The London School of Economics

and Political Science

The Impact of International Norms on Islamist Politics:

The Case of Hezbollah

Filippo Dionigi

A thesis submitted to the Department of International Relations of the London School of Economics for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, London, October 2011.

Declaration

I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the MPhil/PhD degree of the London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work other than where I have clearly indicated that it is the work of others (in which case the extent of any work carried out jointly by me and any other person is clearly identified in it).

The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. Quotation from it is permitted, provided that full acknowledgement is made. This thesis may not be reproduced without my prior written consent.

I warrant that this authorisation does not, to the best of my belief, infringe the rights of any third party.

I declare that my thesis consists of <**95.457**> words.

Statement of use of third party for editorial help (if applicable)

I can confirm that my thesis was copy edited for conventions of language, spelling and grammar by **Chris Steele of Transformat** and **Kate Rosengarten**.

Abstract

In an increasingly interconnected global political sphere, Islamist political actors have undergone a process of transformation, notwithstanding the self-referential character of their ideology. The present study assesses to what extent international norms have influenced this process. The argument is that these norms challenge the self-referential character of Islamism and its communitarian assumptions. The thesis initially provides an overview of Islamist political theory with reference to Muḥammad ʿAbduh, Sayid Quṭb, Bāqir al-Ṣadr and Ruhollah Khomeini, and argues that Islamism is not a particularly original critique of liberalism, but can be considered a form of communitarianism. The study then focuses on the case of Hezbollah to substantiate the claim that international norms influenced Islamist politics. It conducts an empirical analysis of four instances of Hezbollah's interaction with international norms. The norms in question are non-combatant immunity, human rights, and maintenance of international peace, whereas the fourth example provides a more general overview on the impact of international norms on Hezbollah's political language. The case study shows that by interacting with international actors and state institutions, and by looking for legitimacy for its actions - not only vis-à-vis its community - but also within the international normative system; Hezbollah's political identity was modified by the influence of international norms. International norms then challenge the communitarian assumptions underlying Islamist politics. They are important factors in the socialisation of Islamist actors within the international normative system and become constitutive elements of the political identity of Islamist movements such as Hezbollah.

Contents

6

Tables and Figures

Chapter 1

Introduction

1.1   International Norms and Islamist Politics

This is a study in International Relations primarily concerned with the influence of international norms in global politics. It proposes an analysis of how these norms are relevant and which effects they have on Islamism.

International norms and liberal norms in general, have long been disputed. Political ideals that put emphasis on communal affiliation, tradition and particular ethical conceptions have constantly challenged the legitimacy of norms and institutions which claim international or even universal validity. This study focuses primarily on this issue. It frames the relationship between the political activity of Islamist movements and international norms in the wider international political theory debate, in particular the liberal-communitarian debate, and shows that the Islamist objections to liberalism and international norms originate from the same assumptions at the basis of the communitarian critique of liberalism. It then proposes an empirical analysis of how an Islamist movement interacts with international norms and shows that, notwithstanding its self-referential political identity, Islamism is nonetheless subject to international norms.

The study proposed in the following pages combines political theory with historical and sociological analysis. To use Fred Halliday's words, it matches 'analytical universalism with a historical particularism'[1] and reflects upon the relevance of international norms in Islamist politics without being overly distracted by particular historical and social phenomena.

By providing an analysis which takes into account aspects of political theory and historical and social processes, this thesis intends to contribute to a better

---

[1] Fred Halliday, *Islam and the Myth of Confrontation: Religion and Politics in the Middle East* (New edn.; London; New York: I.B. Tauris; In U.S. and Canada distributed by Palgrave Macmillan, 2003) p. 15.

understanding[2] of the importance of international norms, their influence in international politics, and their potential in advancing a more just and peaceful international society.

1.2 The Argument of the Thesis

The thesis begins by showing, with reference to communitarian political theory, that international norms and liberalism have been constantly subject to criticism also within the western political theory debate. It then proposes a discussion of Islamist political theory, especially with regard to its critique of liberal institutions, international norms and, in general, modern secular societies. On the basis of a comparative analysis, it claims that communitarian and Islamist critiques of liberalism rely on specific assumptions about the kind of person we are and the way we live together, whether in communities or societies. Both communitarianism and Islamism share these conceptions of personhood and community on which they build their critical arguments against international norms and liberal society in general. Nonetheless, the empirical analysis following this theoretical discussion will show how, in practice, Islamism assimilates certain international norms. Occasionally, it even uses these norms to legitimate its actions or remains indifferent towards their implementation. Notwithstanding the hostile stance of Islamism to international norms and liberal ethics, international norms do have an impact on Islamism.

Three concluding observations are proposed as resulting from this analysis. The first is that Islamist politics cannot rely simply on the idea of an isolated and self-referential Islamic community. Islamist movements, and the societies in which they operate, have increasingly become part of a broader political and social context in which interactions among persons, states and societies are regulated by norms and institutions the legitimacy of which is not based on Islamic ethics (although they can still be fully consistent with it). International norms have a significant role in regulating these relations. Following on this first point, Islamism cannot count on a conception of person

---

[2] Referring to Hollis and Smith categories of 'explaining' and 'understanding' the aim of this research is more concerned with understanding the impact of international norms on Islamist politics rather than explaining it. *See* Martin Hollis and Steve M. Smith, *Explaining and Understanding International Relations* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1990) pp. 68-91.

whose identity and moral value are solely derived from his or her communal Islamic membership. The Muslim community is not a barrier to broader social and political arrangements and persons become 'constituted' not only by their affiliation to their respective religious community but take part in broader social environments as national groups, global civil society or, even more importantly, in a shared sense of humanity. The third observation of this study is related to the definition of this process of transition of Islamism within the international relations theory debate and claims that it can be understood as a form of international socialisation. Islamist movements, by interacting with international norms, are being progressively socialised within the international society, rather than remain isolated or even alienated from it. Their interaction with international actors produces a progressive assimilation of these norms and their underlying liberal assumptions within their political identity, although this process is still at an early stage.

1.3   Methodology: Comparative Theory and Least Likely Single Case Study

In order to justify the argument of this thesis a theoretical comparative discussion of Islamism and communitarianism is herein combined with a least likely single case study.[3] The theoretical analysis will argue that Islamism can be considered as a form of communitarianism, and based on this theoretical considerations the thesis then proceeds with the case study. The case under analysis is the Islamist movement Hezbollah and the choice of this case is due to a 'least-likely' methodological criterion.[4] The strength of a 'least-likely' case is that it allows for reasonable generalisations. The idea is that if this enquiry succeeds in substantiating the claim that international norms influence the Islamist politics of Hezbollah, then the same can be reasonably expected for 'less tough' cases such as Islamist movements adopting less radical stances.

---

[3] In presenting the methodology of this study I primarily rely on Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2005). See Chapter 4.

[4] Ibid., pp. 120-3.

Hezbollah is a least-likely case because, being an Islamist movement, by definition its political identity refers exclusively to Islamic principles and not to other ethical paradigms such as international ethics.[5] In addition to this, its political identity, originally, has been defined in sharp antagonism with external interferences of any sort. Its military and political action has been justified exclusively along traditional Islamist lines, also resorting to political violence. Its intransigent political profile (even more intransigent of other movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas, the Islamic Action Front etc.) makes it a least-likely case to assess the capacity of international norms to influence the behaviour of an Islamist political actor.

The analysis of the case study is broken down across four instances representative of the interaction between international norms and Hezbollah. All these examples correspond to 'before-after' comparative analyses. This means that each of these instances compares Hezbollah's political identity before and after a process in which international norms intervened over its activity. The only exception is Chapter 9, where the methodology is not process tracing or historical analysis, but a text analysis. Contrarily to what may be expected from an Islamist movement, which relies on communitarian assumptions, these examples will show how international norms are becoming progressively constitutive of Hezbollah's political action and challenge its conceptions of community and person.

The choice of these examples of interaction has been deliberately selective towards instances that serve the purpose of this research. The selection of these cases has been made among historical events in which international actors, such as foreign states diplomacies and multilateral organizations as the UN, interacted directly or throughout third party mediation, with Hezbollah. This happened in various circumstances in which international norms became relevant such as the regulation and ending of inter-state conflicts (Chapters 6 and 8) and the implementation of legislation and policies consistent with human rights principles or democracy or state sovereignty (Chapters 7 and 9).

---

[5] This is a point which will be discussed extensively in Chapters 3 and 4.

It might be helpful to briefly consider why other relevant examples of interaction between international norms and Hezbollah are not considered in this enquiry. Hezbollah's stance towards Palestinian refugees in Lebanon could have been another instance linking international norms and Hezbollah. Nonetheless, this issue has broader implications more closely related to Lebanese domestic politics and the number of factors involved in this issue would have made the case difficult to handle. Also, the occasional swapping of prisoners between Hezbollah and Israel could have been an interesting example regulated by international humanitarian law and negotiated by multilateral agencies and German diplomacy. This phenomenon is nonetheless, rather difficult to investigate because of its secrecy. One particularly prominent case could have been the analysis of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) in relation to Hezbollah. Nonetheless this case would deserve an entirely separate analysis, and, at the time of writing, was too early to have a sufficiently clear idea about how Hezbollah will relate to this institution. Furthermore, the innovative character of this international tribunal renders this case not optimal for generalizations over international norms.

There is, then, another important methodological choice to be justified. At least since 1992, Hezbollah has increasingly normalised its relationship with the Lebanese state and society. The phenomenon has been defined by several Hezbollah's experts as the 'Lebanonisation of Hezbollah'[6] and is rightly considered one of the main trajectories (if not the main trajectory) of Hezbollah's political identity transition. Nonetheless, the thesis will reflect on this phenomenon only as far as is relevant for the scope of the analysis. As this is an International Relations thesis, the author has privileged the analysis of international factors over national dynamics, although admittedly, the two dimensions are often overlapping especially in a state like Lebanon where international powers constantly interfere with domestic politics. Whenever Hezbollah's

---

[6] Hezbollah's Lebanonisation has been discussed extensively by many scholars. *See* for example Magnus Ranstorp, 'The Strategy and Tactics of Hizballah's Current "Lebanonization" Process', *Mediterranean Politics,* 3/1 (1998), 103 - 34. Amal Saad-Ghorayeb, *Hizbuʾllah: Politics and Religion* (London ; Sterling, Va.: Pluto Press, 2002) pp. 82-3.

Lebanonisation becomes relevant as correlated to its 'internationalisation' this will be highlighted, but no separate discussion of this process is offered herein.

Finally, the contextual changes in the strategic and social environment in which Hezbollah operates, such as the withdrawals of Israel and Syria from Lebanese territory or changes in leadership in Iran, are influential factors in Hezbollah's political and military activity. The discussion of these factors will be nonetheless instrumental to the overall scope of the argument. For example, Hezbollah's relations with Iran will be discussed with reference to the ideological influence of Khomeinism and Hezbollah-Syria relations will be mentioned with regard to Syria's role as international mediator in Lebanese and regional affairs.

The last methodological point regards the gathering of relevant information and data for this research. This study relies primarily on bibliographical research especially as regards its more theoretical considerations. In the study of Islamist political theory, the author has made an effort to refer as much as possible to original texts, rather than secondary literature in the attempt of offering a fresher interpretation of this literature.

The empirical part of the research is based on historical, sociological and international relations scholarly publications, as well as interviews and collections of documents from sources such as the Lebanese Parliament, the leaked US cables collected in *Wikileaks*, UN reports and occasional consultation with the Hezbollah affiliated *Consultative Center for Study and Documentation*. To access archives and carry out interviews, the author has undertaken fieldwork research in Lebanon. Interviews were particularly useful in forming ideas and perceptions of the reality on the ground, as well as to fill some documental gaps. Whenever appropriate, they have been quoted directly in the text or referred to in footnote.

Occasionally, documents and sources needed to be translated from the original Arabic. In some cases, this is my translation, and in other cases, I consulted translations available in other publications.

1.4 Causation, Constitution and Socialisation

In presenting the argument and the methodology of this thesis, it is important to clarify some conceptual distinctions. This also helps to locate the thesis in the wider International Relations theory debate. The argument of this thesis does not intend to infer a relation of causation between international norms and Islamist politics. This is to say, with reference to the case study of this thesis, that Hezbollah's changes in its policies and its military activity are not necessarily 'triggered' by a UNSC resolution or by the normative cogency of human rights, to mention two examples which will be discussed below. Inferring causality between Hezbollah's political activity and international norms would stretch the argument of this thesis beyond its scope.

A better framework to locate this thesis in the International Relations literature is constitutive theory. According to Mervyn Frost constitutive theory

> focuses attention on how the key actors in international relations are constituted as such through the mutual recognition they give one another in terms of a standard set of 'rules of the international game'. More specifically it focuses on the ethical background theory which justifies the whole set of rules which constitute the practice. […] Constitutive theory is a particularly important mode of analysis because it brings to light that actors within a given social practice (or set of social practices) are constituted not just as actors but as ethical actors subject to ethical conditionalities.[7]

In the case of this study, then, the actor in question is Hezbollah; the actions of which are increasingly 'conditioned' by international norms. In this sense, international norms do not have a causal function but acquire a *constitutive* value, which shapes Hezbollah's political identity transition. More generally, constitutive theory dismisses the validity of causal thinking in social sciences. Alexander Wendt claims that in constitutive theory the "'Independent variable/dependent variable' language that characterises causal enquiries makes no sense, or at least must be interpreted very differently, in constitutive inquiries.'[8] Consistently with this theoretical approach, this

---

[7] Mervyn Frost, *Global Ethics: Anarchy, Freedom and International Relations* (London ; New York: Routledge, 2009) p. 19.

[8] Alexander Wendt, 'On Constitution and Causation in International Relations', *Review of International Studies,* 24/05 (1998), 101-18 at p. 106.

thesis does not account for a causal process and shows how international norms have become progressively constitutive of Hezbollah's political and military activity.

In accounting for this process of integration of international norms in Hezbollah's political identity, a useful concept, which captures this phenomenon, is that of socialisation. There are several definitions of this concept in International Relations theory. Kenneth Waltz's neorealist theory refers to the idea of socialisation and argues that a way 'structures work their effects is through a process socialization that limits and molds behavior'[9] of political actors. This nonetheless is a different way of using this concept as it widely relies on the distinction between system and structure which is not used in this study.

John Ikenberry and Charles Kupchan offer an analysis of socialisation with reference to the Gramscian idea of hegemony. They claim that hegemonic actors in the 'international system' not only cast their influence by means of material power but

> [There] is also a more subtle component of hegemonic power, one that works at the level of substantive beliefs rather than material payoffs. Acquiescence is the result of the socialization of leaders in secondary nations. Elites in secondary states buy into and internalize norms that are articulated by the hegemon and therefore pursue policies consistent with the hegemon's notion of international order. The exercise of power-and hence the mechanism through which compliance is achieved-involves the projection by the hegemon of a set of norms and their embrace by leaders in other nations.[10]

In this sense, socialisation occurs as an exercise of hegemonic power over secondary actors inculcating beliefs and norms in other political actors and obtaining their acquiescence towards these norms. Ikenberry and Kupchan advance three hypotheses on how socialisation occurs. The first is that socialisation results from circumstances of war and crisis (external inducement), the second regards the fact that socialisation is successful when norms and beliefs are embraced by elites (normative persuasion) and

---

[9] Kenneth Neal Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, Mass: Addison-Wesley Pub. Co, 1979) p. 76.

[10] G. John Ikenberry and Charles A. Kupchan, 'Socialization and Hegemonic Power', *International Organization,* 44/3 (1990), 283-315 at p. 283.

the third hypothesis is that socialisation occurs as a result of intervention within domestic state affairs (internal reconstruction).[11]

A different view on socialisation is given by scholars of the constructivist school. Their conception is less concerned with power than Ikenberry's and Kupchan's, and attributes importance to the role of (international) civil society, NGOs and multilateral organisations, which they refer to as 'norms entrepreneurs'.[12] Constructivists understand socialisation as the progressive internalisation of norms (for example human rights), resulting from interaction with international institutions, as well as from internal oppositions and pressures from civil society organisations.[13] Socialisation amounts to a process that initially begins with 'instrumental adaptation'[14] to norms, and then turns into a deeper progression where norms begin to define political action from within, rather than being mere external constraints. Thomas Risse and Kathryn Sikkink describe socialisation as a dialogical process as follows:

> The more they [political actors] 'talk the talk,' however, the more they entangle themselves in a moral discourse which they cannot escape in the long run. In the beginning they might use arguments in order to further their instrumentally defined interests, that is they engage in rhetoric […]. The more they justify their interests, however, the more others will start challenging their arguments and the validity claims inherent to them. At this point, governments need to respond providing further arguments. They become entangled in arguments and the logic of argumentative rationality slowly but surely takes over. It follows that we expect argumentative rationality, dialogue, and processes of persuasion to prevail in later stages of the socialisation.[15]

At the final stage, norms become fully internalised within the political identity of actors so that they become constitutive of their identity and institutionalised. The empirical analysis proposed in Chapters 6 to 9 will highlight the occasions in which the

---

[11] Ibid., p. 290-2.

[12] With regard to the concept of socialisation in constructivist theories of norms diffusion see for example Thomas Risse-Kappen and Kathryn Sikkink, 'The Socialisation of International Human Rights Norms into Domestic Practices: Introduction' in Thomas Risse-Kappen, Steve C. Ropp, and Kathryn Sikkink (eds.), *The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) pp. 1-38. As regard 'norms entrepreneurs' a definition can be found in Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, 'International Norm Dynamics and Political Change', *International Organization,* 52/4 (1998), 887-917 at p. 896.

[13] Risse-Kappen and Sikkink, 'The Socialisation of International Human Rights Norms into Domestic Practices: Introduction' pp. 17-35.

[14] Ibid., p. 12.

[15] Ibid., p. 16.

interaction between international norms and Hezbollah can be understood as form of socialisation with reference to the definitions provided above.

The concept of socialisation, as well as the constitutive and constructivist perspective in general, helps also to address one main criticism of the argument of this study, which is worth addressing preliminarily also at this stage. Realist and rationalist theories of International Relations typically assume that political actors act on the basis of a logic of a maximisation of their power to achieve their interests. This may seem to justify the claim that international norms' influence on a movement as Hezbollah does not reflect a shift in its political identity, but is instrumental to the maximisation of its power. Nonetheless, this is only a partly convincing explanation from a constructivist perspective according to which interests and norms are not separate components of a political actor, but rather constitute each other. As Wendt says 'power and interest have the effect they do in virtue of the ideas that make them up.'[16] Thus, the fact that an Islamist movement, to a degree, abides by international norms (although these norms are extraneous to its ethical foundations) is indicative of the fact that what its interests of political actor are about (and then how it exercises its power), is partly informed by international norms. As Jeffrey Checkel observes in constructivist theory norms 'constitute states/agents, providing them with understanding of their interests.'[17]

The fact that Hezbollah does not object to human rights legislation, accepts a distinction between combatants and non-combatants, or commits to a UNSC resolution, is indicative of the fact that its interests are progressively being determined not only by Islamist principles but also through international norms. Whether the 'cause' of this phenomenon is determined by a power-maximising logic is not of concern from a constructivist perspective. As it was said, constructivism and constitutive theory are not interested in establishing causal links and focus on how the interests and the power of an actor come about.

---

[16] Alexander Wendt, *Social Theory of International Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) p. 135.

[17] Jeffrey T. Checkel, 'The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory', *World Politics,* 50/2 (1998), 324-48 at p. 326.

1.5   Working Definitions and Key Concepts

The reader will have noticed how certain concepts are of central importance all along this study. For this reason, it can be useful clarifying a few key concepts which will become more precisely defined when used in analysis.

The concept of international norms has been preferred to international law because the object in question, in fact, is not law in a strict sense. Law is characterised by a clear legal wording, by being codified in texts usually of a rather precise nature although in the international realm hybrid categories as 'soft law' or Customary International Law challenge this aspect and blur the distinction between norms and law. Nonetheless, what is at stake in this study, is not the international legal order, but rather the ethical assumptions regulating relations among international actors. The focus of the study is on ethics rather than legal orders. This does not preclude the possibility of referring to principles of international law as indeed is the case in various chapters of this study. The idea nonetheless, is that law remains the surface of a deeper ethical framework with which this study is concerned.

There are several definitions of norms in international relations theory and international political theory. Frost's conceptualisation of international norms as 'settled norms' is particularly helpful. He 'regard[s] a norm as settled where it is generally recognized that any argument denying the norms (or which it appears to override the norm) requires special justification.' According to the same account, the fact that a norm is violated, does not diminish its status as a settled norm. [18] The concept of settled norms is fully inclusive of several principles regulating international relations and, more importantly, includes the norms that are considered in this study. The norms in question are the principles established by *ius in bello* (the Laws of War) and in particular non-combatant immunity in conflict,[19] human rights,[20] state sovereignty and international peace[21].

---

[18] Mervyn Frost, *Ethics in International Relations: A Constitutive Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996) p. 105.

[19] In Frost account this falls under category L3 ibid., p. 110.

[20] These go under category D2 in Frost account, rather peculiarly they are considered 'domestic norms' something for which he will be criticised, *see* Section 2.4.2. Ibid., p. 111.

Chapter 9 refers to international norms more broadly and, among others, refers also to the norms that Frost defines as 'Modernization Norms' such as development and cooperation.[22]

The main phrase used to refer to the context of interaction between international actors is 'international society'. There are several, and variously defined, alternative locutions as the 'international system' or 'structure' preferred by neo-realist, or the 'international regime' of regime theorists as well as 'empire' often used by Marxists or the 'international community' usually attributed to cosmopolitans. International society is used herein as intended by English School theorists but also by constructivists. These theories use the term society as a way of describing relations among states as based on shared rules and institutions[23] and this is indeed the kind of definition which best serves the purposes of this study to refer to the context of international politics.

There is nonetheless one important caveat, the study presented herein is mainly concerned with non-state actors, as Hezbollah, and not with states and this may seem innovative when referring to the concept of international society, which however, conceptualises society as a society of states. This aspect does not seem to raise problems of a theoretical or practical kind, as the definition of international society does not clash necessarily with the consideration of non-state actors. Quite to the contrary, when adopted by constructivists, this concept is widely inclusive of actors as NGOs and international NGOs for example. Another important aspect is that the locution 'international community' has been avoided because the study puts emphasis on the difference between the concepts of community and society, a point which will be further clarified in the following chapters.

As regards the term Islamism, this embraces the political theories and the practices (including paramilitary operations), which find their alleged foundations and legitimation

---

[21] State sovereignty goes under the category 'S' in Frost and international peace is mentioned in particular under 'L2' ibid., pp. 106-9.

[22] Ibid., pp. 110-1.

[23] *See* for example Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics* (2nd edn.; New York: Columbia University Press, 1995) p. 102.

in a certain interpretation of the Islamic tradition. In general, Islamism tends to promote an Islamic polity, but what is this about exactly is often left open to interpretation. There have been various discussions of which term best captures what is herein called Islamism. 'Fundamentalism' has been avoided because it has raised objections with regard to the fact that this term identified primarily Christian traditionalist movements.[24] 'Political Islam' is not particularly problematic and, although very generic, is occasionally used. The discussion of Chapter 3 will provide the reader with a clearer idea of how Islamism is understood herein.

The term 'community' will be defined in more detail in Chapter 4 with reference to communitarianism and Islamism, but it is important to notice that is not interchangeable with 'society'. There is a long tradition of theoretical distinctions between the concepts of community and society (which cannot be fully addressed herein), this refers for example to German philosophy and social theory as in the case of Ferdinand Tönnies[25] who proposed the distinction between community as defined by shared culture, history and values in contrast with society understood as a voluntary association among persons regulated by rules.

As it will be further made clear, communitarians and Islamists envision a political realm in which the ethical community plays a central role in various respects, whereas liberals associate their political project to the idea of society as a 'cooperative venture for mutual advantage.'[26] Closely related to this distinction is the way the concept of person is delineated in this enquiry. Two main paradigms are at stake. The Islamist and communitarian paradigm will be described in more detail in Chapter 4, and refers to the idea of person primarily identified as the member of an ethical community. This conception is in sharp contrast with the idea of the Kantian moral agent, which is

---

[24] Edward W. Said, *Covering Islam: How the Media and the Experts Determine How We See the Rest of the World* (Rev. edn.; New York: Vintage Books, 1997) pp. XVI-XIX.

[25] Ferdinand Tönnies, *Community and Association (Gemeinschaft Und Gesellschaft)* (London,: Routledge & Paul, 1955). For an application of this distinction within the international relations theory debate and the English School in particular *see* Barry Buzan, 'From International System to International Society: Structural Realism and Regime Theory Meet the English School', *International Organization,* 47/03 (1993), 327-52 at p. 333.

[26] John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice* (Rev. edn.; Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard Univeristy Press, 1999) p. 109.

characterised by moral individual autonomy and constitutes a central assumption for liberal theory as well as for international norms.

Finally, an important consideration regards the definition of Hezbollah as a 'terrorist organisation', whether amateurishly by the press or within legal contexts by governments and international organisations. This study will avoid this term, not because I am certain that Hezbollah's activities cannot be considered forms of terrorism (whatever the definition adopted), but because the term has acquired a strongly politicised connotation.[27] An unqualified use of the term 'terrorism', considering its semantic uncertainty and its defaming political use, would mean inevitably to take sides in the debate over the morality of political violence in the context in which Hezbollah operates. This would exceed the scope of this study, which does not aim to propose a discussion of the ethical justifications of political violence. Furthermore, the use of this term, terrorism, charged with political meaning and for which no universally accepted definition exists, does not provide additional explanatory value to the analysis of the events and theories discussed below; quite to the contrary, it seems to produce more confusion. Similarly, the identification of Hezbollah as a 'resistance movement' simply refers to its military activity in generic terms. By this I do not mean to endorse or refuse the definition of Hezbollah as a resistance movement or a liberation movement as this would deserve a separate discussion of the various historical phases of Hezbollah's activity.

Notwithstanding this attempt to provide some working definitions, there are plenty of examples, which often blur distinctions and differentiations. There are Islamists and communitarians, which endorse some aspects of liberalism, persons that see themselves as both Kantian moral agents but also members of ethical community, and phenomena that are better explained through the lenses of a realist international structure rather than constructivists or English School conceptions of international

---

[27] As Conor Gearty wrote: "'terror' and 'terrorism' have come to be regarded as such powerful condemnations that all those looking for a suitable insult have wanted to appropriate them." C. A. Gearty, Terror (London: Faber, 1991) p. 4.

society.[28] These working definitions should be seen more as Weberian 'ideal types'[29] rather than ontological categories, in the sense that they are analytical instruments, which cover only part of a more complex reality.

1.6   Structure of the Thesis

This thesis is divided into ten chapters. Chapter 2 proposes a discussion of the critiques of liberal norms and institutions including international norms with reference to communitarian political theory. It considers the early stages of this critique, the debate on domestic political theory (especially with reference to John Rawls's theory of justice), and then moves to the international political theory debate. The point of this chapter is to prepare the ground for the comparative analysis proposed in Chapter 4.

Chapter 3 presents the theories of four key Islamist thinkers: Muḥammad ʿAbduh, Sayid Quṭb, Muḥammad Bāqir al-Ṣadr and Ruhollah Musavi Khomeini. The four of them are very different in time, space, and also in their respective theories but they all share a critical attitude towards the liberal political project and the application of liberal norms and institutions within the context of the Islamic community. The choice of different thinkers provides an account of Islamism, representative of its internal variations but also shows underlying assumptions of Islamism, which cut across the whole spectrum of the Islamist political theory paradigm. Reference to al-Ṣadr and Khomeini is particularly relevant because anticipates the focus on Shiʿī Islamism, which is at the basis of Hezbollah's political identity.

Chapter 4 proposes a comparative analysis of the conceptions of person and community in Islamist and communitarian political theory and claims that Islamism can be understood as a form of communitarianism. It will show that at the roots of the

---

[28] English school theorists themselves often refer to international community rather than society, especially in the early stage of English School literature. As Halliday notices for English School theorists as Hedley Bull do not seem to value this distinction between society and community. Fred Halliday, 'International Society as Homogeneity' *Rethinking International Relations* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1994) p. 99.

[29] A useful definition of ideal type is 'pure conceptual model of types of social actions', Hollis and Smith, *Explaining and Understanding* p. 80. For a discussion of Weber's ideal type *see* Susan J. Hekman, *Weber, the Ideal Type, and Contemporary Social Theory* (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983) pp. 18-38.

communitarian and Islamist critique of liberalism and international norms there are common assumptions on the ideas of person and community. The study, then, will highlight the core characteristics of person and community in these theories to which it will refer again towards the conclusions of the thesis.

The focus then shifts from a theoretical discussion to a more historical approach. Chapter 5 introduces the rise of Shiʿī Islamism in Lebanon and then presents the specific case of Hezbollah on which the rest of the thesis will focus. Chapter 6 proposes the first instance in which the approach of Hezbollah to international norms is discussed. It refers to the events of the 1996 war and discusses the process that led to the adoption of a regime of restraint on warfare on the basis of the non-combatant immunity norm.

Chapter 7 looks at Hezbollah's involvement in parliamentary politics in Lebanon, and proposes a monitoring of the activity of Hezbollah's delegation in the parliament with regard to the implementation of human rights legislation. This occasion shows how Hezbollah modified its political profile to adapt to the secular (although confessionalised) and quasi-liberal institutions of the Lebanese state and to analyse Hezbollah's approach to human rights legislation.

Chapter 8 considers again a context of war. This time the focus is on the events of 2005 and the 2006 conflict in Lebanon. The analysis looks at how UN Security Council resolutions impact over Hezbollah's political identity and its political and military actions at a time in which Hezbollah has escalated its participation to politics becoming part of the government. This chapter will highlight how international norms such as state sovereignty and international peace do not leave Hezbollah unchanged. However, the Islamist movement becomes entangled in a process of negotiation and implementation of norms which are entirely derived from the international normative system.

Chapter 9 is somewhat different in its methodology but is an opportunity for a more general and conclusive overview of the process presented in the previous chapters. It proposes a comparative analysis of the two most important texts published by the

movement: the 1984 *Open Letter* and the 2009 *Political Document*. Through this comparison in texts' contents and vocabulary, the chapter highlights the sharp increase in references to terms and norms that overlap with liberal and international norms and the decrease in Islamic and particular references. The chapter will particularly emphasise the focus on person and community as units of analysis in order to lead to the conclusions presented in Chapter 10. This last chapter presents the overall conclusions of this study, which corresponds to the concluding observations mentioned above in Section 1.2 above.

The thesis is provided with three appendices, two of which are relevant for Chapter 9 and are working translations of the *Open Letter* and the *Political Document of Hezbollah*. I have retranslated or edited these texts so that they could be analysed with a software[30] for text analysis. More details regarding these texts can be found in the section preceding the appendices. The third appendix is a data collection regarding the monitoring of the parliamentary debates on human rights legislation and refers to the case discussed in Chapter 7.

1.7   Style and Transliterations

In terms of style, this text has been drafted with reference to the *Oxford Style Manual*[31]and in abidance with the indications given by the department and the university of affiliation of the author. With regard to the transliteration of Arabic terms the author referred to the guidelines suggested by the *Oxford Style Manual* complemented by the indications given by the *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*. Most of the Arabic terms have been transliterated including most of the names of persons. Terms that have become of common use have been proposed in their more common form as accepted in English.

---

[30] The software instruments in question are QDA Miner and Word Stat.

[31] R. M. Ritter, *The Oxford Style Manual* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).

Chapter 2

The Communitarian Critique of Liberalism

2.1   Introduction

With the end of the Cold War, liberal norms and institutions have witnessed a remarkable expansion in the global political sphere, both at domestic and international level. The last decades of the Twentieth Century have been considered an unprecedented historical opportunity for the expansion of these norms on a global scale. Famously, Francis Fukuyama considered this the 'end of history', where liberal democracy would have become the 'final form of government' for all states, whereas alternative models (communism and Islamism) were doomed to decline.[1] The United Nations undertook actions and issued declarations in which increasing global interdependence and the post-Cold War historical juncture were considered an opportunity for freedom, equality, solidarity and peace to spread globally.[2] The UN Secretary General Kofi Annan in 2005 released a report 'In Larger Freedom' in which he made the case for a major reform of international institutions claiming that: 'After a period of difficulty in international affairs, in the face of both new threats and old ones in new guises, there is a yearning in many quarters for a new consensus on which to base collective action.'[3] On this basis, he called for new human rights institutions, the reduction of inequality, the affirmation of peace and the increase of international security.

The legitimacy and theoretical assumptions, on which liberal norms and institutions rely, nonetheless, have been constantly challenged. This chapter introduces some of the most common critiques of liberalism, which developed within the Western political theory debate with reference to communitarian political thinking. In brief, liberals have elaborated their theories with an idea of the person in mind influenced by the concept of the Kantian moral agent. It is argued that, 'No constitutive attachment, either to state, nation, family or cultural group, must trump the claims of individuals and their basic

---

[1] Francis Fukuyama, 'The End of History?', *The National Interest,* 16 (1989): 3-18.

[2] UN General Assembly 'United Nations Millennium Declaration' (8 September 2000).

[3] UN Secretary General 'In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All' (A/59/2005: 21 March 2005).

rights and status.'[4] According to this conception, a person is an autonomous individual capable of choosing amongst alternative ways of life primarily through the use of reason. This conception informs the idea that a just political order allows persons living together in societies that maximise their autonomy and their capacity to achieve their personal interests. Liberal institutions as rights, the rule of law, the separation of powers, but also state sovereignty and its monopoly over the use of force are based on this conception.

Critics of liberalism, however, see this conception of the person as an autonomous moral individual with scepticism. Communitarians in particular rather rely on a conception closer to the Hegelian idea according to which the person acquires their identity and ethical principles as part of a group of people sharing a tradition and a common history.[5] This group of people is defined as a *community* and not as a society. A community is not exclusively defined by rules for mutual advantage and individual well-being, but shares among its members, ethical principles constitutive of the person's ethics.

This differentiates the idea of community from the liberal idea of society in which various ethical conceptions co-exist in mutual tolerance and are all equally valued. A community, according to the critics of liberalism, is more assertive towards its members on how they should live and which ethical principles should be valued. This inevitably compresses the moral autonomy of the individual which is, however, of capital importance for liberals.

This divergence between liberals and their critics regarding the concept of the person and how persons live together (whether in communities or societies) has important consequences on how they theorise both domestic and international politics as the following pages will show. Whereas liberals consider just political institutions

---

[4] Paul Kelly, *Liberalism* (Cambridge ; Malden, MA: Polity, 2005) p. 10. More generally Kelly's discussion of the concept of liberalism is the main working reference for the account of liberalism presented in the next pages along with John Charvet and Elisa Kaczynska-Nay, *The Liberal Project and Human Rights: The Theory and Practice of a New World Order* (Cambridge, UK ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008).

[5] For a useful account of Hegel's influence on communitarian political theory the reader can refer to Andrew Linklater, *The Transformation of Political Community: Ethical Foundations of the Post-Westphalian Era* (Oxford: Polity, 1998) pp. 52-5.

maximising individual freedoms, communitarians are keener to identify as just a political order that protects and foster the values of the moral community.

Section 1.2 provides an overview of how communitarian criticism of liberal norms is rooted in a long tradition and refers to Edmund Burke's polemic against the expansion of the French Revolution influence in Europe and Karl Marx's criticism of rights. Section 1.3 shows how similar forms of criticism remained relevant at a later stage, at a time in which liberal democracies and international liberal norms were firmly established in western political systems and beyond. This is the case of contemporary communitarian political theory which emerged primarily as a reaction to the revival of the Kantian liberal tradition initiated by John Rawls's theory of justice. Section 1.4 highlights how the liberal-communitarian debate was projected into international political theory and international relations theory. In this case, the source of contention primarily relates to the issue of humanitarian intervention, and the universality of human rights. This section will focus particularly on the latter.

The aim of this section and the following chapter is to shed some light on these critical views of liberalism and identify the underlying assumptions of the criticism. This will be instrumental to the comparative analysis proposed in Chapter 4.

2.2   Early Critiques: Burke, Marx and Universal Rights Declarations

The *American Declaration of Independence* (1776) and the *Declaration of the Rights of the Man and the Citizen* by the French National Assembly (1789) are generally considered as historical milestones of the rising importance of the idea of universal rights, and more broadly, of liberal institutions. These declarations were the outcome of a long intellectual history which peaked with the diffusion of the enlightenment's political culture.[6]

---

[6] James Griffin, *On Human Rights* (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2008) p. 13.

2.2.1 Burke's Conservative Stance against the French Revolution

Not coincidentally, it was in relation to these declarations that criticism of liberalism began to emerge. Edmund Burke and Karl Marx are representative examples. Both proposed a critique of these declarations and more generally of the revolutionary events of eighteenth and nineteenth century France. Their criticism anticipated the more recent critiques of liberalism. Jeremy Waldron observes that:

> Bentham, Burke and Marx all attack human rights for what they call their 'abstraction'; they all focus on the theme of individualism versus community, though their respective conceptions of community are of course very different; and they all claim that rights of man involve a radically impoverished view of the constitution of human society.[7]

This highlights the central problem of the debate. Critics of liberalism are primarily concerned with the way liberals understand the idea of the person and community. If we consider Burke's political theory we will see that:

> Burke's perspective on international society relates to a prominent debate in normative theory between cosmopolitanism and communitarianism. Although Burke appealed to a universal natural law applicable to humanity, his emphasis on cultural similitude as an underpinning for international society (particularly in Europe) parallels communitarianism as a normative approach to international relations.[8]

Burke was an aristocrat asserting the importance of the preservation of the traditional political order and its elites because of alleged intrinsic moral value. The French Revolution was perceived as a threat to the *status quo* of the European community and Burke claimed that it had to be opposed to preserve the integrity of traditional moral values. Most of his intellectual work is in defence of the *status quo* against the revolutionary movement initiated by the French Revolution which he severely criticises in *Reflections on the Revolution in France* (1790). His polemic against the revolution and the institutionalisation of a liberal order was particularly directed by the idea of the rights of man.

---

[7] Jeremy Waldron, *'Nonsense Upon Stilts': Bentham, Burke and Marx on the Rights of Man* (London: Methuen, 1987) p. 3.

[8] Edmund Burke, David P. Fidler, and Jennifer M. Welsh, *Empire and Community: Edmund Burke's Writings and Speeches on International Relations* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1999) p. 54.

Despite the fact that he was a universal moralist, generally committed to a religious understanding of natural law, according to Burke the moral legitimacy of norms and political orders, as David Boucher observes,[9] results from a shared communal tradition and history embodied in the national and European ethical context. Moral righteousness and rights correspond to the ethical principles constitutive of the community and these shall not be subverted by the will of an isolated individual detached from the communal context. As he argues, 'The body of the community, whenever it can come to act, can meet with no effectual resistance; but till power and right are the same, the whole body of them has no right inconsistent with virtue.'[10]

Chris Brown observes, in this regard, that 'In opposition to the universal claims of the Revolution, Burke posed a different notion of the organic community to that of Rousseau or the republicans.'[11] In Burke's theory the community is the element underpinning the legitimacy of a political order. Consequently, he does not oppose indiscriminately the idea of rights (which he recognises within certain limits) but criticises their extension beyond the borders set by history and the community on the basis of which rights are stipulated.[12] Since the French Revolution was subversive of traditional communal values, Burke criticises this phenomenon as corrupting the moral order of Europe and extends this criticism to the declaration of rights. In opposition to the idea of 'man' as depicted in the rights declaration, Burke proposes a conception of the person as a 'civil social man'[13] understood as part of a social group whose moral understanding overlaps with the principles of the civil community. It is for this reason that he was sceptical of the idea of the rights of man as conceived in the French declarations.

---

[9] David Boucher, *Political Theories of International Relations: From Thucydides to the Present* (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 1998) pp. 314-6.

[10] Edmund Burke, Francis Canavan, and Edward John Payne, *Select Works of Edmund Burke: A New Imprint of the Payne Edition*, 4 vols. (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1999) p. 100.

[11] Chris Brown, *International Relations Theory: New Normative Approaches* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992) p. 58.

[12] As the next section will show, this kind of criticism is to be found also among contemporary communitarian critics of human rights universality.

[13] Burke, Canavan, and Payne, *Select Works* p. 98.

As John Vincent observes 'the correct way to think about rights, according to Burke, was in terms of the ancient and indisputable laws and liberties inherited from our forefathers, and this meant particular rights, the rights of Englishmen, not the rights of man.'[14]

2.2.2   Marx's Critique of Liberal Individualism: the Self-Sufficient Monad

In *On the Jewish Question* (1843), Marx provides another example of criticism against the idea of the rights of man where he criticises the idea of the person as individual self-sufficient beings. As Michael Walzer points out, 'The writing of the young Marx represents one of the early appearances of communitarian criticism, and his argument, first made in 1840s, is powerfully present today.'[15]According to Waldron, there are two interpretations of the Marxian critique of rights. In the first interpretation, Waldron observes, the rights of men declared in the French declarations were for Marx an invention of the bourgeoisie to maintain its privileges using the liberal theory of natural rights. The second interpretation explains that, although in Marx's critique the rights of man are nothing but the invention of bourgeois elites, the rights of citizens can be a means of facilitating the constitution of a political community rather than its fragmentation.[16] In this second interpretation, not only the rights of man (as opposed to citizenship rights) are instruments for the interests of the bourgeoisie perpetuating the injustice of the capitalist society, but they rely on a conception of person in contrast with Marx's idea of the human as a 'species-being'[17]. This critique emerges when he criticises the principle of equality as conceived in the French declaration.

Equality in this declaration corresponds to the idea that 'each man shall without discrimination be treated as a self-sufficient monad' according to Marx. His criticism is likewise severe with the rights to property that he dubs as the 'right of selfishness.'[18]

---

[14] R. J. Vincent, *Human Rights and International Relations* (Cambridge Cambridgeshire ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986) p. 28.

[15] Michael Walzer, 'The Communitarian Critique of Liberalism', *Political Theory,* 18/1 (1990), 6-23 at p. 8.

[16] Waldron, *'Nonsense Upon Stilts'* pp. 126-9.

[17] Ibid., p. 129.

[18]Karl Marx, 'On the Jewish Question' in David Mclellan (ed.), *Karl Marx: Selected Writings* (2nd edn., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) pp. 60-1.

More generally, he argues that 'none of the so-called rights of man goes beyond egoistic man, man as he is in civil society, namely an individual withdrawn behind his private interests and whims and separated from the community.'[19]John Charvet and Elisa Kaczynska-Nay observe that in Marx's critique:

> Political community on this liberal view of man is in effect only an abstract ideal framework external to individuals and the only real bond holding them together is need and private interest. The political community, while purporting to realize the common good, is in actuality degraded into serving the interests of egotistic man.[20]

As an alternative to this individualist liberal conception, he proposes the idea of a person characterised by a communal nature, according to which the person develops their life in the political community and is valued as a communal being.[21] This is why, according to certain interpretations, Marx is not entirely hostile to the idea of political rights (distinguished from the more general notion of human or natural rights).

Waldron argues that political rights are consistent with Marx's 'species-being' conception of the person, whereas those rights that exclusively safeguard individual freedom are not. According to Marx, political rights 'Are only exercised in community with other men. Their content is formed by participation in the common essence, the political essence, the essence of the state.'[22] Differently, for example, the right to property is only the result of an individualist conception of the person. However, more can be said in this respect considering Allen Buchanan's discussion of Marx's theory. Buchanan argues that one of the main critical points of Marx is that 'the concept of person as essentially a being with a sense of justice and who is a bearer of rights is a radically defective concept that could only arise in a radically defective form of human society.'[23] According to this interpretation, the liberal individualist conception of person is the evidence of an unjust social system in which the rights of man perpetuate this injustice, while political rights try to rectify, in vain, its deficiencies. Marx's critique is

---

[19] Ibid.

[20] Charvet and Kaczynska-Nay, *Liberal Project* p. 310.

[21] Marx, 'On the Jewish Question' p. 53.

[22] Ibid., p. 59.

[23] Allen E. Buchanan, *Marx and Justice: The Radical Critique of Liberalism* (London: Methuen, 1982) p. 51.

that rights and justice are futile concepts as they rely on a vision of society that is fundamentally faulty.

Indeed, rights become relevant in conditions in which justice is not possible since the modes of production of the capitalist society constitute a form of injustice themselves. According to this conception, the relations that we establish with other persons are constitutive of justice. Justice is not an external principle but is intrinsic to how society and social relations are arranged. According to Marx, it is only in the communist society where class and property are abolished, that social relations will be just. In these circumstances, rights and justice will become obsolete. As a result, justice is about establishing relations regulated by the ideal of socialism and not by recognising individual rights.[24]

It is only in the life of the community (a community based on the principles of communism) that the person can achieve actual emancipation. A just political order is underpinned by social arrangements in which persons are understood as 'species being' embedded within a network of equal and just social relations. In this sense, the Marxian critique represents a form of communitarianism, because it conceives persons primarily as communal beings and community as the source of a just social order. As in the case of Burke, the rise of a liberal conception (epitomised by the rights declarations of the French Revolution and US independence) prompted a critical reaction by theorists endorsing a conception of community and person analogous to that of contemporary communitarianism. The rise of liberal norms, such as universal rights, provoked an intellectual critical reaction of which Marx and Burke are prominent representatives. Both, even though from opposing perspectives, found their views on the idea of community as the fundamental source of legitimacy for a certain political order. This conception proposed an idea of person as connected with communal membership epitomised by Marx's 'species-being' and Burke's 'civil social man'.

In sharp contrast with the Kantian idea of the individual as moral agent, Marx and Burke's conception produced the basis of an enduring theoretical tension between

---

[24] Ibid., pp. 81-5.

liberals and communitarians that has influenced the political theory debate until the present time.

2.3   Contemporary Communitarian Critique of Liberalism

In the second half of the twentieth century, liberalism reacquired centrality in the political theory debate due to the contribution of scholars who proposed a revised version of the Kantian tradition. *A Theory of Justice* (1971) by John Rawls[25] is the main work that reframed the debate on justice and rights in political theory[26] revitalising the liberal tradition in normative public thinking.

2.3.1   Sandel's Critique of Rawls's Theory of Justice: the Unencumbered Self

The main aim of *A Theory of Justice* is reformulating social contract theory, without resorting to metaphysical or natural law principles, but rather relying on public reasoning and following procedures eventually leading to the achievement of fair principles of justice. According to the Rawlsian conception, justice is the primary virtue of social institutions and when applied to public life of society, it shall be based on a principle of fairness.[27] In order to come to a definition of which principles should underpin a just society, Rawls imagines an ideal condition in which the persons involved agree on a set of principles to assess whether the basic institutions of a society are just or not.

This ideal condition is the 'original position' in which rational agents agree on two main principles. Certain procedural restrictions guarantee the fairness of the result of this process. Rawls imagines that the actors involved in the 'original position' are behind a 'veil of ignorance' that does not allow them to know their social position, wealth or conception of the good life.[28] On the basis of this 'mental experiment' according to

---

[25] The next section will refer to the revised edition. *See* Rawls, *Theory of Justice*.

[26] Michael Walzer, *Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality* (New York: Basic Books, 1983) p. XVIII.

[27] Rawls, *Theory of Justice* pp. 3-6.

[28] Ibid., pp. 118-23.

Rawls it will be possible to establish the principles to evaluate whether a society is just or not. There are certain circumstances on which the 'original position' is based, which render social cooperation both possible and necessary.[29] One main condition is that different persons, in general, have different conceptions of the good life. Another condition is that the world is characterised by a scarcity of goods. These two conditions are the circumstances justifying the idea of justice (as conceived in liberal theory) as prior to alternative ethical conceptions.

On the basis of these conditions, the rational actors in the 'original position' will eventually agree on two principles of justice. The first requires the equal right of a person to enjoy as much freedom as possible without limiting the freedom of others. While the second principle (the 'difference principle') establishes that social and economic inequalities are justified only if they maximise the expected benefit of the worst-off person and when free and equal access is guaranteed to anyone for any social position.[30]

Rawls's theory provoked a lasting debate between liberals and communitarians. Michael Sandel presents one of the most influential critiques in *Liberalism and the Limits of Justice*.[31] His main argument is that the priority of justice over the other virtues of a social order is based on implausible assumptions. The first assumption to be criticised is the priority of the right over the good.[32] The second assumption is the conception of the self as prior and detached from its ends.[33]

Sandel articulates his criticism mostly with reference to these two elements and concludes that the conception of person on which Rawls's 'original position' is based is implausible and cannot support the conclusions that Rawls justifies by means of the 'original position'. The liberal conception of justice is based on a misrepresentation of

---

[29] Ibid., pp. 109-12.

[30] Ibid., pp. 47-101.

[31] The following paragraphs will refer to the second edition. Michael J. Sandel, *Liberalism and the Limits of Justice* (2nd edn.; Cambridge, UK ; New York: Cambridge Universtiy Press, 1998).

[32] Ibid., p. 17.

[33] Ibid., p. 22.

the self and an instrumental conception of society that undermines its validity.[34] Sandel disagrees with the idea of justice taking precedence over other virtues since this conception is based on unrealistic presuppositions. Rawls's objective and subjective circumstances of justice do not apply in a number of relevant contexts, according to Sandel. For example, a family, a tribe but also an established nationalism with a shared identity and common purpose. Here, individuals share common ends on the basis of a common ethical understanding rather than being divided along different ethical conceptions. This is in contrast with the Rawlsian view whereby individuals in societies are motivated on the sole basis of self-interest and mutual cooperation, and then undermines the validity of the conditions under which justice (as it is conceived from his liberal perspective) enjoys precedence over other virtues.[35]

Whereas social aggregation for Rawls is merely instrumental, Sandel claims that communities have a *constitutive* function and determine what justice for the members of the community entails. According to communitarianism, it is as members of a community constitutive of our moral identity that we agree on what justice is about, and not as individual moral agents in an abstract ideal situation. Justice then is the substantiation of a particular moral belief and does not rise above different ethical beliefs. Liberals reply to this criticism by saying that the circumstances of justice do not intend to give an account of reality but rather to reproduce an ideal condition which is reasonable in gaining consensus on justice as fairness.

Nevertheless, this counter-argument is not entirely convincing for Sandel who focuses his criticism on the conception of the person (the 'moral subject') underlying the Rawlsian 'original position'. According to Sandel, even in the ideal conditions of Rawls's 'original position', if the person was a rational, self-interested individual deprived of ethical identity through a 'veil of ignorance', they would not agree on the two principles of justice.

---

[34] Ibid., p. 150.

[35] Ibid., pp. 28-46.

Sandel points out that for the person, as conceived in the Rawlsian 'original position' (i.e. as a moral agent capable of choosing between alternative ends and moral conceptions), the actual process of choosing and reasoning cannot take place. Since the person is deprived of ethical communal reference throughout the expedient of the 'veil of ignorance' this prevents the subject adopting a substantial ethical perspective which in turn renders an inability to operate actual choices.[36]

This conception of person, which Sandel calls 'unencumbered self',[37] is implausible. He argues that a person cannot establish the principles of justice of a political order if not on the basis of the moral conception developed as member of an ethical community. According to Sandel 'The assumptions of the 'original position' thus stand opposed in advance to any conception of the good requiring a more or less expansive self-understanding, and in particular to the possibility of community in the constitutive sense.'[38] He concludes that:

> Rawls' conception of the person can neither support his theory of justice nor plausibly account for our capacity for agency and self-reflection; justice cannot be primary in the way deontology requires, for we cannot coherently regard ourselves as the sort of beings the deontological ethic requires to be.[39]

The point then, very simply, is that the Rawlsian conception of liberal justice as fairness does not acknowledge sufficiently the role of the community as the definitional factor of the ethical principles of the person. Rawls's theory is inconsistent; because a person in the 'original position' would not choose the principle of justice, since the 'veil of ignorance' renders them incapable of the act of choosing. What really happens behind the 'veil of ignorance' is the discovery of principles shared by other parties of the agreement situated in an identical condition through a process of self-understanding.[40] He considers the 'original position' a plausible idea only understood as the 'coming to

---

[36] Ibid., pp. 54-9.

[37] Michael J. Sandel, 'The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self', *Political Theory,* 12/1 (1984), 81-96 at pp. 18-20.

[38] Sandel, *Liberalism* p. 64.

[39] Ibid., p. 65.

[40] Ibid., pp. 122-32.

self-awareness of an inter-subjective being.'[41] The inter-subjective being in question is the community from which we acquire our identity. It follows that justice is not prior to the idea of good, but is a conception of what good is, shared by the members of the community as the constitutive element of their identity.

Just like Burke and Marx were critical of how the person and community were conceived in early declarations of rights for being individualist and disruptive of communal values; Sandel is critical of how the person is conceived in Rawls's liberal theory in a similar way. The same criticism was raised by other influential scholars such as Charles Taylor and Alastair MacIntyre.

2.3.2 Taylor's Atomism and MacIntyre's Virtue Ethics

A relevant case is Taylor's atomist critique of liberal ethics.[42] According to Taylor, any social contract theory is atomist (i.e. individualist) and relies on the primacy of individual rights over communitarian obligations and principles of belonging. This is true, especially with regard to the theory of Robert Nozick[43] on which Taylor focuses in his *Atomism*. The primacy of rights claimed by liberals and libertarians relies, according to Taylor, on a misconception of the person as a self-sufficient being isolated from the social dimensions of life. From the atomist perspective, the person is an individual capable of choosing in autonomy as a self-conscious agent among different life plans. It is through the exercise of this capacity that the person realises their freedom. Thus, the recognition of rights comes as a result of the atomistic conception of the person in order to safeguard their nature of free, individual and capable of autonomous choice.

But Taylor criticises this view, and argues that the capacities of a person and the possibility to develop their potential are dependent on the social components of their

---

[41] Ibid., p. 132.

[42] The next paragraphs refers to Charles Taylor, 'Atomism' *Philosophical Papers: Philosophy and the Human Sciences* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985) pp.187-210.

[43] Robert Nozick, *Anarchy, State, and Utopia* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1975).

life. It is as members of a community only that persons acquire the capacities on which the alleged primacy of rights is based. According to Taylor:

> The identity of the autonomous, self-determining individual requires a social matrix, one for instance which through a series of practices recognizes the right to autonomous decision and which calls for the individual having a voice in deliberation about public action.[44]

Thus it is not *qua* individual persons that we are entitled to rights but as members of a liberal community in which rights are valued legitimate norms that we are entitled to as a recognition of rights. Taylor points out that a person develops capacity as social being through processes of mutual recognition and socialisation, contrarily to the atomistic conception of the person according to which the individual is located above his or her social context. [45]

MacIntyre's criticism of liberal theories of rights is delineated in *After Virtue* (1981)[46] the main argument of which is that moral philosophy is in an age of disorder and cannot cope with the actual need of contemporary society since common virtues are shared as the basis of an ethical community. MacIntyre develops a critique of Rawls's and Nozick's theories arguing that both do not adopt any principle of desert in the recognition of rights to persons.[47]In these liberal conceptions there is no shared ethical understanding establishing a common set of virtues on which it is possible to assess what a person deserves from the point of view of justice. This reveals that both Rawls's and Nozick's theory are based on an individualist conception by which persons have different ethical views. He claims that this is the result of an age of moral decay in which modern society has become a 'collection of strangers'.[48] The main consequence of the permanent disagreement on different ethical conceptions is the erosion of the ethical community and the reinforcement of a conception of the individual, prior to and

---

[44] Taylor, 'Atomism' p. 209.

[45] Ibid., p. 205.

[46] Alasdair C. MacIntyre, *After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory* (2nd edn.; Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984) Especially Chapter 17.

[47] Ibid., p. 249.

[48] Ibid., p. 251.

independent from, a sense of communal affiliation.[49] As a result, what we are witnessing in the modern age is the detachment of government and politics from the ethical principles of community.

For this reason, MacIntyre argues that modern society needs to revive the idea of justice as the embodiment of the virtues of an ethical community. On the contrary, the liberal conception of justice and rights as prior to concurrent ethical conceptions[50] is the result of individualist assumptions relegating the role of the community to a secondary level.

In *Whose Justice? Which Rationality?* (1988) MacIntyre's criticism refers to how liberal ethics relies on assumptions of individualist 'impersonality' which cannot constitute the foundation of a just society. According to him:

> Those conceptions of universality and impersonality which survive this kind of abstraction from the concreteness of traditional or even nontraditional conventional modes of moral thought and action are far too thin and meagre to supply what is needed.[51]

MacIntyre argues that liberalism is an ethical conception that cannot justifiably claim priority over other ethical conceptions, but should be understood rather as a conventional ethical tradition, among many others, in which persons are 'educated' to be 'liberal'. In his own words:

> To be educated into the culture of a liberal social order is, therefore, characteristically to become the kind of person to whom it appears normal that a variety of goods should be pursued, each appropriate to its own sphere, with no overall good supplying any overall unity to life.[52]

As in the previous cases, the communitarian critics of liberal political theory criticise the idea of the person as detached from moral traditions and then the community.

---

[49] Ibid., p. 250.

[50] Common way of paraphrasing this idea of the priority of rights is Ronald Dworkin's conception of 'rights as trumps'. Ronald Dworkin, 'Rights as Trumps' in Jeremy Waldron (ed.), *Theories of Rights* (Oxford Oxfordshire ; New York: Oxford University Press, 1984).

[51] Alasdair C. MacIntyre, *Whose Justice? Which Rationality?* (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988) p. 334.

[52] Ibid., p. 337.

According to them, becoming a liberal person is not the result of abstract reasoning but rather the outcome of a process of socialisation within a liberal tradition.

MacIntyre and other communitarians criticise the assumptions of liberal ethics since liberalism relies on the idea that a person is prior to communal bonds and can develop an ethical understanding in isolation from communalistic and traditional affiliations.

Sandel, Taylor and MacIntyre have developed an influential and at times convincing critique of liberalism. This critique unfolds primarily at a meta-theoretical level, in which the object of their criticism is not liberal theory but rather its underlying assumptions about persons and community. Notwithstanding the different cultural and historical circumstances, the contemporary critique of liberalism is similar to that of Burke and Marx who were equally unsatisfied with how liberals conceive the person and community in their rights declarations. This kind of disagreement gained momentum in another occasion with the emergence of liberal theory in international political theory and international relations theory.

2.4   Implications of Communitarianism in International Political Theory

The liberal-communitarian dichotomy applies in many respects to the international political theory debate intended as the political theory scholarship dedicated to normative issues in international relations (international justice, humanitarian intervention, human rights and so on).[53] There are two areas, according to Brown, in which the liberal-communitarian divide is manifest: the legitimacy of the international use of force and issues of global justice, especially human rights and the idea of global distributive justice.[54]

---

[53]   *See* for example Brown's and Adler's analysis of communitarianism in international relations. Brown, *International Relations*. Emanuel Adler, *Communitarian International Relations: The Epistemic Foundations of International Relations* (London ; New York: Routledge, 2005).

[54] Brown, *International Relations* p. 100.

A concise overview of the debate on human rights is illustrative of how communitarianism is critical of liberal theory and cosmopolitanism also within the context of international politics. The main friction between liberal-cosmopolitan theories and communitarianism is obvious in the three main areas of the human rights debate: their foundations, the relationship of human rights with state sovereignty and the divergence between minimalist and extended conceptions of human rights.

2.4.1   Communitarian Critique of Human Rights Foundationalism

Considering that communitarians were critical of liberal theories of rights within the institutional framework of the state, it is not surprising that the cosmopolitan claims about the universal recognition of rights provoked even more radical criticism. MacIntyre argues that 'It would be of course a little odd that there should be such rights attaching to human beings simply *qua* human beings' and concludes that 'there are no such rights, and belief in them is one with the belief in witches and unicorns.'[55]Taylor argues that an unconditional recognition of rights to human beings based on 'the self-sufficiency of man alone'[56] cannot be plausible since the person exercises capacities (that are the basis for the recognition of rights) within a social communitarian environment. Brown captures the communitarian criticism of universalist human rights conceptions as follows:

> Liberal societies of the last 150 to 200 years have indeed been the freest and most generally congenial societies known to history, but not because they have been constructed on the basis of rights; their success has been based on features within them that pointed towards a different, more community and less individualist, context for political action. It was because of the existence of this context, because these societies were, in certain respects, *ethical communities*, that rights were widely honoured and respected.[57]

The communitarian concern about the legitimacy of norms, which do not rely on an ethical community, applies to universal human rights which are subject to criticism

---

[55] MacIntyre, *After Virtue* p. 69.

[56] Taylor, 'Atomism' p. 189.

[57] Chris Brown, 'Universal Human Rights: A Critique', *The International Journal of Human Rights,* 1/2 (1997), 41 - 65 at p. 49.

either for their reliance on a faulty conception of person or for the implausible idea of a universal liberal community.

According to communitarians, the foundation of human rights as universal norms is problematic because a person can neither be an abstract individual independent from local communal allegiances, nor does the international context correspond to a universal liberal community. Since these conditions are not met, the universal recognition of rights to human beings leans on faulty assumptions.

2.4.2 Communitarian-Cosmopolitan Syntheses

Notwithstanding these divergences, as Emanuel Adler observes: 'In light of the problematic dichotomy established by the debate between liberal cosmopolitans and communitarians, some scholars have sought a synthesis between the two approaches.'[58]

The case of Andrew Linklater is a good example of liberal-communitarian mediation. Linklater proposes a speculation in which he reconsiders the concept of political community, claiming that under the influence of globalising factors this cannot be considered anymore as necessarily coextensive with the borders of the Westphalian state. Accepting part of the communitarian claims over the importance of community, but also emphasising the importance of universalist cosmopolitan stances, he claims that:

> Far from being antithetical communitarianism and cosmopolitanism provide complementary insights into the possibility of new forms of community and citizenship in the post-Westphalian era. They reveal that more complex associations of universality and difference can be developed by breaking the nexus between sovereignty, territoriality, nationality and citizenship and by promoting wider communities of discourse.[59]

---

[58] Adler, *Communitarian International Relations* p. 8. There are many examples of conciliatory accounts between liberal and communitarian conceptions in international political theory. The present analysis only considers a few. One interesting contribution that cannot be discussed herein but deserves to be mentioned is Amitai Etzioni, *From Empire to Community: A New Approach to International Relations* (1st edn.; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004).

[59] Linklater, *Political Community* p. 60.

On this basis he proposes a theory critical to realist and neo-realist conceptions of international relations as occurring in a-moral and anarchical systems; and claims that international political theory should be able to capture the dynamic evolution of the international political community in a 'post-Westphalian era'.[60] Although such a short account does not do justice to a more sophisticated theory, Linklater basically refers to the concept of 'dialogic community',[61] closely related to Habermasian ethics discourse. He reflects on the possibility of a universal ethical discourse which may strike 'appropriate balances between universality and difference'[62] thus solving the tension between communitarian particularistic claims and cosmopolitan universalist stances.

Frost's 'constitutive theory' of international ethics is another prominent case of liberal-communitarian mediation in international political theory. His theory revives the Hegelian idea of balance between the state, community and the individual as mutually constitutive. It relies on a conception of the person characterised by distinctive communitarian features. For example he says that 'Constitutive theory starts by asserting that a person only has value *qua* individual in a relationship of mutual valuation with another person or other people, i.e. within a community.'[63] He argues that individuality is achieved through a dialectical process divided into three stages: the person as member of the family, their emancipation as an individual in civil society[64] and reciprocal recognition of individuals as rights holders; members of the same sovereign state.[65] A fourth stage regards the recognition of the state as a *sovereign* state in the international context; if a state is not recognised as such, its citizens cannot be recognised as rights holders.[66]

---

[60] *See* for example ibid., pp. 34-45.

[61] Ibid., pp. 85-100.

[62] Ibid., p. 108.

[63] Frost, *Ethics in International Relations* p. 141.

[64] Notice that Frost conceives civil society extensively and going beyond the borders of the state, differently from the more traditional Hegelian conception. Mervyn Frost, 'Mervyn Frost Replies to Peter Sutch's 'Human Rights as Settled Norms: Mervyn Frost and the Limits of Hegelian Human Rights Theory'', *Review of International Studies,* 26/03 (2000), 477-83 at p. 478.

[65] Frost, *Ethics in International Relations* pp. 141-50.

[66] Ibid., pp. 150-5.

According to this approach, then, sovereignty and rights are not antagonistic but mutually reinforcing norms. However, this attempt to harmonise the relationship between the norm of sovereignty and human rights provokes some perplexities. According to Frost's critics, his notion of human rights is altered by the embedment of the individual in the political community. As Peter Sutch points out:

> For Frost our sense of what is to be a free individual is tied up with our sense of what is to be a free citizen. Our everyday claims concerning human rights or self-determination only make sense in relation to these specific modes of existence.[67]

This reconnects to Marx's critique of the rights of man as opposed to the rights of citizens, but the problem is that in Frost's constitutive theory, individuals have rights only as members of the sovereign state.[68] This seems to alter the cosmopolitan idea of human rights, the meaning of which does not entirely overlap with citizens' rights, but has been specifically developed to detach the idea of rights from affiliation to a specific social group. Thus, even though Frost may have found a possible equilibrium between rights and sovereignty, his critics point out that this comes at a high cost for the concept of human rights.

Frost replies to his critics by clarifying that different to the traditional Hegelian conception, civil society is not limited by state boundaries but extends well beyond these: 'Civil society must be understood as a social form, a form of human associational life, which can be understood independently of sovereign democratic state, or states.'[69] In this way the problems raised by the co-extensive character of right holders and citizens are at least in part solved, becoming related to a wider social body that is the global civil society.

2.4.3   Communitarian Pragmatism: Anti-Foundationalism

Other ideas have been proposed in an attempt to solve the theoretical gap between communitarians and cosmopolitans. The problem of human rights' moral foundations

---

[67] Peter Sutch, 'Human Rights as Settled Norms: Mervyn Frost and the Limits of Hegelian Human Rights Theory', *Review of International Studies,* 26/02 (2000), 215-31 at p. 223.

[68] Frost, *Ethics in International Relations* p. 111.

[69] Frost, 'Mervyn Frost Replies to Peter Sutch' p. 478.

has been addressed with what has been defined 'communitarian pragmatism'.[70] Communitarian pragmatism, different to Frost's constitutive theory and Linklater's Dialogic Community, aims at a reconciliation of the particular-universal duality decoupling human rights from the idea of a universal foundation. Taylor, for example, argues that, as a condition for an 'unforced consensus' on human rights, 'We would agree on the norms while disagreeing on why they are the right norms.' [71] Leaving aside the moral reasons underpinning human rights, communitarian pragmatism claims that we can still find a shared set of norms, notwithstanding the different ethical backgrounds which persons may have as members of diverse communities.

A further example of communitarian pragmatism is Richard Rorty's anti-foundationalism who, claiming that there is no such thing as a universal 'human nature',[72] concludes that no morality can guarantee the universal recognition of human rights. He argues that by means of a 'sentimental education' we can enable persons to recognise other persons as human beings; throughout this 'education', the human rights culture will achieve wider recognition.[73]In addition to communitarian pragmatism and Frost's and Linklater's mediation attempts, the influence of communitarian theory on human rights can also be highlighted with reference to the later works of Rawls and certain aspects of David Miller's theory of nationality. In this case, the debate focused not so much on the moral foundations of rights, but concentrated on which rights can be recognised universally and which are however limited by the boundaries of ethical communities like nations or ethnical identities.

2.4.4   'Thin and Thick': Minimalist Human Rights Conceptions

Notwithstanding the fact that Rawls is among the main representatives of the liberal tradition, in his study dedicated to the problem of international justice he outlines a

---

[70] Timothy Dunne and Nicholas J. Wheeler, *Human Rights in Global Politics* (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999) pp. 1-28.

[71] Charles Taylor, 'Conditions of an Unforced Consensus on Human Rights' in Joanne R. Bauer and Daniel Bell (eds.), *The East Asian Challenge for Human Rights* (Cambridge, UK ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999) p. 124.

[72] Richard Rorty, 'Human Rights, Rationality and Sentimentality' in Stephen Shute and S. L. Hurley (eds.), *On Human Rights: The Oxford Amnesty Lectures* (New York, NY: BasicBooks, 1993) p. 119.

[73] Ibid., pp. 112-34.

theory that is inclusive of certain communitarian aspects. In the *Law of Peoples* he delineates the idea of a 'well-ordered hierarchical people', that is, a group of persons mostly characterised by a comprehensive ethical conception, but still meeting minimal requirements of moral 'decency'.[74] According to Rawls, despite the sophisticated procedural devices of the 'original position', liberals should not expect these peoples to abandon their comprehensive conception of the good and embrace international liberal principles of justice. The 'original position' does not apply in this context, since 'an original position argument for domestic justice *is a liberal idea*, and it does not apply to the domestic justice of decent hierarchical regime.'[75]

Rawls's *Law of Peoples* acknowledges that different and non-liberal ethical communities constitute an irreducible limit to the universal acceptance of liberal values. This view resembles the communitarian conception according to which liberal principles cannot be extended beyond the borders of the liberal community[76] since it is the liberal community itself that provides the basis for the legitimacy of its norms. Whereas the 'veil of ignorance' and the priority of the right over the good were the bases of domestic liberal justice (inclusive of the redistributive component justified by the 'difference principle'), according to Rawls, these procedures do not apply to the international political context, because it lacks an overall liberal foundation. Ethical pluralism, in the international context, imposes more severe limitations to the effective application of the principles of justice that Rawls develops with reference to domestic political orders. His law of peoples, for this reason, reduces human rights to a minimal list of fundamental rights[77] and considers distributive justice in global terms inevitably arbitrary.

---

[74] According to Rawls: "A decent people must honour the laws of peace, its system of law must be such as to respect human rights [Rawls has a minimalist conception of human rights Note of the Author] and to impose duties and obligations on all persons in its territory". John Rawls, *The Law of Peoples* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999) p. 67.

[75] Ibid., p. 70. Emph. Add.

[76] It has to be noticed that the limitation of the extension of liberal principles is also due to the commitment of liberal peoples to the principle of tolerance. *Ibid., pp. 59-60.*

[77] Human rights according to Rawls are different from those rights that liberal states guarantee. "Human rights in the Law of Peoples [..] express a special class of urgent rights, such as freedom from slavery and serfdom, liberty (but not equal liberty) of conscience, and security of ethnic groups form mass murder and genocide." Ibid., pp. 78-9.

Miller's theory proposes similar considerations but links the ethical community (on which the recognition of rights is based) to the idea of the nation. In this case, the nation constitutes a community informing the ethical principles of the person. The responsibilities of a person are primarily connected to their affiliation to a national community and do not extend beyond its borders except for the most serious violations. The 'ethical significance of nationality' is the basis on which Miller argues that 'the duties that we owe to our compatriots might be more extensive than the duties we owe to strangers, simply because they are compatriots'.[78]According to this view, our affiliation to a national community entails a minimalist recognition of human rights and limits the recognition of a complete set of rights (inclusive of those rights related to social and distributive justice) to the members of the same ethical community.

The political theory debate on human rights is well alive today and the examples aforementioned are only a partial representation of a more articulated discussion that is also becoming relevant for the norms applied in the use of force in international relations. The theories outlined above, nevertheless, suffice to illustrate how the communitarian conceptions of person and community cast their influence also in the international political theory debate challenging liberal universalist views.

With reference to the debate on human rights foundations, communitarian theory claims that human rights enjoy legitimacy only when recognised within a particular ethical community and not as the result of a universal morality. Communitarian theorists influence the international liberal political theory debate is by showing the limits of its universality. According to their views, the extension of liberal norms beyond the borders of liberal communities is arbitrary, because the international political context does not provide the same conditions that can be found in domestic politics.

Whereas, in domestic politics, norms and institutions as rights can lean on the existence of an ethical community as the foundation of their legitimacy; this does not apply to the international context because no such community exists. If it exists, its

---

[78] David Miller, 'The Ethical Significance of Nationality', *Ethics,* 98/4 (1988), 647-62 at p. 647.

moral substance, according to theorist such as Rawls, Miller and also Walzer[79] is so morally 'thin' that it can only legitimate minimalist conceptions of human rights and global justice.

2.5   Conclusions

In a discussion of the liberal-communitarian debate Walzer claims that: 'communitarianism is doomed – it probably is not a terrible fate – to eternal recurrence.'[80]Notwithstanding the common perception of an increasingly liberal global order; the previous pages have shown that the political theory tradition of liberalism has been criticised in its philosophical and normative foundations since its inception, and much of this criticism remains very much alive. The examples overviewed in this chapter show how this criticism is symptomatic of a particular conception of the person and community antithetic to the liberal individualist view.[81]

Underlying the recurrent communitarian critiques of liberalism; there is a common conception of the person. According to this conception, a person's ethical principles are derived from membership to a community which constitute the source of identity; contrarily to the liberal conception where the individual, as an autonomous moral agent, is fully in charge of his or her life choices. These divergences over conceptions of person and community produce different political views. Marx and Burke are critical of the emergence of political norms and institutions as universal rights. Communitarians have highlighted how the liberal theory of Rawls is unconvincing in its assumptions and fails to account for the importance of communal human relations in establishing what a just society entails.

A similar criticism emerges at the international political theory level, where the lack of a shared communal affiliation undermines the legitimacy of cosmopolitan claims about human rights. At this stage of the debate, communitarians and liberals have tried to

---

[79] Michael Walzer, *Thick and Thin: Moral Argument at Home and Abroad* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1994).

[80] Walzer, 'Communitarian Critique' p. 22.

[81] In Chapter 4 this conception will be defined in more detail along with the conception of community.

reconcile their views seeking a common ground as in the case of Frost or pragmatists such as Rorty.

The next chapter will show how these communitarian arguments are not the sole prerogatives of western critics of liberal norms, but the contextualisation of the person within history and customs and the consequent moral value attributed to the community are also central tenets in the Islamist critique of liberalism.

Chapter 3

The Islamist Critique of Liberalism

3.1 Introduction

Having seen how liberalism is subject to criticism within western political theory, this chapter presents some influential theories of Islamism and their criticism of liberal norms and institutions. Islamism will be presented with reference to Muḥammad ʿAbduh (1849-1905), Sayid Quṭb (1906-1966), Muḥammad Bāqir al-Ṣadr (1935-1980) and Ruhollah Musavi Khomeini (1902-1989).[1] These Islamist thinkers have been chosen for their influential role in contemporary Islamist politics; for example al-Ṣadr, Quṭb and Khomeini are all mentioned in the 1985 Hezbollah's manifesto which will be considered in the following chapters.[2]

Notwithstanding the differences among them and the diverse political and social contexts in which they operated, all of them share the idea of Islam as the exclusive source of a just and fair community. Whereas ʿAbduh operated in a context in which political engagement aimed at self-determination from colonial rule, Quṭb, al-Ṣadr and Khomeini were committed to recovering the Islamic communities from the rule of domestic autocratic regimes sponsored by foreign powers. All of them were convinced that the Muslim community has become morally and materially corrupt due to the imposition of norms and institutions originating from western liberal culture. From this it follows that Islam is the *only* source that can recover the community from its moral and material decay and the necessary means to achieve both spiritual and material well-being for the person. They all envision (although in different ways) the establishment of an 'Islamic system', a social and political architecture (often vaguely defined) which on the basis of its Islamic inspiration guarantees justice and well-being.

The discussion will now focus on Islamist criticism of liberal institutions and the political theories they theorise as alternatives. It will prepare the ground for a comparative analysis, proposed in Chapter 4, between the western and Islamist critiques of liberalism with reference to concepts of community and the person.

---

[1] The year of birth of Al-Ṣadr is disputed.

[2] *See* Section 5.5 and Chapter 9.

3.2 Reason and Islamic Tradition: the Reformism of Muḥammad ʿAbduh

One of the consequences of colonial domination in the Middle East is the diffusion of liberal social, political and economic norms within a context that had remained substantially isolated from their rise in Europe and the USA. This inevitably affected the social reality of states like Egypt which passed from the rule of the Ottoman Empire to the control of a colonising state and eventually achieved independence (1922). The new situation posed questions about how the tradition of Islam could cope with the expansion of modern principles of government such as public administration, the establishment of new penal codes, judicial systems, liberal education and capitalist modes of production and exploitation, all diverse from the various traditional norms and institutions present in the region.[3]

One of the prominent examples of Islamist scholars investigating the tension between modernity and Islamic ethics is Muḥammad ʿAbduh, who studied under the guidance of the pioneer of modern Islamism Jamāl al-Dīn al-Afghāny (1838-1897). During his life, he covered important public offices, such as heading a reform commission for education in the al-Azhar University (the oldest Islamic centre of knowledge) and Grand-Mufti of Egypt (the highest legal and religious authority in the country). He was exposed to western culture in a number of circumstances[4] and acknowledged the progress of the European society compared to the backwardness of the Egyptian context. This experience stimulated interest in investigating the decay and resurgence of civilisations. Most of his work, published in an extensive number of volumes, is dedicated to theological issues but with implications relevant from political, legal and social perspectives. Nevertheless he never produced a systematic political theory.[5]

---

[3] A particularly helpful account of this process is given by Talal Asad. Talal Asad, *Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2003) pp. 205-56.

[4] ʿAbduh established a friendship with Wilfrid Blunt an English member of the foreign office. *See* Wilfrid Scawen Blunt, *Secret History of the English Occupation of Egypt: Being a Personal Narrative of Events* (London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1907) pp.105-7. He also spent time in Paris where he attended the lectures of positivist philosophers such as Comte.

[5] Malcolm H. Kerr, *Islamic Reform; the Political and Legal Theories of Muḥammad ʿAbduh and Rashīd Riḍā* (Berkeley,: University of California Press, 1966) p. 146.

Most notably, he published a *Commentary to the Qurʾān* (*Tafsīr al-Qurʾān*) and the theological treatise *The Message of Unity* (*Risālat al-Tawḥīd*) but also took part in public life of the Arab world throughout the publication of articles in magazines such as *al-Manār*, the leading publication of the Arabic *al-Nahḍa* (resurgence) movement. He was involved in the Egyptian nationalist movement; he endorsed the ʿArabi revolt against the rising British rule in Egypt in 1882 and was exiled for this reason to Lebanon for three years.

3.2.1   Modernity and Tradition in a Divided Community

According to ʿAbduh's view, the Muslim community was living in an age of decay due to the domination of the Ottoman Empire, followed by the imposition of the foreign colonial rule. ʿAbduh was also concerned with the uncritical application of Islamic principles ignoring the mutated historical circumstances which were surrounding his community. For this reason, he not only expressed criticism towards westernisation (*taghrīb*) but criticised the lack of responsiveness of the religious and cultural establishment of Egypt.   Egyptian society and its political system needed to be reformed to be brought back to its original splendour.[6]   He advocated and partly implemented reform projects focussing on education and justice. The guidelines of his reformist project were drawn from Islamic principles such as the Islamic juridical tradition and references to the acts and sayings of the Prophet of Islam[7]. Innovatively, his approach relied on the use of reason as opposed to the uncritical imitation of tradition (*al-taqlīd*). His intellectual aim was to develop a theory which could be receptive, to a certain extent, of modern and liberal values; while remaining committed to the essence of Islamic principles (the *sharīʿa*), and more in general the Qurʾanic tradition. According to his view, Egyptian society was deeply divided. He observes:

---

[6] Albert Hourani, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age 1798-1939* (London: Oxford University Press, 1962) p. 136.

[7] These are contained in what is usually referred to as the Sunna, the collection of acts and deeds of the Prophet Muḥammad coming second only to the Qurʾān as reference in the Islamic community.

> I found myself in opposition to the views of the two great groups of which the Community is composed: the devotees of the religious sciences and the others of their type, and the devotees of modern techniques and their partisans.[8]

As a consequence, his political project was dedicated to address this social divide to 'bridge the gulf within Islamic society, and, in so doing, to strengthen its moral roots.'[9] Notwithstanding his reformist views and the importance of the concept of reason, ʿAbduh was not an uncritical admirer of liberal institutions. He opposed the idea of a secularised Egyptian society and claimed that achievements similar to those of European societies can be attained in Egypt only by relying on a unified Islamic moral community.[10] In an article advocating the reform of the education system in al-Azhar, ʿAbduh claims that:

> Like all other Eastern nations, Egypt constituted a religious community bounded together by the *Shariʿa*. It had built its ethics and its civilizations on religion. Religion is the organizing principle of all its affairs […] Moral conduct will disappear when religion collapses. The same thing will happen if religion is deformed by introducing into its core any innovations or superstitions. The nation will be weakened. [11]

The main point of ʿAbduh's criticism against the modernising project of Egypt was that liberal institutions cannot be simply transposed into the Egyptian social context, since these would have endangered its foundations.[12] He proposed to reform the Islamic moral community maintaining the commitment to fundamental principles but interpreting these through a prism of reason. The modernisation of Egyptian society and the application of liberal principles needed to be harmonised with the foundational principles of the Islamic community. He argued that Islam is a religion concerned with the welfare of its community especially with reference to the principle of *maslaḥa*[13]. Considering the moral and material decay of the Islamic community in his time, he

---

[8] Kerr, *Islamic Reform* p. 108.

[9] Hourani, *Arabic Thought* p. 139.

[10] Ibid., p. 137.

[11] Muhammad ʿAbduh, 'The Necessity of Religious Reform' in Mansoor Moaddel and Kamran Talattof (eds.), *Modernist and Fundamentalist Debates in Islam: A Reader* (1st Palgrave Macmillan edn., New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002) p. 45.

[12] Hourani, *Arabic Thought* p. 137.

[13] This principle is of fundamental importance in Islamist thought and corresponds to the idea that the ultimate aim of Islam is the well-being of the community on the basis of Islamic principles. There will be occasion to look into this in more detail at a later stage. *See* Section 7.3.

concluded that the mere perpetuation of tradition did not do justice of the promises of Islam and thus must be wrong. It is the application of Islamic ethics combined with the use of reason that eventually brings about the renewal of the Islamic moral community, and it is only on this basis that the Egyptian society can achieve progress and well-being.[14] But to what extent reason can actually reshape the application of Islamic principles in a more modern and liberal fashion, it is not clear in ʿAbduh's theory. Nadav Safran notes:

> ʿAbduh refrained from basing man's freedom on any ontological principle and founded it on a semiagnostic, pragmatic consciousness in order to avoid the complications in which the Muʿtazilah became involved. In so doing he liberated man from the shackles of traditional religion, reaffirmed more emphatically man's moral responsibility and dealt a blow to the spirit of passiveness.[15]

Safran's view is only partially convincing; although is true that ʿAbduh expanded the freedom of the individual to reinterpret its ethical principles through reason; he was an assertor of the sovereignty of God (ḥākimiyat Allah). ʿAbduh was convinced that a sensible use of reason and an enlightened application of Islamic ethics would converge on progress and well-being harmoniously. Individual reason, public interest and the role of the rulers would be guided by a unifying common ethical sense that he defines as *al-raʾy al-ʿamm* the 'public opinion'.[16]

Notwithstanding, in cases of conflict between Islamic principles and reason, the priority has to be given to the ethical principles of Islam. Thus, a fairer assessment of ʿAbduh's theory would conclude that, although he seems to support a liberal idea of individual free will and freedom, this is curbed by the limits imposed by his membership to the Islamic community. Conflicts between reason and Islam are, according to ʿAbduh, due to the incapacity of individual or collective reason to appreciate aspects of the prophetic revelation. As Malcolm Kerr points out, in ʿAbduh's theory 'the Divine Law makes up for the deficiencies in human nature. It confirms reason and lends certainty to its

---

[14] Samira Haj, *Reconfiguring Islamic Tradition: Reform, Rationality, and Modernity* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2009) pp. 77-86.

[15] Nadav Safran, *Egypt in Search of Political Community; an Analysis of the Intellectual and Political Evolution of Egypt, 1804-1952* (Cambridge,: Harvard University Press, 1961) p. 70.

[16] Kerr, *Islamic Reform* p. 133.

conclusions when reason is right, and corrects and supplements it where it has been misguided.'[17] Even though reason has an important role in ʿAbduh's theory, its use is still embedded within Islamic ethics which establishes its moral orientation.[18]

3.2.2 Limits to Individual Reason: *al-shūrā* and *al-ijmāʿ*

ʿAbduh qualified the concept of reason arguing not only that the collective interests of the community represents a limitation to individual will, but also that community is the ultimate source of Islamic ethical principles. Following Kerr's analysis[19] of ʿAbduh's theory, let us consider two examples showing how the Islamic moral community represents the ultimate reference for a just political order in ʿAbduh's thought. These examples refer to two principles of Islamic ethics and jurisprudence: *al-shūrā* (consultation) and *al-ijmāʿ* (consensus).

The concept of *ijmāʿ* is interpreted by ʿAbduh in a modernist way that revises its more traditional conception and incorporates the role of reason. Traditionally the concept is based on the *ḥadīth*[20]: 'My community will never agree upon an error'[21] and, accordingly, ʿAbduh claims that what is agreed among the members of the Muslim community is always ethically right. It is on this basis that Sunni Islamism[22] claims that the moral righteousness of the community entails its well-being and progress.[23] However, ʿAbduh was puzzled by the fact that the Muslim community was in fact in a condition of moral and material decay hence something must have been wrong in its collective consensual judgements. For this reason, he criticises the traditional conception of *ijmāʿ*. He claims that the concept is not a dogmatic and ahistorical truth to be derived exclusively from the imitation of the life of the Prophet of Islam, but corresponds to the

---

[17] Ibid., p. 125.

[18] Ibid., p. 129.

[19] Ibid.

[20] A *ḥadīth* is a secondary source of Islamic ethics immediately following the Quran in hierarchical terms and is usually about actions and sayings of the Prophet of Islam and the community of his followers.

[21] This *ḥadīth* is reported by various commentators: al-Tirmidhi (4:2167), ibn Majah (2:1303), Abu Daūd among others. Wording may vary slightly from one author to another.

[22] As we shall see below, Shiʿī Islamism emphasises the importance of religious jurisprudents as guiding the community.

[23] Leonard Binder, *The Ideological Revolution in the Middle East* (New York,: Wiley, 1964) p. 99.

idea that the collective consensus of knowledgeable persons on an uncertain issue brings about legal decisions consistent with the Islamic revelation facilitating the progress of society.[24] The uncritical and literal application of the prophetic tradition is as problematic as an indiscriminate use of reason that does not takes into account the Islamic revelation. The fact that this traditionalist interpretation of *ijmāʿ* is misleading is shown by the fact that it does not support a community's welfare (*maslaḥa*) but rather perpetuates its backwardness. He then proposes an interpretation in which collective consensus is achieved within a group of religious scholars trained in religious exegesis (*ijtihād*).[25] This for ʿAbduh is the correct interpretation of *ijmāʿ* and should prevail over both literal traditionalism and a use of reason which does not take into account the principles of Islam.

The second limitation to individual reason and consequently to moral agency, is the principle of consultation: *al-shūrā*. According to this traditional Islamic principle, the individual cannot 'rise above the desires, ambitions, and personal inclinations with which he is surrounded, even should he have the will to do so except through the cooperation with others.'[26] The person shall take into account not only individual will and reason, but also consult and cooperate with the general interest of the community. This principle and its importance in the thought of ʿAbduh can also explain why he was critical of the imposition of the Ottoman *Tanzimat* and European liberal institutions onto the Egyptian society without cooperating with the local society. Indeed, ʿAbduh argued that the Islamic community can be reformed successfully only from within, consulting with its members and in particular its scholars trained in the Islamic disciplines.[27] The *shūrā* principle also leads to the consideration of the idea of a just political order since it not only applies to individuals but also to the ruler, who should consult with his

---

[24] Kerr, *Islamic Reform* p. 143-4.

[25] *Ijtihād* is a fundamental concept in Islamic ethics indicating the exegesis of the Islamic revelation. Conservatives school understood this as a process that could have been excised only by the prophet and his companions (*al-salafiyūn*) and so conclude that 'the door of *ijtihād* is closed'. ʿAbduh however, favoured the idea that the Islamic revelation is still subject to constant interpretation through the use of reason and can be reinterpreted also after the death of the Prophet and his companions. *See* for an example of this theoretical debate Asad, *Formations of the Secular* p. 219-21.

[26] Kerr, *Islamic Reform* p. 134.

[27] Hourani, *Arabic Thought* p. 155.

community when making decisions. It then represents a limitation of his power. In more recent times, it is also on the basis that certain strands of Islamism claimed the legitimacy of democratic political institutions from an Islamic perspective comparing the principle of consultation with the electoral consultation typical of democratic processes.[28] ʿAbduh argues that, even though the head of the executive power must be a Muslim and legislation shall be based on the respect of the *sharīʿa*, neither the ruler enjoys a privileged relationship with God nor has he a preeminent position in the community of the believers in religious terms.[29] If the head of the government implements policies at odds with Islamic principles, he must consult with the Islamic community and in consultation, rectify these decisions. In this regard, Kerr points out that ʿAbduh's conception of the political order are closer to a 'divine-law nomocracy' rather than a theocracy.[30]

ʿAbduh's theory relies widely on the idea of the Islamic community and its importance as the necessary element underpinning a thriving reformist project. The person, an individual capable of autonomous thinking, shall take into consideration the interests and the teaching of the Islamic ethical community no matter whether he is the ruler of the community or simply a member. ʿAbduh's interpretations of *ijmāʿ* and *shūrā* exemplify the idea of combining reason with traditional Islamic principles and confirm the Islamist character of his political and social theory. Leonard Binder notes, with reference to ʿAbduh's conceptions of *ijmāʿ* and *ijtihād*, that 'according to the Sunni view, the Islamic community remained divinely guided, not by caliphs so much as through the immanence of divine will in that community itself.'[31] Thus, not only Islamic principles have the last word on issues that cannot be determined forthrightly, but ʿAbduh also resorts to the Islamic vocabulary when theorising the ideal moral order of the community and substantially revisits its traditional meaning.

---

[28] For a thorough discussion of the concept of *shūrā* and its relation to democracy in the Islamist discourse *see*: Abdelilah Belkeziz, *The State in Contemporary Islamic Thought a Historical Survey of the Major Muslim Political Thinkers of the Modern Era* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2009) pp. 171-94.

[29] Kerr, *Islamic Reform* p. 146.

[30] Ibid., p. 149.

[31] Binder, *Ideological Revolution* p. 99.

The role of the community as guaranteeing the moral righteousness of its members and its political structure is also noted by Charles Adams. Reporting ʿAbduh's commentary to a *sūra*[32] of the Qurʾān, Adams observes that according to ʿAbduh 'no people can exist as an independent entity unless there be some bond that binds them together and gives them unity, so that they become a living community, as though they were a single body.'[33]

ʿAbduh's contribution to Islamist political theory then can be described as that of a moderniser concerned with the reunification of the Islamic community under its traditional unity throughout the incorporation of a modern and, to a certain extent, liberal conception of reason. He proposed the revision of traditional norms and institutions of Islam in light of new social conditions which were emerging in Egypt as a reaction to the impact of western rule. His theory will be greatly influential and will produce a number of followers trying to harmonise the relationship between modernity, its liberal foundations and Islam.[34]

3.3   The Radicalisation of Islamist Theory: Sayid Quṭb

Two main ideological trends gained central importance as a reaction to western domination in the Middle East. The first is nationalism, epitomised in Egypt by the establishment of the *al-Wafd* (the Delegation) party inspired by liberal principle.[35] The second is Islamism, which became a politically and socially organised reality with the foundation of the Society of the Muslim Brothers (*Jāmʿa al-Ikhwan al-Muslimīn*) in 1928.

In the nationalist and independent struggle, freedom and political legitimacy were attached to the independence of the nation, whereas the Islamic component seemed to

---

[32] A *sūra* of the Quran is a section of the holy text of Islam.

[33] Charles C. Adams, *Islam and Modernism in Egypt; a Study of the Modern Reform Movement Inaugurated by Muhammad Abduh* (New York,: Russell & Russell, 1968) p. 172.

[34] *See* Hourani, *Arabic Thought* p. 161-93.

[35] Saʿad Zaghlūl, prominent member and founder of the Wafd was himself a student of both ʿAbduh and Afghani even though he successively embraced more liberal and secularist views. *See* Francesco Gabrieli, *The Arab Revival* (New York,: Random House, 1961) p. 77.

only have secondary importance.[36] Egyptian nationalism leaned towards liberal ideals, which it failed to deliver.[37]Islamism, however, critical towards the influence of western liberalism and concerned with the re-establishment of an Islamic community, developed an increasingly self-referential character. The main thinker and political activist in this field was one of ʿAbduh's students Rashīd Riḍa (1865-1935) whose intellectual circle was frequented by Ḥasan al-Bannā (1906-1949) the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood.[38] In the subsequent decades, the Brotherhood was subject to a pattern of radicalisation which culminated in the Sixties with the figure of Sayid Quṭb whose thought and execution by the Nasserite regime will be the seed for the rise of Islamist factions such as Islamic Jihad, *al-Takfīr wa al-Hijra* and *al-Qāʿida*.[39]

Part of this process was in connection with the emergence of similar transnational patterns of radicalisation taking place in other Muslim societies. A particularly relevant figure, which influenced the Islamist political debate in the Arab Middle East whose intellectual contribution cannot addressed herein, was Abu ʿAla al-Mawdudi (1903-1979) in Pakistan, who had contacts especially through his students also with Islamist activists as Quṭb and was the founder of the Jamat-e-Islami the main Islamist political organisation in Pakistan.[40]

3.3.1 Quṭb's Early Intellectual Stage

Quṭb's theory is neither linear nor systematic but unfolds in a pattern of progressive radicalisation culminating during his detention period in the Egyptian gaols (1954-

---

[36] Hourani, *Arabic Thought* pp. 161-93.

[37] In this regard we shall refer to what Marsot defines as the "Egyptian liberal experiment", Afaf Lutfi Sayyid-Marsot, *A Short History of Modern Egypt* (Cambridge Cambridgeshire ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985).

[38] Hourani, *Arabic Thought* p. 360.

[39] The influence of Quṭb's life and thought on this movement is explained in several publications. *See* Fawaz A. Gerges, *The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2005) pp. 43-79. John Calvert, *Sayyid Qutb and the Origins of Radical Islamism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010) p. 292, Gilles Kepel, *Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam* (4th edn.; London: I.B. Tauris, 2006).

[40] For a discussion of Mawdudi's influence on Quṭb's thought *see* Calvert, *Qutb* pp.157-9 and 213-20. One of the most influential publications of Mawdudi is his critique of human rights *see* Abul 'Ala Al-Mawdudi, *Human Rights in Islam* (Leicester: Islamic Foundation, 1980). For a discussion of Mawdudi's approach to human rights see for example Ann Elizabeth Mayer, *Islam and Human Rights: Tradition and Politics* (3rd edn.; Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1998).

1964).[41] His earlier intellectual production is dedicated to literary criticism and the study of aesthetics and includes an autobiographical story *Child from the Village*, (1946) reporting his modest origins from the Egyptian rural region.[42] Ibrahim Abu-Rabiʿ notices this formative period is an integral part of Quṭb's intellectual formation.[43] In 1948 he undertook a two year visit to the United States where he attended courses in education and English.[44] This experience deepened his criticism of western society on the basis of his observations of US lifestyle and culture. During or soon after this time abroad, Quṭb began to work on social and political topics along with the study of the Qurʾān. A few months after his return to Egypt, he developed closer ties with the Muslim Brotherhood, with which he will become associated in the 1950s.[45] *Social Justice in Islam* (1949) is his first publication dedicated to political and social questions.[46] Quṭb published several revised versions of this book and, as William Shepard notes, each of these is indicative of the radicalisation of his views.[47]

3.3.2 *Social Justice in Islam*

Quṭb argues that justice, and in particular *social* justice, can only be achieved by establishing an Islamic moral community. His theory relies on the principle that a just political order can only be founded on the precepts of Islam which is conceived as a complete and self-sufficient ethical system. As he says: 'Islam has one universal theory which covers the universe and life and humanity, a theory in which are integrated all different questions; in this Islam sums up all its beliefs, its laws and statutes, and its

---

[41] For the best account of Quṭb's radicalisation and its involvement in the activity of a secret armed organisation *see* Calvert, *Qutb* p. 229-71.

[42] Sayyid Qutb, *A Child from the Village*, trans. John Calvert and William E. Shepard (1st edn.; Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2004).

[43] Ibrahim M. Abu-Rabiʿ, *Intellectual Origins of Islamic Resurgence in the Modern Arab World* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996) p. 92-3.

[44] Adnan Musallam gives a biographical overview of the events and the correspondence from the USA in Adnan Musallam, *From Secularism to Jihad: Sayyid Qutb and the Foundations of Radical Islamism* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2005) pp. 111-36.

[45] Ibid., pp. 130-8.

[46] Sayyid Quṭb and William E. Shepard, *Sayyid Qutb and Islamic Activism: A Translation and Critical Analysis of Social Justice in Islam* (Leiden ; New York: E.J. Brill, 1996).

[47] Ibid.

modes of worship and work.'[48] Thus, Islamic justice means justice in a material as well as spiritual sense and recognises what is owed to the person as well as what is owed to God.

Differently from the more receptive attitude of ʿAbduh (who was sympathetic towards certain liberal aspects), influences that are not authentically Islamic are criticised by Quṭb, thus highlighting the self-referential stance of his political conception.[49] Most of his discussion of Islamic social justice relies on a comparison with European society and the communist conception of justice. Western liberalism and communism are seen as morally flawed from an Islamic point of view because they only prove the need of the person exclusively in material terms.[50]

The principles of social justice, according to Quṭb, are absolute freedom of conscience (limited by the exclusive and incontestable sovereignty of God) human equality (including a certain understanding of gender equality)[51], and mutual responsibility in society. This last principle entails a limitation of individual freedom especially when conflicting with the interest of the community towards which the individual is responsible for its welfare.[52] The concept of social responsibility (*al-takāful al-ijtmʿaī*) in Islam according to Quṭb establishes the priority of the community over the freedom of the individual. As he says:

> There can be no decent life if every individual seeks to enjoy his absolute freedom without limit, nourished by his awareness of the absolute liberation of his inward soul from all pressure and absolute equality unlimited by any ties or conditions, for such an awareness is guaranteed to destroy both society and the very individual. Society has higher interest which must limit the freedom of the individual, and it is in the individual's own interest to have definite limits to his enjoyment of freedom.[53]

---

[48] Sayyid Qutb, *Social Justice in Islam*, trans. John B. Hardie (Washington: American Council of Learned Societies, 1953) p. 17.

[49] Ibid.

[50] Quṭb often compares his theory of social justice with western liberalism and communism under each of any respects of his analysis including for example freedom of conscience ibid., p. 31-2. Human equality ibid., p. 53-4.

[51] Quṭb and Shepard, *Sayyid Qutb and Islamic Activism: A Translation and Critical Analysis of Social Justice in Islam* p. 61-6. Quṭb mentions equality also with reference to human rights but then provides a long list of qualifications diversifying the role of men and women.

[52] Ibid., pp. 55-67. This aspect will be further considered in the following chapter.

[53] Ibid., p. 68.

In his theory then, social justice is the result of a harmonious cooperation among the members of the Islamic community based on the implementation of Islamic principles that, although acknowledging a degree of individual freedom, privilege the general well-being of the community. The analysis then proposes a review of the Qurʾanic principles that regulate justice in Islam especially with reference to the practice of almsgiving to which Quṭb refers to as source for social redistribution.[54]

Social Justice in Islam is also the first publications in which he outlines his conception of an Islamic political system. According to this account, Islam represents a political system which, although resembling certain western institutions, is self-sufficient in its political structure and does not rely on external sources.[55] He does not mention the Caliphate and points out that the Prophet did not nominate anybody as a descendent.[56] The main role of a ruler in Quṭb's theory is guaranteeing the justice of the community considering the opinion of its members thus referring to the *shūrā* principle. He also declares that the relationship of the ruler with God is equal to that of other Muslims. All Muslims (including the *ahl al-dhimma*) are entitled to the same rights. Quṭb stresses the egalitarianism of Islamic political theory along with its foundation on a common moral conscience, and its universal applicability. Furthermore, whenever the ruler does not guarantee the respect of Islamic justice or is not guided by the principles of Islam his subjects have the right not to recognise his authority. His theory fundamentally relies on the concept of 'sovereignty of God' (*ḥākymiyat Allah*) which he develops further in his later works and to which he opposes the blasphemous idea of the sovereignty of man. As he says:

> The theory of government in Islam is based on the testimony (*shahādah*) that there is no god but God, and when one confesses that divinity belongs to God alone he hereby confesses that sovereignty (*ḥākymiyyah*) in human like belongs to God alone; and God (S) exercises sovereignty in human life on one hand by directly controlling human affairs by His will and determination (*qadar*) and on the other hand by establishing the basic order of human life and human rights and

---

[54] Ibid., pp. 104-9.

[55] Ibid., pp. 87-99.

[56] This point is in contrast with the Shiʿī tradition which however attributes a leading role to the religious jurisprudents.

duties and relationships and mutual obligations by His Shari'ah and program (*manhaj*). Any other theory would be idolatry (*shirk*) and unbelief (*kufr*).[57]

At this stage, he also characterises *jihād* primarily as a defensive activity,[58] in this respect he will develop more radical views later in his life. Quṭb's discussion proceeds with the analysis of more technical economic aspects and, having outlined a brief history of Islamic political systems, concludes with a reflection over its contemporary condition. He observes that:

> Islamic society today is not Islamic in any true sense. […] In our modern society we do not judge by what Allah has revealed; the basis of our economic life is usury;[59] our laws permit rather than punish oppression; the poor tax is not obligatory, and is not spent in the requisite ways. We permit the extravagance and the destitution of which the Messenger once said: whatever people anywhere allow a man to go hungry, they are outside the protection of Allah, the blessed and exalted.[60]

This criticism widely echoes ʿAbduh's concern of a divided and morally declining Muslim community also to be found in the rest of Islamist theory. The sense of a lost Islamic morality in the Egyptian society will subsequently become one of the fundamental aspects of Qutbist thought.

Quṭb considers the influence of western culture as the main cause for the decay of the Islamic community and criticises the Arab 'liberal thinkers and accurate scholars'[61] who facilitated this process.

3.3.3 Critique of Modernity in 'the West' and in the Muslim Society

Quṭb generally criticised capitalism and Marxism as only partially providing for the well-being of the person. As Abu-Rabiʿ points out, Quṭb shows his dissatisfaction with capitalism because of its individualism and the attribution of an absolute freedom to the

---

[57] Quṭb and Shepard, *Sayyid Qutb and Islamic Activism: A Translation and Critical Analysis of Social Justice in Islam* p. 111-2.

[58] Ibid., p. 91.

[59] This might refer to the fact that not only usury is strongly condemned by Islamic ethics but also bank interests on loans are considered usury as well.

[60] Qutb, *Social Justice in Islam* p. 227-8.

[61] Ibid., p. 228. Quṭb's criticism is nonetheless more sophisticated than it may seems a few pages later he quotes rather approvingly the comments of the French scholar Alphonse Goully and the English orientalist H.A.R. Gibb on the expansion of Islam in the non-Arab world.

person. According to Quṭb: 'The capitalist system emerged on the basis of emancipating the individual, making of individual freedom an ideal, and giving the upper hand to individual interests.'[62] He explains that the emergence of individualism and capitalism was as a result of the withdrawal of the Christian church from public life due to the affirmation of secularism in the western society. On this basis, he also directs his criticism towards the Kemalist revolution in Turkey, which he considers the sign of how modern liberal principles are penetrating the Islamic community, undermining its moral foundations.[63] Quṭb's concern is that this process will eventually lead to the same decadence as witnessed in the West.

As regards Marxism, Quṭb's criticism is related to its materialism and the conception of man as exclusively entangled in relations of an economic nature thus neglecting spiritual life. Materialist ideologies, in his view, reduce human well-being to a material dimension, whereas Islam guarantees spiritual well-being mediating a relationship with God which is absent in liberal and communist societies.[64]

Another aspect of his criticism is directed towards the Islamic clergy in Egypt. His idea is that 'the way to establish the rule of Allah on earth is not to give some consecrated people - the priests- the authority to rule, as was the case with the rule of the Church, nor to appoint some spokesmen of Allah as rulers, as is the case in a "theocracy".' [65] Along with the rise of liberalism and socialism, Quṭb considered the subservience of the Islamic religious establishment as another factor bringing about the moral decay of the Islamic community.

3.3.4 Quṭb's Radicalisation: *Jāhiliyya*

In one of his most influential publications, Quṭb begins by claiming that:

---

[62] Quṭb in *Al-Islām wa Mushkilat al-Ḥaḍāra* [Islam and the Problem of Civilisation], quoted in Abu-Rabiʿ, *Origins of Islamic Resurgence* p. 160.

[63] ibid., pp. 143-4.

[64] ibid., pp. 159-60.

[65] Sayyid Quṭb, *Milestones*, trans. M.M. Siddiqui (Indianapolis: American Trust, 1990) p. 40.

> Humanity today is standing on the brink of an abyss, not because of the threat of annihilation hanging over his head –for this is just a symptom of the disease and not the disease itself- but because humanity is bankrupt in the realm of "values", those values which foster true human progress and development.[66]

Milestones (1964) is the publication in which he presented his most radical views.[67] The book is in three parts;[68] the first is captured by the quotation above and criticises contemporary society as affected by moral decay resorting to Islamic traditional terminology. The key term is *jāhiliyya* which literally means 'ignorance'. In Islamic scholarship this term identifies the historic period preceding the revelation of the Qurʾān and refers to a lack of knowledge of the message of Islam as revealed to the Prophet Mohammad.[69] Quṭb projects the meaning of this term onto contemporary circumstances of modern Egyptian society. The main manifestation of this condition is that human beings are subject to the sovereignty of other human beings, whereas the fundamental predicament of an Islamic system (*al-niẓām al-islāmī*) is *ḥākimiyat Allāh* that it is the 'sovereignty of God'. Having replaced the sovereignty of God with the sovereignty of man, the community fell in moral decay and, notwithstanding the material progress of western societies; its moral status is that of ignorance.

A fundamental distinction emerges within the society between the believer and the apostate (*kāfir*) who has abandoned or betrayed the faith in Islam to embrace the false gods of modernity. In this respect, Quṭb sees a relevant portion of the Muslim community falling into apostasy (*kufr*).

The second part of *Milestones* is dedicated to the methodology (*manhaj*) throughout which the society of *jāhiliyya* can be reconverted into the authentic Islamic moral

---

[66] This is the translation of the first paragraph of *Maʿalim fī al-Ṭarīq* (usually translated as "Milestones" but literally *Signs on the Way*) I am using here the translation provided in Roxanne Leslie Euben and Muhammad Qasim Zaman, *Princeton Readings in Islamist Thought: Texts and Contexts from Al-Banna to Bin Laden* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009) p. 136.

[67] Quṭb's literary work in jail is rather vast and includes many other publications such as his *Fī Ẓilla al-Qurʾān* (in the Shade of the Quran) a wide ranging commentary to the Qurʾān in seventeen volumes of which Milestones is an anthology. For a vivid discussion of Quṭb's detention period and its related radicalisation *see* Calvert, *Qutb* pp. 197-227.

[68] I refer to Euben's partition of the structure of *Milestones* in 'diagnosis', 'cure' and 'method', Roxanne Leslie Euben, *Enemy in the Mirror: Islamic Fundamentalism and the Limits of Modern Rationalism* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1999) p. 56.

[69] William E. Shepard, 'Sayyid Qutb Doctrine of Jahiliyya', *International Journal of Middle East Studies,* 35/04 (2003), 521-45 at p. 522-4.

community. An Islamic community is the only basis that can guarantee the justice and welfare of the person by establishing an Islamic order (*al-niẓām al-islāmī*). Two key concepts are at the core of this methodology: *hijra* and *jihād*. The first refers to the idea that the most pious members of the Muslim community within the modern society need to isolate and migrate (*hijra*)[70] to rebuild a 'vanguard community' based on the leadership of God and the teachings of the Prophet as they were understood when he was alive.[71] This experience of isolation from the society of *jāhiliyya* allows the vanguard to acquire its moral Islamic status and then, in a gradual manner, returns to the society to promote the establishment of the *al-niẓām al-islāmī* (Islamic order).[72]

Two procedures can be legitimately implemented to establish *al-niẓām al-islāmī*: *jihād bil-saīf* (struggle through the sword) and *jihād bil-ḥujja wal-lisān* (struggle through argumentation and language). Quṭb explains, not without contradictions, that *jihād* is of a defensive nature but this does not mean passive acceptance of the *status quo*. Whenever social and political circumstances hamper the possibility of the person to embrace and practice Islam, this legitimises *jihād* in its more radical meaning. *Jāhiliyya*, in which the sovereignty of man over other men replaces the sovereignty of God, corresponds to this kind of circumstance thus justifying *jihād*. According to Quṭb:

> When they have no such freedom, then it becomes incumbent upon Muslims to launch a struggle through individual preaching as well as by initiating an activity movement to restore their freedom, and to strike hard at all those political powers that force people to bow to their will and authority, defying the commandments of Allah, and denying people the freedom to listen to the message of Islam, and to accept it even when they wish to do so. After annihilating the tyrannical force, whether political or racial tyranny, or domination of one class over the other within the same race, Islam establishes a new social, economic and political system in which all men and women enjoy real freedom.[73]

---

[70] The term *hijra* refers to the migration of Prophet from Mekka to Medina.

[71] Quṭb, *Milestones* p. 32. The term milestones used by Quṭb refers to the teachings available in this book which is a shortened version of his Qurʾān commentary (*In the Shade of the Quran*) and includes the basic precepts to be followed by the revolutionary nucleus. Calvert, *Qutb* p. 225.

[72] As Yvonne Haddad observes this is the part of Qutb's theory that may have the major influence on groups such as al-Takfīr wa al-Hijra (literally, excommunicate and migrate) which later in the history of Egypt represented the most radical an violent forms of Islamism, Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad, 'The Qur'anic Justification for an Islamic Revolution: The View of Sayyid Quṭb', *Middle East Journal,* 37/1 (1983), 14-29 at p. 18. Nonetheless Qutb's theory only partially overlaps with that of movements as *al-Takfīr wa al-Hijra* and *Jihād al-Islamī*.

[73] Quṭb, *Milestones* p. 42.

The practice of *jihād* is, thus, legitimate not only in the form of predication but also through social activism. The aim of *jihād*, nonetheless, is not the forceful imposition of religious belief over other persons since the Qurʾān clearly states that there is no compulsion in religion. *Jihād bil-saif* might be applied against the apostates (*kuffar*) according to Quṭb, but its main task is creating the conditions by which Islam can be freely announced and practiced as the human being is only free in these circumstances. The first stage for the vanguard community, before resorting to any other means, is predicating Islam and its values within the society, and not to undertake premature actions. This aspect remains ambiguous. Quṭb will eventually become the mind of a secret organisation allegedly related to the Brotherhood and found in possession of weapons (although the purpose of the arms remains obscure) and his involvement in this activity will eventually lead to his second arrest and subsequent execution.[74]

The third part of *Milestones* is related to the final aim of the process of reconversion from *jāhiliyya* to Islam that is the establishment of *al-niẓām al-islāmī*. Quṭb eventually called for the establishment of an Islamic political order (*al-niẓām al-islāmī*) on the basis of what he already theorised in *Social Justice in Islam*. The structure of this system is outlined only vaguely, also because Quṭb did not think that its realisation would have taken place in the near future. The fundamental principle on which it relies is the 'sovereignty of God' (*ḥākimiyat Allāh*) to which everyone is subject including the ruler.[75] This concept is rather obscure in its actual meaning and provoked several discussions about its interpretation.[76] Quṭb considered *ḥākymiya* as the 'exclusive prerogative of God who alone is qualified to fashion principles appropriate to the proper functioning of a social, political and economic order.'[77] On the basis of this principle, the ruler of an Islamic political system would have derived the legitimacy of his rule from applying the principles of Islam given by God (primarily the *sharīʿa*). If this condition is missing, no

---

[74] Calvert, *Qutb* pp. 229-71.

[75] As is it was mentioned in Section 1.3.4 this is a concept which was developed by Quṭb under the influence of Mawdudi's political thought.

[76] For a discussion of the debate on *ḥākimiya see* for example: Sayed Khatab, *The Power of Sovereignty: The Political and Ideological Philosophy of Sayyid Qutb* (London: Routledge, 2006) pp. 7-46.

[77] Calvert, *Qutb* 215.

obedience is due to the ruler because he is not acknowledging the sovereignty of God. An Islamic political system can take any form or institutional arrangement so long as it acknowledges the priority of God's law over any alternative principle. According to Quṭb, the election of the ruler is acceptable but it is not this which confers legitimacy to him, but the fact that the he abides to the principles of *sharīʿa* when exercising his authority.[78]

This conceptualisation of an Islamic political system, although vague, constitutes a basis for opposition to the Nasserite regime which was harshly repressive towards Islamists. The radicalisation of Quṭb's theory (especially of *jihād*) and its advocacy for the foundation of an Islamic political system deteriorated the relationship with the government who arrested and executed him with the charge of being involved in armed activity against the regime and for being part of a secret organisation linked with the then outlawed Muslim Brotherhood.[79]

Quṭb's ideas of Islamic social justice, his criticism of contemporary society as *jāhiliyya*, his *manhaj* (method) including *hijra*, *jihād* and the aim of establishing an Islamic system (*al-niẓām al-islāmī*) became the central tenets of Islamist thought in the entire region after his death. His execution rendered his message even more powerful elevating him to the status of martyr (*shahīd*) becoming an example for many to follow.[80]

3.4   The Case of Shiʿī Islamism: Muḥammad Bāqir al-Ṣadr

Quṭb's critique of contemporary society spread widely in the entire region and beyond, including in Iraq which, similar to Egypt, was under an authoritarian regime and, under Saddam Hussein, witnessed the rise and repression of Sunni as well as Shiʿī Islamist groups.

---

[78] Khatab, *Power of Sovereignty* pp. 28-36.

[79] It remains unknown nonetheless whether the charges were genuine or fictitious. Calvert, *Qutb* p. 259.

[80] *See* for example how Ayman al-Ẓawaḥiri, among the intellectuals of al-Qāʿida, declared to be personally struck by the death of Quṭb. Gerges, *Far Enemy* p. 6.

A branch of the Muslim Brotherhood was active in the country gathering consensus mainly among Sunnis, but the experience of the Brotherhood and the teachings of Quṭb were influential also in the mobilisation of the Shiʿī community in the southern region. Interestingly, it was ʿAbd al-Salām ʿArif, a post-monarchy Iraqi ruler, who asked to Nasser to pardon Quṭb on occasion of his first arrest in 1964 thus confirming how his influence was far reaching.[81] The most prominent Islamist organisation which emerged out of the Shiʿī mobilisation was *Ḥizb al-Dʿawa* (the Party of the Call);[82] founded in Najaf in 1958 following the fall of the monarchy. As Faleh Abdul-Jabar claims: 'the first sources of indoctrination for the Dʿawa's activists were drawn from the works of Egyptian thinkers like Hassan El-Banna, Sayid Qutb, Muhammad Al-Ghazali and others.'[83] As we will see in Chapter 5, some of the members of Dʿawa migrated to Lebanon under duress of Saddam Hussein's repression and constituted the first nucleus of Hezbollah with the support of Iran.

The key intellectual figure of the Dʿawa was Muḥammad Bāqir al-Ṣadr (1935-1980) whose thoughts had major influence also in the theorisation of the *Wilāyat al-Fāqih* (the Governance of the Jurisprudent) which later emerged in Iran.[84] Al-Ṣadr received a classical religious education provided in the *ḥawza* system of Najaf,[85] the renowned Shiʿī cultural centre of Iraq and, eventually, his intellectual and religious leadership brought him to the highest rank in the Shiʿī clerical hierarchy i.e. Ayatollah.[86] Different from the traditional religious establishment of Najaf, which was prevalently quietist, Al-Ṣadr was a keen political activist.

He took part in the foundation of the Dʿawa, the primary concern of which was the promotion of Islamic values within the Shiʿī community of Iraq and beyond. Al-Ṣadr published extensively in cultural magazines of the Society of the ʿUlamāʾ (*Jāmaʿat al-*

---

[81] According to Calvert ʿArif was an admirer of Quṭb's intellectual work and he was under the influence of the Iraqi branch of the Brotherhood. Calvert, *Qutb* pp. 236-7.

[82] In certain early literature *Ḥizb al-Dʿawa* is also known as *Ḥizb al-Dʿawa al-Islamiyya*.

[83] Faleh A. Jabar, *The Shi'ite Movement in Iraq* (London: Saqi, 2003) p. 81.

[84] *See* Section 3.5.2.

[85] The *ḥawza ʿilmiyya* is the traditional educational and cultural institution of Shiʿism under the leadership of knowledgeable scholars. Its main centres are in Najaf in Iraq and Qum in Iran.

[86] Ayatollah comes from *Ayatu Allāhi* that can be translated "sign of God".

ʿUlamāʾ) often in collaboration with another notable Shiʿī intellectual: Muḥammad Ḥusayn Faḍlallah[87] who will later have a central role in Lebanon and nearby region (*see* Section 5.4).[88] His relationship with the religious establishment of the *ḥawza* in Najaf was nonetheless problematic. After an internal dissent with the leadership of the Society of the ʿUlamāʾ he took distance from it, and while ascending the religious hierarchy of *marjʿaiyya* he isolated himself from political activism since a direct political role was considered incompatible with religious leadership.[89] Notwithstanding this, most of the Dʿawa sympathisers kept looking at him as a guide and, contextually with the Iranian revolution, his opposition to Saddam Hussein's regime became manifest along with his support for regime change in Iran.[90]

3.4.1 Al-Ṣadr's Islamist Critique of Capitalism and Socialism

Al-Ṣadr published three main works: *Our Philosophy* (1959), *Our Economics* (1961), and *Islam Leads Life* (1979).[91] *Our Economics* is one of the most popular and is an extensive inquiry in which he criticises both capitalist and socialist models and theorises an Islamic economic system. The work shares the same topics and approach discussed by Quṭb in *Social Justice in Islam*.[92] Nonetheless, as Chibli Mallat claims, al-Ṣadr's work enjoys a higher qualitative standard compared to that of Quṭb.[93] In *Our*

---

[87] There will be occasion at a later stage to elaborate more into detail with regard to Faḍlallah's role and theory. *See* Section 5.4.

[88] For a detailed discussion of the emergence of the society and al-Ṣadr's role in it *see* A. Jabar, *Shi'ite Movement* pp. 114-9, T. M. Aziz, 'The Role of Muhammad Baqir Al-Sadr in Shii Political Activism in Iraq from 1958 to 1980', *International Journal of Middle East Studies,* 25/2 (1993), 207-22 at pp. 207-22. The foundation of the society is primarily explained as a reaction to the diffusion of communist materialist ideology in Iraq after the fall of the monarchy.

[89] Aziz, 'The Role of Muhammad Baqir Al-Sadr' p. 210. Baram, Amatzia (2010) Amatzia Baram, 'Sadr the Father, Sadr the Son, the "Revolution in Shi'ism" and the Struggle for Power in the Hawzah of Najaf' in Amatzia Baram, Achim Rohde, and Ronen Zeidel (eds.), *Iraq between Occupations: Perspectives from 1920 to the Present* (1st edn., New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010) p. 143.

[90] Aziz, 'The Role of Muhammad Baqir Al-Sadr' p. 217-8.

[91] Muhammad Baqir al-Ṣadr, *Our Philosophy*, trans. Shams Constantine Inati (London; New York NY, USA: Muhammadi Trust in association with KPI 1987). Al-Sadr Muhammad Baqir (1982) *Iqtisaduna* Beirut: Dar al-Taʿaruf. *Islam Leads Life* to my knowledge has not been translated: As-Sadr, Muhammad Baqir (1979) *Al Islam Yaqud al Hayat* n.d. (Khayam Press: Qum).

[92] For an overview of al-Sadr's contribution to the Islamic economy debate *see* Rodney Wilson, 'The Contribution of Muḥammad Bāqir Al-Ṣadr to Contemporary Islamic Economic Thought', *Journal of Islamic Studies,* 9/1 (1998), 46-59.

[93] Chibli Mallat, *The Renewal of Islamic Law: Muhammad Baqer as-Sadr, Najaf, and the Shi'i International* (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993) p.145.

Philosophy the substance of the argument is analogous to Quṭb's, but al-Ṣadr's criticism towards capitalism and communism unfolds philosophically with reference to authors such as Marx, Kant and Locke.

The prologue of *Our Philosophy* echoes the words of Quṭb on the concept of *jāhiliyya* and, more generally, the Islamist concern on the integrity of the Muslim community:

> After the Muslim world fell into the hands of colonialists, a stream of Western thought based on these colonialists' cultural principles and notions concerning the universe, life and society swept through it. This helped colonialism gain continuous ideological expansion in the battle it launched to abolish the existence of the Muslim nation [*Umma*] and the secret of its nobility of descent represented in Islam.[94]

Al-Ṣadr shares the sense of decay of the Islamic community which already was denounced by other Islamists and in *Our Philosophy* the aim is to restore the primacy of Islamic thought over the influence of western capitalist and communist theories. This is also the principle motivating his activism in the Dᵃawa, the ultimate aim of which was to establish an Islamic polity over the Islamic community and rule according religious revelations of Islam. As he says:

> The Islamic state has two functions. The first is to educate mankind in accordance with the [its] ideological principle, and to impress its own character on their tendencies and feelings. The second is to observe them externally, and to bring them back to the principle if they deviate from it in practice.[95]

Al-Ṣadr's argument, then, follows the Islamist canon outlined with reference to ᶜAbduh and Quṭb. He argues that capitalist democratic systems and communist ideology are based on a materialist conception of the person to which he directs his criticism. Starting from premise widely resembling the Hobbesian state of nature he claims that human coexistence requires 'guidance and organization.'[96] According to al-Ṣadr, social theories share a common quest about: 'which system is good for human beings and provides them with a happy social life?'[97] He reviews four possible answers to this question which he classifies as democratic capitalism, socialism, communism and the

---

[94] al-Ṣadr, *Our Philosophy* p. xvii.

[95] Ibid., p. 32.

[96] Ibid., p. 5.

[97] Ibid.

Islamic system. Only the latter can be successful in guaranteeing guidance and happiness for human beings. According to al-Ṣadr: 'Capitalistic democracy is based on unlimited confidence in the individual, and in the fact that the individual's personal interests naturally ensure the interests of the society in various areas.'[98] However, this assumption is not realistic; capitalist democracy fails to deliver promises of well-being, according to al-Ṣadr, because materialism does not promote any particular ethical or metaphysical view but focuses on the material well-being of the person:

> Because the capitalistic system was filled with the spirit of materialism, morality was removed from the picture. It was nowhere to be found in the system. Put more correctly, its notions and criteria underwent a change. The individual interest was declared as the highest objective, and all kinds of freedom as means for fulfilling that kind of interest. This resulted in most of the severe trials, catastrophes, tragedies and misfortunes that the modern world has experienced.[99]

Al-Ṣadr's criticism of capitalist democracy incorporates aspects echoing the Marxian critique of capitalism, pointing out how the system facilitated the polarisation between rich and poor throughout an unlimited recognition of the right to property. Rather than being genuinely democratic, al-Ṣadr argues, the capitalist system represents a rule of the elite and not of the people. If the problem with capitalist democracy is materialist individualism, materialism in the case of communism has the opposite effect. The person, abandon their self-interest, and is assimilated within an undistinguished social aggregate. Although the same criticism could be directed towards his own theory, al-Ṣadr argues that individual freedom would be completely denied in socialism. In his own words:

> Even if the individual acquires full insurance and social security for his life and needs because the social wealth supplies him with all of this at the time of need, nevertheless, it would be better for him to obtain this insurance without losing the breath of righteous freedom, without melting away in fire as person, and without drowning in a stormy social sea.[100]

---

[98] Ibid., p.7.

[99] Ibid., p. 11.

[100] Ibid., p. 19.

This is why Jabar considers al-Ṣadr a 'liberal Islamist' especially if compared to other Islamist thinkers.[101] Nonetheless, this assessment is only partially convincing. Also in the case of ʿAbduh, the person was recognised a degree of individual freedom but the limitations related to Islamic ethics seriously compromise the possibility of looking at Islamism as a form of liberalism. Islamism is characterised by a substantial ethical conception, whereas liberalism aims to be neutral towards all the conceptions of the good, rendering the idea of Islamist liberalism contradictory.

In addition to this, al-Ṣadr observes that the coincidence between collective and individual interests, which he understands as the core of communist theory, is a utopian view that cannot be possible without religious guidance. He believes that both the democratic-capitalist and communist systems are utopic and do not reach their actual ends. Contrarily to this, the Islamic system (*al-niẓām al-Islāmī*) historically existed during the life of the Prophet Muḥammad, thus being realistically achievable. For its achievement, it is necessary for a modification of the conception of human life:

> Islam established a system in which the individual is not considered as a mechanical tool in the social system, nor society as an organization established for the sake of the individual. Rather, it gave to each –the individual and society- their rights and insured the individual both his spiritual and material dignity.[102]

According to this view, the Islamic system would promote a form of public morality on the basis that: 'Human beings begin to appreciate moral values and the ideals that religion teaches them to respect' [103] thus harmonising the interests of the individual with the collective interests of the Islamic community. His conception of the person as an individual socially bound to the Islamic community sharing its ethical principles reproduces the conception according to which the person develops their ethical understanding, not as an isolated individual, but as part of the Islamic community. As in communitarian theory, it is the constitutive value of the community that informs the ethical identity of the person and harmonises the conflict between personal and communal interests.

---

[101] A. Jabar, *Shi'ite Movement* pp. 280-7.

[102] al-Ṣadr, *Our Philosophy* p. 26.

[103] Ibid., p. 30.

3.4.2 Al-Ṣadr's Ideal of an Islamic System: the *Wilāyat al-Faqīh*

Different from the case of Sunni Islamism, Shiʿī Islamism developed a more defined conception of Islamic polity reflecting the theory outlined above, but also institutionalising certain aspects of traditional clerical hierarchy typical of Shiʿism. Al-Ṣadr presents the institutional architecture of an Islamic state in the same months in which the Iranian Islamic revolution was unfolding.[104] He provides an exegesis of a verse of the Qurʾān (5. 44), which refers to a story of Jewish people asking for judgement over a contentious issue. The Prophet replies that the Jews should apply their own law as God dictated in the Torah and then indicates judicial-religious hierarchy to which al-Ṣadr refers to as a source in theorising a political order. According to al-Ṣadr's interpretation, however, at the top of the hierarchy is the judgement of the prophets, second there is that of the Imams[105] and, at the third level, there are the religious jurisprudents. Al-Ṣadr interprets this hierarchy as the source of a constitutional hierarchical system. The Prophet of Islam is not there anymore and, after the disappearance of the twelfth Imam, the Islamic community has been deprived of the guidance of the rightly guided Imams until the Imām al-Mahdī will reappear. Responsibility in administering justice, then, falls onto the third category: the *mujtahid*[106], who achieved his title in Islamic Shiʿī schools (*ḥawza*) such as those of Qum (Iran) and Najaf (Iraq).[107]

Those *mujtahidūn* achieving higher prominence through a large following in Shiʿism attained the qualification of *marjʿa*[108] or grand-ayatollah (*ayatu-Allāh al-ʿuẓmā*). The institution of *marjʿaiyya* (that is the religious leadership of the *marjʿa*) assumes in Shiʿī Islamism a political connotation. According to this view, the *marjʿa*, from being the head of a juridical-religious hierarchy, becomes 'the objective criterion to the community from the point of view of Islam… not only as to the fixed elements of legislation in the Islamic

---

[104] Mallat, *Renewal of Islamic Law* p. 59-78.

[105] Which in the Jewish tradition and in this verse are represented by the rabbis.

[106] A *mujtahid* is a learned scholar trained into the interpretation of the Islamic religious sources within the Shiite religious educational system of the *ḥawza ʿilmiyya*.

[107] It will be highlighted in the following section how the same reasoning is reproduced by Khomeini.

[108] The term literally means "reference".

society, but also to the changing temporal elements. [The *marjʿa*] is the supreme representative of the Islamic ideology.'[109]

Jabar claims that al-Ṣadr's political system establishes a separation between the role of the *marjʿa* and the executive and legislative branches of the Islamic state, but this does not always seem convincing. The *marjʿa*, in al-Ṣadr's political theory, is in charge of rectifying incorrect rulings and providing guidance to the community from an Islamic point of view, thus overruling the role of executive and legislative powers. It is under the leadership of the *marjʿa*, whose knowledge guarantees infallibility in its juridical-religious judgements, that the 'vice regency of mankind' (*khilāfat al-insān*) can become the surrogate of the prophetic testimony (*shahāda al-ʿanbiyya*) which was only possible when the Prophet or one of the twelve Imams revered by Twelver Shiʿism were alive.[110] On the basis of these premises, al-Ṣadr prefigures the constitutional architecture of the Islamic state in the third part of his *Islam Leads Life* (1979). Mallat argues that his draft of the Islamic constitution is one of the most influential documents in the drafting of the constitution of revolutionary Iran a few months after the publication of *Islam Leads Life*.[111] Al-Ṣadr attributes to the *marjʿa* supreme authority in the state hierarchy. Among these, the *marjʿa* declares war and peace, approves the candidates for president, appoints the highest members of the judiciary, and the jurists who sit in the *Council of the Guardians* i.e. a qualified assembly whose members are distinguished scholars. Another important function of the *marjʿa* is deciding on the (Islamic) constitutionality of laws approved by parliament. As we shall see,[112] the constitutional arrangement that al-Ṣadr theorises will be incorporated into the post-revolutionary Iranian institutional framework with few modifications.

Al-Ṣadr, nonetheless, will not witness the realisation of this project in Iran. His political activism; the relationship with the Iranian revolutionary leadership; and the long-lasting

---

[109] Al-Ṣadr *The Caliphate of Mankind and Prophetic Testimony* quoted in Mallat, *Renewal of Islamic Law* p. 66.

[110] A. Jabar, *Shi'ite Movement* pp. 280-7.

[111] Mallat, *Renewal of Islamic Law* pp. 69-72. This point is in fact not entirely confirmed for example Said Amir Arjomand claims that only certain aspects were actually influential. *See* Said Amir Arjomand, 'Book Review: The Renewal of Islamic Law. Muhammad Baqer as-Sadr, Najaf and the Shiʿi International by Chibli Mallat', *Islamic Law and Society,* 2/3 (1995), 348-53.

[112] *See* Section 3.5.2.

opposition to Hussein's regime, eventually led him to imprisonment and execution in 1980. His political theory remains, nonetheless, influential and was powerfully amplified by the success of his colleague, as well as competitor in religious leadership, Khomeini with whom he had a difficult relationship. Even Hezbollah in Lebanon in its *Open Letter* of 1985 condemns Hussein's repression against the rise of political Shiʿism in Iraq and acknowledges al-Ṣadr's contribution referring to him as a *mujāhid ʿālim*: a 'militant *ʿālim*'.[113]

3.5   Political Shiʿism in Practice: Khomeini's Iran

Up until this stage, the experience of Islamism has been characterised by constant frustrations. None of its reformist or revolutionary attempts were successful. Repression, combined with the influence of foreign powers was too strong in all the countries of the Middle East to allow the realisation of Islamist aspirations. The Iranian Revolution (1979), was a surprising phenomenon that shook the region and upset the entire regional political balance and established the first regime inspired by Islamist principles. Its theoretical foundations were primarily theorised by Ruhollah Musavi Khomeini (1902- 1989), an Iranian born cleric highly trained in Islamic jurisprudential doctrine and with a powerful charisma.

The Iranian revolution (and Khomeini) intertwines with the Najaf networks described in the previous section. Khomeini lived in exile in Najaf from 1965 to 1978 and during this period elaborated most of his political theory.[114] The degree of influence of Iraqi scholars over his work remains disputed, since his figure was rather isolated from the scene and in competition with other religious leaders including al-Ṣadr. His lectures in Najaf, nonetheless, are of central importance among its political publications.[115]

---

[113] *See* Section 5.5. *ʿālīm* is the singular of *ʿulamāʾ*.

[114] H. E. Chehabi, 'Religion and Politics in Iran: How Theocratic Is the Islamic Republic?', *Daedalus,* 120/3 (1991), 69-91 at p. 72.

[115] Hamid Dabashi, *Theology of Discontent: The Ideological Foundation of the Islamic Revolution in Iran* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2006) p. 437.

3.5.1 Khomeini's Islamist Critique of Modern Society

Khomeini's critique of the West and its liberal institutions is not particularly original and fully overlaps with the previous cases. As ʿAbduh, Quṭb and al-Ṣadr, Khomeini claims that constitutional arrangements based on principles extraneous to the Islamic tradition are lacking in moral legitimacy. He is harshly critical of the imposition of liberal and western norms on the Islamic community, the decline of which was determined by its indiscriminate westernisation imposed by colonial powers and their local allies.

He accused the West for its attempts to deprive the Iranian people not only of their material goods but also of their ethical foundations. His criticism was directed against the constitutionalism imposed in Iran by local supporters of modernisation and their foreign patrons.[116] In his own words:

> They have removed from operation all the judicial processes and political laws of Islam and replaced them with European importations, thus diminishing the scope of Islam and ousting it from society. For the sake of exploitation they have installed their agents in power.[117]

According to Khomeini, the implementation of non-Islamic policies to rule over the Islamic community altered the moral integrity of its individuals. In his view 'a believing, pious, just individual cannot possibly exist in a socio-political environment of this [non-Islamic] nature and still maintain his faith and righteous conduct.'[118] A person's morality is fully constituted by the social environment in which is embedded, (*see* Chapter 4). Khomeini proposes a reassessment of the Islamic concept of *al-insān al-kāmil* (the perfect/complete human) and proclaims the need for an Islamic social and political system as a condition for the person to achieve moral perfection. As Hamid Dabashi observes:

> When translated into political terms, the idea of "the perfect man," perfectly harmless in its mystical context, necessitates a total, final, and absolutely unconditional program of moral and ideological righteousness upon which Islam,

---

[116] Ibid., p. 439.

[117] Ruhollah Khomeini, *Islam and Revolution: Writings and Declarations of Imam Khomeini*, trans. Hamid Algar (Berkeley, Calif.: Mizan Press, 1981) p. 35.

[118] Ibid., p. 48.

as a social and metaphysical order, teaches, regulates, guides, and controls every conceivable move and manner of a Muslim individual.[119]

The need for an Islamic revolution and the establishment of an Islamic government are dictated by the necessity to recover the moral community and the person from the decay determined by the spreading of western moral values under the rule of Pahlavi's monarchy, which forcefully implemented highly modernist and secularised reforms. According to Khomeini:

> all non-Islamic systems of government are the systems of *kufr* [apostasy], since the rules in each case is an instance of *taghut* [tyranny], and it is our duty to remove from the life of Muslim society all traces of *kufr* and destroy them. It is also our duty to create a favourable social environment for the education of believing and virtuous individuals, an environment that is in total contradiction with that produced by the rule of the *taghut* and illegitimate power.[120]

Non-Islamic regimes inspired by the liberal principles of western constitutional arrangements correspond to *kufr* (apostasy), one of the most serious sins of Islam which corresponds to the denial of the truth of Islam. The abolition of these oppressive regimes and the foundation of an Islamic state are necessary to redeem the Islamic community from its moral corruption. In one of his lectures, Khomeini observes that:

> In the past we did not act in concert and unanimity in order to establish proper government and overthrow treacherous and corrupt rulers. Some people were apathetic and reluctant even to discuss the theory of Islamic government, and some went so far as to praise oppressive rulers. It is for this reason that we find ourselves in the present state. The influence and sovereignty of Islam in society have declined; the nation of Islam has fallen victim to division and weakness; the laws of Islam have remained in abeyance and been subjected to change and modification; and the imperialists have propagated foreign laws and alien culture among the Muslims through their agents for the sake of their evil purposes, causing people to be infatuated with the West.[121]

The quotation shows Khomeini's concern for the decline of the moral community of Islam because of the interference of western norms and institutions in its organisation. Similarly to Quṭb and al-Ṣadr, Khomeini's Islamist project relies on a critique of the western liberal model and he refuses to compromise with norms and institutions not fully derived from the tradition of Islam. Although western societies have developed

---

[119] Dabashi, *Theology of Discontent* p. 476. It shall be noticed how the same idea of *al-insān al-kāmil* is to be found also in Quṭb, there will be occasion to develop further on this concept in Chapter 4. Calvert, *Qutb* p. 209.

[120] Khomeini, *Islam and Revolution* p. 48.

[121] Ibid., p. 54.

material conditions of welfare and produced scientific progress to the point of landing on the Moon, Khomeini claims that this is not true progress. He says:

> Let them go all the way to Mars or beyond the Milky Way; they will still be deprived of true happiness, moral virtue, and spiritual advancement and be unable to solve their own social problems. For the solution of social problems and the relief of human misery requires foundations in faith and morals; merely acquiring material power and wealth, conquering nature and space, have no effect in this regard. They must be supplemented by, and balanced with, the faith, the conviction, and the morality of Islam in order truly to serve humanity instead of endangering it.[122]

It is exclusively with reference to Islamic norms that a just political system can be realised. Western values and institutions cannot enjoy legitimacy in the regulation of the affairs of the Islamic community since they are in contradiction with its founding precepts. In his view:

> At the beginning of the constitutional movement, when people wanted to write laws and draw up a constitution, a copy of the Belgian legal code was borrowed from the Belgian embassy and a handful of individuals […] used it as the basis for the constitution they then wrote, supplementing its deficiencies with borrowings from the French and British legal codes. True, they added some of the ordinances of Islam in order to deceive the people, but the basis of the laws that were now thrust upon people was alien and borrowed. […] They are all opposed to Islam; they violate the system of government and the laws of Islam.[123]

These considerations then justify the need to eliminate external westernising influences on the Islamic community to establish an Islamic government providing for the well-being of the person in a comprehensive manner.

3.5.2 Khomeini's Islamic Government

Khomeini vaguely sketched his political theory in *The Revealing of Secrets* (1943-4)[124] and then developed it further in *Islamic Government* (1971).[125] According to him, the Islamic government is constitutional in a different way from other forms of government:

> It is constitutional in the sense that the rulers are subject to a certain set of conditions in governing and administering the country, conditions that are set forth in the Noble Qur'an and the Sunna of the Most Noble Messenger. It is the laws

---

[122] Ibid., p. 36.

[123] Ibid., p.31.

[124] Vanessa Martin, *Creating an Islamic State: Khomeini and the Making of a New Iran* (London: I.B.Tauris, 2000) pp.103-12.

[125] Khomeini, *Islam and Revolution*.

and ordinances of this of Islam comprising this set of conditions that must be observed and practiced. Islamic government may be defined as the rule of divine law over men.[126]

The *sharīʿa* only, nonetheless, is not enough to guarantee the just order of the Islamic community and has to be complemented by an Islamic authority since it is only under the guidance of Islamic scholars that the Islamic community can guarantee the actual well-being of the person. This aspect introduces the concept of the *Wilāyat al-Faqīh* (the governance of the religious jurisprudent) according to which the *faqīh* (a legal-religious expert of the rank of a *marjʿa* characterised by moral integrity and excellence in theological, ethical and juridical disciplines) is at the top of the state hierarchy. The *faqīh* is the repository of supreme ethical and legal knowledge and decides over the rightful application of the *sharīʿa* in the public and private lives of Muslims. This is an important difference between Islamist Shiʿī theory and its Sunni counterparts in which the clergy were not given any particular leading role.

Most of *Islamic Government* is dedicated to the explanation and interpretation of Qurʾanic verses and *ḥadīth* justifying the attribution of political responsibilities to the *ʿulamāʾ*.[127] Also in Khomeini, as in al-Ṣadr, the fact that no religious authority of the status of the Prophet or one of the twelve Imams is present on earth confers political and legal authority to the Islamic jurisprudent (the *faqīh*) as the highest-ranking religious figure.[128]

The *Wilāyat al-Faqīh* in Khomeini's theory remains, nonetheless, a vague concept in terms of institutional structure, which he will amend in various respects in the course of his intellectual and political career.[129] It is also for this reason, that al-Ṣadr's constitutional proposal (Section 3.4.2) is considered particularly innovative compared to Khomeini's vague conceptualisation. The 'righteous and proper organs of

---

[126] Ibid., p. 55.

[127] Especially the second lecture under the title 'the form of an Islamic government' is dedicated to this work of exegesis justifying the political activism of the ʿulamaʾ. Ibid., pp. 55-125. Parts of this chapter will be directly quoted or referred to by Hezbollah in its 1985 *Open Letter*.

[128] Dabashi, *Theology of Discontent* p. 445.

[129] Martin, *Creating an Islamic State* p.127.

government'[130] which Khomeini advocated, became in part a reality in the form of the Iranian constitution in December 1979 which incorporates the idea of a religious leadership overseeing the work of the legislative, executive and judiciary branches, with the capacity of vetoing decisions that are deemed in breach of Islamic ethics.[131] With the establishment of the Islamic Republic in Iran, these institutions began to be shaped throughout a troubled constitutional process in which several elements of Khomeini's theory were eventually integrated.[132]

The office of the *Walī al-Faqīh* was established at the highest hierarchical level of the state, a position which was filled by Khomeini himself. The second most important institution was the Council of the Guardian, an assembly of knowledgeable scholars with the function of licensing major legislative decisions from an Islamic point of view. A Council of Experts elected by the people was also established with the main role of appointing the *Walī al-Faqīh*. These religious institutions were complemented by a presidential-like apparatus[133], which established a President of the Republic elected directly by the people along with the Parliament. All these institutions were nonetheless under the watchful control of the *Walī al-Faqīh* and the Council of the Guardian.[134]

In its original conception the *Wilāyat* was not limited to rule over the Iranian people only, but aimed to be influential over the entire Islamic community regardless of national borders. As it will be seen, this was also the case for Hezbollah, which was a

---

[130] Khomeini, *Islam and Revolution* p. 54.

[131] The realisation of the *Wilāyat al-Fāqih* at a constitutional level was nonetheless the result of a troubled process affected also by the internal opposition. Said Saffari reports in detail the constitutional debate in the post-revolutionary Iran, highlighting the fact that its outcomes were far from obvious, being the concept of the *Wilāyat* opposed also from within the religious elite of Iran. Said Saffari, 'The Legitimation of the Clergy's Right to Rule in the Iranian Constitution of 1979', *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies,* 20/1 (1993), 64-82 at pp. 64-82.

[132] For an overview of this process *see* Chehabi, 'Religion and Politics in Iran'. Saffari, 'Legitimation of the Clergy'.

[133] According to Saffari this component of the Islamic Republic was inspired to the French presidential system. Saffari, 'Legitimation of the Clergy'.

[134] At a later stage, other institutions would have been added to supplement to the others also because this polity revealed several issues in its actual functionality.

fundamental pawn in the process of 'exporting the revolution' [135] and which will declare submission to the authority of the Iranian *Faqīh* in its declarations.[136]

Despite its appeal for tradition and authenticity, Khomeini's theory and consequently the Iranian institutional system was widely innovative from the point of view of religious orthodoxy. Said Saffari observes that in the Shiʿī tradition the believer has always been free to choose his *marjʿa al-taqlīd*. Nonetheless, the institutionalisation of the *faqīh* as a unique authority eliminates this possibility and forces the recognition of one *marjʿa* that corresponds to the *faqīh*.[137] Halliday observes that:

> Khomeini's ideas were fundamentalist in their claim to derive everything from sacred texts, but they were not fundamentalist or traditional if these terms are meant to imply that Khomeini's views are inherited from the past. Both the ideas themselves, and even more so, the political and social effect they had, were novel ones, dependent upon modern social conditions and modern political debates upon which they drew quite freely without attribution.[138]

The ideal institutions theorised by Islamism had to be 'bent' or reinterpreted to fit a reality different to the Islamic ideal and inevitably introduce innovations.[139] In addition, the fact that the clergy would have become politically active and considered (at least *de facto*) infallible[140] was discontinuous with the tradition of Shiʿism which has been characterised by quietism and generally recognised infallibility only to the Prophet and the twelve Imams. This shows a fundamental limit of the Islamist project. Notwithstanding its claims of completeness and moral superiority, the implementation of Islamic political institutions in Iran shows the limits of the Islamic traditions as a source for political institutions and the need to innovate and integrate Islamic principles

---

[135] Fawaz A. Gerges, *Journey of the Jihadist: Inside Muslim Militancy* (1st edn.; Orlando, Fla.: Harcourt, 2006) p. 83.

[136] *See* Appendix 1. § 7, 14, 16, 17.

[137] Saffari, 'Legitimation of the Clergy' p. 78.

[138] Halliday, *The Myth of Confrontation* p. 45.

[139] More troubling is the reverse process in which society is forcibly 'reformed' to fit institutions that would not otherwise suit, which is partly the case of Iran. For a critique of the communitarian foundations of Islamism *see* Katerina Dalacoura, 'A Critique of Communitarianism with Reference to Post-Revolutionary Iran', *Review of International Studies,* 28/01 (2002), 75-92. The obsolescence of the concept of community in Islamism and communitarianism will be one of the concluding considerations of this study.

[140] With regard to the concept of infallibility in Khomeini *see* Dabashi, *Theology of Discontent* pp. 463-6.

with other non-Islamic norms to fill the numerous gaps not covered by Islamic orthodoxy.

3.6   Conclusions

As Fawaz Gerges points out, the relationship between Islam and the western political and cultural sphere has been historically conflicting well before the rise of western powers in the Middle East in modern times.[141] The social transformation experienced in this region, resulting from the impact of western political models, has facilitated the rise of Islamism although it may not be the only cause.

Islamists theorise a political project advocating for the resurgence of an Islamic moral community in alternative to the diffusion of liberal and secularist norms. The previous pages have outlined the core tenets of four key Islamist thinkers, showing how they are all concerned with the moral decay that the Islamic community is witnessing as a result, in their opinions, of the impact of western liberal doctrines. They see as the roots of the problem of the Islamic community the impact of liberal norms such as secularism, reforms of the juridical system, education and, more generally, the rise of individualism. They claim that this situation is due to the imposition of norms and institutions that are avulse from the Islamic tradition and therefore argue for the establishment of political institutions based on Islamic norms as a panacea.

Their interpretation of Islam is the only legitimate source throughout which this situation can be addressed to restore the moral integrity of the community and its well-being. They call for the restoration of virtues predicated by Islam within the Muslim community through reform or revolution, as a necessary condition for a return to spiritual as well as material well-being.

Based on this discussion it is possible to proceed with a comparison between the Islamist critique of modern liberal principles and the communitarian critique of

---

[141] Fawaz A. Gerges, *America and Political Islam: Clash of Cultures or Clash of Interests?* (Cambridge, UK ; New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1999) p. 37.

liberalism presented in Chapter 2. Notwithstanding the different cultural and historical contexts in which western and Islamist critiques of liberalism have developed, a common argumentative basis cuts across these two stances. If we live aside the historical particularity and cultural specificity of Islamism, the Islamists' claims epitomised by the thinkers above can be interpreted as part of the broader communitarian tradition, which has always been critical of liberal ethics. The Islamist emphasis on community, tradition, and moral virtues as opposed to individualism, autonomous moral reasoning, and the 'society of interests'; is suggestive of the possibility that common assumptions underlie the reasoning of both communitarians and Islamists.

The following chapter will propose a comparative enquiry of these common assumptions. It will claim that communitarianism and Islamism do not share the sole fact of being critical of liberal norms and institutions as endangering the moral integrity of the community; but their criticism is based on shared assumptions about the concepts of the person and community.

Chapter 4

Islamism as Communitarianism:

a Comparative Analysis

4.1   Introduction

The claim of this chapter is that underlying the communitarian and Islamist critiques of liberal norms and institutions presented in Chapters 2 and 3, there is a shared way of thinking about the community and the person.

To recapitulate in an overly simplistic manner, liberalism, and those international norms derived from it, leans on the Kantian individualist tradition according to which a person is a moral agent capable of autonomously choosing their life path independently from its relations from others.[1] However, communitarianism and Islamism rely on a conception of the person, according to which their ethical principles are defined in relationship with the community of which the person becomes a part of. Whereas liberalism understands persons as autonomous moral agents (and on this basis postulates norms and institutions as rights, democracy and liberal statehood which are primarily concerned with the protection of the status of moral agent), this chapter shows that communitarians and Islamists rely on the idea of community as constitutive of the person's ethical principles. As Charvet and Kaczynska-Nay argue, communitarians think that 'an individual self is not an inherently separate and independent rational entity but a being embedded in the thick fabric of a particular communal life.'[2]

The differences in these assumptions have an important explanatory value in understanding how international relations and norms are theorised by Islamists and communitarians and how they think these norms are relevant for their political projects. The following pages isolate a few key aspects which Islamist and communitarian conceptions of community share. These are:

- The community is constitutive of the ethical principles of the person and has an intrinsic value.
- Is conceived as a self-referential entity characterised by autonomy in defining its constitutive principles.
- Is the exclusive source of legitimacy for a political order.

---

[1] *See* Chapter 2.

[2] Charvet and Kaczynska-Nay, *Liberal Project* pp. 298-9.

In addition to this, the chapter identifies three elements that Islamist and communitarian political theories have in common with regard to their conception of the person.

- The person acquires their identity and ethical principles through a process of identification within the community.
- The achievement of freedom and the complete realisation of human potential are determined by the identification of the person with the principles of the ethical community.
- The person is bound by loyalty and responsibility towards the ethical community as the source of their identity.

In the following pages each of these aspects will be explained and justified by a comparative analysis of the texts and debates presented in the previous chapters. This will form the basis upon which the rest of this study will assess the impact of international norms on Islamist politics by considering Islamism as a form of communitarianism.[3]

4.2 Community as Constitutive of the Person's Identity

According to the conception of community as constitutive, the community is the source of the ethical understanding of its members. Sandel says that:

> community describes not just what they [persons] have as fellow citizens but also what they are, not a relationship they choose (as a voluntary association) but an attachment they discover, not merely an attribute but a constituent of their identity. In contrast to the instrumental and sentimental conceptions of community, we might describe this strong view as the constitutive conception.[4]

The constitutive nature of community becomes evident if contrasted with the instrumental conception of society typical of liberalism. An example in this regard is Rawls's theory in which the society is conceived as 'a cooperative venture for mutual advantage' and its members decide to cooperate because this 'makes possible a better life for all.'[5] Communitarians however argue that becoming part of a society is a more complex process in which 'our identity is always partly defined in conversation with

---

[3] The author has published elsewhere a condensed and slightly different version of this and the previous chapters. *See* Filippo Dionigi, 'Islamism as Communitarianism: Person, Community and the Problem of International Norms in Non-Liberal Theories', *Journal of International Political Theory,* 8/1-2 (2012), 74-103.

[4] Sandel, *Liberalism* p. 150.

[5] Rawls, *Theory of Justice* pp. 6 and 9.

others through the common understanding which underlies the practice of our society.'[6] It is as part of a community that the person defines their ethical principles and thus recognises the legitimacy of institutions such as rights or state sovereignty. The idea that this process can take place in abstraction from social relations is disputed by communitarians.

A similar conception can be found in Islamism. In the cases of Quṭb, ʿAbduh, al-Ṣadr and Khomeini, the community (that in this case corresponds to the Islamic community) is the main target of their reformist or revolutionary projects. Islamism attempts to re-establish the unity and morality of the Islamic community which is seen to have been corrupted by the influence of western modernity and liberal values, but also by the incapacity of the traditional religious establishment to tackle its challenges. Ira Lapidus claims that Islamists 'oppose consumer and individualistic gratification as social values in favour of moral commitment and community loyalty […] Islamist movements are an important force for creating a viable community life.' [7] Talal Asad captures convincingly the difference between ʿAbduh's idea of community and the liberal model of society when he says that:

> The theological concept of *Umma* that Abduh employs, has the sense of a collective body of Muslims bound together by their faith in God and the Prophet - a faith that is embodied in prescribed forms of behavior. It is therefore quite different from the idea of a society made up of equal citizen governing themselves individually (through conscience) and collectively (through the electorate). [8]

As seen, ʿAbduh, Quṭb, al-Ṣadr and Khomeini were all aware of the moral decay of their society. ʿAbduh for example observed the fracture between an uncritical endorsement of modernity and a blind application of tradition, and Quṭb referred to the concept of *jāhiliyya* to describe the moral decay of the contemporary society. In this respect, Roxanne Euben claims that there is similarity between Quṭb's critique of his society and Macintyre's description of contemporary ethics as emerging from the ruins

---

[6] Taylor, 'Atomism' p. 209.

[7] Ira M. Lapidus, 'Islamic Revival and Modernity: The Contemporary Movements and the Historical Paradigms', *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient,* 40/4 (1997), 444-60 at p. 447.

[8] Asad, *Formations of the Secular* p. 230.

of a 'moral catastrophe'.[9] Al-Ṣadr similarly observed how Iraqi society needed to be recovered from the influence of liberal secularist views and communist ideology. Khomeini claimed that 'a favourable social environment for the education of virtuous individuals'[10] is necessary for Muslims not to fall into the domain of unislamic modes of life.

This Islamist impulse of calling for the restoration of an Islamic moral community comes from the assumption that community has a constitutive value for the moral status of the person and is the foundational basis to achieve personal well-being. Islamist and communitarian stances against the liberal individualist political ideal share the theoretical premise according to which the community constitutes the source of morality for its members. The community is the source of 'a good life' for persons who otherwise would be perceived as morally unsubstantiated. As a consequence, it is by means of community membership that a person acquires morality. It is not a coincidence that the reformist attempts of ʿAbduh were mostly focused on public education. He considered this the most effective instrument to reconstruct the moral texture of the community and to establish a shared ethical understanding through education. This is confirmed by him when he says that:

> the form of civil order in a society is only the image of the substance of the characteristics its members have acquired through the habits and customs that have grown in them whether praiseworthy or reprehensible. The different laws they have had in their period of rise and decline cannot be detached from these characteristics, no matter how much those laws have changed in form or subject matter. This has been recognized by those wise persons who have striven first of all to change people's characteristics and manners, whenever they wanted to establish a well-defined order in the society.[11]

Similarly Quṭb, claims that:

> Our method realizes the establishment of well-integrated educational, ethical, economic, social and political systems which in turn, help in creating man with a

---

[9] Euben, *Enemy in the Mirror* pp. 135-6.

[10] Khomeini, *Islam and Revolution* p. 48.

[11] Quoted in Kerr, *Islamic Reform,* p. 135.

complete personality- a man who has been weakened by contemporary life and its followed criteria[12].

Also according to al-Ṣadr's view, it is Islam that has the role of redeeming the person from moral corruption throughout the recreation of the Islamic moral community. According to al-Ṣadr:

> [Islam] assaulted the materialistic notion of life and posited, instead, a new notion of life. On the basis of this new notion, Islam established a system in which the individual is not considered a mechanical tool in the social system, nor society as an organization for the sake of the individual. Rather, it gave to each –the individual and society- their rights and insured for both his spiritual and material dignity.[13]

It is the relation that the person establishes with the community that constitutes their moral identity; and when this relation is regulated by the principles of Islam then, al-Ṣadr argues, the person realises their full spiritual and material well-being. The constitutive value of the Islamic community appears also in the thoughts of the eminent Shiʿī scholar Muḥammad Ḥusayn Faḍlallah [14] who claimed that 'Islam, by virtue of its divine and comprehensive legal system, embodied an unsurpassed normative code and practical set of values, which together provided the basis for refining individual behaviour and reforming social relations.'[15]

4.3   Community as Self-Referential

By self-referentiality is intended the idea that only the principles and norms which traditionally and historically identify the ethical community are considered legitimate by its members. Unless there is overlapping, heteronomous ethical conceptions infringing upon traditional communal norms cannot be recognised as legitimate.

As seen, communitarians do not see the plausibility of the idea of 'stepping out' from the particular situations and communities in which the person develops their moral

---

[12] Quṭb from al *Islām wa Mushkilat al-Ḥadāra* (Islam and the Problem of Civilization), quoted in Abu-Rabiʿ, *Origins of Islamic Resurgence* p. 162.

[13] al-Ṣadr, *Our Philosophy* p. 26.

[14] On the importance of this scholar, especially with regard to Hezbollah, will be referred further below. *See* Section 5.4.

[15] Jamal Sankari, *Fadlallah: The Making of a Radical Shi'ite Leader* (London: Saqi, 2005) p. 138.

reasoning. There is neither such a thing as an 'original position' nor an ideal speech situation (as Rawls and Habermas respectively suppose) which justify abandoning the communal ethical views of a person in favour of abstract reasoning. As Charvet and Kaczynska-Nay observe communitarians argue that the 'general standpoint from which apparently objective claims are made are themselves aspects of a community's system of beliefs and anyone making such claims will not be distancing himself from his community but will remain embedded in it.'[16]

Islamists have equally argued that Muslims shall not give up their identities of religious persons submitted to Islam to accept liberal norms and institutions, because this endangers their identity as Muslims, corrupts the integrity of their community and, ultimately, compromises their relationship with God. It is not difficult to observe in what sense the community is self-referential in communitarian theory, for example if we consider the significance of sovereignty emphasised as an international norm protecting the self-determination of communities. This was strongly asserted in the debate about human rights universality where state sovereignty was conflated with the protection of the ethical community of the state. Equally, the relevance attributed by communitarians to the borders of communities as a limitation to our ethical obligations is another sign of the self-referential nature of community.[17] More importantly, the idea of the community as the exclusive legitimate foundation of norms such as rights, testifies that external sources would not be recognised as legitimate, from the communitarian point of view, because their origins are extraneous to the community itself.

Self-referentiality is evident also within Islamist thought. Quṭb considers the Islamic community a morally superior entity compared to European and US societies as well as the communist modern society. As Paul Berman observes Quṭb 'wanted to show that Islam was self-sufficient –that Islam did not need the thinkers of the West, could rely on its own spectacular resources of the past, was all-inclusive, independent, and fully

---

[16] Charvet and Kaczynska-Nay, *Liberal Project* p. 303.

[17] *See* for example in this regard David Miller and Sohail H. Hashmi, *Boundaries and Justice: Diverse Ethical Perspectives* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2001).

adequate.'[18] It is a consequence then, that the Islamic moral community represents not *a* source for the legitimacy of a political order and its institutions, but the *only* source valid to play this foundational role.

The idea of a community as self-referential does not mean that the Islamic community shall not be permeable to innovations. Indeed Quṭb repeatedly points out that natural sciences and technology can be studied and developed within the Islamic community, as these can ameliorate the welfare of the society as in the societies of *jāhiliyya*. Nonetheless, external influence cannot be accepted on the moral grounds of the community. Quṭb claims on several occasions that only the Islamic moral community can guarantee well-being to the person; alternative moral conceptions are flawed either because of their individualism and their idolatry of the human (capitalist society) or because of its materialism (communist society and atheism). For example he states that:

> Only Islamic values and morals, and Islamic teachings and safeguards, are worthy
> of mankind. These provide a permanent and true measure of human progress.
> Islam is the real civilization and Islamic society a truly civilized community.[19]

Community self-referentiality is also to be found in ʿAbduh. Even though ʿAbduh's Islamism, and in general modernist Islamism, is receptive of the external influences and despite the fact that ʿAbduh is deeply conscious of the mutual influences among different ethical communities, his theory is that only with reference to the Islamic ethical tradition, a political order can be legitimised. Indeed, it is this assumption that justifies his reformist intents towards the Islamic community rather than an uncritical endorsement of modern, Western values and institutions. He criticises the sectors of Egyptian society that abandoned Islamic traditions to embrace external moral conceptions uncritically based on this self-referential conception of community. As Samira Haj observes:

> Locating the disease of backwardness in the moral degeneracy of the Muslim
> community, 'Abduh deemed a revived Islam (rather than its demise or

---

[18] Paul Berman, *Terror and Liberalism* (New York, N.Y.: Norton, 2003) p. 77.

[19] Quṭb, *Milestones* p. 76.

confinement) a constitutive feature to Muslim advancement. As against the Europeans and the Europeanized Arab intellectuals who were adamant that breaking away from Islam, in particular, was necessary to become modern and find equal footing with Europe, 'Abduh maintained that a reconfigured Islam in light of the confusion produced by colonial modernity was the only solution for faithful Muslims seeking advancement.[20]

Both ʿAbduh and Quṭb believed in the renewal of the moral Islamic community from within and with reference to its traditional principles. Both were concerned with providing an understanding of Islamic ethics consistent with the historical challenges to which their community was subject to. Whereas they internalised certain aspects, such as a modern use of reason and natural sciences, they claimed that well-being, justice and progress can only be *Islamic* justice, well-being and progress.

Community self-referentiality is common also in Shiʿī Islamist theory. The very fact that an Islamic political project such as the *Wilāyat al-Faqīh* is put forward as an alternative to liberal and communist models by al-Ṣadr and Khomeini, testifies the idea that Islamic norms are seen as alternative to other ethical conceptions rather than complementary. Khomeini's harsh condemnation of the influence of liberal political models on the Iranian constitutional process, seen in Section 2.5.1, further reinforces this. His criticism of the westernisation of the Islamic community substantiates the claim that it is only with reference to the Islamic tradition that legitimate political institutions can rise. Equally, Faḍlallah claims that 'Islam, as a divinely revealed and organic system of existence, does not need to borrow, much less incorporate, alien terminology and foreign concepts, tenets and theories.'[21] Declarations of this kind, asserting the idea that the Islamic model is self-sufficient and it does not need or accept external interference, confirm how also in Islamism, community is conceived as a self-referential entity over which external influences are only arbitrary impositions lacking a basis of legitimacy.

---

[20] Haj, *Islamic Tradition* p. 94.

[21] Sankari, *Fadlallah* p. 106.

4.4 Community as Source of Legitimacy

The idea that the concept of community has a fundamental role as a source of legitimacy for political norms and institutions comes as a consequence of the two previous points on its constitutiveness and self-referential character. As the community is constitutive of the moral principles of persons and as the exclusive source of moral principles, it then becomes the only basis to acknowledge the legitimacy of political institutions and norms. On the contrary, if norms and institutions do not reflect the principles of the ethical community, these will be challenged as illegitimate by its members whose moral reasoning and ethical parameters are derived from the traditional community.

Indeed, the members of the ethical community identify themselves with these principles because these are constitutive of their identity and consequently they would recognise the legitimacy of a political order, its norms and institutions only if this order reflects such principles. Consider for example Taylor when he describes an ideal communitarian polity. He claims that the viability of this kind of institutional system can be based either on coercion or on participation. Coercion is not an option and he continues by saying that:

> In order to have a free society, one has to replace this coercion with something else. This can only be a willing identification with the polis on the part of the citizens, a sense that the political institutions in which they live are an expression of themselves. The 'laws' have to be seen as reflecting and entrenching their dignity as citizens, and hence to be in a sense extensions of themselves.[22]

For political institutions to be legitimate, they have to be an 'extension' of our personal moral identity and reflect the norms and values that we have acquired as members of an ethical community. If this is not the case, then legitimacy is undermined, because is not derived by our moral sense. The role of community as a source of legitimacy can be observed also with regard to the debate on the universality of human rights. Let us consider again Brown's view on human rights and the western liberal tradition:

---

[22] Charles Taylor, 'Cross-Purposes: The Liberal-Communitarian Debate' in Charles Taylor (ed.), *Philosophical Arguments* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995) p. 165.

> Liberal societies of the last 150 to 200 years have indeed been the freest and most generally congenial societies known to history, but not because they have been constructed on the basis of rights; their success has been based on features within them that pointed towards a different, more community and less individualist, context for political action. It was because of the existence of this context, because these societies were, in certain respects, ethical communities, that rights were widely honoured and respected; a successful rights-based politics is parasitic on features of the polity that have nothing to do with rights- indeed, that may even be inimical to rights thinking.[23]

This conception relies on the idea that it is the existence of an ethical community and its contextual historical tradition, which grants the basis of legitimacy for norms and institutions such as rights. International norms as human rights cannot be considered legitimate if they are not derivatives of our communal moral principles and traditions.

The argument unfolds in a similar manner, although in different historical circumstances, within Islamist political theory. Concerned about the decay of the Muslim community of Egypt, Quṭb argues that:

> The cure for this situation was not to leave our comprehensive religion in a corner for devotion only. Nor was to rush off to draw our laws from French legislation, or our system of government from western political theories, or our social system from materialistic theories, before we had demonstrated the unsuitability of this *Shari'ah* as a basis for modern society! For the natural organic growth of a [political] system in any environment makes it more suitable in relation to this environment - at least- than an arbitrarily adopted system that is foreign to the nature of this environment and has not grown up in it in a gradual organic way.[24]

This is an indicator of how only traditional ethical communities provide the moral grounding for the legitimacy of political institutions, also in the case of Islamist theory. Equally, ʿAbduh discusses in detail the ground of legitimacy of a political order pointing out how uncritical endorsement of external norms and political institutions lacks a moral basis of legitimacy. He claims that 'the form of civil order in a society is only the image of the substance of the characteristics of its members.'[25] The link between the ethical community and political order becomes evident in ʿAbduh's legal and political theory with regard to his conceptions of *shūrā* and *ijmāʿ* as have been presented above.[26] In his view, a just political order shall exercise power within the limits established by

---

[23] Brown, 'Universal Human Rights' p. 49.

[24] William Shepard, 'The Development of the Thought of Sayyid Qutb as Reflected in Earlier and Later Editions of 'Social Justice in Islam", *Die Welt des Islams,* 32 (1992), 196-236 at p. 17.

[25] Kerr, *Islamic Reform* p. 135.

[26] *See* Section 3.2.2.

consultation (*shūrā*) with the community and in particular its Islamic scholars in order to be legitimate. The principle of *ijmāʿ* further reinforces this aspect. Whenever there is a moral and political question whose ethical righteousness is in doubt, the final word remains with the community.[27] The principle is derived by the Islamic *ḥadīth* which states 'My community will never agree upon an error'[28] which establishes that consensus (*ijmāʿ*) or disagreement of the community corresponds to its moral righteousness or immorality.

A similar way of thinking is also present in Shiʿī political theory, although is articulated differently from the Sunni case because of its particular hierarchical organisation through the tradition of the *marjʿaiyya* and consequently the *Wilāyat al-Faqīh*. In this case the community of believers constitutes the basis of legitimacy for the leader of the community (the *marjʿa*) and in the case of Khomeini's *Wilāyat al-Faqīh* for the *Walī al-Faqīh*. As Khomeini claims, it is the duty of the community to acknowledge the legitimacy of the authority of a religious expert, as the only legitimate authority from an Islamic point of view. The central importance of community in granting a licence of morality to political decisions confirms how Islamists see the community as a central source of legitimacy for political institutions in a way that shares many similarities with the communitarian conception.

4.5 Conception of the Person as Community Member

The way community is understood in Islamism and communitarianism directly influences how the person is conceptualised. The first aspect is that in communitarianism and Islamism the person is described as developing their moral identity by relating to the other members of the community, which is a direct consequence of the constitutive function of the community. Communitarian theory offers several examples highlighting this aspect. Taylor argues that:

---

[27] In particular ʿAbduh refers to the opinion of scholars trained in Islamic jurisprudence as the guides and guardian of the morality of the community.

[28] This *ḥadīth* is reported by various commentators: al-Tirmidhi (4:2167), ibn Majah (2:1303), Abu Daūd among others. Wording may vary from one to another.

> The identity of the autonomous, self-determining individual requires a social matrix, one for instance which through a series of practices recognizes the rights to autonomous decision and which calls for the individual having a voice in deliberation about public action.[29]

On this basis, the communitarian person develops their identity in a symbiotic process with the community. The Sandelian critique of the liberal 'unencumbered self' further clarifies this aspect. Referring to the idea of a liberal rational actor detached from communal relations, he points out that:

> To imagine a person incapable of constitutive attachments such as these is not to conceive an ideally free and rational agent, but to imagine a person wholly without character, without moral depth.[30]

The idea of the person as abstract from moral and communal relations as it is theorised for example in Rawls's original position, is considered an implausible assumption to which opposes the idea that we as persons can only be plausibly conceived as part of a wider ethical context that is the community.

A similar conception of the person as a component of a wider relations framework emerges in Islamist theory. As Abu-Rabiʿ notes with reference to Quṭb, Islam is conceived as a religion that cannot be lived and practiced as individuals. Persons shall become part of a social environment on the basis of which his or her moral life is based. As Quṭb Says:

> Without this environment the life of the individual becomes impossible, or at least extremely difficult. Therefore whoever wishes to be a Muslim should know that he cannot devote himself to his practice of Islam except in a Muslim environment dominated by Islam. He is mistaken if he imagines that he can realize his Islam as an individual lost in the midst of a society ignorant of divine guidance.[31]

Furthermore Abu-Rabiʿ comments on Quṭb's conception of person and comes to the conclusion that according to him:

> Man is that complex structure of body, emotions, passions, fears, and hopes that are subject to social conditions and relationships. Qutb warns against treating man as an abstraction or as a speculative construct. Man should be taken as a

---

[29] Taylor, 'Atomism' p. 203.

[30] Sandel, *Liberalism* p. 179.

[31] Quṭb in *Hadhā al-Dīn* (This Religion of Islam) quoted in Abu-Rabiʿ, *Origins of Islamic Resurgence* p. 141.

complete whole and, above all, should be considered within a historical and social context.[32]

Such a conception is then similar to the kind of conception that can be found in communitarianism

The fact that the person is conceived in Islamism as part of a relational communal network in which acquires their moral understanding is also present in ʿAbduh as it is reported for example by Charles Adams in a quotation already mentioned above. In his discussion of ʿAbduh's commentary to the *Qurʾān*, Adams observes that:

> one of the principles of society, he [Abduh] says in introducing his comment, is that no people can exist as an independent entity unless there be some bond that binds them together and gives them unity, so that they become a living community, as though they were a single body.[33]

Haj further confirms this, and points out:

> 'Abduh presumed, as any Muslim would, that religious duties (*'ibadat*), as embodied practices, were constitutive of social relations, and he took for granted that interactive transactions (*mu'amalat*) were integral to the constitution of a Muslim subject. Accordingly, the understanding of a Muslim subject as a constitutive part of the collective community is bound to be different than the liberal understanding, in which a clear distinction is drawn between ethics and law, and ethics and religious belief are delineated as private and interior.[34]

ʿAbduh's conception of the person is then in contrast with the liberal conception, his communal nature can be deducted from his own words:

> God has created us as social beings desirous of creating social bonds with one another; these bonds start in families and branch out to other parts of the society until they are rooted in the nation and the larger Community of Muslims.[35]

Also in Islamist Shiʿī thinking a similar conception of the person as deeply embedded in communal relations emerges. al-Ṣadr claims that:

> the basic distinguishing feature of the Islamic system is represented in its being basis on spiritual understanding of life and a moral sense of life. A major point of this system is the taking into consideration of both the individual and society, and

---

[32] Ibid., p. 152.

[33] Adams, *Islam* p. 172.

[34] Haj, *Islamic Tradition* p. 112.

[35] ʿAbduh quoted in ibid., pp. 125-6.

the securing of a balance between life of the individual and social life. The individual is not considered the central principle in legislating and governing, nor is the large social existence the only thing to which the state pays attention and for whose sake it enacts its laws.[36]

Al-Ṣadr's view on the ultimate aim of moral righteousness in Islamic life and the balance between social and individual existence, mirrors the communitarian conception of the integration of the person within a network of social relations characterised by shared moral principles and providing the basis for their realisation. As he further makes clear:

[Religion] builds a link between personal motives and the paths leading to good in life. It also modifies the interest of individuals in such a way as to make individuals believe that their personal interests and the real general human interests –as defined by Islam- are interrelated.[37]

A strong connection between the person and the social and historical context in which is embedded is then of cardinal importance, and confirms how communitarianism and Islamism have in common a similar view on persons as deeply related to their communal environment. The person acquires moral principles and develops moral reasoning on the basis of the relationship that establishes within the community and not in abstraction from it.

4.6   Personal Realisation through Community Membership

In liberal theory the person achieves freedom and personal realisation primarily as a result of a process of emancipation in which the exercise of individual autonomy is the decisive factor limiting the influence of heteronomous principles. Both Islamism and communitarianism purport a different picture. According to these theories the person achieves full liberation and realisation (and in the religious context, their salvation) adhering to the ethical principles on which the community is based and not emancipating from it. As Buchanan notes with reference to communitarian theory:

If I am a member of a community I share goals and values with other members. I and they conceive of these as our goals, not just as goals which we each have as

---

[36] al-Ṣadr, *Our Philosophy* p. 31.

[37] Ibid., p. 29.

> individuals and that happen to be the same for all of us. [...] In activities that are the life of a community, individuals think of themselves primarily as members of the group, and of their values as the values of the group.[38]

According to communitarianism the boundary between individual and communitarian identity is permeable and individual autonomy does not represent a limit to the adoption of communitarian principles within the ethical principles of the individual.

As Taylor states, even presuming the existence of a liberal self, independent from the network of social relations in which one is embedded and provided with rights:

> The identity of the autonomous, self-determining individual requires a social matrix, one for instance which through a series of practices recognizes the rights to autonomous decision and which calls for the individual having a voice in deliberation about public action.[39]

As seen, Sandel is equally critical of the possibility of conceiving persons as moral agents dissociated from the context in which they are educated, raised and where they establish their social relations.[40] It is for this reason that communitarianism relies on an idea of the person according to which freedom and realisation are to be achieved, not by means of emancipation from communal bonds, but rather through establishing a deeper connection with the ethical community. This aspect further confirms the analogy between the underlying assumptions of communitarianism and Islamism.

Qutb for example claims that freedom and realisation of the person can be achieved only when embracing the moral life of Islam. Berman observes that 'Freedom in liberal society seemed to Qutb no freedom at all. That kind of freedom was merely one more expression of the hideous schizophrenia –the giant error that places the material world over here, God over there.'[41] In one of his most influential works he argues that:

> Only in the Islamic way of life do all men become free from the servitude of some men to others and devote themselves to the worship of Allah alone, [...] This

---

[38] Allen E. Buchanan, 'Assessing the Communitarian Critique of Liberalism', *Ethics,* 99/4 (1989), 852-82 at p. 857.

[39] Taylor, 'Atomism' p. 203.

[40] Sandel, 'Procedural Republic' p. 90.

[41] Berman, *Terror* p. 80-81.

concept and the way of life covering all the practical aspects of man's life is the vital message that mankind lacks. [42]

Both Quṭb and Khomeini, theorise an idea of the person as *al-insān al-kāmil*: the perfect or complete human.[43] According to this conception the person achieves status of virtuous moral being by fully endorsing the precepts of the Islamic community.

On a similar basis, ʿAbduh's attempt to restore a moral Islamic community in Egypt and the reform of education relies on the idea that it is only as members of the Islamic community that the person can achieve well-being and realise their freedom. In *The Theology of Unity*, for example, he dedicates an entire chapter entitled, *Religion and Human Progress: their Culmination in Islam*. He points out that:

> human society reached a point at which man came to his full stature, helped by the morals of the earlier vicissitudes. Islam supervened, to present its case to reason, to call on mind and intelligence for action, to take emotion and feeling into partnership for man's guidance to both earthly and heavenly blessedness.[44]

Similar statements dominate the discourse of al-Ṣadr. Also in this case, the relationship between the person and moral life of the Islamic community is a fundamental component for the liberation and realisation of the full potential of humanity, and eventually leading to salvation. According to al-Ṣadr 'the basic distinguishing feature of the Islamic system is represented in its being based on spiritual understanding of life and a moral sense of life.'[45]

As much as we need to be part of a liberal community to become liberal persons according to communitarians, in Islamism we can realise our potential as human beings only as members of an Islamic community. The dependency of the person on the moral community of which they are part, is also to be found in Islamism then, and confirms the argument that Islamism and communitarianism share similar assumptions regarding the conceptions of person and community.

---

[42] Quṭb, *Milestones* pp. 4-5.

[43] For Khomeini *see* Section 3.5.1 and Dabashi, *Theology of Discontent* p. 477. As regard Quṭb *see* Calvert, *Qutb* p. 208.

[44] Muḥammad 'Abduh, *The Theology of Unity* (London,: Allen & Unwin, 1966) pp. 133-4.

[45] al-Ṣadr, *Our Philosophy* p. 31.

4.7   Moral Responsibility towards the Community

A final consideration linking communitarianism to Islamism is that, in both theories, the person is responsible of protecting the integrity of the community. Whereas liberalism emphasises the recognition of rights to persons as norms protecting them from external unwanted interferences, Islamist and communitarians emphasise the responsibility of the person towards the community.

According to communitarian thinking, the person develops a sense of loyalty and a correlated sense of responsibility towards the community. Both Taylor and Sandel, develop a thorough criticism of liberal conceptions and argue that persons do have rights but these rights are counterbalanced by the responsibility to preserve the community on which these rights are based. For example, Taylor argues that:

> The incoherence of asserting the primacy of rights is even clearer if we imagine another way in which the conflict could arise: that, in destroying the society, I would be undermining my own future ability to realize this capacity.[46]

It is for this reason that communitarianism emphasises the importance of the responsibilities and obligations of persons to abide to ethical principles of the community in order not to undermine the bases of their lives.   According to communitarians, we first become members of a community and then responsible towards it and eventually we acquire entitlements such as rights and freedom. The idea of a fully autonomous being which, on the basis of rights, can neglect or deny the importance of the moral values of the community of which they are part, is criticised by communitarians. This is because the person is conceived as responsible towards the community since it is the origin of personal moral principles and identity. This aspect can also be found in Islamism.

ʿAbduh argues for the importance of personal responsibility in various occasions. For example, although he claims that reason is a component of his Islamist theory, nonetheless this cannot overcome the interests and the judgements of the community. Principles of consultation (*shūrā*) and consensus (*ijmāʿ*) shall prevail over the claim of

---

[46] Taylor, 'Atomism' p. 199.

individual reason. The interest and well-being of the community (*maslaḥa*) shall overcome the interests of isolated individuals especially when in contrast with collective interests. Quṭb's case is even more radical in this respect and he points out repeatedly that, while the community is responsible of preserving the rights and welfare of its members, this also applies *vice versa* to the person. As he says:

> every individual is charged in the first place conscientiously to perform his own work; for the results of individual work are in the long run advantageous and beneficial to the community. […] No individual, then can be exempt from this care for the general interest, but everyone must have a constant care for the community.[47]

Furthermore, for Quṭb the sense of individual responsibility is embedded in a communitarian perspective to the point of becoming coextensive with collective responsibility. According to him:

> every individual will be held responsible for evil-doing in the community, even if he has had no part in it. For society is a unity which is harmed by any evil-doing, and the duty of every individual is to guard and to protect it.[48]

Also in the case of Shiʿī Islamism, the sense of responsibility of the individual towards the community is predicated as a factor of utmost importance. One example is Khomeini who argues that the Muslim has a duty to undertake action to protect their community from the external interferences that harm its moral integrity. This duty is based on a cardinal Islamic principle that is 'enjoining the good and forbidding the evil'. As Khomeini says, 'he who enjoins the good and forbids the evil actively calls men to Islam by remedying injustice and opposing the oppressor. Enjoining the good and forbidding the evil has been made a duty primarily for the sake of accomplishing these high aims.'[49]

Quite the opposite of the liberal conception of the person according to which the priority is their emancipation from ascribed ethical conceptions and norms; communitarianism and Islamism purport the idea of the person who has distinct responsibility towards the

---

[47] Qutb, *Social Justice in Islam* p. 62.

[48] Ibid., p. 63.

[49] Khomeini, *Islam and Revolution* p. 117-18.

community of which they are part. The close relationship with the community and the ethical importance that communitarians and Islamists attach to it entails an idea of persons responsible for the preservation of the integrity of the community.

4.8   Conclusions

In *Enemy in the Mirror*, Euben observes that:

> the extent to which modern Islamic thinkers from Afghani to 'Abduh to Qutb are engaged with the problems and dilemmas of Western political thought suggests that, in a colonial and postcolonial world in particular, questions that define political theory have ceased to be, if they ever solely were, Western.[50]

This is a key point for this study which explains how comparing western and Islamist critiques of liberalism establishes a relationship between ways of political thinking connected by the same phenomenon: the rise of liberal values in the western world and their expansion in the Middle East. Halliday goes even further, and with regard to Euben's observation, claims that:

> [this] may not only lessen the claim that the radicalism of the Islamic world is *the* enemy in the post-Cold War mirror, but also suggests that it is rather part of a broader challenge to Western domination found in Chiapas and Beijing, in Baghdad and Delhi, as much as in Cairo and Qom: Euben at times comes close to conceding this but, if this is so, then Islamism is not so philosophically distinct.[51]

Indeed, the analysis proposed in this chapter shows that Islamism is 'not so philosophically distinct.' I have argued that Islamism and communitarianism share analogous conceptions of person and community upon which they develop their criticism of liberalism. It is on this basis that is possible to understand Islamism as a form of communitarianism in analytical terms.

The concept of community was defined as self-referential and constitutive of the person's ethical identity. Conversely, it was pointed out how the person is not an individual moral agent (as liberals would argue) but is the member of a community,

---

[50] Euben, *Enemy in the Mirror* p.123.

[51] Fred Halliday, 'Book Review: Roxanne L. Euben, Enemy in the Mirror', *Ethnic and Racial Studies,* 24/6 (2001/01/01 2001), 1071-95 at p. 1074. Orig. Emph.

which in turn is the source of his or her moral beliefs, which then defines on which principles a just political order should be based. The impact of liberal norms has provoked the reactions of thinkers (Marxist, conservatives, Catholics[52], Islamists and so on) who perceive the 'liberal project'[53] as a threat to the moral status of the community, inevitably leading to its decay into a morally unsubstantiated society of individuals.

This then leads to the next stage of the study which will assess how international norms have changed these conceptions, especially with regard to Islamist movements. Are Islamist conceptions of the person and community tenable? Is the ontological status of the person and community as conceived by Islamists plausible, or is the Islamist political project founded on unrealistic assumptions?[54]

I will claim that the assumptions of Islamism are being profoundly challenged by the increasing importance of liberally inspired norms as international humanitarian law, human rights and UN Security Council resolutions based on state sovereignty and international peace. The idea of a self-referential community, constitutive of the identity of the person, is confronted by a process of socialisation of Islamist political actors in the international society in which liberal norms are predominant.

The following chapters are dedicated to the study of this process with reference to the case of Hezbollah. The study eventually comes to a concluding assessment on the impact of international norms on Islamist politics in Chapter 10. Prior to that, Chapter 5 will introduce an historical perspective of the emergence of Shiʿī Islamist politics in the region, and in particular, in Lebanon.

---

[52] Although this barely emerges in the work of Taylor and MacIntyre, both of them are catholic philosophers thus sharing a certain religious matrix with their Islamist counterpart although they both are also committed secularists.

[53] Charvet and Kaczynska-Nay, *Liberal Project*.

[54] An analysis of these questions, and in particular of how communitarianism applies to the understanding of Middle Eastern politics is to be found in Dalacoura, 'A Critique of Communitarianism'. Dalacoura's discussion has been of central importance in developing the considerations presented in this and the following chapters.

Chapter 5

The Rise of Political Shiʿism in Lebanon

5.1   Introduction

The previous chapters provided a theoretical overview of how liberalism has been criticised by Islamist thinkers and how this criticism relies on the same assumptions of the communitarian critique of liberalism. The study now turns to the empirical analysis of the case study of Hezbollah.[1] This chapter will bridge the theoretical analysis of Islamism with the empirical enquiry into Islamist politics and international norms. As Section 5.5 will show, at its inception, Hezbollah's Islamist identity fully aligns with the political discourse theorised by Islamists as Quṭb, al-Ṣadr and Khomeini.[2] Reflecting entirely the parameters of Islamism then, the case of Hezbollah is useful for the argument that this thesis intends to propose.[3] After the presentation of the origins of Hezbollah and its foundation in Lebanon, the following chapters will discuss the impact of international norms on its political identity, especially pointing out how its Islamist profile has been revised on various occasions in a way that increasingly converges with liberal principles.

Before that, the following pages explain how the experience of Shiʿī Islamism in Iraq is central in the development of political Shiʿism and in particular for Hezbollah. Iranian Shiʿism is also fundamental for Hezbollah and although the most relevant facts in this respect are mentioned in Section 5.5, the reader should also refer to Section 3.5 for a discussion of Khomeinism.

The Iraqi repression, the Iranian Revolution, the Iraq–Iran War and Israel's invasion of Lebanon all contributed to the birth of an Islamist alliance in Lebanon among Shiʿī scholars and activists. From this nucleus, with the fundamental contribution of Iran, eventually Hezbollah was born. Before Hezbollah's foundation, as Section 1.3 shows, Shiʿism in Lebanon was already being mobilised at a social and political level by the

---

[1] The transliteration of the term is *Ḥizbuʾ Allahi*. In Chapter 9 there will be a more thorough discussion of the meaning of this name.

[2] As it will be noted all of them are indeed directly or indirectly mentioned in the *Open Letter*. *See* Section 5.5.

[3] For a more thorough discussion of the choice of this case study see Section 1.3.

charismatic figures of Mūsā al-Ṣadr (1928–1978),[4] Muḥammad Mahdī Shams al-Dīn (1936–2001) and Muḥammad Ḥusayn Faḍlallah (1935–2010). Key factors of this process were the Israeli invasion of the country and the long-standing marginalisation of the Shiʿī community from the centres of power in Lebanon. Section 5.4 will illustrate these aspects to then look into the historical events related to the inception of Hezbollah in Section 5.5.

The final section will outline the contents of Hezbollah's first political manifesto, which will help define the political identity of Hezbollah as an Islamist movement.[5]

5.2   Political Shiʿism in Iraq: Foundations and Exile

The origins of Shiʿism in Iraq are centuries old, but its politicisation in modern times becomes a relevant phenomenon for the scope of this study at the end of the 1950s with the formation of *Ḥizb al-Dʿawa* of which Muḥammad Bāqir al-Ṣadr was among the main ideologues.[6]

In 1958, Iraq was in an unstable political situation. The Hashemite monarchy, established in 1920, was overthrown by a military coup enacted by ʿAbd al-Kārīm Qāsim who adopted an ideological framework mixing pan-Arab, nationalist and communist components clashing with Shiʿī tradition. Tribal rivalries and the fact that most of the Iraqi political leadership was Sunni exacerbated the antagonism between the newly established regime and the Shiʿī community.

The Dʿawa drafted a foundational document (circa 1960) with three items: founding a modern organisation for the dissemination of the party's political vision, deciding a political agenda for the implementation of the goals of the party and asserting the need to establish an Islamic political system in Iraq as its final aim.[7] According to Jabar, the

---

[4] 1978 is the date of his disappearance; the actual date of death remains uncertain. In fact, there are people who think that Mūsā al-Ṣadr is still alive.

[5] A more analytical approach to the contents of Hezbollah's first manifesto will be presented in a comparative perspective in Chapter 9. A translation of Hezbollah's *Open Letter* of 1985 can be found in Appendix 1.

[6] *See* Section 3.4.

[7] A. Jabar, *Shi'ite Movement* p. 79.

foundation of the Dʿawa is to be understood as part of a renascent intellectual life in the Shiʿī context, epitomised by the figure of al-Ṣadr.[8] Amatzia Baram argues that the foundation of the party was due to the concerns of the Shiʿī clergy about the decline of the Shiʿī community which, under Qāsim's regime, was increasingly exposed to atheism and communism as alternative ethical paradigms threatening the moral integrity of the community.[9] Hanna Batatu observes that:

> It was not a reviving Islam or an ascendant Shiʻism that prompted elements within the *hawzah al-ʿilmīyah* (the circle of ʿulamaʾ) at Najf to organize ranks in the late 1960s and set on foot the Dʻawa party. On the contrary, they were moved by the growing sense that the old faith was receding, that scepticism and even disdain for the traditional rites were rife among the educated Shīʻīs, that the belief of even the urban Shīʻa masses was not as firm, and their conformism to ancient usages not as punctual or as reverent as in times past, and that the ʿulamaʾ were losing ground and declining in prestige and material influence.[10]

In a way that is similar to the rise of Sunni Islamism in Egypt; the foundation of the Dʿawa resulted from the convergence of a movement of renaissance in religious–political thought with the emergence of social circumstances perceived as threatening the integrity of the Muslim community.

Exactly who the founders of Dʿawa were is not clear. Jabar says that al-Ṣadr was the author of the foundational document, while Baram claims that Muḥammad and Mahdī al-Ḥakīm (the sons of the Iraqi Ayatollah Muḥsin al-Ḥakīm) had an important role in the foundation of the Dʿawa, thus breaking the tradition of quietism[11] endorsed by their father. Batatu claims that the Dʿawa's original leadership was represented by both Iranian and Iraqi religious scholars inspired by al-Ṣadr's intellectual work.[12]

---

[8] Ibid., p. 78.

[9] Amatzia Baram, 'The Radical Shiʻite Opposition Movement in Iraq' in Emmanuel Sivan and Menachem Friedman (eds.), *Religious Radicalism and Politics in the Middle East* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1990) p. 96.

[10] Hanna Batatu, 'Iraq's Underground Shīʻa Movements: Characteristics, Causes and Prospects', *Middle East Journal,* 35/4 (1981), 578-94 at p. 586.

[11] With quietism, I refer to the notion frequently adopted by Shiʿī ʿulamāʾ in Iraq that religion shall not interfere directly with the political process.

[12] Hanna Batatu, 'Shiʻs Organization in Iraq: Al-Daʻwah Al-Islamiyah and Al-Mujahidin' in Juan Ricardo Cole and Nikki R. Keddie (eds.), *Shiʻism and Social Protest* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986) pp. 178-9.

The Dʿawa was not the only Islamist phenomenon emerging in Iraq. In 1960 the ʿulamāʾ of Najaf[13] constituted the *Jamʿat al-ʿUlamāʾ* (Society of the ʿUlamāʾ), which aimed to contrast the decay of Shiʿism by means of cultural promotion, education and welfare provision. The Society included the most prominent religious figures of Shiʿism in Iraq and among its younger ranks Muḥammad Bāqir al-Ṣadr, Muḥammad Ḥusayn Faḍlallah and Muḥammad Mahdī Shams al-Dīn stood out. The last two of them will escape to Lebanon where they will later have a prominent intellectual and political role.[14] Differently from the Dʿawa, the *Jamʿat al-ʿUlamāʾ* was not politicised and maintained the profile of a socially oriented organisation.

In addition to the Dʿawa and the Society of the ʿUlamāʾ, there was the Shirāziy Group (1962), a political faction led by Ḥassan Shirāziy and his brother Muḥammad Ḥusayn Shirāziy who challenged the primacy of Dʿawa as the main Shiʿī Islamist movement in Iraq. According to Jabar, the dispute was due to intellectual divergence and to tribal and city rivalry. The Shirāziy Group criticised the fact that the Dʿawa was not under the authority of a *marjʿa*. It is not a coincidence that Khomeini, who promoted the idea of *marjʿa* as leader of the Islamic state, was more sympathetic to the Shirāziy Group rather than the Dʿawa and Bāqir al-Ṣadr.[15]

Around 1968 the informal organisation of the Shirāziy movement was upgraded by Muḥammad Taqiy al-Mudarrisiy and Hadiy al-Mudarrisiy to a more formal organisation known as *al-Ḥaraka* ('the movement'). After the Iranian revolution, *al-Ḥaraka* changed its name to become the *Munaẓamat al-ʿAmal al-Islāmī* (The Islamic Action Organisation). In the meantime, the Dʿawa became progressively more nationalised and particularistic under the new leadership of Ṣubḥiy al-Dakhil in 1961.

A turning point for Shiʿī activism was 1968 with the ascent to power of Saddam Hussein who, differently from his predecessors adopted a Baʿathist ideology. The rise

---

[13] Najaf is a central traditional place for Shiʿism, in which many religious schools (*ḥawza ʿilmiyya*) preparing future ʿulamāʾ are based. Its Iranian corresponding centre is Qum which is equally prestigious and in competition with Najaf.

[14] A. Jabar, *Shi'ite Movement* p. 111.

[15] Ibid., pp. 216-23.

of Hussein into power escalated the tension with the Shiʿī community. From 1972 to 1974 the regime began to arrest and execute the leadership members of the Dʿawa. In 1972 al-Dakhil was executed while al-Ṣadr was released from arrest under pressure of popular movement.

We have already looked at occasions highlighting the impact of the Iranian revolution in the region, but what matters for this account is that in Iraq the Iranian revolution produced the conditions for even harsher repression against Shiʿites. Al-Ṣadr expressed enthusiasm and support for the revolution in Iran, though his relationship with the new *Walī al-Faqīh,* Khomeini, was rather cold. As a consequence a consistent part of the Shiʿī population supported the revolution. Al-Ṣadr's endorsement of the Iranian revolution provoked the reaction from the Iraqi regime which, in 1980, arrested and executed him. According to Saʿad Jawad the detention and execution of al-Ṣadr (1980) was facilitated by the fact that Khomeini sent telegrams or letters to him that were intercepted by Iraqi intelligence, which confirmed his contact with the Iranian leadership, a fact which Khomeini almost certainly was aware of.[16]

Membership to the Dʿawa was declared illegal and punished with death, and a number of its adherents expatriated. Some of them went to Lebanon where they joined the ranks of the rising local Shiʿī movement and would eventually become founding members of Hezbollah.[17]

A similar situation characterised the other Shiʿī political groups. The *Munaẓamat al-ʿAmal al-Islamiy* of al-Mudarrisiy was involved in a bombing campaign including the attempt on the life of the foreign minister, Tāriq ʿAzīz in April 1980. Ḥassan Shirāziy (one of the Shirāziy brothers) was killed in 1980 in Beirut. His brother, Muḥammad Shirāziy, became one of the leaders of the Shiʿī community in Kuwait, and Muḥammad Taqiy al-Mudarrisiy also became a leading *marjʿa*. As observed by Laurence Louër,

---

[16] 'Author's Interview with Saʿad Jawad, Professor of the University of Baghdad', (London, UK: 12 October 2010). Mallat reports part of these epistolary exchanges and indicates how Khomeini referred to al-Ṣadr as *Ḥujjat al-Islām* and not as ayatollah, which would have been the address appropriate to the religious status of al-Ṣadr *see*: Mallat, *Renewal of Islamic Law* pp. 50-4.

[17] In 1981, there was a suicide attack against the Iraqi embassy in Lebanon, which was eventually claimed by the Dʿawa. It was one of the first dramatic signs of Dʿawa presence in Lebanon. Augustus R. Norton, *Hezbollah: A Short History* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007) pp. 71-2.

Shiʿism was becoming a prominent transnational phenomenon with ramifications all across the region also as a consequence of the repressive Iraqi regime.[18]

Tension between Iraq, its Western allies and Iran erupted in the Iraq–Iran conflict (1980–88). Within this context, Iran began to play an even more influential role in the Shiʿī Iraqi scene and more broadly in the Shiʿī community at a regional level. A new organisation trying to unify the Iraqi Shiʿī movements was born in 1982 in Tehran under the leadership of Muḥammad Bāqir al-Ḥakīm. *The Supreme Assembly of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq*[19] (SAIRI) was the organisation in which a great part of the Islamist Shiʿī activists, including some Dʿawa members, converged under the influence of Iran. The idea of a unified Shiʿī opposition group to the Iraqi regime was, nonetheless, constantly challenged by internal antagonism, and by the conflicting souls of Arabism and Shiʿism. Shiʿism was a solid transnational bridge linking Iraqi Shiʿites with Iranian Shiʿites, but their Arab heritage was at odds with Iran and its Persian (*ʿajamiy*)[20] roots. Nonetheless, with the powerful backing of the Iranian Islamic Republic and relying on its wide transnational network, political Shiʿism was soon to spread in the region and Lebanon was a particularly fertile ground in a key geo-strategic location.

5.3   Shiʿī Islamism in Lebanon: Mūsā al-Ṣadr, Shams al-Dīn and Faḍlallah

The Lebanese connection with the broader Shiʿī community passes through a few thinkers and ayatollahs who reawakened the centuries-old Shiʿī tradition of Lebanon.[21] All of them are strictly related to the transnational Shiʿī network that was illustrated

---

[18] Laurence Louër, *Transnational Shia Politics: Religious and Political Networks in the Gulf* (New York, Paris: Columbia University Press ; In association with the Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches Internationales, 2008) p. 4.

[19] *Al-Majlis al-ʿAla lil Thawra al-Islamiyya fil ʿIrāq*, the same movement now operates openly in post-invasion Iraq under the name Islamic Supreme Council for Iraq.

[20] This term is traditionally used to refer to non-Arab identities and in particular Persians and corresponds to the Western concept of 'barbarian'. Bernard Lewis, *The Political Language of Islam* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988) p. 4-5, n. 5

[21] For an overview of Lebanese Shiʿī tradition *see* Albert Hourani, 'From Jabal 'Āmil to Persia', *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London,* 49/1 (1986), 133-40.

above. In this respect, Mūsā al-Ṣadr (1928–1978),[22] Mahdi Shams al-Dīn (1936–2001) and Muḥammad Ḥusayn Faḍlallah (1935–2010) are the three key religious figures along with many others active at the local level.[23]

Of the three thinkers, Faḍlallah and Shams al-Dīn were members of the *Society of the ʿUlamāʾ* of Najaf where they were in contact with Bāqir al-Ṣadr and with whom they had a friendly and intellectual relationship. While Faḍlallah and Shams al-Dīn were Iraqi Arabs (with Lebanese ancestors), Mūsā al-Ṣadr (also with roots from *Jabal ʿĀmil*)[24] was born in Iran. All of them were students of two Grand Ayatollahs Muḥsin al-Ḥakīm and Abu al-Qāsim al-Khuʾy and received their official titles of religious scholars in the *ḥawza* of Najaf, in the same cultural environment in which Bāqir al-Ṣadr and Khomeini operated.[25] Mūsā al-Ṣadr was the cousin and brother-in-law of Bāqir al-Ṣadr,[26] and in 1959 accepted to take over the position of *fāqih* (religious judge) in the Lebanese city of Tyre.[27]

As reported in Fouad Ajami's biography of Mūsā al-Ṣadr,[28] his charismatic figure had the most important role in reviving the Shiʿī tradition in Lebanon. Mūsā Al-Ṣadr recovered the Shiʿī community from the social, economic and political marginalisation to which they had been relegated in the Lebanese state dominated by the Christian and Sunni Muslim communities since its inception. Initially he mobilised the Shiʿī community at the social level without interfering politically. At a later stage (1969) he promoted and obtained the foundation of the Higher Islamic Shiʿī Council in Lebanon

---

[22] 1978 is the date of his disappearance; the actual date of death remains uncertain.

[23] Shiʿites in Lebanon are concentrated particularly in the southern regions that are traditionally known as *Jabal ʿĀmil*, the eastern region of Lebanon Biqʿa Valley and the southern suburbs of Beirut al-Ḍaḥiyeh. It shall be noted how these three figures are also listed by Qāsim as the main protagonists of Shiʿī mobilisation in Lebanon. Naim Qassem, *Hizbullah: The Story from Within* (Updated edn.; London: Saqi, 2010) pp. 56-61.

[24] This is how the region of south Lebanon is traditionally identified. This area has a long tradition of Shiʿism dating back centuries. *See* Hourani, 'Jabal 'Āmil to Persia'.

[25] At a later stage, Grand Ayatollah al-Khuʾy would have designated Faḍlallah as his *wakīl* (official religious representative) in Lebanon. Sankari, *Fadlallah* p. 49.

[26] Fouad Ajami, *The Vanished Imam: Musa Al Sadr and the Shia of Lebanon* (London: Tauris, 1986) p. 25. Jawad nonetheless does not confirm this information and claims that they were only distantly related. 'Author's Interview with Saʿad Jawad, Professor of the University of Baghdad', (London, UK: 12 October 2010).

[27] Chibli Mallat, 'Aspects of Shi'i Thought from the South of Lebanon: Al 'Irfan, Muhammad Jawad Mughnyya; Muhammad Mahdi Shamseddine; Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah', *Papers on Lebanon,* 7 (1998).

[28] Ajami, *Vanished Imam*.

(*al-Majlis Al-Islāmiy al-Shiʿa al-ʿAlā*), which, within the sectarian system of Lebanon, institutionalised the role of the Shiʿī sect to a higher degree and established a more centralised authority.[29] His political involvement became more prominent when he founded the Movement of the Dispossessed (*ḥarakat al-maḥrumiyn*), announced in 1974 in Baʾalbek after months of public rallies denouncing the social condition of Shiʿites in Lebanon.[30] The birth of the Movement of the Dispossessed marked the culmination of Mūsā al-Ṣadr's mobilisation of the Shiʿites in Lebanon. He advocated the need to attain a more incisive political role for the Shiʿī community and urged the state to address the problems of social and economic justice of the Shiʿī people.

A few months later in 1975, a political and paramilitary formation under the acronym Amal[31] was born under his auspices. Amal represented at least in part the interests of the Shiʿī community and participated in the conflict against Israel (but also against the Palestinians in Lebanon) and in the Lebanese civil war. Nonetheless, though Amal adopted Mūsā al-Ṣadr as its spiritual guide (*murshid al-ruḥiy*), he was never directly involved in its affairs as it is customary for Shiʿī religious leaders not to embrace a political faction. Conversely, Amal did not adopt a religious–political agenda, instead focusing on being a predominantly secular movement. This gave Shiʿī Islamists the opportunity to carve out their political space as a separate force. In 1980, Mūsā al-Ṣadr disappeared in obscure circumstances during a visit to Libya.

Despite personal friendship and esteem, Faḍlallah's stance was different from Mūsā al-Ṣadr's and he occasionally disagreed with the Iranian-born *ʿālim*, whose prestige became so high that he was also called *imām* by his followers. Faḍlallah moved from Najaf to Lebanon in 1966, at a time in which the Iraqi repression was harsh on Islamist Shiʿī figures,[32] but also because he was involved in the foundation of Dʿawa.[33] His

---

[29] Fawwaz Traboulsi, *A History of Modern Lebanon* (London ; Ann Arbor, MI: Pluto, 2007) p. 178.

[30] The foundation of the Movement of the Dispossessed was also in collaboration with the Christian Bishop Gregoire Haddad who was inspired by the South American Liberation Theology. Elizabeth Picard, 'The Lebanese Shi'a and Political Violence', *UNRISD Discussion Paper, I*42 (1993) at pp. 18-20.

[31] *Afwāj al-Muqāwamat al-Lubnāniyya* (Battalions of the Lebanese Resistance) the acronym is also similar to the word for hope in Arabic.

[32] Sankari, *Fadlallah* p. 121.

[33] *See* Sankari for Faḍlallah's role in the foundation of Dʿawa ibid., pp. 73-80.

presence in Lebanon was soon to be noticed when he began predicating and taking part in the cultural and religious life of the country.[34] He became one of the most prominent minds of Shiʿism in the world with a prolific publication activity including poetry, theology and public ethics. In 1995 he was recognised as *marjʿa* and this strained his relations with the Iranian leadership, which claimed the monopoly over the religious leadership throughout the authority of the *walī al-fāqih*.[35]

Faḍlallah's early thinking publicly supported the typical Islamist arguments about the decay of the Muslim community and exhorted for a mobilisation of society in order to redeem the *umma* from this decay. His public discourse widely reflects the concerns about the ethical integrity of the community and consequently that of its members, as observed in Chapters 3 and 4. Even before his arrival in Lebanon, Faḍlallah focused on the idea of the individual as an organic part of the ethical Islamic community as a first step in the reconstruction of the *umma*. According to Faḍlallah:

> The engendering of conscious and committed Muslim individuals in society would constitute the first phase in creating a true Islamic society, through the nurturing of fraternal Islamic ties and the insemination in the collective psyche of Islamic precepts and values, such as social justice, equality and solidarity.[36]

He became the promoter, in the Lebanese context, of the Islamist discourse endorsing Islam as an alternative to the value system imposed by the interference of Western ideologies within the Islamic community. In one of his sermons in 1972 he argued that: 'Islam, by virtue of its divine and comprehensive legal system, embodied an unsurpassed normative code and practical set of values, which together provided the basis for refining the individual behaviour and reforming social relations.'[37] His Islamist views then widely overlapped with the political project of the Dʿawa and basically reproduced the conditions for its re-foundation in Lebanon.

---

[34] Mallat, 'Aspects of Shiʿi Thought from the South of Lebanon: Al 'Irfan, Muhammad Jawad Mughnyya; Muhammad Mahdi Shamseddine; Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah'.

[35] Sankari, *Fadlallah* p. 256.

[36] Ibid., p. 106.

[37] Ibid., p. 138.

Faḍlallah's commitment to Islamic reform of the community is another element that partly distinguishes him from Mūsā al-Ṣadr. While Mūsā al-Ṣadr's Movement of the Dispossessed was characterised by a variety of internal political and not necessarily religious components, for Faḍlallah this was not the case. His social action was Islamic in nature and acted throughout a network of Islamic charitable institutions. This process gave birth to the wide network of social and welfare organisations that even today characterises Lebanese Shiʿī politics and social action but also established a connection between Faḍlallah and the emerging political Shiʿī movements.

Initially, the link was between Faḍlallah and the Lebanese branch of the Dʿawa. At a later stage, in correspondence with the Iranian revolution and the execution of Bāqir al-Ṣadr, the Dʿawa members joined the ranks of the emerging formation of the Islamist Shiʿī movement, which eventually would have contributed to the formation of Hezbollah.[38] As Nizar Hamzeh observes, future leaders of Hezbollah such as ʿAbbās al-Mūsawī[39] and Ṣubḥiy al-Ṭufaiylī were indeed coming from the ranks of the Dʿawa.[40] Faḍlallah became the leading figure of the Islamist Shiʿī mobilisation in Lebanon. As in the cases of Bāqir and Mūsā al-Ṣadr, his affiliation to a political organisation was neither direct nor formalised, although certain scholars unconvincingly tend to associate him officially with Hezbollah.

The Iranian revolution further reinforced the already radical Islamist views of Faḍlallah, who saw the revolution as an inspirational model and a demonstration of the possibility for Islamism to achieve its ends. Differently from other Shiʿī leaders, Faḍlallah thought that political action and religious belief should be combined to rescue the Islamic community from its decay and the Iranian revolution strengthened this belief. This point was not as obvious as it may seem, since leading figures of the Islamist Shiʿī

---

[38] Ibid., pp. 154-5.

[39] ʿAbbās al-Mūsawī was Secretary General of Hezbollah from May 1991 until he was killed by Israel in February 1992. Al- Ṭufaiylī was one of the most hard-line members of Hezbollah and its first Secretary General nominated in the first General Conference; he left Hezbollah in 1992.

[40] Ahmad Nizar Hamzeh, *In the Path of Hizbullah* (1st edn.; Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 2004) p. 25. The same is confirmed by Sankari, *Fadlallah* p. 155. Shararah claims that 600 Dʿawa militants travelled to Lebanon at least up until 1976 where they were trained in the military camps of Fatah. Waddah Shararah, *Dawlat Ḥizb Allah: Lubnān Mujtamʿan Islamiyan* (4th edn.; Beirut: Dar al-Nahar, 2006) p. 109.

community such as Grand Ayatollah Muḥsin al-Ḥakīm and his successor Abu al-Qāsim Khʿui were both quietists, and defended the idea that there is no religious authority that can legitimately replace the Disappeared Imam until he returns to earth.[41]

His colleague Shams al-Dīn took a softer position in this respect. Nonetheless, Faḍlallah made clear in one of his publications (*Islam and the Logic of Force*, 1976) that the field of action of Islam interested both religious ethics as well as politics. The theory of the *Wilāyat*, as conceived by Khomeini, sparked a debate within the Shiʿī community in Lebanon which, at that point, was also represented by Shams al-Dīn. Shams al-Dīn was keener on the kind of social mobilisation path inaugurated by Mūsā al-Ṣadr in Lebanon. The more moderate intellectual stance of Shams al-Dīn was confirmed by the fact that he succeeded Mūsā al-Ṣadr at the head of the Lebanese Supreme Shiʿī Council. He was not as convinced regarding the *Wilāyat al-Faqīh* as Faḍlallah. Both Mallat and Jamal Sankari indicate how he expressed rather pragmatic concern due to the fact that in a country characterised by sizable Christian, Druze and Sunni communities, the *Wilāyat* would not have been feasible if not throughout forced imposition.[42] It was a position that, at a later stage, would have persuaded the most radical factions of the Lebanese Shiʿī community. The alternative concept presented by Shams al-Dīn was that of *al-dymuqraṭiyya al-taʿadudiyya* (pluralist democracy) reproducing the idea of a democratic participatory system but preserving the role of communities. Faḍlallah, however, maintained a more radical position claiming that the *Wilāyat* represented the ideal Islamic state to which the Muslim community should aspire. Such a position was endorsed by Hezbollah in 1985, in his *Open Letter to the Downtrodden of Lebanon and the World*. As mentioned below, the letter recognised the leadership of Khomeini and auspicated the establishment of a central Islamic state.[43]

The debate on the *Wilāyat,* and generally on the perspective of an Islamic polity in Lebanon, assumed more nuanced shades contextually with the more peaceful period

---

[41] Shiʿites believe in the return to earth of the *Imām al-Mahdī*, who disappeared as the twelfth Imam after ʿAli.

[42] Mallat, 'Aspects of Shi'i Thought from the South of Lebanon: Al 'Irfan, Muhammad Jawad Mughnyya; Muhammad Mahdi Shamseddine; Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah', Sankari, *Fadlallah* pp. 225-6.

[43] Appendix 1, § 14.

of post-1989 Lebanon once the civil–sectarian conflict was sedated. At this stage, Faḍlallah implicitly recognised the utopic nature of the *Wilāyat*, when applied to the case of Lebanon, and developed the concept of *dawlat al-insān* (the human state). The idea of the 'human state' corresponds to the notion of 'non-confessionalist democratic institutional mechanisms of electoral representation and public accountability, religious inclusivism, and social and economic justice.'[44] This marks the beginning of a more moderate view on Islamic statehood which is also reflected in Hezbollah's choice of participating in the political life of Lebanon and promoting the project of an Islamic state more as a political ideal rather than the starting point of a revolutionary political process.[45] The 'human state' is a sort of middle base towards forms of more strictly Islamic statehood, which is recognised by Faḍlallah as a necessary compromise to cope with the social circumstances of Lebanon.

The Shiʿī community of Lebanon did not lack reasons of internal dissent in various theoretical respects, but one fundamental element was common to all its internal components: the principle of resistance against the Israeli occupation and more generally against the Israeli state. All the Shiʿī leaders mentioned thus far shared the most hostile views towards Israel and Israeli policy in the region. With Lebanon subject to Israeli occupation and attacks, this further radicalised the situation. Mūsā al-Ṣadr expressed his hostility to Israel and support for the Palestinian cause in times when this was not even popular in south Lebanon and despite being among the moderate minds in the spectrum of Shiʿī thinking. His successor Shams al-Dīn condemned Israel even more harshly when he was the head of the Supreme Shiʿī Council at a time in which Lebanon was undergoing invasions and attacks from Israel. He was the issuer of an important *fatwā* that sanctioned the religious duty among the Shiʿites of Lebanon of civil disobedience and resistance against the Israeli occupier after the clashes between Shiʿī believers and the Israeli army during the ʿAshūraʾ procession in 1983.[46]

---

[44] Sankari, *Fadlallah* p. 238.

[45] *See* Sections 7.2 and 7.3.

[46] Fouad Ajami, 'Lebanon and its Inheritors', *Foreign Affairs,* 63/4 (1985), 778-99 at p. 788.

Faḍlallah's position was the same, if not even more radical, as he gave religious justification for the struggle against Israel.[47]

Throughout the tenures of Mūsā al-Ṣadr, Shams al-Dīn and Faḍlallah, the transnational network of Shiʿī activism emerged prominently on the Lebanese scene. Most importantly, the impact of the Iranian revolution and its foreign policy in the region, the common cause of opposition to Israel and the social marginalisation of Shiʿites in Lebanon provided the ideal conditions for the rise of Shiʿī Islamism in Lebanon. It is the combination of these factors that produced the conditions for the foundation of Hezbollah, as discussed in the section below.

5.4 Historical Context of Hezbollah's Foundation

The first public document signed by Hezbollah attesting its official existence is the *Open Letter to the Oppressed of Lebanon and the World* (*al-Risālat al-Maftuḥa Lilmustaḍʿafiyn fī Lubnān wa al-ʿĀlim*) announced in 1985. However, its announcement and the formalisation of Hezbollah's existence were preceded by several intricate events.

Some sources date the original foundation of Hezbollah to 1982 but its origins can be traced back to 1978.[48] Nʿaīm Qāsim, a founding member of Hezbollah and its Deputy Secretary-General since 1998, claims that the first appearance of an Islamic resistance front is testified by the publication of the 'Document of the Nine' (*Wathīqa al-Tisʿa*). The manifesto, endorsed by three religious men from each of the Shiʿī regions of Lebanon (the South, Biqʿa Valley and the Beirut's peripheral area), relies on three points: belief in Islam, opposition to Israel through *jihād*, and acknowledgment of the *Wilāyat al-Faqīh* as the only legitimate leadership.[49] Not by coincidence, the same principles became the ideological backbone of Hezbollah. According to the same account, in the seven years preceding the *Open Letter* of 1985, a Consultative Council (*majlis al-*

---

[47]Sankari, *Fadlallah* pp. 149-50.

[48] Augustus R. Norton, *Amal and the Shiʿa: Struggle for the Soul of Lebanon* (1st edn.; Austin: University of Texas Press, 1987) p. 101.

[49] Naim Qassem, *Hizbullah: The Story from Within*, trans. Dalia Khalil (London: Saqi, 2005) pp. 20-1.

shūrā) was secretly operating as the most prominent forum in which religious Shiʿī leaders planned resistance activities against the Israeli occupation.

Along with the social and intellectual mobilisation presented in the previous section, the newly established leadership in Iran was a fundamental factor in the formation of a religious Shiʿī resistance in Lebanon in ideological as well as logistical terms. Iran became a model of revolutionary Islamic regime for the *Shūrā*, and acted as a promoter for the formation of a religiously inspired Shiʿī armed group in Lebanon. The popularity of the Iranian revolution favoured the formation of factions further challenging the leadership of Amal within the Shiʿī community, already weakened by its ambiguous approach to the issue of a Lebanese–Israeli peace of 1983. A seceded branch of Amal, the Islamic Amal (*Ḥarakat Amal al-Islāmiyya*) emerged under the leadership of Ḥusayn al-Mūsawī[50] one of the signatories of the *Manifest of the Nine*.

The second Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982[51] escalated the internal conflict between Amal (with the backing of Syria) and the Palestinian Liberation Organisation. This was the effect desired by Israel but also favoured by Syria, which deployed its army in Lebanon in 1976[52] and intended to control the expansion of the Palestinian movement and did not want to be marginalised by the Palestinian Liberation Organisation in the negotiations with Israel. Initially, the Israeli army was greeted with enthusiasm in the villages of the south[53] but a few months later the situation radically changed. A probably unexpected consequence of the 1982 invasion was the Iranian intervention in Lebanese affairs. In the surroundings of the city of Baʿalbek, Iran deployed about 1,500 Guardians of the Revolution with the aim of training a local resistance whose main priority was fighting the Israeli invasion and establishing an

---

[50] Not to be confused with ʿAbbās al-Mūsawī mentioned above whose origins were in the Iraqi Dʿawa and then became one of the founders of Hezbollah to finally be elected Secretary General in 1991.

[51] The operation is known under the code name Peace for Galilee. Israel occupied Beirut and held the West area in which the PLO was based under siege for months until its evacuation in August of the same year under the supervision of the Multinational Forces composed by the USA, France and Italy. *See* Section 6.2 for a review of Israeli military operations in Lebanon.

[52] Syrian intervention in Lebanon deserves a separate analysis. For the scope of this discussion, it is sufficient to say that Syria intervened militarily in Lebanon at the beginning of the civil war in 1976 on the side of the Christian factions and against the Palestinian and leftist militias. It eventually withdrew in 2005, as a result of a traumatic historical process. More details regarding this withdrawal can be found in Section 8.2.

[53] Qassem, *Hizbullah* p. 88.

Islamic state.[54] Furthermore, Nicholas Blanford reports that the Iraqi members of Dʿawa formed a network of armed cells called *Qassām,* the members of which would have eventually joined the Islamic Resistance (*al-Muqāwama al-Islāmiyya*) i.e. Hezbollah's armed wing.[55]

Another account is given by one of the masterminds of the exportation of the Iranian revolution in the Levant and the creation of Hezbollah, ʿAlī Muḥtashimī (Iran's ambassador to Syria from 1982 to 1985 and then Iran's Interior Minister). He claims that Iran deployed a number of elite troops in Lebanon to counter the Israeli invasion within the broader framework of the Iran–Iraq war.[56] The choice, nonetheless, turned out to be logistically unsustainable and for this reason Khomeini decided to instead provide training to the local Shiʿī population. In this respect, Gerges observes that the Iranian deployment in Lebanon was busier indoctrinating and Islamising the local Shiʿī population rather than fighting directly against the Israeli occupying troops.[57]

The leader of Amal, Nabih Berri, joined the National Salvation Committee (20 June 1982) set up by the president Ilyas Sarkis to deal with the Israeli Invasion and the presence of the PLO in Lebanon.[58] The committee appeared to be more concerned with the withdrawal of the PLO rather than the Israeli occupation and, even though Berri left the committee, his participation produced an alienation of its constituency that turned to the project of an Iranian-inspired Islamic resistance against the Israeli occupation. In the meanwhile, a Multinational Force (MNF) composed by the USA, France and Italy was deployed to escort the evacuation of the PLO from Lebanon. The ambiguous relationship of Amal with the invading forces of Israel and its openness to negotiations

---

[54] Robert Fisk, *Pity the Nation: Lebanon at War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991) pp. 468-70. Ranstorp reports that these forces were from the al Quds Regiment of the Guardians and were redeployed from the Iran–Iraq front as a consequence of Israel's invasion. Magnus Ranstorp, 'The Hizballah Training Camp of Lebanon' in James J. F. Forest (ed.), *The Making of a Terrorist: Recruitment, Training, and Root Causes* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger Security International, 2006).

[55] Nicholas Blanford, *Warriors of God: Inside Hezbollah's Thirty-Year Struggle against Israel* (1st edn.; New York: Random House, 2011) p. 35.

[56] Five planes of troops were transferred to Lebanon, the troops were drawn from Baseegee and the Dhul-Faqir Brigades, both elite brigades of the Revolutionary Guards. Manal Lutfi, 'The Making of Hezbollah', *Al-Sharq al-Awsaṭ,* 18 May 2008.

[57] Gerges, *Journey of the Jihadist* p. 85.

[58] Norton, *Amal and the Shiʿa* pp. 93-4, Traboulsi, *History of Modern Lebanon* pp. 214.

were the reasons for the deep fracture between Amal and the Islamist factions of the Shiʿī community, which eventually split and founded Islamic Amal.

Within this framework, the newly trained Islamist forces became fully operative between the end of 1982 and 1983. After the withdrawal of the PLO under the supervision of the MNF (23 August 1983), the new Lebanese president Bashīr Jumayel, endorsed by Israel and the US, was elected by what was left of the parliament with the expectation of establishing a pro-Israeli regime in Lebanon, and striking a peace deal in a few months between the two countries.[59]

Jumayel was killed a few weeks later and succeeded by his brother Amin. His assassination was then followed by the massacres of Sabra and Shatila in south Beirut (15, 16, 17 September 1982). The massacres took the lives of more than 1,000 Palestinian refugees and internally displaced persons and were carried out by factions of the Christian militias under the eyes of the occupying Israeli army a few days after the MNF left the country.[60] Under pressure due to the rage in international public opinion, the MNF was redeployed but only to become the new target of the Islamic factions and their foreign patrons: Syria and Iran.

On 11 November 1982, the first 'martyrdom operation' was carried out against an Israeli-occupied building in Tyre. The Islamic guerrilla against the occupation was becoming a painful reality for the occupying forces. The suicide bomber, Aḥmad Kassīr, remained unknown for years and was only later revealed and endorsed by Hezbollah as the first *shahīd istishahādiy*,[61] a martyr who is consciously going to die carrying out a *jihād* operation. The attack killed 75 Israeli and 15 others, among them Palestinians and Lebanese.[62] With the unfolding of further clashes among the sectarian

---

[59] The agreement was achieved with the treaty of 17 May 1983 but it never became legally binding.

[60] Traboulsi, *History of Modern Lebanon* pp. 218-9. Fisk, *Pity the Nation* pp. 359-400.

[61] Hezbollah claims that in its history there are 12 *shahīd istishahādiy*, where 12 is a sacred number in twelver Shiʿism since it corresponds to the number of imams preceding the return of the Imam al Mahdi (from a conversation with Jilles Kepel). Norton notes that this was not the first suicide attack in Beirut: in 1981 the Iraqi embassy was hit by a suicide bomber and the attack was claimed by *Ḥizb al-Dʿawa* Norton, *Hezbollah* p. 71. On suicide bombing in Lebanon and how this was not a Shiʿī prerogative see also Joseph Elie Alagha, *Hizbullah's Identity Construction* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2011) pp.107-10.

[62] Fisk, *Pity the Nation* pp. 458-9.

militias but also against the Israeli occupier, the MNF was drawn into the conflict thus dissipating its already limited credibility of impartial force. On 18 April 1983 a suicide attack was carried out against the American Embassy during a meeting of CIA agents killing 63 people. The attack was claimed by Islamic Jihad, an obscure organisation associated with the emergence of Islamic armed activity in Lebanon, though more precise identification is difficult.[63]

In September 1983, Israel withdrew its troops from the Shuf, the mostly Druze area in which Christian militias were fighting against the Druzes led by Walīd Junblāṭ. The withdrawal had ominous consequences for the Christian minority and it was at that point that the MNF, especially the US, intervened in the conflict inevitably risking the impartiality that was at the basis of their mission. On 23 October 1983, a marines' base and a French paratroopers' building were hit by two simultaneous suicide operations. The attacks killed 241 marines and 54 French soldiers[64] and were claimed again by Islamic Jihad. Hala Jaber describes the attacks as the result of collaboration among Syrian and Iranian intelligence with the participation of members of the Lebanese Shiʿī militias; nonetheless the attacks took place at a stage when Hezbollah did not have the means to carry out this kind of operation.[65] Fisk reports an interview with Ḥusayn al-Mūsawī (the leader of Islamic Amal) in which he declared his support for the attacks but he did not claim responsibility.[66]

A few days before the attacks against the marines and the French soldiers, another landmark event took place in Nabatiyya (south Lebanon) where, during a ʿAshūraʾ celebration, an Israeli military convoy tried to pass through the procession enraging the crowd and killing two people. The event provoked the reaction of the Higher Islamic

---

[63] Gerges reports that in the phone call claiming the attack, Islamic Jihad said: 'we are neither Iranians, Syrians, nor Palestinians, but Muslims who follow the precepts of the Qurʾān' Gerges, *Journey of the Jihadist* p. 87.

[64] Fisk, *Pity the Nation* p. 515.

[65] Hala Jaber, *Hezbollah: Born with a Vengeance* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997) p. 80.

[66] Fisk also notes that the militiamen surrounding al-Mūsawī defined themselves as members of Islamic Amal but also of Hezbollah in 1983 Fisk, *Pity the Nation* p. 515., nonetheless Qāsim comments that the name Hezbollah (party of God) was officiously used by different factions and was only decided as the name of the organisation shortly before the *Open Letter* declaration (1985). Qassem, *Hizbullah* p. 76.

Shiʿī Council presided by Shams al-Dīn who issued a *fatwā* calling for civil resistance, thus officialising with a religious edict the Shiʿī opposition to the Israeli occupation.[67]

In 1984, the tension in Lebanon was still high. In April the MNF withdrew completely while the Israeli army reduced the occupation area but maintained control over the southern region.[68] On 2 February 1984, one of the most prominent leaders of the Islamic resistance and a student of Faḍlallah, Sheikh Rāghib Ḥarb, was killed. The killing was blamed on the Israelis and further consolidated the consensus around the resistance. The constant status of occupation, the continuous threat from the occupying forces and the enormous damages to the agricultural economy[69] of the south Lebanon exasperated its population producing internal displacement and migration towards Beirut as well as creating fertile ground for the Islamic activism to grow.

On the first anniversary of the death of Rāghib Ḥarb (16 February 1985), an official spokesman of Hezbollah, Ibrahim Amin al-Sayyid, announced the *Open Letter to the Oppressed of Lebanon and the World.*[70] The text was signed by Hezbollah thus marking the existence of a paramilitary entity operating under this name. It was within this context of military confrontation involving international forces, Israeli military occupation, Palestinian factions and internal sectarian militias that Hezbollah emerged as the epitome of Shiʿī Islamism in Lebanon. Its motto was a verse of the Qurʾān saying 'God's party [*Ḥizbuʾ Allāhi*] is sure to triumph'[71]and on its flag appeared the definition 'The Islamic Revolution in Lebanon'.[72]

---

[67] Jaber, *Hezbollah* p. 18, Norton, *Amal and the Shiʿa* p. 113.

[68] This will become the so-called 'Security Zone' for Israel from which it withdrew in May 2000. For a persuasive critique of this strategy *see* Augustus Richard Norton and Jillian Schwedler, '(in)Security Zones in South Lebanon', *Journal of Palestine Studies,* 23/1 (1993), 61-79.

[69] Traboulsi, *History of Modern Lebanon* p. 227.

[70] *See* Appendix 1 for the complete text.

[71] Qurʾān 5. 56. M. A. Abdel Haleem, *The Qurʾan* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005) p. 73.

[72] *Al-Thawra Al-Islamiyya fī Lubnān*, this was to be later changed to The Islamic Resistance in Lebanon.

5.5   Hezbollah's *Open Letter*

The *Open Letter* is the subject of a more detailed analysis in a comparative perspective in Chapter 9, but for now it is sufficient to identify its central themes as the definitional elements of Hezbollah's political identity and to observe how these are consistent with the definitions of community and person, as proposed in Chapter 4. Hezbollah can be identified as a religious Islamic community (the 'umma of Hezbollah')[73] committed to the principles of Islam, abiding by the decisions of the *walī al-faqīh*[74] and aiming at liberating Lebanon from external interferences, military occupation and promoting an Islamic reform of Lebanese society and institutions. The letter says that

> We, the sons of Hezbollah's *umma*, consider ourselves a part of the *umma* of Islam in the world; which is facing the most tyrannical and arrogant assault from both the West and the East – an assault intended to deprive it of the content of the Message with which God has blessed it.[75]

This places Hezbollah clearly in the mainstream Islamist discourse which sees the Islamic community as threatened by the influence of external powers and values and in need of defending itself. Its exclusive reference to the Islamic tradition, highlighting the self-referentiality of Hezbollah, is evident if we consider for example the part in which it declares that 'the fundamental sources of our culture are the venerable Qurʾān, the infallible *Sunna*, and the decisions and *fatwā* made by the *Faqīh* our *marjʿa al-taqlīd*.'[76] Hezbollah aligns its political identity with Islamism by asserting the need to reform the community and its members. It declares so with reference to Quṭb's concept of *jāhiliyya*[77] and states that 'it is time for us to realise that all the western ideas concerning human origin and nature cannot respond to his aspirations or rescue him from the darkness of misguidedness and *jāhiliyya* (ignorance). *Only* Islam can bring about human renaissance, progress, and creativity.'[78] The person then, in Hezbollah's

---

[73] According to Qāsim this would have been the original name of Hezbollah. Qassem, *Hizbullah* p. 59.

[74] *See* Appendix 1, §14.

[75] *See* Appendix 1, § 13.

[76] *See* Appendix 1, § 17.

[77] *See* Section 3.3.4.

[78] *See* Appendix 1, § 180–1, Emph. Add.

project, needs to embrace Islam and the principles of *sharīʿa* to achieve his or her full realisation and salvation.

These principles inform an individual's responsibility towards the community, including the duty to resort to *jihād* if necessary to defend the moral and material integrity of the community. The letter states that 'each of us [members of Hezbollah] is a combat soldier when the call of *jihād* demands it and each of us undertakes his task in the battle in accordance with his *shariatic* duty within the framework of action under the guardianship of the *Wilāyat al-Faqīh*.'[79] Eventually the letter exhorts all the Muslims of the world to be aware of their moral responsibility and support the cause of Hezbollah. The same text confirms how only Islamic principles can be the source of legitimacy for a political order when it says that 'we do not hide our commitment to the rule of Islam and that we call to choose the Islamic system (*al-niẓām al-islāmī*) that alone guarantees justice and dignity for all and prevents any new imperialist attempt to infiltrate our country.'[80] Hezbollah is nonetheless adamant at this early stage in stating that the implementation of an Islamic polity in Lebanon can only be the result of free choice from the Lebanese people and that it should not be imposed.[81]

The document then presents a number of considerations strictly from an Islamist perspective and related to the historical and social circumstances in which Hezbollah was operating at the time. It denounces the practices of Western imperialism especially in relation to the US, France and its regional allies (primarily Israel but also the other Arab regimes enjoying the support of Western states). It declares Hezbollah's aims of eliminating Israel, and fighting its occupation of Lebanese soil. Consequently Hezbollah is also hostile towards Israel's Lebanese allies, the component of the Christian community operating under the banner of the *katāʾeb*.[82] It also denounces the corruption of Lebanese statehood as well as its imbalance in the distribution of power in favour of the Christian component. It finally calls for a renewed sense of

---

[79] *See* Appendix 1, § 18.

[80] *See* Appendix 1, § 52.

[81] The letter refers in this context to the verse of the Qurʾān stating 'there is no compulsion in religion' (2. 256).

[82] These were the militia following the leadership of Gemayel also known as the Phalange; see Section 5.5.

responsibility for the Islamic community, the *umma*, to join the struggle against these forms of injustice as a duty dictated by belief in Islam. Quoting extensively from Khomeini's appeal to the Muslim *ʿulamāʾ* to mobilise, the letter ends by calling them to undertake action and join the ranks of the Islamic revolution mentioning Bāqir al-Ṣadr and Musa al-Ṣadr as examples of paramount virtue.[83]

5.6 Conclusions

This chapter has presented the contexts in which Islamist Shiʿī political ideas developed within Iraq, Iran and eventually focused on the case of Lebanon, where Hezbollah was founded and operates.

It has been highlighted how the case of Iraq is important as the intellectual cradle of Islamist Shiʿism, from where it subsequently spread to the rest of the region including Lebanon. The overview above shows a direct connection with the experience of Bāqir al-Ṣadr (who is mentioned in the *Open Letter*) and the rise of Hezbollah in Lebanon via the diaspora of Iraqi-trained *ʿulamāʾ* who found refuge in Lebanon and politically mobilised its Shiʿī community. The case of Iran is also fundamental. It constitutes the inspirational source of emulation for Hezbollah as the example of an accomplished Islamic revolution but also as the basis of the *Wilāyat al-Faqīh* to which the movement fully commits in the *Open Letter*. Iran plays also a fundamental role as the regional strategic ally for the movement, providing material assistance in the military sector as well as in Hezbollah's social services. At a later stage Syria also became part of this alliance.

Hezbollah becomes a relevant case study for this analysis and will be used to understand to what extent international norms influence Islamist politics. Since its inception, Hezbollah earned a reputation for a particularly hard-lined Islamist movement which defended its stance and implemented its politics without hesitating to use force and relying on aggressive rhetorical action. This renders its permeability to

---

[83] *See* Appendix 1 § 201 and 203.

international norms unlikely. The self-referentiality and sense of self-sufficiency of this Islamist political actor and the foundational assumptions (as they were presented in the previous chapters) on which its political identity is based render implausible the possibility that international norms may influence its behaviour. If we consider the content of the *Open Letter* as well as its actions; it is hard to imagine that, a few years later, Hezbollah would have fielded its candidates in elections in Lebanon, or that it would have internalised certain principles of international humanitarian and human rights law, or that would have accepted the implementation of UN Security Council resolutions directly concerning its range of action.

In an attempt to challenge this presumption, the following chapters present different instances in which Hezbollah interacted with international norms. The cases presented below highlight how, contrary to what may be reasonably presumed, the political identity of Hezbollah has been altered by international norms. This will bring to the conclusion that Islamist politics are not as immune to the influence of liberal norms as they claim to be, rather international norms act as means of socialisations of Islamist movements within the wider framework of international society challenging the communitarian assumptions upon which Islamism relies.

Chapter 6

Non-Combatant Immunity and Israel-Hezbollah Wars:

the Case of the April Understanding

6.1   Introduction

The first case to consider for interaction between Hezbollah and international norms is the norm of non-combatant immunity in conflict. The concept is of central importance in International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and, above all, in the corpus of norms that regulates armed conflict.[1] As Hezbollah was involved in international conflict, it inevitably became exposed to the influence of this norm.

The task for this analysis is to investigate to what extent and in which respects the definition of a person as 'non-combatant' was capable of modifying Hezbollah's warfare. This chapter shows that even if Hezbollah initially did not distinguish between non-combatants and combatants among Israelis, at a later stage the distinction emerged as a parameter regulating its warfare as a result of its interaction with international political actors. The shift is representative of how an international norm is able to influence the identity of the Islamist actor, although it does not indicate necessarily a genuine commitment to international norms.[2]

The events to which this phenomenon is related refer in particular to the 1996 conflict between Israel and Hezbollah and especially with regard to the Qānā Massacre. After the events of Qānā, Hezbollah became part[3] of an unsigned agreement (the April Understanding) regulating the conflict on the basis of a combatant/non-combatant distinction. Although the historical process leading to the April Understanding began in 1992 with the killing of Hezbollah's Secretary-General ʿAbbās al-Mūsawī, the events of 1996 constitute a watershed after which the adoption of non-combatant immunity became official. By this I do not intend to claim that after 1996 Hezbollah always

---

[1] The international law regulating conflict and including the principle of non-combatant protection is primarily, but not only, represented by the Geneva Conventions. Non-combatant immunity is also a principle of international customary law.

[2] In fact Hezbollah also made some strategic gains out of the application of the non-combatant principle. This aspect regarding the distinction between authentic commitment to norms and strategic interests will be addressed in more detail in the conclusions with reference to the distinction between causal and constitutive theories.

[3] It was not mentioned in the agreement but it was represented by Syria and Lebanon as parties in the agreement. *De facto* it is widely accepted that the agreement was drafted with reference primarily to Hezbollah as the main actor involved in the conflict.

respected this principle but that its military strategy was revised also on the basis of this principle as it will become clearer on the basis of the following analysis.

The following pages introduce Israel's wars in Lebanon (Section 6.2), then report the events of Qānā (Section 6.3) and the subsequent diplomatic negotiations (Section 6.4). Section 6.5 discusses Hezbollah's principles of Islamic warfare and Section 6.6 shows how they changed with regard to the April Understanding. The conclusion will be that the adoption of non-combatant immunity by Hezbollah is indicative of an initial stage of socialisation in the international normative framework and that this challenges the Islamist concept of attaching moral value to the person in relation to their communal affiliation as well as the self-referential idea of the community typical of Islamist theory (Section 6.7).

6.2   Israel's Wars in Lebanon

Israel has been operating militarily in Lebanon at least since 1968.[4] The first major operation (preceded by various clashes with the Palestinian factions based in south Lebanon) was in 1978, when the Israeli Army invaded its northern neighbour for the first time (Operation Litani). The main aim, at this early stage, was to eliminate the Palestinian factions, and in particular Yaser ʿArafat's PLO, which were using south Lebanon as the platform for their attacks against Israel. As seen in the previous chapter, in June 1982, Israel embarked on a full-scale invasion (Operation Peace for Galilee) reaching Beirut with the objective of eradicating the Palestinian presence in the country to then establish a friendly Christian-led regime. Eventually, the PLO left Lebanon (although many Palestinian factions remained) in August 1982 but Israel's occupation lasted until May 2000.[5]

---

[4] In 1949 Israel and Lebanon signed an Armistice Agreement following the first Arab–Israeli war. Traboulsi, *History of Modern Lebanon* p. 113. Israel engaged militarily with Lebanon with an attack on its civilian aircrafts at the Beirut International Airport (28 December 1968). Kamal S. Salibi, *Cross Roads to Civil War: Lebanon, 1958-1976* (Delmar, N.Y.: Caravan Books, 1976) pp. 38-9.

[5] Certain enclaves remain occupied to date by Israeli forces, allowing Hezbollah to claim its role of national resistance even after 2000. These are the Shebaʿa area, Kfar Shūbā and Ghajjar. The actual definition of borders of these areas remains disputed, especially in the case of Shebaʿa. More generally the entire border

137

In 1985, the Israeli army partially withdrew maintaining its presence south of the line of the Litani River, establishing an area under its control and under the control of its proxy militia, the South Lebanon Army (SLA).[6] The area was to become known as the 'Security Zone' and intended to be a buffer between Israel and Lebanon. Allegedly, it would have enhanced the security of Israel isolating it from the rocket attacks originating from south Lebanon. Nonetheless, it did not deliver the expected results. It soon became a battlefield in which the Lebanese resistance against the Israeli occupier practised its war of attrition.[7] According to Nizar Hamzeh's research, the Islamic Resistance[8] carried out about 6,000 operations from 1985 to 2000 including direct attacks on military personnel, mortar shelling, Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), ambushes and, at a later stage, the shooting of Katyusha rockets.[9] Domestically as well as internationally, the Israeli presence in Lebanon was often questioned, especially on the basis of the frustration of its goals, the human losses and its illegality.[10]

On three occasions the war of attrition with the guerrilla factions grouped under the National Resistance escalated to high-intensity conflicts. Israel engaged in full-scale military operations with Hezbollah, which had the lion's share in the guerrilla activity in July 1993 (Operation Accountability), in April 1996 (Operation Grapes of Wrath) and in July 2006 (Operation Change of Direction).[11] The aim of all these operations was to annihilate Hezbollah but regularly failed to do so. Israel's strategy in these wars, as well as in the occupation of Lebanon, proved to be ill-conceived and indeed the strategy was often judged as a failure.[12] The then Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin described the

---

between Lebanon and Israel is being redrawn along the so-called Blue Line with the supervision of the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) Mission.

[6] The SLA was primarily composed of Christians and under the control of Saʿad Haddād.

[7] Norton and Schwedler, '(in)Security Zones' p. 71.

[8] The Islamic Resistance is the operative armed wing of Hezbollah and the major player in the resistance activity against Israel.

[9] Hamzeh, *In the Path of Hizbullah* p. 89. I would nonetheless point out that this figure is almost exclusively based on Hezbollah's sources and its accuracy is therefore only approximate.

[10] Since 1978 UNSC Resolution 425 demanded the full withdrawal of Israel from the Lebanese territory and established the presence of the UNIFIL. For a comprehensive defence of the legality of Israeli military activity in Lebanon *see* Barry Feinstein, 'Legality of the Use of Armed Force by Israel in Lebanon - June 1982', *Israel Law Review,* 20/362 (1985), 362- 96.

[11] The events related to the 2006 war are covered in more detail in Chapter 8.

[12] Judith P. Harik, *Hezbollah: The Changing Face of Terrorism* (London ; New York: I.B. Tauris, 2004) p. 49.

1993 operation as an effort to undermine the popular support of the Islamic Resistance in south Lebanon. The strategy was to displace the civil population by targeting civilian areas, infrastructure and Hezbollah's bases.[13] The displacement of civilians, allegedly, not only would have undermined Hezbollah's support, but would have also pressured the Lebanese government into dealing with the problem of south Lebanon in a more resolute way. According to Itamar Rabinovich:

> Its principal component was a broad-scale expulsion of the Lebanese civilians from the southern part of the country north towards Beirut. In this fashion the Israeli authors of the operation expected to generate pressure on the Lebanese government of Rafiq Hariri and ultimately on the latter's Syrian patrons.[14]

However, the 1993 operation did not achieve these aims. 350,000 civilians evacuated part of the area migrating north of the Litani, but part of the population simply did not have another place to go nor the means to evacuate. Furthermore, the operation did not damage Hezbollah. Despite suffering casualties, the movement was even more active after the conflict and its popular support was as robust as before, if not more.[15] The seven-day conflict of 1993 also had disproportionate consequences between the parties involved in terms of casualties. The Israeli army lost nine men (two of them immediately before the beginning of hostilities), whereas 147 Lebanese died in the attacks, most of them confirmed as civilians. In the same operation, about 75 Lebanese villages were destroyed along with other infrastructure.[16] After six days of war, on 31 July 1993, the US Secretary of State Warren Christopher brokered a ceasefire agreement in which the parties involved agreed on mutual restraints in military operation (July Agreement).

The July Agreement did not cease the hostilities completely, but set up a regulatory regime for their continuation within restraints. According to this unwritten pact, Hezbollah would not fire rockets into Israel and Israel would stop targeting Lebanese

---

[13] David Hirst, *Beware of Small States: Lebanon, Battleground of the Middle East* (New York: Nation Books, 2010) p. 250.

[14] Itamar Rabinovich, *The Brink of Peace: The Israeli-Syrian Negotiations* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1998) p. 103.

[15] Norton and Schwedler, '(in)Security Zones' p. 71.

[16] Ibid.

villages. As August Norton and Jillian Schwedler observe: 'Implicitly, the parties agreed that attacks inside the "security zone" that did not target civilians fell outside of the ceasefire agreement.'[17] Between 1993 and 1996, the conflict continued at a substantially lower intensity within the restraints established by the informal agreement.

The 1996 operation was a continuation of Israel's 1993 strategy with the same outcomes. Operation Grapes of Wrath began on 11 April 1996[18] after weeks of escalation on both sides in breach of the 1993 informal accord.[19] Israeli military engagement aimed at dislodging civilians and targeted Hezbollah's bases. As Rabinovich says: 'at the core of the operation lay the notion that Israel could achieve at least some of its goals by exerting pressure on the government of Rafiq Hariri through destroying some economic targets and through causing the population in the south to flee to Beirut.'[20] The engagement rules of the Israeli army reflected this strategy. For example they established that the civilian population travelling towards the north, thus evacuating the area, should not have been targeted whereas engagement was allowed with anyone travelling south, thus discouraging the repopulation of the area.[21] The operation continued until 26 April when the parties agreed to a ceasefire. This time, the agreement was written and it became known as the April Understanding. The suspension of hostilities and their further regulation was principally due to the Israeli shelling of a UN compound which killed 104 civilians. What subsequently became known as the Qānā Massacre is analysed in more detail in the following section.[22] It

---

[17] Ibid.

[18] Rabinovich claims that the operation began on 2 April. Rabinovich, *Brink of Peace* p. 230.

[19] Hezbollah calls the 1996 war *al-Ḥarb al-Thāmina* that is 'the eighth war' This is because it locates the war in the wider context of Israeli wars in the Middle East following the preceding seven wars of 1948, 1957, 1968, 1973, 1978, 1982 and 1993. Anonymous, *Al-Ḥarb Al-Thāmina [the Eighth War]* (Beirut: al-Markaz al-Istishadi lil Dirasat wa al-Tauthiq, n.d.) p. 8.

[20] Rabinovich, *Brink of Peace* p. 231.

[21] 'Author's Interview with Maj. Gen. Franklin Van Kappen, Military Advisor to the UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros Ghali', (Den Hague, the Netherlands: 2 November 2010). The same information is also reported in the Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch reports covering these facts. Amnesty International (1996) 'Israel/Lebanon Unlawful Killings During "Operation Grapes of Wrath"' (MDE 15/042/1996: Amnesty International: 23 July 1996). Human Rights Watch (1997) 'Israel/Lebanon: "Operation Grapes of Wrath" - the Civilian Victims' (8(E), 9: Human Rights Watch: September 1997).

[22] The events related to the 2006 conflict are discussed in more detail in Chapter 8.

was inevitable that these wars, in which civilians were cruelly used 'like pawns'[23] for strategic purposes, would have eventually caused damages of these proportions.

6.3 The Massacre of Qānā

The events of Qānā are a turning point in the Israel–Hezbollah conflict.[24] The human suffering caused by the conflict and the reputational costs for both actors involved in this event, provoked a rethinking of the rules of engagement and more generally of the conflict. On 18 April 1996, south Lebanon was for the seventh consecutive day under the attack of Israeli military forces. To these attacks, the Islamic guerrilla group along with other armed formations responded by targeting Israeli military outposts in the Security Zone, and shooting rockets into northern Israeli territory in retaliation.

On that day, a Hezbollah squad shot about eight rockets and five mortar rounds against Israeli military targets. The mortar rounds fell close to an Israeli patrol which was unharmed and reacted by asking for rescue fire. Hezbollah's fighters used an area surrounding a UN compound under the command of the UNIFIL mission as the launch pad for their attack. According to the observation of the subsequent investigation, the rockets and mortar rounds were shot from positions at a distance varying from 600 to 200 metres from the south side of the UN compound in breach of the laws of war.[25] In the UN base, more than 800 people took refuge from the hostilities.

The Israeli army engaged in the rescue fire called for by its troops and the consequences were a disaster. Once identified, the coordinates of the location from where the Hezbollah attack was launched and orders were sent to an artillery battalion located on the Israeli/Lebanese border. Having noticed the proximity to the UN-

---

[23] Human Rights Watch (1996) 'Civilian Pawns: Laws of War Violations and the Use of Weapons on the Israel-Lebanon Border' (Human rights Watch: May 1996).

[24] In the following account I mainly refer to the UN report written by Major-General Franklin van Kappen on behalf of the UN Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali. UN Security Council 'Letter Dated 7 May 1996 from the Secretary General Addressed to the the President of the Security Council' (S/1996/337: 7 May 1996). The author carried out interviews with van Kappen and the journalist Robert Fisk who was an eye witness of the Qānā events, and reported on these in Robert Fisk, *Pity the Nation: The Abduction of Lebanon* (4th, new American edn.; New York: Thunder's Mouth Press/Nation Books, 2002) Ch. 18.

[25] The laws of war forbid engaging in combat activity closer than 500 yards to non-combatants' facilities.

inhabited area, the battalion asked for confirmation on the target which was subsequently given by the central command. Two artillery batteries then fired on the targets indicated by the orders.[26] The facts reported by the subsequent investigation of the massacre show that the shelling of the Israeli artillery focused on two areas, the second of which did not match with the area from where Hezbollah was previously shooting. The first concentration of impact was south of the UN compound, roughly corresponding to the site where the Hezbollah mortar was located. But the second area of impact corresponded with the UN compound. Almost all the proximity-fuse[27] ammunitions fell on the second target area, killing more than one hundred refugees who were taking shelter in the UN premises.

According to some testimonies, some of the members of the Hezbollah brigade who were shooting in the proximity of the compound entered the premises after firing the mortars.[28] It is not established whether this happened before, during or after the Israeli shelling of the compound. Nonetheless, the shelling of UN facilities was a violation of the laws of war and even the presence of combatants in the building, if ever confirmed, would not have justified the shelling.[29] The massacre provoked an international reaction for the level of barbarity which the conflict had reached. The grim images of the victims became immediately public throughout the world's media. As the target of the shelling of a UN facility, the Qānā events immediately assumed an international relevance. The UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali sent his Military Adviser Major-General Franklin van Kappen to Lebanon to report on these events. Israel's military strategy[30]

---

[26] At a later stage it was discovered that an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) was flying over the area, along with other helicopters as testified by a video recorded by an international observatory in a nearby UN basis.

[27] These are ammunitions that explode not on the contact with the target but in its proximity. Their use is related to specific strategic reasons such as targeting a moving object or others.

[28] Blanford, *Warriors of God* p. 168. The same was also confirmed to the author as a possible although unconfirmed hypothesis by Fisk. 'Author's Interview with Robert Fisk, Middle East Correspondent for *the Independent*', (Beirut, Lebanon: 9 September 2009).

[29] A double-effect principle argument to justify the shelling of the UN facility is dismissed by the disproportionate cost in human lives, and almost null strategic value of the target. In addition to this, the UN compound was clearly signed, reported on maps and the UN previously alerted Israel to the presence of refugees in the compound.

[30] It has to be noted that the Qānā Massacre is only one of the incidents involving civilian victims in this conflict. For a more complete overview of the war's events which involved civilians *see*: Amnesty International (1996) 'Israel/Lebanon Unlawful Killings During "Operation Grapes of Wrath"', Human Rights Watch (1997) 'Israel/Lebanon: "Operation Grapes of Wrath" - the Civilian Victims'.

and Operation Grapes of Wrath in general became a source of criticism and condemnation inconvenient for Israel and its allies. In a frank page of his memoire, Rabinovich observes with regard to the strategic thinking of Grapes of Wrath that:

> If the flaws in this kind of thinking were not self-evident, they should have been realized by any Israeli who studied the lessons of Operation Accountability. The prospects of actually achieving the operation's goals were limited, while Israel was bound to be cast in the role of the heartless, powerful state venting its rage and massive military power on innocent and helpless civilians.[31]

Even more problematic was the fact that van Kappen's investigation excluded almost categorically the accidental nature of the Qānā events. Different elements brought him to the conclusion that the shelling of the UN compound could have not been a mistake although the motivations of this action are not very clear.[32]

The shelling of the UN building was not the result of involuntary overshooting of the guns according to the military investigation of van Kappen. Further doubts were raised by the contradictory declarations of Israeli officials during van Kappen's investigations, for example as regards the presence of helicopters during the bombing. At a later stage, a tape recorded by a Norwegian troop not far from Qānā shows the presence of a helicopter and a drone in the area of the shelling while the shelling was ongoing, a fact denied by Israeli officials. Van Kappen's report listed a number of circumstances showing the implausibility of the accident thesis put forward by the Israeli authority, and concluded that: 'while the possibility cannot be ruled out completely, it is unlikely that

---

[31] Rabinovich, *Brink of Peace* p. 231.

[32] In addition to the cost in human lives of this operation for the Lebanese, the Qānā events had detrimental strategic effects for Israel, which further begs the question of what provoked this Israeli reaction. When the author asked Robert Fisk what would have justified such reaction he replied with the word 'punishment' saying that the Israeli army and its soldiers were profoundly frustrated by the war and its losses on the Israeli side. 'Author's Interview with Robert Fisk, Middle East Correspondent for *the Independent*', (Beirut, Lebanon: 9 September 2009). Van Kappen thinks that the responsibility for the operation does not lie with the high-ranking command of the Israeli army, which would unlikely have put itself in such an unfavourable situation. Rather, a breach in the Israeli chain of command may have caused an alteration of orders eventually leading to the massacre. 'Author's Interview with Maj. Gen. Franklin Van Kappen, Military Advisor to the UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros Ghali', (Den Hague, the Netherlands: 2 November 2010). *See* Blanford, *Warriors of God*, Fisk, *Pity the Nation* pp. 170-1.

the shelling of the United Nations compound was the result of gross technical and/or procedural errors.'[33]

A different opinion is advanced by Louis Rene Beres, who defends the legality of Israel's shelling of Qānā. He claims that 'responsibility for this tragic Israeli artillery bombardment of UN-protected civilian refugees in Lebanon lies pre-eminently with Hizbullah and its Islamic state mentors, Syria and Iran, as well as with Lebanon.'[34] He defends this opinion on the basis of the alleged fact that Hezbollah was committing a 'perfidious act' engaging in military activity in the proximity of a UN basis,[35] and that Israel shelled the UN compound due to a mistake in mapping the location.[36]

Van Kappen's report was eventually submitted to the Secretary-General, and rendered the situation embarrassing at the diplomatic level for Israel and its allies.[37] In a meeting with van Kappen, Madeleine Albright (then US Ambassador to the UN) asked him whether he was sure about the report's contents and made clear that she was 'upset' about it.[38] Pressure was exerted on the UN in order to keep the report confidential; further, the tape recording the events was not to be made public but eventually the report was adopted and made public by the Security Council.[39]

6.4   The Diplomatic Negotiations of the April Understanding

The events of Qānā encouraged the acceleration of the diplomatic efforts to end the hostilities and rendered Israel's position in the negotiations most unfavourable. As

---

[33] UN Security Council 'Letter Dated 7 May 1996 from the Secretary General Addressed to the the President of the Security Council'.

[34] Louis Rene Beres, 'Israel, Lebanon and Hizbullah: A Jurisprudential Assessment', *Arizona Journal of International & Comparative Law,* 14/1 (1997) at p. 145.

[35] Ibid., p. 147.

[36] Ibid., p. 144. The claim of wrong mapping was dismissed by the UNIFIL spokesperson Timur Goksel as 'the biggest sickest joke ever heard in my life.' Blanford, *Warriors of God* p. 172.

[37] Hezbollah's responsibilities remain relevant. Van Kappen recalls that during his investigative mission he met with anonymous exponents of the Islamic Resistance and pointed out how the launch of attacks which may have harmed the security of civilians were a 'coward' action from which they should have refrained. The agreement was, then, that Hezbollah would have not carried out such operations in proximity of civilians. 'Author's Interview with Maj. Gen. Franklin Van Kappen, Military Advisor to the UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros Ghali', (Den Hague, the Netherlands: 2 November 2010).

[38] Ibid.

[39] Fisk, *Pity the Nation* pp. 681-9.

Rabinovich says, 'the ensuing wave of international and Arab indignation and condemnation made Israel's position practically untenable.'[40] The actors involved in the diplomatic initiative were Israel and the US along with European countries, such as France. Syria acted as the patron of the resistance in Lebanon. Lebanon, at the time under Rafīq al-Ḥarīrī's premiership, was under the pervasive influence of Ḥāfeẓ al-Asad's rule and was supportive of the National Resistance. Iran kept a low but decisive profile in giving the green light to the final agreement.

Two main diplomatic tracks were in competition; on the one hand there was the US channel, on the other the France minister of foreign affairs, Hervé de Charette, was engaged in a different negotiation. According to a report of that time, 'their efforts devolved into competing shuttle diplomacy with the two of them following each other back and forth between Jerusalem and Damascus in an effort to broker an agreement between Israel, Lebanon, and Lebanon's *de facto* suzerain, Syria.'[41] The USA was looking for an agreement that would have imposed the disarmament of Hezbollah by the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) or Syria. After three months in which there were no attacks against the Israeli army or shooting of rockets, then there would have been a possibility to start negotiating the withdrawal of Israel from Lebanon.[42] This was a proposal that had been around since the 1993 crisis.[43] Three years later, and in a weaker bargaining position, the same proposal was turned down.

France was pursuing an agreement referring to UNSC Resolution 425 and thus demanding the withdrawal of Israel from Lebanon without asking for Hezbollah's disarmament or the cessation of its activity in the security zone.[44]The two plans overlapped in their intent to protect civilians thus resuming and ameliorating the non-written conditions of the 1993 July Agreement. On 26 April, the parties reached an

---

[40] Rabinovich, *Brink of Peace* p. 231.

[41] Adam Frey 'The Israel-Lebanon Monitoring Group: An Operational Review' (3: Washington Institute for Near East Policy: September 1997).

[42] Gabriella Blum, *Islands of Agreement: Managing Enduring Armed Rivalries* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2007) p. 211-2. Jaber reports that the time before the beginning of talks for the Israeli withdrawal was nine months and not three months as Blum indicates. Jaber, *Hezbollah* p. 195.

[43] The same proposal remains the central demand of US foreign policy in later years, as discussed in Chapter 8.

[44] Jaber, *Hezbollah* p. 194-6.

agreement over an unsigned document, the so-called April Understanding. The Understanding contained various clauses, but importantly included an absolute prohibition of targeting non-combatants as it was established by the international norm of non-combatant immunity. The Understanding goes as follows:

> The two parties commit to ensuring that under no circumstances will civilians be the target of attack and that civilian populated areas and industrial and electrical installations will not be used as launching grounds for attacks .[45]

A forum of participating countries (Israel–Lebanon Monitoring Group) would have supervised the abidance or violation of the terms of warfare established by the document.[46] Eventually, the mechanism established a code of practice for the continuation of hostilities incorporating the principle of non-combatant immunity and establishing an absolute prohibition to target civilians and civilian property. The members of the Israel–Lebanon Monitoring Group (ILMG) were France, the US, Syria, Lebanon and Israel. Since then, tensions on the border have often run high although no major clashes occurred until 2006 when the July War erupted. Eventually, Hezbollah invoked the April Understanding as a condition for a ceasefire for the 2006 conflict.[47]

6.5 Military *Jihād* and Islamic Warfare

The events presented above had a significant impact on Hezbollah's military action against Israel, shaping its warfare in a way that increasingly (although not in a definitive manner) internalised the principle of discrimination between combatants and non-combatants in relation to Israeli targets as well. Although principles regulating the use of force are present in Islamic warfare tradition and in Hezbollah's practices as well, the integration of an absolute[48] principle of non-combatant immunity within Hezbollah's

---

[45] Adir Waldman, *Arbitrating Armed Conflict: Decisions of the Israel-Lebanon Monitoring Group* (Huntington, NY: Juris, 2003) p. 27.

[46] This forum is important because it constituted the basis on which Israel and Lebanon would later have taken part in the Tripartite Forum established within the framework of the UNIFIL mission.

[47] Sayyid Ḥasan Naṣrallah, 'Speech on Al-Manar Channel', (Mideastwire.com, 2006: 9 August 2006).

[48] 'Absolute' in the sense that it does not make exceptions, even when the non-combatant is Israeli.

religious warfare is an innovation that came about progressively as a result of the 1996 events.

Jihād is the basis of legitimacy for Hezbollah's military activity.[49] This is confirmed by Qāsim's account of Hezbollah's pillars in which *jihād* figures among the most prominent.[50] The concept of *jihād* also appears in various occasions in the 1985 letter.[51] According to Qāsim, military *jihād* is conceived as defensive (*al-jihād al-difʿaī*) by Hezbollah and with the purpose of liberating occupied territory or as a defence to aggression against the community. Offensive *jihād* (*al-jihād al-ibtidʿaī*) is not allowed in the absence of the Prophet or before the return of the twelfth vanished Imam (*Imām al-Mahdī*), and therefore Hezbollah considers only defensive *jihād* to be legitimate.[52]

Thus, the foundation of Hezbollah's *jihād* against Israel is based on the idea that Israel is an illegitimate occupying entity and thus *jihād* against Israel is a just war as it is defensive against an oppressive occupier.[53] The problem is that the theory of religious warfare regulated by *jihād* is subject to interpretation with regard to the immunity of non-combatants and this uncertainty leaves open a discretionary margin of interpretation. Whereas *jihād* provides relatively clear indications with regard to *ius ad bellum* the regulation of conflict (i.e. *ius in bello*) is more problematic. As John Kelsay notices 'there is a paucity of attention in contemporary Islamic discussions of the *jus in bello* concerns, and […] this points to the difficulty of keeping a moral tradition "up to date" when its interaction with military and political matters is limited.'[54] A growing

---

[49] It shall be reminded that the concept of *jihād* in Islam is more extensive than how the idea of a military struggle captures. For a broader discussion of *jihād* in Hezbollah see Hilal Khashan; Ibrahim Mousawi, 'Hizbullah's Jihad Concept', *Journal of Religion and Society,* 9 (2007), 1-19. Ibrahim Mūsawī is a member of Hezbollah, mainly in charge of its external relations.

[50] Qassem, *Hizbullah* p. 86-112.

[51] For example a section of the *Open Letter* specifies that all Hezbollah's members are also *jihād* fighters. See Appendix 1, § 18.

[52] Although Qāsim's explanation obviously resorts to Shiite traditional thinking, offensive *jihād* is nonetheless forbidden in the Sunni tradition. Also Quṭb, to mention one example, in his commentary to the Qurʾān makes clear that aggression is forbidden in Islam. *See* Alia Brahimi, *Jihad and Just War in the War on Terror* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2010) p. 175.

[53] This point is reiterated in almost all Hezbollah's declarations. For an analysis of this see Saad-Ghorayeb, *Hizbullah* pp. 112-27.

[54] John Kelsay, 'Islam and the Distinction between Combatants and Noncombatants' in James Turner Johnson and John Kelsay (eds.), *Cross, Crescent, and Sword: The Justification and Limitation of War in Western and Islamic Tradition* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1990) p. 198.

literature recently tried to clarify the regulation of conflict according to Islamic principles but, as it is regularly the case, discussions of Islamic interpretations are hardly conclusive.[55] The sources of *sharīʿa*, whether the Qurʾān or the *ḥadīth*, are subject to interpretations and various legal schools, traditions and opinions of sheikhs, ayatollahs or *ʿulamāʾ* differ in various respects with none having the last word.

There is general agreement, however, that in Islamic warfare women, children and elders shall be immune from the consequences of belligerent actions. This confirms that a principle of non-combatant discrimination applies to some extent, as in IHL.[56] Sohail Hashmi observes that:

> The Qur'an provides the basis for *ius in bello* considerations: 'and fight in God's cause against those who wage war against you, but do not transgress limits, for God loves not the transgressors' [2:190]. The 'limits' are enumerated in the practice of the Prophet and the first four caliphs.[57]

Nonetheless, various problems arise, for example with the interpretation of the concept of aggression and defence, especially with regard to foreign occupation or towards oppressive and authoritarian regimes. This led to interpretations authorising attacks against authoritarian regimes in the past (as seen in the case of Quṭb), Israeli non-combatants or the use of suicide bombing as forms of resistance.[58] Furthermore, non-combatant immunity in Islamic warfare is limited by derogations as the 'double-effect principle', or cases of necessity or non-intentionality as in IHL.[59]

In the case of Hezbollah, the *fatwā* issued by Shiʿī Grand Ayatollahs in Lebanon and from the *Walī al-Faqīh* Khomeini and his successor Khamenei confirmed the religious obligations (*wājib sharʿī*) of *jihād*. As already discussed, one example of this is Shams

---

[55] *See* for example Brahimi, *Jihad and Just War*, John Kelsay, *Arguing the Just War in Islam* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2007).

[56] Brahimi, *Jihad and Just War* pp. 157-62. Other limitations are imposed with regard to ransacking, inflicting damage on property, crops and trees, holy places and religious persons.

[57] Sohail Hashmi, 'Interpreting the Islamic Ethics of War and Peace' in Terry Nardin (ed.), *The Ethics of War and Peace: Religious and Secular Perspectives* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996) p. 161.

[58] Kelsay proposes a discussion of three key examples of this debate in relation to 'The Neglected Duty' relevant in particular for the Egyptian Islamist movements against Sadat, Hamas Charter and Bin Laden's 'Declaration of Armed Struggle against the Jews and Crusaders'. Kelsay, *Just War in Islam* pp. 125-54.

[59] Ibid., p. 108.

al-Dīn's *fatwā* of 1983 in which 'civil resistance' to the Israeli occupation was religiously sanctioned.[60] However, Qāsim refers repeatedly to the declarations of Khomeini and Khamenei as a source justifying *jihād* against Israel. He makes clear that:

> The *jihad* decision is tied to the Jurist-Theologian [*Walī al-Faqīh*], upon whom rests the duty of diagnosing the situation and categorizing it as falling under the banner of defensive jihad or not. He is entrusted with defining the fundamentals and guidelines of confrontation. The responsibility for blood is great, and fighters should not be consigned into any battle without identifying that which is in harmony with the duty and objectives of *jihad*.[61]

Thus, no matter what interpretations could be available, the last word in Hezbollah's regulation of warfare is in the judgements and decisions of the *Walī al- Faqīh*.[62]

6.6 Non-Combatant Immunity in Warfare against Israel

The actual rules of engagement in conflict and the definition of lawful targets remain vague and often decided on a circumstantial basis. Let us consider a key example. The first operation carried out by Hezbollah (or its original nucleus) against an Israeli military target in Tyre sheds some light in this respect. Targeting a military facility of an occupying force was legitimate from the point of view of Islamic warfare as interpreted by Hezbollah, but things were complicated by the fact that the facility was also the place of detention of many Muslims.[63] According to Jaber this raised serious moral dilemmas in Hezbollah.

> When the Shiite radicals met at the time to discuss the bombings of the two IDF [Israeli Defence Force] bases, they were faced with an acute moral dilemma. Torn between their desire to attack Israel at the hearth of its operations in Lebanon and their Islamic teaching and upbringing which condemned the killing of their fellow

---

[60] W. Andrew Terrill, 'Low Intensity Conflict in Southern Lebanon: Lessons and Dynamics of the Israeli-Shi'ite War', *Journal of Conflict Studies,* 7/3 (1987), 22-35 at p. 24. *See* Section 5.3.

[61] Qassem, *Hizbullah* p. 95.

[62] This seems to be an aspect that has progressively changed. In an interview, MP ʿAlī Fayyāḍ of Hezbollah declared that the authority of the Iranian *Walī al-Faqīh* is legitimate only for those who chose him as *marjʿa al-taqlīd.* 'Author's Interview with ʿAlī Fayyāḍ, Member of Parliament, Republic of Lebanon (Loyalty to the Resistance Block- Hezbollah)', (Beirut, Lebanon: 29 September 2011).

[63] These were Palestinians detained by the Israeli forces, most likely as allegedly involved in guerrilla activity. As already mentioned, this operation was only later endorsed by Hezbollah, the name of the bomber was Ahmed Qasir who has come to be remembered as the first Hezbollah martyr out of twelve.

> Muslims, the fighters realized that what they needed was not just a military decision, but a religious edict, fatwa, from a scholar.[64]

Hezbollah eventually obtained a religious ruling legitimising actions in which Muslims were killed if they were used as human shields by the enemy or anyway if the enemy casualties were higher than the Muslims killed.[65] This case shows that the criterion for engaging in bellicose activity took into account the minimisation of harm to the non-combatant population, but on the basis of the 'Double-Effect Principle'[66] or assessing the general benefits of this operation against its costs. The operation was therefore eventually authorised notwithstanding its high cost in innocent lives.[67] Ayatollah Faḍlallah also confirms this logic in an interview in which he declares that doing injustice to an unbeliever is forbidden and the hijacking of means of transport containing civilians or kidnapping non-combatants is in violation of Islamic principles, but these principles can be derogated for pragmatic reasons:

> Some issues have to be viewed in a wider context. Otherwise, how can one justify wars, where there are many innocent casualties? If harming an innocent is categorically wrong, then warfare is categorically wrong. Islamic values do not exist in abstraction, suspended in mid-air, as it were; they are human values that apply to real situations in the real world. A negative value may be transformed into a positive value if it serves the public good.[68]

As in the case of International Humanitarian Law, the prohibition of killing non-combatants is not unconditional, and can be suspended if the strategic benefits of its violation are proportionate to its collateral damage. Hezbollah primarily carried out attacks against military targets and in general avoided or minimised the involvement of

---

[64] Jaber, *Hezbollah* p. 88-9.

[65] Ibid., p. 89.

[66] Double-Effect Principle is a concept of ethics originally developed in Thomistic philosophy but often mentioned in the ethics of war debate. There is no uncontroversial interpretation but fundamentally this principle allows for the killing of non-combatants as long as this is not the primary intention of the fighter and even though this might be a necessary consequence of the attack. A principle of proportionality applies as well, prohibiting an attack in which harm to non-combatants is disproportionate with respect to the strategic benefits of the operation. *See* Uwe Steinhoff, *On the Ethics of War and Terrorism* (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2007) pp. 33-5..

[67] As we shall see further in the next chapter, this calculation of costs and benefits in applying Islamic juridical principles is institutionalised in Islamic jurisprudence and refers to the concepts of *maṣlaḥa* and *tazāḥum* both allowing for a suspension of certain Islamic principles when overall this suspension leads to a greater a good. *See* Section 7.3

[68] Shaykh Muhammad Hussayn Fadlallah and Mahmoud Soueid, 'Islamic Unity and Political Change. Interview with Shaykh Muhammad Hussayn Fadlallah', *Journal of Palestine Studies,* 25/1 (1995), 61-75 at p. 65. The concept of public good translates the Islamic concept of *maṣlaḥa*.

non-combatants, but when necessary or strategically advantageous, non-combatants could also have been involved in an attack. This does not apply when the non-combatants in question are Israelis. Indeed Hezbollah deliberately targeted civilians and civilian property in Israel, disregarding the principle of non-combatants' immunity, especially through the use of Katyusha rockets.

Israel's assassination of Hezbollah's Secretary-General ʿAbbās al-Mūsawī (1952–1992) was the event that initiated Hezbollah's deliberate attacks on civilians.[69] Al-Mūsawī was killed on the 16 February 1992 along with his wife and his children by an Israeli helicopter gunship. The assassination enraged Hezbollah, which promptly replaced al-Mūsawī with Hasan Nasrallah. The killing of al-Mūsawī inaugurated Hezbollah's 'balance of terror' doctrine (*tawāzun al-rʿab*), on the basis of which it would have reacted to Israeli attacks with attacks targeting northern Israel using Katyusha rockets.[70] This widened its military objectives from targeting the Israeli military in Lebanon to aiming at Israelis in the north of Israel. Katyushas are rudimentary and ballistically inaccurate weapons, they do not allow precise targeting and differentiation between military or civilian targets and consequently they amount to deliberate attacks on civilians.[71]

The effectiveness of these actions is inferior if compared to the damage caused by Israeli operations.[72] Nonetheless, its terrorising effects over the civilian population and the causation of internally displaced persons are accounted as violations of the laws of war. The issue of Hezbollah's alleged involvement in terrorist attacks targeting civilians outside of Israel, in the same period, also deserves brief consideration. In 1992, the

---

[69] Ghorayeb claims that the Katyusha rockets launched against Israel was inaugurated in 1992 but not in relation al-Mūsawī's assassination but with regards to Israel's attempt to invade the villages of Kafra and Yater. Saad-Ghorayeb, *Hizbullah* p. 143.

[70] Blanford, *Warriors of God* p. 133.

[71] Amnesty International (1996) 'Israel/Lebanon Unlawful Killings During "Operation Grapes of Wrath"'. The relevant jurisprudential source in this regard is the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the First Additional Protocol of the Geneva conventions. All the principles contained in these documents are part of customary international law to which all parties in conflict are expected to abide to no matter their ratification or their status as state or non-state actors. Ibid., p. 2.

[72] Ibid., Human Rights Watch (1997) 'Israel/Lebanon: "Operation Grapes of Wrath" - the Civilian Victims'.

Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires was bombed[73] and in 1994 the Israeli–Argentinian Mutual Association in the same city was also attacked.[74] The responsibility for these acts has been attributed by the Argentinian prosecutor to Hezbollah among others, but Hezbollah has always denied accountability.[75] If Hezbollah's responsibilities for these terrorist attacks were to be ascertained, it would further confirm Hezbollah's selective commitment to non-combatant immunity according to which Israelis or Zionists are not considered immune.[76]

Amal Saad-Ghorayeb elaborates that Hezbollah has made its war with Israel a founding commitment prior to any other, and that it sees Israel as an undistinguished 'monolithic society' in which all its members are a potential target for Hezbollah.[77] She accounts for Hezbollah's justification of attacks on Israeli civilians on the basis of three factors: as a self-defence policy, a strategic measure and as the result of the belief that all Israelis are Zionist enemies, hence legitimate targets.[78] Hezbollah's warfare, then, allowed for deliberate targeting of non-combatants and non-combatants property in Israel, differently from the other cases in which restraints applied in the case of non-combatants. This selective application of the non-combatant immunity principle is not only to be found in Hezbollah's case but is consistent with wider Islamist moral thinking on warfare against Israel.

---

[73] The attack took place on 17 March 1992 and killed 29 civilians and wounded hundreds.

[74] 18 July 1994, there were 85 casualties and hundreds of wounded.

[75] This is in fact surprising because Hezbollah either in the long- or short-term does claim responsibility for its actions because its leadership is often proud of them especially if the operations achieve their objectives. Saad-Ghorayeb, *Hizbullah* p. 137.

[76] Daniel Sobelman claims that Israeli intelligence is correct in attributing these operations to Hezbollah. Daniel Sobelman, 'Hizbollah from Terror to Resistance: Towards a National Defence Strategy' in Clive Jones and Sergio Catignani (eds.), *Israel and Hizbollah: An Asymmetric Conflict in Historical and Comparitive Perspectives* (London ; New York: Routledge, 2010) p. 59-60. Dalacoura also links these actions including the TWA hijacking of 1985 and the kidnappings in Beirut in the 1980s to Hezbollah, and she concludes that Hezbollah was linked to these events. Katerina Dalacoura, *Islamist Terrorism and Democracy in the Middle East* (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011) p. 85.

[77] Saad-Ghorayeb, *Hizbullah* pp. 138-43.

[78] Ibid., p. 143.

One of the most notable examples is that of Yūsuf al-Qarḍawī, a prominent Sunni ʿālim who proposes a similar line of thought.[79] His argument is that since Israel is a country in which men and women are supposed to serve in the army and remain liable to be recalled as reservists, then the distinction between combatants and non-combatants does not apply because all of them are potential enemies.[80] In this perspective, attacks against Israelis are legitimate even when they do not discriminate between combatant and non-combatant targets, as happened in certain attacks carried out by the Palestinian resistance in Israel.

The argument was similarly exposed by Nasrallah in a speech of 2001 at a time in which the April Understanding was suspended.[81] Nasrallah claims that 'there are no citizens [*madaniyin*] in the Zionist entity [as] all of them are aggressors and participants in the onslaught against the [Palestinian] people.'[82] Furthermore Ghorayeb quotes Hezbollah's high ranking member Husain al-Mūsawī saying that 'the Israeli soldier in Lebanon has a mission to expand occupation; the Israeli civilian in Israel is a confirmation of that occupation. They both serve one aim and both considered enemies'[83] thus confirming how Israelis are undifferentiated objectives for Hezbollah's military activity. It is then legitimate to conclude that, although Hezbollah applied the principle of non-combatant immunity, it did so *selectively* and not with regard to the Israelis who are considered an undistinguished group of enemies. With the July Agreement of 1993 but above all after the April Understanding of 1996, things changed. After then, admittedly, there were various occasions in which Hezbollah did target non-combatants in Israel as retaliation to Israeli actions targeting non-combatants in Lebanon, but this strategy of retaliation was based on a distinction

---

[79] Sheikh Yousef al-Qaradawi is a widely known Muslim scholar based in Qatar and popular for his religious television programme *Islam and Life*. *See* Gilles Kepel, *The War for Muslim Minds: Islam and the West* (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2004) p. 165.

[80] Kelsay, *Just War in Islam* p. 141.

[81] The Understanding was then resumed at the end of the July War when Nasrallah declared Hezbollah's commitment to the April Understanding as a condition for the ceasefire. In his own words: 'I naturally assert our commitment to the April Understanding, and we call on the enemy to abide by this understanding.' Nasrallah's speech on 12 August 2006 transmitted by Al-Manar, translation by Mideastwire.

[82] Hasan Nasrallah quoted in International Crisis Group (2002) 'Old Games, New Rules: Conflict on the Israel-Lebanon Border' (7; Washington: International Crisis Group: 18 November 2002). The word *madaniyin* would probably be better translated as 'civilians' in this context.

[83] Husain al-Mūsawī quoted in Saad-Ghorayeb, *Hizbullah* pp. 144-5.

between combatants and non-combatants within Israelis, which was previously absent in Hezbollah's military action.

The event of Qānā of 1996 and the high costs in civilians' lives of the war overall prompted a rethink. At this stage non-combatant immunity became influential in redefining the rules of the conflict and introduced the distinction between combatants and non-combatants with regard to Israeli population. Qānā was a tremendous shock for the local population and, notwithstanding the fact that Israel was responsible for the massacre, Hezbollah, with its fighters shooting in proximity of the UN compound, bear relevant responsibilities which did not pass unnoticed to the local population.[84]

The cost in human lives and, in particular, the human lives of innocent non-combatants became unacceptable under any principle from the point of view of international law or in a cost–benefit perspective. Self-restraint came, then, as a consequence to put an end to the use of civilian lives and deaths as the instrument of a cruel game on both sides. Under the pressure of international actors, eventually, the parties agreed on rules regulating the conflict contained in the April Understanding. The new rules were clearly drawing a distinction between combatants and non-combatants within Israel's population, changing the selective non-combatant immunity principle adopted by Hezbollah into an absolute non-combatant immunity principle. Rules decided on the basis of International Humanitarian Law prevailed over various interpretations of Islamic warfare. In commenting on the April Understanding on the 30 April 1996, Nasrallah, Secretary General of Hezbollah, declared that:

> Our second objective is the protection of civilians: before the July Understanding [the unwritten agreement of 1993] no one bothered about the Lebanese civilians - neither America, France, Russia, the European Union, the Arab League, or the United Nations. It was nobody's business; we never heard condemnations of civilian massacres in the south. The resistance used Katyushas in order to put

---

[84] Both Robert Fisk and Nicholas Blanford report that at the funeral and the commemoration of the victims of the massacre erupted between Amal and Hezbollah, probably related to the issues of responsibilities. Blanford, *Warriors of God* p. 177, Robert Fisk, *Pity the Nation: Lebanon at War* (3rd edn.; Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press, 2001) Chapter 18.

pressure on the Israelis, and tell them that when Lebanese civilians are in danger, your civilians will also be in danger.[85]

Hezbollah then moved from a view of the enemy in which all Israelis were potential targets to a concept in which a distinction between civilian and non-civilian became relevant.

Although the April Understanding imposed the absolute prohibition of targeting civilians,[86] Hezbollah's doctrine of the 'balance of terror' remained active in the sense that when Israel violated the Understanding by targeting Lebanese civilians, retaliatory action was implemented on a regular basis by Hezbollah. Violations of the April Understanding occurred, but until the Understanding was effective,[87] its rules significantly curbed hostile activities on both sides. According to Adir Waldman:

> While civilian casualties did continue in the wake of the April Agreement, the parameters of the conflict in southern Lebanon did in fact change under its operation. The parties to the Agreement understood that firing at civilians or firing from civilian areas was now outside of the code of accepted behavior and that there would be repercussions from such actions.[88]

What is relevant for the sake of this analysis is that, although the Understanding was violated on certain occasions by resuming 'the balance of terror' strategy, they nonetheless introduced a distinction between non-combatant and combatant that was previously absent in the case of Israeli targets. As Daniel Sobelman observes:

> The rules of the game which co-evolved between the sides defined the nature and the scope of the confrontation, containing and restraining the intensity of the conflict. Perhaps the most pivotal of all the rules of the game was the guiding principles calling for the exclusion of targeting civilians on both sides of the border.[89]

---

[85] Hasan Nasrallah, 'The April Understanding' in Nicholas Noe and Nicholas Blanford (eds.), *Voice of Hezbollah: The Statements of Sayed Hassan Nasrallah* (London ; New York: Verso, 2007) p. 154.

[86] Point 3 of the Understanding states that: 'the two parties commit to insuring that under no circumstances will civilians be target of attack and that civilian populated areas and industrial and electrical installations will not be used as launching grounds for attacks.'

[87] Waldman claims that the Understanding was eventually suspended indeterminately in February 2000 at the peak of renewed tensions between the parties. Waldman, *Arbitrating Armed Conflict* p. 101.

[88] Ibid., p. 4.

[89] Sobelman, 'Hizbollah from Terror to Resistance: Towards a National Defence Strategy' p. 54.

In a more general perspective, the practice of targeting civilians became more explicitly condemned by Hezbollah. For example, Hezbollah condemned the attacks against the Christian monks in Algeria (1996), tourists in Egypt (1997) [90] and the attacks on the 'Twin Towers' (but not the Pentagon, considered a military target) in 2001.[91]

This process of assimilation of an international norm within the activity of an Islamist movement can be interpreted as an indicator of its socialisation within international society. Hezbollah's warfare originally relied exclusively on Islamic premises but by interacting with international actors and on the basis of dramatic historical circumstances, the international norm of non-combatant immunity acquired importance introducing differentiation between combatants and non-combatants within the Israeli population.

6.7   Conclusions

The need to regulate the conflict with Israel in light of the disastrous events at Qānā and the human suffering that was imposed on the civilian population of Lebanon modified the principles of Hezbollah's hostile activity. With the April Understanding, Hezbollah's moral thinking on the rules of warfare shifted from a merely Islamist interpretation to an idea that combined the duty of *jihād* against Israel with the international normative distinction between combatants and non-combatants, until then not applied to Israelis.

This has some implications with regard to the considerations presented in Chapter 4 on person and community which anticipate part of the observations presented in Chapter 10.[92] The fact that international norms influenced the behaviour of an Islamist political actor is an indicator that Islamism is not as self-referential as it claims to be and signals a phase of socialisation in international society in which, by interacting with international political actors, international norms increasingly acquire a constitutive

---

[90] Saad-Ghorayeb, *Hizbullah* pp. 101-2.

[91] Robin Wright, 'Inside the Mind of Hezbollah', *Washington Post,* 16 July 2006.

[92] *See* Sections 10.2 and 10.3.

value for its political identity. The indeterminacy of Islamic principles of warfare (Section 6.5) leaves a margin of discretion that allows international norms to influence their interpretation, for example extending the definition of non-combatants to all persons, notwithstanding their religious or national affiliation. This is the sign of an increasing susceptibility of an Islamist actor to the influence of international norms and also an indicator of its progressive socialisation within the international normative framework.

Furthermore, this chapter has shown that although Hezbollah considered all Israelis as combatants, with the implementation of the April Understanding, Israeli non-combatants acquired the same moral value as other non-combatants and then became entitled to immunity from belligerent activity. This shift not only shows that an Islamist actor is indeed subject to the influence of international norms, but also its concept of person as strictly defined by communal affiliation is challenged. As Hugo Slim says:

> The civilian idea argues for what social psychologists call a 'super-ordinate identity' – a belief that all of us, no matter what side we are on, have a greater common identity as human beings than the particular identities that war bestows on us as 'enemies' or 'allies'. Belief in the idea of the civilian turns, therefore, on issues of personal identity and social relationship. It requires us to allow people a fundamental and vulnerable human identity that is not determined by their immediate relationship with politics, economics or social structure of war. Their human value transcends their social connections with the war.[93]

Slim captures well the importance of the recognition of persons as non-combatants which has been described in this chapter. With the extension of the category of non-combatant to include Israelis, Hezbollah has implicitly (and probably not entirely cognisant) acknowledged a moral value attached to their humanity that was absent before, when the Israelis were considered an undistinguished enemy.

This amounts to a change in the way Hezbollah looks at persons not only as members of a certain community as Muslims, Christians or Zionist Jews for example, but entails a recognition of their human status and consequently of their moral value independent from their contextual communal affiliation. As much as the idea of an isolated self-referential community is challenged by the events of 1996, the Islamist idea of person

---

[93] Hugo Slim, 'Why Protect Civilians? Innocence, Immunity and Enmity in War', *International Affairs,* 79/3 (2003), 481-501 at p. 483.

is altered in favour of an emerging concept of humanity in which the moral value of the person is independent from contextual and communal characterisation. As the following chapter shows, similar patterns of transition in Hezbollah's political identity can be traced with regards to other occasions in which it interacts with international norms.

Chapter 7

Hezbollah and Human Rights Legislation in the Lebanese Parliament

7.1   Introduction

Having looked at the first case which highlighted the dynamics of Hezbollah's interaction with IHL, this chapter analyses Hezbollah's approach to the legislative process in relation to human rights laws. In 1992, Hezbollah decided to take part in parliamentary politics in Lebanon after a lengthy discussion within its ranks regarding this decision and its effects on its political identity (Section 7.2). For this reason, it was necessary to rethink how an Islamist movement could have dealt with norms and institutions not founded on Islamic principles but rather inspired by liberal norms such as the sovereignty of a parliament elected by the Lebanese people. Even more problematic was the fact that the parliament could approve laws that may not have been Islamic in their inspiration and sometimes may even be in open conflict with Islamic principles.

Section 7.3 illustrates how Hezbollah makes decisions in this regard. What is interesting to notice is that its approach to law making allows for the adoption of legislation that is not Islamic and sometimes may contravene Islamic principles. In order to assess how international norms influence this process, this chapter looks at how legislation informed by human rights principles was addressed by the members of Hezbollah's delegation in the parliament.

Three patterns can be discerned. The first is the most common, and amounts to Hezbollah's neutrality towards human rights legislation. Having analysed about 50 laws concerned with human rights from 1992 to 2006, in almost all these cases Hezbollah does not raise issues of fundamental relevance against the approval of these laws in the Lebanese Parliament (Section 7.4).

The second pattern is a form of selectivity that sees Hezbollah active in supporting a solution for certain human rights issues (examples given here refer to detainees in Lebanon protestors' rights in Bahrain and the issue of the offensive movie against the Prophet of Islam). But this more proactive stance is noticeably limited to social groups

with which Hezbollah shares a particular sense of loyalty due to a common sectarian identity (Section 7.5).

Finally, there are issues in which the more conservative and Islamist outlook of the movement still prevails over the influence of international human rights principles. As Section 7.6 illustrates, this is the case particularly for those human rights laws which aim at reforming the conservative personal status law system of Lebanon and more generally in the Middle East. In this respect Hezbollah, along with the other Islamist factions of the parliament and in agreement with religious authorities, does not seem to be open to compromise.

On the basis of this analysis, the chapter then concludes that Hezbollah's integration in the Lebanese parliamentary system since 1992 increasingly exposed it to the influence of international norms (although mediated through national legislation) and facilitated its socialisation within the international normative system, in particular with regard to human rights legislation. As in the previous example with regard to non-combatant immunity, the self-referentiality of Islamism is strongly challenged and an Islamist political actor like Hezbollah is forced to revise aspects of its political identity to fit into the wider framework of norms and institutions of Lebanon, but also of the international human rights system.

7.2   Hezbollah's Participation in Parliament

The decision to take part fully in Lebanese politics came as a consequence of the new social and political circumstances emerging from the end of the civil war and the Ṭāʾif Agreement of 1989[1] and was the result of a heated debate within Hezbollah. There have been various interpretations from scholars about the nature of the debate and the internal dynamics of this discussion between various views within Hezbollah, and most

---

[1] The Ṭāʾif Agreement brought to an end the Lebanese civil war (1975–90). It modified the distribution of parliamentary seats between Christians and Muslims attributing half of these to the former and the other half to the latter. It also called for the progressive abolishment of the confessional system. Until when abolishment of the sectarian system is not accomplished, nonetheless, governments are required to be representative in their composition of all the Lebanese sects. The same agreement, maintained the distribution of powers at the executive level (a Christian president, a Sunni Prime Minister and a Shiʿī Chair of the Parliament) but gave more powers to the Prime Minister, thus reducing the capacity of the President.

accounts refer to an internal struggle between Hezbollah's factions but the subject remains the object of speculation. [2] What is relevant, however, is to notice the theoretical implications of this move.

The primary concern was how Hezbollah could retain its Islamic political values while interacting with norms and institutions that have foundations which are disconnected from Islam. It is not a coincidence that the movement experienced its first internal split in these circumstances with the departure of one of its most hard-line members, Subḥī al-Ṭufaylī, who became an outspoken critic of Hezbollah's post-1992 policies. [3] Qāsim reports that a commission of notables of Hezbollah was asked to discuss various questions in this respect. One of the fundamental issues was: 'would participation be considered a form of acquiescence to the political system's reality, including the responsibility of adopting and defending such a system and abandoning the Islamic vision?' Another question was: 'would participation lead to a reorganization of priorities of the type that would result in abandoning the cause of the resistance in favour of taking part in the internal political game?' [4]

Hezbollah was fully aware of the impact that integration within Lebanese politics may have had over its Islamic identity and consequently adopted measures to contain these effects. Eventually, the decision to take part in politics was granted by a *taḥkīm* (ruling) of the then *Walī al-Faqīh* Khamenei. [5]

A central concern in the debate was whether a political actor, whose legitimacy was derived from the interpretation of Islamic principles, can become part of a non-Islamic political system. The moral integrity of the movement could have been undermined by the secular nature of the state and by the malpractices diffused in its administration, such as its symptomatic corruption and its patron–client relations. To tackle this issue,

---

[2] The most informative accounts on the internal Hezbollah debate on participation in Lebanese politics can be found in Harik, *Hezbollah* pp. 47-62, Saad-Ghorayeb, *Hizbullah* pp. 47-58. Ranstorp, 'The Strategy and Tactics of Hizballah'.

[3] Hamzeh, *In the Path of Hizbullah* p. 111. The departure of al-Tufayli is also explained as being due to internal competition over leadership offices within the movement hierarchy. Saad-Ghorayeb, *Hizbullah* p. 47.

[4] Qassem, *Hizbullah* p. 314.

[5] Ibid., p. 320.

Hezbollah reconfigured its internal hierarchical structure, to which it added a Council of Parliamentary Activity (*Majlis al-ʿAml al-Nīābī*) distinguished from the Political Council (*Majlis al-Siyasī*) of the party.[6] The Council of Parliamentary Activity was subordinate to the Shūrā Council (*Majlis al-Shūrā*), the top decision-making assembly of the movement and which obeys the authority of the *Walī al-Faqīh*. Any decision taken by the Council of Parliamentary Activity is then under the scrutiny of an Islamic authority and the same, in turn, happens with the decisions of the members of Hezbollah's parliamentary delegation whose members are nominated by the Shūrā Council.[7] It is through this mechanism that Hezbollah tried to contain the effects of its inclusion in the parliament. Another measure of self-restraint to avoid contamination with Lebanese institutions was to limit participation only to the legislative activity not taking part in the government, at least until 2005.

Whether these adjustments were effective remains disputed. In fact, as we shall see in the following sections, Hezbollah's participation in parliamentary activity exposed it considerably to external influence. Ghorayeb argues that Hezbollah's participation in parliamentary politics represents a major shift in its relations with the Lebanese state. Until the Ṭāʾif Agreement of 1989, Hezbollah considered the state to be illegitimate in many respects. Among these, there was the hegemony of the Maronite community, its sectarian system and the ambiguous stance of the Maronite-led state towards Israel.[8] These points were made clear in the 1985 *Open Letter*, which defined the Lebanese state as 'rotten' and condemned it harshly as illegitimate.[9] More generally (as observed in Chapter 3) Islamist political theory does not recognise the legitimacy of institutions that are not entirely founded on Islamic principles and Lebanese institutions are not among these.

---

[6] Qāsim reports that 'the Council of Parliamentary Activity includes the party MPs, and follows up on the affairs of the Loyalty to the Resistance Bloc, and is concerned with the legal studies and the law proposals presented in the parliament'. Naʿem Qāsim, *Ḥizbu Allāh: Al-Manhaj, Al-Tajriba, Al-Mustqbal [Hezbollah: Method, Practice and Future]* (Beirut: Dar al-Hadi, 2004) p. 88. Author's translation.

[7] Hamzeh, *In the Path of Hizbullah* p. 68.

[8] Saad-Ghorayeb, *Hizbullah* p. 30.

[9] *See* Section 5.5 and Chapter 9.

Nonetheless, the Ṭāʾif Agreement established the possibility of the abolition of sectarianism, it revised the allocation of seats on confessional criteria in the parliament leading to equal distribution between Muslims and Christians and reduced the power of the President of the Republic in favour of the of the Prime Minister.[10] Despite the call for the disbandment of militias, Hezbollah was allowed to keep its arms, while Syria would keep its role of patron over the country on the basis of the Brotherhood Agreement signed in 1991.[11]

These new conditions lessened the friction between Hezbollah and the Lebanese institutional system and rendered political participation both an opportunity to matter politically and a necessity to cope with the regional and domestic changes determined by the end of the civil war.

7.3 Accommodation of Islamist Principles in Secular Law Making

If political opportunity and necessity explain Hezbollah's integration in the political system, a fundamental question remains. How can Hezbollah become part of a secular political system if Islamist political actors acknowledge legitimacy exclusively to Islamic institutions?

ʿAbdallah Balqazīz notes that Hezbollah's commitment to Islamic Shiʿī political theory clashes with participation in political institutions that are not legitimated by the authority of an imam. Further, he claims that this choice was informed by the circumstances in which Hezbollah was operating and by its 'sense of reality'.[12]

Joseph Alagha and Faḍīl Abū al-Naṣr observe that Hezbollah's participation in the legislative process marks a significant turn. Originally, Hezbollah did not consider

---

[10] The office of the President of the Republic is traditionally reserved for a Christian while the Prime Minister is always a Sunni Muslim.

[11] Traboulsi, *History of Modern Lebanon* pp. 240-6.

[12] ʿAbd al-Ilāh Balqazīz, *Ḥizb Allāh min al-Taḥrīr Ilá al-Radʿ, 1982-2006: Nuskhah Muwassaʿah li-Kitāb al-Muqāwamah wa-Taḥrīr Janūb Lubnān [Hezbollah from Liberation to Deterrence: 1982-2006]* (al-Ṭabʿah 1. edn.; Bayrūt: Markaz Dirāsāt al-Waḥdah al-ʿArabīyah, 2006) 45-8.

positive law[13] (*al-qanūn al-wadʿiya*) legitimate from an Islamic point of view.[14] But with its co-optation in the parliament, Hezbollah became inevitably enmeshed with the process of sanctioning laws which derive their legitimacy from the sovereignty of the parliament and not from the opinion of a religious jurist. According to Alagha:

> Hizbullah became satisfied with *al-qawānīn al-wadʿiyya* [positive laws] and even contributed to their legislation through its members of parliament. Hizbullah stressed that although the Qur'an, Sunna and the Shari'a are the sources and bases of legislation, some issues in life could be referred to other sources.[15]

Al-Naṣr investigates in more detail how Hezbollah tried to harmonise the approval of non-religiously mandated laws with its religious commitment. In his interview with Hezbollah's head of the parliamentary delegation Muḥammad Raʿad, this is clearly pointed out.[16] In case of inconsistencies between positive legislation and the juridical principles of Islam there is a methodology on which Hezbollah relies to make decisions in this regard. Raʿad describes this as follows:

> for this issue we rely on the following rules: as regards what is entirely in opposition to what is *haram* [prohibited] according to the *sharīʿa* (including its deductions) and what is against what is *halal* [permissible] in the *sharīʿa* (including its deductions and rectifications) and what falls within the field of the permissible; we strive to find the form that is more just according to our view of religion. We may face a project of law in which there is a big damage according to our view, and it may not be possible that we abrogate it on the basis of the rules of the democratic game if not throughout the presentation of another project of law which is less damaging and may not realize what is requested. All this is based on two rules:
>
> The first rule: Warding off the cause of evil (*darʾ al-mafsada*) takes precedence over bringing the general good (*al-maṣlaḥa*).
>
> The second rule: Comparing (*tazāḥum*) between the greater evil and the lesser evil.[17]

These principles establish the criteria used by Hezbollah to decide on the legislation presented in parliament. What is worth noting is that, aside from the limitations they

---

[13] Intended as legislation approved by a secular parliament.

[14] Faḍīl Abū al-Naṣr, *Ḥizbu Allāh: Ḥaqāʾiq wa-Abʿād [Hezbollah: Facts and Dimensions]* (Bayrūt: al-Sharikah al-ʿĀlamīyah lil-Kitāb, 2003), Joseph Alagha, ''Wilāyat Al Faqīh and Hizbullah's Relations with Iran', *Journal of Arabic and Islamic Studies, /*10 (2010 2010), 24-44.

[15] Alagha, 'Wilāyat Al Faqīh' p. 38.

[16] The parliamentary group to which Hezbollah's members are associated is the Loyalty to the Resistance Block (*Kutila Wafʿa al-Muqāuwama*).

[17] Abū al-Naṣr, *Ḥlzballāh* p. 132.

pose, they still allow for the implementation of legislation on the basis of considerations of opportunity and not only on a religious basis. As Raʿad acknowledges, the 'rules of the democratic game'[18] may compel the approval of legislation that is not Islamic. The role of Hezbollah in the parliament minimises the impact of even more anti-Islamic legislation.[19] Furthermore, he observes that 'the principle of jurisprudence (*faqihiyya*) on which we rely in our discussions of positive legislation allows for a wide margin of participation and influence'[20] thus admitting how the political identity of an Islamist movement does not clash necessarily with its inclusion in the parliamentary politics of a secular state.

A similar point was referred to the author in a conversation with a Hezbollah member who indicated how various aspects of positive legislation are substantially disconnected from Islamic jurisprudential tradition (his example referred to penal law) and, as such, Hezbollah takes decisions in this respect which are consistent with Islamic ethics but not dictated by it.[21] In an interview with the author, Hezbollah's MP ʿAlī Fayyāḍ[22] further expanded in this respect. Consistently with the principles indicated by Raʿad, Fayyāḍ suggested that two concepts of Shiʿī jurisprudence play a fundamental role in decision-making over legislation. The first is that of *al-maṣlaḥa al-ʿamma*, basically a principle of public interest,[23] the second concept is *tazāḥum*.[24] The latter is a sort of reflective

---

[18] Ibid.

[19] An important distinction needs to be appreciated between non-Islamic and anti-Islamic legislation. Non-Islamic legislation is not derived by Islamic sources and is not necessarily in opposition to Islamic principles, whereas anti-Islamic legislation is explicitly in breach of Islamic religious duties and principles.

[20] Abū al-Naṣr, *Ḥīzballāh* p. 127.

[21] 'Author's Interview with ʿAbd Al-Halīm Faḍlallah, Director of the Consultative Center for Study and Documentation', (Beirut, Lebanon: 19 September 2011).

[22] ʿAlī Fayyāḍ is a Member of Parliament and Member of Hezbollah elected for the first time in 2009. He is a scholar trained in social sciences and the former director of the Consultative Center for Studies and Documentation, an archive and research centre associated with Hezbollah. He is also the author of a study on the concept of authority in contemporary Shiite thought. 'Author's Interview with ʿAlī Fayyāḍ, Member of Parliament, Republic of Lebanon (Loyalty to the Resistance Block- Hezbollah)', (Beirut, Lebanon: 29 September 2011), ʿAlī Fayyāḍ, *Naẓarīyāt Al-Sulṭah fī al-Fikr al-Siyāsī al-Shīʿī al-Muʿāṣir [Conceptions of Authority in Contemporary Shiite Political Thought]* (Bayrūt: Markaz al-Ḥaḍārah li-Tanmiyat al-Fikr al-Islāmī, 2008).

[23] This concept is not exclusively Shiite but cuts across much of the Islamic and Islamist tradition. The reader will remember for example that the concept of *maṣlaḥa* is also central in Muhammad Abdu's theory. It was also mentioned with regard to decision-making in relation to the immunity of non-combatants in war in Chapter 6. For an analysis of this concept, its potential use as a source of reformation and its relation to the idea of human rights *see* David Johnston, 'Maqāṣid Al-Sharīʿa: Epistemology and Hermeneutics of Muslim Theologies of Human Rights', *Die Welt des Islams,* 47/2 (2007), 149-87 at p. 162.

assessment in which the jurisprudent, on one hand, weighs the effects of an action (in this case a law) in terms of public interest and, on the other hand, assesses to what extent this action infringes upon Islamic judicial principles. When the action greatly benefits the general interest, *tazāḥum* allows for the derogation of certain Islamic principles. This principle therefore allows for the approval of legislation that may be in contradiction with Islamic jurisprudence, but its approval avoids an even greater evil from an Islamic point of view.

Fayyāḍ provided an example in this regard looking at the case of a boy who is drowning. To save his life it is necessary to pass through the private house of a person. Islamic jurisprudence imposes the obligation of asking for authorisation from the owner of the house to access the property. Nonetheless, this would inevitably lead to the death of the boy. Here is where the principle of *tazāḥum* allows for an assessment of a situation from the point of view of public interest. Since public interest in this case (i.e. saving the life of a human being) greatly supersedes the importance of the Islamic principle requiring authorisation to enter the property of a person, then bypassing this principle is granted by the jurisprudent. This derogation suspends the validity of the principle of property in order to preserve the greater interest of saving the life of the boy. At the apex of this process of decision-making over legislation is Hezbollah's *Majlis al-Shūrā*. Asked whether the *Walī al-Faqīh* has a role in this process, Fayyāḍ declared that this happens very rarely and that he could not remember any example. He further pointed out that the authority of the *Walī al-Faqīh* is recognised as a religious reference (*marjʿa*) only by those believers who voluntarily submit to his authority.[25] Hezbollah harmonises its adherence to Islamic jurisprudence with its participation in the drafting of positive laws in a secular institution throughout this method of assessment, which allows them to cope with the tension between Islamic ethical principles and secular legislation.

---

[24] The word literally means 'mutual competition' and is also used in the second principle mentioned by Raʿad in the quotation above.

[25] 'Author's Interview with ʿAlī Fayyāḍ, Member of Parliament, Republic of Lebanon (Loyalty to the Resistance Block- Hezbollah)', (Beirut, Lebanon: 29 September 2011).

When asked about instances of legislation exemplifying this kind of tension, Fayyāḍ mentioned three cases. One referred to the regulation of banking in Lebanon (a key sector of the country's economy). This kind of legislation is in some cases inconsistent with Islamic principles[26] but such principles are reconsidered under the lenses of the benefit that non-Islamic legislation can bring to the public interest. On the basis of these considerations, an exception is made as regards the relevant Islamic principles in favour of the public interest principle. Another instance relates to the regulation of production, consumption and marketing of alcoholic products in Lebanon. Here the general interest is associated with the idea of preserving the 'social pluralism' of Lebanon, characterised by different attitudes towards the consumption of alcohol. Lebanon is a society characterised by 'social pluralism', so goes Fayyāḍ's argument, so Hezbollah tolerates an exception as regards permissive legislation on alcohol even though is not compliant with Islamic principles. The principle of respect of social pluralism is considered a 'general interest' and thus overrides the Islamic principle prohibiting alcoholic products. In another example, Fayyāḍ pointed out how gambling is a prohibited activity by Islamic ethics and, as such, when Hezbollah had to vote over the legislation regulating the activity of the *Casino du Liban* it voted against it but 'did not care'[27] about the outcome of the vote.[28] The fact that the parliament would have passed a law in contradiction with Islamic principles did not limit the possibility of Hezbollah continuing to be part of it.

Thus, Hezbollah does express preferences over legislation on the basis of Islamic principles and tries to limit the impact of legislation which it deems to be in contradiction with Islam. But the fact that such legislation can be approved by the parliament, notwithstanding its opposition, does not mean that Hezbollah cannot take part in its works. Either this legislation can still be beneficial in relation to the general well-being (*maṣlaḥa*), or the violation of certain Islamic principles can be neglected in light of the

---

[26] The most obvious case in this regard would be the fact that Islamic banking forbids the application of interest rates to loans etc.

[27] Quoting Fayyāḍ.

[28] 'Author's Interview with ʿAlī Fayyāḍ, Member of Parliament, Republic of Lebanon (Loyalty to the Resistance Block- Hezbollah)', (Beirut, Lebanon: 29 September 2011).

overall benefit which a law may bring. A more proactive stance opposing legislation that allegedly interferes with Islamic principles intervenes only on occasions in which the stakes are higher such as the reform of the personal status law or situations in which opposition to Israel is disputed.

Thus, considering the fact that Hezbollah developed a methodology that is partially receptive towards non-Islamic sanctioned principles, it is reasonable to expect that human rights legislation may not necessarily be problematic for Hezbollah's delegation in the Lebanese parliament.

7.4   Hezbollah and Human Rights Legislation: Neutrality

The analysis of the parliamentary debate related to the approval of human rights legislation shows that Hezbollah only rarely raise fundamental objections to the approval of human rights legislation. In fact, in most of the cases[29] its parliamentary delegation (the Loyalty to the Resistance Block) has been neutral towards this kind of legislation. Considering that Hezbollah's recognition of the legitimacy of parliamentary institutions in Lebanon already represents a significant change, it is even more remarkable to observe how its involvement in the legislative process of international norms for human rights does not raise major reasons of conflict.

In order to identify human rights legislation, the analysis focused on laws considered problematic by international human rights organisations. For example, the human rights reports and the Universal Periodic Review of the UN Human Rights Council[30] were sources for this selection. In addition to this, the analysis has also kept track of the approval of legislation relating to the ratification of international and regional human

---

[29] Out of the fifty laws analysed (*see* Appendix 3) only in rare cases has Hezbollah commented or objected to these laws which are directly derived from injunctions of international human rights bodies or treaties. *See* below for more details.

[30] It may be interesting to note how MP Fayyāḍ was part of the delegation that took part in the UN Universal Periodic Review of Lebanon. UN Human Rights Council 'Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review: Lebanon' (A/HRC/16/18: 12 January 2011). Other UNHRC reports considered are: UN Human Rights Council 'National Report: Lebanese Republic' (A/HRC/WG.6/9/LBN/1: 23 August 2010). UN Human Rights Council 'Summary Prepared by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights: Lebanon' (A/HRC/WG.6/9/LBN/3/Rev.1: 28 October 2010).

rights treaties and legislation whose human rights relevance has been highlighted by non-governmental organisations.[31]

The first stage of the analysis identified human rights legislation approved in the Lebanese assembly, going through *al-Jarīdat al-Rasmiyya* (*the Official Gazette*) which contains all the legislation approved by the parliament from 1992 to 2006.[32] Once a significant portion of this legislation was isolated,[33] the analysis focused on the parliamentary debate related to the approval, amendment or rejection of these laws in order to understand how Hezbollah's members acted in response to the parliamentary debate on legislation that was strictly related to human rights.

This latter stage of the analysis was problematic. Parliamentary proceedings are published in the *Maḥāḍir Jalasāt Majlis al-Nuwāb* (Proceedings of the Lebanese Parliament Sessions) but they are only partially accessible[34] and the voting procedures used in Parliament are not recorded in the proceedings if not in their final outcome. The assembly votes by raising hands, in spite of the fact that an electronic voting system is available. Once a law is voted, the chair of the parliament declares the approval or rejection of the law but no official count of the votes is recorded in the proceedings (apart from a few exceptions in the more recent records).[35]

---

[31] In addition to this, UNDP is engaged in a process of cooperation with the Lebanese Parliament which includes the publications of useful sources in this regard. In particular the author referred to: UNDP and Lebanese Parliament (General Directorare for Sessions and Committees) 'Al-Itifaqiyat Al Mubarama Bayna Lubnān wa Al Aṭrāf Al Duwaliya (1943-2006) [the Treaties Ratified between Lebanon and Foreign Counterparts (1943-2006)] ' (17; Beirut, UNDP and Lebanese Parliament (General Directorare for Sessions and Committees) 'Al-Tashrīʿa Fi Khamsat ʿashraʿāma [Legislation in Fifteen Years: October 1992-October 2006]' (19; Beirut . In selecting relevant human rights legislation, the author referred to the reports of the human rights treaty system and its specialised committees and in particular the CEDAW Committee, ICERD Committee, ICESCR Committee, CRC Committee. The full list of the reports can be found in the Reports Section of the Bibliography.

[32] The author also considered later issues regarding more recent legislation whenever it was relevant from a human rights point of view.

[33] Appendix 3 reports about 50 laws as relevant in this respect, the survey nonetheless claims to be only a representative sample not a complete overview.

[34] The author had access to the complete collection covering parliamentary sessions from 1992 to 2006 through the kind collaboration of a member of parliament who granted access to the Library of the Lebanese Parliament. Notwithstanding the common belief among Lebanese and also officials, parliamentary proceedings are publicly available and not subject to confidentiality or authorisation by authorities.

[35] On one occasion at least, MP Ghassan Moukhaiber asked the chair of the parliament Nabih Berri to adopt the use of electronic voting in the assembly, though the request did not seem to be successful. Republic of Lebanon (2004) 'Maḥāḍir Jalasāt Majlis Al-Nuwāb [Proceedings of the Session of the House of Representatives]' (Beirut: Government of Lebanon).

The deficiencies of these parliamentary procedures are a serious issue for democratic accountability, but do not affect entirely the possibility of monitoring the parliamentary activity on which this section relies. In most of the cases, if a draft law is problematic, MPs intervene in the debate sessions proposing amendments, abrogation, observations for the records or draft laws alternative to the law proposal in question. These interventions are recorded by name and then render the proceedings a source for monitoring parliamentary works. On the other hand, the fact that a law does not provoke discussion in the parliament is an indicator of the fact that the members of parliament fundamentally agree or are indifferent to its approval. Intervention in parliamentary debate is more common in cases in which the law has not been previously discussed in the parliamentary committees, although it is still possible to present observations in this case.[36]

The monitoring of human rights legislation with reference to Hezbollah contained in Appendix 3 shows that Hezbollah has almost never raised objections of a fundamental nature against the great majority of human rights legislation. From what is possible to observe, between 1992 and 2006, no objections criticising human rights as incompatible with Islam or as undermining the alleged traditional values of the Islamic community have been raised in opposition to the approval of legislation that was informed by human rights principles. The same applies to legislation ratifying international human rights treaties.[37] Out of about 50 human rights laws considered from 1992 to 2006 (and a few others at a later stage), Hezbollah intervened only occasionally and proposed somewhat technical comments rather than criticising the fundamental nature of the law itself.[38]

---

[36] In other cases (especially as regards the ratification of international treaties), the law proposal often contains the reports of the relevant committees in which the ratification law has been discussed and only rarely is further discussion held. The parliamentary committee transcripts are kept confidential apart from the final report drafted by the secretary of the committee, which is rather uninformative apart from essential information. As confirmed to the author by an officer of the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, the ratification of treaties in Lebanon is often a rather bland process over which not much parliamentary scrutiny applies, apart from occasions such as the CEDAW.

[37] As we shall see in the next two sections, critical stances of a kind emerged more recently in relation to rights of women.

[38] There are only a few exceptions to this, which are further illustrated below or are highlighted in Appendix 3.

Dalal El-Bizri points out that, even in the few occasions in which human rights legislation provoked criticism from Hezbollah, such criticism was rather bland. She mentions two examples in addition to the ones considered in Appendix 3. The first[39] relates to a law introducing a compulsory medical certificate as a precondition to marriage; against this, Hezbollah MP ʿAlī ʿAmmār argues that: 'Civilian authorities do not have any role in marriage affairs in Lebanon' and that: 'for Shiites this question is of competence of the man of religion.' The second example[40] refers to a law that gives the possibility to women to start businesses without the consent of the husband. Despite initial criticism, el-Bizri then reports that Hezbollah's position ends up being favourable to the law as she quotes Muḥammad Fnaysh[41] saying that the law will be accepted on 'the condition that it will not be in contradiction with the personal status law.'[42] As further discussed in Section 7.6, the question of personal status law is central for Hezbollah as for all the other political forces and constitutes the only example in which human rights legislation raised some issues.

Let us consider a few other examples which further corroborate the thesis of Hezbollah's neutrality towards human rights legislation. As regards a proposed law concerning the prohibition and limitation of labour for minors, Fnaysh observed that the law did not contain certain specifications regarding the kind of work that can be done by minors. To this observation, the reply stated that the said specifications were agreed upon by the ministry of labour and eventually the law passed with the majority of the votes in the parliament.[43]

Similarly, Fnaysh also intervenes over a matter of administrative nature in the debate of the law establishing a National Committee for Lebanese Women commenting on who

---

[39] Law 334 of 1994.

[40] Law 380 of 1994.

[41] Muḥammad Fnaysh is a Hezbollah MP trained in social sciences and economics who became a Minister in 2005 and was the first member of Hezbollah to become a member of the executive.

[42] Dalal el-Bizri, *Islamistes, Parlementaires et Libanais Les Interventions À L'assemblée Des Élus De La Jama'a Islamiyya et Du Hizb Allah (1992-1996) [Publié Par Le Centre D'études et De Recherches Sur Le Moyen-Orient Contemporain]* (Beyrouth Paris: Centre d'études et de recherches sur le Moyen-Orient contemporain, 1999) p. 15.

[43] Law 536 of 1996. Republic of Lebanon (1996) 'Maḥāḍir Jalasāt Majlis Al-Nuwāb [Proceedings of the Session of the House of Representatives]' (Beirut: Government of Lebanon). *See* Appendix 3.

should establish the wage of its administrative staff. The concern relates to how the wages of its administrative members should be decided and, once the request to abrogate this article was approved, the law is passed by majority vote.[44] On another occasion, Ibrahīm al-Sayyd asked for clarifications as regards the specification of the minimum working age in another law project regarding the prohibition of child labour.[45] Hezbollah MP ʿAbdullah Qasir intervened in the debate on the amendments of the penal procedural code proposing some changes related to the validity period of indictment after arrest.[46] Law 463 of 2002, introducing the reduction of penalties for minor crimes and on the basis of good conduct is widely debated in its details. Hezbollah intervenes with Raʿad in the debate who declares the endorsement of the law as it was drafted by the government. Subsequently Fnaysh intervenes in an attempt to mediate between different views over the wording of an article of the law proposal relating to the selling of drugs.[47]

The analysis of a significant part of the human rights legislation approved in the parliament allows us to conclude that Hezbollah's parliamentary delegation over the years has not raised prejudicial objections to the approval of this legislation amounting to a blanket denial of its legitimacy.[48] Notwithstanding the wide-ranging issues over which this legislation touches upon, including the equal treatment of women in terms of social and economic rights, the prohibition of child labour exploitation, the provision of services and facilities for disabled persons, the reform of the penal procedure code and the ratification of a number of international and regional treaties directly and indirectly connected to human rights, in none of these cases has Hezbollah presented any of the arguments common to Islamist movements even though this legislation originated primarily from principles of human rights ethics and not from Islamic jurisprudence.

---

[44] Law 720 of 1998. Republic of Lebanon (1998) 'Maḥāḍir Jalasāt Majlis Al-Nuwāb [Proceedings of the Session of the House of Representatives]' (Beirut: Government of Lebanon). *See* Appendix 3.

[45] Law 91 of 1999. Republic of Lebanon (1999) 'Maḥāḍir Jalasāt Majlis Al-Nuwāb [Proceedings of the Session of the House of Representatives]' (Beirut: Government of Lebanon). *See* Appendix 3.

[46] Law 349 of 2001. Republic of Lebanon (2001) 'Maḥāḍir Jalasāt Majlis Al-Nuwāb [Proceedings of the Session of the House of Representatives]' (Beirut: Government of Lebanon). *See* Appendix 3.

[47] Law 463 of 2002. Republic of Lebanon (2002) 'Maḥāḍir Jalasāt Majlis Al-Nuwāb [Proceedings of the Session of the House of Representatives]' (Beirut: Governemnt of Lebanon). *See* Appendix 3.

[48] An exception to this, about which more below, is the case of certain women's rights. Another interesting case is Hezbollah's objection to the ratification of the International Treaty to Ban Cluster Munitions (law 127 of 2010).

Three concurrent explanations help us understand this phenomenon. First, it is reasonable to assume that Hezbollah's neutrality towards this legislation can be explained as a result of the principles and methodology that have been mentioned by Raʿad and Fayyāḍ such as *maṣlaḥa* and *tazāḥum*. Regardless of the fact that it is non-Islamic legislation and originates primarily from the principles of international human rights ethics, most of it does not seem to raise concerns from an Islamic point of view with regard to its compatibility with Islamic ethics. Hezbollah's neutrality has also been facilitated by two other factors: its overall low profile in the parliament, and the fact that its Islamist character is not prominent in the way it operates in parliament, although it is strong in other respects such as opposition to Israel and criticism towards regional and global politics.

Hezbollah's Loyalty to the Resistance Block kept a low profile, in the sense that it limited itself to echoing the fundamental stances of the movement, especially in relation to resistance and opposition to Israel as the central aspects of its parliamentary participation. Raʿad assessed the activity of Hezbollah's delegation as follows:

> Its performance is acceptable and reasonable, but we did not attain the exemplary level to which we aspire as if we were 'swimming against the flow'. Despite this, the Loyalty [to the Resistance] Block achieved a number of positive results at the best of its capacity. Even though the party cannot give concrete form to its views in the laws [related to the public well-being], it can play an obstructive role for law projects informed by private interests.[49]

He describes primarily an oppositional role in the parliament where Hezbollah is mainly acting as the voice of dissent over legislation it deems unacceptable. This leads to the fact that no active initiative to promote an Islamist political agenda has ever emerged prominently in Hezbollah's parliamentary activity. The Islamist character of its parliamentary policy is more apparent, although barely detectable, in the refusal of legislation that is deemed to openly challenge the authority of religious institutions, as will be seen in Section 7.6.

However, the methodology described in the previous section leaves a wide margin of discretion for Hezbollah to adopt or not oppose legislation that is also human rights

---

[49] Interview to Muḥammad Raʿad in Abū al-Naṣr, *Ḥizballāh* p. 131.

legislation. Nonetheless, no draft laws or reform projects restructuring the institutional architecture of the Lebanese state in an Islamist sense, for example promoting *sharīʿa*, forms of theocracy such as the *Wilāyat al-Faqīh,* have ever been advanced.

The harshest political stance of Hezbollah in parliament relates to the opposition to Israel, the denunciation of international interference in Lebanese political affairs, and the condemnation of corruption, patron–client social relations and uneven economic development of the country. Also in these cases, as el-Bizri confirms, the Islamic character of Hezbollah can barely be traced in its parliamentary discourse. On the basis of monitoring Hezbollah's parliamentary activity between 1992 and 1996 compared with the activity of the *Jamaʿa Islāmiyya* (the Lebanese branch of the Muslim Brotherhood), el-Bizri notes 'how few are the references to Islam in general, the absence of stances based on the *sharīʿa* and the omission of the *basmala* (the formula that has to be pronounced by believers before starting to speak) in the discourse of Islamist deputies.'[50]According to el-Bizri, the Islamist character emerges more prominently in the political discourse of the Sunni *Jamaʿa Islāmiyya* rather than in the case of Hezbollah.[51]

The final aspect explaining Hezbollah's neutrality towards human rights is that the Lebanese parliament tends to deal with legislation addressing only part of the actual human rights agenda of the country and avoids the most controversial issues. The legislation that reaches the stage of parliamentary discussion is primarily legislation that does not produce political tensions.

Potentially controversial problems such as the rights of the thousands of Lebanese disappeared during the civil war,[52] the reform of personal status laws and crucial aspects related to rights of women have not been on the parliamentary agenda (apart from minor exceptions) in the time frame under analysis. Further, the approval of the

---

[50] el-Bizri, *Islamistes, Parlementaires et Libanais* p. 15. Author's translation.

[51] Ibid., p. 17.

[52] In an interview, the journalist and criminal law expert ʿUmār Nashabe claimed that Hezbollah tends to neglect the issue of disappeared persons in Lebanon so as not to embarrass its concurrent Shiʿī party Amal, the involvement of which in the civil war events easily raise the suspect of possible responsibilities. 'Author's Interview with ʿUmar Nashābe, Al-Akhbār Newspaper', (Beirut, Lebanon: 9 September 2011).

Convention for the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) has been ratified with the vote of the parliament, and its ratification occurred with major reservations, for example as regards the possibility for women to pass their nationality to their children. This has likely eased Hezbollah's attitude towards human rights legislation as in the case of all the other parliamentary groups.

Overall it has maintained a neutral approach, fundamentally acquiescent towards most of this legislation. The most accredited hypothesis explaining Hezbollah's approach to law making leaves open the possibility for the approval of legislation that is not Islamic but is also not in opposition to Islamic principles; a significant part of the human rights legislation that has been debated in the Lebanese parliament seems to be compatible with this approach.

7.5 The Question of Rights of Detainees: Instances of Proactive Selectivity

Among the most prominent issues addressed in the human rights debate in the Lebanese parliament is the condition of detainees in prisons.[53] The conditions for inmates caused criticism from international organisations but, above all, prompted severe protests within prisons including mutinies and hunger strikes by inmates, which have drawn the attention of MPs over this issue.

The case is interesting because it represents an instance in which Hezbollah shifted from a neutralist stance, as described in the previous section, towards a proactive stance, actively supporting the implementation of certain human rights principles to guarantee the human rights of detainees. This includes for example promoting certain legislation and engaging with the works of the Human Rights Committee of the Lebanese Parliament. Indeed the issue has been repeatedly addressed by the

---

[53] One of the central issues is the prison of Rūmīa, the biggest detention centre in the country.

Committee[54] and Hezbollah took part regularly with high-profile members such as Nawāf al-Mūsawī and Fnaysh.

The question of the conditions of detained persons was of central concern for the Committee at least from 2010, but also prior to then, and the parliament has passed laws reducing penalties or granting amnesties often 'justified' on the basis of the poor conditions of detention.[55] On various occasions, the Minister of Justice and the Minister of Interior were summoned by the Committee to discuss the situation of Lebanese jails. More recently, Lebanon has joined the Convention against Torture and later its related Optional Protocol[56] on the basis of which an international committee has visited detention facilities for assessment.[57] It is difficult to establish how the issue of prisons became so prominent in a political agenda crammed with several other human rights issues. Among the relevant factors certainly there are the protests of inmates themselves and the fact that the issue can be addressed without disruptive consequences in political terms.[58] As the Rapporteur of the Parliamentary Human Rights Committee declared to the author, inmates and their relatives have been 'particularly efficient in making their voice heard.'[59]

What is of interest in this case is the fact that Hezbollah has been particularly vociferous on this issue, which is another factor that facilitated its mainstreaming in the political debate. Hezbollah's parliamentary delegates were always present at the

---

[54] According to the records available, the Committee discussed the issue of prisons at least on nine occasions in 2010 and 2011. This parliamentary committee was founded in 1995 and deals specifically with human rights issues often in conjunction with the government and in some cases with civil society organisations.

[55] See for example UN Committee on the Rights of the Child 'Second Periodic Reports of the States Parties Due in 1998: Lebanon' (CRC/C/70/Add.8 26 September 2000).

[56] Ratification through Law 185 of 2000, the Optional Protocol establishment of the convention was ratified by Law 28 in 2008.

[57] The content of the report remains confidential as established by the rules of the convention; acceptance of this special procedure remains an indicator of the importance of the situation from a human rights perspective.

[58] In a conversation with MP Ghassan Moukhaiber, Rapporteur of the Human Rights Committee, he pointed out how the issue became relevant from the point of view of democratic accountability but also in terms of relations among Christian political groups and Muslims, where the Christians benefitted from amnesties previously.'Author's Interview with Ghassān Mukhaīber, Member of Parliament, Republic of Lebanon', (Beirut, Lebanon: 14 September 2011).

[59] Ibid.

sessions dedicated to this topic[60] and, as mentioned above, legislation about the reform of the penal code drew the attention of Hezbollah's MPs on more than one occasion. Its commitment to this specific human rights issue becomes evident if we look at the records of the Human Rights Parliamentary Committee. For example, MP Nawār al-Sahilī, a member of Hezbollah and member of the committee, released a declaration for the records over the urgency of this matter. The declaration came in correspondence with the calling for a hunger strike by the detainees of the largest Lebanese detention centre in Rūmīa.[61]

> We will call for the solution of this issue, and we hope for the application of Article 108 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, so that there is a release of as much as possible detainees held for minor felonies. With regard to the question of those detained for crimes, some of the judges are worried about the fact that they may not return [if released] to the trial. Therefore, the prisoners who apply for release from jail they need to know that there is an on-going trial and that they will need to return to the court. As regards the issue of prison overcrowding, what we can do is to put the judiciary at work and begin to discharge detainees for minor felonies and those detained for more than two or three years. [62]

Al-Sāhilī points out the urgency of the matter using the human rights committee and indeed human rights principles as the platform for his appeal. He calls for the application of the penal procedures of detention with reference to Article 108 of the Code of Penal Procedure. This article establishes that pre-trial detention can be protracted for a maximum of one year under specific circumstances,[63] after this period any detained person who has not being tried shall be released. Many of the detainees in prison[64] are held in breach of this law and its application would also be favourable for the issue of overcrowding which is among the most pressing problems.

---

[60] Reports of the sessions of the Human Rights Parliamentary Committee can be found on the website of the Lebanese Parliament. The actual content of the committees' meetings are kept confidential. Parliamentary Human Rights Committee (Parliament of Lebanon), 'Reports of the Parliamentary Committee on Human Rights', <http://www.lp.gov.lb/NodesAr.Aspx?id=3794>, accessed 1 December 2011.

[61] At the time of writing the situation is far from being solved. Political mobilisation in this respect is high and the families of detainees have taken their protests to the street on several occasions.

[62] Parliamentary Human Rights Committee (Parliament of Lebanon), 'Report of the Parliamentary Human Rights Committee on 10 May 2011', <http://www.lp.gov.lb/NewsPage3Ar.Aspx?id=8081>, accessed 1 December 2011..

[63] For example, in cases of serious crimes such as terrorism or homicide.

[64] Official statistics are difficult to access in this regard, but we are in the order of thousands of persons with a significant percentage of juveniles.

It remains to be understood which factors shifted the policy of neutrality towards this proactive stance adopted specifically with reference to the rights of detainees. First of all, a genuine interest in the protection of the rights of persons under investigation or detained in conditions that do not respect standards of human dignity shall not be excluded. Hezbollah has often been involved in the issue of prisoners of wars and their detention on various occasions and this might have created a particular sensitivity in this respect.

Answering a question regarding this, Fayyāḍ made the point that the issue is given importance by Hezbollah as a matter of justice. According to Fayyāḍ, 'the suffering of people in the Lebanese prisons is a real disaster and we [Hezbollah] regret this.'[65] A genuine moral commitment relating to the minimisation of suffering of persons is a factor that, at least nominally, explains this phenomenon. But Hezbollah's proactive stance as regards the rights of prisoners is also related to other aspects. As sources confirm, the great majority of persons detained in Rūmīa are young males primarily from the area of the Biqʿa, and thus Shiʿites.[66] One of the reasons for this is that Biqʿa is the centre of production of drugs such as hashish. It consequently became a centre of criminality in which the rule of law is barely existent and to which many poor and unemployed young individuals resort to alleviate their critical social and economic situation. This explains why prisons like Rūmīa are populated by a majority of Shiʿites and gives some explanation for Hezbollah's proactive stance regarding detainees' rights.

Hezbollah perceives a particularly close connection with its Shiʿī constituency, a factor confirmed by Fayyāḍ, who said that Hezbollah has a responsibility to represent its

---

[65] 'Author's Interview with ʿAlī Fayyāḍ, Member of Parliament, Republic of Lebanon (Loyalty to the Resistance Block- Hezbollah)', (Beirut, Lebanon: 29 September 2011).

[66] This aspect has been mentioned to the author by different sources including an officer of the UNOHCHR, a member of parliament and a journalist. None of them was in a position to release official statistics on the sectarian or regional affiliation of inmates as they all think these are sensible data, as it is often the case in Lebanon with demographic and statistical data. 'Author's Interview with Ghassān Mukhaīber, Member of Parliament, Republic of Lebanon', (Beirut, Lebanon: 14 September 2011), 'Author's Interview with Lana Baidas, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Lebanon', (Beirut, Lebanon: 12 September 2011).

Biqᶜa constituency in the parliament.[67] In addition to the neutral stance that interests the majority of human rights legislation, there are signs of more proactive policies towards issues in which human rights principles converge with ideological principles and sectarian loyalties. The case of prisoners' rights is clearly indicative of this. On the issue of prisoners there is a convergence of factors that are a genuine moral concern for the minimisation of suffering, Hezbollah's sectarian loyalty[68] and its commitment to issues of social concern. Framing this matter within the human rights discourse is a way for Hezbollah to gather more political consensus nationally.

Analogous cases of selectivity can be mentioned with respect to the rights of Bahrainis (who are in majority Shiᶜites) to protest during the 2011 events in the region. In various circumstances, Hezbollah voiced solidarity with the cause of the Bahraini protesters. To mention one, Hezbollah protested against the measures adopted by the regime against female protestors. Amnesty International equally voiced concerns over ill-treatment and torture in the same circumstances.[69] Hezbollah declared that: 'these kinds of abusive practices resemble the American terrorist practices in Guantanamo and Abu Ghraib, they are subject of condemnation from all the living forces, entrusted with conscience and liberals all over the world.'[70] The selectivity of this stance can be easily noticed if we consider that the repression of Bahraini protestors was taking place at the same time in which the regime of Bashār al-Asad was violently repressing anti-regime protests in Syria. Whereas Hezbollah condemned repression of Bahrainis by their own

---

[67] This aspect is indeed consistent with the principles seen in Chapter 6 with regard to non-combatants' immunity, and which attached a special moral value to the security of persons on the basis of their religious affiliations. 'Author's Interview with ᶜAlī Fayyāḍ, Member of Parliament, Republic of Lebanon (Loyalty to the Resistance Block- Hezbollah)', (Beirut, Lebanon: 29 September 2011).

[68] Obviously Hezbollah is not the only political actor whose politics rely on sectarian loyalty since this is common to the entire Lebanese political system.

[69] Amnesty International, 'Torture Fears for Bahraini Women and Girls in Detention', <http://www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-updates/torture-fears-bahraini-women-and-girls-detention-2011-09-26>, accessed 8 July 2012.

[70]'Hezbollah Press Statement 29th of September 2011 ', <http://ar.moqawama.org/essaydetails.php?eid=21898&cid=199>, accessed 29 September 2011. Similarly, in its 2009 Political Manifesto Hezbollah mentions again the cases of Guantanamo and Abu Ghraib as human rights violations.

regime, they nonetheless voiced support for al-Asad's regime despite its violent repressive measures.[71]

More recently, Hezbollah has (for the first time, to the knowledge of the author) referred to the concept of human rights (*huqūq al-insān*) thus marking a further step in the assimilation of these norms in its political vocabulary in of its declaration. In September 2012, a film released on the internet with offensive content towards the figure of the Prophet Muḥammad sparked a wave of violent protests in the Arab world. In this respect, Hezbollah released the following declaration, claiming that this film: 'is an immoral action which represents the highest grade of aggression of the most important right among human rights, that is the respect for religious belief, sanctity not to mention religious feelings.' [72]

The movement furthermore calls on the United Nations to issue laws prohibiting these offensive actions: 'The UN today is bound to issue laws that condemn this kind of actions in a way similar to the laws that prohibit anti-Semitism.'[73] The declaration further confirms Hezbollah's approach to human rights and its proactive stance towards these norms under certain favourable circumstances.

In certain scenarios then, the neutral stance of Hezbollah towards human rights shifts towards a form of proactive selectivity as in the cases of detainees, Bahrainis and the offences against religious sensibility. As seen in the previous chapter, a selective approach to certain norms is not new for Hezbollah. For political issues, which are important on the basis of sectarian loyalty or ideological commitments, the language of rights is used by Hezbollah in order to favour the political legitimacy of the movement and its actions.

---

[71] For example see Nasrallah interview to al-Manār in 2011 'We are not for toppling an opposition and resistance regime which is ready for reforms and which has begun reforms.' At a later stage also in the case of Syria Hezbollah seemed to adopt more critical positions against the violence of the conflict. Sayyid Ḥasan Naṣrallah, 'Speech on Al-Manar Channel', (Mideastwire.com, 2011: 31 October 2011).

[72] Hezbollah, 'Ḥizb Allah Iudīj Film min Intāj Amirkiy Iasī Lirasūl Allah Muḥammad (Ṣ) [Hezbollah Condemns US Produced Film as Offending the Prophet Muhammad (Pbu)]', <http://www.moqawama.org/essaydetails.php?eid=26390&cid=199>, accessed 14 September 2012.. Author's Translation.

[73] Ibid.

7.6   Personal Status Law and the Claims of Religious Authenticity

If the concurrency of political and human rights interests can produce a selectively proactive policy towards human rights, Hezbollah's generally neutral stance towards human rights reforms can also shift into criticism when human rights are perceived as undermining values and principles that Hezbollah considers fundamental and on which it does not seem to accept compromises. Among these, there is the protection of religious authority in the regulation of family affairs which is institutionalised in Lebanon as in the rest of the Arab world with the personal status law system.[74] This seems to be the case of the debate over the rights of women and the related penal legislation in Lebanon, which were opposed in 2011 on the basis of legal technicalities but also relied on a classical Islamist claim of authenticity. Although Hezbollah does not seem to have particular reservations over the extension of social and economic rights to women,[75] the situation is more complicated when the protection of women's rights interferes with aspects of personal status law, which is *sharīʿa* based and is often conservatively interpreted by religious scholars.

Article 562 of the Lebanese Penal Code is particularly problematic in this respect.[76] This article states that a non-premeditated act of violence against a woman who is caught in adultery or in some kind of extramarital intercourse can benefit from mitigating circumstances in its penal condemnation.[77] The article condones the so-called ''honour crimes' that are acts of violence 'justified' as reactions to the offence of the honour of

---

[74] *Al-qanūn al-aḥūal al-shakhsiya*, the personal status law system is a legal device that was introduced in the colonial period in the Arab world and delegates the legal regulation of private life relations such as wedding, divorce, inheritance, adoption, alimony and others to the religious authorities. Lebanon recognises eighteen different religious groups among various Muslim, Christian and Druze traditions. For each of these there is a different legal code and authority. For the Shiʿī community the highest religious authority is the Higher Shiite Council whereas the Sunni authority is represented by Dar al-Fatwa, personal status law for the Shiʿites is administered by the *Jaʿafarī* Courts.

[75] This seems evident looking at the numerous laws on labour rights which were approved between 1992 and 2006 against which Hezbollah did not raise particular concerns.

[76] This article for the Lebanese Penal Code originates from the French Penal Code of the 19th century, introduced in the Middle East during the Ottoman modernisation and subsequently reproduced during the French Mandate Period. *See* Rafif Rida Sidawi and Amira Abou Mrad Danielle Hoyek, 'Murders of Women in Lebanon: 'Crimes of Honour' between Reality and the Law' in Lynn Welchman and Sara Hossain (eds.), *"Honour": Crimes, Paradigms, and Violence against Women* (London ; New York: Zed Books, 2005) p.111-6.

[77] The article was slightly amended in 1999 and goes as follow: 'Whosoever surprises his spouse or one of his ascendants or his sister in a crime of observed adultery, or in situation of unlawful intercourse, and kills or injures one of them without deliberation shall benefit from the excuse of mitigation.' Translated in ibid., p. 117-8. Emph. Add.

the family.[78] This kind of legislation has been the target of human rights organisations but also of international human rights monitoring institutions.[79] A draft law for the abrogation of article 562 was proposed in parliament and approved in 2011. Its abolition was connected to a wider campaign in which civil society organisations were promoting the abolition of reservations on CEDAW, and the approval of a draft law for the protection of women against family violence (of which more below).[80]

In the parliamentary debate,[81] members of both Sunni and Shiʿī parties found an unprecedented common ground in opposing the proposal to abolish article 562. The draft law was discussed as the last item of the session, and MP Buṭros Ḥarb (a member of *Tayyār al-Mustaqbal*)[82] began the debate complaining sarcastically that the consideration of this law at the late stage of the session would have been a violation of the rights of the members of parliament. This was an indicator of how the Sunni component of the March 14 coalition would have opposed the law, thus opposition to this law was far from being exclusively Hezbollah's prerogative. Another member of *Mustaqbal*, MP Samīr al-Jisr, declared that he was opposing the abrogation of Article 562, then followed by Imād al-Hut a member of the *Jamʿat Islāmiyya* (the Lebanese branch of the Muslim Brotherhood) who declared that article 562 does not refer to 'honour killing' but introduces mitigating circumstances for non-premeditated crimes, and therefore should not be abolished.

On the other hand, the proponents of the law were claiming that Article 562 cannot exist in the twenty-first century, condoning what *de facto* is honour crime and that

---

[78] An offence against the honour of the family would be for sexual intercourse outside of a marriage, adultery and similar.

[79] The 2008 CEDAW report explicitly refers to this article and other articles of the Penal Code as problematic. *See* Para. 26 of UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women 'Concluding Comments of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women ' (CEDAW/C/LBN/CO/3: 8 April 2008).

[80] the law proposal is available online on the website of the human rights organisation Kafa. *See* Kafa, 'Legislative Campaign for the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence', <http://www.kafa.org.lb/FOA.aspx?code=1&Dcode=13&title=The%20law%20to%20Protect%20Women%20from%20Family%20Violence>, accessed 7 November 2011.

[81] The official proceedings of this session were not available at this stage, but a report of the session was published on the website of the Lebanese Parliament. Parliament of Lebanon, 'Legislative Session of the Lebanese Parliament 4th of August 2011', <http://www.lp.gov.lb/NewsPage3Ar.Aspx?id=8313>, accessed 30 November 2011.

[82] Al-Mustaqbal is the political formation mostly composed by Sunni and led by Saʿad al-Ḥarīrī in sharp opposition to the March 8 coalition comprising Hezbollah, Amal and the Free Patriotic Movement.

failing to abrogate it would have brought Lebanon back to the Middle Ages. Eventually Hezbollah's MP Fayyāḍ declared opposition to the abrogative law proposal and asked for its referral to the competent committee. Notwithstanding the opposition, the law was eventually passed with a majority, thus abolishing Article 562. Fayyāḍ maintained that there is a difference between premeditated violence and non-premeditated violence and such difference should be reflected in the penal code. He defended the idea that the two situations deserve different legal considerations from a penal point of view and, for this reason Hezbollah opposed the abrogation of 562. His explanation, then, did not refer to Islamic principles but rather reflected concerns over the dimension of crime intentionality.[83] He also pointed out that on other occasions Hezbollah opposed, customary forms of violence, for example the practice of vendetta in the more traditional sectors of Lebanese society, a fact that is also reported by Hamzeh.[84]

This seems to indicate that Hezbollah's members do not defend an unqualified form of traditionalism (according to which any practice that has been carried out in the past deserves to be protected from change); but rather aim at preserving values that are considered specifically Islamic according to its interpretation.[85] Fayyāḍ defended the idea of a form of 'specificity' of the local ethical traditions to which it should be given priority over external ethical claims such as human rights. In a wider perspective, he clarified that legal questions related to marriage, divorce, custody of children and alimony are all within the religious sphere of jurisdiction with which no other ethical traditions should interfere.[86]

Whereas his explanation for opposing the abrogation of article 562 was merely of a technical character and did not invoke any Islamic principle, personal status law remains a limit against which Hezbollah does not intend to go in terms of political

---

[83] 'Author's Interview with ʿAlī Fayyāḍ, Member of Parliament, Republic of Lebanon (Loyalty to the Resistance Block- Hezbollah)', (Beirut, Lebanon: 29 September 2011).

[84] Hamzeh, *In the Path of Hizbullah* pp. 100-8.

[85] Another important example in this regard is the practice of self-inflicted pain in the celebration of ʿAshūrāʾ. Traditionally this rite consists of processions of persons cutting themselves to bleed and committing acts of self-harm. These actions have been condemned by Hezbollah and also by Faḍlallah as non-Islamic.

[86] 'Author's Interview with ʿAlī Fayyāḍ, Member of Parliament, Republic of Lebanon (Loyalty to the Resistance Block- Hezbollah)', (Beirut, Lebanon: 29 September 2011).

reform, a stance that is common to the other religious communities in the country.[87] The principles of *maṣlaḥa* or *tazāḥum* or the margin of negotiability of certain aspects of Islamic jurisprudence find an insurmountable obstacle when it comes to the regulation of private relations among persons within the religious community.

Another case confirming this issue is related to the proposal of a law criminalising domestic violence and discussed in a joint meeting between *Dār al-Fatwā*[88] and Deputy Secretary-General of Hezbollah Sheikh Qāsim. The delegation addressed a law proposal aiming at criminally penalising domestic violence, including marital rape thus filling a major legal loophole in the Lebanese system. The draft law was proposed by a coalition of human rights organisations, approved by decree in 2010 by the government and then passed to the parliament for approval.[89] This campaign and its related law proposal raised criticism of Hezbollah's leadership. The declaration of Qāsim at the meeting with *Dār al-Fatwā* relies on two lines of argument. The first is that domestic violence against children and women is an issue which needs to be urgently and efficiently addressed judicially. According to Qāsim:

> It is necessary that we deal with the problems that afflict the family and especially women and children, and we shall not close our eyes to these, and it is necessary that we find solutions that can guarantee for the two following principles: respect for the rights of women and children within the family, non-use of violence within the family, protect the privacy of the conjugal life from external interferences, the quicker implementation of the legal provisions of the *sharīʿa*, and not to slow down the tribunals in dealing with the complaints over which they are judging.[90]

The second aspect is that this problem should not be dealt through civil law (*al-qanūn al-mudunī*) but should be under the exclusive jurisdiction of religious courts. In Qāsim's

---

[87] Ibid.

[88] *Dār al-Fatwā* is the official judicial institution for private law with jurisdiction over the Sunni community in Lebanon.

[89] At the time of writing, the law is still being debated in a parliamentary sub-commission in which Hezbollah is represented by MP 'Ali 'Ammar. At the time of writing. The draft law proposed by civil society organisations is in 'Mashrūʿa Qanūn Himaya Al-Nisʾa Min Al ʿunf Al-Usriy [Draft Law for the Protection of Women from Family Violence]', <http://www.kafa.org.lb/FOA.aspx?code=1&Dcode=13&title=The%20law%20to%20Protect%20Women%20from%20Family%20Violence>, accessed 9 March 2012..

[90] Qāsim quoted in: 'Qāsim Yatwāfiq Mʿa Dār Al-Fatwā: Qanūn Alʿanf Al-Usrī "Yukharib Al-Usra Min Dākhil" [Qāsim Agrees with Dār Al-Fatwā: The Law on Family Violence "Destroys the Family from within"]', *al-Safīr,* 9 August 2011. Author's translation.

opinion the law proposal drafted by civil society organisations will affect the integrity of the family. According to his declaration to the press, the law proposal:

> is far from ending family violence, and closer to destroying the family from within, and for this issue details are set out in the reports that have been drafted by the specialists in these things. This topic is also completely remote from political stances, but is exquisitely religious, ethical and humane.[91]

Qāsim and the Sunni Lebanese religious authorities expressed their concerns over the impact that such legislation could have on traditional family values and denounced the interference of civil courts into what has been traditionally the realm of religious authority.

A similar case took place in 1998 when the then President Elias Hrawi proposed a law to introduce civil marriage within the framework of an optional civil personal status law to be added to the other personal status laws. Qāsim analyses this case and criticises this law in the respect that the rights and responsibilities that are established by it are different from the rights and responsibilities that Islamic legitimate (*sharʿiy*) marriage establishes, for example with regard to inheritance, alimony, the regulation of adoption and the husband's duty to support the wife and the children. His position is clear in this respect when he claims that 'what is *ḥalāl* (permissible) from the *shariatic* point of view is *ḥarām* (forbidden) from the point of view of civil law and vice versa.'[92]

These more recent developments regarding personal status laws and human rights indicate that, in addition to neutrality and selectivity, Hezbollah also resorts to critical stances towards certain aspects of human rights legislation. It is worth noting that this is only a more recent development in the human rights debate in Lebanon. Qāsim's argument does not seem to condone family violence but is concerned with protecting religious family values and with the preservation of religious legal authority, although human rights standards clearly require criminal legal provisions for these forms of violence. The preservation of the jurisdiction of religious courts was also confirmed by

---

[91] Ibid.

[92] Qāsim, *Ḥizbu Allāh: Al-Manhaj, Al-Tajriba, Al-Mustqbal [Hezbollah: Method, Practice and Future]* p. 320. Author's translation.

Fayyāḍ, who made clear that no human rights principles infringing upon the integrity of personal status law will be accepted by Hezbollah.[93]

Thus, whereas Hezbollah is generally neutral to most of the human rights legislation, the implementation of legislative reforms that alter personal status laws[94] and consequently the authority of religious courts have been opposed in the parliament and the civil society debate.

7.7   Patterns of International Socialisation

The analysis in this chapter has shown how Hezbollah adapted to new political circumstances. Its integration in the political system prompted a rethinking of how it should administer relations with non-Islamic institutions and norms. The patterns of neutrality and selective proactivity discussed in Sections 7.4 and 7.5 indicate how Hezbollah is far from appealing to fundamental incompatibility at least towards certain human rights normative principles, a fact that shows a departure from the self-referential Islamist conception and its fundamental criticism towards liberal norms seen in Chapters 3 and 4. These patterns of neutrality and proactivity can be understood though constructivist lenses as indicators of an early stage of socialisation in international society. Whereas the case of authenticity claims (Section 7.6), however, is indicative of a degree of resiliency of the Islamist political identity of Hezbollah.

A constructivist perspective highlights that there is a shift in the moral reasoning of Hezbollah and that this process of interaction with international norms is not only about rational calculation of political interests in dealing with human rights. Sections 7.2 and 7.3 have shown that beyond Hezbollah's adaptation to parliamentary law making there

---

[93] The author asked Fayyāḍ how this position preserving personal status law and then religious courts could have been consistent with Hezbollah's critical stance against the Lebanese sectarian system. Fayyāḍ's reply was that Hezbollah aims to abolish *political* sectarianism but not *social* sectarianism. This distinction means that while sectarianism according to Hezbollah should be abolished within the political structure of the state, its social structure and the related administration of justice along social sectarian lines should be preserved. 'Author's Interview with ʿAlī Fayyāḍ, Member of Parliament, Republic of Lebanon (Loyalty to the Resistance Block-Hezbollah)', (Beirut, Lebanon: 29 September 2011).

[94] It shall be pointed out how the focus is particularly on personal status law. In the same session in which Art. 562 was abrogated, the crime of human trafficking (primarily concerning rights of women and children) was defined with a new law accordingly with international standards and no objections were raised by Hezbollah.

is a moral reasoning which attempts to harmonise Islamist principles of jurisprudence with positive law. Constructivism considers moral reasoning an element in which persuasion, in addition to instrumental rationality, plays an important role.[95] In our case, instrumental adaptation seems to be partly relevant. The mutated circumstances of post-civil war Lebanon motivated Hezbollah's choice to take part in the parliamentary life of the state so that it could continue to operate within the Lebanese context without being excluded from the parliamentary process.

This, nonetheless, is only part of the picture, because the kind of reasoning that Hezbollah adopts in evaluating the legislation that it supports in parliament described in Section 7.3 shows how Hezbollah had to justify its participation in a process that was sanctioning positive law and not Islamic law, including human rights. The principles enunciated by Raʿad and Fayyāḍ regarding Islamic jurisprudence concepts amount to considerations of moral legitimacy and justification and not to mere political calculus. Risse-Kappen and Sikkink refer to this stage of norm socialisation as forms of moral discourse. According to them, 'moral discourses in particular not only challenge and seek justifications of norms, they also entail identity-related arguments. What I find morally appropriate depends to some degree on who I am and how I see myself.'[96] The principles illustrated by Raʿad and Fayyāḍ to evaluate abidance with Islamic jurisprudence and balancing it with public interest are, in fact, considerations about what Hezbollah may find morally appropriate from an Islamic perspective. In this respect, the rational calculation of interests leaves room for moral considerations in which the political actor attempts an assessment of legislation from the point of view of Islamic morals.

This way of reasoning on legislation corresponds to a process of moral argumentation which in certain occasions fails to come to a conclusion in favour of human rights principles, whereas in other circumstances leaves Hezbollah neutral and in other cases informs a proactive stance towards human rights principles. This latter case is perhaps

---

[95] *See* Section 1.4 and Risse-Kappen and Sikkink, 'The Socialisation of International Human Rights Norms into Domestic Practices: Introduction' p. 5.

[96] Ibid., p. 14.

the most striking, signalling a higher degree of socialisation in which international norms become part of Hezbollah's policy. Hezbollah became a proactive supporter of principles of human rights, as seen with the case of detainees' rights, Bahrainis protesters or articulating its demand for the respect of religious sensibility as a human rights claim. In this latter case, Hezbollah would be identified in constructivist terms as a 'norm entrepreneur' raising awareness over an alleged human rights violation.

It is throughout this process of moral argumentation that political actors become increasingly socialised within the international normative discourse according to constructivists. Instrumental adaptation eventually brings about moral arguments[97] and in the long term can bring the socialisation of an Islamist movement within the international normative framework.

7.8   Conclusions

The participation of Hezbollah in Lebanese parliamentary activity has exposed it to a law-making process which inevitably altered its profile of Islamist political actor. This chapter focused in particular on the case of human rights legislation, which is relevant because not only is this legislation processed through fundamentally secular institutions, but also its sources are based on the international normative framework. The chapter has isolated three patterns that Hezbollah follows in relation to human rights law: neutrality, selectivity and authenticity.

It has been shown that the first pattern interests the great majority of the human rights laws that were passed in the parliament (Section 7.4) and that there are cases in which Hezbollah uses human rights to articulate its political stances domestically and internationally (Section 7.5). There was also consideration of cases in which Hezbollah criticised human rights laws as violating the sphere of autonomy of the religious community and its judicial authorities (Section 7.6).

---

[97] Ibid., p. 16.

More generally, as in the previous case of non-combatant immunity, interaction with international norms as human rights has brought about a reconsideration of Islamist principles in relation to the law making process of the Lebanese Parliament. It was finally observed (Section 7.7) that, from a constructivist perspective, the changes in moral reasoning related to this process show that this is not a mere instrumental adaptation but also produces a shift in the way Hezbollah relates to international norms. This signals a degree of socialisation of Hezbollah within the international normative framework, where international norms are progressively internalised in its political activity as in the cases of rights of detainees, Bahrainis protesters and the respect for religious dignity mentioned in Section 7.5 when Hezbollah refers to human rights principles to substantiate its political demands. The next chapter will consider another instance in which interaction between Hezbollah and international norms further attests its international socialisation.

Chapter 8

State Sovereignty, Self-Defence and International Peace: Hezbollah and UNSC Resolutions 1559 and 1701

8.1   Introduction

As the previous chapter has shown, Hezbollah's participation in Lebanese politics has been purposely limited to parliamentary activity. But the withdrawals from Lebanon of Israel in 2000 and Syria in 2005 changed the political and military scenario regionally and domestically. Contextually Hezbollah escalated its role in Lebanese politics, taking part in the Lebanese government for the first time in 2005. The removal of Israel from almost[1] the entire Lebanese territory in 2000 was celebrated as the final victory for the Resistance in Lebanon but also questioned the justification of the continuation of Hezbollah's paramilitary apparatus.[2] A serious source of troubles was Hezbollah's disarmament, which the movement staunchly opposed even resorting to the use of force in May 2008 when the country came to the brink of internal conflict.

The political void left by the Syrians in 2005 was to be filled by Hezbollah's increased role in the political scene. The work that was previously done by Syrian-backed security officials and pawns in the government was now done by Hezbollah and its allies, especially Amal. Nonetheless, this newly acquired role was not to leave Hezbollah unchanged as this chapter intends to show with reference to the events of 2005 and 2006. The following pages will discuss to what extent the implementation of two UNSC resolutions approved in 2005 and 2006 changed the political identity of Hezbollah. UNSC Resolution 1559 primarily required the disarmament of militias in Lebanon and was approved by the Security Council in 2004.[3] UNSC Resolution 1701[4] was approved in 2006 after the July War and enforced a ceasefire through the deployment of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) backed by a newly reinforced peacekeeping military contingent under the framework of the UNIFIL mission.[5] Both resolutions drew upon

---

[1] There are three minor areas which are considered under Israeli occupation in Lebanon. See Section 6.2 Note 7.

[2] A discussion of the new strategic environment in which Hezbollah was operating after 2000 and underpinning this claim can be found in: International Crisis Group (2003) 'Hizbollah: Rebel without a Cause' (Amman/Brussels: International Crisis Group: 30 July 2003).

[3] UN Security Council 'UN Security Council Resolution 1559 (2004)' (S/RES/1559: 2 September 2004).

[4] UN Security Council 'United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701 (2006)' (S/res/1701: 11 August 2006).

[5] The same resolution also included other demands of which more about below.

fundamental international norms: state sovereignty, right to self-determination and self-defence, to mention the most important.[6]

Three aspects are particularly indicative of how international norms, mediated by UNSC resolutions, begin to affect the political identity of Hezbollah and further determine its international socialisation as suggested in the previous chapters. The first is that Hezbollah, as a member of government, became involved in international negotiations to a new and unprecedented degree. For this reason its accountability to international norms becomes more direct rather than being mediated by other actors as in the case of the April Understanding (Section 8.4.1).

The second aspect is that Hezbollah changed the paradigm throughout which it constructed its legitimacy of resistance movement (Section 8.4.2). We know that originally its justification for military and political action was primarily Islamic,[7] but at this stage it became framed within the parameters of international norms as self-determination and self-defence, somewhat marginalising its religious dimension.

The third aspect is that, with its participation in the executive and by accepting the fundamental demands of UNSC res. 1701, Hezbollah changed its relationship with the state and the LAF. Accepting the deployment of the LAF in the south of Lebanon, Hezbollah acknowledged its authority of state army and hence the authority of the state as the monopolist of force in Lebanon (Section 8.4.3). This latter aspect is more problematic because, at the time of writing, Hezbollah has not disarmed, challenging the state monopoly of force, but the formal recognition of the legitimacy of the LAF deployment in south Lebanon is still a meaningful step which 'locks in' Hezbollah's rhetoric in the international normative discourse of state sovereignty.

In the following pages I reconstruct the process related to the implementation of UNSC Res. 1559 (Section 8.2) and in the negotiations of UNSC Res. 1701 (Section 8.3). This will show how Hezbollah was capable of imposing its conditions over the international

---

[6] In qualifying these principles as international norms I refer to Mervyn Frost's concept of 'settled norm' as indicated in the introductory chapter.

[7] *See* Sections 6.5 and 6.6.

negotiations of these resolutions and their implementation. On the other hand, this newly acquired role of Hezbollah made its political identity increasingly subject to the influence of the norms that it attempted to control.

State sovereignty, right to self-defence and right to self-determination all became norms significantly shaping the political and military activity of Hezbollah and the way it justified its military activity, differently from its previous exclusive focus on Islamic principles.

8.2   The Crisis over UNSC Resolution 1559

On April 2005 the government of Syria informed the UN of the withdrawal of its military and intelligence apparatus from the Lebanese territory.[8] The withdrawal was the result of a long period of pressure against the Syrian regime which peaked with the approval of UNSC Res. 1559 of 2004.[9] The resolution, strongly supported by the US and France, requested the Syrian withdrawal and the disarmament of Lebanese and non-Lebanese 'militias'.

After the assassination of the former Prime Minister Rafīq al-Ḥarīrī on 14 February 2005 pressure against Syria, the primary suspect behind the assassination, created the circumstances under which the regime of al-Asad had to withdraw its forces. Prominent in this process (branded as the 'Cedar Revolution') was the emergence of the March 14 movement, named after the rallies held a month after the killing of al-Ḥarīrī and led by a coalition of parties sharing their opposition to Syrian interference in Lebanese affairs.[10] This coalition enjoyed the sympathy and support of the Western powers (especially the US, France and the UK) and Saudi Arabia.

---

[8] UN Security Council 'First Semi-Annual Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on the Implementation of Resolution 1559 (2004)' (S/2005/272: 26 April 2005).

[9] UN Security Council 'UN Security Council Resolution 1559 (2004)'.

[10] The parties included a multitude of components, primarily the Sunni based al-Mustaqbal, the Christian-based Lebanese Forces and the Free Patriotic Movement (led by Michel 'Aoun who subsequently changes side). Also the Druze-based party led by Walīd Junblāṭ (Progressive Socialist Party) was then part of the March 14 coalition although he later repositioned himself.

In opposition to this movement, the March 8 coalition emerged, named after the demonstrations held in a show of solidarity to Syria and expressing gratitude towards its alleged role of pacifier in Lebanon. In the March 8 coalition, Hezbollah had a prominent role in alliance with Amal. After February 2006 the Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) led by the Christian Michel 'Aoun joined this coalition.[11] The main patrons of this coalition were Syria and Iran with some indirect backing at the Security Council by China and Russia.

While the country was experiencing these profound changes, the polarisation of its society between pro- and anti-Syria camps grew wider. At the same time, an international body for investigation over the killing of al-Ḥarīrī was set up to collaborate with local authorities to produce the basis for a judicial process against those responsible for this assassination and the related crimes.[12] Between May and June of the same year, parliamentary elections were contested. The March 14 coalition won the majority of parliamentary seats and was then in charge of forming a new government inclusive of representatives from all Lebanese religious sects as required by the Ṭāʾif Agreement.[13] In the same elections, eleven Hezbollah members were elected in the parliament along with three non-Hezbollah allies.

A national unity government led by the March 14 leader Fuʾād al-Sinyūra was formed and included, for the first time,[14] members of Hezbollah or representatives trusted by its leadership. Ṭrād Ḥamāda (a Hezbollah ally) and Muḥammad Fnaysh, a member of Hezbollah, became respectively Minister of Labour and Minister of Energy and Water.

---

[11]The alliance between Hezbollah and ʾAoun was sanctioned by an agreement (the Memorandum of Understanding) between the two parties and to date is still in vigour.

[12] The United Nations International Independent Investigation Commission (UN IIIC) was established by UN Security Council 'United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1595 (2005)' (S/RES/1595: 7 April 2005). The investigation was headed by Detlev Mehlis who later provided two reports suggesting direct Syrian involvement in the al-Ḥarīrī assassination. The first report (S/2005/662) informed another resolution, UNSC Res. 1636 (S/RES/1636 of 2005) this time acting in Chapter 7 of the UN Charter and extending the mandate of Mehlis' commission to the drafting of a second report (S/2005/775). Mehlis was replaced in office by Serge Brammertz, the deputy prosecutor of the International Criminal Court in 2006.

[13] As I shall further make clear below, the Ṭāʾif Agreement establishes the formation of governments that are representative of all the religious communities of Lebanon until when the confessional system is abolished.

[14] In previous brief governmental experience, the Hezbollah sympathizer Ṭrād Ḥamāda was part of Najīb Miqātī's transitional government.

Another key figure was Fawzī Ṣallūkh nominated foreign minister and enjoying the support of Hezbollah although not an official member.

Interestingly, whereas the participation in parliamentary politics was a divisive issue which needed to be approved by the *Walī al-Faqīh*,[15] there is no evidence that Hezbollah's participation in the government required approval by the Iranian leadership. The need to counterbalance Syria's withdrawal from Lebanon overrode doctrinal considerations. A member of Hezbollah describes the reasons for its participation in the government as follows:

> Syria's withdrawal left a strategic void in the state's administration, altering the relative size of the various forces, revealing some of the key choices in State policies and exposing Lebanon's vulnerable position in the regional equation. As regional factors lost some of their weight in the political equation, the domestic forces and trends expanded to fill the political space, according to their size, and reposition themselves in a new political constellation. In Hezbollah's view, it was no longer possible to pursue the resistance project and correct the State-building process from outside the structure of power. These goals constituted two major reasons for entering the government.[16]

Thus, Hezbollah took part in the government to counterbalance the increasing role of March 14 and its foreign patrons and to continue its mission of resistance movement, even giving its confidence vote to the government.[17]

8.2.1 The 'Militia' Vs. 'National Resistance' Issue

Reflecting the social tensions of that period, the political process was characterised by the harsh contraposition between the two political coalitions. Among the most controversial items on the government agenda were the implementation of the resolutions related to the prosecution of the al-Ḥarīrī assassination, and the enactment of the points requested in UNSC Resolution 1559, which demanded the disarmament of all 'militias' in Lebanon. But the situation was further exacerbated by the campaign of

---

[15] *See* Section 7.2.

[16] 'Alī Fayyāḍ, 'Hezbollah and the Lebanese State Reconciling a National Strategy with a Regional Role', *Arab Reform Brief,* /11 (2006) pp. 2-3.

[17] The government received its vote of confidence on 19 July 2005.

political assassinations targeting high-profile political and intellectual figures critical of Syria also after the killing of al-Ḥarīrī and Syria's withdrawal from Lebanon.[18]

On 12 December 2005, Gibrān Tuynī a journalist, political figure and outspoken critic of Syria was one of the victims of this bombing campaign, increasing the pressure on the members of March 14 and in general the opponents to Syrian interference in Lebanese affairs. In the hours subsequent to the killing, Prime Minister al-Sinyūra called for an emergency cabinet meeting. He demanded a vote to approve a letter to be sent to the UN Secretary-General asking for the extension of the mandate of the international investigation on al-Ḥarīrī's assassination and the establishment of an international tribunal to try those responsible for this act and the connected crimes.[19] The decision was taken with a majority vote rather than consensus, and infuriated the March 8 component of the council of ministers, which stepped out of the cabinet and left the government until February 2006, although no official resignations were made.

This was the first time in which Hezbollah's ministers and their allies took advantage of their presence in the government to undermine its executive capacity. There are two ways through which this can be done according to the Lebanese constitution. The first is the resignation of a third of the members of the cabinet. According to article 69(1b) of the Constitution, the executive is considered resigned when it loses at least a third of its members. This is because according to art. 65(5) of the Constitution, the legal quorum required for a meeting of the cabinet is two thirds of its members.[20] The second way is through the resignation of the entire component of a religious sect. Art. 95 of the constitution establishes a procedure for the abolition of confessionalism but the same

---

[18] The campaigns of bombing targeted persons such as the Palestinian-Lebanese journalist and intellectual Samir Kassir, killed on 2 June 2005. George Hawi, a prominent anti-Syrian politician was killed on 21 June 2005. Gebran Tueni was killed on 12 December 2005, prompting a governmental crisis. On 21 November 2006, Pierre Gemayel, Minister of Industry and outspoken anti-Syrian voice, was killed in Beirut. Walid Eido, an anti-Syrian MP was killed along with security personnel on 13 June 2007. MP Antoine Ghanem was killed along with other seven people in a bomb blast in Beirut. François Hajj, a general of the army supposed to replace General Suleiman (later to be elected President of the Republic) was killed on 12 December 2007.

[19] UN Security Council 'Letter Dated 13 December 2005 from the Chargé D'affaires A.I. Of the Permanent Mission of Lebanon to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General' (S/2005/783: 13 December 2005).

[20] This political device is usually referred to as the 'blocking third' policy.

clause also says that while confessionalism is not abolished, the government shall be representative of all the Lebanese sects recognised by the state to be legitimate.

Therefore, when a delegation of ministers that is representative of an entire sect resigns, the government is considered unconstitutional. It is controversial whether this kind of suspension of the cabinet activity actually poses a question of constitutionality over its decisions but, as a matter of fact, the cabinet remained paralysed due to the boycotting of its March 8 component.

The reasons for such a strong reaction from the March 8 component of the cabinet are not entirely clear. At this stage, Hezbollah was not completely against an investigation over the al-Ḥarīrī killings[21] posing certain conditions over its implementation but not opposing it as a matter of principle. Investigating the truth behind the killing of al-Ḥarīrī was even a point in Hezbollah's political programme of the 2005 elections, which committed to 'facilitate the mission of the UN's team investigating Hariri's assassination.'[22]

Nonetheless, al-Sinyūra's letter to the UN Security Council came at a point that was highly emotionally charged for Lebanon and at a time in which Syria was held responsible, by a great deal of the public opinion, for the al-Ḥarīrī killing and the killing of Syrian critics.[23] Blocking the works of the cabinet in these circumstances was then favourable for Syrian interests and showing that Syria was still capable of controlling Lebanese politics through its proxies even after its withdrawal from Lebanon. Hezbollah's concern was also related to the procedural aspect of majority vote rather than consensus. Art. 65(5) of the constitution established that the Council of Ministers

---

[21] Hezbollah changed policy towards the establishment of the tribunal a number of times, from a moderate endorsement and certain degree of collaboration to a firm condemnation as the tool of an Israeli–American conspiracy.

[22] 'Hizbullah's 2005 Parliamentary Elections Program' in Joseph Elie Alagha, *Hizbullah's Documents: From the 1985 Open Letter to the 2009 Manifesto* (Amsterdam: Pallas Publications, 2011) p. 88. Deputy Secretary General Qāsim qualified Hezbollah's commitment to the investigation in a declaration saying that Hezbollah would have accepted a tribunal pursuing four fundamental goals: finding the truth, fairness of the trial, non-politicisation, and not being under international influence. As regards this fourth condition he explains that there could be a component of foreign judges in the tribunal. Report from Al-Manār TV, 12 December 2005. Translation available from Mideastwire,com.

[23] At a later stage of investigations of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon the primary focus shifted on four Hezbollah members rather than Syria.

'makes its decision by consensus. If that is not possible, it makes its decisions by vote of the majority of attending members.'[24] Hezbollah was a minority component of al-Sinyūra's government and establishing a precedent of a decision adopted by majority would have diminished Hezbollah's capacity to control the decisions of the government.

The issue was serious for Hezbollah, because the implementation of UNSC Res. 1559 of 2004 demanding the disarmament of militias (read Hezbollah and the Palestinian factions) was pending on the cabinet agenda. A majority vote would have established a precedent for the approval of governmental measures related to UNSC Res. 1559. Hezbollah, by no means, could have been part of a cabinet sanctioning its own disarmament. Furthermore, there are reports saying that Hezbollah's vote of confidence for al-Sinyūra's government and its commitment to its decisions were under the condition that important decisions in the cabinet would have been taken exclusively on a consensual basis, thus rejecting the adoption of important measures on a majority basis.[25] The approval by majority vote of the governmental declaration to the Security Council which prompted the crisis in December 2005 was probably seen as a violation of the principle of consensual decision and a risk for the continuation of Hezbollah's armed activity under international pressure.[26]

Hezbollah MPs had already questioned the commitment of the Prime Minister to UNSC Res. 1559.[27] The Prime Minister made clear in the governmental statement

---

[24] Translation of the Lebanese constitution available from the International Labour Organization. International Labour Organisation, 'Unofficial Translation of the Constitution of the Lebanese Republic', <http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_protect/---protrav/---ilo_aids/documents/legaldocument/wcms_125865.pdf>, accessed 29 July 2011..

[25] In a report published in An-Nahar (a March 14 oriented Lebanese Newspaper), Nicholas Nasif reports that Hezbollah considered the majority based decision of the cabinet as an offence and a violation of the agreement between opposition and majority over decision-making procedures in the parliament. Nasif, Nicholas in An-Nahar 16 December 2005. Translation available from Mideastwire.com.

[26] In an interview with the author, a then member of the Lebanese government declared that majority decisions were nonetheless taken regularly. 'Author's Interview with Ṭāreq Miṭrī , Delegate for the Republic of Lebanon to the Security Council During the 2006 War and Member of Cabinet', (Beirut, Lebanon: 27 September 2011).

[27] Muḥammad Raʾad, the head of Hezbollah's parliamentary bloc questioned the government over this issue in the Question and Answer session of the parliament on 17 November 2005. National Assembly (March 2006) 'National Assembly Report 2005' (Beirut: Parliament of Lebanon). <http://www.lp.gov.lb/Client%20Resources/Download%20Pages/REPORT%202005%20ENGLISH.pdf> (Last Access 3 August 2012)

inaugurating the legislature his endorsement of the national resistance declaring it a 'national right'. According to the statement:

> The government considers the Lebanese resistance a sincere and natural expression of the national right of the Lebanese people to liberate their land and defend their dignity in the face of attacks, threats, and Israeli ambitions, and the factor to complete the liberation of Lebanese territory.[28]

Even though al-Sinyūra's commitment was sufficient to obtain Hezbollah's confidence vote in parliament in July 2005, at a later stage and as a consequence to the majority vote adopted in December's cabinet session, the relations between the majority and the opposition entered a phase of crisis.

8.2.2 Conclusion of the Political Crisis over UNSC Resolution 1559

Hezbollah looked for further reassurance that no decisions by the government would have been implemented to forcefully disarm it. They demanded the approval of a ministerial letter to the Security Council in which it was explicitly identified as a 'national resistance movement' and not as a 'militia'. The distinction was important because in UNSC Res. 1559 both the Palestinian factions and Hezbollah were identified with the term 'militia'.[29] Being identified otherwise (i.e. as a national resistance) would have allowed them to circumvent the requirements of the resolution.

The condition for the government to be reactivated was then to obtain an official acknowledgment of Hezbollah as a national resistance movement. However, this was only partially met. Hezbollah did not obtain a letter to the Security Council but at the end of January 2006 (at a time in which violent protests were spiralling in open street violence) al-Sinyūra gave a speech in parliament declaring that the government will never refer to the resistance with terms other than national resistance, thus excluding

---

[28] Policy Statement of Al-Sinyūra's Government announced to the Lebanese Parliament on 19tuly 2005.

Government of the Republic of Lebanon, 'Policy Statement of the Government Led by Fuʾad Al-Sinyūra', <http://www.pcm.gov.lb/Cultures/ar-LB/Menu/السابقة20%الحكومات/التاريخ20%في20%الوزراء20%مجلس20%رئاسة20%/Pages/w69.aspx>, accessed 8 June 2011. Author's translation.

[29] The Paragraph goes: '3. Calls for the disbanding and disarmament of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias.' UN Security Council 'UN Security Council Resolution 1559 (2004)'.

the possibility of deferring the issue of Hezbollah's arms to the Security Council with respect to UNSC Res. 1559.[30]

In a conversation between the US Ambassador in Beirut and PM al-Sinyūra, the latter described the solution to the political stalemate as a result of a concerted effort between Amal's leader Berri and March 14 forces. Al-Sinyūra made clear to Berri that he did not have the possibility of denying the definition of Hezbollah as a militia and the only thing he could do was to reiterate the formula of Hezbollah as national resistance that was adopted in the inaugural statement of its government. That would have been enough to obtain the support of Amal's component in the parliament who gave a standing ovation to the declaration. Hezbollah then had to recognise the declaration as a sufficient guarantee to return to the cabinet, since divergence with Amal would have meant the end of Shiʿī unity, which is a priority.[31]

With al-Sinyūra's declaration, the boycotting ministers returned to the cabinet and the government was back on track. Hezbollah, its allies and Syria flexed their muscles with their presence in government showing off their political weight. Backed by the terror spread by the bombing campaign taking place in Lebanon against Syrian critics, al-Asad's regime demonstrated that, notwithstanding its withdrawal from Lebanon, it was still capable of interfering with Lebanese politics hampering the approval of government acts which would have been against its interests. The Lebanese political agenda had plenty of controversial items for Syrian interests, among these were the establishment of the Tribunal for the al-Ḥarīrī assassination and the nomination of a new President of the Republic following the end of the term of the pro-Syrian Emīl Laḥūd.[32]

---

[30] Al-Sinyūra's ministerial statement is further analysed in Section 8.4. Republic of Lebanon (2006) 'Maḥāḍir Jalasāt Majlis Al-Nuwāb [Proceedings of the Session of the House of Representatives]' (Beirut: Governement of Lebanon).

[31] As reported in 'US Diplomatic Cable 06beirut324', <http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/02/06BEIRUT324.html>, accessed 5 October 2011.

[32] The extension of Laḥūd's presidential term for a further three years was approved by the parliament through a modification of the constitution (Law 585 of 4 September 2004) under enormous pressure from the Syrian regime over the then Hariri's government and amid international condemnation of this act in 2004. As I will indicate briefly below, the problem of the nomination of a new president after Laḥūd is another reason for contention in the country. As regards the continuation of investigations in Hariri's assassination and the establishment of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, the quarrel continued for the next months but the tribunal was eventually established although its legal basis remains disputed.

This war of words between 'militia' and 'national resistance' continued for a few more months. At a later stage, al-Sinyūra participated in a Security Council meeting in April 2006 addressing the Middle Eastern situation. At the meeting the Prime Minister reviewed the situation of Lebanon and stated that Hezbollah's disarmament was an internal affair:

> While there is consensus throughout Lebanon of the important role that the resistance, spearheaded by Hezbollah, played in forcing Israel's withdrawal from the south in May 2000, as well as on the fact that the south-eastern corner of the country, namely the Sheb'a farms, remains occupied, the future role of Hezbollah's weapons in defending Lebanon is a matter of national debate. That debate will be carried out in the context of the strategy agreed by all Lebanese concerning how best to defend Lebanon, against the backdrop of the provisions of the Ṭāʾif Agreement of 1989, United Nations resolutions regarding Lebanon and the continued occupation of the Shebaʾa farms, as well as the long history of incursions and violations of Lebanese territory by Israel.[33]

But a month later another resolution was adopted by the Security Council (UNSC Res. 1680)[34] again referring to Hezbollah as a 'militia' but lacking effectiveness.

Hezbollah used its participation in the Lebanese government to void the effectiveness of UNSC res. 1559. Its boycotting of the cabinet served its interest of 'preserving the resistance' and the interests of its ally Syria, but this also altered certain aspects of its political identity as discussed in Section 8.4. Before that, other major events were influential in shaping Hezbollah's political and military behaviour in relation to the implementation of UNSC resolutions.

8.3 The July War of 2006 and UNSC Resolution 1701

The withdrawal of Israel in 2000 boosted Hezbollah's popularity in Lebanon and in the region but also questioned its definition of 'resistance movement'. In addition to this, the wave of anti-Syrian sentiment of 2005 brought its ally Hezbollah to one of the lowest levels of popularity in the same year. Things were bound to change as a result of Israel's military campaign against Hezbollah in July 2006, which had the effect of reaffirming its legitimacy as a 'resistance movement' in the eyes of the Lebanese but

---

[33] UN Security Council '5417th Meeting' (UN Doc. s/pv.5417: 26 April 2006).

[34] UN Security Council 'Resolution 1680' (S/RES/1680: 17 May 2006).

not only. The focus of this section is mainly on the negotiation of UNSC Resolution 1701 and the role played by Hezbollah as a member of government in this regard.

The *casus belli* of 2006 was a Hezbollah operation[35] held on 12 July 2006 in which two Israeli soldiers were kidnapped across the southern 'Blue Line' border with Israel to be used as bargaining chips for the release of Lebanese prisoners in Israel.[36] The operation was entirely a Hezbollah initiative and the government was not informed about it. The military reaction of Israel killed at least 1,200 civilians and damaged the civil infrastructure of the country worth billions of dollars.[37] Military operations included a devastating bombing campaign, a blockade of ports and airports and, at a later stage, a ground invasion of the south of Lebanon. Israel reportedly suffered 120 casualties in the war.[38] Hezbollah retaliated by shooting rockets into the north of Israel and fought on the ground against the invading Israeli troops. Hezbollah's casualties were between 300 and 400 fighters, whereas its military capacity was allegedly damaged between 25 and 50 per cent.[39]

8.3.1   The Negotiations of UNSC res. 1701

The war finished with the approval of UNSC Resolution 1701.[40] 1701 was the result of long negotiations, during which the international community acted reluctantly to find a solution to the crisis. Two main drafts for the resolution were negotiated through a

---

[35] The operation was later referred to as 'Operation Faithful Promise', the promise in question was the liberation of Lebanese citizens and members of the resistance held in Israeli jails.

[36] In his press conference held a few hours after the operation, Nasrallah declared that: 'what we did today is our natural right. I do not want to get into a legal, philosophical, or political discussion of this issue. It is the only available way first to release the prisoners held in Israeli jails and second to draw the attention of the international community institutions on the highest level and all world media to the suffering of thousands of Lebanese, Palestinian and Arab detainees.'   Sayyid Ḥasan Naṣrallah, 'Speech on Al-Manar Channel ', (mideastwire.com, 2006: 12 July 2006).

[37] H. Sayed and Z. Tzannatos, 'The Economic and Human Costs of the War' in Nubar Hovsepian (ed.), *The War on Lebanon: A Reader* (Northampton, Mass.: Olive Branch Press, 2008) pp. 316-42.

[38] Ibid., p. 316. These figures (apart from Lebanese civilian casualties) are subject to discussion and also used for propaganda purposes on both sides and should be taken as approximations.

[39] Elias Murr (Minister of Defence at the time) as reported by the US Ambassador in a diplomatic cable. 'US Diplomatic Cable 06beirut2553', <http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/08/06BEIRUT2553.html>, accessed 16 June 2011.Najīb Miqāti as reported by the US Ambassador in a diplomatic cable. 'US Diplomatic Cable 06beirut2566', <http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/08/06BEIRUT2566.html>, accessed 16 June 2011.

[40] UN Security Council 'United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701 (2006)'.

single diplomatic channel.[41] One draft was proposed by the Lebanese government (the 'Seven-Point Plans') whereas the other proposal was a US initiative with intermittent support from France.[42]

The US initiative is to be understood within the wider framework of the Middle Eastern conflict, which Halliday defined as the 'West Asian crisis'. It was part of the triangular dispute that sees: 'Iran and its radical allies on one side (Syria, Iraqi Shiite parties, Hizballah, Hamas), the forces of the radical Sunni insurgency in Iraq and al-Qaeda, on the second side, the US and its regional allies.'[43] The parties primarily involved in the 2006 conflict are the first and the third alliance. The outcry of the Arab region against Israel's war on Lebanon was defined by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice as 'the birth pangs of a new Middle East.'[44] This definition approvingly referred to the Israeli operations in Lebanon and outraged sectors of public opinion for its negligence of the human suffering caused by a full-scale war.

On the other hand, the Lebanese government was immediately active in negotiating a ceasefire but some of the political opponents and allies of Hezbollah cynically saw the war as an opportunity to weaken its domestic role. At the initial stage of the war, part of the Lebanese political elite judged it a favourable event which, presumably, would have weakened the political and military capital of Hezbollah. March 14 MP Boutros Ḥarb[45] was quoted in a US diplomatic cable saying: 'if we are convinced that Israel can finish the job, then we can allow a few more weeks.'[46] According to this view, politically Hezbollah would have been held responsible for bringing Lebanon into a disastrous

---

[41] Miṭrī points out that at a certain stage of the conflict there was also a direct Hezbollah–France diplomatic channel bypassing the government. The effectiveness of this channel remains unimportant according to Miṭrī. 'Author's Interview with Ṭāreq Miṭrī , Delegate for the Republic of Lebanon to the Security Council During the 2006 War and Member of Cabinet', (Beirut, Lebanon: 27 September 2011).

[42] See Table 8.1.

[43] Fred Halliday, 'All Wars Are Different: Lebanon, Israel, and the Maturing of the "Greater West Asian Crisis" ' in Nubar Hovsepian (ed.), *The War on Lebanon: A Reader* (Northampton, Mass.: Olive Branch Press, 2008) p. 383.

[44] 'What we're seeing here, in a sense, is the growing -- the birth pangs of a new Middle East and whatever we do we have to be certain that we're pushing forward to the new Middle East not going back to the old one.' Government of the United States, ''Special Briefing on Travel to the Middle East and Europe' ', <http://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/rm/2006/69331.htm>, accessed 15 June 2011.

[45] Ḥarb was the target of a failed attempt on his life on 5 July 2012.

[46] 'US Diplomatic Cable 06beirut2544', <http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/08/06BEIRUT2544.html>, accessed 16 of June 2011.

conflict; militarily the Israeli army was seen as being in a position to annihilate Hezbollah's fighting capacity.[47] In another quote reported in a US diplomatic cable, Hezbollah's ally Berri compared Israel's military activity to honey saying: 'I like a little bit of honey but if you eat the whole jar you get sick!' Thus concluding that targeting Hezbollah for a limited amount of time would have been beneficial to its weakening but it should not last for too long.[48] This proved wrong in both military and political respects.

Militarily, Hezbollah was not irremediably damaged and was also capable of inflicting serious losses to the Israeli army, whereas politically the war allowed Hezbollah to regain and increase the popularity lost in the previous months and years. Despite these cynical calculations by certain sectors of the Lebanese political elite, the Lebanese government was nonetheless working on a plan to obtain international support for an immediate ceasefire at the UN Security Council.[49] On 19 July 2006, PM al-Sinyūra called for an immediate ceasefire and on 26 July the Seven-Point Plan was proposed at an international peace conference in Rome to facilitate the adoption of a UNSC resolution calling for a complete ceasefire.[50] This plan was the basis of the Lebanese diplomatic initiative and would have been eventually influential in informing Resolution 1701.[51] The main aim was defending the national interest bringing to an immediate end the conflict and limiting its devastating effects.

---

[47] In another leaked US cable there are reports of a conversation with MP members of the March 14 coalition. The US ambassador conveys the content of the conversation as follows: 'They fear a ceasefire coming too early, with an admittedly weak central Lebanese government then forced prematurely to deal with a resurgent Hizballah. Claiming to reflect PM Siniora's private thoughts, several of the assembled leaders urged that Hizballah be given a "real pounding" by the Israelis to the point that the group would be "soft enough to listen to reason."' According to Boutros Harb, 'if we are convinced that Israel can finish the job, then we can allow a few more weeks,' ibid.

[48] Berri said that the operation should not have lasted for more than four to five days at that point (17th of July). 'US Diplomatic Cable 06beirut2407', <http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/07/06BEIRUT2407.html>, accessed 4 October 2011.

[49] In a later speech by Nasrallah in 2010, he claimed that the entire international community and the Arab delegation at the UN were delaying the achievement of a solution to the conflict. Miṭrī, acting Foreign Affairs Minister at that time, strongly denies this as much as he denies any amicable approach to US Ambassador to the UN John Bolton as described by Nasrallah. Naṣrallah, 'Speech on Al-Manar Channel', (Mideastwire.com, 2011: 31 October 2011). 'Author's Interview with Ṭāreq Miṭrī , Delegate for the Republic of Lebanon to the Security Council During the 2006 War and Member of Cabinet', (Beirut, Lebanon: 27 September 2011).

[50] 'B3. Lebanese Prime Minister Fuad Siniora, Seven-Point Plan for Ending the War in Lebanon, Beirut, 7 August 2006', *Journal of Palestine Studies,* 36/1 (2006), 177-78 at p. 177.

[51] The resolution explicitly refers to the plan in its preamble.

The plan asked for an immediate ceasefire to be followed by the complete withdrawal of Israeli troops from Lebanese territory, the deployment of the Lebanese Army in the entire area of south Lebanon and an increase in the military capacity of UNIFIL. Al-Sinyūra's plan was negotiated in a way to guarantee government unity and then responded at least to some of the requests from Hezbollah. The day before the Rome Conference, Nasrallah declared with reference to the negotiation of a ceasefire that:

> We can never accept any condition that will humiliate our country, people or resistance. Nor will we accept any formula that could come at the expense of national interests, sovereignty, independence, especially after all these sacrifices no matter how long the confrontation would last and regardless of the great sacrifices we will offer. Our true and basic motto is: dignity first.[52]

Importantly, even though some of its requirements were accepted by Hezbollah reluctantly, the Seven-Point Plan was unanimously adopted by the Lebanese Government, including Hezbollah's members and its allies at least in the cabinet meetings held on 27 July and 12 August.

Ṭāreq Miṭrī (at that time a member of the cabinet) described a two-hour long cabinet session on 27 July in which Prime Minister al-Sinyūra was determined to achieve a unanimous consensus over the conditions for a ceasefire. Al-Sinyūra was aware that non-consensual decisions would have thrown the cabinet into another crisis, with disastrous consequences for the country at a time in which it was under attack. Apparently, President Laḥūd was concerned primarily with the deployment of the LAF in south Lebanon in proximity with the Israeli–Lebanese border, even though it is not clear why this should have been problematic. Hezbollah, through Fnaysh, its emissary in the government, expressed concern over the deployment of an international force in the south especially as regards its nature as a Multinational Force or as a continuation of the UNIFIL peacekeeping mission. Only after a discussion over the exact wording defining this force and some phone calls did Fnaysh express agreement over the

---

[52] Naṣrallah, 'Speech on Al-Manar Channel', (Mideastwire.com, 2006: 9 August 2006).

Seven-Point Plan, which would have been the subject of negotiations at the Security Council to achieve a ceasefire resolution.[53]

But the Lebanese proposal was opposed by some of the permanent members of the Security Council. It was not deemed conducive to a lasting ceasefire especially by the US. Both the US and France had another ending to the conflict in mind which constituted the alternative proposal they were pursuing to solve the crisis. Their proposal aimed at the approval of two different resolutions under Chapter VII, which would have authorised the deployment of a multinational force in south Lebanon (most likely a NATO contingent) to disarm Hezbollah. In addition to this, the draft resolution agreed between France and the US did not mention a call for an immediate ceasefire but only a cessation of hostilities. The cessation of hostilities was also curiously qualified by an unprecedented distinction between defensive and offensive activities on the behalf of Israel.[54]

Miṭrī, who was at the head of the diplomatic delegation in the UNSC, reports that France was particularly keen for a Chapter VII resolution whereas the US was particularly resistant over the inclusion of the issue of the Shebaʿa farms in the resolution.[55] According to Michael Williams (at the time the UN Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process and then Special Coordinator for Lebanon), France was even asking for the deployment of ground to air missiles to protect Lebanese airspace, a proposal that was staunchly opposed by both the USA and Israel.[56]

---

[53] 'Author's Interview with Ṭāreq Miṭrī , Delegate for the Republic of Lebanon to the Security Council During the 2006 War and Member of Cabinet', (Beirut, Lebanon: 27 September 2011).

[54] The text of the draft resolution advanced by France and the US was leaked to *The New York Times* giving a glimpse of the diplomatic initiative alternative to the Seven-Point Plan proposed by Al-Sinyūra. 'Text of the Draft Security Council Resolution', *The New York Times,* 5 August 2006. See point 6 of Table 8.1.

[55] 'Author's Interview with Ṭāreq Miṭrī , Delegate for the Republic of Lebanon to the Security Council During the 2006 War and Member of Cabinet', (Beirut, Lebanon: 27 September 2011).

[56] Williams claims that paradoxically both Israel and Hezbollah were in agreement on the fact that they would have not wanted a strong military presence on the ground. 'Author's Interview with Michael Williams, Member of the House of Lords of the United Kingdom. Former UN Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process and UN Special Coordinator for Lebanon from 2008 to 2011.', (London, UK: 23 July 2012).

Table 8.1 Comparison of the Lebanese and US–French proposals for ceasefire

	Lebanese Government Proposal (Seven-Point Plan)	USA and France[57] Proposal
1	One resolution with strong wording but not under Chapter VII	Two resolutions, the second under Chapter VII
2	Exchange of prisoners between Lebanon and Israel	Encouraging efforts over the issue of Lebanese prisoners and emphasising the need for unconditional release of abducted Israeli soldiers
3	Withdrawal of Israel beyond the 'blue line'	Strong support for territorial integrity respect for the blue line. Elimination of foreign forces in Lebanon without the consent of its government
4	Deployment of Lebanese Armed Forces in the South	UN mandated force to support the Lebanese Armed Forces
5	Reinforcement of the international peacekeeping force under UN mandate	Deployment of a multinational force for the disarmament of Hezbollah (NATO) and to prohibit its rearmament sealing the borders of the country
6	Complete cessation of hostilities on both sides and commitment to definitive ceasefire	Call for cessation of all attacks from Hezbollah and *offensive* military operations of Israel. Support for a permanent ceasefire and a long-term solution
7	Administration of Shebaˈa and Kfarshouba territories under international authority Provision of maps of landmines in south Lebanon from Israel	Provision of landmine maps from Israel to the UN
8	International commitment for Lebanon's reconstruction	Call to international community for humanitarian assistance

The Lebanese government was against the Franco–US plan. It opposed the idea of a multinational force[58] under Chapter VII claiming that the deployment of the Lebanese army, assisted by an upgraded military force of UNIFIL, would have been better and more easily accepted by all the parties in Lebanon (read Hezbollah). Furthermore, whereas the stronger resolution sponsored by the US wanted to seal the borders of Lebanon in order to prohibit the rearmament of Hezbollah, the Lebanese government

---

[57] The role of France in supporting this line of negotiation was intermittent and often critical of US insistence on certain points.

[58] The reasons to oppose a multinational force were many; the main risk was that the multinational force would have been NATO, which would have been unacceptable for Hezbollah and its allies. In a conversation between the US Ambassador to Lebanon and Lebanese MPs, the ambassador reports that: 'regarding the proposed multinational stabilization force, Osserain commented: 'Did you forget what happened during the 80s?'. He was referring to the Multinational Force Mission of 1982 when the US and France were attacked on three devastating occasions reporting hundreds of casualties. 'US Diplomatic Cable 06beirut2518', <http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/08/06BEIRUT2518.html>, accessed 16 June 2011.

was only concerned with deploying its forces in the South and prohibiting weapons under the line of the Litany river.

According to Miṭrī, achieving a shared agreement within the government over the seven points was already a considerable result.[59] Nothing more than what was already achieved could have been attained without the risk of the government's collapse. Furthermore, the government was critical of a resolution under Chapter VII and the two-phase implementation suggested by the US proposal.

At a later stage, a further issue was raised regarding the explicit request of the withdrawal of Israel from Lebanon. The Lebanese government was obviously requesting it as an essential condition, while the US diplomatic initiative was trying to pass a resolution which would have allowed the Israeli occupation of the South for an indeterminate time.[60] Because of these divergences, negotiations were still far from an agreement while Israel was continuing its bombing campaign which, as it was not successful, was supplemented by a ground invasion.

8.3.2   The Cessation of Hostilities

The diplomatic negotiations were increasingly diverging over their aims. On 25 July four members of the UN Truce Supervision Organisation (UNTSO) mission were killed by an Israeli precision bomb while based in a well signed UN post. According to a US diplomatic cable, the UN Secretary-General Special Representative in Lebanon Geir Perdersen conjectured that the reason for this deliberate attack was to discourage foreign nations from offering troops for a peacekeeping force.[61] Another major accident took place on 30 July; Israel hit a civilian building in Qānā (the same village of the 1996

---

[59] 'Author's Interview with Ṭāreq Miṭrī , Delegate for the Republic of Lebanon to the Security Council During the 2006 War and Member of Cabinet', (Beirut, Lebanon: 27 September 2011).

[60] In one of the leaked cables from the US Embassy in Beirut, Ambassador Feltman reports of the efforts to convince Al-Sinyūra to accept a resolution which would have allowed Israelis in south Lebanon, which Al-Sinyūra opposed as impossible and inevitably brought about the fall of the government and contextually provoked sectarian tensions at an unprecedented level. 'US Diplomatic Cable 06beirut2542', <http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/08/06BEIRUT2542.html>, accessed 16 June 2011.

[61] 'US Diplomatic Cable 06beirut2476', <http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/07/06BEIRUT2476.html>, accessed 16 June 2011.

massacre) killing more than 28 people (of which 13 children) in one round.[62] US Secretary of State Rice was supposed to visit Lebanon then but at that point al-Sinyūra declared that there was no other negotiation to be held before agreeing on an immediate ceasefire.[63] These were just two of the many occasions in which non-combatants were involved in the war on the Lebanese side rendering the negotiations increasingly difficult and squandering precious time to reduce the effects of the conflict.

Throughout this kind of action, causing hundreds of thousands of internally displaced persons, devastating civilian infrastructure and failing to achieve significant military results, the war did not bring about any of the results expected by Israel and its allies. Quite the contrary, whereas Hezbollah at the beginning of the war was held responsible for precipitating Lebanon in a destructive war and was surprised by the scale of the conflict it had to deal with, its capacity to contrast the Israeli army on the ground and the suffering imposed on the Lebanese population by Israel tilted the balance in Hezbollah's favour in the second phase of the war.

The US and France were no longer in a position to impose their conditions on the ceasefire. The situation began to reveal the political, military and intelligence miscalculations that were at the basis of the conflict. Resolution 1701, finally calling for a ceasefire, was approved by the Security Council on 11 August.[64] The resolution was not under Chapter VII and did not call for a multinational force, both crucial demands from the US and France. It established the deployment of the LAF in the south (but not on the Syrian borders) with the collaboration of a newly reinforced UNIFIL military force towards which various Western countries (including a reluctant France) contributed.[65] 1701 only mentioned the possibility of a follow-up resolution (as it was prospected in

---

[62] Human Rights Watch reported 28 deaths and 23 people missing in the attack. Human Rights Watch, 'Israel/Lebanon Qana Death Toll at 28: International Enquiry Needed into Israeli Air Strikes', <http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2006/08/01/israellebanon-qana-death-toll-28>, accessed 13 June 2011.

[63] Carol Migdalovitz (2010) 'Israeli-Arab Negotiations: Background, Conflicts, and U.S. Policy ' (Washington: Congressional Research Service).

[64] A point of dispute among scholars and politicians is whether 1701 called only for the 'cessations of hostilities' or for a ceasefire. The wording of 1701 is ambiguous initially calling for 'a full cessation of hostilities' (section 1) and then 'calling for Israel and Lebanon to support a permanent ceasefire and a long-term solution' (Section 8). UN Security Council 'United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701 (2006)'.

[65] Deployment along the Syrian border was an important aspect because it is widely believed that it is along that border that weapons are smuggled to Hezbollah.

the two-phase plan sponsored by the US) and called for the complete withdrawal of the Israeli army even though the US was probably interested in a protracted Israeli presence in south Lebanon.[66]

Among the other requests there was the demand to fully implement the provisions of the Ṭāʾif Agreement: 'that require[s] the disarmament of all armed groups in Lebanon, so that, pursuant to the Lebanese cabinet decision of 27 July 2006, there will be no weapons or authority in Lebanon other than that of the Lebanese state.'[67] This time the term 'militia' was not used (differently from resolution 1559). The drafters adopted different wording ('armed groups') making the resolution relevant for Hezbollah disarmament and escaping the issue of defining it a 'militia'.[68]

UNSC Res. 1701 welcomed the efforts of the Prime Minister of Lebanon about the fact that 'there will be no weapons *without the consent of the Government* of Lebanon and no authority than that of the Government of Lebanon'.[69] But in this way, Hezbollah would have only needed the consent of the government to retain its weapons which they had officially obtained in the governmental statements a few months before. Even more significantly, the resolution did not inform any cogent mechanism to implement Hezbollah's disarmament, but established only measures to prohibit the acquisition of further weapons. This latter point was sternly pushed for by the US. Surveillance over the implementation of 1701 as regards the rearmament of Hezbollah was to be implemented by the unequipped LAF under the supervision of the UNIFIL military force.

The resolution was, then, more receptive towards the demands of the Lebanese government (including Hezbollah) than the conditions imposed by the US. Hezbollah

---

[66] In a report by the US Ambassador Feltman comments that: 'It will be hard enough to convince Siniora – a Sunni worried about problems with the Shia – to put an official acceptance stamp on Israeli troops in south Lebanon. Speaker Berri will be an even greater problem'. 'US Diplomatic Cable 06beirut2542', <http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/08/06BEIRUT2542.html>, accessed 16 June 2011.

[67] Point 8 of resolution 1701. UN Security Council 'United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701 (2006)'. Author's Emph.

[68] In many of the leaked US diplomatic cables it appears the request of the Lebanese government to use 'Ṭāʾif language' in the resolution as regards disarmament of Hezbollah and 'April Understanding language' as regards the regulation of conflict as opposed to '1559 Language' which was not deemed appropriate to address the issue of Hezbollah. See for example 'US Diplomatic Cable 06beirut2600', <http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/08/06BEIRUT2600.html>, accessed 16 June 2011. 'US Diplomatic Cable 06beirut2441', <http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/07/06BEIRUT2441.html>, accessed 16 June 2011.

[69] Point 8 of resolution 1701. UN Security Council 'United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701 (2006)'.

was capable of maintaining its arsenal and its status of resistance movement notwithstanding the war, the resolution, and the subsequent political pressure eventually leading to the civil unrest of May 2008. UNSC Res. 1701 was, in conclusion, a compromise mainly reflecting the requests of the Lebanese government's diplomatic initiative which in turn was under the influence of Hezbollah's conditions. The devastating war of 2006 and its consequences underpinned the legitimacy of the resistance and the retention of its weapons. In this respect, Williams confirmed that by participating in the government, Hezbollah achieved the best resolution that it could get for its strategic interests.[70] Points 1, 3, 4, 5 and 7 of Table 8.1 prevailed over the alternatives proposed by the US. Hezbollah member Fayyāḍ assesses the achievement of 1701 as follows:

> Just as Israel had failed miserably to achieve goals set for its aggression, the resolution 1701, in its current version, seems to be a Lebanese achievement comparing with all attempts to impose projects under Chapter VII on Lebanon, as well as the American–French or American projects that David Welch brought with (sic) to Beirut. This is also a first degree achievement based on the result of the battle, which reduced many of the political risks that were involved in other decisions.[71]

In the subsequent analysis, I will illustrate that despite the success of Hezbollah in influencing certain aspects of the resolution, its close involvement in the negotiation of the resolution due to its governmental role also influenced its political identity.

8.4 UNSC Resolutions as a Factor of International Socialisation

The previous pages have shown that, by accessing the government, Hezbollah was capable of influencing the process of negotiation and implementation of UNSC resolutions limiting their impact over its action. UNSC Res. 1559 drew upon two main international norms. The first is the principle of state sovereignty demanding the withdrawal of Syria and the disarmament of factions challenging the state's monopoly of force. The second is maintenance of international peace, understood as related to

---

[70] 'Author's Interview with Michael Williams, Member of the House of Lords of the United Kingdom. Former UN Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process and UN Special Coordinator for Lebanon from 2008 to 2011.', (London, UK: 23 July 2012).

[71] 'Alī Fayyāḍ (2008) 'The Resolution 1701 and the Conflicting Strategies' (Beirut: the Consultative Centre for Studies and Documentation: 15 May 2008).

the disarmament of Hezbollah. Similarly, UNSC Res. 1701 relied on the same principles of 1559 demanding the withdrawal of Israeli troops, full deployment of the LAF, reinforcement of the UNIFIL mission and disarmament of Hezbollah.

Even though these resolutions were largely ineffective in constraining it, Hezbollah was nonetheless influenced by their implementation. Its participation in the government was a two-way process. On the one hand, Hezbollah influenced certain aspects of the resolutions. 1559 was neutralised, forcing the government to renew its acknowledgment of Hezbollah as a national resistance entity and not as militia; whereas 1701 was drafted in a way that was certainly different from how Hezbollah's enemies wanted it to be. On the other hand, its newly acquired governmental role made Hezbollah accountable towards the choices of the state in relation to international norms and exposed it to their implementation to an unprecedented degree.

As in the previous cases, Hezbollah's interaction with international norms can be understood as a case of socialisation in which Hezbollah became directly accountable towards international normative principles contained in UNSC resolutions, modified its Islamist political profile by accepting norms (state sovereignty and international peace) which were previously not acknowledged to the same extent and justified its actions not only as an Islamist actor, but as an international actor referring to international law. Socialisation in this case seems to take place as 'external inducement'[72] as Ikenberry and Kupchan define it, considering the fact that military force is central to this process although highly unsuccessful. As a result of the same process, nonetheless, 'normative persuasion' can be seen when considering that, not only does Hezbollah partly abide by the norms imposed by the resolution but it even begins to use these norms as a source of legitimacy for its action.

---

[72] Ikenberry and Kupchan, 'Socialization' p. 290.

8.4.1 Government Participation and Accountability

Hezbollah took part in the government in an attempt to contain the effects of a changed regional scenario. As part of the government, it was capable of influencing the drafting of UNSC Res. 1701 in the way discussed in Section 8.3.2. Sources confirm how the rest of the cabinet was forced to partly accept Hezbollah's conditions to avoid falling into another governmental crisis.[73] Hezbollah's political weight is shown for example in a conversation held by PM al-Sinyūra with the ambassadors of the countries involved in the drafting of the resolution when discussing alternative options to the Seven-Point Plan of the Lebanese government. According to a US diplomatic cable:

> While Siniora did not state that the GOL [Government of Lebanon] would definitely reject the current draft if passed, he hinted at growing disagreement within the Cabinet over the terms of a ceasefire deal, and that his government could collapse over it. While he will not rule out taking a 'creative look' at the proposal in order to make it work, he stated clearly that 'Hizbollah is not going to comply' with the resolution if passed as is, and that this would increase Sunni–Shia tensions while providing the pretext for continued Hizballah militancy and Syrian meddling.[74]

This confirms how Hezbollah was in a position to blackmail the cabinet and potentially cause its collapse. In contrast though, Hezbollah's direct involvement not only allowed it to pose conditions over the content of 1701 but in turn made it responsible towards its content. This made the dismissal of the validity of the resolution more difficult, because Hezbollah was regularly consulted in its negotiation as part of the cabinet, as seen above. Whereas Hezbollah's participation in the government gave it a greater bargaining power the same process made it more accountable for its commitments.

At least two of these commitments requested by the resolution (i.e. accepting the deployment of the LAF and the UNIFIL peacekeeping force) were formally sanctioned by governmental decisions, but in fact were not ideal for Hezbollah. These had to be accepted as a condition for the achievement of a ceasefire. Direct influence over the negotiation of 1701 came with direct responsibility over its implementation which was

---

[73] Also Miṭrī confirmed how al-Sinyūra has always been adamant on the need to find a unanimous consensus in the cabinet over the negotiation of a ceasefire thus inevitably taking into account Hezbollah's conditions of the ceasefire. 'Author's Interview with Ṭāreq Miṭrī , Delegate for the Republic of Lebanon to the Security Council During the 2006 War and Member of Cabinet', (Beirut, Lebanon: 27 September 2011). ibid.

[74] 'US Diplomatic Cable 06beirut2542', <http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/08/06BEIRUT2542.html>, accessed 16 June 2011.

also confirmed by the outspoken commitment of Nasrallah to the core aspects of the resolution. Nasrallah raised various critical points in relation to biases in 1701, for example observing that 'the resolution is unfair and unjust when it tries to blame the resistance which conducted a limited military operation despite the lies we heard yesterday at the UN Security Council's session by the US Secretary of State and the Israeli envoy.' He further pointed out that:

> [1701] did not even make any mention of anything related to Israel's aggression, horrific massacres, the killing of over 1,000 civilians in Lebanon, and the killing of women and children in Qana, Al-Shayyah, Al-Qa, Al-Brital, Akkar, Sarifa, and in many and countless Lebanese towns where massacres were committed within this aggression, where the Lebanese infrastructure was destroyed, and where war crimes were committed. All these acts were not even mentioned in the resolution. Some even considered these acts as a natural right for Israel. This is certainly unjust and unfair.[75]

Despite this, Nasrallah declared commitment to the crucial points of 1701 related to the LAF and UNIFIL deployment:

> In the past, through our political stand and our presence in the Lebanese government, we said that we agree on the idea of deploying the Lebanese Army backed by the UNIFIL troops. This is our stand, and we are committed to it. When the deployment of the army and the UNIFIL troops is decided, they will see all required co-operation, facilitation, and preparedness by the resistance, God willing.[76]

Hezbollah's commitment and the elements of criticism which were raised by Hezbollah were also confirmed to the author by Williams, who from 2008 to 2011 was in charge of reporting to the Security Council on the implementation of 1701. Williams confirms a rather cooperative attitude from Hezbollah's cadres in this respect, and observed a rational and prudent attitude from Hezbollah with regard to the measures and the restraints imposed by this resolution.[77] The inclusion of Hezbollah in the government and consequently in the negotiations of 1701 facilitated its commitment even to conditions that were accepted only reluctantly. This has been partly recognised in Hezbollah's assessment of the situation, for example Fayyāḍ claims:

---

[75] Naṣrallah, 'Speech on Al-Manar Channel', (Mideastwire.com, 2006: 9 August 2006).

[76] ibid.

[77] 'Author's Interview with Michael Williams, Member of the House of Lords of the United Kingdom. Former UN Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process and UN Special Coordinator for Lebanon from 2008 to 2011.', (London, UK: 23 July 2012).

> The resolution has introduced essential modifications to the strategic scene in Southern Lebanon, but they are not fundamental, for they didn't put an end to the previous phase nor recreate a new strategic reality. What actually happened was the inclusion of new strategic facts but they did not turn into new strategic reality. Hezbollah has exceeded its reservations, and the Secretary-General [of Hezbollah] openly said that these are the national bounds which they can't go beyond. Later on, Hezbollah announced its commitment to the government's decision towards resolution 1701, though it is unjust and unfair.[78]

The above then confirms how participation in the government was a double sided process, which has entailed the unprecedented commitment (although reluctant) of Hezbollah to a UNSC resolution.

8.4.2 The Shift in the Legitimacy Paradigm

Because of its increased accountability in government and internationally, Hezbollah's Islamist political profile was also affected. Whereas before its legitimacy of resistance movement widely relied on reference to Islamic ethics, this shifted towards a progressive inclusion of international law principles as the founding source of legitimacy for its actions. The move is not an isolated phenomenon, but reflects what Innis Claude noted. According to Claude, international political institutions progressively developed a 'function of legitimisation in the international realm'[79] and Hezbollah seems to take full advantage of this function. According to Claude:

> While statesmen have their own ways of justifying their foreign policies to themselves and their peoples, independent of external judgements, they are well aware that such unilateral determinations do not suffice. They are keenly conscious of the need for approval by a large and impressive body of other states as may be possible, for multilateral endorsement of their position – in short for collective legitimization.[80]

This view is useful in understanding the issue related to UNSC Res. 1559 which was a resolution imposing an identity which Hezbollah did not intend to accept. The resolution entailed its identification as a 'militia' and to avoid this vilifying label, Hezbollah had to find an alternative definition with a higher legitimacy status. Resorting to Islamic norms would not have helped, since these do not enjoy the same degree of legitimacy of

---

[78] Fayyāḍ (2008) 'The Resolution 1701 and the Conflicting Strategies'.

[79] Inis L. Claude, Jr., 'Collective Legitimization as a Political Function of the United Nations', *International Organization,* 20/3 (1966), 367-79 at p. 370.

[80] Ibid.

international norms in international society but only apply to the Islamic community. Within the international context, a non-state actor carrying weapons can only be defined as a terrorist or criminal organisation or a national movement for self-determination. Hezbollah interfered in the political process to make sure that the second definition would have prevailed in a governmental declaration to neutralise the attempt at being identified as a militia or generically a terrorist organisation.

Once recognised by the Lebanese government as a national resistance, Hezbollah legitimated its existence and action referring to principles of international law as the right to self-determination and self-defence and not with reference to Islamic principles with which Hezbollah is more traditionally associated. Referring to the concept of national resistance, Hezbollah aims to fall into the definition of an armed group operating on the basis of principles established by international law and then enjoying more legitimacy internationally and domestically. The most common reference in this regard is Art. 1 (4) of the 1977 Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions of 1949. This article says that the conventions codifying the principles of international humanitarian law apply also to:

> armed conflicts in which peoples are fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation and against racist regimes in the exercise of their right of self-determination, as enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.[81]

Even though the notion is highly contentious among scholars, the inclusion of non-state actors in the Geneva Conventions establishes the lawful status of an armed group carrying weapons against alien occupation as an exercise of the right to self-determination. Under the pressure of UNSC Res. 1559, Hezbollah adapted its political identity to the definitions used by international norms. As observed by Ian Johnstone, the role of the interpretation of legal aspects within the Security Council is crucial in producing the outcomes of its resolutions and their implementation and the same applies to this case. With its governmental role, Hezbollah was capable, at least

---

[81] Art. 1(4) Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977.

domestically, of favouring an interpretation of international law that would have acknowledged it as a national resistance movement rather than a militia and then as a legitimate entity in the framework of international law.[82]

It is for this reason that the war of words of 2005 between 'militia' and 'national resistance', discussed in Section 8.2, acquired such capital importance and became a condition for Hezbollah to return to the cabinet. The declarations and events considered with reference to UNSC Res. 1559 confirm this hypothesis. The ministerial statement of 2005, voted by Hezbollah in parliament, stated that 'the Lebanese resistance is a sincere and natural expression of the national right of the Lebanese people to liberate their land and defend their dignity in the face of Israeli attacks, threats and ambitions, and the factor to complete the liberation of Lebanese territory.'[83]

The same is confirmed in a second occasion after Hezbollah and its allies boycotted the government for weeks and returned to the cabinet under the condition of another declaration by al-Sinyūra. The declaration was another statement defining the political identity of the movement as a national resistance and not as a militia. Al-Sinyūra made clear that: 'We, mister chairman, never called the resistance with any other name different from resistance, and that is a national resistance and we never used other expressions to describe it other than the expression national resistance.'[84] By being identified as 'national resistance', Hezbollah escaped the vilifying label of 'militia' and (supposedly) acquired international legitimacy grounded in international law, but at the same time it also abandoned its Islamist definition at least in the public political sphere.

Hezbollah's identity was framed in a way that rendered it immune to the application of 1559 and traced a distinction between a militia and a national resistance movement. Nevertheless, Hezbollah's manoeuvring to acquire this status also made it an actor whose political principles are not determined by traditional Islamic norms but by

---

[82] Ian Johnstone, 'Security Council Deliberations: The Power of the Better Argument', *European Journal of International Law,* 14/3 (June 1, 2003 2003), 437-80 at pp. 437-80.

[83] Government of the Republic of Lebanon, 'Policy Statement of the Government Led by Fuʾad Al-Sinyūra', <http://www.pcm.gov.lb/Cultures/ar-LB/Menu/السابقة%20الحكومات/التاريخ%20في%20الوزراء%20مجلس/رئاسة%20Pages/w69.aspx>, accessed 8 June 2011. Author's translation.

[84] Republic of Lebanon (2006) 'Maḥāḍir Jalasāt Majlis Al-Nuwāb [Proceedings of the Session of the House of Representatives]' (Beirut: Governement of Lebanon). Author's translation.

international normative concepts. The change is evident if we contrast this definition with the traditional definition of resistance as an Islamic religious duty. Consider for example the definition of Hezbollah given in its 1985 *Open Letter*:

> The main sources of our culture are the venerable Qurʾān, the infallible Sunna, and the decisions and *fatwās* made by the *Faqīh* our *marjʿa al-taqlīd*. These sources are clear, uncomplicated, and accessible to all without exception and they need no theorization or philosophy. All they need is abidance and application. As to our military power, nobody can imagine its dimensions because we do not have a military agency separate from the other parts of our body. Each of us is a combat soldier when the call of *jihād* demands it and each of us undertakes his task in the battle in accordance with his '*shariatic'* duty within the framework of action under the guardianship of the *Wilāyat al-Faqīh*.[85]

The kind of process that has been described in this chapter shows how in this transformation the inclusion of Hezbollah in the government and its exposition to international norms such as UNSC Res. 1559 compelled a redefinition of its identity from being exclusively defined in Islamic terms to an identity that relies on international norms as a source of legitimacy.

Whether Hezbollah can actually be defined as a resistance movement in 2005 remains disputable (especially considering that the occupying force of Israel had almost totally withdrawn from Lebanon), what really matters is that, at this stage, its *raison d'être* is not only Islamist, but widely relies on international norms as a source of legitimacy. As a member of government and acting within the framework of international norms, Hezbollah had to accept the underlying assumptions of the international normative system in which its exclusively religious identity could not be used to legitimise its existence as a resistance movement.

The same kind of transition in Hezbollah's paradigm of legitimacy can be traced with reference to 1701 and the July War of 2006. Hezbollah's declarations during the war show how international norms were instrumental in legitimising its activity also in this case. At the beginning of the 2006 conflict, for example, Nasrallah needed to justify the kidnapping operation that prompted Israel's reaction in front of the Lebanese public. It

---

[85] *See* Appendix 1 § 17–18.

did so by framing this operation in the broader military activity of the movement and referring to the aforementioned governmental statement of al-Sinyūra:

> The government statement, on the basis of which we participated in the government, talks about the Lebanese government's endorsement of resistance and its national right to liberate the land and the prisoners. How could a resistance liberate prisoners? Go to George Bush for example? I cannot and will not go to George Bush. When you talk about the resistance's right, you are not talking about the Foreign Ministry's right. You talk about an armed resistance, and you establish in the government statement its right to liberate the land and the prisoners.[86]

Operation 'truthful promise' then was framed as an operation which, according to Hezbollah's leader, enjoyed legitimacy as a right to national liberation of land and prisoners. Legalistic thinking in terms of international law becomes relevant because the kidnapped Israeli soldiers were not on Lebanese soil when they were assaulted, a point which was contested within Hezbollah's ranks as a violation of the same international principles throughout which Hezbollah justified its military activity.[87] To this objection, Nasrallah commented as follows in an interview, showing once more the relevance of international norms in informing the activity of the movement:

> Nothing depends on this point when there is an occupied territory. You can refer to the legal opinion by the late professor Edmond Naim. The legal viewpoint is clear. Under international law, if one inch of our land is occupied, we have the right to carry out operations in Tel Aviv. […] there is no difference from the legal point of view if we take them prisoners in Shabaʿa farm, the border, near the barbed wire, or a few hundred meters beyond the borders. This is our right in international law. We should not forget that they are holding Lebanese prisoners, claiming they are prisoners of war.[88]

For the scope of this analysis, it is not relevant to discuss whether Nasrallah's legal opinion would hold in an international legal court (as it seems hardly the case); the point is that Hezbollah is not justifying its actions strictly with reference to the Islamic ethical paradigm but referring to an interpretation of international law.

---

[86] 'B4. Hizballah Leader Hasan Nasrallah, Interview with Al-Jazeera, 20 July 2006 (Excerpts)', *Journal of Palestine Studies,* 36/1 (2006), 178-83 at p. 180.

[87] Andrew Exum (2006) 'Hezbollah at War: A Military Assessment' (43; Washington DC: Washington Instiue of Near East Policy: December 2006).

[88] 'B4. Hizballah Leader Hasan Nasrallah, Interview with Al-Jazeera, 20 July 2006 (Excerpts)', p. 180. Edmond Naim was a prominent figure in the Lebanese academia with an expertise in international law. In its scholarly work he defended the legality of armed resistance against occupying forces in Lebanon.

Furthermore, international norms are not only instrumental to the legitimacy of Hezbollah's action but are also instrumental to the condemnation of Israel's military activity. Reference to the concept of 'war crime' in Nasrallah's speeches is indicative and reiterates the issue discussed in Chapter 6 regarding the protection of civilians in conflict:[89]

> The killing of civilians, including men, women and children, is taking place deliberately [...] Are these not war crimes? Is not the killing of children and women a war crime? Is not the demolition of vacant buildings that are distant from the battlefield and which are not used in any way and have nothing to do with Hezbollah's leaders and fighters considered a war crime?[90]

An interesting anecdote was reported by Williams.[91] In one of his meetings regarding 1701 with Hezbollah's Minister Fnaysh, Williams was subject to the demands from Fnaysh to release a press statement in public, despite the fact that he did not have any intention to do so. Fnaysh's demand was due to the fact that Hezbollah wanted to be seen as being involved and as part of the process of negotiations and implementation of 1701. Entertaining relations and meeting at a high level with the UN was becoming part of Hezbollah's public role and image and needed to be fully boasted by media.

As in the case of Resolution 1559 in which Hezbollah had to define itself as a national resistance, the events related to the July war of 2006 and the adoption of UNSC Res. 1701 also had the effect of constraining Hezbollah to justifications referring to international norms. International institutions and then international norms were used as sources of legitimisation for political actors as Claude prefigures.[92] Exposed to hostile international pressure, menaced by a regional conflict and with the responsibility of acting as member of government, Hezbollah could not justify its mission of resistance as an Islamic duty only, but had to defend its legitimacy resorting to international norms.

---

[89] It has been widely reported that Hezbollah also attacked civilians deliberately in the 2006 war even though the number of reported casualties (43) is far lower if compared to the 1,200 Lebanese civilian casualties. *See* Human Rights Watch (2007) 'Civilians under Assault: Hezbollah's Rocket Attacks on Israel in the 2006 War' (19: August 2007).

[90] Naṣrallah, 'Speech on Al-Manar Channel', (Mideastwire.com, 2006: 9 August 2006).

[91] 'Author's Interview with Michael Williams, Member of the House of Lords of the United Kingdom. Former UN Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process and UN Special Coordinator for Lebanon from 2008 to 2011.', (London, UK: 23 July 2012).

[92] Claude, 'Collective Legitimization ' pp. 367-79.

This further attests the process of socialisation of Hezbollah within the international normative framework described by constructivist social theory considered also in the previous chapters.[93] The initially reluctant interaction of political actors with the international normative system progressively brings about the regulation of domestic and international relations on the basis of international norms. Kathryn Sikkink and Martha Finnemore mention how political actors are socialised as the result of a demand of legitimacy as in this case for Hezbollah. According to them:

> An important condition for domestic receptiveness to international norms is a need for international legitimation. If legitimation is a main motivation for normative shifts, we might expect states to endorse international norms during periods of domestic turmoil in which the legitimacy of elites is threatened. [94]

The above also applies to a non-state actor such as Hezbollah, the legitimacy of which could not be explained with exclusive reference to the Islamic normative paradigm anymore, and needs then to be underpinned by international norms.

8.4.3 Towards a Normalisation of State–Hezbollah Relations?

A final observation to be advanced is that, particularly as a consequence of UNSC Res. 1701, Hezbollah had partially to normalise its relations with the state authority or, at least, acknowledge symbolically that it could not depict itself as alternative to state sovereignty but rather as a complementary element. The main indicator confirming this is the deployment of the LAF in the southern region of Lebanon along with the reinforcement of the international peacekeeping force, UNIFIL. Williams reports that Hezbollah would have never admitted it in public, but the deployment of the LAF in south Lebanon was an act that restated the authority of the state over a territory from which it was virtually absent for 30 years.[95] Hezbollah had to accept (reluctantly) the deployment of thousands of Lebanese troops in an area controlled by the Shiʿī

---

[93] Also the idea of normative persuasion here seems to fit the case. G. John Ikenberry and Charles A. Kupchan, 'Socialization and Hegemonic Power', ibid.44 (1990), 283-315 at p. 290.

[94] Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, 'International Norm Dynamics and Political Change', ibid.52/4 (1998), 887-917 at p. 906.

[95] 'Author's Interview with Michael Williams, Member of the House of Lords of the United Kingdom. Former UN Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process and UN Special Coordinator for Lebanon from 2008 to 2011.', (London, UK: 23 July 2012).

movement. More generally, in relation to Hezbollah's commitment to the Seven-Point Plan of al-Sinyūra, Fayyāḍ notes that:

> There is no doubt that Hezbollah's stance submitted to critical circumstances that arose from the domestic division, and the will of Hezbollah to provide a minimum of internal solidarity and national unity in the face of aggression and Western hegemony dominating the international institutions.[96]

The deployment of the LAF was previously considered unacceptable, as Nasrallah declared in one of his speeches:

> Yes, in the past, we objected to the deployment of the army along the borders, not because we had suspicions about the army, may God forbid. This is a national army and for years we have been praising it, […]. When we objected to, or had reservations about, this deployment, it was not out of fear of the army, because this national army can never be a source of fear for its people. The fact is that we objected out of fear for the army through its deployment along the international borders. The question is clear. Deploying a regular army along the international borders directly face to face with an enemy that might at any time transgress is like placing this army in the mouth of a dragon.[97]

Despite this, Hezbollah eventually accepted the deployment of the LAF along with the international peacekeeping force.[98] From a non-state actor Hezbollah was eventually being forced to progressively accept the authority of the state even within a territory over which it claimed control. It is hard to imagine that this would have happened without the imposition of a UNSC resolution demanding the recognition of state sovereignty by Hezbollah through the deployment of the LAF in the south.

Furthermore, Hezbollah accepted the deployment of UNIFIL, which is an even more crucial indicator of change since, thus far, opposition to foreign interference (especially on military grounds) has been among the central pillars of Hezbollah. The United Nations in general have always been considered an irremediably biased institution not to be trusted by Hezbollah as clearly stated in its 1985 *Open Letter*.[99] There are limitations to the confirmation of this last hypothesis. Indeed, the army was never capable of carrying out the disarmament of Hezbollah over which no political consensus was reached due to the staunch opposition of Hezbollah and its allies in the

---

[96] Fayyāḍ (2008) 'The Resolution 1701 and the Conflicting Strategies'.

[97] Naṣrallah, 'Speech on Al-Manar Channel', (Mideastwire.com, 2006: 9 August 2006).

[98] *See* ibid.

[99] See § 209 of the *Open Letter to the Downtrodden* in Appendix 1.

months following the war. In addition the UNIFIL contingent had some tense phases during its operations in south Lebanon.

Nonetheless the deployment of the army in South Lebanon with the approval of Hezbollah was a major step forward achieved through a UNSC resolution which progressively contributes to normalising state–Hezbollah relations by promoting state sovereignty. Although forced on to Hezbollah, the LAF deployment could be considered as socialisation through 'external inducement' according to which a political elite has been forced to accept a policy, but also adapts to it. With Ikenberry and Kupchan's words: 'the normative principles underlying the hegemon's policies come to be embraced as rightful by the elites', in this case by Hezbollah, which declared itself to be willing to cooperate with the deployment of UNIFIL and the LAF.

8.5   Conclusions

As observed in the previous cases with regard to international humanitarian law and human rights, Hezbollah's interaction with international norms as UNSC resolutions also brings about a modification of its political identity of Islamist movement and facilitates its international socialisation.

This chapter has analysed the events of 2005 and 2006 during which Hezbollah became part of the Lebanese government for the first time. At the time, Lebanon was under the scrutiny of international political actors and subject to two major UNSC resolutions based on fundamental international norms such as state sovereignty and maintenance of international peace. It shows how Hezbollah played all its cards in the political process of negotiation and implementation of these resolutions to minimise their impact but in turn was also drawn into the international normative system.

Sections 8.2 and 8.3 have provided an analysis of this process and shown the political role of Hezbollah as a member of government. In Section 8.4, it was argued that even if Hezbollah was indeed efficient at influencing the implementation of these resolutions, this did not happen without costs for Hezbollah's political identity.

Its inclusion in the government has produced the conditions for direct international accountability over its commitment to these resolutions. Furthermore, with its exposition to the international normative system, Hezbollah was forced to account for the legitimacy of its actions on the basis of international norms and not in terms of Islamist values, thus changing the founding paradigm over which its activity was based. Finally it was observed how this process has also reshaped Hezbollah's relations with the authority of the state imposing the presence of the LAF and the reinforced UNIFIL contingent in south Lebanon.

As in the previous cases, Hezbollah's self-referential character and Islamist foundations are increasingly challenged by its socialisation in international society. The phenomena described in this chapter compelled Hezbollah to revise its Islamist identity in a way that is increasingly receptive towards international norms and can be interpreted as a form of international socialisation externally induced but also leading to a normative shift in the legitimacy paradigm on the basis of which it justifies its political action.

Chapter 9

International Norms and Hezbollah's Political Vocabulary

9.1   Introduction

The previous chapters have highlighted the impact of international norms on Hezbollah's Islamist identity analysing its interaction with international actors. This chapter focuses on an analysis of the language of Hezbollah, in particular with regard to the kind of vocabulary used.

It carries out a comparison of the frequency of key terms between two fundamental documents for Hezbollah. The first is the already mentioned *Open Letter to the Downtrodden* (OLD) which was introduced in Section 5.5. The second is the *Political Charter of Hezbollah* (PCH)[1], publicly announced by the Secretary-General Nasrallah on Hezbollah's satellite channel al-Manār in October 2009.[2] These documents (which are of comparable length) have been chosen for their central importance in the overall discourse of Hezbollah. The first, as already seen,[3] is the founding declaration of the movement, while the second is the main programmatic political document that has been released by Hezbollah.

The analysis refers to the categories of person and community (presented in Chapter 4 and mentioned in the other chapters) as the terms of comparison between the two texts. Section 9.2 discusses the concept of community and shows how Hezbollah initially defines this concept in religious terms, especially referring to the idea of *umma*, and then shifts towards an increasing use of the term nation (*waṭān*). Section 9.3 looks at persons, and shows a transition in Hezbollah's political vocabulary from the identification of persons on the basis of religious parameters to their definition as members of a national political community, especially as citizens of the Lebanese nation state. Section 9.4 focuses on the role of international norms and claims that the transition of Hezbollah's political language is characterised by an increasing reference

---

[1] *Al-Wathīqa al-Siyasiyya li Ḥizbu Allāh* (the Political Document of Hezbollah) is part of a larger document entitled *Naḥu al-Dawla al-Qudra wa al-ʿAdala* (Towards the Just and Capable State) which has not been released yet by Hezbollah because it is still to be licensed by the *Majlis al-Shūrā* of the party. 'Author's Interview with ʿAlī Fayyāḍ, Member of Parliament, Republic of Lebanon (Loyalty to the Resistance Block- Hezbollah)', (Beirut, Lebanon: 29 September 2011).

[2] Both documents are in Appendices 1 and 2 and have been purposely re-translated for the sake of this analysis.

[3] *See* Section 5.5.

227

to key normative concepts, widely overlapping with international norms such as: sovereignty, rights, development and others.

International norms are influential in the way Hezbollah redefines Lebanese statehood. From the Islamic paradigm, sketchily outlined in the 1985 document, Hezbollah moves towards the idea of a modern state, which to a certain extent has a liberal connotation. Hezbollah in the 2009 document depicts a state where citizens have rights and in which institutions deliver justice, promote economic development, do not interfere with personal ideas of moral righteousness and rely on some form of democratic accountability. Although with a different methodological approach, this chapter integrates the analysis of the process of socialisation that has been described in the previous chapters, and illustrates how international norms have influenced certain aspects of Hezbollah's political identity with reference to its political language.

9.2 From *Umma* to Nation (*Waṭān*): Hezbollah's Shift in Terms of Collective Entities

A fundamental concept in Islamic and Arabic vocabulary is that of *umma*. The term, which roughly corresponds to 'community', is characterised by a remarkable semantic uncertainty rendering its definition and translation difficult in certain occasions. It is for this reason that the author did not translate, but transliterated the term in the OLD and the PCH.

To fully appreciate the relevance of this concept, it is necessary to elaborate its meanings in more detail. The origins of the word are not confirmed: Bernard Lewis and Halliday argue that it is related to a similar term in Hebrew or Aramaic;[4] Tamim al-Barghouti says that it comes from the Arabic root *umm* which means 'to lead';[5] whereas Said Bensaid argues that it is possible to connect this term with the Arabic term for

---

[4] Lewis, *Political Language* p. 17. Fred Halliday, 'The Politics of the Umma: States and Community in Islamic Movements', *Mediterranean Politics,* 7/3 (2002), 20-41 at p. 23.

[5] Tamim Al-Barghouti, *The Umma and the Dawla: The Nation State and the Arab Middle East* (London ; Ann Arbor, MI: Pluto Press, 2008) p. 37.

'mother'.[6] The term appears in the Qurʾān at least 62 times[7] and several other times in the *ḥadīth*, often with different meanings. In certain cases it even refers to an individual rather than a group.[8]

More relevant than its origins are its different meanings. As is widely accepted, the most important, but by no means the only one, is that of community of believers. In particular when referring to the Islamic community, the *umma* is further qualified by the adjective 'Islamic' that together forms the locution *al-umma al-islāmiyya.* In this case *umma* refers to a group of persons sharing a religious belief in the message of Islam and, as a consequence, a shared commitment to its values and principles. Although there are many different interpretations of Islam, the *umma* entails a sense of unity among the believers, a sense that is further confirmed by the harsh condemnation of sectarian division in Islam epitomised by the abhorrence of strife among Muslims (*fitna*).[9] As Halliday says:

> The assertion of a Muslim community is intimately related to the strength of shared norms, that is *umma* entails not only a common Muslim community facing other non-Muslim people, but is dependent upon the espousal by that community of its internal values and faith, and the fulfilment of duty.[10]

Barghouti proposes a similar definition of *umma* when he says that 'a physical existence of individuals is called an *umma* when these individuals have an image of themselves as a collective, and when this image is guiding them to do things in certain ways distinct from others.'[11] A further aspect is how this concept becomes politically relevant as a source of legitimacy for political and judicial institutions. As Lewis says: 'the polity or community over which this sovereign rules is the *umma*, the single

---

[6] Said Bensaid, 'Al Watan and Al Umma in Contemporary Arab Use' in Ghassane Salamé (ed.), *The Foundations of the Arab State: Nation, State, and Integration in the Arab World* (London ; New York: Croom Helm, 1987) p. 167.

[7] Halliday, 'Politics of the Umma' p. 23.

[8] Al-Barghouti, *Umma and Dawla* p. 39.

[9] See for example Hamzeh's discussion of the unity of the Islamic Umma, Hamzeh, *In the Path of Hizbullah* pp. 39-42.

[10] Halliday, 'Politics of the Umma' p. 25.

[11] Al-Barghouti, *Umma and Dawla* p. 39.

universal community embracing all the lands in which Muslim rule is established and the Islamic law prevails.'[12] Also, Halliday observes that:

> The very definition of an *umma* as a community of shared values, religious or not, has political implications: one is that it should, where possible, coincide with a political authority, as was the case of the Prophet in Medina and was to continue to be the case for his four immediate successors.[13]

The relationship between *umma* and political institutions, thus, is a close one, and will be further investigated below. In addition to its meaning of religious community, *umma* is associated with ethnic groups. In particular with the rise of pan-Arabism, the political discourse often resorted to the idea of an Arabic *umma* (*al-umma al-ʿarabiyya*). In this case, the term is emptied of its religious connotation and redefined on the basis of a shared Arab identity corresponding to a set of values such as self-determination, the formation of a unified Arab state and the revival of Arab culture and inner strength[14] as opposed to foreign domination. This meaning, however, is not of particular importance in the Islamist political vocabulary, which criticises the ethnic conception as being in contradiction with the universalist aspirations of the Islamic *umma*.[15] Throughout its universal call to belief in Islam (*dʿawa*), the *umma* aims to become as widespread and inclusive as possible inviting conversion to Islam in complete disregard of ethnic, national or allegedly racial borders.

This is also attested in both the OLD and the PCH where the Arab nation as *al-umma al-ʿarabiyya* is never mentioned.[16] In the more recent PCH the notion of an Arab political constituency is often referred to as 'our Arab and Islamic world' (*ʿālamna al-ʿarabī wa al-islāmī*)[17] but not as *umma*. This indicates how Hezbollah seems to attach a religious and universalist meaning to the concept of *umma* consistently with the more general Islamist trend.

---

[12] Lewis, *Political Language* p. 32.

[13] Halliday, 'Politics of the Umma' p. 24.

[14] Ibid., p. 28.

[15] As will be explained below a more appropriate term identifying national or ethnic groups is *waṭān* or *qawm*.

[16] There is only one exception in § 139 of PCH in which the word umma is used in the locution 'Arab and Islamic umma.'

[17] § 8,40,41,100,110,130 of the PCH.

Another interpretation of *umma* is put forward by Lewis who, in addition to its religious and ethnic meaning, identifies a moral meaning of *umma* which seems to apply to both the previous cases. According to Lewis the *umma* 'can be moral, since the Qurʾān speaks of the *umma* of good people, as opposed to the *umma* of bad people.'[18] With reference to the case in question, this notion seems to become relevant if we consider the expression: 'sons of Hezbollah's *umma*' (*abnaʾ ummat ḥizbu Allāhi*) which is used only in the OLD.[19] Qāsim reports that 'Umma of Hezbollah' was originally intended to be the name of the movement but eventually the name adopted was the shorter 'Hezbollah'. The meaning of *umma* in this case is that of a moral community that literally could be translated as: 'the community of the partisans of God.'[20]

In addition to these variations in meaning, a further confusing factor is that *umma* has often been translated as 'nation'. A common example is that of the name of the United Nations, which in Arabic is *al-Ummam al-Muttaḥida*, literally the 'united *ummas*'.[21] As it has been pointed out, however, translating *umma* as nation is rather misleading since it has been shown how different shades of meaning characterise this term, while the concept of nation itself (equally problematic to define) does not seem to correspond fully to the idea of *umma*. Al-Barghouti observes that translating *umma* as nation necessitates forcing into the concept of *umma* an alien idea avulse from its more traditional meaning raising the suspicion of a neo-colonial bias. He says that:

> In translating non-European terms into European languages the conceptual richness and thus the true operative meaning and function of political ideas are distorted and muted. The translation of 'Umma' into 'nation' and 'Dawla' into 'state' holds such biases.[22]

Whether this is the actual case or not, translating *umma* as 'nation' in Hezbollah's OLD, as Norton does,[23] is ambiguous because this translation does not actually describe

---

[18] Lewis, *Political Language* p. 32.

[19] This locution is found in §12,13, 14, 46 of the OLD.

[20] Qassem, *Hizbullah* p. 59.

[21] The plural of *umma* is *ummam*.

[22] Al-Barghouti, *Umma and Dawla* p.32.

[23] Norton, *Amal and the Shiʿa* p. 168.

what Hezbollah refers to when it refers to an *umma*. Translating the locution 'Hezbollah's *umma*' as 'Hezbollah's nation' is unconvincing.[24] The same problem applies to the translation of Qāsim's *Hezbollah: the History from Within* in which *umma* is also translated as nation.[25]

Nonetheless, al-Barghouti's view quoted above advances a form of cultural essentialism which is not convincing. While certain uses of *umma* might be problematic to translate, the term *dawla* (as I will illustrate below) fully reflects the idea of a modern state, at least in Hezbollah's PCH. On the basis of what has been observed then, it is reasonable to argue that Hezbollah refers to the concept of *umma* as a religious community of believers, universal in its extension (hence different from a nation) and with both moral and political implications.

Similar to the ambiguous translation of *umma* as nation, is the translation of *Ḥizbuʾ Allāhi* as 'party of God'. The locution comes from the Qurʾān (5. 56)[26] which was revealed to the Prophet in the seventh century, a time in which the idea of a 'party' (*Ḥizb*) in the modern political sense suggested by the translation 'party of God', would have been obviously anachronistic. Furthermore, in the OLD, Hezbollah itself does not accept the definition of party when it declares that 'we in Lebanon are neither a closed organizational party nor a narrow political structure.'[27] The translation of Hezbollah as 'party of God' does not seem to accurately capture the reality at least until 1992, when it also developed a political office becoming part of the political scenery of Lebanon.[28] In this case, the idea of Hezbollah as a party covers only part of a more complex reality including a military apparatus and a widespread social services network.

---

[24] Note, for example, that also Olivier Carré translates the locution 'the sons of Hezbollah's Umma' found in OLD as the 'fils de la communauté du Parti du Dieux' that is 'the sons of the community of the Party of God.' He also translates 'Islamic Umma' as 'World Community of Islam'. Olivier Carré, 'Quelques Mots-Clefs De Muhammad Husayn Fadlallâh', *Revue française de science politique,* (1987), 478-501 at p. 489.

[25] The Arabic edition is: Qāsim, *Ḥizbu Allāh: Al-Manhaj, Al-Tajriba, Al-Mustqbal [Hezbollah: Method, Practice and Future]*. For an example see page 83 of the Arabic version and Qassem, *Hizbullah* p. 59.

[26] The Qurʾān verse is also quoted in §2 of the OLD.

[27] § 15 of the OLD.

[28] *See* Section 7.2.

Having considered the concept of *umma* and *ḥizb*, it is possible to briefly consider the idea of *dawla*.

The translation of this term is not as problematic as *umma* and is generally accepted as 'state'. As Lewis observes, 'by far the commonest term for the state and the polity, from the eighth century onwards, is *dawla*, which, with its phonetic variation in other Islamic languages, is now the almost universal word for the state.'[29] There are, nonetheless, some specifications to take into account. The first is that *dawla* is a term with a long history that refers to 'any authoritative political arrangement. It is temporary not territorially fixed and usually associated with the ruling elite.'[30] In this more general sense, the concept does not refer only to the state as it developed in the modern era (i.e. a sovereign government ruling a people over a territory) but also to other polities such as the Caliphate or the *Wilāyat al-Faqīh*, in which sovereignty is only recognised with God and law making is not derived from the will of the people but from the interpretation of the *sharīʿa*. Also, the temporality of the *dawla* is considered in contrast with the eternity of the rule of God. A common saying in popular Islamist discourse is that Islam is '*dīn wa dawla*' which means it is both religion (*din*) and administration of immanent power. Furthermore, the concept of *dawla* is different from the term *balad* which is often translated as 'country'. A further distinction regards the more general term *niẓām* which can be translated as 'system' or 'regime' and is used in the phrase *al-niẓām al-islāmī,* meaning 'the Islamic system' to which many Islamist thinkers refer to and that is also mentioned in the OLD.[31] The term is often a matter of discussion because it is not clear how an Islamic system would look in its institutional arrangements, while an Islamic *dawla* would be associated with the idea of an Islamic state.

A further term that needs to be introduced before coming to the analysis of the OLD and the PCH is *waṭān*, commonly associated with the idea of nation as it developed originally in the European context. Lewis introduces this term as follows:

---

[29] Lewis, *Political Language* p. 35.

[30] Al-Barghouti, *Umma and Dawla* p. 56.

[31] See § 52 and 77 of the OLD.

> In modern times a new word has entered the political vocabulary and is now in almost universal use. It is the Arabic term *waṭan* meaning 'one's place of birth or residence.' It is often used in the sense of 'homeland' or 'birthplace'. […] In the course of the nineteenth century, the word *waṭan*, with its derivatives for 'patriot' and 'patriotism', passed into common use as part of the new nationalist terminology[32].

Nonetheless, Lewis argues, the term nation was imported into the Middle East from an allegedly disconnected cultural context and its application is therefore difficult in these circumstances. As in the case of *umma*, the ambivalence of *waṭān* remains unsolved. Al-Barghouti takes a more definite stance and reminds us that *waṭān* is also the term that indicates the concept of nationalism in its derived word *waṭāniyya*. He further refines the meaning making a distinction which will also be relevant for this analysis. He points out that *waṭān* refers to the idea of nation as the *local* nation, basically derived from the administrative partitions imposed at the end of the colonial period in the Middle East.

Differently, the term '*qawm*' refers more often to the pan-Arab sense of nation which is an analogous form of nationalism but goes beyond the borders of Sykes-Picot's map of the Middle East. As he observes:

> *Qawmiyya* means to belong to a certain group of people, '*qawm*', and is therefore usually associated with Arab nationalism; Arabs have the same origin, the same language, and the overwhelming majority of them have the same religion and the same collective memory.[33]

Moreover, Bensaid observes that *waṭān* refers to localised nationality even though he points out that the same term, occasionally, refers to Arab nation as (*al-waṭān al-ʿarabī*) just like in the case of *umma*. The last term that needs to be mentioned is *shʿab* which corresponds simply to 'people'. Differently from *waṭān*, *shʿab* is not strictly related to patriotic values and, differently from *umma*, does not necessarily entail ethical bonds between its members. As Halliday says, 'the term *shʿab* (people) could be used interchangeably, depending on the preference of the speaker, to refer to all Arabs, or, if

---

[32] Lewis, *Political Language* p. 40.

[33] Al-Barghouti, *Umma and Dawla* p. 179.

more wary of pan-Arabism to denote specific Arab people, such as the Egyptians, Yemenis, or Tunisians.'[34]

Table 9.1 overview of the terms defined in Section 9.2

Term	Translation	Description
umma	community	Terms primarily of religious connotation with both political and moral implications. It refers to a group of persons sharing a belief and a set of moral principles
dawla	state	Does not have a religious connotation in a strong sense. Primarily refers to an institutional structure administering material power. Used to translate the modern concept of state.
ḥizb	group of partisans	Often translates as party only captures part of a more complex social, political and religious reality in the case of Hezbollah. Hezbollah explicitly refers to this term in its Qurʾanic origins.[35]
waṭān	nation	The term that has been used to translate the national community in a modern sense, as a people sharing a territory, a language and a history. Translating *umma* as nation is often misleading.
qawm	nation	This term is used more often to indicate national identity in a more ethnic and beyond-national-borders sense.
shʿab	people	Can be properly translated as people, without specific characterisations

On the basis of the vocabulary that has just been analysed, it is now interesting to turn to a comparative analysis of its use in the OLD and the PCH to then propose some concluding observations in the final part of the paper.

Consideration of the term *umma* shows that Hezbollah has become keener in adopting a political language that more insistently refers to the Lebanese nation rather than the Islamic community only as its community of reference. In the OLD the term *umma* is frequently used with two main meanings. The first meaning was already mentioned and it refers to Hezbollah as a community of partisans of God. But the document makes clear that this community is part of a broader Islamic *umma* (that is its second meaning) as it says: 'We, the sons of Hezbollah's *umma*, consider ourselves a part of

---

[34] Halliday, 'Politics of the Umma' p. 28.

[35] Hezbollah's motto from the Quran (5.56) contains its name and goes: '*faʾinna ḥizbu Allāhi hum al-ghālibūn*' translated 'God's party is sure to triumph'. Abdel Haleem, *Qurʾan* p. 73.

the Islamic *umma* in the world'[36] and further specifies that 'we are a *umma* tied to the Muslims in every part of the world by a dogmatic and political bond, namely Islam.'[37]

Indeed the rest of the document refers to the concept of *umma* as a universal religious community which aims to protect the downtrodden people[38] according to the principles of Islamism against the threats of 'imperialism' and 'Zionism'.[39] The main guides of the community are the ʿ*ulamaʾ* who have the duty of leading the religious community on the path of Islam.[40] This idea of *umma* is reiterated all across the document in which it is mentioned 24 times[41] and inevitably becomes a key definitional term for this early stage in Hezbollah's political vocabulary. Quite differently in the PCH, 24 years later than the OLD, the term *umma* appears 11 times.[42] The locution 'Hezbollah's Umma' is absent, but the concept maintains its meaning of transnational religious community committed to Islam for which the Islamic resistance have fought Zionism and imperialist domination[43] and maintaining its enmity against the US and Israel as the main threat for the unity and well-being of the community. Nonetheless, although *umma* remains relevant, the idea of nation acquires prominence, being mentioned as *waṭān* in 23 occasions,[44] all of them referring to Lebanon.[45]

In the OLD, the term nation (*waṭān*) was not used at all, while in the PCH it is obviously of central importance. The second chapter of the PCH goes under the title 'Lebanon' and its first section is 'the nation' thus giving a clear sign of how Hezbollah's political identity has become concerned with the national dimension of the political process. While the reference to the idea of umma as the Islamic community is maintained in

---

[36] §13 of the OLD.

[37] §15 of the OLD.

[38] §72 of the OLD.

[39] §128 of the OLD.

[40] §191 of the OLD.

[41] §12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 23, 26, 28, 46, 72, 78, 125, 146, 158, 172, 191, 200, 208 of the OLD.

[42] § 11, 18, 44, 52, 92, 118, 132, 133, 159, 144, 161 of the PCH.

[43] § 132, 133 of the PCH.

[44] §2, 54, 55, 57, 58, 59, 60, 64, 65, 66, 68, 70, 79, 80, 82 of the PCH.

[45] The figure would be 49 cases if we consider derived terms such as 'national'.

general terms, the concept of nation is reiterated on a number of occasions signalling a shift from the centrality of *umma* to the importance of *waṭān*. This phenomenon has been widely reported in the scholarship on Hezbollah and defined as the 'Lebanonisation' of the movement.[46] Considerations in terms of vocabulary analysis corroborate the more general observation of a nationalised Hezbollah.

As mentioned before, the term *waṭān* denotes an idea of nation in a clearer manner than *umma*. *Waṭān* is used with reference to the local nation and not the Arab nation. In addition to the frequent use of *waṭān* (which is correlated to a decrease in the use of *umma*) it can be seen a more common use of 'people' and 'peoples' in the PCH. In different cases the concept is used to indicate national peoples as sub-units of a wider *umma*. For example the term is used to refer to the Palestinian or Lebanese people, while in other occasions it is clearly distinguished from the term *umma* when the text for example says: 'Here lies over the shoulder of the *umma* and its peoples'[47] or 'has not left choice to our *umma* and its peoples'[48] thus indicating how the two concepts are differentiated.

The term people (*shʿab*) occurs in the OLD 11 times,[49] and in most of the cases, does not refer to a national people but is used in looser locutions such as the 'oppressed people' or the Muslim 'people'. Differently, 'people' is used as referring to a national population in almost all 42 cases[50] of the PCH thus confirming the trend that was already clear with reference to the term *waṭān*. The first observation, then, is that this shift in Hezbollah's vocabulary clearly indicates how the political community to which it refers in more recent times is primarily the Lebanese nation. The *umma*, understood as the universal community of Muslims, maintains relevance but not as much as at the origins of the movement. The recurrent reference to *waṭān* and similarly the use of

---

[46] Literature on the 'Lebanonisation' of Hezbollah is vast; scholarship is almost unanimous in recognising this phenomenon. See for example Saad-Ghorayeb, *Hizbullah* pp. 82-7. among others. *See* Section 1.3.

[47] § 133 of the PCH.

[48] § 52 of the PCH.

[49] § 42, 44, 45, 52, 76, 78, 81, 129, 134, 149, 151.

[50] § 15, 18, 57, 61, 62, 66, 71, 80, 86, 97, 130, 142, 150, 153, 159, 161 of the PCH.

shʿab in the PCH of Hezbollah is a clear break with the OLD, which almost exclusively refers to the *umma* as the main community of reference.

This fact also has some important political implications in the kind of institutional system that Hezbollah envisages and these are clearly reflected in another vocabulary shift between the OLD and the PCH. As already discussed above, the nature of the political community to which an actor refers inevitably influences the type of polity which the actor envisions as its political ideal. If we consider the OLD, Hezbollah does not endorse clearly an institutional system as part of its programme of action. The word 'state' (*dawla*) is used to refer to other states that are not Lebanon, and, on one occasion, to refer to the Islamic Republic of Iran.[51] Iran is referred to as the 'nucleus of the world's central state of Islam',[52] it is unclear what this means and whether Hezbollah imagines the establishment of a transnational Islamic state. The ambiguity continues when the term *dawla* is abandoned, and the text refers to the concept of the 'Islamic system' (*al-niẓām al-islāmī*).[53]

In these occasions Hezbollah clearly endorses the idea of promoting an Islamic system as the only one that can guarantee justice and dignity, a project that is central for most of the Islamist actors especially at their early stage. In a sentence of the OLD, it declares that they aspire 'to see Lebanon ruled by Islam and its just leadership'[54] although the text then specifies that this will only happen with the consensus of the majority of the people. Nonetheless, Hezbollah does not specify what this means exactly, especially considering the fact that the relative majority of the population at that time was Christian, and the OLD reader is left with doubt about whether Hezbollah is thinking of a global Islamic state with a centre in Teheran or something else. On a similar note, the *Wilāyat al-Faqīh* is mentioned in three instances in the OLD[55] but in

---

[51] § 14 of the OLD.

[52] Ibid.

[53] § 52 and 77 of the OLD.

[54] § 78 of the OLD.

[55] § 7, 16, 18 of the OLD.

none of these cases is it proposed as an institutional arrangement to be applied to the Lebanese context, rather it is considered the centre of the spiritual/religious community.

Hezbollah's undetermined political vision changes sharply in the more recent PCH, where the institutional system prefigured by the party is defined in more detail. The term *dawla* (to be understood as the concept of state in the modern sense) is used 32 times with reference to Lebanon.[56] Entire sections of the document are dedicated to explaining which principles this state should rely on.[57] It can be argued that the shift from *umma* to nation outlined above corresponds in terms of institutions to a shift from a vague reference to an Islamic system in the OLD, to a more precisely defined idea of state in the PCH. The idea of an Islamic system is never mentioned in the PCH, whereas reference to the Islamic Republic of Iran assumes a slightly different meaning. Although it maintains a privileged relationship in the foreign relations of Hezbollah, what was defined in the OLD as 'the nucleus of the state of Islam in the world' in the PCH is defined as 'a state of central importance in the world of Islam.'[58]

From these observations it is possible to deduce a transition in Hezbollah's political identity from a fundamental emphasis on the *umma* as its central community of reference towards the Lebanese nation. The *umma* maintains a relevant degree of importance in the newer document as well, but the concept of nation acquires a comparable value.[59] This shift has important consequences with regard to the polity that Hezbollah endorses. From a vague reference to the idea of an Islamic system in Lebanon, Hezbollah moves towards the affirmation of an accomplished form of statehood, widely overlapping with the principle proposed by international norms, as discussed in Section 8.5. (See Figure 9.1)[60]

---

[56] § 2, 18, 37, 38, 62, 63, 67, 70, 72, 79, 80, 81, 106, 133 of the PCH.

[57] See among others § 80 of the PCH. See Section 4 of the document for more details related to which principles are relevant for Hezbollah's political agenda in relation to Lebanese statehood.

[58] § 14 of OLD § 106 of the PCH.

[59] See Tab. 1.

[60] The graph accounts for the absolute frequency of the key terms indicated, and thus includes also for example the word state when it is not used in reference to Lebanon in particular. The difference with the actual counting provided in the text is minimal, but the reader should refer to the frequency provided in the text for the exact value.

Figure 9.1 Frequency of key terms on collective entities in the OLD (Violet) and the PCH (Purple)

9.3   From the Person as Downtrodden (*Mustaḍʿaf*) to Citizens (*Muwātin*)

Before discussing more specifically the role of international norms in the dynamics of change in Hezbollah's vocabulary, it shall be considered how persons are identified through different parameters in the OLD and the PCH. The shift highlighted in this section fully matches with the change that was described in the previous section with reference to collective entities as *umma* and nation.

As can be observed from its title, the OLD is addressed specifically to an audience that is the 'downtrodden of Lebanon and the world'. The term 'downtrodden' is a translation for *mustaḍʿafīn* (singular: *mustaḍʿaf*) which is a key concept in Islamist rhetoric. The term is used usually in opposition to *mustakbārīn* indicating persons characterised by arrogance or abusing their power. These two concepts are also found in the Qurʾān

referring to the victims of injustice and those who abuse their powers.[61] According to Lewis:

> The Arabic word *da'if*, with the primary meaning of 'physically weak' or 'deemed weak', has been used since ancient times to denote those who are socially weak, i.e. in a socially inferior position. A derived participle form, *mustaḍʿaf*, 'made weak' or 'deemed weak', has acquired the meaning of 'deprived' or 'oppressed' and has been used from medieval times to the present day in revolutionary appeals.[62]

The distinction between 'the oppressed' and 'the arrogant' became of central importance in Khomeini's rhetoric, which is highly influential in Hezbollah's discourse. As Halliday observes, 'Khomeini divided societies into two categories of people – the *mostazafin* and the *mostakbarin* (literally those made weak and those made big) – two Qurʾanic terms which began to be used in the populist sense of "oppressed" and "oppressor".'[63]

The same dichotomy can be observed in Hezbollah's OLD where *mustaḍʿafīn* recurs 31 times[64] and *mustakbārīn* and other terms from the same semantic field are found 19 times, thus showing the centrality of these concepts.[65] Olivier Carré observes how the term *mustaḍʿafīn* has a particular importance 'because it is to them [the downtrodden] who especially have to be addressed with the Quran's predicament since potentially they have, after all, a greater internal force.'[66] Indeed, it is also for this reason that Hezbollah's OLD is specifically addressed to the downtrodden people in the attempt to mobilise them. Previous stages of the Shiʿī mobilisation in Lebanon referred to the 'dispossessed', such as in the case of the Movement of the Dispossessed headed by Musa al-Ṣadr.[67] But in that case, the term used was *maḥrumin*. According to Mona Harb and Reinoud Leenders, the shift from *maḥrumin* to *mustadhʿafin* is important

---

[61] 'But we wished to favour those who were oppressed [*ustuẓʿifū*] in the land, to make them leaders, the ones to survive' (Qurʾān 28. 5). Lewis indicates how in particular Qurʾān 4. 76–77 is a call for resistance and revolution to fight for the cause of the downtrodden. Lewis, *Political Language* p. 124.

[62] Ibid., p. 15.

[63] Halliday, *The Myth of Confrontation* p. 62.

[64] § 1, 4, 8, 12, 21, 22, 41, 42, 54, 68, 72, 88, 92, 109, 113, 120, 121, 152, 168, 171, 174, 177, 178, 179, 211, 213, 215 of the OLD.

[65] § 5, 13, 20, 21, 22, 30, 64, 78, 84, 87, 112, 113, 119, 123, 155, 178, 186, 211, 213 of the OLD.

[66] Carré, 'Quelques Mots-Clefs' p. 490. Author's translation.

[67] *See* Section 5.3.

because 'the latter invokes an opportunity for transformation and change, whereas the former involves stagnation.'[68]

As in the case of the concept of *umma* the term is ambiguous in certain respects. For example, Asʿad AbuKhalil observes how the reference to a category of oppressed and the call to rise and resist the oppressors echoes Leninist ideology in addition to its religious connotation.[69] The overlap between two ideological paradigms, on one hand the religious call to social justice, on the other the Marxist theme of class struggle, was indeed common in the Islamist revolution in Iran which Hezbollah considers exemplar. Addressing this specific audience, Hezbollah positioned itself not only in the religious discourse of Khomeini but, as Ghorayeb points out, also embraced the wider third word-list rhetoric of the *Wretched of the Earth*.[70]

In 1985, Hezbollah's political identity, as that of other Islamist groups, was in competition with socialist and nationalist competitors. The capacity of combining an appeal to social justice and conveying a message of communitarian affiliation within the framework of Islam was a powerful means of expanding its appeal to spheres in which Islamism did not yet have sway. The religious component nonetheless remains the priority. As Hamzeh says, 'when Hizbullah's ideology speaks of the downtrodden (*mustad'afin*) versus the arrogant (*mustakbirin*), the party does not call for one segment of the Shi'ite or Muslim community to engage in a class conflict with another. Rather, the party calls for transcendence of all class differences to be archived by the Islamic just order.'[71]

The religious dimension of Hezbollah's political identity also maintains its centrality when observing the other terms referring to persons in the OLD. A prominent role is attributed to the ʿulamaʾ, a term that appears nine times in the text. The OLD appeals

---

[68] Mona Harb and Reinoud Leenders, 'Know Thy Enemy: Hizbullah, 'Terrorism' and the Politics of Perception', *Third World Quarterly,* 26/1 (2005), 173-97 at p. 189.

[69] As'ad AbuKhalil, 'Ideology and Practice of Hizballah in Lebanon: Islamization of Leninist Organizational Principles', *Middle Eastern Studies,* 27/3 (1991), 390 - 403 at p. 395.

[70] Saad-Ghorayeb, *Hizbullah* p. 17.

[71] Hamzeh, *In the Path of Hizbullah* p. 42.

repeatedly to religious scholars as *ʿulamaʾ* asking them to assume the leadership of the community and lead the downtrodden on the path of Islam.[72] Furthermore, the text refers more generally to Muslims on 25 occasions.[73] They are asked to unite and take part by any means in the resistance struggle against the enemy. The insistent reference to persons as Muslims and the appeal to *ʿulamaʾ* as their guides are indicative of a perspective in which religious parameters are the main criteria in identifying persons and their socio-political role.

Combining an understanding of the oppressed that stems mainly from a religious parameter (*mustaḍʿaf*) with the reference to Muslims and *ʿulamaʾ*, the vocabulary analysis of the OLD clearly shows how Hezbollah identified persons, at that time, with reference to religious criteria thus highlighting their moral duties as a result of their religious affiliation. Two more terms need to be mentioned before looking at the more recent PCH. Within the wider framework of the concept of *jihād* (which is mentioned five times in the OLD),[74] two words referring to persons become relevant: *mujāhid* (a fighter for *jihād*) and martyr[75] (*shahīd*). The term *mujāhid* has been used on several occasions in Arabic political vocabulary to denote fighters, not only on a religious basis but also with regard to a struggle for national self-determination.

For example in the public discourse of the Algerian independence war, the term was constructed around an understanding of *jihād* that is not only religious but also nationalist.[76] In the case of the OLD, its religious connotation is obvious because to denote combatants without specific religious reference other terms are used such as *muḥārib*.[77] *Mujāhid* appears eight times[78] and is also specified that all the members of

---

[72] The word recurs in plural or singular (*ʿālim*): § 185,189, 190, 197, 199, 200, 204, 206, and 207 of the OLD. The term does not occur in the PCH. The singular appears three times: § 197, 198, 204.

[73] § 7, 15, 16, 39, 40, 42, 51, 67, 98, 100, 101, 107, 109, 138, 143, 155, 175, 182, 184, 186, 190, 192, 205 and 207 of the OLD.

[74] § 5, 18, 144, 153, 195.

[75] Martyr is intended as a martyr of faith in the religious sense. The word 'martyr' in English is derived from the ancient Greek word for 'witness', intended as a witness of faith. Interestingly, also in Arabic the word *shahīd* is derived from the verb that means to witness.

[76] Fred Halliday, *Shocked and Awed: How the War on Terror and Jihad Have Changed the English Language* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2011) pp. 163-4.

[77] § 56 of the OLD.

Hezbollah are trained to take part in military *jihād*[79] thus confirming the importance of being a *mujāhid* for Hezbollah.

The concept of martyr (*shahīd*) refers to the most morally valued idea of person by Hezbollah and Islam in general. A martyr in the Shiʿī tradition is the paramount virtuous person, who gave his or her life as a witness of faith in Islam.[80] The OLD itself is dedicated to a *shahīd* (Rāghib Ḥarb). The OLD mentions the term martyr and other terms in the same semantic field on nine occasions.[81]

As previously seen, in the OLD Hezbollah identifies its friends and allies as the '*mustaḍʿafīn* of the world' and then repeatedly identifies persons throughout a religious paradigm; this also happens in the categorisation of its enemies. The enemies are primarily the Israelis along with their main ally the United States, and more generally 'the West'. On the domestic front, the Phalangists (*katāʾeb*) also have a preeminent role. From a regional perspective, the text critically elaborates against Arab regimes accused of collaborating with the enemy. Also in this case, the reference to the enemy combines religious and ideological aspects. The category of *mustakbārīn* works as the term identifying the promoters of imperialism and Zionism that are the US, its allies in the region and above all Israel. In certain instances, the reference is also strictly religious and disturbingly discriminating as in the case in which the Qurʾanic verse is quoted, which identifies Jews and pagans as the bitterest of the enemy of the believer in Islam.[82]

A different case is that of the 'Christians' (*al-masiḥiun*) who are mentioned in the OLD eight times and one time referred to as Maronites.[83] The text differentiates between Christians in general and the Phalangists (*katāʾeb*). The latter are considered allies of Israel in Lebanon. They are defined as 'fundamentalist Christians'(*al-masḥiūn al-*

---

[78] § 8, 138, 143, 146, 150, 151, 156 and 200 of the OLD.

[79] § 18 of the OLD.

[80] Saad-Ghorayeb, *Hizbullah* pp. 127-33.

[81] § 1, 5, 8, 144, 151, 196 of the OLD.

[82] See § 32 of the OLD, the verse is Qurʾān 5. 82.

[83] § 51, 91, 92, 93, 94, 101, 108 of the OLD.

mutʿaṣibūn)[84] and identified as enemies pursuing political Maronism.[85] Nonetheless, the OLD makes a distinction and claims that not all the Christians in Lebanon are considered enemies and calls for their collaboration in the struggle against the enemy. Towards the Christians, Hezbollah develops a minimalist and a maximalist approach in the OLD. In the minimalist case, it calls for a compromise and a pact of collaboration and coexistence whereas, in the maximalist case, it makes a *dʿawa* appeal for them to join Islam as the true faith.[86] The document makes clear that Hezbollah, though promoting Islam, does not intend to impose it by force to anyone under any circumstances.[87]

Vocabulary analysis of the OLD reveals that Hezbollah widely relies on its own religious paradigm in identifying persons both as allies or enemies; this is not the case of the PCH, or at least not to the same extent. In the PCH of 2009, the dichotomy between oppressed and oppressor persists but is not as relevant as in the OLD. The distinction between *mustaḍʿafīn* and *mustakbārīn* among others becomes relevant when the document says:

> The criteria of divergence, dispute and conflict in the vision of Hezbollah and its methods are based upon political-moral grounds, primarily between the arrogant (*mustakbar*) and downtrodden (*mustadhʿaf*), the oppressor and oppressed, the usurper and the subject and between the occupier and pursuer of freedom and independence.[88]

Overall, the term *mustaḍʿafīn* and its derivatives occur only three times[89] compared to 31 times in the OLD and its use is related to aspects of secondary importance, such as Hezbollah's appreciation for the liberation movements in South America.[90]

---

[84] § 95 of the OLD.

[85] §74 and 93 of the OLD.

[86] § 52, 75, 77, 96, 99, 106, 108, 109 of the OLD.

[87] § 71 of the OLD.

[88] § 116 of the OLD.

[89] § 40, 116, 126 of the PCH.

[90] § 126 of the OLD. In the same section of the charter, it specifies that: 'the slogan "the unity of the downtrodden" remains a major and basic pillar of our political thought in building our understanding, relations and stances of international issues' thus making clear how this third word-list paradigm is primarily related to establishing a connection with the international context.

The term *mustakbārīn* and its related words such as arrogance (*istikbār*) recur in 11 cases,[91] fewer than the 19 cases of the OLD, although not a sharp difference. What might be interesting to point out in this regard is that along with the term arrogance (which is used to refer to the foreign policies of US and Israel) another term gains prominence in the text. Hegemony (*haymana*) occurs in the PCH 24 times[92] compared to only two cases found in the OLD. Whereas *mustakbār* is a term with religious connotations, hegemony, to the knowledge of the author, does not bear a comparable religious connotation, and is more commonly associated with a strictly political and somewhat secular vocabulary.

A major indicator of change from the OLD is the emergence of a term that was virtually absent in the OLD[93] and that makes a greater appearance in the PCH. The appearance of the concept of citizen (*muwātin*) is a remarkable shift in how Hezbollah refers to persons in its political discourse. As Lewis observes, this term was not entirely part of the Arabic language until modern times, when the need to find a term that reflected its meaning in Western political culture emerged. As he says:

> It was not until the general adoption of Western ideas of nationality and citizenship in the Islamic world that a term was needed and was found. It is now in common administrative usage in virtually all Muslim states. The choice that was made among the rich lexical resources of the Arabic language is significant. The Arabic term is *muwāṭin* its Persian and Turkish equivalents are *hamvatan* and *vatandaş*. All three come from the Arabic *watan* .[94]

Perhaps Lewis is not entirely convincing in describing this process as the 'choice' of a term for a concept that was allegedly inexistent before. Languages develop through shared use by their users and not through choices. Nonetheless, the use of this term in the PCH was a choice of the author of the text. Considering the political significance that this term carries with it, its use is a relevant shift in Hezbollah's political vocabulary. From a political vocabulary in which persons were referred to on the basis of a

---

[91] § 8, 10, 40, 42, 52, 105, 130, 131, 132, 112 and 116 of the PCH.

[92] § 2, 9, 11, 13, 21, 22, 23, 26, 27, 30, 31, 34, 38, 40, 117, 118, 119, 125 and 130 of the PCH.

[93] The term citizen is used only once in § 62 with a rather critical tone.

[94] Lewis, *Political Language* p. 63.

traditional religious paradigm, the text adopts a term which characterises persons as members of a national political community.

Table 9.2 Key terms of Section 9.3

Term	Translation	Description
mustaḍʿaf	downtrodden	Generally indicating a victim of oppression, this is a term that has been widely incorporated in social/religious discourse and is also to be found in the Qurʾān.
mustakbār	arrogant	Contrary to the term above, its literal meaning indicates someone who 'makes himself bigger'. It refers to an oppressor, or someone abusing their power and is also present in the Qurʾān.
masiḥī	Christians	Term probably originating from the term 'messiah', referring to Christians as those who believe in the messiah.
muslim	Muslims	The term literally means 'submitted' and refers to persons adhering to the faith in Islam.
kataʾib	Falangist	Term indicating the Christian paramilitary factions, especially active during the Lebanese civil war.
muwātin	citizen	Term originating from the root *wa-ta-nun*, indicating one's place of birth and also used to refer to nation as *watan*. Its modern translation fully corresponds to the concept of citizen.
mujāhid	a person carrying out *jihad*	The term indicates a person carrying out *jihād*, not necessarily *jihād bil saif*, i.e. military *jihād*, but also the greater *jihād* that is the effort of a person to abide by the path of virtue
shahīd	martyr	The term can be more literally translated as 'witness', meaning primarily witness of faith. Its translation as 'martyr' is nonetheless entirely correct since martyr also comes from the ancient Greek term meaning 'to witness' and maintains the same meaning.

Citizen (*muwātin*) appears six times in the PCH[95] and only once in the OLD, where it is used with a rather derogatory tone. The appearance of this term is implicitly linked to the emergence of the concept of nation and state observed in the previous section. The term *muwātin* stems from the same root of the word *waṭān* (nation) and in conceptual terms is directly linked to the existence of a state which, as pointed out in the previous section, emerged as a central concept in Hezbollah's political vocabulary in the PCH. If the recurrence figure related to the term citizen is not particularly high, this trend is nonetheless confirmed by the fact that the term 'Lebanese' referring to Lebanese citizens recurs in the PCH 12 times,[96] whereas the same term does not appear as identifying persons in the OLD in any circumstances. More generally, the term

---

[95] §77, 79, 80 of the PCH.

[96] §55, 57, 62, 63, 70, 76, 78, 80, 82 of the PCH.

Lebanese is used in 31 cases, thus confirming the emphasis of the PCH on the national character of Hezbollah's political identity.

Figure 9.2 Compared frequency of terms referring to persons in the OLD (Violet) and the PCH (Purple)

This confirms how the paradigm of nationality and citizenship became increasingly relevant in recent times for Hezbollah, although its religious dimension maintains a fundamental role (*See* Figure 9.2).[97] A further relevant aspect is related to the issue of Palestinian refugees.[98] Hezbollah declares that Palestinians should not become Lebanese citizens. This is a complicated matter of Lebanese politics, in which the possibility of naturalisation[99] of Palestinian refugees has been a long-standing issue. The fact that Hezbollah opposes Palestinian naturalisation in Lebanon further confirms

---

[97] The elaboration in this figure does not take into account the distinction between the use of 'Lebanese' when referred to persons or to things. The reader should consider the statistics in the text for more accurate figures.

[98] I will further develop this in Section 9.4.

[99] The term used in Lebanese politics is *tawatīn* which stems from the same root of nation and citizen and literally could be translated as 'to nationalise'.

the importance that it attaches to the idea of citizenship.[100] The decline of merely traditional and strictly religious criteria in identifying persons also appears from the less regular references to 'Christians'. The term appears only four times and in none of these cases refers to persons. It is used along with the term 'Islamic' to describe the holy places in Palestine and Jerusalem in particular.[101] A final observation that further distinguishes the PCH from the OLD is the fact that also the term 'Muslims' does not appear as prominently as in the OLD: where the OLD refers to Muslims on 26 occasions, the PCH does so only nine times.[102]

The observations above, then, should be enough to conclude that a vocabulary analysis of these two documents reveals a consistent change in Hezbollah's political identity. None of the paradigms of reference, whether religious or ideological, is completely abandoned but the extent to which Hezbollah resorts to terms such as 'arrogant' (*mustakbārīn*) and 'downtrodden' (*mustaḍʿaf*) and the emergence of other terms such as 'citizen' (*muwātin*) or 'Lebanese' are indicators of a shift in its vocabulary. What was noticed in the previous section with reference to a shift from *umma* (religious community) to *waṭān* (nation) and then *dawla* (state) is similarly reproduced in the terms referring to persons. The primarily religious character of these terms is subsituted by more secular and national terms such as 'citizen'.

---

[100] This explanation can be complemented by the fact that the Palestinian population in Lebanon is almost entirely Sunni and their naturalisation in Lebanon may on a longer term alter the sectarian balance of the country.

[101] The document fails to mention, rather deceivingly, that those places are also holy for the Judaic tradition.

[102] § 49, 107, 113, 130, 132, 135, 136, 140 and 159 of the PCH.

Figure 9.3 Aggregated frequency of religious (blue) and national (yellow) vocabulary

This modification inevitably reflects a change in Hezbollah's political identity. Reference to imperialism and enmity towards Israel remain substantially unvaried but the approach to internal Lebanese politics changes. In a way, this is consistent with what has been observed about collective denominations in the previous section. Hezbollah assimilates a vocabulary apt to a national political organisation which sees values in a nation and a state to be preserved and politically promoted. From a vocabulary mainly derived from a distinction between imperialists and downtrodden people, in its more recent document Hezbollah goes as far as to say that among its aims there is the achievement of a society in which 'the citizen becomes a value in itself.'[103] The change from *umma* to *waṭān* matches with a shift of focus from downtrodden (*mustaḍʿafīn*) to citizens (*muwātinīn*).

9.4   The Role of International Norms: Redefining Statehood

To what extent did international norms influence Hezbollah's transition outlined in the previous sections? The question is legitimate because if we look at the 1985 OLD text, the dynamics of change that could have been reasonably expected are certainly

---

[103] § 77 of the PCH.

250

different from the kind of mutation described in the previous sections. The Islamist hard-line movement advocating the establishment of a an Islamic system justifying and legitimising its actions through a constant reference to Islamic principles could have hardly been imagined as launching a political manifesto such as the PCH of 2009 characterised by constant reference to a modern conception of statehood mentioning ideas as rights, democracy, freedom, justice and state building.

The claim is that international norms have influenced Hezbollah's political identity transformation, which progressively assimilated the vocabulary of international norms as a constitutive element of its identity. The text analysis provides confirmation of how Hezbollah has assimilated a set of norms previously absent from its identity. Thus, it confirms a trend of socialisation within international society. This is not only the result of externally induced constraints but is a more spontaneous choice of the movement, which is indicative of how socialisation at this stage seems to influence Hezbollah at a deeper level within its identity.

In different parts of the OLD, Hezbollah (as also seen in the previous chapters) asserts that its sources are exclusively Islamic. It makes clear that it is committed to the leadership of the *Walī al-Faqīh* of Iran,[104] it states that it is bound to the precepts of the Islamic community,[105] and declares that:

> The main sources of our culture are the venerable Qurʾān, the infallible Sunna, and the decisions and *fatwas* made by the *faqīh* our *marjʿa al-taqlīd*. These sources are clear, uncomplicated, and accessible to all without exception and they need no theorization or philosophy. All they need is abidance and application.[106]

This kind of stance is a clear delimitation of its sources of political and military legitimacy. They confirm the idea that Hezbollah, at least in its early stage, saw itself as a self-referential entity relying on its hierarchies and traditions when defining its identity

---

[104] § 14 of the OLD.

[105] § 15 of the OLD.

[106] § 17 of the OLD.

and justifying the legitimacy of its political actions. This is particularly clear in the following statement, which is a reference to Quṭb's concept of *jāhiliyya*[107].

> It is time for us to realize that all the western ideas concerning human origin and nature cannot respond to human aspirations or rescue us from the darkness of misguidedness and *jāhiliyya* (ignorance). Only Islam can bring about human renaissance, progress, and creativity.[108]

This kind of declaration, as a matter of fact, eliminates any possible space for the inclusion of principles considered external to the ethical perimeter of Islam. The overall document relies on the contraposition between a 'world of downtrodden' and a 'world of arrogance' led by the US and its regional proxy, Israel. International organisations and the kind of norms on which they rely:

> are not podiums for the downtrodden communities (*ummas*) generally and they continue to be ineffective due to the hegemony of their decisions by the states of world arrogance, whether in terms of the implementation or the obstruction of such decisions.[109]

This view, which echoes a realist understanding of international relations, was profoundly critical of international norms and perceived these as manipulated by the interests of hegemonic powers. This is further confirmed by the kind of political institutions which Hezbollah envisions in the OLD and by the religious perspective that it adopts referring to collective groups and to individuals. This kind of self-referentiality renders unlikely the influence of international norms on the political identity of Hezbollah, since these norms are deemed external to the ethical boundaries of Islam.

But the text analysis presented in this chapter shows the contrary. Hezbollah has assimilated many elements of the vocabulary of international norms. Although at its inception Hezbollah relied exclusively on sources of legitimacy stemming from its interpretations of the Islamic tradition, looking at its more recent documents such as the 2009 PCH it is possible to notice the assimilation of a vocabulary widely inclusive of the key concepts of international norms. A comparison of the OLD and the PCH shows

---

[107] *See* Section 3.3.4.

[108] § 180–1 of the OLD.

[109] § 211 of the OLD.

how the latter document is punctuated by terms typical of the international normative language absent in the OLD. (See Figures 9.4 and 9.5.)

frequency by FILE

Figure 9.4 Frequency of International Norms Vocabulary in the OLD (violet) and the PCH (purple)

Among the most evident cases there is the term sovereignty (*syāda*), which refers to the international norm *par excellence* whose adoption is consistent with Hezbollah's endorsement of a modern form of statehood. This term in the PCH recurs 9 times[110] whereas in the OLD is absent. Hezbollah reiterates the message that a solid institutional system needs to benefit from a degree of internationally recognised sovereignty which protects it from foreign interference within the affairs of the state.

Another term, which stands out for the frequency of its use in the PCH and is virtually absent from the OLD, is that of 'rights' (*huqūq* singular *haqq*). The term occurs on 15 occasions.[111] The concept is mentioned in different circumstances, for example is applied to the case of Palestinians with reference to their civil and social rights in

---

[110] § 33, 34, 55, 64, 65, 66, 70, 80, 111 of the PCH.

[111] § 18, 23, 33, 34, 62, 78, 80, 85, 88, 122, 132, 133, 143, 144 of the PCH.

Lebanon, but also asserting their 'right to return' to their homeland.[112] An interesting reference regards the idea of a 'right to resistance'. Hezbollah in the PCH complains that its definition as a terrorist organisation is a political manipulation aiming at delegitimizing the cause of the Islamic resistance.[113] It then subsequently claims that resistance is legitimate from an international normative perspective (literally 'humanitarian and rights based legitimacy')[114] and that George W. Bush's equation of terrorism with resistance is an arbitrary justification of the 'war on terror'.[115]

The document goes as far as to mention the case of the Guantanamo Bay detention facilities arguing that such detention conditions and other cases are a violation of the rights of prisoners who are arbitrarily detained, unfairly tried or simply under detention without trial. Although no explicit mention of the locution of 'human rights' (*huqūq al-insān*) is made, this part of the PCH is obviously referring to human rights principles such as right to fair trial, prohibition of arbitrary detention and torture and widely echoes similar concerns raised by many human rights organisations[116] and the international civil society. Another example refers to the question of crimes of war. In the OLD Hezbollah denounces the indifference and the responsibility of the international public towards the massacre of Ṣabrā and Shātilā in Beirut in September 1982.[117] But, differently from the PCH, rather than pointing out the crime in terms of human rights violation the text then refers to a verse of the Qurʾān which asserts the enmity between Muslims, Jews and unbelievers.[118] This is an indicator of how the ethical paradigm throughout which Hezbollah judges crimes is changed, while originally reference was made exclusively to principles of Islam; at a later stage Hezbollah has assimilated a vocabulary that links also to the international normative framework.

---

[112] § 88.

[113] A similar point was discussed in Chapter 8, with regard to UNSC Res. 1559. See Section 8.2.1.

[114] § 33.

[115] With reference to the legitimacy of the use of force against occupying military army see for example the discussion proposed by Harik *See* Harik, *Hezbollah* p. 165.

[116] § 34 of the PCH.

[117] *See* Section 5.4. The relevant verse of the Qurʾān goes: 'You [Prophet] are sure to find that the most hostile to the believers are the Jews and those who associate other deities with God' (5. 80). Abdel Haleem, *Qurʾan* p. 75.

[118] § 32 of the OLD.

In a similar case, the impact of international norms on Hezbollah's vocabulary also appears in the use of the locution 'crime against humanity' which is used with reference to 'the West'.[119] The term crime is recurrent also in the OLD, but is not defined as 'against humanity' (*ḍud al-insaniyya*) which is a phrase clearly derived from the international normative vocabulary. A further indicator, relevant from the point of view of international norms, is the qualification of Palestinians in Lebanon as 'refugees' (*lājaʾin*). The term recurs 3 times in the PCH[120] and although the problem of Palestinian refugees represented a dramatic reality also at the time of the OLD, this term is not used in such context, confirming also in this case how the adoption of an international norms-specific vocabulary is relevant at a later stage of Hezbollah's history. In a similar way Palestinians are described as 'asylum seekers' and as entitled to minimum standards of living. Also in these cases the terminology is derived from international norms principles being the concept of asylum seeking an international norm itself, and the principle of adequate standard of living a human rights principle guaranteed in international human rights law.

The influence of international norms is not limited to matters of international nature but affects also the way Hezbollah envisions the Lebanese state in the PCH. The kind of statehood which Hezbollah delineates in the new charter is widely overlapping with international norms standards. Among other aspects, for example, Hezbollah declares its commitment to safeguarding freedom, sovereignty and self-determination. Its conception of Lebanese statehood includes the promotion of principles of non-discrimination on religious and territorial ground. Hezbollah then voices support for a parliamentary representative system, independence of the judicial power, implementation of the rule of law, commitment to equal development, provision of education, health and housing, fight against corruption and other principles.

---

[119] § 130 of the PCH.

[120] § 82, 84, 159 of the PCH.

All of the above are constitutive elements of modern liberal statehood widely overlapping with the standards of international society, a long section[121] of the PCH is dedicated to these; differently from the OLD which does not contain such references. It is safe to argue that the process of Lebanonisation of Hezbollah brought about the assimilation of national values; but the way statehood is conceived: its qualities, principles and aims, are defined not through particularist national or Islamist parameters (such as *sharīʿa, Wilāyat al-Faqīh* etc.), but consistently with principles which enjoy widespread legitimacy in international society (democracy, rights, justice, non-discrimination and so on). Although national traditional forms of statehood in Lebanon have always relied on political confessionalism, Hezbollah criticises this system. In the OLD the form of state prefigured is mainly inspired to a vague idea of Islamic state (*al-niẓām al-islāmī*), however this concept is *completely* absent in the 2009 document. Hezbollah's adoption of a political language that assimilates international norms terminology brings about a conception of statehood which widely reflects international normative and liberal parameters, and breaks with the Islamist stance. The impact of international norms becomes particularly relevant not as a *cause* of the transition of Hezbollah's political identity, but rather as the factor that directs Hezbollah's political transformation towards international normative standards.

Another example is the principle of democracy mentioned on five occasions in the PCH text[122] although with various limitations. Hezbollah, also in the OLD, made clear that it did not intend to impose political choices that are not approved by a majority of the population although the term democracy is never mentioned. The PCH seems to assimilate the concept with a stronger commitment but also specifies that, until when political sectarianism is abolished (an aim for which Hezbollah is longing for), democracy in the country can only be '*consociational* democracy'.[123] Hamzeh argues that the concept of democracy seems to be reduced by Hezbollah to a minimal

---

[121] *See* Chapter 3 of the PCH.

[122] § 74, 75, 76, 77, 79 of the PCH.

[123] § 76.

conception corresponding to a principle of majority-rule over the minority.[124] Nonetheless in an interview with the author, Hezbollah's MP Fayyāḍ has specified that Hezbollah considers as a possibility the model of consociational democracy with mutual veto described by Arend Lijphart, thus making clear that Hezbollah's democratic commitment has become increasingly more sophisticated.[125]

There are important areas, however, where Hezbollah's discourse clashes with the ethical underpinnings of international norms. For example, the principle of non-discrimination towards women is mentioned in a qualified manner in the PCH. Women should be empowered, according to Hezbollah, but only 'within the scope of the benefit of her particular characteristics and its effects and with respect to her capacities.'[126] Moreover, fundamental aspects of the domestic and international political debate are left unaddressed. Hezbollah, for example, does not mention secularism as a principle informing its conception of statehood, and does not address the issue of personal status law reform, which in the Lebanese system is under the control of religious authorities and represents a major limitation from a human rights perspective.[127] These are not problems without solutions, but the silence of Hezbollah on such issues leaves several questions unanswered about its political agenda.[128]

International norms vocabulary does not appear in the more recent Hezbollah document as the sharp increase of one single term replacing another (as in the previous cases), but can be perceived as a diffused assimilation of terms punctuating the entire document and its language differently from the OLD in which this vocabulary is irrelevant. None, of the previous paradigms of reference of Hezbollah's identity, whether Islamism or its Lebanese affiliation is dropped or completely neglected, but all

---

[124] Interview with the author. 'Author's Interview with ʿAlī Fayyāḍ, Member of Parliament, Republic of Lebanon (Loyalty to the Resistance Block- Hezbollah)', (Beirut, Lebanon: 29 September 2011).*See* Arend Lijphart, *Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration* (New Haven ; London: Yale University Press, 1980) pp. 36-8.

[125] Hamzeh, *In the Path of Hizbullah* p. 29.

[126] § 80 and 13 of the PCH.

[127] On the issue of personal status law *see* Section 7. 6.

[128] As it was already said, nonetheless, the PCH is an extract of a longer document under the title: *Towards a Capable and Just State* [*Naḥu al-Dawla al-Qudra wa al-ʿAdala*] which has not been released yet.

of them are reinterpreted with reference to a terminology that is influenced by the vocabulary of international norms.

The adversarial Islamist political identity of the movement presented in the 1985 document is softened in the 2009 declaration by the adoption of concepts and terms borrowed by the international normative framework. The adoption of this language is an indicator of a process of socialisation of Hezbollah within international society and can be seen also as indicative of a degree of internalisation of these norms in its political identity. Although no specific scholarly literature has highlighted language shifts as indicators of international socialisation, is safe to claim how the shift presented in this section is indicative of a progressive internalisation of international norms in the political language of Hezbollah. Wendt has observed that in constitutive theories 'the answers to constitutive questions must support a counterfactual claim of necessity, namely that in the absence of the structures to which we are appealing the properties in question would not exist.' [129] The counterfactual claim in this case would be whether we can explain the emergence of the vocabulary of international norms within Hezbollah's political language if not on the basis of the fact that the 'structure' of international norms did become influential in shaping Hezbollah's political identity. In fact, is hard to imagine alternative explanations to this phenomenon if not as the result of international norms influence on Islamist politics.

---

[129] Wendt, 'Constitution and Causation' p. 106.

frequency of international norms vocabulary

Figure 9.5 Compared frequency of international norms vocabulary in the OLD (left) and the PCH (right)

9.5   Conclusions

The observations proposed in this chapter sum up the process of socialisation that this study has attempted to capture in the previous three chapters with regard to the influence of international norms on Hezbollah. The previous pages have outlined a comparative analysis of two milestones of Hezbollah's political discourse, the OLD and the PCH, emphasising how the differences between these two documents are particularly evident if we look at the evolutions of the concepts of community and person and how the vocabulary of international norms is a significant variable in this comparison.

Section 9.2 has shown that Hezbollah has increasingly shifted towards a consideration of the national community as the main reference of its political project, leaving behind the religiously based concept of *umma* although not abandoning it completely. Section 9.3 has drawn the attention of the reader to an analogous transition, but with reference to the concept of person, which shifts from its primarily religious identification in the OLD to the acknowledgment of the status of Lebanese citizens in the PCH. The role of international norms in this process has been traced with regard to the consistent

emergence of a vocabulary that, rather than drawing on traditional Islamic notions, is receptive towards concepts and principles widely overlapping with the norms of international society. The transition from *umma* to nation and the emergence of the concept of citizen are matched with the development of a political project and a form of statehood for Lebanon inclusive of principles that can hardly result from a traditionalist interpretation of Islam as proposed in Islamism.

Although reference to Islam is still present and antagonism with certain international actors remains central, Hezbollah envisions a political project and a form of statehood that partly reflects liberal parameters in contrast with the older concept that was highly self-referential and exclusively Islamist. Consistently with what has been discussed in the previous chapters, the analysis proposed herein confirms how Hezbollah is involved in a process of progressive socialisation within the international normative system. Comparing the texts of these two documents of Hezbollah provides further evidence of this process.

The comparative analysis of these texts has also more clearly shown how the communitarian assumptions of person and community are challenged by the rising influence of international norms. Hezbollah does not rely exclusively on Islamic principles in founding the legitimacy of its political project but expanded its vocabulary to include concepts that are also found in the international ethical system. Analogously, the person is not seen only as part of a religious community anymore but is also conceived as part of a national political community. Both of these shifts in Hezbollah's language mark a departure from the more radical and conservative communitarian views of Islamism as they were conceptualised in Chapter 4, and open the space for a less confrontational approach to liberal norms. The next chapter will provide an overall assessment of this process of change in Hezbollah's political identity.

Chapter 10

Conclusion: the Impact of International Norms on Islamist Politics

10.1 A Recapitulation

This chapter presents the concluding remarks of this study preceded by a recapitulation of the previous chapters.

The initial three chapters of this study have shown how liberalism and liberal norms have always been subject to criticism. Chapters 2 and 3 presented an overview of this criticism, referring respectively to the communitarian and Islamist critiques of liberalism. Chapter 4 has shown that communitarianism and Islamism are critical of liberalism in similar ways not by a coincidence, but because they rely on analogous conceptions of community and the person. Chapter 4 proposed a comparative analysis of these conceptions highlighting their commonalities and concluded that Islamism can be understood as part of the wider tradition of communitarian political theory.

The thesis showed how community is conceived as constitutive of the moral identity of the person, how it acts as the source of legitimacy for norms and institutions, and how is characterised by self-referentiality. This conception influences how communitarians and Islamist thinkers conceptualise the person. I highlighted the deep sense of communal affiliation the person has in communitarian and Islamist theory. The realisation of persons and their freedom is accomplished, in this conception, through assimilation within the ethical community, rather than through individual emancipation. Following this, the person is primarily understood as responsible towards the moral integrity of the community. Based on these assumptions (more of a meta-theoretical rather than a theoretical nature) Islamism and communitarianism built their critical stances against liberalism.

Chapter 5 bridged the theoretical discussion of Islamism with the empirical analysis of Islamist politics, introducing Shiʿī Islamism to then focus on the case of Hezbollah. Four instances representative of interaction between Hezbollah and international norms were then discussed. Chapter 6 referred to non-combatant immunity, Chapter 7 considered Hezbollah's approach to human rights legislation, Chapter 8 looked at UNSC resolutions (especially with regard to state sovereignty and international peace)

and the previous chapter proposed a comparative analysis of the transformation of Hezbollah's political language looking to the vocabulary related to international norms.

Contrarily from what could have been expected from a hard-line Islamist movement, the political theory of which relies on communitarian assumptions; these examples have shown that liberally inspired international norms have had an impact on Hezbollah's political identity. The thesis will conclude by presenting some of the most important respects in which Islamist politics and its assumptions have been modified by interacting with international norms.

10.2 The Impact on the Person

Islamism share with communitarianism an idea of the person as profoundly interconnected with the community; specifically, in the case of Hezbollah, the relevant community would be the Shiʿī community. For this reason, if we consider the declarations of Hezbollah in the *Open Letter,* we will find extensive reference to persons as Muslims or anyway identified through the lenses of religious affiliation. We can also find various occasions in which Hezbollah call for a sense of moral responsibility towards the community, which becomes even a duty to fight for its defence. The thesis also highlighted how, on the same basis, the only just institutions that can be established are those based on the principles of the Islamic community. Hezbollah, for example, declared how an Islamic political system was its political ideal in this early stage of its activity, and how international organisations as well as foreign states should not have interfered within the realm of its community.

Notwithstanding this consistent Islamist communitarian stance, the examples of interaction with international norms presented in the previous chapters had a significant impact. Although, at an earlier stage, Hezbollah's political profile was entirely aligned with the more general Islamist discourse discussed in Chapters 3 and 4; the cases of the April Understanding, its approach to human rights legislation and the political vocabulary used in the 2009 declaration, were symptomatic of a change in the way it conceives persons as moral and political subjects.

The case of the April Understanding has shown how Hezbollah became receptive of the non-combatant immunity principle also towards Israeli non-combatants, a distinction previously absent in its ideas about warfare. This turn is indicative of how it became receptive of an idea of person not exclusively defined by its communal affiliation. What has been defined as the constitutive role of the community in Chapter 4, does not seem to apply anymore (or at least not in an equal measure) in this context, as the result of the influence of an international normative principle.

Although in the past Hezbollah identified Israelis and Zionists as enemies and fundamentally de-humanised them, by applying the principle of non-combatant immunity, it began to acknowledge (deliberately or not) the equal moral value of the person *qua* human being, independently from their communal affiliation whether Muslim, Christian, Lebanese, Jew or Zionist. It is worth reconsidering Slim's reflection with regard to the idea of the person that underlies the principle of non-combatant immunity. According to Slim:

> the civilian idea argues for what social psychologists call a 'super-ordinate identity' – a belief that all of us, no matter what side we are on, have a greater common identity as human beings than the particular identities that war bestows on us as 'enemies' or 'allies'. Belief in the idea of the civilian turns, therefore, on issues of personal identity and social relationship. It requires us to allow people a fundamental and vulnerable human identity that is not determined by their immediate relationship with politics, economics or social structure of war. Their human value transcends their social connections with the war.[1]

The events described in Chapter 6 relate to a dynamic of change in which international norms changed the conception of person that underlies to the Islamist stance against their enemies. From the Islamist-communitarian conception, Hezbollah progressively internalises an idea of person that is closer to the liberal conception, which puts less emphasis on communal affiliation and rather values the person individually and universally as a human being.

Chapter 7, with regard to human rights legislation, suggested a similar transition from a conception of person as presented in Sections 3.5 to 3.7, to a conception that more closely resembles the liberal idea. Human rights are norms fully representative of the

---

[1] Slim, 'Why Protect Civilians?' p. 483.

liberal tradition. There was nonetheless occasion to point out how this universality and their possible application beyond the borders of liberal societies is problematic for communitarians as well as for Islamists, since they only acknowledge the legitimacy of institutions that are part of their own specific tradition.

The analysis of Hezbollah's approach to human rights has revealed that Hezbollah did not raise significant objections to the parliamentary approval of this legislation, notwithstanding its Islamist ideological matrix. It remained neutral towards the domestic legal implementation of much of this legislation and, in a few cases, even proactively promoted the implementation of certain human rights legislation. Admittedly, the same case highlighted instances in which Hezbollah opposed to human rights measures allegedly disruptive of traditional moral institutions and in contradiction with the authority of the moral community.[2]

Notwithstanding the resilience of certain Islamist-communitarian stances, it is clear how Hezbollah was fundamentally receptive towards this legislation. This permeability to international norms contrasts with the traditional Islamist stance, which would have naturally posed objections to human rights as 'non-Islamic' individualist norms endangering the integrity of the ethical community and incompatible with the purely Islamic inspiration of its political project. Nonetheless, Hezbollah's participation to the parliament has produced a rethinking of its approach to secular legislation in general, including to human rights legislation. Acquiescence towards human rights legislation entails recognition of rights to persons indistinctively of their communal affiliation, gender, age or political opinions. As in the case of non-combatant immunity, human rights are international norms that facilitate the affirmation of a conception of the person where moral value, and then entitlement to rights, does not originate from communal affiliation, but from a broader sense of shared humanity.

The shift in Hezbollah's way of thinking of persons was noticed also in the comparative analysis proposed in Chapter 9 with regard to the 1985 and 2009 declarations. The thesis highlighted how Hezbollah has become keener to identify persons not much with

---

[2] *See* Section 6.6.

reference to a religious paradigm, as in the case of 1985, but with increasing reference to the idea of citizenship. The comparative analysis of Chapter 9 has documented how the idea of statehood and consequently of citizenship that Hezbollah proposes in its more recent document, is not informed by an Islamic model of statehood but converges towards international normative standards. Hezbollah's 2009 *Political Document* refers to principles as democracy, equal access to justice, development, and many others. It describes a form of citizenship according to which persons are entitled to rights and to participate to political and social life as citizens of a modern state.

In a sense, this transition from 'Shiʿī Muslim' to 'national citizen' is not a departure from a certain communitarian perspective. As it was indicated in Chapter 2, nationalism and the identification of the political community as the national community is indeed one of the ways in which communitarian political theory (consider for example Miller) has recently articulated its claims.[3] But what marks a significant turn is the fact that, along with embracing a broader national political perspective, Hezbollah has also internalised the kind of institutions and norms that overlap with the idea of statehood of international society. The idea of an Islamic system, or a *Wilāyat al-Faqīh* in Lebanon is replaced by an idea of statehood that widely overlaps with international normative standards.

Hezbollah has often reiterated the fact that the social composition of Lebanon does not allow for the establishment of a strictly Islamic model of statehood in the country. Its endorsement of an idea of citizenship and statehood that converge with the principles of international society may have been dictated by the social circumstances of Lebanon and its pluralism, but international norms constituted the trajectory, which marked Hezbollah's transition from a *Wilāyat al-Faqīh* model to a quasi-liberal project.

By becoming aware of the fact that the Lebanese political community extends beyond the borders of the Shiʿī Lebanese community, Hezbollah recognised that its political body cannot be identified only as the Shiʿī Muslim. It had to acknowledge that the person has a moral and then political value that goes beyond our particular communal affiliations and includes membership to a broader national political community, which is

---

[3] *See* in particular Section 1.4.4.

in turn part of the international society. In one part of its 2009 document, Hezbollah declares that it supports a state, which is characterised by 'the effective exercise of democracy, where the citizen represents a value in and of himself.'[4]

International norms play a significant role in the process of Hezbollah's political identity transition modifying its conception of person; I think this has been clearly shown in the previous chapters. These norms not necessarily have the most prominent and influential role, but deserve to be taken into account as a factor. The communitarian assumptions of Islamism about the person do not hold in the circumstances of an increasingly interconnected global political sphere regulated by international norms, which influence the social and political realm in which Islamist politics operate.

10.3 The Impact on the Community

If international norms influence how an Islamist political actor thinks of persons, this also has consequences on the way he conceives of the community. Chapter 4 highlighted how self-referentiality is a distinguishing feature of Islamist and communitarian political theory. The previous chapters, from the case of the Qānā Massacre and beyond, highlighted how Hezbollah's self-referentiality has serious limits in legitimising its actions of Islamist political and military actor.

The case of the April Understanding was an occasion to show how Hezbollah modified its principles of Islamic warfare in a way that included the fundamental principle of non-combatant immunity. Chapter 7 discussed Hezbollah's integration in the Lebanese parliamentary system and showed how this process prompted a rethinking of Hezbollah's role as Islamist actor, so that it could justify its inclusion in a secular institutional system.

In this latter case, Hezbollah had to find a way to harmonise its Islamic thinking with the secularised law-making process of the Lebanese state.[5] Even more relevant was the

---

[4] Alagha, *Documents* p. 126.

[5] *See* Section 7.3.

connection established between Hezbollah's participation to the Lebanese parliament and the implementation of international norms as human rights. This issue raised internal debate within Hezbollah. It required a judgement from the *Walī al-Faqīh* and even caused splits within its hierarchy as in the case of former Secretary General al-Ṭufaylī. At stake, in this process, was the identity of Hezbollah as an Islamist movement; in the sense that its political decisions would have not been exclusively based on the Islamic traditional way of thinking anymore, but would have opened it up to the influence of more liberal and secular procedures and norms. In other words, the constitutive principles of its political identity would have included also non-religiously sanctioned norms as the international norms with which the movement began to interact in the instances discussed above.

The Islamic community, its tradition, and hierarchical structures, ceased to be the only source of legitimacy for Hezbollah's political action. The Islamist movement found itself in a condition in which it had to justify its practices with reference to norms that were not only Islamic anymore. Chapter 3 highlighted how Islamism derives legitimacy in particular from concepts as the 'sovereignty of God'. But by becoming part of a parliamentary and quasi-democratic system, Hezbollah has fundamentally accepted the sovereignty of the Lebanese parliament, hence of the Lebanese people.

The fact that Hezbollah's political and military decisions began to incorporate aspects dictated by the requirements of international norms affected its self-referential political identity according to which only Islamic traditional values and its hierarchical structures legitimately rule over the Islamic community. In the case of the April Understanding, Hezbollah was directly exposed to an international norm by becoming part of an international agreement.[6] In the case presented in Chapter 7, integration within state institutions was the main factor exposing it to the influence of international norms as human rights and international treaties. The conception according to which the only Islamic norms that can legitimise the actions of an Islamist actor was complemented by

---

[6] Although Hezbollah's participation to the agreement was mediated by Syria and the government of Lebanon and it was not directly mentioned in the agreement.

a progressive internalisation of heteronomous norms harmonised with the Islamic tradition throughout concepts as *maṣlaḥa* or *tazāḥum.*[7]

One of the most telling cases in this respect was the analysis of how Hezbollah interacted with the process of drafting and the implementation of UNSC resolutions as part of the Lebanese government presented in Chapter 8. Under the pressure of international actors and within the context of a devastating military attack; Hezbollah fended off accusations of being a 'militia' and justified its military operations during the 2006 war not only referring to Islamic principles as *jihād* but with reference to principles of international law as self-defence and the right to liberate an occupied territory. This marks a significant shift in the paradigm throughout which Hezbollah build its legitimacy of political and military actor. Becoming entangled in a process of obvious regional and international relevance and being identified as a threat to international peace, Hezbollah was drawn on the ground of international society where exclusive reference to Islamic norms could have not been sufficient to legitimise its actions and where international norms are the relevant ethical framework, which constitutes international social practices.

Participation in the government did allow Hezbollah to put its weight in the decision making process, but also brought it on a political ground in which international norms became an essential source of legitimacy. From a typical non-state actor entity, Hezbollah was progressively being integrated within the state and as such needed to abide to the restraints that international norms impose on states. Operating outside the canons imposed by the principles of international norms (for example not being recognised as a legitimate resistance movement), or not justifying its military operations in 2006 as a legitimate act of self-defence within the parameters established by international law, would have meant to be labelled as a 'rogue' actor, exactly the kind of vilifying label that Hezbollah was trying to avoid.

In order to rely on these sources of international legitimacy, nonetheless, it would have been obviously insufficient to appeal to the Islamic norms, which were the constitutive

---

[7] *See* Section 6.3.

principles of its traditional community, and it was necessary broader reference to the normative principles of international society. By declaring its commitment to UNSC resolution 1701, Hezbollah was committing to the norm of international peace and state sovereignty on which this resolution is based.[8] By criticising its identification as a 'militia', rather than legitimate resistance movement, Hezbollah was appealing to the principles of self-defence and the fighting of occupying forces as sources of legitimacy for its actions and then as constitutive elements of its political identity.[9]

There is no dispute that this reference to international norms was only partially legitimate for Hezbollah, and that its argumentations of legitimacy in terms of international norms can be criticised in many respects. The relevant aspect, nonetheless, is how Hezbollah has begun to see itself as an actor part of the broader international society framework rather than remaining accountable only to the Shiʿī tradition. At least two of the parameters which defined the communitarian and Islamist conception of community seem to be challenged by the influence of international norms on Hezbollah: its self-referentiality and its reference to Islamic norms as the exclusive source of legitimacy.[10]

Its self-referentiality of Islamist movement was left behind to internalise norms that would have allowed wider international recognition but at the same time would have also bound Hezbollah to the limits imposed by these norms (not bombing Israeli civilians, abiding by human rights treaties, going along with UNSC resolutions, and proposing a more liberal political project). Islamic principles were, at least in part, replaced or integrated with international norms as sources of legitimacy, and the moral and legal obligations that rose from commitment to these norms were not exclusively towards the Shiʿī community anymore but generally towards the Lebanese state and international society. International norms have produced an idea of community in Hezbollah's political identity that is not exclusively based on particularistic Islamic views, but is increasingly socialised within the international normative framework. Its

---

[8] *See* Section 7.4.3.

[9] *See* Section 7.2.1.

[10] *See* Sections 3.3 and 3.4.

political identity is not that of an actor accountable only to the Shiʿī community but refers broadly to its location in the international society.

This is also reflected in the transition that was shown in the previous chapter from the idea of community as *umma* to community as 'nation' (*waṭān*).[11] It shall be conceded, that this amounts more to a process of nationalisation rather than internationalisation and it may seem appropriate to conclude that international norms do not play a role in this process. However, this is not entirely the case because, as it was observed in the section above, this form of nationalisation corresponds to the endorsement of a form of statehood that widely reflects international normative standards rather than motivating claims of 'authenticity' or particularity. By expanding its reference from the more strictly religious community to a national political community, Hezbollah in the 2009 document adjusts its political ideal to a form of statehood, which is inclusive of the standards of international norms rather than alternative Islamic models. By entering parliamentary politics (Chapter 7), and then the government (Chapter 8), Hezbollah eventually appealed to the national political community and became subject to the ethical norms which regulate international society rather than maintaining exclusive reference to traditional communitarian values.

Reference to international norms, then, has served Hezbollah's purposes of legitimating both its political project as planned in the 2009 *Political Document* and its military activity as in the 2006 events. The self-referential conception of community and the exclusive source of legitimacy of Islamic norms have been expanded to include also international norms and inevitably locate Hezbollah in the wider context of international society where non-combatant immunity, human rights, state sovereignty, self-defence and international peace are widely acknowledged as international norms.

As it was mentioned at the beginning of this study, norms are not only rules producing expectations of *normal* behaviour of a political actor, but also have a constitutive value, in the sense that they increasingly become a definitional aspect of the identity of a political actor. As Wendt says 'social structures also *constitute* actors with certain

---

[11] *See* Section 9.2.

identities and interests'[12] and this is the case of international norms becoming constitutive of Hezbollah's political identity making it an international political actor more responsive to international normative principles and conceiving persons not only as member of ethical communities but also as connected to a broader sense of shared humanity. The following section shows how this process can be understood as a form of international socialisation.

10.4 International Socialisation of an Islamist Actor

This study has highlighted a modification, not only on the surface, but also in the underlying assumptions, of Islamist politics. The thesis has shown that international norms influenced the transition of the political identity of an Islamist movement. There have already been various occasions to observe that this transformation can be understood as a process of international socialisation.

Understanding the phenomena described in this enquiry as the international socialisation of an Islamist actor challenges opposite considerations of the kind proposed by Dennis Ross and David Makovsky for example. Ross and Makovsky claim that 'The Lebanese arena requires understanding that Hizbollah is driven more by ideology and its ties to Iran than any accountability to either the Lebanese government or public sentiment.'[13] Based on this, they conclude that engagement with non-state actors as Hamas and Hezbollah is bound to fail, because these will empower their legitimacy whereas their ideological stances remain unvaried and their political role is cynically self-interested. This study has argued the contrary. Interaction with international norms influences Hezbollah's political identity, increases its accountability to international society, as well as to the Lebanese people, and modifies its political identity. The chapters above have shown that Hezbollah is more pragmatic than Ross and Makovsky maintain. Contrarily to their claim, it is reasonable to believe that

---

[12] Wendt, *Social Theory* p. 78, orig. emph.

[13] Dennis Ross and David Makovsky, *Myths, Illusions, and Peace: Finding a New Direction for America in the Middle East* (New York: Viking, 2009) p. 267.

Hezbollah's isolation and forced marginalisation feeds its alienation from international society and push it towards conservative Islamist stances

In the introduction I discussed how two main types of socialisation would have been useful in explaining Hezbollah's interaction with international norms.[14] The conceptions in question were Ikenberry and Kupchan's idea of hegemonic socialisation and the constructivist approach. The definition given by Ikenberry and Kupchan seems to fit the reality of war in which Hezbollah was embedded in the cases of Chapter 6, with regard to non-combatant immunity, and Chapter 8 with regard UNSC resolutions 1559 and 1701. In these cases, crisis, the use of force and power politics seem to be the factors that imposed over Hezbollah the acceptance of restraints over its military activity, and in particular the acceptance of the distinction between combatants and non-combatants in Israel and the deployment of the LAF and the UNIFIL peacekeeping troops in south Lebanon.

Under the pressure of war and by paying a high price in civilian lives, Hezbollah eventually accepted the restraints imposed by international norms on its military activity. Nonetheless, this bitter consideration by no means entails that this could have been the only way nor the most effective by which Hezbollah could have been socialised in international society. However, the thesis claimed that another fundamental factor was Hezbollah's inclusion in the government in 2005. Integration in state institutions, not only enabled it to advance its political stances, but also exposed it to a form of accountability in relation to the UNSC resolutions to which it committed as part of the Lebanese cabinet. As noted with regard to the April Understanding and UNSC resolution 1701, the inclusion of Hezbollah in these international agreements increased its exposition to international norms, such as non-combatant immunity, state sovereignty and international peace, and made it more accountable towards their implementation. In this way, through its integration into the wider political process, Hezbollah became exposed to the influence of these norms with the consequences that were discussed in the previous sections of this chapter.

---

[14] *See* Section 1.4.

Socialisation by force only covers part of the story. If war and crisis, along with integration in the political process, are among the determinants for socialisation in the cases analysed in Chapter 6 and 8; the cases of human rights legislation and the adoption of a more liberally oriented political document presented in Chapters 7 and 9, are better understood through the lenses of the constructivist conception of socialisation. These phenomena signal a deeper level of socialisation involving a shift in moral reasoning.

Chapter 7 has shown how Hezbollah engaged primarily in a dialogical process both within its organisation, and more importantly with Lebanese institutions, leading it to develop a moral reasoning, which could have harmonised norms and in particular legislation not based on Islamic principles. The reiterated participation in state institutions and the related political processes brought an Islamist movement (previously critical of non-Islamic, and above all liberal, norms) on the ground of more secularised politics. Section 7.3 has shown the way of reasoning and the internal arrangements adopted to harmonise Hezbollah's participation to parliamentary activity. Sections 7.4 to 7.6 have shown that (although problems of assimilation remain in various respects) Hezbollah has been either neutral but sometimes even proactive, with regard to the majority of human rights legislation approved in the parliament.

The analysis that has been proposed in Chapter 9 with regard to the 2009 political document of Hezbollah represents a turning point in this process. The fact that an Islamist movement begins to articulate its political stances with a vocabulary characterised more by its reference to terms as democracy, rights, sovereignty, development, justice and so on, rather than exclusive reference to religious norms, is indicative of how it has been socialised within international society. The need to resort to these concepts is symptomatic of the acquisition of a logic and the becoming part of a discourse in which this vocabulary, and its related norms, become sources of legitimacy for political action.

Hezbollah has been socialised in the sense that the society it addresses in its political action is not only the Shiʿī community of Lebanon anymore (for which reference to

religious Islamic values would have been sufficient and perhaps even more effective), but also includes the broader Lebanese society and the international society. This aspect is indicative of an unprecedented degree of internalisation of international norms for Hezbollah, since these have become part of the political language of the movement and signals how it sees itself as part of a broader social context which goes well beyond the borders of its traditional community.

As Wendt argues, 'answers to constitutive questions must support a counterfactual claim of necessity, namely that in the absence of structures to which we are appealing the properties in question would not exist.'[15] This applies to our case confirming the relevance of international norms in shaping Hezbollah's political identity transition. Counterfactually, if Hezbollah were to remain the alienated Islamist actor accountable only to the Shiʿī community; it would have not needed neither to pass human rights legislation; nor to announce a political project referring to principles and norms as democracy, rights, justice, freedom and citizenship, departing from its Islamist political identity.

It remains nonetheless problematic to come to the constructivist conclusion which suggests an irreversible pattern of socialisation from 'talking the talk' to 'walking the walk' of international norms.[16] Although supported by a vast constructivist scholarship, this is a deterministic way of looking at socialisation, which may not necessarily apply to this case. At this stage, the considerations and the examples discussed in previous chapters are significant indicators of a process that is only in its initial phase. This process is embedded in a regional environment characterised by instability and wars that can easily reverse this pattern. Furthermore, major political actors, such as the USA, have exerted enormous pressure encouraging Islamist alienation, rather than socialisation, for similar reasons to those claimed by Ross and Makovsky above.[17]

---

[15] Wendt, ' Constitution and Causation ' p. 105-6.

[16] Risse-Kappen and Sikkink, 'The Socialisation of International Human Rights Norms into Domestic Practices: Introduction' p. 16.

[17] See the considerations of Fawaz Gerges in this respect. Gerges, *America and Political Islam: Clash of Cultures or Clash of Interests?* pp. 37-58.

Nonetheless, it is important to reiterate that the criterion for the choice of this case study was its unlikeliness of being subject to the influence of international norms.[18] This means that, having shown how international norms affect Hezbollah's political identity, and even though Hezbollah's socialisation in international society may seem precarious; the socialisation of Islamist actors with less hostile profiles, more easily integrated in state institutions, and possibly not 'armed to the teeth' as Hezbollah, can be expected to take place more easily. These cases (consider al-Nahḍa in Tunisia, the Islamic Action Front in Jordan and perhaps the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt) by being integrated into the international political framework are likely to display a higher degree of permeability to international norms than was the case of Hezbollah.

10.5 Perspectives for Further Research

Looking at how international norms influence Islamist politics, this enquiry has proposed three main concluding observations. First, international norms have prompted a rethinking in Islamist politics of how to conceive the idea of the person, and second, a reconsideration of what it means to be part of an ethical community. With regard to these two aspects, the thesis claimed that the communitarian assumptions of Islamism have been modified in a way that progressively converges towards a model more compatible with the principles of international society. The third consideration is that the process of assimilation of international norms comes down to a form of international socialisation of Islamist actors, determined by the increasing interactions of these political movements with the international society. By focusing on a process of interaction between political actors and drawing attention on the shifts in political identity of an Islamist movement, I primarily relied on a constructivist and also a constitutive approach. I thereby tried to advance an understanding of Islamism that does not relegate it to the realm of culturally specific studies but rather approached the phenomenon in universal analytical terms. By understanding Islamism as a form of communitarianism I claimed that, in fact, Islamist political theory does not raise any

---

[18] *See* Section 1.3.

particularly original critical point to liberalism but widely overlaps in its assumptions with the communitarian political theory tradition.

The conclusions of this thesis, by no means, exhaust the wide range of considerations that could be advanced as answers to the question of the enquiry. Introducing other comparative cases could be an interesting way to understand which factors facilitate the international socialisation of Islamist actors. A few were mentioned herein: interaction and integration within state and international institutions play a relevant role, but more work needs to be done to draw sounder conclusions. The role of war in this process deserves comparisons with more peaceful (although still violent) phenomena, for example, Islamism in Egypt, Jordan but also Indonesia. Comparisons with these cases could help us understand whether alternative, less violent, processes can produce international socialisation through moral persuasion and creating incentives. The social context in which Islamist movements operate is also a relevant factor. Expanding the focus of this research will contribute to a deeper understanding of whether, for instance, a more religiously mixed society such as Lebanon or a more secularised society (for example Tunisia) are factors which render Islamist movements more permeable to the influence of international norms.

Islamism is far from being a static political reality. As Maxime Rodinson argued:

> We can assume, on the contrary, that religious ideologies, like all ideologies, have a concrete and real basis in the constantly competing human groups who share out the planet between themselves or form different strata of a society. We can take into account the constant interaction of these groups and the fact that their primary consideration must be the demands of material and social life. [19]

I have argued that in the process of interaction to which Rodinson refers, international norms have a significant impact and shape a trajectory of change towards the socialisation of Islamist political actors in international society. Further scholarly research will contribute to a better understanding of these phenomena and, perhaps, be conducive to a more just and peaceful international political sphere.

---

[19] Maxime Rodinson, *Marxism and the Muslim World* (London: Zed Press, 1979) p. 12.

Appendices

Appendix 1

The following text is an edited translation of the *Open Letter to the Downtrodden of Lebanon and the World*, the first official declaration of Hezbollah to which this thesis refers on several occasions. The original Arabic text has been provided by the *Consultative Centre for Study and Documentation* of Beirut, a research and documentation centre affiliated with Hezbollah.

The translation provided herein is primarily that of August Richard Norton.[1] Nonetheless, this translation was sometimes incomplete or not entirely satisfactory and has been complemented or cross-checked with the translation of Alagha[2]. Also Alagha's translation has been re-edited in certain respects. Certain parts have been entirely retranslated. Furthermore, the author has edited the translation to be consistent with the translation of the *Political Document of Hezbollah* available in Appendix 2, so that the two translations could be compared with regard to key-terms frequency with Wordstat (*See* Chapter 9). For example, the term *waṭān* has been translated as 'nation' in both texts and the same applies to other key terms. In addition to this, the translation below aims at being as literal as possible, so that it could be processed in Wordstat providing accurate statistics of the usage of a specific vocabulary reflecting the original text. This, inevitably, affected the quality of the English used for this translation and the reader is invited to refer to the other translations aforementioned to access a more readable text. The author used Haleem's translation for the quotation of the Qurʾān present in the text.[3]

---

[1] Norton, *Amal and the Shiʿa*. See Appendix.

[2] Alagha, *Documents* 39-55.

[3] Abdel Haleem, *Qurʾan*.

English	العربية	§ No.
Text of the open letter addressed by Hezbollah to the downtrodden in Lebanon and the world, describing its projects and path on the occasion of the first anniversary of the martyrdom of sheikh martyr Raghib Ḥarb (peace be upon him), the symbol of Islamic resistance and the paramount martyr. Date 26 of First Jumada 1405 in the Hijra calendar corresponding to February 16, 1985 in the Christian Calendar.	الرسالة المفتوحة التي وجهها حزب الله إلى المستضعفين في لبنان والعالم مبيناً فيها تصوراته ومنهجه بمناسبة الذكرى السنوية الأولى لاستشهاد رمز المقاومة الإسلامية شيخ الشهداء راغب حرب (رضوان الله عليهم). بتاريخ 26 جمادى الأول 1405هـ الموافق 16 شباط 1985م.	1
In the name of God, the merciful and the compassionate {*Those who put their trust in God, His prophet, and the faithful are God's party and they shall prevail. God almighty is always true*} (sura al-Ma'ida: 56)	بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم {وَمَّن يَّتَوَلَّ الله ورَّسِولَّهِ والَّذِينَ آمَنوا فَإِنَّ حُزِّبَ الله هِمِ الغَالِّبُونّ} (المائدة: 56).	2
Dedication	إهــــداء	3
To the torch that burned bright, lit for the downtrodden in Lebanon the path to free and honourable life and burned with the blaze of his innocent blood the tyranny and myth of the Zionist entity.	إلى المشعل الذي ازداد تألقاً وضياءً فأنار للمستضعفين في لبنان درب الحياة الحرة الكريمة، وأحرق بوهج دمائه الطاهرة جبروت الكيان الصهيوني وأسطورته.	4
To the pioneer who was faithful to his kinsmen, who offered them the model for *jihad* and who did not spare his own life until he died a martyr in supporting them and a witness to the injustice of world arrogance and its insolence.	إلى الرائد الذي صدق أهله؛ فكان قدوة لهم في الجهاد، ولم يبخل عليهم بروحه حتى قضى شهيداً في سبيل نصرتهم، وشاهداً على ظلم الاستكبار العالمي وغطرسته.	5
To the symbol of the triumphant Islamic resistance and of the splendid Intifada through which our kinsmen are still recording their most magnificent Husainite (Shiʿī) epics in the South and in Western al-Biqa'a.	إلى رمز المقاومة الإسلامية الظافرة والانتفاضة الرائعة التي لا يزال أهلنا يسطرون أروع ملاحمها الحسينية في الجنوب والبقاع الغربي.	6
To him who scattered America's dreams in Lebanon and who resisted the Israeli occupation, carrying the banner of action of the leader of the *Wilāyat al Faqīh* ʿAbd Allah Khomeini who was always cherished and described as the ʿamīr of the Muslims.	إلى الذي بدد أحلام أمريكا في لبنان، وقاوم الاحتلال الإسرائيلي رافعاً لواء العمل بولاية الفقيه القائد الذي كان يحلو له دائماً أن يصفه بأمير المسلمين عبد الله الخميني.	7
To the venerable among the martyrs Raghib Ḥarb, (may God be pleased with him), on whose anniversary we present this open letter to the downtrodden in the world, including in its lines the revolutionary Islamic political plan embodied by the	إلى شيخ الشهداء راغب حرب (رضوان الله عليه) نهدي في ذكراه السنوية هذه الرسالة المفتوحة إلى المستضعفين في العالم، مثبتين بين ثنايا سطورها الخط السياسي الإسلامي الثوري الذي جسده الشهيد السعيد مع إخوانه الشهداء ليكون نهجاً ودليلاً	8

English	Arabic	#
happy martyr and his brother martyrs so that it may act as a clear path and guide to all the *mujāhidīn* in Lebanon.	واضحاً لكل المجاهدين في لبنان.	
We beseech the Lord, may He be praised, to grant us steadfastness, to strengthen us, and to give us victory over the group of the wrongdoers.	سائلين المولى ـ سبحانه وتعالى ـ أن يفرغ علينا صبراً ويثبت أقدامنا وينصرنا على القوم الظالمين.	9
God's peace, mercy, and blessings be with you. Hezbollah	والسلام عليكم ورحمة الله وبركاته حزب الله	10
In the name of God, the compassionate and the merciful *{Say, 'Now the truth has come from your Lord: let those who wish to believe in it to do so, and let those who wish to reject it do so' We have prepared a Fire for the wrongdoers that will envelop them from all sides. If they call for relief, they will be relieved with water like molten metal, scalding their faces. What a terrible drink! What a painful resting place!}* (Sura, al-kahf:29)	بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم {وَقُلِ الْحَقَّ مِن رَّبِّكُمْ فَمَن شَاءَ فَلْيُؤْمِن وَمَن شَاءَ فَلْيَكْفُرْ إِنَّا أَعْتَدْنَا لِلظَّالِمِينَ نَارًا أَحَاطَ بِهِمْ سِرَادِقُهَا وَإِن يَسْتَغِيثُوا يُغَاثُوا بِمَاءٍ كَالْمُهْلِ يَشْوِي الوجوهَ بِئْسَ الشَّرَابُ وَسَاءَتْ مُرْتَفَقًا} (الكهف: 29).	11
Who Are We and What Is Our Identity?	**من نحن وما هي هويتنا؟**	12
Free downtrodden men, We are the sons of Hezbollah's *umma* in Lebanon. We greet you and address the entire world through you: persons, institutions, parties, organizations and political, humanitarian, and information associations.	أيها المستضعفون الأحرار. إننا أبناء أمة حزب الله في لبنان نحييكم ونخاطب من خلالكم العالم بأسره: شخصيات ومؤسسات، أحزاباً ومنظمات وهيئات سياسية وإنسانية وإعلامية..	
We exclude nobody because we are eager for all to hear our voice, understand our message, comprehend our projections, and study our plan. We, the sons of Hezbollah's *umma*, consider ourselves a part of the *umma* of Islam in the world; which is facing the most tyrannical arrogant assault from both the West and the East - an assault intended to deprive it of the content of the Message with which God has blessed it; so that it may be the best *umma* known to the people that encourages virtue and discourages vice and that believes in God. The assault is also aimed at usurping its wealth and resources, at exploiting the capabilities and skills of its sons, and at controlling all its affairs.	ولا نستثني أحداً؛ لأننا حريصون على أن يسمع صوتنا الجميع، فيفهموا مقالتنا، ويستوعبوا طروحاتنا، ويتدارسوا مشروعنا. إننا أبناء أمة حزب الله نعتبر أنفسنا جزءاً من أمة الإسلام في العالم التي تواجه أعتى هجمة استكبارية من الغرب والشرق على السواء بهدف تفريغها من مضمونها الرسالي الذي أنعم الله به عليها لتكون خير أمة أخرجت للناس تأمر بالمعروف وتنهى عن المنكر وتؤمن بالله، وبهدف استلاب خيراتها وثرواتها واستثمار طاقاتها وكفاءات أبنائها، والسيطرة على كافة شؤونها.	13

English	Arabic	
We, the sons of Hezbollah's *umma*, whose vanguard God has given victory in Iran and which has established newly the nucleus of the world's central state of Islam in the world. We are committed to the orders of a single, wise, and just authority, represented in the *Walī al-Faqīh* and presently embodied in the rightly guided imam Grand-Ayatollah Ruhollah al-Musavi al-Khomeini (long life to him), who combines all the qualities of the total *imām*, who has prompted the Muslim's revolution, and who is bringing about their glorious renaissance.	إننا أبناء أمة حزب الله التي نصر الله طليعتها في إيران، وأسست من جديد نواة دولة الإسلام المركزية في العالم.. نلتزم بأوامر قيادة واحدة حكيمة وعادلة تتمثل بالولي الفقيه الجامع للشرائط، وتتجسد حاضراً بالإمام المسدد آية الله العظمى روح الله الموسوي الخميني دام ظله.. مفجر ثورة المسلمين وباعث نهضتهم المجيدة.	14
Therefore, we in Lebanon are neither a closed organizational party nor a narrow political structure. Rather, we are a *umma* tied to the Muslims in every part of the world by a dogmatic and political bond, namely Islam, whose message God completed at the hands of the last of His prophets, Muḥammad (may God's peace and prayers be upon him and upon his kinsmen) who has established it as a religion for the worlds to follow, saying in the venerable Quran: {*Today I have perfected your religion for you, completed My blessing upon you, and chosen as your religion Islam.*} (Sura al-Maida: 3)	وعلى هذا الأساس فنحن في لبنان لسنا حزباً تنظيمياً مغلقاً، ولسنا إطاراً سياسياً ضيقاً.. بل نحن أمة ترتبط مع المسلمين في كافة أنحاء العالم برباط عقائدي وسياسي متين هو الإسلام الذي أكمل الله رسالته على يد خاتم أنبيائه محمد (صلى الله عليه وسلم) وارتضاه للعالمين ديناً يتعبدون به؛ إذ قال في القرآن الكريم:{الْيَوْمَ أَكْمَلْتُ لَكُمْ دِينَكُمْ وَأَتْمَمْتُ عَلَيْكُمْ نِعْمَتِي وَرَضِيتُ لَكُمُ الإِسْلاَمَ دِيناً} (المائدة: 3).	15
Therefore, what befalls the Muslims in Afghanistan, Iraq, the Philippines, or elsewhere befalls the body of our Islamic *umma* of which we are an indivisible part and we move to confront it out of a *shariatic* fundamental duty and in the light of a general political vision decided by the leading *Wilāyat al-Faqīh*.	ومن هنا فإن ما يصيب المسلمين في أفغانستان أو العراق أو الفليبيين أو غيرها إنما يصيب جسم أمتنا الإسلامية التي نحن جزء لا يتجزأ منها، ونتحرك لمواجهته انطلاقاً من واجب شرعي أساساً، وفي ضوء تصور سياسي عام تقرره ولاية الفقيه القائد.	16
The fundamental sources of our culture are the venerable Qurʾān, the infallible Sunna, and the decisions and *fatwa* issued by the *Faqīh*, our *marjʿa al-taqlīd* (reference of emulation). These sources are clear, uncomplicated, and accessible to all without exception and they need no theorization or philosophy. All they need is abidance and application.	أما ثقافتنا فمنابعها الأساسية: القرآن الكريم، والسنّة المعصومة، والأحكام والفتاوى الصادرة عن الفقيه مرجع التقليد عندنا.. وهي واضحة غير معقدة وميسرة للجميع دون استثناء، ولا يحتاج إلى تنظير أو فلسفة، بل جل ما تحتاجه هو الالتزام والتطبيق.	17
As to our military power, nobody can imagine its dimensions because we do not have a military agency separate from the other parts of our body. Each of us is a combat soldier when the call of *jihād* demands it and each of us undertakes his task in the battle in accordance with his	وأما قدرتنا العسكرية فلا يتخيلَنَّ أحد حجمها، وإذ ليس لدينا جهاز عسكري منفصل عن بقية أطراف جسمنا، بل إن كل واحد منا هو جندي مقاتل حين يدعو داعي الجهاد، وكل واحد منّا يتولى مهمته في المعركة وفقاً لتكليفه الشرعي في إطار العمل بولاية الفقيه القائد..	18

English	Arabic	#
shariatic duty within the framework of action under the guardianship of the *Wilāyat al-Faqīh*.		
God is behind us, supporting us with His care, putting fear in our enemies' hearts, and giving us His dear and resounding victory against them.	والله هو من ورائنا يؤيدنا برعايته ويلقي الرعب في قلوب أعدائنا وينصرنا عليهم بنصره العزيز المؤزر.	19
The Arrogant World Is in Agreement on Fighting Us	**العالم المستكبر متفق على حربنا**	20
Free downtrodden men, The countries of the tyrannical arrogant world in the West and the East, have agreed to fight us and have been instigating their agents against us, trying to distort our reputation and to fabricate lies against us in a malicious attempt to drive a wedge between us and good and downtrodden men, and in an endeavour to dwarf and deface the important major accomplishments we have made at the level of our confrontation with America and its allies.	أيها المستضعفون الأحرار: إن دول العالم المستكبر الظالم في الغرب والشرق قد اجتمعوا على محاربتنا، وراحوا يحرِّضون عملاءهم ضدنا يحاولون تشويه سمعتنا وافتراء الأكاذيب علينا.. في محاولة خبيثة للفصل بيننا وبين المستضعفين الطيبين، وفي سعي حثيث لتقزيم ومسخ الإنجازات المهمة والكبرى على مستوى مواجهتنا لأمريكا وحلفائها...	21
Through its local agents, America has tried to give people the impression that those who have put an end to its arrogance in Lebanon, who drove it out humiliated and frustrated, and who crushed its plot against the downtrodden in this country are no more than a handful of fundamentalist terrorists who are only concerned with blowing up drinking, gambling, and entertainment spots and other such activities.	لقد حاولت أمريكا عبر عملائها المحليين أن توحي للناس بأن من قضى على غطرستها في لبنان وأخرجها ذليلة خائبة وسحق مؤامرتها على المستضعفين في هذه البلاد، هم ليسوا إلا حفنة من المتعصبين الإرهابيين الذين لا شأن لهم إلا بتفجير محلات الخمور والقمار وآلات اللهو وغير ذلك.	22
But we are confident that such insinuations will never deceive our *umma* because the entire world knows that whoever thinks of confronting America and world arrogance does not resort to such peripheral acts that preoccupy them with the tail and make them forget the head.	ولكن كنّا على يقين بأن مثل هذه الإيحاءات لن تخدع أمتنا؛ لأن العالم بأسره يعلم أن من يفكر بمواجهة أمريكا والاستكبار العالمي لا يلجأ إلى مثل هذه الأعمال الهامشية التي تشغله بالذيل عن الرأس.	23
America behind all our Catastrophes	**أمريكا وراء كل مصائبنا**	24
We are moving in the direction of fighting the roots of vice and the first root of vice is America. All the endeavours to drag us into marginal action will be futile when compared with the confrontation with the United States. Imam Khomeini, the leader, has repeatedly	إننا متوجهون لمحاربة المنكر من جذوره... وأول جذور المنكر أمريكا.. ولن تنفع كل المحاولات لجرنا إلى ممارسات هامشية إذا ما قيست بالمواجهة مع أمريكا. فالإمام الخميني القائد أكد ولمرات عديدة أن أمريكا هي سبب كل مصائبنا وهي أم الخبائث..	25

283

stressed that America is the reason for all our catastrophes and the mother of all evils.		
By fighting it, we are only exercising our legitimate right to defend our Islam and the dignity of our umma. We declare frankly and clearly that we are a *umma* that fears only God and that does not accept tyranny, aggression, and humiliation.	ونحن إذ نحاربها فلا نمارس إلا حقنا المشروع في الدفاع عن إسلامنا وعزة أمتنا. إننا نعلن بصراحة ووضوح أننا أمة لا تخاف إلا الله، ولا ترتضي الظلم والعدوان والمهانة..	26
America and its allies from the countries of the North Atlantic Alliance (NATO) and the Zionist entity that has usurped the sacred Islamic land of Palestine, have engaged and continue to engage in constant aggression against us, and are working constantly to humiliate us.	وإن أمريكا وحلفاءها من دول حلف شمال الأطلسي، والكيان الصهيوني الغاصب لأرض فلسطين الإسلامية المقدسة، كل هؤلاء قد مارسوا ويمارسون العدوان علينا باستمرار ويعملون على إذلالنا باستمرار..	27
Therefore, we are in a condition of constant and escalating preparedness to repel the aggression and to defend our religion, existence, and dignity. They have attacked our country, destroyed our villages, massacred our children, violated our holy places, and installed over our heads criminal henchmen who have perpetrated terrible massacres against our *umma*. They are still supporting these butchers, who are Israel's allies and preventing us from determining our destiny with our free will.	ولذا فإننا في حالة تأهب مستمر ومتصاعد من أجل رد العدوان والدفاع عن الدين والوجود والكرامة. لقد هاجموا بلادنا ودمروا قرانا وذبحوا أطفالنا وهتكوا حرماتنا، وسلطوا على رقابنا جلادين مجرمين ارتكبوا مجازر رهيبة بحق أمتنا، ولا يزالون يدعمون هؤلاء الجزارين حلفاء إسرائيل، ويمنعوننا من تقرير مصيرنا بمحض اختيارنا.	28
Their bombs fell on our kinsmen like rain during the Zionist invasion of our country and the Beirut blockade. Their planes raided our civilians, children, women, and wounded day and night whereas the areas of the agent Phalangists remained safe from the enemy's bombardment and a centre for directing and guiding the enemy forces.	إن قنابلهم كانت تتساقط على أهلنا كالمطر أثناء الاجتياح الصهيوني لبلادنا ومحاصرة بيروت.. وطائراتهم كانت تغير بشكل متواصل في الليل والنهار على المدنيين من أهلنا وعلى أطفالنا ونسائنا وجرحانا.. وكانت مناطق الكتائبيين العملاء آمنة من قصف العدو ومركزاً لتوجيه وإرشاد قواته.	29
We appealed to the world's conscience but heard nothing from it and found no trace of it. This conscience that we missed in the days of tribulation is the same conscience that was mobilized and alerted when the criminal Phalangists were blockaded in the city of Zahle, in the Biqʿa and when the allies of Israel were besieged in Dair al-Qamar, in the Shuf,. We were horrified and then realized that this world conscience stirs only at the request of the strong and in response to	وكنا نستصرخ ضمير العالم آنذاك فلم نسمع له حساً ولم نجد له أثراً. هذا الضمير الذي افتقدناه أيام المحنة هو نفسه كان مستنفراً ويقظاً يوم حوصر الكتائبيون المجرمون في مدينة زحلة البقاعية، ويوم حوصر المتحالفون مع إسرائيل في دير القمر الشوفية.. فهالنا الأمر وأيقنا أن هذا الضمير العالمي لا يهتز إلا بناء لطلب الأقوياء واستجابة لمصالح الاستكبار.	30

English	Arabic	#
the interests of arrogance.		
The Israelis and Phalangists massacred several thousands of our fathers, children, women, and brothers in Sabra and Shatila in a single night, but no practical renunciation or condemnation was expressed by any international organization or authority against this heinous massacre that was perpetrated in coordination with the NATO forces, which, only a few days, rather hours, earlier, had departed from the camps that the defeatist [government] agreed to put under the protection of the wolf in response to the manoeuvre of Philip Habib, the American fox.	لقد ذبح الإسرائيليون والكتائبيون عدة آلاف من آبائنا وأطفالنا ونسائنا وإخواننا في صبرا وشاتيلا خلال ليلة واحدة فلم يصدر عن أية منظمة أو هيئة دولة أي استنكار أو شجب عملي لهذه المجزرة البشعة التي ارتكبت بتنسيق مع القوات الأطلسية التي غادرت قبل أيام بل ساعات، المخيمات التي قَبِلَ المنهزمون أن يضعوها تحت حماية الذئب استجابة لمناورة الثعلب الأمريكي فيليب حبيب.	31
Those criminal attacks came only to reaffirm our firm belief that {*You (Prophet) are sure to find that the most hostile to the believers are the Jews and those who associate other deities with God*} (Sura al-Ma'ida: 82)	وجاءت هذه الاعتداءات المجرمة لتؤكد ما ورد في معتقداتنا الثابتة أنه ﴿لَتَجِدَنَّ أَشَدَّ النَّاسِ عَدَاوَةً لِّلَّذِينَ آمَنُوا الْيَهُودَ وَالَّذِينَ أَشْرَكُوا﴾ (المائدة: 82).	32
There is No Choice for us but Confrontation	**لا خيار لنا إلا المواجهة**	33
Thus, we have seen that aggression can be repelled only with sacrifices and there cannot be dignity if not with the sacrifice of blood, and that freedom is not given but regained with the sacrifice of both heart and soul.	وعلى هذا الأساس رأينا أن العدوان لا يرد إلا بالتضحيات.. والكرامة لا تكون إلا ببذل الدماء، والحرية لا تعطى وإنما تسترد ببذل المهج والأرواح.	34
We have opted for religion, freedom, and dignity over a despicable life and constant submission to America and its allies and to Zionism and their Phalangist allies.	فآثرنا الدين والحرية والكرامة على العيش الذليل والخضوع المستمر لأمريكا وحلفائها وللصهاينة وحلفائهم الكتائبيين...	35
We have risen to liberate our country (*balad*), to drive the imperialists and the invasion out of it, and to determine our fate by our own hands.	وانتفضنا لتحرير بلادنا وطرد المستعمرين والغزاة منها وتقرير مصيرنا بأيدينا.	36
We could not endure more than we have endured. Our tragedy is more than ten years old and all we have seen so far are the covetous, hypocritical, and incapable.	ولم يكن بوسعنا أن نصبر أكثر مما صبرنا عليه، فمحنتنا تجاوزت من السنين عشراً ولم نرَ إلا كل طامع أو متملق أو عاجز.	37
Zionist-Phalange Coordination	**تنسيق صهيوني كتائبي**	37
Nearly 100.000 is the number of the victims of the crimes perpetrated against us by America, Israel, and the Phalange.	مئة ألف ضحية هو العدد التقريبي لجرائم أمريكا وإسرائيل والكتائب فينا.	38
Nearly one half million Muslims have been displaced and their quarters of al-Nabʿa,	تهجير لنصف مليون مسلم تقريباً وتدمير شبه كامل	39

285

Burj Hammūd, al-Dikwāna, Tall al-Zaʿtar, Sibniya, al-Ghawārina and in Jabail, have been almost totally destroyed. Our kinsmen staying in Jabail are still exposed to the tragedy without a single international organization moving to rescue them.	لأحيائهم في النبعة وبرج حمود والدكوانة وتل الزعتر وسبنيه وحي الغوارنة وبلاد جبيل التي لا يزال من تبقى من أهلنا فيها يتعرضون للمحنة دون أن تتحرك هيئة عالمية واحدة لإنقاذهم.	
The Zionist occupation continues to usurp the lands of the Muslims, extending over more than one-third of Lebanon's area in prior coordination and full agreement with the Phalange, who have denounced the attempts to confront the invading forces and have taken part in implementing some of Israel's schemes so as to complete Israel's plan and to give it what it wishes in return of their achievement of the premiership of the government.	واحتلال صهيوني استمر في اغتصابه لأراضي المسلمين حتى وصل إلى احتلال لأكثر من ثلث مساحة لبنان بتنسيق مسبق واتفاق كامل مع الكتائبيين الذين استنكروا محاولات التصدي للقوات الغازية.. وشاركوا في تنفيذ بعض خطط إسرائيل ليكملوا مشروعها ويعطوها ما تريد ثمناً لإيصالهم إلى رئاسة الحكم.	40
Thus, butcher Bashir al-Jumayyil had attained the presidency with the help of Israel, of the Arab oil countries, and of the Muslim deputies who are subservient to the Phalange. He gained this presidency in the wake of a skilful manoeuvre to beautify his image in a surgery room called the "Salvation Committee"-a committee that is no more than an American-Israeli bridge over which the Phalange crossed to oppress the downtrodden.	وهكذا كان؛ فلقد وصل الجزار بشير الجميل إلى سدة الرئاسة مستعيناً بإسرائيل والنفطيين العرب وبالزعماء المستزلمين للكتائب من نواب المسلمين وأثر محاولة متقنة لتجميل صورته البشعة في إطار غرفة عمليات سميت بـ "لجنة الإنقاذ" ولم تكن إلا جسراً أمريكياً ـ إسرائيلياً عبر عليه الكتائبيون باتجاه التسلط على رقاب المستضعفين.	41
But our people were not willing to endure this humiliation and they wiped out the dreams of the Zionists and their allies. But America persisted in its rashness and brought Amīn al-Jumayil to succeed his buried brother. Amin's first accomplishment was to destroy the homes of the evacuees, to attack the Muslims' mosques, to order the army to demolish the quarters of the downtrodden on the heads of their occupants, to enlist the help of NATO forces against us, and to conclude the ill-fated May I7 accord that turned Lebanon into an Israeli protectorate and an American colony.	لكن شعبنا لم يستطع الصبر على هذه المهانة، فأباد أحلام الصهاينة وحلفائهم.. إلا أن أمريكا أصرت على حماقتها فأوصلت أمين الجميل لخلافة أخيه المقبور، وكانت أول إنجازاته تدمير منازل المهجرين، والاعتداء على مساجد المسلمين، وإعطاء الأوامر للجيش بقصف أحياء الضاحية المستضعفة على أهلها، واستدعاء قوات حلف الأطلسي للاستعانة بهم علينا، وتوقيع اتفاقية 17 أيار المشؤوم الذي يجعل من لبنان محمية إسرائيلية ومستعمرة أمريكية.	42
Our Fundamental Enemies	**أعداؤنا الأساسيون**	43
Our people could not withstand all this treason and decided to confront the imams of infidelity of America, France, and Israel.	ولم يستطع شعبنا أن يتحمل كل هذه الخيانة فقرر مواجهة أئمة الكفر: أمريكا وفرنسا وإسرائيل.	44
The first punishment against these forces was carried out on April 8 and the second on October 29, 1983. By that time, a real war had started against the Israeli	ونفذ بحقهم أول عقوبة لهم في 18 نيسان، ثم في 29 تشرين أول 1983م وكان قد بدأ حرباً حقيقية ضد قوات الاحتلال الإسرائيلي ارتقى خلالها إلى	45

occupation forces, rising to the level of destroying two main centres of the enemy's military rulers. From a popular and military resistance it escalated to a point in which the enemy had to make its decision on phased withdrawal - a decision that Israel was compelled to adopt for the first time in the history of the so-called Arab-Israeli conflict.	مستوى تدمير مركزين أساسيين لحكامه العسكريين، وصعد من مقاومته الإسلامية شعبياً وعسكرياً حتى أرغم العدو على اتخاذ قرار بالفرار المرحلي وهو قرار تضطر إليه إسرائيل لأول مرة في تاريخ ما سمي بالصراع العربي ـ الإسرائيلي.	
For the sake of the truth, we declare that the sons of Hezbollah's *umma* have come to know well their basic enemies in the area: Israel, America, France, and the Phalange.	وللحقيقة نعلن أن أبناء أمة حزب الله باتوا الآن يعرفون أعداءهم الأساسيين جيداً في المنطقة: إسرائيل، أمريكا، فرنسا، والكتائب.	46
Our Objectives in Lebanon	**أهدافنا في لبنان**	47
And now they are in a condition of ever-escalating confrontation against these enemies until the following objectives are achieved:	وهم الآن في حالة مواجهة متصاعدة ضدهم حتى تتحقق الأهداف التالية:	48
Expel Israel from Lebanon as a prelude to its final obliteration from existence and the liberation of venerable Jerusalem from the talons of occupation.	ـ تخرج إسرائيل نهائياً من لبنان كمقدمة لإزالتها نهائياً من الوجود وتحرير القدس الشريف من براثن الاحتلال.	49
Expel America, France, and their allies from Lebanon and the termination of the influence of any imperialist state in the country.	ـ تخرج أمريكا وفرنسا وحلفاؤهما نهائياً من لبنان وينتهي أي نفوذ لأية دولة استعمارية في البلاد.	50
Submission by the Phalange to just rule and their trial for the crimes they have committed against the right of Muslims and Christians with the encouragement of America and Israel.	ـ يرضخ الكتائبيون للحكم العادل ويحاكمون جميعاً على الجرائم التي ارتكبوها بحق المسلمين والمسيحيين بتشجيع من أمريكا وإسرائيل.	51
Giving to all our people the opportunity to determine their fate and to choose with full freedom the system of government they want, keeping in mind that we do not hide our commitment to the rule of Islam and that we call to choose the Islamic system that alone guarantees justice and dignity for all and prevents any new imperialist attempt to infiltrate our country.	ـ يتاح لجميع أبناء شعبنا أن يقرروا مصيرهم ويختاروا بكامل حريتهم شكل نظام الحكم الذي يريدونه، علماً بأننا لا نخفي التزامنا بحكم الإسلام وندعو الجميع إلى اختيار النظام الإسلامي الذي يكفل وحده العدل والكرامة للجميع، ويمنع وحده أية محاولة للتسلل الاستعماري إلى بلادنا من جديد.	52
Friends	**أيها الأصدقاء**	53
These are our objectives in Lebanon and those are our enemies. As for our friends, they are all the world's downtrodden peoples and all those who fight our enemies and who are eager not to harm us, be they individuals, parties, or	إذاً ... هذه هي أهدافنا في لبنان وهؤلاء هم أعداؤنا، أما أصدقاؤنا فهم كل الشعوب المستضعفة في العالم، وهم كل من يحارب أعداءنا ويحرص على عدم الإساءة إلينا.. أفراداً كانوا أو أحزاباً أو منظمات...	54

organizations.		
We especially address this letter to them to say:	وإننا نتوجه إليهم ونخصهم بهذا الخطاب فنقول:	55
combatants and those of you in an organization, wherever you are in Lebanon and whatever your ideas,	أيها المحاربون والمنظمون أينما كنتم في لبنان وأياً كانت أفكاركم..	56
we agree with you on major and important goals embodied in the need to topple the American hegemony of the country, to expel the Zionist occupation that bears down heavily on the people's lives,	إننا متفقون وإياكم على أهداف كبيرة ومهمة.. تتمثل في ضرورة إسقاط الهيمنة الأمريكية على البلاد.. وطرد الاحتلال الصهيوني الجاثم على رقاب العباد..	57
and to strike all the Phalangist endeavours to control government and administrative affairs, even though we may disagree with you on the methods and level of confrontation.	وضرب كل محاولات التسلط الكتائبي على شؤون الحكم والإدارة.. وإن كنّا نختلف في أساليب المواجهة ومستوى المواجهة.	58
Come, let us rise above quarrelling over minor issues and let us open wide the doors of competition for achieving the major goals.	فتعالوا نترفع عن التخاصم فيما بيننا على الأمور الصغيرة ونفتح أبواب التنافس واسعة أمام تحقيق الأهداف الكبيرة.	59
It is not important that a certain party control the street. What is important is that the masses interact with this party.	فليس مهماً أن يسيطر حزب على شارع، وإنما المهم أن تتفاعل الجماهير مع هذا الحزب.	60
It is not important that many military parades be held for the citizens. What is important is to increase the operations against Israel.	وليس المهم أن تكثر الاستعراضات العسكرية على المواطنين.. بل المهم أن تكثر العمليات ضد إسرائيل.	61
It is not important that we draft statements and call for conferences. What is important is that we turn Lebanon into a graveyard for American schemes.	وليس المهم أن نصيغ البيانات وندعو إلى مؤتمرات، بل المهم أن نجعل من لبنان مقبرة للمشاريع الأمريكية.	62
You carry ideas that do not stem from Islam. This should not prevent cooperation between us for these objectives, especially since we feel that the motives urging you to engage in the struggle are fundamentally Islamic motives emanating from the injustice inflicted upon you by tyranny and the oppression exercised against you by it.	إنكم تحملون أفكاراً ليست من الإسلام... وليس في هذا ما يحول بيننا وبينكم التعاون معكم من أجل هذه الأهداف؛ خصوصاً أننا نشعر بأن الدوافع التي تحرضكم من أجل النضال هي دوافع إسلامية في الأصل، منشؤها الظلم اللاحق بكم من الطاغوت، والاستضعاف الذي يمارس عليكم من قِبَله..	63
Though formed through non-Islamic ideas, these motives must inevitably revert to their essence when you find that revolutionary Islam is the force leading the struggle and the resistance to oppression and arrogance.	وهذه الدوافع إن تشكلت بأفكار غير إسلامية فلا بدّ أن تعود إلى جوهرها حين ترون الإسلام الثوري هو الذي يتصدى لقيادة الصراع، ولمقاومة الظلم والاستكبار.	64
However, we shall accept no provocation, instigation, or aggression from you against	على إننا لا نرتضي منكم تحرشاً ولا استفزازاً ولا اعتداءات على أمننا وكرامتنا، ونلتزم معكم بمعالجة	65

our security or our dignity, we are obliged with you to deal with any problem with the good word first, and we are eager not to let you obstruct our movement toward our objectives.	أي التباس بالتي هي أحسن أولاً، ونحرص على أن لا تشغلونا بما يعيق تحركنا لأهدافنا.	
You will find us eager to open up to you. You will also find that our relationship with you will grow stronger the closer our ideas move toward each other,	وستجدوننا حريصين على الانفتاح عليكم، وستزداد العلاقة معكم كلما ازداد التقارب الفكري فيما بيننا وبينكم،	66
the more we feel that your decision making is independent, and the more the interest of Islam and the Muslims dictates that this relationship be bolstered and developed.	وكلما شعرنا باستقلالية قراركم، وكلما اقتضت مصلحة الإسلام والمسلمين تعزيز هذه العلاقة وتطويرها.	67
Downtrodden partisans,	أيها المحازبون المستضعفون.	68
You have sought what is right but have missed it, and those who seek what is right and miss it are not like those who seek what is false and hit it.	أنتم ممن قصدتم الحق فأخطأتموه.. وليس من قصد الحق فأخطأه كمن قصد الباطل فأصابه.	69
Therefore, we extend our hand to you and tell you sincerely: {*Our People respond to the one who calls you to God*} (Sura al-Ahqaf: 31) and {*and respond to God and His Messenger when he calls you to that which gives you life.*} (Sura al-Anfal: 24)	ولذا فإننا نمد أيدينا إليكم ونقول لكم مخلصين {يا قومنا أجيبوا داعي الله} (الأحقاف: 32) و { واستجيبوا لله وللرسول إذا دعاكم لما يحييكم} (الأنفال:24).	70
We Are Committed to Islam But We Do Not Impose It by Force	**نلتزم بالإسلام ولا نفرضه بالقوة**	71
Free, downtrodden, We are a *umma* committed to the message of Islam and that wishes the downtrodden and all the persons to study this divine message because it will bring about justice, peace, and serenity in the world.	أيها المستضعفون الأحرار! إننا أمة التزمت برسالة الإسلام وأحبت للمستضعفين وللناس كافة أن يتدارسوا هذه الرسالة السماوية؛ لأنها تصلح لتحقيق العدل والسلام والطمأنينة في العالم.	72
God, may He be praised, says: {*There is no compulsion in religion: true guidance has become distinct from error, so whoever rejects false gods and believes in God has grasped the firmest hand-hold, one that will never break. God is all hearing and all knowing. God is the ally of those who believe: He brings them out of the depths of the darkness and into the light. But close to the disbelievers are their false gods, who take them into depths of darkness, they are the inhabitants of the Fire, and there they remain.*} (Surah al-Baqra: 256-7)	والله ـ تعالى ربنا ـ يقول: {لَا إِكْرَاهَ فِي الدِّينِ قَدْ تَبَيَّنَ الرُّشْدُ مِنَ الْغَيِّ فَمَنْ يَكْفُرْ بِالطَّاغُوتِ وَيُؤْمِنْ بِاللَّهِ فَقَدِ اسْتَمْسَكَ بِالْعُرْوَةِ الْوُثْقَى لَا انْفِصَامَ لَهَا وَاللَّهُ سَمِيعٌ عَلِيمٌ اللَّهُ وَلِيُّ الَّذِينَ آمَنُوا يُخْرِجُهُمْ مِنَ الظُّلُمَاتِ إِلَى النُّورِ وَالَّذِينَ كَفَرُوا أَوْلِيَاؤُهُمُ الطَّاغُوتُ يُخْرِجُونَهُمْ مِنَ النُّورِ إِلَى الظُّلُمَاتِ أُولَئِكَ أَصْحَابُ النَّارِ هُمْ فِيهَا خَالِدُونَ }. (البقرة: 256، 257)	73
Therefore, we do not wish to impose Islam on anybody and we hate to see others impose on us their convictions and their systems.	ولذا فإننا لا نريد أن نفرض الإسلام على أحد، ونكره أن يفرض الآخرون قناعاتهم وأنظمتهم علينا، ولا نريد أن يحكم الإسلام في لبنان بالقوة كما	74

289

English	Arabic	#
We do not want Islam to rule in Lebanon by force, as political Maronism is ruling at present.	تحكم المارونية السياسية الآن.	
But we stress that we are convinced of Islam as a faith, system, thought, and rule and we urge all to recognize it and to resort to the *sharīʿa*. We also urge them to adopt it and abide by its teachings at the individual, political, and social levels.	لكننا نؤكد أننا مقتنعون بالإسلام عقيدة ونظاماً، فكراً وحكماً، وندعو الجميع إلى التعرف عليه والاحتكام إلى شريعته، كما ندعوهم إلى تبنيه والالتزام بتعاليمه على المستوى الفردي والسياسي والاجتماعي.	75
If our people get the opportunity to choose Lebanon's system of government freely, they will favour no alternative to Islam.	وإذا ما أتيح لشعبنا أن يختار بحريته شكل نظام الحكم في لبنان فإنه لن يرجح على الإسلام بديلاً.	76
Therefore, we urge adoption of the Islamic system on the basis of free and direct selection by the people, not the basis of forceful imposition, as some people imagine.	ومن هنا فإننا ندعو إلى اعتماد النظام الإسلامي على قاعدة الاختيار الحر والمباشر من قِبَلِ الناس، لا على قاعدة الفرض بالقوة كما يخيل للبعض.	77
We declare that we aspire to see Lebanon as an indivisible part of the political map opposed to America, world arrogance, and world Zionism and to see Lebanon ruled by Islam and its just leadership. This is the aspiration of a *umma*, not of a party, and the choice of a people, not of a gang.	ونعلن أننا نطمح أن يكون لبنان جزءاً لا يتجزأ من الخارطة السياسية المعادية لأمريكا والاستكبار العالمي وللصهيونية العالمية، والتي يحكمها الإسلام وقيادته العادلة. وهذا الطموح هو طموح أمة وليس طموح حزب، واختيار شعب لا اختيار عصابة.	78
Our Minimum Aspiration in Lebanon	**الحد الأدنى لطموحنا في لبنان**	79
Therefore, the minimum we shall accept in terms of achieving this aspiration, which we are religiously bound (*sharʿan*) to achieve, is:	وعلى هذا الأساس فإن الحد الأدنى الذي يمكن أن نقبل به على طريق تحقيق هذا الطموح المكلفين بالسعي لتحقيقه شرعاً، هو:	80
rescuing Lebanon from subservience to either the West or the East, expelling the Zionist occupation from its territories finally and adopting a system that the people established out of their free will and choice.	(إنقاذ لبنان من التبعية للغرب أو للشرق وطرد الاحتلال الصهيوني من أراضيه نهائياً واعتماد نظام يقرره الشعب، بمحض اختياره وحريته).	81
Why Do We Confront the Existing Regime?	**لماذا نواجه النظام القائم؟**	82
This is our visualization and these are our projections of what we want in Lebanon. In the light of this visualization and these projections, we confront the existing regime due to two main considerations:	هذه هي رؤيتنا وتصوراتنا عمّا نريده في لبنان، وعلى ضوء هذه الرؤية والتصورات نواجه النظام القائم لاعتبارين أساسيين:	83
1. Because it is a product of world arrogance and a part of the political map that is hostile to Islam.	1 ـ لكونه صنيعة الاستكبار العالمي وجزء من الخارطة السياسية المعادية للإسلام.	84
2. Because it is a fundamentally oppressive structure that no reform or patchwork	2 ـ لكونه تركيبة ظالمة في أساسها لا ينفع معها أي إصلاح أو ترقيع، بل لا بد من تغييرها من جذورها	85

improvement would do any good and that must be changed from the roots {*those who do not judge according to what God has revealed are doing grave wrong.*} (Sura al-Maida: 45)	{وَمَن لَّمْ يَحْكُم بِمَا أَنزَلَ اللّهِ فَأُوْلَٰئِكَ هِمُ الظَّالِمُونَّ}. (المائدة: 45)	
Our Position toward the Opposition	موقفنا من المعارضة	86
We determine our stance vis-a-vis any opposition to the Lebanese regime in light of the two above-mentioned considerations. We consider any opposition moving within red lines imposed by the arrogant forces a scarecrow opposition that will ultimately agree with the existing regime.	وفي ضوء الاعتبارين الآنفين نحدد موقفنا من أية معارضة للنظام اللبناني. فنعتبر أن كل معارضة تتحرك ضمن خطوط حمر فرضتها القوى المستكبرة هي معارضة شكلية لا بد وأن تلتقي في نهاية المطاف مع النظام القائم.	87
Any opposition moving within the sphere of protecting and safeguarding the constitution currently in force and not committed to making fundamental changes in the system's roots is also a scarecrow opposition that will not achieve the interests of the downtrodden masses.	وكل معارضة تتحرك ضمن دائرة الحفاظ والحرص على الدستور المعمول به حالياً، وتلتزم عدم إجراء أي تغيير أساسي في جذور النظام، هي معارضة شكلية أيضاً لا تحقق مصلحة الجماهير المستضعفة.	88
Moreover, any opposition moving within the positions where the regime wants it to move is an imaginary opposition that serves only the regime.	وكذلك فإن كل معارضة تتحرك في المواقع التي يريدها النظام أن تتحرك من خلالها، هي معارضة وهمية ليست إلا لخدمة النظام.	89
On the other hand, we are not at all interested in any projection for political reform within the framework of the rotten sectarian system, just exactly as we are not interested in the formation of any cabinet or the participation of any figure in any ministry representing a part of the oppressive regime.	ومن ناحية أخرى، فإن كل طرح للإصلاح السياسي على ضوء النظام الطائفي العفن لا يعنينا فيه شيء، تماماً كما لا يعنينا تشكيل أية حكومة أو اشتراك أية شخصية في أية وزارة تمثل جزءاً من النظام الظالم.	90
Words to the Christians in Lebanon	**كلمات برسم المسيحيين في لبنان**	91
Honourable, downtrodden men! We wish to address through you a few words intended for the Christians in Lebanon, especially intended for the Maronites.	أيها المستضعفون الشرفاء! إننا نتوجه من خلالكم بكلمات قليلة نضعها برسم المسيحيين في لبنان وبرسم الموارنة على وجه الخصوص.	92
The policy followed by the leaders (*zuʿama*) of political Maronism through the Lebanese Front and the Lebanese Forces is incapable of achieving peace and stability for the Christians in Lebanon because it is a policy founded on bigotry, sectarian privileges, and alliance with imperialism and Israel.	إن السياسة التي ينتهجها زعماء المارونية السياسية من خلال "الجبهة اللبنانية" و "القوات اللبنانية" لا يمكن أن تحقق السلام والاستقرار للمسيحيين في لبنان؛ لأنها سياسة قائمة على العصبية والامتيازات الطائفية والتحالف مع الاستعمار وإسرائيل.	93
The Lebanese tragedy has proven that the	ولقد أثبتت المحنة اللبنانية أن الامتيازات الطائفية	94

sectarian privileges are one of the main causes of the big explosion that has brought about the collapse of the country and that the alliance with America, France, and Israel did the Christians no good when they needed the support of these forces.	كانت سبباً رئيسياً من أسباب الانفجار الكبير الذي قوض البلاد، وإن التحالف مع أمريكا وفرنسا وإسرائيل لم يُجْدِ نفعاً للمسيحيين يوم احتاجوا لدعم هؤلاء.	
Moreover, the time has come for the fundamentalist Christians to come out of the tunnel of sectarian loyalty and of the illusions of monopolizing privileges at the expense of others.	ثم إن الأوان قد آن ليخرج المسيحيون المتعصبون من نفق الولاء الطائفي ومن أوهام الاستئثار بالامتيازات على حساب الآخرين،	95
It is time for them to respond to the divine call (daʿwa) and to resort to reason instead of arms and to moderation instead of partisanship.	وأن يستجيبوا لدعوة السماء فيحتكموا إلى العقل بدل السلاح وإلى القناعة بدل الطائفة.	96
We are confident that the Christian prophet of God, peace be upon him, is not responsible of the massacres perpetrated by the Phalange in his name and yours.	إننا على يقين بأن رسول الله المسيح ـ عليه الصلاة والسلام ـ براء من المجازر التي ارتكبها الكتائبيون باسمه وباسمكم.	97
Is not responsible of the stupid policy adopted by your leaders to oppress you and oppress us. Muḥammad, God's prophet, peace and mercy be upon him, is also not responsible of those who are considered Muslims and who do not observe God's law and who do not seek to apply God's rules to you and to us.	وبراء من السياسة الحمقاء التي يعتمدها زعماؤكم للتحكم بنا وبكم. كما وأن رسول الله محمد (صلى الله عليه وسلم) هو براء أيضاً ممن يحسب على المسلمين ممن لا يلتزمون بشرع الله ولا يسعون إلى تطبيق أحكامه علينا وعليكم.	98
If you reconsider your calculations and you realize that your interest lies in what you decide with your own free will and not in what is imposed on you with iron and fire, then we will renew our call (daʿwa) to you in response to God's words:	فإذا ما راجعتم حساباتكم وعرفتم أن مصلحتكم هي ما تقررونه أنتم بمحض اختياركم لا ما يفرض عليكم بالحديد والنار، حينئذٍ نجدد دعوتنا لكم استجابة لقول الله ـ تعالى ـ:	99
{Say, 'people of the Book! Let us arrive at a statement that is common to us all: we worship God alone, we ascribe no partner to Him, and none of us takes others beside God as lords.' If they turn away, say, 'Witness our devotion to Him.} (al-Imran: 64)	{قِلَ يَا أَهْلَ الْكِتَابِ تَعَالَوْا إِلَى" كَلِمَةٍ سَوَاءٍ بَيْنَنَا وَبَيْنَكُمْ أَلاَّ نَعْبُدَ إِلاَّ اللهَ وَلا نِشْرِكَ بِهِ شَيْئًا وَلا يَتَّخِذَ بَعْضِنَا بَعْضاً أَرْبَاباً مِّن دونِ اللهِ فَإِن تَوَلَّوْا فَقُولوا اشْهَدِوا بِأَنَّا مِسْلَمونَ}(آل عمران: 64)	100
Oh Christians of Lebanon, If you find it too much for the Muslims to share with you some government affairs, then God also finds it an excess for us to do so because the Muslims would be taking part in a government that is unjust to you and to us and that is not founded on the basis of the sharīʿa that was completed by the last of the prophets.	يا مسيحيي لبنان... إن كان كبر عليكم أن يشارككم المسلمون في بعض شؤون الحكم.. فإنه والله كبر علينا ذلك أيضاً؛ لأنهم يشاركون في حكم ظالم لنا ولكم... وغير قائم على أحكام الدين ولا أسس الشريعة التي اكتملت بخاتم النبيين.	101

If you want justice, then who is more just than God? Is He who revealed from heaven the message of Islam alongside the prophets so that they may rule among men justly and may give each his due right?	وإن كنتم تريدون عدلاً، فمن أوْلى من الله بالعدل؟ وهو الذي أنزل من السماء رسالة الإسلام على امتداد بعثات الأنبياء من أجل أن يحكموا بين الناس بالقسط ويأخذوا لكل ذي حق حقه.	102
If somebody has misled you, exaggerated matters for you, and made you afraid of reactions on our part to the crimes the Phalange have committed against us, then this is completely unjustifiable.	وإن كان أحد قد ضللكم وعظم لكم الأمور وخوفكم أن ينالكم منّا ردود فعل على ما ارتكبه الكتائبيون من جرائم بحقنا، فهذا ما لا مبرر لكم فيه أبداً؛	103
Because those who are peaceful among you are still living among us without being disturbed by anybody.	إذ إن المسالمين منكم لا زالوا يعيشون بيننا دون أن يعكر صفوهم أحد.	104
If we are fighting the Phalange, it is because they are blocking your view of the truth, they turn you away from the way of God, and they desire on the earth improper deviation and they have waxed proud with great insolence.	وإن كنّا نقاتل الكتائبيين فلأنهم يشكلون حاجزاً أمام رؤيتكم للحقيقة ويصدونكم عن سبيل الله ويبغونها في الأرض عوجاً بغير حق، وقد استكبروا وعتوا عتواً كبيراً.	105
We wish you well and we call you to Islam so that you may enjoy this world and the hereafter.	وإننا نريد لكم الخير وندعوكم إلى الإسلام لتسعدوا في الدنيا والآخرة،	106
If you refuse, then all we want of you is to uphold your covenants with the Muslims and not to participate in aggression against them.	فإن أبيتم فما لنا عليكم من سبيل إلا أن تحفظوا عهودكم مع المسلمين ولا تشاركوا في العدوان عليهم.	107
Oh Christians, free your thoughts of the residues of hateful sectarianism, liberate your minds from the shackle of fundamentalism and insularity, and open your hearts to our invitation to you to join Islam because in it lies your salvation, happiness and your good in this world and in the hereafter.	أيها المسيحيون.. حرروا أفكاركم من رواسب الطائفية البغيضة، وجردوا عقولكم من أسر التعصب والانغلاق، وافتحوا بصائركم على ما ندعوكم إليه من الإسلام؛ ففيه نجاتكم وسعادتكم وخير الدنيا والآخرة.	108
We extend this call (daʿwa) of ours to all the downtrodden non-Muslims. As for those who belong to Islam denominationally, we urge them to commit to Islam practically and to rise above fundamentalisms that are hateful to the religion.	ودعوتنا هذه نضعها برسم كل المستضعفين من غير المسلمين، أما المنتسبون للإسلام طائفياً فندعوهم للالتزام بالإسلام عملياً، والترفع عن العصبيات التي يمقتها الدين.	109
We assure all that this is the age of the victory of Islam and of right and of the defeat of infidelity and falsehood.	ونؤكد للجميع بأن هذا العصر هو عصر انتصار الإسلام والحق، وهزيمة الكفر والباطل،	110
Join with right before the {*day the evildoer will bite his own hand and say, 'If only I had taken the same path as the Messenger'. Woe is me! If only I had not taken so and*	فالتحقوا بركب الحق قبل أن يأتي {وَيَوْمَ يَعَضُّ الظَّالِمُ عَلَى" يَدَيْهِ يَقُولُ يَا لَيْتَنِي اتَّخَذْتُ مَعَ الرَّسُولِ سَبِيلاً يَا وَيْلَتَى" لَيْتَنِي لَمْ أَتَّخِذْ فُلانًا خَلِيلاً لَقَدْ أَضَلَّنِي	111

so as a friend –he let me away from the Revelation after it reached me.} (al-Furqan: 27-9)	عَنِ الذِّكْرِ بَعْدَ إِذْ جَاءَنِي وَكَانَ الشَّيْطَانُ لِلْإِنسَانِ خَذُولاً}. (الفرقان: 27 - 29).	
Our Story with World Arrogance	قصتنا مع الاستكبار العالمي	112
Honourable, downtrodden men, As for our story with world arrogance, we shall sum it up for you in these words:	أيها المستضعفون الشرفاء... وأما قصتنا مع الاستكبار العالمي فنوجزها لكم بهذه الكلمات:	113
We believe that the struggle of principles between the United States and the Soviet Union ended forever a long time ago.	إننا نعتقد أن صراع المبادئ بين أمريكا والاتحاد السوفييتي قد ولى منذ زمن بعيد وإلى غير رجعة...	114
The two sides have failed to achieve happiness for mankind because the idea they have offered mankind, though assuming the different forms of capitalism and communism, agrees in material content and fails to deal with the problems of mankind.	فلقد أخفق الطرفان في تحقيق السعادة للبشرية؛ لأن الفكرة التي قدماها للناس وإن اختلفت من حيث الشكل إلى رأسمالية وشيوعية إلا أنها التقت في المضمون المادي وقصرت عن علاج مشاكل الإنسانية.	115
Neither western capitalism nor eastern socialism has succeeded in establishing the rules of the just and serene society, nor have they been able to establish a balance between the individual and society or between human nature and public interest.	فلا الرأسمالية الغربية ولا الاشتراكية الشرقية نجحتا في إرساء قواعد المجتمع العادل والمطمئن، ولا استطاعتا أن تحققا التوازن بين الـفـرد والمجتمع ولا بين الفطرة البشرية والمصلحة العامة.	116
The two sides have mutually recognized this fact and have realized that there is no more place for ideological struggle between the two camps.	وتوصل الطرفان إلى إقرار واعتراف متبادل بهذه الحقيقة، وأدركا أنه لم يعد من مجال للصراع الفكري فيما بين المعسكرين...	117
They have both turned to struggle for influence and interest, hiding from public opinion behind the mask of disagreement on principles.	وانعطفا سوياً إلى الصراع حول النفوذ والمصالح مستترين أمام الرأي العام وراء الاختلاف في المبادئ.	118
In the light of this understanding, we believe that the ideological struggle between the two camps has been folded forever and been replaced by the struggle for influence and interests between the countries of the arrogant world that are led today by America and the Soviet Union.	وفي ضوء هذا الفهم فإننا نرى أن الصراع الفكري بين المعسكرين قد طوي نهائياً، وحل محله صراع المصالح والنفوذ بين دول العالم المستكبر التي يتزعمها اليوم أمريكا والاتحاد السوفييتي.	119
Consequently, the downtrodden countries have become the struggle's bone of contention and the downtrodden peoples have become its fuel.	وعلى هذا الأساس فالبلدان المستضعفة باتت هي محكم الصراع، والشعوب المستضعفة أصبحت وقوده.	120
While we consider the struggle between the two superpowers a natural outcome of the material content that motivates each of them, we cannot agree to have this struggle conducted at the expense of the interests of the downtrodden and their	ونحن إذ نعتبر الصراع بين الجبارين ناتجاً طبيعياً للمضمون المادي الذي يدفع كلاً منهما .. إلا أننا لا نستطيع أن نقبل بهذا الصراع على حساب مصالح المستضعفين وبلادهم ونواجه كل أطماع وتدخل في شؤوننا.	121

294

English	Arabic	#
countries and we oppose to any ambition and interference in our affairs.		
While denouncing America's crimes in Vietnam, Iran, Nicaragua, Grenada, Palestine, Lebanon, and other countries, we also denounce the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the intervention in Iran's affairs, the support for Iraqi aggression, and so forth.	وفي الوقت الذي ندين فيه جرائم أمريكا في فيتنام وإيران ونيكاراغوا وغرينادا وفلسطين ولبنان وغيرهما... ندين أيضاً الغزو السوفييتي لأفغانستان، والتدخل في شؤون إيران، ودعم العدوان العراقي وغير ذلك.	122
In Lebanon and in the Palestine area, we are mainly concerned with confronting America because it is the party with the greatest influence among the countries of world arrogance, and also with confronting Israel, the ulcerous growth of world Zionism.	أما في لبنان ومنطقة فلسطين، فإننا معنيون بمواجهة أمريكا بشكل رئيسي؛ لأنها صاحبة النفوذ الأقوى بين دول الاستكبار العالمي، وكذلك إسرائيل ربيبة الصهيونية العالمية...	123
Therefore, we are concerned with confronting America's allies in NATO who have gotten embroiled in helping America against the area's peoples.	ومن ثم فإننا معنيون بمواجهة حلفاء أمريكا من دول حلف شمال الأطلسي التي تورطت في مساعدة أمريكا ضد شعوب المنطقة..	124
We warn the countries that have not gotten involved yet against being dragged into serving American interests at the expense of our *umma*'s freedom and interests.	ونحذر الدول التي لم تتورط بعد من الانجرار إلى خدمة المصالح الأمريكية على حساب حرية أمتنا ومصالحها.	125
Israel Must Be Wiped Out of Existence	**إسرائيل يجب أن تزول من الوجود**	126
As for Israel, we consider it the American spearhead in our Islamic world. It is a usurping enemy that must be fought until the usurped right is returned to its owners.	أما إسرائيل فنعتبرها رأس الحربة الأمريكية في عالمنا الإسلامي وهي عدو غاصب تجب محاربته حتى يعود الحق المغصوب إلى أهله.	127
This enemy poses a great danger to our future generations and to the destiny of our *umma*, especially since it embraces a settlement oriented and expansionist idea that it has already begun to apply in occupied Palestine and it is extending and expanding to build Greater Israel, from the Euphrates to the Nile.	وهذا العدو يشكل خطراً كبيراً على مستقبل أجيالنا ومصير أمتنا خصوصاً أنه يحمل فكرة استيطانية توسعية بدأ تطبيقها في فلسطين المحتلة ويحاول التمدد والتوسع ليبني دولة إسرائيل الكبرى من الفرات إلى النيل.	128
Our struggle with usurping Israel emanates from an ideological and historical awareness that this Zionist entity is aggressive in its origins and structure and is built on usurped land and at the expense of the rights of a Muslim people.	وصراعنا مع إسرائيل الغاصبة ينطلق من فهم عقائدي وتاريخي مؤداه أن هذا الكيان الصهيوني عدواني في نشأته وتكوينه وقائم على أرض مغصوبة وعلى حساب حقوق شعب مسلم.	129
Therefore, our confrontation of this entity must end with its obliteration from existence. This is why we do not recognize any ceasefire agreement, any truce, or any separate or non-separate peace treaty with it.	ولذا فإن مواجهتنا لهذا الكيان يجب أن تنتهي بإزالته من الوجود، ومن هنا فإننا لا نعترف بأي اتفاق لوقف إطلاق النار ضده، أو أية اتفاقية هدنة معه، أو أية معاهدة سلام منفردة أو غير منفردة.	130

English	Arabic	#
We condemn strongly all the plans for mediation between us and Israel and we consider the mediators a hostile party because their mediation will only serve to acknowledge the legitimacy of the Zionist occupation of Palestine.	وندين بشدة كل مشاريع الوساطة بيننا وبين إسرائيل، ونعتبر الوسطاء طرفاً معادياً؛ لأن وساطتهم لن تخدم إلا الإقرار بشرعية الاحتلال الصهيوني لفلسطين.	131
Therefore, we reject the Camp David treaty, the (King) Fahd plan, the Fez plan, the Reagan plan, the Brezhnev plan, the French-Egyptian plan, and any plan including even tacit recognition of the Zionist entity.	وعلى هذا الأساس نرفض معاهدة كامب ديفيد، ونرفض مشروع فهد، ومشروع فاس، ومشروع ريغان، ومشروع بريجنيف، والمشروع الفرنسي - المصري، وكل مشروع يتضمن اعترافاً ولو ضمنياً بالكيان الصهيوني.	132
We underline in this regard our condemnation of all the deviant countries and organizations that chase after capitulationist solutions with the enemy breathlessly and that agree to "barter land for peace."	ونسجل في هذا السياق إدانتنا لكل الدول والمنظمات المنحرفة التي تلهث وراء الحلول الاستسلامية مع العدو وتقبل "بمقايضة الأرض بالسلام"	133
We consider this a betrayal of the Muslim Palestinian people's blood and of the sacred Palestinian cause.	ونعتبر ذلك خيانة لدماء الشعب الفلسطيني المسلم ولقضية فلسطين المقدسة.	134
On the other hand, we view the recently voiced Jewish call for settlement in south Lebanon and the immigration of the Ethiopian Jews and others to occupied Palestine as a part of the expansionist Israeli scheme in the Islamic world and as an actual indicator of the danger emanating from the recognition of or coexistence with this entity.	ومن جهة أخرى فإن الدعوة اليهودية التي أُطلقت أخيراً للاستيطان في جنوب لبنان، وكذلك هجرة اليهود الأثيوبيين وغيرهم إلى داخل فلسطين المحتلة،ننظر إليها على أنها جزء من المشروع الإسرائيلي التوسعي في العالم الإسلامي، ومؤشر فعلي على الخطر الناجم من الاعتراف بهذا الكيان أو التعايش معه.	135
Escalating Islamic Resistance	**المقاومة الإسلامية المتصاعدة**	136
When speaking of usurping Israel, we must pause before the phenomenon of Islamic resistance that sprang from the occupied Lebanese territories to impose a new historic and cultural turn on the course of the struggle against the Zionist enemy.	وحين نتحدث عن إسرائيل الغاصبة لا بد أن نتوقف عند ظاهرة المقاومة الإسلامية التي انطلقت من المناطق اللبنانية المحتلة لتفرض تحولاً تاريخياً وحضارياً جديداً على مجرى الصراع ضد العدو الصهيوني.	137
The honourable Islamic resistance that has inscribed and continues to inscribe the most magnificent sagas against the Zionist invasion forces; that has destroyed by the faith of its *mujāhidīn* the myth of invincible Israel; that has been able to place the usurping entity into a real dilemma as a result of the daily military, economic, and human attrition it inflicts on this entity, forcing its leaders to acknowledge the severe resistance they face at the hands of the Muslims.	فالمقاومة الإسلامية المشرفة التي سطرت ولا تزال أروع الملاحم والبطولات ضد قوات الغزو الصهيوني، وحطمت بإيمان مجاهديها أسطورة إسرائيل التي لا تقهر، واستطاعت أن توقع الكيان الغاصب في مأزق حقيقي من جراء الاستنزاف اليومي له عسكرياً وبشرياً واقتصادياً اضطر قادته أن يعترفوا بقساوة المواجهة التي يلقونها على أيدي المسلمين.	138

This Islamic resistance must continue, grow, and escalate, with God's help, and must receive from all Muslims in all parts of the world utter support, aid, backing, and participation so that we may be able to uproot this cancerous germ and obliterate it from existence.	هذه المقاومة الإسلامية لا بد أن تتواصل وتنمو وتتصاعد بعون الله ـ تعالى ـ وأن تلقى من المسلمين جميعاً في كافة أقطار العالم كل الدعم والتأييد والمساندة والمشاركة حتى نستطيع أن نجتث الجرثومة السرطانية ونقتلعها من الوجود.	139
While underlining the Islamic character of this resistance, we do so out of compatibility with its reality, which is clearly Islamic in motive, objective, course, and depth of confrontation. This does not at all negate its patriotism, but confirms it. On the contrary, if this resistance's Islamic character were effaced, its patriotism would become extremely fragile.	وإذ نصر على تأكيد إسلاميتها فإنما يكون ذلك انسجاماً منا مع واقعها الذي يبدو واضحاً أنه إسلامي في الدافع والهدف والمسلك وعمق المواجهة.. وهذا لا يلغي وطنيتها أبداً بل يؤكدها.. على العكس مما لو طمست إسلاميتها فإن وطنيتها تصبح هشة إلى حد كبير.	140
Appeal for Broad Islamic Participation	**نداء من أجل مشاركة إسلامية واسعة**	141
We take this opportunity to address a warm appeal to all the Muslim sons in the world, we call them to share with their brothers in Lebanon the honour of fighting the occupying Zionists,	إننا ننتهز الفرصة لنوجه نداءً حاراً إلى كافة أبناء المسلمين في العالم ندعوهم من خلاله إلى مشاركة إخوانهم في لبنان بشرف القتال ضد الصهاينة المحتلين،	142
either directly or by supporting and assisting the *mujāhidīn*, because fighting Israel is the responsibility of all Muslims in all parts of the world and not only the responsibility of the sons of Jebel ʿĀmil and Western al-Biqʿa.	إما مباشرة أو من خلال دعم المجاهدين ومساعدتهم. ذلك أن مقاتلة إسرائيل هي مسؤولية كل المسلمين في كافة الأقطار والمناطق وليست مسؤولية أبناء جبل عامل والبقاع الغربي وحدهم.	143
With the blood of its martyrs and the *jihād* of its heroes, the Islamic resistance has been able to force the enemy for the first time in the history of the conflict against it to make a decision to retreat and withdraw from Lebanon without any American or other influence.	لقد استطاعت المقاومة الإسلامية بدماء شهدائها وجهاد أبطالها أن ترغم العدو ولأول مرة في تاريخ الصراع ضده على اتخاذ قرار بالتراجع والانسحاب من لبنان دون أي تأثير أمريكي أو غيره،	144
On the contrary, the Israeli withdrawal decision has revealed real American worry and has formed a historic turning point in the course of the struggle against the usurping Zionists.	بل على العكس تماماً؛ فإن قرار الانسحاب الإسرائيلي أظهر قلقاً أمريكياً حقيقياً وشكل نقطة انعطاف تاريخية في مجرى الصراع ضد الصهاينة الغاصبين.	145
Through their Islamic resistance, the *mujāhidīn* -the women with rocks and boiling oil for their weapons, the children with their shouts and their bare fists for their weapons, the old men with their weak bodies and their thick sticks for their weapons, and the youth with their rifles and their firm and faithful will for their weapons; have all proven that, if the *umma* is allowed	وأثبت المجاهدون...من خلال مقاومتهم الإسلامية التي شاركت فيها النساء حيث سلاحها الحجارة والزيت المغلي، والأطفال حيث سلاحهم الصراخ والقبضات العارية، والشيوخ حيث سلاحهم الجسد الضعيف والعصا الغليظة.. والشباب حيث سلاحهم البندقية والإرادة الصلبة المؤمنة: هؤلاء جميعاً أثبتوا أن الأمة إذا ما تُركت تدير أمرها بحريتها قادرة على أن تصنع المعجزات وتغير المتوهم من	146

English	Arabic	#
to manage its affairs freely, it is capable of making miracles and of changing the imaginary fates.	الأقدار.	
The Governmental Politics of Avariciousness and Treasonous Negotiation	**سياسة الارتزاق الحكومي والتفاوض الخياني**	147
Let us pause a little before the government parades that emerge seasonally in an attempt to mislead the people into believing that the government supports the resistance against the occupation to declare clearly:	ونتوقف قليلاً عند الاستعراضات الحكومية التي تبرز في المواسم محاولة أن توهم الناس بمشاركة الحكم في دعم المقاومة ضد الاحتلال لنعلن بوضوح:	148
Our people have come to loathe verbal and media support and to despise those who offer it. If some statements have been issued by some pillars of the existing regime, let nobody imagine that the masses are unaware of the fact that these statements do not represent the position of the entire regime, especially since the regime is not about to throw its army into the battle to share the honour of liberation.	أن الدعم الإعلامي والكلامي بات شعبنا يمجه ويحتقر أصحابه.. وإن صدرت بعض التصريحات عن بعض أركان الحكم القائم، فلا يتوهمن أحد أن الجماهير في غفلة عن أن هذه التصريحات لا تمثل موقف الحكم برمته خصوصاً وإن الحكم ليس في وارد أن يزج جيشه لينال شرف المشاركة في التحرير.	149
As for the (regime's) financial support for the resistance, it is insignificant and it has not reached the *mujāhidīn* in the form of weapons, munitions, combat costs, and so forth.	أما الدعم المالي للمقاومة فليس ذا قيمة؛ إذ لم يصل إلى أيدي المجاهدين سلاحاً وذخيرة ونفقات قتال وما شابهه.	150
Our people reject the policy of avariciousness at the expense of the resistance. The day will come when all those who have traded in the blood of our heroic martyrs and who have glorified themselves at the expense of the *mujāhidīn*' s wounds will be judged.	وإن شعبنا يرفض سياسة الارتزاق على حساب المقاومة، وسيأتي يوم يحاكم فيه كل الذين تاجروا بدماء الشهداء الأبطال وبنوا لأنفسهم أمجاداً على حساب جروح المجاهدين.	151
We cannot but stress that the policy of negotiating with the enemy is high treason against the resistance, which the regime claims to support and aid; and that the government's determination to enter into negotiations with the enemy was nothing but a plot aimed at recognizing the legitimacy of the Zionist occupation and giving it privileges for the crimes it has committed against the downtrodden in Lebanon.	ولا يمكننا إلا أن نؤكد بأن سياسة التفاوض مع العدو، وهي خيانة كبرى للمقاومة التي يدعي النظام دعمها وتأييدها، وإن إصرار الحكم على دخول المفاوضات مع العدو لم يكن إلا مؤامرة تستهدف الاعتراف بشرعية الاحتلال الصهيوني ومنحه امتيازاً على ما ارتكبه من جرائم بحق المستضعفين في لبنان.	152
We add that the Islamic resistance, which declared its refusal to abide by any results emanating from the negotiations, reaffirms that the jihad will continue until the Zionists withdraw from the occupied territories as a	ونقول استطراداً.. إن المقاومة الإسلامية التي أعلنت رفضها الالتزام بأية نتيجة تصدر عن المفاوضا ت، تؤكد على استمرار الجهاد حتى جلاء الصهاينة عن المناطق المحتلة كمقدمة لإزالتهم من	153

298

English	Arabic	#
prelude to their obliteration from existence.	الوجود.	
International Forces and Suspect Role	**القوات الدولية والدور المشبوه**	154
The international forces that world arrogance is trying to deploy in the Muslims' territories from which the enemy will withdraw so that they may form a security barrier obstructing the resistance movement and protecting the security of Israel and of its invasion forces are collusive and rejected forces.	وإن القوات الدولية التي يسعى الاستكبار العالمي لإحلالها على أراضي المسلمين في المناطق التي سينسحب منها العدو بحيث تشكل حاجزاً أمنياً يعرقل تحرك المقاومة ويحفظ أمن إسرائيل وقواتها الغازية هي قوات متواطئة ومرفوضة...	155
We may be forced to deal with them exactly as we deal with the Zionist invasion forces. Let all know that the commitments of the imposed Phalangist regime are not in any way binding to the Islamic resistance *mujāhidīn*. Other countries must think carefully before they get immersed in the swamp in which Israel has drowned.	وقد نضطر إلى معاملتها كما نعامل قوات الغزو الصهيوني على حد سواء. وليعلم الجميع أن التزامات النظام الكتائبي المفروض لا تُلزم بأي شكل من الأشكال مجاهدي المقاومة الإسلامية، وعلى الدول أن تفكر ملياً قبل أن تتورط في المستنقع الذي غرقت فيه إسرائيل.	156
Defeatist Arab Regimes	**أنظمة الانهزام العربي**	157
As for the Arab regimes falling over themselves for reconciliation with the Zionist enemy, they are decrepit regimes incapable of keeping up with the *umma*'s ambitions and aspirations	وأما الأنظمة العربية المتهافتة على الصلح مع العدو الصهيوني فهي أنظمة عاجزة وقاصرة عن مواكبة طموح الأمة وتطلعاتها،	158
and they cannot think of confronting the Zionist entity usurping Palestine because these regimes came into existence under a colonialist guardianship that played the major role in the creation of these eroded regimes.	ولا تستطيع أن تفكر بمواجهة الكيان الصهيوني الغاصب لفلسطين؛ لأنها نشأت في ظل وصاية استعمارية كان لها الدور الأكبر في تكوين هذه الأنظمة المهترئة.	159
Some reactionary rulers, especially in the oil countries, are not reluctant to turn their countries into military bases for America and Britain and are not ashamed to rely on foreign experts, appointing them to top official positions.	إن بعض الحكام الرجعيين خصوصاً في الدول النفطية، لا يتورعون أن يجعلوا من بلدانهم قواعد عسكرية لأمريكا وبريطانيا، ولا يخجلون من الاعتماد على خبراء أجانب يعينونهم في مناصب رسمية عليا،	160
They are implementing the policies set for them by the White House circles to smuggle their countries' wealth and divide it among the imperialists by various means.	وينفذون ما تقرره لهم دوائر "البيت الأبيض" من سياسة تهريب الثروات وتوزيعها على المستعمرين بأساليب شتى.	161
Some of them claim to be protectors of the Islamic *sharīʿa* so that they may cover up their treason and may justify their submission to America's will while, at the same time, considering the entry of a single revolutionary Islamic book into their country something banned and prohibited.	ويدعي بعضهم أنه حامي الشريعة الإسلامية ليغطي خيانته وليبرر استسلامه لإرادة أمريكا، وفي الوقت نفسه يعتبر عبور كتاب إسلامي ثوري واحد إلى بلاده أمراً محرماً وممنوعاً.	162

As a result of the defeatist policy followed by these reactionary regimes vis-a-vis Israel; the latter has been able to persuade many of them that it has become a fait accompli that cannot go unrecognized, not to mention the necessity of acknowledging the need to ensure its security.	ونتيجة لسياسة الانهزام التي تتبعها هذه الأنظمة الرجعية تجاه إسرائيل، فقد استطاعت هذه الأخيرة أن تقنع الكثيرين منها بأنها أصبحت أمراً واقعاً، لا مجال لعدم الاعتراف بها فضلاً عن الإقرار بضرورة الالتزام بتوفير أمنها.	163
This defeatist policy is what encouraged the buried al-Sadat to commit his high treason and proceed to conclude peace with Israel and sign the humiliation treaty with it.	وسياسة الانهزام هذه هي التي شجعت السادات المقبور أن يرتكب خيانته الكبرى فيبادر إلى مصالحة إسرائيل وتوقيع معاهدة الذل معها.	164
The policy of defeatism is what is now governing the movement of the Gulf Cooperation Council, the Jordan-Egypt axis, Iraq, and the Arafat organization.	وسياسة الانهزام هذه هي التي تحكم مجلس التعاون الخليجي ومحور الأردن ـ مصر والعراق والمنظمة العرفاتية.	165
The defeatist policy toward America is what is directing the position of the reactionary rulers toward the war of aggression imposed on the Islamic Republic of Iran and is standing behind the boundless financial, economic, and military support for the agent Saddam out of the belief that the Zionized al-Tikriti regime can destroy the Islamic Revolution and can prevent the dissemination of its revolutionary blaze and concepts.	وسياسة الانهزام أمام أمريكا هي التي توجه موقف الحكام الرجعيين من الحرب العدوانية المفروضة على جمهورية الإسلام في إيران، وتقف وراء الدعم غير المحدود لصدام العميل، على مستوى التمويل والتموين الاقتصادي والعسكري ظناً منهم أن النظام التكريتي المتصهين يمكنه أن يقضي على الثورة الإسلامية ويمنع من انتشار وهجها الثوري ومفاهيمها.	166
This defeatist policy is what motivates the reactionary regimes to keep their peoples ignorant, to water down and dissolve their Islamic identity, and to suppress in their countries any Islamic movement opposed to America and its allies.	وسياسة الانهزام هذه هي التي تدفع الأنظمة الرجعية إلى تجهيل الناس وتمييعهم وتذويب شخصيتهم الإسلامية وقمع أي تحرك إسلامي مناهض لأمريكا وحلفائها في بلادهم،	167
It is also the policy that causes these regimes to fear the awakening of the downtrodden and to prevent their involvement in political affairs, because of the big danger posed to the survival of these regimes by awareness on the part of peoples of the corruption of their governments and of their suspect ties and by sympathy from these peoples for the liberation movements in all parts of the Islamic world and of the world generally.	كما أنها هي التي تدفعها إلى الخوف من يقظة المستضعفين ومنعهم من التدخل في شؤون السياسة لما في ذلك من خطر كبير على بقاء تلك الأنظمة ناتج عن وعي الشعوب على فساد حكوماتها وارتباطاتها المشبوهة، وعن تعاطف هذه الشعوب مع حركات التحرر في كافة أنحاء العالم الإسلامي والعالم.	168
We find in the reactionary Arab regimes a barrier blocking the development of the awareness and unity of the Islamic peoples and we consider these regimes responsible for obstructing the attempts to keep the wound open and the struggle continued	إننا نجد في الأنظمة العربية الرجعية ما يشكل حاجزاً أمام تنامي وعي الشعوب الإسلامية ووحدتها، ونعتبرها مسؤولة عن عرقلة المحاولات التي تستهدف إبقاء الجرح مفتوحاً والصراع	169

against the Zionist enemy.	مستمراً مع العدو الصهيوني.	
We have great hope in the Muslim peoples that clearly have begun to complain in most of the Islamic countries and have been able to infiltrate into the world of revolutions to learn from its experiences, especially from the triumphant Islamic Revolution.	وأملنا كبير بالشعوب المسلمة التي بدأت تبدي تذمرها بوضوح في معظم البلاد الإسلامية، واستطاعت أن تتسلل إلى عالم الثورات لتستفيد من تجاربها وخصوصاً من الثورة الإسلامية الظافرة...	170
The day will come when all these brittle regimes will collapse under the blows of the downtrodden, as the throne of the tyrant in Iran has already collapsed.	وسيأتي اليوم الذي تتساقط فيه هذه الأنظمة الهشة أمام قبضات المستضعفين كما تساقط عرش الطاغوت في إيران.	171
While waging a ferocious battle against America and Israel and their schemes in the area, we cannot but warn these regimes of working against the *umma*'s rising tide of resistance to imperialism and Zionism. These regimes must learn from the Islamic resistance in Lebanon great lessons in determination on fighting the enemy and on defeating it.	ولا بد ونحن نخوض معركة شرسة ضد أمريكا وإسرائيل ومخططاتهما في المنطقة، إلا أن نحذر هذه الأنظمة الرجعية من العمل بالشكل المعاكس لتيار الأمة الناهض والمقاوم للاستعمار والصهيونية، وعليها أن تتعلم من المقاومة الإسلامية في لبنان دروساً كبيرة في الإصرار على مقاتلة العدو حتى إلحاق الهزيمة به.	172
We also warn these regimes against getting involved in new submission plans and in aggressive schemes aimed against the young Islamic revolution because such involvement will lead the leaders of these regimes to the same fate faced by Anwar al-Sadat and by Nurī al-Sᶜaīd [last Iraqi prime minister under the monarchy] and others before them.	كما أننا نحذر هذه الأنظمة من التورط بمشاريع استسلام جديدة، وبمشاريع عدوانية تستهدف الثورة الإسلامية الفتية.. لأن ذلك سيؤول بأقطاب هذه الأنظمة إلى نفس المصير الذي لاقاه أنور السادات ومن قبله نوري السعيد وغيرهما.	173
World Front for Downtrodden	جبهة عالمية للمستضعفين	174
We address all the Arab and Islamic peoples to declare to them that the Muslims' experience in Islamic Iran left no one any excuse since it proved beyond all doubt that bare chests motivated by faith are capable, with the great God's help, of breaking the iron and oppression of tyrannical regimes.	ونتوجه إلى كافة الشعوب العربية والإسلامية لنعلن لها أن تجربة المسلمين في إيران الإسلام لم تبق عذراً لأحد، حين أثبتت بما لا يدع مجالاً للشك أن الصدور العارية المدفوعة بإرادة الإيمان قادرة بعون الله الكبير أن تحطم كل حديد الأنظمة الطاغوتية وجبروتها.	175
Therefore, we urge the peoples to unite their ranks, to chart their objectives, and to rise to break the shackle that curbs their will and to overthrow the agent governments that oppress them.	لذا فإننا ندعو هذه الشعوب لتوحد صفوفها وترسم أهدافها وتنهض لكسر القيد الذي يطوق إرادتها، وتسقط الحكومات العميلة التي تتسلط عليها.	176
We strongly urge on all the downtrodden of the world the need to form a world front that encompasses all their liberation movements so that they may establish full and comprehensive coordination among	ونلح على جميع المستضعفين في العالم بضرورة تشكيل جبهة عالمية لهم تضم كافة حركاتهم التحررية بهدف التنسيق فيما بينها تنسيقاً كاملاً شاملاً من أجل تأمين الفعالية لتحركها والتركيز	177

English	Arabic	#
these movements in order to achieve effectiveness in their activity and to focus on their enemies' weak points.	على نقاط ضعف أعدائها.	
Considering that the imperialist world with all its states and regimes is uniting today in fighting the downtrodden, then the downtrodden must get together to confront the plots of the forces of arrogance in the world.	فإذا كان العالم المستعمر بكافة دوله وأنظمته يجتمعون اليوم على حرب المستضعفين... فإن على المستضعفين أن يجتمعوا لمواجهة مؤامرات قوى الاستكبار في العالم.	178
All the downtrodden peoples, especially the Arab and Muslim peoples, must realize that Islam alone is capable of being the idea to resist aggression, since experiences have proven that all the positivist ideas have been folded forever in the interest of American-Soviet *détente* and other forms of *détente*.	وعلى كافة الشعوب المستضعفة وخصوصاً الشعوب العربية والإسلامية أن تدرك بأن الإسلام وحده هو المؤهل ليكون الفكر المقاوم للعدوان بعدما أثبتت التجارب أن كل الأفكار الوضعية قد طويت إلى الأبد لمصلحة التوافق الأمريكي مع السوفيات وغيرهم.	179
It is time for us to realize that all the western ideas concerning human origin and nature cannot respond to his aspirations or rescue him from the darkness of misguidedness and *jāhiliyya*.	وقد آن الأوان لندرك أن كل الأفكار الغربية عن أصالة الإنسان وفطرته لا يمكن أن تستجيب لطموحاته أو تنقذه من ظلمات الضلال والجاهلية..	180
Only Islam can bring about human renaissance, progress, and creativity because is {*fuelled from a blessed olive tree from neither east nor west, whose oil almost gives light even when no fire touches it –light upon light- God guides whoever He will to His light*} (Sura al-Nur: 35)	وحده الإسلام يحقق نهوض الإنسان وتقدمه وإبداعه لأنه {يوقَدُ مِّن شَجَرَةٍ مُّبَارَكَةٍ زَيْتُونَةٍ لاَّ شَرْقِيَّةٍ ولا غَرْبِيَّةٍ يَكَادُ زَيْتُهَا يُضِيءُ ولَوْ لَّمْ تَمْسَسْهُ نَّارٌ نُّورٌ عَلَى" نِورٍ يَهّدِي اللّهُ لِنُورِهِ مَن يِّشَاءٍ} (النور: 35).	181
God Is with Unity of Muslims	**الله في وحدة المسلمين**	182
Muslim peoples, beware the malicious imperialist *fitna* (sedition) that seeks to divide your unity, to sow division among you, and to arouse Sunni and Shi´ī sectarian fundamentalisms.	يا أيتها الشعوب المسلمة حاذري من الفتنة الاستعمارية الخبيثة التي تستهدف تمزيق وحدتك لتزرع الشقاق فيما بينك وتثير العصبيات المذهبية السنية والشيعية.	183
Know that colonialism was able to control the wealth of the Muslims only after it divided and fragmented their ranks, instigating the Sunnis against the Shi´ites and the Shi´ites against the Sunnis,	واعلمي أن الاستعمار ما استطاع أن يسيطر على ثروات المسلمين إلا بعد أن سعى في صفوفهم تمزيقاً وتفريقاً.. يثير السنة على الشيعة، ويحرض الشيعة على السنة،	184

English	Arabic	#
entrusting this task afterward to its agents among the mediators of the countries, to evil ʿulamāʾ at times, and to leaders (zuʿamāt) that imposed it on the neck of slaves.	وأوكل هذه المهمة فيما بعد إلى عملائه من حكام البلاد حيناً ومن علماء السوء أحياناً ومن الزعامات التي سلطها على رقاب العباد.	185
God is with the unity of the Muslims and because is the rock on which the schemes of the arrogant are smashed and the hammer that crushes the plots of the oppressors.	فاللَه في وحدة المسلمين ... فإنها الصخرة التي تتحطم عليها خطط المستكبرين والمطرقة التي تسحق مؤامرات الظالمين.	186
Do not allow the policy of "divide and rule" to be practiced in your countries and fight this policy by rallying behind the venerable Qurʾān:	فلا تَدَعوا لسياسة "فرق تسد" أن تمارَس في بلادكم وقاوموها بالالتفاف حول القرآن الكريم.	187
{Hold fast, to God's rope all together and do not spit into factions" (al ʿImran: 103) "As for those who have divided their religion and broken up into factions, have nothing to do with them (Prophet)" (al ʾAnam: 159) "Remember God's favour to you: you were enemies and then He brought your hearts together and you became brothers by His grace: you were about to fall into a pit of Fire and He saved you from it.} (Sura al-ʿImrān: 103).	{واعتَصِموا بُحَبِلْ الله جَمِيعا ولا تَفَرَّقوا} (آل عمران: 103). {إنَّ الذِينَ فَرَّقوا دُينَّهمَ وكَانوا شِيَّعا لَسَّتَ مُنَّهمَ} (الأنعام: 159). {واذكروا نَّعَمتَ الله عَلَّيَكمَ إذْ كنَّتمَ أعَدَاءْ فَألَّفَ بَينَ قلوبكمَ فَأصَّبَّحَتم بُنَّعَمَّتَهَ إخَّوْانا وكنَّتمَ عَلَّى شَّفَا حَفَّرَةً مُنَّ بُنَّارٍ فَأنَّقَذَّكم مُنَّهّا} (آل عمران: 103).	188
Ulama of Islam,	يا علماء الإسلام	189
As for you, ʿulamāʾ of Islam, your responsibility is as big as the tragedies that have befallen the Muslims.	وأنتم يا علماء الإسلام فإن مسؤوليتكم كبيرة جداً بحجم المصائب التي تحل بالمسلمين...	190
You are best qualified to perform your duty of leading the umma toward Islam and of alerting it to the plots that its enemies are hatching in order to dominate it, plunder its wealth, and enslave it.	وأنتم خير من يقوم بواجبه في قيادة الأمة نحو الإسلام... وفي توعيتها على ما يخطط له الأعداء للسيطرة عليها ونهب ثرواتها واستعبادها..	191
There is no doubt that you are aware that the Muslims look up to you in your capacity as bearers of the trust given by God's prophet (may God's peace and prayers be upon him) and as heirs of the prophets and the messengers.	ولا شك أنكم تدركون أن المسلمين ينظرون إليكم بصفتكم حملة الأمانة من رسول الله (صلى الله عليه وسلم) وبصفتكم ورثة الأنبياء والمرسلين ..	192
Be the hope and offer the good example by declaring what is right and by standing in the face of the oppressors and the tyrants.	فكونوا الأمل و القدوة الحسنة, في الجاهرة بالحق و الوقوف بوجه الطغاة والمتجبرين,	193
Be the model in rising above the frippery of	وكونوا القدوة في الترفع عن بهارج الحياة الدنيا	194

English	Arabic	#
this world's life ornaments and by yearning for paradise and martyrdom for the sake of God.	وزخرفها والتوق إلى الجنة والشهادة في سبيل الله.	
You have in God's prophet a good model of how he fasted with the people and how he ate when they ate, of how he led the faithful in prayer, and how he led their ranks in the arenas of the jihad.	ولكم في رسول الله أسوة حسنة حيث كان يجوع مع الناس ويشبع مع الناس، وكان يؤم المصلين في المسجد ويتقدم صفوفهم في ساحات الجهاد.	195
He was their refuge in their hard times, he warmed their lives with his instructions and solutions, and they followed him with confidence and assurance.	وكان ملجأ لهم في المهمات يستدفئون بتوجيهاته وحلوله وينقادون له واثقين مطمئنين.	196
Muslim ʿulamāʾ,	يا علماء الإسلام...	197
Imam Khomeini, the leader, has stressed repeatedly the need for the piousness of the ʿālim and the importance of the integrity of himself before the others, and he said in several occasions:	إن الإمام الخميني القائد أكد مراراً على ضرورة صلاح العالِم واهتمامه بتزكية نفسه قبل الآخرين، وقال في أكثر من مقام:	197
"If they find out that a ship-owner is not upright, they say that so and so is not upright and if they find that a merchant cheats, they say that so and so is a cheat. But if they find, God forbid, that a religious ʿālim is not upright, then they will say that religion is not right."	"إن الناس إذا عرفوا أن صاحب حانوت غير صالح، فيقولون إن فلاناً غير صالح، وإذا عرفوا أن تاجراً يغش الناس، فيقولون إن فلاناً غشاش، أما إذا عرفوا أن عالم الدين ـ لا سمح الله ـ غير صالح فإنهم سيقولون إن الدين غير صالح".	198
Muslim ʿulamāʾ, Because of this and other things, your responsibility is very heavy. Ask for God's help to perform this duty and beseech God (may He be praised, with the invocation Imam ʿAlī, may God be pleased with Him) "God, we do not ask you for a light burden but for strong backs."	فيا علماء الإسلام... لهذا الأمر وغيره... فإن مسؤوليتكم كبيرة جداً، فاستعينوا بالله على القيام بها وادعوا الله ـ عز وجل ـ بدعاء الإمام علي (عليه الصلاة والسلام): "اللهم إنا لا نسألك حملاً خفيفاً بل نسألك ظهراً قوياً"	199
You will then find out that the umma is most responsive to your appeals, instructions, and leadership. Know that the imperialist is aware of the importance of your position in the umma and that this is why he has directed his strongest stabs to the hearts of the mujāhidīn ʿulamāʾ,	وستجدون الأمة خير مستجيب لنداءاتكم وتوجيهاتكم وقيادتكم. واعلموا أن موقعيتكم في الأمة قد عرف المستعمر أهميتها ولذا فإنه وجَّه أقوى طعناته إلى صدور العلماء المجاهدين...	200
hatching an infernal plot to conceal Imam al-Sayyd Musa al-Sadr when this imperialist felt that the he was an insurmountable obstacle in the face of his aggressive schemes,	فدبر مؤامرة شيطانية لإخفاء الإمام السيد موسى الصدر بعدما أحس أنه عقبة كأداء في وجه مخططاته العدوانية...	201
killing the Islamic philosopher Sheikh Murtaḍa Maṭary, and executing the great Marjʿa Ayatollah al-Sayyd Muḥammad Bāqir al-Ṣadr when the imperialist felt the	وقتل الفيلسوف الإسلامي الشيخ مرتضى مطهري... وأعدم المرجع الإسلامي الكبير آية الله السيد محمد باقر الصدر حيث أحس منه بخطورة	203

danger imam's stance posed a danger embodied in Imam Bāqir's words: "Fuse with Imam Khomeini as he has fused with Islam."	موقفه الذي جسده بهذه الكلمات: "ذوبوا في الإمام الخميني كما ذاب في الإسلام"	
The imperialist is lurking for every religious ʿālim performing his Islamic duty in the best manner possible.	وها هو يتربص الدوائر بكل عالم ديني يقوم بواجبه الإسلامي خير قيام.	204
On the other hand, imperialism has been penetrating the Muslims with glib preachers who have no fear of God, who issue fatwas where there is no possibility to issue a fatwa, who sanction peace with Israel, prohibit fighting it, and justify the treason of the oppressive rulers.	ومـن ناحية أخرى راح الاستعمار يخترق المسلمين بـوعاظ للسلاطين لا يخافون الله ويفتون بما لا مجال فيه للفتوى فيجيزون الصلح مع إسرائيل ويحرمون قتالها ويبررون خيانة الحكام الظالمين.	205
The imperialist would not have done all this if it were not for the importance of the religious ʿulamāʾ's influence over the people.	وما كان المستعمر ليفعل ذلك لولا أهمية تأثير العالم الديني على الناس.	206
Therefore, one of your most important responsibilities, oh ʿulamāʾ of Islam, is to educate the Muslims to abide by the dictates of religion,	من هنا فإن من أهم مسؤولياتكم ـ يا علماء الإسلام ـ أن تربوا المسلمين على الالتزام بأحكام الدين،	207
to point out to them the political line they should follow, to lead them toward glory and honour, and to devote attention to the ḥawza for ʿulamāʾ so that they may graduate leaders faithful to God and eager to uphold religion and the *umma*.	وتوضحوا لهم الخط السياسي الذي يسيرون على هديه، وتقودوهم نحو العزة والرفعة... وتهتمـوا بالحوزات العلمية بحيث تستطيع أن تخرِّج قادة مخلصين لله وحريصين على نصرة الدين والأمة.	208
Final Word Regarding International Organizations	كلمـة أخيرة حول المنظمات الدولية	209
Finally, a word must be said regarding international organizations and institutions, such as the United Nations, the Security Council, and others.	وأخيراً لا بد من كلمة حول المنظمات والهيئات الدولية كمنظمة الأمم المتحدة ومجلس الأمن الدولي وغير ذلك.	210
We note that these organizations are not podiums for the downtrodden communities (*ummas*) generally and they continue to be ineffective due to the hegemony of their decisions by the states of world arrogance, whether in terms of the implementation or the obstruction of such decisions.	فإننا نسجل أن هذه المنظمات ليست منبراً للأمم المستضعفة بشكل عام وتبقى عديمة الفاعلية بسبب هيمنة دول الاستكبار العالمـي على قراراتها إجراءاً أو تعطيلاً.	211
What is the right to contradiction (the veto) enjoyed by some states if not a proof of the soundness of what we are saying.	وما حق النقض ـ الفيتو ـ الذي تحظى به بعض الدول ألا دليلاً على صحة ما نقول..	212

Therefore, we do not expect anything to come out of these organizations would serve the interest of the downtrodden and we urge all the self-respecting countries to adopt the plan to abolish the veto right enjoyed by the states of arrogance.	ومن هنا فإننا لا نتوقع أن يصدر عن هذه المنظمات ما يخدم مصلحة المستضعفين، وندعو كل الدول التي تحترم نفسها إلى تبني مشروع إلغاء حق النقض الفيتو لدول الاستكبار..	213
We also urge these countries to embrace the plan to expel Israel from the United Nations by virtue of its being a usurping and illegal entity, in addition to its being an entity hostile to human inclinations	كما ندعوهم إلى تبني مشروع طرد إسرائيل من الأمم المتحدة باعتبارها كياناً غاصباً وغير مشروع فضلاً عن كونه معادياً للنزعة الإنسانية.	214
Free, downtrodden people, These are our visualizations and objectives and these are the rules that govern our course.	أيها المستضعفون الأحرار... هذه هي تصوراتنا وأهدافنا، وهذه هي القواعد التي تحكم مسيرتنا؛	215
Those who accept us by accepting right, and God is the only truth. As for those who reject us, we will endure until God issues his judgment on us and on the group of oppressors.	فمن قبلنا بقبول الحق فالله أولى بالحق، ومن رد علينا نصبر حتى يحكم الله بيننا وبين القوم الظالمين.	216
God's peace, mercy, and blessings be upon you.	والسلام عليكم ورحمة الله وبركاته	217
Hezbollah	حزب الله	218

Appendix 2

The following is a translation of the *Political Charter of Hezbollah*. This translation is primarily the work of the author, with reference to other translations available and has been proofread by a professional translator of the LSE Language Centre. The main translation available was provided on the website of the *Islamic Resistance in Lebanon*[4], this translation although widely quoted in the press, is only partial and often inexact. Another translation has been recently proposed by Alagha, but this was not available at the time of writing.[5]

As in the previous case, the following translation has been done taking into account the needs of comparative vocabulary analysis, i.e. key terms have been either transliterated (for example *umma*) or translated always in the same way as far as logical sense holds (for example *waṭān* as nation).

The quotes from the Qurʾān are within brackets and the English translation provided is from Haleem's translation.[6]

---

[4] <http://www.moqawama.org/essaydetailsf.php?eid=16245&fid=47> Last access 18 April 2012.

[5] Alagha, *Documents* pp. 115-38.

[6] Abdel Haleem, *Qurʾan*.

English	العربية	§ No.
The Political Charter of Hezbollah	**الوثيقة السياسية لحزب الله**	1
Introduction **First Chapter: Hegemony and Awakening** First: The World and the Western-American Hegemony Second: Our Region and the American Project **Second Chapter: Lebanon** First: the Nation (*waṭān*) Second: the Resistance Third: the State (*dawla*) and the Political System Fourth: Lebanon and the Lebanese-Palestinian Relations Fifth: Lebanon and the Arab Relations Sixth: Lebanon and the Islamic Relations Seventh: Lebanon and the International Relations **Third Chapter: Palestine and the Negotiations of Settlement** First: The Palestinian Issue and the Zionist Entity Second: Jerusalem and the Al-Aqsa Mosque Third: The Palestinian Resistance Fourth: Negotiations of Settlement **Conclusion**	**المقدمة** **الفصل الأول: الهيمنة و الاستنهاض** أولاً: العالم والهيمنة الغربية والأميركية ثانياً: منطقتنا والمشروع الأميركي **الفصل الثاني: لبنان** أولاً: الوطن ثانياً: المقاومة ثالثاً: الدولة والنظام السياسي رابعاً: لبنان والعلاقات اللبنانية ـ الفلسطينية خامساً: لبنان والعلاقات العربية سادساً: لبنان والعلاقات الإسلامية سابعاً: لبنان والعلاقات الدُولية **الفصل الثالث: فلسطين ومفاوضات التسوية** أولاً: قضية فلسطين والكيان الصهيوني ثانياً: القدس والمسجد الأقصى ثالثاً: المقاومة الفلسطينية رابعاً: مفاوضات التسوية **الخَاتمة**	2
In the name of God the merciful and compassionate, praise be to God the lord of the two worlds, the prayer and peace, to the seal of the prophets of our Lord, Muḥammad and to his pure family and his noble companions and to all the prophets and the messenger.	بسم الله الرحمن الرحيم والحمد لله رب العالمين والصلاة والسلام على خاتم النبيين سيدنا محمد وعلى آله الطاهرين وصحبه المنتجبين وعلى جميع الأنبياء والمرسلين.	3
God the almighty said in his most excellent book: {*But We shall be sure to guide to Our ways those who strive hard for Our cause: God is with those who do good*} (Sura al-	قال الله تعالى في كتابه المجيد: {وَالَّذِينَ جَاهَدُوا فِينَا لَنَهْدِيَنَّهُمْ سُبُلَنَا وَإِنَّ اللَّهَ لَمَعَ الْمُحْسِنِينَ.}	4

ankbut: 69) And the Almighty said: {*You who believe be mindful of God, seek ways to come closer to Him and strive for His cause so that you may prosper*} (Sura al-māʾida: 35)	(العنكبوت: 69) وقال تعالى: {يَا أَيُّهَا الَّذِينَ آمَنُواْ اتَّقُواْ اللّهَ وَابْتَغُواْ إِلَيهِ الْوَسِيلَةَ وَجَاهِدُواْ فِي سَبِيلِهِ لَعَلَّكُمْ تُفْلِحُونَ.} (المائدة:35)	
Introduction	المقدمة	5
This political document aims at presenting the political vision of Hezbollah and includes its visions, stands, and ambitions. It also comes –before any other thing- as a result of what we have well experienced from the priority of action and the precedence of sacrifice. In an extraordinary political phase full of changes, it is no longer possible to address such transformations without noting the special position our resistance has reached or the set of achievements that we have realized in our journey. And it will be a necessity to address these transformations through the process of comparison between two mutually contradicting paths and what is between these two of an increasingly adverse agreement/harmony.	تهدف هذه الوثيقة إلى تظهير الرؤية السياسية لحزب الله، حيث تنطوي على ما نراه من تصورات ومواقف وما نختزنه من آمال وطموحات وهواجس، وهي تأتي - قبل أي شيء آخر - نتاجاً لما خبرناه جيداً من أولوية الفعل وأسبقية التضحية. ففي مرحلة سياسية إستثنائية وحافلة بالتحولات، لم يعد ممكناً مقاربة تلك التحولات من دون ملاحظة المكانة الخاصة التي باتت تشغلها مقاومتنا، أو تلك الرزمة من الإنجازات التي حققتها مسيرتنا. وسيكون ضرورياً إدراج تلك التحولات في سياق المقارنة بين مسارين متناقضَين وما بينهما من تناسب عكسي متنامٍ:	6
1- the path of resistance and opposition in its phase of ascendance, which relies on the military victories and the political successes and established in terms of popularity and politically the resistance paradigm; and stabilized the political positions and stances, despite the enormity of the objectives and the gravity of challenges, in order to reach a change in the balance of power in the regional equation beneficial to the resistance and its supporters.	1 - مسار المقاومة والممانعة في طوره التصاعدي الذي يستند إلى انتصارات عسكرية ونجاحات سياسية، وترسُّخ أنموذج المقاومة شعبياً وسياسياً، والثبات في المواقع والمواقف السياسية رغم ضخامة الإستهداف وجسامة التحديات..، وصولاً الرامية إلى تغيير ميزان القوى في المعادلة الإقليمية لصالح المقاومة وداعميها.	7
2- The path of the American-Israeli arrogance and supremacy in its different dimensions, alliances and direct and indirect outreaches, which is witnessing defeats as well as military and political failures reflecting a continuous failure	2-مسار التسلط والإستكبار الأميركي -الإسرائيلي بأبعاده المختلفة وتحالفاته وامتداداته المباشرة وغير المباشرة، والذي يشهد انكسارات أو انهزامات عسكريةً وإخفاقات سياسية، أظهرت فشلاً متلاحقاً للإستراتيجيات الأميركية ومشاريعها واحداً تلو	8

English	Arabic	#
collapse of the American strategies and its plans one after the other. All this has led to a condition of confusion, decline and inefficiency in the ability to control the path of developments and events in our Arab and Islamic world.	الآخر ، كل ذلك أفضى إلى حالة من التخبط والتراجع والعجز في القدرة على التحكم في مسار التطورات والأحداث في عالمنا العربي والإسلامي.	
These data coalesce in a broader international scene which itself exposes the American impasse and the decline of the unipolar hegemony in favour of a multi-polarity whose features have not been drawn yet.	تتكامل هذه المعطيات في إطار مشهد دُوليّ أوسع، يُسهم بدوره في كشف المأزق الأميركي وتراجع هيمنة القطب الواحد لصالح تعددية لم تستقر ملامحها بعد .	9
What deepens the crisis of the international arrogant system is the meltdown in the American and global financial markets as well as the entrance of the American economy in a condition of turmoil and inefficiency which reflects the peak of the structural crisis in the haughty capitalist model.	وما يعمّق أزمة النظام الإستكباري العالمي الإنهيارات في الأسواق المالية الأميركية والعالمية، ودخول الإقتصاد الأميركي في حالة تخبّط وعجز، والتي تعبّر عن ذروة تفاقم المأزق البنيوي في الأنموذج الرأسمالي المتغطرس.	10
Therefore, it's possible to say that we are amid historical a transformation which signals the decline of the United States of America as an hegemonic power, the disintegration of the unipolar domination and the beginning of the historical process of the decline of the Zionist entity.	لذا يمكن القول: إننا في سياق تحولات تاريخية تُنذر بتراجع الولايات المتحدة الأميركية كقوة مهيمنة، وتحلّل نظام القطب الواحد المهيمن، وبدايةِ تشكّل مسار الأفول التاريخي المتسارع للكيان الصهيوني.	11
The resistance movements stand at the heart of these international transformations and they represent a fundamental strategic factor in the international scene after performing a central role in producing or catalyzing the transformations that have been achieved in our region.	تقف حركات المقاومة في صُلب هذه التحولات، وتَبرُز كمعطًى إستراتيجيٍّ أساسيٍّ في هذا المشهد الدُولي، بعد أن أدت دوراً مركزياً في إنتاج أو تحفيز ما يتصل من تلك التحولات بمنطقتنا.	12
The resistance in Lebanon, which our Islamic resistance is part of, was a forerunner in confronting the hegemony and the occupation more than two decades and a half ago. And it maintained this choice in a time that seemed it was the peak of the American era during which attempts were made to describe it as the end of history.	لقد كانت المقاومة في لبنان، ومن ضمنها مقاومتنا الإسلامية، سبّاقةً إلى مواجهة الهيمنة والإحتلال قبل ما يزيد على عقدين ونصف من الزمن، وهي تمسكت بهذا الخيار في وقت بدا وكأنه تدشينٌ للعصر الأميركي الذي جرت محاولات تصويره وكأنه نهاية للتاريخ.	13

Under the conditions of the balance of power and the circumstances prevailing at the time some considered the option of resistance as a kind of illusion, or a political recklessness or a tendency that goes against rationality and realism.	وفي ظل موازين القوى والظروف السائدة آنذاك إعتبر البعض خيار المقاومة وكأنه ضربُ وهمٍ، أو تهورٌ سياسي، أو جنوحٌ مناقضٌ لموجبات العقلَانية والواقعية.	14
Despite all of this, the resistance progressed in its jihadist march, believing in the rightfulness of its cause and in its power to make victory through having faith in God the almighty, being part of the *umma* as a whole, and through commitment to the Lebanon's national interests, trusting its people and cherishing humanitarian values with respect to right, justice, and freedom.	رغم ذلك مضت المقاومة في مسيرتها الجهادية، وهي على يقين من أحقية قضيتها وقدرتها على صنع الإنتصار، من خلال الإيمان بالله تعالى والتوكل عليه، والإنتماء للأمة جمعاء، والإلتزام بالمصالح الوطنية اللبنانية، والثقة بشعبها، وإعلائها القيم الإنسانية في الحق والعدالة والحرية.	15
Through its long jihadist march and its aforementioned victories, starting from the end of the Israeli occupation in Beirut and Al-Jabal to its retreat from Sidon, Tyre, and Nabatieh, the aggressions of July 1993 and April 1996, and the liberation of May 2000, ending with the July 2006 war; this resistance laid down its credibility and paradigm before achieving its victories. Thus the cumulative stages of its project evolved from a liberation force to a force of balance and confrontation, and then to a defense and deterrence one, in addition to its internal political role as an influential factor in building the just and capable state.	فعلى مدى مسارها الجهادي الطويل وعبر انتصاراتها الموصوفة، بدءاً من دحر الإحتلال الإسرائيلي في بيروت والجبل إلى هروبه من صيدا وصور والنبطية وعدوان تموز 1993 وعدوان نيسان 1996 والتحرير في أيار 2000 فحرب تموز 2006، أرست هذه المقاومة صدقيتها وأنموذجها قبل أن تصنع انتصاراتها، فراكمت حقبات تطوُر مشروعِها من قوة تحرير إلى قوة توازن ومواجهة ومن ثَمّ إلى قوة ردع ودفاع، مضافاً إلى دورها السياسي الداخلي كركن مؤثّر في بناء الدولة القادرة والعادلة.	16
In relation to this, the resistance was in the position to develop its political and humanitarian position, and it progressed from being a national Lebanese value to also become an Arab and Islamic prominent value. Today it has become a universal and human value whose model is followed and built upon its gains in the experiences and literature of all those who strive for freedom and independence all over the world.	بالتزامن مع ذلك، قُدّر للمقاومة أن تطور مكانتها السياسية والإنسانية، فارتقت من كونها قيمةً وطنيةً لبنانيةً إلى كونها ـ أيضاً ـ قيمةً عربيةً وإسلاميةً متألقةً، وقد أصبحت اليوم قيمة عالميةً وإنسانيةً يجري استلهام أنموذجها والبناء على إنجازاتها في تجارب وأدبيات كل الساعين من أجل الحرية والإستقلال في شتى أنحاء المعمورة.	17

Though Hezbollah is aware of those promising changes and what it sees as the persistence of the enemy between failure in his war strategy and failure in imposing solutions in its own way, does no belittle in scale of the challenges and the on-going risks and it does not underestimate the difficulty of the process of confrontation and the magnitude of the sacrifices required by the resistance march towards regaining rights and participating in mobilizing the *umma*. However –in the face of that- it has become clearer in its choices, more willing in its determination and more confident in God, in itself and its people.	18	إنّ حزب الله رغم إدراكه لتلك التحولات الواعدة، وما يراه من مراوحة العدو بين عجز استراتيجية الحرب لديه والعجز عن فرض التسويات بشروطه، فإنه لا يستهين بحجم التحديات والمخاطر التي لا تزال ماثلةً، ولا يُقلّل من وعورة مسار المواجهة وحجم التضحيات التي تستوجبها مسيرة المقاومة واسترداد الحقوق والمساهمة في استنهاض الأمة، إلاّ أنه ـ في قبال ذلك ـ قد بات أشد وضوحاً في خياراته وأمضى عزيمةً في إرادته وأكثر ثقةً بربّه ونفسه وشعبه.
In this context, Hezbollah sets the founding lines of a theoretical and political framework of its vision and stances towards the posed challenges.	19	في هذا السياق، يحدِّد حزب الله الخطوط الأساسية التي تشكّل إطاراً فكرياً ـ سياسياً لرؤيته ومواقفه تجاه التحديات المطروحة.
First Chapter **Hegemony and Awakening**	20	**الفصل الأول** **الهيمنـة والإستنهـاض**
First: The World and the Western-American Hegemony	21	**أولاً : العالم والهيمنة الغربية والأميركية**
Following World War II, the United States became the master of a central and primary project of hegemony; under their control the project experienced an appalling development on the levels of domination and subjugation unprecedented in history, benefiting in this from a combined result of achievements of many kinds and several planes: in science, culture, knowledge, technology, economy and in the military plane supported by an economic-political system that views the world only as open markets governed their own laws.	22	بعد الحرب العالمية الثانية باتت الولايات المتحدة صاحبةَ مشروع الهيمنة المركزي والأول، وعلى يديها شهد هذا المشروع تطوراً هائلاً في آليات التسلط والإخضاع غير المسبوقة تاريخياً، مستفيدةً في ذلك من حصيلة مركّبة من الإنجازات المتعددة الأوجه والمستويات العلمية والثقافية والمعرفية والتكنولوجية والإقتصادية والعسكرية، والمدعومة بمشروع سياسي إقتصادي لا ينظر إلى العالم إلاّ بوصفه أسواقاً مفتوحةً ومحكومةً لقوانينها الخاصة.
Indeed, what is most dangerous in the logic of Western hegemony generally, and in particular in the American case, is that they consider themselves basically the owner of the world, and that they have the right to hegemony on the basis of their superiority in more than a field. For this reason, the Western (in particular American) expanding	23	إنّ أخطر ما في منطق الهيمنة الغربي عموماً، والأميركي تحديداً، هو اعتباره منذ الأساس أنه يمتلك العالم، وأنّ له حق الهيمنة من منطلق التفوق في أكثر من مجال، ولذا باتت الإستراتيجية التوسعية الغربية ـ وبخاصة الأميركية ـ ومع اقترانها بالمشروع الإقتصادي الرأسمالي إستراتيجيةً عالميةً

strategy combined with the project of capitalist economy has become a strategy of global nature without limits to its ambitions and greed.	الطابع، لا حدود لأطماعها وجشعها.	
Savage capitalism forces- represented mainly in international monopoly networks of companies that cross the nations (*qawmiaat*) and continents, networks of various international enterprises, especially the financial ones among these, backed by superior military force, have led to more antagonisms and conflicts, of which, not less important, are the conflicts of identities, cultures, civilizations, in addition to the conflicts between poverty and wealth.	إنّ تحكّم قوى الرأسمالية المتوحشة، المتمثلة على نحوٍ رئيسٍ بشبكات الإحتكارات الدُولية من شركات عابِرة للقوميات بل وللقارات، والمؤسسات الدُولية المتنوعة، وخصوصاً المالية منها، والمدعومة بقوة فائقة عسكرياً، أدى الى المزيد من التناقضات والصراعات الجذرية، ليس أقلها اليوم: صراعات الهويات والثقافات وأنماط الحضارات، إلى جانب صراعات الغنى والفقر.	24
This savage global capitalism have turned into a mechanisms to spread division, plant dissent and destroy identities as well as imposing the most dangerous types of cultural, civil, economic and social alienation.	لقد حولت الرأسمالية المتوحشة العولمةَ إلى آلية لبث التفرقة وزرع الشقاق وتدمير الهويات وفرض أخطر أنواع الإستلاب الثقافي والحضاري والإقتصادي والإجتماعي.	25
Globalization has reached its most dangerous evolution when it turned into a military one, led by those following the Western scheme of hegemony; of which we have witnessed most of its manifestations in the Middle East, Afghanistan, Iraq, Palestine and Lebanon, where the latter's share was the July 2006 aggression by Israel.	بلغت العولمة حدَّها الأخطر مع تحولها إلى عولمة عسكرية على أيدي حاملي مشروع الهيمنة الغربي، والتي شهدنا أكثر تعبيراتها في منطقة الشرق الأوسط، بدءاً من أفغانستان إلى العراق وفلسطين فلبنان، الذي كان نصيبه منها عدواناً شاملاً في تموز العام 2006 وذلك باليد الإسرائيلية.	26
The project of American hegemony and domination did not ever reach the levels of danger which it reached recently, and in particular in the last decade of the twentieth century till today, which is the one that brought about the mounting downfall of the Soviet Union and the beginning of its disintegration, which was the historical opportunity in the American calculations to appoint themselves at the head of the world hegemonic project, and on the behalf of historical responsibility and this is why it does not distinguish between the interest of the world and the interest of America which is what I call the "marketing" of hegemony as the interest of other countries and peoples and not as exclusively American interest.	لم يبلغ مشروع الهيمنة والتسلط الأميركي مستوياتٍ خطرةً كما بلغها مؤخراً، لا سيما منذ العقد الأخير من القرن العشرين وحتى اليوم، وذلك في مسار تصاعدي إتخذ من سقوط الإتحاد السوفياتي وتفككه نقطة انطلاق، لما شكّله من فرصة تاريخية في الحسابات الأميركية للإستفراد بقيادة مشروع الهيمنة عالمياً، وذلك باسم المسؤولية التاريخية وبأنّ لا تمييز بين مصلحة العالم والمصلحة الأميركية، ما يعني تسويق الهيمنة كمصلحة لباقي الدول وال لا بوصفها مصلحةً أميركيةً بحتةً.	27

This path found its peak with the neoconservative grip under the administration of Bush the son; this is the movement that stated its specific vision in the document "Project for the New American Century".	لقد بلغ هذا المسار ذروته مع إمساك تيار المحافظين الجدد بمفاصل إدارة "بوش" الابن، هذا التيار الذي عبّر عن رؤاه الخاصة من خلال وثيقة "مشروع القرن الأميركي الجديد."	28
It was neither strange nor surprising that what the charter focused on, was the question of rebuilding the US capacities; which reflected a new strategic vision of national (*qawmī*) American security it seemed quite clear that it was based on building a military capacity not only to be reputed a deterrence force but also to be considered capable of action and intervention. Whether to conduct "defensive" operations by carrying out pre-emptive strikes or for therapeutic purposes by interacting with crisis situations after they took place.	لم يكن غريباً ولا مفاجئاً أن يكون أكثرُ ما أكدت عليه هذه الوثيقة مسألةَ إعادة بناء القدرات الأميركية، والتي عكست رؤيةً استراتيجيةً جديدةً للأمن القومي الأميركي، بدا واضحاً تماماً أنها ترتكز على بناء قدرات عسكرية ليس باعتبارها قوة ردع فقط وإنما أيضاً باعتبارها قوة فعل وتدخّل، سواء للقيام بعمليات "وقائية" عن طريق توجيه ضربات إستباقية أم لأغراض علاجية من خلال التعامل مع الأزمات بعد وقوعها.	29
Following the September 11 attacks, the Bush administration found that the opportunity was appropriate to exercise the largest possible power and influence by way of expanding its strategic vision of single-handed hegemony over the world in practice and under the slogan: "global war against terrorism". Thus this administration relied on efforts which at the beginning were considered successful, these are:	وجدت إدارة "بوش" بُعيد أحداث 11 أيلول 2001، أنها أمام فرصة سانحة لممارسة أكبر قَدْر من النفوذ والتأثير، من خلال وضع رؤيتها الإستراتيجية للهيمنة المنفردة على العالم موضع التطبيق تحت شعار "الحرب الكونية على الإرهاب" وهكذا قامت هذه الإدارة بمحاولات إعتُبرت ناجحةً في بدايتها وفق التالي :	30
1. Militarizing foreign relations and policies as much as possible (to the highest level). 2. Monopolizing decision-making, taking strategic decisions single-handedly, relying on coordination only at times of necessity and exclusively with allies that can be trusted. 3. Rapidly ending the war in Afghanistan to give its entire attention to the next and more important step, i.e. taking over Iraq which is considered as the foundation of establishing the New Middle East in conformity with the	1. عسكرة علاقاتها وسياساتها الخارجية إلى الحد الأقصى. 2. تجنّب الإعتماد على الأطر المتعددة الأطراف، والإنفراد باتخاذ القرارات الإستراتيجية، والتنسيق حيث هناك ضرورة، ومع حلفاء يمكن الركون إليهم . 3. حسم الحرب في أفغانستان بسرعة للتفرغ بعد ذلك للخطوة التالية والأهم في مشروع الهيمنة ألا وهي: السيطرة على العراق، الذي اعتُبر نقطة الإرتكاز الرئيسة لإقامة شرق أوسط جديد يتناسب مع متطلبات عالم ما بعد 11 أيلول.	31

314

requirements of post September 11 world.		
This administration was not hesitant in resorting to all means of deception, cheating, and diversion to justify its wars, particularly the war on Iraq, and against all those who fight its neo-colonialist project, whether countries, movements, forces or personalities.	ولم تتورع هذه الإدارة عن اللجوء إلى كل أساليب التمويه والخداع والكذب الصريح لتبرير حروبها، لا سيما الحرب على العراق، وضد كل مَن يقاوم مشروعَها الإستعماري الجديد من دول وحركات وقوى وشخصيات.	32
Furthermore, the Bush administration sought to establish conformity between "terrorism" and "resistance", in order to strip off the resistance of its humanitarian and rights based legitimacy and by that justifying waging all sorts of wars against these movements, seeking to deprive the bastions of defense of peoples and states of their right to life, freedom, dignity and pride and their right to a full sovereignty, and the development of their own specific experience and took their place and administration in the historical humanitarian, civilizational, and cultural process.	وفي هذا الإطار عمدت هذه الإدارة إلى إقامة تطابق بين مقولة "الإرهاب" ومقولة "المقاومة" لتنزع عن المقاومة شرعيتَها الإنسانية والحقوقية، وتبرّر بالتالي خوض الحروب على أنواعها ضدها، في سياق إزالة آخر حصون دفاع الشعوب والدول عن حقها بالعيش بحرية وكرامة وعزة، وعن حقها بسيادة غير منقوصة وبناء تجاربها الخاصة وأخذ مواقعها وأدوارها في حركة التاريخ الإنساني حضارياً وثقافياً.	33
The so called "Terrorism" has turned into an American pretext of hegemony through many tools such as prosecution/detention, arbitrary detention/lacking the most basic elements of fair trials as we have seen in the camps of Guantanamo as well as through direct interference in the sovereignty of countries, and its conversion to "a registered trademark" for arbitrary incrimination, and the imposition of punitive measures against entire peoples, giving itself an absolute right to launch destructive wars that distinguish between the guilty and the innocent and do not differentiate between man, woman, elderly or child.	لقد تحوّل عنوان "الإرهاب" إلى ذريعة أميركية للهيمنة من خلال أدوات: الملاحقة/ الضبط والإعتقال التعسفي/ إفتقاد أبسط مقومات المحاكمات العادلة، كما نجدها في معتقلات "غوانتنامو"، ومن خلال التدخل المباشر في سيادة الدول وتحويلها إلى ماركة مسجلة للتجريم التعسفي واتخاذ إجراءات معاقَبة تطال شعوباً بأسرها، وصولاً إلى منح نفسها حقاً مطلقاً بشن حروب تدميرية وماحقة لا تميز بين البريء والمجرم، ولا بين الطفل والشيخ والمرأة والشاب.	34
The American wars of terrorism have reached at this point the cost of millions of lives as well as manifestations of overall destruction, that not only melted concrete and houses but also the structures and the components of societies themselves to the point of their disintegration and inverted the process of their historical development, in the process of degeneration caused to return the generation of civil wars along	لقد بلغت كلفة حروب الإرهاب الأميركية حتى الآن الملايين من البشر فضلاً عن مظاهر الدمار الشاملة، التي لم تُصِب الحجر والبنى التحتية فحسب وإنما بنية ومكونات المجتمعات نفسها، حيث جرى تفكيكها، وعَكَس مسار تطورها التاريخي، في عملية ارتكاس أعادت إنتاج صراعات أهلية ذات أبعاد مذهبية وطائفية وعرقية لا تنتهي. هذا من غير أن ننسى استهداف المخزون الثقافي والحضاري لهذه	35

English	Arabic	#
ideological, sectarian and ethnic groups with not end. All his in addition to the targeting of the cultural and civilizational heritage of these peoples.	الشعوب.	
There is no doubt that American Terrorism is the origin of all terrorism in the world. The "Bush" administration has turned the United States into a threat menacing the whole world on all levels and dimensions. If an international survey was to be made, the US would turn out to be the most hated state in the world.	لا شك أنّ الإرهاب الأميركي هو أصل كل إرهاب في العالم، وقد حولت إدارة "بوش" الولايات المتحدة إلى خطر يتهدد العالم بأسره على كل الصعد والمستويات. ولو جرى اليوم استطلاعٌ عالميٌّ للرأي لظهرت الولايات المتحدة كأكثر دولة مكروهة في العالم.	36
The failure of the war on Iraq and the development of a situation of resistance therein, in addition to the regional and international abhorrence to the results of the war, and the failure of the so called "War on Terrorism" especially in Afghanistan, as well as the complete failure of the catastrophic American war against the resistance in Lebanon and Palestine through using Israel as a tool, have led to the erosion of American international prestige as well as to a strategic decline in the capabilities of the United States to act or engage in new adventures.	إنّ الإخفاق الذي مُنيت به الحرب على العراق، وتطور حالة المقاومة فيه والإمتعاض الإقليمي والدُولي من نتائج هذه الحرب، وفشل ما يسمى "الحرب على الإرهاب" خصوصاً في أفغانستان، وكذلك الفشل الذريع للحرب الأميركية على المقاومة في لبنان وفلسطين بأدوات إسرائيلية، أدت إلى تآكل الهيبة الأميركية دُولياً وإلى تراجع استراتيجي في قدرة الولايات المتحدة على الفعل أو خوض المغامرات الجديدة.	37
Yet what has been said does not mean that the United States will easily leave the scene, but it will use all necessary means to protect what it calls "its strategic interests", for the American hegemonic policies are based on ideological considerations and projects nourished by extremist tendencies allied with an industrial-military complex that knows no limit to greed and ambition.	إلاّ أنّ ما تقدَّم لا يعني بأنّ الولايات المتحدة ستُخْلي الساحة بسهولة، بل ستقوم بكل ما يلزم من أجل حماية ما تسمّيه "مصالحها الإستراتيجية"، ذلك أنّ سياسات الهيمنة الأميركية تنهض على اعتبارات إيديولوجية ومشاريع فكرية، تغذّيها اتجاهاتٌ متطرفةٌ متحالفةٌ مع مركّب صناعي - عسكري لا حدود لجشعه وأطماعه.	38
Second: Our Region and the American Project	**ثانياً : منطقتنا والمشروع الأميركي**	39
If the whole world of the downtrodden is under the yoke of arrogant hegemony, then our Arab and Islamic world takes the biggest and the most costly share because of its history, civilization, resources and geographical location.	إذا كان العالم المستضعَف بأسره يرزح تحت نير هذه الهيمنة الإستكبارية، فإنّ عالمنا العربي والإسلامي يناله منها القسط الأوفر والأثقل، لدواعي تاريخه وحضارته وموارده وموقعه الجغرافي .	40

For centuries, our Arab and Islamic world has been subject to endless, wild and savage wars, but those wars took a higher plane with the planting of the Zionist entity in the region, as part of a project to fragment it into entities bearing all kinds of names and are in conflict and enmity. this phase of colonialism reached its peak with the US replacing classical colonialism in the region.	إنّ عالمنا العربي والإسلامي هو منذ قرون عرضةً لحروب إستعمارية وحشية لا تنتهي، إلاّ أنّ مراحلها الأكثر تقدماً بدأت مع زرع الكيان الصهيوني في المنطقة، ومن ضمن مشروع تفتيتها إلى كيانات متصارعة ومتنابذة تحت عناوين شتى، ولقد بلغت ذروة هذه المرحلة الإستعمارية مع وراثة الولايات المتحدة للإستعمار القديم في المنطقة.	41
The central aim of the American arrogance consists of spreading all forms of control over peoples: political, economic, cultural and plundering of their wealth, where the oil wealth occupies the top of the list for it is a main tool to control the levers of the world economy, as well as all the other means which do not require any moral or human constraints or criteria including the use of extreme military power whether directly or through a proxy power.	يتمثل الهدف المركزي الأبرز للإستكبار الأميركي بالسيطرة على الشعوب بكل أشكالها: السياسية والإقتصادية والثقافية ونهب ثرواتها، ويأتي في الطليعة نهب الثروة النفطية بما هي أداة رئيسة للتحكم بروح الإقتصاد العالمي، وبكل الأساليب التي لا تلتزم أي ضوابط أو معايير أخلاقية أو إنسانية، بما فيها استخدام القوة العسكرية المفرطة، مباشرةً أو بالواسطة.	42
To achieve this goal, America resorted to different general policies and work strategies, of which the most outstanding are:	إعتمدت أميركا لتحقيق هدفها سياساتٍ عامةً واستراتيجيات عمل، أبرزها:	43
1. Providing the Zionist entity all the means to guarantee its stability for it is a forefront and a focal point for the American neo-colonial project to fragment the region, supporting it with all elements of power and continuity and providing a security network for its existence in such a way that allows this entity to play the role of a cancerous gland that consumes all the capabilities of the *umma* and its potentials, throws its abilities in disarray and shatter its hopes and expectations.	1. توفير كل سبل ضمان الإستقرار للكيان الصهيوني، بما هو قاعدة متقدمة ونقطة ارتكاز للمشروع الأميركي الإستعماري التفتيتي للمنطقة، ودعم هذا الكيان بكل عوامل القوة والإستمرار، وتوفير شبكة أمان لوجوده، ما يؤهله للعب دور الغدة السرطانية التي تستنزف قدرات الأمة وطاقاتها وتبعثر إمكاناتها وتشتت آمالها وتطلعاتها.	44
2. Undermining the spiritual, civilizational and cultural potentialities of our peoples and weakening their morale through media and psychological wars that affect their values, and their figures in jihad and resistance.	2. تقويض الإمكانات الروحية والحضارية والثقافية لشعوبنا والعمل على إضعاف روحها المعنوية، عبر بث حروب إعلامية ونفسية تطال قيمَها ورموزَ جهادِها ومقاومتِها.	45

46	3. دعم أنظمة التبعية والإستبداد في المنطقة .	3. Supporting the dependent and tyrannical regimes in the region.
47	4. الإمساك بالمواقع الجغرافية الإستراتيجية للمنطقة، لما تشكِّله من عقدة وَصْلِ وفصل، برأ وبحراً وجواً، ونشرُ القَواعد العسكرية في مفاصلها الحيوية خدمةً لحروبها ودعماً لأدواتها.	4. Taking control of the geographical strategic positions in the region for they represent conjunction points by land, air and sea, and spreading military bases in its vital intersections to back up its wars and support its means.
48	5. منع قيام أي نهضـة في المنطقة تسمح بامتلاك أسباب القوة والتقدم أو تلعب دوراً تاريخياً على مستوى العالم.	5. Preventing the establishment of any renaissance in the region that allows the acquisition of the means of power and development or play a historical role on a global level.
49	6. زرع الفتن والإنقسامات على أنواعها، لا سيما الفتن المذهبية بين المسلمين، لإنتاج صراعات أهلية داخلية لا تنتهي.	6. Planting the seed of seditions and divisions of various kinds, especially the religious strives among Muslims, to create endless internal civil conflicts.
50	من الواضح أنه لا مجال اليوم لقراءة أي صراع في أي منطقة من مناطق العالم إلاّ من منظار إستراتيجي عالمي، فالخطر الأميركي ليس خطراً محلياً أو مختصاً بمنطقة دون أخرى، وبالتالي فإنّ جبهة المواجهة لهذا الخطر الأميركي يجب أن تكون عالميةً أيضاً.	It is clear that the only way to view any conflict in any region in the world is through the lenses of global strategy, for the American threat is not only a regional threat affecting one region. Therefore, the front of confrontation to this American threat should be global as well.
51	ولا شك بأنّ هذه المواجهة صعبةٌ ودقيقةٌ، وهي معركةٌ ذات مدًى تاريخي، وهي بالتالي معركةُ أجيال وتستلزم الإستفادة من كل قوة مفترَضة، ولقد علّمتنا تجربتنا في لبنان أنّ الصعوبة لا تعني الإستحالة بل بالعكس فإنّ شعوباً حيةً ومتفاعِلةً، وقيادةً حكيمةً وواعيةً ومستعدةً لكل الإحتمالات وتراهن على تراكم الإنجازات، تصنع النصر تلو النصر. وبقدر ما يصحّ هذا الأمر عمودياً عبر التاريخ فهو يصـح أفقياً بالإمتداد الجغرافي والجيو-سياسي أيضاً.	There is no doubt that this confrontation is critical and difficult; it is a battle of a historical proportion, and therefore it is a battle for generations and requires employing any force available. Indeed, our experience in Lebanon has taught us that difficulty does not mean the impossible but, on the contrary, lively and proactive peoples, a wise, conscious leadership prepared for all the possibilities and bets on the basis of accumulated achievements can achieve victory after victory. And as this is through vertically throughout history it is also true horizontally on the geographical and geo-political plane.

The American arrogance has left no option to our *umma* and its peoples but the option of resistance for a better life and for a better humane future for humankind, a future governed by relations of fraternity, diversity, solidarity at the same time and in which peace and harmony prevail, in the same way the movement of the greatest prophets and reformers throughout history have drawn its features and as it is reflected in the expectations and desires of the true and transcendental human spirit.	لم يترك الإستكبار الأميركي لأمتنا وشعوبها من خيار إلاّ خيار المقاومة، من أجل حياة أفضل، ومن أجل مستقبل بشري وإنساني أفضل، مستقبل محكوم بعلاقات من الأخوّة والتنوع والتكافل في آن، ويسوده السلام والوئام، تماماً كما رَسَمَت معالِمَه حركةُ الأنبياء والمصلحين العظام عبر التاريخ، وكما هو في تطلعات وأشواق الروح الإنسانية الحقة والمتسامية.	52
Second Chapter **Lebanon**	الفصل الثاني لبـــــــنان	53
First: the Nation	أولاً : الوطن	54
Lebanon is our nation and the nation of our fathers and ancestors. It is also the nation of our children, grandchildren, and the future generations. It is the nation for whose sovereignty, pride and dignity and the liberation of its land we have given the dearest sacrifices and the dearest martyrs (*shuhadaʾ*). We want it to be the nation for all Lebanese equally, which embraces them, and shelters them and attains pride through them and their deeds.	إنّ لبنان هو وطننا ووطن الآباء والأجداد، كما هو وطن الأبناء والأحفاد وكل الأجيال الآتية، وهو الوطن الذي قدّمنا من أجل سيادته وعزته وكرامته وتحرير أرضه أغلى التضحيات وأعزّ الشهداء. هذا الوطن نريده لكل اللبنانيين على حد سواء، يحتضنهم ويتسع لهم ويشمخ بهم وبعطاءاتهم.	55
We want it to be single and unified in terms of land, people, state and institutions; we reject any form of division or "federation", explicit or concealed. We want it sovereign, free, independent, strong, honourable, powerful, potent and capable, present in the regional equations, and a fundamental contributor in making the present and the future as it was always present in making history.	ونريده واحداً موحَّداً، أرضاً وشعباً ودولة ومؤسسات، ونرفض أي شكل من أشكال التقسيم أو "الفدرلة"، الصريحة أو المقنَّعة. ونريده سيداً حراً مستقلاً عزيزاً كريماً منيعاً قوياً قادراً، حاضراً في معادلات المنطقة، ومساهماً أساسياً في صنع الحاضر والمستقبل كما كان دائماً حاضراً في صنع التاريخ.	56
One of the most important conditions for the establishment of a nation of this type and its persistence is having a just, capable and strong state, a political system which truly represents the will of the people and their aspirations for justice and freedom, security and stability, well-being and dignity. This is what all the Lebanese look for and work to	ومن أهم الشروط لقيام وطن من هذا النوع واستمراره أن تكون له دولة عادلةٌ وقادرةٌ وقويةٌ، ونظامٌ سياسيٌّ يمثّل بحق إرادة الشعب وتطلعاته الى العدالة والحرية والأمن والإستقرار والرفاه والكرامة، وهذا ما ينشده كل اللبنانيين ويعملون من أجل تحقيقه ونحن منهم.	57

achieve and we are with them.		
Second: the Resistance "Israel" represents an eternal threat to Lebanon - the state and the entity - and a real menace to the country in terms for its historical ambitions in its land and water and since it is a model of coexistence for the followers of the divine messages, in a unique formula, and a nation that opposes to the idea of a racial state which manifests itself in the Zionist entity. Moreover, Lebanon's position on borders of the occupied Palestine and in a region troubled by the conflict with the Israeli enemy, compelled it to assume national and pan-Arab (*qawimiyya*) responsibilities.	تمثّل "إسرائيل" تهديداً دائماً للبنان ـ الدولة والكيان ـ وخطراً داهماً عليه، لجهة أطماعها التاريخية في أرضه ومياهه، وبما هو أنموذج لتعايش أتباع الرسالات السماوية، في صيغة فريدة، ووطن نقيض لفكرة الدولة العنصرية التي تتمظهر في الكيان الصهيوني. فضلاً عن ذلك، فإنّ وجود لبنان على حدود فلسطين المحتلة، وفي منطقة مضطربة جراء الصراع مع العدو الإسرائيلي، حتّم عليه تحمّل مسؤوليات وطنيةً وقوميةً.	58
The Israeli threats to this nation began with the establishment of the Zionist entity on the land of Palestine, an entity that did not hesitate to reveal its ambitions over the land of Lebanon to annex parts of it, and to take hold of its resources and wealth, and especially its water, and it has sought to gradually achieve these ambitions.	بدأ التهديد الإسرائيلي لهذا الوطن منذ أن زُرع الكيانُ الصهيوني في أرض فلسطين، وهو كيانٌ لم يتوانَ عن الإفصاح عن أطماعه بأرض لبنان لضم أجزاءَ منه، والإستيلاء على خيراته وثرواته، وفي مقدمتها مياهه، وحاول تحقيق هذه الأطماع تدريجياً.	59
This entity began its aggression on Lebanon in 1948 from the border to the heart of the nation, from the Houla massacre in 1949 to the attack on Beirut International Airport in 1968, and in-between there were long years of assaults on the border areas, its land, population and wealth, as a prelude to directly seize its land through recurring invasions, leading to the March 1978 invasion and the occupation of the border area, and subjecting to security, political and economic control within the framework of an integrated project, in preparation to the subjugation of the whole nation with the invasion of 1982.	باشر هذا الكيان عدوانه منذ العام 1948، من الحدود إلى عمق الوطن، من مجزرة حولا عام 1949 إلى العدوان على مطار بيروت الدُّولي عام 1968، وما بينهما سنوات طويلة من الإعتداءات على مناطق الحدود، بأرضها وسكانها وثرواتها، كمقدمة للإستيلاء المباشر على الأرض عن طريق الإجتياحات المتكررة، وصولاً إلى اجتياح آذار 1978 واحتلال منطقة الحدود وإخضاعها لسلطته الأمنية والسياسية والإقتصادية، في إطار مشروع متكامل، تمهيداً لإخضاع الوطن كلّه في اجتياح العام 1982.	60
All of this was taking place with the full backing of the United States of America and the indifference to the level of collusion of the so-called "international community" (*mujtam'a*) and its international institutions, with a suspicious official Arab silence and in the absence of the Lebanese authority	كل ذلك كان يجري بدعم كامل من قِبَل الولايات المتحدة الأميركية، وتجاهل إلى حدّ التواطؤ من قِبَل ما يُعرف بـ"المجتمع الدُّولي" ومؤسساته الدُّولية، وفي ظل صمت رسمي عربي مريب, وغياب للسلطة اللبنانية التي تركت أرضَها وشعبَها نهباً للمجازر والإحتلال الإسرائيلي من دون أن تتحمل	61

which allowed its land and people to be subject to massacres and to the Israeli massacres occupation without assuming its responsibilities and its national duties.	مسؤولياتها وواجباتها الوطنية.	
Under this tremendous national tragedy, the suffering of the people and the impotence of its state and being abandoned by the world; the Lebanese who are loyal to their nation could not but use their right and undertake their national, moral and religious duties to defend their land. Thus, their choice was: launching an armed popular resistance to face the Zionist threat and the constant aggressions against their lives, their means of living and their future.	في ظل هذه المأساة الوطنية الكبرى ومعاناة الشعب وغياب دولته وتخلّي العالم عنه، لم يجد اللبنانيون المخلصون لوطنهم سوى استخدام حقهم، والإنطلاق من واجبهم الوطني والأخلاقي والديني في الدفاع عن أرضهم، فكان خيارهم: إطلاق مقاومة شعبية مسلّحة لمواجهة الخطر الصهيوني والعدوان الدائم على حياتهم وأرزاقهم ومستقبلهم.	62
In such difficult circumstances, in which the Lebanese lacked a state, a process of regaining of the nation through the armed resistance began in order to liberate the land and the political decision from the control of the Israeli occupation as a step towards the restoration of the state and the building of its constitutional institutions.	في تلك الظروف الصعبة، حيث افتقد اللبنانيون الدولة، بدأت مسيرة استعادة الوطن من خلال المقاومة المسلّحة، وذلك بتحرير الأرض والقرار السياسي من يد الإحتلال الإسرائيلي كمقدمة لاستعادة الدولة وبناء مؤسساتها الدستورية،	63
And most important of all this re-establishing the national values which the nation is built upon and above all sovereignty and national dignity that gave the value of freedom its real meaning and it did not remain a mere unfulfilled slogan but confirmed by the resistance through the action of liberating the land and man. These national values transformed into a founding stone of the building of modern Lebanon, assured its position on the map of the world and restored its own reputation as a country that is respected and its people are proud of belonging to it as a nation of freedom, culture, knowledge and diversity as well as a nation of vigor, dignity, sacrifice and heroism.	والأهم من ذلك كلّه إعادة تأسيس القيم الوطنية التي يُبنى عليها الوطن وفي طليعتها: السيادة والكرامة الوطنيتان، ما أعطى لقيمة الحرية بُعدَها الحقيقي، فلم تبقَ مجرد شعار معلّق بل كرّستها المقاومة بفعل تحرير الأرض والإنسان، وتحولت هذه القيم الوطنية إلى مدماك أساس لبناء لبنان الحديث، فحجزت موقعه على خارطة العالم وأعادت الإعتبار إليه كبلد يَفرض احترامَه ويفتخر أبناؤه بالإنتماء إليه بما هو وطّن للحرية والثقافة والعلم والتنوع كما هو وطن العنفوان والكرامة والتضحية والبطولة.	64
These dimensions combined have been achieved by the resistance through the Liberation of 2000 and the historic victory of July 2006, offering to the whole world a living experience in defending the nation, an experience that has become a lesson from which peoples and states learn to protect their land, defend their independence and	إنّ هذه الأبعاد مجتمعةً توّجتها المقاومة من خلال ما أنجزته من تحرير في العام 2000 ومن انتصار تاريخي في حربٍ تموز عام 2006، والذي قدّمت فيهما تجربةً حيةً للدفاع عن الوطن، تجربةً تحوّلت إلى مدرسة تستفيد منها الشعوب والدول في الدفاع عن أرضها وحماية استقلالها وصون سيادتها .	65

English	Arabic	#
preserve their sovereignty.		
This national achievement of the resistance was carried out hanks to the support of a loyal people and a national army, thus thwarting the enemy's ambitions and causing him a historical defeat, and for the resistance, with its mujahidin and martyrs (*shuhada*ʾ) and Lebanon with its people and army, to achieve a great victory that ushered in a new era in the region highlighting to the crucial role and function of the resistance to repel the enemy and secure the protection of the nation's independence and its sovereignty, the defence of its people and the completion of liberating the rest of the occupied territory.	تَحقَّقَ هذا الإنجاز الوطني للمقاومة بمؤازرة شعب وفيّ وجيش وطنيّ، فأحبطت أهدافَ العدو وأوقعت به هزيمةً تاريخيةً، لِتَخْرُج المقاومةُ بمجاهديها وشهدائها، ومعها لبنان بشعبه وجيشه، بانتصار عظيم أسّس لمرحلة جديدة في المنطقة عنوانها محورية المقاومة دوراً ووظيفةً في ردع العدو وتأمين الحماية لاستقلال الوطن وسيادته والدفاع عن شعبه واستكمال تحرير بقية الأرض المحتلة .	66
Indeed this task and mission is a national requirement as long as the "Israeli" threat and the ambitions of the enemy over our land and waters remain, and as long as a strong and a capable state is missing and within the imbalance of force between the state and the enemy -	إنّ هذا الدور وهذه الوظيفة ضرورةٌ وطنيةٌ دائمةٌ دوامَ التهديد الإسرائيلي ودوامَ أطماع العدو في أرضنا ومياهنا ودوام غياب الدولة القوية القادرة، وفي ظل الخلل في موازين القوى ما بين الدولة والعدو -	67
-the imbalance that usually compels weak states and peoples targeted by the greed and threats of imperious and powerful states to seek ways to benefit from the available capabilities and possibilities. The permanent "Israeli" threat requires from Lebanon to pursue a defensive strategy that combines a popular resistance that defends the nation against any Israeli aggression and a national army that protects the nation, and maintains its security and stability, in an integral operation which is proved to be successful in the last period in conducting the fight with the enemy and achieved victories for Lebanon and increased the means for its protection.	الخلل الذي يدفع عادةً الدول الضعيفة والشعوب المستهدفة من أطماع وتهديدات الدول المتسلطة والقوية، إلى البحث عن صيغ تستفيد من القدرات والإمكانات المتاحة ـ فإنّ التهديد الإسرائيلي الدائم يفرض على لبنان تكريس صيغة دفاعية تقوم على المزاوجة بين وجود مقاومة شعبية تساهم في الدفاع عن الوطن في وجه أي غزو إسرائيلي، وجيش وطني يحمي الوطن ويثبّت أمنه واستقراره، في عملية تكامل أثبتت المرحلة الماضية نجاحها في إدارة الصراع مع العدو وحققت انتصارات للبنان ووفرت سبل الحماية له.	68
This formula, which is part of the defensive strategy, constitutes an umbrella for the protection of Lebanon, after the failure of the other ventures on other forms of protections, whether international or Arab, or through negotiation with the enemy.	هذه الصيغة، التي توضع من ضمن استراتيجية دفاعية، تشكّل مظلّةَ الحماية للبنان، بعد فشل الرهانات على المظلات الأخرى، سواء أكانت دُوليةً أم عربيةً أم تفاوضيةً مع العدو،	69

Adopting the option of resistance brought about to Lebanon the liberation of the land, restoration of the state institutions and protection of sovereignty resulting in the real independence. In this context, the Lebanese, with their political power, social strata, cultural elites and economic organisations are concerned with protecting this formula and being part of it because the Israeli danger threatens Lebanon in all its components and constituents which requires the widest Lebanese participation in assuming the responsibilities in defending the nation and providing the means for its protection.	فانتهاج خيار المقاومة حقّق للبنان تحريراً للأرض واستعادةً لمؤسسات ال# وحمايةً للسيادة وإنجازاً للإستقلال الحقيقي. في هذا الإطار فإنّ اللبنانيين بقواهم السياسية وشرائحهم الإجتماعية ونُخَبِهم الثقافية وهيئاتِهم الإقتصادية، معنيون بالحفاظ على هذه الصيغة والإنخراط فيها, لأنّ الخطر الإسرائيلي يتهدّد لبنان بكل مكوناته ومقوماته، وهذا ما يتطلّب أوسع مشاركة لبنانية في تحمّل مسؤوليات الدفاع عن الوطن وتوفير سبل الحماية له.	70
Finally, the successful experience of the resistance in fighting the enemy and the failure of all plots and wars to destroy it or to strangle its option and disarm it on one hand and the on-going "Israeli" danger against Lebanon and the continuation of its threat on the other hand, requires from the Resistance to the relentless pursuit to acquire the means of power, reinforce its capacities and potential which enable it to exercise its duty, undertake its national responsibilities, and take part in carrying out the task in liberating of what remains of our land that is under the "Israeli" occupation in the Shibaʿa farms and Kfar Shouba hills and the Lebanese village of Ghajar as well as retrieving the detainees and missing people and martyrs' bodies (*shuhadaʾ*), and participating in the role of defending and protecting the land and the people.	إنّ نجاح تجربة المقاومة في التصدي للعدو، وفشل كل المخططات والحروب للقضاء عليها أو محاصرة خيارها ونزع سلاحها من جهة، واستمرار الخطر الإسرائيلي على لبنان وعدم زوال التهديد عنه من جهة أخرى يَفرض على المقاومة السعي الدؤوب لامتلاك أسباب القوة وتعزيز قدراتها وإمكاناتها بما يساعد على تأدية واجبها والقيام بمسؤولياتها الوطنية، للمساهمة في استكمال مهمة تحرير ما تبقّى من أرضنا تحت الإحتلال في مزارع شبعا وتلال كفرشوبا وبلدة الغجر اللبنانية، واستنقاذ مَن بقي من أسرى ومفقودين وأجساد الشهداء، والمشاركة في وظيفة الدفاع والحماية للأرض والشعب.	71
Third: the State and the Political System	**ثالثاً : الدولة والنظام السياسي**	72
The most fundamental problem in the Lebanese political system, which hinders its reform, development and modernisation, is political sectarianism.	إنّ المشكلة الأساسية في النظام السياسي اللبناني، والتي تمنع إصلاحه وتطويره وتحديثه بشكل مستمر هي الطائفية السياسية.	73
The fact that the Lebanese political system is founded on a sectarian basis represents in itself a strong obstacle towards achieving true democracy through which an elected majority is able to govern and oppose an elected minority, opening the door for a proper alternation of power between those who govern and the opposition or the	كما أنّ قيام النظام على أسس طائفية يشكّل عائقاً قوياً أمام تحقيق ديمقراطية صحيحة يمكن على ضوئها أن تحكم الأكثرية المنتخَبة وتعارض الأقلية المنتخَبة، ويُفتح فيها الباب لتداول سليم للسلطة بين الموالاة والمعارضة أو الإئتلافات السياسية المختلفة.	74

various political coalitions.		
For this reason the fundamental condition for the achievement of real democracy of this kind is the abolition of political sectarianism from the system, thus the "Ṭāʾif Agreement" stipulated forming a national committee to carry it through.	ولذلك فإنّ الشرط الأساس لتطبيق ديمقراطية حقيقية من هذا النوع هو إلغاء الطائفية السياسية من النظام، وهو ما نص "اتفاق الطائف" على وجوب تشكيل هيئة وطنية عليا لإنجازه.	75
Until when the Lebanese, through their national dialogue will be able to achieve this historic and sensitive objective (the abolition of political sectarianism) and as long as the political system in Lebanon is based on sectarian foundations, then the consociational democracy remains the fundamental basis for governance in Lebanon, because it is the actual quintessence of the spirit of the constitution and the core of the pact of coexistence.	وإلى أن يتمكن اللبنانيون ومن خلال حوارهم الوطني من تحقيق هذا الإنجاز التاريخي والحساس ـ نعني إلغاء الطائفية السياسية ـ وطالما أنَّ النظام السياسي يقوم على أسس طائفية فإنّ الديمقراطية التوافقية تبقى القاعدة الأساس للحكم في لبنان، لأنها التجسيد الفعلي لروح الدستور ولجوهر ميثاق العيش المشترك.	76
Thus, any approach to the national issues according to the equation of majority and minority remains dependent on meeting the historic and social conditions for the exercise of effective democracy the value of which is the citizen himself/herself.	من هنا فإنّ أي مقاربة للمسائل الوطنية وفق معادلة الأكثرية والأقلية تبقى رهن تحقق الشروط التاريخية والإجتماعية لممارسة الديمقراطية الفعلية التي يصبح فيها المواطن قيمةً بحد ذاته.	77
The desire of the Lebanese to live together in dignity and equal rights and duties requires a constructive collaboration in order to consecrate real participation, which constitutes the most suitable formula to protect their complete diversity and stability after a period of instability caused by different policies based on the tendency towards monopoly, elimination and exclusion.	إنّ إرادة اللبنانيين في العيش معاً موفوري الكرامة ومتساوي الحقوق والواجبات، تحتّم التعاون البنّاء من أجل تكريس المشاركة الحقيقية والتي تشكّل الصيغة الأنسب لحماية تنوعهم واستقرارهم الكامل بعد حقبة من اللاإستقرار سبّبتها السياسات المختلفة القائمة على النزوع نحو الإستئثار والإلغاء والإقصاء.	78
The consociational democracy represents a proper political formula to assure real participation of everybody and an assuring factor to the elements of the homeland, and it contributes greatly towards a broad participation during the period of the establishment of a secure state which is considered by all its citizens to exist for them.	إنّ الديمقراطية التوافقية تشكّل صيغةً سياسيةً ملائمةً لمشاركة حقيقية من قِبَل الجميع، وعامل ثقة مطَمْئِن لمكونات الوطن، وهي تُسهم بشكل كبير في فتح الأبواب للدخول في مرحلة بناء الدولة المطْمْئِنة التي يشعر كل مواطنيها أنها قائمة من أجلهم.	79
The state that we look forward to collectively build with the rest of the	إنّ الدولة التي نتطلع الى المشاركة في بنائها مع بقية	80

324

Lebanese is: 1. A state that safeguards the public freedoms and provides the suitable environment for the practice of these freedoms. 2. A state that works for national unity and national cohesion. 3. A state that is capable of protecting the land, people, sovereignty and independence and that has a national, strong, prepared and equipped army and efficient institutions of security seeks to ensure the security of people and their interests. 4. A state the structure of which is built on modern, effective and collaborative institutions that relies on clear and well-defined authorities, functions and missions. 5. A state that abides by implementing the laws on everybody without discrimination in respect of public freedoms and justice towards the rights and duties of the citizens regardless of their religion, region, or inclinations. 6. A state that has a genuine parliamentary representation achievable only through a modern electoral law that allows the Lebanese voters to choose their representatives without the influence of money, kinship, and other pressures and realizes the widest possible representation of the different layers of the Lebanese people. 7. A state that relies on those who have scientific competence, professional skills and trustworthy people regardless of their sectarian affiliations, and establishes effective and powerful mechanisms to clear the administration from corruption and corrupt people without compromise. 8. A state that has a supreme judicial	اللبنانيين هي : 1. الدولة التي تصون الحريات العامة، وتوفر كل الأجواء الملائمة لممارستها. 2. الدولة التي تحرص على الوحدة الوطنية والتماسك الوطني. 3. الدولة القادرة التي تحمي الأرض والشعب والسيادة والإستقلال، ويكون لها جيشٌ وطنيٌ قويٌ ومقتدرٌ ومجهّزٌ، ومؤسساتٌ أمنيةٌ فاعلةٌ وحريصةٌ على أمن الناس ومصالحهم. 4. الدولة القائمة في بنيتها على قاعدة المؤسسات الحديثة والفاعلة والمتعاونة، والتي تستند الى صلاحيات ووظائف ومهام واضحة ومحددة. 5. الدولة التي تلتزم تطبيق القوانين على الجميع، في إطار احترام الحريات العامة والعدالة في حقوق وواجبات المواطنين، على اختلاف مذاهبهم ومناطقهم واتجاهاتهم. 6. الدولة التي يتوافر فيها تمثيل نيابي سليم وصحيح لا يمكن تحقيقه إلاّ من خلال قانون انتخابات عصري يتيح للناخب اللبناني أن يختار ممثليه بعيداً عن سيطرة المال والعصبيات والضغوط المختلفة، ويحقق أوسعَ تمثيل ممكن لمختلف شرائح الشعب اللبناني. 7. الدولة التي تعتمد على أصحاب الكفاءات العلمية والمهارات العملية وأهل النزاهة، بغض النظر عن انتماءاتهم الطائفية، والتي تضع آليات فاعلةً وقويةً لتطهير الإدارة من الفساد والفاسدين دون مساومة. 8. الدولة التي تتوافر فيها سلطة قضائية عليا ومستقلة وبعيدة عن تحكّم السياسيين، يمارس فيها قضاةٌ كَفُوؤن ونزيهون وأحرارٌ مسؤولياتِهم الخطيرة في إقامة العدل بين الناس. 9. الدولة التي تُقيْم اقتصادها بشكل رئيس على قاعدة القطاعات المنتِجة، وتعمل على استنهاضها وتعزيزها، وخصوصاً

power, independent of the control of the politicians, through which capable, impartial and independent judges exercise their critical responsibilities in implementing justice among people.	قطاعات الزراعة والصناعة، وإعطائها الحيّز المناسب من الخطط والبرامج والدعم، بما يؤدي الى تحسين الإنتاج وتصريفه، وما يوفر فرص العمل الكافية والمناسبة، وخاصةً في الأرياف.
9. A state that sets up its economy chiefly according to the productive sectors and works on strengthening and consolidating these sectors especially the agricultural and industrial ones and giving them the appropriate scope in planning, programming and support that leads to improving production and its distribution and providing enough and suitable jobs, especially in the countryside.	10. الدولة التي تعتمد وتطبق مبدأ الإنماء المتوازن بين المناطق، وتعمل على ردم الهوّة الإقتصادية والإجتماعية بينها.
10. A state that adopts and implements the principle of balanced development among the regions, and work on closing the social and economic gap between them.	11. الدولة التي تهتم بمواطنيها، وتعمل على توفير الخدمات المناسبة لهم من التعليم والطبابة والسكن، الى تأمين الحياة الكريمة، ومعالجة مشكلة الفقر، وتوفير فرص العمل وغير ذلك.
11. A state that cares about its citizens and work for the provision of appropriate services for them including education, health and housing to guarantee a dignified life, solve the problem of poverty and provides employment opportunities etc.	12. الدولة التي تعتني بالأجيال الشابة والصاعدة، وتساعد على تنمية طاقاتِهم ومواهبِهم، وتوجيهِهم نحو الغايات الإنسانية والوطنية، وحمايتِهم من الإنحراف والرذيلة.
12. A state that takes care of the young and rising generations and help them develop their potentials and talents, guides them towards national and humanitarian goals, and protects them from deviation and vice.	13. الدولة التي تعمل على تعزيز دور المرأة وتطوير مشاركتها في المجالات كافةً، في إطار الإستفادة من خصوصيتها وتأثيرها واحترام مكانتِها.
13. A state that works to empower the role of the woman and develops her participation in all fields, in order to benefit of her individual characteristics, her influence and respecting her position.	14. الدولة التي تُولي الوضع التربوي الأهمية المناسبة، خصوصاً لجهة الإهتمام بالمدرسة الرسمية، وتعزيز الجامعة اللبنانية على كل صعيد، وتطبيق إلزامية التعليم الى جانب مجّانيته.
14. A state that gives the status of educational the appropriate importance, especially in regards to public schools, bolsters the Lebanese university at all levels, and implements a compulsory and	15. الدولة التي تعتمد نظاماً إدارياً لا مركزياً يعطي سلطاتٍ إداريةً واسعةً للوحدات الإدارية المختلفة (محافظة/ قضاء/ بلدية)، بهدف تعزيز فرص التنمية وتسهيل شؤون ومعاملات المواطنين، دون السماح بتحوّل هذه اللامركزية الإدارية الى نوع من الفدرالية لاحقاً.
	16. الدولة التي تَجهدُ لوقف الهجرة من الوطن، هجرة الشباب والعائلات وهجرة الكفاءات والأدمغة، ضمن مخطط شامل وواقعي.
	17. الدولة التي ترعى مواطنيها المغتربين في كل أصقاع العالم، وتدافع عنهم وتحميهم،

free education.

15. A state that is based on an administrative rather than a centralised system which allows broad administrative powers to the different administrative units (province/district/municipality), in order to boost development and facilitate the affairs and dealings of citizens without allowing the transformation of this decentralised administration into a kind of federalism at a later.

16. A state that does it best to stop the emigration from the nation of young people and families and human capital flight ("brain drain") within a far-reaching and comprehensive programme.

17. A state that supports its citizens and emigrants all over of the world, and defends and protects them, and benefits from their diffusion, positions, and connections in to serve the national causes. | وتستفيد من انتشارهم ومكانتهم ومواقعهم لخدمة القضايا الوطنية. | |
The establishment of a state on these specifications and conditions is our objective and the objective of every honest and sincere Lebanese. In Hezbollah, we will make all possible efforts, in collaboration with the different popular and political forces that share this vision with us, to realize this noble national objective.	إنّ قيام دولة بهذه المواصفات والشروط هدفٌ لنا ولكل لبناني صادق ومخلص، ونحن في حزب الله سنبذل كل جهودنا، وبالتعاون مع القوى السياسية والشعبية المختلفة التي تشاركنا هذه الرؤية، من أجل تحقيق هذا الهدف الوطني النبيل.	81
Fourth: Lebanon and the Lebanese-Palestinian Relations	**رابعاً : لبنان والعلاقات اللبنانية ـ الفلسطينية**	
The problem of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon was and continues to be one of the tragic consequences of the emergence of the Zionist entity over the land of Palestine and the expulsion of its people from it. Those expelled moved to Lebanon to live there temporarily as guests with their Lebanese brothers until they return to their nation and their homes from which they were forced out.	كانت مشكلةُ اللاجئين الفلسطينيين في لبنان ولا تزال واحدةً من النتائج المأساوية لنشوء الكيان الصهيوني على أرض فلسطين وتشريد أهلها منها، فهؤلاء انتقلوا إلى لبنان ليعيشوا فيه مؤقتاً كضيوف لدى إخوانهم اللبنانيين ريثما يعودون إلى وطنهم وديارهم التي أُخرجوا منها.	82

What both the Palestinians and the Lebanese suffered because of this expulsion was in fact directly caused by the Israeli occupation of Palestine, and the calamities and tragedies that followed as a result of this affected all the peoples of the region and not only Palestinians.	وما عاناه الفلسطينيون واللبنانيون على حد سواء جراء هذا اللجوء، كان سببه الحقيقي والمباشر هو الإحتلال الإسرائيلي لفلسطين، وما نتج عنه من مآسٍ وويلاتٍ أصابت شعوب المنطقة بأسرها ولم يقتصر ضررها على الفلسطينيين فقط.	83
And the suffering of the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon was not limited to the pain of forced migration and seeking asylum only, but also to the attacks and the savage Israeli massacres	كما أنّ معاناة اللاجئين الفلسطينيين في لبنان لم تقتصر على آلام الهجرة القسرية واللجوء فقط إنما أضيفت إليها الإعتداءاتُ والمجازرُ الوحشيةُ الإسرائيلية،	84
which destroyed people and properties like what happened in the camp of Nabatiya which was completely destroyed. The harshness of life in the camps in conditions that lack the minimum of a dignified life, the denial of civil and social rights and the failure of the successive Lebanese governments to do their duties towards them.	التي دمرت الحجر والبشر، كما حصل في مخيم النبطية الذي دُمّر بالكامل/ قساوةُ العيش في المخيمات في ظل ظروف تفتقر إلى الحد الأدنى من مقومات العيش الكريم/ الحرمانُ من الحقوق المدنية والإجتماعية/ عدمُ قيام الحكومات اللبنانية المتعاقبة بواجبها تجاههم.	85
This exceptional situation requires today from the responsible Lebanese authorities to assume their responsibilities and therefore build the Lebanese-Palestinian relations on a strong, solid and legal basis taking into account what is right, just and shared interests of both peoples and these circumstances and relations should not be governed by whims and moods, political calculations, internal contentions, and international interventions.	إنّ هذا الواقع غير الطبيعي بات يحتّم اليوم على السلطات اللبنانية المسؤولة ضرورة تحمّل مسؤوليتها، وبناء العلاقات اللبنانية ـ الفلسطينية على أسس صحيحة ومتينة وقانونية، تراعي موازين الحق والعدل والمصالحَ المشتركة لكلا الشعبين، وأن لا يبقى هذا الوجود وهذه العلاقات محكومةً للأمزجة والأهواء والحسابات السياسية والتجاذبات الداخلية والتدخلات الدُولية.	86
And we believe that success in this important matter is achieved through the following points:	إننا نرى أنّ النجاح في هذه المهمة يتحقق من خلال ما يلي:	87
1. Direct Lebanese-Palestinian dialogue. 2. Enabling the Palestinians in Lebanon to agree on a unified and voluntary authority to represent them in this dialogue, bypassing the current disagreements in the general Palestinian situation. 3. Giving to the Palestinian in Lebanon their civil and social rights, in a way that respects their human status, protect their personality,	1. الحوار اللبناني - الفلسطيني المباشر. 2. تمكين الفلسطينيين في لبنان من التوافق على اختيار مرجعية موحَّدة لهم تمثلهم في هذا الحوار، متجاوزين التباينات الحاصلة في الوضع الفلسطيني الأعم. 3. إعطاء الفلسطينيين في لبنان حقوقهم المدنية والإجتماعية، بما يليق بوضعهم الإنساني ويحفظ شخصيتهم وهويتهم	88

identity and cause. 4. Commitment to the right to return and rejection of naturalization (*al-tawatyn*).	وقضيتهم. 4. التمسك بحق العودة ورفض التوطين.	
Fifth: Lebanon and Arab relations	**خامساً : لبنان والعلاقات العربية**	89
Lebanon is of an Arab identity and affiliation and asserts its identity and affiliation for they are natural and genuine state within the dynamics of the Lebanese society.	إنّ لبنان العربي الهوية والإنتماء إنما يمارس هويته وانتماءه بوصفهما حالةً طبيعيةً أصيلةً في التكوين المجتمعي اللبناني.	90
In addition, the vital space, the geo-politics, the strategic depth, and the policies of regional integration and national (*qawmiyya*) interest, as strategic determinants of Lebanon's political position and its major interests, requires from Lebanon its commitment to the just Arab causes and first and foremost the Palestinian question and the struggle against the Israeli enemy.	كما أنّ المدى الحيوي والجغرافيا السياسية والعمق الإستراتيجي وسياسات التكامل الإقليمي والمصالح القومية، بوصفها محدِّدات إستراتيجية لموقع لبنان السياسي ومصالحه الكبرى، تحتّم عليه الإلتزام بالقضايا العربية العادلة، وفي طليعتها قضية فلسطين والصراع مع العدو الإسرائيلي.	91
Moreover, there is an urgent need for concerted efforts to overcome the conflicts that divide the Arab rank. The contradictory strategies and the different alliances, important and critical as they are, do not justify the policies of exertion or engaging in external plans aiming at deepening discord and inciting sectarian feuds, fomenting the elements of division and separation which leads to the exhaustion of the *umma* and therefore serving the Zionist enemy and fulfilling the American objectives.	كذلك، ثمة حاجةً أكيدةً إلى تضافر الجهود لتجاوز حالة الصراعات التي تشقّ الصف العربي، إذ أنّ تناقض الإستراتيجيات واختلاف التحالفات، رغم جدِّيتها وحدَّتها، لا تبرّر الإنسياق في سياسات الإستهداف أو الإنخراط في المشاريع الخارجية القائمة على تعميق الفُرقة وإثارة النعرات الطائفية وتحريك عوامل التجزئة والتفتيت، بما يؤدي إلى إنهاك الأمة وخدمة العدو الصهيوني وتنفيذ المآرب الأميركية.	92
Developing the political approach that rests upon restricting conflicts, organizing or even preventing them from happening without getting to the level of open conflicts, is an option that should be adopted to develop a distinctive and responsible approach in dealing with national (*qawmiyya*) issues and seeking common factors that enhance this approach and provide constructive communication between governments and peoples to establish the broadest platform of solidarity for our causes.	إنّ تطوير المنهج السياسي القائم على حصر النزاعات أو تنظيمها والحؤول دون انفلاتها إلى مجال الصراعات المفتوحة، هو خيارٌ جديرٌ بالتبنّي لإنضاج مقاربةٍ نوعيةٍ ومسؤولةٍ في التعاطي مع القضايا القومية، وكذلك البحث عن المشتركات لتعزيزها وتوفير فرص التواصل البنّاء على مستوى الحكومات والشعوب، لتحقيق أوسع إطار تضامني يخدم قضايانا.	93

In this context the option of resistance constitutes a fundamental need and an objective factor in strengthening the Arab stance and weakening the enemy, independently from the nature of strategies or the political stakes undertaken.	وهنا يشكّل خيار المقاومة حاجةً جوهريةً وعاملاً موضوعياً لتصليب الموقف العربي وإضعاف العدو، بمعزل عن طبيعة الإستراتيجيات أو الرهانات السياسية المتخذة.	94
On the basis of all what has been said above, the resistance finds nothing wrong in spreading out the advantages gained from pursuing the option of resistance so that it extends to the different Arab scenes as long as the outcome is part of the equation of weakening the enemy and strengthening and consolidating the Arab stand.	بناءً على كل ما تقدّم، لا تجد المقاومة غضاضةً في تعميم عوائد الإستفادة من خيارها، بحيث يطال مختلفَ المواقع العربية، ما دامت النتائج تندرج في إطار معادلة إضعاف العدو وتقوية وتصليب الموقف العربي.	95
In this context, Syria has taken a distinctive and firm stand in the fight against the Israeli enemy and supported the resistance movements in the region, and stood by them in the most difficult circumstances, and sought to unify the Arab efforts to secure the interest of the region and confront the challenges.	وفي هذا الإطار، سجلت سوريا موقفاً مميزاً وصامداً في الصراع مع العدو الإسرائيلي، ودعمت حركات المقاومة في المنطقة، ووقفت الى جانبها في أصعب الظروف، وسعت الى توحيد الجهود العربية لتأمين مصالح المنطقة ومواجهة التحديات.	96
Hence, we emphasize the need to maintain the special relationships between Lebanon and Syria as a common political, security, and economic need, dictated by the interests of the two countries and their peoples, by the imperatives of geopolitics, the requirements for Lebanon's stability and the confrontation of common challenges.	إننا نؤكد على ضرورة التمسك بالعلاقات المميزة بين لبنان وسوريا، بوصفها حاجةً سياسيةً وأمنيةً واقتصاديةً مشتركةً، تُمليها مصالح البلدين والشعبين وضرورات الجغرافيا السياسية وموجبات الإستقرار اللبناني ومواجهة التحديات المشتركة،	97
We also call for an end to all the negative sentiments that have characterised the relations between the two countries in the past few years and to bring these relationships back to normal as soon as possible.	كما ندعو الى إنهاء كل الأجواء السلبية التي شابت علاقات البلدين في السنوات القليلة الماضية، والعودة بهذه العلاقات الى وضعها الطبيعي في أسرع وقت ممكن.	98
Sixth: Lebanon and the Islamic Relations	**سادساًَ ً : لبنان والعلاقات الإسلامية**	99
Our Arab and Islamic world is facing challenges reaching our societies and its different components and that shouldn't be neglected for they are critically important.	يواجه عالَمُنا العربي والإسلامي تحدياتٍ تطال مجتمعاتِنا، بمكوناتها المختلفة، ما يقتضي عدم التهاون بخطورتها.	100

Indeed, the confessional tension and the contriving sectarian troubles, especially between Sunnis and Shiʿites, the fabrication of national (qawmiyya) conflicts between Arabs, Turkmen and Kurds as well as between Arabs and Iranians, the threatening and intimidation of minorities, the trickling out of Christians from the Arab Mashreq and particularly from Palestine and Iraq not to mention Lebanon, all threatens the cohesion of our societies, undermines its immunity and increases obstacles against its renaissance and development.	فالإحتقان الطائفي والتوترات المذهبية المفتعَلة، وعلى الأخص بين السنّة والشيعة، واختلاق التناقضات القومية بين كُرد وتركمان وعرب، وإيرانيين وعرب.. وتخويف الأقليات وترهيبها، والنزف المسيحي المستمر من المشرق العربي، وخاصةً من فلسطين والعراق فضلاً عن لبنان، كل ذلك يهدد تماسكَ مجتمعاتنا، ويقلّل من منعتها، ويفاقم من عوائق نهضتها وتطورها.	101
Therefore, instead of being a source of social enrichment and vitality, the ethnic and religious diversity has been misused and employed as factor of social division, incitement and destruction.	وبدل أن يمثّلَ التنوعُ الديني والقومي مصدر غنًى وحيويةً إجتماعيةً فقد أسيء توظيفُه، وتم استخدامه كعامل تمزيق وفُرقة وتفتيت مجتمعي.	102
The situation resulting from this misuse seems to be the result of the intersection of Western deliberate policies, the American in particular, irresponsible internal and factional practices and visions, in addition to an unstable political environment.	إنّ الحالة الناجمة عن هذا الإستخدام السيئ هي حصيلة تقاطع لسياسات غربية متعمدة، وأميركية تحديداً، مع ممارسات وتصورات داخلية عصبوية لا مسؤولة، بالإضافة إلى بيئة سياسية غير مستقرة.	103
It seems urgent to take these facts into consideration, and it is essential and necessary to include them as one of the core concerns of the program of the main forces and tendencies, including the Islamic movements, that have a special responsibility of facing these challenges and solving these problems.	إنّ أخذ هذه الحقائق بعين الإعتبار يبدو ملحّاً، ومن الجدير والضروري إدراجها كأحد الإهتمامات الجوهرية في برامج القوى والإتجاهات الأساسية، بما فيها الحركات الإسلامية، التي تقع على كاهلها مسؤوليةٌ خاصةٌ في التصدي لهذه التحديات ومعالجة تلك المشكلات.	104
Hezbollah emphasizes the importance of cooperation between the Islamic states at all levels, which would give them a force of solidarity in confronting the arrogant plans, protect society from cultural and media invasion, and encourage them to take advantage of their resources in the exchange of the different benefits among these countries.	يؤكد حزب الله على أهمية التعاون بين الدول الإسلامية في المجالات كافةً، وهو ما يمنحها قوةَ تضامنٍ في وجه المخططات الإستكبارية، وحمايةً مجتمعيةً من الغزو الثقافي والإعلامي، ويحضّها على الإستفادة من خيراتها في تبادل المنافع المختلفة بين هذه الدول.	105

Within this paradigm, Hezbollah considers Iran the Islam a state of central importance in the Islamic world, since it is the one that overthrew the Shah and its American-Zionist projects through its revolution, and supported the resistance movements in our region, and stood with courage and determination by the Arab and Islamic causes and especially the Palestinian one.	وفي هذا الإطار، يَعتبر حزب الله إيرانَ الإسلام دولة مركزيةً مهمةً في العالم الإسلامي، فهي التي أسقطت بثورتها نظام الشاه ومشاريعه الصهيونية - الأميركية، ودعمت حركات المقاومة في منطقتنا، ووقفت بشجاعة وتصميم الى جانب القضايا العربية والإسلامية، وعلى رأسها القضية الفلسطينية.	106
The policy of the Islamic Republic in Iran is clear and firm in supporting the central and main cause of the Arabs and Muslims: the Palestinian cause.	إنّ سياسة الجمهورية الإسلامية في إيران واضحةً وثابتةٌ في دعم القضية المركزية الأولى والأهم للعرب والمسلمين وهي القضية الفلسطينية،	107
Since the declaration of the great victory of the Islamic Revolution under the leadership of *Walī Al-Faqīh* Imam Khomeini (may God honour his soul), and the opening of a Palestinian embassy in place of the Israeli embassy, this support has been on-going in different shapes and forms until today under the leadership of the *Walī al-Faqīh* Imam Khamenei (may he live long). This led to the achievement of outstanding victories for the first time in the history of the struggle with the Zionist invaders.	منذ إعلان انتصار الثورة الإسلامية المباركة بقيادة الولي الفقيه الإمام الخميني (قده)، وفتح أول سفارة فلسطينية مكان السفارة الإسرائيلية، وقد استمر هذا الدعم بأشكاله كافةً الى يومنا هذا بقيادة الولي الفقيه الإمام الخامنئي (دام ظلّه)، ما أدى الى تحقيق انتصاراتٍ بارزةٍ لأول مرة في تاريخ الصراع مع الصهاينة الغزاة.	108
The fabrication of a conflict with the Islamic Republic of Iran by some Arab parties is a self-betrayal and sell out of the Arab causes and serves only "Israel" and the United States of America.	إنّ اختلاق التناقض مع الجمهورية الإسلامية في إيران من قِبَل بعض الجهات العربية يمثّل طعناً للذات وللقضايا العربية، ولا يخدم سوى "إسرائيل" والولايات المتحدة الأميركية.	109
Thus, Iran that formulated its political ideology, built its vital space on the basis of "the centrality of the Palestinian cause", enmity towards "Israel", confrontation with the American policies and integration in the Arab and Islamic milieu,	فإيران التي صاغت عقيدتَها السياسية، وبَنَتْ مداها الحيوي علىٰ قاعدة "مركزية القضية الفلسطينية" والعداء لـ"إسرائيل" ومواجهة السياسات الأميركية والتكامل مع البيئة العربية والإسلامية،	110
must be welcomed with the will of cooperation and brotherhood, and engaged with as a basis for awakening, a strategic barycentre and model of sovereignty, independence and liberation supporting the contemporary Arab-Islamic project of independence and as a force which bolsters the power of the countries and the peoples of our region.	يجب أن تُقابَل بإرادة التعاون والأخوّة، والتعاطي معها كقاعدة استنهاض ومركز ثقل استراتيجي وأنموذجٍ سيادي واستقلالي وتحرري داعم للمشروع العربيّ - الإسلامي الإستقلالي المعاصر، وقوةٍ تزيد دول وشعوب منطقتنا قوةً ومنعةً.	111

The Islamic world gains strength through alliances and cooperation of its countries. And we stress the importance of benefiting from the elements of political, economic and human power present in every state of the Islamic world on the basis of integration, success and non-subordination to the arrogant.	إنّ العالم الإسلامي يَقْوى بتحالفاته وتعاون دوله. ونؤكد على أهمية الإستفادة من عناصر القوة السياسية والإقتصادية والبشرية.. الموجودة في كل دولة من دول العالم الإسلامي، على قاعدة التكامل والنصرة وعدم التبعية للمستكبرين.	112
And we should remember the importance of unity among Muslims as Allah exalted be He says: {*Hold fast to God's rope all together; do not split into factions*} (Soura Al-Imran: 103).	ونذكّر بأهمية الوحدة بين المسلمين، قال تعالى: {وَاعْتَصِمُواْ بِحَبْلِ اللّهِ جَمِيعاً وَلاَ تَفَرَّقُواْ}،	113
And to beware of what causes division among Muslims such as sectarian incitements, between the Sunna and the Shi'a in particular, and we rely on the conscience of the Islamic peoples in resisting the plots and strives at this level.	والحذرِ مما يسبب التفرقة بينهم كالإثارات المذهبية، وخاصةً بين السنّة والشيعة، ونحن نراهن على وعي الشعوب الإسلامية في التصدي لما يحاك من مؤامرات وفتن على هذا الصعيد.	114
Seventh: Lebanon and International Relations	**سابعاً: لبنان والعلاقات الدُّولية**	115
The criteria of divergence, conflict and struggle in the vision of Hezbollah and its approach are based primarily upon political-moral grounds, between the arrogant and downtrodden, the oppressor and oppressed, and between the usurper and the subdued and between the occupier and pursuer of freedom and independence.	إنّ معايير الإختلاف والنزاع والصراع في رؤية حزب الله ومنهجه إنما تقوم على أساس سياسي - أخلاقي بالدرجة الأولى، بين مستكبِر ومستضعَف، وبين متسلط ومقهور، وبين متجبّر محتلّ وطالب حرية واستقلال.	116
Hezbollah considers that the unilateral hegemony in the world overturn the international balance of power and stability as well as the international peace and security.	كما يَعتبر حزب الله أنّ الهيمنة الأحادية تُطيح بالتوازن والإستقرار العالميَين وبالأمن والسلم الدُّوليَين.	117
The unlimited support of the American administration for "Israel", its encouragement of aggression and concealment of its occupation of Arab lands as well as the hegemony of the American administration over the international institutions, and the double standards in issuing and implementing international resolutions, and the interventionist policy in the affairs of other societies, the militarization of the world, the resort to the	إنّ دعم الإدارة الأميركية اللامحدود لـ"إسرائيل"، ودفعَها للعدوان، وتغطيةَ احتلالاتها للأراضي العربية، بالإضافة إلى هيمنة الإدارة الأميركية على المؤسسات الدُّولية، وازدواجيةَ المعايير في إصدار وتنفيذ القرارات الدُّولية، وسياسةَ التدخل في شؤون المجتمعات الأخرى، وعسكرةَ العالم واعتمادَ منطق الحروب المتنقلة في النزاعات الدُّولية، وإثارةَ القلاقل والإضطرابات في كل أنحاء العالم، يضع الإدارة الأميركية في موقع المعادي لأمتنا وشعوبنا،	118

logic of proxy wars in international conflicts, and provoking unrest and tensions in all parts of the world, places the American administration in a position of an enemy to our *umma* and our peoples, and it also bears the main responsibility in creating the imbalance and the troubles in the international system.	كما يحمّلها مسؤوليةً أساسيةً وأولى في إنتاج الإختلال والإضطراب في النظام الدُّولي.	
As regards the European policies they oscillates between inability and lack of efficiency on one hand, and the unjustified side-lining with the American policies on the other hand, which effectively leads to channelling the Mediterranean tendency in Europe to the advantage of the Atlantic tendency hegemony with its colonial characters.	أما السياسات الأوروبية فإنها تتأرجح بين العجز وقلة الفاعلية من ناحية والإلتحاق - غير المبرَّر - بالسياسات الأميركية من ناحية ثانية، ما يؤدي فعلياً إلى تجويف النزعة المتوسطية في أوروبا لصالح هيمنة النزعة الأطلسية، بخلفياتها الإستعمارية.	119
Following American policies- especially in its phase of historic failure- represents a strategic mistake that will only lead to more problems and complications in the European-Arab relations.	إنّ الإلتحاق بالسياسات الأميركية - وخاصةً في مرحلة إخفاقها التاريخي - يشكِّل خطأً استراتيجياً لن يؤدي إلاّ إلى مزيد من المشكلات والتعثر والتعقيدات في العلاقات الأوروبية - العربية.	120
Europe has an important responsibility for the damage it has caused due to the colonial legacy it has inflicted on our region - of which our people still suffer from its consequences and impacts.	إنّ على أوروبا مسؤوليةً خاصةً بفعل الإرث الإستعماري الذي ألحق بمنطقتنا أضراراً فادحةً لا تزال شعوبنا تعاني من نتائجها وتأثيراتها.	121
And since certain European peoples have a history of resistance against the occupier then it is an ethical and humanistic, more than a political, duty of Europe to acknowledge peoples' right to resist the occupier on the basis of the distinction between resistance and terrorism.	ولأنّ شعوباً أوروبيةً لها تاريخ في مقاومة المحتل فإنّ واجب أوروبا الأخلاقي والإنساني - قبل السياسي - يفرض عليها الإعتراف بحق الشعوب في مقاومة المحتل، على قاعدة التمييز بين المقاومة والإرهاب.	122
In our view the requirements of stability and cooperation in European-Arab relations necessitate establishing a European approach that is more independent, fairer, and more objective.	وبحسب رأينا: إنّ مقتضيات الإستقرار والتعاون في العلاقات الأوروبية - العربية تستوجب بناء مقاربة أوروبية أكثر استقلاليةً وأكثر عدالةً وموضوعيةً.	123
Building a common vital space would be unfeasible in terms of politics and security without this transformation that is able to tackle the sources of deficiency that spawn crises and instability.	وسيكون متعذراً بناء المدى الحيوي المشترك، سياسياً وأمنياً، من دون هذا التحول الكفيل بمعالجة مَواطن الخلل المولِّدة للأزمات واللاإستقرار.	124

On the other hand, we look with all interest and respect at the experience of independence and liberation that rejects hegemony in the countries of Latin America. We see big room for convergence between their project and the project of the resistance movements in our region, which leads to constructing a more just and balanced international system.	ومن ناحية أخرى، ننظر بكثير من الإهتمام والتقدير للتجربة الإستقلالية والتحررية الرافضة للهيمنة في دول أميركا اللاتينية، ونرى مساحاتٍ واسعةً من التلاقي بين مشروعها ومشروع حركات المقاومة في منطقتنا، بما يُفضي إلى بناء نظام دُوليّ أكثر عدالةً وتوازناً.	125
Encountering that experience is source of hope on a global level, in the light of a common humane identity and a common political and moral background. In this context, the slogan "the unity of the downtrodden" remains a major and basic pillar of our political thought in building our understanding, relations and stances of international issues.	إنّ ملاقاة تلك التجربة تشكّل باعثاً لآمالٍ واعدة على المستوى العالمي، بالإستناد إلى هوية إنسانية جامعة وخلفية سياسية وأخلاقية مشتركة. وفي هذا السياق، سيبقى شعار "وحدة المستضعفين" أحد مرتكزات فكرنا السياسي في بناء فهمنا وعلاقاتنا ومواقفنا تجاه القضايا الدُولية.	126
Chapter Three	**الفصل الثالث**	127
Palestine and the Negotiations of Compromise	**فلسطين ومفاوضات التسوية**	128
First: the Palestinian Question and the Zionist Entity	**أولاً : قضية فلسطين والكيان الصهيوني**	129
The Zionist entity since its occupation of Palestine and the expulsion of its people from it in 1948, and with help support from the international hegemonic powers, has been a direct assault and a serious danger engulfing the whole Arab region and a real threat to its security, stability, and interests; its damage and detriment is not limited only to the Palestinians people or the countries and the peoples neighbouring Palestine. The attacks, the tensions and the wars the region has witnessed because of the hostile tendency and practices of Israel are evidence and proof of the degree of injustice that has inflicted the Palestinian people and the Arab and the Muslims because of the crime against humanity the West had committed when planted this extraneous entity in the heart of the Arab and Islamic world, to become a hostile infiltration and an outpost for the arrogant Western project in general and the basis for domination and hegemony over the region	شكّل الكيان الصهيوني منذ اغتصابه لفلسطين وتشريد أهلها منها في العام 1948، برعاية ودعم من قوى الهيمنة الدُولية آنذاك، عدواناً مباشراً وخطراً جِدّياً طالا المنطقة العربية بأكملها، وتهديداً حقيقياً لأمنها واستقرارها ومصالحها، ولم يقتصر أذاه وضرره على الشعب الفلسطيني أو الدول والشعوب المجاورة لفلسطين فحسب، وما الإعتداءات والتوترات والحروب التي شهدتها المنطقة بفعل النزعة والممارسات العدوانية الإسرائيلية إلاَّ الدليل والشاهد على مقدار الظلم الذي لحق بالشعب الفلسطيني وبالعرب والمسلمين جراء الجريمة ضد الإنسانية التي ارتكبها الغرب عندما أقدم على زرع هذا الكيان الغريب في قلب العالم العربي والإسلامي، ليكون اختراقاً معادياً وموقعاً متقدماً للمشروع الإستكباري الغربي عامةً، وقاعدةً للسيطرة والهيمنة على المنطقة خاصة.	130

in particular.		
The Zionist movement is a racist movement in theory and practice and it is a result of a mentality of arrogance, authoritarianism and domination. Its project in its roots and foundation is a project of occupation, judaization and expansion. The entity from which it emerged developed, established its roots and continued through occupation, aggression, massacres and , and terrorism , with the support , protection and nurturing by the colonial states, the United States of America in particular, which are associated with it through a strategic alliance making them real partners in all its wars, massacres and terrorist acts.	إنّ الحركة الصهيونية هي حركة عنصرية فكراً وممارسةً، وهي نتاج عقلية إستكبارية إستبدادية تسلطية، ومشروعَها في أصله وأساسه هو مشروع إستيطاني تهويدي توسعي. كما أنّ الكيان الذي انبثق عنها قام وتمكّن واستمر عبر الإحتلال والعدوان والمجازر والإرهاب، بدعم ورعاية واحتضان من الدول الإستعمارية، لا سيما الولايات المتحدة الأميركية، التي ترتبط معه بتحالف إستراتيجي جعلها شريكاً حقيقياً له في كل حروبه ومجازره وممارساته الإرهابية.	131
Certainly the fight that we and our *umma* are having against the Zionist-colonial project in Palestine is a duty of self-defence against the Israeli-imperialist occupation, aggression, and injustice that threatens our existence and endangers our rights and our future, and from our side this fight is not a religious or a racist or sectarian confrontation fight, even though the agents of this Zionist-arrogant project they have never refrained from using religion and exploiting religious sentiments to achieve their aims and objectives. And what the American president "Bush" and his successor "Obama", along with the leadership of the Zionist entity, have done by asking the Palestinians, the Arab and the Muslims to recognize the Jewishness of the "State of Israel" is merely the most evident proof of that.	إنّ الصراع الذي نخوضه وتخوضه أمتنا ضد المشروع الصهيوني - الإستعماري في فلسطين إنما هو قيامٌ بواجب الدفاع عن النفس ضد الإحتلال والعدوان والظلم الإسرائيلي - الإستكباري الذي يتهدد وجودنا ويستهدف حقوقنا ومستقبلنا، وهو ليس قائماً على المواجهة الدينية أو العنصرية أو العرقية من جانبنا، وإنْ كان أصحاب هذا المشروع الصهيوني - الإستعماري لم يتورعوا يوماً عن استخدام الدين وتوظيف المشاعر الدينية وسيلةً لتحقيق أهدافهم وغاياتهم. وليس ما ذهب إليه الرئيس الأميركي "بوش" وخَلَفُه "أوباما" وقادةُ الكيان الصهيوني معهما، من مطالبة الفلسطينيين والعرب والمسلمين بالإعتراف بيهودية "دولة إسرائيل" إلّا أوضح دليل على ذلك.	132
The natural and inevitable outcome is that for this usurper and artificial entity to live an existential crisis that haunts its leadership and supporters, for it is an unnatural born and an entity that is unable to continue and exposed to extinction. Here lies the historic responsibility on the shoulder of the *umma* and its peoples to not to recognize this entity no matter the pressures and the challenges are, and to continue the fight for the liberation of all of the illegally occupied land and to regain all the rights that have been taken away no matter how long it	إنّ النتيجة الطبيعية والحتمية أن يعيش هذا الكيان الغاصب المفتعَل مأزقاً وجودياً يؤرِّق قادتَه وداعميه، لكونه مولوداً غير طبيعي وكِياناً غير قابل للحياة والإستمرار ومعرَّضاً للزوال. وهنا تقع المسؤولية التاريخية على عاتق الأمة وشعوبها أنْ لا تعترف بهذا الكيان مهما كانت الضغوطات والتحديات، وأنْ تواصل العمل من أجل تحرير كل الأرض المغتصبة واستعادة كل الحقوق المسلوبة مهما طال الزمن وعظمت التضحيات.	133

takes and how big the sacrifices are.		
Second: Jerusalem and the Al-Aqsa Mosque	ثانياً: القدس والمسجد الأقصى	134
The whole world is aware of the status and sanctity of the city of Jerusalem and the al-Aqsa mosque. The al-Aqsa mosque is the first of the two Qiblas and the third holy place and the place of the ascension of the prophet to Allah (may Allah bless him and his family and peace be upon them) and a junction for messengers and prophets (the blessing of Allah be on all of them), and no one denies the importance of Al-Aqsa Mosque status of sanctity for the Muslims as one a the most sacred monument for them and its profound relation to Islam as one of the most important Islamic symbols on the face of earth.	يدرك العالم بأسره مكانةَ وقداسةَ مدينة القدس والمسجد الأقصى، فالمسجد الأقصى هو أُولى القِبلتين وثالثُ الحرمينِ ومسرى رسول الله (صلّى الله عليه وعلى آله وسلّم)، وملتقى الأنبياء والرسل (عليهم صلوات الله أجمعين)، ولا يُنكِر أحدٌ عظيمَ مكانته لدى المسلمين كَمَعْلَم من أكثر المعالم قدسيةً عندهم، وعمقَ علاقته بالإسلام كواحد من أهم الرموز الإسلامية على وجه الأرض.	135
And the city of Jerusalem that embraces Islamic and Christian holy places enjoys a high reputation for both the Muslims and the Christians.	ومدينة القدس بما تحتضن من مقدسات إسلامية ومسيحية، تتمتع بمكانة رفيعة لدى المسلمين والمسيحيين على حد سواء.	136
The continuing Israeli occupation of this holy city along with plans and projects of Judaization, expulsion of its people, confiscation of their homes and properties and surrounding it with Jewish quarters, belts and blocks of settlements and its strangulation by the wall of racial separation in addition to the continuing American-Israeli efforts to make it an eternal capital for the Zionist entity and recognized internationally are all aggressive measures which must be rejected and condemned.	إنّ استمرار الإحتلال الإسرائيلي لهذه المدينة المقدسة مع ما يرافق ذلك من خطط ومشاريع تهويدية وطرد أبنائها ومصادرة بيوتهم وممتلكاتهم وإحاطتها بأحياء يهودية وأحزمة وكتل إستيطانية وخنقها بجدار الفصل العنصري، بالإضافة إلى المساعي الأميركية - الإسرائيلية المتواصلة لتكريسها عاصمةً أبديةً للكيان الصهيوني باعتراف دُوليّ، كلها إجراءات عدوانية مرفوضة ومدانة.	137
Furthermore, the continuing and repeated attacks on the blessed Al-Aqsa mosque and the excavations that have been carried out within its precinct and the destruction projects under-way, constitute a serious and real danger threatening its existence and survival and warns of serious ramifications on the whole region.	كما أنّ الإعتداءات الخطيرة المتواصلة والمتكررة على المسجد الأقصى المبارك وما ينفَّذ في نطاقه من حفريات وما يُعَدّ من خطط لتدميره، تشكّل خطراً جِدّياً وحقيقياً يهدد وجودَه وبقاءَه، ويُنذر بتداعيات خطيرة على المنطقة بأسرها.	138

337

The duty of defending Jerusalem and liberating it and the defence of Al-Aqsa mosque its protection is a religious, a humanitarian and moral responsibility that falls on the shoulders of all the free and virtuous persons of our Arabic and Islamic *umma* and all the free and virtuous persons of the world.	إنّ واجب نُصرة القدس وتحريرها والدفاع عن المسجد الأقصى وحمايته، هو واجبٌ دينيٌّ ومسؤوليةٌ إنسانيةٌ وأخلاقيةٌ في عنق كل حرّ وشريف من أبناء أمتنا العربية والإسلامية وكل أحرار وشرفاء العالم.	139
We call upon the Arabs and the Muslims, on the official and popular level, and all the countries that are interested in peace in the world to make their efforts and use all means to free Jerusalem from the yoke of the Zionist occupation and to protect its real identity and its Islamic and Christian sanctity.	إننا ندعو ونطالب العرب والمسلمين على الصعيدين الرسمي والشعبي، وجميع الدول الحريصة على السلام والإستقرار في العالم، لبذل الجهود والإمكانيات لتحرير القدس من نير الإحتلال الصهيوني، وللمحافظة على هويتها الحقيقية ومقدساتها الإسلامية والمسيحية.	140
Third: The Palestinian Resistance	ثالثاً : المقاومة الفلسطينية	141
The Palestinian people, while waging the battle of self-defence and struggling to regain its legitimate national rights, in their historical meaning and geographical position, they are doing so only to exercise a legitimate right that has been sanctioned and made incumbent by divine messages, international laws and humanitarian values and customs.	إنّ الشعب الفلسطيني وهو يخوض معركةَ الدفاع عن النفس ويكافح لاستعادة حقوقه الوطنية المشروعة في فلسطين بمعناها التاريخي وواقعها الجغرافي، إنما يمارس حقاً مشروعاً تُقرّره وتُوجِبه الرسالات السماوية والقوانين الدُّولية والقيم والأعراف الإنسانية.	142
This right includes resistance in all its forms, and primarily the armed struggle, and with all means the Palestinian resistance can use, especially given that the imbalance of power is favouring of the Zionist enemy that is armed with the latest atrocious and destructive weapons.	وهذا الحق يشمل المقاومة بكل أشكالها - وفي مقدمتها الكفاح المسلّح - وبكل الوسائل التي تتمكن فصائل المقاومة الفلسطينية من استخدامها، خاصةً في ظل اختلال موازين القوى لمصلحة العدو الصهيوني المتسلح بأحدث أسلحة الفتك والدمار والقتل.	143
Experiences, which represented a striking evidence with no doubt at all throughout the struggle between our *umma* and the Zionist entity since its occupation of Palestine and till now, have proved the importance and significance of the option of the jihadi resistance and the armed struggle in confronting aggression, liberating the land, regaining the rights,	ولقد أثبتت التجارب - التي شكّلت دليلاً قطعياً لا يدع مجالاً للشك والإرتياب على امتداد مسيرة الصراع والمواجهة بين أمتنا وبين الكيان الصهيوني منذ اغتصابه لفلسطين وحتى يومنا هذا - أهميةَ وجدوى خيار المقاومة الجهادية والكفاح المسلح في مواجهة العدوان وتحرير الأرض واستعادة الحقوق	144

attaining the balance of terror and closing the gap of strategic superiority through the equations imposed by the resistance with its available capabilities, its will, and its determination in the battle field.	وتحقيق توازن الرعب وسد فجوة التفوق الإستراتيجي عبر المعادلات التي فرضتها المقاومة بإمكانياتها المتاحة وإرادتها وعزيمتها في ميدان المواجهة	145
The best witness and evidence on this is what the resistance achieved in Lebanon and what it has accumulated from its civil, military and moral accomplishments throughout its jihadi experience, particularly when forcing the Zionists to the great Israeli withdrawal from most of the occupied Lebanese lands in May 2000, or through the complete failure of the Zionist army during the July War of 2006 during which the resistance achieved a divine, historic and strategic victory that radically changed the equation of the conflict and inflicted the first defeat on this scale on the Israeli enemy and refuted the myth of an army that is invincible.	وخير شاهد ودليل على ذلك ما حققته المقاومة في لبنان من انتصارات متتالية، وما راكمته من إنجازات ميدانية وعسكرية ومعنوية على امتداد تجربتها الجهادية، لا سيما عبر إرغام الصهاينة على الإنسحاب الإسرائيلي الكبير في أيار العام 2000 من معظم الأراضي اللبنانية المحتلة، أو عبر الفشل المدوي للجيش الصهيوني في عدوان تموز العام 2006، والذي حققت فيه المقاومة انتصاراً إلهياً وتاريخياً واستراتيجياً غيّر معادلة الصراع بشكل جذري، وألحق أول هزيمة بهذا المستوى بالعدو الإسرائيلي، وأسقط أسطورة الجيش الذي لا يُقهر.	146
Another evidence on this is what the resistance in Palestine has achieved of continuous accomplishments through the experience of the Palestinian revolution and the option of the armed struggle that has been pursued, and through the first 'Intifada of stones', and the second Al-Aqsa Intifada, reaching a major setback of the Israeli army during the complete withdrawal from the Gaza Strip in 2005,	والدليل الآخر على ذلك هو ما حققته المقاومة في فلسطين من إنجازات متواصلة عبر تجربة الثورة الفلسطينية وخيار الكفاح المسلّح الذي انتهجته، وعبر انتفاضة الحجارة الأولى وانتفاضة الأقصى الثانية، وصولاً إلى الإندحار القهري للجيش الإسرائيلي عبر الإنسحاب الكامل من قطاع غزة في العام 2005	147
without conditions, negotiations, or agreements, and without any political, security, or geographical gain, making it the first qualitative and geographic victory on the ground of this proportion and level.	بلا قيد أو شرط وبلا تفاوض أو اتفاق ومن دون تحقيق أي مكسب سياسي أو أمني أو جغرافي، ليكون ذلك أول انتصار ميداني - جغرافي - نوعي بهذا الحجم وهذا المستوى	148
The significance of the option of resistance in Palestine, as the first Israeli forced withdrawal by the effectiveness of the resistance, within the historical borders of Palestine.	وهذه الدلالة لخيار المقاومة في فلسطين، كونه أولَ انسحاب إسرائيلي إضطراري بفعل المقاومة، ضمن حدود فلسطين التاريخية،	149
The meanings of this is strategically of a high importance in our conflict with the Zionist entity. Furthermore, the brilliant resistance of the fighting (mujāhid) Palestinian people and its Resistance in Gaza in facing the Zionist occupier in year	والدلالات التي يحملها هذا الأمر بالغة الأهمية في مجرى الصراع بيننا وبين الكيان الصهيوني على الصعيد الإستراتيجي. كما أنّ الصمود الرائع للشعب الفلسطيني المجاهد ومقاومته في غزة في مواجهة العدوان الصهيوني سنة 2008 درسٌ للأجيال	150

English	Arabic	#
2008 is a lesson to future generations and a warning to invaders and occupiers.	وعبرةٌ للغزاة والمعتدين.	
If that was the efficacy of the resistance in Lebanon and Palestine, then what was the usefulness of the option of negotiations and settlement?	فإذا كانت هذه هي جدوى المقاومة في لبنان وفي فلسطين، فماذا كانت جدوى الخيار التفاوضي التسووي؟	151
What are the outcomes, interests and the gains that the negotiations and the agreements achieved throughout all their stages but more Israeli superiority, domination and intransigence and more gains, interests and conditions for Israel?	وما هي النتائج والمصالح والمكاسب التي حققتها المفاوضات في كل مراحلها وعبر كل الإتفاقات التي أنتجتها، أليس المزيد من الغطرسة والتسلط والتعنت الإسرائيلي والمزيد من المكاسب والمصالح والشروط الإسرائيلية؟	152
While we assert our continuous and firm stand on the side of the Palestinian people and the Palestinian cause, along with its historical, geographical and political foundations, we categorically and firmly confirm our support, help and defence of the Palestinian people, the Palestinian resistance movements, and their struggle against the Israeli project.	إننا إذ نؤكد وقوفَنا الدائم والثابت إلى جانب الشعب الفلسطيني والقضية الفلسطينية، بثوابتها التاريخية والجغرافية والسياسية، نؤكد بشكل قاطع وجازم مساندتَنا وتأييدَنا ودعمَنا لهذا الشعب وحركات المقاومة الفلسطينية ونضالها في مواجهة المشروع الإسرائيلي.	153
Fourth: Negotiations of Compromise	**رابعاً: مفاوضات التسويـة**	154
Our stance on the negotiations and agreements which the Madrid Negotiation Process achieved, through the " Wadi Araba Accord" and its extensions, the "Oslo Accords" and its extensions and, before these two, the "Camp David Accord" and its extensions has been an absolute rejection of the foundation and principles of the option of compromise with the Zionist entity which is based on recognizing its legitimacy of existence and conceding to it what it illegally plundered from the Arab-Islamic Palestinian land.	كان موقفنا ولا يزال وسيبقى تجاه عملية التسوية وتجاه الإتفاقات التي أنتجها مسار مدريد التفاوضي عبر "اتفاق وادي عربة" وملحقاته و"اتفاق أوسلو" وملحقاته ومن قَبلهما "اتفاق كامب ديفيد" وملحقاته، موقفَ الرفض المطلق لأصل ومبدأ خيار التسوية مع الكيان الصهيوني، القائم على أساس الإعتراف بشرعية وجوده، والتنازل له عما اغتصبه من أرض فلسطين العربية والإسلامية.	155
This stance is a firm, permanent and final stance; not subject to revision or negotiation, not even if the whole world recognized "Israel".	هذا الموقف هو موقف ثابت ودائم ونهائي، غير خاضع للتراجع أو المساومة، حتى لو اعترف العالم كله بـ"إسرائيل ."	156

On that basis, and from a position of brotherhood, responsibility and persistence, we call upon all the Arab officials to commit to the aspirations of their peoples by reconsidering the option of negotiation, re-examining the results of the accords signed with the Zionist enemy and completely and definitely abandoning the illusory and unjust process of settlement called deceivingly and dishonestly "the Peace Process", especially that those who bet on the role of the consecutive American administrations as a honest and just partner and mediator in this process have clearly seen that those administrations have abandoned them, exercised pressure and blackmailing against them, and showed enmity towards their peoples, their causes and their interests, and fully and blatantly stood on the side of its strategic ally: the Zionist entity.	ومن هذا المنطلق، ومن موقع الأخوّة والمسؤولية والحرص، فإننا ندعو المسؤولين العرب إلى أن يلتزموا خيارات شعوبهم، عبر إعادة النظر بالخيار التفاوضي، وإجراء مراجعة لنتائج الإتفاقات الموقَّعة مع العدو الصهيوني، والتخلي الحاسم والنهائي عن عملية التسوية الوهمية الظالمة المسمّاة زوراً وبهتاناً "عملية السلام"، لا سيما وأنّ مَن راهنوا على دور للإدارات الأميركية المتعاقبة كشريك ووسيط نزيه وعادل في هذه العملية، قد عاينوا ـ بما لا يقبل الشك ـ أنها خذلَتهم، ومارست عليهم الضغط والإبتزاز، وأظهرت العداء لشعوبهم وقضاياهم ومصالحهم، وانحازت بشكل كامل وسافر إلى جانب حليفها الإستراتيجي الكيان الصهيوني.	157
As for the Zionist entity, which the Arab officials imagine there is a possibility to establish peace with, has showed throughout all the stages of negotiations, that nor does it want peace or seeks it, that it uses negotiations to impose its conditions, consolidate its position and achieve its interests and to break the intense enmity and psychological barrier of their peoples towards it by achieving an official, popular, gratuitous and open normalization that guarantees normal co-existence and integration in the regional system and imposes itself as an accomplished fact in the region, accepted and its existence recognized as legitimate after we give up the Palestinian land that it has robbed.	أما الكيان الصهيوني، الذي يتوهمون إمكانيةِ إقامةِ سلام معه، فقد أظهر لهم في كل مراحل المفاوضات أنه لا يطلب السلام ولا يسعى إليه، وأنه يستخدم المفاوضات لفرض شروطه وتعزيز موقعه وتحقيق مصالحه وكسر حدّة العداء والحاجز النفسي لدى شعوبهم تجاهه، عبر حصوله على تطبيع رسمي وشعبي مجاني ومفتوح يحقق له التعايش الطبيعي والإندماج في النظام الإقليمي وفرض نفسه كأمر واقع في المنطقة والقبول به والإعتراف بشرعية وجوده، بعد التخلي له عن الأرض الفلسطينية التي اغتصبها.	158
Thus we call upon, expect and hope from all the Arabs and the Muslims, on the official the popular levels, to return to Palestine and Jerusalem as a central cause for all of them, to unite and commit to its liberation from the abominable and brutal Zionist occupation, to do what their religious, ethical and humane duties urge them to do towards their holy places in Palestine and towards its deprived people, to provide all what is needed to support the resistance of the Palestinians people to be able to carry on their struggle, to reject and do away with all normalization processes	من هنا، فإننا ندعو ونتوقع ونأمل من كل العرب والمسلمين، على الصعيدين الرسمي والشعبي، العودةَ إلى فلسطين والقدس كقضية مركزية لهم جميعاً، يتوحدون حولها ويلتزمون تحريرها من رجس الإحتلال الصهيوني الغاشم، والقيامَ بما يمليه عليهم واجبُهم الديني والأخوي والإنساني تجاه مقدساتهم في فلسطين وتجاه شعبها المظلّوم، وتوفيرَ كل مستلزمات الدعم لتعزيز صمود الشعب الفلسطيني وتمكينه من مواصلة مقاومته، ورفضَ كل مشاريع التطبيع مع العدو الصهيوني وإسقاطها، والتمسكَ بحق عودة جميع اللاجئين الفلسطينيين إلى أراضيهم وديارهم التي أخرجوا منها، والرفضَ	159

with the Zionist enemy, to maintain the right of complete return of the Palestinian refugees to their land and homes from which they were expelled, to firmly reject all proposed alternatives such as naturalization (al-tawtyn), compensation or relocation, to immediately break the siege imposed on the Palestinian people, and in particular the total siege on Gaza Strip and to support the cause of thousands of detainees and prisoners in the Israeli prisons and to come up with plans and practical ways to set them free from detention.	القاطعَ لكل البدائل المطروحة من توطين أو تعويض أو تهجير، والعملَ الفوريَّ على فك الحصار المفروض على الشعب الفلسطيني لا سيما الحصار الشامل لقطاع غزة، وتبنّيَ قضية آلاف الأسرى والمعتقلين في السجون الإسرائيلية، ووضعَ الخطط والبرامج العملية لتحريرهم من الأسر.	
Conclusion	**الخَاتمة**	160
These are our vision and ideas which we have developed on seeking rightness and truth. These are our positions and commitments. We have sought to be people of sincerity and loyalty who believe in truthfulness and speak it up, defend it and sacrifice ourselves for it to the point of martyrdom (*shahāda*), seeking nothing but the favour of our Creator and Lord of the heavens and earth, and we do not expect anything from this but the blessing from our families, people and our *umma* and their well-being and happiness in this world and hereafter.	هذه هي رؤيتنا وتصوراتنا، حَرِصْنا في البحث عنها أن نكون طلابَ حق وحقيقة. وهذه هي مواقفنا والتزاماتنا، سعينا أن نكون فيها أهلَ صدق ووفاء، نؤمن بالحق وننطق به، وندافع عنه ونضحي من أجله حتى الشهادة، لا نبغي في ذلك سوى رضا خالقنا وإلهنا رب السماوات والأرض، ولا نرجو من ذلك سوى صلاح أهلنا وشعبنا وأمتنا وخيرهم وسعادتهم في الدنيا والآخرة.	161
Oh God, you certainly know that what we did was not for power or anything ephemeral, but it was to cherish truth and end oppression and to defend your wronged servants, establish justice on your earth and a gain your gratification and win your company. For this our martyrs (*shuhadaʾ*) sacrificed themselves, and for this we carry on and continue our work and the *jihad*, and promised us one of the good turns: either victory or having the honour of meeting You imbued in our blood.	اللهم إنك تعلم أنه لم يكن الذي كان منّا منافسةً في سلطان ولا ابتغاءً لشيء من الحُطام، وإنما كان إحياءً للحق وإماتةً للباطل ودفاعاً عن مظلومي عبادك وإقامةً للعدل في أرضك وطلباً لرضاك والقرب منك، على هذا قضى شهداؤنا، وعلى هذا نمضي ونواصل العمل والجهاد، وقد وعدتنا إحدى الحُسنيين إما النصر أو التشرّف بلقائك مخضّبين بدمائنا.	162
And our promise to you Lord, and to all your wronged servants, is to remain faithful to the commitment, yearning for the promise, consistent and unwavering.	ووَعْدُنا لك يا ربّ ولكل عبادك المظلومين، أن نبقى الرجالَ الصادقين في العهد، والمنتظرين للوعد، والثابتين الذين ما بدّلوا ما تبديلاً.	163

Appendix 3

Survey of Human Rights Legislation Approved in the Lebanese Parliament 1992- 2006 and beyond.

The following table includes a comprehensive overview of the laws that have been approved in the Lebanese parliament that are related to human rights principles directly or indirectly. The overview does not aim to be complete but representative of a consistent body of legislation in relation with human rights that has been approved in the parliament and then published on the al *Jaridat al-Rasmiyya* (the Official Gazette). Relation to human rights principles was primarily established on the basis of the reference of these laws to international documents on human rights such as the reports of the human rights treaty bodies to which Lebanon is a party and which are available in the relevant time frame. In addition to this, the author has considered laws self-evidently relevant from a human rights point of view (for example accession or ratification to human rights treaties) or which are relevant from a human rights point of view on the basis of the discussion that they provoked in the Lebanese civil society. For the purposes of this research, observations are limited to the role of Hezbollah's members of parliament in the parliamentary debate. The parliamentary debate was analysed through its records the *Maḥāḍir Jalasāt Majlis al-Nuwāb* (Proceedings of the Sessions of the Assembly of Representatives) which was possible to consult only from 1992 to 2006 in the Library of the Lebanese Parliament. At the time of writing, proceedings after 2006 were not available according to the staff of the Lebanese Parliament Library. For the more recent period, unofficial summaries of the parliamentary debate were available from the web-site of the Lebanese Parliament. These are less accurate and sometimes very short, but still informative sources. For 2003, no relevant human rights laws were found. In 2007 the Parliament was substantially inoperative in terms of law making. No records of legislative sessions are available for 2009 probably because being an election year no legislative sessions were held. Other useful sources were provided by the cooperation project of the UNDP and the Lebanese Parliament. Further information was collected through interviews

with members of parliament, UN officers of OHCHR and UNDP, non-governmental human rights organizations and journalist specialized in the topic. (Sections in grey are cases of human rights norms that have been criticised by Hezbollah).

Year	Law	Law Content	Source	Observations	Law relevance
1992	Law 182 of 1992	Law amending some provisions of the legislative decree no 119 of 16/9/1983 on the protection of juveniles criminal and the principles of its related tribunal.	the law establishes for the detention of juvenile convicted in special centre for re-education or in jails for minors (see CRC Committee Report, CRC/C/70/Add.8, p. 164)	The debate does not contain Hezbollah intervention and focuses on the fact that despite the law is considered important, there are no such centres as required by the law. The law is approved by majority.	Rights of the Child
1993	Law 243 of 1993	Law on persons with disabilities	Law Establishing a permanent national body for the affairs of disabled persons within the Ministry of Social Affairs (See the CRC Committee Report CRC/C/15/ADD p.169)	Discussed and approved on the basis of reports from committees. Neither objections nor debate only MP 'Aly Khalil asking clarifications over the texts presented by the committees.	Rights of Persons with Disabilities
	Law 275 of 1993	Women can take part in property transactions with no need for male witnesses.	The law establish for the competence of women to attest in the Property Register and abrogates part of the text of Art 54 from Decree 188, 15th of March 1962. (See CEDAW Committee Report CEDAW/C/LBN/3 p. 83)	The law is approved without objections and recording the contents of the Parliamentary Committee on Justice and Administration.	Women's Rights
1994	Law 291 of 1994	Ratification of the International Convention on Psychotropic Substances.	Mentioned by the CRC Committee a beneficial to the rights of the Children (see CRC/C/70/Add.8)	Ratified on the basis of reports from the relevant Parliamentary Committees.	International treaty

	Law 302 of 1994	Establishing death penalty for intentional murder with political reasons or of political nature.		Law discussed extensively but no intervention by Hezbollah at the end Ra'ad makes some observation related to some procedural issues	Penal Code
	Law 334 of 1994	Law requesting the presentation of a medical certificate before marriage	Among the examples mentioned by el-Bizri as regards human rights and Hezbollah (see el Bizri op. cit. 1999, p. 15)	Hezbollah intervenes criticizing the interference of non-religious officers in matrimonial affairs.	Women's Rights
	Law 380 of 1994	Law allowing to women of 18 and older to engage fully in commercial transactions without the authorization of the husband (as previously requested by the law)	See above, the law is also mentioned in the state submitted report to the CCPR (see CCPR/C/42/Add.14)	Hezbollah intervenes initially critically but then withdraw its objections considering that the law does not infringe on personal status law provisions.	Women's Rights
	Law 382 of 1994	Regarding TV and radio broadcasting.	Criticized by UN Human Rights Committee for not establishing clear criteria over TV and Radio licensing (see Paragraph 24. CPR/C/79/Add.78)	Approved without objections in the debate	Information and communications
1995	Law 426 of 1995	Ratification of the International Convention to Combat Illicit Trafficking in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances	Mentioned in the CRC Committee Report (see CRC/C/70/Add.8)	Approved with reference to the reports of the relevant parliamentary committees.	International Treaty
1996	Law 536 of 1996	Amending various paragraphs of the Labour Law relating to child	Amendment to Art 21 of the Labour Law, any worker under the age of 18	During the parliamentary debate Fnaysh asks about the absence of	Labour Law Rights of the Child

		rights	is subject to the rules established by Chapter of the Labour Law. Amendment of Art. 22: Absolute Prohibition to employ minors under 13 years old. Amendment to Art. 23 No minors of less than 15 years can do heavy work (with reference to Appendixes 1 and 2) other limitation to work of minors in terms of hours of work and quality of work. The law is mentioned by the CRC Committee (see CRC/C/70/Add.8 p. 119).	tables in the text of the law presented in the parliament, but is being replied by Ahmed Sweid that the tables have been agreed with the minister of labour already and that the text presented in parliament is the same agreed with the minister of labour. The law passes without other objections and on the basis of the reports of the relevant committees.	
	Law 572 of 1996	Permission to the government to ratify the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (with various reservations)	Ratification recommended in various international monitoring reports.	Approved with the reports of the parliamentary committees. No member of the parliament raises concerns related to the reservations adopted on the treaty. The committee for administration and justice proposes the addition of a line specifying the need for consistency with Personal Status Law thus justifying reservations.	Women's rights UN Treaties
1997	Law 613 of 1997	Law authorizing the government to join the two additional protocols to the Geneva treaties of 1949 on the protection of victims of war.		Approved without objections, report of the foreign affairs committee attached.	International Treaty

	Law 666 of 1997	General amnesty for drug dealers 4000 individuals taking advantage of the act	The law is praised by the CRC Committee as attenuating the social tension due to the persecution of young persons involved in drug trafficking and detained in poor conditions (see CRC/C/70/Add.8, p. 154)	The law is presented as an amended form of the amnesty given in 1991 by the Minster of justice Bahiyj Tabbara. No objections are raised by the assembly.	Penal Code
1998	Law 686 of 1998	Establishing free education for all Lebanese and compulsory until the age of 12 (later until the age of 15) but then excluding the sons of Lebanese women married to a non-Lebanese. (AI in A/HRC/WG.6/9/LBN/3/Rev.1 p. 7)	Amendment of Art 49 of the draft Law 134/59 from the ministry of Education. A bill to raise compulsory education age is before the parliament but not approved at the time of writing.	The law is passed with reference to human rights standards and no members of parliament raise objection or comments. The head of government clarifies that the government will not be liable of paying for benefits to private schools.	Rights of Child
	Law 720 of 1998	Law Establishing the National Committee for Lebanese Women	Following the Beijing World Forum and on the basis of its human rights constitutional commitment Lebanon Establishes a National Committee for Lebanese Women.	Fnaysh intervenes to support Husseini's object ion to the fact that the members of the organization cannot establish their own salary, the article is then abrogated.	Rights of Women
1999	Law 91 of 1999	Prohibition for employment for persons of less than 18 years old for more than 6 hours per day	Amendments to Labour Law in Articles: 23 (on the conditions of employment of minors) 25 (on vocational training). This law as the previous ones are mentioned in various CRC reports as positive steps in terms of human rights.)	MP Ibrahim al Saiyed (member of Hezbollah) asks for clarifications over the minimum age of work when conditions apply to work under the age of 18. A reply is given by Nailah Mouʿawad (13 under various conditions) the law is approved without further questions	Labour Law Rights of the Children

				from Hezbollah's delegation.	
	Law 116 of 1999	Authorizing accession to ILO treaties: 132, 139, 142, 159, 172,172	ILO treaties contain provisions overlapping with human rights standards.	Most of treaties are accessed only with reference to parliamentary committees' records. No relevant discussion takes place in the parliament.	International Treaties
2000	Law 185 of 2000	With this law, Lebanon accesses the Convention Against Torture a fundamental treaty in the international bill of human rights.		The law is passed with reference to the reports from the Parliamentary Committee on Human Rights and the Parliamentary Committee on Justice and Administration. There are no interventions from individual members of parliament.	International Treaty
	Law 207 of 2000	Non-discrimination of men and women at work as regards salary, work duties promotions etc. Right to maternity leave Prohibition of making redundant a pregnant woman, or in maternity leave and to all persons in ordinary leave or in sickness leave.	Amendments to Articles: 26: non-discrimination of employer towards men and women 28: "delivery holiday for pregnant women (7 weeks) 29: payment of "delivery holiday" 52: prohibition of dismissal notice for pregnant women, in "delivery holiday", or any worker in leave or holiday. This law is mentioned in the state submitted report to the CRC see CRC/C/129/Add.7).	No objections or comments are raised in the parliamentary debate. Law approval widely relies on parliamentary committees reports.	Labour Law Women's Rights
	Law 220 of 2000	Ratification of the Law Decree on the rights of persons with	The law is mentioned in the Universal Periodic Review documentation but	The law is passed as a single law as proposed by Naila Mouʾawad,	Rights of Persons with Disabilities

		disabilities	its actual implementation is still pending apparently (see A/HRC/WG.6/9/LBN/3/Rev.1, p. 4).	Nasiyb Lahoud proposes one amendment relating to the percentage of buses equipped for disabled persons. No comments or objections from Hezbollah's delegation.	
2001	Law 324 of 2001	Law giving equal rights to women employees in terms of social security especially as regards maternity leave.	(See UNDP *al Tashriy'a fiy Khamsat 'Ashra 'Aama* Vol. 19, Studies and Information Series, 2007, p. 99.)	The law is approved on the basis of its discussion in the Parliamentary Committees (Parliamentary Committee on Justice and Administration, Parliamentary Committee on Public Health, Work and Social Affairs). The Law is approved without amendments and comments from members of the parliament.	Labour Law, Rights of women
	Law 335 of 2001	Ratification of convention on Worst forms of child labour (ILO 182)	The law is approved also as suggested by CRC Committee (see CRC/C/15/Add.169) and is mentioned by the Special Rapporteur on human trafficking (see E/CN.4/2006/62/Add.3)	The law is approved on the basis of the discussions held in the Committee for Justice and Administration, the Committee for the Woman and the Child, the Committee for Public Health, Work and Social Affairs, and the Committee for Foreign Affairs and Migrants. No interventions are recorded and the law passes with a majority vote without amendments.	Labour Law Rights of the Child
	Law 349 of	Amending the penal code in favour	The Code of Criminal Procedure, as	The debate includes a discussion of	Penal Code

	2001	of rights of the detained person.	amended by Act No. 359 of 16 August 2001, defines the rights of all suspects under investigation. These rights, such as the right to legal counsel and the right to see a physician, are read out to suspects or accused persons. Officers who violate investigation procedures are subject to prosecution, and magistrates must take into account the principle that suspects must not be questioned under duress and ensure that his testimony is not subject to any external influences, whether psychological or physical.	procedural matters as regards the way to approve the new code after being revised by the Council of ministers and the president of the republic. Hezbollah intervenes through Abdullah Qasir with reference to the issue of the time of validity of the indictment over investigations. The proposed period is ten days which can be extended on the basis of the kind of the crime and the decision of the attorney general. The amendment is being then approved on the basis of the form proposed by Boutros Ḥarb taking into account also Hezbollah's requests.	
	Law 387 of 2001	Gives the right to women to benefit from the allowances of the Civil Servants Cooperative	The law is mentioned as an achievement in terms of women's rights in a UNDP-Lebanese Parliament report (See UNDP *al Tashriyʻa fiy Khamsat 'Ashra 'Aama* Vol. 19, Studies and Information Series, 2007, p. 19).	The Law amends aspects of law 343 of 2001 and is discussed thoroughly especially by Nayla Mouʿawad and others but no reports of Hezbollah participation to the	Women's Rights
2002	Law 400 of 2002	Ratification of ILO convention 138 on minimum working age (10/6/2003)	The treaty sets minimum age for admission to work and is mentioned by the Special Rapporteur on human trafficking (see E/CN.4/2006/62/Add.3).	The ratification of the treaty is criticized by Bouṭros Ḥarb (March 14) and Saleh Al-Khair. Because the state commits to a policy that requires serious responsibilities	International Treaty Labour Law Rights of the Child

				towards the children but as a matter of fact this commitment is far from being respect by state institutions. The law is approved by majority.	
	Law 414 of 2002	Ratification of the Optional Protocol of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution, and Child Pornography.		The law is approved without debate and reservations on the treaty. The law has been previously discussed in the relevant parliamentary committees.	Child Rights
	Law 422 of 2002	Law relating to the protection of Juveniles in conflict with the law or at risk	Despite several flaws highlighted by the CRC committee, this law still represents progress in terms of rights of the child in Lebanon. The law is mentioned in the HR Committee session of 25/11/2002 and in the Women and Children committee of the Parliament. The same law is mentioned in the CRC Committee report and in the UPR state submitted report of 2010 (see CRC/C/LBN/CO/3, and A/HRC/WG.6/9/LBN/1) The law intended to guarantee better conditions for the detention of juveniles its application is only partial according to many reports.	The law is approved through article by article debate. Hezbollah's MPs do not participate to the debate in which Bouṭros Ḥarb, Walid 'Aido and few others are active in proposing minor amendments, linguistic changes and clarifications.	Rights of the Child Penal Code
	Law 463 of	Reduces penalty for certain crimes	This law follows to the	The law regards the possibility of	Penal Code

	2002	as an extraordinary measure to deal with the overcrowding of prisons. Its effective implementation will be only a few years later.	recommendation made by the Human Rights Parliamentary Committee in the session of 3/3/ 2004	reducing the application for certain legal sentences for minor crimes on the basis of good conduct and similar. The debate analyses proposals from MPs and the government. Part of the debate is dedicated to introducing a distinction between the commercial trafficking of drugs and its consumption or minor distribution (*taruiyj*) whereas the latters would not be considered major crimes. Hezbollah intervenes in two occasions in the debate. First through Muḥammad Raʿad who declares that their political delegation favours the law proposal as suggested by the Government. In a second occasion Muḥammad Fnaysh intervenes (p. 2142) trying to quicken the process of drafting of the law as regards the aforementioned distinction in art 15 of the law proposal.	
	Law 472 of 2002	Authorizing the government to join the Agreement Establishing the Organization of Arab Women		Approved by majority no debate.	Women's Rights
	Law 483 of 2002	Amendments to article reforming social security law in favour of	This law amends article 14 of the Social Security Code, where the	Parliamentary debate is on an alternative law proposal by Ghanwa	Women's Rights

		women and men equality.	words "the male insured" have been amended to "the male and female insured equally, without discrimination" the law is mentioned in the state submitted report to the CEDAW committee (see CEDAW/C/LBN/3 p. 12).	Jallul (of the March 14 coalition) whereas the law passed has been proposed by Bouṭros Ḥarb, Elie Skaff and Muḥammad Safadi. No interventions from Hezbollah are reported.	
2003	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
2004	Law 35 of 2004	Permission to the government to join the Arab labour treaty no 19 of 1998		The treaty is approved by majority but with various reservations over its text. The approval of the law raises several observations regarding the issue of "labour inspectors" MP Moukhaiber of the Free Patriotic Movement and MP Ghanem (Member of the March 14 Alliance) raise concerns over the reservations contained in the law. MP Mukhaiber also demands the need to use electronic vote system present in the assembly. Hezbollah does not intervene in the debate.	Regional treaty, Labour rights.
	Law 567of 2004	Permission to the government to ratify the ILO treaty 152 on Safety and Health in Dock Work.		Approved with committees reports (at the end MP Moukhaiber of the Free Patriotic Movement complains about the fact that these laws are not being read by members of parliament).	Labour Rights International Treaty.

	Law 591 of 2004	Permission to the government to join the international labour treaty 148 of 1988		The treaty is approved without parliamentary debate on the basis of the committees' report.	International Treaty Labour Law
	Law 598 of 2004	Permission to the government to join the international labour treaty 174 of 1993		The treaty is approved by majority through reference to Parliamentary Committees' debate. MP Fatoush notices that the treaty does not cover issues related to the protection of workers dealing with radioactive material.	International Treaty Labour Law
	Law 608 of 2004	Permission to the government to join the international labour treaty 150 of 1978		The law is approved by majority with reference to the reports provided by relevant parliamentary committees.	International Treaty Labour Law.
2005	Law 664 of 2005	Law ratifying the decree introducing the Ombudsman of the Republic.	The law is mentioned in the Universal Periodic Review as a sign of progress in human rights standards (See A/HRC/WG.6/9/LBN/3/Rev.1, p.2) The effective implementation of the law is still pending nonetheless.	The law debate is particularly long and being related to a technical legal issue it delves into complicated jurisprudential aspects to which primarily MP Moukhaiber and MP Ḥarb contribute. No participation of Hezbollah's member is recorded.	Civil and Political Rights
	Law 680 of 2005	Ratification of UN convention to combat transnational organized crime.		The law is approved by majority, no debate in the parliament but only reference to the reports of the relevant Parliamentary Committees.	International Treaty

	Law 681 of 2005	Accession to protocol against Smuggling of Migrants by Land Sea and Air (Supplement to UN Convention on Transnational Organized Crime)		The treaty is approved on the basis of the reports of the relevant parliamentary committees.	International Treaty
	Law 682 of 2005	Law authorizing the government to accede the Protocol to Prevent Suppress and Punish Trafficking Persons, Especially Women and Children (optional protocol to Convention on Transnational Crime)	In 2011 the parliament will adopt a law defining the crime of trafficking of persons accordingly to the requirements of this treaty.	The law is approved by majority without objections and with reference to reports from relevant parliamentary committees.	International Treaty Rights of the Child Rights of Women Rights of Migrants
2006	Law 718 of 2006	Giving permission to join the Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (PO A ISS)		The law is approved by majority in the parliament with reference to the reports of the relevant parliamentary committees.	International Treaty
	Law 759 of 2006	Authorization to join the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.		The law is approved but details on the parliamentary discussion are not available. (Source the Lebanese Parliament Website unofficial report of the session held on: 31st of October 2006)	International Treaty

	Law 765 of 2006	Prohibition on the use of chemical weapons.		The law is approved but details on the parliamentary discussion are not available. (Source the Lebanese Parliament Website unofficial report of the session held on: 31st of October 2006)	International Treaty
2007	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
2008	Law 1 of 2008	Permission to the government to ratify the Arab Charter for Human Rights	Discussion of approval of this law took place in the Human Rights Committee in 2003 and then was mentioned in the 2006 Legislative session.	Approved on the basis of the committees' reports.	International Treaty
	Law 12 of 2008	Accession to the Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.	On 22 December 2008 and that the Ministry of Justice had made a proposal for the establishment of an independent national mechanism to visit detention centres with a view to preventing torture and ill-treatment.	The law is approved but details on the parliamentary discussion are not available. (Source the Lebanese Parliament Website unofficial report of the session held on: 25th of September 2008)	International Treaty
	Law 14 of 2008	Permission to the government to join Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects.		Same as above.	International Treaty

	Law 49 of 2008	Ratification of the Arab Labour Conventions 1-9-13-15-17-18		Approved throughout parliamentary committees reports.	International Treaty
2009	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
2010	Law 127 of 2010	Ratification of the International Treaty for the prohibition of cluster ammunitions		Criticised by Hezbollah as altering the strategic military balance against Israel which did not sign the treaty. MP Ra'ad argued that the Resistance cannot give reassurances to Israel over the kind of weaponry that is used by Lebanon. MP Mūsawī also criticises the ratification of the treaty not being reciprocated by Israel and also due to the fact that the costs tackle the issue of cluster bombs in Lebanon is particularly high and there is no international compensation for this cost.	International Treaty
	Law 128 of 2010	Rights to social security for Palestinian workers	Palestinian Refugees working in Lebanon and registered in the Directorate for Political Affairs of Refugees is subject to the Labour Code including indemnity at the end of employment and as regards accidents on the work place. Palestinians are exempts from conditions of reciprocity as regards social security.	The law is discussed in the parliament also on the basis of various proposals made available by members of parliament. The main issue is related to the institution of a special fund for social security of Palestinians or rather the use of the regular national fund. Hezbollah participates actively to the	Rights of Palestinian Refugees

				discussion with MP Muḥammad Fnaysh and MP Nawwaf al-Mūsawī in favour of the expansion of Palestinian rights in this respect. The Christian component of the parliament presents minor criticism, especially as regards the risk that this law may pave the way to the naturalization of Palestinians in Lebanon and endanger the rights to return. The law is passed by the majority.	
	Law 129 of 2010	Condition of reciprocity for foreign workers in Lebanon. And permit to work to Palestinians with a permission from the Ministry of Labour (mentioned by AI in A/HRC/WG.6/9/LBN/3/Rev.1 (no41, p. 8)	Exemption of Palestinian refugees as regards reciprocity and taxation over the working permit. Although they still need to be registered in the Directorate of Political Affairs and of Refugees, Ministry of Interior and their access to the job market is limited to lesser qualified professions.	The law is briefly discussed through but receives general support. According to interviews with the author Hezbollah was supporting the idea for unrestricted possibility of Palestinian to work in Lebanon but the Christian component only accepted limited possibility to work in jobs that were no highly qualified.	Rights of Palestinian Refugees
2011	Law 162 of 2011	Abrogation of Art. 562 of the Criminal Code establishing mitigating circumstances for violence related to "family honour".	Reported by Human Rights Watch and many other human rights organization as an important step.	MP 'Fayyāḍ demands the deferral of the law to the committees.	Rights of Women.
	Law 164 of 2011	Law Punishing the Trafficking of Persons		Hezbollah's MPs do not raise observations or concerns in this regard.	Rights of women Rights of Child

Bibliography

Books

A. Jᴀʙᴀʀ, Fᴀʟᴇʜ (2003), *The Shi'ite movement in Iraq* (London: Saqi) 288 p.

Aʙᴅᴇʟ Hᴀʟᴇᴇᴍ, M. A. (2005), *The Qurʾan* (Oxford world's classics; New York: Oxford University Press) xli, 464 p.

ʻAʙᴅᴜʜ, Mᴜʜᴀᴍᴍᴀᴅ (1966), *The theology of unity* (London,: Allen & Unwin) 3-164 p.

Aʙū ᴀʟ-Nᴀṣʀ, Fᴀᴅ̄ɪʟ (2003), *Ḥizb Allāh: ḥaqāʾiq wa-abʻād [Hezbollah: Facts and Dimensions]* (Bayrūt: al-Sharikah al-ʻĀlamīyah lil-Kitāb) 278 p.

Aʙᴜ-Rᴀʙɪʾ, Iʙʀᴀʜɪᴍ M. (1996), *Intellectual origins of Islamic resurgence in the modern Arab world* (SUNY series in Near Eastern studies; Albany: State University of New York Press) xii, 370 p.

Aᴅᴀᴍs, Cʜᴀʀʟᴇs C. (1968), *Islam and modernism in Egypt; a study of the modern reform movement inaugurated by Muhammad Abduh* (New York,: Russell & Russell) viii, 283 p.

Aᴅʟᴇʀ, Eᴍᴀɴᴜᴇʟ (2005), *Communitarian international relations: the epistemic foundations of international relations* (The new international relations; London ; New York: Routledge) xvii, 334 p.

Aᴊᴀᴍɪ, Fᴏᴜᴀᴅ (1986), *The vanished Imam: Musa al Sadr and the Shia of Lebanon* (London: Tauris) [243]p.

Aʟᴀɢʜᴀ, Jᴏsᴇᴘʜ Eʟɪᴇ (2006), *The shifts in Hizbullah's ideology: religious ideology, political ideology and political program* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press) iii, 357 p.

___ (2011), *Hizbullah's documents: from the 1985 Open letter to the 2009 Manifesto* (Amsterdam: Pallas Publications) 222 p.

___ (2011), *Hizbullah's identity construction* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press) 308 p.

Aɴᴏɴʏᴍᴏᴜs (n.d.), *al-Ḥarb al-Thāmina [the Eighth War]* (Beirut: al-Markaz al-Istishadi lil Dirasat wa al-Tauthiq).

Aᴘᴘʟᴇʙʏ, R. Sᴄᴏᴛᴛ (1997), *Spokesmen for the despised: fundamentalist leaders of the Middle East* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press) vii, 429 p.

Asᴀᴅ, Tᴀʟᴀʟ (2003), *Formations of the secular: Christianity, Islam, modernity* (Cultural memory in the present; Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press) 269 p.

Aᴠɪɴᴇʀɪ, Sʜʟᴏᴍᴏ and Dᴇ-Sʜᴀʟɪᴛ, Aᴠɴᴇʀ (1992), *Communitarianism and individualism* (Oxford readings in politics and government; Oxford [England] ; New York: Oxford University Press) vi, 237 p.

Bᴀʟǫᴀᴢɪᴢ, ʻAʙᴅ ᴀʟ-Iʟāʜ (2006), *Ḥizb Allāh min al-taḥrīr ilá al-radʻ, 1982-2006: nuskhah*

muwassaʿah li-kitāb al-Muqāwamah wa-taḥrīr Janūb Lubnān [Hezbollah from Liberation to Deterrence: 1982-2006] (al-Ṭabʻah 1. edn.; Bayrūt: Markaz Dirāsāt al-Waḥdah al-ʿArabīyah) 111 p.

AL-BARGHOUTI, TAMIM (2008), *The Umma and the Dawla: the nation state and the Arab Middle East* (London ; Ann Arbor, MI: Pluto Press) ix, 240 p.

BARBER, BENJAMIN R. (1996), *Jihad vs. McWorld* (1st Ballantine Books edn.; New York: Ballantine Books) x 389 p.

BAUMAN, ZYGMUNT (2000), *Liquid modernity* (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press) vi, 228 p.

BELKEZIZ, ABDELILAH (2009), *The state in contemporary Islamic thought a historical survey of the major Muslim political thinkers of the modern era* (Contemporary Arab scholarship in the social sciences v 3; London: I. B. Tauris).

BERMAN, PAUL (2003), *Terror and liberalism* (New York, N.Y.: Norton) 214 p.

BINDER, LEONARD (1964), *The ideological revolution in the Middle East* (New York,: Wiley) x, 287 p.

EL-BIZRI, DALAL (1999), *Islamistes, parlementaires et Libanais les interventions à l'Assemblée des élus de la Jama'a islamiyya et du Hizb Allah (1992-1996) [publié par le Centre d'études et de recherches sur le Moyen-Orient contemporain]*, ed. CERMOC (Document; Beyrouth Paris: Centre d'études et de recherches sur le Moyen-Orient contemporain) 1 vol. (18).

BLANFORD, NICHOLAS (2006), *Killing Mr Lebanon: the assassination of Rafik Hariri and its impact on the Middle East* (London ; New York: I. B. Taurus) x, 236 p.

___ (2011), *Warriors of God: inside Hezbollah's thirty-year struggle against Israel* (1st edn.; New York: Random House) xvii, 522 p.

BLUM, GABRIELLA (2007), *Islands of agreement: managing enduring armed rivalries* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press) xiii, 355 p.

BLUNT, WILFRID SCAWEN (1907), *Secret history of the English occupation of Egypt: being a personal narrative of events* (London: T. Fisher Unwin) xii, 606p.

BOUCHER, DAVID (1998), *Political theories of international relations: from Thucydides to the present* (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press) xii, 443 p.

BRAHIMI, ALIA (2010), *Jihad and just war in the war on terror* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press) xi, 318 p.

BROWN, CHRIS (1992), *International relations theory: new normative approaches* (New York: Columbia University Press) vii, 264 p.

BUCHANAN, ALLEN E. (1982), *Marx and justice: the radical critique of liberalism* (London: Methuen) xiv,206p.

BULL, HEDLEY (1995), *The anarchical society: a study of order in world politics* (2nd edn.; New York: Columbia University Press) xviii, 329 p.

BURKE, EDMUND, CANAVAN, FRANCIS, and PAYNE, EDWARD JOHN (1999), *Select works of Edmund Burke: a new imprint of the Payne edition*, 4 vols. (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund).

BURKE, EDMUND, FIDLER, DAVID P., and WELSH, JENNIFER M. (1999), *Empire and community: Edmund Burke's writings and speeches on international relations* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press) xv, 353 p.

CALVERT, JOHN (2010), *Sayyid Qutb and the origins of radical Islamism* (New York: Columbia University Press) xi, 377 p.

CHARVET, JOHN and KACZYNSKA-NAY, ELISA (2008), *The liberal project and human rights: the theory and practice of a new world order* (Cambridge, UK ; New York: Cambridge University Press) xii, 434 p.

DABASHI, HAMID (2006), *Theology of discontent: the ideological foundation of the Islamic Revolution in Iran* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers) lxii, 644 p.

DALACOURA, KATERINA (2002), *Islam, liberalism and human rights* (Rev. ed edn.; London: I. B. Tauris) 248 p.

___ (2011), *Islamist terrorism and democracy in the Middle East* (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press) x, 213 p.

DUNNE, TIMOTHY and WHEELER, NICHOLAS J. (1999), *Human rights in global politics* (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press) xi, 337 p.

ETZIONI, AMITAI (2004), *From empire to community: a new approach to international relations* (1st edn.; New York: Palgrave Macmillan) xii, 258 p.

EUBEN, ROXANNE LESLIE (1999), *Enemy in the mirror: Islamic fundamentalism and the limits of modern rationalism* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press) xiv, 239 p.

EUBEN, ROXANNE LESLIE and ZAMAN, MUHAMMAD QASIM (2009), *Princeton readings in Islamist thought: texts and contexts from al-Banna to Bin Laden* (Princeton studies in Muslim politics; Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press) xv, 516 p.

FAYYĀḌ, ʿALĪ (2008), *Naẓarīyāt al-sulṭah fī al-fikr al-siyāsī al-Shīʿī al-muʿāṣir [Conceptions of Authority in Contemporary Shiite Political Thought]* (Silsilat al-dirāsāt al-ḥaḍārīyah; Bayrūt: Markaz al-Ḥaḍārah li-Tanmiyat al-Fikr al-Islāmī) 478 p.

FISK, ROBERT (1991), *Pity the nation: Lebanon at war* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

___ (2001), *Pity the nation: Lebanon at war* (3rd edn.; Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press) xxi, 727 p.

___ (2002), *Pity the nation: the abduction of Lebanon* (4th, new American edn.; New York: Thunder's Mouth Press/Nation Books) xxi, 727 p.

FROST, MERVYN (1996), *Ethics in international relations: a constitutive theory* (Cambridge studies in international relations; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) 251p.

___ (2009), *Global ethics: anarchy, freedom and international relations* (Critical issues in global politics; London ; New York: Routledge) ix, 182 p.

FULLER, GRAHAM E. and FRANCKE, REND RAHIM (1999), *The Arab Shi'a: the forgotten Muslims* (New York: St. Martin's Press) x, 290 p.

GABRIELI, FRANCESCO (1961), *The Arab revival* (New York,: Random House) 178 p.

GEORGE, ALEXANDER L. and BENNETT, ANDREW (2005), *Case studies and theory development in the social sciences* (BCSIA studies in international security; Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press) xv, 331 p.

GERGES, FAWAZ A. (1999), *America and political Islam: clash of cultures or clash of interests?* (Cambridge, UK ; New York, NY: Cambridge University Press) xiii, 282 p.

___ (2005), *The far enemy: why Jihad went global* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press) xii, 345 p.

___ (2006), *Journey of the jihadist: inside Muslim militancy* (1st edn.; Orlando, Fla.: Harcourt) 312 p.

GRIFFIN, JAMES (2008), *On human rights* (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press) xiii, 339 p.

HAJ, SAMIRA (2009), *Reconfiguring Islamic tradition: reform, rationality, and modernity* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press) xii, 284 p.

HALLIDAY, FRED (2003), *Islam and the myth of confrontation: religion and politics in the Middle East* (New edn.; London ; New York: I.B. Tauris ; In U.S. and Canada distributed by Palgrave Macmillan) xv, 255 p.

___ (2011), *Shocked and awed: how the war on terror and jihad have changed the English language* (London: I. B. Tauris).

HAMZEH, AHMAD NIZAR (2004), *In the path of Hizbullah* (1st edn., Modern intellectual and political history of the Middle East; Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press) x, 196 p.

HARIK, JUDITH P. (2004), *Hezbollah: the changing face of terrorism* (London ; New York: I.B. Tauris) x, 241 p.

HEKMAN, SUSAN J. (1983), *Weber, the ideal type, and contemporary social theory* (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press) viii, 213p.

HIRST, DAVID (2010), *Beware of small states: Lebanon, battleground of the Middle East* (New York: Nation Books) xiv, 480 p.

HOLLIS, MARTIN and SMITH, STEVE M. (1990), *Explaining and understanding international relations* (Oxford: Clarendon) 226p.

HOURANI, ALBERT (1962), *Arabic thought in the liberal age 1798-1939* (London: Oxford University Press) x, 403 p.

JABER, HALA (1997), *Hezbollah: born with a vengeance* (New York: Columbia University Press) xvi, 240 p.

KELLY, PAUL (2005), *Liberalism* (Key concepts; Cambridge; Malden, MA: Polity) ix, 183 p.

KELSAY, JOHN (2007), *Arguing the just war in Islam* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press) 263 p.

KEPEL, GILLES (2004), *The war for Muslim minds: Islam and the West* (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press) 327 p.

___ (2006), *Jihad: the trail of political Islam* (4th edn.; London: I.B. Tauris) xiii, 454 p.

KERR, MALCOLM H. (1966), *Islamic reform; the political and legal theories of Muḥammad ʿAbduh and Rashīd Riḍā* (Berkeley,: University of California Press) vii, 249 p.

KHATAB, SAYED (2006), *The power of sovereignty: the political and ideological philosophy of Sayyid Qutb* (Routledge studies in political Islam; London: Routledge) xii, 298 p.

KHOMEINI, RUHOLLAH (1981), *Islam and revolution: writings and declarations of Imam Khomeini*, trans. Hamid Algar (Berkeley, Calif.: Mizan Press) 460 p.

LEWIS, BERNARD (1988), *The political language of Islam* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press) vii, 168 p.

LIJPHART, AREND (1980), *Democracy in plural societies: a comparative exploration* (New Haven ; London: Yale University Press).

LINKLATER, ANDREW (1998), *The transformation of political community: ethical foundations of the post-Westphalian era* (Oxford: Polity).

LOUËR, LAURENCE (2008), *Transnational Shia politics: religious and political networks in the Gulf* (Series in comparative politics and international studies; New York, Paris: Columbia University Press; In association with the Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches Internationales) vii, 326 p.

MACINTYRE, ALASDAIR C. (1984), *After virtue: a study in moral theory* (2nd edn.; Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press) xi, 286 p.

___ (1988), *Whose justice? Which rationality?* (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press) xi, 410 p.

MALLAT, CHIBLI (1993), *The renewal of Islamic law: Muhammad Baqer as-Sadr, Najaf, and the Shi'i International* (Cambridge Middle East library; Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press) ix, 245 p.

MARTIN, VANESSA (2000), *Creating an Islamic state: Khomeini and the making of a new Iran* (Library of modern Middle East studies; London: I.B.Tauris) 248p.

AL-MAWDUDI, ABUL 'ALA (1980), *Human rights in Islam* (Leicester: Islamic Foundation) 39p.

MAYER, ANN ELIZABETH (1998), *Islam and human rights: tradition and politics* (3rd edn.; Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press) 260p.

MILLER, DAVID (1995), *On nationality* (Oxford political theory; Oxford: Oxford University Press) 210p.

MILLER, DAVID and HASHMI, SOHAIL H. (2001), *Boundaries and justice: diverse ethical perspectives* (The Ethikon series in comparative ethics; Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press) xi, 367 p.

MUSALLAM, ADNAN (2005), *From secularism to Jihad: Sayyid Qutb and the foundations of radical Islamism* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger) xiii, 261 p.

NORTON, AUGUSTUS R. (1987), *Amal and the Shiʿa: struggle for the soul of Lebanon* (1st edn., Modern Middle East series; Austin: University of Texas Press) xxii, 238 p.

___ (2007), *Hezbollah: a short history* (Princeton studies in Muslim politics; Princeton: Princeton University Press) vi, 187 p.

Nozick, Robert (1975), *Anarchy, state, and Utopia* (Oxford: Blackwell) xvi, 367 p.

Oh, Irene (2007), *The rights of God: Islam, human rights, and comparative ethics* (Advancing human rights; Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press) vii, 158 p.

Qāsim, Naʿem (2004), *Ḥizbu Allah: al-Manhaj, al-Tajriba, al-Mustqbal [Hezbollah: Method, Practice and Future]* (Beirut: Dar al-Hadi).

Qassem, Naim (2005), *Hizbullah: the story from within*, trans. Dalia Khalil (London: Saqi) 284 p.

___ (2010), *Hizbullah: the story from within* (Updated edn.; London: Saqi).

Qutb, Sayyid (1953), *Social justice in Islam*, trans. John B. Hardie (Near Eastern Translation Program; Washington: American Council of Learned Societies) viii, 298 p.

___ (2004), *A child from the village*, trans. John Calvert and William E. Shepard (1st edn., Middle East literature in translation; Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press) xxxii, 150 p.

Qutb, Sayyid (2004), *A child from the village*, trans. John Calvert and William E. Shepard (1st edn., Middle East literature in translation; Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press) xxxii, 150 p.

Qutb, Sayyid (1990), *Milestones*, trans. M.M. Siddiqui (Indianapolis: American Trust) iii, 138 p.

Qutb, Sayyid and Shepard, William E. (1996), *Sayyid Qutb and Islamic activism: a translation and critical analysis of Social justice in Islam* (Social, economic, and political studies of the Middle East and Asia,; Leiden ; New York: E.J. Brill) lxii, 378 p.

Rabinovich, Itamar (1998), *The brink of peace: the Israeli-Syrian negotiations* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press) xv, 283 p.

Ranstorp, Magnus (1997), *Hizb'allah in Lebanon: the politics of the western hostage crisis* (London: Macmillan Press) xvi, 257 p.

Rawls, John (1999), *A theory of justice* (Rev. edn.; Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard Univeristy Press) xxii, 538 p.

___ (1999), *The Law of peoples* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press) viii, 199 p.

Ritter, R. M. (2003), *The Oxford style manual* (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

Rodinson, Maxime (1979), *Marxism and the Muslim world* (London: Zed Press) 229p.

Rorty, Richard (1999), *Philosophy and social hope* (London: Penguin).

Ross, Dennis and Makovsky, David (2009), *Myths, illusions, and peace: finding a new direction for America in the Middle East* (New York: Viking) xiv, 366 p.

Saad-Ghorayeb, Amal (2002), *Hizbuʾllah: politics and religion* (Critical studies on Islam; London ; Sterling, Va.: Pluto Press) x, 254 p.

al-Ṣadr, Muḥammad Bāqir (1987), *Our philosophy*, trans. Shams Constantine Inati (London ; New York NY, USA: Muhammadi Trust in association with KPI ;) xvii, 295 p.

Safran, Nadav (1961), *Egypt in search of political community; an analysis of the intellectual and*

political evolution of Egypt, 1804-1952 (Harvard Middle Eastern studies,; Cambridge,: Harvard University Press) 298 p.

SAID, EDWARD W. (1997), *Covering Islam: how the media and the experts determine how we see the rest of the world* (Rev. edn.; New York: Vintage Books) lxx, 200 p.

SALIBI, KAMAL S. (1976), *Cross roads to civil war: Lebanon, 1958-1976* (Delmar, N.Y.: Caravan Books) viii, 178 p.

SANDEL, MICHAEL J. (1998), *Liberalism and the limits of justice* (2nd edn.; Cambridge, UK ; New York: Cambridge Universtiy Press) xvii, 231 p.

SANKARI, JAMAL (2005), *Fadlallah: the making of a radical Shi'ite leader* (London: Saqi) 397 p.

SAYYID-MARSOT, AFAF LUTFI (1985), *A short history of modern Egypt* (Cambridge Cambridgeshire ; New York: Cambridge University Press) viii, 151 p.

SHARARAH, WADDAH (2006), *Dawlat Ḥizb Allah: Lubnān mujtamʿan Islamiyan* (4ᵗʰ edn. Beirut: Dar al-Nahar) 476 p.

SHUTE, STEPHEN and HURLEY, S. L. (1993), *On human rights* (Oxford Amnesty lectures; New York, NY: BasicBooks) ix, 262 p.

SOBELMAN, DANIEL (2004), *New rules of the game: Israel and Hizbollah after the withdrawal from Lebanon* (Memorandum; Tel Aviv: Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University) 128 p.

STEINHOFF, UWE (2007), *On the ethics of war and terrorism* (Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press) 160 p.

TÖNNIES, FERDINAND (1955), *Community and association (Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft)* (International library of sociology and social reconstruction (London); London,: Routledge & Paul) xxxiv, 293 p.

TRABOULSI, FAWWAZ (2007), *A history of modern Lebanon* (London ; Ann Arbor, MI: Pluto) xi, 306 p.

VINCENT, R. J. (1986), *Human rights and international relations* (Cambridge Cambridgeshire ; New York: Cambridge University Press) viii, 186 p.

WALDMAN, ADIR (2003), *Arbitrating armed conflict: decisions of the Israel-Lebanon Monitoring Group* (Huntington, NY: Juris) viii, 320 p.

WALDRON, JEREMY (1987), *'Nonsense upon stilts': Bentham, Burke and Marx on the rights of man* (London: Methuen) [256]p.

WALTZ, KENNETH NEAL (1979), *Theory of international politics* (Addison-Wesley series in political science; Reading, Mass: Addison-Wesley Pub. Co) 251 p.

WALZER, MICHAEL (1983), *Spheres of justice: a defense of pluralism and equality* (New York: Basic Books) xviii,345p.

___ (1994), *Thick and thin: moral argument at home and abroad* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press) xi, 108 p.

WENDT, ALEXANDER (1999), *Social theory of international politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press).

Book Sections

ʿABDUH, MUḤAMMAD (2002), 'The Necessity of Religious Reform', in Mansoor Moaddel and Kamran Talattof (eds.), *Modernist and Fundamentalist Debates in Islam: a Reader* (1st Palgrave Macmillan edn.; New York: Palgrave Macmillan), x, 382 p.

BARAM, AMATZIA (1990), 'The Radical Shiʿite Opposition Movement in Iraq', in Emmanuel Sivan and Menachem Friedman (eds.), *Religious radicalism and politics in the Middle East* (SUNY series in Near Eastern studies; Albany, NY: State University of New York Press), vii, 244 p.

___ (2010), 'Sadr the Father, Sadr the Son, the "Revolution in Shi'ism" and the struggle for Power in the Hawzah of Najaf', in Amatzia Baram, Achim Rohde, and Ronen Zeidel (eds.), *Iraq between occupations: perspectives from 1920 to the present* (1st edn.; New York: Palgrave Macmillan), vi, 279 p.

BATATU, HANNA (1986), 'Shiʿs Organization in Iraq: Al-Daʿwah al-Islamiyah and al-Mujahidin', in Juan Ricardo Cole and Nikki R. Keddie (eds.), *Shi'ism and social protest* (New Haven: Yale University Press), x, 325 p.

BENSAID, SAID (1987), 'Al Watan and Al Umma in Contemporary Arab Use', in Ghassane Salamé (ed.), *The Foundations of the Arab state: Nation, state, and integration in the Arab world* (London ; New York: Croom Helm), 260 p.

DANIELLE HOYEK, RAFIF RIDA SIDAWI AND AMIRA ABOU MRAD (2005), 'Murders of Women in Lebanon: 'Crimes of Honour' between Reality and the Law', in Lynn Welchman and Sara Hossain (eds.), *"Honour": crimes, paradigms, and violence against women* (London ; New York: Zed Books), xiv, 384 p.

DWORKIN, RONALD (1984), 'Rights as Trumps', in Jeremy Waldron (ed.), *Theories of rights* (Oxford Oxfordshire ; New York: Oxford University Press), 209 p.

HALLIDAY, FRED (1986), 'Iranian Foreign Policy Since 1979: Internationalism and Nationalism in the Islamic Revolution', in Juan Ricardo Cole and Nikki R. Keddie (eds.), *Shi'ism and social protest* (New Haven: Yale University Press), x, 325 p.

___ (1994), 'International Society as Homogeneity', *Rethinking international relations* (Basingstoke: Macmillan).

___ (2008), 'All Wars are Different: Lebanon, Israel, and the Maturing of the "Greater West Asian Crisis" ', in Nubar Hovsepian (ed.), *The war on Lebanon: a reader* (Northampton, Mass.: Olive Branch Press), xxvi, 422 p.

HASHMI, SOHAIL (1996), 'Interpreting the Islamic Ethics of War and Peace', in Terry Nardin (ed.), *The ethics of war and peace: religious and secular perspectives* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press), x, 286 p.

KELSAY, JOHN (1990), 'Islam and the Distinction between Combatants and Noncombatants', in James Turner Johnson and John Kelsay (eds.), *Cross, crescent, and sword: the justification and limitation of war in Western and Islamic tradition* (New York:

Greenwood Press), xviii, 236 p.

Marx, Karl (2000), 'On the Jewish Question', in David McLellan (ed.), *Karl Marx: selected writings* (2nd edn.; Oxford: Oxford University Press), xi, 687 p.

Ranstorp, Magnus (2006), 'The Hizballah training camp of Lebanon', in James J. F. Forest (ed.), *The making of a terrorist: recruitment, training, and root causes* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger Security International).

Risse-Kappen, Thomas and Sikkink, Kathryn (1999), 'The Socialisation of International Human Rights Norms into Domestic Practices: Introduction', in Thomas Risse-Kappen, Steve C. Ropp, and Kathryn Sikkink (eds.), *The power of human rights: international norms and domestic change* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

Rorty, Richard (1993), 'Human Rights, Rationality and Sentimentality', in Stephen Shute and S. L. Hurley (eds.), *On human rights: The Oxford amnesty lectures* (New York, NY: BasicBooks), ix, 262 p.

Sobelman, Daniel (2010), 'Hizbollah from Terror to Resistance: Towards a National Defence Strategy', in Clive Jones and Sergio Catignani (eds.), *Israel and Hizbollah: an asymmetric conflict in historical and comparitive perspectives* (London ; New York: Routledge), ix, 202 p.

Taylor, Charles (1985), 'Atomism', *Philosophical papers: Philosophy and the human sciences* (Cambridge Cambridgeshire; New York: Cambridge University Press), 340 p.

___ (1995), 'Cross-Purposes: the Liberal-Communitarian Debate', in Charles Taylor (ed.), *Philosophical arguments* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press), xii, 318 p.

___ (1999), 'Conditions of an Unforced Consensus on Human Rights', in Joanne R. Bauer and Daniel Bell (eds.), *The East Asian challenge for human rights* (Conditions of an Unforced Consensus; Cambridge, UK ; New York: Cambridge University Press), xiii, 394 p.

Sayed, H. and Tzannatos, Z. (2008), 'The Economic and Human Costs of the War', in Nubar Hovsepian (ed.), *The war on Lebanon : a reader* (Northampton, Mass.: Olive Branch Press), xxvi, 422 p.

Interviews

'Author's Interview with ʿAbd al-Halīm Faḍlallah, Director of the Consultative Centre for Studies and Documentation ', (Beirut, Lebanon: 16 September 2009).

'Author's Interview with ʿAbd al-Halīm Faḍlallah, Director of the Consultative Center for Study and Documentation', (Beirut, Lebanon: 19 September 2011).

'Author's Interview with ʿAlī Fayyāḍ, Member of Parliament, Republic of Lebanon (Loyalty to the Resistance Bloc- Hezbollah)', (Beirut, Lebanon: 29 September 2011).

'Author's Interview with ʿAmr Ḥamzāwī, Researcher at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Middle East Centre', (Beirut, Lebanon: September 2009).

'Author's Interview with Bāsel Ṣalloukh, Assistant Professor at the Lebanese American University ', (Beirut, Lebanon: 17 July 2009).

'Author's Interview with Bāsel Ṣalloukh, Assistant Professor at the Lebanese American University', (Beirut, Lebanon: 21 September 2011).

'Author's Interview with Bashshār Ḥaīdar, Professor at the American University of Beirut', (Beirut, Lebanon: 6 September 2011).

'Author's Interview with Ghassān Mukhaīber, Member of Parliament, Republic of Lebanon', (Beirut, Lebanon: 14 September 2011).

'Author's Interview with Ḥāzim Ṣaghīa, Editorialists in al Hayat and Public Intellectual', (Beirut, Lebanon: 7 July 2009).

'Author's Interview with Lana Baidas, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Lebanon', (Beirut, Lebanon: 12 September 2011).

'Author's Interview with Maj. Gen. Franklin van Kappen, Military Advisor to the UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros Ghali', (Den Hague, the Netherlands: 2 November 2010).

'Author's Interview with Michael Williams, Member of the House of Lords of the United Kingdom. Former UN Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process and UN Special Coordinator for Lebanon from 2008 to 2011.', (London, UK: 23 July 2012).

'Author's Interview with Mona Ḥarb, Professor at the American University of Beirut', (Beirut, Lebanon: 23 June 2009).

'Author's Interview with Neeraj Singh, Spokeperson for the UN Interim Mission in Lebanon', (Beirut, Lebanon: 29 July 2009).

'Author's Interview with Nicholas Blanford, Journalist for Time Magazie and Christian Science Monitor', (Beirut, Lebanon: 24 July 2009).

'Author's Interview with Paul Sālem, Director of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Middle East Centre', (Beirut, Lebanon: 25 August 2009).

'Author's Interview with Robert Fisk, Middle East Correspondent for *the Independent*', (Beirut, Lebanon: 9 September 2009).

'Author's Interview with Rola Abimorched, Researcher in Human Rights NGO Kafa-Enough ', (Beirut, Lebanon: 19 September 2011).

'Author's Interview with Saʿad Jawad, Professor of the University of Baghdad', (London, UK: 12 October 2010).

'Author's Interview with Ṭāreq Miṭrī , Delegate for the Republic of Lebanon to the Security Council during the 2006 War and Member of Cabinet', (Beirut, Lebanon: 27 September 2011).

'Author's Interview with Timur Goksel, Former Spokeperson for the UN Interim Force in Lebanon', (Beirut, Lebanon: 8 July 2009).

'Author's Interview with ʿUmar Nashābe, Al-Akhbār Newspaper', (Beirut, Lebanon: 9 September 2011).

Governmental Documents

Migdalovitz, Carol (2010), 'Israeli-Arab Negotiations: Background, Conflicts, and U.S. Policy ', in Congressional Research Service (ed.), (Washington: Congressional Research Service).

National Assembly (March 2006), 'National Assembly Report 2005', (Beirut: Parliament of Lebanon).

Republic of Lebanon (1996), 'Maḥāḍir Jalasāt Majlis al-Nuwāb [Proceedings of the Session of the House of Representatives]', (Beirut: Government of Lebanon).

___ (1996), 'Maḥāḍir Jalasāt Majlis al-Nuwāb [Proceedings of the Session of the House of Representatives]', (Beirut: Government of Lebanon).

___ (1998), 'Maḥāḍir Jalasāt Majlis al-Nuwāb [Proceedings of the Session of the House of Representatives]', (Beirut: Government of Lebanon).

___ (1999), 'Maḥāḍir Jalasāt Majlis al-Nuwāb [Proceedings of the Session of the House of Representatives]', (Beirut: Government of Lebanon).

___ (2001), 'Maḥāḍir Jalasāt Majlis al-Nuwāb [Proceedings of the Session of the House of Representatives]', (Beirut: Government of Lebanon).

___ (2002), 'Maḥāḍir Jalasāt Majlis al-Nuwāb [Proceedings of the Session of the House of Representatives]', (Beirut: Government of Lebanon).

___ (2004), 'Maḥāḍir Jalasāt Majlis al-Nuwāb [Proceedings of the Session of the House of Representatives]', (Beirut: Government of Lebanon).

___ (2006), 'Maḥāḍir Jalasāt Majlis al-Nuwāb [Proceedings of the Session of the House of Representatives]', (Beirut: Government of Lebanon).

UNDP and Lebanese Parliament (General Directorare for Sessions and Committees) 'al-Tashrīʿa fi Khamsat ʿAshraʿĀma [Legislation in Fifteen Years: October 1992-October 2006]', (UNDP Cooperation Project with the Lebanese Parliament: Studies and Information Series, 19; Beirut: October 2007).

___ 'Al-Itifaqiyāt al Mubārama Bayna Lubnān wa Al Aṭrāf al Duwaliya (1943-2006) [the Treaties Ratified between Lebanon and Foreign Counterparts (1943-2006)] ', (UNDP Cooperation Project with the Lebanese Parliament: Studies and Information Series, 17; Beirut: February 2007).

Journal Articles

Anonymous, 'B3. Lebanese Prime Minister Fuad Siniora, Seven-Point Plan for Ending the War in Lebanon, Beirut, 7 August 2006', (2006), *Journal of Palestine Studies,* 36 (1), 177-78.

ABUKHALIL, AS'AD (1991), 'Ideology and practice of Hizballah in Lebanon: Islamization of Leninist organizational principles', *Middle Eastern Studies,* 27 (3), 390 - 403.

___ (1994), 'The Incoherence of Islamic Fundamentalism: Arab Islamic Thought at the End of the 20th Century', *Middle East Journal,* 48, 677.

AJAMI, FOUAD (1985), 'Lebanon and Its Inheritors', *Foreign Affairs,* 63 (4), 778-99.

ALAGHA, JOSEPH (2010), ''Wilāyat al Faqīh and Hizbullah's Relations with Iran', *Journal of Arabic and Islamic Studies,* (10), 24-44.

ARJOMAND, SAID AMIR (1995), 'Book Review: The Renewal of Islamic Law. Muhammad Baqer as-Sadr, Najaf and the Shiʿi International by Chibli Mallat', *Islamic Law and Society,* 2 (3), 348-53.

AZIZ, T. M. (1993), 'The Role of Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr in Shii Political Activism in Iraq from 1958 to 1980', *International Journal of Middle East Studies,* 25 (2), 207-22.

BATATU, HANNA (1981), 'Iraq's Underground Shī'a Movements: Characteristics, Causes and Prospects', *Middle East Journal,* 35 (4), 578-94.

BERES, LOUIS RENE (1997), 'Israel, Lebanon and Hizbullah: a Jurisprudential Assessment', *Arizona Journal of International & Comparative Law,* 14 (1).

BROWN, CHRIS (1997), 'Universal human rights: A critique', *The International Journal of Human Rights,* 1 (2), 41 - 65.

BUCHANAN, ALLEN E. (1989), 'Assessing the Communitarian Critique of Liberalism', *Ethics,* 99 (4), 852-82.

BUZAN, BARRY (1993), 'From international system to international society: structural realism and regime theory meet the English school', *International Organization,* 47 (03), 327-52.

CARRĒ, OLIVIER (1987), 'Quelques mots-clefs de Muhammad Husayn Fadlallâh', *Revue française de science politique*, 478-501.

CHECKEL, JEFFREY T. (1998), 'The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory', *World Politics,* 50 (2), 324-48.

CHEHABI, H. E. (1991), 'Religion and Politics in Iran: How Theocratic Is the Islamic Republic?', *Daedalus,* 120 (3), 69-91.

CLAUDE, INIS L., JR. (1966), 'Collective Legitimization as a Political Function of the United Nations', *International Organization,* 20 (3), 367-79.

COHEN, JOSHUA (2004), 'Minimalism About Human Rights: The Most We Can Hope For?', *Journal of Political Philosophy,* 12 (2), 190-213.

DALACOURA, KATERINA (2002), 'A critique of communitarianism with reference to post-revolutionary Iran', *Review of International Studies,* 28 (01), 75-92.

DIONIGI, FILIPPO (2012), 'Islamism as Communitarianism: Person, Community and the Problem of International Norms in Non-Liberal Theories', *Journal of International Political Theory,* 8 (1-2), 74-103.

DOUZINAS, COSTAS (2002), 'Identity, Recognition, Rights or What Can Hegel Teach Us about

Human Rights?', *Journal of Law and Society,* 29 (3), 379-405.

F<small>ADLALLAH</small>, S<small>HAYKH</small> M<small>UHAMMAD</small> H<small>USSAYN</small> and S<small>OUEID</small>, M<small>AHMOUD</small> (1995), 'Islamic Unity and Political Change. Interview with Shaykh Muhammad Hussayn Fadlallah', *Journal of Palestine Studies,* 25 (1), 61-75.

F<small>EINSTEIN</small>, B<small>ARRY</small> (1985), 'Legality of the Use of Armed Force by Israel in Lebanon - June 1982', *Israel Law Review,* 20 (362), 362- 96.

F<small>INNEMORE</small>, M<small>ARTHA</small> and S<small>IKKINK</small>, K<small>ATHRYN</small> (1998), 'International Norm Dynamics and Political Change', *International Organization,* 52 (4), 887-917.

F<small>ROST</small>, M<small>ERVYN</small> (1998), 'A turn not taken: Ethics in IR at the millenium', *Review of International Studies,* 24 (05), 119-32.

___ (2000), 'Mervyn Frost replies to Peter Sutch's 'Human rights as settled norms: Mervyn Frost and the limits of Hegelian human rights theory'', *Review of International Studies,* 26 (03), 477-83.

___ (2004), 'Justice and Sovereignty', *Theoria: A Journal of Social & Political Theory,* (104), 54-68.

H<small>ADDAD</small>, Y<small>VONNE</small> Y<small>AZBECK</small> (1983), 'The Qur'anic Justification for an Islamic Revolution: The View of Sayyid Quṭb', *Middle East Journal,* 37 (1), 14-29.

H<small>ADDAD</small>, S<small>IMON</small> (2005), 'A Survey of Lebanese Shi'i attitudes towards Hezbollah', *Small Wars & Insurgencies,* 16 (3), 317 - 33.

H<small>ALLIDAY</small>, F<small>RED</small> (2001), 'Enemy in the mirror: Islamic fundamentalism and the limits of modern rationalism. A work of comparative political theory', *Ethnic and racial studies,* 24 (6), 1072.

___ (2002), 'The Politics of the Umma: States and Community in Islamic Movements', *Mediterranean Politics,* 7 (3), 20-41.

H<small>AMZEH</small>, A. N<small>IZAR</small> (1993), 'Lebanon's Hizbullah: From Islamic revolution to parliamentary accommodation', *Third World Quarterly,* 14 (2), 321 - 37.

H<small>ARB</small>, M<small>ONA</small> and L<small>EENDERS</small>, R<small>EINOUD</small> (2005), 'Know Thy Enemy: Hizbullah, 'Terrorism' and the Politics of Perception', *Third World Quarterly,* 26 (1), 173-97.

H<small>OURANI</small>, A<small>LBERT</small> (1986), 'From Jabal 'Āmil to Persia', *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London,* 49 (1), 133-40.

H<small>UNTINGTON</small>, S<small>AMUEL</small> P. (1993), 'The clash of civilizations?', *Foreign Affairs,* 72 (3), 22-22.

I<small>KENBERRY</small>, G. J<small>OHN</small> and K<small>UPCHAN</small>, C<small>HARLES</small> A. (1990), 'Socialization and Hegemonic Power', *International Organization,* 44 (3), 283-315.

J<small>OHNSTON</small>, D<small>AVID</small> (2007), 'Maqāṣid al-sharīʿa: Epistemology and hermeneutics of Muslim theologies of human rights', *Die Welt des Islams,* 47 (2), 149-187.

J<small>OHNSTONE</small>, I<small>AN</small> (2003), 'Security Council Deliberations: The Power of the Better Argument', *European Journal of International Law,* 14 (3), 437-80.

L<small>APIDUS</small>, I<small>RA</small> M. (1997), 'Islamic Revival and Modernity: The Contemporary Movements and the

Historical Paradigms', *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient,* 40 (4), 444-60.

Leenders, Reinoud (2006), 'How the Rebel Regained his Cause Hizbullah & the Sixth Arab-Israeli War', *MIT Electronic Journal of Middle East Studies,* 6, 38-56.

Lewis, Bernard (1990), 'The Roots of Muslim Rage', *The Atlantic,* 266 (3), 47-47.

Mallat, Chibli (1998), 'Aspects of Shi'i Thought from the South of Lebanon: Al 'Irfan, Muhammad Jawad Mughnyya; Muhammad Mahdi Shamseddine; Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah', *Papers on Lebanon*, 7.

Meyer, John W. and Jepperson, Ronald L. (2000), 'The 'Actors' of Modern Society: The Cultural Construction of Social Agency', *Sociological Theory,* 18 (1), 100-20.

Miller, David (1988), 'The Ethical Significance of Nationality', *Ethics,* 98 (4), 647-62.

Mousawi, Hilal Khashan; Ibrahim (2007), 'Hizbullah's Jihad Concept', *Journal of Religion and Society,* 9, 1-19.

Norton, Augustus Richard and Schwedler, Jillian (1993), '(In)security Zones in South Lebanon', *Journal of Palestine Studies,* 23 (1), 61-79.

Picard, Elizabeth (1993), 'The Lebanese Shi'a and Political Violence', *UNRISD Discussion Paper,* (42).

Ranstorp, Magnus (1998), 'The strategy and tactics of Hizballah's current "Lebanonization" process', *Mediterranean Politics,* 3 (1), 103 - 34.

Reisman, Michael (1997), 'The Lessons of Qana', *Yale Journal of International Law,* 22.

Saffari, Said (1993), 'The Legitimation of the Clergy's Right to Rule in the Iranian Constitution of 1979', *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies,* 20 (1), 64-82.

Sandel, Michael J. (1984), 'The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self', *Political Theory,* 12 (1), 81-96.

Shanahan, Rodger (2004), 'Shi'a Political Development in Iraq: The Case of the Islamic Da'wa Party', *Third World Quarterly,* 25 (5), 943-54.

Shapira, Shimon (1988), 'The Origins of Hizballah', *The Jerusalem Quarterly,* 46, 115-30.

Shepard, William (1992), 'The Development of the Thought of Sayyid Qutb as Reflected in Earlier and Later Editions of 'Social Justice in Islam'', *Die Welt des Islams,* 32, 196-236.

Shepard, William E. (2003), 'Sayyid Qutb Doctrine of Jahiliyya', *International Journal of Middle East Studies,* 35 (04), 521-45.

Slim, Hugo (2003), 'Why protect civilians? Innocence, immunity and enmity in war', *International Affairs,* 79 (3), 481-501.

Sutch, Peter (2000), 'Human rights as settled norms: Mervyn Frost and the limits of Hegelian human rights theory', *Review of International Studies,* 26 (02), 215-31.

Terrill, W. Andrew (1987), 'Low Intensity Conflict in Southern Lebanon: Lessons and Dynamics of the Israeli-Shi'ite War', *Journal of Conflict Studies,* 7 (3), 22-35.

WALZER, MICHAEL (1990), 'The Communitarian Critique of Liberalism', *Political Theory,* 18 (1), 6-23.

WEGE, CARL ANTHONY (1994), 'Hizbollah organization', *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism,* 17 (2), 151 - 64.

WENDT, ALEXANDER (1998), 'On constitution and causation in International Relations', *Review of International Studies,* 24 (05), 101-18.

WILSON, RODNEY (1998), 'The contribution of Muḥammad Bāqir al-Ṣadr to Contemporary Islamic Economic Thought', *Journal of Islamic Studies,* 9 (1), 46-59.

ZISSER, EYAL (1996), 'Hizballah in Lebanon - at the crossroads', *Terrorism and Political Violence,* 8 (2), 90 - 110.

Magazine and Newspaper Articles

ANONYMOUS, 'Text of the Draft Security Council Resolution', *The New York Times,* 5 August 2006.

ANONYMOUS, 'Qāsim yatwāfiq mʿa dār al-fatwā: qanūn alʿanf al-usrī "yukharib al-usra min dākhil" [Qāsim agrees with dār al-fatwā: the law on family violence "destroys the family from within"]', *al-Safīr,* 9 August 2011.

FAYYĀḌ, ʿAlī (2006), 'Hezbollah and the Lebanese State Reconciling a National Strategy with a Regional Role', *Arab Reform Brief*, (11).

FUKUYAMA, FRANCIS (1989), 'The End of History?', *The National Interest*, 16, 3-18.

LUTFI, MANAL, 'The Making of Hezbollah', *Al-Sharq al-Awsaṭ,* 18 May 2008.

WOODWARD, BOB, 'Sources Say Reagan Approved CIA Covert Training and Support of Squads Set Up to Preempt Strikes at U.S. Facilities in Mideast', *Washington Post,* 12/05/1985.

WRIGHT, ROBIN, 'Inside the Mind of Hezbollah', *Washington Post,* 16 July 2006.

Governmental and Non-Governmental Reports

ADAM, FREY (1997) 'The Israel-Lebanon Monitoring Group: an Operational Review' (3: Washington Institute for Near East Policy).

AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL (1996) 'Israel/Lebanon Unlawful Killings During "Operation Grapes of Wrath"' (MDE 15/042/1996: Amnesty International: 23 July 1996).

EXUM, ANDREW (2006) 'Hezbollah at War: a Military Assessment' (Washington DC: Washington Institute of Near East Policy).

FAYYĀḌ, ʿAlī (2008) 'The Resolution 1701 and the Conflicting Strategies' (Beirut: the Consultative Centre for Studies and Documentation: 15 May 2008).

HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (1996) 'Civilian Pawns: Laws of War Violations and the Use of Weapons on the Israel-Lebanon Border' (Human rights Watch: May 1996).

___ (1997) 'Israel/Lebanon: "Operation Grapes of Wrath" - The Civilian Victims' (8(E), 9: Human Rights Watch: September 1997).

___ (2007) 'Civilians Under Assault: Hezbollah's Rocket Attacks on Israel in the 2006 War' (19: August 2007).

INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP (2002) 'Old Games, New Rules: Conflict on the Israel-Lebanon Border' (7; Washington: International Crisis Group: 18 November 2002).

___ (2003) 'Hizbollah: Rebel Without a Cause' (Amman/Brussels: International Crisis Group: 30 July 2003).

UN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 'Report of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights aspects of the victims of trafficking in persons etc.' (E/CN.4/2006/62/Add.3: 20 February 2006).

UN COMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS 'Concluding observations of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Right: Lebanon' (E/C.12/1993/10: 9 June 1993).

UN COMMITTEE ON THE ELIMINATION OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN 'Reports provided by specialized agencies of the United Nations system Etc.' (CEDAW/C/2008/I/3/Add.3: 2 November 2007).

___ 'Concluding comments of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women ' (CEDAW/C/LBN/CO/3: 8 April 2008).

___ 'Summary record of the 820th meeting' (CEDAW/C/SR.820: 20 February 2008).

___ 'Consideration of reports submitted by States Parties under article 18 of the CEDAW' (CEDAW/C/LBN/3: 7 July 2006).

UN COMMITTEE ON THE ELIMINATION OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION 'Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination: Lebanon' (CERD/C/64/CO/3: 28 April 2004).

___ 'Sixteenth periodic reports of States parties due in 2002: Lebanon' (CERD/C/383/Add.2: 4 March 2004).

___ 'Seventeenth periodic reports of States parties due in 2004: Lebanon' (CERD/C/475/Add.1: 25 February 2004).

___ Sixteenth periodic reports of States parties due in 2002: Lebanon' (CERD/C/383/Add.2: 18 November 2003).

___ 'Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination' (CERD/C/304/Add.49: 30 March 1998).

___ 'Thirteenth periodic reports of States parties due in 1996: Lebanon' (CERD/C/298/Add.2: 6 November 1997).

UN Committee on the Rights of the Child 'Concluding observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child: Lebanon' (CRC/C/15/Add.54: 7 June 1996).

___ 'Consideration of State Submitted Reports, Concluding Observations: Lebanon' (CRC/C/LBN/CO/3: 8 June 2006).

___ 'Concluding observations of the Committee on the Rights of the Child: Lebanon' (CRC/C/15/Add.169: 21 March 2002).

___ 'Summary Record of the 1142nd Meeting' (CRC/C/SR.1142: 21 August 2006).

___ 'Initial reports of States parties due in 1993: Lebanon' (CRC/C/8/Add.23: 3 February 1995).

___ 'Second Periodic Reports of the States Parties Due in 1998: Lebanon' (CRC/C/70/Add.8: 26 September 2000).

___ 'Third periodic reports of States parties due in 2003: Lebanon' (CRC/C/129/Add.7: 25 October 2005).

UN General Assembly 'United Nations Millennium Declaration' (8 September 2000).

UN Human Rights Committee 'Second periodic reports of States parties due in 1988: Lebanon.' (CCPR/C/42/Add.14: 22 November 1996).

___ 'Concluding observations of the Human Rights Committee: Lebanon.' (CCPR/C/79/Add.78: 1 April 1997).

UN Human Rights Council 'Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review: Lebanon' (A/HRC/16/18: 12 January 2011).

___ 'Compilation prepared by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights: Lebanon' (A/HRC/WG.6/9/LBN/2: 2 September 2010).

___ 'Summary prepared by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights: Lebanon' (A/HRC/WG.6/9/LBN/3/Rev.1: 28 October 2010).

___ 'National report: Lebanese Republic' (A/HRC/WG.6/9/LBN/1: 23 August 2010).

UN Secretary General 'In larger freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all' (A/59/2005: 21 March 2005).

UN Security Council 'UN Security Council Resolution 1559 (2004)' (S/RES/1559: 2 September 2004).

___ 'United Nations Security Council Resolution 1701 (2006)' (S/res/1701: 11 August 2006).

___ 'First semi-annual report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on the implementation of resolution 1559 (2004)' (S/2005/272: 26 April 2005).

___ 'United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1595 (2005)' (S/RES/1595: 7 April 2005).

___ 'Letter dated 13 December 2005 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General' (S/2005/783: 13 December 2005).

___ '5417th meeting' (UN Doc. s/pv.5417: 26 April 2006).

___ 'Resolution 1680' (S/RES/1680: 17 May 2006).

___ 'Letter Dated 7 May 1996 from the Secretary General Addressed to the the President of the Security Council' (S/1996/337: 7 May 1996).

References from the World Wide Web

ANONYMOUS, 'US Diplomatic cable 06Beirut324', <http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/02/06BEIRUT324.html>, accessed 5 October 2011.

___'US Diplomatic cable 06Beirut2553', <http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/08/06BEIRUT2553.html>, accessed 16 June 2011.

___'US Diplomatic Cable 06Beirut2566', <http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/08/06BEIRUT2566.html>, accessed 16 June 2011.

___'US Diplomatic Cable 06Beirut2437', <http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/07/06BEIRUT2437.html>, accessed 16 June 2011.

___'US Diplomatic Cable 06Beirut2544', <http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/08/06BEIRUT2544.html>, accessed 16 of June 2011.

___'US Diplomatic Cable 06Beirut2407', <http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/07/06BEIRUT2407.html>, accessed 4 October 2011.

___'US Diplomatic Cable 06Beirut2518', <http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/08/06BEIRUT2518.html>, accessed 16 June 2011.

___'US Diplomatic Cable 06Beirut2476', <http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/07/06BEIRUT2476.html>, accessed 16 June 2011.

___'US Diplomatic Cable 06Beirut2600', <http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/08/06BEIRUT2600.html>, accessed 16 June 2011.

___'US Diplomatic Cable 06Beirut2441', <http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/07/06BEIRUT2441.html>, accessed 16 June 2011.

___'US Diplomatic Cable 06Beirut2504', <http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/08/06BEIRUT2504.html >, accessed 16 June 2011.

___'US Diplomatic Cable 06Beirut2542', <http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/08/06BEIRUT2542.html>, accessed 16 June 2011.

AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL 'Torture fears for Bahraini women and girls in detention', <http://www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-updates/torture-fears-bahraini-women-and-girls-detention-2011-09-26>, accessed 8 July 2012.

AN-NAHAR 'Nasrallah to March 14 Camp: Building the State Doesn't Mean Eliminating the Other', <http://www.naharnet.com/stories/en/33486-nasrallah-to-march-14-camp-building-the-state-doesn-t-mean-eliminating-the-other>, accessed 16 March 2012.

GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF LEBANON 'Policy Statement of the Government led by Fuʾad al-

Sinyūra', <http://www.pcm.gov.lb/Cultures/ar-LB/Menu/السابقة20%الحكومات/التاريخ20%في20%الوزراء20%مجلس20%رئاسة20%/Pages/w69.aspx>, accessed 8 June 2011.

GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES "Special Briefing on Travel to the Middle East and Europe' ', <http://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/rm/2006/69331.htm>, accessed 15 June 2011.

HEZBOLLAH 'Ḥizb Allah iudīj film min Intāj Amirkiy iasī liRasūl Allah Muḥammad (Ş) [Hezbollah Condemns US Produced Film as Offending the Prophet Muhammad (pbu)]', <http://www.moqawama.org/essaydetails.php?eid=26390&cid=199>, accessed 14 September 2012.

___ 'Hezbollah Press Statement 29th of September 2011 ', <http://ar.moqawama.org/essaydetails.php?eid=21898&cid=199>, accessed 29 September 2011.

HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (13 June 2011), 'Israel/Lebanon Qana Death Toll at 28: International Enquiry Needed into Israeli Air Strikes', <http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2006/08/01/israellebanon-qana-death-toll-28>, accessed.

INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANISATION 'Unofficial Translation of the Constitution of the Lebanese Republic', <http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/___ed_protect/___protrav/___ilo_aids/documents/legaldocument/wcms_125865.pdf>, accessed 29 July 2011.

KAFA 'Legislative Campaign for the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence', <http://www.kafa.org.lb/FOA.aspx?code=1&Dcode=13&title=The%20law%20to%20Protect%20Women%20from%20Family%20Violence>, accessed 7 November 2011.

___ 'Mashrūʿa Qanūn Himaya al-Nisʾa min al ʿUnf al-Usriy [Draft Law for the Protection of Women from Family Violence]', <http://www.kafa.org.lb/FOA.aspx?code=1&Dcode=13&title=The%20law%20to%20Protect%20Women%20from%20Family%20Violence>, accessed 9 March 2012.

PARLIAMENT OF LEBANON 'Legislative Session of the Lebanese Parliament 4th of August 2011', <http://www.lp.gov.lb/NewsPage3Ar.Aspx?id=8313>, accessed 30 November 2011.

PARLIAMENTARY HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE (PARLIAMENT OF LEBANON) 'Reports of the Parliamentary Committee on Human Rights', <http://www.lp.gov.lb/NodesAr.Aspx?id=3794>, accessed 1 December 2011.

___ 'Report of the Parliamentary Human Rights Committee on 10 May 2011', <http://www.lp.gov.lb/NewsPage3Ar.Aspx?id=8081>, accessed 1 December 2011.

SECRETARY OF STATE CONDOLEEZA RICE 'Special Briefing on Travel to the Middle East and Europe', <http://2001-2009.state.gov/secretary/rm/2006/69331.htm>, accessed.

THE DAILY STAR 'Rights Group Slams Removal of Marital Rape Clause from Law', <http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Local-News/2011/Nov-24/155001-rights-group-slams-removal-of-marital-rape-clause-from-law.ashx>, accessed 24 November 2011.

Statements of Sayyid Ḥasan Naṣrallah

ANONYMOUS, 'B4. Hizballah Leader Hasan Nasrallah, Interview with al-Jazeera, 20 July 2006 (excerpts)', (2006), *Journal of Palestine Studies,* 36 (1), 178-83.

NAṢRALLAH, ḤASAN (2007), 'Elegy for Sayyed Abbas Mussawi', in Nicholas Noe and Nicholas Blanford (eds.), *Voice of Hezbollah: the statements of Sayed Hassan Nasrallah* (London ; New York: Verso), ix, 420 p.

___ (2007), 'On Jews', in Nicholas Noe and Nicholas Blanford (eds.), *Voice of Hezbollah: the statements of Sayed Hassan Nasrallah* (London ; New York: Verso), ix, 420 p.

___ (2007), 'The April Understanding', in Nicholas Noe and Nicholas Blanford (eds.), *Voice of Hezbollah: the statements of Sayed Hassan Nasrallah* (London ; New York: Verso), ix, 420 p.

NAṢRALLAH, ḤASAN (2006), 'Speech on Al-Manar Channel', (Mideastwire.com: 12 August 2006).

___ (2006) 'Speech on Al-Manar Channel ', (Mideastwire.com: 12 July 2006).

___ (2006), 'Speech on Al-Manar Channel', (Mideastwire.com: 25 July 2006).

___ (2006), 'Speech on Al-Manar Channel', (Mideastwire.com: 9 August 2006).

___ (2011), 'Speech on al-Manar Channel', (Mideastwire.com: 31 October 2011).