

The London School of Economics and Political Science

*New China and its Qiaowu:
The Political Economy of Overseas Chinese
policy in the People's Republic of China,
1949–1959*

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the London School of Economics for the degree of Doctor of
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Abstract:

This thesis examines *qiaowu* [Overseas Chinese affairs] policies during the PRC's first decade, and it argues that the CCP-controlled party-state's approach to the governance of the *huaqiao* [Overseas Chinese] and their affairs was fundamentally a political economy. This was at base, a function of perceived *huaqiao* economic utility, especially for what their remittances offered to China's foreign reserves, and hence the party-state's *qiaowu* approach was a political practice to secure that economic utility.

Through the early-to-mid-1950s, the perceived economic utility of the *huaqiao* and their remittances led to policies that systematically privileged the *huaqiao* (especially in China) and their interests, all in the name of securing, incentivising and increasing remittances back to China. This was even done at the expense of other CCP ideological impetuses, especially in terms of socialist transformation, as the party-state permitted contradictions between these *youdai* [favourable treatment] policies for the *huaqiao*, and its own vision for socialist transformation.

Yet, by 1959, and after a series of crises brought the contradictions between *qiaowu* and socialist transformation to the fore, the CCP's radical shift to the left led by Mao Zedong forced *qiaowu* to now conform with Mao's demand to place 'politics in command'. Thus *qiaowu* abandoned its prioritisation of economic utility and its past policies, for alignment with Mao's revolutionary ideals, and in service to the Great Leap Forward.

This thesis represents an original contribution to historiography on the PRC, the *huaqiao*, and *qiaowu*, both in terms of the new evidence from a wide range of Chinese archives that it utilises, but also because it revises existing narratives—and especially the pro-CCP conventionalisms—that gloss over the *huaqiao* experience of New China. Furthermore, this thesis also addresses the lacunae in the historiography on the PRC in the 1950s, and its silence on where *qiaowu* fits into the story of China's socialist transformation.

Table of Contents:

Abstract	3
Table of Contents	4
Acknowledgements	6
Glossary of Chinese terms	7
List of Abbreviations	9
Introduction	12
The Political Economy of Overseas Chinese policy	15
Historiography	18
Structure and Scope	30
Sources	33
Prologue: Fait Accompli?	36
Chapter 1. Rights and Interests	42
Introduction	43
To do some good	44
Openness and Sincerity	49
Common Program	60
Conclusion	63
Chapter 2. Screaming for socialism	66
Introduction	67
Like another province overseas	68
If only 1%	79
All <i>huaqiao</i> have money	94
Conclusion	114
Chapter 3. No complaints, no escapes, no shortfalls	118
Introduction	119
They will fervently leap	120
Rather Left than Right	132
More money, more problems	148
Conclusion	166
Chapter 4. Fourth-class socialism	170
Introduction	171
‘Is the Overseas Chinese Affairs Bureau your Daddy?’	173
Special Circumstances	187
The Great Debate	201
Conclusion	220
Chapter 5. Politics in Command	224
Introduction	225
A Great Leap Forward for <i>qiaowu</i>	227
Keep Left	241
Conclusion	254

Conclusion	258
Political Economy	261
Contradiction	265
Paradox	269
Caveat Emptor	274
Appendices	276
Appendix I. ‘Overseas Chinese Remittances to the People’s Republic of China, 1950–1960’	277
Bibliography	278

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Above everything and everyone else, I thank God. ‘For of him, and through him, and to him, *are* all things’—I am only here because of him.

To God be the glory; the best is yet to be.

Glossary of Chinese terms:

This thesis uses *hanyu pinyin* romanisation for Chinese proper names and nouns, except in those few instances where their other (usually older) forms are more generally familiar, for instance: Sun Yat-sen (Sun Zhongshan), Chiang Kai-shek (Jiang Jieshi), Tan Kah Kee (Chen Jiageng), and etc.

Citations of Chinese sources in the footnotes are in *pinyin*. The thesis bibliography lists the Chinese secondary sources consulted, and includes a title translation in English, *pinyin* transliteration, and the Chinese characters for each entry.

Quotations from Chinese sources have been translated into English.

The following is a glossary of some of the more common Chinese terms in the thesis.

Pinyin	English translation	Characters	Notes
<i>guiqiao</i>	Overseas Chinese returnee (to China)	归侨	shorthand for 归国华侨 [guiguo huaqiao]
<i>haiwai huaqiao</i>	Overseas Chinese (actually abroad)	海外华侨	sometimes also 国外华侨 [guowai huaqiao]
<i>huaqiao</i>	Overseas Chinese	华侨	
<i>nanqiao</i>	Overseas Chinese refugee	难侨	shorthand for 归难华侨 [guinan huaqiao]
<i>qiaobao</i>	Overseas Chinese compatriot	侨胞	shorthand for 华侨同胞 [huaqiao tongbao]
<i>qiaohui</i>	Overseas Chinese remittances	侨汇	shorthand for 华侨汇款 [huaqiao huikuan]
<i>qiaojuan</i>	Overseas Chinese dependent and/or relative	侨眷	shorthand for 华侨眷属 [huaqiao juanshu]
<i>qiaolian</i>	Overseas Chinese association	侨联	from <i>huaqiao</i> friendship association, 华侨联谊会 [huaqiao lianyihui]; or the All-China Federation of Returned Overseas Chinese, 中华全国归国华侨联合会 [zhonghua quanguo guiguo huaqiaolianhehui]
<i>qiaouqu</i>	Overseas Chinese area	侨区	shorthand for 华侨地区 [huaqiao diqu]
<i>qiaopi</i>	Overseas Chinese correspondence	侨批	from a Hokkien (Minnan) pronunciation of letter, or 信 [xin] as 批 [pi].
<i>qiaosheng</i>	Overseas Chinese student	侨生	shorthand for 华侨学生 [huaqiao xuesheng]

<i>qiaowu</i>	Overseas Chinese affairs	侨务	shorthand for 华侨事务 [huaqiao shiwu]
<i>qiaoxiang</i>	Overseas Chinese hometown	侨乡	shorthand for 华侨家乡 [huaqiao jiaxiang]
<i>teshu</i>	special, or exceptional	特殊	as in <i>huaqiao</i> special circumstances, 华侨特殊 情况 [huaqiao teshu qingkuang]
<i>youdai</i>	favourable or preferential treatment	优待	from 优良对待 [<i>youliang</i> duidai] or 优厚对待 [<i>youhou</i> duidai]

List of Abbreviations:

1949-1952 duiwai maoyi juan	<i>1949-1952 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo jingji dang'an ziliao xuanbian: duwai maoyi juan</i>	1949-1952 中华人民共和国经济档案资料选编: 对外贸易卷
1949-1952 gongshang tizhi juan	<i>1949-1952 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo jingji dang'an ziliao xuanbian: gongshang tizhi juan</i>	1949-1952 中华人民共和国经济档案资料选编: 工商体制卷
1949-1952 jinrong juan	<i>1949-1952 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo jingji dang'an ziliao xuanbian: jinrong juan</i>	1949-1952 中华人民共和国经济档案资料选编: 金融卷
1949-1952 nongcun jingji tizhi juan	<i>1949-1952 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo jingji dang'an ziliao xuanbian: nongcun jingji tizhi juan</i>	1949-1952 中华人民共和国经济档案资料选编: 农村经济体制卷
1953-1957 jinrong juan	<i>1953-1957 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo jingji dang'an ziliao xuanbian: jinrong juan</i>	1953-1957 中华人民共和国经济档案资料选编: 金融卷
1958-1965 jinrong juan	<i>1958-1965 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo jingji dang'an ziliao xuanbian: jinrong juan</i>	1958-1965 中华人民共和国经济档案资料选编: 金融卷
AAPC	Advanced Agricultural Producers' Cooperative	高级农业生产合作社
ACFROC	All-China Federation of Returned Overseas Chinese	中华全国归国华侨联合会
APC	Agricultural Producers' Cooperative	农业生产合作社
BMA	Beijing Municipal Archives	北京市档案馆
BPG	Beijing People's Government	北京市人民政府
BOC	Bank of China	中国银行
CA	Central Archives	中央档案馆
CASS	Chinese Academy of Social Sciences	中国社会科学院
CC	Central Committee	中央委员会
CCP	Chinese Communist Party	中国共产党
CFEC	Central Finance and Economics Commission, CPG	中央人民政府财政经济委员会
CKZL	<i>Zhonggong dangshi jiaoxue cankao ziliao</i>	中共党史教学参考资料
CNS	China News Service	中国新闻社
CPG	Central People's Government	中央人民政府

CPR	<i>China Political Reports</i>	
CPPCC	Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference	中华人民政治协商会议
CPSU	Communist Party of the Soviet Union	
CWIHP	Cold War International History Project	
DDRS	<i>Declassified Documents Reference System</i>	
DHGLR	<i>Dang he guojia lingdaoren lun qiaowu</i>	党和国家领导人论侨务
DWGW	<i>Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo duiwai guanxi wenjian ji (1949-1959)</i>	中华人民共和国对外关系文件集(1949-1959)
ECFC	East China Finance Committee	华东军政委员会财经委员会
FPA	Fujian Provincial Archives	福建省档案馆
FPC	Fujian CCP Committee	福建省共产党委员会
FPG	Fujian People's Government	福建省人民政府
GAC	Government Administration Council	中央人民政府政务院
GBP	Pound sterling	
GDQW	<i>Guangdong qiaowu</i>	广东侨务
GLF	Great Leap Forward	大跃进
GMD	Guomindang	国民党
GPC	Guangdong CCP Committee	广东省共产党委员会
GPPC	Guangdong People's Committee	广东省人民委员会
HKD	Hong Kong Dollar	
ISD	Internal Security Department, Singapore	
JYMZ	<i>Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao</i>	建国以来毛泽东文稿
JYZW	<i>Jianguo yilai zhongyao wenjian xuanbian</i>	建国以来重要文件选编
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs, PRC	中华人民共和国外交部
MFAA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archive, PRC	中华人民共和国外交部档案馆
MOE	Ministry of Education, PRC	中华人民共和国教育部
NBCK	<i>Neibu cankao</i>	内部参考

NPC	National People's Congress	全国人民代表大会
OCAC	Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission, CPG	中央人民政府华侨事务委员会
OCAO	Overseas Chinese Affairs Office of the State Council	国务院华侨事务办公室
PBOC	People's Bank of China	中国人民银行
PCC	Political Consultative Conference	政治协商会议
PLA	People's Liberation Army	中国人民解放军
PRC	People's Republic of China	中华人民共和国
RIIA	Royal Institute of International Affairs (Chatham House)	
RMB	Renminbi	人民币
QWB	<i>Qiaowu bao</i>	侨务报
QWTX	<i>Qiaowu gongzuo tongxun</i>	侨务工作通讯
Selected Works	<i>The Selected Works of Mao Tsetung</i>	
SGD	Singapore Dollar	
SMA	Shanghai Municipal Archives	上海市档案馆
SPC	Shanghai CCP Committee	上海市共产党组织
SPG	Shanghai People's Government	上海市人民政府
SSC	Supreme State Conference	最高国务会议
TNA	The National Archives of the United Kingdom, London	
UFWD	CCP CC United Front Work Department	中国共产党中央委员会统一战线工作部
USD	United States Dollar	
WCDA	Wilson Center Digital Archive	
Xinhua	Xinhua News Agency	新华社
YPG	Yunnan People's Government	云南省人民政府
ZZJZ	<i>Zhonggong zhongyang jiefang zhanzheng shiqi tongyi zhanxian wenjian xuanbian</i>	中共中央解放战争时期统一战线文件选编
ZZKM	<i>Zhonggong zhongyang kangri minzu tongyi zhanxian wenjian xuanbian</i>	中共中央抗日民族统一战线文件选编
ZZWX	<i>Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian xuanji</i>	中共中央文件选集

Introduction

While on a visit to Bangkok in November 1978, and just over a year after he had been restored to political ascendancy, Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central Committee (CC) vice-Chairman Deng Xiaoping gave a speech to some *huaqiao* [华侨 Overseas Chinese].¹ Deng declared that the People's Republic of China (PRC) sought 'reaffirmation and restoration of the past policies that Chairman Mao and Premier Zhou had formulated while they were alive'.² This, in the realm of *qiaowu* [侨务 Overseas Chinese affairs] policies, broadly meant that the *haiwai huaqiao* [海外华侨 Overseas Chinese abroad] should be law-abiding, adopt local citizenship, and integrate with local peoples. Yet, Deng also admitted that for the *huaqiao* in China, 'Lin Biao and the 'Gang of Four' had interfered with Chairman Mao and Premier Zhou's *qiaowu* policies', and had thus caused the *huaqiao* to suffer during the dark years of the Cultural Revolution.³ But Deng promised them a restoration; he pointed to the State Council's new Overseas Chinese Affairs Office as a veritable temple to *qiaowu*, and to Liao Chengzhi's return to the guardianship of *qiaowu* as like the return of a benevolent Bodhisattva to the temple.⁴ Liao had headed the older Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission (OCAC) until it had been shuttered during the Cultural Revolution.⁵ Thus the return of Liao, the long-serving,

¹ While *huaqiao* translates as 'Overseas Chinese', it means 'Chinese sojourners'. Thus 'Overseas Chinese' does not differentiate between permanent and temporary sojourning, especially since *huaqiao* identity could mean persons either in, or outside China. Today, *huaqiao* identity is linked to Chinese nationality and foreign residence, but in the period framed by this thesis, that distinction was very rarely made. Back then, *huaqiao* identity could include: *huaqiao juanshu* [shortened to 侨眷 *qiaojuan*] or the *huaqiao* dependents or relatives in China; *huaqiao xuesheng* [侨生 *qiaosheng*] or the *huaqiao* students who returned to China; *guiguo huaqiao* [归侨 *guiqiao*] or returnees; and the *haiwai huaqiao* [海外华侨] were those actually abroad. In the interests of analytical specificity, this thesis prefers to transliterate *huaqiao* as a general reference to all identities, and use the specific terms (i.e. *guiqiao*) where necessary. See 'A Note on the Origins of *Huachiao*', in Wang Gungwu, *Community and Nation: Essays on Southeast Asia and the Chinese*, selected by Anthony Reid (Singapore: Heinemann Educational Books (Asia), 1981), 118-127; Glen Peterson, *Overseas Chinese in the People's Republic of China* (New York: Routledge, 2012), 2-3.

² Deng Xiaoping, 'Jiejian taiguo huaqiao, huaren daibiao de jianghua', 09/11/1978, in State Council Overseas Chinese Affairs Office (ed.), *Dang he guojia lingdaoren lun qiaowu* [hereafter, *DHGLR*] (Beijing: Guowuyuan qiaoban, 1992), 335-337 (336).

³ Ibid., 337.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Liao Chengzhi was the son of Liao Zhongkai and He Xiangning—who were close friends of Sun Yat-sen. He rose in the CCP in the 1930s, and became an alternate member of the CCP CC at the Seventh Party Congress (1945). Liao was appointed OCAC vice-Chairman in 1949—with his mother as titular Chairperson—but was de facto head since he ran its Party Group [党组 *dangzu*]. He became a full CCP CC

enlightened guardian of *qiaowu*, spoke to Deng's apparent intention to restore *qiaowu* to its previous benevolence and correctness. Yet, this view of the past—this 'Deng version' of history—was an attempt to whitewash the darker episodes of the preceding years, which went far beyond the iniquities of the Cultural Revolution.⁶

Contrary to the narrative of benevolence, correctness and a general positivity as the characteristics of the CCP's pre-Cultural Revolution *qiaowu* policies, this thesis views *qiaowu* as a tragic failure even before the Cultural Revolution. This thesis is thus first and foremost a revision of the CCP narrative on its past approach to *qiaowu*. More specifically, this thesis focuses on the first decade of the PRC (1949–1959) to analyse the history of policies towards the *huaqiao* in China, from the very beginning of the new state. To that end, this thesis asks three main questions. What was the CCP's approach to *qiaowu*? How was *qiaowu* practiced, and how did it correlate with other policy contexts and circumstances in the PRC? And where did *qiaowu* end up by 1960—and why? In answer to the questions above, and based on mainly heretofore unused archival evidence, this thesis argues for an analysis of the CCP's *qiaowu* as a political economy; a locus of contradiction; and ultimately, as the site of paradoxical failure and broken promises. Thus this thesis sets out to offer a new history of *qiaowu* in the PRC that will also provide insights on the first ten years of New China and its political economy.

The following pages will discuss the thesis' main arguments, before summarising its structure and scope. This will include a discussion of the historiographical lacunae—both in terms of the histories of the PRC, and of 'Overseas Chinese affairs'—that this thesis seeks to fill. Finally, after an overview of the evidentiary sources that this thesis

member at the Eighth Party Congress (1956), and OCAC Chairman in 1959. He vanished from public life during the Cultural Revolution, but was later restored to the CCP CC at the Tenth Party Congress (1973). See 'Liao Chengzhi', in Wolfgang Bartke, *Who's Who in the People's Republic of China* (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1981), 209–210.

For the attacks on Liao and *qiaowu* in the Cultural Revolution, see Shanghai Returned Overseas Chinese Cultural Revolution Liaison Station, and Shanghai Overseas Chinese Affairs Office Revolutionary Rebels Third Corps (eds), *Zalan Liao Chengzhi de 'xiao guowuyuan'* (Shanghai, 1967).

⁶ Deng was not alone in this. See also Xi Zhongxun, 'Zai sheng, zizhi qu, zhixia shi qiaoban zhuren huiyi shang de jianghua (zhai yao)', 21/04/1984, *DHGLR*, 364–368 (364).

employs, an introduction to pre-1949 CCP approaches to the *huaqiao* (and also to *qiaowu*) will offer a prologue to the subsequent chapters of this thesis.

The Political Economy of Overseas Chinese policy:

This thesis closely examines *qiaowu* policy, to construct a narrative of the ideas, discourses, events, and contexts that were formative to *qiaowu*, and to thus analyse its development and implementation in the PRC's first decade. In that sense, this thesis seeks to contextualise the *huaqiao* place in PRC history by first looking at how the *huaqiao* were placed into the various contexts (political, economic, and etc.) of the new Chinese party-state and its *qiaowu*.⁷ Moreover, this thesis frames a chronology of New China's first decade that is bounded by two seminal events: it begins around the birth of the PRC (1949), and it ends just after the Lushan Conference (1959) had fixed China on the path of the Great Leap Forward (GLF)—basically, the epicentre of the Maoist era.⁸

The crux of this thesis' argument is that *qiaowu* in the PRC (1949–1959) was a political economy. In other words, *qiaowu* was a political practice by the Chinese party-state in service of economic objectives, wherein policies towards and regarding the governance of the *huaqiao* were defined by both a perception of *huaqiao* economic utility, and the imperative to capitalise on that utility. Indeed, given this thesis' identification and analysis of the continual interplay through the 1950s between economics and politics in *qiaowu*, political economy is not just a characterisation of the CCP's approach to *qiaowu*, but also a paradigm for analysing and proving other supplementary arguments.⁹

⁷ In the PRC, the CCP has supreme authority over the government and exercise of state power. Thus there was (and is) no meaningful separation between Party and State, hence 'party-state' refers 'not only to the party itself but also the government, legislature, and other hierarchies'. See Susan H. Whiting, 'Growth, Governance and Institutions: The Internal Institutions of the Party-State in China' (Institute for Policy Studies, Singapore, and the World Bank, Washington, DC: 2006), 17.

⁸ 'The pivotal event in the history of the People's Republic of China was the Great Leap Forward. Any attempt to understand what happened in communist China must start by placing it squarely at the very centre of the entire Maoist period.' See Frank Dikötter, *Mao's Great Famine: The History of China's Most Devastating Catastrophe, 1958–1962* (London: Bloomsbury, 2011), xiv.

⁹ 'Political economy, in sum, regards economic ideas and behaviour not as frameworks for analysis, but as beliefs and actions that must themselves be explained. They are contingent and problematic; that is, they

First, this thesis argues that the political economy of *qiaowu* (especially in 1950–1956) was derived from the *huaqiao*'s inclusion in the New Democracy of New China, as a function of the CCP's rationalisations about its economic interests, *huaqiao* economic utility, and what *huaqiao* remittances meant for its foreign reserves. This was the meaning of the *huaqiao* place in the New Democracy, and the *qiaowu* of the new party-state was premised on this definition of *huaqiao* utility, and given an imperative to secure remittances. Yet, *qiaowu* practitioners (led by the OCAC) soon realised that the reality of remittances was that they were a manifestation of the transnationality of *huaqiao* interests, because they reflected the interests of both *haiwai huaqiao* remitters, and their recipients in China, like the *guiqiao* [归侨 *huaqiao* returnees], or the *qiaojuan* [侨眷 *huaqiao* dependents and relatives]. For the recipients, remittances were their livelihood. But for remitters, remittances fulfilled traditional relationships, commercial interests, and most of all, familial responsibilities. For *qiaowu*, this entailed the recognition that securing remittances required the satisfaction of *huaqiao* interests; and that since the focus of interests (for remitters and recipients) lay in China, incentivising remittances should have a domestic centre of gravity. Thus *qiaowu* embraced the 'favourable treatment' [优待 *youdai*] of the *huaqiao* (mainly in China), in political, economic, and social policy. This preferential treatment was regularly justified by a discourse of *huaqiao* 'specialness', but in reality, it was pragmatism that rationalised the *youdai* approach as the most efficient way of incentivising and securing remittances.

Yet, as this thesis argues, the *youdai* in *qiaowu* was contradictory to the CCP's agenda for socialist transformation. The *youdai* policies appeared to privilege the *huaqiao*

might have been different and they must be explained within particular political and social science contexts. Historical political economy applies this approach to the study of the past.' See Charles S. Maier, *In search of stability: Explorations in historical political economy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 1-16 (6).

For more on China's 'historical political economy', see Carl Riskin, *China's Political Economy: The Quest for Development since 1949* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987); Shih Chih-yu, *State and Society in China's Political Economy: The Cultural Dynamics of Socialist Reform* (London: Lynne Rienner, 1995).

by preserving socio-economic relations, lifestyles, and even class identities, in ways seemingly counter-intuitive to socialism. This was rationalised as economic pragmatism, but there was a contradiction at hand because the party-state was, after all, intended to bring about socialism (and communism), which thus made its mission that of socialist transformation. Yet, even while the party-state sought to bring about socialism in the 1950s, it still went ahead with *qiaowu* that contradicted socialist ideals. Moreover, whenever the party-state encountered contradictions between *qiaowu* (and its *youdai*) and socialist transformation, it favoured the *youdai*—even if this was resented or rejected by lower-level Party cadres and the non-*huaqiao* masses, who could not quite reconcile the contradictions. Even when intensified socialist transformation by the mid-1950s brought contradictions with *qiaowu* to higher levels of intensity, the party-state's view of the *youdai* as the way to secure key economic imperatives ensured that it permitted those contradictions to persist. In a way, the *youdai* policies benefitted from their apparent oppositeness to intensified socialist transformation, which by 1956, appeared to be economically unsound. Yet, this also ensured that the *youdai* approach was associated with anti-ideological, or anti-socialist transformation positions, and this was its downfall. Once the maelstrom of the Hundred Flowers and Anti-Rightism in 1957 gave way to an overtly ideologically-defined political context, the same economic rationality of the *youdai* approach became evidence of Rightism. Thus the advent of Mao Zedong's 'politics in command' in 1958 meant the abandonment of the *youdai* approach, even as the new GLF placed socialist transformation at the centre of all party-state activity.

Finally, this thesis demonstrates the paradoxical nature of *qiaowu* in 1949–1959. Firstly, though the *youdai* policies theoretically pandered to *huaqiao* interests, they were ultimately unable to increase *huaqiao* remittances. This failure was partly due to the incompetence and policy violations of CCP cadres and officials, but it was mainly the result of contradictions between the *youdai* approach and CCP ideology. Though *qiaowu*

practitioners advocated the *youdai* approach, the impetus for socialist transformation never went away, so paradoxically, the more that *qiaowu* tried to effect the *youdai* approach, the greater the contradiction became, with all the negativity for *qiaowu*—and the *huaqiao*—that that fomented. Indeed, even when the contradiction was resolved in favour of socialist transformation, that only made things worse, since it brought the GLF down on the *huaqiao*, with drastically negative effects on remittances. Secondly, while the *youdai* approach was really about party-state self-interest, and marginalised *huaqiao* interests whenever it suited, *qiaowu* in 1950–1956 truly did privilege the *huaqiao*. Yet, even this positive discrimination had negative consequences in the end, since by placing the *huaqiao* in contradiction to socialism, it resulted in their identification as politically backward, or ideologically retarded, and fomented resentment amongst the non-*huaqiao*. This was already evident in the mid-1950s, but ironically, came home to roost after the end of the *youdai* policies, as ‘politics in command’ showed the paradox, and the cost of the *youdai* approach to the *huaqiao* in China.

Historiography:

Mainland Mainstream:

Almost forty years on since his speech, Deng Xiaoping’s version of *qiaowu* history still exerts a hegemonic influence over Mainland Chinese historiography. This occurs mainly in rather hagiographic interpretations of the CCP leadership (especially, as Deng identified, ‘Chairman Mao and Premier Zhou’) that assume that its approach to *qiaowu* was benevolent and correct, and thus that the party-state’s practice of *qiaowu* prior to 1966 was necessarily blameless.

The hagiographic interpretation of the role of Mao, Zhou et al., and the reification of their *qiaowu* lives on in the work of many Chinese historians.¹⁰ Writing on the so-

¹⁰ See Ren Guixiang, ‘Mao Zedong qiaowu sixiang yu shijian yanjiu’, *Dangshi yanjiu yu jiaoxue*, No. 2 (2014), 4-13; Ren Guixiang, ‘Xin Zhongguo jianli hou Mao Zedong yu guiguo qiaoling ji huaren kexue jia

called ‘first generation of CCP leaders’ and its ‘collective thinking on *qiaowu*’, Xu Wenyong’s narrative of the party-state leadership’s *qiaowu* is a tale of policymaking ‘with Mao Zedong at the core’, that was basically defined by the democratic pluralism of the united front; by commitment to protecting the ‘rights and interests’ of *huaqiao*; and by dedication to serving the *huaqiao* both in and outside China. This benevolence by the party-state, Xu argues, led to ‘correct *qiaowu*’ that let the *haiwai huaqiao* feel the ‘warmth of their homeland’, even while leading those in China to integrate with socialist construction and progress.¹¹ Yet, as this thesis demonstrates, the party-state’s *qiaowu* had little to do with benevolence, and was decidedly about economic realism; the commitment to the ‘rights and interests’ of *huaqiao* was actually based on utilitarian perspectives; and ultimately, the party-state did not seek to serve the *huaqiao* with ‘correct *qiaowu*’, as much as it sought to utilise, manipulate and extract.

The hagiographic view of the ‘first generation’ CCP leaders as benevolent practitioners of ‘correct *qiaowu*’ implies that all their policies until 1966 were positive. This is logical; there is little point in passing the Cultural Revolution off as an aberration otherwise. Thus, approved discourse on pre-1966 *qiaowu* refrains from casting the party-state in negative light.¹² This reluctance—indeed, institutional inability—of Chinese historiography to hold the party-state to account, is not uncommon.¹³ But the reification

jiaowang shuping’, *Guancha yu sikao*, No. 4 (2014), 65-70; Yang Libing, ‘Lun Mao Zedong de qiaowu fangzhen zhengce jiqi zuoyong’, *Bagui qiaokan*, No. 2 (2004), 4-7; Zheng Yingqia, Lu Ning, ‘Mao Zedong yu huaqiao’, *Jinan xuebao: zhixue shehui kexue ban*, 16:1 (1994), 1-7; Liu Zhengying, ‘Zhou Enlai dui Xin Zhongguo qiaowu gongzuo de jiechu gongxian’, *Dangde wenxian*, No. 3 (2000), 1-5; He Donghang, ‘Deng Xiaoping de qiaowu sixiang tanjiu’, *Jimei daxue xuebao (zhixue shehui kexue ban)*, 7:3 (2004), 12-16.

¹¹ Xu Wenyong, ‘Lun zhonggong diyi dai lingdao jiti de qiaowu sixiang yu dang de tongyi zhanxian’, *Lilun yuekan*, No. 3 (2009), 22-24.

See also Chen Yunyun, ‘Dang de diyi dai lingdao jiti huaqiao tongzhan sixiang shulue’, *Guangxi shehui zhuyi xueyuan xuebao*, 23:3 (2012), 25-30; Chen Yunyun, Liu Cheng, ‘Dang de diyi dai zhongyang lingdao jiti qiaowu sixiang tanxi’, *Ningbo daxue xuebao (renwen kexue ban)*, 26:4 (2013), 78-83; Liu Hua, ‘Zhongguo gongchandang yu Xin Zhongguo qiaowu shiye’, *Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao xuebao*, 9:1 (2005), 46-51.

¹² Xiao Wu, “‘Jianguo yilai qiaowu zhengce de huigu yu sikao’ xueshu zuotanhui jiyao”, *Huaqiao huaren lishi yanjiu*, No. 3 (2001), 11; Wang Yongkui, Wang Zhangang, “‘Wenhua Da Geming’ chuqi de zhong qiaowei”, *Bainian chao*, No. 8 (2015), 35-39.

¹³ The Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) maintains that historians who focus on the failures of Chinese socialism and criticise CCP leaders are historical nihilists influenced by Western capitalism. See

of ‘correct *qiaowu*’ has led to a failure to analyse: the political economy of *qiaowu*; the contradictions between *youdai* policies and socialist transformation; and how the party-state abandoned the *youdai* approach for coercion and exploitation. Indeed, nothing that even remotely suggests that the party-state’s *qiaowu* failed, or even betrayed the *huaqiao*, is present in Mainland historiography.

Thus, any search for historical interpretation in the Mainland historiography of *qiaowu* in the PRC over 1949–1959 is left only with a zombie-like history; alive to incidents, events and developments too prominent to ignore, but dead to the controversial, and unwilling to confront difficult facts. The result is a historiography that points to the legitimacy of *huaqiao* political participation, but never to the economic realism of the New Democracy.¹⁴ Or histories that admit that remittances were sometimes affected by failures to implement policy, or by ‘left deviations’, but which ignore the centrality of the party-state’s view on the utility of remittances, and the contradictions that arose due to this focus.¹⁵ Or indeed, discussions of the *huaqiao* experience of socialist transformation that claim party-state benevolence as evinced by the *youdai* policies, but which fail to identify or consider the fundamental self-interest that drove the party-state’s *qiaowu*, and the cost that it inflicted on the *huaqiao*.¹⁶

Zhang Shunhong, ‘Fandui lishi xuuzhuyi yao jiang qingchu Zhongguo de da daoli’, *Qiushi*, No. 96 (2016); Jean-Philippe Béja, ‘Forbidden Memory, Unwritten History: The Difficulty of Structuring an Opposition Movement in the PRC’, *China Perspectives*, No. 4 (2007), 88–98.

¹⁴ See Guo Zhongjun, ‘Tongyi zhanxian shijiao xia zhonggong huaqiao huaren zhengce de yanbian jiqi jingyna’, *Xibu xuekan*, No. 8 (2013), 5–13; Chen Yunyun, Liu Cheng, Zhou Qiwei, ‘Huaqiao huaren yu Zhongguo tongyi daye guanxi de lishi huigu yu sikao’, *Lilun xuekan*, No. 7 (2011), 87–91; Zhao Hongying, ‘Xin shiqi dang dui qiaowu ziyuan de renshi ji sikao’, *Zhonggong dangshi yanjiu*, No. 3 (2005), 45–52; Liu Hua, ‘Ping jianguo chuqi de qiaowu gongzuo’, *Huaqiao huaren lishi yanjiu*, No. 4 (1994), 71–77.

¹⁵ See Zhang Xiaoxin, ‘Bodong yu wending: 1955–1957 nian de Zhongguo qiaohui zhengce’, *Dongnanya yanjiu*, No. 4 (2012), 83–89; Yang Shihong, ‘Xin Zhongguo qiaohui gongzuo de lishi kaocha (1949–1966 nian)’, *Dangdai zhongguo shi yanjiu*, 9:2 (2002), 89–95; Zhang Saiqun, ‘Jianguo chuqi woguo qiaohui zhengce jiqi shijiao fenxi’, *Bagui qiaokan*, No. 3 (2012), 38–44; Qiu Liben, ‘Cong guoji qiaohui xindong xiangan woguo qiaohui zhengce’, *Huaqiao huaren lishi yanjiu*, No. 2 (2004), 8–20; Zhang Saiqun, ‘1950–1957 nian woguo huaqiao touzi zhengce fenxi’, *Huaqiao huaren lishi yanjiu*, No. 3 (2011), 32–40; Gao Yuanrong, Zhang Shuxin, ‘20 shiji wu liu shi niandai guojia guli huaqiao huigu touzi de zhengce’, *Zhonggong dangshi ziliao*, No. 4 (2008), 143–153.

¹⁶ See Li Jingxuan, Qian Bin, ‘Xin Zhongguo jiejue guiqiao he qiaojuan liangshi anquan wenti tanxi’, *Nanyang wenti yanjiu*, No. 4 (2010), 62–69; Xiao Jitang, ‘Xin Zhongguo chengli chuqi tudi gaige zhong huaqiao zhengce de zhiding’, *Zhonggong dangshi yanjiu*, No. 3 (2013), 33–43; Zhao Zengyan, ‘Jianguo chuqi qiaoxiang de tudi gaige’, *Zhonggong dangshi yanjiu*, No. 5 (1990), 66–72; Liao Jinlong, ‘Wushi niandai guiqiao zhongjian jiayuan zhong de qiaowu yu xiandai qishi — yi 1950–1959 nian Tong’an xian

Consider, as a paradigmatic study, what one of the ‘leading figures’ of Mainland Chinese historiography on *qiaowu* argues.¹⁷ Zhuang Guotu suggests that in 1949–1953, *qiaowu* was ‘designed to serve the overall aim of the party and government’, and ‘to restore the national economy, stabilize social life and complete a series of social reforms in the hometowns of overseas Chinese’; while in 1954–1958, it was ‘to mobilize the returned overseas Chinese and their dependents to take part in the socialist construction and revolution’.¹⁸ To Zhuang, there is no question—or critical analysis—about the bases of *qiaowu*, beyond that preferred by CCP-approved narratives. Therefore Zhuang accepts out of hand that the *youdai* approach was party-state benevolence towards the *huaqiao*, and neither examines its economic rationalisations, nor its contradictions with socialist transformation—let alone its tragic cost. This is a sanitised history, which despite vague references to the ideological radicalism of the 1960s that negatively impacted the *huaqiao*, makes no attempt to explain how or why the CCP’s radicalisation affected *qiaowu*. But how can Zhuang explain anything, when he fails to name Mao even once, or even write the words: ‘socialist high tide’, ‘Great Leap Forward’, ‘Anti-Rightism’, or ‘Eighth Party Congress’? Such white-washing, it seems, is what Yang Kuisong meant in his criticism of ‘Party history scholars today’, who are ‘sympathetic’ and ‘understanding’, but who ‘fail to ‘exhaust’ historical source materials or only pick those materials that fit their own point of view or personal values’.¹⁹ Zhuang’s refusal to hold the party-state to account is thus firmly within the mainstream of Mainland Chinese historiography on *qiaowu*, which is manifestly in need of the revision that this thesis effects.

qiaoban dang’an wei qieru dian’, *Bagui qiaokan*, No. 1 (2007), 50-56; Qiao Suling, ‘Liangnan de xuanze: jianguo chuqi de huaqiao hunyin zhengce’, *Huaqiao huaren lishi yanjiu*, No. 3 (2006), 35-41.

¹⁷ Zhuang Guotu is a ‘leading figure in Southeast Asian studies and studies of the Overseas Chinese and an academic authority of high repute’; he sits on the Experts Committee of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office. [http://ice.xmu.edu.cn/english/showletter.aspx?news_id=2478] Accessed 15/03/2016.

¹⁸ Zhuang Guotu, ‘The Policies of the Chinese Government towards Overseas Chinese (1949–1966)’, in Wang Ling-Chi, Wang Gungwu (eds), *The Chinese Diaspora: Selected Essays*, Vol. I (Singapore: Eastern Universities Press, 2003), 18-37 (20-25).

¹⁹ Yang Kuisong, Liu Wennan, ‘Studying the Chinese Communist Party in historical context: an interview with Yang Kuisong, October 17, 2015’, *Journal of Modern Chinese History*, 10:1 (2016), 67-86 (72).

Socialist Transformation:

The historiography of modern China has, in recent years, been marked by what Elizabeth Perry calls the ‘booming migration of historians across the 1949 divide’ of PRC history. Yet, though this has resulted in ‘valuable information and insights on grassroots society under Mao’, Perry argues that historiography on Maoist China is still limited by the ‘reticence on the part of the current generation of historians to advance overarching historical arguments about the enduring influence of that period’.²⁰ But then, given that modern historiography on the PRC has near-uniformly neglected to consider *qiaowu* alongside, or in relation to other analyses of New China, perhaps what is first required is an examination—and a better understanding—of the history of *qiaowu* in the early PRC, before any interpretation of its ‘enduring influence’ on the modern party-state can, or should be attempted. Hence this thesis.

The common neglect of *qiaowu* by histories of the Maoist-era PRC is a particularly curious historiographical omission, especially since, as this thesis shows, the history of the PRC’s *qiaowu* is closely connected to the foundation of the PRC itself. Indeed, most accounts of the united front and the New Democracy fail to address its underlying economic realism and rationalisations that underpinned the *huaqiao* place in it, and the implications for the new PRC’s *qiaowu*.²¹ Li Hua-yu has shown that Stalin pushed for Soviet orthodoxy and a transitional New Democracy in contrast to Mao’s desire for immediate one-party CCP rule, albeit with Mao’s subsequent compliance a trade-off to gain ‘a free hand in domestic economic affairs’.²² Stalin’s role is borne out by the archives, but they suggest also that Mao’s compliance was not merely a trade-off

²⁰ Elizabeth J. Perry, ‘The promise of PRC history’, *Journal of Modern Chinese History*, 10:1 (2016), 113-117 (113-114).

²¹ They see the united front either as a function of CCP ideology (i.e. Van Slyke), or Gramscian ‘position strategy’ (i.e. Groot), and limit discussion of the *huaqiao* to the Zhigong Party. See Lyman P. Van Slyke, *Enemies And Friends: The United Front in Chinese Communist History* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1967), 2-3, 209-218; Gerry Groot, *Managing Transitions: The Chinese Communist Party, United Front Work, Corporatism, and Hegemony* (London: Routledge, 2004), xviii-xix, 38-39.

²² Li Hua-yu, ‘The Political Stalimization of China: The Establishment of One-Party Constitutionalism, 1948-1954’, *Journal of Cold War Studies*, 3:2 (2001), 28-47 (31).

with Stalin, but actually economic pragmatism. As Zhang Shu Guang argues, the dire state of the economy was fundamental to the CCP's united front approach in 1949. Indeed, Zhang alone points to the *huaqiao* place in this pragmatism—albeit in passing.²³ This thesis thus adds to Zhang by showing how the CCP conceived the economic utility of the *huaqiao* (remittances), and made it the *raison d'être* of *qiaowu*.

If *qiaowu* was a function of economic realism, logic dictates that it should have been a priority for a party-state that was almost always in fiscal difficulties.²⁴ This further implies that *qiaowu* must be contextualised within the 'overwhelming task' for the party-state in the 1950s, to govern 'a country as huge, diverse, fragmented, and poverty-stricken as China', even while fulfilling socialism's preconditions.²⁵ And any 'historical political economy' of *qiaowu* should thus be analysed in relation to the party-state's early attempts at socialist transformation: or what Julia Strauss calls 'regime consolidation and the establishment of socialism' (pre-1956); and the later, leftward (Maoist) radicalisation of the party-state (post-1956).²⁶ Yet, most existent historiography has not done this.

Histories of the pre-1956 era of socialist transformation that neglect to consider *qiaowu* miss an important opportunity for analysis of party-state manoeuvring between ideological impetuses, political necessity, economic realism, and social reform—which were, in fact, encapsulated in the party-state's *qiaowu*, and especially in the *youdai* approach to policy. Frank Dikötter's *The Tragedy of Liberation* narrates 'calculated terror

²³ Zhang Shu Guang, *Economic Cold War: America's Embargo against China and the Sino-Soviet Alliance, 1949–1963* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001), 54-56.

²⁴ Philip Kuhn posits that fiscal needs have always been a central concern for the Chinese state throughout its history, yet while Kuhn says that Chinese history without *huaqiao* history is incomplete, he fails to see how the CCP used *qiaowu* as a fiscal solution. See Philip A. Kuhn, *Origins of the Modern Chinese State* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002), 2; Philip A. Kuhn, 'Why Historians Should Study the Chinese Diaspora, and Vice-versa', *Journal of Chinese Overseas*, 2:2 (2006), 163-172 (166).

²⁵ Jeremy Brown, Paul G. Pickowicz, 'The Early Years of the People's Republic of China: An Introduction', in Jeremy Brown, Paul G. Pickowicz (eds), *Dilemmas of Victory: The Early Years of the People's Republic of China* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007), 1-18 (2-3).

²⁶ Julia Strauss, 'Morality, Coercion and State Building by Campaign in the Early PRC: Regime Consolidation and After, 1949–1956', in Julia Strauss (ed.), *The History of the PRC (1949–1976): The China Quarterly Special Issues, New Series*, No. 7 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 37-58 (37); Frederick C. Teiwes, 'The establishment and consolidation of the new regime, 1949–57', in Roderick MacFarquhar (ed.), *The Politics of China: Sixty Years of the People's Republic of China* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 6-86.

and systematic violence', in the CCP's establishment of a new regime to advance its revolutionary agenda.²⁷ Yet, in this, Dikotter discusses the *huaqiao* only once—and *qiaowu* not at all—in a brief passage about the 1952 escalation of the Land Reform.²⁸ Thus Dikotter neglects both the *huaqiao* experience of the terror and violence, and the party-state's attempts to mitigate the negative impact of its own policies on the *huaqiao* through the *youdai*. By neglecting *qiaowu*, he also misses the failure of Party cadres to implement the *youdai*, and thus overlooks further proof, albeit from a different angle, that 'the history of communism in China is...a history of promises made and promises broken'.²⁹ To be sure, Dikotter is not unique in the historiographical neglect of *qiaowu*.³⁰ Thus this thesis, apart from being a history of *qiaowu*, also offers new insights into the internal consistency (or indeed, lack therein) of the party-state's political and economic imperatives—as made manifest in its approach to *qiaowu*.³¹

Similarly, the post-1956 historiography of socialist transformation—and of the party-state's leftward radicalisation—by neglecting *qiaowu*, and specifically the collapse of the *youdai* policies, misses the chance to engage with what Jadwiga Mooney and Fabio Lanza call, the 'multilayered complexities' of Cold War history, particularly 'by emphasizing the power [of] individual acts, personal decisions, or local-level actions

²⁷ Frank Dikotter, *The Tragedy of Liberation: A History of the Chinese Revolution, 1945–1957* (London: Bloomsbury, 2014), xi.

²⁸ Ibid., 80–81.

²⁹ Ibid., xiii.

³⁰ For an example of a neglect of *qiaowu* in an otherwise exemplary overview of PRC history, see Jonathan Spence, *The Search for Modern China* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1991).

An exception is Ezra Vogel, *Canton under Communism: Programs and Politics in a Provincial Capital, 1949–1968* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1969). Yet, even this text needs updating.

³¹ This has obvious resonance with: Robert Ash, 'Squeezing the Peasants: Grain Extraction, Food Consumption and Rural Living Standards in Mao's China', in Strauss (ed.), *The History of the PRC (1949–1976)*, 105–139; Robert Ash, 'The Peasant and the State', *The China Quarterly*, No. 127 (2009), 493–526; Li Hua-yu, *Mao and the Economic Stalinization of China, 1948–1953* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006); Li Huaiyin, 'The First Encounter: Peasant Resistance to State Control of Grain in East China in the Mid-1950s', *The China Quarterly*, No. 185 (2006), 145–162; Li Huaiyin, 'Confrontation and Conciliation under the Socialist State: Peasant Resistance to Agricultural Collectivisation in China in the 1950s', *Twentieth-Century China*, 33:2 (2008), 73–99; Thomas P. Bernstein, Li Hua-yu (eds), *China learns from the Soviet Union: 1949–Present* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2009); Edward Friedman, Paul G. Pickowicz, Mark Selden, *Chinese Village, Socialist State* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1991); Neil Diamant, *Revolutionizing the Family: Politics, Love and Divorce in Urban and Rural China, 1948–1968* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000).

acquired in the midst of superpower politics'.³² To analyse *qiaowu* (and its rise and fall) vis-à-vis the post-1956 leftward shift, is to see how the broader Cold War (especially de-Stalinisation) affected domestic Chinese politics, and created new pressures not just for Mao and the CCP, but also for the rational practice of *qiaowu* and its ideologically contradictory *youdai*. Indeed, to examine the Eighth Party Congress' (1956) preference for *youdai* (contra Mao's 'high tide') is to see also how internal conflict and factionalism in the CCP interacted with external developments (especially in Eastern Europe), with significant consequences for *qiaowu*. Even to analyse the impact of 'politics in command' on *qiaowu* into the GLF in 1958, is to see both the 'power' of Mao's resurgence, but also the localisation (and assimilation) of Maoist Thought and its transmogrification amongst Party cadres and the non-*huaqiao* masses.³³ Thus examining *qiaowu* enables a better understanding of the political, economic and ideological vicissitudes of New China's first decade, and how they interacted to foment the radicalisation of the PRC by the 1960s. This thesis therefore offers, in effect, a narrative of New China through a prism of *qiaowu*,

³² Jadwiga E. Pieper Mooney, Fabio Lanza, 'Introduction: de-centering Cold War history', in Jadwiga E. Pieper Mooney, Fabio Lanza (eds), *De-Centering Cold War History: Local and Global Change* (New York: Routledge, 2013), 1-12 (3).

For an example of the employment of individuals (intellectuals) and their stories, see Jonathan Spence, *The Gate of Heavenly Peace: The Chinese and their Revolution* (New York: Penguin Books, 1982).

³³ For the impact of the Cold War on Chinese politics: see Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 160-163; Shen Zhihua, Li Danhui, *After Leaning to One Side: China and its Allies in the Cold War* (Washington, DC and Stanford: Woodrow Wilson Center Press and Stanford University Press, 2011); Chen Jian, *Mao's China and the Cold War* (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 2001); Chen Jian, 'The Beginning of the End: 1956 as a Turning Point in Chinese and Cold War History', *Modern China Studies*, 22:1 (2015), 99-126; Zhu Dandan, *1956: Mao's China and the Hungarian Crisis* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2014); Zhu Dandan, 'The Hungarian Revolution and the Origins of China's Great Leap Policies, 1956-1957', *Cold War History*, 12:3 (2012), 451-472.

For domestic and internal CCP politics: see Frederick C. Teiwes and Warren Sun (eds), *The Politics of Agricultural Cooperativization in China: Mao, Deng Zihui, and the 'High Tide' of 1955* (New York: ME Sharpe, 1993); Frederick C. Teiwes, *Politics and Purges in China: Rectification and the Decline of Party Norms, 1950-1965* (London: Routledge, 2015); Liu Jianhui, Wang Hongxu, 'The Origins of the General Line for the Transition Period and of the Acceleration of the Chinese Socialist Transformation in Summer 1955', *The China Quarterly*, No. 187 (2006), 724-732.

For 'politics in command' and the GLF: see Frederick C. Teiwes, 'The Purge of Provincial Leaders, 1957-1958', *The China Quarterly*, No. 27 (2009), 14-32; Alfred L. Chan, *Mao's Crusade: Politics and Policy Implementation in China's Great Leap Forward* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); Dikötter, *Mao's Great Famine*; Zhou Xun (ed.), *The Great Famine in China, 1958-1962: A Documentary History* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012); Zhou Xun (ed.), *Forgotten Voices of Mao's Great Famine, 1958-1962: An Oral History* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2013); Yang Jisheng, *Tombstone: The Untold Story of Mao's Great Famine*, trans. Stacy Mosher and Guo Jian (London: Allen Lane, 2012).

and an analysis of how socialist transformation had radicalised China by 1960—thus contributing to deeper understandings of New China’s radicalisation by the end of its first decade, that would have such an ‘enduring influence’ well into the 1970s.

Western Historiography on Qiaowu:

Early Western views of *qiaowu* were unquestionably coloured by early Western Cold War orthodoxy, which in assuming ‘the anticapitalist agenda of the Stalinist state’, naturally lent itself to similar views of the new Soviet ally in 1949: the PRC.³⁴ Indeed, early writings suggested that the CCP might utilise the *huaqiao* to export revolution.³⁵ This view was fossilised by Lu Yu-sun’s *Programs of Communist China for Overseas Chinese* (1956), which alleged that: ‘The real Communist policy is to secure more money from Overseas Chinese and instigate them to oppose local authorities abroad.’ Thus the CCP’s *qiaowu* was a ‘double policy’ of pretence at ‘favoured treatment’ for *huaqiao* interests and *huaqiao* in China, so as to manipulate them into sending money home, even while pushing the *huaqiao* ‘to act as the vanguard of international Communism’.³⁶ There were variations, but by 1960, *qiaowu* was to most Western observers, a CCP plan to export revolution and to cheat the *huaqiao* of their money.³⁷

³⁴ See Odd Arne Westad, ‘The Cold War and the international history of the twentieth century’, in Melvyn P. Leffler, Odd Arne Westad (eds), *The Cambridge History of the Cold War, Vol. I: Origins* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 1-19 (3-8).

³⁵ Victor Purcell, ‘Overseas Chinese and the People’s Republic’, *Far Eastern Survey*, 19:18 (1950), 194-196 (195); Claude A. Buss, ‘Overseas Chinese and Communist Policy’, *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 277 (1951), 203-212 (210-212).

³⁶ Lu Yu-sun, *Programs of Communist China for Overseas Chinese* (Hong Kong: Union Research Institute, 1956), 14-15.

Lu’s views were shared by the U.S. Government. See United States Department of State, ‘The Overseas Chinese and U.S. Policy’, 06/09/1956, *Declassified Documents Reference System [DDRS]*, 1-16.

³⁷ The exception here was British discourse. The British Embassy in Beijing believed that the CCP was serious about preferential treatment for the *huaqiao*, suggesting that it would leave the *huaqiao* as ‘the only rentiers in China’. See ‘Memorandum on Overseas Chinese Communities in Kwangtung and Fukien’, 24/08/1956, Enclosure No. 2, ‘Peking to Foreign Office dispatch, No. 241’, National Archives of the United Kingdom (TNA), FCO 141/14510, 1-3 (2).

Similarly, Victor Purcell and other British scholars were very critical of American views of *qiaowu* that they saw as coloured by ‘virulent anti-Communist’ opinions, and thus lacking in nuance. See Royal Institute of International Affairs (RIIA), ‘The Chinese Overseas Discussion’, 29/07/1959, RIIA/8/2664.

For American Cold War views, see Robert Elegant, *The Dragon’s Seed: Peking and the Overseas Chinese* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1959); Chester Bowles, ‘The “China Problem” Reconsidered’, *Foreign Affairs*, 38:3 (1960), 476-486.

Yet, by the 1970s, the Cold War orthodoxy on *qiaowu* was already under attack. Stephen Fitzgerald's *China and the Overseas Chinese* (1972) was unprecedented for its Chinese sources, but also for its rejection of the idea that *qiaowu* exported revolution. Rather, Fitzgerald pointed to 'the peculiar importance of the domestic perspectives' in *qiaowu*, and how it connected to wider CCP policies.³⁸ But to Fitzgerald, *qiaowu* was still fundamentally about foreign policy ends. Even if *qiaowu* was 'situated in China and preoccupied with domestic affairs', it was 'ultimately concerned with external policies'.³⁹ Thus 'domestic Overseas Chinese policy veered from left to right to serve the implementation of external policy', including the end of the *youdai* approach by 1959.⁴⁰ This, Fitzgerald argues, came from a 'determination to detach the Chinese abroad from China'—in effect, 'decolonisation'.⁴¹ Thus *qiaowu* was actually about moves from 1954 on (around the Dual Nationality Treaty) to 'remove the impediments which Overseas Chinese presented to the advancement of its foreign policy interests in Southeast Asia', since the CCP judged 'colonial' connections to the *haiwai huqiao* to be of diminishing utility—if not a liability—and thus by 1957, *qiaowu* had a 'single overriding objective of detaching the Overseas Chinese from the Chinese homeland'.⁴²

Yet, in fixating on the question of the PRC's *qiaowu* as a function of external policy—either as a conduit to export the communist revolution, or as a foreign policy tool to effect 'decolonisation'—most extant Western historiography on *qiaowu* has missed the point: *qiaowu* in the 1950s was primarily about domestic policy.

This thesis will show that the Chinese party-state had little-to-no interest in using the *huqiao* to export revolution—in fact, it rejected such ideas in the 1950s. Moreover, if *qiaowu* was a political economy, then it is questionable that it would ever have sought

³⁸ Stephen Fitzgerald, *China and the Overseas Chinese: A study of Peking's changing policy, 1949–1970* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972), 13.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 15.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 52.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 73–74.

⁴² *Ibid.*, 116–117.

to spread revolution, since that would have been antithetical to its *raison d'être*: to secure and capitalise on *huaqiao* economic utility, most of all by increasing their remittances. Politicising the *haiwai huaqiao*—as *qiaowu* practitioners noted—would only antagonise the governments of *huaqiao* domiciles, and result in restrictions on *huaqiao* remittances to, or investments in China. In that respect, *qiaowu* was domestically-focused since it was meant, above all, to serve the party-state's economic interests.

Furthermore, this thesis' view of the centrality of economic rationalisations to *qiaowu* (at least until 1956–1957 or so) also creates a certain divergence from Fitzgerald. Fitzgerald was influential on a generation, and continues to exert influence today.⁴³ Yet, *China and the Overseas Chinese* is inaccurate. Indeed, this thesis' analysis of CCP CC and OCAC documents—that Fitzgerald was not able to use—shows that whereas the CCP was disinclined to involve itself with the *haiwai huaqiao*, this actually had no bearing on the meaning or methods of *qiaowu*. The incentivising of remittances required *qiaowu* to persuade the *huaqiao* (in and out of China) that their interests were fulfilled in New China. Hence, external-facing *qiaowu* (mainly propaganda) served to spread information on domestic policies, so as to bolster remittances. Those domestic policies were themselves the main focus, as *qiaowu* implemented a wide-ranging *youdai* approach to secure *huaqiao* interests, and even if it contradicted socialist transformation. So, not only was the *youdai* far more serious than 'double policy' implies, but it also demonstrates that the political economy of *qiaowu* had a domestic centre of gravity.

⁴³ Elena Barabantseva has embraced Fitzgerald's point that the 'administration of Overseas Chinese affairs is not unlike the administration of national minorities'. See Elena Barabantseva, *Overseas Chinese, Ethnic Minorities and Nationalism: De-centering China* (New York: Routledge, 2011).

Others who rely heavily on Fitzgerald include: Meredith Oyen, 'Communism, Containment and the Chinese Overseas', in Zheng Yangwen, Liu Hong, Michael Szonyi (eds), *The Cold War in Asia: The Battle for Hearts and Minds* (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 59–94; Meredith Oyen, *The Diplomacy of Migration: Transnational Lives and the Making of U.S.–Chinese Relations in the Cold War* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2015); James Jiann Hua To, *Qiaowu: Extra-Territorial Policies for the Overseas Chinese* (Leiden: Brill, 2014); Jason Lim, *Linking an Asian Transregional Commerce in Tea: Overseas Chinese Merchants in the Fujian–Singapore Trade, 1920–1960* (Leiden: Brill, 2010).

See also Stephen Fitzgerald, 'Overseas Chinese Affairs and the Cultural Revolution', *The China Quarterly*, No. 40 (1969), 103–126; Stephen Fitzgerald, 'China and the Overseas Chinese: Perceptions and Policies', *The China Quarterly*, No. 44 (1970), 1–37.

'Overseas Chinese in the People's Republic of China':

While most of Western historiography on *qiaowu* has subordinated its domestic aspects to a presumed external focus, Glen Peterson's *Overseas Chinese in the People's Republic of China* (2012) is an exception.⁴⁴ Peterson argues that 'the PRC's approach to the 'Overseas Chinese question' since 1949 has centred above all on an economic calculus: a conviction that Overseas Chinese have an important, strategic role to play in China's modernization'.⁴⁵ Thus resulting in 'a set of contradictory impulses toward the Overseas Chinese, including the domestic Overseas Chinese, by which they were by turns valued and despised for their economic assets and foreign connections'.⁴⁶ This thesis broadly agrees—but there are crucial differences.

Whereas Peterson is concerned with demonstrating the impact of *qiaowu* on the *huaqiao*, this thesis is mainly focused on policymakers and policy discourse. This results in rather different conclusions. Peterson, for instance, does not analyse the united front origins of *qiaowu*, or the interactions between the CCP CC, the OCAC, or the People's Bank of China (PBOC), in policymaking. To Peterson, 'the CCP's conflicting approaches towards the Overseas Chinese after 1949 were the product of several contending impulses', in which the OCAC and officials in major emigrant provinces like Guangdong and Fujian, were the chief advocates of 'an accommodating approach' to *qiaowu*, and in competition with 'those in the CCP who were the principal upholders of the doctrine of class struggle'.⁴⁷ Thus for Peterson, where the OCAC and its allies were able to hold their ground, then the *huaqiao* were spared the worst of class struggle, until the ascendancy of a more ideologically-driven CCP faction ended the *youdai*. This thesis disagrees.

⁴⁴ See also Glen Peterson, 'Socialist China and the Huaqiao: The Transition to Socialism in the Overseas Chinese Areas of Rural Guangdong, 1949–1956', *Modern China*, 14:3 (1988), 309–335; Glen Peterson, 'House Divided: Transnational Families in the Early Years of the People's Republic of China', *Asian Studies Review*, 31:1 (2007), 25–40; Glen Peterson, 'Overseas Chinese Studies in the People's Republic of China', *Provincial China*, 7:1 (2002), 103–21.

⁴⁵ Peterson, *Overseas Chinese in the People's Republic of China*, 7.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 8.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 23.

The competition that the *qiaowu* practitioners confronted in the 1950s was not so much with ideological factions in the CCP leadership, but with its local membership. For most of the 1950s, the highest-echelons of the Chinese party-state approved of prioritising economic imperatives in *qiaowu*. Yet, the conflict between *qiaowu* and the ‘ideological approach’ was mostly at a lower level, because of local cadres and officials who could not accept, or understand *youdai* policies. It was not, therefore, that *qiaowu* competed with more-ideological factions within the CCP; it was rather that the CCP attempted to practice *qiaowu* (and *youdai*) in contradiction to its own ideological impetuses.⁴⁸ It was thus not that the CCP had ‘conflicting approaches’ to its *qiaowu*, as much as the party-state’s *qiaowu* was in contradiction to its own quest for socialist transformation.

Peterson rightly points to the ‘economic calculus’ intrinsic to *qiaowu*, but this thesis shows how that economic imperative affected, and was affected by the politics of the party-state.⁴⁹ This neglect on Peterson’s part is most prominent in his silence on the OCAC Fourth Expanded Conference and the Eighth Party Congress in 1956, which brought the contradictions between *qiaowu* and socialist transformation to a head, and led to the end of the *youdai* approach. In contrast, this thesis’ analysis of the two conferences shows how the politics of the party-state affected *qiaowu*. Thus, and beyond Peterson’s ‘economic calculus’, this thesis demonstrates the political economy of *qiaowu*.

Structure and Scope:

Insofar as this thesis is the story of the ‘historical political economy’ of *qiaowu*, it also exists within the larger context of Maoist China and its ‘ideological, political,

⁴⁸ For instance, Peterson suggests that Deng Zihui’s inflammatory speech in December 1950 was ‘a victory for more ideologically motivated members of the Party against those who had advocated a more peaceful and lenient approach towards land reform’. Yet, while the Land Reform’s escalation created difficulties for the *huqiao*, this was not because the hardliners had won, or the OCAC would not have been able to order rectification, with CCP CC approval. The violations were because—as Liao Chengzhi pointed out—local cadres had failed to implement *qiaowu*. As Chapter 4 shows, even Deng favoured the *youdai* policies. See Peterson, *Overseas Chinese in the People’s Republic of China*, 48-49.

⁴⁹ Charles Maier calls political economy: ‘economics in a context of politics, where the economics is less than the politics but the ‘less’ cannot be separated from the political’. See Maier, *In search of stability*, 2.

economic, and social elements'.⁵⁰ This thesis thus offers an 'inside' analysis of *qiaowu*, within a narrative framed by the 'outside' of the early PRC.⁵¹

The opening backdrop to this thesis rests in the combination of the heady CCP rhetoric heralding New China's advent, its call for a united front and New Democracy, and the *huaqiao* response to this long-anticipated fulfilment of their 'rights and interests'. Against that backdrop, the first chapter (covering 1949–1950) shows the reality of Soviet orthodoxy and CCP economic realism combining to motivate the creation of the New Democracy. This was the basis for the *huaqiao*'s inclusion in the united front, and the *qiaowu* (policy and institutions) that was created to govern their affairs.

Following *qiaowu*'s origin story, the second chapter (1950–1953) situates the nascent *qiaowu* policymaking in the context of the PRC's coming to terms with external pressures, domestic volatility, and the internal logic of its revolution. Indeed, *qiaowu* practitioners were confronted by the negative impacts of socialist transformations (mainly the Land Reform), and foreign pressures (consequent to the Korean War), specifically for *huaqiao* remittance flows. Yet, this coalescence of pressures was also key for recognising the transnationality of interests underpinning remittances, with the domestic interests of *huaqiao* (embodied by those in China) as the crux. It was from this that *qiaowu* thus rationalised the convergence between the 'favourable treatment' of *huaqiao* interests, and the financial utility of this *youdai* approach to the party-state.

Yet, as the third chapter (1953–1955) shows, while *qiaowu* practitioners justified the positive discrimination in the *youdai* policies by a discourse of supposed *huaqiao* 'specialness' (in characteristics and circumstances), there was a contradiction. For the

⁵⁰ Franz Schurmann describes 'the decision complex' in Maoist China as being 'something in the nature of a *gestalt*, in which ideological, political, economic, and social elements are woven together'. See Franz Schurmann, 'Economic Policy and Political Power in Communist China', *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 349 (1963), 49–69 (50).

⁵¹ R.G. Collingwood reminds historians to seek 'the unity of the outside and inside of an event'. See Robin G. Collingwood, *The Idea of History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 213.

Philip Kuhn also argues that 'neither Chinese history lacking emigration nor emigration lacking the history of China is a self-sufficient field of study'. See Philip A. Kuhn, *Chinese Among Others: Emigration in Modern Times* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2008), 5.

party-state, the *youdai*'s strategic imperative meant accepting its ideological aberrations. Yet, this did not always mean effective implementation at the local level, nor was *youdai* always well-received, even within the Party. Earlier socialist transformation (i.e. Land Reform) had near-uniformly negatively affected *huaqiao* in China; local Party cadres and officials had failed to rectify 'left deviationist' excesses, or implement *youdai* provisions; and the CCP's General Line (1952) for agrarian collectivisation, private industry and commerce, had created new complications for *qiaowu* at home and abroad. Yet, *qiaowu* practitioners—with approval of the party-state leadership—responded by doubling down: on propaganda, on rectification, and above all, on *youdai*. Hence the party-state's high-profile interventions in 1955 to entrench the *youdai* policies.

Ironically, as the fourth chapter (1956–1957) reveals, despite the party-state's attempts, it was unable to reconcile *qiaowu* (and the *youdai*) with socialist transformation. Indeed, policies that seemed to create bourgeois—or at least, non-socialist—exemptions for the *huaqiao* were made even more contradictory to socialism by Mao's 'socialist high tide' and its drive to intensify and accelerate socialist transformation. This caused *qiaowu* serious problems, especially as lower-level cadres—and many non-*huaqiao*—resisted the *youdai* policies, not least because they appeared antithetical to the 'high tide'. Yet, *qiaowu* persisted with the *youdai* approach, and it was encouraged in this by the party-state's turn away from the 'high tide' in 1956. The *youdai* approach had been based on an economic rationalisation that such privileging was the means of securing *huaqiao* economic utility, and this rationality combined with a growing sense amongst party-state leaders that Mao's 'high tide' was an irrational path to calamity. Thus, the 'high tide' and its negative impact was openly rejected at the Fourth OCAC Expanded Conference and the Eighth Party Congress in 1956. Yet, this turn was illusory. Thereafter, in the ensuing upheaval of 1957, as Mao leveraged crises abroad (in Hungary) and at home (post-Hundred Flowers) to re-

assert his authority, *qiaowu*'s anti-'high tide' link became a liability in the new Anti-Rightist mood, and *qiaowu* was forced to repudiate the *youdai* approach.

The last chapter (1958–1959) shows the radical change in *qiaowu* after Mao's heralding of 'politics in command' returned the party-state to the older 'high-tide' vision, especially in economic policy, and to an ideological (Maoist) basis for all policymaking. Previous ideas of convergence between *huaqiao* and party-state interests were abandoned, and *huaqiao* 'specialness' and *youdai* were now deemed Rightist, while the pressures created by the GLF for even more hard currency led *qiaowu* to coercive and exploitative methods. This was unwise at best; but with the GLF turn towards large-scale, accelerated collectivisation and economic gigantism, this new variant of *qiaowu* was self-destructive, and there was a drastic fall in remittances by 1959. Yet, while the party-state and *qiaowu* practitioners flirted with reform and a return to *youdai*, the Lushan Conference led to a renewed Anti-Rightist backlash instead, and this quickly resulted in the abandonment of reformist ideas. Even if *qiaowu* was now counterproductive, the party-state was set on Mao's utopianism—and so the *huaqiao* suffered.⁵²

Sources:

Archival research in the PRC is unquestionably difficult, not least because of the modern party-state's restrictive policies. Far from the optimism of the 1990s for a 'new era' of research, recent reports 'paint a grim picture of doing archival research in China'.⁵³ Moreover, this thesis also faces specific limitations given that the OCAC (but also the PBOC and United Front Work Department) archives are hidden in the Central Archives;

⁵² 'While utopian themes were present in Mao's thought as early as 1919, his utopianism took sharp form in the Great Leap Forward of 1958.' See Catherine Lynch, 'Radical Visions of Time in Modern China: The Utopianism of Mao Zedong and Liang Shuming', in Catherine Lynch, Robert B. Marks, Paul G. Pickowicz (eds), *Radicalism, Revolution and Reform in Modern China: Essays in Honor of Maurice Meisner* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2011), 29–54 (29).

⁵³ Michael H. Hunt, Odd Arne Westad, 'The Chinese Communist Party and International Affairs: A Field Report on New Historical Sources and Old Research Problems', *The China Quarterly*, No. 122 (1990), 258–272 (258); Charles Kraus, 'Researching the History of the People's Republic of China', *CWIHP* Working Paper No. 79 (April 2016), 2.

that all documents touched by Mao, Zhou, and other Party leaders from the 1950s are off-limits; and that archival destruction perpetrated during the Cultural Revolution has left a legacy of large gaps in the pre-1960 archives that still exist.⁵⁴

Yet, this does not mean that archival research is impossible. Following Lu Xun's advice to pursue knowledge 'like bees—gathering nectar from many flowers', this thesis embraces archival pluralism.⁵⁵ Firstly, and following many illustrious forebears, this thesis looks to provincial archives.⁵⁶ This method is optimal since the party-state's propensity for paperwork has created immense collections of directives, memoranda and other documents, in provincial (or municipal) archives. This thesis mainly uses material from the Fujian Provincial Archive, the Shanghai and Beijing Municipal Archives, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Given Fujian's historic place as a *huaqiao* home province, its provincial Party and government officials were always going to have a keen interest in *qiaowu*. Thus by combing the archives of the Fujian Party and civil administrations—especially their *qiaowu* departments—documents from the OCAC and other central government bodies on *qiaowu* can be utilised. The same logic applies also to archives from the Shanghai and Beijing authorities; the importance of these two cities ensured that their *qiaowu* offices were always copied in on *qiaowu* directives and documents from the party-state centre. The relative utility of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' archive has been seriously compromised in recent years by the pull-back of archival material, and now by its indefinite closure. Yet, even the limited files that this thesis was able to use offer useful insights into the party-state's approach to *qiaowu*.

Secondly, this thesis actively utilises the published volumes of primary sources on PRC history. These collections (mainly in Chinese) are official (or officially-

⁵⁴ Cultural Revolution-era destruction was the reason proffered by the Library of the All-China Federation of Returned Overseas Chinese for why its archival holdings are slanted towards post-1970 material.

⁵⁵ Lu Xun, 'Zhi Yan Limin', *Lu Xun shuxin ji*, Vols. 1-2 (Beijing: Renmin wenxue chubanshe, 1976), 2: 982-983.

⁵⁶ For an exemplar of this method of triangulation, see Shen Zhihua, Xia Yafeng, *Mao and the Sino-Soviet Partnership, 1945–1949: A New History* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2015), ix.

approved) anthologies by institutions like the Central Archives, or the CCP CC's Party Literature Research Office, which quite obviously privilege certain narratives, or censor (possibly) sensitive documents. Certainly, there is an 'interested selectivity' involved in the official anthologies, but they are still inherently useful—not least because these publications are often the only available source of archives from within the CCP CC or State Council.⁵⁷ Furthermore, historians should already, in any case, be treating these archives with the 'indispensable qualities of accuracy and good faith'—just as they would any other primary source.⁵⁸ To simply reject them out of hand would thus be a waste of potentially valuable evidence. This thesis also employs a sizeable amount of 'internal-circulation' publications—that were originally meant for intelligence and information dissemination to CCP cadres—to inform its analysis. This is especially true of the *Guangdong Qiaowu* [广东侨务] confidential journal series that was disseminated to cadres in Guangdong. Guangdong was the largest *huaqiao* home province, and this series is thus a useful source of documents from the OCAC and the party-state centre, and also provides vital evidence on how *qiaowu* policies that were drawn up at the centre were interpreted and applied (or indeed, not) at the provincial and local levels.

Finally, this thesis utilises archives from 'interested observers' of *qiaowu*. In some cases, this means material from individuals, like the compiled works of OCAC members (i.e. Liao Chengzhi and Fang Fang), or *huaqiao* in China in the public sphere (i.e. Tan Kah Kee). This approach also uses material from those outside China, who had an active interest in *qiaowu*. This includes the British colonial internal security apparatuses (i.e. in the National Archives of Singapore and the United Kingdom), which had a clear interest in *qiaowu* given the large *huaqiao* population in Singapore and Malaya.

⁵⁷ See for instance CCP CC Party Literature Research Office, Central Archives (CA) (eds), *Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian xuanji* [ZZWX], Vols. 1-50 (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 2013).

⁵⁸ George Macaulay Trevelyan, *Clio, A Muse: And other essays, Literary and Pedestrian* (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1913), 50.

Prologue: Fait Accompli?

Over the violent course of January–March 1948, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) turned the Chinese Civil War on its head. By the end of its Winter Offensive, the PLA had crushed the GMD in Manchuria, and was now poised to march southwards—and on to Beijing.⁵⁹ Now in the ascendancy, the CCP CC’s slogans for May Day 1948 triumphantly called on the masses and the ‘intellectuals, liberal bourgeoisie, other democratic parties, community leaders, and other patriots to consolidate and expand the united front against imperialism, feudalism, bureaucrat-capitalism, so as to bring an end to Chiang Kai-shek and to come together to strive to establish a New China’.⁶⁰ Indeed, as the CCP CC declared, it was time for this united front to convene a new Political Consultative Conference (PCC), and establish a democratic coalition government.

The first to respond were a group of *huaqiao* gathered in the ‘General Meeting of Singapore Overseas Chinese Denying Chiang Kai-shek as President of the Republic of China’.⁶¹ And yet, the slogans had not actually specified the *huaqiao*. But this group (led by Tan Kah Kee) clearly took the inclusion of the *huaqiao* in the ‘democratic coalition’ as an accomplished fact, since their reply to the CCP CC indicated enthusiasm for a new PCC and its future protection of *huaqiao* interests’.⁶² Such sentiments were hardly

⁵⁹ Odd Arne Westad, *Decisive Encounters: The Chinese Civil War, 1946–1950* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), 172–178.

⁶⁰ CCP CC, ‘Zhonggong zhongyang fabu jinnian ‘wuyi’ laodong jie kouhao’, 30/04/1948, in CPPCC National Committee (ed.), *Kaiguo shengdian: Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo dansheng zhongyao wenxian ziliao huibian*, Vols. I-II (Beijing: Zhongguo wenshi chubanshe, 2009), I: 9-11 (9).

⁶¹ Chui Kwei-chiang, *The Response of the Malayan Chinese to Political and Military Developments in China, 1945–1949*, Research Project Series No. 4 (Singapore: Institute of Humanities and Social Sciences, College of Graduate Studies, Nanyang University, 1977), 50.

⁶² ‘Xinjiapo huaqiao xiangying zhonggong ‘wuyi’ haozhao zhi Mao Zedong dian’, 04/05/1948, *Kaiguo shengdian*, I: 48.

Yen Ching-hwang notes: ‘Tan Kah Kee was one of the best known Overseas Chinese entrepreneurs in Southeast Asia and China in the 1920s, and has become a legend in Overseas Chinese history. Centred in Singapore and Malaya, his business empire extended to many parts of Southeast Asia and south China. A top Overseas Chinese capitalist, a Chinese patriot and a well-known Chinese educationist and philanthropist, he left his mark in modern Chinese history’. Tan also led the Nanyang Federation of China Relief Funds to raise over C\$400 million for the ‘War of Resistance Against Japan’—Mao himself called Tan the ‘banner of the Overseas Chinese, [and] the nation’s glory’ [华侨旗帜, 民族光辉]. See Yen Ching-hwang, *The Ethnic Chinese in East and Southeast Asia: Business, Culture and Politics* (Singapore: Times Media Private Limited, 2002), 124; ‘Preface’, in A.H.C. Ward, Raymond W. Chu, Janet Salaff (eds), *The Memoirs of Tan Kah Kee* (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1994), ix.

unique; the *huaqiao* in Malaya, Siam, Canada and even Cuba, followed suit, and CCP Chairman Mao Zedong confirmed their validity in a telegram to Tan on 1 October, stating that the CCP would take care to seek the *huaqiao*'s views on China's future.⁶³

Of course, a *huaqiao* place in China's political firmament was not, in itself, particularly groundbreaking.⁶⁴ Sun Yat-sen's *Tongmenghui* had enjoyed great support amongst Nanyang (Southeast Asia) *huaqiao*—in financing and direct participation—and Sun had called them 'the Mother of the revolution' [华侨为革命之母].⁶⁵ Thereafter, the Republic of China's National Assembly (1912) had reserved six (out of 274) seats for *huaqiao* delegates, and Chiang Kai-shek's Nanjing government had made *qiaowu* a state priority for a new, cabinet-level Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission in 1927.⁶⁶ Yet, it was the Second Sino-Japanese War that established the *huaqiao* in Chinese politics through the crucible of the united front. The united front was Marxist-Leninist (and Comintern) orthodoxy, and its earliest Chinese incarnation was the First United Front between the CCP and Guomindang (GMD) in 1922–1927.⁶⁷ But the *huaqiao* place in a united front *per se* actually dated back to the 'August First manifesto' of the so-called Chinese Soviet Republic in 1935, which had called for 'a broad anti-Japanese united front'—by 'all compatriots who refuse to become a conquered people'.⁶⁸

⁶³ Mao Zedong, 'Mao Zedong guanyu ganxie qiaobao xiangying 'wuyi' kouhao he zhengxun dui zhaokai xin zhengxie de yijian fu Chen Jiageng dian', 01/10/1948, in United Front Work Department (UFWD), CA (eds), *Zhonggong zhongyang jiefang zhanzheng shiqi tongyi zhanxian wenjian xuanbian* [hereafter, ZZJJZ] (Beijing: Dang'an chubanshe, 1988), 209-10.

⁶⁴ See Pransenjit Duara, 'Transnationalism and the Predicament of Sovereignty: China, 1900-1945', *The American Historical Review*, 102:4 (1997), 1030-1051; Yong Ching Fatt, 'A Preliminary Study of Chinese Leadership in Singapore, 1900-1941', *Journal of Southeast Asian History*, 9:2 (1968), 258-285.

⁶⁵ 28 of the '72 martyrs of Huanghuagang' (in April 1911) were *huaqiao*. See Liao Chengzhi, 'Quan shijie qiaobao tuanjie qilai fandui Jiang Jieshi ducai maiguo', 15/10/1946, *DHGLR*, 158-160 (160).

⁶⁶ Lien Pei-te, Dean P. Chen, 'The evolution of Taiwan's policies toward the political participation of citizens abroad in homeland governance', in Tan Chee-Beng (ed.), *Routledge Handbook of the Chinese Diaspora* (New York: Routledge, 2013), 42-58 (48).

⁶⁷ Bruce A. Elleman, 'Soviet Diplomacy and the First United Front in China', *Modern China*, 21:4 (1995), 450-480; Lyman P. Van Slyke, 'The United Front in China', *Journal of Contemporary History*, 5:3 (1970), 119-135.

⁶⁸ CCP CC, Chinese Soviet Republic, 'Wei kangri jiuguo gao quanti tongbao shu', 01/08/1935 in UFWD, CA (eds), *Zhonggong zhongyang kangri minzu tongyi zhanxian wenjian xuanbian* [hereafter, ZZKM], Vols. I-III (Beijing: Dang'an chubanshe, 1985), II: 12-18; John W. Garver, 'The origins of the Second United Front: The Comintern and the Chinese Communist Party', *The China Quarterly*, No. 113 (1998), 29-59 (31).

The ‘August First manifesto’ was the basis for the Second CCP-GMD United Front, and it allowed the CCP to publicly push itself to the front of the patriotic struggle.⁶⁹ But this also meant that the proposals for a *huaqiao* place in national politics were pushed into the mainstream, in the CCP’s calls for a ‘national defence government’ based on a ‘delegate body truly representative of all our countrymen’ across a spectrum of political parties, public figures, popular organisations—and the *huaqiao*.⁷⁰ This ‘national defence government’ was for ‘the salvation of the country’, but it was also to seek: ‘freedom and democracy and the release of all political prisoners’; ‘free education and the settlement of unemployed youth’; and ‘the protection within and without of China of *qiaobao* lives, property, and their freedom of residence and to conduct business’.⁷¹

The CCP’s nod to a *huaqiao* political role, and the necessity of *qiaowu* was not new; it was the nature of their proposed involvement that was different. Nanjing—like the late Qing—had engaged with the *huaqiao* on the basis of a relationship between the state and its overseas nationals (which, given the *jus sanguinis* of the Qing (1909) and GMD (1929) Nationality Laws, had meant all Chinese abroad), where their loyalty (and by extension, their contribution) was demanded in exchange for the protection of their rights and interests.⁷² Yet, the CCP had apparently included the *huaqiao* in the united front because it was their democratic right, in their patriotic interest, and because it was the basic duty of any Chinese government. This was thus the stated position that the CCP held onto, even as the Second World War (WWII) came to an end.

⁶⁹ Thomas Kampen, *Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai and the evolution of the Chinese Communist leadership* (Copenhagen: Nordic Institute of Asian Studies, 2000), 82-83.

⁷⁰ Mao Zedong, ‘The Tasks of the Chinese Communist Party in the period of resistance to Japan’, 03/05/1937, in Committee for the Publication of the Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung (eds), *The Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung* [hereafter *Selected Works*], Vols. I-V (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1960-77), I: 263-284 (276).

⁷¹ The term *qiaobao* [侨胞] is short for *huaqiao tongbao* [华侨同胞 *huaqiao* compatriot]. See CCP CC, Chinese Soviet Republic, ‘Wei kangri jiuguo gao quanti tongbao shu’, 01/08/1935, ZZKM, II: 17.

⁷² See Wang Gungwu, ‘Greater China and the Chinese Overseas’, *The China Quarterly*, No. 136 (1993), 926-948; Ong Soon Keong, ““Chinese, but Not Quite”: *Huaqiao* and the Marginalisation of the Overseas Chinese”, *Journal of Chinese Overseas*, 9:1 (2013), 1-32; Leo Douw, ‘The Chinese Sojourner Discourse’, in Leo Douw, Cen Huang, Michael R. Godley (eds), *Qiaoxiang Ties: Interdisciplinary Approaches to ‘Cultural Capitalism’ in South China* (Leiden: International Institute for Asian Studies, 1999), 22-44.

At the CCP's Seventh Party Congress in April 1945, Mao provocatively declared that there were two prospects for post-war China: either (a) New China, 'which is independent, free, democratic, united, prosperous and strong', or 'the old China' run by the Nanjing regime that was 'semi-colonial, semi-feudal, divided, poor and weak'.⁷³ Such antagonistic rhetoric could not have been surprising, given the gradual deterioration of CCP-GMD relations over the war. Indeed, in Mao's view, the 'one and only task' was 'to mobilise the masses, expand the people's forces and unite all the forces of the nation capable of being united in order to struggle under our Party's leadership to defeat the Japanese aggressors and build a new China'.⁷⁴ Thus the CCP abandoned the 'united front from above', and elevated the 'united front from below' to seek a New China.⁷⁵

The CCP proposed a 'national assembly on a broad democratic basis' as the basis for a coalition government, with representatives from across the political spectrum.⁷⁶ The CCP, of course, sought a socialist revolution, but it also sought to continue the united front. In the first statement of a 'common program', Mao stated that while China should not suffer under feudal and fascistic 'big landlords and big bourgeoisie', and could not continue with 'the old type of democratic dictatorship' of the national-bourgeoisie given the 'awakened' political consciousness of the masses (led by the CCP), it also could not 'institute a socialist state system' without meeting its pre-conditions. Instead, China had to establish the New Democracy first, or: 'a united front democratic alliance based on the overwhelming majority of the people, under the leadership of the working class'.⁷⁷

The New Democracy was thus presented as a continuation of the united front, to create a democratic coalition to lay the foundations for socialism.⁷⁸ In this iteration of the

⁷³ Mao Zedong, 'China's Two Possible Destinies in Chinese Society', 23/04/1945, *Selected Works*, III: 251-254 (252).

⁷⁴ Ibid., III: 252.

⁷⁵ The 'united front from above' was the old CCP-GMD united front; the 'united front from below' referred to 'the efforts to gain and hold mass popular support'. See Van Slyke, 'The United Front in China', 120.

⁷⁶ Mao Zedong, 'On Coalition Government', 24/04/1945, *Selected Works*, III: 255-320 (255).

⁷⁷ Ibid., III: 279.

⁷⁸ In reality, as Arne Westad suggests, 'the Comintern archives show that nearly all of Mao's concepts from the anti-Japanese war period—'protracted war', 'new democracy', 'three-thirds system', 'anti-leftism'—

united front, the *huaqiao* place was not only continued, but made even more legitimate.⁷⁹ After all, they had earned their seat at the table because they had, as Mao said, made huge sacrifices for the anti-Japanese united front.⁸⁰ This entitled them to a role in the New Democracy, and to a benevolent *qiaowu*. Thus in 1946, CCP delegates to the short-lived GMD-convened PCC—which was an attempt to avoid civil war—proposed that any new government ‘actively and positively seek to protect *huaqiao* interests, to alleviate *huaqiao* suffering’.⁸¹ Indeed, for all the failures of the otherwise-hapless PCC, it still managed to pass a resolution on 11 March that enshrined ‘the improvement of the status of *qiaobao*’ as a state priority, and a *qiaowu* program to aid *huaqiao* interests, to assist *qiaojuan* in difficulty, to help *guiqiao* return to their hometowns and to positive employment, and to assist *qiaosheng* [侨生 *huaqiao* students].⁸² The PCC did not succeed—civil war broke out in July 1946. But a precedent had now been set by the CCP.

With the onset of Civil War, the united front continued to be the focus of the quest to establish the New Democracy, and the means by which the CCP sought to unite the masses against the GMD. Liao Chengzhi, as Xinhua News Agency head, broadcast a call-to-arms to the *huaqiao* from Yan'an in October 1946. Harkening to the history of *huaqiao* dedication to national salvation and their illustrious revolutionary heritage—which had paved the foundations of the Republic with their blood—Liao exhorted the *huaqiao* to join the CCP against the GMD, who had oppressed the people, and shamefully colluded with American imperialism.⁸³ Thus the *huaqiao* were called to a new united front for national salvation, to bring about the New Democracy and New China.

were inspired and sanctioned by Moscow’. See Odd Arne Westad, ‘Introduction’, in Odd Arne Westad (ed.), *Brothers in Arms: The Rise and Fall of the Sino-Soviet Alliance, 1945–1963* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), 1-46 (6).

⁷⁹ Mao actually said: ‘海外华侨输财助战’. See Mao Zedong, ‘Zai dang de qida shang de zhengzhi baogao’, 24/04/1945, *DHGLR*, 2.

⁸⁰ Zhou Enlai, Dong Biwu, Wang Ruofei, Ye Jianying, Wu Yuzhang, Lu Dingyi, Deng Yingchao, ‘Heping jianguo gangling cao’an’, 16/01/1946, *ZZJZ*, 44-49 (49).

⁸¹ ‘Zhengzhi xieshang huiyi wuxiang xieyi’, 11/03/1946, *ZZJZ*, 60-65 (65).

⁸² Liao Chengzhi, ‘Quan shijie qiaobao tuanjie qilai fandui Jiang Jieshi ducai maiguo’, 15/10/1946, *DHGLR*, 158-160.

By the time of the ‘May Day slogans’ in 1948, both the message of a broad national united front (against the GMD and for the New Democracy), and of a legitimate *huaqiao* place in the democratic coalition, were regular features in CCP discourse.⁸³ After all, as Mao said in January 1948, it was ‘not merely some of the people’ who should govern, but it was for the workers, peasants, craftsmen, petite bourgeoisie, youth, intellectuals, minority nationalities, *huaqiao*—and many others—to govern New China, ‘united together under the leadership of the working class (through the Communist Party)’.⁸⁴ Thus, by May 1948, the *huaqiao* who responded positively to the CCP had good reasons to anticipate their place in the New Democracy, and to expect that New China’s *qiaowu* would cater to their rights and interests.

⁸³ Mao Zedong, ‘The Chiang Kai-shek government is besieged by the whole people’, 30/05/1947, *Selected Works*, IV: 135-140; ‘Manifesto of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army’, 10/1947, *Selected Works*, IV: 147-154.

⁸⁴ Mao Zedong, ‘On some important problems of the Party’s present policy’, 18/01/1948, *Selected Works*, IV: 181-190 (182-83).

Chapter 1.

Rights and Interests

Let me call again to the *huaqiao* overseas,
Compatriots to the distant ends of the earth!
Only because of the need to feed yourself,
Did you leave home to wander the seas...

— Zhang Binglin, *Song of Revolution* (1903)¹

¹ This translation is from Ernest Koh, *Diaspora at War: The Chinese of Singapore between Empire and Nation, 1937–1945* (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 52-53.

Introduction:

At the turn of 1948, and with the PLA's advance on Tianjin and Beijing, the civil war's end seemed imminent.² Chairman Mao certainly thought so; his New Year's (1949) message declared that: 'The Chinese people will win final victory in the great war of Liberation. Even our enemy no longer doubts the outcome.'³ For Mao, the impending victory entailed: the further advance of the PLA south of the Yangzi; the 'regularization' of the PLA to discard 'guerrilla habits'; agricultural and industrial production increases; and convening a new PCC to fulfil 'the tasks of the people's revolution'. Thus 1949 would see China emerge from civil war into 'New Democracy', and with a new PCC to midwife the birth of a New China. The new PRC, Mao said, would be governed by 'a democratic coalition government' led by the CCP, but with 'the participation of appropriate persons' from democratic parties, people's organisations, and all other segments of society (except the reactionaries), including, of course, the *huaqiao*.⁴

At the time of the PRC's birth, there were an estimated 10 million *haiwai huaqiao*, and 30 million *qiaojuan*. Thus, about 8% of China's population (around 500 million) possessed *huaqiao* identities (in one form or another).⁵ In some sense, this statistical significance was sufficient to make the *huaqiao* 'appropriate persons' for the PCC. Yet, the *huaqiao* place in the New Democracy had never been presented as such. The CCP had, over the years, professed a desire to both protect *huaqiao* rights and interests, and to enable them to participate directly and legitimately in New China's political future. Thus, Mao's vision of the advent of a democratic coalition in 1949 spoke directly to *huaqiao*

² For more on the 'three major military campaigns of 1948–49' (Liao-Shen, Huai-Hai and Beijing-Tianjin) that 're-created the political map of China', see Westad, *Decisive Encounters*, 227.

³ Mao Zedong, 'Carry the Revolution through to the End', 30/12/1948, *Selected Works*, IV: 299–307 (299).

⁴ *Ibid.*, IV: 305–306.

⁵ Since there was no national census until 1953, these are PBOC estimates. See Nan Hanchen, 'Guanyu qiaohui wenti de baogao', 18/08/1950, in CASS, CA (eds), *1949–1952 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo jingji dang'an ziliao xuanbian: jinrong juan* [hereafter, *1949–1952 jinrong juan*] (Beijing: Zhongguo wuzi chubanshe, 1996), 809–810.

The 1953 census suggested a population of around 590 million, with an estimated 7.6 million on Taiwan, and 11.74 million *haiwai huaqiao*. See George B. Cressey, 'The 1953 Census of China', *The Far Eastern Quarterly*, 14:3 (1955), 387–388.

expectations for democracy—and a legacy of CCP promises to ensure that hope. Yet, for Mao and the CCP, their rhetoric did not match the reality of their perspectives on, and motivations for the New Democracy. The *huaqiao*, it seems, were misled.

This chapter begins by showing how Mao and the CCP set out to convince the *huaqiao* of their place in the united front and the New Democracy in 1949, particularly in terms of courting a direct *huaqiao* involvement with the new PCC as legitimate constituents. Yet, as this chapter argues, the CCP's public position on the united front was disingenuous; Mao preferred to accelerate the revolutionary process, and outright CCP political domination. As it turned out, the CCP eventually kept its promise for a coalition government, but only the semblance of one. This was a compromise; partly due to Soviet influence, but mainly because economic rationalisations by Mao and the CCP leadership saw the united front as a necessity. Thus the united front was the result of economic *realpolitik*, and the *huaqiao* place in the New Democracy was a function of that rationalisation, not least due to the utility of *huaqiao* remittances. Given, however, that the united front was also the means by which the nascent party-state established *qiaowu* policies and institutions, this also meant that the policies governing the *huaqiao* and their affairs were also, at heart, functions of economic rationalisations. This chapter thus contextualises the origins of *qiaowu*, and by demonstrating its political economy, frames a narrative of *qiaowu* for this thesis' subsequent chapters.

To do some good:

The CCP CC had in its 1948 'May Day slogans', called for a renewed united front to form a democratic coalition, which would thus establish a New China. This coalition required, as the CCP CC conceived, the participation of 'all democratic parties, people's organizations and public personages' to have any form of public legitimacy, and thus the

CC started to plan for such a caucus almost as soon as the slogans had been issued.⁶ These plans, as was entirely expected by then, certainly included the *huaqiao*. Mao's reply (in October 1948) to Tan Kah Kee, who had chaired the meeting of Singapore-based *huaqiao* that had been the first to respond to the 'May Day slogans', contained an implicit promise that *huaqiao* perspectives on the proposed PCC would be welcomed and consulted.⁷ Mao, as it turns out, had direct *huaqiao* participation in mind.

The 'May Day slogans' had met with enthusiastic responses by many *huaqiao* all over the world.⁸ Though the slogans had not explicitly identified the *huaqiao*, their inclusion in the New Democracy was taken as an accomplished fact. Yet, the slogans had not indicated what the nature of *huaqiao* participation in the PCC would be. There was in fact, a view at the time that the *huaqiao* would be represented by one (or more) of the other, non-CCP democratic parties in the future PCC. Indeed, a prominent advocate of that view was the Zhigong Party, which had roots amongst the North American *huaqiao*.⁹ In its response to the slogans, the Zhigong Party declared its support for the new PCC and, among other things, claimed to be a 'revolutionary party representing *huaqiao* interests', particularly since it had explicitly included the protection of *huaqiao* rights and interests in its party platform. Thus the Zhigong Party arrogated to itself the right to speak for the *huaqiao*, stating that since 'this Party represents their interests, we thus completely agree with the CCP CC's slogans'.¹⁰ The Zhigong Party's claim was not entirely without merit, since it did have a sizeable *huaqiao* membership (albeit, mostly North American),

⁶ CCP CC, 'Zhonggong zhongyang fabu jinnian 'wuyi' laodong jie kouhao', 30/04/1948, *Kaiguo shengdian*, I: 9-11 (9); CCP CC, 'Zhongyang guanyu yaoqing ge minzhu dangpai daibiao lai jiefang qu xieshang zhaokai xin zhengxie wenti gei hu ju de zhishi', 02/05/1948, ZZJZ, 197-198.

⁷ Mao Zedong, 'Mao Zedong guanyu ganxie qiaobao xiangying 'wuyi' kouhao he zhengxun dui zhaokai xin zhengxie de yijian fu Chen Jiageng dian', 01/10/1948, ZZJZ, 209-210.

⁸ But there were also pro-GMD *huaqiao* who rejected them. See Fujio Hara, *Malayan Chinese & China: Conversion in Identity Consciousness, 1945-1957* (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 2003), 12-42.

⁹ The Zhigong Party [致公党 party devoted to the public] had close links to the Hongmen secret societies, and was founded in San Francisco in 1925 by Chen Jiongming and Tang Jiayao. In 1946, Chen Qiyu and others re-established the party in Chongqing, seeking to lead *huaqiao* support for the CCP against the GMD. See Groot, *Managing Transitions*, 38-39.

¹⁰ 'Zhongguo zhigong dang xiangying zhonggong 'wuyi' haozhao de xuanyan', 09/06/1948, *Kaiguo shengdian*, I: 30-33 (32).

but what Mao and the CCP actually wanted, was for the *huaqiao* to participate directly in the united front, and as a separate constituency in its own right.

In the CCP CC's plans, the democratic coalition that would be the formal basis for the establishment of the PRC and its future government, was to be formed by 36 constituent parts, in which the *huaqiao* would be a separate constituency.¹¹ Thus, even as the CCP CC began to invite delegates to prepare for a new PCC, it sought the direct participation of certain *huaqiao* notables, and in this, the CCP proved to be remarkably successful.¹² Indeed, the CCP was able to—very publicly—win one of the most famous of the *huaqiao* over to the cause of the New Democracy.

Of all the prominent *huaqiao* personalities that the CCP wanted to participate in the new PCC, Tan Kah Kee—whom Mao had lauded as ‘the banner of the Overseas Chinese’ in 1945—was the one they wanted more than everyone else.¹³ Tan had led the earliest response to the ‘May Day slogans’, but in fairness, this would have surprised no one. Tan was not a CCP member, but his endorsement of Mao had been public since 1940, and he was well-known as a vociferous critic of the GMD.¹⁴ Yet, the lengths to which the CCP went to gain Tan’s direct participation is noticeable, especially since CC directives specifically mentioned him at least three times in 1948.¹⁵ But the point was that the CCP wanted a *huaqiao* of unimpeachable patriotism, and Tan was that man.

¹¹ See Zhou Enlai, ‘Zhongyang guanyu zhengqiu minzhu renshi dui ‘guanyu zhaokai xin de zhengzhi xieshang huiyi zhu wenti’ de yijian gei Gao Gang, Li Fuchun deng de zhishi’, 08/10/1948, ZZJZ, 210-213.

¹² In a CCP CC directive sent to its Hong Kong and Shanghai branches, Chen Qiyu and Situ Meitang were listed as Zhigong Party delegates, and separate from the *huaqiao* invitees, Tan Kah Kee, Feng Yufang, and Wang Renshu. See CCP CC, ‘Zhongyang guanyu yaoqing canjia xin zhengxie zhe de mingdan gei gang fenju de zhishi’, 20/09/1948, ZZJZ, 207-208.

¹³ Mao wrote ‘banner of the Overseas Chinese; [and] the nation’s glory’ to mark Tan’s return from exile. See Mao Zedong, ‘Wei zhuming qiaoling Chen Jiageng xiansheng de tici’, 08/11/1945, DHGLR, 2.

¹⁴ In 1940, Tan visited Chongqing and Yan'an, and while he became disillusioned with the GMD, he was very impressed by the CCP; Tan thereafter became a fierce critic of the GMD. See Yong Ching Fatt, *Tan Kah-kee: The Making of an Overseas Chinese Legend* (Singapore: World Scientific, 2014), 234-286.

Tan returned to Singapore in 1945 (after wartime exile in Java), and resumed (as Malayan Special Branch said) ‘his chosen role of castigator’, provoking a fierce controversy by telegramming President Truman to criticise American aid to the GMD. See ‘Review of Chinese Affairs’, 09/1946, TNA, FCO 141/7622.

¹⁵ See CCP CC, ‘Zhongyang guanyu yaoqing ge minzhu dangpai daibiao lai jiefang qu xieshang zhaokai xin zhengxie wenti gei hu ju de zhishi’, 02/05/1948, ZZJZ, 198; CCP CC, ‘Zhongyang guanyu yaoqing canjia xin zhengxie zhe de mingdan gei gang fenju de zhishi’, 20/09/1948, ZZJZ, 207; CCP CC,

Tan was one of the most famous patriots amongst the *huaqiao* (and then some). Tan had organised 45 *huaqiao* associations across Southeast Asia into the Nanyang Federation of China Relief Funds during WWII, thus leading millions of *huaqiao* to unprecedented unity, and unparalleled contributions to China's war effort.¹⁶ Indeed, Tan's patriotism was near-legendary; he had caused a stir across China in 1938, when in his righteous fury at Wang Jingwei's attempt to negotiate with the Japanese, he sent a cable to the wartime PCC in Chongqing, declaring that: 'when the enemy is still on our land, to talk of peace is to be a Han traitor'.¹⁷ Thus, whatever Tan's politics, and whether other *huaqiao* agreed with him—and many did not—his patriotism was beyond reproach, and to have him participate in the PCC would send a message that the united front had a place for all the *huaqiao* patriots who, like Tan, had hoped for a New China.

By early 1949, Mao and the CCP had set their sights on convincing Tan to be directly involved with the united front. Of course, Tan was already pro-CCP, while Mao and Tan had already communicated.¹⁸ What was left was to make a big show out of the PCC. This was fulfilled on 20 January 1949, when telegrams from Mao to Tan were sensationally published in the Singapore press. Mao invited Tan to join the new Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) because it was time to form 'a democratic coalition government' to 'marshal the strength of the Chinese people at home and abroad to consummate the independence and liberation of the Chinese people'.¹⁹ Tan enjoyed the 'veneration of all Chinese' in Southeast Asia, Mao said, and he thus invited

¹⁶ 'Zhongyang guanyu yaoqing minzhu renshi beishang gei Xianggang fenju de zhishi', 05/11/1948, ZZJZ, 220-222 (221).

¹⁷ The Federation raised C\$400 million in 1937–1941. See Yen Ching-hwang, *The Chinese in Southeast Asia and Beyond: Socioeconomic and Political Dimensions* (Singapore: World Scientific, 2008), 353.

¹⁸ '敌人未出国土前, 言和即汉奸', in Tan Kah Kee, *Nanqiao huiyilu*, Vols. I-II (Singapore: Tan Kah Kee Foundation, Tan Kah Kee International Society, 1993), II: 89.

¹⁹ Tan's stance was made clear by January 1949, when he called the GMD a bandit regime. See Singapore Special Branch, 'Translation of a special article contributed by Tan Kah Kee in the Nan Chiau Jit Pao dated 31.1.49', 31/01/1949, Internal Security Department (ISD) Archives, Singapore.

¹⁹ Mao Zedong's telegram to Tan Kah Kee, 20/01/1949, Appendix A, 'Review of Chinese Affairs', 02/1949, TNA, CO 717/182/4; Singapore Special Branch, 'Tan Kah Kee invited to participate in the new Political Consultative Council', 02/1949, ISD.

Tan to join the CPPCC's Preparatory Committee. Tan's reply was printed on 8 February, and while he declined a political role, he promised to return to China.²⁰

While Tan declined a political role, his patriotism made it unlikely that he would remain uninvolved. Indeed, at a sending-off event in April 1949, he remarked that he had 'long desired to do some good for [his] native land'.²¹ Tan's return to China, in that respect, was a function of his aim to 'do some good' for his country—which was for him, a lifelong quest.²² Yet, Tan also pointed to the GMD as the reason why his quest had hitherto come to naught. But the GMD's failures, Tan said, stood in stark contrast to the CCP's 'good politics', diligence, and compassion.²³ Tan was clearly convinced by the promise of New China, and the strength of this vision soon overcame his initial reluctance.

After Tan arrived in China in June, CCP and public figures took turns at persuading him to represent the *huaqiao* in the Preparatory Committee.²⁴ Tan eventually accepted, and he was elected to the committee's Standing Committee on 15 June.²⁵ In the end, New China's call had been too strong. The CCP, Tan said, was creating 'a truly representative and democratic consensus for the future path of nation-building', which would fulfil *huaqiao* hopes, and ensure that they 'see their status in their respective domiciles raised' to new heights.²⁶ Tan simply could not resist being a part of this.

²⁰ Tan Kah Kee's telegram to Mao Zedong, 08/02/1949, Appendix A, 'Review of Chinese Affairs', 02/1949, TNA, CO 717/182/4.

²¹ Tan Kah Kee, 'Ming shi fei bian zhen wei', 29/04/1949, *Chen Jiageng yanlunji* (Singapore: Ee Hoe Hean Club, Tan Kah Kee Foundation, and the Xiamen-Jimei Tan Kah Kee Research Society, 2004) 263-268 (264).

²² The Tan Kah Kee Company's regulations had demanded loyalty to the company, 'to the entire Chinese business community, and to the nation'. See Yen, *The Ethnic Chinese in East and Southeast Asia*, 130.

²³ Tan Kah Kee, 'Ming shi fei bian zhen wei', 29/04/1949, *Chen Jiageng yanlunji*, 267.

²⁴ This included Mao Zedong, Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai, Zhu De, Li Weihan, Ye Jianying, Dong Biwu, Lin Boqu, Ye Jianying, Shen Junru, Li Jishen, Guo Moruo, Ma Yinchu, and Huang Yanpei. See Tan Kah Kee, 'Qicheng huiguo', *Xin Zhongguo guanganji* (Singapore: Ee Hoe Hean Club, Tan Kah Kee Foundation, and the Xiamen-Jimei Tan Kah Kee Research Society, 2004), 4-5; Liu Zhengying, *Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai yu Chen Jiageng* (Fuzhou: Xiamen Municipal Committee for Research on Party History, and the Alumni Association of the Jimei Schools, 1994), 8-9.

²⁵ Tan Kah Kee, 'Chen Jiageng zai xin zhengzhi xieshang huiyi choubei hui di yi ci quanti huiyi shang de jianghua', 15/06/1949, *Kaiguo shengdian*, I: 165-166; 'Xin zhengzhi xieshang huiyi choubei hui changwu weiyuanhui changwu weiyuan, zhuren, fu zhuren, mishu zhang, fu mishu zhang, mingdan', 06/1949, *Kaiguo shengdian*, I: 182.

²⁶ Tan Kah Kee, 'Zai renmin zhengxie choubei huiyi zhici', 15/06/1949, *Xin Zhongguo guanganji*, 5-7.

The CCP had thus gotten their man. Mao would have been delighted. Earlier in February 1949, Mao had met the Soviet vice-Premier, Anastas Mikoyan, and while discussing the preparations for the CPPCC, had made a list of its constituencies. In Mao's listing, there were the American *huaqiao* representatives (or rather, the Zhigong Party), and separately, the Southeast Asian *huaqiao* representatives, which as Mikoyan recorded, named Tan Kah Kee.²⁷ The naming of Tan shows how committed Mao and the CCP had been to making sure that Tan and the *huaqiao* would be involved with the CPPCC. And yet, Mao and Mikoyan did not talk solely about the *huaqiao*. Inasmuch as the CCP made a serious effort to draw the *huaqiao* into the united front, to study what else Mao said to Mikoyan (and other Soviet leaders), is to see the united front's real meaning. Which was, it seems, rather different to what had been sold to the *huaqiao*.

Openness and Sincerity:

The problem with the CCP's rhetoric on the united front in 1948–1949 is that even as the Party contemplated the prospect of final victory in the civil war, Mao—but also others in the CCP leadership—was already prevaricating (and had been for a while now) on the necessity of a united front, even while the CCP continued to preach the New Democracy.²⁸ Ironically, the chief witness to this insincerity was the 'Great Master' who had first instructed the CCP to embrace the united front. Mao, in messages to Stalin (30 November 1947 and 15 March 1948), had proposed that:

²⁷ The English translation of this MemCon (by Sergey Radchenko) says 'representatives of the Chinese emigrants, living in South-East Asia (Chen Jiageng, etc.)', or 'representatives of the Chinese emigrants living in the USA'. Yet, the Chinese translation (Shen Zhihua et al.) says, '中国东南亚华侨代表 (陈嘉庚等)', and '美国华侨代表'. 'Emigrant' does not mean *huaqiao*; since Mao specified Tan, it is unlikely that he said 'emigrant' (移民). After all, Mao was the one who called Tan '华侨旗帜'. Mao also clearly meant the Zhigong Party (when he said American *huaqiao*) because he did not list them elsewhere.

See Document No. 35, 'Memorandum of conversation between Anastas Mikoyan and Mao Zedong', 04/02/1949, *Cold War International History Project (CWIHP) Bulletin*, No. 16 (2007/8), 144-148 (147); No. 16472, 'Migaoyang yu Mao Zedong huitan jiayao: guanyu minzu he duiwai guanxi wenti', 04/02/1949, in Shen Zhihua (ed.), *Eluosi jiemi dang'an xuanbian: zhongsu guanxi (1945-1991)*, Vols. 1-12 (Shanghai: Orient Publishing Center, 2015), 1: 420-426 (424).

²⁸ Westad, *Decisive Encounters*, 40, 228-230.

In the period of the final victory of Chinese Revolution, following the example of the USSR and Yugoslavia, all political parties except the CCP should leave the political scene, which will significantly strengthen the Chinese Revolution.²⁹

Mao, it appears, initially preferred to accelerate the CCP's consolidation of political power; although he was willing to let 'representatives of the liberal bourgeoisie' join in a future, and CCP-dominated central government of New China, he wanted the CCP to be only political party in government.³⁰ Stalin disapproved; the Great Master flatly rejected Mao's proposals—'we do not agree with this'—and instead instructed in 1948 that: 'It is necessary to keep in mind that the Chinese government in its policy will be a national revolutionary-democratic government, not a communist one, after the victory of the People's Liberation Armies of China'.³¹ Stalin thus told Mao that an acceleration of revolutionary reforms, like 'nationalization of all land and abolition of private ownership of land', and the 'confiscation of the property of all industrial and trade bourgeoisie' (and of the landowners, big to small) should be delayed 'for some time'.³² On the one hand, Stalin's view was similar to what Mao had told the CCP CC in January 1948, especially in terms of 'avoid[ing] adopting any adventurist policies' towards industrial or commercial bourgeoisie, and 'well-to-do' peasantry, but to focus instead on 'real counter-revolutionary local tyrants'.³³ This, of course, was what the New Democracy (and its united front) was supposed to effect—a transitional stage after the CCP's victory, to prepare for the next stage, and a socialist revolution.³⁴ Yet, on the other hand, and while

²⁹ Stalin quoted Mao's message back to him in a cable. See Document No. 5, 'Cable, Stalin [Kuznetsov] to Mao Zedong [via Terebin]', 20/04/1948, *CWIHP Bulletin*, No. 16 (2007/8), 114-115 (114).

For a discussion of the Sino-Soviet documents cited here (along with many more), see Sergey Radchenko and David Wolff, 'To the Summit via Proxy Summits: New Evidence from Soviet and Chinese Archives on Mao's Long March to Moscow, 1949', *CWIHP Bulletin*, No. 16 (2007/8), 105-112.

³⁰ Document No. 5, 'Cable, Stalin [Kuznetsov] to Mao Zedong [via Terebin]', 20/04/1948, *CWIHP Bulletin*, No. 16 (2007/8), 114.

Mao was apparently 'much influenced' at the time, by Liu Shaoqi's thinking on the make-up of the (future) Chinese state. See Westad, *Decisive Encounters*, 228.

³¹ Document No. 5, 'Cable, Stalin [Kuznetsov] to Mao Zedong [via Terebin]', 20/04/1948, *CWIHP Bulletin*, No. 16 (2007/8), 114.

³² *Ibid.*, 115.

³³ Mao, 'On Some Important Problems of the Party's Present Policy', 18/01/1948, *Selected Works*, IV: 183.

³⁴ 'The democratic revolution is the necessary preparation for the socialist revolution'. See Mao Zedong, 'The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party', 12/1939, *Selected Works*, II: 305-334 (330).

Mao's subsequent reply to Stalin simply and innocuously stated that he completely agreed with him—what Mao said and what Mao wanted were very different.³⁵

The united front, and the democratic coalition government it was supposed to engender for New China, were not Mao's preferred choices.³⁶ Even as Mao cabled his acquiescence to Stalin's 'advice' on 26 April 1948, he had no intention of delaying, or even easing up on the CCP's Land Reform Campaign.³⁷ Yet, Mao also followed through with the coalition government, although it is worth noting that the 'May Day slogans' came only days after his reply to Stalin—and may not have been written with non-CCP elements in mind originally.³⁸ Now, there are to be sure, varied perspectives of Mao's changing views—but perhaps that variance is moot. If Mao had truly been convinced by Stalin in 1948, then his prior New Democracy rhetoric was insincere. Or, if Mao had not actually needed convincing by Stalin, then his ideas about outright CCP domination post-Civil War, were tactical and to gain space to manoeuvre.³⁹ Yet, either way, the New Democracy was less about democracy than it was about political manoeuvring.

But to be fair to the CCP, it appeared to put great effort into preparing for the new CPPCC. Instructions were issued to the Party branches in Shanghai and Hong Kong—the likely entry points for returnees—to receive the 'democratic personages' answering the call to the CPPCC.⁴⁰ While, and perhaps in view of the sheer number of responses to the

³⁵ Mao may have tried to pass off the prior proposals as someone else's deviation, since he told Stalin that the 'leftist tendencies' in the Party had since been 'thoroughly corrected'. See Document No. 7, 'Cable, Mao Zedong to Filippov [Stalin]', 26/04/1948, *CWIHP Bulletin*, No. 16 (2007/8), 115-116 (116).

³⁶ Mao was 'committed to 'building socialism' in China as quickly as possible'. See Li, 'The Political Stalinization of China', 31.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 35.

³⁸ Li Hua-yu suggests that the slogans were amended at the last minute to include the united front call to the democratic personages, parties and organisations. See Li, 'The Political Stalinization of China', 35.

³⁹ 'Mao may have believed that if he could satisfy Stalin on political matters, he would have a free hand in domestic economic affairs.' See Li, 'The Political Stalinization of China', 31.

For more on the Mao–Stalin relationship, see Chen Jian, *China's Road to the Korean War: The Making of the Sino-American Confrontation* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994); Niu Jun, 'The Origins of the Sino-Soviet Alliance', in Odd Arne Westad (ed.), *Brothers in Arms: The Rise and Fall of the Sino-Soviet Alliance, 1945–1963* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), 47-89; Shen Zhihua, *Mao, Stalin and the Korean War: Trilateral Communist Relations in the 1950s* (New York: Routledge, 2012).

⁴⁰ CCP CC, 'Zhongyang guanyu yaoqing ge minzhu dangpai daibiao lai jiefang qu xieshang zhaokai xin zhengxie wenti gei huju de zhishi', 02/05/1948, ZZJZ, 197-98; CCP CC, 'Zhongyang guanyu yaoqing canjia xin zhengxie zhe de mingdan gei gang fenju de zhishi', 20/09/1948, ZZJZ, 207-208.

‘May Day slogans’, the CCP created institutional provisions for united front work in September 1948, and settled the Preparatory Committee’s make-up in November.⁴¹ The new United Front Work Department (UFWD) of the CCP CC was placed in charge of work amongst the democratic elements in (still) GMD-controlled areas, amongst ethnic minority nationalities, in ‘united front work in politics’, in *huaqiao* affairs, and in relations with fraternal socialist parties in the Far East.⁴² The CPPCC was therefore an actual, perceptible, political exercise on the part of the CCP, and as Mao wrote to Stalin in December 1948, after a preparatory conference, the establishment of the CPPCC and the democratic coalition would follow in the summer of 1949.⁴³

Yet, for all the apparent CCP activity regarding the CPPCC, the reality behind-the-scenes was far more disingenuous. The CCP CC’s January 1949 directive to Party cadres on interacting with non-CCP ‘democratic personages’ required them to practice ‘openness and sincerity’, and ‘unity and struggle’; or to unite with non-CCP personalities, even while conducting ‘struggle’ to further their socialist education.⁴⁴ Yet, the CC also instructed that ‘openness’ to non-CCP members was finite, as ‘some things could be kept from them’.⁴⁵ Inasmuch as cadres were encouraged to provide reading material to non-CCP members to improve their political awareness, sharing internal party information was forbidden. Of course, most political parties are not known for transparency, but to instruct cadres to keep secrets even while promoting ‘openness and sincerity’, seems curious. Yet, when placed against the reality of the CCP leadership’s dealings with, and its views of other united front figures, the reason for secrecy becomes clear.

⁴¹ The first UFWD had been formed under Wang Ming in 1938, and had paralleled his decline. See Thomas Kampen, ‘The CCP’s Central Committee Departments (1921-1991): A Study of their Evolution’, *China Report*, 29.3 (1993), 299-317 (306).

‘Guanyu zhaokai xin de zhengzhi xieshang huiyi zhu wenti de xieyi’, 25/11/1948, *Kaiguo shengdian*, I: 67-69.

⁴² The new UFWD was created on 26 September 1948. See CCP CC, ‘Zhongyang guanyu chenggongbu gai’ming wei tongzhanbu ji gaibu gongzuo renwu deng wenti de zhishi’, 26/09/1948, ZZJZ, 209.

⁴³ Document No. 22, ‘Cable, Mao Zedong to Stalin’, 30/12/1948, *CWIHP Bulletin*, No. 16 (2007/8), 122-124 (123).

⁴⁴ CCP CC, ‘Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu duidai minzhu renshi de zhishi’, 22/01/1949, ZZJZ, 240-241.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, 241.

Fu Zuoyi [Fu Tso-yi], the GMD commander in Beiping [Beijing], surrendered the city to the PLA on 22 January 1949, and was thereafter specially invited to the CPPCC Preparatory Committee (and later, its full plenum).⁴⁶ In the public narrative, Fu was a high-ranking GMD commander—a war criminal—who had seen the light, and obeyed his duty to the people, thus surrendering Beijing. This apparently showed Fu's sincerity, as did a speech he made admitting his crimes, and his hopes for New China under the CCP.⁴⁷ Yet, Fu's surrender had not been due to conscience. Soviet envoy Terebin [Andrei Orlov] reported to Stalin that Fu and the CCP had come to a pragmatic understanding, while Fu's contrition had been scripted so that 'the people can forgive him'.⁴⁸ This was judicious, but it was hardly 'openness and sincerity'.

Returning to Mikoyan in 1949, a name that came up in his conversations with Mao was Song Qingling [Soong Ching-ling]. Sun Yat-sen's widow was also one of the Preparatory Committee's delegates, and Mao had personally invited her to the 'historical and momentous' CPPCC in January 1949, even suggesting that it fulfilled her husband's last wishes for China.⁴⁹ Song's marriage to the 'Father of the Nation' [国父] made her a national symbol, and much like Tan Kah Kee, her participation bolstered the CPPCC's patriotic credentials immeasurably. Indeed, as Mao told Mikoyan, he wanted Song to be 'chairman of the presidium'. Yet, Mao noted that Song was 'fully subordinate to us', which made her 'huge authority among the people' valuable—and was perhaps why Mao had wanted Song to be chairman.⁵⁰ Even so, Zhou Enlai admitted to Mikoyan that Song 'still [made] them uncomfortable', even if she was pro-CCP, and had previously been a

⁴⁶ See Mao Zedong, 'Mao Zedong fu Fu Zuoyi jiangjun dian', 02/04/1949, ZZJZ, 262; Dikotter, *The Tragedy of Liberation*, 23.

⁴⁷ See Fu Zuoyi, 'Teyao daibiao Fu Zuoyi zai yijie zhengxie quanti huiyi shang de fayan', 23/09/1949, *Kaiguo shengdian*, I: 330-332.

⁴⁸ Document No. 24, 'Cable, Terebin to Stalin [via Kuznetsov]', 10/01/1949, *CWIHP Bulletin*, No. 16 (2007/8), 125-127 (127).

⁴⁹ Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, 'Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai dian Song Qingling beishang canjia zhengxie', 19/01/1949, ZZJZ, 240.

⁵⁰ Document No. 38, 'Memorandum of conversation between Anatas Mikoyan and Mao Zedong', 06/02/1949, *CWIHP Bulletin*, No. 16 (2007/8), 154-158 (156).

CCP courier to the Comintern. Thus, Zhou said, she was under ‘strict surveillance’, because the GMD might ‘take her away by force’—thus implying that Song’s loyalties were suspect (or transferable).⁵¹ Of course, these remarks were made confidentially, but perhaps that is what makes them suggestive of the CCP’s disingenuousness.⁵²

Furthermore, Mao’s conversations with Mikoyan reveal the former’s personal views. On 4 February 1949, Mao told Mikoyan that ‘we openly explain our policy’ to the democrats, and ‘they like our frankness’.⁵³ Perhaps Mao was being ironic about CCP ‘frankness’; he told Mikoyan two days later that regarding ‘the structure of state power’, the CCP would not use ‘the parliamentary form’.⁵⁴ While the ‘congress of people’s representatives’ would elect the central government, the CCP would retain the real power in the new government, since as Mao said:

In the future government communists and leftist democrats will take probably 2/3 of all seats. Formally communists will not have that many seats, but in fact the majority of seats in the government will belong to them because a number of seats will be taken by covert communists. The rightist parties will also take part in the government, but in the minority.⁵⁵

So much for the claims of a ‘truly representative’ New Democracy, or a democratic coalition. And yet, there is a curious dichotomy. After all, although Mao and the CCP did not believe in, or want a coalition government, they still created one.

The CCP’s approach to the New Democracy was in the first instance, a function of Soviet orthodoxy. Even if the so-called democratic coalition government was not the first preference of the CCP leadership, the Soviet influence was not something easily disregarded, especially since Stalin pressured the CCP to adhere to Soviet doctrine.⁵⁶ But

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² Mikoyan spoke with Mao, Zhou Enlai, Liu Shaoqi, Ren Bishi, and Zhu De (with interpreters Shi Zhe, Ivan V. Kovalev, and E.F. Kovalev). See Document No. 38, ‘Memorandum of conversation between Anastas Mikoyan and Mao Zedong’, 06/02/1949, *CWIHP Bulletin*, No. 16 (2007/8), 154.

⁵³ Document No. 35, ‘Memorandum of conversation between Anastas Mikoyan and Mao Zedong’, 04/02/1949, *CWIHP Bulletin*, No. 16 (2007/8), 144-148 (148).

⁵⁴ Document No. 38, ‘Memorandum of conversation between Anastas Mikoyan and Mao Zedong’, 06/02/1949, *CWIHP Bulletin*, No. 16 (2007/8), 156.

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ ‘Tell Chen Yun that we, the Russian communists, are in favor of the Chinese communists not pushing away the national bourgeoisie but drawing them to cooperation as a force capable of helping in the struggle

at the same time, the decisive motivation for the CCP to move beyond its initial inclination for one-Party domination came from an economic realism that made the New Democracy a vital necessity.

The interaction of both the Soviet influence on, and the CCP's economic realism in the establishment of the New Democracy was actually enunciated by Chairman Mao, in a conversation with Stalin's envoy, Ivan.V. Kovalev, in May 1949. Mao told Kovalev that even as the CCP neared victory over the GMD, it acknowledged that: 'we owe our victories to the international revolutionary movement, and first and foremost, to the Soviet Union'.⁵⁷ Indeed, as Mao said, if there had been no Soviet Union, there would be no CCP. Thus the CCP owed its success to the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), who Mao called the CCP's 'elder brother' [老大哥], whose 'high prestige' was testament to the strength of the revolution, and was the basis for Soviet leadership of international communism.⁵⁸ Yet, Mao also made a revealing remark; Mao said that he had spoken recently with some 'democratic personalities', who had told him that: 'You communists have talents in political and military affairs, and this is the source of your strength; but you have none in economics, and this is your weakness.'⁵⁹ Mao, in fact, agreed with this assessment, since he said that:

We know our weaknesses; we feel it too. It is not just our leaders who have no experience of managing the economy, but the whole party too. We are like a girl who is about to be married. While she knows that she will eventually bear children, she has no idea how it will happen, except that this is bound to happen after marriage. We are exactly like that. We know the general direction, and we know how to develop the national economy. We strive towards this direction, but we cannot say how it will turn out, because we are uncertain ourselves. We must quickly build up our economic capabilities.⁶⁰

against the imperialists.' See Document No. 41, 'Cable, Stalin to Kovalev', 26/04/1949, *CWIHP Bulletin*, No. 16 (2007/8), 161.

⁵⁷ No. 16516, 'Kewaliaofu zhi Sidalin baogao: Mao Zedong tan junshi he jingji zhuangkuang' 17/05/1959, *Eluosi jiemi dang'an xuanbian*, 2: 50-52 (50).

⁵⁸ The All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) was the official name of the Soviet party—which changed its name to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in 1952.

No. 16516, 'Kewaliaofu zhi Sidalin baogao: Mao Zedong tan junshi he jingji zhuangkuang' 17/05/1959, *Eluosi jiemi dang'an xuanbian*, 2: 50.

⁵⁹ Ibid., 2: 51.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

Mao's remarks hint at what underpinned the move to establish the New Democracy. On a basic level, it reflected the wishes of the Soviet 'elder brother'; but beyond that, and despite the CCP's initial reluctance, its reservations were decisively overcome by the fact that it needed help to manage the economy, especially—as Mao hinted—from the 'democratic personalities'. The united front was thus a Soviet invention, and the CCP's creation of the New Democracy in 1949 was an economic rationalisation.

Mao, if anything, had understated the extent of China's economic problems to Kovalev. It was not just that the CCP lacked experience in the management of national economic affairs, it was also that it lacked that economic experience at a particularly inopportune moment when, 'after decades of war, civil and international, the nation's economy was at the edge of total collapse' by 1949.⁶¹ Industrial production was only 30% of previous levels; infrastructure was very badly-damaged (if not destroyed); inflation ran rampant; trade was disrupted; coal, iron, steel, cotton, and grain production were at levels well below par; and over 40 million people had been displaced by flooding.⁶² Yet, if this was the fundamental problem that New China faced, then its solution was the united front. Or more precisely, the CCP believed that creating a democratic coalition would enable it to draw upon a broad range of resources. Whether it was in terms of technical expertise and experience, financial capital, or even intellectual knowledge—the united front held a vital key to New China's economic recovery.

Mao was explicitly clear about the role of the united front and the democratic coalition in China's economic recovery. At the inaugural session of the CPPCC Preparatory Committee on 15 June 1949, he stated that:

Upon the formation of China's democratic coalition government, its central tasks will be: (1) to mop up the remnants of the reactionaries and suppress their trouble-making; and (2) to do everything possible and make the utmost effort to restore

⁶¹ Zhang, *Economic Cold War*, 52.

The Soviets certainly thought so: 'The country is undergoing great economic difficulties'. See Document No. 51, 'Report, Kovalev to Stalin', 24/12/1949, *CWIHP Bulletin*, No. 16 (2007/8), 177-182 (177).

⁶² Zhang, *Economic Cold War*, 52.

and develop the people's economy and, at the same time, to restore and develop the people's culture and education.⁶³

Mao wrote later (on 30 June) that: 'we must learn to do economic work from all who know how, no matter who they are'.⁶⁴ And of course, few would have disagreed that China's economic situation in 1949 was perilous. But then again, no one had told the members of the CPPCC that the New Democracy was really about economics.

Mao told the Preparatory Committee in June 1949 that one of the 'central tasks' of the future coalition government was to 'restore and develop the people's economy', but he also left out an important—albeit, probably inconvenient—point: that the People's Democratic United Front (as manifested by the CPPCC) was itself an economic derivative.⁶⁵ After all, the value of the CPPCC was derived from the relative utility of its constituent parts. Inclusion in the New Democracy was thus not because of democratic rights, patriotic sacrifice, or even Soviet doctrine. As Mao wrote to Stalin on 14 June 1949—just before the Preparatory Committee's inaugural session:

The general political program, developed earlier with the gravitation center of gaining victory in the war, must be reviewed and composed on the basis of restoring and developing the economy of China. The organizational structure and the composition of the government must also be developed for solving this task.⁶⁶

If the 'composition of the government' was a function of economic necessity, then it must surely follow that the *huqiao* inclusion in that united front was equally an economic rationalisation. To be sure, it was a function of a perception that the *huqiao* offered an enormous economic utility, because of the value of their remittances.

Sun Yat-sen had called the *huqiao* the 'Mother of the Revolution' because they had birthed (or at least, funded) much of his revolutionary activities in the run-up to the Xinhai Revolution (1911). This was a theme that the CCP frequently returned to in the

⁶³ Mao Zedong, 'Address To The Preparatory Meeting Of The New Political Consultative Conference', 15/06/1949, *Selected Works*, IV: 405-410 (409).

⁶⁴ Mao Zedong, 'On the People's Democratic Dictatorship', 30/06/1949, *Selected Works*, IV: 411-424 (422).

⁶⁵ People's Democratic United Front is a translation of 人民民主统一战线.

⁶⁶ Document No. 45, 'Cable, Mao Zedong [via Kovalev] to Stalin,' 14/06/1949, *CWIHP Bulletin*, No. 16 (2007/8), 166-169 (167).

civil war years, as the *huaqiao* were exhorted to uphold their revolutionary ancestry, and support national liberation.⁶⁷ In 1949, as the CCP's imperatives changed as it confronted the tasks of national government, the older imagery of patriotic *huaqiao* funding national liberation continued to hold sway, except that the objective now was the socialist revolution and transformation of China. Yet, for the CCP, it was not as simple as soliciting direct contributions. Of course, they could do that; Liao Chengzhi (who later became the de facto head of the new OCAC) had been very effective in gaining donations to the Eighth Route Army, especially from Hong Kong-based *huaqiao* during WWII.⁶⁸ But such direct contributions were not indefinitely sustainable, and were not, in any case, the basis for *huaqiao* utility; it was remittances that were of the most value.⁶⁹ The utility was not direct in the sense that the state was not the direct recipient of these funds. But rather that the inflow of large sums of foreign currencies into China had significant multiplier effects for local economies, and also—more importantly for the CCP—added to national income, and offered an absolutely vital non-trade source of foreign exchange.⁷⁰

To be sure, the monies sent by *haiwai huaqiao* to China was mostly sent to other *huaqiao* in the homeland, like *qiaojuan* family/household dependents, or the *qiaosheng* youth in Mainland Chinese educational institutions, but it could also entail funds sent for commerce or other investment purposes, or even for philanthropy.⁷¹ This was a historical practice that was as old as Chinese overseas migration itself, but it had grown over the years into a very large sum of money; one modern estimate for 1864–1949 asserts a figure

⁶⁷ Zhu De, 'Zai Yan'an huaqiao jiuguo lianhui shang de jianghua (zhailu)', 13/03/1946, *DHGLR*, 47-48; Liao Chengzhi, 'Quan shijie qiaobao tuanjie qilai fandui Jiang Jieshi ducai maiguo', 15/10/1946, *DHGLR*, 158-160.

⁶⁸ See Liao Chengzhi, 'Jiaqiang huaqiao xuanchuan gongzuo', 27/09/1940, *DHGLR*, 157.

⁶⁹ Overseas Chinese or *huaqiao* remittances translates 华侨汇款 [*huaqiao huikuan*] or 侨汇 [*qiaohui*].

⁷⁰ The utility of diasporic remittances is not unique to China. See Nicholas P. Glytsos, 'The contribution of remittances to growth: A dynamic approach and empirical analysis', *Journal of Economic Studies*, 32:6 (2005), 468-496; Donald F. Terry and Steven R. Wilson (eds), *Beyond Small Change: Making Migrant Remittances Count* (Washington, DC: Inter-American Development Bank, 2005).

⁷¹ Lin Jinzhi, Li Guoliang, Cai Renlong (eds), *Huaqiao huaren yu Zhongguo geming he jianshe* (Fuzhou: Fujian renmin chubanshe, 1993), 225.

of US\$3.51 billion in *huaqiao* remittances.⁷² Every Chinese government—certainly at least since the late Qing—had seen the immense utility of these remittances, and the CCP recognised it too. Chen Yun, the head of the newly-formed Central Finance and Economics Commission (CFEC), acknowledged in June 1949 that while a trade surplus was the country's best option for foreign exchange, *huaqiao* remittances were in second-place.⁷³ This, as Chen told the CFEC, 'requires everyone's cooperation'.⁷⁴ Chen may have been merely encouraging the Commission to diligence, and to work more closely together, but whether inadvertently or not, Chen's remark about 'cooperation' also spoke to an underlying meaning of the *huaqiao* place in the united front—co-opting them into the CPPCC was a means to a financial end.

The reality of *huaqiao* remittances was that they were overwhelmingly sent for family or household support purposes. According to modern estimates, the investment proportion of overall *huaqiao* remittances over 1862–1949 amounted to an average of 3.65%; by 1949, that figure had fallen to 2.44% for the four preceding years.⁷⁵ Thus, the vast majority of remittances were for family support. Yet, these remittances necessarily involved transnational and vested interests. The *haiwai huaqiao* remitters expected that the monies they sent back to the homeland bettered their dependents' lives; whereas a recipient (usually the *qiaojuan*) was responsible for informing remitters on how monies were used, and by extension, on local and national conditions. In that sense, there was a transnationality to *huaqiao* remittances and their connected interests.⁷⁶ Thus remitters

⁷² Lin Jinzhi does not specify the rates used to convert *yuan* to USD but the similarities with what contemporary documents reported suggests that he used the contemporary exchange rates. See Lin Jinzhi et al., *Huaqiao huaren yu Zhongguo geming he jianshe*, 228.

Wu Chun-hsi's research for 1946–1949 estimated a total of US\$332 million in that period alone. See Table 13, in Wu Chun-hsi, *Dollars, Dependents and Dogma: Overseas Chinese Remittances to Communist China* (Stanford: Hoover Institution, 1967), 80.

⁷³ Chen Yun, 'Guanyu chengli zhongyang caizheng jingji weiyuanhui de baogao', 04/06/1949, People's Liberation Army Institute of Politics Party History Research and Teaching Department (ed.), *Zhonggong dangshi jiaoxue cankao ziliao* [hereafter, CKZL], Vols. 1-20 (Beijing: Zhongguo renmin jiefangjun zhengzhi xueyuan, 1985), 18: 551-552 (551).

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ Lin Jinzhi et al., *Huaqiao huaren yu Zhongguo geming he jianshe*, 364.

⁷⁶ The traditional economic motivations for migration for *haiwai huaqiao* also meant that remittances to the homeland were 'bound by ties of expectation and feelings of obligation to provide a better life for those

wanted to be sure that the funds they sent home were secure, and received safely; while domestic recipients wanted to be assured of the legality of, and access to their funds even in a new political era. And all *huaqiao* wanted to be sure that their vested interests were met. After all, what was the point of remittances if New China had no place for the *huaqiao*? In that sense, the *huaqiao* place in the united front—in a CPPCC that was itself an economic derivative—was a useful sop to those interests.

Common Program:

Tan Kah Kee and six others formed the *huaqiao* delegation at the Preparatory Committee in June 1949, with Tan as the Chief Representative [华侨首席代表] of the *huaqiao* in the CPPCC.⁷⁷ The Committee first met on 15 June, in the Qinzheng Palace in Zhongnanhai (Beijing), and it was comprised of 134 delegates, who formed work-groups to discuss and prepare the documents and agenda for the full plenum of the CPPCC that was to meet in September.⁷⁸ The Preparatory Committee also drew up documents for the CPPCC to consider, including: The Organic Law of the Central People's Government (CPG), The Organic Law of the CPPCC, and The Common Program of the CPPCC. These were in fact the foundational documents of the PRC. To be sure, the CPPCC was defined as ‘the representatives of the Communist Party of China, of all democratic parties and groups and people’s organisations, of all regions, of the People’s Liberation Army, of all national minorities, overseas Chinese and other patriotic democratic elements’, thus making it, as the Common Program declared: ‘the organisational form of the Chinese

left behind’ (i.e. *qiaojuan*). See Sandra M.J. Wong, “‘For the Sake of Kinship’: The Overseas Chinese Family” (PhD Thesis, Department of Anthropology, Stanford University, 1987), 56-57.

For a detailed discussion of the transnational dynamics involved in *huaqiao* remittances, there is none better than Madeline Hsu, ‘California Dreaming: Migration and Dependency’, *Dreaming of Gold, Dreaming of Home: Transnationalism and Migration Between the United States and South China, 1882–1943* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000), 16-54.

⁷⁷ The other six were: Situ Meitang, Chen Qiyuan, Dai Ziliang, Fei Zhendong, Zhuang Mingli—and a Burmese *huaqiao* who did not show up. See ‘Canjia xin zhengzhi xieshang huiyi choubei hui de ge danwei daibiao mingdan’, 16/06/1949, *Kaiguo shengdian*: I: 175-181 (180).

⁷⁸ Tan was in the group that decided the national anthem, seal and flag. See ‘Xin zhengzhi xieshang huiyi choubei hui ge xiaozu mingdan’, *Kaiguo shengdian*, I: 183-185.

People's Democratic United Front'.⁷⁹ Moreover, the CPPCC's Organic Law stated that it was to 'unite all democratic classes and all nationalities throughout China by establishing the unity of all democratic parties and groups and people's organisations', and thus 'put forward their combined efforts in carrying out New Democracy'.⁸⁰ In that sense, since Tan was the Chief Representative of the *huaqiao* to the CPPCC, he was (*ex officio*) the chief representative of the *huaqiao* in the New Democracy. And to be true, Tan's place seemed very legitimate. He had been involved in key discussions and decisions, and had been consulted by CCP leaders.⁸¹ Clearly, Tan was involved with the establishment of the PRC in a real sense—but did that mean that *huaqiao* rights and interests were met? Tan certainly thought so.

On 21 September, the First Plenary Session of the CPPCC met in the Huairen Hall in Zhongnanhai, whereupon Mao famously declared that 'the Chinese people have stood up'.⁸² Over the next week, the CPPCC passed the Organic Laws, the Common Program, and elected the CPG Committee and the CPPCC National Committee.⁸³ Finally, on 1 October, from atop Tiananmen Square, the new CPG Chairman, Mao Zedong, declared the establishment of the PRC. Tan was standing right behind him. Thus Tan was literally behind Mao as he made his historic declaration on 1 October, but Tan was also metaphorically behind the CCP, in the sense that he was fully confident of New China's

⁷⁹ 'The Common Program of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference', 29/09/1949, in *The Important Documents of the First Plenary Session of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference* (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1961), 1-2.

⁸⁰ Article 1, 'The Organic Law of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference', 27/09/1949, *The Important Documents*, 21.

⁸¹ UFWD head Li Weihan indicated that the make-up of the *huaqiao* delegation to the CPPCC had been determined in consultation with Tan. See Li Weihan, 'Xin zhengxie daibiao mingdan xieshang jingguo qingxing', 18/08/1949, *Kaiguo shengdian*, I: 198-200 (198).

Zhou Enlai implied similar things about the value of Tan's view on ethnic minorities. See Zhou Enlai, 'Guanyu renmin zhengxie de jige wenti', 07/09/1949, *Kaiguo shengdian*, I: 206-214 (212).

⁸² Mao Zedong, 'Zhongguo renmin zhan qilai le', 21/09/1949, CCP CC Party Literature Research Office (ed.), *Jianguo yilai Mao Zedong wengao* [JYMZ] Vol. I-XIII (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1987-1998), I: 6.

⁸³ Tan was also elected to the CPPCC National Committee and CPG Committee. See 'Di yijie quanguo weiyuanhui zhuxi, fuzhuxi, changwu weiyuan he mishuzhang mingdan', *Kaiguo shengdian*, I: 548; 'Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo zhongyang renmin zhengfu zhuxi, fuzhuxi ji weiyuan', *Kaiguo shengdian*, I: 549; Tan Kah Kee, 'Zhongguo renmin zhengzhi xieshang huiyi di yi jie quanti shengli bimu', 30/09/1949, *Xin Zhongguo guanganji*, 11-14.

future, under the leadership of Mao and the CCP. To the CPPCC on 24 September, Tan pointed to the years of *huaqiao* suffering ‘under the oppression of the Guomindang’s reactionary government’, but he then said:

But it is different now. The *haiwai huaqiao* have become members of the Chinese People’s Democratic United Front and participants in the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference. The *haiwai huaqiao* have full rights of representation and expression, raising and equalising our status in the politics of our homeland from before. I believe my fellow *qiaobao* will be extremely happy with this.⁸⁴

For Tan, the events of September–October 1949 were like a new dawn for the Chinese people and the *huaqiao*. The CPPCC and CPG had unanimously approved the Common Program, which declared that the CPG would ‘do its utmost to protect the proper rights and interests of Chinese residing abroad’ and also ‘adopt the measures necessary’, so as to ‘facilitate remittances from overseas Chinese’.⁸⁵ These articles were similar to what the CCP delegates had proposed at the short-lived PCC in 1946, and thus it seemed as if there was finally a government willing to protect *huaqiao* rights and interests. No wonder that Tan said that the *huaqiao* would be happy.

Furthermore, the Organic Law of the CPG also mandated a new Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission (OCAC). This Commission shared its name with an organ of the Nanjing government, but unlike the older GMD version, this new OCAC was a supra-Ministerial organ under Premier Zhou Enlai’s Government Administration Council.⁸⁶ Indeed, just as the CFEC had coordinating and policy authority over other ministries involved with economic policy-work (i.e. the PBOC, or Trade, Heavy Industry, and Transport, etc.), the OCAC was the highest body in the new Chinese party-state for policymaking and implementation in *qiaowu*. The OCAC and CPG had been created by

⁸⁴ Tan Kah Kee, ‘Zhengzhi xieshang dahui huaqiao shouxi daibiao zhici’, 24/09/1949, *Xin Zhongguo guanganji*, 9-11 (10).

⁸⁵ See Article 37, and Article 58, in ‘The Common Program of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference’, 29/09/1949, *The Important Documents*, 15, 20.

⁸⁶ CPPCC, ‘Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo zhongyang renmin zhengfu zuzhi fa’, 27/09/1949, *Kaiguo shengdian*, I: 515-520 (519).

Contra Meredith Oyen, the OCAC was most certainly not ‘a bureau within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’. See Oyen, ‘Communism, Containment and the Chinese Overseas’, 62.

the democratic coalition, and the OCAC had non-CCP members (like Tan Kah Kee).⁸⁷

Moreover, since the CPG's agenda was the Common Program, the OCAC's mandate was thus defined by the two articles about *huaqiao* rights and interests, and the facilitation of remittances. In that sense, the party-state's *qiaowu* was a child of the united front. Or at least, that was the theory. Given what the united front was for, and given its inclusion of the *huaqiao* for their financial utility, the reality of the OCAC's mandate was less to do with serving the united front, and more about using it to use the *huaqiao*. But who—besides Mao and his comrades—would have been aware of this?

Conclusion:

The heady events of October 1949 convinced Tan Kah Kee that China had emerged from the darkness. Indeed, writing later on the 'great joy and celebration that the founding of the PRC' had brought, Tan mused that it was impossible to describe this without 'superlative and hyperbolic' words.⁸⁸ Since Tan was so convinced that the New Democracy was real, and that the *huaqiao* place in it was legitimate, Tan submitted seven motions to the CPPCC while it was in session.⁸⁹ Some were on *huaqiao* issues, others were national issues, but all of them typified Tan's belief that the *huaqiao* now had a legitimate political voice in New China's political future.

Of course, Tan had no idea—and no way of knowing—that the united front was about economic rationalisations. Yet, this did not necessarily mean that the party-state's

⁸⁷ The first OCAC was made up of: Chairman (He Xiangning); vice-Chairmen (Li Renren, Liao Chengzhi, Li Tiemin, Zhuang Xiquan); Members (Tan Kah Kee, Situ Meitang, Chen Yuan, Dai Ziliang, Fei Zhendong, Yi Meihou, Huang Changshui, Zhou Zheng, Hou Hanjiang, Zhuang Mingli, Zhao Lingde, Lin Tang, Zhuang Shuming, Ye Jianying, Zhang Yunyi, Zhang Dingcheng, Deng Zihui, Ye Fei, Li Chuli, Lian Guan, Xu Jingcheng, Chen Ren Yi, Wang Yuting, Cai Tingkai, Peng Zemin, Guan Wensen, Wang Renshu, Shao Lizi, Sa Zhen Bing, Fang Fang (June 1950)). See Su Shangyao, Han Wenwei (eds), *Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo zhongyang zhengfu jigou (1949-1990 nian)* (Beijing: Jingji kexue chuban she, 1993), 443.

⁸⁸ Tan Kah Kee, 'Kaiguo shengdian', *Xin Zhongguo guanganji*, 95-97.

⁸⁹ They were: to promote *huaqiao* investment in China; to rectify disruptions to education of *qiaosheng*; to build science laboratories in schools; to offer proper leadership for *huaqiao* education; to establish schools for marine navigation and water conservancy; to promote healthcare and sanitary housing; and to increase cigarette tariffs and end tobacco rations for public servants. See 'Zhuxi tuan changwu weiyuanhui guanyu daibiao ti an de shencha baogao', 29/09/1949, *Kaiguo shengdian*, I: 530-531; Tan Kah Kee, 'Xiang zhengxie tichu qi xiang jianyi', *Xin Zhongguo guanganji*, 157-160.

emergent *qiaowu* simply abandoned the Common Program mandate. In December 1949, on Tan's way back to Singapore to sort out his affairs before returning later, he was consulted by the East China Finance Committee (ECFC) on how to revitalise remittances. Tan suggested that *huaqiao* in China be permitted to receive remittances in their original currencies, or in the new Renminbi (RMB) if they preferred, and allowed to make Hong Kong Dollar (HKD) denominated deposits with state banks if they preferred to do so.⁹⁰ This would mitigate worries about fluctuating RMB values, bolster *huaqiao* confidence in China's economy, and thus encourage remittances. The ECFC took Tan's advice, but this was hardly because *qiaowu* was primarily concerned with *huaqiao* interests. The party-state's concern was for its own economic interests. While this had convinced Mao and the CCP to follow through with the New Democracy because of its economic utility, it meant that the *qiaowu* that came out of the united front was similarly defined by the intention to maximise and capitalise on *huaqiao* economic utility.

The larger imperative for *qiaowu* was about the facilitation of *huaqiao* remittances, not because the Common Program asserted that it was in the *huaqiao* interest, but because it was precisely what the party-state required. On 7 January 1950, as Tan travelled through South China, OCAC Chairperson He Xiangning sent him a directive which ordered him to seek the revitalisation of *huaqiao* remittances, and:

- (i) To use many methods to spread the news as broadly and as far as possible to the *haiwai huaqiao* regarding the underlying principle and motive behind this bond issue.
- (ii) To encourage the *huaqiao* to subscribe to the issue and not be casual bystanders.
- (iii) To use the *qiaojuan* to approach their family and relatives overseas to subscribe because the dividends can be directed towards their family in China, and so too the bond certificates.⁹¹

⁹⁰ ECFC, 'Guanyu guli qiaohui de yijian', 21/12/1949, 1949-1952 *jinrong juan*, 807.

⁹¹ He Xiangning, 'He Xiangning yao Chen Jiageng zhi dian haiwai huaqiao goumai gongzhai ji huidui wenti', 07/01/1950, Fujian Provincial Archive (FPA) #0136-002-0236-0001.

The bond issue referred to the 'Chinese People's Victory Bond'. See CPG Committee, 'Zhongyang renmin zhengfu weiyuanhui guanyu faxing renmin shengli zheshi gongzhai de jueding', 02/12/1949, CCP CC Party Literature Research Office (ed.), *Jianguo yilai zhongyao wenxian xuanbian* [hereafter, JYZW], Vols. 1-20 (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 2011), 1: 52-53.

Given the economic rationalisations underpinning the united front, such orders fail to surprise. What is clear though, is that while the new PRC's *qiaowu* could attempt policies that catered to *huaqiao* interests if there was a relevance to, or a possible effect on *huaqiao* remittances, ultimately, the party-state's imperative was first and foremost, to maximise the utility of the *huaqiao*, especially in financial terms. This correlation between *huaqiao* interests and the party-state's economic imperatives—and the questions and issues it engendered—would come to define the next decade of *qiaowu*.

Chapter 2.

Screaming for socialism

To bring about socialism requires fulfilling its prerequisites. Thus anxiously seeking a faster transformation to socialism, when its preconditions remain unmet, demonstrates that some of our comrades lack a practical understanding of the New Democracy, and that they do not believe that adherence to, and implementation of the Common Program will result in gradual fulfilment and maturing of socialism's preconditions. Screaming for socialism every day is not going to make it happen.

— Zhou Enlai, 13 April 1950¹

¹ ‘口头上天天喊社会主义并不能实现社会主义’, in Zhou Enlai, ‘Fahui renmin minzhu tongyi zhanxian jiji zuoyong de jige wenti’, 13/04/1950, *JYZW*, 1: 153-162 (155).

Introduction:

On New Year's Day 1950, He Xiangning sent greetings to the *haiwai huaqiao* via Radio Peking [Beijing] broadcast. Apart from good wishes, He also acknowledged the core transnationality of *huaqiao*: *qiaojuan* depended on the *haiwai huaqiao* for livelihoods, while the 'first thought' for those overseas, He said, was for the 'peace and progress' of their hometowns.² Thus, He promised that the government would take measures to ensure: the stability of *huaqiao* hometowns; *qiaojuan* livelihoods; and that *huaqiao* in China received remittances without difficulty. Yet, as He also said, it was now time to 'begin building our country':

We warmly and sincerely welcome the *haiwai huaqiao* to carry forward their illustrious revolutionary traditions, to redouble their aid to their homeland, and to participate in the great and glorious cause of building New China.³

The *haiwai huaqiao* participation that He desired, was as she instructed Tan Kah Kee, in subscription to PRC bonds.⁴ But since foreign governments tended to ban *huaqiao* in their domains from doing so directly, what He called for, as her later broadcasts suggest, was for *haiwai huaqiao* remittances to *qiaojuan* (and *guiqiao* or *qiaosheng*) to fund domestic bond-buying.⁵ He's broadcasts, in a way, reveal the fundamental foci for the Chinese party-state's *qiaowu* in 1950: firstly, its prime imperative to gain ever-greater sums of foreign exchange for the party-state's coffers; and also the recognition that *qiaowu* had to (at least) deal with *huaqiao* interests on some level.

This chapter demonstrates how the party-state's *qiaowu* evolved in 1950–1953 into a domestically-focused political practice for economic ends. The chapter begins with analysis of the core considerations for *qiaowu*: firstly, the party-state's strategic interest

² He Xiangning, 'Huanying huaqiao canjia Xin Zhongguo jianshe', 01/01/1950, *DHGLR*, 108-110 (109).

³ *Ibid.*, 110.

⁴ He Xiangning, 'He Xiangning yao Chen Jiageng zhi dian haiwai huaqiao goumai gongzhai ji huidui wenti', 07/01/1950, FPA #0136-002-0236-0001.

⁵ Singapore Special Branch, 'Review of Chinese Affairs', January 1950, TNA, FCO 141/7626. Singapore authorities noted: 'Peking Radio and other Communist inspired sources have made a great play for Overseas Chinese to buy the Chinese government Victory Bonds. They are told that it is their duty to subscribe; that they will increase the foreign exchange of the motherland'. See 'Singapore Political Report', January 1950, TNA, CO 825/82/2.

in securing *huaqiao* remittances; and secondly, the transnationality of *huaqiao* interests in remittances. Although a correlation between the two was recognised early on, this chapter shows that it was the problems consequent to the Land Reform programme, and the Korean War, that forced the party-state to address it in its *qiaowu*. This fomented a convergence in *qiaowu* between the imperatives to secure remittances and to cater for *huaqiao* interests. Moreover, since the Land Reform proved that *huaqiao* interests had a largely domestic centre of gravity, *qiaowu* began to gravitate towards policies that were characterised both by domesticity, and by overt attempts to protect and ensure *huaqiao* interests—all in the name, of course, of remittances. In a sense, this chapter marks this development as the beginning of the ‘favourable treatment’ [*youdai*] era in *qiaowu* in the 1950s. Yet, as this chapter demonstrates, while the party-state approved of this approach to *qiaowu*—at least in theory—the reality was that it proved difficult to effect, not only because of contradictions due to the Land Reform’s radicalisation, but also in no small way, because of the severe failures of CCP cadres.

Like another province overseas:

The perception of the *huaqiao* as potentially vital contributors to the Chinese economy was not a particularly new point of view in 1949.⁶ In that sense, the PBOC’s declaration in 1949 that *huaqiao* remittances were vital to the nation’s finances, since they were ‘an important source of our country’s foreign exchange’, was a restatement of an existing paradigm, or perhaps, the central bank’s acknowledgement of Chen Yun’s earlier instructions to the CFEC.⁷ In that respect, it is worth looking at the CFEC’s own guidelines, issued in January 1950, on *huaqiao* remittance policy and work. The principle,

⁶ See for example Bank of Fujian Province, ‘Fujian sheng yinhang sa niandu gongzuo jihua qiaohui bu fen’, 1941, in FPA (ed.), *Fujian huaqiao dang'an shiliao*, Vols. I-II (Fuzhou: Fujian dang'an chubanshe, 1989), I: 376-378.

⁷ PBOC Shanghai Branch, ‘Zhongguo renmin yinhang Shanghai fenhang 1949 niandu gongzuo zongjie’, n.d., 1949-1952 *jinrong juan*, 832; Chen Yun, ‘Guanyu chengli zhongyang caizheng jingji weiyuanhui de baogao’, 04/06/1949, CKZL, 18: 551.

the CFEC said, was ‘to protect *qiaobao* interests, and to take in *huaqiao* remittances in large quantities’.⁸ An immediate consequence of this principle was a CFEC instruction that institutions managing remittances, like the Bank of China (BOC), were forbidden from engaging in arbitrage on currency exchanges of remittances. This evidently sought to protect *huaqiao* interests, since it ensured that remittances could be exchanged at a lower rate, and seemingly fulfilled the Common Program mandate for *qiaowu*. Yet, given how the *huaqiao* and their economic utility, especially in terms of their remittances, were perceived in the party-state’s view of the united front, perhaps the true crux of the CFEC guidelines was the imperative ‘to take in *huaqiao* remittances in large quantities’. And, to be fair, this was only logical. After all, the reality of New China’s early years was in essence the same problem that had plagued old China: a cash crunch.⁹

Even as the party-state sought to turn China towards economic recovery after 1949, it began to pay more attention to its fiscal and monetary policy. Zhou Enlai said precisely that in December 1949, suggesting that ‘financial and economic planning were embodied in the policies’ that the CPG undertook, so as to shift national priorities from military matters to national construction.¹⁰ Yet, the reality was that China’s economic recovery was an expensive proposition. The party-state needed money, not least to purchase industrial machinery, but money—particularly foreign exchange—was in short supply. Zhou made this explicitly clear when he said that China had to boost domestic production, so as to reduce imports and preserve foreign currency.¹¹ This reality was also manifest in the CCP CC’s instructions to regional administrations to seek central approval before importing foreign machinery; as the CCP CC had to admit in December 1949 to the East

⁸ ‘为保护侨胞利益，大量吸收侨汇’，in CFEC, ‘Qiaohui fangzhen ji banfa’, 25/01/1950, 1949-1952 *jinrong juan*, 807-808 (807).

⁹ One estimate puts the deficit at 46.4% of expenditure in 1949. See Fang Weizhong (ed.), *Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo jingji dashiji, 1949-1980* (Beijing: Shehui kexue chuban she, 1984), 9.

The Bank of China was responsible for foreign exchange work. See North China People’s Government, ‘Huabei qu waihui guanli zanxing banfa’, 07/04/1949, 1949-1952 *jinrong juan*, 845.

¹⁰ Zhou Enlai, ‘‘Dangqian caijing xingshi he Xin Zhongguo jingji de ji zhong guanxi’’, 22-23/12/1949, *JYZW*, 1: 60-72 (61).

¹¹ Ibid., 1: 68-69.

China regional administration, the fact was that China simply could not afford to repair every piece of infrastructure that had been damaged during the war(s).¹² Bringing an end to hard times thus required large sums of hard currency.

The party-state's main interests (or indeed, imperative) in *huaqiao* remittances were therefore derived from, or formulated in, the larger context of its urgent demand for hard currency. This was a logic that was already present in the *huaqiao* inclusion in the united front. Yet, even the need to use the united front as a sop for the *huaqiao*—so as to be able to capitalise on their utility—reflected the underlying actuality that remittances were an inextricable part of *huaqiao* identities and thus, *huaqiao* interests. In March 1950, the First Session of the National Finance Conference stated that remittances were 'the second-largest source of foreign exchange for the country', and thus had an impact on the country's capacity to engage in economic construction and development, and also on the livelihoods of millions of *huaqiao* (mainly *qiaojuan*) in China. Hence, as the Conference declared, the imperative to 'strive for' these remittances needed 'careful attention', on the same level as raising export figures.¹³ Indeed, 'careful attention' was precisely necessary because there was an underlying correlation between the *huaqiao* and the party-state's interests, that was encapsulated within *huaqiao* remittances.

Given the distinct delineation of remittances as a financial question by the party-state in 1950, it makes sense that it was the PBOC which led the effort to address the correlation between *huaqiao* and party-state interests in remittances. The basic premise was simple: remittances were a necessary livelihood for literally millions of *qiaojuan*, *guiqiao* and *qiaosheng* in China; they also represented a vital flow of hard currency into the PRC that was crucial for economic recovery and development. Yet, the party-state

¹² CCP CC, 'Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu dinggou jiqi ji dongyong chengpi waihui xushi xian xiang zhongyang bao pi de zhishi', 02/12/1949, *ZZWX*, 1: 154; CCP CC, 'Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu zan bu xiufu xinwen tielu gei huadong ju de fudian', 07/12/1949, *ZZWX*, 1: 173.

¹³ For 1868–1936, *qiaohui* was roughly equal to 50% of China's trade deficit. See Lin Jinzhi et al., *Huaqiao huaren yu Zhongguo geming he jianshe*, 260; PBOC Head Office, 'Di yi jie quanguo jinrong huiyi zonghe jilu', 15/03/1950, 1949–1952 *jinrong juan*, 808–809 (808).

was aware that it could not simply rely on the vested interests of the *haiwai huaqiao*—to support dependents and maintain traditional (if not, cultural or familial) relations with the *huaqiao* in China—to secure and increase remittance flows. The willingness of remitters to send money was also affected by the relative stability of the PRC itself; remitters would always and obviously be wary in times of socio-political or economic uncertainty. Indeed, one of the main concerns of the *huaqiao* then was that the new RMB was far too unstable. Thus in order for the party-state to fulfil its own (financial) interest, it would also—and first—have to ensure that the *huaqiao* interest in remittances was met.

One of the earliest PBOC instructions on *huaqiao* remittances was thus to instruct that remittances could henceforth be remitted in foreign currencies (i.e. HKD, USD, or GBP, etc.), and that recipients in China were permitted to keep deposits (in the state banks) denominated in those currencies—but only permitted to withdraw these funds as RMB.¹⁴ This was in keeping with the ECFC’s decision (in December 1949) to allow *huaqiao* to receive remittances in their original currencies, and to hold HKD-denominated accounts, except it was now implemented on a nationwide scale, and applied to more currencies. Furthermore, it made a show of addressing worries about fluctuating RMB values, even while creating a ready pool of foreign currency inside China. But above all, it bolstered the PBOC’s claim that its policies gave the *huaqiao* ‘favourable treatment’ [*youdai*]. Thus, as the PBOC proposed: ‘foreign currency belongs to the public, interests belong to the individual’ [外汇归公, 利益归私].¹⁵ Interests meant benefits or well-being—as in the oft-cited ‘*huaqiao* rights and interests’—but clearly, the PBOC had realised that securing remittances required addressing the motivations to send and receive it.

In a way, it is possible to see the elements of the PBOC slogan as coterminous; foreign currency for the ‘public’ (i.e. the state) was the logical consequence of securing

¹⁴ PBOC Head Office, ‘Di yi jie quanguo jinrong huiyi zonghe jilu’, 15/03/1950, 1949-1952 *jinrong juan*, 808.

¹⁵ Ibid.

huaqiao interests. By enabling—or ‘facilitating’, *pace* the Common Program—the stability and security of remittances, the party-state would also benefit from an increased inflow of foreign exchange. But in reality, the two were not coterminous. The ‘individual’, or *huaqiao* interest was only tolerated insofar as it served the interests of the party-state. New Democracy meant in an economic sense, the period before socialist transformation where capitalism was not yet eradicated, but was regulated, with its excesses reformed, curtailed and transformed.¹⁶ This did not make remittances capitalist (or even bourgeois) excess, but it meant that even the Common Program’s view of *huaqiao* ‘legitimate rights and interests’ was conditional on what the ‘leadership of the proletariat’ (i.e. the CCP) defined as being in the country’s interest. As Zhou Enlai said:

Economics in the spirit of the New Democracy for us means that we must exercise leadership alongside careful planning. This leadership and the planning that is its exercise must be done properly, with the broad strategic view in mind, and with the proper contexts taken into consideration.¹⁷

While the PBOC’s approach ‘in the spirit of the New Democracy’ to managing *huaqiao* remittances suggested that party-state and *huaqiao* interests were coexistent, in reality, the ‘strategic view’ saw party-state interests predominate.

The ‘proper context’ of *huaqiao* remittances was defined at a PBOC conference in August 1950. The work in remittances, as PBOC President Nan Hanchen stated, was ‘extremely important’ because it was intrinsically connected to the legitimate interests of 10 million *huaqiao* and 30 million *qiaojuan* and hence: ‘it is also one of the major issues faced by our country’.¹⁸ Nan defined remittances as a legitimate *huaqiao* interest, tracing the history of its suppression by the ‘imperialist-colonialist’ governments and their ‘GMD lackeys’. Yet, with the advent of New China and the New Democracy, Nan said, this

¹⁶ Mao, ‘On the People’s Democratic Dictatorship’, 30/06/1949, *Selected Works*, IV: 421. The CCP claims that the ‘socialist transformation’ only began after the ‘General Line for the Transition Period’ in 1952, yet Mao was already calling for it in 1950: ‘When the tests of war and agrarian reform are passed, the remaining test will be easy to pass, that is, the test of socialism, of country-wide socialist transformation.’ See Mao Zedong, ‘Be A True Revolutionary’, 23/06/1950, *Selected Works*, V: 37-40 (39).

¹⁷ Zhou Enlai, ‘Fahui renmin minzhu tongyi zhanxian jiji zuoyong de ji ge wenti’, 13/04/1950, *JYZW*, 1: 156.

¹⁸ Nan Hanchen, ‘Guanyu qiaohui wenti de baogao’, 18/08/1950, *1949-1952 jinrong juan*, 809-810.

meant future *qiaowu* defined by the Common Program's protection of *huaqiao* interests, and the facilitation of *huaqiao* remittances. Yet, Nan also set out the state's intentions and claims. Nan explained the March 1950 statement that 'foreign currency belongs to the public' to mean that its sale, settlement, and accrual could only be done by national banks. Nan said this was in part because China guarded its sovereignty fiercely, but it was also because: 'our country is presently undertaking the task of construction, and since we need to import a large quantity of goods, our need for foreign currency is even greater'.¹⁹ Nan therefore rationalised the two sides of state and individual interests by stating that remittances legitimately benefited the *huaqiao* and contributed to the nation. But then, Nan also made a remarkable statement to the conference:

We have previously calculated that the total *huaqiao* remittance figure for one year is the equivalent of the total income of Shanxi province (pop. 10 million); in other words, it is as if the country has another province overseas.²⁰

In this, Nan revealed precisely how the party-state viewed remittances: as simply the equivalent of a province's contribution to national income. Nan, of course, asserted that it was *huaqiao* interests that underpinned the party-state's concern for remittances, but this is unconvincing. His explanation of 'interests belong to the individual' suggested that the state eschewed profit from remittances, which were solely intended, as he claimed, to serve the *huaqiao*. But given that Nan had claimed that remittances were a necessity for the accrual of foreign exchange, either he was disingenuous, or Nan, the economist, did not believe that the state's accruing foreign currency—indeed, at fixed rates it set itself—was, at least on a broad level, a form of profit.

Despite the utilitarianism in Nan's remarks, he at least had explicitly indicated the party-state's view of remittances as a source of national income—and not as a legitimate *huaqiao* 'rightful interest'. But at the same time, Nan was clearly keen to present the two

¹⁹ Ibid., 810.

²⁰ '过去我计算过, 一年的侨汇, 要等于山西全省 (一千万人) 的国民经济收入, 也就是等于国家在国外还有一个省', in Nan Hanchen, 'Guanyu qiaohui wenti de baogao', 18/08/1950, 1949-1952 *jinrongjuan*, 810.

sides of interests as being conjoined. The reason for this was the realisation by then, at least on the part of PBOC, that the fulfilment of the party-state's interest required more than just slogans and different types of bank deposits. Thus Nan's desire to play up the *huaqiao* interest in sending or receiving remittances. Indeed, as the ECFC instructed: 'everything to facilitate remittances should be done'.²¹ Yet, the complication was that in the foreign countries where remitters were located, the local governments were seriously restricting remittances, and thus there was a very real concern that 'imperialist oppression' would diminish the party-state's foreign exchange supply.

The party-state was deeply concerned that foreign restrictions would affect its ability to gain hard currency from its 'province overseas', and this worry was not baseless. A memo in August 1950 revealed this worry in its detailed listing of the restrictions on remittances by regions, with significant focus on the British Exchange Controls.²² This was logical, since the British controlled Hong Kong, Malaya and Singapore, and since there were new restrictions on remittances in those territories. For Hong Kong, after 20 February 1950 and the Foreign Exchange Control Circular No. 176, banks could not remit HKD to branches/agencies outside the Sterling Area without prior approval.²³ Moreover, even private remittances within the Sterling Area were limited to £50, with anything more requiring official approval.²⁴ In Singapore and Malaya, the Exchange Controls saw regulations placed on *qiaopi* agencies, the imposition of a new cap on family remittances (S\$45), and all transfers restricted to pre-approved banks in Hong Kong.²⁵ Given that

²¹ ECFC, 'Yijiu sijiu nian huadong qu waihui gongzuo zonghe jianyao baogao', n.d., 1949-1952 *jinrong juan*, 832-835 (833).

²² This was most likely by the CCP CC South China Bureau, 'Diguo zhuyi ji qi fuyong xianzhi qiaohui de gezhong yimou cuoshi', 15/08/1950, 1949-1952 *jinrong juan*, 799-806.

²³ Ibid., 801.

²⁴ Ibid., 803.

²⁵ Cheong Kee Cheok, Lee Kam Hing, Poh Ping Lee, 'Chinese Overseas Remittances to China: The Perspective from Southeast Asia', *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, 43:1 (2012), 75-101 (93); Huang Jianli, 'The Founding of the PRC and the Economic Concerns of Singapore Chinese Entrepreneurs', in Leo Suryadinata (ed.), *Southeast Asian Chinese and China: The Politico-Economic Dimension* (Singapore: Times Academic Press, 1995), 161-192 (172-73).

The term *qiaopi* [侨批] refers to *huaqiao* correspondence, but it is also a shorthand for the *qiaopi* agencies that were private couriers servicing this correspondence, remittances, and the transport of goods.

Malaya and Singapore were the source of a large percentage of pre-war remittances (70% in 1937-1941), and that remittances received through Hong Kong outside of the pre-approved banks dwarfed the figure received through them by 5.5 times—no wonder the party-state was concerned.²⁶ Thus at its Expanded Conference on Banking Affairs in June 1950, the PBOC stated that since remittances suffered from ‘unreasonable limitations’ by the imperialists, the bank would look to different methods to facilitate remittances, perhaps through the BOC, but also through traditional networks of *qiaopi* agencies.²⁷ Thus 1950 saw the fossilisation of *youdai* in state banks’ policies on the *huaqiao* remittances.²⁸ But the pressures on remittances had also led to a realisation that securing remittances could not be left to the banks alone.

Up till this point, it was the PBOC (with CFEC oversight) which had taken the lead in developing *qiaowu* for *huaqiao* remittances. In a way, this was not untoward; given how the party-state conceived of remittances—as Nan Hanchen elucidated—the PBOC being at the forefront was only to be expected. Yet, it was also becoming clear to the party-state that remittances, or at least, the imperative to secure them, required a more comprehensive approach to *huaqiao* affairs. Thus in September 1950, the OCAC and PBOC convened a conference on ‘solving the problems with *huaqiao* remittances’, with the primary concern being that remittances were failing to reach pre-war highs, and were facing new pressures.²⁹ Yet, while the conference, as specified by OCAC vice-Chairman Liao Chengzhi and Nan Hanchen, was to examine remittance issues, it was titled as being on ‘*huaqiao juanshu* welfare’.³⁰ Moreover, it also saw participation from across the CPG:

²⁶ Wu, *Dollars, Dependents and Dogma*, 81-83.

²⁷ PBOC, ‘Liuyue kuoda hangwu huiyi jilu’, 06/1950, 1949-1952 *jinrong juan*, 809.

²⁸ BOC Head Office, ‘Zhongguo yinhang qiaohui yuanbi cundan zhangcheng’, 04/06/1950, 1949-1952 *jinrong juan*, 820; PBOC Fujian Province Office, ‘Zhongguo renmin yinhang Fujian sheng fenhang: youdai qiaohui ji wei qiaobao fuwu banfa’, 07/10/1950, 1949-1952 *jinrong juan*, 820-22; BOC Fujian Province Office, ‘Zhonghang zongchu qiaohui ke: ruhe fuwu qiaobao qiaojuan bianli qiaohui’, 11/12/1950, 1949-1952 *jinrong juan*, 823-828.

²⁹ Liao Chengzhi, Nan Hanchen, ‘Guanyu huaqiao juanshu fuli huiyi jianyao qingkuang de baogao [jielu]’, 06/09/1950, 1949-1952 *jinrong juan*, 811-815 (811).

³⁰ The term *huaqiao juanshu* [华侨眷属] is long-form for *qiaojuan*, or *huaqiao* relatives or dependents.

including the Ministries of Interior, Foreign Affairs, Trade, Post and Telecommunications, and Customs.³¹ This discursive focus and wide institutional participation suggests that the party-state was beginning to realise that solving remittance issues required a broader front of *qiaowu* policies and practitioners.

Liao and Nan's conference report suggested the existence of a multitude of problems affecting *huaqiao* remittances (both external and domestic), and emphasised the binary relationship between specific concern for remittances, and broader *qiaowu*. In some cases, like the alleged imperialists' restriction of remittances, there was not much that *qiaowu* could do. Yet, there were also issues considered within the loci of *qiaowu* that could affect remittances. This was true of the issue of preserving the real value of remittances against the fluctuating RMB, and the ability of *qiaojuan* and *guiqiao* to exchange or withdraw their remittances. This was something that the PBOC and OCAC believed had already been addressed. But even so, there were other problems: *qiaopi* agencies were apparently unclear about policy, which resulted in a lack of cooperation between private couriers and official channels for remittances, and which showed that *qiaowu* had failed to effectively communicate policy. But more troubling perhaps were the revelations that both the *huaqiao* abroad and *qiaojuan* in China were seemingly (rather euphemistically) 'unaware that the government had determined that serving the *qiaobao* and *qiaojuan* was the guiding principle for its policy'.³² The lack of awareness by the *qiaopi* agencies could perhaps be explained away as a product of their suspicions about their role in the process, or the new restrictions on arbitrage. But that *huaqiao* both in and out of China had suspicions over *qiaowu*'s publicly-declared mandate to serve them and their interests, suggested that there was a far larger problem.

³¹ Liao, Nan, 'Guanyu huaqiao juanshu fuli huiyi jianyao qingkuang de baogao [jielu]', 06/09/1950, 1949-1952 *jinrong juan*, 811.

³² Ibid., 812.

The problem of *huaqiao* being ‘unaware’ that *qiaowu* would serve their interests was not that they were ignorant, but it was because the *huaqiao* in China were actually facing oppression, which predictably undermined any sense that *qiaowu* was serving their interests. Liao and Nan said that the *huaqiao* were unclear about the Land Reform policies that were being applied across China, but that this had been made far worse by rural cadres in *qiaoxiang* [侨乡 Overseas Chinese hometowns] who had ‘deviated’ from the correct line in their application of CCP Land Reform policies.³³ This included forcing the *qiaojuan* to buy bonds, or levying grain contributions, based on their remittances.³⁴ The situation had become so extreme that *qiaojuan* actually wrote to their *huaqiao* relatives instructing them to stop remitting for fear of incurring further persecution. Of course, the Land Reform was a nationwide campaign, and the experience thereof was not unique to the *huaqiao*.³⁵ Yet, equally, if the Land Reform in *qiaoxiang* was affecting remittances, then it was also a specific problem for *qiaowu*.

Yet, even though the Land Reform’s implementation (or more correctly, deviation) was posing problems for *qiaowu*—and negatively affecting remittances—the OCAC and PBOC had no solution. The only ‘guidance’ that Liao and Nan proffered was (once again) ‘to serve the *qiaobao* [and] to facilitate *huaqiao* remittances’.³⁶ To be sure, the conference approved measures for dealing with some of the other problems with remittances, mostly through education or explanation: explaining that the RMB’s strengthening meant a corollary fall in the values of foreign-denominated remittances; instructing all *qiaopi* couriers about a uniform 0.005% commission on remittances from 1 October that they

³³ The term *qiaoxiang* is short-hand for *huaqiao jiaxiang* [华侨家乡].

³⁴ Liao, Nan, ‘Guanyu huaqiao juanshu fuli huiyi jianyao qingkuang de baogao [jielu]’, 06/09/1950, 1949-1952 *jinrong juan*, 811.

³⁵ The Land Reform is discussed in the following pages, but it is worth noting that it had begun from as early as 1946. See Westad, *Decisive Encounters*, 128-137; Li Fangchun, ‘Mass Democracy, Class Struggle, and Remoulding the Party and Government during the Land Reform Movement in North China’, *Modern China*, 38:4 (2012), 411-445; Suzanne Pepper, *Civil War in China: The Political Struggle, 1945-1949* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), 207-212.

³⁶ Liao, Nan, ‘Guanyu huaqiao juanshu fuli huiyi jianyao qingkuang de baogao [jielu]’, 06/09/1950, 1949-1952 *jinrong juan*, 811.

were permitted to charge; to introduce more efficiency in the postal service; to allow couriers or returning *huaqiao* to bring in certain items duty-free as a sort of remittance-in-kind to circumvent the imperialists' exchange controls.³⁷ These were all sensible moves to address existing concerns—but none of them addressed the problems for remittances that were consequent to the Land Reform.

It was not as if the OCAC and PBOC—and the other conference attendees—had failed to recognise that securing the party-state's interests (in remittances) also required fulfilment of *huaqiao* interests. The problem was that *qiaowu* could not yet resolve the problems that the Land Reform posed to the remittance flow, particularly since the party-state itself was uncertain on what should, or could be done. The conference declared that it was important to 'strengthen the internal unity' between the *huaqiao* and *qiaojuan*, because it was the *qiaojuan* who regularly conveyed news of China to relatives overseas (through their letters), and thus extra care had to be taken to eliminate *huaqiao* suspicions, so they could 'be assured and safely remit money to support their families'.³⁸ This was clearly recognition of the dualistic—indeed, transnational—nature of *huaqiao* interests that underpinned remittances. And while the conference admitted that there were limits to the external measures that it could undertake, it proposed to improve external *qiaowu* by: raising the levels of *huaqiao* patriotism; helping *huaqiao* to find ways to contribute to their hometowns; encouraging *huaqiao* to legally oppose the foreign imperialists' restrictions on remittances; promoting unity with the *qiaopi*; strengthening the efficiency of banks administering remittances; and by organising collective efforts to revitalise remittances in the CPG.³⁹ This was all very well and good—except for the ironic fact that though the conference's proposed policies showed that it recognised that *qiaowu* had to cater to *huaqiao* interests in order to fulfil the party-state's interests, it had also done

³⁷ Ibid., 812-814.

³⁸ Ibid., 815.

³⁹ Ibid.

nothing to address the main issue that had the most negative impact on *huaqiao* interests, and consequently, on *huaqiao* remittances.

The inability of the conference to offer any solution to the problems that came out of the Land Reform was because there was no agreement on what could or should be done—even though the problem was clear. Inasmuch as ‘deviations’ in the Land Reform had negatively impacted remittances, Nan and Liao admitted that there were differing views on how *qiaowu* should respond to the Land Reform, and thus the conference had avoided coming to a decision: ‘leaving it all to the Ministry of the Interior to conduct further study of the problem’.⁴⁰ Nothing was to be done for the moment, and indeed, nothing could be done yet, because the question of how the Land Reform and *qiaowu* could correlate was in essence, a question about how the *huaqiao* should fit into the new socialist society. This was an on-going debate at the time, and it was a question far easier to deal with in theory than it was in practice.

If only 1%:

The CCP’s Land Reform predated their civil war victory and by 1950, ‘class struggle in the countryside’ had been in progress for a few years.⁴¹ This involved—along Soviet lines—the categorisation of the Chinese countryside into classes, with labourers, poor peasants and middle peasants, set against the landlords and rich peasants.⁴² In theory, the CCP cadres in charge of Land Reform facilitated (if not, led) ‘struggle sessions’ where the poor, hitherto exploited classes voiced their criticisms of, and grievances against their past capitalist oppressors and feudalist exploiters, who would then confess their sins and accept redistribution of their land and assets, thus creating a fairer society.⁴³ In practice, Land Reform very often degenerated into an ‘orgy of violence’, coerced re-distribution(s),

⁴⁰ Ibid., 814.

⁴¹ Dikötter, *The Tragedy of Liberation*, 65.

⁴² Ibid., 66.

⁴³ Ibid., 65-69.

death, and destruction.⁴⁴ This campaign began in CCP-controlled Northeast China around 1946, and spread southwards with the PLA's advances. Yet, by 1948, the CCP apparently began to consider moderating the pace of Land Reform.⁴⁵

By February 1948, Mao was instructing CCP cadres to 'not be impetuous' in Land Reform, which had to match the 'level of political consciousness of the masses and the strength of leading cadres'.⁴⁶ Part of the reason for caution was (as seen in the preceding chapter) because of Stalin.⁴⁷ But equally, CCP control in the 'new liberated areas' was tenuous, and there were already incidences of resistance.⁴⁸ Yet, it does not appear that the Land Reform became less violent, even after the PRC's inauguration, since more reports of 'badly-styled decisions' of rural cadres reached the CCP CC from at least December 1949.⁴⁹ 'Deviationist' cadres were apparently responsible for 'wanton violence, death and arrests' [乱打, 乱杀, 乱抓], and the CCP CC was concerned enough to instruct regional authorities to quickly rectify the deviations.⁵⁰

The impetus towards rectification masked the 'considerable debate' within the CCP leadership on 'how severe Land Reform should be', particularly in the southern regions, which the PLA had only recently taken control of.⁵¹ This debate, in early 1950, leaned towards relative moderation—as Mao himself seemed to suggest in his proposal that a Land Reform Law to underpin the nationwide Land Reform Campaign, exclude the 'semi-feudal rich peasants' for the time being, so that the CCP could better unite the

⁴⁴ Dikötter, *The Tragedy of Liberation*, 67; Westad, *Decisive Encounters*, 133-136.

⁴⁵ Between 500,000 to 1 million people had been killed or driven to suicide in the Land Reform by 1948. See Dikötter, *The Tragedy of Liberation*, 72.

⁴⁶ Mao Zedong, 'Essential points in Land Reform in the New Liberated Areas', 15/02/1948, *Selected Works*, IV: 201-202 (201).

⁴⁷ See Document No. 5, 'Cable, Stalin [Kuznetsov] to Mao Zedong [via Terebin]', 20/04/1948, *CWIHP Bulletin*, No. 16 (2007/8), 114-115; Dikötter, *The Tragedy of Liberation*, 73.

⁴⁸ Westad, *Decisive Encounters*, 134-135.

⁴⁹ CCP CC, 'Zhonggong zhongyang dui huazhong ju guanyu jiuzheng xiagcun gongzuo ganbu buliang zuofeng jueying de pishi', 01/12/1949, *ZZWX*, 1: 148-153 (148).

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 1: 148.

⁵¹ Vogel, *Canton under Communism*, 95.

country and avoid ‘ultra-Left deviations’.⁵² Similarly, there was also a strong sentiment amongst some in the CCP leadership that moderation should be applied to the Land Reform as it was carried out amongst the *huaqiao* in China.

The CCP CC recognised that the *huaqiao* should be treated differently in the Land Reform because their particular situation involved certain ‘special issues’.⁵³ Yet, the Land Reform Law (30 June 1950) promulgated by the CPG Committee failed to define what these special issues were. Article 24, in the section ‘on the handling of the questions to do with special cases’ simply stated that:⁵⁴

Land and houses owned by Overseas Chinese should be handled in accordance with appropriate measures determined by the People’s Governments (or military administrative committees) of the various big administrative areas or by provincial People’s Governments on the principle of having regard for the interests of Overseas Chinese and in keeping with the general principles of this law.⁵⁵

The CPG Committee did not explain what these ‘appropriate measures’ regarding the *huaqiao* were to be. But then again, the lack of specificity about the *huaqiao* position in the Land Reform reflected the fact that the party-state had not yet determined how to deal with *huaqiao* interests, both in relation to the imperatives of Land Reform, and to the strategic economic imperative to secure *huaqiao* remittances.

Although a prior CCP CC discussion of the Land Reform Law in May 1950 acknowledged *teshu* [特殊 special or exceptional] circumstances for *huaqiao*, it was unclear how this was defined. Thus the CCP CC, in an effort at clarification, ordered the Fujian Province CCP Committee (FPC) to report on how they would address the question in July 1950. Fujian was home to many *qiaoxiang*, but its Party Committee was not keen

⁵² Mao Zedong, ‘Request for opinions on the tactics for dealing with Rich Peasants’, 12/03/1950, *Selected Works*, V: 24-25.

⁵³ CCP CC, ‘Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu tudi fa cao’an qicao gongzuo youguan wenti gei hua’nan fenju de zhishi’, 13/05/1950, *ZZWX*, 3: 35.

⁵⁴ CPG Committee, ‘Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo tudi gaige fa’, 30/06/1950, *JYZW*, 1: 292-299 (297).

⁵⁵ ‘The Agrarian Reform Law of the People’s Republic of China’, 30/06/1950, in Harold Hinton (ed.), *The People’s Republic of China, 1949-1979: A Documentary Survey; Vol. I-V* (Wilmington: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1980), I: 63-66 (65).

on special consideration for the *huaqiao*.⁵⁶ In September 1950, the FPC reported that the general nature of land ownership in *huaqiao* areas was of dense populations and scarce land. Tanmu village had on average 0.815 *mu* of land per household, Shixi had 0.482 *mu*, Xujia had 1.04 *mu*—and even then, this was not particularly fertile land since yields were historically low, and grain shortages were common.⁵⁷ These were the reasons why people became *huaqiao* in the first place, and coming from such poverty, the majority ended up in working class professions. But the report also noted that ‘the *huaqiao* also have in their midst, members of the feudalist and exploitative classes’.⁵⁸ This included rich peasants, landlords (big and small) and households owned or maintained by capitalist (or bourgeois) *haiwai huaqiao*. Yet, even if the socio-economic make-up of the *huaqiao* households was mixed, the FPC was ambivalent about special considerations for them.

The FPC’s stated priorities were to ‘eliminate the landlord class and feudalist oppression, enabling the peasantry to gain land’; ‘to develop agrarian production’; and (only) then, ‘to look after *huaqiao* interests’. It is unlikely that the order of these priorities was random, since the FPC was firm in its rejection of ‘one-sidedly looking after *huaqiao* interests’.⁵⁹ The FPC argued that when ‘dealing with the exploitative and feudalist elements amongst the *huaqiao*’, it sought to avoid being forced to ‘retain excessive standards, and therefore cause contradictions with the general principle of the Land Reform’, simply because of so-called *huaqiao* special characteristics.⁶⁰ Of course, land and/or property that deserved exemption should not face expropriation or redistribution, but equally, those who deserved to be struggled against should not be exempted. What was required was the recognition of the ‘close connection’ between Land Reform and the

⁵⁶ CCP CC, ‘Guanyu you min, yue liang shengwei ge qicao yi chuli huaqiao tudi fangwu tiaoli cao’an de jueding’, 15/07/1950, in CASS, CA (eds), 1949-1952 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo jingji dang’an ziliao xuandian: nongcun jingji tizhi juan [hereafter, 1949-1952 nongcun jingji tizhi juan] (Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 1992), 320.

⁵⁷ 1 *mu* [亩] is the equivalent of 0.0667 hectare (666.7 m²). See FPC, ‘Min huaqiao tudi fangwu wenti chuli banfa cao’an’, 02/09/1950, 1949-1952 nongcun jingji tizhi juan, 320-323 (321).

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ Ibid.

⁶⁰ Ibid., 322.

development of the *huaqiao* economy, so as not to ‘naively and one-sidedly exaggerate the special characteristics of the *huaqiao* and thus create inappropriate and excessive demands’.⁶¹ Thus the FPC suggested that the *huaqiao* should worry less about their interests and support the Land Reform first. Only then would exploitation be eliminated and production revitalised, thus enabling economic development that both the *huaqiao* and non-*huaqiao* stood to gain from.

Furthermore, regarding concerns over the possibility that the Land Reform might negatively affect *huaqiao* remittances, the FPC’s report suggested that:

Some [*qiaojuan*] believe that this approach will affect *huaqiao* remittances, but everyone here believes that as long as commercial and industrial policy is managed well, remittances will be unaffected. To give *huaqiao* landlords too much consideration in this respect is to be detached from the will of the masses.⁶²

Indeed, the FPC reported that a *qiaojuan* said that other *qiaojuan* who only collected rent (on land paid for by remittances) and did not labour [劳动 *laodong*] were as bad as non-*huaqiao* landlords.⁶³ Yet, it seems unlikely that this was an honest view; the FPC itself had noted in May 1950 that a very large majority of *qiaojuan* were dependent on remittance (or remittance-derived) incomes for their livelihoods, which makes this self-condemnation a rather unlikely one.⁶⁴ The FPC did suggest that for *huaqiao* who had not been landlords prior to going abroad—and had bought land with the profits of their post-emigrant labour (i.e. through remittances)—they should be differentiated from landlord households who had always been so.⁶⁵ But regardless, the FPC insisted that *huaqiao* should not be allowed ‘extra consideration’ in class assessments, since having to make allowances each time the *huaqiao* were involved would only confuse the masses.⁶⁶ The

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁴ FPC, ‘Guanyu minsheng huaqiao tudi qingkuang baogao’, 25/05/1950, 1949-1952 *nongcun jingji tizhi juan*, 317-318 (317).

⁶⁵ FPC, ‘Min huaqiao tudi fangwu wenti chuli banfa cao’an’, 02/09/1950, 1949-1952 *nongcun jingji tizhi juan*, 322.

⁶⁶ Ibid., 323.

FPC was thus clearly not in favour of special allowances for the *huaqiao*—whatever their special characteristics or circumstances. Yet, ironically enough, the party-state soon went in an entirely opposite direction.

On 6 November 1950, the Government Administration Council (GAC) decreed its ‘Measures governing disposal of land and other property of Overseas Chinese during Agrarian Reform’.⁶⁷ This first established who the *huaqiao* were in connection to the Land Reform Law, so that the appropriate articles could be applied. Accordingly, the *huaqiao* were legally defined as those who had lived abroad for at least a year and/or their immediate family in China (*qiaojuan*), while a *guiqiao* was a *huaqiao* who had not (already) returned for more than three years.⁶⁸ The decree also integrated the FPC’s proposed differentiation between variant *huaqiao* landlords households; those who were landlord households before they (or their members) had gone abroad (and become *huaqiao*) would remain so, and thereafter face the full application of the Land Reform. Whereas landlord households that only became so after they (or their members) had gone overseas—and sent back money to buy land—were allowed to keep their private property (i.e. houses), even though their land could face expropriation. The ‘special’ justification here was that those *huaqiao* who had been poor, and thus forced into economic migration, had also suffered from capitalist or imperialist oppression and exploitation while abroad, much like the working class had—even if they became landlords later.⁶⁹

This relative leniency was not merely for the treatment of the landlords, it also applied to assessment of who were landlords.⁷⁰ For one, *huaqiao* landlords ‘who were engaged in industrial and commercial activities’ were to be dealt with under Article 4 of

⁶⁷ GAC, ‘Measures governing disposal of land and other property of Overseas Chinese during Agrarian Reform’, 06/11/1950, in Wu, *Dollars, Dependents and Dogma*, Appendix C-III, 172.

⁶⁸ This also excluded residents of Hong Kong/Macao, reactionaries/counter-revolutionaries, criminals, and feudalists/big landlords See Peterson, *Overseas Chinese in the People’s Republic of China*, 46-47.

⁶⁹ CCP CC Central-South Land Reform Committee, ‘Zhongnan qu ge sheng nongcun teshu tudi wenti diaocha’, 17/11/1950, 1949-1952 *nongcun jingji tizhi juan*, 313-317 (314).

⁷⁰ Peterson, *Overseas Chinese in the People’s Republic of China*, 47.

the Land Reform Law, which exempted properties used for such purposes from any expropriation.⁷¹ Exemptions were also given to *qiaojuan* who employed labourers to farm some of their land; they were to be classified as ‘semi-landlord with rich peasant status’, which meant that under Article 6, they too could escape expropriation.⁷² Non-labour derived income (like remittances) only mattered in one respect: per Article 8, all *qiaojuan* were entitled to the same quantities of redistributed land or assets as non-*huaqiao* households, except for households who lived off remittances alone, and did not labour.⁷³ It is worth noting that the FPC (and other provinces like Guangdong) had actually suggested some or parts of these policies.⁷⁴ Which makes the necessity for the GAC’s direct intervention somewhat curious, as were the exemptions for the *huaqiao* landlords that contradicted Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy—even if a Chinese revolution required Chinese characteristics.⁷⁵ Sinicization was a convenient ideological cover for the CCP most of the time, but this *qiaowu* requires some explaining.

It was not so much the characteristics of the Chinese revolution—or even CCP benevolence—as much as it was the PRC’s circumstances that dictated *qiaowu*.⁷⁶ The key consideration was the onset of China’s intervention in the Korean War, or what the party-state would later call ‘the Great Movement to Resist America and Assist Korea’.⁷⁷ Given that Mao was demonstrating a growing inclination to intervene in Korea from as early as August 1950—indeed, even before Inchon—it only stands to reason that certain

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² GAC, ‘Tudi gaige zhong dui huaqiao tudi caichan de chuli banfa’, 06/11/1950, in *Huaqiao yanjiu hui* (ed.), *Huaqiao fagui huibian: di yi ji* (Beijing: Lianhe chubanshe, 1951), 7-8.

⁷³ Wu, *Dollars, Dependents and Dogma*, 173.

⁷⁴ Xiao Jitang, ‘Xin Zhongguo chengli chuqi tudi gaige zhong huaqiao zhengce de zhiding’, 33-43.

⁷⁵ For Lenin, the re-allocation of land was ‘an immediate and infallible test of who stands for the peasants and who for the landlords’. See V. I. Lenin, ‘The Land Question in the Duma’, 12/05/1906, *Volna*, No. 15 [<https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1906/may/12.htm>] Accessed 10 December 2014.

On the other hand, *après* Mao: ‘In applying Marxism to China, Chinese communists must fully and properly integrate the universal truth of Marxism with the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution.’ See Mao Zedong, ‘On New Democracy’, 01/1940, *Selected Works*, II: 339-384 (380-81).

⁷⁶ For narratives of CCP benevolence, see Zhao Zengyan, ‘Jianguo chuqi qiaoxiang de tudi gaige’, 72; Xiao Jitang, ‘Xin Zhongguo chengli chuqi tudi gaige zhong huaqiao zhengce de zhiding’, 36.

⁷⁷ See Gary D. Rawnsley, “‘The Great Movement to Resist America and Assist Korea’: how Beijing sold the Korean War”, *Media, War & Conflict*, 2:3 (2009), 285-315; Masuda Hajimu, *Cold War Crucible: The Korean Conflict and the Postwar World* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2015), 170-195.

economic priorities in the PRC were raised to higher levels of importance, even as the country made preparations for war.⁷⁸ In September 1950, the CFEC had already reported to Mao that in order to aid national economic construction, it was vital to engage in increasing production, improving communications and infrastructural networks, ‘attracting *huaqiao* remittances’, and ‘creating impetus for the progressive return of capital to the country’.⁷⁹ To be sure, economic construction was a priority even before the Korean War, but that only makes it all the more likely that the actual intervention necessitated even more attention to the economy.

On 27 October 1950, just two days after the Chinese People’s Volunteers had crossed the Yalu River—and sent the Cold War to new heights of tension—vice-Premier (and CFEC head) Chen Yun and Finance Minister Bo Yibo sent a memo to Mao and the CCP CC regarding their ‘Estimates on the Current Situation and Measures to address Financial Questions’.⁸⁰ Chen and Bo’s planning presumed a scenario where the Korean War would escalate, and possibly lead to attacks on China.⁸¹ The point being, as Chen told the CFEC on 15 and 27 November, that there would be intense economic pressures in 1951.⁸² Whereas planning for 1950 presumed ‘peaceful recovery’, the onset of war predicated increased expenditure and a ‘lower revenue expectation’.⁸³ Chen admitted that the economy was far from resilient, and despite higher expenditures, China could not seek foreign loans, or issue more bonds, since ‘it would not amount to much as well’.⁸⁴ Hence, as Chen said:

⁷⁸ See Chen Jian, ‘China’s Road to the Korean War’, *CWIHP Bulletin*, No. 6/7 (1995), 41; Zhang Shu Guang, *Mao’s Military Romanticism: China and the Korean War, 1950-3* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1995), 85; Niu Jun, ‘The birth of the People’s Republic of China and the road to the Korean War’, in Leffler, Westad (eds), *The Cambridge History of the Cold War*, I: 221-243 (237).

⁷⁹ CFEC, ‘Zhong caiwei guanyu quanguo jinrong huiyi qingkuang xiang Mao Zedong zhuxi bing zhongyang de zonghe baogao’, 06/09/1950, *JYZW*, 1: 358-361 (358).

⁸⁰ Chen Yun, Bo Yibo, ‘Guanyu shiju de guji yu caijing wenti de duice’, in, CCP CC, ‘Zhonggong zhongyang zhuanfa Chen Yun, Bo Yibo, guanyu shiju de guji yu caijing wenti de duice’, 27/10/1950, *ZZWX*, 4: 211-214 (211-212).

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 4: 211.

⁸² Chen Yun, ‘Kangmei yuanchao kaishi hou caijing gongzuo de fangzhen’, 15/11/1950 and 27/11/1950, *JYZW*, 1: 407-415.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, 1: 408.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 1: 410.

In terms of investment in economic development, we have the following guidelines. Anything that has a direct impact on military affairs and materiel, anything with direct impact on state revenue, and anything that stabilises the market; these we will fully embrace and engage in. We have to be circumspect about everything else.⁸⁵

In that light, and considering what the OCAC and PBOC had reported about the Land Reform's early impact on remittances, it is clear that *huaqiao* remittances were the underlying basis for the 1950 GAC decree. In that sense, *qiaowu* was predicated on a party-state desire to 'fully embrace and engage' in securing remittances.

Unfortunately for the CFEC, while China's intervention in Korea underlined the necessity of remittances—given rising expenditure and falling revenues—it also created a different difficulty, since it resulted in the United States' intensification of an 'economic Cold War' against the PRC, and the introduction of sweeping economic sanctions.⁸⁶ This was a new and unwelcome development that the CFEC rushed to counteract in December 1950, issuing instructions designed to reduce the impact of the American sanctions. These ranged from the 'rush purchases' of import materials before the embargo took effect, to the cancellation of orders, the refund of purchases that had been blocked from transfer to Chinese ports, and new regulations on the flow of remittances.⁸⁷

The new regulations promulgated by the PBOC in December 1950 suggested that remittances could, and should henceforth be sent in the form of import materials.⁸⁸ The problem with foreign currency transfers was that this left the PRC exposed to the added

⁸⁵ Ibid., 1: 411.

⁸⁶ Zhang Shu Guang uses 'economic cold war' in the PRC context to refer to 'the heyday of the Washington-led Western embargo on the People's Republic of China (PRC) between 1949 and 1963, which is better known as the China embargo'. See Zhang, *Economic Cold War*, 1.

⁸⁷ The CFEC calculated that the PRC might lose around US\$60 million in foreign exchange (that was still tied up overseas) in the immediate term, if it was not able to cancel orders, re-sell goods, or convert its USD into other neutral currencies. See Zhang, *Economic Cold War*, 86-101.

⁸⁸ PBOC Head Office, 'Meidi dongjie zijing yilai wo zhi cuoshi', 12/1950, in CASS, CA (eds), *1949-1952 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo jingji dang'an ziliao xuanbian: duiwai maoyi juan (zhong)* [hereafter, *1949-1952 duiwai maoyi juan (zhong)*] (Beijing: Jingji guanli chubanshe, 1994), 475-476.

Zhang explains this decision as an instruction to "domestic companies", state-owned or private, to work on turning overseas remittances into import materials. Should these import materials not sell well in China, state-owned trading companies were required to purchase or take charge of them; at the same time, if needed, the [PBOC] would 'advance money to these companies to be paid to remittance receivers.'" See Zhang, *Economic Cold War*, 88.

risks and difficulties of ensuring transactions, even while the US and its allies tightened the pressures on Chinese trade and finances.⁸⁹ Yet, realising however that the *huaqiao* would not necessarily understand what was going on, the CFEC made limited allowances for *huaqiao* to still send money home directly, albeit only in Swiss francs, or HKD via Hong Kong; while *guiqiao* were encouraged to bring gold or US dollars (only in cash) with them into China on their returns.⁹⁰ Yet, none of this meant that the perception of the remittances' core utility to the economy was diminished—in fact, even despite the new pressures, the OCAC and PBOC took pains to stress that remittances remained a critically important resource for the country.⁹¹

In January 1951, the BOC issued instructions to promote remittances in RMB instead of foreign currency. This reflected the change in the utility of foreign currency remittances as a mechanism to preserve value in an era of foreign sanctions on China, and it seems to have convinced remitters quickly since the BOC estimated in February 1951, that RMB now made up 40% of remittances via Hong Kong.⁹² Indeed, the BOC seemed to believe that the *huaqiao* would now prefer RMB to their prior 'misguided affection for foreign currency', while the *qiaojuan*, once assured of the value of RMB remittances, would welcome the change.⁹³ To some extent, the BOC was simply being self-congratulatory: 'this success demonstrates that the People's Government has served the *qiaobao*, executing correct remittance policy, and the achievements we have accomplished have also been educational towards the *qiaobao* in showing to them New China's economic prosperity and the ever-increasing standards of living for the people'.⁹⁴ This was rather disingenuous, since the bank did not promote RMB remittances until it

⁸⁹ CFEC, 'Guanyu ji zuzhi qiaohui zhuanbian jinkou zhi huadong, zhongnan, huanan, Fujian caiwei', 18/12/1950, 1949-1952 *duiwai maoyi juan (zhong)*, 481-482 (481).

⁹⁰ Ibid., 482.

⁹¹ OCAC, Trade Ministry, PBOC Head Office, 'Qiaohui gai wuzi jinkou juti banfa', 10/03/1951, 1949-1952 *duiwai maoyi juan (zhong)*, 482-485 (485).

⁹² BOC Head Office Overseas Chinese Remittances Branch, 'Yijiu wuyi nian fen tuixing renminbi qiaohui de chengxiao', 24/02/1951, 1949-1952 *jinrong juan*, 835-836 (835).

⁹³ Ibid., 836.

⁹⁴ Ibid.

was forced to by the embargo. But nonetheless, the BOC's assessment implied that the way to incentivise the *huaqiao* abroad into maintaining, or increasing remittances, was to focus on the domestic settings and interests—as indeed, the ‘ever-increasing standards of living for the people’ implied. This focus actually reflected the direction that *qiaowu* was generally moving towards by 1951.

The OCAC and the PBOC had first pointed to the transnationality of *huaqiao* interests underlying their remittances back in September 1950, and the OCAC also led the charge to embrace this transnationality more broadly in policy-work. In early 1951, the OCAC sent directives to local governments to instruct them on the collection of *haiwai huaqiao* publications.⁹⁵ This information-gathering drive was apparently due to a desire ‘to better understand the situation of the *qiaobao*’.⁹⁶ But the OCAC ordered that this drive be kept secret, ‘to avoid the unreasonable scrutiny of the reactionary governments’ on those *haiwai huaqiao* who were sending materials back.⁹⁷ This sense of caution was also evident in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ (MFA) orders to the PRC’s representatives based in Southeast Asia to: ‘plan for the long-term, preserve our strength; avoid risk-taking, forestall losses’.⁹⁸ The MFA instructed representatives to organise opposition to American imperialism amongst the *huaqiao* if possible, but only if it did not alienate any local revolutionary or political movements, and if it was not illegal. The point was that such moves would also bring undue suspicion onto the *huaqiao*, both from local governments, and also from non-Chinese political movements.⁹⁹ Encouraging the *huaqiao* to support their homeland was thus never to risk their long-term interests and security.¹⁰⁰ Here was thus a basic acknowledgement of transnational *huaqiao* interests;

⁹⁵ OCAC to Beijing People’s Government (BPG), 21/05/1951, Beijing Municipal Archives (BMA) #008-002-00592, 9.

⁹⁶ Ibid., 8.

⁹⁷ Ibid., 9.

⁹⁸ MFA, ‘Waijiao bu jiu dong nanya huaqiao guoqing qingzhu huodong xiang youguan shiguan zhishi’, 10-22/09/1951, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archive (MFAA) #117-00081-08, 1.

⁹⁹ Ibid., 2.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

for the OCAC (and MFA) the implication was that effective policy looked to the *huaqiao* interest, even if it was served best by downplaying loyalties to, or support for New China. This secured their longer-term interests, enabling them to continue remitting money home, which ultimately was the bigger (and far better) contribution to the party-state's interests. Yet, it is also worth noting that the most effective *qiaowu* was actually that which focused on domestic *huaqiao* interests.

To be sure, the transnationality of *huaqiao* interests meant that *haiwai huaqiao* interests—in whichever foreign country—were key to the flow of remittances. Indeed, the logic for the OCAC and its fellow *qiaowu* practitioners was inescapable: without the *haiwai huaqiao*, there would be no remittances. Yet, since motivations for remittances were centred on the persons, property, and maybe even philanthropy, that were all *in* China, the other inescapable fact was that incentivising the *huaqiao* to send and receive remittances depended on domestic considerations. In a way, perhaps this was always a given; remittances had historically been mostly for family support. In any case, by 1951, this understanding had been forced to the forefront.

Given an understanding that *qiaowu*—and its imperative to gain remittances—was best served by addressing the transnationality of *huaqiao* interests, the party-state and its *qiaowu* practitioners began to undertake broader approaches to *qiaowu* policy, that went beyond facilitating finances. In that respect, Shanghai—that great port at the heart of Chinese trade, finance and industry, and the home of many *qiaojuan*, *guiqiao* and *qiaosheng*—was a microcosm of *qiaowu*'s new direction. In April 1951, the Shanghai People's Government (SPG) acknowledged that the *qiaojuan* 'cannot be meaningfully separated from *hawai qiaobao*'.¹⁰¹ Thus, the task for the SPG was to cater to *qiaojuan* (domestic) interests, precisely so as to pacify the interests of the *haiwai huaqiao*, and thus

¹⁰¹ SPG Civil Affairs Department, 'Shanghai shi qiaowu gongzuo qingkuang baogao', 24/04/1951, Shanghai Municipal Archive (SMA) #B168-1-838, 3.

ensure the smooth flow of remittances.¹⁰² Moreover, the SPG also suggested that the *haiwai huaqiao* had great interest in investing in China, and needed guidance.¹⁰³ The SPG thus created a separate *qiaowu* office under its Civil Affairs Department, to focus on these issues and to work with other *qiaowu* practitioners.¹⁰⁴ This typified the direction *qiaowu* was headed in: always defined by the remittance imperative, but underpinned by broader approaches to *huaqiao* interests. As the SPG noted: ‘We must help them [*huaqiao*] solve their problems, encourage them in their patriotism, and strive to win their support and participation in national construction’.¹⁰⁵

Shanghai’s attempt to professionalise and domesticate *qiaowu* reflected the prevailing *qiaowu* discourse in the party-state’.¹⁰⁶ Indeed, given the domestic centre of gravity for *huaqiao* interests, the task for *qiaowu* was to cast the PRC as the guardian of those domestic (indeed, Mainland) interests. Zhou Enlai (in October 1951) claimed that while foreign governments persecuted the *huaqiao*, New China had a ‘deep care for them’.¹⁰⁷ Similarly, He Xiangning conflated *guiqiao* and *qiaojuan* participation in the ‘Great Movement to Resist America and Assist Korea’ with *haiwai huaqiao* opposition to the US’ imperialism.¹⁰⁸ Indeed, He asserted that even if the US restricted remittances, the *qiaojuan* and *guiqiao* could participate positively in the Land Reform and production, and achieve self-reliance.¹⁰⁹ Equally, the *haiwai huaqiao* could help to revitalise industry by remitting to invest in it.¹¹⁰ Ultimately, as He said:

Dear *qiaobao*, I hope that you, while overseas, are able to work closely together with our foreign friends, and more positively embrace, on the one hand the

¹⁰² Ibid., 3-4.

¹⁰³ Ibid., 3

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., 4.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid., 5.

¹⁰⁶ The Shanghai approach was soon to be replicated elsewhere. See BPG to Ministry of Light Industry, 18/10/1951, BMA #022-012-00646.

¹⁰⁷ Zhou Enlai, ‘Zai quanguo zhengxie di yi jie sanci huiyi shang de zhengzhi baogao’, 23/10/1951, *DHGLR*, 18.

¹⁰⁸ He Xiangning, ‘Zai guiqiao fandui Meiguo wuzhuang Riben shiwei youxing dahui shang de jianghua’, 21/02/1951, *DHGLR*, 112-113 (112).

¹⁰⁹ He Xiangning, ‘Gao guiguo nanqiao ji qiaojuan xiongdi meimei men’, 21/02/1951, *DHGLR*, 113-115 (114).

¹¹⁰ Ibid., 115.

development and establishment of your own overseas enterprise; and on the other hand, also participation in New China's construction work. You can always look to the CPG for concern and positive assistance because you belong to a homeland that loves you.¹¹¹

The public discourse on *qiaowu* was thus that the PRC would do its duty to the *huaqiao*, and if the *huaqiao* (writ large) were similarly to give their homeland all their love and support, then everyone stood to gain. Yet, the problem with this discourse was that—and once again for the CCP—rhetoric was not reality.

In June 1951, at the first-ever OCAC Expanded Conference on *qiaowu* work, He Xiangning equated the new era of New China's 'great construction' with a 'new era' of *qiaowu*. He defined *qiaowu*'s duties as to introduce to all the 'broad masses of *qiaobao* and *qiaojuan*' the 'great victories of our homeland, the role of Mao Zedong thought in these victories, and the situation and experience of the nation-wide and unified struggle in economic construction'.¹¹² Indeed, He said that *qiaowu* was intended at: 'organising *qiaojuan* and *guiqiao* to participate in production', and 'encouraging *huaqiao* capital investment in national construction'. As He declared, these were the 'things that affect the *huaqiao* whether they be within or without China, particularly in terms of *qiaojuan* and *guiqiao* livelihood', and therefore had to be the focus of *qiaowu*.¹¹³ Yet, the real reason why a 'new era' of *qiaowu* was concerned with the 'things that affect the *huaqiao*' was rather more to do with its underlying political economy.

In a report to Zhou Enlai in June 1951, He Xiangning stated that to 'strive for *huaqiao* remittances and to forestall the possibilities of difficulties arising in the flow', the OCAC requested that the national banks 'take special care of remittances, and the special circumstances of *qiaosheng*, and come up with a plan for capital preservation and guaranteed interest rates'.¹¹⁴ According to He, a remittance deposit of HKD 2000 per

¹¹¹ Ibid.

¹¹² He Xiangning, 'Gao hao qiaowu de kaiduan gongzuo', 17/06/1951, *DHGLR*, 116-117 (116).

¹¹³ Ibid., 117.

¹¹⁴ He Xiangning, 'Baohu qiaohui, zhengqu qiaohui', 06/1951, *DHGLR*, 118-119 (118).

month for each *qiaosheng* was sufficient to support their studies; for a *qiaojuan* household (of 3-4 persons), HKD 3000 was enough for basic necessities. Moreover, these figures, according to He, were on the low side.¹¹⁵ Indeed, He asserted that:

Based on our estimates of there being over 10 million *huaqiao*, if only 1% of the *huaqiao* respond to our encouragement, this would be a capital inflow of around HKD 200 million in funds for construction and production.¹¹⁶

He was right to point out that remittances would constitute capital reserves for the economy—and not individual property—because the state banks were basically the only ones legally entitled to administer foreign exchange deposits, conversions, and the monthly payments. But He's rhetoric also reflected two larger points. Firstly, He's scenario of 1% responding meant HKD 200 million more, and not 100,000 more *huaqiao* sharing in the warm embrace of the homeland. Secondly, He's conditional 'if' suggested that she recognised that gaining remittances depended on whether *qiaowu* could successfully convince the *huaqiao*. Thus the 'new era' of *qiaowu* was actually an exercise in the accumulation of economic resources, underpinned by the politics of persuasion.¹¹⁷ The *huaqiao* were thus given special considerations, not because they were legitimately entitled, but because the whole exercise rested on *qiaowu* being able to offer a convincing argument, or indeed, an incentive for remittances.

In a way, despite the fact that the OCAC and *qiaowu* practitioners were, in essence, devising an elaborate deception—or at the very least, deliberate manipulation of *huaqiao* relations, identities and connections—given that this *qiaowu* approach was designed to incentivise the *huaqiao* into remittances, and basically, greater economic utility, there was perhaps still a convergence in this utilitarianism between the party-state's economic interests and *huaqiao* interests. In that sense, despite its disingenuousness, perhaps there

¹¹⁵ Ibid., 118-19.

¹¹⁶ Ibid., 119.

¹¹⁷ The Chinese word *ruo* (若) is actually even more indicative of the conditional: '若有 1%的华侨响应我们的号召,就可有 2 亿港币投入建设生产中了'. See He Xiangning, 'Baohu qiaohui, zhengqu qiaohui', 06/1951, *DHGLR*, 119.

were benefits for all in this form of *qiaowu*. Yet, what was also true was that the relative success of this policy approach depended on successfully convincing the *huaqiao* that their interests were met. Thus Liao Chengzhi declared to some Burmese and Indonesian *huaqiao* visitors to China in September 1951 that:

We are determined, on the domestic front, to do all aspects of *huaqiao* work well, while on the external front, our embassies will spare no effort in seeking to protect *huaqiao* interests.¹¹⁸

This was the gospel of the ‘new era’ of *qiaowu* that the OCAC preached.¹¹⁹ But then again, Liao and his fellow *qiaowu* practitioners would soon realise just exactly how much *qiaowu* was failing to convince.¹²⁰

All *huaqiao* have money:

The Korean War was the impetus for an intensification of the CCP’s attempt at socio-political transformation, particularly as Mao believed that China’s intervention could both raise its ‘international prestige’, and also generate ‘added political energy for securing Communist control of China’s state and society’.¹²¹ Thus, alongside the mobilisation of the Chinese people’s ‘hatred of the U.S. imperialists’ came also an intense campaign to suppress ‘reactionaries and reactionary activities’.¹²² To be sure, this was partly a reaction to the perception of external threat.¹²³ But it was also to eliminate all remaining resistance to CCP control.¹²⁴ Mao and the CCP CC had, after all, ordered the campaign prior to the Korean intervention, justifying it as:

¹¹⁸ Liao Chengzhi, ‘Zhong qiaowei de jinhou gongzuo’, 26/09/1951, *DHGLR*, 161-162 (161).

¹¹⁹ Liao Chengzhi, ‘Guanyu huaqiao xuexiao de jige wenti’, 01/11/1951, *DHGLR*, 162-164; Liao Chengzhi, ‘Huaqiao baozhi de mubiao’, 09/11/1951, *DHGLR*, 165.

¹²⁰ One only has to look at Liao’s frustrated report (as discussed further along in this chapter) to Liao Luyan, the Minister of Agriculture, and Zhou Enlai in December 1951, to realise this. See Liao Chengzhi, ‘Jianjue jiuzheng qiaozu tudi gaige zhong ‘zuo’ de piancha’, 20/12/1951, *DHGLR*, 165-170.

¹²¹ Chen, *Mao’s China and the Cold War*, 59.

¹²² Ibid.

¹²³ Teiwes, *Politics and Purges in China*, 85.

¹²⁴ Frank Dikötter argues it was the CCP’s insecurity that drove the suppression campaign, while most Chinese proto-official narratives suggest that it was a response to counter-revolutionary plots. See Dikötter, *The Tragedy of Liberation*, 85; Zhang Min, ‘Jianguo chuqi de zhenfan douzheng gaishu’, *Dang de wenxian*, No. 2 (1988), 31-41.

So as to strike a blow against the imperialists' plots to sabotage, and to completely eliminate Chiang Kai-shek's remaining bandit groups; so as to ensure the smooth progress of the Land Reform and economic construction; and so as to consolidate and expand the victory of the Chinese people.¹²⁵

Significantly, the CCP CC explicitly tied the suppression [镇反 *zhenfan*] to the Land Reform, which implied that those who obstructed its 'smooth progress' were counter-revolutionaries and/or reactionaries. Equally, to 'strike a blow' against the enemies of the revolution was to intensify the Land Reform—which had, to some in the Party, been too lenient on the landlords and overly-concerned with 'peaceful class assessment, peaceful expropriation and peaceful redistribution'.¹²⁶

The perception of threat at home and abroad in late 1950 thus engendered in China's leaders the belief that it was necessary to 'transform the country's Land Reform into a violent class struggle'.¹²⁷ This was enunciated by Deng Zihui—in charge of Land Reform in Central-South China—in a speech in December 1950 that rejected 'purely technical' Land Reform and called for the destruction of the landlords, and for 'class struggle and opposition between hired labourers, poor and middle peasants, and landlords'.¹²⁸ Yet, 'landlord' was fast becoming 'a kind of stand-in category for all forms of assumed and imputed opposition to the Party and the Revolution'.¹²⁹

Initially, the CCP CC was concerned by the possibility of far-left deviations.¹³⁰ But the problem was that they were inconsistent. In December 1950, Deng Zihui and the Central-South Bureau suggested a 'hands off approach to mobilisation' of peasants, to

Around 712,000 persons were executed, 1.29 million imprisoned, and 1.2 million placed under house arrest. See Yang Kuisong, 'Reconsidering the campaign to suppress counterrevolutionaries', *The China Quarterly*, No. 193 (2008), 102-121 (120-121).

¹²⁵ CCP CC, 'Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu zhenya fan geming huodong de zhishi', 10/10/1950, *JYZW*, 1: 364-366.

¹²⁶ Jiang Guangliang, 'Kangmei yuanchao yundong dui jianguo chuqi tudi gaige yingxiang chu tan — yi Jiangxi sheng wei li', *Journal of Jiangxi Normal University (Social Sciences)*, 48:3 (2015), 93-97 (93-94).

¹²⁷ Peterson, *Overseas Chinese in the People's Republic of China*, 48; Philip C.C. Huang, 'Rural Class Struggle in the Chinese Revolution: Representational and Objective Realities from the Land Reform to the Cultural Revolution', *Modern China*, 21:1 (1995), 105-143.

¹²⁸ Peterson, *Overseas Chinese in the People's Republic of China*, 48.

¹²⁹ Ibid., 48-49.

¹³⁰ CCP CC, 'Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu jin yi bu kaizhan kangmei yuanchao aiguo yundong de zhishi', 02/02/1951, *JYZW*, 2: 23-25 (23).

allow them to ‘attack the landlords’. To the Bureau, to take a ‘hands off approach to mobilising the masses’ was in fact ‘to be complacent on class struggle’, while to ‘one-sidedly insist’ on a predetermined schedule for Land Reform work, and to ‘speak hollowly of a united front’, was ‘a half-cooked appearance’.¹³¹ The CCP CC agreed that Land Reform should not ‘veer right’ and let landlords off easily, but it warned that far left deviations were dangerous. In particular it warned against misguided attacks on rich peasants, wanton violence, coercion and ‘creating a big storm about very little’.¹³² Yet, the CCP CC was obviously not successful in advocating restraint, since by January 1951 this radicalisation had spread to East China as well.¹³³

Conversely, even as the CCP CC preached relative restraint, some other CCP leaders also called for radicalised mobilisation, such as Mao Zedong’s November 1950 call to Fujian to ‘accelerate the progress of the Land Reform, and to expand the armed and determined suppression of counter-revolutionary activities in local areas’.¹³⁴ What this meant was that even as *qiaowu* from November 1950 and into 1951 attempted a ‘new era’ of policy, the party-state was instigating—whether inadvertently or not—a more radical mood that would have very serious repercussions for *qiaowu*.

In December 1951, Nan Hanchen and Hu Jingyun issued the PBOC’s official report on remittance work for the year just past.¹³⁵ According to their calculations, 1951’s remittances had increased year-on-year by 40% (US\$118 million to US\$170 million).¹³⁶ Direct investment by *huaqiao* [侨资 *qiaozhi*] amounted to US\$3 million; a small figure compared to remittances for household support, but still a welcome trend. This, the PBOC

¹³¹ CCP CC Central-South Bureau, ‘Zhongnan ju guanyu fangshou fadong qunzhong chedi wancheng tugai jihua de zhishi’, 01/12/1950, *ZZWX*, 4: 402-414 (402).

¹³² CCP CC, ‘Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu tugai zhong jiuzheng youqing pianxiang he zhuyi fangzhi ‘zuo’ qing weixian gei zhongnan ju de pifu’, 20/12/1950, *ZZWX*, 4: 400-402 (400).

¹³³ CCP CC, ‘Zhonggong zhongyang zhuanfa huadong ju, Zhejiang shengwei guanyu jiuzheng tugai zhong cuo hua jieji chengfen de zhishi’, 22/01/1951, *ZZWX*, 5: 49-51 (49).

¹³⁴ Jiang Guangliang, ‘Kangmei yuanchao yundong dui jianguo chuqi tudi gaige yingxiang chu tan — yi Jiangxi sheng wei li’, 94-95.

¹³⁵ Hu Jingyun was the PBOC vice-President.

¹³⁶ Nan Hanchen, Hu Jingyun, ‘Qunian qiaohui gongzuo zongjie yu jinnian zhengqu kuoda qiaohui qiaozhi de fangzhen’, 06/12/1951, 1949-1952 *jinrong juan*, 836-838 (836).

claimed, vindicated the correctness of their slogan to ‘serve the *qiaobao*, [and] facilitate *huaqiao* remittances’. The PBOC’s correct policy, it argued, had been in: organising the *qiaopi* couriers to overcome the Western embargo; maintaining good awareness of the situation amongst the *huaqiao* overseas; strengthening the ‘education’ (or propagandising) of *haiwai huaqiao* and *qiaojuan*; continuing the professionalising of *qiaowu* to efficiently handle *qiaojuan* travel documents, currency exchange, and to find employment for, and settle *huaqiao* refugees [难侨 *nanqiao*]; ensuring that bank branches spread information to the *huaqiao*; strengthening communication networks between the government and the *huaqiao*; providing guidance on investment opportunities to the *huaqiao*; and in assisting *huaqiao* enterprises in the recovery and expansion of their businesses.¹³⁷

Yet for all the achievements the PBOC claimed, they were also very cautious. The PBOC asserted that the importance of remittances to the economy was only going to increase; *huaqiao* remittances in 1951 were equivalent to 80% of China’s exports to the ‘capitalist countries’—which was year-on-year growth of 29%.¹³⁸ Thus remittances ‘would henceforth be an important source of strength in supporting the national economy’.¹³⁹ However, the PBOC’s report also contained indications that there were problems—foreign and domestic.¹⁴⁰ In the foreign situation, the Western embargo was still in effect, with consequent difficulties for *qiaopi* and the remittance flows. Yet, when it came to the domestic setting, the situation was far more problematic.

The PBOC called for a very ‘thorough rectification of deviations in the Land Reform’. This meant strengthening propaganda and education in the *qiaoxiang* and overseas, to correct the actions of cadres and Land Reform work units, since—whether due to cadres’ deviations or rumours spread by ‘Chiang bandits’—the *huaqiao* had

¹³⁷ Nan, Hu, ‘Qunian qiaohui gongzuo zongjie yu jinnian zhengqu kuoda qiaohui qiaozi de fangzhen’, 06/12/1951, 1949-1952 *jinrong juan*, 837-38.

¹³⁸ Nan, Hu, ‘Qunian qiaohui gongzuo zongjie yu jinnian zhengqu kuoda qiaohui qiaozi de fangzhen’, 06/12/1951, 1949-1952 *jinrong juan*, 815-819 (815).

¹³⁹ Ibid.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid., 816.

developed ‘four fears’ about remittances. Firstly, that remittances left recipients liable to higher class assessments (i.e. landlords); secondly, that the banks would arbitrarily deduct from remittances; third, that recipients would be coerced into making ‘donations’; and fourth, that local Peasant Associations would force recipients into making ‘loans’.¹⁴¹ All of this meant that large sums of remittances were left in accounts in Hong Kong, for fear that withdrawal in China would lead to problems. The PBOC thus insisted on ‘educational’ work to *qiaojuan* to alleviate their fears, so that they could then inform *huaqiao* relatives of the ‘true’ conditions, and ‘more thoroughly rectify the deviations’.¹⁴²

Nan and Hu made it clear that none of this was the PBOC’s fault. The problem, as they saw it, was that large-scale propaganda was not possible in imperialist-controlled countries, but the most effective propaganda was always via *qiaojuan* letters. That, to the central bank, placed the blame on the local cadres. Some of the poor or false information emanating from the villages was allegedly the fault of the reactionary ‘old intellectuals’ who wrote rumour-mongering letters on behalf of others. Yet, this did not convince the PBOC since its own inspection had found many *qiaojuan* writing the ‘tales of misery’ themselves. One view was that the *qiaojuan* did not write of a better life for fear of censorship by ‘reactionary governments’, and hence ‘continually spoke of misery’. Yet, the PBOC did not believe this, and stated that what was needed was more guidance from local cadres to the *qiaojuan* on the information they were sending overseas. This was not something the PBOC considered part of its responsibility; it was rather the duty of cadres and Land Reform work units.¹⁴³ What the PBOC saw as its chief concern was in ‘offering guidance to *huaqiao* investment’; since remittances mostly depended on *qiaojuan* needs and interests, local cadres were to be responsible for rectifying the situation.

¹⁴¹ Ibid., 816-17.

¹⁴² Ibid., 817.

¹⁴³ Ibid., 818.

To be true, the issue of information dissemination—a ‘letter writing campaign’ as Glen Peterson notes—was particularly controversial at the time.¹⁴⁴ While intended at creating positive publicity for New China, and to revitalise remittances, the campaign instead stirred up negative publicity, as many *qiaojuan* either wrote about poor conditions in *qiaoxiang*, or wrote ‘ransom notes’ requesting (demanding) money for fear of what local Party cadres and Land Reform work units might do to them otherwise.¹⁴⁵ The PBOC’s report, on the other hand, demonstrates that it was not concerned with who was actually to blame for the content of the letters—whether it was the ‘counter-revolutionary intellectuals’, local cadres, or misguided *qiaojuan* was beside the point. The point was that it had to be rectified because it affected remittances.

The PBOC was not alone in its concern. Liao Chengzhi, in a report to Liao Luyan, the Minister for Agriculture, and Premier Zhou Enlai (also in December 1951), also criticised the Land Reform in *qiaoxiang*. Liao drew a comparison between Fujian and Guangdong, and stated that because the FPC had developed a better, and more accurate understanding of remittances and Land Reform in *qiaoxiang*, ‘there had not yet been any complaints from overseas’. Yet, in Guangdong, deviations abounded. As the Western Guangdong Party Committee admitted: ‘some of them [cadres] even believe: all *huaqiao* have money—all of them are bad’.¹⁴⁶ Liao believed that such views amongst local cadres were exacerbated by their rudimentary understanding of economics, and thus resulted in serious deviations. These, as Liao described, included cadres ‘attacking inaccurately, [and] attacking without restraint’. To them, ‘all landlords were evil’ but even leasers of small plots (i.e. 1-2 *mu*) and small retailers were assessed as landlords. Cadres conflated capitalism with feudalism, and thus ‘attacked’ without discernment, with *qiaojuan* possessing less than even 1 *mu* of land assessed as landlords because their remittances

¹⁴⁴ Peterson, *Overseas Chinese in the People’s Republic of China*, 32.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid., 32-36.

¹⁴⁶ ‘凡是华侨都有钱的, 都不是好东西’, in Liao Chengzhi, ‘Jianjue jiuzheng qiaoxiang tudi gaige zhong ‘zuo’ de piancha’, 20/12/1951, *DHGLR*, 166.

basically constituted ‘exploitative profit’. Unsurprisingly, all of this had caused ‘a stirring up of insecurity’ amongst the *huaqiao*.¹⁴⁷

This situation, to Liao, had an impact on perceptions of New China amongst the *haiwai huaqiao*. Based on the OCAC’s research and reports from consulates, Liao asserted that because of the news from home, and because of negative rumours spread by the US and its allies, *haiwai huaqiao* had increasingly negative views about the PRC. But this situation could not be addressed, Liao asserted, unless there was a solution to the internal problem first, which the OCAC’s research had firmly centred on the issue of *huaqiao* remittances. As Liao described, *qiaojuan* were fundamentally afraid of the persecution to which remittances opened them to. This was anything from higher class assessments (as landlords); being ‘struggled against’, which ranged from public shaming to physical violence; expropriation, or forced ‘contributions’ of 30-50% of remittances, or forced loans. All of which resulted in *qiaojuan* writing to relatives telling them either to send less money, or not at all, with some even sending received remittances back. Even though the PBOC stated that overall remittances were up, Liao pointed out that Guangdong had seen decreases in a three-month period *after* Land Reform, while fully 40% of the remittances sent for central Guangdong remained in Hong Kong accounts, because nobody dared to withdraw the money.¹⁴⁸

Faced with such a situation, Liao proposed nine rectifications. Firstly, that the South China Bureau require Party Committees and Land Reform work units to study ‘the local *qiaojuan* situation’, examine previous activities, and effectively disseminate the 1950 GAC decree. Second, to ensure that class assessments followed the letter of the law. Thirdly, *huaqiao* remittances were not to be used as a form of class assessment; it was not a form of feudalism, nor was it capitalist profit.¹⁴⁹ Fourth, to ensure that the (real)

¹⁴⁷ Ibid., 165-167.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid., 167.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid.

huaqiao landlords were dealt with proportionately under the 1950 GAC decree. Fifth, *qiaojuan* who were renting out their land because of a lack of labour were not landlords.¹⁵⁰ Sixth, officials were not to use remittances to assess how much *qiaojuan* could rent their land out for—and they were not to force *qiaojuan* ‘to beg for more money’. Seventh, when ‘struggling against’ the truly evil *huaqiao* landlords, action had to be approved by at least county-level Party Committees. Eighth, ‘all matters relating to *huaqiao* remittances must adhere to the governance and regulations issued by the banks’, while cadres were prohibited from interfering with remittances. Ninth, to mobilise the *huaqiao* to support the Land Reform, and to combat the falsehoods, every county was to hold its own *qiaowu* discussion meetings to explain government policy, rectify deviations, and enable the *huaqiao* to inform their relatives abroad of the improving situation in the homeland and in their hometowns.¹⁵¹

Liao knew that there were serious problems with the Land Reform, and that the *huaqiao* had justifiable concerns. However, his concern was not so much for *huaqiao* suffering, but rather for the unacceptable risks to remittances. Thus his proposal that education be strengthened for *qiaojuan*, so that they would write more positive letters to relatives. It was the remittances that mattered to *qiaowu*—not the *huaqiao*. Or, as Liao instructed on the suggested discussion meetings: ‘there must necessarily be some sort of preparation beforehand, lest they become meetings for *qiaojuan* to voice their misery’.¹⁵² Avoiding the perception of misery was the main focus—not actually removing it.

The OCAC and PBOC reports in December 1951 proved very influential, and Liao’s nine-point rectification was approved on 3 January 1952.¹⁵³ This was almost

¹⁵⁰ Ibid., 168.

¹⁵¹ Ibid., 169.

¹⁵² ‘但这种会必须有准备,不然就会变为侨眷诉苦会’, in Liao Chengzhi, ‘Jianjue jiuzheng qiaoxiang tudi gaige zhong ‘zuo’ de piancha’, 20/12/1951, DHGLR, 169.

Ironically, the *sukuhui* [诉苦会 Grievance Meetings] had been used very effectively by the PLA to win the masses over to the CCP during the Civil War. See Zhang Yong, ‘Jiefang zhanzheng zhong yi sukuhui wei zhongxin de xinshi zhengjun yundong’, *Zhonggong dangshi yanjiu*, No. 6 (2010), 72-80.

¹⁵³ OCAC Party Group, ‘Dui tugai zhong huaqiao tudi caichan chuli de jiu dian banfa’, 03/01/1952, 1949-1952 nongcun jingji tizhi juan, 323-324.

immediately followed by the CCP CC's first-ever statement on *qiaowu* on 6 January. The CCP CC formally defined *haiwai huaqiao* as nationals of the PRC—those who had taken up local citizenship were no longer to be included. Yet, the CC acknowledged that all *huaqiao* had close connections with their homeland, not least because of their 'unbreakable bonds' with the *qiaojuan*. Thus *qiaowu* was to protect the 'legitimate interests' of *huaqiao*, to align *huaqiao* policy with foreign policy and to expand the patriotic unity of the *huaqiao*.¹⁵⁴ This entailed 'positive methods within and without China', that would 'protect the legitimate interests of the *huaqiao*, serve the *huaqiao*, welcome back refugees', and also encourage the *haiwai huaqiao* to 'gradually move their assets and business back to the homeland'.¹⁵⁵ The CCP CC also instructed that the *huaqiao* (especially in Southeast Asia) should avoid local politics, while *qiaowu* should communicate with them more effectively, and 'exert great strength in doing *huaqiao* remittance work well, to guide the *huaqiao* to return and invest in China, and to direct the *huaqiao* towards work that would best preserve their rightful interests'.¹⁵⁶

To be sure, the CCP CC's instructions were not new, with one notable exception in the unprecedented renunciation of *huaqiao* dual nationality rights, and by extension, *jus sanguinis*, but even that was not publicly communicated until 1955.¹⁵⁷ Thus what the CCP CC statement actually constituted was both an endorsement of *qiaowu*, and a roadmap for its future. The CCP CC accepted the transnationality of *huaqiao* interests, as derived from 'unbreakable bonds' between *huaqiao* in and outside of China. It approved the focus on domestic-centred interests as a means of incentivising *huaqiao* remittances and more broadly, economic contribution. And the CCP CC endorsed the position that outward-facing *qiaowu* should avoid incurring problems for the *haiwai huaqiao* and their

¹⁵⁴ Other scholars have, for whatever reason, failed to examine this particular memorandum. See CCP CC, 'Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu haiwai qiaomin gongzuo de zhishi', 06/01/1952, CKZL, 19: 429-430.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid., 19: 429.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid.

¹⁵⁷ The *jus sanguinis* principle suggested that *huaqiao* were always entitled to Chinese nationality as a result of their ethnicity, and was thus the basis for their dual nationality. See Chapter 3.

long-term interests. In fact, given the renunciation of dual nationality, this revealed the party-state's intent to shed responsibility for the *huaqiao* outside of the PRC's borders, without compromising the portrayal of New China as the locus of *huaqiao* 'patriotic unity', and to focus on *qiaowu* inside China, and to therefore portray the party-state as the guardian of *huaqiao* interests in the homeland. The CCP CC had thus approved the transnationality of *huaqiao* interests as conceived by the OCAC and its fellow *qiaowu* practitioners, and the political economy of *qiaowu* that was intended to capitalise on that transnationality. Yet, curiously, the CCP CC also pointedly noted that: 'the various local *qiaowu* institutions are to cooperate with local governments in carrying out *guonei huaqiao* and *qiaojuan* work'.¹⁵⁸ But then, this was the crux of the problem.

The OCAC and PBOC believed that effective remittance policy was connected to *qiaowu*'s ability to convince the *huaqiao* that their interests were being fulfilled, but what *qiaowu* practitioners only realised belatedly was that they also had to convince the CCP at the local level. Indeed, a common view amongst local Party officials in South China was that 'struggling against' the *huaqiao* landlords was necessary to satisfy the majority's needs, and to be on the side of the masses. In February 1952, the Party Committee of Zhongshan County (Guangxi Province) reported to the CCP CC South China Bureau, that under current regulations, they were limited to expropriating land from *huaqiao* who had become landlords only after going overseas; but if 'we were not to touch their excess grain, this would affect our ability to satisfy the needs of the poor and tenant farmers, and the majority would be unhappy'.¹⁵⁹ The South China Bureau sent to Beijing for further instructions, and the CCP CC re-emphasised the 1950 GAC decree—but while the Bureau had at least sought clarification from Beijing, this was not always the case.¹⁶⁰

¹⁵⁸ Conversely, external, or *haiwai huaqiao* work was for consular officials. See CCP CC, 'Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu haiwai qiaomin gongzuo de zhishi', 06/01/1952, CKZL, 19: 430.

¹⁵⁹ CCP CC South China Bureau, 'Huanan fenju guanyu tudi gaige zhong zhixing huaqiao zhengce shi faxian de wenti de baogao', 18/02/1952, 1949-1952 nongcun jingji tizhi juan, 325-326 (325).

¹⁶⁰ CCP CC, 'Guanyu tudi gaige zhong chuli huaqiao chengfen wenti gei huanan fenju de fushi', 23/03/1952, 1949-1952 nongcun jingji tizhi juan, 324-325.

In a way, even though the CCP CC instructed *qiaowu* and local officials to work together, what dissonance there was, was of the party-state's own making. What did not help the implementation of the 1950 GAC decree was the launch of yet another mass mobilisation in 1952: the 'Three Antis' campaign (anti-corruption, anti-waste and anti-bureaucratism).¹⁶¹ It was, as Bo Yibo described, 'a revolutionary movement of the same historical importance' as the war in Korea, the Land Reform, and the *zhenfan* campaign.¹⁶² But this particular mobilisation was aimed at securing China's economy by saving money, since 'without adequate supplies of money, we simply cannot build the economy of the New Democracy'.¹⁶³ Thus, and logically enough, the Three Antis initially targeted Party and government officials guilty of corruption, waste and bureaucratism. Yet, the Three Antis soon morphed to target a segment of society that the *huaqiao* had long been vulnerable to being associated with: the national bourgeoisie. According to Zhou Enlai, the Chinese national bourgeoisie, though in the united front and not the same as the big capitalists or comprador classes, were still 'at base the same with bourgeois all over the world', as they were mercenary, profit-driven, opportunistic, and preoccupied with 'their own minority interest'.¹⁶⁴ This, following Zhou's assertion of 'the national economy having the highest priority', meant that these individual interests were going to have to be subjected to 'that which is best able to satisfy the largest possible majority of the people to the highest and most long-term interests'.¹⁶⁵

Zhou was of course, not referring to the *huaqiao* when he made those remarks about individual and national interests. Indeed, given how the party-state saw *qiaowu*'s contribution to the national interest, it is unlikely that Zhou would have considered the

¹⁶¹ CCP CC, 'Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu shixing jingbing jianzheng, zengchan jie zengchan jieyue, fandui tanwu, fandui langfei he fandui guanliaozhuyi de jueding', 01/12/1951, *JYZW*, 2: 415-427.

¹⁶² Bo Yibo, 'Wei shenru di pubian di kaizhan fan tanwei, fan langfei, fan guanliaozhuyi yundong er douzheng', 09/01/1952, *JYZW*, 3: 18-31 (18).

¹⁶³ *Ibid.*, 3: 22.

¹⁶⁴ Zhou Enlai, 'Sanfan yundong yu minzu zichan jieji', 01/02/1952, *JYZW*, 3: 14-17 (14).

¹⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 3: 15.

huaqiao interest—in *qiaowu*'s political economy—to be unnecessary. Yet, that did not mean that CCP cadres were as enlightened. If bourgeois-ness was to be preoccupied with a 'minority interest', it was surely no great leap to see a *huaqiao* landlord, or a *qiaojuan* with remittances as having that 'minority interest'.

Though *qiaowu* had stressed that *huaqiao* landlords were not feudalists, or big capitalists, and that remittances were not exploitative profit, how were local cadres—those whom Liao Chengzhi had derided for ignorance of economics—to reconcile such a differentiation with 'the largest possible majority'? The national bourgeoisie, after all, included a spread of small-time retailers, traders, and industry and commerce owners—so no wonder that local CCP officials like the Zhongshan Committee questioned just how exactly they were meant to fulfil the needs of the majority, and look after the *huaqiao*. Chen Yun and Bo Yibo could state in January 1952 that the Korean War's continuance required careful attention on the economy, but local cadres would have been far more likely to interpret that 'careful attention' in the light of calls to mobilise against capitalist evils—as indeed a second campaign did, on 26 January 1952 with the extension of the 'Three Antis' to a new 'Five Antis'.¹⁶⁶

The problem with local CCP cadres and officials identifying *huaqiao* as either Three or Five Antis enemies was made worse in Guangdong because there, the party-state attempted to conduct a more ideologically-pure Land Reform—with the result that *qiaowu* in the region with the most *qiaoxiang*, was turned upside down.¹⁶⁷ In the wake of the intensification of the Land Reform in late 1950, the Central-South Land Reform Committee had ordered Guangdong officials to take a harsher line in their implementation

¹⁶⁶ The 'Five Antis' were set against: bribery, tax evasion, theft of state property, cheating on government contracts, and economic espionage. See CCP CC, 'Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu shouxian zai dazhong chengshi kaizhan 'wufan' douzheng de zhishi', 26/01/1952, *JYZW*, 3: 45-46; Chen Yun, Bo Yibo, Li Fuchun, 'Yijiu wuer nian caijing gongzuo di fangzhen he renwu', 15/01/1952, *JYZW*, 3: 35-40.

¹⁶⁷ Guangdong had about 6 million *qiaojuan*, while around 20% of land in the province was *huaqiao*-owned. See Dikötter, *The Tragedy of Liberation*, 81.

of Land Reform.¹⁶⁸ The Central-South leaders alleged that Guangdong officials and cadres were too closely linked to the local people, and were overly lenient to landlords because of social (and familial) relationships. Thus accused of ‘localism’, the Guangdong Land Reform Committee was forced into self-criticism and then into a promise in January 1951, that the province’s Land Reform would henceforth be ‘a struggle that shakes heaven and earth’.¹⁶⁹ Yet, the Party evidently did not believe this ‘localism’ could be self-corrected, since over the next two years, 80% of local cadres (from Guangdong) from the county level up were purged and replaced by some 6000 cadres sent from the Northern provinces.¹⁷⁰ These Northern cadres were chosen because they had no local affinities—and certainly, no sympathy.

The purge of Guangdong ‘localism’ was not just because of the Central-South Bureau’s hard line; it was Mao’s desire also to accelerate the Land Reform in South China, and he dispatched Tao Zhu to Guangdong in 1952 with his ‘personal mandate’ to intensify the Land Reform there.¹⁷¹ Tao gradually displaced, replaced or purged leaders accused of ‘localism’—including Fang Fang.¹⁷² Fang had deep roots and a ‘devoted following in the party organisation’ in the region.¹⁷³ But while Fang was the Third Secretary for South China, he was also an OCAC Commissioner.¹⁷⁴ Indeed, Fang had ‘paid special attention to the question of handling land belonging to overseas Chinese’ in a speech in October 1950 on the Land Reform in Guangdong, and so he symbolised *qiaowu* as much as he typified ‘localism’.¹⁷⁵ Both ensured that Fang was demoted in October 1952, and later

¹⁶⁸ Vogel, *Canton under Communism*, 99.

¹⁶⁹ This remark was made by the Guangdong Land Reform Committee’s vice-Chairperson, Li Jianzhen. See Peterson, *Overseas Chinese in the People’s Republic of China*, 49.

¹⁷⁰ Ibid.

¹⁷¹ Tao Zhu had ‘made his name’ in Guangxi’s Land Reform, and much to Mao’s satisfaction. See Dikötter, *The Tragedy of Liberation*, 81; Vogel, *Canton under Communism*, 116.

¹⁷² The purge also included CCP CC South China Bureau First Secretary Ye Jianying. See Vogel, *Canton under Communism*, 116-120.

¹⁷³ Ibid., 97.

¹⁷⁴ Fang Fang was Third Secretary for South China, but since Ye Jianying had other duties in Wuhan at the Central-South Bureau, and since Zhang Yunyi was Party chief in Guangxi, Fang was effectively No. 1 in the Guangdong Party establishment. See Vogel, *Canton under Communism*, 96-97.

¹⁷⁵ Ibid., 97.

removed from the Guangdong Party hierarchy.¹⁷⁶ The party-state was thus seemingly unable to reconcile its *qiaowu* with its own demands for ideological purity.

Yet, for Liao Chengzhi, to insist on ideological dictates against *qiaowu*, as had been the case in Guangdong, would only undermine its political economy. In a speech to visiting Burmese *huaqiao* in May 1952, Liao made a curious remark: ‘It does not matter what occupations the *qiaobao* are in—industry, agriculture, small-scale retail or business, or capitalists, even if comprador-capitalists—as long as they have the homeland in their hearts.’¹⁷⁷ Furthermore, since ‘the homeland and overseas are two different places entirely; the situation is different in each and our methods must also be different’—and thus, as Liao said, ‘we must be careful not to make the mistake of dogmatism’.¹⁷⁸ Liao may have couched these remarks as being about different domestic and external aspects of *qiaowu*, but actually, his point was rather more critical.

Liao’s warning about dogmatism was not merely about avoiding transplanting domestic *qiaowu* to external settings (and vice versa). His point was rather that the correct approach was one which employed appropriate *qiaowu* policy in flexible ways. In June 1952, Liao told the National United Front Conference that reaching out to the *haiwai huaqiao* was to build a ‘Patriotic United Front’ to promote contributions to the homeland. Yet, he also noted that this meant ‘not the methods of revolutionary struggle’, but ‘a gradual approach’. This was because ‘the main components of this unification effort are from the middle and upper levels of society’.¹⁷⁹ And thus it was necessary to avoid activities that might agitate the *haiwai huaqiao*, such as propagandising on the Three and Five Antis, or stirring revolutionary activity amongst them that might provoke their local governments. It also meant encouraging *huaqiao* to visit their homeland, because this

¹⁷⁶ Fang Fang became an OCAC vice-Chairman in 1954, probably because of Liao’s patronage, so Dikötter errs in saying that Fang was ‘never heard of again’. See Dikötter, *The Tragedy of Liberation*, 81.

¹⁷⁷ Liao Chengzhi, ‘Cujin huaqiao de aiguo da tuanjie’, 12/05/1952, *DHGLR*, 170-174 (172).

¹⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 173-174.

¹⁷⁹ Liao Chengzhi, ‘Qiaowu gongzuo de fangshi, fangfa wenti’, 18/06/1952, *DHGLR*, 174-175 (174).

allowed them to report to friends and family on New China; and striving to win *huaqiao* direct investment, because it had a ‘huge implications for our political situation’.¹⁸⁰ This would all—Liao said—increase remittances. Yet, as Liao noted, *qiaowu* was also very much about appropriate policies towards the *huaqiao* in China. This included China’s acceptance of 18,000 *huaqiao* refugees, ‘with great results for propaganda work’.¹⁸¹ But Liao pointedly noted that positive management of the *qiaojuan* and *qiaoxiang* also had ‘decisive meaning’: which meant that it was thus necessary ‘to look after *huaqiao* in the Land Reform’, not to harass them, and not to go beyond the boundaries of the law in expropriations.¹⁸² Thus, and as far as Liao was concerned, ‘revolutionary struggle’ should not undermine the political economy of *qiaowu*.

Ironically, the CCP CC seemed to share Liao’s views on avoiding the (forced) conflation of ‘revolutionary struggle’ and *qiaowu*. Or at least, the CCP CC never quite recognised that the contradiction had been of its own making. Thus, even as it sought intensification of Land Reform—especially in Guangdong—the CCP CC also ordered the rectification of Land Reform deviations in *qiaoxiang* in April and September 1952.¹⁸³ Indeed, the CCP CC even ordered that, ‘if there is a lack of clarity as to whether *huaqiao* should be classified as middle-rich peasants, middle peasants or poor peasants, assessments should be inclined towards a lower classification and not higher’.¹⁸⁴ Of course, such *qiaowu* policies made for good propaganda, which also encouraged investment.¹⁸⁵ After all, Liao’s United Front Conference speech had drawn a direct line between overseas propaganda and more *huaqiao* direct investment, and this was a correlation that the party-state was profoundly interested in, particularly since reports

¹⁸⁰ Ibid., 175.

¹⁸¹ Ibid.

¹⁸² Ibid.

¹⁸³ CCP CC, ‘Huanan fenju jiuzheng zhixing huaqiao zhengce piancha de baogao’, 27/10/1952, 1949-1952 *nongcun jingji tizhi juan*, 326-328.

¹⁸⁴ Ibid., 327.

¹⁸⁵ As was the remit of the new 中国新闻社, or China News Service (CNS), in September 1952. The CNS was different from Xinhua as its main role was to convey information to the *huaqiao*. See Liao Chengzhi, ‘Banhao Zhongguo xinwen she’, 14/09/1952, *DHGLR*, 175-77.

from East China in August 1952 suggested a considerable investment interest amongst *huaqiao*. Given that Shanghai alone could report remittance values of US\$1.6 million per month, the potential for returns were clear enough.¹⁸⁶ This therefore explains also the urgency of the moves to create an ‘Overseas Chinese Investment Guidance Committee’ made up of regional representatives, the CFEC, OCAC, Trade Ministry and other related agencies, to find areas for *huaqiao* investment, and to encourage and lead the investors.¹⁸⁷ Thus, on the surface, Liao’s ‘positive management’ of *qiaowu* seemed to work. Yet, the problem was that while this made for positive propaganda, the latter presumed that the Land Reform deviations in *qiaoxiang* were being rectified. Yet, given that the CCP CC neither recognised, nor addressed the contradictions that it had helped to create, this assumption, as it turns out, was actually very misguided.

In December 1952, the OCAC and PBOC issued a damning report on *qiaowu*. On the one hand, they admitted that they had not been as successful as they had hoped in attracting *huaqiao* investment. On the other, overall remittances had risen year-on-year from US\$118 million (1951) to US\$170 million (1952), which meant that remittances were still dominated by remittances to *qiaojuan*.¹⁸⁸ The PBOC and OCAC were proud of the increases, but they warned that ‘in various districts, regional and local authorities—especially village cadres—are guilty of very serious deviations in their conduct’.¹⁸⁹ Cadres were still using remittances to assess class statuses, arbitrarily punishing those

¹⁸⁶ ‘Henduo huaqiao zixin hui guo biaoshi youyi huiguo touzi’, 05/08/1952, *Neibu cankao* [NBCK]. The *Neibu cankao* [内部参考 internal reference] was a journal of confidential reports by Xinhua reporters, for the purposes of keeping the higher echelons of the CCP in the know about all sorts of affairs. Its circulation was limited to the ministerial level or higher. See Huang Zhengkai, ‘1950 niandai zhonggong xinhua’she ‘neibu cankao’ de gongneng yu zhuanbian’, MA Thesis (National Chengchi University, Taiwan: 2006); Mao Zedong, ‘Dui xinhua’she ‘neibu cankao’ de yijian’, 16/01/1953, *JYZM*, IV: 16.

¹⁸⁷ See CFEC, ‘Zhong caiwei dianxun gedi na xie gongye xu huaqiao touzi’, 06/09/1952, in CASS, CA (eds), *1949-1952 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo jingji dang'an ziliao xuanbian: gongshang tizhi juan* [hereafter, *1949-1952 gongshang tizhi juan*] (Beijing: Shehui kexue chubanshe, 1993), 767; CFEC, ‘Zhong caiwei zhaoji youguan wei fuzhe ren canjia de zhuanti huiyi’, 13/10/1952, *1949-1952 gongshang tizhi juan*, 768-69; CFEC, ‘Zhong caiwei guanyu dui huaqiao huiguo touzi wenti de zhishi’, 17/10/1952, *1949-1952 gongshang tizhi juan*, 770; OCAC to Fujian People’s Government, ‘Qing xiezhu diaocha huaqiao jingying qiyi qingkuang de han’, 27/11/1952, FPA #0148-003-2003-0003.

¹⁸⁸ PBOC Head Office, OCAC Party Group, ‘Guanyu san nian lai qiaohui ji huaqiao touzi de baogao’, 10/12/1952, *1949-1952 jinrong juan*, 842-844 (842).

¹⁸⁹ Ibid.

who received remittances, or levying huge fines. Or worse, in areas that had actually finished the Land Reform, cadres were continuing to victimise those with remittances. The ‘four fears’ about remittances were still prevalent, and instability had again led to stoppages.¹⁹⁰ Here, however, the PBOC and OCAC noted that while Shanghai and Fujian practiced ‘correct policy’—and had seen remittance increases—Guangdong was the opposite. Given that Guangdong was home to 60% of the *huaqiao* in China, it had an inordinate significance to *qiaowu* and remittances.¹⁹¹ But Guangdong remittance values had dropped by 14.9% year-on-year.¹⁹² On a national level, Shanghai and Fujian made up for Guangdong’s shortfall, but this was unsustainable. Thus the OCAC and the PBOC restated their tired injunctions once again, while the CCP CC piled on with a nation-wide directive for ‘earnest rectification’.¹⁹³ Yet, perhaps the CCP CC should have considered what its intensification of the Land Reform in Guangdong had resulted in.

Given the stark figures for Guangdong, perhaps Liao Chengzhi was always going to intervene at the CCP CC South China Bureau’s Conference on *qiaowu* in January 1953. While Liao praised the Guangdong Land Reform for eliminating feudalism, he pointedly noted that by Tao Zhu’s own admission, only 25-30% of those *qiaojuan* ‘hit’ had been accurately targeted; whereas 20-25% were wrongly attacked, and 50% dealt with disproportionately.¹⁹⁴ This was unacceptable, and Liao argued that the officials needed to recognise the long-term consequences of their failures on *qiaowu* and its political economy. Yet, if they were able to stabilise the situation amongst the *huaqiao* in China, it would give the *haiwai huaqiao* an ‘assurance of heart’, which would thus attract their remittances and capital investment in the economy—which, Liao pointed out, was more

¹⁹⁰ Ibid., 843.

¹⁹¹ CCP CC Central-South Land Reform Committee, ‘Zhongnan qu ge sheng nongcun teshu tudi wenti diaocha’, 17/11/1950, 1949-1952 *nongcun jingji tizhi juan*, 313-317 (313).

¹⁹² PBOC Head Office, OCAC Party Group, ‘Guanyu san nian lai qiaohui ji huaqiao touzi de baogao’, 10/12/1952, 1949-1952 *jinrong juan*, 843.

¹⁹³ PBOC Head Office, OCAC Party Group, ‘Renmin yinhang, qiaowei dangzu guanyu 3 nian lai qiaohui ji huaqiao touzi de baogao’, 10/12/1952, 1949-1952 *gongshang tizhi juan*, 773-774 (773).

¹⁹⁴ Liao Chengzhi, ‘Zai huanan fenju di yi ci huaqiao gongzuo huiyi shang de zongjie baogao’, 01/1953, *DHGLR*, 178-184 (178).

than likely to benefit Guangdong. Thus, Liao asserted, practicing correct *qiaowu* had to be a priority for the local CCP committees and civil administrations.¹⁹⁵

For Liao, the lesson was that *qiaowu* would not be best served if it remained purely an endeavour for the OCAC and its partner government agencies, with (occasional) CCP CC oversight. It was clear that effective *qiaowu* needed to be a part of local civil administration. In January 1953, the OCAC reminded Fujian People's Government (FPG) *qiaowu* officials of the provisions that had been created to effect, as they said, 'a policy of preferential treatment towards *huaqiao* questions'.¹⁹⁶ Moreover, the OCAC reminded provincial authorities of *qiaowu*'s transnationality in March 1953, requiring information on what 'principles' provinces were using in their communications to *haiwai huaqiao*.¹⁹⁷ This was actually more a reminder to conform, since the OCAC told the East China Administrative Committee in May, that as far as *huaqiao* investment was concerned—'the Central Government's guiding principle has certainly not changed'.¹⁹⁸

The early forms of 'preferential treatment towards *huaqiao* questions', were in the PBOC's 'favourable treatment' [*youdai*] policies, intended at reassuring *huaqiao* concerns about the security of remittance deposits, and fluctuations in RMB values. Thereafter, *youdai* also characterised the approach to *huaqiao* 'special issues' in the Land Reform—although that had also been undermined by the failures of Party cadres. But by 1953, *youdai* was no longer just for specific issues; as the OCAC had told the FPG, it was a general principle. Thus it applied also to the *qiaosheng* who were simultaneously: *guiqiao* (returning for higher education), closely connected with *huaqiao* families abroad,

¹⁹⁵ Ibid., 182-183.

¹⁹⁶ The *youdai* extended to customs duties, Land Reform, banking services, *qiaosheng* higher education scholarships, and financial aid for refugees, but not militia service and volunteer labour. See OCAC to Fujian Province Overseas Chinese Affairs Committee, 'Fuhuan dui juti zhaogu guiqiao xianti chuli yijian', 06/01/1953, FPA #0148-002-0465-0021, 2.

¹⁹⁷ OCAC to the Overseas Chinese Affairs Committees of the Guangdong, Fujian and Yunnan Provincial Governments, 'Hanxun dafu guowai huaqiao laixin de qingkuang yu yijian', 26/03/1953, FPA #0148-002-0465-0001, 2.

¹⁹⁸ OCAC to the East China Administrative Committee Overseas Chinese Office, 'Zhong qiaowei fushi guanyu huaqiao touzi wenti', 20/05/1953, FPA #148-002-0457-0001, 2.

and in regular receipt of remittances. In August 1953, this *youdai* saw the OCAC, the CFEC and the Ministry of Education (MOE), increase the total number of *qiaosheng* scholarships by 1,000 places.¹⁹⁹ This was in the *huaqiao* interest, but it also meant 1,000 new regular remittances. This was the basic point of *youdai*; indeed, this was the political economy of *qiaowu*. In September 1953, Shantou (Guangdong) officials reported incidents where school officials had attempted to manage remittances on students' behalf.²⁰⁰ This had led to some *qiaosheng* becoming so incensed that they preferred to send the money back. The OCAC, PBOC and MOE intervened immediately to end this practice. Their intervention was in line with a policy statement that Liao proffered in August 1953. For *haiwai huaqiao*, *qiaowu* would 'consider their vital interests, seek solidarity in self-help, aim for long-term survival, [and] consolidate their patriotic unity'; while domestically, it would 'develop production, facilitate *huaqiao* remittances, look after and help solve *qiaoshu* problems and to gradually improve the lives of *qiaoshu*'.²⁰¹

Yet, the problem was that not everyone agreed with this perspective.

To some extent, the integration of *qiaowu* with local civil administrations did take place. October 1953 saw the Shanghai CCP Committee (SPC) approve a plan by the Shanghai United Front Department to settle a group of 516 *guiqiao* from Japan.²⁰² Shanghai officials noted that these *guiqiao* came from different socio-cultural settings, with varied economic backgrounds, and thus needed help in employment and housing, with finances, acclimatisation to new settings, and finding schools for their children.²⁰³

¹⁹⁹ Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai (500 places); Nanjing, Guangzhou (300); Xiamen (100); Fuzhou (200). See OCAC, CFEC, Ministry of Education to the Beijing People's Government, 'Zhuanfa yijiu wusan nian gedi ruxue huaqiao xuesheng jiaoyu buzhu fei shi de tongzhi', 26/08/1953, BMA #002-020-00658, 14.

²⁰⁰ OCAC, PBOC, Ministry of Education to North China, East China, Central-South Administrative and Military Commissions, 'Guanyu chaofa zhongyang huaqiao shiwu weiyuanhui deng guanyu bu dei qingyi jiang huaqiao xuesheng de huikuan tuihui de han', 14/09/1953, SMA B105-5-770-30, 2.

²⁰¹ The term *qiaoshu* is a variant of *qiaojuan* (from *huaqiao juanshu*). See Liao Chengzhi, 'Guowai huaqiao gongzuo de zhidao sixiang', 02/08/1953, DHGLR, 186-88 (187).

²⁰² SPC to CCP CC East China Bureau, 'Zhonggong Shanghai shiwei zhuanfa zhonggong Shanghai shiwei tongzhan bu "guanyu anzhi luri guiguo huaqiao gongzuo de baogao" de tongzhi', 29/10/1953, SMA A47-2-10-191, 1.

²⁰³ Shanghai United Front Bureau, 'Guanyu anzhi luri guiguo huaqiao gongzuo de baogao', 23/10/1953, SMA A47-2-10-191, 2-3.

This can justifiably be seen as in line with the approach that the OCAC encouraged, but this was actually more a Shanghai exception than the rule.

The problem with the integration of *qiaowu* with local administration was that by 1953, the contradictory behaviour of the CCP had resulted in a common perception of *huaqiao* as class enemies. In February 1953, Xinhua reported that cadres in Guangdong were still failing ‘to carry out the correct *huaqiao* policy of the Central Government, and have violated *huaqiao* remittances’.²⁰⁴ Thus Guangdong cadres apparently refused to reform. Worse still were the September 1953 reports of *huaqiao* unrest in Fujian—which had previously been lauded for its *qiaowu*.²⁰⁵ Apparently cadres were having extramarital affairs with *qiaojuan* wives (one ‘with more than ten’) who voluntarily or not, had been giving their remittances to these cadres. Such affairs, some cadres believed, was ‘to both gain a wife, and also money to spend’.²⁰⁶ Now, the prevalence of *qiaojuan* extramarital activity, reflected in a way, what Glen Peterson calls ‘direct action’ by women after the 1950 Marriage Law.²⁰⁷ But the real issue here was that this was a *qiaowu* disaster. One cadre in Hui An county said:

You *huaqiao* are all capitalists. Anyway, capitalists all have money, so if your wife has an affair, just get a divorce and after that marry another one and it will be fine...in the future capitalists will be struggled against; even Tan Kah Kee will be struggled against.²⁰⁸

If all *huaqiao* were capitalists—indeed, class enemies—and therefore could not seek redress from the authorities, since they were all slated for ‘struggle’, then it was no

²⁰⁴ ‘Guangdong qiaohui jianshao’, 19/02/1953, *NBCK*.

²⁰⁵ The ‘good report’ had been confirmed by the province’s own *qiaowu* officials. See Fujian Province Overseas Chinese Affairs Committee, ‘Di yi ci qiaowu kuoda huiyi zongjie baogao’, 20/11/1952, FPA, #0148-001-0024-0023, 1-5.

²⁰⁶ ‘Haiwai huaqiao dui qu, xiang ganbu luan chuli qiaojuan lihun deng wenti jiwei bu manyi’, 21/03/1953, *NBCK*.

²⁰⁷ See Chapter 3 for a discussion of the Marriage Law (1950) and *qiaojuan*. See also Peterson, *Overseas Chinese in the People’s Republic of China*, 40.

²⁰⁸ ‘Haiwai huaqiao dui qu, xiang ganbu luan chuli qiaojuan lihun deng wenti jiwei bu manyi’, 21/03/1953, *NBCK*.

Tan Kah Kee spent a brief interlude in Singapore in February–May 1950 to settle his private affairs, and wind up his business interests. Thereafter Tan took up residence in Jimei, Xiamen, in Fujian, and focused on rebuilding and expanding the Jimei Schools. See Jin Li Lim, ‘New Research on Tan Kah Kee: The Departure of 1950, and the ‘Return’ of 1955’, *Journal of Chinese Overseas* (forthcoming 2017).

wonder that *qiaowu* found little cooperation from local officials, and it was no wonder that Xinhua warned that ‘the *haiwai huaqiao* are dissatisfied’.²⁰⁹

It was of course, not the fault of *qiaowu* that cadres were behaving in this way, but it was *qiaowu* that bore the brunt of the consequences: Fujian’s remittance values for the first half of 1953 sank by 22.08% year-on-year, which was actually worse than the 16.1% fall for the last six months of 1952.²¹⁰ Xinhua suggested that the decreases were to do with foreign restrictions on remittances, economic pressures overseas, changes in the flow of emigration, and because the poorer *qiaojuan*, after Land Reform, had been so positively engaged in production that they were now ‘less dependent on remittances’.²¹¹ Foreign pressures were not in the control of *qiaowu*—but becoming less dependent on remittances was a strange result. Indeed, given the experiences of the *qiaojuan* in the Land Reform, this was simply untrue. But then again, in the light of everything that had been going on since 1950, perhaps the *qiaojuan* simply did not want remittances anymore. After all, who wanted the struggle?

Conclusion:

By 1953, it was clear that something was rotten with *qiaowu*. Given a core imperative to secure remittances for the party-state, the fact that they were falling indicated that *qiaowu* was failing. In 1950, the PRC added US\$122.57 million to its foreign reserves through remittances; in 1951, it was US\$169.23 million; but for 1953, a mere US\$121 million.²¹² These figures essentially bookmark the narrative of *qiaowu* in the early years of the PRC. To an extent, *qiaowu* had enjoyed a degree of success in revitalising remittance transfers after the end of the Civil War, even in spite of the PRC’s

²⁰⁹ ‘Haiwai huaqiao dui qu, xiang ganbu luan chuli qiaojuan lihun deng wenti jiwei bu manyi’, 21/03/1953, *NBCK*.

²¹⁰ ‘Fujian sheng qiaohui buduan xia xiang’, 30/09/1953, *NBCK*.

²¹¹ *Ibid.*

²¹² See Appendix I. ‘Overseas Chinese Remittances to the People’s Republic of China, 1950–1960’.

intervention in the Korean War. Yet, the drastic collapse of remittances after 1951 (to new lows) indicate that it was the domestic pressures consequent to the radicalisation of the Land Reform, the *zhenfan*, and the Three and Five Antis, that had the greatest—and most negative—effects on the flow of *huaqiao* remittances.

As the OCAC (and other *qiaowu* practitioners) saw it, the primary consideration for *huaqiao* remittance policymaking was really that *huaqiao* remittances embodied a transnationality of interests: for the *haiwai huaqiao* who saw remittances as a pillar of relationships (familial, traditional, cultural, even commercial) with their homeland; and for the *huaqiao* inside China that were dependent on remittances for their livelihoods. This understanding thus influenced the development of *qiaowu*.

On a basic level, since the remitting of funds depended in the first instance on the *haiwai huaqiao*, the main concern for outward-facing (external) *qiaowu* was the longer-term security (and survival) of *haiwai huaqiao* interests, in whichever domicile they resided in. Hence the somewhat counter-intuitive tendency in *qiaowu* to keep public alignment with the CCP or New China to a low profile, at least insofar as the *haiwai huaqiao* were concerned. Yet, given the understanding of *huaqiao* remittances as a derivative of transnational interests between all *huaqiao*—or what the CCP CC called ‘unbreakable bonds’—this implied that that *huaqiao* interests as applied to remittances had a domestic centre of gravity. After all, the relative interests in remitting and receiving remittances were all located in the homeland. Thus *qiaowu* practitioners realised that any attempt to increase (or secure) remittances depended on convincing the *huaqiao* that their domestic interests were being met. But therein lay the problem.

Certainly, convincing the *huaqiao* that their interests in China were being met was a difficult proposition. 1950-1953 saw the introduction and intensification of the Land Reform, the *zhenfan*, the Three and Five Antis, and intervention in the Korean War. The Land Reform, already the cause of death, violence and the destruction of traditional socio-

economic structures, also inordinately affected *huaqiao* in China because remittances became tied to class status, and because special allowances for their ‘minority interest’ made them targets in the midst of ideological radicalisation. The suppression campaign and the Three and Five Antis became, as Frank Dikötter notes, a veritable ‘Great Terror’ with millions executed (1.2 per thousand), and millions more sent to labour camps or placed under the ‘surveillance of the masses’.²¹³ The *huaqiao* were targets because of their alleged bourgeois-ness—whether because of their houses, foreign income, or the fact that many did not need to labour—they were different, and they suffered for it. If *qiaowu* failed to convince, it was because it did not have much to go on.

The party-state’s *qiaowu* practitioners knew what the reality was. Thus the OCAC (and its partners like the PBOC) created policies to cater to *huaqiao* interests in China, or to at least appear as if this was the case. Hence the beginning of the *youdai* approach in *qiaowu* in the early 1950s. Yet, *qiaowu* was not helped at all by contradictory actions by the party-state. Thus Land Reform leniency for the *huaqiao* was undermined by the radicalisation of the Land Reform, and the Three and Five Antis. Even when *qiaowu* was approved by party-state leaders (like the CCP CC’s 1952 statement), the Party itself—or at least its cadres and officials—was uncooperative, and whether because of ignorance or ideological deviation, *qiaowu* encountered resistance. Thus perhaps *qiaowu* also failed to convince the *huaqiao* because it could not even convince its own Party.

There were, however, still some options for the OCAC and *qiaowu* in terms of offering a far more convincing case to prove that *huaqiao* interests would find a warm embrace in their homeland. Indeed, this case was greatly strengthened by the news of the future National People’s Congress (NPC) in 1953, and the prospect of *huaqiao* participation in this (theoretically) highest of state institutions. It is curious that the build-up to the NPC in 1953 was never a significant part of propaganda to the *haiwai huaqiao*—

²¹³ Dikötter, *The Tragedy of Liberation*, 100-101.

or for that matter, to the *qiaojuan* who worried about their safety in a state that had used them for target practice. Though the NPC was declared one of the three main tasks of 1953 (with the first Five Year Plan of economic construction and the Korean War) it nary got a mention in *qiaowu*.²¹⁴ This is surprising, especially since there was significant interest amongst the *huaqiao*.

The Electoral Law (gazetted on 1 March 1953) stated that the *haiwai huaqiao* were reserved 30 delegates in the NPC. Certainly, 30 was not a large bloc, but it was not insignificant. Yet, how these delegates were to be elected was not announced, and was to be separately determined.²¹⁵ This news aroused excitement across the country—and certainly excited the *huaqiao*.²¹⁶ Given also that Tan Kah Kee and He Xiangning were appointed to the NPC's Constitution Drafting Committee, while Liao Chengzhi was placed on the Legislation Committee, there was clearly an opportunity in late 1953 for the OCAC and *qiaowu* to engage on a subject of great interest to the *huaqiao* in and out of China. Yet, whether that was enough to make up for *qiaowu*'s failures in the last three years, was a separate question for 1954.

²¹⁴ CCP CC, 'Yingjie yiji wusan nian de weida renwu', 01/01/1953, *Renmin Ribao*.

²¹⁵ The nationalities/ethnic minorities bloc had 150 seats, while the PLA received 60. See CPG Committee, 'Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo quanguo renmin daibiao dahui ji difang ge ji renmin daibiao dahui xuanju fa', 11/02/1953, *JYZW*, 4: 21-31 (22, 25).

²¹⁶ 'Xiamen bu shao ren dui xuanju fa renshi mohu', 02/04/1953, *NBCK*.

Chapter 3.

No complaints, no escapes, no shortfalls

Chairman Mao has instructed that: “The standard of good agricultural collectivisation should be ‘no pig squeals, no cattle bellows, and no peasant complaints.’” Thus insofar as *huaqiao* work is concerned, it behoves us to ensure that there are: ‘No *huaqiao* complaints, no *qiaojuan* escapes, and no *huaqiao* remittance shortfalls.’

— Luo Lishi, November 1955¹

¹ ‘毛主席指示：“农业合作化好的规格是要做到‘猪不叫，牛不叫，农民不叫’”，那么在华侨工作方面，我们要求做到‘华侨不叫，侨眷不跑，侨汇不少’，in Luo Lishi, ‘Guanyu dali dongyuan qiaojuan guiqiao jiji canjia nongye hezuo hua yundong bing jixu quanmian shenru guanche qiaowu zhengce de baogao’, n.d. (12/1955), *Guangdong qiaowu* [GDQW], No. 15 (1 Jan 1956), 17-28 (21).

The *Guangdong qiaowu* [广东侨务] was published by the Guangdong Province Overseas Chinese Affairs Committee [广东省华侨事务委员会] for ‘internal distribution only’.

Luo Lishi was the deputy-director of the Guangdong Province Overseas Chinese Affairs Committee, but not much else is known of him, probably because he was purged in 1958. See Chapter 5.

Introduction:

In 1955, New China seemed to have an image problem. In March 1955, the CCP CC South China Bureau declared that propaganda towards the *huaqiao* was vital to bolster the patriotic unity amongst the *haiwai huaqiao*; counter the anti-CCP rumours spread by the imperialists; and to address the past failures of CCP cadres in the implementation of *qiaowu*, especially the deviations in remittance work.² These issues required serious attention because: ‘since the Liberation, the *huaqiao* remittance earnings are the equivalent of 50% of our total foreign exchange earnings from trade with imperialist countries’.³ Hence propaganda on, and the correct implementation of *qiaowu*, behoved all Party cadres and officials.

The South China Bureau made it clear that propaganda was a fundamental part of *qiaowu* policy. In a second directive, the Bureau defined propaganda’s role as:

Raising the patriotism of the vast numbers of *huaqiao*, *guiqiao* and *qiaojuan*; improving the socialist understanding of the *guiqiao* and *qiaojuan*; enabling the positive development of *huaqiao* remittances; industriously increasing production and support for the nation’s socialist industrialisation efforts; promoting the patriotic unity of the *huaqiao*; improving the relations between *huaqiao* and the peoples in their countries of residence; and the expansion of our country’s international united front.⁴

This role, as it turns out, was absolutely vital. By 1955, it had become manifestly clear to *qiaowu* practitioners that *qiaowu* was flailing in the face of contradictions. Whereas *qiaowu* was a political economy—both in terms of how it was conceived, and practiced—its application had been hampered by failures in party-state policies, both domestic and foreign, since 1953. These failings contradicted—and sometimes undermined—the ability of *qiaowu* to fulfil its imperatives, especially in terms of securing remittances. This

² CCP CC South China Bureau, ‘Guanyu dangyuan, tuanyuan, ganbu yu guowai huaqiao de lianxi de tongzhi’, 07/03/1955, *GDQW*, No. 9 (22 Mar 1955) 19-20 (19).

The basis for the overall propaganda push towards the *huaqiao* came from the CCP CC. See CCP CC, ‘Guanyu xiang guowai huaqiao xuanchuan zonglu xian de zhishi’, 02/02/1954, *ZZWX*, 15: 222-224.

³ CCP CC South China Bureau, ‘Guanyu dangyuan, tuanyuan, ganbu yu guowai huaqiao de lianxi de tongzhi’, 07/03/1955, *GDQW*, No. 9 (22 Mar 1955) 19.

⁴ CCP CC South China Bureau, Propaganda Department, ‘Guanyu jiaqiang dui huaqiao, qiaojuan xuanchuan gongzuo de zhishi’, 16/03/1955, *GDQW*, No. 9 (22 Mar 1955), 22-23 (22).

chapter begins in late 1953, with an analysis of how *qiaowu* struggled to deal with, on the one hand, the failures and legacies of the Land Reform, and on the other, the political challenges and contradictions, consequent to the advent of the General Line. These challenges were made even more complex in 1954 because of the resistance amongst lower-level Party cadres and officials to *qiaowu* protections for *huaqiao* remittances—let alone its *youdai* provisions. Even worse, these failings also became apparent overseas, and thus provoked negative perceptions of the PRC and its *qiaowu* amongst the *haiwai* *huaqiao*, that were exacerbated by a foreign policy that seemed like it was marginalising them. This was thus a negative situation for *qiaowu*, and as this chapter concludes, was what pushed *qiaowu* practitioners into direct—and firmer—interventions to effect a much broader system of special provisions and *youdai* for the *huaqiao*. The propaganda push to the *huaqiao* in 1955 was thus a function of this impetus for corrective action in *qiaowu*, but as the chapter shows, it had been long overdue by that point.

They will fervently leap:

New China had, by December 1953, apparently reached the end of the first stage of the Chinese revolution. The CCP CC declared that since 1949, imperialism, feudalism and bureaucrat-capitalism had been overturned, and China had been turned into the New Democracy—and thus the PRC had ‘victoriously completed’ the preconditions for the next stage of socialist progress.⁵ This four-year mark was not just for macro views of the revolution, as the OCAC had also used that timeframe for its own review, in an Expanded Conference in November.⁶ In his address to the Conference, Liao Chengzhi asserted that the OCAC had successfully achieved: increases in *qiaosheng* numbers and their economic

⁵ CCP CC, ‘Zhonggong zhongyang pizhuan zhongyang xuanchuanbu wei dongyuan yiqie liliang ba woguo jianshe chengwei yige weida de shehui zhuyi guojia er douzheng — guanyu dang zai guodu shiqi zongluxian de xuexi he xuanchuan tigang’, 28/12/1953, ZZWX, 14: 491-529 (492).

⁶ Liao Chengzhi, ‘Guonei qiaowu gongzuo de zhidao sixiang’, and ‘Qiaoxiang de tudi gaige’, in ‘4 nian lai qiaowu gongzuo de baogao’, 01/11/1953, DHGLR, 194-198.

contributions; ‘great patriotic feeling’ amongst the *huaqiao*; encouragement of *huaqiao* investment in industry; and the integration of *huaqiao* enterprises with national economic development.⁷ Future *qiaowu*, Liao asserted, was to be defined by the General Line and national construction, the domestic and external situation, and alignment with Chairman Mao’s directives.⁸ This meant: mobilising the *huaqiao* in China to positive participation in socialist construction and production; cooperating with educational authorities to better utilise *qiaosheng* talents; seeking ‘self-help through production’ for *guiqiao* (and *huaqiao* refugees) to end their welfare reliance; guiding *huaqiao* capital to positive investments; and implementing the principle of ‘facilitating *huaqiao* remittances, and serving the *huaqiao*'.⁹ To be fair, none of this was particularly new. Indeed, as Liao’s promotion of labour productivity (over welfare) shows, this future *qiaowu* was also evidently in line with national economic plans.¹⁰ Liao had thus presented a record of achievement, and a promise of future relevance—but actually, there was something else.

Liao declared many victories for *qiaowu*, but he also tellingly pointed to the ‘Land Reform in the *qiaoxiang*’ in an entirely separate section of his report.¹¹ This, Liao argued, was the most important aspect of domestic *qiaowu*.¹² The Land Reform had mostly been completed by November 1953, and it had, Liao said, successfully redistributed land to the benefit of 92% of *qiaojuan* from the labouring masses, who had seen their lives positively transformed. This was all well and good, but Liao also admitted that in other respects, the Land Reform in *qiaoxiang* had seen failures and deviations.¹³

⁷ Liao Chengzhi, ‘Guonei qiaowu gongzuo de zhidao sixiang’, 01/11/1953, *DHGLR*, 194-195.

⁸ The General Line [总路线] is discussed in detail subsequently, but here: ‘The general line or the general task of the Party for the transition period is basically to accomplish the industrialization of the country and the socialist transformation of agriculture, handicrafts and capitalist industry and commerce in ten to fifteen years, or a little longer.’ See Mao Zedong, ‘Refute Right Deviationist views that depart from the General Line’, 15/06/1953, *Selected Works*, V: 93-94 (93).

⁹ Liao Chengzhi, ‘Guonei qiaowu gongzuo de zhidao sixiang’, 01/11/1953, *DHGLR*, 195.

¹⁰ See for instance, the directives to cut expenditure and save funds for priority industrial projects: Zhou Enlai, ‘Guodui shiqi de zonglu xian’, 08/09/1953, *JYZW*, 4: 301-313 (313); Deng Xiaoping, ‘Caizheng guongzuo de liu tiao fangzhen’, 13/01/1954, *JYZW*, 5: 34-38 (35).

¹¹ Liao Chengzhi, ‘Qiaoxiang de tudi gaige’, 01/11/1953, *DHGLR*, 195-198.

¹² *Ibid.*, 195.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 196.

Liao's discussion of Land Reform deviations (unsurprisingly perhaps) focused on Guangdong. Out of the province's estimated 6.4 million *qiaojuan*, 60% (3.84 million) had 'gained the benefits of the Land Reform', 35% (2.24 million) had 'not gained any positive benefits, but had not suffered any losses', while 5% (320,000) had been classed as landlords (and had undergone expropriations). But within that 5%, only 25% (80,000) 'were truly landlords' and had been dealt with appropriately; 50% (160,000) were 'basically assessed correctly' but had faced overly-extreme punitive action; and 25% had either been assessed wrongly, or had been dealt with incorrectly. Moreover, aside from the landlords, others had undergone class assessments that had seen 'poor peasants and farm labourers becoming middle peasants; small retailers becoming capitalists; and middle peasants becoming rich peasants'—these were all 'fairly commonplace' errors, and affected around 20% of *qiaojuan* (1.28 million).¹⁴ Perhaps this was why Liao did not mention the Land Reform alongside the other *qiaowu* successes.

The reasons for the deviations were varied. As Liao explained, the masses had a deep hatred for their feudal oppressors, who, as Liao said, had also tried to sabotage the Chinese revolution, which thus led to extreme behaviour. Or it was because of cadres' deviationist failures, especially regarding remittances.¹⁵ The so-called deviations were supposedly decreasing because of rectification, but 're-examination of past work' was still necessary.¹⁶ The main rectification dealt with Land Reform assessments, especially for those wrongly based on remittances. Indeed, remittances were not exploitative profits, and Liao stressed that they were not to be used to assess entitlements or expropriations. Moreover, while assessments should be based on *qiaojuan* landholdings and labour, since the main labour of these households was usually overseas, this circumstance was to be considered where *qiaojuan* were unable to till their own land. Moreover, expropriations

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ Ibid., 196-197.

¹⁶ Ibid., 198.

due to wrong assessments were be corrected and suitable aid offered to victims—‘in this way, we can cause the wrongfully-assessed *qiaojuan* to be satisfied, and strengthen the unity between *qiaojuan* and the local peasantry’.¹⁷

The point of unity was not just about rectifying errors, it was also a function of *qiaowu*’s theoretical role. He Xiangning’s 1954 New Year’s broadcast claimed that ever since the foundation of the PRC in 1949, the *guiqiao* and *qiaojuan* had joined the masses in social reforms, patriotic unity, mobilisations and economic activity, ‘offering a great contribution to the development of agricultural production and national economic construction’.¹⁸ She did not mention the Land Reform deviations, and said only that since ‘*qiaojuan* are mostly engaged in agrarian production, with some also engaged in handicrafts; as the country moves towards industrialisation, the *qiaojuan* will be one with the peasants and handicraft workers, gradually moving towards collectivisation, and a better and happier life’.¹⁹ Clearly, the OCAC believed that the deviations had been, or were now being addressed, and so *qiaowu* could move forward into the General Line. But it was not quite as simple as that.

Liao’s definition of *qiaowu*’s future had referred to the General Line, and this harkened to Mao’s June 1953 definition of ‘the general task of the Party for the transition period’ to the Politburo, which made the General Line the dual goals of: industrialisation, and the ‘socialist transformation of agriculture, handicrafts and capitalist industry and commerce’, in 10-15 years.²⁰ This envisioned, alongside the first Five-Year Plan, the socialist transformation of all private industry and commerce, and the advance of the mutual-aid and cooperative movement (or collectivisation) in agriculture. To be sure, the General Line’s economic features were not new ideas, but the acceleration of socialist

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ He Xiangning, ‘Jiji canjia zuguo shehui gaige he jingji jianshe’, 30/12/1953, *DHGLR*, 127-128 (127).

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Mao, ‘Refute Right Deviationist views that depart from the General Line’, 15/06/1953, *Selected Works*, V: 93; Liu and Wang, ‘The Origins of the General Line for the Transition Period and of the Acceleration of the Chinese Socialist Transformation in Summer 1955’, 724-725.

transformation did represent a new impetus.²¹ Mao suggested that New Democracy was on the way out, and to fail to accept this was no less than ‘Right Deviationist mistakes’—nothing should, or would be allowed to obstruct ‘revolutionary struggle’.²²

The accelerated socialist transformation was not immediately popular with all of the CCP leadership; Liu Shaoqi and Zhou Enlai in particular, preferred a more gradual implementation of socialism through the New Democracy. But Zhou, Liu and others fell into line soon enough—this was preferable to being labelled a ‘Right Deviationist’.²³ But this also had implications both for the united front, and the *huaqiao*. Whereas the united front had underpinned the New Democracy, Liu told the UFWD that the work of the united front was now to fulfil the aims of socialist industrialisation and agricultural collectivisation, and it was ‘fundamentally a service in the interests of the working class and labouring masses’.²⁴ And tellingly enough, cadres were to be mindful that ‘this form of united front work is a form of class struggle’.²⁵

While the New Democracy had been a means to economic recovery, the General Line was the path towards extensive economic development. Zhou Enlai told the CPPCC in September 1953 that ‘the guidance of the General Line’ was to: concentrate on heavy industry; cultivate skilled human resources; develop infrastructure and transport, light industry, agriculture and commerce; and promote agrarian and handicraft collectivisation, and the transformation of private enterprise.²⁶ Socialist transformation, Zhou said, also

²¹ See Mao Zedong, ‘Gaizao ziben zhuyi gongshang ye de bijing zhi lu’, 07/09/1953, *JYZW*, 4: 298-300; Li Weihan, ‘Guanyu ‘ziben zhuyi gongye zhong de gongsi guanxi wenti’ gei zhongyang bing zhuxi de baogao’, 27/05/1953, *JYZW*, 4: 183-200.

²² ‘Our present revolutionary struggle is even more profound than the revolutionary armed struggle of the past. It is a revolution that will bury the capitalist system and all other systems of exploitation once and for all. The idea, “Firmly establish the new-democratic social order”, goes against the realities of our struggle and hinders the progress of the socialist cause.’ See Mao, ‘Refute Right Deviationist views that depart from the General Line’, 15/06/1953, *Selected Works*, V: 94.

²³ ‘Mao called his speech ‘Refute Right Deviationist Views that Depart from the General Line’. Zhou and Liu were never named, but his audience was in no doubt about what was happening... Mao savaged Zhou Enlai’s formulation of ‘the social order of New Democracy’, and the term would never be used again.’ See Dikötter, *The Tragedy of Liberation*, 231.

²⁴ Liu Shaoqi, ‘Jiaqiang dang de tongyi zhanxian gongzuo’, 18/07/1953, *JYZW*, 4: 271-277 (276).

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 4: 277.

²⁶ Zhou Enlai, ‘Guodu shiqi de zonglu xian’, 08/09/1953, *JYZW*, 4: 306.

involved a first step towards the ultimate elimination of private property, or the increasing of controls placed on ownership of capital, property and enterprises, which would change private enterprises into semi-private enterprises.²⁷ Thus the General Line clearly heralded imminent and serious changes. And yet, given the precarious position of the Chinese economy in 1953, what would this actually cost?

New China had not been rich to begin with, and was fast running out of money by 1953. In September 1953, Chen Yun warned that the country had a deficit of RMB 21 trillion (about HKD 89 billion).²⁸ The reasons for this were low tax revenues, over-budget wastefulness in construction projects, and of course, the huge cost of the intervention in the Korean War.²⁹ This explains the various injunctions by party-state leaders to cut costs and reduce expenditure even as the country continued with the first Five-Year Plan and the General Line. But if the country was obviously cash-strapped, and yet still set on socialist transformation, then there had to be a way to make up the shortfall. This was where the General Line came in.

In the first instance, the General Line re-organised the agrarian sector through both collectivisation, and the ‘unified sale and purchase system’ that instituted a state-run monopoly on grain (and other agrarian products). Chen Yun argued in October 1953 that China had a ‘serious problem’: a large shortfall in available grain, which meant higher prices, and insufficient supplies for urban centres—where industrialisation was based.³⁰ The reasons for this were varied; the Party claimed that it was because of rent-seeking behaviour by private merchants and peasants who hoarded grain; while historians suggest

²⁷ Ibid., 4: 308.

²⁸ Chen Yun, ‘Kefu caijing gongzuo zhong de quedian he cuowu’, 14/09/1953, *JYZW*, 4: 341-345 (345). The exchange rate was HKD 234: RMB 1 million (12 September 1953). See Appendix D-IV, ‘Comparison between the Official and Free Market Exchange Rates of the Jen-min Pi, 1950 to 1954’, Wu, *Dollars, Dependents and Dogma*, 191-197 (196).

Dikötter puts the deficit at RMB 2.4 billion (July 1953); this is probably calculated using the post-February 1955 ‘new’ RMB (1 ‘new’: 10,000 ‘old’). See Dikötter, *The Tragedy of Liberation*, 216; CCP CC, ‘Guanyu faxing xin de renminbi de xuanchuan tongzhi’, 07/02/1955, *ZZWX*, 18: 120-125.

²⁹ China spent more than RMB 6.2 billion on its intervention. See Zhang, *Economic Cold War*, 140.

³⁰ Chen Yun, ‘Shixing liangshi tonggou tongxiao’, 10/10/1953, *JYZW*, 4: 385-398 (385-386).

that China in 1953 was in a famine, not least because of the Land Reform; or from another angle, that the monopoly was designed to resolve financial shortfalls.³¹ Whatever the case, the Party decided to end ‘free purchase’ and private trade in grain.³² Thus the state dictated a fixed yield for a farm plot, determining also the quantity of grain a person required per month. This subsistence amount, combined with the amount that was due as agricultural tax, plus whatever seeds that were needed for the next round of sowing, were deducted from the pre-determined fixed yield. The remainder (or ‘surplus’) was then compulsorily sold to the state at fixed prices. That surplus was used to ‘feed the cities, fuel industrialisation and pay off foreign debts’, and if there was leftover, peasants were allowed to purchase extra quantities.³³ That, in essence, was the ‘unified sale and purchase system’ that was introduced in October 1953.³⁴

Instituting ‘unified sale and purchase’ required even more state oversight of agrarian production, and in the context of General Line socialisation of agriculture, this motivated an expansion of collectivisation. A form of collectivisation was already in existence by the end of 1953 in the ‘mutual aid teams’, where peasants voluntarily shared equipment, ploughing animals and other farming necessities to till the land they had received in the Land Reform. Results had been mixed, but in late 1953, Mao called for an acceleration of collectivisation through the development of Agricultural Producers’ Cooperatives (APC).³⁵ Whereas mutual-aid teams had shared equipment when necessary,

³¹ This shortfall was also due to the reduction of Soviet aid to the Five-Year Plan. See Dikötter, *The Tragedy of Liberation*, 212-217.

³² Chen Yun, ‘Shixing liangshi tonggou tongxiao’, 10/10/1953, *JYZW*, 4: 389-390.

³³ Dikötter, *The Tragedy of Liberation*, 217.

See also Kenneth Walker, *Food grain procurement and consumption in China* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984); Robert Ash, ‘Squeezing the Peasants: Grain Extraction, Food Consumption and Rural Living Standards in Mao’s China’, *The China Quarterly*, Vol. 188 (2006), 959-998.

³⁴ The ‘unified sale and purchase system’ was swiftly approved. See CCP CC, ‘Guanyu shixing liangshi de jihua shougou yu jihua gongying de jueyi’, 16/10/1953, *JYZW*, 4: 412-21.

‘Unified sale and purchase’ was also extended to other products like food oil, and in 1954, to cotton cloth. See Chen Yun, ‘Liangyou chanxiao qingkuang ji chuli banfa’, 13/11/1953, *JYZW*, 4: 478-481; CCP CC, ‘Guanyu zai quanguo shixing jihua shougou youliaoj de jueying’, 15/11/1953, *JYZW*, 4: 482.

³⁵ Dikötter suggests that ‘not much of the aid was mutual’ and was often coercive, while Hou Xiaojia argues that ‘most party cadres above the county level were fully engaged in the ‘Three-Anti’ movement and cared little about the mutual aid and cooperation movement’. See Dikötter, *The Tragedy of Liberation*, 208-210;

the APCs made this permanent. APCs pooled land with members receiving shares based on their contributions. This was still only semi-socialist, since it had (nominal) private ownership of land, tools and equipment that were contributed in return for shares.³⁶ But this, Mao said, would be resolved in the next stage; for now, it was just as important to socialist transformation as ‘unified sale and purchase’.³⁷ The two were indeed closely linked, since APCs became the main unit by which rural life was governed, including the purchase or sale of surplus crops. Socialist transformation was thus about effecting CCP governmentality as much as it was about changing production relations.³⁸

Private industry and commerce had a different trajectory to the agrarian sector in the initial period of the General Line. Mao had said that socialist transformation entailed eventual elimination of private property and capitalism, but here he preached ‘steady progress, avoid haste’, over a 3-5 year interim period.³⁹ The reason for this was simple. Private enterprises were ‘a great wealth’, employing almost 4 million workers, providing crucial manufactures, aiding capital accumulation, and providing important training for cadres.⁴⁰ Of course, some capitalists were reactionary and ‘at a large distance’ from socialism, but Mao also criticised workers who ‘refused to permit capitalists to gain any benefits whatsoever’.⁴¹ The correct path was instead state capitalism [国家资本主义 *guojia ziben zhuyi*] through ‘joint state-private ownership’ [公私合营 *gongsi heyeying*] of

Hou Xiaojia, “‘Get Organized’: The Impact of the Soviet Model on the CCP’s Rural Economic Strategy, 1949-1953”, in Bernstein, Li (eds), *China learns from the Soviet Union*, 167-196 (181).

³⁶ Mao Zedong, ‘Guanyu nongye huzhu hezuo de liangci tanhua’, 16/10-05/11/1953, *JYZW*, 4: 404-411 (408).

³⁷ Mao Zedong, ‘Guanyu nongye huzhu hezuo de liangci tanhua’, 16/10-05/11/1953, *JYZW*, 4: 410. Cooperatives were also created in the handicrafts industry in late 1953. See Liu Shaoqi, ‘Guanyu shougong ye shengchan hezuo she wenti’, 08/12/1953, *JYZW*, 4: 559-564.

³⁸ Michel Foucault, *The Government of Self and Others: Lectures at the Collège de France 1982-1983*, Arnold I. Davidson (ed.), Graham Burchell (trans.) (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010). The CCP changed the new system’s original name from ‘compulsory purchase’ [征购 *zhenggou*] to ‘unified purchase’ [统购 *tonggou*], since *zhenggou* sounded similar to the Japanese version inflicted in the 1930s. See Kuhn, *Origins of the Modern Chinese State*, 105.

³⁹ Mao Zedong, ‘Gaizao ziben zhuyi gongshang ye de bijing zhi lu’, 07/09/1953, *JYZW*, 4: 298.

⁴⁰ Ibid., 4: 299.

⁴¹ Mao Zedong, ‘Gaizao ziben zhuyi gongshang ye de bijing zhi lu’, 07/09/1953, *JYZW*, 4: 299. See also Elizabeth J. Perry, ‘Masters of the Country? Shanghai Workers in the Early People’s Republic’, in Brown, Pickowicz (eds), *Dilemmas of Victory*, 59-79.

enterprises.⁴² This entailed capitalism that existed not ‘to make profits for the capitalists but to meet the needs of the people and the state’.⁴³ This allowed capitalists to play a patriotic role, and thus state capitalism was not coercive, but in line with the ‘principle of voluntarism’, and therefore ‘different from dealing with the landlords’.⁴⁴ This sounded much like the older New Democracy ideals about the possible and positive contributions of the patriotic bourgeoisie, and indeed, as UFWD head Li Weihan told the All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce (ACFIC), state capitalism would enable capitalists to help fulfil the Chinese people’s ‘hundred-year old desire’.⁴⁵ Yet, within such familiar exhortations were also rather implicit warnings.

State capitalism, Li warned the ACFIC, was to transform industry and commerce. First, in relations between the state and private owners, the state was in charge. Secondly, it was now the workers (labour) who would supervise capital. Even ‘joint state-private owned enterprises [were] not normal joint-stock enterprises’ since socialism exercised the leading role, and enterprises had to align with national plans, i.e. the Five-Year Plan.⁴⁶ The third warning was the most telling—especially for the *huaqiao* since the 1950 GAC decree on *huaqiao* Land Reform had exempted industry and commerce—as Li said that state capitalism was not permanent, and in the future ‘all the means of production and capitalist property will completely change to a system of socialist ownership’.⁴⁷ When that time eventually came, Li obliquely noted, ‘those who had made a contribution to the people’ would be taken care of, along with their children.⁴⁸ Socialist transformation for

⁴² This form of ownership had existed since at least 1951. See Wang Shaoguang, ‘The Construction of State Extractive Capacity: Wuhan, 1949–1953’, *Modern China*, 27:2 (2001) 229–261 (241).

⁴³ Mao Zedong, ‘On State Capitalism’, 09/09/1953, *Selected Works*, V: 101. The breakdown of how joint state-private concerns would ‘meet the needs’ of the greater good was: 34.5% of profits went to the state as tax; 15% was due to the workers’ welfare fund; 30% for re-investment in the enterprise; and 20.5% as dividends for the capitalist. See Mao Zedong, ‘Gaizao ziben zhuyi gongshang ye de bijing zhi lu’, 07/09/1953, *JYZW*, 4: 299.

⁴⁴ Mao Zedong, ‘Gaizao ziben zhuyi gongshang ye de bijing zhi lu’, 07/09/1953, *JYZW*, 4: 299.

⁴⁵ Li Weihan, ‘Zai zhonghua quanguo gongshang ye lianhehui huiyuan daibiao dahui shang de jianghua’, 26/10/1953, *JYZW*, 4: 427–443 (428).

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 4: 437.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 4: 443.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

private industry and commerce was therefore not as far-reaching as it was in agriculture (yet), but it indicated an imminent future, and it spelled out certain expectations.

Li's veiled warning about 'those who had made a contribution to the people' did not specify what he meant, but there can have been little doubt that this was about money. After all, in December 1953, the CPG issued RMB 6 trillion worth of '1954 National Economic Construction Bonds'.⁴⁹ This bond issue was linked to the national construction program, and subscription was thus presented as a possible public display of patriotism. For private enterprise owners, capitalists—and basically the bourgeoisie—to subscribe to the bonds was simply what was expected of them. Indeed, the heaviest burden of subscription allocations fell on the urban bourgeoisie, with RMB 3.2 trillion assigned to private urban industry and commerce, private owners in joint state-private enterprises, and other urban residents.⁵⁰ When more than 50% of the burden fell on urban areas, and on private industry and commerce, the expected contribution was obvious.

The General Line thus presaged a clear direction. For the agrarian sector, it was APCs and 'unified sale and purchase'. For industry and commerce, it was state capitalism, the Five-Year Plan and financial contributions. Yet, where did the *huaqiao* fit into this? The only mention of *qiaowu* was merely in passing in a GAC statement on the 1954 bond issue, which presumed a 'great enthusiasm' of the *haiwai huaqiao*, and an expectation that 'they will fervently leap to subscribe'.⁵¹ The GAC did not explain this, or what it actually meant for *qiaowu*, but it was soon made clear that the *huaqiao* were definitely to be included in the General Line.

To be sure, the inclusion of the *huaqiao* in socialist transformation was supported by the OCAC. Liao Chengzhi had stated in November 1953 that *qiaowu*'s future was tied to the General Line, and He Xiangning echoed this on New Year's Day 1954, reminding

⁴⁹ This was a pre-1955 RMB value. See GAC, 'Guanyu faxing 1954 nian guojia jingji jianshe gongzhai de zhishi', 09/12/1953, *JYZW*, 4: 565-568.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 4: 566.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*

the *qiaojuan* and *guiqiao* to ‘be one with their peasant brethren’ and ‘march towards collectivisation’.⁵² This also applied to the *huaqiao* involved in industrial construction or production; they were to heed the leadership of the CPG and to develop positive contributions. Indeed, in all sectors, they were to ‘learn to labour, to be hard-working in their planting, to strive to conserve resources, to overcome difficulties, and to transform their own lives’.⁵³ The *huaqiao* in commerce were also to improve the People’s Livelihood, to obey the law, ‘to establish a new way of doing business’, to accept the leadership of state enterprises, and to embrace state capitalism and play positive roles in the country’s economic construction.⁵⁴ Thus *qiaowu* clearly sought to include the *huaqiao* in socialist transformation’s dictates.

Yet, despite the intention in 1954 to align *qiaowu* with the General Line and its impetus for accelerated socialist transformation, there were still concerns about the legacies of an earlier attempt at socialist transformation that still plagued *qiaowu*. Indeed, inasmuch as Liao had defined future *qiaowu* as aligned with the General Line, he had also warned of the legacies of deviations in the Land Reform, and had asserted that a necessary rectification of Land Reform failures amongst the *huaqiao* was still an ongoing task. Thus, and given that the General Line had called for the acceleration of socialist transformation, *qiaowu* would—at the very least—have had to consider how it would (or could) reconcile the demands for ‘revolutionary struggle’ with its policy imperatives. After all, its most recent experience of socialist transformation had evidently failed to lead to positive results for *qiaowu*’s policy goals.

In some sense, the question for *qiaowu* was similar to that which confronted the party-state as a whole: what did the General Line actually require? Mao’s answer was

⁵² He Xiangning, ‘Jiji canjia zuguo shehui gaige he jingji jianshe’, 30/12/1953, *DHGLR*, 127.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 127.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 128.

that the General Line was to be the ‘beacon illuminating our work in all fields’.⁵⁵ And it truly did become the all-encompassing focus for the party-state’s work. Despite the initial reluctance of Zhou Enlai et al., once the Party leadership came around, they demanded that the party-state embrace it at all levels. Chen Yun’s introduction of ‘unified sale and purchase’ stressed that the work should ‘necessarily rely on the rural cadres, Party and Youth League members’.⁵⁶ Yet, as Li Fuchun, Minister of Heavy Industry and CFEC deputy-head, pointed out, while industrialisation was one of the main goals of the General Line, the fulfilment of that objective was limited by both the quantity and quality of trained cadres available. Hence, as Li said, the party-state would expand its Party Schools, technical schools and professional training for cadres, who Li reminded to seek technical development (and learn from Soviet advisers).⁵⁷ Mao similarly told rural cadres to become ‘experts in agricultural socialist transformation’, and knowledgeable in theory, policy, plans, and methodology.⁵⁸ Perhaps this was in response to the lessons of the Land Reform, or to the early wastefulness of the first Five-Year Plan, but the party-state clearly placed the onus for the General Line’s success on the professionalism of its cadres.

The emphasis placed on the party-state cadres’ expertise and professionalism was one that *qiaowu* fervently shared. Liao’s November 1953 report had asserted that many of the Land Reform deviations came down to cadre failings, ignorance, overzealousness, or a basic lack of understanding.⁵⁹ The FPC and the South China Bureau (among others) had since addressed these failings, and Liao was confident that the rectification would have good effects. But the OCAC also went further in April 1954, creating the first-ever

⁵⁵ Mao, ‘Refute Right Deviationist views that depart from the General Line’, 15/06/1953, *Selected Works*, V: 93.

⁵⁶ Chen Yun, ‘Shixing liangshi tonggou tongxiao’, 10/10/1953, *JYZW*, 4: 394.

⁵⁷ Li Fuchun, ‘Bianzhi di yi ge wu nian jihua ying zhuyi de wenti’, 15/09/1953, *JYZW*, 4: 346-350 (349).

⁵⁸ Mao Zedong, ‘Guanyu nongye huzhu hezuo de liangci tanhua’, 16/10-05/11/1953, *JYZW*, 4: 411.

⁵⁹ Liao Chengzhi, ‘Qiaoxiang de tudi gaige’, 01/11/1953, *DHGLR*, 197.

qiaowu training program for cadres.⁶⁰ But then again, theirs was a great responsibility.

Indeed, as Liao's commencement address to this first class defined the mission of *qiaowu*:

In the overseas setting: to positively unite the various classes of *huaqiao*; to isolate the imperialists and Guomindang reactionaries; to cause the broad masses of *huaqiao* (including *huaqiao* bourgeoisie) to unite around their homeland. In the domestic context: to mobilise *guiqiao* and *qiaojuan* towards positive participation in socialist construction, transformation and production; and to mobilise them to love and protect their homeland's daily advance towards socialism.⁶¹

This mission, Liao said, was as complex as it was important. The cadres were warned to avoid the two main causes of 'left deviationist behaviour'; ideological problems and 'poor quality' thinking about *qiaowu*.⁶² Yet, ironically, this was rather prescient of Liao. As it turned out, *qiaowu* in 1954–1955 would be plagued by contradictions, with the General Line's impetus for accelerated socialist transformation, and a corollary of 'poor thinking' on *qiaowu* leading to problems amongst the cadres and officials on the ground.

Rather Left than Right:

Liao's April 1954 *qiaowu* statement was ostensibly based on the General Line—and indeed prescribed 'advance toward socialism'.⁶³ But this future brought trepidation. Some *huaqiao* in Xiamen were worried that 'fulfilling socialism required blood'.⁶⁴ Others were unsure about state capitalism; if full socialism was inevitable, then their private enterprises were now pointless. Others worried about bank deposits—lest interest be viewed as 'profiting without labour'.⁶⁵ Worst—and after the GAC's bond issue—was the view that 'buying bonds is to turn live money into dead money', and the fear that remittances would bring pressure to buy bonds.⁶⁶ Moreover, *haiwai huaqiao* were wary

⁶⁰ Liao Chengzhi, 'Tigao jiceng ganbu zhengce shuiping, zuohao qiaowu gongzuo', 20/04/1954, *DHGLR*, 199-202.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 199.

⁶² *Ibid.*, 202.

⁶³ It was a good idea for Liao personally too, given Mao's attack on Bo Yibo: 'To criticise Bo Yibo is to criticise his errors in departing from the General Line'. See Mao Zedong, 'Guanyu nongye huzhu hezuo de liangci tanhua', 16/10-05/11/1953, *JYZW*, 4: 411.

⁶⁴ 'Huaqiao duì guojia guodu shiqi zongluxian de fanying', 08/02/1954, *NBCK*.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

of investing, because they feared the repercussions from foreign governments, or doubted its worthwhileness: ‘after spending so much money, there is nothing to show for it’.⁶⁷

Others saw a Catch-22: socialist transformation made them uneasy about depositing remittances with Chinese banks, but socialism’s inevitability also made buying property to preserve wealth unviable.⁶⁸ Clearly, what the OCAC believed about its victories was not universally shared.

Yet, whatever the uncertainty about the future, *qiaowu* was still very much about political economy. Due to the deficit, fiscal plans for 1954 prioritised expenditure cuts and increasing revenue, and among the most affected was funding for *qiaosheng*. In May 1954, the OCAC and MOE instructed that local *qiaowu* offices were not to offer financial aid to *qiaosheng* any longer. Schools could offer aid via (non-*huaqiao* specific) People’s Scholarship funds, but the imperative was to cut costs.⁶⁹ Yet, this was not only about savings.⁷⁰ Liao noted in November 1953 that some *qiaosheng* had rejected remittances as ‘profits of exploitation’, and had written to their families to say that ‘there is no need to remit money, the country has taken care of everything’.⁷¹ Some even cut ties because their families were bourgeois. This was undesirable, especially because of the negative impressions it created amongst *huaqiao*. Hence, Liao asserted, it was vital that *qiaosheng* maintain close ties with their families, ‘including economic connections’, which thus meant teaching *qiaosheng* that the mentality ‘that the country would pay for everything’ was wrong. It also meant instructing *qiaosheng* ‘to strive to gain *huaqiao* remittances, to pay for tuition or living expenses, or to deposit with our national banks’.⁷²

⁶⁷ ‘Xiamen shi bufen guiqiao duiyu touzi wenti gulu zhong zhong’, 28/04/1954, NBCK.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ OCAC, Ministry of Education (MOE), ‘Guanyu huaqiao xuesheng fuli buzhu banfa de tongzhi’, 26/05/1954, FPA #0136-006-0284-0012.

⁷⁰ In fairness, the *qiaosheng* were notorious for causing trouble. See ‘Nanjing shi huaqiao xuesheng sixiang qingkuang’, 31/08/1953, NBCK.

⁷¹ Liao Chengzhi, ‘Guanyu guiguo huaqiao xuesheng jiaoyu gongzuo de ruogan wenti’, 11/1953, in Liao Chengzhi wenji bianji bangongshi (eds), *Liao chengzhi wenji*, Vols. I-II (Hong Kong: Sanlian shudian, 1990), I: 263-274 (269).

⁷² Ibid.

The point of the *qiaosheng* thus lay mainly in their remittances. In May 1954, the OCAC introduced a policy that gave *qiaosheng* who received regular remittances an entitlement to bridging loans, in the event that their remittances were disrupted. This policy did not cover *qiaosheng* who did not receive remittances at all, or who had not received any within the last calendar year. There were also requirements for guarantors. For sums below RMB 200,000, guarantors had to be either CCP cadre or ‘a fellow *qiaosheng* who received regular remittances’. For all sums above RMB 200,000, both were required. This evidently ensured that the party-state would get its foreign exchange—one way or another. But the BOC was also entitled to regain its principal through direct deductions from the borrower’s account.⁷³ Yet, despite the evident utilitarianism here, given the party-state’s obvious concern with safeguarding remittances, surely the larger implication for the *huaqiao* was that whatever the imperatives of socialist transformation, the golden goose would be kept safe?

To be sure, the advent of the General Line did not seem to preclude *qiaowu*’s practice of *youdai*. Whereas there had been special leniency in the Land Reform for *huaqiao* households who had only become landlords after becoming *huaqiao*, similar allowances were now offered to *huaqiao* bourgeoisie and capitalists. In response to questions on ‘how *huaqiao* capitalists were to undertake socialist transformation’, the OCAC drew a clear line. For those abroad, the ‘practice of capitalism in the countries in which they live is perfectly legal’, and ‘we have no cause to require them to undergo socialist transformation’.⁷⁴ As for *huaqiao* who sent money back, or who had or wanted to invest in China, they were welcomed—especially in joint state-private enterprise—with the CFEC forming a committee to guide their investment.⁷⁵ Of course, *huaqiao*

⁷³ BOC Shanghai Branch, ‘Guanyu jianfu huaqiao xuesheng xiao’e shenghuo daikuan zhang cheng ji neibu zhangwo banfa qing shenyue heshi de han’, 10/06/1954, SMA B20-2-3-35.

⁷⁴ OCAC, ‘Cao zhuan zhong qiaowei jieda ruhe duidai huaqiao ziben jia de yi xie wenti’, 31/08/1954, FPA #148-002-0522-0073, 1-3.

⁷⁵ Ibid., 2.

capitalism overseas was still exploitative of workers' surplus value, but here the OCAC preached tolerance, stating that the General Line did not eliminate capitalism, but rather sought to use it positively. These *huaqiao* had roles to play, and to reject their investment, or ostracise their relatives from employment, or view their remittances as 'exploitative profit', was only to 'add a greater financial burden to the country'.⁷⁶ Such allowances, the OCAC asserted, were also part of a constitutional obligation to the *huaqiao*.

The PRC's Constitution—still a draft until the first NPC in September 1954—stated in Article 98 that 'the People's Republic of China protects the proper rights and interests of Chinese resident abroad'.⁷⁷ This made the Constitution a useful device by which *qiaowu* justified allowances towards the *huaqiao*. Article 98 protected their 'rights and interests', and Article 11 guaranteed 'the rights of citizens' own lawfully-earned incomes, savings, houses and other means of life' (including remittances).⁷⁸ But actually, the Constitution's provisions for *huaqiao* were also very necessary because the deviations against *qiaowu*—and violations of remittances—were still commonplace.

In March 1954, the *qiaowu* office and PBOC branch for Yunnan investigated an apparent fall in remittances in Hexi County, producing a report for the OCAC and PBOC in June that caused a furore. Firstly, even though local officials knew the importance of remittances, they had marginalised the protection of *huaqiao* proprietary rights to their remittances, so as to effect 'struggle' against counterrevolutionaries. Thus, while officials paid lip service to *huaqiao* rights, they confiscated, fined, deducted or froze remittances as punitive action against *huaqiao* in post-Land Reform 'supervision of the masses' or reform-through-labour.⁷⁹ Some cadres had forced those classed as *qiaojuan* rich peasants

⁷⁶ Ibid., 3.

⁷⁷ Article 98, 'The Constitution of the People's Republic of China', 20/09/1954, *Documents of the First Session of the First National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China* (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1955), 161.

⁷⁸ Article 11, 'The Constitution of the People's Republic of China', 20/09/1954, *Documents of the First Session of the First National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China*, 139.

⁷⁹ 'Supervision of the masses' [管制] was a punitive action where cadres supervised every aspect of the offender's life (including his/her work and food). See Dikotter, *The Tragedy of Liberation*, 249.

to seek approval before withdrawing their remittances, but then only approved those with ‘no political problems’. The Yunnan People’s Government (YPG) was cognisant of the significance of *huaqiao* remittances, but considered such abuses merely ‘overly rigid’ methods. After all, remittance levels were often unaffected since overseas relatives had no idea of the situation, because some cadres impersonated *qiaojuan* in letters.⁸⁰ The OCAC and PBOC were horrified. The cadres were warned that remittances affected *qiaojuan* livelihood, but also ‘the question of production’, as ‘one of the most important sources of the country’s foreign exchange’. Thus absolutely no violation or interference with remittances would be brooked, even for ‘*huaqiao* remittances that belong to landlords, rich peasants or those under the supervision of the masses’, and any deviation from these instructions would be ‘not only erroneous, but illegal’.⁸¹ Punitive action was to be based on the law, and was not to target remittances. As the PBOC and OCAC warned, ‘to lump remittance work and anti-counterrevolutionary struggle together, indeed to plan to use remittances as a means of controlling the potential actions of counterrevolutionaries is incorrect’.⁸²

The OCAC and PBOC were also concerned with reports of other, more insidious interferences with remittances. Yunnan was warned to let the *huaqiao* spend remittances as they saw fit—on ancestral graves, funerals, celebrations, weddings, or philanthropy—it was not for cadres to govern how *huaqiao* lived. Moreover, cadres were warned that remittance proprietary rights extended to the *haiwai huaqiao*; until recipients received the money, senders were entitled to seek redress from remitting banks if the remittance was never received, and so cadres would be undermining the BOC/PBOC if they interfered with remittances.⁸³ Such reports concerned *qiaowu* practitioners, indeed that these abuses

⁸⁰ OCAC, PBOC, ‘Zhongyang huaqiao shiwu weiyuanhui, Zhongguo renmin yinhang zonghang lianshu pifu dui Yunnan sheng huaqiao shiwu chu ti chuli qiaohui banfa bu fu zhengee’, 20/09/1954, *GDQW*, No. 5 (25 Oct 1954), 4-10 (5-6).

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 5.

⁸² *Ibid.*, 5-6.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, 6-7.

still existed convinced the OCAC and PBOC that ‘the post-Land Reform situation for *qiaowu* and remittance policy work still harbours numerous failings’.⁸⁴ Thus the OCAC and PBOC sent their lengthy criticism across the country, requiring regional authorities to ‘seriously check the conditions’ of *qiaowu* work in their jurisdictions.⁸⁵

The OCAC and PBOC report had (rightly) identified the legacies of the Land Reform as a major factor in the problems with remittance work, and this was an issue which Liao’s 1953 rectification agenda was intended to address. But clearly, this was still a work-in-progress—and not just in the *qiaoxiang*, but in the cities too. Guangzhou’s *qiaowu* bureau had, in July–August 1954, undertaken a general survey of the city’s *huaqiao*. The survey excluded the suburbs, *qiaosheng*, new *guiqiao*, *huaqiao* in public sector work, and those not on the household register, but still involved 33,891 persons.⁸⁶ The city’s *qiaowu* officials found that of the *huaqiao* households in the city, 4,751 were completely reliant on remittances for survival, of which 1,440 (30.3%) were in dire straits; while of the 3,601 households partially reliant on remittances, 982 (27.2%) were in difficulty. There was also a minority that did not receive any remittances at all.⁸⁷

Further investigations revealed that Guangzhou had seen an 18.4% fall in remittances over January–June 1954. According to officials, there were two main reasons: one was external, blaming the imperialist embargo, GMD propaganda, and foreign economic recessions. Yet, the other reason was that remittance policies were failing: there were violations of remittances, and not only were the masses ignorant of policy, but cadres had also failed to implement it. Consequently, *qiaojuan* had deep suspicions, and many left their remittances in Hong Kong—estimated at US\$100 million. Yet, since that amount had even reached Hong Kong, *qiaowu* practitioners argued that ‘the imperialist

⁸⁴ Ibid., 7.

⁸⁵ Ibid., 5.

⁸⁶ See Guangzhou Municipal Government Overseas Chinese Affairs Bureau, ‘Guangzhou shi fangwen guiqiao, qiaojuan gongzuo de jingyan’, 07-08/1954, *GDQW*, No. 7 (13 Jan 1955), 15-18 (15).

⁸⁷ Ibid., 15.

embargo is not the primary cause'. It was instead the failure to implement policies.⁸⁸

Relatedly, *huaqiao* were also being denied exit visas—mainly for Hong Kong. Most visa applications were for travel to collect remittances, but others wanted to visit family or transit through Hong Kong. Yet, Public Security was more than likely to reject these applications because of deep-rooted suspicions about the reasons for travel, whether the *huaqiao* would return, or because they were unfamiliar with ‘the applicant’s background’, and cadres thus preferred rigid attitudes and ‘to rather be left than right’.⁸⁹ Yet, *qiaowu* officials believed that this was a reflection of cadres’ ignorance.⁹⁰

Finally, it had become common for tenants of *huaqiao*-owned property to refuse to pay rent. These tenants, some in arrears for years, included cadres, peasants, workers, and businessmen—practically all segments of society—but the *huaqiao* owners were also from similarly diverse class backgrounds. Nevertheless, these tenants claimed that such rent demands were actually evidence of landlordism and exploitation, and thus refused to pay. After all, as a tenant remarked: ‘In a communist world, the one living in the house is the one who owns it.’⁹¹ This problem was very serious, because for many *huaqiao*, rental revenue was an important supplementary income. Indeed, that they were unable to earn this was one reason for the large numbers of *huaqiao* with economic difficulties—and given that Guangzhou’s *qiaowu* bureau paid out RMB 8 million every month in welfare, this was a huge burden.⁹² The urban *qiaowu* problems were thus different from *qiaoxiang*, but they had similar themes: *huaqiao* dissatisfaction and suspicion, official treatment of

⁸⁸ Ibid., 16.

⁸⁹ ‘To rather be left than right’ is a literal translation [宁左勿右]. See Guangzhou Municipal Government Overseas Chinese Affairs Bureau, ‘Guangzhou shi fangwen guiqiao, qiaojuan gongzuo de jingyan’, 07-08/1954, *GDQW*, No. 7 (13 Jan 1955), 17.

⁹⁰ The survey suggested that 85% of Guangzhou *huaqiao* were ‘labouring masses’, 15% bourgeois, and 5% landlords, rich peasants or bureaucrat-capitalists. Thus even suspicion of ‘class status’ for visa applicants should only have applied to a small minority of *huaqiao* residents. See Guangzhou Municipal Government Overseas Chinese Affairs Bureau, ‘Guangzhou shi fangwen guiqiao, qiaojuan gongzuo de jingyan’, 07-08/1954, *GDQW*, No. 7 (13 Jan 1955), 16.

⁹¹ Ibid., 17.

⁹² Ibid.

the *huaqiao* that preferred overt strictness as ostensibly more ‘left’ behaviour, and with the masses themselves believing that the *huaqiao* deserved what they got.

Whereas the OCAC had sought rectification of the Land Reform’s failures and excesses amongst the *huaqiao* in China, and especially so as to repair the damage that had been wreaked on remittance flows, the post-Land Reform situation did not appear to be improving. Instead, with the advent of the General Line and its overt othering of the bourgeois in the interests of ‘revolutionary struggle’, *qiaowu* was confronted with a new set of difficulties. In the era of accelerated socialist transformation, the cadres on the ground seemed to want ‘to rather be left than right’, but this was coming at the expense of *huaqiao* interests—and hence, at the expense of remittances. This did not go unnoticed. In response to instructions from the South China Bureau, the East Guangdong Party Committee proposed in December 1954 to ‘comprehensively and systematically execute and propagate *qiaowu* policy from the cadres to the masses, so as to struggle and strive to fulfil the *huaqiao* remittance objectives’.⁹³ The motivation for this was that, while the region had a minor success in raising remittance figures by 1.65% over 10 months, and in *qiaojuan* and *guiqiao* participation in APCs that ranged from 48% (Dabu County) to 86.8% (Mei County), and 80% participation in Mei County Credit Cooperatives, it also admitted that ‘at present, the execution of policy across the region is very uneven’.⁹⁴ For instance, Chao An County’s 51 villages had at least 76 major incidents of ‘remittance infringements’.⁹⁵ East Guangdong also said unidentified ‘evil businessmen’ had deceived *qiaojuan* through false investment schemes, but this was never elaborated on. In any case, despite the small increase in remittances, the region had only met 83.91% of its target.⁹⁶

⁹³ East Guangdong Party Committee Overseas Chinese Affairs Office, ‘Cong ganbu dao qunzhong, quanmian di xitong di xuanchuan guanche qiaowu zhengce, wei zhengqu wancheng qiaohui renwu er fendou’, 06/12/1954, *GDQW*, No. 7 (13 Jan 1955), 19-30.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, 19-20.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, 20.

⁹⁶ This confirms, contra CCP claims, the existence of remittance accumulation quotas. See East Guangdong Party Committee Overseas Chinese Affairs Office, ‘Cong ganbu dao qunzhong, quanmian di xitong di xuanchuan guanche qiaowu zhengce, wei zhengqu wancheng qiaohui renwu er fendou’, 06/12/1954, *GDQW*, No. 7 (13 Jan 1955), 20-21.

The situation was admittedly serious, and thus the Committee suggested ‘mobilising the whole Party to rely on the masses’ to fulfil correct *qiaowu* policy.

Correct *qiaowu* firstly meant ‘the expansion of opportunities and outlets’ for remittances to be utilised.⁹⁷ Thus the policy that the *huaqiao* were entitled to spend money as they saw fit—on ‘weddings, funerals and celebrations’—was to be propagated.⁹⁸ Indeed, if *huaqiao* wanted to construct buildings, local officials were to provide suitable assistance, including permission to purchase building materials and food.⁹⁹ Guidance was also to be given through a special *huaqiao* South China Investment Company, and despite ongoing socialist transformation, any *huaqiao* who returned to invest would retain their class.¹⁰⁰ Which was useful, given that the party-state held that bourgeois activity abroad did not always make one a capitalist, since *haiwai huaqiao* were victims of imperialist or colonialist oppression. But this policy also reflected concerns about class statuses.

Secondly, correct *qiaowu* was to address the ‘legacies of *huaqiao* class status problems’. According to the South China Bureau, apart from counterrevolutionaries, ‘despotic landlords’, and landlords who deserved ‘the people’s wrath’, all other classes could be revised if necessary.¹⁰¹ Liao had promised this in late 1953, but its application since its official start in April 1954 had been uneven.¹⁰² In some cases, the mere suggestion of *huaqiao* class changes had been met with deep resistance from peasants unwilling to return confiscated property to *huaqiao*, and from local cadres who found

⁹⁷ Ibid., 22.

⁹⁸ Weddings, funerals and celebrations [婚丧喜庆] was a metaphor for a wide variety of uses. See East Guangdong Party Committee Overseas Chinese Affairs Office, ‘Cong ganbu dao qunzhong, quanmian di xitong di xuanchuan guanche qiaowu zhengce, wei zhengqu wancheng qiaohui renwu er fendou’, 06/12/1954, *GDQW*, No. 7 (13 Jan 1955), 22.

⁹⁹ Any construction project had to pay and feed its workers, but building supplies and material were already officially controlled—given the state’s appetite for such things in the Five-Year Plan—and food was under the ‘unified sale and purchase’ system after 1953. See East Guangdong Party Committee Overseas Chinese Affairs Office, ‘Cong ganbu dao qunzhong, quanmian di xitong di xuanchuan guanche qiaowu zhengce, wei zhengqu wancheng qiaohui renwu er fendou’, 06/12/1954, *GDQW*, No. 7 (13 Jan 1955), 23.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

¹⁰² Liao Chengzhi, ‘Qiaoxiang de tudi gaige’, 01/11/1953, *DHGLR*, 198; Wenchang County Party Committee United Front Department, ‘Zhonggong Wenchang xianwei tongzhanbu guanyu guanche huaqiao zhengce gongzuo de tongbao’, 19/10/1954, *GDQW*, No. 6 (5 Dec 1954), 12-16.

‘toadying-up’ to *huaqiao* ideologically inconsistent.¹⁰³ But the orders were clear. All incorrectly classed *huaqiao* could have their statuses changed (or ‘removing hats’).¹⁰⁴ All *huaqiao* workers, shop employees or businessmen who were classed concurrently as landlords were to be cleared (or ‘cutting off tails’). For the correctly classed, if they had been law-abiding, ‘in view of the need to take care of the *huaqiao*, it is permissible in all cases to deal with them generously and to announce that they are not to be treated as landlords from henceforth’. Even absentee *haiwai huaqiao* landlords could have their class revised, and rich peasants adjusted to poor or middle peasants, since ‘this had a very large positive effect on gaining *huaqiao* remittances, and uniting with the *huaqiao* and *qiaojuan*’.¹⁰⁵ Those undergoing reform-through-labour should be relieved after two years, while former landlords were not to be ostracised, and were allowed to join cooperatives. Expropriated property was to be returned, unless already distributed. In the event that property had not been re-distributed, but was being occupied, ownership rights were to revert to the *huaqiao*, but arrangements could be made for renting or borrowing.¹⁰⁶

In line with the rights of *huaqiao*, remittances were to be vigorously protected, with infringements severely dealt with, and both the cadres and the masses educated on policy. The *huaqiao* rights were such that, ‘even in cases where recipients of remittances are law-breakers from landlord households, it is imperative that law-breaking landlordism is separated entirely from remittances’.¹⁰⁷ Some cadres thought that this was ideologically counter-intuitive, but the East Guangdong Party Committee reminded them that:

Looking at this from a national perspective, the crux of the issue is the accumulation of funds for socialist industrialisation, and the construction of the heavy and machine industries. Therefore, in consideration of the state and

¹⁰³ Guangdong Province Overseas Chinese Affairs Committee, ‘Meixian guanche chuli huaqiao dizhu chengfen wenti shidian gongzuo jieshao’, n.d. (c. 12/1954), *GDQW*, No. 7 (13 Jan 1955), 34-36 (36).

¹⁰⁴ East Guangdong Party Committee Overseas Chinese Affairs Office, ‘Cong ganbu dao qunzhong, quanmian di xitong di xuanchuan guanche qiaowu zhengce, wei zhengqu wancheng qiaohui renwu er fendou’, 06/12/1954, *GDQW*, No. 7 (13 Jan 1955), 23.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., 24.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

people's highest interest, we cannot refuse to use money derived from *huaqiao* industrialist and merchant families.¹⁰⁸

Similarly, the cadres in charge of local Credit Cooperatives were also warned against any infringements, and to cooperate with the banks to ensure that 'facilitating remittances' was carried out in service of 'the state and people's highest interest'.

The Committee also proposed a more serious effort to organise the *qiaopi* couriers to resist the imperialists' restrictions on remittances, and to utilise the transnationality of their occupation. Domestically, the *qiaopi* couriers could ensure that remittances were delivered on behalf of the *huaqiao* limited by anti-China restrictions. While externally, the couriers could help to spread positive propaganda. Thus couriers were encouraged to contribute positively—and crucially, allowed their commissions.¹⁰⁹ Finally, the *guiqiao* were to be appropriately settled. The principle for returnees was still 'self-help through production', but work groups were to pay specific attention to their needs.¹¹⁰

There was thus serious attention towards the issues affecting *qiaowu* in 1954, and a strong focus on better implementation on the ground. This also placed the responsibility for *qiaowu* on local, lower-level cadres. In that respect, Hainan Island is an excellent case-study of the utter failure of cadres in *qiaowu*. But this case-study needs to begin with the victory cadres declared in October 1954, when Wenchang County reported a remittance increase of 66%. Indeed, so successful was Wenchang that even previously suspicious *huaqiao* had since 'written letters to express their gratefulness'.¹¹¹ Wenchang's victory—so it said—had been due to correct application of *qiaowu* policy: it had rectified *huaqiao* classes; encouraged *qiaojuan* and *guiqiao* participation in collectivisation; encouraged 'glorious labour' and not reliance on remittances; implemented policy on *huaqiao*

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., 25.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., 26.

¹¹⁰ Ibid., 27.

¹¹¹ Wenchang County Party Committee United Front Department, 'Zhonggong Wenchang xianwei tongzhanbu guanyu guanche huaqiao zhengce gongzuo de tongbao', 19/10/1954, *GDQW*, No. 6 (5 Dec 1954), 12.

marriages, ‘causing the *qiaojuan* to feel that the government cares for them’; and engaged in education, making cadres more knowledgeable, and assuring the *qiaojuan* and *guiqiao* of their remittance rights.¹¹² The result was the expansion of *huaqiao* patriotic unity, and dramatic remittance increases. Such reports were not unique to Wenchang; Hainan as a whole reported an 88% success rate in class revision island-wide.¹¹³

Hainan cadres trumpeted their successes and were generally held as models of correct *qiaowu*. In a November 1954 discussion of the letters received by provincial offices, Guangdong authorities held up Hainan’s positive example, proven by letters from *huaqiao* expressing gratitude to Chairman Mao, the CCP and CPG; enthusiasm for national construction and the gaining of remittances; and their approval for *qiaowu*.¹¹⁴ Hainan’s success, so it said, was because it had professionalised cadres and improved their knowledge. Chen Wuying (head of Hainan *qiaowu*) said as much to the ‘Second South China Conference on Overseas Chinese Affairs Work’, quoting penitent cadres who had ‘previously failed to hear the Party’s *qiaowu* policies’, but who were now no longer ‘ignorant of the immense utility that gaining remittances offered to the country’s socialist industrialisation and construction’.¹¹⁵ Chen cautiously pointed to room for improvement since some still believed that class revision was for *haiwai huaqiao*, and not for *qiaojuan*. But that was for future work; Hainan had done well thus far.

¹¹² The Marriage Law (1950) entailed a right to divorce ‘under conditions of abandonment’. In some cases, *qiaojuan* wives had seen this as ‘license for openly defying the authority of their overseas husbands’; while others rejected a ‘double standard’ where *haiwai huaqiao* kept separate wives/families overseas. Either way, *haiwai huaqiao* men responded to divorce demands and petitions by cutting off remittances and thus official policy was that ‘mediation and reconciliation, rather than divorce, were the preferred means for dealing with marital disputes’. Only when all attempts at resolution had been exhausted would the matter be sent to the Courts. See Peterson, *Overseas Chinese in the People’s Republic of China*, 40-43. See also Wenchang County Party Committee United Front Department, ‘Zhonggong Wenchang xianwei tongzhanbu guanyu guanche huaqiao zhengce gongzuo de tongbao’, 19/10/1954, *GDQW*, No. 6 (5 Dec 1954), 14; ‘Guangdong sheng huaqiao hunyin wenti hen yanzhong’, 01/11/1954, *NBCK*.

¹¹³ Guangdong Province Overseas Chinese Affairs Committee, ‘Yue zhong, Hainan, yue bei qu dangwei zhaokai quan qu qiaowu gongzuo huiyi’, n.d. (c. 1954), *GDQW*, No. 6 (5 Dec 1954), 25.

¹¹⁴ Guangdong Province Overseas Chinese Affairs Committee, ‘Guanyu jin yi bu jiaqiang chuli huaqiao lai xin de yijian’, 15/11/1954, *GDQW*, No. 7 (13 Jan 1955), 4-6 (4).

¹¹⁵ Chen Wuying, ‘Hainan qiaoxiang jiehe nongye huzhu hezuo yundong, guanche zhengce, jie jue yiliu de jingyan’, n.d. (c. 13-21/12/1954), *GDQW*, No. 7 (13 Jan 1955), 12-14 (12-13).

Hainan's apparent focus on class revision was seemingly endorsed in February 1955 when the South China Bureau approved the Guangdong *qiaowu* Party Group's proposal on the early revision of *huaqiao* class. Since late 1954, a (rather ironic) team led by Tao Zhu, and (now) OCAC vice-Chairman Fang Fang had been engaged in a pilot program for early revision of *huaqiao* landlord status.¹¹⁶ While the Land Reform Law entailed a five-year period after assessment before a landlord could apply for a class revision, the Bureau authorised in February 1955 an accelerated process for *huaqiao* (and only *huaqiao*) landlords and rich peasants.¹¹⁷ Successful revision now required law-abiding behaviour, and reform of exploitative behaviour, but without the five-year wait. The Bureau instructed local Party Committees that early revision was 'one of the most important tasks at present', and the reasons for this were simple.¹¹⁸ The pilot program's ostensible effect was an increase in remittances—Guangzhou had an increase of 3.7% in January; West Guangdong districts, 7.9%; and Zhongshan County first among equals at 13%.¹¹⁹ Early revision was also immensely popular, and those *qiaojian* with revised classes were eager to write letters to 'report joy'.¹²⁰ Changes in class also enabled more *huaqiao* to participate in collectivisation, offering APCs and Mutual Aid Teams more resources—especially remittances.¹²¹

The Guangdong *qiaowu* Party Group's pilot program was convincing, and the South China Bureau thus extended it to *huaqiao* rich peasants, who had not been included originally.¹²² But the Party Group went further, suggesting that *qiaowu* become part of

¹¹⁶ Guangdong Province Overseas Chinese Affairs Committee Party Group, 'Guanyu chuli huaqiao dizhu tiquan gaibian chengfen de shidian gongzuo baogao', 03/02/1955, *GDQW*, No. 9 (9 Mar 1955), 3-13 (3-4).

¹¹⁷ CCP CC South China Bureau, 'Zhonggong zhongyang huanan fenju pi zhuan 'Guangdong sheng qiaowei fen dangzu guanyu chuli huaqiao dizhu tiquan gaibian chengfen de shidian gongzuo baogao'', 10/02/1955, *GDQW*, No. 9 (9 Mar 1955), 2-3.

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 2.

¹¹⁹ Guangdong Province Overseas Chinese Affairs Committee Party Group, 'Guanyu chuli huaqiao dizhu tiquan gaibian chengfen de shidian gongzuo baogao', 03/02/1955, *GDQW*, No. 9 (9 Mar 1955), 3-4.

¹²⁰ *Ibid.*, 5.

¹²¹ *Ibid.*, 11.

¹²² *Après* Guangdong Overseas Chinese Affairs Committee Director, Rao Zhangfeng, the 'experimental phase' had seen 2406 out of 2614 *huaqiao* landlord households (across 9 counties) undergo class changes in a 2-month period; basically a 91.6% success rate. See Rao Zhangfeng, 'Guangdong sheng huaqiao shiwu

Party Committees' permanent agendas, to effect systematic implementation.¹²³ The class revisions were to continue, but other *qiaowu* issues like the protection of remittances, the return of *huaqiao* property, rent disputes, and propaganda to *qiaojuan* and the masses, were all to receive further attention.¹²⁴ The Party Group asserted that *qiaowu* rested on 'Party Committees at all levels and *qiaoxiang* cadres', who had to remember that time was literally money, since 'a delay of one month in implementing policy is the same as the loss of one month's possible remittances'.¹²⁵ Yet, while the Party Group reminded districts to adhere to policy, it said that Hainan had basically completed the work. Given its successes, Hainan was a model of victorious *qiaowu*.

Yet, despite the glorious victories that Hainan was supposed to have had by 1955, the stark reality was that it was close to crisis. Reports that things were not quite as glorious as had been thought emerged in June 1955 when Xinhua reported that Hainan's remittance figures had actually fallen every year since 1951, with the past five months seeing a fall of US\$100,000 (RMB 240,000) year-on-year.¹²⁶ Apart from the usual nod towards imperialist restrictions on remittances, the reasons for the fall were otherwise domestic. Indeed, the first reason was because 'various county Party Committees and cadres have failed to pay attention to *huaqiao* work, and have been insincere in making the implementation of *huaqiao* policy part of their work agendas, preferring to believe that it is the sole responsibility of *qiaowu* departments'.¹²⁷ In Wenchang, with a *huaqiao*

weiyuanhui Rao Zhangfeng zhuren zai Guangdong sheng di yi jie renmin daibiao dahui di er ci huiyi de fayan', 09/02/1955, *GDQW*, No. 9 (9 Mar 1955), 16-18 (16).

¹²³ Guangdong Province Overseas Chinese Affairs Committee Party Group, 'Guanyu chuli huaqiao dizhu tiquan gaibian chengfen de shidian gongzuo baogao', 03/02/1955, *GDQW*, No. 9 (9 Mar 1955), 8.

¹²⁴ *Ibid.*, 12-13.

¹²⁵ *Ibid.*, 13.

¹²⁶ 1951 (US\$9.8 million); 1952 (US\$7.4 million); 1953 (US\$5.1 million); 1954 (US\$4.8 million); Jan-May 1955 (US\$ 2.13 million). See 'Hainan dao qiaohui zhu nian jianshao', 01/07/1955, *NBCK*.

The official rate was fixed at USD 1: RMB 2.4 until 1971. But the black market rate was closer to USD 1: RMB 11 in 1955. See Abdol. S. Soofi, 'Prediction and Volatility of Black Market Currencies: Evidence from Renminbi and Rial Exchange Rates', *International Journal of Theoretical and Applied Finance*, 5:6 (2002), 659-666; 'Historical Official Exchange Rates between the Renminbi and U.S. Dollar, 1955-2008' in, Cheung Tai Ming, *Fortifying China: The Struggle to Build a Modern Defense Economy* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009), 265.

¹²⁷ 'Hainan dao qiaohui zhu nian jianshao', 01/07/1955, *NBCK*.

population above 50%, the local Party Committee's cadre conference in April 1955 turned Chen Wuying away, while its Party Secretary, who was apparently too busy with other work, had obstructed the *qiaowu* work teams attempting class revisions.

There were also reports of 'deviations in the unified sale and purchase', with *qiaojuan* complaining that they had insufficient food—especially those who had once been landlords/rich peasants. One *qiaojuan* from Lehui County said each person had only been able to buy 7 *jin* of food provisions each month, while other *qiaojuan* who had wanted to hold weddings or build houses had never been able to buy more than 20-30 *jin*, which was not sufficient to host guests or feed workers.¹²⁸ While a few *qiaojuan* had been driven by this suffering to commit suicide, more generally—and worryingly, given the point of *qiaowu*—the *huaqiao* were unsure of what was the point of remittances if they could not use it to feed themselves, and were thus writing to their relatives abroad to tell of the deprivations that 'unified sale and purchase' had forced upon them.¹²⁹

Wenchang had claimed that it had effectively managed *huaqiao* marriages, but the 1955 report suggested a far different situation, with large numbers of *qiaojuan* demanding divorces, and local officials avoiding any involvement. In one district, out of 80 *qiaojuan* households in a village, 13 had extra-marital affairs. Such incidents had come to the knowledge of *haiwai huaqiao* men, who had furiously cut off remittances. One *huaqiao* fumed that even if they had 'avoided the landlord hat' or had those hats removed, they had been 'given the hat of a cuckold'.¹³⁰ Worst still was that 'the large majority of those who have had unnatural male-female relations with *qiaojuan* are rural cadres'.¹³¹ Clearly, despite Wenchang and Hainan's reports, the reality was that Party cadres were

¹²⁸ 1 *jin* (or 1 catty) is 0.5 kg. See 'Hainan dao qiaohui zhu nian jianshao', 01/07/1955, *NBCK*.

¹²⁹ This situation was not unique to *huaqiao*; the government set subsistence quotas for grain 'at roughly 13 to 16 kilos per head each month—a little more than half the required amount of unhusked grain to provide 1700 to 1900 calories. It was a starvation diet imposed equally on all villagers.' See Dikötter, *The Tragedy of Liberation*, 217, 213.

¹³⁰ 'Hainan dao qiaohui zhu nian jianshao', 01/07/1955, *NBCK*.

¹³¹ This was similar to Fujian (see Chapter 2). 'Unnatural male-female relations' [不正当的男女关系] was Xinhua's term. See 'Hainan dao qiaohui zhu nian jianshao', 01/07/1955, *NBCK*.

the problem, and the fundamental contradiction in *qiaowu* was really that what the party-state determined was not what its cadres were doing.

In fairness, the East Guangdong Party Committee's *qiaowu* office had begun to discover some problems already in February 1955.¹³² Cadres were apparently abusing the 'unified sale and purchase' system, using it to punish class enemies, and withholding food from *qiaojuan* who lived off remittances; other cadres had restricted supplies to meet their own quotas for surplus accumulation; while cadres had also failed to convey policy regarding *huaqiao* property since *qiaojuan* were unsure if they could build houses, or own property in a period of socialist transformation.¹³³ Other *huaqiao* investors had questions about whether they were entitled to dividends and the protection of their capital, or if the *huaqiao* investment companies even offered a superior interest rate to bank deposits. All of this was sufficient for one *huaqiao* to remark that: 'the Centre's *huaqiao* policies are great and correct, but the rural cadres' implementation of these policies is inadequate'.¹³⁴ East Guangdong clearly saw the problem, but its response was rather lame. Cadres were told to head to rural areas to resolve these issues 'as a priority', to engage in yet more policy education, or indeed to conduct more checks on work.¹³⁵ Such actions, the Party Committee believed, would fulfil the party-state's *qiaowu* policies which were 'correct and absolutely necessary to implement'.¹³⁶ Yet, none of this was particularly new, and since cadres (as on Hainan) had long claimed to be implementing such policies, was not particularly helpful either. The cadres therefore could not be relied

¹³² East Guangdong Party Committee, 'Zhonggong yue dong qu dangwei dui yue dong qiaowu ju guanyu 'yue dong qu qiaowu gongzuo huibao huiyi hou jiehe liangshi gongzuo zhong guanche huaqiao zhengce de qingkuang ji dangqian cunzai wenti de baogao' de pishi', n.d. (02/1955), *GDQW*, No. 8 (13 Feb 1955), 2-4 (2).

¹³³ East Guangdong Party Committee Overseas Chinese Affairs Office, 'Yue dong qu qiaowu gongzuo huibao huiyi jiehe liangshi gongzuo zhong guanche huaqiao zhengce de qingkuang ji dangqian cunzai wenti de baogao', n.d. (02/1955), *GDQW*, No. 8 (13 Feb 1955), 4-13 (8-10).

¹³⁴ *Ibid.*, 9.

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*, 12-13.

¹³⁶ East Guangdong Party Committee, 'Zhonggong yue dong qu dangwei dui yue dong qiaowu ju guanyu 'yue dong qu qiaowu gongzuo huibao huiyi hou jiehe liangshi gongzuo zhong guanche huaqiao zhengce de qingkuang ji dangqian cunzai wenti de baogao' de pishi', n.d. (02/1955), *GDQW*, No. 8 (13 Feb 1955), 2.

on to keep faith with *qiaowu*, indeed, the cadres were actually the problem. Thus by early 1955, a far more direct intervention in *qiaowu* was clearly needed.

More money, more problems:

By January 1955, Liao Chengzhi had to admit (again) that *qiaowu* was failing. Indeed, it was a failure made even more egregious by the fact that in 1950-1954, the PRC had seen a net remittance inflow of US\$684.06 million. This, as Liao told the CCP CC, was about 50% of the hard currency earnings from exports to capitalist countries.¹³⁷ Yet, while remittances had peaked in 1951 (US\$169.23 million), they had fallen ever since, with 1954's figure only 70% of 1951.¹³⁸ The decline was significant, and although there had been external pressure, Liao noted that 'our work has contained severe failings'.¹³⁹ Yet, Liao was not referring to the OCAC and PBOC. He was blaming instead the failure to implement policies on the ground by the lower-level cadres and officials. Indeed, Liao said that remittances had declined because of: the common violations of remittances; the linkages of *huaqiao* class status to remittances; the wrongful linkages of grain yields to remittances; and the persecution of *qiaopi* couriers due to suspicions of their class, or as spies because of their travel.¹⁴⁰ These violations had greatly undermined efforts to secure remittances, so much so that the *qiaojuan* were unwilling to receive or seek remittances, as they now believed that: 'more money, more problems'.¹⁴¹

¹³⁷ Whereas the report in the *ZZWX* only lists the PBOC and OCAC Party Groups as authors, Liao was personally responsible and he presented it to the State Council. See Liao Chengzhi, 'Guanyu guoqu qiaohui gongzuo zhuangkuang he gaijin jinhou gongzuo wenti de baogao', 17/02/1955, *GDQW*, No. 10 (10 May 1955), 2-9; Liao Chengzhi, 'Zhongyang huaqiao shiwu weiyuanhui dangzu he Zhongguo renmin yinhang dangzu guanyu qiaohui wenti xiang zhongyang de baogao', 03/01/1955, *ZZWX*, 18: 135-151 (135).

¹³⁸ Based on OCAC-PBOC calculations: if 1951 (=100), 1952 (95.3), 1953 (71.5), 1954 (70). See Liao Chengzhi, 'Zhongyang huaqiao shiwu weiyuanhui dangzu he Zhongguo renmin yinhang dangzu guanyu qiaohui wenti xiang zhongyang de baogao', 03/01/1955, *ZZWX*, 18: 135.

¹³⁹ Ibid.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid., 18: 136.

¹⁴¹ The phrase literally means 'more gold summons disaster' [多金招祸]. See Liao Chengzhi, 'Zhongyang huaqiao shiwu weiyuanhui dangzu he Zhongguo renmin yinhang dangzu guanyu qiaohui wenti xiang zhongyang de baogao', 03/01/1955, *ZZWX*, 18: 140.

The problem, as the OCAC and PBOC Party Groups admitted, was that *qiaowu* had failed to protect or guarantee the ‘proprietary rights of *huaqiao* remittances’, because it had failed to communicate this imperative to Party cadres.¹⁴² Past statements on this imperative had been kept within limited Party circles—with the exception of Fujian, since the FPG had publicly declared that remittances were inviolate.¹⁴³ Otherwise, such public statements had never been countenanced. Some believed that to do so would confirm the anti-CCP and imperialist propaganda that alleged that *huaqiao* remittances were under attack. But then again, remittances were truly under attack—from within. In focusing on rectifying Land Reform excesses, the OCAC and PBOC had only belatedly seen the growing contradiction in the General Line era between collectivisation in *qiaoxiang*, and *qiaowu*. Cadres had focused on remittances as a resource for agrarian collectivisation and socialist transformation, and since this was technically outside Land Reform rectification, had ignored *qiaowu* directives.¹⁴⁴ After all, socialist transformation was the national agenda, which therefore meant that the OCAC and PBOC would have to intervene directly to define *qiaowu* in the context of the General Line.

The priority for the OCAC and PBOC was more effective communication of *qiaowu* to the cadres and masses, particularly in areas with large *huaqiao* populations. Cadres were essentially out of control: coercing *huaqiao* to join Credit Cooperatives; persecuting *qiaojuan* for allegedly-bourgeois lifestyles; accusing remittances of being exploitative profits; forcing *huaqiao* to subscribe to National Economic Construction Bonds; and including remittances in land yield demands, thus forcing *qiaojuan* to sell more grain to meet ‘unified sale and purchase’.¹⁴⁵ Such violations were not confined to

¹⁴² Ibid., 18: 136.

¹⁴³ The OCAC and PBOC believed that this firm and transparent declaration was why Fujian had seen fewer incidents of remittance violations. See Liao Chengzhi, ‘Zhongyang huaqiao shiwu weiyuanhui dangzu he Zhongguo renmin yinhang dangzu guanyu qiaohui wenti xiang zhongyang de baogao’, 03/01/1955, ZZWX, 18: 137.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid., 18: 137-138.

¹⁴⁵ While Fujian was the exception again, the worst culprits were Yunnan, Zhejiang and Guangxi. See Liao Chengzhi, ‘Zhongyang huaqiao shiwu weiyuanhui dangzu he Zhongguo renmin yinhang dangzu guanyu qiaohui wenti xiang zhongyang de baogao’, 03/01/1955, ZZWX, 18: 138-139, 143.

cadres; the masses were guilty too. Some said ‘individualist capitalists’ had cheated the *huaqiao* with false investment schemes. But there were also postal workers impersonating *qiaojuan* in letters demanding money; ‘hooligans’ extorting remittances; and Village Committees which examined *huaqiao* letters and exacted levies.¹⁴⁶ It was thus necessary to instil the lesson that remittances affected over ten million *huaqiao* in China, representing both their livelihoods, and their potential economic contributions. To attack remittances was therefore both a violation of legal rights and economic sabotage. Thus, while Liao called for policy education and investigation of violations, he also requested that the State Council issue a decree on ‘Resolutely implementing and protecting *huaqiao* remittances policy’, with an accompanying *People’s Daily* editorial, ‘so that the country’s *huaqiao* remittance policy will be known in every household’.¹⁴⁷

Secondly, all violations of remittances were to be rectified. While collectivisation was a national priority, and the CCP desired that *qiaojuan* join in the socialisation of agriculture, participation was to be strictly voluntary. To coerce *qiaojuan* into joining cooperatives (whether Credit or APCs) would wreck attempts to increase remittances.¹⁴⁸ Similarly, that *qiaojuan* received this income without labour was not to preclude their participation in collectivisation, and it certainly was not grounds for an increase in harvest demands. All direct violations—whether false investment schemes, impersonated letters, or extortion—were to be rectified, with ‘abominable cases’ severely dealt with in a high-profile way, *pour encourager les autres*.¹⁴⁹

Thirdly, recipients’ rights to use remittances as they saw fit were to be protected. Since remittances were mostly for family support, they were not exploitative profits. Of course, while the collectivisation drive was a priority, cadres were not to force the issue, or limit how remittances were spent—even if not on the Mutual Aid Teams or the APCs.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid., 18: 139-140, 143.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid., 18: 145.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid., 18: 146

¹⁴⁹ Ibid., 18: 147.

Even where *huaqiao* households were enabled by remittances to live relatively better (if not, bourgeois) lives compared to the masses, cadres were not to seek to ‘equalise’ the two demographics by restricting *huaqiao* spending. This would reduce the desire to even seek remittances, which of course, was unacceptable. Conversely, cadres were to provide *qiaojuan* with opportunities to spend their money. If goods were controlled under ‘unified sale and purchase’ (i.e. cotton cloth or cooking oil), cadres were to allocate larger amounts of food or goods for *qiaojuan* so that they would use their remittances.¹⁵⁰

Fourthly, for the *huaqiao* who wanted to invest in property, land or construction, they were to be allocated extra building material and food (for workers).¹⁵¹ Moreover, those *huaqiao* who invested in urban construction were to be given a five-year exemption from property tax. Longstanding *huaqiao* interest in philanthropy was also encouraged. But to prevent misappropriations, local officials and community bodies were warned not to re-allocate funds intended for specific purposes, or to solicit donations from *huaqiao* directly.¹⁵² The OCAC and PBOC also suggested that the CCP CC authorise Beijing, Shanghai, Fujian, and Guangdong to research and arrange for opportunities for *huaqiao* to invest. Of course, direct investment had been a small part of remittances in 1949-1955, at around RMB 120 billion (US\$4.87 million).¹⁵³ Yet, there was potential for growth. The PBOC estimated that HKD 2 billion (US\$349.99 million) from Southeast Asian *huaqiao* had come into Hong Kong in recent years, and had mostly remained there.¹⁵⁴ To gain that

¹⁵⁰ Ibid., 18: 148.

¹⁵¹ Construction and property were traditional counter-inflationary hedges; in Jinjiang County (Fujian), 10-21% of remittances were in property investment alone. See Liao Chengzhi, ‘Zhongyang huaqiao shiwu weiyuanhui dangzu he Zhongguo renmin yinhang dangzu guanyu qiaohui wenti xiang zhongyang de baogao’, 03/01/1955, *ZZWX*, 18: 141.

¹⁵² Ibid., 18: 148-149.

¹⁵³ This report was written before the ‘new’ RMB. Hence, RMB 120 billion (at USD 1: RMB 24620) was roughly US\$4.87 million, or US\$812,000 per year. In proportion to overall remittances, this was less than 0.005% of 1951 (US\$169 million). Moreover, remittances for investment followed the national trend and was falling year-on-year. 1954 was 77.1% of 1953. See Liao Chengzhi, ‘Zhongyang huaqiao shiwu weiyuanhui dangzu he Zhongguo renmin yinhang dangzu guanyu qiaohui wenti xiang zhongyang de baogao’, 03/01/1955, *ZZWX*, 18: 148-149, 141.

¹⁵⁴ Liao Chengzhi, ‘Zhongyang huaqiao shiwu weiyuanhui dangzu he Zhongguo renmin yinhang dangzu guanyu qiaohui wenti xiang zhongyang de baogao’, 03/01/1955, *ZZWX*, 18: 141.

capital, the OCAC and PBOC suggested that *huaqiao* investments in national investment companies be guaranteed an 8% yearly interest; have guaranteed proprietary rights even after the transition to socialism; have no bearing whatsoever on class status; and entitle the investor to a job from the state enterprise they invested in.¹⁵⁵

Finally, the OCAC and PBOC determined to move away from their previous hesitation about propaganda to the *haiwai huaqiao*. Whereas they had previously thought that this might only encourage the imperialists' anti-CCP propaganda, they now felt that it was necessary to accurately and extensively convey information to the *haiwai huaqiao* about the PRC's protection of remittances and the implementation of *qiaowu*. Moreover, it would also help in the dissemination of information about the homeland's development, thereby encouraging the *haiwai huaqiao* into patriotic unity with their homeland, and to oppose the restrictions placed on remittances by foreign governments.¹⁵⁶

Liao Chengzhi believed that this extensive formulation by the OCAC and PBOC would place *qiaowu* implementation, and remittance protections at the heart of future work agendas for Party Committees in *huaqiao* areas. Indeed, the rectification Liao demanded suggested a direct intervention in the implementation of *qiaowu*, so as to resolve the fundamental problem, which was that it was the party-state's own agents who undermined its objectives. Or, as Liao said:

There is still a large portion of cadres who harbour an incorrect perspective; they believe that the Centre has two incompatible policies—one, that of the socialist transformation of agriculture, and the other, that of *huaqiao* policy. This is an error, and it is an extremely harmful way of thinking. Policies for *huaqiao* work and for *huaqiao* remittances are part of the Party's most important policies. These policies embody the Party's approach during the transitional period towards the labouring masses, towards the bourgeois, and are in obedience to the Party's overall objective in the General Line. To implement the Centre's policies on the protection of *huaqiao* remittance proprietary rights and to do *qiaojuan* work well,

At USD 1: HKD 5.7143, this came to US\$349.99 million, or twice the 1951 remittance peak. See Werner Antweiler, 'Foreign Currency Units per 1 U.S. Dollar, 1948-2014' (University of British Columbia: 2015) [<http://fx.sauder.ubc.ca/etc/USDpages.pdf>] Accessed 28 July 2015.

¹⁵⁵ The exceptions for *huaqiao* investments following socialist transition also applied to *huaqiao* capital deposits. See Liao Chengzhi, 'Zhongyang huaqiao shiwu weiyuanhui dangzu he Zhongguo renmin yinhang dangzu guanyu qiaohui wenti xiang zhongyang de baogao', 03/01/1955, ZZWX, 18: 141.

¹⁵⁶ Ibid., 18: 150.

not only helps to win over the *guowai huaqiao* to the homeland, but also helps to contribute to developing production and the socialist transformation of agriculture.¹⁵⁷

The CCP CC apparently agreed with Liao, since it soon issued an ‘all-China’ directive approving the OCAC–PBOC memorandum, and instructing that all regional and local governments implement it henceforth.¹⁵⁸

The immediate consequence of the OCAC–PBOC report and the CCP CC’s directive was the State Council’s decree on 23 February 1955 that explicitly entrenched the principle that remittances were legal income, and made its protections long-term policy, thus giving the OCAC–PBOC suggestions the force of law.¹⁵⁹ There would be no excuse for any ignorance of *qiaowu* henceforth—not least because the national press were instructed to, and did give the decree substantial coverage. Indeed, as Liao had suggested, the *People’s Daily* ran a lengthy editorial on 3 March (written by him) that publicised the State Council decree.¹⁶⁰ This direct intervention by the State Council served two purposes: it sent a strong message to the cadres and the masses, but it also added impetus to the wider propaganda directed at the *haiwai huaqiao* that was part of this new *qiaowu* activism. The propaganda push in 1954–1955 was thus a function of the Liao-devised *qiaowu* intervention in January–February 1955.¹⁶¹ The necessity for this push was most obviously to counteract the negative publicity that failures in *qiaowu* had created by 1954, and the anti-CCP propaganda that had capitalised on situation.¹⁶² But there was another

¹⁵⁷ Ibid., 18: 144.

¹⁵⁸ CCP CC, ‘Zhonggong zhongyang pizhuan zhong qiaowei dangzu he Zhongguo renmin yinhang dangzu guanyu qiaohui wenti de baogao’, 10/02/1955, ZZWX, 18: 134.

¹⁵⁹ See State Council, ‘Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo guowuyuan guanyu guanche baohu qiaohui zhengce de mingling’, 23/02/1955, in All-China Federation of Returned Overseas Chinese Preparatory Committee (ed.), *Guonei qiaowu zhengce wenjian huibian* (Beijing: Quanguo guiguo huaqiao lianhui, 1956), 16–17.

¹⁶⁰ ‘Guanche qiaowu zhengce, jianjue baohu qiaohui’, 03/03/1955, *Renmin ribao*; Liao Chengzhi, ‘Guanche qiaowu zhengce jianjue baohu qiaohui’, 03/03/1955, *DHGLR*, 204–207.

¹⁶¹ The *People’s Daily* editorial and the two South China Bureau propaganda directives were published as a special issue of *GDQW* (in an extra No. 9) on 22 March 1955. See Guangdong Province Overseas Chinese Affairs Committee, ‘Guanyu jiaqiang dangyuan, tuanyuan, ganbu yu guowai huaqiao lianxi yu zhengqu qiaohui jihua’, n.d., *GDQW*, No. 10 (10 May 1955), 17–20.

¹⁶² ‘Hezhong she zaoyao wo moshou he kouliu qiaohui’, 03/03/1955, *NBCK*; ‘Taifei duiwo baohu qiaohui banfa luanjia wumie’, 21/03/1955, *NBCK*; ‘Zhonggong yu huaqiao’, 14/04/1954, *Ziyou ribao*; ‘Kan zhonggong qiaowu kuilei xi’, 28/09/1953, *Zhongsheng wanbao*.

reason: to stabilise the transnational connection between New China and its overseas children, despite—or perhaps precisely because of—a growing sentiment that the PRC was marginalising, or even seeking to outright abandon its duties to the *haiwai huaqiao*.

Liao's editorial for the *People's Daily* in March 1955 took care to emphasise the constitutional basis of the PRC's stance on the 'legitimate rights and interests' of *huaqiao* and of course, on the legality of remittances as lawful income, and the state's guarantee of their right to own property.¹⁶³ But the point of such references was that by 1955, the *huaqiao* had ample reason to doubt the Constitution.

Originally, the Electoral Law of 1 March 1953 had reserved a thirty-delegate bloc to represent the *haiwai huaqiao* in the NPC, with the precise method of their election to be separately determined.¹⁶⁴ This aroused excitement amongst the *huaqiao*.¹⁶⁵ But many were unsure of how this would work, since the most direct and obvious suffrage would have been elections among the imperialist or reactionary-governed *haiwai huaqiao*. This prospect horrified British officials in Southeast Asia, not only because it would infringe unprecedentedly on British sovereignty, but also since it would be profoundly subversive in Malaya and Singapore.¹⁶⁶ The British government thus thought to deliver a demarche to the CPG, to reject 'unwarrantable interference with the sovereignty of the local territorial administration concerned'.¹⁶⁷ Yet, the British need not have worried.

As it turns out, the PRC's extension of democracy to the *haiwai huaqiao* turned out to be a damp squib. On 28 November 1953, British *Chargé d'affaires* Humphrey Trevelyan reported to the Foreign Office that He Xiangning had been quoted saying that 'having regard to the circumstances in which the Overseas Chinese lived abroad', and

¹⁶³ Articles 11, 12 and 98, in 'Guanche qiaowu zhengce, jianjue baohu qiaohui', 03/03/1955, *Renmin ribao*.

¹⁶⁴ CPG Committee, 'Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo quanguo renmin daibiao dahui ji difang geji renmin daibiao dahui xuanju fa', 11/02/1953, *JYZW*, 4: 21-31 (22, 25).

¹⁶⁵ 'Xiamen bushao ren dui xuanju fa renshi mohu', 02/04/1953, *NBCK*.

¹⁶⁶ 'Sir Hilary Blood to Oliver Lyttelton', 17/12/1953, TNA, CO 1022/904; 'Sir Ronald Garvey to Oliver Lyttelton', 30/11/1953, TNA, CO 1022/904.

¹⁶⁷ Memorandum: 'Representation of Overseas Chinese in All-China People's Congress', 5th Meeting of Malaya/Borneo Governors' Conference, 07/09/1953, TNA, CO 1022/404.

given that ‘nominations’ for elections would be difficult’, delegates would be selected by ‘consultation’. Trevelyan believed this meant ‘that the Chinese have given up the idea of holding elections overseas’—and he was correct.¹⁶⁸

Rather than hold any sort of election, the OCAC simply chose thirty delegates to the NPC at an Expanded Conference from 8-14 July 1954. The delegates included famous names like Tan Kah Kee, Situ Meitang, He Xiangning and Liao Chengzhi. Liao claimed that the thirty candidates had been nominated from *haiwai huaqiao* able to return to China, and *guiqiao* who were ‘still representative of Chinese abroad’, and of course, ‘in accordance with the actual circumstances of overseas Chinese’.¹⁶⁹ But even if circumstances prevented *haiwai huaqiao* from voting for, or nominating delegates, their *qiaojuan* relatives, their *qiaosheng* children, and their *guiqiao* friends had all been equally shut out of the process. Of course, that was not to say that the *huaqiao* in China did not get to vote. They could still vote in local elections and for regional NPC delegates—just not for their own *huaqiao* representatives.¹⁷⁰

The *huaqiao* were thus denied the franchise—and this took place even without a British protest. Trevelyan believed that this stemmed from Beijing’s new desire for good relations with the newly-independent countries of Southeast Asia. After all, Zhou Enlai had told the NPC on 23 September that the PRC was willing to resolve the *huaqiao* dual nationality issue with Southeast Asian countries that had, or would establish diplomatic relations with it.¹⁷¹ This issue came from a traditional view that nationality was based on

¹⁶⁸ ‘Mr. Trevelyan, Peking to Foreign Office’, 28/11/1953, TNA, CO 1022/404.

¹⁶⁹ Enclosure No. 1, ‘Peking dispatch to Foreign Office, No. 314’, 23/09/1954, TNA, FO 371/110377.

¹⁷⁰ The delegates were: Fang Junzhuang, Situ Meitang, Wu Zen, He Xiangning, Wu Yixiu, Li Huanqun, Li guangchen, Zhou Zheng, Guan Wensen, Qiu Ji, Hong Si Si, Xu Simin, Ma Yusheng, Kang Mingqiu, Zhang Guoji, Zhang Yi, Zhuang Xiquan, Zhuang Mingli, Chen Qiyuan, Chen Jiageng [Tan Kah Kee], Peng Zemin, Huang Changshui, Ye Yidong, Liao Chengzhi, Liao Sheng, Deng Junkai, Li Hexing, Xie Yingrui, Yi Meihou, Su Zhenshou. See ‘Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo di yi jie quanguo renmin daibiao dahui daibiao mingdan’, *Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo di yi jie quanguo renmin daibiao dahui di yi ci huiyi wenjian* (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1955), 162-174 (170).

¹⁷¹ ‘Humphrey Trevelyan to Sir Anthony Eden’, 23/09/1954, TNA, FO 371/110377; Zhou Enlai, ‘Report on the work of the Government’, 23/09/1954, *Documents of the First Session of the First National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China*, 75-130 (121).

ethnicity—or blood, hence *jus sanguinis*. Thus *huaqiao*, even if born abroad, could claim Chinese nationality, or more troublingly, China could lay claim to their loyalties.¹⁷² Thus giving voting rights to the *haiwai huaqiao* would only have provoked already-suspicious governments, and given the close ties between *huaqiao* in and out of China, to restrict the franchise for one group meant that it had to be restricted for all.

It was true that this electoral restraint on the part of the PRC was motivated by foreign policy, but this had actually begun with the January 1952 CCP CC statement on *qiaowu* that stated that Chinese abroad with local citizenship were not *huaqiao*. Yet, this early rejection of dual nationality was obviously not discussed outside the CCP CC, which thus explains why the British thought the PRC had a new foreign policy in 1954. Actually, it was the continuation of an existing policy, except with the added intention of using the dual nationality issue as foreign policy tool.

Since April 1954, the PRC had publicly preached the ‘Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence’, or: mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty; mutual non-aggression; mutual non-interference in each other’s internal affairs; equality and mutual benefit; and peaceful coexistence.¹⁷³ Dual nationality fell within these principles, and Zhou Enlai thus told Jawaharlal Nehru in New Delhi in June 1954 that the *huaqiao* should be loyal to their adopted countries, while U Nu was told in Rangoon that the *huaqiao* should ‘abide by the host country’s laws’.¹⁷⁴ Indeed, Zhou told the Indian, Indonesian and Burmese ambassadors to China in July that the *huaqiao* dual nationality issue would be

¹⁷² Clement Attlee, upon his return from a Labour Party delegation to the PRC, remarked: ‘You already have the problem in Malaya, Siam, Burma, and all over South East Asia of the penetration of the Chinese who are the abler and more dominant race’. See Clement R. Attlee, ‘My Impressions of China Today’, Record of General Meeting held at Chatham House, 16/11/1954, RIIA/8/2256, 9.

¹⁷³ ‘Agreement between India and China on Trade and Intercourse between Tibet region of China and India, 29 April 1954’, in Hinton (ed.), *The People’s Republic of China*, I: 165-166.

¹⁷⁴ MFA, ‘Minutes of Conversations between Zhou Enlai and Burmese Prime Minister U Nu’, 28/06/1954, *Wilson Center Digital Archive [WCDA]* [<http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/112438>] Accessed 28 July 2015; Minute: ‘Mr. G.H. Middleton, Acting High Commissioner for the United Kingdom to India, New Delhi’, 06/07/1954, TNA, FO 371/110376.

solved with Indonesia first, and Burma thereafter.¹⁷⁵ Even Mao told Nehru in October that: ‘the question of overseas Chinese should also be solved in an appropriate manner’.¹⁷⁶ But since the PRC’s rejection of dual nationality—even if only in private—had actually predated the Five Principles, all this apparent accommodation on the dual nationality issue was actually more about foreign policy bargaining.¹⁷⁷

By the time of Liao’s *qiaowu* report to the CCP CC in January 1955, leveraging on *huaqiao* dual nationality in foreign policy paralleled the rapprochement between Beijing and Jakarta, with movement towards Chinese participation in the Bandung Conference, and a treaty on dual nationality in April 1955. Indeed, in January 1955, even before the Dual Nationality Treaty negotiations were concluded, Zhou Enlai was already telling the Indonesian Ambassador that he expected an agreement to be formally reached.¹⁷⁸ But curiously, the contemporaneous OCAC-PBOC memorandum in January 1955 made no mention of dual nationality. Then again, since the CCP CC’s 1952 *qiaowu* statement, dual nationality was no longer a matter for *qiaowu*, and belonged to the MFA. Yet, even if *qiaowu* was uninvolved with the dual nationality talks, it had to deal with the consequent perceptions that the PRC was abandoning the *haiwai huaqiao*.

The PRC’s use of *huaqiao* dual nationality in foreign policy chess soon created a corollary problem when foreign press reports began to accuse the PRC of abandoning the *haiwai huaqiao*.¹⁷⁹ While such views from Western and anti-CCP sources were to be

¹⁷⁵ MFA, ‘Zhou Enlai’s Conversations with the Ambassadors of India, Indonesia, and Burma’, 10/07/1954, *WCDA* [<http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/112439>] Accessed 28 July 2015.

¹⁷⁶ MFA, ‘Minutes of Chairman Mao Zedong’s Third Meeting with Nehru’, 26/10/1954, *WCDA* [<http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/117828>] Accessed 28 July 2015.

¹⁷⁷ The MFA made a special list noting all the countries which were affected by *huaqiao* dual nationality. See MFA, ‘List of Problems between China and other Asian-African Countries’, 1955, *WCDA* [<http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/114718>] Accessed 28 July 2015.

¹⁷⁸ MFA, ‘Minutes of Premier Zhou Enlai’s Meeting with Indonesian Ambassador Arnold Mononutu regarding the Afro-Asian Conference and Visiting Indonesia’, 22/01/1955, *WCDA* [<http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/113190>] Accessed 28 July 2015.

¹⁷⁹ ‘Miandian cui wo jiu huaqiao shuangchong guoji wenti biaoming taidu’, 22/07/1954, *NBCK*; ‘Xianqu luntan bao zaoyao woguo jiang fangqi juzhu zai haiwai de huaqiao’, 24/07/1954, *NBCK*; ‘Lutou she zaoyao ‘huaqiao buzai renwei Zhongguo gongming’ yinqi Xianggang de qunzhong dui renmin zhengfu biaoshi buman’, 30/09/1954, *NBCK*; ‘Xianggang tongbao dui lutou she mie wo ‘bu chengren huaqiao’ de fanying’, 16/10/1954, *NBCK*.

expected, the danger was that this could compound already negative perceptions amongst *huaqiao*. After all, declining remittances already indicated the existence of suspicions of the PRC amongst the *huaqiao*, and this weighed heavily on *qiaowu* practitioners. Hence, while the Guangdong Overseas Chinese Affairs Committee's 'overall objectives' for 1955 had conventional emphases on remittances and investment, there was also a strong intent 'to strengthen connections with *guowai huaqiao*', and also to 'expand propaganda work to the *huaqiao* in a planned manner and through effective communication'.¹⁸⁰ Propaganda, of course, was not the end in itself. The Land Reform—and indeed, its rectification—had proven to *qiaowu* that there was a transnationality of *huaqiao* interests inextricably connected to remittances, and that the satisfaction of those interests had a domestic centre of gravity. After all, the remitters and recipients both had interests in the money, but both their interests were also mainly established in China. This, of course, was the basis of *youdai*. But it was also the basis for the propaganda to convince the *huaqiao* of this preferential treatment. Thus the *youdai* approach in *qiaowu* was actually a kind of balancing act between political economy and public relations.¹⁸¹

To be sure, the *youdai* approach dated back to the early Land Reform leniency for *huaqiao* landlords in 1950, and had also been affirmed in 1954–1955, in the rectification of Land Reform deviations, despite the onset of the General Line. Yet, the State Council's February 1955 decree marked a new departure for *youdai*, because it also implied that the *youdai* approach would be practiced even if it was actually contradictory to socialist transformation. To be true, *qiaowu* had encountered contradictions on the ground in 1954–1955, especially in terms of how local cadres and officials failed to implement, or even resisted *qiaowu* provisions for *huaqiao*, in the context of the General Line and its

¹⁸⁰ Guangdong Province Overseas Chinese Affairs Committee, 'Guanyu jiaqiang dangyuan, tuanyuan, ganbu yu guowai huaqiaolianxi yu zhengqu qiaohui jihua', n.d., *GDQW*, No. 10 (10 May 1955), 19.

¹⁸¹ The PRC was also aware that the GMD was attempting to entice *huaqiao* capital to Taiwan through 'preferential treatment plans for *huaqiao* investments'. See East Guangdong Party Committee Overseas Chinese Affairs Office, 'Cong ganbu dao quzhong, quanmian di xitong di xuanchuan guanche qiaowu zhengce, wei zhengqu wancheng qiaohui renwu er fendou', 06/12/1954, *GDQW*, No. 7 (13 Jan 1955), 22.

socialist transformation. Yet, this had not been seen as contradiction between *qiaowu* and socialism, but rather the fault of what Liao had called an ‘incorrect perspective’ by those who thought *qiaowu* and socialist transformation incompatible.¹⁸² For Liao and *qiaowu* practitioners, there was no contradiction. Even if their rationalisations of priorities had (always) placed the securing of *huaqiao* remittances at the very top, this ultimately served socialist transformation. This was the view that the CCP CC accepted anyway.

However, despite what Liao and the OCAC (and PBOC et al.) argued, there was a latent contradiction between *youdai* and socialist transformation. Mao’s vision of the General Line had called for the transformation of socio-economic relations and situations, into more socialist ideals and forms. Yet, *qiaowu* ran contrary to this. The General Line sought the end of bourgeois and capitalist ownership, while *youdai* privileged *huaqiao* property rights and private investments. Socialist transformation entailed collectivisation and common ownership of the means of production, but *youdai* exempted the *huaqiao* and protected their individual rights. This was publicly justified as arising from the special circumstances or characteristics of the *huaqiao*—such as the *haiwai huaqiao* exemption from class assessment as bourgeois because they supposedly suffered under imperialism. But the real reason for this was always about remittances. And it was this imperative that motivated the acceptance of contradiction. After all, as Liao had convinced the CCP CC and State Council to decree: ‘The state policy of protecting remittances from the Overseas Chinese is not only the present policy of the state but also the permanent policy of the state.’¹⁸³ That was to say, even after socialism.

Practically every OCAC intervention after the State Council’s decree in 1955 was an instance of *youdai* that proved the centrality of the remittance imperative, and one example of this was in terms of *huaqiao* correspondence. The *huaqiao* were prolific letter

¹⁸² Liao Chengzhi, ‘Zhongyang huaqiao shiwu weiyuanhui dangzu he Zhongguo renmin yinhang dangzu guanyu qiaohui wenti xiang zhongyang de baogao’, 03/01/1955, ZZWX, 18: 144.

¹⁸³ See Appendix C-V: Zhou Enlai, ‘Order of State Council for the implementation of the policy to protect remittances from Overseas Chinese’, 23/02/1955, in Wu, *Dollars, Dependents and Dogma*, 176-177 (177).

writers, both to each other, and to government bodies. Guangdong had naturally paid some attention to this previously, especially given that the province contained the most *huaqiao*.¹⁸⁴ But in March 1955, the OCAC issued its own directive on letters received by official agencies. Cadres and officials were required to learn *qiaowu* and government decrees and policies, so that their replies to the *haiwai huaqiao* could aid the ‘patriotic unity’ between the *huaqiao* and their homeland.¹⁸⁵ The concern here was that a positive connection between the *haiwai huaqiao* and the PRC had to be maintained, so that the remittance flows could be secured.

The management of *huaqiao* correspondence was of vital importance especially because many of the letters were about *huaqiao* marriage (divorce) issues. The party-state had long practiced a gendered policy in terms of *huaqiao* marriages, in that *qiaowu* tended to side with *haiwai huaqiao* husbands when *qiaojuan* wives sought divorces, and often pressured wives to drop their cases.¹⁸⁶ Yet, if the *qiaojuan* wife persisted, then a divorce petition would be sent overseas. However, in May 1955, the OCAC and the Supreme People’s Court alleged that the dispatch of the petitions had been inconsistent. Some were sent by county courts, others by *qiaowu* bodies, or the OCAC, or foreign consulates. The OCAC claimed that this bred *haiwai huaqiao* suspicion (as their letters suggested) and thus demanded stricter protocol, with all correspondence henceforth to be conducted only by provincial *qiaowu* and judicial offices. But what the OCAC was really trying to do was reduce divorce petitions, as they only caused resentment amongst the *haiwai huaqiao* men who were the remitters. Hence cases involving ‘relatively important’ or high-profile *huaqiao*, or with the potential for ‘a very large impact’, were to be sent to the OCAC for (euphemistic) ‘further research’, that would, of course, allow the petitions to be delayed

¹⁸⁴ Guangdong Province Overseas Chinese Affairs Committee, ‘Guanyu jin yi bu jiaqiang chuli huaqiao lai xin de yijian’, 15/11/1954, *GDQW*, No. 7 (13 Jan 1955), 4.

¹⁸⁵ OCAC, ‘Guanyu gaijin chuli huaqiao laixin de zhishi’, 22/03/1955, SMA B26-2-342-1.

¹⁸⁶ Peterson, *Overseas Chinese in the People’s Republic of China*, 40-43.

or obfuscated.¹⁸⁷ Here *youdai* was for the *haiwai huaqiao* men, since the preservation of *huaqiao* families maintained remittances. But this was hardly in keeping with the spirit of the Marriage Law, or socialist liberation and gender equality.¹⁸⁸

Of course, *qiaowu* practitioners were also aware of the accusations that the CCP had exploited the *huaqiao*. Indeed, as Liao had suggested in January 1955, the decline in remittances was partly to do with such views, which were compounded by reports of poor *qiaoxiang* conditions. To address this, directives on correspondence towards the *haiwai huaqiao* sought to standardise the content of replies to create a better image of the PRC. Thus directives in May 1955 instructed that *guiqiao* and *qiaojuan* were to be educated on how state bonds were state-guaranteed savings, patriotic expressions, and contributions to socialist construction, but all open attempts to court *haiwai huaqiao* subscription were forbidden.¹⁸⁹ If however, *qiaojuan* ‘wanted to take the initiative to write to their *qiaobao* to request that they remit money to subscribe to the bonds’, extra care was to be taken in guiding their correspondence, to avoid giving anti-CCP governments excuses to restrict remittances, and to avoid arousing *haiwai huaqiao* suspicion.¹⁹⁰

A similar intervention also took place in the management of *qiaosheng* letters. Ironically, some *qiaosheng* had become too enamoured with socialism, even to the point of ‘far left’ deviations. Some believed their *haiwai huaqiao* families backward and/or reactionary, while others feared that their bourgeois origins precluded membership in the CCP or Youth League. Thus many now rejected remittances as ‘exploitative profit’, or even publicly repudiated their families.¹⁹¹ This, of course, provoked negative reactions

¹⁸⁷ Other politically sensitive cases being those that (rather improbably) saw ‘participation in reactionary movements’ as grounds for divorce. See OCAC, Supreme People’s Court, ‘Guanyu gei guowai huaqiao de hunyin susong wenjian diban de zanxing guiding’, 05/05/1955, SMA B20-2-242-2.

¹⁸⁸ See also Neil J. Diamant, ‘Re-examining the Impact of the 1950 Marriage Law: State Improvisation, Local Initiative and Rural Family Change’, *The China Quarterly*, No. 161 (2000), 171-198.

¹⁸⁹ Guangdong Province 1955 National Economic Construction Bonds Committee, ‘Guanyu Guangdong sheng qiaobao qiaojuan rengou 1955 nian guojia jingji jianshe gongzhi de buchong zhishi’, 10/05/1955, *GDQW*, No. 11 (5 Jun 1955), 1-2 (2).

¹⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, 2.

¹⁹¹ OCAC, MOE, ‘Pizhuan Fujian sheng ‘guanyu ruhe zhidao zai xiao qiaosheng xiang guowai tongxin de tongzhi’, 29/03/1955, *GDQW*, No. 11 (5 Jun 1955), 3-5.

amongst *haiwai huaqiao* parents. Thus the OCAC and MOE instructed schools to conduct intensive education to teach *qiaosheng* to report on the homeland and *qiaoxiang* to their families; to report their academic progress; and to teach them the differences between China and their families' domiciles, and not to impose one on the other. Indeed, schools were to 'teach them to treat their families correctly', to write regular letters, and to gain remittances.¹⁹² They were also to be taught that their remittances reduced the burden they placed on national finances, and also contributed to China's foreign reserves. But lest the *huaqiao* become wary, schools were told 'not to overdo the foreign exchange message', and to emphasise instead 'how remittances reduce the country's financial burden'.¹⁹³ Schools were thus to play an active role in letter-writing, whether in guiding terminology, or censoring possibly controversial vocabulary.¹⁹⁴ The point was to bolster the relations between *qiaosheng* and their families, to the benefit of remittances and the pacification of *huaqiao*. But not, as it were, to the vindication of socialist education.

Clearly, a central focus of *qiaowu* in 1955 was on effective communication, but it was only one aspect of policy. As OCAC vice-Chairman Zhuang Mingli told a conference in Fujian, while talking about correct policy was necessary, 'we still have 2 million or more *qiaojuan* and *guiqiao* who are not present here with us in conference'.¹⁹⁵ The success of *qiaowu* rested also on having something to show for all its talk. This, as East Guangdong *qiaowu* officials reported in June 1955, was still a problematic proposition. Firstly, some cadres were still unwilling to carry out class revisions. Secondly, improper class revision also led to instances where the 'political treatment' of former landlords or rich peasants had not changed. Thirdly, even where class revision had been undertaken,

¹⁹² Ibid., 3.

¹⁹³ Ibid.

¹⁹⁴ Letters were to be 'relaxed, lively, specific and emotive', with neat and clear penmanship, and avoid provocative terms (i.e. socialism, comrade or 'Chiang-American traitors'). See OCAC, MOE, 'Pizhuan Fujian sheng 'guanyu ruhe zhidao zai xiao qiaosheng xiang guowai tongxin de tongzhi', 29/03/1955, *GDQW*, No. 11 (5 Jun 1955), 4-5.

¹⁹⁵ Zhuang Mingli, 'Zhong qiaowei Zhuang Mingli zai sheng yi ci qiao daibiao huiyi shang de jianghua', 10/04/1955, FPA #0148-001-0061-0027, 1-3 (3).

the return of *huaqiao* property (even if wrongfully confiscated) did not follow. Fourthly, problems with ‘unified sale and purchase’ abounded; around 90% of *qiaojuan* in Jieyang County wrote to relatives telling of starvation, some committed suicide, and a growing number tried to escape China (with a 120% increase in Jieyang in one month).¹⁹⁶

It was not all bad news. Fujian had by August 1955 ‘basically completed dealing with leftover problems to do with land, as well as in the early revision of *huaqiao* landlords’ class status’.¹⁹⁷ But Fujian, as Liao Chengzhi had noted in January 1955, was better at *qiaowu* than most. Elsewhere, firmer intervention was needed. One solution was to control bad news. Thus East Guangdong officials co-opted the *qiaopi* couriers into censorship efforts, citing an instance (in October 1955) where a courier had convinced a *qiaojuan* not to write that ‘life is hard; there is money but no rice to buy; we are starving’. But to write instead that ‘our household did not harvest as much because of a water shortage so please send money to aid us’.¹⁹⁸ On the other hand, changing the content of letters was not enough to satisfy *huaqiao* interests. For instance, while the property of former *huaqiao* landlords and rich peasants was supposed to be returned after class revision unless already re-distributed, property that had been ‘borrowed’ by the masses or government or military personnel had not been returned. In line with the *youdai* approach, instructions were thus issued requiring all property borrowed by government, military, or other public agencies to be returned by the end of October, or converted into formal leases or borrowing agreements, with proprietary rights reverting to the *huaqiao*. Similarly, other properties borrowed by the masses were also to be returned, or entered into lease or borrowing agreements, in line with ‘looking after the *huaqiao* and looking

¹⁹⁶ East Guangdong Overseas Chinese Affairs Office, ‘Yuedong qu di 3 ci qiaowu gongzuo huiyi hou guanche qiaohui zhengce qingkuang gongzuo yijian de zonghe baogao’, 06/06/1955, *GDQW*, No. 12 (18 Jul 1955), 11-18 (14-16).

¹⁹⁷ Fujian Province Overseas Chinese Affairs Committee Party Group, ‘Guanyu qiaowu zhengce guanche qingkuang de baogao’, 13/08/1955, FPA #148-001-0045-0011.

¹⁹⁸ Yang Jian, East Guangdong Overseas Chinese Affairs Office deputy-Director, ‘Guanyu fan xianzhi douzheng ji cuo li huaqiao fangwu wenti fayan’, 10/1955, *GDQW*, No. 15 (1 Jan 1956), 32-36 (33).

after the peasants'.¹⁹⁹ All violations were to be severely punished.²⁰⁰ Compared to earlier years, this was a far more assertive and firmer intervention by the party-state's *qiaowu* practitioners to implement the *youdai* approach.

Firmer intervention went together with an even wider application of the *youdai* approach to *qiaowu*. The State Council decree in February 1955 had made it clear that *huaqiao* remittances were, and would be private property in perpetuity. In August 1955, this was extended to include physical *huaqiao* property. On 6 August, Mao issued a decree granting incentives for *huaqiao* use of, and investment in uncultivated land, in order to develop *huaqiao* patriotism and encourage participation in national economic construction.²⁰¹ To that end, it permitted *huaqiao* to apply to use hitherto uncultivated land either through private enterprise, joint state-private enterprise or even cooperatives. Most importantly, if *huaqiao* agrarian investment took the form of private or state-private ownership, their usage rights were guaranteed for a full twenty to thirty years.²⁰² This clearly suggested a tolerance of *huaqiao* capitalism that would last even well beyond the era of socialist transformation, and it was a clear statement of *youdai*.

From the perspective of the party-state, there can have been little doubt that its *qiaowu* was clearly defined by *youdai* by the latter half of 1955. This was an approach to policy that had been formulated by *qiaowu* practitioners, and endorsed by the CCP CC and the State Council. Thus, despite the contradictions that *youdai* actually posed to socialist transformation, this was not particularly a concern for the party-state. Yet, what was rather more concerning though, was that the Party cadres were still proving rather

¹⁹⁹ Ibid., 35.

²⁰⁰ Guangdong Province Party Committee, Guangdong Province People's Government, 'Guanyu zhuyong huaqiao fangwu bixu ding yue jiao zu de tongzhi', 25/09/1955, *GDQW*, No. 17 (15 Apr 1956), 10-11. The same also applied to rent disputes. See Guangzhou Municipal Government Overseas Chinese Affairs Bureau, 'Guanyu chuli ben shi huaqiao fangwu zulin jiufen wenti gongzuo baogao', 23/11/1955, *GDQW*, No. 14 (25 Dec 1955), 30-36.

²⁰¹ Mao Zedong, 'Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo zhuxi ling', 06/08/1955, *Guonei qiaowu zhengce wenjian huibian*, 22.

²⁰² 'Huaqiao shen qing shiyong guoyou de huangshan huangdi tiaoli', 06/08/1955, *Guonei qiaowu zhengce wenjian huibian*, 22-24.

resistant. As Fujian pointed out to the OCAC in October 1955, the protection of remittances, and the *youdai* for *huaqiao* were well and good, but cadres were still of the belief that ‘in all things requiring money, look to the *huaqiao* and *qiaojuan*’.²⁰³ In this, ironically enough, the cadres were not wrong; that principle was basically the *raison d’être* of *qiaowu*. But even so, it was not supposed to look like that.

The issue, as the Guangdong Conference on *qiaowu* (chaired by Fang Fang) admitted in December 1955, was that ‘various levels of the Party do not pay attention or are ignorant of the important meaning of this work’.²⁰⁴ Thus the conference proposed some necessary improvements. The first was with socialist transformation: *huaqiao* had to be integrated with collectivisation, and this meant not only class revision work (with 6% of households still not re-assessed), but also that former landlords and rich peasants should be allowed to participate in cooperatives. This also meant that *qiaojuan* with no labour experience were to be trained, not coerced and criticised. In all circumstances, remittances were not to be levied unless voluntarily offered. Secondly, on ‘unified sale and purchase’, Guangdong would allocate more food and establish special shops for (only) *huaqiao* in *huaqiao*-concentrated areas so they could buy extra items on top of their allocations. The conference also re-emphasised the need to settle *huaqiao* property and rent disputes. The *guiqiao* were also to be domiciled in their hometowns, with employment arranged by the state if necessary, but with encouragement of their participation in labour and production as a first option. Moreover, since remittances ‘definitely required additional protection’, education programs for cadres and masses on

²⁰³ Fujian Province People’s Committee, ‘Tongbao guanyu dongyuan qiaojuan touzi ji guli huaqiao juban gongyi shiye ying zhuyi de wenti’, 28/10/1955, *GDQW*, No. 14 (25 Dec 1955), 8-9 (8).

²⁰⁴ Fang Fang was not cited as the report’s author, but since he presided with ‘guidance and leadership’ (so the Conference reported), his direct influence seems obvious enough. Fang Fang, ‘Jianjue guanche zhixing youguan huaqiao gongzuo de zhengce, ba huaqiao gongzuo renzhen zuohao’, 17/12/1955, *GDQW*, No. 15 (1 Jan 1956), 5-12 (5).

policy would be extended, with severe rectification of violations.²⁰⁵ This was much like earlier policy, but there was also a new principle at hand: liberality.

In terms of the *huaqiao* who wished to leave or enter the PRC, the Conference proposed liberality. Unless there were valid reasons (i.e. pending criminal charges or ‘political problems’), *huaqiao* should be allowed to leave China if they wished; the PRC ‘welcomed’ all arrivals but would not ‘send off’ those who left.²⁰⁶ Instead of restricting new arrivals ‘for fear of saboteurs and spies’, the restrictions should be loosened so that the *haiwai huaqiao* could travel freely to their homeland. Indeed, rather than prevent departures ‘for fear of people badmouthing us’, the conference suggested that there was nothing to fear since the country was developing well, and real criticisms were always worth examining for value.²⁰⁷ This was a departure from traditional visa regulations—and thinking—but the OCAC, Foreign Ministry, Public Security and PLA confirmed this as a national policy in December 1955.²⁰⁸ But then, this was consistent with the direction that *qiaowu* was heading in. After all, any unhappy *qiaojuan* and *guiqiao* would be less inclined to seek remittances, while suspicious and dissatisfied *huaqiao* would have less incentive to remit. But if the *youdai* approach was properly executed, there would be ‘no *huaqiao* complaints, no *qiaojuan* escapes, [and] no *huaqiao* remittance shortfalls’—and thus if *qiaowu* was done well, New China had nothing to worry about.²⁰⁹

Conclusion:

By the end of 1955, the practice of *qiaowu* by the OCAC and its partners had undergone significant changes. On the surface, the *youdai* approach continued existing

²⁰⁵ Ibid., 6, 8-11.

²⁰⁶ ‘来者欢迎,去者不送’, in Fang Fang, ‘Jianjue guanche zhixing youguan huaqiao gongzuo de zhengce, ba huaqiao gongzuo renzhen zuohao’, 17/12/1955, *GDQW*, No. 15 (1 Jan 1956), 11.

²⁰⁷ Ibid.

²⁰⁸ OCAC, MFA, Ministry of Public Security, PLA Public Security Command, ‘Guanyu huaqiao qiaojuan churu guo shenpi yuanze de lianhe zhishi’, 31/12/1955, *GDQW*, No. 16 (20 Feb 1956), 1-4.

²⁰⁹ Fang Fang, ‘Jianjue guanche zhixing youguan huaqiao gongzuo de zhengce, ba huaqiao gongzuo renzhen zuohao’, 17/12/1955, *GDQW*, No. 15 (1 Jan 1956), 6.

qiaowu that catered to *huaqiao* interests, so as to secure party-state interests. Yet, what had truly changed was how *qiaowu* related to socialist transformation. Previously—as in post-Land Reform rectification—*qiaowu* had tried to reconcile its imperatives with the CCP’s quest for socialism. For *qiaowu* practitioners, the two were not incompatible. The rationalisation was that *qiaowu* was a key to the resources that the General Line and socialist transformation needed. Hence the *youdai* was a pragmatic necessity. But in reality, it was not so simple, since Party cadres proved very resistant to *youdai*. This was partly due to ignorance, but it was also an ideological intransigence enabled and emboldened by the General Line’s ‘revolutionary struggle’. Moreover, despite the rhetoric on the Dual Nationality Treaty, and about New China’s positive development that were proffered to the *huaqiao*, *qiaowu* was aware that it was failing to convince the *huaqiao* that their interests were met.²¹⁰ There was thus an urgent need for an intervention to ensure more effective *qiaowu* by 1955. In part, this saw greater emphasis on positive communications with the *huaqiao*. But in the main, *qiaowu* became overtly defined by *youdai*, even if this contradicted socialist transformation. The principle for *youdai* was not new. But the liberality with which *qiaowu* now applied it, and the side-lining of more socialist ideals—this reflected a new trajectory. Of course, *qiaowu* was not acting unilaterally—this new direction had the approval of the party-state leadership. Yet, what *qiaowu* practitioners did not realise (yet) was that inasmuch as *qiaowu* had undergone changes, New China was itself moving to the left.

At the end of July 1955, Mao declared to a conference of Party Secretaries that ‘a new upsurge in the socialist mass movement is imminent throughout the countryside’.²¹¹ Countering criticism that socialist transformation was already too fast, he announced that

²¹⁰ The Dual Nationality Treaty was signed on 22 April 1955, at the end of the Bandung Conference. See ‘Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo he Yindu Nixiya Gongheguo guanyu shuangchong guoji wenti tanpan de gongbao’, 22/04/1955 in, Shijie zhishi chubanshe (ed.), *Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo duiwai guanxi wenjianji (1949-1959)* [hereafter, *DWGW*], Vols. 1-5 (Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 1959), 3: 275-276.

²¹¹ Mao Zedong, ‘On the question of Agricultural Co-operation’, 31/07/1955, in Hinton (ed.), *The People’s Republic of China*, I: 223-233 (223).

‘the high tide of socialist transformation in the countryside’ had been reached, and was soon to ‘sweep over the whole country’.²¹² By this Mao meant collectivisation; while there had been 14,000 cooperatives in late 1953, and 650,000 in June 1955, he wanted further growth to 1.3 million.²¹³ This would transform 110 million households into collective farming, but it was possible, Mao said, with ‘socialist enthusiasm’. Yet, there were two potential problems: either ‘left deviationist mistakes’ where the Party became ‘dizzy with success’; or ‘right deviationist mistakes’ where the Party was ‘scared of success’ and preferred conservatism that led to ‘resolute contraction’.²¹⁴ The problem at hand, Mao alleged, was right deviationism, because some were reluctant to accelerate the process, and ignorant of the inevitability of the ‘high tide’. Yet, Mao predicted that by the end of the first Five-Year Plan (in 1957 or 1958), 250 million people in 55 million households would be in cooperatives—or half the peasant population.²¹⁵

For its part, *qiaowu* was not against the ‘high tide of socialist transformation’. Guangdong *qiaowu* deputy-Director Luo Lishi declared in late 1955 that the province was determined to achieve a target of 150,000 cooperatives by the end of 1956, with a 75-80% participation rate of peasant households.²¹⁶ Collectivisation had also started in the *qiaoxiang*, and in a survey of 25 *qiaoxiang* (plus 1 village), 38.94% of *qiaojuan* were in APCs, while 35.96% were in Mutual Aid Teams.²¹⁷ It was therefore not as if *qiaowu* was uncooperative with the drive for accelerated socialist transformation—indeed, according to Luo, the *youdai* dictum of ‘no *huaqiao* complaints, no *qiaojuan* escapes, no *huaqiao* remittance shortfalls’ was itself in homage to one of Mao’s quotes.²¹⁸ Yet, Luo also said that the ‘socialist high tide’ would be for *qiaowu* in general: whether for ‘uniting

²¹² Ibid., I: 223.

²¹³ Ibid., I: 225.

²¹⁴ Ibid., I: 226.

²¹⁵ Ibid., I: 231.

²¹⁶ Luo Lishi, ‘Guanyu dali dongyuan qiaojuan guiqiao jiji canjia nongye hezuo hua yundong bing jixu quanmian shenru guanche qiaowu zhengce de baogao’, n.d. (12/1955), *GDQW*, No. 15 (1 Jan 1956), 17.

²¹⁷ Ibid., 17.

²¹⁸ Ibid., 21.

with the *guowai huqiao*', gaining remittances, or supporting industrialisation.²¹⁹ These things had all been important aspects of *qiaowu* since the advent of the General Line (and earlier), and *qiaowu*'s role was to gain financial resources to fund economic programs—even if, especially after 1955, its methods contradicted socialist transformation. Yet, if as Luo said, future *qiaowu* was going to be informed by the 'socialist high tide', surely any contradiction was unsustainable. Indeed, according to Luo, *qiaowu* was to effect 'the positive leadership of rural *guiqiao* and *qiaojuan* into participation in the collectivisation campaign' as its 'biggest and most central task'.²²⁰ But if *qiaowu* in the 'high tide' was to make collectivisation its chief priority, then what about the earlier position on *qiaowu* that 'the crux of the issue is the accumulation of funds for socialist industrialisation'?²²¹ Luo, of course, did not speak for the OCAC, PBOC, or any other central party-state institution. But if his understanding of *qiaowu* was firmly within the ambit of the 'socialist high tide', and if, as Mao said, opposition to that was right deviationism—where, in the end, did that leave *qiaowu*? There was, it seems, a looming contradiction.

²¹⁹ Ibid.

²²⁰ Ibid., 17.

²²¹ East Guangdong Party Committee Overseas Chinese Affairs Office, 'Cong ganbu dao qunzhong, quanmian di xitong di xuanchuan guanche qiaowu zhengce, wei zhengqu wancheng qiaohui renwu er fendou', 06/12/1954, *GDQW*, No. 7 (13 Jan 1955), 25.

Chapter 4.

Fourth-class socialism

Some *qiaojuan* are like passengers riding on the socialist train; even though they are not necessarily sitting on the soft seats and riding in comfort, they are at least in the fourth-class carriage.

— Fang Fang, 26 December 1957¹

¹ ‘由于坚持侨眷与全体人民一起发动, 也顺利地过了几个关, 进入了社会主义, 有些侨眷好像乘社会主义的火车一样, 虽不是坐软席那么舒服, 但也跟着坐上了四等车’, in Fang Fang, ‘Dui dangqian qiaowu gongzuo de zhishi jianghua (zhaiyao)’, 26/12/1957, *GDQW*, No. 1 (22 March 1958), 1-7 (2).

Introduction:

New China, Chairman Mao told the Sixth Supreme State Conference (SSC) on 25 January 1956, was at the threshold of the last stage of the socialist revolution, and with the ‘high tide’ of revolutionary spirit sweeping through China, would enter full socialism within three years.² This harkened to the impending liberation of China’s productive forces; as agriculture and light industry/handicrafts moved from individual ownership into socialist collective ownership, so too would commerce and industry be transformed from capitalist to socialist ownership, and thus ‘greatly develop industrial and agricultural production’.³ Thus China, Mao declared, would take its rightful place among the world’s leading lights within the next ten years.

Mao had announced ‘the high tide of socialist transformation’ in July 1955, so his SSC pronouncements were not surprising.⁴ Unless of course, the delegates had failed to pay attention to the more than 104 directives Mao had issued between September and December 1955 on driving his ‘socialist high tide’ forward.⁵ Mao, in fact, had been quite accurate in his predictions. The number of households in APCs had jumped from the 16.9 million Mao cited in July 1955, to more than 70 million by December 1955; or, over 60% of China’s 110 million peasant households.⁶ Thus even though the SSC passed the ‘Draft Agricultural Program for 1956-1967’, it was not new policy, but it was in fact, a process that was already underway.⁷

To Mao’s mind, the ‘socialist high tide’ in agriculture was both necessary, and motivational for an acceleration in the transformation of commerce and industry. Yet, it

² Mao Zedong, ‘Shehui zhuyi geming de mudi shi jiefang shengchan li’, 25/01/1956, *JYZW*, 8: 63-64.

³ *Ibid.*, 8: 63.

⁴ Mao Zedong, ‘On the question of Agricultural Co-operation’, 31/07/1955, in Hinton (ed.), *The People’s Republic of China*, I: 223-233 (223).

⁵ Zhang Shu Guang, ‘The Sino-Soviet Alliance and the Cold War in Asia, 1945-1962’ in Leffler, Westad (eds), *The Cambridge History of the Cold War, Vol. I: Origins*, 353-375 (360).

⁶ Mao Zedong, ““Zhongguo nongcun de shehui zhuyi gaochao” xuyan”, 27/12/1955, *JYZW*, 7: 367-370 (367).

⁷ The plan called for 85% household participation in APCs by 1956’s end, and accelerated production (i.e. a 310 million *mu* increase in rice cultivation). See CCP Politburo, ‘Draft Agricultural Program for 1956-1967’, 25/01/1956, in Hinton (ed.), *The People’s Republic of China*, I: 268-272.

also entailed ideological loyalty to Mao Zedong Thought. To resist ‘the speed of socialist transformation of agriculture’ was not only conservatism, as Mao said, but also rightist thinking.⁸ By 1956, it was clear that to be labelled a rightist conservative was a none-too-subtle warning of what might follow: at best, a diatribe from Mao—‘some of our comrades are tottering along like a woman with bound feet’—or worse, identification as a counter-revolutionary and thus arrest and/or judicial punishment.⁹ To resist conservatism thus entailed—as Zhou Enlai explained—adherence to Mao’s vision ‘to complete socialist transformation early; over-fulfil the national plans for industrial development; and accelerate the progress of the technical transformation of the national economy’.¹⁰ Thus Mao’s ‘high tide’ of socialist transformation would continue, and it would also be further defined by the principles of ‘more, faster, better and more economical’ [又多, 又快, 又好, 又省].¹¹ Anything else was apostasy.

Some amongst the 300-odd SSC delegates were undoubtedly uneasy with the extent of the acceleration that Mao called for; the Chairman had ridden roughshod over his comrades’ reservations in 1955.¹² But what did this mean for *qiaowu*? 1956 would see *qiaowu* practitioners doubling-down on *youdai* policies and its discourse of *huaqiao* specialness. Yet, a dramatic reversal would take place by late 1957. This chapter begins with analysis that while *qiaowu* did not oppose the ‘socialist high tide’ per se, *qiaowu* practitioners realised that *youdai* was being resisted or undermined by cadres who either did not understand the political economy of *qiaowu*, or who found the *youdai* policies

⁸ Mao Zedong, “Zhongguo nongcun de shehui zhuyi gaochao” xuyan’, 27/12/1955, *JYZW*, 7: 369.

⁹ See Dikötter, *The Tragedy of Liberation*, 236-238; Frederick C. Teiwes, Warren Sun, ‘Editors’ Introduction’, in Teiwes, Sun (eds), *The Politics of Agricultural Cooperativization in China*, 5-27; Kenneth R. Walker, ‘Collectivisation in Retrospect: The “Socialist High Tide” of Autumn 1955–Spring 1956’, *The China Quarterly*, No. 26 (1966), 1-43.

¹⁰ Zhou Enlai, ‘Guanyu zhishi fenzi wenti de baogao’, 14/01/1956, *JYZW*, 8: 9-38 (10).

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² Dikötter, *The Tragedy of Liberation*, 235-236.

The attendees included: Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai, Li Jishen, Shen Junru, Guo Moruo, Huang Yanpei, Peng Zhen, Li Weihan, Chen Shutong, Deng Xiaoping, Chen Yun, Chen Yi, Li Fuchun, Li Xiannian, Dong Biwu, Fu Zuoyi, He Xiangning, and Tan Kah Kee. See Xinhua, ‘Report to the Supreme State Conference’, 25/01/1956, in Hinton (ed.), *The People’s Republic of China*, I: 266-267.

counterintuitive or contradictory to socialism. Yet, even so, *qiaowu* persisted with *youdai*—and so did the party-state’s leadership. As this chapter shows, the appreciation of the CCP CC for *youdai* was because its premise on economic rationality spoke to a growing sense in the Party leadership that Mao’s ‘high tide’ was a rash path headed for disaster. This criticism prominently came to a head in mid-1956 at the Eighth Party Congress. Yet, this was also the peak of *youdai*, as 1957, suffice to say, was a chaotic year. Mao used domestic crises consequent to the Polish October and Hungarian Uprising to call for rectification of contradictions between the Party and the masses—and to re-assert his authority. Yet, when this fomented intense criticism of the CCP in the Hundred Flowers, Mao seized the opportunity to unite the besieged Party behind him, and to launch an Anti-Rightist Campaign against his and the CCP’s critics. Henceforth, not only was anti-CCP criticism Rightism, but even policy not aligned with Mao was Rightism. And this was the precise charge against *qiaowu* for its *youdai* policies.

‘Is the Overseas Chinese Affairs Bureau your Daddy?’

Fang Fang had defined the three key performance indicators of *qiaowu* in late 1955 as: ‘no *huaqiao* complaints, no *qiaojuan* escapes, [and] no *huaqiao* remittance shortfalls’.¹³ And while these imperatives represented different strands of policy, they were all connected by the principle that *qiaowu* was to maximise the economic utility that the *huaqiao* offered. As such, as Tao Zhu instructed in December 1955: ‘Party committees at every level must pay serious attention to this work’.¹⁴ This was thus the impetus behind the policies that entrenched a correlation between ideas of *huaqiao* specialness [*huaqiao teshu*], and *youdai* policies.¹⁵

¹³ Fang Fang, ‘Jianjue guanche zhixing youguan huaqiao gongzuo de zhengce, ba huaqiao gongzuo renzhen zuohao’, 17/12/1955, *GDQW*, No. 15 (1 Jan 1956), 6.

¹⁴ Tao Zhu, ‘Zhonggong Guangdong sheng wei Tao Zhu shuji zai Guangdong sheng di yi ci shi, zhenwei shuji huiyi shang de jianghua’, 13/012/1955, *GDQW*, No. 15 (1 Jan 1956), 1-4 (1).

¹⁵ The term *teshu* [特殊] refers to *huaqiao teshu* [华侨特殊] or, *huaqiao* specialness or exceptionalism.

An explicit correlation of *teshu* and *youdai* in the practice of *qiaowu* can be found in instructions issued on New Year's Day 1956 regarding food and consumer goods allocations under 'unified sale and purchase'.¹⁶ Of course, the demand for more food (and consumer goods) was not unique to the *huaqiao*, since nationwide rationing had been introduced since August 1955 to solve inefficiencies in the state monopolies, and to control domestic migration.¹⁷ Yet, it was only the *huaqiao* who received extra allocations for 'their special needs'.¹⁸ In 18 *huaqiao* areas in Guangdong, authorities increased allocations for *huaqiao* households that included in total: 10 million *jin* of rice, 100,000 bolts of cloth, 1 million *jin* of cooking oil, and 1 million *jin* of sugar.¹⁹ Guangdong officials believed that such *youdai* was a path to unity with the *huaqiao*, but also to gain foreign exchange, as it created new avenues for using remittances. Thus, while officials saw that *youdai* might cause resentment amongst non-*huaqiao*, their solution was to expand propaganda on *qiaowu*, 'to cause the masses to support favourable treatment of the *huaqiao*'.²⁰ Clearly, special needs meant special treatment.

Guangdong's initiative on *huaqiao* allocations of food/consumer goods was a prominent instance of the correlation between *teshu* and *youdai*. This, it was held, was an important part of achieving Fang Fang's three-pronged slogan. Indeed, as the OCAC, Commerce, and Food and Grain Ministries pointed out in February 1956, the issue of food/goods allocations for *huaqiao* not only affected remittances, but also *huaqiao* migration, whether from rural to urban areas, or even from China.²¹ Hence, it was also

¹⁶ Guangdong Province Overseas Chinese Affairs Committee, Commerce Department, Civil Affairs Department, Food and Grain Department, Supply and Marketing Cooperative, 'Guanyu dui huaqiao zengjia liangshi, mianbu, shiyou, tang 4 zhong tongxiao shangpin de teshu gongying, gedi bixu renzhen liji guanche zhixing', 01/01/1956, *GDQW*, No. 15 (1 Jan 1956), 15-16.

¹⁷ Dikotter, *The Tragedy of Liberation*, 222-223, 225, 235.

¹⁸ Guangdong Province Overseas Chinese Affairs Committee, Commerce Department, Civil Affairs Department, Food and Grain Department, Supply and Marketing Cooperative, 'Guanyu dui huaqiao zengjia liangshi, mianbu, shiyou, tang 4 zhong tongxiao shangpin de teshu gongying, gedi bixu renzhen liji guanche zhixing', 01/01/1956, *GDQW*, No. 15 (1 Jan 1956), 15-16.

¹⁹ Ibid., 15.

²⁰ Ibid., 16.

²¹ Jinjiang in Fujian saw around 10,000 *qiaojuan* migrate to Hong Kong and other countries in 1955. Taishan in Guangdong saw about 3000 applicants a month for travel permission. See OCAC, Food and

imperative to check the yield assessments of *huaqiao* land to revise overly-high demands. Moreover the allocation for *huaqiao* with food shortages (i.e. 10-20 *jin* of rice/grain a month) had to be increased to at least 24 *jin* a month per person.²² Both the high demands and food shortages motivated *huaqiao* migration, and these measures were thus to ensure ‘no *qiaojuan* escapes’. The authorities were also aware of the risk of *youdai* causing resentment amongst non-*huaqiao*, but they believed that the risk could be lessened through propaganda.²³ Guangdong’s initial proposals were thus amended to integrate the new instructions, and by March 1956, *youdai* had been further entrenched in these *qiaowu* policies on extra food distribution for *huaqiao* households.²⁴

The desire to implement *youdai* better also led to efforts to ensure ‘no *huaqiao* complaints’ regarding their investments. But this was a complex issue since *huaqiao* investment could mean either new foreign direct investment, or existing investments in private industrial or commercial firms. In both cases, the end of private ownership that Mao preached was likely to have serious implications. Furthermore, investment was not limited to finance (i.e. in bonds or shares) but also included land, construction, or even philanthropy. Thus this was a question without a ready answer.

One proposal about *huaqiao* investments in January 1956 was a Guangdong suggestion of tax relief for construction funded by *huaqiao* remittances. A three-year break had been offered in 1955 to remittance-funded projects, but this was now raised to five years. Moreover, where the project was a joint investment between *haiwai huaqiao* and friends/relatives in China: if the *haiwai huaqiao* had the sole proprietary rights, then

Grain Ministry, Commerce Ministry, ‘Guanyu jiaqiang dui qiaojuan, guiqiao liangshi, shiyou, tang, mianbu, roulei deng wuzi gongying de zhishi’, 21/02/1956, *GDQW*, No. 17 (15 Apr 1956), 4-7 (5).

²² The directive specifically required ‘Guangdong, Fujian, Guangxi and others’ (or, major *qiaou*) to ensure the 24 *jin* minimum. Of course, in reality, 24 *jin* (12 kg) was still not a healthy diet, but it would have made a difference to the starving. See OCAC, Food and Grain Ministry, Commerce Ministry, ‘Guanyu jiaqiang dui qiaojuan, guiqiao liangshi, shiyou, tang, mianbu, roulei deng wuzi gongying de zhishi’, 21/02/1956, *GDQW*, No. 17 (15 Apr 1956), 5-6.

²³ *Ibid.*, 7.

²⁴ Guangdong Province Food and Grain Department, ‘Guanyu dui guiqiao qiaojuan liangshi gongying de guiding’, 19/03/1956, *GDQW*, No. 17 (15 Apr 1956), 8-9.

the five-year exemption applied, while the three-year break applied if the rights belonged to the party-in-China. If the rights were shared, then local *qiaowu* agencies and provincial governments would decide.²⁵ What made this obviously an attempt to entice capital inflows was the added instruction that construction by parties from Hong Kong or Macao using remitted funds could also enjoy similar tax breaks.²⁶ So, even if the ‘Hong Kong and Macao compatriots’ were not *huaqiao* (after 1950), *youdai* was extended to them since there was foreign exchange involved. To be fair, the tax break played to longstanding *huaqiao* practices of using land purchases and construction as a means of asset preservation. Yet, for this to work, the *huaqiao* also needed to believe that their property would actually remain theirs.

The problem in early 1956 was that it was not at all clear how the acceleration of socialist transformation—indeed, towards socialist ownership—affected existing *huaqiao* investments, let alone future investment. Some private enterprises had, since the General Line (1953), already been in joint state-private ownership. But 1956 saw accelerated movement towards full socialist ownership, or essentially, nationalisation. In some cases, this was a matter of mere days, as when the Shanghai Federation of Industry and Commerce decreed on 15 January that all remaining private enterprises enter joint state-private ownership by 20 January.²⁷ But even that was temporary since the desired end was when ‘all commerce and industry became functions of the state’.²⁸ This was achieved with the barest of token compensation for private holdings, with a promised 5%

²⁵ Guangdong Province Finance Department, Tax Office, ‘Guanyu huaqiao qiaojuan xinjian fangwu mianzheng fangdi chanshui zai zhixing zhong jige juti wenti de buchong guiding’, 12/01/1956, *GDQW*, No. 16 (20 Feb 1956), 5.

²⁶ The ‘Hong Kong and Macao compatriots’ had not been recognised as *huaqiao* since the 1950 GAC decree on *huaqiao* Land Reform, but the idea that they be treated like *huaqiao* in terms of investments dated back to December 1955. See Fang Fang, ‘Jianjue guanche zhixing youguan huaqiao gongzuo de zhengce, ba huaqiao gongzuo renzhen zuohao’, 17/12/1955, *GDQW*, No. 15 (1 Jan 1956), 12; GAC, ‘Guanyu tudi gaige zhong dui huaqiao tudi caichan de chuli banfa’, 06/11/1950, 1949-1952 nongcun jingji tizhi juan, 318-320.

²⁷ British Consulate-General, Shanghai, ‘Shanghai Fortnightly Summary’, No. 27, 03/02/1956 in Robert Jarman (ed.), *China: Political Reports, 1911-1960 [CPR]*, Vols 1-11 (Cambridge: Archive Editions, 2001), 10: 211-213.

²⁸ Dikotter, *The Tragedy of Liberation*, 241.

return on the value of the private holdings for seven years.²⁹ This, unsurprisingly enough, did not reassure *huaqiao* investors.

In Guangdong, some *huaqiao* argued for a differentiation between those who had invested before and after 1949—one, it was said, had contributed to socialist construction, whereas the other had, at best, enriched the ruling-class. Thus those who invested post-1949 should be entitled to the same benefits as those who invested in the state-run Overseas Chinese Investment Companies (i.e. 8% annual interest).³⁰ Others worried that accelerated socialist transformation meant that the *huaqiao* would not be consulted on the nationalisation of their holdings.³¹ Curiously, a few *huaqiao* in Fujian actually expressed enthusiasm for nationalisation, and sought to start the process earlier.³² These sentiments were however, likely to have been intended at creating images of patriotic, progressive voluntarism. After all, as many *huaqiao* saw it, accepting socialist ownership early was ‘the clever thing to do’—it certainly was a better alternative to being ‘like a leper’.³³

The party-state was well aware from its own investigations that regardless of what the *huaqiao* said, the reality was that they had mostly accepted socialist transformation under pressure, or even violent duress.³⁴ But the party-state did not actually have a plan to reassure them yet. The CCP CC’s instructions issued on 3 February 1956 suggested that voluntary offers from *huaqiao* enterprise owners to undergo socialist transformation could be accepted, but all other related issues had to wait for investigations to finish.³⁵ The one exception was for *qiaopi*, who were ‘not appropriate’ for socialist transformation, lest their delivery of remittances from capitalist countries be affected. Otherwise, the CCP CC had no guidance on how *youdai* in *qiaowu* fit into the ‘socialist high tide’.

²⁹ Around 800,000 had their holdings expropriated. See Dikotter, *The Tragedy of Liberation*, 239–241.

³⁰ ‘Guangzhou shi huaqiao ziben jia dui siying gongshang ye gaizao de fanying’, 07/02/1956, *NBCK*.

³¹ *Ibid.*

³² ‘Guiqiao qiaojuan dui siying gongshang ye shehui zhuyi gaizao de sixiang fanying’, 18/02/1956, *NBCK*.

³³ *Ibid.*

³⁴ CCP CC, ‘Guanyu tingzhi dongyuan ziben jia ba zhangwai zicai touru heying qiyi de zhishi’, 24/01/1956, *ZZWX*, 22: 123–124.

³⁵ CCP CC, ‘Guanyu huaqiao touzi jingying de siying gongshang ye shehui zhuyi gaizao zhong ying zhuyi wenti de tongzhi’, 03/02/1956, *ZZWX*, 22: 172–173.

The question of *qiaowu* in the ‘socialist high tide’ led in February 1956, to a jointly-convened OCAC Party Group and UFWD conference, with Fang Fang and Liao Chengzhi responsible for delivering the conference’s report to the State Council. Indeed, it is noteworthy that this report was endorsed by many other state institutions with roles in *qiaowu*.³⁶ This was significant because, ‘regarding the Party’s guidelines on domestic *qiaowu* work during the transition period’, Fang and Liao said:

The conference was unanimous in determining that, based on the special characteristics of *qiaojuan* and *guiqiao*, to: positively educate and organise the *qiaojuan* and *guiqiao* to join with people across the country to participate in socialist construction, to embrace socialist transformation, to strive to gain *huaqiao* remittances and *huaqiao* investment to increase foreign exchange reserves, to settle appropriately the questions of employment for *guiqiao* and education for *qiaosheng*, and through the *qiaojuan*, *guiqiao* and *qiaosheng*, to influence the broad masses of *huaqiao* abroad towards unity and love for their homeland.³⁷

Most of the so-called guidelines would have been familiar, but the operative instruction within the report’s guidelines was really the clear instruction that *qiaowu* was to be ‘based on the special characteristics of *qiaojuan* and *guiqiao*’.

Liao and Fang made it clear that the *youdai* in *qiaowu* was the crux. For instance, for rural *huaqiao* households, and in a move ‘appropriate to their special characteristics’, cooperatives were forbidden from using remittances as evidence of reactionary-ness, and to thus exclude *qiaojuan* and *guiqiao* from collectivisation.³⁸ The *huaqiao* households were to receive special allowances even in the more fully socialist Advanced Agricultural Producers’ Cooperatives (AAPC), where income depended on labour contributions.³⁹

³⁶ This included the CCP CC Rural Affairs Department, PBOC, BOC, and the Ministries of Public Security, Food and Grain, Commerce, Labour, Education. See Liao Chengzhi, Fang Fang, ‘Guodu shiqi de guonei qiaowu gongzuo fangzhen’, 17/02/1956, *DHGLR*, 207-212.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 208.

³⁸ *Ibid.*

³⁹ AAPCs were semi-socialist because while labour and the means of production were collectively pooled, members still owned their land and tools, and were entitled to income shares based on those contributions. AAPCs were fully socialist as the means of production and land were owned collectively, and members became ‘agricultural workers who received work points for their labour’. See Dikötter, *The Tragedy of Liberation*, 237; Yang Mo-wen, ‘Socialist Transformation of Agriculture in Communist China’, in Union Research Institute (ed.), *Communist China, 1949-1959*, Vols. I-III (Hong Kong: The Union Research Institute, 1961), I: 149-176 (153-156).

AAPCs theoretically fulfilled: ‘From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs’. See Karl Marx, *The Gotha Program* (New York: National Executive Committee, Socialist Labor Party, 1922), 31.

This system placed *qiaojuan* at a disadvantage since their household's primary labour (i.e. younger adults) were by definition (of *huaqiao*), mostly overseas. Hence, Liao and Fang instructed that AAPCs make provision for *qiaojuan* and *guiqiao* so that they would not suffer falls in their income.⁴⁰ Indeed, regardless of the 'socialist high tide', there were also provisions for *qiaojuan* and *guiqiao* who did not labour, and lived off remittances. Such persons should be permitted to do so—lest they seek to migrate—and if they had suspicions about collectivisation, they were to be patiently addressed.

As for the questions about *huaqiao* investments, Fang and Liao admitted that previous perspectives had been unhelpful, but they now determined 'to do good work in the socialist transformation of domestic *huaqiao* investment'.⁴¹ The intention was to integrate the desire of *huaqiao* to invest, along with the country's economic plans, and thus direct returning capital investment to areas where they could play positive roles, such as in plantation agriculture, or localised industrial projects in *qiaoxiang*. At the same time, while the socialist transformation of enterprises was unavoidable, because *huaqiao* private enterprises were intrinsically connected to *haiwai huaqiao*, 'some special measures in the transformation process' were necessary.⁴²

The OCAC Party Group advocated that the post-1949 *huaqiao* investment in enterprises be guaranteed an 8% yearly return after transformation, with employment provided for the *huaqiao* investors. Moreover, for post-1949 *huaqiao* investors, their shares would remain private property even 'after the successful achievement of socialism'.⁴³ Pre-1949 *huaqiao* investment however, had to accept the same deal as other private investors/owners in the country: 5% interest for seven years. This was meant to placate the majority of *huaqiao* investors, and it went further in guaranteeing that regardless of when the investment was made, *huaqiao* private property was not to be

⁴⁰ Liao, Fang, 'Guodu shiqi de guonei qiaowu gongzuo fangzhen', 17/02/1956, *DHGLR*, 208.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ Ibid., 209.

included in the verification (and liquidation) of capital assets unless they were used for business purposes. Otherwise, they were legal property. Finally, to consolidate the existing regional Overseas Chinese Investment Companies, a new state corporation would be set up to direct *huaqiao* capital to where it was most needed.⁴⁴

Liao and Fang also reported that *qiaowu* had arrested the remittance decline in 1955, and thus they could now report a slight increase.⁴⁵ But they also warned that anti-counterrevolutionary activity and accelerated collectivisation risked affecting remittances, and thus remittances had to be differentiated from 'counterrevolutionary funds'.⁴⁶ Moreover, a direct correlation was drawn between 'gaining remittances', and 'taking care of *qiaojuan* living habits' by addressing their food/goods allocation.⁴⁷ This endorsed the Guangdong proposal (January 1955), and was also the basis for the OCAC's own *youdai* allocation policies that followed.⁴⁸ The *qiaopi* were also exempted from business taxes, which paralleled the effort to gain remittances from the *qiaosheng*, with educational facilities to be expanded 'to accept even more *qiaosheng*'.⁴⁹ Moreover, cadres were instructed that though the *qiaosheng* in some cases truly 'had counterrevolutionaries among them', it was vital that cadres did not over-propagandise, lest students learn the lessons so well that they cut ties with their 'backward' bourgeois families.⁵⁰

The UFWD and OCAC Party Group report of February 1956 thus offered a vision of *qiaowu* that was at base, a clear correlation of *teshu* with *youdai*. To be sure, it also spoke to how and where *qiaowu* practitioners saw *qiaowu* in the larger context of socialist

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ 1955 saw a US\$12.549 million increase year-on-year. See Lin Jinzhi et al., *Huaqiao huaren yu Zhongguo geming he jianshe*, 228-231.

⁴⁶ Liao, Fang, 'Guodu shiqi de guonei qiaowu gongzuo fangzhen', 17/02/1956, *DHGLR*, 209.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ Guangdong Province Overseas Chinese Affairs Committee, Commerce Department, Civil Affairs Department, Food and Grain Department, Supply and Marketing Cooperative, 'Guanyu dui huaqiao zengjia liangshi, mianbu, shiyou, tang 4 zhong tongxiao shangpin de teshu gongying, gedi bixu renzhen liji guanche zhixing', 01/01/1956, *GDQW*, No. 15 (1 Jan 1956), 15-16; OCAC, Food and Grain Ministry, Commerce Ministry, 'Guanyu jiaqiang dui qiaojuan, guiqiao liangshi, shiyou, tang, mianbu, roulei deng wuzi gongying de zhishi', 21/02/1956, *GDQW*, No. 17 (15 Apr 1956), 5.

⁴⁹ Liao, Fang, 'Guodu shiqi de guonei qiaowu gongzuo fangzhen', 17/02/1956, *DHGLR*, 210.

⁵⁰ Ibid., 211.

transformation. This was in a sense, clearly still a political economy, as the OCAC always grounded its *qiaowu*—indeed, its *youdai* approach—in economic rationalisations. Thus Liao and Fang confidently stated that ‘domestic *qiaowu* work is a long-term responsibility of our Party’, and that ‘to believe that the socialist revolution invalidates the necessity of *qiaowu*, or to consider it an undue burden or bother, is incorrect’.⁵¹ Yet, in spite of the broad agreement between the OCAC and other party-state institutions on the correlation between *teshu* and *youdai*, the problem was that *qiaowu* actually appeared to contradict the ‘socialist high tide’.

Chairman Mao had in October 1955, pronounced the impending ‘extinction of capitalism’.⁵² Indeed, as Mao declared, the past year’s main work (or as he described, ‘the anti-idealism struggle’; ‘the anti-counterrevolutionary struggle’; ‘the food and grain question’; and ‘the agricultural collectivisation question’) had been ‘a struggle against the bourgeoisie and we have dealt them a serious blow, and will continue to give further crushing blows to them’.⁵³ The ‘anti-idealism’ referred to the ‘bourgeois idealism’ of the scholar Hu Feng, whose imprisonment as a counterrevolutionary in June 1955 had sparked off a purge of intellectuals.⁵⁴ But this was less about idealism or materialism than it was about eliminating the bourgeois discourse from politics altogether.⁵⁵ Indeed, even collectivisation, and the food and grain issue (or basically, ‘unified sale and purchase’), according to Mao, were also struggles against the bourgeoisie. So, if the *other* in all of this was the bourgeoisie, and if the ‘socialist high tide’ presaged their impending eradication, then surely the *youdai* approach, with all its special exceptions and exemptions from effecting purer socialism, was—at the very least—somewhat counter-intuitive to the Maoist mainstream.

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² Mao Zedong, ‘Guanyu nongye hezuo hua he ziben zhuyi gongshang ye gaizao de guanxi wenti’, 11/10/1955, *JYZW*, 7: 260-264 (263).

⁵³ Ibid., 7: 263.

⁵⁴ Dikötter, *The Tragedy of Liberation*, 186-189.

⁵⁵ Spence, *The Gate of Heavenly Peace*, 374.

The OCAC's April 1956 directive on food and goods allocation reveals that it was aware of how counter-intuitive it was to propose special treatment for one particular—minority—constituency, even as the rest of the country was racing towards socialism. Thus alongside the calls for greater implementation of the special allocation came also directives to strengthen education for cadres in *huaqiao* areas, 'to cause them to recognise the important meaning of this work', and to learn the 'special circumstances' of *huaqiao*, and that their allocations were 'entirely reasonable'.⁵⁶ The problem, of course, was when the cadres refused to accept the *youdai* policies or their justifications.

Whereas the OCAC and its *qiaowu* partners advocated *youdai*, the reality was that there was significant confusion, or resistance amongst local, lower-level cadres. In some cases, the problems were old ones, as in March 1956 when the OCAC had to remind Shandong Normal University to teach *qiaosheng* 'not to scold their parents for being bourgeois'.⁵⁷ This suggested that cadres had not conveyed information adequately. But in other cases, cadres simply opposed *youdai*. While the OCAC had ordered that *qiaojuan* participation in collectivisation be managed in consideration of the labour deficiency of *huaqiao* households, many cadres openly defied this. In Kaiping County in Guangdong, a 70-year old *qiaojuan*, being unsuitable for field work, was given the impossible job of looking after children, which the OCAC noted, 'required her to manage nine children, when five of them are still learning to walk, and four of them still need to be carried'. In another case, two *qiaojuan* women over 60-years old were assigned to arduous field work. Thus instead of implementing *youdai*, cadres were ignoring it. Yet, as one cadre said: 'You join the collective and do not labour; who is going to feed you!',⁵⁸

⁵⁶ OCAC, 'Dui 'liangshi bu, shangye bu, zhong qiaowei guanyu jiaqiang dui qiaojuan, guiqiao liangshi, shiyou, tang, mianbu, roulei deng wuzi gongying zhishi' de xuanchuan yijian', 13/04/1956, *GDQW*, No. 18 (9 Jun 1956), 1-3 (1).

⁵⁷ OCAC, 'Guanyu zai ziben zhuyi gongshang ye shehui zhuyi gaizao zhong ruhe zhidao huaqiao xuesheng yu guowai zichan jieji jiating lianxi wenti de gonghan', 03/03/1956, BMA #002-008-00092, 1-10 (3).

⁵⁸ OCAC, 'Zhuanfa Kaiping xian Shuikou qu Longtang xiang cengceng guanche huaqiao zhengce de zuofa', 02/04/1956, *GDQW*, No. 18 (9 Jun 1956), 17-24 (19).

One reason why cadres resisted *youdai* was pure pragmatism. As a Production Team leader in Kaiping noted: ‘My team is responsible for 130 *mu*, and out of the 27 labourers I have, seven are *qiaojuan*—if they do not labour positively, then who are we to rely on?’⁵⁹ For such cadres, to allow the *qiaojuan* to enjoy collectivisation’s benefits even while they shirked a full commitment to labour was simply ridiculous. One cadre remarked: ‘They want us to fulfil quotas on the one hand, and then on the other hand also carry out *huaqiao* policy—being a cadre is really difficult.’⁶⁰ Yet, resistance to *youdai* was also derived from popular resentment. In Kaiping, peasants complained: ‘The government sees the monied men; but nobody cares if peasants live or die.’ Others mocked the *qiaojuan* who participated in collectives: ‘The government has permitted you to not work, why do you want to work?’⁶¹

Resistance to *youdai* extended to practically all aspects of *qiaowu*. In Jieyang County in Guangdong, cadres persisted in discriminating against *huaqiao* households considered class enemies. Shantou *qiaowu* officials discovered that in certain villages, while most peasants were permitted to retain around 20-25 *jin* of grain (per month) from their assessed land yields under ‘unified sale and purchase’, for *qiaojuan* and *guiqiao* who had been re-classed in 1954-1955 (from landlord or rich peasant status), the average was 16-21 *jin*—with the lowest at 11.5 *jin*. Cadres also refused to return *huaqiao* property confiscated in the Land Reform, but instead allowed cooperatives to expropriate them. Those *qiaojuan* and *guiqiao* who wanted to join AAPCs or APCs were also being rejected because of the negative views about their class statuses. Yet, when they were confronted, rural cadres were defiant—as one blithely remarked: ‘We rural cadres are uneducated and so we do not understand policy.’⁶²

⁵⁹ Ibid., 20.

⁶⁰ Ibid.

⁶¹ Ibid., 22.

⁶² GPC United Front Department, ‘Zhuanfa qiaowu ju ‘jiancha Jieyang xian Wulian qu Qianqu xiang dang zhibu yanzhong qishi he weifan huaqiao zhengce de baogao’ de tongzhi’, 04/05/1956, *GDQW*, No. 18 (9 Jun 1956), 25-27 (25, 27).

In a way, it was not actually that cadres did not understand *qiaowu*'s political economy per se. The problem was more to do with relative perceptions of economic utility. Conversely, while some cadres rejected *huaqiao* from collectivisation, others coerced them into it. The reason for the coercion was remittances, which many cadres (and peasants) saw as a ready source of funds. Coerced contributions were forbidden, but there were still indirect methods. One common way was to hold meetings where relentless pressure was applied. As one *qiaojuan* said: 'I feel sad every time they call a meeting of *qiaoshu*, once a meeting is called it means they want money.'⁶³ Thus, while the Guangdong People's Committee (GPPC) strongly reiterated that voluntariness was imperative, that apparently did not preclude being pressured into volunteering.⁶⁴

Some cadres also simply did not care for *qiaowu* very much. An investigation in May 1956 by the Guangdong and Hainan *qiaowu* Party Groups revealed that local cadres were actually and utterly complacent. One cadre remarked: 'since 90% of the *qiaojuan* and *guiqiao* are now in the cooperatives, let the cooperatives handle them—anyway, their livelihood and production problems are not really that big'. Another cadre said: 'Chairman Mao works hard every day, and you dare to not work?'⁶⁵ In fairness, Hainan's collectivisation had seen a high rate of participation by *huaqiao* households because it had tried to manage *huaqiao* labour deficiencies via an innovative differentiation between so-called normal, special and honorary cooperative members.⁶⁶ But Hainan also had to

⁶³ GPPC, 'Guanyu dongyuan qiaojuan huaqiao cunkuan touzi ji xingban huaqiao gongyi shiye de tongbao', 29/04/1956, *GDQW*, No. 19 (9 Jun 1956), 24-25 (24).

⁶⁴ In Puning, Guangdong, a *qiaojuan* who had been reluctant to buy bonds in 1955 had been accused of saving his money for 'old Chiang'. Another had to buy RMB 200 of bonds before her class was changed. One other incident had seen the village People's Committee deprive an elderly *qiaojuan* of sleep for two nights before he agreed to purchase bonds. See BOC Puning Branch, 'Guanyu qu nian Hantang xiang, Cikeng xiang zai tuixiao gongzhai gongzuo zhong weifan huaqiao zhengce wenti de baogao', 06/05/1956, *GDQW*, No. 18 (9 Jun 1956), 13-15.

⁶⁵ GPC, 'Pizhuan sheng qiaowei dangzu, Hainan qiaowu ju gongzuo zu 'guanyu Hainan qu guanche huaqiao zhengce chubu qingkuang baogao'', 30/05/1956, *GDQW*, No. 19 (9 Jun 1956), 4-11 (5, 8).

⁶⁶ Normal members [社员] did regular labour, special members [特别社员] did less, while an honorary member [名誉社员] did little or no labour, but contributed something (money, land or tools). The Hainan *qiaowu* Party Group believed that this had stabilised labour relations between the *huaqiao* and the masses. See GPC, 'Pizhuan sheng qiaowei dangzu, Hainan qiaowu ju gongzuo zu 'guanyu Hainan qu guanche huaqiao zhengce chubu qingkuang baogao'', 30/05/1956, *GDQW*, No. 19 (9 Jun 1956), 9.

admit that the numbers of *qiaojuan* attempting to travel abroad had increased. In the first three months of 1956, 1,524 persons had left Hainan, and only 49 returned.⁶⁷ So whatever collectivisation's successes, *qiaowu* was not succeeding. The Party Groups believed that the issue was a failure in education, which itself was due to the cadres' inadequate concern for *qiaowu*. After all, cadres in Qiong Dong were so ambivalent that they were not at all bothered that they had lost the County Committee's directives on *qiaowu* work.⁶⁸

Thus while *youdai* was meant to effect positive engagement with the *huaqiao*, and thus effectively utilise their economic potential, it was creating problems instead. In April 1956, Guangzhou *qiaowu* officials reported that a two-month survey revealed that both cadres and *huaqiao* were very unclear on *youdai*. At one extreme, some *huaqiao* interpreted *youdai* to mean that they were so 'special' that they could get away with forging documents for travel, arbitrarily evicting tenants, or raising rents.⁶⁹ At the other extreme, cadres openly rejected policy, particularly on food allocations and travel permissions.⁷⁰ When one *qiaojuan* enquired with the city's *qiaowu* Bureau about travel, the Bureau replied that the police had not yet returned her paperwork. When the *qiaojuan* went to the police, a cadre was so furious that he had not been consulted first, that he snapped: 'Is the Overseas Chinese Affairs Bureau your Daddy?'⁷¹ To be sure, many *qiaowu* officials on the ground had long believed that their local Party and government counterparts were inattentive to *qiaowu*.⁷² But the derision for *qiaowu* itself suggests that *youdai* was actually proving very divisive.

⁶⁷ Ibid., 7.

⁶⁸ Ibid., 10.

⁶⁹ Guangzhou Municipal Government Overseas Chinese Affairs Bureau, 'Guangzhou shi di 2 ci guiqiao, qiaojuan daibiao huiyi gongzuo baogao', 29/04/1956, *GDQW*, No. 18 (9 Jun 1956), 31-41 (33).

⁷⁰ Ibid., 37-39.

⁷¹ While *lao dou* [老豆] (from 侨务局是你的老豆吗?) is usually Cantonese slang for 'Father', the more ambiguous 'Daddy' is apropos because it can also mean 'pimp' or 'Sugar Daddy'. Given the sentiment that *huaqiao* were special by virtue of their wealth, it is likely that this remark was pejorative. See Guangzhou Municipal Government Overseas Chinese Affairs Bureau, 'Guangzhou shi di 2 ci guiqiao, qiaojuan daibiao huiyi gongzuo baogao', 29/04/1956, *GDQW*, No. 18 (9 Jun 1956), 33, 41.

⁷² Liao, Fang, 'Guodu shiqi de guonei qiaowu gongzuo fangzhen', 17/02/1956, *DHGLR*, 211.

Guangzhou's solution to the general problems with *qiaowu* was to engage in even more propaganda and education to 'raise awareness', and to 'allow everyone to boldly express their sentiments and raise questions'.⁷³ On the other hand, this was clearly not enough, since a March 1956 report from the Guangdong CCP Committee (GPC) identified the causes of *qiaojuan* escapes as:

- (1) Insufficient determination in looking after the special characteristics of *qiaojuan* in collectivisation with regards to their main labour strength being overseas, and their general weakness in labour;
- (2) The failure of some districts to make adequate and timely adjustment to allocation of food and other consumer goods for *qiaojuan*;
- (3) An overly-strict control regime for processing permissions for travel to Hong Kong and Macao, as well as for entry and exit of the country;
- (4) Unresolved issues regarding education and employment for *qiaojuan* children;
- (5) Previous inadequacy in educating the backward elements amongst the *qiaojuan* while also failing to adequately look after their special characteristics; at the same time, the wrong thinking prevalent amongst some rural cadres and peasants and their frequent resort to coercion and commandism has not been fully addressed, and has led to *qiaojuan* dissatisfaction and suspicion.⁷⁴

Guangdong thus called for a more rigorous implementation of *youdai*, which entailed: distinguishing between different types of cooperative members; permission to live off remittances; permitting *qiaojuan* to keep their houses as private property even after collectivisation; ensuring a 24 *jin* minimum per month per *huaqiao* in food allocation; rigorously educating rural cadres and the masses; and relaxing procedure for travel by *qiaojuan* to Hong Kong, Macao and beyond.⁷⁵ The Guangdong report was approved by the CCP CC in May 1956, which also added an instruction that 'all those who have failed to seriously carry out *qiaowu* policy thus far are required to go a step further in making arrangements to do so'.⁷⁶ So, clearly, when faced with resistance to *qiaowu*, the CCP CC came down on the side of *youdai*.⁷⁷

⁷³ Guangzhou Municipal Government Overseas Chinese Affairs Bureau, 'Guangzhou shi di 2 ci guiqiao, qiaojuan daibiao huiyi gongzuo baogao', 29/04/1956, *GDQW*, No. 18 (9 Jun 1956), 34-35.

⁷⁴ CCP CC, 'Pizhuan Guangdong sheng guanyu zhengqu qiaojuan anyu xiangju jianshao xiangwai liudong de zhishi', 21/05/1956, *ZZWX*, 23: 173-177 (174).

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 23: 176.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 23: 173.

⁷⁷ There were similar issues in Fujian. See 'Fujian you xie nongye she qiangpo qiaojuan canjia shengchan bushao ren pa laodong shenqing qu xianggang', 13/06/1956, *NBCK*; 'Fujian you de qiaoxiang dui youliang gongying kou de jin yinqi qiaojuan buman', 14/06/1956, *NBCK*.

The CCP CC directive of May 1956 suggests that whereas lower and local-level cadres were often resistant and/or resentful of *qiaowu* and its *youdai*, the Party's central leadership had no such qualms. The irony of course, was that while the OCAC and every other interested institution were pressing this program of *qiaowu*, those who resisted were in fact, trying to keep faith with the 'socialist high tide'. But perhaps that irony was inevitable since the Party leadership itself had by mid-1956 begun to consider a slower pace of socialisation, even while they took stock of the 'high tide'. In that context, *youdai* was obviously not going away—yet.

Special Circumstances:

Despite the resistance of local cadres and officials to the *youdai* policies, and its contradiction with the 'socialist high tide', *qiaowu* practitioners were undeterred. Indeed, *qiaowu* in mid-1956 saw even more vigorous assertions of *youdai*.⁷⁸ In this, *qiaowu*—led especially by the OCAC—was emboldened (or enabled) by the growing sense that 'high tide' features were 'rash advances' [冒进 *maojin*] and thus ruinous. Mao had overridden such reservations in the Party in 1955, but they re-emerged more strongly in 1956, and thus *qiaowu*—or rather, the economic rationality of the *youdai* approach—caught the political mood of opposition to the 'high tide'.

The clarion call of the 'socialist high tide' in 1955 had been for: 'more, faster, better and more economical'. And this, the *People's Daily* had explained, was to build 'more' (or larger); to grow 'faster' (against conservatism); to do things 'better'; and to seek 'economical' methods against hasty and careless work.⁷⁹ Yet, many CCP leaders were uncomfortable with this vision. By February 1956, Zhou Enlai was warning the

⁷⁸ See GPC, 'Zhuanfa sheng huaqiao touzi fudao weiyuanhui dangzu guanyu touzi gongzuo de baogao', 17/05/1956, *GDQW*, No. 19 (9 Jun 1956), 15-17; GPPC, 'Guanyu huaqiao zai cheng zhen ji nongcun jianzhu fangwu, dianpu de gongdi chuli banfa de tongzhi', 12/05/1956, *GDQW*, No. 19 (9 Jun 1956), 20.

⁷⁹ *People's Daily* editorial, 'Wei quanmian di tizao wancheng he chao'e wancheng wu nian jihua er fendou', 01/01/1956, *JYZW*, 8: 1-8 (5).

State Council that the ‘better and more economical’ imperatives were being neglected. Indeed, as Zhou warned: ‘socialist enthusiasm should not be damaged, but unrealistic and baseless things should not be proposed or wildly accelerated, or else there will be a grave danger’.⁸⁰ In March, Liu Shaoqi, in a speech on cultural work, said on transforming theatrical troupes into state-run units that ‘this is not progress, it is retreat’. Indeed, Liu pointedly noted: ‘The same applies to everything else; if there is no obvious advantage to be gained, there is no need to change anything, or at least, the changes can be made at a slower pace.’⁸¹ While in June, Li Xiannian’s budget report warned that ‘rash advances’ led to ‘the incurrence of losses’.⁸²

Objection to the ‘socialist high tide’ did not mean that Party leaders opposed socialist transformation. As Liao Luyan told the NPC in June 1956, 61% of peasant households had been organised into AAPCs, which combined with APCs, indicated a dramatic success. Yet, accelerated collectivisation had also caused problems: wastage, unscrupulous uses of resources, inefficient management, unreasonable allocation of income shares, unsafe work practices, poor husbandry, and overly-intense labour.⁸³ But the crux, Liao argued, was ‘the tendency towards one-sided emphasising of the national and collective interest even while disregarding individual interests’; especially since a regard for individual interests was ‘the most important step towards consolidating and developing agricultural collectivisation’.⁸⁴ By 20 June 1956, with the *People’s Daily* criticising ‘impatience’ and announcing imminent rectification of excesses, the CCP leadership was clearly turning away from the ‘socialist high tide’.⁸⁵

⁸⁰ Zhou Enlai, ‘Jingji gongzuo yao shishi qiushi’, 08/02/1956, *JYZW*, 8: 111-112 (111).

⁸¹ Liu Shaoqi, ‘Duiyu wenyi gongzuo de jidian yijian’, 08/03/1956, *JYZW*, 8: 148-152 (148).

⁸² Li Xiannian, ‘Guanyu yiji wuwu nian guojia juehsuan he yiji wuliu nian guojia yusuan de baogao’, 15/06/1956, *JYZW*, 8: 278-306 (302-303).

⁸³ Liao Luyan, ‘Guanyu ‘gaoji nongye she shengchan hezuo she shifan zhangcheng (cao an)’ de shuoming’, 15/06/1956, *JYZW*, 8: 307-318 (308).

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, 8: 308.

⁸⁵ The editorial was by the CCP Propaganda Department (with Liu Shaoqi’s influence). *People’s Daily* editorial, ‘Yao fandui baoshou zhuyi, ye yao fandui jizao qingxu’, 20/06/1956, *JYZW*, 8: 324-329.

The CCP leadership's turn away from Mao's 'high tide' vision was not unnoticed by the Chairman, who was personally offended by the *People's Daily* criticisms.⁸⁶ Yet, Mao found that a more collegial approach was necessary—for the time being. The reason for this was Soviet General Secretary Nikita Khrushchev's 'secret speech' to the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) on 25 February 1956, which launched a 'devastating attack' on Stalin and Stalinism.⁸⁷ Khrushchev lambasted Stalin for, *inter alia*, his regime of terror, his various atrocities, his megalomania and his cult of personality—all in all, a series of accusations that left listeners 'in a state of shock'.⁸⁸ They were not the only ones.

While the CCP's delegates to the 20th Congress were not invited to the 'secret speech', a copy was later sent to Beijing.⁸⁹ While Mao and his colleagues were shocked by the speech, Khrushchev's revisionism at least seemed to presage a rectification of the asymmetry in international communism. After all, Stalin's requirement of subservience from other parties had previously caused much resentment in the CCP leadership. Stalin had also been guilty of a number of sins—ranging from his support of Wang Ming to his equivocation during the Civil War.⁹⁰ Yet, that did not mean that the CCP was particularly keen on 'de-Stalinisation' since Mao proposed a view that 70% of Stalin's work had been correct, and only 30% mistaken. Thus the *People's Daily*, on 5 April 1956, declared Stalin, despite his mistakes, 'a great Marxist-Leninist'.⁹¹

Mao's equivocation on Stalin's legacy came down to the fact that, to his own mind—and to many others—'Mao was China's Stalin, the great leader of the People's Republic'.⁹² Criticising Stalin could be a transnational enterprise—China had many

⁸⁶ Dikotter, *The Tragedy of Liberation*, 276.

⁸⁷ Nikita S. Khrushchev, 'Speech to 20th Congress of the CPSU', 25/02/1956, *Nikita Khrushchev Reference Archive* [www.marxists.org/archive/khrushchev/1956/02/24.htm] Accessed 25 August 2015.

⁸⁸ Dikotter, *The Tragedy of Liberation*, 275.

⁸⁹ Chen, *Mao's China and the Cold War*, 64.

⁹⁰ Chen Jian, Yang Kuisong, 'Chinese Politics and the Collapse of the Sino-Soviet Alliance', in Westad (ed.), *Brothers in Arms*, 246-294 (260).

⁹¹ Ibid., 261.

⁹² Dikotter, *The Tragedy of Liberation*, 275.

legitimate grievances—but criticising Stalin also had an obvious parallel in that a negative judgement of his flaws could also be applied to Mao’s leadership. Attacking the Stalinist cult of personality and its centralisation of authority in one man hit too close to home for Mao, and he was forced to take defensive measures.

Given the growing opposition within the Party leadership that Mao faced, the ‘secret speech’ thus influenced him into giving way on the ‘high tide’.⁹³ On 25 April, Mao’s ‘On the Ten Great Relationships’ speech to the Politburo demonstrated his acceptance of criticisms of the ‘high tide’, acknowledging the need for ‘a balance between heavy industry on the one hand and light industry and agriculture on the other’. Mao, in fact, championed openness and democracy, calling for criticism from non-Communists, as it was ‘more favourable to the Party, to the people, and to socialism’.⁹⁴ Mao thus encouraged intellectuals (long-accused of counterrevolutionary ideas, *à la* Hu Feng) to express their ideas and criticisms freely; as he told the SSC on 2 May: ‘Let a hundred flowers bloom, let a hundred schools of thought contend.’⁹⁵ While Mao did not agree with his colleagues, he gave way—temporarily.

For *qiaowu*, the turn away from the ‘high tide’ by June 1956 offered a favourable opportunity for a reassertion of the *youdai* approach. Of course, in the first instance, *qiaowu* and its *youdai* policies had had a tenuous relationship (at best) with the ‘high tide’, while conversely, the OCAC Party Group (chiefly Fang Fang and Liao Chengzhi) were close to the proponents of ‘rash advances’ criticisms in the CCP.⁹⁶ In a way, it was only to be expected that the *youdai* approach—which had come into conflict with the ‘high tide’ time and again—would have a keen resonance when the political mood shifted

⁹³ Chen, *Mao’s China and the Cold War*, 66.

⁹⁴ Mao Zedong, ‘Lun shi da guanxi’, 25/04/1956, *JYZW*, 8: 206-226 (217).

⁹⁵ CCP CC propaganda chief Lu Dingyi conveyed the speech to the intellectuals: ‘The Chinese Communist Party proposes, in art and literary work, to let a hundred flowers bloom; and in scientific work, to let a hundred schools of thought contend.’ See Lu Dingyi, ‘Bai hua qifang, bai jia zhengming’, 26/05/1956, *JYZW*, 8: 256-277 (256).

⁹⁶ Liao was especially close to Zhou Enlai. See CCP CC Party Literature Research Office (eds), *Zhou enlai nianpu (1949-1976)*, Vols. 1-2 (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 2007), 1: 586.

against the ‘high tide’ itself. But beyond that, *youdai* had a special significance in mid-1956 because it was both a discourse and a model of how economic rationality could serve socialist transformation—without causing economic disaster.

On 8 June 1956, at the OCAC’s Fourth Expanded Conference in Beijing, Fang Fang publicly placed *qiaowu* in the camp of anti-‘rash advances’. According to Fang, *qiaowu* was presently encumbered by ‘serious problems and mistakes’ largely due to the excesses of the ‘socialist high tide’. As Fang described, ‘high tide’ collectivisation had seen *huaqiao* ostracised and excluded from cooperatives, and even when *huaqiao* households had joined cooperatives, their special circumstances had been neglected. This had led to a failure to integrate the *qiaojuan* and *guiqiao* into production, either because of a disregard for the household work that traditionally occupied *qiaojuan*, or because cooperatives had blindly insisted that they meet production quotas, whatever their labour deficiencies. Moreover, while the State Council’s 1955 decree had made remittances inviolate, the ‘high tide’ had seen incidents of *huaqiao* being pressured into investments or taking up shares in cooperatives, or coerced into making deposits in credit cooperatives. Furthermore, ‘unified sale and purchase’ had also seen cases of arbitrarily high demands on land yields, thus leaving *qiaojuan* and *guiqiao* with insufficient food. All of this, Fang argued, represented grievous failures.⁹⁷

Part of the problem was institutional failure. Fang said that some local *qiaowu* offices had not understood *huaqiao* conditions and circumstances properly, and had thus been unable to make adequate and timely checks on work, or implement policy correctly. Fang also pointed to a stark inadequacy in propaganda and educational work amongst Party cadres and the masses: ‘meaning therefore that they did not have complete understandings of policy, and making it impossible for *qiaowu* policy to be carried out,

⁹⁷ Fang Fang, ‘Guanyu guonei qiaowu gongzuo de ruogan zhengce’, 08/06/1956, Qiaowubao Press (eds), *Qiaowu zhengce wenji* (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1957), 47-65 (47-49).

thus ensuring that *qiaowu* work was caught in a long-term passivity'.⁹⁸ This was simply subjectivism and bureaucratism, which Fang said would be rectified in five areas.

Firstly, the *youdai* policies in agrarian collectivisation were to be more firmly implemented, and any deviations were to be immediately rectified. Given that over 90% of *huaqiao* households were already involved in collectivisation (with 50% in AAPCs), this re-emphasis on *youdai* was mainly in terms of labour management: the *huaqiao* who wanted to live off remittances, or who were incapable of labour, were not to be forced to take part in labour. Those without labour experience could be trained, but it was to be a strictly voluntary and gradual process. Moreover, cooperatives were forbidden to coerce or pressure the *huaqiao* into making contributions or investments.⁹⁹

Secondly, the *youdai* policies towards *huaqiao* foreign investors would be further developed. A state *huaqiao* investment company would lead this drive—as an extension of existing provincial Overseas Chinese Investment Companies—and investors would be guaranteed: 8% annual interest, employment in state enterprises, and their proprietary rights even after socialism. Indeed, ‘based on a consideration of the special characteristics of *huaqiao* industry and commerce’: *huaqiao* investors were to be informed prior to nationalisation; all commercial debts to *huaqiao* would be repaid, even post-nationalisation; and *huaqiao* holders of post-1949 investments would receive ‘generally higher’ annual interest post-transformation than the non-*huaqiao* received.¹⁰⁰

Thirdly, and in a restatement of the 1955 State Council decree, Fang declared that remittances were a legitimate right and interest of the *huaqiao*, and were thus inviolate. It seems that during the ‘high tide’ collectivisation, remittances had often been identified as sources of contributions, deposits and investments to APCs and AAPCs. While in some other cases, remittances had been seen as evidence of backwardness, thus causing many

⁹⁸ Ibid., 49.

⁹⁹ Ibid., 50-52.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., 54-55.

huaqiao to reject further receipt of remittances. Whatever the case, it was unacceptable, and Fang demanded that all interference with remittances be stopped.¹⁰¹

Fourth, the *guiqiao* were to be more efficiently employed and settled. Since 1949, some 200,000 or so *huaqiao* had returned to the homeland, and while they constituted a source of manpower, many work units had discriminated against them, either because of ignorance about *huaqiao* 'special characteristics', or because of a belief that *guiqiao* were politically-backward because of prolonged exposure to foreign influences. Thus many *guiqiao* with technical skills ended up wasted in agrarian production instead of industry, while 'advanced intellectuals' were assigned mundane jobs that did not utilise their education. Thus there was a need to rectify this wastage of human resources.¹⁰²

Fifth, Fang emphasised that the *qiaosheng* were a source of trained manpower, the recipients of large sums of remittances, and also conduits for external propaganda. Hence all schools with *qiaosheng* were to adopt the principle of 'equal results, priority admission', which meant that all things being equal, *qiaosheng* would have priority in enrolment. Three 'tuition schools' for *qiaosheng* would also be established in Beijing, Guangzhou and Jimei (Xiamen) to attract more returnees, and also enable them to qualify for entry into higher education institutions.¹⁰³

Fang proposed three steps to the rectifications. First, strengthening administrative capacity; from the provincial (or autonomous municipality) level downwards, all *qiaowu* agencies were to have appropriate manpower, training, and to also form closer ties with provincial People's Committees. Secondly, committees or work groups of *qiaojuan* at the

¹⁰¹ Ibid., 56-57.

¹⁰² Fang Fang, 'Guanyu guonei qiaowu gongzuo de ruogan zhengce', 08/06/1956, *Qiaowu zhengce wenji*, 58-60.

The State Council had already noted in February that the inefficiency especially affected *guiqiao* 'advanced intellectuals' [高级知识分子] with university qualifications or advanced technical skills. For instance, a former Professor of Medicine was now a hospital resident, while a former engineer was a zookeeper. See Beijing People's Committee, 'Guanyu dui *guiqiao* zhong gaoji zhishi fenzi gongzuo anpai qingkuang de jiancha baogao', 29/04/1956, BMA #002-008-00064, 4-7; State Council, 'Guanyu jiang anzhi guiguo *huaqiao* gongzuo naru guihua de tongzhi', 22/02/1956, BMA #002-008-00064, 13-15.

¹⁰³ Fang Fang, 'Guanyu guonei qiaowu gongzuo de ruogan zhengce', 08/06/1956, *Qiaowu zhengce wenji*, 61-62.

local levels were to work with village town committees and local groups, to implement *qiaowu* from the ground up. Finally, the *huaqiao* community associations [侨联 *qiaolian*] were to be consolidated under a national federation, to allow ‘the broad masses of *guiqiao* and *qiaojuan* to have a forum to express their opinions, to check on *qiaowu* work and to effectively communicate with *guowai huaqiao*’.¹⁰⁴

Fang’s speech was a vigorous defence of *youdai* at the OCAC Fourth Expanded Conference, and it also echoed the OCAC–UFWD report in February that had argued for a *youdai* approach ‘based on the special characteristics of *qiaojuan* and *guiqiao*’, so as to gain hard currency, achieve patriotic unity with the *haiwai huaqiao*, stabilise socio-economic relations for the *huaqiao* in China, and further socialist transformation.¹⁰⁵ Yet, while the February report had suggested how *youdai* could work in, and aid the transition to socialism, Fang’s address in June was a sharper contrast of *qiaowu* with the failures of the ‘socialist high tide’. Fang had admitted to institutional failures by local *qiaowu* offices, but this was pro forma self-criticism since Fang did not return once to this theme, and instead pointed repeatedly to cadre deviations and violations of *youdai*, to make his case for rectification. The point was that *qiaowu* could contribute a great deal to the socialist transformation, but only if the economic rationality of its *youdai* policies was unhindered by the deviations of cadres bent on ‘rash advances’. To be sure, this was the mainstream view at the Conference; Tan Kah Kee declared that existing problems were ‘not the fault of national policy’, but rather ‘the product of deviationist failure amongst various cadres’.¹⁰⁶ Yet, it was not just the OCAC who took this view. In fact, the Fourth Expanded Conference’s insistence on the *youdai* policies resonated very strongly with many in the CCP leadership.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., 63–65.

¹⁰⁵ Liao, Fang, ‘Guodu shiqi de guonei qiaowu gongzuo fangzhen’, 17/02/1956, *DHGLR*, 208.

¹⁰⁶ Tan Kah Kee, ‘Chen Jiageng weiyuan zhibi muci (di si ci qiaowu kuoda huiyi)’, n.d. (c. 11–15/06/1956), FPA #0148-002-0697-0109.

The point of the *youdai* was that it offered *qiaowu* a rational means to fulfilling a key economic imperative. But this also made it attractive to those who saw Mao's 'high tide' as 'rash advance', and the pro-*youdai* position thus became firmly associated with the calls for more pragmatic and gradual approaches to socialist transformation, and with those who enunciated such views, like vice-Premier Deng Zihui.¹⁰⁷

Deng Zihui held a reception for county Party Secretaries and Governors on the sidelines of the OCAC Fourth Expanded Conference, where he stressed that *qiaowu* was an 'unshirkable duty'.¹⁰⁸ As Deng said, 'the crux of *huaqiao* work is domestic *qiaowu*', since to do *qiaowu* well in China was also to win over the *haiwai huaqiao*. This was a well-accepted policy tenet by now, but Deng also saw that meeting *huaqiao* interests with domestic *youdai* might also stir controversy, especially since 'the peasants have a certain egalitarianism'.¹⁰⁹ Thus Deng advised that *qiaowu* should refrain from setting itself against the peasants, or else the peasants would grow to resent the *huaqiao*, and that it was further incumbent upon *qiaowu* to reach out to the peasants, and to ensure that it did not appear to 'over-privilege' the *huaqiao*.¹¹⁰

Deng's warning about 'over-privileging' the *huaqiao* might ostensibly sound like a contradiction of *youdai*, but he in fact reminded the gathered officials that *youdai* was a necessity.¹¹¹ In fact, Deng was giving a pragmatic warning, since he believed that the masses would resent *youdai* if they were left to their own devices. Thus if the *huaqiao* were to be 'an important source of strength for socialist construction', then the masses' perceptions of *youdai* had to be managed.¹¹² Since *youdai* was premised on rationality, it was also only rational that *qiaowu* manage perceptions. After all—and in a backhanded

¹⁰⁷ Deng Zihui was (ironically, given his radicalism in the Land Reform) considered by Mao to be 'the chief opponent to the Socialist High Tide'. See Dikotter, *The Tragedy of Liberation*, 236.

¹⁰⁸ Deng Zihui, 'Deng Zihui fu zongli dui dangqian qiaowu gongzuo de zhishi', 23/06/1956, *GDQW*, No. 20 (10 Aug 1956), 1-7 (1).

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., 2.

¹¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹¹ Ibid., 3-7.

¹¹² Ibid., 1.

reference to the ‘high tide’—as Deng remarked: ‘We must adhere to Marxist-Leninist dialectical materialism—or what Chinese people call ‘seeking truth from facts.’ Enough is enough, and not enough means, not enough.’¹¹³ Thus Deng concluded: ‘We must not cause the *qiaojuan* to become an eyesore to the peasants; basically, we must look to both aspects at the same time, and not one before the other.’¹¹⁴

Looking ‘to both aspects at the same time’, as Deng instructed, was essentially to pragmatically present *youdai* as both a rational policy approach, and as a better path to socialist progress. On the same day in June 1956 as Deng’s sermon on pragmatism, He Xiangning told the NPC that the *huaqiao* were fully supportive of the ‘high tide’, as was proven by the 90% *qiaojuan* participation in collectivisation. This, He implied, was because *qiaowu* had encouraged the *huaqiao* in their support for socialist transformation. From the 1955 State Council decree on remittances, to Mao’s directive on *huaqiao* usage of wasteland, and to ‘appropriate care for *qiaojuan* special conditions’ in food/goods allocation, this had all brought the *huaqiao* closer to their homeland.¹¹⁵ Indeed, He pointed to results—a 50% increase in *huaqiao* investment, compared to four years earlier. Thus *youdai* was clearly a viable and successful approach.

Yet, He’s apparent integration of the *youdai* approach with the ‘high tide’ was disingenuous, especially since she said ‘careless and impatient attitudes’, the neglect of *huaqiao* ‘special circumstances’, and ‘trying to accomplish a 12-year plan in three years’, were the causes of problems.¹¹⁶ But in publicly reconciling the narratives of the ‘socialist high tide’ and the *youdai*, He was claiming credit on *qiaowu*’s behalf. Collectivisation, after all, had truly succeeded in transforming agrarian China. Thus, to associate the *youdai* with that success was to bolster its socialist credentials, and would also mitigate criticisms that *qiaowu* had over-privileged the *huaqiao* in socialist transformation.

¹¹³ Ibid., 3.

¹¹⁴ Ibid., 7.

¹¹⁵ He Xiangning, ‘Jin yi bu guanche zhixing qiaowu zhengce’, 23/06/1956, *DHGLR*, 135-141 (135-136).

¹¹⁶ Ibid., 136.

He's attempt to cast *youdai* as appropriately socialist, even as she blamed its problems on the 'rash advances' of the 'high tide', was apropos of the ongoing debate over the future of collectivisation. On 15 June 1956, Liao Luyan had submitted a draft 'Model Articles of Association for Advanced Agricultural Producers' Cooperatives' to the NPC. These were for the most part based on the version for the APCs, but they were intended to 'address the new problems that arose when the APCs were converted to AAPCs', and had been 'based on the new experiences learnt during the agricultural collectivisation and construction process'.¹¹⁷ Which for Liao, mostly meant (as noted earlier), 'address[ing] the tendency towards one-sided emphasising of the national and collective interest even while disregarding individual interests'.¹¹⁸

Fang, Deng and He had all pointed to the *youdai* approach as an economically rational means to fulfilling *qiaowu* imperatives in the context of socialist transformation. Indeed, this sense of *youdai* as a sort of middle way between socialist transformation and economic rationality was exactly what the NPC endorsed on 30 June 1956 when it passed the 'Model Articles'. Articles 14 and 15 provided for, *inter alia*, the special circumstances of *qiaojuan* and *guiqiao* who were labour-deficient by making provision for their employment in roles suitable to their ability and/or capacity to labour.¹¹⁹ Article 49, alongside an acknowledgement that cooperatives among minorities had to respect their customs and practices, ordered those in the *huaqiao* areas to 'pay special attention to unite the *guiqiao* and *qiaojuan* with the running of the cooperatives'.¹²⁰ Article 58 guaranteed that *guiqiao* and *qiaojuan* would not be ostracised, and ensured that their representation in a cooperative's assembly would be in proportion to their population in the cooperative.

¹¹⁷ Liao Luyan, 'Guanyu 'gaoji nongye she shengchan hezuo she shifan zhangcheng (cao an)' de shuoming', 15/06/1956, *JYZW*, 8: 310.

¹¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 8: 308.

¹¹⁹ These articles provided for other labour-deficient demographics (i.e. where labour had migrated to cities but 'were still applicable at the same time to *guiguo* *huaqiao* and *qiaojuan*'. See NPC Bills Committee, 'Guanyu gaoji nongye shengchan hezuo she shifan zhangcheng (cao an) de shencha baogao di si dian: dui *guiqiao* *qiaokuan* de zhaogu', 29/06/1956, *GDQW*, No. 19 (9 Jun 1956), 1.

¹²⁰ Article 49, 'Gaoji nongye shengchan hezuo she shifan zhangcheng', 30/06/1956, *JYZW*, 8: 345-366 (361).

Article 61 ensured that cooperatives with significant proportions of *guiqiao* or *qiaojuan* should also reserve a number of leadership positions for them.¹²¹ Thus while collectivisation was held as a key part of socialist transformation, it was also entrenched with new *youdai* provisions for the *huaqiao*, based on a logic that *youdai* for *huaqiao* specialness was necessary, and the key to maximising their economic utility.

While the ‘Model Articles’ endorsed the *youdai* approach in *qiaowu*, far more significant approval was to come at the first session of the CCP’s Eighth Party Congress in September 1956. Of course, the OCAC had not waited for the Eighth Party Congress to begin shoring up *youdai*—that began after the Fourth Expanded Conference.¹²² Yet the Eighth Party Congress offered a prominent platform for a very decisive underlining of the pre-eminence of *youdai* in *qiaowu*.¹²³ Indeed, Liu Shaoqi, in his political report to the Congress on 15 September, remarked that ‘the patriotic *huaqiao* overseas are also a part of the united front, and we must continue to unite with them’.¹²⁴ While Liu specified the *haiwai huaqiao*, his instruction ‘to unite with them’ was not actually about those abroad—since as Deng Zihui had pointed out previously, uniting with the *huaqiao* abroad was precisely through domestic *qiaowu*. Moreover, Liu was clearly not advocating unity with the *haiwai huaqiao* in a sense of a homeland–diaspora relationship, because since the Dual Nationality Treaty (1955), the PRC had maintained that the *haiwai huaqiao* should

¹²¹ Article 58, Article 61. ‘Gaoji nongye shengchan hezuo she shifan zhangcheng’, 30/06/1956, *JYZW*, 8: 363, 365.

¹²² Two new policies are worth highlighting:

Firstly, voting rights were extended to the *huaqiao* landlords and rich peasants who had not yet had their class changed. See Guangdong Province Overseas Chinese Affairs Committee, ‘Zhuanfa Guangzhou shi qiaowu ju xiang Guangzhou xuanju weiyuanhui tichu guanyu Guangzhou shi ji ceng xuanju zhong youguan huaqiao dizhu funong gaibian chengfen chuli yijian’, 29/08/1956, *GDQW*, No. 21 (25 Sep 1956), 6-7.

Secondly, Hainan’s innovation of normal/special/honorary cooperative members was simplified into normal/special only, since honorary members were usually the old and infirm, who should have already had special consideration. See Guangdong Province United Front Department, ‘Fu zhonggong Hainan qu dangwei dui ‘guanyu zai zhengdun gonggu nongye shengchan hezuo she zhong jiehe guanche zhixing huaqiao zhengce de zhishi’ de yijian’, 11/08/1956, *GDQW*, No. 21 (25 Sep 1956), 8-10.

¹²³ By Liao’s own assessment, previous *qiaowu* that ‘looked after the special characteristics of *qiaojuan* and *huaqiao*’ had been marked by inadequacy, but had since ‘been basically corrected’. See Liao Chengzhi, ‘Zai dang de ba da shang de fayan’, 20/09/1956, *DHGLR*, 218-221 (218).

¹²⁴ Liu Shaoqi, ‘Zai Zhongguo gongchan dang di ba ci quanguo daibiao dahui shang de zhengzhi baogao’, 15/09/1956, *JYZW*, 9: 33-100 (74).

take up local citizenship.¹²⁵ Thus ‘unite with them’ had little to do with either patriotic or diasporic identities of *huaqiao*. As Li Weihan explained to the Congress on 25 September, *qiaowu* defined by the imperative to ‘unite with them’ meant the traditional ‘protection of the legitimate rights and interests of *huaqiao*’, along with the rejoinders to take up local citizenship and to be law-abiding. But it was also about *youdai*: the protection of remittances, preferential provisions for *huaqiao* investment, facilitation of *huaqiao* investment and *qiaosheng* higher education, and ‘looking after the special circumstances and needs of domestic *huaqiao*’, and so on.¹²⁶ This, Li said, was just as important as rectifying ‘high tide’ excess. And thus the *youdai* in *qiaowu* was the future.

Of course, none of this meant that *qiaowu* was actually uninterested in the *haiwai huaqiao*, especially since the precious remittances originated with them. But the *youdai* in domestic *qiaowu* reflected the party-state’s realisation that the transnationality of *huaqiao* interests in their remittances found its most comprehensive satisfaction inside China. Thus inasmuch as the PRC did not want the responsibility for Chinese abroad who had taken up local citizenship, the party-state was careful to be seen as upholding the ‘unbreakable bonds’ between all Chinese. As Zhou Enlai told some Burmese *huaqiao* in December 1956, even if those who became Burmese citizens were no longer *huaqiao*: ‘we will still be relatives, and what is so bad about that? Just like how a daughter remains a relative even after she marries’.¹²⁷ Thus while *youdai* was a domestic locus of policy, its fulfilment of *huaqiao* specialness spoke to a transnational audience.

In a sense, *youdai* was domestic policy, but also transnational propaganda. Given that the propaganda to the *haiwai huaqiao* was to encourage them to look to local citizenship and their long-term interests, and also to spread positive information on

¹²⁵ Zhou Enlai said this directly to former Singapore Chief Minister, David Marshall. See ‘Zhou Enlai zongli jiu Xinjiapo Zhongguo ren de guoji wenti dui Daiwei Maxie Er de tanhua’, 09/10/1956, *DWGW*, 4: 136-137.

¹²⁶ Li Weihan, ‘Zhaoyao zhe huaqiao de guanghui’, 25/09/1956, All-China Federation of Returned Overseas Chinese (ACFROC) (eds), *Qiaowu bao* [QWB], No. 1 (17 Oct 1956), 1.

¹²⁷ Zhou Enlai, ‘Zai Miandian huaqiao huanying hui shang de jianghua’, 18/12/1956, *DHGLR*, 11.

qiaowu and *huaqiao* situations in China, *youdai* was basically relevant abroad and necessary at home.¹²⁸ In that vein, the State Council finally established Fang Fang's proposed national *qiaolian* in October 1956.¹²⁹ The All-China Federation of Returned Overseas Chinese (ACFROC), while theoretically an organisation for the *guiqiao*, was actually an OCAC device to bring existing organisations for *guiqiao* and *qiaojuan* under central control.¹³⁰ This was to aid the dual purposes associated with the *youdai* approach: to help implement domestic policy that catered to *huaqiao* interests (and incentivised their remittances), and to inform propaganda on those precise policies to the *haiwai huaqiao* (that would also encourage remittances). Thus the OCAC defined the objectives of the ACFROC as: 'uniting and educating *guiqiao* and *qiaojuan*, communicating with *guowai huaqiao* on the local situation and *qiaowu* policies, and organising welfare services for *guiqiao* and *qiaojuan*'.¹³¹ This, as the new ACFROC Chairman, Tan Kah Kee, declared at its inauguration on 5 October, would strengthen the 'broad People's Democratic United Front' that Liu Shaoqi had pointed to at the Eighth Party Congress.¹³² Indeed, as the ACFROC editorialised: 'in order to do *qiaowu* work well, we must not neglect the special characteristics of *huaqiao* and *qiaojuan*'.¹³³

By October 1956, the paramountcy of the *youdai* approach in *qiaowu* was clearly established. Indeed, the *youdai* in domestic policy had been precisely endorsed by the party-state as the means towards fulfilling the economic imperatives of *qiaowu*, and as a means for reconciling economic rationality with socialist transformation. Yet, while

¹²⁸ Fujian Province Overseas Chinese Affairs Committee, 'Guanyu dui guowai huaqiao xuanchuan gongzuo de ruogan wenti', in 'Qiaowu zhengce qiaocai', 19/09/1956, FPA #0148-001-0100-0010.

¹²⁹ State Council, 'Guanyu zhuanfa qiaowei guanyu chengli quanguo qiaolian ji gesheng shi guiguo huaqiaolianhehui jiqi bianzhi de yijian de tonghzi', 16/10/1956, SMA B24-2-36-45.

¹³⁰ The OCAC assigned 300 cadres to *qiaolian* work. See OCAC, 'Baoqing pizhun chengli quanguo qiaolian ji gesheng shi guiguo huaqiaolianhehui jigou bianzhi', 15/09/1956, SMA B24-2-36-45.

¹³¹ Ibid.

¹³² Tan Kah Kee, 'Wei jiefang Taiwan, wei jianshe zuguo er fendou!', 05/10/1956, in ACFROC (eds), *Zhonghua quanguo guiguo huaqiaolianhehui: chengli dahui tekan* (Beijing: Zhonghua quanguo guiguo huaqiaolianhehui, 1956), 7-10 (8).

See also Tan Kah Kee, 'Zai zhonghua quanguo guiqiao diyici daibiao dahui shang de kaimu ci', 05/10/1956, in Overseas Chinese Museum (ed.), *Chen Jiageng wenji*, Vol. 1-6 (Xiamen: Overseas Chinese Museum, 1994), 6: 627-630.

¹³³ ACFROC, 'Xuanchuan qiaowu zhengce', *QWB*, No. 1 (17 Oct 1956), 2.

the Eighth Party Congress ensured that *youdai* was the Party-approved doctrine for *qiaowu*, and indeed, also the main feature of its external-facing propaganda, there was another, inadvertent consequence to its approval. The Congress, after all, saw an apparent reduction in Mao's status since it 'dropped the Socialist High Tide, deleted all references to Mao Zedong Thought from the [Party] constitution, and denounced the cult of personality'.¹³⁴ Indeed, when the Congress had approved Liu Shaoqi's political report, it had resolved that the excesses of the 'high tide' had been 'adventurism' and that the task ahead was to prevent and correct 'leftist adventurist tendencies', as much as it was also to resist rightist conservatism.¹³⁵ The Congress' approval of *youdai* thus also meant that this approach to *qiaowu* was nailed squarely by association to the rejection of 'leftist adventurism'—and more importantly, to the rejection of Mao. This would come back to haunt *qiaowu* in 1957.

The Great Debate:

Inasmuch as Nikita Khrushchev's 'secret speech' and the consequent 'de-Stalinisation' were influential on the renunciation of the 'socialist high tide' in China, their other inadvertent effect was to foment severe instability within the Soviet bloc. By October 1956, both Poland and Hungary had seen the replacement of erstwhile Stalinist regimes on the back of mass demonstrations and popular discontent that had been inspired—to a large extent—by 'de-Stalinisation'.¹³⁶ The two crises were eventually resolved—in vastly different ways and with divergent consequences—but both had been observed with great concern in China.¹³⁷

¹³⁴ Dikötter, *The Tragedy of Liberation*, 283.

¹³⁵ CCP Eighth Party Congress, 'Zhongguo gongchan dang di ba ci quanguo daibiao dahui guanyu zhengzhi baogao de jueyi', 27/09/1956, JYZW, 9: 292-304 (298).

¹³⁶ Csaba Bekes, 'East Central Europe, 1953-1956' in Leffler, Westad (eds), *The Cambridge History of the Cold War, Vol. I: Origins*, 334-352 (347, 350-351).

¹³⁷ In Poland, whereas Wladyslaw Gomulka's rise to power was initially viewed with suspicion by the CPSU leadership, Gomulka eventually convinced Khrushchev that the 'Polish path to socialism' would not undermine the Soviet bloc. On the other hand, in Hungary, the early Soviet military intervention in October provoked an uprising, which the appointment of Imre Nagy as Prime Minister was intended to pacify.

The immediate effect of the Polish October and Hungarian Uprising for China was the inspiration they provided for popular dissent. As Frank Dikötter notes, while ‘people had to read between the lines, as the news was severely censored’, they were aware of enough, since ‘workers started invoking the example of Hungary in acts of defiance against the state’.¹³⁸ Workers protested for a variety of reasons—like their stagnant or decreasing incomes, poor housing and welfare—‘but what caused the explosion of discontent was the collectivisation of private enterprises under the Socialist High Tide’.¹³⁹ Workers started to strike, and were soon joined by some 100,000 students by 1957.¹⁴⁰ Elsewhere, peasants began to clamour to leave the APCs and AAPCs. Of course, rectification of the ‘socialist high tide’ had been promised at the Eighth Party Congress, but it now seemed as if the Party was losing control.

The Polish October and the Hungarian Uprising, as Zhu Dandan has pointed out, ‘stimulated domestic debates’ in China amongst the Party and people. Against the backdrop of strikes, demonstrations, and peasants leaving collectives, the suggestion was that the CCP, like its Hungarian and Polish counterparts, had become estranged from the people it was supposedly leading.¹⁴¹ Mao was one of those who believed that what had happened in Hungary (and to a lesser extent, Poland) could also happen in China. Indeed Mao believed, as Shen Zhihua asserts, that the CCP’s problem was that its relationship with the masses was now threatened by popular dissatisfaction with its erroneous policies, and its past behaviour which had been ‘divorced from the masses’.¹⁴² Hence, Mao called for an internal rectification campaign to eliminate the bureaucratism, factionalism and subjectivism in the Party. Bureaucratism and subjectivism referenced previous failings,

Nagy’s introduction of liberalising reforms did not, however, quell anti-Communist sentiment, and finally the Red Army invaded Hungary. See Békes, ‘East Central Europe, 1953-1956’, 350-351.

¹³⁸ Dikötter, *The Tragedy of Liberation*, 278.

¹³⁹ Ibid., 279.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid., 278.

¹⁴¹ Zhu, ‘The Hungarian Revolution and the origins of China’s Great Leap policies, 1956-57’, 454-455.

¹⁴² Shen Zhihua, ‘Yi jiu wu qi nian zhengfeng yundong shi ruhe kaishi de’, *Zhonggong dangshi yanjiu*, No. 6 (2008), 72-83 (72-73).

but factionalism hinted at something else. Indeed, as factionalism implied, Mao also believed that such a rectification offered an opportunity for him to ‘reclaim the initiative’ barely a month after the Eighth Party Congress had publicly renounced his ‘high tide’ vision (if not his Thought) and marginalised his leadership.¹⁴³

The CCP leadership, while acknowledging the likely ‘contradictions among the people’, were not in favour of Mao’s internal rectification.¹⁴⁴ Liu Shaoqi proposed ‘top-down’, ‘self-regulative’ reform to the CCP CC in November 1956.¹⁴⁵ But Mao preferred direct action: ‘strikes, popular parades and demonstrations as proper methods for forcing the cadres to correct their mistakes’.¹⁴⁶ Yet, Mao was unsuccessful. As a *People’s Daily* editorial on 29 December 1956 for the Politburo suggested, while ‘shortcomings’ would be ‘determinedly criticised and overcome’, such criticisms should ‘only be made in the service of consolidating democratic centralism and the leadership of the Party’.¹⁴⁷

Given the CCP leadership’s resistance, Mao unsurprisingly took his ideas to a different audience on 27 February 1957, and lectured the 11th SSC on ‘How to Handle Contradictions among the People’.¹⁴⁸ Mao said that the Hungarian crisis was due to their Party’s bureaucratism and its conflation of counterrevolutionary threat with legitimate concerns of the people. Indeed, Mao acknowledged similar mistakes in China, particularly during past political campaigns, and now promised amnesty for political prisoners, and ‘expressed regret’ at the loss of life. Yet, this meant that China could end up like Hungary, unless the CCP reformed itself.¹⁴⁹ Mao criticised the Party for its bureaucratism and declared that it would be the people who would show where the Party

¹⁴³ Dikötter, *The Tragedy of Liberation*, 284.

¹⁴⁴ Zhu, ‘The Hungarian Revolution and the origins of China’s Great Leap policies, 1956-57’, 454.

¹⁴⁵ Ibid.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid., 456.

¹⁴⁷ *People’s Daily* editorial, ‘Zai lun wuchan jieji zhuanzheng de lishi jingyan’, 29/12/1956, *JYZW*, 9: 482-511 (504).

¹⁴⁸ Most cite this as ‘On the Correct Handling of Contradictions among the People’ but the original title was ‘如何处理人民内部的矛盾’ and was amended afterwards to ‘关于正确处理人民内部矛盾的问题’, which was its title when the (amended) speech was published in June 1957. See Mao Zedong, ‘Ruhe chuli renmin neibu de maodun (jianghua tigang)’, 27/02/1957, *JYZW*, 10: 50-55 (54).

¹⁴⁹ Dikötter, *The Tragedy of Liberation*, 287.

had failed. No one would be exempt, or as Mao asked (rhetorically): ‘Old cadres cannot be criticised?’¹⁵⁰ The principle, as Mao had proposed in May 1956, was to: ‘Let a hundred flowers bloom, let a hundred schools of thought contend; long-term coexistence, mutual supervision.’ The ‘hundred flowers’ was a reference to allowing for different viewpoints in the arts and science, but as Mao explained on 1 March, ‘long-term coexistence’ and ‘mutual supervision’ also referred to the persistence (and tolerance) of the (non-CCP) political parties, their alternative perspectives and mutual criticism.¹⁵¹ Only thus could the Party resolve its contradictions with the people.

The SSC included non-communists and delegates from the other democratic parties, and they approved Mao’s speech.¹⁵² Mao, to be clear, had called for a specific Rectification Campaign. Indeed, to the National Propaganda Work Conference on 12 March, Mao claimed that the CCP CC had since decided to launch a Rectification to criticise and correct bureaucratism, subjectivism, and factionalism within the Party.¹⁵³ Thus Mao openly invited non-CCP personages to participate in the criticism, as they wished. As for how the process would work, it was to be through open criticism but also self-criticism, where individuals were to study and reflect on their work. While cadres were wary of non-Party criticisms, Mao said that the criticisms would be like ‘breeze or mild rain’, avoiding personal attacks, and focused on learning ‘from past mistakes’.¹⁵⁴ Yet, Rectification did not appeal to the CCP CC or the Party at large.¹⁵⁵ And Mao’s desired criticisms were also slow to materialise since the prior experiences of intellectuals

¹⁵⁰ Mao Zedong, ‘Ruhe chuli renmin neibu de maodun (jianghua tigang)’, 27/02/1957, *JYZW*, 10: 52.

¹⁵¹ Shen Zhihua, ‘Yi jiu wu qi nian zhengfeng yundong shi ruhe kaishi de’, 75.

¹⁵² ‘Mao came across as an earnest proponent of a more humane form of socialism, departing radically from past tradition.’ See Dikotter, *The Tragedy of Liberation*, 286.

¹⁵³ Mao Zedong, ‘Zai gongchan dang quanguo xuanchuan gongzuo huiyi shang de jianghua’, 12/03/1957, *JYZW*, 10: 98-112 (104).

¹⁵⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁵ See the discussion on the Beijing Municipal Committee Propaganda Work Conference in March 1957, in Shen Zhihua, ‘Yi jiu wu qi nian zhengfeng yundong shi ruhe kaishi de’, 75-76.

The CCP CC did not issue a directive on the Rectification Campaign [整风运动 *zhengfeng yundong*] until April 1957. See CCP CC, ‘Zhongguo gongchan dang zhongyang weiyuanhui guanyu zhengfeng yundong de zhishi’, 27/04/1957, *JYZW*, 10: 196-200.

of Maoist campaigns were enough to make them practice, as Jonathan Spence notes, ‘an understandable caution’.¹⁵⁶

Given the general reluctance for Mao’s proposed Rectification, *qiaowu* was not any different in early 1957, and its focus was on *youdai*; apart from the launch of the ACFROC, September 1956 to April 1957 also saw a string of new policies.¹⁵⁷ One in particular bears highlighting because it shows the extent to which *qiaowu* was prepared to privilege and set the *huaqiao* apart from the masses. On 8 February 1957, the Politburo instructed that the country should ‘increase savings’ to recover from the excesses of 1956. The ‘high tide’ had seen expenditure rise sharply in 1956 by around RMB 2.8-3 billion.¹⁵⁸ This had to be corrected, and one of the Politburo’s austerity measures was a requirement that every person be allocated 1 *jin* less of grain/rice a month.¹⁵⁹ Under ‘unified sale and purchase’ this was an effective, albeit crude measure, since a reduction in allocations also meant that the state had more to sell. Yet, the Fujian PBOC and *qiaowu* Committee argued that applying this measure to the *huaqiao* would be counterproductive. Since the Politburo’s main consideration was financial, then remittances—which in Fujian, amounted to an estimated US\$38 million in 1957—should not be undermined, which was exactly what reducing allocations to the *huaqiao* would do. Thus, in ‘primary *huaqiao* areas, especially where there are the most remittances’, the correct measure was instead to allocate even more food/goods to *huaqiao*, which would ‘help to withdraw more currency from circulation, and thus motivate *qiaojuan* to gain more remittances’.¹⁶⁰

¹⁵⁶ Spence, *The Gate of Heavenly Peace*, 374-376.

¹⁵⁷ See GPC, ‘Pizhuan Guangdong sheng huaqiao shiwu weiyuanhui dangzu ‘guanyu gaoji she zhong jiejue qiaojuan laodong shouru ji jixu chuli huaqiao fangwu yiliu wenti de baogao’, 12/09/1956, *GDQW*, No. 22 (15 Nov 1956), 1-6; PLA General Political Department, ‘Guanyu budui jiezhu huaqiao fangwu wenti de zhishi’, 23/11/1956, *GDQW*, No. 24 (15 Apr 1957), 1-2; Guangdong Supreme People’s Court, Public Security Department, Overseas Chinese Affairs Committee, ‘Guanyu qiaohu difu gaibian chengfen jiechu guanzhi ji jiaoshi deng wenti de lianhe zhishi’, 17/11/1956, *GDQW*, No. 24 (15 Apr 1957), 6-7.

¹⁵⁸ CCP Politburo, ‘Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu yi jiu wu qi nian kaizhan zengchan jieyue yundong de zhishi’, 08/02/1957, *JYZW*, 10: 24-38 (24-26).

¹⁵⁹ Ibid., 10: 36.

¹⁶⁰ Fujian Province Overseas Chinese Affairs Committee, PBOC Fujian branch, ‘Guanyu zhengqu qiaohui wenti de qingshi baogao’, 14/02/1957, in CASS, CA (eds), *1953-1957 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo jingji dang'an ziliao xuanbian: jinrong juan* [hereafter, *1953-1957 jinrong juan*] (Beijing: Zhongguo wujia chubanshe, 2000), 981-984 (982).

The Fujian *qiaowu* and PBOC report was endorsed by the FPC, which noted in a report to the CCP CC, that ‘in the midst of developing the campaign to increase savings, we must avoid negatively impacting the motivation of *qiaojuan* to gain remittances as a result of one-sided propaganda on cost-cutting’.¹⁶¹ The CCP CC agreed with this and sent the Fujian proposals (in May 1957) to all provinces that had *huaqiao* populations, with its ringing endorsement of the ‘very good’ suggestions, suggesting that to balance the need to ‘increase savings’ amongst the masses, with special provisions for *huaqiao* so as to gain remittances, was in its judgement, ‘correct’ policy.¹⁶²

Yet, even as the *youdai* policies continued to prosper (and proliferate), Mao also continued to advocate Rectification. After the National Propaganda Work Conference on 12 March, Mao headed south to hold meetings with CCP officials and cadres, acting as ‘a wandering lobbyist’ for Rectification.¹⁶³ Mao’s message was that Rectification was for the Party to overcome internal contradictions, and thus overcome contradictions with the masses. In that respect, Mao said, the Party should not be wary of criticism, but should embrace it.¹⁶⁴ In the end, Mao proved convincing.¹⁶⁵ By April 1957, even Zhou Enlai had admitted that: ‘correct treatment of contradictions among the people requires first of all that the CCP engage with the issue’.¹⁶⁶ Thus on 27 April, the CCP CC approved Mao’s directive ‘On instructions regarding the Rectification Campaign’, which thus determined to ‘let a hundred flowers bloom, let a hundred schools of thought contend’ alongside ‘long-term coexistence, mutual supervision’.¹⁶⁷ The Chairman had gotten his wish.

¹⁶¹ FPC, ‘Pizhuan sheng huaqiao shiwu weiyuanhui, sheng renmin yinhang dangzu, ‘guanyu zhengqu qiaohui wenti de qingshi baogao’, 07/03/1957, 1953-1957 *jinrong juan*, 968-969 (968).

¹⁶² CCP CC, ‘Zhuangfa Fujian shengwei pizhuan sheng huaqiao shiwu weiyuanhui dangzu, sheng renmin yinhang dangzu guanyu zhengqu qiaohui wenti baogao de pishi’, 01/05/1957, ZZWX, 25: 306.

¹⁶³ Zhu, ‘The Hungarian Revolution and the origins of China’s Great Leap policies, 1956-57’, 460-61; Mao Zedong, ‘Jianchi jianku fendou, miqielianxi qunzhong’, 18-19/03/1957, JYZW, 10: 120-123.

¹⁶⁴ Shen Zhihua, ‘Yi jiu wu qi nian zhengfeng yundong shi ruhe kaishi de’, 78.

¹⁶⁵ Mao, over 17-19 April, held three meetings with Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai, Zhu De, Deng Xiaoping and Chen Yun, and on 19 April, Mao ordered local Party Committees and Party Groups of CPG institutions to report on contradictions among the people, and ‘views within and without the Party’. See Shen Zhihua, ‘Yi jiu wu qi nian zhengfeng yundong shi ruhe kaishi de’, 82.

¹⁶⁶ Ibid.

¹⁶⁷ CCP CC, ‘Zhongguo gongchan dang zhongyang weiyuanhui guanyu zhengfeng yundong de zhishi’, 27/04/1957, JYZW, 10: 197.

Mao had envisioned that the Rectification Campaign would focus on CCP bureaucratism, factionalism and subjectivism, and would involve ‘open criticisms’ in structured settings by democratic personages and intellectuals. One example of this was over 8-16 May 1957 in a UFWD-organised series of seven meetings. Some attendees criticised the discrimination that non-CCP members faced in government work, where ‘they had very little authority relevant to their duties’. Others criticised the campaigns against the alleged reactionaries and counter-revolutionaries, many of whom had been members of the democratic parties. There were also criticisms of Party policy, which while well-founded, was poorly implemented at lower levels.¹⁶⁸ Yet, all this ‘mutual criticism’ suggested that the Rectification was going as planned, and providing, as Li Weihan noted, a ‘motivating influence’ for reform.¹⁶⁹ But this was not to last.

As the news of the Rectification Campaign spread more extensively in May 1957, criticisms began to appear outside of structured fora, and became ‘a torrent of criticism’.¹⁷⁰ Students, workers, peasants, and intellectuals—Chinese society—began to voice louder and increasingly strident criticisms.¹⁷¹ The CCP was openly criticised for: its record on democracy, human rights, economic development, social inequality, civil rights; its failures in accelerated collectivisation; the violence and repression it had perpetrated in past political campaigns; and the severe gap between general living standards and Party members’ living conditions.¹⁷² Shanghai alone saw ‘major labour disturbances’ involving over 30,000 workers in around 580 enterprises, with another 700

¹⁶⁸ See ‘Non-Communists’ Criticism of Communist Rule’, 8-16/05/1957 in Hinton (ed.), *The People’s Republic of China*, I: 504-522.

¹⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, I: 522.

¹⁷⁰ Dikötter, *The Tragedy of Liberation*, 286.

¹⁷¹ See also Shen Zhihua, *Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo shi, di san juan: sikao yu xuanze: cong zhishifenzhi huiyi dao fanyoupai yundong* (Hong Kong: Chinese University of Hong Kong Press, 2008); Eddy U, ‘Dangerous Privilege: The United Front and the Rectification Campaign of the Early Mao Years’, *The China Journal*, No. 68 (2012), 32-57.

¹⁷² ‘Urban workers began to express dissatisfaction by means of strikes, demands for better work conditions, slowdowns, and phony sick calls; peasants withdrew from the new collectives or tried to withhold taxes, claiming that the Party was extracting more than landlords had ever done.’ See Spence, *The Gate of Heavenly Peace*, 379.

minor ‘walkouts and organised slowdowns’. Some 8,000 students also took to the streets to mark the May Fourth Movement in an uncomfortable reminder of how social unrest had led to that ‘abortive student uprising’ in 1919.¹⁷³ Rather than improving the Party’s authority and credibility, Rectification was undermining it.¹⁷⁴

The Rectification Campaign (or, more popularly, the Hundred Flowers) had been conceived as a means to induce CCP internal reform, but the wave of public criticism unleashed on the CCP came as a rude shock. In such a climate, *qiaowu* could not have gone unscathed. Yet, if open criticism was intended to ‘increase the credibility’ of the CCP with the masses, then surely *qiaowu*—so often in contrast to the failure of cadres to look after the *huaqiao*—was safe from allegations of bureaucratism and the like?¹⁷⁵ But the reality was that *qiaowu*, or at least, its *youdai* approach, was stuck in a rather ambivalent position vis-à-vis ‘contradictions among the people’ and the cadres.

One prominent example of contradictions in *qiaowu* lay in the issue of *huaqiao* ancestral graves. In September 1956, the GPPC’s attention had been called to instances of *huaqiao* ancestral graves in *qiaoxiang* being forcibly relocated or demolished to make way for road-building, irrigation, crop-planting and various agrarian economic projects. In order to protect ‘*huaqiao* and *qiaojuan* customs and practices’, Tao Zhu had ordered that no relocation of graves be undertaken without official approval, with no coercion permitted. If the land was indispensable, then the *huaqiao* were to be negotiated with, or given material to build new graves. Where a project was in the vicinity of *huaqiao* graves, any encroachment in a radius of 15 *chi* (5m) from the grave was prohibited.¹⁷⁶

Yet, despite Tao Zhu’s intervention, Guangdong *qiaowu* officials reported in March 1957 that the situation was still not ideal. Some among the cadres and the masses

¹⁷³ Dikötter, *The Tragedy of Liberation*, 289-290.

¹⁷⁴ For a precis on the ‘blooming and contending’, see Teiwes, *Politics and Purges in China*, 166-215.

¹⁷⁵ Mao Zedong, ‘Zai gongchan dang quanguo xuanchuan gongzuo huiyi shang de jianghua’, 12/03/1957, *JYZW*, 10: 105.

¹⁷⁶ Tao Zhu, ‘Jinzhì qiangban huo pohuai huaqiao shanfen zumu’, 20/09/1956, *GDQW*, No. 21 (25 Sep 1956), 3.

had ‘the mistaken view’ that the government protected *huaqiao* graves, but not the non-*huaqiao*’s. Others said that *huaqiao* customs were backward superstitions (indeed 风水 *feng shui*) and disputed the use of remittances for building graves or holding rituals.¹⁷⁷ In response, Guangdong officials insisted that non-*huaqiao* ancestral graves were also to be protected, and while *feng shui* was truly backward superstition, the *huaqiao* were entitled to their beliefs; officially, the state would ‘not promote, [but] not forbid’ such customs.¹⁷⁸ Yet, the fact that these issues had even arisen suggested to *qiaowu* practitioners that there was truly confusion and contradiction among the masses, that was consequent to the *youdai* policies. Hence, as the GPPC instructed cadres, it was necessary for them to differentiate ‘who is an enemy and not, employing methods of persuasion and education to resolve contradictions among the people’.¹⁷⁹ Yet, if there were such contradictions among the people regarding the *youdai*, was persuasion and education enough?

If there were contradictions regarding *qiaowu*, then *pace* Mao there was a need for Rectification, and by late April 1957, *qiaowu* had begun to move towards Mao’s position—as did the rest of the Party. At the third plenary session of the Eighth CCP CC Conference—which issued ‘On instructions regarding the Rectification Campaign’—Liao Chengzhi argued that:

Due to the inadequacies of *qiaowu* institutions in propaganda and education work, as well as in implementation of *qiaowu* policy, internal contradictions among the *huaqiao*, *guiqiao*, *qiaojuan*, the domestic population, and the cadres, have not been correctly understood by the cadres and the people. The question of how to clarify their thinking and understanding, based on Comrade Mao Zedong’s instructions on handling contradictions among the people, is at present, the key issue for the continued implementation of *qiaowu* policy.¹⁸⁰

¹⁷⁷ Guangdong Province Overseas Chinese Affairs Committee, ‘Guanyu huaqiao fenmu wenti fu Guangdong sheng gong’an ting han’, 22/03/1957, *GDQW*, No. 24 (15 Apr 1957), 8-11.

See also Steve A. Smith, ‘Local Cadres Confront the Supernatural: The Politics of Holy Water (*Shenshui*) in the PRC, 1949–1966’, in Strauss (ed.), *The History of the PRC (1949–1976)*, 145–168.

¹⁷⁸ Guangdong Province Overseas Chinese Affairs Committee, ‘Guanyu huaqiao fenmu wenti fu Guangdong sheng gong’an ting han’, 22/03/1957, *GDQW*, No. 24 (15 Apr 1957), 9.

¹⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, 8.

¹⁸⁰ Liao Chengzhi, ‘Zai dang de bajie sanzhong quanhui shang de fayan’, 30/04/1957, *DHGLR*, 222-237 (223).

Thus Liao clearly aligned *qiaowu* with the larger momentum towards Mao's Rectification Campaign. In a way, perhaps this was inevitable given the tendency in the Party. Yet, this would also lead to dramatic consequences for *qiaowu* later on.

Criticisms of *qiaowu* in the Hundred Flowers, as was the general intention, were supposed to come from structured fora, and a prominent example of this was from Chen Qiyu, Chairman of the Zhigong Party. At the UFWD-organised meetings over 8-16 May 1957, Chen 'advanced criticism on the problems of how to settle the dispute over his party's buildings, how to find schools for the returned Overseas Chinese students, how to select students to study abroad and so forth'. Chen suggested that for *qiaowu*, 'the spirit of equality is not shown in all the matters concerned'.¹⁸¹ The issue, as Huang Dingchen from the Zhigong Party said, was that 'despite the fact that the government attaches importance to Overseas Chinese affairs, the United Front Department does not care much about the work of the Chih Kung Tang and extends it little assistance'.¹⁸² To be fair, the Zhigong Party were not wrong; neither the OCAC nor the UFWD had ever sought its input. But then again, the Zhigong Party had never been designated as the representatives of the *huaqiao*, that role had been for the specially-nominated *huaqiao* delegates (like Tan Kah Kee). Moreover, after the Fourth Expanded Conference, the role of interlocutor between *qiaowu* and *huaqiao* had been passed to the ACFROC. Thus, the Zhigong Party's (understandable) frustration was not actually a legitimate *qiaowu* contradiction.

Yet, what the Zhigong Party suggested about *huaqiao* grievances was a very different matter. Chen Qiyu told Xinhua on 11 May that he had discovered serious dissatisfaction among the *guiqiao*, particularly those from Japan. Reports in 1956 had already shown that many Japanese *guiqiao* faced discrimination because of their different political, cultural and linguistic backgrounds, which often meant that they were given

¹⁸¹ 'Non-Communists' Criticism of Communist Rule', 8-16/05/1957 in Hinton (ed.), *The People's Republic of China*, I: 507.

¹⁸² Chih Kung Tang is the older Wade-Giles transliteration of 致公党. See 'Non-Communists' Criticism of Communist Rule', 8-16/05/1957 in Hinton (ed.), *The People's Republic of China*, I: 512.

unsuitable or irrelevant jobs—as was the case of a former Tokyo University Professor, who was not permitted to teach in Wuhan Normal University, but instructed to engage in ‘self-study’.¹⁸³ But while poor employment options were bad enough, it was also reported that general discrimination—even abuse—was not unusual for Japanese *guiqiao*. The *qiaosheng* among them were ostracised, or in other cases, these *guiqiao* saw their Japanese wives face sexual harassment.¹⁸⁴ Things evidently had not changed by April 1957, since Chen Qiyu found similar tales—so much so that some had decided to give up on China and return to Japan.¹⁸⁵ Yet, these Japanese *guiqiao* were merely one locus of unhappiness amongst the *huaqiao* in China.

In Guangzhou, the *huaqiao* were also dissatisfied. Though *youdai* policies had seen *guiqiao* and *qiaojuan* receive special allocations of foodstuffs and goods in ‘unified sale and purchase’, this presumed that there were even supplies to be found. Thus the *qiaojuan* and *guiqiao* called for a ‘special market’ system to allow them to use their remittances to purchase items imported specifically for them. Thus the state could gain foreign currency, and they could access more goods.¹⁸⁶ On the other hand, perhaps the *guiqiao* and *qiaojuan* also wanted to use their foreign currency because the state was profiting from arbitrage at their expense. According to official bank rates, US\$100 was RMB 234, but the free market rate (in Hong Kong), as *huaqiao* complained, was closer to RMB 254, which meant that they lost about 8% of the real value of their remittances.¹⁸⁷ The Chinese banks’ commission was 2.5%, but even if the banks took no commission, the *huaqiao* still lost out. Thus many *huaqiao* chose to receive remittances in Hong Kong, convert it to RMB and smuggle it back, or left it in Hong Kong banks, stocks or property. Either way, the PRC lost out because the *huaqiao* were dissatisfied with it.

¹⁸³ ‘Wuhan shi anzhi guiqiao gongzuo zhong cunzai de wenti’, 11/08/1956, *NBCK*.

¹⁸⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁸⁵ ‘Cong Riben guilai de huaqiao sixiang wenti yanzhong’, 11/05/1957, *NBCK*.

¹⁸⁶ ‘Guangzhou shi guiqiao, qiaojuan xiang quanguo renmin daibiao dahui tichu de yaoqiu’, 13/05/1957, *NBCK*.

¹⁸⁷ *Ibid.*

The criticisms of *qiaowu* that arose amongst the *huaqiao* were thus not against *youdai* per se, but against the failures of the party-state and its *qiaowu* practitioners to implement *youdai*. At the fourth plenary session of the Shanghai PCC (22-25 May 1957), the *huaqiao* delegates Lin Chaopin, Chen Shiyin and Zheng Kuiyi lambasted the state of *qiaowu*. Of course, the special provisions for *huaqiao* were basically correct, but their implementation was clearly lacking. Whether it was remittance protections, *guiqiao* employment, or the ways that cadres had treated the *huaqiao* in socialist transformation—the results did not match the intentions. Previously, of course, they had been afraid to speak, ‘lest we be accused of having backward thinking’, but in the Hundred Flowers, to speak ‘was to do their duty’.¹⁸⁸ Yet, what Lin, Chen and Zheng did not realise was that the party-state’s interest in *youdai* was fast diminishing.

While the Rectification was conceived as internal Party reform, the ‘torrent of criticism’ that the Hundred Flowers unleashed forced a rethink.¹⁸⁹ The backlash began on 15 May 1957 with Mao’s ‘Things Are Changing’ memorandum; he now claimed that the Hundred Flowers had been intended to expose the rightists, and to allow them ‘to bury themselves’.¹⁹⁰ Thus, while the ‘rightists’ continued criticising, the Party prepared to strike.¹⁹¹ Finally, on 8 June, the *People’s Daily* accused rightists of trying to overthrow the Party and the working class.¹⁹² Mao, on his part, published a version of ‘On the Correct Handling of Contradictions among the People’ that had been edited to seem as if it had been a ‘strategy to unmask the enemies of the revolution’ all along.¹⁹³

¹⁸⁸ “‘Qiaowu gongzuo zhong cunzai de maodun’ — Lin Chaopin weiyuan, Chen Shiyin weiyuan, Zheng Kuiyi deng zai Shanghai shi zhengxie di yi jie weiyuanhui di si ci quanti huiyi shang de lianhe fayan gao’, n.d., 1957 (c. 22-25/05/1957), SMA L1-1-107-165.

¹⁸⁹ ‘In Beijing, the Chairman himself was in a state of shock. He had badly miscalculated. ‘He stayed in bed,’ his doctor Li Zhisui noted, ‘depressed and apparently immobilised, sick with the cold that called me back, as the attacks grew ever more intense. He was rethinking his strategy, plotting his revenge.’’ See Dikötter, *The Tragedy of Liberation*, 291.

¹⁹⁰ Mao Zedong, ‘Shiqing zhengzai qi bianhua’, 15/05/1957, *JYZW*, 10: 234-239 (238).

¹⁹¹ CCP CC, ‘Guanyu duidai dangqian dangwai renshi piping de zhishi’, 16/05/1957, *JYZW*, 10: 241-242.

¹⁹² *People’s Daily* editorial, ‘Zhe shi wei shen me?’, 08/06/1957, *JYZW*, 10: 255-258 (257).

¹⁹³ Dikötter, *The Tragedy of Liberation*, 291; Mao Zedong, ‘Guanyu zhengque chuli renmin neibu maodun de wenti’, 19/06/1957, *JYZW*, 10: 56-92.

Having now supposedly unmasked the rightists and anti-communists, Mao instructed in July 1957 that the country train the sights of Rectification onto these enemies. Employing the methods of ‘great debate’ [大辩论 *da bianlun*], the masses, led by the Party, were to engage in struggle against rightists in meetings, denouncing their Rightism and requiring them to confess their deviationist behaviour.¹⁹⁴ This new campaign, Mao said, would last at least until the spring of 1958. As Rectification turned into an Anti-Rightist Campaign, some half a million were labelled rightists and suffered through struggle sessions, criticisms and coerced confessions for offences—sometimes real, but mostly imagined.¹⁹⁵ Yet, this new backlash against the Hundred Flowers also meant that the Party leadership now ‘fell into line’ with Mao, lest they be accused of Rightism.¹⁹⁶ This had two effects: the re-statement of Mao’s ideas on economic development that would lead to the Great Leap Forward in 1958; and more immediately, a re-emphasis on socialist values and the centrality of the Party.¹⁹⁷

Anti-Rightism, as the CCP directed in August 1957, was to institute a ‘great debate’ across China on ‘the two roads of socialism or capitalism’—with the socialist road the obviously correct choice.¹⁹⁸ In that light, political discourse and policy had to be judged by which of the ‘two roads’ it took. The OCAC fell in line with Anti-Rightism very early on. He Xiangning, at the NPC on 11 July, now rejected the idea that *huaqiao* special characteristics, or the need for unity with the *haiwai huaqiao* exempted *huaqiao* from ‘reform campaigns and movements’, and dismissed suggestions that *huaqiao* were dissatisfied ‘because of these campaigns’. Indeed, to He: ‘None of these perspectives are aligned with reality, nor are they in line with *huaqiao* desires.’¹⁹⁹ He’s assertions on

¹⁹⁴ Mao Zedong, ‘Yi jiu wu qi nian xiaji de xingshi’, 07/07/1957, *JYZW*, 10: 429-437.

¹⁹⁵ ‘The criteria for identifying a rightist were so vague that they could potentially include almost anyone who had ever voiced an opinion.’ See Dikötter, *The Tragedy of Liberation*, 293-294.

¹⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, 295.

¹⁹⁷ See Teiwes, *Politics and Purges*, 230.

¹⁹⁸ CCP CC, ‘Guanyu xiang quanti nongcun renkou jinxing yi ci da guimo de shehui zhuyi jiaoyu de zhishi’, 08/08/1957, *JYZW*, 10: 466-468 (466).

¹⁹⁹ He Xiangning, ‘Dui qiaowu gongzuo jige wenti de kanfa’, 11/07/1957, *DHGLR*, 146-153.

‘*huaqiao* desires’ were nowhere near reality, but then again, perhaps what the *huaqiao* wanted or thought was no longer the point. As He declared: ‘To overly emphasise special care for a minority, and thus affect nationwide measures overall—this is wrong.’²⁰⁰ He now accused *youdai* of selfish demands that only led to ‘damage to the interests of the country and the majority of people’. Indeed, she said that rather than seek *youdai*, *qiaowu* was now firmly in the midst of overcoming its ‘serious bureaucratism, subjectivism and factionalism’ so that it could aid socialism’s advance.²⁰¹ The era and indeed, the practice of *youdai* had thus fallen victim to Anti-Rightism.

He’s speech in July 1957 was a harbinger of the end of *youdai*, but the actual turn away took longer as *qiaowu* struggled to deal with both the imperatives of Anti-Rightism and its founding principles (so to speak) and political economy. What was clear though, was that post-Hundred Flowers *qiaowu* now had a clear prioritisation of the ‘majority interest’ against that of the *huaqiao*. This was clear in Tao Zhu’s order on 4 July 1957 for a new and stringent inspection regime for Guangdong’s borders with Hong Kong to ensure that the *huaqiao* did not smuggle cash or goods into China. The *huaqiao* had been allowed certain leeway with regards to personal luggage in the past, but faced with a trend of *huaqiao* converting remittances in Hong Kong and thereafter either smuggling cash into China, or purchasing goods in Hong Kong to resell, Tao ordered a clampdown. If anyone was going to profit, it would and should be the party-state, and all smugglers would be ‘dealt with severely’.²⁰² This was clearly a prioritisation of the party-state’s interest, and a reversal of *youdai*, but at the same time, it was not contradictory to the economic imperative that *qiaowu* was supposed to serve.

Smuggling remittances affected the party-state’s accumulation of foreign currency, and in that sense, a clampdown was inevitable. But the focus on remittances

²⁰⁰ Ibid., 148.

²⁰¹ Ibid., 152.

²⁰² Tao Zhu, ‘Jinzhizousi taohui he size maimai jinkou wupin’, 04/07/1957, *GDQW*, No. 26 (12 Oct 1957), 19-20.

also saw a form of *youdai* continue. The State Council approved a OCAC, PBOC and Trade Ministry proposal on 30 July 1957, that brought up the earlier suggestion (from *huaqiao* themselves) that *huaqiao* be allowed to use foreign currency to purchase extra food/goods which the state imported and sold. The State Council's approval did not mention imports, but allowed increased allocations of foodstuff, consumer goods and 'high-quality' products (i.e. medicine) for the *huaqiao*, with their purchases to be in proportion to remittances received. The State Council left the purchase ratio up to Guangdong and Fujian, but authorised them to create special departments to manage *huaqiao* allocations. Yet, this was a façade of *youdai*, and more akin to profiteering since the State Council instructed that sale prices should be higher than under 'unified sale and purchase'—indeed suggesting that edible oils and cotton cloth be sold at a 100-200% mark-up.²⁰³ The majority interest thus came at the expense of the *huaqiao*; the *youdai* was on the way out, but *huaqiao* economic utility was fair game.

The State Council did continue to issue *youdai* policies in August 1957 for *huaqiao* investment, and it continued to claim that it was concerned about *huaqiao* special circumstances and interests, but this was window dressing.²⁰⁴ Anti-Rightism now meant a campaign amongst the *huaqiao*: to eliminate the capitalist inclinations of 'richer *huaqiao* households', to oppose individualism and 'departmental selfishness', to cause *qiaojuan* and *guiqiao* to enthusiastically love and participate in cooperatives and collective enterprise, to be 'one with the masses' and to be thrifty and frugal.²⁰⁵ Above

²⁰³ State Council, 'Pizhuan huaqiao shiwu weiyuanhui, duiwai maoyi bu, Zhongguo renmin yinhang 'guanyu zhengqu qiaohui wenti de baogao' de zhishi', 30/07/1957, *GDQW*, No. 26 (12 Oct 1957), 21-22.

²⁰⁴ See State Council, 'Huaqiao juanzi yu guoying huaqiao touzi gongsi de youdai banfa', 02/08/1957, *Qiaowu zhengce wenji*, 100-101; Liao Chengzhi, 'Guojia dui huaqiao shiwu de youyi zhongyao cuoshi', 03/08/1957, *DHGLR*, 238-242.

The OCAC clearly changed its mind about the nature of *huaqiao* investment since it told the Fujian *qiaowu* Party Group that it should remove the phrase 'is not a form of exploitative profit' from a description of *huaqiao* investment. See OCAC Party Group, 'Fu guanyu huaqiao touzi gongsi guxi xingzhi jieshi wenti', 09/10/1957, FPA #148-002-0798-0059.

²⁰⁵ Guangdong Province Overseas Chinese Affairs Committee, 'Guanyu xiangying shangji haozhao xiang qiaojuan, guiqiao guangfan shenru kaizhan shehui zhuyi jiaoyu de zhishi', 15/08/1957, *GDQW*, No. 26 (12 Oct 1957), 15-17 (15).

all, this meant intensified socialist education for the *qiaojuan* and *guiqiao* to eliminate: the ‘feeling that they were special’, the overemphasis on their needs, their neglect for long-term majority interests, their desires to leave cooperatives, remittance smuggling, and their capitalist inclinations.²⁰⁶ Anti-Rightism was thus no less than the sweeping eradication of the *huaqiao* interest itself.

As part of the general Anti-Rightist Campaign, ‘Great Debate’ sessions were held in *qiaoxiang* where accused rightists were forced to self-criticise and to confess their counterrevolutionary sins—and unsurprisingly, many *huaqiao* tried to escape. Yet, the OCAC in August 1957 ordered a clampdown on ‘hiding from rectification’. All *guiqiao*—including *qiaosheng*—were to participate in Anti-Rightist struggle in their work or educational units. If individuals were out of employment or school, the local *qiaolian* was to organise their ‘study session’.²⁰⁷ If a *huaqiao* actually ‘escaped from struggle’, they were to be (euphemistically) ‘persuaded to return to their original units’—and local Public Security informed.²⁰⁸ Another directive on 31 August stated that *guiqiao* and *qiaosheng* could be sentenced to ‘labour re-education’ as a means to rectification—harkening back, as it were, to the punishments of the Land Reform.²⁰⁹

As all of this was going on, the OCAC itself was forced to reach for a new governing principle. In October 1957, this was defined, according to the Guangdong *qiaowu* head, Luo Lishi as: ‘equal treatment, somewhat different; according to special characteristics, appropriate care’.²¹⁰ This new principle signalled the party-state’s intent to eradicate *huaqiao* privileges, even while *qiaowu* tried to maintain the façade of catering to the *huaqiao* interests. According to Luo, ‘equal treatment’ meant that the *huaqiao* had

²⁰⁶ Ibid., 15.

²⁰⁷ OCAC, ‘Guanyu fangzhi guiqiao, qiaosheng taobi zhengfeng he fan youpai douzheng de jixiang tongzhi’, 31/08/1957, *GDQW*, No. 26 (12 Oct 1957), 13-15.

²⁰⁸ Ibid., 15.

²⁰⁹ OCAC, ‘Dui guiqiao he qiaosheng zhong de huai fenzi de laodong jiaoyang wenti de chuli yijian’, 31/08/1957, *GDQW*, No. 26 (12 Oct 1957), 17-19.

²¹⁰ ‘一视同仁, 有所不同; 根据特点, 适当照顾’, in Luo Lishi, ‘Zai Guangdong sheng qiaowu juzhang kuoda huiyi de baogao’, 15/10/1957, *GDQW*, No. 27 (20 Dec 1957), 1-9 (4).

to be one with the masses and embrace socialism. It was still noted though, that they were ‘somewhat different’ and thus could not transform overnight. Hence, they would still receive ‘appropriate care’ for their ‘special characteristics’.²¹¹ Superficially, this sounded like *youdai*, but it was not even close to it.

Luo claimed that the *huaqiao* would still receive ‘appropriate care’, but his subsequent discussion of remittance smuggling proves the falseness of his statement. Guangdong, Luo said, had ‘lost remittances’ of around US\$7 million in January–July, and was on course to lose US\$10 million in 1957. Guangdong was thus instituting extensive education and propaganda against smuggling, but Luo also warned that the Public Security Ministry had since recommended that all the remittance smugglers be executed.²¹² The smuggling of currency and goods had arisen because the *huaqiao* had become dissatisfied with the losses they regularly incurred in exchanging foreign currencies inside China. But here, the party-state’s solution was to threaten them with death. In any event, the *huaqiao* were left with only one option if they did not want to exchange their remittances for RMB with the state banks: to use remittances under the State Council’s July 1957 provision for allocations of consumer goods and foodstuffs to the *huaqiao* outside of ‘unified sale and purchase’ on the basis of their remittances. The State Council had recommended raising prices, but Guangdong believed that high prices resulted in low demand, determining instead to unilaterally cancel all the prior *youdai* allocations to the *huaqiao* in ‘unified sale and purchase’ in 1958.²¹³ Thus, in the end, leaving the *huaqiao* with little choice but to use their remittances to purchase the (so-called) extra allocations to make up the shortfall.

This policy was passed off as ‘appropriate care’, but all that was being cared for was the party-state’s interest. In the case of the pastiche of *youdai* that let *huaqiao* use

²¹¹ Ibid., 4.

²¹² Ibid., 6.

²¹³ Ibid., 7.

remittances to purchase extra food/goods, the interest was explicit. After all, the Guangdong instructions on 6 December on the allocations also made allowances for *huaqiao* visitors to China and ‘international friends’ to also make such purchases, but remarked that: ‘for all *huaqiao* without foreign currency, because the government’s *youdai* provisions for *huaqiao* have not yet been cancelled, they will not be given any further *youdai*’.²¹⁴ This was ‘appropriate care’—but it was care for profit.

Even the idea of ‘equal treatment’ was false since the explicit message of Anti-Rightism was that the *huaqiao*—with all their differences—were ideologically-backward. The ‘Great Debate’ method of struggle was of ‘three comparisons, two reviews and five antis’ in meetings, which were to: ‘compare with overseas, compare with the past, compare with the peasants; review production results, review labour attitudes; oppose sabotage, oppose corruption, oppose wastage, oppose dependency, oppose laziness’.²¹⁵ For *qiaojuan* with labour deficiencies; *guiqiao* who came from capitalist countries; or *qiaosheng* who lacked socialist knowledge, the comparisons necessarily went against them. Which meant in the end, that even to have a *huaqiao* identity was a liability. This was not a new phenomenon; *huaqiao* had long been easy targets for such allegations.²¹⁶ But this was nowhere near a sense of ‘equal treatment’.

The end of 1957 thus saw the end of an era in *qiaowu*. In November 1957, Liao Chengzhi told the OCAC that *qiaowu* was now entering its third stage. The first had been during WWII; the second dated back to the founding of the PRC; and now, the third stage would be defined by: the ‘transformation of the ownership of the means of production’, the ‘socialist revolution in politics and ideological thinking’ and ‘the question of the

²¹⁴ The *youdai* policies in ‘unified sale and purchase’ were repealed on 21 May 1958. See GPPC, ‘Guanyu pin waihui zengjia tongxiao shangpin gongying gei *guiqiao*, *qiaojuan* de zhishi’, 21/05/1958, *GDQW*, No. 2 (16 Jun 1958), 43-45; Guangdong Commerce Department, ‘Wei zuohao *huaqiao* wuzi gongying gongzuo de jige juti wenti de buchong tongzhi’, 06/12/1957, *GDQW*, No. 1 (22 Mar 1958), 28-30 (30).

²¹⁵ Luo Lishi, ‘Zai Guangdong sheng *qiaowu* juzhang kuoda huiyi de baogao’, 15/10/1957, *GDQW*, No. 27 (20 Dec 1957), 7.

²¹⁶ ‘Taishan, Meixian deng *qiaoxian* fadong yu zuzhi *qiaojuan* *guiqiao* canjia shehui zhuyi da bianlun de jingyan’, n.d. (c. 10/1957), *GDQW*, No. 27 (20 Dec 1957), 27-31 (28).

position and direction of *huaqiao* work'.²¹⁷ This did not mean that *qiaowu* would abandon its fundamental imperatives. But it did mean that *qiaowu* was entering a new reality. In some sense, *qiaowu* would not change: Liao said that the 'work of gaining remittances would not decrease, but instead, requires a greater effort from us'.²¹⁸ Indeed, the OCAC, in the third stage, was 'to aid externally, the winning over of post-colonial Southeast Asia and the striving for international peace', and 'internally, to determinedly advance socialist transformation and socialist construction'.²¹⁹ Yet, whereas the OCAC had once been proactive, even autonomous, to the extent that it had been able to both advocate and carve out special provisions for its own policy, that role was now reduced. In foreign affairs, *qiaowu* was to align completely with the MFA, which suggested a future irrelevance, since Liao declared that the OCAC would, in the interests of its work in maintaining links to the *haiwai huaqiao*, reduce its role in domestic affairs, with a 33% reduction in size, and devolution of work to local authorities.²²⁰ In a way, this made sense. If *qiaowu* was no longer about special policy for the *huaqiao*, but instead the integration of the *huaqiao* within the socialist whole, then its domestic focus would become irrelevant.

The corollary to the subordination of *qiaowu* to the new socialist imperatives was thus the subordination of the *huaqiao* to the masses. Liao's November 1957 speech launched this new era, and its consequences were immediate. On 1 December, the OCAC issued instructions on the settlement of *guiqiao* in 1958 and made it explicitly clear that they would now be required to focus on 'the glory of labour' and join the masses.²²¹ Moreover, education was also to instruct the *guiqiao* to raise their class awareness—'to learn from the workers' and 'emulate the peasants'.²²² Far from 'appropriate care' for

²¹⁷ Liao Chengzhi, 'Liao Chengzhi fu zhuren zai zhong qiaowei di er jie di yi ci quanti weiyuan huiyi shang de jianghua', 27/11/1957, *GDQW*, No. 2 (16 Jun 1958), 1-10 (4).

²¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 9.

²¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 8.

²²⁰ *Ibid.*, 9-10.

²²¹ OCAC, '1958 nian du guiguo huaqiao tuanjie jiaoyu he jiedai, anzhi gongzuo fang'an', 01/12/1957, SMA B20-2-79-6.

²²² *Ibid.*

special characteristics, *qiaowu* was to obey the demands of socialist transformation, and there would soon be no room for the *huaqiao* to be *huaqiao* any longer.

Conclusion:

The reality—and irony—of the vicissitudes of 1956–1957 for *qiaowu* was that the seeming vindication of its *youdai* approach in mid-1956 was also an incontrovertible demonstration of its contradiction with, and opposition to Mao’s vision of socialism, and thus the triumph of *youdai* held also the seeds of its own destruction.

To be sure, *qiaowu* practitioners had initially believed that the *youdai* approach could, and should persist during Mao’s ‘socialist high tide’, and even aid socialism’s progress. After all, the political economy of *qiaowu* rationalised catering to *huaqiao* interests as being the means to fulfilling the party-state’s economic interests. The ‘high tide’ called for faster socialist transformation, but it did not change the fact that the party-state needed the foreign exchange from *huaqiao* remittances. Thus securing remittances through the *youdai* policies was clearly a rational course of action. Yet, in reality, the *youdai* approach did not sit well with the ‘high tide’ at all.

Mao’s vision called for revolutionary struggle and the eradication of capitalism. While conversely, *qiaowu* and its *youdai* policies protected bourgeois interests, privileged minority *huaqiao* ‘specialness’, and exempted the *huaqiao* from socialism. Or at least, that is what it seemed like to many Party cadres and officials, who resented the positive discrimination given to the *huaqiao*, and resisted the contradictions that *qiaowu* imposed on their attempts to keep faith with Mao’s vision of revolutionary progress. Yet, when *qiaowu* practitioners were confronted with the contradiction between the ‘high tide’ and their *youdai* approach in 1956, they stuck firmly to their guns.

As far as *qiaowu* practitioners were concerned, the *youdai* policies were intended to meet the party-state’s interests, and thus their rational implementation should not be

obstructed. Hence the OCAC Fourth Expanded Conference's insistence on the *youdai* approach, and on the need to rectify the failures of Mao's 'high tide'. In fact, this view resonated strongly with many in the CCP leadership who had, by mid-1956, come to view Mao's 'high tide' as dangerously 'rash advances' that led only to economic calamity. Thus the prevailing view amongst the CCP leadership by the Eighth Party Congress in September 1956, was for a slowing down of socialist transformation, and for a return to economic rationality and stable development. In this context, the *youdai* approach and its rationality were obviously welcomed, and thus the Eighth Party Congress endorsed the *youdai* approach resoundingly. Yet, this also meant that the *youdai* approach was now irrefutably associated with the criticisms of, and opposition to Mao's vision.

As it turns out, the party-state's turn away from Mao's 'high tide' vision—and his leadership—was brief, as the onset of the Polish October and the Hungarian Uprising in late 1956 created a crisis of confidence amongst the Party leadership that gave Mao the opportunity to reclaim the ascendancy. The events in Eastern Europe provoked a reaction in China, especially in increasingly vocal and direct expressions of public dissent and protest against the CCP. This burgeoning crisis created worries among Party leaders about the 'contradictions among the people', but it also pushed the Party to re-unite behind Mao. Mao proposed a Rectification Campaign of open criticism and dialogue, to enable the Party to reform and reclaim its authority, and therefore unite with the people again. Yet, Mao underestimated the depth of feeling against the CCP, and his plan to let a Hundred Flowers bloom only unleashed a wave of public criticism of the CCP.

The *huaqiao* in China had strong opinions on how the party-state had treated them. Ironically, it was not that the *huaqiao* opposed *qiaowu*, but rather that they criticised the failures to implement the *youdai* policies, since many faced discrimination, exploitation, or violations of their interests. Yet, such fierce criticisms also ensured that the *huaqiao* would be considered part of the anti-CCP sentiment in the Hundred Flowers. Although

the attacks on its authority had come as a shock, the party-state soon turned on its critics, and led by Mao, launched an Anti-Rightist Campaign in mid-1957 against all its critics, who were now accused of being rightist, anti-socialist enemies. Thus those *huaqiao* who insisted on their privileged treatment, and the *youdai* policies and ideas that had enabled them, were all now seen as evidence of rightist contradiction.

The CCP backlash against the Hundred Flowers pushed China to the left, and into a ‘Great Debate’ on ‘the two roads’ with only one correct answer; capitalism was rightist deviation, and those against Mao’s vision of socialist transformation were simply rightist counterrevolutionaries. Thus even *qiaowu* practitioners had to ensure their alignment with Mao’s vision, lest they end up accused of being rightists too, and this necessarily meant a turn away from *youdai*. For *qiaowu* which had been so closely linked to opposition to the ‘high tide’, the *huaqiao* interest could no longer be a priority. While *qiaowu* did not abandon its underlying economic imperatives, it now had to subordinate all policy to the ‘majority interest’ (as Mao defined) for renewed and intensified socialist transformation. This mainly meant the intensification of the Anti-Rightist Campaign among the *huaqiao*, the marginalisation of *huaqiao* identity against that of the broad ‘labouring masses’, and the subjugation of *huaqiao* interests to the party-state’s.

Thus by the end of 1957, *qiaowu* had turned 180°. Even Fang Fang, who along with Liao Chengzhi had been a leading ideologue of the *youdai* approach, was forced to change tune by 26 December 1957:

As to our past work, there were instances where our provision of care was too broad, where we accommodated too much, and where we did not carry out enough political and ideological education—these were shortcomings in policy implementation on our part.²²³

It is possible that Fang did not mean what he said. Indeed, his remark about the *qiaojuan* in the ‘fourth-class carriage’ of the socialist train can be viewed in two ways; Fang was

²²³ Fang Fang, ‘Dui dangqian qiaowu gongzuo de zhishi jianghua (zhaiyao)’, 26/12/1957, *GDQW*, No. 1 (22 Mar 1958), 3.

either saying that the *huaqiao* were at least on the same train as the masses, or it was a backhanded remark that the end of *youdai* had left the *huaqiao* as fourth-class citizens.²²⁴ Yet, either way, it was moot. The reality was that regardless of Fang's feelings, he had to declare that the *huaqiao* would not be allowed to 'obstruct the interests of socialism' any longer, and would have to accept a 'domestic policy of assimilation, and through socialist principles, the gradual elimination of *qiaojuan* and *guiqiao* special characteristics'.²²⁵ This was foreboding, but this was just the beginning. Given that China had been returned to the path of accelerated socialist transformation, and given also that advocating *youdai*, or the *huaqiao* interest, was no longer possible, the future of *qiaowu* was anything but certain. In fact, it was about to get worse, as *qiaowu* entered the new era of 'politics in command', and the Great Leap Forward.

²²⁴ Ibid., 2.

²²⁵ Ibid., 5.

Chapter 5.

Politics in Command

Ideological and political work is the fundamental guarantor of economic and technical work; it serves the foundations of the economy. Ideology and politics is the Commander-in-Chief; it is the soul. If we slacken—even slightly—in our ideological and political work, our economic and technical work will surely go astray.

— Mao Zedong, 31 January 1958¹

¹ Mao Zedong, ‘Gongzuo fangfa liu shi tiao (cao’an)’, 31/01/1958, *JYZW*, 11: 34-51 (40-41).

Mao is not usually cited as the author of the ‘60 Theses’, but apart from No. 23 (by Liu Shaoqi and other unnamed ‘regional comrades’), the rest was all Mao’s work. See Mao Zedong, ‘Gongzuo fangfa liu shi tiao (cao’an)’, 01/1958, *JYZW*, VII: 45-65.

Introduction:

On 9 October 1957, Chairman Mao proclaimed that a return to the old ‘socialist high tide’ slogan of ‘more, faster, better and more economical’ was imminent.² This meant the revival of Mao’s vision of accelerated socialist transformation and economic development, but also the continuation of Anti-Rightist Rectification until May Day 1958 at least. Anti-Rightism though, was now not only directed against the Party’s enemies in society, but also against rightists in the Party. The rightists, Mao said, were those who resisted ‘high tide’ principles, in their opposition to ‘rash advance’.³ This was thus the backdrop to the *People’s Daily* declaration on 27 October of a future ‘Great Leap Forward’ (GLF): the PRC would soon, through mass political mobilisation, ‘build socialism on top of a backward economy’.⁴

Mao’s resurgence was encouraged by the historic Sputnik satellite launches on 4 October and 3 November 1957. As Mao told fellow communist leaders in Moscow in November 1957, these unprecedented events showed that: ‘the east wind prevails over the west wind, that is to say that the forces of socialism have become overwhelmingly superior to the forces of capitalism’.⁵ This sentiment, in the vein of older Marxist-Leninist ideas about the ‘correlation of forces’, tied in well with Mao’s idea of a GLF, and thus even as the USSR aimed to economically overtake the USA in 15 years, Mao declared his intention to catch the UK in the same time.⁶ Mao’s grandstanding was of course, also about claiming a leading position for Chinese communism (and himself) internationally.⁷

² Mao Zedong, ‘Zuo geming de cujin pai’, 09/10/1957, *JYZW*, 10: 527-540 (536).

³ Ibid., 10: 535.

⁴ *People’s Daily* editorial, ‘Jianshe shehui zhuyi nongcun de weida gangling’, 27/10/1957, *JYZW*, 10: 582-586 (582, 586).

The first item back on the agenda was the plan to transform the agricultural economy in twelve years. See CCP Politburo, ‘Draft Agricultural Program for 1956-1967’, 25/01/1956 in Hinton (ed.), *The People’s Republic of China, 1949-1979: A Documentary Survey*, I: 268-272.

⁵ Dikötter, *Mao’s Great Famine*, 13; Mao Zedong, ‘Zai Mosike gongchan dang he gongren dang daibiao huiyi shang de jianghua’, 14-18/11/1957, *JYZW*, VI: 625-647.

⁶ Mao entirely approved of the *People’s Daily* terminology of a ‘Great Leap Forward’. See Shen, Li, *After Leaning to One Side*, 156-157.

⁷ See Chen, *Mao’s China and the Cold War*, 70-71; Shen, Li, *After Leaning to One Side*, 156.

But the idea that the ‘objective conditions’ favoured China’s socialist transformation was a popular one, and on New Year’s Day 1958, the *People’s Daily* declared that it was time ‘to ride and advance with the east wind that prevails over the west wind; [and] to ride and advance with the communist wind that prevails over rightists, bureaucratism and conservatism!’,⁸

For the party-state’s *qiaowu* practitioners, 1957 had seen the renunciation of *qiaowu*’s previous *youdai* approach, and also the prospect of impending and sweeping changes to the institutional powers and roles of *qiaowu* itself. Equally, the advent of the GLF, and the (perceived) changes to the ‘correlation of forces’ found their way into *qiaowu*. In November 1957, Liao Chengzhi told an OCAC conference that Sputnik heralded a crucial turning point in world history—and thus ‘it behoves us to determinedly press on along the socialist road, accelerating our country’s socialist construction’.⁹ Indeed, the ‘objective conditions’ also suggested, as Liao said, that: ‘a new political situation has emerged throughout the country, with all manner of work now in a Great Leap Forward’.¹⁰ And this certainly applied to *qiaowu*.

This chapter analyses *qiaowu* during the early GLF. Following the repudiation in late 1957 of the *youdai* approach in the wake of the Anti-Rightist Campaign, 1958 saw Mao impose a new governing paradigm for the party-state: ‘politics in command’. Mao’s decree that (his) political ideology become the preeminent consideration in all party-state activity marked the advent of a new mode of policy. For *qiaowu*, its prime imperative to capitalise on *huaqiao* economic utility was unchanged, but its methods were now defined by an impetus to conform to the GLF and ‘politics in command’. This impetus to both seek *huaqiao* utility, and to conform to the ‘socialist road’, led to both the eradication of *youdai*, and the creation of policies designed to exploit and extract from the *huaqiao*—

⁸ *People’s Daily* editorial, ‘Chengfeng polang’, 01/01/1958, *JYZW*, 11: 1-7 (7).

⁹ Liao Chengzhi, ‘Liao Chengzhi fu zhuren zai zhong qiaowei di er jie di yi ci quanti weiyuan huiyi shang de jianghua’, 27/11/1957, *GDQW*, No. 2 (16 Jun 1958), 1.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 3.

even if it violated their interests. This policy approach undermined the rationality that had once underpinned *youdai*, and unsurprisingly, by 1959, this approach (and the larger effects of the GLF) had devastated *huaqiao* remittances. This realisation proved sufficient to influence *qiaowu* practitioners into proposing reform of GLF-centric policies, and indeed, to return to (some) *youdai*. Yet, while this reformist perspective enjoyed some support in the CCP CC initially, it was short-lived, and was soon obliterated by the leftward shift of the party-state after the Lushan Conference (July 1959). Rather than accept reform, Mao turned on the critics of the GLF, accused them of being anti-socialist and anti-CCP, and forced the party-state to renew its support for the GLF. Thus rather than any reform of counterproductive policies, *qiaowu* practitioners were forced to return to the Maoist camp, and *qiaowu* was left on a path to destruction.

A Great Leap Forward for *qiaowu*:

Fang Fang had asserted in late 1957 that after all that China—and *qiaowu*—had gone through in the last year, work amongst the *huaqiao* would enter a ‘new era’ in 1958. But though Fang said *qiaowu* would be changing, there was still a certain reticence on his part, which he revealed when he said that for ‘all of *qiaowu* policy to be for socialism, is also complicated’.¹¹ Yet, in a way, the issue was not that complex at all—or at least, it was not for Mao Zedong.

Mao had, at the Hangzhou (3-4 January 1958) and Nanning (11-22 January) Conferences, lambasted those CCP leaders who had opposed ‘rash advances’ in 1956. Bo Yibo’s preoccupation with balancing budgets was criticised, as was Zhou Enlai, who Mao warned was ‘only fifty metres’ from being a rightist.¹² The result was that the Party leadership fell in line behind the Chairman’s call for a GLF and a ‘new high tide in

¹¹ Fang Fang, ‘Dui dangqian qiaowu gongzuo de zhishi jianghua (zhaiyao)’, 26/12/1957, *GDQW*, No. 1 (22 Mar 1958), 5.

¹² See Dikötter, *Mao’s Great Famine*, 16-18; Chen, *Mao’s China and the Cold War*, 72-73.

production'—or indeed, a revival of the old 'high tide'.¹³ Mao, following the two conferences, produced 'sixty theses' on work that placed 'permanent revolution' at the heart of the GLF. This was a new stage of the revolution, Mao claimed, that followed the Land Reform, the transformation of private enterprise and so on, and would continue along the 'political and ideological fronts'.¹⁴ More precisely, this meant that 'ideological and political work', as Mao said, was 'the fundamental guarantor of economic and technical work; it serves the foundations of the economy. Ideology and politics is the Commander-in-Chief, it is the soul.'¹⁵ This, Mao insisted, was the only way to be 'Red and Expert' in economic development, and to fail to prioritise politics and ideology was to be 'red in name, but white in reality'.¹⁶ What being 'Red' meant was, of course, what Mao said it was. But the CCP leaders fell in line at Hangzhou and Nanning, and the Party soon followed suit.¹⁷ Politics was in command.¹⁸ Everything else—and *qiaowu*—would have to obey.

The message of 'politics in command' was a clarion call to the party-state that started at its highest echelons, and travelled down its hierarchy, especially after Mao's speeches at the Chengdu Conference (8-26 March) to the CCP CC department and regional Party Committee secretaries.¹⁹ The OCAC Party Group, as Liao Chengzhi and Fang Fang's report in February 1958 to the UFWD suggests, got the message. Fang and Liao identified the two key tasks of *qiaowu* as: 'the basic resolution, within 10 years of the question of the Southeast Asian *huaqiao*'; and 'the implementation, from the perspective of 600 million people, of principles of 'overall consideration, appropriate

¹³ Mao Zedong, 'Gongzuo fangfa liu shi tiao (cao'an)', 31/01/1958, *JYZW*, 11: 34.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 11: 40.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 11: 40-41.

¹⁶ Mao Zedong, 'Zai Nanning huiyi shang de jielun tigang', 21/01/1958, *JYZW*, VII: 24-31 (24-25).

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, VII: 24-25.

¹⁸ 'Politics in command' [政治挂帅] was coined by the *People's Daily* in homage to Mao's dictum that politics was the Commander-in-Chief. See *People's Daily* editorial, 'Zhengzhi guashuai shi qinjian ban qie de baozheng', 27/03/1957, *Renmin ribao*.

¹⁹ See Dikotter, *Mao's Great Famine*, 39-40; Mao Zedong, 'Zai Chengdu huiyi shang de jianghua tigang', 09, 10, 20, 22, 26/03/1958, *JYZW*, VII: 108-125.

arrangement' and 'building the country with diligence and thrift', so as to adapt to the present socialist revolution and Great Leap Forward'.²⁰ Yet, the OCAC Party Group also offered a self-criticism. They had failed, they said, to lead *guiqiao* and *qiaojuan* to labour and production; they had over-accommodated in the allocation of goods to *guiqiao* and *qiaojuan*; they had not guided the *huaqiao* to accept socialist transformation and to support production; and they had also overly-worried about the 'international influence' of *guiqiao* and *qiaosheng* issues, permitting their clamour for special consideration, at the expense of 'political and ideological education'.²¹

Given the self-admitted failures of the OCAC, a new way forward was necessary. Firstly, the Rectification Campaign would extend to the *guiqiao* and *qiaojuan* to push them onto the 'socialist road'. Secondly, the principle of 'building the country with diligence and thrift' would be implemented so as to teach *huaqiao* to labour and play positive roles in the great production campaign. Thirdly, and based on the principle of 'overall consideration, appropriate arrangements', the OCAC would resolve the 'problem of special characteristics', and would no longer over-emphasise *huaqiao* specialness. Fourthly, all new *guiqiao* would be settled, and led to participate far more positively in production. Fifthly, the OCAC would seek to 'straighten' the various *qiaolian* so as to more firmly establish their socialist cores.²² This, Liao and Fang said, would ensure a 'new initiative'—'thus bringing about a Great Leap Forward for *qiaowu*'.²³

Liao and Fang did not really discuss new policy towards the *haiwai huaqiao* even though one of their key tasks referred to Southeast Asian *huaqiao*—but there was little to say. Indeed, the idea of a (so-called) Southeast Asian *huaqiao* question was actually in

²⁰ Liao Chengzhi, Fang Fang. 'Dangzu guanyu huaqiao shiwu weiyuanhui di er jie di yi ci quanti weiyuan huiyi he quanguo qiaolian di yi jie di er ci quanti weiyuan huiyi de zongjie baogao', 25/02/1958, FPA #0148-002-0898, 2.

²¹ Liao and Fang now said that the Japanese *guiqiao* were some of the worst offenders. See Liao, Fang, 'Dangzu guanyu huaqiao shiwu weiyuanhui di er jie di yi ci quanti weiyuan huiyi he quanguo qiaolian di yi jie di er ci quanti weiyuan huiyi de zongjie baogao', 25/02/1958, FPA #0148-002-0898, 2.

²² Ibid., 3-4.

²³ Ibid., 8.

reference to Zhou Enlai's August 1957 instruction that the number of Dual National *haiwai huaqiao* be halved in ten years.²⁴ In that sense, the 'advice' to *haiwai huaqiao* that taking up local citizenship was in their 'long term interests' was simply the continuation of a foreign policy dating to 1952. Hence, the *haiwai huaqiao* were 'to seek common ground in the midst of difference' in their foreign domiciles.²⁵ Yet, for the *huaqiao* in China, they were to follow a line of, 'from commonality, transform differences'.²⁶ This, as it turns out, was an intention to 'transform and eradicate' the 'special characteristics' of the *huaqiao* in China.²⁷

Examining the five parts of the OCAC's 'new initiative' enables analysis of *qiaowu* when politics took command, and in that regard, it was the Rectification that was most important. Rectification was however, about *qiaowu* practitioners as much as it was for the *huaqiao*. It was not enough for *qiaowu* cadres to be competent; they were to be 'Red and Expert'.²⁸ Cadres, as Guangdong *qiaowu* Party Group deputy Secretary Wu Feng criticised in March 1958, were guilty of the 'five fears' and 'five attitudes'. Cadres were: 'afraid of *huaqiao* remittance decreases; afraid of *huaqiao* complaints; afraid of affecting the *guowai huaqiao*; afraid of *qiaojuan* migration; and afraid that democratic personalities would complain'.²⁹ Cadres also had 'bad attitudes' regarding: their proclivity for foreign things; squeamishness in implementing policy; apathy; extravagant

²⁴ Luo Lishi, 'Zai Guangdong sheng qiaowu juzhang kuoda huiyi de baogao (zhaiyao)', 15/10/1957, *GDQW*, No. 27 (20 Dec 1957), 3.

²⁵ '异中求同', in Liao, Fang. 'Dangzu guanyu huaqiao shiwu weiyuanhui di er jie di yi ci quanti weiyuan huiyi he quanguo qiaolian di yi jie di er ci quanti weiyuan huiyi de zongjie baogao', 25/02/1958, FPA #0148-002-0898, 5.

²⁶ '以同化异', in Liao, Fang. 'Dangzu guanyu huaqiao shiwu weiyuanhui di er jie di yi ci quanti weiyuan huiyi he quanguo qiaolian di yi jie di er ci quanti weiyuan huiyi de zongjie baogao', 25/02/1958, FPA #0148-002-0898, 5.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ See Yang Fengcheng, 'Guanyu 'you hong you zhuan' wenti de lishi pingjia', *Zhonggong dangshi yanjiu*, No. 4 (1997), 56-61.

²⁹ Wu Feng, 'Sheng qiaowei fen dangzu Wu Feng fu shuji zai sheng juzhang, changzhang huiyi shang guanyu kefu youqing, guzu ganjin, lizheng shangyou, tuidong qiaowu gongzuo dayue jin de baogao', 31/03/1958, *GDQW*, No. 2 (16 Jun 1958), 17-24 (18).

lifestyles; and the harbouring of grievances.³⁰ These were serious errors, especially when economic rationalisations—like concern for remittances—led to ‘backward thinking’. Indeed, as Wu decried: ‘remittance work is only one aspect of *qiaowu*—we cannot possibly do everything for remittances’. Instead, all *qiaowu* that forsook struggle for ‘unprincipled accommodation’ would simply have to be rectified. Curiously, Wu also suggested that these errors were the fault of Luo Lishi and other comrades who had failed to check ‘rightist and defeatist tendencies’.³¹

Luo Lishi, the putative head of Guangdong’s *qiaowu*, had been a supporter of the ‘high tide’. But Luo could not escape Rectification, and neither did thousands of *qiaowu* and non-*qiaowu* cadres who were purged as the party-state strained itself into ideological conformity.³² Indeed, for *qiaowu*, Rectification was all the more necessary because of its previous *youdai*. As Wu told a conference in mid-1958:

In the past, *qiaowu* work was biased towards provision of care, thus neglecting education and committing rightist errors. Experience has since proven that ‘politics in command’ is the soul of every good work. Without politics in command, there is no way to do good work; even if there are some accomplishments, they cannot be consolidated. ‘Politics in command’ is the precondition for a Great Leap Forward in production, while also being of service to construction and production.³³

Of course, as Wu also said in July, Rectification was set against Rightism, or indeed, the ‘anti-rash advance’ perspective of 1956.³⁴ Yet, given the association between the Eighth Party Congress, and the *youdai* approach, Rectification for *qiaowu* was clearly inevitable. The ‘new initiative’ thus required that old Rightism be eradicated, so that *qiaowu* could then effect the preconditions for the GLF.

³⁰ ‘洋气, 娇气, 暮气, 阔气, 怨气’, in Xinhui County People’s Committee Overseas Chinese Affairs Office, ‘Xinhui xian shangban nian qiaowu gongzuo zongjie baogao’, 15/07/1958, *GDQW*, No. 3 (16 Aug 1958), 41-45 (41).

³¹ Wu Feng, ‘Sheng qiaowei fen dangzu Wu Feng fu shuji zai sheng juzhang, changzhang huiyi shang guanyu kefu youqing, guzu ganjin, lizheng shangyou, tuidong qiaowu gongzuo dayue jin de baogao’, 31/03/1958, *GDQW*, No. 2 (16 Jun 1958), 18.

³² Teiwes, ‘The Purge of Provincial Leaders, 1957-1958’, 14-32; Dikotter, *Mao’s Great Famine*, 23.

³³ Wu Feng, ‘Sheng qiaowei Wu Feng fu zhuren zai Shantou qiaowu zhandi huiyi zongjie baogao’, 20-27/06/1958, *GDQW*, No. 3 (16 Aug 1958), 1-10 (6).

³⁴ Wu Feng, ‘Sheng qiaowei Wu Feng zhuren zai Haikou qiaowu zhandi huiyi zongjie’, 30/07/1958, *GDQW*, No. 3 (16 Aug 1958), 10-18 (12).

Rectification was also the key to the second and third aspects of the OCAC's 'new initiative': to eradicate *youdai* and *teshu* ideas, and to push the *huaqiao* in China towards the 'socialist road'. The two were related since *guiqiao* and *qiaojuan* resisted socialism precisely because they clung to such ideas—and this was most evident in issues about remittances. As the PBOC Guangdong Branch admitted, remittance work had been 'biased towards economic perspectives' and neglected politics and ideology. But now, with politics as the 'the soul [and] direction', remittance work would be a function of the 'mass perspective'.³⁵ And thus the *huaqiao* would be educated on the 'mass perspective' so that their remittances could (and would) be changed henceforth from 'dead treasure' into 'living wealth'—and made of use to the masses.³⁶

To be fair, the focus on remittances as a site where *youdai* had to be rectified predicated 'politics in command'. This had been true from the December 1957 clampdown on remittance smuggling (in cash or in kind) by the *huaqiao* who were trying to avoid losses that the PRC's fixed exchange rates inflicted on the real values of remittances.³⁷ By early 1958, Guangdong could report a success in its anti-smuggling campaign. The figures for December 1957 revealed a 9.32% increase in remittances coming into Guangdong compared to the same period in 1956; in some counties, the increase was as high as 30%, while the province saw a 5.8% increase overall year-on-year.³⁸

To be sure, remittance smuggling was always going to be suppressed, given China's voracious—and growing—appetite for foreign exchange. Indeed, with the GLF, increasing imports of equipment to supply the large-scale construction programs made

³⁵ PBOC Guangdong Branch, 'Guangdong sheng qiaohui gongzuo cujin huiyi zongjie', 27/05/1958, *GDQW*, No. 2 (16 Jun 1958), 24-34 (24).

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 27.

³⁷ Luo Lishi, 'Zai Guangdong sheng qiaowu juzhang kuoda huiyi de baogao', 15/10/1957, *GDQW*, No. 27 (20 Dec 1957), 5.

³⁸ Guangdong Province Overseas Chinese Affairs Committee, 'Dali daji zousi taohui huodong de juda chengguo: qudong yilai quansheng qiaohui xianzhu shangsheng', n.d. (probably 03/1958), *GDQW*, No. 1 (22 Mar 1958), 19-20; Guangzhou Municipal Government Overseas Chinese Affairs Bureau, 'Guanyu zai fan zousi yundong zhong dui qiaojuan guiqiao jinxing xuanchuan gongzuo zongjie (zhaiyao)', 17/01/1958, *GDQW*, No. 1 (22 Mar 1958), 8-15.

foreign exchange that much more important.³⁹ This explains the heavy pressure on *qiaowu*—that was then passed on to the *huaqiao*—to secure more remittances. In 1957, the PRC gained US\$108.28 million in foreign exchange through *huaqiao* remittances, and it sought an increase to US\$115.25 million in 1958.⁴⁰ On the surface, this increase was not unrealistic. But while the real value of US\$7 million was about RMB 35 million, the fixed rate (2.4) that the Chinese state banks offered the *huaqiao* would have meant only RMB 16.8 million.⁴¹ What's more, in the PBOC's 1958 targets, remittances were expected to make up 80% of the total foreign exchange not from foreign trade, so the point of remittances (in the 'mass perspective') was really that the *huaqiao* were expected to subsidise a weak RMB, fund the GLF—and to be grateful about it.⁴²

Yet, while the expectation of remittances from the *huaqiao* was clear enough, the party-state was initially still somewhat wary of giving off the impression that the Rectification was a means of pressuring the *huaqiao*. The Shanghai Leading Group for Rectification's instructions in March 1958 suggested that cadres avoid pressing the *huaqiao* on their foreign connections and remittances. Instead, the Rectification (meetings, sessions, criticisms and etc.) was to focus on socialist education and 'building the country with diligence and thrift'. Thus encouraging the *huaqiao* to gain remittances was subsumed into a call to 'love the country, [and] love the Party' [爱国爱党 *aiguo aidang*].⁴³ Yet, with the intensification of the GLF by mid-1958, the severity of the Rectification amongst the *huaqiao*, and its pressure on their financial contributions also

³⁹ Dikötter, *Mao's Great Famine*, 75.

⁴⁰ PBOC Head Office, 'Guanyu yi jiu wu ba nian duizi fei maoyi waihui shouzhi jihua wenti (jielu)'. 09/01/1958, in CASS, CA (eds), 1958–1965 *Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo jingji dang'an ziliao xuanbian: jinrong juan* [hereafter, 1958–1965 *jinrong juan*] (Beijing: Zhongguo caizheng jingji chubanshe, 1989), 551–552.

⁴¹ The Trade Ministry acknowledged that the real rate was around RMB 4.87 per US\$1—in fact, it used US\$1: RMB 5 in its internal calculations. See Trade Ministry, 'Guanyu tiaozheng xianxing duizi waihui neibu qingsuan pajia de baogao', 06/11/1958, 1958–1965 *jinrong juan*, 545–546.

⁴² The target for non-foreign trade earnings was US\$145.25 million; remittances at US\$115.25 million, was 79.34%. See PBOC Head Office, 'Guanyu yi jiu wu ba nian duizi fei maoyi waihui shouzhi jihua wenti (jielu)'. 09/01/1958, 1958–1965 *jinrong juan*, 551.

⁴³ SPC Leading Group for Rectification, 'Guanyu fadong qiaojuan guiqiao canjia li nong zhengfeng de tongzhi', 21/03/1958, SMA B20-2-255-1.

increased. On 5 May 1958, at the Second Session of the Eighth Party Congress, Liu Shaoqi re-defined the General Line as being: ‘to go all out and strive for the best in building socialism with more, faster, better and more economical results’.⁴⁴ By this point, the GLF—especially in the agrarian sector—had already resulted in intensified collectivisation, large-scale construction projects, and a heightened political atmosphere, and it would only become more intense after the General Line was reassessed.

While Fang Fang had once worried about ‘complications’, his interpretation of *qiaowu* in the (new) General Line was simple enough: *qiaowu* was ‘for the whole people’.⁴⁵ This counterintuitively suggested that *qiaowu* (or more formally, *huaqiao shiwu*) was now no longer about the eponymous *huaqiao*. But what it really meant was that though *qiaowu* managed *huaqiao* affairs, it did so in service to the (socialist) whole, with no room for affirmative action, positive discrimination, or special treatment. This meant the eradication of *teshu* and *youdai* ideas—which were ‘not fashionable’ and were thus ‘to be forgotten’.⁴⁶ It also meant, Fang now warned, that ‘the one finger that is uncomfortable, should not be allowed to obstruct the movement of the other nine’.⁴⁷ This applied to new anti-*youdai* moves such as the repudiation of ancestral graves provisions, and goods/foodstuffs allocation. But mostly, *qiaowu* ‘for the whole people’ simply meant new approaches to the utilisation of *huaqiao* labour and capital.

If *qiaowu* was a function of the needs of ‘the whole people’, then remittances too were to serve the greater whole. Whether it was for the larger (centralised) needs of the state to cover its trade deficit, or the localised needs of cooperatives for capital to expand production, remittances were the obvious way to meet the demands of the ‘whole people’. This was recognised even before the General Line (May 1958), since the OCAC issued a

⁴⁴ Liu Shaoqi, ‘Zhongguo gongchan dang zhongyang weiyuanhui xiang di ba jie quanguo daibiao dahui di er ci huiyi de gongzuo baogao’, 05/05/1958, *JYZW*, 11: 247-280 (257).

⁴⁵ Fang Fang, ‘Guanyu guonei qiaowu gongzuo lizheng yuejin juxian de jianghua’, 24/05/1958, *GDQW*, No. 2 (16 Jun 1958), 10-16 (11).

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 13-14.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, 12.

memorandum in April regarding *qiaojuan* and *guiqiao* investment in agricultural production, suggesting that local agencies look to *huaqiao* capital as a way of funding the GLF.⁴⁸ Yet, the OCAC saw that this could be counterproductive if it led to *haiwai huaqiao* suspicion.⁴⁹ Hence *qiaowu* was to ensure that when *huaqiao* were encouraged to invest, volunteerism was to be maintained, and coercion—direct pressure or otherwise—was prohibited.

Yet, coercion was exactly what happened. While local Party cadres, like the Foshan County CCP Committee, reported that ‘political education and ideological mobilisation’ had increased *huaqiao* investment, these were one-sided reports.⁵⁰ The fact was that the methods by which the *huaqiao* were ‘encouraged’ to contribute were coercive, and were precisely resented as such. While the Rectification (and General Line) had involved the holding of town and village meetings to effect socialist education, Mei County in Guangdong reported that *qiaojuan* and *guiqiao* had been very dubious, believing that: ‘every time a meeting was called they would be required to produce more money’. Some also questioned why—as food shortages began across China due to the neglect of farming in favour of GLF construction—pressure was being placed on them. As one *qiaojuan* notably remarked: ‘A lack of food affects production, the stomach needs to Leap Forward first. Since the *huaqiao* have no special considerations under the equal treatment principle, then it is only correct that equal treatment must be applied to our financial contributions’.⁵¹ Yet, Mei County saw these views as the fault of old views on *huaqiao teshu*, which when rectified, would ameliorate.

⁴⁸ OCAC, ‘Guanyu fadong qiaojuan guiqiao touzi nongye shengchan xu zhuyi de wenti tongzhi’, 02/04/1958, *GDQW*, No. 2 (16 Jun 1958), 34-35.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, 34.

⁵⁰ Foshan reported that it had gained: RMB 1.4 million in donations; RMB 7.18 million in investment in agricultural production; and RMB 4.28 million to investment companies. See Foshan CCP Committee, ‘Guanyu dangqian fadong huaqiao, qiaojuan touzi juanxian gongzuo bixu zhuyi de jige wenti de tongzhi’, 18/05/1958, *GDQW*, No. 2 (16 Jun 1958), 35-36.

⁵¹ Mei County Committee Overseas Chinese Affairs Office Work Group, ‘Mei xian zhaokai qiaojuan guiqiao xianchang huiyi de jingyan zongjie’, 31/05/1958, *GDQW*, No. 2 (16 Jun 1958), 61-67 (62, 63).

Yet, rectification of the *teshu* ideas was the precise means of coercion. Puning County (Guangdong) reported in October 1958 that its remittances had increased by 8.15% (compared to 1957) over January–August. Moreover, Puning had successfully encouraged *huaqiao* deposits in credit cooperatives that amounted to 45% of overall deposits.⁵² Yet, Puning had also called 1214 meetings over 3 months at all levels from all-county meetings to Production Brigades, or an average of 13.5 meetings of one form or another *every day*.⁵³ At meetings, apart from regular dosages of General Line propaganda, cadres engaged in comparison exercises [评比 *pingbi*] at all levels, from province, to cooperative, down to households and individuals. Each was assessed on how relatively advanced (or backward) they were—model workers and peasants were ‘Red Flag’, and the backward were defeatist ‘White Flags’ who were to be struggled against.⁵⁴ The *pingbi* similarly applied to *huaqiao* in Puning (and elsewhere), except that along with politics and ideology, were comparisons of investments, donations, remittances and lifestyles. This, Puning asserted, encouraged a ‘Great Leap Forward in *qiaowu*’. But of course it did—it was either that or a ‘White Flag’.⁵⁵

Some *huaqiao* in China did appear to support the GLF. One *qiaojuan* blamed past *qiaowu* for: ‘over-emphasising extra care for us, causing those of us who could labour to become spoilt and lazy’. Another wanted to become ‘a Red *qiaojuan*, and a member of socialism’s vanguard’.⁵⁶ Yet, given that the alternative was to be a rightist, enthusiasm was obviously the safer choice. In any case, those *huaqiao* responsible for conveying their communities’ sentiments had by the end of 1958, been thoroughly suppressed, as the OCAC Party Group’s February 1958 pledge to ‘straighten’ the *qiaolian* had promised.

⁵² Puning County Overseas Chinese Affairs Office, ‘Puning xian 9 ge yue lai qiaowu gongzuo zonjie’, 21/10/1958, *GDQW*, No. 4 (7 Nov 1958), 5-14 (8).

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 6.

⁵⁴ Dikötter, *Mao’s Great Famine*, 36-37.

⁵⁵ Puning County Overseas Chinese Affairs Office, ‘Puning xian 9 ge yue lai qiaowu gongzuo zonjie’, 21/10/1958, *GDQW*, No. 4 (7 Nov 1958), 12.

⁵⁶ Guangdong Province Overseas Chinese Affairs Committee Leading Group for Rectification, ‘Guanyu wu yue chu men zhengfeng de zongjie baogao’, 12/06/1958, *GDQW*, No. 2 (16 Jun 1958), 47-54 (48-49).

Given its association with the First Session of the Eighth Party Congress that had rejected the ‘socialist high tide’, the ACFROC had unsurprisingly been an early target for Rectification—even before the Party Group’s February report. And by late January 1958, the ACFROC was promising to ‘eliminate the *teshu* thinking that is divorced from the masses, so as to resolve the contradictions between the *huaqiao* and the peasants’.⁵⁷ This, according to the ACFROC, meant the ‘supervision of the masses’, to aid *qiaowu* and to eradicate erroneous *teshu* emphases.⁵⁸

Apart from the ACFROC, Rectification also extended to local *qiaolian*, or any local *huaqiao* community associations or organisations. Previously, those *huaqiao* with influence or standing in *huaqiao* communities had been obvious candidates for roles in the *qiaolian*, and they were thus similarly obvious targets for Rectification. The *qiaolian* leaders were thus pushed towards self-criticism, mutual criticism, and into studying socialist transformation, and ‘to open their hearts to debate’ [交心辩论 *jiaoxin bianlun*].⁵⁹

This was not as benign as it sounded. To *jiaoxin* involved admitting errors and mistakes, and gaining correct knowledge of ‘On the Correct Handling of Contradictions among the People’. This meant speeches, ‘Big Character Posters’, and demonstration of clarity and support for the Party line. Yet, *jiaoxin* was mainly about imposing an ideological correctness—to ‘help these people clarify what was right and what was wrong’.⁶⁰ Shantou’s (June 1958) Rectification report lists some so-called clarified issues: ‘the East Wind prevailing over the West Wind’; ‘the superiority of socialism’; ‘whether the *huaqiao* bourgeois class needed to be transformed, and whether *guiqiao* and *qiaojuan* in general needed to undergo education’; ‘the issue of *huaqiao* and *teshu*, and individual

⁵⁷ ‘1958 nian qiaolian de gongzuo fangzhen he renwu’, *QWB*, No. 1 (20 Jan 1958), 4-7 (6).

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 7.

⁵⁹ Guangdong Province Overseas Chinese Affairs Committee Leading Group for Rectification, ‘Guanyu 5 yue chu men zhengfeng de zongjie baogao’, 12/06/1958, *GDQW*, No. 2 (16 Jun 1958), 53.

⁶⁰ Shantou Municipal Committe Overseas Chinese Affairs Bureau, ‘Shantou shi qiaolian hui shehui zhuyi jiaoyu ji fanyou gongzuo zongjie’, 04/06/1958, *GDQW*, No. 2 (16 Jun 1958), 55-61 (58-59).

interest versus national and the people's interests'; 'the leadership of the Party'; and 'participation in labour'.⁶¹

Rectification thus transformed the *qiaolian* into mere tools for the GLF. As a report from Xinhui County (July 1958) indicates, the (new) duty of the *qiaolian* was not to the *huaqiao*, but to the party-state's interest. Xinhui's *qiaolian* apparently, post-Rectification, had 'unanimously approved a petition to the government to repudiate all special quotas for the allocation of edible oil, sugar, cloth and meat' for *huaqiao*.⁶² Given the severe shortages amongst *huaqiao*—and everyone else, everywhere else—this seems counterintuitive. Yet, in this, they were only following orders to eliminate *youdai*. Failure to do so would only have meant purging, especially given the Guangdong United Front Department's order that *qiaolian* committees be more than 50% 'leftist' or 'centre-leftist'.⁶³ The 'straighten[ing]' of the *qiaolian* in the GLF thus meant the marginalisation of *huaqiao* interests and *huaqiao* voices.

The eradication of *youdai* in *qiaowu* enabled leveraging on remittances in the interests 'of the whole people', but it also aided restructuring *huaqiao* labour. Taishan County, for instance, considered that previous *youdai* on 'freedom to participate in work' (or indeed, not work) had not solved any practical problems.⁶⁴ It was instead, necessary to educate *huaqiao* on 'the glories of labour' to help them walk together with the masses on the socialist road. After Liu Shaoqi's re-statement of the General Line in May 1958, these views only became more intense, as was the case across China.⁶⁵

⁶¹ Ibid., 58.

⁶² Xinhui County People's Committee Overseas Chinese Affairs Office, 'Xinhui xian shangban nian qiaowu gongzuo zongjie baogao', 15/07/1958, *GDQW*, No. 3 (16 Aug 1958), 41-45 (42).

⁶³ Shantou purged 18 'rightists' from the *qiaolian* Committee in September 1958, while Jieyang cut its *qiaolian* Committee by 10, and purged 7 'non-labouring masses'. See Shantou Municipal Committee Overseas Chinese Affairs Bureau, 'Guangfan kaizhan er tiao lu de jiaoyu diaodong qiao zhong de yiqie jiji yinsu wei shehui zhuyi jianshe fuwu', 25/10/1958, *GDQW*, No. 4 (7 Nov 1958), 14-23 (15); Jieyang County Committee Overseas Chinese Affairs Office, 'Jieyang xian qiaowu gongzuo kua shang le yuejin jin zhi ma', 15/10/1958, *GDQW*, No. 4 (7 Nov 1958), 23-32 (30).

⁶⁴ Taishan County Committee Overseas Chinese Affairs Bureau, 'Cong jiji fangmian zhaogu qiaojuan laodong', n.d. (c. 01/1958), *GDQW*, No. 1 (22 Mar 1958), 15-16 (15).

⁶⁵ 'One in six' in China were in some form of mass irrigation project by January 1958. See Dikötter, *Mao's Great Famine*, 27.

According to Fang Fang in May 1958, the needs of ‘the whole people’ made it necessary for *huaqiao* to ‘equalise their identity’ with the masses.⁶⁶ Thus with the call ‘to go all out’ to fulfil the GLF, there could be no room for non-participation in labour by ‘lazy persons’ and ‘privileged households’.⁶⁷ Thus Taishan, which once had about 20-30% *huaqiao* non-participation in labour, now boasted 98% participation post-Rectification.⁶⁸ The same also applied to state farms/plantations manned by *guiqiao*. The Changshan Farm (near Zhangzhou, Fujian) had struggled since 1953 with restless *guiqiao* employees, 75% of whom were labelled ‘centrists’ or ‘backward’.⁶⁹ Yet, after the Rectification and ‘the victory of socialism’, the Changshan *guiqiao* had since been educated in the correct socialist perspectives and work methods, and had thus become disciplined, hardworking and diligent—and with 100% labour participation.⁷⁰

Settling *huaqiao* labour was one of the OCAC Party Group’s February 1958 key foci, but it was not an end in itself. Like the eradication of *youdai* and *teshu* ideas, and ‘straighten[ing]’ the *qiaolian*, these processes served the GLF. Thus Guangzhou had, over a six-month period, undertaken a Rectification amongst *huaqiao* with a 95% participation rate. With the elimination of *youdai*, and the purge of the *qiaolian*, the *huaqiao* had been pushed to participate in the GLF. By April–May 1958, Guangzhou *huaqiao* had contributed RMB 1.126 million towards production, and had established local agricultural cooperatives, but also 38 industrial cooperatives, including neighbourhood iron and steel furnaces. Guangzhou had also seen a 17.5% increase in remittances in a six-month period due to its eradication of smuggling. Even the local *qiaosheng* had got in on the fervour, voluntarily renouncing their scholarships so that the funds could be

⁶⁶ Fang Fang, ‘Guanyu guonei qiaowu gongzuo lizheng yuejin juxian de jianghua’, 24/05/1958, *GDQW*, No. 2 (16 Jun 1958), 14.

⁶⁷ Guangdong Province Overseas Chinese Affairs Committee Leading Group for Rectification, ‘Guanyu 5 yue chu men zhengfeng de zongjie baogao’, 12/06/1958, *GDQW*, No. 2 (16 Jun 1958), 48.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ OCAC, ‘Fujian sheng Changshan huaqiao jiti nongchang yuejin qingkuang’, 23/05/1958, FPA #0148-002-0899-0171.

⁷⁰ Ibid.

redirected.⁷¹ What Rectification thus accomplished was thus a radical restructuring of *huaqiao* socio-economic relations.

The transformation of socio-economic relations amongst *huaqiao* intensified in August 1958 with the establishment of the People's Communes.⁷² The Communes amalgamated the APCs and AAPCs in a given area, sometimes incorporating up to 20,000 households in a unit run on regimented, near-military lines, with communal facilities for cooking, eating, childcare, healthcare and provision of other necessities. This, it was held, allowed for greater mobilisation and distribution of labour, and the countryside was soon turned into some 26,000 communes.⁷³ This, as Guangdong's *qiaowu* Committee said in November 1958, meant that *qiaowu* was now to focus on 'guiding *qiaojuan* and *guiqiao* to offer their strength and money to support industrial and agricultural production and construction, positively entering into the People's Commune campaign'.⁷⁴ Thus in Jieyang, out of a *huaqiao* labour strength assessed at 3,100, some 3,264 joined the local Commune.⁷⁵ This was not a miscalculation; but a 105% participation rate meant that there were labourers who were not even expected to work, like the 70-year old *qiaojuan* who cadres said had refused to rest because he said that to work was beneficial to both himself and the country.⁷⁶ Elsewhere, in Mei County, *qiaojuan* in one village more than doubled their workdays in 1958, while *huaqiao* households across Mei County contributed 5.529 million *jin* of scrap metal to the backyard furnaces to make steel.⁷⁷ Indeed, after reducing 'superstitious practices' and 'backward extravagance' (including the Chinese New Year),

⁷¹ Guangzhou Municipal Government Overseas Chinese Affairs Bureau, 'Shangban nian Guangzhou qiaowu gongzuo qingkuang', n.d. (c. 06/1958), *GDQW*, No. 3 (16 Aug 1958), 32-40.

⁷² CCP CC, 'Guanyu zai nongcun jianli renmin gongshe wenti de jueyi', 29/08/1958, *JYZW*, 11: 384-392.

⁷³ 'Apart from Tibet and some other areas, China's 27 provinces and autonomous regions were organised into 23,384 people's communes comprising 90.4% of all rural households. In 12 provinces, every rural household joined a commune. By the end of October, there were reportedly 26,576 people's communes incorporating 99.1% of households.' See Yang, *Tombstone*, 167, 163-196.

⁷⁴ Guangdong Province Overseas Chinese Affairs Committee, 'Guanyu Guangdong sheng shehui zhuyi jianshe qiaowu gongzuo xianjin danwei pingbi banfa', 07/11/1958, *GDQW*, No. 4 (7 Nov 1958), 1-5 (1).

⁷⁵ Jieyang County Committee Overseas Chinese Affairs Office, 'Jieyang xian qiaowu gongzuo kua shang le yuejin jin zhi ma', 15/10/1958, *GDQW*, No. 4 (7 Nov 1958), 23-24.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, 24.

⁷⁷ Mei County Committee Overseas Chinese Affairs Office, 'Mei xian 9 ge yue lai qiaowu gongzuo qingkuang', 30/10/1958, *GDQW*, No. 4 (7 Nov 1958), 33-38 (35).

Mei County *huaqiao* were able to bank deposits of RMB 6.486 million.⁷⁸ Thus by the end of 1958, *qiaowu* had evidently brought the *huaqiao* squarely into the GLF.

The promulgation of ‘politics in command’ in January 1958 thus saw *qiaowu* fall into line, and become, as Puning’s *qiaowu* anthem revealed, chiefly defined by Mao’s vision and the GLF:

Party Committees in command, *qiaowu* cadres work for them,
campaigns are as waves, one wave pushing the next onward,
the path ahead must be clear, closely tied to core work,
staff should share their thoughts; reflections should be timely;
politics is our Commander, ideology is the soul,
qiaojuan education is the key, it aids propaganda out and in.

‘Replying letters’ is a tool, *qiaoxiang* news touches many people,
qiaobao come and go, receive them with warmth and generosity,
strive to win others over to our side, there is an impact at home and abroad;
develop models for others to follow, all should learn from experimental fields;
slogans should be loud and clear, all are measured by the ‘five’ and ‘four’,⁷⁹
mobilise all the positive forces, reach for the skies and raise the Red Flag.

Keep Left:

In November 1958, the OCAC sent a report to the State Council which stated that for *qiaowu* regarding the *haiwai huaqiao*, ‘united front work in different regions should

⁷⁸ Ibid., 35.

⁷⁹ 党委挂主帅, 侨干当参谋,
运动如波澜, 后浪推前浪,
方向要明确, 中心结合紧,
参谋出意见, 反映须及时,
政治是统帅, 思想是灵魂,
侨眷重教育, 内外宜宣传。

‘回批回文’是工具, 侨乡报导感动人,
出入侨胞多接待. 热情朴素又大方,
争取对象有重点, 国内国外相呼应,
培养典型来带动, ‘试验田’里去观摩,
口号提出要响亮, ‘五比’‘四看’见短长,
积极因素调动起, 冲天干劲插红旗。

The ‘five’ and ‘four’ were the ‘five comparisons and four observations’ for *pingbi* of *huaqiao*: comparisons of politics, ideology, lifestyle, investments and, donations; and observations of motivation, responses, remittances, and (remedial) measures [比政治, 比思想, 比生活, 比投资, 比捐献；看干劲, 看反映, 看侨汇, 看措施].

Puning County Overseas Chinese Affairs Office, ‘Puning xian 9 ge yue lai qiaowu gongzuo zonjie’, 21/10/1958, *GDQW*, No. 4 (7 Nov 1958), 13-14.

also see different methods'.⁸⁰ Thus the *huaqiao* in the capitalist and imperialist countries should be encouraged to and/or used to counter anti-CCP propaganda; while the *huaqiao* in the Non-Aligned countries (for instance) should be encouraged to play positive roles in fostering better relations between their homeland and their domiciles. This became the 'three good(s)' policy [三好 *san hao*] in which the PRC: supported the *haiwai huaqiao* who took up local nationality abroad; encouraged the *haiwai huaqiao* who retained Chinese nationality to be law-abiding, and build good relations with locals; and welcomed all *huaqiao* who wanted to return to the homeland, to join the GLF and 'like everyone else in the country, participate in labour and production'.⁸¹ The first two 'good(s)' were not new, and even the third was quite understandable.⁸² The GLF and its expansion of industrialisation and agricultural collectivisation had obviously meant a greater demand for technical expertise.⁸³ But what the OCAC failed to address was why any *huaqiao* would even want to return to China in the first place.

For the *huaqiao* in China, their experience of the GLF was generally not dissimilar from the rest of the country. The basic point was that by 1959, the GLF was clearly failing, and the Chinese were plainly suffering. Food shortages had increased over 1958, rather than decrease as a result of glorious labour and the transition to the People's Communes.⁸⁴ By January 1959, CCP leaders themselves estimated some 70,000–120,000 deaths from starvation.⁸⁵ Inefficiency and waste plagued production; the vaunted iron and steel production campaign had caused RMB 5 billion of losses; peasants had been diverted from agricultural work to work on large-scale construction projects; and ultimately, 'up

⁸⁰ OCAC, 'Guanyu sheng shi qiaowu gongzuo bumen de waishi gongzuo lingdao guiqiao guikou de jianyi', 24/11/1958, BMA #102-001-00038, 2-10 (10).

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 6.

⁸² Stephen Fitzgerald argues that the 'three goods' policy was part of the decolonisation that began in 1956. Yet, the 1952 CCP CC memo on *qiaowu* suggests that the disinterest in the *haiwai huaqiao* started earlier. See Fitzgerald, *China and the Overseas Chinese*, 135; CCP CC, 'Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu haiwai qiaomin gongzuo de zhishi', 06/01/1952, CKZL, 19: 429-430.

⁸³ See OCAC, 'Guanyu zai guowai zhaomu huaqiao jishu renyuan huiguo de yijian', 31/03/1959, SMA B20-2-235, 19-20.

⁸⁴ Dikötter, *Mao's Great Famine*, 68-72.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 89.

to a third of the time devoted to agriculture was lost'.⁸⁶ Furthermore, much-inflated statistics—particularly for grain produced—gave false impressions to economic planners, who therefore failed to amend requisition quotas that were imposed on the peasants.⁸⁷ Thus China was moving ever closer to an economic calamity by 1959.

Yet, there was also a specific consequence of *qiaowu*'s submission to 'politics in command' in 1958: a sharp fall in *huaqiao* remittances. The figures for remittance had initially risen during the early GLF, with Guangdong notably reporting a 23.64% increase year-on-year for January–May 1958, while China saw a 14.47% increase nationally in the first half of 1958.⁸⁸ This was attributed, at the time, to successful efforts, particularly in Guangdong and Fujian, to suppress the remittance smuggling, and to the mobilisation of the *qiaojuan* and *guiqiao* to gain more remittances (to convert to deposits and investments). Yet, by February 1959 it had become clear that 1958 as a whole had seen a 7.84% decrease compared to 1957's remittances, with the third and fourth quarters of 1958 seeing decreases of 16.03% and 43.82% respectively.⁸⁹

Explanations for the stark decline in remittances were varied. The devaluation of the Indonesian rupiah, and restrictions by Thailand, Singapore and Malaya were blamed. But the main reason, the PBOC and OCAC said, was that many *qiaojuan* and *guiqiao* had inadequate understandings of the GLF and People's Communes.⁹⁰ These *huaqiao* had feared that remittances would become public property in communes, and had thus reduced efforts to gain remittances, telling relatives to cease remittances, or even

⁸⁶ Ibid., 61–63.

⁸⁷ Frank Dikotter states that while the real amount produced was just over 200 million tons in 1958, Chinese planners believed it closer to 400 million tons. See Dikotter, *Mao's Great Famine*, 62. Yang Jisheng asserts that in Fujian, the grain output for 1959 was 12.2% less than 1956, but the gross procurement (minus the amount sold back to villagers) was 40.9%, thus 'the total grain output for 1960 was 1.145 billion kilos less than that for 1957, but the gross procurement was still 140 million kilos greater'. See Yang, *Tombstone*, 332.

⁸⁸ GPPC, 'Guanyu dongyuan qiaohui zhuan cunkuan de tongzhi', 03/07/1958, *GDQW*, No. 3 (16 Aug 1958), 27; OCAC, PBOC, 'Guanyu jiaqiang zhengqu qiaohui de qingshi baogao', 21/02/1959, 1958–1965 *jinrong juan*, 600–601 (600).

⁸⁹ OCAC, PBOC, 'Guanyu jiaqiang zhengqu qiaohui de qingshi baogao', 21/02/1959, 1958–1965 *jinrong juan*, 600.

⁹⁰ Ibid.

splurging wildly on food and drink before Communisation. Conversely, with the communes' management of all aspects of socio-economic life, some *qiaojuan* and *guiqiao* now believed that there was no need for remittances any longer. Some cadres had exacerbated the issue by saying that remittances were an obstacle to the achievement of an ideological Great Leap, while other cadres placed restrictions on *huaqiao* deposits, imposing 50-100 year timeframes before any withdrawals were permitted. And finally, the spectre of the nefarious Hong Kong remittance smugglers was raised again.⁹¹

To be sure, the advent of the People's Communes had truly led many *huaqiao* in China to fear the loss of their remittances, and the alleged *huaqiao* splurges on food and drink (also clothes, bicycles, watches and etc.) had actually happened.⁹² But that had been in October 1958; the overall decline had started before that. A Trade Ministry report had already noted in November 1958 that remittances were falling throughout the year. In the first quarter, the average inflow was US\$12 million per month; in the second, US\$8 million; third, US\$7 million; and by October, US\$5 million.⁹³ Yet, the Ministry stated that: 'This is because the establishment of the People's Communes in our country have resulted in more secure livelihoods, for instance, when greater supplies of food, clothing and other items are distributed next year, in principle remittances will decrease even more.'⁹⁴ This was a barefaced attempt to impose ideology on data, and it paralleled the larger politicisation of statistics in the GLF.⁹⁵ But there was clearly a problem.

The real problem was that the *huaqiao* were deeply dissatisfied. Reports from Shanghai counties (Songjiang, Jinshan, Nanhui, Fengxian) in January 1959 suggested

⁹¹ Ibid.

⁹² 'Xiamen shi zai chouban renmin gongshe zhong shichang shang chuxian qianggou xiaofei pin he chuxu, qiaohui jianshao deng xianxiang', 27/10/1958, NBCK.

⁹³ Trade Ministry, 'Guanyu tiaozheng xianxing duizi waihui neibu qingsuan paijia de baogao', 06/11/1958, 1958-1965 *jinrong juan*, 545-546 (545).

⁹⁴ Ibid., 545.

⁹⁵ See 'The politicization of Statistics', 31/07/1958, in Hinton (ed.), *The People's Republic of China*, II: 672-673.

serious discontent over the People's Communes.⁹⁶ There were *huaqiao* who, because they had remittances, wanted no part in collective production, and in some cases, intended to leave the communes and travel abroad. Others also refused their assigned jobs.⁹⁷ This obviously did not match what the OCAC and PBOC said (in February), but the fact was that *huaqiao* were discontented. In Jinjiang (Fujian) alone, some 14,035 applied for travel permission. This 69.2% increase on 1957 had mostly occurred in the latter half of 1958. Which, as Xinhua reported, was because 'they are dissatisfied with collective life, afraid of labour, harbouring nostalgia for bourgeois lifestyles'.⁹⁸

Aside from the communes, even the students were discontented. Reports in May 1959 suggested that Nanjing, Shanghai, Shandong, Guangzhou and other regions with large student populations, had seen increasing numbers of the *qiaosheng* requesting to leave China since March. Some had (so-called) 'ideological problems', or an alleged fondness for bourgeois lifestyles. But others were pressured by their parents overseas to return home. Yet, the main reason, according to Xinhua, was that schools had failed to properly educate these students on the GLF, on supporting the Party, and on more positive participation in socialist labour and production.⁹⁹

Initial explanations for *qiaowu* problems and *huaqiao* dissatisfaction tended to place the blame on the *huaqiao* themselves, and not the circumstances of the GLF that *huaqiao* found themselves in. On the other hand, *qiaowu* practitioners—certainly the OCAC—knew very well that the situation was far more complex. By May 1959, the OCAC had become aware of *huaqiao* letters sent overseas 'complaining of hardship, causing instability amongst the *guowai huaqiao*', due to the 'comparative tightness' in

⁹⁶ SPC United Front Department, 'Pizhuan qiaowu chu guanyu si ge xian qiaowu gongzuo qingkuang he jinhou de yijian', 23/01/1959, SMA B20-2-19-29.

⁹⁷ SPC Overseas Chinese Affairs Office, 'Guanyu Songjiang, Jinshan, Nanhui, Fengxian si xian liao jie qiaowu (gang'ao) gongzuo de qingkuang he kaizhan zhe xiang gongzuo yijian de baogao', 15/01/1959, SMA B20-2-19-29.

⁹⁸ 'Guiqiao, qiaojuan shenqing chuguo he qu Xianggang de renshu zengduo', 05/03/1959, NBCK.

⁹⁹ 'Guiguo huaqiao xuesheng yaoqiu chuguo', 12/05/1959, NBCK.

food supplies.¹⁰⁰ Local *qiaowu* officials were thus instructed that while they were not to deny that there were food shortages (albeit due to natural disasters, they said), they were to advise any *haiwai huaqiao* who enquired, that the Party was tackling the problem, and would soon resolve it by gaining a big harvest, and clamping down on grain hoarders.¹⁰¹ This was a propaganda exercise to be sure, but it also suggests that the OCAC knew that the *huaqiao* were unhappy. The same also applied to the Beijing officials who censored *qiaosheng* letters and discovered their complaints about the lack of freedom, opposition to labour-as-education in the GLF, parental pressure, and a profound resentment against Anti-Rightist Rectification.¹⁰²

Yet, as to whether the party-state itself recognised the problems with the GLF, there is a substantial historiographical debate regarding the period between late 1958 and the Lushan Conference (July 1959), on whether the party-state was prepared to slow down the GLF and ‘correct left’ deviations [纠左 *jiu zuo*]; or whether the party-state was in fact, preparing not only to continue, but to intensify socialist transformation by targeting Rightism [反右倾 *fan youqing*] again.¹⁰³ To be fair, there is evidence on both sides.¹⁰⁴

¹⁰⁰ OCAC, ‘Guanyu hanfu guowai huaqiao huo qiaotuan liangshi wenti de tongzhi’, 20/05/1959, SMA B20-2-235, 13-14 (13).

¹⁰¹ Ibid., 14.

¹⁰² Beijing People’s Committee, Civil Affairs Bureau, ‘Sixiang dongtai’, 23/05/1959, BMA #002-011-00049, 8-9.

The students may have had another grievance regarding the reduction of their financial aid since 1958. See Guangdong Province Education Department, Finance Department, Overseas Chinese Affairs Committee, ‘Guanyu renzhen jiejue gedi huaqiao zhong, xiao xue jingfei kunnan de lianhe zhishi’, 28/08/1958, OCAC (ed.), *Qiaowu gongzuo tongxun* [QWTX], No. 19 (18 Dec 1959), 6-7.

The *Qiaowu tongxun* [侨务通讯] was the policy information dissemination journal of the OCAC, and was classified and for ‘internal-distribution only’ to OCAC cadres and officials. Contra Peterson, it was the *QWTX* that was the ‘official organ’ of the OCAC, and not the *QWB*—which was a propaganda organ of the ACFROC. See Peterson, *Overseas Chinese in the People’s Republic of China*, 24.

¹⁰³ Yang, *Tombstone*, 350-351; Dikotter, *Mao’s Great Famine*, 88; Tao Shuimu, ‘Dui ‘1959 nian Lushan huiyi shi jiu ‘zuo’ de ma?’ yi wen de shangque’, *Zhonggong dangshi yanjiu*, No. 2 (1996), 87-88; Wang Demu, ‘1959 nian Lushan huiyi fan qingxiang wenti zhi wo jian’, *Dangshi yanjiu yu jiaoxue*, No. 1 (1997), 59-61; Luo Pinghan, ‘Yi jiu wu ba nian zhi yi jiu liu er nian liangshi chanxiao de jige wenti’, *Zhonggong dangshi yanjiu*, No. 1 (2006), 27-36; Li Jingping, ‘Renmin gongshe shiqi suoyou zhi de san ci guodu’, *Dangdai zhongguo shi yanjiu*, 19:4 (2012), 48-55.

¹⁰⁴ ‘Zhengzhou huiyi jilu’, 27/02-05/03/1959, in *Dangdai Zhongguo nongye hezuo hua bianji shi* (eds), *Jianguo yilai nongye hezuo hua shiliao huibian* (Beijing: Zhonggong dangshi chubanshe, 1992), 528-532; ‘Guanyu renmin gongshe de shi ba ge wenti’, 04/1959, *Jianguo yilai nongye hezuo hua shiliao huibian*, 557-562; ‘Chairman Mao’s words at the Shanghai Conference, March 25, 1959’ in Zhou (ed.), *The Great Famine in China, 1958-1962*, 23-25.

But, at the same time, insofar as the OCAC was concerned, *qiaowu* was incontrovertibly in favour of the *jiu zuo*.

The OCAC chose *jiu zuo* by May 1959 because of the overwhelming evidence that the GLF, and the People's Communes in particular, was even more destructive towards *huaqiao* remittances than had been previously conceived. In February 1959, when confronted with reports revealing that 1958 had seen a 7.84% fall in remittances compared to 1957 figures, the OCAC and PBOC equivocated, blaming everyone and everything except the GLF. Yet on 29 May 1959 the OCAC Party Group reported that for January–April, while the remittance inflow was at US\$25.55 million, this represented a sum 42.4% less compared to the same period in 1958.¹⁰⁵ This made the 1959 yearly target (of US\$95 million) now essentially unreachable, and the Party Group thus sought 'to enjoin all regions to seriously implement the Centre's policies on protecting *huaqiao* remittances' and to solve certain 'other questions'.¹⁰⁶

The OCAC Party Group's oblique reference to 'other questions' was actually a subtle criticism of the failures of the GLF, and especially of the People's Communes. Though the Party Group did not specify what the 'other questions' were, the reforms that it proposed were all explicitly linked to the GLF and the People's Communes. Firstly, the Party Group suggested that '*huaqiao* remittances and its associated income were to be considered private property in perpetuity', and all the contributions not from 'genuine volunteerism' were to be returned forthwith.¹⁰⁷ If the communes were not able to return the money, then proper explanations were to be given to the *huaqiao*, and their consent sought for a schedule for future repayment. This move was not unprecedented since the CCP Politburo had agreed at the Shanghai Conference (April 1959) to similar reforms.¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁵ OCAC Party Group, 'Guanyu zhengqu wancheng yi jiu wu jiu nian qiaohui renwu de baogao', 29/05/1959, 1958-1965 *jinrong juan*, 601-602.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., 601.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid.

¹⁰⁸ CCP Politburo, 'Guanyu renmin gongshe de shi ba ge wenti', 04/1959, *JYZW*, 12: 142-158 (146).

But the OCAC went further. Secondly, when banks or remittance agencies released funds, they were to maintain recipients' privacy, to respect their right to deposit (or not, as they chose), and to guarantee their receipt of remittances. Under no circumstances were banks to convert remittances to deposits without permission, or to use 'methods of mobilisation' to coerce *huaqiao* deposits, or to apportion quotas for *huaqiao* in *pingbi* comparisons.¹⁰⁹ Thirdly, on *huaqiao* philanthropy, all donors' wishes were to be respected always, particularly regarding how funds were used. Fourth, *huaqiao* investments (whether from abroad or in-country) were to be directed to the Overseas Chinese Investment Corporations—and not to the communes or any lower-level cooperatives, who were banned from soliciting investments from the *huaqiao*. Fifthly, the State Council decree permitting remittances to be used for purchase of goods and foodstuffs from the special (foreign currency) stores was to be implemented, since 1958 had seen its neglect in many cases. Sixth, if the *huaqiao* had received permission and allocation of building materials for their construction projects, absolutely no one was to confiscate them for use in other projects (i.e. GLF construction). Furthermore, unless there were other, more pressing demands, workers and building materials were not to be denied to *huaqiao* projects. Seventh, all the local Party Committees were to pay serious attention to remittance issues, and to guide related agencies, so that they could be dealt with, and the larger objective of gaining remittances carried out and fulfilled.¹¹⁰ Thus it is very clear that the OCAC Party Group had come to view the GLF as being in need of *jiu zuo* reforms.

The OCAC Party Group also identified certain State Farms (or plantations) for the *huaqiao* (particularly in Guangdong) which had failed, ever since they underwent Communisation, to solve the problems regarding the settlement of *guiqiao*, allocation of

¹⁰⁹ OCAC Party Group, 'Guanyu zhengqu wancheng yi jiu wu jiu nian qiaohui renwu de baogao', 29/05/1959, 1958-1965 *jinrong juan*, 602.

¹¹⁰ All of this was also applicable to 'Hong Kong and Macao compatriots'. See OCAC Party Group, 'Guanyu zhengqu wancheng yi jiu wu jiu nian qiaohui renwu de baogao', 29/05/1959, 1958-1965 *jinrong juan*, 602.

work, planting and harvesting of cash crops, and food production. These Farms had ‘contradictions that increased daily’ and were in fact, incurring ‘huge losses’. The GPPC thus determined to hive off the *huaqiao* State Farms from the Communes, and to return them to their previous autonomy. The OCAC Party Group approved of this move, and recommended that other regions consider similar steps for their *huaqiao* State Farms—‘which should no longer be included in the People’s Communes’.¹¹¹

While it is thus obvious that the OCAC Party Group sought *jiu zuo* for *qiaowu* in 1959, it was also the first time in a while (certainly since late 1957) that the OCAC had attempted to assert a distinct *qiaowu* agenda in apparent contrast (and indeed, as a corrective) to larger party-state policy. Not since the heyday of the *youdai* in 1956 had the OCAC so actively attempted to rectify aspects of overall party-state policy that had—as it conceived—negatively affected the practice of *qiaowu*. Indeed, and rather than being subject to ‘the whole people’, here was *qiaowu* making a stand for the *huaqiao*. Yet, in this, the OCAC Party Group was doubtlessly emboldened by similar sentiments in the CCP CC. After all, the report was approved by the CC on 7 June 1959, which suggests that there was—at least—some support for a *jiu zuo* in *qiaowu*.¹¹²

On 26 June 1959, the OCAC Party Group issued a new report on the People’s Communes that was distinctly in the *jiu zuo* spirit, which proposed to return ‘freedom and security’ to *huaqiao* in communes. Hence, *huaqiao* property—houses, animals, fruit trees, farming implements and so on—was to be returned to its previous owners instead of being considered collective property. Rent or compensation should be paid if *huaqiao* houses had been used or damaged. If communes wanted or needed to use *huaqiao* property, the owner’s express consent was required.¹¹³ All *huaqiao* labour was to be voluntary and reasonable; those with labour deficiencies had to be properly managed,

¹¹¹ Ibid.

¹¹² Ibid., 601.

¹¹³ OCAC Party Group, ‘Guanyu dangqian renmin gongshe zhengshe zhong youguan qiaowu zhengce de ruogan yijian (di san ci xiuzheng gao)’, 26/06/1959, FPA #0148-001-0147-0032, 33, 37.

while those that wanted to live off remittances (and not labour) should be free to do so.¹¹⁴

Communes' allocation of food and other necessities was to be a separate issue entirely from how much in remittances a *huaqiao* received. Moreover, where a commune had damaged or destroyed *huaqiao* ancestral graves, the *huaqiao* were to be consulted about re-burial and given every assistance. Additionally, the Party Group suggested other 'small freedoms' for the *huaqiao*: special leave from work for *qiaojuan* and *guiqiao* when their relatives visited from abroad; permissions to travel overseas to visit relatives; allowance for voluntary *huaqiao* participation in communal canteens, since they were allowed to buy provisions with remittances; and the allowance of *huaqiao* with urban property to relocate from rural areas.¹¹⁵ These 'small freedoms', the Party Group believed, would encourage *huaqiao* support for the communes, positively influence the *haiwai huaqiao*, and effect 'togetherness' with the peasants.¹¹⁶ And at the very least, they would arrest the decline in remittances, and return *qiaowu* to a rational political economy.¹¹⁷

The OCAC was thus clearly in favour of a mid-course correction for the GLF in mid-1959. Moreover, the *jiu zuo* reforms proposed by the OCAC also seemed, in many ways, like a return to some form of *youdai*, particularly insofar as it thought to offer 'small freedoms' to the *huaqiao*, to renew protections of their private property, to allow for their 'labour deficiencies' in the communes, and to reassert their rights and interests regarding remittances. This proposal to re-introduce at least some aspects of *youdai* policies was in a way, an admission that the 'Great Leap Forward for *qiaowu*' that Liao Chengzhi and Fang Fang had heralded in February 1958 was failing, and that its drive to make *qiaowu*

¹¹⁴ Ibid., 35.

¹¹⁵ Ibid., 36.

¹¹⁶ Ibid., 37.

¹¹⁷ One *huaqiao* in Jinjiang County (Fujian) pointed out that the pressure on *huaqiao* to contribute land, property and remittances in the Communes had been very counterproductive. Jinjiang had gained RMB 5 million from converting (selling) *huaqiao* gold and jewellery, but the disturbance this caused to the *huaqiao* had seen a corresponding decrease in remittances by RMB 6.66 million, thus 'both in terms of the political cost, and the economic cost, such measures cause more harm than good'. See 'Guqiao yaoqiu chuli zhanyong qiaojuan fangzi he qiangpo chushou huangjin wenti', 07/06/1959, NBCK.

serve ‘the whole people’ had been misguided.¹¹⁸ Yet, despite what the OCAC had come to realise about the GLF, and of the need for a mid-course correction, none of this would actually amount to anything.

Originally, when the CCP leadership first gathered at the Lushan Conference in July 1959, the idea had been to hold a wide-ranging discussion on the future of the GLF, and this was a sentiment that even Chairman Mao had been open to.¹¹⁹ Indeed, the Lushan Conference was expected to ‘push further for economic reforms’ along the line indicated by earlier moves towards reform of the People’s Communes.¹²⁰ Yet, as the conference progressed, criticism of the GLF not only increased, but also intensified, to the point that Mao began to see it as a direct attack on his leadership. In particular, in what would become infamously known as the ‘Peng Dehuai Affair’, Mao interpreted Marshal Peng Dehuai’s criticisms of ‘leftist deviations’ in the GLF as a very personal attack.¹²¹ Peng had, in a letter to Mao, criticised unidentified Party leaders and cadres ‘who casually rejected the laws governing economics and science’ in blind adherence to ‘politics in command’. Indeed, as Peng sharply admonished: ‘‘Politics in command’ cannot possibly replace economic laws, let alone replace the taking of specific and measured steps in economic work.’¹²² Mao was livid, and distributed the private letter to the Conference, claiming that the GLF was now under attack by rightists in the Party.¹²³

At the CCP CC’s Eighth Plenum that began on 2 August, the Party leadership united behind Mao. The CCP CC, in fact, endorsed Mao’s allegations of rightist enemies hidden within the Party’s ranks. As the CC’s directive on ‘opposing Rightist tendencies in thinking’ on 7 August suggested, rightists and conservatives within the Party had

¹¹⁸ See Liao, Fang, ‘Dangzu guanyu huaqiao shiwu weiyuanhui di er jie di yi ci quanti weiyuan huiyi he quanguo qiaolian di yi jie di er ci quanti weiyuan huiyi de zongjie baogao’, 25/02/1958, FPA #0148-002-0898, 8.

¹¹⁹ See Mao Zedong, ‘Lushan huiyi taolun wenti’, 03/07/1959, *JYZW*, 12: 369-370.

¹²⁰ Dikötter, *Mao’s Great Famine*, 91.

¹²¹ Ibid., 93.

¹²² Peng Dehuai, ‘Peng Dehuai tongzhi de yijian shu’ 14/07/1959, *JYZW*, 12: 384-389 (388).

¹²³ Dikötter, *Mao’s Great Famine*, 93.

sought to capitalise on issues in the GLF, taking every opportunity to ‘attack socialist construction’.¹²⁴ Such people were ‘not with the masses’—indeed, as the CC declared, they were standing ‘outside the masses’ with their criticism of the People’s Communes, the steel and iron production drive, and of the GLF.¹²⁵ They, the CC promised, would be dealt with severely and quickly so that the General Line would not be compromised. In this new (indeed, renewed) anti-Rightist mood, all who had once criticised the GLF—or indeed, Mao—were obviously guilty of being ‘rightist opportunists’ who had taken advantage of momentary setbacks, or even the mere rumours of setbacks, to plot against and oppose the working class and the labouring masses.¹²⁶ The immediate result was that Peng and his allies were purged from the CCP and removed from all their positions. But the larger, and more significant consequence was the evident affirmation of the correctness of the GLF. Whatever the problems with the GLF, the Party declared that they ‘had all been or were being quickly solved’ by the leadership of Mao and the CCP.¹²⁷ There would—and indeed, could—be no reform.

For the OCAC and *qiaowu*, the CCP CC’s Eighth Plenum made it exceedingly clear that *jiu zuo* was dead on arrival. Certainly, and given that the OCAC Party Group had clearly identified the People’s Communes as the cause of the decline in remittances, the OCAC was itself dangerously close to being accused of ‘rightist opportunism’. Thus the OCAC had to re-state support for the GLF, or be ‘outside the masses’. It did not matter that the OCAC’s reforms regarding *qiaowu* in the People’s Communes and GLF had been an attempt to arrest the decline in the party-state’s foreign exchange, or for that matter, that the hard currency that the OCAC was trying to secure (through its reforms) was desperately needed by the GLF—not to mention, the party-state. After all, as the CCP CC

¹²⁴ CCP CC, ‘Guanyu fandui youqing sixiang de zhishi’, 07/08/1959, *JYZW*, 12: 430-431 (430).

¹²⁵ Ibid., 12: 430.

¹²⁶ CCP CC, ‘Wei baohu dang de zonglu xian, fandui youqing jihui zhuyi er douzheng’, 16/08/1959, *JYZW*, 12: 439-444 (441).

¹²⁷ Ibid., 12: 439.

declared, ‘right opportunism’ simply failed to see ‘that in all pursuits undertaken by the people under the leadership of the Party, the achievements are the main things, while defects and mistakes are secondary and merely one finger out of the ten’.¹²⁸

The CCP CC’s assertion that ‘the achievements are the main things’ brings to mind Fang Fang’s statement in May 1958 that *qiaowu* ‘for the whole people’ meant that ‘the one finger that is uncomfortable, should not be allowed to obstruct the movement of the other nine’.¹²⁹ In effect, that is exactly what happened after the Lushan Conference as *qiaowu* tried to let the nine fingers’ worth of achievements (so to speak) cover the one finger of *huaqiao* discontent and *qiaowu* problems. Thus rather than rectify the *huaqiao* situation in the People’s Communes, the imperative was on propaganda and socialist education to encourage *huaqiao* patriotism, and hence, contribution.¹³⁰ To be sure, remittances for 1959 had missed *qiaowu*’s US\$95 million target by a mile—with one estimate for the year at US\$80.24 million.¹³¹ The recognition of this failure had first motivated the *jiu zuo* sentiments in the OCAC, but even though none of those reforms had actually taken place, the OCAC declared in November 1959 that it would aim for US\$100 million in remittances in 1960.¹³²

For the OCAC, the post-Lushan approach presumed that if the achievements of the GLF were stressed to the *huaqiao*, then *qiaowu* would somehow be able to meet its objectives. Hence, the OCAC suggested that to enable the *huaqiao* in China ‘to realise the advantages of socialism, and the glorious future that communism offered’, would also enable them to influence, and to be effective conduits of positive information towards

¹²⁸ CCP CC, ‘Central Committee Communiqué on the ‘Readjustment’ of Claims and Targets’, 26 August 1959, Hinton (ed.), *The People’s Republic of China*, II: 756-758 (758).

¹²⁹ Fang Fang, ‘Guanyu guonei qiaowu gongzuo lizheng yuejin juxian de jianghua’, 24/05/1958, *GDQW*, No. 2 (16 Jun 1958), 12.

¹³⁰ Guangzhou Municipal Overseas Chinese Affairs Commiteee, ‘Guanyu fudao qiaojuan guiqiao xie jiaxin de yixie zuofa he tihui’, 19/10/1959, *QWTX*, No. 19 (18 Dec 1959), 7-11.

¹³¹ Ministry of Finance, PBOC Head Office, ‘Shangbao yi jiu liu ling nian fei maoyi waihui shouzhi jihua’, 03/03/1960, 1958-1965 *jinrong juan*, 554-555 (554).

¹³² OCAC, ‘Guanyu zhengqu wancheng ‘san ge yi’ meijin renwu de chubu yijian’, 19/11/1959, 1958-1965 *jinrong juan*, 602-603 (602).

their *haiwai huaqiao* friends and family.¹³³ Indeed, as the OCAC instructed the ACFROC before its Congress in November 1959:

Through the meeting's political influence, to encourage the *guiqiao*, *qiaojuan* and *qiaosheng* to an even greater Great Leap Forward in production work and studies; to establish even more Red Flag Model Soldiers, to share experiences, and to make a positive contribution to the homeland's socialist construction.¹³⁴

Yet, despite the OCAC's emphasis on propagandising the GLF and its achievements, it was well aware of the hollowness of such instructions. After all, the worsening situation in China had already become common knowledge. As a Xinhua report suggested in late 1959, even the Indonesian *huaqiao*—who were themselves facing an increasingly hostile situation in Indonesia—had been reported as saying that: 'to stay in Indonesia is to wait for death, to go to Taiwan is to court death, but to go to the Mainland is to starve to death'.¹³⁵ Yet, propaganda and platitudes about the GLF was all that the OCAC could do. Constrained by the CCP CC's order that 'the achievements are the main things', *qiaowu* was helpless. Thus by the end of 1959, and regardless of the negative *huaqiao* experience of the GLF, the surrender of economic rationality, and the catalogue of broken promises to the *huaqiao*—the simple reality was that politics was in command.

Conclusion:

On 1 January 1960, and as New China entered a new decade, the *People's Daily* declared that after the 'great and profound transformation' that had taken place over the preceding decade, the next ten years promised 'limitless light and hope'.¹³⁶ Not so. Or at least, not so for *qiaowu*. The Hundred Flowers and the Anti-Rightist Campaign had, at the end of 1957, been portents of impending changes in *qiaowu*, and in 1958, the party-state radically transformed its *qiaowu*—but it was not for the better.

¹³³ Ibid., 603.

¹³⁴ OCAC to ACFROC, 'Guanyu zhaokai quanguo qiaolian di yi jie di si ci weiyuanhui (kuoda) huiyi de buchong tonghzi', 14/11/1959, BMA #002-011-00049, 19-21.

¹³⁵ 'Yinni huaqiao zijin dapi yitou Xianggang', 26/11/1959, NBCK.

¹³⁶ *People's Daily* editorial, 'Zhanwang liushi niandai', 01/01/1960, JYZW, 13: 1-8 (1).

Mao had, in late 1957, proclaimed a return to his older ‘socialist high tide’ vision of accelerated and intensified socialist transformation—except that it was now called a Great Leap Forward. Yet, as Mao saw it, if this GLF was to succeed, and overcome the obstructions—even from within the CCP—that had plagued his last attempt at instigating rapid revolutionary progress, the party-state—indeed, the PRC in its entirety—needed a new governing paradigm: ‘politics in command’. Thus the party-state was required by early 1958, and certainly after the Hangzhou and Nanning Conferences, to conform to Mao’s political ideology, and to strive to achieve his vision for a GLF.

For *qiaowu*, the advent of the ‘politics in command’ era and the GLF meant, first and foremost, the eradication of the older *youdai* approach in policy. Previously, *youdai* policies had so often contradicted aspects of socialist transformation, and had in fact, been allowed to do so by a party-state too permissive—as Mao saw it—of rightist deviations. Thus in 1958, the party-state swiftly resolved that contradiction in favour of revolutionary socialism. All the special considerations, positive discrimination, and privileges for the *huaqiao* were repealed, and the continued practice of Anti-Rightist Rectification ensured that this ideological conformity was enforced, not just amongst the *huaqiao*, but also—and perhaps, especially—amongst *qiaowu* practitioners themselves.

Thus driven to rectify its previous Rightism, and to re-align the socio-economic structures and relations of the *huaqiao* with the interests ‘of the whole people’, the party-state’s *qiaowu* increasingly became the vise by which the *huaqiao* were squeezed, on one side by a demand for ideological conformity, and on the other, by a distinctly exploitative economic utilitarianism. Of course, *qiaowu* had always rested on an economic base; or on the view that the *huaqiao* were necessary components of a united front because of the economic value they represented. Yet, in the GLF, the imperative to adhere to ‘politics in command’ rejected the idea that this economic value required the positive management of *huaqiao* interests, so as to efficiently capitalise on *huaqiao* utility. Instead, *qiaowu* was

to employ socialist methods and mobilisation to turn the *huaqiao* into useful contributors to ‘the whole people’ and the majority interest. But this, in reality, turned into blunt and open extraction from, and exploitation of the *huaqiao*. The *huaqiao* remittances had long been the centrepiece of the political economy of *qiaowu*, and while the onset of the GLF actually increased the relative economic importance and utility of the remittances, the politics of the time—indeed, the ideological milieu—ensured that the *huaqiao* would now suffer greatly for what they were thought to have been able to give.

Thus by 1959, *qiaowu* had been successfully aligned with the dictates of the GLF and ‘politics in command’. But it had also become clear to the party-state by early 1959 that the GLF was heading towards a socio-economic disaster. This was by no means the uniform view amongst the CCP leadership, but it was a significant one nonetheless, and it certainly counted *qiaowu* practitioners—especially the OCAC—amongst its supporters. For *qiaowu*, the resolution of the contradiction with socialist transformation seemed to have created a new contradiction; *qiaowu* in line with ‘politics in command’ undermined its political economy. This view was motivated by the stark realisation that there had been drastic falls in *huaqiao* remittances, which were assessed to have been a consequence of the People’s Communes, and specifically, a result of the coercion, repression and abuse that the *huaqiao* had suffered. Faced with the impending collapse of the remittance flow, *qiaowu* practitioners scrambled to rectify the situation. There was thus a brief period in mid-1959 where the OCAC led an attempt to reform the excesses of the GLF in *qiaowu*, and a fleeting flirtation with a re-introduction of a semblance of the *youdai* policies—or at least, a set of provisions for *huaqiao* in the communes to arrest the fall in remittances, and to stabilise their morale, by restoring their ‘freedom and security’.

Yet, the attempt to reform *qiaowu* in the GLF never materialised. Indeed, whereas many within the party-state leadership had thought to engage in *jiu zuo* in mid-1959, and to rectify the excesses of the GLF, this inclination quickly floundered in the wake of an

even greater shift to the left by the CCP. While the Lushan Conference in July 1959 had initially offered a forum for a reconsideration of the GLF, it had instead ended up in acrimony, with Mao accusing critics of the GLF of being anti-Party and anti-socialist ‘rightist opportunists’. Thus with Mao’s vilification (again) of ‘rightist enemies’, all proposals to *jiu zuo* had to be quickly abandoned, lest their proponents end up on the wrong side of history—and on the wrong side of Mao.

By August 1959, the transitory attempt at reforming the GLF had given way to both a renewal of Anti-Rightism, and of the GLF vision. For *qiaowu*, this meant that its earlier reform attempts had to be abandoned, even if the causes of the remittance decline remained unaddressed. The OCAC knew that this post-Lushan direction was disregarding of economic rationality, since failing to improve the *huaqiao* situation in the GLF would be counterproductive to attempts to convince the *huaqiao* to support the PRC—let alone remit more money. Yet, there was no other choice for *qiaowu*, since the renewal of Anti-Rightism ensured that *qiaowu* had to conform to the GLF. Thus in returning to Mao’s orthodoxy, *qiaowu* turned away from the reforms intended at solving *huaqiao* discontent, and returning *qiaowu* to a more rational political economy. This turn would prove to be decisive, and inasmuch as it represented the abandonment of New China’s original promise to protect *huaqiao* rights and interests, it set *qiaowu* on a path defined by Mao’s ideological and political imperatives, that would eventually lead to a delayed, but calamitous reckoning in the Cultural Revolution.

Conclusion

Over the course of 1959, and faced with increasingly overt racial discrimination by the Indonesian government, along with intensifying threats and acts of anti-Chinese violence, quite a few of the *huaqiao* in Indonesia 'decided it was time to leave'.¹ In this, they were aided by the PRC, which sent ships to Indonesia to repatriate the Chinese refugees. The despatch of the ships after December 1959 was actually—as far as the PRC was concerned—the least it could do, and the most it was willing to venture, since it was keen to 'adopt a constrained manner' in dealing with the Indonesian government's anti-Chinese discrimination, so as to avoid offending President Sukarno.² Yet, portraying the PRC as both the benevolent homeland, and the mighty guardian of the *huaqiao*, also offered an opportunity for a useful corrective to negative reports about China. Hence an OCAC directive in February 1960 stated that: 'At present, the main content of patriotic education for the new *guiqiao* should be focused on the General Line, the Great Leap Forward, the People's Communes, the great construction of the last ten years, and the superiority of the socialist system, and etc.'³ Such propaganda reflected the party-state's renewed emphasis on Mao's vision in 1960, especially after the attacks on Rightism in the wake of the Lushan Conference.⁴ But the reality was that the PRC was already in a crisis by then, as the intensified application of the GLF drove China's food production down to new record lows—and sent millions to their graves.⁵

¹ Around 130,000 Indonesian *huaqiao* had returned to China by 1961. See Michael R. Godley, 'The Sojourners: Returned Overseas Chinese in the People's Republic of China', *Pacific Affairs*, 62:3 (1989), 330-352 (334).

² And even then, the repatriation exercise barely lasted half a year. Due to its 'prohibitively high economic costs', the PRC cancelled the program after July 1960. See Zhou Taomo, 'Ambivalent Alliance: Chinese Policy towards Indonesia, 1960–1965', *CWIHP Working Paper*, No. 67 (2013), 15.

³ OCAC, '1960 nian zhunbei jiedai anzhi daliang guiguo huaqiao de xuanchuan jiaoyu gongzuo jihua', 18/02/1960, SMA B20-2-243-1.

The GLF, the People's Communes and the General Line, would later be known as the 'Three Red Banners' [三面红旗]. The first use of this term was probably in CCP CC, 'Zhonggong zhongyang guanyu quandang dongshou, daban nongye, daban liangshi de zhishi', 10/08/1960, *JYZW*, 13: 456-464 (456).

⁴ From August 1959 to January 1960, 7.5% of Party Committee members from the party-state organs under the CCP CC were 'singled out to be criticized'. Moreover, in January 1960, Mao declared that the GLF would 'not be inferior to last year, and may even be a bit better'. See Yang, *Tombstone*, 390, 451.

⁵ Grain output in 1960 (143.5 billion kilos) was 26.5 billion kilos less than 1959, and was even lower than that of 1951. Indeed, 60% of all deaths because of starvation in the 'Great Famine' (Yang Jisheng estimates 36 million) occurred from late 1959 to late 1960. See Yang, *Tombstone*, 326-339.

The deteriorating situation in China therefore made it all the more imperative for *qiaowu* to engage in ‘patriotic education’ towards the *huaqiao*, to convince them that all the increasingly negative stories of hardship and suffering emanating from the PRC were not true, but also—and perhaps, more importantly—to reassure the *huaqiao* both in and out of China, that the PRC was still the guarantor of all their rights and interests. Indeed, Liao Chengzhi, at a reception for some of the newly-returned Indonesian refugees in Guangdong, told them that:

Whenever the *huaqiao* found themselves facing persecution, or difficult circumstances, they naturally had an earnest expectation that their strong homeland would step forward to protect their legitimate rights and interests, and solve their problems. But in the old China, whether it was the feudal dynasties, or the reactionary Guomindang government, they only knew how to persecute and exploit the people, and they were never able to provide a solution to any *huaqiao* problems—much less send ships to repatriate them. Thus, the *huaqiao* have historically lamented that they were: ‘Overseas orphans.’

Dear *qiaobao*, your homeland is fully aware of your suffering and hardship, and we welcome all those Indonesian *qiaobao* who are now destitute and homeless, to come back, and to join in the homeland’s great socialist construction.⁶

The irony of Liao’s assertions is that by his own standards, and certainly by his own accusations against the previous ruling regimes of China, the exact same charge of seeking ‘to persecute and exploit’ the *huaqiao* could legitimately have been laid right at the entrance to the Zhongnanhai complex by 1959. For all Liao’s rhetoric, and for all his overt attempts to display party-state benevolence, the fact was that those *huaqiao* refugees who returned to the PRC in 1959–1960 were actually returning to a country that was far less interested in helping them, than it was in using them. Indeed, to consider New China’s overall treatment of the *huaqiao* through its *qiaowu* in 1949–1959—as this thesis has done—necessarily leads to rather stark conclusions about the PRC’s *qiaowu* as: a failed political economy; a contradiction with socialist transformation; and as a paradox, and a betrayal of the *huaqiao*.

⁶ Liao Chengzhi, ‘Qiangda de zuguo shi huaqiao de kaoshan’, 01/03/1960, *DHGLR*, 252-253 (253).

Political Economy:

This thesis argues that the PRC's policies towards the *huaqiao* in 1949–1959 should be understood as a political economy. Here, the party-state's *qiaowu* was a political function of economic imperatives—particularly to secure the foreign exchange that *huaqiao* remittances offered. In that sense, the imperative to gain remittances was the touchstone for *qiaowu*, and was the basis of the *youdai* [favourable treatment] approach in 1950–1956 which defined policy based on the rationalisation that catering to the *huaqiao* interests served the party-state's interests. Yet, this interplay between political manoeuvring and economic rationality was not to last, since the advent of the GLF and 'politics in command' in 1957–1958, forced *qiaowu* to embrace an ideological purity (*après* Mao) that made *youdai* untenable, and its political economy a failure by 1959. Of course, the supremacy of Mao's ideology did not remove the underlying economic imperatives to *qiaowu*. Yet, there was a distinct asymmetry where *qiaowu* and its economic ends were subjected to the dictates of Mao Zedong Thought. This ultimately made *qiaowu* a failed political economy, since even though the party-state soon realised that the practice of ideologically-purer *qiaowu* undermined its own economic objectives, it could, and would not adjust its counterproductive politics.

Yet, despite the eventual abandonment of the *youdai* approach to *qiaowu* by 1959, the fact that it had even existed, and that it had been allowed (if not enabled) to contradict the larger demands of socialist transformation in the 1950s, might seem counterintuitive to certain perceptions of Maoist China.⁷ But even so, it was certainly not as if the party-state's revolutionary ideology and its quest to achieve communism in China, precluded it from recognising that its economic interests—and hence, the security and future success of the revolution—might sometimes actually be better served by policies that temporarily

⁷ The OECD is fairly typical in its suggestion that 'the ideological commitment to a socialist economy and rejection of capitalism was very strong' in the PRC, prior to Reform (post-1978). See Angus Maddison, *Chinese Economic Performance in the Long Run: Second Edition, Revised and Updated: 960–2030 AD* (Paris: Development Centre of the OECD, 2007), 18.

diverged from the revolutionary path.⁸ Such thinking was of course at the very heart of the New Democracy that was established with the PRC in 1949, and it was also the crux of the *qiaowu* that followed in the early-to-mid-1950s.

The centrality of the economic perspective to the PRC's *qiaowu*—especially on the perceived utility of the *huaqiao* and their remittances—was in many ways, the product of a long Chinese tradition of utilitarian views of *huaqiao* remittances. This ‘historical political economy’ predated New China, but it was the post-1949 party-state that institutionalised it. The fact was that the CCP’s New Democracy was an economic rationalisation, and the united front that it instituted was but a reluctant compromise, so as to capitalise on the broadest range of resources available. The CCP held the real power in the CPG after October 1949, but the semblance of democracy was a necessary pretence. Thus contrary to CCP conventionalism, the New Democracy and its CPPCC was about economic utility—and so was the *huaqiao* place in that united front.⁹

The origins of *qiaowu* were as a fulfilment—or at the very least, part of the ‘organised hypocrisy’—of the New Democracy.¹⁰ This was evident in the creation of the CPPCC, its Common Program, and the OCAC—all to make *qiaowu* the conduit for the party-state’s self-proclaimed duty of care towards the *huaqiao*. Yet, the reality was that the policy-practitioners (the OCAC, but also the CFEC, PBOC and BOC) were primarily concerned with *huaqiao* economic utility, mainly in terms of remittances. Given the sums of hard currency involved, this was logical—and after 1950, desperately vital, not least

⁸ ‘Yet at a time when Chinese policymakers did not act ‘pragmatically’ on so many occasions, they appeared to have behaved ‘pragmatically’ in pursuing policies towards Japan that favoured China’s economic interests.’ See Amy King, *China-Japan Relations after World War II: Empire, Industry and War, 1949–1971* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 14.

See also Dorothy J. Solinger, ‘Economic Reform Via Reformulation in China: Where do Rightist Ideas come from?’, *Asian Survey*, 21:9 (1981), 947–960.

⁹ See General Affairs Office of the CPPCC National Committee, *The Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference* (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 2004), 2.

¹⁰ The term ‘organised hypocrisy’ is defined ‘saying one thing but doing another, endorsing a logic of appropriateness while acting in ways consistent with a logic of consequences’ in international relations. Given the CCP’s united front ‘appropriateness’ that served economic ‘consequences’, the term can certainly be applied here as well. See Stephen D. Krasner, ‘Organized hypocrisy in nineteenth-century East Asia’, *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific*, 1:2 (2001), 173–197 (176).

because of the ‘economic Cold War’.¹¹ Yet, remittances, as *qiaowu* practitioners realised, represented fundamentally transnational issues. For the party-state, remittances were simply foreign exchange. Yet, remittances were also both a livelihood (especially for the *qiaojuan*), and a (if not, the) pillar of transnational relations between the *haiwai huaqiao* remitters and the *huaqiao* recipients in China. The money came from abroad; but the motivations for, and interests in sending that money were domestic.¹²

The political economy of *qiaowu* in the early 1950s thus involved a recognition that securing remittances was intrinsically linked to its transnationality, and in convincing overseas remitters that remittances served both their interests, and that of the recipients. Thus the need for *qiaowu* to buttress the *huaqiao*’s interests. Yet, since the centre of gravity for *huaqiao* interests was inside China (defined by mostly familial, but sometimes commercial concerns), *qiaowu* embraced a primarily domestic approach in 1950–1956, to set the *huaqiao* in China apart as a special demographic, and to incentivise remittances. Consequently, *qiaowu* systematically instituted *youdai* policies, with notable leniency for *huaqiao* landlords, early revision of class statuses, extra food for households in *qiaoxiang*, exemptions from collectivisation and labour, legislative protections of private property—and many other manifestations of *youdai* all the way to 1956, that were guided in each instance by the unifying thread of the imperative to gain more remittances.

To be sure, this approach to *qiaowu* required balancing between economic and political imperatives, sometimes even to the point of contradiction. Yet, the party-state regularly favoured the *youdai*, and *qiaowu* practitioners (especially in the OCAC and PBOC) consistently advocated and defended *huaqiao* interests, against CCP cadres and officials who did not follow *youdai* provisions. But this was never really about *huaqiao* ‘rights and interests’ per se; they were only relevant insofar as they served to gain

¹¹ Zhang, *Economic Cold War*, 79–102.

¹² The transnationality of interests, and the role of domestic motivations for foreign remitters are not unique to the Chinese diaspora. See Bharati Basu and James T. Bang, *International Remittance Payments and the Global Economy* (New York: Routledge, 2015), 112–142.

remittances. Whether it was the suppression of women's rights (especially to divorce) to keep the *haiwai huaqiao* (men) happy; or the encouragement of *qiaosheng* to maintain traditional Confucian ties, and to ignore what their socialist education implied about their bourgeois families, it was the maintenance (or increase) of remittances that defined the underlying logic of *qiaowu* in 1950–1956.¹³

The party-state's practice of the *youdai* approach to *qiaowu* therefore depended on both the primacy that it assigned to gaining ever-more *huaqiao* remittances, and also on the centrality of economic rationality to its policymaking towards the fulfilment of that remittance imperative. Yet, when the party-state turned—or perhaps, was forced—to the left after 1957, it was ideological purity that took over as the primary consideration. Thus in 1958, Chinese politics—and *qiaowu*—underwent radical change. The advent of the GLF and 'politics in command' now meant that all policy was now held to an ideological standard defined by Maoist principles which emphasised revolutionary advance, mass mobilisation in politics and economics, and rapid, intense socialist transformation. Thus *qiaowu* had to submit to a new governing paradigm for all its work.

On the surface, 'politics in command' did not detract from *qiaowu*'s political economy; after all, the GLF necessitated greater imports of capital equipment, and thus, more demand for hard currency. Yet, 'politics in command' also required *qiaowu* to conform to the dictates of socialist transformation and the interests of 'the whole people', instead of minority *huaqiao* interests. Whereas *qiaowu* had once adopted a rationalisation

¹³ This gendered *youdai* contradicts positive portrayals of the CCP's approach to feminism. See Lin Chun, 'Citizenship in China: The Gender Politics of Social Transformation', *Social Politics: International Studies in Gender, State & Society*, 3:2-3 (1996), 278-290; Tina Mai Chen, 'Female Icons, Feminist Iconography? Socialist Rhetoric and Women's Agency in 1950s China', *Gender & History*, 15:2 (2003), 268-295. Party-led dampening of socialist enthusiasm in favour of Confucian ethics contradicts the idea of a 'collapse of the Confucian value system' in the 1950s. See Odd Arne Westad, 'The Great Transformation: China in the Long 1970s' in, Niall Ferguson, Charles S. Maier, Erez Manela, Daniel J. Sargent (eds), *The Shock of the Global: The 1970s in Perspective* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010), 65-79 (66). See also the view that: 'Mao Zedong had no desire to rid his people of the Confucian virtues of self-denial and compliance, but he wanted to replace Confucianism with himself and his own thought—Mao Zedong Thought—as the object and beneficiary of these virtues', in Ci Jiwei, *Dialectic of the Chinese Revolution: From Utopianism to Hedonism* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994), 63.

that political flexibility enabled the fulfilment of economic ends, *qiaowu* now abandoned *youdai* and ‘bourgeois tendencies’ to more closely align with ‘politics in command’, and this led to the eradication of *huaqiao* privileges, provisions and protections, and a turn towards outright exploitation. But it also led to significant losses, as the main effect of this *qiaowu* approach was a sharp fall in remittances. Yet, even when it was confronted with the counterproductive nature of its policies, the party-state proved unable and unwilling to alter course. By 1959, though *qiaowu* still had a key economic role, its politics no longer served that imperative, but were instead undermining it. Though *qiaowu* practitioners were well aware of this, there was nothing they could do. Thus by the end of New China’s first decade, its *qiaowu* had become a failed political economy, and subservient to a Maoist fantasy.

Contradiction:

Curiously—and ironically—the CCP after Mao has not been opposed to the idea of contradictions in its *qiaowu*; indeed, the modern party-state rather prefers this view. Of course, *pace* Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, Xi Zhongxun et al., the main contradiction in the narrative of New China’s *qiaowu* was the Cultural Revolution, and specifically, was made manifest by Lin Biao and the ‘Gang of Four’.¹⁴ In this narrative, *qiaowu* since 1949 was a series of enlightened policies, benevolently and correctly catering to the ‘rights and interests’ of the *huaqiao*, until it was tragically—albeit only temporarily—interrupted in the late 1960s. This narrative suited post-Mao politics, but it also suits the CCP’s self-portrayal of the post-1978 period as a resolution of preceding contradictions, and also matches the current CCP nostalgia for dialecticism.¹⁵ Yet, this narrative is

¹⁴ Deng Xiaoping, ‘Jiejian canjia quoqing de qiao tai gang ao tongbao luxingtuan de jianghua’, 29/09/1977, *DHGLR*, 328-330; Jiang Zemin, ‘Zai disici quanguo guiguo huaqiao daibiao dahui shang de jianghua’, 18/12/1989, *DHGLR*, 345-348; Xi Zhongxun, ‘Zai sheng, zizhiqu, zhixiashi qiaoban zhuren huiyi shang de jianghua (zhaiyao)’, 21/04/1984, *DHGLR*, 364-368.

¹⁵ Frank Dikötter, *The Cultural Revolution: A People’s History, 1962–1976* (London: Bloomsbury, 2016), 312-322; ‘Xi stresses adherence to dialectical materialism’, 24/01/2015, *Xinhua News Agency*; ‘Xuexi

inaccurate. The basic fact was that *qiaowu* in 1949–1959 was almost always in a difficult dialogue, competition, and contradiction with other, ideological impulses.

To be sure, given this thesis’ analysis of the political economy of *qiaowu*, the narrative of a correct—even rational—practice of *qiaowu* that was sabotaged by the turn towards hyper-ideological policymaking in the late 1960s, is particularly tempting. Especially if seen also in terms of a variant ‘plan-rational’ and ‘plan-ideological’ political economy.¹⁶ But to be sure, rationalised policy and ideological imperatives are not necessarily mutually exclusive.¹⁷ On a basic level, there was no contradiction between *qiaowu* and the CCP’s revolution. After all, the *huqiao* were in the New Democracy precisely because the socialist state had an economic need; *qiaowu*—and the hard currency it secured—funded ‘socialist construction’, and the capital imports needed to transform China into a modern industrial economy, and thus safeguard and carry forward the revolution to its glorious, classless end.

Yet, even if *qiaowu* served the (Chinese) revolution and an ideologically-defined end, the reality was also that *qiaowu*’s practice and the revolution’s progress were contradictory, because *qiaowu* relied—or at least, was perceived to rely—on seemingly counter-revolutionary practices to achieve its objectives. Thus while *qiaowu* served the socialist revolution, it also contradicted socialist transformation. In a way, this contradiction was inevitable. The New Democracy—and its united front—was intended for the practical leveraging of resources for the socialist state’s strengthening, and indeed, its survival in 1949. This intention underpinned the *huqiao* inclusion, and it gave *qiaowu* its governing remittance imperative. This then led to the *youdai* approach to fulfil the

yunyong bianzheng weiwu zhuyi zengqiang xietiao tuijin ‘sige quanmian’ de nengli’, *Qiushi*, No. 4 (2015), 11–12.

¹⁶ See Chalmers Johnson, *MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925–1975* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1982), 18; Jean C. Oi, *Rural China Takes Off: Institutional Foundations of Economic Reform* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 7.

¹⁷ See Nigel Gould-Davies, ‘Rethinking the Role of Ideology in International Politics During the Cold War’, *Journal of Cold War Studies*, 1:1 (1999), 90–109; Douglas J. Macdonald, ‘Formal Ideologies in the Cold War: Toward a Framework for Empirical Analysis’, in Odd Arne Westad (ed.), *Reviewing the Cold War: Approaches, Interpretations, Theory* (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2000), 180–204 (184).

transnational *huaqiao* interests, precisely in order to incentivise and increase remittances. But crucially, this also meant a policy approach, and a whole system, that was predicated on the preservation, manipulation, and expansion of existing *huaqiao* networks, relationships, social structures and conventional (if not to say, traditional) practices. Or, in other words, the *youdai* approach relied on an inherently conservative social dynamic. And this was obviously a contradiction to the CCP's (and certainly Mao's) agenda for the socialist transformation of China.¹⁸

To be fair, and in the halls of Zhongnanhai, there was probably no contradiction in the mind of the CCP leadership and the *qiaowu* practitioners in the OCAC and related institutions. Since the failure to gain remittances would have sent the PRC's precarious finances over the precipice, *qiaowu* was not only a revolutionary imperative, but an existential one. Yet, here was the root of the contradiction. The survival of the revolution required remittances—and thus *youdai*—but (and certainly for Mao) the revolution also required the transformation of China's politics, society and economy, into purer socialism—and thereafter, communism.

The first evidence of the contradiction between *qiaowu* and socialist transformation was during the Land Reform, and in terms of the lenient provisions for *huaqiao* landlords—to protect remittances. This early *youdai* saw opposition even within the CCP, but the party-state proffered a discourse of *huaqiao* special [*teshu*] characteristics and circumstances to justify its positive discrimination. Of course, this was about economic pragmatism, but here was the start of a pattern of contradiction. The *youdai* policies were frequently resisted, especially by lower-level cadres and officials, because the policies seemingly pandered to bourgeois interests, or exempted the *huaqiao* from socialism. At the same time, the *youdai* policies were also consistently endorsed by

¹⁸ This brings to mind a famous remark that 'the most radical revolutionary will become a conservative on the day after the revolution'. See Hannah Arendt, 'Civil Disobedience', *Crises of the Republic: Lying in Politics; Civil Disobedience; On Violence; Thoughts on Politics and Revolution* (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1972), 49-102 (78).

qiaowu practitioners, who legitimised them with public discourse on *huaqiao teshu*, even as the party-state justified the policies unto itself through economic rationalisations. Thus in 1950–1956, the party-state juggled the *youdai* and socialist transformation—especially after Mao’s General Line (1952)—even while it knew that the *youdai* was ideologically counter-intuitive, since it had to regularly order rectifications of ‘leftist deviationist’ behaviour, and force recalcitrant cadres to comply. Yet, as OCAC and CCP CC archives show, the party-state always chose the *youdai* over revolutionary struggle.

To be sure, the contradiction became more pronounced during the ‘socialist high tide’ in 1955–1956, when Mao called for the end of capitalism, an accelerated collectivisation campaign, and anti-bourgeois struggle. Yet, the *youdai* and its economic rationality found support amongst, and had a resonance in, the negative reaction to Mao’s ‘high tide’ and its irrational ‘rash advance’, and thus both the OCAC’s Fourth Expanded Conference, and the Eighth Party Congress in 1956 endorsed the *youdai*. But even as the Congress marked the peak of the *youdai*, it also marked the high-point of contradiction, since its approval demonstrated a clear preference for economic rationalisation, over a distinctly ideological program for socialist transformation.

Given the undeniable linkages between the *youdai* and the criticisms of the ‘high tide’, Mao’s resurgence in 1957–1958 was always going to bring a backlash. Mao, emboldened and enabled by the political crises that besieged the CCP, now alleged that ‘Contradictions Among The People’ threatened the revolution. This was partly to entrench his leadership, partly to shore up the Party’s authority (after the Hundred Flowers saw attacks on its legitimacy), and partly to effect ideological purity. The ensuing Anti-Rightist Campaign thus cemented the supremacy of Mao’s leadership, his Thought, and his political program. Thus, the *youdai*—so tainted by the Eighth Party Congress and a running sore for earlier attempts at socialist transformation—was now evidence of Rightism in *qiaowu*, and by the OCAC and its partners.

Anti-Rightism in late 1957 thus sounded the death-knell for the *youdai*, and the advent of Mao's 'politics in command' in 1958 marked the end of this particular era of *qiaowu*. Mao's intention was for a sweeping ideological conformity that would—to his mind—bring China into the revolution's next stage. This prioritisation of revolutionary struggle underpinned the launch of the GLF in 1958, but it also ensured that *qiaowu* would not be permitted to contradict socialist transformation. Thus *qiaowu* post-1958 eradicated the *youdai* approach in its policies, and forsook economic rationality—especially in terms of the most efficient means of securing remittances. Whereas the *youdai* had sought to incentivise remittances, *qiaowu* now turned to direct exploitation and extraction of *huaqiao* utility. Of course, *qiaowu* practitioners quickly realised by 1959 that these newer policies, while obedient to 'politics in command', were actually economically counter-productive. Yet, while *qiaowu* practitioners briefly attempted to address this problem, the party-state's inability to change course meant that in the end, and rather ironically, the party-state simply traded one contradiction for another.

Paradox:

Back in 1949, New China's proto-constitutional Common Program made the *huaqiao* two promises: that the CPG would protect *huaqiao* rights and interests (Article 58); and also 'adopt the measures necessary' to 'facilitate remittances' from the *huaqiao* (Article 37).¹⁹ Yet, *qiaowu* failed to fulfil either promise. Paradoxically, although the party-state practiced positive discrimination for the *huaqiao* through its *youdai* approach to *qiaowu* in 1950–1956, this failed to effectively guarantee the rights and interests that it was supposed to protect, and worse, was abandoned after 1958 in a turn that thoroughly undermined *huaqiao* interests. Furthermore, for all that *qiaowu* intended to facilitate (and grow) remittances for both the *huaqiao* and the party-state's foreign reserves, it was

¹⁹ Article 37, Article 58. See 'The Common Program of the Chinese People's Consultative Conference', 29/09/1949, *The Important Documents*, 15, 20.

singularly unsuccessful in doing so. Yet, the irony and tragedy is that even if *qiaowu* failed to expand remittances, the party-state was still relatively better off for it—which leaves the *huaqiao* as the real (and only) losers in this story.

The party-state's *youdai* approach in its policies towards the *huaqiao* was premised on the rationalisation that catering to the *huaqiao* interest would also serve to secure and expand the flows of remittances. The practice of *youdai* in policymaking and implementation therefore depended on an entire system of positive discrimination for the *huaqiao* in 1950–1956 that essentially made them a special demographic—carved out of the masses—that was entitled to extra allowances and lenient provisions, permitted to distinct separateness, differentiation and exemptions, and given legal protections and guarantees that were sometimes counter-intuitive to the very logic of the PRC's socialist identity itself. In other words, *qiaowu* in its *youdai* form was a veritably pecuniary pluralism, wherein the tolerance of special interests, for a particular minority demographic, was a function of a financial incentive.

Regardless of the pecuniary premise of the *youdai* policies, that the CCP sought the satisfaction of *huaqiao* interests might reasonably be seen as evidence of convergent interests for the party-state and the *huaqiao*. In reality, theory and practice were not so easily reconciled. Of course, it is true that the party-state's *youdai* approach did offer real benefits to *huaqiao*, which included things like extra allowances of food and consumer goods in ‘unified sale and purchase’ rationing, state-sponsored employment and settlement of the new *guiqiao*, generous scholarships for the *qiaosheng* in higher education, or even the differentiation between types (special, honorary, normal) of membership in cooperatives that allowed *qiaojuan* participation in collectivisation without actual labour. All of these—and much else—were very real policy initiatives that explicitly catered to the *huaqiao* interest. Yet, the efficacy of *youdai* was tempered by the

fact that in many cases, such policies faced resistance and very often caused resentment.²⁰

Indeed, it was not just CCP cadres and officials in lower-level, local jurisdictions who actively opposed, or violated *youdai* provisions and *qiaowu* policies because they seemed to contradict the ideological demands (if not, principles) of socialist transformation. It was also the masses (in both rural and urban areas) who resented the privileging of the *huaqiao*. Whether this was manifest in rent and property disputes, none-too-subtle grumbling, or extortion of remittances—the masses simply did not appreciate the *youdai* provisions. Of course, the party-state justified itself by harkening to a discourse of *huaqiao* specialness, but the fact was that the favourable treatment of *huaqiao* came at a cost to the non-*huaqiao*. After all, if the *huaqiao* did not labour in the cooperatives, then someone else had to make up the shortfall. Or, if the *huaqiao* received extra food, then the surplus available for others would obviously be decreased.

Furthermore, and against the backdrop of popular resistance and resentment to *youdai* policies and provisions, the fact was that party-state was utterly insincere about *huaqiao* ‘rights and interests’. The governing principle of *youdai*—as pecuniary pluralism—was the financial incentive, but whereas this could (and did) motivate positive discrimination for the *huaqiao* where the incentive was clear, it also followed that the party-state could undertake *qiaowu* that was distinctly against the *huaqiao* interest, if it was profitable to do so. For instance, while one *youdai* policy permitted remittance deposits denominated in foreign currency—as a hedge against RMB fluctuation—withdrawals were only permitted in RMB and at fixed rates that meant significant losses to the real value. Yet, this also meant that the party-state profited from the arbitrage. Thus, while the *youdai* policies seemed to typify a convergence between the party-state’s economic interests, and its promise to protect *huaqiao* ‘rights and interests’, the special

²⁰ In that sense, the *youdai* was not dissimilar to other forms of positive discrimination around the world, in the provocation of resentment amongst those who did not benefit. See Thomas Sowell, *Affirmative Action Around the World: An Empirical Study* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2004), 1-22.

provisions for the *huaqiao* in the half-a-decade or so of the *youdai* era must be weighed against both the backlash that was brought on the *huaqiao*, and the fact that the party-state itself was willing to undermine *huaqiao* interests when it served its own financial purposes. In any case, as far as the narrative of the whole of New China's first decade is concerned, the point is moot. After all, post-1958 and the advent of 'politics in command', the party-state abandoned the *youdai* approach altogether, and all pretences at even the slightest concern for *huaqiao* 'rights and interests'.

Yet, in some sense, that the PRC had even practiced the *youdai* in the 1950s was itself a relative innovation. In contrast, and despite a large diaspora of its own, 'India took little interest in overseas Indians' after 1947, and 'successive Indian governments adopted an attitude of studied indifference to the overseas Indians lest they should appear to be interfering in the internal affairs of another country'.²¹ Indeed, while *qiaowu* had derived the *youdai* approach to *huaqiao* rights and interests from a perception of their economic utility that dated all the way back to the PRC's establishment (and beyond), India only began to pay attention to this political economy of diaspora in the mid-1980s.²² Thus, in effect, the PRC's pecuniary pluralism was in a league of its own. And it was admired as such by other socialist bloc countries who thought it worthy of emulation. Even as late as 1964, long after the collapse of *qiaowu*'s political economy in the GLF, Hungary's Ambassador in Beijing enquired with the MFA if it could offer any advice on diasporic policy, because, as the Hungarians believed, their Chinese comrades had created *qiaowu* policies that were 'quite good and enlightened'.²³ But of course, the Hungarians did not quite realise that *qiaowu* had not been good for everyone.

²¹ Aparajita Gangopadhyay, 'India's Policy towards its Diaspora: Continuity and Change', *India Quarterly: A Journal of International Affairs*, 61:4 (2005), 93-122 (98).

²² Rina Agarwala, 'Tapping the Indian Diaspora for Indian Development', in Alejandro Portes, and Patricia Fernandez-Kelly (eds), *The State and the Grassroots: Immigrant Transnational Organizations in Four Continents* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2016), 84-110; Zhu Zhiqun, 'Two Diasporas: Overseas Chinese and Non-resident Indians in their Homelands' Political Economy', *Journal of Chinese Political Science*, 12:3 (2007), 281-296.

²³ MFA, 'Guanyu Xiongyali zhuhua dashi ni liaojie wo dui huaqiao zhengce deng wenti', 04/01/1964, MFAA #117-01380-02, 3.

The point of the pecuniary pluralism, the *youdai* approach, and even the party-state's marginalisation of *huaqiao* interests in the 1950s had always been about the remittances, hence the Common Program's promise to 'facilitate remittances'. One would have expected that that promise would have been the one that the party-state would have kept, and yet, even that was not the case. Paradoxically, though the party-state went to great lengths in the 1950s to secure (and expand) the remittance flows, the evidence actually demonstrates that it was singularly unsuccessful in doing so. In 1950, the PRC had a net inflow of US\$122.57 million in hard currency via *huaqiao* remittances; in 1959 the figure was US\$80.24 million, which thus meant a comparative decrease of the yearly intake of remittances of around 34.5% after ten years.²⁴ Of course, the record low for 1959 was in part due to the early effects of the GLF, but then again, the figure for 1957 was itself only US\$108.28 million—which suggests that even the six preceding years of the *youdai* era had not fulfilled its primary goal. Perhaps this was the consequence of the party-state's failure to keep its first promise, or perhaps it was also a reflection of the disruption to *huaqiao* relationships as China underwent socialist transformation. Either way, here was another promise that the party-state failed to keep.

Yet, despite the fact that the party-state was obviously unsuccessful in securing and expanding the remittance flows, it is important to distinguish between that failure, and the rather ironic fact that the party-state was still relatively better off despite its failure. After all, remittances in 1950–1957 (around US\$1.17 billion in one estimate) nearly covered the PRC's trade deficit for the same period (around US\$1.38 billion).²⁵ This very impressive figure raises important questions for future research—chief among which must surely be to ask how much worse off would New China have been without the *huaqiao* and their remittances. But it also means that, despite the fact that the party-

²⁴ See Appendix I. 'Overseas Chinese Remittances to the People's Republic of China, 1950–1960'.

²⁵ Lin Jinzhi et al., *Huaqiao huaren yu Zhongguo geming he jianshe*, 271; Peterson, *Overseas Chinese in the People's Republic of China*, 66–67.

state's *qiaowu* was far from successful in its quest to 'facilitate remittances', there were more than a billion reasons why *qiaowu* was still to the benefit of the PRC. So, paradoxically, the party-state was still better off. Yet, while this was all very well and good for the party-state, the corollary to all of this must also be the realisation that if the party-state still benefitted (and immensely so), though its *qiaowu* had failed to keep its promises to the *huaqiao*, then the only victims of its *qiaowu* failures were actually the *huaqiao*. New China had made the *huaqiao* certain promises, and the party-state had failed to keep them, and thus by 1959, the *huaqiao* were in a far more tenuous position, and certainly worse off, than in 1949.

Caveat Emptor:

This thesis has offered a narrative of the ways in which the PRC viewed and treated the *huaqiao* in its first decade, and it argues for an understanding of *qiaowu* as a political economy that ultimately failed, in the wake of ideological radicalisation by 1959. This analysis allows an understanding of how the party-state conceived and used the *huaqiao*, but it also enables an understanding of the *huaqiao* experience of New China under the CCP. This thesis is thus important as a contribution to the existent, even if rather lacking, historiography on the *huaqiao* and their relationship with, and experience of the early PRC. Indeed, given its specific arguments, the thesis is also a refutation of CCP propaganda, and a revision of conventional wisdoms about the *huaqiao* in New China proffered by official and proto-official narratives. Given the significance of the *huaqiao* to modern China—indeed, as Odd Arne Westad describes, they 'were, and are, the glue that holds China's relations with the world together, in good times and bad'—this thesis' contribution to more accurate, evidence-based understandings of the *huaqiao* place in modern Chinese history, is surely a positive historiographical development.²⁶

²⁶ Odd Arne Westad, *Restless Empire: China and the World since 1750* (London: The Bodley Head, 2012), 216.

This thesis also exerts a contemporary relevance precisely because of the modern party-state's re-politicisation of the Overseas Chinese (writ large). For the post-1978 Chinese party-state, the political economy of *qiaowu* has been no less—perhaps even more—important than that of its predecessors.²⁷ More recently, and in myriad ways ranging from claims about the support of the 'Overseas Chinese communities' for the PRC's claims to the Diaoyu Islands; to suggestions that the greater political representation and status of the ethnic Chinese abroad (as with the American Congresswoman, Judy Chu) is because 'China's national strength is constantly enhancing'; and to demands that Chinese students abroad embrace 'patriotic education'—the party-state has brought diaspora back into fashionable discourse.²⁸ The modern PRC is not just interested in looking for capital investment from the Chinese abroad; it is also very keen on solidifying the transnational connections between *all* Chinese for its own ends. Indeed, as PRC President Xi Jinping's dramatic and shrill pronouncements often claim: 'the fulfilment of the Chinese nation's great rejuvenation is the common dream of all Chinese sons and daughters at home and abroad'.²⁹ But then again, such sentiments are not new, except that the similar claims and promises of New China in 1949 led only to hardship and disappointment by 1959. So perhaps the Chinese 'at home and abroad' today would be wise to be wary about buying into a 'common dream'—again.

²⁷ After all, it was foreign direct investment (FDI) from the Chinese abroad (no longer *huaqiao*, but *huaren* or *huayi*) that powered the economy post-1978, with 70-80% of total FDI coming from them (66% from Hong Kong and Taiwan; 10-15% from Southeast Asia). See Maria Hsia Chang, 'Greater China and the Chinese 'Global Tribe'', *Asian Survey*, 35:10 (1995), 955-967; Paul J. Bolt, 'Looking to the diaspora: the overseas Chinese and China's economic development, 1978-1994', in Liu Hong (ed.), *The Chinese Overseas, Vol IV: Homeland Ties and Agencies of Interaction* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2006), 76-104.

²⁸ Lia Zhu, Niu Yue, 'Overseas Chinese urged to support sovereignty for South China Sea', 13/07/2016, *China Daily*; 'Overseas Chinese's participation in politics becomes irresistible trend', *People's Daily Online*, 03/11/2012 [<http://en.people.cn/90785/8003362.html>] Accessed 30 May 2016; Chris Buckley, 'China Says Its Students, Even Those Abroad, Need More 'Patriotic Education'', *New York Times*, 10/02/2016 [<http://nyti.ms/1SHMKxw>] Accessed 30 May 2016; MFA, 'Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Zijun Gave Briefing to Chinese and Foreign Journalists on the Diaoyu Dao Issue', 27/10/2012 [http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/topics_665678/diaodao_665718/t983015.shtml] Accessed 30 May 2016.

²⁹ Xi Jinping, 'Shixian zhonghua minzu weida fuxing shi hai nei wai zhonghua er nu gongtong de meng', 06/06/2014, *Renmin wang* [<http://cpc.people.com.cn/xuexi/n/2015/0717/c397563-27322408.html>] Accessed 30 May 2016; Xi Jinping, 'Xi Jinping zongshuji gei Xiamen shi Jimei xiaoyou zonghui huixin', 22/10/2014, *Fujian ribao*.

Appendices

Appendix I.

Overseas Chinese Remittances to the People's Republic of China, 1950–1960

(in units of US\$1 million)¹

	Lin Jinzhi et al. (1993) ²	Wu Chun-hsi (1967) ³	Contemporary PRC ⁴
1950	105.526	60.10	122.570
1951	185.268	56.81	169.230
1952	182.982	41.05	161.276
1953	144.490	45.34	120.999
1954	131.166	41.22	118.461
1955	143.715	46.49	116.000
1956	139.382	45.85	*****
1957	138.040	45.42	108.280
1958	117.385	41.69	99.800
1959	89.218	36.05	80.240
1960	117.596	41.69	96.510
Total	1494.768	501.71	1193.366 (w/o 1956)

¹ US\$ values for Contemporary PRC column as per archival documents; both Lin and Wu do not suggest a base year for their calculations, suggesting that their figures also correspond to their contemporaneous data.

² Table: '1864–1988 nian huaqiao hui kuan tongji yi lan biao', in Lin Jinzhi et al. (eds), *Huaqiao huaren yu Zhongguo geming he jianshe* (Fuzhou: Fujian renmin chubanshe, 1993), 228–231.

³ Table 47: 'Total Overseas Chinese Remittances to Communist China, 1950 to 1964', in Wu Chun-hsi, *Dollars, Dependents and Dogma: Overseas Chinese Remittances to Communist China* (Stanford: The Hoover Institution, 1967), 142.

⁴ PRC data:

1950 is from a PBOC chart for 1950–1952. See Table 43: '1950 zhi 52 nian dui ziben zhuyi guojia waihui shouzhi tongji biao', in PBOC, 'San nian lai guoji shouzhi yu waihui gongzuo zongjie', 12/1952, CASS, CA (eds), *1949–1952 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo jingji dang'an ziliaoz xuanbian: jinrong juan* (Beijing: zhongguo wuzi chubanshe, 1996) 896–904 (902).

1951–1954 is from a 1951 value of US\$169.23 million (100%) and 1952 (95.3%), 1953 (71.5%) and 1954 (70%). See Liao Chengzhi, 'Zhongyang huaqiao shiwu weiyuanhui dangzu he Zhongguo renmin yinhang dangzu guanyu qiaohui wenti xiang zhongyang de baogao', 03/01/1955, CCP CC Party Literature Research Office, CA (eds), *Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian xuanji*, Vols. 1–50 (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 2013), 18: 135–151 (135).

1955 from: PBOC to Mao Zedong, 'Zhongguo renmin yinhang huibao tigang', 11/04/1956, CASS, CA (eds), *1953–1957 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo jingji dang'an ziliaoz xuanbian: zonghe juan* (Beijing: Zhongguo wuzi chubanshe, 2000), 677–703 (701).

1956 is the only year the official archives have no clear data for. The only indication comes from a balance sheet for 1956–1957 denominated in RMB. In this estimate, 1956 is at RMB 312 million, and 1957 at RMB 325 million. In theory, at a fixed rate of US\$1: RMB 2.4, this should mean US\$ 130 million for 1956. But comparison of 1957 figures (see below) does not support the 1:2.4 rate. Based on the PBOC figure for 1957, the conversion is around 1:3 (from 325/108.28), which makes 1956 a far more sensible US\$104 million. See PBOC, '1957 nian quanguo waihui shouzhi pingheng biao', 23/11/1957, CASS, CA (eds), *1953–1957 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo jingji dang'an ziliaoz xuanbian: zonghe juan* (Beijing: Zhongguo wuzi chubanshe, 2000), 925.

1957–1958 from: Table 1: '1958 nian dui ziben zhuyi guojia qiaohui he fei maoyi waihui shouru fen diqu tongji', in PBOC, 'Guanyu yi jiu wu ba nian dui ziben zhuyi guojia fei maoyi waihui shouru difang fencheng zhixing qingkuang he yi jiu wu jiu nian fei maoyi waihui shouru difang fencheng yijian de baogao [jielu]', 17/02/1959, CASS, CA (eds), *1958–1965 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo jingji dang'an ziliaoz xuanbian: jinrong juan* (Beijing: Zhongguo caizheng jingji chubanshe, 1989), 592–594 (593).

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