

The London School of Economics and Political Science

**An Island of the Floating World:
Kinship, Rituals, and Political-economic Change
in Post-Cold War Jinmen**

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Abstract

During the Cold War era, the island of Jinmen was the frontline of the Republic of China in its military standoff with the People's Republic of China. From 1949 to 1992, the life of the islanders was profoundly disturbed and altered by wars and militarization generated by the bipolar politics. Despite this, the localized patrilineages dating from imperial times remain central to the organization of local social life. Grounded on fifteen months of fieldwork in a patrilineal community, this dissertation demonstrates the significant roles of kinship and kinship-related rituals in sustaining the local social fabric through turmoil and uncertainty during and after the Cold War.

The first part of this thesis focuses on lineage ancestral sacrifices, domestic worship, and funerals. The continuation of rituals that sustain patterns of interpersonal relationships is argued to constitute a means of negating the destruction of social order experienced in the period of military control and conflict. Yet, against the background of these ritual continuities, the thesis also examines how they have been adapted to shifting circumstances, such as the involvement of military and political authorities in folk ritual practices as a means for securing their legitimacy, and the material changes in rituals that have accompanied rapid commercialization from the 1990s.

The second part focuses on the impact of the Cold War on local political and economic life and state-society relations. Despite some salient changes, the ways that people define their social roles and relate to one another are shown to have remained largely framed by values and morals from the sphere of kinship. Kinship therefore actually continues to constitute a distinctive feature of the local political-economic structure, countering an often-seen formula assuming causal relations between the dramatic political-economic changes and the declining role of kinship or "traditional" values in orienting people's life and action.

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Note on Style

All translations from languages other than English are mine, unless otherwise indicated. Vocabularies that are commonly used by the people of Jinmen in the Minnan dialect are written italicized in the form of romanization designed by the Ministry of Education, Taiwan (on-line: http://twblg.dict.edu.tw/holodict_new/index.html). All other Chinese words in italics in the standard pinyin form are part of the vocabulary of standard Mandarin (*guoyu* in Taiwan, the official dialect used in government and education). The names of persons and places are also given in pinyin form, except for names that have different forms of romanization more commonly used (such as Chiang Kai-Shek instead of Jiang Jieshi).

In December 2014, the value of the New Taiwan Dollars was approximately 50 NTD for one British pound.

Chapter One

Introduction

Jinmen, an archipelago of islands in the Taiwan Strait,¹ lies 10 kilometres off Mainland China (People's Republic of China, PRC) and 300 kilometres from Taiwan, whose government claims the islands as part of the Republic of China (ROC). From 1949 to 1992, Jinmen was under strict military control and therefore inaccessible to ordinary citizens on Taiwan except soldiers. During the Cold War, at the peak of military confrontation between the ROC and the PRC, Jinmen was generally perceived by the Taiwanese population as one of the destinations where unfortunate young men might be sent for compulsory military service.² Not only could such men expect not to see their loved ones for a long time, but they also risked losing their lives. As a ROC citizen born on Taiwan, my understanding about Jinmen used to be limited to this restricted and Taiwan-based perspective. However, this changed when a personal trip to Jinmen broadened my interests in the island, its history and its people's lives.

In early autumn 2010, I landed on Jinmen for the first time after a one-hour flight from Taipei, the capital of Taiwan. On arrival I was struck by the proximity to China. As I enjoyed the beautiful sunset over the coast of Jinmen, I could not help but see beyond to the skyscrapers of the coastal city Xiamen on the Mainland. This geographic proximity was dramatically highlighted by a local guide, who told me about a former military regulation on Jinmen forbidding all items that could be used as buoyancy aids from private ownership because a Taiwanese soldier was reputed to have used two basketballs to swim to Xiamen in 1979.³ From the 1990s, following the decline of the global Cold War and the mitigation of hostilities between the ROC and the PRC, the tension on Jinmen over the possibility of imminent military conflict receded. In 2001,

¹ Jinmen consists of several islands but the great majority of population resides on Great Jinmen Island and Little Jinmen Island (or Lieyu). I spent my fieldwork mainly on Great Jinmen Island (where the local government and public facilities are located) but also collected data on Lieyu. Throughout the thesis, I use "the island of Jinmen" to mean the entire area.

² Another unpopular site for military service was a group of islands along the coastline of China called Mazu, which was also under military control.

³ After landing on China, this soldier changed his name to Lin Yi-Fu. He later became an important economist in China and took up the position of Chief Economist and Senior Vice President of the World Bank between 2008 and 2012.

an agreement between the ROC and the PRC led to the lifting of restrictions on post, transportation and trade between Jinmen and China (*xiao santong*). The agreement also allowed Jinmen residents to travel freely to China for business and brought tourists from the Mainland to Jinmen. Ever increasing numbers of Chinese and international visitors now come to Jinmen to see the numerous, decommissioned military constructions through which they are able to imagine the island's recent past as a "war zone" (*zhandi*).

While the dense military fortifications throughout the island impressed me greatly, I was also fascinated by two aspects of Jinmen's cultural landscape which I had not come across in Taiwan. Firstly, with the exception of three medium-sized market towns and some residential areas developed from the mid-twentieth century, most of the villages are single-surname settlements or what today's local government calls "natural villages" (*zirancun*). Each of these settlements is dominated by one patrilineal group with a particular surname dating from imperial times. Secondly, the larger of these single-surname settlements were characterised by large numbers of traditional Minnan-style⁴ houses and more Western-style buildings that incorporated Chinese architectural elements. Both styles of architecture can be understood to embody the islanders' historic accomplishments, such as serving in the imperial officialdom or making great fortunes through overseas trade in Southeast Asia prior to the 1930s. Many such buildings deteriorated or even collapsed during the period of military control, but have since been renovated by government agencies under the project of cultural heritage preservation. As I walked along the lanes between this mix of houses in various states of restoration and decay, I wondered about the lives of local residents through the period of military hostilities. Had their lives been altered in ways that paralleled the histories of those houses that had been destroyed by bombs or were collapsing due to long-term neglect?

⁴ "Min" was another term for the province of Fujian in imperial times and the word is still used in some contexts today. "Minnan" means southern Fujian, where the majority of Jinmen residents trace their ancestral origins.




Figure 1. The geographic location of Jinmen



Figure 2. The islands of Jinmen (coloured in black)

With my new-found obsession with the mystery of Jinmen, I departed for Britain for my postgraduate study in anthropology at the LSE. With no hesitation, I chose Jinmen as the ethnographic site for my doctoral research. I read American historian Michael Szonyi's (2008) monograph about Jinmen entitled *Cold War Island: Quemoy on the Front Line*⁵—the first English-language scholarly work seeking to represent the lives of ordinary people on Jinmen in the Cold War context on the basis of oral history and archival documents. His brilliant combination of interview and archival material and world politics established a compelling argument connecting the tremendous changes of local society to the domestic and international circumstances framed by the Cold War politics. I was inspired to develop a research proposal investigating how the bipolar politics of previous decades has affected local people's perceptions of the state, democracy and politics in the post-Cold War era. Though I was aware of the salience of kinship (e.g., the existence of numerous single-surname villages in Jinmen), it was not my primary concern at that time. In October 2013, I returned to Jinmen to carry out fifteen months of fieldwork. Gradually, the everyday flow of local life I encountered in the field led me to shift my research focus towards kinship, its related practices, and the broader arena of social interactions grounded on kinship. I was also drawn to investigate the role of kinship in local politics and in the relationship between state and local society today, which were the original themes of my research proposal. As I describe below, the significance of kinship in local life was underscored for me during the process of deciding the site for my ethnographic research.

The residential and social boundary hinged on kinship

As mentioned above, numerous big and small single-surname villages are found in Jinmen. Though Jinmen as a whole is “rural” compared to most of Taiwan, the islanders themselves call these natural villages *xiangxia* (rural areas, countryside). It is easier to find a place to rent in the market towns where many new buildings were constructed for the increasing number of people from Taiwan or China who have come over the last two decades to study in the local university, work or do businesses. But,

⁵ Quemoy is a romanization of Jinmen in the local dialect of Minnan.

I was inclined to live in a rural village which I expected to allow me to cultivate deep relationships with local-born people more efficiently and thereby get a closer look at their everyday life. While in the UK, before my initiation to fieldwork, I had been informed by a Jinmen-born man about the potential difficulty I might encounter in finding a place to rent in *xiangxia* because of a lack of spare rooms or houses and the villagers' concerns about outsiders. One Taiwanese friend knew my situation and helped me by asking her colleague who once worked in Jinmen about my search for accommodation. Then I was advised to contact Mr. Lin, a local-born public employee in Jinmen, and he found me a place in his colleague Mr. Cai's native village of Qionglin. Qionglin is dominated by a group with surname Cai and is one of the larger single-surname villages on Jinmen. Based on my preliminary investigation online, I thought that the village's moderate scale in terms of its geographic scope and population would help me to gather sufficient data, so I almost made up my mind to conduct my fieldwork in Qionglin.

I made a short, pre-fieldwork visit to Jinmen in September 2013 to meet my potential landlord and see the environment of the village. Mr. Lin and Mr. Cai led me to the traditional Minnan-style house they intended for me to use, which had been renovated not long before my arrival. The landlord was busy searching for the keys in another house and so his mother and some other senior ladies living nearby came to greet us. Mr. Cai introduced me to them, telling them that I was a PhD student who wanted to do research about Jinmen, while I smiled at them politely. The senior ladies seemed satisfied with my straightforward background, returning me smile but raising no particular queries or concerns. A few minutes later, the landlord (a man in his early forties) came with the keys and I had a quick check of the house. Without further consideration, I expressed my content with the house to the landlord and asked him some details about the rent and lease. I found myself a bit nervous, mainly because I was concerned about making a good impression on the landlord and other villagers who might be my future informants, but also because I detected that the landlord's attitude seemed rather reserved. He looked at me with examining eyes, saying that he had agreed to let me the house only because I was introduced by his agnate.

Certainly, my experience of relying on personal connections to find a place to settle down and of being viewed prudently and cautiously by the locals is shared by many ethnographers who have done fieldwork in unfamiliar locales. But, after a period of living in Qionglin, I learned the very clear-cut residential and social boundary revolving around kinship meant that only a very small proportion of residents in my field village have no consanguineous or affinal relationships with the dominant Cai group. This is despite the large movements of people through the area over recent decades, specifically the large proportion of ROC troops who retreated from the Mainland to Jinmen after 1949 and, more recently, the rising number of people who came from Taiwan from the 2000s onwards to establish temporary or permanent residence in Jinmen for a variety of reasons (for example, one frequently-given reason is the generous welfare provision by the local government discussed in chapter seven). As far as I know, the ROC soldiers who retreated from the Mainland, a good proportion of whom married local women, either resided in the market towns or moved to Taiwan long ago. The newcomers from Taiwan in recent years tend to live in the towns or the newly-developed residential areas. The rural villages face the steady outflow of the younger generations to Taiwan or elsewhere for education and work, and this decrease has not been complemented by new settlers arriving from outside. As a result, Qionglin village (as with other single-surname settlements in Jinmen) has always remained a kinship-based community from imperial times, and outsiders have had a limited effect on the village's demographic constitution and social networks.

My everyday interaction with the villagers and observations of their family and social life impressed on me the similarities with the “traditional Chinese society” described by ethnographers who researched rural China prior to the 1940s (e.g., Hu 1947; Kulp 1925; Lin 1947) and the lineage societies discussed by Maurice Freedman (1958, 1966). The similarities lie in, for example, the character of kinship (or patrilineal descent) as the organizing principle of local communal life and the prevalence of various religious and customary practices that were deemed superstitious or unmodern and wasteful by the republican state at the beginning of the twentieth century. In other words, many kinds of so-called traditional rituals and

customs seem to have continued in Jinmen even during the era of military conflict; my informants also emphasized that they conducted the rituals and customs in the same ways their ancestors did in imperial times. Moreover, to be able to follow the old ways of conducting large-scale rituals (e.g., lineage ancestral sacrifices, funerals, village temple festivals), it is necessary to draw on the collective efforts of the villagers, and in doing so the existent mode of resource mobilization and social intercourse is reaffirmed. This suggests that the arena of social interactions has been constantly formed around kinship. But, I should note that the social networks are not restricted to the village context but extend into the wider society of Jinmen. As my interlocutors always said, interpersonal relationships (*renji guanxi*) in Jinmen are very close and tight, so that wherever you are on the island you can easily find a connection to a person, even to someone you meet for the first time. And, such tight interpersonal relationships are grounded on kinship.

The residential and social boundary based on kinship and the continuation of cultural practices described above led me to consider a number of questions: How could the kinship-based communities and the related communal activities have been maintained throughout the political and military turbulence over the twentieth century? What roles did kinship and its related rituals play in the life of local people and state-society relations during the turbulent period and how might this have changed more recently? Why do people (including those residing outside of Jinmen) continue the conventional practices today despite the additional burdens and expenses they result in? These questions constituted the dominant concerns throughout my fieldwork and accordingly kinship became the core of my research project. Overall, this thesis attempts to study continuities and changes in the patrilineal communities of Jinmen in relation to local historical particularities, specifically Jinmen's embeddedness in the Cold War and post-Cold War contexts.

Exploring the localized experience of the Cold War and its aftermath

The terms Cold War and post-Cold War as used in this thesis have empirical and analytical importance. Empirically, in line with Szonyi's usage (2008:260), the nearly

five decades of militarization that the society of Jinmen experienced not only originated from the political and military competition between ROC and PRC, but were also linked to the worldwide division into two distinct paths of political and economic modernization (liberalism-cum-capitalism versus communism) in the second half of the twentieth century known as the Cold War. In the same vein, the demilitarization of Jinmen from the mid-1980s was linked to the dissolution of the global bipolar politics, in which the rapprochement between China and the US in the 1970s influenced the mitigation of military tension across the Taiwan Strait. In my description of local history below and throughout the thesis I will single out the link of the tremendous changes in the various aspects of local life to the bipolar politics during the Cold War era, and discuss the developments in the local political-economic structure from the 1990s after the dissolution of the global Cold War.

Analytically, in line with Heonik Kwon's pioneering works on Vietnam (2006, 2008) and South Korea (2009, 2013) in the post-Cold War context, this thesis argues for an engagement with the Cold War history of which the societies studied were part, so as not to overlook the connection between the present condition of a society and its previous experiences of wars, mass death, military regulation and political injustices generated by the extreme politics. Analytical attention to this bipolar history is also intended to place my ethnographic study in conversation with the wider scholarship on the Cold War involving experts from the disciplines of history, political science and international relations. As Kwon (2010:17) puts it, for a long time the Cold War was understood from the dominant western (or Soviet) perspective as a period of "long peace" or "imaginary war", but this biased perspective has been critiqued by many scholars for ignoring the forty million human casualties of war in different parts of the world. Within the Cold War historiography there have been shifts of focus from the superpowers of the US and the Soviet Union to the Cold War periphery, and from the study of high politics and diplomacy to the study of the social and cultural dimensions of the Cold War (cf. Zheng et al. 2010:1-11; Masuda 2015a:1-9; Szonyi's monograph on Jinmen is one example of this scholarly endeavour). But, as Kwon contends, it is necessary to broaden the temporal scope of research beyond the widely defined end of

the Cold War, usually taken to be the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. This is because it is problematic to assume that the Cold War ended in different places at the same time and in the same way. It is also at this point that anthropology with its theoretical and methodological strength in the study of the social and cultural dimensions of human societies can make significant contributions to the exploration of how the extreme politics has been “decomposed” in different societies (Kwon 2010). This thesis investigates and analyses how the conditions and new practices that emerged in Jinmen during the Cold War era have been absorbed by the kinship-based communities and the extent to which they continue to have a salient presence in their current lives, so as to demonstrate the localized responses to the aftermath of bipolar politics. In doing so, the thesis makes a contribution to the communication between anthropology and Cold War scholarship.

Framing the thesis

This thesis centres on the question: What roles do kinship and kinship-based rituals play in the society of Jinmen in relation to the drastic political-economic changes that took place there during and after the Cold War? In order to answer this question and to frame the seven chapters ahead, background information and theoretical scaffolding are necessary.

The following section provides a summary of the history of Jinmen during the Cold War, emphasizing those details which are pertinent to my study of the contemporary life of local people. The historical description is largely in keeping with Szonyi’s (2008) monograph on Jinmen as the data I collected during fieldwork is in line with his empirical material. However, I will suggest that his emphasis on the transformations of local society by militarization and geopoliticization is weakened by the lack of attention he gives to the role of kinship in organizing the local life. For this reason, I will discuss one aspect that Szonyi does not explore in depth: the cultural aspect of the Cold War politics represented in the different policies of the ROC and the PRC authorities towards folk ritual practices. As I will demonstrate, this is linked in important ways to this thesis’s exploration of the role of kinship and related rituals

in ordering the life of Jinmen residents across changing circumstances.

Having established the investigation of kinship and rituals in the life of Jinmen residents as the central concern of this thesis, the second section reviews relevant anthropological and sinological literature so as to situate my theoretical approaches. The third section describes my fieldwork experiences and research methods. The final section outlines the organization of this thesis.

Jinmen in the context of Cold War

Before the end of World War Two in East Asia, the islands of Taiwan and Penghu were colonies of Japan while Jinmen (under the province of Fujian) remained part of the ROC's territory led by the Kuomintang (the Nationalist Party, KMT hereafter).⁶ Following the Japanese surrender in 1945, Taiwan and Penghu were returned to the ROC as the province of Taiwan. Meanwhile, on the Mainland, the pre-existent standoff between the KMT and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) developed into outright civil war. The KMT eventually lost its control of the Mainland and moved the ROC government and army to Taiwan in 1949. In the same year, the CCP established the People's Republic of China (PRC) and soon, on October 24, sent about 8,000 troops to attack Jinmen which was still under the KMT's control. The PRC army landed on Guningtou, in the northwest part of Great Jinmen Island, and engaged the ROC army stationed there in fierce fighting in the local lanes and courtyards causing great damage to local people's life and property. Ultimately the ROC troops won the battle, which allowed the KMT to secure its ROC government on Taiwan.

Their victory in the Battle of Guningtou confirmed the military significance of Jinmen to the KMT army as its proximity to the Xiamen harbour meant that the Jinmen garrison could be used to delay or disrupt an invasion by the PRC. Henceforth, the number of soldiers in Jinmen increased rapidly; the island entered a state that Szonyi called "*ad hoc* militarization" in which the civilian government on Jinmen was

⁶ Following the loss of the First Sino-Japanese War in 1895, the Qing government signed the Treaty of Shimonoseki in which China ceded the islands of Taiwan and Penghu to Japan in perpetuity. The Qing dynasty was overthrown by the revolutionary led by Dr. Sun Yat-Sen, who then established the Republic of China and the KMT in 1912.

removed and authority over civilian affairs transferred to the commander of the Jinmen Defence Headquarters (JDHQ) (2008:26). Though the civilian government was abolished, the provincial government of Fujian was formally reconstructed on Jinmen. In reality, however, this provincial government was an empty shell because the JDHQ commander also served in the position of provincial chairman. Nonetheless, the preservation of Fujian provincial government (covering the counties of Jinmen and Mazu) was seen as vital by the KMT because it gave validity to the claim that the territory under ROC governance extended beyond the province of Taiwan and indicated the KMT's intention of recovering the CCP-controlled Mainland.⁷

The outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 took the unresolved aspects of the Chinese civil war to a different level of the larger global Cold War. The Korean War resulted not only in the US sending the Seventh Fleet to the Taiwan Strait to save the ROC from a communist invasion, but also led to a new opening for ROC diplomacy. The ROC President Chiang Kai-Shek realized that the fate of the ROC hinged on support from the US-led anti-communist powers, so his foreign policy aimed to "make the most of the existence of the cold war to secure as much international sympathy and support as possible to enable it to survive the continued confrontation against the PRC" (Tsang 2006:30). This might have contributed to the restoration of the civilian county government on Jinmen in 1953, which marked the ROC's acknowledgement of the importance of shaping the image of Jinmen as "a place of freedom, a part of Free China in contrast to Red China" (Szonyi 2008:27). However, the reestablishment of the civilian government did not affect the military's complete authority.

In September 1954, the PRC launched a heavy artillery bombardment of Jinmen,

⁷ In the original ROC Constitution, provincial government was the core unit that mediated between the smaller counties and the central government. The existence of two provincial governments under the ROC effective control was essential to conforming to the constitutional emphasis on the existence of a greater Republic of China beyond Taiwan. In the 1990s, probably due to the democratic movements of the period, the problem of overlapping authority between the Taiwan provincial government and the ROC national government regarding population, constituency, power and legitimacy became a hot topic of debate. Eventually, following the fourth constitutional revision of December 1998, the Taiwan provincial government ceased to be a legal local government entity. As Yeh (2015:50) puts it, in addition to promoting government reform, the downsizing of the Taiwan provincial government had the significant political implication that Taiwan was not just one province of a greater China. However, the Fujian provincial government still exists, so that the PRC's suspicion about Taiwan's independence is partly dissolved.

an episode known as the First Taiwan Strait Crisis. Szonyi (2008:43) notes that Chiang Kai-Shek took this chance to press the US for its agreement to guarantee Taiwan's security. Chiang emphasized Jinmen's defensive importance by building up military forces on the island, raising troop levels from 60,000 in 1954 to a peak of about 100,000. His strategic intention was that the US might be unwilling to allow the fall of Jinmen because such huge losses for the ROC army would pose a serious blow to morale on Taiwan. The Formosa Resolution passed by the US Congress in January 1955 announced the US commitment to protecting territories under the jurisdiction of the ROC against the PRC's aggression; the US intervention very likely deterred the PRC from continuous shelling of Jinmen. Szonyi contends that the 1954-5 crisis mattered considerably to the overall geopoliticization of Jinmen, as the fate of the island became inseparable from the global Cold War, and the build-up of troops to a level where they outnumbered the civilian population led to greater militarization of local society (2008:48).

Entering the state of “war zone”: militarization of the society of Jinmen

In 1956, given the reality that the CCP regime could hardly be overthrown in the short term, the KMT regime adjusted its strategies on Jinmen by establishing a system of War Zone Administration (WZA), thereby manifesting to the world its continuing commitment to anti-communism and recapturing the Mainland (Szonyi 2008:26). This system resolved problems of coordination between the military and civilian authorities by placing the county government under the WZA Committee directed by the JDHQ (the Committee chairman was the JDHQ commander). The WZA Committee's offices mirrored the civilian agencies of the county government, constituting a parallel structure that penetrated into all political and social entities on the island. In fact, immediately after the Battle of Guningtou, the KMT-army had already extended its direct control downward to the village-level by reorganizing the island into about 150 “administrative villages”. The village headman was mainly a nominal position and appointed by the JDHQ. The real power-holder was the village political instructor (renamed as deputy village headman after the establishment of the WZA), who was

sent from the military to implement the JDHQ's commands, such as regulating the movement of civilians, militia training and mobilization. This arrangement lasted approximately three decades, indicating the degree to which Jinmen inhabitants were kept under state surveillance.

The most direct way that the WZA militarized the life of Jinmen civilians was the routinization of militia service (Szonyi 2008:50-63), which constitutes a large part of locals' oral recollections and their appeal to the government for compensation today (see chapter seven). On reaching a certain age, both men and women were obliged to join the militia, attending military training and conducting a wide range of tasks, such as portering, construction work, relief and rescue work, and logistical support. Another important practice of the WZA was ideological education, including nationalist schooling and regular political training for the militia members, which were aimed at enhancing the civilians' patriotic sentiments and anti-communist consciousness.

While the ROC was engaged in war preparation, the PRC again launched an artillery attack on Jinmen on August 23, 1958 (the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis). The bombing this time was more intensive and long-lasting: about half a million shells landed on the sixty square miles of the island over six weeks—almost 10,000 shells per square mile. This crisis is an episode much highlighted in the oral history of the Jinmen residents. For instance, many former militia members remembered that they were ordered to participate in the life-threatening task of unloading the supply convoys on the beach where the shelling was most intense (Szonyi 2008:71-3). After forty-four days of constant bombing, the Minister of Defence of the PRC announced a unilateral seven-day cease-fire, with a message from the CCP's chairman Mao Zedong who claimed the operation as a victory because it had successfully entrapped the US (Szonyi 2008:73).⁸ In the KMT's view, maintaining Jinmen as a civilian community rather than merely a military base was strategically helpful for portraying the Communist attack in a much darker light. However, the cease-fire provided an

⁸ This "Message to our Taiwan Compatriots" was known to be drafted by Mao Zedong, declaring that "Whenever necessary we can shell [Jinmen and Mazu]. Whenever we are in need of tension, we may tighten the noose, and whenever we want to relax the tension, we may loosen the noose. We will let them hang there, neither dead nor alive, using them as a means to deal with the Americans" (see Szonyi 2008:73).

opportunity to evacuate the civilians for their safety and thereby avoid similar accusations being made against the KMT itself. In the days after the cease-fire, the WZA announced that the students, teachers and staff of Jinmen Secondary School would be evacuated to Taiwan. A further declaration followed immediately that all residents were allowed to register for voluntary evacuation. However, the majority of Jinmen civilians chose to stay. They were undoubtedly afraid of the bombing but they were more afraid of the uncertainty of making a living in Taiwan where they had no land to farm and no connections on which to rely (Szonyi 2008:74; I also heard the same remarks from my informants).

The remaining islanders then experienced another two decades of shelling on alternate days by the PRC between October 1958 and December 1978. However, the destructive power of this shelling was much weaker and mainly for the purpose of propaganda. The PRC army replaced live shells with shells that exploded in mid-air, scattering propaganda leaflets. Though it was not uncommon that the shrapnel caused danger to people's lives and property, Jinmen residents seemed to accommodate the danger as part of their everyday lives. As one man recalled: "You just went on living your life. It was just a question of who had good luck and who didn't..." (see Szonyi 2008:76). They also became good at listening to the shells and judging the distance between them and the shelling: if the shell was diagnosed to be falling far away from them, people might just continue what they were doing and not run to the bomb shelter.

Militarization on Jinmen continued into the 1960s and 70s, with the project of building combat villages and programmes aimed at creating a model county and turning the people of Jinmen into a modern, civilized, mobilized citizenry. Nevertheless, the influence of global Cold War politics on Jinmen gradually weakened as the PRC's role in the international system changed in the early 1970s, particularly following Sino-American rapprochement and the seating of the PRC delegation at the United Nations. The post-Mao economic reform in China also brought about a warming of cross-strait relations. On Taiwan, the KMT regime confronted a growing crisis of legitimacy as the US officially recognized the PRC and severed diplomatic relations with the ROC in 1979, while domestically there were thriving political

movements for democratization. The political changes inside and outside the ROC eventually led to the repeal of martial law⁹ on Taiwan in 1987 and on Jinmen in 1992, which signalled the formal ending of the Cold War across the Taiwan Strait. However, the issue of Taiwan's independence from or unification with China emerged and remains crucial to the cross-strait relationship today.

Militarization on Jinmen also comprised a sweeping force of multi-dimensional intervention in the ordinary life of local people. Szonyi uses the term "combat economy" to describe such intervention in local economy in terms of agricultural modernization aimed at competing with the CCP's agricultural policies, and the burgeoning of various small-scale enterprises providing goods and services to the vast number of soldiers stationed on the island (2008:121-48) (see chapters six and seven). Szonyi also notes that the considerable presence of troops led to an unbalanced local marriage market as young women chose to marry soldiers rather than their fellow islanders and to local worries about rape and correspondingly the emergence of the military brothel system (2008:151-66). By these examples, Szonyi explains his take on political scientist Cynthia Enloe's definition of militarization as "the step-by-step process by which something becomes controlled by, dependent on, or derives its value from the military as an institution or militaristic criteria" and links militarization on Jinmen to global Cold War politics (2008:3). He argues that life on Jinmen was geopoliticized in the sense that geopolitics profoundly influenced the social structure of local communities, bringing about "new patterns of interactions, new rhythms of life, and new attitudes to diverse issues" (2008:5). Indeed, many new practices and ideas appeared on Jinmen during the Cold War period, but have they really shaken the previous ways of life? My brief answer is that Szonyi seems to overemphasize the transformative forces of politics and military power imposed on the local society and therefore he overlooks the persistent presence of kinship-based patterns of life through this turbulent period. One aspect that Szonyi does not discuss, but which is critical to

⁹ In 1947, at the peak of the Chinese civil war, the National Assembly of the ROC passed the Temporary Provisions Effective During the Period of Communist Rebellion in 1947, which later allowed the ROC government on Taiwan to announce the imposition of martial law on all of its territory in 1949.

my own research, is the continuation of kinship-oriented rituals.

The cultural aspect of the bipolar politics

The continuation of conventional sacrificial and mortuary rites on Jinmen is a noteworthy phenomenon when examined in the context of modern-state building and Cold War politics. Around the turn of the twentieth century, the fact that the Qing empire was successively defeated by and succumbed to the Western powers and Japan aroused attempts at radical departures from tradition and the invention of a modern state including an all-out assault on Chinese religion. Western concepts of religion and superstition were imported: religion was understood as a strong, moralizing, and unifying force behind the Western nation-states, and compatible with science; in contrast, superstition was thought as unscientific and thus distinct from religion (Goossaert & Palmer 2011:50). Influenced by these new concepts, anti-superstition became part of a larger campaign of social reform, targeting not only local cults of diverse deities but also the Confucianism-related ideas and practices including the cult of ancestors, traditional cosmology, and geomancy. After the establishment of the Republic of China in 1912, anti-superstition was developed into the New Culture Movement from the mid-1910s to 1920s, which later merged with the 1919 May Fourth Movement. These movements posed a wholesale rejection of China's religious heritage and argued for the creation of a new Chinese culture based on global and western standards, particularly democracy and science. Nevertheless, the anti-superstition movement was limited because it was neither a unifying force nor a bottom-up approach. Despite the republican state's initial step of removing Confucian classics from the school curriculum, the ambition to revive classics-based education did not vanish and ultimately Confucianism was reincorporated into the curriculum in order to encourage the cultivation of traditional Chinese ethics including obedience to the parents, elders, and the authorities (Billioud & Thoraval 2015:29-32). As reported by anthropologists and other scholars, ancestor worship in homes, ancestral halls and at graveyards continued in China in the first half of the twentieth century. Other religious activities such as redemptive societies and temple cults also remained active,

especially in rural areas, despite the state's repressive anti-superstition policies.

In 1949, the KMT retreated to Taiwan where it based its ROC government, while the CCP established the PRC. This marked the launching by the two republics with mutually-competitive cultural and religious policies. The PRC launched its policy of land reform immediately after its founding. This was aimed at radically transforming society by creating a new social structure based on class categories and it represented a direct assault on the lineage corporations: the large estates that supported lineages and communal rituals were appropriated, and the lineage leaders who were usually local elites and landlords were executed or forced to become ordinary farmers (Goossaert & Palmer 2011:150). The various campaigns and policies of the 1950s had already seriously damaged the vitality of all the religious communities; in 1962, Chairman Mao's call for class struggle to be expanded and deepened further smashed religious activities (Goossaert & Palmer 2011:146-64). The Cultural Revolution beginning from 1966 until 1976 resulted in the thorough destruction of all forms of religious life: religious leaders were condemned as ox demons and snake spirits; the officially registered temples, monasteries, mosques and churches were forced to close; ancestral halls were destroyed and ancestral tablets placed at home were confiscated by work teams or Red Guards (though many people hid the tablets or copied the records on the tablets onto red paper) (Goossaert & Palmer 2011:165).

The ROC government also carried out land reform throughout its territory, but it did not have much effect on Jinmen or on the local lineage activities (see chapter two). The KMT attempt at building a modern state on Taiwan was theoretically a continuation of its previous campaign on the Mainland in the 1930s called the New Life Movement, which sought to produce a new civic morality with a strong focus on the proper forms of embodiment in public spaces (including hygiene), rather than inner ideological purity. As Goossaert and Palmer put it, this campaign showed Chiang Kai-Shek's attempt to compete with the CCP methods of popular mobilization by initiating "a state-directed popular movement for a national renaissance, building on Confucian values to overcome the cultural backwardness of the people" (2011:175). The regime proposed four traditional virtues of propriety (*li*), righteousness (*yi*), honesty (*lian*),

and sense of shame (*chi*)—drawn from Confucian tradition but not referring to the traditional civility—to shape the behavioural standards and civic responsibility of the citizens, modelled on military discipline (Goossaert & Palmer 2011:175; Billioud & Thoraval 2015:32). Indeed, the various measures of militarization on Jinmen were in line with the above framework that Szonyi also discusses (2008:81-100). Moreover, in response to the Cultural Revolution in the PRC, the KMT launched the Cultural Renaissance Movement in 1966 that further affirmed the incorporation of Confucian values into the state’s project of national modernization (e.g., one method was to improve educational standards with an emphasis on the Confucian virtues such as filial piety and fraternal love). The KMT regime’s attitude toward religion remained anti-superstition-oriented, with regulations focused on eliminating religious practices seen as backward and wasteful, and ensuring that religious organizations did not threaten government control. For example, the villages on Jinmen used to hold the Pudu festival (purgatory and salvation rituals for the wandering ghosts) on different days in the seventh month of the Chinese lunar calendar, but the military unified the organizing of the festival on the fifteenth day of the seventh month in order to manage public gatherings and reduce the overall expenses on related rites and banquets. As Szonyi puts it, frugality in expenditure was an important part of the national struggle with the Communists (2008:184). But the military did not intervene in the operation of the lineage-level ancestral rituals and of the domestic worship of gods and ancestors.

Ritual continuities and localized responses to the bipolar politics

Given the KMT and CCP regimes’ different attitudes toward traditional Confucian ethics in their projects of modern-state building, the practices and objects associated with the dead were largely preserved on the ROC territory but suffered serious destruction in the PRC. Moreover, the two regimes’ different treatment of folk ritual practices indicated the kind of state-society relationship that they wanted to cultivate. In chapters five and seven, I will describe the ways in which the KMT-military have been involved in the funerals of Jinmen residents since the period of military control, and discuss the significance of this kind of involvement in today’s local politics.

It should be noted that my study of the link between commemorative rituals for the dead in Jinmen and Cold War history differs from Heonik Kwon's mainly as a result of the differences in our ethnographic materials. The Cold War was experienced by the ordinary people that Kwon studied in Vietnam and South Korea as involving real wars and massacres. They were contexts in which brothers in one family might become enemies on the battlefield after each joining opposing communist and anti-communist camps. For a long time, the people in both countries have not been able to heal these wounds by means of holding private commemorative rituals, because these were deemed as backward customs and practices by the post-conflict regimes. Things began to change in both countries from the 1990s. One noteworthy change is that the living incorporate the dead who took different sides during wars into the ancestral ritual space in explicit and demonstrative forms. For example, a domestic or communal ancestral shrine is transformed into a politically mixed shrine, bringing together the dead who were politically deemed patriotic and praised and the dead who were politically stigmatized. This practice makes the dead brothers who fought each other while alive reunite in the ritual world created by their living kin and descendants, who in this way are able to find some consolation. The resurgence of private commemorative rituals in Vietnam also shows a set of inventive practices that enable the uprooted ghosts of war to transform into auspiciously powerful guardian spirits and build close ties akin to kinship relations with the place where their bodies are buried. Kwon argues that these grassroots-level practices of death commemoration constitute sites of major communal initiatives for the resolution of bipolar conflicts.

In the case of Jinmen, the deaths and displacement of human lives caused by warfare were also aspects of the island's history during the bipolar era. There are shrines which were built by local people in response to the request of the spirits of dead soldiers who expressed their wish through spirit mediums (cf. Chi 2000; Szonyi 2008:182-3). One significant instance is that of a spirit called Li Guang-Qian who was a hero leading the fight against the Communist troops during the Battle of Guningtou and who died in the fighting; a shrine was then built for him through spiritual revelation and, some years later, was enlarged with funding from the military

government for its merits of patriotic education and commemoration of heroes of the ROC army. There is also a cult of a female spirit called Wang Yu-Lan, whose identity was confirmed through a spirit medium as a young woman living in Xiamen but unfortunately killed by the Communist soldiers who intended to rape her; her corpse floated up to Jinmen in 1954 and, two years later, the military erected a shrine for her called Lienü Miao (Chaste Female Martyr Temple) (Chi 2000, 2009; Szonyi 2008:184-8). This cult was also appropriated by the state to emphasize the female spirit as a symbol of resistance against communism and the exemplar of traditional Chinese values such as chastity; but for the ordinary people living around this temple, she was a ghost whose deification or transformation was enabled by the regular offerings made to her by the living.

Although I am aware of such cases from other parts of Jinmen, my discussion of ancestral rituals in the later parts of my thesis is not directly relevant to the decomposition of the Cold War as it was for the cases from Vietnam and South Korea discussed by Kwon. This is probably because my field village was not a major site of battle or artillery attacks by the CCP, so it was never particularly apparent to me whether the spirits worshipped at home died in wars or militia service. Neither did I spot any rites or shrines specifically for the ghosts of dead soldiers. As far as I know, most of the ancestors worshipped at home in the village had a “normal” death. The lineage-level ancestral rituals are only for remote ancestors and do not cover any members from the republican era. However, despite these differences, I do take inspiration from two important points made by Kwon. Firstly, as mentioned earlier, the period of bipolar politics which had different effects in different places may provoke contemporary action to address the traumas, resentments and injustices resulting from the previous era. In chapter seven, I will discuss how the political developments in Jinmen from the 1990s reveals the local initiatives that ask the state for redress and compensation for people’s losses and suffering in the era of military conflict. Secondly, as Kwon argues, the ritual commemorations for the war-related dead initiated by the ordinary families suggest the generative power of human creativity to confront the war-induced destruction and ruins, instead of merely

constituting a revival of traditional religious morality. In the same vein, this thesis explores the social significance of the continuing ritual practices in the lives of Jinmen residents who witnessed great changes in and after the Cold War era.

Literature review of Chinese kinship and the thesis's theoretical approaches

So far I have presented the substantial impacts on Jinmen society by militarization and bipolar politics, but also have pointed out the continuing practice of kinship-based rituals and the maintenance of residential boundaries with limited penetration from outsiders. Aside from the KMT regime's relatively positive attitude toward "traditional culture", how might we make sense of the persistence of patrilineal communities and their rituals with regard to Jinmen's recent history? To formulate my approaches to answer this question, I begin with a review of the existent literature discussing the roles of kinship and the related rituals in the lives of Chinese people.

The first part of theoretical review examines a range of anthropological literature of Chinese kinship written prior to the mid-1980s. Maurice Freedman's lineage theory is central to this discussion due to the similar characteristics of Freedman's lineage villages and the single-surname villages in Jinmen. I will summarize how the previous scholarship discusses the role of kinship in Chinese social organization—ideas which will enrich the analysis of my own data later on. In contrast, the second part introduces Taiwanese anthropologist Chen Chi-Nan's (1985) work that scrutinizes the genealogical dimension of Chinese kinship and critiques Freedman's lineage model for its overemphasis on the functional dimension. Though Chen's thesis is insightful, his exclusive attention to the system of Chinese kinship left the role of kinship in people's everyday lives largely unexamined. To address this gap, the third part discusses the theoretical turn in the anthropological studies of kinship in the mid-1990s that led to work on the processual and fluid character of human relationship building, which is collectively bracketed in the notion of "relatedness". The fourth part of the literature review focuses on kinship-based rituals. I introduce the work of Michael Puett, an American anthropologist specializing in China whose re-reading of ritual classics from ancient China challenges the view of Chinese ancestral rituals in early

scholarship and opens a window onto the relationship between ritual practices and kinship morality and sentiments. This section concludes with a summary of this thesis's major theoretical approaches.

Patrilineal descent and kinship organization

In an overview of the anthropology of Chinese kinship, Santos (2006) notes that kinship emerged as a primary subject of inquiry as soon as China became an object of modern anthropological study. This may be due to the fact that various groups built on kinship exist in all levels of society, together with the ancient, influential system of philosophical and moral thought known as Confucianism that attaches great value to family, filial piety and ancestor worship. Early studies, such as Daniel Kulp (1925) and Fei Hsiao-Tung (1939), have suggested a positive valuation of kinship in ordering the life of Chinese people and suggested the degree economic interdependence among a group of kin could be used as an important criterion to evaluate the group's integration. The strength of Maurice Freedman's lineage theory lies in his linking systematically the kinship domain to the political and economic domains through the notion of patrilineal descent.

Grounded mostly on second-hand ethnographic studies on China that were conducted before 1949, Freedman developed a lineage model in his two books, *Lineage Organisation in Southeastern China* (1958) and *Chinese Lineage and Society: Fukien and Kwangtung* (1966), in which patrilineal descent is singled out as the predominant organizing principle of rural Chinese societies. Freedman attempted to use the Chinese material to test the theoretical strength and comparative applicability of the theory of descent groups developed by British anthropologists in the 1940s, which was originally based on empirical evidence from small-scale African societies. Freedman translated the Chinese terms *zu* or *zongzu* as lineage (i.e. a common descent group) and identified three characteristics that were common to both Chinese and African lineages: (1) membership in a lineage was determined by the principle of descent; (2) a lineage was a corporation and its members shared a set of defined rights, offices, and duties; (3) lineages were internally differentiated (Freedman 1958: 133-

40; cf. Watson 1985:6). Freedman argued that, in the Chinese setting, a patrilineal descent group formed a corporation by jointly establishing a landed estate for sacrifices to common ancestors, usually together with the construction of an ancestral hall. Internal differentiation occurred when a small group of wealthier agnates set up a new worshipping unit endowed with its own fund of property, which resulted in what Freedman called asymmetrical segmentation.

Freedman argued that, as in the African cases, patrilineal descent was an important principle of intergenerational succession of power and property, and thus formed a connecting link between the domestic domain and the political-jural domain of social organization in traditional Chinese societies. The Chinese lineages inwardly defined membership and the rights of accessing benefits generated from the corporate property by the principle of patrilineal descent (through birth or adoption) and outwardly acted as political-jural “moral persons” to maximize the interests of their own groups. Freedman attempted to counter Meyer Fortes’s opinion that the existence of corporate descent groups was less likely in a heterogeneous society like China by contending that (1) the imperial state was centralized and yet allowed a sufficient degree of autonomy to local communities; (2) the increasing differentiation in social status within a lineage did not threaten but benefit the lineage as a whole because the effective leaders (usually wealthy merchants or ranked officials) placed the lineage in a balanced opposition to the state and local bureaucratic authority (1958:137-8).¹⁰ This argument that recognises the role of kinship in state-society relations was taken by historians who explore the popularization of the state ideology in rural areas in late imperial times, which I will discuss in relation to Jinmen in chapter two.

Anthropological research of Chinese society from the 1960s to the early 80s was primarily conducted in rural Hong Kong and Taiwan because Mainland China was inaccessible to foreign researchers till the mid-1980s. This research also tended to be framed with the intention of testing the effectiveness of Freedman’s lineage model.

¹⁰ Though the imperial state did not allow degree-holding men to serve in official positions in their own communities, their fellow kinsmen regarded them as actual leaders with high prestige and the power to decide lineage matters. In addition, the local authorities would be prudent in intervening in those lineages with members serving as higher ranked officials.

Though this body of scholarship pointed out the limitedness or problems of Freedman's theory, they were in line with Freedman in taking descent as the fundamental principle of agnatic corporation, and viewing other variables such as access to political and economic resources and local ecological conditions as determinant to the growth and maintenance of the corporation. For example, Jack Potter (1968) and Rubie Watson (1985)—both studied large lineages in the Hong Kong New Territories—noted that the development of an industrial economy and a new administrative system under British colonization had weakened the lineage's importance in its individual members' lives because (1) people no longer relied on common landed estates and agriculture as the central source of income, and (2) the termination of the imperial examination cut off the lineage's traditional access to political power.

Anthropologists who did fieldwork on Taiwan found that, instead of large lineage villages, most rural villages consisted of several small surname groups (cross-surname settlements). Rather than rejecting Freedman's thesis entirely, Burton Pasternak (1972) sought historical and ecological causes particular to Taiwan to explain the difficulties for large corporate lineages to develop. Myron Cohen (1976) explained the phenomenon of the existence of numerous economically integrated extended families (which consisted of old parents and their married sons' conjugal families though the members might live separately) in southern Taiwan by arguing that the economic incentives (i.e., the maintenance and expansion of common landed estates) were the primary force binding members of a family together. This argument of a positive correlation between the existence of common estates and the degree of family solidarity is actually in line with the earlier studies by Kulp and Fei as well as with Freedman's theory that a strong lineage organization is dependent on the endowment and expansion of corporate property (cf. Cohen 2005).

The above-mentioned studies reveal a consistent theoretical line, which can be traced to Freedman's lineage model, in which the concept of descent has been taken for granted as the fundamental principle behind Chinese kinship groups. As a consequence the focus of research in this vein was on the factors which explain the

variation and changes of kinship organization in different locales, such as common economic resources, agnatic collaboration in production, and access to political power. This resulted in the neglect of the study of the specifically genealogical dimension of Chinese kinship and gave rise to problematic categorizations of kinship-related groups which placed too much emphasis on the lineage and its corporate functions.

The genealogical dimension of Chinese kinship: fang and jiazu

In contrast to those anthropologists who focused on the constitution of patrilineal corporations with reference to Freedman's model, Chen Chi-Nan (1985) demonstrated a distinctive research endeavour to re-explore the ideas of Chinese kinship. Based on his fieldwork in rural Taiwan in the late 1970s, Chen argued that the term *fang*, which his informants used commonly in everyday life but had been overlooked by the previous researchers, is the key idea for understanding Chinese kinship structure, ideology and associated practices.

In her thesis on common descent groups, Hu Hsien-Chin (1948:18-9) mentioned that the term *fang* (lit. a house or a room) is associated in native usage with the internal arrangement of a *jia* (extended family). Each conjugal family within a *jia* that occupies a separate section of the home or a separate building is called a *fang*. All the conjugal families within a *jia* are numbered according to the birth order of the brother who is its head. In a similar way, *fang* is used to refer to the subdivision of a *zu* (common descent group) and therefore most anthropologists have translated *fang* as sub-lineage (like Freedman) or branch. Though Hu did not explore the concept of *fang* any further, this short note indicates a relationship between an inclusive unit (*jia* or *jiazu*) and its subordinate units (*fang*). Chen Chi-Nan highlights this relationship, defining *fang* as meaning a unit composed by a son in relation to his father's *jiazu*; here *fang* and *jiazu* are purely genealogical concepts without reference to any functional factors. Chen argues that the connotation of father-son filiation in the concept of *fang* is the fundamental notion of the genealogical *fang/jiazu* system.

The genealogical *fang/jiazu* system is obviously male-focused, without taking into account female offspring. As illustrated in the diagram below, a son (F or G)

constitutes a *fang* in relation to his father's (C) *jiazu*; the father (C) constitutes a *fang* in relation to the grandfather's (A) *jiazu*. This *fang-jiazu* chain is continuously formed upon the emergence of new male offspring, either by birth or by adoption, in an agnatic line. Chen (1985:132) notes that the indigenous concept of *fang* (father-son filiation) is similar to the concept of patrilineal descent in the anthropological usage; however, patrilineal descent emphasizes the idea of a common ancestor for the members involved (e.g., A is the common ancestor) while *fang* emphasizes the individual father-son filiation (e.g., A-B, A-C, and A-D). The father-son filiation not only suggests the genealogical relationship between individuals but also the genealogical relationship between groups. On the same diagram again, a man (C) together with all of his male offspring (F and G) and his wife (C') constitute a *fang* group (elementary *fang*); this *fang* group together with the *fang* groups led by his brothers (B and D) and their father (A, as the apical ancestor) constitute a *jiazu* group (elementary *jiazu*). In the case of sole male offspring (E), this man's *fang* group and his father (B) also form a *jiazu* group. Accordingly, the scale of the entire group is predicted to expand along with the continuous appearance of new *fang-jiazu* chains (Chen 1985:129-30).




Figure 3. *fang* and *jiazu*

Chen summarizes six principles intrinsic to this genealogical system: (1) continuity of agnatic descent lines; (2) fraternal differentiation based on birth order; (3) generational differentiation between father and son; (4) subordination of *fang* to

jiazu; (5) membership based on successive *fang-jiazu* chains; and (6) *fang* segmentation based on fraternal and generational differentiation (1985:128-9). In the life of Chinese people, this system operates to regulate a man's or woman's kinship status, property ownership, domestic organization, agnatic adoption (*guo fang*), uxorilocal marriage, lineage formation and segmentation when acting in combination with functional features. For instance, in the situation of an uxorilocal marriage, the married-in man (X) agrees to have one son (Y) to succeed the agnatic line of his father-in-law (Z). Therefore, in the genealogical sense, Y constitutes a *fang* in relation to Z's *jiazu*, with X and his wife and other children being excluded; but in reality, all of the foregoing people may constitute a group living together, which is generally called a stem family. Altogether, Chen argues that a clear distinction must be made between the genealogical connotations involved in the concepts of *fang* and *jiazu* and the functional factors such as common residence and common property involved in the concepts of *jia*, *zu* and *zongzu*. Chen critiques that Freedman's lineage theory was problematic because he overlooked the genealogical dimension.¹¹

Chen argues that the genealogical *fang/jiazu* system is a unique cultural construction produced by the Chinese people grounded on the universal biological facts of reproduction. Based on this genealogical system and its related principles, Chinese people organize their life and form small or large practical living groups with diverse functions. But in many situations, the *fang* and *jiazu* groups remain existent in the genealogical sense. The synchronic nature of anthropological fieldwork has inclined researchers to focus on what they could directly observe in the field. Accordingly, the studies that I mentioned in the preceding part explicate the variation and changes of Chinese kinship groups by attending to the essentially changeable factors, such as residential arrangement, corporate estates, production activities,

¹¹ This problem is evidenced by Freedman's idea of asymmetrical segmentation, which he asserts to be comparable to the symmetrical segmentation in the Africanist descent theory (1966:38). Chen critiques that such comparison was problematic because in the African cases segmentation hinges on the genealogical principle—the mother-son filiation (e.g., among the three sons of father X, two sons of mother Y constitute a symmetrical segment to the segment constituted by the third son of mother Z), which Fortes calls the complimentary filiation (1953:33; see Chen 1985:132). But, Freedman's asymmetrical segmentation was actually difference in economic capacity amongst the lineage agnates to endow a landed estate and a distinct worshipping unit—i.e., functional factors.

political and military alliances. This ultimately led to a problem of treating the functional elements as fixed criteria with which to categorize different types of groupings. For example, James Watson (1982a) seeks to resolve a considerable confusion regarding the usage of “family”, “lineage”, “clan”, “higher-order lineage” and “surname group” in the anthropological and historical writings by beginning from a working definition of the Chinese lineage. Watson defines a lineage as “*a corporate group* which celebrates *ritual unity* and is based on *demonstrated descent* from a common ancestor” (original italics, 1982a:594), which is evidently a succinct summary of Freedman’s thesis. Other kinds of groups are then distinguished from a lineage and from each other by the three factors marked in italics. However, as historian Szonyi (2002:6) remarks, Watson’s definition only outlines the important characteristics of the corporate lineages that were observed in the twentieth century, and has nothing to do with the historical development of these characteristics. Moreover, this definition potentially risks encouraging a teleological approach to the lineage that evaluates local specificities in terms of convergence or dissonance with an ideal type.

Chen’s thesis has two important theoretical implications for my research: (1) The persistence of various male-focused ideas and practices in contemporary Jinmen suggests the effectiveness the genealogical *fang/jiazu* system though the “traditional” perceptions about gender and family have encountered many challenges from the late twentieth century. (2) It is productive to view the large lineage village as the product of human construction (a genealogical *jiazu* group developed into an estate-holding corporation) according to the internal and external conditions in particular historical timeframe, and to explore people’s efforts to build an integrated kin union and make it endure through the generations.

Relatedness: beyond the fixed and given system of kinship

As mentioned above, Freedman’s lineage theory has profound influence over subsequent anthropological studies of Chinese kinship, which has been described as a “lineage paradigm” (cf. Watson 1982a; Santos 2006). Though Chen Chi-Nan’s thesis

critiques Freedman's model, his thesis retains a male-centred and formalist understanding of kinship. This emphasis on patrilineal descent or the father-son relation encountered resistance in the late 1990s, as part of the theoretical turn in the anthropological studies of kinship (see Carsten ed. 2000; Carsten 2004). The 1990s theoretical turn resulted from the destabilization (e.g., by the new reproductive technologies) of the understanding in the west that "biology" or "nature" is the grounding for the "social"; accordingly, researchers began to consider how the people of non-western societies think about the relationship between the biological and the social. They also proposed the more flexible notion of relatedness to describe human relations of various kinds based on indigenous statements and practices—some of which may seem to fall outside what anthropologists have conventionally understood as kinship (Carsten 2000:3). Within this new body of scholarship, there are studies focused on Chinese societies which produce alternative perspectives on Chinese kinship (cf. Lin 1998, 2000; Stafford 1995, 2000a, 2000b).

As Charles Stafford (2000a:48) explained, the lingering influence of Freedman's lineage theory is arguably related to the emphasis on regional and historical analysis which tends to take a male-dominated view of kinship and look at the public roles of descent groups and men, while overlooking the local process of kinship and relatedness and the private roles of women that can be found through intimate, participant-observation fieldwork. A shift of research attention and methodological approach to the informants' statements and practices in everyday life helps to reveal that Chinese kinship is not, in essence, an extreme and fixed version of patriliney, but a less rigid and less exclusive system of kinship in which women's roles are positively evaluated—comparable to the fluid, negotiable, incorporative and processual kinship found in Austronesian societies (see Stafford 2000a:38). For example, Lin Wei-Ping's (1998, 2000) study of a rural village in southern Taiwan examines kinship from the perspective of bodily substance and the flow of such bodily substance in life rituals such as weddings and funerals. She points out the indigenous cultural understanding that a Chinese person is constituted by substances from both the paternal side (bone) and the maternal side (flesh). Furthermore, kinship is built up by fulfilling obligations

and asserting rights between parents and children (embodied in the rituals of birth celebrations, weddings and funerals) to achieve the cultural ideal of a “good life” (*hao ming*). As such, the parent-child relationship is not merely about the connection given by birth but also about the ongoing cycle of nurturing and caring between the two generations.

Lin’s thesis is in line with Stafford’s (1995, 2000a, 2000b) incisive account of the Chinese folk model of the cycle of *yang* based on his fieldwork in rural Taiwan and China from the late 1980s. *Yang* is a very common Chinese expression, meaning “to raise” or “to care for”. The cycle of *yang* suggests the mutual caring and obligations between parents and children as parents provide *yang* of various kinds, such as food, house, money and affection, as their children grow up, are educated, and get married; then later, the grown-up children take care of their aging parents by providing *fengyang* (respectful nurturance). Indeed, such mutual caring between two generations fits with the classical view of parents’ responsibility for taking good care of their own family (e.g., the term *qi jia* from the Confucian classics, meaning to maintain the harmony of one’s family) and children’s “filial obedience” (*xiao*) to their parents. But, as Stafford (2000b:123-4) contends, this cycle of *yang* catches a significant phenomenon in the everyday life of Chinese people; that is, the great concern which is paid to the practicalities of support between parents and children as well as everyday emotions of kinship, rather than to the abstract moral principles involved. One key point of Stafford’s thesis is that in Chinese societies, “ties of kinship between parents and children are significantly *produced and reckoned* through *yang*”, and such ties are not simply given by patrilineal descent (original italics, 2000b:124). Moreover, the cycle of *yang* helps to illuminate the important roles played by women who are usually the primary provider of (*feng*)*yang* of various kinds in their marital families. This is something that was not recognized in earlier scholarship due to its focus on the formal and public roles of descent groups and men, as well as a biased view originating from the male-centred perspective that married-in women were disruptive outsiders.

In addition to the cycle of *yang*, Stafford also proposes the cycle of *laiwang*, which centres mostly on relationships between friends, neighbours and acquaintances,

and argues that these two cycles are “equally forceful, and relatively incorporative systems of Chinese relatedness” alongside patriliney and affinity (2000a:38). As such, the notion of relatedness in Stafford’s usage is more extensive, referring to literally any kind of relation between persons and being intended to encompass formal and informal relations of kinship and much else besides (2000a:37). The term *laiwang* literally means the interaction between two persons, and is usually used to describe the reciprocal movement, back and forth, between people who have a relationship of mutual assistance (e.g., the flow of gifts on the occasion of a wedding)—which, in the anthropological literature on China, has most often been discussed in relation to the question of social connections or *guanxi* (see Kipnis 1997; Yan 1996; Yang 1994). The theoretical significance of the cycle of *laiwang* lies in its highlighting of the processual aspect by which relationships are made and confirmed between persons who are not related (or not closely related) by kinship, and the salience of the accumulation of numerous small interactions (e.g., commensality, transfers of money and the sharing of responsibilities) in the course of everyday life in maintaining the long-term relationship and mutual sentiments (Stafford 2000a:46-7). Furthermore, as with the cycle of *yang*, Stafford (2000a:47; 2000b:125) emphasizes women’s undoubtedly crucial roles in the cycle of *laiwang*, which has long been analysed as an arena of action dominated by men. In sum, Stafford’s thesis is very helpful to my research into how my informants “do” kinship in everyday life and how women play important roles in producing relatedness in the typical patrilineal community.

Ancestral rituals and kinship morality

Anthropologists have long identified shared ancestor worship is a distinctive feature of Chinese kinship grouping. This is supported by the written genealogies of the large patrilineages (discussed in chapter two), which recorded (almost undoubtedly from the male perspective) people’s attempts at reuniting dispersed agnates and strengthening their mutual sentiments via collective performance of sacrifices to remote common ancestors. Therefore, the argument that ancestor worship helps to enhance agnatic solidarity is prevalent in most anthropological discussion on the relationship between

ancestral rituals and the integrity and maintenance of Chinese kinship groups. Recently, however, Michael Puett has challenged this argument on the basis of his re-examination of the ritual classics of early China.

Let me begin by identifying the differences between worshipping recent and remote ancestors that researchers of China have noted. In line with other scholars (Kulp 1925:146-7; Yang 1961:38-43), Freedman claims that domestic worship of recent ancestors involves both rites of kinship solidarity, in which ancestors serve as the defining foci of agnatic units, and rites of memorialism, in which the living's care of ancestors is mainly out of their personal sentiments to the dead who are still vividly remembered (1958:84). In contrast, in the hall worship of distant ancestors, kinship solidarity is highlighted while memorialism is less relevant because “[i]n a hall an ancestor was endowed with a remoter and less individualized personality” (1958:84). Therefore, the hall worship—a distinct worshipping unit based on a landed estate—was a means of distinguishing the social and economic power of a particular lineage or segment from other less privileged lineages or segments.

Freedman did not say much about the role of ancestor worship in agnatic solidarity as his focus was on the embodiment of social stratification in the ritual arena. But, based on Freedman's thesis, James Watson singles out ritual unity as one of the three core criteria defining a lineage, as he states: “a lineage cannot exist unless its members gather periodically, at a grave or in a hall, to celebrate rites of unity. This does not mean that all members need be present at ritual occasions, but a sufficient proportion must attend often enough to maintain the *conscience collective* of the group, to borrow from Durkheim” (original italics, 1982a:597). Watson seems to suggest that the existence and continuous practice of ancestor worship is sufficient to cultivate the sense of the conscience collective. Yang makes a similar assertion, stating that the whole series of sacrificial rites, including the ritualistic ways of showing respect to ancestors and the post-ritual commensality of a large number of agnates, work to “perpetuate the memory of the traditions and historical sentiments of the group, sustain its moral beliefs, and revivify group consciousness” (1961:43). Moreover, Yang argues that the aim of Confucian philosophers such as Xun Zi was to transform the

ancient cult into an enlightened, nontheistic ritual for the purpose of stabilizing and perpetuating the kinship system as the basic unit of social organization, but this attempt was obstructed by the fact that the supernatural implications of the ancestral cult (i.e., the religious experience of communion with the spirits) were widely retained by the majority of the commoners as well as plenty of traditional Confucianists (1961:51).

In an essay on religion and society, Radcliffe-Brown (1959) refers to the Confucian theory of ancestral rituals in a similar way to Yang. He claims that in China, as elsewhere, there was a folk belief of the efficacy of religious rites in averting evils and bringing blessings, to which the Confucian scholars developed an attitude that could be called rationalistic or agnostic (1959:158). Radcliffe-Brown understood the content of some chapters in *Liji* (the *Book of Rites*) and Xun Zi's words as arguing that “[t]he rites give regulated expression to certain human feelings and sentiments and so kept these sentiments alive and active” and, built on these sentiments, the conduct of individuals is controlled and then the continuance of an orderly social life is made possible (1959:160). As such, the Confucianists seemed to take a rationalist stand and look at rituals in terms of their social functions, which are independent of any beliefs that may be held as to the efficacy of the rites. Radcliffe-Brown contends that the ancient Confucian thoughts about rituals have long displayed a general theory of the social function of religion that many modern scholars (including Durkheim and Radcliffe-Brown himself) argue to be prevalent across different cultural settings. Radcliffe-Brown and the aforementioned scholarship on Chinese ancestor worship apparently share a common assumption that rituals function to regulate, maintain and transmit between generations sentiments on which the constitution of the society depends. It is at this point that I turn to Michael Puett, who proposes a different reading of the Chinese classics and an alternative understanding of the role of rituals.

Puett (2005) argues against Radcliffe-Brown's distinction between the ritual participants who actually believed in the efficacy of the rites and the Confucian theorists who saw ritual in purely functional terms. In his re-examination of the ritual classics such as *Liji*, Puett contends that these texts were re-interpretations of the sacrificial rituals prevalent during the Bronze Age, in which there was indeed a belief

in the efficacy of ritual but the efficacy was grounded on the notion that ritual could humanize the divine world (2005:80; cf. 2002). Puett notes that the authors of *Liji* shared an idea found in the Shang (a polity prior to the time of Confucius) sacrificial system that rituals were made to transform capricious and potentially antagonistic divine forces into anthropomorphic deities, and place them within a hierarchy that would hopefully act on behalf of humanity. Though in *Liji* some chapters present the cosmos as being filled with capricious spirits and some present it as being populated by natural forces, the crucial notions are consistent: the spirits and ancestors are the product of ritual, and human ritual is the source of order, or at least of the order that is beneficial to humans (Puett 2005:80-2). Therefore, it is not relevant whether ritual participants believe in the existence of capricious spirits and the effects of rites to transform the potentially antagonistic spirits into benign ancestors; what is relevant is the belief that ritual is a human construction and so is the resulting order of the social and cosmic realms. Puett concludes that what underlies the Confucianist texts is not an unmasking of superstitious beliefs as Radcliff-Brown asserts, but an argument for a notion of sacrifice as having a fundamental transformative efficacy (2005:93).

Puett (2015) also disagrees with modern scholars (such as Radcliffe-Brown) who assume that ritual serves to inculcate a worldview involving normative values that the practitioner is being called upon to accept. He argues that normative values are not embedded in the ritual itself but located in the disjunction between the ritual space and our lived experiences outside of the ritual space. As mentioned above, in the ritual theories of early China, rituals were regarded as human attempts to domesticate the capricious divine forces which tended to be indifferent and unconcerned with humans altogether, but rituals could be also regarded as attempts to domesticate humans and help them to forge better relationships with one another (Puett 2013:97). However, this domestication was always limited as rituals only occupied limited periods of time; therefore, rituals must be carried out time and again to construct an artificial, though temporary, world in which the participants try to relate to one another in the proper ways required of the ritual. Ritual as the creation of an artificial, or subjunctive, space was seen in one of the well-known statements in the *Analects* of Confucius:

He sacrificed as if present. He sacrificed to the spirits as if the spirits were present. The master said, “If I do not participate in the sacrifice, it is as if I did not sacrifice”. (*Lunyu*, 3/12; see Puett 2013:98)

Puett argues that the concern is not with the belief in the presence of the spirits; the crucial point is that the ritual serves as a space within which one acts “as if” the spirits are present. Moreover, the operation of the ritual connotes an explicit demarcation of the subjunctive space of ritual from the world of our lived experiences. Such disjunction is suggested in a rite of offering food to the deceased described in one chapter of *Liji*. The ritual occurs in a situation in which a ruler passes away and his son becomes the new ruler, performing sacrifices to his deceased father. In this rite, the grandson (the living ruler’s son) plays the role of impersonator, receiving sacrifices from the living:

Now, according to the way of sacrificing, the grandson acted as the impersonator of the king’s father. He who was made to act as the impersonator was the son of he who made the sacrifice. The father faced north and served him. By means of this, he made clear the way of a son serving his father. This is the relation of father and son. (*Liji*, 131/26/14; see Puett 2013:98)

The stated aim of this ritual is to inculcate in each practitioner the proper dispositions that should be held in the relationship between father and son. But, as Puett emphasizes, the role reversal makes sure that the participants could not conceivably confuse their non-ritual social roles with those roles they take on within the ritual. By reversing roles in the ritual, the participants relate to one another as if they had a proper relationship: the father situates himself in a subservient position vis-à-vis his dead father, whom he presents as his ruler; the son, by role-playing, becomes the ruler of his father, and hence learns from his father the proper form of subservience to an elder. If the deceased father is present at the ritual as well, the same logic applies: instead of being a dangerous ghost, the ritual would help to transform him into a proper father to his living son. The assumption behind this, Puett argues, is that the participants may not relate to each other properly outside of the ritual: fathers are not always good fathers to their sons and vice versa, and the relationship between the living and the deceased is hardly always harmonious. Such an apparent disjunction calls upon the organization of rituals

to ask the participants to act as if they do retain the proper relationships, and to develop the dispositions proper to them. The perfect harmony of the various subjects is thus a goal that is unachievable but repeatedly attempted through rituals. Instead of the frequently encountered assumption that rituals provide a normative order to which we should try to approximate our behaviour, Puett contends that the ritual theorists of early China suggest that rituals work to create of sets of patterned responses in the ‘as if’ world that stand in tension with the patterned responses we have in our lived reality. Participants therefore do not find norms in the rituals, but instead attain a sensibility of responding to situations appropriately through their continuous working through the disjunctions between ordinary lived behaviour and the as-if world of rituals (2015:550). I will demonstrate how Puett’s thesis illuminates an alternative analytical lens into the relationship between ancestral rituals and kinship morality in my study of Jinmen.

Summary of theoretical approaches

Building on the above literature review, I now wish to summarize this thesis’s main theoretical approaches. First of all, given that the term lineage has been widely used by anthropologists and historians as the translation of the native terms *zu* or *zongzu*, I retain this translation but my usage of the term lineage includes the genealogical notions of *fang* and *jiazu* intrinsic to the terms *zu* or *zongzu*. Given that a lineage may exist in a genealogical sense without significant functions, this poses a historical question of how a group of agnates developed into a large organization with common property and substantial functions that anthropologists have defined as characterizing the localized corporate lineage. In chapter two, I will draw on studies by historians into the formation of large localized lineages in southeast China in late imperial times, and situate the case of the Cai lineage against this broader background. This will help to explore the human expectations and endeavours involved in the Cai lineage’s formation and maintenance.

The large localized lineages found both in the New Territories of Hong Kong and in Jinmen suggest an interesting possibility for comparative analysis into how the lineages in the two places have responded to changing political-economic conditions.

Studies of the New Territories show that processes of westernization and modernization have indeed weakened the power of the lineages because of the declining economic dependence of individual members on the lineage common resources. In chapters two, six and seven, I examine how the drastic transitions during the course of the twentieth century have changed the role of the lineage both in the political and economic lives of its members and in state-society relations in Jinmen. In doing so, I bring to light the lingering effects of Cold War politics on local society.

Furthermore, the studies based on the New Territories tend to view the role of lineage ancestral rituals as cultivating a shared sense of kin solidarity. In contrast, in chapter three, I draw on Puett's thesis of ritual disjunctions to analyse the Cai lineage's ancestral ceremony. Instead of seeing the ritual function to socialize the participants into certain patterns of dispositions and behaviours, I explore how my interlocutors reflected on or responded to the differences that they experienced or observed between the subjunctive world of the ritual and the lived experiences outside of the ritual, and between life in their home village and life in their residence elsewhere.

In chapters three, four and five that focus on kinship-related rituals, I also pay attention to how people organize rituals, how they relate to one another when organizing rituals, and how the ritual events are linked to their everyday sociality. In particular, in light of Stafford's thesis and the wider literature on relatedness, I explore the organizing of rituals in the proactive sense of making and generating intimate human relatedness. This is not to negate the genealogical system of Chinese kinship as a set of prescribed rules, but to foreground the domain of social life in which everyday intimacies occur and the roles of women appear significant—in great contrast to their marginal status in the traditional patriarchal structure. My investigation into the organizing of rituals also covers the important issue of cultural transmission, that is, how the ways of preparing and performing rituals are transmitted between generations, and how individuals' thoughts and external changes affect the process of transmission—which are points missing from previous scholarship. I explore how human agency and adaptation to the changing world are revealed in the processes of cultural transmission, which must be understood as involving more than

the acquisition of a fixed and coherent system of knowledge from forebears. Examining cultural transmission as a dynamic and active process in this way contributes to our understanding of the phenomenon of cultural continuities in a society that has been affected by warfare, destruction and transformation over the twentieth century.

Fieldwork experiences and research methods

As described above, I successfully secured a place to live in Qionglin by using my only rather indirect personal connections. As a consequence, my arrival in the field in 2013 was inevitably the cause of some suspicion among my landlord and the villagers about my motives for coming to Qionglin. Fortunately, my status as a female student and a Taiwanese native seemed to help to alleviate the concerns of at least those villagers living nearby. However, I encountered another problem when introducing myself and my research to the villagers. On my previous visits to Jinmen, I had already observed the tranquillity of the rural villages throughout the island in terms of the very limited range of human activities visible during daytime and the significant proportion of the elderly in the village demographic constitution. For this reason, I found it difficult to encounter local residents and introduce myself to them when I toured the village on foot. Even though I screwed up the courage to greet those elderly villagers I happened to meet, our talks usually ended quickly as my grasp of the Minnan dialect (the only dialect spoken by many of the villagers I encountered who were usually female and illiterate) was poor at that stage and furthermore my interlocutors seemed uninterested both in my presence in the village and in my research topic.

Fortunately, my neighbour, Madam Yang, was a very generous and amiable lady. We had already met once when I had come to the village previously to check the house, and when I returned and formally moved into the house opposite to hers she greeted me enthusiastically. I was happy to find that Yang could speak *guoyu* (lit. the official language in the ROC, i.e., Mandarin), so I consulted her about various practical things in order to help me settle down. Regarding my question of how to get to know more villagers for the sake of my research, she suggested that I should join their folk dance

practice every night in front of the village office. I took her advice and presented in the appointed place in that evening following our conversation. I saw a group of women, aged from their forties to their seventies, exercise in time to the music. Yang gestured at me to come over when she spotted me; I approached and found myself a place a bit behind the group. None of the group's members asked me anything; neither did they pay attention to me but just continued their exercise. Feeling awkward, I managed to follow the actions and observed the ladies' interactions with one another. After several songs, a middle-aged woman asked the senior ladies to change the formation for a new song they were learning to dance. I guessed that it was a dance performance they were going to present somewhere, but when I queried the ladies standing beside me, they just shook their heads in response. Feeling awkward again, I decided to retreat from posing any further questions.

The turning point for my attempts to break through the villagers' indifference or silence toward me was a pilgrimage tour (*jin xiang tuan*) which involves a group of villagers touring a number of local cult temples by coach and offering incense to the deities. This tour was organized to celebrate the Chongyang Festival—a festival which has connotations of promoting respect for the elderly—by the village's community development association (*shequ fazhan xiehui*), a civil organization established following the social laws for maximizing the community's well-being. I heard about this event from Madam Yang and expressed my wish to participate in the trip. Yang asked the woman responsible for the trip on my behalf, and at first I received a negative answer which seemed to be related to my outsider status. Nevertheless, things changed dramatically a few days later.

On a hot Saturday morning, my reading was interrupted by the sudden presence of my landlord's second daughter, An-An. I had left the door open as many villagers did and she had come right in. I had seen her once before when she came to my place with her grandmother, Madam Lu, to offer incense to the family gods and ancestors served at the domestic altar in the central room of the house. This lovely, six-year-old girl did not explain clearly the reasons for her unexpected visit, but I was pleased to have her as a companion. We spent one hour or so drawing and playing some little

games, then I told An-An that I should take her home because it was approaching lunchtime and she agreed. Hand in hand, we walked back to her home which was just a few metres away from mine. Her grandmother expressed her surprise as she thought that An-An was away with her mother and sister in the town. This timid, kind old lady invited me to have lunch with them. My landlord, nicknamed as A-Lang, who had just come back, also asked me to stay. This first commensality was my first step to build trustful relationships with A-Lang and his family, who then provided indispensable support to my completion of fieldwork.

While we enjoyed lunch, A-Lang mentioned that he heard about my request to join in the pilgrimage tour as a result of his position as the leader of the village's community development association, and he guaranteed that I could go with them. On the day of the pilgrimage tour, in the parking lot where our coaches were standing by, I saw Madam Yang and several senior ladies whom I had met but not spoken to on the night of the folk dance practice. These ladies, except Yang, only glanced at me or at most greeted me with a slight smile. We boarded the coaches and I chose a seat at the very rear. A-Lang was in the same coach as me. After our coach set off, A-Lang stood at the front, using a microphone to greet the passengers. Then, to my surprise, he announced my participation in the tour to the passengers and introduced my status as a PhD student wanting to study the history of Jinmen and Qionglin, asking the villagers for their support for my research. I was also called to the front to greet everyone; I had finally attained the attention of the villagers and even received their polite, welcoming applause. With A-Lang's endorsement, I found that the senior participants of the pilgrimage tour began to talk to me and ask various questions. At the end of the tour, I had established initial contacts with a number of male and female villagers including the village head, most of whom would go on to become my key informants throughout my fieldwork. These initial contacts also allowed me to get involved more rapidly and smoothly in the diverse kinds of activities that made up village life, ranging from the domestic and informal domain to the public and formal domain, all of which provided rich opportunities for me to gather data.

Following some people's suggestion to me during the pilgrimage tour, I then

joined in the village voluntary group (*shequ zhigongdui*) established in the late 1990s, corresponding with the demilitarization of Jinmen society and the relaxing of rules on civil society associations. This became the most rewarding way through which I was involved in village social life. The founder is a female villager, nicknamed A-Xiu, who has participated in volunteering in a Buddhist association for a long time. Therefore, when the central and local governments started promoting village voluntary groups as a means to facilitate the improvement of the community's general well-being, A-Xiu thought it would be a good project that should be introduced to Qionglin. She established the voluntary group based on the folk dance group that she founded a few years earlier. As a result, most of the active volunteers are the same elderly and middle-aged women in the folk dance practices. In general, the voluntary group operates alongside the participatory projects (e.g., environment cleaning and beautification, regular basic physical tests for the elderly people, household visits of elderly people living alone) proposed by government agencies, but the group also provides necessary support to the lineage communal affairs such as funeral (see chapter five). In this way, the village voluntary group is like a platform through which the female volunteers go a little beyond their accustomed networks to interact with those who they know but are not familiar with, thereby broadening the scope of *laiwang*.

Given the village voluntary group's extension into the different aspects of the village life, becoming a volunteer myself facilitated my involvement in the Cai lineage community and enabled me to explore some aspects of local life less accessible to outsiders. I was frequently asked to assist in the various events, such as funeral preparations and dispatching auspicious food (e.g., for the celebration of a new-born boy) to all the households in the village, and was often invited to attend banquets hosted by a family, the lineage, or some external associations. By combining this method of long-term and deep participant observation together with reference to historical material and relevant literature, I was successfully able to discern different perspectives into the contemporary lives of people in Qionglin in relation to the changes brought by militarization and demilitarization.

The data that reveals the history of the Cai lineage and its organization is derived

from existing written material (e.g., the Cai lineage's genealogy, local gazetteers and the writings of Cai ancestors), my observation of the lineage's communal activities (e.g., ancestral rituals and temple festivals) and my interviews with some men deeply engaged with lineage affairs. My data has then been compared to ethnographies of Chinese lineages in other places and to the scholarly discussion of traditional Chinese society. This material has been helpful for describing the "structure" of the Cai lineage and to portray the life of "old society" before the breakdown of the imperial state and the advent of militarization and modernization. Also, it helps with identifying the aspects of old society that can still be observed in the present.

The data on contemporary life in Qionglin and throughout Jinmen was collected during my fifteen months of participant observation in the diverse activities inside and outside the village and my frequent contact and conversation with the locals on many different occasions. The evidence therefore includes a wide range of topics, such as: generational differences in occupations and expectations for the future; gendered division of labour in the informal and formal arenas; the persistence and modifications of ritual practices; and, the interaction of local society with the official bodies regarding ancestral property, welfare entitlements, and past injustices induced by military control. The existing publications about Jinmen by scholars and local intellectuals also provide useful comparative and complementary material. By drawing on all these rich sources of data this thesis is able to provide a relatively comprehensive analysis of everyday life in Jinmen in the post-Cold War context.

Organization of the thesis

This thesis's ethnographic material is centred on the village of Qionglin dominated by the Cai lineage, but I will provide evidence that suggests my discussion could be applied more widely to Jinmen society. In each chapter I will note the impact of the previous wars and militarization on the topic under discussion and give a succinct summary of the connection of the local present conditions to the past of bipolar politics in the concluding section.

Chapter two delineates the formation of and changes experienced by the Cai

lineage in three stages: the imperial era, the republican era prior to the end of the Cold War, and the present post-Cold War period. Rather than focusing on the element of corporate property, I foreground human efforts and agency in keeping the lineage as an integrated union despite the great external and internal changes. I also note how the government project of cultural heritage preservation in Qionglin has provoked different views about ancestral property among the lineage members, and how such different views are related to generational differences in occupations and expectations about their lives in the future that will also be seen in the later chapters.

The next three chapters explore the roles of the sacrificial and mortuary rituals at lineage and domestic levels in local social life. Overall, they demonstrate that the continuation of rituals that has sustained the patterns of interpersonal relationships constitutes a kind of negation of the destruction of social order that Jinmen experienced in the era of military conflict. Meanwhile, the ways of preparing and organizing rituals have been adjusted to accommodate to the shifting material environment, and these changes form an important part of local people's remembrance of the past. Each chapter also has its particular analytical focus. Chapter three examines the lineage ancestral sacrifices, showing that the male-centred social order has been reproduced by keeping the old ways of organizing the ritual, which involve much of women's work in the informal domain (e.g., preparing sacrificial food). Also, in light of Puett's thesis of ritual disjunction, I suggest that the continuation of the lineage ancestral ritual is not merely about the living's moral obligation but also about their situational responses generated from their participation in the world created by the ritual that is distinct from their lived experiences.

While women are formally excluded from the lineage ancestral rituals, they are usually the primary executors of domestic worship of gods and ancestors. Chapter four explores how women's domestic ritual practices are linked to their multiple relationships with spiritual beings and human beings in the typical patrilineal community, and how their routine ritual practices are linked to the sustaining of an accustomed pattern of life through the era of military conflict. I also discuss the divergent attitudes toward domestic worship among the married and unmarried women

of different ages in relation to the changing social-economic circumstances.

Chapter five relates the local emphasis on the importance of a conventional funeral that involves elaborate rituals and a large body of voluntary labour and guests to the maintenance of local social networks. This is shown to be crucial not only to ordinary households but also to the local authorities and political personnel during and after the Cold War era. I frame my analysis from the angle of cooperation, exploring the mechanisms that ensure the three groups of cooperative relationships (between parents and children, between kin, and between non-kin) on track. This helps illuminate the intricate weaving of local social relationships that extend beyond kinship and which apply moral pressure on people to keep the customary ways of conducting funerals.

Chapters six and seven deal with the direct impact and lingering effects of the Cold War on the local economic and political patterns and state-society relations. Chapter six uses the life stories of three women to discuss the changing constitution of household economy along with the state's policies and national economy. In doing so, I analyse the ways in which women destabilize patriarchal authority but at the same time contribute to the reproduction of the patriarchal norms in their conjugal households. Chapter seven discusses the political development of Jinmen after the end of military control and the normalization of democracy. I spell out how kinship and the past experiences became the foundation on which a localized political community has formed. I also discuss how this community has attempted to figure out the best position for Jinmen in the troubling relationship between Taiwan and China today. These two chapters suggest that despite a number of salient changes in local political and economic life, the ways in which people define their social roles and relate to one another remain largely framed by values and morals from the sphere of kinship. Kinship therefore actually constitutes a distinctive feature of the local political-economic structure, countering the assumption that the roles played by kinship and family should decrease, and that manifestations of individualism should increase, in the era of globalization that has followed the end of the Cold War (cf. Giddens 1998).

Chapter Two

The Formation and Changes of the Cai Lineage

Qionglin village, dominated by the Cai lineage, is one of the larger lineage villages in Jinmen and one designated site in the government plan for cultural heritage preservation after the termination of military control in 1992. In addition to the official investment in restoring old buildings over the past two decades, this chapter will show that the village's continuing traditional appearance is the result of a combination of the delayed development of Jinmen due to military concerns and the local inhabitants' own attempts at preserving their ancestral assets and maintaining a living environment, revolving around kinship, to which they are accustomed.

In this chapter, I trace the long-term processes of the formation and changes experienced by the Cai lineage and its settlement through three stages: the imperial era, the republican era prior to the end of the Cold War, and the present period of post-Cold War. This approach helps to explain the historical depth of the Cai lineage and its cultural assets, which contributes to the incorporation of Qionglin into the government project of heritage preservation as well as to the willingness of the Cai members to protect their ancestral property. This approach also depicts the changing circumstances of the past century that have posed challenges to the sustaining of the Cai lineage as an integrated union. As such, this chapter paves the way for the later chapters exploring human efforts in continuing the kinship-related rituals that play important roles in maintaining the lineage organization and moral bonds between its members.

In the previous chapter I mentioned that Chen Chi-Nan's (1985) thesis on the *fang/jiazu* system leads us to consider the localized corporate lineage as the product of human creation in response to the internal and external conditions prevailing in particular historical contexts. In the first section of this chapter, I introduce the work of several historians and show how it lends support to this argument and demonstrates the historical processes by which the large corporate lineages emerged in southeast China during the late imperial period. The second section places the case of the Cai lineage in this broader historical timeframe using the Cai lineage's written genealogy

(*zupu*), its members' written works dating from imperial times, the Qing local gazetteer, and my informants' oral statements. I explicate how the extended genealogical *jiazu* group surnamed Cai grew into a localized property-holding lineage in late imperial times in a similar manner to the elite lineages described in the aforementioned historical studies. Instead of detailing the Cai lineage's development, I emphasize how the lineage corporation and the sense of lineage unity were both the product of people's creative efforts. The third section explains the effects of militarization on the Cai lineage and the village in the republican era, including the relationship between individual members' economic activities and the lineage's corporate property.

Together, the second and third sections set out the background against which the government project of cultural heritage preservation appeared in post-Cold War Jinmen. The forth section then describes the implementation of these efforts at heritage preservation in Qionglin. These efforts have gained the support of the leaders of the Cai lineage who anticipate that the project would enhance the lineage's prestige and its members' sense of lineage unity. However, as the project interferes with the personal property of individual members, it has provoked conflicting opinions among the villagers. I use concrete examples to illustrate the villagers' views and reactions to the preservation of their ancestral houses, exploring how people relate themselves to the ancestral property, the familiar neighbourhood, and the lineage as a whole. The chapter concludes by suggesting that it is productive to explore the continuities and changes of the lineage organization by looking at human efforts invested in maintaining a sense of lineage unity and kin solidarity through a wide range of activities in everyday life such as rituals, as opposed to focusing on the issue of corporate property (or economic mutual-dependence) that was central to earlier studies of Chinese lineages. I recognise that as this chapter's analysis is largely based on historical material and the statements of male informants, it tends to present a male perspective on the lineage and kinship. Subsequent chapters investigating the ritual practices of the lineage and domestic levels will foreground women's roles in contributing to the sustaining of the lineage community.

Corporate lineage as the product of human agency

My review of historical studies is focused on works by David Faure (1985; 2007), Zheng Zhen-Man (2002) and Michael Szonyi (2002), all of whom worked with materials from the southeast part of China—the same geographic region where Freedman developed his lineage theory and where my ethnographic site is located. The three historians all adopt anthropological terms such as descent and lineage, and they draw on anthropological findings in the framing of their arguments. But, as Faure (2007:2) states, his aim is to place Freedman's thesis in a historical context by explaining the process by which the scholarly mode of lineage (i.e., a lineage with its own written genealogy and ancestral hall in an official style known as *jiamiao*) appeared in the New Territories of Hong Kong and the commercial centre of Foshan in Guangdong province during the Ming (1368-1644 AD) and Qing (1644-1911 AD) dynasties. Similarly, Zheng and Szonyi provide cogent historical theorizations of the development of elite lineages in the different parts of Fujian province. They all agree that the evolution of the elite lineages was to a large extent linked to the implementation of the *lijia* system over the course of the Ming dynasty. *Lijia* was a system of household registration for tax and labour service, which also opened access for commoners to the examinations for the imperial officialdom. Those who passed these examinations became degree-holding gentry who enjoyed prestige and power in their native communities and acted as intermediaries to facilitate the extension of the state ideology into local society, particularly the popularization of *zongfa* ethics.

Zongfa refers to the system of ancestral veneration, including ancestral shrines to recent ancestors (*zong*) and to distant ancestors (*tiao*) of the patrilineal line. As Zheng puts it, the right to erect temples for the worship of ancestors has historically been a marker of status distinction and hence been strictly regulated in every dynasty (2002:268-9). For instance, the Ming statutes stipulated that only officials above a certain rank were allowed to set up a shrine to worship ancestors of the four previous generations, whereas commoners were only allowed to sacrifice to their parents inside their homes. The Qing laws permitted commoners to worship ancestors of the four previous generations but the right to erect ancestral shrines was still restricted to

ranked officials. However, in contrast to conservative attitude of the state authorities, early in the Song dynasty (960-1279 AD), neo-Confucian theorists, such as Cheng Yi and Zhu Xi, had advocated the dissolution of the distinction of sacrificial regulations between aristocrats and commoners. Zhu Xi was a particularly important figure in promoting the popularization of *zongfa* ethics, as he wrote: “When a gentleman builds a house his first task is always to establish an offering hall (*citang*) to the east of the main chamber of his house. Four altars are made for offerings to his ancestors of the recent generations” (see Zheng 2002:271). Zheng argues that Zhu Xi’s proposal that commoners should also erect shrines to sacrifice to ancestors of the four previous generations—even if these shrines remained inside the residence—helped to promote *zongfa* ethics among the ordinary population. Another scholar Cheng Yi went further, asserting that commoners can perform sacrifices to the founding ancestors and ancestors above the four most recent generations in the shrines, which was deemed improper by Zhu Xi because this practice did not exist in antiquity. Despite the differences, the neo-Confucian philosophers expedited the spread of a popularized version of sacrificial rituals, which was used by the ordinary people to justify their practice of ancestor worship in a manner inconsistent with the state’s statutes. For instance, as recorded in the written genealogy of an agnatic group in Putian, Fujian, the setting up of a hall outside the residence and sacrificing to distant ancestors was justified by a more important goal of *jing zong sou zu*, which means to reunite the numerous, dispersed members in joint veneration of the founding ancestors (Zheng 2002:272-3).

After the erection of an independent hall to worship remote ancestors became a common social practice from the mid-Ming, ordinary people began to construct their ancestral halls in the official style of *jiamiao* that was formerly restricted to aristocrats. Faure notes that this architectural fashion appeared only after the court battle known as the Great Rituals controversy in the mid-Ming, in which the court officials debated whether the Jia-Jing Emperor, who was not the son of the previous emperor, should regard performing sacrifices to his own birth parents as his primary filial duty. The emperor finally rested his decision on the ground of filial piety to his birth parents and

made sacrifices; the officials who supported this decision returned home and established sacrificial halls in the style of *jiamiao* for their own lineages as an expression of their political stand (2007:9-10). Though the Ming statutes still formally restricted the right to build *jiamiao* to ranked officials, in practice this architectural mode was favoured and increasingly adopted by the ordinary population. Faure contends that the popularization of the *jiamiao* style revealed the connection of the lineages to the state's ideology; the general acceptance of this official mode by the rich and then by the poor also had the practical result of encouraging the setting up of landed estates in the name of a common ancestor (2007:10).

Zheng notes that in Fujian the practice of endowing ancestral estates can be traced back to the Tang and Song dynasties, but its development on a large scale occurred in the Ming and Qing as it became common for each generation to set aside a portion of family estate to serve sacrificial needs (2002:308). (Similar practices have also been noted on Taiwan, cf. Chen 1985:170.) The establishment of a sacrificial estate may be linked to rituals at an ancestral hall but it is most likely linked to rituals in ordinary houses and graveyards. For example, in a vignette recorded in the written genealogy of a group in Fujian, a man told his relatives and friends that he had decided to reserve a sacrificial estate from his property which was otherwise to be evenly divided among his three sons because he thought that, while property division would reduce possibility of conflict among brothers, ancestor worship based on a common estate would provide occasions for the brothers to gather together and celebrate, thereby strengthening their mutual sentiments (Zheng 2002:309-10). Notwithstanding the emphasis on affection in the above instance, Zheng emphasizes that setting aside sacrificial land during family property division was helpful to avoid fragmentation of landholdings and therefore was often a landlord's strategy for preserving wealth and status, which otherwise would be greatly weakened within a few generations (2002:310).

Lastly, the written genealogy as a record tracing descent was noted by Freedman (1966:31) to be less a family tree than a strategic text which is intended to produce certain social effects, such as defining the lineage membership and the related rights

and obligations in written form. In his study of the lineages in the Fuzhou region, Szonyi (2002) notes that the written genealogies were used to claim the ethnic identity of the lineages in question. In the compilation of genealogical texts, these groups realized their attempt to specify their origins as Han migrants from north China, and erase or conceal their ancestral links to the Dan boat people and the She highlanders, who were believed to descend from the aboriginal inhabitants of the Fuzhou region prior to Han immigration. The motivation behind the practice of tracing descent back to north China was self-differentiation, to assert a connection to Han Chinese culture and a denial of the low status of those outside that culture (2002:26-55). Szonyi argues that such a specification of the patrilineal origin in the written form is a strategic kinship practice, whose importance to the members of a lineage may be greater than the corporate property.

To summarize the significant arguments from the above historical studies: (1) the localized lineages built around common ancestral property in southeast China that inspired Freedman's lineage theory only began to proliferate from the mid-Ming, along with the implementation of the *lijia* system and the popularization of *zongfa* ethics; (2) the employment of neo-Confucian rituals in the lives of ordinary people was advocated by "a body of go-betweens that brokered the relationships between government and local society, be they the degree-holder gentry or the clerks and secretaries who held office only by official appointment" (Faure 2007:7); (3) the establishment of ancestral estates to finance sacrifices to common ancestors was out of the founders' desire to reunite kin members who were otherwise indifferent to one another and also a means of preserving status and power for landlords; (4) the compilation of written genealogies can serve a particular group's attempt at self-fashioning and self-differentiation. Altogether, an important message for my study is that a lineage corporation in Freedman's definition was arguably a historical outcome of people's deliberate efforts (particularly those of the scholar-gentry lineage members), and such agency was exercised in a manner that attempted to accommodate the state's institutions, the social trends, the elite-dominated pursuit of group unity and collective interests, and the group's construction of self-identity. Below I describe how

a similar kind of human agency was involved in the formation of the Cai lineage that I studied.

The formation of the Cai lineage in late imperial times

The written genealogy of the Cai lineage seems to be the primary source for its members' knowledge about their group, based on which my male informants stated that their first ancestor who lived in the current settlement of Qionglin¹² was a married-in son-in-law of a family surnamed Chen who arrived more than one thousand years ago during the Song dynasty. The name of this ancestor's natal village (also on Jinmen) was noted but no additional information was provided about that village or the Cai who lived there.¹³ It was recorded that this ancestor had one son but no explanation was provided about why this son did not succeed his maternal grandfather's agnatic line according to the customary laws.¹⁴ One male informant supposed that it was probably because the first ancestor insisted on having his only son continue his own agnatic line. For a long time, the Cai remained a small-scale genealogical *jiazu* group without collective functions because from the second to the fifth generation there was only one male descendant able to continue the agnatic line in Qionglin—other male descendants either became monks or established permanent residence in other places. As emphasized in the written genealogy and by my informants, the expansion of the Cai must be attributed to the ancestor belonging to

¹² The settlement of Qionglin was originally named Pinglin, which refers to the flat terrain with abundant trees. The educated village men cited a local gazetteer, explaining that the name of Qionglin was given in 1625 by Emperor Xi of the Ming Dynasty to reward a Pinglin-born court official Cai Xian-Chen for his outstanding erudition—which is one marker of the Cai lineage's gentry history. But, in everyday communication in local dialect of Minnan, people address their village by using the old name of Pinglin and call their group Pinglin Cai.

¹³ The written genealogy also indicates that the farthest ancestral roots of the Cai can be traced to a place in today's Henan in northern China, and then the county of Tongan in southern Fujian, but there are no details about the date of the migration or how it came about.

¹⁴ One editorial principle in the Cai lineage's old written genealogy was to record the names of all male offspring in both biological and genealogical senses, including identifying those who have situations of *guo fang* (to be transferred from one agnatic line to another in the genealogical sense) or uxorilocal marriage—both of which would be noted under their names. However, as the first edition of written genealogy appeared in the mid-Ming (hundreds of years after the first ancestor settled in Qionglin), the records about the ancestors of the first few generations and even the counting of generations may not be accurate. Also, the preface revealed that the editor's sources were basically dependent on an old picture of the group's family tree and the lineage elders' oral recollections which were not reliable.

the fifth generation who had two sons both of whom remained in the village,¹⁵ following which the population grew gradually. (The significance of the fifth generation ancestor is underscored in the ancestral sacrifices as discussed in chapter three.) These two brothers of the sixth generation became the apical ancestors of the two main segments (or *fang* groups in relation to the *jiazu* group centred on the fifth generation ancestor) under their names of Zhu-Xi and Le-Pu respectively. The naming of the segments noted in the written genealogy could be seen as a materialized marking of particular *fang/jiazu* groups which otherwise exist in an invisible, genealogical sense.

The initiative to start compiling a written genealogy of the Cai is itself an indication of the emergence of the gentry class within the lineage along with the implementation of the *lijia* system and the popularization of *zongfa* ethics in the Ming and Qing. The *lijia* system allowed the registered commoners to enter the imperial examinations for civil service, which led to the dissemination of Confucian education in rural areas. In the middle of the Ming dynasty, during the 16th century, a Cai descendant passed the imperial examinations for the first time; another descendant of the same generation began the process of producing their group's written genealogy. The initiator of the first written genealogy was a student of Confucian education, who explained in the preface that he was motivated by the observation of the attenuated sentiments among agnates, and the production of a written genealogy was aimed at reuniting the dispersed agnates in joint reverence of common ancestors. He was not alone in this work and received support from other scholars of Confucian education within the lineage, including the first degree-holding descendant. The appearance of a written genealogy emphasizes the importance of the educated members in the development of the Cai group into a scholarly mode of lineage, in line with Faure's (1986, 2007) definition, and in the production of the sense of lineage unity.

Throughout the Ming and Qing, the Cai lineage produced numerous *shidafu*

¹⁵ This ancestor had two more sons: the third son had an uxorilocal marriage near today's Xiamen on the Chinese mainland; the fourth son suffered an early death. An intriguing thing is that the tablet of the ancestor who had an uxorilocal marriage is placed in the *jiamiao*. The reason is unknown to me but it may suggest that this ancestor's descendants made regular visits to Qionglin to worship their common ancestors in the pre-republican era.

(scholar-gentry educated in Confucian scholarship), including thirteen degree-holders who passed the highest or second highest levels of the imperial examinations. The Qing local gazetteer also recorded some degree-holders of the Cai lineage for their outstanding moral attributes and accomplishments in academia and officialdom. These scholar-gentry not only made great efforts to compile their group's written genealogy, which went through six editions during the Ming and Qing dynasties, but also encouraged Confucian education and ritual propriety (centred on neo-Confucian scholar Zhu Xi's thesis) in their natal settlement, as recorded in their public and personal written works. They also played roles in promoting the popularized version of *zongfa* ethics in Qionglin by setting up an ancestral hall dedicated to remote common ancestors. Seven ancestral buildings¹⁶ were constructed in late imperial times: one is called *Caishi jiamiao* belonging to the Cai lineage as a whole; the other six buildings are called *zongci* under the names of the apical ancestors of particular subordinate agnatic lines. The two apical ancestors of the sixth generation, Zhu-Xi and Le-Pu, both have separate *zongci*, indicating their status as the originators of the Cai population living in Qionglin today. In fact, there are two *zongci* named after Le-Pu which were built in different times and by different segments. The three remaining *zongci* were built by three subordinate segments within the Zhu-Xi or Le-Pu segments: one *zongci* was named after a Ming degree-holder, so only his direct descendants worship at this hall; the other two *zongci* were named after particular ancestors who had direct descendants as degree-holders. In other words, the chosen apical ancestors reflected the scope of agnates that the founders of a particular ancestral hall wanted to include; the construction of the halls was thus a marker, directed to both an internal and external audience, of a specific genealogical *fang* group's social status and its distinct identity.

Only one of these ancestral buildings has any surviving written records detailing the time and objectives of its construction. This is supposedly the most recent of the halls, which was built in the mid-Qing period and which includes an inscription on a

¹⁶ The precise count is eight ancestral halls in seven buildings, one of which consists of two halls in the names of two different ancestors.

wall inside the hall. The writer of the inscription was Cai Ting-Lan, a degree-holder, who wrote the inscription following a request from agnates belonging to another lineage segment who were financing the establishment of the *zongci* and its associated estate for ancestral sacrifices. The inscription records that the initiator of this *zongci* had fraternal relationships with the lineage agnates and worked so hard that he accumulated a great fortune. He began the project of building the *zongci* but died before its completion; however, his aspiration for the hall to be completed was revealed in the words he spoke to his sons: “Ever since the segmentation of our lineage, other *fang* have built their own *zongci* but our *fang* has not done it yet. The passage of time increased our sense of shame and sorrow. As you the younger generation are willing to continue the building project to serve our ancestors and express the sense of filial piety, I feel consoled as my wish has come true”. This case supports Freedman’s argument that the setting up of an ancestral hall and its related estate was a representation of social stratification and the development of a distinct identity, but it can also be read as a manifestation of human intention and agency which was framed by the social trend towards the popularization of *zongfa* ethics. Despite the lack of similar information about the founding of the other ancestral buildings, it is possible to see the influence of the scholar-gentry through their words which are inscribed on the walls or pillars inside the halls and which emphasize Confucian ethics (e.g., loyalty to the nation and filial piety) and agnatic solidarity.

The spatial location of the seven ancestral buildings in Qionglin is also related to the processes of fission and fusion in the anthropological discussion of Chinese lineages (Freeman 1974:79-80; Watson 1982:95). The *jiamiao*, which was supposedly built by the collective efforts of all the Cai agnates in Qionglin and thus represents the process of fusion in Freedman’s definition, is located almost in the centre of the village. The other six *zongci* were located more or less on the borders of the subordinate segments’ living areas called *jiatou*,¹⁷ which suggests the marking of these segments’

¹⁷ The villagers (including the married-in women) usually use the names of their *jiatou* (e.g., *Dacuo* and *Dazhai*) to refer to the genealogical groups to which they belong rather than the segment names noted in the written genealogy. This suggests that not all the people in the lineage community are acquainted with the written genealogy but they still possess certain genealogical knowledge related to their dwelling in a specific *jiatou* and the associated worship of ancestors who resided in the *jiatou* or

land holding in the *jiatou* and their distinct segment identity—corresponding with the process of fission or segmentation in Freedman’s definition. However, as Chen (1985:177) argues, the processes of fusion and fission can be understood as the characteristics intrinsic to the two genealogical notions in the Chinese kinship system—the inclusiveness of *jiazu* and the separateness of *fang* respectively. In practice, the separateness of *fang* is functionally represented in the family property division between male offspring, while the inclusiveness of *jiazu* is represented in the collective endowment of the common ancestral property among a group of agnates. Chen claims that Freedman was wrong to argue that the establishment of an ancestral estate should be understood as representing a process of fission. Returning to the Cai lineage, we can instead see the construction of the seven ancestral buildings as a physical manifestation of *varying degrees* of inclusiveness: the *jiamiao* was intended to mark the lineage unity as a whole, similarly the six *zongci* were intended to highlight the unity of the specific segments (as well as their distinctiveness).

As mentioned above, only one of the seven ancestral buildings in Qionglin has existent records specifying its connection with ancestral property, which was mainly financed by a single family. Though some notes in the written genealogy suggest the existence of common property for the worship of the lineage founding ancestors,¹⁸ it is unknown how the property in question was originally endowed and whether it was linked to the current *jiamiao* building. Anthropologists have noted two ways in which ancestral property has historically been endowed: one source was the landed estate reserved for the purpose at the time of family property division—this was mainly used for the worship of recent ancestors; the other source was property newly-purchased for the worship of remote ancestors, in which case expenses were evenly shared by a group of agnates and might involve a good proportion of personal donations from wealthier members (cf. Chen 1985:171-2; Watson 1985:32-3). The second of these sources seems likely to have been how the seven ancestral buildings in Qionglin were financed,

achieved success in the imperial examinations.

¹⁸ For example, it was recorded that an elderly member of the Cai lineage in the Ming dynasty had no sons and wanted to have the son of his son-in-law as his successor to continue his agnatic line. For this reason he donated part of his personal property to the lineage to pay for the sacrifices for common ancestors.

but this gives rise to further questions about the ways in which people accumulated the required capital.




Figure 4. The layout of the Qionglin settlement and the location of the seven ancestral buildings
(adapted from Mi 1994:113)

Freedman (1966:159-64) contends that the surplus accumulated in the highly productive rice economy of southeast China facilitated the endowment of ancestral property. Rubie Watson's (1985:12-35) study in the New Territories of Hong Kong adds the insight that the capital for setting up the lineage's ancestral estates was

generated from the prosperous regional economy (including markets and boat traffic) in the eighteenth century. In the case of Jinmen, the Qing local gazetteer notes that islanders living inland specialized in farming while islanders living close to the sea were involved in both farming and fishing. Due to the poor quality of the soil and the lack of rain in Jinmen, farmers planted sweet potato as a subsistence crop rather than rice. However, the crop of sweet potato was far from sufficient, so people relied on boat traffic which transported food and goods from the port of Xiamen on the Chinese mainland. As land suitable for farming was scarce (and the practice of family property division further reduced the allocation of land for each farmer), a great number of men migrated westward to coastal China or eastward to the islands of Taiwan and Penghu, or even farther to the tropical lands of Southeast Asia. My elderly informants of the Cai lineage confirmed that these conditions continued into the early republican era, and the written genealogy and oral recollections note the continuous outflow of young men who sought other means of economic advancement. On this basis, it seems impossible that the corporate lineages in Jinmen emerged out of the prosperous rice economy; however, trade and commercial activities might have produced some wealthy merchants who were willing to help establish ancestral estates with support from their scholarly agnates. Though it is recorded that many degree-holders on Jinmen lived a frugal life and were incorruptible during their terms of office, my interlocutors supposed that the connection to imperial officialdom had benefited the dominant lineages by facilitating the expansion of their territory (thereby taking control of productive fields and seashore) and their occupation of the sites which were considered geomantically favourable for the burial of important ancestors in imperial times.¹⁹

Though the above only offers a partial account of the development of the Cai lineage during the imperial era, it suffices to say that a scholarly mode of lineage was

¹⁹ One senior male informant told me a story (also briefly noted in the written genealogy) that the Cai lineage once had a serious fight with another large lineage on Jinmen, which was accused of destroying the grave of a Cai ancestor located within their territory because they coveted the good fortunes generated from that auspicious geomantic site. Freedman (1966, 1970) also provides a lengthy discussion on the relationship between geomancy and ancestor worship, noting that villages, lineages and individuals may quarrel with one another over geomantic interference.

a human construction that was achieved in particular historical contexts and in which the local scholar-gentry played significant roles. A number of prestigious educated men in the Cai lineage contributed to the production of the sense of lineage unity by their participation in the editing of written genealogy, the construction of ancestral halls, and the promotion of Confucian education and ritual propriety. Together, these drove the transformation of a loose union of agnates into a corporate elite lineage. Unlike Freedman and his followers, who have tended to emphasize the salience of corporate property in the existence of lineage organization, I highlight human endeavour in the creation of the sense of lineage unity or the collective consciousness essential for keeping the lineage organization alive even when its political and economic bases have been largely worn down. This will be illustrated in the next two sections and in the later chapters.

The Cai lineage and its settlement in the republican era

Anthropologists who follow Freedman's lineage theory suggest that the existence of corporate ancestral property from which the members who had shares could receive economic benefits was essential to the consolidation of lineage unity and solidarity (cf. Cohen 2005; Potter 1968; Watson 1985). In the case of the Cai lineage, there are no clear historical documents to pin down the relationship between the lineage corporate property and the household economy of individual members in the past; nor do my elderly informants recall any ancestral estates which can be rented to individual members to farm and thereby generate sacrificial fees (as discussed in chapter three, the sacrificial fees have long been shared by the descendants on duty). Most farmers seemed to farm on their family-owned land, but have probably benefited from other lineage-dominated resources (e.g., the seashore for oyster farming as discussed in chapter six). Therefore, lineage corporate property is arguably an important but not necessarily crucial factor for agnatic solidarity.

The aforementioned context of economic hardship on Jinmen which led to the constant outward migration of young men also suggests the limited influence that the

lineage's corporate property had on individuals.²⁰ The route of migration extended farther in the mid-nineteenth century, when the Anglo-Chinese War (also known as the First Opium War) resulted in China opening five ports (including Xiamen) to British trade in 1842. Numerous young men from Jinmen took ferries from Xiamen toward Southeast Asia (particularly Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia) where the Western colonial powers had sophisticated trade networks and there was abundant demand for unskilled labour. In a series of books published by the government of Jinmen in recent years based on oral histories and archival documents, there are many stories about the migrants' successes and failures, and the bitterness and sadness they experienced in these foreign places. However hard their lives in the tropics might have been, most migrants managed to send at least some remittances back home to support their elderly parents, wives and children left behind. A local proverb "*shiqu, liusi, sanliu, yihui*" (ten people travelled to Southeast Asia, six died, three stayed, and only one returned home) suggests the possible and often unhappy destinies of these migrants. However, those who were fortunate enough to make the return journey usually brought back considerable financial resources with them, which were then used in the construction of large private houses in the Western-Chinese hybrid architectural style, in the renovation of the lineage's ancestral halls, and in the establishment of public facilities. The Cai lineage was also involved in the above migration economy and this is embodied in the private houses and public facilities built by a few successful members.²¹ These structures vividly demonstrate the attempts of the migrating agnates to maintain their ties with their home villages and in turn have contributed to the consolidation of their lineages as living entities.

²⁰ However, in line with James Watson's (1975) study of Cantonese migrants in London, the Jinmen migrants also relied on their agnates who had previously departed for Southeast Asia for assistance in helping them on their journey and to find work in the foreign territories. Watson views such kinship connections as a kind of lineage resource.

²¹ In the 1970s and 1980s, when the situation in Jinmen was more stable and people were able to initiate the restoration projects, the Cai descendants of two segments mobilized to raise funds for the refurbishment of their respective ancestral halls (*zongci*). They also asked their overseas agnates to donate money for this purpose. According to my informant who was involved in the restoration of one of these halls, it was very difficult to raise the necessary funds and he greatly appreciated his overseas uncle's efforts at persuading migrant agnates to donate. These two cases suggest that it would be much more difficult to integrate all of the lineage agnates in the refurbishment of the lineage's common ancestral hall (*jiamiao*), which was actually left unrestored until the 1990s when the government agencies intervened.

The migration economy reached the peak around the 1930s before the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945), which blocked both the routes of migration to Southeast Asia and of remittances back to Jinmen. A small group of the Japanese army entered Jinmen in late 1937 and occupied the island for eight years. My elderly informants recalled that they were forced by the Japanese to plant opium on their own land and to provide free labour in the construction of an airport and some military fortifications. These authoritarian orders certainly caused substantial interference in the locals' daily subsistence as the land they needed for producing food was appropriated for opium. However, this did not seem to have much effect on the individuals' ownership of land or the lineages' common estates. By contrast, the KMT-led army who arrived in Jinmen after the Japanese surrender and the Chinese civil war initiated many measures that did interfere considerably in the private ownership of land.

I do not have documentary evidence that describes exactly how the KMT-army's land policies and militarization affected the Cai lineage's corporate property and individual villagers' private property, but my informants' statements and experiences provide an indicative overview. As mentioned above, the senior villagers who have been lifelong farmers said that they worked on their family-owned land rather than on the ancestral estates or rented land. In other words, large landlords might have existed but only very few; accordingly, the ROC government policy of land reform in the 1950s (e.g., the Land-to-the-Tiller Act, which was a moderate measure to weaken the power of the landlords) had little effect on Jinmen. However, during the Cold War era, the military government on Jinmen appropriated or confiscated plenty of personal property and the lineage's common property with little or no compensation. For example, a female villager said that the land of their old house located beside the central road of Qionglin (which runs from north to south separating the two halves of the village) was confiscated by the military in the 1960s in order to widen the road so as to allow tanks to pass through in case of the outbreak of war. The family only received very limited compensation and that came a long time after. In addition, they were not able to reclaim the land after the termination of military governance because

the road is now considered a public good.

Though it is not clear whether the land that the Cai individuals farmed had ever been part of the common ancestral estates, my informants said that the Cai lineage's success in the imperial officialdom had helped the lineage to expand its farming area and territory, and part of this was categorized as the lineage's common property. The land categorized as the lineage's property includes, for example, a portion of Mount Tai-Wu (the highest mountain on Jinmen) where the graves of the fifth ancestor and some other important ancestors are located. This site was and remains under military control because Mount Tai-Wu is still the base of the Jinmen Defence Command today. Another site that formed part of the lineage's common property that was also under military control is the land around Mount Shuang-Ru. This land is unsuitable for farming but in the 1960s and 70s it provided additional income for households in Qionglin because it was a source of porcelain clay. The military allowed the Cai to exploit the porcelain clay, which was then sold to the military-owned ceramics factory on Jinmen or to Taiwan. This economic activity ceased around the 1980s as there was no more clay to be exploited but the land was confiscated by the government after demilitarization to be used for public facilities. The villagers said that their lineage *gongjia* (*gong* meaning public, *gongjia* referring to a group that deals with the lineage's common affairs) failed to claim much of the lineage's common property back from the relevant authorities, but in recent years they had been successful in obtaining a large amount of compensation for a stretch of land which has become part of an important new road on the island. This compensation went to a foundation established in the early 1990s, which was named after the first ancestor of the Cai lineage, Shi-Qi-Lang Gong (henceforth referred to as Shi-Qi-Lang Gong foundation), and which has responsibility for managing the lineage's common property including mobile and immobile assets such as the seven ancestral buildings.

Notably, while the villagers use the traditional term *gongjia* to refer to the Shi-Qi-Lang Gong foundation, they also use it to indicate an informal group of men responsible for arranging the lineage-level sacrificial and mortuary rituals (see chapters three and five). In the latter situation, some men are not directors in the board

of the Shi-Qi-Lang Gong foundation but are included for their familiarity with the ritual details. Despite the lack of written records, it is arguable that the Cai lineage had an operational organization in charge of the lineage's common property and communal affairs in the past,²² but, to abide by the legal regulations in the present, the Cai set up a foundation to manage the ancestral property. The Shi-Qi-Lang Gong foundation's board currently consists of ten directors and two supervisors, elected every three years from about thirty male representatives of the ten *fang* groups (each *fang* group recommends three representatives) based on factors such as their personal reputation, engagement in lineage affairs, and their political and economic abilities. The election of the board of directors suggests the persistent efficacy of the male-focused genealogical categorization in the organization of a modern, legally-sanctioned institution, but an individual's personal characters and abilities are also important criteria. Indeed, the villagers usually expressed comments showing that they expect the people with political power and money to be the leaders from whom they can seek help, but this does not mean that the villagers are economically dependent on the leaders as is the case in the relationship between tenants and landlords.

More than the appropriation or confiscation of private land by the military government, it was the context of militarization and the ongoing threat of war that most affected the villagers' living environment. Everywhere in Qionglin today, it is easy to find disused bomb shelters and anti-communist or patriotic slogans on the walls of ordinary houses, which tell of people's lived experiences of bipolar politics. Furthermore, an order made in 1968 by the Minister of National Defence, Chiang Ching-Kuo,²³ that the focus of the construction in Jinmen should switch from social and economic development to military preparedness had significant effects on the landscape of Jinmen, particularly Qionglin and eleven other villages which were designated as "combat villages" (*zhandou cun*) (Szonyi 2008:102-6). As a result, the

²² Despite no records showing the power structure of the lineage *gongjia* in the past, one informant told me that a particular segment which had more degree-holders in imperial times used to have more authority in deciding lineage affairs, such as the rules for distributing duties in running the lineage ancestral sacrifices and the village temple festivals. However, this segment is no longer strong, partly because it had not produced many male offspring.

²³ Chiang Kai-Shek's son, who later became the President of the ROC.

physical environment of the village, including civilian homes, was militarized. For example, within the village a central stronghold and additional fortified shelters were built; civilian homes were altered to involve camouflaged firing holes for use in combat. In 1976, a further expansion of the combat village project called “Underground Jinmen” (*dixia Jinmen*) resulted in the construction of an extensive network of tunnels that linked the basements of civilian houses in the territory of Qionglin (the first site selected for this project), which was aimed at enabling the militia to defend against attack by withdrawing underground and then taking the enemy by surprise in a counter-attack. Although the tunnels were never used for military purposes, they did become tourist attractions after the island opened for tourism in the mid-1990s.

Though the landscape of Qionglin was changed by the appearance of many bomb shelters and underground tunnels during the period of militarization, the layout of the settlement was largely maintained and plenty of traditional houses were retained because of the generalized material scarcity of the time and the military’s restrictions on the height of any new constructions for defensive reasons. Relatively few ordinary houses were built between the 1950s and the 1990s and none exceeded three floors in height. Generally speaking, by the 1990s, after the end of military control, Qionglin seemed to have retained a traditional appearance and a rural atmosphere, and it was for this reason that Qionglin was designated as a protected site in the government project of cultural heritage preservation.

The project of cultural heritage preservation in Qionglin

The previous section illustrates that the Cai lineage can no longer be classified as a dominant lineage in the terms of Freedman’s model, following the advent of the modern-state’s military forces which appropriated much of its corporate property. The demographic constitution of Qionglin today also points to the difficulty in uniting lineage members. Qionglin village currently consists of about 300 households and about 1,500 permanent residents.²⁴ Many houses are occupied by just one widowed

²⁴ These numbers are not precise because they are based on my informants’ figures for the village

elder or an elderly couple, most of whom have married children living in Taiwan. Stem families, composed of a young man, his wife and children, and his elderly parents, also occupy a large proportion of houses. Extended families, with married brothers and their elderly parents all residing together, are very rare either due to the limited living space of the natal houses or due to the migration of many young men to Taiwan in search of more job opportunities. The majority of younger men and women, whether married or unmarried, in the village are involved in a diverse range of occupations (e.g., formal and temporary jobs in the government agencies, a variety of service-related jobs, and some men worked in the government-owned sorghum distillery) other than farming and oyster cultivation, which were the dominant occupations of their parents' generation. The newly-emerged shopping malls and large tourist shops have provided new work opportunities but, as far as I know, local people with a lower level of education are only employed for the less-skilled and lower-paid jobs.²⁵ The islanders with higher education still tend to pursue careers in urban Taiwan or elsewhere. The constant outflow of the younger generation and the generational differences in occupations and lifestyles may be a factor that has encouraged the leaders of the Cai lineage to collaborate with the government project of settlement preservation.

The project of cultural heritage preservation emerged on Jinmen immediately after the termination of military governance in 1992. At that time the county government of Jinmen and the legislature of Taiwan proposed the establishment of a national park to preserve the decommissioned military constructions as resources for historical education and tourism development, which was intended to save the local economy from the negative impact of the great withdrawal of soldiers who used to be the primary clients for numerous small businesses on Jinmen (see chapter six). In 1995 the central government passed the proposal for Jinmen National Park, which is aimed

households and population rather than on official statistics. In fact, the official statistics record about 3,500 people in the village, but this number is not reliable because a large proportion of people, though registered in Jinmen, actually live in Taiwan.

²⁵ During my fieldwork, two large shopping malls opened in quick succession but they, and the large tourist shops, are primarily used by the tourists from China and Taiwan because of the tax-free benefits they offer. Therefore, they have limited relevance to the lives of local residents.

at preserving the military legacy as well as the ancestral inheritance of local residents, including tangible architecture and intangible cultural practices. The Park is a unit under the Ministry of the Interior, and as such its administration is independent from the local county government. Around the same time, the importance of and the potential advantages stemming from cultural heritage preservation gained increasing recognition and support among the authorities of the ROC government. The Council for Cultural Affairs (now the Ministry of Culture) selected Jinmen and other places as Taiwan's potential World Heritage sites in 2002. The county government of Jinmen also actively engaged in the work of applying World Heritage site status by setting up a committee in 2011 and has allocated a large budget to heritage preservation. Though the Ministry of Culture is in charge of the national laws and policies on cultural heritage preservation, in practice the Jinmen National Park management authority (henceforth referred to as the Park), and the local government are the main executive bodies and their mutual relationship is more competitive than collaborative.²⁶

With the aim of preserving the military legacy and the traditional Minnan culture, Jinmen National Park was endowed by the central government with the authority of managing a considerable proportion of Jinmen's land on which numerous former military bases and several large native settlements are located. Qionglin was one of the six Minnan settlements selected and included under the Park's custody because of its relatively large concentration of Minnan houses and its ancestral buildings that were registered as National Historical Monuments in 1985. The village's extensive civil defence tunnels were also deemed worthy of preservation. The Park executed the preservation project by investing heavily in restoring or refurbishing many historic

²⁶ Shortly after the Park did so, the local government also proposed its own policy of heritage preservation and competed with the Park by providing better incentives for the restoration of traditional houses, such as higher levels of subsidies and less strict criteria for application. But, the local government's funding policy initially excluded the settlements under the Park's plan (including Qionglin), which resulted in the worsening of the Park's image among the residents. The local government modified its funding principles in 2012 to allow the residents in the settlements under the Park's control to choose the body from which they applied for subsidy. In addition, Jinmen Defence Command (JDC) also played an important role in the project of heritage preservation as a large proportion of Jinmen's land was under its control during the period of militarization. JDC has released a considerable part of the land and many disused military bases to the Jinmen National Park and the county government in different stages. It has also constantly faced requests to return land to ordinary citizens (see chapter seven).

structures, including the seven ancestral buildings, a number of traditional houses and the civil defence tunnels, all of which are now either open for public visits or have been turned into guest houses. It also carried out environment beautification projects such as installing brick paving in most of the lanes in the village. During my stay in Qionglin, many villagers told me that at the beginning of this process they felt pleased with the renewed, beautiful landscape of their home and appreciated the Park's contribution. However, their attitudes have now changed as they claimed, "We were deceived by the Park!"

The villagers' discontent was mainly targeted at the restrictions imposed by the Park on their freedom to dispose of their own houses and land, particularly those located in the historical scenic area. In brief, Qionglin is defined by the Park as the first type of general restricted region, in which the land is further categorized into the historic scenic area, the living and development area, and the peripheral area. In each area there are corresponding rules regarding the height and appearance of any old and new buildings, and the percentage of a given piece of land which may be occupied by buildings and so on. The historic scenic area means that most houses in this area are historic, traditional-style houses, and therefore the relevant regulations are much stricter. The Park's aim of maintaining the traditional landscape forbids the residents from tearing down the old houses to build modern houses in the historic scenic area, and only subsidizes projects for the restoration of the old houses back to their original appearance and for building new houses incorporating Minnan architectural elements in other areas. There is no legal punishment for people who transgress the regulations, but any project to build new houses is likely to encounter problems as it is the Park which has the authority to issue construction licenses. Many villagers criticised these regulations which blocked their plans to enlarge their living space to accommodate more people.²⁷

²⁷ For example, a young village woman stated that "the renovation of old houses which usually only have one floor cannot solve the problem of lack of space, which further pushes young people away from home"; and when people want to return home due to the living and working pressure in urban areas, they are dissuaded by the spatial constraints of their old houses. Also, young people tended to complain about the inconvenient construction materials that had to be used (e.g., they made it hard to keep houses clean) and the interior design of the traditional houses (e.g., they were not suitable for modern furniture or the use of electronic equipment). However, their seniors seemed accustomed to

Another often-heard critique resulted from the fact that, after years of inclusion in the Park's plan, the villagers have not themselves received any economic benefits from heritage tourism despite the promises of the official bodies. In fact, the lack of tourist income for the villagers is due to a paradoxical situation. On the one hand, tourists usually spend less than one hour in the village (and a very small amount on the entrance fees to the civil defence tunnels if they visit) because there are no souvenir shops, cafés or restaurants where they can spend time and money. On the other hand, with the exception of a few villagers who run guesthouses in renovated traditional houses, most of the villagers seem generally unenthusiastic about earning money by setting up tourist businesses. Indeed, some villagers expressed their antagonist feelings toward the tourists because of the bad impressions left by some tourists whose noise caused a disturbance. The difficulty of incorporating heritage tourism into the villagers' economic activities²⁸ is beyond the scope of this chapter but it does suggest that it is not economic interest that encourages individual villagers to restore their old houses.

As my first-hand notes regarding the villagers' responses toward the preservation project only cover my fieldwork period from late 2013 to the end of 2014, I do not have direct knowledge of the situation in the previous years. But, it seemed that the preservation project had been progressing well. One year before my arrival, with the local government's encouragement and assistance, the Qionglin community submitted the application for the designation of Settlement according to the central cultural laws, and the registration as Municipal Settlement was successfully passed at the end of 2012.²⁹ The territory designated as Municipal Settlement is consistent with the first

living in the old houses and did not make similar complaints.

²⁸ This phenomenon is not only found in Qionglin but throughout Jinmen. Though in the past many local households earned money from soldiers through various small businesses, the same is not true of today's tourist businesses. Local people said that tourists only stay on the island for a short time and tend to spend money in the market towns and in the large tourist shops and restaurants, unlike soldiers who spent months or even a few years on the island and relied on the nearby villagers to provide them with food, goods and various services. This partly explains why there are very few microscale enterprises targeting tourists in the villages.

²⁹ According to the Article 16 of the *Cultural Heritage Preservation Act*, "applications for the designation of Settlements shall be submitted by local citizen or organizations and shall be reviewed, registered and publicly declared by the municipal or county (city) competent authority and shall be reported to the central competent authority for recordation". And, "the central competent authority shall review and select from the Settlements registered in accordance with the preceding paragraph with higher preservation consensus and value as Significant Settlements".

type of general restricted region defined by the Park, but it was intended to expand the scope of the historic scenic area in this region. As registration brings increased restrictions on any modifications to village buildings, why would this project have gained the support of Qionglin residents? I do not have sufficient evidence to answer the question definitively but, based on my private conversations with many villagers, it seemed that this project was basically promoted and realized by the leaders of the Cai lineage or the lineage *gongjia*.

Why were the lineage leaders willing to advocate this preservation project? Economic concerns are unlikely to be the answer because the project does not promise individuals any economic benefits. According to my informants, their collaboration in this project was out of their concern for the preservation of ancestral property and their sense of honour from making their lineage's name renowned nationwide and worldwide. These sentiments seem to be confirmed by the villagers' actual practices. For example, two lineage leaders, one elderly and one middle-aged, spent much of their savings on the renovation of their old houses during my fieldwork, and this practical action was inseparable from their support for the registration of Qionglin as Municipal Settlement. The two men have influence in the lineage *gongjia* and more widely among the villagers not merely because of their official posts but also because of their deep devotion to the various lineage communal activities, which has earned them the admiration of the villagers. Some other men who have some influence over lineage affairs agreed with the preservation project and their support was consistent with their own enthusiasm for the exploration and dissemination of the lineage's gentry history, which they pursue through the publishing of articles and books on relevant topics. However, one year after Qionglin's registration, one male informant in the lineage *gongjia* told me that they were deceived by the project leader, a scholar from Taiwan, who had promised that he would negotiate with the Park to loosen the restrictions on the restoration of houses and land development in Qionglin, and it was this promise which had been key to securing support from the common villagers. However, by July 2014, the lineage *gongjia* had not received satisfactory responses to their requests and therefore launched a petition calling for the village's withdrawal

from the Park and the project.³⁰

Given that the preservation project does indeed interfere with people's right to dispose of their own property, what motivates many villagers to comply with the project regardless of the Park's restrictions? The case of a house renovation in Qionglin described in a Master's thesis (Yang 2006) suggests possible answers. The house in question is a traditional Minnan-style building which is more than one hundred years old and located in the historic scenic area, and therefore the Park wanted it to be preserved. Owing to the Chinese principle of equal division of family property among brothers, the ownership of this house and land is divided between two men, who are referred to as A and B. Owner A and his wife initially proposed the renovation for two reasons: firstly, they wanted to place the ancestral tablets in the native site, and this need was intensified by the wife's illness that, following the intervention of a spirit medium, was thought to be the result of the ancestors' interference; secondly, the mother of owner A had constantly talked about the house's restoration when she was alive and on this basis the spirit medium also claimed that they must carry out the restoration. Hence owner A invited owner B to join in with the renovation and made an application to the Park, which gave the project a relatively decent amount of subsidy. However, before the start of renovation, owner B suddenly decided to retreat from the project, probably because he was reluctant to share the additional expenditure required on top of Park's subsidy and because he considered the renovation unnecessary as he resides in Taiwan. Though owner A said that he was willing to cover all the costs, owner B rejected this proposal which potentially harmed his *mianzi* (reputation).

Afterwards, because of his family's need to enlarge their living space, owner A considered building a new two-storey house in the vacant land right in front of the old house. In this way, he could place the ancestral tablet on the ancestral land and continue the family's intimate contact with the neighbourhood. Owner A reached an agreement with owner B that B would take ownership of the old house and its land while A took the vacant land to the front of the house. This solution was nonetheless rejected by the

³⁰ After the petition, the Park and the project leader tried to appease the lineage *gongjia* by promising the conditions that the villagers wanted, so Qionglin was still included in the Park's plan at the time this thesis was completed.

Park on the premise of maintaining the traditional setting. As it was located in the historic scenic area, it was deemed that the new building would disturb views of the settlement and have negative effects on the heritage value of the old house. This result had not been expected by owner A, who was unaware of such restrictions until that moment. Owner A finally accepted the Park's proposal that he built a new house on his land in the peripheral area with a higher level of subsidy from the Park. In addition, with owner B's approval, the Park was granted superficies rights³¹ over the old house for thirty years, while A and B still share equally the ownership of the house and land. As a result, owner A did not have to spend anything on the refurbishment of the old house, but the use of the restored building for the next thirty years would be subject to the Park's decision, and it would have to be used either as a guest house or as an exhibition hall.

This case demonstrates that the living descendants may have different views about the preservation of their collectively-owned ancestral houses. Some descendants may feel indifferent to this matter if the property has no obvious connection to their current life. In my fieldsite and many other villages, I observed plenty of derelict traditional houses with trees and weeds growing inside as well as houses that had partially deteriorated because no one had lived there for a long time. Some historic houses which people had hoped to restore, finally collapsed as a result of delays caused by failed negotiations between the descendants, many of whom have built permanent residences in other places. However, there are also many cases in which the owners renovated the ancestral houses even though they live in other modern houses nearby or far away from Jinmen. Similar to the case of owner A above, they did so because of some or all the following reasons: (a) they want to leave the ancestral tablets in the ancestral place (with or without divine confirmation);³² (b) they are abiding by the instructions given by their dead parents or seniors; (c) they need a place to stay when

³¹ This is a legal status similar to the rights of leaseholders under British law, which gives a person usage rights over a building for a specified period, but not ownership of the building itself or the land upon which the building rests.

³² Note that the ancestral tablets can be moved to a new building or a non-native place as long as the living attained the permission from the ancestors by throwing blocks, which is a common practice of local people. But, as it is not necessary to place ancestral tablets in the old house, some people found it more attractive and practical to build a big, modern house rather than to save the old one.

they pay short-term visits back home; (d) they have emotional attachment with the ancestral houses and the familiar neighbourhood where they grew up and can locate their sense of belonging. Indeed, the senior people living in the modern houses on the outskirts of the village usually return to their old houses in the daytime to talk or play cards with other villagers. Moreover, for the elderly people who have been dwelling in the old houses and the neighbourhood throughout their life, it seems less necessary and desirable for them to tear down the old house to build a modern one (especially as many senior villagers have already bought houses or flats for their children on Taiwan). In fact, most refurbished traditional houses in Qionglin are lived in by one widowed elder or an elderly couple, because they enjoy the convenience of chatting with their neighbours and life-long friends in the courtyard and freely entering each other's houses to borrow items or seek assistance. As will be elaborated in the later chapters, I argue that the mutual sentiments among kinsmen should be seen as being nourished by the affective and practical ties that people build and enhance in such actions of everyday life as well as in their periodic collaboration in preparing rituals, rather being the natural consequence of genealogical connection. The sense of lineage unity is also substantiated by such constantly cultivated interpersonal bonds, rather than the just being the product of the actions of a few lineage leaders or the result of common economic interests.

From the above we see a continuum regarding the villagers' views about the preservation of their ancestral houses and the settlement's historic appearance. On one side is the desire of some villagers for some considerable material improvements to their current lives, such as larger, modern houses that can encourage young people to remain in the village; on the other side is the desire to restore the ancestral houses and to maintain the accustomed pattern of life without the disturbances caused by outsiders. It seems that there is a tendency for the younger generation to support changes to the village and the elderly to prefer continuity with the past, but most people oscillate between the two sides. This dilemma between continuity and change and the generational differences in attitude are also observed in the practices of conventional rituals which will be scrutinized in the following chapters.

Conclusion

By tracing the available historical material, this chapter has demonstrated that the Cai lineage was formed and developed as a large localized community in late imperial times, to which a number of scholar-gentry played central roles in producing a sense of lineage unity through a variety of activities. The Cai said that their lineage, with the advantage of official connections, accumulated plenty of corporate property in imperial times but a large proportion was later appropriated by the military during the Cold War period. Despite the fact that the political and economic bases of the Cai lineage have been largely undermined in the republican era, the lineage organization (*gongjia*) did not die out but continued working to arrange the lineage communal rituals and activities. This suggests that the sense of lineage unity has constantly been desired by the Cai, whose members have thus worked to produce and maintain it rather than allowing the lineage to recede to a loose group of agnates only related to one another by genealogical connection.

Though the period of war and militarization left the landscape of Jinmen with numerous military fortifications, the limited extent of capitalist development on the island unexpectedly contributed to a large proportion of Minnan settlements retaining their traditional character. This led to the emergence of heritage preservation and tourism development immediately after the end of military control. Qionglin is one designated site in the preservation project, and the leaders of the Cai lineage have collaborated in the project's implementation. This has been potentially beneficial to the reputation of the lineage outwardly and to the cultivation of the sense of lineage unity inwardly despite the challenges posed by the constant outflow of young people and the increasing diversification of lifestyles between generations. However, because the project interferes with people's right to dispose of their ancestral property, it has provoked divergent views among the villagers: some are certain they want more significant changes, while others are clear that they prefer the older pattern of life to which they are accustomed. However, most people are uncertain and express their ambivalence about the appeal of both the old and the new. One intriguing solution to this dilemma is that people have agreed to renovate their old houses in the centre of

the village but have also built new modern houses on the outskirts. In this way, elderly people can easily return to the neighbourhood they are familiar with to spend time with their kin and old friends. This suggests that the long-term affective and practical ties that people maintain to help smooth the challenges and contradictions of their everyday lives have been important in keeping alive mutual sentiments among kin and the sense of lineage unity. This is a topic I will explore further in later chapters.

Chapter Three

Ancestral Sacrifices and the Vitality of the Lineage Organization

One October afternoon shortly after I moved into Qionglin, I paid a visit to the house of Cai Qing-Mu, a man in his early seventies who was commended by male and female villagers alike for his familiarity with the lineage's common affairs. Cai Qing-Mu told me that he has been participating in arranging the ancestral sacrifices in the *jiamiao* (the ancestral building serving the whole lineage) for fifty years since he was married. This suggests that the lineage ancestral ritual has continued throughout the Cold War era. In contrast, the rites in other subordinate ancestral halls (*zongci*) were suspended during that period due to economic difficulties and the migration of members to Taiwan. Furthermore, in the 1990s, only one segment reinitiated their hall worship. This chapter therefore explores the reasons why the lineage-level ancestral sacrifices were able to be sustained to the present day despite the great changes in Jinmen society over the past century.

As that was our first meeting, I told Cai Qing-Mu that I wanted to know the history of the Cai lineage and I let him take the lead. At one point, he mentioned that a couplet inscribed on the pillars in the *jiamiao* has important meanings. In response, I suggested we visit the *jiamiao* so that he could explain it to me; he looked pleased and agreed immediately. By then I was already acquainted with the locations of the ancestral buildings and village temples in Qionglin, but Cai Qing-Mu took a shortcut from his house to the *jiamiao* past the gardens of some of the other villagers, saving a little time and lightening our mood. The *jiamiao*, which is located almost in the centre of the village, is a magnificent structure with obvious imperial architectural features. Even a non-expert in Chinese history or architecture can easily imagine the historic value that the building possesses. It had been carefully refurbished by the Jinmen National Park in the late 1990s with the original structure and decorative embellishments being maintained and restored while care was taken to avoid the use of any anachronistic materials or techniques, for which Cai Qing-Mu expressed appreciation to the Park.

I followed Cai Qing-Mu into the *jiamiao*, which consists of two partly open spaces connected by a courtyard. We went firstly to a pillar at the rear of the *jiamiao* where an enormous and ornately carved wooden altar holding the lineage's ancestral tablets is situated. The inscription on this pillar states that the Cai began to settle in Qionglin in the Song dynasty. We then moved to a second pillar on which the inscription records that the lineage produced numerous degree-holders in imperial times. My interlocutor seemed to want to demonstrate that every word and phrase in this building reveals something about the lineage, such as its honourable accomplishments in imperial times and the ancestors' pedagogic instructions for their descendants. He directed my attention to couplet that he had mentioned earlier in his house, the two halves of which were each inscribed on one of a pair of pillars. He explained that the first half of the couplet should be read “[the Cai ancestors] pursued their aspirations and devoted themselves to [Confucian] study so that the subjects who served in the two rounds of sacrificial performance in the ceremony were all imperial degree-holders” and the second reads “[the Cai descendants] shall not make distinctions between one another but gather and together eat the food that has been served to the ancestors after the sacrificial ceremony”. Though it may not be difficult for a person who knows Mandarin to understand the couplet's surface meaning, Cai Qing-Mu noted that at a deeper level the couplet actually connotes the basic framework of the sacrificial rite in the *jiamiao* (which I will explicate later on) as well as the ancestral instruction for lineage unity. After explaining to me several inscriptions that carry the ancestors' exhortations, Cai Qing-Mu paused for a few seconds and commented that nowadays most people only care about their own interests and it has become harder for the lineage to be united. Just a few days before this occasion, I had heard a similar statement from my landlord A-Lang: “In the past, our forebears always did things together: farmed together, fished together, and did rituals together; however, these days most young people have left farming and left Jinmen, so it's getting difficult to gather young men together to do things for the lineage as a whole”.

Despite the pessimistic tone of my informants' remarks, nowadays members of the Cai lineage still do gather together to carry out the ancestral sacrifices in the

jiamiao, continuing a practice that has probably gone on for more than two-hundred years.³³ The connection between the ancestral ritual and the maintenance of the lineage as an active organization has not been carefully explored in existing studies of Chinese lineages, especially those associated with Maurice Freedman's lineage model. As discussed in chapter one, the premise of Freedman's lineage theory is that descent worked as a structuring principle of rural societies in imperial China, but his ethnographic focus is centred on the large elite lineages which indeed had strong political and economic functions that could bind people together. Accordingly, anthropologists studying the large lineages of the Hong Kong New Territories argued that the new administrative system and capitalist development brought by the British greatly weakened the significance of the lineages in the local communities. As we have seen in chapter two, the changes to the lineages in Jinmen could be explained in the same way because the transition to the republican era and the military control that followed made it impossible for the lineages to accumulate political and economic power as before. However, as we shift the focus away from the lineage's political and economic functions, we find that the local lineages still do have a salient presence in the lives of people in Jinmen today, and I argue that this salience is inseparable from the ancestral sacrifices that the local lineages continue to perform.³⁴

Certainly the earlier studies of the Chinese lineage also noted the ancestral ritual as one central characteristic of the lineage corporation and, as discussed before, they tended to view the role of the ritual in terms of its function of cultivating mutual sentiments between agnates. However, existing studies offer no further explanations for how exactly mutual sentiments between agnates were consolidated through the ritual or why the ritual could be continued year after year. This chapter will unpack

³³ Despite the lack of accurate records, the agency responsible for the restoration of the *jiamiao* in the 1990s estimated that the building was constructed around the early Qing dynasty (the late eighteenth century). But some notes in the written genealogy hint that the ancestral sacrifices to the founding ancestors actually began much earlier. My informants also said that the current ritual etiquette in the ancestral sacrifices was imported by an ancestor who was in charge of ritual affairs in the imperial court of the Ming dynasty. Therefore, it can be concluded the Cai lineage has carried out the ancestral ritual in the *jiamiao* for at least two hundred years.

³⁴ Most of the lineages in Jinmen hold their lineage-level ancestral sacrifices (plus post-ritual banquets for the kin participants to enjoy) on the day of the winter solstice. The local county government thus announced the day of the winter solstice as a public holiday to satisfy the local custom.

the ritual continuities by attending to the two aspects that have so far been left unexplored: (1) how the ritual is organized and (2) how the ritual is transmitted between generations. I will demonstrate how the continuation of the ritual is made possible by the collective efforts of the villagers of different ages, sexes and occupations, rather than only the highly educated men or the politically and economically powerful members. For example, Cai Qing-Mu, who I got to know better following our first visit to the *jiamiao*, told me with an embarrassed smile that he only attended secondary school for one year and has been a farmer throughout his life; however, it seems to me that his voluntary work and long-term devotion to the lineage affairs has equipped him with substantial knowledge about the lineage, which is unknown to many villagers, and this has earned him admiration within the lineage. As one might imagine, not all of men and women in the lineage are as interested in lineage history and affairs as Cai Qing-Mu is, and this is related to the non-unified and non-coherent transmission of ritual knowledge and practices that this chapter will explore.

Moreover, I will connect the continuation of the Cai lineage's ancestral sacrifices to Michael Puett's thesis on ritual that I discussed in chapter one. With his rereading of the ritual theories of early China, Puett argues that the efficacy of rituals lies in the disjunction between a set of patterned responses in the ritual world (or the "as if" world) and the patterned responses we have in our everyday life. I will show that Puett's argument about ritual disjunctions provides an analytical lens through which we can try to understand how the lineage ancestral ritual is still able to call the young agnates back home, even though their everyday life is increasingly detached from their home community and some of them may be otherwise totally indifferent to lineage affairs, something about which Cai Qing-Mu expressed his disappointment.

This chapter begins with a section unpacking how the lineage ancestral rituals are prepared and organized by the Cai, and how the patrilineal ideology (or the genealogical system of Chinese kinship as Chen Chi-Nan would put it) and the sense of lineage unity are perceived and maintained in the process of making the ritual event. It should be noted that, although I recognise women's indispensable contribution to the ritual preparations, the lineage ancestral ritual is in principle a male domain and

the entire procedure is quite formal, especially when compared to the sacrificial rites managed chiefly by women at home or in the ancestral houses that will be discussed in chapter four. The second section describes the liturgical procedure of the sacrificial rite and the post-ritual banquet. The third section discusses how the male offspring of the Cai lineage learn to perform the rite, and links my data to Maurice Bloch's (2004) discussion of ritual and deference. The fourth section draws on Puett's thesis to explore how the effects of the disjunction created by the ritual make the ritual a desirable practice that encourages the continuation of both the ritual itself and the lineage as an active organization. In light of Puett's understanding of ritual as creating an "as if" world, the last section briefly discusses the collaboration between people in Jinmen and in China on the reconstruction of ancestral buildings and rituals on the Mainland in the wake of the enduring military tension across the Taiwan Strait. The concluding section summarizes the Cai's attempts and endeavours to continue the ritual but also their adjustments of some aspects of the ritual alongside the changing conditions in the contexts of Cold War and post-Cold War. It argues that the ritual continuation suggests the resilient character of the Chinese kinship group in the face of transforming forces beyond their control.

Organizing and preparing the ancestral sacrifices

The Cai lineage has two types of the lineage-level ancestral sacrifices: one is performed in the lineage ancestral hall (*jiamiao*) and the other takes places at the grave sites of the common ancestors. As mentioned earlier, an enormous and ornately carved wooden altar in the *jiamiao* holds the lineage's ancestral tablets (thirty-five in total) that belonged to the ancestral couples of the first few generations and those who were degree-holders in imperial times. In contrast to the practices noted in other ethnographies (cf. Martin 1973:93-4; Watson 1985:41-2), members of the Cai lineage could not have their tablets placed in the *jiamiao* simply on the basis of their lineage membership or monetary donations. One informant told me that the *jiamiao* only contains the tablets of degree-holding ancestors plus the first few ancestors because their predecessors cared about the lineage's reputation and therefore they refused to

include tablets just because members had made donations. This also had the effect of avoiding individual members showing off their wealth.³⁵ The ancestral graves worshipped by the lineage as a whole belong to the ancestral couples of the second and fifth generations. The hall sacrifice shares similar principles with the grave sacrifice regarding food preparation and liturgical procedure but is more complicated, so my discussion hereafter is focused on the hall sacrifice.

The Cai lineage holds the ancestral sacrifices in the *jiamiao* twice annually: one of these occasions is called the spring sacrifice (*chunji*) and takes place on the anniversary of the death of an ancestor of the fifth generation named Jing-Shan Gong; the other is called the autumn sacrifice (*qiujii*) and takes place on the anniversary of the death of Jing-Shan Gong's wife. As mentioned in chapter two, the Cai remained a small-scale genealogical *jiazu* group in Qionglin for its first five generations and only began to expand in population after Jing-Shan Gong, who had two sons staying in the village. The designation of sacrificial dates is said to highlight the importance of Jing-Shan Gong and his wife to the lineage's prosperity. For the same reason, the Cai also make sacrifices to this ancestral couple at their grave during the Qingming period (also known as the Tomb-Sweeping period) in spring. My informants said that this grave, located on Mount Tai-Wu, seems to be an excellent geomantic site beneficial to the procreation of male offspring. Altogether, the explicit message is the emphasis on the continuation of the agnatic descent line, which is also demonstrated in the rules for organizing the ancestral sacrifices and in the ritual itself.

Both Cai Qing-Mu and A-Lang are active members of the lineage *gongjia*, which as mentioned in the previous chapter is a group dealing with the lineage's common affairs. The *gongjia* operate a system of *toujia* (a possible English translation of *toujia* is "host" but here the term refers to a man who takes his turn of duty), which is used to distribute the tasks of ritual preparation among a given number of men every year.³⁶ Under this system, the responsibility for the four sacrificial rites (two in the *jiamiao*

³⁵ It is unknown to me why the Cai did not include new tablets after the transition to the republican era, during which some descendants may also have achieved significant accomplishments comparable to their ancestors in imperial times. However, there are some inscription boards hung in the *jiamiao* which were endowed by the Cai descendants who achieved high positions in the republican army.

³⁶ The *toujia* system is also used by other lineages in Jinmen but the precise details may be different.

and the other two at the graves) is shared by two groups of *toujia* every year. Each group consists of twenty men, who, according to the lineage rules, must be married, male descendants (foster sons and married-in son-in-laws are excluded). The first group is responsible for the spring sacrifice in the *jiamiao* and the grave sacrifice in Qingming; the second group is responsible for the autumn sacrifice in the *jiamiao* and the grave sacrifice on Chinese New Year's Eve.

The lineage *gongjia* keeps a book recording the names of all the living members of the lineage who qualify for these duties and the number of times that they have previously served as *toujia*. Every year before the spring and autumn sacrifice, the newly-married men who want to take the role of *toujia* will inform the *gongjia* to register their names. This means that a man can avoid the duty simply by not having their names registered, and those who have established permanent residence elsewhere may particularly want to do so. However, it is not uncommon that fathers residing in Qionglin of newly-married men living outside of Jinmen will inform the *gongjia* about their sons' change in status, and take on the work of *toujia* on their behalves. The newly-married descendants serving as *toujia* are called *xinhun tou* (lit. newly-married hosts). If there are not sufficient newly-married men, the *gongjia* will contact the senior men to make up the numbers. The senior men on duty are called *lao tou* (lit. old hosts) because they have taken on the role of *xinhun tou* before. Normally a married man will act as *toujia* two or three times throughout his lifetime. The formal recognition of a new male offspring's lineage membership, which is called *bao xinding* (lit. to register a new male descendant), also occurs in the *jiamiao* on the sacrificial day. Usually before the start of the ritual, the father of a baby boy goes to the *jiamiao* to register his son's name in a booklet and pays a small fee which contributes to the lineage's common funds. The baby's name will also be written on a piece of red paper and displayed on a board hung in the *jiamiao* to announce the establishment of the baby's lineage membership. The practices of being *toujia* and *bao xinding* both highlight the value of the patriliney, which has effects on people's personal feelings and social practices as we will see below.

After confirming the members who will be *toujia*, the next step is to distribute the tasks which is settled by lot. A pamphlet kept by the lineage *gongjia* contains a detailed division of labour for the preparations (one lot represents a task)³⁷ and procedures of the ancestral ceremony in the *jiamiao*. A few weeks before the ritual, the *gongjia* will convene a meeting of the *toujia* in the *jiamiao*, where the *toujia* draw lots for their allocated tasks. In addition to these tasks, all twenty *toujia* are individually responsible for preparing some appointed sacrificial foods, serving the ancestors during the ritual, and paying a share towards the banquet for the lineage members that takes place after the ceremony.³⁸ The lineage *gongjia* will use the common funds to pay for the sacrificial food and items placed on the central sacrificial table, but not the food and banquet prepared by the individual *toujia*. For the ancestral sacrifices at grave sites, the *toujia*'s main work is to work together to clear up the surroundings of the graves and again to individually prepare certain appointed sacrificial foods. The *toujia* in charge of the grave sacrifice in Qingming has the additional duty of providing a banquet for kin who attend to enjoy after worshipping. The *toujia* responsible for the other grave sacrifice give a certain amount of cash to the lineage *gongjia* as there is no post-ritual banquet for them to pay for.

Food evidently constitutes an important part of the ancestral ritual and, for the *toujia* and their families, it means expenditure additional to their usual daily expenses. In imperial times, the Cai lineage seemed to have some common property to generate funds for sacrifices and to ease the burden of less-advantaged households, but, as far as my senior informants remember, it has long been the responsibility of the *toujia* on duty to share the ritual expenditure. I was told that in the hard times of militarization and austerity there were a few cases in which some members refused to fulfil the duty of *toujia* but attended the post-ritual banquet, which provoked complaints in the lineage. But, as many informants confirmed to me, in general, people felt proud to be a *toujia* because it manifests that a man has fulfilled or is going to fulfil the two

³⁷ These include duties such as purchasing certain sacrificial food and items, hiring the traditional music band, and clearing up the *jiamiao* and setting the tables.

³⁸ Currently each *toujia* pays for four tables, the total cost of which is about NTD 16,000 (roughly GBP 320). As my informants commented, this is affordable to most households because of today's better living standards, but may remain a burden to some poorer households.

important obligations in life—marriage and begetting a child. Some households would especially prepare a customary festival dish—steamed rice noodles with oysters and some other ingredients—and share it with close kin and neighbours before the ancestral ceremony to celebrate their happiness about taking the role of *toujia*. The host household would ask their skilled female relatives and neighbours to help prepare this dish. As a male informant remarked, this practice (which is still carried out by some households) is not only to share the happiness but also to return *renqing* (lit. human sentiments) experienced when they previously received the same dish or some other assistance. The dual implications of celebration and reciprocity embedded in this practice are also found in the sending of auspicious food to all of the households in the village upon the birth of a baby boy or a son’s engagement. In other words, to a large extent, the events revolving around the continuity of the patriline structure the social intercourse and mutual sentiments of this kin community.

The value of patriliney is clearly expressed in the various elements of the ancestral ritual which itself relies on the birth of male descendants for its continuation. Married-in women in this kind of patrilineal community tend to experience intensive pressure to give birth to at least one male descendant. After all, no matter how much happiness a baby girl may bring to a household, there are no socially-recognized ways to celebrate her birth and to allow her parents and grandparents to enter the cycle of reciprocity and thereby to consolidate affective ties with close kin and neighbours. Procreation is thus not a free choice made by a couple alone, but a serious matter concerning the whole family’s reputation and social networks. For a household, not having the opportunity to be *toujia* or *baoming* suggests the breakdown of the family line and is considered a great misfortune for the family. Families in this situation constantly encounter the sympathetic eyes of their kin in the village and find themselves partly isolated from the social life revolving around the male-centred ritual celebrations.³⁹ Though the practices of being *toujia* and *baoming* involve a certain

³⁹ Sometimes the sympathy may be expressed in a joking way. For example, when I observed a Daoist ritual celebrating a deity’s birthday, some men told me that an elderly man who took the duty of *toujia* (a similar *toujia* system is also used for organizing the village temple festivals in the Cai lineage, but this is separate from the system for the ancestral sacrifices) has no son but seven daughters. They made a joke in front of this man that there are eight *xianniū* (lit. female celestials) in

freedom of choice, in practice it seems very hard for a man and his family to ignore the expectations of his kin and social networks that lie behind these practices, and to remain indifferent to the celebratory atmosphere associated with the continuity and prosperity of the lineage.

The aforementioned mutual assistance between households in preparing the sacrificial dishes was very important in the times when there were no commercial services that could be relied upon. My senior informants said that just two decades ago the entire preparation of sacrificial food and banquets still had to be done by the villagers and, as one might imagine, the work was largely imposed on women. Several senior men and women recalled that in the past they had to start preparations for the sacrificial rite well in advance, for example, by rearing chickens and saving money from their limited family budget to buy other necessary food. As the date of the sacrifice approached, the wives of the *toujia* would ask their neighbouring female relatives for help with preparing the appointed sacrificial food and the post-ritual banquet. In return, they would give assistance when it was their neighbouring kin's turn to be *toujia*. As such, the cycle of mutual help generated from the ritual obligations served to enhance the practical and affective ties between the women and their families. However, this cycle of reciprocity was also a source of pressure because it would be hard to retreat from the cycle. The emergence of catering services that came along with the rapid commercialization of Jinmen that began in the 1990s has to a certain extent affected the maintaining of the mutual bonds between families as young married women have less need to collaborate with one another. In fact, young women generally lack the skills necessary for cooking the traditional sacrificial dishes that their seniors had to learn when they were young—an experience that also helped the women to build affective relations with the female elders who taught them. However, as I will discuss further in chapters four and five, young women and their husbands, especially those who stay in their home village, have not shed all the traditional duties imposed

his house (meaning his seven daughters and his wife), and this man just smiled without comment in response.

on them and accordingly they still tend to keep amicable relationships with their relatives, rather than becoming entirely detached from the kin-based networks.

The preparation of sacrificial food that contains certain meanings is also related to the transmission of ancestral exhortations to the living members. The Cai lineage has its own specific menu for the offerings served to the ancestors in the ritual, the origin of which is unknown to me. The menu consists of five dishes, each of which features one main ingredient that is attributed a symbolic meaning. For example, a dish containing a whole chicken is called *khike* in the local dialect, meaning the establishment of a family and setting up of one's career (the pronunciation of chicken and family or household in the local dialect are both *ke*). This is an auspicious phrase which fits perfectly the situation of the newly-married *toujia*, but which also reflects an aspiration applied to men more generally. My informants said that these dishes, which make great use of inexpensive and common local produce, show their ancestors' honourable moral attributes of modesty and frugality, without showing off the lineage's connection with the imperial officialdom. This is also demonstrated by an inscription on the wooden altar in the *jiamiao* which, as Cai Qing-Mu explained to me, means that the Cai descendants offer simple sacrifices to their ancestors regularly so that the households of individual members are united as "one family" (*yi jia*). Though this inscription may be unknown to many male and female villagers, they will by and large learn similar ideas from the senior villagers as they make preparations for the sacrifices or as they enjoy the banquet after the ritual. Meanwhile, the connection to one another experienced during the ritual preparations and the commensality enjoyed afterward make the sense of lineage unity concrete and impressive to the people involved.

By scrutinizing how the Cai lineage organizes the ancestral ritual, this section has demonstrated that the ritual continuation is not merely a result of the KMT regime's relative respect for Confucianism-oriented practices that was noted in chapter one. Instead, it should be understood as the outcome of the complicated interactions of the ideological emphasis on the continuity of the patriline and the human practices of marriage, childbirth and reciprocal mutual assistance with corresponding mutual

pressure. In line with Stafford's (2000a:48-9) call for a shift of analytical focus from the formalist definition of kinship to the local processes of relatedness, my empirical material shows that the Cai lineage operates as an integrated organization based on the practical and affective ties built between individual households during the ritual events (and enhanced in everyday living), to which women make significant contributions despite their marginal status under the patrilineal ideology. This is not to negate the effectiveness of genealogical ideas in shaping people's thoughts and practices, but to foreground the ways in which people substantiate their relationships beyond the fixed kin connections. However, the continuing outflow of the younger generations and the increasing commercialization of recent decades have to a certain extent altered the old ways of mobilizing human and material resources, and consequently the moral and social bonds between kin have been affected. The following sections explore further why the ancestral ritual still attracts a number of old and young agnates back home and encourages them to remain involved in lineage affairs.

Performing the ancestral sacrifices and the post-ritual commensality

As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, a couplet inscribed on the pillars of the *jiamiao* describes the framework of the ancestral sacrifices. The first phrase indicates that the ritual in the *jiamiao* consists of two rounds of worship and a good proportion of the ancestors to whom sacrifices are served in the ritual were degree-holders in imperial times. The second phrase indicates that there is a post-ritual feast in which the male descendants of the Cai lineage together eat the food that has been served to the ancestors in the ritual.⁴⁰ The two rounds of worship follow the same procedure but involve the worship of different ancestors. The first round (called *touting*) is scheduled at ten thirty in the morning and involves sacrifices being served to all of the thirty-five ancestors whose tablets are deposited in the hall (including the ancestral couples of the first five generations, the three ancestors of the sixth generation and the degree-holding ancestors), with the tablets of the first ancestral

⁴⁰ The sacrificial foods placed on the tables are either half-cooked (as is the case for the aforementioned special menu of five dishes) or non-cooked (e.g., biscuits and fruits); the former will be further cooked for the post-ritual banquet.

couple placed at the centre (see Figure 5). In the second round (called *erting*), which takes place at eleven thirty, the ancestral tablets of the first four generations are excluded and the tablets of the fifth ancestral couple are placed at the centre. The second round of worship is a mark of the important status of the ancestral couple of the fifth generation in the Cai lineage and, again, a metaphor emphasising the importance of the procreation of male offspring for the continuation of the patriline.




Figure 5. The spatial arrangement of the ancestral tablets, sacrificial items and food for 'touting'

The ritual participants used to be restricted to the male lineage members, but nowadays women are allowed to attend the rituals as onlookers. The practitioners in the ceremony are composed of (1) the twenty *toujia* acting as attendants to serve the ancestors beside the tables; (2) seven elderly men acting as *zhujiguan* (lit. the main sacrifice performers; only those who are of the highest seniority within the lineage and have grandsons can take this position); (3) four men acting as ritual masters leading the ritual process—these are voluntary posts including one master of ceremonies, one addresser whose role is to recite the sacrificial script to the ancestors, and two ritual assistants. Before the start of the ancestral ceremony, the seven *zhujiguan*, the ritual masters and the two *toujia* who have been assigned to attend beside the central table have to wear long Chinese gowns to show ritual propriety and to mark the separation of the ritual world from the lived reality.

The liturgical sequence of the entire ancestral ceremony resembles other Chinese religious rituals, being composed of “a cleaning and invitation, a welcome greeting, an offering and a petition or memorial, a further offering of thanks, and a separation enacted as seeing off the guest and expecting a reunion” (Feuchtwang 2007:61-2). The beginning of the first round of worship is declared by *daguchui* (a type of music played by a traditional ensemble of horn and drum, and used by the imperial court on important occasions), which was emphasized by my informants as an illustration of their ritual similarity with court etiquette. Meanwhile, the ritual executors open the gates of the wooden ancestral altar, taking out the tablets and placing them in the arranged seats (this action is called *chu zhu*; *zhu* meaning the ancestral tablets)—inviting and welcoming the ancestors to attend the feast prepared for them. After setting down all the tablets, the seven *zhujiguan* take up their place (in A as marked in Figure 5). Following this, the master of ceremonies first instructs the ensemble to change to another melody and then instructs the *zhujiguan* to wash their hands in the basin at the side of the hall. As the *zhujiguan* return to their place, the master of ceremonies announces the next act which is the holding of the burning incense sticks to greet the ancestors. Then, with the help of the two ritual assistants standing beside them, the seven *zhujiguan* kneel and touch their foreheads to the ground (i.e., kowtow)

four times in an expression of deep respect to the ancestors, then offer a drink to the ancestors four times, and then remain bowed while the addresser reads the sacrificial script (in place B in Figure 5). The sacrificial script has a fixed content (containing the date of the ritual, brief notes of the trajectory of the Cai lineage and a list of all the ancestors served in the ritual) but is newly written by the addresser in calligraphy on red paper for each sacrifice. After the addresser finishes reading, the *zhujiguan* kowtow another four then stand up in readiness for the next stage.

The next stage is a ritual etiquette called *san xian li* (lit. the rite of three rounds of performing sacrifices), which was probably introduced by an ancestor who was in charge of the ritual affairs in the imperial court. The *san xian li* begins with the general offering of animal sacrifices, food and fruit by the seven *zhujiguan* in place A. Then, in each round of performing sacrifices, the master of ceremonies will give orders regarding the following acts to be done by different persons : (1) the *zhujiguan* move to place B and kowtow four times (in the second and third rounds of sacrifice, they offer drinks to the ancestors before they kowtow), then they return to place A when finished; (2) as the *zhujiguan* are returning, the *toujia* attending at the table serve the ancestors the specially-prepared food (the wives of the *toujia* may help hand the food to the *toujia* but not serve the ancestors directly); (3) the *zhujiguan* then kowtow four times while remaining in place A. The specially-prepared foods used in the three rounds of sacrifice are rice-noodle soup with steamed buns, rice soup with sweets, and rice with tea respectively. This arrangement is said to save the ancestors from the burden of having too many delicate dishes offered to them.

After *san xian li*, the seven *zhujiguan* offer tea to the ancestors and hold up gold spirit money to present to the ancestors; the addresser then burns the sacrificial script in position B. The master of ceremonies gives a final order to let off firecrackers and instructs the *zhujiguan* to perform the final four kowtows. The gold spirit money that has been presented to the ancestors is taken away by the *toujia* to burn in the courtyard. The first round of worship (*touting*) is formally ended by the sending off of the ancestors enacted by placing their tablets back on the altar (this action is called *jin zhu*). The second-round of worship (*erting*) begins about twenty minutes later, following the

same procedure including reciting a sacrificial script for *erting* and the *san xian li*. The entire ancestral ceremony is completed by an act of enquiring whether the ancestors were satisfied with their descendants' performance and the feast. One of the seven *zhujiguan* or another honoured man from the lineage will throw blocks to find the answer (and will continue throwing blocks until the appearance of a positive answer). After receiving the response that the ancestors are satisfied, the ceremony finally ends with the explosion of firecrackers.

Once the sacrificial ceremony is completed, the half-cooked sacrifices are taken away by the provider of a catering service to prepare the post-ritual banquet set for the evening. The villagers told me that the post-ritual banquet used to be restricted to the married male members who have at some time served in the post of *toujia*. Each of the twenty *toujia* on duty is given a list of men who will be his guests and these are usually his agnates of the same branch. The guests' act of attending the banquet is called *chi tou* (lit. to eat the banquet provided by the *toujia*). In the past, if a guest could not attend the banquet, he could have his adolescent son substitute for him, but not his wife, daughter, or any other relatives. But, for several years now, this rule has been loosened and the banquet is now open to women, children, and even non-relatives to attend as long as the number of attendants does not exceed the seats provided by the *toujia*. As a result, I was myself asked by an informant to attend the banquet on his behalf. My informants explained that the change of rules was to adapt to the modern trend that women should be able to enjoy the same entitlements that had long been restricted to men, and to respond to the fact that many other lineages in Jinmen, which have similar sacrificial rites and post-ritual banquets, have also opened up access to such banquets to women.

As mentioned earlier, in the days prior to the emergence of catering services in Jinmen, the work of preparing the banquet fell to the wives of the *toujia*, who were unable to do it without support from close kin and neighbours. Previously, each *toujia* set up tables at his house, and therefore in the evening after the ritual the male guests went to different *toujia*'s homes to enjoy the feast. The emergence of catering services saves the households of the *toujia* from the trouble of doing the preparation and also

allows the guests to eat together in the ancestral buildings. As the *jiamiao* cannot include all of the banquet tables due to the limited space, other subordinate ancestral halls are also used. The basis on which the Cai lineage is divided up among the tables in the different ancestral halls basically corresponds to the agnatic branches; accordingly, a *toujia* and his guests belonging to the same branch hold their banquet in their own branch's ancestral hall. In this way, although the brothers of the Cai lineage do manage to follow the ancestral instruction to reunite and practise commensality, their adaptation to the actual conditions also makes the distinction between branches explicit. Nevertheless, the overarching message of lineage unity is strongly manifested in the creation of an atmosphere of *renao* (lit. heat and noise) in which a large number of kin sit around the tables in the ancestral buildings and eat food together. As Adam Chau (2006:150) puts it, *renao* is used by the Chinese to describe a condition of social life that is exciting and highly desirable (compared to the dull and bland drudgery of everyday life), and the term is applied to various occasions from family reunion during the Chinese New Year to large-scale temple festivals. The large gathering of people and the happening of acts, such as talking and shouting, eating and drinking, smoking, playing, and setting off firecrackers, together create a scene of social heat, which refers to the warmth generated from human sociality and a fear of, or distaste for, social isolation (Chau 2006:153). This suggests that the lineage ancestral ceremony creates a temporary space of intensive human communication and interaction and a joyful mood that is distinct from everyday life in which the villagers may rarely see or talk to each other. For this reason, the event is favoured and there is a desire for it to happen time and again. In the fourth section of this chapter, I will link this point to Puett's thesis of ritual disjunctions.

The transmission of ritual knowledge and practices

The type of complex ancestral ritual described above with its many liturgical steps is perhaps less likely to be found by anthropologists working in poorer rural areas. Nonetheless, the elements of kowtow, offering drink and presenting gold spirit money and so on, are generally prevalent in all Chinese sacrificial rites. What I want to

highlight and discuss here is the fact that most ritual participants have no idea about how these elements are combined in the ritual and must rely on experienced men for instructions. In the above sacrificial rite, obvious differences exist between the three groups of ritual participants—the twenty *toujia*, the seven *zhujiguan*, and the ritual masters—in terms of their familiarity with the ritual. The differences are apparently related to the degrees to which they devote themselves to the regular running of the ritual. Though the pamphlet recording the ritual procedure kept by the lineage *gongjia* should be accessible to any lineage members,⁴¹ it seems that most participants did not bother to read the pamphlet beforehand, nor is there any preparatory session of training in the ritual practices. When participating in the ancestral ceremony, the newly-married *toujia*—most of whom live outside of Jinmen and are rarely involved in the ritual-related events—looked puzzled and uncertain about what they should be doing. Upon hearing the orders of the master of ceremonies, there was some delay and confusion as they scrambled to serve somewhat ineptly the appointed sacrifices to the ancestors. Most of the old *toujia* also looked confused, explaining that it had been a long time since their last experience of serving in this role. On my third occasion of observing the ritual, and having studied the ritual pamphlet, I found I was myself able to remind the *toujia* of the correct food to be served in each step. In contrast to the other ritual participants, the seven *zhujiguan*, some of whom had already performed the same role several times, appeared more relaxed and could make the correct gestures immediately in response to the master of ceremonies' orders. However, like the *toujia*, the *zhujiguan*'s every action is performed according to the directions of the master of ceremonies, so it is not necessary for them to know the entire procedure in advance.

The four ritual masters—the master of ceremonies, an addresser and two assistants—are obviously more strongly acquainted with the ritual procedure than other participants. Their familiarity is built on their voluntary and regular participation in the rite over a long period of time. For example, the aforementioned elderly man, Cai Qing-Mu, who has been involved in organizing the ancestral sacrifices for fifty

⁴¹ I acquired from the village head a copy of this ritual pamphlet, which had been made in recent decades. It is unknown to me how the Cai transmitted the ritual procedure before the appearance of this pamphlet.

years, took the role of master of ceremonies in one ancestral ceremony that I observed. I once asked him if there are any mandatory criteria to act as a ritual master or if there are any formal ways of training the masters. Instead of answering my questions directly, he took himself as an example and replied, “I don’t know why. I just felt interested in the lineage affairs [including the lineage sacrificial and mortuary rites]. I’ve joined in the arranging of the ancestral sacrifices since I got married at the age of twenty-three. I followed closely the old masters and observed what they did during the ritual, and I consulted them regarding the ritual and other lineage matters in my leisure time”. This suggests that the posts of ritual masters are basically open to all married male descendants regardless of their degree of education and their political and economic capacities, and there are no formal ways of transmitting ritual knowledge and practices to the later generations. People who are new to the roles of the master of ceremonies, addresser or assistant may receive some instructions from their experienced seniors in advance and do some practice privately, but there is no rehearsal or formal training before the ritual. Their proficiency is mainly established on their own repeated practice during the ritual.

The above demonstrates that there is no uniform transmission of the ritual practices among the male offspring of the Cai lineage, but also suggests that the male offspring’s understanding of the ancestral sacrifices is largely constituted by what they *do* in the ritual, rather than what the ritual *means*. I made several attempts to ask those ritual participants who were younger or were less involved in village communal activities about the meaning of a particular ritual item or step. However, the answers I usually received were “I don’t know what it means” and “I just do what the elderly tell me to do”. As the pamphlet recording the ritual procedure only lists what acts are to be carried out and provides no explanation of the meaning of each ritual step, those who are interested in knowing more must resort to other sources such as their seniors and written works about the ritual. For example, the ritual masters such as Cai Qing-Mu and his younger agnates learned from their seniors about the preparation of certain food and about the connection of the inscriptions in the *jiamiao* to the ancestral sacrifices. This is an informal method of transmitting the meanings of ritual customs

that are specific to the Cai lineage, but there is another kind of ritual knowledge transmitted across Chinese society through the spreading of Confucianism-oriented ritual theories, such as neo-Confucian philosopher Zhu Xi's work *Family Rituals* (*Jiali*). Distinct from many societies which also have practices of ancestral sacrifices but lack written records, China has a rich corpus of ancient ritual classics to which the current practices of ancestral ritual can trace their origins. There are several educated members of the Cai lineage writing articles in which they discuss the connections between their sacrificial rites, such as the *san xian li*, to the ritual classics and court practices of different dynasties.⁴² In general, all the participants in the ancestral sacrifices know it is a ritual of showing their respect to their remote common ancestors, but only a small proportion of them spend additional time and effort on exploring the symbolic meanings or the historical origins of the rite.

Note that my discussion here is not concerned about whether the ritual participants believe in the existence of ancestral spirits or the transformative power of the ritual,⁴³ but about whether the understanding of the meanings of all the acts and items involved in the ancestral ritual is actually necessary for the transmission of this rite.⁴⁴ In this regard, I find Maurice Bloch's (2004) essay on ritual and deference particularly inspiring. Bloch begins his discussion with the ethnographic experience, shared by many anthropologists, that ritual participants are unable to explain what a

⁴² The historical interaction of folk ritual practices and the imperial/scholarly-mode rituals was arguably very complicated with influences going in both directions. However, this lies outside of the scope of this chapter, and furthermore it is not necessarily a concern of the villagers who want to know the origins and meanings of their inherited rituals by tracing their origins in ritual classics and historical texts.

⁴³ As Puett (2005:81) argues, according to the ritual theories of early China, what matters is the belief that ritual is a human construction, and therefore the order of the social and cosmic realms that ritual brings about is also a human construction. Hence, whether or not the ritual participants believe in the existence of capricious spirits and the ability of rites to transform them is not relevant. However, this is not to deny that some ritual participants did indeed believe in the existence and power of capricious spirits.

⁴⁴ Some readers may recall a relevant discussion by James Watson (1988a), which argues that Chinese religion and rituals are characterized by a tendency to consider “correct practice” (orthopraxy) much important than “correct belief” (orthodoxy). But, many historians (e.g., Rawski 1988; Sutton 2007; Szonyi 2007) have critiqued this argument and claimed that beliefs do matter. Anthropologists have also found Watson's thesis misleading. As Stafford (2007) argues, the significance of “belief” or “meaning” varies greatly between contexts and different types of situations. For example, much of what spirit mediums do (e.g., by walking through fire under divine protection) is explicitly about convincing doubters to believe. By contrast, in the practice of ancestor worship, belief is rarely called into question.

given ritual means and why they do it in a particular way, but nevertheless they stress they must carry out that ritual in precisely that way. He argues that such responses from informants are related to the three elements in human communication that together constitute rituals: (1) quotation and deference; (2) consciousness of deference; (3) lack of clarity as to who is being deferred to (2004:129). An obvious characteristic of the phenomena we call rituals is their repetitiveness—a ritual containing a set of acts is repetitively and regularly carried out. The ritual performer is also aware that he is repeating a set of acts that he himself has done previously or, more often and more importantly, he has seen or heard others perform the ritual before; therefore, the acts do not completely originate in the intentionality of the performer. Bloch describes this as conscious repetition or conscious quotation, which is illustrated by the familiar remarks from the ritual executors such as “We do this because it is the custom of our ancestors” (2004:125).

The view of ritual as acts of repetition or quotation has been described by some philosophers as “deference” (Burge 1986; see Bloch 2004:126), which means reliance on the authority of others to guarantee the value of what is said or done. Bloch contends that an alternative lens into human ritual practices is made possible by linking deference to quotation. Quotation suggests a kind of abandonment of the examination of the truth of a quoted statement, and such abandonment is dependent on the trust in (i.e., deference to) the speaker who made that statement, without making efforts at understanding. Looking at ritual via this lens of quotation and deference helps to explain, for example, why there is no problem for the members of the Cai lineage to carry out the ancestral sacrifices with its complicated set of liturgical acts even though its meanings are unknown to most participants.

Then we come to the third element of ritual—lack of clarity as to who is being deferred to. Bloch notes that the often-seen statements from informants such as “It’s the tradition” and “It is the custom of the ancestors” point to the coexistence of explicit deference and awareness of imprecision about who exactly is the originating mind behind the practice. Though tradition is normally read as something being handed forward from the past to the present, Bloch argues that “the appeal to the *authority* of

tradition, something that is socially much more central, involves being handed back from the present toward an indeterminable past destination" (original italics, 2004:131). When an anthropologist asks his or her informants why they do a ritual in a certain way, this demand for exegesis may place the informants in a predicament of searching for an original intentionality which may never be able to be pinned down. Bloch suggests three possible ways by which the informants give their answers. The first is that the informants may simply switch off the intentionality-seeking device by refusing to give further answers other than "tradition" to why, for example, the Cai lineage incorporate the *san xian li* into their ancestral ritual. The second is that some informants may also wonder the same question that the anthropologist asks and try to find a person who they can refer to—for example, some members of the Cai lineage said that the *san xian li* was introduced by a degree-holding ancestor in the Ming. As an ancestral figure has been identified, the intentionality-seeking device ceases working and the informants offer no more exegeses than their adherence to what was left by that ancestor—i.e., deference to the authority of that ancestor. The third is that some informants may continue searching for intentionality beyond normal originators—for example, some men of the Cai lineage found that their *san xian li* traces its origin in the ritual classics of ancient China and the ritual etiquette of the imperial court, which were introduced by their degree-holding ancestor. The ritual classics and the imperial ritual etiquettes are, as Bloch puts it, like phantasmagorical quasi-persons to which "minds" may just about be attributed with some degree of plausibility, thus apparently restoring intentional meaning to the goings-on of ritual" (2004:134). These phantasmagorical initiators, together with a group of scholarly ancestors, form an entity called "tradition", which the offspring of the Cai lineage defer to and maintain.

In sum, the character of deference seems to have helped the liturgical procedure of the Cai lineage's ancestral rite to be transmitted from generation to generation (as people call it their lineage's tradition), and continue largely unchanged despite the drastic social-economic changes which have resulted in the changes to the other non-liturgical aspects of the ritual event (e.g., the permission for the village women and

outsiders to attend the ceremony as onlookers, and the replacement of some sacrificial food or items that are rarely found in contemporary times).

Ritual disjunctions: reunion in the ritual versus separation in the reality

The above analysis singling out the character of deference during the implementation of rituals also leads us to rethink an assumption, arguably existent in the earlier studies of Chinese lineages, that the function of rituals is to instil norms or socialize people into certain patterned dispositions. Let me recall the scene described above that took place during the Cai lineage's ancestral ceremony when the newly-married *toujia* did not know the ritual procedure in advance so they could not immediately grasp the master of ceremonies' instructions regarding what food should be offered in each step; accordingly, they relied on guidance from the people nearby (including the anthropologist) to minimize mistakes and to complete the ritual. The actual enactment of the sacrificial rite is by no means a smooth implementation of every act stated in the ritual pamphlet, but involves scenes of minor chaos like the above. The inexperienced *toujia* were so occupied by their attempts to follow the instructions they were given that they had limited opportunity to try to make sense through their role-playing of the norms that may be ingrained in the ritual. However, they were not ignorant of the overarching message that the ritual was aimed at conveying. They knew the ritual emphasised the importance of the reunion of the dispersed agnates under their reverence to common ancestors, and indeed they tried to behave in an appropriately respectful manner during the ritual. This suggests that the ritual participants would be fully aware of the differences between the ideal of lineage unity invoked by the ritual and the reality of an otherwise rather fragmented and dispersed lineage, which links to the key point about disjunction highlighted by Puett in his review of the ritual theories of early China.

As was discussed in chapter one, Puett notes that the role reversal involved in a rite of ancestral sacrifice mentioned in *Liji* (the *Book of Rites*) has two important goals: the first goal is to inculcate in each ritual practitioner the proper dispositions that should be held in the relationship between father and son (i.e., by playing the role of

the deceased grandfather in the ritual, the grandson observed the ways in which his father shows subservience to his senior); the second goal is to establish a clear demarcation between the ritual world and the lived reality (i.e., the grandson could not conceivably confuse his non-ritual social role with the role he plays in the ritual). The role-playing in the ritual requires the participants to relate to one another *as if* they had proper relationships (i.e., the son's subservience to his father), however in reality they may be indifferent or antagonistic to each other. The repetitive practice of the ritual is to repeatedly place the participants in this disjunction between the subjunctive world and the lived experiences. In so doing, the participants may reflect on the differences between what the ritual requires and what they actually behave in everyday life, and then they may begin adjusting their ways of conduct toward what the ritual is aimed at cultivating.

To use Puett's thesis of ritual disjunctions may require a long-term tracing of an actor's life and observing how he or she behaves during the ritual and in the everyday life outside of the ritual in order to investigate the actor's reaction or changes—which needs a special design of research methods that was not included during my fieldwork. However, I suggest that using Puett's thesis to examine the informants' statements and practices related to rituals helps to produce insightful understandings of the empirical phenomena. My informants who are active members in the lineage *gongjia* arranging the lineage ritual events, such as Cai Qing-Mu and A-Lang, have been dwelling in the village for most of their lifetime and are regular performers of offering incense to ancestors at the domestic altar and in the ancestral halls of their own lineage branches. I also saw some elderly men who are not members in the lineage *gongjia* but go to their branches' ancestral halls to offer incense every morning and evening. Their regular practices of ancestor worship are consistent with their statements showing their concern over ancestor veneration and the lineage affairs, and with how they define a person with morality. For example, in recent years there are many disputes over land ownership between the inhabitants in Jinmen and their kinsmen whose forebears migrated to Southeast Asian countries decades ago; the latter who were born and live overseas paid their first visit of Jinmen after 2000s when air transportation became

convenient and began requesting their share of the ancestral property. The villagers critiqued their overseas kinsmen for not making any contribution to the maintenance of ancestral property and the regular performance of sacrifices to ancestors, and only aiming at the benefits they can earn through selling their share of land to real estate developers.⁴⁵ One village man who encountered this kind of dispute told me that his overseas kinsmen “do not take seriously the matters about gods and ancestors, as they never hold intense sticks to worship gods and ancestors”.⁴⁶ The values emphasized in the ancestral sacrifices, such as filial piety and remembrance of the ancestors, seemed to be absorbed by my informants through their repetitive participation in the world of ritual reverence to ancestors and affect the ways in which they make moral judgements regarding issues in their lived experiences.⁴⁷

The thesis of ritual disjunctions also helps to analyse the phenomenon that the men who have established residence in Taiwan return to Jinmen to participate in the lineage’s ritual events. On the three occasions I attended the ancestral ritual in the *jiamiao*, I found that many newly-married and old *toujia* who live in Taiwan returned to Qionglin especially for the ceremony. Several old *toujia* told me that they missed the first opportunity to be a *toujia* because at that stage they did not want to spend time and money on a trip back home for worship (especially as they had to take leave from work as the ritual often fell on a weekday). As a result, their fathers, who were in the village and who were more concerned about the importance of participation in the ritual, took on the duties on their behalves. What motivated these men to return in the first place was unknown to me, but it was interesting to examine their statements and acts during the ritual events. I met these men twice at least because the *toujia* in each

⁴⁵ For various reasons the market value of land in Jinmen sees a dramatic rise in recent years. Many real estate developers based on Jinmen or Taiwan purchase land from local people to develop new residential areas. This seems to arouse the overseas migrants’ interest in their ancestral land in Jinmen. But, some found out later that the location of their ancestral land was not good so its market value is too low to earn benefits from selling it.

⁴⁶ However, I also learned several instances that the overseas kinsmen sent money back to ask their brothers or relatives in Jinmen to take care of their ancestral houses and to worship ancestors on their behalves in earlier years and eventually transferred their shares of the ancestral property to their kin as they decided to reside overseas permanently.

⁴⁷ This resembles what Ellen Oxfeld (2004; 2010) calls people’s moral debt to their parents and ancestors, which is embodied in a Chinese proverb, “Drink water, but remember the source” (*yin shui si yuan*).

turn of duty are responsible for one hall sacrifice and one grave sacrifice. Some men came alone or with their wives for the hall sacrifice but took children together to attend the grave sacrifice which fell on the national holidays. As these men told me, they took their children back because they wanted their children to gain a sense of their lineage's "tradition" and to see the village where their fathers were born and grew up.

It is hard to tell what messages the old and newly-married *toujia* as well as any adolescents looking on took from the ritual,⁴⁸ but most of them appeared curious about the ritual, which was demonstrated by their using their advanced digital cameras to capture the images absent from their everyday life in urban Taiwan. These images include scenes in which the *toujia* attempted to follow the orders to serve the ancestors the appointed sacrifices in a respectful manner, and also scenes of the *toujia* leading their wives and children to kowtow to the remote ancestors during the interval between the two rounds of worship. These scenes are consistent with the proper attitudes that the young should show to their elders as required in the ritual, however they are almost certainly not entirely consistent with the way the participants behave in lived reality. The *toujia* and their children's witness of the ritual may not have immediate influence in their patterned dispositions and behaviours in everyday life, but their experiences of the entire ritual event (including the *renao* atmosphere and post-ritual commensality) may generate some new perceptions about the ritual and the lineage, and interest in knowing more. For example, some members of the Cai lineage published articles in the local newspaper on the ancestral sacrifices and some shared their photos or videos about the ritual online. In addition, probably with the official promotion of cultural heritage preservation over the last two decades, a trend emerged among local intellectuals to investigate and publish books about local customs and rituals, in which the Cai lineage's ancestral sacrifices are often mentioned. The local government's registration of this ancestral ceremony as a Municipal Folk Custom in 2011 has also made the ritual a tourist attraction, which is mentioned on the websites introducing Jinmen's tourism and on the individual tourists' personal webpages. Though it is hard

⁴⁸ As Stafford (2007) puts it, the attention of the ritual participants may be drawn to the various things relevant or non-relevant to the ritual *per se*, but all of these are part of the process of learning religion.

to tell how these newly-emerged channels of spreading information about the Cai lineage's ancestral ritual may affect its members' perception of the lineage's tradition, the younger generations may look at the ritual as a unique event that marks their lineage's particularity, especially given the fact that this kind of lineage ancestral sacrifice is rarely seen in Taiwan.

Moreover, as noted earlier, the sense of lineage unity is not only created during the ritual itself but also produced during the processes of kin collaboration in preparing the ritual and post-ritual commensality in the ancestral buildings. Many of my interlocutors said that the event of lineage ancestral sacrifices was like the Chinese New Year festival, in both of which they enjoyed the moments of big reunion of kin (*jiazu datuanyuan*), the feast, and the atmosphere of *renao*. Some of them also claimed that they always manage to return home and join in the event because this allows them to see their brothers and relatives who live in different places. Though the sense of kin solidarity emphasized in the ritual event may not last long once the participants return to their everyday routine, the differences between the ritual event and the lived reality seem to generate a desire for people to continue organizing and participating in the ritual. In light of Puett's thesis, the ritual practices understood broadly (i.e., including preparation prior to the ritual, the post-ritual banquet, and the newly-emerged techniques of sharing the ritual knowledge and experiences) can also be understood to create a disjunction from the experiences that people have in their everyday life, and this may further enhance the ritual participants' sense of being part of the lineage and lead them to pay greater attention to the lineage's tradition and communal affairs. Therefore, when attempting to explain why the ancestral sacrifices are still able to inspire a number of male members of the Cai lineage to come back to the village every year, despite the differences in their place of residence, career, personal interests and so on, it is important to examine the contribution made by the full range of practices associated with the ritual.

Cross-border ritual collaboration

The view of ritual as involving the creation of an "as if" world is also able to shed light

on the analysis of contemporary ritual collaboration between people in Jinmen and in China. In the two decades since the termination of military governance on Jinmen and the amelioration of the relationship between the ROC and the PRC, there has been a great deal of non-official activities between the civilians on the two sides. The island of Jinmen was transformed from an enclosed fortress on the frontline to an important port from which it only takes thirty minutes by ferry to reach the coastal city of Xiamen on the Mainland. The Cai lineage have organized many trips to China: to visit the place which was supposed to be the original settlement from where their ancestors came; to pay homage at the graves of the ancestors who were imperial officials and were buried in the places where they worked; and, to attend various gatherings co-hosted by the common-surname associations based in different parts of the world. They also re-established contact with their distant lineage brothers whose forebears left Jinmen centuries ago and settled down in the coastal regions of China, and then helped them to reconstruct their ancestral halls and rituals which had been destroyed during the Maoist era. I did not observe these cross-strait communications in person, but I obtained brief testimonies from my male informants who were involved in the activities. In a recent case that I heard about on a short return visit I made to Jinmen in the winter of 2015, the Cai lineage's *gongjia* helped their distant agnates in China to repurchase an ancestral estate from the local government because it was said to be harder if this was done by the citizens of the PRC themselves. The Cai lineage also contributed a large sum of money to the establishment of an ancestral hall on that estate. After the hall was completed, the experienced men of the Cai lineage (including Cai Qing-Mu) shared knowledge and contributed labour in order to help reconstruct the sacrificial rite. My informants said that they organized a large group to travel to China to celebrate the completion of that new ancestral hall. They also went through complex bureaucratic procedures to transport the sacrificial food (the aforementioned special menu of five dishes and other food specifically for the ritual) to China because their remote kin have lost the knowledge of how to prepare the sacrifices during the turbulence of the extreme politics of China's twentieth century.

Examples like the Cai lineage's re-connection with their remote kin in China are

very common in Jinmen. This is indicated by the high frequency of related reports in the local newspaper. The reasons for this can be traced back to the time prior to the extension of the Chinese civil war into Jinmen, when there were frequent flows of people and goods between Jinmen and the Mainland. In the pre-republican era, a great number of young men left Jinmen to find spare land to cultivate or search for other work opportunities in coastal China. If they were fortunate enough to survive and settle down there, after a few generations their descendants might set up ancestral halls to worship them and maintain contact with their distant kin in Jinmen. Whenever the situation permitted, these descendants might visit Jinmen to worship the founding ancestors. However, this kind of communication between kin in Jinmen and China was abruptly interrupted by the political turmoil of 1949. Following this, the lineage brothers on the two sides did not just lose contact with each other; they even had the potential to harm each other. For example, one informant told me that his distant kin living in a PRC-controlled island a few miles away from Jinmen took part in the sneak attacks on Jinmen several times during the peak of the military confrontation across the Taiwan Strait. People on the two sides also experienced two distinct and mutually competitive political mobilizations and forms of economic development under the framework of the Cold War. As noted in chapter one, one of ways in which the two sides diverged was in terms of the two regimes' different attitudes towards the Confucian tradition and religion. As a result, while in Jinmen the objects and practices associated with the deceased were largely preserved, in China there was large-scale destruction of religious objects and suppression of religious practices.

I do not have enough data to explicate what motivated my informants from the Cai lineage and their remote kin to collaborate in the reconstruction of ancestral buildings and rituals on the mainland. Nor can I say whether my informants link the ritual collaboration to the critical issue of Taiwan's independence from or reunification with China. My suggestion is to look at the resurgence of ritual communications across the Strait through an analytical lens that understands ritual as involving the construction of a subjunctive world, and to see the phenomenon as the grassroots approach to dissolving the bifurcation that resulted from the bipolar politics. In the "as

if' world created by ritual and in which ritual participants should behave in accordance with the proper dispositions and relationships required of the ritual, the differences that exist between participants in the lived reality are temporarily set aside. I would go further and argue that all the activities involved in the collaborative efforts at ritual reconstruction can be seen as contributing to the creation of a temporary subjunctive space, in which those involved work for a collective aim irrespective of the differences between them resulting from their long-term separation in mutually-competitive political environments. By viewing the entire event as a temporary subjunctive space, I do not imply that people disguise their true feelings. Rather, whatever they might feel, they tend to act fraternally to one another, including to remote kin who they might be seeing for the first time, because this is an event for manifesting the ideals of kin reunion and solidarity. This kind of ritual collaboration between ordinary people in Jinmen and China can therefore be understood as a grassroots response to the arbitrary rupture in kin communication caused by the Chinese civil war and the Cold War politics that followed. Moreover, it represents an inventive way in which ordinary people confront the as-yet-unresolved opposition between the ROC and the PRC that has persisted following the demise of the global Cold War.

Conclusion

In chapter one I drew extensively on historian Michael Szonyi's (2008) monograph on Jinmen to explain how the KMT-army's policies of militarization in accordance with the bipolar framework of the Cold War had substantial effects on various aspects of local society in Jinmen. But, I also point out that, as Szonyi did not discuss kinship or the family, this resulted in him neglecting the resilient character of the Chinese kinship group and the relatively stable aspects of local society—the continuation of the Cai lineage's ancestral sacrifices throughout the Cold War period was one of them.

By paying attention to how the Cai lineage's ancestral ceremony was prepared and organized prior to the 1990s, this chapter has shown that the continuation of the ancestral ritual was the result of the complicated interactions of the ideological emphasis on the continuity of the patriline and the human practices of marriage,

childbirth, and reciprocal mutual assistance and mutual pressure. In the hard times of military control and material scarcity, the cycles of mutual help and reciprocity during the ritual preparation not only strengthened the practical and affective ties between the lineage members' households (in which women played considerable roles) but also substantiated their sense of the lineage as an integrated union. This leads to my contention that, despite Szonyi's cogent argument about the changes to local people's patterns of life caused by militarization and geopoliticization, the regular holding of the ancestral ritual was one means through which the villagers kept alive the accustomed channels of linking with one another and thereby attained a sense of order and stability, or minimized the sense of disorder and uncertainty caused by the condition of military conflicts and preparation.

As the ritual was carried out throughout the period of militarization on the island, the ritual event constituted a significant part of the villagers' remembrance of the past and perception of the changes that had taken place in the period of demilitarization. The decades of military control were remembered by my senior interlocutors as times of economic austerity that led to some men avoiding the duty of *toujia* altogether, although most households did their best to prepare the appointed foods and relied on their close kin for assisting them in their preparations. For the middle-aged men who passed their childhood years during militarization, the ancestral rituals and the village temple festivals were remembered as rare occasions on which they were able to enjoy meat and other delicious foods that were alien to their normal lives. The termination of military control in 1992 and the rapid expansion of commercialization on Jinmen afterward were described by my informants as leading to great changes in the way rituals were prepared. The lineage still keeps the same menu for the sacrificial food but, thanks to the emergence of catering services, the families of the *toujia* on duty are now freed from the work of rearing chickens, buying various ingredients, and asking others for assistance in cooking the dishes. This certainly helps to relieve the burden of most newly-married *toujia* and their wives, who were probably born and raised in Taiwan or elsewhere and have no idea about the techniques for preparing sacrificial food. The young and middle-aged men who have established permanent residences in

Taiwan can now return to the village with their wives and children by convenient air transportation which was unimaginable two decades ago. Therefore, so long as they have access to money, they are able to serve as *toujia* in the ritual without expending much effort or suffering much inconvenience. As such, the web of mutual help that bound the old generations together has gradually slackened off; the ritual itself may be continued just as it was before, but the wider organization of human and material resources that goes into the ritual has altered a great deal as it has adapted to the changing conditions. This is a pattern that will also be seen in relation to the funerary ritual discussed in chapter five.

Despite the increasing differences between generations, I have shown that the attraction of the ancestral rite is sufficient to be able to encourage a good proportion of male members to return to the village every year. There are various motivations that impel people to take part in the ritual, such as the effectiveness of the patrilineal ideology (to be a *toujia* is to claim the continuation of the agnatic line) and the sense of filial piety (young people are called back by their seniors who are still enmeshed in the intimate networks of the village). In addition, in light of Puett's arguments, I have argued that it is useful to view the persistence of the ancestral sacrifices in terms of the disjunction between the ritual world and the lived reality and the disjunction between the experience in and outside of the home village. Though most of the ritual participants do not know how to perform the ritual themselves or what the various liturgical acts mean, they defer to the instructions given by other experienced men to serve sacrifices to the ancestors in the proper dispositions that are required of the ritual. The ritual participants may not show the same kind of subservience to their seniors in their everyday life, but the differences between their behaviours in the ritual and outside of the ritual may provoke them to reflect on their behaviour and, possibly, impel them to make adjustments. The disjunction created by the lineage ancestral sacrifices has potential not only to help ameliorate the strained relationship between the young and the elderly, but also to enhance some members' ties to the kin community which have atrophied due to their long-term absence. Moreover, the ritual-related activities (e.g., the preparation prior to the ritual, the post-ritual banquet, and

the newly-emerged techniques of sharing ritual knowledge and experiences) also create a disjunction from the experiences that people have in their everyday life, particularly for those who live in the cities far away from their home village. I suggest that part of the efficacy of the lineage ancestral ritual emerges from participants' experiencing this disjunction which enhances their sense of being part of the lineage and encourages them to become more involved in the lineage activities. In this way, the ritual can be sustained into the future and the lineage as a whole is continuously revitalized.

The recently-emerged collaboration between people in Jinmen and in China on the reconstruction of ancestral buildings and rituals on the Mainland could also be analysed through the understanding of the ritual as the creation of an “as if” world. In the subjunctive world of ancestral ritual, the participants not only behave properly to the ancestors being worshipped but also express fraternity to other participants. This fraternity should be expressed regardless of how divergent their lived experiences might be, even, for instance, if they stemmed from living in places that underwent mutually-competitive political and economic modernization. Due to the lack of ethnographic evidence, I could not further explore the experiences that people either in Jinmen or in China had as a result of their involvement in the ritual collaboration, and how their experiences are linked to their thoughts about the difficult issue of Taiwan’s relationship with China. This is a topic which must await future empirical research for proper answers. However, what I would like to suggest here is that the ritual collaboration across the Taiwan Strait should be viewed as the ordinary people’s inventive solution for mitigating the trauma and rupture generated by the bipolar politics—or, in Heonik Kwon’s terms, the process of decomposition of the Cold War.

Chapter Four

Domestic Worship and Women's Multiple Relationships

The house in which I lived throughout fieldwork is a traditional Minnan-style house which consists of three main parts: one central room and two main side rooms, each of which has an additional small room extending to the side (see Figure 6). The two extended parts are themselves connected by a brick wall with a wooden gate in the middle. I rented the right-wing of the house from A-Lang, who lives with his widowed mother (Madam Lu), his wife and two children in another traditional house a short distance away. Madam Lu was nearly seventy years old and yet every morning and evening she walked to the house in which I was staying to worship at the domestic altar set up in the central room. If one stands facing the gate of the house, on the left-hand side of the domestic altar one finds a wooden cabinet in which the ancestral tablets of my landlord's family are placed. On the right-hand side there is another wooden cabinet in which three small statues, representing the family gods of Guan-Yin (God of Mercy), Tu-Di-Gong (God of Earth) and Zao-Shen (God of Stove) respectively, are placed. This arrangement of domestic altars is typical of most households in Jinmen.




Figure 6. The layout of the author's rented house

It became my habit to get up upon hearing the sound of Madam Lu opening the exterior wooden gate to enter the house in the early morning, and I could expect to meet her again in the late afternoon before preparing dinner. One evening I saw Xu, the daughter-in-law who lives with Lu, and her two children coming to worship. This was a rare situation because A-Lang was usually the substitute when Lu was busy with other things. Xu told me that A-Lang had taken Lu to hospital in Taiwan for an examination, something which Xu herself did not know much about. Two days later, when Lu came to worship, I got talking to her together with other two elderly ladies living nearby, and I took the opportunity to ask Lu about her health. Lu told me that the trip had been for a regular physical examination but also to get a diagnosis for the headache and bad quality of sleep that she had been suffering from for some time. The doctor did not find any particular causes for her illness and considered that Lu might be too nervous or under too much pressure. The other two ladies commented immediately that Lu must have been worrying too much about the many anniversaries of the deaths of ancestors that she has to take care of. Indeed, the number of days each year on which Lu must perform *tsuèkī* (as they are called in local dialect, literally translating as to perform sacrifices to an ancestor on the anniversary of his or her death) is much greater than most villagers. This is related to her personal life history and her marital family's conditions—an issue to which I will return later. But, Lu's burden is not only the many days of *tsuèkī*, but also the simple but frequent rites of making sacrifices to gods and powerful spirits in the domestic domain and in the village temples, all of which are included in the term *baibai* (*pàipài* in local dialect).

As a Taiwan-born citizen with no experience of worshipping ancestors or family gods at home (but with experience of worshipping ancestors at Buddhist temples), during fieldwork in Jinmen I was deeply impressed by the great extent to which *pàipài* frames the annual schedule and quotidian lives of most married women (especially the elderly) and evidently is of great concern to them. This aroused my interest in the question of what impels women to carry out domestic worship, particularly the worship of their husbands' ancestors whom they may never have met or know little about. This question tends to be addressed in existing studies of China by referring to

the obvious patriarchal character of the Chinese society and the resulting firmly gendered division of labour, which is represented in the proverb “*nan zhu wai, nü zhu nei*”, meaning that men are responsible for affairs outside the home whereas women are responsible for affairs within the home, which includes *pàipài*. In addition, as *pàipài* involves women making sacrifices to powerful spirits or gods at home and at local cult temples to ask for blessings and protection, the belief in the efficacy of spiritual beings is argued to motivate women’s ritual practices. This chapter attempts to go beyond the above explanations to examine women’s practices of domestic worship by attending to two aspects which were also foregrounded in the previous chapter on the lineage ancestral sacrifices: (1) how the ritual practices are transmitted between generations; (2) how the ritual practices are relevant to women’s relationships with human and non-human beings and their sociality. These also will be helpful for illuminating how the mundane practices of domestic worship are linked to the sustaining of the local social fabric despite the military threat that dominated island life during the Cold War era.

As mentioned in chapters one and two, the political and economic modernization initiated by the KMT regime generated irreversible changes to the local society of Jinmen, and this in turn gave rise to enlarged generational differences in education, occupation and lifestyles. The local marriage market also experienced great changes originating from the stationing of considerable numbers of troops on Jinmen during the militarization period with a great number of local women marrying ROC soldiers originating from the Mainland or Taiwan. In addition, there has been a persistent outflow of local young men and women, which continues to the present day, resulting in a good proportion of young people having non-Jinmen-born spouses and establishing permanent residence outside of Jinmen. Nowadays many of the men who remain in Jinmen find their brides from various other countries such as China (which is possible now following the mitigation of the tensions between the ROC and the PRC that started from the 1990s), Vietnam and Indonesia. As I will show, these huge social-economic changes are to a large extent related to the generational differences in attitudes toward the ritual practices. My ethnographic experience reveals that, unlike

the cautious and conscientious attitude toward *pàipài* displayed by most elderly women, the younger females tend to be less concerned with, or indifferent to, any kind of ritual practices. (This is similar to the contrasting attitudes toward lineage affairs exhibited by more elderly and younger men.) In many households in Qionglin, the young daughters-in-law who have formal jobs outside the village are usually absent from the domestic worship of ancestors and family gods that their mothers-in-law would perform, as well as from those periodical events at the village temples that usually attract many female worshippers. Some of them made clear to me their indifference to *pàipài* and their desire to get away from it. As far as I observed, this attitude is widely held by many young and unmarried local women. However, there are also many young married women who expressed more positive attitudes toward *pàipài*, especially ancestor worship. This chapter will discuss these divergent attitudes toward *pàipài* among the married and unmarried women of different ages in relation to the shifting circumstances and, more importantly, also in relation to the connection between the ritual practices and women's sociality.

The overarching aim of this chapter is to explore how women's practices of domestic worship are linked to their multiple relationships with the spiritual beings and the human beings in the typical patriarchal environment, and how their routine practices are linked to the maintenance of an accustomed pattern of life despite the considerable changes that have occurred over the past decades. To give readers a sense of women's practices of domestic worship, the first section introduces a variety of *pàipài* that local married-in women are conventionally required to do throughout the year; it then discusses the ways in which the proprieties involved in *pàipài* are transmitted between generations, and the link between women's ritual practices and beliefs. The second section uses Madam Lu's life story, firstly, to exemplify how ancestor worship may become a great burden for a married-in woman, and secondly, and more significantly, to analyse the relationships between the worshipper and the objects being worshipped from the female perspective, instead of from the perspective of the father-son relationship which is the orthodox prescription of the ancestral sacrifices. This section also includes a discussion of various possible motivations that

may impel a woman to carry out ancestor worship both carefully and continually. Building on the first two sections, the third section draws on several ethnographic examples to spell out the external impetus for women to comply with the duty of *pàipài*, and also to demonstrate how *pàipài* can lead to problems and frictions within families and between generations. These examples also suggest that there is an important of degree human agency in the ritual practices as the living are able to adjust the ways of conducting the rituals to fit their current lives, which involve many differences from their ancestors' ways of life. The concluding section foregrounds the link between women's practices of domestic worship and their lived experiences of Jinmen's turbulent recent history, and summarizes the effects of the social-economic changes on the practices of domestic worship.

Women's everyday business of worship and the transmission of ritual practices

During fieldwork I kept a diary with included both the Gregorian calendar and the Chinese lunar calendar, which was convenient for noting the many kinds of ritual activities in the village determined by the lunar calendar. Usually, I did not remember the date according to the lunar calendar myself, but I was able to guess it when I saw the villagers conducting certain rituals that take place on the same date of each lunar month. In a similar way, my senior female informants were often reminded of the dates they should do *pàipài* when they observed their neighbours' preparations for the forthcoming worship. This suggests that the villagers' easy observation of each other's conduct in this close-knit community forms a kind of mutual surveillance on their ritual practices, but also indicates that the total days of *pàipài* may be of such an overwhelming number that it is hard for any individual villager to always remember by themselves. The following is a list of the kinds of *pàipài* conducted by most households in Qionglin, as well as generally observed throughout Jinmen and rural Taiwan (cf. Feuchtwang 1974).

- morning worship on the first and fifteenth days of every month in the Chinese lunar calendar: simple food offerings and spirit money to gods in the village temples and at domestic altars;

- evening worship on the second and sixteenth days of every lunar month: several dishes of meat and vegetables and spirit money to reward the troops of the village temple gods (the ritual practice is called *khòkun* in local dialect) and to Di-Ji-Zhu (or Zu; the host or ancestor of the house foundation);
- on the birthdays of village temple gods: more abundant food offerings and spirit money to gods (the temple management committee usually employs Daoists to hold *jiao* rituals as celebration);
- on specific festival days, such as Chinese New Year's Day, *Thinn-Kong senn* (in local dialect, literally the birthday of the Emperor of Heaven) and the winter solstice: special food offerings to particular gods and family gods;
- on the first, nineteenth and last day of the seventh lunar month, of which the nineteenth day is the Pudu festival (including the purgatory and salvation rituals for the wandering ghosts): abundant dishes of meat and vegetables and spirit money for homeless and hungry ghosts;⁴⁹
- on specific festival days, such as Chinese New Year's Day, the Qingming Festival (the Tomb-Sweeping Day), and the winter solstice: abundant or special food offerings and spirit money to all of the family ancestors.

Aside from the above days of *pàipài*, every Cai family in Qionglin also has its own list of sacrificial dates for ancestral beings, including the anniversaries of the deaths of individual male and female ancestors⁵⁰ of recent generations as well as the days of performing collective sacrifices to the distant ancestors beyond the household level (e.g., the family of Madam Lu together with other genealogically close families worship their common ancestors in ancestral houses and at graves). All of the above-mentioned *pàipài* are usually managed and carried out by women and account for a substantial portion of their housework duties. This is not to say that men are entirely free from domestic worship, particularly ancestral sacrifices which are in principle deemed to be the obligation of male offspring. During fieldwork, I found that some

⁴⁹ In most parts of Taiwan and China, the Pudu festival is on the fifteenth day of the seventh month, but in Jinmen every village has its own custom for deciding the day of Pudu. In my fieldsite it is on the nineteenth day.

⁵⁰ In this context, a female ancestor means the wife of a Cai man who gave birth to male offspring.

men actually played more active roles than their wives in performing domestic worship, and some widowed men (whose married sons live elsewhere) prepared dishes and conducted worship on their own. The gendered division of labour which is so obvious in the lineage-level ancestral rituals becomes blurred in the arena of domestic worship. In other words, there are no explicit rules to associate women with domestic worship, but, in the environment of traditional patriarchy, domestic worship has been viewed as one of the household chores for which women should take responsibility. Indeed, this is a view widely taken for granted by most of my male and female interlocutors.

As Madam Lu made regular visits to *pàipài* at the house I rented, I had plenty of opportunities to observe how she did it. Gradually I noticed the differences in the timing of her visits, the offerings she prepared, and the spatial arrangement of offerings to various spiritual beings. With my observations of *pàipài* in other households and my various interlocutors' statements, I am confident in saying that Lu's ways of doing *pàipài* exemplifies a common pattern that can be found throughout Jinmen. On the days of *tsuèkī*, Lu always came about ten o'clock in the morning, using a shoulder pole to carry food offerings consisting of ten dishes of meat and vegetables, plus steamed rice—suggesting the dead eat the same things as the living. She pulled out a square shaped table, which is usually stored under the rectangular table on which the wooden cabinets for family gods and ancestors are located, then set the table up slightly over to the right-hand side in front of the cabinet for ancestral tablets. The small door of the cabinet was opened for the tablets to be revealed. She then switched on the small electric lamps on the two sides of the cabinet, which substituted for red candles—a necessary item in the worship. The food offerings and spirit money were placed on the square table, together with some pairs of chopsticks for the ancestor(s) to use.⁵¹ Lu also prepared small drinking glasses filling with sorghum liquor for the ancestor(s). After setting things up in the right place, she lit three incense sticks to initiate communication with the ancestor(s), asking the ancestor(s) to come to enjoy the food offerings and to bless and protect their descendants. She then waited for about twenty

⁵¹ Even though the ritual is for celebrating a particular ancestor's death anniversary, the villagers prepare more than one pair of chopsticks (but always an odd number of pairs) as Lu told me that perhaps that particular ancestor may call on other ancestors to enjoy the feast.

minutes, during which time she might have a chat with people living nearby. After half of the incense sticks had burned off, she held the spirit money up to greet ancestor(s) and moved outside to burn the spirit money, which marked the end of the domestic sacrificial ritual.

The timing of *pàipài*, the offerings to be prepared and the spatial arrangement of offerings vary according to the objects of worship, so sacrifices to deities and powerful spirits differ from that described above for ancestors. For example, the offerings made to Guan-Yin, one of the family gods, on the three days of celebration (for her birth, religious enlightenment, and becoming a nun) must be vegetarian (usually fruits or biscuits) and can be offered together in the daily morning worship. The offerings made on the second and sixteenth days of every lunar month usually consist of four dishes of meat and vegetables plus steamed rice (which become the household's dinner afterward). These are first offered to the troops of local temple gods outside the house, where spirit money is also burned for them. Then the dishes are moved inside the house to worship Di-Ji-Zhu, with spirit money again burned. Moreover, the types of spirit money used for gods, ghosts and ancestors are different and vary according to different situations. It is not my purpose to give full details of the variations in worshipping different spiritual beings, but rather to highlight that *pàipài* involves complicated proprieties that trouble many daughters-in-law when they first enter into their husbands' families.

Given that my own description of how Madam Lu does *pàipài* is grounded on my repeated observation of the same practices for more than one year, it would be possible for any person to capture the basic framework and detailed arrangements for the worship of different spiritual beings if enough time and attention were paid. Though my Jinmen-born female informants across different generations had themselves observed in childhood that their mothers were always busy with *pàipài*, they were not required to help and therefore barely knew anything about how to perform *pàipài* before marriage. They said that they started to *gen zhe bai* (lit. to follow somebody to do worship) after their mothers-in-law immediately after entering their husbands' families, which suggests the attitude of deference at work. The phrase *gen zhe bai*

refers to a set of acts for preparing the sacrificial food, arranging the sacrifices in the proper places, and performing the worship in accordance with what their seniors say and do, during which the younger women would be told that a ritual is done for a particular deity or ancestor, but usually offered no explanation as to why the ritual is done in a particular way. As the senior women tended to guide the younger step-by-step through *pàipài* as they performed it, they did not reveal all the things they knew in advance, and therefore the younger women might make mistakes because of a lack of information. For example, several young women told me that in the beginning they were frequently corrected by their mothers-in-law after having mistakenly prepared the “wrong” offerings.⁵² Sometimes they could receive an answer as to why a particular food is not “right”, but more often they were not interested in getting an answer, or the senior women did not have an answer to give them, because they had also simply deferred to what their mothers-in-law had told them to do.

The practices of domestic worship are normally transmitted between mother-in-law and daughter-in-law, but they are also discussed in the different gatherings of women that occur in everyday life. The apprentice-like process of learning *pàipài* means that a female’s knowledge about *pàipài* tends to be exclusively from her mother-in-law, and may be different from another female’s knowledge. As such, I often found that the village women did discuss with each other the differences between their families’ customs of *pàipài*, but they usually left aside the question of why there are differences by claiming their deference to their seniors—“I just followed what my mother-in-law told me to do”, as they put it. In this way, most women tended to switch off the intentionality-seeking device (see the discussion of Bloch 2004 in chapter three). However, some of my female informants said that they had been curious, so they had asked their fathers-in-law or other senior men who knew more about rituals. These women were thereby able to articulate clearly the so-called customary ways of doing worship (e.g., the correct numbers of incense sticks that should be burned for gods and ancestors in different situations, the proper food offerings on particular

⁵² The often-mentioned foods that were considered “wrong” include fruits, such as tomato and guava, which are forbidden from being offerings to gods and ancestors because, in the folk interpretations, they contain too many seeds and are therefore difficult to digest.

occasions, etc., and recall the nicknames or the generations of the remote ancestors that they worship in the halls and at graves⁵³—details that many village men and women are ignorant of or, indeed, indifferent to.

The above discussion has been focused on how the ritual “practices” are transmitted between generations, but this does not mean that “beliefs” do not matter. The practices of performing sacrifices to spiritual beings such as gods, ghosts, and ancestors are generally associated by the locals with the religion of Daoism. Therefore, there are cases of villagers who adhere to Christianity refusing to take part in the customary practices of *pàipài*, including ancestor worship. Some vegetarian villagers (e.g., followers of Yiguandao) are allowed to do *pàipài* by their religion but they would remove all the non-vegetarian food from the sacrifices to the spiritual beings. In other words, the majority of the female villagers who claimed that they do *pàipài* in the ways that they learned from their seniors either associated themselves with Daoism (as they also attended the local cult temples frequently) or identified themselves as not adhering to any religion. Those who are attendees of local temples tend to believe in the efficacy and power of the deities. For example, I was told that the principal deity (Bao-Sheng-Da-Di) in Qionglin protected the villagers in late 1949 by blowing the ships carrying Communist troops, who had intended to land on the northern seashore of Qionglin, westward to Guningtou. I was also told by some that the practice of *khòkun* is related both to the locals’ appreciation for the past protection the gods’ troops have provided, and also to pray for this to continue so the troops might drive away evil spirits or the ghosts of those who died tragically in past wars.

Given that “beliefs” evidently do matter to the worship of powerful spiritual beings in certain households, can the same be said for ancestor worship? I will discuss this question in the next section about the relationships between the female worshippers and the ancestral beings to whom they regularly make ritual greetings.

⁵³ As far as I observed, both male and female villagers generally do not remember the remote ancestors by their real names but instead use a type of nickname. The nicknames may be made from the specific date of making sacrifices, the special geomancy of the ancestor’s tomb, or the particular sacrificial food served to the ancestor.

Ancestor worship from a female perspective: making and marking multiple relationships through ritual performance

Though anthropologists have long noted that women are usually the primary practitioners of domestic ancestor worship, they seem not to have tried to see the ritual from the female perspective. This is probably because the father-son relationship (as embodied in the notion of *fang*) is not only the key relation of the genealogical system of Chinese kinship but also the primary relationship in the ancestral sacrifices. The male-centric perspective is also present in the ritual classics on ancestral sacrifices, in which the role of women as the performers of sacrifice is arguably absent (cf. Zito 1987:369). However, as Stafford (2000a) argues, instead of the given and fixed patrilineal connections, it is productive to attend to the fluid, negotiable, incorporative, and processual dimension of Chinese kinship (or relatedness), in which women play salient roles in substantiating interpersonal relationships. In the same light, I argue for the importance of looking at the practices of ancestor worship from the perspective of women in order to explore what kinds of relationships, other than the father-son relation or the patrilineal connection, are emphasized in the ritual or through the ritual. I begin with the case of Madam Lu who, as mentioned earlier, has more days of *tsuèkī* to take care of than most villagers; I discuss her relationships with the various ancestral beings and her motivations for maintaining these relationships through the ritual. I also discuss other possible motivations that people might have for performing the sacrificial rite.

As described at the beginning of this chapter, Lu lives with her youngest son, daughter-in-law and two grandchildren in a traditional Minnan-style house just a few metres away from where I was staying. Lu has five sons, two of whom live in Jinmen, while the other three reside in Taiwan. In Lu's house there is a domestic altar on which the cabinets for gods' statues and ancestral tablets are placed. A wooden board that records all the dates of *tsuèkī* (fifty-two in total) is hung on the wall right beside the domestic altar. On the board there are five categories of sacrificial dates: (1) sacrificial dates for Lu's dead husband and his recent ancestors, whose tablets are located in the house I rented; (2) sacrificial dates for distant ancestors of the lineage branch of which

Lu's husband was part; (3) a category including only three sacrificial dates, probably for the lineage forebears of Lu's husband; (4) sacrificial dates for the dead who were the original owners of the house in which Lu now lives and whose tablets are placed on the domestic altar of that house; (5) a special category consisting of sacrificial dates for a Cai family in which Lu was a *yangnǚ* (lit. an adopted daughter, but in Lu's case, as was conventional practice, the adoption did not go through legal procedures and therefore it was not necessary for the adopted daughter to change her surname). There are no significant differences in the ways that Lu performs sacrifices to these five categories of ancestors, but from Lu's perspective she relates to these various ancestors in different ways and with different sentiments. It should be noted that, although I try to present *Lu's perspective* by using the data I collected from her words and acts, it remains *my interpretation* of the data.

Setting aside the third category, whose meaning is uncertain to me, the first two categories indicate the different levels of worshipping units that Lu's sons belong to. The fundamental worshipping unit revolves around Lu's deceased husband and his parents and grandparents. The higher-level unit revolves around the common ancestors that Lu's sons should co-worship with other agnates of the same lineage branch; however, in reality it is usually Lu who performs the ritual. From the perspective of Lu, with the exception of her husband, her connections to both recent and distant ancestors are indirect, via her husband and sons. It seemed that she had not seen her parents-in-law in person for reasons that were unknown to me, but she still has to perform sacrifices to them. Though the same procedure for performing *tsuèkī* applies to both the close and remote ancestors, some minor differences reveal the performers' attitudes and sentiments to the dead. In contrast to other *tsuèkī* where Lu is usually the only ritual practitioner, on the death anniversary of Lu's husband her two sons in Jinmen and their wives (but not their children who were at school) accompanied Lu to the house I lived in to worship. Seeing their mother's rapid steps and actions, the sons joked to me that their mother was worried about keeping her husband waiting when he was hungry. The timid old lady did not say anything but was busy arranging the table and taking out the papier-mâché gold ingots to be burned for her husband. Lu

had spent several days folding these papier-mâché gold ingots, which were given in addition to the spirit money for her husband. These different treatments of ancestors, however insignificant they might seem, suggest the ritual performers' emotional attachment to the particular deceased person. Anthropologists who have attended to the function of rituals (e.g., Kulp 1925:146-7; Freedman 1958:54; Yang 1961:38-43) contend that the worship of recent ancestors is more concerned with personal commemoration of the dead about whom the ritual practitioners still have living memories, while the worship of distant ancestors is more concerned with the consolidation of agnatic solidarity. This contention is arguably accurate (though apparently based on a male-centred perspective) but lacks specifics about how the ritual participants may express their sentiments. By Lu's case and numerous other instances of domestic ancestor worship I observed, I suggest that the Chinese sacrificial rite is generally conducted without explicit demonstrations of the ritual practitioners' personal sentiments to the dead. However, the slight material differences in the practitioners' actions do still reveal their personal concerns about particular deceased people of whom they still have vivid memories. As far as Lu's performance of sacrifices to her husband is concerned, the relationship that is emphasized is less the father-son relation (between Lu's husband and sons) than the wife-husband relation. Lu's performance of sacrifices to her husband's recent and remote ancestors can be examined through the lens of Stafford's (2000a; 2000b) discussion of the cycle of *yang* (care and nurturance) between parents and children. Though the Chinese moral pedagogy prescribes that sons have primary responsibility to provide *fengyang* (respectful care and nurturance) to their parents when they are elderly and in the afterlife (in the form of ancestral sacrifices), it is very common that their wives become the actual providers of *fengyang*. As such, for Lu, the sacrifices to her husband's recent and remote ancestors are an extension of the duty of *fengyang* that she continued to do on behalf of her husband and then her sons after her husband died. In turn, after she dies, Lu may find herself as part of her husband's extended family that is worshipped by her sons (or their wives), because she can expect to be included into the ancestral group with her name being written beside her husband's name on the same tablet.

The fourth category, consisting of sacrificial dates for a Cai family that originally owned Lu's house, is the result of the practice of *guo fang* (lit. to be transferred from one's father's line to another man's agnatic line in the genealogical sense). In Chinese context the obligation to worship ancestors is not merely generated by genealogical connection but also by economic relations—the Chinese sons' duty to perform ancestral sacrifices is accompanied by their right to inherit family property. *Guo fang* normally occurs when a man, who has never married or produced direct descendants, names a son of his brother, or another agnate in the same generation, as his heir; the heir (adopted son) will then inherit that man's property and in return is expected to worship him (and his ancestors) after his death. This ritual obligation, along with the property, will be passed down the succeeding generations. *Guo fang* usually does not involve the adopted son physically moving into his adopted family and therefore is more like a transaction involving the exchange of property for peace and happiness in the afterlife. Emily Martin (1973:149-62) provides several instances illustrating that, as her informants themselves claimed, property inheritance or usage became the main cause for the obligation to worship, and some people even used their act of worship to justify their use of land belonging to a particular deceased person. Martin's wider discussion identified the many complexities that the practice of ancestor worship involves in the context of real social lives, but, in this chapter, for the sake of analytical clarity, I only focus on her observation that property inheritance constitutes one important motive for the conduct of ancestor worship. In the case of Lu's family, I was told that one elder brother of Lu's husband was *guo fang* to succeed a fellow lineage man's family line, together with that family's property and the obligation to perform ancestral sacrifices. Then, for a reason unknown to me, Lu's eldest son was *guo fang* to succeed his uncle's rights and obligations. Possibly because Lu's eldest son resides in Taiwan, Lu took on the addition work of *tsuèkī* this involved. She verbally distinguished this category of ancestors from her marital family's ancestors with a remark that her act of worship was due to their inheritance of that family's property.

The fifth category of ancestors that Lu worships is, genealogically speaking, unconnected to her marital family and her own descendants. As an adopted daughter

who has since married into another family, she would not typically be expected to worship this group of ancestors. So, why does Lu treat the worship of her adopted family's ancestors as her duty? I never asked her this question but some possible explanations may be derived from her life history. Though I met Lu almost every day, my poor dialect of Minnan and Lu's rather timid personality hindered us from longer and deeper conversations in the beginning. Gradually my grasp of the Minnan dialect improved and Lu also appeared to want to talk with me more. She voluntarily revealed to me the story of how she had originally entered Qionglin village as an adopted daughter. The story was very short as Lu was not a talkative person and only described things in plain words. Throughout my fieldwork I heard the same story several times as Lu did not remember that she had already told it to me. The complete version of her story is as follows:

When I was about seven years old, I was sent to a Cai family in Qionglin as an adopted daughter. My natal family in another village was very poor so my parents had to send me away. But not long after I entered the household, my adoptive mother went to Singapore to live with her husband. They gave birth to a son there but the boy had an unfortunate early death. Then my adoptive father died. My adoptive mother did not return to Jinmen but sought help from her brothers living in Taiwan and eventually died there. Her tablet was placed in a Buddhist temple in Taiwan. Every year I send some money to the temple which makes sacrifices to my adoptive mother on my behalf.

I was left to live with my aged, adoptive *a-tsóo* (in local dialect, literally grant-grandmother). I went to sea to collect oysters and sold them to the villagers, so I had money to buy fish for *a-tsóo* to eat. I cooked fish with rice noodles and served it to *a-tsóo*. *A-tsóo* said that I could eat the porridge that was left over from the morning meal. I was not clever enough at that time. If I had added some more water and rice noodles when I was cooking for *a-tsóo*, I would have been able to eat rice noodles with fish soup. When I was eighteen years old, *a-tsóo* hurried me to get married so that she could ease her mind and leave this world. It was arranged for me to marry a Cai man in the village. Only twenty-two days after my marriage, *a-tsóo* passed away. That can't have been a coincidence...

Lu became sentimental with tears in her eyes every time when she recalled the last words *a-tsóo* spoke to her. I do not know whether or not Lu inherited any property, but

her emotional ties with *a-tsóo* are sufficient to understand why she takes responsibility for the several sacrificial dates of her adoptive family. On this basis, we can say more generally that the sacrificial rite can form a channel for the living to express personal sentiments to the dead, even though personal feelings tend to be invisible during the ritual itself. Furthermore, Lu's act of making sacrifices to the ancestors of her adoptive family could be read as her self-identification with and her desire to seek recognition from her adoptive family. Self-identification is realized in the ritual space of ancestral sacrifices, in which Lu behaves *as if* she were the son, the qualified heir responsible for the well-being of all the ancestors' afterlife. Though in reality her connection with her adoptive family ceased upon her marriage, she could identify herself as part of the adoptive family through the regular taking the role of the performer of sacrifices in the ritual.

Lu's case complicates the assumption that the patriarchal system provokes the Chinese daughters' desire for inclusion in and recognition by their natal families (see Sangren 2000c, 2003, 2013). Lu still has occasional contact with her brothers from her natal family but the long-term separation seems to have attenuated her relation with her natal family. The key point here is that, without actually challenging the patriarchal system, there is sufficient space in the actual practice of ancestral sacrifices for people to satisfy their personal, sentimental needs. This flexibility would include the practices of *bai waizu* (lit. to worship external ancestors), of which Lu's performing sacrifices to the ancestors of her adoptive family is an example. The practice of *bai waizu* is common in Jinmen (Zeng 2012:40-6; cf. Weller on Taiwan 1999:342; Wolf 1974) and this could be linked to people's lived experiences of military conflicts in the Cold War era. The "external ancestor" (*waizu*) is defined according to the circumstances in which the worshipper is situated. As the prescribed relationship in Chinese ancestral sacrifices is the relationship between the ancestors and the male offspring of the same agnatic line, *bai waizu* is a practical solution for married-out daughters, men who have uxorilocal marriages, and men who were *guo fang* to another agnatic line to worship the ancestors of their natal families. As illustrated by Lu's case, people usually go back to the house of their natal or adoptive families to make sacrifices to these ancestors. In

some cases, the worshippers attained the marital families' permission to set up ancestral tablets for the external ancestors in their new households and are thereby able to make regular sacrifices to them. The tablets of these external ancestors cannot be put in the central room where the domestic altar is situated, but any other place in the house is acceptable.

Though I do not have relevant ethnographic data, a case mentioned in a realistic novel by the Jinmen-born writer Chen Chang-Ching (2008) suggests that a practice similar to *bai waizu* provided a solution for local people who could not worship their dead kin in the normal way during the Cold War era. The novel describes how a woman, who had lost contact with her husband who had left to find work in Southeast Asia, took her daughter to seek help from her distant female cousin because their house and the small plot of farmland were destroyed by the bombs during the second Taiwan Strait crisis in 1958. However, on the night of their arrival in the relative's house, another episode of shelling by the Communists occurred nearby. As they tried to run to the bomb shelter, the first woman and her cousin's husband were hit by the bombs just a few metres from the shelter and died immediately. The surviving woman took her niece and her own son to perform a simplified burial ceremony for the two who had died so tragically. Afterward, in addition to making one for her husband, she also made an ancestral tablet for her unfortunate elder cousin and placed it on the ancestral altar of her own marital house. She told her niece who was still a child: "According to our customs, the tablets of the external relatives (*waiqi*) cannot be placed here. However, in such a turbulent era of wars, those taboos are outside of my concern as I cannot bear to leave your mother's tablet unattended. But you have to remember that when you grow up and are able to buy your own house, you must bring your mother's tablet to your house and continue the sacrifices. This is the filial piety toward one's parents that a person should observe. I hope you will always bear this in mind" (2008:32). With this instance, the author illustrates the toughness of ordinary people who managed to continue their life even though their home and loved ones were deprived suddenly by the military conflicts caused by the bipolar politics, over which they had no control. The temporary solution of placing her mother's ancestral tablet in

the relative's house in transgression of the usual customs, became the impetus for the surviving daughter to strive to survive and to build her own house where the tablet would finally find its proper resting place. If the daughter were to take her mother's tablet into her husband's family and makes sacrifices there, it would still be an example of an abnormal, *bai waizu* practice. For the innocent victims, this kind of abnormal solution forms a silent indictment of the cruelty and absurdity of extreme politics.

The above fictional instance of when tragic circumstances required sacrifices to the dead to be made in another family's house and the wider practice of *bai waizu* are certainly both concerned with the Chinese moral pedagogy of filial piety. However, they are also linked to folk understandings of the power of spiritual beings. As discussed in chapter one, the ritual theories of early China suggested that humans create the ritual of ancestral sacrifices in order to transform capricious and potentially antagonistic divine forces (or ghosts) into anthropomorphic deities, and place them within a hierarchy that would hopefully act on behalf of humanity. This thesis is generally supported by anthropological studies of Chinese rural societies. Whether or not they refer to the ritual classics, anthropologists tend to interpret the ancestral sacrifices as ritual mediation between the living world and the non-living world, which consists of gods, ghosts, and ancestors (see e.g., Feuchtwang 1974; Martin 1973; Wolf 1974). The relationship between the living world and the beings of the other world is not direct but mediated through “a ritual code, which selects and transforms living concrete actions into a negation of the living concrete world, creating a world which is *as if* living and concrete, a world in which the beings ‘eat’ the food that is offered them before it is eaten concretely by the living” (original italics, Feuchtwang 1974:116). In other words, the sacrificial rite provides a principle of transcending difference, making it possible for the visible/living and the invisible/non-living worlds that were usually distinct to connect through the intervention of human agency (Zito 1987:349).

Ethnographic findings demonstrate that ritual mediation is required by the ordinary people who believe in the power of spiritual beings to bless and protect or to cause harm and disaster. Informants' statements showed that they make sacrifices to

the deities who are believed to be able to bring blessings or resolve the worshippers' real-world problems. They also make offerings to ghosts who, through the spirit medium, said that they were offended by certain causes and demand redress (cf. Wolf 1974). Ancestors are not considered to be as powerful as deities and, to paraphrase Freedman (1967:95), are generally conceived of as benevolent and will only be provoked when they suffer neglect or want to draw their descendants' attention to certain matters (see the house-restoration example in chapter two). Sacrifices to ancestors therefore were said, on the one hand, to make their forebears enjoy a comfortable life in the other world, and on the other, to enable the living to avoid unhappiness and punishment at the hands of ancestors. But, the above is only true for the dead who can be unquestionably incorporated into the group of ancestors being worshipped by their patrilineal descendants. In reality, the sacrificial rite is usually held to appease or console the dead who are outside of the proper category of ancestors. This includes those who died as children, women who died without marrying, women who married but who bore no male offspring, or sojourners who died far away from home. Before the sacrifices, dead of this type are conceived of as ghosts, and spirit mediums may confirm that they are the source of misfortune to a family in question. As such, the practice of *bai waizu* and making sacrifices to kin who suffered untimely death is a way of distinguishing a spiritual being from ghosts, or a means of transforming a threatening ghost into an ancestor who acts for the benefit of the living (cf. Puett 2013:93). In sum, it can be seen that the cautious and vigilant attitude the villagers take toward the power of spiritual beings constitutes a compelling force for people to continue the sacrificial rite for both the "normal ancestors" and the ancestors outside of the normal category.

As was seen above, the five categories of ancestor worship that Madam Lu attends to suggest the multiple relationships which together constitute her moral, emotional, familial and social world. Through the ritual of ancestral sacrifices, she relates herself to the dead and the living, and is thereby able to reorient her sense of self in the world. Lu's attendance to *tsuèkī* for her adoptive family can be construed as an expression of her emotional bond with her adoptive family, especially with *a-tsóo*,

and her filial sentiment of returning the debt created by her adoption, despite the fact that in her case she was more the provider of *yang* than the receiver. Her offerings, on her son's behalf, to the ancestors who were the original owners of the house in which she now lives refers to her ties with her son as well as her reciprocal relationship with the original property-owners. Her performance of sacrifices to her husband and the ancestors of his agnatic line indicates her status as a member of the extended patrilineal family and her future position integrated into the group of ancestors worshipped by her sons and their offspring after her death. Altogether, Lu's case illustrates that a married woman may make sacrifices to ancestral beings from various sources, and the multiple relationships with the dead and the living that a female worshipper establishes or substantiates through the ritual become her motivations for continuing the practices. Moreover, belief in the power of spiritual beings, by the female worshipper herself and/or the community in which she lives may provide an impelling force that drives a woman to carry out the ritual in order to transform a capricious ghost into a benevolent ancestor. The importance of belief in motivating worship will be seen again in the next section.

The constraints on worship: women's different attitudes on *pàipài* responsibilities

Following on from the argument of the previous section that a female worshipper relates herself to the dead and the living and reorients her sense of self through the ancestral ritual, this section discusses women's self-orientation and the relationships she forms with people in the close-knit community via the general practices of *pàipài*. Using my ethnography, I show how these relationships with others may come to be experienced as a source of external pressure on women to continue the practices of *pàipài*, and how this in turn may provoke attempts to abandon the *pàipài* practices and break off the associated relationships.

As discussed in the first section, my female informants confirmed that they began to learn the ways of performing *pàipài* to various spiritual beings after moving into their husbands' home. Though they might have been reluctant to do *pàipài* at the beginning, they said that they have “*bai xiguan le*” (lit. *pàipài* has become their habit).

The village women not only include *pàipài* in their daily routine but also become concerned if they cannot perform a particular worship at the appointed time. For example, when a woman has planned a trip away from home, she always considers the potential clash with a particular day of *pàipài*. My female informants frequently told me and other women that they were busy because they were shortly going away for a few days and they had to finish preparing the sacrificial food and worship gods or ancestors properly before they left. And, when they made the offerings, they must, in the first instance, ask gods or ancestors for understanding and forgiveness for their advancing the time of worship. This clearly indicates my female interlocutors were concerned both about *pàipài* and how others evaluated their actions. When I heard about such matters, I wondered to myself why my informants were so worried about missing a particular *pàipài* and why they bothered to reveal this to others. This is particularly intriguing as they do *tsuèkī* at home and thus no other people outside the household would otherwise learn about it.⁵⁴ To understand my informants' behaviour, it is helpful to recall my discussion in the preceding section of people's cautious attitude toward ancestral interference (i.e., their "belief" in the power of ancestral spirits) and the socially-sanctioned morality of filial piety.

During my fieldwork, I never encountered any cases in which ancestors were said to punish their offspring for their negligence about worship, but I often heard remarks about people's cautiousness about making any modifications to the worship routine. For example, one woman who works outside the village and was struggling to combine her career and her duty to worship threw blocks to obtain the ancestors' permission to change the time of *tsuèkī* from ten to seven o'clock in the morning. However, her act of changing the custom in this way put her under pressure from her extended family, who declared that she would be blamed if any subsequent misfortune occurred. By this logic, a household's peace and harmony is linked to a woman (as daughter-in-law, wife and mother) fulfilling her filial duty of ancestor worship, even though under the

⁵⁴ In contrast, as the regular worship of the troops of village temple gods is implemented outside the house, the act of worship is apparently observed by the neighbouring households. Some younger women revealed to me that the examining eyes of neighbours, especially senior women, together with comments or questions did pressure them into carry out this public worship.

patrilineal-cum-Confucian ideology it should be her husband's duty. In other words, ancestor worship matters a great deal to a woman's personal reputation as a filial daughter-in-law, a competent wife and a careful mother. This logic is also applicable to women's devout worship of gods. As Sangren (2000a, 2000b) argues, women's prayer to gods was always more about the well-being of the members of their conjugal families than about their selves and, therefore, their ritual practices indicate their compliance with the patriarchal model of women's roles in terms of viewing their marital families as the top priority.

Furthermore, given the great emphasis on ancestor worship throughout Jinmen,⁵⁵ a newly married-in woman soon acknowledges the pressure for her to follow the duty of worship, especially when she lives with her parents-in-law and has no formal career outside home. The pressure is not merely from her parents-in-law but also from the women of the families which are genealogically close to her husband's family. Women of families which belong to the same lineage branch bring sacrifices to the subordinate ancestral halls (*zongci*) or ancestral houses on given days to make offerings together to the common ancestors. Despite the feeling of obligation and pressure, women who worship common ancestors often become good friends and form their particular circle, distinct from the female circles revolving around other worshipping units. Through practicing ancestor worship, a female new-comer gains access to a particular women's community (cf. Wolf 1972) and a place of belonging where she can seek advice and assistance from experienced female seniors regarding various customs and household matters. For example, a Taiwan-born woman in her early sixties, who accompanied her husband back to Qionglin after several decades of life in Taiwan, told me that she was not interested in the cult of local deities at all because "everywhere we can find gods [to worship]", and therefore she only participated in the village temple festivals occasionally for fun. However, she asserted her deeper concern with ancestor worship, adding that because her own mother-in-law had died before their return she tried her

⁵⁵ One informant told me that the emphasis on ancestor worship is illustrated by the Jinmen households' placing the ancestral tablets on the left-hand side of the domestic altar (facing the house's gate) as the left-hand side signifies a superior position. In contrast, in most households in Taiwan, the left-hand side is reserved for placing gods' statues (cf. Feuchtwang 1974:107).

best to learn the local ways of conducting the sacrificial rites and other customs from several senior female relatives in the village. Her efforts at learning have apparently been beneficial to her good relationships with a number of female villagers and her inclusion into the wider kin community.

The above discussion demonstrates that *pàipài* for a married-in woman is not merely about fulfilling the ritual obligations imposed on her, but is a complicated matter that impacts upon her relationships to different people and involves finding herself a place in her marital family and the extended kin community. As a new member entering into her husband's family, a young woman's docile practice of domestic worship under her mother-in-law's guidance was the first step necessary for her to be recognized by the new family. Whether or not the young woman would later give birth to a son by which she could secure her position in her husband's family in the traditional sense (though this emphasis on male offspring is not as strong today as it was before), her careful and conscientious practices of domestic worship earned her positive evaluations from senior members of the family and the women's community. Though in the beginning the young woman might be reluctant to worship her husband's ancestors, as time passed by she became familiar with *pàipài* and came to instinctively address her husband's ancestors as if they were her ancestors. She gradually viewed *pàipài* as part of her everyday routine and felt less frequently that she was an outsider in her husband's family. However, she would now and then be reminded of her "outsider" status by her mother-in-law, family seniors and the kin community, which made her feel pressured and frustrated. In response, she might try to assert her "insider" status by her continued devout practices of domestic worship. However, the situation seems to be changing and many younger women appear not to accept this way of confirming their insider status.

As noted in the introduction to this chapter, it is not uncommon to hear younger women claiming that they want to get as far away from all kinds of *pàipài* as possible. One female informant in her twenties told me that the native young women tend to avoid marrying local men or choose to marry Jinmen-born men who work and reside in Taiwan or elsewhere partly because they are afraid of the many *pàipài* duties in

most native households. Their observation of their mothers' practices of *pàipài* have left them with negative impressions about how they consume so much of women's time and confine them to the domestic domain and within narrow social circles. But the younger generation's avoidance of it is not merely because *pàipài* is deemed a bothersome, traditional practice with some superstitious overtones. It is also because the women's communities built up around the units of worship appear to exert so much pressure on village women that the prospect of getting caught up in them is intimidating and frightening. Young women commented in a negative tone that these narrow female circles are usually the source of gossip, exaggerated rumours and unreasonable criticisms.

For the women who married into Jinmen from Taiwan or other countries, the daughter-in-law's work of performing *pàipài* is understandably a difficult assignment. The difficulty lies less in their being requested to do *pàipài* than in their being taught to do *pàipài* in specific ways. For example, a young woman from Mainland China, who lives in the market town of Jinmen after marriage but visits her husband's natal village on the days of *tsuèkī*, complained to me about the efforts involved in the rite, particularly in terms of the troublesome preparation of sufficient sacrificial food, which was more than the family could consume within one or two meals afterward. Also, she does not like the solution of storing food in the refrigerator for days or even weeks as many elderly women do. She recalled that in her hometown in southeast China people only worship ancestors of the three most recent generations on important festivals such as Qingming, with simple offerings—three kinds of meat (pork, chicken and fish) and fruit, which is of great contrast to the situation in Jinmen. But, when I hinted at potential changes in the future, she objected to this idea immediately by saying that she cannot change it because "these are the customs passed down from ancestors". During fieldwork I heard similar responses from many young women, who do not find *pàipài* superstitious or bad but have opinions on how to do it. Several women remarked to me that they had encountered problems persuading their mothers-in-law to simplify the types of food offerings (to use more easily-prepared and easily-stored food such as fruits and biscuits to replace cooked meat and fish) or to use food

that the living like to eat. It is hard to tell whether the seniors' insistence on the old ways of preparing offerings is out of their sincere belief that ancestors only want to enjoy certain kinds of offerings or out of their inclination to do things in the ways they are familiar with and to object to any proposals made by their daughters-in-law. Altogether, sacrificial food constitutes one major originator of disputes between mothers-in-law and daughters-in-law, and the main aspect of the family transmission of ritual practices over which younger women are reluctant to defer to their seniors.

Moreover, some young daughters-in-law feel pressured by their senior kin's insistence on continuing to worship remote ancestors separately on the dates of their individual deaths, even though they have obtained permission from ancestors to install an inclusive tablet and worship them together on the two appointed days every year.⁵⁶ Another problem is the timing of *tsuèkī*, which should be around ten o'clock in the morning, which clashes with the young women's working hours. I knew of some cases in which the young daughters-in-law were only able to take part-time jobs—implicitly or explicitly demanded by their seniors—which allowed them to adjust their timetable to the duty of *tsuèkī* (as well as the duty to take care of all the other household chores). However, as some women clearly stated, a formal career outside—particularly a job in the public sector which is a respected occupation in local terms—usually allows a daughter-in-law, with the support from her parents-in-law, to rid herself of the obligations of *pàipài* and most other household chores. Notably, in the situation where an elderly couple have several daughters-in-law, the level of worship duties for these younger women may vary according to their parents-in-law's attitudes. From the perspective of daughters-in-law, the unfair treatment meted out by their parents-in-law could consist of one or more of the following: (1) the responsibility for *pàipài* tends to fall heavier on daughters-in-law coming from poorer households in China or Southeast

⁵⁶ I was told that, in order to gain permission to make a single, inclusive tablet (*lidai zuxian zongpai*) for all the ancestors more than three generations removed from the generation of the household head and then worship the ancestors included on that specific tablet on the two appointed days in spring and autumn, the living descendants should firstly light incense sticks in front of all the tablets of remote ancestors at the domestic altar. The offspring should then ask for permission and throw blocks to learn the ancestors' response. Some people carry out their plan after receiving one positive response from ancestors, but some people are more prudent and only change their practices after receiving three successive positive responses from ancestors.

Asian countries than that on Taiwan-born or Jinmen-born daughters-in-law; (2) the responsibility for *paipai* tends to be heavier for women without formal careers than for women with respected occupations (e.g., school teachers, governmental employees, etc.); (3) the responsibility for *paipai* tends to be heavier for wives of the less favoured sons, who are asked to stay in Jinmen to take care of their parents, than for wives of the favoured sons, who are encouraged to develop their careers elsewhere. The young women's feeling of unfairness often resulted in their resentment towards their parents-in-law or other family members, though they tended to express this feeling very implicitly.

Whatever the ages and birthplaces of the married-in women are, the women's communities formed upon the units of ancestor worship are not always warm or helpful, but, from time to time, may be stressful and unwelcoming. The gossip, rumours and unreasonable criticism within these exclusive communities that dissuades native girls from participating in the local marriage market are also disliked and resented by the married-in women. As mentioned earlier, my female interlocutors often revealed their concerns about *paipai* to other women, but they did so in a way which emphasized their diligent fulfilment of their duties as daughters-in-law, wives and mothers, and thereby precluded the risk of social critique. A young daughter-in-law, given her inferior status in the community, is more vulnerable to the criticism of her seniors. For example, a Taiwan-born female had the support of her own mother-in-law for her formal career away from the village and her correspondingly reduced level of worship duties, but some elderly women criticized her, telling her mother-in-law, "This Taiwan-born daughter-in-law did not help with *paipai* in the Chinese New Year [the peak time of ancestor worship] and even thought about going back to her natal family". The emphasis on the young woman's origin in Taiwan (or anywhere else other than Jinmen) was very often present in the negative comments of local elderly women on the performance of their or other women's daughters-in-law, despite the fact that their own married-out daughters also struggle to manage the burdens of *paipai*. Moreover, this kind of criticism that emphasizes the daughter-in-law's continuing ties to her natal family implies a paradoxical feeling that the senior women may have. On

the one hand, they understood the young daughter-in-law's desire to visit her natal family during the Chinese New Year (an occasion for family reunion) as they may have had the same feeling during their initial years of marriage. On the other hand, they thought the young woman should acknowledge the fact that after marriage a woman should give her husband's family priority over her natal family.

Though above I have described the intergenerational frictions revolving around the work of *pàipài*, I also knew many old ladies who carry out domestic worship on their own either because all of their sons and daughters-in-law live outside Jinmen or because the young couples intentionally escape this responsibility. I asked the elderly women in this situation what would happen about the arrangements for *pàipài* after their death. "The future is none of my business. Let the children decide themselves!" was typical of the responses I often received from my informants. An old couple who are always conscientious about the ancestral sacrifices at the domestic and the lineage levels revealed to me privately that they have obtained their family ancestors' permission to set up an inclusive tablet for all the ancestors of recent generations (who are currently worshipped individually), and they will tell their children not to set up ancestral tablets for them when they die. This is to allow their sons, who all reside in Taiwan, to be largely relieved from the work of performing sacrificial rites after their parents' death. The old couple reminded me that this arrangement cannot be revealed to other villagers who may disagree with or even criticise their decision. It is likely that dilemmas over the continuation of the practices of ancestor worship appear in every family in Jinmen upon the death of the older generation. However, it seems that this struggle has become even more significant in the post-conflict era which has featured by the persistent outflow of younger generations and the decline of agricultural work which used to bind many men and their wives to their homes in the village. The cases described above suggest that the decision on whether or not to worship ancestors in the customary ways is in the hands of the living offspring, though their decision tends to be influenced by other social forces and, possibly, also by ancestral interference.

Conclusion

In the novel by the local writer Chen Chang-Qing, which was discussed above, there is a passage describing the widowed woman, together with her orphaned niece and her own son, preparing the food for the ancestral sacrifices on the day of winter solstice (2008:36-44). The author explains that although the islanders of Jinmen lived a tough life during the peak of military attacks by the Chinese Communists without enough food for their own daily needs, they could not leave the ancestral beings unattended. Even in the very poor households, such as that of the widowed woman in the novel, people did their best to prepare various kinds of sacrifices that could cover the entire surface of the sacrificial table. Instead of meat and fish, which were supposed to be the main sacrifices to the ancestors on important sacrificial dates, the widow made use of crops she grew herself and the food distributed by the military to produce several sacrificial dishes. She led the two children through the steps of the correct procedure to perform sacrifices to the ancestors. And, when she was holding the incense sticks to greet the ancestors, she asked the ancestors to bless and protect all the members of her household, to end the Communists' artillery attacks, and to assure them of a great harvest in the coming year.

The above portrait demonstrating the continuities of domestic worship as performed by ordinary villagers irrespective of the military attacks and economic difficulties—something which is also confirmed by my elderly informants as their lived experiences in the Cold War period. In line with the argument that I made in the previous chapter on the lineage ancestral ritual, the recurring cycle of worshipping gods, ghosts, and ancestors year after year constitutes one way through which the islanders maintained a particular pattern of arranging time and particular channels of relating to human and non-human beings. By this means they attained senses of order and stability or minimized senses of disorder and uncertainty generated from the broader political and military standoff. However, Jinmen civilians' experience of military conflicts also had effects on the local interpretations and practices of worshipping spiritual beings. The senior villagers who witnessed the Chinese Communists' attacks affirmed their belief in the power and efficacy of the local deities,

which were said to protect their adherents from serious damage to life and property. The tragic death caused by the Communists' shelling resulted in the living's taking up the abnormal arrangement of ancestor worship in order to console the dead and give solace to their grief-stricken relatives.

Nonetheless, despite the continuities in domestic worship, as shown in the third section, the differences between the senior and the younger generations regarding the ritual practices are very obvious in contemporary Jinmen. The social-economic changes over the twentieth century have to a large extent affected women's economic activities and local marriage patterns, which in turn have contributed to local-born, young women's expression of their desire to avoid *pàipài*. Significantly, the young females voiced their desire to avoid *pàipài* by saying that they want to get away from the closed women's circles revolving around the worship of spiritual beings, which they felt had bound their mothers within narrow social worlds for decades. In other words, the young women attempt to detach themselves from the local social fabric which has been maintained by the continuation of various ritual activities through which the participants initiate and maintain relationships with one another. For the married-in women from Taiwan, China or Southeast Asian countries, their acceptance or refusal of the duty of domestic worship is also related to what kind of relationship they want to keep with the members of their marital families, the women's worshipping units, and the wider kin community. While the young daughters-in-law accept the duty of domestic worship, they may have formal jobs outside the village or have different priorities, so, with or without support from their senior members of family, they attempt to adjust the ritual practices to suit their needs. As such, the transmission of ritual practices between generations does not involve the young people's total deference to their seniors, but the changes (e.g., to the timing of the sacrifices or to what kind of food is sacrificed) tend to have no bearing on the reasons why the rituals have to be done. Interestingly, the decreasing proportion of young villagers who stay home and continue the domestic worship after the death of their parents might be predicted to disrupt to some extent the forms of sociality revolving around the worship of various spiritual beings. However, other kinds of social

activities such as the lineage ancestral sacrifices and funerary rites described elsewhere in this thesis may still counter-act this and help to maintain the vitality of certain kin-based social networks.

Chapter Five

Funeral, Cooperation and Local Social Networks

During my fifteen months of fieldwork in Jimmen, I observed six grand funerals for local people who had died in old age (“elderly dead” hereafter): five in Qionglin and one in another smaller village. As my informants stressed, these funerals were carried out in accordance with the “ancient manners” (*gufa*) and I was struck by the similarities with the funerals that scholars have described as “traditional” in various parts of Chinese society (cf. Watson & Rawski eds. 1988). While the emphasis was on the persistence of the ancient manners, which may refer to a particular set of funerary rites and customs, my informants also pointed out two major new phenomena that I want to focus on in this chapter. The first is the enlargement of the funeral in terms of the number of people and the amount of material consumption involved. One senior male informant told me that it was impossible to hold such grand funerals in the earlier period of military control when life was very tough and the poor families of the same lineage branch had needed to set up the burial association (*huzhuhui*) to help each other, physically and financially, to complete the funeral. As living standards gradually improved, the burial association eventually disappeared, but the spirit of mutual help between kin has been preserved and is still manifested in the current ways of organizing funerals. Nowadays the funerals for elderly dead in the large lineage villages such as Qionglin tend to involve a large proportion of kin from the village serving as voluntary helpers with various mortuary affairs. As a result, there is limited reliance on the commercial providers of funerary services that are very popular in contemporary Taiwan. The enlarged scale of funerals has also been accompanied by an increasing level of material consumption, including the gifts that flow between the bereaved family and the funeral helpers and attendees. Indeed, the lavishness of these grand funerals has now reached a level that would have been unimaginable during the previous decades of economic hardship.

The second new phenomenon identified by my informants is the regular involvement of the official bodies in the funerals of ordinary households, which is

something that emerged late in the period of military control. As mentioned in chapter one, the modern regimes of the KMT and the CCP took different approaches of reforming the popular religions and customs during the Cold War period. The CCP which took control of the Mainland from 1949 showed a firmer attitude by launching a series of drastic movements, which caused great damage to various religious and customary objects and practices, including funerary rituals (cf. Whyte 1988). In rivalry with the CCP, the KMT on Taiwan responded to what was happening on the Mainland and proposed to “revive the traditional Chinese culture” (*fuxing Zhonghua wenhua*), with particular emphasis given to the Confucian values which the KMT viewed as helpful for cultivating a sense of loyalty to the nation. The effects of this policy allowed conventional ritual practices to survive in most rural areas, even in military-controlled Jinmen. More significantly, the government’s modernized version of funerary etiquette and the state’s official bodies were incorporated in the funerals of ordinary households without conflict with the pre-existent funerary customs. As such, in contrast to the situation in contemporary China, where the “traditional” funerary rites have to be “revived” (cf. Oxfeld 2004), the funerals in Jinmen involve the coexistence of conventional funerary rites, which have been continued uninterrupted, and the new funerary etiquette promoted by the modern state since the days of military control.

In line with the attention to the correlation between ritual activities and interpersonal relationships in chapters three and four, this chapter explores how the funerary event provokes the establishment or consolidation of the different sets of social relationships in local society, and its significance to state-society relations during and after the period of military governance. The chapter is focused on funerals for the elderly dead, which tend to be the most elaborate and observable by ethnographers. This is related to the patrilineal-cum-Confucian ideologies, under which the scale and complexity of funerary rituals are meant to vary according to the status of the dead. The funerals of young people who die before their time are ritually less intricate and relatively poorly attended because the dead are thought to have failed in fulfilling their obligations in life (to have children, to bury their parents, etc.). In contrast, the funerals of elderly people are considered “white happy events” that should

entail elaborate rituals and a very large audience, as well as banquets to thank the volunteer helpers and attendees, which together require a great cash outlay by ordinary households.⁵⁷ This kind of expensive and elaborate funeral is prevalent in Jinmen today, especially in the lineage villages, and, as I will demonstrate through the ethnography of this chapter, such funerals involve webs of relationships that are more complicated than those involved in the ancestral rituals discussed in the previous chapters. This is because the white happy events not only draw in the collective efforts of the bereaved family's kin community but also a large body of guests of different social positions, especially members of local official bodies and political personnel. Using the same analytical approach as in the previous chapters, I scrutinize how human and material resources are mobilized and organized in a white happy event so as to unpack the significance of the funeral in sustaining the local patterns of social intercourse, including the interaction between ordinary households and local authorities.

An important and distinctive contribution of this chapter is that uses the idea of cooperation to analyse the multiple social relationships involved in the white happy events. In doing so it distinguishes three sets of cooperative relationships: (1) cooperation between parents and children; (2) cooperation between kin; (3) cooperation between non-kin. By singling out the angle of cooperation that indicates the co-efforts of two or more agents in achieving the common target, I attempt to add new analytical and theoretical light to the ways in which the Chinese funeral has been discussed in existing studies. For example, in her study of revived funerary rituals in post-reform China, Ellen Oxfeld (2004) argues that the ritual revival is prompted by the living's deeply internalized sense of moral debt to the dead and the confirmation or establishment of a family's status. In response, I suggest that by looking at funerals through the lens of cooperation, it is possible to complement Oxfeld's observations on the motivations of children to hold grand funerals for their parents, by also giving due recognition to the efforts made by the elderly themselves to ensure they receive ritually

⁵⁷ Funerals for the elderly dead are “white happy events” and these are viewed as are analogous to weddings, or “red happy events”, in the sense that both events are deemed to be the realization of particular life stages and should therefore be ritually celebrated.

proper funerals after their own deaths.

The angle of cooperation is also valuable for further enriching the discussion of the links between Chinese sociality and ritual organization, to which Adam Chau (2004) has made an important contribution. With a shift of attention from the ritual-procedural aspects (which have long been the focus in the anthropological studies of Chinese funerals) to the hosting aspects, Chau contends that the success of a white happy event is grounded on the common characteristics of social organization present in both the ritual activities and the secular life of ordinary Chinese. Examples of these common characteristics include volunteerism based on the principle of reciprocity and the symbolic weight placed upon the importance of being a good host. I take Chau's insights but found that his discussion tended to focus on the perspective of the family staging the funeral, without further explorations of the motivations of other participants. It is in this respect that the angle of cooperation is helpful for investigating the motives of agents of divergent statuses and social positions in contributing to a successful funerary event.

In my discussion, I will explore further the cultural mechanisms suggested in Oxfeld's and Chau's studies which ensure cooperation in white happy events, such as the ideas of filial piety (moral debt to parents), status, reciprocity and hospitality. In addition, I also bring in Sperber and Baumard's (2012) thesis that combines evolutionary and cognitive approaches to examine the relationships between morality, reputation and human cooperation. This provides an inspiring theoretical lens through which to examine the intriguing fact that grand funerals are favoured and supported by both the locals and the official bodies in contemporary Jinmen despite consuming so many human and material resources. Altogether, by unpacking the multiple relationships in a funerary event from the perspective of cooperation, this chapter is aimed at demonstrating how a white happy event in Jinmen today forms an exemplary model of local social networks (including the relationship between ordinary people and political authorities) and, as such, the ritually complicated and economically expensive funeral practice tends to be maintained.

The first section that follows describes the general pattern of how white happy

events are organized and conducted in Jinmen. It also demonstrates how the previous KMT-military government was, and the present local authorities still are, involved in the funerals of ordinary residents. The second section analyses the three kinds of cooperative relationships involved and the mechanisms that keep cooperation on track, with reference to the anthropological scholarship on Chinese funerals and Sperber and Baumard's (2012) thesis on the relationship between morality and reputation. The third section deals with the personal reflections of participants on the type of large-scale funerals that have become a prevalent mode in contemporary Jinmen. It discusses these reflections by drawing on the analytical distinction between ethics and morals proposed by anthropologists (cf. Laidlaw 2002, 2013; Stafford 2010, 2013), which sheds light on the contestation between the mode that is socially promoted and the mode that is personally judged as proper or good. The chapter concludes with a brief comparison between my ethnography of Jinmen and Oxfeld's (2004) study of funerals in China, which illustrates how the different attitudes toward religious and customary practices between the KMT and the CCP during the Cold War era have resulted in differences in the practice and perception of funerals by ordinary people on the two sides.

The white happy events on Jinmen

The following description of a typical “white happy” funeral for the elderly dead (i.e., those who had enjoyed a long life, had male offspring and had finally passed away at home) mainly draws on my personal observations in Qionglin village. However, on the basis of my attendance of a funeral in another village and the studies of local intellectuals (Yang & Lin 1997), I contend that it reflects the common pattern for such events throughout Jinmen. Below I separate the white happy event into several stages, summarizing the duties of the bereaved family and the involvement of kin and non-kin participants in each stage. Despite some differences in the details, the ritual-procedural aspects of the funerals in Jinmen are similar to those summarized by Watson (1988a), which are largely based on the imperial neo-Confucian scholar Zhu Xi's simplified version of funerary rites. Local intellectuals also highlight this point

and emphasize that Zhu Xi once gave lectures in Jinmen and had a far-reaching influence on local ritual etiquette. However, instead of the details and meanings of the funeral rituals and customs, I highlight the various tasks that suggest cooperation between different agents and the flow of abundant material resources. I also demonstrate how the modern state's modified funeral etiquette and the official bodies are incorporated in the funerals of ordinary households.

Before the occurrence of death

It is generally believed among the people of Jinmen that a good end to one's life should occur at the native place. The customs require moving the dying person to the main area of the ancestral house where the ancestral tablets are placed, and laying out the person on a bed of boards supported by benches. Usually, no external assistance is needed at this moment but the lineage *gongjia* would keep an eye on the ongoing developments. A difficult situation happened during my fieldwork, when an elderly woman was asked to help with cleaning and dressing another dying lady who had been staying in the ancestral house for days. The female helper never openly expressed her fear of touching the dying body but she refused to attend a wedding banquet during that period because of her own and the other villagers' concerns about her association with something "unclean". She nevertheless murmured to me that she had no other choice but to help out because both she and the sick lady are daughters-in-law of the same lineage branch.

Upon the occurrence of death

The bereaved family enters the period of *shou ling* (lit. attending the soul of the dead). The family members change into mourning clothing immediately and (sons and daughters-in-law in particular) constantly attend beside the corpse to avoid any inauspicious situations. They also go through a series of customs that continue up until the corpse is enclosed in the coffin and a soul tablet for the deceased is installed on a temporary altar set up in front of the coffin. They should then attend constantly beside the coffin until the burial day, during which time the relatives and friends of the dead

and the bereaved family come successively to pay respect to the dead by offering incense sticks before the temporary altar.

The bereaved family relies on the experienced lineage men to contact the businesses selling funerary paraphernalia, such as coffins and mourning attire. Also, an important task at this moment is to choose the day for the formal funeral ceremony and burial. The bereaved family selects an auspicious date for burial according to folk beliefs (some dates are considered particularly good or bad according to the timing and date of the deceased's birth) or on the basis of advice from a ritual specialist, and then ask for the permission and guidance of the main deity of the village temple. In present-day Jinmen people tend to choose a date falling on the weekend in order to have more funeral attendees, especially guests who are public employees or work away in Taiwan or elsewhere.

Before the day of burial

Various things must be done after the decision of the burial date, such as employing the ritual experts (usually Daoists) and music bands, formally sending the death notification to affines if the deceased is female, publishing the obituary notice in the local government-owned newspaper (*Jinmen Daily News*), and preparing the mourning accessories for the funeral helpers and attendants. The bereaved family counts on their kin and neighbours for the above tasks as they should concentrate on their own mourning duties.

There is evidently labour division between male and female helpers. The educated and experienced men assist in formal work such as arranging the ceremony and preparing the obituary notice for the newspaper. Notably, the publishing of obituary notices in the local newspaper is a new practice which probably emerged around the mid-1980s and has quickly become a popular practice in Jinmen.⁵⁸ The

⁵⁸ One informant told me that the practice of publishing obituary notices in newspapers initially appeared on Taiwan and was originally the privilege of wealthy people. Around the mid-1980s, an employee of *Jinmen Daily News* adopted this practice for his father's funeral, which aroused the islanders' interest in imitating this practice more widely. In addition to publishing obituary notices, local people nowadays buy the advertisement pages of local newspaper to publish various kinds of congratulatory messages including those for engagements, marriages and job promotions for employees of public institutions. The use of newspapers in this way constitutes a new medium for

obituary notice usually covers half of one newspaper page and consists of two lists: one list of the *zhisang weiyuanhui* (lit. a committee dealing with the funerary affairs) comprising the magistrate of Jinmen county and the department directors of the county government; the other list is of the deceased's living spouse and siblings, and descendants by birth, adoption, and marriage. The idea of the *zhisang weiyuanhui* originated in the *Guomin liyi fanli* (lit. the etiquette model for nationals) proposed by the KMT-led government in 1970. In principle, such committees are established only for the dead who had made important contributions to the nation or society, or who had honourable virtues. My informants said that the setting up of the *zhisang weiyuanhui* became a popular practice for funerals of ordinary elderly dead in Jinmen following the emergence of the practice of publishing obituary notices in the newspaper. In this context the *zhisang weiyuanhui* is a nominal organization, without involvement in the actual arranging of funerals. However, on the day of the formal funeral ceremony, the magistrate and local officials may attend the *gongji* (lit. public ceremony) to pay respect to the dead. The nominal existence of *zhisang weiyuanhui*—which are not found in Taiwan—and the popularity of publishing obituary notices in the government-owned newspaper are intriguing, as is the fact that they both came into fashion from the late 1980s. I suggest that these characteristics of funerals in Jinmen are indicative of the attempts by the military government to portray a positive image and to cement good relationships with local society during a period in which military preparedness on the island was still deemed necessary even though the relationship with the CCP was beginning to improve.

As with their unseen but important roles in the lineage's ancestral ritual, women help with various tasks, which appear more informal and private, but that are essential to the satisfactory completion of a funeral. During the period of *shou ling*, the daughters-in-law of the deceased are discouraged from cooking as they are assumed to be too sorrowful to eat. It is fortunate if they can rely on their female relatives (usually the daughters-in-law of the same lineage branch) to prepare at least the daily dinner. This can be a tough job because the number of mourners during this period

consolidating local social networks.

sometimes reaches forty or fifty and this can continue for one to two weeks. The village women, especially those who belong to the same lineage branch, also offer a helping hand in folding paper printed with Buddhist scriptures into the shapes of lotus flowers and *yuanbao* (gold ingots) that are eventually burned to help smooth the way of the deceased to the western paradise (*xifang jile shijie*) where the soul might go to avoid the endless cycle of reincarnation (cf. Oxfeld 2004:972). This is also a new element imported from Taiwan in recent decades, and my elderly female informants appeared fond of and skilled at this practice. They usually do this work in the house of the bereaved family, where they spend one to two hours chatting with their female acquaintances and some members of the bereaved family. A few days prior to the funeral ceremony, they gather together again to prepare the mourning cloth, face towels and auspicious red strings for the funeral participants. As with the mutual help and gathering involved in the ancestor worship beyond the domestic sphere (discussed in chapter three), their collaboration in the funerals is one channel through which village women build up and consolidate their affective relationships—though again the sense of moral obligation is also pressing.

Condolence gifts⁵⁹ from kin, friends, colleagues, local political figures and official bodies also arrive at the house of the bereaved family during this period. These are displayed outside the house and, in the eyes of the villagers, they are an evident mark of the *mianzi* (status or social reputation) of the deceased and the bereaved family (cf. Oxfeld 2004:975).

The host family rewards the male helpers who assist in carrying the coffin and other funerary items on the burial day with tobacco wrapped in the mourning cloth prepared by the village women. On the eve of the burial, the host family also arranges a simple banquet for close kin and certain essential voluntary helpers to thank them for their support. In the past, the banquet used to be entirely dependent on the unpaid assistance of the host family's female relatives and neighbours, but it is now prepared by the commercial catering services that appeared in Jinmen from the 1990s.

⁵⁹ Typically, condolence gifts included elegantly designed pots of flowers, stylized piles of bottled or canned drinks, and scrolls with condolence messages. The fashion for such items was learned from Taiwan in recent decades as the living standards of Jinmen households greatly improved.

Upon the day of funeral ceremony and burial

As the funeral ceremony is set to begin at noon, multiple preparations begin simultaneously from the early morning. These include digging a hole for the coffin at the chosen grave site (most households choose to bury the dead in the public cemetery), getting the site of the ceremony ready, and preparing food for mourners and funeral helpers, all of which are carried out by kin with some assistance from paid professionals. The village men help with setting up the ceremonial site, placing a long table covered with sacrificial offerings in the middle of an open area right in front of the deceased's ancestral home—a location that allows the ancestors to witness the departure of their descendant. Some metres away from the ceremonial site, female villagers cook porridge for the kin mourners, helpers and guests to eat as the funeral will last three to four hours with no interval for lunch. More condolence gifts from guests and kin, such as cash (the amount is usually low) and bed linen, are received at a table set up beside the ceremonial site.

In the meantime, the deceased's close kin gather together in front of the coffin at the ancestral house and follow the guidance of a Daoist specialist in the performance of the ritual of *zhuan xifeng* (lit. turning the west wind, which is to send the dead to the western paradise), while a traditional music ensemble plays mortuary tunes at the side. At the appointed time for the funeral ceremony, several village men carry the coffin to the designated site, where the Daoist leads the mourners to implement the last round of the *zhuan xifeng* ritual. The funeral ceremony for people to pay their final respects to the dead consists of two parts: the first is the *jiashi* (family ceremony) for the deceased's kin and affines; the second is the *gongji* (public ceremony) for non-kin individuals and groups. Several experienced lineage men take the positions of master of ceremonies, addressor of mortuary scripts and ritual assistants that are crucial to the performance of the ceremony. Throughout the family and public ceremonies, the deceased's offspring queue and kneel down in order according to their statuses, and a long queue extends from the sacrificial table to the rear of the ceremonial space where the coffin is placed.

The family ceremony is carried out in a traditional manner in terms of the way

people pay respect to the dead and the use of a traditional music band; it is basically consistent with the neo-Confucian ritual etiquette. It begins with the deceased's immediate offspring (sons, daughters-in-law and grandsons) who kneel and move to the front of the sacrificial table, kowtowing and offering drink to the dead. The addressor then recites the mortuary script for the deceased on behalf of the deceased's direct offspring; after that, the offspring kneel and move back to their previous positions. Afterward, the master of ceremonies gives orders for the deceased's other descendants, siblings and affines to pay respect to the dead. The precise etiquette of paying respect to the deceased varies according the individual's particular relationship with the deceased—everyone offers incense sticks, kneels down and kowtows, but those who are junior and closer to the dead repeat these acts more times.

The public ceremony is usually set to begin at half past noon (as noted in the obituary notice in the local newspaper), and must be started on time so as not to let the guests wait.⁶⁰ As mentioned above, there is a nominal funerary committee (*zhisang weiyuanhui*) consisting of the magistrate of Jinmen county and the directors of the county departments. The magistrate usually attends the ceremony in person, together with several representatives from the county government. If the magistrate is absent, the county government still sends a number of representatives to the ceremony. The military bases on Jinmen and the local branches of political parties also send representatives. It is common on Taiwan, especially during the election period, that political personnel of various kinds attend the funerals of ordinary households, even those which have no obvious political and official connections. But in Jinmen, the presence of the official bodies and the political personnel in the funerals of ordinary households are not occasional but routine, and there are even more attendees from the candidates' camps during the election period. The attendees at the public ceremony also come from the social networks of the deceased and the bereaved family, including friends, colleagues, members of common-surname associations (*zongqinhui*), and so on. The public ceremony proceeds according to the procedures noted in the

⁶⁰ In situations when a large number of people attend the family ceremony, the master of ceremonies would suspend the family ceremony to allow the public ceremony to commence first.

aforementioned *Guomin liyi fanli* (the etiquette model for nationals), and the traditional music band is replaced by a western music band. The group led by the magistrate is the first to pay respect to the dead, proceeding through a sequence of offering incense sticks, flowers, drinks and fruits, the reciting of the mortuary script by the addressor, and finally bowing (not kowtowing as in the family ceremony) to the deceased three times. Afterward, the master of ceremonies will call successively the titles of various official bodies and private associations to pay respect to the dead, in the same ritual sequence but without the reciting of the mortuary script.

After the public ceremony, the coffin is placed on a van and accompanied by a long procession for a tour around the village before being transferred to the burial site. Numerous trucks (usually about fifteen to twenty) decorated with flowers and funerary symbols, which are condolence gifts from kin and acquaintances of the bereaved family, take the lead in the procession.⁶¹ The trucks are followed by ritual specialists, music bands, male helpers who hold scrolls with condolence messages (sent by the official bodies, public and private institutions and individuals) or customary funerary objects, the van carrying the coffin, and a long line of people composed of the offspring of the dead and kin villagers (including the representatives sent from households belonging to the lineage branch of which the dead was part and voluntary attendees from other branches). The length of the funerary procession is the hot topic of conversation among the funeral participants and onlookers along the road, who comment not only about the deceased's social status, the family's reputation, social networks and economic ability but also about the unity and reputation of the lineage as a whole.

During the tour of the village, the procession stops two to three times at different locales to carry out the rite of *banlaji* (lit. the rite in the middle of the journey). The lineage men who help in the funeral ceremony will have gone ahead of the procession to prepare in advance the sacrificial table at the appointed locations for the *banlaji*. This rite (involving the acts of offering incense sticks and drink, kowtowing and reciting the mortuary script) is normally conducted by the deceased's internal

⁶¹ Again, this is a new practice learned from Taiwan in recent decades.

grandsons-in-law (whose wives are the deceased's sons' daughters) or sons-in-law. But, in some funerals I attended, the husbands of the deceased's external granddaughters (daughter's daughters) and nieces were called to perform this rite—which, as I was told, suggests the deceased's good fortune to have so many juniors to send him or her off. The procession finally stops at the village exit and only the offspring of the dead, Daoist specialist, the ritual assistants, and some lineage men escort the coffin to the burial site.

Before placing the coffin in the hole dug in advance, three rites are to be performed by three particular persons: (1) the rite of *si houtu* (to report to the God of Earth about the deceased's eternal sleep at the designated site) performed by the director of the KMT's local service station; (2) the rite of *jin mingjing* (to present and place on the coffin a long red scroll on which the deceased's name and age are written) performed by the chief of the local police station; (3) the rite of *dian zhu* (to use a Chinese writing brush to paint a point in red on the soul tablet of the dead, which is to lead the *hun*, or soul, of the dead into the tablet⁶²) performed by the head of the township. In the past the bereaved family invited the local gentry or officials to perform the three rites (Yang & Lin 1997: 94-100); I am not aware of when the roles became the responsibility of these public officials. I suggest that this phenomenon is seen as another demonstration of the intimate relationship between ordinary people and the authorities of Jinmen. The involvement of the director of the KMT's local service station in the burial rite particularly points to both the KMT's previous attempts to secure its legitimacy on the island during the period of tense military competition with the CCP, and its current intention to secure local support in the elections after the normalization of democracy in 1992 (see chapter seven).

After the fulfilment of the three rites, the offspring of the deceased follow the Daoist's guidance to complete the burial and bring the deceased's tablet back to the village. The villagers who formed the procession earlier wait at the village exit for the return of the mourners; then, following behind the mourners, they carry out the second

⁶² As Watson (1988a:8-9) notes, anthropologists have debated about the exact configuration of the soul of deceased ancestors. The commonly accepted explanation is either the *hun/p'o* dichotomy or a tripartite division of the soul in grave, domestic shrine, and hall tablet.

round of touring the village but in the reverse direction. The funeral helpers and attendants are then invited to a post-funeral banquet, which was arranged by the female relatives and neighbours of the host family in the past, but is now prepared by commercial catering services. During the banquet, the Daoist moves between the tables to exercise purification rituals by reciting a short incantation and spreading salt on the bodies of the participants. The deceased's sons then go from table to table to express their gratitude to the helpers and guests. This marks the satisfactory completion of a white happy event, although the deceased's immediate family has further mourning duties.

According to the data I collected, the average cost of these white happy events is about NTD 500,000-800,000 (GBP 10,000-16,000). Many informants confirmed that the two banquets before and after the funeral, which may involve thirty to forty tables in total (the host family tends to prepare extra tables just in case they are needed) are the largest expenditure of the entire funeral.

Three cooperative relationships in the white happy events

The previous section demonstrates that white happy events in contemporary Jinmen have been enlarged by a combination of conventional funerary customs and new funerary etiquette promoted by the modern state. As a result, they involve more people with various social positions as helpers or attendees and, accordingly, more material flows between the bereaved family and the participants. Such large-scale funerary events, as Chau (2004) argues, require an efficient social organization and thus manifest the characteristics of Chinese social intercourse in general. Following on from Chau's insight, I propose to look at the social organization of the white happy events by exploring the three cooperative relationships: (1) cooperation between parents and children; (2) cooperation between kin; (3) cooperation between non-kin. This is helpful for examining the motivations of the people involved other than the family staging the funeral, and to reveal the importance of funerary events to the sustaining of local patterns of social intercourse.

Cooperation between parents and children

The white happy events are apparently linked to the Chinese patrilineal-cum-Confucian ideologies, under which the holding of a ritually proper funeral for the dead parents by the living (particularly the male offspring) is a demonstration of their *xiao* (filial piety) or, as Oxfeld (2004) argues, a means of repaying their moral debt to their parents. However, I find that the folk model of the cycle of *yang* discussed by Stafford (2000a) to be helpful for singling out the cooperative aspect of the relationship between parents and children. As mentioned in the previous chapters, this model refers to the norm that parents are obliged to raise and care for (*yang*) their children and, in turn, children are obliged to provide support and nurturance (*fengyang*) to their elderly parents. Additionally, it illuminates the actual processes of *yang* between the two generations, recognising that *yang* takes a broad variety of forms, such as the organizing of the major household events of weddings and funerals. As Stafford (2000a:43) explains, a wedding is the last, and usually very expensive, obligation of Chinese parents to their child. This is especially the case for sons because of the potential expenditure on a new house, new furniture, betrothal gifts, banquets, etc. upon which a successful wedding depends. Notice, however, that the bride and groom will also very likely be involved in providing themselves with a wedding—as the money they earned and handed over to their parents before marriage was partly or entirely saved by their parents to cover future wedding expenses. The organizing of a wedding is therefore an embodiment of parent-child cooperation, and a similar cooperative relationship can be seen to be involved in the arranging of funerals for parents. White happy events like that described above tend to involve great additional expenditure for ordinary households. One informant told me that most elderly people in Jinmen have pensions of various kinds (linked to their experiences in the era of military conflicts and preparation, see chapter seven), which are saved for their own funerals in the hope of not leaving a financial burden for their children.

The cooperation between the two generations could also be seen as the result of the concern over the deceased's afterlife and the living's well-being. The folk beliefs suggest that a ritually proper funeral is important for both the dead and the living,

because the correct and careful treatment of the deceased's body and soul in accordance with the mortuary customs and rituals (e.g., the offspring's constant attendance beside the dead before burial and the implementation of Daoist or Buddhist rituals for their salvation) can prevent the deceased from becoming an evil spirit that may cause harm to the living. Though the younger villagers may not take these folk beliefs seriously, they still tend to abide by these ritual requirements as they want to avoid any possible gossip and criticism from their close kin and neighbours for their "unfilial" behaviour. The evaluation of filial piety is linked to the degree of elaborateness of a funeral (including the gifts and banquets to thank helpers and attendees) and therefore to the *mianzi* of the family staging the funeral (cf. Oxfeld 2004) and to the assessment of whether the bereaved family have been good hosts or not (cf. Chau 2004). To achieve success in this regard requires that parents and children cooperate and invest financially in the organization of a grand funeral. Though I rarely heard the bereaved families express their concerns about *mianzi* directly, their ability to hold a white happy event itself indicates the *fuqi* (good fortune) of the dead and the *mianzi* of the bereaved family. For example, one young female informant told me that her father-in-law's funeral was very *lengqing* (cold and desolate) because at the moment of his death (at the relatively young age of his early sixties) none of his three sons had given him a grandson and therefore his funeral could not count as a white happy event. Her marital family could only hold a small-scale funeral without the large audience and many condolence gifts that would have manifested the family's *mianzi*.

Cooperation between kin

Rather than relying fully on paid funerary professionals as in urban Taiwan, the above ethnography shows that the white happy events on Jinmen involve plenty of voluntary assistance from the deceased's lineage community in both the liturgical and hosting duties. The bereaved family attains help from kin in various respects such as knowledge about funerary customs and procedure, labour and time devoted to the diverse range of tasks, and in the form of the condolence gifts and attendance at the funeral that manifest the *mianzi* of the host family. Cooperation between the kin

helpers is also essential to a successful funeral. As mentioned above, a group composed of the lineage men acquainted with funerary affairs (the lineage's *gongjia*) mobilizes immediately after receiving news of a death in a lineage family. The male village head, who is renowned for his sophistication about customs, takes the leading role in organizing the funeral and coordinates the different parties involved, including the bereaved family, the ritual specialists, the sellers of funerary items, the catering service, and the village voluntary group (led by the female villager A-Xiu mentioned in chapter one). The village head and some experienced men are always present at every funeral in the village and are responsible for certain duties (e.g., arranging and controlling the procedure of the funeral ceremony), while the rest of the men are occasional helpers carrying out tasks assigned by their seniors (e.g., setting up the site of the funeral ceremony, carrying the coffin and holding funerary items in the procession). The village voluntary group, of which most members are middle-aged and elderly women, has become a reliable source of assistance at funerary events since its establishment in the late 1990s. This group always turns up to help prepare mourning accessories at the house of the dead and cook porridge on the day of burial, joined by other voluntary labour including female relatives and neighbours of the bereaved family.

Notice that the gendered division of labour in Qionglin described above seems to contradict the situation observed by James Watson (1988b) in Cantonese villages where the women were usually more knowledgeable about white events than the men, who were afraid of contamination by the dead.⁶³ The Cantonese villagers believed that the “killing airs” (death pollution) emanating from the corpse dissipate men's *yang* (male) essence but are less effective on women's *yin* (female) essence, so that women can handle corpses and attend funerals with easier minds. In Qionglin, despite the existence of the idea of death pollution, men participate more deeply than women in the matters directly related to the dead, such as carrying the coffin out of the ancestral

⁶³ As many ethnographers have noted, the idea of death pollution resulted in acts such as the careful selection of the proper day for funeral, the prohibition of pregnant women and children from the house in mourning, and the implementation of certain rituals to purify the family and the funeral site as a protective measure against the harm caused by death (cf. Cormack 1927; Hase 1981; Hsu 1948; Martin 1973; Watson 1982b, 1988b).

house and escorting the coffin to the burial site, probably because (a) they have moral obligations to help their kin whether they like it or not; (b) they trust that the ritual purification steps will protect them from harm; (c) in any case they will keep themselves from spreading possible pollution to others by avoiding “happy” events such as weddings in the immediate mourning period. At least in my fieldsite, gendered labour in the funerals is not necessarily linked to the *yang/yin* difference but is more closely connected to patriarchal ideas about the outward/inward difference and the appropriate conduct of the sexes, which suggest that men’s labour is more associated with the formal and public domain while women’s labour is more associated with the informal and domestic domain.

The phenomenon that the bereaved family receives voluntary assistance from their kin in the lineage village of Qionglin to complete a white happy event appears to support Freedman’s (1958:94) assumption that a stronger moral bond exists between kin living in a lineage community. As my senior informants said, during the previous decades of economic difficulty the bereaved family had to rely on the generous support from kin of the same lineage branch to hold a ritually proper funeral. The great improvement of living standards in recent decades has made it possible to hold large-scale funerals that involve kin beyond the branch distinction, and these funerals are thus manifestations of the lineage-village as an integrated community. In other words, kin collaboration in the funeral is generated not only by moral obligations but also by the *mianzi* of the group as a whole. Moreover, women can have significant contribution to the enhancement of the lineage’s reputation. For example, several times, I heard people from outside of Qionglin complimenting the village voluntary group on their efficient organization and excellent skills in preparing several large pots of porridge for the guests and helpers to eat on the day of funeral ceremony. Such praise should not just be understood as referring to the qualities of the individual women. Rather, the collective actions of this group in support of the funeral are also a demonstration of how women’s work substantiates the sense of the patrilineal unity that attracts the admiration of outsiders.

Apart from the steady presence of the lineage *gongjia* and the village voluntary

group, other kin participants give their support out of the deeper moral bond between kin of the same lineage branch. Indeed, over time, the mutual support between genealogically close families forms the cycle of reciprocity or the exchange of labour (cf. Chau 2004). But, rather than viewing this support in transactional terms, many of my female informants emphasized their affective ties with the bereaved family of the same branch, which are grounded on the regular communication and cooperation in everyday life and in other ritual activities (e.g., the ancestral rituals beyond the domestic level as discussed in the previous chapters). Thus the gathering of women in the house of the bereaved family to help with various matters further consolidates their mutual sentiments. It is also common that people reached beyond their own lineage branch to help more genealogically distant bereaved family in the way of taking leave from their jobs in order to show their physical and/or spiritual support in the funeral.

Cooperation between non-kin

The above ethnography shows that the host family may receive support from non-kin primarily in the forms of condolence gifts and attendance at the funeral ceremony, both of which contribute to the bereaved family's *mianzi*. In contemporary Chinese societies, the idea of death pollution may be deemed superstitious and would not dissuade people from attending, especially if the host family has prepared appropriate protective measures (e.g., the attendees are given particular plants that were thought to ward off evil spirits). But, as many ethnographies have noted, it is most likely to be the host families that possess good social prestige and wide *guanxi* (social relationships or "connections") networks that can expect to receive many guests beyond the circle of close kin (cf. Chau 2004; Kipnis 1997:96-103; Oxfeld 2004; Yan 1996:95). But, *guanxi* in its literal sense is not sufficient to account for a person's attendance at another person's funeral. The direct material benefits cannot be a major concern because most likely a funeral attendee's expenditure (on travelling and a condolence gift) would be much higher than the rewards he or she received in the form of a meal in the post-funeral banquet and a face towel. As the non-kin participants' relations to the bereaved family vary from one person to another, their motivations

should be expected to differ accordingly. We can get some idea of a person's motivation from his or her own statements. For instance, some funeral attendees tended to emphasize their affective bond with the deceased or the deceased's family rather than their mere *guanxi* by describing how good their relations have been since they first met. The stress they place on their sincere feelings is similar to the notion of *jiaoqing* (interactional affection) analysed by Wu Di (2014) in his study of non-kin cooperation between Chinese migrants in Zambia. It is less difficult to explicate the presence of the representatives of official bodies and individual political figures at an ordinary household's funeral which, at least in the eyes of the ordinary villagers, is undoubtedly related to their attempts to legitimize their governance or boost their political prospects however they might explain it themselves. But, instead of trying to pin down each individual's explicit motivations, I have found that Sperber and Baumard's (2012) discussion of the relationship between morality and reputation provides an enlightening, alternative analytical lens.

Grounded on a combination of evolutionary and cognitive approaches, Sperber and Baumard's main argument is that the function of moral behaviours is to help individuals gain a good reputation as cooperators, which is accompanied by the issue of hypocrisy indicating that the motivation for behaving morally is self-interested and instrumental rather than genuinely moral. Sperber and Baumard contend that, because of human beings' capacity for communication, our reputation is not merely built upon our behaviours but the outcome of the exchange of opinions between different persons. As part of the conversational community, we develop a reflective management of our reputation, which involves anticipating how our behaviours would be interpreted and commented upon and defending our reputation by joining in the conversation with an acceptable justification. This kind of moral reasoning or reflection, as opposed to moral intuition that is genuinely moral, does not guide our action directly but may encourage our choice of a course of action that can be more easily justified. Sperber and Baumard thus conclude that, for the purpose of securing a good reputation, it is advantageous "to appear to be moral and the most effective way to do so is to actually be moral, to conform to the social selection pressure for genuine morality" (2012:513).

From this perspective, we could suppose that among the various non-kin attendants at a white happy event, some people's motivations were genuinely moral whereas some were self-interested. And, among the self-interested motivations was the desire to secure a good reputation, such as the county magistrate and the representatives of different political parties who have explicit aims of reinforcing their moral reputation (which is helpful to their political careers) through their delivery of spiritual support to the bereaved family in person. Sperber and Baumard's thesis also sheds new light on the efforts of the living offspring to hold a ritually satisfactory funeral for their parents and the generosity of kin in helping with some potentially polluting tasks. Whatever else they may have in mind, the living offspring hope to maintain their own and their family's good reputations among the intimate kin community by following all the necessary requirements for a successful funeral. However good or bad their private relationships with the bereaved family might be, their kin in the village try to offer proper support in order to secure their good reputations, which in time guarantees them equivalent help when they are in need. The above example of a senior woman who was requested to clean and clothe a dying relative can also be analysed using Sperber and Baumard's thesis. Although she submitted to the moral requirement of cooperation, this senior woman also expressed her personal thoughts to me regarding her obligation towards a member of the same lineage branch including her reluctance to perform the task and her grievance, though implicit, about being viewed as a person associated with death. However, regardless of her own mixed feelings, the senior woman's action was positively evaluated by the villagers. I heard some villagers commend the senior woman, saying, "You are great. You did a good thing that most people would not want to do". This case supports Sperber and Baumard's thesis of the positive correlation between a good reputation and (genuinely) moral behaviour, which involves both the first-party's own self-evaluations and the third-party's observation and judgments. Despite the senior woman's ambivalent feelings, she undoubtedly built up a good reputation for herself in the village.

The above analysis shows that each of the three sets of cooperative relationships

involved in funerals is built upon cultural mechanisms that are actually also at work in other social contexts. For the cooperation between parents and children, the model of the cycle of *yang* and the concern of family's *mianzi* drive the co-efforts of the two generations in holding a grand wedding banquet or building a big house to accommodate family members of three generations or more. For the cooperation between kin, factors such as senses of moral obligation, the cycle of reciprocity, the *mianzi* of the individual family and of the lineage as a whole, and personal sentiments are essential to vitalize the kin organization in the communal activities such as lineage ancestral rituals and campaigns for kin candidates in the elections (see chapter seven). For the cooperation between non-kin, people may be merely motivated by their *guanxi* of various kinds, but very often there is an emphasis on mutual sentiments, reciprocity or instrumental considerations depending on the particular situations. For example, the political figures not only attend funerals but also visit the wedding banquets of ordinary households with big monetary gifts (*hongbao*), by means of which they want to build up a good reputation for themselves as well as attract the votes that will bring them victory in the election. Moreover, a common characteristic in all the above sets of cooperative relationships is the individual agent's concern with moral reputation. In sum, a white happy event provides an occasion on which the various kinds of pre-existing interpersonal relationships are confirmed and strengthened, and these relationships are essential to the normal running of people's everyday life and to the achievement of various personal projects and ambitions. Therefore, funerals are not just about dealing with death in the proper way, but are also important events that are crucial to the sustaining of the local social fabric.

Ethical reflections on the socially promoted form of funeral

The preceding section on the three categories of cooperative relationships indicates the cultural logics or social norms that motivate human cooperation in the organizing of a large-scale funeral. However, is this kind of expensive funeral really wanted by all the people involved? Though I did not observe any explicit rejection or negotiation regarding the holding of a grand funeral for an elderly dead, this does not exclude the

possibility of self-reflections and judgments by the people involved. Viewing the expanded form of white happy events as being supported by a number of social norms suggests a Durkheimian conceptualization of the moral as involving collectively sanctioned rules, values and opinions. But, James Laidlaw (2002, 2013) criticises this approach and points out that Durkheim's presumption of society as being a system of moral facts led to a reductionist understanding of moral concepts as functional devices of social control. To go beyond a Durkheimian definition of morality, Laidlaw draws on philosopher Bernard Williams and historian Michael Foucault to argue for an analytical distinction between morality and ethics, in which the term "moral" refers to rules and regulations enforced by institutions whereas "ethics" relates to the attempts that people make to do what they consider right or good (cf. Stafford 2010). An ethnographic study of ethics and morality should therefore reveal "the complexity and specificity of ethical reflection, reasoning, dilemma, doubt, conflict, judgment, and decision" in human life rather than unilateral attention to moral codes (Laidlaw 2013:23). In light of this approach, below I provide examples that demonstrate the individuals' reflections on the socially promoted form of white happy events in contemporary Jinmen.

Instance (1): In deciding the date of the funeral ceremony and burial for an elderly villager of Qionglin, some auspicious dates clashed with a pilgrimage trip to China by several of the lineage men in charge of funerary affairs and many villagers who were crucial to the holding of a grand and ritually elaborate funeral. The bereaved family thus decided to choose a date three weeks after the occurrence of death (the average duration is currently one to two weeks), by when the pilgrimage group would have returned to the village. While I was chatting with an elderly female informant about the delay, she shook her head and said, "It's best to finish the funeral within one week, otherwise it would be very troublesome for the young people living on Taiwan". Her sentiments were actually shared by many elderly villagers who did not disagree with the customs or folk concerns about selecting an auspicious burial date, but nonetheless expressed their worries about the potential inconvenience this could cause to their offspring after they die. Given the high proportion of the younger generation who have

established permanent residence on Taiwan or elsewhere, the senior generation are well aware of the burden of a conventional funeral for their offspring in terms of the difficulty in taking long-term leave from work and the money and time they would have to spend on travelling. However, it is not an easy matter for an elder to request to have his or her own funeral conducted in a ritually simplified manner (i.e., one that could be completed within a few days) because their concerns about their offspring are balanced against other concerns. For example, they may be worried that their prospects for the afterlife are linked to the proper performance of the funerary rites, and also about the implications for the family's *mianzi* if a grand funeral ceremony does not take place.

Instance (2): There has been some private discussion among the male villagers who usually help with funerals in the village about the increasing levels of expenditure on funerary banquets. Some complained that in recent years the banquets have been grown too extravagant, whereas in the difficult days of the past they were very simple and only involved close kin and few essential helpers. However, the village head said that it is hard to change the trend as the large banquet is relevant to the *mianzi* of the host family as well as a kind of return for the previous banquets hosted by other households. Interestingly, in some ways, the increasing scale of the funeral was also viewed in a positive light. One of my most informative interlocutors, a middle-aged man who usually helps with the funerals in the village, gave an interesting response when he was asked by the host of a funeral (the son of the deceased) about the necessity of a grand funeral. He replied, "You see, it's our ancestors' wisdom. To hold such a grand funeral is to bring together the lineage members which can enhance our mutual sentiments and affections (*lianluo ganqing*)". His insightful response linked the funeral of a lineage member to the sense of lineage unity that is experienced by the lineage members involved in a funeral through their collaboration in the diverse funerary tasks and gathering together to send off the deceased and to enjoy the post-funeral banquet and the *renao* (social heat) atmosphere (discussed in chapter three). This kind of embodied experience of lineage unity may have encouraged the villagers' collective silent agreement on the desirability of large-scale funerals.

Instance (3): While attending a funeral in a smaller village, I met an elderly man who was representing the common-surname association to which the deceased's lineage belongs. Knowing my status as a researcher of Jinmen, this man told me, "There is a bad custom (*huai xiguan*) in Jinmen today; that is, the funerals are too large". As I pondered his remark, he continued, "The practice of publishing obituary notices in the local newspaper is money-consuming and the setting up of *zhisang weiyuanhui* occupies a substantial amount of the magistrate's and government employees' time [as they have to attend the funerals to pay respect to the dead and sometimes there are two or three funerals in one day]. However, none of the magistrates has so far dared to abrogate the practice [of showing presence in the funerals of ordinary households] because they are concerned about votes in the elections (*weile xuanpiao*)". One of my female informants also expressed criticism of the practice of publishing obituary notices in the newspaper. She said that the duration between death and burial is very often extended to allow time for the preparation and publishing of the obituary notice and for the government employees to prepare and send the condolence scrolls and flower pots to the bereaved family. But, she also admitted that the presence of the official bodies and political figures is considered important for displaying the *mianzi* of the bereaved family. The magistrate and political figures earn support from the ordinary people by *gei* (giving or adding) *mianzi* to the ordinary families staging the funeral—a kind of electoral strategy to build up their reputation and affective ties with the potential voters. Conversely, the bereaved family and the wider community of which it is part may find they lose *mianzi* if the magistrate and political figures attend the funerals in other villages but not theirs.

Together, the three instances above suggest the difficulty involved in altering or simplifying the current form of white happy events as any changes imply the potential destruction of existent social relationships and the benefits they bring. However, it can be anticipated that the discussion and debates about the necessity and appropriateness of holding large-scale funerals will become ever more intense among the younger generations as many of them have established permanent residence far away from home, in stark contrast to the senior generations who have spent most of their lifetime

in the natal villages and remain deeply embedded in the familiar circles of collaboration. The younger generations who live on Taiwan may also be indifferent to the *mianzi* given by the presence of local political figures at the funerals. As the numbers of elderly villagers who usually help with the funerary affairs are declining, it would not be surprising if one day the bereaved family has to rely on paid funerary professionals to make all the necessary preparations.

On the other hand, while recognising the potential for future changes, it may be that the man in instance (2) is not alone in seeing the value of the large-scale funerals as being in their ability to create large gatherings of lineage members. As I argued in chapter three, the disjunction between the lineage ancestral ceremony and everyday life outside of the ritual that people found through their participation in the ritual event seemed to provoke their interest in the lineage's tradition and strengthen their sentimental attachment to the lineage as a whole. In a similar vein, it may be that the impression of lineage unity created in the process of conducting a grand funeral is sufficient to encourage the continuation of this way of conducting funerals despite the time, effort and money they consume.

Conclusion

In a rural village in Guangdong, China, where Oxfeld (2004; cf. 2007) did fieldwork from the 1990s onwards, the “traditional” funerary rites have been largely revived (though there was never a complete interruption) in the era of economic reforms that began in the late 1970s. As Oxfeld notes, the phenomenon of ritual revival (a wide range of religious and customary practices including funerary rites) in reform-era China has been discussed by many scholars in terms of its implications for state-society relations. One common interpretation is that the ritual revival has helped with the restoration of the people’s sense of local particularities (in terms of history and ritual traditions) and the positive assertion of peasant identity, in contrast to the Communist state’s negative portrayals of peasants as “backward” (i.e., the traditional ritual practices are backward and superstitious). Oxfeld found the above argument only partially accurate, as her informants tend to see the resurgence of traditional funerary

rites as being more about the living's commemoration of the dead and their care for the souls of the dead, as well as the living's own *mianzi* (status), rather than being about the assertion of peasant identity. In light of this, Oxfeld suggests that it would be productive to see how of the two sides, peasants on one side and the state or state officials on the other, each draw on the categories of the other side to interpret ritual practices. For example, one of her male informants—a long-time Communist party member and atheist—explained that his holding of a traditional funeral for his mother was to secure his status and to commemorate the dead, rather than because he believed in the spirit world. He also made an insightful remark: “I think both Buddha and Mao were basically saying the same thing, ‘serve the people’” (Oxfeld 2004:982). Furthermore, by drawing on Louis Dumont’s idea about the hierarchy of values in a cultural system in which some values are encompassing, Oxfeld argues that the morality of remembrance is the encompassing value that motivates the traditional funerals in post-reform China; other elements such as status competition and the sincerity of individual mourners can be understood with reference to the above encompassing value.

Obviously, the current funerary rites in Jinmen and in Oxfeld’s fieldsite are different in various aspects (though some customary liturgical steps are similar) as a result of the two distinctive trajectories that the two places experienced in the Cold War era. As noted before, in contrast to the CCP’s tough attitudes and extreme manners of reforming the religious and customary practices especially during the Maoist era, the KMT took a less hard position in order to compete ideologically with the CCP. Though the KMT disapproved of grand funerals involving large amounts of material consumption and proposed a new set of etiquette for the funerals of ordinary people (included in the aforementioned *Guomin liyi fanli*), it never intervened forcefully in the “traditional” funerary rites. Therefore, as my informants affirmed, they continued to abide by the “ancient manners” for carrying out funerals throughout the era of military control, although the scale was comparatively much smaller because of the economic difficulties of the time. Rather than taking an antagonistic attitude toward the folk funerary customs, the KMT government directly involved itself in the funerals

of Jinmen civilians in the Cold War era, by having KMT personnel and local officials participate in the burial rites. Later on, this was reinforced by the emergence of the practice of publishing obituary notices in the government-owned newspaper and the setting up of a nominal funerary committee headed by the county magistrate. This involvement in the funerals suggests the KMT's intention of securing its legitimacy of governance and support from the civilian population in its foremost frontline against the CCP by showing its closeness to the people and respect for their beliefs and practices. Rather than enforcing its modified funerary etiquette as the new orthodoxy, the KMT appeared to submit itself to the "orthodoxy" to which the ordinary people of Jinmen have long adhered.

As the islanders of Jinmen have not experienced the state's forceful interference in their funerary customs, I have never heard them describe the folk beliefs and practices connected to death and funerals as "feudal superstitions". Nor have I heard them speak of a struggle between the state's promoted funerary etiquette and their own long-lasting funerary practices. The current popular form of funerals for the elderly dead has, however, provoked some personal (ethical) reflections on the extensive consumption of human energy, time and money these events involve, but not on the customary rites which are related to the living's commemoration of the dead and their concern for the afterlife of the dead. Despite some voices questioning the enlargement of white happy events, it is not easy for individuals to counter the trend and to scale down a funeral. As this chapter has demonstrated, the success of the large-scale white happy events is grounded on the effective coordination and cooperation of a large number of human agents with different statuses and social positions, and therefore is closely linked to the maintenance of interpersonal relationships of various kinds. While the people involved may have different motivations, their own moral reputation is arguably what they all want to ensure. The offspring of the deceased hold a ritually elaborate funeral with a large banquet to thank helpers and attendees and therefore confirm their self-image as filial descendants and good hosts. The ordinary villagers assist their kin in mourning and thereby guarantee their kin's reciprocal support in the future. The county magistrate and political personnel send condolence gifts and attend

the funerals in order to secure support from ordinary citizens and their own bright political prospects. Therefore, a successful white happy event as a whole can be understood as the epitome of the complicated and intimate social networks characteristic of Jinmen.

Chapter Six

Female Labour and Changes in Household Economy during the Cold War

On a hot November afternoon one month after I started fieldwork, Madam Yang and I sat on a bench near the village office, chatting about various things. As I had once seen Yang shell peanuts, I asked her if she planted peanuts herself. She nodded and said that she has a small plot of land in the *suann* (mountain in local dialect; local people use *suann* to mean the farmland), and she used to plant sorghum there but had stopped doing so more than one decade ago because none of her sons want to continue farming. Of her own accord, she then recalled the past days (in the Cold War era), telling me that “life in the past was very tough and difficult (*hao ku*)” as she had to take on the work of sorghum farming which had previously been men’s work, together with oyster collecting, doing household chores and taking care of six children. Not being able to think of a more appropriate response, I simply commented, “Yeah, it really wasn’t easy. You were great!” Yang immediately responded, “It was the same for everyone. The woman sitting there [pointing at a woman a few meters away from our position] also had to do these things”.

Later on, after I had become acquainted with more villagers and the local history, the significance of Madam Yang’s remark became apparent to me as it indicates women’s significant roles in sustaining the livelihood of their marital households during the hard times of military control and economic austerity. This chapter is intended to use the life stories of three women to analyse the effects of the era of bipolar politics on the economic constitution of ordinary households and the roles women played in these circumstances. The eldest woman, Madam Yang, was in her early seventies and the other two women, Madam Li and Madam Chen, were both around sixty years old when I met them in 2013. This means that the three women all lived through the period of military governance and their economic activities during that time were to varying degrees related to the shifting political-economic situation. Activities done by the woman at that time, such as sorghum farming and running microscale businesses selling to soldiers are, as mentioned in chapter one, part of what

historian Szonyi (2008) called the combat economy—a term that depicts the militarization and geopoliticization of the local economy in the Cold War era. Szonyi suggests two main dimensions to this combat economy (2008:122): (1) The KMT-led state's interventions in the economy were framed by a global discourse of state-mediated development and were prevalent across the territory under its control, but the geopolitical conditions of Jinmen constrained the possible options for state planners and made certain results especially desirable. For example, the importing of sorghum to replace sweet potato—originally the local subsistence food—was out of the military's concern for the cultural image of sweet potato as a food for the poor and therefore reflected badly on its image in its competition with the CCP. However, as local people found sorghum unappetizing, the military proposed using sorghum to make liquor which not only allowed the establishment of a local industry but also served the troops' great demand for alcohol (2008:128-9). (2) A special kind of entrepreneurialism emerged from the 1950s as local people's innovative response to the geopolitical context on Jinmen. The considerable body of troops stationed on the island provoked the burgeoning of a great number of family-based, small businesses to provide food and services of various kinds, but also resulted in many problems and affected military-civilian relations (2008:134-46).⁶⁴

Szonyi's discussion focusing on the correlation between the changes of local economy and the state-military's strategies and the broader geopolitical situations is compelling and convincing. However, this chapter takes a different approach to the topic by focusing its attention on individuals' lived experiences, exploring the factors, institutions and circumstances that cultivate an individual to become a particular kind of economic agent. This analytical lens is inspired by Charles Stafford's (2004) analysis of the life stories of two Chinese men, in which he made use of Alfred Gell's (1988) thesis of human technical systems to explore the relationship between learning and economic agency. This chapter will show how paying close attention to learning and economic agency illuminates a different route for investigating the effects of the

⁶⁴ For example, the shop owners offered credit to soldiers so that they could delay payment till they received pay from the military or money from family in Taiwan, but this act was prohibited by the military.

state's policies and the broader political-economic conditions on my three female informants' economic abilities and the economic constitution of the households of which they are part.

This female biographical perspective has ethnographic and theoretical significance with regard to the typically patriarchal environment in which my female subjects are situated. Ethnographically, the tracing of the routes through which my three female informants became competent economic agents is helpful for illuminating how the changing circumstances affected and gradually modified the patriarchy-based household economy, and thereby made women's economic roles increasingly salient. Theoretically, these modified patterns of economic life in which women have important roles raise the question of whether women still submit to the patrilineal values that give men predominant authority and control over resources and render women in an inferior and dependent position. As I will demonstrate later on, the stories of the three women indicate a paradox in which their adherence to the patriarchal norms co-exists with their undoubted authority in their individual conjugal households. I will discuss this paradox by examining the value of female labour in relation to their personal reputation and relationships with others (especially their children). My data will also show a more positive understanding of women's power in their marital families than Margery Wolf's (1972) concept of uterine family, which suggests women's potential authority but also the threat they pose to family unity as a result of their close emotional bonds with their sons.

The following discussion begins with an account of Gell's (1988) thesis of human technical systems and how Stafford (2004) employs this thesis to discuss the relationship between learning and economic agency. It explains how Stafford's discussion is able to shed analytical light on my own case studies. The second section focuses on the economic trajectories of my three female protagonists, exploring the processes and media through which they became competent economic agents and how their acquired abilities contributed to their household economy. The third section discusses the paradoxical phenomenon of women's distinct economic achievements but also their adherence to patriarchy-oriented social roles. It argues that, from the

women's perspective, they may not evaluate their labour by the autonomy or authority that they could attain for themselves but by their personal reputation and relationships with the persons whom they are concerned about; as such, they tend to invest their labour in the work conventionally imposed on women and contribute the profits from their labour outside to the family as a whole. The chapter concludes with a brief summary of how the changing circumstances over the past century have altered the economic destinies of men and women on Jinmen, which used to be structured by the patrilineal values and kinship system. However, as shown in my three female protagonists' stories, although women may have more opportunities than before, the values and moralities from the sphere of kinship still remain effective in defining women's social roles.

Learning and economic agency

In his paper *Technology and Magic* (1988), Gell begins by outlining his objection to the old association of technology with tool-use. He argues that technology is more than the ability to use tools and involves the knowledge required for the invention, making and use of tools, and the existence and transmission of this knowledge must be linked to a certain social context. Gell further contends that human beings are distinguished not by our ability to use tools but by our employment of techniques that mediate between tools—a set of “given” elements (the body, some raw materials, some environmental features)—and a goal-state which is to be realized through utilizing these givens. Moreover, some tools are rudimentary but necessitate a certain period of learning, in appropriate learning settings, before they can be deployed with sophistication. For example, it takes time to become skilful at using a knife and minimizing wastage in butchering. Gell notes that human technical ability manifests not only in the context of subsistence production but also in other domains such as art. For instance, a flute as a tool and an element in a technical sequence is used by humans for diversion, adornment and pleasure; a flute is intentionally employed to control and modify human psychological responses in social settings.

By expanding the understanding of human technological capacities and linking

them to a wide range of goals, Gell proposes a model involving three general technical systems that human beings possess. The first is “technology of production”, which refers to “roundabout ways of securing the ‘stuff’ we think we need; food, shelter, clothing, manufactures of all kinds” (1988:7). The second is “technology of reproduction”, which basically refers to kinship. To understand kinship system as a technology, Gell draws an analogy between human beings and domesticated animals: the same techniques that human beings use to breed and train horses and dogs are also found in the ways of breeding and rearing a human child in order to “produce precisely those individuals for whom social provision has been made” (1988:7). This is followed by a potential difficulty in getting people to actually comply with the demands of the technical systems of production and reproduction. Gell then suggests the third technical system called “technology of enchantment”, which is also observed in the domestication of animals: “[h]uman beings entrap animals in the mesh of human purposes using an array of psychological techniques, but these are primitive by comparison with the psychological weapons which human beings use to exert control over the thoughts and actions of other human beings” (1988:7). The so-called psychological weapons vary from art, music, dances, rhetoric, gifts, and so on, which are employed by human beings “in order to secure the acquiescence of other people in their intentions or projects” (1988:7).

As Stafford argues, though Gell’s model may be questioned for its over-extension of the concept of technique, it is a useful heuristic device from the perspective of learning and economic agency (2004:175). With Gell’s idea that humans employ a variety of techniques, which together form the three technologies of production, reproduction and enchantment, to attain the desired outcome, Stafford proposes that it is analytically beneficial to look at: (1) how our individual and collective economic histories are linked to the elements of the three technical systems; (2) how the techniques of the three systems, such as elements in a kinship system, appear to be the collective possession of a culture and require individuals to learn in order to have an impact in the lived reality. He also emphasizes that the process of technique-learning very likely continues throughout an individual’s lifetime and is constrained by the flow

of changing circumstances (2004:176).

In Stafford's analysis of the economic life of one old man and one young man in China (based on his fieldwork in the late 1990s), he pays particular attention to how the diverse learning environments that these two men were exposed to were linked to their distinct individual abilities and their choices of different careers. The old man was born in a family with migrant-merchant roots but also deep immersion in Confucian education and his father was the founder of a small school teaching Chinese classics. Being directly and indirectly trained by his father in childhood, the old man also took a job as a teacher after he managed to graduate from high school in the Maoist era. His story shows that the most valuable fortune that he inherited from his father was not tangible assets but the manners of being a person with morality and the ways of acting like a teacher—which correspond to the techniques of production and reproduction. The old man's excellence in calligraphy is like his exertion of the technique of enchantment in the sense that his brilliant calligraphic works reinforce his social prestige as a person with virtue. But, family is not the only place where a person can learn and cultivate economics-related abilities. In comparison with the old man, the young man in Stafford's article did not come from such a decent family background and was not interested in studying when he was a child. Stafford suggests that his fundamental skill at being a merchant was built on his involvement in selling vegetables in the village market in his childhood and a chicken-raising enterprise in his youth. With his long-term participation in the business world, the young man developed a technology of enchantment using his excellent marketing skills to make the clients want to buy his merchandise.

Stafford's case studies suggest that family and kinship (i.e., Gell's technology of reproduction) play a significant role in cultivating an individual with certain abilities and dispositions (technologies of production and enchantment) which may be related to his or her future economic careers; but there are also various other sources from which an individual can learn the knowledge and skills to earn a living. In addition, the economics-related knowledge and skills may involve life-long processes of learning and improving. With these ideas in mind, in my description and analysis of

the life experiences of my three female informants I will highlight: (1) with reference to Gell's three technical systems, how and from where they achieved the knowledge and skills to participate in the economic activities; (2) how they developed their economics-related abilities along with the flow of circumstances in their life; (3) how they contributed to the household economy using their distinct capacities. In addition, as Stafford's discussion is based on men's stories, my cases centred on women pose a comparative question of whether and how gender matters in men's and women's economic destinies in Chinese settings. I will respond to this question in the conclusion.

The economic trajectories of three women

The following descriptions of my three female informants' life stories are based on my personal conversations (not formal interviews) with each of them on various occasions. While I have assembled the fragmentary information from numerous conversations into three integrated stories, I have also attempted to translate and edit the phrases in a way that maintains their words intact. In addition, I have provided contexts and information relevant to their stories, which would not be apparent from their words alone, but which helps to reveal how their personal life histories were connected to broader circumstances—e.g., how their economic activities were related to the measures of the military government on Jinmen.

Madam Yang

Yang was in her early seventies when I moved into the house close to hers in Qionglin. She gave me generous support during my initial period of settling down in the village, and soon became one of my best informants. I was always amazed by her abundant energy when doing various kinds of strenuous activities, such as oyster collecting. Below is an extract from my fieldnotes recording my experience of accompanying Yang to her oyster farm, which gives an idea of the hardship involved in oyster collecting and the time and efforts required in order to master this technology of production:

At dawn, one day in late November 2013, I was awakened by a familiar voice

shouting my name outside my bedroom window. It was Madam Yang, inviting me to her oyster farm. Less than ten minutes later, I appeared in front of Yang's house in jeans and sports shoes. But I was advised to change my jeans and footwear because the muddy water would make them filthy. I returned to my place to change into shorts and plastic sandals, but Yang again told me this was wrong because I would get hurt by the sharp shells of the oysters. As I was now thoroughly confused about the appropriate outfit, Yang went away and brought back for me a new pair of thick knee-high socks and a pair of plastic shoes covered with dust, which had originally been bought for her co-living daughter-in-law some years ago. After several attempts, I finally passed Yang's inspection of my clothes and, together with Madam Hong, we embarked on our journey to the oyster farm. However, my intention to assist Yang in moving her trolley was rejected as she claimed, "You don't know how to do it".

Pushing the trolley in front of her, it took Yang about twenty minutes to walk from her house to the seashore to the north of the village, which seemed quite fast in my opinion. After passing through the sorghum fields, we reached the seashore and found an asphalt causeway extending into the sea, which only fully appears during low-tide. This asphalt lane measuring two hundred and fifty metres in length was constructed by the township office a few years ago to facilitate the journey out to the oyster farm, and it has been greatly appreciated by Yang and her fellow oyster collectors. Soon we reached the end of the causeway, from where we had to wade through the muddy water to the oyster farm about three-hundred metres away. Somewhere about halfway to our destination, Yang discovered that one wheel of her trolley had broken. Though she managed to reach her oyster field, Yang was worried about carrying her heavy collection back with the broken trolley. I volunteered to take the broken trolley back to her house and return to her with another one. After a moment's hesitation, Yang accepted my proposal. I rushed there and back, and one hour or so later I got back to Yang who had already harvested nearly two large baskets of oysters. She commended me loudly and told the nearby oyster collectors about my accomplishment of moving the trolley and finding the right route back.

I was discouraged from trying oyster collecting because the old ladies were afraid that I might hurt myself due to my lack of skills and experience. I thus stood to the side and observed their work, asking the occasional question. As I walked between Yang's and Hong's fields, I was frequently warned to watch my step on

the mudflat. I did have trouble in remaining steady on the slippery ground and was amazed to find that the ladies could move around with ease. I asked Yang about the scope of her oyster farm and she pointed to the pieces belonging to her, which she could identify clearly even though the boundaries with the other oyster fields were not physically marked. It seemed that the collectors began their work by checking the overall condition of their fields, identifying those parts in which the oysters looked big enough for harvest. They then used a trowel or sickle to hack oysters off the long plastic sticks on which they grow, selecting the good oysters and placing them into the basket while leaving the empty or rotten ones on the muddy ground. Finally, they reinserted the sticks firmly into the mud for the next round of oyster breeding. The work procedure was not especially complicated but it was strenuous, and it was not uncommon to cut one's fingers by the oyster shells. After about two hours of harvesting, Yang and Hong started packing and loading their harvest onto the trolleys but other collectors nearby worked much longer. My attempt to help move the trolley was again refused by Yang, as she told me, "It's too heavy and dangerous for you to do". Therefore, I followed quietly behind the ladies, watching them moving the heavily laden trolleys, at a slow but steady speed, back to their houses in the village.

The above description only introduces one part of the labour involved in oyster production. My experience of being constantly reminded of my mistakes and inability shows that oyster farming involves a process of learning and repeatedly practicing the mediation between the technical knowledge and physical skills. A competent oyster farmer not only knows about how the tide changes each day, the appropriate working outfit and the necessary equipment, but is also skilled at using tools efficiently to harvest oysters, quickly distinguishing between good and bad, and keeping the heavy trolley full of oysters under control as they transport it a long way through the mud. From where did Yang acquire these techniques of oyster production? Below, I will show that it was related to her marriage and the patrilineal kinship system.

Yang was married into one Cai family in Qionglin when she was eighteen years old, shortly after the 1958 artillery attack by the Chinese Communists. To ease the economic burden that had been aggravated by war, Yang's father arranged this marriage for his teen daughter based on his friendship with the Cai lineage. At that

time, Yang was the youngest daughter-in-law in her husband's large family, and she was afraid of her mother-in-law and the wives of her two elder brothers-in-law. Her busy schedule of daily tasks began in the early morning, preparing firewood to cook breakfast for the large family and also sorting out the food for the pigs. Apart from her household chores, in the oyster harvest season she went to the oyster farm at dawn or in the late afternoon according to the timing of low-tide. Yang had been born in an inland village and had no idea about how to breed and collect oysters, so she learned it gradually through labouring with her female seniors in her marital household.

The northern bay of Qionglin village, where the oyster farm of Yang's marital family is located, is a kind of common property owned by the Cai lineage.⁶⁵ A large expanse of the northern bay has long been under the Cai lineage's monopoly, but only the Cai members whose predecessors set up oyster farms in earlier times are entitled to practise oyster production now. Before the 1970s, oyster farmers used to rely on low stone pillars to cultivate oysters, which involved a complicated procedure of preparation. The stone pillars were a kind of family property transmitted between generations, but the pillars in some specific areas were confiscated by the army for military construction in the 1950s. In 1976, Jinmen Fisheries Research Institute introduced the use of bamboo sticks to breed oysters, which had already been widely adopted in Taiwan. Some years later, the Institute promoted plastic sticks that were much more durable than bamboo sticks and therefore strongly favoured by oyster farmers. The invention of new tools allowed the expansion of oyster fields further away from the coastline. Some new oyster farmers joined the production during this period as they could occupy the previously unexploited areas using these new tools.

Plastic sticks remain the most popular tools used in the oyster fields in Qionglin today. Yang may initially have learned the knowledge of oyster farming from her mother-in-law, but she have continued to accommodate her own experience and practice to the new equipment, eventually mastering the technology. She also became

⁶⁵ An informant told me a story that suggests the Cai lineage dominated of an even larger part of seashore in imperial times. According to this story, a very long time ago, one member of the Cai lineage killed a man of a nearby village. As a result, part of the oyster field was given to that village as compensation.

proficient in catching crabs and fish appearing in the tidal basin or between the oyster fields. Yang developed her skills and knowledge in an era when the coastal waters of Jinmen were under strict military surveillance. Yang usually only responded to my questions about life during the period of militarization by saying, “Those days were very hard”. But, when we walked to the seashore, she revealed voluntarily to me her experience of having to show a special identification card⁶⁶ to the sentries standing on guard at the access point to the seashore. She also said that the soldiers would give her a helmet (probably to aid the soldiers in identifying the oyster collectors and maintaining surveillance of their movements) which she had to return after finishing her oyster collecting, rather than the cotton hat she wears today as protection against the harsh sunlight. Moreover, she had to work more efficiently to collect enough harvest within the rigid time limits set by the army.

It was probably not long after their marriage when Yang’s husband left farming to work in the sorghum distillery. Yang thus had to bear the additional workload of sorghum farming, about which she had to learn the necessary knowledge and skills from her husband, elder relatives, and other farmers in the same village. She was also required to learn the modern agricultural techniques and to try the new types of crop developed and promoted by the Jinmen Agricultural Research Institute and the Farmers’ Association. Both these institutions were established in the early 1950s with financial support from the US-funded Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction (JCRR)—a body founded on the US-Taiwan alliance against communism in the Cold War context. Eventually Yang became good at cultivating diverse kinds of produce, such as peanuts, sweet potatoes, and various vegetables and fruits. She also learned to drive a cow-drawn carriage and was very proud of her excellent skills. As she said, “I don’t know how to drive an automobile but I am very good at driving the cow-drawn carriage”. Though she gave up farming a long time ago, she reserves a small plot of land for growing peanuts—a favoured snack of the local elderly and an essential ingredient in several kinds of traditional sacrificial and festival foods. She also grows

⁶⁶ Oyster farmers and fishermen were given special ID cards by the military in order to prevent the penetration of the CCP’s spies.

some vegetables for domestic consumption in the vacant areas around her house, but what she produces is far from sufficient to satisfy her family's daily needs and most types of food must be purchased from the market.

Economic agency based on kinship

Yang's story illustrates that her economic agency was put into effect in the way she employed the techniques of production and the relevant resources (e.g., farmland and oyster field) that she accessed through her marital family. Furthermore, the family itself embodied the technology of reproduction, namely, the patrilineal system or the genealogical system centred on the father-son relation (cf. Chen 1985). In this system, rights to property, either those inherited with membership of a lineage or attained within a lifetime, used to be solely bestowed on men of the household and kin groups. Therefore, prior to the twentieth century, Chinese women had virtually no property rights and "women's labour, fertility and person constituted a form of property, itself exchangeable in a number of transactions and chiefly in marriage" (Croll 1984:44). Marriage was mainly arranged by and negotiated between the parents of the groom and the bride. Upon the decision of marriage, the groom's family may have sent the bride's family certain betrothal gifts (usually in monetary form as brideprice), over which the bride was unlikely to claim her rights. But, the bride's father may have given her gifts such as jewellery, clothes, household furnishings and cash as her dowry. If a woman was accompanied by a dowry when she entered into her husband's family, the assets would not necessarily constitute part of the larger family estate but remained part of the conjugal fund or of the woman's personal fund. A bride with no dowry to offer her financial support found herself in a helpless situation and had to submit fully to her husband's family.

In Yang's case, her marriage might have been a good match in her father's eyes as his friendly relations with the Cai lineage were enhanced and the socio-economic status of his affinal family was similar to his. It is likely that Yang entered her husband's family without a dowry, which rendered her in a vulnerable and dependent state. Though she might have acquired some techniques when she assisted in

household chores in her natal family, marriage brought her into an entirely unfamiliar environment where she was required to learn many new things (e.g., managing the household, preparing sacrificial food and participating in subsistence production) under the guidance of her seniors—especially her mother-in-law (see chapter four). Moreover, her productive activities were inseparable from the property possessed by the patrilineal group of which her husband was part, such as the oyster field and the family farmland. As a result, Yang’s economic agency was inseparable from her status as the wife of a man belonging to an agnatic group, through which she could access economic resources and relevant productive knowledge.

Though Yang’s economic capacities were grounded on the kinship system, she also enhanced her competence at oyster collecting and farming through her long-term engagement in these activities and by absorbing the new techniques provided by the official institutions. Owing to her ability to work on the farm and on the seashore, her husband could take the job in the liquor factory which brought the cash income needed by their agrarian household for a variety of purposes including rearing their six children. Yang’s economic contribution to her marital household, though not in monetary form, was undeniably important, and I often heard her children express their appreciation for her efforts. Certainly, Yang’s efforts in rearing and caring her six children were also “work” in itself, and this “work” relied on her good combination of knowledge and skills that she learned from her seniors and her own experience—this is what Stafford (2000a) calls the process of *yang* which I will further discuss in the next section. Moreover, Yang also contributed to her marital family by accumulating social capital. Yang has been widely commended by the villagers for her outstanding working capabilities—apart from her efficiency in farming and oyster collecting, she is renowned for her ability to cook various traditional meals and sacrificial foods. Her exceptional abilities were very likely the result of her attempt to refine all the skills learned from her female seniors, instead of merely completing her tasks perfunctorily. As one of her daughters told me, “My mother is very smart and learns things very quickly”. Yang’s cooking ability can be understood as her technique of enchantment, to which the villagers respond by asking for her help when they need to prepare special

foods. Yang's generous attitude to the villagers' requests has earned her reputation as an excellent co-operator, and enhanced her family's relationship with the neighbourhood and the wider kin community.

As Yang's learning experiences and arena of economic and social activities were restricted within the domestic and village contexts, her economic agency was to a large extent framed by the kinship system. Similar to the old man in Stafford's (2004) essay—whose personal characters and career have been shaped by his scholar-gentry family background, Yang presents several characteristics that correspond to widespread ideas of what a traditional Chinese woman should be like: being an obedient daughter who accepts a marriage arranged by parents at a young age; being fully occupied with affairs in the domestic domain after marriage; and being reliant on the marital family's property for subsistence. As such, Yang appeared to be a contributor to the reproduction and preservation of the patrilineal system. However, her story also shows her distinct abilities of mastering the skills learned from her seniors in the marital household and absorbing new knowledge and techniques provided by the state, which have enabled her to share with her husband the responsibility of being a breadwinner able to sustain the household. Though the value of her labour may be taken for granted under the patriarchal structure, it does not mean that she was unconscious of her own capacity and contribution. I found that Yang always looked pleased and confident when she showed me or other younger females how to prepare a particular festival food and when she was praised by other villagers for her excellent skills in getting things done promptly and precisely. While Yang's lack of schooling and therefore illiteracy seemed to be a cause of shame to her (she had to admit her incapacity to read and write in various situations), she is proud of her ability to speak Mandarin—even if her Mandarin was somewhat limited, this was still more than many illiterate senior women could manage. She once told me that she had been to Taiwan for a while to tend to a hospitalized senior female relative; then she joked, "I was blind and that woman was deaf because I couldn't read and that woman couldn't speak Mandarin [which is commonly used in urban Taiwan]". If these women had been able to go beyond the family context to learn different things as is possible with modern

schooling, what kinds of economic agents might they have become? The stories of Madam Li and Madam Chen described below provide interesting examples.

Madam Li

Li was born in a village in the northwest of Jinmen in the 1950s during the peak of military tension across the Taiwan Strait. The family's livelihood was mainly reliant on her father's construction business, with complementary support from her mother's agrarian work. However, her mother became ill and eventually had to stop working. As a result, Li's sister, who was the eldest daughter and in her early teens at the time, left school to earn money by washing military uniforms for soldiers and to take care of her mother in the hospital. Gradually, Li's sister expanded her microscale business to the point that she was able to support her two younger sisters and one younger brother to continue their education. After graduation from junior high school, Li originally planned to further her studies in a vocational school in Taiwan. However, she missed the deadline to register at the school because of delays to the passenger ferry, the only transportation between Jinmen and Taiwan allowed and operated by the military government at that time. Instead of returning home, Li decided to work in a factory in northern Taiwan and sent remittances back to her family. This was a choice that many girls in rural areas of Taiwan made in the 1970s and 80s after the state shifted its focus from agriculture to export-oriented industrialization in the 1960s (cf. Gallin 1984a, 1984b; Lee 2004). In the early 1970s, over fifty percent of new industrial and commercial establishments were set up in rural areas and accordingly a growing portion of labour power was elicited from peasant families. Industrialization did not extend to Jinmen because of the possibility of war and the insecure supply of resources such as water and electricity. Consequently, a great deal of local people, unmarried women in particular, moved to Taiwan and became wage labourers.

Two or three years later, Li was called back by her parents to take over the business supplying services to soldiers established by her elder sister, who was getting married. In Li's hand's, this microscale business was run very well and provided sufficient income for both her younger brother and sister to attend university. As a

successful business operator, remaining unmarried had been an option for Li. Her mother was very worried about this however, and ultimately found a husband for Li when she was approaching thirty. In order to save her mother from worrying, Li agreed to the marriage with the eldest son of a Cai family in Qionglin. The poor economic condition of the groom's family was known to her beforehand, but only after marriage did she realize that her husband had large debts, part of which might be related to their marriage expenditure (on the wedding banquet, new furniture, etc.). Despite the debt, her husband is a good-hearted, honest and filial son, and the only one of three sons who stayed behind in Jinmen to take care of his early-widowed mother and all the family affairs. Instead of complaining, Li always bears in mind the words said to her by her mother: "Great wealth is dependent on the god of heaven but diligence and frugality leads to a comfortable living". It was hard to pay off the debt with the low salary earned by her husband who works in the sorghum distillery. Though Li was precluded from working outside because she was raising her children and tending to her mother-in-law who suffered from diabetes, she tried every means to generate additional income. When she had spare time, she used to push a trolley full of watermelons grown by her husband, walking a long way to a military camp and selling them to soldiers. By this and perhaps other methods unknown to me, she managed to clear the debt within a few years and finally, with some financial support from her natal family, built a three-storey house in the early 1990s.

Li's ambition to construct a new house was not only out of practical considerations—their inherited traditional house was too old and narrow—but also out of her wish to have a son. When she started planning the house project, she was bearing her third daughter. A spirit medium told her that their ancestral house was fine for their dwelling in but not good for her to have male offspring. She thus made up her mind to build a new house, which eventually brought her a son. In spite of her endeavour to fulfil her duty as a daughter-in-law, Li was often troubled by her mother-in-law, who now and then had flashes of bad temper, probably due to her illness and old age. After her son entered nursery school, Li became a volunteer in the local public hospital partly to avoid direct conflict with her mother-in-law. It was not an easy decision because of

her husband's concern about her ignoring her housework responsibilities and the villager's suspicion of volunteering which, as Li told me, they had no idea about. Li overcame the challenges and has now been volunteering in the hospital as well as in other voluntary groups for years.

Though Li has not formally worked outside the home after marriage, in recent years she has earned revenue by holding two retail licenses for selling liquor. It has been a common practice in Jinmen that ordinary citizens use their own houses as bases to apply for the retail license, using which they can purchase sorghum liquor at the wholesale price, then generate a profit by reselling liquor to local distributors or tourist shops (cf. Szonyi 2008:211). Li told me that this policy had been introduced by the first democratically elected county magistrate, who sought to address the local economic crisis after demilitarization (see chapter seven). Though the profit from these retail licenses fluctuates according to the sales volume of sorghum liquor on the market, Li has managed to send her children to university and graduate schools. Her second daughter, who was the first of her children to start working, gave part of her salary to her mother every month. When this daughter was getting married, Li presented her daughter with a cheque including all the money she had received from her daughter as well as some valuable jewellery as her dowry. The bride's parents were also responsible for the cost of the wedding banquet for the guests on the bride's side. Li's sophistication in managing the household economy was praised by her daughters with the appellation of "Minister of Finance" of their family.

Madam Chen

Chen was also born in the 1950s, one of three daughters in a rather poor family in Jinmen. She moved to Taiwan to work in a factory when she was around twenty. Her father's early death some years later might have been the cause of her return home. To relieve her mother's concerns, in her late twenties, Chen accepted a marriage broker's arrangement to marry the second son of a Cai family in Qionglin. As her father had passed away not long before the marriage, her family did not request a brideprice from the groom's family, whose economic condition was also not strong. They only held a

simple wedding, after which the bride moved into her husband's ancestral house, living together with her parents-in-law, elder brother-in-law and his wife and children.

Before their marriage, Chen had no idea about what type of man she was marrying. A small incident led her to find that her husband barely had any money in his bank account. She wondered how it was possible that her husband, a professional soldier, did not have any savings after years of serving in the army. She received an answer from her mother-in-law who told her that her husband always spent his salary carelessly, buying many necessary and unnecessary items for the extended family. He was also the main financial contributor to the refurbishment of their old house. Chen said that her husband is a kind yet difficult person, who is not suited to a disciplined and formal career. Ultimately, after completing a twelve-year contract, her husband resigned from the army, giving up the life-time pension he would have been entitled to if he had continued military service for twenty years. Thereafter he changed jobs frequently and seemed to have no will to take another regular and long-term occupation.

Chen regarded herself as a "conventional woman" (*chuantong nüren*) who had imagined her role as a housewife staying at home, taking care of children and household chores, while her husband worked outside the home to feed the family. It was probably because of her husband's lack of ambition in formal careers that, after her two sons entered primary school, Chen went out to learn the business skills needed for selling clothes. She has now been running a stand selling clothes in the market town for about twenty years, which has made her the primary breadwinner in their economic household. She has also attempted to increase their income through investment in the stock market but is always prudent about maintaining the capital for her clothing business intact. By these means, not only was she able to support her two sons through university, but she also purchased a flat in Taiwan and a house in Jinmen. In recent years, she has also shared the expense of employing an Indonesian carer to take care of her ailing mother-in-law. Chen's two sons now both work in Taiwan, residing in the flat bought by their mother. They were told that they can sell the house and then use their equal shares to help fund the purchase their own houses upon

marriage. The other new house in Jinmen is intended to be the place for Chen and her husband to enjoy their retirement.

Economic agency beyond kinship

The gap of about one decade between the cohort of Madam Yang and that of Madam Li and Madam Chen was the key to the differences in their routes of learning and becoming economic agents. One important factor was the availability of formal education. Though the six years of compulsory primary schooling had been implemented nationwide in the early stage of the republican state, in rural Jinmen more girls than boys were forced to leave school to tend younger sibling or assist in household chores (cf. Lee 2004 on Taiwan). Yang and most women in her generation had never even entered school and remain illiterate. On the contrary, a good proportion of women born after the 1950s, like Li and Chen, were allowed by their families to attend school and even achieved the nine years of formal education that was introduced when the central government announced it was going to experiment with the three-year extension of mandatory education in Jinmen in 1964. Gradually, state-dominated schooling supplemented the role of family as the main technology of reproduction, producing citizen-students with the modern knowledge and skills that enabled them to go beyond the traditional mode of production. The abilities acquired at school, such as speaking Mandarin (the official language), writing and doing basic mathematics, as technologies of production were arguably helpful for Li and Chen to accommodate to factory work and life in Taiwan. These basic capacities, together with the characteristics (boldness, adaptability to new situations, open attitudes toward unfamiliar persons, etc.) that they cultivated during their migrant life in Taiwan, are likely to have been very beneficial to their later engagement in business.

The years of schooling and working outside home led Li and Chen to delay their marriage for several years—a situation which had been rare for women from rural poor families in earlier decades. Most rural women born before the 1950s got married early, in their late teens, and the marriage form of *tongyangxi* (lit. the little adopted daughter), in which a woman who was given away by her natal family as a child and adopted by

another family who raised her as a future wife for one of her sons, was very common (cf. Wolf 1972:171-90). These women who married at a young age and who did not have any formal education did not have any access to technologies of production other than those of their marital families—as in the example of Madam Yang above. In contrast to their seniors who had limited options, modern education and different working experiences enabled Li and Chen to develop themselves as independent economic agents. However, kinship and economy were connected in a different way as the money that the ladies earned in the factories contributed to the income of their natal families, which was the general pattern throughout Taiwan. In Brandtstädt's (2009) study of the female migrant workers from the Penghu Islands to Taiwan, she argues that the phenomenon of these female labourers sustaining close emotional links with their natal families by means of sending remittances should be seen as an “economy of *ganqing*” (sentiment), in which kinship value is produced by gendered work (2009:154). But this economy of *ganqing* did not undermine the conventional pattern of marriage under the patrilineal ideology. Both Li and Chen followed their parents' wishes to accept arranged marriages with men who were totally unknown to them, then after marriage they tended to stay at home, fulfilling their roles as good wives, good daughters-in-law and good mothers. The economic difficulties of their conjugal households nevertheless drove them to re-employ their economic capabilities to increase household income.

In Li's case, she attempted to make an income without disobeying her husband's desire for her to attend to household matters at home full-time. Her business sensitivity grounded on her previous experiences enabled her to figure out a way of generating revenue by selling watermelons to soldiers in the military base nearby. The feasibility of this business was dependent on the combination of three technical systems. The watermelons that Li sold were produced by her husband labouring on the family land—her appropriation of the result of her husband's use of a combination of the techniques of production and reproduction. Then she employed her marketing skills, which she had mastered in the years of running the microscale business serving soldiers, to sell the fruit to the troops—her application of the technique of enchantment.

In recent years, she made a profit from the two liquor retail licenses, the application for which was dependent on using the ancestral house that her husband inherited and the house that she built with household savings and financial support from her natal family. These two examples illustrate that Li exerted her economic agency in a way that made good use of the economic knowledge she gained from her previous learning and practices as well as the economic capital that she could access, part of which was family property inherited by her husband. Li thus appears as an active agent who took advantage of the familial resources rather than a passive subordinate whose actions are determined by the reproduction of the patrilineal system.

Chen's story demonstrates a different kind of economic agency with no obvious connection to the patrilineal system, that is, to her husband's inherited property or his family's productive techniques. I do not know from where she learned the skills required to run the clothes business and acquired the capital to establish her enterprise, but it is likely to have been related to her former work experiences in Taiwan. As her husband barely had any savings, she might have used the money that she saved during her years of migrant work in Taiwan. Chen's familiarity with Taiwan also enabled her to establish cooperative relationships with the clothing distributers in urban centres and travel there frequently to select the types of clothing to be shipped to Jinmen for selling. After years of running her enterprise, her marketing skills were so good that she was able to earn enough to purchase two houses. Moreover, her ability to talk in an informed manner about economic trends and the dynamics of stock market made a strong impression on me as this kind of knowledge was rarely articulated by other female villagers in her age cohort and never by women senior to her. Chen's economic accomplishments provide an example of an agent's comprehensive use of all three technical systems without drawing on resources of the patrilineal kinship system. Her economic independence, and even economic superiority over her husband, has made her more like the actual head of her household.

Women's labour and authority in the patriarchal settings

My three female informants' stories serve to raise an old debate: Have women's

economic accomplishments helped to improve women's subordinate status in the Chinese patriarchal system? On the basis of her data gathered in Taiwan over an extensive period from the 1960s to the 1970s,⁶⁷ sociologist Rita Gallin (1984a, 1984b) contends that, despite women's distinct economic competence gained from their work in the agricultural or industrial sectors, they appeared to comply with the patriarchal norms that render women in an inferior position, enduring the lack of personal autonomy and authority. For example, women tended to use their own earnings for the advantages of their conjugal households rather than for their personal independence and continued to bear primary responsibility for child-rearing and housework despite their full-time jobs outside the home. Gallin argues that the persistent forces of traditional norms and values in defining women's status were the result of a system of "patriarchal capitalism" that reproduces women's subordination because the submissive, docile, and transient female labour force was beneficial to the Taiwanese employers, allowing them to respond to the rapid changes and fluctuations of the international market.

In one sense, Gallin's argument is compelling because she notes the convergence of the exploitation of women's labour in the Chinese patriarchal system and the appropriation of surplus value in capitalist production, and links this to Taiwan's striving for economic success in the extremely competitive global market. My three informants' economic trajectories—Yang's expansion of her labour into heavy farm work to allow her husband to work in the military-owned distillery, and Li's and Chen's migrant work in Taiwanese factories—could be read in the light of the exploitation of their labour by the patriarchal capitalist system. However, Gallin's argument is also reductionist as she defines women's subordinate position by only attending to the surface phenomenon (e.g., women's double workload of household chores and formal occupation), without offering any exploration of women's

⁶⁷ Similar to the patterns noted in my three female informants' stories, Gallin's data shows that the entry of women into farm and then nonfarm labour corresponded to the transition of the national economy from agriculture to industrialization. Married women initially took over the farm work from their husbands so the men could seek jobs and earn cash income in urban areas; later, as factories sprouted in rural areas from the 1970s, a large proportion of married and unmarried women became wage labourers themselves.

subjective feelings and thoughts. As such, her argument leaves no room for an alternative understanding of women's agency and power as exerted in the creation of their ideal family life.

By attending to the aspects of learning and economic agency, the previous section on my three female informants' economic trajectories has demonstrated that women are not mere subordinates in the patriarchal environment but manifest their personal competence in various ways. While women's economic abilities were constrained by the patriarchal principles in earlier days (e.g., women in Madam Yang's generation were largely excluded from property succession and access to education), they could make important contributions to the economic well-being of their marital households by mastering and advancing the skills they learned from family seniors and other institutions. They could also earn themselves good reputations by their own excellent work abilities and by helping others with their excellent skills, which would at the same time be beneficial to enhancing the reputation of their families in the close-knit community. While a large proportion of women who benefited from six to nine years of mandatory education from the 1960s onwards (e.g., the age cohort of Madam Li and Madam Chen) could only find low-wage jobs in the factories (the result of the system of patriarchal capitalism as Gallin argues), they attained skills and experiences unavailable to their female seniors and, possibly, helpful to their developing economics-related capacities. Their continuous widening and deepening of their knowledge and skills (as a result of the human capacity for learning) also enables women to engage in diverse kinds of money-making strategies, such as setting up micro-scale enterprises and investing in the stock market. Though the money that women make tends to flow to a variety of family projects (e.g., building or purchasing a house, paying children's tuition fees, etc.), the contribution is acknowledged not only by the women themselves, but also very likely by their husbands, children and other family members—hence Madam Li being known as the Minister of Finance in her household.

Further, I suggest that the value of female labour is highlighted in their building up of personal reputation and their strengthening of the ties with their family members

(cf. Brandtstädter 2009 on unmarried women enhancing their ties with their families by sending remittances back home). This point has been neglected by Gallin, probably because of her formalist lens on the Chinese patriarchal system that precludes the female perspective—the weakness of many of the earlier studies of Chinese kinship (e.g., Freedman's lineage theory) as well. In the early 1970s, Margery Wolf critiqued the predominant focus on men in the study of Chinese family, and proposed the notion of uterine family to describe the cohesive unit composed by a mother and her children, from which the father is excluded (1972:32-7). Wolf contends that women tend to work on behalf of this unit, striving in particular for strong emotional ties with their sons, with the immediate aim of securing their present position within larger patrilineal families and a longer-term aim of ensuring they are supported by their sons in their old age. Despite the conceptual attractiveness of the uterine family, Stafford (2000b:123) notes that this idea tends to depict women's accommodation to the patriarchal family, and therefore it remains in line with the male-centred studies which identify women as the cause of family division. Instead, Stafford argues that the folk notion of *yang* (care and nurturance) sheds light on a much more important and positively evaluated role for women in the Chinese family.

As mentioned in the previous chapters, the notion of *yang* suggests the flow of care and nurturance between generations. Though it is traditionally assumed that men are the chief providers of support and nurturance in their households (both to their aged parents and to their children), in practice, they tend to focus on the economic aspects and leave the everyday work of *yang* to their wives. I suggest that women's labour is mostly embodied in their provision of *yang* to different subjects, which is linked to how women see their social roles and how they substantiate their relationships with those whom they are concerned about. In Madam Yang's case, her parents-in-law died long ago, but her provision of *fengyang* (respectful care and nurturance) is represented in her diligent performance of ancestral sacrifices to the dead couple on the anniversaries of their deaths. In the cases of Madam Li and Madam Chen, they manage to fulfil the roles both of carers for elderly parents and of bread-winners. From her first day of being a daughter-in-law, Li has borne the primary

responsibility for tending her ill mother-in-law, with financial support partly from her husband's salary and partly from her own earnings through various channels. Chen was unable to take care of her ailing mother-in-law herself because of her clothing business, but she was the main actor responsible for finding, training and paying part of the salary of an Indonesian carer, with little support from her brother-in-law's family living under the same roof. Moreover, Yang, Li and Chen all attend carefully to the *fengyang* of the distant ancestors by performing ancestral sacrifices at graves and in the ancestral houses, where their acts are evaluated by women of the same lineage branch. There is no doubt that their provision of *fengyang* is in line with the traditional duties imposed on daughters-in-law, but, as I suggest in chapter four, their filial acts are also positively linked to their good personal reputation in their individual families and the extended kin community.

All of my three female informants were most likely the primary providers of *yang* to their own children, which resulted in the intimate ties of their children to them—the core of Wolf's idea of the uterine family. And, the provision of *yang* to the children tends to continue even after the children have married and have their own families. For example, during the ninth and tenth months of the lunar calendar, Madam Yang went to the tidal basin to catch crabs several times and then called her daughters and sons (living in Jinmen) to come back to Qionglin to collect the crabs or to eat the crab porridge she had cooked. One of her daughters once told me that they have got a bit fed up with eating crabs, because they had eaten so many within a short period, but they would not disappoint their mother out of acknowledgement and appreciation of their mother's care for them. Also, while many old ladies sold their oyster produce to their acquaintances or in the market town, Yang always saved her harvest for domestic consumption. She looked pleased when sharing with me the fact that she would always divide the oysters into several portions to give to her non-co-living married sons and daughters in Jinmen. Though Madam Li occupies much of her time with voluntary activities nowadays, she spares the time and labour to take care of the baby girl of her second married daughter who works in the hospital. Like other senior village women who also help take care of their grandchildren, Li always looked content and happy

when with her little granddaughter. Rather than only offering their labour in exchange for money or rewards of various kinds, women frequently use their labour to express their affections and, at the same time, receive affections from the ones they are concerned about.

The mutual attachments between mothers and children are also manifested in the way my informants' share their children's stories with me, relating details that suggest their closeness and intimacy. As children tend to be together with their mothers for a larger amount of time than with their fathers, they may observe and learn some characteristics from their mothers and eventually decide their personal ambitions or careers by taking their mothers as their model. The third daughter of Madam Li made up her mind to be a professional social worker (and she successfully achieved it) as a result of her admiration of her mother's long-term engagement in volunteering. Madam Chen's eldest son devotes himself to a marketing-related career in light of his observation of his mother's success in her clothing business. As Stafford (2009:149) suggests, we may not find female authority in the forms of matrilineal descent and matrilocal residence but instead in women's dominant influence in the emotional dispositions and outlook of their children—this is also a kind of technology of reproduction.

As the notion of the uterine family assumed the exclusion of the father and emphasized the emotional ties between a mother and her children, it appeared unable to delineate women's economic contribution to the household beyond her emotional investment and their substantial decision-influencing power over men. Another concept of matrifocality suggested by Raymond Smith (1973) seems to be more useful analytically. In the community of Guyanese descendants of African immigrants that Smith studied, an obvious division of labour between sexes was observed among the co-resident couple: the man was the primary contributor to supporting the household by working outside, whereas the woman was occupied with child-rearing and was to a large extent economically dependent upon her spouse—a similar pattern to that which existed in the Chinese context. Smith describes the formation of a matrifocal family as a developmental process: a woman initially built a strong emotional bond

with her children through her long-term investment of time and effort in child-rearing, and, some years later, after the children had grown up, they began to bring back to their mother their outside earnings to contribute to the daily expenses of the household. The matrifocal quality was increasing as the woman shifted her status from the focus of affective ties to the centre of an economic and decision-making coalition with her children (Smith 1973:124-5). In the matrifocal household, the presence of the husband-father may be less significant but not excluded. As Smith puts it, though “the proportion of women who are household heads increases with age—principally because of widowhood—matrifocality is a property of the internal relations of male, as well as female, headed households” (1973:125). The term “matrifocal household” is a useful heuristic for understanding the families in which my three female protagonists appear to be the affective, economic, and decision-making foci.⁶⁸ Indeed, though the family life that the three women each established with great efforts was broadly in line with the patrilineal ideology, it is a mistake to regard them as passive subordinates as this deprives them of any recognition of their agency.

As my cases are focused on elderly married women, one may wonder whether the young women think and behave very differently. Insofar as I observed in Jinmen, the generational differences in exposure to various forms of knowledge and skills and increasing opportunities for women to work outside home have obstructed the reproduction of the patrilineal system to some extent. In typical patriarchal communities, like my fieldsite, it is not uncommon to find that young women who have formal careers outside the village remain unmarried over the age of thirty. The authority of mothers-in-law also appears less effective than is assumed to have been the case in traditional contexts. An often-heard remark from senior village women was that their daughters-in-law—who may be born in Jinmen or Taiwan, or from different countries—are bad at household management, including cooking and doing domestic worship (see chapter four). But, as long as the daughters-in-law make an economic contribution to the households by working outside, the old women tended to avoid

⁶⁸ Madam Yang’s decision-influencing power in the household also became significant after her husband’s death.

direct conflict with the younger women. Instead of “teaching” the younger women the duties required of daughters-in-law, the old women often chose to take over child-rearing and housework. However, this does not mean that young women are entirely freed from the patrilineal values. For example, many young women made efforts to give birth to at least one son, because of the pressure—coming from family seniors and the social atmosphere of celebrating the birth of male offspring—to which the women may reluctantly or voluntarily submit (see chapter three). Therefore, though women’s status in their individual patrilineal households may be improved by their significant economic contribution, giving them more power in decision-making, the situation is still a long way from allowing one to conclude that there has been a major weakening of the patriarchal norms orienting women’s marital and social lives.

Conclusion

This chapter has demonstrated the roles that the patrilineal system and the state’s policies played in the economic trajectories of three women living in Qionglin. In response to my earlier note on the possibility of comparing my cases with those of Stafford (2004) to illuminate the importance of gender, we can see from Madam Yang’s case that gender mattered greatly to the differences in people’s economic destinies in the early republican era. In the 1940s, when Yang was born, male-centred agrarian households were common economic units throughout Jinmen. At that time, career diversification within a peasant household was a generalized phenomenon because the family’s land was too small to produce enough food, and young men wanted to experience adventure in the outside world. In contrast to men who were allowed to try various careers, marriage was the best prospect for girls from poorer households as they were excluded from property succession and there were very few job opportunities for women in the traditional patriarchal society.

The arrival of the KMT’s army in Jinmen in 1949 had an obvious impact on local society and women’s economic opportunities. As described in this chapter, the local economy became ever more closely linked to the state’s strategies and the national economy. As the economic goal of the KMT government in the 1950s was agricultural

development, most Jinmen households remained agriculture-based. However, the military's establishment of the sorghum industry affected the constitution of household economy as local young men began working in the sorghum distillery and their wives had to take over the work of farming. With support from the US-funded institution the JCRR, Jinmen's agricultural yields significantly increased because of the introduction of modern agricultural techniques and materials such as fertilizer, pesticides and improved seed varieties. The production of oysters was also improved as a result of the introduction of new tools. The early-married, uneducated women became skilled producers and an important labour force in the primary sector. Nevertheless, their agrarian work tended to bind them to the home and incorporated them into the reproduction of the patrilineal system.

As the average living standards on Jinmen were raised along with advances in agriculture, access to formal education was no longer restricted to male offspring. Women also attained new opportunities to earn money because the substantial number of soldiers stationed on Jinmen stimulated the flourishing of various microscale enterprises. Later, the state's shift of economic focus to industrialization from the 1960s onwards drove many Jinmen girls to become wage labourers in Taiwanese factories. In this way, their gender became less effective in confining women's economic destiny to one option—marriage. The new economic opportunities that women enjoyed did not weaken their ties with their natal families, but strengthened them as a result of the remittances they sent back home. The economic constitution of many peasant households was also influenced by the migrant economy, which on the one hand absorbed much young female labour power, and on the other gave younger siblings alternatives to agrarian work as their older siblings' remittances allowed them to pursue higher education and non-agrarian careers. Moreover, the emergence of various economic opportunities enabled women to earn money through different channels after marriage. But, as the stories of Madam Li and Madam Chen illustrated, women's economic competence did not necessarily lead to their dissociation from, or resistance against, the patriarchal norms. Despite their ability to be economically independent, both Li and Chen accepted arranged marriages out of their filial

sentiments to their parents. After marriage, despite their important economic contribution to their marital households, they still bear the workload of doing household chores and providing (*feng*)yang to their parents-in-law and their children. Rather than emphasizing the exploitation of their labour by the patriarchal system, I argue that their labour should be evaluated by examining their successes at building up their personal reputation and consolidating their relationships with the persons who are of concern to them.

It is undeniable that the drastic political-economic changes over the twentieth century have greatly altered the economic constitution of the patriarchy-based, agrarian households that were dominant in Jinmen and Taiwan in the early republican era. On Jinmen, as Szonyi's work convincingly demonstrates, the tense military conditions and geopolitical context were the primary causes of the local economy developing in the way it did. However, as shown by the stories of my three female protagonists, the changing economic patterns and women's increasing economic contribution and authority in their households has not necessarily led to the decreasing importance of the patrilineal and kinship values that define many of women's social roles. In line with my argument about the correlation of ritual continuities and human sociality in the previous chapters, I have argued that the women's efforts to portray particular kinds of self-image and to build and sustain social relationships in the close-knit community are the main reason that women's behaviour still appears to conform to patriarchal norms.

Chapter Seven

Local Political-economic Structure after the Cold War

During my fieldwork in Jinmen, I was struck by how frequently the economic advantages related to the trade in sorghum liquor became a topic of everyday conversations among the locals and between the locals and outsiders. From soon after I moved into Qionglin, villagers who learned of my plan to stay in Jinmen for more than a year would immediately ask me whether I had changed my household registration to Jinmen.⁶⁹ This was because, as they explained, if I had I would be able to enjoy a variety of welfare benefits, such as free public transportation and free medical care. More importantly, they explained, after one year of registration I could obtain the privilege of purchasing the locally produced sorghum liquor at a lower price and could earn profits by reselling the liquor to local distributors. Soon, I found that when I joined in a small gathering of men or women or both on various occasions, the topic of the benefits that the sorghum liquor industry had brought to Jinmen quite often cropped up. These benefits were also a common topic in the local government-owned newspaper, *Jinmen Daily News*, which also had occasional reports on local government and politicians' responses to ordinary citizens' worries about the potential threat to their economic well-being. Jinmen's generous welfare programme has in fact become renowned throughout the ROC territory as the county usually achieved highest marks in various happiness indexes among all the counties of Taiwan in the surveys conducted by different mass media and third parties in recent years. Accordingly, it is common for local residents to encounter questions from tourists from Taiwan about how many benefits they could really obtain. In response, some residents simply listed the kinds of welfare they are entitled to, while others would emphasize that these benefits are deserved because the islanders had suffered so much during Jinmen's previous period as a "war zone".

What is impressive about this situation is the significant extent to which the life

⁶⁹ I am a citizen of Taiwan and have household registration in a county in the island of Taiwan. If I want to change my registration but do not have my own residence in Jinmen, then I must get a local person's permission for registering my name under his or her residence address.

of Jinmen residents has been associated with the government policies of *shehui fuli* (social welfare), in which the sorghum distillery plays an important role. This chapter uses the term social welfare in accordance with how it is used by the county government of Jinmen. This means that it includes some forms of benefit (e.g., the profits generated from reselling liquor) that are not consistent with the normal understanding of social welfare in western advanced countries as being targeted specifically at economically disadvantaged groups.⁷⁰ As will be explained later on, the distillery is a product of past military governance but, more importantly, it is essential to the financial strength of local government in the present and to its policy of giving monetary rewards to local people who lived through the period of military attacks and preparation. The distillery and the welfare policies are also linked to the development of local politics after demilitarization and the normalization of democratic politics from the 1990s onwards. Through examining the complicated relationships between the distillery, the local politics, and the economic well-being of the Jinmen residents, this chapter is aimed at exploring how the political-economic structure of Jinmen in the present is closely linked to the previous period of the tense confrontation between the ROC and the PRC under the bipolar framework of the Cold War.

While Jinmen was included in the capitalist/liberal camp in competition with the communist camp during the Cold War, it had its own local trajectories of political and economic modernization. Also, its experience of military control and conflicts was not only distinct from the “long peace” that many western advanced countries experienced, but also distinct from the conditions on the island of Taiwan where the military threat and interventions were not as serious or direct as on Jinmen. With his studies on

⁷⁰ Notice that some of the forms of welfare to which the people of Jinmen are entitled are also enjoyed by the residents of other offshore islands under the governance of the ROC in accordance with the *Offshore Islands Development Act*, which is aimed at “promoting the developmental construction, enhancing the industrial development, protecting the natural environment, preserving the cultural features, improving the quality of life, and augmenting the welfare of residents of offshore islands”. The benefits include exemption from business tax for local business operators, subsidies from the Ministry of Education on textbooks, and miscellaneous expenses for students receiving national compulsory education, and subsidy from a central government budget on the charges for transportation between offshore islands and the main island of Taiwan, and so on. But, the kind of welfare I discuss in this chapter is proposed and financed by the local government, and is therefore locally specific.

Vietnam and South Korea in relation to the Cold War context, Heonik Kwon (2006, 2008, 2010) contends that the locally grounded experience of the bipolar era has provoked localized ways of dealing with the legacies and trauma in the contemporary lives of ordinary people. In line with Kwon's call for an investigation of the divergent ways in which bipolar politics has been "decomposed" across the world, this chapter will demonstrate how the state has been requested to redress the sufferings that the people of Jinmen endured in the precious decades, and how the past experiences have given rise to a shared moral sense of injustice that binds local residents together with local government and political figures as a kind of localized political community.

The initial two sections of this chapter scrutinize the local political-economic structure by focusing on the complicated relationships sketched above involving the county government, the sorghum liquor company, the local newspaper, and ordinary residents. The first section describes how the sorghum distillery became more intimately linked to the economic well-being of local residents after the generous welfare programme emerged as a response to the economic impact of demilitarization. The second section explores the relationship that binds the county government's finances to those of the liquor company, and how this in turn has affected the relationship between local society and the state. Having elucidated the economic characteristics of the local political-economic structure, the third section focuses on the political conditions that evolved after the termination of military control, which led to the normalization of democratic elections. Taking the 2014 municipal-level election as its entry point, this section singles out the two principles on which the local political structure is based: the primary principle is kinship (which follows on from my discussion in the previous chapters on the correlation between ritual continuities and the maintenance of local social fabric); the secondary principle is the connection between islanders forged from their shared collective memories of the period of militarization, which act to bind kin and non-kin together in a more inclusive political community. Together, these two principles demonstrate Jinmen's particularities and help to show how the situation on the island is distinct from the situation on Taiwan. It also shows how the collective memories have resulted in the introduction of some

welfare provision (financed by the distillery's profits) and contributed to the shaping of a localized political community. Based on the previous three sections, the fourth section examines state-society relations during and after the Cold War. This chapter ends with a summary of how the present local political-economic structure of Jinmen demonstrates the importance of a locally grounded perspective on state-society relations in the era of post-Cold War, which is characteristic of the movement toward an interactive and constructive relationship between the state and civil society.

In addition to my own fieldwork data, this chapter uses many reports from the local newspaper, *Jinmen Daily News*, which was founded by the military in the 1960s and taken over by the county government in 1992. Despite its official tone, this newspaper has a large local readership (many households in my field village have long-term subscriptions) and it is perhaps the exclusive medium through which most local residents access political and economic news at the local, national and international levels. During fieldwork, I visited the village office almost every morning to read their free copy of *Jinmen Daily News*. Though the office also had copies of another newspaper from a Taiwan-based publisher, most villagers seemed only to read the local one. I often had to wait for another villager (usually a male) to finish reading the paper, or I would pass it straight on a villager who had come after me; this gives an indication of the popularity of this particular local newspaper. Reading the newspaper in the morning was also the time when I could hear the lively conversations about politics that took place nearby among male and female villagers. Despite the fact that most elderly village women are illiterate, they accessed the information in the newspaper by listening to their male counterparts' oral summary of what they had read. As such, the morning gathering in the village office to read the paper forms a kind of civil space where people exchanged news and personal opinions about various public matters, with the views of the local people largely in accordance with the discourses of the government-owned newspaper rather than challenging or contradicting them.

My approach to dealing with the newspaper material is in line with Gupta's (1995) idea that it is productive to analyse how the discursive construction of the state in newspapers contributes to the shaping of the image of "the state" among its governed

population. I agree with Gupta regarding his treatment of newspapers as a raw material that can enrich theoretical analysis of the state in light of the prominent correlation between newspaper reports and oral interviews, and his view of local newspapers as a kind of “field data”. Slightly different from Gupta, who compared local vernacular and national English-language newspapers to analyse the different discursive constructions of the state, in my case study I only focus on the local press as my objective is to explore how the local government shapes its relationships with local residents and with the state/central government in a discursive form, as well as how local residents perceive and react to these discourses (including their perception of “the state”). This approach is helpful as it allows me to show the role of the local newspaper in the formation of a localized political community.

Sorghum liquor and the economic well-being of Jinmen residents

As mentioned in chapter six, the sorghum distillery, founded in the early 1950s, was originally the military’s attempt to change the local traditional diet of sweet potato and to answer the troops’ great demand for alcohol. The military encouraged the growing of sorghum using measures such as exchanging the sorghum grown by Jinmen farmers for an equal weight of rice, and allotting a few bottles of sorghum liquor to farmers at seasonal festivals. In this way, the military attempted to assert its image as *ai min* (lit. loving and caring for people) and downplayed its ability to command villagers using the power of the armed forces. However, local farmers only received old rice that had originally been held in reserve by the army for military preparedness and this had usually been stored for more than three years before being transferred to ordinary households. My elderly informants recalled that in the past they felt it was better to have old rice to eat than nothing, but nowadays they feel resentful toward the military for this measure, particularly after some research findings revealed the correlation between the long-term storage of rice grains and the presence of aflatoxin, a potent carcinogen that causes liver cancer. Given the elderly islanders had eaten so much old rice in the past and the fact that liver cancer seems presently to plague the elderly on Jinmen, there were good grounds for them to feel aggrieved. I was struck by local

seniors' ambivalent feelings toward the military-civilian relations of the previous decades: on the one hand, ordinary people appeared vulnerable to the state-army's authoritarian commands; on the other, they appreciated the gradual material improvements brought by the military. Interestingly, during my fieldwork I never heard any negative opinions toward the sorghum distillery *per se*; instead, the founder of the distillery—the general commander Hu Lian—was respectfully addressed as *Xiandai Enzhugong* (lit. a modern benevolent master), a point to which I will return in the fourth section.⁷¹ This positive evaluation is related to the intimate relationship of the liquor industry to the economy of local households.

The life story of Madam Yang described in the previous chapter reflects a general change to the constitution of farming households in Jinmen that followed the founding of the sorghum distillery in the 1950s: more and more young men were drawn from agrarian households to work in the distillery while their wives took over the heavy work of sorghum farming. Though agriculture suffered a drastic decline from the late 1980s, the distillery still occupies a substantial proportion of local male labour.⁷² Besides this direct link between the sorghum distillery and household economy, the focus of this chapter is the variety of benefits financially associated with the distillery that local residents called *shehui fuli* (social welfare)—a term they learned from the discourses of local politicians. As mentioned earlier, during fieldwork I was often encouraged by the villagers to change my household registration to Jinmen so that I too could enjoy this generous social welfare. My interlocutors emphasized that these welfare offerings would not be possible if the sorghum distillery did not exist. They also added that the distillery only began to earn substantial profits to finance the government's welfare programme when Chen Shui-Zai, the first democratically elected county magistrate, was in power.

⁷¹ *Enzhugong* in the context of Jinmen is a respectful title for an imperial official named Chen Yuan from the eighth century, who was assigned to lead twelve groups of people bearing different surnames to Jinmen to herd horses. In present-day Jinmen, many villages have their own temple dedicated to Chen Yuan in gratitude for his contribution to the initial exploitation of the island and the legends about his spiritual power after his death.

⁷² The decline of farming in Jinmen has not threatened the production of sorghum liquor as the local produce was far from enough from the beginning and the distillery has long relied on the import of sorghum from other countries.

During the period of War Zone Administration (WZA) from 1956 to 1992, the post of county magistrate in Jinmen was not decided by democratic election but by order of the military. Chen Shui-Zai, a native of Jinmen, won the first democratic election for magistrate in 1993, but he faced two big challenges: (1) the economic crisis caused by the troop withdrawal (as a large number of small businesses supplying soldiers could not survive after losing their primary source of clients) that followed the mitigation of the military standoff between the ROC and the PRC from the late-1980s; (2) the financial sources of his own county government, which could no longer rely on central government subsidies routed through the WZA from the Ministry of Defence. In an interview conducted by Szonyi, Chen Shui-Zai stated that “We had to try to develop a social welfare system—we wanted it to be as good as in Western countries. But we needed money. So my attitude was that we had to be self-reliant” (Szonyi 2008:208). His solution was to borrow funds from the state to expand the distillery and increase the production. Thanks to the high demand for Jinmen sorghum liquor in the market in the 1990s and the monopoly system (which will be further explained in the next section), the distillery brought the county government great revenue and made possible the generous welfare programme.

Two decades after Chen Shui-Zai’s term of office, the welfare programme that he proposed had not only been largely maintained but even expanded in some respects. At the time I completed fieldwork, at the end of 2014, the social welfare to which people registered in Jinmen may be entitled can be separated into three types: (1) the ordinary social welfare, which can be found in other parts of Taiwan, but the level offered in Jinmen is relatively generous, including free public transportation, free medical care, free tuition fees and lunch for pre-university students, and a variety of grants for the elderly and disadvantaged groups; (2) the privilege of buying sorghum liquor at the wholesale price at three traditional festivals (the Chinese New Year, the Duanwu Festival and the Mid-Autumn Festival) and to apply for the license of liquor retailer (the license-holders can earn profits by renting their licenses to other bigger distributors); (3) the monetary compensation to Jinmen residents who participated in the militia before 1958 or experienced the WZA period for their physical sufferings

and sacrifice of civil rights (this will be discussed further in the third section).

The significant role of the sorghum distillery in the economic well-being of local households and in securing the bond between local residents and government agencies becomes evident by comparing local conversations about the liquor-related benefits with the reportage of *Jinmen Daily News*. Take the following example from my fieldnotes about the villagers' experiences of the transactions involved in the purchase and re-sale of liquor. On a hot day in May in 2014, I took a walk past the village office where plenty of boxes of sorghum liquor had been stored ready for the registered citizens to buy. This particular liquor transaction occurred before the Duanwu Festival, one of the three festivals during which each adult citizen can purchase a dozen bottles of sorghum liquor at a cheaper price (12 bottles for NTD 4,800, about GBP 96), then earn a profit by reselling the liquor to local distributors (the profit on the 12 bottles ranged from NTD 2,000 to 4,700). As I passed by the village office, I heard a loud, angry voice from an old man inside. It seemed that the old man was unhappy with the acquisition price proposed by the liquor distributor. Some days later, when talking with a female informant, she told me that this old man had scolded the distributor for buying his liquor at a low price while earning a lot of money himself. My informant added that this kind of scene is quite common in Jinmen today, though she personally found it unjust to blame the distributor because the acquisition price actually does go up and down frequently.

Unfortunately, the acquisition price went further down during the Mid-Autumn festival, and this became a news story in *Jinmen Daily News* in August 2014. The related reports described how the continuous fall in the acquisition price had led to widely-shared discontent among local residents. As a result, the vice president of the county council asked the county magistrate and the general manager of the sorghum liquor company to respond to this issue in an extraordinary meeting of the council. The company explained that, in addition to the fact that there had been a decrease in the demand for sorghum liquor on the market, the declining acquisition price was also related to the problem of oversupply caused by the relaxed rules requiring only one year's registration in Jinmen in order to attain the privilege of purchasing liquor at the

wholesale price. The company suggested returning to the former stricter requirement of three years of registration.

The above two instances illustrate that the profits generated from the liquor transaction have become a central concern for many local residents, and local politicians appeared to respond to the issue immediately and attempted to show their accountability through the local press. As most journalists at *Jinmen Daily News* are local-born residents who are familiar with the day-to-day concerns of their fellow villagers and have easy access to local politicians, their reportage tends to reflect directly local actualities. Its extensive body of local readers also checks if the reports convey their real concerns and if the government or particular politicians have realized their promises. I suggest that, by enabling the delivery of government welfare to Jinmen residents, the distillery strengthens the ties between ordinary residents and local government agencies. The local newspaper further enhances these ties through its role in facilitating communications between ordinary villagers and local political figures beyond the face-to-face level.

Sorghum distillery and the financial structure of the county government

The previous section notes that the sorghum distillery's ability to generate considerable profits should be attributed to the first democratically-elected magistrate's proposal to expand the distillery's production. This section explains how the increasing profits of the distillery became closely connected to the financial structure of the county government, and how subsequently this financial connection led to the county government's protective measures against the global trend of neoliberalism-oriented government reform (led by the governments of Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher) that was adopted by the ROC government from the 1990s.

In the wake of retaking the islands of Taiwan and Penghu from the Japanese after WWII, the KMT-led government ordered the production and sale of alcohol products to be regulated by a government agency called the Taiwan Tobacco and Liquor Monopoly Bureau under the Taiwan provincial government.⁷³ However, Jinmen's

⁷³ The KMT preserved the monopoly agency for various products (including liquor and tobacco)

sorghum distillery, which was under the Fujian provincial government subject to the WZA's control, was outside the Monopoly Bureau's regulation.⁷⁴ Therefore, the sale of sorghum liquor was originally confined within the area of Jinmen. In 1977, the WZA authority reached an agreement with the Monopoly Bureau that allowed Jinmen sorghum liquor to be sold in Taiwan but the total number of bottles was regulated, which was supposed to prevent the distillery from increasing its profits (Weng 2002:19-20).

After the end of the WZA, the county government took over the distillery but the monopoly system remained in force. The monopoly system allowed the county government to benefit directly from a local tax on the monopoly profit of the distillery which, at the same time, was free from other central-government taxes such as tariff duty and business income tax. By then, the Monopoly Bureau in Taiwan no longer limited the total bottles of Jinmen sorghum liquor to be sold to Taiwan and therefore the Jinmen Distillery could adjust its production according to the demand of the market. Also, the county government allowed the local large liquor distributors to cooperate with the distributors in Taiwan, opening another channel for selling sorghum liquor to Taiwan. As *Kinmen Kaoliang Jiu* (Sorghum Liquor of Jinmen) has become a famous and beloved brand among liquor consumers, the distillery generated great profits that accounted for more than 40 percent of the county government's annual revenue on average (Weng 2002:84-90). Local residents also shared the economic benefits of the distillery's success as they were recipients of the generous welfare programme it funded, and they made additional profits from renting their liquor licenses to the larger distributors who needed more stock to meet the high demand.

In the meantime, the central government of the ROC was following the global trend of neoliberalism-oriented government reform, promoting a policy of

established by the Japanese during its colonial rule of Taiwan, and renamed the agency as the Taiwan Tobacco and Liquor Monopoly Bureau in 1947.

⁷⁴ As mentioned in chapter one, the existence of two provincial governments suggested the KMT's special arrangements in response to the reality of its losing the Mainland to the Chinese Communists in 1949 and the implementation of the Constitution of Republic of China in Taiwan province and part of Fujian province including islands of Jinmen and Mazu. Following the fourth constitutional revision of December 1998, the Taiwan provincial government ceased to be a legal government entity. However, the counties of Jinmen and Mazu remain under the Fujian provincial government of the ROC.

privatization which turned government-owned enterprises into private corporations in order to improve the enterprises' performance and facilitate the development of the capitalist market economy. With this trend, the county government of Jinmen was required to embark on the privatization of its sorghum distillery. In February 1998, the distillery completed the stage of corporatization and was renamed as the Kinmen Kaoliang Liquor Incorporated, though it was still owned by the county government. As it took time to set up the relevant legal regulations before repealing the monopoly system, the central government asked the county government of Jinmen to postpone the process of privatization. In 2002, the monopoly system was finally annulled, and the *Tobacco and Alcohol Administration Act* and the *Tobacco and Alcohol Tax Act* came into force as part of Taiwan's preparation for entry into the World Trade Organization. These new Acts, however, generated local suspicions and concerns on Jinmen about the privatization of the distillery. Drawing on the discourses from the county magistrate and local politicians in *Jinmen Daily News*, below I discuss how these two Acts pushed the county government to react by protecting and justifying its financial dependence on the liquor company and its decision to suspend the company's privatization.

In 2003, one year after the implementation of the *Tobacco and Alcohol Tax Act*, there were a series of reports in *Jinmen Daily News* in which the incumbent county magistrate complained that the new Tax Act had resulted in a great decline of the county government's annual income and threatened the county's development, but he assured Jinmen residents that there would be no curtailment of the welfare programme that they had enjoyed. As mentioned above, the previous monopoly system allowed the county government to harness most of profits earned by the liquor company. In contrast, the new Tax Act requires the liquor company to pay a great deal of alcohol levy—a national tax—to the central government, which then redistributes part of the total alcohol tax revenues to the municipal-level governments according to particular principles in the *Act Governing the Allocation of Government Revenues and Expenditures*. As a result in this change in taxation, the annual income of the county government of Jinmen has decreased greatly compared to the previous years when the

monopoly system was in force.

The county magistrate and local politicians expressed their discontent with this situation in the local newspaper by asserting: (a) it was unfair that the amount of the total taxes that Jinmen county contributed to the central government was much higher than the amount of subsidies that it received back; (b) Jinmen's previous status as a war zone had extensively delayed the island's development and therefore the central government should return all of the tax revenues from the liquor company to Jinmen county to support various plans for infrastructure development and resource exploitation. Through the local newspaper, these political figures declared to local residents that they had requested that the central authorities amend the *Act Governing the Allocation of Government Revenues and Expenditures* so as to allow 80 percent of the alcohol levy to be returned to Jinmen county, but until now this amendment has not been passed in the Legislative Yuan (a branch of the ROC government similar to a national parliament). In order to solve the financial shortfall until the amendment is passed, the county government has used another legal source, the *Income Tax Act*, as the basis for the county-government owned liquor company to make voluntary donations to the county government (which would be considered as expenses or losses for the year of payment when settling the total amount of tax revenue that the county should submit to the central government). This solution became one important reason for suspending the liquor company's privatization as the county government would encounter great financial shortages once more than fifty percent of the liquor company's stock was released to the public (i.e., the county government would no longer have control over the company's profits).

Though the privatization topic seemed to have disappeared from the locals' conversation during my fieldwork, I observed a scene that illustrated the triangle of mutually-reliant relationships between the county government, the liquor company and ordinary residents. One morning in late December 2013, I was walking to the village office for my daily read of *Jinmen Daily News*. As I approached the office, I heard a heated discussion among a few elderly men. Seeing my confused face, one man passed the newspaper to me and pointed at the report they had been debating. The

report described how, as other media also reported, one member of the Control Yuan⁷⁵ had remarked that “the liquor company’s donation of its surplus to the county government of Jinmen every year benefits the county government but diminishes the income of the national treasury”. In response, the county government asserted that there was nothing illegal regarding the liquor company’s donation and that Control Yuan member’s personal opinion would potentially cause harm to the entitlements of all Jinmen citizens and the county’s development. The elderly men that I met in the village office all appeared to stand on the side of the county government by claiming that the sorghum liquor company belongs to the people of Jinmen and criticising the central government for coveting the profit created by the islanders’ hard work. According to a report in *Jinmen Daily News* a few days later, the county government’s retort was also supported by most county councillors, who issued a serious condemnation of that Control Yuan member, criticizing her for exceeding her authority to intervene in the local government’s financial administration and for being ignorant of local people’s hardship.

The above incident further indicates the close ties between ordinary islanders and local government agencies, which are based not only on common economic concerns but also in the shared sense that the liquor company is the common property of the people of Jinmen. Local people’s sense of ownership becomes explicit, and even quite emotional, when being questioned by outsiders. I remembered vividly a conversation one afternoon between Madam Yang and a female tourist from Taiwan, in which Yang became impatient with the tourist’s emphasis on Jinmen residents’ current enjoyment of “luxurious” social welfare. Finally, Yang responded, “You don’t know how difficult and hard our life was in the past”. The conversation stopped at that point and that tourist soon left with her group. I kept silent during and after that conversation because I knew from my conversations with Yang of her decades of labouring on the sorghum farm and her husband’s decades of working in the distillery, by means of which they managed to feed and raise six children despite the austere economic conditions. And,

⁷⁵ The Control Yuan is one of the five branches of the ROC government, functioning as an investigatory agency that monitors the other branches of the central government and the local governments.

her family story was generally shared by most farming households on Jinmen. I suggest that local people's shared sense of ownership over the liquor company, their sense of entitlement to the distillery-generated benefits they receive, and the emotions attached to their past life experiences together contribute to the collective moral attributes that draw ordinary residents and local government and political figures into a kind of localized political community. By attending to the significance of the sorghum factory in island life, this section has shown how this political community produced its locally grounded strategy to deal with local economic issues, in opposition both to the state's intervention and the wider trend for neoliberalism-driven government reform which promotes a reduced welfare state.

Local political structure and the 2014 municipal-level election

The previous two sections focused on the economic character of the local political-economic structure of Jinmen; that is, how the profits from sorghum liquor bind the local government, liquor company and ordinary residents tightly together. This section is focused on the political character, using my observations of the municipal-level election in late 2014 and other secondary sources to explore how democratic politics has developed in Jinmen after the termination of the martial law. As noted in chapter one, Jinmen was excluded from the political movements on Taiwan in the 1970s and 80s, and local elections were largely suspended during the WZA period.⁷⁶ Therefore, a brief review of the existing relevant literature on Taiwan is provided so as to compare my case of Jinmen with the situation on Taiwan. In addition, I will give examples demonstrating the link of the sorghum liquor-related benefits to local electoral

⁷⁶ The political movements on Taiwan were generally a reaction against the KMT's authoritarian regime and an appeal for democratization (as many civil rights, such as the national-level elections, the freedom of speech and of the press, and the freedom of assembly and association, were suspended by the martial law). Experts on Taiwan's politics also note that these democracy campaigns accompanied the rise of Taiwanese nationalism, which became the ideological foundation of the Democratic Progressive Party established in 1986. However, as Jinmen was still under the WZA until 1992, Taiwan's political movements only tended to influence a small number of Jinmen natives who were in Taiwan at that time, rather than the population on Jinmen. Moreover, while elections at the municipal level were allowed in Taiwan after WWII, they were suspended on Jinmen. It was not until 1971 that elections of township chiefs, township councillors, and village heads were reinstated, and not until martial law was lifted in 1992 that the elections of county magistrate and councillors were restored.

campaigns and local government policies that help demonstrate the particularities of Jinmen's political-economic structure.

Studies of Taiwan politics by anthropologists and political scientists have noted that the KMT's attempt to build a liberal democratic nation-state on Taiwan after 1949 was overshadowed by its reliance on factionalism and clientelism (e.g., Bosco 1992, 1994; Crissman 1981; Jacobs 1976, 1979). As Bosco (1992:161) notes, although there were no other parties in opposition to the KMT and no alternative ideology for voters during the Cold War era, the KMT still sought to form clientelist relationships with faction leaders to mobilize votes in order to present itself to the world as a democratic "Free China". The foundation of factional mobilization and leadership was a general character of Chinese sociality called *guanxi*, which refers to a web of people-to-people relationships (e.g., kinship, friendship, religious membership) and "involves the exchange of gifts, favours, and banquets; the cultivation of personal relationships and networks of mutual dependence; and the manufacturing of obligation and indebtedness" (Yang 1994:6). Local factions attained power and prestige by securing an enduring patron-client bond between the KMT and ordinary citizens: on the one hand, they dispensed patronage in the form of jobs, local improvements and assistance with bureaucratic problems; on the other, they successfully mobilized votes for particular candidates, from whom they gained favours to serve the constituents. This factional politics encountered changes after the emergence of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), whose leaders were deeply involved in the democratic movements of the 1980s and were advocates of Taiwanese nationalism and Taiwan's independence. Bosco (1994:30) found that the KMT remained dependent on factional mobilization, which was more effective in contests for lower electoral offices and in rural areas; by contrast, the DPP gained support by ideological mobilization, which succeeded in contests for higher electoral offices and in urban areas. Noticeably, over the last two decades, the DPP has greatly expanded the scope of its support-base, which now extends to a large proportion of the rural population, and the party won the presidential election three times in 2000, 2004, and 2016. The 2016 victory in the presidential election was also accompanied by success in the elections for the Legislative Yuan in which it won more

than half of the posts; as a result, the DPP could in principle now put its policies into practice with less difficulty. Nevertheless, the DPP's advocacy of Taiwan's independent status has resulted in its struggling to win votes in Jinmen, a topic to which I will return later on.

The above studies centred on Taiwan's politics encounter problems when being applied to Jinmen where, as my informants said, faction (*paixi*) is not an adequate concept for understanding local politics. On Jinmen, kinship or, more precisely, patrilineal connection is the foremost factor in elections, rather than being merely one of the elements from which factions are formed as is the case in Taiwan. This is related to the different degrees to which patrilineal descent operates to organize local communities on Jinmen and on Taiwan. Anthropologists (e.g., Cohen 1976, 2005; Sangren 1984, 1987) who worked on Taiwan have noted that the large localized lineage corporations were in the minority, while *shenminghui* (deity-cult corporations) were a more effective form of folk organization across different surname groups. Accordingly, Taiwan-based anthropologists found that politics and religion were intimately linked: many community temples serve as the base for local factions; local political leaders are also usually temple managers who donate large sums of money for building temples or refurbishments; and, governmental officials and politicians pay homage to local deities and sponsor religious festivals in order to increase their legitimacy (e.g., Feuchtwang 1992, 2003; Martin 1981; Sangren 1987; Weller 1999). In Jinmen where single-surname communities are prevalent, people's religious loyalty tends to be toward the lineage-village-owned temples, and it is therefore less likely that a cross-surname political union would develop based on the local cult. Though the intertwined relationship between politics and religion also exists, none of my informants thought that the local cult had more bearing in determining the election results than kinship. In this way, the case of Jinmen has more similarities with the case of the Hong Kong New Territories studied by Rubie Watson (1985), who noticed that despite the declining economic influence of the lineage corporation on individual households, the lineage descendants who had political ambitions found lineage loyalty to be a reliable foundation for success in political competitions. Further, as discussed

in the previous chapters, lineage loyalty is closely connected to the continuation of communal ritual activities that sustain interpersonal relationships of various kinds and the related socially-recognized values, such as moral obligation among kin, *mianzi* (status or social reputation), the cycles of mutual-help and reciprocity and so on—all of which are also helpful to kin cooperation in the elections.

The way that patrilineal connection functions to guide the election results in Jinmen is very straightforward—people are inclined to vote for candidates of the same surname group. In the elections for the village head in single-surname villages, often just one candidate stands, who will always be a member of the given lineage and is most likely an active participant in the lineage affairs. For the elections of township chief and township councillors across several lineage villages, candidates can usually rely on securing most of the votes from their own lineage villages and therefore they put more effort in soliciting votes in other villages. As one male informant of mine who sought to continue his position of township councillor in the 2014 election told me, he spent more time in other electoral areas because he believed that his deep engagement in the various lineage affairs (such as the lineage-level ancestral sacrifices, villagers' funerals, and the village temple events, etc.) outside of the election period had earned him the trust of his kin villagers. However, as it happened he was not able to be completely confident about gaining the votes of fellow villagers, because another village man (his distant cousin belonging to another lineage branch), though a newcomer to politics, joined in the election for township council. As a result, there were some unhappy conflicts behind the scenes, but my informant told me that, despite his worries about losing votes to his cousin, he hoped they would both be elected as councillors as that would be best for the interests of their lineage. Many villagers expressed their commendation and support for my informant, but predictably the village votes were divided between these two descendants according to people's different lineage branches. In fact, in the final result, they were both successfully elected because Qionglin is a relatively large village with a correspondingly large electorate, but my informant achieved many more votes both from within and outside the village than his kinsman. This is probably because the other candidate was not only

new to politics but also less engaged in the lineage's communal activities and therefore less respected and appreciated by his fellow kin.

To succeed in elections for county magistrate and county councillors, candidates need the support of the *zongqinhui* (common-surname associations) to which they belong. A common-surname association is formed by several patrilineal groups across the island on the basis of sharing the same surname (i.e., their supposedly shared if very remote common ancestral origin), with the aim of maximizing the advantage of the groups involved. Accordingly, a common-surname association that covers a larger electoral area has an advantage in facilitating its promoted candidate winning county-level elections. It has become common knowledge that after the normalization of county-level elections in 1993, the post of magistrate tends to come down to a competition between the two major common-surname associations of Chen and Li. Indeed, all the democratically-elected magistrates so far have either been surnamed Chen or Li. As kin networks are extremely important for success in elections, a person pursuing a political career would not make a move before securing the support of his or her kin association. My interlocutors said that after a common-surname association learned of a member's intention to stand in the higher-level elections for magistrate or legislator (for each of which there is just one post covering Jinmen) the association would hold a general meeting to discuss whether to support this candidate. If there were more than one member intending to stand in the same election, the association would make a choice between them in order to maximize their chances of victory.

In terms of electoral strategy, according to an interview recorded in a Master's thesis (Chen 2005), a former magistrate said that he had three channels through which he aimed to secure votes: his common-surname association, his personal supporters who campaigned for votes on his behalf, and the political party to which he belonged. Among these three, he said that kin networks were absolutely the most effective. In his case, his campaign headquarters was set by his common-surname association with little assistance from the regional office of his political party. Many of his close and distant agnates became his election team, accompanying the candidate when he held face-to-face meetings and visited all the households in their own residential areas, and

they frequently reminded their other kin about the election during the course of daily life. Married-in women of the lineage were requested to support the candidates of their husbands' surname group rather than theirs. Common-surname associations usually only mobilize for county-level elections, but the above electoral strategy is otherwise observable in elections at every level. Though the lineages and common-surname associations are male-centred units, they give support to female candidates either on the basis that they are female descendants or on the basis that they are married-in daughters-in-law.

Kin organizations such as lineages and common-surname associations on Jinmen resemble local factions on Taiwan, both of which mobilize votes on the basis of particular personal relationships in contrast to the standard model in western theories of democratic elections that treats every voter as an individual citizen responsible for his or her own political decisions concerning the future. Though Jinmen's kin organizations do not act like as brokers maintaining the patron-client bond between political parties and ordinary citizens in the way that factions on Taiwan do, elected politicians in Jinmen usually make personal donations to their kin organizations and support government plans for infrastructure and development in their kin's residential areas. The overlap between citizen and kinsmen creates a situation in which local politicians are evaluated according to the same criteria as relatives, such as the degree to which they participate in the kin groups' affairs and fulfil the moral obligation of mutual care among kinsmen (e.g., attendance at funerals, as described in chapter five). As Feuchtwang (2003) explains, ordinary people use the criteria of benevolent responsiveness to judge both the efficacy of a particular god and the performance of a politician. An example of this was seen above in the use by the elderly people of Jinmen of the title *Xiandai Enzhugong* (modern benevolent master) to praise the great contribution (*en*) to local society of the former military commander who founded the liquor distillery. Following the normalization of democratic elections, when talking about the performance of local politicians, the islanders are now more likely to emphasize these politicians' intimate connections and obligations to kin supporters rather than their contributions to wider Jinmen society because of the significance of

kinship in deciding local elections.

Though kinship is a decisive factor in local elections, I provide two examples to illustrate that higher-level politicians in particular seek to widen their political base beyond kin networks by focusing on the issue of the economic entitlements of local residents that are associated with their experiences in the Cold War era. Certainly, it is normal that politicians have to address people's economic well-being, and proposals related to the economy and welfare are always central to election campaigns. However, I would like to go beyond this apparently commonplace observation and argue that the relationship between local political authorities and ordinary residents in Jinmen today is cultivated in an attempt to address the consequences of the previous period of military conflict and preparation. In doing so, I provide a locally grounded view of how the Cold War has been "decomposed".

The two examples I provide relate to two changes to welfare policies that were introduced soon after the 2014 election. The first change was initiated by the new magistrate Chen Fu-Hai, who announced a major adjustment to the policy that gave Jinmen citizens special privileges relating to the purchase of sorghum liquor. Specifically, the period of residence in Jinmen required to obtain these privileges was extended from one year to four years for new registrants. Chen claimed that this liquor-purchasing privilege was an important part of the government's welfare programme but that it had been negatively affected by the improper setting of rules. As noted in the section on the sorghum distillery above, the former requirement for just one-year's registration resulted within just a few years in a rapid rise of the number of people qualified to enjoy this privilege and, consequently, the amount of liquor being sold on the market increased significantly, leading to a corresponding decline in the acquisition price. The new magistrate also said many people had changed their household registration to Jinmen despite not actually residing in Jinmen in order to receive the generous welfare provision, and that this had created problems for the county's registration system and negatively affected the county's welfare delivery. By emphasizing that this adjustment was necessary to protect local people's current welfare entitlements, Chen was implicitly implying that the failures of the previous

magistrate had put at risk the financial well-being of the people of Jinmen.

The second change was a welfare policy proposed by Chen Fu-Hai during his campaign for magistrate election. On the basis of an incumbent article according to which Jinmen residents who participated in the militia before 1958 are entitled to compensation with a sum of money being paid at each of three seasonal festivals, he proposed another article in which the scope of the compensation is broadened so that all citizens of Jinmen aged between 55 and 64 years old and who reached 16 years of age before the end of the WZA can apply for it. He argued that local people who were born and lived during the WZA period sacrificed and endured a great deal because of the KMT's extraordinary military control and the Chinese Communists' military attacks.⁷⁷ As reported in *Jinmen Daily News*, he claimed that though such monetary compensation is a kind of "delayed justice (*zhengyi*), it is justice rightly deserved". After he won the election, this proposal was passed by the county council and was enacted in the summer of 2015.

The two examples above illustrate not only that local politicians tend to secure their support by promoting policies with concrete economic incentives for their potential voters, but also that the welfare policies tend to be associated with the legacies of the period of military control, including the tangible legacy of the sorghum distillery and the intangible legacy of the lived experiences of military mobilization. As was seen in the previous sections, the ordinary citizens' liquor-related benefits provide local politicians with a stage for political performance. The claims they make on this stage, such as that the sorghum distillery is the collective outcome of Jinmen residents' hard work, are part of a discourse that is aimed not only at defending local people's economic entitlements, but also at forming local residents into a political community that stands in opposition to interference from the central government. In a similar vein, the policy of providing monetary benefits to local people in the name of rewarding their sacrifice of personal freedom and civil rights during the militarization

⁷⁷ As mentioned in chapter one, after the 1949 battle on Jinmen, the CCP launched another two serious attacks on Jinmen by intense bombing from the Mainland in the 1950s, which caused plenty of death and injuries. From 1958 to 1976, the CCP carried out shelling on Jinmen on alternate days. Most shells during this later period were filled with propaganda materials, but they nonetheless sometimes caused serious harm to people's life and property.

period serves to reinforce the image of “*Jinmen ren*” (the people of Jinmen) as a distinct community bound together by their collective experiences of having lived under the military’s dictates and with the ever-present threat of the Communists’ attacks on their life and property.

The county government’s provision of monetary compensation not only confirms Jinmen residents’ inclusion into a specific political community but also recognises the local demand for justice for the hardships of the past. In fact, immediately after the end of the WZA, a local political activist submitted a petition to the county government to demand compensation: (a) for property seized or damaged; (b) for unpaid service and labour by the militia; (c) for injuries suffered at the hands of both the Chinese Communists and the KMT-led army (see Szonyi 2008:235). As Szonyi suggests, the idea of demanding compensation might have first come to the minds of Jinmen residents when, in 1995, the central government began to offer compensation to Taiwanese people who suffered under KMT rule, particularly the victims of the “2-28” incident of February 28, 1947, when the KMT used its armed forces to suppress Taiwanese protests and caused thousands of deaths and imprisonments. The central government also set up a committee to investigate the “2-28” incident and its related circumstances. Szonyi notes that, on seeing the central government making redress for its past unjust treatments to Taiwanese people, some Jinmen natives felt it necessary to call public attention to their own stories which had been marginalized for a long time (2008:235-6). Following this, numerous volumes that collect oral histories of Jinmen residents were published by the government institutions. The central government responded by announcing a compensation scheme for the various injustices of the previous decades, much in accordance with the aforementioned three categories (Szonyi 2008:236). The state’s compensation to Jinmen residents, which embodies the exchange relations between the people and the state and their mutual indebtedness, reinforces the islanders’ sense of localized political identity. However, the issue of the confiscation of land by the military government has not been resolved, and nor has the level of compensation paid by the central government’s limited scheme fully satisfied people. As a result, local politicians seek to build up their political

prestige by campaigning for solutions to these two issues.

Lastly, I turn to consider the role played by political parties and political ideology in Jinmen's elections. The KMT absorbed plenty of ordinary members in the WZA period,⁷⁸ and many young local political leaders joined the KMT to initiate their political careers. However, the election results of the past two decades show that party affiliation is less relevant than it was. In actual fact, many politicians quit the KMT after losing the party's nomination for election to a challenger, but they were still able to win election because of their continuing strong support from their kin. Younger political leaders said that the KMT-army's long-term monopoly over power in Jinmen made it natural for local political newcomers to join in the KMT even though the party is usually not helpful in the lower-level electoral campaigns. When situations (such as losing the party's nomination) lead them to leave the KMT, they tend to either remain outside of any party or join one of the parties other than the DPP. My interlocutors' responses suggest that their preference for the KMT over the DPP is related to the two parties' different political ideologies: while the KMT is associated with a belief in "one China" or reunification with China, the DPP is associated with a belief in Taiwan's independent status from China. For many people in Jinmen, the DPP's victory in the elections, particularly in the presidential election, puts Jinmen at risk again from military attacks and economic sanctions from China.⁷⁹ The DPP members in Jinmen, like local politicians in other parties, shift their attention to local issues such as asking the Jinmen Defence Command to return the land previously confiscated from civilians and asking the central government to make redress to civilians who participated in past military activities. In a broader sense, both the members of the DPP and the KMT

⁷⁸ During fieldwork, I found that a majority of senior villagers (especially men) are members of the KMT though they had different motives for joining the party. According to the personal statements that I collected, some people joined the KMT because their family forebears were supporters of Dr. Sun Yat-Sen's revolution to overthrow the imperial government and to found a Chinese republic; some joined because they entered the KMT-led army to be professional soldiers out of the desire for a stable income. I was also told that there was a period during which an informal rule required male students in Jinmen's senior high school to join in the KMT. Most students chose to join in order to avoid any unwanted trouble.

⁷⁹ My informants spoke critically of the DPP's former chairman Shi Ming-De's call to withdraw all troops from Jinmen. When, in 1995, Shi Ming-De asked, "Why should the sons of Taiwan run the risk of being held hostage on Jinmen?", this was widely interpreted as an appeal for the Taiwanese government to abandon Jinmen. The resentments and suspicions consequently felt by locals toward the DPP have not yet been allayed.

attempt to attract local support beyond kin networks by engaging with the issue of KMT-military's injustices of the previous decades, but the DPP members tended to use more critical discourses. The collective memories of the injustices of the militarization period have thus become an important resource for local political competition as well as the very foundation on which local politicians and ordinary residents formed a locally grounded, mutually reliant political community.

State-society relations during and after the Cold War

As noted in the first section of this chapter, during fieldwork I found that the feelings of local elderly people toward the WZA period were highly ambivalent. The elderly said that they had no choice but to submit to the military's orders even though they had to participate in some dangerous work as militia members or to allow the army to confiscate their land or movable property to construct fortifications (see chapters one and two). However, of their own accord, many senior interlocutors also highlighted the material improvements made by the military, especially during the period when Hu Lian served in the position of general commander in Jinmen (1949-54, 1957-58). Local people praised Hu Lian not only for his establishment of the sorghum distillery and other public constructions but also for his kindness to, and careful consideration of, the ordinary islanders.⁸⁰ For example, during my talk with an elderly male informant about life during the period of military governance, he mentioned one good measure introduced by Hu Lian, which was said to be a response to the scarcity of food, especially meat, in the days immediately after the 1949 Battle. Hu Lian found money from somewhere to purchase a great deal of piglets from Taiwan and to allow local peasants to buy pigs with deferred payment. If the piglet was successfully reared and sold (to the army or to the market), the peasant repaid the government at the original cost without interest. If the pig unfortunately died early, the peasant only needed to cut off the pig's legs as evidence and was excused repayment. My interlocutor commented

⁸⁰ During fieldwork, I heard numerous vignettes about local people's good memories of Hu Lian. There was also a series of reports in the local newspaper in 2005 dedicated to the celebration of the one hundredth anniversary of the birth of Hu Lian (he died in 1978), which included Hu's military accomplishments and contribution to the nation as a whole, and his benevolent governance that earned him the respect and admiration of Jinmen residents.

that this measure brought the local poor households a not insignificant additional income, and showed Hu Lian's *dezheng* (benevolent governance). While most elderly people could recall their individual stories about the good aspects of the military governance, one man whom I interviewed in another village made a remark from a macroscopic perspective. This local-born, retired school employee (who once served in the national army but retired after a serious injury during his military service) told me, "Jinmen is a tiny offshore island that no one would [otherwise] pay attention to. If it had not been for the Chinese civil war and the KMT's defeat and retreat to Jinmen in 1949, Jinmen would not have the kinds of development and construction that we see today".

The above instances show that, from the local perspective, their remembrance of the KMT-army in the militarization period was not entirely filled with negative experiences of authoritarian commands that greatly disturbed their life, rather there were also some tangible improvements in their living standards and public infrastructure, and there were particularly warm memories of the general commander, Hu Lian, who was respectfully known as *Xiandai Enzhugong*. I do not know from when locals began to use this title to address Hu Lian, but the title of *Enzhugong*—which suggests the relationship between the giver of *en* (favour, benefits, positive contribution) and the receiver of *en*—implies the kind of military-civilian and state-society relations that the KMT-military attempted to cultivate during the Cold War era. This is clearly illustrated in one of Hu Lian's instructions to the troops: soldiers should help the ordinary people and the ordinary people will respect soldiers (*jun zhu min, min jing jun*). The notion of *en*, which is often translated in English as the receiver's feeling of debt and gratefulness to the giver (e.g., children's feeling of moral debt to their parents' *en* of giving birth to them and nurturing them, cf. Oxfeld 2004), also suggests Jinmen residents' (especially the elderly's) moral sentiments toward the KMT-military. Such moral sentiments are arguably related to their loyal support for the KMT in the democratic elections after the end of military control, particularly the presidential election. But, maybe for some, this sense of indebtedness was an ideological creation of the KMT-military, as the civilians of Jinmen had no choice

other than to accommodate themselves to the island's official status as a war zone, which had been unilaterally decided by the state in response to the international circumstances of the time.

The co-existence of the KMT-army's dictatorship and the mutual-reliance between the military and the civilian population that characterized the state-society relations of the Cold War era faced salient changes after the termination of the WZA, when local political forces began to develop and intermediate in the relations between local society and the central authorities. As noted previously, during the period when martial law was in force, the suspension of various civil rights almost completely prevented Jinmen residents from engaging with politics, and the military-controlled government left barely any room for the development of local political power. The normalization of democratic elections in 1993 was the turning point for local politics, when local people with ambitions in politics began to mobilize their kin networks to carve out their political career. The newly emerged, local political powers solidified their political strength not only by means of kinship connections but also by addressing the problems caused by the military measures of previous decades. On the economic side, we have seen that the first democratically elected magistrate coped with the local economic recession in the wake of the great troop withdrawal by expanding the sorghum distillery and using the distillery-generated profits to establish a generous local welfare programme. And, this liquor industry has resulted in the intimate bonds between the local government (and its finances), the liquor company (and its profits) and local residents (and their welfare benefits); bonds that give succour to the local government and politicians as they work to resist the central government's interference and the trend of privatization of government-owned enterprises. On the political side, as shown in the several examples in the preceding section, local political figures now seek to build up their prestige and broaden support beyond their kin networks by engaging in the issues related to people's past experiences. Local people's collective memories of military control and preparation have become the very foundation on which politics in Jinmen is conducted, on the basis of which local politicians support the local government's provision of monetary compensation to ordinary residents who

endured the hardships of the WZA period and help the people to demand compensation or claim back land from the state or military.

In sum, the normalization of democratic elections and the autonomy of local government in finances and policy-making from the 1990s have led to the complicated entanglement of the local government, local politicians, the sorghum liquor company and ordinary residents, which I call the localized political community. Within this localized political community, the close bonds of local residents and local political personnel rest on a shared moral foundation constituted by Jinmen's intimate kin networks and the islanders' collective experiences of the period of militarization. Through the institution of democratic elections and the manipulation of available political and legal resources, local politicians elected at either the town or county levels propose and advocate policies (such as the generous welfare programme) that are advantageous to local residents, who in return offer their support and votes in elections. This kind of transaction is similar to the patron-client bond or reciprocal relationship that characterizes factional politics in Taiwan. However, I would suggest that, aside from mutual interest, the moral obligation originating from kinship ties and the moral sentiments grounded on collective memories of the past are given greater emphasis in the relationship between Jinmen residents and their political representatives.

Outwardly, this localized political community suggests the self-differentiation of the people of Jinmen from the population on the rest of the ROC territory. This self-differentiation of local identity (e.g., local people always call themselves as *Jinmen ren* never *Taiwan ren*) is partly related to the geographical separation of Jinmen from Taiwan and the long-term historical differences (e.g., as my elderly Jinmen informants put it, Taiwan was colonized by the Japanese for fifty years while Jinmen was only occupied for eight years). However, more significantly, it is related to Jinmen's status as a war zone during the Cold War era. As noted above, local political leaders defend the financial bond between the county government and the sorghum liquor company and the welfare programme by emphasizing the difference in experience between the people on Jinmen and the people on Taiwan in the decades when martial law was in force. Though people on both places suffered restrictions on their civil rights, the

people on Jinmen were like “inferior citizens” (*cideng gongmin*, a term often appears in the statements of local people and reports in the local newspaper) as a result of the far greater restrictions imposed on them due to the island’s status as a war zone. As such, the policies that bring material benefits to Jinmen residents are justified as making amends for the inequality they experienced in the previous decades. In theory, after the end of military governance in Jinmen, residents regained their full status as citizens equal to that of residents on Taiwan. However, the welfare policies on the island that identify Jinmen residents as a particular group deserving of special privileges indicate that local people together with their elected political representatives are not satisfied with equal treatment. Instead, they want recognition of their distinct status and entitlement to redress for the state’s previous injustices towards them.

The links between historical particularities and local identity that are so important to politics in Jinmen also gain expression in the political competition that has characterised Taiwan in the post-Cold War era. Though the bipolar politics of the Cold War faded away globally, the domestic politics of Taiwan evolved into another kind of bipolar politics (the so-called Blue-Green opposition as blue signifies the KMT and green signifies the DPP) revolving around Taiwan’s relationship to China and the KMT’s past unjust treatments of people in Taiwan (e.g., the incident of 2-28 and White Terror, cf. Feuchtwang 2011; Shih 2011, 2014). In other words, within Taiwan the Cold War was not experienced as a “long peace”, but Taiwanese people did suppress their antagonistic and resentful feelings toward the KMT (cf. Masuda 2015a:258-70, 2015b). Now, however, the previously suppressed events demand public attention and the state’s apology and redress. In contrast to the situation on Taiwan, the case of Jinmen differs in that Jinmen was excluded from the “2-28” incident but actually experienced military attacks from China and long-term militarization, during which the KMT-army were responsible for numerous tragedies that were known as the Jinmen’s version of White Terror. In the oral recollections of local residents and the realistic novels by local writer Chen Chang-Qing (e.g., 2008, 2013a, 2013b), there are stories of people being falsely accused of being “Communists” and of misconduct by soldiers wreaking havoc on local people’s lives. Moreover, Jinmen’s historical intimacy and today’s

increasing economic and cultural communications with China (see chapter three) seem to make local residents resistant to the prospect of Taiwan's independence. Altogether, the localized political community of Jinmen appears to keep its distance from "Taiwan", including both the state/central government and those Taiwanese people who advocate independence from China. Instead of the direct confrontation between Jinmen residents and the KMT-military (which represented the state) that was characteristic of the Cold War era, the normalization of democratic institutions following the end of military control led to the emergence of a distinct level of local government and political figures who have strong, intimate bonds to ordinary citizens and who stand with them and represent their concerns in their confrontation with the state/central authorities.

Conclusion

What kind of state-society relationship will develop in the places that were, in the various dimensions, structured by the bipolar framework of the Cold War after the demise of the bipolar era? One response to this question from British sociologist Anthony Giddens is found in his well-known monograph *The Third Way* (1998).⁸¹ Pertinently, in this book, Giddens points out that a general characteristic of the state-society relations in the Cold War era was that the modern state based its legitimacy largely on its role of safeguarding the political community against external enemies. With the passing of the bipolar era, the state could no longer resort to the presence of external enemies as the source of its legitimacy. Meanwhile, the very expansion of democratization across the world—which is linked to “the deeper forces that are reshaping the global society, including the demand for individual autonomy and the emergence of a more reflexive citizenry” (1998:71)—has pushed the reform of the state and government, including having a major role in renewing civic culture and fostering an active civil society (1998:78-9). Giddens argues that in the era of post-global bifurcation or globalization, social solidarity can no longer be reliant on the top-

⁸¹ The third way thesis was originally built upon Giddens's concern with how social democracy can transcend both old-style social democracy and neoliberalism and find ways to accommodate to a rapidly changing world in the aftermath of the bipolar politics.

down action of the state or appeals to tradition. Instead, the emergence of “the new individualism”—which portrays an individual with an open and reflective attitude, paying concern to public affairs and willing to accept responsibilities for the consequences of his or her own deeds—is seeking a new balance between individual and collective responsibilities, and toward a constructive relationship between the state and civil society (1998:34-7; 78-86).

In one sense, Giddens’s portrayal of the state-society relations in the post-Cold War era is suggestive and supported by the phenomena of democratization, government reform (toward a smaller scale, entrepreneurial government), and the sprouting of civil organizations and activities of various kinds in Taiwan immediately after the lifting of martial law. But, the third way thesis that tends to look forward to the future but not to look backward has its limitations as it downplays local particularities and the lingering effects of the past. As Kwon (2010:116) puts it, Giddens’s vision of the third way as speaking of the morality and politics of the age of globalization is problematic for its exclusive drawing on the experiences of the “long peace” of Europe’s Cold War and its overlooking the Cold War’s diverse ramifications across the world. Also, the concept of civil society in Giddens’s usage can be traced back to the Enlightenment in eighteenth-century Europe, which “taught us to look for autonomous individuals reaching their own moral decisions apart from earlier communal moralities, and shifted our attention to what Max Weber would later call the transition from traditional to rational political and economic systems” (Weller 1999:135). However, as Robert Weller (1999, 2004) argues with reference to numerous examples from post-1980 Taiwan and China, individual identity in both places is often still linked to the bonds of local community, kinship and religion, which many earlier analysts dismissed as premodern. He also suggests that a wide range of local-level associations based on the above informal bonds, though not consistent with the western concept of civil society, do indeed contribute to political change or improvement of governance and thus demonstrate the possibility of an alternate civility.

In line with Kwon and Weller, my case study of Jinmen shows different kinds of state-society relations and civil society from those Giddens has depicted. Firstly, an

individual citizen of Jinmen may have characteristics similar to the new individualism that Giddens describes, but he or she is still situated in a world of tight kin networks which are the defining feature of local democratic politics today. Further, the political-economic structure of Jinmen appears connected in complicated ways to both the tangible (e.g., the sorghum distillery) and intangible (the collective experience of wars and military preparation) legacies of the bipolar politics. Within the society of Jinmen, an individual's political identity and direction of political movement tend to be framed by kinship and their historical link to the period of militarization. When any Jinmen-born citizen—including the younger generations who never experience war and military control—who pays attention to local public affairs talks about the island's present and future, they are very unlikely to do so without also mentioning its past. Local residents and their political leaders thus form a localized political community that spans across the generations and which draws upon collective memories and political and legal resources to request the state or military makes appropriate recompense for their sufferings and sacrifices during the previous decades of military conflict and political suppression.

Finally, the localized political community of Jinmen has been trying to figure out the most advantageous position for itself between Taiwan and China, whose relationship still occasionally comes under strain as a result of, for example, the DPP's success in the presidential election. Though the government of Taiwan no longer claims legitimacy based on its ability to safeguard the population against the threat posed by the Chinese communists, as it did during the era of extreme politics, its relationship to China remains an unresolved problem and has created ongoing difficulties in its relations with the various components of the population it governs. As noted in the final section of this chapter, the domestic politics of Taiwan today is characterized by a new kind of bipolar party politics focusing on Taiwan's relationship to China and the KMT's past unjust treatment of Taiwanese people. The different experiences between Taiwan and Jinmen during the period of the KMT's one-party rule have led their respective populations to pursue different approaches and make different claims, but in both Taiwan and Jinmen the demand for the state to make

redress for historic wrongs has become a central part of political debate. Therefore, I would argue that constructive state-society relations in contemporary Taiwan and Jinmen must be understood as not merely being about the pursuit of what Giddens calls the partnership between government and the active civil society, but also about the state's confrontation with its past injustices, which were closely linked to the bipolar politics of the Cold War.

Chapter Eight

Conclusion

The research for this thesis began with my fascination with the mix of continuities and changes that I discovered on my pre-fieldwork visit to Jinmen and my reading of Szonyi's (2008) historical study of the island in the Cold War context. Together, these inspired me to conduct long-term ethnographic fieldwork in a patrilineage in Jinmen in 2013/14 with the aim of unravelling the intriguing contradiction that has run through the course of this thesis. That is, on the one hand, the society of Jinmen had experienced wars and long-term militarization framed under the bipolar politics, which, as Szonyi argues, had turned the life of local people upside down. Yet, on the other hand, the residential and social boundary set up around patrilineal connection (common surname) and various cultural practices (e.g., the sacrificial and mortuary rituals) are convincingly claimed by the locals to be the same as they were during the pre-republican era. Anthropology's strengths of deep involvement in and detailed investigation of the everyday minutiae of the people studied led me to single out the important roles of kinship and its related rituals in mediating the continuities and changes, which had not been scrutinized by Szonyi in his argument about the transformation of Jinmen society by militarization and geopoliticization.

Taking the Cai lineage of Qiongliong as its central example, this thesis has traced the formation of the localized, elite lineage community in late imperial times and demonstrated that the ideal and material embodiments of the unity of the patrilineage were the outcome of human creation, particularly by the scholar-gentry who imported the official mode of ritual etiquette into their home communities. The magnificent ancestral buildings (*jiamiao* and *zongci*) and the regular grand sacrifices to the remote common ancestors were not only symbolic manifestations of lineage unity but, more importantly, were linked to the corporate landed estates and the associated mode of organizing resources, both of which bound the agnates together. Earlier studies of Chinese lineages, formulated under the influence of Freedman's lineage model, tend to see corporate estates as the key element uniting lineage brothers, binding them in

pursuit of their common economic interests despite the obvious class differences between them. Following on from this line of reasoning, the decline of these elite lineages was attributed to the change from a feudal regime to a modern administration and capitalist economy that undermined the lineages' political and economic base. Though this explanation certainly offers insights into the situation in Jinmen, where the large lineages could no longer accumulate political and economic power as before, its exclusive emphasis on economic factors risks neglecting the contribution of rituals to the maintenance of kin organization.

Just as the formation of the territorialized lineage revolving around an ancestral hall was inseparable from the gentry members' expectation and endeavours in late imperial times, this thesis has argued that the living descendants' investment in continuing the rituals were critical to the sustaining of the lineage as an integrated union throughout the dramatic changes of the past century. By exploring the ways in which human and material resources are mobilized and arranged in making the grand sacrificial and funerary rituals, this thesis demonstrated that the production of the ritual events strengthens the practical and affective ties between the individual members and their households beyond the level attained in the ordinary communications of quotidian life. Moreover, it is not only the targeted agnatic bond which is reconfirmed through these ritual events; the mutual sentiments between the married-in women ("outsiders" in the patriarchal context) are also enhanced by their cooperation in, and indispensable contribution to, the completion of the events. In line with the theoretical turn in the anthropology of kinship to the fluid and processual aspects of human relatedness, this research also challenges the male-centred, formalist understanding of Chinese kinship (i.e., patrilineal descent) that dominated earlier lineage studies. My material shows that (1) the agnatic ties are not the natural result of genealogical connection but substantiated through the continuous cycles of mutual-help and reciprocity present in both ritual conditions and everyday living; (2) women have significant roles in producing the sense of lineage unity as they are active agents in maintaining these cycles of mutual-help and reciprocity between households, which also facilitate the building of women's personal reputation and their relatedness with

others. Nonetheless, at the same time, women's vital contribution to the production of the ritual events that manifest the value of the patriliney makes them important reproducers of the male-centred ideology and morality.

Altogether, with its focus on rituals, the first part of this thesis demonstrated that the continuation of sacrificial and mortuary rituals—of different scales and operating on different levels from the household unit to the largest lineages and common-surname associations—sustained the patterns of interpersonal relationships of the patrilineal community and beyond, extending throughout Jinmen society. In this way, the sacrificial and mortuary rituals constitute a means of negating the destruction of the social order that Jinmen experienced in the Cold War era. When my informants talked about the persistence of their ritual practices, their statements not only suggest their “deference” to their ancestors or lineage seniors (as they said “We have carried out the rituals in accordance with the ancient manners inherited from our ancestors”), but also suggest that, by organizing the rituals in the old ways, they have maintained the patriarchal order and the associated mode of social intercourse. However, these ritual continuities did not preclude the impact of the changing circumstances that affected Jinmen throughout the twentieth century on how the rituals are conducted. For example, the KMT-military authorities have been involved in the burial rituals of ordinary people since the Cold War period (which was crucial to securing their legitimacy), and the rapid commercialization in Jinmen from the 1990s has brought significant changes in the ways ritual-related items, food and banquets are prepared, and this in turn has impacted on the ways of organizing voluntary human labour. Furthermore, the broad social and economic changes that have affected the islanders in recent decades have enlarged the differences between generations in occupation and lifestyle. Yet, as this thesis has sought to demonstrate, the different scales of ritual activities have constantly animated and strengthened kinship morality, emotional bonds, and the social reputation of individuals and the group, and thereby prevented a clean break between the younger generations and the wider kin community.

The second part of this thesis, focused on economic and political changes in Jinmen during and after the Cold War era, furthers the argument that the values and

morality from the sphere of kinship remain salient forces in structuring local political and economic life. The ethnographic material illustrates that the new economic initiatives and military preparation enforced by the KMT-military government in the era of its competition with the CCP in China directly affected the lives of local people in both positive and negative ways, and have resulted in tangible and intangible legacies that influence the local political-economic structure today. Nonetheless, local people's engagement in economic and political activities is still largely framed by the kinship system and the related moral values and obligations. Chapter six shows that, despite the increasing financial contribution that women make to their households (thanks to the broadening access for them to education and work opportunities), women's labour and authority in their marital households are primarily evaluated not on the basis of this, but on the basis of their provision of (*feng*)yang (nurturance and care) to the living and the dead (in the form of ancestral sacrifices).

Chapter seven shows that the political development in Jinmen after the normalization of democracy following the end of military control has been dominated by patrilineal connection. Notably, while political candidates distinguish themselves from one another using kinship (and the particular interests of their own groups), they share common political concerns relating to the islanders' experiences of enduring the damage to their life and property caused by wars, militarization and political suppression in the Cold War era. The past experiences also resulted in local people's (especially the elderly's) ambivalent perceptions of the KMT-military: on the one hand, they complained about a variety of arbitrary and coercive orders by the military government; on the other, they appreciated the military's protection from the communists' attacks and contribution to the island's material improvements (the sorghum liquor industry in particular). Such ambivalent perceptions of the KMT are then linked to today's situation: the relationship between Taiwan and China remains an unresolved issue that has provoked another kind of bipolar politics, this time within Taiwan, after the global dissolution of the Cold War. Though local people's attitudes toward the KMT are complicated, the party tends to achieve substantial local support for its assertion of "one China"—a position that people hope will prevent war returning

to Jinmen again. In sum, kinship bonds and the islanders' past experiences of military control laid the foundation for the localized political community of Jinmen, which claims redress and compensation from the state for the sacrifice and suffering endured by the islanders over the previous decades, and which strives for an advantageous position for Jinmen in the highly uncertain relationship that exists today between the governments of Taiwan and China.

Throughout this thesis a consistent message that I have emphasized is that the islanders' continuing organization and performance of the rituals that has constantly vitalized and confirmed kinship morality and interpersonal ties has been crucial to the production of the sense of lineage unity and continuity, which in turn has created a perception of permanence and order in confrontation with Jinmen's experiences of political and military turbulence over the twentieth century. It should also be emphasized that, just like the fluid and creative character of human relatedness, such kinship morality is not given but must be nourished and strengthened by human action on a regular basis, such as the kinship-related rituals in the domestic and lineage levels. Beyond this, however, there are two important questions that I have not addressed directly so far: (1) What is the relationship between kinship morality (the socially-shared mode of thinking and behaving that is usually prescribed in the rituals) and individual human lives? (2) In what situations may the socially-shared mode be challenged and changed? In what follows I discuss some general anthropological theories of continuity and change that respond to these two questions. My discussion will be focused on Bloch's (1977) distinction between two notions of time and two cognitive systems, and Bloch and Parry's two co-edited volumes (1982, 1989) in which they theorize the relationship between the transient life of the individual and the enduring social and cosmic order. Following this, I will turn to the cases of imperial and republican Chinese states, using which I will (1) point out some weaknesses in Bloch and Parry's arguments, and (2) draw on Puett's essays which suggest a new approach to exploring the interaction between ritual (the prescribed social and cosmic order) and people's lived experiences.

The transient world of the individual and the reproduction of social order

In an early theoretical essay concerning the question of how to account for social change, Maurice Bloch (1977) discussed the notion of time both in relation to human rituals and lived experiences, by which he pointed out the problem of Radcliffe-Brown's theory of social structure. Taking Geertz's essay on the Balinese notion of time as an example with which to advance his argument, Bloch criticized Geertz's overwhelming focus on evidence from ritual contexts which led him to the problematic assertion that the Balinese have a non-durational notion of time (1977:283-5). Bloch argued against the claim by cultural relativists that concepts of time are closely bound to social organization and accordingly vary from society to society. Instead, he proposes that there are two notions of time: one is a view of time like our own everyday, folk concept of lineal durational time; the other is a static notion of time that is often referred to as cyclic. The former notion tends to be universal while the latter tends to be culturally specific and is often examined by anthropologists in the study of ritual communication and myth. By arguing for the juxtaposition of the two notions of time, Bloch further contends that there are two cognitive systems involved: one is a system used in everyday communication based on universal notions of time and cognition; the other is a culturally specific system which is characteristic of ritual communication. (In a recent article, he calls these two cognitive systems the transactional and the transcendental respectively (see Bloch 2008).) Building on these insights, Bloch notes that one problem with Radcliffe-Brown's theory of social structure is his (like Geertz's) almost exclusive focus on examples from ritual contexts and therefore his concentration on the cognitive system that is not directly relevant to lived experiences. Moreover, as Radcliffe-Brown inherited from Durkheim the idea that the categories of understanding and systems of classification are social in origin, this belief in the social determination of cognition "leaves the actors with no language to talk *about* their society and so change it, since they can only talk *within* it" (original italics, Bloch 1977:281).

Some interrelated questions follow on from Bloch's argument about the two systems of cognition (including the two notions of time): (1) How do the two cognitive

systems operate in any society? (2) In what ways are the two cognitive systems linked to each other? (3) In what ways may the changes occurring in the lived reality (the cognitive system based on everyday communication) lead to the changes in the other cognitive system which is characteristic of ritual communication? Below, I review briefly some of the responses to these questions offered in two co-edited volumes by Bloch and Parry: *Death and the Regeneration of Life* (1982) and *Money and the Morality of Exchange* (1989).

In the introduction to *Death and the Regeneration of Life*, Bloch and Parry state the two foci of the collection: the first is the significance of symbols of fertility and rebirth in funerary rituals; the second is the connection of the symbolism of mortuary practices to the organizational aspects of the society in which it occurs (1982:6). Altogether, by combining sociological and symbolical analyses, they attempt to unpack the relationship between the individual human life and a symbolically constructed image of the enduring social and cosmic order within which that life is lived. Despite great variations in different cultures, examples from many societies suggest that the rituals surrounding death are permeated by the symbolism of rebirth or the renewal of fertility. What is to be renewed or revitalized may be the fecundity of people, or animals and crops, or of all three—whichever is culturally conceived to be most essential to the reproduction of the social order. For example, the Merina in Madagascar that Bloch (1982) studied hold an idea of a total identification between specific groups of people (demes) and specific areas of land, and the fertility which is ensured by the proper combination of ancestral corpses and ancestral land is the generalized fertility of both the group and its material means. The funerary rite known as the *famadihana* works to create the symbolic order—the eternal non-individualist deme, continuing undivided in its merged representation of people and land—by denying those aspects (decomposition, pollution and division) that are devalued by the Merina and thereby creating the desired order (1982:218-9). The Merina funeral illustrates the presence of the two cognitive systems and the two associated notions of time. Death, which as an empirical experience suggests a notion of time as irreversible duration, is dealt with by the mortuary rituals, which reassert continuity by equating

death with birth into the depersonalized collectivity of ancestors, which is the source of the continuing fertility of the living, i.e., the rituals reassert the enduring social order. In other words, funerary rituals serve as the link between the present and the past, and the link between the two cognitive systems (the transactional and the transcendental). Such a link is not only present in the rituals but in a wide range of human activities.

Inspired by similar analytical initiatives to the first volume, but covering a different topic, a second collection co-edited by Bloch and Parry, *Money and the Morality of Exchange*, considers the ways in which money is symbolized in different societies, then explores the relationship between a cycle of short-term exchange, which is the legitimate domain of individual activity, and a cycle of long-term exchanges concerned with the reproduction of the social and cosmic order. It is the intersection of these short- and long-term cycles of exchange that primarily interests me here, and this is nicely illustrated in Janet Carsten's (1989) paper on the Malay fishermen of Langkawi. Carsten describes how fishing in Langkawi is a highly commercialized domain of production exclusive to men, who tend to establish contractual relationships with strangers in order to prevent the commercial activities from damaging the harmonious relations between kin. Women are excluded from the amoral domain of market transactions, and this, together with their close association with the household and the hearth (both embodied the ideal of unity and resistance to division), enables women to resolve the problem created by men's commercial relations which are antithetical to Malay kinship morality. Women overcome this problem by "cooking" the money—just as they cook the fish—that men hand over to them after each day's work. In this way, the women transform both money and fish into something which can be safely incorporated into, and will nourish, the household.

As shown by the Malay instance, Bloch and Parry contend that the maintenance of the long-term order necessitates both pragmatically and conceptually the individual short-term acquisitive endeavour; the relationship between the two cycles "forms the basis for a symbolic resolution of the problem posed by the fact that transcendental social and symbolic structures must both depend on, and negate, the transient individual" (1989:25). I suggest that Chinese people's material contributions to the

artefacts of ancestral reverence can be viewed in the same light. Leaving aside the meanings of money in Chinese society, we have seen numerous examples in my case study of the Cai lineage (see chapter two), and in many other ethnographies of China, of the living descendants' converting their economic achievements into the establishment of ancestral halls and ancestral estates, lineage schools, and public facilities for the well-being of all the kin in lineage villages. That is, converting material wealth into the maintenance and growth of the lineage community. In the case of the Cai lineage, the sharing of expenditure on sacrificial food, other ritual items, and the post-ritual banquet among the members on duty is inseparable both from the individual members' personal reputation as well as the reputation of the lineage as an integrated union. These material embodiments that contribute to the symbolic construction of a permanent patrilineage and agnatic solidarity have been made possible by the individual members' income from a variety of occupations, which may require their engagement in the world of market transaction and competition with strangers (e.g., the founding and later restoration of the Cai lineage's ancestral buildings were largely dependent on the few successful merchants and overseas migrants prior to the mid-twentieth century). The continuation of the ancestral ritual and commensality that represent the enduring social order of the united patrilineal family thus appear to transcend the lived experiences in which brothers are separated by family property division (which may even cause disputes among them) and by different personal pursuits.

Just like the situation of funerals in which human ritual practices transform the death of the individual into the symbolic renewal of the wider community, the Malay and the Chinese cases suggest that an individual's economic gain in the world of lived reality can be transformed by human action into symbolic reproduction of social order and morality. Such human action (the Malay women's "cooking" money and the Chinese merchants' donation to the establishment of ancestral estates) is the link between the transactional and the transcendental, and the presence of such action suggests that the actor is still affected by the demands of the long cycle, rather than being totally absorbed by transient activities. Bloch and Parry (1989:26) note that the

articulation between the two spheres is by no means unproblematic: if the long-term cycle is not to be reduced to the transient world of the individual, the two spheres must be kept separate; however, as the long-term cycle is to be ensured by the creativity and vitality of the short-term cycle, they must also be related. This raises further interesting questions: What happens when this balance between the two spheres is challenged? What about those great changes that impact on in people's lived reality and that discourage human action to sustain the prescribed social and cosmic order?

Bloch and Parry noted that rituals often serve to reproduce the social and cosmic order on which traditional authority is based and, therefore, it is often necessary for the legitimating function of rituals to be hidden from the actors themselves. However, at certain points in history the political significance of such practices may become transparent and become the target to be demolished (1982:42). For example, during the Maoist period in China, the communist regime launched a systematic propaganda campaign against so-called traditional religious and ritual practices, such as the funerary rites discussed in James Watson's (1982b) paper. While Bloch and Parry's argument may explain the persistence of certain ritual practices for long periods, it is questionable whether the actors are indeed always unaware of the efficacy of the rituals in confirming and securing the legitimacy of the power-holders? Below I draw on Angela Zito's (1984, 1993; cf. 1997) essays on the relationship between the construction of emperorship and ritual practices in imperial China to suggest that it was precisely because the actors (especially the power-holders) were aware of the ritual's legitimating function that they were prudent and careful about whom could perform certain rituals and how these rituals were performed. Furthermore, I argue that modern regimes may also display an awareness of the function of ritual, as was seen in the case of the KMT-military which involved itself discreetly in the folk ritual practices for the purpose of securing its legitimacy.

The construction of emperorship in and through rituals in imperial China

The discussion of the social and cosmic order of traditional China is inseparable from the concept of *li*, a term often translated as rite or ritual and which was central to the

Chinese classic text *Liji* (the *Book of Rites*). As Zito notes, both seventeenth and eighteenth century ritualists and modern analysts generally agree that “*li* is about order, specifically a hierarchically formed, cosmically constructive order in which all things and people have a place of relative importance” (1984:55). But, instead of describing *li* as a synchronic model for human conduct, Zito proposes that *li* is seen as a discourse, as “a constitutive practice whose traces we find in its products, one of which is subjectivity itself” (1993:328). For example, the discourses of *li* formed subject positions—the Five Bonds of ruler/subject, father/son, husband/wife, elder/younger sib, and friend/friend, which were practically embodied in various ways that produced the hierarchical relations. Particularly of interest here is Zito’s argument about the close relationship between the construction of emperorship in imperial China and the convergence of discourses of *li*, *wen* (meaning “text” or “writing” in a narrow sense), and *xiao* (filiality). The example she provides is the Grand Sacrifice (including sacrifice to Heaven and Earth, Ancestors, and Soil and Grain) performed by the emperor, which constituted the cosmic cycle and, at the same time, verified the emperor’s fitness to rule as the man (as filial son of Heaven) who could show the unity of Heaven and Earth. Zito emphasizes the connection of editing ritual texts to ritual performance (which she calls “text/performance”) in the Grand Sacrifice, which was crucial to the emperor’s authority and legitimacy. That is because, rather than being merely a performer of ritual that must be done in accordance with the ritual texts, the emperor had a group of literati-officials responsible for the editing of these texts. This act of editing involved embellishing, correcting, and mending the texts from the past; as such, ritual texts “could be subtly reordered by virtue of its linguistic presence and privilege upon the sacrificial altars of the Imperium” (1984:54). The Grand Sacrifice, which is characterized by its fusion of text/performance, thus embodied the intersection of the discourses of filiality (*xiao*) through ancestor reverence with the discourses of history and its retrieval through texts (*wen*)—two potent forms of social power that constituted emperorship.

In a sense the ritual practices of imperial China can be understood through Bloch’s distinction between the transactional and the transcendental. Given that *li*

refers to the ways of being human that are considered necessary to the working of the cosmos as well as its embedded social order (including everything from how to dress to how to venerate ancestors), human acts that follow *li* are the link of the transient world of the individual to the transcendental social and symbolic structures. In the Grand Sacrifice that Zito studied, such human acts included the emperor's ritual performance and his editors' textual crafting which altogether constructed and sustained the cosmic order. But, as Zito (1993) argues, the text/performance in the Grand Sacrifice suggests that the beliefs or meanings of the rituals were indeed an important concern of the imperial state, in contrast to James Watson's (1988a) claim that the state was predominantly concerned with correct practices (orthopraxy) rather than correct beliefs (orthodoxy). Moreover, counter to Bloch and Parry's contention, the actors (the emperor and the literati) did acknowledge the function of rituals to legitimate the emperor's power to rule. Instead of being merely a static reproduction of order and hierarchy, Zito emphasizes human agency and intention in the demonstration of *li*. Zito mentions a shifting perception in late imperial times: a display of knowledge of *li* through proper ceremony was considered good in the seventeenth century, but by the eighteenth century this was not as good as writing books about *li* (1993:329). The emperor and the literati who had privileged access to literacy, through differentiated practices of *li* in text/performance, not only reproduced the hierarchical order but also shaped their distinguished subjective positions. Given this, an important message that I take from Zito is that ritual participants can reflect on the efficiency and function of ritual and therefore change them, for example, through alternations to the text/performance or, as Zito put it, "through literacy they were able to retrieve a sagely past for enactment in the present, with an eye for hurling their representations into a future when they themselves would be ancestors" (Zito 1993:329).

Practicing *li* in text/performance also became common among the ordinary population in late imperial times. As mentioned in chapter two of this thesis, the rural-born officials who served in the imperial court were the major contributors to the popularization of *zongfa* ethics (the ritualistic reverence to ancestors) in rural areas, which were embodied in their various written works including texts of ritual etiquette.

The popularization of the official-mode of ritual proprieties (e.g., the Cai lineage's *san xian li*) and buildings (*jiamiao* and *zongci*) in a sense threatened the status differentiation marked through ritual hierarchy, but it also involved the lay population in the reproduction of the kind of social and cosmic order that was hierarchical and centred on the son of Heaven, the emperor. However, the reproduction of this hierarchical order that was sustained by the practices of *li* in text/performance was fundamentally called into question upon the establishment of the republican state in 1912. As Billioud and Thoraval (2015:258-9) put it, the new Chinese nation was distinguished from the previous regime by its nationalist ideology, which terminated the ancient ideal of a universal empire, and by new secular techniques of knowledge and governance that attempted to sever and isolate from each other the visible and invisible dimensions of the universe. The Chinese civil war between the KMT and the CCP resulted after 1949 in two different paths for the relationship between the political and the religious in Taiwan and China respectively. As noted in chapter one and illustrated by several examples throughout this thesis, the KMT in Taiwan took a relatively soft stand toward "traditional" practices and objects associated with the maintenance of the social order beneficial to the imperial regime, in comparison with the more forceful social reform enacted by the CCP in China. Though the cultural landscapes in Taiwan and China today look similar on the surface (e.g., the buildings of Daoist cult temples and ancestral halls, and the various religious and ritual practices), in China, most of the objects and practices were "restored" following the economic reforms of the 1980s. This raises interesting comparative questions regarding ordinary people's perceptions of "traditional" objects and practices in the two republican states, which I consider below.

Continuity and change in China and Taiwan

Let me begin this review with studies of continuity and change in the period of post-reform China. Numerous anthropological and sociological research projects have been set up from the 1980s (when the Mainland was re-opened to foreign researchers) to investigate from different perspectives the social consequences of the socialist

revolution (see, e.g., Han 2001; Hann 2009; Potter 1993; Potter and Potter 1990; Siu 1989; Whyte 2003; Wolf 1985). A common concern in this rich body of scholarship is to what extent the Communist regime's socialist revolution has transformed Chinese society, with studies examining a range of levels from the intimate domain of family life to the public domain that includes activities such as folk religious practices. What I am concerned with here are the different opinions about whether the resurgence of various religious and customary practices in post-reform China, especially in rural areas, should be viewed as an indication of cultural continuities. Some scholars have asserted the irreversible, profound changes of the society brought about by the socialist state. For example, Siu claims: "Except for elderly villagers who have some emotional ties to the past, the majority of the peasants have neither the experience nor the memory of those times" and "[t]he features of traditional village life that scholars see being revived in the 1980s...differ substantially in form and meaning from their counterparts in the past" (1989:291-2). Others emphasize continuities, as Potter contends: "There have been reforms but not basic changes in marriage patterns; family and kinship patterns remain much the same; the lineages changed on the surface but the deep structural features persisted during the Maoist period and even surface symbolism such as tombs, halls, and dragon boat races have appeared in the post-Maoist period" (1993:170-1). Instead of a detailed unpacking of the two sides of the argument, I want to raise a question that has not been properly scrutinized by either side: By what criteria can we judge the similarities or differences between the older and younger generations' perceptions about the rituals that are revived in contemporary China? It is beyond the scope of this conclusion to address this question fully, but I suggest that Bloch's distinction of the two cognitive systems offers one approach to unpacking this question.

As was discussed above, the existence and sustaining of the long-term order is ensured by human ritual practices that reproduce the prescribed social and cosmic structure. As the actors perform the rituals, they are responding to the demand of the long-term cycle, or what Bloch calls the cognitive system that does not directly link up with empirical experiences. In other words, the continuation of ritual practices suggests that the cognitive system concerned with social and cosmic order has been

maintained at an appropriate distance from people's everyday life, and therefore has not yet been problematized by human actors. (Though, according to Zito, this appropriate distance should not exclude human consciousness of the ritual's legitimating function.) The social revolution in China during the Maoist period presents a case in which the cognitive system prescribing the social and cosmic order in imperial times was severely questioned, and any symbols recognized as signifying that order were abolished. The case of China thus supports Bloch's argument that social change is generated from huge changes in human lived experiences that eventually lead to a critical reflection on and challenge to the social and cosmic structure that is endured by ritual practices.

The revival of "traditional" practices and objects in post-reform China appears to show the limitations of the revolution in eradicating permanently the influence of the cognitive system critiqued for its link to the "feudal institutions". Nevertheless, in contemporary China, people's perceptions of these practices and objects are to varying degrees still linked to their experiences in the revolutionary period. For example, in some contexts ordinary people and communist officials use terms that were prevalent in the Maoist period such as "feudal superstitions" (*fengjian mixin*) and "bad customs" (*exi*) to describe the rituals that they carry out today. As Steinmüller (2013:157-8) puts it, the principle of *li* itself has become profoundly embarrassing over the past century, and this past still influences how people relate to it. This is illustrated by an instance mentioned by Oxfeld (2004) of a Communist party member who justified his holding of a traditional funeral for his mother by mingling the religious and Maoist discourses.

In contrast to the situation in China, as many researchers have noted, the Confucianism-oriented kinship morality and folk religious practices have been largely preserved in Taiwan. This is inseparable from the KMT's relatively soft stand toward "traditional" beliefs and practices and its shrewd combination of Confucian values (e.g., loyalty and filiality) and patriotic-nationalism (e.g., in the domain of schooling, cf. Stafford 1995) to consolidate its authority to govern against its rival, the CCP in China. As Billioud and Thoraval (2015:260) note, the KMT regime did not try to appropriate the worship of Heaven—a former privilege of the emperor—to establish

the same kind of cosmic legitimacy. But, in a similar way, the KMT consciously used other “traditional” rituals to legitimate its power to rule (e.g., the KMT-military’s involvement in the burial rituals in Jinmen, see chapter five). Meanwhile, the continuity between material and intangible realms (seen from a modern perspective, Billioud and Thoraval 2015:255) could also be maintained at the level of the microcosmic bases of experiences through individual or community practices, such as ancestral sacrifices, practices of spirit possession, cults of local deities, and bodily practices like *qigong*, and so on.

The observable continuities do not necessarily suggest consistency over time in people’s perceptions of the “traditional” practices and objects. Modern education based on western-centred sciences and rapidly changing living environments have led to reflections on some folk religious practices. For example, there has a general social critique in recent decades of the practice of burning incense sticks and spirit money on the basis that it causes air pollution and exacerbates global warming; in response, one renowned Daoist temple in Taipei announced the removal of all incense burners in 2014, which was generally commended by the media and the temple’s disciples. The temple-attendants who supported this measure claimed that, although burning incense sticks is thought to establish communication with the gods, their prayers will still reach the gods as long as their minds are honest and sincere. To a certain extent rituals and “tradition” seem now to be more “objectified” and consciously reflected upon, but the prescribed values or moral principles nonetheless still tend to be respected and followed. The instances that I described in chapter four show that young women may attempt to change the ways in which food offerings are prepared and the timing of sacrifices to suit their needs and preferences, but they do not tend to question the practices of worshipping ancestors and powerful spirits *per se* because of the embedded kinship morality. Furthermore, I have argued that young women’s personal thoughts or beliefs about the rituals may be irrelevant to their acceptance of responsibility for performing domestic worship, and that this instead should be explained with reference to their maintenance of their relationships with those about whom they are concerned and their own social reputations. The same logic is applied

to their male counterparts and to their senior generations. In other words, I argue that the need to establish and maintain the social relationships and good reputation (as a moral person) that are important to everyday life is central to motivating people's continuing practice of traditional rituals. Importantly, this need is itself shaped by the moral principles embedded in the rituals. This may look similar to the interplay of the transactional and the transcendental that Bloch and Parry describe, however, while their argument focuses on the reproduction of the social order through human action, I emphasize how participation in the ritual affects the ways in which the participants engage in the world of lived reality—an issue that I address further below.

The intersection of ritual and everyday life

The previous discussion on the construction of political-religious order in imperial China indicates a limitation of Bloch and Parry's thesis on the relationship between the short-term individual activities and the long-term cycle of the social and cosmic order. It is not, as Bloch and Parry suggest, the case that the long-term cycle (or the transcendental) is always hidden from the actors who perform the rituals that reproduce the order. In imperial China, the emperor and his officials all knew very well the importance of rituals (practicing *li* in text/performance) to constructing and maintaining the cosmic legitimacy; this was also acknowledged by those revolutionary forces that sought to overthrow the imperial regime, including the force that established the republican state in 1912 (cf. Zito 1984:50). Another problem relates to the distinction that Bloch makes between the two cognitive systems is the potential of distancing rituals from our lived reality in our analyses. As Puett (2014:222) notes, "[w]hat lies outside ritual for Bloch is still essentially what we experience, the 'we' now being read as universal humans as opposed to modern humans"; this tends to take culture (however understood) away from the discussion of our lived experiences. To argue against this theoretical tendency, Puett suggests that a re-reading of Chinese ritual theories concerned with how ritual interacts with the world of everyday experience sheds light on general theories of religion.

As mentioned in chapter one of this thesis, Puett notes that the ritual classics, such

as *Liji*, shared an idea that the world abounded with capricious and potentially antagonistic divine forces, and rituals were human creations to domesticate these highly agonistic forces and place them within a hierarchy manipulable for the sake of human interests. Different from many modern ritual theorists who depict premodern Chinese cosmology as the one of harmonious monism, Puett contends that in classical China the world is viewed as fragmented and fractured, and ritual works to create an “as if” space (or a subjunctive space) in which order is able to be constructed. However, the subjunctive world created by ritual is only temporary, and therefore the ordered world of flawless repetition can never fully replace the broken world of experience; as such, the tension between the two becomes the driving force for the endless work of ritual. Furthermore, while many theorists have followed Durkheim in claiming that rituals function to socialize the individual into a particular way of thinking and behaving, Puett’s original and important contribution is that, instead of locating normative values in the subjunctive space of the ritual, he argues they are encountered in the disjunction between the world constructed by the ritual and our lived experiences.

Puett notes that the emphasis on tension and incongruity between ritual and everyday life in Chinese ritual classics is also found in Robert Orsi’s (2007) argument that ritual operates in “the register of the tragic” (2014:230; cf. Seligman et al. 2008:28-34). In his ethnographic work on American Catholicism, Orsi suggests seeing religion as “a network of relationships between heaven and earth involving humans of all ages and many different sacred figures together” (2007:2). For example, Orsi describes the paradoxical relationships of children, women and people with physical disabilities to the saints: on the one hand, the holy figures could be dangerous enforcers of cultural structures, norms and expectations; on the other, they are called by the vulnerable to be their allies in resistance and subversion, but more often, in their “negotiating [of] compromises that are often tragic in their inevitability” (2007:4). By focusing on the complex relationships that develop in everyday life through religious practices, Orsi suggests “replacing the meaning-making subject with a more tragic figure whose engagements with the world, within particular circumstances of power, proceed through media that may embody meanings against him or her” (2007:170).

As Puett argues, both Orsi's work on contemporary American Catholicism and the ritual theories of ancient China suggest a view of ritual as a set of relationships, rather than a system of meaning. Analysing religious and ritual practices in this way requires greater attention to be paid to people's lived experiences and their relationships with other human and non-human beings than is the case for those approaches discussed above that emphasize the reproduction of the social and cosmic order. Research that attends to the interplay or tension between ritual actions and those actions of the mundane world in this way has wide applicability to ethnographic studies in different cultural settings. Moreover, it also sheds light on how religion and ritual have salient relevance to human ethics at the day-to-day level.

In his 2015 Maret Lecture, Joel Robbins (2016) focuses on a problem that he has found in current anthropological studies on "ordinary" or "everyday" ethics: a tendency to marginalize the role of religion in the examination of people's moral lives. To argue against this tendency, Robbins draws on Bloch's (2008) distinction of the transactional and the transcendental to contend that people do take seriously in their everyday life the values prescribed in religion or ritual that they learn through bodily engagement in the religious and ritual activities (2016:773-4). (However, Robbins did not challenge Bloch's (2008:2056) argument that the actors cannot perceive directly the "essentialized roles and groups" that constitute the transcendental social, which is a problem that I have discussed above.) What I want to highlight in Robbins' argument is his recognition of the role of ritual in mediating the tension between the idealized image of the world projected in the ritual and the lived experiences outside of the ritual (2015:21-2; 2016:770-1). Robbins suggests that some rituals allow people "to suspend the *complex relation* between values and action that holds in daily life" (2015:22; my own italics), as in lived reality one needs to make choices among a number of values simultaneously and tends to make only small progress toward further realization of the values involved in the rituals. In other words, "[r]ituals show people the values that exist in their community by providing realized representations of them, but they do not expect people to live lives singularly devoted to reproducing these values in such pure form" (Robbins 2015:22). I think that there is thought-provoking overlap between

what Robbins calls “complex relation” and what Puett calls “disjunction”, as both suggest the possible differences between the idealized order presented in the ritual and the empirical experiences which may abound with chaos, discord, and conflict. They both also suggest that the values, proper dispositions and relationships that are emphasized in the rituals may be hard for people to fulfil fully in their everyday lives but they nevertheless remain desirable. As long as the actors are themselves involved in the ritual on a regular basis, they situate themselves time and again between the ordered world of the ritual and the world of lived experiences. They thus learn the differences between these two worlds, and some movement toward being a person with the morality emphasized by the ritual becomes possible.

In my discussion of the Cai lineage’s ancestral sacrifices in chapter three, I used Puett’s disjunction thesis to account for the phenomenon that the time- and money-consuming ancestral ritual is still able to attract back to the village many younger descendants whose lives have been otherwise detached from the kin community for various reasons. However, thus far, I have not spelled out explicitly how people’s ritual practices are related to ethics in their everyday life. (Though, in chapter five, I have discussed people’s ethical reflections on the socially promoted form of funeral.) What I argued in the three chapters on rituals was that collaboration in organizing the rituals and performance of the rituals have a strong bearing on both male and female practitioners’ personal reputations as moral persons as well as their relationships with others which are also evaluated in moral terms. The criteria for judging whether a person is moral or not are mostly prescribed in the rituals. For example, by performing sacrifices to ancestors, the performer (either a man or woman) shows him or herself to be a moral person who knows and embodies the idea of filiality required of the ritual; similarly, by playing a proper role as a helper or guest at a funeral, the actor expresses his or her understanding of moral obligation and *renqing* (human sentiments). Though the ritual participants may not always behave in their daily life as they do in the rituals, their regular involvement in the rituals manifests their acknowledgement of, and adherence, to the moral principles or values prescribed in the rituals. As values such as filiality, moral obligation between kin, and *renqing* are not merely underscored in

the ritual space but also emphasized in the everyday living, we can see the importance of ritual in informing what is socially recognized as good and right in people's personal ethical judgments and actions in their day-to-day lives.

In sum, this ethnographic study suggests the usefulness, but also limitations, of using Bloch and Parry's thesis on the intersection of the transactional and the transcendental to theorize continuity and change in human society. The continuation of "traditional" rituals in Jinmen can be read as the symbolic reproduction of the social order manifesting the value of the patriliney and kin solidarity in line with Bloch and Parry's arguments. But, such continuities should by no means be taken as suggesting that the actors are necessarily unaware of the efficacy and function of the ritual in sustaining a particular kind of social order. Zito's exploration of the court ritual in imperial China and my discussion of the KMT's involvement in folk ritual practices demonstrate the power-holders' shrewd appropriation of the rituals that create the order beneficial to their legitimacy. At the lay level, both the elite-gentry and the less-educated (both in imperial times and in republican times) acknowledge and appreciate the overarching values or moral principles prescribed in certain rituals (e.g., the lineage unity and kin solidarity in the ancestral sacrifices), so they are willing to continue the rituals despite great changes in their living environments. Moreover, instead of seeing ritual as a static reproduction of social order as implied by Bloch and Parry, it is productive to see ritual as endless work to overcome the tension or incongruity between the idealized world created by the ritual and the participants' real lives outside of the ritual, and to examine how participation in the ritual provokes people's reflections on that tension, and how such reflections may affect people's ethical thinking and behaviour in their everyday life.

A locally-grounded response to the Cold War and its aftermath

The first part of this thesis's title—an island of the floating world—is borrowed from Kazuo Ishiguro's novel *An Artist of the Floating World* (1986). The novel describes a man, a respected, retired artist in post-second world war Japan, whose anxiety about his second daughter's marriage negotiations pushes him into deep self-reflection on

his past as a pro-government painter during the war. My referencing of this novel is not only because of the common elements of war, disorder and uncertainty, but also because it also explores the links between the present and the past in the lived experiences of people who were involved in specific historical moments. This ethnographic study focusing on everyday life in Jinmen in relation to the island's situation in the Cold War and then post-Cold War contexts suggests that kinship and kinship-related rituals play salient roles in sustaining the local social fabric in times of great change, and are therefore highly relevant to the current local political-economic structure which is closely connected to the legacies of the previous decades.

In line with Heonik Kwon's works on Vietnam and South Korea, this study is aimed at demonstrating that anthropology's expertise in exploring the social and cultural dimensions of the society in question provides insightful material to enrich the Cold War scholarship in terms of analytical and ethnographic perspectives. Firstly, Jinmen's experience of wars and long-term military control and preparation illustrates a different understanding of the Cold War distinct from the "long peace" or "imaginary war" that it is frequently imagined to have been in western advanced countries. Szonyi's pioneering study of the social history of Jinmen deserves credit for presenting this local perspective, especially from the angle of ordinary people based on the first- and second-hand data from oral interviews. However, as has been seen in this thesis, I have questioned Szonyi's emphasis on change and have instead argued that greater attention must be given to the continuities in the intimate aspects of kinship and family life which served as bulwarks maintaining a sense of order for the people of Jinmen in the face of rapidly changing circumstances outside of their control.

The attention to kinship and family life also sheds light on how the current life of the people in Jinmen is linked to their past experiences of military conflicts and preparation. As shown in Kwon's work, the resurgence of, or the development of new forms of, ancestral rituals in contemporary Vietnam and South Korea are grassroots response to decomposing the tragedies of mass death and human displacement caused by the extreme politics. Though my discussion of the kinship practices in Jinmen differs from Kwon's case studies in a number of respects, one important commonality

is that in each case an understanding of how the present was linked to the past was gained by scrutinizing family life and kinship practices concerned with relationship-making between the living, and between the living and the non-living. For example, the persistence of the old ways of doing sacrificial and mortuary rituals has sustained the interpersonal bonds in the kin communities and the wider society of Jinmen, which in turn laid the foundation on which today's local political forces are built and through which attempts are made to deal with the past in a way that can benefit people's present lives. Just like Ishiguro's Japanese artist who moves between the past and the present to situate his self, the islanders of Jinmen seek better prospects for their lives with constant reference to what has happened on the island in the Cold War era.

This anthropological study has unpacked the link between the current social pattern of Jinmen and the locals' experiences of changes during and after the Cold War era by focusing on kinship and kinship-related practices. This approach has demonstrated the necessity of resetting the often-seen formula for discussing social changes in different disciplines in the social sciences: a formula assuming causal relations between shifting political-economic circumstances and changes in the domain of kinship and family. This is not to deny the considerable changes that have taken place in terms of marriage, childbirth and family constitution at a global scale alongside the great changes in the political, economic and technological domains. Instead, I want to suggest that it is productive to explore the dynamic and resilient character of kinship and related practices in responding to the varying situations in which people live. The continuities that I found in Jinmen are not only about the persistence of ritual and customary practices, but even more so about the senses of order and familiarity created in and through these practices, which are intertwined with kinship morality, the on-going cycles of mutual help and reciprocity, and the social reputation of individuals and the group. Certainly, there are also increasing differences between the generations in diverse aspects of their lives. Yet, despite this, the continuing ritual engagement that vitalizes and confirms kinship morality and values, which permeate into people's everyday life, is important to strengthening their interpersonal ties and bringing about the desired social order.

Appendix: Glossary of Chinese Characters

ai min	愛民
baibai	拜拜
bai waizu	拜外祖
bai xiguan le	拜習慣了
banluji	半路祭
Bao-Sheng-Da-Di	保生大帝
bao xinding	報新丁
chi	恥
chi tou	吃頭
chu zhu	出主
chuantong nüren	傳統女人
chunji	春祭
cideng gongmin	次等公民
citang	祠堂
daguchui	大鼓吹
dezheng	德政
Di-Ji-Zhu/Zu	地基主/祖
dian zhu	點主
dixia Jinmen	地下金門
en	恩
erting	二亭
exi	惡習
fang	房
fengjian mixin	封建迷信
fengyang	奉養
fuqi	福氣
fuxing Zhonghua wenhua	復興中華文化
gei	給
gen zhe bai	跟著拜
gongji	公祭
gongjia	公家
gufa	古法

Guan-Yin	觀音
guanxi	關係
guo fang	過房
guoyu	國語
Guomin liyi fanli	國民禮儀範例
hao ku	好苦
hao ming	好命
hongbao	紅包
huai xiguan	壞習慣
hun	魂
huzhuhui	互助會
jia	家
jiajи	家祭
jiamiao	家廟
jiao	醮
jiatou	甲頭
jiazu	家族
jiazu datuanyuan	家族大團圓
jin mingjing	進銘旌
jin xiang tuan	進香團
jin zhu	進主
jing zong sou zu	敬宗收族
jun zhu min, min jing jun	軍助民, 民敬軍
laiwang	來往
lengqing	冷清
li (rite; ritual; propriety)	禮
lian	廉
lianluo ganqing	聯絡感情
jiaoqing	交情
lidai zuxian zongpai	歷代祖先總牌
lijia	里甲
lao tou	老頭
mianzi	面子
Minnan	閩南
nan zhu wai, nü zhu nei	男主外, 女主內

paixi	派系
Pudu	普渡
qigong	氣功
qi jia	齊家
qiuji	秋祭
renao	熱鬧
renji guanxi	人際關係
renqing	人情
san xian li	三獻禮
shehui fuli	社會福利
shenminghui	神明會
shequ fazhan xiehui	社區發展協會
shequ zhigongdui	社區志工隊
shidafu	士大夫
shou ling	守靈
si houtu	祀后土
tiao	祧
tongyangxi	童養媳
toujia	頭家
touting	頭亭
Tu-Di-Gong	土地公
waiqi	外戚
weile xuanpiao	為了選票
wen	文
Xiandai Enzhugong	現代恩主公
xiangxia	鄉下
xiao (filial piety; filiality)	孝
xiao santong	小三通
xifang jile shijie	西方極樂世界
xinhun tou	新婚頭
yang	陽
yang (to raise; to care for)	養
yangnu	養女
yi	義
Yiguandao	一貫道

yi jia	一家
yin	陰
yin shui si yuan	飲水思源
yuanbao	元寶
Zao-Shen	灶神
zhandi	戰地
zhandou cun	戰鬥村
zhengyi	正義
zhisang weiyuanhui	治喪委員會
zhuan xifeng	轉西風
zhujiguan	主祭官
zirancun	自然村
zong	宗
zongci	宗祠
zongfa	宗法
zongqinhui	宗親會
zu, zongzu (lineage)	族, 宗族
zupu	族譜

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