The London School of Economics and Political Science

Dimensions of statehood: A study of public goods in Bukavu, the Democratic Republic of Congo

Randi Solhjell

A thesis submitted to the Department of Government of the London School of Economics for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, London, December 2015

Declaration

I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the MRes/PhD degree of the London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work other than where I have clearly indicated that it is the work of others.

The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. Quotation from it is permitted, provided that full acknowledgement is made. This thesis may not be reproduced without my prior written consent.

I warrant that this authorisation does not, to the best of my belief, infringe the rights of any third party.

I declare that my thesis consists of 94.208 words.

Statement of use of third party for editorial help

I can confirm that my thesis was copy edited for conventions of language, spelling and grammar by the LSE Language Centre.

Abstract

This thesis challenges common political science assumptions about regions, nations, and societies in contexts of state weakness, with a special focus on de facto, rather than de jure, statehood in sub-Saharan Africa. I argue that theories of statehood must reach deeper into the empirical workings of state-society relations. Instead of positing abstract models or normative ideal types of modern states, I conceive of statehood as a set of daily practices that govern, regulate and generate effects on those experiencing and "performing the state". I look at public good provision and consumption as a way to study these practices of statehood.

The arguments advanced in this thesis are based on interpretive and relational methods. Interpretivism focuses on meanings and beliefs, as opposed to strict laws and statistical correlations. Relational methods demonstrate how interactions between consumers and providers of public goods evolve and condition de facto statehood. Qualitative data, which includes semi-structured interviews, focus groups, and participant observations, are drawn from firsthand encounters with service providers and citizens in Bukavu, the capital of South Kivu province in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Empirical observation and analysis shed light on governance patterns, citizen-subject relations, and provide a heuristic approach to statehood dimensions. Approaching the concept of statehood through dimensions is useful in light of the multiple meanings that it holds.

Statehood, I argue, is never fixed and does not reach a teleological end point, but rather, embodies different dimensions that can be analyzed through patterns of public goods provision. I argue that the state, often imagined as a coherent entity, is comprised of different practices found in a variety of spaces and social relations. This approach to statehood decreases discrepancies between the literature and empirical realties and engages with "real" experiences of statehood in non-Western spaces.

Acknowledgments

Contents

Index of figures

Index of tables

List of Acronyms and Names

ACCO   *Association Congolese de Conduire*, Association of Congolese Drivers

CNKi   *Le Comité National du Kivu,* the National Committee of the Kivu

FONER   *Le Fonds National d'Entretien Routier*, the National Funds for Road Maintenance

Funu   Water station in central Kadutu, Bukavu

ISP   *Institut Supérieur Pédagogique de Bukavu,* Institute of Higher Education in Pedagogical Science

Kaduru   Water station located between the periphery of Ibanda and Kadutu, Bukavu

Mairie   *Mairie de Ville*, Municipality and City Hall

OR   *L'Office de Route*, the Road Office

OVD   *L'Office des Voiries et Drainage*, the Roads and Drainage Office

REGIDESO   *Régie de Distribution d'Eau*, Water Distribution Authority

Roulage   *La Police de la Circulation Routière*, the Traffic Police

Ruzizi I   Main hydroelectric power station of Bukavu, owned by SNEL

Ruzizi II   Hydroelectric power station, owned by SINELAC and shared between DRC, Burundi and Rwanda

SINELAC   *Société Internationale d'Électricité des pays de Grands Lacs,* International Electricity Company of the Great Lakes countries

SNEL   *Société National d'Électricité,* National Electricity Company

SONAS   *Société Nationale d'Assurances*, National Insurance Association

Maps of the DRC and Bukavu (DRC)

Figure 1 Contemporary, political map of the Democratic Republic of Congo

Illustrates the position of Bukavu with red circle and the capital of the DRC, Kinshasa, in blue circle. Reserved Rights of Nations Online Project.

Figure 2 Colonial map of Belgian Congo

Illustrates Belgian Congo (1908-1960) where regions were divided up and named after the main urban administration polities (*chief-lieu de province*), such as Costermansville, today Bukavu and provincial capital, and Leopoldville, today Kinshasa and capital.

Figure 3 Bukavu general map

Illustrates Bukavu's three urban territories (*communes*): Ibanda, Kadutu and Bagira.

Figure 4 Bukavu detailed map

Additional details of Bukavu, as referred to in the case studies.

Figure 5 Historical map of Bushi kingdoms in Bukavu and surroundings

Illustrates Bukavu and surrounding province (South Kivu) based on chiefdom systems. Kabare chiefdom is the closest to Bukavu and is ruled by a local king (mwami) of the Shi population in Kabare. Both Ngweshe and Kabare are two kingdoms organized within Bushi – the country of the Shi. Reserved Rights of "Colle, P. (1937). "Essai de monographie des Bashi." Bukavu, Zaïre: Centre d'Etude de Langues Africaines"

1.0 Introduction

"States, one discovers, are not so easy to destroy. Fragments of their institutional organs may persist even when the central nervous system is no longer fully operative. (…) Imprinted on societal memory is a set of recollections of a "normal state": security it is expected to provide, services it is assumed to assure, rituals of statehood it is expected to perform. These expectations serve as a legitimating reservoir for renewed assertions of state authority."

(Crawford Young, 2002, p. 445)

There is an abundance of political science literature which characterizes, and pathologizes, specificities about the "African state" and African politics, adding to an already pervasively negative description of these states. The African state has been termed : "Weak" (Rothschild, 1987), "quasi" (Jackson, 1993), "failed" (Rotberg, 2003) (or a "failure" (Bates, 2008)), "fictitious" (Sandbrook & Barker, 1985), "lame", "leviathan" (Callaghy, 1987) and even "vampire" (Frimpong-Ansah, 1991) and, more recently, in a "hybrid political order" (Boege et al., 2008). However, despite this categorization, there are many examples of "strong" states that do not demonstrate critical weaknesses in the areas of state engagement in service provision or monopoly on violence, such as contemporary Rwanda, Ethiopia and Ghana. Nevertheless, certain states in the sub-Saharan African region are often perceived as weak, demonstrating what many observers would term high political disorder, little or limited legitimacy from its citizens and/or autocratic rule. This has typically included the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Somalia and more recently South-Sudan (Krasner & Risse, 2014, pp. 549-550).

There are indeed states that have depleted their national economic assets, and thus have limited ability to conduct larger scale projects or even most civil services. Yet, these particular African states have, despite receiving criticism (see e.g., Zartman, 1995), shown resilience to total collapse or breakdown. For instance, Somalia is framed as *the* example of a "failed" or "collapsed" state. However the country has, since the 1990s, demonstrated empirical versions of statehood, state-building and other political processes that have largely been ignored by many Western scholars (Hagmann & Hoehne, 2009, p. 52). In the DRC, "the complexities of statehood (…) are legendary [and] the state remains omnipresent on the social, economic and political landscape," as Trefon (2004, p. 3) argues.

Instead of recognizing these different forms of statehood, Western political science has often assumed weakness in such states because it does not engage with empirical or alternative forces

of state-society relations. A common feature of such political science literature is the focus on what the African state is *not,* rather than what it is. Often, Western political experiences and ideal notions of legal-rational states are compared to African states. For instance, Krasner (2004) argues that state failure is defined by the absence of one or more of the principles of legal, non-intervention and domestic sovereignties. Jackson and Rosberg (1982a) argue that many African states lack positive sovereignty, i.e., they do not control their territory. Or, as Zartman (1995) argues, a state has collapsed when it no longer provides basic services to its population. However, as Eriksen (2011, pp. 233-234) has pointed out, all of these perspectives are defined by deviations or deficiencies from a given norm of statehood.

Further, interpreting African states as "weak", "quasi" or "failed" often stems from an image of the Western state. The tendency to think of the non-West as an extension of Europe has already been recognized. In particular, Escobar (2011) on development and modernity, Said (2001) on Western notions of orientalism, Mbembé (2001) on postcolony thinking, Spivak (1988) on silencing the subaltern, and Chakrabarty (2000) on provincializing Europe all make thought-provoking contributions to this broader criticism. As Mbembé (2001, p. 2) writes:

"(…) Africa still constitutes one of the metaphors through which the West represents the origin of its own norms, develops a self-image, and integrates this image into the set of signifiers asserting what it supposes to be its identity. Africa, because it was and remains that fissure between what the West is, what it thinks it represents, and what it thinks it signifies, is not simply *part of* its imaginary significations, it is *one* of those significations."

The narrow interpretation of the African state as something not Western (or not yet Western), or as a black hole of nothingness as Mbembé (2001, p. 3) remarks, is a disservice to political science literature. It can almost appear as if the "African state" whether weak, failed, strong or authoritarian does not consist of any civil servants or citizens relying on these relations.

Recognizing both the academic work on African statehood and criticisms of Western situatedness, my contribution is to examine how statehood is perceived and practiced daily in Africa, as a counterpoint to abstract and decontextualized models of the "state". In this respect, I propose an inductive way of seeing the state as practices that are created, sustained and challenged, through the people living and performing the experience of statehood. I propose the following research question:

- How is statehood perceived and practiced by those experiencing the state and how can these perspectives and practices inform scholarly understanding of statehood?

My approach contributes to a shift from static perceptions of states and statehood norms, to investigate how statehood is practiced and shaped within state-society interrelations. To investigate this, I have taken an inductive approach based on previous field experiences to study certain daily goods that matter profoundly to people who live in nations often considered "weak", "failed", or lacking de facto (but not de jure) statehood, using the DRC for my observations. Rather than making claims of what statehood should be, field experiences in the DRC generally and in the provincial capital of Bukavu specifically have led me to the topics of waste management, water and hydroelectricity, and public roads. These topics are studied as different case studies of public goods within the same geographical space (Bukavu) under the concept of statehood. I term these goods "public" as they are basic, daily goods that the majority of citizens in Bukavu will to some degree consume, enjoy or would like to enjoy. Water and sanitation (waste management) are basic to existence, while roads represent a good that citizens need for communication and livelihood. These are also public goods because they rely on certain collective efforts in order to work in a densely populated urban space.

However, as Blundo and le Meur (2009, p. 14) argue; "public is not synonymous to state" and there can be many different providers of these services. Thus, the concept of statehood is useful as it avoids ontologically prejudging the location of these services as being in a given space, such as the "state" (Brenner, 2004, p. 4). Inductively, statehood is explored as something that is exercised in relations to others and to certain (material) goods and that forms patterns of practices. Specifically, the relations explored are found within two main categories of people, namely people as "providers" and as "consumers" related to specific goods. I use the terms "provider" and "consumer" to distinguish two basic positions in relation to public goods. I derive these terms from various and different sources in the sociological and anthropological literature (Bourdieu 1984, Dahl G. 1999, Miller 1995) and have found they help with my interpretation of what I observe in relation to public goods. They are not terms used by my informants but analytical distinctions I find useful.

However, these categories, i.e., consumers and providers, are not mutually excluding, but rather relational and dynamic. By analyzing how social actors, interpreted as service providers and consumers, are accessing, enjoying, and interpreting the meaning of public goods in the city of

Bukavu in eastern DRC, I demonstrate how they call the state into being. In doing so, I also establish how the city becomes a central locus for interpreting statehood in contexts in which a "formal" state interpretation as conceived in the West would be problematic.

Based on these case studies and understanding different perceptions and practices, I propose an alternative analytical approach to statehood, namely seeing statehood through different *dimensions*. These dimensions are based on empirical observations and deployed at different levels of abstractions. They are inductively produced but also linked to the work of other scholars (e.g. Bissell 2011, Ekeh 1975, Hagmann & Peclard 2011, Hansen & Stepputat 2001, Mitchell 1999) to demonstrate the transferability of these ideas beyond the study site. Specifically, the conceptual tools of dimensions are inspired by Hagmann and Péclard's (2011) "negotiating statehood" as well as languages of stateness, i.e., (re)production of hierarchies, institutions and forms of identities and languages (Hansen & Stepputat, 2001, p. 6). The purpose of focusing on dimensions is to suggest a heuristic approach to study abstract ideas of statehood. By heuristic approach, I mean "a set of conceptual tools, which, rather than telling us anything substantive about the social world, suggests ways of approaching it" (Lund, 2014, p. 229). In other words, I do not attempt to explain why the state is weak, for instance, but rather propose ways of approaching the dynamics of statehood.

The empirical observations here are thus connected to a broader academic debate on (African) statehood (Clapham, 1998; Englebert, 2009; Jackson & Rosberg, 1982a, 1982b), public goods provision, contested states (Bierschenk & Olivier de Sardan, 2014; Blundo & Le Meur, 2009; Trefon, 2010) and state-society relations (Migdal, 2001). By contested, I follow what Hagmann and Péclard (2010, p. 545) argue, namely that recognizing: "the profoundly contested nature of the state and the host of conflictive interactions inherent in defining statehood." Thus, I propose an approach that brings to the fore the conflictive interactions of what statehood means, seen through the eyes of those living and performing "the state" on a daily basis.

1.1 Aim and purpose

The aim of this thesis is two-fold: First, the thesis stems from an interest in challenging some common assumptions about "regions", "nations" and "societies" associated with state weakness and *de jure,* but not *de facto,* statehood in sub-Saharan Africa. State weakness is an

assumption derived from the absence of governance: such a claim assumes as a starting point Weberian ideal forms of legal-rational states, i.e., it assumes that a failed state is one that hardly performs its basic tasks of welfare distribution, taxation for the public interest or the provision of internal and external security. Understanding the distinction between de jure, the legal status, and de facto, the domestic statehood, as famously proposed by Jackson and Rosberg (1982a, p. 3), explains how the "empirical properties [of African states] have been highly variable, while the juridical components have been constant." Following this, Englebert (2009, p. 7) applies a causal link between international legal sovereignty and domestic authority, arguing that the essence of this power is legal (juridical) and that "it is the last remnant of public order in weak and failed states – sovereignty – that Africans instrumentalize."

However, many would agree that sovereignty is also something that is challenged at various levels from external and internal sources, and it is not necessarily the most interesting angle to analyze in order to understand "the state". In addition, examination of the political map of Africa reveals a continent that has hardly changed on the surface, despite being considerably dynamic at the level of empirical or de facto statehood. I argue that one should examine more closely the empirical workings of crucial state-society relations, such as public goods provision, to understand the survival and persistence of the state and state-like presence in states that are often considered weak or failed. I propose that scholars need to take de facto forms of statehood seriously in order to understand states in non-Western spaces.

Second, and following the lines of closer engagement with de facto forms of statehood, this thesis offers a micro-analysis of the practice of public good provision and consumption in Bukavu, a provincial capital in the DRC. The aim is to better understand what the "state" means, through state-society interactions of de facto statehood, in what observers may claim to be a weak state. This research angle aligns with the "*politique par le bas*" approach, i.e., low rather than high politics (Bayart, Mbembe, & Toulabor, 1992). I argue that it is important to scrutinize basic services for citizens in order to understand statehood, instead of focusing solely on elite actors and national levels to understand states and state-society relations. Along those lines, I subscribe to what Lund (2006a, p. 674) proposes, namely that:

"instead of looking at the state as an entity 'from above', we attempt to approach public authority 'from below', from the variety of concrete encounters between forms of public authority and the more or less mundane practices of ordinary people."

Thus, instead of reflecting from an "armchair", as Olivier de Sardan (2009, p. 39) terms it, this thesis is based on first-hand encounters with public servants, various citizens of Bukavu and a range of actors involved in controlling and negotiating public goods. The services, i.e., waste management, piped water (and electricity) and roads are, to various degrees, often controlled, monitored or sub-constructed through or by the state, and form a central part of the daily life of citizens and their daily interaction with the "state".

The purpose of this thesis is to combine two different scholarly fields in order to shed light on the process of statehood and the contested nature of the state. First, I question assumptions about "the state" based on the literature on deviant states in Africa. This leads my research into a field of a more philosophical body of literature, in particular into that which emphasizes social theories of practices. Here, Bourdieu's ([1990] 1997) "categories of practices" and "categories of analysis" are useful tools for approaching abstract notions, such as "the state". On one hand, states in the daily lives of people may be interpreted in a variety of context-dependent ways. However, "a state" may often be considered an "it", even though the "it" could relate to a number of different practices and topics that can broadly be positioned as categories of practices. On the other hand, scholars, when analyzing topics such as the state, may also assume the state to be an entity containing a set number of attributes (e.g., monopoly of legitimate use of violence, territorial sovereignty, basic health and education services). However, such approaches, as categories of analysis, may be little more than a scholar's subjective reflection of what a state should look like. Instead, I interpret something that is not real per se, i.e., a state as an entity, as still having "effects on reality" (Foucault, 1994, p. 23). Drawing from empirical observations, I see the state as practices coming alive through performance and effect (inspired by Bourdieu, 1999; Doty, 2003; Dunn, 2010; Foucault, 1994; Mitchell, 1999). The purpose of this approach is not only to avoid the pervasively negative description of the "African state", but also to approach the social world inductively through categories of practices. Here, the state is seen as a set of practices in daily life; governing, regulating and/or have effects on the provision and consumption of public goods.

Secondly, in using empirical observation, my purpose is to contribute to a small but emerging scholarly field that can be positioned in political anthropology or interpretive sociology to the study of African statehood, broadly, and public goods debates, specifically. Bierschenk and Olivier de Sardan (2014), Blundo and Le Meur (2009), Hagmann and Péclard (2010), and Lund (2006b) all provide a much needed counterpoint to abstract and decontextualized models of

statehood. I consider these scholars' work within a heuristic approach to statehood by providing researchers with conceptual tools for approaching these topics (Lund, 2014, p. 229). Empirically, this is a move towards seeing state-society relations from the perspectives of state agents, state-like actors and citizens. Thus, this thesis responds to the lack of narratives from below and the need to challenge sweeping characterizations regarding the African state. This type of research is known variously, in the Global North, as studies on citizenship in urban centers, European state formation and the study of bureaucrats and institutions (Bierschenk & Olivier de Sardan 2014, p. 39). These areas of investigation are equally necessary for African countries for a deeper insight into statehood.

1.2 Locating the site and universe of cases

The DRC is facing difficulties in establishing (or running) what can be considered "effective state institutions": two such difficulties are an inability to control its own forces (raising concerns regarding the legitimate use of violence) and systemic corruption in the state apparatus. However, and largely neglected in contemporary writing on the DRC, important state-building efforts were made during the first period of president Mobutu Sese Seko's rule between 1965-1974 (Putzel, Lindemann, & Schouten, 2008, p. v; Young & Turner, 1985). The strong sense of nation and citizenship that the Mobutu regime (1965-1997) fostered, though certainly with its considerable challenges, is still overtly present even in the eastern provinces. However, the ebbs and flows of the thirty years of Mobutu's state-formation and state-decline, resulted in highly complex power networks fulfilling, or substituting, de facto statehood.

The provincial capital Bukavu in South Kivu province is situated in the far east of the country, close to the borders with Rwanda and Burundi. This is, arguably, the most governed area of the province with provincial ministry representatives, municipal governance and the presence of UN forces. The further away from the capital one travels, the less visible the formal state or state-like presence (e.g., the UN) are. It is important to emphasize that outside the city forms of governance vary from territorial administration, chiefdoms or armed groups to religious authorities, that is different from the city. In Bukavu, there exist considerable "stateness" or "state-like" systems of formal government that offer interesting spaces to study local government in interaction with citizens. Thus, this study is limited to a space where there is a

considerable presence of local government, a situation that sets the urban setting apart from its surroundings and offers an intriguing space for studying civil servants and urban consumers.

Moreover, the urban center of Bukavu is not a random choice for case constructions, in line with what Bates et al. (1998, p. 13) argue: "[O]ur cases selected us rather than the other way around." The starting point for this research process came during fieldwork, two years prior to the PhD in, amongst other places Bukavu. From this fieldwork, I was puzzled by the density of public authorities, or those claiming to have legitimate positions. This was a place far from the textbook description of African states, where the state is considered weak, failed or collapsed. Instead, there appeared to be a plurality of competing, as well as complementing, networks and agents of those offering forms of state-like roles, such as education, security, or health. There was, in a sense, no escaping the state in Bukavu.

What particularly stood out in contrast was a visit to a Congolese bureaucrat who was writing his report on a piece of paper. His office was in a cupboard with only the sun as a source of light. Immediately after this visit, I went to the office of an international NGO located in a colonial house by the lakeside, with infrastructure the Congolese administration could only dream of acquiring. The reality I witnessed, left me wondering who actually governs this space (Dahl, 1963). Another contrasting experience was in the central military camp in Bukavu where the families of the soldiers were also living. I witnessed how the children did not even have clothes to cover their bodies. The starvation and impoverishment in this camp left me questioning the assumption of territorial control and means of violence in Weberian interpretations of statehood. In the DRC, the soldiers were not protected by the state while they were charged with protecting the people.

Yet, and despite these difficult circumstances, there is clearly *a heavy state presence* in Bukavu, where one might not assume to find it, due to a perception of severe state weakness. The case logic, thus, represents a study of an area, considered in mainstream literature on African statehood to be severely weak both in terms of public service provision and control over territory (monopoly on violence). On the contrary, in practice, when it comes to forms of governance in this city, an authoritarian regime was demonstrated: there was a density of formal and competing arrangements of public goods provision and contested citizenship, where the so-called "weak state" could use considerable political and violent oppression to strike down its citizens. I argue that the state is *not* an "empty shell" (Chabal & Daloz, 1999, p. 14)

but establishes frames of political order that allow citizens, to a lesser or greater degree, to acquire rights and navigate access to the public goods.

On the universe of cases, the research questions posed above are broad enough to be asked wherever there is a form of governance structure and citizen-like perceptions and practices. The studies of particular public goods (waste management, water including electricity, and public roads) here are seen as cases whose observation may enable an understanding of dimensions of statehood. That is, they are not seen as statehood per se but as cases to address perceptions and practices of the "state". In other contexts, such goods may be taken for granted and thus not as negotiated, which may lead to other case studies, such as perceptions, practices and expectations of provision and consumption of social benefits and the welfare state. In this thesis, it is precisely from areas of deep contestation and daily negotiations between authorities, service providers and citizens that offers clues to understand how statehood emerge.

1.3 Thesis summary and structure

This thesis engages with a discussion on de facto statehood through empirical practices of public good provision and consumption. Chapter 2 positions the study in a broader scholarly debate on African statehood to develop a theoretical framework of these case studies. The classic scholarly debates in political science on statehood are often discussed in neo-patrimonial, clientelistic and deviance forms in relation to the Weberian ideal type of legal-rational state practices. Instead, my framework contributes to understandings of African statehood by linking together various discussions on the state that are not sufficiently interpreted in the mainstream literature on "African states", namely discussions on modes of governance, citizen-subjects relations and *dimensions of statehood* seen through the city. Inspired by Olivier de Sardan (2014) a "mode of governance" is any organized form of public good delivery, de facto or official, i.e., de jure, form of service delivery involving specific authorities.

In the dimensions of statehood, I interpret how the state is *performed* and *enacted*: not as a singular entity but rather as a series of experiences, practical dimensions of statehood and citizenship coming alive through the city. My approach aligns with Hagmann and Péclard (2011, p. 19) and the idea that statehood processes are dynamic and partly undetermined and that empirical statehood should be the starting point of any analysis. What can be termed "languages of stateness" (Hansen & Stepputat, 2001) or "discourses of stateness" (Dunn, 2010)

are ways of understanding what I call the "dimensions of statehood." These dimensions are formed mainly through an inductive approach based on case studies with an emphasis on interpretive and relational aspects.

Chapter 3 discusses the methodological aspects of the thesis, namely the interpretative and relational approaches, the case studies, reflexivity and limitations. The interpretive approach emphasizes "meanings, beliefs, and discourses, as opposed to laws and rules, correlations between social categories, or deductive models" (Bevir and Rhodes, 2006, p. 70). Interpretations of what statehood is, what the state should provide, relations between service providers and consumers are multiple, intersubjective understandings. These interpretations can be considered categories of practices and are seen as informants' perspectives and are central to understanding perceptions and practices of "living" and "performing" the state in these case studies.

Furthermore, the conceptual approach in this thesis focuses on the *relations* between 'consumers' and 'providers' of public goods to eventually demonstrate how dimensions of statehood are interrelated. Thus, no one or nothing, in this analytical approach, is considered in isolation. Rather, consumers and providers derive their whole being from relations within a group, a community, a city and/or a state. Further, statehood is not one, unified concept, but rather consists of different dimensions, which, I argue, give statehood its "reality". A dimension is considered here as an aspect of statehood, which is, to varying degrees, related to other dimensions and thus follows the logic of a relational approach.

Chapter 4 offers some general and specific selections of history relating to the creation, effect, practices and performance of state and statehood relations in the DRC and Bukavu. I argue that it is necessary to use history as a means to problematize the present. A contextual understanding is necessary to understand contemporary languages of statehood, public services and ownership, and ideas about who is entitled to citizenship. The chapter examines "pre-colonial"[1] forms of governance, the Belgian Congo (1908-1960), the Zaire period (1971-1997), the transition from Zaire to the DRC and fieldwork interviews from Bukavu and its surroundings. This chapter is aimed at situating the empirical chapters in a historical context and, in particular,

---

[1] In quotation marks as these pre-colonial structures were interpreted, reinforced and suppressed during and after colonialism.

situating the colonial construction of Bukavu as an administrative city space. The chapter allows for references, images and expectations that are produced discursively in contemporary Bukavu.

In Chapter 5, 6 and 7, I present the case studies of public goods in Bukavu. These chapters are structured to allow providers to speak first and then subsequently for us to hear consumers' perspectives. This structure follows the direction of supply as I examine those with a good to offer (providers) and then subsequently those who consume the goods (consumers). These chapters expose the differences between the goods, actors involved in provision and consumption, and how actors interpret these relations. Service providers are, to varying degrees, found within the municipal apparatus (waste management), the national and parastatal agencies (e.g., road construction, electricity, and water), commercial companies (e.g., waste management, water) but also in other forms of networks and associations. The latter shows how being a consumer does not exclude one from being a provider or vice versa. These are relational roles that are dynamic and changing rather than a priori conceived. Locally, such roles can be performed by those working in neighborhood networks (sharing water) or local NGOs (clearing household waste), or by street children (waste management), vendors (selling access to generated electricity) or criminal groups[2] (controlling water pumps).

Consumers are located in two main geographical areas, namely the urban territories of Kadutu and Ibanda. These sites (Kadutu and Ibanda) are historically divided areas, the former being the African cité and the latter a European center. Citizens in these areas have different and similar experiences and perceptions of services. There are also specific categories of consumers, namely taxi drivers, enjoying public roads and a pharmaceutical company that enjoys regular access to water.

I find that there is an important state engagement in managing the infrastructural construction and control (policing) over the roads in urban settings, though this in not necessarily the case in rural areas. At the other end of the scale is neglect and loss of control when it comes to sanitation and waste management, both of which are formally placed under the responsibility of the municipality. Water (and the sub-category hydroelectricity) aligns more closely with an

---

[2] This criminal activity is more accurately governing access to public services, rather than service provision per se.

idea of state unity and is both perceived as and controlled by the "state" in a form of state monopoly. However, there are institutional changes taking place in attempting to privatize water, which have further implications for statehood. Moreover, consumers' perceptions of these goods and their expectations towards those in control of these goods vary. There are also clear distinctions between those who have access to these goods from "official" connections and those who have to seek alternatives to enjoy some level of access.

I argue that all of these practices and perceptions of public goods play a role in statehood dimensions. There is also a level of state persistence that is integrated in service providers' and citizens' daily lives, and, in turn, enforces de facto statehood. This micro-study of these interactions shows not only how these public service providers cope (or the provider-consumer relationship), but also demonstrates the multiple ways of speaking of the state, the variety of practices, expectations and performance. Even for the most neglected public good, namely waste management, there are a number of providers that act to redress certain deficiencies in overall management by the municipality. For the public roads, there are multiple institutions in place, with varying degree of access to international networks and of domestic cooperation with each other. These different practices, expectations and performance develop into dimensions of statehood.

Chapter 8, the analysis, offers a theoretical discussion for analyzing my observations through modes of governance, citizens-subjects and dimensions of statehood. I categorize the three public goods into the following modes: Waste management as "non-governed", public roads as "plural governance" and, finally, water and hydroelectricity as "state monopoly". Further, I make distinctions between citizens based on their enjoyment of public services, that is to say, I differentiate between those connected to official service provision regulations and those disconnected from the same services. In other words, a distinction is made between the "haves" and "have-nots" or citizens and subjects. The contribution of modes of governance and citizens-subjects is to provide analytical clarity to the complex and lived experience of state practices and performances.

Further, and in order to develop a more dynamic approach, I develop "dimensions of statehood" as a heuristic approach to public good relations between consumers and providers. There is no conclusive list of dimensions of statehood, and so, in agreement with Hagmann and Péclard (2011, p. 16), that is why I see these as a heuristic rather than explanatory approach (Lund,

2014, p. 229). I propose three dimensions based on empirical observations from Bukavu. These are 1) dimensions of disctinctions, 2) spatial dimensions and 3) ideology dimensions. These three dimensions are stemming from the empirical data in Bukavu and linked to broader discourses connected to theoretical contributions. I argue that understanding the different encounters and practices is key to understanding "the state", which creates structural effects on those "living" and "performing" the state and is engrained in daily life.

Chapter 9, the conclusion, offers summary remarks on the theoretical, empirical and methodological contributions of my thesis. My theoretical contribution is to nuance and complicate state practices when it comes to the daily governance of public goods, moving away from limited understandings of de facto statehood in Africa. Rather than defining public goods as 'non-excludable' or 'non-rivalrous', I argue that a broader understanding is needed to capture the realities and practices in their daily forms. These goods are rather seen as something that all citizens would like to enjoy and/or enjoy, and they are hence of a public interest that somehow falls under the state's responsibility, may that be through the regulating of private services or a state monopoly on public services (Olivier de Sardan, 2014, p. 400). My empirical observations contribute to area studies of the DRC, and, more broadly, hold comparative and general value. I argue that even though Bukavu and all the specific set of events studied may be particular to the area, it is still possible to use similar approaches to other concrete (urban) places. Methodologically, by taking a relational approach, consumer-provider practices and ideas demonstrate different modes of governance structures and (dis)connections to services of interest. Finally, I argue that categories of analysis based on empirically observed categories of practices are valuable to comparative analysis and broader theory-building.

2.0 Literature review and theoretical framework

This chapter will position this thesis in a broader theoretical field, namely the so-called sub-Saharan "African state" and statehood literature linked to urban public goods provision. Rather than using the terminology of "state" or "authorities", I use the concept of *statehood*, as the former two phrases hold limitations when confronted with the empirical material I have gathered. As Brenner (2004, p. 4) argues (emphasis in original):

"The generic concept of *the* state has become increasingly problematic. The notion of *statehood* seems to me a more precise basis for describing modern political institutions, because it does not ontologically prejudge the configuration of state scalar organization, the level of state centralization, or the degree of institutional isomorphism among state agencies."

The aim of this chapter is to offer a discussion of mainstream (political science) literature in order to situate my theoretical framework. The framework contributes to linking together discussions on the state that are not sufficiently interpreted in the mainstream literature on "African states", namely the *dimensions of statehood* seen through the languages of stateness in the city space. Rather than studying the state per se, the approach of dimensions of statehood takes into account ongoing political and economic challenges that affect state practices. By studying statehood, I interpret the multiple sources of representing the state through various practices and performance from the viewpoint of those living and performing "the state".

Rather than taking normative or pre-formed claims about the state, the starting point of this approach consider negotiations over *public goods* seen from the perspectives of those living and performing the state, what I term *consumers* and *providers*. The focus on those attempting to access (consumers) and those who deliver and/or control (providers), leads to an understanding of the everyday needs of citizens and functions of service delivery. In turn, this speaks to aspects of statehood challenges, prospects and negotiations in dynamic rather than static forms. I argue that it is possible to have and experience statehood in the absence of actual state practices in public goods provision. For instance, people can have a strong opinion and sense of national belonging even though central governance structures might appear dysfunctional. Further, those controlling and/or providing public goods are forms of authority figures, but these individuals do not necessarily need to be employed by, for instance, central government.

The city space provides an added analytical perspective from which to understand intensified negotiations over public goods. It is a space where the state can be more visually and physically present and where a higher concentration of people requires collective efforts for public good provision. Though the study of cities is far from new in social sciences, it is strikingly absent in much of the mainstream political science literature on neo-patrimonial rule, 'weak states' and de jure, but not de facto, statehood. This is surprising considering how cities can be viewed as "the cradle of citizenship" marked by the etymological relation between "cities" and "citizenship" (Earle, 2011, p. 2). I argue that it is through the creation and continuation of cities that colonial masters conquered and ruled their colonies in Africa, an organization based on the European experience of nations-states. As Isin notes (2007, p. 221), the state can be seen as emanating from, organized through and assembled by the city space. It is a space where a dominant group or groups have consolidated themselves, whether as colonial masters or citizens; these groups then create forms of modern rule and authorities under what later may be termed "states." The city space is thus the production of state representation and effect. Here, I see the state as practices, not an entity or a group of actors that come as given, but rather an entity that becomes "real" through performance (see also Doty, 2003; Dunn, 2010).

This chapter is structured as follows: First, I will discuss the central conceptual terms in this thesis, including "the state", "statehood" and "public goods". This debate lays the conceptual foundation for the thesis. Namely, understanding the state as processual in nature, i.e., a series of experiences, practical dimensions of statehood and citizenship in the city space. Further, statehood is seen as living and performing the state, something that is exercised in relations to others and to certain (material) goods that forms patterns of practices. Finally, public goods are seen as necessary material goods, though with symbolic value attributed to statehood and which may, indirectly or directly, be assumed to fall under the duties of the state. Second, I will present some of the mainstream theoretical contribution to this field. The debates on neo-patrimonial rule, clientilism, strongmen and weak states are highly influential and largely based on interpretation of Max Weber's work on traditional and modern forms of domination. Although this literature has academic value, the ontological basis is affected by a certain situatedness of Western forms of statehood interpretations. The literature, generally speaking, takes de facto statehood as absent or limited. Thus, and finally, I offer a discussion to speak back to this literature by taking de facto statehood seriously through those living and performing the state. The final section engages with a more recent contribution, namely

interpretive forms of statehood based on extensive, qualitative research that lays the foundation for my theoretical approach to the subsequent empirical study.

2.1 Conceptual approaches: The problem of the state in African studies

The sub-Saharan "African state" (henceforth Africa) is put in brackets, as many critics would rightfully say that there is no form of unitary African. Empirically speaking, the historical, cultural, socio-economic and geographical diversity of these forty-seven sovereign states is an obvious reason. In that sense, scholars may find it more useful to, for instance, discuss "European" states rather than "African" states, as European countries have a certain path dependency reflected in state formation literature, such as Tilly (1992) has pointed out. Certainly, European states are different but have at the same time undergone and are undergoing processes of integration. Also, fortunes and misfortunes in states' development are also a result of several internal and external factors and it would be overly simplistic to claim the African state as, e.g., "failed". What is certain, however, is that "the Western imagination of the state, however traversed by myths and historical fiction, remains the globally most powerful idea of political order in the twentieth century, institutionalized in the international state system after 1945" (Hansen & Stepputat, 2001, p. 10).

Thus, I will not attempt to theorize what a state *is* per se but rather how a state is *performed* and *enacted*; not as a singular entity but rather as a series of experiences, practical dimensions of statehood and citizenship coming alive through the city. According to this line of thinking, the state is interpreted in a processual understanding, not as a pre-given entity, but rather subjects in process (Migdal & Schlichte, 2005, p. 20). As Weber (1998, p. 78) writes, "all subjects in process (be they individual or collective) are the ontological effects of practices which are performatively enacted." A more applicable definition for this thesis regarding the **state** can be found in Lund's (2006a, p. 676) important contribution to the debate on African states and state formations where he argues the following:

"The 'state' is (…) the quality of an institution being able to define and enforce collectively binding decisions on members of society. We tend to reserve state qualities for government institutions, but this is more a reflection of our idea of an end result than of the messy process of state formation itself."

In many ways, I subscribe to the idea that the concept and discourses of the state are "a 'mythical abstraction' which has assumed a particular place within the field of government" (Rose & Miller, 1992, p. 175). This is not the same as saying that the state is a myth, or a product of the human imagination. Rather, it subscribes to what Foucault (1994, p. 23) terms "effects of reality" (*effets de réalité*) to describe that a discourse, which does not exist per se, still has effects on reality.[3] This is what I call the state effect (Bourdieu, 1999; Foucault, 1994; Mitchell, 1999). Methodologically, this thesis is not based on a discourse analysis of the state but is rather inspired by the way of seeing the state as practices through an interpretive research design (see Chapter 3). As Eriksen (2011, p. 247) argues, the idea of state can be seen as a category of practice rather than as a category of analysis. Both domestic and external actors reinforce or undermine the state idea (whatever it may be) through their practices.

Based on this processual understanding of the state, **statehood** is understood as "performing" and "living" the state (Migdal & Schlichte, 2005, pp. 14-15). By applying "performing" and "living", statehood becomes more "real" it is exercised in relations to others and to certain (material) goods that forms patterns of practices. These practices are conducted by "the diverse, multiple actions of state actors as well as the myriad responses and interactions between state officials and non-state actors" (Migdal & Schlichte, 2005, p. 15). I reject a normative concept of statehood that evaluates the amount of service provision and/or territorial control, as most states would not fit such definitions of statehood (see also Eriksen, 2011, p. 234). Such normative concepts are static; what a state is, or rather should be, rather than how it is done. Moreover, various dimensions of statehood in this thesis do not automatically fit concepts of formal state structures but rather show the assemblage of social relations, practices and political processes involved in public good provision and consumption. As Lund (2006b, p. 686) argues, "(…) public authority becomes the amalgamated result of the exercise of power by a variety of local institutions and the imposition of external institutions, conjugated with the image of a state. Hence the practice of governance varies from place to place, and even from field to field." In sum, I argue that statehood is not limited to the nation-state and that my approach is based on the claim that the "state" is practices that can be observed at different levels. As an entry point, I see practices of negotiating (access, control and delivery) of public goods as a clue to understanding dimensions of statehood.

---

[3] Quotation from the original text: "(…) c'est la formation corrélative de domaines, d'objets, et de discours vérifiable et falsifiables qui leurs sont afférents; et ce n'est pas simplement cette formation qui m'intéresse, mais les effets de réalité qui leur sont liées."

By **public goods**, I mean goods that are perceived by most citizens and authorities as necessary and practiced in different forms in the performance of statehood. As discussed above, I do not make assumptions as to where such services might be located or as to who should perform them (i.e., I avoid normative and static readings of the state). Rather, I take a more pragmatic view as to how statehood is performed by tracing who and how public goods are controlled by different actors. This thesis examines the public goods of water, electricity, public roads and waste management. Two of these goods, namely water and waste management are vital for the maintenance of basic public health. Public roads and the sub-category of electricity are not equally vital for life, but they are necessary for most livelihoods and generally in great demand. These goods can be associated with the state. For instance, and even under neo-liberal governance, the state will often at the very least hold a role as a regulator of different services, and in close-to 'pure' state-controlled countries there will be alternative, sometimes clandestine operators delivering these goods. There are, however, many other practices that perform delivery of these services, such as commercial companies, NGOs or neighborhood networks.

Views as to what public goods are and who should provide them are rooted in historical, normative and contextual notions. As shown in Chapter 7 on water and energy, for instance, I evidence how there is a shifting debate, and therefore tension, over the perception of water as a "social good" (*bien social*), a "public good" (*bien public*) or as a matter for commercial ownership (*société commerciale*) for paying clients. In other words, these goods cannot simply be defined by their function (non-excludable, non-rivalrous) when using interpretive and relational approaches (Chapter 3) to the dimensions of statehood. By unpacking what is understood by "public goods" and moving beyond static views, I am opening up an avenue for a dynamic and multilayered understanding of practices related to statehood. This stands in contrast to the representation of classic, mainstream political science literature on the African state.

My decision to avoid a priori categories in defining consumers, providers or public goods stems from my interpretation of empirical rich research, in which I saw no clear dichotomy between "state" and "society". As Mitchell (1991, p. 78) suggested, to begin "with the assumption that the elusiveness of the state-society boundary needs to be taken seriously, not as a problem of conceptual precision but as a clue to the nature of the phenomenon. Rather than searching for

a definition that will fix the boundary, we need to examine the detailed political processes through which the uncertain yet powerful distinction between state and society is produced." Political processes and negotiations over public goods occur continually and result in a dynamic de facto statehood that is never frozen in time but rather performed, created, transformed and reinvented.

Now that I have established the central parameters in my approach to the analysis of statehood and public goods, it is necessary to situate their relevance in how mainstream African politics literature has been discussed and critiqued.[4] This includes how concepts of neopatrimonialism, clientelism, state weakness, statehood and public goods have been studied either separately or from a normative perspective. This is done in order to establish my heuristic approach to statehood, an approach which seeks to address current discrepancies between the literature and empirical realties. Moreover, the different goods, perspectives of consumers and providers are found in the scope of a city (Bukavu). The city is seen as a proxy for a state in terms of the public delivery agencies located in Bukavu, as different from the surroundings in the province. By proxy, I do not claim that the city replaces the state. Rather, I see the city as an observable terrain where statehood is a more pressing topic. In this terrain, there is a specter of the state in the public's expectations and then in how the state is performed; these form a reality that is often overlooked by current literature.

The research question in this thesis is a way to zoom in on statehood practices from below. That is, away from a macro perspective of the state, as seen from above, to the day-to-day realities of civil servants, alternative providers and citizens, as viewed from below. In other words, *politique par le bas* as Bayart, Mbembe, and Toulabor (2008) have termed it. Thus, the theoretical framework for this study will in particular examine the more interpretive and relational approaches, as discussed in more detail in the methodology chapter (3), to understand how public good providers and consumers are creating and challenging certain dimensions of statehood through their relations and subjective perspectives.

---

[4] Inevitably, several elements of the wide-ranging literature have been omitted in order to offer only a selection of the theoretical and conceptual approaches central to this thesis, before moving on to the more specific theoretical framework of the empirical and analytical research.

2.2. The African state, statehood and public goods: Mainstream literature in review

Much political science literature on African states and politics has emphasized characteristics, such as the neopatrimonial (e.g. Médard, 1982), the clientelistic (e.g. Lemarchand, 1972) and/or informal (e.g. Bayart, 1993; Chabal & Daloz, 1999) forms of state and authority. There is also a substantial literature on "local strongmen" or chiefs (e.g. Berman, 1998; Herbst, 2000; Sandbrook, 1985). These terms make up some of the fundamentals of African statehood literature. I will primarily focus on neoptatrimonialism and clientelism, both of which, in many ways, form the basis of broader theoretical discussions informed by interpretations of Max Weber's (1978) writings on traditional and modern forms of domination. These theoretical debates are important and influential in the study of African statehood and authorities: because they form essentially the analytical basis of Jackson and Rosberg's (1982a) de facto and de jure conceptualization of African statehood. The neo-patrimonial and clientelistic debates connect observed data (e.g., observations on relations of reciprocity between patrons and clients) with the broader theoretical literature. They nevertheless remain somewhat more abstract, taking a top-down (domination), long term view that is difficult to entangle compared to the more recent contributions from what can be termed interpretive approaches (e.g., Hagmann & Péclard, 2010) from below. What becomes rapidly apparent from reviewing this literature, whether top-down or bottom-up, is the predominance of early European state formation as a blueprint with which to analyze African contexts. This means that the scholarly literature is somewhat limited in thinking of the rest as an extension of Europe of what state means and how they are formed (see also Chakrabarty, 2000). Where this literature ends, so to speak, my analytical contribution begins by developing how processes of statehood are taking place with or without a state performance that calls the state into being.

The concept of neopatrimonialism, introduced by Eisenstadt (1973), derives from the governance system, named patrimonialism, which Weber (1978) viewed as a traditional form of domination. Patrimonialism derives from the masculine, father figure type rule of patriarchy. It is important to distinguish between what Weber explains as primary patriarchalism, indicating a structural relationship at a household level, and patrimonialism as a form of political rule (Bruhns, 2012, p. 14). The patrimonial state as Weber (1978, p. 1013) argued is "when the prince organizes his political power over extrapatrimonial areas and political subjects – which is not discretionary and not enforced by physical coercion – just like the

exercise of his patriarchal power." By introducing "neo" into patrimonialism, one moves from this traditional form of rule to a rule where one formally distinguishes between public and private but whereas these differences are not practiced. Médard (1979) is largely credited for applying the term "neopatrimonialism" to the sub-Saharan African context, with the case of Cameroon. His work (see also 1982) drew heavily on political clientelism literature.

Clientelism has a less clear origin than neopatrimonialism and its use varies widely. The term was used widely in 1960s literature on local politics.[5] An often cited definition is by Scott (1972, p. 92), who sees clientelism as a "special case of dyadic (two persons) ties involving a largely instrumental friendship in which an individual of higher socioeconomic status (patron) uses his own person of lower status (client) who, for his part, reciprocates by offering general support and assistance, including personal services, to the patron." Moreover "[clientelism] is predicated on a situation where there is already a difference between ownership of resources and control of their use in broader settings and on a certain segregation between the resources exchanged in generalized and in specific exchange", according to Eisenstadt and Roniger (1980, p. 60). In a setting of material deprivation and social destitution and with an absence of social provision by the state or lack of law enforcement, people may seek clientelistic forms of linkages for their subsistence survival. Such relationships can and do expand from only two people, and in the African statehood literature, political clientelism can be understood as "a more or less personalized relationship between actors (i.e., patrons and clients), or sets of actors, commanding unequal wealth, status or influence, based on conditional loyalties and involving mutually beneficial transactions" (Lemarchand, 1972, p. 69).

The modern use of neopatrimonialism, as distinct from Weber's (1978) ideal type application of the term to describe traditional domination in contrast to legal-rational bureaucracy under modern rule, has been conceptually stretched to encompass a number of political experiences in Latin America, Africa, the former Soviet Union and Asia. But as Erdmann and Engel (2007, p. 96) write "[n]eopatrimonialism is indeed a universal concept, although one that has received little critical analysis, notably of its appropriateness for understanding African politics." There are of course noteworthy exceptions to this claim, especially Bach and Gazibo (2012), but I

---

[5] John Sidel, lecture in "Local Power in an Era of Globalization, Democratization, and Decentralization", 17 January 2012.

argue that the analytical utility of the concept characterized by (though not reduced to) clientilism, personal and informal rule is limited.

The analytical challenge that comes with a catch-all concept is to disentangle what processes are at work. From a political scientists' angle, one can question whether agents are performing according to a structuring principle of neopatrimonial rule or if they are performing according to an agent-to-agent form of rule in the absence of any structure. However, this dichotomous view of agents versus structure is limited. As Elias (2001, p. 19) suggested, we can imagine society as

 "a group of dancers performing court dances. The steps and bows, gestures and movements made by the individual dancers are all entirely meshed and synchronized with those of other dancers. If any of the dancing individuals were contemplated in isolation, the functions of his or her movements could not be understood. The way the individual behaves in this situation is determined by the relations of the dancers to each other."

Hence, I argue that it is useful to distinguish between normative perspectives from the Western experience and how the state is practically performed from the African experience. In this thesis, I focus on the latter, namely practices according to African experiences.

An emphasis on neopatrimonialism hinders potentially stimulating avenues of research if scholars can already detangle the malaise of a political system, a regime or a political economy. In other words, in whose image are scholars constructing authorities and states? That is, are scholars interested in developing models of state performance through Weberian ideal types or are they engaging with discourses through the lived experience of citizens or state agents on their own terms? I argue that the mainstream literature on neopatrimonialism engages with the former. This is problematic, as Western experiences are used as the main historical source to explain current state practices in African contexts. Although there is no escaping and no need to avoid the discourses of statehood and state as interpreted in Western literature, my contribution is to develop an analysis through some of the lived experiences of people to speak back to this literature.

Moving further from these debates on neopatrimonialism and clientelism, there is a significant debate on whether to describe certain African states as weak (Englebert, 2009; Jackson & Rosberg, 1982), quasi (Jackson, 1993) or collapsed (Zartman, 1995). For instance, from

Zartman's (1995, p. 4) standpoint, the state is seen as a service provider and is collapsed "when the basic functions of the state are no longer performed." Jackson and Rosberg (1982) and more recently Englebert (2009) subscribe to a specific type of state performance, namely a monopoly on violence and ability to control sovereign territory. In these debates, I argue that the state is seen as a "preformed" (Emirbayer, 1997, p. 282) entity that must deliver on the terms of its preformation in order to be real. This particular state performance is not necessarily seen through the eyes of the citizen but rather through problems of civil wars, armed groups and loose boundaries emerging from underlying political and socio-economic problems. As an alternative analytical avenue, statehood offers a way of examining the performance of specific functions of public good delivery and expectations.

In terms of statehood and inspired by Max Weber, the work of Jackson and Rosberg (1982a; 1982b), focuses on statehood both in terms of the *de jure*, the juridical, and the *de facto* attributes of the state. As they (1982b, p. 3) argue, the "empirical properties [of African state] have been highly variable, while the juridical components have been constant." On the one hand, the principle of sovereign states (de jure) remains, while on the other, many states have not been able to control their territory (de facto). Following the work of Jackson and Rosberg, Englebert (2009) establishes a causal link between international legal sovereignty and domestic authority. He (pp. 62-63) argues that international recognition endows African state actors with a domestic power of command. The essence of this power is legal (juridical). He (p. 7) argues that "it is the last remnant of public order in weak and failed states – sovereignty – that Africans instrumentalize". I argue that seeing "international recognition" as the independent variable to explain domination is a reductionist approach that overlooks the "*politique par le bas*". Such an approach overlooks the agency of Africans, whether as citizens or public authorities, and assumes that states would evaporate without international recognition. Somaliland serves as a counter-example. In addition, the focus on de jure can even be seen as a myth (Adalbert Hampel, 2015, p. 5) when we consider the critical literature on the Westphalian narrative (see e.g. De Carvalho, Leira, & Hobson, 2011; Schmidt, 2011). I argue that it is necessary to take de facto aspects seriously because African states are not simply upheld by principles of international sovereignty. By taking de facto into consideration, an analytical avenue opens up that demonstrates different forms of domination, various state practices, perceptions and ordinary people's understandings of the "state", and a number of statehood dimensions.

Further, the underlying feature of contrasting or comparing African states with an interpretation of Western liberal norms and/or Weberian rational-legal authority as an ideal type under modern rule is problematic. Weber (1991, p. 78) famously argued that "a state is a human community that (successfully) claims the *monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory*" (emphasis in original). Force in itself does not make a state, as Weber explained, but it is a mean specific to the state. In addition, territorial delineation is also a key attribute of the state. The point to be made about territory and the monopoly of violence is that states can be defined by how they work, not what ends they seek. In fact, Weber's writing sees states' characteristics and capabilities limited, ultimately, only by the human imagination. One such imagining is what Weber (1978, p. 905) called the ideal type *modern* state with the following basic functions: "The enactment of law (legislative function); the protection of personal safety and public order (police); the protection of vested rights (administration of justice); the cultivation of hygienic, educational, social-welfare, and other cultural interests (the various branches of administration); and last, but not least, the organized armed protection against outside attack (military administration)." The Weberian rational-legal authority as an ideal type in a modern rule is far removed from the real practice of states in many countries, not only on the African continent. As Scott (1998, p. 82) reminds us: "The utopian, immanent, and continually frustrated goal of the modern state is to reduce the chaotic, disorderly, constantly changing social reality beneath it to something more closely resembling the administrative grid of its observations." My work is in line with a functional approach to state performance and practices, namely the provision of public goods, but I detach this provision from any particular institutional form, such as an ideal type modern state. This is done in order to avoid normative assumptions of what the state should or should not do and rather to take a more inductive approach to where and how these goods are de facto delivered.

The literature on persistent "state weakness" and the blurring of formal and informal boundaries in many African states is seen in relation to the aforementioned Weberian ideal type of modern states. Hardly any other mainstream literature makes this more explicit than Chabal and Daloz (1999, p. 7) when they argue that "the logic of state service [in Africa] is resolutely particularistic and personalized – far removed from the bureaucratic norms as they operate willy-nilly in most Western societies" and thus "public employment is exploited as a private resource." And as they (ibid, p. 14) provocatively argue further, the African state is "an empty shell" that "failed to acquire either the legitimacy or the professional competence which are the

hallmarks of the modern state". Thus, a common feature of this literature is the focus on what the African state is not rather than what it is, seen from a modern ideal type state perspective.

However, as Sartori (1970, p. 1034) noted, the terminology in political science is largely bound to political experience from the Western hemisphere, and this still remains relevant today. Chakrabarty (2000, p. 27) argues that "[t]here is a peculiar way in which all these other histories [e.g. being "Indian" or "Kenyan"] tend to become variations on a master narrative that could be called "the history of Europe"." In other words, we can only think of the rest as an extension of Europe both conceptually and in the rest's experience of what is the life of "nations" and "states". The history of the "others" is thus interpreted through the history of the European. Paradoxically, an outsider perspective is thus privileged over an insider perspective when considering the "other", whether it is citizens, states or nations. There is thus a need for scientific knowledge that can connect different practices and meanings, not do deny the existence of certain practices and meanings, but rather to build knowledge through these different interpretations (Haraway, 1988, p. 580). Only through recognizing the situatedeness of social researchers and the researched, it is possible to move forward in conceptually and theoretically stimulating fields.

In order to do so, Hagmann and Péclard (2010, p. 541) have suggested that "[t]he heuristic limitations of mainstream Western political science have encouraged researchers to resort to either more empirically grounded or more conceptually innovative approaches to public and state authority in Africa." A common feature for these approaches relies on dynamic interpretations of state-society relations in Africa (e.g. Bierschenk & Olivier de Sardan, 2014b; Hagmann & Péclard, 2011; Lund, 2006a; Titeca & de Herdt, 2011). They are dynamic in the sense that they consider a range of actors providing public goods and services as well as variations across time and space where they engage more deeply with empirical realities on, for example, bureaucracy and corruption on a daily basis. They also analytically employ concepts interpreted from the empirical research, such as "twilight institutions" (Lund, 2006a). These interpretive approaches are of inspiration to my thesis and will be further developed in the theoretical framework below.

Though the mainstream African state literature is extensive, in particular regarding states' weakness, what is often overlooked is precisely the interpretive and dynamic forms of de facto statehood. Statehood, I argue, is never fixed or reaches an end point, but rather allows

researchers to study different dimensions, through particular relations, issues and spaces. The relations, issues and spaces in this thesis relate to so-called public goods in an urban setting. Rather than taking the state as a given entity, the study of public goods, both in meaning and practices, through consumer-provider relations enables a space for expressing statehood. The term public goods, however, is often associated with economic theory. A classic definition in this field is Samuelson's (1954, p. 387) model where he argues that "*collective consumption goods* which all enjoy in common in the sense that each individual's consumption of such a good leads to no subtraction of that good (...)." In this field, public goods, or collective consumption goods, are as an ideal, seen as non-excludable and non-rivalrous, meaning that no citizen should be excluded from using them regardless of payment and that their use will not reduce availability for others (Samuelson 1954, see also Pickhardt, 2006, p. 446). The term *public* in the economic literature is not reduced to an understanding of the public sector (government). Rather, it means that allowing goods, such as roads, defense, water or schools *solely* in the hands of the private would, using economic terms, lead to substantial market failure where some citizens would benefit more at the cost of others.

There are many challenges in applying an orthodox economic definition to public goods, as many of the goods discussed in this paper do not fall under Samuelson's strict definition. For instance, the development of roads would not be a public good as increased use of the same roads decreases the availability for others. Moreover, it was for long assumed in political and economic sciences that self-interested individuals cannot act collectively without outside coercion, inspired by the publications of Hardin's (1968) *The Tragedy of the Common* and Olson's (1965) *The Logic of Collective Action* (see also Bardhan & Ray, 2008a, p. 4). However, subsequent studies have shown how various communities do indeed cooperate without outside coercion but instead through a sense of, for instance, common norms and collectivity (see for instance Escobar & Alvarez, 1992). The exogenous perspective in classic political and economic sciences leaves out crucial perspectives about how people actually (de facto) produce, manage and consume public goods. Also, I argue that a deeper immersion into perceptions of public goods by people themselves is important to avoid a priori assumptions about these goods and how they are accessed and delivered.

At the other end of the social science scale, regarding epistemology, many anthropologists have taken a different view of public goods or what can be termed common resources. Resources such as water or land may be interpreted "as cultural systems with material as well as symbolic

value" (Bardhan & Ray, 2008b, p. 8). Closely connected to the debate on public goods is the term consumer, as the anthropologist Miller (2003, p. 1) has described in the following way:

"While in economics to be a consumer is to have choice, my emphasis is on quite another aspect. I use the term consumer in opposition to the aesthetic ideal of a creative producer. (…) [T]o be a consumer is to possess consciousness that one is living through objects and images not of one's own creation. It is this which makes the term symptomatic of what some at least have seen as the core meaning of the term modernity."

In this study, and inspiried by anthropology and sociology, I use the terms "consumers" and "providers" as forms of relations over material goods that also take symbolic meaning in expressing statehood. Section 2.3.2 and the methodology chapter (3.1) will include further discussion on the conceptual choice of "consumer/provider" categories.. Consumer/provider categories in this thesis are "observer expressions" (categories of analysis) that "belong to an observer's vocabulary rather than to that of the actors" (Dahl G., 1999, p. 15). This is due to the rather normative nature of the terms, which, if used actively in fieldwork, might cause excessive confusion or debate.

I have taken an approach of seeing individuals as part of their surroundings and assumed that there are specific, though not necessarily unique, relations of reciprocity, mistrust and/or resistance when it comes to interpretations and practices of public goods. I find it useful to understand public goods in terms of certain economic and material conditions but at the same time I seek to understand more precisely the meaning and the role of different goods in expressing statehood. I argue that their limited availability and the way in which they are subject to negotiation within urban territorial organization provide an interesting entry point for further investigation into what we mean by public goods and interpretations of de facto statehood. The focus on the urban space – the city – will be further developed in the next section.

2.3 Theoretical and conceptual approaches to statehood: Modes of governance, citizens –subjects and dimensions of statehood

Instead of assuming the African state as dysfunctional according to a parochial understanding of what the state should be, I rather see the state as practices coming alive through performance and effect (inspired by Bourdieu, 1999; Doty, 2003; Dunn, 2010; Foucault, 1994; Mitchell, 1999). The modern state's distinctiveness, Mitchell (p. 89) argues, is that it appears as an

apparatus separate from the social world that creates the state effect. Mitchell (1999, p. 89) argues "[w]e must analyze the state as (…) a structural effect. That is to say, we should examine it not as an actual structure, but as the powerful, apparently metaphysical effect of practices that make such structures appear to exist." Furthermore, he (1999, p. 84) states that this distinctiveness "means that we should not be misled into taking for granted the idea of the state as a coherent object clearly separated from "society" – any more than we should be misled by the vagueness and complexity of these phenomena into rejecting the concept of the state altogether." In this thesis, public goods seen from consumer perspectives demonstrate how "the state" is considered often as an entity, but also that the different practices that informants discuss can relate to anything from the central regime, the water agency, municipal authorities to traffic police. In other words, consumers and providers make what the state is rather than delimiting how they should think about the state. Simultaneously, those who consider the "state" to be largely found within public good provision (though with exceptions), are making claims about citizens and subjects within this coherent idea of modern statehood. The state effect means the construction of a binary separation of state from society, as well as considering claims about accessing and enjoying what is considered public goods as clues to interpret statehood. The state effect forms a basic assumption of this thesis and can be viewed as an explanatory framework: a substantive statement about "the state" to challenge dominant frameworks of failure and weakness (Lund, 2014, p. 229).

In order to take into account how people themselves speak of what I interpret as statehood, this thesis takes an inductive approach to study public good provision and consumption in Bukavu. Thus, the empirical chapters (5-7) will let the informants speak rather than taking prescribed measures to evaluate state functions from a distance. In the final analysis chapter (8), I will use what Oliver de Sardan (2009, 2014) calls "modes of governance" to categorize forms of governance when it comes to public good provision. Olivier de Sardan together with other scholars, especially Bierschenk and Olivier de Sardan (2014), Blundo and Le Meur (2009), Hagmann and Péclard (2010) and Lund (2006b), provides a much needed counterpoint to abstract and decontextualized models of statehood. I consider these scholars' work within a heuristic approach to statehood. That is, they provide conceptual tools that enable researchers ways of approaching social science topics, rather than making claims of how the social world is (Lund, 2014, p. 229). Though theories of neo-patrimonial rule or clientelism are providing some useful ideas for theorizing governance practices, they do not, in light of the evidence gathered in this thesis, contribute to a fuller picture of interpreting or approaching daily

governance in regions seen as different from the West, such as certain African states. In other words, when the image of an ideal-type of modern "Western states" does not fit other states, scholars need to go further to investigate how assemblages of state practices actually work in different contexts. Instead of "state failure", I argue, there are conceptual failures in mainstream political science literature as it appears unable to grasp state-society relations in a meaningful way.

At the same time, I do not claim that there are certain essentialist characteristics of the state in Africa, i.e., certain normative features of the state as different from the normative features of the Western state. As Hansen and Stepputat (2001, p. 10) argue, there is a need to abandon the idea of "African" or "Western" conceptions of statehood and rather trace the "various languages of stateness (…) [to understand how they] have been spread, combined, and vernacularized in various parts of the world." Or, to go back to Jackson and Rosberg's (1982a, 1982b) de jure and de facto statehood, there is a need to distinguish between discursive productions of the state, namely "discourses about the state's identity vis-à-vis other states and 'international' society (discourses of sovereignty) and discourses about the state vis-à-vis a bounded 'domestic' society (discourses of stateness)", as Dunn (2010, p. 82) argues. My approach aligns with Hagmann and Péclard (2011, p. 19) and the idea that statehood processes are dynamic and partly undetermined and that empirical statehood should be the starting point of the analysis. What can be termed "languages of stateness" or "discourses of stateness" are ways of understanding what I call the "dimensions of statehood". I will discuss these aspects further in this section, as well as in Chapter 3 (Methodology).

These inspiring theoretical contributions in what can be termed interpretive, political anthropology or sociological readings of daily governance, however, are partly lacking an equal engagement with what can be considered the other side of the binary, namely "the society" made up of citizens and subjects and their encounters with the "the state" (i.e., the state effect). This is not to say that these authors do not engage with "citizens" or " society". On the contrary, it is precisely the engagement with lower level bureaucrats and citizens that has inspired innovative perspectives on governance such as Lund's (2006b) "Twilight Institutions." Rather, my ambition here is to contribute to this literature by providing a relational approach to study 'consumers' and 'providers' of public goods as dimensions of de facto statehood.

Moreover, as stated, examining the city space can provide an added analytical perspective to understand intensified negotiations over public goods. The design of Bukavu is a shadow of what it used to be under colonial rule; it is now re-negotiated and challenged in its contemporary forms. It is a space of state presence, of both imaginative and physical forms, and where an increasing population requires and demands public good provision. This enables a space for thinking about citizenship: the responsibility of the "state" and of "citizens". Due to the broad scholarly field of "citizenship" studies in social sciences, I engage with mainly three scholars that contribute to a relational understanding of state-citizens perspectives. Two of the authors, Mamdani (1996) and Ekeh (1975), can be positioned within the colonial/post-colonial discussions of categorizing belonging. Though they use different terminology, I considered such discussions as one field of emphasizing colonial experiences as a source of "Africa's impasse" (Mamdani, 1996, p. 3) between 'traditional' and 'modern' governance structures. The third author, Isin (2008, p. 16), captures a broader critical field of relational citizenship, namely "as practices of *becoming claim-making subjects* in and through various sites and scales" (my emphasis). The important contribution of these authors sheds light on understanding public good provision and consumption, interpreted in a colonially designed city and the differences between those inhabiting the same urban space. Thus, rather than making distinctions between rural-urban divides (cf. Ekeh 1975), I see the intensity of governing and accessing public goods in the city as a clue to understanding citizen- and subject-making as part of the state effect.

Finally, the interpretation of modes of governance (cf. Olivier de Sardan, 2014) and citizen-subjects (cf. Mamdani 1996) in relation to public goods develops into what I call the *dimensions of statehood*, inspired in particular by the aforementioned scholars Hagmann and Péclard (2010, 2011). Hagmann and Péclard (2011, p. 5) contribute to an analysis of statehood in Africa based on perspectives from different actors (local, national, and international) engaged in forging and remaking the state through negotiations and contestations. However, rather than applying their heuristic framework (see section 2.3.3), I develop my heuristic approach through dimensions of statehood based on a combination of my empirical fieldwork from Bukavu and these heuristic approaches.

Interpretive and relational approaches to statehood, seen both from the perspectives of citizens (consumers) and those controlling and delivering public goods (providers), are different from the mainstream political science literature that considers state performance as a monopoly on

violence and the control of borders (e.g. Englebert, 2009; Jackson & Rosberg, 1982a) or as the performance of service delivery based on norms of Western statehood models (e.g. Zartman, 1995). The approaches also differ from taking the Western historical trajectory of state formation as the starting point for debating the "African state" (e.g. Chabal & Daloz, 1999). Instead, these approaches allow those living and performing the state to attribute meaning to topics considered essential to everyday life, as I find in my case studies from Bukavu. I will in the remaining sections discuss these theoretical approaches.

2.3.1 Modes of governance

In order to develop a systematic categorization of governing public goods based on the case studies from Bukavu, I use what Olivier de Sardan (2014, p. 420) terms "*modes of governance*" in the analytical contribution (Chapter 8). A mode of governance is a way of interpreting governance practices when it comes to delivery (provision) of public goods. In other words, I avoid using established normative thinking as discussed above about where the state ought to work and what it ought to be, and rather take an inductive approach to interpreting actual practices of governance when it comes to public provision in order to understand aspects of statehood. "Governance", then, as a term is "stripped of both the ideological visions peculiar to some development organizations and the oversimplified, reductive critiques typical of certain academic deconstructions", as Olivier de Sardan (2014, p. 420) argues. Instead, an empirical approach to the concept of 'governance' can be defined as "any organized method of delivering public or collective services and goods according to specific norms (official and practical), and to specific forms of authority" (Olivier de Sardan, 2009, p. 4). Hence, any organized delivery of public goods, involving "agents of the state" (Bourdieu, 1999, p. 71), other actors or networks and forms of practices and rules can be considered modes of governance and thus indicators of statehood. "Agents of the state" refers to actors that produce "the performative discourse on the state which, under the guise of saying what the state is, cause (…) the state to come into being by stating what it should be (…)" (Bourdieu, 1999, p. 71). These agents of the state exist at lower and higher levels of the administrative apparatus, as the empirics demonstrate, and shows how the state is enacted and performed.

Governance of public goods relates to "collective action, authority or regulation, which for a long time was associated with the State, and which today can be implemented by other types

of institutions and players" (Olivier de Sardan, 2009, p. 4). Here, I find the term particularly useful as it avoids traditional dichotomies of state/non-state or formal/in-formal and rather emphasizes comparative and dynamic perspectives on statehood through the practices and performance of service delivery. As the empirical chapters will demonstrate, there are multiple actors and institutions providing, governing (e.g., exercising regulatory power), and controlling public goods. In my analysis, I develop three types of governance modes in relation to the public goods studied in Bukavu, namely:

1. Non-governed: Waste management (Chapter 5)
2. Plural governance: Control and usage (enjoyment) of roads and road construction (Chapter 6)
3. State monopoly: Water and energy (electricity) (Chapter 7)

Each category should be seen as ideal type based on an interpretive approach (see Chapter 3) to the empirical observations. Thus, these categories are not finite and there will always be exceptions to the modes. The aim of this categorization is to clarify some of the broader patterns of governance regarding these goods. This includes both formal and informal rules and practices. Olivier de Sardan's (e.g. 2009) work is based on West Africa, broadly, and Niger, specifically. By studying a different context (the Great Lakes region and the DRC broadly, and Bukavu, specifically), my observations are different from the modes found in Olivier de Sardan's work. They align, again, with the principle of taking de facto (empirical) observations of statehood as the point of departure for analysis (Hagmann & Péclard, 2011, p. 19). Modes of governance, however, are only one side of the binary effect of the state. In order to study these modes of governance we have to turn to citizenship because governance depends on relational perspectives on who and what is governed, how those attempting to access public goods view governance and how they interpret their claims and rights as citizens.

2.3.2 Claim-making citizens and subject

The term "consumers" in this thesis is not used in the strict economic meaning but is inspired by anthropological and sociological work on the topic. Miller (1995, p. 142) argues that modern anthropological work prior to 1970, was often drawn "to societies defined by the absence of

(…) goods." The idea of consumerism of modern societies was the antithesis of what students of anthropology were supposed to study. By the 1970s, Miller argues (p. 142), Douglas and Isherwood with their work "The World of Goods. Towards an Anthropology of Consumption" and Bourdieu's "Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste" broke the silence in anthropology on the subject of consumption.

The idea of "consumers" in this thesis is specifically related to the creation of distinction, such as the "haves" and the "have nots" of citizens and subjects in Bukavu. Bourdieu (1984, p. 483) captures this idea, one of the dimensions of statehood in this thesis, when he argues the following:

"One only has to bear in mind that goods are converted into distinctive signs, which may be signs of distinction but also of vulgarity, as soon as they are perceived relationally, to see that the representation which individuals and groups inevitably project through practices and properties is an integral part of social reality. A class is defined as much by its *being-perceived* as by its *being*, by its consumption – which need not be conspicuous in order to be symbolic – as much by its position in the relations of production."

Consumers, in this thesis, are thus defined by their relation to others, such as providers, as well as by other consumers. To be clear, consumers are for example, not defined by their quantity of domestic tap water consumption but rather by how they perceive their access in relation to these "others" (consumers and providers) and how these perspectives affect ideas of citizenship and state-society relations. These ideas, in turn, create tensions and fields of struggle that challenge and affect dimensions of statehood.

This relational study undertaken calls for a dynamic and practice oriented understanding of citizenship, othering and subject-making under the state effect. Rather than considering the legal or constitutive acts of citizenship or dichotomous categories, I subscribe to Isin's (2008, p. 16) definition of citizenship "as practices of *becoming claim-making subjects* in and through various sites and scales" (my emphasis). These practices can, for instance, be consumer-provider relations and expectations and duties and rights from the viewpoint of those attempting to access and those who control the access to public goods. Critical studies of citizenship are thus focused "on how status becomes contested by investigating *practices* through which claims are articulated and subjectivities are formed" (my emphasis) (Isin 2008, p. 17). The focus on *practices* is important in this study as I focus on the daily consumption and provision of public goods from citizens' own perspectives on norms, expectations, rituals

and rules. In other words, I look at citizenship as practice in order to understand *politique par le bas* and acts of citizenship to enable an understanding of how claims are articulated as part of a sense of belonging to a political community (e.g., a state). These articulations are situated in the everyday realities of citizens. The city and territorial state have in common that they are sites where statehood happens, in the context of the DRC and many other African states and elsewhere. De facto statehood, at the municipal or provincial government levels, happens at the city level.

Part of the broader picture of understanding citizenship in Bukavu is to consider the relation with and belonging to the city. As Isin (2002, pp. 1-2) argues, the city can be seen as a difference machine, where social struggles take place, which can determine the content and extent of citizenship. In colonial terms, the rights and duties (content) and criteria for inclusion (extent) could be determined for instance by observable physical attributes, e.g., white or black skin, based on racial discrimination. In post-colonial terms, the content and extent of citizenship was generally granted on paper to most inhabitants (though with exceptions) but the practice of citizenship could be limited to certain urban inhabitants connected to the modern state while excluding, for instance, rural and uneducated inhabitants. In the city of Bukavu, people considered 'properly' urban, e.g., the educated French-speaking citizens, are increasingly confronted with a growing population escaping the countryside and this forms the basis of contested and evolving statehood. This is also why I consider Ekeh (1975) and Mamdani's (1996) work of interest because of their engagement with colonial and post-colonial effects on citizenship. In many ways, the city encapsulates much of the dynamics involved in producing and performing the state.

In brief, the actors and groups studied in this thesis are positioned in an urban space where there is a high density of formal "stateness", marked by a central administration and representation of all provincial offices. The state's formal territorial organization beyond this space (outside of the city), however, is more limited and in many places completely absent. Statehood can thus be studied in a highly concentrated space of territorial organization to emphasize the intensity of the state effect. My case studies from Bukavu observe ongoing struggles for citizenship, feelings of alienation and claims of rights to public goods in the city. I argue that nowhere is the state closer, physically and virtually, than in the city.

This section will first start with Isin's (2002, 2007) contribution to the debate, which is a relational approach to citizenship. Like the idea of "state effect", as discussed by Mitchell (1999), Isin provides a framework for interpreting some of the basic relational aspects of citizenship. This includes interpreting relations of inclusion and exclusion and how subjects derive their identity from these transactions (see also Chapter 3 on the relational approach). As the empirical observations will demonstrate, there are citizens connected to public good provision and there are others that are disconnected from the same services, who find alternatives sources. After this introduction, I will discuss the basic arguments of Mamdani (1996) and Ekeh (1975) that contribute to the theoretical debate on colonial and post-colonial effects in these debates.

In this study, subjects at the margins of inclusion and exclusion are of interest because they confront, destabilize and contest citizenship. In this way, they contribute to an evolving interpretation of statehood through their claims and interests in public good provision. Isin (2002, p. 3) writes that investigating citizenship requires, at the very least, "constraining the claims of citizens against the claims of the others." If there are victorious citizens, then there ought to be those who are not victories in their claims. This does not mean that citizenship comes naturally and those excluded are irreconcilable with the included. Rather, the otherness is, according to Isin (2002, pp. 3-4), seen as a condition of citizenship and that preciously the alterity always emerges both from dialog and from constituting each other. Isin (2007, p. 222) proposes that

"through *orientations*, *strategies* and *technologies* as forms of being political, beings develop *solidaritistic*[6], *agonistic*[7] and *alienating*[8] relationships. (…) [T]hese forms and modes constitute ontological ways of being political in the sense that being thrown into them is not a matter of conscious choice or contract (…). It is through these forms and modes that beings articulate themselves as *citizens*, *strangers*, *outsiders* and *aliens* as possible ways of being as identities and differences."

For instance, in colonial Bukavu, citizens were seen as a minority group of white settlers, while certain groups of Congolese, referred to as *évolués*, were entitled to partial citizenship rights, including rights to services, such as piped water or education. These two groups were largely seen in contrast to a third group, namely the tribal or indigenous groups considered unruly and

---

[6] For instance generous, beneficent, accommodating and understanding (Isin, 2008, p. 19)
[7] For instance competitive, resistant, combative and adverse (Isin, 2008, p. 19)
[8] For instance vengeful, malevolent, revengeful, hateful and hostile (Isin, 2008, p. 19)

attached to traditional customs (see Chapter 4). In contemporary Bukavu, certain citizens formally connected to public services and service providers refer to inhabitants who live in squatter settlements and who refuse to comply with various taxes and payments as "anarchic" citizens (see especially Chapter 8).

It is, in Isin's (2007, p. 222) view, impossible to study citizenship without consolidating the othering processes that lead to the terms of "strangers", "outsiders" or "aliens"; and moreover, one must also consolidate the spaces that are created through these orientations, strategies and technologies available for producing these relations. These processes articulate themselves and crystalize in the space called the city. Here, the actual practices of public good provision may be highly excluding processes, where only a few may be formally connected to services. In studying public goods provision and consumption in Bukavu, processes of alienation and belonging are being articulated (see Chapters 5-7) and ultimately demonstrate the complexity and dynamics of statehood (see Chapter 8). As Simone (2004, p. 2) argues, "African cities can be seen as a frontier for a wide range of diffuse experimentation with the reconfiguration of bodies, territories, and social arrangements necessary to recalibrate technologies of control."

More broadly, colonial African cities created the feeling and presence of the superior colonial state (see e.g. Ferguson, 1999). As Fetter (1976, p. xi) argued, "[m]odern imperialists, like the ancient Romans, were among the world's foremost city builders." However, the design of these European planned cities to create a "'rational' and 'orderly' urban milieu" (Bissel, 2011, p. 2) in the name of modernity may to varying degrees have been unsuccessful in controlling the urban spaces, according to those master plans. Master planning, of course, is not the same as implementation, which can be inconsistent, underfunded and incomplete. Nevertheless, as Bissel (p. 23) argues, creating wide and straight streets, clearing "huts" and placing natives where "they ought to be" was a key aspect of colonial urban design that transformed drastically both the imaginative (virtual) and physical (actual) spaces. The resulting colonial urban design can be as much used and interpreted by the liberated elite in former colonial city spaces.

In the study of Bukavu as a city, there are signs of both physical and interpreted colonial inheritance that cannot be overlooked. As a physical example, the city's administrative buildings and central residential areas are in art deco architecture that is a European imported construction. The more interpretive aspects concern political identities and perceived civic

relations in access and enjoyment of public goods. Thus, some practices when it comes to consumption and provision of public goods is analyzed in colonial design of the divided city.

Moreover, citizenship and belonging in Bukavu is differentiated between those living in the urban center and those considered rural but inhabiting the urban space. These differences have historical trajectories and have also been affected heavily by the wars and conflicts in the region. The mass import of Belgian and European versions of administration, e.g., reports and organizational charts, was mixed with a particular view of tribal/indigenous groups, who were deprived of basic rights and the *évolués,* who had access to certain goods. In many ways, the city can be seen as a *difference machine* in the way that it "assembles, generates, distributes and differentiates these differences, incorporates them within strategies and technologies, and elicits, interpellates, adjures and incites them" (Isin 2007, p. 223). The city is thus a battleground for groups to define themselves, make claims and demand rights. The city of Bukavu is an historical and contemporary site for these processes. Historically, Congolese living in the African city (contemporary Kadutu) were not randomly picked out as *évolués* – a claim to semi-citizenship – but had acquired certain bonds with the colonizers through the latter's orientations, strategies and technologies. *Évolués'* positions created ways of being political that were different from the ways experienced in the pastoral life of the village. But instead of accepting a subordinate position to the white settlers, the battleground for the city and thus the state began. Since independence, various forms of expressing and making claims of public goods have taken place and these claims provide an insight into dimensions of statehood.

Since the historical trajectory of Bukavu is affected by a particular colonial urban design, the work of Mamdani (1996) and Ekeh (1975) contributes to the discussions above in illuminating particular aspects regarding differentiating citizens, connections of public goods and belonging in the modern state system.[9] Mamdani's (1996, p. 4) influential work on citizen and subject focuses on the colonial legacy of *institutions* and institutional *segregation* that in his view remains to different degrees intact in Africa. The minority rule by Europeans in the colonies

---

[9] Noting, however, that I do not think colonialism is the only perspective for understanding contemporary politics on the African continent. In addition, the variety of colonial experience when it comes to colonial rulers (British, French, German, Portuguese, Belgian), varieties within colonies across time and space as well as varying impacts on the colonized do not allow for a unitary 'model' of colonial legacy overall. Nevertheless, this case study represents a particular vision of a colonial urban space that persists in form in present-day Bukavu.

offered citizenship only to the civilized, leaving the 'uncivilized' "subject to an all round tutelage" (Mamdani, 1996, p. 17). This meant political rights for only a few, civilized men, as made up, broadly speaking, the historical European political experience of the time, but with a racial logic for the African continent. Mamdani (pp.17-18) differentiates between two forms of controlling natives in the colonial era; indirect and direct rule. Direct rule meant urban civil power and exclusion of natives from civil freedoms, while indirect signified tribal authority, as Mamdani (p. 18) explains. The latter was a state-enforced way of dealing with the "native question" – how a foreign minority could rule over an indigenous majority (p. 16). The author sees indirect and direct rule as two forms of despotism, the former decentralized and the latter centralized. Mamdani (p. 18) argues that "[u]rban power spoke the language of civil society and civil rights, rural power of community and culture." Urban power spoke of civil rights (citizens) and customary power emphasized tradition (subjects) where all power was in the hands of chiefs. Though the author's theoretical and empirical discussion goes into greater depth, the value of this argument relates specifically to urban citizenship – rights and duties under a formal state – and the contrast with rural subjects excluded from formal rights. This insight is particularly important to understand differentiation as part of the dynamic forms of statehood, such as disputes, (re-)negotiations and interpretations.

Ekeh (1975, p. 106), much inspired by de Tocqueville and others, wrote that the European conception of citizenship entails that "[t]he individual as a member of a political community has certain rights and privileges which he may claim from it. Similarly, he has certain duties and obligations which he has to perform in the interest of the political community." He (ibid, p. 106) argues that the African experience of citizenship is different and depends on whether the person is taking part in the "primordial" or the "civic" public. The primordial public is seen by Ekeh as a moral obligation to sustain and benefit from the person's community, often seen as an ethnic community, which surpasses economic or material goods. The civic public, on the other hand, is according to Ekeh (p. 107) an *amoral* community with a considerable emphasis on the economic community. While people from both publics may seek to acquire rights from the civic, there is no obligation to "give back" (duties) in return for the benefits in the civic public. Ekeh's (p. 108) explanation for these two publics is the colonial experience that established a myth of a civic public that could never be impoverished and a primordial one that needs care in terms of reciprocity; a perception emphasized by the creation of the civic public, according to the author. In short, as Ekeh (p. 108, emphasis in original) rephrases, "[a] *good* citizen of the primordial public gives out and asks for nothing in return; a *lucky* citizen of the

civic public gains from the civic public but enjoys escaping giving anything in return whenever he can."

Ekeh's argument is theoretical and there are many authors who disagree with the emphasis on colonial structures or the existence of a primordial public. There are certainly also many examples of Africans paying a number of taxes or performing duties that cannot simply be interpreted as extraction.[10] Finally, Ekeh's deterministic view can assume a 'return to the tribal' when all economic means from the civic public are exhausted, which is not necessarily the case forty years after the article was first published. Though keeping in mind this criticism, there is value to this theoretical claim, which takes the form of distinguishing between expectations (rights) and responsibilities (duties) in the 'civic public' in Africa. In these case studies, what is considered a "modern" form of statehood stands often in contrast to the way in which certain public good providers and citizens describe certain others to be "anarchic" subjects that belong to "traditional" cultures. In turn, there are excluded sections of the population that make claims to the same goods that challenge statehood dimensions. In this thesis, these views are expressed by several participants of the study in Bukavu and will be further discussed in the empirical and analytical sections (Chapters 5-8).

In sum, modes of governance provide understanding of governing public goods from the provider side, while citizens-subjects aspects articulate differentiation between inhabitants and how they make claims in accessing public goods. The city offers a space to study more intense negotiations over the same goods, state presence as de facto statehood forms and efforts of and challenges to collective efforts. These theoretical approaches are important in interpreting statehood as something that is exercised, forming patterns of practice, in relations to others and to certain (material) goods. I will in the next section incorporate these aspects into what I call dimensions of statehood.

2.3.3 Dimensions of statehood

Based on the interpretations of modes of governance, on one hand, and citizen-subject aspects, on the other, I develop a more dynamic interpretation of statehood through what I call

---

[10] See for instance a more nuanced approach to corruption in Olivier de Sardan (1999) "A moral economy of corruption in Africa?" *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 37(01): 25-52.

"dimensions of statehood". I see statehood as a concept that it is composed of dimensions which give it its "reality" (what it is). A dimension, as defined by Babbie (2015, p. 129), is "a specifiable aspect of a concept". The focus on dimensions in this thesis is to underscore that a dimension is only one way to interpret a situation (statehood) and that there can be multiple dimensions to explain the same topic. The empirical chapters provide indicators of these dimensions to show statehood in concrete existence, matriculation and enactment. The focus on dimensions of statehood through consumer and provider perspectives on public goods diverges from the traditional preoccupation with authorities, legitimacy and evaluating performance from a Western legal-rational ideal type. The scholarly inspiration for this thinking is derived from the aforementioned scholars (Bierschenk & Olivier de Sardan, 2014b; Blundo & Le Meur, 2009; Lund, 2006b) and in particular Hagmann and Péclard's (2010, 2011) work on "negotiating statehood". I will in this section discuss the heuristic framework of "negotiating statehood" and some limitations, in order to contribute to this literature through "dimensions of statehood". On "negotiating statehood", Hagmann and Péclard (2011, p. 19) argue that

"processes of state (de-)construction are dynamic and partly undetermined, (…) [and hence] the analysis of state institutions must be embedded in a broader understanding of state-society relations, (…) [as] state building and formation is inherently conflictive and contested and that empirical rather than judicial statehood constitutes the analytical point of departure."

 This thesis draws inspiration from this approach by taking de facto (empirical) statehood as a starting point. More specifically, Hagmann and Péclard (2010, p. 544) suggest looking beyond the position of actors and into the resources and repertoires that these actors employ, where negotiations take place (negotiation arenas) and what the main outcomes and issues at stake (objects of negotiations) are. The term "resources" in this framework relates to the material basis for collective action, both tangible and intangible, which includes, for instance, access to state resources through national monopolies on piped water, bureaucratic skills and international donor networks (Hagmann and Péclard, p. 547). The repertoires are the symbolic basis that legitimizes the actors' existence, which can include shared but also contested and transforming ideas of public service provision and duties and rights as citizens (ibid, p. 547). These transforming ideas could be, for instance, changes in the policy of water provision from a social good to a good for paying clients (see Chapter 7).

Most state-society relations are arguably dependent on both the material and the symbolic basis for the construction, destruction and reinvention of shared communities, be they in the form of a village, a city or a nation-state. These case studies show how statehood in the DRC is dynamic and symbolism is drawn from a repertoire of colonial, post-colonial, international and local imaging. It also shows the resources available in public institutions, such as technicians, and international donor networks unfold a story of decay and a reassertion of the state. By introducing the idea of "negotiating" statehood, scholars can move beyond a discussion on "failed" or "weak" states and static or immovable political systems in Africa (Doornbos, 2011, p. 219). This avoids attempts that start with a list of criteria for state functions and rather engages with a more grounded approach to statehood derived from empirical observations (Hagmann & Péclard, 2011, p. 7).

However, and precisely because Hagmann and Péclard's approach supports empirically grounded studies, I do not attempt to copy their framework. Instead, my approach is based on patterns of experience from both "providers" and "consumers" views on public goods in Bukavu. Though "negotiations" is an interesting term to approach the dynamics of statehood, there is not always room for negotiations due to highly unequal power relations, donor conditions and authoritarian forms of governance. For instance, the World Bank negotiates with the central regime in Kinshasa on restructuring roads, in which both local representatives of the road agency and private consumers in Bukavu hold little power in negotiating the terms. Those living in Bukavu, however, share practices and hold perceptions regarding public good deliverables. This is why dimensions in this study, I argue, hold a better approach to understanding statehood. In brief, dimensions of statehood mean to address the relations between those "performing" and those "living" the state in how they attribute meanings to de facto statehood through public goods (also inspired by Migdal & Schlichte, 2005, p. 14). These statehood dimensions are developed inductively in the analytical contribution (Chapter 8) through relational networks of public good provision and consumption/enjoyment. They are also coupled with a broader scholarly contribution to show the transferability beyond the study area.

Through the empirical contribution, I show that the challenge to and potential of state practices and performance is not limited to the models of neopatrimonialism or clientelistic rule but is instead constituted by negotiations, interpretations and practices over public goods, all of which I consider to be dimensions of statehood. In turn, this affects what it means to be a citizen and

a service provider and is linked to acts of citizenship, practical ways of claiming a right or to have rights, all of which are in turn linked to an "implementation" of statehood. The different forms of being political (Isin 2002) are used as clues to interpret the relationships that develop in the urban space to understand, for instance, identities of alienation, claim of rights as citizens and seeing citizens as clients under the neo-liberal agenda. Ferguson (1999, p. 83) points out that some urban inhabitants may feel more "properly" urbanized in contrast to either newer villagers or less educated urban dwellers. During fieldwork in Bukavu, this was a repeated narrative among inhabitants, who often looked down on the uneducated, poorer citizens, often framing them as villagers. These differences could manifest in choice of clothing or number of children in a family. Though there can be many explanations for these popular narratives, the peculiarities of colonial history when it comes to bureaucratic and administrative practices are important for a fuller picture of many contemporary African cities. Long after the departure of the colonial presence, there is a certain sentiment of once having been connected to a "modern world" and a feeling of being disconnected in the contemporary world among those viewing themselves as "properly" urbanized and to some extent also among those on the margins (Ferguson, 1999, p. 238). Many of the older urban population were once privileged with an access to public services, although certainly with a racial discrimination that is now gone. For instance, once there was a modern post-office in Bukavu, now citizens have to cross over the border to Rwanda to receive mail. What this contemporary disconnection results in is a high degree of expectations towards the "state" of what should be state deliverables (norms). However, a high degree of expectations does not solely come from an older generation but is also shown in the debates of youth, which will be demonstrated in the empirical chapters. The popular image of the neighboring town Cyangugu in Rwanda demonstrates that there are alternative forms of statehood and state practices and performance that shape perceptions and claims of what it means to be a citizen.

Although there are high expectations in the urban space, there are also considerable forms of resistance and contestation when it comes to public goods provision. As Low (1999, p. 10) argues, the city is a "site of ongoing urban conflicts about the provision of the material basis for social reproduction" such as control over housing and access to land. In the city, resistance against the state does not always have to be in the form of active contestation, it can be as much about silencing, as Low (p. 10) argues. The answer to who should provide and deliver electricity, piped water and public transport depends on ideological, commercial and need-based viewpoints. As these case studies will show, resistance can take the form of stealing

electricity or refusal to comply with official bureaucracy. All of these aspects of perceptions, images of statehood relations and constraining relations develop into dimensions of statehood.

2.4 Conclusion

This theoretical discussion has reviewed some of the mainstream approaches to what can broadly be termed "African politics". The concepts of neopatrimonialism, clientelism, the blurring of informal/formal rule and assumptions of state weakness were some of the important debates in this review. However, as I have argued, there is an underlying tendency to compare ideal types, based on Max Weber's work, and to apply them, wittingly or unwittingly to the African context. Although less spoken of, the deeper interpretation of this literature is a reading of the master narrative of European state formation privileged and applied to a number of nations and states around the world. Though European state formation is of crucial importance to the history of modern state organizations, I argue that there is a need to construct scientific knowledge that can connect different state practices and meanings to build knowledge from a variety of experiences. Where the literature stops, i.e., that the de facto does not exist in a form known to Western scholars, my research begins. I take the de facto seriously, based on the claim that the state is not an entity that comes preformed but rather it comes into effect and is realized through practices and performance.

In order to do so, I place an emphasis on the state effect, i.e., the forms of modern statehood that create a distinctiveness of the state separated from society. I use the literature inspired by the more interpretive, political anthropology and sociological readings of statehood to understand modes of governance, citizen-subjects and dimensions of statehood. However, I develop a basis for this understanding through a more inductive approach, engaging with empirical observations of statehood seen through the eyes of citizens in Bukavu, who are in the position of service providers (providers) or who are citizens in search of access to goods (consumers). There are never any clear lines of who is a consumer and who is a provider as *real* practices are not found in a priori categories. I apply a relational, interpretive approach that allows people to express views of how they deal with these issues on a daily basis, what they expect of the state and vice versa and how privileges and disadvantages to access of goods work in the city. I argue that public goods are highly contested in the city and are a political question at the core of understanding de facto statehood, i.e., performing and living the state in the daily lives of citizens. These statehood dimensions make up what I call the state effect: A

view that the state comes into being through the performance and practice of different groups in relations to each other.

3.0 Methodology

"For, when it comes to the state, one never doubts enough. (…) [T]o have any chance of thinking a state that still thinks itself through those who attempt to think it (…), one must strive to question all the presuppositions and preconstructions inscribed in the reality under analysis as well as in the thoughts of the analyst."

Pierre Bourdieu (1999, p. 54)

This thesis draws inspiration from those social scientists who argue for the inclusion of the qualitative field research that is more often used in anthropological work into broader political science research areas, such as governance, public order or the state (e.g. Blundo & Le Meur, 2009; Olivier de Sardan, 2008; Schatz, 2009). Certainly, I do not attempt to make claims of crude divisions between anthropological methods and political science topics. Rather, the interest of this thesis is inspired by social scientists, irrespective of their discipline, whose research relies on extensive empiricism for developing theories and conceptual framings from 'real' practices (interactions between the researcher and the researched).

The rationale, both ontologically and epistemologically, in this thesis is based on *interpretive* approaches to science both in the "reality" of the topic being studied and its "know-ability" (Schwartz-Shea & Yanow, 2012, pp. 3-4) In fact, interpretivism recognizes the validity and positioning of these experiences that shape the researcher's understanding of the social world. Further, I do not believe that there is a clear dividing line between inductive and deductive research in practice, as scholars predominantly construct a case or a concept based on academic training and social experiences (see Lund, 2014). Thus, extensive empirical research to inform theory, i.e., so-called inductive research, will to some degree involve the use of existing theoretical approaches and ideas regarding the topic under investigation. This thesis leans mostly on inductive research, but also draws inspiration and approaches from different studies on statehood and public services. Specifically, I conduct a micro-scale analysis of certain public goods in Bukavu to inform the debate on abstract notions of de facto statehood, the populace and the state.

Bevir and Rhodes (2006, p. 70) argue "[a]ll political scientists offer us interpretations. Interpretive approaches differ in offering interpretations of interpretations. They concentrate on meanings, beliefs, and discourses, as opposed to laws and rules, correlations between social categories, or deductive models." The topics covered in this thesis can be seen from multiple,

intersubjective realities. It is of interest in this study to find interpretative meanings of de facto statehood, both from the perspective of those being researched and my own analytical interpretation of these issues (Schwartz-Shea & Yanow, 2012, p. 41). For instance, I asked the participants to explain what they considered public, and to explain what their expectations are and how they deal with daily, basic goods. As the interview questions demonstrate (see empirical chapters), I search for knowledge that is based on (subjective) views, diverse voices and interpretations from empiricism (categories of practices) and from the literature on statehood, public goods and the state (categories of analysis). These categories are discussed in Section 3.1 below. I also search for meanings and beliefs that people hold to explain their practices as I see these as inseparable and constitutive of each other (Bevir & Rhodes, p. 70). In interpretive research, this means that what, in the first encounters, may seem as a range of conflicting, counterintuitive (e.g. expectations of the state when state services have ceased) and varying perspectives from participants, gradually falls into recognizable patterns as the researcher immerses herself in the data and literature. This is not an isolated process of the researcher making sense of individual participant's "rationality" but rather a careful mapping process of what increasingly emerges, in the forms of recognizable meanings, beliefs or practices in the case study, connected to a wider literature discourse and historical trajectories.

Methodologically speaking, these approaches are often flexible and open-ended, but at the same time systematic in the process of empirical research, which in more positivist approaches would be termed "rigorous". By positivist approaches I mean "forms of research that rest on realist ontological and objectivist epistemological presuppositions" (Schwartz-Shea & Yanow, 2012, p. 6). Flexibility and open-endedness of the interpretive approach have taken place at all the different stages of my research process, from initial design, fieldwork, systematizing data and textual representation. For example, the concepts of public goods or statehood are never firmly fixed by a set of assumptions or claims in this thesis. Instead, their meanings have developed through engaging with the research participants and in further work outside the field study. This is a systematic process in the way that, for example, similar types of questions are asked to different participants while allowing them space to elaborate on meanings and views on topics that arise, which, in turn, are subjected to further interpretations. This is not a linear process, however, but rather a reflexive one by moving back and forth between fieldwork, deskwork and analysis. In the following section, I will explain the relational approach and the categories of practices and categories of analysis that fall under the interpretive ontological and epistemological rationale.

3.1 Concepts and categories

My conceptual approach focuses on the *relations* between 'consumers' and 'providers' of public goods as dimensions of de facto statehood. The problem with statistical "variables" analysis, rational actor and norm-based models, as Emirbayer (1997, p. 281) argues, is that these approaches hold the idea that entities come first and relations between these entities happens subsequently.[11] Instead, relational approaches reverse these assumptions and enable an understanding of the social reality "in dynamic, continuous and processual terms" (Emirbayer, p. 281). Relational approaches, as Emirbayer (p. 287) explains, consider how "units involved in a transaction derive their meaning, significance, and identity from the (changing) functional roles they play within that transaction. The latter, seen as a dynamic, unfolding process, becomes the primary unit of analysis rather than the constituent element themselves." For instance, as Lund (2006, p. 675) eloquently puts it, "the state did not rise like the sun at an appointed time. It was present at its own making." Thus, no one, or nothing, in this analytical approach is considered independent from each other or in isolation. Rather, consumers and providers derive their whole being from relations in a group, a community, a city and/or a state. Also, being a consumer does not exclude one from being a provider or vice versa: these are relational roles which are dynamic rather than being categorically stable.

The empirical chapters demonstrate the different viewpoints of consumers and providers and the back and forth between these groups that produce and unfold the dimensions of statehood processes. Moreover, public goods are relational entities specific to different and dynamic situations and interpretations. For instance, the case studies show how the perception of water as a public good is contested by neoliberal donor agendas. Also, and crucially, the very notion of "public goods" is equally contested and disputed in these relations. The relational perspectives in this thesis, investigated through the empirical data and the face-to-face encounters in the field study, lead to a reconceptualization of the terms, such as "citizens" and "subjects" and form the essential contribution of the thesis (see also Emirbayer, 1997, p. 295). The recurrence of terms such as "anarchic" to describe subjects or my participants' repeated protestations that "public goods" should be "free, available to all" or claims by other groups

---

[11] In the article, Emirbayer (1997, p. 282-283) develops a thorough critique of what he calls the substantialist thinking, namely that there are units of analysis (things, beings, essences) that are "self-subsistent entities, which come 'preformed.'"

that such goods should be "only for paying clients", all demonstrate the unfolding processes and negotiations between groups within a relation (see Chapters 5, 6 and 7).

One challenge with the relational approach is the problem of boundary specification (Emirbayer, 1997, p. 303). In my study, the issue of drawing lines when it comes to the units of study is the most pressing. Since there are no finite categories or natural borders, i.e., essentialist categories that are mutually excluding, the field of "units", such as groups or goods, could be endless. The dimensions of statehood, and state practices and performance, are also multiple sites of study. Fieldwork restrictions, such as time and attaining qualitative data, are fairly obvious. Analytically, I restricted the boundaries of my research to three cases of public goods – waste management, water and hydroelectricity, and public roads – within two significantly different urban territories in Bukavu, namely Kadutu and Ibanda. These goods were studied through the service providers, for instance through the national agencies or local practices of provision. I also limited myself to consumers of these goods in these two territories. But more than the practical and analytical boundaries that I have drawn, there are ontological questions that need to be answered, as Emirbayer (1997, p. 304) points out. Once the boundaries are drawn encompassing who and what constitutes these relations, there is the challenge of interpreting what is obtained from inside those boundaries (ibid, p. 304). In other words, in forming my interpretation of statehood dimensions, the perspectives and narratives conveyed by the actors I engage with are coupled, systematically, with certain aspects of state performance, and the loss or access to everyday goods. The relational approach thus follows the interpretive approach as discussed above.

Conceptually, I argue that statehood is composed of dimensions that give it its "reality". A dimension, as defined by Babbie (2015, p. 129), is "a specifiable aspect of a concept" and is useful in approaching a concept that holds multiple meanings. Thus, dimensions are essentially aspects of statehood in this thesis and these aspects are relational, i.e., one dimension may depend on or be in conflict with another dimension. Moreover, the dimensions identified in my analysis (Chapter 8) are based on the patterns discovered in public good provision and consumption in Bukavu. Thus, the focus on dimensions is not an attempt to build a complete "model" of what encompasses statehood, as both the topic and the site (Bukavu) are limited in scope and generalizability. Rather, the focus on dimensions is a way of highlighting some of the central relations identified as a move towards revealing dynamic and negotiable forms of statehood. The dimensions are inductively approached but they also are discussed through other

theoretical interpretations of statehood (e.g., Hagmann & Péclard, 2011; Hansen & Stepputat, 2001; Mamdani, 1996), which is important for their comparability and transferability. Table 1 summarizes the dimensions discussed in this thesis.

Table 1 Dimensions of statehood based on empirical evidence

Dimensions	Specific topics	Discussion points
Spatial	International borders Urban Design	• Relations with Rwanda • Segregation of population and urban demography
Distinctions	Hierarchies Citizen-subject	• State domination and discrimination • Belonging and Othering; anarchic subjects, tensions, practices of state resistance
Ideology	Languages of stateness Statehood Ideals	• Language as performative through presence and representation of state without corresponding practices • Assumptions of unity and disunity

These dimensions operate at different levels of abstraction. The spatial dimension is derived from the particular geographical location of Bukavu and implications for perceptions. This especially concerns border relations with Rwanda and colonial and contemporary urban design. The dimension of distinction concerns issues such as being citizens, what are acceptable consumer-provider relations and tensions related to hierarchies and discrimination. Finally, the dimension of ideology is concerned with discourses of stateness and unity/disunity of statehood ideals. These discourses are found in Bukavu, but also beyond, and I use Hansen and Stepputat's (2001) and Hagmann and Peclard's (2011) work in particular to show how these aspects are produced and (re)negotiated in ways that ultimately underscore the dynamics of statehood.

Further, the public goods represented in this thesis – waste management, water and hydroelectricity and roads – are widely different in terms of both their materiality and location of responsibility. For instance, managing waste is often the responsibility of municipal arrangements and/or private companies. Constructing national roads or hydroelectric dams are encompassing investments, and often a national priority; hence, they are more closely governed by central state ministries and agencies. Moreover, Rao and Appadurai (2008, p. 163) ask a pertinent question about public goods, calling them common goods: "How do we decide epistemologically what constitutes the Commons. In other words, what is common about the commons from a methodological perspective?" Broadly speaking, "the commons", or what I term public goods, relate to certain physical goods in this thesis. However, these goods also hold symbolic value, such as that relating to shared meanings and interests, collective actions or an individual's position in a community. What makes these goods *public*, I argue, is the *common need, desire* and *enjoyment* of them in the city and, in turn, the *control*, *management* and *delivery* by service providers. Thus, rather than assuming these goods are located within public institutions or in the "state", public means a shared value in one or more communities, requiring certain collective actions (service provision). Urban centers are geopolitical sites of contested access to and control of public goods and form a space of intensified negotiations of statehood.

It is useful for analytical purposes to distinguish between *categories of practice* and *categories of analysis*, as inspired by Bourdieu ([1990] 1997, pp. 80-97). Categories of practice denote the more popular, everyday terms used to describe social life. These are necessary forms of categorizing and organizing the world around us and enable researchers to connect with their population of interest. Here, the idea of the "state effect", i.e., that modern statehood appears as an apparatus separate from the social world (Mitchell, 1999, p. 89), becomes highly relevant for the researcher. Categories of analysis are what the researcher uses to describe the object of scientific inquiry. I do not think a sharp distinction between categories of analysis (scientific inquiry) and practices (everyday descriptions of the social world) is useful in this research. As Brubaker and Cooper (2000, p. 5) argue; a sharp distinction between these categories would mean that social scientists would have a much poorer, artificial language to describe the social world. This does not mean that these authors, or I, uncritically accept the way those being researched portray their world or frame them as categories of analysis. Instead, as Brubaker and Cooper (2000, p. 5) argue, categories of practices, such as public goods or state, can be (and here will be) used as categories of analysis, but social scientists have to exercise caution

in *how* they use these categories. Mitchell (1999, p. 76) makes this distinction clear when he argues the following:

"The network of institutional arrangement and political practice that forms the material substance of the state is diffuse and ambiguously defined at its edges, whereas the public imagery of the state as an ideological construct is more coherent. The scholarly analysis of the state is liable to reproduce in its own analytical tidiness this imaginary coherence and misrepresent the incoherence of state practice."

Concepts such as the state, statehood or public goods are, and will remain, ambiguous, fluid and fragmented, depending on their theoretical foundation and social practice. Thus, a first step in this process has been to avoid a usage of these concepts that connotes a given, essentialist categorization. For the categories of practices, this means that I have let my informants explain what they perceive or understand as public goods, what they expect from the state, what is expected of being a citizen and their everyday access to and control over the goods studied here. This has meant, however, that informants may speak of the state as an entity, even though they may refer to multiple actors and different institutions from the local municipality level to the head of government. These categories of practices from informants' perspectives are important ways of understanding perceptions and practices of "living" and "performing" the state in the case studies. However, these categories of practices, such as what people describe as the "state", are different from the categories of analysis in the thesis. As a category of analysis, I see the state as the effect of practices and that it takes multiple forms and that it "is called into being by stating what [the state] should be" (Bourdieu, 1999, p. 71). Thus, the analytical process of this thesis has involved making certain conceptual separations between empirical (categories of practices) and theoretical (categories of analysis) contributions.

In the categories of analysis, I have identified citizens of the two urban territories Kadutu and Ibanda as *consumers* because they represent groups of private households trying to access, enjoy, navigate and manage their ways in the field of what is categorized as "public goods" in the analysis. In a sub-category of consumers, I identify taxi drivers as consumers because they represent a group of actors who enjoy access to public goods provided by, for instance, the urban road agency. These taxi drivers are also service providers in offering transport that private citizens enjoy and rely on daily. Nevertheless, they are seen as consumers in the category of public roads because of their frequent usage and confrontation with the state and state-like actors. *Providers*, as another category of analysis, represent groups of actors involved in the provision of and control over the same public goods. None of these individual actors

refer to themselves or are called consumers or providers in *practice*. This is, rather, a category of analysis to organize the inquiry. However, these categories of analysis are blurry as (networks of) citizens may be providers of public goods when they assist in or constraining public good provision that benefit the community, such as collective waste management, controlling water posts or restricting access to roads. From those charging small client fees to larger criminal networks, citizens outside the formal state agencies, private companies or municipal apparatus are engaged in public goods provision. This represents the relational approach in the thesis.

The categories of consumer and provider are also conceptually useful in analyzing distinction, i.e. what you have (or do not have) and who you are (or are not), both in relation to others (consumers and providers) and to understand how citizen-subject divisions are created, upheld and negotiated. As demonstrated empirically, distinctions are made on the basis of economic and social capital that differentiates consumers in two main social groups (citizen and subjects or the haves and have-nots) and their relations with providers. Moreover, there is evidence that the providers, those in charge of control and provision of common goods, are also sometimes seen as particularly privileged consumers. This shows how these categories of consumer and provider are not one-dimensional but rather conflictual, interpretive and dynamic in form.

The social actors categorized as consumers or providers are, in turn, engaged in identifying, explaining and making claims on the *dimensions of statehood* and the *state practices* and *performance*. In the analysis (Chapter 8), I also make categorical distinctions of "modes of governance" in controlling public goods and citizen-subjects distinctions as categories of analysis. Again, these forms of categorizations are not used in practice by informants but analyzed through the way in which social actors self-identify, and identify what they expect and how they enjoy, control and manage public goods. Categories of practices in these situations are for instance *dahoulage* (stealing electricity), perceptions of what "public" means, service provision by the state, perceptions of what is expected of "citizens" and acts of "anarchic" settlers. Categories of practices also involve references to time and space through historical and comparative claims of how the 'state' used to work and how provision of public goods works in neighboring Rwanda (Cyangugu town). These *categories of practices* comprise, I argue, *de facto statehood*, i.e., the different dimensions of performing and living the state.

Table 2 shows an example of these categories. However, it should be noted that these categories come from a rich qualitative data collection where, as the empirical chapters will detail, there are fluctuations in the usage of these terms and in what context they are used and by whom. Thus, the Table 2 is simply for illustrative purposes.

Table 2 Exemplifying the differences and connections between categories of practices and analysis.

Category of practices	Interlinkage based on observation	Category of analysis
Dahoulage – *"stealing a little* [electricity]"	Citizens who are unwilling to pay and lack trust in the monopolized state service of electricity.	State resistance
Anarchic	An expression used by public service providers referring to inhabitants unable, unwilling or resisting the duties of urban space and common goods.	Subjects
Real clients	Perceptions by public service providers of proper citizens able to pay, comply with the rules and duties of the state apparatus.	Citizens
Public	Considered free to all, regardless of status, enjoyment on equal basis, liberty, as considered by private citizens (consumers) in Kadutu, Bukavu.	Public

3.2 Case studies and Methods

Before elaborating on my case study design and field research, I will position the case studies in relation to broader literature. Lund (2014, p. 224) argues that

"[a] case is an edited chunk of empirical reality where certain features are marked out, emphasized, and privileged while others recede into the background. As such, a case is not "natural," but a mental, or analytical, construct aimed at organizing knowledge about reality in a manageable way."

By applying concepts, such as public goods and statehood to an empirical reality, I have made theoretical choices that enable me to speak to a broader audience and make connections that reach beyond this particular site of field research. However, the concepts used have also directed me, as a researcher, to orient my inquiry about the world (the cases) I have studied. This is not a selection bias but rather a conscious choice of how to study and frame reality. Other researchers might have emphasized structural models of domination or focus on the individual rational actor with a set of fixed preferences. Case studies, however, are a more dynamic exercise where there are no static variables and action is not frozen in time (Migdal & Schlichte, 2005, p. 20). Based on the broad research question I have posed, I do not believe these complex processes can be narrowed down to a single explanatory variable. Instead, this thesis captures a range of views, context and interpretations of the state of affairs, which can be positioned in what George and Bennett (2005, p. 76) refer to as 'building blocks' studies. These are "particular types or subtypes of a phenomenon [to] identify common patterns or serve a particular kind of heuristic purpose" (George & Bennett, p. 76). The phenomenon I study is de facto statehood through public good relations (types). I consider the study of public goods as consisting of different case studies of the same phenomenon, namely statehood. In my analysis, I seek to both identify certain patterns through "modes of governance" and "citizen-subject" relations. However, in order to contribute more broadly to de facto statehood analysis, I use these patterns to develop a heuristic approach to statehood dimensions. I do, however, place much value on individual perspectives in themselves, and I have chosen an empirical representation of participants' own voices in Chapters 5-7.

The case studies here are positioned in an interpretive, relational research design that investigates how social actors in Bukavu discuss, negotiate, control and enjoy public goods. This allows for problematizing normative and/or preformed claims about the state based on European state formation and, instead, provides an entry point for analyzing statehood coming alive through citizens' relations in urban space. As Danermark et al. (2002 in Lund, 2014, p. 227) argue:

"Social scientists do not discover new events that nobody knew about before. What is discovered is connections and relations, not directly observable, by which we can understand and explain already known occurrences in a novel way."

These case studies are positioned within typical political science concepts, such as states, statehood, public goods and citizens, but are based on rich qualitative data to interpret everyday perspectives on statehood by analyzing the social actors whose voices are often silenced in Western dominated literature.

Choosing a single-site for the case studies, meaning geographically narrow in this study, is a highly context-dependent exercise. Instead of using loaded terms, such as generalizability, case studies that are rich in descriptive data can make use of patterns (general) and abstractions (concepts and theories) to interpret the social world (Lund, 2014, p. 225). By using these terms, it is possible to address the relationship between the context-dependent, i.e., case studies based on Bukavu citizens, and the broader implications of the research in the literature and vice versa. In other words, by applying categories of analysis, I use the case studies to develop conceptual and theoretical contributions that are relevant outside the patterns observed.

The selection of participants (informants) follows what Yin (in Small, 2009, pp. 25-26) terms "the case study logic", rather than sampling logic. As Small (p. 19) argues "[s]ampling logic is superior when asking descriptive questions about a population; case study logic is probably more effective when asking how or why questions about processes unknown before the start of the study." The relatively limited number of informants, namely 40 interviews and 7 main focus groups (further discussed below), is specific to the case study logic of saturation rather than "representative" sampling logic. Interview subjects were carefully selected on the basis of their role in service provision, such as specific agencies, while focus group members were selected based on representing different socio-economic groups and sex/age differences. The number of participants was unknown until completion, where each participant had a different "selection probability" and was asked semi-structured questions that allowed for further follow-up questions. Questions were also adapted to specific agencies (e.g., the road agency or the water company) but also between different categories of consumers, such as women living in Kadutu with no "formal" connections to public good provision or men in Ibanda with these formal connections (see further discussion below for more on this topic). This was a sequential process where each participant's contribution led to a refinement and re-evaluation of my understanding of the topics. Towards the end of my research, I found that new interviewees or focus group settings did not reveal new ideas on the study topic, but rather reaffirmed the patterns I had identified from previous encounters. In addition, the main service providers of

the goods studied in this thesis were covered through the interviews and additional interviews with them would be repetitive. This was the level of saturation for my empirical inquiry.

Table 3 shows the main categories of providers and consumers, type of goods and forms of access and delivery. Again, these categories are not fixed and consumers might be providers in some instances or vice versa.

Table 3 Table summarizing the case studies

Based on type of goods, informants, access and delivery studied and identified in Bukavu

	Providers: Public institutions	**Providers:** Commercial Companies, international donors	**Consumers/ Providers:** Local/Civil society associations	**Consumers:** Private citizens from Ibanda & Kadutu
Waste manage-ment	*Single*: Formally placed at the municipal level	*Poubel Net*	Youth groups, market waste collectors	Recycling, use of public space including rivers, lake.
Roads and traffic	*Multiple*: • *Office de Route* • *Office des Voiries et Drainage* • *Fonds National D'Entretien* • *Les Policiers de Circulation Routière* • *Société Nationale d'Assurances*	Bilateral and international agreements though World Bank, European Union, China.[12]	• *Association Congolese de Conduire* • *Forces-Vives*	Special focus on taxi drivers.
Water & hydro-electricity	*Monopoly*: • *Régie de Distribution d'Eau* • *Société National d'Électricité*	World Bank	• "*Salongo*" (voluntary work) • "Fin d'heure" (extortion gangs) • Neighbor-hood networks	• Formal connections • Use of rivers, rain and lake, • Funu and Kaduru, water stations • *Dahoulage* (stealing electricity)

More specifically, the case studies conducted in Bukavu involved participants representing different perspectives from the consumer and provider dimensions of public goods. I conducted these studies by combining semi-structured interviews (mainly service providers), focus groups with a topic guide (consumers), and participant observation (understanding social context). I

---

[12] I was not able to gain access to these bilateral and multilateral agencies, but informants discuss them and I use secondary literature, such as reports, available on the topic of restructuring the governance of water, as well as participant observation on road reconstruction by Chinese companies.

will discuss these approaches individually below, but first I will discuss the rationale behind different methods applied to different informants.

The "providers" were interviewed on an individual basis, whereas the "consumers" where interviewed in a focus group setting. The reasons for this are the following. First, the providers were specific individuals in charge of or controlling key goods addressed in the case studies. As I needed specific, in-depth knowledge on the individual cases (water, electricity, waste management, roads), a focus group setting where these different providers were grouped together would have been time-consuming and not have allowed for deeper engagement with the individual cases. Second, I argue that these individual authorities often held different levels of power, influence and legitimacy and an interview setting allowed them to speak more freely than they might have done when confronted with powerful authorities (e.g. their superior) in the same room. Individually, they dared to question their roles and responsibilities as service providers in a broader (political) system. By having these service providers in an interview setting, I could also more easily follow-up on specific topics related to day-to-day management of these public goods while keeping the interest and attention of the interview subject. In addition, and practically speaking, as an individual (female) doctoral student with little political or economic influence in Bukavu, getting these authorities together in a room would have been very difficult, indeed probably impossible. It might have required unethical tools (e.g. bribes) or a profound confidence building with individual authorities, in addition to difficulties with the dispersed geographical locations of the various offices.

Second, regarding the approaches to setting up the focus groups, "consumers" were grouped into three main categories in two different geographical territories (Kadutu and Ibanda) in addition to a special group of consumers related to roads (male taxi drivers). This was done primarily as I wanted to nuance views on specific topics and engage more deeply with meaning and reasoning behind different perceptions of access to services from different layers of society. Focus groups provided a social context in which such issues as being a citizen and the contested context of public goods access could be considered, rather than from the isolated, individual perspective of interviews. The meanings, perceptions and interpretations of topics related to de facto statehood are in many ways collective (however contested) and could more effectively be debated through discussions and interactions with a group. As will be shown in the empirical chapters, certain personal views were highly contested by members of the same focus group while other views were agreed upon, while discussions added more substance to

these views. As an "outsider" or "experience-distant" researcher (see section 3.3), the focus groups allowed me to gain further insight into these social processes and the topics debated revealed issues that I might not have encountered in an individual interview setting.

Specifically, I interviewed 40 participants, of whom two were interviewed twice. The formal interviewees were mainly participants representing a service provision (state-owned, commercial or other types) and/or the formal administration of Bukavu. However, amongst the interviewees, I also conducted (six) interviews with intellectuals, who provided me with an insights historical, political and economic context of Bukavu, all of which were relevant for deeper interpretation of state-society relations. I do not claim that these intellectuals were able to describe the 'objective reality' of these relations, but it was possible to explore ideas and perspectives with them, based on my research, which stimulated further analysis.

During the fieldwork, I made a list of core questions to ask during the interviews with the service providers. These questions began with some background queries about the institution or organization that provided the public good. Such questions could, for instance, ask if the agency was state-owned, how it was funded, or questions could cover any history of institutional changes, such as past moves from parastatal to semi-private status. I also asked questions regarding cooperation or connections with other institutions, such as whether the water agency cooperated with the municipal waste management services or vice versa. These questions, however, often took interesting turns on relevant topics that emerged. By using semi-structured techniques, I managed to gain information about service provision practices and performances that were unknown to me prior to entering the field. This was useful as I was conducting an empirical study without knowing any answers before encountering the participants. The information that I wanted to access during these interviews was mainly oral; I could later follow up on interviews by searching for written documentation on the same topics (i.e., triangulation). One such example includes references to World Bank initiatives that were affecting the institutional arrangements, e.g., neo-liberal agendas, and relations between providers and consumers.

Further, in order to gather perspectives from consumers, i.e., private citizens of Bukavu, I chose to conduct six focus groups; three in the poorer neighborhoods of Kadutu and three in the city center and more privileged area of Ibanda. Focus groups averaged from three to eight participants in three different group compositions:

1) Youth, a mixed group of girls and boys: One in Ibanda, one in Kadutu
2) Women: One in Ibanda, one in Kadutu
3) Men: One in Ibanda, one in Kadutu

In these focus group settings, I followed the same principle of semi-structured interviews. Participants were asked questions regarding basic background information, such as age, occupation and where they lived in Bukavu. In addition, I had a set of core questions regarding what they considered "public goods" and "public services" to mean, whether or not they had piped water, electricity and regular waste services. Moreover, I asked them about taxation practices when using public roads. I would then follow up on more qualitative questions depending on their responses to actual practices and expectations. For instance, an emerging topic across these focus groups discussions was the idea of "public", such as public space, as a category of practice. This was an analytical insight into the contested nature of "public" in Bukavu and different responses were received from private citizens in focus groups, interviews with intellectuals and service providers.

In addition, I conducted one focus group discussion with taxi drivers in Bukavu that represents a particular group of consumers for one of the public goods, namely roads, in the case study. Obviously, these taxi drivers also need, for instance, water in their daily lives, but as Lund's definition of a case study cited above highlights, I have chosen particular empirical realities that I privilege, the enjoyment of public roads in this particular context. These participants were also asked basic background information, but the prepared questions related to accessing public roads daily. I also followed up with questions regarding the drivers' union (ACCO), which I was not sufficiently familiar to prior to the meeting, and practices and expectations when it came to taxation and traffic police.

Prior to these focus groups, I also conducted pilot focus groups with youth, students, men and women, from both Ibanda and Kadutu during the first two fieldwork visits as a way of immersing myself in their realities and perspectives. These discussions were of an explorative character; I asked broad questions about life and expectations in Bukavu and sentiments about the Congolese government, locally and centrally. Participants were free to discuss what came to mind and conversations revealed topics in Bukavu that allowed me to re-consider, follow-up and refine questions. They were also a lesson in group composition: I learned to avoid

silencing certain participants in a group, and to prepare and plan for final focus groups. However, the main findings in the empirical chapters are primarily based on the final six focus groups and the focus group with taxi drivers. In total, I conducted 14 focus groups (personally) while the research assistant conducted one focus group.[13]

In terms of the composition of the six main focus groups, it was useful to divide the adult population into separate groups of men and women, as there is a tendency in Bukavu for men to take charge in a group, potentially silencing women. There are also differences between being a university student and being an adult woman in Bukavu, where the former may have more room to speak up. I also adopted this approach because there were different gender roles concerning daily tasks and the household roles of men and women. Though the youth groups could also be divided into girls and boys, my previous experience with both dividing and combining girls and boys revealed that talking to the younger population together stirred more debate on the given topics. Dividing the population into age groups – young people who still lived with their families and adults having their own families – it was possible to gain a sense of expectations from people who had only lived briefly during the late Zaire and the DRC period (1990s and onwards) and those who had experienced the decades of the 1970s and 80s.[14]

Finally, participant observation was an important way of understanding, for instance, 'public' transport, commercial waste services, public water sources and a range of other issues. Lessons from these observations were pursued further in different interview and focus group settings. These observations were made, for instance, when using taxis, visiting municipal offices, or generally engaging with people accessing different public goods. In addition, participant observation allowed me to ask informal questions in any particular context. For instance, when traffic police stopped my driver, I would ask questions about the event immediately after it occurred. These answers are not used as quotations in the thesis, but rather enriched my understanding of the social context.[15] Such events also informed me about my influence in this social context. Using the same example, the police officer sought to negotiate a handsome bribe

---

[13] During the fieldwork in September-October 2014, I was unable to conduct a focus group with women in Ibanda. The research assistant, Jonathan Magoma, had actively participated in all the focus group meetings in the role as translator, moderator and also note taker to ensure we had compatible understanding and was fully competent to conduct a focus group on his own. I sent him the topic guide with questions, allowing for participants and interviewer to further discuss issues that were raised, and he conducted and transcribed the focus group interview.

[14] See background Chapter 4 for more details on the contextual situation of Congolese statehood aspects.

[15] Section 3.3 will further elaborate on reflexivity and positionality.

with my driver based on my presence, as a potential source of extra cash, while at the same time using excessively polite French when engaging with me.

All interviews and focus groups were transcribed; some were recorded, when agreed upon, and were transcribed. Transcription was necessary after focus groups where participants' contributions had been fragmented or when participants had spoken over each other. The majority of interviews and focus groups, however, were recorded by my taking hand-written notes: this was more comfortable for the participants and more convenient for me. Once returning to my lodgings in the afternoon or evening, I immediately transcribed the notes using my laptop and made separate notes on participant observations. Quotations in this thesis are taken directly from these transcriptions.

Language is another important issue in my methodological approach, as there are a variety of languages and dialects spoken in Bukavu, including, but not limited to, French in administrative and education settings, varieties of Swahili, Mashi (Shi language), and Lingala among soldiers. In this section, I will only focus on the immediate practicalities, while returning to more profound issues in Section 3.4. During the fieldwork, I worked with two translators. Ali, whom I met first, was able to assist me during the pilot fieldwork. Due to other commitments on his side, Jonathan would eventually also assist me in arranging focus group meetings. The type of participants was structured (age group, neighborhood and sex) and Jonathan would find participants in places where they could typically be found, such as local in churches, certain schools or cafés. The participants were also informed about my intentions prior to meetings.

Working with translators was enriching because we could discuss and explore themes before and after the focus groups and interview settings. Jonathan, who I worked most with during the fieldwork visits, also reminded me of relevant questions that I could ask in interviews and focus groups based on previous encounters and experiences. This enriched the data with questions that I might have otherwise overlooked. Also, both Ali's and Jonathan's cultural sensitivity to customs on how to approach people in the particular settings smoothed entry to these settings and improved the way I formulated language. At a personal level, working together with them gave me confidence as a researcher to knock on any door because I knew that language skills were not a concern. I was less vulnerable to potential personal attacks or harassment as I was never alone. Moreover, there were conversations that I was not supposed to hear (spoken in

Swahili or Mashi) that my translators were able to pick up on and inform me about. One example of this is discussed in the chapter on roads (Chapter 6), where I was able to observe corruption taking place in the traffic police office.

3.3 Reflexivity and Positionality

In order to address validity in qualitative research, I will discuss the reflexive character of this thesis, i.e., that "social researchers are part of the social world they study" (Hammersley and Atkinson 2007, p. 15). This is important to consider, in order to limit my effects on the data while, simultaneously, acknowledging my position in the study. In other words, the main concern here was to ask questions that were open-ended and not based on potentially biased personal perceptions, while being aware of how my presence might have shaped the participants' answers. As such, I will use the term "participants" in this discussion as they were actively taking part in my research through sharing personal reflections, perceptions and ideas.

However, when participants were active in the study they may have been describing a version of their access to public goods provision or their consumption from, to some extent, ulterior motives. For instance, it was usual that poorer citizens in Kadutu would claim that there were no existing services for them and then, in the next sentence, ask for help. Poorer citizens' encounters with Westerners are usually of a donor-recipient nature and their perception of me, despite my presentation as a student, was often framed as a potential source of funding. Respecting that these citizens find themselves in difficult situations, it was important to ask different follow-up questions so that we could work around the subject of public goods to gain a fuller picture. That said, it is precisely in the subjective meanings and perspectives of participants that I was interested. Nevertheless, it remained an important issue throughout the fieldwork visits to be aware of informants' intentions and their representations, and to triangulate data by combining views from different participants, with participant observation and with what was available from written sources to gain a more accurate picture.

Moreover, becoming an "insider" in Congo was almost impossible for me. There are some obvious and subtler reasons, as well as advantages and disadvantages, related to this outsider position. Being an insider has both advantages and disadvantages and needs to be scrutinized thoroughly to be taken seriously (see e.g. Abu-Lughod, 1989). In short, I neither fitted in as a

white woman, nor was I part of the expatriate community working in Bukavu. For example, expatriates are generally not allowed to take local taxis due to insurance and safety issues. By contrast, being a student without development aid funding and taking a local taxi leveled my position, to some extent, with the participants. However, my European "ethnicity" inevitably affected Congolese perceptions about me, as they tend to view Western Europe as a rich and well-functioning continent. In many ways, I remained privileged with a return ticket that cost the equivalent of several years of an average Congolese salary, and a Norwegian passport. At night, I could return to a safe house with guards, food, beer and friends, where the only thing I lacked was well-functioning access to the Internet. My understanding of people's suffering due to poverty would be a subjective interpretation of what I saw and what people would tell me, not felt in the same way as the participants of this research.

Furthermore, the outsider position is important to consider when it comes to knowledge and the types of questions asked. As an outsider, I could ask questions that a participant might not have thought about or reflected much upon, or I could ask questions that might compel the participant to explain what could be obvious for insiders. Geertz (1973 in Schatz 2009, p. 6-7) has termed this the "experience-distant" approach, contrasted by degree with "experience-near." By being experience-distant to meanings, relations and identities in public good provision in Bukavu, I investigated "taken-for-granted" knowledge by participants. Thus, the key was to be alert and always ask questions about phrases, names and expressions that seemed obvious to the insiders (experience-near). As Schwartz-Shea and Yanow (2012, p. 29) argue, "[b]eing a stranger to one's physical setting (…) - and trying to hold on to that quality for as long as one can – is desirable in order to see as explicitly as possible what for situated knowers is taken-for-granted, common sense, and tacitly known." Simultaneously, doctoral research is an insider exercise of writing my interpretations of the empirical observations and theoretical field. Contrary to many participants in this study, I am "experience-near" to social science languages that have shaped and constructed my analytical interpretations. Thus, there are different degrees of experience-distant and experience-near depending on the social and academic context in this PhD process.

Furthermore, gaining access to data and the issues of language and gatekeepers can be pressing concerns for outsiders or experience-distant researchers (Hammersley & Atkinson, 2007, p. 40). Gatekeepers can potentially select access to documents and participants based on their personal loyalties, and so it is important to consider these limitations. Here, negotiating, and

re-negotiating, access in a respectful manner was important and was always a combined effort by the translators and me. In many respects, research assistants are also gatekeepers as they influence who I might end up interviewing. For instance, the research assistant usually set up the focus groups; I could have spoken to different people if I had done this myself. However, based on my experience, the best way to set up focus groups was through my research assistant because, had I done this, I would have, firstly, attracted unnecessary attention as a white woman and, secondly, been unable to find "representative" participants of each group given my lack of knowledge regarding local contexts. Here, it was important to develop a framework identifying the characteristics of the population that I wanted to meet with and to ensure that participants were briefed by both my research assistant and me before conducting a focus group.

During the fieldwork visits, some doors remained closed. I was unable to interview the traffic police at street level, international donors or the elite consumer Bralima, the local brewery. At the same time, being a white foreigner opened up more doors than perhaps would have been available to a Congolese student. As my research assistant Jonathan highlighted often, and which I also noticed in different encounters, the Congolese administration would normally demand an official purpose for a local meeting, often preferring questionnaires to be filled out to allowing face-to-face semi-structured interviews. By contrast, there was generally an open-door policy for white foreigners. Reasons include, from my understanding, an interest in potential funding or a curiosity about the researcher. The administrative and public authorities also seemed to be interested portraying Congo in a favorable way and thus interested in talking to an international researcher. As a contrast, I would not expect similar open access to provincial or municipal authorities in my own country of origin (Norway) and, hence, the outsider position came with its advantages and privileges. By being an outsider, I could also ask less informed questions about issues that I might, otherwise, have felt uncomfortable asking about.

3.4 Methodological challenges and ethical considerations

This section will elaborate on some of the ethical and methodological challenges. First and foremost, there are some potential biases in a micro-study design that should be addressed, related also to the issue of scale. Just as macro-studies can ignore details, an overemphasis on micro-dynamics can cause researchers to lose the larger picture. Researchers may also run the

risk of ignoring macro-activities originating from political authorities, e.g., from the central government or development agencies, when focusing on a relatively few number of people. In addition, it was important always to be aware of the different realities existing outside the urban center of Bukavu.

Thus, to avoid a purely micro-study bias, I have, as far as possible, studied contemporary and historical state structures, including a brief archival study of Bukavu's colonial design as the administrative headquarter of the eastern Congo, to enrich my understanding of the context in which I conduct my analysis. Moreover, I had an important meeting with the local king of Kabare (the Mwami of Kabare, the Shi kingdom), the Shi having ruled the study area for centuries before the colonial occupation (see Chapter 4). This enabled a contextual understanding of rulers and legitimacy, as well as contested land issues, all of which are underlying problems for public goods provision.

As mentioned, I worked with two research assistants to assist with translation and arranging focus group meetings. The issues of language and interpreters would have been even more pressing, had I conducted an ethnographic study; however, it is still useful to discuss some of these challenges in a micro-study approach. In terms of the limitations of my language abilities, the French I learned at school and in Paris was different from the varieties spoken in Bukavu. An advantage, however, was that French was used mainly as an administrative and formal language, which meant that I would not have to deal with slang or idiomatic expression. Yet, there is no escaping the fact that, due to the historical-colonial origins of the French language, by using French, it was difficult to gain a more personal or deeper understanding of participants' inner thoughts about the public goods I was studying.

Hence, a distance was created by my speaking French and not having mastered Swahili or Mashi (i.e., I was a linguistic outsider). Working with translators, however, allowed me to gain an insight into the expressions and thoughts of non-Francophone participants of a lower socioeconomic status. However, different translators or interpreters will emphasize and translate in their own ways, which might affect participants' or my understanding. Translation is not simply a mechanical effort that can be controlled in the field but a highly subjective, cognitively demanding and time-consuming exercise (Borchgrevink, 2003, p. 106). This means that it is important for the translator and the researcher to work closely together to avoid, as far as possible, misunderstanding.

An example during the early stages of my second fieldwork revealed a problematic translation of the concept "public goods". As the translator and I spoke English to each other, I did not consider using the French expression *bien public* to ensure that he understood what I meant. Instead, and during the first interview, the concept was translated to *bonne gouvernance* (good governance), which made me realize that we needed to discuss further the purpose of the research. However, it also revealed how categories of analysis may be interpreted in a dramatically different manner from categories of practices. Interpreting public goods as "*bonne gouvernance*" is an example of how Western donor agendas affect vocabulary in this area. Frequently, I would discover the contested nature of what public means which, in turn, informed my analyses regarding the contested nature of the "state". Moreover, effective communication relies on more than language and I consider myself incredibly lucky to have worked with people that were polite, respectful and intelligent. This is important as the fieldwork was highly dependent on communication and could have yielded far less fruitful results if I had been ill at ease with the translator. Luckily, it was possible during the fieldwork visits to collaborate closely and, as a result, to develop more informed questions at each stage of the data collection.

Furthermore, interview and focus groups are, generally speaking, unnatural settings and discussions will rarely flow naturally from the onset. Some encounters were more successful than others, for a variety of reasons. The most challenging aspect was that I did not necessarily have sufficient time to gain near-insider trust from the participants. In order to compensate for this limitation, it was necessary to read my participants, in terms of their social interaction, always to be polite and respectful and to work my way through an introduction that clarified my purpose. Also, as they increasingly understood my study, it was possible to ask very specific questions, compared to my first stumbling attempts, that allowed the participants to share more in-depth knowledge. This was particularly useful when conducting follow-up interviews with the same participants or in later-stage encounters. Moreover, it was important to choose environments in which participants felt secure, especially in focus group meetings; this was also an ethical concern. The interviews were mainly conducted in offices or similar such places, while the focus groups were conducted in private locations, for example, in one of the homes of the participants or in a shielded local pub where the participants were not disturbed by others.

Though the topic of the thesis may be seen as less volatile compared to topics analyzing conflicts in the region, the issues I studied were highly politicized and many were fearful of expressing political viewpoints that could put them in danger. By ensuring a secure environment, as far as possible, the conversations flowed into fuller discussions. The participants of the focus groups remain anonymous to protect them: in the worst case, individual citizens' expressions of their viewpoints may lead to harm to themselves or their family.

As written sources are limited concerning the topic I researched in Bukavu, the majority of the empirical work is based on information learnt orally. This is a subjective exercise and participants will intentionally and unintentionally distort information, for example, by manipulating their views, sharing some views and not others, or having 'extreme' viewpoints that diverge from the majority of the population. Thus, it was particularly useful to cross-check and triangulate data by speaking to different participants, as well as using written sources, when available, to gain more diverse perspectives. This does not mean that my study is "fact-based", in line with more positivist approaches, but rather I wanted to verify if the perceptions presented by participants were one-off opinions or whether these were views to which other participants could also relate.

Finally, a few more ethical considerations should be mentioned. As much as possible, I attempted to have a well-developed research design and a clear idea of what I was studying, before entering the field, in order to avoid taking unnecessary time from, and lose the interest of, participants. Though the study was constantly evolving on the ground, I was purposeful with the people I wanted to meet and the type of information I was seeking. It was also important to gain consent from and respect the confidentially of the participants. All participants were informed about my purpose and were asked if they would allow their name in my thesis, both before and after the interview/focus group. All interviews and discussions were conducted on a voluntary basis. Finally, I did not pay for any information but would sometimes offer soda or beer in appropriate settings, such as in pubs, as well as covering for taxi/transport for focus groups participants who had to travel in order to meet me. It would, in my view, be unethical if participants incurred costs related to my studies. I also provided a salary for research assistant work.

3.5 Summary remarks

This chapter has demonstrated my intentions to move beyond what I consider to be the limitations of the methodology used in mainstream political science, namely the realist ontological and objectivist epistemological presuppositions (Schwartz-Shea & Yanow, 2012). I argued that it is problematic to approach the social world only through pre-formed concepts and assume that entities come first and relations between these entities happen subsequently. Thus, I have combined what are termed interpretive and relational approaches to this study. By interpretive approaches, I mean a focus on subjective meanings, beliefs, and discourses, rather than correlations between entities. I further offer "interpretations of interpretations" to inform an inductive understanding of de facto statehood. By relational approach, I mean that I consider the transaction or relations between informants and the public goods as central to these meanings, beliefs and discourses. The interpretive, relational design enables me not only to problematize normative and/or preformed claims about how a state should appear or what it is not, but also enables me to focus on the people living and performing the state to provide an entry point for analyzing dimensions of statehood.

Conceptually, and inspired by Bourdieu ([1990] 1997), I use categories of practices - everyday terms used by informants to describe social life, both objects and subjects – and categories of analysis – how I describe the object of scientific inquiry – as tools to approach and analytically develop the study. These categories of practices and analysis are not clinically separated, as these terms can be used by both social scientists and in everyday life by social actors, such as "the state". In my scientific inquiry, the social world is studied, interpretively, by analyzing the meanings that social actors attach to certain categories of practices. Here, my inquiry starts with the meanings that consumers and providers attach to three categories of public goods: waste management, water and hydroelectricity, and public roads. I see these case studies as a building block study, which entails studying types (public goods) of a phenomenon (statehood) in order to develop a heuristic approach to de facto statehood dimensions. This, in turn, informs my categories of analysis within de facto dimensions of statehood that in turn make up some of the patchwork that we call "the state".

4.0 Background chapter: The making of Bukavu and ideas of statehood

"Observation is never neutral, the gaze is directed from a particular point of view. (…) There is no way of seeing from 'nowhere in particular'."

(Hastrup, 1995, p. 4)

The quote above is illustrative of how both scholars and those "producing history" construct plans, images and practices of statehood, nations and citizens. History can be seen as a production of thoughts, ideas, *knowledges* (*connaissances*) and sets of dispersed events (Foucault, 1998, pp. 301-302). As Foucault ([1972]2002, p. 8) argued, history "deploys a mass of elements that have to be grouped, made relevant, placed in relation to one another to form totalities." According to this understanding, knowing a total history (e.g. of a nation) is impossible (Foucault, [1972]2002, p. 10). Rather, certain selections of history relating to the creation, effect, practices and performance of statehood dimensions will be emphasized. This chapter situates the subsequent discussion (Chapter 5-7) of my observations through interpreting historical trajectories and genealogies of the construction of Congo and Bukavu. In these cases, I argue that it is necessary to use history as a means to problematize the present.

Taking a Foucauldian perspective, Neumann and Sending (2010, p. 20) argue that historical trajectories and relations are preconditions for action. This way of thinking, the authors (ibid p. 20) argue, can also be applied to the political action of constructing governmentality. Governmentality is seen as techniques, rationales and mentalities for subject-making that authorities use for particular ends or power (Foucault, 1991). The relations studied between public goods provision and consumption need to be positioned in these historical relations, as no actors or groups can rightly be seen as independent, either from each other or from their context. I will follow this principle through an interpretation of the literature on the Belgian Congo (1908-1960), the period known as Zaire (1971-1997) and the transition to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), supplemented by fieldwork interviews in and around Bukavu. Overall, the chapter is intended to interpret historical trajectories and relations when it comes to concepts surrounding public good provision, statehood and the state effect (colonial or independent) in Bukavu.

The chapter is structured as follows: First, I will begin with the story of Bukavu seen from pre-colonial structures. Second, a history of the colonial authorities will be presented. These authorities invested in public good infrastructure and building, and were thus the creators of the Bukavu's physical aspect. But they also contributed to creating the underlying relationships within the city, by creating identities and the body of colonial administration. As discussed in the theoretical chapter, the city can be seen as a difference machine that creates ways of being political that are different from those associated with the pastoral life of a village (Isin, 2002; Mamdani, 1996). Major investments in a piped water system, electricity, roads, sanitation and administrative housing occurred in the post-World War II period, primarily in the first half of the 1950s. In many ways, Bukavu approximated a European city in this period. In order to understand why these investments took place, I argue that it is important to look at the colonial governmentality through the archives available on these issues.

Second, this chapter will review the post-colonial period and the rise of the Zairian nation-state through President Mobutu Sese Seko (henceforth Mobutu). Understanding this period is crucial for understanding the broader picture regarding nation-building and, relatedly, public goods provision. Contrary to its common categorization as a pure kleptocracy, the Zairian government, in fact, invested much in public service provision and, thus, fortified an image of the importance of the state and its promise. Importantly, and even though the regime eventually fell, that promise of the state lives on among citizens. As in many post-colonial countries, Zaire was a state that promised much but that did not deliver on all these promises. I will particularly discuss what Young and Turner (1985, pp. 64-65) call the fourth stage, between 1970-74, which saw considerable state expansions in ideological and economic terms and, moreover, there was an expansion in the reach of the regime in terms of the domestic dimensions of statehood. It was in this period that nation-building techniques, rationales and mentalities (governmentalities) were at their peak. This will be discussed in relation to the politics of zairianisation and authenticity as a form of governmentality that had a major impact on state ownership, ideas of being political and the promise of the state. Specific national agencies will be discussed in this chapter, such as the water agency (REGIDESO) and the electricity agency (SNEL), to situate the state's monopolization of services.

The last section includes a discussion on the transition from Zaire to the DRC and some of the broader issues and specific aspects that concerns contemporary Bukavu. In this section, I discuss changes to the languages of stateness (Hansen & Stepputat, 2001, p. 6) in the country

as a result of the fall of Mobutu's regime and conflict complexities in the eastern provinces. The section is also based on emerging issues from fieldwork, such as population growth, and international and domestic aspects of statehood that affect service providers and consumers in Bukavu.

Creating a modern state effect in the DRC has been as much about alienation and othering as an articulation of citizenship under a state. A significant number of academic and legal texts, dating back to Belgian Congo, reveals a considerable preoccupation with the identification of people as, for example, citizens, workers, slaves, evolved, ethnic, tribal or indigenous, on one hand, and the design of the modern administration ("the state") on the other. Recalling the theoretical discussion (Chapter 2), the othering is seen as a condition of citizenship (Isin, 2002, pp. 3-4). Namely, defining who belongs and does not belong to modern state. Simultaneously, the discourses emerging from these texts reveal equally how much there was no *one* Belgian Congo – a unified colonial state – but a plurality of political rationalities and techniques employed to govern different regions and people. The colonial period and the following decades after independence have undoubtedly pushed people and groups into new ways of defining "the public". Various visions of what a nation state should be have coalesced with dual expectations of duties and rights.

The particularities of the city, as where the colonial masters' settled, administered and created divisions, create a space for interaction, sometimes conflictual, across a range of identities and practices (Isin & Nielsen, 2008, p. 8). To take the example of colonial Leopoldville (Kinshasa), this city grew in the first half of the 20th century into what de Boeck (2011, p. 266) describes as "a segregationist, Janus-faced city, a city like a Bounty candy bar, with a white heart, La Ville, the home of the city's European population (…) and a surrounding, quickly growing peripheral African city, commonly referred to as La Cité, home to an increasing number of Congolese." Though smaller in size and established later as a colonial city, Bukavu had clear, segregationist lines of settlements and claims of citizenship and othering (subject-making). Although racial discrimination has long been abolished, I argue that there are still divisions based on the colonial structure and later conflictual relations when it comes to constructing identities of belonging and othering. These historical trajectories are relevant for understanding negotiations over public goods as dimensions of statehood.

4.1. Pre-colonial structures in South Kivu, Congo

Looming in the background of the municipal apparatus of Bukavu's formal state is its relationship with the traditional kingdom(s) of the Shi people, *Bashi*; a form of autochthon claim to the land of South Kivu (see Boas & Dunn, 2013). It should be noted, however, that when the Shi arrived, hunter-gather "Pygmie"[16] groups, Batwa or Bambuti, were already there and are believed to be the first inhabitants of the Rift Valley forests (today covering eastern DRC, Uganda, Rwanda and Burundi) (Lewis, 2000, p. 5; Vansania, 2001, pp. 25, 32-34). Though these groups deserve more discussion, the Shi tribe is considered the first to have created central, hierarchical forms of governance in the region and will thus be prioritized in this thesis.

The Shi tribe arrived in what is now known as Kabare territory around 1350 and was organized under different clans (Schneider 1996, p. 55). The Shi eventually consolidated their kingdom under one clan chief named Kabare Kaganda (Masson, 1960). However, in 1750, Kabare's son, Kagweshe Bagweshe, rebelled against his father and the kingdom was split into two; Kabare in the north and Ngweshe in the South (Masson, 1960; Sosne, 1974). This led to conflicts over land between the two kingdoms. In addition, five other, smaller chiefdoms (Kaziba, Luhwidnja, Burhinyi, Nindja and Kalonge) have formed other elements of South Kivu's domestic statehood (Bishikwabo, 1980, p. 89). As Bishikwabo (1980, p. 90) writes, "an ethnic unity [Shi] does not necessarily mean a political unity" and the region was inclined to rivalry and wars prior to colonization. In addition, immigration from neighboring Rwanda and Burundi has also been influential in political and economic spheres. However, unlike North Kivu province in contemporary DRC, the arrival of migrants from Rwanda and Burundi was largely due to the political dynamics in these neighboring kingdoms prior to colonization (Vlassenroot 2013, p. 15). Though the exact dates and migration history are disputed, authors such as Alexis Kagame (1972 in Vlassenroot 2013, p. 16) have traced these Rwandan groups, who would later be known as Banyamulenge, back to the end of the 17th Century. The Banyamulenge, meaning "people of Mulenge", consist of a small Tutsi pastoralist community speaking Kinyarwanda (Turner, 2007, p. 76). The Bashi in contemporary Bukavu regard the Banyamulenge with

---

[16] "Pygmies" is a generic academic term but also used actively by interest groups and Congolese nationals in the DRC.

suspicion; many of the latter live in Cyangugu town, Rwanda, across the border from Bukavu and are fearful of attacks during the night.[17]

In the traditional Shi kingdoms, the clans were organized into hierarchical positions from the local king, *Mwami*, on top to the peasants without any political position, *Bashizi,* at the bottom (Tull, 2005, p. 73; Van Acker, 2000, p. 2).[18] The Mwami, or *Bami* in plural (Bishikwabo, 1980, p. 92), are still in power today (though at varying degrees) but considered a territorial administration under the formal government as *chef de chefferie*. In the traditional Kabare and Ngweshe kingdoms, land was not owned per se by the Bami. Rather, land was administrated under a social organization known as *kalinzi* that can be described as a 'structuring structure' (Mugangu 1997 in Van Acker, 2000, p. 2). Instead of a formal contract, kalinzi can be seen, as Van Acker (p. 2) states, as "an institution that legitimizes the whole social organization by absorbing all persons within a given area into a network of dependent relations." Within this social hierarchy an annual rent in the form of products and labor would be paid by those working on the land to the given patron in the area and the surplus redistributed to sustain the social structure. Under this system, no one had full or no land rights as anyone, even immigrants, could rent land as long as they respected these rules. In that sense, land can be interpreted as a form of common good, although with certain prescribed roles. At the same time, this traditional organization was of an extremely hierarchical nature and subject-making under an autocratic, mythical king's rule. Yet, the Bami rule can be seen as a state-like form of authority, as they absorbed classic approaches to statehood with regard to territory, population (subjects) and the creation of central governance forms. Within this form of hierarchical rule, I argue, there is a limited space for transitions and changes in order for individuals to become politically engaged citizens.

The traditional king of Kabare territory (*Mwami de Kabare*) is the closest monarch to Bukavu and is a direct royal descendent from the preexisting kingdom with an autochthonous claim to the city, as well as to South Kivu (Turner, 2007, p. 101). During my last fieldwork (October 2014), I was told that due the popularity of this form of rule, tribal leaders are not allowed to officially stand for elections because it would usually mean a landslide victory to the Mwami.[19]

---

[17] "Banyamulenge" is often used as a group term for the armed rebellion that started the First Congo War 1996-1997.
[18] Also in personal conversation with Mwami Desiré Rugemaninzi II, 29 October 2014, Kabare, DRC
[19] In informal conversations during fieldwork September to October 2014 as well as with an intellectual, Déo Katwanyi Kabika, 28 October 2014, Bukavu, DRC.

A Mwami, then, is an authority closer to the population, having ethnic ties with the majority group (*Mashi*) in the region. During the interview with the Mwami of Kabare, Jonathan, my research assistant, asked a very pertinent question regarding this claim, namely why the Mwami did not have armed guards to protect him, unlike politicians in Bukavu. The Mwami answered as follows:[20]

"I am the *Mwami*, my family will always rule. When I am dead, my son will take over. This is not the case for politicians. If the governor dies, it is not necessarily his son that takes over. Also, if anyone killed me, the person who did this and his family would be ruined. He would be killed and his family would have their house and belongings taken away from them. I don't have to safeguard my life; this is my people. But the politicians need to safeguard their lives because it is not their people."

There is a claim here that shows a considerable "closeness" to people under the Mwami's rule that is dually based on threat of violent repercussions to anyone who makes an attempt on his life and a discourse of "eternal rule" through family inheritance and membership in contrast to the politicians and electorates in Bukavu. Using Weberian terms, the Mwami is using claims of legitimate rule, in the traditional ideal type of authority. Within this form of rule, legitimacy changes power from simple materiality (violence, corruption, and habit), to authority. Within this form of rule, as claimed by the Mwami, there is a shared belief between him and his subjects in his authority that makes it pointless for anyone to attempt to kill him. Of course, he may be killed, as predecessors have been, but the Bami's legitimacy and their followers may persist. As I will discuss further in the section on contemporary administration in Bukavu (4.4), the Governor, the Mayor and the three Bourgmestre are not elected by citizens but imposed by the central government in Kinshasa. Thus, using the Mwami's rationale, although these figures hold power over the citizens of Bukavu, they do not do so legitimately.

Colonialism had a major impact on traditional Bami rules, although its impacts are disputed and used as political tools for creating certain histories about legitimate rules. From one point of view, the Mwami went from having a mythical status of "unchallenged and unchallengeable" to subordination or opposition under the colonial masters (Young & Turner, 1985, p. 165). For instance, the story of Mwami Rugemaninzi I, the grandfather of the current Mwami of Kabare (cited above), is that he was imprisoned in Leopoldville (Kinshasa) due to his opposition to Belgian rule.[21] When the Mwami returned after independence, the structure

---

[20] Interview with Mwami Desiré Rugemaninzi II, with research assistant Jonathan Magoma 29 October 2014, Kabare, DRC.
[21] Interview with Deo Katwanyi Kabika, an intellectual, 28 October 2014, Bukavu.

of Bukavu was completely transformed and the traditional kingdom was split into different smaller Mwami territories.[22] In contemporary South Kivu, these smaller chiefdoms draw their legitimacy from both so-called traditional and modern forms of statehood. This includes, for instance, promoting modern forms of education, healthcare and administration and, at the same time, drawing on ethnic ties, traditional titles and rituals. The current Mwami of Kabare is no exception to this duality of traditional-modern statehood.[23]

However, another version of history might be that colonialism had the impact of "territorializing identity", as Vlassenroot (2013, p. 17) argues. This version sees a defining of identity in relation to territory and thus a strengthening of ethnicity as the organizing principle in the region. The arrival of the Belgian authorities thus partly consolidated and legitimatized chiefdoms outside the civic public (Ekeh, 1975). Sosne (1979, p. 194) argues that the Belgian rule profited Shi authorities, especially the higher levels of area chiefs, kings and their allies. This profit was particularly linked to plantation owners' need for labor, largely drawn from the Shi population and facilitated by the traditional kings. Moreover, different sets of customary laws were created by the colonial masters based on an ethnic citizenship that recognized the assumed pre-colonial order (Vlassenroot 2013, p. 18). The result, as Mamdani (1996, 1997) has described, was a two-faced rule: One being the civic rule and the other an ethnicized and racialized power framed as native authority. The chief of a chiefdom was seen as a way to link the colonial state with the territories through African nobles (Dembour, 2008, p. 23). As I will discuss, the colonial experience in Bukavu, however, was modernizing in nature in the creation and construction of a modern city, partly constructed under the principle of civic rule but also encapsulating different politicized identities known as *évolués*.

4.2 Colonial governmentality and the development of an urban administration in Bukavu

Understanding colonial governmentality - mentalities, rationalities and techniques - has led me to archival sources from the Royal African Museum in Belgium, where in particular I consulted texts from Belgian colonial administrative experts. These texts do not offer reliable accounts qualify as of individual Belgians but rather describe the basis and rationale behind some of the

---

[22] Ibid, as well as interview with Mwami Desiré Rugemaninzi II, 29 October 2014, Kabare, DRC

[23] Reminding the reader that statehood can be perceived as a relative concept of the ability to enforce various collectively binding decisions on its members and hence a term not limited to formal state apparatus.

many ways of organizing and dividing the population from citizens and subjects. The colonial governmentality under King Leopold II's Congo Free State (1885–1908) was in many respects more extreme than Belgian Congo (1908-1960) marked by a sharp contrast between outspoken ideals – anti-slavery, freedom, independence, "equality before the God of all" (Boulger, 1898, p. 1) – and practice – brutal slavery that led to millions dead and severe disruption to the lives of many others. The events of the Congo Free State are captured in a range of historical (e.g., Hochschild, 1998), fictional (e.g., Conrad, 1902), and journalistic writings and I will not focus on these happenings here as Bukavu and the surrounding region were largely "undiscovered" in this period. In brief, a typical description of the "natives" in the colonial imagining of the Congo Free State is captured below (Boulger, 1898, p. 340)[24]:

"The blacks are still in their infancy as a people. They may never attain manhood; and the one essential to their continued well-being is the presence of their white educators and leaders, who supply the initiative, in which they seem to be completely lacking. If they ever do attain an equality with white men, it will be the greatest human triumph in the history of the world."

Though these depictions were adjusted according to international pressure, especially through the declaration of International Human Rights (1948), there persisted an explicit or tacit tendency of sub-ordination and hierarchy based on "ethnicity" and "culture" in Belgian Congo (1908–1960). In Belgian law, for instance, there were whites (*les blanches*), evolved natives (*les noir évolués*), and tribalized or non-evolved natives (*les noir non évolués*) (Hostelet, 1954, p. 303). These identities, however, were only a few of the many forms of different subject-making claims by the Belgian colonizers; other such claims included workers, *garçon* (servant) and indigenous.[25]

Identity making also affected government techniques in dealing with land ownership and belonging. When the Belgian government assumed power after Leopold, the administrative foundation for public, commercial and private land was laid (Misch & Thron, 1909, p. 5). In the original text on land tenure in Belgian Congo, Misch and Thron (ibid pp. 6-7) argued that "[t]he natives do not understand the property or idea of vacant land. They settle in the territories where they come and go to harvest. The concepts of indigenous property and vacant land cannot

---

[24] The historian Boulger's accounts serve as a time capsule to study a pro-Leopold and Congo Free State description of European colonial powers, administration and so-called natives.

[25] In reviewing the colonial literature, I noticed that the Belgians used considerable efforts in grouping and counting subjects in the colony.

be used as a basis for land legislation [in Belgian Congo]."[26] Broadly speaking, the land was instead divided into: firstly, Belgian Congo's state-owned land; secondly, land owned by individuals and companies or concessions; and, thirdly, indigenous land based on customary law (ibid). More specifically when it came to land rights (*droit foncier*), the Belgian colonial authorities distinguished between three types of land: *les terres domaniales*, the public land owned by the colony and for commercial exploitation (the companies and colonial state were often intertwined), *les terres enrigstrées*, private land for Europeans, and *les terres indigènes*, the indigenous or native land owned by clans (Hostelet, 1954, p. 303; Malengana, 2001, p. 164). For the clans under the Shi, this meant that in mainly rural areas they could continue to cultivate land and use rivers and lakes for fishing but they did not formally own the land or production apart from subsistence farming.

Moreover, the Belgians recognized three forms of native circumscription: firstly, the chieftaincy (*chefferie*), secondly, the sector (*secteur*) and, thirdly, the extra-customary center (*centre extra-coutumier*, CEC) (see Baumer, 1939; Dembour, 2008; Young & Turner, 1985). This was primarily done in order to link the Belgian colonial state in the capital and cities to the population at large. As Young and Turner (1985, p. 233) argues, "[t]he manner in which they were applied depended both on the Belgian perception of the nature of the pre-colonial polity and on the distinctive provincial administrative traditions." For the Kivu (today divided into North and South Kivus), where Bukavu was the administrative headquarter, the chieftaincy formula was favored in the rural and semi-rural areas (ibid), while a CEC was established in Kadutu outside the city center of Bukavu. Several of these chieftaincies, as Turner (2007, p. 81) argues, should have become *secteur*, as they encompassed populations of various origins rather than pre-colonial, ethnically unified chiefdoms. Instead, the Belgians territorialized ethnicity by creating these administrative chieftaincies where populations were grouped under ethnic characteristics. In addition, certain ethnic communities were prioritized, including Shi (Bashi), Lega and Bembe, all of whom had more self-conscious perceptions of their ethnicities, which the Belgians reinforced (Turner, 2007, p. 81). Furthermore, the chieftaincy division also reinforced pre-colonial conflicts between the Kabare and Ngweshe kingdoms.

---

[26] Own translation. Original text "Les indigènes n'ont pas la notion de la propriété, ni celle des terres vacantes. Ils sont établis sur les territoires où ils ont l'habitude d'aller et de venir et d'exploiter certain produits. Les notions de propriété indigène et de terres vacantes ne pourront donc servir de base à une législation foncière qui viserait à adapter un droit nouveau aux faites."

Turning to a discussion of the city, treating the urban space was an important occupation of the colonizers. As Boeck and Plissart (2004, p. 20) argue, creating the cities took "place in the European mirror of colonialism which invented and created the primitives idea of the Congo and its counter-image, the urban landscape." Creating the African other in popular Western imaginary was especially aided by events such as the World Exhibition in Antwerp, Belgium, in 1930. This exhibition included a display of the African Village, positioned next to a Le Corbusier house, constructing a particular imaginary of traditional Africa (Boeck & Plissart, 2004, p. 21). The cities rising from the jungle were seen as modernity, in contrast to the "backward" life of the villages.

Bukavu city, or Costermansville[27] as it was called until 1953, had a peculiar private-public foundation only similarly shared with Katanga.[28] This foundation began with the establishment of the National Committee of the Kivu (*le Comité National du Kivu*, CNKi) in 1928 (Hostelet, 1954, p. 216). It is evident that by "national", when it comes to CNKi, the meaning was Belgian. As Rutten (approx. 1930, undated, p. 350), the head of the CNKi, expressed: "We will witness the rise of a truly Belgian province in the heart of Africa, where our traditions and national virtues will be perpetuated in a magnificent setting."[29] The purpose of this committee was, according to Frank (in Hostelet, 1954, p. 216), then Belgian minister of colonies, to "study and develop the Kivu region in terms of transport and communications, the related development of agriculture and industries and the mining exploitation."[30] At the same time, the committee had also "the obligation to assure the success of the white colonial settlers and enhance the material and moral conditions for the indigenous population" (Rutten, approx. 1930, undated, p. 350). Thus, CNKi was formed with the purpose of creating an organized, central city to administer the eastern regions. This was partly due to a need for administering unskilled labor forces from their neighboring colony Ruanda-Urundi, known as Banyarwanda,

---

[27] Named after the Belgian sub-lieutenant in the *Force Publique,* Paul-Marie Costermans, who fought against German East Africa prior to World War I in the region.

[28] In Katange, *le Comité spécial du Katanga* (CSK), established in 1900, was a civic committee representing both the Belgian colonial state and the Katanga Company (*la Compagnie du Katanga*). Income and costs were to be distributed two thirds to Belgian Congo and one third to the company (Kovar, 1967, p. 747). The CSK constituted of six members; four from the Belgian Congo state and two from the Katanga Company (ibid). Contrary to the Kivu establishment, Katanga was "a golden tree [that] yielded phenomenal returns" (Young & Turner, 1985, p. 284). For more details on creating the CSK, see especially Fetter (1976, pp. 20-23).

[29] Own translation. Original text : "[N]ous verrons surgir au centre de l'Afrique une province vraiment belge, où se perpétueront, dans un cadre magnifique, nos traditions et nos vertus nationales."

[30] Own translation. Original text : "L'objet principal du Comité du Kivu est d'étudier et d'aménager la région du Kivu au point de vue des voies de transports et de communications, du développement de l'agriculture et des industries qui s'y rapportent ainsi que de la mise en valeur des mines."

for the agricultural industries (Malengana, 2001, pp. 45-46). In a short time, span (1930-60), the construction of Bukavu transformed a society that had lived under a rule of chiefdom systems since the 14th century. This transformation of social space from traditional peasant societies to an urbanized and industrialized society is a cross-cutting phenomena much discussed by Lefebvre (1974[1991]). The pictures below taken from the same area ("La Botte") of Bukavu illustrate the city's physical transformation with major implications for the inhabitants of the city.

Figure 6 Costermannsville (Bukavu) in 1930.

Photo collection of Pierre Gallez

Figure 7 Bukavu in 1958.

Photo collection of Pierre Gallez

These physical and subjective transformations of the city space also had major impacts on an emerging understanding of public service provision. Broadly, the Catholic Church and other missionaries are known for playing a key role from the Congo Free State period onwards in the areas of education and public health in particular (Nzundu, 2013). The urban centers, however, were largely occupied by the Belgian authorities and thus related directly to the economic development of the colony. This was not a complete rural and urban divide but rather a

preoccupation by the colonial state, complemented where needed by the religious institutions.[31] As an example, the Belgian authorities divided school systems for the indigenous population into three types namely: official schools (*les écoles officielles*), subsidized free schools (*les écoles libres subsidiées*) and non-subsidized free schools (*les écoles libres non subsidiées*) (Hostelet, 1954, p. 244). The official schools were by law under the customary chiefs, the subsidized schools under the Catholic system and the least prioritized (the non-subsidized) by the Belgian state.[32] I argue that these divisions and segregations created boundaries of citizenship and belonging that, in turn, affect how citizens continue to be distinguished within the modern state in urban spaces, such as Bukavu.

In Bukavu, the Belgian authorities divided the space into urban territories (*communes*), which still divide the urban space. *Ibanda* was and continues to be the urban center and was home of many European citizens. *Bagira*, the third and most remote territory, was considered a missionary station. The *Kadutu* territory, in between these two *communes*, was considered an extra-customary center (CEC) area, where natives were referred to as detribalized (*détrabilisés*) (Dembour, 2008, p. 23). This term was based on a dichotomy between indigenous peoples who were or were not attached to custom and who continued to live under one or the other of the two former types of territories. In the CEC area of Kadutu, "detribalized natives" could acquire small parcels of land that were considered outside *les terres domaniales* and *enrigstrées* (Malengana, 2001, p. 167). These subjects (*détrabilisés*) can be positioned in an in-between category of claim-making subjects (citizens) and subjects referred to as indigenous or natives with no claim to full citizenship under Belgian colonial masters. Figure 8 shows the CEC area Kadutu in 1960.

---

[31] Certainly, the Catholic Church, as a religious and "civilizing" force and with its central and dominating position in the city, also occupied physical and subjective space in colonial Bukavu. However, the major infrastructure work studied in this thesis was conducted by the Belgian colonial state in the form of the CNKi.

[32] My claim that the state schools were the least prioritized is based on the readings of archival texts detailing the number of teachers per student, the number of official inspections and the amount of investment.

Figure 8 Kadutu (Bukavu) 1960 as a model of African cities.

Picture by Luc Van Gremberghe, photo collection of Pierre Gallez

These CEC areas, as found in different colonial cities in Belgian Congo, were constructed through the Belgian *Office des Cités Africaines* (O.C.A) to improve the living standards of the detribalized. They offered public services, such as schools, health services and piped water, in return for work in the industries (Baumer, 1939). However, they were also constructed as a model for modern city planning in African colonies. I.e., "scientifically planned, hygienic, and removed from the European settlement", as Fetter (1976, p. 73) describes them. The African cities, or CECs, can be viewed as being a technology for the supervision of the state by colonial masters (Boeck & Plissart, 2004, p. 24). They demonstrate forms of social control and conceptualizations of normality and deviance within the urban space genealogy. Capelle (1947, p. 25), writing on la Cité, the African cities, highlighted an important difference between these urban spaces and the rural, "ethnic" organization: "Ethnic groups have no legal

existence organized in *la Cité* [CEC], and their notables [chiefs] have neither any rights nor power."[33]

These African CECs, near or at the margins of the European city, I argue, created ways of becoming political for the detribalized as a group. This does not mean that individuals within this group had the same experience. Rather, the conditions or *habitus* of the CEC areas created a group experiencing "similar conditions of existence and conditionings" (Bourdieu, [1990] 1997, p. 59) that produced new ideas of integration and difference.

More specifically, the detribalized were generally understood as *évolué(e)s* by colonizers. As *évolués*, they were neither seen as the African Other, as in the African village imaginary, or as European citizens. This term was not, however, used in a straightforward manner by the colonial authorities. As the territorial administrator of Leopoldville, Capelle (1947, p. 65), reflected:

 "No one, among the high-ranking administrative authorities, moral or social, is venturing on the hazard to define what is meant by "evolved" when it comes to native Congo, [and we will not attempt to do this either]. Generally, this term is understood as those among the natives, who [achieved smaller or bigger accomplishments] towards our moral, spiritual, social, material and technical conceptions, to our conceptions of life and civilization. All humanity is moving towards the best and highest ideals - at least we can hope - all men are not evolved, but evolving (*évoluant*). The term "evolved" (*d'"évolué"*), which seems to mark the arrival at an inconceivable terminal, is particularly ill-chosen. As it stands, however, we will use [the term evolved], not to deviate from an inveterate habit already, and thus confuse minds."[34]

In this text, the term *évolués* comments on the indigenous who had climbed the ladder of what Capelle terms "our" civilization. This discourse of unified ideals of "civilization" stemming from a European conception marks the differentiations made between citizens, becoming citizens and the African Other. This represents a form of governmentality as the relation

---

[33]Translated by author, original text: "Les groupes ethniques n'ont aucune existence légale organisée dans la Cité, et leurs notables n'ont aucun droit ni aucun pouvoir quelconque."

[34] Own translation. Original text : "Personne, parmi les plus hautes autorités administratives, morales ou sociales, ne s'étant hasarde à définir ce qu'il faut entendre par "évolué" lorsqu'il est question des indigènes du Congo, nous ne nous risquerons pas davantage à le faire. On qualifie généralement de cette appellation ceux, parmi les indigènes, qui ont parcouru une étape plus ou moins importante vers nos conceptions morales, spirituelles, sociales, matérielles et techniques, vers nos conceptions de la vie et de la civilisation. L'humanité tout entière étant en marche vers des idéaux meilleurs et plus élevés – du moins peut-on l'espère – tous les hommes sont, non des évolues, mais des évoluant. Le terme d'« évolué», qui semble marquer l'arrivée à un inconcevable terminus, est donc particulièrement mal choisis. Tel qu'il est, nous l'emploierons cependant, pour ne pas déroger à une habitude déjà invétérée, et ainsi semer la confusion dans les esprits."

between an art of modern government (civilization) and ideas of social, moral and economic rationalities (Foucault, 2014, p. 17). At the same time, Capelle is uneasy about using the term *évolués* as it indicates an end state rather than a process of "evolving" (*évoluant*). In Capelle's (1947, p. 66) view, the *évolués* existed but they were a rarity at the top of a pyramid. By being *évolués*, they were considered by many colonial authorities as the ones to lead the nation forward, taking over the public institutions and retaining the interest of the indigenous. *Évolués* becoming citizens was seen as the long-term future as there were no sign of Belgium leaving the territory, even by 1960. For instance, Hostelet (1954, p. 334), the head of colonial studies reflected six years prior to independence that "[t]he day Congo will be politically and economically independent, indigenous people inherit a country excellently organized in all areas, in addition to a Congolese staff made fit to ensure the proper functioning of public services and private enterprises with more or less prolonged assistance from Belgian technicians and other Europeans (...). "[35] This was far from the reality in 1960.

In the latter age of colonialism, after the end of the World War II, Belgian Congo's functions started to resemble what, many assume to be, the functions of modern states based on increased fiscal and administrative capacity (Dorman, Hammett, & Nugent, 2006, p. 5). In the post-World War II colonial administration of Belgian Congo the archives indicate that:

 "[t]he rates of public services are subsidized, or even free, to the benefit of users. These are the transport services or the use of communication, roads and canals. The payment of a public service is dictated by the principle of national solidarity. Each resident must have in every place of the territory any important public service at the same price, or different rates as low as possible"[36] (Hostelet, 1954, p. 257).

This account says nothing about the differences among inhabitants in Belgian Congo nor how they were treated in practice. However, it is interesting to note the inclusion of a comment on public services being offered at affordable prices and the idea of national solidarity towards the end of the Belgian Congo. These ideas were emphasized as a part of the "civilization" task of the colonial power (Hostelet, 1954, p. 365). As an example, the national water company

---

[35] Own translation. Original text : "Le jour où le Congo sera autonome politiquement et économiquement, les habitants autochtones hériteront d'un pays excellemment organisé en tous les domaines, plus un personnel congolais rendu apte à assurer le bon fonctionnement des services publics et des enterprises d'intérêt privé, avec l'aide indispensable plus ou moins prolongée de techniciens belges et autres Europeens (…)."

[36] Own translation. Original text : "Les tarifs de ces services publics sont réduits plus ou moins, voire même gratuits, au profit des usagers. Tels sont les services des transports, ou l'usage des voies de communication, routes et canaux. La rémunération d'un service public est dictée par un principe de solidarité nationale. Tout habitant doit bénéficier, en tout lieu du territoire, de tout service public important au même tarif (postes), ou à des tarifs aussi peu différents que possible."

Regideso, was created in 1939 for the Belgian colonies of Congo and Ruanda-Urundi (today Rwanda and Burundi) (Muhunduka, 2010, p. 39). In Bukavu, the motivation for establishing the Kahele water station and Ruzizi I in 1954-58, both owned by Regideso, seems to stem from a practical concern for combined needs in the industrial economy and for attracting white settlers (Muhunduka, 2010, p. 92). There were thus certain boundaries regarding who "the public" were, namely the white settlers, where the larger infrastructure projects were directed for commercial and private consumption. Thus, the creation of public water and electricity services was predicated on the premises of certain commercial and client-based relations for the national company Regideso.

4.3 Independent Congo and the Mobutu years (1965-1997)

The role of President Mobutu in what would be known as Zaïre, in terms of public good provision, is important to examine when it comes to understanding expectations and ideas of state practices and performance. In the first years of the Mobutu regime (1966-1974), Zaïre perhaps came closest to exhibiting unified nation-state ideal; an ideal triumphed by the historic boxing match, the Rumble in the Jungle, in 1974. A number of domestic and international factors, however, would eventually lead to a decaying of the state ideal and state practices when it came to public goods provision (see especially Young & Turner, 1985). I will in this section prioritize certain elements of the build-up of the nation-state to demonstrate the historical trajectories to public good provision, in what is considered the fourth stage of the regime from 1970 to 1974. This period falls in line with broader nationalism tendencies in sub-Saharan Africa (see especially Berman & Londsdale, 2013; Londsdale, 2013).

The early years of the Mobutu regime were in sharp contrast to the immediate post-independence year. Regarding the latter, political and economic conflicts, coupled with the instrumentalizing of ethnic divisions during the first four years of independent Congo (1960-1964), are generally considered to have amounted to an international crisis. The period included secession of Katanga, the assassination of the first Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba, the death of UN secretary general Dag Hammarskjold[37] and Cold War proxy conflicts between the US

---

[37] Hammarskjold was killed in a plane crash as he attempted to mediate the crisis through the UN led Congo Mission. His death has led to much controversy regarding Cold War interests and sabotage. The four inquiries and one commission following Hammarskjold's death have never been able to rule out sabotage or attack (see especially Williams, 2011).

and Soviet Union. At the time of independence, the country was de facto split into four rules: The central government in Kinshasa (then Leopoldville); a rival central government by Lumumba's followers in Kisangani (then Stanleyville); and the secessionist regimes in the mineral-rich provinces of Katanga and South Kasai (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2011). Belgium authorities, as allies of the West, saw Lumumba's ideological struggle as all too radical for their vested interests in the Congo (Reybrouck, 2011, pp. 249-250): For an example of this, one only has to look at his independence speech of 30 June 1960 – a thought-provoking text where he used specific examples to criticize the injustice of colonialism, describing the 'blood, tears and sweat' of the oppressed and the robbery of the white men.

These complex and interweaving conflicts were followed by a coup d'état in 1965, in which Mobutu took the position as one of Africa's "strongmen". The first independence period (1960-1964) of the country, as Young and Turner (1985, p. 42) argue, was "a shambles" (*la pagaille*) from the conflicts between politicians and their self-interests. This confusion eased the way for a seizure of power by Mobutu and his grand vision for the country. His reign would outlive the end of the Cold War, ending with the First Congo War (1996-1997), and had major implications for the country's nation-state ideals, state-building practices and dimensions of statehood. In the scholarly debate, the 1960s marked the prime of modernization theory and a belief in the state as consolidating the interest of development and "a major means of bringing about societal change and fulfilling economic and social aspirations" (Azarya in Rothchild & Chazan, 1988, p. 4). The literature was inspired by the historical events of independence from colonial powers. In their seminal work on Zaïre, Young and Turner (1985, p. 43) position the young Mobutu "as a leader [that] was privately contested by some, but the centralized, strong nation-state vision of the polity seemed to most the only salvation." Mobutu resurrected part of the strict structure of a colonial state image based on a view that there was a need for firm command and central power (Tull, 2005, p. 65). However, in this early period, the president also had a wide range of policy advisors, from technocrats to veteran politicians to diplomats and this allowed for some of the more successful policies, such as the 1967 currency reform. Thus, the first period of Mobutu rule enjoyed a reasonable amount of popular legitimacy (Tull, 2005, p. 65).

Regarding state practices of nationalism, Mobutu introduced a new ideology on the 27th October 1971 to move away from colonial history and return to "authenticity" (*recours à l'authenticité)* (Malu-Malu, 2002, p. 164). This authenticity was articulated as a "move away from borrowed or imposed ideas toward an increased awareness and privileging of indigenous

cultural beliefs and values" (Dunn, 2003, p. 111). Already began in 1966, Mobutu introduced the policy of changing the colonial names of cities, villages and even people to so-called "authentic" names, i.e., names that would have recognizable to African ancestors.[38] This was done in order to 'decolonize' the identity of Congo and its people using a sense of nationalistic pride rather than striving to be a Westerner. Mobutu himself captures this vision for the Congo in 1970 (Dunn, 2003, p. 104):

"Congolese! Show to the old world who claims to be more civilized than the black continent, that our ancestral African hospitality is not a vain word and that you are more human[e] than those in Europe who think they may submit people to the consequences of conflicts between African states and financial groups."

This was a break with the Belgian discourses of colonialism, where "civilization" was a governmentality of modern government techniques. The nation-building was not solely based on African ancestral inheritance, however, as Mobutu and his regime were also concerned with keeping in line with international recognition of sovereign states and maintaining de facto statehood. As a dimension of statehood, the concepts of father and family, as representing the Zairian state effect, were important for establishing and maintaining political authority in the country. The idea of the nation as a family with Mobutu as the eldest and wisest member was used frequently by himself and the regime as a way to legitimate his position domestically and abroad but also to justify a rather repressive rule (Schatzberg, 1991, p. 72). For the West, Mobutu was a figure that confirmed an idea of African Other while at the same time not threatening the way states were supposed to be organized as Dunn (2003, p. 119) argues. Mobutu managed in the period 1970-1974 to establish a sense of national belonging through using a mixture of African ancestral past, colonial imagery and Western political concepts of nation and citizenship.

On the 30 November 1973, a deepening of authenticity politics was introduced as zaïrianisation (Young & Turner, 1985). The zaïrianisation policy, though arbitrary, included a state monopolization of public goods, such as the road companies[39], insurance[40], water and energy[41].

---

[38] The name "Zaïre" was also taken from a perceived authentic name for the river Congo, though it turned out to be a Portuguese interpretation of the name for river namely *N'zadi*, in order to rid the country of its colonial past (see also Dunn, 2003).
[39] The Road Office (l'Office de Route) and Office of Roads and Drainage (l'Office des Voiries et Drainage) (OVD)
[40] The National Insurance Association (Société nationale d'assurances) (SONAS)
[41] The Water Distribution System (la Régie de Distribution d'Eau) (Regideso) and the National Elecitrcuty Company (la Société National d'Électricité) (SNEL)

These services were and are still considered parastatal (para-étatique) due largely to the process of economic nationalism in this period of zaïrianisation (1973-74) (Young & Turner, 1985, pp. 326-327, 331). Parastatal, in the case of Zaire/DRC, means a state monopoly on these services and where the government elects an advisory board (see also Chapter 7). The national water company Regideso was, in the Belgian colony, fused with the electricity company la Société d'Électricité d'État. Due to changes in judicial and organizational terms under Mobutu, the water company REGIDESO and the electricity company, renamed to la Société National d'Électricité (SNEL), separated into two companies in 1970 (Muhunduka, 2010, pp. 93, 96). During zaïrianisation, SNEL and REGIDESO became completely monopolized by the Zairian state under law 74/012, 14 June 1974 (Muhunduka, 2010, p. 97). These practices had an impact on the popular imagining of these services as state provided and owned, which continues to affect perceptions in contemporary Bukavu.

A lecturer in history and political science at the Institut supérieur pédagogique de Bukavu (ISP), Jean-Mari Kazungusibwa Viancy, perceived the historical transition of zaïrianisation in the following way:[42]

"In 1973, Mobutu had a political plan, a plan that was spoken of as a plan for social security of its citizens. This is known as zaïrianisation of the country. This is when things fell apart at several levels. First, for REGIDESO and SNEL, there was a shift in leadership… The process positioned people who were bad leaders for the service. The payment made to these services by the public and more generally taxes paid were not going back to associations that provided the services. Secondly, the revenues people were getting were insufficient to pay for a quality public service. In fact, the salaries that people were earning made it impossible to pay the bills at the end of the month. Increasingly, the services that Regideso and SNEL provided were cut from people's houses."

This period of nationalistic ideas and techniques of governance1, such as authenticity and zaïrianisation, has provided much inspiration for the literature on neo-patrimonialism and clientilism in Western scholarly debate. As Bach (2012, p. 31) claims: "It is the evolution of the Mobutu regime (1965-97) after 1974 that still offers the purest illustration of a thoroughly patrimonialized state". Young and Turner (1985, p. 327) argue that its attempts at state-building illuminate the characteristics of Zaïre in the following way: "The contradiction between its expansive ambitions and its practical capabilities, the inner logic of the symbiosis between state and class formation, and the limitations of the personalist, patrimonial structure of power." The authors (p. 327) argue that zaïrianisation – despite the outspoken logic of a

---

[42] Personal interview, own translation, 22 October 2014, Bukavu.

'return of the land to its people' – sustained and enforced a privileged class - acquéreurs or acquirers - that rushed to grab assets in the commercial and light industrial sectors. The economic consequences became evident short after 1974, exemplified by the dislocation and shortages of goods. Mobutu, in the words of Vlassenroot and Romkema (2007, p. 9), "built up a network of patronage and converted economic assets into a stock of political resources for (re)distribution to those who had shown political loyalty." I argue that the government techniques of zaïrianisation and authenticity, framed as nationalistic ideology, have provided a broad inspiration for scholarly literature on neopatrimonial and clientilistic rule (see also Bach, 2012).

Moreover, the economic nationalism (zaïrianisation) that took place created arguably great confusion about what "public" means. For instance, under the Mobutu regime's Bakajika Law, all land became state property (Turner, 2007, p. 42). "State" and "public" ownership becomes synonymous but took the form of acquisitions (acquéreurs) by politicians and businessmen close to Mobutu (Young & Turner, 1985, p. 347). At the same time, however, the parastatal agencies of water and energy continued to run despite these challenges at the leadership level throughout the Mobutu regime (1965-1997) and thus upheld public service provision of these goods. These services have never completely ceased in the post-Mobutu era, even though secondary towns may no longer be serviced by REGIDESO or SNEL (World Bank, 2011).

For Bukavu, zaïrianisation, as a form of economic nationalism, and authenticity, seen as a state ideology of autochthonous claims to land and belonging, had major impacts. The practices of zaïrianisation created further insecurity in land ownership and access to farmland that pushed peasants to migrate to urban centers such as Bukavu in search of a livelihood (Vlassenroot, 2007, p. 34). However, the practices of zaïrianisation and authenticity also created space for political and economic mobility (MacGaffey, 1987, p. 96), which is proportionally far less recognized than national financial difficulties.[43] This is not a claim in support of Mobutu's political and financial practices but rather an insight into the dynamics of claim-making subjects in the Zairian landscape. In Bukavu, businesses owned by foreigners, such as plantations outside the city, were bought by Congolese nationals, who then established a business elite in Bukavu. However, turmoil in the economy and shortages of goods, partly due

---

[43] The problems related to economic nationalism in Zaire gave rise to a literature on «underdevelopment» or the «anti-developmental» state (see e.g. Gould, 1979) as well as emphasis on informal networks for survival (e.g. Peemans, 1997).

to zaïrianisation practices, also led to a considerable growth in the informal sector. Bukavu, as an economic hub for markets, trade and import, expanded. However, the authenticity policies also brought into light the subject-making and Othering, such as the defining of the Banyamulenge Other (allochthon) or the authentic (autochthon) Congolese, which would prove explosive in the Kivu region (see Lemarchand, 2009; Prunier, 2008 for more on Banyamulenge, Banyarwanda, ethnicity and conflicts).

Coupled with the reforms of zaïrianisation and authenticity, Mobutu also introduced in 1973 Salongo – a Lingala word for work – interpreted as community labor inspired by an official state visit to communist China (Callaghy, 1984, p. 299; Schatzberg, 1991, p. 109). Salongo was framed as a way to mobilize the population in an educative manner and consisted of 'voluntary' work, such as repair and rebuilding roads, administrative buildings and the cultivation of certain crops. Callaghy (ibid p. 302) argues that ordinary Zairians were skeptical due to "the realization that all the work goes to reinforce the power of the consolidating state. [Thus, p]assive resistance and minimum compliance are the norm." This perspective, however, positions the state as an entity where citizens can choose to act or not act. Rather, I see this term frequently employed today in contemporary Bukavu, though with a variety of interpretations. For instance, every Friday, citizens are ordered to clean the streets and keep their shops closed from 8 to 10 in the morning. The term, as the empirical chapters illustrate, is also used for workers employed in Kadutu central market and used by people controlling one of Bukavu's public water sources (Funu). This demonstrates the relational, dynamic and complex experiences of the state effect. As Foucault (1998, p. 306) argued, "a language always constitutes a system of possible statements. It is a finite ensemble of rules, which authorizes an infinite number of performances."

4.4 The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) (1997-present day) and contemporary Bukavu

The last two decades of Congolese history is often a source of inspiration for failed states or state collapse literature (e.g. Rotberg, 2003; Zartman, 1995). Or, as authors like Herbst and Mills (June 24, 2013) claim; "Congo is not a failed state; it is a nonstate, incessantly at war for the last 17 years, and home to some of the world's worst violence." However, the transition from Zaire to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in the 1990s is not so much a history

of "failed state" or "nonstate", but rather offers a history of the changing nature of the language of stateness (Dunn, 2003, p. 143; Hansen & Stepputat, 2001, p. 5). From a dominate discourse of a unified, Zairian state headed by Mobutu, the state practices and realities would increasingly demonstrate the political and economic complexities of Congo. For instance, economic pillaging by Mobutu, state officials and regime supporters took its toll on the national economy and thus on ordinary citizens. In addition, the limited control by the armed forces outside Kinshasa was increasingly clear as foreign and domestic armed groups made their presence felt in eastern DRC in the early 1990s. Mobutu was also struggling with prostate cancer, eventually leading to his death in 1997, which became a metaphor for his faltering grip on the state and Zaire as the cancer in the African region (Dunn, 2003, p. 140).

Ordinary Congolese, however, also experienced early democratic forces in the transition from Zaire to the new Congo. After considerable domestic pressure, Mobutu arranged the Sovereign National Conference (CNS) in 1991 to allow different social, religious and political voices a say in shaping the future political landscape (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002, p. 189).[44] In the CNS, political opposition, NGOs, churches and different interests groups (civil society) were invited to discuss and come up with solutions to adapt to the new political climate, domestically and internationally, as well as to the multiple challenges the country faced in economic and social terms. These democratic attempts were broadcasted live on national radio and TV. As a national, Congolese initiative, the CNS had little international support and the outcomes from the different commissions were partly weak and contained inconsistencies that Mobutu would use to his advantage (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002, pp. 192-196). Yet, and in reference to languages of stateness, these political processes also strengthened a sense of nationhood and citizenship, as ordinary Congolese could follow the talks, participate in public forums and support civil society organizations (Dunn, 2003, p. 143; Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002, p. 197). This discursive space had been limited during Mobutu's reign prior to 1990 and often met with violent oppression by state actors.

The outcomes from the CNS, however, would soon be overshadowed by the dramatic events in Rwanda and Burundi. In this section, I will first discuss some of the broader political events

---

[44] National conferences became popular in many francophone African countries in the early 1990s. In Benin's National Conference of 1990, the success of stripping the then dictator, Matthieu Kérékou, of power and creating a peaceful transition to an interim government, inspired a wave of national conferences in Africa (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002, pp. 190-191). The results, however, varied widely.

that took place in Congo and South Kivu province in the 1990s. Then, I will outline some demographic and economic background regarding Bukavu and, then, concentrate on more specific aspects of the political landscape of contemporary Bukavu.

4.4.1 War and political turmoil in Congo

The political turmoil and subsequent genocide and ethnic violence in Rwanda and Burundi in 1993-4 would have an immense impact on neighboring Congo, generally, and South and North Kivu provinces in particular. Hundreds of thousands Rwandan and Burundian Tutsis and Hutus fled to North and South Kivu for refuge. Some of these Hutus were also génocidaires and fled to Congo to escape retribution by the new Tutsi regime in Rwanda. Meanwhile, the Zairian government in Kinshasa, still headed by Mobutu, established the Vangu Commission to investigate the new "foreigners" in the east (Turner, 2007, p. 88). The Commission, however, was ingrained in anti-Tutsi sentiments, and was highly suspicious of Banyamulenge groups in South Kivu and the seizure of power by the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) in Rwanda. The Commission claimed the new Tutsi leaders of Rwanda planned to acquire Zairian territory (Turner, p. 89). In addition, the Zairian government claimed that the international community was secretly arming Rwandan and Burundian groups in Zaire to destabilize the Kivus (Turner, p. 90). This political tension between the neighbors led to the subsequent militarization of key towns in the Kivus by the Zairian army, including Bukavu, in 1996. There were executions, attacks and retaliations committed on both sides of the Zairian and Rwandan borders. In the midst of this, Bukavu was a center for Hutus fleeing genocide, rebels of various connections and Banyamulenge groups that used the city for camouflage to avoid attention.

The fall of Mobutu in 1997 is seen as a consequence of the new RPF government in Rwanda, who were eager to hunt down Hutu extremists, known as interahamwe, in the Congo, and install a different, supportive regime in favor of RPF ideology (Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2002, p. 225).[45] However, a state coup by the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) would not be taken favorably by most Congolese or for that matter the international community. Thus, the RPF, led by Paul Kagama, together with President Museveni in Uganda, decided to support the long-time rebel leader Laurent Kabila as the head of a more "authentic" Congolese liberation struggle in

---

[45] It should be noted that the complexity of this war, both historically and regarding the various parties involved, necessitates a much more detailed analysis, which is, however, beyond the purpose of this thesis.

September 1996 (Nzongola-Ntalaja, p. 225; Prunier, 2008, pp. 115-116). Kabila's fragmented movement was a coalition consisting of other armed groups under the name of Alliance des forces démocratiques pour la libération du Congo-Zaïre (AFDL) (Prunier, 2008, p. 113). The AFDL, however, did not have the armed forces to secure its victory from Bukavu, Goma, provincial capital of North Kivu, to final destination Kinshasa. Apart from some Angolan armed support, it was largely the work of Rwandan soldiers that lead the way for a final seizure of power by Kabila in Kinshasa, May, 1997. According to Prunier (2008, p. 124), Kabila acquired in this period the nickname of Ndiyo Bwana – "yes sir" in Swahili – because of his reliance on the Rwandese backers. This period, September 1996 to May 1997, is often referred to as the First Congo War.

The installment of Kabila as president of the newly re-named Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) stands in sharp contrast to the politically more inclusive space of the preceding national conference (CNS) (Lemarchand, 2009, p. 231). Kabila, a leader of guerilla movements in the 1960s from his base in South Kivu, was not familiar to the new post-Cold War era and saw the political realities in Kinshasa, such as the CNS, as "Mobutist".[46] He excluded all the key political and civil society members of the CNS and imposed a single-party system, supported by his Rwandese backers, conducted arbitrary arrests and public executions of political opponents (Lemarchand, 2009, p. 231; Prunier, 2008, pp. 152-154). It is worth noting that contemporary discourses in Bukavu (and elsewhere in DRC) hold "father" Kabila as a more authentic, clear-sighted head of state in contrast to his son Joseph Kabila. As one of the men I interviewed in Ibanda, central Bukavu, argued:[47]

"But [state] authorities can also be good. Like father Kabila, the old Kabila. He tried to change these robberies [i.e., corruption in the municipality and state apparatus] by the [state] authorities. He would take these bad people and burn them in front of people. Now the authorities have failed again."

From this point of view, violent retribution against those perceived as "Mobutists" was a break from Mobutu's regime. Economically, however, Kabila's regime (1997-2001) was equally corrupt.

---

[46] Initially, Kabila was famously supported by "Che" Guevara, who in 1965, with the support of Tanzania's socialist government, led a small group of Cuban revolutionists to Kabila's base in Congo to support the "African revolution" (Prunier, 2008, p. 114). However, Guevara would soon be disappointed by Kabila's main interest in whiskey and women and his nonchalance regarding the revolution. Guevara left the country only a few months later.

[47] Focus group meeting with five men living and working in Ibanda on 21 October 2014, Bukavu

Furthermore, Kabila's connection with Rwanda was domestically disputed. His political and military entourage in 1997 consisted of key Rwandan and Banyamulenge personalities; a highly unpopular group with many Congolese, who increasingly saw Kabila as a puppet of Kagame, President of Rwanda (Lemarchand, 2009, pp. 231-232). In 1997, Kabila had to choose between maintaining links with his Rwandan and Tutsi backers or breaking off with them to gain domestic legitimacy (Lemarchand, p. 232). Kabila chose the latter and ordered all foreign troops to be expelled from the DRC, an act which would lead to what is known as the Second Congo War (1998-2003). Some of the key figures of his former entourage and Kagame would start the *Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie (RCD),* an insurgency group with Rwandan RPA troops that led the uprising against Kabila (Tull, 2005, p. 94).[48] Had it not been for Angolan armed support for Kabila, Lemarchand (p. 233) remarks, "the DRC probably would no longer exist." Following that conflict between Congolese Mayi Mayi groups, *Interhamwe*, factions of the Congolese army and branches of RCD would lead to mass atrocities against civilians in north-east and eastern DRC.

Kabila was assassinated by his own bodyguard, 16 January 2001, and quickly replaced by his young, twenty-nine year old son Joseph Kabila (Prunier, 2008, p. 249). To everyone's surprise, the young and inexperienced Kabila showed remarkable ability to play the political game by pleasing domestic and international human rights activists and respecting relations with UN Security Council members (Prunier, pp. 258-259). It is also in this period that the UN mission MONUC was established with the blessing of Kabila. MONUC was initially established to monitor the Lusaka agreement of 1999 but later became one of the UN's largest peace operations (later re-named MONUSCO). The Sun City agreement of 17th April 2002 is seen as the end of the Second Congo War, though conflicts and armed groups have continued to be part of the daily lives of many citizens in the Kivu and Orientale provinces.

In conclusion, the 1990s and onwards have brought forward multiple versions of statehood and complicated images of state effects and practices. For instance, some of the armed groups in eastern DRC have re-employed and invented state-like structures and orders (see e.g. Hoffmann & Vlassenroot, 2014; Raeymaekers, 2014; Tull, 2005). At the same time, the central government of Kinshasa and provincial administration has never ceased to exist. On the

---

[48] RCD would later split into two factions; RCD-Goma backed by Rwanda and RCD-Bunia backed by Uganda.

contrary, their presence has been felt and experienced in cities throughout the political turmoil. As the focus in the aforementioned studies on eastern Congo is centered on violent actors, often, though not exclusively, in rural and semi-rural areas or outside provincial capitals, the contribution of this thesis is the focus on the formal state and state-like orders and everyday goods in the city of Bukavu.

4.4.2 Contemporary Bukavu and Fieldwork Timing

The empirical study was conducted during different periods in Bukavu. Three contextual (historical) aspects must be considered in particular regarding the timing of the fieldworks, which will be further elaborated below. First, Bukavu citizens in the period of research (2012-2014) experienced a relatively peaceful time. The most recent major violent event was the occupation of the city in 2004 by members of the Rally for Congolese Democracy Goma (RCD-Goma), who entered Bukavu with the claim of genocide threats against their supporters and members from the Banyamulenge communities. Second, and closely related, the broader instability in the region of South Kivu pushed rural and semi-rural citizens into the city of Bukavu, which in turn has had consequences for urban planning (or lack thereof), economy and settlements (claims of urban citizenship) that need some further elaboration. Third, the research took place between elections, namely after the national elections of 2011 and before upcoming election, due to be held 2016. This influenced perceptions, as one can see in the empirical chapters, because recent memories of election promises and campaign influence attitudes towards the state.

First, the relative peace in the period of research allowed the level of security needed for conducting this type of research as well as the time to reflect on everyday needs by my informants. More fundamentally, the ideas of who belongs and who does not were less centered on "foreign" occupation (Rwandan influence) as have typically influenced scholars studying war time periods (fluxes of conflicts extending from 1994-2004) in the area. Rather, and as will be demonstrated, citizens of Bukavu looked to Rwanda (Cyangugu neighboring town) than would have been the case for scholars studying war time periods (such as the various conflicts extending from 1994-2004) in the area. Rwanda served as an example of successful state building in terms of public services (such as measures to control waste and provide access to water and electricity). Both before and during the research period, I witnessed Rwanda's rapid

transformation of road building, environmental policy (e.g. banning plastic bags) and large investments in public service delivery. This stood in stark contrast to what was witnessed on the DRC side of public service delivery. In turn, this influenced perceptions in Bukavu on the study topic and shows the importance of historical contingency of the research.

However, despite the relative peace during the period of my research, the regional instability has made Bukavu a peacekeeping and NGO hub which has affected statehood dimensions. The connections and disconnections between urban-rural spaces have been intensified. Bukavu, on one hand, is the center of formal governance structures, including both the Congolese administration and international staff. This stands in contrast to the surrounding rural areas, which are controlled by armed groups and traditional chiefdoms/sectors. Due to this, I argue, Bukavu has become a center for international and domestic statehood dimensions, affecting techniques, rationales and mentalities of governance. For instance, the UN[49] presence is an everyday reminder of a particular form of governmentality. As Neumann and Sending (2007, p. 700) argue "[a] conceptualisation of the international as a socially embedded realm of governmentality sees the international as a structure (defined by relations of power) that generates different and changing practices of political rule (defined as governmental rationality)." Though the UN is not incorporated directly in this study, its presence is affecting language and mentalities of both the "governing" and the "governed", or, alternatively, the "peacekeepers" and the "peace-kept". This can be illustrated with interpretations of expectations towards state deliverables and usage of UN funded infrastructure as legitimacy tools for politicians (e.g., the road to the local airport in Bukavu).

Second, and related, the issues of urban planning (or lack thereof) and local economy need some further elaboration. Provision of the goods I study - waste management, roads, water and electricity – have been subject to growing pressure as Bukavu has experienced a considerable urban growth. The inflow of domestic and international refugees and a steady increase of people from the villages have consequences for planning, consumption and provision in the city. Reliable data on the number of inhabitants do not exist but estimates indicate a population size of around 1 million people in 2015. According to the City Hall's records (Mapendano, 2008), the total population in 1960 was 70.257, rising to 147.647 in 1977, and in 1996 reaching

---

[49] By the UN, I refer to the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo or MONUSCO.

241.426. These population increases have been seen as steady and expected, based on demographic estimates in Bukavu from the viewpoint of the service providers such as REGIDESO. What was not expected were the wars (1996-1997 and 1998-2003) that led to a growing city. The increase to approximately 1 million people has happened over the same period as investment in public infrastructure has been limited, since the end of the 1980s. This historical context has had a major influence on the perceptions of my informants – ranging from service providers and intellectuals' perspective on the "unruly" and "anarchic" new settlers to Kadutu citizens' fight for equal rights as citizens. This historical context of urban settlement has intensified claims of what public goods mean and the dynamics of statehood.

Further, Bukavu's economy was also affected by these conflict/peace dynamics and settlement issues during the time of research. The city's economy is a relative topic and one may focus on the informal or formal economy, illicit or legal trade, and, not least, official or unofficial forms of taxation.[50] According to a World Bank report (March 2011, p. 82), "[d]ata at the city level [of Bukavu] is non-existent, and it has not benefited from the kind of scholarly and analytical interest that Kinshasa has." Any numbers are thus tentative and rarely account for informal or illicit trade and/or unofficial tax incomes. I assume that these informal economic activities are significant, not just as part of total economic activity but also for the daily livelihood of the urban poor. An estimate by the same World Bank report (March 2011, p. 83) suggests that urban poverty in Bukavu was at 84.6% above the national poverty rate of 71.3%. Though numbers should be taken with caution, poverty is widespread, something supported by my own observations in Bukavu.

This context of widespread poverty is a key issue underlying this study and the situation during the time of this research. South Kivu province used to be the food production center of DRC and Bukavu its center for refinement, logistics and transport to other provinces and abroad. Today, and during the period of my research, the need to import food has been a sad consequence of the conflict and post-conflict political turmoil, both of which have destabilized the entire agricultural industry. On the other hand, instability in rural South Kivu and the entry of international humanitarian assistance and personnel have led to other booming industries, namely banking and house construction (see e.g. Jennings, 2015). However, this economy is

---

[50] All of these economic forms, however, may be considered legitimate depending on different interest groups. For instance, artisanal mining may be considered the main source of income for villages depending on this industry, while international bans on so-called "conflict minerals" may see this economy as illicit.

largely benefitting certain elites in Bukavu and Kinshasa and has little or negative impact on the urban poor, who are pushed out of the urban center (Ibanda). This context, in turn, demonstrates how statehood is a dynamic and ongoing process of negotiation.

Finally, the political context during which this research was undertaken, namely between two national elections, has consequences for citizen-state relations and perceptions of statehood. The Congolese people have experienced two national elections in 2006 and 2011. A third election is expected in 2016, after the research period. Experiencing elections, e.g. mobilizing voters and anticipating political changes, shapes perceptions such as citizens' expectations and service providers' delivery of public goods. In the first, pilot research period (March-April 2012), focus group discussions revealed for instance how neighborhoods received more electricity than usual prior to election (service delivery), as well stimulating heated debates among university students on how voters from poorer districts could easily be bought (legitimacy of election).[51] As the empirical chapter demonstrates (see especially Chapter 7, p. 181 and 202), the discourses of promises, expectations and actual practices of public good access and delivery, are influenced by the election experiences across different socio-economic layers of Bukavu citizens.

Regarding election promises that influence de facto statehood dimensions, there are particular discourses and practices employed by the current regime under the rule of President Kabila (2006-). As an election promise prior to 2006, Kabila's party introduced the so-called *Révolution de la modernité* – revolution to modernity – which incorporated the *Cinq Chantiers* (Five Public Works). These are state-led investments intended to modernize road infrastructure, health and education, housing accommodation, access to water and electricity and employment (see de Boeck, 2011, pp. 273-274; RadioOkapi, 20 December 2011). With the 50th anniversary of independent Congo in 2010 and an election coming up, President Kabila and his party geared up the efforts to improve road infrastructure, housing and access to water and electricity (de Boeck, 2011, p. 274). This has had a major impact in parts of the former European center of Kinshasa (la Ville), but also a lesser impact on the urban centers of Ibanda in Bukavu. These projects drive towards modernity are reminiscent of colonial times, but now with the new Global South urban centers, such as Beijing, Islamabad and Dubai, as role models.

---

[51] Two preliminary focus groups held 5 April and 23 April 2012 with university students and youth, both women and men, from Ibanda (Bukavu).

Although most of the *Cinq Chantiers* projects are funded by the World Bank, the EU and Chinese bilateral investment, the state engagement is an attempt to reassert state presence. These forms of state reassertions are visible in the city of Bukavu. State providers may use *Cinq Chantiers* terms for their legitimacy building (e.g., the representative at *Foner*, the taxation for road usage in Bukavu, in p. 155 of section 6.1) and consumer perspectives on state deliverables. All of these international and domestic actors make use of modernizing discourses, at the different levels that make up the state effect in Bukavu; presenting a unified state ideal of structure, modernity and order. These projects, however, also have major effects on citizen-state relations, as will be discussed further in Chapter 8 on dimensions of statehood. New projects and infrastructure divide citizens and subjects and questions the right to the city (Lefebvre, 1974[1991]).

In the remaining of this section, I will describe Bukavu's contemporary political structure to situate the reader in the following empirical chapters. In terms of the local administration in Bukavu, there are both continuities and discontinues with the colonial past. Administrative organization of Bukavu municipality has hardly changed in structure or position from the era of colonialism. For instance, the colonial structures of urban territories (communes) are upheld in Bukavu (i.e., Ibanda, Kadutu and Bagira). The boundaries between the African city (CEC) Kadutu and Ibanda (European center) are both physical and subjective divisions, although with different perspectives from the colonizers' terminology and techniques. The actual divisions can be seen in infrastructure, including buildings, road construction and availability of cables and channels for electricity and water. Yet, these physical city structures stemming from the colonial era are, I argue, specters of the modern state project. Buildings such as the grand post office in art deco architecture and Hotel Résidence with a wrought iron elevator are ghosts from the past. In contemporary Bukavu, citizens resort to Rwanda (Cyangugu town) for post, as there are no longer public post services. The elevator is a memory of the past abundance of electricity; it can no longer run due to power shortage. Yet, provincial and municipal authorities still occupy colonial administrative buildings, such as the City Hall (Mairie de Ville) that used to be the building of the CNKi administration. The subjective divisions can be understood in the forms and modes of how subjects articulate themselves, their relations to the Other, and priorities of public good provision. These aspects come alive through the empirical data in how citizens and subjects, consumers and service providers, articulate their expectations and ideas.

The city also continues to be the administrative center in the province with a considerably more developed formal state structure of governance compared to its surroundings. However, through a national committee of the Kivus, more centralized and authoritarian rationales, techniques and mentalities, in part inherited from Zaire era, are used in governing the city. This includes in particular the close connection between the central government in Kinshasa and the election of representatives at the higher level of the municipality in Bukavu.

Figure 9 Organizational chart of the formal municipal structure in Bukavu[52]

Given to the author by the City Hall (Mairie de Ville) (6 October 2014)

This organizational structure is "real" in the sense that one can locate offices and representatives with these titles. Some of these representatives are interviewed in this thesis, especially in relation to waste management. In separate interviews with the head of the Urban Division and the head of the 2nd Bureau (*IIe Bureau*), the Mayor, the deputy Mayor and the three *Bourgmestre* as well as their deputies are chosen by the president himself.[53] In practice, this means that the Ministry of Interior in Kinshasa chooses the candidates and then the president assigns the positions. At the level of *chef des quartier* (chief of the district) and below (*chefs des cellules, chefs d'avenue, chefs de 10 maisons*), the representatives are chosen by the

---

[52] There are 96 chefs des cellules with 96 assistants and 400 chefs d'avenues, while the number of chefs de 10 maisons was not available.

[53] Interview with Mutikiv, the head of the 2nd Bureau and Shiko, the head of *Division de l'administration du Territoire,* both interviewed 2 October 2014, Bukavu.

governor of the province.[54] I argue that the municipal representatives are chosen with authoritarian rationalities and techniques. These representatives are not elected by those they govern but rather based on links with the central government and affiliation with the presidential party.[55] Also, the head of the 2nd Bureau explained that there used to be an advisory board in Bukavu that dealt with the candidates at the municipal level but that this was no longer practiced.[56]

Thus, I argue that these municipal and provincial authorities may feel less obliged to answer to or serve a broader conception of "the public" in the city and serve instead the ruling regime. Certainly, this is far from unique to Bukavu and demonstrates forms of control and interests among public authorities. The bureaucracy in the municipal administration of Bukavu is manifested in the pervasive phenomenon of an official reporting solely to their superior, who, in turn, passes on their report to their superior and so on. These reports are often handwritten by people considered technocrats, i.e., technical staff in charge of particular public services, and it is only the Mayor himself that will have a say in policy making. Those with positions that concern the Mayor, such as the urban road office (OVD, see Chapter 6), have a closer engagement with him on a weekly or daily basis. The Mayor is thus a decision-maker and he chooses areas of attention, as the head of administration in the Urban Division out it:[57]

"In Bukavu, the Mayor is the governor; he is concerned with all issues like electricity, roads… He is the one in charge. The sub-offices are technical offices; they carry out the services. They can propose the maintenance of different services but it is the Mayor that decides."

Forms of authoritarian control are also exercised through the means, or threat of, violence in Bukavu. This is not limited to the army, occurring also through the different networks within the secret police[58] and other forms of police, the governor's intelligence apparatus and various security services. However, the apparatus of violence is not a coherent entity but rather serves different interest groups. It is widely known that police officers do not have sufficient salaries and that traffic police are sent out to collect money from drivers (see Chapter 6). Further, armed

---

[54] The popular sentiment from the focus groups conducted in different neighborhoods seemed to be that the chiefs at the local quartier (district) level lacked the ability to mobilize the local population or enable better public services. Focus group interviews during the fieldwork in October 2014, Bukavu.

[55] The party of president Kabila is *Parti du peuple pour la reconstruction et la démocratie* (PPRD) and *L'Alliance pour la majorité présidentielle* (MP), the latter being the coalition party of the regime. However, during my fieldwork in October 2014, there were efforts to re-establish local elections for the municipality. Thus, this could mean a beginning to more democratic forms of local governance techniques.

[56] Interview with Mutikiv, the head of *Deuxième Bureau*, 2 October 2014, Bukavu.

[57] Interview with Shiko, the head of *Division de l'administration du Territoire*, 2 October 2014, Bukavu.

[58] l'Agence Nationale de Renseignements, ANR.

security is found at different levels, like the United Nations peace operation MONUSCO, which secures, at least in legal and policy terms, Bukavu from attacks from armed groups found in the province. For the elites, security is commercialized either through companies offering private services or renting "public" armed or police forces. However, for those unable to pay these costs, there are also forms of citizen response to the lack of safety in the city, exemplified by the *Forces-Vives* (Chapter 6). The complex interweaved and parallel forms of policing and (armed) security illustrate different dimensions of statehood and differentiation of citizens and subjects in the city.

4.5 Conclusion

In this chapter, I have argued that the creation of the contemporary state effect and interpreting dimensions of statehood in Bukavu follow certain historical trajectories, as I see no actors or groups as independent of each other. The modes of chiefdoms, colonial rule and the nation-building of Zaire have all contributed to ideas and knowledge that make up the state effect in Bukavu. Creating the city as a contrast to the tribal villages was an important occupation for colonial authorities. Within the city-space, however, further distinctions were made to differentiate between European citizens, *évolués* (detribalized) and *non-évolués*. These forms of subject-making as an art of modern government (civilization) impacted ways of becoming politically engaged citizens in Bukavu. The rationales for public good provision in the city stemming from the colonial authorities are complex. These rationales are also interweaved with the theory and practices of commercial interests, European settlement providing the urban labour forces with certain privileges.

During the nation-building years of 1970-74 in Zaire, public good provision became closely associated with economic nationalism (zaïrianisation). Several companies became national, monopolized services (such as REGIDESO and SNEL) and are often still now described as parastatal. The policies of zaïrianisation coupled with authenticity, as a claim to nationalizing companies to be authentically Congolese, have had a profound impact on contemporary Bukavu. Policies introduced by Mobutu, such as *Salongo*, have also survived, although they are practiced according to a variety of interpretations in today's Bukavu. Zaïrianisation gave much inspiration to a particular scholarly literature on neo-patrimonial and clientilistic forms of rule. Less recognized in this literature, nevertheless, are the aspects of lower-level subject-

making and mobility that have arisen as a result of the policies of authenticity and zaïrianisation.

The recent political transitions in Congo, from Zaire to the DRC, and the conflicts in the eastern provinces all affect the language of stateness, as well as dimensions of statehood. Early democratic forces in the 1990s, exemplified by the CNS, were an introduction to governance changes, as insiders and outsiders of the state apparatus were allowed to take part in discussions. However, the genocide and resulting changes in Rwandan politics led to the fall of Mobutu and the installment of President Laurent Kabila. Still, tensions and relations with Rwanda are shaping ordinary citizens of Bukavu's understanding of statehood dimensions.

I have argued that these historical trajectories from both colonial and independent Congo/Zaire have affected various aspects of governmentality in contemporary Bukavu. Physical and subjective divisions continue as forms of ordering and subject-making of people living the city and the state effect. However, the colonial modern state project still casts a shadow over a state that continues to reproduce the state effect. At the same time, the state project from colonial and independent times is used, reinvented and projected in multiple forms in Bukavu. This will be seen through the eyes of consumers and providers as subjects living the state in the following empirical chapters.

5.0 "The political class does not take care of garbage here": Urban Waste (Mis)management and the Politics of Neglect

Urban waste management and sanitation are excellent themes through which to study state-society relations.[59] Generally speaking, there is an expectation, or at least a desire, for clean public space that the local authorities should maintain. Of course, this needs to be positively enforced through citizens' duties to appropriately dispose of waste in the public space. Simultaneously, citizens who wish to upkeep a clean personal space will need to have access to proper waste disposal. At the public service provider level in Bukavu, there are scarce waste depots and limited official recycling. Thus, citizens utilize rivers, a lake and colonial drainage systems to dispose of waste. However, citizens still find ways to recycle and reuse. It is important to note that what some see as waste, others see as opportunity. Therefore, waste can be defined as something "that ha[s] lost [its] value in the eyes of the first owner" (Contreau 1984 in Beall, 1997, p. 953). In particular, this chapter will discuss how a deprived area, Kadutu, deals with waste problems. It will examine the administration, starting from the highest officials, *Mairie* or the City Hall, and then examine down through the hierarchy of public servants in the municipality. Moreover, this chapter will discuss waste management perspectives from citizens both in Kadutu and Ibanda. These citizens are positioned as consumers but, revealingly from the empirical data, they are also providers of services due to the "politics of neglect" (van der Geest & Obirih-Opareh, 2009) at the local municipality level. This means that it is not only those formally in charge of waste management, such as the municipal authorities, but also private citizens of Bukavu who are involved in disposal or negotiation with local authorities.

The aim of this chapter is to exemplify how waste management becomes a place for urban state-society frictions through negotiations and potential loss of control over public space. Here, the daily governance of waste becomes the center of disputes over what "the public" space constitutes. By daily governance, I mean what mechanisms are used, what institutions are in place and how actors individually or collectively organize in order to tackle sanitation problems, in particular waste management, on a day-to-day basis (van

---

[59] The main categories of waste that will be discussed are biodegradable waste (such as leftover food, plants and human waste i.e., excrement) – which are potentially recycled into compost for land fertilization – as well as solid waste (such as plastic, cans, paper and fabric) that generally have a more technically-demanding recycling process.

Eeuwijk, 2009, p. 303). In my research, both citizens from Ibanda and Kadutu expressed a perception of dismemberment from official, "public" places. Here, certain places, such as the *Place de L'Indépendence* (see map), have been kept spotless by a number of staff working for the municipality and it shows (unsurprisingly) how public authorities appreciate tidy 'public spaces'. However, the *Place de L'Indépendence* symbolizes the power for the central authorities and is serviced by municipal sanitation resources that could have been used for clearing waste from more crowded neighborhoods (*quartiers populaires*). In many ways, *the Place de L'Indépendence* is a good example of how a state is "capable of creating a definite and authorized nation-space materialized in boundaries, infrastructure, monuments, and authoritative institutions" (Hansen & Stepputat, 2001b, p. 2). As such, the de facto statehood survives and rises in the midst of squalid surroundings.

However, my observations reveal the tensions of belonging to a city associated with the issue of private versus public space. Though private spaces such as homes, clothes and so on are kept clean, the "indifference to the dirt [in the urban space] is indicative of [urban dwellers'] desire not to reproduce their social relationship within this environment" (Bouju, 2009, p. 149). I argue that the poorer inhabitants are marginalized and viewed as "illegal" squatters who disrespect what the authorities perceive as the foundations of civic relations. With this marginalization, there is clearly a lack of incentive to foster the social relations of cleanliness that are important in private spaces. Waiting for the rain to flush the waste away or using rivers and broken water pipes as garbage disposal can all be perceived as responses to rejection by the urban authorities and feelings of abandonment. Those with financial means can easily get away from these "dirty" areas by moving to the leafier European style neighborhoods in Ibanda. In that case, the idea of a collective urban space is rejected on both sides of "civic" relations.

In contrast to the other two categories of public goods (i.e., roads and water), waste management is not as clearly governed by one service provider like SNEL (electricity) and REGIDESO (water). Thus, waste recycling is mainly conducted by the private citizens of Bukavu or through certain commercial industries. However, Congolese law (de jure) states that the municipal authorities (*Mairie*) are responsible for managing waste, especially in urban centers. Thus, I will first present the perspectives from a sub-office in charge of waste management in Bukavu's *Mairie* (City Hall). The Kadutu

market is particularly relevant for studying waste management as a common societal concern and lies within the municipal authorities' remit because they own the market. Thus, and secondly, I will present the perspectives of the local waste workers and the office for sanitation in the market. Further, I will also present the perspectives of a private organization for waste service, referred to as *Poubel Net,* which mainly serves elite consumers. Finally, I will discuss waste management among citizens from Kadutu and Ibanda in Bukavu. In these two areas, particularly Kadutu, there is a constantly increasing urban population, and there is, thus, an increasing necessity for more regulated waste management due to public sanitation and health demands.

5.1 Waste Management from the Providers' Point of View

Compared to the other public services and institutions, it was a challenge to identify the formal, administrative level of waste management in Bukavu. As the next section will reveal, there are indeed views on where the waste should be thrown (into rivers, sewage channels, the lake and so on) but the identifying service providers in the public or private sector was more difficult.[60] In this section, I will dissect the different levels of public administration when it comes to waste management. This starts with the *Mairie* (the City Hall), following then a *commune* or territorial level through Kadutu, where the *bourgmestre* is positioned, to the level of *chef du quartier* in Kadutu.[61] Finally, the last level will include the Kadutu market administration together with the local waste workers. All levels are located within the municipal administration and demonstrate a high level of political neglect (Van deer Geest & Obirih-Opareh 2009). This in turn results in frustration regarding waste management in the lower level administration. Finally, there will be a discussion on waste management for the elite through examination of a private company operating in the more affluent areas of Ibanda. In Ibanda, many private households rely on what the people in Kadutu are missing, namely space in their own gardens to either burn solid waste (e.g. plastic) or use leftover food and other biodegradable waste as fertilizers for the soil.

---

[60] The search for public institutions, however, led me to important intellectuals working in research institutions and NGOs in Bukavu who throughout the two last field visits provided excellent opportunities and taught me significant lessons from their experiences.

[61] See chapter 4 for more detail on the municipal administrative structure of Bukavu.

My first encounter regarding waste management at the *Mairie* was particularly interesting. There was great confusion as to whom I should talk to in order to gain a better understanding of waste management in Bukavu. From the reception area, I was sent to the *Chef de division urbaine*, the head of the urban division, who wrote a paragraph on my purpose at the office that I in turn would give to another person at the secretariat of the *Mairie*. This person, whom I would not meet in relation to this topic, was not *per se* in charge of waste management but might know who to talk to.[62] Together with my research assistant, I waited in the office to see if the man would arrive. After an hour and no arrival, we decided to try again the next day, again with no luck. On the third day when he was still not in the office and it was not known when he would return, I asked one of his colleagues if he knew about any "state actors" in charge of waste management in Bukavu. He replied with surprise "*étatique?! Non.*"[63] Compared to other public goods, waste management initially seemed to be an issue that was not perceived as formally supervised by any public institutions.

After several more attempts, I was eventually pointed to *L'Environnement et Conservation de la Nature*, i.e., the Service for Conservation of the Natural Environment, at the *Mairie*.[64] I conducted two interviews with the executive of the office, Augustin Chahihobwa Rukomeza, in two separate years.[65] This office was found undesignated at the back of the building with no entry other than a small trail from the outside. The place may have been designed for a guard under the Belgian rule, or perhaps it had been a shed for gardening equipment, and there was no electric light. Rukomeza explained that the office was "a multi-sectorial service that coordinated efforts pertaining to the urban environment and the conservation of nature"[66] with the following sub-offices:

---

[62] In other encounters, however, this man working in the secretariat would prove valuable in fixing appointments and contact details for municipal bureaucrats.

[63] "Stat(e)/ist actors?! No." Brief encounter at the *Mairie*, 15 September 2013, Bukavu.

[64] Though the municipal services are neglected, the Congolese government supports the preservation of nature, as evidenced by the largely functioning *Institut Congolais pour la Conservation de la Nature*. There are reasons to suspect that the preservation of the rain forest holds more value in the global arena than managing the day-to-day issues of local sanitation problems for poorer citizens. As one Congolese student working on local environmental degradation put it: "The state does not work for the people but the international elite." It was clear for this citizen that the public authorities were more interested in attracting international aid money, such as for reforestation and protection of the rainforest, than considering their own citizens that are blatantly in need for improved waste services.

[65] Interview with Augustin Chahihobwa Rukomeza, *chef du bureau*, 19 September 2013 and 28 October 2014, Bukavu.

[66] Interview with Rukomeza, 28 October 2014, Bukavu.

1. Cellule de services généraux (general service unit)
2. Cellule de la surveillance continue de l'environnement (environmental monitoring unit)
3. Cellule de contrôle et vérification interne (inspection) (control and internal audit unit)
4. Cellule de la conservation de la nature (+reboisement) (conservation unit + reforestation)
5. Cellule de l'*Assainissement* de *Milieu* (environmental sanitation unit)
6. Cellule d'éducate et informate environmentales (environmental education and information unit)

All of these units (cellules) are found in each of the three territorial entities (*communes*) in Bukavu, namely in Ibanda, Kadutu and Bagira. Each unit is represented by a delegated person who has reporting responsibility to Rukomeza's office. He claimed that his office coordinated these activities in the territories (*communes*) and each unit provided a monthly report and one annual report. Each of these six units were represented by an individual in each of the communes and, thus, there were eighteen staff for all the three territorial entities combined. Moreover, Rukomeza claimed there was not a national or provincial agency in charge of domestic waste management services but that Congolese law gave the municipal authorities full responsibility for this issue.[67] However, when I interviewed Rukomeza the second time, he elaborated that his office also collaborated with the provincial ministry of environment[68] on particularly harmful activities that would need his inspection and then the permission of the ministry to proceed, such as the construction of hotels. Considering how quickly hotels are developing in Bukavu, these processes seem to be fairly corrupt. The most cross-cutting issue, however, was the aspect of a designated waste disposal area for citizens in Bukavu. I asked him several questions about this concern in both interviews. In an extract from the conversation he explained the following (my emphasis):[69]

Rukomeza: "We have a place for garbage disposal called *Irabati*. [Irabati] is an agreement with the plantation owner, located in the *cheferie du Kabare* [the chiefdom just outside Bukavu] but it is not yet finished. It is ten by ten meters and four meters deep. But we still haven't constructed the walls so we are not using it yet."

Solhjell: "But if the waste is not taken to this place, where do these tricycles provided by the Mairie take the waste to?"

---

[67] Interviewed 19 September 2013, Bukavu.
[68] Formally entitled *Le Ministère de l'Environnement, Conservation de la Nature et Tourisme de la République Démocratique du Congo,* which also has provincial levels of representation.
[69] Interviewed 28 October 2014, Bukavu.

Rukomeza: "Well, they do take it to *Irabati*. Before, they took it to a place in Bagira but the *bourgmestre* [of Bagira] asked us to stop because they did not appreciate the waste from Bukavu coming to Bagira. This was a place where an old *REGIDESO*[70] sewage channel burst and water flooded and the population, as well as the Bralima [brewery] used it to dispose of their waste. There was a call for the Bralima to fix this issue, but we never heard back from them."

Solhjell: "Who owns Irabati?"

Rukomeza: The plantation company (*société plantation*), but there is no tea plantation in *Irabati*, that is why we can use it. The company has tea plantations in other places like in Walungu and different parts of *Kabare*. But at *Irabati* there are only eucalyptus plants.
(…)

Solhjell: "But of all the public or common goods I have studied here in Bukavu, the issue of waste seems to be the most problematic and highly neglected area. What is really hindering the construction of designated waste disposal areas?"

Rukomeza: "It is a lack of funding. But at the same time, there are so many priorities, like road construction, paying employees, funding petrol for different activities… This blocks the development of a waste construction place."
(…)

Solhjell: "Still, the issue of waste seems to be the least prioritized of the *Mairie* considering the extent of the problem. Has it been forgotten completely?"

Rukomeza: "It hasn't been forgotten, but *there is a lack of will among the authorities*. The people are poor… There are vehicles that can be used but *the problem is the lack of space*. During Mobutu, there were plots (*parcelles*), but these were sold. The good waste disposal areas are so far away from the city. There used to be also the waste disposal by *Ruzizi*, but this had to be removed when the refugees from Rwanda came because the problem of waste gave a very bad first impression when entering Bukavu. You know, *the world's image of us*… Now people use dangerous places for waste disposal where there are problems of landslides that can affect everything."

Being unprioritized by the authorities, politically or financially, and problems of space for designated waste disposal were both emphasized by Rukomeza as the driving issues preventing proper sanitation. Rukomeza recognized the problems of using the water company's (REGIDESO) broken-down installations for waste disposal but argued that there was no cooperation between their offices. The lack of relations between these state-like institutions reduces the state effect in the domain of waste management. This was also a concern when it came to *Irabati,* the waste disposal area. This place was referred to on different occasions with administration at the territorial level (Kadutu and Ibanda) as well as by citizens complaining about the distance from Bukavu. As Rukomeza mentions, this is a place located in the chiefdom of Kabare, 12 km outside of the city,[71] and is also in proximity to the main water reserve (*Kahele*) for Bukavu (see Chapter 7).

---

[70] Regideso is the water company in the DRC and will later be discussed in Chapter 7.
[71] Distance according to Google maps, accessed 18 April 2014,

The infiltration of waste in this water reserve was a concern expressed during the field visits to Kabare.[72] Yet, the limited or nearly absent coordination between the water agency and waste management affected overall state performativity.

Some municipal investment in waste management does exist. This is largely in the form of tricycles; three-wheeled vehicles resembling motorcycles with room for carriage. Rukomeza claimed that these vehicles had been provided directly by the mayor himself to the three urban territories (*communes*). Thus, I met with representatives of the *commune du Kadutu* to inquire further about their work on waste management.[73] The environmental supervisor, Jean de Dieu Tchalumba Olomwene, and the head of administration, Paul Jean-Marie Koabashi explained the following (my emphasis):[74]

Solhjell: "How do you deal with waste management here in Kadutu?"

Olomwene: "Every Saturday we have the *Salongo*. People collect their waste and put it on the side of the road. We then take the waste using a vehicle from the *Mairie* and take the waste to *Irabati*, the designated waste area in Kabare, outside Bukavu."

Solhjell: "Two questions, what kind of area is *Irabati* and do you collaborate with the environmental office at the Mairie [*Le Service de l'Environnement et Conservation de la Nature]*?"

Olomwene: "Yes, we collaborate with the environmental office in Bukavu, the *Mairie*. He [Rukomeza] is my boss. The *Irabati* area belongs to a private plantation company producing tea leaves. The *Mairie* has an agreement with these land owners. You know, there is a certain wealth in waste, if it is treated well. But now we have no overview, all the waste goes together. It was in 2012 that we started this more organized waste collection, using the tricycles that we got from the *Mairie*. We have three of them but only two are working at the moment. We need bigger vehicles, especially with the Kadutu market."

Solhjell: "Can you ask the *Mairie* or other authorities for help on this issue?"

Koabashi: "We asked the central government in Kinshasa for help, as we have a big urban population in Kadutu. But we get no help from the *Mairie*. The *Mairie* collects a lot of taxes from companies but all is sent back to Kinshasa and not used in our *commune*. Everything we get is from the central government. Though, we do get some small but insignificant funding from the Mairie."

Solhjell: "What about your own taxes? Can you use some of the income from taxes to improve and invest in waste management?"

---

[72] Interview with manager Daniel Kasereka, Regideso's Kahele water reserve, 16 September 2013, Kabare, and the chief of Kabare (Mwami) Desiré Rugemaninzi, interviewed 29 October 2014, Kabare.
[73] Interview with Paul Jean-Marie Koabashi, *chef de bureau*, and Jean de Dieu Tchalumba Olomwene, environmental supervisor, 22 October 2014, Bukavu.
[74] Ibid

Koabashi: "The taxes from the roads here do not come back to us. But we do have some local taxes. Like at the market in Kadutu, we own the markets that do not have roofs. The market with a roof is owned by the *Mairie*. In the dry season, we do get some income. But now in the rainy season, no one wants to stand outside with their goods."

Solhjell: "What about the issue of waste thrown in the rivers and lake, how do you deal with this?"

Olomwene: "The problem is the mentality of people. We work now and then with students on sensitizing the people. But we lack means to educate people. *But the lack of will from the government is also affecting people's mentality. They [people in Kadutu] cannot keep their waste in their house. They have to dump the waste in the river, people have no other choice.*"

The expression "Salongo" is here used to evoke a specter of the of the Mobutist state for certain collective efforts of waste management. These representatives, whose *commune* level is positioned hierarchically just below the *Mairie* in the administration, expressed deep concern for the need for more support from the *Mairie* and for the lack of means to deal with the problems of waste, especially with regard to the Kadutu market. Comparatively, the representatives at the *commune* level of Ibanda, were praising the *Mairie* and particularly the Mayor's support and appeared to be much closer to the central power of the administration.[75] Koabashi and Olomwene expressed their concern at funds being sent back to Kinshasa and the limitations this created in the effectiveness of municipal services. This shows the tension between public authorities and service providers' relations when it comes to waste management as an aspect of de facto statehood negotiations in an urban space. This municipal level (*commune*) did not have the right to collect taxes but appeared closer to the population in a rapidly growing urban space. This demonstrates potentials in de facto statehood relations.

Lower down the municipal hierarchy is the *chef du quartier*, which is comprised of twenty representatives and an additional twenty deputy positions dispersed among the three territories. I met with one *chef du quartier* in Kasali, a neighborhood in central Kadutu, named Marcelin Ramazani, who was willing to share with me some critical views on the aspect of waste management:[76]

Ramazani: (…) "When it comes to waste, we don't really have a public waste place. All waste places that used to be here have been sold."

---

[75] Interview with *Bourgmestre* and *du Bureau* at *Commune d'Ibanda*, 24 October 2014, Bukavu. It should be noted, however, that I was unable to conduct an interview at the level of Bourgmestre in Kadutu as both the Bourgmestre and his deputy were out of touch during the field visit in October 2014.
[76] Interview with Marcelin Ramazani, Chef du quartier of Kasali, Kadutu, 30 October 2014, Bukavu.

Solhjell: "What about the tricycles at the *commune*, do you use these and do you know if there is a charge on using this service?"

Ramazani: "We don't use them, but we have local private associations that charge 3-500 Congolese Franc [30-50 cents USD] per sack of waste. *Irabati* is a long way for us. The tricycles are by the market, but they often lack money for petrol so they ask for donations. The private association we used to have, *plaidoyen debout* [standing plea], is no longer running because they did not make enough money transporting the waste all the way to *Irabati*."

Solhjell: "What would you recommend as solutions to the waste issues in your district?"

Ramazani: "First, the authorities need to construct a public depot for waste. The problem is all over the city, not just in this district. We repeat this again and again to the authorities. Instead, there are street children who work for 200 Congolese Franc per bag of waste collecting it on foot."

Solhjell: "What is the central problem with waste issues in your view?"

Ramazani: "It is not at the population level. I talk to the *Bourgmestre*, who talks to the Mayor, but they say nothing to us. So we keep quiet with the population because we have nothing to say or give them."

Ramazani's perspective on the lack of space for public waste is of particular interest. He expressed, as shown, that what used to be public is now owned privately. This public turned private space in the city shows the contested living environment in Bukavu. These contestations will continue to shape state effect as urban citizens and service provider representatives become embedded in relations that are non-escapable. The perceptions, meaning and practice of what is public and what is private will shape the statehood processes. The technologies used for governing waste, such as used by the private association mentioned, were not profitable enough due to transport costs to *Irabati* and the charges that the Kadutu population were able and willing to pay, according to Ramazani. Waste thus instead became a livelihood option for street children who were going to households collecting bags. This provides an example of how citizens at the margin (street children) are sometimes engaged in providing services in the absence of government technologies.

Finally, the common problems of waste in Kadutu are particularly elevated in the central market, as was consistently referred to throughout my fieldwork. Though this market is not directly positioned in the administrative hierarchy of the municipality, there is a direct link with the environmental office and *Assainissement Hygiénique Marché Central de Kadutu*, the hygienic sanitation office at the Kadutu central market, who are in charge of

hygiene including waste management. Kadutu central market is owned by the *Mairie*. The rent and income tax from the market seem to be important for the *Mairie* and thus the efforts of municipal waste services (such as tricycles) are directed to this area. The office for *Assainissement Hygiénique* was a dark, tiny room consisting of two senior civil servants, piles of paper work and an LED flashlight.[77] The head of office, Ezekiel Mwomera, was willing to explain some of their concerns regarding waste and how difficult it was to keep order with a large number of people visiting this popular market:[78]

"There is a lack of means to get rid of the waste here. We have nothing… Transportation is a real problem. People from nearby villages come to Kadutu to sell or buy products and they just throw away the plastic, the banana leaves and manioc leftovers here. We at this office also have some technical issues. We have a small staff that collects garbage from the market but the only option then is to throw it in the river. There are no options other than using the river or the lake even though we know it pollutes. The *Mairie* has never replied to our requests. There is no space to dispose of garbage here and the only option is far away [Irabati]. (…) *The political class does not take care of garbage here. It is the Mairie's responsibility. The land belongs to the state. If they really wanted, they could ask people to leave and use it for waste depots*."

Based on what Mwomera was telling me, there was a frustration with the lack of political will from the municipal authorities. In particular, it is interesting how Mwomera describes the lack of space for public waste, on one hand, and the view that the state owns the land, on the other. The de jure aspects of land ownership are certainly disputed[79] but it also demonstrates a considerable state effect on public space. The imagining of land being owned by the state has major implications for de facto statehood dimensions exemplified through the disputes over governing waste. Here, the politics of neglect by de facto public authorities was a concern to Mwomera.

After the interview, Mwomera took me to the place where they disposed of waste, which was just across the street from the market approachable through a trail between small wooden houses. The 'landfill' area was spread in an area of numerous private houses and on a small hill leading down to the river Kahuha, which flows into Lake Kivu through the former industrial area.

---

[77] At first, these two men were reluctant to speak to me as I did not hold any official document from higher ranking authorities but they eventually accepted my presence thanks to my research assistant's persuasion.

[78] Interview with Ezekiel Mwomera, *chef du bureau*, 24 September 2013, Bukavu

[79] Formally, the 1973 General Property Law (Law No. 73-021) provides for state ownership of all land, subject to rights of use granted under state concessions in the DRC (see also Koen Vlassenroot & Huggins, 2005). However, the law also permits customary law to grant use-rights to unallocated land in rural areas. This is a source of considerable legal tension concerning land tenure.

Figure 10 Waste disposal by Kadutu Central Market.

Photo taken by author, September 2013

As the picture (figure 10) illustrates, the problem of waste mismanagement also affects public health concerns and access to clean water. Thus, waste management is a good interrelating with the other goods discussed (water management, including hydroelectricity, and roads). The citizens living in these surroundings find themselves, I argue, on the margin of the state. These waste sites create spatial relations for struggles of "a public that is yet to come" (Walters, 2008, pp. 203-204).

As mentioned by Mwomera, his office also employed around twenty-three waste collectors, both women and men. I was able to conduct a focus group discussion with ten of these employees in his office the next day. The workers were from the villages outside Bukavu and had a relatively long walk, two to three hours each way, to get to Kadutu. It was not difficult to get the impression that these were poorer workers with little or no education and no knowledge of French. The income for each worker was stated to be around a few hundred Congolese Francs, around fifty cents USD, per day. The following is an excerpt of the discussion (my emphasis): [80]

---

[80] Interview with waste collectors, six women and four men, all senior citizens, *Assainissement Hygiénique marché central de Kadutu*, 25 September 2013, Bukavu. Interview fully translated from Swahili/Mashi to English by Jonathan Magoma, interpreter and research assistant.

Woman 1: "We struggle in this work because we have no tools. We have to put the garbage bags on our heads and carry them to the dump. Sometimes the bags leak. We cannot carry them far in this way."

Solhjell: "Do you get any assistance from the *Mairie*?"

[A group consensus follows that there is no help from the *Mairie*]

Man 1: "It is the responsibility of the *Mairie* to help us with a place for waste, it is their duty. We expect help on this and they should provide us with transportation."

Solhjell: "Why do you expect anything from the *Mairie* when they are not helping you at all?"

Man 1: "It is their [*Mairie's*] duty, we still have hope. With the last mayor we did get some funding for salaries. *It is our right to expect this from the state*."

Woman 2: "We heard some time back that the *Mairie* would help us remove the bags of garbage. We collected all the bags and took them to the place we were told to but they never came to pick them up with their trucks. After some time, it began to smell and we had to get rid of it all. *We lack encouragement*."

Solhjell: "What do you think in terms of the public health issues, like smell and diseases, when it comes to this situation?"

[A group consensus again that this is badly affecting the health of everyone, not just the workers.]

Man 2: "There are all sorts of things at the garbage place. Dead animals, aborted babies… We [the waste workers and the hygienic office] got together and wrote a letter to the authorities [*Mairie*] to complain about these conditions, but they never replied back to us."

Solhjell: "Do you meet the central municipal authorities at all and do you get your salaries directly from them?"

Woman 3: "The government does not come to us, they only talk to the market owners. It is the market owners that pay our salaries."

Man 1: "There are so many taxes paid by the sellers but they all go directly to the *Mairie*. Nothing comes back to us."

Solhjell: "Speaking more generally, what is your view when to it comes to the lack of government involvement in issues such as waste management, but also clean water and access to electricity?"

Man 2: "The authorities have ill intentions. They take everything into their own pockets. Those who took over after the Belgians were brutal and their inheritance has continued in later generations."

Solhjell: "If they are so useless, why are you afraid to speak up against their bad deeds?"

Man 2: "We cannot seem to shake them off [the state authorities]."

The three tricycles that were meant for waste management in Kadutu were not available for these workers. Elaborating on the latter aspect from the excerpt, i.e., that it was

impossible to "shake off" the state, the employees in further discussion explained that if they ever stopped working, the waste would pile up within two days. Then, the market place salesmen and women would call up representatives at the *Mairie* because the sellers paid taxes to them and the *Mairie* would send police to arrest the waste workers or worse the market owner, which, in turn, would mean serious repercussions for them and their families. At the same time, there are interesting aspects of these workers' expectations of "the state", seen especially as the municipality (*Mairie*) in this case, despite these workers' difficult situation. The expectations stand in contrast to the practice of municipal authorities who have continued to disappoint in the domain of waste management service provision, according to the workers. However, it is also in contrast to the fear of the *Mairie* and the market owners. The workers' relations with these authorities demonstrates acts of being political (Isin, 2002). They have a solidaristic bond among themselves as waste workers for the market owners. These relations have in turn mobilized them into writing a letter to the *Mairie*; expecting certain rights as public employees and actions from their employer. These bonds and relations, I argue, are shaping the waste workers into political beings.

Finally, there are commercial actors involved in the waste business in more affluent areas. Travelling through the neighborhood of *Muhumba* (see figure 4) where I lived during my stay, I discovered posters on the gates of restaurants and hotels advertising *Poubel Net*, which can be interpreted as "Clean Waste"[81], and a picture of a modern waste truck. I gained an interview with the chief secretary at *Poubel Net*, Germaine, in her office.[82] She explained that they were a part of a larger Canadian company named *Groupe Ciel Ouvert* (Open Sky Group) and that their focus was primarily on the disposal of household organic waste for paying clients. She explained that they had agreements with land owners in the area where they would turn the biodegradable waste into compost for land fertilization. The cost of their service varied from one to twenty USD per month depending on who the clients were. She explained the following:[83]

"Our clients are paying customers. Poorer people rely on youth organizations that can get rid of garbage at lower costs. But in order to operate, the ministry of environment demanded a lot of taxes from us. [Group Ciel Ouvert] pays six thousand [US] dollars per year in order to be allowed

---

[81] The word *net* is an abbreviation of the word *nettoyage*, to clean, in French.
[82] Interview with Germaine, chief secretary, *Poubel Net*, 17 September 2013, Bukavu. Germaine preferred to use her first name only in the thesis.
[83] Ibid

to operate. The lack of public waste disposals areas is a problem for the Government. The political authorities in la Botte [the provincial ministries' neighborhood] use our services but they refuse to pay. The have a large debt to our company. The taxes they take from us and other companies are just pocketed. Sometimes when the bosses [in the public offices] are short on cash, they send lower ranking servants to demand payments from us on the basis of various taxation claims. It is fine to pay taxes, that is normal, but where the money goes is not OK. (…) We prefer clients like large humanitarian organizations, The Red Cross for instance, who have many ex-patriots and always pay at the end of the month. (…) People in the city are suffering as they cannot pay the money for this service. They have to throw their garbage on the streets and in gutter and sewage channels, blocking water and creating diseases. People send their kids to throw away garbage. It is a big problem for the city."

Thus, seen from Germaine's perspective, the local government was primarily a problem and it saw Poubel Net's service as a potential business opportunity rather than a source of waste management relief. The cost of these "high-end" services that Poubel Net offered were generally not an option for most citizens in Bukavu, as Germaine pointed out. Germaine points to the lack of waste disposal areas as "a problem of the Government." This remark demonstrates a perception of close affiliation between managing public space and state performances. Thus, private companies like Poubel Net, is calling for state practices and performances on regulation, management and finance of public good provision. In the next section, I will present the views of consumers in relation to waste management services.

5.2 Waste Management from the Consumers' Point of View

I conducted interviews and focus groups with adolescents, women and men in Ibanda and Kadutu, where we discussed, amongst other things, the issue of waste management. The men I interviewed in Kadutu were not involved in waste management, as this was seen as a woman's and/or a youth's task.[84] The women I interviewed in Kadutu had very few material resources and lived in small houses with earthen floors and had on average eight children.[85] For them, human waste problems (toilets) and the lack of space were particularly concerns. The following is an excerpt of our discussion:[86]

Woman 1: "We don't have any place to get rid of the [toilet waste]. When the toilet is full, we wait for the rain to take it away. We don't have anywhere to dig for a new toilet; there is a lack of land."

(…)

---

[84] Interview with five men in Kadutu, 9 October 2014, Bukavu.
[85] Focus group with nine women in Kadutu, 4 October 2014, Bukavu. Translator translated from Swahili/Mashi to English.
[86] Ibid

Solhjell: "Can you organize, like get together and dig new toilets elsewhere in Kadutu? Or is this illegal?"

Woman 2: "If we want to build something together, like a public toilet, then we lack the space to build this. It is not illegal to organize. It is just that we don't have the space."

Solhjell: "What about waste more generally, what do you do with it?"

Woman 3: "We put our waste in bags and wait for the rain to take it away."

Woman 2: "There is a waste place in Funu [one public water reservoir in Kadutu]. During the dry season we take it there to burn it or we take it to a stream. We also drink from the same streams. We live like some animals."

From what they shared with me, these women were not in a position to pay for waste services and instead were using water in the form of rain or streams to dispose of waste or, alternately, to burn it during the dry season. In addition, the women were extremely concerned with the issue of toilet facilities; a problem that was causing diseases and discomfort for them and their families. In the preceding field visit, I had also conducted several interviews with women working at the central market in Kadutu.[87] Though a few were saying they paid small sums to youth groups who collected waste, they mainly relied on rivers, gutters, and the colonial drainage systems.[88] During their attempts at disposal in the drainage system at Camp Saio (the main army camp, see map figure 4), two of the women I interviewed reported that they had had several run-ins with local police officers who would claim that garbage disposal was not allowed in what was considered to be public space.[89] Rather than reporting the transgression to their chiefs or fining these women the local police would usually negotiate for small sums of money.

As mentioned, local youth groups occasionally collected waste, however it was not clear where they would dispose of it. Although it is likely that they would also use the rivers and the drainage systems, since these groups did not have access to motorized transportation. None of the women I spoke to had considered buying services from private companies such as *Poubel Net*, as they had either never heard of them, did not trust them and/or could not afford them. One of the women argued that she would rather

---

[87] Interviews with different women working in stalls, either individually, in pairs or in focus group meetings, 25.-26 September 2013, Kadutu market, Bukavu. A total of sixteen women were interviewed.
[88] They especially depended on the Kahuha river which runs through the neighborhood and out to Lake Kivu, the streets, or colonial drainage systems, like the Camp Saio area (see map), for dumping their household waste.
[89] Ibid

support the local youth groups, because she knew them, instead of a company.[90] For the women that lived further away, it was easier to dispose of their waste without needing to negotiate with the police as the outskirts were subject to lax controls. The "state density" in the urban space makes these relations and interactions between public authorities and citizens more frequent and harder to escape.

Moreover, the issue of toilets and the possibility of a sewage system, was also discussed with the same women.[91] As none of the women had access to piped water in their house, there was no such thing as water closets or flush toilets that they could access. One of the older women who had lived in the Kadutu neighborhood for decades stated that toilet needs had been much easier in the past when there had been far fewer people and more vegetation where they could 'do their business' without being disturbed. Now there was little privacy, as she pointed out.[92] In sum, the primary waste disposal areas for these women were rivers, the lake, old drainage systems and streets, all of which can be conceptualized as public space.

For the youth in Kadutu, they expressed similar concerns with a lack of options when it came to waste disposal and public toilets:[93]

Girl 1: "We only have some public toilets in the market, but they are private. You have to pay the owners of the market to use them."

Boy 1: "There are no services for getting rid of waste here. We have to dump it in the river."

Boy 2: "I would like to start a business in public toilets. I would charge people and make money."

Girl 2: "Private toilets are a possibility. In people's houses… They are very dirty, but after you pay you can use it like you please. But the longer you stay, the more you pay, like with diarrhea." [Everyone laughs].

Boy 3: "When the toilets are full, people wait for the rain. They release it into the gutters, the rivers and they pollute the entire neighborhood."

Boy 1: "Like *Salongo* [community duties]. People collect the waste, but they have no place to put it."

Solhjell: "Concerning *Salongo*, does everyone in your community do this?

[90] Women interviewed 25.-26 September 2013, Kadutu market, Bukavu
[91] Ibid.
[92] Ibid
[93] Interview with four girls and four boys aged 15-18 living and studying in Kadutu, 7 October 2014, Bukavu

Boy 1: "No, it is only in the market place. They are not paid workers but they work for the chief of the market. It is not done in people's private houses."

During the discussion, these young people were expressing both frustrations with the sanitation difficulties but were at the same time joking and suggesting business models for much needed public toilets. It is also interesting to see in this excerpt, as well as in different encounters I had during focus group discussions, how certain institutions were talked about as both public and private in the same sentence. The discussion on "public toilets" was interpreted as places that were not in a private home but in the popular Kadutu market that everyone could visit. At the same time, the young people considered these "public toilets" as private because there was a user fee. Thus, there is an idea that for a toilet to be entirely public, there should be no cost associated with its usage. These perceptions of what public means, seen through the eyes of Kadutu youth, revealed a tension, which would become increasingly clear, between public and private service providers and consumers.

Moreover, the sense of community duties, termed *Salongo,* was here being neglected; there was no assistance from the authorities to provide designated waste areas. Hence, the young people and their neighborhood resorted to using rivers and gutters that in turn caused hazards to the common good of the area, such as smell, diseases and difficulties of cleanliness.

The youth in Ibanda were living with a slightly more organized practice of waste disposal and had better access to WCs compared their peers in Kadutu.[94] Below is an excerpt from the discussion:

Girl: "In our house, there is a group of people that come each Monday to collect waste. They are paid fifteen dollars per month, per family. In one house, there might be four families. Each family will need to pay this sum of money to have their waste removed."

Boy 1: "Where I live, there is a sort of business organization that collects waste. They charge one thousand Congolese francs [1 USD] per month and they come with a lorry to collect waste."

Solhjell: "And what about toilets; do you have access to those in your house?"

---

[94] Focus group with three students, one girl and two boys living in Ibanda, all students at ISP, interviewed 9 October 2014, Bukavu. The interview was conducted in English.

Boy 2: "Yes, but we empty it directly into gutters and sewage systems. There is a big tank in which to empty the toilets also but it is a long walk."

Girl: "In my house we have three toilets. They work and we don't have to use the gutters.

However, although this group of youth young people did not need to dispose of the waste themselves, the organizations that collected waste were also dumping the waste into rivers, gutters and the lake. Thus, they could maintain more sanitary private space without needing to deal with waste themselves. The women in Ibanda were also struggling with waste problems and they explained the following:[95]

Woman 1: "I keep the waste in bags and there's a car belonging to volunteers [Salongo] interested in cleaning the environment in Bukavu that collects the bags once a week. But it's not free of charge. Concerning waste from the toilet, I simply rent the vehicle from the *Mairie*."

Woman 2: "I live in an area where a car can't reach. To get rid of the waste I pay some children who take the waste to an unknown place. There is no public waste place in Bukavu! My toilet hasn't been full yet. But in my quarter, my neighbors are used to filling up the old toilets with the soil from digging a new toilet so that the old is covered by earth.[96] Also, there are people, in my quarter, who wait until it rains so that they can use water pipes to flush their toilets and let it flow through the water channel. They do the same with solid waste and everything flows down to the lake."

Woman 3: "There was a large pit dug in Mukukwe by MONUSCO [headquarters] where we used to throw the waste. Since it was full, we had difficulty to get rid of the waste. Nowadays we're throwing waste at the playground near the new MONUSCO camp set near the ISP roundabout. With this, the problem is that the municipal authorities are threatening with imprisonment in case they find us throwing [waste] at this place. But the question is where do they want us to be throwing the waste when there's nowhere for it?"

Woman 4: "They should provide us with another pit or just with any place for it."

Jonathan Magoma: "I heard that the Mayor's office has got a vehicle that collects waste from different homes. Doesn't it collect from your homes?"

Woman 1: "I know they have got two vehicles; one for solid waste and another for waste from the toilet but they don't dispose of waste from people's homes free of charge."

Woman 2: "They collect for somebody who pays."

Woman 3: "I was told those vehicles were an aid [development assistance], so I can't understand why they should charge us!"

---

[95] Focus group with four women living in Ibanda, conducted and transcribed by research assistant Joanthan Magoma, from Mashi/Swahili to English, 30 November 2014, Bukavu.
[96] This concerns traditional toilets: when a toilet is about to be full, people start digging a new one next to the old one. The dirt from the digging is thus used to cover the old toilet.

These women may be considered lucky compared to their peers in Kadutu, who have to dispose of waste themselves. The matter of using sewage systems, gutters, public places (e.g., the playground) and the lake for garbage disposal is a growing concern within the city. This was further discussed with the men I interviewed in Ibanda. These men were also experiencing difficulties with waste issues but were relatively better off, in the sense that they were not as directly affected, living in better neighborhoods with WCs in their homes.[97] Due to the fact that the issue of waste spurred a long discussion, this passage length is longer. Nonetheless, this conversation demonstrates a number of interlinked problems and private initiatives (my emphasis):[98]

Man 1: "Waste should be managed by public services. In my area, there is no designated place for garbage. People just wait for the rain. It ruins the houses. Even during the dry season, we wait. The waste is just outside the house. Rain water is the garbage disposal."

Man 2: "In my neighborhood, there are associations. I pay five dollars per month for them to collect waste. I don't know where they take the waste. They come three times per month if they are regular or only one time if they are irregular."

[This focus group continued during the following meeting.]

Solhjell: "What can be done about the issue of waste in Bukavu, do you have any solutions?"

Man 1: "*The population has no other option than to dump their waste in the river or wait for the rain. The NGOs cannot finance the waste issue for the entire city of Bukavu. Even myself, I own a car, but there is no other place to dispose waste.* The NGOs only have limited project time and finance."

Man 2: "There are some public places…"

Man 1: [Interrupts] "Really? Define a public garbage place. Have you ever been to Kinshasa? Things are even worse there. No, the lake is our waste place. People lack opportunities and it affects the lake. It will create serious pollution problems."

Man 2: "But here are lots of initiatives, like local organizations. People deal with waste using their own means and they recycle into compost. Another initiative is to let the waste dry in sand and then burn it. The problem is to finance the transport of waste and to construct the place for turning waste into electricity, biogas and so on. But also there is a need to change people's mentality."

Man 3: "The city is dirty. The first method people use is to throw waste in the river. People leave waste in the roads during the night. Look at the government in Rwanda where they focus on biodegradable waste and where they have banned plastic bags. This dirty city [Bukavu] is why we have cholera and mosquitos causing malaria. You know, sometimes during the night, people just leave their waste bags outside other people's houses. Or they leave them in a pothole in the

---

[97] Focus group meeting with five men living and working in Ibanda, interviewed 14 and 21 October 2014, Bukavu. I had two sessions with them as there were many follow-up issues that I wanted to discuss further.
[98] Ibid

road before it is repaired. This causes problems with flies and mosquitos. The plastic bags left in the road are not biodegradable. The [Congolese] government should invest in biodegradable products like in Rwanda. *But the government has given up (démissionnaire) in the DRC. It has given up in that domain [waste].*

Man 4 [medical doctor]: "The impact on people's health is important. After the dry season in June-August, when it starts raining in September, there are always epidemics like cholera. In this period [the start of the rainy season], five people per day come to the hospital to receive treatment for cholera. And there's also typhoid fever… These patients always arrive from the combined problems of waste and rain."

(…)

Man 1: [Interrupts] "But look at the *Mairie*, they don't even have toilets! And the waste truck that they possess is tiny!"

Man 4 [medical doctor]: "There are many consequences when it comes to waste. The children play in the waste without shoes and they cut themselves on glass and get diarrhea and other diseases. We take the cases of cholera to the provincial hospital. In the worst months, September-October and January-February, the MSF takes charge. *We know all the solutions to the problem but the issue is lack of funding and also the mentality of 'new' inhabitants from the villages.* They have not been educated and they don't understand the problems with waste."

Man 3: "But the government must also be sensitized, not only the population. There is also the problem of applicability. You see, there have been several studies done to find solutions to non-biodegradable waste. But there are business interests in the market of importing plastic bags and other goods from Dubai and China. These people are afraid of losing their lucrative businesses if there are bans on goods, like in Rwanda."

Though more affluent than the women and young people in Kadutu, these men expressed great concern with the waste situation. On one hand, they could see the potential resources in waste, such as biogas, yet on the other hand they saw the poverty of the *Mairie* (who are responsible for Bukavu) and that the level of investment required to harness these resources could not be placed on individual NGOs. In addition, they expressed concern with business interests importing non-biodegradable goods from Asia and the lack of government policy ("the government has given up…"), similar to that of Rwanda, that could end some of the problematic consumption. These comparisons to Rwanda were frequently mentioned in other interviews and focus groups and demonstrated how another form of state performance was possible that was dissimilar to the form found in Bukavu.

These men can be considered middle class and they expressed frustration with the 'new' inhabitants of Bukavu. These were mainly seen as war-affected, uneducated villagers who were unaware of the interlinkages between clean water, proper waste disposal and preventing diseases. However, as I judged from the women in Kadutu, some of whom

were from the villages and many of whom were illiterate, there were also concerns with the problematics of waste, poor drinking water and diseases. Therefore, what I found to be the most cross-cutting daily issue was the lack of proper disposal areas for waste rather than a lack of knowledge among citizens. Nevertheless, this image of "the Other", i.e. subjects unaware of proper civic relations, is a central part of understanding dimensions of statehood and will be further discussed in Chapter 8.

It is important to note that there is a large informal economy regarding waste recycling in Bukavu. What some consider waste, others perceive as a resource that will be thoroughly checked, recovered, sorted and finally reused or resold. In Kadutu, the lack of official waste disposal areas and functioning public service forces citizens of Bukavu to handle household waste themselves or organize collectively. From my understanding, the problem of waste in Bukavu would be an even larger concern if the population were more affluent and hence more wasteful.

For instance, what is considered waste in Western countries would be considered a resource for both private and commercial use in Bukavu. For many Congolese, t-shirts from the Western world, regardless of what is printed on them, are of value and there is a major business in selling second-hand clothes in Bukavu. In addition, old textiles can be remade into 'new' clothes and are an important source of urban income. Another example is plastic cans for fetching water or selling petrol. During one personal experience, I was throwing my waste into a designated place for burning and a woman immediately came to fetch the empty water bottles that I had placed there. Furthermore, an everyday observation along the roads are trucks and taxis filled with jerry cans that are sold and used to hold water, petrol or cooking oil. There is also an important industry of recycling glass bottles from soft drinks and beer; these need to be returned to the brewery Bralima or seller. As I experienced personally, the housekeeper or fixer who had bought drinks for me (as it was not always easy to figure out where to buy these outside of restaurants and bars) had many worried looks if they were unable to find a bottle that was missing or if I was too slow to drink what they had bought. What I perceived, with a carefree attitude, as common disposable items were, however, a precious resource to them as they had to return these glass bottles to the brewery or sale depot to avoid trouble.

In another interesting case, when I was visiting the hydroelectric power station *Ruzizi I*[99], I saw waste flooding from a disused tunnel constructed by the Belgians right next to the power station and from the Ruzizi river itself.[100] The waste in this tunnel came from two places: One source was the waste which blocked the turbines in the Ruzizi power station and was taken out and dumped in the tunnel entrance. The other source was from waste entering the colonial drainage system through the tunnel from the nearby Camp Saio[101]. Outside the tunnel was a group of women collecting various items. The women explained that they were collecting any useful things they could find for their family or, potentially, to sell at the local market.[102] From what I could see, the women had collected plastic sandals, plastic cans and some sticks for firewood. This waste recycling by local women may not mean much to the overall sanitation problems in Bukavu, but it illustrates local initiative in making use of waste as an informal waste recycling process.

There are also privately owned, commercial actors involved in recycling, such as the warehouse *Société Kotecha*, who has specific requests for items during certain times of the year. For instance, this could be a collection of itemized cans twice per year where the provider will earn small sums per unit. I also witnessed how metal was collected in large trucks, which was then transported back to Kenya where re-melting installations are used for production for various industries. The examples of Kotecha and metal collection appear to be at the highest level of the recycling business in Bukavu. Here, the receivers of the products can simply state "yes" or "no" to the suppliers of the desired material and avoid getting their hands dirty. This can be compared to the 'petty pickers' of waste for personal or commercial use, such as the aforementioned women. For those at the bottom of the hierarchy, it is likely that the work they conduct in sorting waste also creates an increased likelihood of infections as there is no hygiene control in these areas. In between these two 'extremes', there are local collectors and sellers of recycled waste. Based on my observation, these collectors and sellers could be street vendors or those who have more permanent shops selling repurposed goods, such as small toys made of plastic or used car parts. Regardless of these recycling activities, there is certainly

---

[99] See further discussion in chapter 7 on the power station.
[100] Visit to Ruzizi I on 12 September 2013, Bukavu.
[101] Camp Saio is the main military camp in Bukavu, see figure 4 for location.
[102] Ibid, informal discussion with women.

negotiation over the urban space that affects perceptions of public space and responsibility through the issue of waste management.

5.3 Concluding remarks

There are two interdependent spaces of concern when it comes to waste management or the "politics of dirt"[103]: The city's private and public spaces. The city's public space is largely positioned under the responsibility of the municipal authority, the City Hall, in Bukavu. What stands out from my fieldwork is the neglect of any form of public waste disposal system. This neglect is in turn affecting pollution, public health, access to clean water, public roads and even the hydroelectric power station as waste becomes lodged in the turbines. The main public outreach from the municipal authorities seems to be sensitization campaigns, planting trees and a few tricycles that require user fees. Major efforts are instead directed to world heritage sites, such as national parks and rainforests, what some would term "donor darlings"[104]. Though these latter sites are of global importance, the neglect of urban citizens demonstrates a serious challenge to the de facto statehood. The disregard of waste management in a collective space is one of the main health hazards and causes numerous deaths.

At the same time, it is puzzling to see how people's private spaces, such as their homes or clothes are kept exceptionally clean. Individuals' polished shoes, for instance, are remarkably spotless as citizens navigate their ways along the muddy trails of peripheral Bukavu. These forms of cleanliness demonstrate, as Bouju (2009, p. 146) argues, "the will to reproduce the social relationship fostered with those who share this space". Thus, there is no resonance in claiming that people of Bukavu do not understand cleanliness, as municipal authorities may argue. They clearly and visibly do. A question to be asked is then, rather, why public spaces are neglected, both by municipal authorities and the urban citizens? At the core of answering this question lie the challenges of state-society relations, the political legitimacy of municipal authorities and the perception of local

---

[103] Title borrowed from research project led by Prof. Stephanie Newell, Sussex University.

[104] The term refers to political connections such as former colonial countries, trade partners and media favorites, such as protection of silverback gorillas. In the DRC, a specific "donor darling" is the considerable attention to female victims of sexual violence with limited focus on the much broader issues of maternal health care or the complexity of human rights violations against both men and women (see e.g. Baaz & Stern 2010).

governance structures in the eyes of the public. These are all dimensions of de facto statehood.

One broader aspect to answer this question of neglect is to go deeper into interpretations of public space in Bukavu. In all the focus group discussions I asked the participants about the idea of public space (inductive concept formation) and examples of such places in the city. A public place was assumed to be a place that was free of a user charge, and where anyone could spend time or speak freely without coming under surveillance. However, the participants assumed that such a place did not really exist in Bukavu. Certain places, such as the central market in Kadutu, the stadium, two spaces used as football fields and playgrounds, the pubs and the churches were discussed but none of these really fitted with the concept of public space as perceived by the citizens. As one woman in Ibanda explained:[105]

"No, there is no such place in Bukavu even though the authorities tend to say that markets, football grounds and schools are public spaces. They aren't! What I know is that in other countries, there are places that people go to at any time for enjoyment or relaxation, public talk or for any discussion and we don't have such things in Bukavu."

Out of curiosity, I also asked all the participants if the *Place de L'Indépendence* – a large, well-maintained roundabout centrally located with sculptures erected by current president Joseph Kabila – was a public space, even though the participants never mentioned it. A consistent "no" resonated and revealed a tension when it came to the public authorities' legitimacy. As one of the other women from Ibanda explained:[106]

"In my opinion, *Place de L'Indépendence* shouldn't be called that. I would suggest it to be named "*place du président*" or simply Majority Square (*Majorité Présidentielle*). I stand there only if there is a governmental authority holding a meeting; and as you can see, there are chains surrounding the big circular section and people don't cross them outside of these [special] occasions. If you stand there for a while, two policemen or more will walk toward you and chase you away."

In many ways, both citizens from Ibanda and Kadutu expressed a perception of dismemberment from official "public" places. The fact that this was a place kept spotless by a number of staff working for the municipality shows, unsurprisingly, how public

---

[105] Focus group with four women living in Ibanda, conducted and transcribed by research assistant Joanthan Magoma, from Mashi/Swahili to English, 30 November 2014, Bukavu.
[106] Ibid

authorities appreciate tidy 'public spaces'. However, this particular space was a demonstration of power for the central authorities, accompanied by municipal sanitation resources that could have been used for clearing waste from more crowded neighborhoods (*quartiers populaires*). Politicians that were not a part of the presidential majority coalition (*Majorité Présidentielle*), such as the presidential candidate Vital Kamerhe, have been ejected this place.[107] The citizens I spoke to in Bukavu thought of this as a political rather than public space.[108] In many ways, *Place de L'Indépendence* is a physical evidence of a state that is "capable of creating a definite and authorized nation-space materialized in boundaries, infrastructure, monuments, and authoritative institutions" (T.B. Hansen & F. Stepputat, 2001b, p. 2). As such, the de facto statehood survives and rises in the midst of surrounding squalor.

Though private spaces, such as homes, clothes and so on are kept clean, the "indifference to the dirt [in the urban space] is indicative of [urban dwellers] desire not to reproduce their social relationship within this environment" (Bouju, 2009, p. 149). The newer inhabitants in Bukavu arriving from rural areas are often illiterate and struggle with employment and livelihood in the city. They also live in small houses with little private space for dealing with waste compared to the leafier residential areas. In many ways, they are rejected by the authorities who perceive them as squatters who disrespect the foundations of civic relations. With this rejection, there is clearly a lack of incentive to foster these social relations of cleanliness that they nourish in their private spaces. Waiting for the rain to flush the waste away or using rivers and broken water pipes as garbage disposal can be perceived as a response to their rejection by the urban authorities and feelings of abandonment. These actions can also be interpreted as "weapons of weak" (James Scott, 1985) by slowly destroying the living environment of an imagined collective space. Those with financial means, such as the 'elected representatives', can easily escape these "dirty" areas by moving to the European style neighborhoods with gardens and fresher air. In that sense, the idea of a collective urban space is rejected on both sides of a perceived civic relationship.

---

[107] Vital Kamerhe, originally from Bukavu, came third in the presidential election in 2011 and continues to be one of the most popular politicians in eastern DRC. Kamerhe attempted to hold a highly anticipated political speech on 20 February 2014, which resulted in the provincial authorities using excessive force to remove both Kamerhe and the thousands of people gathered around *Place de L'Indépendence*.
[108] Focus group discussions September-October 2014.

The state, represented by the municipal authorities in this case, upholds cleanliness in certain spaces attached to the regime (political spaces) and central urban spaces (certain roads or roundabouts) in which their offices are found. The citizens, represented by Kadutu and Ibanda residents, uphold cleanliness in their private spaces. In between are the public spaces that are not "owned" politically or privately but that are used, to varying degrees, as wasteland. When citizens are rejected and treated as subjects outside the state's responsibility they may also act in ways of resistance. This shows the tension in state-society relations when it comes to waste management as an aspect of de facto statehood negotiations.

6. State Persistence: Perspectives from the Roads

Usually, roads can be seen as a public good, although some roads may be solely utilized by private owners or members of exclusive groups. This chapter focuses on the roads that are considered public in the urban areas of Bukavu. These are the main roads that everyone can use, although vehicle drivers are taxed at various levels depending on the size of their vehicle. Contrary to the other goods discussed, there are a plethora of actors working on road construction, taxation and "safety" and maintenance and construction of public roads are also held to be a key focus for the Mayor of Bukavu. Moreover, in many ways, roads represent an aspect of state-building and connectivity to the world. Roads connect the countryside to the urban centers, as well as the local with the national and the national with the international. Roads are often seen as promoting economic prosperity by enabling the mobility of goods and people. As Dalakoglou and Harvey (2012, p. 459) argue "[r]oads and the powerful sense of mobility that they promise carry us back and forth between the sweeping narratives of globalisation, and the specific, tangible materialities of particular times and places."

However, roads in Bukavu also represent spaces of contestation from relations between authorities representing public institutions and between different authorities and consumers. During colonial times, roads enabled exploitation from raw material to slaves; benefitting a few but often worsening the living conditions for the indigenous population. Road construction in colonial Congo involved forced labor and expropriation of land from the population to provide routes to plantations and mission stations (Fairhead, 1992, p. 21; Reybrouck, 2011). As this study will show, road control in contemporary Bukavu is a system for exclusion or inclusion, depending on your position within the society and perhaps one of the most visible displays of state-citizen negotiations in the city.

These negotiations are partly due to the limitations of paved roads. In Bukavu, there is one main road to the city center that stretches between the Rwandan border (Ruzizi I entrance) and the peninsula leading to the provincial government (*La Botte* or "the boot" because of its shape). During my last field visit in October to November 2014, there was also major construction work on roads (in particular on Avenue l'Hippodrome) in Bukavu that will be discussed. In addition, there is a newly built (2009) road out from

Bukavu leading to the local airport (Kavumu Airport) where small humanitarian flights, helicopters and private jets can land. The limited and concentrated public roads make the motorized mobility space limited and concentrated. I argue that the public roads are densely governed by multiple agents and agencies, whereby movement is restricted due to public infrastructure limitations and authoritarian control. Figure 4 with detailed map of Bukavu shows the road restrictions and the locations of traffic police.

The division between consumers and providers becomes less clear in the study of roads as some of the public authorities act in an extortive manner and thus consume more than they provide. On the other hand, citizens utilizing roads are providing much needed 'taxes' to the municipal authorities, local traffic police as well as national road maintenance agencies. The focus on consumers in this chapter is largely from the perspective of the taxi drivers of Bukavu. Indeed, the taxi drivers are service providers as they represent the main form of transportation and drive to, from and around the city. They are represented as consumers in this chapter because they enjoy the public paved roads and they are in daily contact with the service providers of road maintenance and safety. Critical to their livelihood is to conduct as many travels back and forth on the main roads to secure both an income for the owners of the vehicle and the drivers' salaries. This is well known among the regulators of traffic, which intensifies day-to-day engagement and negotiations between public servants (e.g., traffic police) and these consumers (i.e., taxi drivers).

The roads, and in particular junctions, form a major safety concern, however, they also serve as public spaces. They allow a space for thinking about being political (Isin, 2002), the right to the city (Lefebvre, 1996), and enable service providers to perform the state (Doty, 2003; K. C. Dunn, 2010). Thus, I have provided perspectives from citizens on these aspects as well as a local program called *Forces-Vives* run by an organization called *SAJECEK* which provides local security at one of the main junctions in Kadutu (Place Major Vangu, see Figure 4). Regarding public service providers, the main institutions are the Road Office (*l'Office de Route*) (OR), the Roads and Drainage Office (*l'Office des Voiries et Drainage)* (OVD) whose authority is in the urban areas, the National Fund for Road Maintenance (*Le Fonds National d'Entretien Routier)* (*FONER)* and finally the National Insurance Association (*Société nationale d'assurances*) (SONAS). However, there are also international and regional organizations that play a major role, such as the

World Bank and the European Union (EU), as well as public authorities like the Mayor of Bukavu, Philémon Lutembo Yogolelo. Negotiations with the World Bank and EU donors will be included here. Their views will be analyzed from the perspective of the OVD and FONER followed by secondary sources for some practical considerations, such as terms of conditions.

Finally, the role of the Congolese traffic police, formally entitled *La Police de la Circulation Routière* and informally *roulage*, operate in a largely undefined space between the consumers and providers of public services. De jure speaking, an examination of the *roulage* as a public service, may reveal some perspectives on the ideas and practice of the rule of law. Though certainly a contested concept, the rule of law is often understood as a core functioning of the modern state and can be seen as "protecting citizens against the state and against one another" (Bedner, 2010, p. 48). In practice, or de facto, the Congolese traffic police operating along the main road junctions are using laws, regulations and fines in a parasitic manner, i.e., using public goods for private gains. Rules are thus not protecting citizens from the state, but rather protecting the state at the expense of its citizens. Controlling the access to and taxation of roads provide an income for those who enforce them. Furthermore, I argue that roads form a visible space in which the public authorities perform their role through control and regulation, which creates the state effect. That is an effect of practices that make structures of control and separation appear to exist (Mitchell, 1999).

6.1 Road construction and traffic control from the providers' point of view

Compared to the other public goods discussed, there are multiple public offices charged with road construction and maintenance. To my knowledge, there are three main state institutions for road construction. The best known, due to its national outreach, is the *l'Office de Route* (henceforth OR), which is responsible for road construction at the national and provincial level. The second is the *l'Office des Voiries et Drainage* (henceforth OVD) their authority is primarily in urban centers, such as in Bukavu. The third is *la Direction des Voies de Desserte Agricole,* which maintains rural roads and

rivers for agricultural purposes.[109] Additionally, there is the office *le Fonds National d'Entretien Routier* (henceforth FONER), which collects taxes for road maintenance and provides funds for the abovementioned road construction offices.

I interviewed Albert Tsongo, who was the head of the technical division in OR.[110] When I explained the purpose of my visit he informed me that their office, contrary to popular belief[111], was not in charge of the city center of Bukavu but rather the roads leading out from capital provinces. I nevertheless continued the discussion in order to gain a better insight into the broader issues of road construction within the province. Tsongo gave me a brief history lesson of the OR's establishment and he explained how there were no road works between independence in 1960 and 1971.[112] The OR was established in 1971 and, as Tsongo stated, the World Bank financed its operation between 1975 and 1988. When I asked him why the Congolese government rarely paid for any of the roads themselves, considering all the wealth found within its borders, he simply stated that this was only *potential* richness, it was not tangible. He demonstrated this by stretching his hands out together as if he was holding something.

Further into our conversation, Tsongo asked his secretary to fetch a map for illustrative purposes to explain the current and planned activities for road construction in the South Kivu province. Interestingly enough, there were no maps in his office, neither on the walls or his desk when I was there. When he showed me the map with the 2011-2016 plans, it took him some attempts to locate the main roads, such as the one between the two major cities Bukavu and Uvira. Throughout my visits in Bukavu, it has been evident that conventional cartographic maps are not much used either in formal or informal settings, so Tsongo's trouble with locating this road was understandable.[113] On studying the maps, I realized that the road plans seemed rather ambitious, if not a case of outright wishful-thinking. I asked him why the OR made these ambitious plans when considering the cost and he stated the following:[114]

---

[109] The OVDA was not consulted, as their remit falls outside the territory of Bukavu.
[110] Interview with Albert Tsongo, *chef de division technique* in the OR, 13 September 2013, Bukavu.
[111] In informal discussions with citizens in Bukavu, the problems of roads were often blamed on the Office de Route.
[112] Interview with Albert Tsongo, 13 September 2013, Bukavu.
[113] In fact, maps can be seen as highly controversial and a power tool in a deeply contested political climate, such as eastern DRC. See for instance Turner's (2007, p. 62-66) accounts on this subject.
[114] Interview with Albert Tsongo, 13 September 2013, Bukavu.

"We send the project plans to Kinshasa and they will provide some funding for part of the roads. Other parts of the roads will have to wait. We also have a collaboration with the EU and the World Bank. For the road to Uvira, this has the highest priority in the province and is financed by Sinohydro [a state-owned Chinese construction company]. The second on the list is the road to Goma, which is financed by the EU. But the road to Kavumu [the airport outside Bukavu] is half funded by the DRC government and the rest with the help of the Chinese. (…) Money is the problem. The Congolese state is not able to mobilize all the funds needed for road construction and it is not a dictatorship. The government cannot simply dictate what needs to be done."

The construction plans in the OR revealed the plethora of different actors engaged in road construction in the DRC. Tsongo explained how the roads could be supported partly via Congolese central funds (*le budget d'investissement*) and significantly from external funds, most importantly including the World Bank, the EU, the Chinese government and the UK Department for International Development.[115]

I was able to conduct two interviews with the provincial director of the OVD, Alain Tshimbalanga Ntambwe, who is in charge of constructing the roads in Bukavu.[116] Acting as a participant observer, I judged Ntambwe as an authority eager to demonstrate his superiority over his employees or over whoever would enter his office with lower status than himself. He is also highly visible and active in supervising road construction activities, as I could often see him together with the Mayor of Bukavu on the road *Avenue Hippodrome* (see figure 4), which was being developed during my field visit in October and November 2014. In my view, urban road construction is a form of legitimacy reservoir for these authorities since it visibly demonstrates performance and tangible results for the common good. In other words, these visible signs of authorities reclaiming the urban space form a way of performing and reasserting the importance the state.

In particular, during both discussions, Ntambwe emphasized two issues; financial support and the 'illegal settlements' along the roads that the OVD were reconstructing. These two aspects, however, collide as financial support is primarily external from the World Bank (see e.g., Diop 2014) or the EU[117] and comes with terms of use, which often lead to conflict between settlers and public institutions. First, Ntambew explained how a

---

[115] Ibid. Tsongo mentioned all of these as important external funding.
[116] Interview with Alain Tshimbalanga Ntambwe, *directeur provincial*, OVD, 13 September 2013 and 8 October 2014, Bukavu.
[117] On the EU project, see for instance
http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/rwanda/eu_rwanda/devlopment_cooperation/infrastructure/index_en.htm downloaded 8 December 2014.

majority of the OVD's work in Bukavu was sub-contracted to private companies, especially Chinese companies, financed through the World Bank.[118] He explained that allowing this private-public relationship was an obligation for the DRC in line with World Bank conditions.[119] Secondly, as mentioned, there is clearly a considerable friction between citizens who have built houses and shops along the roads and authorities, such as Ntambew. Though there are variations, many of these local constructions have been built with the blessing of the Congolese administration and so their houses and shops can be officially documented. Donor conditions, set by both the World Bank and the EU, stipulate financial compensation for those individuals and families who will have their homes or livelihoods removed by the state. From my understanding, this is non-negotiable and it is causing frustration by bringing road construction in Bukavu to a standstill. To give an example, there is a new steel bridge funded by the EU. It is located between the busy overpass of Cyangugu in Rwanda and the city of Bukavu. It was puzzling to see that, two years after its construction, the bridge was still not in use. When I inquired about this at the OVD, as well as in other less formal settings, it became evident that the financial issue halting further construction was the need to compensate around thirty families who would have their homes torn down to allow for a new road that leads to the steel bridge. Though there are no permanent World Bank or EU representatives in Bukavu to my knowledge, the deadlock seemed to have been a result of the donors' strict condition that financial compensation be documented and signed by all families and the EU's unwillingness to trust the local government representatives in Bukavu before this was done.

There is clearly a conflict between the presence of local governance and absence of international governance that affects local actions. International donor funding and visions are affecting statehood dimensions and state performativity by dictating conditions and to some extent practices. However, the international donors do not have (and probably never will have) full control over the practices and this opens up a space for maneuvers and negotiations locally. Regarding this issue, Ntambew in a question on who were financing the aforementioned *Avenue Hippodrome,* said the following:[120]

---

[118] The Chinese companies tend to win the World Bank bids through low cost contracts. Interview with director Alain Tshimbalaiga Ntambew , OVD, 13 September 2013, Bukavu.

[119] Interview with director Alain Tshimbalaiga Ntambew , OVD, 13 September 2013, Bukavu.

[120] Follow-up interview with director Alain Tshimbalaiga Ntambew, OVD, 8 October 2014, Bukavu.

Ntambew: "This is financed by the World Bank, we need to answer to them. For example, we are required to deliver on environmental levels and standards of roads. We have to pay for houses that are torn down to build roads. Before we had agreements, now we have to respect everything."

Solhjell: "But shouldn't people be compensated for their houses if they are torn down?"

Ntambew: "These houses were built with illegal documents."

Solhjell: "Given by whom?"

Ntambew: "The *Mairie*, those who were supposed to give legal documents for house constructions. We have arrested some of them, but others have escaped. Those who were working in the administration."

These donor conditions seemed to irritate Ntambew, who perhaps would rather demolish houses or pay small sums directly as compensation without entering into legal proceedings. Based on Ntambew's statements, there are also processes of maneuvering between donor standards, local practices of house compensation and dealing with *débrouillez-vous* (improvised) practices among the local administration. In the previous interview, I also asked Ntambew about the relationship between OVD and Bukavu citizens and he replied as follows:[121]

"(…) It is a problem of illegal settlers because of the displacement of people during the wars [from 1996-97 and 1998-2003]. The drainage system we have tried to maintain was destroyed by their anarchic house building. Sometime back we had an incident where three children were swept away from their houses when we were undertaking a large drainage project. This is a tragedy but people cannot blame us [OVD], it is the illegal settlers who have ruined everything. These people are unwilling to pay taxes, which makes our work difficult."

Other than describing the death of these children as a tragedy, Ntambew held little empathy for what he considered illegal settlers and their anarchic housing who, in his view, were people that did not understand the principles of taxation and road and drainage constructions. As long as these illegal settlers were disrupting and disrespecting proper governance structures and civic relations, Ntambew did not feel responsible towards them. The city space becomes important as it encapsulates much of the dynamics involved in producing and performing the state, as I argued in the theoretical chapter. Relations between public authorities, such as Ntambew, and poor inhabitants with few options are particularly strained and affect local dimensions of statehood.

---

[121] Interview 13 September 2013, Bukavu

Although the majority of the funding for road constructions come from international donors, the DRC also has FONER, which is used to construct toll roads for the routes in and out of Bukavu. I interviewed the provincial director of FONER, Dieudonné Kuburhamwa Ngaboyeka, in order to understand the role and position of this institution. The following is an excerpt (my emphasis): [122]

Ngaboyeka: "FONER is the source of funding for roads. We are not an NGO, we are an autonomous public service. We have an administration and staff. [Ngaboyeka fetches a large booklet with reference to FONER's rights and duties.] The legislator has allowed us to finance road construction through taxation on the roads and from carbon tax in the city and the villages. Offices like OVD, OR, DVDA are the ones that are actually maintaining the roads. We ensure the funding. As you know, the roads are in a bad condition and FONER was established in 2008 by president Kabila on his 'revolution to modernity' (*la révolution de la modernité*). There was a need to standardize the building of the country and FONER was established to help secure founding on three levels: the national, the urban and the agricultural levels. *In the city, the roads are public, we struggle with funding to maintain them.* (…) FONER has been in Bukavu since 2010. Thanks to us we have avenues and roads. In Kinshasa, though, they have little power. But here we have a good reputation. But since FONER was created only in 2008 and established in 2010 in Bukavu, it means that you have to limit your expectations. How much can you expect of a four-year-old child? But if a child can achieve 98% of the expectations, the performance of the child will be great in the future. There is still much to be done but we have produced a high performance so far."

Solhjell: "In order to enforce these road user charges, do you collaborate with the traffic police?"

Ngaboyeka: "We have two normal police officers in each junction, not the traffic police. The collaboration works well with the PNC [the national police]. The two policemen in each junction are armed. It is sometimes necessary to use force to make people pay."

Throughout the interview, Ngaboyeka was referring to and showing me the booklet with laws and regulations regarding FONER. Since this is a new public service, it was perhaps important as a form of de jure legitimization of FONER and their power to impose taxes. The example of FONER demonstrates a reassertion of state performance through establishing taxation systems for road improvements as a common good that citizens can enjoy. The reference to president Kabila's revolution to modernity (see chapter 4) reproduces the intention of strengthening the state effect. Part of the state effect, as it is practiced in Bukavu, is road development, both in terms of construction and maintenance, as a visible sign of state-building and state deliverables.

---

[122] Interview with Dieudonné Kuburhamwa Ngaboyeka, provincial director, 8 October 2014.

Moreover, the aspects of roads in Bukavu being public and taxation being problematic meant that FONER could not set up road blocks as they do outside the city. The idea of public, I argue, seems to be interpreted by many citizens in Bukavu as "free of charge", which was evidenced throughout the focus group interviews in this thesis. Instead, FONER had to rely only on funding from carbon taxes and taxes on the import of cars, which limited income. Since Ngaboyeka did not trust the traffic police, there was only collaboration with the national police, who do not oversee traffic junctions or the public streets in Bukavu. I argue that, rather than there being a lack of authority, norms or rules in the case of policing public roads, there is, in fact, a plurality of competing arrangements, which challenge a unified ideal of statehood but also reinforce de facto statehood and the state effect.

The difficulties of collaborating with the traffic police also came up during discussion with the national insurance company, SONAS. Registration with SONAS is compulsory and argued to be the most important documentation needed for drivers according to the drivers' union ACCO. This national company, established in 1967, has a monopoly on insurance in DRC after a law passed on 5 January 1973, during the period of *Zairianization* (C. Young & Turner, 1985, p. 331, see also chapter 4 in this thesis). This gave SONAS the absolute right to collect car insurance from all car owners and other forms of taxable goods (such as real estate collection). After several attempts, I finally gained an interview with SONAS, which had one of the plusher offices in Bukavu, and managed to talk to the deputy director, Hamuli Theodore Muzalia.[123] He explained that the only compulsory insurance needed for car owners, namely the *responsabilité civil* or civil liability, was a form of insurance based on private wrongs, such as crashing your car. This is used mostly to distinguish one's liability from motoring violations. I also asked whether SONAS collaborates with the traffic police and Muzalia replied:[124]

Muzalia: "In principle, we work together. We at SONAS are not on the road, it is the traffic police that check documents. The problem is when the police don't take in those who are lacking the correct documents. Some drivers can drive for years without the correct documentation. When the car crashes, it will not be covered."

Solhjell: "So what happens when people don't have the right documentation?"

---

[123] Interview with Hamuli Theodore Muzalia, assistant chief at Sonas insurance, 6 October 2014.
[124] Ibid

Muzalia: "There is a penalty by law if you are driving around without it. I do not want to discuss the internal problems of corruption in the traffic police. In principle, we have a good relationship, but in practice, we have some problems.(...)"

Solhjell: "What are the most important documents needed?"

Muzalia: "*Carte rouge* [details of car identity], *responsabilité civil* and finally the driver's license. All three are needed for you in order to drive legally. If the driver has all these documents in order, SONAS can play a role. The traffic police do not help us much, but this comes back to the fraud issue."

Solhjell: "So when I spoke to the chief of traffic police last time, he said you had a very good relationship?"

Muzalia: "He would say that, and it is true at the level of chief. We have a very good relationship at that level. But the problem is on the ground. It really depends on who is working and with whom at the road level. (…) We only send SONAS staff to investigate accidents. The police will not always accept that we send our own staff. It can be a challenge to work with them. It's always difficult. In a few days, October 10, we will do a general inquiry on the roads regarding insurance. The traffic police will secretly warn their friends about this."

In this discussion, Muzalia only listed three documents that were needed. This contradicts the experience of the taxi drivers and the drivers' union (ACCO) with documentation on the street level, which will be discussed in the next section. Muzalia was open about the challenges of working with the traffic police in Bukavu, as long as I did not discuss this issue with the Chief of traffic police.[125] Based on our conversation, it seemed obvious that these police officers were more interested in settling disputes at the local level without having to involve SONAS. It also seemed to be a tactic among traffic police to neglect the insurance document as a mutual deal between some drivers and the police. The competing arrangements of a national, monopolized insurance, on the one hand, and local handling at the street level on the other, demonstrate an interesting form of the combined de jure and de facto dimensions of statehood. As Bierschenk (2014, p. 238) argues: "A bureaucracy is not a machine but a configuration of social processes.(…) [A]ll formal organizations require informal rules and practices in addition to formal ones to be able to function." Thus, there is nothing extraordinary about these practices. They rather show how static definitions of the state and statehood can hinder social scientists in understanding de facto practices of "doing the state" (J. Migdal & K. Schlichte, 2005, p. 14).

---

[125] An ethical note is that Muzalia had no problem with me referring or quoting him in my thesis on the issue of traffic police corruption. He only emphasized that I should not discuss this directly with the chief of police.

Since *la Police de la Circulation Routière* is important and visible as the public authority on the roads in Bukavu, I conducted an interview with the South Kivu commander of the traffic police, Bin-Alias Assani Buyoka.[126] The police wear bright yellow shirts and sometimes wear helmets or sun glasses. There are no traffic lights and accidents happen daily from the increased use of the urban roads combined with poor driving skills, overcrowded and overloaded vehicles and the lack of proper sidewalks. In that sense, a system of dedicated traffic police could have positively contributed to road safety. However, as a participant observer, it can appear as if these officers are not necessarily enforcing the rule *of* law but rather ruling *by* law: They use traffic regulations in order to govern for their own interests. The institutional structure of *la Police de la Circulation Routière* also closely resembles the armed forces with a central, hierarchical command.

Two observations during my visit to the provincial police office are illustrative. First, when arriving at the police station, I stated my purpose to the commander Buyoka and he instructed me to obtain permission from the police general. When the general arrived, he was protected by five police bodyguards half pointing their AK47s at us and the rest of the police force, while circling the general as he walked from the car to his office. As Nlandu (2012, p. 27) states, the Congolese national police are based on hierarchies and structures of a military nature and many police officers have a military background, either from the national forces or former armed groups. The militarized protection around the general keeping him safe from his own staff, I argue, demonstrates a certain unease and mistrust within the circles of public authorities. Secondly, at the police station, there were a number of confiscated taxis, such as mopeds (*motos*) and other vehicles. While waiting for the commander, I witnessed an owner of one of the mopeds together with the driver negotiating with the traffic police in order to retrieve her taxi. Though these negotiations might seem trivial, they constitute relations between public authorities and citizens based on both parties' livelihood (income). These forms of relations also constitute "perfoming" and "living" the state, such as negotiation around laws, regulations and practices in the public space as citizens are forced to engage with public authorities.

---

[126] Interview with Bin-Alias Assani Buyoka*, Commandeur de la Police de Circulation Routière Sud Kivu*, 13 September 2013, Bukavu

In the interview, commander Buyoka was reluctant to share and so, as the conversation progressed, I attempted to push him on the challenges within the traffic police as discussed above:[127]

Solhjell: "What kind of documentation is required by car owners?"

Buyoka: "Insurance, vignette, driver's license, you know, all the usual."

Solhjell; "So where can you get all these documents?

Buyoka: "There are so many state services, I can't name them all."

Solhjell: "What happens if drivers are caught without all the right documentation?"

Buyoka: "Usually, drivers are fined between twenty to hundred dollars depending on what they have done. We [the traffic police] have the authority to provide drivers with a document, if they lack documentation, for ten dollars, which lasts for fifteen days. This is to help drivers because they often need some more time to get all the documents in order."

(…)
Solhjell: "You sometimes hear people complaining that 'having a car is to be in constant debt to the traffic police'. What is your view on this perspective?"

Buyoka: [Laughing] "This is true only for people coming from cultures without need for documentation, people who can't read... All the actions we are taking are solely for the purpose of the safety of the citizens."

Solhjell: "How are these officers selected then?"

Buyoka: "It takes a particularly attentive person with a good head and the ability to relate to other people on a day-to-day basis. It is the police general that selects them."

Solhjell: "But it is not a secret that there are some corruption issues in the traffic police?"

Buyoka: "There is no proof of corruption. Tell me specifically which officers you are talking about and I will fire them personally."

In this interview, the commander was unwilling to share information on the specific taxes and documents regarding traffic regulation. However, the sums discussed by Buyoka (20—100 USD) were also considerably higher than the ones paid to individual traffic police officers, which were often less than one USD and paid in Congolese Francs, according to the drivers' union (next section). Again, these relationships show a space to maneuver within the de jure and de facto dimensions of statehood.

---

[127] Interview with Bin-Alias Assani Buyoka, 13 September 2013, Bukavu

It was also interesting during the meeting with the commander to observe what was going on around him.[128] First, during the interview with the commander, two smartly dressed men entered his office. I had seen these two men trying to find the commander earlier while waiting outside his office and they were, despite wearing civilian clothes, saluted by the traffic police officers. Buyoka also addressed them as military officers (*colonel*). The meeting would last less than a minute and the two men were saying to the commander that they were thirsty. Buyoka replied that he hardly had anything and then gave them twenty USD. After they had received this money they seemed satisfied and left the office. Another incident during the meeting was when the commander received a phone call regarding a major's vehicle that was being held by the traffic police. He commanded the person he was talking to on the phone to immediately release the car and let the man go. Thus, it is likely that the regulation laws are applied differently depending on the position of the driver and not depending on the principle of equality under law. Overall, these two incidents show the position of the commander in a hierarchy of patron-client relations. However, it also shows how public authority figures such as Buyoka, have state qualities in their ability to produce, enforce and sanction rights.[129]

6.2 Consumers

Seen from a pedestrian perspective, any form of movement along the main roads in Bukavu is a risk. There are no longer any sidewalks, which there were in the 1950s, so the only option is to walk along the streets themselves. Vehicles and motorcycles always have precedence over pedestrians and there are no (functioning) streetlights, cross walks or traffic lights that might provide some safety. Drivers' licenses require no driving tests and can be bought for thirty USD at *La Division Provinciale des Transports et Voies de Communication* in Bukavu. These dangers and the resulting traffic accidents provide a source of income for the traffic police, as discussed above. Below is a picture taken during the field visit in 2013 to illustrate a typical popular road in Bukavu with stalls that have replaced sidewalks:

---

[128] Spoken in Swahili, translated by research assistant Jonathan Magoma after the interview. 13 September 2013, Bukavu
[129] Christian Lund, 15. September 2014, lecturer entitled *Occupied! Property, citizenship and Land in Rural Java*" at the PhD course *Governance at the edge of the state*, organized by Koen Vlassenroot, Ghent University .

Figure 11 Road near Place de l'Indépendance.

Photo taken by the author, September 2013

Furthermore, roads in Bukavu are generally in a treacherous state, although they are in much better condition than the rest of the province, where there are few or no asphalt roads. Of course, this is apart from the aforementioned road leading to Kavumu airport and the roads in Uvira, the other urban center in South Kivu. However, during my field visits from 2012 to 2014, there were many infrastructure projects taking place. Because roads are needed by most, if not all, citizens in Bukavu and are highly visible urban spaces, they are both of interest to donors and used by elites, as discussed in the previous section. However, these projects are not solely a blessing for the inhabitants of the city. For instance, in Ibanda, where most of these projects were taking place due to its city center location, the focus groups revealed considerable frustration over these road developments. As one man from Ibanda explained: [130]

---

[130] Focus group meeting with five men living and working in Ibanda on 14 October 2014, Bukavu

"You know, the authorities are tearing down the houses now in Bukavu to construct roads. The houses are perceived as illegal by the authorities. But you know, it was the authorities who signed the documents in the first place. The people wanted to build small houses for living, for a barbershop… They had the correct documents. They were given the right orders by the authorities. Now the authorities don't care if they ruin people's businesses."

From October to November 2014, while passing the road constructions every day, it was clear that stalls and small houses were being torn down to make way for wider roads, similarly to those seen in colonial times. The new road construction demanded space for sidewalks, drainage and potentially some trees and separate lanes. In the more crowded area of Kadutu, where this work had not yet started, I was told by the representatives of *La Commune de Kadutu* that people were coming to them fearful that their house would also be torn down. The most worried citizens in Kadutu had a red cross sprayed on their door were the new roads were to be built, the representatives explained.[131] Generally speaking, during my visits, both issues of demolishing private property and the issue of taxation were frequently discussed in Bukavu. The youth I spoke to in Kadutu all had part-time jobs, which included movement along or presence on the roads. These included *motos* taxi (moped) work for the boys or selling consumer goods in stalls along the road for the girls.[132] The boys said the following:[133]

Boy 1: "When I drive the *moto*, I get taxed sometimes by the authorities and other times by clandestine who set road blocks."

Boy 2: "When drivers do 'bad parking', they are fined and threatened with being arrested and taken to the *Mairie*. There they have to pay 300.000 Congolese franc [approximately 300 USD] and to avoid this they pay the traffic police or other authorities directly."

It is interesting to note that these boys used the term tax, not for instance extortion. According to them, there was the use of taxation by different authorities and a more covert/illegal form of taxation, referred to as clandestine. The use of threats, such as threatening to take offenders into the *Mairie* where more functionaries would become involved, is also common to push people to settle fines on the spot when the driver has broken some regulation. However, the majority of these 'fines' are paid as bribes in small bills, for instance a 100 Congolese franc (10 cents USD), that the driver will pay by

---

[131] *La Commune de Kadutu* is the central administrative office under the *Mairie de Ville*/City Hall. Interview conducted with Paul Jean-Marie Koabashi, *chef de bureau*, and Jean de Dieu Tchalumba Olomwene, *superviseur de l'environnement*, 22 October 2014.
[132] Interview with four girls and four boys aged 15-18 living and studying in Kadutu, 7 October 2014, Bukavu.
[133] Ibid

closing his/her hand, as if making a fist, with the window half down. The traffic police officer will then take the money and let the offender pass. This is an acceptable gesture in Bukavu and it is usually done either because the drivers lack all the necessary documents, a situation that will be described below, or because the driver wishes a speedy resolution. It also may be simply understood as a mutual understanding of paying the police salary since 'everyone' knows that traffic police officers pay their superiors to keep their positions.

The perspective of the roads' most frequent users, namely the taxi drivers, provides useful elaboration. Despite lacking an official public transport system, Bukavu's taxi system is a tightly governed and organized industry. Each car and driver is registered under the drivers' union *Association Congolese de Conduire* (ACCO), which is a compulsory union established by the *Mairie*. Through different meetings with the Congolese public in Bukavu, it seems that the unions are reasonably strong but that they function more as a form of governance and tax control rather than fighting for labor rights. I will show this through my interview with ACCO. The transport system cannot be seen as either "public" or "private" ownership. Officially, there is no public transport and owners of motorized transport (vehicles, minibuses and mopeds) are different private citizens. Yet, at the same time the system is carefully controlled and taxed by the municipal authorities. The transport system can be seen as an institution that operate in a twilight between private and public, or state and society (Lund, 2006b, p. 686).

The transport system is popular and used by the majority of citizens who does not own their own vehicle and can afford the fares. There is a fixed sum of 500 Congolese francs (50 cents USD) along the main road for taxis and less for minivans or mopeds, usually around 100 to 200 Congolese francs (10 to 20 cents USD) depending on the journey. Moreover, the vehicles are also more or less identical; ancient Toyota Carina cars, Toyota Hiaces or Noah minivans. These vehicles are known for their simple but robust construction and easy and cheap maintenance. There is also an important economy around fixing these cars through the many garages or young men who are quick to assist if a car breaks down on the road. The minivans seem to be the main link between the commune of Bagira, which is the third and most peripheral territory of Bukavu, and Kadutu market and central Ibanda. In the minivans there will be young men between 15 and 18 years old, hanging out from the side door shouting the stops and collecting money

from passengers. There is one taxi station by the road in Katana leading to and from Bukavu in the Kabumba area close to *Place de L'Indépendence* and Bukavu port. Here, I conducted both an interview with the ACCO representative, Justin Musaka Bahati, and a focus group with five taxi drivers.

First, I interviewed Bahati in his modest office at the taxi station to ask what the purpose of ACCO was and he said the following (my emphasis):[134]

Bahati: "The drivers come from different levels of the society, such as the army, the villages, and they struggle to collaborate with each other. That is why we have ACCO. Like, the drivers that come from the army might not understand why they need all the documents and maybe they can't read. We at ACCO sensitize the drivers to make sure they have all the documents needed. We also help them to understand that they have to *faire rapport* [pay] to the traffic police. This means that the chief of police will get 1000 Congolese franc [I USD] per day from each traffic police (*roulage*). "

Solhjell: "How come the drivers need to pay the traffic police so that they can pay their boss? Can't you as a union fight those practices?"

Bahati: "If these officers fail to *faire rapport*, they will not be sent back to the road the next day. How can you battle that? The traffic police (*roulage*) have an order from the chief and *everyone is afraid of the government*. The traffic police are simply looking for faults, such as having too old cars or damage, and force people to pay in order to avoid problems for themselves and the driver. The drivers will be harassed if they don't have all the documents.

Solhjell: "But isn't it the purpose of the drivers' union to fight for the workers' rights?"

Bahati: "*You cannot fight the state; we have to collaborate with the government. You can negotiate on sums for the taxes but you can never say no. We always collaborate*. The drivers will also need to pay the *Mairie* for parking. There is no public parking here, *débrouillez* [to improvise] is the rule. Like here [at the taxi station] it is the SNCC [the National Society of Railways] that owns the parking space. There is a good relation between SNCC and the *Mairie* and it is the *Mairie* that negotiates the terms for us when it comes to taxes."

During our discussion, Bahati made no attempts to hide the practice of police harassment. More profoundly, Bahati made it clear that there was no escaping the state. Based on Bahati's perspectives, I argue that through the governance and control of roads, the state effect is one of fear, oppression and subordination. Of interest is also Bahati's use of the expression *débrouillez* – a discourse dating back to 1960 from the secessionist constitution of Sud-Kasai, referred to as "article 15", whereby state authorities were encouraged to fend for themselves or improvise in finding ways to cope with their tasks,

---

[134] Interview with Justin Musaka Bahati, president of ACCO in Ibanda, 24 September 2013, Bukavu.

financially and otherwise (C. Young & Turner, 1985, p. 228).[135] More generally, the difficulty of life in DRC has popularized this term and now it refers to all the *de facto* ways of coping and surviving.

Bahati also explained that local governance structure of the transport system was the municipal authorities as the overarching control body. My interpretation was that the drivers' union does not work for drivers' rights but rather ensures the streamlining of government rules and taxation among drivers. Since Bahati frequently mentioned the need for documents, I asked if he could list them, which he did without any hesitation and in a hierarchical order:[136]

Table 4 Required documents for drivers in Bukavu[137]

Type of document	Issuing Authority
1. Insurance	*La Société Nationale d'Assurances* (SONAS)
2. Urban road maintenance tax (Taxe voirie urbaines)	City Hall, *Mairie de la ville de Bukavu*
3. Technical Control	The Provincial Division for Transport and Communication, *La Division Provinciale des Transports et Voies de Communication*
4. Vignette (Correct labelling of vehicle)	The Import Directorate, *Direction Generale d'Impots* (DGI)
5. Authorization of number of persons allowed in the vehicle	*La Division Provinciale des Transports et Voies de Communication*
6. Driver's license	*La Division Provinciale des Transports et Voies de Communication*

This overview provides an insight into the different public offices that drivers need to consult before legally driving in Bukavu, according to Bahati. There is nothing

---

[135]This expression since spread and was also popularized by the Congolese musician Pépé Kallé in 1985 with the song *"débrouillez-vous!"*(Ayimpam, 2014, p. 12). An extract of the song (translated by Ngoyarto 2011 in Ayimpam, 2014, p. 12): Article 15, mes chers, débrouillez-vous pour vivre ; pour vivre vous devez chercher, débrouillez-vous pour vivre.

[136] Interview with Justin Musaka Bahati. Bahati listed them himself in my notebook.

[137] Described by ACCO representative Bahati, Bukavu.

controversial or unique about these documents in themselves, however their potential use in extortion by public authorities creates problems and tensions with the general public. Some of these documents will, in many cases, need to be renewed on an annual basis, such as the driver's license. Since the driver's license was listed at the bottom of the hierarchy, I asked Bahati if proof of driving skills should be most important and he said no and argued that insurance (SONAS) was essential. In order to obtain a driver's license in Bukavu, you need an ID card, a passport photo and twenty to thirty USD depending on 'administration costs'. If an accident happens, you have to be insured unless you want to end up in jail or be ruined completely by financial settlements, as Bahati explained.[138] If a person is killed in traffic, the family of the deceased can settle on large sums for funerals and livelihood compensation. Moreover, Bahati could also list with precision the taxes required by the FONER, which are paid daily when passing certain road blocks:[139]

- 2300F (approximately 3$) for small cars (4 passengers)
- 3100F (approximately 4$) for minivans (Hiace or Noah) (10 passengers)
- 4500F (approximately 5$) for minibuses (18 persons) and jeeps
- 9000F (approximately 10$) for smaller trucks (*camionnette)* of 6-10 tons
- 18000F (approximately 20$) for trucks (*camion*)

With the help of Bahati, I was able to conduct a separate focus group with five male drivers aged between twenty-five and forty. The focus group took place in a bar across the street from the taxi stand to allow for a more secretive discussion. The focus group was conducted in the local languages of Mashi and Swahili through the help of my research assistance as the drivers were not comfortable in French. I asked questions regarding their relations with the authorities and the need for documents and below is an excerpt from the discussion (my emphasis):[140]

Driver 1: "We try to give something back to our children. But the police harass us. The best thing would be to never see them again."

Driver 2: "The real problem is not the ones on the road but the chiefs, the people in the hierarchy… They require a minimum fixed sum from every officer on the road depending on where they [the officers on the road] are positioned in the traffic."

---

[138] Interview with Bahati, 24 September 2013, Bukavu.
[139] Ibid
[140] Interview with five male taxi drivers, 24 September 2013, Bukavu.

Driver 3: "Transport is not well organized in Congo. Even if we have all the documents, the police will find a hundred-and-fifty other problems with your car. They will always be discovered. Some time back, ACCO complained to the governor and there was a reduction in the number of traffic police."

Solhjell: "So can you raise your voice against the oppression of the police or others harassing you, for instance through using the union (ACCO)?

Driver 2: "They [ACCO] can't do anything. *If you raise your head too high, there is a coffin reserved for you on the roof* [local proverb]. It is a problem that concerns us all. ACCO is afraid."

Driver 5: "Everything is political. If we unite to fight for our rights, ACCO will see us as rivals. The chiefs in the government will react. (…) When you ask about your rights you will be arrested and the price will be higher. Protests are costly. *When you work against the government you will not succeed*."

The group seemed generally to agree, although with the exception of contact with the governor, that the union did not fight for their rights and there was an underlying assumption that if you start to demand rights, it would be in separate networks and not through the ACCO. There was a considerable level of fear of the government and the reluctance to raise voices against the oppression was specifically discussed in terms of death threats, the potential of jail time and the very costly fines that could be around 200 USD. These fears worked as disincentives to the drivers, who could lose their and their family's livelihood and potentially, even risk their lives. Again, from the perspective of the taxi drivers, the governance and control of roads demonstrates the state effect as one of fear, oppression and subordination.

Moving from the discussions with taxi drivers, the drivers' union and the various focus group settings, it is useful to examine both local security concerns and the streets as a public space for protest. First, when it comes to security, bad driving or corrupt traffic police are not the only dangers at the main intersections. The *fin d'heure* – urban banditry after dark – thieves (*larrons*), and swindlers (*escrocs*) pose considerable risks for citizens utilizing and dependent on transport in one of the roundabouts formally named *Place Major Vangu* (popularly called *Essence*), see Figure 4 and a satellite photograph (Figure 12) below. This intersection connects Bukavu and three national roads (N2, N3, N5) as well as connecting South Kivu to Rwanda (exit Ruzizi II) for heavy trucks and lorries. It is also the main bus and taxi station in the Bukavu. Needless to say, this is a strategic and profitable space for criminal activity and banditry. The Congolese police and traffic police are for many different reasons reluctant to deal with these issues, especially after dark when they themselves are at risk.

Figure 12 Place Major Vangu[141]

Place Major Vangu in the big red circle and the red cross of the approximate position of office of SAJECEK that provided local security based on networks for citizens.

As a response to these insecurity challenges, but also reclaiming the idea of the roads as a public space, a local organization called SAJECEK[142] provides security for citizens through a program called *Forces-Vives* – living force. This group organizes private investigators for the return of stolen goods and is an interesting example of both a consumer and a provider. They represent the general public in demanding better rights and improved services from the public authorities by frequently contacting these authorities to arrange meetings with local communities but also by using the roads as a space for protests to demand citizens' rights.

The SAJECEK office was a container a hundred meters from Essence (see the red x for the approximate position on Figure 12). I interviewed the president of the organization, Robert Njangala, and the executive secretary general, Hugo Guy Luwese, in relation to *Forces-Vives* but also their broader work on citizens' rights and the responsibility of

---

[141] Satellite photo from Google maps
[142] The full title of the NGO is *La Synergie des Associations des Jeunes pour l'Education Civique, Electorale et la promotion de leadership cohésif au Sud-Kivu*

public authority figures.[143] First, *Forces-Vives* is a voluntary service for citizens who, for instance, have had their cell phones or laptops stolen. Victims can call *Forces-Vives* to ask for an investigation, provided that they pay the transport costs of the investigators. These investigators are young men who follow-up on leads to search for stolen goods. When I asked why specifically young men were the investigators and not women or men generally, Njangala replied that this was simply because of time constraints for both adult women and men from their daily work. Young men, on the other hand, were more available. However, I suspected that it might be easier to maneuver for the young men against other young men who form the majority of the urban banditry.

In response to my enquiry as to how *Forces-Vives* conducted their investigations, Njangala replied that, to avoid confrontations, it was essential never to ask who had committed a crime but only to focus on where the robbery had taken place. Though payment for returned stolen goods was voluntary, it was normal to provide a 10% fee of the total value of the good. For instance, a laptop bought for two-hundred USD was often given back with a payment of twenty USD from the rightful owner. Moreover, regarding potential imprisonment, Njangala told me that *Forces-Vives* did collaborate with the police, but he also highlighted that minor crimes, such as cell phone theft, were not viewed from their perspectives as important enough to warrant a trial.

Since *Forces-Vives* has become a relatively successful program and with resourceful and outspoken individuals (see also Scheye, October 2011), they have been partly coopted and silenced. The former president of SAJECEK, Christian Wanduma, was given the position as chief of the *Cellule d'Investigation du Gouvernorat de Province*, the investigative unit of the governor's office, which has an agenda of improving security. Yet, my understanding is that his role is to keep a close watch on citizens or organizations that give negative reviews of the governor or his network. From the interview with *Forces-Vives*, it was made clear that having Wanduma in the Governor's office was not an advantage in terms of ameliorating the state-society relations of public good provision. Instead, Wanduma had started his own *Forces-Vives* close to the Kadutu market, which he on different occasions had claimed was reducing crime significantly in Bukavu. In

---

[143] Interview with Robert Njangal, président de SAJECEK, and Hugo Guy Luwese, Secrétaire Exécutif Géneral, 21 October 2014, Bukavu.

contrast, the *Forces-Vives* representatives considered the security situation to be grave and that the public authorities were not taking the necessary responsibility.[144] Overall, the program of *Forces-Vives* demonstrates how citizens themselves take an active responsibility for security along the roads but also how they use it to express views on public needs.

Secondly, in conversation with Luwese, I inquired further about their relations with the authorities on how they dealt with the issue of the bad roads in the area.[145] He told me that they had attempted the most peaceful means first, namely to write and invite the relevant public authorities to talk to them about citizens' needs in the neighborhood. The next step would be to demonstrate as follows (my emphasis):[146]

Solhjell: "Are you free to demonstrate?"

Luwese: "It is not easy but it is a last resort. We arrange 'sit-ins'. Last time, we arranged a demonstration against the bad roads here. The mayor (*maire*) threatened us by sending a text message stating that 'I will treat you like the M23[147]' if we conducted the demonstration. But the constitution allows us to demonstrate, though in practice they cancel our applications. We do it anyway against their will. Then they send police who will shoot at us and threaten us with guns."

Solhjell: "So you feel threatened?"

Luwese: "Yes, every day. The criminals are making us suffer. We have become their enemies. The office [of SAJECEK] has been burned twice during a day. If we work at night, they threaten us and you might even end up getting killed. The government also threatens us with text messages promising death to us. The police also... But we will continue our work. The situation here in the DRC is difficult if you want to conduct demonstrations… It means you will be pursued. The government does not want you to denounce them. They are afraid of having their bad deeds broadcasted. They want to camouflage them, they are afraid of revolutions, like in Tunisia."

Solhjell: "But speaking from an international perspective, the bad deeds of the Congolese government are well known. Why are they so afraid of being broadcasted?"

Luwese: "Because the authorities are trying to regain their position. They try to enforce their position. *They don't want people to be united, this can be a cause of revolution against their government*."

As the conversation with Luwese shows, in order to gain sufficient attention for the need for public goods, such as improving the roads, it is necessary to resort to the last option,

---

[144] Interview with Robert Njangal, *Président de SAJECEK*, and Hugo Guy Luwese, *Secrétaire Exécutif Géneral*, 21 October 2014, Bukavu.
[145] Interview with Hugo Guy Luwese, 21 October 2014, Bukavu.
[146] Ibid
[147] M23 (2012-2013) was an armed group that caused considerable challenges for the Kinshasa regime and is often blamed as the 'bad guys' by the government.

namely to use the public sphere for demonstrations. Again, the image of the state from this perspective is one of oppression through threats, but also a regime fearful of losing control over its citizens. The public authorities, from the perspective of Luwese, are fearful of citizens' uniting, such as through demonstrations, and prefer a fragmented population occupied with internal disputes rather than a common, state-like enemy.

When it comes to the broader issues of state-society relations and roads in Bukavu, I have in the following discussion included perspectives from two intellectuals. These intellectuals are "consumers" but also add some interesting state-society perspectives. Déo Katwanyi Kabika, who has spent his entire life in Bukavu, described the issue as follows:[148]

"During Belgian rule, there used to be a *plan du ville* in Bukavu on how things were constructed and their purpose. After independence, people thought they were free from rules, like laws on how to drive. This confusion still exists and has resulted in the construction of anarchy. Independence is a concern for all citizens, the nation… But with liberty come laws, duties and rules. Instead, independence is practiced as anarchy. Maybe we are just at the beginning of re-establishing order in Congo. (…) I was ten years old when independence happened. There used to be avenues with sidewalks and separate traffic lanes. When independence happened, people started building houses on the sidewalk, crossed the street without thinking and drivers would drive as they wished. The problem started in particular with *zairianization*. The authorities were just given things without working for them. It created an expectation that if one belonged to a certain class, one would get things for free. If my father is appointed, I will get things for free... This is our country's biggest sin."

As with other intellectuals I spoke to, Kabika is pointing to the lack of mutual respect or social contract for laws, duties or rules from both citizens and public authorities. Through Kabika's discussion, there is a discourse of *anarchy* or *the anarchic,* which refers to the disrespect by certain groups of citizens breaking an elusive social contract. "Anarchic", "disrespect" and "negligence" were all words used by lecturer Jean-Mari Kazungusibwa Viancy in this respect:[149]

"(…)[T]he roads are a national property, they are public. To use the roads, the constitution gives the right to free movement. The individuals walking along the roads do not pay for their usage. However, there is a tax for community improvements of the roads. This can be in the form of *Salongo* [community duties] among citizens, which is still applicable today but regarded with much more indifference. The citizens are neglecting this because they are not given anything in

---

[148] Interview with Déo Katwanyi Kabika, director at the NGO *Initatives et Actions pour la Developpement Local* (IADL), 28 October 2014

[149] Interview with Jean-Mari Kazungusibwa Viancy, lecturer in history and political science at the *Institut supérieur pédagogique de Bukavu*, 22 October 2014, Bukavu.

return for their work. In addition, there are taxes on vehicles (…) [and] the use of roads, like urban taxes, *vignette* [correct labelling of vehicles imported] and insurance, which also needs to be paid. This is an obligation of the state to demand taxes from citizens. (…) The traffic police (*roulage*) are the ones that regulate these taxes. The state is concerned because of the anarchic housebuilding along the roads. As you can see in the city, they are in the process of demolishing them. (…) People misuse the public spaces to set up their own shops along the roads. They have their own markets along the roads that are not regulated. This is disrespect of public space."

I interpret Viancy's and Kabika's perspectives as indicating the dimensions of de facto statehood intensely negotiated over in Bukavu. What they sometimes refer to as "anarchic" use of public roads, such as constructing houses and shops and conducting arbitrary forms of taxation by the public authorities, shows the dynamic rather than static processes of statehood. Both Viancy and Kabika's category of practices, when it comes to their understanding of state-citizens relations, builds to a certain degree on the philosophical idea of a social contract[150] as well as the de jure versus the de facto forms of domestic statehood. The de jure elements discussed in these perspectives are Viancy's and Kabika's references to the legal texts, such as the constitutions, laws and regulations formally established in the country. The de facto elements, or the functioning of statehood in practice, on the other hand, are the violations on both sides of the state-citizens' relations of the de jure.

6.3 Concluding Remarks

This chapter has been concerned with certain consumers of the roads in Bukavu, on the one hand, and a plethora of actors involved in construction, controlling funds and policing along the public streets, on the other. The public roads in Bukavu demonstrate the strong hold of the state through the multiple sites of state agencies and service providers. The public roads in Bukavu and the everyday livelihood they provide for a number of public authority figures, taxi drivers and citizens travelling back and forth to markets forms an important contribution to ideas of public goods and collective space.

Road constructions are high politics and a priority for international donors and for public authorities who use these constructions for their own legitimacy building. As Dalakoglou and Harvey (2012, p. 460) argue: "Beyond the moral complexity of establishing the

---

[150] This includes philosophers such as Thomas Hobbes, Jean-Jacques Rousseau and John Locke who have discussed these bonds between "the state" and "the citizens" from different viewpoints.

infrastructures as a 'public good' – in the majority of cases roads are constructed as public works – the realisation of such works involves financial, regulatory and technical relations that often fold international, national and local regimes into a single and specific location". Tension arises when requirements on the donor side, such as documented compensation to families losing their homes, goes against the interests of local regimes, e.g., the authority of the OVD. Moreover, these donor relations with national and local regimes (from Kinshasa to Bukavu) have led to a return to colonial style roads in the urban center (Ibanda). As the head of OVD explained, the priority of road re-construction was first the colonial roads in boulevard style with trees, separate lines and sidewalks.[151] Though perhaps "pleasant" in a European sense, this also questions who has the right to make and re-make the city (Harvey, 2009; Lefebvre, 1996). This is a highly excluding process as it inhibits the right to set up shops or homes for many inhabitants in Bukavu. The public roads are thus at the center of a negotiating arena of state reassertion (Hagmann & Péclard, 2011). Resources that the state employs are drawn from both national and international agents and institutions. There are also symbolic resources such as regime promises to the public. The negotiations that take place locally demonstrate the tensions when policies and plans are implemented. More importantly, such negotiations demonstrate that there is space for manoeuver and that both state agents and citizens, who are in the midst of these processes, may employ different de facto strategies.

It would be interesting to understand better the issue of road construction in the long-term context and as a means of oppression, as mentioned in the introduction. Constructing and maintaining roads in Congo will inevitably require significant labor hours due to its vast size and challenging terrain. In colonial times, the use of forced labor was used to construct rapidly the roads and railway tracks that were needed to extort rubber and other valuable materials (see e.g., Hotchild 1998). During the years of Zaire, Mobutu's attempts of *Salongo*, which was communal work, including repairing and maintaining roads, were often met with resistance by the 'average' Zairian man, according to Fairhead (1992, p. 25). Furthermore, he noted (ibid) that, "many of those who will have to build the road are not in favour of road building, as they would effectively be building the vehicle of their own oppression". While women at the time (1980s) were generally exempt from *Salongo*, only men with privileged status and correct

---

[151] Interview with Alain Tshimbalanga Ntambwe, *Directeur Provincial*, OVD, 8 October 2014, Bukavu

documents were excused (ibid). Road construction can thus be seen as a form of oppression by the state towards citizens of "lesser worth", who are not well connected in society.

In contemporary Bukavu, there are no visual forms of forced labor when it comes to road construction but there are clearly frictions that traverse international-national-local boundaries. The World Bank and other donors are connected only with the national authorities in Kinshasa and these donors have rules for compensating families who will lose their homes or shops. There is thus an internationalization of road construction, and this strains the relations between public authorities (e.g. the OVD) and the citizens.

The issue of taxation forms another key aspect of controlling roads more broadly. Taxation is closely linked to the heavy presence of coercive forces on the roads and main junctions. Some of these forces circumvent taxes from the official bureaucracy and others enforce official taxes. Those who circumvent, like the traffic police, use official regulations, on for example the number of passengers allowed in a taxi, to extract fees. A share of these fees is sent back to the chief of traffic police. The traffic police demonstrate an institution that uses and interprets official rules and adopts them to the social context. Part of the reason for these taxation systems is the plurality of institutions affiliated with road safety, maintenance and construction, intensified by the interest of international donor and finance communities in infrastructure.

Another issue is the inadequacy of the budget set aside for these institutions and hence the need to acquire funds from the public. These various practices of taxation form a significant part of the daily lives of citizens and the "management mode of the state in everyday life" (Blundo, 2007, p. 126). It is interesting to note that political rhetoric in Congo often focuses on what the state will deliver but rarely addresses these (unpopular) issues of arbitrary taxation. An example here includes the focus on "*Les Cinq Chantiers du Congo*" – president Kabila's infrastructure projects, such as road construction in addition to health, education, safety and improving civil servant functions - but never a debate on how to mobilize funds or revenue collection from the public. These issues are rather debated through civil society organizations or by certain scholars or critical journalists in Bukavu and elsewhere in the DRC (see e.g. Pole-Institute, June 2012). Though perhaps avoided in public debate by the state, the issue of roads constitutes in

many ways the center of state-citizens' relations. The promises from international donors, the importance from higher level political figures and the multiplicity of public sector institutions involved in road construction, safety and various forms of governance and administration are all interlinked issues. It is a story of a state rising up from the aftermath of war and decay. It also shows the dynamic negotiating arenas for statehood, such as the position of state agencies in the local and international arenas.

There are frequent disputes and conflicts relating to both taxation and road constructions where the latter affects citizens' private homes and shops. The representative at the drivers' union ACCO demonstrated how deeply embedded the transport system is in the public sector and the importance of following the conduct of these authorities rather than fighting for drivers' rights. Based on the discussion with ACCO and the drivers, I view the role of the traffic police in the road system as resembling what MacGaffy (1987) calls "parasites" meaning actors that utilize their positions in the state to extract wealth from the society. Or as Dalakoglu and Harvey (2012, p. 460) argue, "(…) roads can disconnect as effectively as they forge connection. Too often they fail to fulfil their promise, too often they entrench the violent exclusions of established political and material orders." Transportation infrastructure in Bukavu acts as a strong-hold for the parasitic state, where any attempt at speaking up against oppression or harassment inevitably results in a worsening situation for road users. Road users, in turn, seem to be neither in the club that can escape these public authorities nor afford the cost of speaking up against oppression.

The state, represented by the different road agencies, taxation bureau, insurance company and traffic police, are arenas of intense negotiating regarding de facto statehood. The citizens, including the frequent user of the roads, such as the taxi drivers, are kept under continual surveillance by competing and complementing service providers attached to the construction, taxation and safety of roads. The issues surrounding local roads overstep international and national boundaries of what constitutes de facto statehood. Road construction is a visible sign of state building and can be used by a number of agents both in service provision and consumption. The variety of practices regarding taxation and safety illuminates how service providers invent strategies within, at the interface of and outside the formal procedures of bureaucracy (Hagmann & Péclard, 2011).

7.0 From Public to Private Goods: Water and Hydroelectricity

Simply stated, water supports life. It is a good that is non-excludable, meaning that people (consumers) should (in an ideal world) never be excluded from accessing water. Examples, such as rainwater, freshwater lakes, rivers and streams are common goods that anyone should be able access regardless of payment. Water is considered a basic human right (UN, 1992), meaning that no one legitimately can prevent people from using common resources, such as rainwater or streams *and* that water must be offered at affordable prices. At the same time, however, water can be excludable when captured and sold as bottled water or tap water for private consumption. Providing water at affordable prices requires, amongst other things, clear regulations and significant investment to ensure supply to the less privileged. Moreover, in many countries, the commercialization of water via tap water systems has foreshadowed the transition from public to private (or even public-private ownership). Nonetheless, it is true for some countries that allowing more competition in the water sector could reduce prices and improve efficiency. However, in other places it can cause class exclusion and social unrest, such as occurred in the Water War in Bolivia.[152]

The purpose of this chapter is to examine the practices of water supply in Bukavu and the excludable nature of transitions of public to private ownership that are taking place. Furthermore, I also consider electricity as a sub-category of water in this case as the focus is on *hydro*electricity generation as a sub-category of water supply in this case study. Electricity generation is not a life or death matter, as drinking water supply is, but it is needed and desired (enjoyed) in 'modern' societies. That said, the limited availability of electricity in Bukavu has created a space for alternative forms of energy provision such as charcoal (*makala*), generators and solar panels. I will not address the aspect of hydroelectricity at the same length as drinking water supply but will treat it as a sub-category of the water resources with particular emphasis on two empirical phenomena of consumer-provider frictions – *dahoulage* (stealing electricity) and *délestage* (load shedding) – and to a lesser degree institutional cooperation.

There are three main sources of water for citizens in Bukavu. The first and most desired is tap water, which many consider to be the cleanest. The supply of piped water in the urban and

---

[152] The Water War in Bolvia (studied by Baer, 2008 and others) is an example of a successful mobilization. This mobilization was led by La Coordinadora in Cochabamba, Bolivia, against a water privatization policy that had caused inequitable water management in their community.

semi-urban areas is run by *Régie de distribution d'eau* (REGIDESO). This water distribution system was undergoing (at the time of the research) transitions from a national, *parastatal* (which will be further discussed) agency to a private, shareholder company. Taps are mainly located in private homes although REGIDESO also have at least one public tap located at the state-owned school *Institut Supérieur Pédagogique de Bukavu* (ISP), and in other state-owned institutions, such as army camps, hospitals and schools. Secondly, there are public water stations named "Funu", "Kaduru" and "Nyakliba" in Kadutu that are not owned by REGIDESO.[153] Additionally, there are alternative purification systems provided by the government and international humanitarian organizations. Finally, the third source is generally accessible water from rain, the rivers and the lake. This last group (water from rain, rivers and lake), which may be highly contaminated due to the waste problems, is mainly used for washing clothes or bodies but also as drinking water in the dry season.

As mentioned, water is also used in the production of hydroelectricity which is the only source of domestically generated electricity in the region. There are private alternatives, such as generators or solar energy, but these are not nationally owned by the *Société National d'Électricité* (SNEL) which holds the governmental monopoly on hydroelectricity. In Bukavu, the delivery of electricity comes from a hydroelectric power dam completed by the Belgians in 1958 named *Ruzizi I* after the river Ruzizi which flows from Lake Kivu to Lake Tanganyika.[154] It has a generating capacity of about thirty megawatts (MW), however, there are usually obstacles to running the MW to full capacity. There is a second dam called *Ruzizi II,* which was funded by the World Bank in 1989 and which is shared by the three neighboring countries of Burundi, Rwanda and the DRC under the regional name of *Société Internationale d'Électricité des pays de Grands Lacs* (SINELAC). It generates at most about forty-five MW, hence one-third (i.e., fifteen MW) of its power goes to each country. Based on my encounters, there is limited cooperation between these two institutions. The Congolese government has claimed that an additional two dams will be built, named *Ruzizi III* and *IV,* but this depends on improving cooperation between SINELAC and SNEL and the integration of Ruzizi I and II. This study will focus mainly on SNEL's distribution within Bukavu and the local dynamics of its access and provisions.

---

[153] See Figure 4 for approximate location of Funu and Kaduru. Nyakliba is not considered in this thesis.
[154] See Figure 4 for location of Ruzizi I.

7.1 Controlling Water Distribution

In order to better understand the dynamics of organizing tap water supply in Bukavu, I conducted two interviews with the same director of administration and finance at REGIDESO, Swedy Maneno.[155] Maneno was a difficult man to get hold of and was not particularly interested in meeting with a PhD student. However, the last meeting proved to be particularly useful as I had a much better overview of the tap water supply situation in Bukavu and was able to ask specific questions. In the first interview, Maneno explained how the distribution of drinkable water was a challenge in the province since "the demand is too high and the equipment is too old".[156] He argued that this was mainly due to the "anarchic urbanization" happening in Bukavu where "it is difficult to identify the real clients", in which he means those who pay for their usage.[157] Maneno argued that many houses lacked functioning meters to measure water use, which was the normal way of charging citizens for the service.[158] Maneno's perceptions demonstrate a relation of differentiation between inhabitants he considers anarchic and unwilling to pay for services and inhabitants he calls "real clients." I argue that this client-service provider relation that he favored is an example of a neo-liberal turn in the policies of tap water provision in Bukavu.

In the second interview, these neo-liberal policies became clearer when he gave a more detailed account of his views on the privatization process which had been unconfirmed during the previous field visit. I discovered that REGIDESO has undergone considerable institutional changes over the period of my research from 2012 until 2014. This is in line with the World Bank's support to privatize previously nationally owned companies targeting in particular REGIDESO and SNEL (see especially World_Bank, 2006). Maneno explained the transition from a so-called *para-etatique* or parastatal to a shareholder company. The following is an excerpt from the conversation (my emphasis): [159]

Maneno: "As it is today, the price of water is not sufficient to cover the cost of the maintenance and improvements of the installations. *Water is seen as a social service*. Generally, in Africa, water is perceived as a *social good* (*bien social*) but not for economic interests and investment. We cannot

---

[155] Interview with Swedy Maneno, *Chef de Division Administrative et Financière*, REGIDESO, 16 September 2013 and 28 October 2014, Bukavu. The interviews were conducted with approximately a year separation and both times in his office.
[156] Interviewed 16 September 2013, Bukavu
[157] Ibid
[158] It is interesting to note here that Maneno is complaining about the lack of meters in private households while the men interviewed in Ibanda were complaining about the manual measures of meters.
[159] Interviewed 28 October 2014, Bukavu

modify the prices due to politics. People think it is expensive already and they will demonstrate in the streets in response to any price increases. We cannot invest with prices at this level; we can only pay for personnel in REGIDESO. We are forgotten by the external actors when it comes to financing, like Oxfam, who are not helping us. The political situation doesn't allow us to increase the price. There might be demonstrations which will be directed to the president and they might result in the departure of the leadership."

Solhjell: "But isn't the purpose of privatization to make money out of water, since you are now a shareholder company?"

Maneno: "Yes, the purpose is to both improve the service and to make money. These things go together; by improving the installations, we will start to make money. The one affects the other (*engrenages*). We are in a process of *state disengagement* regarding the service. We are searching for shareholders, so when one invests, the whole company will benefit. *The state will always be keeping an eye on the services though, like education and health… but they will not control them directly, just control the price of water.* This is due to politics, as I mentioned. The consequences for an increase in water prices will cause demonstrations and in turn affect the president."

Solhjell: "When I speak to different people, REGIDESO is often referred to as para-étatique (parastatal). Is this incorrect then?"

Maneno: "This is no longer the case. Before it used to be and it meant that *the state monopolized the service and the leadership would be nominated by the state and rule for a given term*. This used to be the case and the leaders of REGIDESO then had to directly report back to the state. Today and for the last two years, we have had a general assembly that decides on the leadership."

Maneno was explaining the relation of state disengagement (neo-liberal reforms) with governing water supply and how water is perceived as a social good closely linked to regime stability ("the state will always be keeping an eye on the price of water"). Any attempts at a complete separation from the public sphere in regards to tap water seemed impossible in Maneno's view. Nevertheless, he, as head of administration and finance, appeared to be very keen on the idea of a purely commercial service with high costs for consumers. In both meetings, Maneno seemed to hold little empathy for consumers who were unable and/or refusing to pay the current charges of REGIDESO.

In terms of the possibility of a public outcry from an increasing cost of water, I argue that there is a large potential for social unrest. This is because, first, there is a pattern of high expectations of state deliverables among consumers in Bukavu, which will be demonstrated in the second section on consumers. Second, these expectations are coupled with grand promises during election campaigns by political candidates, such as establishing Funu.[160] This shows how elections, such as the one held in November 2011, intensifies the experience of statehood and expectations. Third, there are deficiencies in the actual city space when it comes to materiality

---

[160] See section 7.2 in this chapter and also Chapter 4 on President Kabila's *Cinq Chantiers*

of services, infrastructure and financial capacity, all of which in turn affect citizens in their daily access to water. These interlinked processes may create alienating relations that could cause social unrest and the deposing of political leaders.[161] I argue that services like tap water supply is closely associated with "the state", understood in this relation as the central regime, which will be discussed further in the analysis (Chapter 8). Moreover, these de facto statehood concerns are overlooked by international donors, such as the World Bank, who instead take an economist's view: "The financial situation of REGIDESO continues to be critical as revenues collected (both from private and public consumers) do not cover expenditures that are incurred by the company" (captured by World Bank analyst Fall, 2014, p. 2).[162] There is thus an external donor pressure on improving commercial success that, to little extent, considers de facto dimensions of statehood. As mentioned, the Water War in Bolivia serves as an example of these commercial and financial issues for World Bank donors in relation to domestic socio-economic realities (Baer, 2008). The relations between authoritarian regimes' need for stability and potentials for solidaristic bonds uniting groups against regimes seem to be overlooked by technocratic and neo-liberal donor communities.

Meeting Maneno was also useful as it allowed me to visit the primary water reserve *Kahele* for Bukavu, located in the nearby village of Kabare, 12 km outside of the city.[163] When the Belgians constructed the city in the 1940s and 1950s, they located the main water reserve in this high altitude district, allowing the water to flow using gravity rather than electric pumps. This is different from supply to Goma and Kinshasa, where water is pumped up from a freshwater reserve (Lake Kivu and the Ndjili River, respectively). At the Kahele water reserve station, I managed to arrange a guided tour from the water production manager Daniel Kasereka.[164] Kasereka gave me a brief history of the reserve, explaining that it was built by the Belgians in 1954 to serve mainly Bukavu. In the 1980s, construction and maintenance were

---

[161] See also Chapter 6 regarding *Forces-Vives* perspectives on political leaders' fear of unity and demonstrations.

[162] There is also perhaps a tendency to ignorance in the World Bank's representation of water consumption. For instance, in an article about the Urban Water Supply Project in the DRC (webpage accessed 2 June 2015 at http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2013/10/10/improved-access-to-drinking-water) the authors write the following: "The project also includes an educational component, the aim of which is to sensitize the authorities as well as citizens about the need to economize in their water use and to promote behavior change, because without collective awareness, if water flows abundantly, it runs the risk of being wasted." I have never encountered in my field visits any Congolese who are wasteful of water. In addition, any infrastructural work to improve supply will take a long time to accommodate the rapidly urbanizing population (see also Maractho & Trefon, 2004).

[163] Distance according to Google maps, accessed 18 April 2014. Maneno acted as a gate keeper in this relation.

[164] Personal interview with manager Daniel Kasereka, REGIDESO's Kahele water reserve, 16 September 2013, Kabare, DRC.

undertaken in order to increase the water supply to a growing urban population. They managed to triple the supply from 450m^3/h to 1380 m^3/h. He reiterated what many have argued during my field visits, namely that the water reserve supply is not sufficient to match the demand of the city and that the output varies considerably with the seasons.

As he was showing me around the river that was the source of the supply, Kasereka explained how local people in Kahele were stealing the water. This caught my interest and I asked several questions to better understand these relations. Kasereka stated that during the dry season, people would take water from the installation for their private farming activities. On some occasions, they would report repeat offenders to the police. The rule is that local residents had to stay ten meters away from the river. On other occasions, REGIDESO had tried to buy people's farm land so that they would stop stealing water. Yet, since people's survival was contingent on land, they had refused to sell it. Another measure to prevent theft that was suggested during the conversation was the construction of another river that the local residents could use. But for this, Kasereka explained, REGIDESO had been dependent on external funding. These days, he elaborated, it was Oxfam that provided water for local residents in certain villages. REGIDESO provides water only for the cities and thus these tensions create alienating relations between rural inhabitants and service providers. Villagers would instead seek service provision from humanitarian agencies and chiefdoms (Kabare in this case).

After we completed a tour of the Kahele station, Kasereka explained the technical aspects of the water purification process and we ended with a political discussion in the research lab together with a technical expert. The technical expert in the research lab had wondered what I was doing there since I was a political scientist. I explained that I was trying to understand negotiations over public goods and the connections between different public institutions. Based on this, Kasareka said the following (my emphasis): [165]

"People in Bukavu suffer. On average, they only have two liters of water per day when they should have about twenty liters. These two liters are supposed to cover drinking, cooking, washing and sanitation and it goes without saying that it is an insufficient amount. We try to do our best with limited means and resources, but what comes out of the tap in Bukavu is affected by the poor maintenance of pipes. *The distribution of water is not equal either… It is commercialized*. We deliver most of the water to Bralima [a brewery in Bukavu]. REGIDESO was a social service in the 1970s and it was set up to cover water delivery to the entire Congolese population. Though it is still parastatal (*para-étatique*), REGIDESO is now handled by a private company from Senegal and they only deliver to those who are most likely to pay. You see, Senegal had the same problems with water in their country but they solved

---

[165] Ibid

it with privatization. Because of this, *water is no longer seen as a public resource but a private good for paying clients*. We could be seen as saviors, by bringing clean water to the Congolese people, but that is not how the Congolese government sees it. We [workers at Kahele water reserve] need to keep a clean conscience, we can never stop production. We need to continue serving clean water to the public even though it is private."

Through this discussion, it is easy to see Kasareka's frustration with unequal distribution and how REGIDESO is currently only for commercial or private clients. The shift from the idea of a social service to a private good for paying clients is in line with the neo-liberal agenda of the World Bank and REGIDESO's financial manager Maneno. However, it also demonstrates the tensions among service providers themselves. Such relational tensions also demonstrate the complexity and dynamics within state-like agencies. I argue that the political shift (domestically and abroad) to a neo-liberal agenda impacts by differentiating citizens and subjects, making the former clients and the latter irrelevant.

Another concern that also became apparent throughout the guided tour was that the lack of electricity seemed to hamper the various processes of filtration and quality analysis of water to Bukavu. I asked about relations with SNEL, but there seemed to be no collaboration, even though they were mutually dependent on the same natural resource. Kasereka commented the following on this issue: [166]

"The responsibility if something goes wrong is placed at one person, one individual, who makes an error rather than blaming the failure of the system. We need electricity to work but the system is not working."

In Kasereka's view, the practices and performance are dependent on individuals rather than on the structure or institution. This perception, I argue, follows the broader pattern of service providers' lack of connectivity and cooperation across agencies in charge of public good provision. As discussed in Chapter 5, the waste management service in the municipality (*mairie*) was not in contact with REGIDESO and vice versa. These observations illustrate a system of individuals in charge of services and their practices, demonstrating that there is not one, unified state that comes preformed. Rather, there is a plurality of individuals taking part in, practicing and performing "the state". At the same time, the perspective of "the system", I argue, aggregates an idea of a coherent state, i.e. the state effect.

---

[166] Ibid

With limited access to tap water in Bukavu, many consumers (especially in Kadutu) resort to utilizing public water sources, called Kaduru and Funu. These two places are very different from each other. Kaduru is located at the beginning at Kadutu, closer to the urban center Ibanda of Bukavu, where fewer people live.[167] Funu, on the other hand, is located in the most densely populated area of Kadutu.[168] Kaduru was considered a good source according to consumers I encountered in my field visits. Here, water seemed to be flowing 'endlessly' and with a relatively high quality speaking from the viewpoint of consumers. This water source, I witnessed, appeared clearer than the muddy water in Funu. From my understanding, the quality of water was due to it coming from a deep water source that was unpolluted unlike the open rivers and lake.

During my fieldwork in October 2014, it was impossible to find any reliable information on the Kaduru installation, as everyone I spoke to had conflicting ideas. The responses I received variously described Kaduru as a missionary contribution during Belgian Congo, a local organization in collaboration with Belgian engineers, or simply as a REGIDESO plant. Speaking with REGIDESO, it was clear that it was not their installation. One scholar explained that Kaduru was the original name of Kadutu when the first missionaries came to Bukavu more than one hundred years ago.[169] Judging from the many unknowns and varying explanations, no one seemed to really know the origin of Kaduru. Moreover, no one seemed to be in charge of the five water taps from which water was pouring plentifully. This was confirmed by the people I spoke to fetching water at Kaduru, participant observation and in focus group settings.

The only limitation to Kaduru was its location: It was far from where most people lived and the walk back to their homes would mean a very steep and exhausting climb while carrying water cans. Most women working in the market would first have to walk further away from their homes to fetch water and then to return via a long walk home at night and this was deterring their use of this source. However, Kaduru also serves Congolese working in international NGOs with access to company cars that contained large water tanks. They go to Kaduru because they have problems with REGIDESO in their neighborhoods in Ibanda. Thus,

---

[167] See Figure 4 for approximate location of Kaduru.
[168] See Figure 4 for approximate location of Funu.
[169] Jean-Mari Kazungusibwa Viancy, a lecturer in history and political science at the Institut supérieur pédagogique de Bukavu (ISP), interviewed 22 October 2014, Bukavu.

Kaduru is serving clients of REGIDESO, not only consumers who have been excluded from REGIDESO services for varies reasons.[170]

Funu is a very different place, as it was set up by a parliamentarian called Jean-Pierre Mukubagnyi Mulume during his election campaign in 2011. At Funu, control and access is in sharp contrast to Kaduru. It was clear from visiting Funu that this water source is in a bad state. There used to be thirty water pumps but now only one works and it was strictly controlled by people who called themselves *Salongo*, meaning "volunteers".   I spoke to two of the three people that claimed they were in charge of supervising the water source.[171] My engagement with these two *Salongo* was informal: It was not possible to conduct a formal interview with either of them as the crowd was extremely rowdy. One person, who was clearly subordinate to the main *Salongo*, had been severely beaten and was unable to focus his eyes. The apparent leader of the *Salongo* was standing on top of the water pump in a domineering manner and either had his arms folded or gave instructions by pointing. In our discussion, the subordinate *Salongo* stated that, while Funu was being established, the MP had used his own well-paid police officers and soldiers to protect the construction area and ensure safe access to water for the public.[172] He explained that, once these guards had gone, the area had been left to the local police (referred to as *police de proximité[173]*) who then did nothing to ensure the safe upkeep of the pumps. According to the subordinate *Salongo*, as a result of this lax security, the pumps and the batteries for the solar panel lights had been stolen, events that prompted the *fin d'heure* to patrol the area at night.[174] When I asked both *Salongo* if the still had contact with Mulume or his guards, the replied that they did not. The subordinate Salongo claimed that Mulume was very disappointed with people in the neighborhood because of the misuse of the construction. The Salongo said that the police had appointed them to protect Funu, and when I followed up by asking if they were police, they insisted that they were just volunteers or *Salongo*.

The position of these *Salongo* with respect to the users of Funu or the public authorities (e.g., the local police and Mulume) was unclear. *Salongo*, which is the term they used of their position, dates back to Mobutu's Zaïre as community work on a voluntary basis (see also

---

[170] The reasons for exclusions will be further discussed in section 7.2
[171] Participant observation and informal conversations conducted on 10 October 2014, Bukavu.
[172] Ibid
[173] This police force is an example of donor initiatives, in particular from the EU mission in the DRC, to support security sector reform of the national police force (PNC). Reporting on their performance varies considerably from donor reports, journalistic and scholar articles to citizens living the experience of these forces.
[174] Due to the dangerousness associated with *fin d'heure*, I did not conduct interviews with them.

Chapter 4). The use of *Salongo* ideology in this study, conducted in 2012-2014, shows the influence and interpretation of history in contemporary forms of statehood. Salongo is form of statehood relation that appear to have survived based on the intensity and complexity of relations between those controlling access and those accessing a public good (water) in a city space where public water sources are limited. Therefore, it seems undoubtedly important to untangle relations between consumers and service providers in order to understand the different dimensions of statehood and actors enacting the state. *Salongo* will thus be further discussed in Chapter 8 as an aspect of governance and languages of statehood.

Finally, in terms of payment, the volunteers claimed that they were not taking any money from Funu users and that they were motivated purely by welfare concern. The claim, however, seemed somewhat incredulous given my understanding of the situation gathered from focus group discussions and also from my participant observations. Although it was difficult to persuade anyone fetching water there to speak, especially since the *Salongo* were keeping a close eye on me, I managed to talk briefly to one woman who simply said that you only pay to be first in line.[175] Other than that, this was a free service, according to her.[176] This was, as mentioned, not what I have been told in the focus groups with youths or with women, both of which groups stated that they pay around 100 Congolese Francs (10 cents USD) for a gallon of water in Funu. Nevertheless, this source was less exclusive than the REGIDESO client-provider model in that it lacked the barriers of bills, the costs of tap installation and the necessity of possessing home-owner documentation.

7.2 Consumers of Water

The most desired water, tap water, is a precious good in Bukavu. Even in affluent areas with tap water connections, water rarely flows and usually will only be accessible for a limited time during the day. Moreover, obtaining a connection to REGIDESO may be a complicated process in the first place, due to the fact that REGIDESO requires an ownership title to the house or building as well as to the land. This complicates access for many Kadutu residents. The service provider, in this case Maneno from REGIDESO, claimed that many houses had been built without the proper documents for land ownership or safety regulation. Many of these living

---

[175] Participant observation and informal conversations conducted on 10 October 2014, Bukavu.
[176] Ibid

spaces did not include installed tap water systems. In addition, potential clients of REGIDESO, on top of having to pay connection fees, are required a form in French to register, which is a process that presupposes reading skills and thus excludes many inhabitants in Bukavu. By requiring these French forms and housing documents, the city can be seen as a "difference machine" (Isin, 2007) that incorporates strategies and technologies for exclusion.

At the same time, those who do have access to REGIDESO's services may sell water on to non-clients; thus REGIDESO might not be particularly motivated to establish a water connection to one household as they are bound to lose out on revenue from further redistribution to other households.[177] There seems to be a mutual mistrust between public service providers, such as REGIDESO, and consumers. Some consumers that would like to enjoy tap water and electricity services may be perceived as thieves by the providers since they do not pay or conform to usage rules. The providers of these services, on the other hand, may not be trusted by paying consumers, who often fail to receive regular tap water (or electricity) due to REGIDESO's and SNEL's (the electricity company) limited infrastructure. There is thus a network of relations between consumers and providers that need to be analyzed in order to understand the dimensions of statehood. The following sections will discuss first the consumers of REGIDESO services (tap water) and then the alternative water systems used by those citizens without access to REGIDESO.

To investigate those with access to tap water through REGIDESO, I conducted an interview with an elite consumer and three separate focus group discussions with middle class women, men and youths, living and working or studying in Ibanda. For the elite consumer, Pharmakina (a pharmaceutical company), it was the first and only time I heard that access to water and electricity was not a big issue in Bukavu. Although my informant at Pharmakina, Grégoire Shamavu, stated that there were some irregularities regarding both goods, he also told me that Pharmakina had a close working relationship with REGIDESO and SNEL.[178] However, as Bralima, the brewery and the largest industry in Bukavu, was expanding there were more problems than usual. As Shamavu explained:[179]

---

[177] Meters installed to measure consumption were not reliable as they were checked manually by employees that were willing to negotiate locally on a preferred sum.

[178] Interview with Grégoire Shamavu, the head of the technical department at Pharmakina, 2 October 2014, Bukavu.

[179] Ibid

"We are experiencing some irregularities these days with several interruptions. Today we see that the pressure in the taps varies considerably and sometimes we have almost no supply of water. These are difficult times for REGIDESO, it is an internal problem for them. Pharmakina uses the same water delivery as Bralima, which is just a few hundred meters up the road. We have a separate, private line with REGIDESO, shared between us [Pharamkina] and Bralima. The problem now is that Bralima first gets the water due to its location and since Bralima is expanding, they have invested in large water tanks and we receive less water than usual."

Unfortunately, I was unable to interview at Bralima as they were in a "silence-period" during the field visit in October 2014 due to an expansion deal with Heineken, which meant they were not allowed to discuss their business with outsiders. What I could observe were the large water tanks that they had newly installed, which Shamavu referred to as limiting Pharmakina's access to water. I also asked Shamavu if he had ever considered a more reliable form of water or energy resources since they were such a large company located close to the lake and possessing a great potential for using solar energy. He replied the following (my emphasis): [180]

"That is a beautiful idea. But [in the same way as] when it comes to electricity, this is always provided by SNEL. For the few interruptions we have, we use generators. But to be autonomous, like using Lake Kivu for instance, there would be a need for several purification treatments. Also, if we do not use the state services, we would be heavily taxed if we used the lake as a resource. In addition, the state services are not the same as we are private clients, so it is a private service. *The private relationship means that they [REGIDESO and SNEL] will do whatever we ask them to do*. For the public services, the clients are there but the supply is not. The hierarchy is long in the public services; money disappears in the long process. While with private services, business is taken care of directly."

Shamavu's statement reveals an interesting discourse on private and public relations as well as on the presence of the state. First, there is an outspoken neglect of the public in the consumer-provider relations that became clearer throughout the conversation with Shamavu. The public's needs were not a priority for the service providers. Secondly, in this elite consumer-provider relationship, there seemed to be much bargaining power for Pharmakina due to the revenues generated for REGIDESO and SNEL. By private relationship, Shamavu meant in practical terms that Pharmakina had separate pipes and lines with REGIDESO and SNEL that were not connected to the public pipes and lines available to the public. It also meant that there were close ties between Pharmakina and the central leadership of REGIDESO and SNEL that enabled a better customer service that took complaints and irregularities seriously.

Based on this interview, it seemed that the consumer-provider relation with Pharmakina was far more important to maintain for REGIDESO and SNEL than the private households without

---

[180] Ibid

the same revenue potentials or ties to central management. Shamavu's insistence that their usage of water (and electricity) did not affect the public's access to tap water in Bukavu, seems dubious since the only captivated water source serving Bukavu is served by REGIDESO, namely the Kahele water station. In other words, the separate, private pipeline for their activities was surely exhausting the same captivated source that was meant to serve the public lines. This demonstrates relational networks of private connections with "public" service providers, which lead to for conflict and mistrust among groups of citizens claiming rights vis-à-vis service providers.

For private citizens in Ibanda, the realities of obtaining tap water were different than for the elite consumer level. In the focus group discussion with men who live in Ibanda, irregularities in accessing tap water in private homes revealed differences between owning and renting. In Bukavu, home ownership seems exceptional and most citizens in Ibanda rely on renting.[181] Relations with water suppliers for those renting a home with installed tap water arose as a topic in the focus group. I asked the male focus group what would happen if they were to refuse to pay a bill on the grounds that their water service was not regularly available in their home. One man responded: [182]

"I am in a weak position. I rent the house and my landlord will tell me that I am only renting the house. I cannot refuse to pay for water and electricity because then they will cut the lines and pipes and it costs even more to get them re-installed. When I complain to REGIDESO, they don't do anything. Sometimes there might be water during the night, but only for a few minutes. My wife, my kids and I we all wake up to try to get some water. But by the time we are by the taps, the water has already stopped flowing. If the meters were regulated by computers there would be no problems, but now they do everything mechanically and they have no clue about how much water is flowing in the channels."

Indeed, the fallibility of manually measured systems arose during different discussions with private citizens enjoying access to REGIDESO services. It meant usually that individuals would have to negotiate with REGIDESO technicians that came to measure their consumption. These relations illustrate what Shamavu (from Pharmakina) explained above, namely, that there is a long hierarchy in public services ("money disappears in the long process"). For individuals without direct connections to the leadership of REGIDESO, these lower level negotiations were not usually settling problems of tap water supply. Thus, even private citizens

---

[181] Based on fieldwork observations, ownership of homes seemed to be divided amongst a small elite and generates considerable cash revenues. In fact, from what I could gather during the fieldwork, the main income-generating activities in Bukavu, apart from the aid industry, are in property and in the import of goods such as textiles, food and cars. This economy offers little incentive for elite investment in national or local economies.
[182] Focus group meeting with five men living and working in Ibanda on 21 October 2014, Bukavu

in Ibanda who could afford to pay bills were not guaranteed a constant supply of water to their private tap.

To women in Ibanda, access to water and electricity was usually within reach, albeit limited for some, either in their home or in their neighborhood. There was a group consensus that it was the government's duty to provide the population with basic access to water, which is an example of citizens' calling the state into being. In the focus group, the women were outspoken about the difficulties with these services (my emphasis):[183]

Woman 1: "In my house, there is no water anymore. There [used to be] but since the pipe directing water to my house was broken some meters away [from my house], it has never been repaired. As to the electricity, there is some but not permanently."

Woman 2: "There's water and electricity in my house and I can say it's regular compared to how it works in other areas. I've never woken up or sent my children in the morning to fetch water from somewhere else except during some occasions in the dry season. There's always water though it is sometimes cut for a few hours."

Woman 3: "Where I live there's no water, no electricity. I resort to asking my neighbors to get water or send my children to fetch some from ISP [state owned university]."

Woman 4: "In Ibanda, there are houses where there's water and others where there's no water. In the house that I'm renting, there's water and electricity. Compared to our neighbors, we have [permanent] water and electricity. *But you should know that this is the arrangement of my landlord with REGIDESO and SNEL technicians who are paid extra money so as to keep this regular for us.* Around six families in my neighborhood have adopted this practice, and those who haven't just get supply during the evening or at night, two or three times per week, especially for electricity."

(…)

Woman 1: "[T]here are people who are corrupt at both SNEL and REGIDESO. They permanently serve these big factories where they get bribes for the maintenance and forget about the rest. I know a guy from SNEL who used to sensitize[184] us so that we can get together in our neighborhood and collect some money to get a special line. *I then understood that when they set a special line they somehow forget about the common lines."*

Woman 2: "I know that there's water and electricity available but there are cuts because they just want us to negotiate with some bribes."

Woman 3: "Yeah, they [have bad intensions] (*malfaiteur*)."

Woman 4: "And still, none of these workers can be fired even if you report corruption with evidence to their superiors since it's the latter who urge the former to behave so. Where on earth can this happen?"

---

[183] Focus group with four women in Ibanda, conducted in Mashi/Swahili and transcribed into English by research assistant Jonathan Magoma. Interviewed 30 November 2014, Bukavu.
[184] This word (*sensibiliser*) is used frequently among service providers and citizens in Bukavu that illustrates, I argue, the infiltration of aid donor language in the city.

Clearly, there are variations in the women's access to electricity and water. For some, the water pipes are never repaired and for others there are special deals between landlords and service providers to keep the access regular for both water and electricity. These special arrangements are interesting forms of statehood relations adding to higher level negotiations between more economically resourceful consumers (landlords) and service providers. The relations are example of practices employed to overcome limited access to public goods. More profoundly, such practices create ways of becoming claim-making subjects (Isin, 2008b, p. 16) at the same time as they create a space for thinking about contested access, examples of which could be corruption or the unwillingness of citizens to pay for special services because they are considered public. By contested access, I refer to focus group women's protestations regarding the discriminate provision of these services; a discrimination enacted mainly through private deals. Throughout the conversation they also discussed the difficulties and unwillingness of service providers to reach outside the Ibanda commune, namely to Kadutu. These women were thus evincing solidaristic relations with urban residents in Kadutu, in contrast to the aforementioned agonistic relations with the service providers.

In the Ibanda youths focus group, there were three students in their early 20s that were studying at the stated owned university ISP. When asked about their access to water, all of the students had varying degrees of tap water access in their homes (in addition to the one at ISP), although the supply varied from every day to three days per week. I asked them what they did when there was no running water in their house and two replied: [185]

Girl: "There is a community relationship for sharing water. Some charge people, like there are families that take money."

Boy 1: "You know, in neighborhoods like where the governor's house is, there they have twenty-four hours of electricity and water. So they don't care about us. Just look at Cyangugu [in Rwanda] versus Bukavu. There they also have twenty-four hour services. This is because of the political system; they [the Congolese authorities] need to be better organized. Things are destroyed by the head of the state. Some authorities are above the law. They care only about their private profits, not the people. The only chance we have is to remove them. We need to have people that care about their community."

The youth in Ibanda (as with many of the youths I have interacted with during my field visits) quickly turned to a political discussion. They expressed frustration towards the sitting government, both in Kinshasa and in the province, and a sentiment of injustice as citizens of

---

[185] Focus group with three students, one woman and two men, in Ibanda, all from ISP, interviewed 9 October 2014, Bukavu.

Bukavu. This included anger at the affluent neighborhoods where the governor was living and enjoying functioning public services. The connections made between water and the "state", represented as central authorities both in Kinshasa and provincially, are an example of the associational role and position of the state in providing these services. The unfair distribution, as discussed in this focus group, is an example of disputed statehood in Bukavu. However, and what was repeated in many of the focus groups, was their perception of the neighboring town of Cyangugu in Rwanda where there is hardly any irregularity on tap water or energy supply, despite it sharing the same natural resources. Although I did not inquire about service provision or consumption in Cyangugu, the importance of (imagining) a good public service delivery was a repeated narrative among Bukavu residents. Cyangugu, I argue, represents the idea and practice of a different statehood that is within reach for Bukavu. Such territorial differences are discussed as one of the dimensions of statehood (spatial dimension, see Chapter 8).

The focus group meeting with youth in Kadutu revealed a very different reality compared to that of Ibanda with these young people having very little access to tap water and electricity. With their lack of access in mind, I inquired about their perspectives on what public services meant to them and they replied (my emphasis):[186]

Boy 1: "It [public services] means it is for the population, something that is *given* by the representatives of the population."

Girl 2: "It means also something that it is *demanded*, like health services (*santé*)."

Solhjell: "Do you see SNEL and REGIDESO as public services?"

[The students agree.]

Boy 1: "*These are public services. Unfortunately, they don't serve the public*. Water and electricity is not permanent. It is not like in Rwanda. Here, electricity can come once per week or even once per month."

Boy 2: "Funu [the water pump in Kadutu] is a public service in Kadutu. But there you also have to pay and it is crowded with people. It was built by the deputy governor during his last campaign. It is the only place to get water in Kadutu, but it is very crowded."

In the discussion of what public services represent, the youth in Ibanda eagerly explained what they saw as their rights, demands and expectations. The idea of public services was something that should be free and available based on popular demand. In some ways, it can be surprising to hear youths from impoverished neighborhoods making politically and socially engaged

---

[186] Interview with four girls and four boys aged 15-18 living and studying in Kadutu, 7 October 2014, Bukavu.

claims about these services despite never having enjoyed them in the first place. On the other hand, the city is a space where precisely these issues become real, as subjects can witness inclusion, exclusion and marginalization in their immediate surroundings. The youths drew comparisons with neighboring Rwanda (Cyangugu) but also described their sense of injustice towards higher ranking state representatives. One of the girls from Kadutu explained the following when I asked what they could do to alert government employees to the issues of tap water and electricity supply:[187]

"To raise awareness in the government is impossible because they live in their beautiful houses. They never see this sad life. We would like to make changes, but we lack the means to do so."

Although this girl expressed sentiments of helplessness (change as impossible with "we lack the means") further discussion in the focus group also revealed high expectations of the government. This calls the state into being, I argue, as one of the girls expressed:[188]

Girl 1: "We expect changes from both the government and individual authorities [in the government]. We expect a lot from the state, but it is only for the paying for now [those with financial means]."

Solhjell: "What are your expectations?"

Girl 1: "Electricity, water, roads, public toilets, waste services… this is a dream, but it can be achieved in several years' time."

The youth, I argue, found themselves on the margins of the state in the sense that they were excluded from services based on their inability to pay. However, through their experiences growing up in Bukavu and their social relations, they envisioned and demanded a better future. This youth, as subjects at the margins of inclusion and exclusion of "the state", confront, destabilize and contest citizenship in Bukavu (see also Isin, 2002).

The focus group discussion with five men in Kadutu was difficult since three of the five men were highly suspicious of me, being unprepared for the meeting.[189] This led to long discussions on whether I could be trusted or not and misinterpretations of my purpose and methods. Nevertheless, I managed to gain an understanding as to some of their different experiences with

---

[187] Ibid
[188] Ibid
[189] Interview with five men in Kadutu, 9 October 2014, Bukavu. They were unprepared as the interpreter and I decided to show up in a public place called *Ancien Coopera* where men meet, talk and drink in Kadutu. Unlike the other focus group, they were not asked in advance for a place or a time to meet.

tap water supply. When asked if they had regular access to tap water and electricity in their homes, two men explained:[190]

Man 1: "This is a big neighborhood [Kadutu] so I cannot speak for everyone. But at my house we have electricity, though not always and not regularly. We also have water from REGIDESO."

Man 2: "Some people have taps in their houses, others borrow from neighbors. But the people I know don't use the rivers as a water source. There is more water in Kadutu then in Nguba [Ibanda] and Panzi [outside Bukavu]."

There is a bias in their responses because these two men (who considered me trustworthy) had a higher education, which meant that they were not amongst the poorer section of Kadutu society. Most importantly, these two men revealed that there are private tap water options in houses in Kadutu as well as a system of sharing taps amongst neighbors. Moreover, the discussion also revealed some of their expectations of the government and how citizens are calling the state into being:[191]

Man 1: "I expect security, electricity and drinking water [from the government]. I expect water regularly, clean and that it is distributed to all neighborhoods in Bukavu."

The women I spoke to in Kadutu, who lived in households with little or no access to tap water, made use of the lake, rainwater, public sources (Funu and Kaduru) and rivers.[192] Despite the rainy season being helpful for families without access to tap water, it was also associated with increased potential for landslides and floods. The women said the following:[193]

Woman 1: "Now that it is raining, things are better. But the water comes into our houses and floods our belongings. Like yesterday, I bought wheat and the rain flooded in and ruined what I had bought."

Solhjell: "So do you drink the rainwater?"

Woman 1: "Yes, we drink it. During the dry season we have to fetch the water from the lake or a stream. Our children also help us doing this. But the water there [in the lake or the streams] is not clean."

Woman 2: "We also use Funu, everyone uses that source. But a lot of people fight there over water. You also have to pay for it."

---

[190] Ibid

[191] Ibid

[192] Interviews with different women working in stalls, either individually, in pairs or in focus group meetings, 25.-26 September 2013, Kadutu market, Bukavu. A total of sixteen women were interviewed. A second focus group with nine women in Kadutu was conducted 4 October 2014, Bukavu. Full translation was needed in both fieldworks as the women did not speak French.

[193] Focus group with nine women in Kadutu, 4 October 2014, Bukavu.

In both of my field visits with women in Kadutu, the issue of exclusion from tap water based on payment was evident. In addition, they could neither afford cisterns nor water purification filters.[194] With an income of less than a dollar a day and many mouths to feed, investment for the future was difficult from their perspective. Instead, when faced with exclusion from REGIDESO services, all the women I talked to in Kadutu kept referring back to the public water sources Funu and Kaduru. During the day, Funu was controlled by *Salongo*, volunteers, but after dark groups referred to as *fin d'heure* were in charge, according to both the women in the focus group and women working on the market stands.[195] These are gangs understood as *banditisme urbain*; the increasing problem of urban banditry due to poverty, war trauma, lack of opportunity and youth unemployment. *Fin d'heure* can be translated as "the end of time" and refers to when the sun sets at around 6 pm every day. For women that work during the day, running for example small businesses (selling vegetables or consumer goods), are expected to be home before dark: Only an immoral wife or daughter would stay out after dark. Women such as like those I met at the market, who work all day on stalls, cannot close their shop to fetch water from distant sources, such as Kaduru. After they had closed for the day, they explained that *fin d'heure* demanded smaller sums from them, usually a fee based on their income from the market. These gangs could be armed with sharp objects such as knives (*armes blanches*) or intoxicated and it was best to do as they said to avoid getting hurt.

Finally, the women in the focus group discussion seemed to have far fewer expectations of the government and local municipal representatives. When I asked if they could demand improvement through their *chef du quartier*, two women answered:[196]

Woman 4: "We can talk to him, but he cannot take our concerns to the *mairie*. We will die together here, the flood will take his house too." [Everyone laughs]

Woman 5: "If you want to speak up, they will arrest you! (...) The leaders of the group will be hunted down and imprisoned."

Their encounters with state-like authorities were often in the form of an agonistic and alienating relationship characterized by resistance and hostility (Isin, 2008b, p. 19). During our conversation, the women discussed ways of avoiding paying taxes to local authorities, as an

---

[194] Field visit conducted both in September 2013 and October 2014, Bukavu.
[195] Field visit conducted both in September 2013 and October 2014, Bukavu. Interviews with different women working on stalls, either individually, in pairs or in focus group meetings, 25.-26 September 2013, Kadutu market, Bukavu. A total of sixteen women were interviewed.
[196] Focus group with nine women in Kadutu, 4 October 2014, Bukavu

example of this agonistic and alienating relation. Their expectations towards "the state" were of a more sinister and cautious character, which I interpreted as an othering processes in the dimensions of statehood. The aspects of othering, exclusion, fear and resistance will be further discussed in Chapter 8, as dimensions of statehood.

7.3 Hydroelectricity

Electricity supply has already been discussed to some degree in the preceding section (7.2), but I will elaborate further on some of the providers and consumer dimensions in Bukavu more specifically in this section. Two important expressions are used in Bukavu, namely *dahoulage* and *délestage*. The first is a Mashi term (the main local language) derived from the word *kudaula,* and means "to take a little." [197] It is used to describe how residents attach small cables to the public electrical lines to connect electricity to their homes. The other is a French term (*délestage*), which, in relation to electricity, refers to intermittent supply and be can be translated to "rolling blackouts" or "load shedding" in English. This practice is undertaken by SNEL agents and is argued to be a public service practice to ensure that district x will have electricity on certain times/days so that district y will have it on other times/days. This is done because of the limited availability of electricity which is partly caused, in turn, by the practice of *dahoulage,* which clearly eats into profits and therefore exacerbates the lack of investment in infrastructure. Thus, *dahoulage* and *délestage* are connected local practices, with the former done by consumers and the latter by the provider SNEL.

To gain a deeper insight into the perspective of providers, I interviewed representatives at both SNEL and Ruzizi I, the main and largest power station for Bukavu. At the SNEL office in Bukavu, I interviewed the head of the technical and distribution division, Déo Mashali.[198] Similarly to REGIDESO, they are discussing transitions from being a centralized, state owned company (parastatal) to a private utility. Mashali referred to a feasibility study conducted by the EU investment bank on the development and rehabilitation of the Ruzizi power stations (CEPA, May 2014). This report reveals a regional dimension of developmental initiatives but also expresses donor conditions: The Ruzizi I, II and III (the latter is not yet built) will have their public sector dimension in the *Energie des Grands Lacs*, which is a regional organization

---

[197] Jonathan Magoma, interpreter during my field visits in 2013 and 2014.
[198] Interview with Déo Mashali, 12 September 2013, Bukavu.

for Rwanda, Burundi and DRC, where the tri-national company SINELAC is found. As mentioned, SINELAC is in charge of Ruizizi II. The national public investment from each of these countries is 10% of total funding (30% in total) with the remaining investment coming from shares sold to private companies (CEPA, pp. 24-25). There are no escaping the political and diplomatic difficulties of regional development, as the nations of the DRC and Rwanda have, at different levels, shown hostility towards each other. While these issues reach far beyond the focus area of this thesis, Mashali explained some of the coordination difficulties within the DRC and his view of the need to decentralize:[199]

"It is Kinshasa that coordinates the big projects, such as the Ruzizi I, II, III and IV. We [SNEL South Kivu/Bukavu] inform the government and ministry of energy about possible solutions for the energy problems here in the east. If we were decentralized, we could work faster. Now [SNEL] is heavily centralized. You know, Ruzizi I is now only producing 25 megawatts but could provide 500 megawatts! There are lots of potentials in this area but realizations of these are not yet happening. Electric dams are costly, financially, and Kinshasa needs to sort out their state problems."

Mashali's perspective describes the difficult relations between state actors and internal problems that limit state performance in providing electricity. The possibility of decentralizing SNEL as a solution to their coordination problems was also discussed in relation to water access by the cabinet director to the South Kivu governor, Professor Severin Magangu Matabaro (my emphasis):[200]

"The water governance (*régie*) provided by the state means that everyone has by law the right to access water. But there are certain monopolies like REGIDESO and SNEL that makes more use of water as a resource. They cannot, however, satisfy all consumers. (...) We are reconsidering the monopoly system now so that it may be modified for enterprises and the liberalization of these services. We are considering a private/public partnership. *The popular perception by many is that these services are supposed to be free, provided by the state. But they are not free.* SNEL is not yet decentralized for the public, while REGIDESO is partly privatized. *It is important for people to understand that private houses will not have free services.* It is a difference compared to, for example fountains, which people can use as much as they want to."

In both interviews, the need to decentralize was put forward as an institutional solution to the energy problems. However, from the viewpoint of Mashali at SNEL, the emphasis was put on a move from Kinshasa to Bukavu, so that large funds could be channeled directly through SNEL's provincial office for more efficiency. Yet, Matabaro (the cabinet director) wanted to change the parastatal and public ownership to a public/private shareholder ownership model.

---

[199] Ibid
[200] Interview with prof. Severin Magangu Matabaro, titled *directeur de cabinet* to the governor Marcellin Cishambo, 9 October 2014, Bukavu.

Then, the government in Kinshasa would still have a percentage of the company but the change would allow private entrepreneurs to develop and rehabilitate facilities. These proposals for changes in ownership evince a neo-liberal policy turn, which challenges popular perceptions of public goods as free services, as Mashali argued. The implications of relabeling water and electricity provision as client-based consumer goods raise future relational challenges between service providers and consumers. Profoundly, it also changes the image of what the state "should do" and expectations towards the "state".

Finally, on the provider side, my meeting with the technician at the Ruzizi I gave me insight into the dynamics of Belgian Congo and contemporary Bukavu.[201] It is important to note that Ruzizi I was, and still is, primarily for the urban centers, such as Bukavu, as well for neighboring Cyangugu in Rwanda. The installation was built between 1954 and 1958 and was designed to service a population of 300,000 but with a capacity to serve up to 500,000 should the need arise. During the tour, the technician at the Ruzizi I explained: [202]

"Back in Belgian Congo, they produced too much electricity. The authorities encouraged people to buy household products, like refrigerators and so on, because it is not good to produce current (*courant*) without consumption. They also gave electricity to Rwanda and Burundi because the borders were not like today, people could cross freely… Today, SNEL still sells electricity but it is not enough to meet the demand in Bukavu. We only have four turbines working now and because of the dry season, there is not enough water flowing in Ruzizi. In order to produce energy, we need both the lake and the machines. But as you can see, we also have big problems with garbage thrown in the lake. It blocks the turbines… This didn't use to be a big problem but people nowadays have lost their sense of public responsibility and throw everything in the lake and rivers. In the past, we only needed to remove the waste once per month. These days it is twice a week!"

His perspective of "people nowadays have their sense of public responsibility", is an example of agonistic relations between service providers and consumers. From the perspective of the technician, subjects in Bukavu were destroying the public good of an electricity facility in the urban space. Regarding the issue of waste problems and energy production, my observations indicate that there seems to be a lack of coordination between different institutions in ensuring that their areas of responsibility and management would not create difficulties for each other. As Chapter 5 revealed, there are considerable problems at the municipal level for responsible waste management. Moreover, the technician believed that, although there was some potential for rehabilitating machines, overall production would not exceed 29 megawatts. He argued that the most durable option is to build a new power station, similar to Ruzizi III.

---

[201] Visit to Ruzizi I and interview with technician conducted on 12 September 2013, Bukavu.
[202] Ibid.

As a participant observer in the installation, it was fascinating to see the old British machinery carefully maintained and operating well. Another noteworthy observation was to visit the control room; by far the most densely administered place in the entire installation. The room was filled with twelve people whose role was to monitor and rotate electricity to different districts (*délestage*). Considering what I was told in the focus group with men and women from Ibanda, there is arguably room for negotiating *délestage* depending on the proximity of important SNEL residents in different neighborhoods of the urban center. Also, the provincial ministries that resided in la Botte in Ibanda received far more electricity than other neighborhoods in Bukavu. This is also true for important consumers such as Pharmakina and most likely Bralima. For Pharmakina, it was clear that *délestage* was not a concern for them because of their private and elite-based relations with SNEL representatives. Thus, electricity is a form of negotiable but limited public good that favors elite and paying consumers in the city. Access to electricity becomes a clue to statehood that differentiates subjects, citizens and elite within the city space.

More generally in the city space when it comes to consumers, there are considerable differences between access to electricity in the urban center Ibanda and the *quartier populaire* of Kadutu. To various extents, all the focus groups participants living in Ibanda had connections to SNEL. But the issue of bribes also came up, as two men from Ibanda explained:[203]

Man 1: "(…) For electricity, it works if you have a person from SNEL living in the same neighborhood. When SNEL comes to your house to check the meters, you should pay them an incentive. The bill will always be the same no matter what, but people pay differently. In urban places, you have to pay more. If you give something like a bribe to the person who checks the meter, they will write something differently on their checks. If you don't pay, the bills might be higher."

Man 2: "I only have electricity no more than three times per week and it is only in small quantities. Imagine the installation at Ruzizi, it was created for a much smaller population, not one million people. (…) We [his family] live in the outskirts [of Ibanda], we only have electricity from three to eight pm. You are always losing… They [SNEL] will send a bill no matter what. Even if you ask for them to cut the wire so that you don't have to pay. They even send bills then!"

In Kadutu, however, electricity is severely limited and most people seem to utilize *dahoulage*. When I asked a group of women working in Kadutu market about their connections to SNEL

---

[203] Focus group meeting with five men living and working in Ibanda on 21 October 2014, Bukavu

they replied that they did not (officially) have electricity in their house.[204] Then, I asked if they stole electricity and two women replied:[205]

Woman 1: "What is there to steal? [Everyone laughs]. There is no electricity in the cables anyway. They [SNEL] don't send electricity here."

Woman 2: "Sometimes our children are killed because of *dahoulage*. It is really dangerous. This is the situation because of bad leadership. We need to live but the leaders are killing us."

These perspectives describe how Kadutu subjects are living on the state margin ("they don't send electricity here") where access to electricity is left to local practices. However, the second woman's interpretation of *dahoulage* as a direct responsibility of the "bad leadership" of the government falls in line with interpreting state practices and performances as enabling citizens to live better lives. These strong sentiments ("we need to live but the leaders are killing us") and relations to life and death matters are also a testimony of calling the state into being. It also serves as an example, again, of the associational role of the "state" and service delivery of electricity supply.

In Kadutu, the lack of electricity and the cost of connection forces people to use the most popular fuel, namely charcoal (*makala*) for cooking and, if affordable, to power generators used in charging computers, cellphones or photocopiers and other common devices. However, excessive use of charcoal, due to the population increase coupled with scant electricity supply, has caused many problems. One such problem is considerable deforestation in and around Bukavu, which has exacerbated pollution and indirectly led to landslides in the densely populated neighborhoods of Kadutu (Trefois et al., 2007). Lack of access to renewable energy sources in Bukavu is thus threatening the lives of its inhabitants and life quality more generally. However, the lack of public provision of electricity has also enabled small businesses in Kadutu, called "public phone" (*publi phone*), that offer the service of charging cellphones among other services. To my knowledge, this blooming small scale business is a result of limited access to electricity, be it from the grid or from generators, as a majority of Kadutu citizens seek power to charge their cellular phones. Thus, there are clearly business opportunities for private citizens based on limited access to electricity. This is an innovative way to deal with inadequate and discriminatory public services.

---

[204] Interview with five women working in a mattress stall, 25 September 2013, Bukavu.
[205] Ibid

Going back to the two practices of *dahoulage* and *déléstage,* Jean-Mari Kazungusibwa Viancy, a local lecturer in history and political science at the *Institut supérieur pédagogique de Bukavu* (ISP), explained the two practices in the following way (my emphasis): [206]

"Insecurity in the region has caused a large number of people to move to Bukavu. The state does not control the movement of people here; it is anarchic. Now, the mentality of this population… they have anarchic souls. You have expressions like "*dahoulage*", meaning that people steal electricity. These people are not officially a part of SNEL's services. They are *pirate consumers*, illegal… Even at some point, a former minister of energy accepted this practice publically to gain support before an election. But *dahoulage* is an expression of *state resistance*. Due to the illegal consumption of electricity and lack of payment, the service provided by SNEL is insufficient to cover the entire city. They instead shift and rotate their service [*déléstage*] to different neighborhoods at a given time per day because it is not enough for all. Here at ISP we have electricity until 3:30 pm, then again at 6:30 pm until 8 pm. The companies that provide huge revenues for SNEL and REGIDESO are Bralima and Pharmakina, who are benefitting from their services. But places like hospitals do not get the services, which in turn creates a huge insecurity for the population."

Viancy's interpretation of these practices demonstrates the complex relations between consumers and providers. His perception of newcomers in Bukavu as "pirate consumers" with "anarchic souls" describes also the alienating relations between people who consider themselves properly urban and those at the margins of the state. As this research was conducted in a period of large influx of village settlers, the relations and ideas of "proper" urban citizens and rural "subjects" were intensified. It also shows the importance of national elections, held in 2011, in playing on ideas of rights for poorer citizens (claiming access to free electricity) to gain votes. Moreover, the phenomenon of dahoulage represents more than not paying for a public service. As Viancy implied, it can be seen as a form of state resistance, where the public sphere is severely constrained and it can also be seen both as an individual action but also as a collectively held act of resistance. This shows, I argue, solidaristic bonds between citizens and the exploitation of these bonds by authority.

However, Viancy's perspective on public institutes, that they prioritize elite consumers rather than, for instance, hospitals also problematizes the "state". As he argued further: "The state has failed its mission. Our situation is a form of modern slavery; people are feeling bad about their lives. (...) Life here is in danger."[207] Viancy saw the "mission of the state" to provide security and to empower citizens to have a better life, neither of which described the state

---

[206] Interviewed 22 October 2014, Bukavu.
[207] Interview with Jean-Mari Kazungusibwa Viancy, 22 October 2014, Bukavu.

practices from his perspective. This understanding of the state – enabling citizens to live a better life – is an interpretation that takes into account the importance of public good provision as a core dimension of statehood.

7.4 Concluding remarks

Water should be plentiful in Bukavu with its numerous rivers, lake and rainy season. Nevertheless, the taps often offer only a few drops even when the rain is pouring outside. Equally, the potential of the river Ruzizi and its hydroelectric power station (Ruzizi I) could offer urban citizens their daily electricity needs. Yet, there are several neighborhoods cut off from these goods and many other areas that receive them only on a rotational basis. There are financial and technical aspects to these issues, but they are also highly political. In terms of the financial and technical aspects, the major public infrastructures – Kahele water reserve and Ruzizi I – date back to the 1950s, although rehabilitate with limited and fragmented donor and state initiatives that did not anticipate the rapid urban growth of the 1990s. Politically, a glance over to the neighboring Rwandan town of Cyangugu, which shares the same natural resources reveals how a different nation-state can provide 24-hour services, even without better technical or financial means. In addition, it was evident that in Bukavu, both water and electricity were no longer practiced as public goods. Regardless of private or national ownership, water and electricity are already, and without doubt, favoring certain neighborhoods (for example Muhumba, which is popular with UN employees and other ex-pats), public buildings in la Botte (the peninsula with government buildings) and commercial enterprises.

When it comes to consumers, it is possible to categorize them into three groups. The first is the elite consumer represented by Pharmakina and the provincial administrative neighborhoods in Ibanda. Though employees at Pharmakina experience some difficulties, they are privileged by having a private client-provider type of relation to both SNEL and REGIDESO, a relation that takes complaints seriously. In the second group, there are the middle-class citizens that live in interconnected houses in the urban center (Ibanda). In particular, the men and women's daily problems related to SNEL and REGIDESO can be attributed partly to issues of house ownership and the discriminatory practices of private deals. However, they were also forced to pay for these services even though the tap water and electricity outputs were at times marginal. The third group can be considered to be the low-income or urban poor mainly residing in

Kadutu. Many living in households here were not officially connected to either SNEL or REGIDESO. Although considered one of the urban territories (*communes*) of Bukavu, some Kadutu residents, I argue, were living on the margin of the state. Many would resort to water stations, such as Funu or Kaduru, and local practices of stealing electricity (*dahoulage*).

Moreover, there is a considerable diversity of income-generating activities and twilight zones of public/private relations when it comes to electricity and water provision and enjoyment. Insiders to SNEL and REGIDESO can arrange special relationships with landlords or neighborhoods that go together to provide funding for pipes or lines to direct water or electricity. Also, many of the urban dwellers will rely on alternative provision of water and forms of energy outside the national agencies of REGIDESO and SNEL. However, the practice of these alternative sites at, for example, public water stations, varied considerably. Funu, the public water pump in Kadutu that was used as an electoral boost during the 2011 electoral campaign, was soon looted once the election was over and when this study was conducted. This demonstrates, I argue, a degree of illegitimacy of public authorities in the eyes of the voters. If it had been perceived as a public good and a shared interest for the neighborhood – a collective space and community – Funu might have been preserved. The feeling of abandonment among poorer citizens after election results and when MPs had returned to Kinshasa, legitimized the looting and the emergence of local practices regarding these "public" goods such, as enacted by *Salongo* or volunteers that were de facto governing this space.

Regardless of all these varieties of accessing and controlling water and energy, imprinted in the social memory of many citizens in Bukavu is an idea of these goods as public or social goods (*bien social*), expecting them to be delivered freely and to everyone regardless of wealth. The second and the third group of consumers had considerable expectations of the "state" connected to these public services, despite limited or no provision by "the state". This idea of public or social good was also repeated by the service providers in charge of the administrative and financial aspects of REGIDESO and SNEL, as well as the technical staff employed at the water and energy reserves serving Bukavu. Yet, at the same time, consumers expressed deep frustration towards the same public authorities for not delivering on their promises, especially among the youth. The idea of water and electricity as free, accessible services for everyone rather than a commercial good was a source of frustration also for service providers. However, from the central administration, this idea was disputed and regarded as a misperception by the public. As discussed, REGIDESO and SNEL are turning into public/private shareholder

companies and this might have future effects on exclusion, such as through payment and access for many inhabitants in Bukavu. For higher level service providers, this shift is seen as efficiency solutions to reduce income gaps and promote infrastructure developments. The technicians in charge of daily management at Kahele water reserve, on the other hand, expressed frustration with the increasingly commercialized system. In the middle of these perspectives, the chief of cabinet to the governor, an intellectual, saw these issues as combined efforts of both sides of the civic relation.

At the core of these consumer-provider relations of water and energy provision in Bukavu is the aspect of state disengagement and transition from public to private goods. This transition, however, might not come without cost, as there is considerable potential for social unrest. Water and electricity services are closely related to regime stability. During election time in 2011, for instance, electricity was provided in more neighborhoods and for longer periods of the day in Bukavu to boost support for the current regime. In the case of water, the regime in Kinshasa regulated water prices even though REGIDESO had become a commercial shareholder company. The price of water in Bukavu was considered too low by the REGIDESO financial administrator (see also Maractho & Trefon, 2004) but important to avoid public demonstrations as 'water is life' (REGIDESO's slogan) and so closely associated with the state and hence regime. This demonstrates negotiations of de facto statehood through the state practices of regulation as a means of social control, on one hand, and demands made by citizens on the other. Thus, maintaining public services at a minimum level and at certain prices is important for de facto dimensions of statehood.

Moreover, as the services of piped water and electricity are increasingly becoming commercialized, at the same time as they are struggling for improved institutional functioning, the state can both be seen as disengaging and engaging. First, the "state" can be disengaging in the way that these services are no longer fully in the hands of the state but that private investors are engaging in investment and profit. Second, the "state" is also one of positioning and engagement, seen through a variety of practices, such as engaging with an international network of investors with potential financial and technical resources and re-establishing water and energy provision. The transition from public or social goods to private goods is thus a dynamic process of negotiating de facto statehood. Here, the plans and efforts to structurally change water and electricity services into commercial and private-public enterprises may or

may not improve investment and infrastructure but, as I have argued above, these goods are political matters that go beyond technical and economic challenges.

These companies (SNEL and REGIDESO), regardless of official ownership, are perceived in many respects as the "state" by citizens of Bukavu. When I asked what public goods were, water and electricity were often mentioned and expected to be delivered by the state. The monopoly of these state agencies in the past and present brings about an important idea of the state and the services it is expected to deliver (see also Lund, 2006a). In other words, monopolized services both create an imagined state and a popular demand for the state. This state is thus not only coercive or violent but also offers, at least in theory, a minimum access to much needed daily goods. It is important to emphasize that piped water is the most desired form of water in Bukavu and is only offered by REGIDESO. Further, SNEL and REGIDESO are also important for the coordination and relations with international and bilateral partners. Any medium to large investment in infrastructure in the water and electricity sectors will require the knowledge, agreement and agency of actors in these institutions. International donors thus uphold the image of these institutions as governmental.

The state, represented by REGIDESO and SNEL, upholds a certain monopoly over water and electricity in the urban centers supported by international agencies. The citizens, depending on their contextual situation, such as income, literacy or private relations with these state agents, are to varying degrees dependent on these services and hold high expectations of what should be delivered. The statehood relations in these forms of public good show some potential for rejuvenation, but also for conflict, regarding the ability to offer these goods at acceptable prices.

8.0 Analysis: Dimensions of statehood

This thesis so far has contributed to a study of daily public good provision and consumption in Bukavu, as a counterpoint to abstract and decontextualized models of statehood. In this respect, I have positioned my work in the more empirically informed studies of statehood from the lived experience of people (e.g., Olivier de Sardan, 2009b). This approach is different from either considering state performance as a monopoly on violence and the control of borders (e.g., Englebert, 2009; Jackson & Rosberg, 1982a) or as the performance of service delivery based on norms of Western statehood models (e.g., Zartman, 1995). The preceding empirical chapters on waste management, water, electricity and roads have dealt with micro-scale perspectives on these issues in Bukavu. The actors and groups that I have engaged with in Bukavu are living and doing the state from a variety of backgrounds and practices. By the state, I mean "the quality of an institution being able to define and enforce collectively binding decisions on members of society" (Lund, 2006a, p. 676), which is not limited to government institutions (see Chapter 2).

Through these chapters, I have demonstrated how relations within and between actors and groups are formed, discussed, interpreted, and challenged. The relations of service providers and consumers with respect to public goods are, I argue, forms of expressing de facto statehood. The negotiations, enjoyment, control and access to what can be broadly seen as "public goods" create a pattern of experiences, practical dimensions of statehood and citizenship ideas that make up the state effect, i.e., an effect of practices that makes structures of control and separation appear to exist (Mitchell, 1999).

The discussion will be further developed in this chapter, examining dimensions of statehood based on recurring patterns of public good provision and consumption from the case studies. The purpose is to move from a purely context specific description of practices in Bukavu to a more conceptually and theoretically abstract discussion. In order to do so, I will first make comparisons within the cases of different "modes of governance" (Olivier de Sardan, 2014, p. 419) and "citizenship" when it comes to public good provision and consumption. Furthermore, I also construct and suggest dimensions of statehood that may be useful in other case studies or theory-building of de facto statehood. Thus, despite relying on empirical data from one site, the cases from Bukavu can illustrate and be used for comparative purposes and theory-building.

This chapter is structured in the following way: In the first section, I will develop the interpretive analytical perspectives on "modes of governance" (Olivier de Sardan, 2014, p. 420) and citizenship in a comparative, within-case categorization. This categorization is aimed at developing the empirical data into more manageable and analytically distinct (ideal) types. I argue that there are three modes that govern public goods; 1) non-governed (waste management), 2) plural governance (road construction and control) and 3) state monopoly (water and hydro energy). I further argue that there is a dividing line between inhabitants connected to (citizens) and those disconnected (subjects) from the same goods.

In the second section, I will discuss public good provision and consumption as dimensions of statehood. I emphasize three dimensions namely distinctions, spatial and ideology, with each holding two sets of components. The dimension of distinction derives from empirical evidence of two interrelated components of hierarchies and citizen-subject debates, which is further connected to a broader literature field (such as Mamdani 1996 and Ekeh 1975). The spatial dimension focuses on specific, geographical elements derived from the study location namely international borders and urban design. Finally, the ideology dimension focuses on languages of stateness (Hansen and Stepputat 2001, p. 5) and statehood ideals as discursively produced in the case studies.

These dimensions are interlinked, I argue, as assemblages of hierarchies, languages, ordering and histories, which are used by citizens, subjects and service providers and which make up the state effect. I further argue that alternative networks of public good providers, whoever they may be, cannot completely replace or avoid the state. This is not necessarily the case outside Bukavu, but represents rather the way cities can be at the center of negotiating de facto statehood through intensified struggles between the populace and service providers over public goods. The city can thus be seen as a space enabling intense negotiations over symbolic repertoires of power and legitimacy and tangible and intangible resources (Hagmann & Péclard, 2010); negotiations which create the state effect.

8.1 Categories of analysis: Modes of governance and citizens-subjects

I will in this section first present my interpretation of service provision in expressing statehood through what Olivier de Sardan (2014, p. 419) has termed "modes of governance". Here, governance is interpreted as an empirical approach to understand "any organised method of delivering public or collective services and goods according to specific norms (official and practical), and to specific forms of authority" (Olivier de Sardan, 2009a, p. 4). Further, a "mode of governance" is thus any organized form of public good delivery through de facto, but also official, i.e., de jure, forms of service delivery involving specific authorities (see Chapter 2). Though the emphasis is on de facto, the relations with official or de jure governance structures are important as authorities in service delivery positions refer to and make use of these rules in a variety of ways. This will become clearer in the discussion on dimensions of statehood.

As argued in the theoretical Chapter (2), the term "modes of governance" is useful as it avoids traditional delineations made between state/non-state or formal/informal and rather emphasizes dynamic forms of de facto statehood through service provision practices and performance. This case studies examined state agencies, private companies, municipal services and community networks, all of which were delivering (to varying degrees) services I term public goods. For the consumers, which are largely made up of private citizens in Bukavu, I make use of Mamdani's (1996) 'citizen-subject' distinction as well as Lund's (2006b) work on 'twilight institutions' in relation to accessing and enjoying public goods. In discussing dimensions of statehood in the next section, these separations between service delivery providers and consumers will be developed according to a more dynamic, relational approach. I consider modes of governance and citizen-subject relations as *categories of analysis*, i.e., categories the researcher uses to describe the object of scientific inquiry (Chapter 3). They are developed based on categories of practices, namely how actors self-identify in terms of what they expect and how they enjoy, control and manage public goods.

When it comes to 'modes of governance' in controlling the public goods discussed, I make the following three distinctions:[208] First, waste management can be interpreted as a "*non-governed*" mode. Though there are some municipal authorities and civil servants formally in place (de jure), the practices and performances (de facto) of any "public" waste management

---

[208] I would like to point out that all these categories have exceptions when it comes to modes of governance and these categories of analysis are used mainly for summarizing and developing my inductive research.

are severely limited or non-existent. The management of this public good is notoriously understaffed and left for municipal rather than governmental regulation. Though urban waste management is generally not considered a task for higher government officials, the lack of regulations, financial or political support is a form of the "politics of neglect" (van der Geest & Obirih-Opareh, 2009, p. 219) of broader governance structures. That is, the absence of any waste management policy but also a de facto governance of "not thinking about it" (van der Geest & Obirih-Opareh, p. 19). The exceptions to this category are the politically significant places for provincial, regime-affiliated elites (e.g., *Place de l'Indépendence)*. However, these spaces are de facto *political* rather than public spaces. This emphasis on keeping clean only politically significant places or neighborhoods in which members of the public authorities reside, I argue, is a source of disconnection between authorities, or "the state", and the populace. Simultaneously, citizens enjoy having their private homes clean, and use the public spaces – rivers, lake and roads – as dumping grounds. There were also community networks that dealt with waste by using public spaces for garbage disposal. Thus, waste management is considered non-governed due to the lack of institutional arrangements and actual practices (de facto) as a "public good" or "public cleanliness".

Second, I consider public roads in a category (mode) of plural governance considering the range of institutions and actors: locally, nationally and internationally. By plural governance, I mean that the management, control and building of public roads are governed by multiple agents and agencies, sometimes at a distance and other times in close proximity to "consumers" or users. The various actors and affiliated institutions govern, for instance, road construction, safety, insurance, union and taxation. This mode of plural governance creates a patchwork of relations between investors (mainly international), service providers and consumers. The main actors that perform and regulate these practices are found within public institutions, locally and nationally, although with a clear role for private companies sub-contracted in the road construction industry. Some of the locally positioned institutions in Bukavu, may be overstaffed and infused with an arsenal of regulations to be used in a strategic, discriminatory manner (Blundo, 2006, p. 807). Here, the consumer/provider relations become blurred. This is especially related to the conduct of traffic police positioned along strategic junctions on the main roads in Bukavu.

Moreover, public road (re)construction is a field that intersects with local, national and international interests and creates prosperity and political legitimacy as well as tension. There

are development and investment agencies from the North as well as bilateral agencies of Chinese origin that hold a vested interest in the operation and management of infrastructure work. Olivier de Sardan (2009a, p. 15) has called these different levels of engagement the "associational mode" of local governance. In this case study, there are clearly forms of institutional relations between different agencies associated with public roads. These relations, which take a variety of forms, include associations between Bukavu-based agencies (e.g., traffic police and insurance company) and Bukavu-based agencies with national (Kinshasa) and/or international actors (e.g., road construction agencies and World Bank lenders). The relations include cooperation, such as between those governing international funds and those constructing roads. In other relations, there are more agonistic or alienating relations (Isin, 2007, p. 222), such as the arbitrary unionizing of the taxi system by municipal authorities.

However, there are also exceptions or changes to this mode of governance that occur at nighttime, after 6 p.m., that allow for more clandestine operations. These nightly changes are sometimes attributed to *Fin d'heure* and other times to the national police and army. The distinction between public authorities and *Fin d'heure* is not always clear and governance after dark appears to operate under different rules.[209] Nevertheless, there is no, or hardly any, escaping the state or state-like presence along the main roads.

Third, I consider water and hydroelectricity governed in a mode of *state monopoly*. The parastatal inheritance of water and energy companies have imprinted a memory of these goods as social goods, free and accessible to all. Piped water and hydroelectricity, as located in two single state-controlled agencies, can both be seen as "specters of the state"[210]. The actual delivery of services from these agencies may be limited but the memory of social goods located in monopolized state agencies demonstrates the reproduction of the state in society. In other words, the state monopoly agencies have perhaps ceased to deliver what they promise, but by reproducing the physical and symbolic forms of these institutions, they are specters of the state. I argue that in the agencies SNEL and REGIDESO, the state is closest to a coherent entity with structural effects on governance.

---

[209] I will discuss fin d'heure further in the next section (8.2).
[210] Term also inspired by Tobias Hagmann, paper presentation of "Specters of the state: Problematics of government after state collapse in Somalia" at Ghent University, 16 September 2014.

Although there are institutional changes taking place, especially in the water agency, the state currently governs and regulates tap water prices. No other groups or agencies are, for now, allowed to operate in providing systems of tap water or hydro energy without the blessing of these public institutions. Exceptions to this are, for instance, deals between mining companies operating in rural areas dependent on energy and water systems where "public" infrastructure is absent. Here, deals are made between government officials and mining companies that allow for private investors to set up their own systems. However, this is not the case for urban centres, where local companies like Pharmakina (the pharmaceutical company in Bukavu) claimed they would be taxed heavily if they attempted to create their own system outside the official monopoly.

Moreover, the neo-liberal transition regarding water regulations, and to a lesser extent hydro energy, comes in the form of investing, through shares, in the existing government agencies. Thus, and despite privatization, regulation imposed by government agencies is being reproduced and reasserted as the authority on water and energy services. At the same time, privatization of water may lead to increased tensions and negotiations between central government officials and private citizens. For instance, increased water prices were referred to as threatening regime stability, and hence there is a close associational role of "the state" in the delivery of water (the state effect). Table 5 summarizes modes of governance in the management of the public goods.

Table 5 Categories of analysis: Modes of governance in relation to public goods

Public goods	Modes of governance
Waste management	Non-governed
Managing public roads	Plural governance
Water and electricity	State monopoly

When scrutinizing the individuals within these forms of governance structures, the more challenging actors to examine are the so-called *Salongo*, or volunteers, who operate in a position in between the formal public bureaucracy of civil servants, on the one hand, and the population, or consumers, on the other. Though the term *Salongo* is unique to the Congolese context, the phenomenon itself is not. For instance, as Blundo's (2006, p. 802) study of Senegalese bureaucracy demonstrates, there are "volunteers" operating in public service provision. These individuals, Blundo (p. 803) explains, are

"[c]reated by a sometimes opaque, often under-equipped administration, given disproportionate discretionary powers and subject to little control, they contribute, as a foot-bridge between the civil servants and the population, (…) involving negotiation, monetized powers, and the creation or adaption of rules."

Those I met in Bukavu claiming to <u>be</u> or <u>do</u> *Salongo*, for instance, controlled and regulated the water post *Kaduru*, while others cleaned public markets and roads. There appears to be a distinction between "being" and "doing" *Salongo*. Those "being" were operating as a public authority, i.e., state-like in the form of controlling water sources, while those "doing" were conducting services for other (public) authorities, such as the market owner, police or others, in the form of communal work. Actors being or doing *Salongo* are in many ways performing de facto statehood in spaces where official authorities may have few solutions to improve state performance. This cuts across and intersects with all the goods studied in this thesis and can, for instance, be seen by observing waste pickers along the main roads, those dealing with crowds trying to access a water source or those intervening in negotiations over taxi parking where public parking is limited. Although individuals who position themselves as Salongo may be disputed, the term legitimizing these actions as, overall, it fits with state practices and performances in public good delivery. This and other dimensions of statehood will be discussed further in Section 8.2.

When it comes to citizens and their enjoyment of public services, it is possible to distinguish between two main groups: those connected to official service provision regulations and those disconnected from the same services, in other words, a distinction between the "haves" and "have-nots" (Lund, 2006b, p. 700). Another way of putting this distinction is that it is between "citizens" and "subjects" (cf. Mamdami, 1996). However, the term subjects does not fall well into the category of "rural power of community and culture", as formulated by Mamdami (1996, p. 18). For instance, there is no real presence of the rule of *Bami* (traditional kings) in Bukavu: the closest *Mwami* (local king) governs a territory outside the city and does not collect taxes or offer services in the urban space. The way I view subjects is rather as inhabitants that are disconnected from public service provision, for a variety of reasons, and who are somehow at the margins of the "state "and distant from customary authorities. Another way of determining this distinction is to see it as to whom "the state" answers and to whom "it" does not. Again, the modern state effect of establishing a binary rule of the state as an ideological entity on one hand, and the society on the other, creates structural effects for who is considered within the state's responsibility.

These divisions partly take the form of territorial delimitations between Ibanda, the urban center prioritized by the colonial authorities, and Kadutu, the space mainly inhabited by the urban poor. However, there are also neighborhood distinctions within the same urban territory that divides these two groups. An example is the differences between the two adjacent peninsulas of Muhumba and Nguba neighborhoods in Ibanda (see Figure 4, detailed map of Bukavu), where the former was the main residential area for white settlers, a fact reproduced today as it is still the residential location of choice for expatriates. The latter, Nguba, was largely undeveloped during colonial times but is today densely populated due partly to its economic and security benefits gained through proximity to the Rwandan border.[211] Within Kadutu, there are also the former CEC areas (see Chapter 4) that allowed for the development of regulated water and electricity connections. These housing options, however, do not accommodate the majority of Kadutu residents.

Moreover, Kadutu residents also have access to the Kaduru water reserve, which is not regulated by REGIDESO, but which allows (at least potentially) residents to enjoy regular and

---

[211] Economic reasons are especially the plentiful trans-border trade with Rwanda and security reasons are mainly the potential ease of seeking refuge from instability in eastern DRC.

cleaner water access. However, Kaduru is a space that is used more efficiently by those with access to cars that can contain water tanks too heavy for individuals to carry. The individuals tasked with carrying water are mainly women and children and thus further separation between the haves and have-nots relates to gender roles, regular employment and age.

The discrimination against the have-nots can also be attributed to intentional or unintentional barriers to public service provision. Official ownership or the rent status of housing forms one such barrier. If a family cannot provide "legal"[212] documentation for their living arrangement, then there is no (legal) recourse to gain connection to public services. This relates not only to accessing tap water or electricity, but also to the potential demolition of "illegal" houses to (re)construct roads. Another barrier is the dual issue of French language paperwork and illiteracy among poorer residents. Further, authoritarian approaches to governance, such as the oppression of public demonstrations or opaque political decisions, pose many challenges for residents unfamiliar with systems of access or private relations with service providers.

In sum, subjects disconnected from public services are at the margins of the state *and* removed from customary authorities (e.g., *Bami*) and often find themselves unable to enjoy what citizens, to varying degrees, can enjoy. Table 6 summarizes the forms of citizen-subject distinctions as categories of analysis.

---

[212] Legal is a disputed term in practice (de facto) as there were examples of housing legally approved by what certain public authorities, such as the head of OVD, considered illegitimate civil servants.

Table 6 Categories of analysis: Forms of citizens and subjects

Citizens (haves)	Subjects (have-nots)
Official service connections	No official service connection, alternative practices, e.g., stealing electricity (*dahoulage*), Kaduru and Funu water supplies.
Official housing	"Squatter" settlements
French literacy	Widespread illiteracy
(Partly) regular income	Widespread urban poverty
"Properly" urban	"Newer" settlers from (semi-) rural areas

8.2 Interpretive approaches to de facto statehood: Dimensions of statehood

This discussion so far has focused on categorical distinctions of modes of governance, on one hand, and citizens and subjects, on the other. The purpose for using such distinctions is to lend analytical clarity to the complex and lived experience of state practices and performances. In this section, I will further develop dynamics of de facto statehood, namely in what I term dimensions. These interlinked dimensions can subsume historical (e.g., colonial), international (e.g., de jure relations with de facto), micro (e.g., specific authorities in Bukavu), hierarchical (e.g., state control of public goods), or language (e.g., *Salongo*) characteristics to create the overall state effect and performance. By this I mean that there is an "effect of practices" (Bourdieu, [1990] 1997; Mitchell, 1999) that structures and orders everyday access to and management of public goods.

Dimensions of statehood is a heuristic approach based on public good relations between consumers and providers, as presented in the preceding chapters (5-7). As Hagmann and Péclard (2011, p. 16) argue:

 "There can be no conclusive list of dimensions of statehood that are subject to negotiation, but rather a changing patchwork made out of the multiple objects of negotiation that are manifest at the boundary of state and society, private and public, legal and illegal, indigenous and foreign, collective and individual."

In this thesis, I highlight three dimensions of statehood based on my interpretations of the empirical observations and discussed in relation to broader scholarly contributions. These are spatial dimensions (including international borders and urban design), dimensions of distinctions (including hierarchies and citizen-subject) and, finally, ideology dimensions (including languages of stateness and statehood ideals).. These dimensions are not seen as discrete categories, but rather as aspects of statehood, where each is seen in relation to the others. These dimensions also relate to ideas and practices when it comes to citizenship. Here, citizenship will be discussed from the perspective of consumers' enjoyment of public goods. This rather limited perspective of citizenship is based on the case studies and empirical data available, rather than engaging with broader theoretical and de jure meanings of citizenship disconnected from the empirical data.[213] Exceptions here are my engagement with Engin Isin's work on citizenship and city, as well as with the post-colonial approaches of Mahmood Mamdani and Peter Ekeh (see Chapter 2). In my study, service providers consist of public authorities, state-like agents and networks, all striving for their own position and subject to expectations from within the state and from the society when it comes to practices and symbolic forms. The many dimensions of stateness produced and reproduced through varies practices can be both unique and universal, and anywhere in between. As this section will demonstrate, there is no attempt to distinguish "African" statehood from, for instance, "European" statehood, as dynamic dimensions of statehood are formed through multiple sources of local, national and international imaginings, techniques and rationales. In many ways, statehood in Bukavu is influenced by both "European" or "Western" and "African" interpretations and practices of bureaucracy, control and provision of public goods. In this section, I will build on the statehood dimensions shown through empirical examples from Bukavu to demonstrate the state effect and performances. This will shed light on theoretical implications for understanding de facto statehood in these case studies and beyond.

First, spatial dimension is based on two empirical insights, namely the interpretation of colonial urban design and international borders related to the Rwanda-DRC proximity. I argue that colonial aspects of statehood have implications for contemporary statehood practices and performances, such as the feeling and creation of the superior colonial state (Ferguson, 1999).

---

[213] Also, qualitative empirical work on citizenship in the DRC is largely embedded in identity politics debates related to conflict.

The colonial vision of Bukavu as a segregated space dividing Europeans, *évolués* and indigenous (though not in entirely fixed identities) influences dimensions of statehood even today. Bissell's (2011, p. 23) argument that colonial urban design transformed drastically both the imaginative and physical spaces by creating wide and straight streets, clearing "huts" and placing natives where "they ought to be" is relevant for contemporary transitions in Bukavu. Though discourses during the colonial governmentality were different from discourses found within contemporary political and policy circles nationally and internationally, it is easy to find similar concerns and measures. For instance, instead of using certain terms, such as "indigenous", meaning people attached to tribal or customary rule (cf. Ekeh, 1975), other terms used in these case studies by service providers and intellectuals revealed the view that there are "anarchic" and "disorderly" subjects, who are unable to cope in the modern civic public. The term *évoulés* in the colonial era is for obvious reasons not a term applied today, especially due to the racial discrimination attributed to the term, i.e., evolved from the tribal groups and on the path to reach white, European civilization. Instead, the dividing lines of belonging and not belonging are based on differentiating between those with formal education and 'proper' urban settlement in contrast to the illiterate, urban poor, whose dwellings are still viewed as characteristically rural, despite their urban location. The reproduction of colonial forms of administration, differentiating between literate and illiterate, legal and 'unruly' settlements are all attributable to a particular colonial inheritance of the urban space. In Mamdani's (1996, p. 4) terms, the citizen-subject divide of the colonial legacy of institutions and institutional segregation is continued in different forms in Bukavu and thus challenges statehood relations.

Closely related is the example of the prioritizing of colonial roads (e.g., *Avenue Hippodrome*) through road rehabilitation projects supported by the World Bank. Commenting on this process, certain authorities (e.g., the OVD representative, the urban road office) argued for the clearing of "anarchic" buildings and shops. These forms of reconstruction and space clearance for roads can be seen as forms of "modernization", at the expense of those considered "uncivilized." "The appearance of structures", as Mitchell (1999, p. 89) argues, is a central part of the modern state effect. By specifying function and space, the appearance of structure contributes to an effect of binary order, as Mitchell (p. 89) explains: Individuals and their activities, on one hand, and an inert structure, on the other, that is set apart from individuals, "precedes them, and contains and gives framework to their lives." Road (re-)construction is created and prioritized at all levels based on an idea of the modern state effect, i.e., structure

and order provided by the "state". Here, disorderly or anarchic subjects are not acting according to the modern state effect. However, by tearing down houses and stalls, the modern state project is taking shelter and livelihood from their "unruly" inhabitants. The effects of urban reform in clearing "anarchic" infrastructure and people have also been recognized in de Boeck's (2011) study of Kinshasa, especially in relation to president Kabila's campaign of *Cinq Chantiers* (Five Public Works) (see Chapter 4). As de Boeck (2011, p. 273) writes:

"The state's brutal destruction of citizens' material and social environments under the guise of urban reform that once again seems to be inspired by the earlier moral models of colonialist modernity, therefore forms a violent attack on precisely that crucial creative capacity that is a sine qua non to belong, and to belong together, in the city."

Although on a smaller scale, inhabitants of Bukavu thus feel and live the policies of modern state reforms.

Furthermore, the memories (experienced or not) of abundant electricity, ordered roads with separate lanes and sidewalks, and postal services are not only colonial history but can also be seen as specters of the state. Also, the offices of public authorities are located in colonial houses, such as the *Mairie*, the City Hall, occupying the former main administration of Costermansville by CNKi (see Chapter 4). These memories and physical signs of the past continue to serve as "a legitimating reservoir for renewed assertions of state authority" (Young, 2002, p. 445). They also create expectations of what the state "should" deliver among the populace.

Yet, and despite the historical divisions, maintaining an urban, European-like city and a separate African city are not necessarily the case for contemporary Bukavu. Colonial urban planning was mostly dramatically different from contemporary practices of, or de facto, urbanization in Africa (see also Goodfellow, 2013, p. 48). Instead, the ever-growing peripheral city, as Kadutu exemplifies, penetrates and affects relations with public authorities and above all de facto statehood and state-citizens' relations. Rapid urban growth without corresponding urban planning to facilitate public good provision creates an intensified space for negotiating de facto statehood. Inhabitants referred to as "subjects" in the preceding section are questioning de facto statehood when they demand, expect and challenge their lived disconnections from public goods. The fluctuating and confrontational territorial boundaries within the city, such as

those which delineate Kadutu and Ibanda, can be seen as both unique and universal as they represent hierarchies and identities that can be found in many urban contexts, though carrying their own histories, knowledge and people.[214] This demonstrates the dynamic, rather than static, feature of de facto statehood. Here, urban citizenship is being de facto questioned, demanded and potentially transformed to renegotiate statehood. Subjects at the margins of inclusion and exclusion confront, destabilize and contest citizenship.

Further, another element of the spatial dimension is the international border between Rwanda and the DRC, which serves as a confrontation and dividing line of statehood. Cyangugu (in Rwanda) is a site-specific image and performance of an alternative form of de facto statehood. Rwanda was often mentioned across all the goods studied, e.g., Rwanda's waste management through banning plastic bags, repairing roads and offering 24hour services of water and electricity. This de facto statehood seen as high performance in service delivery functions has implications for perceptions and expectations of consumers in Bukavu. For many consumers in Bukavu, the state performance of service delivery in Cyangugu was closely associated with regime responsibility in Kinshasa and Kigali, the capitals of DRC and Rwanda respectively. The discourses on public good delivery in Bukavu, in contrast to Cyangugu, demonstrate the close associations between "the state", interpreted as the central regime in Kinshasa or Kigali, and delivery and performance of these services. Through the images of de facto statehood in Rwanda, state authorities and their performances are called into being by citizens and subjects in Bukavu. Here, state (images of) performances question the legitimacy of public authorities. Although this thesis does not focus on international sovereignty principles (de jure statehood), de facto statehood dimensions build on images of other sovereign nations to question domestic practices.

Statehood in Rwanda, in contrast to those in the DRC, have focused on a processual transformation shaped by more recent events, groups and individuals with normative, political and economic forces. The Rwandan Patriotic Front, headed by president Paul Kagama (see Chapter 4), has fundamentally contested what was the image of the Rwandan state, and contributed to different imaginings and practices of what the state "should" look like. For instance, as Goodfellow (2014, p. 316) writes, "urban cleanliness and modernity are

---

[214] Divided cities can be interpreted in multiple forms and across time and division is so common that it can almost be a defining attribute of "the city".

constitutive of the 'New Rwanda,'" and these discourses have a major impact on forceful urban restructuring plans *and* actions by the Rwandan government. These more recent transformations of statehood in Rwanda also highlight not only the importance of historical and contextual knowledge but also how statehood is part of local and regional dynamics that are not simply "imported" by European (colonial) systems (Migdal & Schlichte, 2005, p. 21). This image and practices of Rwanda demonstrate a processual understanding of the state and dynamics of statehood.

Second, the dimension of distinction relates specifically to aspects of hierarchies and citizen-subject issues. Hierarchical distinctions of statehood relate to the position of the state in controlling public goods. Constraining, controlling and enabling the access and provision of public services may be powerful tools. For instance, road (re)construction was a legitimizing tool of state performance for public authorities (e.g., from the mayor) and donors. All the goods studied were, to varying degrees, controlled and sometimes monopolized through state-owned companies (e.g., SNEL and REGIDESO). Even for waste management, the most "neglected" service from the delivery side, there was a perception and knowledge of land being owned by the state that resulted in disputes over governing waste. This was particularly a source of frustration for the sanitation office at Kadutu central market, where the municipality owned the market and as such it was perceived as "state-owned". The state presence is thus felt and experienced as a dominant force of public good provision, control and expectations of performance. By being a "dominant force", I mean that "the state", as a land owner for instance, is seen as the responsible "actor" in dealing with the collective needs of society. The municipality, as owner of the Kadutu market, was called into being when problems of waste became a collective "ill" for the society.

Hierarchies also relate to the capacities of and discrimination against citizens vis-a-vis public good deliveries. Performing as a citizen to acquire certain rights to access public goods requires formal property settlements (e.g., owning or renting a 'legal' house), knowledge of French and some regular income to pay bills. This creates separations between citizens of "haves" and "have-nots", as discussed previously. Such hierarchies have also intensified through decades of violent conflicts that have disrupted education, livelihoods and housing options, and inevitably constrained public good provision. Following these hierarchies, a relational element is how service providers describe these subjects as "anarchic". Anarchic is a term that

illuminates a field of government rationalities, technologies, languages of statehood and hierarchies in relation to these subjects (Hansen & Stepputat, 2001; Rose & Miller, 1992). By claiming that they are "anarchic", service providers adapt a mentality of disengagement towards these individuals. When subjects are viewed as anarchic by service providers, there is less need for "answerability" (Bakhtin 1993 in Isin, 2008, p. 29) in relation to public goods provision. By situating subjects as anarchic, service providers adapt an alienating mode towards this group. That is, such individuals are considered anarchic subjects unable to cope with government techniques of rules and regulations and thus hierarchically positioned beneath civic relations. Anarchic also implies that such subjects are irrational or disordered and that they do not respect government technologies.

Closely related to hierarchies, another aspect of the dimension of distinction is the universe of "ordinary" people that make up citizen-subject aspects (Mamdani, 1996). Here, relations with and position relative to service providers are essential characteristics. The different methods or techniques found within the state boundaries for producing hierarchies, institutions and identities are also about creating relations between the modern individual and political subjects (Mitchell, 1999, p. 87). This aspect, I argue, is at the core of understanding de facto statehood. I will thus elaborate further on these relations, their disconnections and prospects in more detail.

Recalling Mamdani's (1996) post-colonial argument of urban power that spoke of civil rights (citizens) and customary power that emphasized tradition (subjects); certain urban citizens are connected to the public services in contrast to those perceived as rural, anarchic, disorderly subjects, who were largely excluded from the same services in these case studies. However, these subjects are also not necessarily connected to customary rule, such as the *Mwami* (traditional king) in Kabare outside Bukavu (see Chapter 4). They are subjects considered both on the margins of the state *and* the "primordial public" as Ekeh (1975, p. 106) terms it. Ekeh's (p. 108) theoretical statement of *lucky* citizens in the civic public who only gain (rights) without giving anything in return (duties) is to a lesser degree supported by the empirical evidence, as service provision is severely limited regardless of position. But the symbolic and sometimes mythical importance of these divisions is a reality for subjects, citizens and service providers at the lower levels in Bukavu. The discourse of the "political class" that consumes without

giving anything back and close their eyes to problems of waste in the public market serves as an example (see page 123).

In order to understand these citizens-subject tensions, it is useful to incorporate perspectives from Engin Isin's discussion on citizenship and the city. The idea of being a citizen in these case studies might relate to the tension of rights and duties as inhabitants of the city. These are dynamic forms of relations and, as Isin (2007, p. 224) argues, "[w]hen we assume that nationality is citizenship what we accept is that there is a nation that corresponds to a state." In Bukavu, as well as in many other places, the promises of the state, its constitution and policies, do not correspond to state practices or performance. Yet, these promises do play important roles in reproducing images of a state yet to come. For instance, the Congolese Constitution (February 2006) was referred to here as granting rights and obligations and thus perpetuating the existence and promise of the state. The civic public's great expectations for rights were found across all layers of society and especially among poorer citizens (i.e., the subjects) in these case studies. Rather than rights per se, the 'mythical dimensions of the modern state' (Hansen & Stepputat, 2001, p. 15) continued to live on through, for instance, the constitutional text that recognized the rights and duties of the "state" and its citizen. The repertoire of rights, duties and expectations towards the "state" shows the dynamic and negotiable arenas of statehood (Hagmann & Péclard, 2010, p. 551).

Moreover, citizenship is practiced in relation to the Other (Isin, 2002, p. 3), namely those who I term subjects, or who certain service providers term "anarchic" settlers. This group of subjects is differentiated in a number of ways (e.g., by age, background, ethnicized identities) but, all in a similar way, they experience disconnections from official public services (what Bourdieu, [1990] 1997, p. 59 terms *habitus*). In this group, there is a sense of a struggle for recognition and to be treated on equal terms by enjoying access to regular public services. The poorer inhabitants of Bukavu, those disconnected from public service provision, were perhaps the most vocal demanders of access. As noted by Fardon (1988 in Hickey, 2006, p. 99), marginalized groups may form a stronger basis for identity formation and means of mobilization. These are relational issues, as struggles to achieve similar treatment are formed in the image of citizens with access to public goods. As I argued in the theoretical chapter, inspired by Isin (2007), cities intensify and encourage interactions and are a battleground for groups to define themselves, make claims and demand rights. Here, "acts of citizenship" are

articulated through "those to whom the right to have rights is due" (Isin & Nielsen, 2008, p. 2). These articulations of rights are related to the possibility of accessing public goods in the future, while waiting for a state performance that is yet to come.

Further, the issue of citizenship and belonging is closely associated with "public space" in the city, as particularly addressed in Chapter 5 on waste management. Among consumers in Bukavu, there were perceptions of dismemberment from official "public" places. However, the ways in which citizens and subjects (consumers) expected public spaces to be (e.g., free of charge, for recreation, and places for freedom of speech), were lacking in the city. Most "public spaces" (*espaces publics*) in the city center (Ibanda) were instead de facto politicized and/or monitored by police and other security forces (e.g., secret police, soldiers, or traffic police). This situation seemed to create tensions in de facto statehood relations, where the population are kept out of so-called public places in the urban center. Other "public"[215] spaces in Kadutu, however, were significantly more squalid (see Figure 10 in Chapter 5). Beyond the technical and financial aspects of waste management, the dirtiness of public places in Kadutu represents both a loss of governance[216] and indifference from residents towards the municipal authorities. This situation is described by Lesbet (1999 in Bouju, 2009, p. 168), who argues the following:

"Mud and refuse perpetuate the dialogue between the 'deaf' governors, who mask their illegitimacy and incapacity when they repeatedly state that 'people are dirty' and a society reduced to silence, on whose behalf the authorities are not even capable of disposing of refuse. This is how the 'dumb' speak to 'deaf' ones by the intermediary of refuse."

Among residents in Kadutu, Bukavu, the disposal of waste in public spaces, at an individual level, is certainly the easiest way to deal with garbage. At a collective level, such disposal can be seen as a form of de facto helplessness and an act of resistance in the form of negligence towards officials who attempt to raise awareness through campaigns (see also Bouju, 2009, p. 168). Since the public spaces in the urban center (Ibanda) are protected and protests are violently (by force or economic means) struck down by authorities, resistance by poorer inhabitants is rather found in more silent modes.

---

[215] That is, land not owned privately but often by the municipality, state agencies or state (as in public land). This land could be industrial areas, rivers or other areas where private houses are not built.
[216] I remind the reader that I see governance as "any organized method of delivering public or collective services and goods according to specific norms (official and practical), and to specific forms of authority" (Olivier de Sardan, 2009a, p. 4).

From a provider's point of view, there were concerns regarding the use of public spaces, such as main roads, for small businesses, housing and markets. Broadly, this was seen as abuse and neglect by certain inhabitants and a source of frustration for the authorities in the urban road construction company (OVD), the water agency (REGIDESO) as well as for intellectuals. These authorities' and intellectuals' use of the terms "anarchic" or "anarchy" was a way of explaining the perceived negligence of city dwellers. Bukavu's mayor told me that he wanted to visit mayors in Europe to learn about their order and use of urban space.[217] His perception of the citizens of Bukavu was that they were unable or unwilling to keep the city clean (*propre*) and that it was noisy, specifically referring to drivers using the car horn (*klaxon*).[218] His dream of a European style urban space demonstrated, in my view, an authority far removed from the people he was representing. At the same time, authority figures positioned lower down the hierarchy, such as in the municipal sub-offices (*Bourgmestre* and *Chefs de Quartiers*) in Kadutu, expressed empathy with citizens in their need for waste services. Thus, there were variations in provider-consumer relations in perceptions of using or abusing "public space" depending on a provider's position and proximity to consumers.

Another practice, namely *dauhoulage*, can also to some extent be seen as a form of state resistance by subjects in Bukavu. At an individual, daily level, such practices can certainly also be seen simply as opportunities of acquiring electricity when people are disconnected in their private homes. Arguably, electricity is a desired good that demands some minimum engagement from the state, i.e., as a regulator and potential financial source for developing infrastructure. In the DRC, the electricity agency (SNEL) is still state-owned (state monopoly) though transitioning to neo-liberal modes of operating (i.e., shareholder ownership and investment from multilateral investment funds). However, many potential foreign investors in hydroelectricity in the DRC fear corruption and, moreover, there is a lack of financial incentives (income) to invest. Thus, and for the foreseeable future, it is likely that SNEL will continue to operate in a parastatal mode.

SNEL is thus closely associated with "the state" seen as the central government in Kinshasa. This is also why the expression *dauhoulage* is an interesting example of state resistance.

---

[217] Discussion with Mayor Philémon Lutombo Yogolelo, 8 October 2014, Bukavu.
[218] ibid

Dauhoulage can be seen as a form of popular justice to access a highly demanded public good. As such, the expression describes an "act[..] of citizenship" from "those to whom the right to have rights is due" (Isin & Nielsen, 2008, p. 2). The term *dauhoulage* can, thus, be interpreted as a central aspect of the statehood practices employed by the "have-nots". Such popular justice can also find approval from public authorities, especially during election campaigning. Politicians outside the regime will use both the representation of SNEL as a state responsibility and the perspective of social justice for poorer urban dwellers to gain votes. Those positioned in the government standing for re-election can also increase provision of electricity in Bukavu during election campaigns. Provision of and access to electricity can thus be understood as elements of statehood because of the close associational role of this good and "the state", i.e., the central regime in this case.

Third, and finally, the dimension of ideology plays a role in performing and living the state through using languages of stateness and statehood ideals. Language is performative and illuminates how authorities or agents of the state give effect to and shape their actions towards state practices (Rose & Miller, 1992, p. 177). As Hansen and Stepputat (2001, p. 9) argue, "[t]he attribution of stateness to various form of authority also emerges from intense and often localized political struggles over resources, recognition, inclusion, and influence." For instance, *Salongo,* as a term used in the control of the water pump Kaduru in Kadutu, is a way of legitimating agents' positions, ordering and controlling a public good. The volunteers, or *Salongo*, were using languages of stateness inherited from Mobutu's production of state-society relations and nation-building attempts. These state-like agents uphold and enable the existence of a state or state-like representations in controlling a highly demanded public good: Water. These languages demonstrate how images of states and statehood can live on despite a lack of corresponding actual or official state practices and presence. Actors and practices referring to *Salongo* are not necessarily a privatization of the state or state failure, but instead a mode of governance that adapts to certain circumstances and facilitates interactions between state and society.

Fin d'heure, as another example, can be interpreted as a term coming from languages of state absence after dark. *Fin d'heure* is not, to my knowledge, "a group" of specific individuals but rather the term represents a multitude of different de facto (discourses of) statehood when "the state" is interpreted as absent. By absent, I do not necessarily claim that they are physically

missing, but rather that there are changes in modes of governance that occur at nightfall. From consumers, the use of the term *Fin d'heure* could be interpreted within frames, such as rumors, moral views on the position of women, fear of urban banditry committed by former rebels, public authorities abusing positions after dark, and sometimes also as a scapegoat expression used by public authorities for criminal activities generally in Bukavu. By the latter, I mean that public authorities can systematically blame external groups that are seen as beyond the control of local politicians or civil servants. From the providers' point of view, *Fin d'heure* could be seen as illegal taxation groups, armed banditry and a problem resulting from two decades of war and conflict. Overall, there is no escaping that the city experiences a near total blackout, with some exceptions relating to nightlife and private properties. *Fin d'heure* can be seen as languages of state absence and enables a space for other groups or public authorities to act somehow differently from the daytime mode of governance. Statehood can thus be interpreted differently depending on night or day and thus shows the dynamics of these relations.

Further, the reproduction and dispute over the idea of a unified statehood plays a key role in the ideology dimension. This is not only "a mythicized abstraction" but it also has effects on reality (Foucault, 1994, p. 23). To be clear, I do not assume that there is an actual degree of unified statehood, e.g., such as the Fragile State Index[219]. Rather, I assume that the representation of a unified statehood plays a role in the creation of the state effect. In one example of unity, the representative at FONER (Chapter 6), the national agency for road taxation, drew not only on symbolic systems (e.g., the idea of taxation to sustain and distribute public goods) but also positioned himself as performing the state ideology of "revolution to modernity." Here, FONER is an interesting example of the aligning of ideological projects with state practices and thus constructing, or at least attempting to construct, a unified state ideal. The FONER representative also drew on the Congolese constitution as well as relations to other state-like agencies of road construction and security. Through these languages of stateness, he combined de jure and de facto dimensions of statehood and by talking also constructed a *raison d'état*. Through agents like him, the state is being produced as a unified ideal and comes "into being by stating what [the state] should be" (Bourdieu, 1999, p. 71).

---

[219] Previously known as Failed State Index, it is a measurement developed by The Fund for Peace that indicates "high risk" states. Accessible at http://library.fundforpeace.org/fsi

In another example, *Forces-vives*[220] representatives portrayed an opposing image of the state's interest in fractioned, rather than unified, statehood. As one representative argued: "[The state authorities] don't want people to be united, this could be a cause of revolution against their government."[221] From this perspective, state representatives can be interested in maintaining divisions among their populace, by, for example, focusing on ethnic differences and loyalties or external enemies (e.g., *Fin d'heure*, Banyamulenge). Here, creating an image of divisions, both among the populace and "the state" can be seen as a government technology for keeping the masses at bay. Certainly, the DRC has its share of political, linguistic and ethnic cleavages, but the disunity is rather a matter of how these cleavages can be instrumentalized by authorities when confronted with grievances (see also Dorman, Hammett, & Nugent, 2006, p. 9). Ultimately, notions of unified statehood are tied up to broader questions of nationhood, citizenship and belonging. Thus, the dimension of ideology is closely tied to the dimension of distinction, where hierarchies and citizen-subject forms important part of experiencing and living the state. .

In summary, the dimensions of statehood discussed in this chapter illustrate different heuristic approaches to the study of state-society relations, moving beyond debates of what the African state is not. The dimensions are from inductive approaches to statehood based on consumer-provider relations of public goods in Bukavu. These dimensions are also inspired by scholarly debates and heuristic approaches that take empirical statehood as an analytical starting point (e.g., Bierschenk & Olivier de Sardan, 2014; Hagmann & Péclard, 2010). The different aspects of the three dimensions (distinctions, spatial and ideology) form a patchwork of angles to study de facto statehood in contested spaces. Rather than what is missing, I argue that the state can be seen as different categories of practices and analyzed through those "living" and "performing" the state. These dimensions represent abstract and concrete, as well as ideal and material, forms of social processes that produce and reproduce statehood in Bukavu and beyond.

---

[220] Forces-vives is a network that works with private investigators for the return of stolen goods, discussed in Chapter 6 on public roads. Forces-vives represents both consumers in demanding better rights and improved services by the public authorities but also engages with authorities and offers assistance to citizens.
[221] Interview with Hugo Guy Luwese, 21 October 2014, Bukavu.

8.3 Concluding remarks

In this chapter, I have represented public good provision and consumption in modes of governance and citizen-subjects' divisions, respectively, as an inductive approach from empirical observations in Bukavu. Moreover, and in order to show the dynamic forms of statehood, I have discussed dimensions as ways of approaching patterns of different practices and ideas connected to state-society relations. The three dimensions discussed in this chapter are structures produced and reproduced in mundane social process I argue to constitute "statehood". I further argue that the state comes into being through these structures, both in abstract and concrete forms. Regarding abstract forms, I have discussed for instance specters of the state, modernity, hierarchies and languages of statehood as part of the state effect. Regarding concrete forms, I have discussed disconnections and connections to public services and the ways in which marginalized individuals circumnavigate the state to enjoy, provide and control services.

Rather than assuming state weakness and a lack of authorities, norms and rules, I argue that there are rather a plurality of competing structures and divisions that challenge but also reinforce de facto statehood. As Abrams (1988, p. 79) argued, "the state is the unified symbol of an actual disunity." Thus, there is no unity in practices but rather a plurality of practices that make up what may be called "the state." Here, the power of the service providers should not be underestimated. This micro-study of provider-consumer interactions shows not only how these public service providers cope, but also how parallel systems can co-exist and operate in the same arena (Lund, 2006a; Olivier de Sardan, 2014). Even for the most neglected public good, namely waste management, there are different (local) providers (networks or companies) that act to redress the deficiencies in overall management from the municipality. Regarding public roads, there are multiple public institutions in place in charge of constructing and controlling roads with varying degrees of access to international resources and of domestic cooperation. For water and electricity, the state practices and performances were largely observed to be a state monopoly.

Furthermore, there were practices of service providers from the same national institutions that cooperated in a patronage system with consumers at street-level, such as the neighborhood connections to electricity and water for instance, or at the elite level, through private deals on

the same services. Patterns of clientelism are evident, i.e., unequal control over resources that allows certain exchanges between patron and clients to take place. Yet, these practices can be seen through a broader understanding of divided cities and dimensions of statehood in order to capture analytically a fuller picture of state and state-like practices. Instead, the modern state effect of establishing a binary rule of the state as an ideological entity on one hand, and the society on the other, creates structural effects as to who is considered within the state's responsibility.

There exists also a reassertion of the state in these case studies through the resources and repertoires available for new investments in the public sector and the public-private partnership to enhance service provision (ideally). This is not a unitary process with coherent norms, funding and procedures. Rather, it is made up of a patchwork of different elements including official norms, adaptive strategies and practical norms within relational and economic dimensions (Olivier de Sardan, 2014, pp. 415, 417). All these actors within, at the interface and outside the bureaucratic apparatus make use of an ideal form of the territorial state system (Hagmann & Péclard, 2010, pp. 542-543).

Moreover, and perhaps more powerful is the very notion of the state and what it should be that lives on through imaginative force. For instance, the Congolese in Bukavu often joke about the inability of the political leadership, the various infrastructure problems and lack of public goods, but I have so far not encountered anyone opposing the state as an institutional arrangement or proposing an alternative, stateless society. For any society, sticking to what is familiar is often more palatable than upheaval, thus stepping into the unknown. This also implies a powerful idea that state presence is an essential part of social order in the everyday lives of Congolese citizens and this idea, though far removed from the outcomes of 'normative' state practices, is an imaginative force not to be underestimated.

9.0 Conclusion

This thesis has attempted to move away from a limited understanding of de facto statehood in Africa (i.e., whether it exists or does not) to reflecting on various dimensions of statehood. The thesis started with a criticism of political science literature that has considered certain states in sub-Saharan Africa to be weak, failed or collapsed. Neopatrimonialism and clientelism are closer to bridging theoretical debates to empirical practices. However, it is problematic that Western experiences are used as the main historical sources in discussion of African state experiences. Moreover, the assumption of *de jure* but not *de facto* statehood, or negative but not positive sovereignty, in some African states, such as the DRC, has inspired me to work on de facto statehood. Instead of abstract and decontextualized models of statehood, I have argued that a starting point for analysis could be to observe how statehood is performed on a daily basis in Africa. I have argued that the state can be seen as practices, created, sustained and challenged, through the people living and performing the experience of statehood.

Rather than making prescriptive, normative claims about how states should appear, or who should provide public goods, I have investigated those living and performing the state in the variety of practices, ideas and performances. These were examined through observations of the daily negotiations over certain public goods (i.e., waste management, water and electricity, and public roads). I have examined the perceptions of service providers and consumers vis-à-vis each other and their expectations, such as perceptions and claims on duties and rights. Through these case studies, it was possible to study how certain consumers were connected to public state provision, while others were disconnected and considered to be on the margins of the state (anarchic subjects). This shows how "political rationalities and governmental technologies" (Rose & Miller, 1992, pp. 175-176), such as infrastructure and service provisions, are issues that divide and connect citizens and subjects within the same state. Thus, people experience statehood differently in the same shared space and understanding these experiences are important for deeper engagement with those living and performing the state. People also experience statehood differently based on the historical context. Moreover, this research was conducted in a period of relative peace in Bukavu (not the region as such) and in between two national elections. Elections and war can intensify the experience of statehood, such as intensifying the dimension of distinction (e.g. citizen-subject, hierarchies of belonging and

exclusion). Thus, this type of research is highly influenced by the dynamics of statehood, namely the changing character of state-society relations over time.

Moreover, the numerous stakeholders in national agencies, municipal authorities and bureaucrats complicate the image of de facto statehood relations. There is no dominant framework of "state-building" or a dictatorial leader, which is rarely or ever the case, and hence different political processes are taking place in negotiating what are public goods and how they should be provided. Thus, there is a need "to problematize the relationship between the translocality of "the state" and the necessarily localized offices, institutions, and practices in which it is instantiated", as Gupta (1995, pp. 375-376) argues. These processes differ widely in character. One aspect is the local, contextual innovations, such as recycling of waste, offering forms of security and insurances at major public road junctions or the presence of "Fin d'heure". Other processes are of national and international character, such as the privatization of the water agency, and road and energy infrastructures. In between these processes are (state) authorities attempting to position themselves locally, nationally and internationally. Despite their translocality, these authorities and various agencies are also part of creating the state effect, because the distinctiveness of the modern state is that it appears as an apparatus separate from the social world (Mitchell, 1999). However, these individuals also compete, disassociate and/or negotiate with each other and the populace, and this also shows the dynamic and negotiable space of statehood. These encounters and practices are key to understand "the state" as engrained in daily life: a state that creates structural effects on those "living" the state. As such, it is from my epistemological perspective fruitless to characterize the state as consisting of institutions, public authorities and bureaucrats in a singular model labelled "failed" or "weak".

Moreover, the citizens and subjects of Bukavu, encountered in focus group discussions, all engaged in discussing "the state". Often, the state was considered an entity, an "it" or an actor. Yet, these understandings of the state, as categories of practices, varied: the state was understood variously as the president, the regime, the municipality, the multiple forms of public service providers, and it was also found in relations to the Rwandan government. This demonstrates, I argue, that the "African state" is not a blank spot, an "empty shell" (cf. Chabal & Daloz, 1999), but rather a variety of practices, in which ordinary citizens hold relations of connections and disconnections. Moreover, these varied understandings of the state derive

precisely from the challenge of viewing the state as a coherent, singular entity. This is not to say that categories of practices refuse the term "it" when it comes to an understanding of the state. On the contrary, the state is often considered an entity in practice, although there are widely different interpretations of what "it" contains. Rather, the discourses described here showed varied understandings and multiple layers of the "it" [the state] when it comes to perceptions, emphasis and "situated knowledges" (Haraway, 1988). The following lays out the theoretical, empirical, political and methodological contributions of this thesis.

9.1 Theoretical contribution

Political science terminology is largely bound to political experience from the Western hemisphere (Sartori, 1970, p. 1034). This terminology, I argue, limits engagement with the actual practices of state and state-like representatives and ordinary citizens in daily modes of de facto statehood. The terminology of failure, weakness and also de jure but not de facto statehood can be seen as "a function of measurement instead of methodology, thereby detaching ontological questions and the implications thereof," as Hampel (2015, p. 10) argues. For instance, instead of state "failure", there are reasons to consider conceptual failure in what traditional political science considers to be de facto statehood. In my interpretation, statehood is a dynamic process with no particular end or beginning. Fostering and nurturing relations of reciprocity in statehood relations, for instance, does not reach an ultimate level in practice. This insight has been recognized in studies of institutions, bureaucracies and street-level bureaucrats on the global North but is yet to be developed on a similar scale regarding the global South (Bierschenk & Olivier de Sardan, 2014, pp. 35-36). Thus, this thesis contributes theoretically to enriching and balancing understandings of statehood in the global South.

Further, this thesis has contributed to an emerging literature on dynamic forms of statehood, authority and "the state" in Africa (e.g., Hagmann & Péclard, 2011; Lund, 2006; Olivier de Sardan, 2014). The abundance of political science literature on the "African state" has remained surprisingly silent on the detailed day-to-day matters of public servants and actual practices of public good provision (Blundo, 2006, p. 799). My theoretical contribution is thus to nuance and complicate state practices when it comes to the daily governance of public goods. But more than analyzing the control and management practices of these goods, I also contribute to a relational approach to understanding citizens' own perspectives and practices of dealing with agents of the state or state-like actors in accessing and enjoying public goods.

However, by choosing a single site, however diverse, for empirical work (Bukavu), it is not possible to develop a 'general' theory on de facto statehood that can be applied to other settings. Instead, I positioned my thesis as a building block study (George & Bennett, 2005, p. 76) to study dimensions of statehood and to identify patterns of public goods provision and consumption. The research conducted offers an insight into an area of contested and transforming political order, which is often assumed to be a site of severe state weakness. On the contrary, governance in Bukavu demonstrated an authoritarian character, a density of formal and competing arrangements of public goods provision and connected and disconnected citizenship. I argue that the state is not an empty shell but establishes modes of governance in relation to public good provision and consumption. By distinguishing goods and their modes of governance, it is possible to find sites of states (location and form), citizen-state and subject-state relations, negotiations and disconnections. These modes are dynamic and citizens will negotiate and have expectations to accessing different public goods. I argue also, then, that despite the challenges of public goods provision, the state can show remarkable resilience and dominance in the public sphere.

Finally, the dimensions of statehood, seen through public good provision and consumption, can serve as a heuristic tool for understanding the complex and multiple practices of the state. The state, often considered or imagined as a coherent entity (the state effect), is different practices found in a variety of spaces and social relations. This approach shifts focus away from pre-conceived norms of statehood to an engagement with empirical observations to de facto statehood. In this thesis, I discussed elements of urban colonial design and international borders (spatial dimension), hierarchies of control and citizen-subjects (dimension of distinction), languages of stateness and unified ideals of statehood (ideology dimension) . Dimensions of distinction and ideology may be considered across a variety of spaces and time, while the spatial dimension is of a more context specific nature. In addition, these dimensions are seen in relation to each other. For instance, issues of urban colonial design have effects on inclusion and exclusion rationales of citizen-subject debates, such as dividing urban architecture and interpretations of who deserves citizenship status. However, this is not a static situation but rather dynamic and negotiable modes that creates statehood relations in the city. There may also be a number of other dimensions that are relevant for understanding statehood, which is why I consider my approach to statehood to be heuristic.

In sum, the theoretical contribution of this thesis is to move away from interpreting African states according to a master narrative of Western states and decontextualized models, and instead offer an interpretive way of seeing the state as practices, created, sustained and challenged, through the people who experience statehood first hand. Such an approach is different from starting with ideal-types defined by territorial integrity, the control of borders or the monopoly on legitimate use of force: a starting point that often leads to assumptions of failure or weakness. Instead, this thesis has demonstrated empirical versions of statehood through daily needs, provision and meanings of public goods in an urban space with a density of polities.

9.2 Empirical and political contribution

Here, the empirical observations contribute to area studies of the DRC and, more broadly, hold comparative and general value. The DRC has attracted numerous students and scholars studying peacekeeping (Autesserre, 2010), conflicts and violence (Baaz & Stern, 2009; Vlassenroot & Raeymaekers, 2008), hybrid political order (Meagher, 2012) and, earlier, nation-building (Lemarchand, 1964), neo-patrimonial forms of governance (Callaghy, 1984; Willame, 1972) and state decay (Young & Turner, 1985). Thus, my research contributes to a country that has received substantial scholarly attention, although from various perspectives and where many contemporary studies have revolved around violence and conflicts. I aim to contribute also to this growing body of work, though with an emphasis on the "everyday", as a contrast to a focus on rebel groups, violent conflict or peacekeeping.

There are also certain urban spaces and central towns that have attracted scholars on topics related to this thesis, although Bukavu has tended to receive less attention among scholars, who favor Goma, Lubumbashi or the mega-city Kinshasa (e.g., de Boeck & Plissart, 2004; Trefon, 2010). The recent and dramatic history of Congo (see Chapter 4), however, makes Bukavu and other "state-dense" areas a fascinating point of departure for (re)negotiating statehood (cf. Hagmann & Péclard, 2010). Thus, this thesis contributes empirically both to area studies of the DRC, but also holds comparative value to other empirical sites where statehood is intensely contested due to various factors, such as violent conflicts, state decay and reassertion, and economic difficulties.

Second, and as a note of caution, when describing and analyzing empirical observations from the eastern DRC, a first step is to be self-aware of normative labels of Western forms of statehood. As stated in the introduction, this does not mean to reject Western statehood as a whole and completely immerse oneself in "pure" Congolese politics. On the contrary, the many forms of interpreting, performing and living the state in the DRC are made up of a variety of statehood knowledge and practices. Rather, descriptions and analyses beginning with and conflating labels, such as "failed", "collapsed", "weak" and "failing" (see especially Englebert, 2009, pp. 41-42), are not only negative but also call for explanations of what these labels are referring to, in what domains, in which relations and across what space and time. I have in the conduct of the fieldwork and in presenting the empirical observations made a more open inquiry to avoid these labels. This, however, does not mean that I am somehow "objective" to the research, as I agree with Lund (2014, p. 226) in that scholars establish frames of inquiry through particular (abstract) language, such as "state", "public goods" or "citizens". Rather, the aim of my empirical research is to avoid using pervasively negative descriptions formed by normative assumptions of an ideal type of state and rather inquire empirically through using certain conceptual frames.

Third, when it comes to comparative value, Bukavu is a regional exception and generalizations made, based on my empirical observations there, cannot be automatically applied to rural or semi-rural areas. For instance, the agencies SNEL and REGIDESO and municipal representatives are urban phenomena. Instead, the comparability of Bukavu relates to either urban centers in the DRC where public good provision agencies are based, or in different African cities. However, a comparative approach can also be made to statehood in areas primarily governed by, for instance, chiefs, particular armed groups and/or religious authorities (e.g., Hoffmann & Vlassenroot, 2014; Raeymaekers, 2014). Further, the individual topics of, for instance, access to water and control over public roads could be further explored in almost infinite number of places. The analytical approach of this thesis could also act as a heuristic framework for studying public goods, contributing to broad ideas of state-society relations and statehood. Thus, and even though Bukavu and all the specific set of events studied may be particular of the area, it is possible to apply a similar approach to other spaces.

Fourth, the analytical value of the empirical data is to demonstrate how the same issue, e.g., access to water, can be a matter of intense negotiations, claims and rights, showing a pattern of dynamic relations across different goods, subjects and time. I have termed these patterns

"statehood" but they are not limited to formal state structures. Statehood can rather be seen as patterns of social relations, practices and political processes. Some of these patterns can be very concrete, such as the practice of attaching cables to electricity wires. However, they can also be interpreted as acts of state resistance, depending on context. Other patterns, such as the description of certain inhabitants as "anarchic", are discussed here more in abstract forms of ideal civic relations, "modern" statehood and colonial modes of governance. These patterns, whether daily practices or more abstract issues, contribute to relational and interpretive approaches to de facto statehood. That is, the empirical findings, ranging from taxing usage of public roads, dumping waste, fetching water in Funu and administrating electricity provision, are "observable, empirical elements signifying different aspects of the 'whole'" (Lund, 2014, p. 228), which in this case means understanding dimensions of statehood.

Finally, there are also political implications of my research. Many of the daily issues in Bukavu, such as waste management or access to water and electricity, remain largely neglected in contemporary state and political studies of the DRC (some exceptions include Muhunduka, 2010; Mwacan & Trefon, 2005; Titeca & de Herdt, 2011; Trefon, 2010). This is puzzling as these topics are of concern to most, if not all, citizens and service providers in Bukavu. For instance, the mismanagement of waste and relatedly lack of safe water sources have major implications for public health. As noted by the medical doctor[222] in Chapter 5 (p. 133), the annual onset of the rainy season in September often brings outbreaks of cholera and typhoid fever, and also a raised chance of contracting malaria. Moreover, and from a political perspective, the neoliberal transition to a market controlled water agency is deeply concerning in a city with a high urban poverty rate and limited institutional regulatory bodies. The considerable confusion regarding the water agency's continuing "parastatal" status (it is owned and regulated still by the government) may imply that these privatization transitions are not well communicated for politically sensitive reasons. As a researcher, trying to understand these regulations, it was rather by chance that I discovered that this transition in ownership was taking place. Based on my observation, access to water may develop into a private good for paying clients, which deserves broader political attention.

Moreover, political projects such as *Cinq Chantiers* carry a particular exclusionist logic, where irregular houses and stalls are torn down to make way for "modern" constructions and

---

[222] Categorized under focus group of male consumers living in Ibanda.

infrastructure. The irregular houses and stalls torn down are in effect described by *Article 15*; to cope or manage to survive, which can be labelled "informal economy" (de Boeck, 2011, see also Chapter 6, p. 156). This exclusionist logic also hits women hard as they are often the ones running small businesses along the main roads. This is not a one-way process, however, as *Cinq Chantiers* was a political campaign with appeal to many Congolese who would like to see improvements in all the domains that can be described as "public work". Rather, such projects, and the de facto realization of these projects (road work and the clearing of houses), are worrying for many fearful of losing their homes and businesses. These and many other concerns observed empirically are part of the urgency of public goods, both in terms of needs and quality of delivery.

9.3 Methodological contribution

By emphasizing the living and the performing of the state, part of the methodological contribution here is the interpretive approach. This approach emphasizes meanings, beliefs, and discourses that may provide scholars with tools to find novel ways of understanding traditional social and political science topics, such as "the state", "citizens" and "public goods". Rather than seeking correlations, laws or deduction, I emphasize the position and perception of those being researched as well as my own analytical interpretation of these perspectives and observations. Within the interpretive approach, I follow the importance of relational approaches as a way to understand how "units" or subjects studied involved in transactions with other units or subjects derive their meaning, identity and being from these transactions (Emirbayer, 1997). I have argued that consumers and providers must be seen as beings in relations, such as in a group, a community, a city and/or a state. By taking a relational approach, consumer-provider practices and ideas demonstrate different modes of governance structures and (dis)connections to services of interest. These relational roles are dynamic and changing rather than a priori formed, and thus being a service provider or consumer depends on relational roles.

My interpretive approach is aimed at understanding meanings, beliefs and discourses from subjects being studied and from there developing an analysis of these perspectives from my interpretations, using both theoretical literature and empirical observations. Conceptually, the thesis has contributed to a different way of studying public goods provision and consumption. Rather than defining these goods as 'non-excludable' and 'non-rivalrous', a broader

understanding is needed to capture realities and practices in their daily forms. Public goods are seen as such because they address common needs, and, in turn, require control, management and delivery by service providers. Thus, I do not make claims regarding a priori functions, positions or provision of these goods but rather take an inductive approach to empirical observations.

Furthermore, categories of analysis and categories of practices, inspired by Bourdieu, are also highly valuable to empirical studies on statehood and "the state". Conceptually, these categories enable researchers consciously to distinguish between and compare topics and perceptions raised by those being studied (categories of practices) and the researcher's analytical perceptions (categories of analysis). As such, abstract theoretical fields of "state" or "statehood" can be examined empirically in a hands-on, specific manner. This enables researchers to move back and forth between the idea of a unified state as a binary order vis-a-vis society (state effect) and the numerous practices, perceptions and ideals that exist empirically.

Eriksen (2011) argued that the state can be considered categories of practices, not of analysis, and hence researchers can analyze the idea of state (categories of practices) with actual state practices. Epistemologically, this is a useful way of operationalizing "the state", which consists of a range of different actors, history, translocality, ideology and practices. However, at a sub-level of the state, I also consider categories of analysis based on observed categories of practices as valuable to comparative analysis and broader theory-building. The theoretical literature has offered useful terms for analysis (e.g., modes of governance or citizens-subjects), while the content of individual modes or relations is based on empirical observations. Thus, studies on statehood can enjoy both already the heuristic approaches already established, while also allowing for the flexibility and dynamics of contextual interpretations of the same topic.

Appendix 1.0 List of fieldwork participants

The shaded in orange are participants representing «consumers» of public services, i.e. people who were interviewed on the basis of how they were able to access and enjoy public goods. Most of the other informants are either representing an agency or a form of service provision. Finally, there are others representing intellectuals (university students and lecturers), NGOs, reporters and donors to gain further insight into the case interest.

Who	Position/role	Place	Date of interview
1. Bercky Masheka Zihindula	Congolese PhD candidate (degree from South Africa)	Meeting in a restaurant, Ibanda, Bukavu	9.3.2012
2. *Anonymous*	Coordination officer in MONSUCO (the UN operation)	Meeting at MONUSCO headquarters, Ibanda, Bukavu	10.3.2012
3. Solange Lusiku Nsimire	Chief editor of independent newspaper *Le Souverain*	Meeting in her office of *Le Souverain*, Ibanda, Bukavu	22.3.2012
4. Pacifique Mulirci	Head of youth organization *Jeunes Reporteurs de Congo*	Meeting in a bar in Ibanda, Bukavu	22.3.2012
5. Innocent Utshudi	Congolese PhD candidate	Meeting in my resident at the time, Ibanda, Bukavu.	23.3.2012
6. *Anonymous*	Military Attache	Meeting in a restaurant, Ibanda, Bukavu	28.3.2012
7. Youth (mixed) in Ibanda	Preliminary focus group (pilot study)	Meeting in a bar in Bukavu	5.4.2012
8. Claude Byamungu	Local NGO (AAP SUD KIVU- ASBL) developing and supporting local state in service provision	Meeting in his office, Ibanda, Bukavu	11.4.2012
9. Youth (mixed) in Ibanda	Preliminary focus group (pilot study)	Meeting in a bar in Ibanda, Bukavu	23.4.2012
10. Déo Mashali	Head of administration, SNEL	Meeting in his office, Ibanda, Bukavu	12.09.2013
11. *Anonymous*	Main technician at SNEL (*Chef de Département Technique*)	Meeting at Ruzizi I power station, Ibanda, Bukavu	12.09.2013
12. Daniel Kasereka,	Head of REGIDESO's Kahele station (main water reserve for Bukavu)	Meeting at Kahele water reserve, in Kabare territory, South Kivu	12.09.2013

13. Albert Tsongo	Head of the Technical Division (*Chef de Division Technique*) at the Road Office (*Office de Route*)	Meeting in his office, border zone Ibanda/Kadutu, Bukavu	13.09.2013
14. Justin Musaka Bahati	President of ACCO	Meeting in his office, near place d'Independence, Ibanda, Bukavu.	24.09.2013
15. Taxi drivers (*anonymous*)	Focus groups discussion (consumers)	Meeting in a bar, next to taxi station near place d'Independence, Kadutu/Ibanda border, Bukavu	24.09.2013
16. Ezekiel Mwomera	Hygienic Sanitation Office at the Central Market in Kadutu (*Assainissement Hygiénique Marché Central de Kadutu)*	Meeting in his office, Kadutu central market, Bukavu.	25.09.2013
17. Women in Kadutu	Stall workers at the Central Market in Kadutu (*Marché Central de Kadutu)*, focus groups and individual interviews	Meeting in their stalls, different locations around the market, Kadutu, Bukavu.	25.-26.09.2013
18. *Anonymous,* waste workers	Waste workers hired through the Central Market in Kadutu (*Assainissement Hygiénique marché central de Kadutu)*	Meeting in the Mwomera's office (16), (*Assainissement Hygiénique marché central de Kadutu),* Kadutu, Bukavu	26.09.2013
19. Three master students	Working on public health and sanitiation issues, *l'Université Officielle de Bukavu*	Meeting in a restaurant in Ibanda, Bukavu.	1.10.2013
20. Mr. Shiko	City Hall (*Mairie de ville*), Head of Urban division (*Chef de Division Urbaine*)	Meeting in his office in the City Hall, Ibanda, Bukavu	2.10.2014
21. Gregoire Shamvu	*Pharmakina*, Head of technical department (*Chef de Département Technique*)	Meeting in his office at Pharmakina, Bagira, Bukavu	2.10.2014
22. Raphaël Mutikiv	City Hall, Second Bureau (*IIe bureau*)	Meeting in his office in the City Hall, Ibanda, Bukavu	3.10.2014
23. Women in Kadutu	Citizens (consumers) in focus group discussion	Meeting in the home of one of the women in Kadutu, Bukavu	4.10.2014

24. Hamuli Theodore Muzalia	SONAS (insurance), assistent chief of office	Meeting in his office, Sonas, Ibanda, Bukavu	6.10.2014
25. Philémon Lutombo Yogolelo	Mayor of Bukavu (Maire de Bukavu)	Meeting in his office in the City Hall, Ibanda, Bukavu	8.10.2014
26. Alain Tshimbalanga Ntambwe	OVD, provincial director (*directeur provincial*)	Meeting in his office, border zone Ibanda/Kadutu, Bukavu	8.10.2014
27. Dieudonné Kuburhamwa Ngaboyeka	FONER, director general	Meeting in his office, Ibanda, Bukavu	8.10.2014
28. Youth in Kadutu	Citizens (consumers) in focus group discussion	Meeting in a bar in Kadutu, Bukavu	8.10.2014
29. Severin Magangu Matabaro	Cabinet director (*Directeur de Cabinet*) of the governor in South Kivu (*Gouverneur de la Province*). Also former professor working on land rights in the Kivus.	Meeting in his office, Ibanda, Bukavu	9.10.2014
30. Youth in Ibanda	Citizens (consumers) in focus group discussion	Meeting in a bar/restaurant in Ibanda, Bukavu	9.10.2014
31. Men in Kadutu	Citizens (consumers) in focus group discussion	Meeting in *Coopera*, a public place and bar in Kadutu, Bukavu	9.10.2014
32. Funu volunteers (*Salongo*)	Volunteers working for the control of the water pump *Funu* in Kadutu	Funu water pump, Kadutu, Bukavu.	10.10.2014
33. Men in Ibanda	Citizens (consumers) in focus group discussion	Meeting in two different bars in Ibanda, Bukavu	14.10.2014 & 21.10.2014
34. Robert Njangala & Hugo Guy Luwese	SAJECEK/Forces-vives, President of SAJECEK & Executive secretary General	Meeting in their office in Kadutu, Bukavu.	21.10.2014
35. Eric Mabanze Moligi	Representative of the *Bukavu Forces-vives* in Kadutu connected to the governor's office	Meeting in their office, near the central market of Kadutu, Bukavu.	21.10.2014
36. Asani Fungomukaba	*Chef d'Avenue* Virunga/Nyamugo	Meeting at *Bukavu Forces-vives* office, Kadutu, Bukavu.	21.10.2014
37. Paul Jean-Marie Koabashi	Head of administration (*Chef de Bureau*) at the Bourgmestre office (*Commune de Kadutu)*	Meeting with both in Koabashi's office in	22.10.2014

38. Jean de Dieu Tchalumba Olomwene	Environmental supervisor at the Bourgmestre office (*Superviseur de l'enviornnement*)	*Commune de Kadutu*, Bukavu.	
39. Jean-Mari Kazunguzibwa Viancy	Lecturer at *L'Institut Supérieur Pédagogique de Bukavu* (ISP) in political history of the Congo	Meeting in his office at ISP, Ibanda, Bukavu	22.10.2014
40. Douglas Dunia Mukome	Bourgmestre in Ibanda	Meeting in his office (*Commune de Bukavu*), Ibanda, Bukavu.	24.10.2014
41. Deo Katwanyi Kabika	Head of a local NGO named *Initiatives et Actions pour le developpement local* (IADL)	Meeting in his office, border zone Ibanda/Kadutu, Bukavu.	28.10.2014
42. Maneno Swedy	Head of administration and finance at REGIDESO, (*chef de Division administrative et financière*)	Meeting in his office, Ibanda, Bukavu.	16.09.2013 and 28.10.2014
43. Augustin Rukomeza Chahihobwa	Head of the Environmental Office, (*Chef du Bureau, Le Service de l'environnement et conservation de la nature*) City Hall.	Meeting in his office, Ibanda, Bukavu.	19.09.2013 and 28.10.2014
44. Mwami Desiré Rugemaninzi II	Local king (*mwami, Chef de chefferie*) Kabare	Meeting in his office, Kabare territory, South Kivu.	29.10.2014
45. Deo Kwasa	Head of District (*Chef du quartier)*, Nyalukemba, Ibanda	Meeting in his office, Ibanda, Bukavu.	30.10.2014
46. Marcelin Ramazani	Head of District (*Chef du quartier)*, Kasali, Kadutu	Meeting in his office, Kadutu, Bukavu.	30.10.2014
47. Women in Ibanda	Focus group, conducted by research assistant Jonathan Magoma	Bethel Church, Ibanda, Bukavu	30.11.2014

Bibliography

Abrams, P. (1988). Notes on the Difficulty of Studying the State (1977). *Journal of Historical Sociology, 1*(1), 58-89.

Abu-Lughod, L. (1989). Zones of Theory in the Anthropology of the Arab World. *Annual Review of Anthropology, 18*(1), 267-306.

Adalbert Hampel, K. (2015). The dark(er) side of 'state failure': state formation and socio-political variation. *Third World Quarterly*, 1-20.

Autesserre, S. (2010). *The Trouble with the Congo: Local Violence and the Failure of International Peacebuilding*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Ayimpam, S. (2014). *Economie de la Débrouille à Kinshasa. Informalité, Commerce et Réseaux Sociaux*. Paris: Karthala.

Baaz, M. E., & Stern, M. (2009). Why Do Soldiers Rape? Masculinity, Violence, and Sexuality in the Armed Forces in the Congo (DRC). *International Studies Quarterly, 53*(2), 495-518.

Babbie, E. (2015). *The Practice of Social Research*. Beimont, CA: Cengage Learning.

Bach, D. C. (2012). Patrimonialism and neopatrimonialism: Comparative receptions and transcriptions In D. C. bach & M. Gazibo (Eds.), *Neopatrimonialism in Africa and Beyond*. London: Routledge.

Baer, M. (2008). The Global Water Crisis, Privatization, and the Bolivian Water War. In J. M. Whiteley, H. Ingram & R. W. Perry (Eds.), *Water, Place, and Equity* (pp. 195-224). Cambridge, Massachusetts MIT Press.

Bardhan, P., & Ray, I. (2008a). Economists, Anthropologists, and the Consted Commons. In P. Bardhan & I. Ray (Eds.), *The contested commons : conversations between economists and anthropologists*. Malden: Blackwell Publishing.

Bardhan, P., & Ray, I. (Eds.). (2008b). *The contested commons : conversations between economists and anthropologists*. Maldon Blackwell.

Bates, R. H. (2008). *When Things Fell Apart: State Failure in Late-Century Africa*. Cambridge Cambridge University Press.

Bates, R. H., Greif, A., Levi, M., & Rosenthal, J.-L. (1998). *Analytic Narratives*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Baumer, G. (1939). *Les centres indigènes extracoutumiers au Congo Belge*. Paris: Domat-Montchrestien

Bayart, J.-F. (1993). *The State in Africa: The Politics of the Belly* (Vol. 2). London: Longman.

Bayart, J.-F., Mbembe, J.-A., & Toulabor, C. M. (1992). *Le politique par le bas en Afrique noire*. Paris: Karthala.

Bayart, J.-F., Mbembe, J.-A., & Toulabor, C. M. (2008). *Le politique par le bas en Afrique noire*. Paris: Karthala.

Beall, J. (1997). Social capital in waste—a solid investment? *Journal of International Development, 9*(7), 951-961.

Bedner, A. (2010). An Elementary Approach to the Rule of Law. *Hague Journal on the Rule of Law, 2*(01), 48-74.

Berman, B. (1998). Ethnicity, Patronage and the African State. *African Affairs, 97*(388), 305-341.

Berman, B., & Londsdale, J. (2013). Nationalism in colonial and post-colonial Africa. In J. Breuilly (Ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of the History of Nationalism* (pp. 308-317). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Bevir, M., & Rhodes, R. A. W. (2006). Defending Interpretation. *European Political Science, 5*(1), 69-83.

Bierschenk, T. (2014). Sedimentation, fragmentation and normative double-binds in (West) African public services. In T. Bierschenk & J.-P. Olivier de Sardan (Eds.), *States at Work: Dynamics of African Bureaucracies* (pp. 221-245).

Bierschenk, T., & Olivier de Sardan, J.-P. (2014a). Ethnographies of Public Services in Africa: An Emerging Research Paradigm. In T. Bierschenk & J.-P. Olivier de Sardan (Eds.), *States at Work: Dynamics of African Bureaucracies*. Leiden: Brill.

Bierschenk, T., & Olivier de Sardan, J.-P. (2014b). *States at Work: Dynamics of African Bureaucracies*. Leiden: Brill.

Bishikwabo, C. (1980). Le Bushi au XIXe siècle : un peuple, sept royaumes. *Revue française d'histoire d'outre-mer, 67*(246-247), 89-98.

Bissel, W. C. (2011). *Urban Design, Chaos and Colonial Power in Zanzibar*. Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.

Blundo, G. (2006). Dealing with the Local State: The Informal Privatization of Street-Level Bureaucracies in Senegal. *Development and Change, 37*(4), 799-819.

Blundo, G. (2007). Dealing with the Local State: The Informal Privatization of Street-Level Bureaucracues in Senegal. In C. Lund (Ed.), *Twilight Institutions: Public Authority and Local Politics in Africa*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.

Blundo, G., & Le Meur, P.-Y. (2009). *The Governance of Daily Life in Africa: Ethnographic Explorations of Public and Collective Services*. Leiden: Brill.

Boas, M., & Dunn, K. (2013). *Politics of Origin in Africa: Autochthony, Citizenship and Conflict* London: Zed Books.

Boeck, F. D. (2011). Inhabting Ocular Ground: Kinshasa's Future in the Light of Congo's Spectral Urban Politics. *Cultural Anthropology, 26*(2), 263-286.

Boeck, F. D., & Plissart, M.-F. (2004). *Kinshasa: Tales of the Invisible City*. Tervuren: Royal Museum for Central Africa.

Boege, V., & al., e. (2008). *On Hybrid Political Orders and Emerging States: State Formation in the Context of 'Fragility'*. Berlin: Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management.

Borchgrevink, A. (2003). Silencing language: Of anthropologists and interpreters. *Ethnography, 4*(1), 95-121.

Bouju, J. (2009). Urban dwellers, Politicians and Dirt: An Anthropology of Everyday Governance in Dobo-Dioulasso (Burkina Faso). In G. Blundo & P. Y. L. Meur (Eds.), *The Governance of Daily Life in Africa: Ethnographic Explorations of Public and Collective Services* (pp. 143-170). Leiden: Brill.

Boulger, D. C. (1898). *The Congo State or The Growth of Civilisation in Central Africa*. London: W. Thacker & Co.

Bourdieu, P. (1999). Rethinking the State: Genesis and Structure of the Bureaucratic Field (L. J. D. Wacquant & S. Farage, Trans.). In G. Steinmetz (Ed.), *State/Culture: State-Formation after the Cultural Turn*. Ithaca & London: Cornell University Press.

Bourdieu, P. ([1990] 1997). *The Logic of Practice* (R. Nice, Trans.). Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd.

Bourdieu, P. ([1979] 1984). *Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste* (R. Nice, Trans.) Boston, MA: Harvard University Press.

Brenner, N. (2004). *New State Spaces: Urban Governance and the Rescaling of Statehood*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Brubaker, R., & Cooper, F. (2000). Beyond 'Identity'. *Theory and Society, 29*(1), 1-47.

Bruhns, H. (2012). Weber's patrimonial domination and its interpretations In D. C. Bach & M. Gazibo (Eds.), *Neopatrimonialism in Africa and Beyond*. Oxon: Routledge.

Callaghy, T. (1987). The State as Lame Leviathan: The Patrimonial Administrative State in Africa. In Z. Ergas (Ed.), *The African state in transition* Basingstoke Macmillan.

Callaghy, T. M. (1984). *The State-Society Struggle: Zaire in Comparative Perspective*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Capelle, E. (1947). *La Cité Indigène de Léopoldville*. Léopoldville (Congo Belge): Le Centre d'Etudes Sociales Africaines.

CEPA. (May 2014). Report of the development results of EU Africa ITF 2007-2012. In C. E. P. Associates (Ed.): European Investment Bank (EIB).

Chabal, P., & Daloz, J. P. (1999). *Africa Works: Disorder As Political Instrument*. London: International African Institute.

Chakrabarty, D. (2000). *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference*. Princeton Princeton University Press.

Clapham, C. (1998). Degrees of statehood. *Review of International Studies, 24*(02), 143-157.

Congo, R. D. d. (February 2006). *Constitution de la Republique Democratique du Congo*. Kinshasa: Assemblee Nationale

Conrad, J. (1902). *Heart of Darkness*. Dover Publications, Incorporated.

Dahl, G. (1999). On consuming and being consumed. In R. Fardon, W. van Binsbergen & R. van Dijk (Eds.), *Modernity on a Shoestring: Dimensions of globalization, consumption and development in Africa and beyond* (pp. 13-32). Leidon & London: European Inter-University Development Opporutnies Study Group (EIDOS).

Dahl, R. (1963). *Who governs? Democracy and Power in an American City* (3 ed.). New Haven: Yale University.

Dalakoglou, D., & Harvey, P. (2012). Roads and Anthropology: Ethnographic Perspectives on Space, Time and (Im)Mobility. *Mobilities, 7*(4), 459-465.

De Carvalho, B., Leira, H., & Hobson, J. M. (2011). The Big Bangs of IR: The Myths That Your Teachers Still Tell You about 1648 and 1919. *Millenium, 39*(3), 735-758.

Dembour, M.-B. (2008). *Recalling the Belgian Congo: Conversations and Introspection*. New York & Oxford: Berghahn Books.

Doornbos, M. (2011). Researching African Statehood Dynamics: Negotiability and its Limits. In T. Hagmann & D. Peclard (Eds.), *Negotiating Statehood: Dynamics of Power and Domination in Africa*. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.

Dorman, S., Hammett, D., & Nugent, P. (2006). Introduction: Citizenship and its Causalties in Africa. In S. Dorman, D. Hammett & P. Nugent (Eds.), *Making Nations, Creating Strangers: States and Citizenship in Africa* (pp. 1-26). Leiden: Brill.

Doty, R. L. (2003). *Anti-Immigrantism in Western Democracies: Statecraft, Desire and the Politics of Exclusion*. London: & New York: Routledge.

Dunn, K. (2003). *Imagining the Congo: The International Relations of Identity*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Dunn, K. C. (2010). There is No Such Thing as the State: Discourse, Effect and Performativity. *Forum for Development Studies, 37*(1), 79-92.

Earle, L. (2011). Citizenship, the 'Right to the City' and State Fagility. *Working paper, Crisis States, London*(2).

Ekeh, P. P. (1975). Colonialism and the Two Publics in Africa: A Theoretical Statement. *Comparative Studies in Society and History, 17*(1), 91-112.

Elias, N. (2001). *Society of Individuals: The society of Individuals* (E. Jephchott, Trans.). New York & London: Bloomsbury Publishing.

Emirbayer, M. (1997). Manifesto for a Relational Sociology. *American Journal of Sociology, 103*(2), 281-317.

Englebert, P. (2009). *Africa: Unity, Sovereignty, and Sorrow*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Eriksen, S. S. (2011). 'State failure' in theory and practice: the idea of the state and the contradiction of state formation. *Review of International Studies, 37*(1), 229-247.

Escobar, A. (2011). *Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World*. Princeton Princeton University Press.

Escobar, A., & Alvarez, S. (1992). *The Making of Social Movements in Latin America: Identity, Strategy, and Democracy*. Boulder: Westview Press.

Fairhead, J. (1992). Paths of authority: Roads, the state and the market in Eastern Zaire. *The European Journal of Development Research, 4*(2), 17-35.

Fall, M. (2014). Congo, Democratic Republic of - DRC Urban Water Supply Project : P091092 - Implementation Status Results Report : Sequence 11. Washington, D.C.: World Bank Group.

Ferguson, J. (1999). *Expectations of Modernity: Myths and Meanings of Urban Life on the Zambian Copperbelt*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Fetter, B. (1976). *The Creation of Elisabethville 1910-1940*. Stanford: Hoover Institution Publications (Stanford University).

Foucault, M. (1991). Governmentality. In G. Burchell, C. Gordon & P. Miller (Eds.), *The Foucault effect: studies in governmentality*. Chicago University of Chicago Press.

Foucault, M. (1994). *Dits et écrits* (Vol. IV). Paris: Gallimard.

Foucault, M. (1998). On the Archaeology of the Sciences: Response to the Epistomolgy Circle (R. Hurley, Trans.). In M. Foucault & J. D. Faubion (Eds.), *Aesthetics, Method, and Epistemology* (pp. 297-333). New York: The New Press.

Foucault, M. (2014). *On The Government of the Living: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1979-1980* (A. I. Davidson, Trans.). New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Foucault, M. ([1972]2002). *The Archaeology of Knowledge* (A. M. S. Smith, Trans.). Oxon & New York: Routledge.

Frimpong-Ansah, J. H. (1991). *The Vampire State in Africa: The Political Economy of Decline in Ghana*: J. Currey.

George, A. L., & Bennett, A. (2005). *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.

Goodfellow, T. (2013). Urban Planning in Africa and Politics of Implementation: Constrasting Patterns of State Intervention in Kampala and Kigali. In B. Orbist, V. Arlt & e. Macamo (Eds.), *Living the City in Africa*. Zurich & Berlin: Lit Verlag.

Goodfellow, T. (2014). Rwanda's political settlement and the urban transition: expropriation, construction and taxation in Kigali. *Journal of Eastern African Studies, 8*(2), 311-329.

Gould, D. J. (1979). The Adminsitration of Underdevelopment In G. Gran & G. Hall (Eds.), *Zaire: The Political Economy of Underdevelopment*. New York: Praeger

Gupta, A. (1995). Blurred boundaries: The discourse of corruption, the culture of politics, and the imagined state. *American Ethnologist, 22*(2), 375-402.

Hagmann, T., & Hoehne, M. V. (2009). Failures of the state failure debate: Evidence from the Somali territories. *Journal of International Development, 21*, 42-57.

Hagmann, T., & Péclard, D. (2010). Negotiating Statehood: Dynamics of Power and Domination in Africa. *Development and Change, 41*(4), 539-562.

Hagmann, T., & Péclard, D. (2011). Chapter 1. Negotiating Statehood: Dynamics of Power and Domination in Africa. In T. Hagmann & D. Péclard (Eds.), *Negotiating Statehood: Dynamics of Power and Domination in Africa* (pp. 1-23). Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.

Hammersley, M., & Atkinson, P. (2007). *Ethnography: principles in practice.* . London: Routledge.

Hansen, T. B., & Stepputat, F. (2001). Introduction: States of Imagination. In T. B. Hansen & F. Stepputat (Eds.), *States of Imagination: Ethnographic Explorations of the Postcolonial State*. Durham and London: Duke University Press.

Hansen, T. B., & Stepputat, F. (2001b). *States of Imagination: Ethnographic Explorations of the Postcolonial State*: Duke University Press.

Haraway, D. (1988). Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the Privilige of Partial Perspective. *Feminist Studies, 14*(3), 575-599.

Hardin, G. (1968). The Tragedy of the Commons. *Science, 162*(3859), 1243-1248.

Harvey, D. (2009). *Social Justice and the City*. Athens & London: the University of Georgia Press.

Hastrup, K. (1995). *A Passage to Anthropology: Between Experience and Theory*. London & New York: Routledge.

Herbst, J. (2000). *States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Herbst, J., & Mills, G. (June 24, 2013). The Invisible State: It's time we admit the Democratic Republic of Congo does not exist. , *Foreign Policy*. Retrieved from http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/06/24/the-invisible-state/

Hickey, S. (2006). Caught at the Crossroads: Citizenship, Marginality and the Mbororo Fulani in Northwest Cameroon. In S. Dorman, D. Hammett & P. Nugent (Eds.), *Making Nations, Creating Strangers: States and Citizenship in Africa* (pp. 83-104). Leiden: Brill.

Hochschild, A. (1998). *King Leopold's Ghost: A Story of Greed, Terror and Heroism in Colonial Africa*. Michigan: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Trade & Reference Publishers.

Hoffmann, K., & Vlassenroot, K. (2014). Armed groups and the exercise of public authority: the cases of the Mayi- Mayi and Raya Mutomboki in Kalehe, South Kivu. *Peacebuilding, 2*(2), 202-220.

Hostelet, G. (Ed.). (1954). *L'œuvre civilisatrice de la Belgique au Congo, de 1885 à 1945 : L'œuvre économique et sociale* Bruxelles: Académie royale des Sciences coloniales.

Isin, E. F. (2002). *Being Political: Genealogies of Citizenship*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Isin, E. F. (2007). City.State: Critique of Scalar Thought. *Citizenship Studies, 11*(2), 211-228.

Isin, E. F. (2008a). Chapter 1: Theorizing Acts of Citizenship. In E. F. Isin & G. M. Nielsen (Eds.), *Acts of Citizenship* (pp. 15-43). London & New York: Zed Books.

Isin, E. F. (2008b). Theorizing Acts of Citizenship. In E. F. Isin & G. F. Nielsen (Eds.), *Acts of Citizenship*. London & New York: Zed Books.

Isin, E. F., & Nielsen, G. F. (2008). Introduction: Acts of Citizenship. In E. F. Isin & G. F. Nielsen (Eds.), *Acts of Citizenship* (pp. 1-12). London & New York: Zed Books.

Jackson, R. H. (1993). *Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Jackson, R. H., & Rosberg, C. G. (1982a). *Personal Rule in Black Africa: Prince, Autocrat, Prophet, Tyrant*. Oakland: University of California Press.

Jackson, R. H., & Rosberg, C. G. (1982b). Why Africa's Weak States Persist: The Empirical and the Juridical in Statehood. *World Politics, 35*(01), 1-24.

Jennings, K. M. (2015). Life in a 'Peace-kept' City: Encounters with the Peacekeeping Economy. *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding*, 1-20.

Kovar, R. (1967). La « congolisation » de l'Union Minière du Haut Katanga. *Annuaire Français de Droit International, 13*(13), 742-781

Krasner, S. (2004). Sharing Sovereignty: New Institutions for Collapsed and Failing States. *International Security, 29*(2), 85-120.

Krasner, S., & Risse, T. (2014). External Actors, State-Building, and Service Provision in Areas of Limited Statehood: Introduction. *Governance, 27*(4), 545-567.

Lefebvre, H. (1974[1991]). *The Production of Space [Production de l'espace]* (D. Nicholson-Smith, Trans.). Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.

Lefebvre, H. (1996). *Writings on Cities* (E. Kofman & E. Lebas, Trans.). Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.

Lemarchand, R. (1964). *Political Awakening in the Belgian Congo*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.

Lemarchand, R. (1972). Political Clientelism and Ethnicity in Tropical Africa: Competing Solidarities in Nation-Building. *The American Political Science Review, 66*(1), 68-90.

Lemarchand, R. (2009). *The Dynamics of Violence in Central Africa*. Philadelphia University of Pennsylvania Press.

Lewis, J. (2000). The Batwa Pygmies of the Great Lakes Region. London: Minority Rights Group International.

Lipsky, M. (1980). *Street-level bureaucracy : Dilemmas of the individual in public services* New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

Londsdale, J. (2013). Anti-colonial nationalism and patriotism in Sub-Saharan Africa. In J. Breuilly (Ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of the History of Nationalism* (pp. 318-337). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Low, S. M. (1999). *Theorizing the City: The New Urban Anthropology Reader*. Piscataway, NJ: Rutgers University Press.

Lund, C. (2006a). Twilight Institutions: An Introduction. *Development and Change, 37*(4), 673-684.

Lund, C. (2006b). Twilight Institutions: Public Authority and Local Politics in Africa. *Development and Change, 37*(4), 685-705.

Lund, C. (2014). Of what is this a case? Analytical movements in qualitative social science research. *Human Organization, 73*(3), 224-234.

MacGaffey, J. (1987). *Entrepreneurs and Parasites. The Struggle for Indigenous Capitalism in Zaire.* . Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Malengana, C. N.-N. (2001). *Nationalité et citoyenneté au Congo Kinshasa: Le cas du Kivu*. Paris: L'Harmattan.

Malu-Malu, J.-J. A. (2002). *Le Congo-Kinshasa*. Paris: Karthala.

Mamdani, M. (1996). *Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Mapendano, F. (2008). Histoire de Bukavu. Bukavu: Bureau d'Etudes la Mairie de Bukavu

Maractho , A. M. M., & Trefon, T. (2004). The Tap is on Strike: Water Distribution and Supply Strategies In T. Trefon (Ed.), *Reinventing Order in the Congo: How people Respond to State Failure in Kinshasa*. London: Zed Books.

Masson, P. (1960). *Trois Siècles Chez les Bashi*. Tervuren: Musée Royal de l'Afrique Centrale.

Mbembé, J. A. (2001). *On the Postcolony*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Meagher, K. (2012). The Strength of Weak States? Non-State Security Forces and Hybrid Governance in Africa. *Development and Change, 43*(5), 1073-1101.

Médard, J.-F. (1979). L'état sous-développé au Cameroun *Année africaine 1977*, 35-84.

Médard, J.-F. (1982). The Underdeveloped State in Tropical Africa: Political Clientelism or Neopatrimonialism? . In C. S. Clapham (Ed.), *Private patronage and public power: political clientelism in the modern state*: Frances Pinter.

Migdal, J. S. (2001). *State in Society: Studying How States and Societies Transform and Constitute One Another*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Migdal, J. S., & Schlichte, K. (2005). Rethinking the State. In K. Schlichte (Ed.), *The Dynamics of States: The Formation and Crises of State Domination* (pp. 1-39). Farnham: Ashgate.

Miller, D. (2003). *Worlds Apart: Modernity Through the Prism of the Local*. London: Routledge.

Misch, & Thron. (1909). Le regime foncier du Congo Belge *Recrutement et formation des magistrats et des fonctionnaires coloniaux du Congo Belge*. Bruxelles Hayes.

Mitchell, T. (1991). The Limits of the State: Beyond Statist Approaches and Their Critics. *The American Political Science Review, 85*(1), 77-96.

Mitchell, T. (1999). Society, Economy, and the State Effect. In G. Steinmetz (Ed.), *State/Culture: State-Formation after the Cultural Turn* (pp. 76-97). Ithaca & London: Cornell University Press.

Muhunduka, D.-K. D. (2010). *Gestion additive, biens public et fourniture de d'electricité dans la region de Bukavu (RD Congo).* (Doctorat en Sciences Politiques et Sociales), Universite Catholique de Louvain, Louvain.

Mwacan, A. M. M., & Trefon, T. (2005). The Tap is on Strike: Water Distribution and Supply Strategies. In T. Trefon (Ed.), *Reinventing Order in the Congo: How People Respond to State Failure in Kinshasa*. London: Zed Books.

Neumann, I. B., & Sending, O. J. (2007). 'The International' as Governmentality. *Millennium - Journal of International Studies, 35*(3), 677-701.

Neumann, I. B., & Sending, O. J. (2010). *Governing the Global Polity: Practice, Mentality, Rationality*. Michigan University of Michigan Press.

Nlandu, T. M. (2012). Mapping Police Services in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Institutional Interactions at the Central, Provincial and Local Levels (Vol. 71). Brighton: Institute of Development Studies

Nzongola-Ntalaja, G. (2002). *The Congo: From Leopold to Kabila: A People's History*. London & New York: Zed Books.

Nzongola-Ntalaja, G. (2011, 17 January 2011). Patrice Lumumba: the most important assassination of the 20th century, *The Guardian*

Nzundu, A. B. L. (2013). *Missions catholiques et protestantes face au colonialisme et aux aspirations du peuple autochtone à l'autonomie et à l'independence politique au Congo Belge*. Rome: Pontificia Univ. Gregoriana.

Olivier de Sardan, J.-P. (2008). *La rigueur du qualitatif: Les contraintes empiriques de l'interprétation socio-anthropologique*. Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium: Brylant.

Olivier de Sardan, J.-P. (2009a). *The eight modes of local governance in West Africa*. Africa Power & Politics. University of Sussex. Brighton.

Olivier de Sardan, J.-P. (2009b). State Bureaucracy and Governance in West Africa. In G. Blundo & P.-Y. Le Meur (Eds.), *The Governance of Daily Life in Africa: Ethnographic Explorations of Public and Collective Services*. Leiden: Brill.

Olivier de Sardan, J.-P. (2014). The Delivery State in Africa. Interface Bureaucrats, Professional Cultures and the Bureaucratic Mode of Governance. In T. Bierschenk & J.-P. Olivier de Sardan (Eds.), *States at Work: Dynamics of African Bureaucracies* (pp. 399-429). Leiden: Brill.

Olson, M. (1965). *The logic of collective action: Public goods and the theory of groups*. Harvard: Harvard University Press.

Peemans, J. P. (1997). *Crise de la modernisation et pratiques populaires au Zaïre et en Afrique*: Editions L'Harmattan.

Pickhardt, M. (2006). Fifty years after Samuelson's "the pure theory of public expenditure": What are we left with? . *Journal of the History of Economic Thought, 28*(4), 439-460.

Pole-Institute. (June 2012). Gouvernance et Refondation de l'Etat en République Démocratique du Congo *Collection Cultures & Memoires vivantes*. Goma: Pole Institute.

Prunier, G. (2008). *Africa's World War : Congo, the Rwandan Genocide, and the Making of a Continental Catastrophe*. Oxford: Oxford University Press,.

Putzel, J., Lindemann, S., & Schouten, C. (2008). Drivers of change in the Democratic Republic of Congo: The rise and decline of the state and challenges for reconstruction. A literature review. *Crisis States Research Centre, London School of Economics, Working Paper No. 26*.

RadioOkapi. (20 December 2011). Joseph Kabila investi président de la République démocratique du Congo. Retrieved from:
 http://radiookapi.net/actualite/2011/12/20/joseph-kabila-investi-president-de-la-republique-democratique-du-congo/

Raeymaekers, T. (2014). *Violent Capitalism and Hybrid Identity in the Eastern Congo*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Rao, V., & Appadurai, A. (2008). Scale and Mobility in Defining the Commons. In P. Bardhan & I. Ray (Eds.), *The Contested Commons: Conversations between Economists and Anthropologists* (pp. 159-167). Hoboken, New Jersey: Wiley.

Reybrouck, D. V. (2011). *Kongo - Historien om Afrikas hjerte [Congo - A History]* (G. Dimmen, Trans.). Amsterdam: De Bezige Bij Publishing.

Rose, N., & Miller, P. (1992). Political Power beyond the State: Problematics of Government. *The British Journal of Sociology, 43*(2), 173-205.

Rotberg, R. I. (2003). *When States Fail: Causes and Consequences*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Rothchild, D. S., & Chazan, N. (1988). *The Precarious balance : state and society in Africa*. Boulder: Westview Press.

Rothschild, D. (1987). Hegemony and State Softness: Some Variation in Elite Responses. In Z. Ergas (Ed.), *African States in Transition*. New York: St. Martin's Press.

Rutten, M. (approx. 1930, undated). La Comité National du Kivu, par Martin Rutten, Gouverneur Général Honoraire du Congo Belge, Président du Comité National du Kivu. In L. Franck (Ed.), *Le Congo Belge, volume 2*. Bruxelles: Ancien Ministre des Colonies.

Said, E. W. (2001). *Orientalism: Western Conceptions of the Orient*. London: Penguin Books Limited.

Samuelson, P. A. (1954). The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure. *The Review of Economics and Statistics, 36*(4), 387-389.

Sandbrook, R., & Barker, J. (1985). *The Politics of Africa's Economic Stagnation*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Sartori, G. (1970). Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics. *The American Political Science Review, 64*(4), 1033-1053.

Schatz, E. (Ed.). (2009). *Political Ethnography: What immersion contributes to the study of power*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Schatzberg, M. G. (1991). *The Dialectics of Oppression in Zaire*. Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press.

Scheye, E. (October 2011). Local Justice and Security Providers in South Kivu: Going Local to Support Youth-Neighborhood Watch-Community Development Groups. The Hague: Clingendael.

Schmidt, S. (2011). To Order the Minds of Scholars: The Discourse of the Peace of Westphalia in International Relations Literature1. *International Studies Quarterly, 55*(3), 601-623.

Schwartz-Shea, P., & Yanow, D. (Eds.). (2012). *Interpretive Approaches to Research Design: Concepts and Processes*. Oxon: Routledge.

Scott, J. (1972). The Erosion of Patron-Client Bonds and Social Change in Rural Southeast Asia. *The American Political Science Review, 66*(1), 91-113.

Scott, J. (1985). *Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance*. Yale: Yale University Press.

Scott, J. (1998). *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed*. New Haven: Yale University.

Small, M. L. (2009). `How many cases do I need?': On science and the logic of case selection in field-based research. *Ethnography, 10*(1), 5-38.

Sosne, E. D. (1974). *Kinship and contract in Bushi : a study in village level politics* (PhD), University of Wisconsin-Madison, Madison.

Sosne, E. D. (1979). Colonial Peasantization and Contemporary Underdevelopment: A view from a Kivu village. In G. Gran (Ed.), *Zaire: The Political Economy of Underdevelopment* (pp. 189-210). New York: Praeger Publishers.

Spivak, G. C. (1988). Can the Subaltern Speak? In C. Nelsen & L. Grossberg (Eds.), *Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture*. Basingstoke: Maxmillan Education.

The_World_Bank. (March 2011). Democratic Republic of Congo: Boosting Growth and Employment. Volume III: Sectoral Studies (pp. 187). Washington D.C. : The World Bank.

Tilly, C. (1992). *Coercion, Capital and European States: AD 990 - 1992* (Vol. 2). Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Inc.

Titeca, K., & de Herdt, T. (2011). Real goverance beyond the 'failed state': Negotiating education in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. *African Affairs, 110*(439), 213-231.

Trefois, P., Moyeresons, J., Lavreau, J., Alimasi, D., Dadryio, I., Mitima, B., . . . Nahimana, L. (2007). Geomorphology and urban geology of Bukavu (R.D. Congo): Interaction between slope instability and human settlement. In R. M. Teuuw (Ed.), *Mapping Hazardous Terrain Using Remote Sensing* (pp. 65-76). Bath: The Geological Society Publishing House.

Trefon, T. (2004). Introduction: Reinventing order in the Congo. In T. Trefon (Ed.), *Reinventing order in the Congo: How people respond to state failure in Kinhasa*. London: Zed Books.

Trefon, T. (2010). *Parcours Administratifs dans un État en Faillite: Récits populaires de Lubumbashi (RDC)*. Paris: L'Harmattan.

Tull, D. M. (2005). *The Reconfiguration of Political Order in Africa: A Case Study of North Kivu (DR Congo)*. Hamburg: Institut für Afrika-Kunde.

Turner, T. (2007). *The Congo Wars: Conflict, Myth and Reality*. London: Zed Books.
      The Dublin statement on water and sustainable development (1992).

Van Acker, F. (2000). *Of Clubs and Conflict: The dissolvant power of social capital in Kivu*. Paper presented at the IASCP Conference, Bloomington, Indiana.

van der Geest, S., & Obirih-Opareh, N. (2009). Liquid Waste Managment in Urban and Rurual Ghana: Privatisation as Governance? . In G. Blundo & P.-Y. Le Meur (Eds.), *The Governance of Daily Life in Africa: Ethnographic Explorations of Public and Collective Services*. Leiden: Brill

van Eeuwijk, B. O. (2009). The Daily Governance of Environmental Health: Gender Perspectives from Dar Es Salaam, Tanzania. In G. Blundo & P.-Y. Le Meur (Eds.), *The Governance of Daily Life in Africa: Ethnograhic Explorations of Public and Collcetive Services*. Leiden: Brill.

Vansania, J. (2001). *Le Rwanda ancien: Le Royaume nyiginya*. Paris: Karthala.

Vlassenroot, K. (2007). Households land use strategies in a protracted crisis context: land tenure, conflict and food security in eastern DRC: FAO

Vlassenroot, K. (2013). South Kivu: identity, territory, and power in the eastern Congo. *Usalama Project Report: Understanding Congolese Armed Groups*. London: Rift Valley Institute.

Vlassenroot, K., & Huggins, C. (2005). Land, Migration and Conflict in DRC. In C. Huggins & J. Clover (Eds.), *From the Ground Up: Land Rights, Conflict and Peace in Sub-Saharan Africa (Part Two: Land Reform)* (pp. 115-194). Nairobi: African Center for Technology Studies.

Vlassenroot, K., & Raeymaekers, T. (2008). New Political Order in the DR Congo? The Transformation of Regulation. *Afrika Focus, 21*(2), 39-52.

Vlassenroot, K., & Romkema, H. (2007). Local leadership and governance in eastern DRC. Ghent: University of Ghent

Walters, W. (2008). Acts of Demonstration: Mapping the Territory of (Non-)Citisenship. In E. F. Isin & G. F. Nielsen (Eds.), *Acts of Citizenship*. London & New York: Zed Books.

Weber, C. (1998). Performative States. *Millennium - Journal of International Studies, 27*(1), 77-95.

Weber, M. (1991). *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*. London: Routledge.

Weber, M., Roth, G., & Wittich, C. (1978). *Economy and Society: 2 Volume Set*: University California Press.

Willame, J.-C. (1972). *Patrimonialism and Political Change in the Congo*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Williams, S. (2011). *Who Killed Hammarskjold?: The UN, the Cold War and White Supremacy in Africa* London: C Hurst & Co Publishers Ltd.

World Bank, A. R. (2011). Democratic Republic of Congo: Boosting Growth and Employment. In C. D. Poverty Reduction and Economic Management 3 (Ed.), *Volume III: Sectoral Studies* (Vol. 59631- ZR). Washington, D.C: The World Bank.

World_Bank. (2006). Congo, Democratic Republic of - Urban water supply project. Washington DC: World Bank.

Young, C. (2002). After the Fall: State Rehabilitation in Uganda. In M. R. Beissinger & C. Young (Eds.), *Beyond the State Crisis? Postcolonial Africa and the Post-Soviet Eurasia in Comparative Perspective* (pp. 445-463). Baltimore, Maryland: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

Young, C., & Turner, T. (1985). *The rise and decline of the Zairian state*. Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press.

Zartman, I. W. (1995). *Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Pub.