

The London School of Economics and Political Science

*Transnational Police Cooperation in Puerto Rico and the Dominican Republic:
Approaches and Implications*

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DECLARATION

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ABSTRACT

Crime in the Caribbean consists of drug and human trafficking, weapons smuggling and terrorism, and is fuelled by this region's physical location as a gateway to the United States (US). Significant challenges to effective policing are transnational (TN), making the region an ideal testing ground to study transnational police cooperation (TNPC). Current cooperation is seen as reactive and hindered by the Caribbean's topography, cultures, legal systems, nepotism and territorialism.

Using a phenomenological perspective, this qualitative study investigates TNPC in the Caribbean region, focusing on Puerto Rico (PR) and the Dominican Republic (DR), assessing how TNPC works within this region, current structures and operations in the Caribbean. Other researchers such as Malcolm Anderson and Ethan Nadelmann have established the theoretical research base upon which this study is built. However, as empirical research is limited around this particular study, this paper primarily draws upon interviews with law enforcement agents in PR working for the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA) Program, administered by the White House Office of National Drug Control Policy. This study investigates stakeholders' perspectives and the various methods of TNPC with the aim of improving the efficiency and effectiveness of multi-agencies towards a practical model, as embodied by HIDTA.

This research is the first of its kind, offering a new direction for theory and research.

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PREFACE

The globalization of crimes has emerged as a significant economic, social welfare, health, and governance issue over the last two decades. The issues that are tied up in globalization and the globalization of crime are fast-moving and constantly evolving and, as a result, theories of the best way to deal with this type of crime are somewhat understudied. New types and characteristics of crime require different policing approaches, different philosophies and innovative use of technology. The limited research in this field has become not only increasingly focused on global crimes and criminals but on those who attempt to police the transnational crimes and criminals (Bowling & Foster, 2002; Cain, 2000; Reiner, 2000). Transnational policing has become a very real practical possibility: as borders and boundaries blur for criminals, so too must policies intended to fight crime. Many agencies established or reviewed within the last twenty years have recognised the need for policing of crime that crosses national borders and becomes a matter of international jurisdictions: the concept of extradition is just one example of this. Change within and among law enforcement communities is imperative if the fight against crime is to evolve sufficiently to match the change in criminal patterns, methods and activities.

The aftermath of the September 11, 2001 (9/11) terrorist attacks on the US provides a prime example of the need for law enforcement agencies worldwide to collaborate in countering transnational criminal activity. Put simplistically, members of criminal networks in one country had carried out an act of terror in another country, which killed nationals of a wider variety of countries and effected economic functions throughout the world. From the perspectives of punishment, prevention and intelligence, ideologically, change within law enforcement communities is crucial. However, it is telling to note that in the years since “9/11”, no strong, international or formal policy has been employed in terms of nurturing cooperative efforts. In reality, then, policing communities have shown themselves largely incapable of initiating and delivering change. Transnational cooperation relies on an ability of local policing systems and agencies to initially adapt and evolve within a more local context, and, in many instances, they have not been able to do this effectively. As a common practice, transnational policing (TNP) is still far from being mastered, suffering from a lack of consistency, codes of best practice, or guidelines for recommended conduct. With the exception of the pioneering research of Anderson, Nadelmann, Andreas, Sheptycki,

Bowling, Kline, Harriott and Griffith, all who have laid an important foundation and framework, over thirty years, on which to build upon, there is still a substantial lack of empirical data on TNPC. As such, in order to really assess the best practice, in practical and applicable terms, evidence-based research needs to be conducted.

To date, most studies on TNP have concentrated primarily on structural features, like comparative policing, courts, and corrections, or on transnational crimes or regional issues (Hill, 2005; Ortiz, 2005; Roth, 2004), failing to capture a practical or multi-disciplinary approach to cooperation. There are a number of factors and issues involved with the actual practice of Transnational Police Co-operation (TNPC) that needs to be considered in detail if and real progress is going to be made. Indeed, studies on TNPC need to be holistic in addressing issues and in providing a multi-disciplinary approach (Braithwaite, 2001). This study adopts this more complete methodology by examining different societal contexts and the social psychological features (e.g. competition, motivation, coercion, or trust) in various environments which affect TNPC. Social psychology has been defined as “the scientific investigation of how the mental, emotional, and behavioural characteristics of individuals are influenced by the physical or implied presence of others” (Hogg & Vaughan, 2002, p.2). The application of strategic social psychological elements in an analytical TNPC framework could theoretically emphasise ways to create and implement methods of improved TNPC. A social psychological framework could be practical and helpful in elucidating a law enforcement individual’s behaviours, attitudes and beliefs in the context of his/her culture and/or group and in assessing what the impact of these components might have on transnational cooperation. Issues, such as motivation, competition, coercion and trust might prove to be essential elements in finding paths to improved cooperation. Certain attitudes, beliefs, or cultural characteristics of the TNP community (that is, the various organisations that are charged with TNP issues) could, for example, explain what are individual and group beliefs and/or attitudes towards cooperation. One could then suggest customised training that would articulate the research findings in practical and applicable terms. Ideally, creating, managing and progressively developing a program that addresses the issues found in the current research may contribute a unique and valuable perspective. In theory, improved universal legislative agreements could stem from social psychologically based research findings in behavioural or cultural processes used by individuals, groups or management in TN police agencies. Challenges such as bureaucratic inertia, cultures of authority and the suggested

unwillingness of change to the established methods of operation, all deny any real reform in policing. It could be argued that, in the utopian world of police cooperation, a universal, or a two-way, interactive political communications system (Deosaran, 1992) could be developed based on the foundation of the simplest of concepts - unity in the diversity itself - to value the uniqueness and importance of each individual and societal context. Social psychological influences are the building blocks to such unity. These issues have been touched on within the literature (Gambetta, 1988) but this relatively limited focus is not thought to be sufficient for such a potentially crucial area.

Assessing the effectiveness of existing organisations will allow a consideration of good practice and areas that can be improved. An organisation that will be interesting and relevant to consider is the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas (HIDTA) Program. Run by the United States Office of National Drug Control Policy, the HIDTA Program is a drug-prohibition enforcement initiative. A 'HIDTA' refers to a geographical area (such as a major city or border crossing) that is seen to be a major area of international drug trafficking. The HIDTA Program is an ideal example to focus on, since it embodies a practical and pragmatic approach to transnational and regional co-operation, based on an understanding that in order to achieve its aims – to disrupt and dismantle major drug trafficking organisations – a seamless cooperation between all law enforcement agencies is required. The HIDTA website (<https://www.whitehouse.gov/ondcp/high-intensity-drug-trafficking-areas-program>) states that it assists law enforcement agencies with training, technical assistance, crime mapping, intelligence analysis and program evaluation. Analysis focusing on such initiatives are critical in developing a better understanding of TNPC and how programs should be run to obtain the most collaborative and effective outcomes. HIDTA analysis will provide one element of the way in which the research questions are approached.

As well as honing in on a particular organisation, there is a need to locate this research geographically. The criminal “hotspot” regions of Puerto Rico (PR) and the Dominican Republic (DR) are interesting settings in the context of criminality across borders. The crimes that occur in these areas are overwhelmingly related to drug and human trafficking and this has become a particular issue in terms of transnational policing due to PR’s location as a gateway in the US. Evidently, the consideration of the HIDTA program is relevant here. The designation of PR as a HIDTA in 1994 is due to the area’s high attractiveness to drug trafficking organisations based on the aforementioned geographic and strategic considerations. In considering all of these

factors, it seems that PR would benefit strongly from a strategic approach to cooperation that involves all law enforcement agencies in the region. As such, HIDTA is a highly appropriate model to apply here.

Indeed, PR is arguably one example of an ideal setting for international cooperation and therefore provides an exceptionally relevant area to locate research in this topic: it is a protectorate of the US, which affords its citizens the right to get on a US-bound plane or mail guns to the States with no more than a driver's license. The island is also privy to US funding and utilization of the US legal system, with the region (along with the US Virgin Islands - USVI). The PR's HIDTA designation, mentioned earlier, owes to the area being a haven for drug trafficking organisations by being very central and having many coves, with the island's over 900 miles of coastline very difficult to police. Complicating matters is PR's status as a major container port with high levels of tourism and, therefore, transience and ability to trade with relative ease. Lastly, only 450 miles from the South American coast and being a Spanish-speaking culture with low per capita regional incomes and a high influx of illegal migration further contribute to TNPC difficulties. Surrounded by multicultural islands and having South American connections, PR is an international hub for police working for agencies from a number of countries. PR offers a global model of cooperation with other Caribbean nations worthy of examination, often those with long cultural ties to their mother European countries, plus close cooperation with Central, South, and North America. With the Caribbean region repeatedly ranked as one of the top five dangerous drug regions in the world (DEA, Drug Intelligence Brief, 1999-2003), it is a "hotspot" of transnational crimes such as money laundering, terrorism and the trafficking of drugs, weapons and humans. These issues and challenges make the island a natural home base for transnational police efforts.

Moreover, using these areas will be an opportunity to offer an explanation of crime in a context that is currently not illuminated or solved by presumptuous Western ideals or theories (Anderson, 1989; Brogden, 2005; Cain, 2000). It has been said that there is a "Wild West" or "catch me if you can" attitude towards law enforcement on the island of Puerto Rico, known also as *la isla del encanto* (the island of enchantment). This view of the existing law enforcement in this region is the result, in part, of a lack of coordinated efforts in catching international criminals. Hence, research, in the form of conversations, on the detailed ways in which DEA agents working for HIDTA (on special assignment in PR) perceive and experience TNPC, specifically the social

psychological factors impeding or facilitating success, is needed to add depth and clarity to the general understanding researchers have of TNPC. An in-depth approach to the study of how TNP agencies cooperate, and the components influencing such cooperation, can prove to aid the TNP community towards reformation of social policy and legislation at the government and international levels. Ultimately, this investigation provides evidence-based recommendations involving the barriers, facilitators and social psychological components that lend themselves to ideal TNPC; to identify and then examine barriers to and facilitators of effective cooperation within crime fighting models like HIDTA, particularly the social psychological components influencing such cooperation, which could potentially then act as catalysts to a more globally linked police network.

This research begins with an investigation assessing the situation qualitatively, with efforts describing and analyzing agents' perceptions of and experiences with transnational cooperation, within the context of an individual's culture and group, through semi-structured interviews. A concerted effort is made to understand how law enforcement officers working for HIDTA, in certain Latin Caribbean offices, collaborate or how they would like to collaborate within the region and across borders. Key social psychological influences that articulate good practice lessons, facilitating the implementation of the HIDTA model within this region, are examined in-depth. The social psychological factors to be explored are: personal, social, cultural, regulatory and political. As well, influences of potential barriers and facilitators such as motivation, trust, betrayal, coercion, leadership, integrity, power, resources, competition, race/ethnicity, and gender are investigated. The investigation is based in PR, and seeks to highlight the challenges and approaches faced there, as well as in the DR.

Research Question

Does this study examine the barriers and facilitators to the use of HIDTA as a model of TNPC on a global scale?

The questions posed in the Topic Guide (see Appendix D) during the semi-structured interviews focused on stakeholders' perspectives on transnational crime and policing in PR and the DR, the role and contribution of the DEA and HIDTA Program, and the perceived barriers and potential improvements in TNPC in PR and the DR. The investigation sought to assess the TNPC approaches and challenges in PR and the DR by:

1. Analyzing the perspectives on the crime problem, the contextual factors involved and how TNP tackled the current problems in PR and DR.
2. Analyzing the role and value of the DEA and HIDTA Program in addressing these challenges.
3. Identifying perceived barriers and potential improvements in TNPC.
4. Articulating the good practice lessons to enhance cooperation in TNP and to examine options for implementing realistic change in the future.

Limitations

Given that the analysis of TNPC is undoubtedly difficult to undertake, this primary research approach is unique and thus limited in having no comparisons. Further limiting the applicability of results is the fact that the definitions of "crimes," "policing," and "cooperation" differ greatly between regions, making comparisons difficult. While there was success in gathering over 80 hours of data on tape, data collection issues pose limitations to the research. Practical problems of language and translation may have been at play since interviews were conducted in English, a second language for some respondents. Participants' heavy accents were, at times, hard to understand, making transcribing difficult. Spanish was used in the interviews when it was sensed there may be potential problems with racist attitudes between the English-speaking interviewer and the Spanish-speaking interviewee. Yet another issue was that, given the protective culture of policing, participants may have also felt hesitant to speak freely and openly, revealing the inside workings of their corner of law enforcement, despite reassurances of anonymity.

Finally, the applicability of findings is limited in that each police agency has its own values and philosophies. Cultural differences in attitudes also influence how agents view crime, how it should be policed and how agencies should cooperate.

Delimitations

The delimitations of a study are those characteristics that limit the scope (define the boundaries) of the inquiry as determined by the conscious exclusionary and inclusionary decisions that were made throughout the development of the proposal.

This study's parameters were set, based on participants, data collection and findings. The study was limited to the experiences of one group of HIDTA agents, who appeared to be a very heterogeneous group. Since research interviews were the primary method of data collection, findings are also delimited to what was verbally communicated during interactions with participants and the investigator's impressions of the interview experiences. The data is further restricted in that the findings reflect participants' perceptions of their experiences, as was asked of them.

Structure of Thesis

Chapter One discusses challenges and approaches to transnational policing, as well as the nature and trends in transnational crime and the emergence of and approaches to transnational policing. This is followed by discussion of the implementation of TNPC in PR and DR, so as to provide a cultural context for the study.

Chapter Two provides the theoretical framework used in this study and discusses cooperation and its role in transnational policing. It discusses the elements and impact of cooperation in TNP organisations. This is followed by forms of cooperation in transnational policing, specifically in PR and DR. The contextual and social psychological influences are then examined as barriers and facilitators in transnational policing.

Chapter Three presents a detailed description of the research design, the investigator's rationale for decisions made regarding research methods, data collection techniques, the researcher's role in the research process and methods for verification and analysis.

Chapter Four begins with an introduction to the stakeholder's narratives and the approach to analysis. The focus of this chapter is TNP and Caribbean links, examining stakeholders' perspectives on the crime problem, including contextual factors and how the crime problems are being tackled.

Chapter Five looks at the role and contribution of the DEA and the HIDTA Program in PR and the DR. It considers the extent and nature of cooperation between the DEA and other agencies whose agents' experiences of working for/with the DEA

are also taken into account. This is followed by an in-depth analysis of the agents' views on the HIDTA Program and their methods of cooperation. This chapter investigates whether the HIDTA Program, theoretically, could be implemented as a global model for TNPC.

Chapter Six focuses on TNPC by looking at the perceived barriers to cooperation in PR and the DR and the potential ways to improve that cooperation. This chapter also investigates whether it might be possible to develop a transnational version of the HIDTA Program.

Chapter Seven gives a complete overview of the research questions, providing a summary plus implications of those findings, and discussion of the overall approach towards enhancing cooperation in the future by understanding the barriers and facilitators that drive cooperation. Options for implementing change are also considered before concluding with final thoughts on the topic of TNPC in PR and the DR.

Chapter One

Transnational Policing: Challenges and Approaches

1.1 Introduction to Chapter One

Accounts of transnational crime and policing in PR and the DR have been sparse in the literature. The following chapter provides a context to the challenges and approaches towards TNC. The nature of and trends in transnational crimes are introduced first, followed by a historical perspective, illustrating how Western law enforcement has imposed its culture around the globe and what implications have arisen from this internationalization. A brief analysis of the structure of the overlapping agencies that police transnational crimes follows. Lastly, how TNP is specifically implemented in PR and the DR is addressed to help better understand the challenges and approaches explored throughout this thesis.

1.2 Transnational Crime – Its Nature and Trends

The nature of transnational crime (TNC) has been difficult for law enforcement, theorists, and researchers to define and classify (Crawford, 2011; Goldsmith & Sheptycki, 2007; Leishman, Loveday, & Savage, 2000; Manning, 2000; McLaughlin & Muncie, 2001; Sheptycki, 1998b). Before exploring the various notions of TNC, it is important to understand its origins. Williams & Vlassis (2001) provide a comprehensive analysis, noting how the, then, UN Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Division originally used the term to “identify certain criminal phenomena transcending international borders, transgressing the laws of several states or having an impact on another country” (Williams & Vlassis, 2001). This definition captures the root concept of TNC. It is important to note that due to the complex nature of this type of crime, it is often viewed within the same theoretical framework as ‘organised crime’.

Definitions of transnational crimes vary according to the needs and experiences of different organizations (Edwards, 2000; Garland, 2001; Halstead, 1998; Hollin, 1999; Weber & Bowling 2002). Some theorists and researchers have concentrated on the structure of characteristics of crime groups (Myers, 1996; Taylor, 1999; Walklate, 1998), while others focused on the way markets allow organised crime to flourish (Rawlinson, 2001). In contrast, law enforcement agencies tend to concentrate on the business insight and perspective of organised criminals (McFarlane, 1998). There have been a vast number of suggestions as to the definition of organised crime, most said to be largely motivated by particular agendas and concerns. However, some elements of

existing definitions remain somewhat constant: the crimes committed have a strong economic factor; the offences are of “major significance” and the groups are enduring in number and involvement (Morrison, 2003). By way of illustration, The United Nations Conventions against Transnational Organized Crime (CATOC, 2000) defines an organised criminal group as “a structured group of three or more persons existing for a period of time and acting in concert with the aim of committing one or more serious crimes or offences established in accordance with this Convention, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit” (CATOC, 2000). Although broad and applicable across many cultures, types of crimes, and jurisdictions, Morrison (2003) further highlights that it is inadequate for the bigger debate about the nature of organised crime, which requires a larger framework, and is unlikely to stand the test of time. Essentially, the relation between transnational crime and organised crime is that transnational crime is an element of organised crime – a tool available to extend the scope of crime – and that it takes structured and strategic crime to operate across borders (Morrison, 1997). Morrison’s research linking these groups could aid the development of rational policy making and deconstruct the evident groups in transnational organised crime.

Reviews regarding the changing nature of crimes indicate that there are a number of trends. “Myers (1996) has noted that there is an increase in the number of criminal organizations engaged in transnational organised crime. Some have found that there are increased similarities between criminal organizations and legitimate transnational corporations, both of which are sovereignty-free actors (Williams & Florez, 1994, cited in Morrison, 2003). Others have shown an increased use of technology by organizations that operate in legitimate and illegitimate economies (Morrison, 1997). It would be wrong to assume that all groups follow the same blueprint. Like legitimate transnational corporations, transnational criminal organizations differ in structure, strength, size, and range, and in the diversity of their illicit activities (Morrison, 2003), including fraud, embezzlement, prostitution, and trafficking in a variety of illegal goods” (Williams & Florez, 1994, cited in Morrison, 2003).

Transnational crimes have presented serious risks to societies have motivated governments and policymakers worldwide, to create major existing law enforcement agencies and intelligence infrastructures (e.g. Interpol, Eurpol, DEA) designed to diminish the threat (UNDCP, 2002). Deconstructing assumptions and myths about

transnational organised crime is a pertinent starting point to understanding how the TNP community can better respond to the growing concerns regarding transnational crimes. In general, there are two persistent, false assumptions about transnational organised crime: (1) organised crime groups from the same region operate either cooperatively as one or as a number of competing groups (Bean, 2002; Sterling, 1994); and (2) ethnicity is an acceptable classification when describing organised crime groups (Halstead, 1998). Media, journalists in particular, plays a role in sensationalizing existing assumptions and myths. Perhaps the most worrying concern of the sensationalist media is that assumptions can block rational analysis and policy development (Halstead, 1998; Williams & Florez, 1994). However, regardless of the powerful impacts of the media, the evolving nature of transnational organised crime in a rapidly changing world is inevitable, making it more difficult and demanding for those who must enforce these crimes.

1.3 The Emergence of Transnational Policing

In an age where rapid global interactions intensify and complicate social transformations (Giddens, 2002), each society, to various degrees, faces significant wide-ranging change, including crime and policing (Nadelmann, 1993; Nelken, 1994). Indeed, the changing nature of crime has been considered and, in order to adapt to this, new methods and theories surrounding policing had to be developed. One need only look at personnel and caseload statistics for an indication of how rapidly Western criminal law enforcement has spread globally (UNDCP, 2000). The internationalization of Western criminal law enforcement, or “Americanization” (Andreas & Nadelmann, 2006), has emerged for various reasons, including misleading, theoretical presumptions of Western criminology. The deep presumptions of Western theories have been criticised as harmful for non-Western consumers in denying the possibility of difference (Cain, 2000; Cohen, 1982; Crawford, 1997; Findlay, 1999).

Brogden (2005) concluded that the twenty-first century concept of policing is seen as a commodity or package that is for sale on the international market. What he terms “exporting” of policing, where buyers and sellers of policing commute across the globe, “The seller frequently fixes the price, determines the contours of the product, and provides installation experts trained on home ground. The buyer has little choice in the range of goods on offer, and, when faced with the desperate needs of the home market, is often too receptive to the blandishments and pressure of the producers.

“Designs are based on production rather than consumption priorities” (Brogden, 2005, p. 3). His study briefly highlights the “one size fits all” and “West knows best” mentalities, and concludes that generic police packages seem to suit sellers rather than consumers around the globe.

There seems to be a clear inequality between two dominant types of societies: democratic and transitional. (Loader, 2000) Democratic societies, like the US, are founded on an ideology of equality, whereby anyone can achieve regardless of their social background or personal circumstances. The clichéd concept of the ‘American Dream’ encapsulates this ideal (Cullen, 2003). There is often a feeling of superiority whereby democratic states feel that their involvement is essential for assisting other types of regime; in combating crime, democratic states seek to strengthen the administration of justice in societies where defence mechanisms against drug-sponsored corruption and violence are weak. Helping governments to target, seize, and administer assets belonging to criminal actors is an essential aspect of deconstructing international criminal networks. For example, such policy tools as the annual drug certification process in the US can highlight problems of high-level corruption in drug source countries and impel their governments to take countermeasures (Loader, 2000).

Transitional societies, however, can be defined as a form of society characterised by being in the midst of transition or change within a social, cultural, political, economic, or business context. Often, these are the same societies democratic societies try to aid in the administration of justice and where defence mechanisms against transnational crimes and corruption are seemingly weak (Loader, 2000). The dichotomy most apparent in the cooperation between the two societies is the availability of resources. There is pressure on transitional societies to conform to Americanization, which is actually driving the possibility of cooperation between the two apart (Dixon, 1999; Muncie, 2004). This phenomenon is viewed as an increasingly hegemonic influence, with Newburn and Sparks (2004) stressing the major criminological issue as an understanding of the similarities and differences in the pattern of contemporary systems of crime control, as well as the movement and translation of commodities between and within politics and political culture. Brogden (2005) also argues that there is an assumption that transitional or “failed societies” should follow the North American way of policing, and that this model is superimposed without consideration of local needs. The need to pay heed to the cultural context, particularly in countering “West knows best” efforts, continues to be made as the

internationalization of Western criminal law enforcement grows (Buruma, 2000). Walker (2000) has warned that unless new and effective regulatory tools are devised that encompass solutions to the complexity of various transnational contexts, policing may not satisfy the current realities and criticisms of “informalism and accountability”, which traditionally have plagued policing history worldwide. Walker (2000) argues the importance of political and economic constraints within the ‘ideological matrix,’ stating, “the stable prosperity of the EU in the more fluid post-Cold War world order stands in stark contrast with the insecurity and poverty of the polities and economies to the South and East” (p. 93). It is imperative for all parties involved to understand the basic issues and wishes of transitional societies before blindly accepting or rejecting the importing of Western-democratic philosophies of policing. The need for such fundamental comprehension is exemplified in the challenges law enforcement faces in interdicting the cross-border movement of drugs and other forms of contraband, amidst the expanding global legal market for goods and services that creates a ready pipeline for the smuggling of illicit goods. The overall US–Mexican trade volume of \$130 billion, the hundreds of millions of legal border crossings each year, and both countries’ vested interest in the expansion of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) have created a pipeline for smuggling illicit goods and an almost impossible situation for law enforcement. Consequently, US customs officials are able to subject only 25 percent of the 3.5 million commercial vehicles entering the US from Mexico annually to a “narcotics enforcement examination”.¹ Yet a single conveyance is capable of transporting tons of narcotics in just one border crossing while easily blending in with legitimate trucks. Recent law enforcement estimates suggest that Mexican traffickers are delivering between five and seven tons of drugs, including cocaine, marijuana, heroin, and methamphetamine, to the US each day.²

1.4 Approaches to Transnational Policing

Agencies of Transnational Policing

There are many types of agencies involved in the process of transnational policing. There are individual networks, law enforcement agencies, non-governmental

¹ Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP). (2003). Enhanced truck inspections. *Report to Congress*. Washington, D.C.

² Flood of contraband hard to stop, (1997, November 2). *The Washington Post*.

organizations (NGOs), governments, and private corporations. Bowling (2009) produced an effective typology of policing by categorizing and distinguishing “high” and “low” policing. Private and public forms of policing work were later added, “aimed at securing territory and work aimed at securing populations” (Sheptycki, 2000, p. 32). However, perhaps the most useful typology yet of TNP would be the one designed by Bowling and Foster (2002), who have classified formal TNP into three distinct categories: (1) national policing agencies operating abroad (by government); (2) transnational and cross-border police cooperation arrangements (between governments); and (3) international policing agencies above government.

National policing agencies would include British Military Intelligence, Section 5 & 6 (Mi5, Mi6), National Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS) in the United Kingdom or the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in the US. The DEA's Intelligence Division has been a pioneer in endeavors to systemize and make the concept of TNPC relevant across the world with its Regional Information Sharing Centre concept, which is discussed in detail in Chapter 5. The DEA is responsible for enforcing the controlled substances laws and regulations of the US, and is a model example of global representation, with “5,235 Special Agents, a budget of more than \$2.3 billion, and 87 foreign offices in 63 countries” (DEA, 2010).

Ideally, TNPC would include intergovernmental efforts, such as the formation of the Trevi group by the European Council of Ministers and The Schengen Agreement, signed in 1985 to police across European borders, enabling the right of “hot pursuit” across borders where governments share information on the designed Schengen Information System for crime and criminals. Other examples include the 1991 intelligence exchange between European Union member states in forming Europol and the Law Enforcement Cooperation Program based on the Australia Federal Police's liaison officer network. “Officers in the network form the link between countries, facilitating the exchange of information, as well as enhancing communication and understanding by attending international conferences and seminars, and by building a rapport with law enforcement officers of their host country” (www.afp.gov.au). The International Law Enforcement Academies (ILEAs), established, for example but not only in, El Salvador, Botswana, Budapest, and Bangkok, also foster cross-border police and multi-agency cooperation at the intergovernmental level. This institute has facilitated several US local forces in training

law enforcement personnel around the world. The only requirement of the academy is that the foreign officers be committed to incorporating and encouraging good practices of international cooperation in their work. The International Police Executive Symposium (IPES), which is composed of international police executives who meet and exchange information regularly at conferences with academics and other agencies, is yet another positive example of international cooperation.

International agencies are typified as United Nations Security Police or UN Civil Police Units known as CivPol. CivPol is part of the UN peacekeeping operations. It was first used in the Congo in 1960, and today is operational in six countries involving 4,720 officers from 45 countries. The International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) was formed in 1923 to act as an international intelligence network between self-governing members. Interpol has membership in 176 countries, but still does not have an international treaty of any sort (Bowling & Foster, 2002).

Another type of cooperation, beyond government, is Private Transnational Policing. It typically includes private security companies employed in private buildings or airport security for, as an example, surveillance purposes, servicing clients like Wells Fargo, Securitas, Pinkerton or Kroll. There are also private militias that are used to support public law enforcement agencies and private corporations, such as Military Professional Resources, Inc. (Bowling & Foster, 2002). Lastly, Brogden (2005) suggests agencies such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), have strict criteria for receiving economic assistance and loans, requiring mandatory improvement of current methods of policing. Bayley and Shearing (1996) would add that international agencies establish and govern national policing.

1.5 Implementation of Transnational Policing in Puerto Rico and the Dominican Republic

Puerto Rico

“Populated for centuries by aboriginal peoples, PR was claimed by the Spanish Crown in 1493, following Columbus’s second voyage to the Americas. In 1898, after 400 years of colonial rule that saw the indigenous population nearly exterminated and African slave labour introduced, PR was ceded to the US as a result of the Spanish-American War. Puerto Ricans were granted US citizenship in 1917. Popularly elected governors have served since 1948. In 1952, a constitution was enacted providing for internal self-government. In plebiscites held in 1967, 1993, and 1998, voters chose” to

retain commonwealth status (<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/rq.html>).

PR is a commonwealth associated with the US and is subject to US federal laws. Due to its geographic location and association with the US, PR is a major Caribbean point of entry for large, metric-ton quantities of cocaine destined for the continental US. The island is also a transit point and consumer market for Colombian heroin. An important incentive for traffickers reaching PR, or any US overseas territories, is that, once they reach a US territory, illicit drugs can be transported to the continental US in cargo that is not subject to further inspection by the Bureau of Customs and Borders Protection (CBP). PR is also an attractive sea and air transportation site in the Caribbean due to having one of the busiest seaports in North America, with an abundance of commercial airline flights to the US.

In recent years, traffickers have made less use of go-fast boats and airdrops directly from South America to PR, largely due to law enforcement efforts. Instead, much of the cocaine entering PR is smuggled through nearby Caribbean islands. Traffickers also have increasingly used self-propelled semi-submersibles (SPSS) to transport cocaine from South America to Mexico. These vessels typically protrude only a few inches above the surface of the water, making them very difficult to visually detect. SPSS typically have a four-man crew and are capable of carrying multi-ton quantities of cocaine. Traffickers operating in PR increasingly use the US Postal Service (USPS), especially Express Mail services, to send drugs from PR into the continental US. Investigators must obtain search warrants to open parcels sent through the USPS, which delays the packages and alerts traffickers to the fact that they have been intercepted (PR/USVI HIDTA Drug Market Analysis, 2008).

Cocaine smuggled into PR is often stored locally until transportation to the continental US can be arranged. Cocaine leaves PR via maritime bulk freighters and on commercial airlines, either in the possession of couriers or concealed in cargo. Traffickers also use commercial maritime containers to smuggle metric-ton quantities of cocaine, but more often hide drugs among legitimate cargo in maritime containers, a fraction of which are inspected. Analysis of commercial maritime seizure data for 2004 through 2009 indicates that cocaine and marijuana are most often smuggled in commercial maritime vessels from Caribbean locations. The main drug smuggled is cocaine, although smaller amounts of heroin and MDMA (3, 4-Methylenedioxymethamphetamine, commonly known as “ecstasy”) are also smuggled,

sometimes together with shipments of cocaine. Seizure totals and routes have remained relatively constant over the past few years, and the use of commercial maritime containers is far more common in the Caribbean than at other entry points (NDIC National Drug Threat Assessment, 2010). The amount of cocaine seized by Puerto Rican law enforcement officials almost tripled from 1,544 kilograms in 2006 to 4,414 kilograms in 2007 (PR/USVI HIDTA Drug Market Analysis, 2008).

In recent years, Mexican drug trafficking organisations have expanded their operations throughout the US, including the Caribbean and Florida area, and so have, to some extent, taken over from Colombian organisations which were previously dominant in the area. However, Colombian drug trafficking organisations are still an active presence in drug smuggling through PR. In addition, although the Central-America/Mexico route is now far more popular, Venezuela has become a major transit point for drug flights through the Caribbean, since US counter narcotics cooperation with Venezuela has diminished since 2005. Elsewhere in the Caribbean, the Bahamas continue to serve as a major transit country for both Jamaican marijuana and South American cocaine points (NDIC National Drug Threat Assessment, 2010).

Dominican drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) are the main transporters of drugs into and through PR and the US Virgin Islands (USVI); they operate extensive transportation networks, often using the Netherlands Antilles, other Dutch territories, and Hispaniola as staging areas. Dominican organisations often work closely with Puerto Rican organisations and sometimes include Puerto Ricans in their organizations. Puerto Rican organisations, though, are the primary retail drug distributors in PR. They also coordinate drug shipments on behalf of Colombian drug traffickers to the continental US and other areas. Puerto Rican drug trafficking organisations also maintain extended distribution cells in the continental US (PR/USVI HIDTA Drug Market Analysis, 2008).

PR is a major transhipment point for Colombian heroin destined for the northeastern US, principally New York City. Heroin is also smuggled into PR by commercial air couriers and cruise ship passengers. The couriers often conceal heroin internally, in luggage, or underneath clothes. Airports in PR are principal entry points for marijuana shipments. Marijuana is often seized in 1- and 15-kilogram-size packages, and is typically concealed inside checked suitcases or hand-carried items. However, the use of cruise passengers appears to have declined in popularity since 2006 (NDIC National Drug Threat Assessment, 2010). Traffickers have been known to

route large quantities of marijuana, often with cocaine, from Mexican and Colombian sources through the Eastern Caribbean and PR, to destinations in Florida and along the US east coast. Some small-scale marijuana production also occurs in PR.

Like many other Caribbean islands, traffickers have begun to use PR as an alternate transhipment location for European MDMA destined for the US. However, PR is not yet believed to be a major MDMA transhipment location. Couriers transport small amounts of MDMA from the Netherlands to PR, sometimes via the DR, and likely via other Caribbean Islands, as well. Some MDMA remains in PR for local consumption.

Most of the cocaine transported through PR is intended for the continental US and other areas such as Europe, but a sizable amount is set aside for local distribution. Cocaine, crack, heroin, and marijuana are readily available in PR, and prices vary throughout the island. The DEA's Caribbean Field Division has noted temporary increases in drug prices in PR due to the disruption of trafficker activities during regional law enforcement surge operations. Heroin and marijuana are the most widely abused illicit drugs in PR, but cocaine, pharmaceutical drugs, and other dangerous drugs are also commonly abused. Heroin is the primary drug identified in drug-related treatment admissions to publicly funded facilities in PR, accounting for 85 percent of all admissions in the commonwealth in 2006 (PR/USVI HIDTA Drug Market Analysis, 2008). Marijuana is one of the most commonly abused illicit drugs in PR. The climate is not conducive to large scale marijuana growing, but it is widely grown in the USVI, and it is being grown indoors in some gated communities in PR (PR/USVI HIDTA Drug Market Analysis, 2008).

Due to its well-developed financial infrastructure and US connection, PR is an important centre for money laundering in the Caribbean. Drug money also enters the DR from PR through currency exchange houses ("casas de cambio" or "remesadoras"). Cells of drug-trafficking organisations that launder money in PR use a number of methods, ranging from financial institutions, money remitters, bulk cash smuggling, shell corporations and other means, such as the Colombian Black Market Peso Exchange (BMPE). Bulk currency moves from the continental US through PR on its way to Latin America. Electronic wire transfers, on the other hand, are being used less because the USA PATRIOT Act allows for greater scrutiny of these transfers. Asset substitution has become another important method used, which involves legitimate or semi-legitimate party purchases of used cars or boats from the continental US and then

resale to drug traffickers in cash at inflated prices (PR/USVI HIDTA Drug Market Analysis, 2008).

Dominican Republic

Explored and claimed by Columbus on his first voyage in 1492, the island of Hispaniola became a springboard for Spanish conquest of the Caribbean and the American mainland. In 1697, Spain recognised French dominion over the western third of the island, which in 1804 became Haiti. The remainder of the island, known by then as Santo Domingo, sought to gain its own independence in 1821, but was conquered and ruled by the Haitians for 22 years; it finally attained independence as the DR in 1844. A legacy of unsettled, mostly non-representative, rule for much of its subsequent history was brought to an end in 1966, when Joaquin Balaguer became president. He maintained a tight grip on power for most of the next 30 years, when international reaction to flawed elections forced him to curtail his term in 1996. Since then, regular competitive elections have been held in which opposition candidates have won the presidency. The Dominican economy has had one of the fastest growth rates in the hemisphere over the past decade.

The DR serves as a drug trafficking command and control centre, as well as an important transhipment point. Dominican Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTOs) have become more and more influential in the 21st century, aided by a shift in using Mexican versus Colombian suppliers. This diversification of suppliers has allowed Dominican DTOs to expand their operations, bring down costs, and increase profit margins (NDIC National Drug Threat Assessment, 2010). Dominican nationals have become major players in the drug transportation business throughout PR and the Northeastern Caribbean, as well as the Eastern/Mid-Atlantic US. Dominican organizations facilitate transportation for most of the smuggling ventures that occur within the Eastern Caribbean. The DR has also become a safe haven for an ever-increasing number of Dominican nationals who are criminal fugitives from the US.

The DR is an important transhipment point for illicit drugs smuggled from South America and destined for the US (DEA, 2003). Cocaine is the principal drug smuggled through the DR; however, heroin transhipment through the country is increasing. As detailed above, cocaine moving through the DR is more likely to come from Mexico than Colombia. Drugs are smuggled into the DR via maritime vessels, airdrops, couriers, and overland via Haiti. Once the drugs are in the DR, traffickers often smuggle them in small maritime vessels to PR for transhipment into the US. One

of the primary methods for smuggling cocaine into the DR involves go-fast vessels that arrive at remote areas along the Southwest or Southeast Coast of the DR. Dominican crews in wooden yola-type vessels sometimes take the drug hand-off close to the shoreline. The majority of these originate in the Maracaibo area of Venezuela and the Colombian Guajira Peninsula (INSCR Country Report, 2010). Although the quantity is difficult to assess, it is likely drug traffickers also transport large amounts of cocaine overland from Haiti. Other methods used by traffickers include airdrops via general aviation aircraft, commercial vessels for transfers to go-fast boats or yolas, concealment in legitimate cargo, and the use of couriers aboard commercial flights originating in Venezuela, Colombia, or Panama. Multi-hundred-kilogram amounts of cocaine are occasionally shipped from the DR to the US via maritime containerised cargo. According to recent estimates, 7% of the cocaine directed towards the US transits Hispaniola (INSCR Country Report, 2010).

In recent years, heroin smuggling through the DR has increased, and, as with cocaine, Dominican groups have increased their operations across the US. In July 2007, the head of a Dominican DTO was arrested; the DTO head controlled shipped heroin and cocaine from Colombia through Venezuela to the DR and then on to the US, Canada, and Europe using young Dominican female couriers. The couriers generally concealed between 3-8 kilograms of cocaine or 1-3 kilograms of heroin in their luggage per trip (New York/New Jersey HIDTA Drug Market Analysis, June 2008).

Since mid-1999, DEA and other law enforcement agencies have reported increased MDMA trafficking through the Caribbean. This information also has revealed the important role of Dominican trafficking groups. The Dominicans played a relatively limited role in international MDMA trafficking until early 2002, when European offices began reporting a sharp increase in the number of Dominican trafficking groups operating in Europe and the use of couriers on commercial air flights to the US. These groups, consisting of at least eight major Dominican sources of supply in the Netherlands, are smuggling MDMA from the Netherlands, through Germany and other European countries, to major cities on the US East Coast. Investigations have identified 160 couriers arrested worldwide and the seizure of over 2 million tablets of MDMA in 2002 (DEA, 2003). Cannabis is also grown in the DR, largely for local consumption. A raid in 2009 on a marijuana plantation destroyed ten thousand plants with a value of approximately \$5 million (INSCR Country Report, 2010).

Most of the drug money entering the DR from the US and PR passes through casas de cambio or remesadoras (DEA, 2003). These money exchange businesses facilitate the movement of money by Dominicans between the US, PR, and the DR. They are attractive to drug traffickers because of their large numbers throughout each region, their flexibility in transferring large amounts of currency, and their disregard for US reporting requirements. The fact that they are used by thousands of legitimate companies and individuals is incentive enough for drug traffickers to use these businesses for their illicit activities, as they provide a legitimate cover to conduct drug-related financial transactions. In 2002, the government of the Dominican Republic promulgated new money laundering legislations to address this problem more effectively. Following the collapse of BANINTER, the third-largest Dominican bank, the Dominican government struggled to implement anti-money laundering legislation passed in 2002. The government of the DR is a member of the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF³) and the Egmont Group.⁴

The Dirección Nacional de Control de Drogas (National Directorate for Drug Control-DNCD) is the lead agency for combating drug trafficking and drug-related money laundering in the DR. The DNCD is made up of personnel from the National Police, the armed forces, and the National Department of Investigations. The Dominican Navy also participates in maritime drug interdiction.

The government of the DR has signed the major international anti-drug agreements, including those at the 1961 and 1971 U.N. Convention on Psychotropic Substances⁵ and the 1988 U.N. Drug Convention. Also, the government of the DR is

³ The Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF) is a regional body developed to advance anti-money laundering initiatives within the Caribbean. Its 25 members include Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Aruba, the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bermuda, the British Virgin Islands, the Cayman Islands, Costa Rica, Dominica, the Dominican Republic, Grenada, Jamaica, Montserrat, the Netherlands Antilles, Nicaragua, Panama, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Turks and Caicos, Trinidad and Tobago, and Venezuela.

⁴ The Egmont Group, created in 1995, is an international group of Financial Investigative Units (FIU) that meet annually about financial crimes. According to the Egmont Group, FIUs are centralised agencies that, at a minimum, receive, analyze, and disclose to competent authorities information provided by financial institutions (and other mandated entities) concerning possible money laundering and other financial crimes.

⁵ The 1961 U.N. Convention codified internationally applicable control measures in order to ensure the availability of drugs and psychotropic substances for medical and scientific purposes, and to prevent their diversion into illicit channels. It also included general provisions on illicit trafficking and drug abuse. The 1971 U.N. Convention established an international control system for psychotropic substances. The Convention was in response to the diversification and expansion of the spectrum of drugs of abuse, and it introduced controls over a number of synthetic drugs. The 1988 U.N. Convention established comprehensive measures against drug trafficking, including

party to the Inter-American Convention against Corruption.⁶ The US government and the government of the DR have had a bilateral extradition treaty since 1909. In 1998, the government of the DR enacted legislation allowing the extradition of Dominican nationals. In 2005, judicial review was added to the procedure for extradition, making extradition procedures more transparent. The Government of DR GODR extradited a total of 24 Dominicans in 2009 (18 to the US), and deported 17 US and third-country national fugitives to the US to face prosecution; 22 of the 41 extraditions/deportations were narcotics-related. In addition, the US extradited one fugitive to the DR, an accused murderer of a Dominican police officer (INSCR Country Report, 2010). The government of the DR does not have a formal Mutual Legal Assistant Treaty (MLAT) with the government of the US, but it generally cooperates with US Government agencies in counter-drug and fugitive cases.⁷

During the first 11 months of 2009, Dominican authorities seized approximately 4.4 metric tons of cocaine, 1.4010 metric tons of marijuana, 39 kilograms of heroin, 10,166 tablets of Ecstasy, and 1.3 million tablets of pseudoephedrine. During Operation Firewall (a comprehensive law enforcement operation targeting criminal organizations involved in the smuggling of large quantities of US currency.), US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and Dominican Customs confiscated \$608,400 in US currency (INSCR Country Report, 2010).

The GODR cooperates with US government agencies, including the DEA, FBI, US Customs Service, and US Marshals Service on counter-narcotics and fugitive matters. The DNCD housed and manned the DEA-sponsored Caribbean Centre for

provisions against money laundering and the diversion of chemicals used in illegal drug production. It helped establish international cooperation regarding the extradition of drug traffickers, controlled deliveries, and the transfer of case proceedings.

6 The Inter-American Convention against Corruption requires signatory countries to criminalise solicitation or acceptance of bribes and other corrupt acts, and to eliminate bank secrecy or political grounds as a basis for refusal to cooperate in criminal investigations. Signatories also are encouraged to take important preventative measures to reduce their vulnerability to corruption. The Convention is limited to members of the Inter-American Drug Abuse Commission (CICAD). CICAD Caribbean member states include: Antigua and Barbuda, The Bahamas, Barbados, Dominica, the Dominican Republic, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago.

7 Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (MLAT) allow generally for the exchange of evidence and information in criminal investigations.

Drug Information (CDI) at its facilities in Santo Domingo. An increasing number of Caribbean countries have found the CDI's intelligence analysis services useful and are now frequent contributors of new information. The Dominican Navy received six renovated patrol craft and two newly constructed 115-foot patrol ships, supplied under a US \$25 million commercial contract with a US company. Plans were also made to incorporate these vessels into multilateral counter-narcotics and anti-migration patrol activities.

Dominican institutions remain vulnerable to influence by interest groups or individuals with money to spend, including narcotics traffickers. Corruption in the DR is endemic, with numerous law enforcement and military officials, many of high rank, being implicated in corrupt activities, including trafficking in narcotics and money laundering. Entire police units have been under investigation and have been removed from duty for suspected drug trafficking activities.

In 2009, the GODR attempted to reduce the influence of narcotics traffickers in the judicial system by focusing on internal affairs and changing the venue of judicial proceedings when necessary. The Dominican National Police (DNP) Internal Affairs office (IA) was restructured in 2009 and conducted approximately 70-90 internal investigations monthly against police personnel engaged in improper conduct (INSCR Country Report, 2010). The GODR is a party to the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, and in 2001 signed the consensus agreement on establishing a mechanism to evaluate compliance with the Convention.

Currently, cocaine and heroin trafficking, money laundering, institutional corruption, and reform of the judicial system remain the US' primary counter narcotics concerns in the DR. The US government and the government of the DR cooperate to develop Dominican institutions that can interdict and seize narcotics shipments and conduct effective investigations leading to arrests, prosecutions, and convictions.

The US has continued to provide assistance and cooperate with the DR on drug interdiction. For instance, during 2009, the Department of State's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) provided equipment and training to maintain the drug and explosive detection canine units, support the vetted Sensitive Investigation Unit and Tactical Response Team, expand computer training, database expansion and systems maintenance support, improve the DNCD's capability to detect drugs smuggled through airports, and enhance the DR's anti-money laundering capacity. US Customs and Border Protection conducted two international

interdiction training seminars on airport and seaport cargo for the DNP, DNCD, and Dominican Republic Customs Authorities (Direccion General de Aduanas-DGA).

The United States Coast Guard (USCG) participated in joint counter narcotics and illegal migrant operations, including the use of mobile biometrics to identify and prosecute criminals transiting the Mona Passage between the DR and PR. In addition, the US Coast Guard held three subject-matter expert exchange conferences for the benefit of the Dominican Navy, as well as providing maritime law enforcement, leadership, engineering and maintenance, port security, and command and control training to the Dominican Navy. The Law Enforcement Development Program, implemented by the Embassy's, National Academy of Sciences (NAS), assisted the DNP with reforms aimed at completing its transformation into a professional, civilian-oriented organization. Since the program was initiated in 2006, over 9,000 police investigators and prosecutors have undergone training in basic crime scene investigation. The US Agency for International Development (USAID) also provided assistance to strengthen the DR's justice system, with a particular focus on effective implementation of the Criminal Procedures Code to ensure proper acquisition, storage, and handling of evidence and adherence to reasonable time limits for prosecuting cases (INSCR Country Report, 2010).

1.6 Summary of Chapter One

The challenges and approaches to TNP, the nature and trends in TN crime, the emergence of TNP, and approaches to TNP were discussed with the aim of setting a context to TNP in PR and DR. The nature and trends in TN crimes focuses on different structure, strength, size and range and in the diversity of illegal activities. The emergence of TNP then centred on the important mind set of the one-size fits all and West knows best mentalities. Western criminal law enforcement has stretched globally but traditionally denied the possibility of differences. It is only by examining TNP in a historical context that the challenges can be highlighted fully. Therefore, exploring and building on the research of democratic versus transitional societies by academics in a historical context is critical to finding solutions that are holistic and inclusive to all cultures for TNP to truly be efficient. Next, the approaches to TNP were considered by looking at different law enforcement agencies and what their individual roles and responsibilities entailed. Generally it was found that there are individual networks, NGO's, governments and private corporations.

Next the implementation of transnational policing in PR and the DR were introduced to better understand the local challenges and cultural contexts. PR was found important because of its commonwealth status, US Federal laws and unique geographical location. Mainly go fast boats and small vessels from DR (known locally as Yolas) carry the cocaine from St. Martens and the Virgin Islands. The drugs are stored locally until transportation to the US can be arranged. PR is also an important location for transhipment for MDMA from Europe. It was also geographically an important centre for money laundering because of its well-developed financial infrastructure. DR drug money is laundered through casas de cambios, money exchange offices in both the DR and PR. The DR was found to be more influential to Mexican cocaine as opposed to Colombian cocaine.

The uniqueness of PR and the DR discussed here was clearly seen as an essential key factor to understand the local context and steps needed to improve cooperation. Overall, this chapter on the challenges and approaches taken in PR and DR was found to be crucial in appreciating the context and ways forward towards understanding better cooperation.

Chapter Two

Cooperation And Its Role In Transnational Policing

2.1 Introduction to Chapter Two

The following chapter seeks to provide a theoretical perspective on TNPC. It first explores elements and potential impact of cooperation and the role of these facets in TNP. Examining elements such as teamwork, networking, communication, competition, capacity building, leadership, and trust will help provide an improved understanding of how cooperation exists in the TNP community. This theoretical approach remains open to a range of topics and perspectives that have not been covered in such depth at the time of writing. Forms of cooperation in TNP, such as intelligence-sharing, joint operations, and shared training are then investigated, as is the DEA’s Regional Information Sharing Centres’ (RISC) attempt at TNPC. This is followed by an overview of the HIDTA program, which is the largest cooperative “umbrella-agency” in the Caribbean region. Finally, the methods and theories currently prevalent in the field of social psychology, as these relate to barriers to and facilitators of TNPC in PR and the DR, are examined in detail.

2.2 Cooperation: Elements and Impact

Cooperation within organizations has become a much-debated topic since the 1970s, as it has become increasingly clear that the most effective organizations are those in which all members work together to achieve their aims, rather than working separately. While much of the research pertains to business situations, the concept is also true of public services such as policing. Indeed, it is of particular relevance in the context of fighting crime, where the need for shared intelligence often becomes essential (Anderson, 1989) and trust becomes a major factor (Curral, 1995) as without it working as a team becomes very difficult, if not impossible. When extended to *transnational* policing, cooperation becomes of primary importance. As De Cremer and Van Knippenberg (2002) point out, cooperation is essential when there is outcome interdependence – when the outcomes rely on many people doing their parts well. This has never been truer of policing than it is today. Cooperation in organisations relies on a range of interactions, including teamwork, networking, communication, leadership, and capacity building. All these involve a degree of trust (Curral, 1995). Something else that these aspects share in common is that cooperation inherently involves risk, as

individuals carry out tasks, share information, and give up their time and efforts to aid others for the greater good of the group. Curral talks about trust as being a measure of dependence on another under conditions of risk, and it is extremely applicable to policing. The following paragraph will go on to expound on the idea of trust as it applies here.

2.2.1 Trust. Largely due to the risks inherent in all types of cooperation, effective cooperation relies very heavily on one element of interpersonal relationships: trust. Trust has, in recent years, become a focal point of much of the research into organisational behaviour and cooperation (Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995; Schoorman, Mayer, & Davis, 2007). Anderson's (1989; 1997) study emphasised the need for trust in any truly cooperative relationship. In his 1997 work, Anderson (1997) wrote:

Whether the external frontier can be effectively managed and policed depends on how closely national authorities cooperate with one another, which, in turn, requires a high degree of mutual trust in police, administrative and judicial authorities of other member states. (p.184)

Trust has been defined in various ways in the existing literature on the subject. However, the most cited and most commonly used definition is Schoorman, Mayer, and Davis's (2007) understanding of trust as the “willingness to take risks for another person or at the hands of another person” (p. 346). Risk features prominently in many definitions of trust (Gambetta, 1988; Luhman, 1979; Zand, 1972) as, without risk, trust becomes irrelevant. Morgan and Hunt (1994) found that high levels of trust led to increased cooperation and increased commitment to organisations as well as reducing conflict within it and the tendency to leave it. Much of the literature on risk, trust, and cooperation discusses these issues of cooperation as they apply to a business environment (Gambetta, 1988; Luhman, 1979; Schoorman, Mayer, & Davis, 2007; Zand, 1972). However, one might say that cooperation in a TNP environment involves even more risk as lives, as well as large sums of money and the rule of law, may be at risk. As such, the importance of trust becomes even more central as the perceived or actual risk can be even higher for those involved.

Trust can be further affected—both in a negative and positive way—by cognitive factors, such as a careful assessment of the qualities of other individuals, as well as by emotional or affective factors, such as positive feelings toward others. Trust

consists of a complex interaction of factors (Kramer, 1999). Schoorman, Mayer, & Davis (2007) suggest that, of the cognitive factors involved, the main aspects are an assessment of the other person's ability, integrity, and benevolence. For instance, in order for trust to be built, it is essential for one party to believe that the other has the ability to deliver effectively on promises. Incompetence, for example, erodes trust. Integrity is also a key component - the belief that the other party will stand by agreements made. Ability and integrity are quickly assessed during interactions and relationships, while benevolence (the belief that another party has one's best interests in mind) takes longer to build (Schoorman, Mayer, & Davis, 2007). Anderson (1997) writes of the importance of trust in the context of the way in which the legal system operates. Indeed, if the government, police force, or other agency of one's country has faith in the legal system and the values that one is dealing with, they are more likely to be cooperative. Glaeser (2000) writes that trust is often established using previous behaviour as a benchmark. Depending on the situation, this could make it more or less difficult to gain trust.

While some researchers' writing about trust believe trust and distrust are at two ends of a continuum, Lewicki, McAllister, and Bies (1998) point out that trust and distrust can coexist; you might trust a person to do one thing but not another. This is where Glaeser's (2000) understanding of previous experience may come in, as someone (or indeed an entire organisation) may have proved trustworthy under a particular set of circumstances but not under others. Interestingly, Dietz and Hertog (2006) discuss the idea that one's own inclination to trust is actually a more accurate predictor of his or her behaviour than is the estimation of another's trustworthiness. These authors also discuss the decision to trust as dependent on a complicated matrix of factors. Some of these are inevitably connected to the behaviours of the "trustee" (in this case, Dietz and Hertog refer to organisations) but urge people to look at external factors as well. The authors discuss various "cues" as well as the inability of individuals to process an infinite number of cues at one time, leading to a discussion of which cues are most important in establishing trustworthiness.

Lewicki, McAllister, and Bies (1998) write about trust as consisting of confident positive expectations and distrust as involving confident negative expectations. Whether one agrees with their assessment that trust and distrust are *separate* conceptual entities (rather than ends of a spectrum), these researchers' important contribution is the idea that ambivalence is very common and that one can

both trust a person and distrust them at the same time, depending on the situation that one is in at the time. For example, a law enforcement officer might trust a colleague to be above corruption and not to leak information to criminal networks but may not trust that same individual to file a report on time. The fact that trust and distrust coexist within relationships leads to the possibility of risking some elements of cooperation on trust while building in controls to reduce risk in other areas. This could involve, for example, encouraging the sharing of information between agents as much as possible and appropriate while continuing to install strong security measures on shared databases in order to record and monitor access to information in case trust is ever abused. These controls and checks involve *institutionalised distrust* (Luhmann, 1979), which can actually allow interpersonal trust to flourish.. Depersonalising distrust means that cooperation can continue but that safeguards are in place to reduce some of the risk.

It is possible, therefore, to achieve a healthy balance between trust and distrust when it comes to monitoring and controlling; in fact, Schoorman, Mayer, & Davis (2007) suggest that, when risk is high, control systems such as transparency may help to bridge the gap between trust and risk by allowing individuals to take greater risks based on assurance on the control system. However, too much control may also undermine trust in the long term, since cooperation will not be seen as evidence of trustworthiness, but rather as an effect of the control system (Schoorman, Mayer, & Davis, 2007, p. 348). Similarly, Kramer (1999) points out that some technologies that are intended to raise standards or improve cooperation can actually be counterproductive by undermining trust, either because they reduce intrinsic motivation to be trustworthy or because they reduce personal interaction between team members, managers, and staff.

Moving beyond the cognitive and emotional aspects of trust, Schoorman, Mayer, & Davis (2007) emphasise the importance of understanding trust in a cultural context rather than as a constant concept across cultures. For instance, they propose that a proclivity to trust others may be affected by the type of culture in which an individual is raised, as well as by one's personal psychological makeup and life experiences. Similarly, 'task-oriented' cultures tend to trust and cooperate more readily on individual tasks than do 'relationship-oriented' cultures, in which people often take longer to build trust. This is an important aspect to consider with regard to TNP, and works to further reinforces the importance of avoiding the imposition of a US-centric TNP model on

cultures in which the natural proclivity to cooperation/trust may stem from different factors and may play out differently in day-to-day activities and decisions (Schoorman, Mayer, & Davis, 2007). Knack and Zak (2001) discuss the vast differences in trust across cultures. The authors discuss the idea of trust playing out between principals and agents (this can encapsulate a range of relationships, such as those between employer and employee, investor and investee, etc.), where the principal puts oneself at risk when interacting with the agent. They found cheating (breaches of trust) to be more likely when the social distances between agents were larger, any social sanctions in place to try to avoid this are not useful, the amount invested is higher, and investors' wages are lower. These factors may work to explain differences, at least from one perspective, in how trust works across cultures.

Trust issues related to race also exist, overlapping with issues of trust between cultures. Anderson (2000) considers the impact that such differences can have on trust; this is applicable not only to intrinsic differences but also perceived differences, and the author notes that, for example, European Nationalists tend to distrust non-white people because of the vast differences in behaviour and attitude but also because there is a feeling that the two groups might have very different loyalties. This is a particularly significant issue in TNP, terms where colonial roots and histories can factor in .

Schoorman, Mayer, & Davis (2007) further suggest that, culturally, more competitive "masculine" cultures may place a higher value on one's ability as a factor in trust. This may be relevant to not only the development of trust in Latin American cultures, for example, but also specifically to the internal macho 'cop culture' which often exists within the field of law enforcement. If law enforcement officers put a high value on ability and are more likely to trust co-workers who have proven themselves to be able and competent, it may be possible to channel this natural inclination and capitalising on it through team-building and networking exercises in order to speed up the development of trust.

Trust is typically considered an integral element in facilitating and encouraging cooperation between agencies, organisations, and governments; many factors have been cited as crucial in the fostering or, conversely, the hampering of the development of trust in this context. It is also interesting to note the role of trust in gaining information from individuals who are directly involved in highly integrated criminal organisations (Kaiser & Starie, 2005). In order to gain information and intelligence, someone must gain the trust of an informant, and it is highly unlikely that someone from another

country can obtain this level of trust. Trust is an integral aspect throughout the process of TNP and is integral within TNP organisations.

2.2.2 Teamwork. Teamwork is increasingly seen as an essential aspect of organisational functioning, both in the business world and fields such as policing. As such, the need for trust in team working has become increasingly relevant. Jones and George's (1998) study of trust in team working frames discuss two varieties of trust: conditional and unconditional. They use a psychological framework based on values, attitudes, moods, and emotions to explain how people experience trust in an organisation and how it affects teamwork, incorporating an emotional as well as cognitive understanding of trust.

Levin, Cross, and Abrams (2004), in their research on knowledge transfer and trust in an organisational setting, found that strong ties had a positive effect on receipt of knowledge between two parties—it impacted trust based both on competence and on benevolence. Additionally, there was also some evidence that, in the workplace, people gain useful knowledge from what these authors referred to as “trusted weak ties” (p. 5). Weak, in this context, refers to a tie that is characterised by distance and/or by infrequent interaction. The authors suggest that organisations could benefit from building trusted weaker ties, also adding that these are not only sometimes as useful as strong ties but are also easier to maintain.

What is known as conditional trust involves calculating returns when cooperating; for instance agreeing to help someone because this individual helped you yesterday or will help you tomorrow. While this is a perfectly acceptable form of cooperation for some situations e.g. when dealing with contacts from other departments with whom one rarely works. When people need to work together as a team on a day-to-day basis, however, the most effective form of cooperation is most likely to arise when *unconditional* trust is present. When unconditional trust exists, people identify with the group and grow to consider each other colleagues and friends instead of just co-workers. Positive affective states reinforce a feeling of belonging to the group, and members of the team develop shared values and positive attitudes toward one another. This translates into more willingness to take risks and make self-sacrificing efforts for the good of the group and in order to advance shared goals.

Under conditions of unconditional trust, people define their roles broadly, as they are willing to carry out whatever tasks are necessary to reach their team's goals, whereas in situations of conditional trust people are less likely to 'go the extra mile',

though they may cooperate with each other to some extent. In team-working situations, it is important that people seek help whenever they need it, as this additional cooperation often increases efficiency. However, if only conditional trust exists within an organisation, people will be less likely to be willing to seek help voluntarily, as they do not want to appear weak or to become indebted to another person. Within teams where unconditional trust is present, this concern drops away, allowing the team to become more efficient (Jones & George, 1998).

Abrams, Cross, Lesser, and Levin (2003) write about informal networks as being the primary way many employees gain information. They write about the impact of tie strength on the way individuals in organisations gain knowledge. While people typically gain information from strong ties, there is also significant information to be gained from weaker ties when the dimension of trust is held constant. This study controlled for the effect of trust in order to explore the impact of weak ties, exploring the effects of benevolence and competence. The study suggests that organisations would benefit from a bolstering of its weaker ties (which are also less difficult to maintain, as a general rule). The idea is that this can facilitate smooth transfer of knowledge within an organisation.

Teamwork is an important and, some would say, necessary element of TNPC. The very concept of TNPC might be viewed as different organisations working as a team. Reichel (2002) states, ‘...transnational crimes...beg for a cooperative international response. Multinational collaboration is occurring, but the needed action requires a level of teamwork that countries of the world are only beginning to understand’ (p.5). Successful teamwork rests on trust and, as discussed above, useful transfer of knowledge between individuals within and between organisations.

2.2.3 Networking. Networks are an increasingly important part of social and organisational life, particularly as many organisations are shifting from rigid hierarchical structures to more level structures organised around teamwork. The social capital and trust engendered through networks allow greater capabilities and information sharing amongst members of networks. For instance, through “friends of friends” and weak links in the network, relationships that are not close (but may still prove useful, as described above) can be utilised as trust can often be created by belonging to the same network. This concept of “loose ties” or, as explained above, “weak ties” (Levin et al., 2004) is an important one, as these are the links across a lot of useful information can be shared (Granovetter, 1973). Within tight-knit networks,

information may already be fully shared (e.g. within a close-knit team of agents working together on a case or on similar cases). The most useful connections tend to exist between members of that team (“nodes” in that network) as well as with agents in other teams, perhaps covering different jurisdictions, who may have information or capabilities which those within the close-knit network lack and can make use of. When two networks are connected by loose ties or weak links, vital information which would remain isolated otherwise can be passed between the two groups and then quickly disseminated amongst the members of each group. In the context of policing, the ability to pick up the phone and ask a question of a contact with whom one does not otherwise have any official information-sharing is an essential element in communication and cooperation. Similarly, one contact in the right department can smooth over problems with sensitive or difficult issues such as deportations, etc. Burt (1992) describes these effects in terms of access, timing, and referral benefits.

2.2.4 Communication. Communication as an aspect of networking and cooperation is essential and, at a time when increased access to communication technology means that cooperation and networking can take place between people who have never met in person, the question arises of whether effective trust-building communication between members of a network *requires* face-to-face communication. Several studies have suggested that electronic or distance communication alone does not build the trust required to sustain effective cooperation (Rocco, 1998). However, it appears that a limited amount of occasional face-to-face contact can establish enough trust to make subsequent electronic cooperation effective. Rocco's 1998 indicated that, while cooperation in electronic environments between people who had never met tended to fail because of lack of trust, introducing a face-to-face pre-meeting before cooperation began dramatically raised the levels of cooperation. This is clearly relevant to transnational policing, as geographic distance plays an important role in the challenges facing agents working together in different countries. Particularly in the Caribbean, where island geography creates an additional obstacle to regular face-to-face contact, it is important to know that even occasional physical meetings can support subsequent cooperation at a distance. This lends support to the reports of officers who suggested that they always ensure they personally meet contacts from other departments in order to “put a face to a name” and that occasional networking and co-training events provide useful opportunities to build trust. Bowling (2009) talks about the importance of collaboration that is established not only through formal channels,

i.e. the cooperation that exists between various formal agencies, but also the cooperation that is built through friendships and informal contacts—these are often established through training opportunities or similar.

2.2.5 Capacity building. Capacity building involves the strengthening of organisations and draws on the field of organisational learning and change. Honadle (1998) evaluates the definitions of “capacity” and concludes that it involves a range of factors, including: having “the ability to anticipate and influence change; make informed, intelligent decisions about policy; develop programs to implement policy; attract and absorb resources; manage resources; and evaluate current activities to guide future action” (p.577). In order to build these capacities effectively, organisations must have the capacity to learn from experience. Jones (2001) refers to Revan's theory of learning, which claims that organisations need to ensure that their ability to learn from experience exceeds the rate of change, as they cannot otherwise remain effective. In fact, Kolb and Revan's theories of learning both emphasise learning from experience: the learner critically reflects on his or her lived experience, generalises from these reflections, and experiments with new behaviours (Jones, 2001). Therefore, effective capacity building is an on-going process rather than an end state; it refers to the continuing sustainable ability of organisations to be effective.

2.2.6 Leadership. Research on leadership has tended to focus on either the effects of middle-managers on their immediate subordinates/teams (Yukl, 1994) or, conversely, on leaders at higher levels, who strategically lead the business but have less day-to-day interaction with staff (Canella & Monroe, 1997). The bulk of the literature focuses on trust and emphasises the need for staff to trust their leaders. The implication is that leaders who are trusted will be able to encourage cooperation and will be more likely to engender willingness to cooperate with each other amongst their subordinates.

The field has gradually come to distinguish between transactional leadership and transformational leadership, which are sometimes described as two ends of a continuum but are more commonly described as two styles of leadership which can (and indeed should) coexist (Crossan & Dusya, 2004). Transactional leaders set goals and make agreements explicit within their organisation, while transformational leadership is charismatic, inspirational, and personally considerate – inspiring others to think past their self-interest and to instead work toward the good of the entire organisation. Ideally, a model leader will embody elements of both or will be able to utilise both of these styles of leadership as circumstances dictate. For instance, in

creating organisational change or encouraging cooperation, a transformational-style leader would be more successful, whereas the achievement of ambitious targets might benefit from transactional-style leadership (Crossan & Dusya, 2004).

According to Schoorman, Mayer, & Davis (2007), trust in the dominant coalition or management team is critical to understanding organisational trust, as this group will determine the strategic actions of the organisation. Recognition, at a strategic level, of the importance of cooperation is essential, as otherwise efforts to cooperate will necessarily remain patchy and driven by individuals rather than the organisation as a whole. A more in-depth description of the ways managers and leaders can elicit the trust of their staff is explored by Whitener et al (1998). Starting from the assumption that trust involves risk, they suggest that there are broadly five key methods that managers can use to build their subordinates' trust: behavioural consistency; behavioural integrity; sharing and delegation of control; communication; and demonstration of concern. Consistent behaviour allows predictability and, therefore, builds trust over time. Behavioural integrity involves matching words and deeds. Delegation of control, by allowing employees to be involved in decision-making, allows them some control over their circumstances and builds reciprocal trust. Communication is critical, and it is essential that managers explain their decisions openly; this leads to them being increasingly trusted. Finally, a demonstration of concern implies benevolence.

Two other elements of employee-manager trust are advanced by De Cremer and Van Knippenberg (2002), who suggest that leaders' abilities to promote procedural fairness, as well as their possession of charisma, are two inroads toward promoting cooperation. Procedural fairness echoes both the need for predictability and the need for communication; if decisions are relatively predictable, well-explained, and not arbitrary, employees are more likely to trust them. Managers ought to also abide by their decisions in order to promote their own integrity. It seems likely that procedural fairness and behavioural integrity in particular would promote cooperation, as a fair and reasonable authority overseeing cooperation is likely to reduce the likelihood of cooperation-sabotaging behaviours, such as free-riding (Crossan & Dusya, 2004).

De Cremer and Van Knippenberg (2002) also suggest that more important than promoting cooperation should be promoting "belongingness", as incentivising can reduce the intrinsic motivation to do a job well. In comparison, encouraging employees to identify with each other and to work for the good of the team is a more effective

strategy, as is reducing the *barriers* to cooperation (as opposed to creating incentives). This is interesting in reference to policing as law enforcement officers generally have strong intrinsic motivation already; since the job is dangerous and not necessarily well-paid compared to other sectors, motivation tends to come more from the desire to ensure the safety of society than for personal gain. De Cremer and Van Knippenberg (2002) report that, while procedural fairness and charisma were both effective ways of managing cooperation, they did not necessarily work well together and actually appeared to cancel out other's effects. As charisma is a rather elusive quality, it seems that procedural fairness may be the more reliably effective form of management.

In conclusion, trust must be developed and maintained carefully in all relationships existing in an organisation, whether between managers and immediate subordinates, senior/strategic management and the rest of the organisation, members of individual teams and cursory acquaintances, and contacts within the network. Cooperation relies on the ability to trust others enough to brave the risks of sharing often-sensitive information. In the case of TNP, these risks can be quite high, so trust needs to be correspondingly high.

2.3 Forms of Cooperation in Transnational Policing

The greater the threat to national security, the greater the role of local policy in the US (Clarke, 2006), and the more TNP becomes relevant. Forms of cooperation in TNP can be broadly characterised into three areas: sharing of intelligence/information, joint operations, and shared training. These three broad forms of cooperation are carried out by organisations involved in transnational policing, which range from local organisations linked with those abroad to those with a truly global reach. Homeland security policy requires cooperation at all levels of government—local, state, and federal (Caruson, 2007).

Intelligence Sharing

Sharing of information on criminal activities and organisations is probably the most highly developed form of cooperation between policing organisations worldwide. This applies also to sharing information across multiple jurisdictions (Caruson, 2007). However, there are still major limitations to the amount and type of information that is shared, both because of the secrecy built into police culture and because of legal constraints. As Aldritch (2004) points out, there are serious contradictions between the need to share information in a highly networked world, where criminal operations are

global, and the culture of policing in the West, which values the protection of sources and consists of highly compartmentalised agencies. Security requires the cooperation of many of those compartments (Caruson, 2007), but this does not necessarily always come naturally.

Within the EU, the establishment of Europol has created a clear central hub for information sharing across the region, from constant daily analysis to larger scale analysis, such as the European Organised Crime Threat Assessment and the EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report, published annually (Europol, 2010). While sharing within the EU is typically relatively smooth, one major problem with information sharing outside of regional organisations is that legal constraints based on privacy laws can vary drastically. In particular, sharing information on criminal and terrorist suspects on a bilateral level between the EU and the US has proved more difficult because EU assumptions around privacy are stricter than those allowed for by the US (Townsend, 2003).

However, as a facilitator of information sharing on a global level, International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) plays a similar role to Europol in ensuring the smooth sharing of information and facilitating cooperation between national agencies. For instance, the secure Interpol search facility I-24/7 offers access to virtually all of Interpol's police databases, including those recording lost and stolen travel documents, fingerprints, stolen vehicles, and even stolen works of art. Interpol also uses notices to alert police worldwide to fugitives, suspected terrorists, and criminals, and nominal data on hundreds of thousands of crimes (Interpol, 2010).

Joint Operations

Cooperation through joint operations is also common, though the continuing importance of legal jurisdiction in policing means that generally only state officials will be able to carry out arrests within that state, and representatives of other states' law enforcement agencies must remain in an advisory capacity rather than active. However, joint operations can be effective when each national agency focuses on activities occurring within their own borders, but it is less common for international or global organisations to carry out investigations, due to sovereignty and jurisdictional constraints. Europol, for instance, acts only as a support agency for national policing agencies, facilitating cooperation, and does not carry out its own investigations within member states, or arrest suspects. It does, however, facilitate joint operations between member states' agencies, often at internal borders between member states where it is

highly advantageous to have both law enforcement presences cooperating closely (Europol, 2010).

Despite the growing need for cooperation and information sharing, there still appears to be a gap in how this plays out. Billions of dollars have been spent by the US each year in order to prevent terrorism in the wake of 9/11, yet these gaps remain (Squires, 2009). Gutierrez (2004) writes that, before 9/11, the national intelligence apparatus was highly flawed; these include, according to this author, issues in information sharing, conflict between agencies, and autonomous operations. In the wake of 9/11, national agencies realised the need for change at all levels.

Shared Training

Training is a highly developed form of transnational cooperation between policing organisations. For instance, the five International Law Enforcement Academies, founded by President Clinton in 1995 and operating in Budapest, Bangkok, Gabarone, Roswell, and San Salvador, train and share knowledge on a range of TNP issues, including human trafficking, narcotics, and financial crime. Each Academy is designed to provide training that particularly relates to the policing challenges faced in that region. Part of the explicit remit of ILEA is to build links between law enforcement agencies throughout the world, which reinforces the importance of training as a way of building contacts and trust between agents from different countries (ILEA, Budapest, 2010). In ILEA Budapest, for example, an international visiting faculty, rather than a static resident faculty, allows even more diversity and networking.

Interpol also has a remit for training and conducts over 140 training courses per year, training over 4500 participants from 165 countries. It also runs a number of other training programs, including the web-based Interpol Global Learning Centre (Interpol, 2010). The UN Police Division (UNPD), in addition to patrolling in peacekeeping zones throughout the world, provides training and advice to local police, helping to maintain the rule of law in conflict-torn areas (United Nations, 2010).

In conclusion, there is substantial transnational cooperation occurring across the world, both through global or regional organisations geared specifically toward facilitating that cooperation, or through agreements and sharing between national forces. While it is essential for the success of policing in a world where criminal forces are globally connected that that cooperation continues it does raise questions about accountability and oversight, particularly on occasions when personal data is being passed around the world.

2.4 An Attempt at Transnational Police Cooperation: Regional Information Sharing Centres

The DEA's Regional Information Sharing Centres (RISC) model is based on a "practical approach" toward transnational cooperation. For some time now, the DEA has recognised the need to adapt in order to face the rapidly emerging challenges surrounding crime and globalisation. For example, the southwest region of the US has a serious drug trafficking problem and has been designated a "High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area" (Harrison & Kennedy, 1996). This is one area where cooperation and sharing information, in order to better understand the bigger picture of what is going on in the region, would be useful. The authors found that, in actuality, despite the designation, there is little actual data available on drug use in the region and that rates of use in the region were similar to those in other parts of the country.

Given the need to adapt to ever-present challenges, the DEA's Intelligence Division has led in codifying and applying the concept of TNP across the world. In fact, the DEA's Intelligence Programme lists "strengthening information sharing and intelligence coordination along the continuum of transnational policing" as one of its five "Strategic Goals and Objectives." The DEA's approach assumes that, in order for law enforcement to be successful, "threats of mutual concern, joint planning, information sharing, operational coordination, and maximisation, allocation, and utilization of resources against targets of mutual interest" (www.dea.gov) must be emphasised. Joint "efforts, such as the International Drug Enforcement Conference (IDEC) and...INTERPOL already exist and are quite effective at facilitating cooperation and communication...But, as effective as they may be at the regional level and intra-regional levels, they lack an essential daily interface" (www.dea.gov) necessary for success at an international level and do not include mechanisms capable of building a truly worldwide information-sharing network.

The DEA has had liaison officers stationed abroad in order to facilitate information sharing and support investigations for many years (Brown, 2008). More recently, this has been enhanced by the development of bilateral working groups designed to focus cooperative efforts further through enhanced information sharing, common targeting, and joint investigations. These liaison efforts and joint targeting operations are effective to a certain extent, but the results are often too inconsistent, erratic, and short-lived.

The DEA sees the creation of both the strategic RISCs and predetermined regional cooperative goals and objectives as embracing the TNP concept and taking it to the next level. At present, all multilateral international cooperative efforts are devoid of a steady information flow to tactical centres. A RISC will serve as the organisational nucleus and will provide the operational services required to share targeted information throughout a defined region. The DEA intends the RISC model to form a worldwide network of regional information warehouses, where the sole purpose of each will be to facilitate cooperation between law enforcement agencies across the globe.

2.5 High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas Program Overview

The High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas Program (HIDTA) was established in 1988 and intended to, as stated on the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) website, 'provide assistance to Federal, state, local and tribal law enforcement agencies operating in areas determined to be critical drug-trafficking regions of the US (ONDCP website, 2012). HIDTA was originally established as a means of facilitating cooperation amongst all of the agencies who have a role in preventing drug trafficking – 'Federal, state, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies' (ONDCP website, 2012). As stated by Gutierrez (2005) and Squires (2009), in post 9/11 US, people increasingly realised the importance of cooperation between agencies and the weight of its absence. Whether this applies to drug trafficking or the cessation of terrorist activities, the import of cooperation remains constant.

At present, there are 28 HIDTAs, including approximately '16 percent of all counties in the US and 60 percent of the US population' (ONDCP website, 2016) The structure is designed to aid cooperation, with the local HIDTA branches being controlled by executive boards with an equal number of regional, federal, and non-federal groups. Below this, a director and deputy director work control the HIDTA taskforces, the people who are involved more directly with the issues as they stand within the local environment. Each group has the responsibility to assess the threat of drug trafficking in that area, and the jurisdiction to develop appropriate strategies for dealing with that threat in that specific area. This is thus an ideal example of TNPC: the crime itself is transnational and, in order to attempt to combat it, organisations and nations must come together to deal with the problems at their root. HIDTA is indeed a program embodying a pragmatic approach to transnational and regional cooperation, based on an understanding that the disruption and dismantling of major drug trafficking

organisations requires seamless cooperation between all law enforcement organisations and jurisdictions. Its existence stems from the recognition that particular areas of the US are subject to highly concentrated levels of drug trafficking which, in turn, have a serious impact on other pivotal areas. The intention in creating designated areas is to attempt to increase federal assistance to these areas and to focus and coordinate efforts between various federal agencies and local forces; the idea is that this will better combat the problem. HIDTA's main goals nationally include disrupting the market for illegal drugs by dismantling or disrupting drug trafficking and money laundering organisations (advocating a proactive approach to combating drug crime) and improving the efficiency and effectiveness of HIDTA initiatives.

HIDTA's model implicitly (and indeed explicitly on the ONDCP website) recognises that neither of these goals can be achieved without completely seamless and practiced cooperation between agencies; its very premise is that they are single agencies around which relationships can develop and cooperation can be facilitated in this manner. Indeed, arguably one of the most pivotal aspects of HIDTA's approach is co-location and commingling of the different agencies, with the aims of breaking down traditional barriers between law enforcement agencies and encouraging enhanced information and resource sharing. The principle of incorporating cooperation and coordination into every aspect of the organisation's structure operates at all levels. This is where trust, as discussed above, becomes essential.

Originally, five areas of the US were designated as a HIDTA in 1990 (Houston, Los Angeles, New York/New Jersey, South Florida, and the Southwest Border), with PR/USVI and Washington/Baltimore following in 1994. The designation of PR/USVI as a HIDTA is due to its attractiveness to drug trafficking organisations based on geographic and strategic considerations. As such, HIDTA is a highly appropriate model to apply here. The aim is that the PR/USVI HIDTA program will act as a coordinating umbrella to eliminate duplicated efforts, maximise resources, and improve information and intelligence sharing. To this end, the PR/USVI HIDTA funds taskforces are run by different agencies within the region, but these are located within specific HIDTA facilities rather than within offices belonging to the lead agency. This co-location of agents within taskforces is a fundamental principle of HIDTA's organisational framework and an integral aspect part of its strategy.

2.5.1 Cooperation and foreign partners. HIDTA in the Caribbean is intended to improve cooperation and coordination, particularly between the different

jurisdictions of PR and the US Virgin Islands (USVI), namely St. Thomas, St. Croix, St. John, and surrounding smaller islands. With only 14 miles distance between the two jurisdictions, there is a substantial need for effective cooperation. While HIDTA is generally designed as a regional model to encourage participation between otherwise potentially rival agencies, rather than as a truly transnational program to integrate the law enforcement efforts of foreign states, the PR/USVI HIDTA has unique features that replicate some of the circumstances involved in truly transnational cooperation. By 2006, the PR/USVI HIDTA had developed relationships with 24 federal and non-federal agencies, with over 815 state, local, and federal law enforcement and support personnel co-located within HIDTA's taskforces. In addition, PR/USVI HIDTA was able to refer 17 investigations to other HIDTA regions or other agencies, creating a larger web of cooperation extending across the US (Strategy Document, 2006).

Based on the success of HIDTA's model with regard to integrating federal agencies with local forces in the PR/USVI region, it does not seem unwarranted to suggest that it could make a similar contribution to cooperation on a transnational level. The most important principles of HIDTA's methodology, in relation to smoothly combining transnational forces, include the idea that participation in the program is entirely voluntary and, even more importantly, that cooperation is conducted with the assumption of complete equality between agencies. The emphasis is on equal partnerships, allowing all partners involved in taskforces and operations to work together on a "level playing field" and promoting a co-equal atmosphere (Strategy Document, 2006). This, along with the essential component of co-location of staff, could help to reduce territorialism and mistrust between different agencies, facilitating the creation of relationships and, therefore, better use of information and resources.

The equal sharing of responsibility, involvement, and decision-making capacity extends to the highest levels of the organisation, with the executive board made up of 10 representatives from federal agencies and 10 from local agencies (although the distribution of representatives from PR and USVI is not similarly equal, with 16 from PR and only four from USVI) This stems from the focus HIDTA places on integrating federal and local forces. In the case of a truly transnational HIDTA, there could be increased emphasis on ensuring parity of representatives from separate countries/jurisdictions rather than from federal/local agencies.

2.5.2 Regional agreements and logistics. On a daily basis, the logistical operation of HIDTA focuses on creating effective coordination of law enforcement in the region to ensure maximum efficiency in combating drug trafficking organisations in PR and the USVI. At the top level of HIDTA, the executive board both embodies the principles of cooperation between agencies comprised, as it is, of members across participating agencies, and deals with decision-making and top-level coordination of the PR/USVI HIDTA program. The role of the board covers both organisational and strategic functions. On the strategic side, it identifies drug trafficking organisations to be targeted, provides a forum to share crucial trends in drug trafficking, and gathers information on which drugs are being distributed throughout the region. However, in addition to acting as a forum to discuss strategy and trends, the board allocates resources and ensures that operations are prioritised in a manner that guarantees cooperation and a joint approach to all investigations (Gutierrez, 2004). Consisting of 20 members, half drawn from federal agencies and half from local agencies, the executive board meets annually to review HIDTA goals and outputs and to assess performance. It also operates an Intelligence Subcommittee that advises on issues surrounding intelligence, including on technology and training.

However, on a day-to-day basis, the Director of HIDTA is responsible for dealing with administrative and operational support to the HIDTA taskforces. Acting as brokers between the different taskforces/initiatives, the Director and Deputy Director facilitate multi-agency cooperation, a crucial role in an organisation where integration and coordination are essential elements of daily business. They also support the Executive Board with policy development and in carrying out directives, as well as managing technology development for the taskforces. Strategically, the Director acts as a linking conduit for information between the executive board, the Initiative (taskforce) Supervisors, and the ONDCP.

Within each taskforce, one agency takes the lead on operational activities, such as conducting investigations. The managers and agency supervisors from whichever agency is leading supervise the taskforces. Despite the need for one agency to take a lead role in each taskforce, the intention remains for all agencies to have equal status and to operate on a level playing field, as mentioned above. In order to increase communication and coordination between the different taskforces, the supervisors of each taskforce initiative, and federal and state prosecutors, meet monthly in PR as part of a Case Management Committee. This is separate from the constant intelligence

communication and deconfliction (the activity where the ISC track cases, operations, and investigations to avoid both the wastage of resources through duplicating investigations, and the loss of lives through disastrous clashes of undercover operations) that goes back and forth between the taskforces and the ISC. Through the committee, the supervisors are able to promote improved information sharing, identify ways to share resources when conducting day-to-day operations, and gather information on training needs. They also report annually on whether initiatives are reaching goals and budgeting efficiently.

Individual taskforces within HIDTA fit within one of four areas: investigation, interdiction, intelligence and management/administration. Within the investigative area, there are several geographically separate taskforces involved in investigating major criminal organisations. These include Ponce Major Organisations Investigations (MOI), Fajardo MOI, San Juan MOI, St. Croix MOI, and St. Thomas MOI, which are all led by the DEA. Other investigative taskforces include the PR Fugitive taskforce (lead by US Marshals), the HIDTA Money Laundering Initiative, led by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and the Safe Neighbourhoods Initiative (which focuses on firearms use and drug-related violent crime in PR). All of these investigative taskforces attempt to disrupt the work of complex drug trafficking organisations at an organisational level, ultimately with the aim of dismantling the organisation entirely.

In comparison, interdiction-focused taskforces primarily attempt to intercept illegal drugs and illegal migrants entering and moving through PR and the USVI. All interdiction personnel also have training to identify potential terrorist threats and so have the additional remit to be alert to homeland security threats. Interdiction taskforces include Fuerzas Unidas de Rapida Accion - The United Forces of Fast Action (FURA), led by the PR Police Department, which provides (A) interdiction forces within the coastline of PR; (B) the Blue Lightening Strike Force (BLSF), led by the US Virgin Islands Police Department, carrying out a similar role within USVI waters in order to prevent the island being used as a transhipment point; and (C) the High Seas Narcotics/Migrant Trafficking Operations, led by the US Coast Guard, which addresses narcotics and illegal migrant trafficking, providing 24-hours a day coverage of the seas around PR/USVI (Strategy Document, 2006). Within support, two taskforces provide services to ensure the on-going smooth running of HIDTA. The Management and Coordination Support Initiative (led by contracted civilians) provides support to the executive board, director, and taskforces in administrative and logistical

matters, including preparing and monitoring budgets and reporting on performance as well as providing professional development and implementing policy and procedure. Separately, the HIDTA Training Initiative (led by the FBI, and previously by the US Coast Guard) provides appropriate training to improve the quality of investigations and strengthen local law enforcement in PR/USVI (Strategy Document, 2006). The intelligence area, however, is served by one taskforce, the Investigative Support Centre, outlined in detail below.

2.5.3 Intelligence-sharing and gathering of information. An irreplaceable aspect of HIDTA's role as a coordinating body is to ensure that facilities exist to collect, process, analyse, and share intelligence effectively and in a timely manner across all the law enforcement agencies in PR and the USVI. Intelligence is crucial in the fight against any kind of crime – As Baker (2008) put it, 'criminals demonstrate considerable cleverness, operational strategies and planning. Therefore, intelligence data and analysis admirably serve the law enforcement mission'. (Baker, 2008, p.4) Intelligence is essentially information: information about where a crime is going to be committed, who has committed it, and other related information. In order to prevent crime, one must understand how it operates and intelligence enables this to be established. Intelligence is arguably the most important ingredient in ensuring that efforts to combat drug trafficking organisations are accurate, well timed, and achieves effective prosecutions and convictions, as well as mere arrests. To realise this aim, the Intelligence aspect of HIDTA's brief is fulfilled by the Investigative Support Centre (ISC), an FBI-led initiative including agents and analysts from 12 separate agencies, all co-located within the same facility to ensure maximum integration. In addition to the ISC as the central functional source of intelligence information (Gutierrez, 2004), an Intelligence Subcommittee set up by the executive board supports all the PR/USVI HIDTA initiatives and their participating agencies on issues ranging across a number of areas, such as intelligence, training, and computer technology (HIDTA Strategy Document, 2006).

The ISC aims to collect, evaluate, analyse and disseminate timely intelligence on a wide range of areas, from drug distribution to drug-related firearms trafficking, homeland security targets, money laundering, and violent crime organisations and those who commit them. The ISC, since 9/11, has changed the way that it shares information (Gutierrez, 2004). Providing a full range of tactical, operational, and strategic intelligence support, it has a number of functions, including event deconfliction,

case/subject deconfliction, post-seizure analysis, analytical case support, and strategic intelligence. The ISC provides these services not only to other HIDTA initiatives and taskforces but also to all participating agencies and other appropriate law enforcement and intelligence community organisations. It further attempts to exchange information and coordinate with other HIDTAs across the US. It is worth noting that these issues are extremely important elements of the intelligence gaining and sharing process, particularly in relation to trust: deconfliction in particular, which refers to the need for intelligence gathering organisations not to be overly involved in each other's operations, and to stick to their own 'territory', and in ensuring that each organisation knows the plans of the other, so that they do not conflict. (Best Jr., 2010)

Intelligence is usually considered the most important aspect of being proactive in disrupting and dismantling drug trafficking organisations. Without it, it is impossible to build investigations, carry out operations, and achieve convictions. Certainly in a situation where there are finite budgets for law enforcement, it is essential that operations be carried out in a highly efficient way, which means having the knowledge of where resources can be most effectively utilised at any given time. In 2004, 133 operations were aided by intelligence from the ISC; the aim in the strategic report for HIDTA 2006 was to have every operation underpinned by the ISC's intelligence (Strategy Document, 2006).

Made up of 52 intelligence analysts and agents from most of the HIDTA participating agencies, the ISC provides a range of intelligence services and aims to produce instant, organised intelligence products which meet agent-informant requirements and can be used to build investigative or law enforcement operations. The ISC also uses the Racketeering Enterprise Investigation (RICO) concept which derives from the RICO Act on organised crime (note – the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (1970) made it 'unlawful to acquire, operate or receive income from an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity' (Albanese, 2010, p. 297). The technology ISC has at its fingertips is advanced and includes advanced technology databases, advanced hardware and software, and new communication devices, such as the Title III (TII/S2 system). In addition to these functions, the ISC also houses the DEA Forensic Laboratory support, which provides additional forensic support, ensures that evidence is processed and analysed quickly and effectively, and ensures that expert witnesses are always available to support successful prosecutions.

However, far from only collecting information about the operations of drug trafficking organisations, one of the most important services provided by the ISC for the taskforces within HIDTA is to collect information regarding their own operations i.e. deconfliction, as defined earlier. The ISC also acts as a conduit to the Fusion Center for information sharing, which is essential to information exchange (Gutierrez, 2004). Where coordination between separate taskforces and agencies is not thoroughly carried out, or where information about operations and cases is not available in a suitable and timely manner, it is possible that clashes between separate operations can result in injuries or death from ‘friendly fire’ simply because agents were in the wrong place at the wrong time.

This is, understandably, considered to be an unacceptable risk, and, therefore, deconfliction is not only an important contribution toward improving effective use of scarce resources but also a basic safety measure to ensure that officers are not injured by the operations of their own counterparts from other agencies or taskforces. Even in cases where no injuries occur, failure to deconflict can result in disruptions and setbacks through compromises to investigations. The PR/USVI Strategy document for 2006 states that “one cannot put a price on how valuable such services can be,” and this is, no doubt, an accurate characterisation of how law enforcement agencies view the service (Strategy Document, 2006, p. 30). For instance, in 2004 alone, there were over 5,000 submissions to the deconfliction service within ISC; every single participating agency chose to use its services (Strategy Document, 2006). Beyond processing information, another function of the ISC is to provide one central location for all law enforcement agencies’ intelligence services so that participants are commingled (as is general HIDTA policy) in one intelligence sharing environment. As such, all PR/USVI HIDTA taskforces enter data into the HIDTA computer system, ensuring that the ISC always has access to data from all arms of HIDTA.

2.5.4 Research development and training. The efforts of all these taskforces are supported by the HIDTA Training Initiative, an FBI-led taskforce (previously led by the US Coast Guard) providing training courses and professional development to officers involved in HIDTA taskforces. Good training is essential to ensuring that law enforcement continues to be effective and to constantly improves and, as such, it should be regarded as playing a key role in strategy. However, despite this pivotal role, acknowledged in the HIDTA Strategy Document (2006), the HIDTA training initiative was cut in 2004 from 14 full-time staff to two part-time coordinators. These remaining

members of staff were forced to perform extra duties in addition to their normal duties, whilst the HIDTA training initiative lost its entire budget, equipment, and transportation. The HIDTA Strategy Document for 2006 suggests that, “This occurred primarily due to the development of a more cost-effective approach to training that would focus on securing/coordinating free or reduced costs training resources. The goal was to focus strictly on training officers assigned to HIDTA Initiatives/Task forces, and thus reduce the reliance on the limited HIDTA funds, thereby allowing for their redirection into needed operational areas” (p. 31).

However, while it claims that no major losses have occurred, it belies the stated importance of training to effective cooperation and law enforcement and raises the question of whether the HIDTA Training Initiative can continue to be quite as effective on as few resources. In 2004, training was provided to 904 students (totalling 2,454 classroom hours) at an average cost of \$360 per class/student. All the training was provided free of charge to personnel and participating agency staff. The 2005 cuts, while clearly necessary due to the on-going decline (in real terms) of HIDTA's budget, seem likely to have had an effect on either the quality or availability of training.

2.6 Barriers and Facilitators in Transnational Policing: Contextual and Social Psychological Influences

The challenges to TNP often seem endless. Reiner (2000) highlights the fragmentation and diffusion of the police function, and many modern police organisations feature as manifesting a new stage of social development, with the ‘police’ originally a specialised body for safeguarding security, which was then forced to become more universal. Newburn and Sparks (2004) have also noted the tensions between “macro-level concerns of globalization – and its related concepts and processes – and those which are more concerned with the meso and micro-level issues of governance and governmentality” (p. 12). This tension of analytically separate but tangled conceptualisations of uniform and diverse approaches to crime control is perhaps the most significant barrier that needs to be overcome in future years.

Morrison (2003) argues that transnational cooperation, such as extradition arrangements, with other countries ,has seemingly increased over the years but has failed to synchronise national laws significantly. In 1998, the United Nations General Assembly called for a Convention Against Transnational Organised Crime, but fell short in failing to define a timeframe for implementing the obligations of the treaty,

and, hence, a clear indication as to when different jurisdictions would create or adapt laws and procedures to bring nations in line with the Convention's spirit (UNDCP, 2000). The creation of this Convention does not guarantee the power of some governments to effect change or even reach a consensus towards organised crime. The need for further and more extensive international cooperation became apparent. Like any social phenomenon, transnational crime continues to evolve in response to a constantly shifting legal, economic, and political environment. Given these concerns, governments need to develop more effective counter measures against transnational criminal actors. Certain obvious prescriptions include improving cross-national police cooperation, sharing intelligence on criminals and crimes in progress, rationalising and integrating national and international laws against serious crimes, and decreasing loopholes within the international financial system (Bigo, 2000; Rawlinson, Gregory & Brooke, 2001; Sheptycki, 2002). Contextual influences, such as economic and legislative constraints, particularisms, and police culture are multifaceted challenges, which will be explained in more detail in the following section (2.6.1). This will be followed by an examination of social and psychological influences such as cultural and behavioural influences, including factors such as competition, motivation, coercion, and trust.

2.6.1 Contextual influences.

Economic constraints. Police forces in many societies struggle to cope within the context of poverty and economic constraints. Johnston (2000) defines the resource predicament as:

...the politics of resources concerned with trying to ensure that all citizens are provided with a fair share of available policing goods; something that requires attention both to the unwarranted 'over' (or overly invasive) policing of particular individuals or social groups, and to the inability of (disadvantaged) citizens and communities to acquire a proportionate level of such goods (p. 10).

Limited resources affect policing as an institution and as a practice. Training, intelligence, equipment, and communication all suffer without appropriate funding and leave little funding for mechanisms of global cooperation. Some researchers argue that desperate societies looking for solutions to their crime crisis reach for any cure available, especially if funded by 'experts' or 'exporters' (Brogden, 2005; Held, 2000). Brogden (2005) notes that police forces in transitional societies tend to contain

elements of both disciplinary extremes of policing, highly centralised and militarised, and are practically undirected because of the exigencies of poor pay, resources, and training; this is often quite different from democratic forces. Economic needs ultimately convolute problem-solving policing. In a study on *Governmental Legitimacy and Policing Styles*, Bennett (2004) highlights the important issue of economic constraints and the destructive consequences of corruption that undermine policing and transnational cooperation. Others have argued that there must be a change in economic priorities within the police on a universal scale (Newburn, 2003; South, 2003). South (2003) holds that, in the future, police, customs, and security services liaison officers will likely enhance their roles and will also have increased powers in international anti-drugs and anti-terrorism operations.

South (2003) argues that, given the volume of drugs produced for the international market, modest improvement in enforcement effectiveness may make little difference to availability. This author's overall view is that, in order to increase enforcement effectiveness, some shift of prioritisation away from the street and up the chain of supply is required. As Farer, (1999) noted:

...fighting narcotics businesses requires breaking up large criminal cartels that export illicit drugs, and wiping out the cultivation and refining of these substances in some countries. An alternative strategy, is to diminish the attractiveness of such businesses to criminal groups by simply decriminalizing or legalizing the production and sale of drugs (p.26).

Indeed, getting the target right and attempting to increase the effectiveness of where the resources are focused ultimately would have the result of managing economic constraints if the resources available are used in the most appropriate manner. South's (2003) consideration of different methods of approaching the problem is key here; as Farer (1999) considers:

...much of the so-called economic crime in Russia, for example, can be eliminated by rationalizing tax codes and export control regulations; current confiscatory tax schedules strangle business productivity and encourage unhealthy collusion between businessmen and criminals to evade taxes...(p.26). The message here is that economics and effectiveness go hand in hand.

Legislative constraints. One of the most difficult challenges in TNP is legislative constraint (Weber & Bowling, 2002). Criminals and organised crime groups

are at a major advantage in the new millennium as travel allows easy access to an infinite number of locations for committing crimes and hiding from the consequences of these crimes. For example, international migration flowing from the US to Latin America, whether in the form of post-war return migration or deportation, seems to be an increasing factor in gang formation, drug trafficking, and organised crime (Rodgers, 1999). One concern is that returnees bring with them a violent gang culture that they assimilated as gang members while in the US. The Nicaraguan media alluded to this potential consequence of international return migration in mid-1997, before President Clinton signed an amnesty for illegal Nicaraguan migrants in November of that year (Rodgers, 1999). The travel mode of ‘indigenisation’ of crime policies, a term borrowed from cross-cultural psychology, appears increasingly important (Karstedt, 2001). This implies that concepts are adapted and blended into the existing culture of control, on the one hand, and that indigenous concepts or ‘blended’ travel from the periphery to the centre, on the other hand (Garland, 2001).

While criminals are relatively free of “rules and policies”, law enforcement officers struggle with jurisdictional and legislative restrictions known as the ‘Ambit of the Criminal Law’ (Bantekas & Nash, 2003; Hirst, 2003). Regarding cross-frontier offences, Hirst (2003) reviews what is known as the “Terminatory Theory Jurisdiction.” This refers to the idea that a crime is regarded as “committed” only when it is completed, or where its last constituent element takes place. This theory has been challenged and criticised by many, especially Williams (1994), who offered a simpler method of resolving transnational jurisdictional issues (Williams & Florez, 1994, cited in Morrison, 2003). He expounded on the theory by giving a subjective or ‘initiatory’ approach to territorial questions in the hope that this would detangle the ‘purely legal or metaphysical’ aspect of the current law (Hirst, 2003). William’s theory is frequently cited in transnational cases, but judges rarely rely directly on it when making decisions. Twin concepts used by law Lords, instead, are ‘conduct crimes or result crimes’ (Hirst, 2003). The problem of identifying and classifying relevant acts of appropriation is a grave concern domestically as well as on an international scale.

A relevant example illustrating extradition complexities was the arrest of three suspected Al-Qaeda terrorists, who faced possible extradition from the U.K. to the US, on charges alleging conspiracy to murder US citizens within US jurisdiction. The alleged conspiracies were formed outside of the US and were primarily related to murders committed by attacks on US diplomats, peacekeeping forces, or other citizens

in the Middle East and Africa, although they did include possible offences on American soil (Hirst, 2003). Hirst questioned whether or not these conspiracies could be said to involve offences within the jurisdiction of the US, as required under the extradition treaty of 1972 (and Extradition Act, 1989). The House of Lords held that it would suffice if such conspiracies were: (1) triable as extraterritorial offences under US law; and (2) would equally have been triable as extraterritorial offences under English law, had the U.K. been the requesting state and British nationals the target of the alleged conspiracies (Hirst, 2003).

It is clear that these complex legislative difficulties exist even between Western, democratic governments, which are often held up as “role models” for other societies. TNPC is a far cry from being an ideal, cooperative, and universal system. Creating such a system is a task beset with seemingly insurmountable hurdles. Divergent legal systems, different law enforcement strategies, and the increasing diversity of transnational criminal activity combine to hamper effective police cooperation. Walker (2000) pioneers the thought-provoking issues of sovereignty and the growing tensions rising with the emergent order. He contends that we must try to understand trends in cooperation not only in relation to the shifting balance of sovereign authority but also against a background of increasing challenges to the very idea of sovereign authority. According to Bowling (2009), the world is becoming increasingly interconnected (socially, politically, etc.) and this will require that all aspects of policing adapt.

Particularisms. A third challenge to TNP is *particularism*, which can be thought of as two dimensional (Brogden, 2005). On one level, police officers display significant variation from country to country – and often within countries – in terms of their organisation, structure, logic, dynamics, and activities. On another level, and more importantly, this heterogeneity is partially linked to the specific national and local circumstances within which cooperation can develop and operate (Anderson, 1991; Griffith, 1997; Harriott 2000; Harriott 2002; Tulchin & Espach, 2000). Levels of cooperation are linked to country-specific factors. The political culture and civil strife characterising specific countries, for example, will inevitably play a role in explaining levels of cooperation.

A culture of violence is illustrated in countries such as Columbia, Israel, and Pakistan, which are countries with long histories of war and strife. From a policy perspective, the particularism of different societies obviously has important implications. The specific local conditions within which police officers emerge and

operate must be taken into account, with programs varying according to different contexts and circumstances as well as the heterogeneity of the officers themselves. The notion that “West knows best and has all the solutions to rising crimes is promoted internationally almost entirely without recognition of the exigencies of the local context” (Brogden, 2005, p. 26) supports the idea that each community’s particularisms seem to have been left out of the equation. Without a concise, universal definition and legislative structure in place for cooperation, fragmentation sets in and a variety of practices begin to spread aimlessly. By following only a Western police agenda and including only members of respectable groups, it permits little room for critiques of policing accountabilities or practices. Brogden (2005) compares it to the colonial era, “They serve to support existing place practices in their local elite composition. They speak only for a local minority. Policing, as in the past with colonial rulers and now in the hands of new-colonial elites serves the interest of the prosperous and the powerful” (p. 27). This opens the door for theoretical debates on ethics and human rights. Many have argued that effective cooperation requires a mega-supranational system of accountability, with a commitment to long-term sustainability, yet the reality in both Western and transitional societies is that the legal and safeguard frameworks are not yet in place (Anderson, 1995; Bowling & Phillips, 2002; Sheptycki, 2000).

Police culture. Research into “cop culture” as an aspect of policing has been conducted over the last 40 years (Foster, 2003; Reiner 2000) and is relevant example of how organisational cultures can act as persistent inhibitors to change and, in this case, contribute to poor TNPC. Culture, as defined earlier, may also be used to explain a broad range of characteristics within a particular group or organisation. Schein (2004) defined “organizational cultures” as the “deeper level of basic assumptions and beliefs that are shared by members of an organization that operate unconsciously” (pp. 6-7).

In some respects, there is a perception that “cop culture” refers to one means of an operation that is applicable to policemen and women worldwide. Indeed, some researchers suggest that police culture is it is often singular, monolithic and unchanging (Chan, 1996; Foster, 2003). If this were the case, TNPC would be arguably extremely straightforward, as regardless of nationality, location and background, the similarities of operation that (supposedly) exist purely by virtue of being in one profession would allow a high level of universal understanding. However, the situation is much more complex. There are two main elements of “cop culture” considered within the canon of

literature: attitude and means of operation, both of which carry different implications for TNPC.

Reiner (2000) argues that police culture is a “subtle and complex intermingling of police officers’ sense of mission, action-oriented behaviour and cynicism where the emphases on danger, suspicion, isolation, solidarity, pragmatism and authority are all core elements of ‘cop-culture’” (p.87). Machismo, intolerance, prejudice, and conservatism are also regarded as key characteristics of police culture. This has led researchers to explore whether these characteristics are intrinsically present in individuals who choose a career in policing or whether these behaviours are acquired after joining the police and are linked with the nature of police work itself. It is, of course, possible that a combination of the two is accurate of some individuals, with their career exacerbating elements of their natural tendencies. Research suggests that new officers might begin with high ideals about public service but soon reassess their values and sense of identity, beginning to conform to concepts of “crime control” or move from “autonomy” to “solidarity” (Fielding, 1988). Reiner (2000) sums up the development of some forms of cop culture as a “patterned set of understandings that help officers to cope with and adjust to the pressures and tensions confronting the police” (p. 87).

Researchers have also suggested that gender plays an important role in police culture and that male officers tend to be more competitive and perhaps less cooperative than female officers. An Australian study (Braithwaite & Brewer, 1998, cited in Newburn, 2003) found that male officers were directly more competitive in their encounters on the street and used control tactics, threats, and physical actions in order to exert control over citizens. This led to both verbal and physical resistance. On the other hand, female officers, even if they adopted the tactics of their male colleagues, did not experience similar responses. Male officers tended to be frequently placed at risk of physical confrontation while females were generally more supportive of citizens, preferring tactics heavy on mutual power in the interaction. Females were further found to use coercive tactics less frequently and in different contexts than males, resulting in less verbal abuse during their discussions with members of the public and the avoidance of physical resistance. Waddington (1999), cited in Newburn (2003), suggests that women directly challenge the fundamental task of policing as one that is undertaken by “real” men who need to use “coercive authority” and physical strength to maintain control of the streets. However, despite recent changes in policy and

recruitment, the police service remains a largely male, Caucasian, and heterosexual organisation, in which those who are perceived as different by virtue of their race, gender, or sexuality have reported significant problems in gaining acceptance and, in some cases, have been officially recognised as being disadvantaged. As there is little research currently available on the relationship between gender, race, and sexuality in policing, we can only speculate on what the actual relationship between these factors might be. However, it is likely that there is a “complex melding of multiple factors rather than one dominant element” (Miller, 1999, p. 155). Additionally, there is even less research on what impact gender, race, and sexuality have on cooperative behaviour specifically in the police. The real challenge in changing negative cultural characteristics is not forming policies but ensuring that these are put into practice. In his book, Nadelmann (1993) discusses the extension of US efforts beyond the country’s borders and the impact this has on policing. He also discusses the various challenges of internationalisation and how policing has responded to these. He argues that this internationalisation has actually contributed to what he refers to as an “Americanization” of criminal justice systems worldwide.

The way in which different police professionals, and indeed police forces, operate on a practical level can be significant in TNPC terms. Sheptycki (2000) considered, for instance, how every police agency has its own operational culture in response to the different cultural settings in which they operate. He cites the carrying of arms and routine identity checks (Sheptycki, 2000) as areas where there might be some difference between locations. Indeed, police culture as a response to local cultural difference is extremely significant in two ways: first, when police agencies with different cultures have to cooperate with each other, the cultural differences provide a potential barrier that should be pre-empted and understood in order to allow the two organisations to work effectively as a team. As Andreas and Nadelmann (2006) talk about the age of globalization and its effects on policing; indeed, the globalization of policing might be seen as an extension of policing in general. Just as differences exist—and must often be bridged—between worldwide organisations, so must they be when it comes to police culture and transcending difference in order to work together. The second principle discussed by Sheptycki (2000) is the idea that a police agency whose method of operation is in line with the culture of its location is likely to be more effective in certain areas, such as intelligence gathering. Porta et al. (2006) cite an example of police culture being incompatible with local culture, which illustrates

(albeit in a negative way) the importance of this issue. They write that 'the root of many instances of disorder triggered or escalated by the police is found...in the cultures and subcultures of police institutions' (Porta et al, 2006, p.54). It is interesting to note that HIDTA groups operate under the organisational culture of the US and its legislative bodies but have the autonomy "on the ground" to adopt whatever culture and strategy they see fit.

Cultural factors. Just as Western criminal law enforcement has inadvertently underestimated the impact of local culture, many security experts today may have miscalculated the influences that social psychological factors could have on TNPC. Social psychologists define culture as "the social habits of a community" or as "systems of shared meaning" (Hogg & Vaughan, 2002, p. 607). Definitions of culture vary, but they share a similarity in the reflection that "culture is an enduring product of and influence on human interaction" (Hogg & Vaughan, 2002, p. 607). People tend to use their own cultural standards to interpret the behaviours of those who are culturally different from them, despite manifestations of culture, such as social behaviour, attributional style, conformity, and social practices varying dramatically from one culture to the next (Hogg & Vaughan, 2002). People also make causal attributions for their own and others' behaviour (Hogg & Vaughan, 2002), constantly taking account of consensus, consistency, and distinctive information in deciding whether to attribute behaviour internally (to personality traits) or externally (to environmental factors). There may be individual differences in tendencies to make internal or external attributions. In general, most social psychologists agree that people are poor at making attributions (Hogg & Vaughan, 2002).

Bias is another challenge. This is the tendency to protect one's self-image by attributing one's failures to external factors and successes to internal ones. Attributions for the behaviour of people as in-group or out-group members tend to be ethnocentric and based on stereotypes. This bias is affected by the real or perceived nature of inter-group relations (Hogg & Vaughan, 2002). Therefore, in terms of police cooperation, stereotypes may originate in a need for groups or TNP agencies to attribute the causes of failed operations or terrorist attacks to out-groups that have stereotypical properties causally linked to the events. People resort to causal attributions only when there is no readily available social knowledge (social representations, cultural beliefs, or scripts) automatically present to explain events (Hogg & Vaughan, 2002). This could be

applicable to attributions within the TNP community and might be relevant to analysing methods for improved cooperation.

Asch's (1951) famous study of variations in conformity, conducted in a meta-analysis of studies, used statistical procedures that combined data from multiple studies to measure the overall reliability and strength of specific effects, concluding that there is extensive cultural variation in conformity to group pressure (Foster, 2003). There are an overwhelming number of studies regarding conformity and group pressure within the police community (Foster, 2003; McIlveen & Gross, 1999; Reiner, 2000). There is no reason to believe that this would not also apply to the TNP and the impact group pressure could possibly have on cooperation or lack thereof. Socialisation in cultures is also extremely important to consider. For example, a machismo culture is paramount to consider in TNP, where challenges, maltreatment, or even difference of opinions could be met with abuse or violence. Much of the Latin Caribbean shares a machismo culture, and it is important to consider the potential impact of this on cooperation within the TNP community. Tulchin and Espach (2000) talk about key issues in the Caribbean, including drug trafficking, migration, economic issues, and natural disasters. When considering these issues and how they are dealt with, it is also vital to consider the overall culture and how this translates into policing behaviour.

A further example of a difference in how people relate to each other culturally is evident in Eastern versus Western societies. Eastern or "collectivist" cultures tend to cultivate interdependence, whereas Western or "individualistic" cultures tend to encourage independence (Hogg & Vaughan, 2002). Modern organisations that recognise this include crucial differences in values and a different distribution of individualism and collectivism (Hogg & Vaughan, 2002). Unfortunately, not all systems can be considered "modern," and there is no better organisation than the police to illustrate this.

Intercultural communication can often lead to misunderstandings in meaning and intentions, thereby preventing TNP cooperation. For example, "acculturative stress" is a common challenge noted by social psychologists. Groups such as migrants face different acculturative options, varying from preserving their ethnic identity to merging with the dominant culture (Hogg & Vaughan, 2002). Some social psychological principles can be applied across cultures and some cannot. This debate of universal applications or a one-size-fits-all methodology, as briefly discussed in the introduction to this paper, raises tensions within the TNP community and indeed across

a multitude of other professions as well. This is a highly relevant issue for police cooperation in many parts of the world, especially where there is a challenge to maintain cultural diversity, as is the case in the United Kingdom at the time of writing.

2.6.2 Social psychological influences. Theories of crime are almost characterised by a discussion of the social and psychological influences on those individuals and groups who commit crimes. Andrews & Bonta (2010) talk about the impact of class on crime; Schmalleger (2007) considers the need to psychologically profile criminals in order to understand why they committed an illegal act; Siegel (2011) considered the importance of religion in preventing crime. These examples are a tip of the metaphoric iceberg. Indeed, crime is essentially a person deciding (as part of an organisation or otherwise) to in some way wrong another person or organisation. While discussion of crime is often reduced to statistics, areas, and organisations, the root of criminality is *always* people, who are formed and motivated by social and psychological influences. In the context of TNPC and the issues that have been considered until this point, the importance of social psychological influences can be noted: individuals need to trust if they are to cooperate; intelligence will be given to certain people/organisations and not others. Social and psychological influences are crucial in a variety of ways, as will be examined in the following section.

Competition. There is some dispute over whether cooperation is needed. Schelling (1984) questions whether we need less, rather than more cooperation, especially with those who threaten us and with whom cooperating could hinder our own functioning. It cannot always be said with certainty that greater trust and cooperation are, in fact, desirable (Schelling, 1984). This author proposes that not only do people want less competition amongst their enemies, but also amongst friends.

Some may argue that a certain amount of competition is beneficial in improving performance, fostering technological innovation, and improving services. The rationale for this view is not only that those who succeed in competition benefit but that the positive effects of competition are likely to be more generally felt as well. The real problem seems to be finding an optimal balance between cooperation and competition rather than deciding at which extreme to converge. Cooperation and competition are not necessarily opposites and they can and do co-exist. However, most people within the law enforcement community would agree that we have yet to find the perfect combination of the two. One notable view is that competition may depend on cooperation to a large extent, especially in capitalist countries (Hirsch, 1977). The most

basic form of cooperation, e.g., avoiding mutual injury, is undoubtedly a requirement of potentially beneficial competition. Hinde (1986) points out that there is a difference between outdoing rivals and doing them in, as within a species. Even to compete in a mutually non-destructive way, one needs to trust one's competitors to comply with certain rules on some level. Game theory has provided us with a better understanding of why cooperation may not occur, even when it would benefit most parties involved. As Binmore and Dasgupta (1986), as cited in Gambetta (1988), explained in their survey of the subject, rational individuals do not necessarily adopt behaviour that benefits the entire group. These authors concluded that, despite individual rationality and motivation, cooperation may still fail to take place. One of the most noteworthy lessons of game theory is that, even if motivation is not unquestioningly egoistic, cooperation may still encounter many obstacles.

Motivation. The above-mentioned lack of belief in cooperation should not be confused with a lack of motivation for it. The mirror image of the error of taking rational cooperation for granted is to infer that if cooperation does not come about, this is because there are no rational motives for it (Gambetta, 1988). Gambetta (1988) gives the example of traffic jams in cities as an example of failure to cooperate due to a lack of belief that there will be similar cooperation from others, e.g., that others will use bicycles and public transport as well. Thus, rationally motivated cooperation may not even emerge. More simply, it is that an insufficient number of people trust others to act according to these motives. Preferences, when revealed, may simply show that they are conditional on our beliefs. If beliefs change, preferences may change accordingly. Here, traditional game theory does not help, for it considers beliefs to be far more undetermined than they are in reality and further assumes that they are common knowledge. As a result, game theory loses its predictive power, for it can find more equilibrium, usually uncooperative, than in fact exists in the real world. Why should beliefs held by different individuals (or types of individuals) be commonly known? Our understanding of human psychology is imperfect, and we have little idea of how individuals actually form beliefs (Binmore & Dasgupta, 1986, as cited in Gambetta, 1988). Among these beliefs, coercion and trust—as discussed above—are of fundamental importance. And, as Knack and Zak (2001) state, culture has a major effect on trust, which varies across countries. This is important to think about when considering how human psychology affects the concept discussed in this work.

Coercion vs. trust. Coercion, or at least its plausible threat, has been widely practised as a means to ensure cooperation, and is still used today to ensure submission and compliance (Gambetta, 1988). However, it falls significantly short of being an adequate alternative to trust. On the contrary, coercion exercised over unwilling subjects, though it requires less trust in others, will simultaneously reduce the trust that others place in us (Gambetta, 1988). It introduces an asymmetry, which disposes of mutual trust and instead promotes power and resentment. As the high incidence of paranoid behaviour among dictators suggests, coercion can be self-defeating, as it increases the probability of betrayal and defection (Gambetta, 1988). However, coercion does not have to be illegitimate and can be used to enforce rights that are commonly shared. Instead of a unilateral action, coercion may be part of a larger cooperative arrangement that is intended to reinforce and produce a degree of trust in the observance of agreements. However, even if the controlled use and exploitation of coercive power was considered legitimate, it would never be a substitute for trust (Gambetta, 1988). It would still be true that societies that rely heavily on the use of force are likely to be less efficient, more costly, and more unpleasant than those in which trust is maintained. In the former, resources tend to be diverted away from economic undertakings and spent instead in coercion, surveillance, and information gathering.

Cooperation is conditional on the belief that the other party is not a “sap,” i.e., is not disposed to trust blindly. It is also based on the belief that the other party will be well disposed toward us if we make the right move, maintaining equilibrium. Gambetta (1988) has concluded that a certain level of trust can provide a base for cooperative actions, depending on the constraints, costs, and benefits presented by the specific situation. The higher the level of trust, the higher the likelihood of cooperation will be. However, cooperative behaviour does not depend on trust alone, and the optimal threshold of trust will vary according to each occasion. What we need and what we believe may generate irrational responses. Confidence, of the type defined by Luhmann (1979), can be described as a type of blind-trust where the relationships we engage in depend very little on our actions and decisions (Gambetta, 1988). Confidence may also rise from wishful thinking and the reduction of cognitive dissonance; it would then be more akin to hope than to trust. Gambetta (1988) suggests that our capacity for self-delusion far exceeds rational optimistic expectation and that we can indeed make ourselves and others believe something. We tend to expect rational individuals to seek

evidence for their beliefs and to offer that evidence to others. By gathering information about the characteristics and past records of others, we can increase or decrease our trust in them and try to convince others of our trustworthiness by trying to bridge the gaps left by asymmetric information, e.g., by enhancing our reputation for trustworthiness, pre-committing ourselves, and making promises (Williams & Lorenz, 1971, cited in Gambetta, 1988). However, if evidence could solve the problem of trust, then trust would not be a problem at all. Even good evidence of past behaviour does not fully eliminate the risk of future deviance. As Luhmann (1979, as cited in Gambetta, 1988) explained, trust itself affects the evidence we are looking for. When we search for untrustworthy behaviour, it is easy to find, while trustworthy behaviour is almost impossible to conclusively prove. Trust is a peculiar belief predicated not on evidence of occurrence but instead on the lack of evidence to the contrary, which makes it vulnerable to deliberate destruction (Williams & Lorenz, 1971).

In contrast, deep distrust is very difficult to invalidate through experience, because it either stops people from engaging in an appropriate kind of social experiment or, worse, leads to behaviour which bolsters the validity of distrust itself. Once distrust has set in, it can become self-fulfilling and therefore it is soon impossible to know if it was justified to begin with (Gambetta, 1988). It then becomes perfectly rational for an individual to behave accordingly, even if it is someone that was previously prepared to act on more optimistic expectations. Hogg and Vaughan (2002) argue that cognitive inertia may prevent people from changing their beliefs. Giddens (1998) argues that trust is more often seen in traditional societies through kinship relations, local communities, religious commitments, or what he calls “ontological security.” However, he and other researchers proclaim that the need to understand the changing nature and importance of trust in criminology has never been as apparent as it is today (Walklate, 2000; Fukuyama, 1995; Gellner, 1989; Giddens, 1998; Luhmann, 1979), with calls for new solutions based on the tolerant co-existence of diverse cultures and the moral consensus giving group members a basis for mutual trust (Fukuyama, 1995; Misztal, 1996, cited in Walklate, 2000).

Trust can be defined as a level of the subjective probability with which an agent assesses that another agent (or group of agents) will perform a particular action, both before he can monitor such an action (or independently of his ability to be able to monitor it), and in a context in which it affects his own actions (Gambetta, 1988; O’Neil, 2002). When someone is deemed trustworthy, it is implicitly meant that the

probability that the individual will perform actions that are beneficial (or not harmful) to others is high enough for others to consider engaging in some form of cooperation with him/her (Barber, 1983). The conditions of uncertainty about other people's behaviour(s) are central to the notion of trust. It is related to the limits of one's capacity to achieve full knowledge of others, their motives, and their responses to both endogenous and exogenous changes. Trust is also dependent on agents having a degree of freedom to disappoint one's expectations of them and has, therefore, also been defined as a device for coping with the freedom of others (Dunn, 1984, as cited in Gambetta 1988; Luhmann, 1979). Trust will be relevant when at least one party is free to disappoint the other, free enough to avoid a risky relationship and constrained enough to consider that relationship as an attractive option. Cooperation frequently makes some demand on trust, particularly mutual trust. Cooperation cannot exist between free agents who completely distrust each other (Gambetta, 1988). As explored by Levin (2004), the transfer of knowledge is highly dependent on trust, and this becomes extremely important in the context of policing. This author stresses the importance of different types of ties, i.e. weak or strong, and the importance of both in terms of trust and knowledge. Abrams et al. (2003) discusses similar themes in terms of formal and informal networks and their effect on trust and relationships. While blind-trust is an incentive to deception, if trust only exists on one side, cooperation may still fail (Gambetta, 1988). However, depending on the degree of constraint, risk and interest involved, trust as a "precondition" of cooperation may be necessary to varying degrees. All the issues revolving around trust and cooperation are clearly in need of further investigation in TNP.

2.7 Summary of Chapter Two

Chapter 2 focused on a theoretical approach toward cooperation and its role in TNP. The elements and impact of cooperation were discussed, including; teamwork, networking, communication, competition, capacity building, leadership and trust. The theoretical importance of these issues was considered, alongside examples of how they have been applied (and why they are important) in contexts established in Chapter 1 as being relevant to this area, such as in the DEA's RISC initiative and the HIDTA Program.

General barriers and facilitators to TNPC were generally divided into contextual and social/psychological influences. Contextual influences, such as economic and legislative constraints, particularisms, police culture, and local cultural influences were mostly seen as barriers. On the other hand, the social/psychological influences explored, such as behavioural factors, competition, motivation, coercion, and trust were more complex and could even be seen as both a barrier and a facilitator in some instances. The influence and importance of social psychological factors relating to TNPC were also considered.

Chapter Three

Methodology

3.1 Introduction to Chapter Three

The research approach taken in this thesis is different from many qualitative studies involving (for example, informative) interviews, in that not all interviews focus on meaning-making and the individual's experience. Consequently, in keeping with the overall objective of this thesis, this Methodology chapter first explains the research approaches taken. The study was a detailed qualitative enquiry into transnational policing in PR and DR, which adopted a blended approach of qualitative interviews and story-telling. This is followed by the choice of methodology, discussing the research design, rationale for use of interviews and research objectives.

The sampling rationale and selection sections discuss data collection and techniques, as well as research participants followed by the topic guides and research procedure, which included recruitment of participants, reciprocity, ethics and setting. It also describes the piloting interviews, which took place prior to fieldwork in the Caribbean. The methods of analysis draw upon Creswell (1998) and Attride-Stirling's (2001) research, explained further throughout the chapter, and were conducted as recommended by them. This section discusses the thematic analysis of interviews, the questions addressed and the levels of analysis. Finally, issues of quality assurance and reflexivity conclude the chapter.

3.2 Research Approach: Phenomenological and Social Constructionism Influences

Phenomenological Influences

Phenomenology is a complex philosophical framework that is interested broadly in the theme of human experience but undoubtedly there is much more to phenomenology than human experience, Wender (2008). With this in mind, this study utilised methods which have influences from phenomenology but overall was a detailed qualitative enquiry into TNP in PR and DR and was not strictly a work of phenomenology. A phenomenological perspective was chosen to help guide this investigation, as it reflects the lived experience of participants and the meanings people make of their life experiences (Berger & Luckmann, 1967). This perspective further allows for the multiple ways of interpreting human experience, and the meaning-making of these experiences which define an individual's "reality." With reality "socially constructed" (Berger & Luckmann, 1967; Parker 1999), the

phenomenological researcher “collects” the participants’ realities and their interpretations of their constructions (Lincoln, 1990). This is done with epoché, where “all judgments about what is real – the natural attitude” are suspended (Creswell, 1998, p. 52). With the phenomenon inseparable from the individual, reality, as in a phenomena’s true meaning, can only be studied via the experience as described by the individual (Jasper, 1994).

The phenomenological approach further influenced the investigator to focus on the experience’s meaning according to the person who has lived it and who is able to provide a thorough, holistic description of it (Creswell, 1998). Central tenets in utilizing this constructivist-interpretive paradigm approach are to determine and accurately describe an experience’s meaning to the person who has experienced it. Identifying common themes amongst participants, as well as within-case themes, enabled the investigator to comprehend and describe the essence of the experience for participants (Moustakas, 1994) and the issues raised.

Social Constructionism

The social constructionist approach to research posits the “process of meaning production to be as important for social research as the meaning that’s produced” (Holstein & Gubrium, 1995, p. 4). Otherwise stated, the “how” is equally important to the “what.” Social constructionist thought holds that, beyond conveying factual information, “language always constructs particular versions of reality” (Willig, 1998, p. 383).

Drawing on ideas from phenomenology and social constructionism, in-depth interviews were conducted through which the researcher explored how participants made sense of their perceptions of TNPC and its associated meanings. Through an interactive process involving analysis and verification by the participants, the researcher was able to include participants in the knowledge development process, and thus be aware of their own perspectives in interpreting the data. Using participant quotes to support themes and metathemes, evidence about good and bad practices in TNPC is provided in the research.

3.3 Choice of Methodology

Design of Research

Qualitative research aims to understand and describe human behavior and experience, especially the processes by which humans construct meaning (Bogdan &

Biklen, 2003). Qualitative investigations are not propelled by certain questions derived from operationalised variables, but are driven by qualitative research questions seeking to study the full complexity of topics. This includes each participant's story, in context, from his/her own frame of reference.

Qualitative research enables researchers to study and interpret the empirical world holistically from the participant's point of view, not that of the investigator's. It seeks to capture a phenomenon's meanings, beliefs, thoughts, feelings and characteristics without controlling or manipulating events or persons under study (Leininger, 1985), plus stress the importance of context and multiple realities, as more unstructured, naturalistic inquiries (Lincoln & Guba, 1985).

Another strength of utilizing qualitative research methods is that such methods illuminate the details of the human experience in the context of a common phenomenon (Ayres, Kavanaugh, & Knafl, 2003). In using qualitative research in the investigation of TNPC in PR, and the DR, at the HIDTA Office, the investigator was able to:

1. Comprehend data from the "insider's" perspective by discussing a participant's firsthand experiences.
2. Take a discovery-oriented approach to the research questions that gathered a greater understanding than that gained in more rigid approaches as interviews allowed for greater flexibility.
3. Gather the subjective data needed to understand the meaning individuals attached to events in their environment (Duffy, 1987).
4. Pursue issues and topics that may not have been raised in a structured research design (Carr, 1994).

Research Strategy: The Intensive Interview

Interviews, as a research strategy, are ideal in allowing for more complete and more accurate information than other techniques (Newman & Benz, 1998), with stories becoming the primary source of data collection and the construction of meaning. Thus, intensive, in-depth interviews were used as the primary data collection strategy, enabling the investigator to "see the world through the eyes of the person being interviewed" (Ely, Anzul, Friedman, & Garner, 2000, p. 58), acquire more data about an individual's experience(s) and give participants a voice. Such an approach enables participants to express what is important to them in their own words. Since the primary purpose of interviews was to obtain participants' life experiences with respect to interpreting the meaning of a described phenomenon, the interviewer became the

“student” during interviews, while the interviewee took on the role of “teacher” (Spradley, 1979), shaping the interview content using his or her own words (Bogdan & Biklen, 2003).

Interviews vary in structural design and may be open-ended, guided by general questions, and/or may focus on particular topics (Ely, Anzul, Friedman, & Garner, 2000), as this allows for structure, focus and flexibility to co-exist in the interview process. This investigation’s interview process was semi-structured, providing opportunities for data to emerge somewhat spontaneously from participants’ responses, while remaining purposeful and focused, shaped by interpretation and analysis. It included “intuition, past experience, emotion - personal attributes of human researchers” (Wolcott, 2001, p. 33). There was a collaborative exchange with participants to construct the picture participants wished to convey. Going beyond the who, what, where, when and why, this investigation sought to capture the emotional responses, processes involved and subsequent outcomes of the barriers and facilitators to TNPC.

Researcher’s Stance

The researcher as a primary data collection instrument holds that data is filtered through the investigator’s attitudes, experiences, and beliefs in addition to theoretical positions. Hence, the investigator’s role in the research must be acknowledged and the researcher’s stance stated from the study’s outset (Ely, Vinz, Downing, & Anzul, 2001). This research was influenced by the investigator’s qualities of being organised, efficient, compassionate, friendly, outgoing, motivated, curious, conscientious, and driven by a strong sense of equality and justice; collectively, these traits are a subjectivity brought to this study. However, having previously lived in PR, the researcher may have become acculturated to Puerto Rican society and taken on local and cultural biases. Throughout the investigation, these factors had to be kept in check. Caution was used in not interpreting or presenting data through the researcher’s personal judgments.

Expectations that the participants’ narratives would revolve around police culture stereotypes (i.e. “macho”, uncooperative, heavy-handed) had to be set aside. The study’s purpose of inviting participants to share their own perspective was also important to keep at the forefront. With their experiences at the heart of the investigation, focus was primarily on them and their stories. All of these possible biases were consciously addressed and overcome in writing analytic memos and bracketing,

the process of rigorous self-reflection where biases, notions and knowledge about the phenomenon being studied were suspended (Hein & Austin, 2001). At the same time, however, the realization exists that all views are partial and that no investigator is completely objective. The researcher engaged in embedded analysis (Creswell, 1998), in which there was a narration of the research, by a thematic analysis across cases (cross-case analysis). This approach begins with an examination of the subunits and the themes that emerged during the interviews, allowing for a more detailed perspective.

3.4 Sampling: Rationale and Selection

Data Collection Techniques

For this study, 30 agents from HIDTA were interviewed. All interviews took place in the secret location at the HIDTA headquarters in PR. The following is a description of recruitment efforts.

Research Participants

The research participants came from a wide variety of law enforcement and personal backgrounds. There were 26 males and 4 females, ranging between the ages of 22 to 55. Each participant was highly educated, trained and considered a specialist in his/her field. With interviews lasting for up to two hours each, thirty participants was a manageable size for the study. Having a fairly small participant pool was also rooted in the study's important objective: to describe the breadth and depth of a phenomenon's meaning as experienced by the individuals (Creswell, 1998). In this case, participants each gave one, detail-filled interview.

All were English-speaking, bilingual, 25 of whom were either born in PR or of Latino decent. The remaining 5 were American who spoke minimal Spanish, but were not bilingual. Conducting the interviews in English was not of great concern since English is a second language for Puerto Ricans, and research has found that using one's language, whether mother tongue or second language, does not result in discomfort or self-disclosure when talking about an emotional topic (Pizarro, 1995). Those speaking Spanish who were not bilingual admitted, however, that this had been problematic during interviews. There were 12 HIDTA agents specifically from the DEA who participated. The DEA had the largest number of participants from any single agency. The other participants were from a variety of organisations, including HIDTA, Department of Corrections, Interpol and the US Embassy.

3.5 Research Procedure

3.5.1 Recruitment of participants. The investigator gained entry to the HIDTA community with the assistance of the Attorney General of PR and Director of HIDTA, who have vast networks in the local and global policing community. Prior to arrival in PR, the DEA offered assistance with coordinating interviews, however this resulted in only three arranged interviews. A letter was then sent to the Director and CEO of PR/USVI HIDTA requesting help, who further provided assistance with recruitment efforts and guidance from a Puerto Rican perspective.

Volunteer interviewees were sought via the HIDTA PR/USVI office, since it offered a safe, convenient environment and accessibility to a larger number of participants. Letters of cooperation in providing research assistance were obtained from the CEO and Director's office. Potential participants were solicited via convenience and snowball sampling, primarily using mass emails and web flyer postings describing the study at the HIDTA office in PR. A total of 26 men and 4 women responded to the request for participants. Ultimately, the researcher selected all 30 participants who volunteered.

The researcher was accessible to the participants via personal cell phone or by electronic mail for further clarification of the study. As each agent responded, individual names were listed on a note card, used to keep track of each person's contact information, age, response date, preferred language, cultural background, gender, eligibility information (when they were available for interviews), and correspondence efforts regarding setting up interviews. Potential participants were informally screened by the researcher to determine, based on established criteria (from an approved police agency, English-speaking, and working in a transnational capacity), the appropriateness of participation in the research. These agents also indicated that they would be available for at least one hour of interview time during the course of the study. Most interviews were extended by 30-60 minutes.

Interviews were based on pilot interviews conducted with 7 other law enforcement officials: five detectives from the United Kingdom working at the Old Bailey criminal trial, 'Operation Trident' (Jamaican-London linked crime case); one agent from the Association of Caribbean of Police Commissioners (ACCP); and one representative at the United Nations. The seven interviews were kept on record, should the need for additional participants be deemed useful, and were helpful in developing the study's baseline questionnaire. In the end, these were not used for the study's final results and analysis. Participants who chose to take part in the study were provided with

a consent form for their required signature (see Appendix C). The consent form emphasised that their participation was voluntary and described the safeguards that were put in place to assure anonymity and protection of privacy. Participants were assured that the collected interview data would be held in the strictest confidence and that their names, as well as those of any individuals they mentioned, would be changed. The contact information of the study's supervisor was provided to the CEO's office, should participants have any questions or concerns during the course of the study. Furthermore, the HIDTA office was informed that all participants would be privy to all of their own interview tapes and transcripts upon written request.

Reciprocity. “All interviews are interpretively active, implicating meaning-making practices on the part of both interviewers and respondents” (Holstein & Gubrium, 1995, p. 4). Participants were approached with the attitude that they were “research collaborators” (Mishler, 1986) in an attempt to give them as much power as possible throughout the interview process. The interviewer engaged in active listening as participants were invited to communicate freely and openly. Rapport was established and guidance offered when appropriate, in developing the interview, while the researcher took care not to interject, make commentary, and use facial or body expressions in a way that encouraged or discouraged an individual’s open responses. Tape-recorded interviews lasted up to 60-120 minutes.

Ethics. Ethical considerations are embedded in every step of qualitative research (Ely, Anzul, Friedman, & Garner, 2000). The study was conducted in line with the Ethical Approval Form required by the Institute of Social Psychology at The London School of Economics and within the ethical guidelines of the British Society of Criminology, as informed by the British Psychological Society (BPS) and the American Psychological Association (APA) guidelines for ethical treatment of research participants. An ethical approval form was submitted to the LSE’s Institute of Social Psychology Ethics Committee before any data was collected (see Appendix B). The researcher was honest in facing personal perspectives and assumptions in what participants were sharing (via bracketing), and sought to establish a trustworthy environment. The requirements of informed consent and confidentiality applied to all participants. Procedures assigning generic and anonymous codes for respondents, as well as omitting individual names, agencies and titles throughout the study, were put in place to ensure confidentiality with regards to interviews and case files during transcription.. Naturally, the issue of intelligence, secrecy and protecting identities are

of paramount importance in this context, hence the decision to conceal all of this information. All participants were informed of their rights to withdraw from the study at any time without prejudice, and confidentiality of their results was guaranteed.

Setting. With the CEO's assistance, interviews were conducted on site at the HIDTA head office, in a conference room specially designated for this study's research activities whenever it was convenient for participants. The interview space insured privacy and was free from distractions, interruptions, noise, and other people. Meeting times were flexible, so as not to inconvenience participants.

3.5.2 Interview topic guides and procedure. Every interview began with a review of the study's purpose, reassurance of confidentiality and an explanation of how the information would be handled. Permission to tape-record participant interviews was obtained, hence utilizing the voice-centred method of data collection as described by Brown and Gilligan (1992). This method preserved responses for analysis, as no notes were taken during the interviews, which allowed greater trust to be built between interviewer and interviewee, as participants need not worry about what was being noted. The interview's design was such that the interviewer could stimulate participants' recall of specific, TNP cooperation related topics when appropriate.

The interview strategy was supported by Weiss's (1994) and Seidman's (1998) guidelines for conducting qualitative interviews (e.g., preparation, establishing a relationship, phrasing of questions, etc.). The interview schedule consisted of 4 sections (TNP and Caribbean links, the DEA, the HIDTA Program, and social psychological approaches to TNPC) and a total of 26 questions. These interviews took place at the PR/USVI HIDTA office between August 8 and 12, 2005. While there was an initial list of questions with four related topics, covering a wide range of TNP matters to be covered with each informant, the order and depth of coverage varied considerably from one participant to the next.

To begin each interview session, participants were thanked for agreeing to participate. After an informed consent form was filled out and signed, taping began and then ended when the participant and interviewer agreed that the interview had been completed, going no longer than 120 minutes each session. An interview topic guide was used to ensure that questions were posed to each participant, yet it was not used in a rigid, tightly structured way, with interviews allowing participants to freely construct narratives and speak about their thoughts and feelings. Guided by interpretive inquiry, the study of construction, the interview focused on obtaining stakeholder's narratives

on TNPC and establishing comfort with such a progressive lateral topic. Meaning-making was taken to the participants, who were asked to define what TNPC meant to them.

The interview was designed to stimulate the stakeholder's views of TNPC in PR and DR. To this end, a list of topics was drafted, based on TNPC issues that trickled down from the broader issues of TNPC within the Caribbean to leading stakeholders; issues such as the DEA and HIDTA's methods of cooperation, to the very specific social psychological factors that contribute to improved cooperation. Participants were encouraged to tell their stories, with appropriate probing to facilitate elaboration in areas of interest. Some participants talked at length without needing a question or topic to guide them, whereas others were in need of more guidance and prompting. It was emphasised that hearing "their story" was of utmost interest.

The interviews were semi-structured through the use of a mix of open-ended and more focused questions, however were influenced from certain narrative interviewing principles. These influences principally concerned the attempt to develop the interviews around the interviewees describing the operational work they conduct through occupational stories, and methods of story-telling (Denzin, 2001; Plummer, 2002). The narrative approach to questioning was emphasised, since such storytelling is a commonly used mode through which people make meaning of their lives (Mishler, 1986). Inquiry was toward understanding the subjective meaning of TNPC. Inherent in the process was the interviewer's stance of being open to individual differences within each interview. As much as possible, the participant was asked to give an example or fully elaborate on a point with more detail if necessary. Questions similar to, "How did that make you feel?", "What did that mean to you?" and "Can you tell me more?" helped to strengthen rapport, allowing participants to know that their experiences, feelings, and thoughts were being heard. Semi-structured interviews allowed for focus on both particular themes and variations in content and process. Throughout the interview process, participants explored various ways that TNPC information is used and communicated; direct or "spoken" ways, such as reading materials, and indirect or "unspoken ways," like role modelling.

Interviews were transcribed verbatim, as soon as possible, following the interaction, and listened to repeatedly in order to ensure accurate transcription. The transcripts were formatted in an organised manner (page numbers, line numbers, line and margin spacing) that made them easy to reference. Each participant's records were

maintained in their own binder, with names, places and other identifying evidence changed in the transcript for confidentiality purposes. Binders were stored in a secure location, accessed only by the researcher. Regular conferences were held with participants to ensure accurate interpretation of participant's meaning-making and experiences.

3.6 Methods for Analysis

Qualitative research is propelled by the assumption that "knowledge is within the meanings people make of it; knowledge is gained through people talking about their meanings; knowledge is laced with personal biases and values; knowledge is written in a personal, up-close way; and knowledge evolves, emerges, and is inextricably tied to the context in which it is studied" (Creswell, 1998, p. 19). Qualitative research is analysed inductively; abstractions are constructed as evidence is gathered and grouped (Bogdan & Biklen, 2003).

Phenomenological data analysis involves reduction methodology, where specific statements and themes are analysed for all potential meanings. Data analysis was conducive as recommended by Creswell (1998): (1) Interviews were read in their entirety; (2) Significant statements from each interview were extracted, then divided into statements (also known as "horizontalization"), then shared with the participants for accuracy; (3) Statements were formulated into clusters of meaning, which became themes; and (4) Themes were integrated into a narrative, textural description of what was experienced and a structural description of how it was experienced.

Attride-Stirling's (2001) methods were also employed in the analysis, suggesting that there had been too little attention paid to both the process of analyzing qualitative data, and an aim to fill the gap by describing one method of conducting thematic analysis of textual data in detail. She also points out how, what she terms, *thematic networks* can be used to express thematic analyses of qualitative data (Attride-Stirling, 2001) Thematic networks draw on a number of analytical techniques, most particularly Toulmin's argumentation theory, which describes the method of argumentation as the movement from *data* to a *warrant* to a *claim* (Attride-Stirling, 2001). Thematic networks simply aim to structure the themes at different levels of meaning in a text, to illustrate a clearer relationship between premises.

Basic themes are the most low-level, simple premises which make little sense unless read in the context of the organizing and global themes. Organizing themes group these basic themes into clusters of similar issues and reveal some of the assumptions that lie beneath them. A group of organizing themes constitutes a global theme, which is a collection of all the main ideas and metaphors within the text. Global themes group together organizing themes that together constitute an argument. (Attride-Stirling, 2001)

Analysis was conducted by breaking down the text, using codes. Once a series of coded text segments had been identified, themes were abstracted and then further refined. Finally, organizing and grouping these themes produced the Global themes, and the whole was able to be organised as a non-hierarchical, web-like network (Attride-Stirling, 2001). Once the network had been produced it was able to be used as a tool to re-evaluate the text itself, in order to interpret further patterns.

Data was further analyzed as observational and marginal comments were made and analytic memos written on the content of the interviews. Some sections were summarised for content. Such reflective memos enable researchers “to critique our own work and to develop insights or directions” (Ely, Vinz, Downing & Anzul, 2001, p. 28) and turn the field notes into other forms. Transcripts were read several times with statements, holding special meaning to the phenomenon under study, highlighted or underlined. Significant statements were then interpreted both as either across-cases and/or within-cases (Ayres, Kavangaugh, & Knafl, 2003; Van Manen, 1994). Within-case data typically involve detailed case study write-ups with no standard for such analysis; across-case data is used to select categories and look for within-case similarities, coupled with intergroup differences (Miles & Huberman, 1984). Great care was taken to “distinguish between information relevant to all participants and those aspects of the experience exclusive” to a particular informant, as recommended by Ayres, Kavangaugh, & Knafl (2003).

Hence, common themes, supported in the participant’s own words, arose from grouped data that had similar meaning across-cases. In reporting results, being able to provide within-case descriptions, in addition to the overarching themes of across-case data, afforded information closer to the reality of the lived experiences, further serving the investigation’s purpose.

Analytic memos (an examination of the objects, articulations, events and people in study) became part of a maintained log, serving as reflections on what was learned in

the research process. They were penned in an effort to gain new insights and to make suggestions for future action (Ely, Anzul, Friedman, & Garner, 2000). Such self-reflection enabled an awareness of the researcher's prejudgments and experiences and encouraged reliance on intuition in capturing the essence of participants' experiences (Creswell, 1998). A personal log also became data, capturing everything and replicating interview and research experiences in an effort to gather thoughts on the transcripts, analytic memos, observer comments, and ongoing analytic schemes. At this point, the researcher encountered "the self as instrument through a personal dialogue about moments of victory and disheartenment, hunches, feelings, insights, assumptions, biases, and ongoing ideas about method" (Ely, Anzul, Friedman, & Garner, 2000, p. 69). This also provided the details needed to start analysis, including ideas or questions which became apparent during and after the interview, insights revealed during the transcription process and personal reactions. Additional connections were made within and across log entries on future review, prompting further comments to be recorded in the margins. This process, repeated numerous times, added insight, which sometimes confirmed or questioned earlier hunches. This constant comparison method was employed, meaning analysis was ongoing throughout the data collection period (Maxwell, 1996).

A preliminary analysis, following a process guided by Goetz and LeCompte (1984), was conducted after each participant had been interviewed. Tapes and transcripts were thoroughly reviewed to date, prompting intensive note taking, and a tentative list of categories with which to codify interview data was generated. The process of content coding was initiated by first reading and writing down words and phrases in the margins of the transcripts (Miles & Huberman, 1984). Any idea that seemed important was noted, tracking various terms, unrelated findings, and recurring points, allowing an analysis of the data free of any expectations of results. Data was then organised and coded into "bins," meaningful units of labeled data (Ely, Anzul, Friedman, & Garner, 2000). These identified "categories," helped link the data, arranging them into an organised form, in the hope that a conceptual scheme or metathemes emerged. Coding is a process of making sense through categories, and involves combining data about the same topic/theme so that each category can be studied separately (Tesch, 1990). Data was decontextualised, by way of coding and sorting, and then recontextualised, restored to similar groupings of meaning extracted from participants' accounts (Ayres, Kavanaugh, & Knafl, 2003). Categories were

assessed in terms of any commonalities in stakeholder's experiences, as well as idiosyncratic experiences. They were then clustered into overarching themes and constructs, first individually and then for the entire group. Those that were similar in meaning or that lacked specificity were eliminated. 36 codes were identified through this process (Appendix F).

The analyses were based on the scrutiny of transcripts; an examination for a consistency of pattern(s), recurrence of descriptive phrases or "stories," and the emergence of holistic meanings across a number of cases (Miles & Huberman, 1984). The analysis was systematic, recursive, and substantiated with the use of a great deal of data; analysis was not the final phase of the research process, but rather was concurrent with data collection (Ely, Vinz, Downing, & Anzul, 2001). Participants were asked for their time in recursive analysis efforts, inviting further explanation, clarification, or expansion (Lofland & Lofland, 1984). Participant checks were conducted throughout the study, allowing the interviewees to describe the facts in their own views, challenge interpretations, assess the data's overall adequacy and volunteer additional information (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). A transcribed quote from the interviews was either emailed in section or read to them, asking for additional clarification or feedback on the interpretation of their stories. Winnowing assisted in editing the information and deciding what was excessive or unimportant to the study (Ely, Vinz, Downing, & Anzul, 2001).

The final phase of data analysis involved constructing the phenomenon by indicating how elements related to and affected each other, and became a totality (Denzin, 2002). An attempt was made to find the same recurring forms of conduct, experience and meaning in participants' lived experiences before contextualizing the phenomenon. With contextualization, participants agreed to collaborate on the study's themes and structures, verifying or correcting interpretations following data collection. The ultimate themes were statements of meaning that either ran through all or most of the data or ones that carried a heavy emotional or factual impact for individual participants (Ely, Vinz, Downing, & Anzul, 2001). Participants, on the whole, agreed with the final assessment of their commentaries, with minimal corrections to the meaning and analysis of their comments.

3.7 Quality Assurance and Reflexivity

Great care was taken in preparing for interviews and in handling the data collected. The research was conducted in a respectful, non-judgmental manner, highly regarding the confidentiality of thoughts and experiences of HIDTA or any stakeholder's perspectives. In establishing a trustworthy environment for gathering data, recommendations made by Ely, Anzul, Friedman, and Garner (2000) were employed in: establishing rapport; providing focus; questioning, observing, and listening; being sensitive to clues; probing; amalgamating; being involved; and clarifying and managing biases. Lastly, peers and colleagues were consulted in the process, who provided additional tools in maintaining trustworthiness. Amidst such support, honesty was maintained, critical themes identified and alternative interpretations or possible biases were recognised.

Like Douglas (1976) and Geertz (1973), the phenomenological perspective on validity is considered: "that multiple realities exist and multiple interpretations are available from different individuals that are all equally valid. Reality is a social construct" (Newman & Benz, 1998, p. 2). Validity, in this research endeavour, is grounded in the uniqueness of each lived experience. Phenomenological research is "the description of the phenomenon from accounts of those who have experienced it" (Jasper, 1994, p. 312), which is the validity in and of itself.

According to Polkinghorne (1989), there are five questions that investigators may ask themselves in considering if validity is being honoured. These focus on:

1. Whether the interviewer influenced participant descriptions in a way that their actual experience is not truly reflected.
2. The accuracy of the transcription (e.g., the degree to which tapes were written up word for word with stylistic emphasis) and the meaning conveyed in the interview.
3. The possibility of conclusions beyond those given by the researcher that could be derived during transcription analysis.
4. The ability of the investigator to account for the specific contents and connections in the original examples of the experience by going from the general structural description to the transcripts.
5. How specific or general the structural description situation is in holding for the experience in other situations.

In addressing these issues, and the study's trustworthiness, the following was undertaken:

1. Credibility, the data's authenticity, was realised through peer debriefing (talks with colleagues and the dissertation committee), member checking, and clarity of roles. Participants were asked to review portions of their transcripts for accuracy. Participants and professional colleagues were invited to provide input about preliminary conclusions (Stiles, 1993), and biases as researcher (e.g., memos) were continually noted. Peer debriefing involved the doctoral dissertation committee, providing feedback on inconsistencies, alternative interpretations, gaps and unchecked biases. Furthermore, the relationship between researcher and participants was made explicit (Field, 1991), acknowledging at every stage of the study that "Interviewers are deeply and unavoidably implicated in creating meanings that ostensibly reside within respondents" (Holstein & Gubrium, 1995, p. 3).
2. Confirmability, also known as objectivity in quantitative research, was ensured in that the findings, conclusions, and recommendations were supported by the data. All data can be traced back to their original sources if scrutinised (e.g., by linking participants' quotes to their original tapes and transcripts with pseudonyms), supporting the logical consistency between different data sets and truth value (Stiles, 1993).
3. Dependability, or reliability, as it is known in quantitative terms, was achieved through record keeping (e.g., analytic memos) that would foster future research using these processes and procedures (Mertens, 1998) in determining stability of the results over time. An explicit framework was established for data collection and analysis of this type. Participants, being the main source, also contributed to the study's dependability, simply by providing inimitable data. Transferability, which allows another to determine whether research findings are applicable in other contexts or settings, was achieved through cultural and social descriptions of the community, particularly concerning the population from which data came, as is done in the research literature (Stiles, 1993). Thick, rich descriptions of findings, according to Creswell (1998) assist readers in making decisions regarding the transferability of results to other situations or population members who share similar characteristics. Additionally, information was sought from a variety of sources, using several theories to

understand the phenomenon under study, drawing data from multiple sources (Stiles, 1993). Since transferability is essentially determined by the reviewer, no definitive claims are being made as to how results apply to others, as this is not a goal of qualitative research. Instead, the use of detailed description and multiple, varied, cases helps situate stakeholders in their context – time, place, culture, background - allowing reviewers to comprehend the parameters of generalizability regarding who, what, where, and when.

Chapter Four

Stakeholders' Perspectives on Transnational Crime and Policing in Puerto Rico and the Dominican Republic

4.1 Introduction to Chapter Four

Narrative explorations of transnational crime and policing in PR and DR have been sparse in the literature. The experiences and perspectives of the stakeholders were collected by interviewing 30 agents about their perspectives on the crime problem, contextual factors and how they perceive tackling the problem. Taking this approach lent an understanding to how these law enforcement professionals construct the issues of TNP for themselves, and opened doors to a range of topics and experiences explored in such unique breadth and depth. These areas of investigation are critical to help better understand the barriers and facilitators and key social psychological influences in TNPC which are later explored at length.

In keeping with the overall objective of this research, Chapter 4 is the first which reports the current investigation's results, as well as addresses the fundamental question of what TNP is and how it is overwhelmingly relevant in the Caribbean. It specifically covers questions, posed to participants, related to transnational crimes in PR and the DR; how they are addressed and the characteristics of cooperation displayed by local police forces. The resulting interviews with law enforcement officials determined that Caribbean crime related largely to drugs, weapons trading, human trafficking and terrorism. The study also uncovered the fact that cooperation in the Caribbean is different from other regions due to geographical, cultural and legal factors, and cultivating cooperation consisted of intelligence gathering, better surveillance, and undercover operations, amongst other factors. Respondents also felt that increased training, communication and political will were essential to enhance cooperation.

4.2 Perspectives on the Crime Problem

The nature of transnational crimes, and the extent to which it exists, in PR and the DR was given a great deal of attention in establishing the environment in which agents must function. Participants were asked to share their thoughts on how these transnational crimes are currently addressed, including the degree and quality of cooperation involved. Specific aspects of cooperation were specifically probed: whether it is reactive or proactive, whether it is different from methods used elsewhere,

how it is linked to other regions of the world, how it is lacking, regulated, and needs to be improved, as well as how accountability is handled when agents do collaborate.

Themes that emerged revolved around the interconnectedness of crime and the prevalence of drug crime, weapons smuggling, illegal migrations and human trafficking in describing the ‘scene’. The impact of geography as a theme, especially PR’s position as a ‘gateway island,’ helped to further explain why criminal activity prevails in this region.

In offering solutions to existing problems, participants’ responses focused on cultural clashes and legal differences (including local and international laws), the need for cooperation, intelligence sharing, communications, support in cultivating cooperation, and the desire for those involved to be more proactive and tackle crime at its source. Other related themes included the need to train together, the need to get along with local police, and difficulties with human rights protections in doing their job.

In discussing desired changes, major needs included more resources, accountability, support, and an overall organisational makeover.

4.2.1 It is all interlinked: interconnected crime. The clearest theme that emerged regarding the extent and nature of transnational crime in PR and the DR was that different forms of transnational crime in the Caribbean are highly interconnected, with drug trafficking, weapons trafficking, illegal migration, and human trafficking all perceived, by the participants, as interlinked. In addition, PR's position in the Caribbean as an offshore territory of the US was considered an extremely important factor contributing to its high transnational crime rate.

Clearly, transnational crime in the Caribbean does not operate in carefully delineated sectors. While this is true of all crime to some extent, in the case of the Caribbean different kinds of crime are seen as very interconnected. The strongest correlation described by respondents was the link between illegal migration and drug smuggling, given the large numbers of illegal migrants and trafficked people entering PR, many of them carrying drugs. One participant responded, “With 90 miles the Mona Strait is a hotbed of illegal activities” (R4-Federal). Drug crime, itself, was also seen as linked to both weapons smuggling and violent crime. This was on account of the violent and highly territorial nature of drug crime, with drug traffickers’ need for weapons to defend themselves against other traffickers and to protect their territory in the event of turf wars. It was suggested that most violent crime in PR was linked to

drugs: “In our newspapers, every day there is a lot of killings that you don’t see any other reason, they are all drug related in one way or another....”(R27-Local).

4.2.2 Running rampant: drug crime. Drug crime was identified as the most prevalent type of crime, with some respondents suggesting that up to 90% of crime is drug-related. The dynamics of drug trafficking crime in the Caribbean are heavily dependent on PR's position as a “gateway to the US”, although the drugs from the Caribbean do enter other markets, as well. Drugs produced in Central and South America pass through the Caribbean and then on to the US and Europe, and there was a suggestion that the positions of PR and the DR in the chain had been consolidated and grown in recent years:

Between three and five years the crime is going up and the DR like PR is getting one of the more important points in the drugs distribution around this basin with South America. So they are getting (inaudible) crime organisations in the DR and PR, like a middle point in distribution around the world to get into the States and going down to South America. (R20-F)

However, whether PR is only a transhipment point or a destination for drugs in its own right is disputed; certainly the majority of drugs pass through, but several respondents also mentioned a domestic drug problem, with housing projects a key distribution point for drugs. What was not in dispute was that drug crime is highly territorial, as drug traffickers and dealers seek to control specific housing projects and routes. In relation to drug crime, this was the main source of violence as “all the drug distribution points are already booked” (R21-F).

4.2.3 Weapons smuggling abounds. Weapons smuggling was not described as a large-scale problem in its own right in PR, but rather in its relation to drug smuggling and in facilitating drug-related violent crime. Weapons smuggling was clearly linked to drugs in the sense that drug violence fuels demand for weapons. As one respondent commented, “Ninety-nine percent of the time you will always find one with the other...” (R25-F). The fact emerged that weapons smuggling, as a process, is distinct from drug trafficking and does not necessarily follow the same lines of supply or involve the same people. While drug traffickers might regularly carry arms, dedicated weapons smuggling involved different suppliers and separate routes: “No, they come separate. They have guys that, all they do is just get you guns” (R3-International).

It was also agreed that most weapons entering PR were not doing so in large quantities, although some officers described instances when this had happened. Most frequently, weapons were smuggled in smaller quantities, often brought in by post or individuals entering from the US. In this case, PR's position as the "gateway to the US" worked in reverse, with weapons coming from the US into PR, due to relaxed gun laws and the right to carry arms in the US. One respondent described the process whereby individuals are able to carry a weapon on a flight, as long as they inform the airline, but not necessarily the local police:

So it's like the [airline] carrier knows but the carrier doesn't have an obligation to tell the local police that this individual that is coming from New York to PR is bringing a weapon. [...] Maybe he's bringing one new weapon every time and selling that weapon, we don't know. (R27-L)

Another common method of bringing in weapons was via the US Postal Service, disassembling them in PR, and then reassembling the weapons once received in the US.

4.2.4 The problem of people: illegal migration and human trafficking. The issue of illegal entry to the island was regarded by many respondents as on a par with, and closely linked to, the problem of drug crime. Similarly, weapons smuggling and prostitution were seen as connected to the drug world. A rising related concern was that PR's "gateway" status could be exploited by terrorists, both as an entry point and due to the high level of transnational crime, representing potential revenue to fund terrorist activities. Illegal migrants are used by drug traffickers to carry drugs and weapons, and the scale of migration is such that respondents suggested that ten thousand people a year were illegally moving into PR from other islands, especially the DR: "Dominicans are coming to PR in boats that can't even hold two people and there's, like, twenty in there and stuff like that" (R29-F). Illegal entry from the DR tended to be framed as a threat in itself, particularly because a large DR community in PR meant that there were resources available to illegal migrants on their arrival. One respondent stated:

Illegal immigration, that's big business in the DR. Once they get here to PR there is a big DR community and they can easily get a driver's licence, social security number, so it will be easy for them once they get that identification they can easily fly to New York or some other State. (R7-Local)

Because of the heavy association of drug crime with illegal migration, there was also a sense among some officers that “every criminal here is a foreigner” (R3-I). It is an intriguing comment, in that it is not the foreigners, *per se*, that are seen as all criminal. The implication and the emphasis is more on the fact that all of the criminals seemed to be foreign, which in some way exempted all natives from criminal activity or suspicion. There was also an understanding among officers that there were reasons for the wave of migration coming from the DR – primarily instability and poverty:

It’s only natural they will (inaudible) close to it and they have a bunch of problems politically and you have a lot of poverty, and if they just try to get out – I mean, we did it. Puerto Ricans did it at one point; they started fleeing to the US. (R3-I)

In this sense, the Dominicans were sometimes described in terms of a 'threat' in themselves, and there was some stereotyping of Dominicans as dishonest criminals: “They steal a lot, somewhere I’ve heard that, but I’ve never been over there yet” (R29-F). The DR was also viewed as a violent place: “I believe Dominican gangs are very violent and I guess the violence comes from living in the DR and they come here and try to implement that violence here in PR” (R11-F).

In terms of the relationship between PR and the DR, it was suggested that criminals from the different islands specialise in different elements of trafficking, with Dominicans controlling transportation and Puerto Ricans controlling distribution. However, there was also some suggestion that, despite the high level of crime imported from the DR, a greater level of cooperation with the DR balanced this to some extent.

Human trafficking, specifically, was mentioned slightly less often than illegal migration, though often in the same breath and not always clearly demarcated from the more general problem of illegal entry. Some respondents suggested that it was a huge problem, while others were sceptical. Yet, clearly, there is a high level of illegal movement, some of which may not be consensual. Overall, it was clear that illegal movement into PR facilitates the movement of people, drugs, and weapons into the US and, despite some sympathy for the underlying problems, officers saw it as a key challenge.

To conclude with the interconnectedness of crime, it appears that respondents generally agreed on the kinds of transnational crime faced in PR, the DR and the

Caribbean, as well as with the dynamics of how the different kinds of crime interact. The two biggest problems regarding the nature of TN crime in this area are illegal migration and drug trafficking, which feed each other and are closely linked. . In turn, drug trafficking creates a demand for weapons and causes violence. All of these transnational crimes depend heavily on PR's strategic position within the Caribbean and as a territory of the US, as well as on a symbiotic relationship with the DR, where instability and poverty feed crime.

4.3 Contextual Factors

4.3.1 The 'Gateway' Island: Puerto Rico's position. PR's strategic position in the Caribbean appears to be key in explaining the degree of transnational crime experienced on the island. The island's was described variously by participants as a gateway, stepping stone, bridge and a hotspot. Since people and goods entering PR from other countries are considered 'domestic' when they continue on to the US, they are less carefully scrutinised. This makes PR particularly valuable as an entry point to the US for both people and illegal goods. In fact, the supply route from South America had, according to some respondents, actually grown in the past few years. However, the gateway is, to a degree, reversed for weapons smuggling, with more arms going from the US to PR.

The sheer size of the Caribbean, and the difficulty of policing land, sea, and air across many tiny islands, was stressed by agents at the end of interviews, indicating the degree of influence geography has on the criminal situation. For instance, one respondent described flying across the island and being shocked by its scale. Another agent emphasised the number of drug trafficking operations that transpire and the difficulty of watching every vessel entering and leaving all the islands:

When the sun goes down there's boats coming from the east and west and, you know, if you're up in a plane and radar and a night scope, you're going to see all these boats. Where are they all coming [from]?
(R17-F)

Related to this was the frustration that drug traffickers adapt so quickly, making it difficult to keep up with changes in their methods and tactics. One respondent said that agents were currently seeing a shift in operations from drugs entering on yolas (a wooden vessel with a small motor) to drugs entering on entertainment boats (such as

jet-skis and cruise boats), since these were less likely to be searched. The respondent explained, “We can’t define how, but a loophole has been found again and I see ourselves at that point where we’re trying to figure out, okay, there’s a loophole and we’re not seeing it” (R14-F).

Again, emphasising the scale and diversity of transnational crime in the Caribbean, another respondent suggested that it was important to think beyond drug crime:

We have certain countries they have offshore banking for money laundering. They have Internet sites to commit fraud, telemarketing fraud, insurance fraud, that is here on this island, so you will find a whole spectrum of crime not only drugs. (R16-F)

This repeated response regarding the interconnectedness of crime, coupled with the Caribbean’s ideal conditions for transnational crime, such as its geographical advantages, make it a particularly challenging area in which to work.

4.3.2 Is it my problem, your problem, or our problem?: the impact of geography. In understanding how other regions are affected by PR/DR linked crime, two factors emerged as relevant to cooperation: firstly, the awareness other countries and islands have of the problem of crime in PR/DR; secondly, the extent to which they perceive this transnational crime as affecting their own area. Cooperation with areas outside of the Caribbean, such as in North and South America, and cooperation between islands, apart from PR/DR, was generally described as ad hoc rather than established, with crime awareness and the perception of local impact being key to whether cooperation occurs. This suggests that having a sense of a common problem helps to link different forces and build cooperation and trust. However, it appears that competition and territorialism are also factors that emerge as having influence in hampering cooperation.

It is the interconnected nature of crime in the Caribbean that reaches across geographical borders, making the situation everyone’s problem and not purely one of PR/DR. For example, drugs moving through PR/DR often arrive from, or are then sent on to, smaller islands, such as St. Martin, St. Thomas, or St. Croix. The awareness of this problem among smaller islands meant that they were eager to cooperate, for reasons such as the impact that a reputation for drug trading could have on their tourism industries. One respondent talked about this with reference to Aruba:

I think it's because their economy is so much smaller and their island is so much smaller and so they kind of have a tighter grip on things and they would like it, for example this whole Aruba situation. As long as you have, you know, a dirty mob reputation and the media think like that, your tourist industry which those islands rely on, will go down the drain (R23-Internatiomal).

However, in cases where transnational crime did not have a serious impact on islands, or in cases where there was no perceived effect, islands were less likely to be interested in cooperating. In cases where crime was perceived to be simply 'passing through', other forces were likely to be less motivated to cooperate because, as one officer put it, they think, "Hey, it's not our problem, it's your problem" (R17-F).

A key theme that echoed throughout many of the responses was that cooperation with local forces in other countries, islands, or the US mainland depended, to a large extent, on whether agents had an understanding of PR/DR crime and whether they thought it affected their area. In some cases, this understanding, as well as the clear interests at stake, including the cultural links and affinities between the forces (e.g., PR's ties with Miami and New York), could be relied upon in terms of cooperation. In other cases, however, it depended on shifting priorities, time constraints, and efforts made by individuals involved.

Another key idea that emerged, related to geographic awareness, was that the physical differences between working on the mainland and working on islands presented challenges to cooperating and dealing with transnational crime. The natural border of the seas between islands makes entry to islands easier for traffickers, and makes it more difficult to police them effectively, with one participant commenting that law enforcement "need[s] to look [at] air, ground and sea, so that makes us unique" (R1-L). This naturally leads to a problem of resourcing as resources then need to be used more effectively and innovatively to cover all the different entry points. One respondent said:

PR and the Caribbean, being little islands that are spread out in a big chunk of water, the resources and the way that you address these problems are different to how you address problems in the border, for example, where you put up a wall, put in a bunch of sentries. (R3-I)

Some officers suggested that the smaller islands simply did not have the resources available to efficiently police all the different entry point, but, again, this could be presented as an opportunity for cooperation rather than as a barrier to it, as one noted: “There are small islands and they cannot function totally by themselves in a lot of respects so they have to depend on other people whether it be the Brits, whether it be the DEA, whether it be family” (R25-F).

In relation to cooperation with forces on the mainland, the most important factor in cooperation, when inquiring about North America, was whether other forces saw collaboration as something that was in their better interest; whether they were aware of how transnational crime was related to the crimes they investigate. Many respondents provided examples of times when they had successfully cooperated with mainland US forces, suggesting that, particularly in areas with strong links to the Caribbean, such as New York and Miami, awareness of the effects of PR/DR related crime existed. In comparison, some respondents felt that other forces did not appreciate or understand the nature of PR/DR crime, or felt that it did not affect them and were therefore less cooperative. One respondent thought that forces in other parts of the US saw the Caribbean as “on the margins” and perceived crime there as non-threatening to the ‘US mainland: “They seem sometimes to look at the Caribbean as a problem out of the sides, out of the back of the nation and not as a problem within the nation” (R14-F).

This reinforced the idea that the perception of transnational crime as a shared problem and an understanding of its interconnectedness are key influencers towards cooperation. Where this does not exist, respondents report that cooperation is less common.

Apart from the sense of a shared problem, awareness of a shared culture influenced cooperation amongst police forces in particular locales. In areas like Miami, where migration from the Caribbean has been high, not only are many police officers of Latin American origin, but so is the population they are policing. Some respondents suggested that this cultural link improves cooperation:

You had a big influx of Cuban immigrants at one time, you have a bunch of Puerto Ricans taking over Kissimmee or Orlando and other areas of Florida, you have a bunch of South Americans coming in and that all pretty much just changes your style in the sense of, ‘How am I

going to deal with all these individuals', and how, culturally, you have to approach it. (R3-I)

This acknowledges the need to recognise differences and adapt accordingly in order to deal with the alternative modes of operation that characterise different cultures.

Cooperation with Central and South American countries was found to be less extensive than cooperation with islands or with mainland US forces. While there might be some links, information sharing and other forms of cooperation were less frequent and proactive. Since fewer respondents addressed this, there was less information about what caused this lack of cooperation, but one respondent suggested it stemmed from legal differences, as well as the fact that countries with different political systems to the US could be difficult to work with:

Sometimes you know that there's someone out there that you want to get your hands on, the same government tries to hassle you and you've got to go through a whole lot of changes to get your hands on that person [...] but what makes it really hard is the difference on the system. We've got a democratic system, they work on a republican system and all that kind of stuff, and sometimes even government officials believe that you're just hassling people. (R28-L)

Overall, responses suggested that the biggest factor for building trust and cooperation within the law enforcement community, across borders, is a sense that transnational crime is a shared problem. In areas where forces thought of PR/DR-related crimes as 'someone else's problem,' or where they did not clearly see the links between the crime and the area they were policing, cooperation was more difficult to establish. In the very least, there is a need for participants to have a stake in solving them. A shared culture in areas of high Caribbean/Latin American migration also supports a raised awareness and motivates cooperation.

4.3.3 Divided, not united: cultural clashes and legal differences. Another significant factor that emerged throughout the responses was a sense that cooperation in the Caribbean differs because of the sheer number of different islands, each with their own cultures and legal systems. Law enforcement agencies in the continental US might, depending on borders, deal with only one other country – their nearest neighbour, whether Mexico or Canada – whereas, in the Caribbean, officers have to

learn to cooperate with partners from a range of different cultures. These include islands that are overseas territories of Britain, France, or the Netherlands, as well as sovereign states with their own distinct legal and cultural traditions and Latin American countries, such as Colombia or Venezuela. This can lead to complications in dealing with individual legal systems – not to mention law enforcement traditions and cultures. For instance, one respondent mentioned the difficulty of dealing with local by-laws or ‘hidden laws’ of other islands, while others mentioned the challenges posed by different legal traditions. As an example, in islands with a Dutch legal tradition, informants have no legal recognition or protection.

In addition to problems of cultural and legal difference, it was clear that some islands and states are more proactive than others in dealing with transnational crime, and political will was identified as a crucial factor in facilitating cooperation. Respondents noted that they deal extensively with islands/states that are willing to put effort and resources into dealing with transnational crime, as opposed to others that are incapable or unwilling to deal with crime effectively. As one respondent shared:

I think there is much more co-operation here, you just, you know, it's the same (inaudible) in Canada, you know, each place is unique, and what the problem is and how they are supposed to work this out, and some places are not working this out, only by connection with a couple of countries who are actually making a strong effort. I mean the Dominicans and ourselves work very closely, you know, the Dutch co-operate, the same with the English and stuff like that (R17-F).

An exploration into shared cultural elements between the islands of the Caribbean revealed that they were not necessarily positive or helpful towards cooperation. One respondent described a specific “island culture” that could be seen across the Caribbean (R7-L). The officer characterised this as a “relaxed and laid back, slack attitude”. Other, rather negative characteristics of Caribbean culture included nepotism and corruption, and a tendency towards territorialism between agencies (although this, it was suggested, is declining). However, these cultural elements were not the main element that respondents identified as common to the islands. Rather, they suggested that the Caribbean is united by a more instrumental factor, specifically, that the level of transnational crime, and especially violent crime across the islands, means that officers develop a sense of a shared goal or a common enemy. This sense of a

shared problem or goal appears to be an important element in developing trust between officers of different forces, and could be a powerful force in facilitating effective cooperation, as suggested by Gambetta (1988). One respondent stated:

One thing we share is the drug problem all over the Caribbean so we share that particular similar problem. I think that's probably one of the reasons we're – that motivates us to do a lot of intelligence and a lot of communication, having a communal problem. This is our everyday nightmare, people getting killed because of the drug points and the drug selling....it's the same in Jamaica, it's the same here, a lot of islands. (R24-F)

In summary, it is clear that, although the Caribbean experiences a unique range of challenges with cooperation, these challenges in themselves create an environment in which cooperation must constantly be practised. The difficulty of one island dealing with transnational crime independently, as well as the sheer number of complexities that arise from working with a large number of very different agencies, along with the sense of a shared communal struggle against crime, all help to differentiate the Caribbean from the way the mainland tends to cooperate and to encourage cooperation between different forces.

4.4 Tackling the Problem

Stakeholders' perspectives on tackling the problem included key issues of cooperation and ways to cultivate that cooperation, whether by employing more proactive v.s. reactive methods or tackling crime right at its source. However, ultimately perceived solutions were reduced to: better communication and sharing of information, working within local laws and getting along with local police. Desired changes by stakeholders' included: more resources, organisational restructuring and the need to train together.

4.4.1 Cultivating better cooperation through improved communication and intelligence sharing. Several key themes emerged around the kind of cooperation needed to address transnational crime in the Caribbean. In practical terms, these included a need to improve communication or sharing of intelligence, and a need for improved training. A clear theme also emerged of the need to focus on the roots and sources of crime, proactively tackling criminal networks and cutting illegal migration.

Other improvements needed include a greater political will to focus on crime, and a reduction in corruption. Some respondents thought that no improvements were needed, or that change was in progress, but, overall, there appears to be a need for improvement, as there was some suggestion that other actors needed to make a greater effort in cooperation, specifically, the DR. Key barriers to cooperation in the DR, too, were a lack of political will to deal with crime, and the effects of corruption. Some respondents thought that these were particularly bad in the DR, with officers there constantly trying to cope with “mini crime waves” rather than addressing crime at its root. In addition, corruption meant that building relationships for cooperation was difficult, both in building trust and in dealing with a high turnover of staff, as one respondent verbalised:

It's like, okay so all the effort and investment we put into this person to work and have a good relation, now is down the drain and now we got to start all over again, so that's one of the problems that we [have] with working with them. (R13-International)

Sharing information effectively is the highest priority in improving cooperation. Most respondents thought that information should be shared constantly and freely, and that information technology (IT) systems should be linked to allow access to basic information (e.g., names of criminals). There was also a sense that there should be greater information sharing between intelligence communities globally, as well as between organisations within the US, on account of the diversity and global spread of drug-trafficking operations. As one officer explained:

The problem is you don't have specific groups doing the trafficking. You have the Colombians producing, you have Venezuelans transporting, you have people in Panama doing all the money laundering and dealing with the black market there, you have the Middle East using the drug money to support the international terrorism operations there. (R3-I)

While the literature examines the need for information sharing, particularly in the context of intelligence and deconfliction, it also notes that there are difficulties in this area, with intelligence communities not typically very good at cooperating with each other (Anderson, 1989; Sheptycki, 2000).

Cooperation as key. Cooperation on addressing transnational crime falls into two categories: operation-based or intelligence-based. Cooperation in undercover operations and surveillance is one key area in which cooperation is either already strong or is considered important to develop. There was also a clear consensus that this was one area in which forces were required work together. As an essential element of proactive policing, respondents discussed undercover operations in terms of trying to 'keep ahead' of criminal networks:

Just slowly trying to step up and finding the new routes they are using and try and attack that route, and then they'll come up with a different one and you're just moving back and forth using confidential sources, using wire taps (R18-F).

Generally it seems that cooperation between agencies is perceived as widespread, yet not always effective. Some respondents thought that officers were gaining the skills for cooperation and becoming more adept:

Well we have co-operation from all kinds of agencies, the Coast Guard, we have Customs. I think everybody has gained experience in ways and we are trying to put all the efforts to cover all these [...] I think we have the people, we have the knowledge and the skills. (R1-L)

Others, however, thought that there was still too much competition and rivalry between agencies for cooperation to exist. Several respondents thought that antagonism between different agencies over their territory and cases could still hamper cooperation, with one adding: "There are still turf wars happening..."(R10-International). Some of this was related to funding, since "He who has the most, how would you say, arrests, gets the most funding..." (R12-F). But more important was the culture of competition and histories of rivalry that existed. For instance:

You know how badly we hate the FBI and I don't know if you've noticed but there is a lot of animosity...Can you imagine us actually trying to take directions from somebody that carried their badge. (R22-Federal)

The extreme level of dislike revealed in that statement, and its perception of universality, is significant. It supports the overwhelming sense in the literature that intelligence agencies are not always good at cooperating, and continues to illuminate

why. There is arguably a link here to culture as a barrier, with the two organizations clashing, possibly due to a lack of trust (Sheptycki, 2000). This comment is particularly reflective of the literature relating to the barriers to TNPC. However, there was certainly a positive response to interagency initiatives, such as HIDTA, particularly in terms of the resources they contributed. One respondent in particular stressed the range of programs that are funded by HIDTA:

You've got HIDTA, you've got PSN, Project Safe Neighbourhood, you have OCDTA, Organised Crime and Drug Enforcement Task Forces which are funded by the Department of Justice and specifically also this is managed by DEA, so that puts a lot of money which...we definitely need money to address the crime. (R11-F)

This response recognises the benefit of cooperation and considers HIDTA as being an idyllic vehicle by which to facilitate this. It is also interesting to note the recognition of financial benefits, having seen how economics can be a barrier to TNPC (Johnston, 2000). Taking into account the clear economic and resourcing challenges to policing in the Caribbean, this seems, by no means, a minor factor in explaining why agencies and local forces might want to work with a program such as HIDTA. In addition, the possibility to defuse the link between competition for successes in order to attract funding, as described above, may encourage efforts towards cooperation.

During operations, it seems that assets and resources are shared. For instance, one respondent discussed his unit's joint operations with the Coast Guard, with both forces putting their resources/assets to common use, whether that meant computer equipment, personnel, or vehicles. However, another respondent seemed to think that, although cooperation on undercover operations was good, outside of that, there was less need to cooperate. Another felt that there was too much focus on small-time criminals, and that police were not going after the source of the problem:

The authorities are looking only at the small guys, you know [...] try to look at other gangs, other people, the people with power and money right here [...] need to direct our effort in those people in the marinas with the big boats, 50' boats. (R2-F)

This suggests that, although cooperation is positive in operational/practical terms, disagreement can still exist about the aims of the operation and perhaps, outside of

structured operations, cooperation is still too ad hoc and irregular. The statement of the last respondent also reveals an attitude towards corruption, at the “power and money” level, which is a perceived barrier to cooperation and advancement.

Cultivating cooperation. Respondents identified several factors, which encourage or hinder a proactive approach to cooperation. Those which hinder cooperation included a lack of political will to focus on the ‘big fish’ in the drug trade, as well as resource constraints. Although a lack of resources was identified by some respondents as merely a good reason to be reactive, others saw it as a factor actively hindering proactive cooperation. For instance, a lack of equipment for intelligence gathering and analysis, such as statistical crime mapping, could make it difficult to assess accurately where crime threats come from – an important aspect of dealing with crime proactively. One respondent pointed out how the Coast Guard had improved proactive cooperation with smaller island nations by providing them with additional resources:

Coast Guard’s [...] initiated a lot of programs that they’ve incorporated/got on board these other nations who have little resources – ‘We’ll help you.’ Some of the assets that the other people have in fact been repaid, the costs have been more or less paid for by other government entities, you know. They don’t talk too much about that but it’s done. (R4-F)

This suggests that cooperation itself can ameliorate the effects of a lack of resources, which then allows for a proactive approach to be implemented. Sometimes cooperation was stymied by a lack of resources rather than a lack of will. One respondent suggested that other islands sometimes did what they could to cooperate, but might simply not have had the resources to help facilitate effective cooperation:

In the DR, we try and work with them, [...] and, I don’t know, they try to do their best but like I say, they can’t, because these people, they just make their own way on boats and they try to come here at night time and it’s very difficult (R30-F).

Another need identified in facilitating cooperation was for increased undercover operations and informants to deepen their knowledge of criminal activities. There was a sense that this was hindered, to some degree, by cultural differences between agencies

and local police (because informants were more likely to want to deal with local police), and that corruption could hamper efforts since it puts informants at risk.

As previously mentioned, another theme was that sharing intelligence, and communicating it well, was an essential element of success in cooperation, while we have seen evidence (both within the existing body of literature and in the primary evidence generated in this research) to suggest that, generally, this is not successfully achieved. In some cases, however, officers have a strong awareness of how important it is to have 'eyes and ears' in different areas and jurisdictions, therefore, creating motivation to cooperate effectively. Participants also believed that other agencies understood this, creating a basis for cooperation, as one respondent said, "And I understand that those agents of the different agencies, they work together when they are in those countries...." (R27-L). Another respondent added:

We have a very good relationship with the DNCP NacionaleContolle (inaudible), the NCB, they have their own risk. The Central Information (inaudible) is how they call it - and this is very good. It's small though, they get an outstanding start, they get intelligence within hours, they get the information, they analyse it, they send the leads, its pretty good (R16-F).

While practical changes, such as improvements in communication and training, were important to the respondents, many also thought that there was a failure to focus on the right areas, holding back effective combating of transnational crime. This could be seen in short-termism and a tendency to focus on areas where immediate improvements could be seen, for example, by addressing low-level crime in housing projects rather than the criminal networks who feed that crime. To tackle crime at its source, one officer challenged:

Who are you going to get, the usual suspects and a bunch of junkies, you know, these guys are replaced the next day and life goes on [...] But if you are always never getting past the couple of fingers on the hand and you're never moving up to the arm or the elbow, you don't seem to be getting anywhere. (R17-F)

Several respondents seemed to agree that tackling the drugs trade in isolation would not be effective, moving on to suggest that focusing on reducing illegal

immigration and human trafficking would be of great benefit. This suggests a motivation for organisations to cooperate with those who work in these subsidiary and related areas.

Finally, personality, as a factor, was also identified by one respondent who had trouble getting a hold of information from a local intelligence unit:

Because somebody in the past had burnt them and you know, to the locals, one federal agency is the same as all federal agencies. So [...] they could breach it proactively basically by going there confidently, you know, showing that they weren't, you know, out to burn those guys [...] they were very proactive in actually building on relationships... And it has to be personality driven because another agent might not have been able to do it. (R22-F)

It is better to be proactive. A greater proportion of respondents characterised police cooperation as reactive rather than proactive, with most of these agents believing that a tendency to react to events, or at least be *too* reactive, as is currently the practice, was a negative quality. “You know, I would love to sit here and say honestly very proactive but honest ...It's very reactive” (R23-I). They saw the tendency to be proactive as more desirable. However, not all of those who thought cooperation was reactive thought it was necessarily better to be proactive, appearing to relate “reactiveness” to “responsiveness”. Viewed as a pragmatic approach, responding in a timely way to demands, one agent shares: “It's reactive. My observation is we respond to the needs of other Caribbean nations” (R24-F). It was also implied that a reactive, independent approach is more pragmatic or realistic in the “real world” than a proactive cooperative approach. Similarly, another respondent agreed that a reactive approach was more pragmatic, this time on account of limited resources. A few respondents believed that current cooperation was more proactive than reactive: “Proactive...yes. If something happens here we have to go deep into that” (R8-I).

All of the respondents who thought cooperation was already proactive thought this was a positive thing; none saw a need for ‘pragmatism’ or ‘balance’ in a tendency to be reactive. They talked about proactive cooperation in positive terms, speaking along the lines of “we are going to go all the way down to take the problem from the beginning. We don't want to leave anything, we want to close the case and we like to take care of it” (R20-F), and of being “always on the alert [...] we cover a whole lot of

ground, and we always work out ...The things which either have to be addressed" (R28-L).

A few respondents suggested that there was currently a balance (or differing approaches in different areas) between proactive and reactive approaches. Some, but not all, suggested that this was appropriate. For example, one respondent thought that different countries were more or less proactive, but clearly thought being proactive was a positive thing. When asked to expound upon the "right" balance between the reactive and proactive approach, fewer respondents regarded the balance as right versus not. Most favoured a proactive approach. However, by its nature, much police work involves reacting to events, and cannot be entirely proactive. As one respondent explained:

Quite frankly you've got a smart enemy who's been doing this longer and longer. So I mean you are always going to be more reactionary most of the time, you are going to get some stuff, you know, but for the most part a lot of it's luck (R17-F).

Among those who thought the balance was not right, most thought it needed to be more proactive, some thought that improvements were being made, while others thought improvements had to be continual. However, a proactive approach was still seen as more effective, for instance, because it was more likely to secure convictions: "Yes, well usually when you get an indictment in the Caribbean, it's because you've already performed the investigation, you know, you've got intelligence, you get information and then you perform, so I think it's proactive more than reactive" (R1-L). Another respondent confirmed, "I think anything proactive is always preferable" (R22-F).

In conclusion, in terms of cooperation, there was a general consensus among respondents that at least some proactive policing is needed to attack criminal networks and operate 'one step ahead' of criminals. Most also recognised that it is impossible to be completely proactive and that a balance had to be reached. Yet there are clear difficulties in a proactive approach, since it requires political will and additional resources, and can be hindered by corruption and personality clashes. However, it seems that cooperation can help overcome some of these challenges, for instance, by sharing resources.

Desired changes. Stakeholders expressed three main areas of desired changes: resources, organisational restructuring and joint training.

Resources, resources, resources. As suggested previously, proactive policing requires more resources for cooperation to be effective, and many officers suggested that funding for better technology would make a proactive (versus reactive) approach more feasible. Several added that local police, in particular, were underfunded, or that funding was misallocated. Many suggested that there was also a need for better technology, while some derided the useless way resources were spent on technology. For instance, resources were originally allocated to vehicle-based computer systems that, in the end, did not work because there had been no money left to spend on linking up the system. Another barrier to cooperation included bureaucracy, related once again to a lack, or misallocation, of resources. One respondent complained of funds being spent on expensive computer systems for cars while basic resources, such as a fax machine at the airport or better pay for officers, were neglected. This failure to appropriately allocate resources could be related to the problem of 'exported' solutions. Described by Brogden (2005), this is where resources are being spent on acquiring the accoutrements of 'modern' policing, which are useless or inappropriate to the context, while more basic elements are neglected.

Others pointed out that technology was an essential tool in proactive policing, such as mapping crime to see where trends are appearing. It was noted that transnational initiatives, such as HIDTA, sometimes unofficially made up for the shortfall, suggesting that cooperation itself can help alleviate the economic problems of policing in a transitional society, by allowing poorer countries to benefit (whether officially or unofficially) from the resources of others. Another respondent added that local police do well considering how few resources they have: "They're doing a lot with almost nothing, I mean, no equipment, and you've got to see these people who are in the fields doing the best they can with nearly nothing and it is amazing" (R6-F).

A lack of political will and, connected to that, corruption, were identified by some as the root of underfunding, as well as a more general problem in achieving successful prosecutions. One respondent noted the lack of cooperation between different arms of the legal system, such as the police, the courts, and the prosecution service, as possibly related to corruption: "Sometimes we bring cases to them and they're good solid cases, and sometimes they just get tossed out" (R7-L). The implication was that proactive attempts to indict and prosecute people higher up in

criminal networks could fail because they were simply too powerful. Better leadership was also an issue for one respondent, who thought that there was a need for one leader to coordinate cooperation and lead/push others, taking the “dominant role” (R17-F).

Organisational makeover as a must. Some respondents thought organisations needed to be completely remade in order to facilitate cooperation, with several wanting to revisit the topic at the end of interviews. One shared the need for a drastic makeover: “Restructuring the whole thing, a big clean house clean, a clean sweep” (R15-F). Another respondent identified a need for a truly international/transnational police force:

It would be great to have an actual international police force and a group of agents that will investigate and move from one country to another and be able to get all the evidence that I sometimes – sometimes you can have the victim in PR, the perpetrator in Santa Domingo and some of the evidence in let’s say Aruba or Martinique, and then it’s almost impossible to actually submit a crime. (R9-F)

This illustrates a key challenge of transnational policing; that it can be difficult to establish in which jurisdiction a crime was committed. However, despite the relevance of this idea to transnational policing, the respondent added that this was ‘far-fetched’ and that he didn’t “see how that can be done right now” (R24-F). This supports the suggestion that while cooperation would ideally be an extremely central element of TNP, this is not always fully achieved.

Another respondent mentioned the language barrier in terms of communication, at least for dealing with local police (Puerto Rican-born officers in the DEA did speak English, but local police did not necessarily). The emphasis was on local police becoming bilingual rather than English-speakers learning Spanish, which provides further evidence of a culture-clash in the area of language.

Along the same vein, at the end of interviews, several respondents wanted to discuss the importance of improving cooperation even further, and one theme that emerged was the sense that there needed to be better control of cooperative activity, for example, by centralising cooperation. One respondent suggested, “Everybody I know is cooking in different kitchens, that is a big problem...We need to centralise investigations and open the channel for communications between the authorities in those countries” (R2-F).

Other suggestions included having the UN more involved with cooperation in the Caribbean, using the Department of Homeland Security as a good example to follow in terms of effective centralisation, and speeding up communication in centralising cooperation. Centralising cooperation, though, also seems like a reaction to the cultural and legal challenges of cooperating across a range of moderately different contexts. It implies a desire to homogenise and impose order on the confusion of the Caribbean which operates in such a different way; to uniform that difference rather than to embrace it and use it for positive means. Indeed, when considering the differences in culture as a barrier, it was also noted that differences in culture could be a strength; a potential now somehow overlooked.

Training us together. Better training was also a clear priority for respondents, and was considered a contributor to cooperation in three important ways. First, shared training was seen as helping forces work together more effectively, building trust and relationships conducive to cooperation. For instance, one officer said that, having trained officers from the Customs and Border Protection of the DR, they now know that they can trust those officers to be their ‘eyes and ears’ in the DR, and that they had “seen a significant reduction on the number of seizures that we get here because they are being more effective there” (R27-L). To some extent, a failure to trust other participants in cooperation can be related to a lack of trust in their abilities, which can be addressed during shared training. Sharing training can also build a shared set of tactics and ways of working together, thereby reducing misunderstandings and work culture clashes.

Secondly, shared training helps forces deal with the specific character of crime in the Caribbean. As one officer described, “I always say that the Puerto Rican criminal is different than the US criminal and in that same sense, the island criminal, the Caribbean criminal, for example” (R11-F). This stresses, again, the need to develop methods of dealing with crime that directly address the local context, rather than using a ‘one-size fits all’ approach.

The third way in which shared training helps is by correcting a shortfall of training on other islands, due to a lack of resources. This means that the problems of limited resources identified by Brogden (2005) can be, to some extent, enriched by organisations with more resources sharing their own training with others. For instance, one respondent commented: “Whenever there’s something like operations that we

conduct, we take advantage of that to train with the Dominican Navy and we try to help them out [...] they have an Academy [...] but it's not enough..." (R13-I).

In summary, a significant number of respondents thought that transnational police cooperation could be improved by sharing intelligence, sharing training and focusing more proactively on tackling criminal networks at higher, rather than lower, levels. While some respondents thought cooperation was satisfactory, most officers thought there was greater room for improvement, some blaming the inability to reach its full potential on an unwillingness or inability on the part of other islands to cooperate.

Working within local laws. The challenges of working within local laws clearly posed problems for officers. The diversity of legal systems in the Caribbean was mentioned in responses to other questions but was again raised by the respondents as a source of frustration when asked about its impact on cooperation. In particular, the need to build cases and achieve convictions while cooperating with local laws caused frustration, since officers need to deal with not only local laws and police forces, but also with local courts. One respondent said,

We had a case about four weeks ago in which there was an attempt to kill someone, throwing the person overboard a boat and we started an investigation because they requested our assistance. We were helping them but when that got to the point of the judicial process with Attorneys and Magistrates, it was impossible. (R26-F)

As discussed previously, several mentioned the Dutch legal tradition preventing the protection of informants, which runs counter to legal tradition in the US/PR.

In the area of jurisdiction, there were differing experiences of cooperation. One officer complained that cooperation with the DR was not good, and since they had little cooperation with the Dominican Navy, it resulted in the same individuals repeatedly being caught trying to enter PR by sea, then being sent back before returning. Another, however, suggested that although it was necessary to ask permission to enter territorial waters, there was a fairly good/respectful relationship with local authorities.

I mean, we just can't pass that Dominican border. First of all we need to ask for permission to go up to their own territory and we obviously cannot enforce our laws in their waters [...] obviously the key here is that we need to show respect for them (R6-F).

This suggested that cooperation over jurisdiction is not consistent.

In comparison, extradition can be notoriously complex, but apparently extradition from the DR has become easier, with several respondents suggesting that the DR authorities had cooperated well on recent cases involving the extradition of individuals. Extradition is an important tool for dealing with transnational crime, in particular, as one respondent pointed out, because of corruption and weaker systems in some states, such as the DR: “Getting extradited to the US, you know, they get the sentences, the convictions and the sentences that they should get but they will not get in their own countries” (R25-F).

The need to get along: relationships with local police. Good relationships with local police were cited as crucial to the success of working within local legal systems and jurisdictions. Some respondents warned that legal issues could become politically complicated, with one saying that, in dealing with the DR, there was a need to constantly put pressure on them to act, but that good relationships with local police made it easier. When working in another country, their usual means of influence were not relevant, proving good contacts and relationships with locals were more important. Even where there were good relationships with local police, getting things done sometimes required officers to ‘get involved with politics’ by involving governments and embassies, which is seen as complicated and difficult.

Reinforcing the importance of local contacts, respondents who said that their unit had few contacts with the DR forces emphasised that this meant they were at a disadvantage. As one participant highlighted,

The only relations that we have to Santa Domingo is the Interpol office, and we need to verify if any person we are looking for is in Santa Domingo so we send a message by Interpol and we do the operation and that’s it, but not the police in Santa Domingo. That is a closed area for us and that is a problem. (R12-F)

In developing relationships with local contacts, it was seen as essential to be respectful of local police and not to impose on them:

You can’t go and impose, you know, say, ‘Well we do it like this in our country so this is how I think you need to do it.’ I mean that’s not going to get you very far with those guys. (R18-F)

This tactic appears to build the mutual trust required for cooperation, while the emphasis on respect for others' jurisdictions may also show an awareness of the need to play down the competition and rivalry that can hinder cooperation.

My hands are tied: working within international laws. Generally, respondents agreed that working within US laws was less complicated and easier than local laws, although many had complaints about the way both US law and international law had a tendency to be 'politically correct', thereby obstructing law enforcement efforts by protecting the rights of suspects/criminals. Overall, international law was seen as limiting rather than enabling. Related to this, often the positive elements mentioned regarding local laws tended to be ways in which local laws allowed them freedoms that US law did not, for instance, the ease in which to obtain wire taps. Respondents made little reference to human rights law, even when prompted by the interviewer. However, at least one respondent emphasised that they attempted, or were required, to continue to abide by US laws and protect individuals' constitutional rights, even while working outside the US. In addition, some respondents expressed uncertainty or ignorance about the kind of laws and treaties that were in place, for instance: "That is hard to answer. There are laws there but from the back of my head, I don't know..." (R1-L).

Similarly, respondents often expressed a sense of distance from and frustration with, in particular, international law or with the idea of changing the law. As law enforcement officers, they seemed to feel that their role was to work within existing laws and not to think about how laws could be changed. Related to this, another suggestion made at the end of interviews was to improve intergovernmental cooperation, particularly with Central and South American countries, in order to deal better with drug trafficking at its source, before it reached the Caribbean. One respondent cited an example of a time when this had been achieved successfully when dealing with marijuana being trafficked out of Colombia; an agreement between the US and Colombia gave the US Coast Guard the capacity to carry out surveillance on the high seas and search boats leaving Colombia. The respondent thought this worked well until traffickers adapted their methods. Another respondent considered:

Most of the drugs come from Colombia and South America and they have a route already established and I think down there in the south close to South America we need more international agreements so we

can protect the ... that frontier over there.....Yes, the start of the source (R1-L) .

Again, this echoes the need to work more proactively and improve the conditions for cooperation. In terms of forcing cooperation from less willing governments, one respondent thought that there should be some attempt to penalise the countries themselves, using international law, for crimes committed by their citizens. This was an interesting example of using coercion in order to force cooperation, which was not otherwise discussed by respondents.

Overall, the themes that emerged from respondents' answers suggest that law enforcement officers find themselves at odds with the law more often than they feel enabled by it. This came through most clearly in frustrations expressed regarding attempting to work within local law, but also in the responses relating to US and international laws. Relationships with other officers and forces were the most important element in negotiating these difficulties, as they could sometimes cut through red tape and achieve things the officers themselves could not.

Who is accountable, or rather, who can be? Based on responses, it appears that legal accountability and jurisdiction always lie with the country in which operations take place, although agencies are still responsible for the actions of their agents no matter in which country they operate. Leadership, considered separately from legal responsibility/jurisdiction, was more disputed by participants, as some thought that the DEA always took the lead, while others thought the host country was always in charge, while still others contended that it was decided on a case-by-case basis.

While the DEA often provides leadership and impetus for cases, for example by providing other agencies with intelligence, the legal responsibility and jurisdiction for dealing with operations lie with the country involved. US agencies could be invited to participate but are not automatically involved Even if they provided the impetus for the investigation, they would not have arrest powers overseas. One respondent mentioned legal provisions that prevented agents from making arrests abroad:

We give them the intelligence and they do the enforcement action, we are not there when they enforcement action, technically we're not there. Do we get invited? Yes. Are we taking an active role? No. They must take the lead because it works in different countries. (R25-F)

Therefore, while a US agency might take the lead in launching or developing an investigation, any operations or arrests taking place outside the US would be carried out under the powers of officers of that country.

In the case of arrests or searches at sea, the area where the incident took place (in whose waters) would determine jurisdiction. It was also suggested that, in cases involving illegal entry to the country, Immigration or the Coast Guard would have responsibility.

Show me the money: financial accountability and support. The impression was given that financial accountability and resources also varied from case to case. Most respondents did not think that responsibility for financing lay entirely with the US, although one said,

Well it's always going to end up lying with us because we take it more seriously...Yes, but for the most part it's going to be an initiation on our part...Most of the resources they enjoy with the US in one form or another. Whether it's some kind of grant or purchase or payment, that/which goes for the most part of these countries. It comes from the US Government in some form or another. (R17-F)

Contrary to this opinion, for the most part it appears that financial accountability is shared between agencies/forces, depending on the resources used and the structure of the investigation. As one agent stated:

If another country asks for help the manpower is, each jurisdiction, the time spent by investigators and the automobiles are used helping the other country so this is all individually shared by the different jurisdictions [...]Each jurisdiction is very, very much autonomous when it comes to how much money they'll spend and what type of manpower they will. (R24-F)

The sheer inconsistency of responses implies that there are no hard and fast rules for where financial accountability lies. However, there might be tendencies for actors with extensive resources to take a greater role in funding operations. For instance, one officer suggested that the DEA always funded operations (R4-F), while another thought that HIDTA, due to its large and consistent budget, was the main funding source for collaborative operations (R17-F).

Human rights as a hindrance. The issue of accountability for human rights was raised several times. Respondents did not tend to think that the DEA could be held responsible or accountable in terms of human rights being upheld in other countries, although they thought that there was some possibility of leading by example. Some suggested, for instance, that it was important to train other forces and share ‘your way of doing things.’ One officer pointed out that it was difficult to gauge the effect of DEA actions on human rights abuses elsewhere, since it was impossible to control what actions other states would carry out on the basis of information provided by US agencies/the DEA. For instance, one respondent said:

If you’re working on their territory, it’s their law but at the same time, if your targets are now subject to their laws, what happens if the target gets itself tortured.... And not only that but not just torture, say this target is, shall we say, Colombia for instance, we have targets down there that are not just criminals per se but enemies of the state, they are viable military targets, where do you draw the line? Okay, your target is wanted because he was drug trafficking, okay but he is also wanted for mass (inaudible) so what happens when, okay well, you give that information to the Colombians. Yeah, they want to arrest him but they’ll be just as happy to drop a bomb on him. (R22-F)

In the case of human rights, officers were uncertain about where the responsibility and accountability lay. This could suggest that, sometimes, this issue was overlooked – whether through ignorance or in taking advantage of a confusing system. When dealing with states where human rights abuses are rife, there is no way of telling what a tip-off could lead to, but clearly it is possible (and considered important) to lead by example.

4.5 Summary and Conclusions

To summarise Chapter 4, good cooperation with other islands was clearly seen as essential by the respondents, and, overall, appears to be beneficial, despite a range of challenges that were described by officers. The range of different responses suggests that, despite generally good cooperation, it can still be unbalanced and depend upon the different circumstances and units or agencies involved. For instance, some respondents had had very positive experiences, where local authorities were highly involved and

flexible, while some were vehemently opposed to cooperation in certain circumstances. There was a great deal of variation in terms of the extent to which effective cooperation had been achieved, but a general consensus that it was necessary. This reflects the canon of literature as a whole, which extolls the benefits of cooperation without being ignorant of the barriers (Hogg & Vaughan, 2002; Gambetta, 1988; Weber & Bowling, 2002).

On the other hand, others described situations where a lack of willingness to cooperate was linked to other islands viewing transnational crime as something that 'passed through' their jurisdiction rather than directly affecting them. This was only one of the barriers to cooperation. Other difficulties included a lack of resources on other islands. This could sometimes be mitigated by helping local forces, for instance, by helping them develop their ability to build cases. In cases where relationships were positive, respondents noted that it could be useful to cooperate. Using sentencing as an example, where criminals were likely to be granted longer prison terms, other legal systems proved more satisfactory than that of the US

Overall, the respondents agreed that cooperation in the Caribbean differs from cooperation elsewhere, corroborating the thesis that the Caribbean is distinct. The Caribbean's geographical character as a chain of islands, and its cultural history of being a collection of distinct island cultures with their own legal and cultural quirks, were singled out as important key elements. However, respondents differed on whether they saw this as primarily negative. Some went out of their way to point out that having to deal with these challenges daily meant they were better at cooperating than officers who rarely needed to do so. This "forced cooperation" not only means that officers are obliged to constantly practice their skills of cooperation, but also that trust and strong relationships are built by the iteration of cooperation between different actors. Each successful example of cooperation makes the next one more likely.

In general, it seems that most respondents were positive about the kinds of cooperation that had been achieved so far, but felt that there were many areas where cooperation had yet to reach its potential. This appears to be the result of a range of factors, including resourcing problems and a lack of motivation to cooperate, either because there was an inability to see the benefits of cooperation, or because competition appeared to be a more attractive strategy.

Chapter Five

The Role and Contribution of the Drug Enforcement Administration and the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas Program

5.1 Introduction to Chapter Five

This portion of the interviews sought to establish the participants' current role and contact with the DEA, with special attention given to: the best and worst things about working with the DEA; the extent and nature of TNPC between the DEA and other law enforcement agencies; the administration's successes to date; and barriers agents face and possible ways to overcome them.

Major findings related to the extent and nature of cooperation between the DEA and other agencies included joint operations as a form of cooperation, the importance of agents being trained together, and the need to share information and provide resources to officers. When asked about their positive experiences of working with the DEA, major themes revolved around the administration's professional image, its reputation for being organised, well-funded and well-equipped, its advantages in allowing for agent access and its approach in creating job satisfaction. Themes encompassing the negatives of working with the DEA involved agents' undesirable personality traits (e.g. overblown egos) the all-consuming nature of the job, issues with bureaucratic red tape slowing progress, and matters around cases being kept? top secret, even from within, as well as the atmosphere of competition.

When it came to views on the HIDTA Program, the themes which had presented themselves involved: the networking of agents, and creation of links and relationships related to such links; the need for better communication and intelligence sharing; matters around institutionalised secrecy; personality conflicts; the importance of timing; and the need for resources and adequate training.

5.2 The Extent and Nature of Cooperation Between the Drug Enforcement Administration and Other Agencies

The DEA has representation in Foreign Offices in 67 countries, with new offices opening every year. The most recent are in the Middle East, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. One agent commented on the DEA's relationship in foreign countries as excellent:

You know, Afghanistan was one of the most popular places for opium production, the heroin is the by-product, and we are assisting the Department of Defence and other agencies, as well in combating not only drugs but terrorism, as well...they have a co-relationship. The relationship is excellent with the DEA and local police agencies within foreign countries. (R21-F)

Other agents agreed that the DEA is unique, noting that they have officers all over the world. One stated that they may have even more agents than the FBI and that other agencies co-operate with them because they are considered a world leader on drug law enforcement, even sending their people to the DEA Academy to learn new skills (R9-F). Even non-DEA agents, who felt they had limited knowledge and awareness of the DEA's mission and activities in other countries, felt there was strong cooperation. One respondent said:

It's big, people all over the Caribbean and in fact, most of the times that my agency has to go abroad, we have to work with the DEA because they have all the contacts in all those countries. [...] They know all the people at the Embassies, they know all the contacts. It's good that they are all over the place. Eventually one day, we will have an agency like that, you know, in every place, but right now we can't. (R1-L)

The comment that 'one day we will have an agency like that...in every place' is intriguing, suggesting the benefits of having organisations "on the ground" who all cooperate to achieve the same end. The implication of this comment suggests the lack of these type of agencies as a barrier to real success.

Several argued that the DEA would not be able to function well without local cooperation through taskforces (R1-L, R4-F, R9-F, R13-I, R25-F). One DEA agent confirmed that cooperation was indeed extensive and that they value the taskforces attached to their groups (R9-F). Most of the groups have the PR Police Department (PRPD) working with them. Another view, regarding the importance of local connections and understandings was:

Well we have what we call the task forces, the state police, the local police assigned to the HIDTA program [...] they know the area, they know the lands, they know everything about the organisations, the inside

organisations in PR because of the culture and that helps the DEA people from the States to get into these type of organisations, you know. (R16-F)

Other DEA agents highlighted that it all depends on the country that one is dealing with, and whether relationships were good with the DR, with the exception of Venezuela and Haiti. Legal differences also played a large role:

Because when we work with somebody in another country, a case in another country, the Country Office, be it Bogota or in this case Madrid, they have operational control over everything because you know when you operate from another country, you are subject to their laws. That being the case, you can't take the case the way you do here on the streets. There are certain things that other nations will not let you do. In fact a lot of the operations that we would do here in order to gather evidence, considered crime down in Colombia. And we're just starting this case over in Madrid and already we're finding that although we called in the Madrid police and the Spaniards are excellent, they have to answer to their judges. Whereas a lot of questions that have to be answered by us and by the Country Office to the Spanish police before they will authorise an operation. (R22-F)

Overall, many respondents felt that cooperation was very effective between the DEA and other transnational police agencies. Although there were complications involved at times, they were grateful for the DEA's assistance and appreciated their global networks. However, nearly 50% of those interviewed thought the DEA was not working well with local agencies and were extremely competitive for cases. It needs to be kept in mind, however, that many of those responses were given in line with questions regarding the barriers in place rather than as actual perception that cooperation, as such, wasn't a good thing. Since there is no reason why every single HIDTA or any particular agent would have the same experience, it could be suggested that both of the perspectives are equally valid and serve to illustrate the potential benefits, as well as reasonable inconsistencies, in their applied success. One respondent discussed the need for more cooperation between local and federal agents:

One of the problems in PR right now between the law enforcement agents, the local and the feds, is that everybody is running their investigation without shared information and that's why, I believe that DEA is running their investigation apart, do you understand now? ...And the police department resources, I don't know. I think that we need more cooperation between local and federal agents, that includes the DEA and FBI. (R2-F)

There was clearly a lack of strategies to solve this issue. One agent mentioned the communication barrier, with a lack of Spanish-speaking DEA agents, as a problem. The same agent then added that there was an assumption by DEA agents that all PR Police Department (PRPD) officers were corrupt:

...and they might be corrupt, some of them might be corrupt, I believe we shouldn't deny that. But corruption is a thing that we have to look as a complete thing, you know, and we have corruption all over the Governments.[...] And you have to keep on working even in corruption so you cannot stop doing that relationship with another organisation, even if you find some corruption within that agency. You should keep your contact and working with that agency even though there are some corrupt individuals because if not that you will have to let the bad guys win the war and that's not fair. (R14-F)

Others agreed, but one added:

I think that although the DEA has some Spanish speaking agents, which is good because that kind of improves relations between agencies, but I think always there's a difference between federal and state agents and they kind of feel like they know more than you probably. (R7-L)

Another major theme around barriers to cooperation was the response time of information, with one officer complaining that information coming in to DEA offices from abroad was slow to reach them, or was not shared at all. Another suggested that the relationship was one sided:

There are communications but they're very secretive regarding their operations. They do not give us, for example, details regarding an operation that they might have until perhaps the date of the arrest. They

might ask us for some manpower to go along with them and make the arrest. (R24-F)

The DEA cooperates with a multitude of agencies through various practices: joint operations, shared training, shared information and provision of equipment. There are many different programs and initiatives with which the DEA participate, one of them being the HIDTA Program, another is the Organised Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces (OCDETF). The DEA, however, seem to cooperate most often with local agencies, in PR with PRPD. Some stressed the importance of the local police department's role:

Yes, I think we work more with PRPD. I mean HIDTA is its own animal, you know, so they have their own network even though we have one of our agents over there but ...Puerto Rican Police Department, Hacienda, I mean there are lots of task forces here and we rely on the task force to actually come up with leads on the local cases and such. We can't operate without them here in PR. (R22-F)

Another agent stressed the importance of local police in getting local information and obtaining informants, noting that without the assistance of local police, "DEA wouldn't be effective at all" (R23-I). Similarly, one said:

Let me put it this way, I don't want to hurt feelings here, but the locals know the area better than outsiders. Unless the DEA specialist is from PR, he will not know the area, so it depends most of the time on locals to know the area, to do recons and other stuff. (R15-F)

Cooperation with local forces depends on the countries. One agent noted that this could include local or national forces, or the military, as in Colombia, with the Department of Administrative Security (which has a role similar to the DEA and Customs combined). Most of the DEA international agencies are located in foreign embassies, with the State Department providing grants for certain nations, so cooperation is extensive.

Joint Operations

One major form of cooperation was the use of joint taskforces, a multi-agency joint operation that is sometimes led by the DEA or other agencies. From the respondents' perspectives, this was the best way to develop and build trust between

agencies. Sometimes joint operations can simply involve providing additional manpower by sharing agents for a particular case. HIDTA was found to be extremely important and played a role in diffusing conflict of cases. One agent stressed that this was very important, “...because they need to be able to *lead* the operation that they are doing to really get to the big fishes” (R15-F).

One respondent points out that informal cooperation flows back to his office from having officers on joint task forces at HIDTA, “and in a strange way HIDTA seems to be an environment where everyone seems to have their spies” (R14-F). This is questionable as a means of cooperation, as it neither involves trust or teamwork, and rather has underhanded and quite negative connotations. That spying exists suggest that there are barriers, and even rivalries, between agencies. Some agents spoke of how agencies within HIDTA were even afraid of information leaks back to their home-agency.

Some added that the DEA would brief them on operations and may need a lot of cooperation from local police, but that they seldom asked the PR Department of Justice or other international agencies for assistance when it came to arrests. Unsurprisingly, if they have more arrests in field operations, the DEA gains recognition and heftier federal funding for the next year.

The Importance of Training Together

Another form of cooperation between DEA and other TNP agencies is shared training. The DEA lead task forces often offer training when needed, as well as receive it:

We have been working for DEA and DEA have been working with us.... we are training together, DEA and PRPD, we receive as a PRPD officer, we receive training from DEA so that's great because if we didn't, we would have to pay for it, so they do it for us (R8-I).

As one DEA agent explained,

We've attended several trainings with the Coast Guard. Right now we're trying to accommodate the Coast Guard people and some of the ISC on a training that we're going to try to be the lead agency with XYZ, and so we invite people to our trainings, as well as get invited. (R9-F)

The DEA also share training in Virginia, whether at the DEA or the FBI Academies (R18-F). However, most admitted that while the DEA do share a good deal of training they would like to see more of it (R30-F).

The Essentials of DEA Shared Information

Sharing of intelligence and operational information is done in a variety of ways. One method is by attending informal monthly meetings or informal exchanges on the joint task forces. The DEA cooperate on investigations, primarily sharing information with the ISC. For example, cooperation is likely if the DEA has an operation ongoing in La Perla. La Perla is one of the smaller, poorest neighbourhoods (barrios) in Old San Juan, PR. It presents geographical challenges as it is set along a cliff and reaches down to the ocean. There is only one accessible road in and out. This area, more importantly, is also infamous for a high level of drug trafficking and considered to be highly dangerous. According to some police officers, they will not enter the area even if they are undercover. They may inform other agencies to avoid dangerous conflicts and misunderstandings. DEA respondents said that information passed to ISC includes information on targets and contacts. ISC is responsible for accumulating and disseminating information and co-operates with any agencies within HIDTA (R4-F). One local agent suggested that sometimes they passed information to the DEA, but then found out they already knew it. In these cases, the DEA would inform them: "Already have it, you can either leave it alone or you can go into it, but we're investigating it" (R30-F). The agent surmised that the DEA often found it easier to get hold of information because they were better funded and therefore more able to pay informants.

The provision of equipment is another form of cooperation between the DEA and TNP agencies. As the DEA is well funded by the federal government, their equipment is much more advanced and sophisticated. The majority of respondents felt that the DEA was generous in lending equipment or assistance that required a special unit, such as for processing evidence. In some cases, the DEA step in to help out because federal regulations do not permit outside agencies to have access to equipment, such as wiretapping. One agent said,

Not so much computers, but if you need special wiretapping or whatever, you know, equipment that ...if we need to do surveillance or something related with a drug case, we went to the DEA office and if

they have any equipment that we need from them...so we do share equipment often (R12-F).

Although this form of cooperation may be a positive for one agency/joint task force, it is somewhat difficult for those on the technical end. One translating officer noted that wire taps could be passed along for translation with little explanation of what the voices on the tape were related to, making translation very difficult. There were a few officers who claimed that the DEA has refused to share equipment. However, DEA agents argued that they do what they can, even on an informal basis, to provide equipment: "As DEA, we supply PRPD with things that are surplus or that we're no longer going to use. Instead of throwing that away we try to make it happen for them" (R9-F). This arguably illustrates something of a hierarchy, whereby the DEA has determined that PRPD needs nothing more than the equipment that it deems obsolete. This is not indicative of co-operation. Perhaps the attitude to the benefits of cooperation was best summed up by one grateful agent: "We share trainings, we share equipment, we share logistics....No matter how small cooperation might be it's good enough because we have to look at it this way – anything that we can get we need" (R28-L).

Success

When asked how successful the DEA has been at TNPC, the majority of respondents said that the DEA was very successful. Several non-DEA agents even alleged that success rates were as high as 90-97% (R15-F). The majority thought the DEA was successful for a variety of reasons, primarily: response time, accurate tactical intelligence, geography, and resources. The DEA, overall, is perceived to be highly organised and highly strategic. One agent said, "I think it's excellent, outstanding. I've been overseas four times so I'm very experienced working with other foreign national police agencies in foreign countries and it's worked I think very well" (R25-F). Others felt it was because the DEA builds a lot of good cases (R18-F). Some respondents pointed out that the DEA were especially successful because of the resources they receive in comparison to the rest of the US. One officer explains,

I would say with the resources that they have in the Caribbean they have been very resourceful, very successful. I believe that because drug trafficking within the nation is not priority or vital of the interest of the United States and Europe, you will never have the amount of people you need to diminish the threat or control the threat unless drug trafficking

becomes a vital interest of the nations [...] We will always be short of resources ...because it is not a priority. (R14-F)

It is interesting to note that this could be cited as an advantage of the HIDTA Program, which turns the most problematic of areas into priority areas, giving TNPC the best chance of success.

Another stressed that, in the Caribbean, they were extremely successful, but it really depends on physical geography. For example, the DEA in Alaska have very little transnational contact, while PR's geography makes cooperation essential (R11-F). One officer also explained that, with the use of the DEA's tactical intelligence, they were able to quickly implement their operations and trust that the information was accurate. They felt that response time and accurate information was critical in order to do a better job across borders (R27-L).

One DEA agent pointed out that they are successful from a completely different viewpoint, claiming that, across the world, the DEA have an outstanding reputation and that, after 9/11, the DEA were the first to respond at an international level with intelligence. However, this agent also alleged that the DEA is the first US Government law enforcement agency for everything (R16-F). This is debatable and arrogant attitudes of superiority such as these could possibly cause severe divisions in cooperation. An agent comments:

Fairly successful because they co-operate with the FBI and the United States Customs. I mean it's much more focused, you know, they've got one mission and that's drugs and usually everybody is pretty much on board doing something about that..... Quite extensive, but again because the transnational problem with drugs smuggling as compared to other types of crime in the international storm, not everybody is interested in that. (R17-F)

Perhaps, surprisingly, in light of some of the criticisms that have previously been examined, only a small number of respondents answered that the success rate of the DEA needs improvement, though agreeing that recently there has been more co-operation between state and federal agencies (R6-F, R13-I). However, one other respondent expressed the need for improved multi-agency cooperation:

I have to say, I don't think that the DEA by itself can do much, you know. There's no liaison (overseas) with other law enforcement agencies whether they're local or state or federal or international. I don't think that anything will be accomplished because, particularly with drugs, you have so many countries that are involved [...] so you as a single agency just stick to continental US, you really won't be able to accomplish anything, at least that's my opinion. (R3-I)

One agent said,

When it comes to our intervention, we do not hear from them that often. I suspect that they do have a lot of DEA officers in other nations and they do their own intelligence, their own communications, internationally they do it between their own officers. As I said, we don't hear from them that often (R24-F).

Another notion of their success partly lies in the fact that the Caribbean is such a key area for drug trafficking – this is the right place to focus on TNPC. While one agent agreed that, though they are as successful as they can be, it is seemingly futile:

...the greed is just overwhelming and this island is like I would never have imagined when I first came here just how intertwined it is with the drug culture here, it's insane.... And take the ramp-rats over in American Airlines. I'm convinced that the majority of them are dirty. I mean you know we took down a bunch of them a while ago and they're still operating, so it's like, it's so, I don't know... futile? (R22-F)

Almost all of the agents reported that their contact or role with the DEA was positive, and that they had a cooperative working relationship within and outside of PR. One agent said, "It's pretty good. Communication is pretty good, it's a good flow of information and when you need help they'll come up and help you out you know, real cool for you on that aspect" (R15-F). For many agencies, their main contact/role with the DEA was working through the HIDTA program. HIDTA presents an opportunity for meetings between heads of agencies to discuss current operations, and facilitates cooperation via the Investigative Support Centre (ISC), a central system used to share intelligence and information. Many agents admitted that all the intelligence they receive from the DEA is via the ISC. One supervisor explained that after the monthly HIDTA

meetings, he returns to his agents and explains new information and that, in turn, causes agents to have better relations with the DEA, despite not directly attending the meetings (R4-F). They cooperated with DEA agents better because they trust their supervisor's link with HIDTA. Knowing that they have a good history with HIDTA or their special agent in charge, they are able to freely communicate and resolve problems more directly. This has opened up the channels of communication. In cases where they need information that is of a more official nature, they go through the ISC.

This positive perception of communication is not consistent, however. Another respondent rated, on a scale of one to ten, how he felt about cooperation with the DEA, "I would have to say five. In the terms of relationship and how close we are, it's still more work, we need to improve communication" (R13-I). This can be linked to Rocco's (1998) consideration of the importance of effective communication needing to be done in a particular way.

A few of the agencies have limited contact with the DEA because of the sensitive nature of the agencies' information. So cooperation is kept to a basic minimum or case-by-case basis:

The contact is not so active right now because I am working with gathering intelligence on gangs, street gangs in PR and the information is very closed, you know, sensitive....sometimes we need to share information with DEA because the information involves direct property (R2-F).

It is quite striking to consider that, in a context where TNPC is held in high regard, barriers still exist involving trust and confidentiality that transcend the importance for TNPC. Indeed, given that the respondents suggested that consideration of different but related issues could be extremely helpful – such as the close link between street gangs and drug trafficking -, it is a shame, in this instance, that intelligence could not be shared. Clearly, cooperation is not always the case. While there may be some justification for limited cooperation due to sensitive information, in reality, secretive attitudes damage cooperation. Many of the DEA respondents agreed that their main role in PR is to know what is happening in their specific areas or units and to shut down drug trafficking networks. Many DEA agents supervise, or are involved with, special task forces, which have specific remits and consist of multi-agencies and experts. For example, at San Juan airport, a task force made up of DEA

agents and PRPD officers aims to prevent drugs trafficking through the airport bound for the US.

DEA respondents were found to be well educated, experienced, and from diverse professional backgrounds. They enjoyed what they are doing, had a sense of purpose and were proud of their jobs. Overall, they rated job satisfaction as high, as one agent explained, “Well it’s a great job you know. We are trying to work against something that is almost impossible; you know the Drug Enforcement Administration is very important here in PR” (R8-I). Some agents were intelligence analysts, meaning that they had the role of disseminating, collecting, and sharing information with colleagues and counterparts. Others worked in money laundering groups, Foreign Operations or in the assets group, focusing on financial investigation. Many agents felt that their roles were too busy and, although they enjoyed their duties and were sometimes challenged, they were overwhelmed with the amount of work. Many of the units are small and some complained that it is difficult to be pursuing so many cases at once. They also frequently travel abroad as part of their role. One agent described the positive side of this:

I’m doing a lot of learning, I guess, kind of I do a lot of assisting some of the senior agents that have years on. I’ll help them out with a lot of stuff so I get more familiar with the paperwork and policies and all of the red tape that goes with any government organization. So yeah, I mean I’ve got a couple of my own cases that I run right now, which is kind of rare. I know in certain divisions, that wouldn’t even be heard of, so down here I kind of got that fortunate opportunity to do that right out of the gates (R9-F).

Many of the agents felt that their ongoing contact with the DEA was constructive and analytical, also providing good contacts and networking information. One officer reported, “Whatever it takes...If they cannot let me tap into a network...they will in fact go out and do it themselves and get the information and intelligence I need” (R4-F). This suggests a willingness to assist in the sharing of information that, in fact, is somewhat contradictory to some of the other responses. There does seem to be a substantial level of inconsistency in this area. There is, amongst all the discussion regarding particular successes and failures, an overarching feeling of confusion regarding this question. One officer, for instance, admitted not

being able to answer the question of how successful the DEA are and that it was hard to gauge, claiming that it was all relative to the number of agents employed:

...I don't know how I can tell you that because first of all the DEA in PR, they don't have a lot of agents in PR, maybe ten, twenty agents in PR. They use our people from this office, and working together maybe we have fifty and they've got four, okay [...] but they use our work people to work for the DEA. (R7-L)

Many other respondents spoke along similar lines, explaining that it was an operational question, feeling that they could not give their opinion. Indeed, I would suggest that the inconsistencies in these answers and the very different ways in which the question was answered would (or could) suggest a general hesitance in how to judge the success of the DEA with TNPC.

5.3 Agents' Experience of Working for/with the Drug Enforcement Administration

5.3.1 The best things about working for/with the DEA. Other TNP agencies, regarded as stakeholders, found the DEA to be extremely professional, organised, and well-funded. This is hardly surprising given that generous federal funding can attract a pool of applicants who are well educated, experienced, and further trained at DEA academies. Themes that captured the best things about working for or with the DEA included: one's improved professional image, working for a high-class act, the benefits of access associated with the agency, as well as remuneration, increased responsibility, and recognition as lending themselves to job satisfaction.

Most respondents felt that the DEA staff was generally professional, describing its agents as good communicators who are direct, clear-cut and honest. One respondent, who works daily with the DEA, believed,

They are very professional people, most of them, [...] They communicate pretty well, they more or less are straightforward people, you know, they don't deviate from all their, you know, into other way of doing things. They go directly to the point and I like that (R14-F).

Many felt that the DEA has a deeper understanding of the important issues of cooperation, as indicated by one respondent, "They understand that they cannot achieve

their mission by working alone. They understand that the key to success is intelligence sharing" (R27-L) – gaining information and passing that information on.

Another agent said the best thing about working with the DEA was the accessibility of the agent, who was readily available for any direct, face-to-face or telephone, contact at HIDTA as they worked under one roof. Others mentioned that the DEA is very analytical and extremely good at cross-referencing and providing cooperative training, and also fast and efficient when others need access to information from the DEA on off-island contacts. The DEA is seen to be very cooperative and "speak[s] the same language" (R5-F). Overall, the respondents generally agreed that DEA agents had reliable understanding of the issues surrounding TNP cooperation.

Globally, the DEA is seen as highly organised, well-funded and, therefore, well-equipped. Some felt that cooperation was clearly defined by who does what, so that agencies could 'fill the gaps' for each other in terms of equipment and skills. For instance, one agency took care of the maritime side of an operation, while the DEA dealt with the land side. Another said the best aspect is the methods and the equipment the DEA provide (R8-I). Most respondents confessed that, if they had to do the work by themselves, it would be difficult because it takes money and equipment when you really want to get things done. Not surprisingly, some of the respondents blamed the US government for not providing enough funding to their own agencies (R28-L).

Another theme was that one of the best things about working with the DEA was that they have unique access to information that other agencies do not. DEA agents are seen as 'street people,' as a participant stressed:

The best thing about working with them is their people. DEA agents do the time, they are street people, I mean the DEA knows the streets very, very well, they do a lot of undercover, they are exposed more to the bad people in the community and they bring back a lot of information that sometimes is very difficult for us to obtain. (R11-F)

The majority of TNP agents who responded clearly felt that the benefits of working with the DEA far out-weighed any negative aspects. The DEA are respected not only for their professionalism, but for their reliable contacts and networks.

The major themes which emerged, however, for working at the DEA, were the three R's, so to speak: remuneration, responsibility, and recognition. For instance, many agents admitted that the salary and benefits were excellent, as were the benefits

of global travel (R25-F, R17-F, R16-F). Other agents found job satisfaction for different reasons, such as the amount of responsibility they were offered or public recognition when they had succeeded on operations. Many expressed an increased sense of purpose and duty to society:

PR is a place where it needs to be more safe than what it is and working with them, other than that it just compensates, you know, it's a good way to give back to society. So I am proud of what I do. (R4-F)

Others expressed that it is a highly rewarding job when you can see the end results (R9-F). This attitude highlighted their sense of pride in the agency and their positive self-esteem. One even claimed that “they love the drug world” (R4-F). Other agents expressed, similarly, that the job has variety and they rarely have been bored in their careers: “It’s the action. It’s something different every single day, so it’s never the same thing, you never know what to expect every day when you come in, so that’s one of the things I really like about the DEA” (R9-F).

Many expressed they were busy all the time, but that it was better than being bored (R21-F). Others pointed out the best thing was having lots of freedom on the job, with the autonomy to run their own cases. Some expressed that they liked targeting criminals who bring large amounts of drug monies into the country, and felt satisfied that they were an integral part of a solution towards a global problem, helping a larger cause. As one agent put it,

Well the mission of the Agency is an honourable mission. We’re fighting drugs and drug trafficking, not only in our area but internationally and everything that goes on here is linked or affects someplace else. You know the Caribbean is considered like the second threat to the United States in terms of drugs and drug trafficking, they call it the Caribbean corridor. (R21-F)

Another agent provided a balanced perspective:

Challenging! It’s challenging and it’s frustrating at the same time. [...] I was working in PR, it was a lot of fun but you realise even as high up the food chain as you think you are, you’re only making a very limited impact. And then I was switched to xyz Group and I got a lot of freedom

to do these cases which we thought would be making a very much larger impact. (R22-F)

Lastly, one agent viewed being a smaller and focused agency as the best thing:

Well pretty much, compared to other agencies, it's just that we work drugs so we're a very specific agency. [...] compared to the FBI, their jurisdiction is so wide that you can't really concentrate on one thing in particular [...] So that's pretty much what I enjoy most, that we can actually focus on something, we don't have to be worrying about all kinds of stuff. (R9-F)

This highlights the argument against the centralization of TNP agencies. The larger an agency becomes, the more bureaucratic it can become, fragmenting various departments and arguably working against the ultimate goal. The question of exploring a TNP agency that fosters smaller, specific departments or agencies should be considered further.

5.3.2 The worst things about working for/with the DEA. When asked about the worst things involved in working for or with the DEA, two major topics emerged: personality traits and personal sacrifices. It should be pointed out, however, that some non-DEA agents felt that cooperation was great and, therefore, did not have much to say.

One theme that emerged from this portion of interviews was the undesirable personality traits and overblown egos of some DEA agents. With machismo and racism in the police having been historically commonplace (Bowling & Phillips, 2002; Foster, 2003; Reiner, 2000), it is not surprising that traits like ego, machismo and competitiveness, described as a “cop culture” by Reiner (2000), dominated negative descriptions of colleagues. Many agents reported that DEA agents had egos and arrogant attitudes, and that this was exclusive to DEA agents in the region, except for those working at HIDTA, where such attitudes are strongly discouraged (R26-F). Several agents responded that they found the DEA male-dominated and that they have witnessed gender discriminatory practices over the years. When asked for clarification, many stated that these ways continue despite renewed policies and procedures set by headquarters. It was also suggested several times that the DEA needed to become more diverse in terms of gender and race (R25-F). Although many respondents reported that undesirable personalities were the worst thing about attempting to collaborate with

colleagues, many did not have specific examples to give. In fact, the only one who could give an example admitted having had only one bad experience in ten years.

While some DEA agents found that being extremely busy and travelling frequently were positive parts of the job, the majority said these job requirements took their toll, and that personal sacrifices were being made. Time away from family was mentioned as a major consequence, with one agent highlighting the risks of how much time is spent on the job: “Sometimes you get recognised in the street by some of the bad guys. It happened once” (R9-F). Although most agents are extremely careful with their identities, unfortunate, threatening circumstances can and do occur with agents and, worse, their loved ones. This ties in as a potential limitation for TNPC, in the context of the relationship discussed in the literature between trust and risk (Morgan & Hunt, 1994; Gambetta, 1988; Schoorman, Mayer & Davies, 2007). As seen here, the stakes are extremely high. They must be assured that trust can be guaranteed before any cooperation between agencies or individuals can take place. Heavy workload was another problem, along with the possibility of burnout (R16-F). It could, perhaps, be perceived that cooperation with another agency might bring more work, adding to this perceived problem.

The DEA and other TNP agents expressed annoyance over bureaucracy. Federal and local laws and policies currently in place were mentioned by many respondents to hinder rather than expedite the processes of policing across borders (R17-F). One non-DEA agent conveyed,

The worst things are I believe, the problem or most of the problems working with them is the responsive time because they depend on federal systems. When I say federal systems, federal acquisition systems, legal systems and not the DEA. For example, if they need to do a facility or they need to have an enhancement on their facility, they need to wait for two or three years to acquire that change and it's not fair for them to fight against a threat that adapts pretty quickly.... I think the DEA flexibility is not enough (R14-F).

Others agreed, one saying,

Flexibility of operations. Sometimes they are very strict in their ways and they only do drugs. I mean, for example, if I have a case that doesn't

have drugs, I can't really work with them, I can't bring any of them with us. (R22-F)

There were different perspectives on why information may not be passed along quickly but, again, the frustration was with federal bureaucracy, not the DEA itself. Another suggested that information was good quality, but did not move fast enough, for instance, to allow quick interception of boats entering PR. Similarly, in carrying out arrests, bureaucracy can give criminals an unfair advantage. As one agent attested:

Bureaucracy I guess [...] the obvious problem in my point of view is the fact that we are competing practically with the bad guys. They have all the money in the world to get whatever they want or whatever they need and do it the way they want it, we have limited resources and we have to go through many steps in order to get approval, in order for investigations, approval for funds. (R3-I)

Not sharing the same software and computer systems was also expressed as a communications concern, but more as a technicality, than the fault of the agency itself.

Many non-DEA agents thought the worst thing about the DEA is that, admittedly, not unlike themselves, the DEA hoards information, liaisons, and informants and are highly competitive. Others suggested that information mysteriously got sidetracked, while others said the DEA was out to get the final prize - the recognition. Indeed, this is linked to the theory of competition being a barrier to TNPC. Someone added,

They could improve upon, I mean, I know when they work on a federal case they keep it to themselves; sometimes they don't give us information. I don't know if this is because they want to get the credit on everything, or how secret is it, is there something that is really secret? (R30-F)

Some respondents suggested that competition played a part in preventing effective cooperation between forces, with one speaking about it in terms of a relationship "going sour" (R13-I). This suggests that while competition can sometimes be beneficial, in this case, it was more likely to lead to resentment when cases were 'taken away' by other agencies, leading to unwillingness to cooperate in the future. In essence, what caused problems was not robust competition but, rather, rivalry and a

territorial attitude to individual cases. The majority of respondents felt that the DEA were doing an adequate job, but that their role or methods of cooperation needed clarifying.

One of the milder criticisms was regarding the current Director at the DEA; many people were unhappy with him and felt he should be let go (R14-F). It was noted a few times that the “rotten apples should go” and to “fire away the bad people.” It is unclear as to whether the “bad people” referred to the incompetent or the corrupt, but as considered in the literature, there is little difference between the impact of the two (Schoorman, Mayer, & Davis, 2007) on the trust of another organisation. However, further questioning of leadership and restructuring would be required to give a fair and adequate representation of this issue. Several respondents felt the need to express that, although the majority of DEA agents were cooperative, there were always a few egos that would attempt to sabotage joint operations (R25-F).

Improving efficiency of the DEA was noted as important in order to increase cooperation with other agencies. One agent explained,

I would say we need to be more efficient in how we get things done, because this is a very time sensitive business. [...] If we were going to do a drugs transaction and you had a bad guy on the phone and he's telling you, “Yeah, I want to see you now at such and such corner”, and you go like, “Well, you know, now is not a good time”, because we need a couple of hours to get operational supplies in place and people in place and do all this structural thing that we already have in place in order to get that transaction done, I don't think that guy is going to stay on the line. (R8-I)

Both DEA and non-DEA agents complained about the size of the agency. Many felt that the DEA is still too small, and that it needs to be a little bigger. One experienced agent thought that the number of joint initiatives in PR and the Virgin Islands were out of proportion and, since PR is bigger and more populous, it should be a much greater focus of resources and efforts. In addition, this agent thought HIDTA should be the main centre for operations and resources, with the ISC growing to support this. This is certainly a suggestion worth considering given the success of HIDTA to date (R4-F).

Overall, the DEA is viewed as being quite autonomous and secretive. One agent replied,

Customs will come over here to our agency and talk to us and we can exchange problems and we respect the US Inspector, investigators and the FBI. DEA are very, very, secretive of their operations. They call us when they need us, when they need some information internationally, but they do have their own communications network internationally (R24-F).

Many felt that the DEA needs to be more receptive about other agencies, specifically with local ones. It was suggested that if the DEA could understand local agencies and their role, then it would yield better results. Subsequently, the DEA should try to better understand how local people think and react. Many respondents felt that as long as the DEA continues to cooperate with other countries at a local level, and develop good relationships with local law enforcement, they would be able to get the job done.

A last, but crucial, point made was that the DEA needed to be more open to the community. The people in the streets look at the DEA as something very far removed. One respondent said,

They need to be more open with the people in the schools, in the media, radio, television in order to bring back the images that the people have of DEA or the people think something, you know, strange, something obscure. They are outsiders. They need to all map more with the people of the street, the majority of the people, with the local culture...This is very important (R23-I).

Most DEA and non-DEA agents agreed that this was not only important, but critical, that of being more open to community, local culture and local law enforcement.

5.4 Agents' Views of the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Program

HIDTA's overall goal is to reduce drug trafficking in high-intensity areas, such as PR, but *how* HIDTA contributes to achieving this aim was the main issue for most respondents when asked how they saw the program's goals. Key themes were that HIDTA:

- encourages the sharing of information

- improves networking between agencies
- helps ensure that resources are managed efficiently and that investigations are not duplicated
- allows the agencies involved to work more proactively to attack criminal organisations at their source rather than investigating small-time criminals.

In realizing these objectives, the sharing of intelligence was seen as a key element of HIDTA's role, in particular, allowing links to be made between different investigations, which might otherwise remain in separate areas. This element was seen as very important by many of the respondents, since intelligence is regarded as playing a huge role in building good cases and securing convictions. As one agent said: "Intelligence is the base for a good criminal investigation" (R26-F).

Several respondents suggested that HIDTA's role is as a central 'clearing house' for information, so that disparate pieces of information can be collected and connected. HIDTA processes information from a range of different sources so that connections can be made and links established between different cases and reports. This function as a clearing house also speeds up the process of acquiring and connecting important information so that the crucial data is easily accessible and, as one agent put it: "Timing is what makes it work" (R17-F).

There is a clear link between HIDTA's role in allowing intelligence sharing and its role in building networks and relationships, since, in addition to acting as a clearing house for information, it allows agents to access each other directly to confer and compare information. When it came to explaining their own interactions with HIDTA, the range of experiences described by agents differed quite extensively; with some saying they had very little contact with HIDTA, while others worked within the organisation or had constant, daily contact with it. This meant that experiences with HIDTA could range from occasional cooperation on operations or sharing of information, right through to having regular meetings or working constantly with the organisation. In addition, the roles described varied widely: from investigators and taskforce agents, to facilitators, supervisors, training coordinators and administrators.

Processes of Selecting HIDTA Agents

HIDTA agents are selected by the agencies/forces from which they come, rather than handpicked from within HIDTA. Although, candidates are chosen to fit into a specific vacant role within a team and, consequently, must have certain

experience/attributes. The perception is that they are experienced and the best in their field, not agents who are unwanted in other departments. After a thorough selection process, including panel interviews searching for candidates with the right skills and background, potential agents also undergo extensive polygraph and background security checks before they can be offered roles within HIDTA. One officer said:

The HIDTA agents are selected, very carefully selected, like for example, as far as the agency goes, I don't have much of a say on who's going to, which federal agent is going to be assigned to my group. We might sit down and brainstorm a little bit but I don't have say-so that way (R11-F).

If it is well known that HIDTA has a rigorous application process, there may be advantages in terms of building relationships. Conceivably, they are more likely to be considered by other agents within HIDTA to be competent and professional from the beginning, without perhaps having to "prove themselves" extensively before earning trust (it could perhaps also be noted that there is also potential for snobbery from within HIDTA towards other agencies).

There does not, however, appear to be a centralised hiring apparatus for HIDTA, since agents are chosen through their own agencies rather than by an overall HIDTA selection body. Among the suggestions for ways to improve HIDTA's recruitment and training, one suggested that there should be common standards and procedures for selection, as well as the same training. Joint training appears to be a regular feature of HIDTA training, often with different agencies organising or running training sessions and then inviting members of other agencies to participate. The fact that most training was run by individual agencies may be related to funding cuts that have reduced funding for training within HIDTA.

Joint training was also considered to be useful in building relationships and improving cooperation for several reasons. First, it ensures officers have the same reactions to situations and follow similar procedures, such as searches, which can be crucial during operations. Second, good practice and useful tactics are shared throughout the forces. Finally, but most importantly, the networking inherent in joint training builds relationships that can be essential later on, as one respondent said:

It's not that you're going to be sitting on a chair watching the instructor but you're going to be meeting the person right next to you and the

person right next to you, you're going to be going for lunch together, and in some way you're going to be breaking that big wall between agencies [...] then when you need some favour or you need to work together with somebody you say, "I remember that guy, let me call him." (R6-F)

This is an extremely relevant point in the context of motivations and, in particular, social and psychological motivations: building relationships, building trust and building teamwork are all crucial, and this is one of the ways in which these essential elements are fostered.

Joint training also helps develop the message that all the agencies are working towards a common goal, another element which is important in developing cooperation. This is a feature of the HIDTA working culture that is developed through shared training. In terms of improvements that could be made to training, joint training was identified as the most important improvement by respondents, since it offers the greatest benefits to cooperation. One respondent thought, however, that joint training was not the issue, but that leadership was still too fragmented; that performance was judged according to DEA or FBI priorities rather than HIDTA's goals.

When it came to training for local Puerto Rican officers specifically, several respondents thought that training for local officers was more important than training for federal officers, since Puerto Rican officers were less likely to have received adequate training due to funding constraints. In addition, they would not have received the same kind of training as federal agents, and so would need to have additional training in order to operate in the same kind of environment. Language was also occasionally raised as an issue when it came to training, the perception being that there needed to be more Spanish-language training.

Inadequate Training

Complicating training needs further was the important theme that funding and resources were inadequate, or were barely adequate. While HIDTA used to have a dedicated training program, funding for this was cut and training was now arranged and planned on a more ad hoc basis, mostly to coincide with specific operations or to meet particular needs, based on annual surveys. There are no longer any dedicated funds for training. As a consequence, fewer officers - only those whose immediate needs required it - were being sent on courses. In some cases, training was made available on a "first

come, first served” basis, with only a proportion of all the agents able to attend. Many of the respondents thought this was inappropriate and that enough resources should be available to offer the same training to all officers.

Most of the officers thought that additional training would be an important way to improve cooperation and effectiveness. Overall, the perception that standards for recruitment to HIDTA are high may be useful, but recruitment is still managed by individual agencies rather than centrally. In addition, joint training was seen as a crucial contributor in building networks and instilling a sense of shared goals, although it had, to some extent, been downgraded in importance due to funding constraints. Training plays an essential part in ensuring that officers work in the same ways, rather than at cross purposes, and also helps to fill in ‘gaps’ in training for local officers assigned to HIDTA. It seems that increasing joint training and providing more funding to allow additional officers to attend each training opportunity might be another way to promote networks, as well as improved performance.

Information Sharing

Effective means of information sharing is a vital element of TNPC. For example, a key aspect of information sharing through the ISC is to coordinate the actions and operations of individual agencies and forces. By sharing information on which targets they are investigating, and on undercover operations, they avoid both duplicating their efforts and creating embarrassing and dangerous clashes. One officer described a situation:

Which has happened in the past where we've had an informant arrange a deal and we get there and we start looking around and it's like there's (inaudible) from (inaudible) here. “Get out of there,” because we were going to like hit Customs or we were going to hit ourselves. (R3-I)

Information sharing in HIDTA can be broadly grouped into three categories: (1) via systems; (2) through face-to-face contact; and (3) by telephone. By far, the more common method appears to be by telephone, calling a contact to ask questions. There are two extremely important issues at play, however, that do not seem to be entirely compatible in practice. The first is an issue of security. One respondent said:

It's pretty bad over here in PR because we have a lot of corruption in the department and it would be great but it would be bad for any case developed, you know, if somebody get their hands on that information

and they let you know that we're doing an investigation and you, you know. (R20-F)

The issue here is security in the face of potential corruption and the concern that information might get into the wrong hands. Not one of the three categories of information sharing provide an adequate remedy to this. Systems across the various forces and agencies involved in combating crime in the Caribbean are diverse and un-integrated. Respondents described a number of systems, including the Investigative Support Centre (ISC, an FBI/HIDTA system), Business Partner Network (BPN, Coast Guard), Regional Organized Crime Information Centre (ROCIC), Regional Sharing Information System (RSIS), Law Enforcement Online (LEO), and Electronic Privacy Information Centre (EPIC). What was clear is that there is no central system that all the agencies, including local forces, can access. While this might be ascribed simply to a failure to yet establish a centralised system, there are also security concerns in creating a database that anyone can access, particularly in sharing information with local forces in PR. Similarly, as phone calls can be intercepted, there were some concerns that this was less secure and that trust was harder to establish over the telephone. For instance, one respondent said:

Sometimes one of them is not knowing the person face-to-face but if you can tell me you're from the Coast Guard, are you really from the Coast Guard? All this is being done over the line, we don't know if you're really from, I mean what else do I have to vouch for you other than you telling me, you know, I need something else, somebody else to tell me (R13-I).

Trust is crucial in information (Schoorman, Mayer, & Davis, 2007) and face-to-face is considered to be the most appropriate means of achieving this end. Anderson (1989) and Rocco (1998) echo these concerns and very much advocate the face-to-face communication methods. Indeed, some of the respondents recounted how information sometimes had to be literally walked across and put into someone's hands because fax/phone/email lines were not completely secure.

Another important issue in the effectiveness of cooperation was timeliness. While this would not be categorised as a barrier to cooperation, it has an enormous impact on the effectiveness of information sharing. Particularly in cases where there were conflicts between one agency and another, as when an undercover operation

interfered with an operation by another agency, the ISC had sometimes been late in becoming aware of this clash and therefore late in preventing problems.

Networking - Creating Links and Relationships Between Agents

Another essential function that HIDTA fulfils is to bring agents from different agencies and physically force them together, both through providing an office where they work together side by side and by bringing senior officers together for monthly meetings. Monthly meetings between senior officers allow quick resolution of conflicts between agencies and reassignment, or agreement on sharing, of cases when necessary. However, with most of these regular face-to-face meetings being between senior officers or directors, rather than individual agents, some officers did note that they saw it as highly important to introduce themselves to other agents in other areas or departments and to also get to know them directly.

The value of HIDTA's strength in facilitating these opportunities is underlined by several respondents' comments on the importance of having agents literally meeting around the same table, at regular times, or being able to speak to each other directly by being in the same office. This constant proximity, working alongside each other helps build trust and break down barriers between agencies. It is also the most effective way to cultivate relationships between agents and establish good cooperation between agencies. This further increases efficiency and speeds up investigations due to avoiding long processes when needing to acquire information or speak to agents from different forces. Instead, officers have the contacts to quickly get in touch and resolve queries in the first instance. As one officer said:

I would pick up the phone and call my intelligence group that's over there and I would say, "Listen can you find this out from so-and-so agency, or can you find this out," and then they would go to that agency who has the responsibility for that particular action, and they would ask, but if I had my own contact, I could make the call to the agency (R25-F).

In addition to facilitating communications and building relationships and networks, HIDTA helps improve coordination of different agencies in combating drug crime. By allowing agents to be aware of what others are working on, and allowing them to reallocate cases based on new information, cases can be taken over by another

team or shared to ensure greater success in pursuing the case. This could also mean combining resources, such as agents or equipment, to pursue a particular case.

Agents assigned to HIDTA are further able to ensure that priorities and goals are communicated back to their agencies, preventing different agencies from moving in different directions. A key theme of coordinating and maximising resources is the idea of not multiplying or duplicating investigations so that forces, whether local or national agencies, are not pursuing similar targets or lines of enquiry simultaneously, thereby wasting resources. The term for this is “deconfliction”, mentioned earlier, ensuring that different agencies do not conflict by pursuing the same cases. The method of having senior officers meet regularly to compare cases and reassign them according to how they can be pursued most efficiently can both avoid a duplication of efforts and sidestep some of the territorialism of law enforcement agencies. Since senior officers are making authoritative decisions, together, cooperative decision-making is promoted and conflict becomes less likely.

By encouraging cooperation, intelligence sharing and coordination of resources, HIDTA creates better conditions for proactive investigation of drug crime, and many respondents recognised this by identifying that the main purpose of HIDTA was to go after criminal organisations, rather than focus on low-level crime. As has been described in previous sections, proactive law enforcement requires additional resources, strong cooperation, as well as timely and joint analysis of intelligence from a range of sources – all elements which HIDTA’s TNPC model aims to provide.

Several respondents agreed that HIDTA’s role was to focus on building cases and initiating investigations against organisations and powerful individuals rather than low-level dealers, creating an infrastructure that could deal with the complexity of criminal organisations. As one respondent put it, “If we kill the root then we can stop the flow” (R27-L). While this is a somewhat mixed metaphor, it supports a staple of the research and extols a benefit of TNPC, of dealing with areas of concern that relate to the one at hand (for example, the previous suggestion that dealing with low-level crime in housing projects rather than the criminal networks who feed that crime could be significant).

In conclusion, it appears that HIDTA has at least two important roles in combating drug trafficking in the Caribbean. Firstly, it improves cooperation and sharing between agencies, thereby making investigations and operations more efficient and reducing ‘clashes.’ Secondly, by extension, it allows agents within HIDTA to work

more proactively than their counterparts outside HIDTA, focusing more on initiating investigations against criminal organisations and working to attack these organisations at their root rather than investigating lower-level criminals. The gains in information-sharing and efficiency that HIDTA provides, as well as its additional funding, allows for the extra resources needed for effective, proactive work.

5.5 Summary and Conclusions

To conclude, Chapter 5 focused on the findings of interviews held with individual officers at HIDTA working for/with the DEA in PR. Each official was asked about his/her role and, with that as a basis, opinions about the best and worst aspects of working for the agency, types of cooperation between the DEA and other agencies, how successful this cooperation was, and what they perceived as barriers to increased cooperation. Respondents said the DEA is professional, organised, and well-funded, leading to high job satisfaction. At the same time, the work required personal sacrifice and was affected by bureaucracy and competitiveness. Research found that staff saw HIDTA as a central agency whose role it was to coordinate, create linkages and share intelligence through both personal and process-oriented channels. Respondents said barriers included linguistic differences, institutional biases, funding limitations and speed of sharing, but stated that improved networking and technology had been introduced to address these obstacles. HIDTA is seen as a world-class model that mainly needs increased resources to be more successful. It was also perceived as a prestigious agency to which agents were nominated by department heads and joined after an extensive process. They felt that training needed to be multi-agency driven and that all local agents should meet federal standards.

Chapter Six

Transnational Police Cooperation: Perceived Barriers and Potential Improvements

6.1 Introduction to Chapter Six

Perceived barriers to cooperation in TNP in PR and DR have been touched upon in the previous chapters, involving existing literature and some of the views expressed in the context of the DEA and HIDTA program. These have included language barriers, a lack of political will, bad governance and corruption, issues in dealing with different legal systems, cultural insensitivities, a lack of universality and defined roles amongst agencies, gender inequalities and competition. Major themes regarding key influences on TNP cooperation revolved around partnership issues, the politics and play, and anti-Americanism and other cultural clashes. This chapter will consider the perceived barriers and possible improvements in more detail.

6.2 Perceived Barriers to Cooperation in Transnational Policing in Puerto Rico and the Dominican Republic

When respondents were asked what they thought were the main barriers to TNPC, there were some anticipated responses, such as language, politics and different legal systems. However, there were also other factors revealed such as cultural insensitivities, attitudes, organizational issues and gender.

Lack of Political Will

On a transnational level, political differences were seen as a main barrier, with one agent explaining that differences between “neo-socialist” and “capitalist democratic” countries could cause communication barriers. In addition, anti-US government sentiment was also seen as an important barrier:

I see it when I go to these countries and I’m sure many agents feel the same, these other police officers in these other countries, they don’t have a problem with us as a person, they have a problem with our Government, the role it plays. [...] the Dutch, that’s who we work a lot with, they do not like our administration in Washington. They like us, the DEA, but they don’t like the policies of the US....then sometimes you get some comments directed your way and you bite your tongue and so you keep on working (R13-I).

Another agreed and added to sometimes seeing a lack of political will to cooperate in other countries, although the agent was unsure whether this was due to an unwillingness to cooperate with the US or simply a fear that cooperation would expose corruption in that country. When asked why this barrier exists, respondents suggested it was because of historical and current relations with the US Government (R11-F). One agent stated that, in his experience, many countries perceived US assistance as “interference” even if it had been requested (R10-I). Another said that PR’s status undermined their cooperation with some other Latino communities:

We’re a US protectorate, so a lot of people envy that, a lot of people in South American countries and in the Caribbean, even though we are Spanish Latinos, they envision us as Americans and they say, you might be Hispanic but you’re a “gringo also”, you know. That attitude prevents us from doing a lot of work. (R6-F)

Many respondents agreed that the governments, both locally and federally, do not treat local police fairly and do not adequately pay them. In particular, one respondent suggested that a failure of the Puerto Rican elite (including the Governor) to adequately pay public servants, such as the police, reflected an exploitative colonial mentality.

Overall, with all of the mentioned barriers, many agents believed that to overcome them and improve cooperation it would, ultimately, have to be the government’s responsibility. One agent explains,

I think mostly, you know, it takes political pressure from the US Government. I mean there is a certain amount of controlling and co-operation that we can do on our level but obviously [...] to get some things done it takes people at the high office and at the right place to get somebody to co-operate and show them why it’s in their best interest (R14-F).

Bad Governance and Corruption

Bad governance surrounding the issues of economy, health, and education, which typically lead to corruption, was seen as a major barrier not just in poorer countries in the Caribbean but in PR as well. One agent stated that federal agents were seen as being on another tier:

Another barrier it's economic, we make more money than they do in their countries, they consider us on a different social set, someone to look up to, someone they can respect because we have diplomatic roles when we work overseas, [...] the quality of living that we earn which is much more than what they make and the way we are able to operate overseas, everything is paid for so we tend to have the best homes, bigger homes, the furniture, travel more, a lot of luxuries, not here in PR though (R17-F).

It is understood that some of the other Caribbean island police forces may simply not have resources. So it is interesting that PR, a US protectorate, with federal funding and federal agents is not viewed as one of the lucky ones. Another agent expressed their thoughts about bad governance with specific regards to the distribution of resources and priorities in PR:

The political side, the political instrument on the political side, doesn't have the drug trafficking as a priority, not even in PR. The way that I see it, it's the root of most of the problems that we have in PR, but they don't see that, so the priority for the elimination of drug traffic, or reduction of drug trafficking is, you know, as a prime reality, is not there. That is not their priority and so the resources are used for other things (R10-I).

It appears as a catch-22 scenario, in that resources are taken away from local police departments and prioritised to a supposedly better cause which, in turn, enables corruption within the police and within government. This is not unique to PR, as many agents explained that police departments throughout the Caribbean are corrupt, consequently making transnational police cooperation more difficult (R2-F, R9-F, R11-F, R18-F, R30-F). Sadly, this scenario seems to develop a learned helplessness both within the police forces and perhaps, more importantly, in the community itself.

In terms of causes, the question of bad governance and corruption is really an age-old question of which came first? With bad governance, lack of education, lack of training, and poor overall quality of living, corruption is sure to thrive. The attitude in the statement, "I may as well try to get something for myself and my family" is a common one if the government itself is corrupt. Many respondents felt that corruption occurs because of lack of education and lack of role models, with one saying:

You don't get trained; you don't improve your duties, your skills, so a law abider could be an income for the local police. You have a lot of corruption here. I mean, corruption is not an excuse for that, you know, but the income for the local police, state police, that's a reason that most of the corrupted police are getting into that (R11-F).

Another agent explained that the acquisition of even very basic English language skills is not properly funded or encouraged by the local government, and local state employees are not obliged to know English (R18-F). If communication is key, then one would consider, at the very least, the government's support to fund and encourage, if not make mandatory, the second language skill for professional communications. However, as one agent suggested, sometimes problems are not at the senior level and instead it is necessary to make an impact from the bottom up, with networking, dialogue and training.

Corruption Makes for Mistrust

Corruption is the single most important reason for mistrust, far more than concerns that officers from other agencies would be competitive or incompetent. This was understandable, since corruption causes so much more damage and harm than other barriers to trust. There was also a concern that corruption was fairly widespread among local officers in PR and other islands/countries.

In combating corruption, the most important action was background checking and vetting, although better tracking technology for tracing who had accessed information (for instance, through unique reference numbers for each officer when accessing or requesting records/intelligence) would also be useful in determining where leaks had originated. There were differing responses on whether vetting was effective, suggesting that different organisations have vetting procedures of different degrees of thoroughness, with many local forces being inadequate.

Although trust between organisations is important, on a fundamental level, it is based on trust between individuals. As such, suggestions for improving trust between their individual agents, such as joint training and improved networking opportunities, are, to some extent, reiterated. However, in terms of competition over cases and general levels of trust, there are additional institutional changes that could be made. For example, an important problem raised was that there is a proliferation of agencies involved in combating drug crime, with the consequence that there are too many

agencies investigating the same cases and, therefore, creating a tendency to compete over them. Organisations whose main remit is far removed from drug crime are involved in interdiction in addition to those, such as the DEA, for whom drugs are their main focus. One agent put it:

You don't see the Customs and the IRS lining up to take care of people dumping PCB in the water, but everybody wants to play in the drug business. I mean if they want to do that, then let's focus our efforts together. (R17-F)

The proliferation of agencies involved requires more extensive coordination to ensure that investigations are not duplicated, with different elements of the crime being investigated by separate agencies. This perception of the need for deconfliction runs throughout the literature as an established need for effective TNPC (Best Jr., 2010). Some respondents suggested that this issue could be corrected by having more written agreements between agencies, which would improve trust by ensuring that agencies are always aware of their rights and responsibilities to each other in pursuing cases. Official agreements on how to share cases can be useful; one agent described a process known as “bluejacketing”, which allows another agency to take on elements of a case, such as the ATF investigating elements of a drugs case that related to arms dealing (R12-F). This can be an appropriate and structured way of sharing cases that could minimise mistrust.

As with trust between individuals, trust between organisations needs to be earned, not given automatically, and is vulnerable to being lost if there is a perceived betrayal of trust. One respondent described a case where an agency took over an investigation that several other agencies had contributed to, only to claim full responsibility for the success of the case once solved. Of course, this lessens the incentive to cooperate next time (R15-F). Correspondingly, successful cooperation leads to increased trust and willingness to cooperate again. In this sense, trust requires iteration, with each successful episode of cooperation contributing to the success of the next operation. At any time, as with trust between individuals, a betrayal or perceived betrayal can undermine all the trust that has previously been built up. Ensuring that this does not occur is essential. In this, honesty and open communication can help to foster trust since it helps prevent misunderstandings that lead to mistrust. Respect was also mentioned as a key element.

Overall, the personal was more important than the institutional in determining trust levels between both individuals and organisations. Personal trust between individuals, alone and in teams, was seen to affect both individual relationships and trust between agencies. As such, the most effective solutions lie in encouraging trust between individuals, and the most effective approach is through personal contact. Training and regular meetings were both identified as useful ways to establish networking. However, vetting and careful tracking of information were also important ways of dealing with corruption. Formal agreements might also be effective in reducing competition between agencies and improving coordination and collaboration.

The Problem of Differential Legal Systems

One of the most difficult obstacles to transnational cooperation is the different legal systems of each country. When a US agency has information that can be shared, often internal policies on both ends do not permit the exchange. Many agents thought that legal reforms should be a high-priority for the international legal community, with one commenting,

Some countries are more liberal and the local law tends to be more liberal, and then some other countries are more strict. Some places you're guilty until proven innocent instead of ours that you're innocent until proven guilty [...] in that sense I guess that's pretty much what complicates stuff. (R17-F)

Some agents felt that other countries misunderstand their motivations, wrongly imagining that they are trying to interfere in internal affairs, while others expressed their frustration at the way current international laws are structured:

It's a little bit conflicting with the United States Department of Justice. Sometimes when we think it suitable to indict a trafficker it's not the same. In that country and based on their laws...So we have to establish what we call an MOU (memorandum of understanding), also use legal assistance in order to interpret the laws and regulations (the barriers) and charge those traffickers in that colony. [...] sometimes it cannot be done because if that target is arrested in that country, and depending on the country's laws, that target's going to do time in that country (R17-F).

One agent offered a glimmer of hope that the problem of different international laws is not irreversible,

Right now we are developing a case with Madrid, Spain, and different laws and culture and we have to get special permission when it comes to clearance [...] we are going to be working together with the Spanish police. [...] But you know, different laws, we have to study what we can do and what we cannot do so that is one of the issues right now but we work with that and we get there.... It is not something that you cannot fix (R18-F).

When asked why the barrier of different legal systems occurs, many respondents replied that many international laws were not applicable to today's criminal problems (R17-F). One suggested that outdated laws may not only hinder cooperation, but contribute to corruption (R5-F). Another main reason was the mere lack of trust and not having a history with that country, agency, or individual. One agent explained that, while the assumption was that US agencies have the same professional and security protocols and can, therefore, be trusted, other countries' agencies do not.

Lack of Universality and Defined Roles

Many agents complained that there is no universal way of doing things and that this is also a barrier. Each agency has something to contribute, each with its own internal culture and methods. One of the biggest complaints made was the lack of defined roles. In fact, some felt it translated into pure disrespect and a superiority complex: "Federals treat you like you don't know nothing and they know everything" (R30-F). Others realised that it doesn't matter who is in power, as they have to work together to a common goal, but roles must be defined more clearly:

You have locals that want to do big cases and they want to go international and then you have DEA sometimes, they want to make a big case and they go to a drop point and there are so many people on the case...roles have to be clarified (R15-F).

Another felt it was a communication matter, one of having the right protocols in place of how to communicate with each other since there was a lack of clarity about who was in the chain of command and who should be involved at which point.

Institutionalised Secrecy

One theme that emerged was that, to some extent, there is still an institutionalised tendency towards secrecy in many agencies, which is both cultural and structural; built into the structures of the organisations. For example, part of the organisational tendency towards secrecy is that each agency carries completely different records, and that agents from one agency do not have access to the records of another. A DEA agent cannot, for example, access FBI records, even if they are in the same department.

Reinforcing this structural barrier is a cultural tendency towards secrecy, which one respondent noted was actively encouraged in training until 2001 and is therefore engrained in the working habits of most agents. While most respondents said they were always willing to pass on information, several displayed some disquiet about the idea of having to divulge details of sources – a principle which has always dominated police work. However, now that cooperation has been made a requirement, there is more impetus to share.

A most important barrier to this cooperation is the matter of trust. Agents were sometimes simply not sure that they could trust other law enforcement officers who were coming to them for information. In overcoming this, the importance of face-to-face contact was emphasised over and over again, with agents noting that, in order to create a “bridge” between agencies, they would ensure that they were introduced personally to other departments with whom they needed to work.

Another method for networking and allowing agents to meet face-to-face was by holding monthly short conferences, and always sending representatives to similar events held by other agencies or departments. The primary idea was that even limited direct contact could improve trust, since regular meetings between senior officers, or the ability of officers within HIDTA to act as a bridge between agencies, were mentioned as important.

HIDTA’s model of having officers from different agencies working side by side in the same building, in the same offices, directly taps into this advantage of working face-to-face. It can help build trust between agents and agencies much more effectively than by more remote means such as telephoning or sharing the same systems. One agent described the situation as improving through these means:

At one point we actually had somebody from the FBI here in our office space and somebody from the DEA in their office space, and that was hell just because internally all the agencies have their own policy and their own little cultures. So I think that even though we're still separated by doors, now there's more communication in the sense of our supervisors have no problem with each other. (R3-I)

This is reflective of the discussion within the literature referring to the problems that are brought forward when different organisational cultures attempt to work together (Foster, 2003; Reiner, 2000). In discussing what HIDTA does to reduce barriers in information sharing, many officers emphasised that there are no problems within HIDTA itself, and, rather, that issues of trust and competitiveness are more evident when dealing with agents from outside HIDTA. This suggests that HIDTA's methods of promoting cooperation are effective.

Get Off My Turf: Competition Kills Cooperation

Again, competition was identified as a common barrier to cooperation, even on an individual level. At an individual level, it is associated with pride (as agents are proud to be part of their particular agency) and ego. Individuals simply picked up on a mood generated by the dominant organisational culture of competition. For instance:

Do you remember when you went to college for example, when you went to college you probably felt really proud about the college that you were at and you went probably to a basketball game, following this college and the other colleges, and it's addictive and you're proud about the college where you belong, and I'm pretty sure people feel proud about the agency they belong to (R6-F).

To this extent, some respondents did think that it was possible to do more to deal with competitive behaviours, such as emphasising the common goal of defeating crime, and the idea of all law enforcement officers being 'on the same side' rather than competing against one another. One participant said:

Everybody has to think that this is a war between people that don't have any respect for the law or the authorities, and we are the people that need to keep the law running. If everybody is thinking that, we are in the

same boat (inaudible) we are police, we are not FBI or (inaudible) everybody is police. (R2-F)

Similar suggestions included helping everyone feel part of the same organisations (for instance, by showing them how other parts of the organisation work). It was also stressed that leaders and supervisors need to lead by example, personally promoting and leading on cooperation and refusing to show competitive behaviours, such as making derogatory remarks about other teams.

Competition within different agencies was also seen as a barrier. Several agents referred to the problem of 'short memories' since, after 9/11, there was much discussion of the need to work together. Still, turf wars persist. Some suggested that this is because there was a history in the past of "being burnt by another agency". Greed in taking all the credit is a concrete barrier to sharing with local and federal agencies, let alone transnationally. Some agents suggested that the competition, even within their own agencies, was so fierce that they were burnt by other internal divisions. If there is a history of one agency taking shared information for themselves and claiming all the credit, it is sure to fuel bad feelings, lack of trust and, ultimately, lack of cooperation.

The role of competitive behaviour, as it relates to trust, proved itself another major barrier to cooperation. This was especially true in agents trying to avoid cooperation in order to 'hang on to' particular cases, their concern being that, if cases move to a different department or agency, it reflects badly on the initial investigator. A key factor in encouraging competitive behaviour is the promotions system, which rewards agents based on their case work rather than tenure or willingness to cooperate, and, therefore, encourages them to try and keep as many cases as possible rather than passing them on to agencies where they can be more effectively investigated. Thus, one important suggestion would be to make the promotions process less reliant on the number of successful cases, or at least include some incentive towards cooperation. Official acknowledgement of situations where agents contribute to cases that are not their 'own' could invite more cooperation, as well.

Further contributing to matters of trust and competitiveness was the matter that agents considered other agencies and departments closed to them, and were thinking in terms of secrecy and competitiveness. One agent stated:

We have agents that report to HIDTA, like we have one agent from ATF that reports to HIDTA and basically he's like a little spy there, you

know, for us and he's always paying attention to gun aspects of HIDTA investigations, and anything that deals with guns, he'll bring it to us, but there's a misnomer sometimes where most of us don't know exactly what to give to the ISC because a lot of the agents in my group think that if we give something to the ISC, then they're going to give it to the FBI because you remember the ISC is run by the FBI. It's because the FBI have a lot of money. (R11-F)

Not Meant to be Mates: Personality Conflicts

Another barrier to cooperation involves the personality clashes that occur from time to time, where agents find themselves working with a 'difficult' character who is highly territorial or antagonistic, making cooperation difficult. It appears that clashes were not extremely common, but when they did occur there was no specific method of dealing with them, other than by the standard method of "deconfliction" for dealing with cases being pursued by two agencies at once. In some cases, personality might also be linked with issues like competitiveness or trust problems, when egos, rather than incentives in the system, cause competitive behaviour.

The Need for Big Bucks

The importance of intelligence being analysed in a timely manner can be linked to funding, since analysing and disseminating large amounts of intelligence, ensuring that information is sent to where it is most useful, requires both manpower and technology. Several respondents expressed concerns that HIDTA budgets were being cut, while others mentioned that facilities and infrastructure were inadequate, especially in terms of security. There was a sense that HIDTA was not being valued highly enough in funding terms, considering the program's effectiveness and successes.

Assign more money to us. I understand that they've been on the same budget for some nine or ten years now ...Yes, I think it's 10 million....[...] Assign money based on the type of cases you have. I can guarantee you that the HIDTA here does, they require (inaudible) than all the HIDTA's in the US and here they seize more in money and drugs than any HIDTA. Probably the HIDTA's closest to the border. (R11-F)

Cultural Insensitivities

A few respondents discussed cultural differences as a barrier to cooperation, leading to a lack of understanding or appreciation for another's viewpoint. One agent felt that their office is often on the receiving end of this mindset:

Attitude and ego from the other countries and that has happened before.

Very different from us [...] when law enforcement agencies from other countries come here, we receive them with open hands, you know, come here and we'll cooperate with you, however us going to their place, sometimes we feel a little bit with our hands tied (R13-I).

Another suggested that cultural differences could lead to a failure to recognise crimes, for instance, the crime of adultery in some Arab countries would be unrecognisable in the US, which would make it impossible for US agents to respond (R17-F). Again, as with different legal systems, if there was a way to somehow universally agree upon and document certain cultural issues, it would, without a doubt, significantly aid in improving future transnational cooperation.

Lost in Translation: Language

The language barrier was by far the most common response as a barrier to cooperation. Many of the Puerto Rican police department officers do not speak English, and just as many federal agents, who are transplanted to the island, speak no Spanish. The reasons for the lack of second language skills in each group were quite different. English and Spanish are both primary languages of PR, but English is often abandoned in the public school system later on. There are two potential causes for this: lack of resources and an attempt to preserve Spanish on the island (R8-I). Many respondents felt that the lack of a common language was the main contributor in failing to share information or successfully cooperate:

In our case over here in PR we have a lot of agents from the States. They go to school, try to speak Spanish, and some of them do and some of them don't, you know, that's one of the primary issues right now (R9-F)

In essence, many federal agents, although well-funded and educated, do not follow through or make the effort to become bilingual. The lack of resources, training and, indeed, personal effort in learning the second language seemingly leads to an underlying prejudice both locally and federally. Once again, there underlies an issue of

trust. If, as has been evidenced through literature and agents' responses, there is a great deal of benefit for speaking face-to-face in order to build trust and facilitate co-operation, the need to speak the second language either poorly or through a translator is arguably detrimental.

Gender Inequality: Women Have to Work Harder

Overall, there is a small percentage of women working in the law enforcement community, and female respondents replied that gender was a big barrier, begging the question: if there were more women, would there be more cooperation? Or would women be just as susceptible to the ultra-competitive police culture (Braithwaite & Brewer, 1998, cited in Newburn, 2003)? One agent said:

Well being a woman, that is a big barrier. It's male dominated also so when they first get to meet you as a woman, they don't know who you are or what kind of person you are, if you're tough, if you're weak, if you're opinionated, [...] and so ... Although they feel that way about male agents also but more so for the women because in the Latin society, which is where I work, the Latin society is very much ... It's amplified and so you don't know how, they don't know you are going to react with them [...] the working relationship you have with them, it becomes, each personality is whether you get along with somebody or not and get them to accept you as a woman but then depending on how good you do it. You could be totally rejected by them depending on who the person is. (R9-F)

Gender issues can make it difficult for women to work within law enforcement in PR. While one agent said that gender was not a problem in PR as much as elsewhere, it was still required for women to prove themselves by showing that they could work as hard, or harder, than male officers. As one woman agent expressed:

If you show that you're weaker or there's something that you cannot quite accomplish, as well as they do, then you'll be seen as like a little woman who co-operates (inaudible) and they're not going to send you in the front of the stack to work or deal with the guys. (R29-F)

Another agent pared it down to personality above a blanket gender prejudice, implying that it was more a matter of whether a person was capable of leading rather

than their gender, while at the same time suggesting that women officers had greater motivation than men. Still, another respondent thought that the situation between men and women was much less equal, and that, as a woman, it helped to be attractive in order to elicit cooperation from male officers:

It does affect co-operation, especially if they don't know you and I just hate to say this but I've heard it already, so if a person is not good-looking or pleasing to the eye, there's like even less co-operation, [...] Right now, I'm using it to my advantage because I'm not going to be (inaudible) if I can take advantage of it (R13-I).

Overall, it appears that experiences in relation to gender are diverse and not easily generalised, although women certainly find themselves operating in a 'man's world' in law enforcement in PR.

While women may, indeed, have to work harder in some respects, there are arguably areas where significant advantages can be drawn from being a woman. In their study, Braithwaite & Brewer (1998, cited in Newburn, 2003) found that men tended to use physical actions in order to exert control over citizens. This led to both verbal and physical resistance. On the other hand, female officers, even if they adopted the tactics of their male colleagues, did not experience similar responses. "Male officers tended to be more often placed at risk of physical confrontation, while females were generally more supportive of citizens, preferring tactics heavy on mutual power in the interaction" (Braithwaite & Brewer, 1998, p.286). Also according to Braithwaite & Brewer (1998), coercive tactics are less often chosen by females than males, resulting in less verbal abuse and physical resistance towards females during interactions with members of the public.

6.3 Potential Ways to Improve Cooperation in Transnational Policing in Puerto Rico and the Dominican Republic

Key Influences on TNP Cooperation

Cooperation – a highly personal matter. The personal aspect of cooperation is perceived as a key influence on cooperation. Personal aspects, including relationships, commitment and personality factors are, in a number of ways, important to the collaborative process.

In terms of relationships, it appears that face-to-face networking is an essential element of cooperation, creating the initial meetings and laying the foundation for relationships that both increase the participants' faith in the system of cooperation and gives them reason to help "oil the wheels" for each other. Trust between individuals is vitally important, as simply being told that they were 'on the same team' or 'working towards the same goals' was not enough to create full trust and sharing. In particular, senior officers carry out extensive face-to-face networking through events, but respondents also thought that agents with less seniority had opportunities to network and that this was important to cooperation. In relation to this, concerns about organisational aspects were raised, since frequent turnover of agents meant it became more difficult to build and keep stable relationships. Also in regards to networking, technology was frequently mentioned, with respondents stating that improved communications technology had made networking and communication much easier and more secure, and, therefore, improved relationships and the ease with which agents and supervisors could work together.

Another important and related aspect of personal influences was that of personal commitment. It seems that personal attitude and commitment towards the goal of full cooperation was seen as important ingredients in facilitating cooperation, particularly in a legal/jurisdictional environment that is not always conducive to cooperation. In these cases, both personal relationships and personal commitment to cooperation could be helpful factors. For instance, agents went out of their way to find solutions to difficulties in sharing intelligence. These two personal aspects interact, in the sense that a commitment to the principle of cooperation leads to building better relationships with other agents, which then leads to improved attempts at cooperating, and, therefore, an incentive to continue to be committed to it. One agent described this process:

With good networking and knowing each other, [...] If there is any problem they can say, "Okay, we cannot share information" try to bring somebody to look into that and see how we can overcome that barrier to make it better. [...] we have a lot of policies with regard to sharing information to outside countries, but there are always ways that you can find that maybe [...] "Okay I cannot talk to you, you cannot talk to me," it's clear in the policy, but why we don't go to these (inaudible) and then

you tell him, you tell me, I tell him, and then we got the information flow. (R27-L)

Again, the commitment of senior agents was mentioned as a particularly important factor, as those in leadership positions need to be positive about change and cooperation in order to overcome others' apathy.

Personality also emerged as a contributing factor, although not as strongly as other personal aspects. There was a suggestion that there were individuals with personality types who might be resistant to cooperation or to change itself, especially those personalities where 'ego' was the problem. However, officers with determinedly uncooperative traits were considered to be rare.

The political is at play. Political elements were seen as just important, if not more so, than the personal aspects to cooperation. The clearest precondition is that some political influence will exist among the political class to encourage cooperation and create the conditions for an effective response to transnational crime. One agent said:

I think the politics of each little island, of each little state has a lot to do to them because normally in PR if the Government doesn't say we are going to do this, we are going to do that or he doesn't improve the facilities you're not going to be doing anything. (R29-F)

Political will, in favour of cooperation, was an important condition for receiving adequate funding for cooperative initiatives, although a lack of funding was not always related solely to a lack of will to solve the problem. In the case of some islands, like the DR, it was simply a general lack of resources. Corruption was also described as an ongoing problem, although generally not as central a problem as others. Several respondents pointed out that political will was partially based on self-interest, with agencies/governments only willing to cooperate if there was some clear return for them for their efforts (R4-F, R16-F, R17-F, R18-F, R19-International). However, emphasised by an agent, this is clearly counterproductive:

You know, there's more, how can I say, every agency, every country is very jealous about their sovereignty and, you know, they are protecting their laws, protecting their image around the world, so probably I think

nations should open up a little bit more, you know, this is not, this is fighting crime, it's something that benefits everybody. (R18-F)

When asked how to overcome the corruption barriers in place, there were several suggestions. Most common was to improve the vetting process, which involves a series of tests (including lie detectors) and background checks to ensure that the person is "clean", Some went so far as to say this process should not only be used with other countries, but within multi-agency cooperation. One agent replied,

We can work on some type of memorandum for understanding among the countries so they can establish minimum standards about the hiring of this individual or these individuals that are being assigned to work in these task forces, so there is a vetting process. And as soon as the vetting process is established and you pass, then sharing can be more easy. (R4-F)

Another agent thought they needed to increase and revise memorandums of understanding (MOUs) and use of treaties between island nations, for example, having a representative of an island nation on board Coast Guard vessels who would have, for example, the power of arrest in the event they are in the waters of that nation. Other agents suggested that a major restructuring of the agencies take place, specifically, the local police forces where corruption is more common. One suggested that this would need to involve changing personnel at a higher level, bringing in 'fresh faces' and improving the working lives of police (R27-L).

Almost all agents, both federally and locally, agreed that the current situation of inequality of funds and education between local and federal agencies needs to be urgently improved. One agent said they felt it would never be solved because locals will never make the salaries that they make, "it is condescending and we need to stop treating them like they are lower...that becomes individual" (R4-F). A glimmer of hope for a solution is the HIDTA Program:

HIDTA is doing a lot here. HIDTA pays for these task forces, a premium pay in addition to their salary, I don't know how much it is right now, probably there are only 800 more than, in addition to, HIDTA provide the vehicles, they provide all the equipment, the only thing we don't pay is the gun and the salary. Besides that we try to cover

everything. If we don't pay that, DEA try to co-operate on those lines.
(R11-F)

Another mentioned that the DEA provide training for their counterparts by sending them to their academies and by giving them incentives to help out with their financials. The only problem with this major funding from HIDTA is that it is not an official arm of the government but merely a “program” that can be cut at any time. This was noted as a grave concern from all law enforcement in PR, the DEA included (R14-F).

While political will is usually considered a local political issue, international politics was also raised as an issue that affected cooperation. For example, the importance of the US government’s political will, at an international level, was needed in the government parties’ willingness to raise issues of transnational cooperation and drug trafficking with other governments, including those in South America. Related are issues surrounding the US’s position in the world, including the sense that other countries were likely to see US attempts to cooperate/help as an “imposition” even when assistance had been requested. In addition to this concern is the effects of the US change in foreign policy positions, such as an increased focus on terrorism after 9/11, which distracts from drug trafficking as a central problem in itself, rather than one simply linked to terrorism.

Anti-Americanism and other cultural clashes. Cultural influences on cooperation ranged from different values and styles of communication to basic language problems and even anti-Americanism (among island countries).

Difficulties in communication is attributed both to differences in styles of communication, as well as basic language problems among agents. One Spanish-speaking agent suggested that he had trouble introducing other English-speaking agents to Puerto Rican informants, emphasizing the importance of building personal relationships and suggesting that anything that impacts the ability to do that can undermine cooperation. Another respondent said, “I mean people are going to have a natural tendency to want to work with people of their own culture, of their own language” (R23-I).

Others felt the solution lies within education and training. One agent explains the inequality between public education in PR and on the US mainland:

I think it's important that the public schools teach a little bit better English, because I went to private school when I went to school in the States, and I went to public school in PR and there's this big difference, there's a big gap. If you want to get a good education you've got to send your children to private school. Public school is just basic, it worries a lot of people because the majority of Puerto Ricans cannot afford private school. If they do afford it they're like "Oh I sent them to private school and I have the cheapest car and the cheapest house so the kids can get a good education." (R11-F)

One reference to a culture of anti-Americanism among other islands (e.g. Dutch Islands) was related to the previously described perception of the US participation in the world; seen as an "imposition" even when invited.

Overall, the key influences around transnational cooperation focus around political, cultural and personal factors. Personal interaction is a crucial factor in building relationships that go on to facilitate cooperation, making effective networking essential. However, the political factor is also an essential part of the equation. No matter the level of commitment of individual law enforcement officers, effective cooperation requires favourable political conditions: the political will to provide necessary resources, promote cooperation officially and expedite legally difficult situations. Most respondents agreed, however, that a combination of factors and influences towards cooperation was important, rather than a single influence being paramount over the others. In fact, as several respondents pointed out, each of these influences tended to interact and affect each other.

Changing attitudes and perceptions. Attitudes and perceptions were rated as very important for successful cooperation, locally or internationally. Changing the overall perception of the US was noted as a way to improve relations with other countries. Most respondents were in agreement to this given statement,

It's a tricky subject. I guess that first changing the point of view of that particular country towards the U.S. is one major aspect that I would look into [...] first you need to kind of like let these people know that "I'm a friend and not a foe, and I just want to work with you because by helping you I'm helping myself". We have South America, we have countries in South America, they are leading producers of cocaine and

heroin, and actually that makes a lot of money for them, so if you go there and tell them that you are there to get rid of the coca plantations in Bolivia they are going to say like, “No, because we farm those and the locals use it to kind of inhibit their appetite and that’s what gets them going”. [...] they have their own idea of what’s going on and if you don’t work on that first then it’s pretty much useless. I mean you’ll go there and they’ll look at you and they’ll say like, “Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah”, and you turn your back and they’ll continue to do what they’ve been doing. (R11-F)

To improve cooperation, you must be more respectful and understand interdependence in order to expand your network.

Outreach: networking and communication. Networking and communication were noted as key in improving cooperation and overcoming barriers. Interpol is a good example of this, with their modern communications system that is linked to member countries 24/7. One agent suggested having quarterly face-to-face meetings with all the heads of the law enforcement in PR, DR and all the islands, the Netherlands, and so on, to network and share information or methods with one another (R24-F). However, there always needs to be a liaison from the country of origin when one agency enters into another country. The agent explained,

For example, in the DR, if we had an MOU saying, okay you let my agents go there, carry guns, do the law enforcement work as long as one of your agents is there with us, you’re done, but let them free will, because a lot of times they restrain a lot the locals. (R24-F)

Networking, supplying other countries with training and exchanging agents could all be positive means to improve cooperation. Another is to have agents act in more diplomatic roles as opposed to directive roles, asking ‘how can we help you to get the job done?’ In some respects this already being done, but it needs to become a more widespread policy.

The above suggestions are all important approaches towards improving cooperation but they are not being put into practice. One respondent summed it up simply: “There is so much to learn from each other, it’s a win-win situation for all, really” (R14-F).

Individual Level

Reciprocity Gets Results. At a personal level, personality and different styles of communication make a difference to agents' ability to cooperate. An ability to be friendly, to delegate and be diplomatic/tactful, yet aware of personal/office politics, are all qualities that help agents in developing effective, productive working relationships. There was a suggestion that in order to develop the best cooperation, agents need to be able to enjoy each other's company and get along well, becoming friends, as well as colleagues. There is a clear need for officers to feel as if their cooperation is being reciprocated – a need for mutual cooperation. If one person shares willingly while another shares grudgingly, the willing person might feel there is less reason for them to cooperate in the future. One respondent expressed, "As long as I feel that the officers I'm dealing with over in the DR, the ones I'm working my case with, are co-operating with me, then I have no problem with working the case and co-operating with them (R29-F).

To some extent, this need for reciprocity could be used to encourage cooperation, if shown up front how cooperation could be mutually beneficial. As one respondent stated: "Expose them more to operations and push them to, don't ask here, to go to the other agency and show your product. It's basically, here's what I can do for you if you embrace me" (R11-F).

However, obviously not everyone is cooperative or a natural team-player, and several respondents described people they thought had personalities which were less suited to cooperation (R3-I). There were few suggestions as to how these personality types might be helped to become better integrated, particularly as there was a sense that people were set in their ways and not easily capable of change. While there were suggestions made elsewhere about how to encourage or create the best conditions for cooperation through institutional change or material rewards, there were no ideas on how to change 'personalities' that were set against cooperation. Most respondents who discussed this suggested that the best solution was to simply go around "difficult" people (R19-I).

Money as Motivation. There was general agreement that the rewards for successful cooperation needed to improve in terms of verbal encouragement or recognition, as well as through more formal recognition such as salary increases, promotion and qualification for better training opportunities. Regarding verbal appreciation, one agent expressed:

Telling them their successes, you know, showing them that you care, telling them that they are doing a good job. [...] We always need somebody telling us, "You are doing good." Because we may be working very hard but when we don't see the support of somebody, [...] It's like it's more difficult to carry on. (R27-L)

Another respondent thought this, along with organisational culture, was more important than financial remuneration, but most were adamant that decent salaries were essential, especially for local police involved in dangerous and difficult work, comprising of long hours, for what is right now little money: "Salary, recognition, training. If you see somebody doing the right thing then recognise that guy. If you can improve their salary then they are going to work happier..." (R1-L). Another suggested that the existence of HIDTA itself acted as good incentive towards local officers working their way up through the force to be involved in the program, since it was a better paid and more prestigious position (R28-L).

Institutional Level

Cultivating Cooperation via Leadership. There was a strong sense that leadership in organisations is the most important aspect affecting cooperation at the institutional level. Leaders who are personally committed to fostering cooperation and championing the organisation and its successes at the highest levels were seen as essential to the effectiveness of the organisation. There was great respect for leaders who work hard to secure funding in Washington for new cooperative initiatives, and to ensure the successes of the organisation are recognised, thereby reducing the likelihood of funding cuts.

Leaders and managers also play a key role in creating an organisational culture that is conducive to good cooperation and in reducing the role of competition, as well as introducing organisational changes that would benefit cooperation (such as less paperwork). There was a sense that a 'trickle-down' effect in culture was possible, and that it is crucial to have people at the top of the organisation who are completely committed to cooperation fostering this attitude to filter down to lower levels. As one agent shared:

The management has to do it also, they have to set the standards for, they have to do cooperation, if you have them fighting you are going to have us fighting too, you know, we are not going to get along. (R25-F)

There were also concerns about the political nature of appointments for law enforcement in PR and the US mainland, generally, and the fact that this could mean both a relatively frequent turnover of leaders (every few years) and a failure to align the views of a political appointee with the goals and needs of the organisation. One agent remarked:

When you have a government with specific style and they put in personnel that have nothing to do with law enforcement, for example, the head of an agency, a law enforcement agency, you get certain contradictions in style and actually in what they do. It's not necessarily true for every instance [...] but I see it a lot, like for example in PR. Once the government changes or the administration changes all the agencies' heads, they change, and because they're appointed that doesn't mean they are the best person for the job. (R3-I)

In relation to culture and cultural change, turnover of staff was also raised as an issue, since agents who had spent time getting to know PR and learning to cooperate could be reassigned and new people, who have a different attitude, brought in.

Opportunities for Personal Contact. As has been discussed throughout, personal, face-to-face contact with agents from other departments and agencies is often raised as an essential aspect of building good cooperative relationships. As such, some respondents thought that additional opportunities to meet with other agents, such as conferences and regular meetings, would help to improve cooperation at an institutional level. Although this already happens at a managerial level, additional opportunities for agents at lower levels would be useful. As one agent believed:

Exactly and you got to talk to people, I mean, yesterday I saw people that I've talked to on the phone and never seen them before, you know, and you wish you had more time to talk to them, to get to know them, to say, "hey I'm so-and-so that talked to you on the phone," I wish it could be made longer. (R25-F)

There was also a sense that there was a need to build better relationships with officers in other countries, and that personal contact plays an essential part towards that goal. Several respondents mentioned that the DEA was doing well in developing offices and contacts abroad, and that it was important to have an agent stationed in

other countries as this allowed people to 'put a face to a name', to have a personal, trusted contact within that country.

Political Level

You Want Change? Focus on Political Appointments. At a political level, it seemed that there was a huge amount of cynicism and disillusionment about political processes in PR, and, in particular, about the way they lead to political appointments that reflect the attitudes of governing parties rather than the needs of law enforcement. Therefore, the most effective change that many thought could be made at a political level is to change the way law enforcement leaders are appointed, so that they serve the needs of the organisation rather than political masters. At the same time, it was again stressed that leaders need to ensure that they are politically savvy and able to operate in a way that would ensure the organisation was championed and its goals advanced at the highest levels of government.

In addition to the way political appointments are made, there is also a high degree of frustration with the way politics is conducted in PR and how that affects cooperation. Politics is polarised in a way that prevents effective discussion and creates dramatic shifts during changes of government, as expressed by one participant:

Well here in PR every four year is a big issue about the politics, you know, if you have a vision, this Governor came in with a good way to work with this, share information with everybody and work with the crime and everything, and they are doing a great job. Next elections came along, another person will take that out because, "No, he did it, I want to do it this way," and we start all over again. They don't continue what they already start (R20-F).

The attitude of the government towards police cooperation is extremely important since it can prevent any effective cooperation being carried out and, again, there is a sense that the policies of a preceding government would be undermined or impeded by its successor. One respondent expressed this in terms of wanting experts, rather than ideologues, to be in charge of policy and for requiring government to listen to what works rather than suggesting policies that have already been tried and failed (R23-I). Ideally, removing the effects of politics from law enforcement would produce improvements.

Funding. Generally it was understood by respondents that the more money was available, the more cooperation could be carried out and the more effective agencies would be, indicated in the following statement, “As much money as they want to throw at it, that’s how much co-operation”(R17-F). While this might be unrealistic in that this is not the only effective factor, the fact that funding had been frozen for the past few years seems to have produced real differences, particularly in hiring practices, as there was not enough funding to have a reasonable number of agents available to work on task forces. The lack of funding to hire more agents leads to increased hours and overwork among the rest. There were also, again, real concerns that local police did not have funding for basic equipment – even cars – and hampering cooperation between federal and local agencies.

Trust: the most critical component to cooperation. Trust is completely critical in cooperation. This was reflected by unanimous agreement by respondents that, without trust, cooperation could not continue. A minimal level of trust, then, is a basic condition for successful cooperation. However, there were differences between how different people trust, and the extent to which trust has to be earned rather than given implicitly. Corruption also emerged as a major concern in relation to trust.

While trust is considered crucial in allowing cooperation to successfully take place, it was not always given freely or without reservation. While some agents said that they would trust automatically without reservation and only then withdraw their trust if they thought it had been betrayed, many more thought that trust was something that had to be built slowly over many interactions. In both cases, if trust had been betrayed - for instance, if intelligence was seen to have been leaked, or if a tip-off was incorrect - in many cases the relationship could not be repaired. To some extent, lapses in the integrity and value of information can be forgiven, as one agent believed:

I would say you’re telling me there’s a sale of 50% off at JP Penny’s [...] I go there and, yeah, there was a 50% off but guess what, the sale ended yesterday. Nobody likes to be duped. It’s like it isn’t your fault, it’s just maybe that you weren’t (inaudible) and you didn’t know all the facts and therefore the information was like half-way, so there you go. (R13-I)

However, if the value of the information was compromised due to information being leaked or falsely supplied on purpose, there is no way to recover trust. Because of

corruption, important barriers to trust include not having enough information about a person's background or having doubts about their history or associates. Continual intelligence failures or leaks would also lead to mistrust.

In overcoming barriers to trust and building relationships, the need for personal contact with other agents was again one of the most important factors mentioned. The importance of direct networking and communication is clearly the most effective way to build trust, beyond any kind of remote communication. Because of this, additional opportunities for networking and meeting personally were again suggested as ways to build trust. These included regular meetings as well as joint training sessions, perhaps because training is a scenario that involves working together, but not on active casework/investigation, so there is less at stake.

In addition, the need to show that there are mutual benefits to be had in cooperating, and to show reciprocity in trust by offering information, as well as asking for it, are also important. The importance of repeated interactions is crucial, as highlighted here:

Since most of our trust is based on previous behaviour, you just need to kind of start being a good boy from day one and say, “Okay, we’re going to start working together and all that”, and then ensure that my pact with you is in a manner that it’s going to build the trust [...] You don’t tell people that you’re going to do something and then just go behind their backs and do something differently (R3-I).

Clear communication and honesty between agents, in avoiding misunderstandings, also emerged as an important aspect of trust. One agent described how he had accidentally repeated information he had overheard that should not have been shared, but had repaired trust by explaining and apologising to the injured party (R23-I). The honesty ensured that it was treated as a mistake rather than an intentional breach of trust. These rules of honest communication would seem to hold true for most relationships. It was also suggested that because of the stakes involved in trusting agents – when corruption could lead to injury or death, as well as drug crimes – law enforcement officers were naturally less inclined to trust. While this could be overcome to some extent, respondents suggested that a certain amount of wariness had to be tolerated, and was in fact essential. Mistrust, on the other hand, was identified as a

major barrier to cooperation, in particular, because of the life-or-death nature of situations involved with law enforcement.

Features of the HIDTA Agent's Organizational Culture

The need to lead by example. Good leadership is a key component of good cooperation, and respondents agreed that clear leadership that acted as a role model was an important aspect. In addition, in relation to power between the different agencies, one important aspect is that the Executive Board is balanced to ensure equal weighting for federal and local agencies. Interestingly, a respondent (who discussed this referred to this body as the 'Secretive Board' rather than the Executive Board), implied that whatever else the HIDTA leadership achieves, it does not manage to be transparent (R11-F).

Working in spite of reduced resources. Resources are a particular source of contention, since the HIDTA budget has not increased since its original allocation, resulting in a real-term reduction over the years. One respondent made the point that, with increasing costs of keeping facilities open, operational costs have been squeezed. However, while funding has reduced in real terms, another agent made the point that they are accustomed to being as effective as possible on limited resources, so there might be some extent to which HIDTA manages to be effective even on a reduced budget, as shared here: "To be honest with you it doesn't matter, the information that you get me, police officers are used to working with limited resources so we will find ways" (R16-F).

Race and ethnicity. As with gender, different experiences were recorded when race and ethnicity were explored. The literature would suggest that there may be an issue with race. Anderson (2000) considers, for example, the different and often very powerful loyalties that members of one particular race or ethnicity feel towards their own and against others. However, overall it was not considered to be a major issue of contention or barrier to cooperation in PR, and most respondents did not think it was as relevant in PR as it might be elsewhere, as one agent said: "Race, no, because PR is a big mesh of Spanish, White, Black and Indian, so we are just a mesh, so there's no race" (R29-F) .

The range of different ethnic heritages present in PR's culture seems to reduce the impact of racism, or at least make it less obvious on the surface. However, a few respondents did think it had affected them, with one saying: "You'll see favouritisms across the whole agency when it comes to nationality or ethnicity. I've felt it" (R9-F).

The language barrier is also again an issue here, with participants pointing out the division between local agents and federal officers assigned from other parts of the country who do not speak Spanish. One respondent made the point, though, that racism was unacceptable within federal agencies, such as the FBI, although there could be more diversity: “You’d be found out pretty quickly just what kind of, if you had that mindset, you would be found out fairly quickly” (R4-F).

Regarding potential ways to improve cooperation, overall, there were a number of issues that respondents wanted to re-emphasise at the end of the interview, although none were matters that had not been discussed at all before. Essentially the key to cooperation is a willingness to work hard and commit to it, at all levels of the organisation. In achieving this, it is crucial for all agencies/forces to remember that they share a common goal in combating drug crime, and that this goal is worth the work involved in cooperating.

Some respondents also wanted to reiterate the problems faced, particularly in encouraging cooperation between federal and local officers, where a gulf still exists despite attempts by HIDTA to ensure the two are equal within the organisation (R4-F, R11-F, R15-F). Differences in pay, in particular, were singled out as creating resentment on an individual level. Therefore, overall, respondents wanted to reiterate the difficulties involved in cooperation and the attitudes needed to succeed.

6.4 Develop a Transnational Version of the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas Program?

While perhaps seemingly far-fetched, a concept of a global version of the HIDTA scheme and an evaluation of how that could be beneficial, has the potential to reveal much about the success and relevance of the scheme in a TNPC context.

6.4.1 Driving global integration via better communication and intelligence gathering. The clearest advantage to having a transnational version of HIDTA is that it would allow for global integration of intelligence around drug trafficking. Linking intelligence across the world into one system would allow agents to make associations and track connections far beyond their current abilities, and most respondents interviewed thought that this would provide them with a huge advantage in comparison to the current disjointed system. It would also mirror the real structure of criminal organisations, where there is usually collaboration between groups based in a number of countries and crimes are committed across national boundaries. Similarly, the trade itself shifts constantly to react to supply, demand, and enforcement of the law, as is the

case with the heroin trade shifting from Asia to Mexico and Colombia. Because of this, several of the respondents thought that a more global approach was essential in order to “keep up with” drug traffickers. One respondent said:

Since we have such great mobility now between nations and you might have the victim in one country and the evidence in a second country and the perpetrator in a third country, it would be great that a group of agents can travel and they will gather everything together and be able to submit the criminal accusations in one particular jurisdiction. That would be science, as I said before, like science fiction, but there is definitely a need, in the modern world. (R24-F)

It is interesting to note how they consider that a global police force -arguably the purest and most total form of TNPC - as being ideal, but do not consider that it would ever be possible in reality.

6.4.2 Difficulties in linking intelligence systems and security. There are major drawbacks and difficulties to merging international intelligence systems. While the difficulty and expense involved in creating a system that could harness intelligence from all over the world was a definite drawback, the most important concerns lay in the security implications of having a centralised database. There would need to be clear tracking mechanisms in place, so that access would be tracked and agents would be able to view, but not change, data in systems outside their own agencies. Alternatively, a specific administrator could be charged with maintaining the database and answering queries.

In relation to this, the fear of corruption, particularly in other countries that could be members of this transnational HIDTA, also emerged as a theme. No matter how strong the checks put in place on a new system, corruption was still seen to be an element that could undermine the entire enterprise. As one agent believed: “One rotten apple in there would be a huge disadvantage. I mean you have a lot of information in those systems” (R18-F).

In fact, even making enquiries around a particular name could allow corrupt officers to alert criminals to the fact that someone was interested in them, and that they were being investigated, whether directly or indirectly. Therefore, even a very limited amount of information being leaked to criminal organisations could compromise

investigations (which again underlines an important reason why the culture of mistrust and secrecy in law enforcement is so ingrained).

Most of the respondents were in favour of integrated intelligence systems, ‘in theory.’ Yet, the practicality of such systems was called into question based on the difficulties that have already been experienced in trying to implement limited integration:

I think if all the agencies will input information and all these regional information centres that could be shared with everybody, that would be good because I can tell you from my agency, we don’t share that information with anybody.[...] I know ISC doesn’t have access to ATF stuff. And I know they don’t have access to IRS stuff, so if they don’t have access to that, how can they put out information that I need? Like right now, I call the ISC and I ask, [...] “Can you run how many guns this guy has purchased in the last month?” They can’t, they can’t do that, only ATF does that (R18-F).

In addition to the financial and technical difficulties involved, there is also a lack of legal framework to deal with that kind of information sharing, since intelligence gathered by one agency/force can be inadmissible in the courts of another country if not formally/ officially requested and granted.

6.4.3 Sharing expertise and creating shared goals. Another important advantage of creating a transnational HIDTA would be to allow the same relationships and coordination to be built on a global scale as on a national level. For instance, linking law enforcement agencies and forces all over the world would help create shared goals and ensure that forces were working together rather than against each other, and not duplicating efforts. The importance of deconfliction is emphasised in much of the literature (Sheptycki, 2000; Best Jr., 2010; Anderson, 2000). It would also allow sharing of techniques and expertise, which is useful on a national scale, but could be even more effective globally, since there is likely to be even more differences in tactics between various forces than there is at a national level. As one respondent shared: “You see that would be an advantage because you would have a whole different ideas coming together towards a common goal and it would make things easier, not just in PR” (R28-L).

Again, proximity was mentioned by respondents as an essential factor in building trust between agents from different forces:

The advantages for certain [...] are just when you have local law enforcement representatives and federal under the same roof, working in the same office together, just again a natural relationship, a natural flow of information (R23-I).

This underlines the importance of this as a part of the HIDTA model – that by working together under one roof, agents build better, more productive and cooperative relationships and experience less competitive behaviour. In fact, some agents spoke in terms of agents becoming more like “families” by working together.

6.4.4 Difficulties in Integrating Police Forces. Doubts were expressed over the practical difficulties involved in attempting to integrate dramatically different police forces from all over the world. When considering some of the difficulties that had been encountered in trying to integrate even the different cultures of federal US agencies, respondents were sceptical about whether this could be overcome when dealing with an even more diverse range of cultures globally:

What we do between us and England, between us and Spain and between us and Colombia, they’re all going to be different. I mean what you just said, in terms of international standards, an international standard that would be great but who would enforce something like that? There is no world government (R22-F).

Some respondents thought there would be disagreements about where a transnational HIDTA would be based, others that there would be disagreements over leadership. But the clearest problem that emerged was the likelihood of competition between the forces involved. As elsewhere, the prospect of competition was seen a crucial threat to cooperation, but particularly in the beginning, before trust has been established between officers. This included the possibility of competition between different agencies, but also between federal agents and local officers. In particular, officers referred to the recent merging of agencies under the auspice of Homeland Security, which they considered to have been relatively unsuccessful:

Well we’re going through it almost with the Homeland Security where they merge all the agencies and they’ve got a lot of problems, a lot of

problems, budgetary problems, personality problems, turf problems, battles. As far as putting them all together, I've seen nothing accomplish it, a lot of confusion, a lot of confusion. (R25-F)

It is suggested, then, that trying to make something too big and too complicated, means that problems are amplified to a point where nothing meaningful can be accomplished.

6.4.5 Lack of legal framework. Another barrier to implementing a transnational version of HIDTA would be the lack of a legal framework within which it would operate; as outlined earlier, there are important questions of jurisdiction when dealing with transnational crime, particularly in deciding where a crime was committed, when in fact it was carried out across several different countries. The difficulty of deciding where to prosecute a crime and where jurisdiction lay would not be solved by creating a transnational HIDTA, as one agent illustrated:

A new agent came in that did not know anything about Interpol and asked us, "Would you please facilitate the penal code, the international penal code." He actually thought that there was a penal code that would apply internationally and that we would be investigating that here. It was such an unintelligent question for a request that we all laughed at the poor guy. But it would be great if we had something like that, a world penal code. (R24-F)

Similar problems arise with reference to evidence. Although intelligence might be shared between officers from different countries, there are strict procedures for requesting and granting it officially so that it can be used in affidavits or as evidence in court, which would inevitably hamper swift and effective communication.

6.4.6 Management - who's holding the money bag? It was suggested that an essential component of any successful transnational HIDTA would be good management, preferably unattached to any specific agency (or rotated between countries/members) that could help to integrate different forces. This appeared to be in response to the organisational situation within HIDTA, in which managers come from specific agencies, rather than "belonging" to HIDTA alone. It was also stressed that this manager should not have other duties, such as investigative duties. For instance, this individual could be a 'civilian' manager with an understanding of law enforcement, such as an intelligence analyst, as one respondent said: "There seems to be a lot of people wearing different hats, so to speak, doing many jobs" (R14-F).

This also draws out one of the problems with HIDTA, which had not been explored until now - that some agents assigned to HIDTA still have duties to carry out related to their original agency, and are not able to focus completely on their HIDTA role. Concerns were also expressed, with agents questioning how management and funding of a transnational HIDTA would operate, with suggestions including the UN, Interpol or the G8 countries. One officer also suggested that the US would have to be the leader on any such initiative because only the US would be able to afford to fund it.

With concern over funding and the will in Washington to continue and devote resources to the HIDTA program, there was a clear sense by participants that HIDTA is undervalued, particularly in comparison to the work done and successes achieved. This can be understood in terms of funding, with one agent saying that funding for HIDTA had stayed the same for eight years (representing a decrease in funding in real terms). Agents seemed to feel embattled, with one saying:

This year we suffered, well we almost, but we won the war. We had to fight a big battle because they wanted to change a program under the umbrella of The Department of Justice, and since we are under the White House that gives us more power (R5-F).

In conclusion, although respondents discussed the many difficulties involved in setting up a transnational version of HIDTA, they did not come up with any real *disadvantages* to the scheme. This reflects the fact that, although they were sceptical about its implementation, almost all thought that the idea was exciting, at least 'in theory' (only one Federal interviewee suggesting that HIDTA was a not useful model at all). The real objections came not towards the idea of a transnational HIDTA itself, but to the likelihood of it being implemented successfully. The major barriers to this were competition between forces/agencies, fears over corruption, and the lack of a legal framework within which such an organisation would function. Interestingly, despite the fact that their earlier answers showed that HIDTA in the US has largely managed to overcome the tendency towards competition and mistrust, officers did not assume that it would be possible to do the same transnationally. Respondents were also keen to reiterate the importance of cooperation and sharing and to add that management of HIDTA was good. Overall, the clearest concerns were those of funding and the recognition/ continuation of the HIDTA program.

6.5 Summary and Conclusions

To conclude, Chapter 6 examined perceived barriers and potential improvements in PR and the DR and the key drivers of TNPC. It began by considering personal, political, and cultural factors that influence cooperation, and then seeks to understand different steps that can be taken at the individual and institutional level to improve cooperation. It also discusses the importance of attributes, like trust, motivation, leadership, ethnicity, and gender in cooperation. Respondents felt cooperation was affected by a combination of factors, including political will, personal commitment, individual personalities, technology and language barriers. At the personal level, they felt motivation through encouragement, recognition and reward was critical, as was defusing competition and building friendships and diplomacy. At the institutional level, training and leadership were seen as important. Trust was viewed as crucial, built gradually by working together in different ways but driven by individuals. Gender was considered partially useful for cooperation, but ethnicity not that much at all. Respondents repeatedly stated that, at the end of the day, cooperation was the result of an individual's willingness to do so and a commitment to overcoming barriers. Lastly, the advantages and disadvantages of the development of a transnational version of the HIDTA program is theorised and explored by analysing its goals, key influences, information sharing methods and staffing models. Advantages of such a model were increased intelligence and fighting drug trafficking in the same way as terrorism, but disadvantages included difficulties in integrating multiple police organizations, creating shared systems, managing corruption in other countries, and developing shared legal frameworks.

Chapter Seven

Conclusions and Implications

Before discussing the results and implications of the research presented here, I will briefly summarise the research questions posed in this thesis and then summarise the findings from each of the interviews carried out. The implications of the findings, in light of what they mean for the field of transnational policing, will then be discussed. Future steps will then be considered and conclusions drawn.

7.1 Overview of the Research Question

The overall research question driving this thesis, as set out in the preface, was:

1. Does this study examine the barriers and facilitators to the use of HIDTA as a model of TNPC on a global scale?

The review of the literature in Chapter 1 and 2 established that, for several decades, the globalisation of crime has emerged as a significant issue. Many researchers, such as Brown (2008) and Goldsmith and Sheptycki (2007) have investigated the effects of international crime and how this translates into policing. Many agencies have, over the past twenty years, recognised the need to move toward transnational policing. There has been a substantial amount of literature based around the structural features, such as comparative policing, courts, and corrections, or on transnational crimes or regional issues (Hill, 2005; Ortiz, 2005; Roth, 2004). The intention was to consider the impact of social psychological factors, in addition to the aforementioned issues. Some research had already been conducted, but this was felt to be a relevant, vibrant, and potentially valuable area worthy of further research. It was also established that the DEA and HIDTA program would provide the context for the research, and so in order to fully illuminate the successes, failings, and scope of these agencies (as a reflection and representation of TNPC) to attempt to universalise these was thought to provide an avenue for further relevant explanation.

In addition to the main research question, each results chapter presented was driven by a supplementary related research question. Chapter 4 was driven by the investigation of stakeholders' perspectives on transnational crime and policing in PR and the DR. Chapter 5 explored the role and contribution of the DEA and the HIDTA program, and Chapter 6 continued with an investigation into TNPC, specifically examining perceived barriers and potential improvements. This chapter, Chapter 7, aims to interpret the findings and explore ways to enhance cooperation in TNP. This

chapter also critically examines options for implementing change, including looking at what future steps could be taken, and ends with the main conclusion of this thesis.

7.2 Summary of the Findings

There has been substantial discussion throughout this research about the barriers and facilitators to TNPC, both in terms of what the current body of literature suggests, and in terms of what the primary research conducted in this study has revealed. The findings in this respect are crucial for answering the two main research questions and for fitting the summary of the findings into this framework.

Shared Mission

Many of the agents talked about the importance of a “shared mission” in the Caribbean. As one said:

That motivates us to do a lot of intelligence and a lot of communication, having a communal problem. This is our everyday nightmare, people getting killed because of the drug points and the drug selling... It's the same in Jamaica, it's the same here, a lot of islands. (R24-F)

As suggested by the concepts of conditional and unconditional trust put forward by Jones and George (1998), the fact that the drug problem is perceived to be a regional issue provides a sense of shared mission and shared values, which can reinforce trust within teams. Although there is, by no means, unconditional trust between the whole of law enforcement in the Caribbean, with the perception of a common enemy, there is nevertheless grounds for some agents to feel that they have a mission and values in common and that they are “on the same side”. As Bowling (2009) writes, those involved in transnational policing have typically honed a set of skills, including the ability to work with individuals from different cultures, to negotiate different (and perhaps opposing) legal systems, to master the art of diplomacy, and to problem-solve. While this is certainly applicable to transnational issues, working cooperatively with agencies within the same country can also be difficult, requiring a version of some or all of these skills.

Where islands in the Caribbean were less affected by drug crime (or were perceived to be less affected), those islands were less inclined to cooperate with Puerto Rican agents because the crime was considered to be 'passing through' the island and the attitude was, “Hey, it's not our problem, it's your problem.” (R17-F) Some agents

believed the same attitude held true for forces from the mainland US, who saw the problems of PR as separate and not affecting the mainland. If a person, or party, does not feel they have a lot to gain through cooperation, it is possible that the skills discussed by Bowling (2009) will not be used because it is simply easier to ignore the problem, believing it has no bearing on one's situation. Here, Knack and Zak's (2001) research on trust between countries may also be relevant; the author explores how trust plays out when social and economic climates are different and when rates of investment differ.

Electronic Information Sharing

Information sharing and communication could be broadly categorised as either electronic (through central information clearinghouses such as the ISC, which collects information on cases centrally, takes queries, and carries out deconfliction), or via formal or informal personal communications between agents.

With regard to information-sharing via large centralised databases, there was a sense that the ISC was an invaluable resource, and that there should be more sharing of data, but that there were also clear security concerns. This does not necessarily indicate blanket distrust amongst law enforcement agents; rather, it is an ideal example of the need for “institutionalised distrust” (Luhmann, 1979), using control systems to reduce the risks of sharing data. In this case extra controls in fact increase trust and willingness to share by providing some extra safeguards for information. As Gutierrez (2004) wrote, despite post-9/11 changes, there are still some issues that need attention within the ISC.

One of the most important functions of the ISC appears to be deconfliction, which facilitates cooperation by ensuring that operations and investigations by one team/taskforce do not overlap, duplicate, or disrupt those of others. Apart from ensuring effective use of resources, this is an essential control mechanism which prevents dangerous clashes, especially during undercover operations. Again, providing effective but not overly controlling institutional control/monitoring mechanisms facilitates, rather than undermines, trust.

Personal Communication, Networking and Relationships

In addition to sharing via the ISC, a large amount of information-sharing happens informally, by telephone, as agents call contacts they know in other offices to check information. This highlights the importance of networking as a method of linking teams, since although these “loose ties” (Granovetter, 1973) or, as Levin et al., calls

them, “weak ties”, are not necessarily closely linked but trust each other enough to let information pass, which can then be shared with others within the network. In this situation, there is more likely to be “conditional” rather than “unconditional” trust (Jones & George, 1998), where two contacts are inclined to help each other reciprocally. Levin et al.’s research, in his words, refined Granovetter’s (1973) argument about weak ties, finding that useful, non-redundant information can be gained from *trusted* weak ties.

As predicted by studies of cooperation, such as Rocco's (1998), agents still have concerns that trust is harder to establish over the telephone and through other kinds of distant communication than it is in a face-to-face situation. Part of this concern was a worry that phone lines were not secure enough - another area where security should be ensured in order to “bridge the gap” between trust and the possible risk involved. However, there was also simply a difficulty if the person on the other end of the phone line was an “unknown quantity.” Based on the results of the aforementioned studies, it would be reasonable to expect that a limited amount of face-to-face communication with contacts, ahead of time, could mitigate some of the disadvantages of communicating at a distance, and this was borne out by agents’ experiences. A majority of them believed that regular face-to-face meetings, or at least occasional contact and introductions, in order to “put a face to a name” would be essential in building trust. For this reason, it seems essential that in order to build strong links between different agencies and forces, there should be regular meetings and networking events in order to build the type of trust that is more difficult to develop when dealing with people on a purely virtual level. However, it is also important to consider Levin et al.’s argument, as posed above, and how weak ties can also have their uses.

Co-location and Building Strong Teams

One of the most important strengths of the HIDTA model is the physical co-location of different agencies, which underlines the research and suggests that physical presence is a key factor in trust-building. While virtual teams can work, it does seem that physical presence is a significant factor in building trust (Rocco, 1998), and the HIDTA model feeds off this by ensuring not only that agents within the same location have easy access to one another but also that senior officers and directors have regular meetings in order to discuss cases and carry out deconfliction.

In addition to senior officers meeting each other regularly, taskforces operated as much more closely-knit teams, with some clearly displaying signs of unconditional

trust between team members - for instance, some agents described their colleagues as being like family.

Cultures of Secrecy And Competition

While agents report that there has been much organisational change in recent years, and a genuine improvement toward increased cooperation between agencies, there is inevitably still some reluctance to share information based on traditional “cop culture” values, as explored in chapter 2, such as protecting informants and keeping information restricted to a limited audience. This is reinforced by remaining institutional barriers, such as the different cultures and policies that each agency has, as well as completely separate and incompatible data records. While this culture appears to be weakening, thanks to a greater emphasis on cooperation and sharing, it can still cause problems at times.

However, a far more pervasive problem is that of competitive behaviour. While this too has been challenged to some extent, it remains problematic due to the promotions structure, which tends to reward individuals based on cases/investigations that they personally conclude, rather than the extent to which they are able to contribute to other cases or cooperate effectively.

Competition damages cooperation because of an unwillingness to hand over cases to other investigators who may be in a better position to pursue them successfully, as well as a reluctance to seek help in case this means devolving responsibility for the investigation. As one agent put it, “He who has the most, how would you say, arrests, gets the most funding...” (R22-F).

Corruption

While competition is insidious and undermines trust, it is by no means as major a threat to cooperation as corruption. By far, the greatest concern that agents had in trusting other law enforcement officials was corruption. In particular, corruption amongst local officers (for instance in PR and the DR) emerged as a significant concern. While the change in culture needed to undermine corruption is an ongoing task, the most important measures most agents suggested included ensuring the most extensive vetting and background checking possible. This, again, introduces an element of “institutionalised distrust” (Luhmann, 1979) that controls some elements of risk while allowing the need for agents to trust one another. This does not remove the risk altogether and thereby removes the need to trust. One major concern agents raised was that different agencies and departments had different vetting procedures so they were

never sure what types of procedures the people they dealt with had gone through before being accepted as officers. This ties into cooperation and trust as well as the sense, or lack thereof, as described in chapter 2, that people are “on the same team.”

Funding

Funding arose regularly throughout the interviews, in both positive and negative comments, and it is clearly seen as both a vital component of cooperation and a potential sticking point. On the positive side, the additional funding that HIDTA brought to the challenges of policing was extremely needed. In particular, it was common for agents to say that they thought HIDTA's additional resources brought the additional advantage of being able to proactively investigate and dismantle the roots of drug trafficking - the criminal organisations that enable it. Griffith (1997) discusses the serious issue of drug trafficking in the Caribbean, discussing the nature of these operations and the challenges in controlling them. While some thought *more* could be done in this area, few thought it was unimportant as a priority.

Many of the elements that have made the PR/USVI HIDTA successful are reliant on adequate funding. Timeliness of information delivery, for example, arose repeatedly as a crucial aspect of cooperation. Accurate and potentially vital data that arrives too late to help is of no use. As one agent said, “Timing is what makes it work.” (R17-F) However, processing the huge amounts of data that are required in order to ensure this intelligence is useful inevitably involves both expensive technology and manpower. Similarly, equipment, the ability to pay for extra personnel and hours, and extensive training were all listed as essential to cooperation.

Another interesting role that the additional funding from HIDTA fulfilled was that of filling gaps in the funding for other police forces, such as local forces in PR and even in the DR. Through cooperation with PR/USVI HIDTA teams, local forces were able to gain training and even the use of equipment which was otherwise unavailable to them. This helped to redress one major limiting factor on transnational cooperation, which is the disparity of resources between forces of different countries. One of the units working with HIDTA stated that most of their resources come from HIDTA funds; the boats, helicopters, patrol cars, weapons, radios, all kinds of equipment are basically paid by HIDTA. It was suggested that if they weren't getting HIDTA funding, the agents could be certain they wouldn't be able to have access to those resources.

Despite the fact that good cooperation is hard to achieve on a shoestring, funding to the PR/USVI HIDTA has not increased even in line with inflation since the

project's inception, resulting in a real-term budget reduction over the years. This was a source of resentment for many officers, particularly considering what they saw as the impressive achievements HIDTA had made.

Training

Training plays a vital role in improving cooperation in several ways and, in transnational policing, *shared* training appeared to be the most effective way to manage training. Firstly, training ensures that the norms of cooperation are spread throughout the organisation and, of course, that agents are kept up to date with the most effective techniques and methods of policing. While training is important, *shared* training builds on this in order to deliver additional dividends of trust and cooperation. Sharing training between agencies ensures that all agents have the same reactions and procedures for various situations, which is crucial when working together on operations. But, more importantly, it allows agents from different agencies or forces to network with each other, providing essential face-to-face trust-building contact which, as previously discussed, facilitates future cooperation. As one agent stated:

It's not that you're going to be sitting on a chair watching the instructor but you're going to be meeting the person right next to you and the person right next to you, you're going to be going for lunch together, and in some way you're going to be breaking that big wall between agencies [...] then when you need some favour or you need to work together with somebody you say, "I remember that guy, let me call him." (R6)

In addition to the social element of building trust, shared training reassures agents of each other's abilities, so they can be certain of the capabilities of members of other forces. As a belief in others' abilities is an essential precursor to trust (possibly even more so in competitive, "macho" cultures such as exists in policing), this lays essential groundwork for later trust and cooperation.

However, despite the efficacy of shared training as a tool for improving cooperation, training generally has been undermined by the real-term cuts in HIDTA's budget. Where previously HIDTA ran its own dedicated training program with full-time staff, there is no longer any dedicated training budget. Training is now organised by two part-time coordinators and is planned on a far more ad hoc basis. As a

consequence, fewer agents are being accepted for training, and courses are offered on a 'first come, first served' basis that many agents believed to be unacceptable.

Leadership and Political Will

Political will, and intelligent leadership, were two factors mentioned frequently, often alongside the issue of funding. The two are interconnected: without political will to encourage, fund, and create policy around cooperation, there could not be effective cooperation. However, the importance of a strategic leadership that could champion the organisation and the idea of cooperation was related to how much "political will" would exist for it - because a good leader could lobby for political backing for cooperative policies.

The importance of management/leadership that understands the need for cooperation and is able to champion it at the highest levels, including the highest political levels, in order to gain backing and resources for cooperation, is crucial.

7.3 Implications of the Findings

As briefly mentioned in the preface, the research presented here has important implications for a variety of different fields within the TNP domain, especially in current times of economic uncertainty. When budgets are tight, programs such as HIDTA become vulnerable and, therefore, it is vital for researchers within the TNP domain to have as much information as possible about methods of cooperation. Gaining substantial information about different perspectives on TNP cooperation can greatly influence the successful development of improved efficiency and effectiveness of TNP initiatives.

We have seen, throughout this research, the crucial importance of trust in TNPC. Trust is built gradually through commitment, and communication. It is also built, or brought out, through recognising the asset of different types of ties and the value of each (Levin et al., 2004). It has been established that corruption, suspicion, and lack of a personal history or knowledge for others can damage cooperation and that belief in others' competence and their tendency to be benevolent (Abrams et al, 2003) can enhance trust (and thus cooperation). Indeed, history and trust were found to be critical, as mentioned in Chapter 2 (Barber, 1983). This supports the claims and findings of Gambetta (1988) and Luhmann (1979), who have argued that cooperation is still an individual activity; this was explored in the context of cooperation having supposedly become less of an individual activity in recent years.

Chapter 6 has illustrated that capacity building was an essential aspect of improving cooperation. Training was seen as building relationships outside of normal working situations, with integrated, equal training a must. At the same time, agents rated resources and funding as key drivers to cooperation but responded that training had been cut and now was taken out of individual operational budgets. As mentioned above, Brogden (2005) and Held (2000) also noted that training, intelligence, equipment, and communication all suffer without appropriate funding and leave little funding for global cooperation. Chapter 6 provided supporting evidence for this, especially in the areas of training and capacity building.

Griffith (1997) and Harriott (2002) noted that capacity building and funding has been long overdue in the Caribbean. It seems that their holistic and balanced studies of crime control and cooperation would support these major findings. This is something that can be of use to TNP and governments when developing new campaigns for improving cooperation, especially when these are targeted at both the national and international levels. In that case, TNP and governments could ensure that any methods agencies perceive as useful and are highly interested in are more easily available for them to try to implement.

The broad implications of the findings of this research are in informing practical steps of action to improve TNPC. Therefore, the results from the studies presented in this thesis have important implications for researchers in the TNP domain, especially the “newer wave,” as implied in the introductory chapter. A number of researchers have put forward strong arguments that TNPC should no longer be regarded as an ideal concept or activity, and that the need for TNP to cooperate on a more holistic scale is critically required (Bowling & Foster, 2002; Giddens, 2002; Joyce, 2005; Marshall, Robinson & Kwak, 2005; Michalowski & Bitten, 2005; Nadelmann, 1993; Newburn & Sparks, 2004, Nicola, 2005; Niemann & Dovidio, 2005; Reiner, 2000). This research contributes to the study of what is needed to facilitate that cooperation and to improve current practice. It will be of value in a variety of contexts. For instance, transnational law enforcement agencies and governments around the world may benefit from the in-depth examination of how transnational police are cooperating on an individual and institutional level, and perhaps even more so when resources and economic times are difficult. Cooperation needs to be considered much more, as well as fostered more appropriately amongst the correct target groups, and the importance of issues beyond the overarching policy issues and programs should not be underestimated. This is a

must as it becomes increasingly difficult for smaller, less funded, regional police and indeed governments to cope with the aftermath of the economic downturn. For these politicians and law enforcement agencies, the information gathered in this thesis can be vitally important in learning more about how key participants think about TNP cooperation, enabling these policy makers to produce more appropriate campaigns. The implications are, simply put, in the suggestion of ways to enhance cooperation in TNCP, which will be of value to anyone involved in TNP.

7.4 Enhancing Cooperation in Transnational Policing: Future Steps

This section analyses and interprets the results of the research in more depth and explores future steps toward enhancing cooperation in transnational policing. Options for implementing change include building trust through face-to-face interactions, funding for TNPC and creating organisations and systems that facilitate cooperation. Ways forward include such factors as integrated technology, training, and management.

7.4.1 Options for implementing change.

Build trust through daily, face-to-face interaction. One of HIDTA's strengths is the collocation of agents and taskforces in one physical location, which is backed by both theory and evidence as an effective way to build trust and therefore improve cooperation. Agents are more likely to trust each other if they have personal contact with each other at least occasionally, and have the opportunity to share information with each other informally as well as through official channels. As suggested by Abrams et al., trust is also built through factors such as accountability, building a shared vision (which is vital to policing work), ensuring transparency in decision-making, and holding individuals accountable for trust-building. Abrams et al.'s work illustrates that face-to-face contact alone isn't enough but what is accomplished through that contact which truly makes a difference to trust and, therefore, cooperation.

The literature (e.g. Anderson, 1989) extolled the importance of face-to-face interaction in order to build trust, which was reflected in the primary research: the value of encouraging networking, face-to-face meetings, and taskforces where agents/officers work side-by-side with each other. This also ties into Abrams et al.'s (2003) view of creating a shared goal. There should be two main approaches to face-to-face interaction: firstly, to create integrated taskforces that co-locate staff and include members of several agencies. Secondly, to encourage more informal networking in order to build weak links between different teams and forces, as weak links provide

valuable connections between otherwise discrete and closely integrated teams. This ties into Levin, Cross and Abram's (2004) work exploring capitalising on weaker ties and the value of these ties.

For this reason, it seems essential that, in order to build strong links between different agencies and forces, there should be regular meetings and networking events in order to build the type of trust, which is typically much more difficult to develop when dealing with people on a purely virtual level.

One of the best ways to carry out networking – as it goes beyond merely socialising – is to create opportunities for agents to train together. This ties into creating a shared goal, as noted above (Abrams et al, 2003). Trust is easier to build through training as this allows agents to evaluate each other's competence and therefore fulfils the component of trust, which often relies on perception of competence (Levin, 2004). Particularly in the competitive, macho, and risky world of policing, this type of trust-building should not be undervalued. By involving agents from many different forces and taskforces in the same training, shared training can also begin to create the weak links that facilitate informal cooperation. Practically, this would entail increasing the budget for training within HIDTA and ensuring that it is once again allocated specifically for training rather than leached in an ad hoc manner from the budgets of other programs.

Funding for transnational policing. HIDTA's budget has decreased in real terms since its establishment, despite its successes and importance in funding development of local law enforcement in the region. Having evaluated HIDTA's successes, one clear recommendation would be to improve resourcing and make more funds available to the HIDTA program.

HIDTA brings much-needed funding to the fight against transnational crime, and by extending assistance with resources to transitional countries helps to even out some of the resource disparities; this makes transnational cooperation between developed and developing countries more difficult. In particular, considering the advantages of training agents together, and the fact that HIDTA training already makes up for the budget shortfall in training for local Puerto Rican officers, a key improvement would be increasing (and once again ring-fencing) the training budget and opening shared training to all officers involved in cooperation.

Create organisations and systems that facilitate cooperation. HIDTA has also created systems which allow sharing to take place and take some (though not all)

of the risk out of cooperation - for instance through effective deconfliction services, sifting through huge amounts of information in order to link pieces of disparate but connected data, and through vetting and training agents to a standard that makes them more likely to be trustworthy.

These successes need to be capitalised on when creating effective TNP systems, by establishing effective institutional controls that help rather than hinder trust and by providing safeguards without making trust entirely obsolete. These systems would include effective security on databases and network.

Similarly, combating corruption by investing in strong background checking and secure recruitment is a priority. The importance of confidence in control mechanisms cannot be underestimated, and therefore a key recommendation for raising trust in TNP would be ensuring strict, high-security, standardised vetting across all agencies and forces involved in cooperation. While this might be difficult to implement, it is one measure that could dramatically raise the confidence and trust of agents in each other.

Other institutional barriers to cooperation include the promotions system, which perpetuates competition by placing the most importance on successful conclusion of cases rather than the ability to cooperate in order to achieve better results. Therefore, one clear recommendation in order to improve cooperation would be to include it in the system of performance evaluation and ensure that promotion took it into account, rather than giving all credit to the agent/team that “closes” the case. Despite De Cremer and Van Knippenberg's warning against incentivising cooperation, in this case it is more a case of removing a *barrier* to cooperation than trying to incentivise it (De Cremer & Van Knippenberg, 2002). As Tulchin and Espach (2000) write in the context of regional cooperation, few people would challenge the need to cooperate, and the benefits of cooperation, but people have different ideas of how to achieve it.

7.4.2 Ways forward: suggestions for additional areas of research. The current investigation has highlighted other research initiatives that need to be pursued in strengthening the data, and evidence-based efforts, concerning TNPC. Research endeavours could include devising coherent strategies for resolving the problems of multi-agency cooperation. This could include a more holistic approach to TNPC and focus on any of the following: consensus building around key policy proposals; tightening the links between law enforcement agencies and parliaments; developing new legislation to facilitate TNPC strategies; institutional modernisation, and the

interfacing of a master data system. This thesis, and Chapter 6 in particular, highlights reforming and integrating; technology, training methods, better management tools, and greater attention to preparation and sharing to ensure improved cooperation. Recommendations for future research could encompass the following: integrated technology, training, management, and legal jurisdictions as outlined below.

Integrated technology. As cyber-crimes become more sophisticated, the use of counter technology will become increasingly crucial. The funding of necessary equipment ought to be prioritised by governments and policy makers. Databases should be integrated in order to improve time sensitive information and sharing capabilities. Future research could examine such a theoretical transnational IT system that would need to be completely secure, both internally and externally. Security clearances could be given at various levels. Primarily, governments could meet and agree on the general requirements, e.g., a “G20” specifically for TNPC. This could expand to more countries if a G20 pilot were successful. Agencies could then be invited to meet and discuss the specific needs of each stakeholder. Agencies involved could recommend supervisors, technology experts, and logistics managers in order to meet and discuss the criteria, security, and the creation of such an interface. Collaborative transnational agreements and policies could then be signed in order to ensure accountability and complete transparency.

Integrated training. A central training centre could be established in order to examine integrated training needs. Integrated training could include the above-mentioned advanced technology training, regular networking meetings, and even an international exchange of officers. This would assist in trust-building as it would facilitate both face-to-face contact and, as Abrams et al. suggested, a shared goal. This last recommendation could aid TNP by providing to agents with increased education about local knowledge, mentalities, values, etc. This was supported by Nadelmann’s (1993) study of improved cooperation with “one on one cops across borders”. Appropriate and funded language courses could also assist in improving cooperation. As Glaeser (2000) also pointed out, increased contact tends to increased trust, and the combination of increased contact with shared goals could be extremely valuable.

Integrated and improved management. Reforming current management techniques could foster improved TNPC and improved accountability. Countries and oversight committees could set common standards for policing and monitoring their implementation. Again, this would involve an integrated management system—one in

which an unbiased group of experts (not from the TNP domain) could evaluate a reformed management system for the use of a new TNP model. These committees could ensure that factors such as trust, respect for local cultures/knowledge, accountability, and leadership are not only addressed but become mandatory by establishing systems that lead to the display of these characteristics.

Efforts, such as the DEA's RISC and HIDTA, are in need of further policy and research support if reforms to TNP legislation are to occur. Until more is known about the concept of TNPC and how it may influence the way stakeholders think and feel about it, it is very difficult, if not virtually impossible, to know why there are such strong obstacles between national and transnational agencies. The studies presented in this thesis have only lightly scratched the surface of what seems to be a much deeper issue. Therefore, it is important that future research acknowledge the importance of investigating the issue of TNPC in a much more rigorous way before drawing conclusions about how social and psychological influences may impact TNPC and how behaviours may change over time.

In order to ensure all these institutional changes, a number of variables are important. Both the funding available and the political will to deliver change must be present. In the current economic climate, funding for all government activities is being cut, and TNP and drug-trafficking reduction can hardly expect to escape the cuts.

However, it is also essential that leaders fully support and encourage cooperation as a key part of working practice, thereby ensuring that cooperation becomes part of the organisation's strategic priorities rather than merely a bolt-on or a practice used in an ad hoc fashion by officers in the field.

At the institutional level, having leaders who embed cooperation within the policies and everyday practices of the organisation is crucial. The idea of "leading by example" came through strongly in agents responses, echoing the need for leaders to create a good environment for cooperation. In line with Jones and George's (1998) ideas on values and attitudes, there was a sense that the attitudes of senior management toward cooperation needed to be positive if there was to be real progress toward it.

Another aspect is that, in recent years, the "War on Drugs" has to some extent been eclipsed by the "War on Terror", an attitude that was evident through several agents' replies. Clarke et al. (2006) discuss national security threats and resulting homeland security initiatives. This brings its own challenges in terms of risks, vulnerability, trust, etc. This is important in economic, organisational, and intelligence

respects, with the focus of new departments like Homeland Security and the efforts of the intelligence community all concentrating on terrorism, to the detriment of drugs policy efforts. As several agents pointed out, this blinkered approach is short-sighted, as the criminal networks and vast revenues generated by drug trafficking eventually feed into terrorism itself and should therefore not be considered less important. It seems that the lack of funding for TNP and drug-trafficking reduction may continue unless the political will emerges to ensure that it remains a priority. Caruson (2007) discusses the need for cooperation in terms of homeland security and its necessity in terms of federal, regional, and local governments; Buruss (2009) also talked about the pressures that exist in terms of homeland security. Though these are undoubtedly important to address, equally important is the focus on drug trafficking.

7.5 Conclusion

Throughout this research, one of the clearest strands has been the challenge the Caribbean poses to effective policing. More importantly, the challenges the region provides for the police are inherently transnational. As a result, the Caribbean can provide ideal insight into what works and what does not work in transnational policing. As the agents involved were keen to point out, the challenges the Caribbean faces are daunting: an island geographical nature that plays into the hands of drug smugglers and people traffickers; a range of different jurisdictions and cultures across the islands; and a prime strategic position between Central/South America and the US. However, as several interviewees also suggested, the intense nature of the challenges facing law enforcement in the Caribbean have actually *forced* them to cooperate on a daily basis and to a far greater extent than would usually occur in (for instance) mainland US law enforcement or indeed in any mainland situation. Due to this, law enforcement cooperation in the Caribbean can provide insight into the factors that allow police cooperation to thrive as well as those that can hamper it. This has been a model case study, allowing the consideration of the major issues within the field and facilitating a discussion of the TNPC that can be universalised. Indeed, the examination of HIDTA has had the same purpose, and it has been strongly evidence that it should not be applied as a model of TNPC on a global scale. To suggest such a system would be exceedingly naïve and would ignore the nuances and complexities of TNPC; it would also show a highly idealistic perception of the HIDTA. Successfully merging the local, national, regional, and global police is an overwhelming and challenging proposal; the

data shows that policing worldwide displays considerable variation in terms of structure, logic, dynamics, and programs. Described in this study, four distinct challenges stand out from the available literature on TNP cooperation: economic constraints, legislative constraints, local particularisms and social/psychological influences. The counter-argument demonstrated throughout this thesis is not only that this is an unhelpful solution but an undesirable one that could actually be a harmful in many societies. The study presented here has demonstrated that, indeed, current cooperation is largely irrelevant to the sensitivities of many societies and a “one size fits all” model is not appropriate, nor should it be acceptable.

What has been clear throughout this work is the importance of trust as a social and psychological factor that impact on the existence and effectiveness on TNPC. Trust is the critical foundation of any sensible and successful relationship. In TNP, it can be especially important, since policing involves a great deal of risk-taking on the part of its participants. Recognition of these two principles is essential, allowing TNPC to exist, and TNP to flourish. When considering the main findings of this investigation, the relevant thematic points drawn out were the barriers and facilitators of TNPC, all of which have some relevance to trust:

Electronic Information Sharing

A suggestion made by Rocco (1998) suggested that electronic information sharing can only be effectively carried out if personal relationships had been established first and if trust has been established. This was reflected, as seen, within the primary research.

Personal Communication, Networking and Relationships/ Co-Location and Building Strong Teams

Rocco (1998); Anderson (1989) and others have considered the importance of personal communication in building trust, and we have seen throughout the perceived importance of relationships; the idea that an individual has other figures whom they can approach for assistance has been seen as vital, and personal communication and networking have been viewed as potential facilitators for the trust that is needed to create these relationships. As Squires (2009) writes, in the post 9/11 world, cooperation and information sharing are particularly important. This author discusses the importance of drug interdiction and how these might work as a model for how homeland security is dealt with.

Cultures of Secrecy and Competition/Corruption

Luhmann (1979) and Schoorman, Mayer, & Davis (2007) consider in depth the relationship between risk and trust. Secrecy, competition and corruption erode trust, and increase risk and have been viewed throughout this piece in the literature and the primary research as highly detrimental and negative in the context of TNPC.

Funding/ Training/Leadership and Political Will

Trusting in the competency of those who an individual or organisation was working with was a staple of both the literature (Schoorman, Mayer, & Davis, 2007) and of the primary research findings. If an organisation was seen to have good leadership and political backing, be well funded, and good training given, they were more likely to be trusted to do their job properly and to be free of the risk factors involved in secrecy and corruption.

A variety of suggested implications, and measures that should or could be considered for implementation to tackle some of the limitations and barriers to effective TNPC, have been considered at length and put forward as a result of this research. It has been concluded that universalising the HIDTA program – or any program – would not be appropriate. It has been evidenced that social and psychological factors should not be underestimated. In particular, trust is the foundation from which a TNPC operation must be built in order to begin to break down the barriers and problems that we have seen exist. This is an element of TNPC that can – and should – be universalised in order for effective cooperation to take place.

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Appendix A:

Acronyms

ACRONYM	DESCRIPTION
ACCP	Association of Caribbean of Police Commissioners
ACPO	Association of Chief Police Officers
ATF	Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (USA)
BLSF	Blue Lightening Strike Force
BMPE	Black Market Peso Exchange
CANU	Customs Anti-Narcotics Unit
CARICOM	Caribbean Economic Community
CARIFTA	Caribbean Free Trade Area
CATOC	Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime
CBP	Bureau of Customs and Border Protection
CDI	Caribbean Centre for Drug Information (DEA)
CDPF	Commonwealth of Dominican Police Force
CFATF	Caribbean Financial Action Task Force
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CICAD	Inter-American Drug Abuse Commission
CIVPOL	UN Civil Police Units
CND	Dominican National Drug Control Council
DEA	Drug Enforcement Administration (USA)
DEU	Drug Enforcement Unit
DGA	Dominican Customs Agency
DNCD	Dirección Nacional de Control de Drogas (Natl. Directorate for Drug Control)
DR	Dominican Republic
DTO	Drug Trade Organizations
EPIC	Electronic Privacy Information Center
EU	European Union
EUROPOL	European Police Office
FARC	Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia
FATF	Financial Action Task Force

FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FIU	Financial Intelligence Unit
FURA	Fuerzas Unidas de Rapida Accion (The United Forces of Fast Action)
G20	Group of Twenty Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors
G8	Group of Eight Industrialized Nations
GODR	Government of Dominican Republic
HIDTA	High Intensity Drug Trade Area Program (USA)
IA	Internal Affairs office (USA)
ICE	Immigration and Customs Enforcement (USA)
IDEC	International Drug Enforcement Conference
IDEC	International Drug Economic Conference
INCSR	International Narcotics Strategy Control Report
INSCR	International Narcotics Strategy Control Report
INTERPOL	International Criminal Police Organization
IPES	International Executive Police Symposium
ISC	Investigative Support Centre (FBI led Initiative)
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IT	Information Technology
LEO	Law Enforcement Online
MDMA:	3,4-methylenedioxymethamphetamine (Ecstasy)
Mi5	Military Intelligence, Section 5
Mi6	Military Intelligence, Section 6 (officially Secret Intelligence Service, SIS)
MLA	Anti-Money Laundering Authority
MLAT	Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty
MLPA	Money Laundering (Prevention) Act
MOI	Major Organizations Investigations
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
NAFTA	North America Free Trade Agreement
NAS	National Academy of Sciences
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCB	National Central Bureau (Interpol)
NCIS	National Criminal Intelligence Service (UK)

NDIC	National Drug Intelligence Centre (USA)
NGO	Non-governmental Organizations
NYPD	New York Police Department
OAS	Organization of American States
OCDEF	Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces
ONDCP	Office of National Drug Control Policy
PR	Puerto Rico
PRPD	Puerto Rico Police Department
RICO	Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (USA)
RIISS	Regional Information and Intelligence Sharing System
RISC	Regional Information Sharing Centres (DEA)
ROCCISS	Regional Organized Counter Crime Information Sharing System
ROCIC	Regional Organized Crime Information Center
RSIS	Regional Sharing Information System
SPSS	Self-propelled Semisubmersibles
SWAT	Special Weapons and Tactics Team
TGF	TropasGuardasFronteras (Cuban Border Guard)
TN	Transnational
TNP	Transnational Policing
TNPC	Transnational Police Cooperation
TREVI	TREVI Group of European Interior Ministers
UN	United Nations
UNDCP	United Nations International Drug Control Programme
UNPD	United Nations Police Department
USAID	US Agency for International Development
USCG	US Coast Guard
USPS	United States Postal Service
USVI	United States Virgin Islands
WB	World Bank

Appendix B:

Ethics Approval Form

PSYCHOLOGY DEPARTMENT ETHICAL APPROVAL FORM

Tick one box: STAFF project POSTGRADUATE project UNDERGRADUATE project

Title of project SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL INFLUENCES OF TRANSNATIONAL POLICE COOPERATION

Name of researcher(s) MICHELE K. HARRIGAN

Name of supervisor (for student research) DR. JAN STOCKDALE Date OCT. 31, 2004

		YES	NO	N/A
1	Will you describe the main experimental procedures to participants in advance, so that they are informed about what to expect?	✓		
2	Will you tell participants that their participation is voluntary?	✓		
3	Will you obtain written consent for participation?	✓		
4	If the research is observational, will you ask participants for their consent to being observed?	✓		
5	Will you tell participants that they may withdraw from the research at any time and for any reason?	✓		
6	With questionnaires, will you give participants the option of omitting questions they do not want to answer?			✓
7	Will you tell participants that their data will be treated with full confidentiality and that, if published, it will not be identifiable as theirs?	✓		
8	Will you debrief participants at the end of their participation (i.e. give them a brief explanation of the study)?	✓		

If you have ticked **NO** to any of Q1-8, but have ticked **box A** overleaf, please give an explanation on a separate sheet.
[Note: N/A = not applicable]

		YES	NO	N/A
9	Will your project involve deliberately misleading participants in any way?		✓	
10	Is there any realistic risk of any participants experiencing either physical or psychological distress or discomfort? If Yes , give details on a separate sheet and state what you will tell them to do if they should experience any problems (e.g. who they can contact for help).		✓	

If you have ticked **Yes** to 9 or 10 you should normally tick **box B** overleaf; if not, please give a full explanation on a separate sheet

		YES	NO	N/A
11	Does your project involve work with animals? If yes, please tick box B overleaf.		✓	
12	Do participants fall into any of the following special groups? If they do, please refer to BPS guidelines, and tick box B overleaf.	Schoolchildren (under 18 years of age)	✓	
	Note that you may also need to obtain satisfactory CRB clearance (or equivalent for overseas students).	People with learning or communication difficulties	✓	
		Patients	✓	
		People in custody	✓	
		People engaged in illegal activities (e.g. drug-taking)	✓	

There is an obligation on the lead researcher to bring to the attention of the Departmental Ethics Committee any issues with ethical implications not clearly covered by the above checklist.

PLEASE TICK EITHER BOX A OR BOX B BELOW AND PROVIDE THE DETAILS REQUIRED IN SUPPORT OF YOUR APPLICATION. THEN SIGN THE FORM.

Please tick

A. I consider that this project has **no** significant ethical implications to be brought before the Departmental Ethics Committee.

Give a brief description of participants and procedure (methods, tests used etc) in up to 150 words.

This form (and any attachments) should be submitted to the Departmental Ethics committee where it will be considered by the Chair before it can be approved.

B. I consider that this project **may** have ethical implications that should be brought before the Departmental Ethics Committee, and/or it will be carried out with children or other vulnerable populations.

Please provide all the further information listed below in a separate attachment.

1. Title of project.
2. Purpose of project and its academic rationale.
3. Brief description of methods and measurements.
4. Participants: recruitment methods, number, age, gender, exclusion/inclusion criteria.
5. Consent and participant information arrangements, debriefing.

Please attach intended information and consent forms.

6. A clear but concise statement of the ethical considerations raised by the project and how you intend to deal with them.
7. Estimated start date and duration of project.

*This form should be submitted to the Departmental Ethics Committee for consideration.
If any of the above information is missing, your application will be returned to you.*

I am familiar with the BPS Guidelines for ethical practices in psychological research (and have discussed them with the other researchers involved in the project).


Signed.....Print Name.....Date.....
(UG or PG Researcher(s), if applicable)

Signed.....Print Name.....Date.....
(Lead Researcher or Supervisor) *M. Hargan* *MICHELE HARRIGAN* *OCT. 31. 04*
J. E. Stockdale *JE STOCKDALE*
STATEMENT OF ETHICAL APPROVAL

This project has been considered using agreed Departmental procedures and is now approved.

Signed.....Print Name.....Date.....
(Chair, Departmental Ethics Committee) *W. Wells* *16.8.10*

Appendix C:
Interview Information Sheet and Consent Form



**TRANSNATIONAL POLICE COOPERATION IN PUERTO RICO AND THE
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: APPROACHES AND IMPLICATIONS**

Name: _____

Title: _____

Date: _____

Introduction

The title of this study is **Transnational Police Cooperation in Puerto Rico and The Dominican Republic: Approaches and Implications**. Its main aim is to find out how law enforcement agencies in Puerto Rico and the Dominican Republic cooperate with one another, focusing specifically on the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA) Program.

Thank you for taking the time today to be interviewed. Each interview will range between 45 minutes and 1 hour. Though we are calling it an interview, our discussion will be more free-flowing than a regular question and answer session. However, just so that we are able to cover all the areas below, I will be using a set of questions as a guide. Please remember that there are no right or wrong answers and that your personal perspective is greatly appreciated.

In a moment I would like to ask you some general questions relating to the DEA its methods of operation and its successes and shortcomings. After that I would like to understand your views on crime and how crime links between Puerto Rico and The Dominican Republic affect joint operations globally. Then I would like to understand your perspective on the RISC/HIDTA model of cooperation. And lastly, I have some questions regarding what you might understand to be key influences on Transnational Police Cooperation.

So that I can refer back to what we discuss, I would like your permission to record our conversation. However, please be assured that what we discuss will remain between you and I, and the recording will not be given to anyone else. For the sake of further confidentiality, I will also not be referring to anyone by name, nor will any views be identifiable in my report.

Thank you again for your help with this project; I greatly appreciated. In case you have any questions, please feel free to email me at m.k.harrigan@lse.ac.uk

Appendix D

Topic Guide

Section I: The DEA

1. How would you describe your current role [or contact] with the DEA?
2. What would you say are:
 1. The best things about working for/with the DEA?
 2. The worst things about working for/with the DEA?
3. What is the extent and nature of transnational cooperation between the DEA and other police agencies?
4. Who does the DEA cooperate with and what forms has this cooperation taken? [Shared training? Shared information? Provision of equipment? Joint operations?]
5. How successful would you say the DEA has been at TNPC?
6. What do you think are the barriers to TNPC? Why would you say these barriers occur? And what do you think could be done to overcome these barriers and improve cooperation?
7. Is there anything else you think I should have asked, about the DEA, its role or methods of cooperation that I have not?

Section II: TNP and Caribbean Links

8. What is the extent and nature of transnational crimes in PR and the DR? What types of crimes are accorded the highest priority by HIDTA?
9. How are these transnational crimes currently addressed? What kinds of cooperation are involved?
10. To what extent is Caribbean police cooperation reactive or pro-active? Is the balance right? Or would you like to see it change? If so, how?

11. Are cooperation methods in the Caribbean the same or different from those elsewhere?
If so, how?
12. How is police cooperation outside the region affected by ‘PR-DR linked crime’? For example, what’s the affect on other islands in the Caribbean region, or North/South America?
13. In your opinion, what forms of other cooperation are required that do not currently exist to specifically address Puerto Rican or DR transnational-linked crimes?
14. How is police cooperation in PR and the DR regulated by national and international law?
15. When HIDTA agents collaborate with other agencies or police officers from overseas, where does accountability lie? [legal, fiscal, political, administrative or managerial?]
16. Is there anything else you think I should have asked about Caribbean crimes or cooperation in the Caribbean that I have not?

Section III: HIDTA

17. How would you describe your role within/contact with the HIDTA?
18. What do you see as the goals of the HIDTA?
19. How is information shared? What barriers to sharing information have you encountered, if any? What has HIDTA done to address these barriers? What success have they had? What else can HIDTA do to tackle these barriers?
20. How are HIDTA agents selected, educated and trained? Do you feel anything should be done differently and if so, why?
21. What do you feel would be the advantages and disadvantages of implementing the HIDTA models on a transnational scale?

22. Is there anything else you think I should have asked about HIDTA and have not?

Section IV: Key Influences on TNPC

23. What are the key influences that you feel affect TNP cooperation? [personal, social, cultural, regulatory, political]

24. I would like to know what you think could be done to improve cooperation. Let's begin at the individual level;

1. [Individual] What could be done to motivate agents to cooperate more? Why do you think some people cooperate better than others?
2. [Institutional] What changes in HIDTA and other agencies could be made to improve transnational cooperation?
3. [Wider context] What changes politically or economically do you feel could be made to improve transnational cooperation?

25. How important is trust in cooperation?

1. What do you feel are the barriers to trust?
2. What types of things to do you think would improve trust between individuals?
3. What types of things to do you think would improve trust between organizations and agencies?

26. People have identified certain factors which they think affect cooperation. How much are the following features of your organizational culture: on a scale of 1-5 with 1) being A great deal 2) A lot, 3) A little, 4) Not very much and 5) Not at all.

	1	2	3	4	5
Motivation					
Trust					
Mistrust					
Betrayal					
Coercion					

Leadership				
Integrity				
Power				
Resources				
Competition				
Race/ethnicity				
Gender				

27. Is there anything else you think I should have asked overall and have not?

That brings our interview to a close. Thank you very kindly for taking the time out of your very busy schedule today to be interviewed. It is greatly appreciated.

Appendix E: **Sample Interview**

Q

The first question – how would you describe your current role with the DEA?

A

Well right now I'm a special agent with the DEA, I've been a special agent with DEA for [REDACTED] years.

Q

What would you say are the best things about working with the DEA?

A3

Well pretty much, compared to other agencies, it's just that we work drugs so we're a very specific agency. We can do other investigations here, there is a drug nexus, but for most of it it's all drugs, so compared to the FBI, their jurisdiction is so wide that you can't really concentrate on one thing in particular and that's why probably they're so large compared to us. We may have, what, something a little over five thousand agents in total and the Bureau has got like twenty, something like that, from fifteen to twenty, so they have at least three times the agents we have. So that's pretty much what I enjoy more, that we can actually focus on something, we don't have to be worrying about all kinds of stuff.

Q

What would you say are the worst things about working with the DEA?

A

Bureaucracy I guess, and being under DOJ, being a smaller agency, I guess the obvious problem in my point of view is the fact that we are competing practically with the bad guys. They have all the money in the world to get whatever they want or whatever they need and do it the way they want it, we have limited resources and we have to go through many steps in order to get approval, in order for investigations, approval for funds. The introduction of undercover agents in order to infiltrate organisations you need to have good informants that can actually get you in and as time goes on it is a lot harder to actually get good informants. I mean we probably have the best informants of any agency and we have probably the most, but the level of quality, it's decreasing in the sense of as more efforts are put into fighting trafficking the different organisations get tighter and tighter, so in order to get into them you have to have somebody basically in it, so it depends on what level you're approaching that organisation and pretty much

you can't go all the way to the top, you have to go from the bottom up, and that process of going from the bottom up in that particular organisation is very lengthy in time. So it's kind of frustrating in one sense, plus every time the bad guys have – it's funny because you would think that they have a research and development department to come up with all kinds of ways to traffic and smuggle narcotics, and every time you find one method and you counter that method they're already coming up with three or four different methods. And their methods all circumvent the laws, so very much when you discover something you have to create a law to counter that. They have the money to pay for the lawyers, they have the money to pay for the resources, they have not only money, but they use force and coercion to get a lot of stuff done.

Q

Do you think the bad guys, do you think they co-operate differently than agencies do?

A

In what sense?

Q

Well just individual co-operation.

A

Like what? If we arrest somebody and we ask them to co-operate? It's funny because at least in Puerto Rico, my experience in the last five years, we've had many people tell us, "We don't tell on other people, we don't snitch", and it's funny because in my particular experience I've had numerous guys that I've tried to interview or interrogate and I've been very specific telling them, "Listen, we're really not interested in you, who we're really interested in is who you work for, because right now you're going, like what, ten to life, and whoever you work for is out and he's not going to do anything to get you out because he can't, and I can't see why you're willing to spend ten years of your life or more in jail for a guy that, if we get him, he's going to go to jail for at least twenty, and you can pretty much take a lesser sentence. I'm not saying that you are ..."

Q

Would there be retaliation of any sort if that were the case?

A

I guess that, yes, but also there are mechanisms in place to protect them, but it's funny because ...

Q

Do you think they're targets?

A

I think yes, it's just that it's very hard for an individual to pretty much forget their families or their background or where they come from. Once they get in a program, not always but sometimes, you know, your identity changes, you're relocated somewhere, it's a very limited group of people that you can relocate, other than your immediate family, that's it. Once you're relocated you have to start over again work, have no contact with your friends or any relatives because by limiting your outside contact, it's how you're going to protect yourself. Once you start spreading out, "I'm okay, I'm alive, I'm here or there" ...

Q

And imagine in a place like Puerto Rico with such strong cultural family values, that must be ...

A

It's really hard. We've had informants call us, "Oh I've got a friend against me, blah blahblah", and you try to relocate them and they go like, "Oh yeah, I was living in St. Tusef and now I want to live close to St. Tusef", and I go, "The whole idea is to get you out, not to leave you in the area", and they just think that by moving three blocks away from where they were, that's ...

Q

Would you really relocate on the island or would you literally relocate them to ...

A

That depends on the threat. If it's a high threat ...

Q

It's a very small island.

A

Yes, it's a small island, but it is very hard to find people here. If you – how can I say – if you're humble or you're really quiet about what you are or your past, you know, you're discreet, the chances are that you can stay below the radar for a while, and actually for a long while. But if you're bloating around, saying, "Oh yeah, I used to do this, I worked for so and so, and this and that", I mean the island is only 100 by 35 so there's not that many places you can go to without coming across somebody that knows the person that already put the threat on you. But yes, the programs that are in place

will actually relocate individuals outside of Puerto Rico, so it's one of those things that you try to accommodate the person and at the same time you have to do it in a fashion that is actually safe for the person.

Q

Who does the DEA primarily co-operate with and what forms has this co-operation taken? As in forms, by that I mean sharing of information, sharing training, equipment, joint operations.

A

There are many different programs and initiatives that the DEA participates with, one of them being HIDTA, also OCDEF. OCDEF stands for Organised Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces. And locals, in Puerto Rico there is not that many police departments, whereas in the States you will have like the constables and like sometimes municipal police, the city police, the state police. Over here you have the Police of Puerto Rico and Municipal Police departments, so it's not that broad in Puerto Rico, but we actually are in contact with all the law enforcement agencies in the island. We cover also the Virgin Islands and the Dominican Republic.

Q

How successful would you say the DEA has been at trans-national police co-operation?

A

I think very successful I have to say. I don't think that the DEA by itself can do much, you know, there's no liaison with other law enforcement agencies whether they're local or state or federal or international. I don't think that anything will be accomplished because, particularly with drugs, you have so many countries that are involved and you have different export countries and importation countries, ports of entry, mid points, it's merely that different countries are very involved in that that you as a single agency just stick to continental US, you really won't be able to accomplish anything, at least that's my opinion.

Q

What do you think are the barriers to trans-national police co-operation?

A

More than anything I would say the legal systems. Some countries are more liberal and they're not very (inaudible), the local law tends to be more liberal, some other countries are more strict. Some places you're guilty until proven innocent instead of ours that you're innocent until proven guilty, so in the US the burden to prove your guilt, it's on

us. There are other countries where you are guilty and you have to prove your innocence, so in that sense I guess that's pretty much what complicates stuff. You have religious beliefs, in which it's pretty obvious now in our relations with the East, you have other countries that think that, you know, they don't believe in our system, and I guess it just goes back and forth on culture, their local laws and pretty much what's going on in the world at that time. You know, when you try to go to a different country and people don't like other people coming telling them what to do and how to do it, so it's a very sore subject when you have to ...

Q

Yes, you have to be culturally sensitive. And understandably so, I mean there are things that work a certain way in different countries and you have to respect that. What do you think can be done to overcome these barriers, to improve co-operation?

A

That is being done right now?

Q

No, what do you think could be done better to overcome these barriers?

A

It's a tricky subject. I guess that first changing the point of view of that particular country towards the US is one major aspect that I would look into in the sense of – for example, the French are very proud, they don't seem to like the US that much, and when you as a nation go to France to whatever, you know, why go against the trend, I mean they already don't like you, and you don't understand French because you know there's a lot being said. But I think the whole thing will hold true for pretty much every country that you try to kind of like reach, Russia, they're communist, we're democrat, and that will be another example of first you need to kind of like let these people know that "I'm a friend and not a foe, and I just want to work with you because by helping you I'm helping myself". We have South America, we have countries in South America, they are leading producers of cocaine and heroin, and actually that makes a lot of money for them, so if you go there and tell them that you are there to get rid of the coca plantations in Bolivia they are going to say like, "No, because we farm those and the locals use it to kind of inhibit their appetite and that's what gets them going". Plus you have the narco traffickers also put in their little ... I guess that it's more, I would call it being working more an image and actually showing the benefits that co-operation between countries before anything else, and also you have to be more

transparent. I think that right now there's a bunch of differing interests that the US has got for the overt or covert. The people in the different countries that you go to, they know some of them where the information, this information, they have their own idea of what's going on and if you don't work on that first then it's pretty much useless. I mean you'll go there and they'll look at you and they'll say like, "Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah", and you turn your back and they'll continue to do what they've been doing. So I think that it's very hard to put your finger at, this is why we should do it, there are so many things that you have to work at.

Q

Is there anything else that you'd like to add about the DEA or its methods of co-operation?

A

I think we're still too small, that's the thing, we need to be a little bigger, and also I assume that for us to be a little more receptive we need to be more efficient and internally I would say we need to be more efficient in how we get things done, because this is a very time sensitive business. A quick example would be, if we were going to do a drugs transaction and you had a bad guy on the phone and he's telling you, "Yeah, I want to see you now at such and such corner", and you go like, "Well, you know, now is not a good time", because we need a couple of hours to get operational supplies in place and people in place and do all this structural thing that we already have in place in order to get that transaction done, I don't think that guy is, in my experience, we haven't got much time. I mean if I'm ready to do something I just call you and say, "I'm ready to do this, we're going to do this now. If you're not ready, you know, I have somebody else all ready and waiting". So I think that being a little more efficient will give us a better perspective.

Q

I'm now going to ask you a couple of questions about trans-national policing and Caribbean links. What is the extent and nature of trans-national crimes in Puerto Rico and the Dominican Republic? By extent I mean is it generally a huge problem, is it – I realise you're specifically ...

A

I mean mainly drugs, but we have a big influx of illegal aliens here in the island. It's only natural they will (inaudible) close to it and they have a bunch of problems politically and you have a lot of poverty, and if they just try to get out – I mean we did

it, Puerto Ricans did it at one point, they started fleeing to the US, specifically New York and the East coast, and they were just running away from the depression that they were going through in the island, trying to look for a nicer living. Dominicans and many other South Americans and Latin Americans I would say ...

Q

So do you have a lot coming from South America?

A

We have from South America, we have from Asia, we have ...

Q

From Asia?

A

Yes, we have a lot of – not Chinese, but Orientals that, they come through. You don't see them as much as the Dominicans, but we have Asians coming in, we have people from the (inaudible) coming in, we have people coming from Venezuela, Colombia, some of them come with legitimate business. We have a bunch of companies here and they tend to bring their people to work also, but we also have a lot of people who have no income where they come from and they think that here they're going to be able to get started.

Q

The gateway to the US as well.

A

Yes, and you can tell if you go to these many deprived areas, where they have a bunch of money lending companies there, and you can see them coming back and forth and every single penny that they make here they send back to their countries to help family members, try to bring people over. I guess that we get more from the Dominican Republic because of the distance between the islands. I guess that that contributes to the crime right here in the sense that, when I say that every criminal here is a foreigner, you have a bunch of people here that don't have jobs and they need money. I mean you're coming here, if you don't have money you're not going to get anything accomplished. You won't be able to feed yourself, you're not going to be able to feed your family, if you are an addict to whatever drug you're going to need money to get your drugs, I'm going to give you interest for free. We have prostitution, I mean all kinds of stuff, but I guess there are more indirect than direct from (inaudible).

Q

What about weapons smuggling, is that a big thing here?

A

Initially weapons and drugs are very very closely related in the sense of ...

Q

Do you find them in shipments a lot together?

A

Yes, but it's interesting that there are a lot of weapons that are being shipped to Puerto Rico or smuggled into Puerto Rico via mail. I mean they break them apart, they send them to different addresses and they have them delivered to these addresses and then they put them together and they sell them out. That happens a lot and that happens more than actually having – what do you call these – gun shops, you don't see or you don't hear of many gun stores being robbed and weapons missing, most of the weapons come in the mail and all kinds of means.

Q

Where are the weapons coming from, are they coming from Eastern Europe primarily?

A

What I see here, weapons are like a race, the bad guys like the AT47s because they're nasty, they do a lot of damage, and they're noisy, they're very destructive and they're very effective. They don't need much maintenance, it's a weapon that has been designed in the Middle East and in Asia and it's designed to work full of dirt and no maintenance at all. I mean as the weapons get fancier and fancier they require a lot of maintenance so they don't need that, they just need something that they can just throw in their car or bury in the ground for a while and they know where it's at so if something happens they can just go and access it, and this is one of the weapons that you can actually just bury and leave it there and it'll be all rusty and it'll still be shooting. It's not a sniper rifle because it is not that accurate, but it's going to throw a lot of lead down the barrel and that's very much what they want, they just want to spray and run.

Q

Sure. On a scale of one to ten, okay, so that's pretty useless in the island, but when I say weapon smuggling, is Puerto Rico used as a transient route for weapon smuggling?

A

I really couldn't say that. I guess that ATF would be more able to answer your question, because we see the guns coming in and we see the guns being used, but ...

Q

Do you see guns coming in though with drugs shipments or ...

A

No, they come separate. They have guys that, all they do is just get you guns. In undercover operations that we've done, we've had our undercover buy drugs and ask for weapons, and they tell you just in a couple of hours, you know, I'll get you somebody that can get you the rifle that you need. So that's pretty much the smuggling that we've seen. I don't know of operations where the guns have come in here and from here have been shipped outside, but we get a lot of guns here.

Q

How do you think trans-national crimes are currently being addressed here in Puerto Rico?

A

Well we get several operations undercover and we also get initiatives under HIDTA initiatives. The locals are the state police and it's got FURA, which is a fast reacting unit, ISE, formerly Customs and Immigration, they have a lot of assets. We have joint operations with the Coast Guard and it's pretty much everybody is putting their assets into it and it's all being co-ordinated with ...

Q

Can you elaborate on that a bit, about the assets?

A

Assets, what I mean, assets is personnel, computerised equipment, detection equipment, laser, intercepting equipment in the sense of boats, fast boats, aeroplanes, helicopters. There's – I don't know how to say it – it's called Stop and (inaudible), it's like a little blimp, and that's in the south west of the island and it's tied up through some kind of cable and they just have it fly straight up, I don't know how high in the sky, and it actually serves as a radar, it's got the equipment on it and they just set it high and it covers a specific area. I know of a couple of systems, and the Air National Guard also has some equipment in the north of the island that they can actually scope certain areas, and they work closely with the airport, FAA, and also ISE and the Coast Guard because

the capability of their radar equipment is pretty good. I mean they have three-dimensional imaging and all kinds of stuff, and when they see stuff that they can't identify they can actually just get on the phone and get resources to that area and just identify whatever that is and whether it's for national security or drug interdiction or just identify an aircraft in the sky, so therefore they know what's going on and can approach. So that's pretty much what I mean by assets.

Q

To what extent is Caribbean police co-operation reactive or proactive?

A

I think they're both and Customs are reactive most in the sense that they're in charge of everything that goes on, I mean they have jurisdiction.

Q

Do you think the balance is right or would you like to see it change?

A

In my point of view I don't think that the balance is right because ...

Q

How would you like to see it change then?

A

I would like them to have more money to be able to get things done in the sense of, the Police in Puerto Rico – and I'm not trying to demean them – they have at least 20,000 police officers, that's a lot, and on top of that 20,000 police officers they have all kinds of support personnel and they don't have the money or the budget to provide other resources that they need in terms of radio communications, something like just a bullet proof vest, all kinds of gear, safety gear, like they'll be getting more vehicles but they

...

Q

What about computers, are they completely computerised, because I heard that some offices don't even have computers. Do they not have a database of some sort?

A

No. For example, they just received I don't know how many units with the sort of personal computers, not personal computers but an integrated computer system where we can access when we need information. Wow, that kind of thing. I'll think and then I'll tell you, you know, but they have their computers in their cars where they can actually access information right there without having to call the central radio operator

or whatever and find out if that vehicle that they're stopping, it's either reported stolen or it's got any kind of (inaudible) appliance, but the system's not working, so you have just some kind of terminal in your car, I guess it's some kind of (inaudible) terminal that they have in their car but they can't use it. It's just like it's there taking up space inside their car but the system is not working, and it's because there's something about their radar transmission or it's something. Their system needs another thing to be able to work so it's not working. And you can see that they're constantly just looking for funds to actually get things done. At FURA, for example, it's a unit that's working with HIDTA so most of the resources that they have come from HIDTA funds, so the boats, the helicopters, the patrol cars, weapons, radios, all kinds of equipment, they're basically paid by HIDTA funds, and if they weren't getting HIDTA I can be pretty sure that they wouldn't be able to have all those things.

Q

The HIDTA budget though has pretty much remained the same over a decade almost, so how has ...

A

Yes. I don't think it's going to increase, I think it's actually going to decrease.

Q

Really?

A

Yes.

Q

So how is the funding made up, because obviously there's been increases in personnel and increases, you know, with helicopters to buy and ...

A

I really don't know how the budget works with HIDTA. I know that the HIDTA initiative is really broad because, for example, DEA has resources assigned to HIDTA as well as the FBI, ISC, ATF which is the equivalent of the FBI in Puerto Rico, or would be equivalent to FBI in Puerto Rico, but how their budgets are set I don't know. Congress actually assign a big chunk of money, that big chunk of money gets spread out, but what I've heard is that that big chunk of money, that HIDTA initiative, which has been for a while, it's been around for a while, so I think that it already reached the point where its usefulness is just pretty much that's it, and the Government is starting to bring newer initiatives in order to address the different problems that they have to

address. So to be able to determine where the money is coming from and how it is being assigned, I haven't got a clue. I know that, for example, FURA, what they have is pretty much set, I don't see them getting any newer equipment or anything like that, if it's coming I'm not aware.

Q

Are co-operation methods here in the Caribbean the same or different from those elsewhere, and if so how? The co-operation methods here in the Caribbean, are they different from, say, the States or anywhere else?

A

I would probably have to say yes.

Q

How do you think they're different?

A

Because of different cultures and different laws.

Q

Is there anything specifically unique that sticks out in your mind for the Caribbean in co-operation?

A

Let's see. Actually I would have to say that the resources are being used – Puerto Rico and the Caribbean being little islands that are spread out in a big chunk of water, the resources and the way that you address these problems are different to how you address problems in the border, for example, where you put up a wall, put in a bunch of sentries. And your threats are different in the sense of the US being a huge continent, their borders on the east and west is just water, and north you have Canada, so the deal with Canada, that requires you to have certain mechanisms in place, and then south of the US all you have is Mexico. So Mexico and the threat that Mexico will pose have to be addressed differently too, so I don't think that if you go to the borders of Canada and the US you're going to find a big wall of concrete and steel. There might be a bunch of sentries that you have all across the border and ...

Q

Sure, I'm from Canada and I literally lived on the border.

A

So on the border, what you're doing there is you're just stood in what used to be immigration and the border patrol I should say. That's pretty much what you have on

the border, it's just border patrol, so across the border, you're (inaudible) and nobody crosses that line and that's about that. It's just the liaison, relationship between the governments. In the Caribbean you have the governments don't have, you get the British Virgin Islands, you get the US Virgin Islands, you have a bunch of, the lesser Antilles and all of them have different governments, they're governed by different countries too, you have Netherlands, you have Great Britain, we have French little colonies. It's usual closer to South America they deal with the Colombian Government, the (inaudible), so just being in the Caribbean and having all this around you, I guess that's what actually established the difference.

Q

Sure, it's extremely unique actually.

A

So we actually have to deal with everybody.

Q

And when you do deal with everybody, how is police co-operation outside the region affected by trans-national crimes, from here that travel to there? Not so much south because we saw that the route is going north, but how, for instance, are Miami and New York, how is the co-operation between agencies?

A

I have to say that it will have to be fairly restrained in the sense that we have to rely on each other to get the job done.

Q

But the crimes that travel there, how does that affect the co-operation?

A

I guess that is just makes them, that's the way we have to be in the sense of this is your chunk of land and you have to take care of it whether you are (Inaudible) Dade or Florida State Police. I guess the way that they're affected is by the population that they have, for example, Florida, it's a densely populated state, specifically by Latin Americans, and again you have to go back to culture. You had a big influx of Cuban immigrants at one time, you have a bunch of Puerto Ricans taking over Kissimmee or Orlando and other areas of Florida, you have a bunch of South Americans coming in and that all pretty much just changes your style in the sense of, "How am I going to deal with all these individuals", and how culturally you have to approach it. So I guess that that pretty much brings everybody together in that instance. Your law enforcement

personnel also is diverse in the sense of – if you go to Miami most of the police officers are Cuban descendants, and as you go higher in the state it's when you start to see more Anglos in the police department. So I think that they will affect similarly in the sense of we work here and we get immigrants and the immigrants who misbehave, you pretty much have the same thing there. The immigrants that are coming there are coming under the same conditions as they're coming here, it's just that they were able to make it over there instead of here. So I guess that their style and pretty much their co-operation has to be hand in hand in that sense, I just feel more culturally than anything else, because the governments are going to be saying that's right. That's why I'm going to say it first.

Q

In your opinion, what forms of other co-operation are required that do not currently exist here in Puerto Rico, which specifically address Puerto Rican and Dominican crime?

A

I guess that you mean more in the intelligence community, in my point of view, in the sense of ...

Q

More centralisation?

A

At least more co-ordination in the sense of right now the international crimes are not, you can't say that it's – for example, if we talk about drugs I can say, "Yes, it's drug driven", but the problem is you don't have specific groups doing the trafficking. You have the Colombians producing, you have Venezuelans transporting, you have people in Panama doing all the money laundering and dealing with the black market there, you have the Middle East using the drug money to support the international terrorism operations there, so in every agency, for whatever reason, everybody has got an intelligence unit, and if we had somewhere where all that could mingle and actually exchange information I think that it would help a little better to understand more effectively how things are going and why they're going that way. It's easier to see an actual country with their intelligence community, but it's a lot harder to have the intelligence community from the US, the intelligence community from Britain, Spain, More so from Israel, because even though the intelligence gathered might be different in the sense of, "Well okay, I'm NSA, I intercept every frigging communication that

comes into the US or goes out of the US". "Okay, and why are you here?" Just because you have Peters that can actually say like, "Key on the President (inaudible), assassination in" – okay, but if you could put that ear to work, "I'm going to take eight kilos to X point in the US", and you can actually make a phone call and say like, "Hey listen, a little ear over here has overheard that there's this amount of drugs that are going to be transferred from point A to point B". We don't have a mechanism where you have the CIA, NSA, FBI, DEA talk to each other, other to national security matters right now.

Q

But is there not surely, at this critical point now in the criminal justice world, is that not in the works?

A

I don't think it is, I don't think it has ever been like that. I worked a little bit for the Bureau and it's just funny because once you add the human variable into the equation, then you become paranoid in the sense of the CIA doesn't want the FBI to overlook what they're doing and the FBI doesn't want CIA to overlook what they're doing. So when you go to a foreign country and you work in the Embassy - and this is another example - the Embassy has got two tiers, it's got the overt, which everybody sees and it's at the Embassy and they're there to protect the nationals in that country. It also has a covert entity that is working and it's gathering the information whether for technology, counter espionage, how to infiltrate personnel there, what's going on in the Government, what's the impression about our Government, etc. etc. So you get to the Embassy, you say hi to people that you don't know if they're working for the CIA or not. I mean everybody there works for the Department or the State, so it's one of these, and if we could actually integrate all this – for example, the CIA doesn't have a CIA Director, it's got a Director of Intelligence, and in that sense all the intelligence that has been gathered by that country should go to him. It doesn't happen like that. I mean, you know, you've got intelligence, the military, and then you've got CIA and as I say, you've got FBI, and a few other agencies that are not in the website. And if we could have here, for example, if here in Puerto Rico they had an intelligence unit, we have our intelligence unit, National Guard, actually US Army, Air Force, blah blahblah, they all have their intelligence units and they all focused on something in particular, but for us to know that there is a boat leaving the Dominican Republic and it's going in X direction, you know, we don't have a way to convey that information. And if we – as I

say, this is my personal opinion, I guess it's because I worked for the Bureau a little bit – that if you could look for a way that you can actually congregate all these heads together and, you know, you don't have to say like, "So and so told me this and that and that", it's, "If I were you I would be looking in that direction". Then they just look in that direction and oh, wow, there's something happening. I guess that we would be again more effective in our jobs whether it's for drug interdiction or for counter terrorism for that matter. I don't know, I think that there are too many attitudes, too many heads working at the same time, they're working (inaudible) and they're not paying attention to things that might be relevant to so and so. And I guess we do that in our work career, I'm being evaluated for this that I'm doing and if I just happen to come across something that is useful for somebody else in that same office I may overlook look it just because I am so focused on this task in particular that I don't just take a little time to say like, "Hm, somebody might be able to use this". So I don't know if that's a good analogy, but that's the way I feel.

Q

That's really helpful. How is police co-operation in Puerto Rico and the Dominican Republic regulated by national and international law?

A

In the sense of how Puerto Rico might co-operate with them and vice versa? I don't know since I don't know if there is any kind of treaty or government treaty where you can expand your jurisdiction. I know that we have different treaties, federal, that allows us to, for example, part of our investigation here, it's the bad guys that we've seen in your country and we want to prosecute that person in the United States, and we can go to you and through these legal treaties we can have that person extradited and tried in US territory. I don't know if the local governments have that, so I don't know.

Q

When DEA agents collaborate with other agencies or police officers from overseas where does the accountability lie, like legally, financially, administratively?

A

Whose liability is it?

Q

Yeah, when you are dealing with a joint operation, say between here and the Dominican Republic, where would the accountability lie? I guess it would depend too on who initiates the ...

A

Yes, and the liaison, the use that we have of that country, the ASA's office ...

Q

A case by case difference?

A

Yes, because the ASA's office and Chief Counsel in DEA Headquarters, they actually decide what we can do and what we can not do. If, for example, the Dominican Republic needs our help, we actually have a liaison officer, so in the Embassy in the Dominican Republic, for example, inside the Embassy we have people, DEA people, DEA special agents and support employees that work there. If that Government needs anything it is channelled through there and if they need more resources and we need to provide those resources we will do it. But that's all part of Headquarter Chief Counsel, DOJ and ASA's office in order to get everything set all in a legal fashion, so we can't go and just do something and say that we're just going to be liable for it. I guess we're pretty much liable for everything, but in terms of liability issues, it's going to be, I guess it's going to be shared depending on what type of help we're providing and it's on a case by case basis.

Q

Is there anything else you want to add about Caribbean crime or co-operation in the Caribbean that I haven't?

A

No. We're still trying to find out more methods of ...

Q

Around the geographical issue, yes.

A

Yes, because right now we're at a point where we're in the middle of a shift ...

Q

Yes, a very big one coming up?

A

And whether it's specifically for trafficking, we were used certain routes and certain ways of operation and right now that is kind of like the point where we really don't know what's going on in the sense of we're still getting a big influx of drugs into the island but we just don't see where it's coming from. And it's not that we really don't know ...

Q

But they've come up with something crazy, they're a step ahead at the moment.

A

Right now, and this is my personal opinion from what I've seen, right now we're at a point where we are seeing stuff, we just don't see where it's coming from, and we can't define how, but a loophole has been found again and I see ourselves at that point where we're trying to figure out, okay, there's a loophole and we're not seeing it. We've got Coast Guard, we've got FURA, we've got ISE in the waters, we've got a bunch of immigrants coming in, but the yolas don't have drugs any more. Okay, if the yolas don't have drugs any more, where are the drugs coming from? And we're starting to see more information provided by researchers of information and other means that they're using sail boats, they're using just regular entertainment boats. People in participating in different sports, international sports, like auto racing, jet-ski competitions, offshore boating, and all these individuals have the ability to go outside our boundaries and come back in without being searched.

Q

Is there no way to detect, say on these jet-skis, is there no way to detect whether they are carrying ...

A

They just have to go out on the jet-ski and ...

Q

There's no technology that can ...

A

No. You're thinking about like thermal imaging and stuff like that.

Q

Yeah.

A

If you are thinking about like thermal imaging and stuff like that actually thermal imaging is a technology that has been around for a long time and I don't see it being used here in Puerto Rico.

Q

Why is that?

A

I don't know. Maybe it's just it's too expensive technology. It used to be very

expensive, right now it's not that expensive and the imagers are on small, like a video camera.

Q

Is it effective?

A

I think it is. Some people have different thoughts about thermal imagers. Thermal imagers don't go through things so if there's somebody standing outside that wall with a thermal imager I can't see it well.

Q

But isn't there something specifically, and I'm trying to remember back to a long time ago reading about something to do with the jet-skis and the material that they are actually made out of, that it is one of the new created systems that that ...

A

They're made of fibreglass or something.

Q

Yeah.

A

It's very simple with the thermal imager, quite simple. The thermal imager, actually what it does, it just reads temperature. An object will either absorb, reflect and refract, it's three things that an object can do with temperature. When you have anything, for example, fear, I can look at it with a thermal imager and it's going to look like that but with different shades of white or black, then you know what you have in full temperature, or in fact white hot. So different shades of white and grey as the temperature around it changes, and even the actual shape of that, but if you touch it or if you change something on it, that material that you use to alter that object, it's different to the actual object, so the temperature it's going to reflect or absorb, it's different to the temperature that actually the object will reflect or absorb, so if you're looking at it with a thermal imager you can tell that, oh it's been plastered or it's been altered. So in the sense of like, for example, for rescues and looking at properties where you think that there are certain things that might be buried underground, you can look with the thermal imager and the thermal imager is going to show you where the ground has been altered.

Q

Okay. Do they use that type of technology at the airport?

A

I haven't seen it. But I know that the airports are using X-ray machines to see in the luggage and boxes and stuff like that.

Q

Is that all, like checking their luggage, is that all that people see, when it goes through the X-ray they could just ...

A

I'm not sure but I think there are other machines behind. I think that it's actually a huge machine – as you're getting stopped, before you're going to get stopped into the plane, they all go through the machine. But I think that they also do it, alright, they do it for every flight or they do it at random or they do it to specific flights, and once they unload the plane they actually do the same thing, and they also use the dogs, but there's many ways to defeat that. But I don't think the thermal imagers are being used for that, but this is one problem that I see and that's why I say that we're at that point right now where we just don't know what's going on because they change their strategies and their methods.

Q

Okay. How would you describe your role or contact with HIDTA, you're pretty much in HIDTA, so how would you describe your role here?

A

I guess it would probably be facilitator and I'm primarily an investigator for HIDTA. My main focus here is to pretty much comply with the needs HIDTA have at that particular time.

Q

What is the main goal of HIDTA?

A

HIDTA – I have to say that's what it stands for, High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area. HIDTA as an initiative started, I don't know, maybe a little over ten years ago. It tries to concentrate – for example, Puerto Rico, high intensity area would probably be the different (inaudible) we have in progress. High intensity drug trafficking in the area might be considered the entries, different entry points in the area, so your points of entry being the ferry and the (inaudible) that goes to the (inaudible), the different borders, the beaches, airport, the cruise ships, interaction between other islands that we have like (Inaudible) and (Inaudible), St. Thomas, St. Croix are just so close that you

get on a boat and in forty-five minutes you can make it over here and pick it up. So all that and joint up, all these agencies together accomplish it, probably define more what HIDTA is about.

Q

Right, to give timely accurate information to each other in effect. How is the information shared, is there a central database?

A

As far as I know we have right here in the ISE, we also have our Intel Unit, and they share pretty much share all the information that is gathered. I don't know how it's working with ISE and ATF because we don't share the same building now, but that's pretty much how stuff moves around. We have our supervisors, they are in direct contact with HIDTA management here, and that's how we go about doing stuff. Before we're going to go out on a surveillance or any kind of operational duty we write our operational plan and we have a copy of that plan forwarded to the ISE, and ISE take a place with the other agencies that what we're doing is not related to or that we're not going to work against each other, which has happened in the past where we've had an informant arrange a deal and we get there and we start looking around and it's like there's (inaudible) from (inaudible) here. "Get out of there", because we were going to like hit Customs or we were going to hit ourselves. There was one time that we were actually going to hit another of our groups because their informant was getting paid by our informant because we thought he was a drug trafficker, and it was a big mess. Nothing happened because we were able to catch it before anything and the informants never got to get ...

Q

And luckily you did recognise the cars and the papers ...

A

But it was one of those things that if we don't do a timeliness of the operation, just because we were so tight in time at that particular point, the information had come through the ISE, but by the time the ISE received it and was ready to compare and go like, "Hey, your spy was a spy" we were already there. So yes, I will have to say that ISE would be basically like a point of contact or be a conflicting point in the whole operation.

Q

What much success has HIDTA had?

A

Oh many.

Q

What would you say is something that stands out the most? Can you think of an example?

A

It's hard because everything addresses something specific, it's just hard to compare in the sense of, well this operation was bigger than this operation. The FBI do different money laundering operations and drug busts and stuff like that than ourselves, and most of the operations that we do, we do it in concert. For me it's really hard to actually come up with an actual operation that we can say, "Phew, that's been like ...

Q

Sure. But I guess it's just thinking how it's growing from the beginning. I mean people do co-operate more now probably than they did in the beginning.

A

People, in what sense?

Q

Different agencies.

A

Actually I think that, yeah, internally we're a lot more, there's a lot more communication now than there used to be at the beginning.

Q

Sure, and to think you're under one roof, it's a natural tendency to start to trust each other.

A

Not really.

Q

No? So you still don't have a lot of trust?

A

It's not trust, it's just that if an agency regard us just working under the HIDTA umbrella, agencies have got their own culture, their own style, their own regulations ... sorry, I lost track there.

Q

Okay, we were just talking about the successes of ...

A

Yeah, I think the communication has been like kind of a bit of an achievement in the sense of before everything – I mean even though we were in the same building everybody was in their locked doors because we're doing DEA stuff, they're doing FBI stuff, Customs is doing Customs things, ATF were in the building across this parking lot here, and everybody was doing their thing. At one point we actually had somebody from the FBI here in our office space and somebody from the DEA in their office space, and that was hell just because internally all the agencies have their own policy and their own little cultures. So I think that even though we're still separated by doors, now there's more communication in the sense of our supervisors have no problem with each other and every time we're going to do something supervisor to supervisor – agent to agent we don't have that much interaction because we're so into the different cases that we have to work on, but if there's something that we support or we invite support with them there's no conflict. Before it used to be kind of ...

Q

How are agents selected, how were you selected to come here?

A

(Inaudible).

Q

Okay. How about education and training? Is there a central training for HIDTA, I know there used to be an initiative, but it's no longer, but ...

A

To become part of the different program?

Q

Yeah.

A

No.

Q

Do you think that would be useful? Everybody has their own individual work culture, organisational culture, do you think it would be better to ...

A

Some kind of integration training or a seminar or something like that?

Q

No, not really that, but I mean something that might actually incorporate so that everybody realises that, "Hey, we are working under one roof and we have technically the same goals".

A

I don't think that would help. What I think is that there has to be, I guess, more ...

Q

What do you feel?

A

Right now my perception is management in the sense of, the management has to be aware more of HIDTA goals. When you come to work to HIDTA you should work towards HIDTA goals and not work towards DEA goals or FBI goals.

Q

That's exactly what I was trying to get at.

A

And that is something that, I don't know if we can get away with that at any time soon, but I think it's attainable.

Q

Do you think it comes more from a leadership stance than so much more than an educational approach?

A

Yes, and that's going to have to come from the agency heads because, like we were saying, all agencies have different policies and all of that. When you get evaluated you shouldn't get evaluated by DEA standards in the sense of you're a DEA agent, you have to comply with these standards of performance, and the Bureau the same way and ISE the same way. If you're in HIDTA you should have a different evaluation process or different performance levels in the sense of, okay, you are part of this program, this is the performing level of this program. And if you don't have management more knowledgeable or more aware of what the HIDTA needs and goals are instead of what my agency ...

Q

Would that come from the Executive Board, is that where that would have to come from?

A

Actually I think that the people on the Executive Board are still being guided by the agency heads, for example ...

Q

You mean like in the States?

A

All the way to the States?

Q

No, who would be the ones to help you with, maybe to instigate that kind of ...

A

Oh probably, if you asked me I would like to see Major Carter come down with some kind of communication where he'd say, "People assigned to HIDTA are to comply with this, and still you're going to be governed by your agency policy and all of that, but your main focus is HIDTA and HIDTA goals and missions, and as long as you do that ethically and professionally you shouldn't have a problem".

Q

So I guess the first step would be to see if they could do it even locally.

A

Yeah, I mean locally would be great but that would require an individualist guy ...

Q

Sure, to be the head of each agency.

A

And the initiative to – yeah, the ISE would do it, the FBI, DEA ...

Q

Yes, they all could get together and sit down and talk to each other. But do you still think it's going in the right direction?

A

I think it is. We're still governed basically by our agencies but it's, I hope it's not too late, but it's starting to look like now we are more integrated into one HIDTA, and I think at the beginning we didn't have that much guidance.

Q

What do you think are the advantages and disadvantages of implementing HIDTA or the context of HIDTA on a trans-national scale? For instance, could you have within

this building a small division which was international, linked with other international offices like say, London, and then you could have exchange ...

A

If we could have anything that looked like Interpol, that would be great.

Q

This is, you know, a little theory I have had, it sounds like a very simple thing to do, much more complicated of course, but why not have something like HIDTA where you have an international division, you know, it doesn't really have to be that huge, but at the beginning, to start regionally, because once you have something, like you said, over time the doors became unlocked, bonds were starting to form somewhat, and you have to start there because proximity is everything. So if you would have even an international exchange of agents, you know, where you learn different techniques, you learn different ...

A

Well that's the whole thing really. At one point I think it's all about egos than anything else. Like if you have some kind of body where you have different agencies or different governments coming into it, there's always that competition thing and I guess

...

Q

Sure, even under one roof you might still have that, but at least it's not fragmented.

A

Yes, but again you're dealing with a bunch of type A personalities, so it's really hard to get them in the same place and actually have one leader and have followers. Everybody's going to try and say, "Well I'm DEA so if it's drugs I'm the only resource here that can actually deal with it". And it shouldn't be that way.

Q

But in theory do you agree that it might be?

A

In theory, again I repeat, if we can have anything like Interpol here, I tell you it would be great, it would be great. Especially here in the Caribbean, it is something that we deal a lot with other governments all over the Caribbean, you have to. We're getting all this stuff in here, we're shipping everything out, so it's the only way to go I would say.

Q

Then just a couple of questions about the key influences or factors on trans-national police co-operation. What are the key influences that you feel affect trans-national co-operation, i.e. personal, socially, cultural, politically?

A

I'd say politically and right now it's like the key. It is because of how I see things are being done and politically everybody has got their own agenda and that's pretty much what I see as mood stuff. This is going to sound kind of nasty, but the US Government will spend a lot of attention in the foreign relations and all of that, and all of a sudden they had the incident, the September 11 incident, and then the focus shifted from getting all this foreign relationship to oh, what's happening here. Now I have to put all my efforts into creating an agency, another agency that will shelter all these other agencies in order to revamp the efforts against international terrorism, because I think that the US Government never thought that somebody is going to have the time and is going to put the effort and the money into flying aeroplanes into the different places that they did. I mean that's something that I would have never thought of. And it happened in the Second World War when we had Pearl Harbour and I guess that you need to have a major event, a major incident, in order to shift your focus, and that's why I see that pretty much happens with everything.

Q

Yes, we're at an interesting time right now aren't we?

A

Yeah. We're bombarded by drugs and, okay, we're putting our efforts in drugs. We got bombed by international terrorists, okay, now are efforts are on international terrorism, and then they go like, "Oh anything", and these guys are being financed by

...

Q

Okay. I'd like to know what you think could be done to improve co-operation at different levels. So individual level, what could be done to motivate agents to co-operate more?

A

Between agents?

Q

Mm.

A

I guess it'll go back again to management and what I was saying about the egos. You have internally agents who compete against themselves and I guess that you can see that in the military and law enforcement. Agencies compete against themselves, DEA is always trying to prove that they're better than FBI, FBI is the lead agency and they're the main police body in the nation and so, you know, "No, we're better than you are and you can't come over and tell us what to do", and it goes back and forth between agencies. I think if we could get away with that attitude and instead of trying to place the different agencies in some kind of hurricane.

Q

Why do you think though that some individuals co-operate more than others?

A

Because they don't hear that crap about all that stuff. For example, I worked with the Bureau, I work with DEA, I worked for the local government and we all do what we need to do and ...

Q

Sure. It's also part of it.

A

Yes. Just because you have a specific name doesn't mean that you're the authority on it.

Q

It's a certain personality that's attracted to the industry, okay. How about institutional level, what changes in the DEA or HIDTA and other agencies could be made to improve trans-national co-operation?

A

Well it's going to sound a little bad. We have, and this is going to have to be kind of like with the Government, there's a lot of, the head of the agencies, for example, the Administrator at DEA is a national appointing and so is the Director of the FBI and so forth. When you have a government with specific style and they put in personnel that have nothing to do with law enforcement, for example, the head of an agency, a law enforcement agency, you get certain contradictions in style and actually in what they do. It's not necessarily true for every instance, I think that our administrator is the person to be there. I don't think they should be in there too long before something more important comes along and she'll be offered it and she'll take it, but right now I

think that we're at a point where the heads of the different agencies are more geared towards their agency than geared towards what the government is about. But I see it a lot, like for example in Puerto Rico. Once the government changes or the administration changes all the agencies' heads, they change, and because they're appointed that doesn't mean they are the best person for the job.

Q

Sure, and that rotation ...

A

It's horrible because everything starts to open out and the days come when the vision of this individual is not based on the vision of that agency. For example, DEA was created in 1973 as a – how can I say – at the Senate to try to centralise drug investigations, and that reason of being should stay loyal or should stay true for the rest of the days of that agency and it shouldn't change when each administrator like comes along, and that should hold true for every agency. So I think that that's pretty much how – if we have to change something or ...

Q

It kind of goes on to the next one, which is I want to ask about the wider context and what changes politically or economically you think.

A

I think that's the way I feel in the sense of it all trickles down, for whatever reason that I just can't explain, but if you can arrange everything at the top and keep that true, then everything down kind of like falls in place.

Q

The next question – how important is trust in co-operation? Is it very important.

A

Utmost.

Q

What do you feel are the barriers to trust?

A

Well again individual interests and people's agenda. I can say for myself, I'm a person that I need to trust you entirely in order to deal with you and if I see you do something that I don't like, the chances are I'm not going to rely on you again. It's like when you go to church to confession, if you go to confess to a priest and all of a sudden the town knows that you were frolicking, I'm not going to confess again.

Q

No, but it's true, it has to start somewhere. No matter how bad the past has been, you have to start somewhere.

A

And the problem is it's going to be in the individual to say, "You know what, I'm not going to zoom into that, I'm going to start here, right here, from now on, and I'm going to wait, I'm going to hope you're not going to do anything to break that trust". So we leave ourselves and certainly in backgrounds, so we already have a background but it's kind of, "I'm not going to be all open at the beginning". You stop to see how things evolve, then you kind of like open up.

Q

What do you think can be done to improve trust between individuals and organisations?

A

I think that that's pretty much it. Since most of our trust is based on previous behaviour, you just need to kind of start being a good boy from day one and say, "Okay, we're going to start working together and all that", and then ensure that my pact with you is in a manner that it's going to build the trust, but it's going to have to be like that individual's going like, "You know what, people before me did this in this fashion", i.e. that's not my style, this is the way I'm going to do it, and then you do it that way. You don't tell people that you're going to do something and then just go behind their backs and do something differently because that's not, you know, we're going to keep ...

Q

Okay. Can I quickly ask you, I'm just going to say a list of things, this is the very last question. People have identified certain factors which they think affect trans-national co-operation and I just want to ask you how much of the following are features of your organisation, or organisational culture I should say. On a scale of one to five, one being a great deal, two a lot, three a little, four not very much and five not at all. Okay. How would you rate motivation? These are all in terms of co-operation issues.

A

Motivation. In HIDTA or ...

Q

Yes.

A

HIDTA per se.

Q

HIDTA per se. How would you rate motivation as a factor affecting co-operation?

A

In general I think it would probably be in between a two and a three in the sense of one being good and five being better.

Q

Yes, exactly.

A

Well, I can't take two and a half, right? I'll go for a three then.

Q

Okay, three. How about trust?

A

Three again.

Q

Mistrust.

A

How much of it?

Q

Try and be as honest as you can.

A

Yeah, I think that will be a two. And how, the level of ...

Q

Two is higher then, okay.

A

So a two is good or ...

Q

Two is a lot, yeah.

A

I said that we have a lot of trust between us?

Q

Mistrust.

A

Mistrust, I think there's a lot of mistrust, three.

Q

Betrayal.

A

That would be about two.

Q

Okay, so there is past behaviour showing mistrust. Coercion, I do you a favour, you do me a favour.

A

That would be three.

Q

Leadership, how does that affect co-operation?

A

That's primal. Leadership, yeah, I'll put that on a one.

Q

You think that it's good here though?

A

I don't think that it's – yeah, let's balance it, I'll go to three in the sense of for me, leadership, it's primal, it's very important. If that exists, I don't think that that exists that much, I think that there's still room for somebody ...

Q

For improvement, okay, that's really important. Again it isn't in terms of what's happening now.

A

Yeah, I'm not evaluating anybody in particular. I would say that here it's needed.

Q

How about integrity?

A

How good is integrity for co-operation?

Q

In relation to what's happening here, yes. Do you think people here are ...

A

Have a lot of integrity? Yeah, it's either two or four. What would be the good thing?

Q

Two would be a lot of integrity.

A

Okay, yes, two. I think that even though we may have differences, I think that with certain things people are still, we still have integrity here.

Q

Okay. Power and competition, I shouldn't say competition, but power and egos.

A

If we have them or not?

Q

Do you think they affect co-operation a lot?

A

Yes, a lot. That would be a two or a one.

Q

How about resources?

A

We have resources that affect us a lot. Two or one, give it a one, and I may expand that. The resources that DEA has available from HIDTA are not necessarily the same or as effective as the resources that the FBI may have available from HIDTA, and that's why I have had to say that that's a major factor.

Q

Okay. How about competition? High? Okay. What about race and ethnicity, how does that affect co-operation, nothing?

A

No, there's no, in that respect. In the US compared to maybe other parts, and not necessarily used in other countries. In Puerto Rico I know that if you have been here a long time you probably know that you can be white, you can be yellow, you can be black, it doesn't matter. I mean as long as you are not misbehaving or doing something you're not going to hear, you know, if you're doing something wrong people are going to say like, "Look at this arsehole doing something wrong". They're not going to say, "Look at this black guy doing something wrong", or "This frigging Dominican", or something like that. It's very veryvery seldom you can go out and see something like that, so I don't think that ethnicity would have a big bearing on co-operation.

Q

How about gender?

A

I don't think so. Maybe a woman will probably feel like it will have a bearing on but it's because also law enforcement is very ...

Q

Male dominated, yeah.

A

So it's not because of prejudice or anything but for some reason ...

Q

Actually that was my last question. Thanks so very much for taking time out of your busy schedule to be interviewed. I truly appreciate it.

End of Interview

Appendix F: Coding Framework

GLOBAL THEMES	ORGANIZING THEMES	BASIC THEMES (CODES)
Working within the DEA	<i>Advantages of DEA:</i>	Professional Organised, funded and well-equipped Access Job satisfaction
	<i>Disadvantages:</i>	Egos Personal sacrifices Bureaucracy, laws and policies Secrets and competition
	<i>TNPC between DEA and other agencies:</i>	Locals Joint operations Shared training Shared information Provision of equipment
	<i>DEA Success:</i>	Very satisfactory
	<i>Barriers to TNP:</i>	Language Political will Bad governance and corruption Different legal systems Cultural insensitivities Competition and turf wars Defined roles Gender
	<i>Why barriers occur:</i>	Different legal systems Anti-US government and political will Bad governance and corruption
	<i>Overcoming barriers:</i>	Governance and accountability More education/training

		Anti-corruption strategies Changing attitudes and perceptions Networking and communication
TNP in PR and DR	<i>Nature of crimes:</i>	Drug crime Drug crime related to violence Weapons Entering the country Carrying weapons Illegal aliens Human trafficking Terrorism Corruption Causes of crime Interlinked crimes DR >As a "threat" Cooperation with PR position within the Caribbean >As a "gateway to the US"
	<i>Desired Cooperation:</i>	Gather more intelligence Better surveillance Undercover agents/operations Better communication Better cooperation with other islands More resources Combine resources Agency cooperation Improve leadership Avoid personality clashes
	<i>Reactive versus Proactive:</i>	Reactive vs. proactive: Reactive, seen as negative

		Proactive, seen as positive
	<i>Reactive Factors:</i>	Lack of political will
		Lack of resources/equipment
		Need more undercover ops/informants
		Personality
	<i>Types of changes needed:</i>	More/better resources
		Better technology
		Leadership
		Political will
		Corruption
		Organisational change
		Individual specialized programs and units
	<i>Different methods of the Caribbean:</i>	Islands – geography
		Physical barrier to cooperation
		Easier for traffickers
		Many cultures
		Different legal systems
		Being a set of islands and difficulties involved encourages cooperation
		Island attitudes ('slack')
		Nepotism/corruption
		Agency territorialism
		Political will
		Lack of resources and sharing
	<i>Outside the region - effect of PR/DR crime:</i>	Cooperation and awareness of the problem
		"Not our problem" and "Passing through"
		Shared problem
		Violent crime

		Tourism Mainland US "not interested", "don't understand" PR as 'outside' the main US nation/seen as marginal South America Problems with political systems
	<i>Changes needed:</i>	Training Resources/sharing more resources Improved communication/shared information Increased political will Being more proactive/tackle criminal networks Improved extradition Tackling illegal immigration Need more effort on the other side/DR Corruption Change is already happening
	<i>Working within national and international laws:</i>	Working within other country's legal systems: Difficulties Involved with politics Need to 'get around' laws Easier to do certain things (e.g. wire taps) Extradition is working well Working within US law: Abiding by US laws/guidelines while overseas US laws too strict/unhelpful
		International laws/treaties are too

		outdated, need reform:
		Weighted towards suspect's rights
		Frustrated with/seem distanced from international law
	<i>Accountability:</i>	Legal jurisdiction
		Lies with the DEA/US federal govt
		Lies with the country you're in
		Depends on the case
		Financial – who is paying for it?
		Lead by the US
		Lead by the host country
		Shared
		Human rights
		Difficulty of knowing what other countries will do with information shared
		Showing leadership/leading by example
	<i>Other comments:</i>	Scale of the problem
		Geographical complexity of the Caribbean
		Diversity and adaptability of transnational criminals
		Need to keep on improving cooperation
		Centralise
		Improve cooperation with Central/South America
Working within HIDTA	<i>Roles within HIDTA:</i>	(Listed roles – no themes)
	<i>HIDTA's goals:</i>	To reduce drug trafficking
		Sharing intelligence
		Information all in one place–central processing–central clearing house

		Creating links, networking
		Link together the heads of agencies – bosses – directors
		Importance of regularity, and physical presence, regular meetings round a table
		Coordination of aims
		Share resources (e.g. agents or equipment)
		Deconfliction – Allows bosses to decide who should investigate which cases
		Creates infrastructure to identify large criminal organizations – initiate investigations
		HIDTA brings extra funds
	<i>Information sharing:</i>	Automated systems
		Disseminating reports through ISC/logging info through ISC
		Range of different information systems
		Not integrated
		Security concerns with integration
		Coordinating with other agencies/passing on cases
		Face to face
		Individual agents bring info from and pass back to their organisations
		Proximity important
		Telephone contact
		Trust problems
		Information passed strictly through supervisors – strict hierarchy
		History -trust the people they deal with

		most
		History -trust the people they deal with most
		Personality problems
	<i>Barriers to sharing:</i>	Language barriers
		Security – leaks and corruption
		Personality clashes/problems
		Competition
		Institutional bias towards not sharing/structural/trained not to share
		Trust problems
		Timeliness – communication too slow
		Funding
		No problems
	<i>How HIDTA addresses barriers:</i>	Improve technology/communications
		Deconfliction to ensure cases go to the right place
		Improve networking
		Hold conferences, face to face meetings, to build relationships
		Need more funding/resources
		No problems within HIDTA, only with people from outside
		Deal with personality problems, try to go around them
		Promotions based on casework, not cooperation
	<i>HIDTA's success:</i>	Successful, best HIDTA in the US
		Better communication/trust between

		departments
		Good ISC/deconfliction
<i>Future improvements:</i>		Works well, just needs more resources
		Need more funding to support local forces
		Change promotions system to encourage cooperation, not competition
<i>Recruitment:</i>		Selection process
		Heads of agencies select agents – not HIDTA itself
		Individuals are chosen to be assigned to HIDTA taskforces
		Prestigious
		Extensive process and background checks
		Importance of training
		Relationship building
		Need officers to have the same training/avoid conflicting training
		Additional training needed for local officers who get less from their own dept.
		Limited training – HIDTA training resources have been cut
		Funding for training taken out of individual operational budgets
		Pool resources
<i>Implementing HIDTA transnationally:</i>		Advantages:
		It is possible, depends on will

		<p>Would help reflect the shifting nature of drug production/trade</p> <p>Would need good management</p> <p>Take the same approach to drugs as to terrorism</p> <p>Focused on the same mission – But on the other hand widening the focus might dilute it?</p> <p>Disadvantages:</p> <p>Difficulties in integrating very different policing organisations</p> <p>Difficulty of creating shared systems but maintaining security</p> <p>Corruption in other countries (eg. DR)</p> <p>Competition between different forces</p> <p>Difficulty of getting the funding sorted out</p> <p>Difficulty of developing a shared legal framework (both for sharing information and for jurisdiction)</p> <p>Organisational changes – create overall director with complete power</p>
Influences on TNP	<i>Key influences:</i>	<p>Political</p> <p>Resources</p> <p>International vs. local politics</p> <p>Corruption</p> <p>Personal</p> <p>Networking especially between leaders/managers</p> <p>Commitment (and networking helps develop that) – commitment to overcoming barriers eg legal</p>
		Personality

		Technology – communication – linked to networking because allows better Cultural Language Organisational
	<i>Individual level of TNPC:</i>	Motivation Salary and recognition (and training) Better education Defuse competition. Create a feeling of unity Friendships rather than just basic cooperation Reciprocation and trust Need tact and diplomacy Can't change personality Cultural differences
	<i>Institutional level of TNPC:</i>	Training unequal; locals vs feds. Language problems Impetus/leadership from people at the top New initiatives and practices Problem of political appointments Cultural problems Staff turnover Better support for officers from other countries Establishing offices abroad Importance of face to face again
	<i>Wider context - politically and economically:</i>	Anti-political stance/disillusioned with politics
		Problem of political rotation/swings

		Appointments system
		Politicization of the police department
		Good leadership
		Better funding
		Capacity building
		Language training
	<i>Importance of trust:</i>	Trust is crucial to cooperation
		Styles of trusting/building up trust
		Trust gradually, build up trust
		Trust implicitly but withdraw if anything goes wrong
		Need face to face contact to build trust
		Barriers to trust
		Corruption
		Background (suspicion or no knowledge of their history/associates)
	<i>Improving trust between individuals:</i>	Mistrustful personality can't be changed
		Reciprocity
		Building up relationships slowly
		Better communication
		Respect
	<i>Improving trust between organizations:</i>	Training together
		Ongoing, successful cooperation
		Reduce competition
		Better coordination, working towards the same goals
		Verbal and written agreements
		Better communication
		Face to face meetings
		Good leadership

	All comes down to the individual level
<i>Orgn. features affecting cooperation:</i>	Mistrust
	Leadership
	Role models
	Resources
	Gender
	Not really a problem, more about personality
	Have to be 'better than a man'/stronger
	Women are more determined
	Helps to be attractive and use that
	Race and ethnicity
	PR is a 'mesh', race not important here
	No, some racism/'favoritism' exists
	Language barriers
	Racism unacceptable within federal agencies

Appendix G: Interview Participants

ORGANIZATION/AGENCY	TITLE OF INTERVIEWEES/RESPONDENTS
AFT /NIE -Special Investigative Bureau	Supervisor NIE
CBP	Ports/Air & Marine Branches
Coast Guard Investigative Service	Resident Agent In Charge (High Seas & Trafficking Ops Initiative)
Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA)	Special Agent
DEA	TF/SGT
DEA	FBI Intelligence Analyst
DEA	Intelligence Analyst
DEA	TF/SGT
DEA - Airport Division	Group Supervisor
DEA - DR	Chief DEA Supervisor - DR
DEA - Miami	Public Information Officer/SA
DEA - NYFD	Public Information Officer/SA
DEA - PRFD	PIO/DTC Special Support Unit- Caribbean Division
DEA - PRFD	Special Agent - Money Laundering Group (TF-4)
DEA - PRFD	Special Agent - Foreign OPS
DEA - PRFD	Assistant SA-In Charge/Foreign OPS
DEA - PRFD	DEA Intelligence Research Specialist
DEA - PRFD	Special Agent- Colombian Military
DEA - PRFD	Special Agent - X Police Michigan (New)
DEA - PRFD	PIO/DTC Special Support Unit- Caribbean Division
DEA - PRFD	Special Agent-In Charge/Foreign OPS
DEA - PRFD	Special Agent
DEA - PRFD	Acting PIO
DEA - PRFD	Acting DTC
DEA - PRFD/ PRPD	Task Force Agent- DEA & PRPD
Department Of Corrections (DOC)	FBI Agent
Department Of Homeland Security-CBP	Director Of Field Ops - Caribbean
Department of Justice (DOJ) - Chief Prosecutors Office	
DOJ Office Of Drug Control	Director Of Office Of Drug Control
DOJ Office Of Drug Control	Special Agent Of ODC
DOJ Statistical Analysis Centre	Director Of Stats. Centre
DOJ-ATF PRFD	Resident Agent in Charge
DOJ-SIB INTERPOL DIVISION	Special Agent III
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)	Intelligence Analyst
FBI-ISC	Supervisor Intel/IT - Special Federal Officer, X Director of Interpol

FURA - Police Department	Admin. Director FURA (Air & Marine Interdiction)
FURA – Police Department	Senior Officer
FURA -PRPD	Admin. Director FURA (Air & Marine Interdiction)/COBRA - Ctr. for domestic awareness
FURA -PRPD	Rescue Team
FURA -PRPD	SWAT Team Agent
FURA -PRPD	PRDP Agent
Governor's Office	Governor's Advisor On Federal Affairs
HIDTA	Executive Officer PR/VI HIDTA
HIDTA	Executive Secretary
Immigration and Customs	Customs Intelligence Research Specialist
Immigration and Customs	Intelligence Research Specialist
INTEROL	SR. Officer Specialist
ISC-FBI and INTERPOL	Supervisor Intel/IT - Special Agent III
PR National Guard	Communication/Logistics Manager (ONDACP)
PR/USVI HIDTA	Director of HIDTA PR/USVI
S.W.A.T.	Director of PR S.W.A.T
US EMBASSEY - DR	Chief Political Officer
USAF	SSGT. Translator
USCG	US Coast Guard-HIDTA Training Initiative
USCG	US Coast Guard
USCG	LT. JG US Coast Guard
USCG-CGIS	Director High Seas and Trafficking Ops Initiative