assessment of their goals and methodologies, which affects their relationship with each other, with transnational Islamist militant organisations such as al-Qaeda and the Islamic State (rebranded as *Daesh* in South Asia) and with the praetorian Pakistani state. Despite the sheer multiplicity of militant groups in Pakistan, they can be loosely distinguished on the basis of their strategic focus.

The Kashmir *Jihad*

For the Pakistani military smarting against India's capture of a part of the Siachin glacier in the east of Kashmir in 1984, the bourgeoning insurgency in Kashmir was an opportunity to 'pay back the Indians in their own coin.'[483] General Mahmood's admission reaffirms what many in contemporary scholarship refer to as the military's 'revisionist agenda', allegedly responsible for its dichotomous experience with militant Islamists.[484] However, it is important to remember that civilian leaders such

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[482] Christine Fair, "Militant Recruitment in Pakistan: Implications for Al-Qaeda and Other Organisations," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism* 26, no. 6 (2004).
[483] General Mahmood Ahmad interview.
[484] Fair, *Fighting to the End: The Pakistan Army's Way of War*.

as Liaquat Ali Khan and Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto articulated the antipathy towards India much earlier. In fact some accounts hold Bhutto directly responsible for convincing General Ayub, of the necessity to launch *Operation Gibraltar*[485] in Kashmir, which then triggered the Indo-Pakistan war of 1965.[486]

Through the ISI, the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) fighters, composed mainly of indigenous Kashmiris, received both weapons and military instruction in hastily-set up training camps on the Pakistani side of the Line of Control (LOC). Due to the JKLF's aversion to state control, however, the ISI soon shifted its support towards the more politically amenable Kashmiri branch of the *Jamaat-i-Islami*. This served as a precursor to a qualitative shift in the resistance from nationalist to ideological, essentially affecting an Islamisation of the Kashmiri insurgency. The militant wing of the JI, the *Hizb-ul-Mujahidin* (HuM), advocating a union of Kashmir and Pakistan, was widely seen as the prime beneficiary of logistical and financial support from the Pakistani state - a fact corroborated by the personal accounts of eminent journalists in the field.[487] Arguably the most prominent militant group fuelling the Kashmiri resistance, the HuM epitomised the merger of a nationalist cause with a religious one as its primary agenda. The utility of Islamising a resistance for heightened impetus and recruitment potential had already been proven in the anti-Soviet Afghan jihad.

HuM's propaganda materials, particularly fliers regularly found circulating in Kashmir, demonstrate congruence with the military's tacit endorsement of the

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[485] Code-name for a military strategy that facilitated guerrilla attacks to instigate an uprising by the Muslim majority population of Indian-controlled Kashmir. The operation involved volunteers from the Pakistan army and local civilians, mainly those belonging to from the Pakistani-administered side of Kashmir.
[486] Wolpert, *Zulfi Bhutto of Pakistan: His Life and Times*, 116.
[487] Interview with Mohammad Riaz, Afghan Correspondent, *The Frontier Post*, Peshawar, 9 April 2006 and 22 December 2010; Saleem Shahzad interview

Kashmiri *jihad*. Fliers emerging in Srinagar during the 2014 and again in 2017 elections, warned locals against participating in political activities aptly reflected the combination of an anti-India resistance with a *takfiri* agenda. Titled 'election boycott' the fliers contained arbitrary quotations from the Quran such as 'those who do not follow the laws of God, stand condemned as unbelievers' as a pretext for rejecting legitimacy of the electoral system under the Indian Constitution. They then went on to extol sacrifices of the insurgents they celebrate to as 'freedom fighters' for laying down their lives for Kashmir's freedom and the noble cause of Islam. Ultimately they called for a boycott of state elections, threatening 'dire consequences' for all those who dare to participate in the political process under the aegis of the Indian state.[488]

As a case study of militant Islamism deployed to fuel a nationalist insurgency the HuM is interesting in the variety of concerns and issues it raised in its propaganda materials. It overarching goals reflected in all its propaganda materials are to challenge the writ of the Indian state over Kashmir. In this cause it uses conventional militant tactics of publicising Indian atrocities, especially upon of women, youth and children, as a means of justifying its resistance to the state. It denigrates all those seen to be cooperating with the Indian forces as traitors, agents and 'sell-outs', even singling out some of them by name.[489] The fliers contain *jihadist* assertions such as '*Shariat or Shahadat*' (Sharia or Martyrdom), buttressed by Quranic or Arabic quotations '*Al ardh Allah, Wa al Hukm Allah*' (the land is Allah's, it must be ruled by Allah's law), and even more generic Islamist edicts such as banning of alcohol, drugs, shutting-down beauty salons and asking educational institutions to impose '*purdah*'

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[488] *Election Boycott,* Flier of the *Hizb-ul-Mujahidin Jammu & Kashmir 2014.* Retrieved 22 August 2017, https://www.telegraphindia.com/1140501/images/01srinagar3_191656.jpg
[489] *Eid-ul-Azha Message*, Flier of the *Hizb-ul-Mujahidin Jammu & Kashmir*. Retrieved 14 October 2017, http://media2.intoday.in/indiatoday/images/stories/letter-story_660_102513025604.jpg

(seclusion) on women.[490] At the same time, HuM fliers also called on Muslim women to join the resistance and take up arms.[491] In accordance with the various aims and assertions, the language used in these materials ranges from triumphant (extolling the virtues of the *jihadist* cause especially relating to martyrdom) to threatening (using threat of violence as a coercive mechanism).

Pakistan's patronage of Kashmiri militant groups such as the HuM could also be inferred from these materials. The fact that the missives circulated by the HuM actually featured letterheads, detailing addresses and official telephone numbers of its branch offices in the heart of the federal capital, demonstrate that it is allowed to operate with relative impunity.[492] Specific focus on the Kashmiri nationalist struggle, which falls within the Pakistani military's revisionist inclinations, however distinguishes organisations like the HuM from more deviant, underground groups such as *Lashkar-e-Islam* (LI).

The shadowy organisation LI in its propaganda materials appears more independent from the Pakistani state than the HuM, not least due to evidence of fundraising through illicit trade. Receipts with the LI logo discovered during the Pakistan Army's *Operation Khyber-2* in 2015 demonstrated an organised drive to raise funding from the lucrative trade in narcotics, complete with details of quantity, estimated value per kilo and the references through whom the transactions were facilitated.[493] Due to the base nature of their funding and the challenges it presents

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[490] *Shariah or Shahadat*, Flier of the *Hizb-ul-Mujahidin Jammu & Kashmir*. Retrieved 14 October 2017, http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/hizbul-posters-call-for-shut-down-of-beauty-parlours-in-j-k/1/453836.html

[491] *For the Blood of Martyrs*, Flier of the *Hizb-ul-Mujahidin Jammu & Kashmir*. Retrieved 14 October 2017, http://s2.firstpost.in/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/LeT-poster1_Ishfaq-Naseem.jpg

[492] *Independence or Martyrdom*, Flier of the *Hizb-ul-Mujahidin Jammu & Kashmir*. Retrieved 22 January 2017, http://img01.ibnlive.in/ibnlive/uploads/2013/04/hijbul_mujahiddin_2904.jpg.

[493] Receipt recovered during Operation Khyber-2 shows the banned *Lashkar-i-Islam* collected toll on contraband drugs passing through Tirah valley. Retrieved 18 October 2017, https://www.dawn.com/news/1192007

towards law-enforcement agencies, it is therefore highly unlikely that organisations such a LI would operate under state sponsorship.

In contrast to HuM the fliers circulated by *Lashkar-i-Islam* focused primarily on the tactical element of the insurgency in Kashmir, issuing direct threats and promising direct reprisals on anyone perceived to be colluding with the Indian state, with less reliance on ideology for justification. Islamism therefore featured thinly as a strategic driver as opposed than a religious rationale for LI's activities. For instance one LI flier circulating in the Pulwama district of Srinagar simply stated 'All migrants/RSS agents leave or face death! No space for Kashmiri Pandits who want another Israel in Kashmir to kill Kashmiri Muslims. Double/triple your security, be ready for target killing. You will die.'[494] Another circular identified telecoms companies as a key target, due to their involuntary role in the capture and deaths of a number of prominent jihadists at the hands of the Indian forces. Here again LI's strategy seemed to derive from on tactical as opposed to ideological imperatives. It blamed the telecoms network as a 'conspiracy' that had weakened armed resistance in the valley and more broadly the wider society.[495] Making good upon the threat following this communication, the LI claimed responsibility for an attack in June 2015 on a telecom franchise, killing two employees, in the Sopore district of the valley. A local news agency quoted the group making a generic *jihadist* claim: 'it is the outfit of *Mujahideen-e-Islam* (warriors of Islam) and is active for the sake of Allah' whilst claiming kinship with other banned Pakistani militant groups such as

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[494] *Warning for Kashimiri Pundits*, Flier from Lashkar-e-Islam threatening Kashmiri Pundits in Pulwama district in Kashmir. Retrieved 18 October 2017, http://www.khaskhabar.com/picture-news/news-threat-for-kashmiri-pandits-in-pulwama-by-lashkar-e-islam-1-66476-KKN.html
[495] Toufiq Rashid, 'Lashkar-e-Islam Claims Responsibility for Sopore killings, Condemns Geelani', *The Hindustan Times.* http://www.hindustantimes.com/india/lashkar-e-islam-claims-responsibility-for-sopore-killings-condemns-geelani/story-i0pBXWa93kAhGZnjEvPmTJ.html

Lashkar-e-Tayyiba and *Jaish-e-Mohammad*.[496] By affiliating with groups such as LeT and JeM, violently opposed to any form of control or direction from the Pakistani military, LI falls within the group of break-away militant organisations that present substantial and continued challenges for the assertion of broad-based control by the military establishment.

Sectarian / *Takfiri* **Groups**

Arguably some of the most significant challenges presented towards domestic security came from the quarters of the country's violent, sectarian outfits such as the *Tehrik-i-Taliban* Pakistan (TTP), *Lashkar-e-Jhangvi* (LeJ), *Jamiat-ul-Ahrar* (JuA) and *Sipah-e-Sahaba* Pakistan (SSP) etc. amongst smaller lesser known groups. The intensification of sectarian discourse during General Zia's Islamisation drive during the 1980s resulted in a multitude of disparate militant Islamist groups propagating competing, often conflicting, views on Islam and its applications in the modern state. The vast majority of these organisations belonged to the puritan Deobandi school. As such, from 2005 to 2011, there were 29 attacks on Sufi shrines, and in two years between 2010-2011 alone 128 people were killed and 443 injured in 22 attacks on (mostly Sufi) shrines and tombs in Pakistan. [497]

At the same time close affiliation with the Saudis during the Soviet-Afghan war meant that a deeply *anti-Shia* sentiment was condoned, and in some cases even contrived, by the military regime during that decade. Upon deeper examination, it becomes apparent that eventually the sectarian applications of *Islamic* edicts were often defined by very practical socio-economic and political considerations, whether directed against the democratic political system that was deemed difficult to access

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[496] Ibid.
[497] Syed et al., *Faith-Based Violence and Deobandi Militancy in Pakistan*, 236.

otherwise, the economic prosperity of the minority *Qadiyani* or *Ahmadiyya* community, or the predominance of the *Shi'a* community over agricultural landholdings in interior Punjab. According to one account Deobandi seminaries in southern Punjab were 'instrumental in paving the way for Deobandi Islam to displace the syncretic ethos reflected in the local version of Islam', in addition playing an active role in turning the region into the biggest recruiting ground for the *jihadi lashkars* (militiamen) operating in Afghanistan and Kashmir.[498] It is also suggested that the Bhawalpur district in Punjab, contributed as much to *jihad* as some districts in the KPK (previously Frontier) province.[499]

The SSP, for instance, was founded in September 1985 at Jhang (interior Punjab), with the backing of the military government to counter the rising influence of *Shi'a* Iran, benefiting from financial support from both Saudi Arabia and Iraq. It emerged from within the activist ranks of the religio-political party JUI, which publically agreed with their aims but not with their methods, and thus kept the nature of their relationship ambiguous. This did not stop a number of SSP members from (unsuccessfully) running for local elections under the banner of the JUI that was affiliated with Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto's PPP between 1993 and 1996.[500]

The socio-economic rationale behind the emergence of the SSP lay in the feudal structure of interior Punjab, where the majority of landholdings belonged to powerful *Shi'a* families, thereby ensuring their political and economic prominence in a *Sunni* majority area. As the number and influence of *Sunni* traders rose along with that of shopkeepers and transport operators in the region the competition for access to resources, social status and political power began to be framed in terms of opposing

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[498] Syed et al, 83.
[499] Ayesha Siddiqa, "Bhawalpur's Two Ends," *Daily Times Online*, December 25, 2006.
[500] 'Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan,' Mapping Militant Organizations, updated 15 February 2012. Retrieved 24 January 2017, http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/147

sectarian identities. The SSP's principal goal was to assert the apostasy of the *Shiʿa* community and to transform Pakistan into a *Sunni* Muslim state following the *Shariʿa* system.

The SSP fought alongside the *Taliban* in Afghanistan against Masud and the *Shiʿa* Hazaras, and has been held responsible for the massacre of ethnic Hazaras and Iranian diplomats in northern Afghanistan from 1998 onwards and more recently in Baluchistan. It was banned by the Musharraf government in January 2002 but continued to operate its affiliated *madaris* in KPK. The SSP is also vociferously anti-state for the tolerance of religious minorities. The outfit was reportedly renamed *Millat-e-Islamia* Pakistan after its proscription.

Another notorious sectarian militant group the *Lashkar-e-Jhangvi*, emerged from a split within from the SSP in 1996. Led by Riaz Basra, an SSP veteran said to have lived in Kabul until 2001, the LeJ comprised an extremely decentralised group believed to have been responsible for multiple terrorist attacks resulting at *Shiʿa* mosques. The LeJ also claimed responsibility for numerous assassinations and target killings of high profile individuals, diplomats, military personnel, physicians, lawyers, high-ranking police officers, and *Shiʿa* preachers. Fliers circulated by the LeJ bore chilling testimony to the group's intentions. The contents of a flier titled 'Message of Death' in 2008 bluntly outlined the group's violent methodology i.e. that all *Shi'a* were considered worthy of killing unless they 'convert' to *Sunni* beliefs with a pure heart, and that they were liable to pay a *Jizya* (minority tax) to a representative of the LeJ in order to avoid persecution.[501]

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[501] *Message of Death,* LeJ in association with TTP issues death threats to the *Shi'a* community as declared unbelievers according to a collective fatwa issued by Deobandi clerics, justifying the abduction, rape and murder of *Shi'a* women. Retrieved 22 October 2017, http://www.shiachat.com/forum/uploads/monthly_09_2008/post-19560-1220627543.jpg

This communication was significant in three key ways. Firstly, it highlighted with absolute clarity the nature of the threat LeJ posed for the country's defence establishment. In addition to justifying sectarian killings the group also identified *Shi'a* 'mothers, sisters, daughters and wives' as legitimate targets and 'plunder, rape and assault' as a viable methodology. Secondly, by undertaking to collect tax independently LeJ attempted to supplant the conventional institutional function of the state, directly challenging it in the process, and demonstrated its growing financial autonomy. Thirdly, by signing off the flier 'in affiliation with the *Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan*' it indicated a strategic convergence with other sectarian outfits, thereby magnifying the collective threat presented to the county's security establishment.[502] The flier referred to official sanction, a '*fatwa*' issued by hard-line clerics as the ideological basis of such violent recourse. A collective *fatwa* issued by twenty-five Sunni clerics in Baluchistan in 2011 also fortified the *takfiri* stance of organisations such as the LeJ by asserting that 'all *Shi'a* are unbelievers and they should be treated as non-Muslims' thereby legitimising their violent persecution.

With the passage of time LeJ became more brazen with its threats and tactics. For instance a flier circulated by the organisation in April 2012 declared all *Shi'a* as unbelievers and therefore legitimate targets. At the same time it openly boasted about its successful operations, in particular targeting the Hazara *Shi'a* community in Baluchistan. LeJ also used the threat of reprisals, suicide attacks and bombings, to demand the release of some of its operatives detained by the security services. Another flier from 2012 promised suicide '*fidayeen*' missions against the *Shi'a* community, warning them against participating in religious processions during the month of Moharram – traditionally the month of mourning for the *Shi'a* community.

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[502] Ibid.

Referring to the historical setting of the assassination of Prophet Muhammad's grandson the LeJ declared that 'the *mujahideen* of *Lashkar-e-Jhangvi* will make Baluchistan another *Karbala* for the *Shi'a community'.*[503]

The rapidly deteriorating security situation in Baluchistan, particularly vis-à-vis the *Hazara Shi'a* community, reflected the growing capabilities of groups such as LeJ to make real their threats, resulting in a corresponding deterioration in local law and order. More recently, LeJ's affiliation with the Islamic State (*Daesh*), in addition to TTP, represented a magnified challenge towards the effectiveness of country's security establishment and it ability to mitigate the collective fallouts of dissident, anti-state Islamist elements.[504] Not only did this reflect the inability of the praetorian authorities to shut down an officially declared terrorist organisation but the fact that the LeJ continued to openly maintain links with like-minded groups such as *Jaish-e-Mohammad* (JeM), *Harkat-ul-Mujahidin (HuM)*, *al-Qaʿida* network and the Afghan Taliban reflected dangerous levels of autonomy such organisations were able to exercise beyond the reach of the military and intelligence agencies.

In response to the rise of *Sunni* sectarian movements, *Shiʿa* paramilitary groups also arose in Pakistan during the 1990s. Militant organisations such as the *Sipah-i-Mohammad Pakistan* (SMP – Army of Mohammad Pakistan) splintered out of the politically oriented *Shiʿa Tehrik-i-Jafaria Pakistan* (TJP) in 1994. Banned in 2002, the TJP later began functioning again under the name of *Tehrik-i-Islami* (TI – Islamic movement). Reacting to the inability of the TJP to protect the *Shiʿa* community from persecution by militant *Sunni* groups such as the SSP, the SMP recruited members from the rural areas of Punjab to conduct violent reprisals against

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[503] Open Letter from Amir Khalid Khurasan of the Islamic State delivering ultimatum with death threats for *Shi'a* community in Pakistan and declaring solidarity with LeJ and TTP. Retrieved 24 January 2017, https://mnnonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/FMI_ISIS-letter-03-23-15.jpg
[504] Ibid.

*Sunni*s. Allegedly financed by the Iranian government until 1996, by 1998 the SMP (banned by the Pakistan government in 2001) was unable to withstand infiltration by Pakistan intelligence services and due to internal differences disintegrated as an organised group.[505] It did, however, leave behind a scattering of uncontrolled and extremely violent elements from its militant ranks, which continue to conduct independent reprisals for attacks upon *Shi'a* communities especially on the ethnic Hazara community based in Baluchistan.

It is important to note that violent reprisals by militant *Shi'a* groups such as the *Millat-e-Jafaria* were seldom initiated without provocation, and usually carried out in retaliation to the persecution of members of the *Shi'a* community.[506] Moreover, in contrast with the divergent *Sunni 'ulama*, the *Shi'a* clergy demonstrated organisational conformity, prudence and pragmatism by exerting their influence mainly through constitutional and parliamentary channels and projecting a united front when representing communal interests.[507]

Another religious minority that bears the brunt of *Takfiri* persecution at the hands of sectarian militant outfits is that of the *Ahmadiyya* community. Contemporary sectarian groups such as the *Alami Majlis-e-Tahaffuz-e-Khatam-e-Nabuwwat* (AMTKN – Universal Organisation to Safeguard the Finality of Prophethood), TTP, LeJ, SSP and JeM have been undeniably inspired by Maulana Maududi's systematic vilification of the *Ahmadiyya* community. However they escalated Maududi's ideological antagonism into a rationale for indiscriminate violence against the

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[505] Zahab and Roy, *Islamist Networks: The Afghan-Pakistan Connection.*
[506] *Millat-e*-Jafaria Quetta issued public condemnation of militant attack on a *Shi'a*-owned jewelry store in Quetta. Retrieved 24 January 2017, https://lubpak.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/0021-e1349801339720.jpg.
[507] Official directive for unity issued by the *Wafaq ul Madaris Al Shia* Pakistan advocating support for passing of the 'System of Justice' regulation led by an eminent *Shi'a* cleric in the National Assembly. Retrieved 24 January 2017, https://alisalmanalvi.files.wordpress.com/2012/04/jamia-tul-muntair2.jpg

community. In this the Pakistani state, its civil and military leadership, has been historically complicit. The Second Amendment to the Constitution of Pakistan, promulgated under Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto's rule formally declared the *Ahmadiyya* as non-Muslims:

> A person who does not believe in the absolute and unqualified finality of The Prophethood of Muhammad (Peace be upon him), the last of the Prophets or claims to be a Prophet, in any sense of the word or of any description whatsoever, after Muhammad (Peace be upon him), or recognizes such a claimant as a Prophet or religious reformer, is not a Muslim for the purposes of the Constitution or law [508]

This codification of religious intolerance into the fabric of the state served as a precursor to the arbitrary application of the country's blasphemy laws to justify the targeting of professionals such as lawyers, politicians and human rights activists, escalating after General Zia's Islamisation drive.[509]

In his detailed examination on the politics of religious exclusion, focusing particularly on the *Ahmadiyya* community, Qasmi demonstrates how a 'theological polemic was transformed into a political issue demanding direct action from the state.'[510] He shows how Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto epitomised a modernist retreat in an ideological encounter, and attempted to reconcile the political dilemmas he faced as a liberal constitutionalist in the wake of another *anti-Ahmadiyya* uprising in 1974. By putting the question of what he called the '90 year old problem'[511] of the *Ahmadiyya* in front of the parliament instead of the courts or an inquiry commission, Bhutto

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[508] Ministry of Law and Justice, *"Second Amendment"*, Government of Pakistan, (GoPAK) *Electronic Government of Pakistan Archives*. Retrieved 22 October 2017, http://www.pakistani.org/pakistan/constitution/amendments/2amendment.html

[509] *In Islamic shariʿa the punishment for blasphemy against the Holy Prophet is only death.* TTP pamphlets. Retrieved 24 January 2017, https://lubpak.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/ttp-leaflet.jpg. These were scattered around the crime scene of the murder of the Federal Minister for Minorities Affairs, Shahbaz Bhatti, who was killed in Islamabad for supporting amendments to the country's blasphemy laws. His death came nearly two months after Punjab Governor Salman Taseer's assassination supporting the case of Aasia Bibi, a Christian woman who was given the death sentence for allegedly committing blasphemy.

[510] Qasmi, *The Ahmadis and the Politics of Religious Exclusion in Pakistan*.

[511] Qasmi, 178.

inadvertently capitulated to the pressure exerted by the Islamist lobby both at home and from their wealthy patrons in the Arab world. Thus section 295 (a) of the Pakistani Constitution was made to stipulate that it was punishable for a Muslim to propagate against the concept of the finality of prophethood. Since this excluded the non-Muslim community, which the *Ahmadiyya* were now considered, Maududi suggested the law should be extended to everybody. This effectively suggested that the *Ahmadiyya* community be essentially banned from propagating their religious beliefs, directly contradicting another stipulation in the constitution, which safeguarded minority rights especially with regards to religious beliefs and creed. Ultimately as Qasmi shows Maududi got his way by getting the *Ahmadiyya* declared non-Muslims, tying it to the larger question of an Islamic constitution for Pakistan and then 'resolved' within a constitutional framework.[512] In 1984, General Zia passed an ordinance that disallowed the *Ahmadiyya* even to *pose* as Muslims.

The Pakistani Constitution in itself thus formally discriminates against the *Ahmadiyya* by prohibiting them from 'indirectly or directly posing as Muslim.'[513] In fact it is mandatory for Pakistani Muslim citizens applying for passports to sign an explicit statement that states that the founder of the *Ahmadiyya* community is an 'imposter' and that the *Ahmadiyya* are non-Muslims. Militant groups continue to escape accountability for the indiscriminate victimisation of religious minorities under the de-facto cover of Pakistan's *Blasphemy Law.* Section 295-C of the Penal Code, makes the death penalty mandatory for crimes relating to blasphemy. Under this law,

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[512] Qasmi, 95.
[513] Section 298-B, C, *Pakistan Penal Code|*(Act XLV of 1860), Retrieved 09 May 2018, http://www.pakistani.org/pakistan/legislation/1860/actXLVof1860.html

Ahmadiyya belief in the prophethood of Mirza Ghulam Ahmad is considered blasphemous insofar as it 'defiles the name of Prophet Muhammad.'[514]

Even though the persecution of the community at the hands of radical Islamists was not a new phenomenon, the escalation of violence in recent years has been phenomenal. For instance in May 2010 the Punjabi Taliban, a regional affiliate of the TTP claimed responsibility for an armed attack on two *Ahmadiyya* mosques in Lahore, killing ninety-four people and injuring more than a hundred. The fact that the provincial government failed to remove banners seeking the death of '*Qadiyanis*' (derogatory term used for the *Ahmadiyya*) on the main thoroughfares of Lahore prior to the attacks demonstrated their complicity in the deteriorating law and order situation.

Leaflets by a group calling themselves *fidayeen* of Al-Qaeda and Punjab Taliban dropped at the site of the assassination of the Minorities Minister (who also happened be of Christian faith) Shahbaz Bhatti in 2011 defiantly claimed responsibility for his murder proclaiming that 'in *Sharia* blasphemy relating to the Prophet Mohammad is punishable only by death'.[515] Undoubtedly emboldened by the inaction of the state, weeks after this assassination, more fliers against the *Ahmadiyya* by the AMTKN appeared, with very similar content. Pakistan at the time was being governed by the third-time democratically elected Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif – hence under civilian leadership. The complacency of the state in condoning such damaging sectarian extremism was evident by the fact that this flier with direct death threats issued against the *Ahmadiyya* community had included the location of their head-office (mentioned three times on the same page) without any fear of reprisal.

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[514] Section 295-C, Pakistan Penal Code.
[515] *In Islamic Shariʿa the Punishment for Blasphemy Against the Holy Prophet is Only Death*, TTP pamphlets. Retrieved 24 January 2017, https://lubpak.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/ttp-leaflet.jpg.

The leaflet mentions past victims as a portend of future operations targeting the community and then openly states that the AMTKN has compiled a 'hit list' with names of the children and residential details of future victims, which it allegedly shared with like-minded militant groups. The leaflet also mentions owners of a cloth house gunned down by militants in the preceding year as an exemplar. This document is significant also since it demonstrates a level of collaboration between LeJ, JeM and TTP amongst other groups against the *Ahmadiyya:*

> Your names and addresses have been forwarded to Lashkar Jhangvi, Taliban, Jaish-e-Muhammad and other religious organizations for further action if you do not accept Islam. You have our open permission to show this letter to any intelligence agency or police station to obtain security. You will not be spared. We hope that you will quit Ahmadiyyat and accept the shield of Islam to save you from all the hazards of this life and the Hereafter.[516]

Another hate-pamphlet labelling members of the Ahmadiyya community as *Wajibul Qatl* (liable for murder), and inciting people to attack followers of the faith was widely circulated by the so-called All-Pakistan Students *Khatam-e-Nubuwat* Federation in June 2011. These were openly distributed in Faisalabad, Punjab's industrial hub and targeted prominent professionals. It stated 'O Muslim Brothers!!! We need to identify some people (*Ahmadiyya*) among us, who are alluring us. Their punishment is Death (Murder)', furthermore 'Killing these people in an open market is *Jihad* and virtue.' They even go to the extent of making contingent 'mediation from Hazrat (Prophet) Muhammad at the day of judgement' upon such acts of terror.[517] This pamphlet appeared again in 2016 with some edits. This time the document

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[516] *Qadaniyat is a Deadly Poison,* pamphlets issued by the All-Pakistan Students Khatam-e-Nabbuwat Federation. Retrieved 24 October 2017. https://www.rabwah.net/radicals-distribute-jihadi-fliers-against-ahmadis-in-faisalabad/
[517] Ibid.

contained a list of influential *Ahmadiyya* working professionals, industrialists, doctors and businesses with their addresses and workplace details.[518]

Ironically the ideological contradictions in the Pakistani state's very constitution exonerate such grotesque miscarriages of justice. According to the Pakistan Penal Code 'Injuring or defiling place of worship, with intent to insult the religion of any class' (Article 295) and 'Deliberate and malicious acts intended to outrage religious feelings of any class by insulting Its religion or religious beliefs (Article 295-A) is a legal offence. However at the same time Article 298-C criminalises any

> Person of Quadiani group, etc. calling himself a Muslim or preaching or propagating his faith: Any person of the Quadiani group or the Lahori group (who call themselves 'Ahmadis' or by any other name), who directly or indirectly, poses himself as a Muslim, or calls, or refers to, his faith as Islam, or preaches or propagates his faith, or invites others to accept his faith, by words, either spoken or written, or by visible representations, or in any manner whatsoever outrages the religious feelings of Muslims shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine[519]

Militant groups undertaking the violent persecution of religious minorities therefore capitalise on such codification of intolerance and use it to evade the law easily.

Such groups are also utilised by Pakistan's civilian leadership to augment political influence. The fact that Nawaz Sharif's party, the PML(N), benefits from support from the religious right such as the SSP in the militant hot-bed of Jhang (interior Punjab) was demonstrated by the province's Law Minister (Rana Sanaullah) photographed on a by-election campaign trail in 2010 with Ahmad Ludhianvi the

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[518] *O Muslims has your Pride in Your Faith Gone to Sleep,* Leaflet distributed by *Ahrar-Alami-Majlis-e-Khatam-e-Nabuwwat.* Retrieved 24 October 2017, https://www.persecutionofahmadis.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Hate-campaign03.jpg
[519] Of Offences Relating to Religion, *Pakistan Penal Code* (Act XLV of 1860) Act XLV of 1860 Retrieved 25 October 2017, http://www.pakistani.org/pakistan/legislation/1860/actXLVof1860.html

alleged head of the SSP.[520] Thus even though Pakistan's military establishment is often blamed for links with militant Islamists, it is the continued patronage provided additionally by civilian political leadership that empowers and emboldens the systematic victimization of religious minorities.

Cross-Network Affiliates

One of the major ways in which contemporary militancy challenges the domestic influence of security services in Pakistan is through sheer mutability. Militant groups such as the JI affiliated *Al-Badr*, which had participated in the 1971 war along with Afghan resistance groups such as *Tehrik-e-Jihad* and a number of Kashmiri ex-Pakistan army members, had a long history of cooperation with the military. Post-1990 militancy in the country however morphed in an impossible multiplicity of affiliations, crossovers and defections, significantly undermining the ability of the military establishment to direct or influence them. For instance, the earliest *jihadist* movement in Pakistan, the *Jamiat-ul-Ansar* (Society of the Partisans) that had supported the Afghan resistance the eighties, later transformed into the *Harkat-ul-Jihad-i-Islami* (HJI) in Kashmir in 1988. Pan-Islamist in orientation, the HJI aimed at combating the perceived oppression of Muslims by *infidels* worldwide by waging a global *jihad* according to the accounts of journalist Saleem Shahzad, who personally interviewed HJI's senior leadership.[521] It placed special emphasis on liberation of occupied Muslim territories such as Palestine and Kashmir, and extended this rationale towards the struggle for Muslim rights in countries such as Philippines, Burma, Bosnia, and Tajikistan. In 1991, the HJI saw an organisational split that

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[520] Omar Khattab, "Thanks to PML(N), Sectarian Violence May Re-Visit Punjab," *LUBP Online*, February 27, 2010.
[521] Saleem Shahzad interview.

resulted in the creation of the *Harkat-ul-Ansar* (HuA), later known as the *Harkat-ul-Mujahidin* (HuM), which devoted itself to the armed struggle in Kashmir. Following another split in the organisation, this time along ethnic lines in 2000, the Punjabi faction of the group splintered into the *Jaish-e-Mohammad* (JeM), which rapidly gained notoriety with sectarian terrorist attacks across Pakistan. This pattern of splintering in response to divergent goals and tactics became a characteristic of militant organisations in the country and encouraged the proliferation of numerous breakaway *jihadi* groups. Groups such as the *Harkat-ul-Jihad-i-Islami* (HJI) demonstrated expedient splits as well as cooperation across ethnic, ideological, and strategic lines. For instance, the activist ranks of the JUI generated the *Sipah-e-Sahaba* Pakistan (SSP), an offshoot of the HJI, in 1985 to counter rising *Shiʿa* influence in interior Punjab. In 1996, an ideological split over the SSP's decision to formally enter politics gave birth to its notorious breakaway paramilitary faction, the *Lashkar-e-Jhangvi* (LeJ), focusing specifically on armed violence against eminent *Shi'a* families. Another organizational split in 2000 led to the creation of the specifically Punjabi militant faction, the *Jaish-e-Muhammad* (JeM). The HuM, composed mainly of ethnic Pashtuns, broke away to concentrate on *jihadist* operations in Afghanistan in support of the *Taliban* movement, whereas the JeM comprising predominantly of Punjabi recruits from Pakistan focused initially on the Kashmir conflict, but later expanded its activities to include sectarian warfare within Pakistan.

Closeness of key leadership personnel amongst different militant factions meant a convenient transfer of human and material resources amongst groups according to shared goals and ambitions. According to one study, 'the SSP, the JM and the LeJ appeared to be three wings of the same party: the SSP was a political

wing while the JM and the *Lashkar-e-Jhangvi* were the *jihadi* and domestic wings respectively.' [522] Due to the complementarity of some of their broader goals, particularly with regards to the persecution of minority communities such as the *Shi'a*[523] and *Ahmadiyya,*[524] militant groups like the *Tehrik-e-Taliban* Pakistan, LeJ, *Alami Majlise Tahaffuze Khatme Nubuwwat,* and *Majlis Ahrar* have sometimes collaborated on disseminating sectarian propaganda and hate literature, openly declaring their strategic alliances.

Another organisation the *Markaz Daʿwa wal Irshad* (Centre for Preaching and Guidance), set up in Muridke (Punjab) in 1987 with the support of Zia's military government initially incorporated in its agenda the twin goals of *daʿwa* (preaching) with *jihad*. Ideologically affiliated with the puritanical Saudi Wahhabi school of thought, the organization soon spawned its own militant wing, the infamous *Lashkar-e-Tayyiba* (LeT-Army of the Pure). Initially created with the tacit support of the Pakistan government and military leadership for the Kashmiri *jihad*, the notorious LeT was eventually banned as a terrorist organisation (2002). It, however, continued to operateunder the banner of the *Jamaat-ud-Daʿawa* (JuD) and *Pasban-i-Ahl-i-Hadith* and expanded its goals to include a global quest to restore the Islamic caliphate. Its tightly organised organisational network with over 2,000 local offices in the country meant that its militant arms were spread across Pakistan, including interior Sindh and Baluchistan, and this enabled it to effectively evade the punitive actions of the later military regime of General Pervez Musharraf.

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[522] Zahab and Roy, *Islamist Networks: The Afghan-Pakistan Connection.*
[523] *All Shi'a are Non-Muslims and Worthy of Killing,* Islamic State flier issued in liaison with TTP, LeJ, and *Majlis Ahrar* declaring *Shi'a* non-Muslims and issuing death threats including women and children. Retrieved 24 January 2017, https://www.mnnonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/FMI_ISIS-letter-03-23-15.jpg
[524] *All Ahmadis Be Warned, Alami Majilise Tahaffuze Khatme Nubuwwat* flier issued in liaison with LeJ, JeM, and TTP threatening *Ahmadiyya* community with dire consequences including the targeting of businesses, women and children. Retrieved 24 January 2017, http://www.thepersecution.org/nr/2011/mtkn_threat_fbd.png.

Interviews with the National Counter Terrorism Authority in Islamabad revealed the extent of splintering between militant organisations, via confidential information gathered by the country's various intelligence wings. Organisations such as NACTA have attempted to monitor such interactions and connections between various militant groups (see image 1.1 below).[525] However, these allegiences are constantly shifting and hence diffircult to document with accuracy.

NACTA– Cross-Network Afflialitions of Militant Groups in Pakistan 2012 (1.1)

Similarly the TTP itself generated over a dozen known affiliates – some of which were mapped by NACTA's team of counter-insurgency experts , in the organogram below (1.2).

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[525] NACTA Archives 2012

NACTA– *Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan* Organisational Structure 2012 (1.2)[526]

Further challenges to monitoring, and therefore mitigating the activities of militant groups, lay in the unpredictability of their spontaneous convergence and divergence. For instance, there was evidence of ideological affiliation between the TTP, LeJ and ISKP in leaflets promoting the violent persecution of *Shi'a* communities, circulated by a little-known *Talha Zubair Group (Hussain Muawiya Unit)* in the district of DI Khan in 2015. These fliers carried the formal letterheads of the LeJ, *Ahrar-ul-Islam,* and the familiar black flag of Islamic State. They also claimed close affiliation with the TTP.[527]

At the same time there were reported incidents of disaffection within umbrella organisations such as the *Tehrik-e-Taliban* Pakistan (TTP) evidenced by pamphlets

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[526] NACTA Archives 2012

[527] *Amir-ul-Momineen Khalid Khurasani's Open Letter Against Pakistan's Shia Apostates,* Islamic State flier issued in liaison with TTP, LeJ, and *Majlis Ahrar*. Retrieved 24 January 2017, https://www.mnnonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/FMI_ISIS-letter-03-23-15.jpg

circulated South Waziristan (in the FATA region) by a high profile militant announcing the parting of ways with central command and detailing his reasons.[528] In many cases ideological splits or disagreement over involvement in the formal political processes such as the case of the SSP also let to further splintering of groups into smaller and relatively amorphous entities.

Anti-State Militancy

By the end of the Soviet-Afghan war, the ability of the Pakistani army to influence and effectively direct militant activities was adversely affected by a tapering off of economic benefits of foreign patronage, previously channelling tremendous amounts of funds coming from Saudi and US governments towards Islamist groups. This in turn compelled militant organisations to explore access to alternative funding sources. At the same time, General Zia's pan-Islamic agenda fostered a large, informal network of relationships amongst charitable organizations in the Middle East and Pakistani militant groups that were ideologically affiliated with them. To build the intended ideological '*Sunni* Wall,'[529] money poured in from wealthy Saudi patrons and NGOs in the Middle East to *Sunni madaris,* particularly those belonging to the *Ahl-i-Hadith* school, in Pakistan.

Their growing ability to exploit independent sources of finance for instance through trade in contraband and weapons, and through domestic as well as international NGOs allowed militant groups significant autonomy in implementing independent agendas. The fact that most of this funding came in the form of anonymous donations sent directly to bank accounts, and through various internet

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[528] *A high profile TTP commander parts ways with Central Command*, Fata Research Centre, 11 April 2013. Retrieved 12 December 2014, http://frc.com.pk/news/a-high-profile-ttp-commander-parts-ways-with-central-command/

[529] Christophe Jaffrelot, *Pakistan: Nationalism without a Nation*, 92.

channels rendered it virtually untraceable. According to one report, the *Lashkar-e-Tayyiba* and its parent organization the *Markaz-ud-Dawah-wal-Irshad* (Centre for Islamic Invitation and Guidance) were able to raise so much money through the internet, mainly through sympathetic *Wahhabi* channels in Saudi Arabia, that they considered opening an independent bank.[530]

Anticipating the divergent potential of increasingly powerful militant groups therefore Pakistan's military leadership, through the ISI, orchestrated a series of splits within these organizations in the 1990s. For instance, in backing groups such as the predominantly Punjabi *Jaish-e-Mohammad* outfit, the military encouraged a *Punjabisation* of the Kashmir conflict,[531] ostensibly in order to curb the incipient irredentist threat of Pashtun nationalism of its sister group *Harkat-ul-Ansar* (HUA). It aimed to maintain the focus of militant activities on Pakistan's strategic goals in Kashmir, as opposed to the more generic pan-Islamic *jihadist* agenda that Afghanistan-affiliated groups like HUA espoused. The military's support of JeM also intended to check the growing organizational and operational capabilities of competing, and increasingly divergent militant groups such as the LeT.[532]

Formed in 1990 in Afghanistan, the LeT (also known as *Jamaat-ud-Daʿwa*), is based in Muridke (near Lahore), Pakistan. LeT headquarters reportedly housed a *madrassa*, a hospital, and a market, a substantial residential area for students and faculty members, and agricultural tracts in interior Punjab. It allegedly operated 16 Islamic institutions, 135 secondary schools, an ambulance service, mobile clinics, blood banks, and several seminaries across Pakistan. It also reportedly operated several training camps in Kashmir as well as in various other parts of Pakistan. One of

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[530] Stern, "Pakistan's Jihad Culture," 120.
[531] Saleem Shahzad Interview
[532] Sheikh, *Making Sense of Pakistan,* 175.

the 2008 Mumbai attack perpetrators Ajmal Qassab in his recorded confession provided the location of a number of training camps and described the advanced level of fire-arm and urban warfare training that LeT allegedly provided within Pakistan.[533]

Initially created with the tacit support of the Pakistani government and military leadership in order to wage the Kashmiri *Jihad*, the LeT was eventually banned as a terrorist organisation in 2002 over its increasingly indiscriminate and brutal sectarian operations. It continued to operate however under the banner of the *Jamaat-ud-Daʿawa* and *Pasban-i-Ahl-i-Hadith*. The LeT's professed ideology was in line with the *Wahabi Ahl-i-Hadith* school and included the unification of all Muslim majority areas in regions neighbouring Pakistan (e.g. Jammu and Kashmir, Chechnya, and other parts of Central Asia) as well as the restoration of Islamic caliphate over India. It considered India, Israel, and the United States as its primary enemies, and their interests as worthy targets for its militant operations. Most notably, the LeT was held responsible for the November 2008 Mumbai attacks in India. After the 1999 Kargil conflict between India and Pakistan, the organisation adopted *fidayeen* (suicide missions) as part of its tactical strategy and regularly extolled its virtue in its publications.[534]

The LeT is considered a transnational *jihadi*st organisation with an extensive network of contacts spread across various countries and recruits coming in not only from Pakistan and Afghanistan, but also Sudan, Bahrain, Turkey, Libya, Bosnia, Chechnya, and the Philippines. Its activities are primarily funded by donations from Pakistani expatriates resident in the Persian Gulf, NGOs in the Middle East, and private donors in Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. It has been linked to *Tehrik-e-Taliban*

[533] "Transcript, 'Mumbai Terrorist Confession,'" *Financial Times*, November 29, 2008. Retrieved 24 January 2017, https://www.ft.com/content/beeea092-c697-11dd-97a5-000077b07658

[534] *Ihya-e-Khilafat*, (Official Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan monthly magazine) June 2014: 5. Retrieved 24 January 2017, https://azelin.files.wordpress.com/2014/07/ie1b8a5c4abyyc481_-al-khilc481fah-8.pdf.

Pakistan, *Al-Qaeda,* the Afghan *Taliban*, *Jaish-e-Mohammad*, *Hizb-ul-Mujahidin,* and even the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt.

As another avowedly anti-state group, the TTP, emerged in December 2007 initially as an amalgam of thirteen militant groups, deriving their inspiration from the successes of the Afghan *Taliban* and united under the leadership of Baitullah Masud (reportedly killed by a US drone strike August 2009). Its emergence is attributed to a violent reaction against the US War on Terror in Afghanistan (2001-present), associated drone strikes in FATA and the consequent rise of tribal militancy in the region. Many TTP leaders were veterans of the Soviet-Afghan war, with extensive experience in guerrilla tactics and urban warfare. An umbrella organisation made up of various (now allegedly more than 40)[535] militant groups, many of which are based in FATA, the TTP operates as a confederation of regional outfits. Most of the Pakistani *Taliban* groups associate loosely with the TTP franchise. That said, some factions do maintain separate identities and distinct local ambitions such as the TTP Hakimullah Mehsud Group[536], TTP Jammu and Kashmir,[537] and TTP Hangu.[538]

The TTP continues to fiercely resist the Pakistani state, and violently propagates the enforcement of a strident interpretation of the *Shariʿa*. Thus far, their operations have exclusively targeted elements of the Pakistani military establishment

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[535] Panel interview at National Association for Counter Terrorism Activities (NACTA), Islamabad, 29 December 2010: Zafarullah Khan, Joint Director-General Intelligence Bureau (2006-2009), Director-General Federal Investigation Agency (2009-2010), Director-General NACTA (2009-2012); Manzar, Abbas, Director Counter-Terrorism NACTA (2010); Rizwan Ahmad Sheikh, Director National Strategy / International Cooperation NACTA (2010); Anita Turab, Director Counter-Extremism NACTA (2010)

[536] *Public Announcement Appointing a New Representative for the Rawalpindi Division*, Notification from the TTP Hakimullah Masud Group. Retrieved 24 January 2017, http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-HDLH_gxGZ2g/UiSvXRTWkCI/AAAAAAAAAkM/OUiE46tpJiw/s1600/P23232.jpg-218x300.jpg.

[537] *Notification of Potential Targets*. Flier circulated by TTP Jammu and Kashmir. Retrieved 24 January 2017, http://i0.wp.com/news.statetimes.in/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/FF.jpg?resize=640%2C871.

[538] *Democracy is Apostasy* - TTP warns against voting in upcoming local elections. Flier circulated by the TTP Hangu Division. Retrieved 24 January 2017, http://www.pakvotesmap.pk/media/uploads/299_1_1378209878.jpg

and civilian groups such as the *Shiʿa*, Sufi and *Ahmadiyya* communities within Pakistan. The organisation was banned by the Pakistan government in 2008, which also placed bounties on the heads of some of the more prominent TTP leaders. Eventually the Pakistani military formally launched armed offensives against the TTP in FATA areas (such as South Waziristan) in 2009. In return it faced increasing reprisals by affiliated militant groups.[539]

Separate from the Punjabi *Taliban* or *Tehrik-e-Taliban-Punjab* (formed by a loose network of banned militant outfits from Punjab including LeJ, SSP, and JeM) and the Afghan *Taliban*, which espouse a totally different agenda and organisational structure, the TTP nonetheless boasts links with these militant networks particularly in FATA. These links include significant collaboration between the leadership cadres, movement of foot soldiers across groups and sharing of safe havens in FATA as well as urban areas. The TTP has been closely linked to *al-Qaʿida*, allegedly sharing a symbiotic relationship whereby *al-Qaʿida* provides ideological inspiration and TTP provides sanctuaries and foot soldiers in its areas as well as sharing operational experience and access to transnational networks (e.g. links with the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan). In his capacity as former Commander of Pakistan's Western Military Command supervising the Pakistan Army's quick deployment in Federally Administered Tribal Areas (2003) and as ex-Governor Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Lieutenant General Ali Jan Aurakzai affirmed broad-based infiltration of militant elements from central Asian states and their incorporation into al-Qaeda affiliates in Pakistan. [540] However *al-Qa'ida* has on occasion levied criticism on TTP leadership under Hakimullah Mehsud for divergent tactics and ideology, for instance

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[539] *We Claim the Kidnapping and Murder of 23 Frontier Constabulary Soldiers in Custody*. Flier circulated by TTP Mohmand Agency. Retrieved 24 January 2017, http://www.pakistantv.tv/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/BgnVennCAAA2_Hn.jpg
[540] General Ali Jan Aurakzai interview.

in their use of indiscriminate violence and killing of innocent Muslim civilians and attempts to entice *al-Qa'ida* members to join their ranks.[541]

The Pakistani state's initial ambivalence regarding the activities of militant groups was substantially compounded by the sheer number of their manifestations and the inefficiencies of Pakistan's regulatory and policing mechanisms. Almost as soon as an organisation was officially banned, it would re-emerge with a new title. For instance, the *Lashkar-e-Tayyiba* had also operated as *Falah-e-Insaaniyat Foundation* (FIF), Army of the Pure, Army of the Righteous, *Lashkar-e-Toiba*, *Jamaat-ud-Dawah*, *Pasban ahl-e-Hadith, Pasban-e-Kashmir*, *Idara Khidmat-e-Khalq*, *Lashkar-e-Taibi*, *Deccan Mujahidin*, Army of Madinah, *Islamic Jammat ud Dawa*, Movement for the Safeguarding of the First Centre of Prayer, and *Tehrik-e-Tahaffuz Qibla Awa*l. LeT's parent organisation, the *Markaz-ul-Dawah-wal-Irshad* and its subsidiary *Jamaat-ud-Dawah* (JuD), have also been known as *Jamaat-al-Dawa'ila-al-Sunnah*, *Salafi Taliban*, *Jamaat-ud-Dawa* Pakistan, and *Tehrik-e-Tahafuz Qibla Awal*. Similarly, the *Sipah Sahaba Pakistan* (SSP) had been known as *Anjuman Sipah-e-Sahaba-Pakistan*, Guardians of the friends of the Prophets, *Millat-e-Islamia*, *Millat-e-Islami* Pakistan, *Sepah Sahabeh*, Corps of the Companions of the Prophet Muhammad, and most recently the *Ahl-e-Sunnah-wal-Jamaat* (ASWJ).[542]

Ultimately, continuities between military and civilian regimes in failing to foster representative institutions were reflected in thinly veiled expressions of socio-economic dissent through militant, sectarian Islamist rhetoric. For instance, significant socio-economic disparities between the minority *Shi'a* landed gentry and

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[541] *Letter from al-Qa'ida representatives* Mahmud-al-Hasan (Atiyya) and Abu Yahya-al Libi addressed to Amir of TTP Hakimullah Masud, 3 December 2010. Retrieved 24 January 2017, http://www.motherjones.com/documents/354008-letter-criticizes-the-pakistani-talibans-actions
[542] 'Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP),' Terrorism Research & Analysis Consortium. Retrieved 24 January 2017, http://www.tracking terrorism.org/group/sipah-e-sahaba-Pakistan-ssp.

emerging *Sunni* middle-class in the rural fringes of interior Punjab accentuated the use of sectarian identity as a means of ideological retribution and political expression. 'In Jhang, for example, a large proportion of traders and shopkeepers have funded and supported the SSP. Here sectarianism has been seen as the vehicle through which to take on the powerful local landlords – who happen to be *Shiʿas*.'[543] SSP's interest in political participation also reflected the growing desire of this emerging suburban middle class to seek a political voice and role in an otherwise elitist parliamentary system.

Similarly, decades of economic and political neglect and maladministration, manifesting in enduring failures of local governance, as exemplified in the FATA, led to recourse towards extremist Islamism as a means of securing socio-economic justice. The *Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shari'at-e-Mohammadi* (TNSM - Movement for the Enforcement of Islamic Law), founded by a dissident member of the JI in 1994, was one such organization that combined tribal identity with militant Islamism. Gaining popularity in the tribal areas of KPK, particularly in the Swat region, TNSM moved to exploit the vacuum created by the government's repeal of the PATA regulation, which had thus far vested the authority of local dispute resolution with the traditional *Jirga* system. Ill-considered government intervention in this instance fatally disrupted the tribal social-justice system without providing adequate alternatives. Moreover, the complicity of the civilian government of President Zardari, widower of ex-Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, which signed a *Nizam-e-Adl* Bill allowing the establishment of *Sharia* courts in the region emboldened the TSNM militants and their TTP affiliates to try and expand their reach even beyond.

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[543] Talat Aslam, "Resurgent Islam: Can It Conquer Pakistan?," *Herald* (Karachi, September 1992).

Deployed at the frontlines during Pakistan Army's *Operation Rah-e-Rast* (2009) against this militant insurgency in Swat and surrounding areas, Colonel Khuzaimah Majeed expressed the common frustration amongst military personnel at the apathy of the civilian government to provide essential law and order services. Colonel Majeed attributed the rise of TSNM's power in the region more to the popular demand for a more efficient system of justice, in this case the application of the *Shariʿa,* than that of the inefficient state apparatus[544] - a point corroborated by reports such as Fleischner's on the failure of civil governance and corresponding rise in militancy in the region.[545]

Thus state sponsorship and complicity towards militant Islamist groups demonstrated discernible confluence between policies of its military and civilian leadership. The culture of patronage so pervasive in the sphere of domestic politics found purchase in the sponsorship of militant groups as the military's exposure to civilian politics increased in both size and scope. This then had wider implications for the development of effective representative institutions. Militant organisations at their end utilised the operational space that had been provided to them by the state and began to demonstrate increasing returns in the form of reproducing violence cloaked in the garb of Islamism for sectarian, political and socio-economic purposes. The divergent tendencies of militant Islamist groups, initially viewed as a boon for the military's strategic perceptions, therefore proved to be an even bigger limitation on its sphere of influence.

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[544] Author interview with Colonel Khuzaimah Majeed, Corps of Engineers, Pakistan Army, Counter-Terrorist Operations (2010-2012), Islamabad 23 December 2010.
[545] Justine Fleischner, "Governance and Militancy in Pakistan's Swat Valley," 2011.

Chapter 6

Patronage and Praetorianism (1988-2007)

> Pakistani governments, military and civilian alike, irrespective of where they come from, operate in strikingly similar ways. Our system of political patronage is inimical to good governance because it is based on patronage and not policy. It is based on rewarding supporters in exchange for favours, so the leaders who get elected are precisely the ones who work the *biradari* system. Thus neither civilian nor military regimes are able to deliver on the promised social contract for the masses.[546]

A damning indictment from Dr Maliha Lodhi, one of the country's top diplomats, highlights the fundamental irony of civil-military relations in Pakistan. The essentially path-dependent nature of this relationship in Pakistan needless to say rendered a chronically active role for the Pakistani Army Chief (COAS). This chapter builds upon this idea by analysing the institutionalisation of praetorian tendencies within the state through its practical manifestations in the post-Zia era. In particular looking at ways in which the Pakistani military tangibly entrenched its institutionalisation by engineering constitutional provisions for its continued significance in national life in two ways: political, in terms of curtailing the power of the Prime Minister (as Zia did for Junejo), via legislature (as Zia and Musharraf did against the superior judiciary); and economic, in terms of ensuring that a sizable portion of national resources were devoted to its what it considered its institutional interests.

According to contemporary theories of historical institutionalism, policy legacies have a certain path-dependent quality that may limit the range of subsequent policy choices. Aziz utilises this framework to provide an explanation of the military's pattern of intervention and domination in Pakistan. Through this lens then, 'choices that are made early in the history of any polity subsequently develop into

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[546] Dr. Maliha Lodhi interview.

institutionalised commitments and determine subsequent decisions.[547] In Pakistan's case these choices manifested in the dual phenomena of historical causation, whereby the military continued to play a dominant role in state affairs despite the absence of direct existential threats; and increasing returns, whereby the military expanded and intensified its active political involvement. This contextualisation may help to understand the problematic and incomplete nature of transitions from military to civilian rule in Pakistan. This chapter situates and builds upon an assessment of the path-dependent nature of military intervention in Pakistan by analysing the dynamics of various administrations after the decade of direct military rule.

Despite his public support for constitutionalism, the democratic process, and his professed commitment towards holding free and fair elections, Zia's successor COAS General Mirza Aslam Beg did so conditionally. Having closely seen the convoluted results of the military's direct involvement in his capacity as Vice-Chief under Zia, Beg seemed keen to avoid the encumbrances wrought by a direct role of the military in Pakistani politics. That is not to say he did not envisage a significant role for the army in state affairs – merely that he aimed to 'preserve the security and integrity of the nation' *indirectly*. Accordingly Beg candidly admitted to 'managing' the electoral process to ensure a more *balanced* spread of political affiliations and a weak coalition government that could preserve the military's dominance over the state.[548] This *tinkering* of the political process would in time emerge as one of the country's biggest civil-military scandals, the infamous Mehrangate, to taint the military's self-affirmed custodianship of political integrity.

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[547] Aziz, *Military Control in Pakistan: The Parallel State,* 26.
[548] General Mirza Aslam Beg interview.

Shah ascribes this intention to exert significant influence even when the military is not in power as based upon the 'officer corps' norms or collective beliefs about the inappropriateness of civilian control.[549] At the root of such institutional thinking lies a deep-seated belief that the military has both the right and duty to subvert or displace a civilian government, based on its perceptions of 'national interest'.[550] Thus lingering Pakistani praetorianism can be attributed to a phenomenon where success in the first coup breeds success in later coups by 'lowering the normative restraints on military intervention. In the lingo of sociological institutionalism, the military has become socialized into a self-reinforcing "cult of disobedience."'[551] Whilst this thesis accepts the undeniable political clout of the military establishment, this chapter will argue against the assertion that this is a one-dimensional phenomenon.

Aziz provides an alternative to this projection of the 'military-as-a-colossus' i.e. a combination of what he refers to as the military's 'tutelage problem' and parallel co-optation by civilian decision-makers. The former, as a legacy of military rule, refers to the military's continued influence over the political process, particularly where it is able to direct or dictate the parameters of key policy precepts during transitional phases. The continued tutelage in turn has significant implications for the shape and form of the emerging civilian order. The latter aspect refers to support that is extended to authoritarian or military regimes by powerful sections of civil society

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[549] Aqil Shah, "Praetorianism and Terrorism," *Journal of Democracy* 19, no. 4 (2008).
[550] Interview with Lieutenant General Hamid Gul, Director-General Military Intelligence (1986-1987), Director-General Inter-Services Intelligence of Pakistan (1988-1989), Islamabad, 7 April 2006; General Aslam Mirza and General Mahmood Ahmad interviews.
[551] Shah, "Praetorianism and Terrorism," 19.

for their own reasons, which then perpetuates the patterns of behaviour that account for the phenomenon of military intervention.[552]

Using this framework, this chapter explains the fortification of the praetorian system, at another critical juncture i.e. the return of civilian rule to Pakistan. It argues that the institutionalisation of praetorianism within the state continued to be fostered and reinforced by two concurrent trends in the post-Zia era: repeated attempts by civilian leaders to co-opt support from the military high command for political survival and behind-the-scenes *management* of the political system by military leadership. In doing so, elected political leaders played a critical role in undermining civilian primacy and conferring the role of national arbitrator upon the military. The praetorian's tendency to play the role of 'ruler, arbitrator and guardian'[553] at different times can therefore be understood by this path dependent trajectory of Pakistani institutions.

Fair, a long-standing advocate of the military's culpability in ensuring the 'sustained enervation of democracy' holds the Pakistani army's revisionist agenda responsible for creating a 'stove-piped decision-making process with little space for rigorous national security debate or competent civilian input.'[554] Despite her aversion to the military interventionism however Fair does concede that the army comes to power in Pakistan with the support and complicity of both the citizenry and virtually every political and civilian institution, including judiciary, elements of various political parties, and a parliament that is a consequence of flawed elections. She admits that the country's political parties are very much a part of this problem. Thus whilst Fair's arguments regarding the ability of the army to destabilise elected

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[552] Aziz, *Military Control in Pakistan: The Parallel State*, 34.
[553] Perlmutter, "The Praetorian State and the Praetorian Army: Toward a Taxonomy of Civil-Military Relations in Developing Polities."
[554] Christine Fair, "Why the Pakistani Army Is Here to Stay," *International Affairs* (Oxford, 2011), 574.

governments have historical antecedents, this thesis goes a step further and argues that the deterministic factors for the entrenchment of the military's various political functions are the extra-constitutional measures frequently undertaken by civilian opposition parties. This chapter will show how the PPP and PML(N) have historically used extra-constitutional measures to dissolve elected administrations and win early elections rather than allow the leading party to complete its constitutional tenure – thereby undermining the ability of institutions to could sustain civilian primacy.

Conversely Kukreja asserts that actually 'every military coup has strengthened the democratic forces instead of weakening them'.[555] Thus, Pakistani military rulers seem to have inadvertently galvanised the forces of democracy. Where her claim resonates strongly with the arguments presented in this thesis lie in the fact that each military coup has reiterated the need to establish efficiency, accountability and honesty in government, which not withstanding its actual materialisation, has still become a part of the political discourse and narrative of the wider populace. Thus 'military rulers have been forced to acknowledge the supremacy of democracy even while they have circumscribed it with such qualifications as Basic Democracy and Islamic Democracy'.[556] Ultimately she reiterates the political processes seem to be balanced between the Army, the Islamists and the secular democrats in a way that none of these forces have been able to dominate the political culture effectively.

Additionally, this chapter examines the underlying interface between civil-military relations that relates to the institutionalisation of patronage and sponsorship of religio-political groups, including militant Islamists. It is argued that foreign powers particularly the US and Saudi Arabia, utilised an essentially patron-client

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[555] Veena Kukreja and M.P. Singh, eds., *Pakistan: Democracy, Development and Security Issues* (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2005), 104.
[556] Kukreja and Singh.

relationship vis-à-vis Pakistan to advance their regional and strategic objectives using either aid or political recognition or both as incentives for Pakistani political elite. In doing so dominant foreign powers have disincentivised the country's civil-military leadership from adopting a path to critical political reform and sustainable economic growth, and thus facilitated the recourse towards alternative avenues of influence such as religio-political activism.

Reinforcing the Praetorian Military System

The 'Eighth Amendment' – a constitutional *carte blanche* given to the President to dismiss an elected government – was first used by General Zia ul Haq against Prime Minister Mohammad Khan Junejo in May 1988. After Zia, President Ghulam Ishaq Khan used the Eighth Amendment to dismiss the elected governments of Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif in 1990 and 1993, and then President Farooq Ahmad Khan Leghari used it again in 1996 to dismiss Benazir's second government. Each time a President unilaterally cut short an elected government's designated tenure, the reasons provided were uncannily familiar: widespread corruption, nepotism, socio-economic and political mismanagement. The actual reason behind the invocation of the Eighth Amendment, however, could be linked to a critical power struggle between the three nerve-centres of the Pakistani state – the *troika* of the President, Prime Minister, and Chief of Army Staff (COAS).[557]

Intense confrontational politics by Pakistan's dominant civilian leadership, Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif, continued to compel the co-option of the ubiquitous military establishment and Islamist lobby for political leverage. Crucially, this preoccupation with political posturing distracted both elected Prime Ministers

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[557] Haqqani, *Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military*.

from the critical task of formulating and implementing desperately needed institutional reforms during their respective terms. The fact that neither party boasted a significant parliamentary majority in both its tenures and relied on highly combative, often conflicting, coalition governments to run state affairs, reinforced the strength of the military establishment as a critical political arbitrator.

After a decade of predominance, conceding power to civilian leadership for the military establishment was a daunting prospect indeed. Fiercely protective of its control over Pakistan's Afghan and Kashmir policy, military leadership would not countenance any interference from civilian leadership in this regard. Moreover, the comprehensive Islamisation programme of the Zia years and ideological imperatives generated by the military's involvement in the Soviet-Afghan war had fermented a close working relationship between the military high command and religio-political Islamist groups. Military authorities, therefore, had to consider the strident opposition of Islamist parties (JI and JUI in particular) to the prospect of a strong PPP government coming to power under a female head of state.

As a result COAS Beg aimed to install institutional counterweights for the imminent national elections. According to Beg, he had decided to enlist the ISI's help to support rival political parties in order to provide 'a healthy competition to Benazir, to prevent a landslide PPP victory and to foster a two-party system in the parliament for a strong, balanced civil government.'[558] The formula Beg and General Hamid Gul (then ISI chief) eventually worked out to mitigate the PPP's political dominance involved the creation of a rival political party, the *Islamic Jamhoori Ittehad* (IJI). A coalition of nine right-wing conservative parties, of which the Pakistan Muslim League (PML), *Jamaat-i-Islami* (JI) National People's Party (NPP) were key

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[558] General Mirza Aslam interview.

components of the military's cultivated support group in the IJI. The leadership of this pack was awarded to none other than Nawaz Sharif, a lucky political beneficiary of General Zia's civilianisation drive.

Nawaz Sharif's history as a stalwart of the military establishment, having served in Zia's cabinet as Finance Minister and later Chief Minister of Punjab, made him an ideal candidate for the job. His personal grudge against the PPP, due to Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto's nationalisation and its impact on his family's fortunes in the steel industry in the early seventies, was an added bonus. By heading a formidable opposition block directly patronised by the military Nawaz played an active role in entrenching praetorian influence on political scene.

At the same time, despite her aversion to the military establishment's extended influence, Benazir also appeared keen to co-opt potentially useful elements within the military's top brass to gain political leverage. This was corroborated by then COAS Beg, who revealed that within her very first month in power, Benazir had sent her military advisor General Imtiaz to General Beg to ask for information about which officers were General Zia's favourites in the army, so that her government could 'look after them'.[559] Former DG-ISI General Asad Durrani also affirmed this: 'Every political party in Pakistan chooses to keep the Army as its fall-back position' he claimed during interview.[560] Durrani's comments however should not detract from the fact that the military is far from passive in such political intrigues. Over time, and as per General Beg's admission, the Army prefers – indeed now it ensures – that it remains relevant and indespensible to the Pakistani political system.

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[559] Ibid.
[560] General Asad Durrani interview.

Between November 1988 and October 1999, Benazir and Nawaz took turns at the helm of Pakistani politics, neither successfully completing a full term in office. Their failure to complete the stipulated five-year term stemmed as much from inadequate governance as it did from the furtive political machinations of the military establishment. In their battle over political influence, Nawaz and Benazir both used the traditional tools of political patronage – amenable elements of the landed gentry, local socio-political networks etc. to monopolise state power and deploy it against the opposition. Ironically despite their significantly different personal backgrounds, they were both amenable to coalescing with religio-political forces as well as the military establishment to cater for their political ambitions.

When Benazir came to power the first time, she did so under a fairly weak mandate due to the military's political manoeuvring. The army's management of the political process had paid off in such a way that no political party emerged with a clear parliamentary majority. Therefore, Benazir's PPP had to share its 38.5 per cent vote in the National Assembly, amounting to 93 seats out of the total 207, with the IJI securing 30.16 per cent votes with 55 seats, and a newish political force, the *Muhajir Qaumi Movement* (MQM), gaining 13 seats from key areas in Sindh.[561] At the same time Nawaz Sharif managed to gain an overwhelming majority for the PML in Punjab and became its Chief Minister, setting up the Benazir government with a formidable political handicap from the very beginning.

The duplicitous relationship between Benazir and the military establishment also played a pivotal role in undermining her political credibility. As a self-proclaimed champion of democracy in Pakistan, Benazir initially attempted to curtail the military's influence over important areas of domestic and foreign policy, whilst at

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[561] Askari-Rizvi, *Military State and Society in Pakistan*, 205.

the same time making conciliatory gestures to co-opt its support. She initially proclaimed her support for acting President Ghulam Ishaq Khan (also previously handpicked by General Zia ul Haq), and for non-interference in and continuity with the military-led Afghanistan and nuclear policy, retention of Zia's chosen Foreign Minister, Lieutenant General Sahibzada Yaqub Ali Khan, in her cabinet, as well as promises to avoid unilateral decisions over defence expenditure and service conditions.[562] However her attempts to secure the army's support in re-establishing the state's shaky writ in troubled Sindh, and interference in the inner workings of the military high command, soon caused her to repeat her predecessors' miscalculations with regards to soliciting arbitrary praetorian involvement.

The souring of relations between the military and PPP government began in earnest with her unilateral decision to replace the DG ISI, Major General Hamid Gul. Gul's support for Islamist forces in both Pakistan and Afghanistan, and public endorsement for the IJI, had done little to assuage Benazir's suspicions of the military establishment. He had already demonstrated his aversion to the 'Foreign Ministry's interference in Afghan Policy' declaring that 'the *Mujahidin* had no time for Foreign Minister Yaqub Khan's gentrified ways.'[563] Benazir's attempts to reach some sort of post-Soviet political solution in Afghanistan with the moderate pro-Iranian chieftains of North-western Afghanistan challenged the military's on-going support for right-wing Islamist parties. Her friendly overtures towards Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi over the Kashmir issue also clashed with the army's covert support for the militant insurgency.

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[562] General Mirza Aslam Beg interview; Askari-Rizvi.
[563] Haqqani, *Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military*, 214.

Benazir's stumbling attempts at establishing civilian primacy over the military's decision-making strongly irked the army. Along with General Gul, she removed other key ISI officials suspected of destabilising her government including the head of the ISI's Internal Security wing, Brigadier Imtiaz Ahmad. In an attempt to enhance her control over the ISI and undercut its influence over domestic politics, she replaced General Hamid Gul with the apolitical, retired Lieutenant General Shamsur Rahman Kallue. Demonstrating her ignorance of the ISI's essential function as being affiliated directly with the army, and thereby underestimating COAS Beg's influence on the agency, her actions contributed towards antagonizing the military high command instead of reining it in. General Beg's reacted by simply rerouting the ISI's political activities to the Military Intelligence (MI) bureau, effectively isolating General Kallue and leaving him powerless to perform even basic functions as DG ISI.[564] Benazir's attempt to prematurely retire the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (CJCSC) Admiral Iftikhar Sirohi and extend the services of Lieutenant General Alam Jan Mehsud to manoeuvre him into position to replace Beg after his scheduled retirement, were also unsuccessful. By attempting to circumvent the military's internal workings for her own ends therefore Benazir managed to alienate herself from a powerful avenue of support within the existing praetorian system.

At the same time, Benazir's reliance on the army for dealing with the deteriorating law and order situation in Sindh also undermined her authority. A frontrunner in Sindhi politics since its inception in 1984, and as part of Zia ul Haq's military-technocratic government, the *Muttahida Qaumi Movement* (MQM) party wielded considerable influence in Sindh. The fact that it won 13 seats in parliament in the 1988 elections meant that the MQM could exercise significant influence. Here

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[564] General Asad Durrani interview.

again the PPP's inability to countenance the devolution of power led to the MQM's defection from PPP's coalition government in October 1989. As negotiations between the ruling party and MQM broke down, a spate of violence in the province was unleashed. The subsequent launch of *Operation Clean-up* in 1990 against MQM activists resulted in bloody encounters between the police and *muhajir* (immigrant) community.[565] Thus, when the army was finally requested to intervene and forced the civilian police to withdraw, it served as the final nail in the coffin of Benazir's first administration.

On 6 August 1990, President Ghulam Ishaq Khan, supported by COAS Beg, used the arbitrary powers bestowed upon him under the infamous Article 58-2(b) to dismiss Benazir Bhutto's government on multiple charges of corruption, nepotism, and economic and political mismanagement. Fresh elections were to be held within 90 days and blatantly anti-PPP interim governments were installed at the centre and provinces. This time around, the praetorian management of the Pakistani political system was more brazen, combining virulent harassment of Benazir and her husband, Asif Ali Zardari, on public allegations of corruption and abuse of power, with the provision of funds to boost the IJI's electoral campaign. Benazir and her husband were both put behind bars and special accountability tribunals were set up for their trials.[566]

In what later erupted into the media as the *Mehrangate* scandal, General Beg and his new DG ISI Asad Durrani (previously DG MI) sanctioned special funds, some six million rupees, to be channelled from the private Mehran Bank towards the IJI's

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[565] Operation Clean-up (other codename: Operation Blue Fox), was an armed military intelligence program, initially launched under the directives of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in 1992, but brutally intensified under Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto in 1993–94. Designed to *cleanse* Karachi city of *anti-social* elements, the program specifically targeted MQM for their alleged their secessionist activities.
[566] Bhutto, *Reconciliation: Islam, Democracy and the West*.

electoral campaign in 1990.[567] According to his affidavit filed with the Supreme Court, General Durrani claimed to have received instructions from then COAS General Beg to provide 'logistical support' for the disbursement of donations made by businessmen in Karachi, notably a Younas Habib,[568] to IJI candidates across all four provinces. Thus, when Nawaz Sharif swept into power with a staggering 105 out of 205 seats in the National Assembly and control of all four provincial assemblies, it was not unexpected. The Pakistan Democratic Alliance (PDA) headed by the PPP, formed the opposition bloc in parliament securing 45 seats with Benazir Bhutto at the helm.[569]

Nawaz Sharif's relatively easy election victory barely concealed the fundamental limitations in his own ability to govern effectively. His continued reliance on political and economic patronage of the landed and industrial gentry, and an inability to resist the pull of confrontational politics were combined with a demonstrable incompetence in handling internal and external security matters. Sharif had come to power in the wake of the cessation of US economic and military aid in 1990 under the Pressler Amendment as penalty for the continuation of Pakistan's nuclear programme. This meant that a crucial $600 million of US aid were halted and even military equipment, such as the expensive F-16 fighter jets that Pakistan had already paid for, were held back by the American administration.[570] Nawaz's failure to reach a diplomatic solution with the United States regarding the impasse on Pakistan's nuclear programme and its wider economic implications marked the initial dissonance of the military leadership with civilian government on policy matters.

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[567] Muthiah Alagappa, ed., *Coercion and Governance: The Declining Political Role of the Military in Asia* (California: Stanford University Press, 2001), 395.
[568] Correspondant, "1990 Elections Scandal: Habib Says Then Army Chief Used Him," *Express Tribune*, March 8, 2012.
[569] Nawaz, *Crossed Swords: Pakistan, Its Army, and the Wars Within*, 435.
[570] Nawaz, 437.

Justifying his lack of faith in civilian leadership General Beg remarked during interview: 'In the absence of an institutionalized system of policy-making, men in uniform always perform better when they are working on a national security matter. They organize a plan and evolve pragmatic policies. The civil government has no mechanism, no organization and no provision to perform such functions competently.'[571] This perception has been echoed even by segments of civilian politicians, such as a recent admission by a former Minister of Information and Media in the Sharif cabinet, 'a lack of will and vision is responsible for civilian inaptitude in the foreign policy and national security arena. Military doctrines dominate national strategic discourse due to an abject lack of civilian alternatives or analysis on issues of strategic value.'[572] Having had extensive interactions with both civilian and military bodies, Senator Hussain recounted numerous instances where even when the civilian government had the opportunity to take the lead in articulating key policy precepts, it neglected to do so. One instance that he highlighted as an exemplar was during the formulation of a National Security Council Brief – the broad outlines of which were handed to the later government of Asif Ali Zardari by then COAS Ashfaq Parvez Kiyani. Senator Hussain who had played in a significant role in the documentation of this critical framework, expressed his utmost frustration at the ineptitude of the civilian bodies involved in the consultation process. According to him – the report lay in the bureaucratic corridors of the Ministry of Interior for six months and then when it was returned to the military chief, it came without any changes.[573]

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[571] General Mirza Aslam Beg interview.

[572] Interview Senator Mushahid Hussain, Minister of Communications (1990-1993), Federal Information Minister (1997-1999), Senator and Secretary General Pakistan Muslim League (Q) (2002-Current), Islamabad, 03 January 2011.

[573] Mushahid Hussain interview

Hussain's testimony is corroborated by accounts from both military and civilian sources. Generals Ahmad and Beg in separate interviews explained detailed institutional processes that underscore the Army's ability to analyse and comprehend, albeit prioritizing its own institutional interests and issues of national significance with speed and efficacy. Sattar also provides credence to this claim by demonstrating how the Pakistani military has established sophisticated processes of research and analysis, with comprehensive notes and briefings prepared at army headquarters and supported with institutional backing via scrutiny at the highest military levels. This accounts for the discernibly efficient preparation, and hence conceptual advantages, incorporated in the briefings and strategic policies of military representatives as compared to their civilian counterparts. [574]

With outbreak of the first Gulf War and the backdrop of the Pressler Amendment, Nawaz's pro-American position aggravated the military high command. The American rebuff was considered a betrayal of the aid contract under which Pakistan had extended all assistance to turn the Soviets out of Afghanistan in return for reciprocal US military and economic support. Thus, the Nawaz government's support for the US-led invasion of Iraq provoked a strong reaction from the military and the Islamist lobby, leading Beg to publicly propound an idea of strategic defiance *against* the United States.[575]

Such a 'role of custodianship,' Finer ascribes, compels military authorities to 'see it as a duty to arbitrate or veto. They feel authorised to exercise it when some convulsion or decision of the civil authorities seems to them to threaten what they think are the permanent interests of the nation.'[576] In the same vein, Beg alluded to

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[574] Alagappa, *Coercion and Governance: The Declining Political Role of the Military in Asia*, 409.
[575] General Aslam Beg interview.
[576] Finer, *The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics*, 36.

Pakistan's need to actively oppose perceived US victimisation of Muslim states, such as Iraq, which could potentially threaten the security of its Israeli ally. The fact that the Army Chief was able to publicly detract from the ruling administration's official policy without censure clearly demonstrated military's independence from the Nawaz Sharif administration in the arena of foreign policy.

Domestically, like Benazir before him, the Nawaz government in May 1992 sought the army's assistance in curbing anti-social elements in rural Sindh. In fact he further extended its jurisdiction under Article 245 of the constitution, stipulating the provision of military assistance against 'external aggression or threat of war' when called upon by the Federal Government, with subsequent actions being above the scrutiny of any court of law.[577] The decision to extend *Operation Clean-up* into urban Sindh was therefore taken by the army unilaterally. Having willingly relinquished control over Sindh, the Nawaz government also tacitly accepted its failure in establishing effective governance in the province.

The short-sightedness of this decision, however, lay in alienating a strong political ally. In the wake of the violence unleashed by an internal dispute within the MQM earlier in the year, the provincial capital Karachi faced a sharp rise in assassinations, robberies and serious street crime. Thus, when military commanders decided to broaden the operation into urban areas it resulted in direct confrontations between the army and MQM activists. Military authorities exploited the intra-MQM conflict by encouraging dissident elements to set up a breakaway faction, the MQM-Haqqiqi. The fact that MQM was an important component of Nawaz Sharif's federal coalition government at the same time, further deepened the government's political

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[577] Section 4 of the Constitution of Pakistan (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1977, (23 of 1977), renumbered Art. 245 as 245(1) and added clauses 2, 3 and 4 thereto (with effect from 21 April 1977), *Constitution of Pakistan, 1973*

vulnerability. Eventually military action against the MQM in Sindh resulted in the parting of ways between the ruling IJI and the MQM, and led to a spate of recriminations against the military by the federal government.

Even though General Beg's retirement in 1991 bought Nawaz Sharif some breathing space, instead of taking up the opportunity to strengthen his leadership through political accommodation with Benazir, an option presented to him by Beg's successor General Asif Nawaz Janjua, he resolutely remained confrontational. Moreover, he attempted to *buy* the allegiances of new COAS Janjua and senior military generals, by offering material incentives such as new vehicles for their personal use, awarding lucrative licenses for industrial units to their family members and cultivating political relationships based on *biradari* or tribal connections.[578] General Janjua's aversion to the perceived a degradation of his office and attempts to sully military professionalism further accentuated the disjuncture between Sharif and the military high command.

Nawaz Sharif also antagonized the new army chief by flouting official protocols by arbitrarily appointing Lieutenant General Javed Nasir as the new DG ISI. Instead of following the conventional protocol for such appointments, which typically consisted of requesting a panel of suitable candidates from the Army Chief and nominating the DG ISI after consulting him, Nawaz Sharif simply informed the COAS about this decision. Not only did this selection of an ardently Islamist General pose dire international repercussions in terms of Pakistan's foreign relations, the manner in which this was done further aggravated the COAS. General Nasir's self-affirmed support for Islamist insurgencies in Philippines, Bosnia, Central Asia, and,

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[578] Nawaz, *Crossed Swords: Pakistan, Its Army, and the Wars Within.*.

significantly, in China's Xinjiang province[579] not only strained the hitherto steady Sino-Pak relations but also brought the country into international disrepute and onto the US State Department's watch list for allegedly supporting terrorism.

Interestingly, it was Nawaz Sharif's penchant for political confrontation, specifically with President Ghulam Ishaq Khan, and not the Army Chief, that brought a premature end to his first term in office. In this respect he attempted to wrest control over the country's premier intelligence agencies, the ISI and IB, from the President and COAS. To that end he selected ex-head of ISI's internal wing, Brigadier Imtiaz Ahmad, whom Benazir had deposed during her last term, to help with brokering political alliances and relentlessly target his political opponents. The power struggle between the President and Prime Minister eventually came to a head with the sudden death of COAS Janjua (January 1993) and a subsequent scramble to elevate preferred candidates to the critical role. Rumours that Sharif was manoeuvring his own man, Lieutenant General Mohammad Ashraf, the acting Army Chief, into the role of COAS began to circulate amongst military and political circles at the same time. This compelled the President to use his discretionary powers to appoint his own preference, General Abdul Waheed Kakar as the next Army Chief. It is important to note here that President Ghulam Ishaq Khan appointed General Kakar – sixth according to the seniority list, without consulting PM Sharif and thus also out of standard procedure.

This political drama reached its climax with Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif's public, televised speech, in which he accused President Ghulam Ishaq Khan of undermining his government and attempting to remove him from office.[580] The President, in response, reached out to Nawaz Sharif's mounting political opposition,

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[579] Interview with Lieutenant-General Javed Nasir, Director-General Inter-Services Intelligence, Islamabad (1992 -1993), Islamabad, 4 April 2006.
[580] 'Nawaz Sharif Address to the Nation,' 30 July 1993. Retrieved 23 January 2017, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=awqmADLE_9o.

particularly Benazir Bhutto and dismissed Nawaz on a string of charges including the now familiar allegations of corruption, mismanagement, nepotism, constitutional violations, intimidation of political opponents, and undermining the authority of the armed forces. The National Assembly was subsequently dissolved and new elections scheduled for 14 July 1993.

Thus PM Sharif's dismissal in 1993, did not occur inevitably due to the pre-emptive actions of the military high command, but was orchestrated by a President acting in his own interest. This idea is corroborated by Babar, albeit allowing for the likelihood of the President taking the military into confidence before exercising his discretionary authority under the Eighth Amendment. Therefore Sharif's ouster did not happen simply because 'he had fallen out with the army, but because he had antagonised a president who refused to put up with him any longer.'[581]

The conflict, continued to escalate with the ousted government challenging the dismissal and successfully lobbying the Supreme Court to reinstate the Sharif government. The confrontation between the President and Prime Minister eventually descended into a near anarchical battle over control of the influential Punjab assembly:

> In effect, parallel governments were functioning in the Punjab, with the province being separately run by two chief executives, two chief secretaries and two police chiefs. Warrants of arrest were being issued by the rival sides against key officials, and senior generals had prevented a potentially bloody clash between the para-military rangers and the Lahore police.[582]

The magnitude of political chaos created by the power-tussle between President and Prime Minister forced the hitherto reticent COAS General Kakar to step in as arbitrator. After several failed attempts to reach an amicable resolution of the conflict,

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[581] Alagappa, *Coercion and Governance: The Declining Political Role of the Military in Asia*, 401.
[582] Zaffar Abbas, "Enter the Army," *Herald* (Karachi, July 1993).

eventually the Army Chief managed to broker what came to be known as the *Kakar Formula*. Under this arrangement both Nawaz Sharif and Ishaq Khan agreed to resign from their respective offices, and new elections scheduled for October 1993 under a neutral caretaker set-up.

The 1993 elections saw a return of PPP under Benazir Bhutto to power, followed by yet another premature government dismissal and the re-emergence of Nawaz Sharif and his PML(N) in 1997. Their second terms in office demonstrated similar institutional aberrations, including chronic economic maladministration and political confrontations. Both leaders demonstrated a growing penchant for co-opting the military high command, partly for political support and partly to meet challenges in governance. Both attempted to curry favour with the military whilst in power, and levied vociferous criticism on it when in opposition.

In his assessment of Pakistani praetorianism, Babar contextualises the civilian government's definitive contribution towards military adventurism thus i.e. in wanting the armed forces to serve as an amenable instrument of the ruling party or coalition, rather than an arm of state. And when in opposition, civilian leadership would rather see the military confronting the ruling party and 'serve as an instrument of change by facilitating mid-term elections.'[583] In doing so, they inadvertently reinforce Nordlinger's rationale for military intervention: 'Powerful interventionist motives are invariably engendered whenever a civilian government attempts to tamper with the highly valued hierarchical structure [of the military] and the immense power derived from it.'[584]

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[583] Alagappa, *Coercion and Governance: The Declining Political Role of the Military in Asia*, 408.
[584] Nordlinger, *Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Governments*, 46.

In personal interviews, ex-COAS Beg and all former DG ISI's reiterated the critical importance of protecting the Army Chief's autonomy in the military's operational functions, and the strength he derives from unwavering support of his corps commanders and senior staff officers.[585] Sharif in particular irked new COAS General Parvez Musharraf by attempting to interfere with the postings and promotions of senior military officers, and having private meetings with some of them. Due to the evidence of Sharif's ill-concealed attempts to sow dissent amongst the military high command, which could potentially affect the Army Chief's bargaining power vis-à-vis the civilian government as well as make his removal easier COAS General Musharraf prepped against his imminent sacking by securing support from his closest aides in the military high command. [586]

Nawaz Sharif also jeopardized on-going negotiations on weapons procurement between the Pakistani military and the United States by publicly declaring Pakistan's officially unconfirmed possession of nuclear weapons.[587] His vendetta against the military drove him to publically malign the powerful institution with unsubstantiated charges of trade in narcotics to fund covert operations.[588]

Having learnt from her first term in office, Benazir Bhutto in her second tenure avoided antagonising the military by steering clear of its internal affairs. She in fact ingratiated the military high command by including the COAS in regular briefings on foreign policy, internal security and political developments. She also continued to foster military inclusion in civilian institutions. For instance, in 1995-96, three out of four appointed provincial governors were retired senior military men.[589]

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[585] General Mirza, Aslam Beg, General Asad Durrani and General Mahmood Ahmad interviews.

[586] Alagappa, *Coercion and Governance: The Declining Political Role of the Military in Asia*, 405.

[587] *The Nation,* 24 August 1994.

[588] *The News*, 13 September 1994.

[589] Askari-Rizvi, *Military State and Society in Pakistan,* 220.

When he returned to power in 1997, Sharif followed her initiative by extending differential patronage to serving and retired army officers – approving the induction of officers from lower ranks of the army into the police, IB and Federal Investigation Agency.[590] Much like Benazir he also approved the retention of retired military personnel in civilian functions, for example appointing Major General Khurshid Ali Khan as Governor NWFP (1996) and retired Lieutenant General Moinuddin Haider as Governor Sindh (1997).

Laying down the Law

Continuing to render key institutions of the state subservient to their political ambitions, both Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif tangled with Pakistan's superior judiciary over partisan judicial appointments. During his first term, Sharif appointed party loyalists to the Lahore High Court. Benazir followed suit in her second term by appointing some twenty judges to the same High Court, many of whom were known PPP activists. In an unprecedented demonstration of judicial activism, the Supreme Court contested the legal validity of these political appointments. The resulting standoff between the judiciary and political administration escalated with Benazir's refusal to implement the Supreme Court's order to revoke the appointments. President Farooq Leghari's subsequent intervention and insistence on the implementation of the court's judgment ultimately led to yet another public standoff between the Prime Minister and President.

Similarly, Sharif attempted to influence the judiciary by opposing the promotion of several Chief Justices of provincial High Courts and senior judges of the Lahore High Court to the Supreme Court. Many of these judges had questioned and in

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[590] *Dawn*, 3 May and 20 May 1997.

some cases passed judgements against Sharif's personal commercial dealings. He eventually conceded to these appointments but only after pressure from the President and Army Chief. Sharif's tensions with the senior judiciary gained intensity with the success of several court challenges being mounted by opposition leaders, leading to his public tirades against the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court, in turn, initiated contempt of court proceedings against Sharif and his political companions, who responded in kind by amending the contempt of court law through parliament.[591] On 29 November 1997 a mob made up mostly of the youth wing of Sharif's Pakistan Muslim League (PML-N) and led by several of the prime minister's own legislators, physically stormed the Supreme Court premises during the contempt of court hearing. The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court Sajjad Ali Shah was forced to abandon the hearing and flee the courthouse, and subsequently requested help from the military in a letter to the President. President Leghari's support for the Supreme Court's actions against the Prime Minister and consequent reluctance to endorse the government's position, led to yet another confrontation between the President and Prime Minister, dragging in the Army Chief again as mediator.

Mismanagement and Misappropriation

In the backdrop of such rampant factionalism, a resurgence of praetorianism in the country's political processes seemed inevitable and was hastened by mounting law and order problems, rampant corruption, and economic mismanagement. Both Benazir and Nawaz Sharif faced numerous corruption cases in Pakistani courts. The seemingly endless litany of financial misappropriations included large-scale money-laundering scandals and bank loan defaults, tax evasion, bribery and kick-backs,

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[591] Askari-Rizvi, *Military State and Society in Pakistan,* 229.

arbitrary awards of government contracts, ownership of valuable foreign properties as well as purchase of princely estates within Pakistan.[592] The ill-concealed involvement of Benazir's husband, Asif Ali Zardari, in dubious financial deals and his alleged penchant for demanding kickbacks, earned him the popular nickname of Mr 10 Per cent during her first term, rising to Mr 20 Per cent during her second term in office.[593] It was, in fact, Benazir's rejection of President Leghari's directive to investigate corruption cases against senior members of her government, including her husband whom she appointed as Investment Minister, which ultimately led to her confrontation with the President and the subsequent dismissal of her government.

Sharif too had a long list of similar allegations linked to his administration. Even as Punjab Chief minister 'he had allocated over 2,000 plots to his favourites…Deputy Commissioners were allowed to buy Pajeros with government funds and the bureaucrats, in general, received a substantial chunk of the huge amounts of development money that was doled out to PML legislators in political bribes.'[594] According to his nomination form for the 1996 National Assembly elections, he paid under $10 in income tax between 1994 and 1996. Another report claimed that the Sharif family owed over $3 billion to the national exchequer.[595] The Sharif government was responsible for undertaking major loss-incurring projects, including the construction of an opulent Prime Ministerial Secretariat and an ill-conceived Yellow Cab Scheme. Thus, during the Nawaz-Benazir decade between 1988 and 1999, Pakistan borrowed and failed to repay $13 billion in loans. In fact, by the time General Musharraf took power in 1999, Pakistan owed foreign creditors over

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[592] General Aslam Beg, General Mahmood Ahmad, Ahmad Raza Qasuri interviews.
[593] Interview with Ahmad Raza Qasuri Lawyer and Political Activist, Islamabad, 4 January 2011
[594] Aamer Ahmad Khan, "Whatever Happened to Shahbaz Sharif," *Herald* (Karachi, 1994).
[595] Bennet Jones, *Pakistan: Eye of the Storm*, 237.

$25 billion and debt servicing had become the largest component of the annual budget. Most of this debt had been run up in the 1990's.[596]

The inability of both Nawaz and Benazir's governments to establish effective representations and institutional processes compounded the Pakistani electorate's apathy towards their democratic credentials. The intensification of ethnic violence in Karachi and Hyderabad, an increase in organized crime, rise in Islamist militancy and persecution of religious minorities reflected the deteriorating writ of the government across the country. The second Nawaz government in particular witnessed rising sectarian violence, particularly in interior Punjab, and as well as spiralling ethnic violence in Karachi. Whilst the political leadership continued to rely upon the military and engage it in civilian functions, it failed to undertake the reforms necessary to establish robust institutional foundations for democratic civilian control.

Ultimately, the chronic failures of the Sharif government compelled even the normally taciturn Army Chief General Jehangir Karamat to express his frustration publically during his address at the Navy Staff College in October 1998. In a damning indictment of the government's abysmal performance in dealing with national problems, Karamat reemphasized the need for creating a National Security Council (NSC) backed by a 'team of credible advisers and a think tank of experts.'[597] He also advocated the establishment of a 'neutral, competent and secure bureaucracy and administration at the federal and provincial levels'[598] with a word of caution that 'Pakistan could not afford the destabilizing effects of polarization, vendettas, and insecurity-expedient politics.'[599] His comments annoyed Sharif, who reacted by forcing the resignation of the COAS three months before his scheduled retirement,

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[596] Bennet Jones.
[597] *The News*, 7 October 1998.
[598] Ibid.
[599] Ibid.

further aggravating the military high command. Karamat's replacement, Lieutenant General Pervez Musharraf, who came from a minority *muhajir* background, over and above two senior generals including the Chief of General Staff, was intended to insure the pliability of Pakistan's military establishment for the PML government.

Babar succinctly captures a critical flaw in the Sharif government's understanding of civil-military relations, suggesting that the 'government seemed to have fallen prey to the illusion that if there was no legal way to remove the government, it could establish personalised civilian control over the military.'[600] Undermining the procedural conventions of the military in such a way lends credence to a fundamental basis for modern praetorianism: 'When army affairs become intertwined with politics, appointments and promotions are made on the basis of the officer's political affiliations rather than professional qualifications. In order to advance in the military hierarchy, an officer is obliged to establish political alliances with his civilian superiors.'[601] The forging of such political alliances then undermine the future course of democracy in the country.

In a repeat of strategic miscalculations of previous civilian leaders such as Iskander Mirza and Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, Nawaz Sharif's preference of COAS would cost him dearly. His attempts to circumvent long-established military involvement in the country's foreign policy, particularly with regards to India caused further dissention. This was even more irksome with reports of Sharif's personal business interests – continued exports of sugar worth millions to India – at the height of the

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[600] Alagappa, *Coercion and Governance: The Declining Political Role of the Military in Asia*, 410.
[601] Perlmutter, *The Military and Politics in Modern Times: Professional Praetorians and Revolutionary Soldiers*.

Kargil conflict, which strengthened public suspicions regarding his sincerity towards national security.[602]

On 12 October 1999 Sharif pre-empted another crisis by attempting to prevent Musharraf's plane from landing on the way back from an official trip to Sri Lanka. While General Musharraf's plane remained in the air, dangerously low on fuel, Sharif announced the appointment of the new COAS Lieutenant General Khawaja Ziauddin, previously the DG ISI – outside of due procedure. However he had had grossly underestimated the strength of existing support for Musharraf amongst the top military echelons and Ziauddin's term as the new COAS only lasted a couple of hours. Even before the plane landed, General Musharraf's senior-most military commanders had secured the Prime Minister house, the national television station and army headquarters in what they termed a *counter-coup*.

Return of the Boots: General Parvez Musharraf

When Musharraf took over, he blamed Sharif to justify the coup – particularly denigrating his audacity in summarily dismissing another serving army chief, 'a constitutional appointee, without giving him just cause and affording him due process.'[603] Indeed, Musharraf cited the now-familiar professional rationale for military intervention :

> It is unbelievable and indeed unfortunate that the few at the helm of affairs in the last government were intriguing to destroy the last institution of stability left in Pakistan by creating dissention in the ranks of the armed forces of Pakistan.[604]

Nawaz's demonstrably autocratic political strategy during his two terms helped the military establishment to project the coup as a necessity to 'save the army from a

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[602] Alagappa, *Coercion and Governance: The Declining Political Role of the Military in Asia,* 404.
[603] Musharraf, *In the Line of Fire: A Memoir*, 109.
[604] Musharraf, 137.

prime minister who was out to browbeat all institutions, the judiciary, the presidency, parliament, the bureaucracy, and the military.'[605] At the same time, chronic economic maladministration, escalating security problems, rampant corruption, and the socio-political dissonance engendered by constant confrontations between the two leading political parties, led the wider Pakistani population to embrace the coup with an almost palpable sense of relief. Public disillusionment with the post-Zia *democratic* era, its failure to deliver on the promise of socio-economic emancipation and constant co-option of the military establishment by the two leading political parties brought praetorian involvement to the forefront of Pakistani politics once again.

Despite his vehement attempts to deny resemblance with preceding military dictatorships, Musharraf's post-coup *modus operandi* was strikingly similar. His choice of the corporate-political title of Chief Executive was designed to highlight his progressive credentials. As a long-term regime ambition, this tendency exemplifies

> where circumstances or the ambition of the victorious soldiery dictate that the power they have won shall not be set aside, the military junta seeks some endorsement of popular approval; and the regime thereby moves *forward* to a quasi-civilianized type of regime. The military still rule; but they clothe themselves with the evidences of civilian support. [606]

In the long run, whilst Musharraf avoided imposing direct martial law, he did declare a state of national emergency, placing the constitution in abeyance, suspending national and provincial assemblies, and dismissing the Prime Minister and his cabinet as well as all four provincial governments. He emphasised the necessity of his actions for the greater good of the state, asserting:

> The choice before us on 12th October was between saving the body – that is the nation, at the cost of losing a limb – that is the Constitution, or saving the limb and losing the whole body. The Constitution is but a part of the nation therefore I chose to save the nation and yet took care not to sacrifice the Constitution. The Constitution has only been temporarily held in abeyance.

[605] Shah, *The Army and Democracy: Military Politics in Pakistan*, 149.
[606] Finer, *The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics*, 179.

> This is not martial law, only another path towards democracy. The armed forces have no intention to stay in charge any longer than is absolutely necessary to pave the way for true democracy to flourish in Pakistan.[607]

In his very first address to the nation, Musharraf outlined a seven-point agenda for national reconstruction: to rebuild national confidence and morale, strengthen the federation, remove inter-provincial disharmony and restore national cohesion, revive the economy and restore investor confidence, ensure law and order and dispense speedy justice, de-politicise state institutions, ensure devolution of power to the grass roots level, and ensure swift and across-the-board accountability.[608] Despite the similarities of his agenda to both civilian and military leaders before him, public disillusionment with the existing political system in Pakistan was strong enough to allow Musharraf a favourable turn at the helm.

In creating the National Accountability Bureau (NAB) within his first month in power, avoiding direct military involvement in governmental duties, allowing press freedom, and facilitating media liberalisation, Musharraf began his rule with a series of popular measures. Plagued by the same legitimacy issues as his military predecessors, however, his formula to remedy these was also familiar. Under the flexible *Doctrine of Necessity* Musharraf had his coup legitimized by the historically pliable Supreme Court, even though the validation stipulated that elections be held within three years. By this act, the Supreme Court gave Musharraf the authority to promulgate any constitutional amendments he deemed necessary, as long as they did not affect the basic structure of the constitution, in particular the federal system, the parliamentary form of government and judicial independence.[609] In order to extend

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[607] Mirza Rohail and Afreen Baig, 'Full text (draft) of the speech of the Chief Executive of Pakistan General Pervez Musharraf delivered at 20:30 PST (15:30 GMT) on 17 October 1999.' Retrieved 31 October 2014, http://presidentmusharraf.wordpress.com/2007/07/10/address-nation-7-point-agenda/.
[608] Ibid.
[609] Shah, *The Army and Democracy: Military Politics in Pakistan*, 187.

his stay in power, much like Ayub and Zia before him, Musharraf also organized a referendum in 2002 to ratify his *election* as president for a further five years. The Chief Executive's Order No. 12 therefore asked voters to endorse his efforts for

> the reconstruction of institutions of state for the establishment of genuine and sustainable democracy, including the entrenchment of the local government systems, to ensure continued good governance for the welfare of the people, and to combat extremism and sectarianism.[610]

Needless to say, Musharraf received a similar and equally dubious majority vote (97.5 per cent) in support of his position.

Musharraf shared also with his civilian and military predecessors the penchant for expediency-based constitutional reforms. Within two months of the coup, he had created the National Reconstruction Bureau (NRB), which presented a package of proposed constitutional reforms to restructure the parliamentary system, implemented through another Legal Framework Order (LFO) (21 August 2002). In keeping with the tradition of past military regimes, the LFO provided a blanket validation of the military regime including Musharraf's concurrent hold on the position of COAS as well as President for a five-year period. In what was essentially a revival of the notorious Eighth Amendment, the President was 'reauthorised to dissolve the national assembly at his discretion, to appoint military service chiefs and governors, and to approve the appointments of judges of the superior courts.'[611]

The LFO also provided the military with a legal-institutional role in government by paving the way for the introduction of a National Security Council (NSC), an idea that had been circulating in the higher echelons of the military since Yahya's time. Successive army chiefs, including Generals Zia ul Haq, Aslam Beg, and Jehangir Karamat, had emphasised the need for a formal incorporation of the

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[610] Referendum 2002, Retrieved 20 July 2016, *http://storyofpakistan.com/referendum-2002/*.
[611] Shah, *The Army and Democracy: Military Politics in Pakistan*, 191.

military into governmental decision-making processes due to the chronic instability of the civilian political system. The NSC was therefore conceptualised as a formal function of the military within state apparatus, providing institutional counter-weights to the potential abuse of power by the Prime Minister. It was designed to 'serve as a forum for consultation on matters of national security including the sovereignty, integrity, defence, security of the state and crisis management.'[612] Musharraf's original agenda for the NSC espoused consultations on a wide range of issues including

> national security, foreign affairs, law and order, corruption, accountability, recovery of bank loans and public debt from defaulters, finance, economic and social welfare, health, education, Islamic ideology, human rights, protection of minorities and women development so as to achieve the aims and objectives enshrined the Objective Resolution of 1949.[613]

According to Musharraf, the formalisation of the military's role in government was premised on a move from *democratic dictatorship* to what he called the 'elected essence of democracy' – similar to Ayub's idea of a controlled democracy under unitary leadership. [614]The NSC's membership included the President, Prime Minister, Senate Chairman, National Assembly Speaker, Leader of the Opposition in the National Assembly, provincial Chief Ministers, Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, and the three service chiefs.

Part of the reason for the popularity of an NSC was widespread public distrust regarding the intentions and capabilities of civilian governments, and their dubious commitment towards the country's national interests. Even though some in contemporary scholarship alleged the NSC was a conscious attempt by the military to

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[612] National Security Council Act 2004. Retrieved 31 October 2014, http://www.na.gov.pk/uploads/documents/1321332683_643.pdf.
[613] Associated Press, "C.E. Order No. 6 under the Provisional Constitutional Order 1999," *Dawn*, October 31, 1999.
[614] Musharraf, *In the Line of Fire: A Memoir*, 164.

institutionalise its role in politics by creating an overarching supervisory body, [615] there were as Sattar alludes: public detractors of civilian governments that largely condone the additional function of the 'military as a defacto watchdog of the political system and the performance of civilians in office.'[616] However the NSC not only fortified the idea of the military as an indispensable component of effective governance, it by design placed Musharraf at the helm of state power. In doing so, Musharraf accentuated the long-standing view within military circles about the unsuitability of unfettered parliamentary democracy for Pakistan, an idea the post-Zia democratic experience had contributed decisively towards.

Political Intelligence

Pakistan's peculiar experience with democratic governance makes it important to remember that in its case civilian supremacy may not actually equal democratic civilian control. As such the potential of political manipulation vested in the ISI proved irresistible to Pakistani civilian and military leaderships alike. Overall both Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif demonstrated incremental pragmatism in their dealings with both the military and the ISI, especially during their second terms in office. Benazir's involvement with the country's premier intelligence agency had begun to surface with attempts to reappraise the role of intelligence agencies, especially the ISI and IB, within her democratic set-up.[617] At his end Nawaz Sharif ingratiated the military perpetrators of the anti-Benazir *Operation Midnight Jackals* – by appointing one (Brigadier Imtiaz) as DG Intelligence Bureau (IB), and the other (Major Amir) as Director Immigration in the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA).

[615] Akbar S. Zaidi, "The Political Economy of Military Rule in Pakistan: The Musharraf Regime," 2008, 11.

[616] Alagappa, *Coercion and Governance: The Declining Political Role of the Military in Asia* 393.

[617] Nawaz, *Crossed Swords: Pakistan, Its Army, and the Wars Within*, 425.

During Nawaz's tenure thus Brigadier Imtiaz 'acquired the role of a "master spy" and as director of the Intelligence Bureau kept tabs on every second politician and journalist, irrespective of their affiliation.' [618]

Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif therefore shared significant parallels in their keenness to deploy the ISI's political wing for their own purposes.[619] General Mahmood Ahmad, working in the ISI under General Hamid Gul and heading the MI and ISI subsequently, spoke candidly of his personal experience of both civilian Prime Ministers. He asserted that both leaders deliberately kept the ISI's political wing active since they recognised 'the power of its utility for their own personal and political agenda.' [620] Ex-COAS General Beg corroborated this with his own experience by recounting how insistent Benazir Bhutto in trying to entice him to use his influence as Army Chief to depose Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, whilst assuring him of her unreserved political support if he were comply.[621] Benazir additionally widened the scope of the FIA as a civilian alternative to the ISI and granted control of government censorship programs, information dissemination via mail, wire or electronic medium to the IB. By increasing their recourse to the use of force through the army, both premiers distinctly undermined the power of their own administrations.

Benazir's erstwhile interior minister General Naseerullah Babar through the IB also claimed to broker internal political alliances, in particular with religio-political parties such as the JUI. Mindful of the vociferous Islamist opposition to having a female head of state, Babar provided necessary financial *incentives* to JUI's Maulana Fazlur Rahman to secure his support. He readily admitted to providing 'suitcases of American dollars personally delivered to Maulana Fazlur Rahman via a

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[618] Idrees Bakhtiar and Zaffar Abbas, "Day of the Jackal," *Herald* (Karachi, August 1994).
[619] General Mahmood Ahmed interview.
[620] Ibid.
[621] General Mirza Aslam interview.

private chartered plane on Benazir's instructions,'[622] to broker a timely JUI-F coalition with PPP. Popularly nicknamed 'Maulana Diesel' in the media for the discretionary permits he managed to secure to export large quantities of diesel fuel to Afghanistan during the second PPP government, Maulana Fazlur Rahman proved thus to be a financially pliable political ally.

On the other hand emboldened by the historically preferential treatment accorded to him by the military establishment, his success in forcing the resignation of General Jehangir Karamat from the post of Army Chief and the arbitrary nomination of General Pervez Musharraf as his replacement, demonstrated Nawaz Sharif's rising confidence over the military and affiliated intelligence agencies. Misplaced confidence in his ability to influence the strategic direction of the army and ISI ultimately manifested in Nawaz Sharif's failed attempt at rapprochement with India over the Kashmir dispute. The subsequent launch of military operations in May 1999 at the Kargil Heights, situated just across the Indian side of the Line of Control (LoC), at the same time as peace talks between Pakistan and India thereafter testified to this critical disjuncture.

Upon assuming office, Musharraf promptly rewarded General Mahmood Ahmad, one of the tactical masterminds of the Kargil debacle, by elevating him to the powerful position of DG ISI. He then compiled dossiers of incriminating evidence against his civilian opposition, by accessing information amassed by ISI and IB. The ISI then facilitated the formation of an allied political party - the PML(Q) – by engineering defections 'through money and muscle,' largely from Nawaz Sharif's PML(N) during the 2002 elections. Opposition parties reported intimidation from

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[622] General Naseerullah Babar interview.

intelligence agencies in the form of kidnappings and torture of political leaders 'to browbeat them into joining the "King's Party."' [623]

In order to examine how General Musharraf did not digress significantly from the path-dependent trajectory of Pakistani politics there is value in exploring the accommodative attributes of his regime.[624] His promulgation of the controversial National Reconciliation Ordinance (NRO) in October 2007 granted blanket amnesty to politicians, political workers and bureaucrats accused of corruption, embezzlement, money laundering, murder, and terrorism between January 1986 to October 1999, and eventually served to undermine the very basis of the praetorian rationale for imposing direct military rule.[625] At the same time his desire to secure amenable civilian factions within the political system, including religio-political parties also demonstrates how his regime was challenged by its need to appease influential segments of the political spectrum for support.

Islam to the Rescue

By creating and supporting proxy political parties through the ISI, Musharraf epitomised the contradictions inherent in attempting to civilianize his military rule through conventional avenues of religio-political patronage. His support for the Islamist coalition *Muttahida Majlis-i-Amal* (MMA) in particular, both contradictory and self-defeating for his avowedly secular, modernising agenda, served to highlight an expedient utilization of the country's Islamist lobby, similar to previous military rulers. His courting of religio-political groups and capitulation from the stated goals of fighting religious extremism in the country shared methodological similarities with

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[623] Wilson John, "Pakistan Elections 2007-2008: Key Players," *Observer Research Foundation* 8 (2007): 2.
[624] Zaidi, "The Political Economy of Military Rule in Pakistan: The Musharraf Regime."
[625] The National Reconciliation Ordinance, 2007. Retrieved 31 October 2014, http://www.pakistani.org/pakistan/legislation/2007/NationalReconciliationOrdinance.html.

past civilian and military regimes. As such the Bhutto-created political wing of the ISI came to play a pivotal role in brokering these behind-the-scenes alliances with both Islamist and secular political parties.

His indiscriminate use of the ISI to provide support for the pro-Musharraf coalition of six mainstream Islamist parties – the *Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal* (MMA) however had much wider implications, By recognizing the MMA as the main opposition party in the National Assembly, despite Benazir's PPP's clear majority of 81 members to the MMA's 63, Musharraf circumvented much of MMA's opposition to his dual function as President and Army Chief. In turn, the Islamists recognised the importance of the political vacuum created by the exclusion of Sharif and Benazir from the political process. They were further incentivised by the pressure exerted through questions raised about *madrassa* degrees held by their elected representatives, with the possibility of disqualification from political office. By skirting the degree-issue and providing tangible support for the MMA government in KPK, the Musharraf regime managed to co-opt the support of Islamist political parties despite his participation in the US-led War on Terror.[626]

A key attribute of the alliance between General Musharraf and the MMA was the relative mildness of MMA's Islamism due to its dependence on the economic and political patronage of the ruling regime. MMA's continued rule in the province was predicated upon its support for the LFO (2003), which strengthened the powers of the presidency and provided legal cover to Musharraf's dual role as President and COAS. In the legal sphere MMA's *shariah* agenda was limited by the military regime's effective control over federal courts. Economically the federal structure of Pakistan provided significant fiscal and bureaucratic influence of the Musharraf regime over

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[626] Zaffar Abbas, "Friends in Need," *Herald* (Karachi, August 2003).

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the MMA government. Islamabad's approval was needed for large development projects and the possibility of governor's rule imposed by the centre was a significant incentive, even more so due to the undeniable evidence of state monies being disproportionately allocated and discretionary spending directed towards regional political bases of MMA leadership.[627]

A pertinent observation regarding the provincial MMA government at this time was that whilst the rise in militancy in 2006-2007 was indisputable, it was not due to a conscious policy of the MMA. In fact religious parties were often at odds with the emerging insurgent movements and concerned about their expanding influence due to their deleterious impact on public support for MMA rule. However MMA's inadvertent contribution towards the rapid spread of insurgency was primarily due to their state of inertia demonstrated by political inaction even when their writ was challenged by extremist outfits.[628] Corroborating this view with her, Dr Maliha Lodhi elucidated how 'by providing vital operational space to extremist elements within the KPK, religio-political leaders of the MMA as well as the military regime had proved complicit in the empowerment of militant Islamist outfits.[629] Musharraf's appeasement of the MMA therefore created a favourable environment for militant groups to operate in KPK with relative impunity.

Therefore arguably the most damning indictment of Musharraf's regime was in terms of the increasing returns it provided for political Islamists i.e. in making 'parliamentarians out of the mullahs'.[630] Presenting an alternative case about Musharraf's regime being different to civilian predecessors Zaidi posits that it was

[627] White, *Pakistan's Islamist Frontier: Islamic Politics and U.S. Policy in Pakistan's North West Frontier Province*.
[628] White, 56.
[629] Dr. Maleeha Lodhi interview.
[630] Zaidi, "The Political Economy of Military Rule in Pakistan: The Musharraf Regime", 19.

accommodative instead of exclusionary, and draws similarities with past military regimes. Despite significant differences in their overt ideologies, much like Zia Musharraf opted to 'quickly identify individuals and groups who are willing to work with it – and there are many, too many – and allow them some semblance of authority and autonomy.'[631] In fact Musharraf's brand of liberalism ushered in several positive externalities in terms of the inclusion and involvement of previously marginalised civil-society groups. He managed to facilitate the reintroduction of joint electorates for religious minorities, reserving one-third of seats for women at all tiers of the electioneering/governance process and passing of a significant, albeit weak, Women's Protection act etc. He also attempted but failed to get the parliament to repeal various anti-women laws, in particular the Hudood Ordinance. In addition to women's groups, support for his liberal *modernising* ways – at least at the beginning - also came from a wide section of the 'socially and culturally liberal and westernised section of the Pakistani elite' such as activists in the NGO movement, employers associations, trade bodies, several notable intellectuals as well as peace and anti-nuclear activists.[632]

The return of democratic politics post-Zia thus encapsulated and accentuated many the institutional aberrations of earlier administrations in Pakistan. Owing to the centrality of the military in the Pakistani polity, therefore the evolving relationship between militant Islamism and the praetorian system could be seen as an extension, and intensification of a political and strategic narrative that traversed the breadth of Pakistani politics. By ingratiating Islamist political parties with increasing political patronage, giving them a taste of potential increasing returns along that path, both military and civilian governments invariably provided validation and a deeper

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[631] Zaidi, 12.
[632] Zaidi, 15.

entrenchment of religious extremism in its various guises into the fabric the state. In order to augment a critical understanding of the paradoxical interface between praetorian and Islamist forces, including their incipient challenges, this thesis consolidates further nuances of this relationship and analyses its wider implications for Pakistani state and society.

Chapter 7

Praetorianism and Islam

Amongst the multiplicity of scholarly conjectures and perspectives on the Pakistani military's praetorian hegemony, its specific dealings with Islamist political parties, often providing pivotal grass roots support and ideological drivers of legitimacy require closer scrutiny. This phenomenon remains thus far inadequately examined partly because the military high command deliberately obscures the dynamics of such relationships to maintain plausible deniability. In practice, the praetorian system's interaction with Islamists follows two parallel, sometimes overlapping occurrences: regime affiliation with Islamist parties for political legitimacy and covert support for militant Islamist groups as a tactical instrument of foreign policy.

This chapter therefore distinguishes between Islamist militant groups and Islamist political parties whilst examining their correlations to demonstrate their divergent utility and interactions with the praetorian system. The idea of patronage is extended to contextualise the ideological pragmatism of Islamist political parties, a realisation of the increasing returns they experience in terms of rising localised influence, and expedient alliances forged by them with the ruling elite.

Historically, Pakistani military and civilian leaders alike deliberately courted religio-political groups for regime survival and political validation. Whilst military regimes traditionally utilised expedient alliances with Islamist political parties to bolster their dubious legitimacy by providing a civilianising cover, civilian governments courted them to gain grassroots support otherwise lacking due to a predominantly elitist political culture and inadequate development of representative institutions. The argument here supports the idea that praetorian entrenchment in

Pakistani politics ironically rendered military powers susceptible to limitations presented by the Islamist lobby itself. In other words the increasing returns experienced by Islamist parties and fostered by their praetorian patrons, then went on to present significant challenges towards the consolidation of military influence.

The ability of religious forces to exercise considerable socio-political impact by fomenting large-scale social disturbances made Islamist political parties a formidable pressure group. At their end Islamist political parties demonstrated ideological flexibility by being amenable to political affiliations with ruling regimes to gain the sort of national salience they were denied through conventional polls. Needless to say popular rejection of religious bigotry and lack of faith in the ability of a *shariʿa*-compliant socio-political and legal system to deliver was repeatedly evidenced by the dismal performance of religio-political parties at the ballot box.

Haqqani, Nawaz, Askari-Rizvi, Bennett-Jones, and Ziring have explored the Pakistani military's Islamist predilections through various lenses.[633] Haqqani leads the charge by going so far as holding the Pakistani military responsible for maintaining, even exaggerating, 'psycho-political fears' that accentuate the nation's sense of insecurity to guarantee its own institutional supremacy. Nawaz adopts a more balanced stance by asserting that the rapid ascent of the military into a major power centre came from a fateful combination of co-option by civilian political elites and their failure to redress the power imbalance between the institutions of state and that of army. Askari-Rizvi provides a descriptive account of the military's ascendency by taking a more chronological approach through the country's various formative phases. On the other hand Bennett-Jones and Ziring represent a more neutral approach

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[633] Haqqani, *Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military*; Nawaz, *Crossed Swords: Pakistan, Its Army, and the Wars Within*; Askari-Rizvi, *The Military and Politics in Pakistan: 1947-1997*; Bennet Jones, *Pakistan: Eye of the Storm*; Ziring, *Pakistan: At the Crosscurrent of History*.

towards their analysis of the military's relationship with Islam, state and society in Pakistan. They provide a useful albeit narrative account of the dominant role of the military in domestic politics and security. At the same time Jalal and Talbot touch upon the idea of patronage as an intrinsic feature of Pakistani society, which is tied in this thesis specifically to the development of the emerging praetorian system.

In this final chapter, a topical yet inadequately understood issue with regards to Pakistan's praetorian military i.e. that of the infiltration of Islamism within the officer corps is also examined. Through a detailed look at the incidence of Islamism amongst military professionals as well as its implications on their overall professionalism, this chapter debunks the perception that the Pakistani military establishment suffers significant schisms based on religious conservatism. Ultimately the Pakistani state, Kukreja affirms, 'has survived, not with Islam but in spite of Islam' and because the Army has remained a united and cohesive force in the face of chronic political implosions.[634]

The Praetorian Military System and Political Islam

Islamism within the Pakistani polity generally manifests in two dominant forms: as religio-political parties or militant Islamist groups, both often incorporating close ideological as well as organisational linkages. The two largest religio-political parties in Pakistan, JI and JUI, fostered respective militant wings within their cadres and over time developed an indirect network of affiliations with other militant groups, based on sectarian and political confluence. Additionally given the decisive role played by coalitions in forming governments in Pakistan and an ability to mobilise the aggressive Deobandi vote bank, many mainstream political parties such as PML (N),

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[634] Kukreja and Singh, *Pakistan: Democracy, Development and Security Issues*, 104.

PPP (traditionally a left-of-centre party with many Shia leaders) and even General Musharraf-affiliated PML (Q) found it useful to partner with militant religio-political groups such as the SSP.[635] Thus JI and JUI both demonstrated rhetorical and ideological flexibility, and an innate proclivity towards political accommodation in return for socio-political advantage and economic patronage.

JUI in particular demonstrated its political pragmatism by working within the state apparatus very early on. Its founder, a Deobandi cleric called Shabbir Ahmad Usmani, not only worked with the Muslim League towards the creation of Pakistan, he also served as a member of Pakistan's Constituent Assembly – the interim national assembly formed to draft Pakistan's first constitution, which was instrumental in the passage of the Objectives Resolution.[636] Up until Pakistan's first general elections, the JUI focused primarily on gaining credibility by establishing a vast network of *biradari*-esque tribal and ethnic affiliations. Its decentralised hierarchy comprising local religious leaders, the ʿ*ulama* and *aʾimma* of *madaris* and mosques, facilitated its evolution as a *network* Islamist party and ensured grass-roots support from rural populations.[637]

With its ideological foundations firmly grounded in the religious conservatism of the Deobandi school, JUI eventually emerged as a religious movement that turned to electoral politics to safeguard its sectarian interests within the Pakistani polity. In working towards this goal the party benefitted significantly from close association with rural centres of power – the mosques, shrines and *madaris*, building its political support-base on the sheer strength of numbers. As Nasr reiterates

> This link is particularly critical in local elections in rural Pakistan, since religious centres equate to population centres and therefore to opportunities

[635] Fair, "Explaining Support for Sectarian Terrorism in Pakistan: Piety, Maslak and Sharia", 1142
[636] Haroon K. Ullah, *Vying for Allah's Vote* (Washington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2013).
[637] Saleem Shahzad interview.

for mobilization. Members of the JUI and other network Islamist parties…thus come to view their followers as the religious equivalent of the secular territory-based vote band, or political *jagir* (fiefdom).[638]

Political pragmatism within the JUI over time transformed it into party that exists for elections. Because its members come from outside the traditional power structure, winning sufficient support at the polls so they can join electoral coalitions at the provincial or national level is their only way to gain access to patronage goods and to influence policy.[639]

By demonstrating a high level of political pragmatism the JUI has historically maintained significant influence over the direction of Islamist policies in the Pakistani state. For instance, by aligning with Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto's leftist populism between 1971 and 1977, the JUI facilitated the passage of Islamist laws via parliamentary support. Several JUI members even defected to the PPP during this time. By the 1980s, due to its significant success in accessing the rural vote-bank through its widespread network of schools and charity organisations, the JUI was able to gain access to state institutions, increase its membership numbers and establish socio-political legitimacy.

In contrast, the *Jamaat-i-Islami* under the fiercely ideological Maududi was conceptualised from inception as a vanguard Islamist party with an organisational structure based on an elite cadre of technocrats and intellectual leadership recruited from universities and renowned *madaris*.[640] Due to its emphasis on high religious and scholarly credentials as a prerequisite for party leadership, the JI maintained a rigid hierarchy and a tightly controlled chain of command, which constrained its appeal to the urban middle and lower middle class. JI's main support base came from urban

[638] Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, "The Rise of Sunni Militancy in Pakistan: The Changing Role of Islamism and the Ulama in Society and Politics," *Modern Asian Studies* 34, no. 1 (2000): 153.
[639] ICG Asia Report, "Islamic Parties in Pakistan," *International Crisis Group*, 2011.
[640] Nasr, *The Vanguard of the Islamic Revolution: The Jamaat-i-Islami of Pakistan*.

centres where educated middle- and lower middle-class Pakistanis suffered exclusion from the country's elitist parliamentary structure and were drawn to its promise of political emancipation. A large proportion of JI members, due to their educational and professional credentials therefore also formed a part of the urban intelligentsia in secular governmental and academic institutions. These

> hierarchical Islamists tend to share similar educational backgrounds with the economic elite and have experience with a broader social milieu than the average citizen does. This exposure allows the Islamists some influence and provides access to state goods that may be distributed as patronage.[641]

Despite the limitations presented by strict ideological adherence and a vanguard approach in winning mass participation, JI's focus on gaining influence over the state compelled it to moderate its inherent stresses of establishing a holy community to cater for practical, political considerations. As a result it demonstrated significant accommodations with both secular civilian and military regimes in order to gain political prominence, which it was unable to gain otherwise through the conventional electoral process.

Both JI and JUI also relied essentially on their respective networks of *madrassa* affiliates across the country to derive ideological and participatory strength. Nasr delineates such political features of Islamist parties:

> *Madrassa*s play a central role in demarcating the boundaries of the *ulama* parties' constituencies. Through indoctrination, and by providing the basis for organizational networks, madrassas have served the political interests of *ulama* parties, and helped transform their relation to their respective religious communities – from one that is rooted in distinct interpretations of faith to a patron-client relationship.[642]

It was particularly this connection between religious and socio-political power facilitated by mushrooming *madrassa* networks in Pakistan and its potential to

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[641] Ullah, *Vying for Allah's Vote*, 85.
[642] Nasr, "The Rise of Sunni Militancy in Pakistan: The Changing Role of Islamism and the Ulama in Society and Politics", 154.

engender large-scale social mobilisation that made liaison with Islamist political parties so attractive and lucrative for the country's political leadership. Pakistani regimes beginning with General Yahya, and extending to Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, General Zia ul Haq, Benazir Bhutto, Nawaz Sharif, and General Pervez Musharraf, all demonstrated a willingness to patronise either the JUI or JI or both for their respective political ends. Patronage of Islamist parties, however, became especially pervasive in praetorian politics post-Zia with the military's intelligence wing, the ISI, serving as the conduit through which these strategic alliances were engineered and guided.

The Foreign Hand

Historically, Pakistan's unique geo-strategic position played a significant role in the development of the praetorian system's relationship with Islamist militancy. Subject to a divergent onslaught of ideological and geo-political foreign influences, Pakistan has historically served as the fulcrum of *realpolitik* by foreign powers. The extension of arbitrary patronage in particularly by the US and Saudi Arabia, has therefore played a formative role in the evolving relationship between the praetorian military and its Islamist appendages in Pakistan.

Notwithstanding its ceaseless rhetoric about the cause of universal democratic emancipation, the United States inadvertently contributed towards the entrenchment of both praetorianism and Islamism in Pakistan. By maintaining a parallel, independent relationship with the country's military establishment very early on, the United States undermined the authority of Pakistan's civilian leadership, particularly in the realm of foreign policy. Subsequent US administrations continued to prioritise this relationship, preferring its relative freedom from the volatility of democratic politics in Pakistan.

The development of an expedient relationship between American administrations and the Pakistani military establishment can actually be traced back to critical security imperatives following Pakistan's independence that compelled the military leadership to find alternative funding sources to expand its defence capabilities. The waning significance of Britain as the colonial patron-in-chief demonstrated by cutbacks of British defence armament production resulted in the Pakistani military's turn towards Washington to meet its funding requirements. The American military attaché outlined a case for establishing independent dealings with Pakistan's military authorities in the following way:

> Our present policy of procrastination and promises…if we persist in this passive obstructionist policy and dire necessity on the part of Pakistan may force her to deal with other powers and drive her into the orbit of influence [i.e. of the Soviets] that is prejudicial to our interests.[643]

American support for the Pakistan army began initially by providing credit to purchase unspecified *US property* in the subcontinent, despite Washington's previously imposed arms embargo. Accordingly Pakistan's first international credit agreement, a $10 million loan, was signed with the United States on 25 May 1948.[644] What began as credit, provided by the US War Assets Administration for purchasing stores and equipment, expanded rapidly thereafter into other areas of financial assistance with the largest share going to military aid.[645]

This marked the beginning of reciprocal association between the Pakistani Army and the US State Department, a relationship that became progressively entrenched over subsequent decades. The US State Department seemed to prefer dealing with the Pakistani military, as opposed to the fractious civilian leadership, to

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[643] Jalal, *The State of Martial Rule: The Origins of Pakistan's Political Economy of Defence*, 76.
[644] Gardezi and Jamil, *Pakistan: The Roots of Dictatorship. Political Economy of a Praetorian State*, 7.
[645] Numerous grants and credits were offered by US-sponsored financial agencies from the 1950s onwards, including a $1.6 million Ford Foundation Grant and a $60 million loan from the World Bank in 1951.

look after US national interests and strategic goals in the region. In fact as early as 1951, one of the threats to American interests in Pakistan was identified as 'reactionary groups of landholders and uneducated religious' leaders who were opposed to the 'present Western-minded government' and 'favour a return to primitive Islamic principles.'[646]

During the 1950s, US ambassadors serving in the Middle East emphasised the Pakistan's geo-strategic significance in helping to establish influence in the Persian Gulf and strongly advocated the provision of equipment to build up the military capacity of its armed forces.[647] The Eisenhower administration concurrently aimed to reduce direct US military operations in the region by boosting the capabilities of frontline states such as Pakistan to build a northern tier of defence against communist expansionism.

Tapping into the opportunity provided by international developments the Pakistani military pushed for strategic alliance with the United States as a critical source of economic and military aid. In 1953, the first Commander in Chief of the Pakistan Army General Ayub Khan made an independent visit to Washington seeking a 'deal whereby Pakistan could – for the right price – serve as the West's Eastern anchor in an Asian alliance structure.'[648] The conclusion of a joint treaty with the United States in 1954 followed by membership of the SEATO and Baghdad Pack thus marked a promising start to the Pakistan-US alliance. During the severe economic crisis of 1955, compounded by devastating floods in East Pakistan, financial aid from the United States amounted to a substantial $105 million, including $65.5 million under Defence Support, of which $14.46 million to be used to procure military

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[646] Jalal, *The State of Martial Rule: The Origins of Pakistan's Political Economy of Defence*, 127; Haqqani, *Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military*, 322.
[647] General Naseerullah Babar interview
[648] Tahir-Kheli, *The United States and Pakistan: The Evolution of an Influence Relationship*, 3.

equipment, facilities, and services for common defence, as well as $5.3 million under

Technical Assistance and $35-$40 million for agricultural commodities.[649] A secret

CIA memorandum reiterated the driving factors of this relationship:

> Pakistan, fearing India, first turned to the West for protection. The US, seeking to implement its 'containment' policy, was organizing a chain of alliances around the borders of the USSR. Pakistan seized upon this as a means of security. Military aid, provided by the US for the purpose of resisting Communist aggression, was accepted by Pakistan as a means of deterring any aggressive Indian designs…from 1954 to 1964, it received nearly one billion dollars in military assistance from the US.[650]

In subsequent years, the United States continued to demonstrate an unprecedented

level of flexibility in dealing with successive military regimes in Pakistan. Keen to

mitigate the damage caused to the Pakistan-US relationship as a result of its military

assistance to India during the 1962 Sino-Indian border war and inaction during the

1965 Pakistan-India war, the Nixon administration extended diplomatic support

towards Yahya's military regime in 1969. This relationship endured despite Yahya's

brutal military crackdown upon dissidents in East Pakistan in 1971. The Nixon

administration even described such repression as an 'internal Pakistani matter.'[651] In

exchange, Yahya agreed to act as an intermediary for the normalisation of Sino-US

relations.

Contribution of the United States towards an inextricable entrenchment of

praetorianism in Pakistan peaked during General Zia's military regime. Officially,

CIA aid to the *Mujahidin* began during 1980; after the Soviet Army had entered

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[649] 'Progress Report on NSC 5409 (South Asia),' Operations Coordinating Board, 13 February 1955, CIA FOIA Electronic Reading Room. Retrieved 30 January 2017, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP80R01731R003000160013-2.pdf

[650] Letter from W.F. Raborn (Director of CIA) to McGeorge Bundy (Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs), 'Indo-Pakistani Problems,' 18 August 1965, CIA FOIA Electric Reading Room. Retrieved 30 January 2017, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP80B01676R000400150009-5.pdf

[651] Document 245, Telegram from Department of State to the Embassy in India, 7 December 1971, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971*. Retrieved 20 October 2016, https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/nixon/xi/45607.htm.

Afghanistan. Unofficially however President Jimmy Carter's National Security Advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski, confirmed a startling revelation made by a former Director of the CIA, Robert Gates in his memoirs, marking 3 July 1979 as the date on which President Carter 'signed the first directive for secret aid to the opponents of the Pro-Soviet regime in Kabul … in my opinion this aid was going to induce a Soviet military intervention.'[652] Gates revealed that President Carter had signed a formal declaration (a presidential 'finding') authorising the CIA to undertake *special activities* designed to influence political conditions in Afghanistan and agreed to help fund covert support to the Afghan *Mujahidin* in order to give USSR its *bleeding-wound*. Initially, Carter authorised the CIA to spend a little more than $500,000 on

> propaganda and other psychological operations in Afghanistan. The establishment of radio operations through third countries; and provision either unilaterally or through third countries of support for guerrillas in cash or non-military supplies.[653]

This meant that the United States had been keen to make Afghanistan a key front in its Cold War strategy and knowingly increased the probability of a Soviet invasion even before it happened.

Zia's military coup in Pakistan in 1977 and his closeness with the hawkish Director-General of ISI, Lieutenant General Akhtar Abdul Rahman, marked the beginning of a series of fortunate coincidences for American interests. The military regime's struggle for legitimacy and preoccupation with attaining strategic depth with Afghanistan against neighbouring India created an opportunity for the United States to strike a mutually beneficial partnership. By providing substantial economic and military aid, tactical and technological support, as well as intelligence collaboration

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[652] Zbigniew Brzezinski, "Interview with Zbigniew Brzezinski," *La Nouvel Observateur*, January 1998, www.globalresearch.ca/articles/BRZ110A.html.
[653] Robert Gates, *From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider's Story of Five Presidents and How They Won the Cold War* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996), 149.

the United States effectively recruited the military regime in Pakistan to fight its proxy war in Afghanistan. As such Brzezinski commented brazenly 'What is more important to the history of the world? The *Taliban* or the collapse of the Soviet empire? A few crazed Muslims or the liberation of Central Europe and the end of the Cold War.' [654]

After Carter, President Reagan continued and intensified US support for the anti-Soviet campaign by allowing the CIA to covertly ship arms and weapons to the *Mujahidin* through the Pakistan Army and the ISI in 1981. In Pakistan, General Zia took charge of all weapons and funds provided by the CIA, making sure that all forms of aid for the *Mujahidin* passed through Pakistani military authorities. He decided which Afghan guerrillas received this support and how much of it. This invariably meant that there were going to be close links forged between military and intelligence operatives in Pakistan and their comrades in Afghanistan. At the same time, whenever new and complex weapon-systems were introduced, the CIA trained Pakistani instructors from the ISI, such as Colonel Imam, who in turn trained the *Mujahidin* in their usage. Gannon notes,

> The American CIA and ISI were as thick as thieves. Cooperation was in the supply of arms and ammunition and also training, especially in the initial phases. There was also cooperation in the field of intelligence… For the *Jihad* in Afghanistan, against the Soviets, the CIA and ISI were two strands of one thread.[655]

Of special significance to *Operation Cyclone,* as the Afghan *Jihad* was codenamed, was the deployment of *jihadist* or militant Islamism as an operational and ideological strategy. The US Agency for International Development (USAID) spent over $51 million between 1984 and 1994 at the University of Nebraska, Omaha, to develop and

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[654] Brzezinski, "Interview with Zbigniew Brzezinski."
[655] Gannon, *I Is for Infidel – From Holy War to Holy Terror: 18 Years Inside Afghanistan,* 140.

design textbooks, to be printed in Pakistan, which were designed to provide religious validation for the war. Over 13 million of these textbooks were distributed at Afghan refugee camps and *madaris* in Pakistan 'where students learnt basic math by counting dead Russians and Kalashnikov rifles.'[656] These *jihadist* materials remained in circulation in Afghan schools and Pakistani *madaris* long after the end of the Soviet occupation, and continued to provide inspiration for countless similar publications issued by militant *Tanzimat* (e.g. the *Markus al-Da'wa al-I shad*),[657] *madaris* and Islamist political parties.

By cloaking the Afghan conflict in religious terms, the United States had successfully mobilised Islamist sensibilities to solicit support for its Cold War strategy, providing both ideological impetus and practical resources for the unprecedented growth and militarisation of *madaris* in the region. According to one estimate, the American Government allocated over $2 billion of resources through the CIA to the anti-Soviet campaign in Afghanistan between 1980 and 1989. In 1984, the petro-dollar agreement was formed between Ronald Reagan and the Saudi Royal family, with the Saudis pledging to match US contributions towards the Afghan *jihad*. The CIA estimated that by the mid-1980s, another $25 million was being sent to the war effort by NGOs situated in various Arab Gulf states.[658] The ability to tap into these informal, undocumented and unregulated sources of funding was what allowed militant Islamist groups to eventually assert their independence from their military sponsors in Pakistan.

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[656] Stephens and Ottaway, "The ABC's of Jihad in Afghanistan."
[657] *Markaz al-Dawa al-Irshad* is an Ahl-i-Hadith organisation, headquartered in central Punjab (Muridke). It is the parent organization for the Kashmir-based militant organisation *Lashkar-e-Tayyiba*.
[658] Coll, *Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan and Bin Laden, From the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001*, 65.

Even after the end of the Cold War and return of democratic politics, the relationship of the US administration tilted heavily towards patronising the military high command instead of elected civilian leadership. Nordlinger's highlights this feature of American foreign relations stating that its 'preference for democratic civilian regimes is decidedly overshadowed by the goal of preventing the rise of left-wing movements – a policy that redounds to the benefit of anti-Communist praetorians.'[659]

The United States continued to back the ISI-driven Afghan policy supporting a *Mujahidin*-backed Islamist government in Kabul during Benazir Bhutto's first term in office. Ex-COAS General Beg candidly confirmed this continued relevance of a 'direct and independent relationship between the Pentagon and military high command in Pakistan.'[660] Similarly, when Nawaz Sharif came to power, the US government maintained its relationship with the military over the elected government to the extent that, 'Sharif failed to get officially invited to Washington whereas Pakistani generals continued to travel to the US for meetings with the US Central command.'[661]

Parallel interaction with Pakistan's military high command continued even in the face of rising Islamist militancy, including the ISI's support for the Kashmiri insurgency, and despite US opposition to its expanding nuclear programme. An overriding American view of the Pakistan Army as its primary ally resurfaced in a report assessing the *Taliban* threat in Afghanistan in 2006 by General Barry McCaffrey – the key US military delegate in Afghanistan: 'the only load bearing institution holding the nation together … the only corps of high-integrity societal

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[659] Nordlinger, *Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Governments*, 8.
[660] General Mirza Aslam interview.
[661] Haqqani, *Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military*, 224.

leadership in general…when compared to the civilian political elite.'[662] Thus according to figures from USAID:

> between 1954 and 2002 the US provided a total of $12.6 billion in economic and military aid to Pakistan… On average US aid to Pakistan amounted to $383.9 million for each year of military rule compared with only $178.9 million under civilian leadership.[663]

Terrorist attacks on the United States on 11 September 2001 served to renew Pakistan's status as a critical frontline ally in the US-led War on Terror. Just as General Zia benefitted with the forging of an expedient relationship with the United States for domestic and international legitimacy, General Musharraf's military regime also gained from the arbitrary nature of US foreign policy imperatives post-9/11. Given a stark choice of either being 'with' or 'against' the United States, whether to 'turn a blind eye and leave his people hostage to the terrorists or join the free world in fighting the terrorists,'[664] the Musharraf administration made a calculated decision. It committed itself to following US directives to root out al-Qaeda operatives at its border, share intelligence with the US regarding militant activities and movement, and break off all ties with the *Taliban* government in Afghanistan should it refuse to hand over Osama bin Laden and the al-Qaeda leadership within the stipulated two days of the attack.

In return for cooperation in its fight against al-Qaeda, Washington declared Pakistan a major non-NATO ally, pledged $5 billion in military and economic aid, lifted both nuclear and democracy-related sanctions, and provided tacit support to Musharraf's military regime.[665] During this time, President George W. Bush adroitly

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[662] Umer Farooq, "Mixed Signals," *Herald* (Karachi, September 2006).

[663] Haqqani, *Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military*, 324.

[664] 'Fact Sheet: Afghanistan and Pakistan: Strong Allies in the War on Terror,' 29 September 2006, White House Press Release. Retrieved 30 January 2017, https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2006/09/20060929-2.html

[665] Shah, *The Army and Democracy: Military Politics in Pakistan*.

dodged questions regarding the dubious democratic credentials of the Musharraf administration by stating:

> As we work with President Musharraf to bring security to his country, we're also supporting him as he takes steps to build a modern and moderate nation that will hold free and fair elections next year….President Musharraf has a clear vision for his country as a nation growing in freedom and prosperity and peace. And as he stands against the terrorists and for the free future of his country, the United States of America will stand with him.[666]

In return, Musharraf's support for America's *Operation Enduring Freedom* against the Afghan *Taliban* and al-Qaeda network served as a precursor to an even broader commitment. He

> declared that Pakistan will be an enemy of terrorism and extremism, wherever it exists, including inside his own border... He knows that his nation cannot grow peacefully if terrorists are tolerated or ignored in his country, in his region, or in the world. He is committed to banning the groups that practice terror, closing their offices and arresting the terrorists themselves.[667]

An overarching parallel between the three military regimes of Ayub, Zia and Musharraf therefore appears in the remarkable consistency demonstrated by the military establishment in pursuing its institutional interests in spite of the shifting international, strategic landscape. Viewed through the lens of historical institutionalism, Aziz presents this perspective in the following way: 'In Pakistan Military regimes have historically adopted the dominant discourse and adapted policies to maximise advantage within the international community.'[668] This approach was exemplified in its role under General Zia-ul-Haq as a front line state against communism during the Cold War, and then under General Parvez Musharraf as a front-line state in the US War on Terror post-9/11.

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[666] 'President Bush Discusses Global War on Terror,' 29 September 2006, White House Press Release. Retrieved 30 January 2017, https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2006/09/20060929-3.html.

[667] 'U.S.-Pakistan Affirm Commitment Against Terrorism,' 13 February 2002, White House Press Release. Retrieved 30 January 2017, https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/02/20020213-3.html

[668] Aziz, *Military Control in Pakistan: The Parallel State*, 24.

Islamist groups viewed Pakistan's subsequent withdrawal of support for the *Taliban* regime in Afghanistan and crackdown on key militant organisations within Pakistan, having previously benefitted from ISI-support, as a gross betrayal. The corresponding rise in anti-state violence by these groups, including attacks on military installations and several assassination attempts on Musharraf's life itself reflected the cost of acceding to short-term American policies and the reliance on US patronage for political legitimacy. Thus, discretionary patronage of the United States played a definitive role on the entrenchment of praetorianism in Pakistan and the peculiar trajectory of its dichotomous relationship with Islamist militancy.

The Saudi Connection

Geo-political events in the 1980s also proved opportune for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia – another foreign actor looking to extend its influence in the region. In 1979 Khomeini's successful hijacking of the anti-Shah revolution in Iran and its widespread popularity with *Shiʿa* communities across the globe presented a challenge to Saudi monopoly over its claimed ideological leadership of the Muslim world. The strict Wahhabi creed within *Sunni* Islam that was propagated by the Saudi state inherently incorporated a direct and strident opposition to divergent *Shiʿa* beliefs.

In Pakistan General Zia's military takeover combined with his personal conviction towards the propagation of a strict, puritanical version of *Sunni* Islam, and a desperate need to secure political legitimacy made him an ideal partner for the Saudi state's strategic goals. At the same time Saudi Arabia provided considerable financial incentives to the military establishment in Pakistan to secure its ideological and technical support. Under a bilateral agreement, the Pakistan Army agreed to assist

Saudi MODA (Ministry of Defence Affairs) to develop their technical, medical, and training services.

Saudi patronage also assisted Zia's military regime to win broad-based support for participation in the Afghan war from lower and middle ranks of the army in other ways. During the 1980s, a large number of officers particularly Junior Commissioned Officers (JCOs) and Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs) were selected on merit and sent on deputation from Pakistan to Saudi Arabia, generally for a three-year period. From the military's perspective, providing such opportunities of financial uplift and incentivisation of merit was designed to mitigate potential opposition to the war effort from within the army's ranks. Almost all seconded officers returned with more earnings from their three-year deputations than they were able save from their entire military service.[669] As an added bonus they were also able to perform the religious ceremonies of *Hajj* and *ʿUmra*, whilst in the Holy Land.

The secondment programme crucially helped the Pakistani government to secure broad-based, cross-level cooperation with the Saudi military. Close cooperation between the highest levels of Saudi General Intelligence Directorate (GID) and Pakistani ISI began in the late 1970s with the heads of both intelligence agencies maintaining direct and frequent interaction with each other as well as the ruling elites. Heading the GID, Prince Turki himself flew into Pakistan at least five times a month during this time.[670] Even after General Zia's death the GID maintained its independent links with the ISI and frequently disbursed subsidies, leading Prince Turki to openly confess 'We don't do operations … we don't know how. All we

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[669] Interview with Brigadier Javed Ashraf Khan, Corps of Engineers, Pakistan Army, ex-POW 1971, Military Deputation to Saudi Arabia (1982-1984), Director Works and Chief Engineer Navy (1990-1997), Karachi, 2 April 2006.
[670] Younas Samad, *The Pakistan-US Conundrum – Jihadists, the Military and the People: The Struggle for Control* (London: Hurst and Company, 2011).

know is how to write cheques.'[671] Significantly, neither the ISI nor GID utilised formal, official diplomatic channels for logistics, including the transport of cash from Saudi Arabia to Pakistan instead opting for an informal relationship between the respective military leadership.

Even after the Soviet war, independent relationships between the GID and ISI and between Saudi funders and sectarian militant organisations in Pakistan continued unencumbered. Saudi financial support, estimated at several hundred million dollars in the 1990s, helped Pakistani intelligence agencies to build up *jihadi* forces in both Afghanistan and Kashmir, whilst indirect funding from NGOs and charitable organisations in the Middle East continued their support for *Sunni* sectarian groups. [672] Covert, indirect funding streams for these distinctively sectarian militant groups made it impossible to ascertain exactly how much money was coming in, where it was coming from, where it would end up – hence granting them a certain level of autonomy from state and significantly even ISI control.[673] Militant anti-*Shi'ia* groups such as the *Sipah-i-Sahaba-Pakistan* (SSP), *Harkat-ul-Mujahidin* (HUM), and even the Afghan *Taliban* later emerged from the same JUI *madaris* and training camps in the KPK and Afghanistan that had been sustained by Saudi funding.

The Saudis continued to maintain their operational symmetry with Pakistan's military-directed Afghan policy in the 1980s, and subsequently the Kashmir policy in the 1990s. Fearing what was referred to in military circles as the 'nutcracker'[674] situation where Pakistan could end up squeezed between two hostile governments on

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[671] Samad, 100.
[672] Samad, *The Pakistan-US Conundrum – Jihadists, the Military and the People: The Struggle for Control*, 101.
[673] NACTA panel interview.
[674] General Mahmood Ahmed interview.

its Eastern and Western flanks, General Zia had been keen to ensure a friendly interim government in Kabul when the Soviets withdrew. He asserted:

> We have earned the right to have [in Kabul] a power that is very friendly to us. We have taken risks as a front-line state, and we will not permit a return to the pre-war situation, marked by a large Indian and Soviet influence and Afghan claims on our own territory. [675]

Upon taking over as ISI chief in 1987, General Hamid Gul therefore worked closely with Saudi intelligence officials including Prince Turki and his chief of staff Ahmad Badeeb – a relationship that endured even after the coming to power of Benazir Bhutto's secular, civilian government. The Saudis endorsed General Gul's officially unsanctioned, independent instigation of the ill-fated *'Jalalabad Operation'* in 1989, which was designed to topple the Soviet-backed government of Mohammad Najibullah in Afghanistan and replace it with a Pakistan-friendly Afghan government. Under Prince Turki, Saudi intelligence provided Gul and the ISI with enough funding – around $25 million – to coerce bickering *Mujahidin* factions to form a new Islamist-dominated interim Afghan government.[676] Ironically, despite the disastrous failure of the *Jalalabad Operation* the Saudi-ISI relationship remained unaffected, and GID continued to provide the Pakistani military with financial aid and discounted oil sales bypassing Benazir's civilian leadership, even paying cash bonuses to designated senior ISI officers.[677] When the *Taliban* came to power in the mid-1990s therefore, Saudi Arabia followed Pakistan's lead in recognising the new 'Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan' and supported ISI's support for the movement by sending money and equipment for the *Taliban*.

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[675] Interview with General Zia ul Haq, cited in Coll, *Ghost Wars,* 175.
[676] Coll, *Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan and Bin Laden, From the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001*, 191.
[677] Samad, *The Pakistan-US Conundrum – Jihadists, the Military and the People: The Struggle for Control*, 101.

The role of foreign powers, particularly the United States and Saudi Arabia, was thus pivotal in fomenting praetorianism in Pakistan and its dichotomous relationship with Islamist militancy. Military experience augmented by the conflict in Afghanistan and then Kashmir, ideological impetus provided by the Saudi, Iranian, and US governments, and patronage of local Islamist groups by wealthy Arab patrons facilitated the diversification and multiplicity of militant activities in Pakistan.

Islam in the Army

A key concern for contemporary scholars of civil-military relations in Pakistan, that of an insidious radical Islamist wave rising from within the military corps, needs to be factored into this analysis to ascertain the breadth and depth of its impact on the praetorian system. Whilst it is true that close and prolonged interaction of the military with Islamist militants over the years, and especially during the Zia decade, made it inevitable for some influences to filter through even in such a tightly regulated professional environment, there seems to be an almost hyperbolic paranoia in contemporary scholarly lexicon about its potential implications. Interestingly, the Islamist slogan of '*Iman, Taqwa, Jihad Fee Sabilillah*' (Faith, Piety, Struggle in the way of God) was introduced into the army during the civilian regime of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. Bhutto expanded the role of religion in public life towards the end of his regime primarily in order to placate the increasingly raucous Islamist lobby. This included an executive order on the prohibition of alcohol notably in military messes where its consumption was previously an integral part of social interaction. Moreover, in appointing the conservative General Zia ul Haq as his army chief, Bhutto aimed to propagate the Pakistani military's evolution as the ultimate custodian of an anti-India, Islamist ideology.

Upon seizing power, General Zia extended the scope of religion into the barracks. Designed essentially to provide desperately needed legitimacy for his military regime, Zia's comprehensive use of Islamist discourse encompassed internal as well as external policy imperatives. He relaxed the strict rules governing the garrison's interaction with civilians, thereby providing an opening to Islamist influences from outside. He also encouraged the activities of the proselytising *Tablighi Jamaat* (TJ) (Society for Spreading Faith) by allowing the organisation to send its missionaries to the barracks whilst at the same time encouraging soldiers and officers to attend its congregations outside the garrisons.[678] Zia himself was the first COAS to attend the annual congregation of the TJ. He would instruct military personnel verbally during his visits, and in also through official missives, to offer prayers led preferably by senior commanders.[679] He also facilitated setting up central mosques in garrisons, prayer halls in army units and the incorporation of religious education within military programmes. According to a former ISI official: religious activities in the army during the Zia era could be divided into three broad categories: *Zikr* meetings organised by individual officers, TJ activity in the garrisons and JI sympathizers engaged in promoting their views in the army.[680]

Despite various measures to introduce a right wing, Islamist trend into the army however, Zia's Islamisation programme failed to have a formative impact on the overall secular nature of the military corps. The Pakistan Military Academy (PMA) included only rudimentary Islamic education for cadets mostly exalting the virtues of *Jihad* as based on a selfless commitment towards duty and country, but without

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[678] General Javed Nasir and Brigadier Sardar Javed Ashraf interviews.
[679] Haqqani, *Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military*, 113.
[680] Umer Farooq, "Islam in the Garrison," *Herald* (Karachi, August 2011).

indulging in extensive Islamic proselytization[681] – an assertion made by both military and civilian sources.[682] Even though many officers adopted an overt sort of Islamism and a deliberate participation in religious practices during the Zia era, this was primarily in order to gain approval of their commanding officers and contribute towards potential career advancement.[683] Thus, some claims in contemporary scholarship, which allege that Pakistan Army became a primary object of Islamisation with Islamic teaching playing an important role in military education, seem to be misplaced.[684]

General Zia's policies did to an extent contribute towards accentuating existing Islamist tendencies amongst a select cadre of army officers. During his time several regional geo-political and domestic demographic shifts had served to embolden the small but influential Islamist lobby within the forces. Prominent positions awarded to army officers influenced heavily by exposure to an orthodox interpretation of Islam from their postings to Arab countries in the 1970s and 1980s, impact of the *Shi'a* revolution in neighbouring Iran, and the army's direct interaction with Islamist *Mujahidin* battling the communist forces in Afghanistan served to reinforce a small Islamist lobby. Islamism manifested in officers such as ISI's Colonel Imam, who had been directly involved in the psychological and military training of *Mujahidin* forces in Afghanistan and consequently played a pivotal role in Pakistan's parley with the Afghan *Taliban* in the 1990s. As a key ISI operative during the Soviet-Afghan conflict, Colonel Imam also had parallel interaction with the CIA and witnessed first-hand the deleterious impact of an abrupt change in US policy immediately after the war. He attributed the sudden cessation of US funding and a

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[681] Colonel Samrez Salik interview.
[682] Colonel Samrez Salik and Senator Mushahid Hussain interviews.
[683] General Ali Jan Aurakzai interview.
[684] Kapur and Ganguly, "The Jihad Paradox: Pakistan and Islamist Militancy in South Asia," 123.

fundamental unwillingness of the US administration to allow 'a stable, popular Islamic government under the *Mujahidin*' as the principal cause of the extended political instability in the region.[685] This theme of American betrayal and strategic premeditation resonates strongly amongst many of the Islamist military officers and manifested openly in the interviews conducted during research. Some even attributed it to a wider, global, Zionist conspiracy and the inescapable clash between the West and the 'Muslim *Ummah*.'[686] Such active Islamism has on occasion presented internal challenges to the military institution in terms of deviating from standard professional conduct and taking discretionary action on issues of national significance.[687]

Several top Pakistani military commanders demonstrated similar trajectories in developing Islamist inclinations. Lieutenant-General Hamid Gul, first DGMI then DGISI under Zia, had also worked closely with the CIA during the Soviet-Afghan war. According to Gul the United States reneged on its commitment to Pakistan to ensure a smooth post-war transition and therefore was directly responsible for regional anarchy in the wake of the Soviet retreat. He became aggressively anti-American following what he called an 'unforgivable American betrayal in Afghanistan.[688] His anti-US sentiments gained intensity with the subsequent imposition of US sanctions due to Pakistan's nuclear programme. Brazenly declaring,

> God will destroy the US in Iraq and Afghanistan and wherever it will try to go from there…The Muslim world must stand united to confront the U.S. in its so-called War on Terrorism, which is in reality a war against Muslims. Let's destroy America wherever its troops are trapped.[689]

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[685] Colonel Imam interview

[686] General Hamid Gul and General Mahmood Ahmad interviews.

[687] For instance in case of the *Jalalabad Operation* and *Operation Day of the Jackal*.

[688] General Hamid Gul interview

[689] Bill Roggio, "US Moves to Declare Former Pakistani Officers International Terrorists," Long War Journal, 2014, http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2008/12/us_moves_to_declare.php, 31 October 2014.

Gul openly admitted to maintaining personal contact with the *Taliban* and other Islamist groups such as banned militant organisation *Ummah Tamer-e-Nau* (a Community Built Anew). Gul also played a pivotal role in cobbling together the coalition of right-wing religio-political parties constituting the IJI as ISI chief during the 1988 elections. His increasingly insubordinate, right wing machinations resulted in his removal from the ISI and eventually forced retirement from the army itself.

Gul's removal from office actually reveals an important aspect of Pakistani army's institutional priorities, which swiftly counters the idea of an insidious Islamist threat rising from within military ranks. During interviews several senior military commanders including ex-COAS Beg asserted that the army high command as a matter of principle could not tolerate any 'dissident elements' threatening its cohesion and internal chain of command.[690] This does not mean that these elements do not exist in the army, just that when they present a significant challenge towards the institutional hierarchy or deviate from its standard operating procedures without authorisation, they are rooted out quickly. This especially includes dissident Islamist factions from within the military. The dismissal of General Javed Nasir, then DG ISI, in May 1993 by COAS Waheed Kakar for providing covert military support to Muslim rebels in about a dozen countries is a particular case in point in this regard.

Appointed DGISI by Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, Nasir had the dubious honour of being the first army general to sport a flowing beard openly announcing his personal Islamism. Dedicated membership of the *Tableeghi Jamaat* buttressed General Nasir's commitment towards supporting Islamist armed struggle and belief in Pakistan's pan-Islamic obligation to help oppressed Muslims across the world.[691]

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[690] General Ali Jan Aurakzai, General Mirza Aslam Beg, General Asad Durrani interviews.
[691] General Javed Nasir interview.

Close association with several *Wahhabi* and Deobandi groups during his time as DGISI also enabled Nasir to employ militant outfits such as *Harkat-i-Jihad-Islami* (HJI) to recruit and train volunteers to fight in both Afghanistan and Kashmir. He admitted to widening ISI's covert operations against the 'enemies of Islam,' including the 'USA, Hindu leadership of India, the communists, (and) the Zionists.'[692] Considering it a fulfilment of his religious duty, Nasir proudly claims responsibility for supplying arms, particularly sophisticated anti-tank guided missiles in defiance of the UN arms embargo, to besieged Bosnian Muslims against the Serbs during the Bosnian War in 1992.[693] As DGISI, he also extended support to Chinese Muslim insurgents in the Xinjiang Province, rebel Muslim groups in the Philippines and religious groups in Central Asia. His support for the Muslim insurgency in China caused an inescapable diplomatic fissure in the historically amicable Pakistan-China relations leading Nawaz Sharif to readily accept US demands to remove him from office in 1993.[694]

Instrumental in orchestrating the coup that removed Nawaz Sharif and brought General Pervez Musharraf to power was another senior military high commander with Islamist leanings – Lieutenant General Mahmood Ahmad. Having previously served as DGMI (1995) and then as DGISI following the coup in 1999, General Mahmood was a keen proponent of the utility that lay in the military's strategic interaction with Islamist militants.

His personal convictions additionally resonated with the broader rationale of military revisionism i.e. in claiming that 'the army's India-centric policy existed because of India's "might is right policy," due to which Pakistan could not afford to

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[692] Haqqani, *Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military*, 292.
[693] General Javed Nasir interview.
[694] Abbas, *Pakistan's Drift Into Extremism: Allah, the Army, and America's War on Terror*, 148.

allow it any territorial leverage such as in Kashmir.'[695] His support for Islamist militant groups as strategic assets, notably in his role as a key voice in the Kargil conflict, was derived from similar personal and ideological convictions.

Having personally seen Pakistan's humiliating defeat in the 1971 war, General Mahmoud's antagonism was exacerbated by subsequent military incursions by India into the disputed Siachen glacier region in Kashmir in 1984. During interview he admitted his role in fomenting the conflict quite candidly: 'Over the years the Hindus had been encroaching upon us repeatedly, we have been retreating all our lives. We wanted to avenge the Siachen debacle via a considered *strategic* adjustment instead of a military engagement in Kashmir.'[696] The fact that he referred to the 'Hindu' element of Indian territorialism, demonstrated clearly a personal ideological justification for precipitating the crisis – and does not necessarily reflect the generally secular strategic outlook of the military institution. Mahmood also expressed the conventional rationale of pretorianism in the following terms:

> when a building (the state) is collapsing, tottering on the brink of destruction, you cannot idly stand back and watch it self-destruct. That is why the Army steps into the role of state governance. Military strength combined with economic prosperity is vital for ensuring national stability.[697]

Nordlinger identified the normative element in such praetorian ideals: 'In carrying out their chief responsibility of guaranteeing the nation's security, officers tend to overestimate the degree to which it is threatened. Their very reason for being, their ultimate purpose, is national security. And as such, they are extremely sensitive to the possibility that it may be endangered.'[698]

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[695] General Mahmood Ahmed interview.
[696] Ibid.
[697] Ibid.
[698] Nordlinger, *Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Governments*, 54.

When General Musharraf came to power he appointed General Mahmood his DGISI, having endorsed both his justification and methodology of 'inciting some challenges for India to take away the heat from the Kashmir valley'.[699] His use of Kashmiri *Mujahidin* instead of commissioned officers in the Kargil Operation in 1999 was designed to provide the Pakistan army with a cover of plausible deniability. Ultimately what General Mahmood called a 'minor tactical operation' escalated rapidly into a full-scale armed conflict between the two countries, with heavy mobilisation of the Indian army and air force, and resulting in military as well as diplomatic embarrassment to Pakistan. He later blamed the failure of the operation on its capitulation by Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and COAS General Parvez Musharraf, whom he alleged were motivated by personal and political agendas, and defiantly stated 'if I was to do it all again, I would!'[700]

In his influencial capacity as ISI chief Mahmood had a direct relationship with the US administration. Ironically, he was at the Pentagon discussing Osama Bin Laden when the 9/11 attacks happened.[701] His opposition to the subsequent US invasion of Afghanistan, and General Musharraf's agreement to participate in the US-led war on terror involving a fundamental policy U-turn over support for the Kashmir insurgency eventually led to their parting of ways and Mahmood's forced retirement from the ISI.

Perhaps it was telling that in what became an extended four-hour interview for this thesis, General Mahmood spent the first three hours attempting to 're-align' the author's understanding of Islamic history, and defining what he considered the Western world's grand design against the Muslim *Ummah*. Mahmood's romanticised

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[699] Ibid.
[700] Ibid.
[701] Ibid.

notions of the greatness of Islamic civilisation[702] and its deliberate destruction by the 'enemies of Islam' (including India and the secular Western world)[703] cloaked his bitterness in unmistakably communal terms.

Examining the manifestations of Islamism amongst notable officers from Pakistan's military high command serves to highlight several common factors in their ideological orientations: personal experience of military conflict, especially the first-hand *jihadism* of the Soviet-Afghan war; virulent antipathy towards India based on historical antecedents and an associated perception of strategic insecurity; chronic resentment bred from close contact with the fallouts of short-term US policy in the region and the consequent fortification of a broader ideological antagonism towards perceived Western hegemony over the Muslim world.

It is important to remember that the demonstration of radical Islamist views, though pertinent in terms of presenting internal challenges towards the military *esprit de corps*, is far from an accurate reflection of the bulk of the Pakistani armed forces for whom religion is a matter of personal choice rather than public duty. In the Pakistani military lexicon, Islam has featured primarily as a motivating factor during periods of conflict, in the service of strategic goals and as a means of forging closer economic and diplomatic ties with other Muslim countries. According to a retired military General, who also served as former governor of KPK: Where Islamist forces threaten the discipline of the organisation and professionalism derived from its strict command and control structure, the military leadership is quick to quash potential internal dissent.[704]

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[702] General Mahmood Ahmed interview.
[703] Ibid
[704] Ali Jan Aurakzai interview.

For instance, the discovery by Military Intelligence (MI) of an imminent Islamist coup, codenamed *Operation Khilafat*, by a group of senior army officers back in 1995 led to the arrest of 40 army officers, including a Major General, a Brigadier, and five Colonels.[705] This demonstrated the negative impact of political involvement upon the military establishment by 'lowering the standards of professionalism…[where] Political loyalty and coup-making skill supplant the traditional skills of the professional soldier.'[706] The alleged plotters were however quickly tried and convicted by a military court, and in a move designed to deter any such attempts in future, awarded harsh sentences ranging from two to 14 years imprisonment. Then Army Chief Waheed Kakar went a step further to purge the army of such dissident elements by retiring the controversial intelligence chiefs Lieutenant-General Asad Durrani and Lieutenant-General Javed Nasir for 'violating the channels of command.'[707] He tasked his new DG ISI, Lieutenant-General Javed Ashraf Qazi, with cleansing the army of internal Islamists and curtailing support for the Kashmiri *jihadis*.[708]

Thus, as 'a true representation of the Pakistani nation, the army is neither truly secular nor orthodox Islamist'[709] – instead it is an embodiment of Pakistan's shifting socio-cultural milieu. In 2005 for instance, urban middle classes, largely from Punjab (43.3 per cent) and KPK (22.43 per cent) constituted a significant portion of the armed forces, reflecting the generally moderate and modern nature of the officer

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[705] Cover Story, "Coup Chronicles, The 1995 Islamic Coup Attempt: Major General Zaheer Ul Islam and His Coup," Defence Pakistan, 2010, https://defence.pk/threads/major-general-zaheer-ul-islam-and-his-coup.134141/.

[706] Perlmutter, "The Praetorian State and the Praetorian Army: Toward a Taxonomy of Civil-Military Relations in Developing Polities", 12.

[707] Abbas, *Pakistan's Drift Into Extremism: Allah, the Army, and America's War on Terror*, 153.

[708] General Jamshed Ayaz Interview

[709] General Mirza Aslam Beg interview.

corps.[710] Scholars conducting extensive investigative work on the Pakistan Army such as Fair and Cohen also found little to no evidence that the military would deliberately harbour or entertain religiously conservative elements. Even Fair, generally a veritable critic of the Pakistani military concluded that there was ' no systematic evidence that conservative areas are producing more officers than other areas'.[711] It may therefore be misleading to take the conduct of a few Islamist officers as an exemplar of a wider Islamist problem in the military cops, since this distorts the fundamentally secular orientation of the Pakistan army and detracts from its strategic utilisation of Islam.

As such Islamist rationale seems to have found purchase in both Pakistan's internal and external policy profile. Domestically, Islamism found employment for a variety of short-term uses to distract from widespread economic and political weaknesses, and rising ethno-national divergences. The early inroads made by radical, Islamist forces in domestic affairs by the *Majlis-i-Ahrar* movement in the early 1950s epitomised the *modus operandi* of a large majority of religio-political groups in the country in two significant ways. By demonstrating inherent political pragmatism and exploiting popular dissent to further their own socio-political or sectarian agendas such groups fostered patronage-based relationships with existing political forces for the kind of influence they were chronically unable to gain through electoral polls. Significant socio-economic inadequacies of the Pakistani political system combined with a critical lack of institutional development, in turn compelled existing political leadership, both civilian and military, to turn to Islamist forces to secure much-needed broad-based support amongst the masses..

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[710] Nawaz, *Crossed Swords: Pakistan, Its Army, and the Wars Within*, 571.
[711] Christine Fair, "Is Pakistan's Army as Islamist as We Think? New Data Suggest It May Be Even More Liberal than Pakistani Society as a Whole," Foreign Policy, 2011, http://foreignpolicy.com/2011/09/15/is-pakistans-army-as-islamist-as-we-think/.

Islam as a National Unifier

The appeal of a universally applicable Muslim identity, a *nation* unified by a shared belief system had initially proved its mantle in the creation of Pakistan. Jinnah and Iqbal deliberately articulated a broad Islamic ideology, which could appeal to the multifaceted Muslim community in the Indian subcontinent without marginalising their varying cultural and demographic specificities. The inability of the post-independence Pakistani leadership to transcend this utilitarian construct meant that the Pakistani polity failed to change its path dependent trajectory, that entailed an institutionalisation of Islamism as a means of securing popular support.

General Ayub, Pakistan's first military ruler, had attempted a fortification of the Pakistani ideology in order to obscure its inherent ambiguities. With deliberate omission of any Islamist pretence Ayub outlined a simple premise for a working state ideology: 'true that in [Islamic] society national territorialism has no place, yet those living in an area are responsible for its defence and security and development. Attachment to the country we live in and get our sustenance from is therefore paramount.'[712] Ayub's use of the Islamic idiom was therefore also intended as a nation-building service. Further functions of Ayub's envisioned state ideology were derived from his pan-Islamic aspirations and basic threat-perception: 'India in particular has a deep pathological hatred for Muslims and her hostility to Pakistan stems from her refusal to see a Muslim power developing next door. By the same token, India will never tolerate a Muslim grouping near or far from her borders.'[713] Despite his aversion to the religious clergy therefore Ayub countenanced the title of

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[712] Khan, "Friends Not Masters: A Political Autobiography", 197.
[713] Khan, 183.

'Islamic Republic' to be included in the 1962 constitution of Pakistan in appeasement of the Islamist political parties that could challenge his regime.

After Ayub, General Yahya Khan reiterated similar importance of the Islamic ideology as a strategy for national cohesion. The military's derived role as custodian of the Islamic ideology provided it with much-needed legitimacy to justify its continued right and ability to rule the country. The appeasement, and in some cases empowerment, of religious parties for political ends during Yahya's time however set a dangerous precedent. It encouraged religious groups to vilify political rivals by denouncing their secular or socialist leanings as un-Islamic. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto's PPP was a case in point that encountered the wrath of religious zealots for its socialist credentials. However, that did not prevent Bhutto himself from consorting with the Islamist lobby in due course.

In public his recourse to the ideological basis for Pakistan Bhutto also demonstrated confluence with Ayub and Yahya's backing for the 'Islamic' component of Pakistani identity. He envisioned diplomatic potential in Pakistan's pan-Islamic credentials, particularly after the resounding success of the Islamic Summit Conference in Lahore. However popular resentment against Bhutto's arbitrary domestic policies provided ideal cannon fodder for the religious lobby's political agenda and began to affect 'Bhutto's tilt towards an obscurantist interpretation of Islam.'[714] In order to avoid confronting politically belligerent religious forces during clashes between the *Ahmadiyya* community and religious groups thus, Bhutto too opted for their appeasement. In a fatal step towards the institutionalisation of religious conservatism into the fabric of the state Bhutto authorised an amendment to the 1973 Pakistani Constitution to include a provision

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[714] Haqqani, *Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military*, 106.

declaring the *Ahmadiyya* community as non-Muslim. This was subsequently followed by the creation of the Ministry of Religious Affairs. Not only did this act codify the victimisation of the *Ahmadiyya* community, it essentially served to condone the future persecution of religious minorities.

Bhutto's appeasement of Islamist forces combined with rising popular antagonism towards his rule emboldened them. Eventually a coalition of right-wing extremist parties including the *Jamaat-i-Islami* (JI), *Jamiat-Ulema-i-Islam* (JUI), *Jamiat-Ulema-i-Pakistan* (JUP) and the Azad Kashmir Muslim Conference (AKMC) along with other dissident political groups, comprised the PNA movement against Bhutto's rule in 1977. On assuming power thereafter, General Zia capitalised on the emerging significance of religious parties in the political arena and used the opportunity to forge a pivotal relationship with radical Islamist forces in domestic and foreign policy. Going forward, nearly all political regimes demonstrated this expedient recourse to Islamist rhetoric and religio-political support thereby demonstrating the essentially path-dependent nature of patronage-based politics in Pakistan.

Islam for Legitimacy

The use of Islam as a legitimising force to rationalise unconstitutional or unpopular political regimes played a key role in facilitating a direct relationship between the emerging praetorian system and Islamist forces. This reflects uncanny similarities to the military junta's use of religion for legitimacy in Egypt as identified by Nordlinger:

> Islam is accepted by the vast majority, no other communal attachment divides the society, Islam itself asserts a close and overlapping relationship between the religious and governmental spheres…Capitalising upon this uncommon set of advantages, the praetorians sought to have themselves identified with Islam.

> They too were to become defenders of the faith, a role that had previously been the exclusive prerogative of conservative religious leaders.[715]

For unconstitutional military regimes, fostering expedient relationships with Islamist parties provided a viable opportunity for civilianising their rule. Patronage, both economic and political could be extended to religio-political parties vying for influence in the state affairs in return for their support. Despite a consistent failure to perform in polls, therefore religious parties derived their political significance from an innate ability to mobilise raucous crowds, manipulate existing socio-economic cleavages and galvanise religious sensibilities amongst the masses. Thus the factoring in of overtly Islamist provisions into Pakistan's three constitutions, under civilian as well as military governments, demonstrated the formidable coercive potential of the religious lobby.

Whilst Ayub used Islam in the broader ideological context to provide a justification for his rule, Yahya attempted to ensure the military's continued predominance over state affairs by colluding with the Islamists. Results of the country's first general elections in December 1970, with the Awami League sweeping the polls in East Pakistan and PPP in West Pakistan, jeopardised Yahya's envisioned role for the military as an indispensable mediator in a scattered political landscape. His political strategy after these elections therefore evolved to mitigate the threat. Yahya's military regime disqualified a large number of Awami League members from the national and provincial assemblies – 72 out of 160 in the National Assembly and 191 out of 288 in the East Pakistan Provincial Assembly under allegations of conspiring with India and threatening the integrity of Pakistan.[716] The intelligence agencies IB and ISI were tasked with preparing these lists for disqualification. Yahya

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[715] Nordlinger, *Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Governments*, 131.
[716] Haqqani, *Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military*, 77.

then arranged for the vacant seats to be distributed amongst a co-opted political alliance, called the United Coalition Party, comprising six Islamist and *Islam-loving* parties. This politically expedient relationship aimed to give the Islamist parties (three factions of the Muslim League, the Pakistan Democratic Party, *Nizam-i-Islam* Party, and the *Jamaat-i-Islami*) a total of 121 seats in the National Assembly, ensuring their inclusion in a future coalition government. *Jamaat-i-Islami* bagged the largest share of unopposed seats (50 in total) securing significant influence in the Parliament despite its poor electoral performance. The direct patronage of compliant Islamist political parties in turn served the military regime's agenda to secure its continued predominance in the Pakistani political system. Subsequent regimes, both military and civilian, followed this precedent although it was truly epitomised in the decade of military rule under General Zia ul Haq.

Ultimately, however, it was Bhutto's capitulation to religious zealots in 1977 that created a viable space for them to operate. Unable to cope with the rising tide of popular dissent under PNA's *Nizam-i-Mustafa* (System of the Prophet) agitation against his allegedly *un-Islamic* practices, Bhutto attempted a last-ditch attempt towards appeasement. Notwithstanding his own modernist beliefs, he therefore imposed a total ban on the sale and consumption of alcohol, gambling and nightclubs, designated the holy day of Friday as the weekly holiday instead of Sunday, and invited the PNA *'ulama* to join the Council of Islamic Ideology for the implementation of the *Shari'a* Although these concessions failed to save Bhutto's government, they succeeded in providing Islamist groups with necessary traction amongst the masses to secure a significant socio-political role going forward.

Whilst Bhutto expanded the political use of Islam to secure support for his regime, General Zia-ul-Haq epitomised its use both in legitimising his rule and ensuring its longevity. He aimed to entrench the military into the fabric of Pakistani politics buttressed by an unquestionable Islamic rationale, under his custodianship. He demonstrated confluence with General Ayub and Yahya's belief in the necessity of institutionalising the military's role in the state, going a step further to assert that the 'armed forces were responsible not only for safeguarding the country's territorial integrity but also its ideological frontiers.'[717] A fundamental reworking of Pakistan's much-debated ideology therefore became the cornerstone of Zia's political strategy and the projected *raison d'être* of his regime.

Jihad as a Policy Instrument

The use of Islam as a policy instrument, both domestic and foreign, is another overarching feature of Pakistan's praetorian evolution. The Islamic concept of *jihad*, particularly its application as an armed struggle, has featured prominently in Pakistan's multiple conflicts with India and its forward policy in Afghanistan. With its early antecedents discernible in the successful mobilisation of Muslim masses by the *'ulama* against colonial Raj and in the subsequent independence movement, historical causation contributed towards the idea of a religiously sanctioned armed resistance gaining momentum with rising threats to sovereignty post-independence. Indo-Pakistan wars over Kashmir, beginning with the first such conflict breaking out immediately after independence, saw the emergence of *jihadist* tribal militias from the NWFP crossing into Kashmir in October 1947. In a strategy that was to endure over subsequent decades, the Pakistani government supported the Kashmiri resistance and

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[717] Mir, "Coup de Grâce."

officially sanctioned logistical and tactical support for the *freedom fighters* as they came to be called.

Ironically, the initiative to instigate the next significant altercation in Kashmir had come from General Ayub Khan's civilian Foreign Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. The escalation of border hostilities between Pakistan and India into a full-blown war in 1965 was predicated on attempting to find a military solution to the Kashmir dispute. Bhutto in his letter of 12 May 1965 to Ayub recommended a 'bold and courageous stand' to 'open up greater possibilities for a negotiated settlement' in Kashmir. [718] In order to mitigate Pakistan's relative military weakness Ayub sanctioned military training of a force of indigenous Kashmiri irregulars, referring to them as *Mujahidin.*

During the 1971 war, Yahya also used the *jihad* premise to recruit Islamist groups in support of the counterinsurgency effort in East Pakistan. In order to consolidate the strength of its armed forces in the Western wing, the army aimed to raise a *razakaar* (volunteer) force of 100,000 non-Bengali civilians and pro-Pakistan Islamist groups. The *Jamaat-i-Islami*, particularly its student wing the *Islami-Jamiat-i-Tulba* responded by launching two paramilitary counterinsurgency units in support of the army. Named *al-Shams* (the sun) and *al-Badr* (the moon), these paramilitary brigades envisioned themselves as the 'sun and crescent of Islamic revival in South Asia.'[719] In subsequent years these groups continued to feature prominently in the Kashmiri resistance and the Soviet-Afghan conflict.

Bhutto's rule witnessed a shift in diplomatic efforts away from the West and towards closer ties with the Muslim world not only to buttress his regime with Islamic

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[718] Abbas, *Pakistan's Drift Into Extremism: Allah, the Army, and America's War on Terror*, 44.
[719] Haqqani, *Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military*, 79.

legitimacy but also to boost the economy with oil wealth and monetary support for Pakistan's nascent nuclear programme. The 1974 Islamic Summit conference in Lahore therefore marked a turning point in Pakistan's diplomatic history with the Libyan Leader Colonel Gaddafi emphasising Pakistan's role as the 'citadel of Islam in Asia' and offering unrestricted access to Libyan oil resources.[720] Economic support from oil-rich Arab countries was crucial for Bhutto's expansion of Pakistan's military capacities after the devastating fall-outs of the 1971 war. When Zia came to power thus Pakistan's established diplomatic overtures towards the Muslim world found a perfect fit with his intended Islamisation programme.

The Afghan *jihad* presented a lucrative opportunity for Zia to take on and intensify Bhutto's foreign policy initiative promoting closer relations between Pakistan and the Islamic world and to secure funding as well as diplomatic support for his regime. Not only could he claim credit for embarking upon a divine mission against the *Godless* communists, he could also benefit significantly from virulent *Shi'a-Sunni* antagonism that had arisen in the wake of Iranian Revolution. Fearing a spread of the global ideological threat posed by a successful *Shiʿa* revolution in Iran, Saudi Arabia and Iraq and a number of other *Sunni* majority states in the Middle East began to invest in Pakistan as a regional counterweight – a *Sunni Wall* – against Iranian influence. Here US President Jimmy Carter's security advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski played a central role in practically fomenting the Saudi-Pakistan alliance, claiming that the Americans had secured Saudi agreement 'to facilitate Pakistani arms purchases in return for a Pakistani military input to Saudi security.'[721]

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[720] Wolpert, *Zulfi Bhutto of Pakistan: His Life and Times*, 234.
[721] Haqqani, *Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military*, 186.

The 1979 Soviet invasion in Afghanistan also served to reintroduce US *realpolitik* in the region. The invasion pulled out diplomatic relations between United States and Pakistan from their protracted stupor. Relations between the two countries had reached their lowest ebb in April 1979, when the United States enforced the Symington Amendment prohibiting American military and economic aid to countries seeking nuclear enrichment technology.[722] Not only did the Soviet-Afghan conflict suddenly propel Pakistan from a pariah status into a frontline US ally it also gave unprecedented advantages to Zia's internationally isolated military regime in terms of legitimacy and recognition. An unexpected boon from Pakistan's involvement in America's Afghan *jihad* was thus an abandonment of the Carter administration's concerns about Pakistan's nuclear programme and the beginning of what would soon prove to be a political lifeline for Zia's regime. The hyperbolic use of Islam to colour what was essentially a geo-strategic conflict therefore served Zia's dual purpose of gaining much-needed legitimacy for his unconstitutional regime along with ensuring its survival in the longer run.

Conclusion

This thesis tackles two major issues: the rise of the praetorianism and its contentious relationship with militant Islamism. Through the lens of historical institutionalism and path-dependence this thesis reveals how civilian institutional failures at critical junctures of state formation inadvertently contributed towards the emergence and entrenchment of praetorianism as well as the institutionalisation of Islamism. It provides a conceptual alternative to contemporary scholarly notions emphasising the insatiable, hegemonic nature of the Pakistani military establishment. Instead it shows

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[722] Robert J. McMahon, *Cold War on the Periphery: The United States, India, and Pakistan* (New York: Colombia University Press, 1994).

how an incremental rise in the power and influence of Islamist groups, both political and militant, eventually served as a formidable limitation for the expansion of praetorian power.

In post-colonial states such as Pakistan, force and coercion historically played such a critical role in the attempts to achieve internal cohesion or national integration that it served as the anvil upon which the country's leadership based its salience. This thesis shows how in their pursuit of seeking exclusive control over the means and use of force, successive civilian regimes in Pakistan allocated substantial and expanding resources – both economic and political - to bestow increasing returns upon the military as an essential repository of coercion, thereby empowering it disproportionately.

The beginning of what can be deemed a vice regal political tradition in Pakistan that was ushered in by the forced resignation of Pakistan's second elected Prime Minister, Khawaja Nazimuddin by then Governor General Ghulam Muhammad, and preceding the appointment of a serving Commander-in-Chief General Mohammad Ayub Khan as Defence Minister. The significance of this appointment lay in the fact that it crucially reduced the accountability of the military chief. Since the Army Chief was meant to report to the Defence Minister, his civilian superior, Ayub's charge over both offices essentially meant that he became his own boss. In the words of a Pakistani military analyst:

> Ayub Khan, as Army Chief was subordinate to the Defence Secretary; and Defence Secretary was subordinate to Ayub Khan as Defence Minister. The result of this arrangement was disastrous for democracy. It changed the Defence Ministry from an "oversight ministry" to a "facilitation ministry" i.e. Defence Ministry became the formal approving body of all actions and decisions of GHQ. Even today most Defence Secretaries are retired Army Generals…The power of the Army stems primarily from the fact that the

Ministry of Defence has effectively being subordinate to Service Headquarters for the last 60 years.[723]

In his dual capacity General Ayub presented a report in 1954 titled 'A Short Appreciation of the Present and Future Problems of Pakistan' – providing a comprehensive administrative, legal, political and economic road-map to the civilian government on how to run the country.[724] The formal involvement of the military in the affairs of state began soon thereafter.

Serving as an enduring legacy of the inherent institutional weaknesses of Pakistan's founding political party therefore was a fundamental dependence on non-elected networks to perpetuate control over the polity. The bewildering array of political regimes in the short span of Pakistan's existence therefore encapsulated three main continuities: an expedient use of Islam to circumvent nation-building challenges, an arbitrary use of coercion in exercising key functions of the state and an inherent unwillingness of the ruling elite to transcend conventional, unrepresentative networks of patronage. Indeed continuities in civil-military relations constitute an overarching theme in this thesis. It is argued that, in spite of the prevailing tendency in contemporary scholarship to highlight differences between civilian and military regimes, they actually incorporate significant overlaps such as the emphasis on centralisation of state power, manipulation of existing networks of socio-political patronage at the expense of critical, representative institutional development, and the deployment of Islamism to offset political opposition and derive popular legitimacy outside the electoral process.

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[723] Interview with Commander Naeem Sarfaraz, Master Mariner and Captain of PNS Comilla (1971), Islamabad, 15 August 2014.
[724] Mohammad Ayub Khan, *Field Marshal Mohammad Ayub Khan : A Selection of Talks and Interviews 1964-1967*, ed. Shuja Nawaz (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010).

This thesis contextualises what Feaver calls 'low political culture' as constituting an important driver of praetorianism in Pakistan. The 'delirium of delight' with which the masses hailed the military's repeated deposition of civilian governments in Pakistan highlights the fragility of the wider public's attachment to national political institutions. Where the

> purported parliamentary system was mysterious; largely if not entirely alienated from the public; shamelessly manipulated to provide a colour of legality by a narrow and selfish oligarchy; and therefore tainted with every ill that appeared to affect the nation – corruption, inefficiency, betrayal and "colonialism"…constitutional provisions that had been so misused…as to appear entirely untrustworthy.[725]

Once the context for Pakistan's evolving praetorian system is established, the other integral component of the issue – that of the military's relationship with militant Islamism is investigated. Through an examination of original militant propaganda materials, this thesis establishes the divergent roots, sectarian orientations, socio-economic and political ambitions, and operational trajectories of militant Islamist groups. It doing so it fills gaps that exist in understanding the many different manifestations of political and militant Islamism and their interface with the praetorian state. Moreover, the idea of *Islamic* militancy as a universal, monolithic phenomenon is challenged by accentuating the divergent and localised aims and ambitions of Pakistani militant groups.

This thesis investigates critical fissures in the symbiotic relationship between the Pakistani military and Islamist militancy that emerged with increasing autonomy, indeed the increasing returns, displayed by militant groups soon after the Soviet-Afghan war. Emboldened by the tacit support from Pakistan's civilian political governments, as well as leading religio-political parties, which fostered an

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[725] Feaver, *Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight and Civil-Military Relations*, 177.

institutional space for Islamist forces within the state, militant Islamist groups subsequently resolved to bring home the *jihad*. Enduring failures of local governance and lack of infrastructural and institutional development combined with the breakdown of the traditional tribal systems, for instance in FATA areas of the KPK province, further contributed towards the rampant spread of Islamist militancy as a means of gaining socio-economic influence.

Eventually, inherent contradictions in the continued use of militant groups to achieve strategic gains in Afghanistan and Kashmir whilst mitigating their destructive sectarian potential internally accentuated the military's failing influence. The attack on the Army Public School in Peshawar was considered a 'game-changer' in that it finally mitigated the distinction between useful *jihadists* and the *miscreants*[726] in the country's national security narrative. The contradictions inherent in using radical militant groups to further geostrategic goals whilst mitigating their divisive sectarian potential within the country eventually manifested themselves in such violent divergences between these groups and their sponsors. As a senior Foreign Affairs and National Security Advisor to Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, confessed:

> The distinction between some groups you want to target and some groups you don't want to target has virtually disappeared…It was realised that in the end, they support each other and that if you do this you're creating space which can become dangerous in the future. So it's a game changer.[727]

Despite significant efforts expended in directing the course of Islamist militancy therefore the praetorian military's fundamental dependency upon the Islamist lobby to shore up support for its strategic and political ambitions served as a formidable impediment towards curbing their destructive potential. Thus, the notion of the

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[726] Colonel Samrez Salik interview.
[727] 'Peshawar Attack a "Game-Changer" In Terms of Govt's Approach Towards Militants: Aziz,' *Express Tribune*, 19 December 2014. Retrieved 28 December 2016, http://tribune.com.pk/story/809376/peshawar-attack-a-game-changer-in-terms-of-govts-approach-towards-militants-aziz/.

Pakistani military presented as a *colossus* – an omnipotent power capable of deliberately and deterministically steering the course of Islamist militancy by a large section of contemporary scholarship is challenged.

Terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 and subsequent ultimatums issued by the US government, which forced General Musharraf to retract official support from militant organisations, including those fighting in Kashmir, have expedited the reformulation of the military vs. militancy dynamic in Pakistan. A drastic reduction in material and logistical support from its military patrons, and the army's support for US military intervention in Afghanistan resulted in violent retribution from militant groups directed against the Pakistani state and by association its military establishment.

The multifarious splintering of militant groups in recent years has accentuated their amorphous nature and further emphasised challenges they represent towards the military's domestic influence and a simultaneous need to redress an increasingly turbulent internal security paradigm. On 15 June 2014, the Pakistan Army formally launched *Operation Zarb-e-Azb* against an assortment of notorious militant groups including the *Tehrik-e-Taliban-Pakistan* (TTP), *Lashkar-e-Jhangvi* (LeJ), *Jundullah*, *al-Qaeda,* and the *Haqqani* network in the restive FATA region, reflecting a decisive shift in the military's approach towards Islamist militancy from co-optation to confrontation. In an ironic twist, more than 100 *'ulama* from various doctrinal schools declared their unanimous support for the on-going military operation by issuing a joint *fatwa*, on the premise that such a rebellion against a Muslim state and common

order must be crushed militarily, thereby endorsing *Operation Zarb-e-Azb,* and by inference similar future operations as a legitimate *jihad.*[728]

This dissonance between the *ulama* and militant groups represents an interesting development in Pakistan's public religious space. Even though this thesis analyses the interface between Islamist political parties and militancy in the course of examining their significance for praetorian powers, it falls beyond its scope to explore in-depth the disjuncture between various manifestations of Islamism in Pakistan's ideological space. Practical variations between religio-political parties, Islamist clergy and militant Islamist groups are an area of further research that may potentially hold answers to countering the intransigence of militant groups from within the religious lobby. There has been some evidence of this mitigating effect by way of political inclusion as demonstrated by the MMA government in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa during 2006-2007. Public dissatisfaction with the performance of the MMA government, emerging as a result of their inability to deliver on promises of socio-economic emancipation, was compounded by the violence unleashed by militant groups.

The MMA's revival in 2017, despite the party's collapse in the 2008 election, however, demonstrates the practical resilience of religio-political parties and presents opportunities for directing the trajectory of competing Islamisms through a process of political inclusion. Thus, the analysis undertaken in this thesis has brought up further avenues of research that may prove to be a rich resource in terms of achieving a dynamic understanding of Islamism in practice within the Pakistani state and thereby exploring policy options to help formulate a political response to the terrorism of Islamist militancy.

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[728] 'Fatwa declares *Zarb-i-Azb* a *Jihad,*' *Dawn*, 23 June 2014. Retrieved 30 January 2017, http://www.dawn.com/news/1114565/fatwa-declares-zarb-i-azb-a-jihad; 'Pak Army's Zarb-e-Azb is "accurate Jihad": Fatwa,' Dunya News, 22 June 2014. Retrieved, 30 January 2017, http://dunyanews.tv/index.php/en/Pakistan/226359-Pak-Armys-ZarbeAzb-is-accurate-Jihad-Fatwa.

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