

# THE STRUCTURE OF THEORETICAL SYSTEMS IN RELATION TO EMERGENCE

Kent Duane Palmer

Ph. D., Sociology

London School of Economics

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## ABSTRACT

A thesis concerning the ontology underlying the formation of structural-dialectical systems based on the implications of the phenomenon of Emergence is presented. Emergence refers to the unexpected appearance of discontinuities which segment on-going traditions. The Western philosophical tradition is used as an example focussing on motifs introduced in the *Phaedo*, the transition from Hume to Kant, and contemporary ontology. Emergence (as structurally coded artificial novelty) is posited to be the opposite of the phenomenon of Nihilism (erratic change projected by the structural system rendering the formal system visible), and both are functions of the ideational process. The ontological basis of Emergence is sought by exploring the articulation of the form of the ideational process, through which structural theoretical systems are produced, called the 'ideational template'. It has three parts: 1) SHELL--The expanding wave of logical connections by means of triadic formalisms seen on the Nihilistic background; 2) CORE--The unfolding structural-dialectical underpinning to the formal system in which artificial emergences appear; 3) CENTRE OF THE CORE--Fragmentation of the concept of 'Being' which provides the ontological foundation for the Formal/Structural system. The ideational template is de-structured in order to show the feasibility of an alternative metaphysical model based on disconnecting opposite qualities instead of focussing on form and structure as the ideational process does. This brings attention to the principle of 'No Secondary Causation' as a means of tracing back artificial emergence within structural systems to a genuine emergence of all entities and qualitative opposites to a single source (called by Plato 'the Good') indicated by the methodology of logical disconnection rather than syllogistic connection. The alternative to logical ideational connection is called the 'logic of disconnection'. The metaphysical basis of a qualitative science as distinct from quantitative Western science is posited.

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## The Structure of Theoretical Systems In Relation to Emergence

### Introduction

The topic of this essay is the phenomenon of Emergence.<sup>1</sup> Emergence means either the appearance of an unforeseen phenomenon which alters the conception of the whole world radically,<sup>2</sup> or the change in the way the world is looked at conceptually which allows the appearance of hitherto unseen phenomena.<sup>3</sup> The theoretical perspective<sup>4</sup> one has on the world<sup>5</sup> is in a dynamic relation<sup>6</sup> to it. Transformative change<sup>7</sup> may arise from the world and call for an alteration in theory or, vice versa, it might arise from the reconsideration of theory and result in the alteration of the perception of the world. These two directions from which transformative change might arise indicate a single phenomenon: emergence.<sup>8</sup> The politics<sup>9</sup> of this phenomenon issues from the attempt to hold static<sup>10</sup> the connections<sup>11</sup> between the parts<sup>12</sup> of the theoretical complex, the states of affairs<sup>13</sup> in the world, and the relation between the two. When this proves impossible, from the first moment these static connections are projected, because of change and difference impinging upon

them; there then occurs a shifting which allows change in the theoretical perspective while holding static the world; or, which allows change in the world and holds static the theoretical perspective. The politics of holding one factor constant and allowing another to vary as a strategy for confronting the change, and difference, endemic in existence gives rise to emergence in quanta. What is meant by emergence in quanta is emergence in discrete epochs<sup>14</sup> with specific temporal duration, within which there is a unique perceptual-conceptual patterning that manifests in a series of dialectically related moments.<sup>15</sup> Change in the world or in theoretical perspective occurs in bursts<sup>16</sup> rather than as a constant flow. The burst comes from the shifting between holding theory static, to holding the world static, and back again to holding theory static; and that allows stasis and change to be artificially mixed.<sup>17</sup> This produces the illusion of continuity<sup>18</sup> while allowing change to be filtered through a series of locks, like the locks in a canal, where the effects of change are mitigated.<sup>19</sup> This series of locks is the structural system. The phenomenon of emergence is only seen by looking at the way the structural system mediates<sup>20</sup> the shift between theoretical perspectives and the world.

By this phenomenon of emergence, there is a constant unfolding of the theoretical perspective set up within the western philosophical and scientific tradition; and, there is continual transformation of what is seen of the world by those within that tradition. For those of us<sup>21</sup> within this tradition it is the dynamic between the transforming world, and our changing perspective of that transformation, that gives us access to aspects of the truth.<sup>22</sup> It is the truth of what unfolds in the process of emergence that must ultimately be considered.<sup>23</sup> This is what gives ontological dimensions<sup>24</sup> to the phenomenon of emergence. How the truth will be seen depends upon the standards of truth set up prior to its arrival.<sup>25</sup> The process of emergence, and what is uncovered in that process, is measured by these prior standards. The truth impinges upon those within a tradition in a way that is aligned with how they preconstruct the world.<sup>26</sup> That is, how they set up prototypes<sup>27</sup> of what is acceptable information concerning the world. This means that man's relation to the truth is such that it comes out of (or from the direction of) his own descriptions of reality.<sup>28</sup> The way description takes place predefines the intensity of truth that whatever is seen through that description may have. Description in this tradition is ideational.<sup>29</sup> So truth is idealized and is a function of ideation.

Therefore, it is necessary to understand the criteria of idealized truth within the western scientific and philosophical tradition in order to understand how truth as an object of knowledge could manifest itself in that ambiance. Criteria of truth specify what may be called the "ontological mould".<sup>30</sup> The means of producing descriptions within the parameters of those criteria will be called the ideational template.<sup>31</sup> Artificial emergence takes place inside the ontological mould which is a series of interrelated standards of truth. The truth of what appears in emergence and takes the form of the ontological mould itself is the result of a specific application of the ideational means of preconstructing description. It is this means of producing prototypes which must be changed in order to change the standards of truth in the western tradition.

Heidegger distinguishes between two kinds of truth.<sup>32</sup> There is correspondence and its verification as the principal<sup>33</sup> standard of truth, and there is the manifestation of whatever appears between the correspondences which are set up.<sup>34</sup> The truth of manifestation is the more original in the sense that it underlies the correspondence standard (beings must occur first for correspondences to be set up)<sup>35</sup> and in the sense that it was

the standard which, according to Heidegger, was held by the early Greeks.<sup>36</sup> The correspondence standard of truth sets up retraceable relationships between parts of the theoretical complex<sup>37</sup> and also between that complex and the world.<sup>38</sup> This assumes that the theoretical complex and the world have already been manifested in a certain way. The manifestation of differentiated beings whether as part of the world or of the theoretical complex is prior to (ie., is necessary before) the sighting of appearance or manifestation itself. Now, the manifestation is more original than the differentiated appearance of specific beings, because appearance itself must be manifest first in order for anything to be seen at all. However, one sees (notices) specific beings before one sees manifestation in general as their substratum. The consideration of the distinction between these two types of truth is the best starting point for the understanding of the phenomenon of emergence.

The correspondence standard of truth<sup>39</sup> is the principal standard within the western philosophical tradition.<sup>40</sup> This is the standard by which all scientific descriptions of the world are measured. A linguistic description<sup>41</sup> of a state of affairs is set up such that the definitions of every term are unambiguous, consistently used, and

precise. This description is compared to a state of affairs in the world. The different aspects of the description must correspond to the state of affairs in the world, so that, at any point in time, the correspondence may be verified. If it is possible to verify the description by retracing all the links among its parts and between the description and the state of affairs, then it is considered true. By this standard what is true does not change. Change implies falsification. Either the description changes or the state of affairs changes. Once change occurs a new set of correspondences must be fabricated. Setting out a description and then verifying it takes time. Change always occurs before the process can be completed.<sup>42</sup> The elements of the description and the state of affairs are in diacritical relation<sup>43</sup> to each other. Thus any change has vast ramifications. Verification must occur as the construction of correspondences is under way. The structural system<sup>44</sup> mediates between the theoretical perspective and the world as a means of making it possible to verify correspondences in the face of endemic change. The structural system holds static the description or the state of affairs long enough for the correspondences to be constructed and for verification to occur by allowing change to affect some other part of the system than that part being concentrated on at the

moment. In this way the ideal of static description, static world, and a static relation between the two is approximated by a mixture of artificial stasis and artificially channelled change. This ideal of a frozen world of precise and verifiable correspondences has been pursued by the western scientific tradition, and philosophy has attempted to serve science by making firm ontological and epistemological foundations for the realization of that ideal. The search for firm foundations for truth, in the form of static correspondences, has led to those foundations being relaid over and over again.<sup>45</sup> The philosophies of Descartes, Kant, and Husserl testify to the search for these foundations.

Heidegger was the first philosopher of the western tradition to step outside this process of continually re-laying the foundations of the process of verification, and point out that the standard of truth it represents is extremely limited. He indicated<sup>46</sup> the truth of Appearance itself that underlies the correspondences between whatever appears. This shift in perspective from the relations between what appears to the Appearance itself called attention to the conditions that make verification possible, and away from the process of verification of correspondences. This shift was, in

fact, a political move,<sup>47</sup> which turned from concern for the truth of correspondence which is related to the formal system that grows out of isomorphic description, to concern with the truth of the structural system that mediates between the theoretical perspective contained in descriptions and the world described. The structural system governs appearance by oscillating between holding the world static and holding the theoretical perspective static.

Heidegger identifies Appearance as the manifestation of phenomenal beings with the verb "to be" of language.<sup>48</sup> In this way, language, which is the root of descriptions, and Appearance in general, which is the root of the world of phenomenal beings, are identified so that the structural system,<sup>49</sup> and its ontology, become the basis of both descriptions and states of affairs of phenomenal beings. By identifying these two, language<sup>50</sup> annexes the world more fundamentally than it ever did through the use of the correspondence standard of truth. States of affairs in the world are already linguistically conditioned 'beings'. The visibility of 'Being' is based on the appearance of these beings.

Appearance itself is only seen by means of the

appearance of the appearing entities. The shift to looking at Being of Appearance rather than beings (or the appearing entities) sets up another standard of truth. This standard of truth is hermeneutical. What is meant by hermeneutical is that the truth of something is dependent on the continual unveiling of something more about it, the continual deepening of one's understanding of it. When this process stops, what one knows immediately becomes untrue because it is retrospective.<sup>51</sup> Emergence has this kind of truth as its basis, but it can only be seen in the specific transformations of the correspondences. There is no general access to the truth of emergence, only glimpses in situ.<sup>52</sup> That is to say that as one builds the set of correspondences, one is discovering their possibility and deepening one's understanding. If one stops building the correspondences and begins verifying, reconstructing, then one switches back from Appearance as a standard of truth to correspondence verification as a standard. If one does not cease in the pursuit of ever deeper understanding which results in panoplies of correspondences, then the continual bursts of emergent transformations of the set of correspondences differentiated into panoplies appear.

Once these two standards of truth have been outlined, the shift back and forth between them must be

considered. The politics of coping with change by setting up variable and constant elements so that something is always kept constant, but what it is changes from time to time, appears more fundamentally as the shift between these two standards of truth. As the set of correspondences first appears in its basic outlines, then the hermeneutical or teleonomic aspect of the structural system is emphasized. At a certain point one must either set about reconstructing the relations between the correspondences or let go of them completely and attempt to grasp a new set of correspondences. The process of reconstruction makes the process of the unfolding of new sets of correspondences visible and vice versa. One may only look forward to the realm of possibilities and its actualization into specific sets of correspondence for a certain length of time before one must turn and face the task of consolidating what one has grasped. Then it is possible to turn toward the next phase of realizing possibilities on the basis of reconstruction. By this oscillation between modes of truth the tradition is constantly transformed. Every time one turns to reconstruction and away from the cutting edge of the tradition where its possibilities appear just before realization, one sees the landscape of past reconstructions in a new light.

When these two standards of truth have been distinguished<sup>53</sup> then another distinction follows naturally in the historical and logical development of ontology. This is the distinction between manifestation or Appearance (Being) and what M. Henry calls 'the Essence of Manifestation'<sup>54</sup>. Appearance itself must appear. The appearance of Appearance is called its Essence. This is to say that the appearance of entities and the appearance of Appearance, in which the entities are seen, have different natures. Being has as its antinomic opposite, Nothingness.<sup>55</sup> As Merleau-Ponty recognised these two ontological concepts are opposites and cancel each other out.<sup>56</sup> Their cancellation he called Hyper-Being. Heidegger called it ~~Being~~-- 'crossed out'.<sup>57</sup> Appearance appears out of the mirroring<sup>58</sup> of cancellation.<sup>59</sup> Entities in antinomic opposition<sup>60</sup> appear within that Appearance. The Essence of manifestation may be considered as the source of the appearing of Appearance that lies beyond cancellation, or it may be considered as the timing or unfolding from cancellation, of the Appearance bursting forth, if one assumes that Appearance comes from itself<sup>61</sup>, rather than from something other than it. In this way, although emergence is seen as the temporal transformation of correspondences in Appearance, its standard of truth is the same as Appearance itself.

Emergence is the result of the continual unfolding of understanding. But this standard of truth arises from cancellation, which is the limit of conceptual understanding.<sup>62</sup> The phenomenon of emergence takes us to that limit<sup>63</sup>, and it is there we must begin any genuine study of the phenomenon. The standard of truth related to the Essence is cancellation. The Essence never appears. Emergences, as glimpses of the truth of Appearance, arise between these two extremes; between the stasis of correspondence and the non- appearing of the Essence, which may be interpreted as pure transformation. Merleau-Ponty postulates beyond cancellation that there is a fourth kind of Being which he calls "Wild Being".<sup>64</sup> Wild Being is the clarification<sup>65</sup> of the perceptual world after the process of cancellation is completed.

The form of the mould of ontology is very clear. It is made up of a shell, a core, and the centre of the core.<sup>66</sup> The mould of ontology is the fruit of conceptualization which splits the motion of thought from the world, and then begins attempting to hold one static in relation to the other. The shell of the mould of ontology is the appearance of beings in the world and the correspondences between them. It is differentiated appearances. The core of the mould of ontology is Appearance, which allows the

beings to be seen. It is the antinomic opposition between temporalized Being(Being in Process) and Nothingness<sup>67</sup> which are its two descriptions. The centre of the core is the Essence of manifestation (~~Being~~--crossed out) or undifferentiated, and pure, Appearance which is never seen.<sup>68</sup> What M. Henry points out,<sup>69</sup> is that there are two possible approaches to the relation between the core and its centre. One may either take the stance of 'ontological monism', the primary assumption of western metaphysics, that transcendence (Appearance) is grounded in itself.<sup>70</sup> That point of view states that Being is its own origin. Or, one may take the opposite stance of 'ontological dualism' which posits that Appearance appears from an unknown origin: 'X'.<sup>71</sup> Both of these stances<sup>72</sup> have the same effect, however, of placing a discontinuity<sup>73</sup> of cancellation as the origin of the arising of difference,<sup>74</sup> either between Being and Itself<sup>75</sup> as a point of Nothingness, or between Being and the Essence. Ontological monism and ontological dualism are merely a rearrangement of terms. They are antinomic opposites which cancel, leaving no net result.<sup>76</sup> As a consequence<sup>77</sup> of this empty, abstract reasoning, the mould of ontology remains bland and undifferentiated. Beyond distinguishing its three layers and projecting either the assumption of ontological monism or ontological dualism

upon it, little more can be said within the scope of modern ontology. One has left behind the particular appearance for the most universal, which is Appearance itself.<sup>78</sup> That universal either appears from itself or from an unknown. The emergence of Appearance and the emergence as a phenomenon related to beings and their correspondences in appearance, are irrevocably counterposed in the form of ontology.

The mould of ontology is a quantal burst of the Appearance of truth to ideation. The quantum moves from pure undifferentiated Appearance, which is never seen, to completely differentiated appearance of particular beings which obscures Appearance as a universal that mediates between these two extremes.<sup>79</sup> This quantum of the bursting forth of Appearance is undifferentiated in itself<sup>80</sup> from the point of view of modern ontology, because ontologists move to the universal and do not look at its dialectical relation with the particular.<sup>81</sup> The emergent phenomenon which occurs as the transformation of beings is also quantal in nature.<sup>82</sup> By looking at the quantal nature of emergence,<sup>83</sup> the quanta of the bursting of Appearance, from undifferentiation to differentiation, may itself be differentiated transversally.<sup>84</sup>

By this is meant that the internal articulation<sup>85</sup> of the mould of ontology may be seen by studying closely the phenomenon of emergence. Thus, by studying emergence, it is possible to push the limits of ontology much deeper<sup>86</sup>, because the mould of ontology is quantal and emergence is our access to the comprehension of quantal phenomena. The mould of ontology, which is blank without internal articulation, when articulated, may be called the ideational template.<sup>87</sup> The ideational template controls quantization of conceptual processes.<sup>88</sup> The transformation of the ontological mould into the ideational template depends completely on the study of emergence. By studying the emergence of discrete panoplies of correspondences in the process of hermeneutical unveiling to understanding, it is possible to understand the mechanism which emits appearance as a discrete burst from undifferentiation to differentiation. The mould of ontology lays down the basis upon which anything might appear; whereas the ideational template defines the inherent temporal structuring of the process of Appearance. By the ideational template's internal articulation of the mould of ontology, it is possible to explore the nature of the Essence of manifestation. The shell of the ideational template is the connection between beings, and the universal by which their connection

is sustained.<sup>89</sup> The Core of the ideational template is the structural articulation of all appearance.<sup>90</sup> The Centre of the Core is the four states of Being<sup>91</sup>, which describe the fragmentation of the Essence of manifestation, and the attempt to find a deep continuity to counteract that fragmentation.

Emergence phenomena, whether they are the emergence of panoplies of correspondences in discrete bursts, or the emergence of the discrete burst in the appearing of Appearance, point to cancellation. The articulation of the mould of ontology by the ideational template is based on the process of cancellation being worked out.<sup>92</sup> Antinomic opposites--the most general of which are Being and Nothingness<sup>93</sup>-- arise out of the mirroring of cancellation and the return to it. The difference between that arising and return<sup>94</sup> is the period of the emergent burst. Therefore all emergent phenomena, whether ontic<sup>95</sup> or ontological, take us to an understanding of cancellation. This is the basic philosophical experience<sup>96</sup>: the collapse of the antinomic mirroring of pure reason. When one has arrived at this experience, what does one do? Going beyond cancellation experience depends on seeking out its root. Its root is the use of the ideational template as a mode of connection of beings. In this

essay, a presentation of a specific example of cancellation experience will be used in order to present the articulation of the mould of ontology into the ideational template, and then to show how cancellation experience may be avoided by the correct use of the ideational template. In this way cancellation experience will be left behind for another mode of intellection which does not result in cancellation.

Since this essay is about emergence and the access to a deep understanding of the ontological significance of that phenomenon through the experience of cancellation, it will begin with the experience of cancellation. If emergence is merely spoken about as a concept, then the discourse itself will be empty.<sup>97</sup> Nothing would have welled up inside the concepts to fill them with meaning. It is only if emergence occurs in, and is recorded by, the discourse that it can have any real meaning. The standard of truth applied here is that of the Heideggerian hermeneutic<sup>98</sup>, which recognises meaning only if the understanding is advanced in the process of writing the study. If emergence itself did not occur within the discourse, then fundamentally no comprehension of the phenomenon being spoken about by manipulation of concept alone could be transmitted. This essay begins on the basis of

the cancellation of antinomic arguments experienced by the author. This is the kind of truth associated with the Essence of manifestation: the deepest kind of truth known in the western tradition. From this experience as a foundation there is a move towards the confrontation, on an ontological level, of the dilemma which causes cancellation to occur in the first place.

In this essay a movement<sup>99</sup> of thought will be presented, not a concrete position achieved once and for all. It is the movement of thought that has been experienced by the author and it is displayed in order that it might be instructive for others. Thought is a movement of the self-form<sup>100</sup> of the one who thinks it and no one else can do it for you. Either one undertakes thinking<sup>101</sup> oneself and thereby comes to know it by experience, or one accepts the thoughts of others<sup>102</sup> as if they were one's own and misses thereby the experience of thinking. The thinking of another may only serve as guide for one's own, not even as a model. For, each person being different, they will each end up in different places, even if they worked from the same material on the same topic. The path of thought shows up the self-form of the thinker as it unfolds into existence. This unfolding, like that of individual things and of language, points toward the unfolding of all existence. By seeing how the

self-form of an author unfolds in his thought, one may be given clues as to how one's own unfolding of one's own self-form occurs. What is poignant in each man's existence is different, and how he renders that thought-provoking will also be different. The best thing one can learn from another is to address the real issues of life and confront them in one's thought, then to say and do what is necessary to put into action what one finds out in that process of self discovery.

This essay began as a study in the sociology of creativity seven years ago. Noticing that there were only psychological explanations of creativity, an attempt was made to formulate a sociological explanation. This led into a long study of contemporary philosophy, beginning with the phenomenological problem of inter-subjectivity. Once one enters the study of the western philosophical tradition, then one is confronted with a series of authors whose works are all interlinked, so that the whole tradition must be dealt with in order to understand anyone within it. Having spent several years studying philosophy intensely, a unified picture of the tradition finally jelled, and so I was able to begin to set down my understanding of the phenomenon of emergence in a way that came out of a confrontation with the western philosophical

tradition's understanding of the phenomenon. For what I found was that emergence was a key issue which was submerged in the works of all those authors who participated in the tradition, and that they all addressed it in one way or another. That, in fact, they had a unified perspective with regard to it.<sup>103</sup> For me, the whole set of issues which were involved was best exemplified by those who presented them in terms of the topicalization of Nihilism.<sup>104</sup> Therefore, I began an exegesis of this topicalization of the issues, and left behind the terminology that concerned emergence. Then, after developing my argument in terms of the topic of Nihilism, as I began my final draft, my advisor asked me why I used the term Nihilism when the term emergence was what was in my title. I replied that they were the positive and negative aspects of the same thing. So, Professor Rickman advised me to use the positive instead of the negative terminology. When I began to put this into practice, something happened that I had not expected. This was that the argument I had so carefully worked out vanished.<sup>105</sup> It vanished in a way that made me realise that the argument concerning the nature of Nihilism and the argument concerning the nature of emergence were antinomic<sup>106</sup> opposites. This is to say that they are the same argument turned upside down or inverted. When these two views of the same

argument are brought into confrontation the whole thing vanishes. Seeing this, there arose the realisation that there was something else<sup>107</sup>, underlying the whole scenario of conceptualization, in which these two views of the same argument appear, that was covered over by their being manifest, and which became obvious when they disappeared. This something else is not an argument, but more like a principle.<sup>108</sup> It is, in fact, expressed by Plato as the principle of 'no secondary causation'. This is the principle that there is a single condition underlying all multiple causation.<sup>109</sup> It is this movement of thought, from multiplicity to affirmation of oneness, that will be shown in this essay. The essay is about emergence and will express this emergence of the necessity of indicating oneness, in the face of multiplicity, that occurred within the line of thought that produced this paper. In this way, the topic, and how it is spoken about, will be harmonised.

Concepts are intrinsically empty<sup>110</sup> because their truth value is based on stasis, which does not allow for the change endemic in existence.<sup>111</sup> It is only when they transform themselves, and are finally exploded<sup>112</sup>, that anything of the truth can be seen. That is, as far as Appearance and the Essence

as standards of truth are concerned. Any conceptual system only limits and fixes what is seen arising in existence.<sup>113</sup> It limits the arising, the opening out, by applying a single primary distinction at a time to whatever is seen, generating secondary distinctions from this one application. It fixes existence by stabilizing the relation between the application of the primary distinction and the net of secondary distinctions.<sup>114</sup> Concepts become meaningful only when they are shattered by the coming out of that which they cover over (that to which the primary distinction was applied), which was glimpsed in the process of transformation of the net of secondary distinctions, but not grasped in that transformation. The principle that there is no secondary causation is a means of breaking conceptual patterning. It breaks conceptual patterning by de-structuring the template that sets up that patterning. For the term 'causation' one could read 'emergence'.<sup>115</sup> Causation is seen as either operating between beings or as 'first cause'.<sup>116</sup> 'First cause' is the application of a primary distinction to what is hitherto undistinguished. The progressive bisection<sup>117</sup> of secondary conditions, and the unconditioned origin of the progressive bisection, are claimed, by Kant, to be equivalent.<sup>118</sup> This may be translated by saying that all of the secondary causes and secondary

distinctions are equal to the first cause or the application of the first primary distinction. Both the application of the primary distinction (the first cause) and the whole set of secondary distinctions are balanced and equal. The latter is merely the working out of the implications and articulations of the former.<sup>119</sup> The primary distinction which is applied may change and the articulation of secondary distinctions may change. Thus both the first cause and subsidiary causes may each be transformed. Dialectics<sup>120</sup> implies the application of the politics of maintaining stasis in the face of these transformations by oscillating between variables and constants.<sup>121</sup> However, all this depends on the Appearance of the distinctions being applied and transformed. It is this Appearance which is glimpsed in the transformation of the first cause and the subsidiary causes. Everything that emerges in that system of first cause (unconditioned), subsidiary causes (conditioned), and their dialectic is a secondary, or artificial, emergence, whose standard of truth is Appearance. There is no secondary kind of emergence. There is only the genuine emergence from the single source, which is beyond the power of containment of the descriptive system of first and subsidiary causes and their artificial emergent transformations.

This means that everything that comes into existence is from a single source.<sup>122</sup> Specifically, what comes into existence by the hand of man, the realm of first and subsidiary causation and its transformation, is no different in essence from the becoming of existence itself. The difference that appears to be there is completely illusory. Both the argument concerning nihilism and that concerning emergence posited a special realm in which what came from man was distinguished from the becoming of existence. The principle of a single source for the unfolding of all that appears into existence "breaks any initial dichotomy" that a conceptual system would posit. Every conceptual system must posit an initial distinction of some sort. By that act of positing one initial distinction as primordial, there is an attempt to fix existence by focussing on only one of its myriad aspects. The principle of a single source squarely confronts whatever initial distinction is posited and denies it, saying: not two, one. The principle is not a concept, but is instead a point of view which renders conceptual systems meaningful by continually breaking them open, so that their meaning becomes clear.

Conceptual systems become empty almost the very moment they are posited. The freshness they have when they are first posited,<sup>123</sup> when they first

emerge, is balanced by this emptiness<sup>124</sup>, which quickly follows, as spoken of under the rubric of Nihilism. By confronting the conceptual system with the point of view that sees no secondary emergence, it is realised that this situation only occurs because one holds on to the conceptual system after it has manifested, instead of looking to what comes next in the unfolding of manifestation into existence. By holding on, one's attention is riveted to the breakdown of the conceptual system that one is holding on to. One sees this process of breaking down as some other kind of change from the initial welling-up which produced the conceptual system in the first place. This primordial unfolding has not stopped, but the one who holds on to his first conceptualization only sees its effects at second hand in the break down of the concepts he is holding on to. The secondary change that becomes so obsessively watched with an alternation of exhilaration and anxiety, so that it takes on the aspects of emergence and nihilism comes to be all that is seen. The principle of a single source of all emergences into existence is a reminder that breaks the obsessive gaze of the enchanted. It is like suddenly opening the curtains on a darkened firelit room, so that the morning sun shines in. Plato's allegory of the cave<sup>125</sup> is precisely to the point in this respect.

Properly speaking, one may not discuss the principle of no secondary causation within the same realm of discourse as that which speaks of secondary causes. If one even so much as discusses secondary causes they become effective, because, by discussing them, they are then taken into account as if they are something different from the single source, or condition, that makes all things appear possible. It is not that there is a distinction between a sort of primary and secondary causation, for this would be making the very primary distinction that must be avoided. Instead, one either sees that there is only a single source, or one discusses causation. The only thing that the point of view that sees only a single source has to say about causation is a denial of its effectiveness. When one begins to speak about causation, this point of view disappears; and, when one takes up this point of view all discussion of causation ceases. This is why the denial of causation is a principle and not an argument. It is the measure that, when applied to any argument, destructures it. It blows the argument apart; and, in so doing, allows the meaning to appear as a welling up from within the conceptual system, replacing its empty categorization with a fullness of a return to the single source, from which myriads of conceptual systems appear.

Focussing on the appearance of conceptual systems from this source is already an extreme narrowing of vision, for everything appears from it.

It is necessary, therefore, to inaugurate separate domains of discourse. One is either speaking in the domain of discourse, in which the point of view that will only recognise a single condition for all of existence is being used, or one is speaking in terms of effective secondary causation and artificial emergence. The principle of no secondary emergence only has meaning because we live in a world where that which appears from the hand of man seems more real than that which occurs in existence without man's intervention; where man cuts himself off from the rest of existence and sees himself as different in kind from it. Thus the endlessness of speeches about causation in contrast to the brevity of the statement that there is no such thing as effective secondary causation. Within the domain in which a single source is spoken of, one may speak of the arising of the illusory break that sets up the difference between genuine, and artificial, emergence only as an example of the arising in non-relation to/from that source that is common to all things. Within the domain in which this distinction between artificial and genuine emergence is designated-as-real,<sup>126</sup> one may state the principle of no

secondary causation in order to emphasize the unreality of effective secondary causes. In this way a confrontation between the contents of the two domains appears within each, although there is no relation between them and they cannot even be viewed side by side.

This clear splitting or separating of the domains of discourse concerning oneness and multiplicity is a destructuring of the template of ideation that mixes the idea of oneness, and the idea of multiplicity, because it is based on the seeing of both domains at once.<sup>127</sup> The point of view of ideation would have it that one could relate the principle of a single condition underlying all existence to speech about causality; and that one could discuss emergence and its opposite, nihilism, in the same context, passing from one to the other freely.<sup>128</sup> The operationalizing of the concept of no secondary causation in discourse is to deny these relationships. If these relationships are put out of play in discourse, just as the causal relationships that are topicalized in discourse are put out of play, then the process of ideation is broken up. Ideation is the source of the illusory connections, which make the realm in which artificial emergence appears hold together. Without ideation, the illusion falls apart. It is the arising of ideation which opens up the differ-

ence between the realm of discourse, in which only one source is recognised, and the realm of discourse concerned with secondary causation. Without this non-existent difference then, the truth of no secondary causation would never have been recognised. There is, then, a point to the opening up of the difference between the two realms of discourse, which is an emergent event like any other. It has as its source the same condition that underlies the emerging of the rest of existence. The point is that it allows the singleness of the source to be known by contrast.

What is true of the two domains of discourse<sup>129</sup> is also true of the two sub-domains within the realm of discourse concerning causation. They are completely distinct, and one is either in one or the other. If one is apparent then the other is hidden, and vice versa. The sub-domains are two views of the same thing. In this case, there is an argument concerning emergence, and another argument concerning nihilism. The two arguments are in some way completely independent, because they are referenced to different features of existence. However, a close scrutiny reveals that they are the same thing, seen in two different lights. This duplication within the discursive realm of secondary causation, where that which is the same is presented as

different from itself as if it were two different things, is the proof of its illusory nature contained within it. The illusion is of difference, when there is none. This is the opposite of the basis for ideation, which is making them the same when there is difference. Because the difference between nihilism and emergence is just a matter of perspective on the same thing, then it follows that the two domains of discourse are also two views of the same thing.<sup>130</sup> These perspectives are two views within the domain of discourse about causality, whereas the two domains of discourse are somehow not captured by either of them. Speaking in this way, suggests that there is an overview of the phenomenon which allows one to speak of the two domains of discourse, or the two perspectives within the domain of discourse that posits causality as real. This overview is precisely what is denied by the principle of no secondary causation. Speaking this way is merely a description. It is a using of ideation against itself.<sup>131</sup> This is only possible if there is a constant reminder of the meaning of the principle of no secondary causation within the discourse itself. This reminder makes the discourse poignant at each and every point.

Hitherto, causation and emergence have been used as interchangeable terms. The only reason that the

term causation has been introduced at all is because this is the rubric under which these issues are usually discussed. The terminology of causation may well be used, but it is awkward and suggests ideas that are unnecessary, just because of the history of this terminology. The terminology that speaks of emergence is more to the point because the term causation suggests a causal chain from the first, whereas emergence does not suggest this. Causation is merely a certain mechanistic way of conceptualizing emergences. Patterns of events arise together in certain orders. A focus on the primacy of the ordering gives a causal view of that arising. If, instead of focussing on the order and pattern, one focuses on the surprises which show up by concentrating on the breaches in the ordering that appear, we then speak about emergence instead of causation. The patterning is never wholly ordered, nor completely disordered. One sees in it what one is drawn to by one's inclinations. In this essay it is the patterning of disorder, viewed positively or negatively that will be emphasized, simply because it is order that is so often emphasized, as in causal descriptions. However, one must be continuously aware that the whole argument could be represented in terms of the terminology of causation if one wished.

The most sophisticated arguments, whether couched in a terminology of causation or emergence/nihilism, arise from a consideration of the order in the disorder. This is to say that since the pattern of the arising of events synchronically and diachronically (i.e. together and through time)<sup>132</sup> is never wholly ordered, nor yet wholly disordered; it is the attempt to find an underlying order in the disorder and the underlying disorder in the order which leads to the deepest probings of the phenomenon in question. The order in the disorder is the structure which underlies apparent disorder, and the disorder in the order, fundamental disconnections, emergent events, which appear with no possible explanation. The confrontation of structure with these fundamental disconnections is the source of any real considerations of the nature of time.

Whatever terminology one uses, it is, of course, the nature of time that is in question. Time is one name that the single source might be called.

Time.<sup>133</sup> What is it that this word indicates?

When one looks deeply into the matter one cannot help but have a sense of awe. But to express anything of what one may grasp of the vibrance of time, one must begin by making a distinction. Otherwise one must remain declarative in one's discourse.

Time! or Time: expansive/contracted (all

encompassing, and the moment). Once a dichotomy has been introduced, then the basis of a conceptual system has been laid. But this is only one view of time. One might say instead: Time - continuous/discontinuous (going on and on, and in quanta)<sup>134</sup> or one might say: Time - spacetime/timespace<sup>135</sup> or again: Time - filled/empty.<sup>136</sup> Each of these dichotomies gives a different slant to the grasping of the nature of time.<sup>137</sup> All the different perspectives on Time are true and in some sense one must confront the concept of Time with different dichotomies in order really to get a taste of what it is about. Yet the dichotomies that one uses to probe the meaning of time somehow do not capture, either separately or together, what Time itself suggests.<sup>138</sup> Thus, what held for the discourse about the principle of 'no secondary causation' and the discourse concerning causation, which was the necessity of separated domains of discourse, also holds for the discussion of Time and the dichotomies that are brought forward in order to unlock its meaning. There is a disconnection between Time and these dichotomies, that is clear, distinct and complete. In truth, what is said about Time in terms of the dichotomies must be continuously confronted with the reality of Time itself, which is only glimpsed but, goes far beyond what any descriptive device may portray of it.

Once one or more descriptive dichotomies are brought into play then the danger lies in getting stuck with the picture they reveal and not looking beyond that picture. Even more dangerous is becoming involved with the workings of the means of making the picture, i.e. the formal and structural relationships between the various dichotomies. The conceptual system arises from this getting-lost-in-the-means-of-picturing. One forgets that the different dichotomies are fundamentally disconnected from one another, and that even the two sides of the dichotomy are disconnected. Confronting the conceptual system, that grows up around these falsely inter-related dichotomies with what is indicated by the word Time itself, breaks open the system of concepts so that the real meaning may burst forth. By real meaning is meant the indications of the singleness of the source beyond multiplicity. Remembering disconnection in the face of the omnipresence of connection of the conceptual system, and connection when disconnection is asserted over and over, is the process by which the conceptual system's grip on one is loosened so that one comes to taste the meaning of Time itself beyond all the descriptions of it.<sup>139</sup> The generation of descriptions and even their systematic interrelation are necessary stages in this process. In fact, it is the modelling of

this process that the arguments which speak in terms of Nihilism and Emergence are concerned with. The process by which something singular is confronted by a plurality, so that a new singleness which encompasses a multiplicity may arise and how this new singleness points toward the inner core of the singular original in a way that was impossible before this confrontation, is what will be modelled under the rubric of Nihilism and then again in terms of Emergence.<sup>140</sup> This is ideation, and the process itself must be broken up by the assertion of disconnection. Ideation is unbounded connecting of everything together into a total conceptual system. It must be actively resisted by asserting disconnection in the face of overwhelming connection. The core of the core of the singular is gained by this active resistance to the process of ideation that gives access to its core. The core of the core of Time is Timing, which is giving each thing its proper due, at the right instant and in the best possible manner. Its core is the many aspects of Time shown up by the conceptual systems arising out of the different dichotomies, applied to the ineffable quality of Time itself.

In this way it is seen that the conceptual system must undergo temporalization. It must become subjected to Time and broken by Time. When this has

occurred then it may be said to exemplify or indicate, the nature of Time. Until it is broken, it only succeeds in showing itself in the guise of the exemplification of its topic of conceptualization. This is the crux of the question of discourse being unified in terms of what it is speaking about and how it says it. The form of discourse itself-- rhetoric --or the form of ideation in most speech, dominates what is being said and has not been broken in order to serve what is being said. Before it is broken-in, which is just like the breaking-in of a horse for riding, only the form of discourse or ideation may be seen, regardless of the subject matter.<sup>141</sup> These forms when not broken do not serve the speakers, but enslave them. Speech becomes action when it exemplifies the process by which the form of discourse and ideation is broken in. Before that, the action of speech is to say something other than what was intended.<sup>142</sup> When this breaking of the form of discourse or ideation is understood in terms of words, then it may also be applied to action. Words that are to the point must break through the form of speech in some way.

Otherwise the form of discourse and ideation has become an idol. Language as speaking confers Being to beings. It confers the connectedness. This is

true as far as it goes, but one must not stop with language and its intimate connection to the world. Break the form of discourse, break the connection by which Being is conferred on the world. Confer Being only on the single source from which the beings and language arise. Language is not that source - it appears in the world as one being among others. The 'is' of connection by which one says, 'this is that' must be confronted with the 'is' of declaration by which one says 'such and such a matter is'. For anything which the 'is' of connection is used, the 'is' that declares its existence must not be used. In this way, only one matter may be declared to exist. That is the Single Source. That is Time timing existences unfolding in all its aspects. That is Life living through all living things. Plato called it the Good.<sup>143</sup> S'ui identified Time, Life, and Chi in his book Chi. These are some of the attributes of the Single Source.

When the conceptual system is not itself temporalized, but instead displays its own endemic temporality, as isolated from Time itself as if it were an isolated subfunction operating independently out of harmony, then emergence and nihilism appear as sui generis. It is only after the conceptual system has become closed off, after having held onto one or a set of distinctions and made them the

basis of a conceptual system, that these concepts become empty. This is the nihilistic aspect, and it is in this way that concepts begin to change, despite the attempt to fix the system in order to make it stable, which is the aspect of emergence. Thus, nihilism and emergence<sup>144</sup> are the result of a refusal to let go of a conceptual system even after it begins to deteriorate. This makes artificial emergence and nihilism a tertiary phenomenon. That means that it appears as an epiphenomenon of the conceptual system, which is itself an epiphenomenon of ideation, that occurs because thought does not confront itself radically with the principle of no secondary causation. When one begins with the epiphenomenon of an epiphenomenon and attempts to get a clear picture of how things are in the world, using the western scientific and philosophical tradition as the sole source of reference, then one is starting from the farthest point possible from the truth.<sup>145</sup> This is because the western tradition accepts ideation without reference to the principle of no secondary causation as a means of attaining knowledge. Thus, the western tradition gives reality to these epiphenomena, and is in fact almost completely absorbed in them. For the most part those within the western tradition operate in a realm completely dominated by the unbroken form of discourse or ideation. So, if

one begins with an epi-epiphenomenon of ideation, using as a guide the works of men who accept as real what is not -- as the author has done and as many others do every day and have done for centuries -- then one is beginning with a tremendous handicap.<sup>146</sup>

However, the principle of no secondary causation is the root of intellection. Intellection is distinct from ideation.<sup>147</sup> Intellection is a recognition which may use ideation as a tool. The intellect sees the truth of the principle of no secondary causation immediately, unless it is dominated by the life-form of ideation so utterly that it is blinded. Since this principle is the core of all intellectual endeavour, it is possible to arrive at it, no matter where one begins, if there is persistence. This is because, if one takes the process of ideation far enough, it negates itself and shows its illusory nature. For this, however, the confrontation of thought with itself must be deep. One must experience, in that process, the continuous need to relinquish the concepts one has formed and to think again. One must ultimately go against even the channel one's thought takes of its own accord and to which everything points. By this kind of confrontation the dominance of the life-form of ideation is eventually broken, so that the light of the

intellect shines through.

Whitehead has said that all western philosophy is a footnote to Plato.<sup>148</sup> What is amazing is that the core of Plato's dialogues is the principle of no secondary causation, which no one in the western tradition has taken up. Because of this, what Plato says about sophistry, which is the key idea the dialogues are designed to illustrate, becomes true of the entire tradition of western philosophy that flows from that source in Greek thought.<sup>149</sup>

Socrates confronted the other Greeks with this principle, and it is clearly stated. This confrontation of the presocratics with the principle of no secondary causation is, strictly speaking, the source of the western tradition, but that tradition did not take that confrontation into itself. Instead, it forgot.<sup>150</sup> So, not only is the principle of no secondary causation the root of intellection as such, but its appearance in Greek thought is the root of the whole western philosophical tradition.

In order to realise this confrontation anew it must be understood within the context of contemporary philosophy. This is the point. We must begin where we are, and that is completely enveloped by the thought-forms that were developed by the western

philosophical and scientific tradition. It is no good pretending it is possible just to step outside this tradition into another, because we are it. Whatever is seen will be seen through the template of ideation that dominates us. The people of the western world are completely saturated with this way of looking at existence. Therefore, it is necessary to break this in ourselves, using the tools from within that tradition and the resources within ourselves. The form that the unfolding of the template of ideation takes today is different to the form it took in Plato's time, so that it is not possible for us merely to reconstruct what happened then and have it serve us as well. No. It is necessary for us to struggle to make the principle of no secondary causation real for us within the universe of discourse within which our thoughts are formed. Only in this way can there be any hope of escaping from the grip of the template of ideation; seeing it for what it is, and recognising our saturation with it, then breaking it by using it against itself.

The action of a discourse must constantly exemplify this confrontation. Ideation produces concepts and systematizes them and structuralizes them in a continuous stream, and the intellect sees beyond this outpouring of ideal forms, by which it glimpses

more than the concepts contain. The intellect says, on the basis of what it glimpses beyond the constructs of ideation, 'No! That's not it! These apparent causal connections are not real. There is only one source. There is complete disconnection as well as these apparent connections.' Critical discourse should be criticism of oneself, not of others. In the western tradition of scholarship, the setting up of an intellectual position comes after the criticism of one's forebears in the tradition. Self-criticism should be greater.<sup>151</sup> So, if one's criticism of the forerunners is scathing then criticism of one's own position should be even stronger. That is to say that the principle of no secondary causation is not an intellectual position. Any formulation of it must itself be confronted with that principle. Ideation is the endless production of concepts and the formation of them into structural systems. The intellectual activity is a sort of terrorism which one injects into this process to crack it open. The outcome of this injection at every point of connection of a portion of disconnection is genuine emergence. It is the realisation that the template of ideation is part of the unfolding of everything else in the world, and is not in a separate, protected, time-sphere of its own. Thus, the structure of theoretical systems in relation to emergence is a picture of this confront-

ation.

Theories are the forms produced by the ideational process. They are clusters of concepts which are being related systematically and structurally.

Theories are constantly being refuted by a process of confrontation between them and the conception of the way things are produced by means of experimentation. What appears within this confrontation between theory and experimentation is artificial emergence. This confrontation also occurs when anyone attempts to understand anything, for instance, in this case, the western philosophical tradition. The person produces conceptual pictures of what he thinks is meant by his forerunners in the tradition, then he tests these pictures in his reading. This process of testing goes on in an individual's study, and within the tradition itself.

What is seen is that the tradition is a blown-up picture of the individual who interacts with it.

What he sees in it is himself. The realization that there is only genuine emergence must stop both the individual and the tradition dead in their tracks.

Artificial emergence may be understood as the process of interlocking of the individual's self-form and the form of a tradition which is the track left by intersubjectively undertaken ideation. This manifestation of the ideational template within

and outside the individual is broken, when the individual realizes that both he and the tradition, with which he is engaged, flow from the same source as everything else, and that what is unfolding between him and the tradition is no different from the unfolding of everything else. Here, there is a change in perspective, where one suddenly sees a universal process at work everywhere, of which one is merely a small part.

This work is another example of that universality-unfolding. Yet, one only realizes that to the extent that it embodies the confrontation between the principal of no secondary causation and ideation. That is to say that an author must strive to re-centre his work beyond himself and the tradition in which it is suspended, in order to open up an access to the realization that there is only genuine emergence.

From within the conceptual system, genuine emergence appears as a possibility that cannot be realized -- but only glimpsed. And that glimpse is so tentative that it hardly appears at all. It appears from one point of view as the possibility of making a sure and clear, distinction, in the face of the ambiguity that overcomes all distinctions produced by the conceptual system. From the other point of view it

appears as the possibility of an emergence that is not dictated by the structure of the conceptual system. Bateson calls this the fourth metalevel of learning.<sup>152</sup> What is seen is that the clear distinctions, whose possibilities are barely glimpsed through the conceptual system, are all around us in the natural world, that is, there beyond man's projection upon it of an artificial world whose source is ideation. Each bird and flower and even man himself are clearly distinct forms in the world. The genuine emergence that only appears in contrast to artificial emergence as an unobtainable ideal, is the unfolding of the forms of existence that are so clear. It seems so clear and obvious when seen in terms of the unfolding of natural forms. The key point is then to see how the unfolding of the ideational system is also a natural unfolding. The reason it does not seem natural is that we are enthralled by it. Because it has not been broken, it dominates us. By breaking the ideational template one is then able to stop and see that it is like any other natural form. It has clear and distinct outlines, and it unfolds like everything else in existence. This view of the ideational template does not make it any different from what it was before--it is merely an essential recognition that the clear distinction and the genuine emergence are already contained in the

conceptual form as it is. It is perfect because breaking the ideational template gives knowledge of the genuine emergence, to which man would have no access otherwise. By contrast with the illusion it produces, it highlights the purity and reality of the genuine emergence. What emerges is perfect in every case already; it is merely for us to appreciate how it is perfect, beyond our conceptualizations, that prevent our seeing that perfection.

The overarching argument that is being presented here may be stated in two ways. It may be presented beginning either with the template of ideation, or with the principle of one independent source. The reason it appears in this way is that, in order to construct an overview of the relation between the principle of no secondary causation, and the template of ideation that generates causal connections, one must see the two as if they were contained within the domain of ideation, which has two points of view contained within it. This is impossible - in truth the ideational template cannot contain this principle - but for descriptive purposes it may be sketched as if it could, as long as the description remains tentative. This makes the overarching argument of the same kind as the arguments concerning nihilism and emergence that will be presented later. The act of forming an

argument is a relating of propositions, and the possibility of these relationships is denied by the principle of a single source. Therefore the arguments must be of a kind different from a syllogism. Each segment of the argument must be in some way independent, yet intermeshed with the other segments. This view of what an argument must consist of comes only from a confrontation of the ideational template with the principle of a single source. If the arguments themselves express an incipient break-up of the ideational template as it is expressed in standard logical argumentation, then it is only acceptable to use such arguments tentatively in order to express how the break-up could occur. Effectively, then, the arguments must contain discrete jumps which are unexplained. This is, of course, exactly what an argument is not supposed to have in it. In fact, in the sort of anti-argument proposed here, the whole point is to construct the argument in such a way that the jumps may be seen. The jumps are the impingement of the principle of no secondary causation on the argument itself.

In working out the line of thought that culminated in this essay, the author began within the ideational template, unquestioningly taking emergence as a topic, and the tradition of western

philosophy as a source of information concerning the topic. So let us lay out the overarching argument from this direction first. In the research and presentation of results it is generally accepted that the order of discovery is different from the order of presentation of the results in a final form for others to view<sup>153</sup>. This is because of the temporalization of the two viewpoints within the domain of ideation.<sup>154</sup> In the process of discovery, one uses one point of view, and upon discovery there is an automatic switch to the other point of view. Thus, the movement of research and the movement of method (meta-hodos: way after)<sup>155</sup> postulated by the discoverer, so that others may arrive where he has gone by his research, occur within the form of ideation. Here, both directions will be presented together, because they form a single system.

The argument from the direction of discovery has four segments:

1. Ideational arguments occur in related pairs which are the same argument seen from two different view points.
2. Each form of the argument exemplifies the template of ideation itself.
3. When an argument is developed (worked out) from one point of view the implicit generation of the opposite argument occurs with it. If the implicit argument is brought to the surface they both disappear.

4. The vanishing of the argument indicates the principle of no secondary causation. The impossibility of linking the two arguments shows that there is a single disconnected source for both of them independently.

The argument concerning Nihilism and that concerning Emergence are a pair. The first starts from the recognition of nihilistic opposition, and shows how the possibility of clear distinctions arise from them. The second begins with the distinction between genuine and artificial emergence, and shows how artificial emergence arises to form its own separate domain from which genuine emergence can hardly be comprehended. These two arguments are a negative and a positive view of the same phenomenon. By working out the argument from the point of view of nihilism, a model of the template that governs the ideational process is constructed, and ideation is the source of both nihilism and artificial emergence. So, thinking out an argument with respect to a topic, is the construction of a model of the process of thinking itself. When this argument is turned back on itself by a switch from the, already worked-out, argument from one point of view, to the other point of view - making what was implicit, explicit and submerging the worked-out argument into the background - then, in this confrontation, the two arguments cancel each other

out. In the process of cancellation it is realized that they are both false. Kant calls this the antinomies of pure reason.<sup>156</sup> This phenomenon is well known from the history of philosophy. But, because the philosophers who experienced exactly the same phenomenon themselves had forgotten the principle of no secondary causation, when it occurred to them, they retreated, like Kant, back into the ideational form. They saw it as negative, whereas that is exactly what thought that moves<sup>157</sup> must do. It must cancel itself out, in order to show its unreality. By that, the complete disconnection that occurs between the segments of the dialectic of thought's movement is shown up. That disconnection between segments of arguments implies the more radical disconnection between the individual thoughts which make up the segments, which Hume declared, and to which Kant's philosophy was an answer. This radical disconnection indicates that all the moments of thought must arise in relation/non-relation to/from<sup>158</sup> a single disconnected source. There is no relation between the thoughts, but only the "relation to" or "dependence on" the single source that each thought is an exemplification of from a different aspect.

What is thought provoking about the development of this kind of anti-argument is that it goes from

seeing the disconnection between the two points of view in the form of ideation toward the realization that these two points of view are only there to indicate the pure disconnection that separates them. But one gets to this realization by the movement between the two points of view within the template of ideation. It is as if there was a Mobius strip,<sup>159</sup> and as one moved along the surface, first one thought there were two sides, then one realized that there was only one side, and finally one realized that one could jump from one side to the other directly, and, in that jump, one had not moved at all if the strip had no depth. This means that the movement of the argument is no movement at all, unlike the transitiveness of the syllogism, the whole point of which is to get one from 'A' to 'B' via a connection between statements.

Each part of the argument is a picture of the same thing. That thing is the disconnected template of ideation split open. The splitting open of ideation is the realization that it is already intrinsically split. No movement occurs. The separate pictures are merely presented, first in one order; then in another. The changing of the order gives the impression of movement. The other order to the propositions of the argument is as follows:

1. The designating-as-real of the illusory<sup>160</sup> connection between the two domains makes it appear that the principle and the two domains form a triad. This solidification of the tentative relationship between the domains that allows the crux of the principle of ideation to be seen, is the form of ideation.
2. The concept of their being a relation between the two domains arises from the close proximity of the two, which is contrary to the principle that disconnects them. The illusion of connection makes it possible for the crux of the principle of disconnection to be seen.
3. This complete disconnection of everything from everything else can only be seen by the arising of two mutually independent domains of discourse, within which the principle of only one source can be stated differently.
4. There is no secondary causation. There is only genuine emergence. Only clear distinctions occur in existence.

This form of the same argument goes from pure disconnection to pure connection. What is seen is the unfolding of the template of ideation from the principle of no secondary causation. This argument ends where the other argument started. Because of the retreat from the point recognised by Hume that there is complete disconnection between thoughts, (which is recognised by Kant, in his positing the antinomies of Pure Reason) no one in the western tradition has worked out the implications in the principle of no secondary causation stated by Plato. From the point of view of those entrenched in the

form of ideation, the idea of disconnecting everything that one has worked so hard to connect logically and reasonably, seems very strange indeed. However, these implications are easy to work out because they are merely the obverse use of the template of ideation. Merely by severing all the connections that hold the shell of the template of ideation together, one arrives at the state of affairs indicated by the principle of no secondary causation.

The form of the two arguments may be simply stated as follows:

1. Mediation: relationship made substantive --three related things.
2. Relationship posited tentatively --two are related to each other not to the source.
3. No relationship --disconnected pair that make the disconnected source visible.
4. The principle stated --single disconnected source.

Each of these steps are phases in a process of solidification or de-solidification, depending on how you want to look at it. They are moments of a dialectic of thought, that model the unfolding of ideation itself. Ideation is a form that emerges from the single source and points ever back to it. The splitting-open of the template of ideation is

the obverse of the opening-out of the form in the first place. The principle is an icon of that single source, from which the template of ideation opens out. The principle, when held to firmly, is a still point around which the process of ideation revolves. The template of ideation that appears around this still point, ever indicating it anew, is, as it were, a repository for the seed of discovery contained in that still point. The still point which is the end of the process of discovery contained in the seed is the same as the seed. The breaking out of the ideational template, so that one comes to know it, is the whole point of the existence of that form. This breaking-out is merely a transformation of that form itself, not a leaving of it. When complete disconnection is the rule, then there is no where to go. A transformation without movement or causation in a single place is what is called for - i.e. the impossible.<sup>161</sup> That is to say that, what is impossible from the point of view of ideation is precisely what ideation indicates the possibility of, and is that which is necessary for ideation to transform itself into what it indicates. The unfolding of the form of the template of ideation is precisely this impossible transformation, which does not need to occur because it is already true. It is merely unrealised. The transformation is merely the realisation of the

positiveness of this key philosophical experience that Kant called the antinomies, and Hume called the unrelatedness of the moments of thought.<sup>162</sup>

These two arguments only appear within the domain of ideation. They are an example of what they speak about. They are, therefore, not true. It is not enough to confront syllogistic argument with disconnection in this way, for the template of ideation is merely structuralized if this presentation is held on to. Disconnection must be made real. It must be complete. In a way, the partial disconnection of the ideational template is worse than straightforward syllogistic argument, concerning it, which is obviously wrong. It gives the impression that the process is comprehensible. It gives the impression that there is a process or movement. There is no connection between the point of view which sees things in terms of the principle of a single source, and that which sees causal connections produced by ideation. The process is only in description. The description is false. By understanding the complete disconnection between the two points of view on the world, it is possible to appreciate the diamond point of what is indicated by the disconnection of the two. That diamond point is the utter connectedness of everything in the single disconnected source. Complete disconnection is complete connec-

tion. With this one is left speechless. The statement of the principle of no secondary causation which makes the causal context necessary leads to the impossibility of stating it, and that is its ultimate statement. That is a recognition. It must be realized. (~~Its realization secondary causation which makes the causal context necessary leads to the impossibility of stating it and that is its ultimate statement. That is a recognition. It must be realized.~~) Its realization is what the words of the statement of the principle indicate as a possibility.

This statement of the two versions of the overarching argument that ties this essay together will suffice to bring into focus the issues that will be presented in the following chapters. The first chapter will deal with the origin of the principle of no secondary causation in The Phaedo of Plato, and its implications. The second chapter will use the transition from the philosophy of Hume to the philosophy of Kant as an example of the transition between form and structure. The third chapter will present the argument concerning Nihilism and introduce the form of the Ideational template. The fourth chapter will present the argument concerning Emergence, that is, the obverse of the argument concerning Nihilism, and complete the outline of the

form of the Ideational template. And finally, the fifth chapter will present the way in which the topic of Disconnection may be approached that arises from the re-evaluation of the use of the ideational template.

Presenting arguments must not obscure the connection of these issues to life. What is spoken about here is the unfolding of one's life -- the moment by moment opening out to existence. The intellect can either merely monitor this unfolding, or attempt to intervene to change it. The difference between monitoring and intervention is not synonymous with action/inaction. Monitoring may necessitate either action or inaction. Intervention may be by action or inaction as well.<sup>163</sup> Intervention is an attempt to dominate the process of unfolding, to alter its course and make it amenable to one's own wishes. Once intervention is attempted, then one immediately loses sight of the timing of Time itself --one has substituted an artificial temporality. The artificial temporality shows up as nihilism or artificial emergence. We are so lost in artificial time systems that it is almost impossible for us to imagine being connected to the timing of Time, as are all the events of the natural world. Man has become disconnected almost completely from the recognition that events are timed, not by him but by

Time itself, which determines the times of all the events that come into existence. Even the timing of the artificial time systems that man attributes to himself are still timed by Time, not man.

Artificial time systems give the illusion of being able to dominate time, but they cannot control when any event measured in terms of them will occur. They do not have the power to make an event occur at any time other than when it does actually occur. Each event descends at a precise moment of unfolding into existence. The intellect monitors this process, neither seeking to hurry it nor to delay it. If the intellect attempts to hold on to an event or grasp something ahead of its timing by Time, then the intellect ceases to monitor it and loses track of the timing of events. In this disengagement, thought is generated by movement of the intellect ahead or behind. Instead of letting things go, as new things appear in sight during the process of unfolding, things are held on to.

Each thing has its own intrinsic temporality.<sup>164</sup> So, by focussing on, and trying to hold on to, any particular thing, one is holding on to its unique temporality. That temporality is only a part of the whole orchestration of the timing of the unfolding of existence. It is like a sub-cycle. Artificial temporality is comprised of the temporalities of the

things that are held on to. It is always a conglomerate of sub-cycles. It cannot compare to the timing of the unfolding of the events themselves. In that unfolding the temporalities of the sub-cycles are interwoven by Time itself, instead of by man making his own selection. In this way it is possible to see how the timing of artificial temporality is still a timing by Time itself. The temporalities of individual things can only indicate timing of Time, so that even if they are disconnected from that context artificially by man's focusing on them, they have not changed their timing in any way. It is only man that sees a separate time-zone appear. Man becomes even more disconnected when he begins to construct machines that have completely different timings. The zone of artificial timing deepens dramatically. But since man himself has an intrinsic temporality,<sup>165</sup> just like any other thing that unfolds into existence, whatever comes from man can only express this intrinsic temporality, so that still no departure from the determination of timing by Time can occur.

Once the zone of an artificial temporality has arisen, then the difficulty that the intellect faces is connecting the artificial timing to the genuine emergence. Ideation arises as the means of making these connections. The analogy to the artificial

zone of timing is the rate of speech in the unfolding of discourse. Here the problem appears of how to fit the flow of discourse to the flow of events in the world.<sup>166</sup> Ideation is the source of this running commentary. The Greeks knew this difference as physis and logos.<sup>167</sup> To them the unfolding of speech and the unfolding of nature seemed very different. What may have been recognised by the early Greeks is that both are from the same source of unfolding. It is not that the different temporality of speech need be imposed on the unfolding of the other temporalities, besides that of speech. They are all from one source; speech is merely one of many different temporalities. The concept of the matching of the time of speech as a commentary on the unfolding of all other events is the beginning of the form of ideation. It directly covers over the unique source by elevating speech above other phenomena and separating speeches from them. Discourse becomes ideation by another further disconnection. Inner speech is disconnected from outward speech and becomes thought. Thought becomes another running commentary on discourse. This further disconnection corresponds to the difference between the conglomerate of timings that the artificial timing is originally based on and the emergence from man of machines which have unnatural rhythms. Idealism and materialism are intimately

connected in this way.<sup>168</sup> Machines are embodied theories.<sup>169</sup>

So the issues discussed here are central to the understanding of man's relation to existence. The recognition of the intrinsic powerlessness of man in the face of the timing of events by Time rather than by man himself is crucial. When man does not recognise this powerlessness, then artificial timing, within the scope of the timing of Time, but out of harmony with it, arises. The timing by Time occurs by its giving each thing its own temporality. All the separate temporalities interweave, without there being any relation between them. Man introduces, by ideation, artificial connections between a few of these things or events, that he happens to hold on to, so that an artificial time-zone seems to appear. It is illusory, but appears real,<sup>170</sup> especially when within it things and events appear from man that are wholly artificial. There is no time as a connective tissue between the separate temporalities set up in the things themselves. Time is not an overarching concept that covers all these harmonized temporalities; but instead, Time is a name of the source from which all these separate temporalities arise.

## CHAPTER 1

The classic statement of the 'principle of no secondary causation' (i.e. that there is one condition that arranges everything for the best, underlying what appears as the multiple causation of existence) is made by Plato in his dialogue called the Phaedo.<sup>1</sup> An understanding of the issues discussed by Socrates before his death, may provide a starting point for the further elucidation of the nature of the principle of 'no secondary causation' within a contemporary context. Socrates, just before his death, undertakes a defense of the existence of life after death. The immediacy of death's presence for Socrates makes the arguments put forward extremely vivid. Yet, the centre of the dialogue is the setting forth of Socrates' view of causation, of which the generation of the living from the dead, and the dead from the living, is a particular example.<sup>2</sup> The point that Socrates makes here is never seriously considered again within the western tradition.<sup>3</sup> Perhaps this is because the principle of a single source itself is only suggested, and is not the crux of the argument of the dialogue. It is the background for the discussion, which is not itself developed. It is

necessary to understand the arguments presented in the dialogue in the context of this root-principle that is only suggested. Perhaps here it will be possible to recollect these arguments in a way that will bring the principle of no secondary causation into sharper focus, and in this way also to see the limitations of Socrates' presentation.<sup>4</sup>

Life, death, and the two processes of generation that occur in the movement between these two opposites are what connects the argument of this dialogue closely with the theme of emergence. Coming into existence (unfolding), and going out of existence (collapse) are two opposite processes.<sup>5</sup> They entail each other intrinsically. Thus this dialogue is precisely about the theme of emergence. Nihilism also appears forcefully within the dialogue as the counter arguments of Simmias and Cebes against Socrates' account of the immortality of the soul. Together they present opposite arguments against the immortality of the soul,<sup>6</sup> which Socrates must counter. In the refutation of the nihilistic arguments against the immortality of the soul, which is the core of the process of emergence and collapse, the basic confrontation between Nihilism and emergence is made, by which access to the principle of no secondary causation occurs. The reason that the principle is left in the background

is that one is meant to work out the implications of the dialogue and go one-self through the process of experiencing what happens, when these two arguments are brought into juxtaposition. What happens is, of course, that one's perspective is shifted radically to the real meaning of the immortality of the soul. That immortality is based on the necessity of complete disconnection. The body is enmeshed in the world of causation. It emerges and then disappears. That aspect of the human being that is independent of these causal relations is called the soul. The soul is the core of the human being, seen in the light of the truth of the principle of 'no secondary causation.' Both Emergence with its concomitant aspect--that is, collapse--and Nihilism only exist in the world seen in terms of causation. The immortality of the soul is seen to be true when this way of seeing existence vanishes. This vanishing, at which point the soul achieves independence, is death. Thus the dialogue occurs at just the point at which Socrates is about to make the shift to seeing the truth of the principle of a single source in terms of the separation of his spiritual from his bodily existence - a shift he has already made intellectually.

The place to begin the recollection of the dialogue is the point where the principle of 'no secondary

causation' is indicated. In this way, a proper view of the balance of the dialogue around this principle may be attained. This statement comes in a description by Socrates of his own intellectual career.<sup>7</sup> He says that he began as a causalist looking for the ultimate cause of things in other things. He then rejected this means of inquiry, so that he now disclaims any knowledge of the causal relations between things, or events, in existence. He indicates the viewpoint that he substituted for the inquiry into causes in the following paragraph:

However, I once heard someone reading from a book, as he said, by Anaxagoras, and asserting that it is mind that produces order and is the cause of everything. That explanation pleased me. Somehow it seemed right that mind should be the cause of everything, and I reflected that, if this is so, mind in producing order sets everything in order and arranges each individual thing in the way that is best for it. Therefore, if anyone wished to discover the reason why any given thing came or ceased or continued to be, he must find out what it was best for that thing to be, or act or be acted upon in any other way. On this view there was only one thing for a man to consider, with regard both to himself and to anything else, namely the best and highest good, although this would necessarily imply knowing what is less good, since both are covered by the same knowledge. (97 cd.)<sup>8</sup>

The key point is that a single conditioning principle is substituted for the myriad of causes which the physicists see in existence. That it is called

'mind' in this context is inessential. By that reading Plato is made into an idealist, which he appears to be in the western tradition. What is essential is that the single condition arranges everything for the best, that is for the highest good. This is what truly distinguishes the single source.

As for a power which keeps things disposed at any given moment in the best possible way, they (those who see multiple causation) neither look for it, nor believe that it has any supernatural force. 99c; (Author's insert)<sup>9</sup>

The single source is a power that determines timing, but not just any timing. It determines the best timing. To know the best timing it is necessary to know the untimely. Without this contrast one would not really know the best timing. Socrates says that they are covered by the same knowledge. This means that even the un-timely is part of the order of the highest good. The knowledge that comes from the contrast is a single knowledge. It is knowledge of the truth of the principle that 'there is no secondary causation'. This is the recognition that there is only one power which determines all existence. Nothing in existence has any power to do anything to any other thing. When you look deeply into it, this principle has profound consequences. There are no accidents,<sup>10</sup> no random events, nothing left out of

account. There is a set timing for every event, which is that it occurs at just the right moment, even if it doesn't appear so to human beings. This is, of course, the key point. The best timing is beyond what we see as the best. Therefore, to appreciate how the timing that occurs could be the best timing, it is necessary to look beyond our selves. This is what Socrates' account does. Socrates has broken out of the life-form imposed by the template of ideation and realised its inverse by looking back on the template.<sup>11</sup> This breaking forth from the dominance of ideation marks the change in his philosophical career that Socrates describes. By taking the point of view of The Good as superior to one's own viewpoint, one breaks free from the limitations of it.

Once the principle of 'no secondary causation' has been introduced, then it must be understood. That understanding is made possible by the presentation of an alternative view of causation, to that in which things may be said to affect other things. In the normal theory of causation there is either direct action or action at a distance. Descartes<sup>12</sup> and Leibniz<sup>13</sup> developed these two views, which are still with us today.\* In direct causation something comes into contact with another thing, and transmits a force to it, in order to change its state. In

indirect causation the force is transmitted over an intervening distance without contact. Either way, a relationship is set up between the two objects or events. How things may change without such a relationship being set up becomes the matter that must be understood as soon as the principle of a single source is posited. The key concept that makes this understandable is that of opposition, as it operates in existence. It is by disconnected opposites that what appears to be causation occurs. Thus most of the dialogue deals with this theory of opposites. The centre of the argument that Socrates puts forward is the following paragraph:

Socrates had listened with his head turned toward the speaker. It was brave of you to refresh my memory, he said, but don't you realize the difference between what we are saying now and what we said then. Then we were saying that opposite things come from opposite things; now we are saying that the opposite itself can never become opposite to itself - neither the opposite which is within us nor that which is in the real world. Then, my friend, we were speaking about objects which possess opposite qualities, and calling them by the names of the latter, but now we are speaking about the qualities themselves, from whose presence in them the objects called after them derive their names. We maintain that the opposites themselves would absolutely refuse to tolerate coming into being from one another. (103b)<sup>14</sup>

The difference that Socrates' interlocutor<sup>15</sup> did not comprehend is precisely the crucial one for the understanding of the theory of oppositions. There

is a difference in existence between opposite things, and the opposite qualities that are embodied, making them what they are. The qualities<sup>16</sup> do not appear anywhere in a pure form except as abstractions. They only appear phenomenologically as mixed in objects. By the dominance of an opposite quality in the thing, it is given the name of that opposite. For instance when tallness is dominant in a thing, then the thing is tall, and when shortness is dominant, the thing is short. It is by the actual movement of the opposite qualities within the thing that all changes of the thing are effected. So, if one thing becomes tall and the other short, no matter what the apparent causal relation between these two things, the explanation is that tallness became dominant in one and shortness became dominant in the other. As tallness advanced in one, shortness retreated, and in the other thing the opposite process occurred without any relation between the two events. The opposite qualities may not mix, so, if one advances, then the other must necessarily retreat. On the other hand, at the level of seeing things rather than the qualities within the things, opposite things give rise to one another. This emergence of things from their opposites in continual dynamic is what appears in existence because of the impossibility for opposite qualities 'to be opposite to themselves'.

(103c)<sup>17</sup>

The disconnection between opposite qualities is complete. So, if a thing moves in relation to the lay-out of qualities in existence, and the qualities within it do not move with it, then it turns into the opposite. This means that there are two kinds of movement that interlock to make up the changes in existence; there is the movement of qualities within things, and the movement of things in existence.<sup>18</sup> There is a disconnection between the qualities so that if the thing moves, then it may cross from the sphere of influence of one quality to the other. The fact that it does this shows that the disconnection between the qualities is complete. If, when the object moved in relation to the qualitative context, it did not change into its opposite, then opposites might be able to become opposite to themselves. In this way, the movements of the objects exemplify the disconnections between the opposite qualities in existence.<sup>19</sup>

The soul moves from one realm that is invisible into a realm of visibility.<sup>20</sup> In the invisible realm the opposite qualities are distinct whereas in the visible realm they are mixed in things. The same things appear sometimes tall, sometimes short. When the soul, which is immortal, moves across the dividing line between these two distinct realms, then the person whose soul it is changes from dead to

living. At death the soul moves back across the division so that the person changes from living to dead. Certain qualities are intrinsic to the things, while other qualities are changeable for a thing. Thus, for the soul, life is intrinsic to it - it cannot die. However, for the person whose soul it is, there is the experience of life and death. That is to say that, for the human being, an indicator of the single source, the opposite 'life' is attached to it intrinsically, while for the human body as a Dasein (being-there) in the realm of the mixture of body and soul, then there is experience of life and death, as it moves in and out of this realm. Those opposites that are intrinsic to the person or thing are its core attributes that must be distinguished from the inessential attributes based on the movement of the thing.

So we find, in certain cases like these (hot/cold: snow/fire are the examples Socrates uses for the same thing) that the name of the form is eternally applicable not only to the form itself, but also to something else, which is not the form but invariably possesses its distinguishing characteristic. 103e. (Author's insert)<sup>21</sup>

The soul intrinsically is connected to the quality: Life. The body on the other hand is not intrinsically connected to this quality and so experiences life and death alternately. If a person or thing has an intrinsic connection to a quality, then it

cannot remain what it is on the approach of the opposite quality.

It must either withdraw at the approach of (the opposite) ... or cease to exist.  
(103d; Authors insert) <sup>22</sup>

The presentation of the relation between opposites is wholly designed to show up the disconnection between the opposite qualities. This is precisely shown by the fact that things which have related to them certain essential qualities change into their opposites, if they move in relation to the distribution of opposite qualities, and things that have related to them a certain opposite at their core must move, or cease to exist when the distribution of opposite qualities changes so as to bring the approach of a thing's opposite. The dividing line between the opposite qualities is always maintained. It is this dividing line that is highlighted by the movement of the opposite qualities and the things with opposite qualities assigned to them, either at their core or inessentially. The point of this anticausal description has, however, to do with temporality. The opposite qualities are, at each instant, arranged differently in existence. The unfolding of existence is nothing other than this continuously differing arrangement. Things with form<sup>23</sup> are like so many glass shapes, in which the different coloured lights of the continuously

differing arrangement of the qualities appear. However, some of the qualities are intrinsically connected to these forms, and some are not. So, when the arrangement of the qualities changes, the forms have to move in relation to that change. If an opposite that a form is intrinsically connected to, moves, then that form must readjust itself to the movement of that quality. If the form does not move, and the opposite which is counter to that which is registered in its core approaches, then that form is destroyed.<sup>24</sup> This is because the form tried to take a quality into its core that was the opposite of it. Harmony, which Simmias argues to be the nature of the soul, is when the forms move in precise tune with the changing arrangement of the opposite qualities. Disharmony is being either ahead or behind the advance of the changing arrangement. The correct view of existence looks to the qualities within things, not at the the things themselves, and takes into account the changes in their arrangement as a guide to action. If, at any point, one focuses on the things instead of the opposite qualities, then one's attention is held there so that one loses track of the changing arrangement of qualities. This sets up the possibility of an alternative artificial temporality arising. It arises when, by the focus on form, one holds on to the form instead of following the qualities that may

shift to another form. A permanent move to seeing the forms, instead of the qualities leads to destruction because each form has a core of essential opposites. If one does not see the opposite quality coming, then when they meet the form will be destroyed. A corollary to this is that, when opposites are equal, neither being dominant, then they both vanish. This vanishing makes it impossible to see the form any more, and so the form vanishes as well. By this it is seen that it is by the contrast of opposite qualities that the form is seen, and not vice versa.

The movement of existence is a response to the changing arrangement of opposite qualities that appears in things. The qualities shift through the forms, so that one cannot hold on to the forms if one wants to follow the unfolding existence. This holding on to forms is, though, exactly what is basic to the western philosophical and scientific tradition. Forms are taken, by the members of this particular tradition, to be primary and not the opposite qualities. The core qualities of an object are recognized, but not in relation to the approach of their opposites that demand movement or destruction. Thus, western metaphysics has taken the structure of the Platonic description of existence, and missed the point. It has focussed on what does

not move, when the whole point of positing the model is to see the changing of the inessential opposite qualities in relation to the thing with its core qualities. This focus on the form rather than the opposite qualities leads to the appearance of the alternative temporality of artificial emergence. The form seems to have, besides its own internal temporality that aligns it to the unfolding of everything else, a temporal out-of-phasesness with the changing arrangement of opposite qualities. That is to say, as the inessential qualities seen in the object move, and the object does not move in accordance with these changes, then the form seems to have a temporal character besides its own inner timing. This third temporality besides the becoming of the thing itself, and the changing arrangement of opposite qualities, is its out-of-phasesness with regard to its own movement guided by the other two.

It is essential to understand the temporality of this out-of-phasesness. When one focusses on form, as all western philosophy does, then the result is an attempt to freeze the qualities in their present distribution and say that they are the 'secondary qualities' of the form. The primary qualities like mass are those that physics uses to give the form a substantial designated reality. The point is that as soon as the form with its content is taken to be

fixed, the distribution of the arranged opposite qualities in existence changes in the next instant. Looking still at the form, and its contents, what is seen is a falling away of the form, as the qualities within it shift. There is seen a falling away, because what occurs is an inevitable shift away from the first picture of the form's contents.<sup>25</sup> If the first picture is taken as an ideal then, whatever change occurs to the form in relation to that ideal, must be entropic. Now, every form has essential, or core, attributes and inessential, or peripheral, attributes.<sup>26</sup> The core attributes form a cluster.<sup>27</sup> As opposite qualities in existence shift in it's arrangement, then the opposite of the core qualities of the form may approach the form. If these qualities, opposite to those of the form's core, enter the form, then the form is destroyed, because the opposite qualities cancel each other out. This only happens when because of a focus on the level of forms rather than that of qualities, one does not see the opposites approaching.<sup>28</sup> The point is, that each form has a cluster of qualities at its core, so that when one of the opposites of these qualities approaches the form and touches it, then the form ceases to exist in relation to that particular quality at its core, but not necessarily with regard to the other qualities at its core.

This means that the forms may periodically undergo radical transformations<sup>29</sup> which are seen by the one focused on form as complete breaks in the temporal continuity of the form. The study of these breaks in continuity is dialectics,<sup>30</sup> when a diachronic view of the phenomenon is taken, and structuralism,<sup>31</sup> when a synchronic view of the phenomenon is taken. Thus, by the focus on forms being held onto for a long period of time, there occurs a phenomenon of a radical break in the continuity of the form's qualitative content. There is continuous shifting of content away from the initial picture of the form's content, and then a radical discontinuous jump to another form-content picture.<sup>32</sup> This occurs when the opposite of one of the qualities associated with the core approaches and touches<sup>33</sup> the form, so that, with respect to that quality and its opposite, the form ceases to exist. This means that there is a redistribution of the core qualities of the form in relation to its peripheral qualities within the form. What appears with this redistribution is a discontinuous change, or jump, from one form-content relation to another within the form. These jumps in form-content relation are the substance of artificial emergence. In them, something startlingly new unexpectedly appears to the one focussed on the forms.

These two phenomena - continuous falling away of the form content relation with respect to its initial fixing and discontinuous jumps to other form-content relations - are the root of the artificial (third) temporality that insinuates itself between the intrinsic temporality of the form and the changing of the arrangement of opposite qualities. It is wholly illusory and derives its apparent existence directly from a mistaken focus on forms, designating them as real. What is readily seen is that for this artificial temporality, or out-of-phasesness, to appear the description of existence in terms of opposite qualities must be held on to as a form. Then it no longer points to the principle of no secondary causation, but there occurs to it everything described above. The opposites in disconnection, by which the principle of a single source is indicated, must constantly be changed. No description may be held on to, so that even description by opposites must be relinquished at some time. The shifting arrangement of opposites in existence constantly indicates the truth of the principle of a single source.

This then is the core of the set of arguments put forward by Socrates in the Phaedo. If this core is understood, then the rest of the dialogue falls into place. There Socrates is only following in

description the changing arrangement of the opposite qualities and constantly attempting to indicate the principle of 'no secondary causation'. There are many corollaries, which may be gone into concerning the setting-up of the anti-causal descriptive devices, which are displayed here and there throughout the dialogues. They are not developed systematically, because that would constitute a holding on to the descriptive form, rather than using it for the purpose of description. Plato's writing about Socrates is itself already a holding onto form -- the self-form of Socrates. Plato does to Socrates what Confucius did to the man of the Tao in China. Confucius took the form of the righteous (jen) man and held on to its outward aspects, presenting it as a social ideal. Thus, to give a systematic reconstruction of Socrates' teaching, as fixed by Plato, would be more than counter-productive; it would be to do precisely that which is indicated above to be the wrong approach to existence. If the Platonic dialogues are read in terms of an exemplification of the one who holds to the principle of 'no secondary causations's' confrontation with different forms of nihilistic arguments, in order to see their process of emergence, then the correct view of the dialogues will be obtained. As long as the dialogues are viewed only from the point-of-view of the template of ideation, then they are confusing, because

although written using that form, they indicate something beyond it by means of it (i.e., the opening up of approaches to the single source.)

The next step is to look at the development of the argument in the *Phaedo* that leads to the statement of the principle of 'no secondary causation'. The scene is before Socrates' execution. *Phaedo* is relating the events after the fact to Echecrates. When those who have gone to visit him enter, they find him released from his chains. He is then in the position of the prisoner about to be dragged up into the light in the metaphor of the Cave that appears in the *Republic*<sup>34</sup>. In fact, the prisoner is mentioned later in the dialogue.

I will explain, he said. Every seeker after wisdom knows that up to the time when philosophy takes it over his soul he is a helpless prisoner, chained hand and foot in the body, compelled to view reality not directly but only through its prison bars, and wallowing in utter ignorance.<sup>(82c)</sup><sup>35</sup>

Thus there is a direct allusion thereby to the three important similies that are the centre of the *Republic*: the Sun, the divided line, and the cave. These three together give, by means of metaphor, a comprehensive picture of the life-form that uses the template of ideation. A very good exposition of them is found in *Being and Logos* by J. Sallis.<sup>36</sup>

When Socrates' friends enter he is with his wife. It is a family portrait "...and Xanthippe - you know her! - sitting by him with the little boy on her knee."(60a) What happens at this point sets the scene for the whole dialogue.

As soon as Xanthippe saw us she broke out into the sort of remark you would expect from a woman, O Socrates, this is the last time that you and your friends will be able to talk together!

Socrates looked at Crito. 'Crito' he said, 'someone had better take her home.'

Some of Crito's servants led her away, crying hysterically. (60a)<sup>37</sup>

What occurs in the dialogue is that the wife and child go out and the friends come in, but in the end the friends display the same emotional attachment that the wife shows. At the end of the dialogue the ties of family and of friendship are broken by death. These ties are the equivalent of the ties of causation that are broken in the argument of the dialogue.

Socrates sat up on the bed and drew up his legs and massaged them, saying as he did so, 'What a queer thing it is, my friends, this sensation which is popularly called pleasure! It is remarkable how closely it is connected with its conventional opposite, pain. They will never come to a man both at once, but if you pursue one of them and catch it, you are nearly always compelled to have the other as well. They are like two bodies attached to the same

head. I am sure that, if Aesop had thought of it he would have made up a fable about them, something like this -- God wanted to stop their continual quarrelling, and when he found it was impossible, he fastened their heads together; so wherever one of them appears, the other is sure to follow after. That is exactly what seems to be happening to me. I had a pain in my leg from the fetter, and now I feel the pleasure coming that follows it. (60bc)<sup>38</sup>

This paragraph contains the central idea of the whole dialogue. Socrates sees his wife and child going, and his friends coming, and recognizes the unreal ties, which they impute as existing between them and him. The pleasure of friendship and the pain of parting are what he is commenting on. He is released from the chains of the illusion of the connections to family and friends. Being released from that point of view, he comments on the pleasure and pain that mutually entail each other, when one is caught in the illusion of these bonds. Pleasure and pain follow on one another necessarily. If you have one of them, then the other is coming up. However, one never has them together. They alternate on man constantly. Which-ever one you pursue and attempt to hold on to, then you must necessarily have the other after it. Stop there! If the rest of the dialogue is forgotten and this point is grasped, then something great will have been achieved. This insight into the nature of existence, which Socrates

is trying to pass on to us, if grasped, can change one's life utterly.

The two opposites --in this case pleasure and pain-- never meet in man. They are completely distinct, and that distinctness is maintained by their never being in man at the same time. But, although they are never in man at the same time, they mutually entail each other. This means that if one is present, then the other must necessarily come. This interchange occurs precisely, in the timing of Time.<sup>39</sup> This means that man does not determine when the opposites will change places in him. The interchanging of the arrangement of the opposite qualities continuously indicates the single source of everything. The point is that man may move in such a way as to take into account how the opposite qualities move. That is to say that man may move toward the opposite of what he wants, and thus, having had the opposite that he doesn't want first, have a surer grip on the opposite that he does want when it, as it must, appears after its opposite. If instead, man moves toward what he does want, then it is sure to leave him when its opposite necessarily appears. Socrates does not state this extension of his argument, but it is obvious, if one takes a moment to reflect on what he is saying. Almost everyone in the world goes to what they want

instead of its opposite. They attempt to grasp it and hold onto it. This is the source of the illusory connections between things in existence. These connections are based on desires.<sup>40</sup> These connections must necessarily be broken when the opposite of whatever is pursued, on the basis of desire, appears.

Almost no one recognizes that if they want something they must go toward its opposite and not pursue the thing itself. This recognition is the practical understanding of the meaning of the principle of 'no secondary causation'. By going to the opposite, instead of the thing desired, one has affirmed the principle of a single source, instead of causation. There is no way of forging a connection between oneself and whatever one wants. Yet, because things and their opposites have a single source, if one lays hold of something's opposite, then that thing must follow necessarily. By following this guideline, then, one has in fact laid hold of the principle of 'no secondary causation' by one's action.

"They are like two bodies attached to the same head." (60c) The head is the single source that is completely disconnected from everything, and is the source of the disconnection that exists between everything, and, because of its being the source of everything, is pure connection at the same time.

The opposites are completely disconnected from one another. They do not entail one another, because of some connection between them, but because of the single source that they have in common with everything else. If this guideline for the grasping of the principle of 'no secondary causation' in action is followed, then the rest of the dialogue is unnecessary, because the grasping of it in action is stronger than an intellectual grasp of it. If one grasps it intellectually and not in action, then a split between words and actions is created. If it is grasped intellectually, then one must put it into action, in order to have a full comprehension of the principle of a single source.

Socrates introduces the intellectual elucidation of the principle by beginning to speak of fables. The fable is different from that which is logically suggested by what Socrates has just said above. He says, 'God wanted to stop their continual quarreling.' (60c) But how can the opposites be seen to be quarreling, when they cannot be found present in man together? They are never in the same place in order to quarrel. They are separated irrevocably by utter disconnection. Their continuous alternation on man is not conflict. In the fable, though, it is viewed as conflict. The fable is a false view of the relation between the opposites, which assumes

that they can come into contact<sup>41</sup> in order to be in conflict. The fable displays the illusory connections between the opposite qualities posited by ideation. What is seen as conflict is mere alternation --there is a misinterpretation of the phenomenon. The fable says, 'God wanted to stop their quarrelling and found it impossible.' (60c) Surely if it was God, then He could not find anything impossible. On the contrary, it is man who wishes to stop the alternation of the opposites in him, which is decreed by God to arise from the single source. Man wishes to stop the alternation, when he has followed his desires and the opposite of them has come to him by necessity. This wish to stop the alternation of the opposites in him is the source of his focussing on form, instead of the changing arrangement of opposite qualities. He tries to stop at the point, when he has what he wants. When its opposite appears, he digs in and attempts to hold on to what he has grasped of his desires. Artificial temporality is the view of the interval between the grasping of the thing desired and the appearance of its opposite. Man sets himself up as God in his attempt to freeze the alternation of the opposites, instead of moving with them and instead of grasping things in their opposites.<sup>42</sup>

Socrates then says that 'God fastened their heads

together'.(60c) Outside the fable he merely said that they were two bodies with a single head. There was no mention of two heads. Ideation is modelled by a connecting of the different elements of the principle of a single source, and the disconnected opposites that indicate it. Man who makes himself into a god attempts to forge this connection between the two disconnected opposites that indicate the principle of a single source. The principle is in this way seen to appear as the deformity of two heads stuck together instead of as a single head. Ideation is a deformation of the description of existence in terms of disconnection, that posits connections, which do not take into account the necessity of the appearance of a thing's opposite after it.

Immediately after the two descriptions of existence, one as a fable and the other not, Socrates calls our attention back to his legs and the pain and pleasure he feels in relation to the fetters. The two descriptions both refer to one matter. They are two ways of looking at actually experienced pleasure and pain, both emotional and physical.

In the dialogue the next thing that appears is that Socrates has himself been composing verses on themes suggested by Aesop's fables. He says that he used

them because he was not good at inventing stories. Socrates has just invented a fable, though. What is the meaning of this? Looking at the wider context it is seen that the dialogue takes place in a period of delay between Socrates' sentencing and execution.

A fortunate coincidence, Echebrates. It so happened that on the day before the trial they had just finished garlanding the stern of a ship which Athens sends to Delos.

What ship is that?

The Athenians say that it is the one in which Theseus sailed away to Crete with seven youths and seven maidens, and saved their lives and his as well. The story says that the Athenians made a vow to Apollo that, if these young people's lives were saved, they would send a solemn mission to Delos every year, and ever since then they have kept their vow to the god, right down to the present day. They have a law that, as soon as this mission begins, the city must be kept pure, and no public executions may take place, until the ship has reached Delos and returned again, which sometimes takes a long time, if the winds happen to hold it back. The mission is considered to begin, as soon as the priest of Apollo has garlanded the stern of the ship, and this happened, as I say, on the day before the trial. That is why Socrates spent such a long time in prison between his trial and execution.  
(58)<sup>43</sup>

The period of delay between the word of the state that it is going to kill Socrates, and the action of killing him is very significant. The period between word and action is very much like the period between the fixing of a form and its destruction. In fact,

it is the period between word and action, that is the image of the periodicity of artificial temporality. From this period we have three dialogues from Plato. The Apology that begins it, the Crito in the middle, and the Phaedo at the end. The Phaedo takes place in this period of ambiguity, when it still remains to be seen if the word of the state, with respect to Socrates, will come to pass. For men that period between their words and the exemplification of their words in action has a special aspect, when words and actions do not immediately reinforce one another. In the city there is purity and no executions, while the people wait to see if their vow to Apollo will occur or not. The time between word and action is precisely like a voyage over the sea. One does not know what storms will come to blow the ship of intention off course. Phaedo says the following about this time with Socrates.

In the first place, my own feelings at the time were quite extraordinary. It never occurred to me to feel sorry for him, as you might have expected me to feel at the death-bed of a very dear friend. The master seemed quite happy, Echecrates, both in his manner and in what he said; he met his death fearlessly and nobly. I could not help feeling that, even on his way to the other world, he would be under the providence of God, and that when he arrived there all would be well with him, if it has ever been so with anyone. So, I felt no sorrow at all, as you might have expected on such a solemn occasion, and at the same time I felt no pleasure in being

occupied in our usual philosophical discussions - that was the form that our conversation took. I felt an absolutely incomprehensible emotion, a sort of curious blend of pleasure and pain combined, as my mind too took in that in a little while my friend was going to die. All of us who were there were affected in much the same way, between laughing and crying; one of us, in particular, Apollodorus - you know what he is like, don't you.(58e-59b)<sup>44</sup>

In this period of delay there occurs the ambiguity of the mixture of pleasure and pain, of laughing and crying.<sup>45</sup> Kant describes this in his aesthetic as the sublime.<sup>46</sup> It is precisely what was referred to before in the fable of Socrates as the joining of the two heads by man as demigod. The mixture of opposite qualities is impossible, because it brings a quality opposite to itself. Therefore it is seen that there is a dramatic opening of an illusory closed-space in which the connection between the opposites is designated-as-real. This is the space and time, in which formalism<sup>47</sup> transforms itself into structuralism.<sup>48</sup> Formalism occurs when the forms are fixed, and structuralism appears as the artificial temporality of the falling away of these fixed forms. The form of philosophical discussion which had been usual between these friends was held on to in the face of Socrates' death. Instead of taking the wisdom of his first remark, concerning the impossibility of joining pleasure to pain and the necessity of pursuing the opposite of what one

wants, the friends of Socrates wished the same relations between themselves that they had ritualistically acted out before, to be created once again. In this way they attempted to attain the pleasure of philosophical discussion at an inappropriate time, so that it mixed with the pain of their grief.

In this period of ambiguity Socrates reinterprets a recurring dream to the effect that he should "practice and cultivate the arts"(60e). He has always interpreted it to mean the art of philosophy. So, in his reinterpretation, he takes it to mean that he should practise a particular art - so he decides on lyric poetry, beginning with an ode to Apollo, then taking the themes from Aesop, and finally with the fable that begins the dialogue he makes up an imaginary theme himself. This progression from philosophy to the practice of a specific art, and then in that specific art from description to imaginative themes of someone else's, to making up one's own themes is precisely the order of degeneration that occurs as one enters the ambiguous space between word and act of artificial temporality. This is to say that what Socrates says first in the dialogue is pure philosophy. The fable and the philosophical dialogue that follows is the practice of a specific art. The art of sophistry.<sup>49</sup> In the dialogue one goes from a description of the

soul, to the imaginary and nihilistic opposing explanations of Simmias and Cebes. Socrates' reply to these opposite arguments about the nature of the soul that strengthens his own case is the construction of an imaginary theme himself. In that construction he presents a picture of the principle of no secondary causation within discourse. That is, he presents a picture within the art form determined by the template of ideation. This is then a metaphor for the development of the dialogue itself.

Socrates says that the poet Evanos should follow him in death(61bc). In that, Socrates is contrasting himself with a real poet. The poet does not go beyond the form of his art, whereas the philosopher only uses the art to exemplify what is beyond that art-form. This mention of the poet's death in contrast to the philosopher's also has the element of delay. Simmias says that Evanos would not want to follow Socrates into death. This is because the poet, working within the limits imposed by the template of ideation, believes in the apparent connections between the things in this world and does not know of the principle of a single source. The delay between the death of Socrates and that of the poet is an extension into another direction of the delay between the sentence and execution of Socrates. This delay is then immediately turned

into a discussion of hurrying and delaying death. Each segment of the argument of the dialogue is then a transformation of the primary delay period. It is possible to quickly trace this series of transformations up to the point where the principle of 'no secondary causation' emerges. The series is as follows.

- 58b Delay between sentence and execution.
- 60d-61d Delay in the death of the poet following the philosopher.
- 61d-63d Suicide (rushing death) and not wanting to die (delaying death).
- 64 Mock trial begins. Philosophy is a preparation for death.
- 64b-65d Rootedness of the soul in the body (opposites from each other.)
- 70d Reincarnation.
- 72d Recollection
- 77d Argument against the dispersion of the soul after death.
- 79b-84b End of reincarnation arguments.
- 91e-95a Socrates' refutation of Simmias.
- 95a-108a Socrates' refutation of Cebes (opposite qualities cannot mix - principle of a single source stated).
- 109a Socrates' vision of the earth.

It is only necessary for the purposes of this essay to look at the development of the dialogue in general terms. This is because our purpose is to

understand these same issues in a contemporary setting, not to get stuck in an endless elucidation of Plato.<sup>50</sup>

As has been said, the period of delay between sentence and execution is within the dialogue continuously transformed, first into the delay between the death of the philosopher and that of the poet; secondly, into the opposition between rushing death by suicide and delaying it. Rushing and delay both create similar periods of ambiguity. In fact, rushing and delay are a picture of the opposite domains within the template of ideation. The argument of artificial emergence arises from anticipation, whereas the argument of nihilism arises from regret. Anticipation attempts to grasp what is coming in the laying out of events by the timing of Time<sup>51</sup>, whereas regret holds on to what has passed. Both miss the moment itself, because of an obsession with the future or the past. Time-of-other-than-the-moment is a product of the ideational process, positing illusory connections between temporal moments.<sup>52</sup> Moments are not 'points' in a linear sequence, either. The point of time is generated by the ideational template as the opposite to the future/past. Both come from the specious present that William James<sup>53</sup> speaks of, which is the period of ambiguity. The past/future and the point

of time are the articulation of the 'specious present' interval on the pattern of the two sub-domains of the template of ideation.<sup>54</sup>

Next in the dialogue there begins a trial which is a private version of the public trial that appears in the Apology.<sup>55</sup> These two trials are reciprocally related. So, the delay period is turned into the time of a trial. A trial<sup>56</sup> is an artificial event in which a case is presented and a decision rendered. The case here is for the validity of the philosopher's cheerfulness in the face of death, and his confidence in finding blessing in the next world. The trial is an excellent metaphor for the period of delay in which artificial temporality occurs. The two sub-domains that appear within it are the presentation of the case and the rendering of a decision. These are related to words and action- through-words respectively. The opposite of this is action, like the execution of a sentence, and description of the action. This is how words and action interrelate. The action of words and the words about actions (descriptions) occur from the mixture of the two pure categories of words and actions. That is, the mixture of opposites. Thus, it is seen how, when we enter into the discussion of actions-of-words, as was done in the beginning of the introduction, one has already entered into the

ambiguous period of delay. This presentation is inextricably bound to the form of that delay period. To pretend that this discourse, itself, goes beyond the form of ideation would be to give a false view.

Within the trial in the *Phaedo*, Socrates first discusses the rootedness of the soul in the body. This leads him to give a coherent picture of the passage from life to death and from death to life again. This is done in terms of the development of the concept of cyclical reincarnation. Within the delay period as 'Trial' there is given a case for cyclical reincarnation. Cyclical reincarnation is a further specification of the form of the delay period in terms of a different metaphor. This argument concerning reincarnation is proved on the basis of the argument that learning is recollection, and an argument against the possibility of the dispersal of the soul after death. The basic idea of the possibility of cyclical reincarnation is what is important for this essay. What is thought-provoking about that possibility is how cyclical reincarnation forms a closed circuit that gives an excellent representation of the two domains of discourse, in terms of the passage of the soul between the visible and the invisible worlds, back and forth again and again. This picture is, however, obviously false in terms of the principle of no secondary causation. It is,

in fact, certain that, if the principle of no secondary causation were taken into account, the model of reincarnation would be radically altered. This is because the model does not consider the emergence from and the return to the source. In cyclical reincarnation the universe appears as a closed system with endless oscillation between the two domains. This does not in any way point toward the single source. Thus the oscillation cannot be endless. The source is the beginning and the end. Therefore, a correct model must exemplify this and point directly toward the source of everything.

In this way, the case for reincarnation is a preparation for the emergence within the dialogue of the principle of a single source. In response to the cyclical model of reincarnation, Simmias and Cebes present counter-arguments that show that they have recognised the flaw of the over-neatness of Socrates' argument. They, as it were, bring out the flaw, and display it by giving two nihilistically opposing views of it, neither of which quite captures that flaw. Simmias proposes that the soul is harmony, and Cebes that it outlasts many bodies, but still perishes. Both of these arguments are comments on the closedness of the cyclical reincarnation model. One says that such a closed system is in balance and so long as it is in balance, then the

phenomenon of the soul appears; while the other says that the closed system is out of balance; so that the cycles stop after a while.

Both views posit that the soul is not immortal. This is a consequence of argument based on closedness of the system of cyclical reincarnation that does not point to its source. Thus Socrates' model of the immortality of the soul has the ultimate consequence that the soul is not immortal. His own model turns against him and has implications contrary to those he is arguing for. Socrates exemplifies a fundamental feature of all theorizing. The going out of balance of the closed system either causes the soul to cease immediately, or after a while. Thus, the nihilistically opposite arguments of Simmias and Cebes show a period of delay between immediate cessation and cessation-after-a-while. This initial recognition of entropic breakdown occurs because the system does not refer to its source. It is presented as nihilistic opposites, but inherently Simmias and Cebes are pointing out to Socrates that, because everything is in a state of falling away (entropy), which is not exemplified by the model itself, his model could not possibly be true. From this it is possible to see that the manifestation of nihilistic opposition is a stage in the breaking forth of something into manifestation.

1

In this case, what breaks forth is the indication of the principle of a single source. Within the statement of the nihilistic opposition, if the opposites are considered together, there is an inherent recognition of the flaw in the original form of cyclical reincarnation as a theory. It works out too well. It works out too well because it goes on and on, and does not indicate the single source from which its temporality came.

Simmias' argument is refuted fairly quickly by Socrates, and it is in his refutation of Cebes that the principle of no secondary causation appears. Socrates has in the course of the trial acted as a midwife yet again. A model of cyclical reincarnation which was closed was presented, and then the flaw of its over-perfection was recognised and presented in terms of nihilistic opposition. By bringing the model of emergence, in the form of cyclical reincarnation, together with the recognition of this flaw, in the form of nihilistic opposition, the principle of the single source was indicated. Implicitly the two opposite arguments concerning Emergence and Nihilism cancel each other out in that indication, although Plato does not show this in the dialogue. After the arising of the principle, Socrates goes on to discuss opposite qualities rather than the oppositeness of things.

1

The principle of 'no secondary causation' is only just indicated, then we are returned to the closed system again in another respect. In the dialogue as a whole it is the oppositeness of qualities and things that forms a closed system of argumentation. The single source is only just barely indicated, and then back one goes into the too perfect system of oppositions. It is too perfect, when it is not oriented to the principle of 'no secondary causation'. The key point of this is that in nihilism there is a recognition of the flaw in any model that works out too well, and that by developing that opposition the principle of a single source appears. The positing of the over developed model, the recognition of its flaw, and the development of the nihilistic opposition that expresses that flaw, are themselves a model of the transformation and adaptation of the first cyclical model to the principle of a single source. It is the development of a structural model out of a formal one within the delay-period of ambiguity. The understanding of the arising of the structural out of the formal is very important. In the introduction it was breached in terms of the two-way argument concerning the arising of ideation from the principle of a single source. There the structural argument, it was said, is the most dangerous because it makes it appear as if the connection between ideation and the principle of a

single source may be understood. What is seen here is that the trial of Socrates by his friends, which mirrors his trial by the state, is of precisely the same form as the structural argument presented in the introduction. The difference is that, in Socrates's trial by his friends, it is seen how the principle of 'no secondary causation' appears as the 'primer' for the conversion of the argument he presents from a formal into a structural one. This is an extremely thought-provoking state of affairs. Look at it closely. If one sticks to formalism, then one never reaches the principle of a single source. Formalism in itself does not take one anywhere but into the deeper complexities of the formal system. It is only when one sees the flaw in a formal system that one may construct the opposite statement to that form. Then, bringing the two statements together one sees that they cancel each other out and that beyond this cancelling the principle of 'no secondary causation' appears. If one doesn't get out of the life-form of ideation at that point, one generates a structuralism that takes one back into ideation even more strongly. The point is to stick with the principle of 'no secondary causation' when it appears, and to leave ideation behind. Socrates describes this leaving of ideation behind in the final section of the Phaedo, in which he describes the nature of the earth (108e- 114d).

Next, said Socrates, I believe that it (the earth) is vast in size, and that we who dwell between the river Phasis and the pillars of Hercules inhabit only a minute portion of it -- we live round the sea like ants or frogs around a pond -- and there are many other peoples inhabiting similar regions. There are many hollow places all around the earth, places of every shape and size into which the water, mist, and air have collected. But the earth itself is as pure as the starry heaven in which it lies, and is called aether by most of our authorities. The water, mist, and air are the dregs of this aether, and they are continually draining into the hollow places in the earth. We do not realize that we are living in its hollows, but assume that we are living on the the earth's surface. Imagine someone living in the depths of the sea. He might think that he was living on the surface, and seeing the sun and the other heavenly bodies through the water, might think that the sea was the sky. He might be so sluggish and feeble that he never reached the top of the sea, never emerged and raised his head from the sea into this world of ours, and seen for himself -- or even heard from someone who had seen it -- how much purer and more beautiful it really is, than the one in which his people live. Now we are in just the same position. Although we live in a hollow of the earth, we assume we are living on the surface, and we call the air heaven, as though it were the heaven through which the stars move. And this point too is the same, that we are too feeble and sluggish to make our way out to the upper limit of the air. If someone could reach to the summit, or put on wings and fly aloft, when he put up his head he would see the world above, just as fishes see our world when they put up their heads out of the sea. And, if his nature were able to bear the sight, he would recognise that it is the true heaven and the true light and the true earth. For this earth and its stones and all the regions in which we live are marred and corroded, just as in the sea everything is corroded by the brine, and there is no vegetation worth mentioning, and scarcely any degree of perfect formation, but only caverns and sand and measureless mud, and tracts of slime

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wherever there is earth as well, and nothing is in the least worthy of being judged beautiful by our standards. But things above excel those of our world to a degree far greater still. If this is the right moment for an imaginative description, Simmias, it will be worth your while to hear what it is really like upon the earth which lies beneath the heavens. (109b - 110b).<sup>57</sup>

Ideation gives a narrow and constricted view of existence.<sup>58</sup> By connecting everything together it creates the 'hollows' that Socrates describes people living within. This is why ideation is called in this essay a 'life-form'.<sup>59</sup> Ideation appears in many different forms. But all these forms together are patterned by a single pattern called the ideational template.

In the earth itself, all over its surface, there are many hollow regions, some deeper and more widely spread than that in which we live, others deeper than our region but smaller in expanse, some both shallower than ours and broader. (11c) <sup>60</sup>

The broadness and the depth of the hollows of the life-form of ideation vary, so that they appear to be different but actually it is the same thing in every case. The hollow is equivalent to the delay-period spoken of before. By setting up a delay-period an artificial form is created. These forms seem to have a temporality of their own, and it is the different shapes of the hollows that indicate the different variations of these temporalities. To

break out of ideation is for these artificial  
spacetime/timespace regions to disappear. When this  
occurs then the timing of Time is seen, in which  
each thing and event appears perfectly proportioned.

Well, my dear boy, said Socrates, the real  
earth, viewed from above, is supposed to  
look like one of these balls made of  
twelve pieces of skin, variegated and  
marked out in different colours, of which  
the colours we know are only limited  
samples, like the paints which artists  
use; but the whole earth is made up of  
such colours and others far brighter and  
purer still. One section is a  
marvellously beautiful purple, and another  
is golden. All that is white of it is  
whiter than chalk or snow, and the rest is  
similarly made up of other colours, still  
lovelier than those we have seen. Even  
these very hollows in the earth, full of  
water and air, assume a kind of colour as  
they gleam amid the different hues around  
them, so that there appears to be a  
continuous surface of varied colours. The  
trees, the flowers and the fruits that  
grow on this earth are proportionately  
beautiful. The mountains too, and the  
stones have a proportionate smoothness and  
transparencey, and their colours are  
lovelier. The pebbles which are so highly  
prized in our world -- jaspers and rubies  
and emeralds and the rest -- are fragments  
of these stones, but there everything is  
beautiful as they are, or better still.  
This is because the stones are in their  
natural state, not damaged by decay or  
corroded by salt water as ours are by the  
sediment that has collected here, and  
which causes disfigurement and disease to  
stones and earth, and animals and plants  
as well. The earth itself is adorned, not  
only with all these stones, but also with  
gold and silver and other metals; for many  
rich veins of them occur in plain view in  
all parts of the earth, so that to see  
them is a sight for the eyes of the  
blessed. 110b - 111b<sup>61</sup>

Here the focus is upon the qualities of things

rather than their form, for the form is recognised as perfect the way it is. The forms are like transparent glass shapes, in which the colours of the qualities of things are seen. Socrates has given a spatial description of what must be understood in terms of temporality. The hollows are the delay periods which become cloudy with ambiguity. Whole peoples live their entire lives together in these artificial temporal periods because of their designating of form as real.<sup>62</sup> Everything is distorted by the delay-period for those trapped inside it. When the distortion disappears, the earth as-it-is-really appears. Looking at forms the qualities are seen only dully, so that when one focusses back on the opposite qualities they take on an incredible lustre in comparison with what is seen in the 'hollows' of time. It is the same earth, seen from two different perspectives. One perspective is out of phase with the changing of the arrangement of the opposites which gives the lustre that Socrates speaks of to existence, and the other is in phase with it.

Thus it is seen that the leaving of ideation behind is not the disappearance of everything, rather it is that the tissue of ideas that is placed between one's self and the world disappears. Everything becomes crystal clear when this happens, and the

timing of Time is seen, instead of artificially imposed timings. However, even the artificially imposed timings are part of the timing of Time.

Even these very hollows in the earth, full of water and air, assume a kind of colour, as they gleam amid the different hues around them, so that there appears to be a continuous surface of varied colours.  
(110c)<sup>63</sup>

It is this 'continuous surface of varied colours' that is the carpet of the arrangement of opposite qualities. In each moment it is laid out in a different pattern. This patterning is the opposite of structure.<sup>64</sup> Structure is the temporalizing of form, a holding on to form, whereas the patterning is a letting go of form and a focus on the opposite qualities instead. The forms are like transparent glass shapes, within which the colours of the opposite qualities shine. The focus on form, and its structuralization, merely muddies the view of this carpet of colours and distorts it. The carpet itself is not disturbed by these distortions. They are like, as Socrates says, the distortions of light by water. The aether of the upper world is the same medium as the air of this world and the water of the sea in different phases of viscosity. One might say, in terms of Socrates' metaphor, that the aether is the earth seen in the timing of Time, the air is the same earth seen in terms of form, and the sea is

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the same landscape seen in terms of the temporalizing of form into structure. Another metaphor traditionally used for the same thing in the East is the lotus that has its roots in the mud, its stem in the water and its flower, that lies on the surface of the water, in the air. Patterning is seen more and more clearly as the viscosity of the medium is reduced.<sup>65</sup>

In the earth, seen without having to look through the viscous medium that comes from attachment to form, there are seen to be two aspects of temporality. One is the timing of the changing arrangement of opposite qualities laid out in each instant, and the second is the timing given independently to each form itself. In the timing of Time these two form the weft and warp. Artificial temporality appears as breaks in the carpet of time. All the forms are independent of each other, coming from the same single source, from which they are disconnected while being dependent upon it. In their independence of each other, they have a temporality of their own. However, pure disconnection is pure connection.<sup>66</sup> And this connection appears as the light of the opposite qualities that shine in the translucent forms. Connection/disconnection: both must be said in order to indicate the depth of the principle of a single source. Because of the

insidious predominance of ideation within the western tradition, disconnection is declared first. However, complete disconnection is a form of connection of the single source to itself, and this appears as the perfect interlacing of the weft and warp of the timing of Time. Time is disconnected from all disconnected forms that each contain their own special timing. Time is completely connected to itself by this total disconnection of everything else, and the total disconnection of the timing of the different things which, nevertheless, harmonize in their different cycles. This complete connection of Time to itself shows up in the single arrangement of opposite qualities that appear in each moment and shine in the forms.

The single pattern of opposite qualities and the myriad timings of the individual forms appear as opposites from the single source. They say, by their appearance, opposite things about that source. The former says complete connection, and the latter says complete disconnection. This is another way in which the opposite domains appear which indicates the nature of the single source. The single source is not, however, captured by either of these descriptions, and yet it is indicated. Descriptions that capture it and don't capture it are again opposite domains. The point is that the single

source is the origin of all the possible descriptions. It captures the descriptions! Time is seen in the timing of the appearance of the various descriptions of Time. Descriptions are like the forms with qualities. Their articulation is based on the use of that template of ideation which appears when words are matched to actions as a commentary or to things as descriptions. The temporal ambiguity that arises from this matching is dispelled if the word's meanings are looked at and discourse, like a running stream, is not used to create an illusory continuity between actions or things. The tagging of words on to actions or things is the source of the delay that ideation grows up in.

'Well, after this', said Socrates, 'when I was worn out with my physical investigations, it occurred to me that I must guard against the same sort of risk which people run when they watch and study an eclipse of the sun; they really do sometimes injure their eyes, unless they study its reflection in water or some other medium. I conceived of something like this happening to myself, and I was afraid that by observing objects with my eyes and trying to comprehend them with each of my other senses I might blind my soul altogether. So, I decided that I must have recourse to theories, and use them in trying to discover the truth of things.

Perhaps my illustration is not apt, because I do not at all admit that an inquiry, by means of theory, employs 'images' any more than one which confines itself to facts. But, however that may be, I started off in this way, and in every case I first lay down the theory that I judge to be soundest, and whatever seems to agree with it -- with regard to either causes or anything else -- I assume

to be true, and whatever does not I assume  
not to be true. (99d-100a)<sup>67</sup>

Physical investigation attributes causal connections between things in existence. These connections are posited by means of the model of ideation. Ideation occurs because of the focus on forms and the matching of the continuity of discourse to the unfolding timing of events in existence. Discourse provides an artificial rhythm of timing, to which events may be orchestrated to correspond. This is based on the tagging of things or events with words. It is all based on the focus on form and the using of words as a technical device instead of using them as indicators of meaning. The focus on form blinds the soul. This is compared by Socrates to looking at the sun in eclipse. The eclipsed sun is an analogy for the single source. The single source may only be viewed through the medium of words. It can never be seen directly. Sensory blindness is contrasted to theoretical blindness in Socrates' metaphor. The theoretical blindness comes from looking at the forms, instead of the qualities, by means of words, and by using words as technique, instead of with a view to their meanings. Sensory blindness comes from looking at the single source directly, instead of finding indications of it in the timing of the arrangement of opposite qualities and the temporality of things, as one must be satisfied with

seeing the reflection of the things in the water of the running stream of logos, that indicates qualities but does not try to provide an alternative timing by acting like a synchronome.

There are three stages in this: language used as technique, language as a form with its own temporality and core attributes, and language which is still (i.e. intelligent silence)<sup>68</sup>. The first generates ideation, the second may be used to see the qualities, and the third is the means of seeing the single source in the qualities and the temporalities of the forms. From this is seen the centrality of language. It can be a means of holding on to things or a means of letting go of forms and grasping the opposite qualities, and when stilled it may be a means of letting go of everything. When the flow of the temporality of the form of language is arrested, then the timing of all the other events, given timing by Time, is seen more clearly. It is how one uses language that is the key to whether one is tied to forms or set free from them. The manner in which one uses language determines how one treats language itself. The structuralist has a structural view of the form of language (i.e. transformational grammar) and the formalist formalizes language (i.e. non-transformational grammar and philology). Language is that natural form upon which ideation and

dialectical discourse are built as additions.  
Through it access to the qualities may be gained.  
However, in that case, language itself must be seen  
as supple, and may not be formalized and structured.  
The suppleness of language may be increased up to  
the point where words stop, and there is only  
intelligent silent comprehension. If words are like  
water, which Plato is constantly using as a  
metaphor, then certainly distortions appear in  
moving water that disappear in still water. The  
stilling of the water produces that which is like  
aether in relation to air. Intelligent silence is  
not a mere stopping of the flow of discourse. It is  
rather the becoming transparent of the form of  
language until the point when the form does not  
interpose itself at all in the view of the timing of  
Time.

## CHAPTER 2

In the first chapter, there has been set out a reading of the Platonic dialogue 'the Phaedo' which has brought to the fore the place in it of the principle of 'no secondary causation', and the relation to each other of Emergence and Nihilism. What has come to light, though, is an alternative way of talking about existence in terms of opposite qualities and opposite things, that shows up the principle in a practical way in discourse, by positing disconnection between opposite qualities. When one looks at the western philosophical tradition fresh from this exposition it is immediately apparent how far one is from understanding any of this in that context.

Plato spent most of the space in his dialogues giving an exposition of sophistry.<sup>1</sup> Sophistry is the active, indiscriminate application of the ideational process, which takes many forms. The point is that the whole of the western tradition may be subjected to the critique of sophistry given by Plato. The terminology and the issues are different, but the sophistry is the same. In the context of the unchallenged dominance of sophistry, the concept of disconnected opposites is so foreign

that it is almost impossible to appreciate just how deep a critique of the western tradition is offered by looking at the world in this manner. Yet the amazing thing is that in the development of the ideational view of existence to its extreme, there occurs an indication of this other, radically different, view of existence.

The classic example is the case of Hume and Kant. If these two philosophers are considered together, then a very clear example of the picture given in the foregoing chapter on the Phaedo appears again at the beginning of modern philosophy. Hume sets the problem, that Kant sets out to solve.

Now the proper problem of pure reason is contained in the question: How are a priori synthetic judgments possible?

That metaphysics has hitherto remained in so vacillating a state of uncertainty and contradiction is entirely due to the fact that this problem, and perhaps even the distinction between analytic and synthetic judgments, has never previously been considered. Upon the solution of this problem, upon a sufficient proof that the possibility which it desires to have explained does in fact not exist at all, depends the success or failure of metaphysics. Among philosophers, David Hume came the nearest to envisaging this problem, but still was very far from conceiving it with sufficient definiteness and universality. He occupied himself exclusively with the synthetic propositions regarding the connection of an effect with its cause (*principum causalitatis*), and he believed himself to have shown that such an a priori proposition is entirely impossible.

If we accept his conclusions, then all that we call metaphysics is a mere delusion, whereby we fancy ourselves to have rational insight into what, in actual fact, is borrowed solely from experience, and under the influence of custom has taken the illusory semblance of necessity. If he had envisaged our problem in all its universality, he would never have been guilty of this statement, so destructive of all pure philosophy. For he would then have recognised that, according to his own argument, pure mathematics, as certainly containing a priori synthetic propositions, would also not be possible; and from such an assertion his good sense would have saved him.<sup>2</sup>

Kant underestimates the depth of Hume's critique of causality when he says that Hume would have stopped short of destroying pure mathematics. Although the two philosophies are based upon two contending forms of mathematics, (probability and the calculus) and are merely exemplifications of their respective implications, the arguments go beyond the confines of mere casuistry for different mathematical forms. Hume's argument does destroy mathematics, and it is precisely because of this that it is thought-provoking. It is Kant's arrogance toward Hume, in this respect, that shows the non-recognition by him of the real depth of Hume's argument. Whether Hume would have baulked at the extension of his scepticism to the destruction of pure mathematics or not, isn't the point. What is necessary is to recognise the implications of this extension of Hume's argument and Kant's own withdrawal, or recoil, from this

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conclusion of that train of thought. Kant takes Hume's argument further than Hume did himself, and then backs away from the even more devastating results, which he sees appear, when Hume's already radical scepticism was radicalized even further. These even more devastating results are that the whole universe of Mathematico-philosophical discourse is destroyed by the argument against causality. Hume's argument, if radicalized, would destroy the very realm in which it may be stated. Philosophy is a casuistry for mathematics. Hume begins by seeing the implications of the mathematical ideas of probability. If these ideas are taken to their conclusions, they destroy the discipline of mathematics itself. Kant uses the concepts of the calculus in order to save the realm of discourse. In other words, he uses the resources within the realm of mathematics to save mathematics itself. However, what is called for, in order to provide a really firm foundation is support from outside that realm. This support, is not forthcoming. So, Kant's counter-argument is a recoil back into the mathematical system, after he has seen the limits of it clearly. That is, more clearly than Hume. Hume does not quite reach those limits by his thought --- Kant reaches them and retreats. Those limits are defined by the principle of no secondary causation.

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The roots of the Formalist and Structuralist positions in the western tradition may be seen in the opposition between Hume and Kant. The pattern identified in the Phaedo is reenacted here in cruder terms. It is not self-conscious, but instead, a blind mimicry, presented in flattened-out arguments that do not hit the mark so effectively as it was struck in the Phaedo. Only a caricature of the principle of 'no secondary causation' appears in Hume's denial of the connection between cause and effect. A pure formulation doesn't even appear in the Phaedo but only a simulacrum used to generate the structuralist transformation of the dialogue. Here one is even further away from a pure declaration of the principle of 'no secondary causation'. Still what occurs in the history of the western tradition is that the basis of all structuralism, which is the Kantian system, appears even from this weak invocation of the principle of disconnection. Thus here, as well as in Plato, the principle of no secondary causation is used as an act of magic instead of being recognised per se. It is this magical act that is the basis of ideation. The magician is the sophist, whom Plato devotes himself to exposing. In Plato's terminology, Hume is what is called a 'man of earth', which he defines as someone who only believes in what he can grasp in his hands, whereas Kant, who is the sovereign defen-

der of subjectivity, is an archetypical sophist. The 'man of earth' is the dupe of the sophist; they have a pact -- what Hegel calls a master/slave relationship.<sup>3</sup> It is necessary to realise that without a connection with the principle of 'no secondary causation' (because Hume doesn't quite get there, and Kant sees the limits at which the universe of discourse would fall away and recoils from it) the two positions they take become a nihilistic opposition. All the arguments that they advance are mere exemplifications of the nihilism of these opposing positions. This means that they are working out their arguments completely encapsulated by the template of ideation, without even a clue that there is any other possibility. The vague use they make of the principle of no secondary causation is not in the least self-conscious, as it was in Plato, and no contrast at all is made with any position outside that of ideation. It can clearly be seen that by Hume's delay and by not reaching the limits at which the realm of mathematical discourse evaporates, and by Kant's advance beyond it, there is the same form of delay and anticipation, that was seen as the central metaphor being worked out in the Phaedo. Nihilism is the result of the application of the template that produces the lifeform of ideation, without reference to any possibility beyond that life-form. Emergence occurs because the

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principle of 'no secondary causation' impinges on the arguments of those who do not recognise it, as much as upon the arguments of those who do. As was seen, the nihilistic opposition is founded on a vague recognition that the life-form of ideation works out too well, and sets the stage for the genuine emergence of the principle of no secondary causation. When the stage is set but this emergence does not take place, then the result is a dialectical series of nihilistic oppositions. Hence, the western philosophical tradition, which is the constant setting up of the possibility of the emergence of this principle, that always remains stillborn. This very process of setting up the nihilistic oppositions is, however, a constant indication of the possibility of the principle, and an implicit recognition by those trapped within it that it contains something more than ideation.

Consider Hume's argument against causality. It is a denial of the connections between forms, without the affirmation of a single source. This is why probability is the starting point for his thought.

Though there be no such thing as chance in the world, our ignorance of the real cause of any event has the same influence on the understanding, and begets a like species of belief or opinion. There is certainly a probability...<sup>4</sup>

Hume begins by declaring his ignorance of 'Real

cause', while still denying "chance's" reality. It is, therefore, an article of faith that there is the possibility of true knowledge,<sup>5</sup> although this goes hand in hand with the recognition that he does not possess it and finds himself left with opinions. Not having access to true knowledge has the same effect on the understanding as if chance did exist. Thus, for one stuck with his opinions, 'there is certainly probability...'. Probability is a half-way house between the unknown real cause and chance. It is possible to identify the true knowledge of 'real cause' with the principle of no secondary causation. Hume might have imagined that there was a myriad of real causes in existence, hidden from him; but which he beleived in merely because his philosophical argument could not explain the source of existence. If he had gone from what amounted to a rejection of physical investigation, such as Socrates subscribed to in his early days, to the positive task of understanding the source of existence instead of sticking with his critique of ideation; and had, in so doing, followed the same route as Socrates in his own thought, then he may have broken out of the life form of ideation. To do that, however, he may have had to apply Socrates's injunction to do things by their opposites. This belief in a real causality which one does not know from experience, but merely holds as an article of

faith, is a key feature in Hume's thought. Kant is right in saying that Hume would logically have to withdraw from the implications of his scepticism, if he saw them clearly, because his whole argument against causal connection is based on making connections of a syllogistic kind in arguing the case. Thus, his argument does not do what he speaks of through it. He is fundamentally disconnected from what he is saying because the way he says it does not exemplify it. If he had exemplified it, he would have destroyed the realm of discourse in which the argument itself unfolded. Further, Hume's whole argument for the illusory nature of causality, and the psychological reductionism, can be applied to Hume himself. In all this, the question of the real cause is continually begged. The step, to saying that there is a real cause and that it is singular, and further, that it arranges all things for the best, such as Socrates made, is a big one, because it necessitates the rethinking of the whole position of the simple denial of causes in a radically different way.

Hume recognises that causality implies the opening out of the past and the future, and the transference of experience in the past to prediction in the future. In this transference there are regularly conjoined events and irregularly paired ones. Hume

denies that it is possible to count on the reappearance of even the regularly conjoined events. From his argument it is obvious that past and future are assumed to be mirror-images of one another. The transference of causal inference is the act of transcendence that is the core of western philosophy.<sup>6</sup> Hume's argument denies transcendence from one form to another by causal link, just as much as it denies the transcendental motion from past to future entailed in the concept of causality. Temporal and spatial transcendence are denied, but an illusory sort of transcendence is designated-as-real, which makes causal connections appear in the mind as if they were there. Hume has a clear view of the illusory nature of the ideational process and its twin-concept producing template, which creates the mirror-images of past and future. Unfortunately, he cannot offer anything more than a critique of it, and at that, one which is still bound by the template of thinking that he is criticizing.

In generating the twin concepts, past and future, a distinction is made between them. This process of making a distinction is immediately referred to in the section following that on probability,<sup>7</sup> in terms of the clarity of mathematical distinctions in relation to all others, which are progressively more

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ambiguous. Moral distinctions are here contrasted with the mathematical ones. However, moral terms, though ambiguous, are much simpler than the inherently complex distinctions of mathematics, that are so clear. This contrast between morality and mathematics in terms of simple/ambiguous and complex/clear shows immediately the shifting nature of the model of presenting distinctions, given in terms of the generation of the twin concepts of past and future. It is the same model presented in another light. Both are excellent examples of nihilistic mutually exclusive opposition. They are like text book examples of the kind of opposition that polarizes the universe of discourse in such a way as to flatten it out into barren<sup>8</sup> and useless distinctions. The twin poles of the opposition define the two ends of the delay-period, and that is all. They are flattened out into conceptual markers. Within the delay-period ambiguity arises, which takes over the primary distinction that set up the original opposition, which defined, by its mixing, the delay period. That ends when the mixture re-separates. Hume endeavours to confront this ambiguity, which arises in the delay-period of the movement from the mathematical to the moral. The mathematical is the first setting out of distinctions, upon which discourse is based in a clear way. Then, as the discourse begins to work with these

distinctions, the movement toward the other end of the delay-period begins, which is seen as a move toward the moral questions. It is a move toward moral questions because it is a search for the grounds upon which those first distinctions are based, and the grounds of words must be in action. As one explores these grounds in philosophical discourse, the original distinctions become more and more indistinct; but what is realised is that the core of the matter is simpler than the clear mathematical treatment at first suggested. Thus, a progressive increase in ambiguity is accompanied by an increase in simplicity. Unfortunately the discourse starts from multiplicity and, although it goes toward simplicity, it never reaches the single source. One must start from that source for any discourse that treats of it to make sense. It is the geometrically increasing ambiguity that prevents the single source being comprehended by intellectual argument. Built into the system of nihilistic opposition is a precise mechanism that makes it impossible to break out of the form imposed by the template of ideation. This is because it is set up so that, if one variable decreases (i.e. complexity), a complimentary variable increases (i.e. ambiguity).

Hume recognised, however, that the hub of the most intense ambiguity and simplicity was the concept of

power.

There are no ideas which occur in metaphysics more obscure and uncertain than those of power, force, energy or necessary connection, of which it is every moment necessary for us to treat in all our disquisitions. We shall therefore endeavour in this section to fix, if possible, the precise meaning of these terms, and thereby to remove some part of that obscurity which is so much complained of in this species of philosophy.<sup>9</sup>

The nihilistic opposites set up the problem of a locus of radical simplicity and ambiguity, which the philosopher then attempts to break after he has already entered this set-up arena of discourse and agreed to its parameters. Such an effort is, by definition, futile. Camus gives a metaphor for it in terms of the myth of Sisyphus,<sup>10</sup> who pushes the rock up the hill only for it to roll down again. The result is endless oscillation; for, if the locus of intense ambiguity is successfully clarified at one point, it merely shifts its locus and one has to begin all over again with the task of clarification.<sup>11</sup> The most intense point of ambiguity in this system, which creates illusion, is found when one asks where its operational efficacy comes from. How are the nihilistic opposites connected? What gives them their power? Where does the energy that produces the movement of oscillation come from? Notice that Hume wants to fix this concept, after its inherent ambiguity has been established by the

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system of nihilistic opposition that he has set up, and accepted, beforehand. This setting up of an impossible situation and then attempting to perform the operation that has been specifically designed to be impossible, is a precise definition of the movement of those trapped in the form of ideation. No wonder Hume never reached the limits of the mathematical system, at which the universe of his own discourse would have vanished. He placed an insurmountable barrier before his own train of thought.

Hume's basic methodological statement is that 'all our ideas are nothing but copies of our impressions', and in this it is possible to see the precise nature of the barrier that Hume erected before his own train of thought. This barrier is a methodological reduction of everything to the sensory, and a denial of the realm of ideas as epiphenomenal. Look at the contrast between Hume's statement of belief in the possibility of 'real causes', at the beginning of the section on probability, and his institution of a methodology that makes it expressly impossible to even approach knowledge of them, because one is trapped in the sensory. Hume could not have understood Plato's devastating refutation in the Theaetetus<sup>12</sup> of the proposition that perception is knowledge. Hume is

defining himself as what Plato calls the 'man of earth',<sup>13</sup> who only believes in what he can touch and sense.\* Simmias in the Phaedo, with his position that the soul is harmony, is recognisably patterned on this form, which Hume later assumes. Hume expands the definition of his methodology by saying, 'it is impossible to think of anything which we have not antecedently felt, either by external or internal senses.'<sup>14</sup> If this is so, then because he advocates a contradictory position, it would be impossible for Hume even to get close to the conception of a single source. Applying disconnection to the level of the senses, and then denying any other level, gives pure separation. Here is a plenum of completely unrelated sensory information. If this is so, then the world has disappeared! It would be impossible to see anything. Hume has been blinded in the way Socrates feared his physical investigations would blind him. Hume thinks that the sensory plenum is clear, but does not realize he has looked at too bright a light and has become blinded. He has become blinded to the disconnection of the single source. The progressive reduction of Ideas to simple ideas, and finally to sensory impressions is seen as a process of the elimination of ambiguity. Ambiguity is replaced by a false clarity, which is, in fact, equal to complete blindness.

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'These impressions are all strong and sensible. They admit not of ambiguity. They are not only placed in a full light themselves, but may throw light on their correspondent ideas, which lie in obscurity. And by this means, we may, perhaps, attain a new microscope or species of optics, by which in the moral sciences the most minute and most simple ideas may be so enlarged as to fall readily under our apprehension, and be equally known with the grossest and most sensible ideas that can be the object of our enquiry.<sup>15</sup>

Hume mistakes the light of the sensory for the light of reason. When a man looks at the sun and is blinded, he sees a bright light that is so intense that the forms can no longer be seen. The result of going to the extreme of brightness is the extreme of darkness. As Socrates says, if one has one of a pair of opposites, then one must have its opposite after it. The extreme clarity of the sensory realm is balanced for Hume in the extreme darkness of the disconnected realm of 'real causes'. The single source cannot be seen by definition. The extremes of light and darkness obscure it, and cut Hume off from it.

'To be fully acquainted, therefore, with the idea of power or necessary connection, let us examine its impression with greater certainty, let us examine its impression; and in order to find the impression with greater certainty, let us search for it in all the sources from which it may possibly be derived.'<sup>16</sup>

What appears in Hume as the sources of power are in Kant the subject. Kant, unlike Hume, affirms both the sensory and the realm of pure idea, pure reason, but places a third thing, the understanding, between them. Thus Hume subtracts from the situation of merely defining two opposite domains while Kant adds a third to them. This is another example of their advance and delay. What Hume sees about the sensory realm is true, but it is only part of the story.

'When we look about us toward external objects, and consider the operation of causes, we are never able, in a single instance, to discover any power or necessary connection, any quality, which binds the effect to the cause and renders the one an infallible consequence of the other. We only find that the one does, in actual fact, follow the other. The impulse of one billiard ball is attendant on the motion of the second. This is the whole that appears to the outward senses. The mind feels no sentiment or inward impression from this succession of objects: consequently, there is not in any single particular instance of cause and effect anything which can suggest the idea of power or necessary connection.

From the first appearance of an object, we never can conjecture what effect will result from it.<sup>17</sup>

Hume recognises what was said by Socrates about the qualitative opposites being laid down in a different pattern in each moment with respect to the opposites cause/effect. He says that these opposite events are conjoined and connected. He also notes that one follows the other, so that what is seen is that

there is here an implicit restatement of the point made by Socrates at the beginning of the Phaedo, in much more conceptual and much cruder terms. It is important to see that it is essentially the same point. It is not that Hume does not know how the opposites work; but that he cannot formulate it clearly to himself because the conceptual apparatus of ideation gets in the way. This is primarily because of the focus on form and event, rather than their qualitative opposites. It is not that the sensory is unimportant. Rather, it is that the primary qualities closely attached to form are what Hume means by sensory. The other sensory qualities are ignored, and so their opposites are not taken into account.

'In reality, there is no part of matter that does ever, by its sensible qualities, discover any power or energy or give us ground to imagine that it could produce anything or be followed by any other object by which we could denominate its effect. Solidity, extension, motion: these qualities are all complete in themselves and never point out any other event which may result from them. The scenes of the universe are continually shifting, and one object follows another in an uninterrupted succession; but the power or force that actuates the whole machine is entirely concealed from us, and never discovers itself in any of the sensible (primary) qualities of the body.<sup>18</sup>

All power and energy arises from a single source.

It is true that the source is not manifest in the

solidity, extension, and motion of forms per se. Instead, the source, in pure disconnection from the forms, contains pure connection. Because it contains pure connection it may be maintained that it is everywhere manifest. Hume focuses on form and sees the continual shifting of the objects, instead of that shifting of the qualities to which the movement of the objects is a response. Thus one could say that it is exactly the movement of the universe, seen as forms bearing the opposite qualities, which is the open manifestation of the power or force that actuates the whole 'organism' of the universe. What is necessary to see this is the positing, as Socrates does, of a realm other than the sensory in which the opposite qualities are pure and separated. Hume denies such a realm, so that even his appreciation of the sensory is reduced. He is stuck with forms, and can only see their primary qualities.

Hume goes on to discuss in detail the relation of the body to the soul, and the question of will. He shows that the power that moves the body at the command of the soul is equally as mysterious as that which connects cause and effect outside in the universe. Although he posits a mystery, Hume has some appreciation that whatever the 'power' is, it has equal efficacy in the universe and in the inner-most core of the human being.

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'For, first, is there any principle in all nature more mysterious than the union of soul with body; by which a supposed spiritual substance acquires such an influence over a material one, that the most refined thought is able to actuate the grossest matter. Were we empowered, by a secret wish, to remove mountains, or control the planets in their orbit, this extensive authority would not be more extraordinary, nor more beyond our comprehension.<sup>19</sup>

It is interesting that Hume speaks here of a union of soul and body. Even the idea that there could be such a thing as a soul is totally against his doctrine, because he denies the existence of an invisible realm in which it could exist. Unless, that is, he follows Simmias and posits that the soul is only harmony. Next, he says that the union between soul and body is what is mysterious. After denying connections in the sensory-formal realm, he posits connection in the ideational realm, whose existence he denies! Soul and body are opposites, and so, they are disconnected just like all the other opposites. It is not that there is some great mystery, but that there is only a single source manifested in all existence. The mystery is why Hume doesn't begin his chain of reasoning with this single source, instead of positing the impossibility of knowing it, then trying to know it, thus contradicting himself and bringing about stalemate in his argument.

Hume posits that it is impossible to know the power that moves things by cause and effect in the universe, that it is impossible to know the power by which the volition moves the body, and finally, he argues that it is impossible to know what moves volition itself. But this negative statement is fruitless without the concomitant affirmation of a single source from which this power issues, that is, manifest in a) the unfolding of the universe, b) the movement of the body, and c) the appearance of volition. The denial suggests so strongly the affirmation of the single source. Saying that there is no secondary causation as strongly as Hume has done does not render the primary causation a mystery, but instead makes its affirmation a necessity. Hume, in fact, rejects the positive affirmation of a single source by setting up a caricature of Berkeley's<sup>20</sup> position, which goes to the other extreme of assigning all causation to 'God'. 'God' in this case is only a theological, conceptual, device that lends no greater clarity to the argument. One knows no more by replacing the mystery by the word 'God'. These two positions outlined by Hume, are another example of nihilistic opposition which produces dialectically related flattened-out dichotomies. Kant calls these the 'antinomies of pure reason'. Two perfectly valid

arguments, starting from opposite premisses. The philosophies of Hume and Berkeley are an example of two antinomical philosophies. They are, with regard to their central precepts, mirror reflections of one another. Kant's philosophy is designed precisely to overcome their mutual implicit cancellation of one another. Hume confronts nihilistic opposition both within the way he states his arguments, and also in the world, by being in counterpoint within the philosophical tradition to the philosophy of Berkeley. Kant confronts this obvious nihilistic opposition, which is self-destructive, and attempts to remedy it instead of merely accepting it.

The flattened-out theological concept of 'god' is, in fact, just as much a mystery as Hume's mysterious unknowable power. One puts off the question of source too far, and the other answers too quickly. Within the ideational system 'god' is always a convenient conceptual marker for the point where thought stops and the thinker decides to close it off. How can any description of God be valid unless it were from Him Himself? When a thinker says 'God is....' he is putting a limit on Him which is merely a reflection of the self of the thinker. Any description which contains a genuine attempt to set up the correct relation between God and man must, by its nature, begin with the affirmation of the principle

of 'no secondary causation'. This is because man must dismantle the self/ideational-template entanglement in order to be able even to begin to approach a correct relationship with God. Otherwise, man sees only himself in his conception of God. God is reduced to a mere conceptual marker, 'god', in a philosophical system, showing the limits of that system. Affirmation of a single source is the first step of iconoclasm that destroys all the idols and demigods, and cutting through the nihilistic opposition which would fix a conceptual picture of God that has nothing to do with the Reality.<sup>21</sup>

Having defined his position as dialectically opposite that of Berkeley, Hume goes on to restate his conclusion.

'...so that, upon the whole, there appears not, throughout all nature, any one instance of connection which is conceivable by us. All events are entirely loose and separate. One event follows another; but we never can observe any tie between them. They seem conjoined, but never connected. And, as we have no idea of anything, which never appeared to our outward sense or inward sentiment, the necessary conclusion seems to be that these words are absolutely without any meaning, when employed either in philosophical reasonings or common life.'<sup>22</sup>

After this statement he goes on to give a positive account of what causality actually is, which is a habit of the mind to imagine connections when

presented with regular conjunctions of events. The mind, in this case, is an image of the universe of discourse, dependent on the possibility of connection, which is necessary for Hume to work out his negative argument. Ideation projects connections between forms where there aren't any, instead of grasping with the intellect that everything is dependent on a single source. Hume correctly states the illusory nature of the ideational process, which is completely wrong in its hypothetical connection of the forms to each other. However, he does not see beyond the confrontation of illusory ideational connection and sensory disconnection. Hume does not attempt to answer the question posed by the dialectical opposition between his philosophy and Berkeley's, but is only interested in taking up a position. His disconnection of all sensory things from one another is, itself, more than an ideational fantasy because, in order to state it, he had to create a connective tissue of ideas in his argument. Hume does not do what he says; for if he did, the result would have been silence. As it is, the resulting philosophical position is equivalent to silence. Words not coupled with action are merely idle chatter, as Rosen says in Nihilism<sup>23</sup>, and idle chatter is equivalent to silence. This is because it silences speech that is to the point and thought provoking.

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On the whole, the interest in Hume's philosophy can only be limited. Its significance is that it introduces a disquieting note into the universe of discourse of western philosophy, to which there was a massive response by those who attempted to find reassurance for themselves, that the ideational realm was not just a fantasy. What is interesting about this is that Hume severely limits his own scepticism,<sup>24</sup> and does not connect it to any sources in the Greek tradition. So Hume, by presenting a watered-down version of the sceptical position is setting up a 'man of straw' for other philosophers to refute. This is what, in fact, the role of the sceptic is. He follows the philosophical dialogue, throwing in arguments on either side, just to keep it going, which may be refuted by those who take up positions in the dialectic. This makes the dialectician's arguments stronger, since they have to deal with arguments from non-standard points of view. This is precisely what happened in the western philosophical tradition. The massive systems of Kant and Hegel were the response to the limited scepticism of Hume. Kant responded directly to Hume's obviously fallacious sceptical argument. He extended that argument to the destruction of the realm of discourse, which necessarily follows from it, when the constraints placed on the argument by

Hume are lifted. This is to say that, when the principle of disconnection is applied to the argument that expounds it, silence must result. That silence is the ceasing of the monologue of the self, which is matched as a commentary to the events and things in the world. This monologue is the core of the process of ideation. The source of this monologue is as mysterious as the mysterious 'power' expounded by Hume.

Kant connects the two mysteries and makes the inner monologue the source of the mysterious power that moves the universe. The ultimate point in the Critique of Pure Reason is where the Transcendental Subject is identified with the Transcendental Object by means of transcendental Affinity in the section called the Transcendental Deduction.<sup>25</sup> It is easy to get lost in Kant's system and terminology,<sup>26</sup> so it is best to have a simple presentation of this main point and keep the argument clear. Transcendental in its simplest definition means beyond experience. Hume contrasts the 'power' as causality in the universe to the 'power' acting in the body and in the mind. It is equally mysterious in all three places. It is beyond experience, as Hume says, and Kant calls this transcendental. The transcendental subject is this power, as it is manifested in the root of volition. It is associated

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with the voice of that monologue, coming from out of nowhere, with which men identify themselves. The transcendental object is the same power as is manifested in the body and the universe. Transcendental affinity is the matching of the monologue with the events that occur in the universe and in the body.

'There are only two possible ways in which synthetic representations and their objects can establish connection, obtain necessary relation to one another, and, as it were, meet one another. Either the object alone must make the representation possible, or the representation alone must make the object possible. In the former case, this relation is only empirical, and the representation is never possible a priori. This is true of appearances as regards that (element) in them which belongs to sensation. In the latter case, representation in itself does not produce its object, in so far as its existence is concerned, for we are not here speaking of its causality by means of will. Nonetheless, the representation is a priori determinant of the object, if it be the case that only through the representation is it possible to know anything as an object.<sup>27</sup>

Synthetic representations are the ideational connections, that Hume denied the possibility of, which make the connections between two objects or events, such as cause and effect. Hume effectively showed that these connections are nowhere made in experience. Thus, the object is not the source of the synthetic representations that occur in the mind. If that is the case, then the only other possibility, if we are determined to give these

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connections a reality, is to say that the synthetic representations (ideational connections) make the objects possible. This means that the world can only be seen through the ideational lattice or template. The connections come first and then the objects take up their places within the mould of the connective relations that are projected on to the world, by the ideational process, like a filter for sensations. This is an accurate picture from the point of view of those trapped in the life-form of ideation. What is seen in the move from Hume to Kant is a fixing of the form of the template of ideation. Hume says that sensory separation is real, and ideational connection is illusory. Kant says that sensory separation is filtered beforehand by the ideational form, and points out the solidity of the filtering device. Hume cannot really argue, because he is trapped in the limits of the ideational template himself. His argument has been effectively disarmed.

Kant does not claim that ideation produces the existence of the object, but that it determines its form in connection with other objects. This is crucial because it institutes the difference between the objects as seen inside and outside the ideational template's jurisdiction. In Kant's terminology, this is the difference between

phenomena and things-in-themselves (das ding an sich). That which he calls 'noumenon', is the pre-formed mould of the object, projected as a prototype beyond the template of ideation's jurisdiction, that acts as the filter which brings sensations into the template of ideation in a predigested form. This prototypical character of the ideational template is what gives it its seeming substantiality. It jumps ahead of the sensations into a realm that seems outside experience. Actually it is not outside experience, but it is merely outside the limits of the self (self-form) of the one embroiled in the ideational life-form. When one does not look beyond one's self, then the ideational template expands out to mould experience in order to cohere with one's own self-obsessions. The voice within, which comes from nowhere, acts to filter the incoming sensations into a certain pre-set form. The monologue which at first appears as an overlay to the timing of events comes to select which external timings are to be seen, by filtering out everything that does not fit the pattern of the self-form of the self-obsessed. Thus the ideational template seems to dictate the patterning that connects together the objects, even though it does not dictate their existence.

Truly, Kant's philosophy is of limited application

because it does not consider in the least what the objects are like beyond this filtering system, or how they come into existence in order to be filtered as a secondary process. Kant's philosophy is an in-depth look at the realm of artificial temporality which the ideational process produces. The entering of sensation as preprogrammed is artificial emergence, and the forms that objects take once inside, is the designated reality of nihilistic opposition. Kant specifically precludes the consideration of how the objects come into existence, by the fact that his whole philosophy is an attack on the traditional metaphysics which functions unselfconsciously within the form of ideation, thinking that the ideational forms are an accurate tool for knowing about existence. 'Metaphysica specialis' which Kant precludes from philosophy as a pursuit of pure reason, concerns the connection of the Soul to the World by 'God'.<sup>28</sup> The connection of the transcendental subject to the transcendental object by the transcendental affinity is a transformation into terms of the ideational template's outer shell, of this rejected path of scholastic metaphysics. It is the ideational template become selfconscious and critical of the connections that it posits, tying them to sensations. Thus the distinction is made between ideation disconnected from sensations, and connected to sensations. When connected to

sensations it forms the basis of understanding, whereas in isolation it merely produces pure self-cancelling twin concepts of the ideational template. Connection, then, is at the heart of the Kantian project, where he attempts to forge a link between reason and sensation. He represents reason clinging to sensation, whereas Hume clung to sensation and rejected reason as illusory, although he used it to state his case.

Pre-critical metaphysics applied the form of the template of ideation indiscriminately to things it could know and to things it could not know by sensory experience. Kant tied metaphysics down to only those things that may be sensed. In a way, Kant completed the programme begun by Hume. Hume fastened on to sensory experience as the only means to knowledge, rejecting ideation as illusory. Kant followed him, but brought the ideational form, which Hume was unselfconsciously using, and attached it intimately to the sensory forms, making it the source of those forms. Experience becomes a narrative by a voice-from-nowhere. However, in doing this, Kant says it is impossible to know anything of what lies beyond the ideational template's limits. The whole philosophical tradition, which has come after him, accepted this limitation to the realm of discourse set up by ideation. As the dialectic

worked itself out within that realm, there has been greater and greater specification of the form of the ideational process. Those trapped in it know its form, and exhibit it with precision. They take on that form, so that they are saturated by it, and exemplify it in everything they say and do. The point is that they do not go beyond it in any way. The regimen of it is totalitarian. The fact that the form of the template appears in many different manifestations only serves to re-emphasize the imprisoning character of the ideational process, that Socrates saw so clearly. The variety of appearances of the ideational template's form is superficial and not a deep kind of variety. An apple and a pear are different intrinsically. The metaphor for the differences produced by the ideational system is an apple painted to look like a pear, then a lemon, and then an orange. The sensory forms all look different but the core attributes are the same.<sup>29</sup> This shows the danger of focussing on form, because, if one sees only form, it may be that one is seeing the same thing in superficially different manifestations. This is exactly what has happened to those in the western tradition. They see the form of the template of ideation manifesting itself over and over in different disguises, which they do not recognise as being the same.

The form of the template of ideation is the basis of all the technology and institutional forms in the western world.<sup>30</sup> These outward products of this way of thinking embody and exemplify its specific structure. Technological devices and institutions are materialised theories.<sup>31</sup> When Heidegger speaks of the confrontation between man and technology<sup>32</sup> it is the interlinking between the self-form of men and the ideational life-form that is being indicated. What man faces in this confrontation is a progressively more intense embedding in the sensory, which is just the opposite of what Socrates indicates is called for in philosophy. Kant's work ties men to the sensory even more strongly than Hume's. In Kant, men are tied to the sensory through their reason. They are not led to a rejection of it. Hegel goes even farther and makes the Absolute the most concrete level of experience.<sup>33</sup> In effect, he makes the sensory realm equivalent to the mysterious power of which Hume speaks. The progressive immersion into the sensory is accompanied by desensitisation. Men come to be able to see only the things that are prefiltered and predigested for them by the ideational life-form. They come to the state in which they must rush to project the form of ideation in order to be able to see anything at all. This state is the point of total immersion in the ideational template, which is

concomitantly an attachment to, and overloading of, sensory stimulation. It is precisely because of the involvement in the ideational template, that attention is drawn away from what is happening on the sensory level of experience. The not-paying-attention to the sensory experience allows an over-involvement in it to go unchecked. Contrary to what is generally thought, involvement in the ideational template disconnects the attention of the intellect from the sensory side of experience, and by that means unconsciously connects those involved in ideation behaviourally and bodily even more securely to the sensory. Thus, the ideational life-form is both a way of thinking and a way of acting. The concomitant way of acting leads to a total immersion in the sensory which goes unnoticed because of pre-occupation with the ideas.

Because the ideational filtering system desensitizes by sensory overload and prestructuring experience, thereby setting up the realm of artificial temporality, which is manifest as an out-of-phasesness to the timing of Time itself; because of this difference, between artificial and genuine, emergence is set up. Artificial emergence is a change in the prestructuring of experience by the ideational template, whereas genuine emergence is the entrance of unprestructured material into the ideational form. By

the entrance of non-prestructured material, a connection to genuine timing outside the compass of the ideational template is made. These are known as synchronicity, unforeseen consequences, or even as miracles. Desensitisation also results in the flattening out of experience within the ideational template's jurisdiction. The nihilistic oppositions are caricatures of the opposite qualities. The overload of the sensory makes it impossible to see the sensory manifestation of the opposite qualities clearly. Only, flattened out, conceptually structured images of opposition appear within the ideational template's jurisdiction. This, then, is another reversal of what is generally conceived to be the case. The sensory is mediated to the desensitized individual through ideas, so that instead of tasting the sensory fully, the experience of it is blunted by the intervention of the ideational template's mediation. What can be seen here is what Plato called the mixture of opposites that occur in the delay period -- pleasure and pain, laughing and crying -- which results in what Kant calls in his aesthetic 'the sublime'. Ideation by drawing attention away from the sensory allows an undisciplined immersion in sensory experience in terms of behaviour. But that overload of sensation is mediated to the one who is immersed in conceptualization, so that he cannot really taste it

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directly. The form of ideational mediation of the opposite qualities is nihilistic opposition, which presents flattened out and conceptually structured images of the opposite qualities. Desensitisation is the result of the artificial mixture of opposites in the delay period. The principle expounded by Socrates that opposites cannot be opposite themselves is specifically violated within the delay period of differing and deferring as described by Derrida.<sup>34</sup> In it the opposite qualities are brought into conflict artificially by the dialectical form of the movement of nihilistic oppositions. This conflict of the opposites is nihilistically opposite the pure cancellation of the opposites that occurs in pure reason, which Kant describes as happening when reason is detached from sensory involvement.

Look how the embedding of reason, as an a priori filter into the sensory, brings about the conflict of the nihilistic opposites, and how opposite this is the cancellation of the opposites, when reason is disengaged from the sensory. This nihilistic opposition which is the root of the Kantian metaphysic is mediated by what he calls the understanding. The understanding is based on the transcendental subject and object. The transcendental object is what is beyond the flattened-out

conceptual caricature of the sensory object, to which one has been desensitized, and the transcendental subject is beyond the cancellation of the nihilistic opposites. Both are the representations of the limits of the delay-period, within which nihilistic opposition occurs. The transcendental affinity posits that the two ends of the delay-period are identical. The unity of the subject appears in the coherent unity of the objects that appear to him. The subject- turned-inside-out is the object, as Nietzsche commented on Kant's philosophy.<sup>35</sup> The delay-period is the 'time' it takes for the subject to turn inside out.<sup>36</sup> This turning-inside-out is a process of separating mixed-up opposites after having mixed them. The movement from the mixture of opposites in the sensory to the cancellation of the opposites in pure reason is an example of the creation of an illusion, because the opposites need not have been mixed up in the first place in order to be re-separated. Also, the concepts of transcendental subject, object and affinity are wholly fictitious since they do not appear within the delay-period itself, but are indeed transcendental with respect to it. This is why the transcendental subject is identified with the empirical subject as its substratum that is manifested as a voice from nowhere, and the objects are seen as images attached to the narrative of that

voice. These are all that appear in the delay-period in actuality, and the transcendental concepts are fictions projected to explain these images locked into a narrative.

The movement from mixing opposites to the cancellation of nihilistic opposites is the movement of the ideational process itself within its delay-period. The delay-period begins by the wavering between opposites, and ends with its cancellation. Thus we see here not just the static structure of the ideational template's form, but also its temporal manifestation. The two are completely intertwined. The key thing is to get a clear picture of the ideational template's structure, and the dialectical playing out of that structure, in order to recognise it in existence. The form of ideation unfolds into existence and collapses back again, until it vanishes, just like all the other forms in existence, according to the timing of Time. It has its own inherent temporality, like all the other forms, and it participates in the laying down of the pattern of the opposite qualities from moment to moment. The wholeness and naturalness of its unfolding and collapse, indicating the single source, cannot be appreciated from within the compass of the life-form of ideation. It is only by the advent of genuine emergence, at which the

ideational template disappears, that this inherent connection to the timing of Time may be appreciated fully. This may occur at any time, since the structure of the ideational template is completely illusory, but it is at the end, when the ideational template cancels itself out, that a clear picture is most likely to be gained.

The cancellation of the ideational template at the end of the delay-period is different from the cancellation of opposites that occurs at certain points in the working-out of the dialectical movement within the delay-period. The cancellation of the opposite qualities alters the form-content (quality converted into information) relation within the ideational template. This cancellation points to the principle of 'no secondary causation,' because it shows that the opposites cannot in truth be mixed, and that the mixture within the delay-period is illusory. The cancellation of the dialectical structure of the whole ideational template points even more strongly to the principle of 'no secondary causation.' The beginning point and the end point of the delay-period is the same.<sup>37</sup> By entering the delay-period, the illusion of artificial time is produced. If one had not entered the delay-period, then following the timing of Time no artificial time would have been

produced. There would have been no surplus capital to express it in economic terms.<sup>38</sup> Just as the present economic system, that follows the ideational template's form in its structuring, is based on the accumulation of a horde of surplus capital for investment and lending with interest; so the ideational system is itself concerned with the production of artificial time. The 'horde' of artificial time is the 'hollow' of the delay-period itself. The opposite of the horde in economic terms is the constant circulation of the bartered goods in flow. So the opposite of the 'hollow' of the delay-period is the timing of Time. The absence of artificial time is a constant indication of the single source. The whole of the horde of artificial time points toward its own absence by moving toward, in each instant of the specious present, its own cancellation. The movement toward cancellation within the delay-period points toward the nonexistence of artificial temporality. When artificial temporality does not exist, then the single source is indicated by the timing of Time at each instant.

The nonexistence of artificial temporality, affirmed before it is entered into, is a stronger indication of the principle of 'no secondary causation'. It means that the focus on the level of form cannot occur in the first place. For the cancellation of

the opposites, which alters the form-content relation of the form focused on, to take place, there had to be an initial focus on the level of form. If this initial focus had not occurred, then the opposites would not have cancelled, but would have maintained their intrinsic separation. The movement of the forms would have followed the laying down of the pattern of the opposite qualities. The cancellation of the whole of the ideational template indicates, however, that this focus on form, which makes the cancellation of the opposites occur within it, should not have occurred in the first place. The affirmation of the illusory nature of artificial time is thus an even stronger indication of the principle of a single source. One should not get into a position where one can see the cancellation of the opposites in the first place. The strongest affirmation of the principle of a single source is never to let go of it, so as to see the delay-period become manifest. If one does let go, then the intrinsic cancellation of the ideational template indicates and reaffirms that principle. The opposites cancel each other out and the whole ideational template is therefore cancelled. Their different kinds of cancellation are not equal. If one reaches the cancellation of the whole of the ideational template, then there is a stronger affirmation of the principle of no secondary

causation. This is because the one who sees the whole thing disappear, knows not to enter it again. Not to enter the dialectic in the first place is the heart of the matter. When it is entered, first there is the fixing of form, then follows the playing out of the cancellation of opposites, until the whole dialectic is worked through and the ideational template finally cancels.

The ideational template's form is not something solid such as the visible form of an object. Visible forms -- shapes of natural and artificially-produced objects -- are only one species of form. Ideation is primarily a behavioural mode; that is, a certain way of doing things. The form of it resides in what might be called the shapes of the actions, produced in the one who uses the ideational template to negotiate his way through the world. Actions based on the ideational template have a certain coherence, and it is this coherence that suggests the structure of the form of the template itself. Primarily, this coherence comes from the matching of the actions to the pattern of internal dialogue which connects them into a narrative. The interfacing of action and monologue occurs in a specific way that has definable parameters. It is these parameters that are set out in conceptual terms by philosophers such as Hume and Kant, and the whole

tradition that springs from them. In the ideational template's form there are basic disconnections between words and actions which occur precisely because the words are placed in a narrative form and then matched, in timing, to an action sequence. The narrative form and the artificial timing come between the word and the action producing the delay-period. Because of the ambiguity and wavering between alternatives that occurs in the delay-period, it is likely that what is done will not be the same as what is said, or that the description of the action will be different from what occurred. Therefore, although the ideational template makes connections between words and between words and actions, its result is actually a disconnection. The ideational template itself shows up in the consistent aspects of this real disconnection between words and actions, which is a result of the mixing of opposites and the production of ambiguity. Thus the form of the template itself is not a visible object, but more like a coherent way in which actions continually go astray from the original intention expressed in words, or how descriptions of actions deviate from what occurred.<sup>39</sup> This consistent deviation of actions in the world from what is said before and after them has specific parameters, these are called the 'form' of the ideational template. When this 'form' is consciously

conceptualised and imposed on life as a template or patterning device, and not merely the result of an incidental separation between words and actions, then it becomes a way of life, a life-form.<sup>40</sup> The working out of this life-form, in terms of negotiating one's way through existence, consciously applying it in specific situations, may be called the 'process' of ideation. The process of ideation means that the experience is being run through the filter of the ideational form. In that process the experience is prestructured. Seeing the 'structure' of the life-form of ideation only occurs when that template is used as a processor of experience. What happens when the template is used in this way is completely different from what is seen if the form of the template itself is looked at on its own. This difference is again the difference between form and structure. Form is the parameters that appear in the disconnection between words and actions. When these parameters are conceptualised and then used to process experience by being taken as a guide for further words and actions, then the experience becomes structured. This structuring shows the interior design of the template of ideation. All this indicates how the template of ideation itself unfolds and collapses again, like any natural form. This means that it is possible to see that the template of ideation has its own temporality -- it

has been given its own timing by Time. For process, structure, and the becoming of unfolding/collapse, are all aspects of ideation's manifestation in existence; but they too are dependent on the focus on form, to be seen. The formalisation of ideation itself into a template, which is the result of the process of focussing on form, is obviously the embedding of form into itself. The word template describes this embedding.<sup>41</sup> That is the production of a structure. Thus structure and form imply one another.<sup>42</sup> Structure is merely the selfconsciousness of the formalization process becoming manifest.

This brings about a consideration of how the attempted connection between words and actions, which actually produces an intrinsic disconnection, 'causes' a focus on form to occur. The opposite of ideation is to do what one says as soon as possible, and to say what one does as accurately as possible. When this is done, then even if one is still operating on the basis of the ideational template, the delay-period is reduced and the ambiguity is ameliorated. The only way to see one's way toward the 'way out' of the ideational template's arena of domination is the application of the principle of a single source in an iconoclastic manner. To the one ensnared in the ideational life-form there is a

constant stumbling, interference,<sup>43</sup> 'sludge,'<sup>44</sup>  
deviation,<sup>45</sup> which is encountered, that puts a  
drag on action. It is the experience of this  
phenomenon which draws one's attention to form. The  
primary qualities of form: solidity, mass,  
extension, are all experienced as a result of the-  
one-whose-action-is-being-held-up looking to see  
what is hindering him. Since his action is not  
cutting through the world, his vision goes from his  
purpose toward what-is-hindering-the-achievement-  
of-that-purpose, and at that point the focus on form  
occurs. This interference seems to be a property of  
the forms themselves, when it is not recognised that  
in fact it is a result of the split between words  
(purposes) and actions (results), and a non-  
recognition of the principle of no secondary  
causation. The principle of a single source negates  
the concept that the interference could be from the  
forms, because they have no causal power. If that  
is the case, then it must be from one-self, what one  
does and says. The material world is then a mirror-  
ing back of the break between words and actions,  
produced by ideation in terms of interference-  
phenomena. Instead of connection between word and  
action there should be a mutual confirmation. It is  
not necessary to rationalise actions, neither in the  
sense of justifications, nor in the sense of making  
them systematically based on oral accounts. Words

and actions should be independent -- not holding on to actions with words, nor holding on to words in action. Yet these opposites should confirm and support one another, as they alternate in man. If this occurs, then a clear view of the timing of Time is possible. wherein the interferences cease to have the same effect. because if they manifest themselves, then this produces a recognition of the single source rather than a reflection of one's self.

The philosophies of Kant and Hume exemplify the same movement from form to structure that was witnessed in the exposition of the Phaedo given in Chapter 1. This is an important episode in the development of the western philosophical tradition, because it represents the movement in that tradition. from a concern with form. to the laying of the ground work for a concern with structure. For although Kant and Hegel are still speaking about formal systems they are really beginning to explore the structural framework underlying the formal system. This is why their philosophies are so much more massive than those that went before. They are proper philosophical systems, in which the structuring of the ideas is for the first time as important as what is said. It is the limited introduction of the principle of disconnection by Hume that was the

impetus for this transformation of the western philosophical tradition. There was a massive response defending the template of ideation, a limited version of that principle being introduced, so that it is easier to see why Socrates was put to death for the more vivid introduction of the principle in a clearer form in Athens.

### CHAPTER 3

In Chapters one and two, two exemplifications of the movement from the formal to the structural mode of apprehending existence have been displayed. The first was at the very beginning of the western tradition in its Greek roots. There the whole of what has hitherto been manifested in the western tradition was played out in microcosm. Not only was it played out, but those who were involved had a better grasp of the subtleties of the phenomenon that was appearing within the city state of Athens. So much was this the case, that Plato could capture the essence of it in a dramatic dialogue such as the Phaedo. The second example was taken from a specific turning-point in the western tradition, that begins with Descartes and Leibniz in sixteenth-century Europe. The transition from Hume-Berkeley to Kant-Hegel, which represents dialectically inter-related moments in the western tradition, displays the same movement historically that Plato displayed dramatically. From a purely formalist setting because of an even limited involvement with the

principle of 'no secondary causation', there appeared Kant's, and then Hegel's massive philosophical systems. In Kant's philosophy, the key element is the 'architectonic', the structuring of the ideas themselves. Although formalism is still the topic being defended, the basis of structuralism has been built into the way in which the ideas are presented. In Hegel's philosophy what appears is dialectics, which is also used as the device by which the ideas are presented, even though the issue still seems to be the defence of formalism. Hegel merely takes as his premise the opposite of Kant's premises.<sup>1</sup> Thus his philosophy is an inversion of Kant's, and therefore is tied to it in an essential way. Structure and dialectic are intimately related.<sup>2</sup> The dialectic is a moving structure.<sup>3</sup> Hegel sets the a priori categories in motion.

The next two chapters will contain a presentation of arguments concerning Nihilism and Emergence respectively. Both these arguments assume that one is immersed in the structural-dialectical system already.<sup>4</sup> This is, in fact, the situation in which we of the western philosophical tradition find ourselves. Kant has set the parameters, within which all the other philosophical positions have been worked out. They are all commentaries and means of bringing to light the subtleties of the structural

system that Kant posited; just as the whole of the western tradition is, on a wider scale, a footnote to Plato as Whitehead has commented. In these terms, the perspective, taken from this point on in this essay, is one of being within the life-form created by the template of ideation, and looking out, trying to see if there is any possibility of anything beyond it. Thus, the perspective is reversed from that of the two previous chapters that effectively looked at the phenomena from the outside. Also, because one is dealing with the structural system and its intricacies, the formal element is no longer the centre of focus. In this segment of the tradition, structuralism is the sole concern; the elements of the formal system have been assumed.<sup>5</sup> Thus, in the process of presenting the arguments concerning Nihilism and Emergence, an attempt will be made to give an "overview" of the form of the structural system and its related ontology. It is here, then, after the setting has been made clear, that the actual process of dealing with the structure of theoretical (or formal) systems in relation to emergence/nihilism begins. The structural-dialectical system was instituted by the philosophies of Kant and Hegel, and has been, step by step, unfolding in the development of the western tradition up to this point.<sup>6</sup> Its form is not arbitrary, but is very precise, and has been worked

out in great detail and intricacy. It is first expressed theoretically, which means in terms of the ideational template, and then it is given concrete expression in institutions and technology. Nihilism and emergence express the dynamic of the structural-dialectical system. Nihilism is the dynamic movement from the inside toward the outside and emergence is the dynamic movement from the outside toward the inside. In the former one begins with the nihilistic oppositions that occur within the ideational template, and attempts to define the possibility of a clear, unambiguous non-nihilistic distinction. In the latter one begins with the clear distinction between artificial and genuine emergence, and works toward the definition of the difference between the timing within the template of ideation, and that form's own unfolding as an example of genuine emergence. These two together are an example of nihilistic opposition that occurs within the ideational template expressed in terms of the dynamic of the structural system.

In this chapter the issue is the argument concerning nihilism, the opposite of which will be approached in the next chapter. What is necessary is to set the context for the comprehension of the argument, and then present the argument itself, followed by what is seen of the structural system from the per-

spective it offers. The argument will be in the same form as those presented in the introduction, concerning the relation between the principle of 'no secondary causation' and the template of ideation. That is to say that the argument is itself structural, not syllogistically formal. Kant uses the syllogism and the traditional form of logic as the source of his architechtonic. Out of that came the basis of the structural system. This is a clear indication that structure unfolds from form.<sup>7</sup> It is this unfolding of structure from form, that is the background for understanding the argument concerning the nature of nihilism. Once the structural panoply has unfolded, a certain problematic is framed by it, which the argument concerning nihilism answers. That problem is essentially concerned with the nature of the ambiguity created in the delay-period, in which form and structure are manifested, and the argument concerning nihilism seeks to approach the possibility of clear distinctions on the basis of understanding the nature of this ambiguity. This project is, by necessity, of the same sort as that in which we saw Hume engaged in the last chapter. Hume accepted an ambiguous simplicity as the opposite of complex clarity; and then, having accepted the parameters of the definition of this problematic, attempted to solve the problem within those very terms that defined it

as impossible to solve.<sup>8</sup> In the development of this argument, concerning the nature of nihilism, I followed, albeit unwittingly, the same route. This route is necessarily taken by everyone who works within the parameters given in the western tradition. If you accept the existence of 'problems', you must search for 'solutions'. Problems and solutions are like cause and effect: when you disconnect them they disappear as meaningful ways of seeing the world. On the other hand, qualitative opposites are only meaningful ways of looking at the world as long as they are disconnected.

The point of going over this problematic and its solution is to display, once again, how this self-defeating system of argumentation<sup>9</sup> works in a contemporary context. We must continually call attention to it, so that others may be warned of it.<sup>10</sup> In the process of exemplifying it, however, one gets a view of how the structural system works. Thus by going completely down the wrong path<sup>11</sup> one learns a great deal.<sup>12</sup> The object that this study had, when it was begun, was to understand the structure of theoretical (formal) systems. This object is achieved in the course of pursuing an impossible goal. By the re-display of this course of inquiry a view of the resulting vision of the structural system may be gained.

1

Nihilism<sup>13</sup> is a term used in a restricted part of the western philosophical tradition, and the only reason the term is used in relation to the definition of emergence, is that those who worked with that term<sup>14</sup> gave a very clear picture of the phenomenon<sup>15</sup> that the author was trying to understand. This whole essay stems from the action of getting rid of that term. For, as has been said, when the term 'emergence' was substituted for it,<sup>16</sup> the whole argument, which had been designed around it, disappeared. The substitution of the term 'emergence' for 'nihilism' entailed turning the argument upside down,<sup>17</sup> and rendering it positive. The initial argument and its inverse cancelled each other out.<sup>18</sup> This is the experience associated with what Kant called the antinomies of pure reason. At that point there was the option of writing nothing<sup>19</sup> or attempting to elucidate the experience itself.<sup>20</sup> This attempt at elucidating the experience is necessarily structural<sup>21</sup> in outline. However, by struggling to indicate the meaning of the principle of 'no secondary causation', there is a struggle against the passive acceptance of the structural mode that asserts itself after the point of cancellation has been reached. The cancellation of the structural mode itself will, I hope, allow a stronger affirmation of the principle of 'no secondary causation.'<sup>22</sup> The term 'nihilism' has been

used by Nietzsche, Heidegger, and more recently by S. Rosen in his book by that name.<sup>23</sup> It is not necessary, however, to use this term. Nihilistic opposition is precisely the same thing as the antinomical opposites described by Kant in the Critique of Pure Reason.<sup>24</sup> More recently, T. Adorno has based his entire critique of western philosophies, such as Heidegger's, on the identification of antinomies.<sup>25</sup> This same phenomenon appears over and over again in the western tradition under different names. This is because it is the root of philosophical experience. One either realizes that one is caught in this mirroring,<sup>26</sup> or one does it unselfconsciously. The oscillation between ideational opposites is the basic feature of thought's movement within the ideational form. Thus, the term itself is not particularly important, ---it is the experience indicated by that term that counts. While studying nihilistic, or antinomic, opposition there occurred a cancellation of nihilism, with its opposite, which is emergence. The subject was subjected to topicalisation by the topic!<sup>27</sup> What is the relation between thinker and thought in this?<sup>28</sup>

A historical picture of the development of philosophy's appreciation of the phenomenon of nihilism, or antinomic opposition, might be apropos, but by

the rules of philosophical exegesis, historical reconstructions do not qualify as a basis for the understanding of a phenomenon.<sup>29</sup> Therefore, if comprehension is the aim, another tack will have to be taken. This is because emergence is the opposite of nihilism. Historical reconstruction pins down that which it studies and fixes it into a framework. The only framework in ideation is that of antinomic opposition. So, to provide a historical reconstruction of the dialectic, by which discussion of the phenomenon of nihilism (antinomic opposition) manifested itself in the western tradition, would be to be nihilistic. Understanding must be a going-beyond historical reconstruction, which would mean the breaking of the antinomical framework by the emergence of something new. The history of the concept of nihilism-antinomy is a record of emergences in human thought. It is a dialectical progression. Emergence and nihilism are intimately bound one to the other. One cannot separate their topicalisation from the way one deals with them in speaking about them, for they are manifested in that act of speaking. Historical reconstruction versus dialectical understanding,<sup>30</sup> nihilism-antinomy versus emergence,<sup>31</sup> language versus speaking (Merleau-Ponty)<sup>32</sup>, dialectic and the dialectic applied to itself (Sartre);<sup>33</sup> these are all examples of the form-to-structure conversion, that is at the centre

of attention in this essay. This transformation invades the speech about it, so that the only alternative is to present a conceptual model of this process, which will fix it, and then watch that model transform. That is to say, if one is to say anything comprehensible, one must submit to the reification process. Otherwise, poetry which is a complete surrender to ambiguity is the result.<sup>34</sup> Heidegger has already noted the nihilistic opposition that holds between thought and poetry in his later works.<sup>35</sup> This is another example of exactly the same antinomic dichotomy. Endless examples of icons of the form-to-structure transformation may be given from the western tradition. What is presented here is the terms in which this standard phenomenon presented itself to the author. The thing to be noticed is that in this paragraph, form/structure has been identified with nihilism/emergence, because nihilism has been taken as a form and fixed upon. The fixation or the fetishism of the experience of antinomic opposition is the centre of philosophical endeavour.

The best way to define the nihilism-antinomic opposition, without going into the history of the conceptualisations about it proposed by the different philosophers, is to contrast it to qualitative and formal opposition, discussed by Socrates

1

in the Phaedo. This is justifiable because there is no assurance that the philosophers in the latter part of the western tradition have a clear picture of it. In fact, trapped as they are, in the life-form imposed by the ideational template with no reference to anything else -- no understanding of the opposites, such as that displayed by Plato in his dialogues -- it is certain that they have no comprehension of the nature of the nihilistic opposites, because their very expression of them is itself unselfconsciously nihilistic.

The nihilistic opposites are an illusory mediation between opposite qualities and opposite things. They are an attempt to build a bridge, or connection, between the two types of opposites defined by Plato in the Phaedo. Nihilistic opposites are twinned conglomerates of opposite qualities. They are structural because they are dependent on a code.<sup>36</sup> First, a set of binary oppositions are marked off as a pool of resources. Then, a subset of qualities are selected from this pool and made into a conglomerate, all their opposites being made into another conglomerate. These twin conglomerates are presented as a pair of opposite things. For instance, the opposite arguments concerning cosmology called the antinomies of Kant are an example of twin conglomerates such as these.<sup>37</sup> Or, take the

example from the previous chapter concerning Hume's setting-up of the difference between clear complexity and ambiguous simplicity. The pool of binary oppositions contained the opposites complex/ simple and clear/ambiguous. This was the code, that is the definition of the possible bits of information and their binary correspondences. The definition of the code specifies the system, because only those opposites contained in the code may be used. Then, Hume selects two of these information-bits and pairs them in such a way as to produce a "trade-off". Clarity is paired with complexity instead of simplicity. In this way, two opposite conglomerates are made up of the binary code in which positive-negative opposites from the pool are mixed together in two separate amalgamations that are the reverse of one another. It is quite obvious that this is the mechanism by which mixture is produced in the delay-period.<sup>38</sup> This mechanism might be called twinning.<sup>39</sup> It produces twin entities as mixtures of binary oppositions.<sup>40</sup> These twinned entities may be presented in many forms, and this process is never stated explicitly as being the standard means of producing theoretical entities<sup>41</sup> -- thus there is a lot of mystery surrounding what is in effect a very simple operation. One way they are presented is as opposite arguments; Kant does this in the Critique of Pure Reason.

The twin conglomerates of coded opposites are a way of attempting to connect opposite qualities to opposite things. Remember that opposite qualities do not proceed from each other, whereas opposite things do. Thus, the things and the qualities are opposites. There is, then, no connection between them. The qualities appear in the things, but are not attached to them except in-as-much as a form has a core of specific qualities, which must always be seen to remain in the particular form designated. The twin conglomerates are a caricature of this core. The caricature is made to stand for the thing. It is neither opposites which must be looked at one at a time, rather than in systematised sets; nor is it a thing (or form), since the thing itself is disconnected from the qualities that, except for the thing's core qualities, appear within it, and it is essentially disconnected from the opposites of its core qualities. The caricatures of the core stand half way between the qualities and the things, and it operates as a reduction in-as-much as the opposites used in the code are conceptual binary oppositions, instead of opposite qualities; and the core of the form is being characterised, instead of the form itself being copied. The qualities in the core of a form do not coalesce into a conglomerate; they are not stuck together in some way. They are independently attached to the form like the seeds

in an apple -- each has its own encasement by the apple core. Or it is like the orange that is internally differentiated into sections, with one or more seeds to a section. Socrates, in his description of the earth, uses this latter metaphor. Thus the mechanism for producing twinned opposite caricatures of entities in connection to their qualities is a process of mixture with a very definite outline. It is an attempt at making a mediating theoretical device by a reduction to conceptual terms of the opposite qualities and things.


The point about antinomic, nihilistic, or, as they may be called 'twinned opposite' conglomerates, is that when they are brought together they cancel each other out. Opposite qualities may never be brought together, and opposite things produce one another; so that the twinned opposites made by conceptualisation are of a completely different nature from the qualities and forms that they are an attempt to mediate. By means of the conceptual twins, structure and dialectic are modelled.<sup>42</sup> These models are produced by making even more complex conglomerates, so that there are subsets within them twinned in more than one way. This patterning of the conglomerate is the structure; and when it is set in motion by the process of cancellation being carried out, there is differential cancellation of

only part of the conglomerate at a time; so that new qualities appear and disappear with each structural rotation; this is the means by which the dialectic is modelled. Specifically, the code pool is divided into subsets, and a conglomeration is made of the subsets before the conglomeration of the individual binary opposites. The internal division of the pool of the code is the structure. This internal division may be as complex or simple as one likes. When the twins are constructed they then have different layers which cancel each other out differentially. Differential cancellation means that, when the twins are brought together, only one subset can be cancelled at a time. There is, then, a progressively rotating cancellation which only cancels part of the twins at a time. This creates a model of the change in the form-content relation, which occurs when one of the opposites in a form is cancelled by its opposite. In the Savage Mind Levi-Strauss specifies this process in terms of what he calls the 'totemic operator'.<sup>43</sup> The following is a simple model of it.

#### FIGURE 1

The structural difference inaugurated in the code pool acts like a pivot<sup>44</sup> so that when 'A2' cancels with 'B1', 'D3' and 'C4' are held apart and vice versa. In this way different aspects of the twins appear at different times. Such a simple example,

FIG 1



seems trivial but when the structure is sufficiently complex, this becomes an important device for modeling change.

Structure in its simplest definition, along the lines of this model, is the encoding of differences into the code-pool. Dialectics appear after that as the resulting differential cancellation of the twins. That is to say that in cancelling, the twins must work through the encoded structural differences, before complete cancellation can occur. The totemic operator must appear in progressive stages, and the differences put into the code pool must be unravelled, before cancellation may be complete. It takes time for structure to manifest itself.<sup>45</sup> The time-span of manifestation is the delay-period, in which the ambiguity that is the result of this mixing process occurs. The stages of progressive differential cancellation are the moments of the dialectic. Structure is the dead dialectic.<sup>46</sup> It is the reading of the embedded differences, which are added to the code in the systemic pool, by which time is represented in the caricature of form.

In the Phaedo, the arguments of Simmias and Cebes are a picture of the synchronic and diachronic<sup>47</sup> aspects of structural encoding. The structure in

the synchronic moment appears to be an in built harmony among the parts, while diachronically it appears as something that lasts through the dialectical phases of cancellation, until the whole mixture of the totemic operator has been unearthed and the twins are completely cancelled. These are the two possible views of structure. In the dialectical moment it is an inbuilt harmony between the parts of the cancelling twins that is apparent, but which disappears when the next phase of cancellation occurs. The harmonic aspect of structure is like an incomplete sketch of the structure itself, which is only wholly seen at the end of the delay-period when the whole dialectic has been worked out. Simmias's and Cebes's arguments are nihilistically opposite, and what they give a model of is antinomic opposition itself. Thus, they completely embody the nihilistic point of view. The point is that nihilism has welled up inside them; they are the twinned images that cancel each other out, unknown to themselves. All this may seem trivial from the point of view of the modelling of structural emergence. But, when one begins from the point of view of the one who is only given structurally encoded, twinned, images within a delay-period, which is emerging according to an unknown pattern, in which one is one's self embodying and exemplifying part of the movement of that dialectic, then it is, from this

interior perspective, where one is immersed in the unfolding ideational template, difficult to see the simple pattern behind complexly orchestrated events. The structuring is merely a way of making it appear within the double mirroring<sup>48</sup> of the cancellation, as if there were something there when there is, in fact, nothing. In other words, the cancellation is in effect from the first, and the delay-period merely puts off the discovery that, in fact, there is nothing of any substance to either form or structure. When one is trapped in the template of ideation, whatever one does will exemplify that template. In that state, where the template of ideation is emerging in one's self and in those with whom one is interacting, it is almost impossible to get any view-point from which the structuring principle, no matter how simple, may be seen. It is difficult to imagine how the preliminary structuring by ideation takes place. One experiences one's self as already immersed in the delay-period, so that there doesn't seem to be anytime when the mixture one is participating in has taken place. The point is that the mixture occurs instantaneously at the point at which one enters the delay-period by focussing on form.<sup>49</sup> This is how the prototypical projection of the ideational template a priori -- before experience -- works. The opposite of the delay-period is the no-time of the projection of

prestructuring. It is this that makes the beginning and the end of the delay-period the same.<sup>50</sup> And it is the sameness of its beginning and its end that points to the principle of 'no secondary causation'. If the beginning and the end are the same, (i.e., if when you enter the delay-period you only end up where you started), then the question is why enter it in the first place?

The word 'nihilism' designates the debilitating effects of continually entering these prestructured delay-periods. 'Antinomy' designates the twinned images that, appearing within the ideational template, are presented as arguments. Socrates refers to the phenomenon, which these words designate as 'mislogic'. In a digression, a delay-period within the delay-period of the trial, which is in the delay-period of the stay-of-execution, Socrates explains what he means by mislogic; and this is the best definition of the phenomenon that is under consideration here that may be obtained, if we are determined to avoid the perpetually transforming definitions of the philosophers, who exemplify nihilism themselves.

'However, you have led me into a digression. The resemblance between arguments and human beings lies not in what I said just now, but in what I said before, that, when one believes that an



argument is true, without reference to the <sup>2</sup> the same thing happens again and again -- ~~X~~ you know how it is, especially with those who spend their time arguing both sides (i.e. the sceptics) -- they end by believing that they are wiser than anyone else, because they alone have discovered that there is nothing stable or dependable either in facts or in arguments, and that everything fluctuates just like water in a tidal channel. and never stays at any point at any time.

That is perfectly true.

Well, then, Phaedo, he said, supposing that there is an argument which is true and valid and capable of being discovered, if any one nevertheless, through his experience of these arguments, which seem to the same people to be sometimes true and sometimes false, attached no responsibility to himself and his lack of technical ability, but was finally content, in exasperation, to shift the blame from himself to the arguments. and to spend the rest of his life loathing and decrying them, and so missed the chance of knowing the truth about reality -- would it not be a deplorable thing?<sup>51</sup> (90b-d, Phaedo, Authors insert)

Socrates' definition of the phenomenon of nihilism, in which antinomical oppositions of structured twins are continuously produced, goes directly to the root of the phenomenon and that is oscillation, or wavering. But it is not just wavering once or twice, but a continual repetition of wavering until one doesn't know any more what is correct and what isn't. By this process, human beings take on the character of arguments. That is to say human beings are imprinted with the ideational template, when, through wavering, they become receptive to the mirroring

which occurs in pure reason, or, as it is here expressed, 'logic'. By oscillating between the twinned images, that appear in the mirroring, one takes that mirroring in, and embodies it in a fundamental way.

The one who is caught in this situation finds the alternation of the opposites in him to be like the fluctuation of water in a tidal channel. The ontological mould is like the shallow tidal channel which focuses on the action of the waves. The dissipation of the waves in the channel is analagous to the transformation of the alternating opposites into the nihilistic background. By the wave form () rebounding off the end of the tidal channel and recrossing itself, the energy is dissipated into a choppy perturbation, whose form is broken. The only access to the ideational template is, in this analogy, through the phenomenon of the solitary waves,<sup>52</sup> () which do not dissipate and rebound from the wall of the channel without losing their shape. The ideational template is the origin of all the wave-formations, all the oscillations between antinomic opposites, but its own differentiation can only be seen in certain specific kinds of waves, which appear as quanta. The specific quality of solitary waves is that they do not dissipate -- entropy or nihilism does not effect

them in the same way as other wave formations. It is this non-dissipation which points to a harmonic patterning device, that lies behind the phenomenon of waves. This phenomenon, like that of the solitary waves, is only seen in the tidal channel, -- not on the open ocean. The rebound of the waves that causes dissipation to increase is precisely the addition of the delay-period. It comes from the focussing on the alternation of the opposite qualities into the narrow ontological mould. The point is that this instability, when taken in, makes the whole world seem to be in flux. As a response, the framework of the twins is manufactured in order to have something to hang on to. For, as the oscillation occurs, one may switch from one twin to the other. The only problem occurs when the twins are brought together, because then they cancel each other out. So, structuring is a 'ploy' that delays this cancellation. Thus, the antinomial opposite conglomerates are produced as a further focussing on the fluctuation within the ontological mould -- a solidification of it into an artificial form, as it were.

It is when man shifts responsibility for this state of affairs outside himself, that the imprinting of the ideational template is complete. Nihilism is 'lostness' in the resulting confusion which is ever

increasing for those imprinted by the ideational template. First, man begins to waver, then the oscillation becomes continuous, and man becomes attached to it as a form by actually arguing on both sides. After that, he finds that everything exemplifies his own oscillation, and then he shifts responsibility for the instability that appears to him to be outside himself. The oscillation of the rebounding wave-forms turns into erratic perturbations. These are the stages of the unfolding of the ideational template, for the oscillation must occur by rebound, and for that rebound there must be a narrowing obsession with form within the ontological mould. The existence of the oscillation implies the projection of an a priori patterning device, which produces the waves of the alternation of the opposite qualities, that are transformed into a rebounding oscillation, that then dissipates into perturbations of nihilism. It is as if each wave that hit the shore had a different quality all its own. When the tide is in, then certain qualities appear, and when the tide goes out, their opposites come in with the waves. On the other hand, when the ontological mould is posited like the construction of a tidal channel, the different qualities of each wave are forgotten, and the waves are merely seen as the transference of mechanical energy. The unique qualities of the waves are no longer seen. The

a priori positing of the template of ideation is instantaneous, and it joins by structuring the beginning to the end, so that the delay-period is artificially unified. It is only seen in the appearance of certain kinds of waves -- an analogy with solitary waves. That unification of beginning and end is the synchronization of speech to event. This is what is meant by arguments resembling people. Human beings are reduced by this process to caricatures, to speeches that are twinned arguments. The grammatical structure of language is imprinted on them, and their lives become entrapped in a narration from a disembodied voice; they become fictional characters playing out a drama within an artificial time-span.

Socrates contrasts with this the possibility of an 'argument which is true, valid and capable of being discovered'. The possibility of such an argument, from the point of view of the one entrapped in pre-structuring by the template of ideation, means that there is a possibility of release from the prison. But note that Socrates says that this means of release is itself an argument. This means that the release may only be envisaged by the one entrapped in terms of the form of the prison itself.<sup>53</sup> Thus, where nihilism, as complete 'lostness' in ambiguity, which is ever-increasing, exists, then

one conceives of a non-nihilistic, clear distinction, that cuts through the wavering once and for all. This is Hume's impossible project all over again. Since the solution is formed in terms of a problematic, then it can only be the antinomical opposite of that problematic. Thus, instead of freedom, there is an unfolding of one antinomic twin from another, which is a caricature of the things giving rise to their opposites. This is dialectical movement. Structure is embodied instantaneously, and then it is given time to unfold. What is seen is that the time of the unfolding of structure is precisely the time in which the next structure, after the culmination of the present dialectical phase, is encoded. The manipulation of content in one phase of dialectical unfolding is the embedding of structure on to the code-pool for the next phase of unfolding, which will occur. The instantaneousness of positing the structure depends on not noticing that anticipation is antinomically opposite delay, and that for every delay-period there must be a period of anticipation. In the period of anticipation the structure of the delay-period is laid down. Thus, it appears as if it were instantaneously posited. However, the a priori exists in the simultaneous positing of the periods of anticipation and delay, because their connection through artificial time is not in the same time. It is an instantan-

eous connection.<sup>54</sup> The instantaneous connection is no connection -- it is a direct mirroring.

The step outside the ideational template cannot be conceived of in terms of that template. The only option is for the possibility to be proposed as the possibility of a clear distinction, or a true argument, in the context of nihilism, which is the same as an antinomic oscillation gone wild, or in the context of the invalidity of all arguments that contradict one another.

'Very well,' he said, 'that is the first thing that we must guard against. We must not let it enter our minds that there may be no validity in argument. On the contrary, we should recognise that we ourselves are still intellectual invalids, but that we must brace ourselves and do our best to become healthy -- you and the others partly with a view to the rest of your lives, but I directly in view of my death, because at the moment I am in danger of regarding it not philosophically but self-assertively.' (90e)<sup>55</sup>

The approach to intellectual health by the production of an argument, that cuts through the very mechanism that makes all arguments invalid, is exactly the taking on of Hume's impossible task. Socrates took this on in the face of death and staked his fate on it. Immediately, in the face of nihilism, Socrates appealed to the principle of 'no secondary causation'. This task is that of cutting through the structure that underlies nihilistic

opposition. Thus, the difference between Socrates and Hume is that, where Hume tries to solve the problem set up in terms of ideation itself, Socrates appealed to the opposite of the ideational template, which is complete disconnection. Still, Socrates produces an argument, instead of merely invoking the principle of 'no secondary causation' and leaving it at that. He therefore went into a structural phase, which displayed what was hidden in the nihilistic opposition, and caused his own argument to become structured. What is seen here is how the self-form interlocks with the template of ideation. Nihilism appears to Socrates in response to his argument concerning reincarnation. Socrates responds, and by that displays what is hidden in the nihilistic opposition that confronts him, but in so doing his own argument becomes more solid and structured. The self, in responding to nihilism, becomes enmeshed in it, just as in transferring responsibility from the self to the arguments, the self becomes imprinted with them. Both to attack and to give up are antinomical responses. What Socrates says is that one is trapped in it either way, but that it is best to struggle in that situation. For then it is possible that, with help from the outside, one may work through the dilemma and become free of it.<sup>56</sup>

The self-form may either be passively imprinted by

the ideational template, and thereby connected to it, or there can be struggle against that imprinting, in which it will emerge as an unfolding of the structuring of the self. The imprinting of the ideational template on the self, when it is in a passive state, manifests itself in words and actions, once the self begins to struggle against the imprinting process with help from outside the ideational template through the appeal to its opposite -- i.e. the principle of 'no secondary causation'. Precisely the opposite of this struggle against imprinting occurs in the politics of the use of the ideational template in order to establish the structure which is imprinted in the self-form indelibly. This is that the imprinted individual is moved to a free space, in which he is given room for the imprinted structure to manifest itself. Sensory deprivation is an effective means of eliciting hallucinations from a person who is immersed in a culture based on sensory overload. On the same principle, if a person who has been programmed by a systematic introduction to the ideational template is put into a free space, then the structuring underlying that programming will manifest itself in the development of his self-form in that situation. The selective allocation of individuals to free closed-spaces is a means of impregnating specific individuals with the capacity to structure. To

struggle within the imprinting situation is to move in the opposite direction from this free space; but it has the same effect -- i.e. structure manifests itself in the self-form of the individual. To move in this direction opposite to the free space, and to invoke the opposite of the ideational template, turns the programmed individual into an iconoclast of the first order. He is not merely a revolutionary, who in opposing the established order still uses the basic ideational format, which is used by all the different contenders for political power. Instead he has broken with the system at the root of it's formation.

Socrates sets up the antinomic opposites of approaching death philosophically (passively) or self-assertively. He further defines self-assertion as the act of trying to convince one-self rather than an audience. Thus, he is defining a situation in which the self is struggling against itself. The struggle against imprinting must be waged against one-self. In that case, as the structure manifests from the self-form, one has hold of it, instead of it having dominance over one, as it does if the structure manifests itself in the free space which is institutionally provided to elicit the same effect. Also, it is indicated that the true and valid argument must be one in which one

has 'the strongest possible conviction in one's self'. This means that the possibility of freedom from the ideational template lies within the self-form's struggle against itself. So, Socrates regards his refutation of Simmias's and Cebes's arguments as a struggle against himself. This means that he regards the nihilism of their twin arguments as arising from himself--not from them. He has not given up responsibility for the nihilism of their twin arguments, but on the contrary, has taken responsibility for them, and has, in refuting them, taken action against the structuring which has appeared in the delay-period, forced on him by the stay of his execution. The key to this is to note that, in this delay-period, Socrates began to practice an art for the first time, other than the philosophical art -- i.e. lyrical poetry. The practice of this art led to his inventing the fable to rival Aesop with which the dialogue began. By means of this art the imprinted structuring within Socrates himself began to manifest itself based on the wavering of his resolution that his dream meant to practice philosophy rather than a specific art. When this view of the dialogue is taken, it becomes a documentation of the struggle of a man against his self, and the nihilism coming from within him, that it presents him with. It is a struggle to the death between him and his daemon<sup>57</sup> -- the voice from no-

where in the dream.

This is how Socrates defines the phenomenon of nihilism, or antinomic opposition, in simple human terms. Quite straight-forwardly, it derives from the connection between two different sorts of cognitive method. One cognitive approach is an oscillation between two points, and the other is a circling of a single point. These are the basic approaches open to man, by which he can know existence, other than his being the point circled or one of the end points of the oscillation. Oscillation is the basic movement from one thing to another, while circling is a staying with, by moving around, the same thing. These two approaches might be called Transcendence and Sameness.<sup>58</sup> These are disconnected opposite modes of cognition which are connected to produce the ideational form. In the ideational form an oscillation between images is placed within a circling, the image of which is a delay-period, in which the beginning and the end are the same. It is structure in the ideational form which is used to connect these two modes of cognition. By structural coding the beginning and end of the delay-period are made the same, and the structure is coded into the twin images that are oscillated between within that delay-period.

Structure is a means of building an illusory bridge

between these two quite separate modes of cognition. These two methods are comparison and reiteration, or information about sensory opposites and recognition of meaning by indication of non-conceptual oneness, and they alternate in man as a means of comprehending existence. When he tries to mix them, the ideational life-form is the result. They become reduced to the two motifs that underlie all philosophy, which in the western tradition pushes Transcendence forward, and bases it on a hidden Sameness. The point moved 'from' and the point moved 'to' are surreptitiously connected by another, hidden route; the structure is an example of this hidden passage, which is coded into that which is presented. In this way, the two cognitive modes are mixed in order to produce a ploy. The ruse is of the form: how can you get from 'point A' within a sphere to 'point B' outside a sphere without crossing the boundary of the sphere? It is a ruse because the one offering the dilemma has already set up a higher dimensional passage from A to B for himself, by invoking the other cognitive mode, without accounting for it to those to whom he has posed the problematic or transcendence.<sup>59</sup> Look at Kant's connection of transcendental subject to object. Their transcendental already suggests that they are connected by another route which, by definition, those within the ideational form have no access to. And so it is

that Kant bases his whole system on the distinction between infinitude and finitude. Infinitude is taken from the calculus of Newton, so that it is seen that the Kantian philosophy is a casuistry for classical physics. Already the connection by sameness has been specifically precluded by relegating 'metaphysica specialis' to pure reason. Yet since the subject and object in question are 'transcendental', they are therefore already in that very realm where the precluded cognitive approach applies. This surreptitious connection, between subject (A) and object (B) provides the basis for an overt, presented connection between them -- i.e. transcendental affinity. The surreptitious and overt connections form an antinomic pair. It is all based on mixing the two cognitive modes, turning them into philosophical motifs that are mutually interdependent, and making possible the positing of illusory connections. This is, of course, a severe reduction in the value of both these cognitive modes.<sup>60</sup> Their mixture produces nothing but ambiguity. It is out of this ambiguity that structure arises.

Consider the simple model of a grid of distinctions being laid over a landscape.<sup>61</sup> In the Introduction, the landscape was designated 'Time'. It was said that different distinctions could be

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applied to this landscape and that, by each of them, different features would be highlighted.<sup>62</sup> It was also stated that if these different distinctions were connected, a system would be produced. Consider the code pool, a set of mutually-related distinctions, from which a formal system may be built and into which structure may be coded. In this grid- landscape model, ambiguity may appear in two places. It may appear in the closed-space between the grid and the landscape, or it may appear at a point of intersection of the grid and the landscape.<sup>63</sup> If it appears between the grid and the landscape, its form will be a constant shifting or wavering of the distinctions, either in relation to each other, or of the whole set in relation to the landscape. If it appears as a point of intersection between grid and landscape, then an actual locus of paradox or contradiction is produced. The point is that the actual space between the grid and the landscape has the quality of producing ambiguity and optical illusion.<sup>64</sup> Heidegger defines this difference in terms of two different concepts of Being: an Atemporal Being, which is pure presence, and Temporalized Being, which is a mixture of presence and absence.<sup>65</sup> It is out of this special space between the mathematically clear net of distinctions and the shifting landscape that structure appears.<sup>66</sup> It appears as a means of connecting

form and content (here content refers to what appears within the grid from the landscape). It basically involves constructing a second finer grid, called the code, from which the contents of the form are selected. Thus, the contents of the forms are no longer qualities, but instead are 'micro-forms'. Complete disconnection from qualities has taken place within the ideational template. The embedding of form into form is structure. Structure is the bridge between form and micro-form which attempts to eliminate the ambiguity that still persists in the shifting of the two grids in relation to each other.

The two grids are the twin images of each other that progressively cancel each other out, and their cancellation is delayed by the encoded structure. Between the two images lies the line of cancellation, that is the boundary which by definition cannot be crossed, but is nevertheless surreptitiously crossed by the one who puts forward the ruse -- the sophist. He is the one who acts differently from what he says. It is in approaching the crossing of this line that ambiguity is produced. The more closely one approaches it, the more intense the ambiguity. Structure is the transformation that specifies the two end points' relation to one another. Structure is encoded into the form of the twin on this side of the line of cancellation, so

that one may transform that twin into its nihilistic opposite, without having to cross the boundary at all. So the secret passage may be seen instead, as the positing of a necessity to cross the boundary when it is not really necessary.

Once structure appears it begins to transform itself. For this a new kind of Being is necessary, a new ambiguous space is opened up, in which the transformation-of-the-transformations takes place. As Sartre says, the dialectic must itself be dialectically transforming.<sup>67</sup> Adorno calls this the negative dialectic,<sup>68</sup> and Merleau-Ponty glimpses it in his re-writing of Being and Time under the title Phenomenology of Perception, where he calls this new third modality 'the recoil of Being-in-the-World'.<sup>69</sup> Later, in the Visible and the Invisible<sup>70</sup> Merleau-Ponty calls this third kind of Being, that is different from pure presence and the mixture of presence and absence, 'Hyper-Being' which he contrasts to yet a fourth kind of Being which he calls 'Wild Being'. Structure unfolds in a series of transformations. This unfolding circles around a point that is outside the whole system, based on the preconceptions, like ontological monism, with which the system began its unfolding. This ideal of a kind of Being beyond our presuppositions is what Merleau-Ponty calls Wild Being. However, conceiv-

ing a state beyond presuppositions depends on the working out of the implications of presuppositions in the first place. All this is merely a re-statement of Hume's impossible project at a higher level of sophistication, as it is worked out in the dialectical unfolding of contemporary philosophical debate. The four kinds of Being<sup>71</sup> form a circular system, which cannot be broken out of as long as one accepts the terms in which it is posed. The whole problem becomes the differences and similarities between these different specified sorts of Being. The idea of having different kinds of Being is itself a paradox; ultimately one is returned to the connection between Sameness and Transcendence that they represent.

This brief overview of the development of Hume's impossible project of unifying the antinomic opposites without their cancellation in terms of the contemporary philosophical scene, where it is played out on a grand scale, has been necessary, in order to show up clearly the problematic posed by antinomic opposites and the nihilistic situation that results. What is shown is that, opposite to, and underlying, structural systematics is a complete ontology. Ontology defines the nature of the differentially ambiguous spaces, in which form is posited, structure arises, and then unfolds, and

finally the collapse of these spaces into one thought-provoking matter. The definition of the progression of differentially ambiguous spaces is analogous to the encoding of delay by means of structure. Ontology and structural systematics are mutually dependent, and are, in fact, twinned antinomic opposites. In contemporary philosophy nihilism is embodied, not just by two men putting forth opposite arguments,<sup>72</sup> but by four or five interlocked arguments presented by several philosophers.<sup>73</sup> The point is that in the end, the whole dialectical progression is seen, as in the case of the definition of the different types of Being, to collapse and cancel itself out at the end of the playing out of the dialectic.<sup>74</sup> Thus it is seen again that opposite the pair structural systematics/ ontology is set up what may be called conceptual oneness.

Conceptual oneness is the embedding of Infinitude, interpreted as 'interpenetration', rather than God, as Kant did, into finitude. Interpenetration, popularized by Zen Buddhist enthusiasts in the west, is a way of conceptualizing Oneness, as appearing within form without destroying form. Each form is said to reflect every other form in the universe. Interpenetration is the identification of Form with No-form by reason. This is completely different to

the experience of the Zen Buddhists themselves, without which conceptual Oneness becomes meaningless speculation based on someone else's experience. This embedding of Infinitude into finitude may be modeled, using the paradigm from mathematics of higher dimensionality, which is bounded by zero and 'n' dimensionality. 'N' dimensionality is interpreted as the internal coherence of zero dimensionality and zero dimensionality is interpreted as the external coherence of 'n' dimensionality. By this interpretation a model of interpenetration is constructed conceptually.

Conceptual oneness is the idealized model of this collapse of the four states of Being, and is posited as a state of affairs simultaneous with the differentiations projected by structural systematics and ontology.<sup>75</sup> One could say that conceptual oneness is the ultimate landscape for the double grid of structural systematics and ontology. Conceptual oneness is that which ideation posits as lying beyond the precincts of the ideational template.<sup>76</sup>

It is the instantaneousness of the connection between advance and delay.<sup>77</sup> Conceptual oneness is the opposite of the ideal of merging the opposites without cancellation. It is the seeing of cancellation (Infinitude) simultaneously mixed with the state of non-cancellation (finitude). The

ideational template is bent on the mixture of opposites to the end. The illusory connections it posits are based on this. Notice that cancellation/production-of-antinomic-opposites and the ideal of merger-of-the-twins-without-cancellation/conceptual oneness makes an interlocking conceptual grid, analogous to the differentiation of the four kinds of being. Thus the same phenomenon occurs to the description<sup>78</sup> as occurred to the described.<sup>79</sup> It vanishes.<sup>80</sup> The point is to let go of it.<sup>81</sup>

The argument concerning the nature of nihilism, and its relation to the possibility of a clear distinction, is posed in this context. The idea of the argument is merely to point out the positive aspects of this phenomenon of nihilism, that seems to be negative from the perspective of the one entrapped in the template of ideation. The argument in its most simple statement has the following outline:

1. There is nihilism<sup>82</sup> -- antinomic opposition<sup>83</sup> and its consequences.<sup>84</sup>
2. Nihilism has systematic features<sup>85</sup> that show that it has a coherent essence.<sup>86</sup>
3. Systematics<sup>87</sup> and ontology<sup>88</sup> together indicate conceptual oneness,<sup>89</sup> and these together further indicate the possibility of; the non-nihilistic distinction.<sup>90</sup>
4. The non-nihilistic distinction is the homeopathic-like 'potency' <sup>91</sup> of the anti-nomic opposites.<sup>92</sup>

This argument comes from looking positively at a negative phenomenon. The destructive effects that stem from the imposition of the ideational template on existence are everywhere manifest.<sup>93</sup> They are myriad critiques of the state of the world as a result of the imposition of the ideational template by means of institutions and technology. There are all true! The affair that the human species is engaged in fills one with awe. But look how man's self-destruction, genocide, and the destruction of the planet all stem from his being caught up in a conceptual life-form which is completely without substance,<sup>94</sup> that is completely illusory. All these terrible effects occur because man looks at existence in a way that is fundamentally wrong. However, to appreciate the meaning of this error, it is necessary to look at the phenomenon of the nihilistic effects of the application of the ideational template to existence in a positive light. Thus it is necessary simply to accept the appearance of nihilism in existence. Those who present their critiques of the state of the world, or their analyses of the phenomenon of nihilism do not accept its manifestation in the world. They have no solutions, which will not make things worse, because they too are based on the ideational template; and they do not accept the world as it appears to them.<sup>95</sup> They are lost in an ambiguous position,

somewhere in between, which is precisely the point. Nihilism to them is an incoherent phenomenon that is somehow endemic to man's character, and is anti-nomically opposed to reason. Rosen presents this position very distinctly in his book Nihilism.<sup>96</sup>

Once the phenomenon of nihilism has been accepted, then its coherence begins to appear. It has, when looked at in a broad perspective, systematic features that point to the fact that it has, after all, a coherent essence. Heidegger, despite the inherent nihilism of his own position, as pointed out by Rosen<sup>97</sup> and Adorno,<sup>98</sup> who themselves embody nihilism fully, recognised this coherence of the phenomenon of nihilism, which he noted in his letter The Question of Being.<sup>99</sup> The question then becomes: What is the meaning of the coherent essence of the phenomenon of nihilism, that appears when the phenomenon is accepted, but which does not appear when it is not accepted? This is another way of approaching the question of the relation between the template of ideation and its nihilistic effects, which appear when it is applied to existence.

Ideation is a way of seeing the world. As such, it is a means of rendering visible. The application of the grid to the landscape is made in order to see the landscape. The coherence of the phenomenon of

nihilism appears in the way it renders things visible. By the application of an artificial device for looking at the world, the world is affected. This is Heisenberg's famous principle.<sup>100</sup> Instrumentation effects measurement in a way that produces ambiguity. The effect does not come from the observer, but from the observer's insistence on observation through a mediating device. The instrument is the concretization of the delay period. It distorts experience. The disturbance in the thing under observation is part of the process of observation -- without it the thing would remain invisible. Thus, nihilism's appearance in existence is just like that -- it is the effect on existence of the lens of ideation and nothing more. In order for the forms or concepts produced by ideation to be seen, there must be produced a 'background noise.'<sup>101</sup> This background noise is the echo of previous applications of the template of ideation. The coherence of nihilism appears in the relationship of the disturbances in the context to the thing rendered visible in that context. The constant shifting of the landscape<sup>102</sup> is necessary for the grid to be seen, or if one is looking at the landscape, then the grid appears to be shifting, or contains a paradoxical point within it. The disturbance or interference ('noise') is not random. Instead, it has a very special erratic character, that allows

continuities to show up. The continuities are the connections posited by ideation. In order to project them the ground has to be prepared by a prior tilling process. That tilling process amounts to the previous effects of the application of the template of ideation on the world. The preparation for rendering visible occurs simultaneously with the actual visibility of something that has already been prepared for in the moment before. The nihilistic effects of ideation and the form of the ideational template are completely interlinked.

It is the separation of the mechanism of rendering visible from the self, that is the root of this disturbance being projected into existence. This is seen by the fact that in the eye, the same kind of erratic change is produced,<sup>103</sup> and that, when in experiment the image being viewed is moved exactly in time with the erratic movement, the image disappears. This also sheds light on the phenomenon of cancellation which, in terms of temporality, is exactly the matching of the timing of the erratic motion with the motion of the presented object. The separation of the self from the template of ideation, the projection of the means of seeing outside the self, means that the whole mechanism that exists in the self must be reduplicated outside it. Part of what must be reduplicated is the mechanism that

produces erratic change, which in turn allows continuities to be seen. Thus, nihilism results. The struggle with the self in the nihilistic situation is the means of bringing the ideational template back into focus with the self-form, and the realization that they are the same thing. When the self-form and the ideational template are brought into focus, then only vision, only Time, remains. The erratically moving objects and the erratically moving background vanish. The point is to let go of them.

Once nihilism has been accepted and its positive value recognised to be in the production of erratic change, which serves as a background on which whatever is presented to theoretical vision is seen; then it is possible to locate the source of this erratic change and see that the very thing that produces nihilism serves to define the possibility of the opposite to nihilism. The definition of the possibility of the opposite to nihilism is not, however, the same as the grasping of that opposite. Thus, there is a distinct move from the grasping of the possibility of a clear distinction, which may be done in terms of the very thing that produces nihilism, to the grasping of what this possibility implies. These two distinct stages form the rest of the argument concerning the nature of nihilism.

The structural system is the mechanism that produces erratic change.<sup>104</sup> It is constructed out of specific components in order to fulfil this function.<sup>105</sup> Any variation in the specifications for the formation of a structural system must be within the tolerances that allow this function to occur. Just because it is conceptual does not mean that the structural system is arbitrary and functionless.<sup>106</sup> The literature would not be so full of such precise descriptions of it if this were the case. The motion of erratic change is a result of the way the concepts are fitted together, which creates a gestalt effect -- an optical illusion in the realm of theory.<sup>107</sup>

The structural system is itself seen on the background of the erratic change it produces, as well as whatever is presented in that context. Presentation of theoretical forms other than the structural system itself is the function of ontology. For everything that is presented on the background of erratic change, there is a concomitant withdrawal of something else.<sup>108</sup> Complementary to structure in the structural system is the framework<sup>109</sup> of presentation and withdrawal which appears in ontology. The framework is related to the whole of the ambiguous closed space, within which structure manifests, as structure is related to the whole of the

coding-pool which defined the boundaries of the system. Heidegger calls the whole of this ambiguous closed space the 'Clearing-in-Being'.<sup>110</sup>

#### FIGURE 2


Thus the structural system provides the context for the presentation of theoretical objects. The ontological component, which is its opposite, controls the interchange function of presentation and simultaneous withdrawal of something else.

Both the structure and the framework, which are twinned formations, have an internal articulation which, in specific circumstances, defines the singularity<sup>111</sup> and the non-nihilistic distinction respectively. These circumstances appertain, when conceptual oneness is applied as a criterion to the twinned formation which indicates them.<sup>112</sup> Conceptual oneness is the cancellation of the antinomic opposites "structural system/ontology", which is considered to be what lies outside the ambiguous space (i.e. infinitude). When this conceptual oneness<sup>113</sup> is brought inside the ambiguous space and applied to it as the criterion for understanding what is happening in the ambiguous space (i.e. interpenetration), then the internal articulation of that space is clarified.<sup>114</sup> Immediately the structural system takes on a different aspect from that of merely appearing either open or closed.<sup>115</sup>

FIG 2

STRUCTURAL SYSTEMATICS

ONTOLOGY



The possibility of an openly-closed system<sup>116</sup> with static, impenetrable boundaries, yet with access to information about what lies outside its boundaries, appears. The openly-closed system is the modelling of the ruse of the philosophers<sup>117</sup> in terms of the structural system. The singularity is the locus of access to the outside, without breaking the boundaries of the system. The singularities that appear in the openly-closed system are defined by the structure. There is a concomitant transformation of the ambiguous space defined by ontology. Where the structural system becomes fixed, the ambiguous space becomes purely transforming. In this process the internal articulation of the framework, which is seen to hold Process-Being and Nothingness apart, appears, in which the definition of the possibility of the non-nihilistic distinction occurs. The internal articulation of the framework is a vortex,<sup>118</sup> of which the non-nihilistic distinction is the centre. This vortex of the framework defines the non-nihilistic distinction without capturing it.

This is a brief sketch of a necessarily complex argument.<sup>119</sup> Without going into the intricacies of the argument itself, one may see from this that the very mechanism that produces erratic change is, when transformed by seeing its relation to ontology and conceptual oneness, the means of definition of

the singularity, the source of information from nowhere, and its opposite, the clear non-nihilistic distinction. This is made possible by the precision of the definition of the structural system and its ontology, and by the use of this definition against itself through the application of conceptual oneness.

The opposite of the question of how the world can stand in the face of the phenomenon of nihilism, is how can the world appear if everything is conceptually one.<sup>120</sup> Nihilism and conceptual oneness are opposites. The same system that produces nihilism implies that all the forms conceptually unite, in infinitude, beyond the ideational template (beyond the boundary of the ambiguous space).<sup>121</sup> In this way there is an attempt by ideation to seal off the ideational template from anything outside it, by blurring what is outside it into a conceptual oneness left undefined until the embedding into finitude is attempted.

The appreciation that the structural system is an image of the self-form, and that the ontological framework and its bubble of ambiguous space is an image of the ideational template, helps to make the esotericism of systematics and ontology more palatable. The ideational template responds to the

information from the singularity, as the matching of narrated events to a monologue. The self-form responds likewise to the clear distinction. But the clear distinction only exists where erratic change is not projected. So those within the ideational template have no access to the clear distinction. Once the self-form and the ideational template separate from one another, and the means of rendering visible is externalized, then this access is cut off. Yet the very mechanism that produces erratic change in a wider context, when turned against itself, rigorously defines the possibility of the clear, non-nihilistic distinction. It is defined as that which the framework of presentation and withdrawal covers over, and when the conceptual oneness is applied to that framework, it articulates itself internally, so as to point toward the non-nihilistic distinction, which it is covering over.

The final stage of the argument concerning the nature of nihilism is to move from this systematic indication of the possibility of the non-nihilistic distinction to an understanding of what the non-nihilistic distinction is in relation to the anti-nomic opposites. For, strictly speaking, the clear distinction does not exist in any relation to them whatsoever: it is not in the same universe of discourse. Yet the universe of discourse in which

antinomic opposition occurs may be transformed by using a part of it against the whole of it -- by unfolding conceptual oneness back on to sytematics and ontology -- into a pointer, indicating the possibility of the clear distinction that lies outside the ideational template. Expressing the status of the clear distinction in relation to the anti-

nomical opposites that it is disconnected from is extremely difficult. This is ultimately because they are the same thing looked at differently. The antinomic opposition covers over conceptually the opposite qualities that are clearly distinct from one another. That which covers over the opposite qualities is ultimately based on them: it is a conceptual distortion of them. Making the distortion disappear is the nub of the matter: it is a matter of purification, as Socrates has said in the Phaedo.

One way to express the relation between the antinomies and the clear distinction that appears when erratic change stops, is by means of metaphor. One metaphor is that of the 'potency',<sup>122</sup> which is, in homeopathy, a progressive dilution, until there are no chemical traces of the original substance left. The 'potency' has an effect opposite to that of the chemical substance, from which it is taken. Another metaphor is the diamond, which by compression is a

transformation of coal into a radically different substance. Both by compression and by dilution a process of purification takes place, in which something base is transformed gradually by stages into something fine, which doesn't seem to have any relation to the thing from which it comes, judging by the extreme differences in quality of the two.

The point is that the clear distinction is not a mediation of the nihilistic opposites. It is not on some other level of existence above or below them.<sup>123</sup> Even to say that it is not in the same realm of discourse is misleading. The non-nihilistic distinction is the same as the distinction between the antinomic opposites, yet different.<sup>124</sup> But it is so in a universe of discourse where sameness and difference<sup>125</sup> are not connected to the template of ideation. The clear distinction is not conceptual. It is recognised by the intellect; but when the intellect is used to solidify things, then the access to the clear distinction is cut off by the function that allows concepts to appear and be sustained in theoretical visibility. That is the function of the structural system, that produces erratic change beyond the self-form. It is the twin of it, i.e. ontology, which covers over the non-nihilistic distinction. Seeing the non-nihilistic distinction, instead of its being blocked, is a

matter of recognition which is not conceptual. The understanding of man reaches beyond what language can express. When the movement of language is stilled, and silent, cognition occurs, upon which action is based, then the ideational system is put out of play. When language, of which the template of ideation is a technological externalisation, is put into the service of silent cognition, then it expresses the truth. Until this occurs, however, language merely blocks the way to silent cognition, and the ideational template is manifested, in which the internal monologue is matched to a narration of external event.

## CHAPTER 4

This chapter is concerned with emergence. It will complete the picture begun in the previous chapter concerning the structural system and its ontology, and develop the argument which is opposite that concerning nihilism. These two tasks go together, because one must first gain a complete picture of the effects of the ideational template, which will be seen in taking the structural system to its logical conclusion. Then, it is possible to see at a glance the form of the ideational patterning device, and to distinguish the way in which, within the arena dominated by discourse, it brings forms into manifestation, from the way forms are manifested outside this arena. In effect, there are, in the temporal working out of the structural system, discontinuities between patternings of the system in different periods<sup>1</sup> of its unfolding. The ideational template is the patterning principle,<sup>2</sup> that dictates completely the various patterns that the structural system may have. The dismantling of the ideational template occurs by the institution of discontinuities between the three

major elements which constitute its shell. These discontinuities, between the segments of the shell of the template<sup>3</sup>, may be understood by analogy with the discontinuities between structurally patterned emergent phases of the unfolding of the system.<sup>4</sup> It is for this reason that the argument concerning emergence is fitted into the outline of a discontinuous argument.<sup>5</sup> However, there is a fundamental difference between these two types of discontinuity.<sup>6</sup> The discontinuity between segments of the shell of the ideational template (that is, between opposites, so that only one may be seen at a time, or between the opposites and the single principle they indicate, so that if the opposites are seen, then the single principle is not seen -- this prevents the imagination of connections between these three elements, fusing them into one overarching unit) effectively prevents the arising of the formal system in the first place, and thus prevents its entering a structural phase of development. When the shell of the ideational template is held in this sort of dislocation then it is possible to encounter genuinely emergent events in existence.<sup>7</sup> If, however, the structural system has already been allowed to flourish, then the artificially-induced emergent changes in the patterning of the structural system,<sup>8</sup> which are marked by temporal discontinuities in the unfolding of that

system, might be mistaken for the discontinuities that prevent the structural system from arising in the first place.<sup>9</sup> This chapter goes from an expose of how the discontinuities in the unfolding of the structural system appear, to an account of the unfolding of the form of the ideational template, stated in terms of a discontinuous argument. It is intended by this means to get a clearer picture of the means of destructuring the ideational template.

An account of the arising of the structural discontinuities gives a picture of the inner workings<sup>10</sup> of the ideational template. It has a certain specific form of its own, which is understood most completely when it has been shown, as it develops through time. By seeing this unfolding, one gets a picture of the patterning template at the core of the ideational template, which dictates the movement between the disconnected segments of the ideational template's shell.<sup>11</sup> This means that, when one moves from opposite to opposite, and each opposite disappears in such a way that the two opposites are never seen in conjunction,<sup>12</sup> then this discontinuous appearing and disappearing, which never allows the formal system of connections to appear, is controlled by the same 'mechanism' that produces the discontinuities between emergent patterning phases of the structural system.<sup>13</sup> In

this way the completely developed structural system, as the full expression of the ideational template, sheds light on the deconstructing of the ideational template. Thus, it is possible to state the unfolding of the ideational template from the single source in terms of a dialectical argument. The complete unfolding of the ideational template is a means to understanding its deconstructing and dismantling.

At this point a synopsis of the chain of reasoning, basic to this chapter will be presented.

1. The ideational template's shell projects formal correspondences or connections within the ontological mould of acceptable standards of truth.
2. These formal correspondences when considered as a whole, or as what Sartre calls a detotalized totality in the Critique of Dialectical Reason, synergetically produce the formal system.
3. The formal system needs a nihilistic background to be seen. This back-ground is produced by the structural underpinning of the formal system as erratic change, noise. A system that produces erratic change is inherently structural.
4. The structural system and its nihilistic background form a gestalt. The gestalt is diachronic as well as synchronic, i.e. it is a temporal whole, as well as a whole at any one time; it arises in quanta, or discrete units with specific duration.
5. At certain, well defined points in time the entire pattern of the gestalt of the structural system and its background

changes radically. Changes in patterning are emergent events. They require redefinition of the entire system at a formal level.

6. The gestalt whole of the structural system and its background is only visible because emergent events occur. It renders these two visible in the same way that nihilism rendered visible the formal system.
7. In order to understand emergent phenomena, it is necessary to see the relation of the structural system to its ontological foundations. Structure and ontology are linked. Ontology describes the deformation of the medium in which the structural system appears. That medium is called 'Being'.
8. This deformation has four specific phases discovered by contemporary ontology. These are described as four different kinds of Being, i.e. Pure Presence, Process-Being, Hyper-Being (the cancellation of Being and Nothingness) and Wild Being (pure deformation, equated with no deformation).
9. The formal system redefines the deformation of the medium which contains it into a closed space which is analogous to the delay-period of ambiguity. This is described as Process Being.
10. Out of the closed space structure appears.<sup>14</sup> It also has a quantal form describing the progressive deformation of the closed space. This is described as Hyper Being.
11. Progressive infolding deformation of the closed space tends toward the limit of pure deformation. This is described as Wild Being.
12. One analogy for the progressive deformation of the closed space is the higher dimensional spaces of mathematical geometry.<sup>15</sup>
13. The regular polytopes (geometrical figures with equal lines, faces & angles; also called polyhedra) both of three dimensions and higher dimensions, define the possibilities or motifs of structural deform-

ation, and contain a mapping of the core patterning of the ideational template.<sup>16</sup>

14. Structural pattern changes from one motif to another are based on these regular 'n' dimensional polytopes which are geometrical indices for the basic patterns that all thought takes.<sup>17</sup> They have a much deeper significance than mere mathematical or geometrical forms.
15. The closed space is segmented by an infolding on itself, coherently differentiated according to the specific articulation of these regular polytopes. Emergence is the movement from one of these segmented compartments to another. Each compartment is patterned on a different motif.
16. Thus emergent events register deformations in the space/time continuum in which the structural system moves.
17. The whole of this deformational process is described by the four states of Being.
18. The centre of the core of the ideational template is the way of coming into manifestation described by the four states of Being. This is the essence of artificial emergence. The ideational template brings things into manifestation in a certain way, which is different from the way things are manifested in existence as genuine emergences.
19. Seeing the core of the ideational template, which is the structure of its deformational progression, and its centre, which is the way it brings things into manifestation, one has gained an overview of the entire template, through seeing how the formal system is projected, how structure appears in it and how this structuring defines the core and centre of the template.
20. By studying these successive higher dimensional polytopes, one sees how formlessness<sup>18</sup> enters into the structuralization of forms -- intrinsically,--so that it is possible to understand how formlessness can enter into the shell of the ideational template from the first by the logic of disconnection,

20. thereby preventing the arising of system and structure.

This is the first phase of the chain of reasoning that is the basis of this chapter. In this first phase a picture of the whole of the form of the ideational template is presented. By understanding its form it is possible to dismantle it, in such a way that the primacy of the single source is indicated. This indication is contained in the argument concerning emergence, which is the object of the second phase of the argument. The argument concerning emergence concerns the distinction between genuine and artificial emergence. It contains the arising of this particular non-nihilistic distinction.

1. The ideational template has a shell, core and centre:

Shell: the connection of opposites and their connection to the concept of the principle of a single source to form a triad. From this operation the possibility of projecting the formal system arises.

Core: the progressive deformation of the formal system according to a specific series of structural motifs. When connection appears in the shell, then disconnection must appear from the core. No-form enters from the core. No-form enters into the structural aspect of the system irrevocably as discontinuities.<sup>19</sup>

Centre: By taking the process of deformation to its logical conclusion,<sup>20</sup> the four types of Being<sup>21</sup> appear as a unified description of the type of

bringing-into-manifestation peculiar to the ideational template, within the parameters set by the ontological mould. This is a bringing-into-manifestation based on distortion. Distortion is necessary because formlessness when suppressed enters surreptitiously into form. The way the template brings-into-manifestation is an image of its own coming into manifestation.<sup>22</sup>

2. The ideational template as disembodied discourse, is only one of the natural forms, among myriads of others in existence, but man has stretched it over all the others as a means of control and manipulation. It is the form on which the generation of illusion takes place. It arises like all forms in existence from the single source.
3. Genuine emergence is the distortionless way of manifestation, by which all forms arise from a single source, including the form of the ideational template. Artificial emergence takes place as a manifestation of structure within the arena, the ontological mould, controlled by the template. Men mistake the action of artificial emergence which they produce themselves (by applying the ideational template to everything) for genuine emergence - by this substitution men come to think that the forms of existence come from them, rather than from the single source.
4. A description of genuine emergence must account for the arising of artificial emergence. This is the point of the argument concerning emergence. It begins with the single source and shows how the non-nihilistic distinction between these two types of emergence arises from the single source, and how thereby the single source is indicated more strongly than if it had never arisen.
5. The argument concerning emergence has four steps or structurally disconnected compartments:
  - A. There is a single source (single disconnected principle).

B. Everything -- including the ideational template -- arises from, and returns to that source (opposites of unfolding and collapse: disconnected).

C. The distinction between artificial and genuine emergence arises from the source, i.e. connection occurs according to the form of the ideational template giving the illusion that things are connected to each other rather than to their source. This creates the web of artificiality and the form of emergence connected with it, as opposed to the genuine emergence from the single source. Things seem to come from ideation, instead of its being seen that even artificial things come from the single source (connection of opposites).

D. The distinction between artificial and genuine emergence is necessary, in order to know the single principle more fully. By the complete development of the structural system an image of disconnection is made possible, in order to understand what the disconnection of the ideational template's shell-segments would entail. Formlessness, denied by the unrestrained positing of completely connected forms by ideation, appears in the structural system as discontinuities. By taking the positing of continuous formal systems to an extreme formlessness is better known.

By carrying out the disconnection of the ideational template's segments, connection is moved to the core, instead of appearing in the shell. By this an undistorted view of genuine emergence as distinct from artificial emergence is gained.

6. The point of all this is to see the complete image of the ideational template, and the wisdom of applying disconnection to it in order to escape its tyranny. If formlessness will enter into form, no matter how solidly one makes the connections in order to avoid it, then it is

tions in order to avoid it, then it is wise to use form as merely a means of tracing the outlines of formlessness.

7. Pure disconnection of everything in existence from everything else, and recognition of complete dependence on the single source, which entails that none of the things in existence are associated with it is pure connection since everything is connected in dependence on the source. Pure disconnection and pure connection are opposites. The opposites are held together in disconnection and non-contradiction. In this way the single source is glimpsed.

This chain of reasoning is necessary, only because in the western philosophical tradition men have become so lost in structuralism that they never stand back from its endless complexities to take account of their situation. Only by taking structuralism to its logical conclusion and getting an overview of its limitations, is it possible to withdraw from this enthrallment, and take a fundamentally new direction. This new direction is toward a science of primary rather than secondary causation; genuine rather than artificial emergence. It is based on a critique of the way ideation is used as a means of forging connections, rather than as a way of moving between disconnected opposites. The whole point of the above chain of reasoning is to point out the positive function of the ideational template, that appears when it is worked out completely and the results are reapplied to the shell of the template, in order to avoid going through the

same routine over again. Since disconnection cannot be avoided by applying connection to everything one applies disconnection to everything and by that connection results. This is the application of the wisdom that Socrates mentions at the beginning of the Phaedo, which if followed, would avoid the arising of the delay-period within which structure manifests itself, from the beginning. By working out the form (i.e. shell, core and centre) of the ideational template completely there is established a firm foundation for exploring the possibilities of such a science of primary emergence (causation), because, whenever ideation appears, it will be recognised, without having to follow the forms in which it presents itself to their conclusions. The whole of the mechanism of the ideational template indicate the possibility of a science of primary causation. That is the recognition of the power of the single source in the perfect order/disorder of existence. The application of disconnection to the shell of the template is the process that purifies the nihilistic opposites, so the non-nihilistic 'potency' (distinction) results.

So, as we work through the rest of the chapter, using this chain of reasoning in each of its two phases outlined above as a basis, it is necessary to keep the whole in mind. Seeing the results of the

working of the ideational template as a whole taken to its final conclusion, leads to the posing of the argument concerning emergence in a structurally disconnected outline, which in turn leads to the disconnection of the segments of the template, and to the positive view of its role. It is positive in the sense that, if one works it out completely as a means of connection, one is led back to disconnection, and if one applies disconnection, in the first place, then the real connection of the principle of no secondary emergence appears. Emergence of new patterns in the working out of the structural system is the key to the approach to the phenomenon of genuine emergence, in which is seen that it arises from a single source. Exploring the phenomenon of emergence is the basis for founding a science of primary causation.

All emergence is seen in the western intellectual tradition primarily as a moment in the unfolding of the ideational template. That is to say, that emergence is the positive aspect of the phenomenon of nihilism. It cannot appear without the nihilistic background-effect, and after its newness wears off, it is seen to increase the general nihilistic ambience created by the application of the ideational template. Because of this aspect of the structural system which creates artificial

emergences, a more genuine phenomenon of emergence, which appears in existence, gets covered over. The exploration of the differences between these two different kinds of emergence, which may be called artificial and genuine emergence respectively, is the key-point in the argument that is the antinomic opposite to the argument concerning nihilism. It is the key-point because it contains a non-nihilistic distinction. To understand genuine emergence in a clear way, it is necessary to understand the artificial images of it, which are produced by ideation in order to obscure its real nature. Genuine emergence is precisely what the structural system is designed to deal with, because it is the most dangerous opponent to the ruse of ideation. This ruse is denial of Time by the artificial simulation of time. That is, the substitution of the delay-period for the genuine unfolding of the timing of Time itself. This substitution is made as a means of controlling the unfolding of events. The ideational template seeks to impose its narration to the exclusion of all other possible narrations. The genuinely emergent phenomenon breaks in on this artificially imposed sequence of events, and thereby, shows that the power of control is not in the hands of the ones that produce the narration, but instead belongs to some other power. (i.e. the capacity of the single source to order existence in the best way.) As

Nietzsche says, 'It thinks' is not the subject.'<sup>23</sup> The subject which is beyond experience, is transcendental, produces the narrative and is the 'connection-maker' behind the scenes, with which the empirical subject identifies, and to which the external events that occur in the delay-period are matched; but this patterning is shattered when the genuinely emergent event occurs,<sup>24</sup> that breaks that patterning in a significant way. Ideation by means of the structural system produces various narrative scenarios, or motifs, simultaneously from the same patterning template, in order to cover the divergent possibilities of the timing of Time, that might intrude into the delay-period. There occur shifts between these scenarios (motifs), and it is these shifts between different narration-patterns within the delay-period, that might be called artificial emergence. It is as if the delay-period had separate spatio-temporal compartments, containing different narrational patternings. (For instance, if Waiting for Godot and End-Game are recognised as different narrational patternings of the same play, then their relationship is an analogy for the separate spatio-temporal compartments, transformationally related across an emergent discontinuity.) To shift from one to the other, one might think one had left the delay-period for another realm of genuine temporality, but in fact,

one has only shifted perspective (from one motif to another) within the same delay-period. The point is that these phase-shifts occur as a strategy of the ideational template's manifestation as a structural system, in order to cover over the effects of genuine emergence.

This shifting of the patterning of the delay-period, in order to counteract the effects of genuine emergence, makes it appear as if the delay-period has a temporality of its own, which artificially produces emergent phenomena. However, this artificial emergent phenomenon is keyed to the structural underpinning of the system (detotalized totality) of diacritically-connected correspondences produced by ideation. In other words, the structural system is temporalized, to produce a series of dialectically interrelated moments, which are the points of interest in the narration, but also there are different sets of possible narrations, and shifts may occur between narrational patterns as well as from one dialectical moment to another.<sup>25</sup> Thus, artificial emergences merely reinforce narrational patterning, rather than breaking that patterning. Freedom is simulated, in order to render imprisonment more effective.<sup>26</sup> Emergence which is artificially produced seems to be a release from the ambience of pervasive nihilism that is caused by the

application of the ideational template. In fact, it is precisely these artificial emergences that cause nihilism to intensify.<sup>27</sup> Without emergences, nihilism would remain only a threshold-setting mechanism, to make theoretical visibility possible. Nihilism would quickly be recognised as such if that were the case --i.e. as only the randomization necessary to make statistical patterns visible. Randomization is brought about by an ordered procedure. The temporal aspect of the structural system produces, in an ordered fashion, minimal erratic change, which makes conceptual objects visible to theoretical sight. On the other hand, emergence takes that temporalization of the structural system a step further from mere threshold-producing disruption to a point where nihilism actually penetrates deeply into the disrupted natural forms of existence.<sup>28</sup> Because the intensification of nihilism comes as an unrecognisable pattern, which must be grasped anew, and therefore interiorised<sup>29</sup>, before being understood to be merely another image of the same thing, it allows the threshold of disruption to be pushed deeper into the bedrock of existence.<sup>30</sup> This lowering of the threshold makes whole, hitherto-unseen sets of correspondences visible,<sup>31</sup> so an illusion is created that some sort of advancement occurs, because the new narrative pattern restructures the sets of cor-

respondences, when in fact, because the means of producing the correspondences (i.e. the ideational life-form) has not changed, nothing has really changed.

The genuine emergence must therefore break the mechanism that produces the simultaneous different motifs of narrative patterns, which may be shifted back and forth within the delay-period. Not only the disruptive effects of the use of the ideational template must be seen, but also what is presented as a move-away from those disruptive effects by the institution of a new régime (patterning motif) must be seen as a means of spreading disruption further. It is not until the ideational template itself is put out of play, by the logic of disconnection, that the disruptive effects are curtailed. Whatever the régime, as long as it is based on ideational connections, it will merely be an extension of corruption under a new guise. The seeming necessity for a final genuine emergence<sup>32</sup> to put out of play the mechanism which produces simultaneous narrative scenarios (motifs), and then controls the functional shifts between them, makes the genuine emergent phenomenon appear as if it were an attack on the core of the ideational template's temporal functioning. This, in turn, is a distortion of the genuine emergent phenomena, by relating them to the

illusion of the ideational template's functioning. The ideational template specifically produces artificial phenomena, that cover over the real nature of genuine emergence. Making it into something, that must put out of play the core of the ideational template, is a further extension of this covering over process. However, genuine emergence can only be thought of in this way within the ambience of the ideational arena. Here genuine emergence may be seen as an artifact of (or reaction to) artificial emergence. Artificial emergence is produced by the specific functioning of the structural system when it is temporalized, while genuine emergence might be described as the specific cutting-to-the-core of the mechanism that produces these artificial emergences, by the action of the timing of Time on artificial time. The timing of Time is as much an artefact as the artificial time of the ambiguous delay-period. The view of genuine timing is built up from the realisation of the distortions that appear within the delay-period (i.e. by a Negative Dialectic such as Adorno describes). Thus there is a non-nihilistic distinction to be made here between the effects of the ideational template's distortions and what exists outside the actions of those distortions. The process of separating these distortions itself introduces distortion, so that the point of distortionless distinguishing<sup>33</sup> is never reached

so long as the ideational template is functioning -- yet, on the other hand, without its functioning no distinctions would be made at all.

The only way out of this dilemma is to picture genuine emergence in terms of the critical destructure of the ideational-template itself. Because this template does have a specific form (specified in terms of its shell, core and centre), which, when read in terms of the principle of a single source that states there are no secondary emergences, by explicit disconnection takes one to the point, where the timing of Time's genuine emergence may be appreciated. When the ideational template is disconnected, it freezes i.e. stillness is imposed on the action of endless connection, and pure distinction occurs in the separation of the segments of the triads of conceptual elements. Before it is possible to approach that point, it is necessary to understand the connection between artificial emergence and nihilism in terms of the structural system and its ontology. Only by this means may the artificiality of genuine emergence itself be glimpsed as a means of approaching the argument concerning emergence, which itself is stated in a way that portrays the physiognomy of artificial emergence in the guise of an argument. Once the form of temporalisation of the ideational template is understood,

then it is possible to attempt to portray genuine emergence as pure distinction in terms of the freezing<sup>34</sup> disconnection of the ideational template's intrinsic form.

The way ideation works is very simple in this context. It is a means of directing the attention of the observer from one point of interest<sup>35</sup> to another in a series. In order to create a seeming connection between the points of the series, a narration is added to tie the series together.<sup>36</sup> The point is that for each presented 'point of interest' to be seen, it is necessary to create a particular gestalt patterning, to draw the attention of the observer to the desired location. The best way to do this is to set the background in motion in respect to the presented point-of-interest which is held still. This renders everything else in sight ambiguous, and gives extra clarity to the point at which the attention of the passive observer is being directed. Thus, the key-thing is to create an artificial disparity between foreground and background. This disparity between foreground and background is then made to shift in such a way, that the attention is moved from point to point. The discontinuity that then exists between points is covered over by the addition of a continuous narrative, which creates the illusion of a continuity between the

points. The artificial disparity 'renders visible' the point of interest, which would otherwise be merely one of many things that the observer might observe. The disparity exists in the over-intensity and clarity of the point-of-interest and in the blurring of the background. A "gestalt" is created because the draining of clarity from the background, to give it a foreground, is a single dynamic process that unites the two. What appears as the immediate result of this process is a smooth transition between points of interest in a series.<sup>37</sup> When this series appears in dialogue it might be called an argument. The syllogism is the means of connecting statements which, because of the conceptual movement from specific to general or vice versa, is contrasted to the linear movement from statement to statement. It is precisely the connection between these two axes of movement that produces the illusion of continuity. The movement from series of discontinuous repetitions to the illusion of continuity is the quintessence of the effect of ideation.<sup>38</sup> This production of illusory continuity is based on the prior production of the disparity between foreground event and blurred background. That disparity is based on the production of minimal erratic change which creates the threshold, on which the point of interest or dialectical movement may be seen as supercharged with

intensity.

Once the general picture of how the shell of the ideational template functions is understood, then it is possible to see where artificial emergence fits into this picture. Artificial emergence makes the gestalt of foreground/background disparity visible by contrasting it to other possible gestalt-patterns based on structurally-coded motifs. The initial creation of this disparity is already a temporalisation of the shell of the ideational template, which results in the illusion of continuous motion against the far background of erratic change, on which the discontinuities of the series of repetitions appear as the immediate background. Artificial emergence is a further extension of this temporalization of the shell ideational-template to its core. It is, in fact, a deepening of the initial disparity by the creation of a disparity between several simultaneous gestalt patterns or realized structural motifs. This disparity first makes the gestalt pattern visible, just as the point of interest was rendered visible. It is one gestalt among several, which form the background on which the presently manifest gestalt pattern is seen. However, this disparity is embedded in the artificial time of the delay-period, so the gestalt pattern is given a temporal limit. A particular

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BY K.D. PALMER

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LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS  
PH.D. THESIS

K.D. PALMER  
52A COLLEGE  
NORWICH, NR3 1DD

gestalt pattern<sup>39</sup> may only exist for a particular quantum of time, then another gestalt pattern becomes manifest. The arising of the complete new gestalt pattern is an artificially created emergence. The purpose of this emergence is that it renders visible the current gestalt pattern retrospectively. This means that it is the possibility of structural rotation<sup>40</sup> to another gestalt pattern that renders visible the current pattern in its temporally limited phase. The other gestalt quanta are not manifested, but it is still the background of its possibility that makes the presently manifested quantum visible.<sup>41</sup> What is important here is the notion that it is not the new gestalt pattern that is important, but the patterning template at the core of the ideational template that produces simultaneous gestalt patterns, which are then presented in series. The cluster of gestalt patterns (realized motifs) are produced all at once by a single template, but made to appear as if they arose successively. Thus, it appears as if new patterns are being made manifest, when in fact there is merely a working out of the implications of an initial pattern-setting, which took place at the beginning of the delay-period. The point is, further, that this initial simultaneous patterning is always merely the imaging of the core of the ideational template, within which all the possible

structural motifs are encoded. The initial patterning is the application of the ideational template to some aspect of existence. As it is worked out it appears, as new things are discovered, in a succession of rearrangements of the gestalt. In the final analysis, though, it is discovered that the ideational template has merely been embedded in that particular aspect of existence, and what has appeared are in fact images of the inner workings of the template itself. What appears under the lens of the ideational template are only images of that template.<sup>42</sup> It is only when that template's pattern is itself changed, by the logic of disconnection, that anything else appears at all.

The gist of this approach to emergent phenomena is to show that almost all of what appears as new perspectives, new techniques, new developments of every kind in the western philosophic and scientific tradition are in fact merely a display of artificial emergence at work.<sup>43</sup> That is to say that what appears as advance or progress is an ever-deepening of the exploration of the implications of the ideational template. That template operates in a specific fashion to produce periodic changes, which keep alive the interest in the outward technological project, and at the same time divert attention from what remains unchanging throughout all the changes

no matter how radical, i.e., the template itself. This is the way the ideational template is used. The task of current ontology is to account for a specific type of change, which causes the whole tradition of incremental changes to be seen from a fundamentally new perspective. This type of change is called by G.H. Mead, emergence.<sup>44</sup> Other writers have called it 'Episteme changes'<sup>45</sup>, 'Epochs of Being'<sup>46</sup>, 'Paradigm changes'<sup>47</sup>.

There are many names in literature for this phenomenon which has recently become the centre of the attention of philosophers of science and contemporary ontologists alike. Different writers have different ways of stating the matter to themselves. The key point is that, at certain points in the development of a tradition, the methodology and conceptual schemata which are generated from the ideational template, there occur breaks which mark the beginning of the arising of a completely new approach to the subject matter in question. The move from Newtonian to Einsteinian physics is a famous example.<sup>48</sup> Most studies of this phenomenon are historical in nature and for that reason cannot see that what is happening is intrinsic to the mode of conceptualisation used by philosophy and science.

Philosophy presents the attentive reader with different models of the process of conceptualisation

which is considered to be the core of the human being. Each of the major philosophers has gone more and more deeply into the conceptual modelling of the process of conceptualisation. In that modelling process there occur emergent phases, in which deeper and deeper implications of the ideational template are brought to the surface. The move from Hume and Berkeley to Kant and Hegel is an example, containing as it does just such a deepening of man's perspective on the process of conceptualisation, by the move from the formal level to the structural-dialectical level of modelling. Contemporary ontology moves to even deeper levels of modelling. However, in all this it is the same essential form which is being explored; and the effect of deepening and shifting perspectives with regard to it is an aspect of the temporal functioning of that form which, ironically, is being used to explore itself. The mirroring<sup>49</sup> is doubled,<sup>50</sup> and ramification (interpreted by western philosophy and science as infinity) occurs. However, even when ideation is used as a tool to explore other phenomena, such as those occurring in what is called 'nature',<sup>51</sup> it still only manages to produce images of itself. The same phenomenon occurs as appears in the tradition of philosophy. Emergent events are discovered in nature, and in the tradition as it unfolds. That is, emergent events occur in both. This is seen by

those involved in the tradition as a deepening of the understanding of the phenomenon, that is the topic of investigation, rather than as a proliferation of images of the tool being used. The conceptual template, when it is used as a tool, either for self-exploration or the exploration of other phenomena, is set in motion or temporalised. The temporalisation of the ideational template produces a very complex time-form, which, though definite, has so many facets, that it is difficult to grasp the whole of it at once, in order to see that it is one thing being imaged in many different ways. Emergent events are a particular feature of this complex time-form whose intrinsic temporality is that of the delay-period of ambiguity. It is as if the delay-period were intrinsically shattered into several facets or compartments, which overlap spatially but not temporally. These facets appear as fundamental shifts in conceptual perspectives.

In all emergent events there is a shift in the conceptual way of looking at the phenomenon in question, which ultimately results in transformations of the phenomenon itself. As conceptualisation is reoriented, new aspects of the phenomenon appear. However, this is eventually seen as the mirroring of the temporalised ideational template in the phenomenon being studied. If another hypothet-

ical methodology were used, which was not based on isolated conceptualisation, then whatever the form that underlay this other methodology would be mirrored back in the way things appeared under that methodology. The principle of a single source is the only means of avoiding the distortions inherent in the movement of the methodological tool. It makes it possible to see the phenomena in question in terms of itself without an intermediary, so that what emerges when it is used as a means of considering phenomena is a genuine emergence in the true sense. That is to say that, when the distortions caused by the use of the ideational template as an intermediary between man and the world are put out of play, and artificial emergences cease, genuine emergence appears. Genuine emergence in the true sense is not the way the timing of Time counters the artificial temporality caused by the introduction of the ideational template. In the true sense, genuine emergence, is when there is no trace of the distortions of the ideational template to be countered. For this to occur, the principle of secondary emergences must itself cease to be an idea. For that, it is necessary to move out of the conceptual realm into a realm of experience unmediated by the moving conceptual template. In this paper it is only possible to indicate the functioning of the ideational template, as it is seen in

relation to the principle of 'no secondary causation.'

Once it is known that men in the western tradition are trapped in the witnessing of this one existent time-form, that appears as a patterning device, which is mirrored back to them in an endless diversity of self images, in which specific patterns remain constant, then it is possible to attempt to disconnect one-self from that time-form of the ideational template, and to see the distortions that it introduces into perception by rendering perception theoretical. In order to get at this view of the ideational template, it is necessary at this stage to capitulate to the process of modelling conceptualisation, using conceptualisation. The modelling that will be given here is taken from the study of the history of philosophy's attempt to present a succinct model of the ideational template. Once one realizes that all philosophy is about the same thing in a very much over-determined manner, then a certain very definite pattern appears. In terms of this pattern, the ideational template in its temporalisation has two very definite aspects, which have a direct bearing on the phenomenon of artificial emergence. These two aspects are the structural system, and its associated ontology. It is as if ;there were a medium -- an 'ether'<sup>52</sup> -- in which forms produced by the ideational template

appear. If one looks in this analogy at the action of the 'ether' (Being) on the forms then one is dealing with ontology, whereas, if one looks at the movement of the forms themselves, one is dealing with the structural system.

The forms become a system when they are considered as a whole, rather than as unrelated fragments. The system is structural, when the movement of this whole is considered over time. That movement is dialectical, and the form of the movement when taken again as a temporal whole seen all-at-once is the structure. There is an interaction between the medium and the structural system that appears in it, such that the inner constitution of the medium distorts the forms that appear in the medium. The different types of truth which are necessary compensations for these distortions specify the ontological mould. Distortion occurs by changes in the consistency of the medium. These changes in the consistency of the medium point to the fundamental features of the process of the coming-into-being of the forms that appear as a result of the action of the ideational template. To appreciate together these two dynamic aspects of the results of the action of the ideational template, is to approach to the core of it, which is indicated by the phenomenon of artificial emergence. Artificial emergence indi-

cates the action of the core of the ideational template. If the phenomenon of artificial emergence did not occur, there would be no access to that core. It is time that allows the forms in existence to unfold, so that their depth may be seen.

The extent of the comprehension of the way of manifestation of conceptual or theoretical forms in contemporary ontology is staggering. The attempt to give a picture of the core of the problem being wrestled with by the philosophers of the western tradition must, because of its complexity, first be schematic, and in this paper a schematic picture will be all that will be presented.<sup>53</sup> A clear introduction to the problem of emergence is all that is necessary in this context. Consider the position of a conceptual form (generally, an idea) which is placed in relation to other such forms, to comprise a theory of philosophy. As thought develops other forms are posited, and the relationship between the forms considered as a whole changes, until the whole theory is discarded or a new whole is created, using some aspects from the old theory and other aspects newly added to make up another whole.<sup>54</sup> This is a process that occurs over time, and which may have all sorts of constraints added to it, but essentially it is the process, in which new theoretical forms appear as a result of the movement of thought

working by application of the ideational template, that imagines connections between thought forms. These connections may be of the same logical type, or between elements of different logical type. As the train of thought moves, applying the connection-forging mechanism of the shell of the ideational template, then certain specific stages of development appear in sequence. This sequence indicates the dialectical form of thought. When an image of the whole sequence is grasped, then in that appears the structure of the temporal whole of the chain of thought.

Structure specifies the length and pattern of the dialectically evolving moments held together to make up a quantum, which turns into another, differently patterned, dialectical quantum at a specific point through an emergent event. However, all this takes place in a specific medium, which is indicated by the term 'Being'. When the formal system is first posited as a complex of interrelated elements, then it is, as it were, all laid out on a flat surface, and is purely present in all its aspects for inspection.<sup>55</sup> However, when the system becomes too complex to be seen at a glance, and it takes time to move from one set of elements to another within the formal system, then the system has been temporalised.<sup>56</sup> This temporalisation becomes even

more significant when, either parts of the system are considered to be moving (when it becomes a machine), or when something is to be considered as moving within the system (i.e., when a process is described). But when the system itself begins to change and finally to completely transform itself, then temporalization is complete, because all the reference points within the system are considered to be changing. The process of tracing these progressive alterations is the concern of structuralism, because by means of it one is able to set up progressive transformations which allow one to move from one stage to another in this process of change of the system.<sup>57</sup> Systems are constructed so that they are structural in their initial coding; then any changes in the system become more regular and predictable. The ultimate level of structural patterning is that which will trace the transformation of the whole system across a threshold, in which the entire system is in a moment transformed into another pattern. The only possible way to do this is if the system's structure is itself patterned on the form of the ideational template.<sup>58</sup> Then the key to decoding the new pattern is the use of the ideational tool which is the one thing kept constant. Thus, it appears that the process of setting up structural systems, that will undergo any transformation and still remain intelligible, is a

process of defining the core of the ideational template's own differentiation of form, when the template itself undergoes temporalisation.

When the flat, completely presented formal system is seen opposite some landscape of which it is considered an approximate mapping, then there occurs a certain distortion in the process of considering the relation of the mapping to the landscape. Here the landscape may be internal to the system or some aspect of existence to which it is compared. For instance, it may be an indexing system, which allows the movement between different parts of the system, that cannot be inspected simultaneously. This distortion that appears, whenever there is some movement with respect to the system, is a change in the medium, within which the system is posited. This distortion revolves around the difference between presence/absence. One has to look between the grid and the landscape or between different parts of the grid of the system. Then, one is constantly dealing with the presence and absence of elements in succession. What is noticed is that presence/absence has a particular effect on the medium in which the system is posited. One may either merely invent means of referencing, which attempt to hide these distortions, or one may look directly at them themselves. When one looks at them and the accumulation

of indexing features that attempt to circumvent them, then it becomes apparent that the whole nature of the system must be different, in order to cope with them. The set of distortions taken as a whole which appear, because of the movement between presence and absence, may be called the closed-space.<sup>59</sup> Heidegger has called this closed-space the 'Clearing in Being' in Being and Time.<sup>60</sup> Once it is recognised, it is realised that it has completely different features from the medium, in which things are purely present. It is the artificially-lighted space in which systematically defined processes occur.<sup>61</sup> It is the space in which the temporal revolution of the system occurs. The difference between Being as pure presence and Being as temporal process, which includes the rotation between presence and absence, must be recognised. The closed-space considered as a whole has certain features, which are specific to it, just as the formal system considered as a whole. In effect these features are the same as those of the delay-period of ambiguity. From clarity of pure presence one has moved to the compensating ambiguous realm that underlies it. In witnessing the movement of the closed-space as a whole, one sees that there is a function of presenting and hiding at work that has, so to speak, a life of its own. This autonomous function, which allows some things to be presented

in the closed-space only with the concomitant obscuring of others (which is what creates the ambiguity involved), is directly related to the functioning of the ideational template. It allows gestalt-patterns to be presented all-at-once. What does not fit the pattern is obscured. The ambiguity of the closed-space is that several gestalt-patterns for the formal system are stored there at once, overlying each other. The means by which they are over-determined in relation to each other is the structure. The structure itself never appears, but may only be manifested, dialectically moving between different presented images within a gestalt-pattern, and between gestalt-patterns. Structure can only appear over a period of time.<sup>62</sup> Structure is a composite image of the relation to one another of the dialectically related moments all at once.

The point is that, as men get better at building structural systems that will undergo complete emergent transformations, they approximate to the form of the ideational template more and more closely. Furthermore, they discover that this particular form had underlain all their thought from the beginning. In this way, structure appears out of the closed-space of the ambiguous delay-period. That period appears more fully as the length of the philosophical and scientific tradition of the west, which

makes more and more complex images of the ideational template. In the tradition the images which appear come out in pre-structured gestalt-patterns which interchange as they emerge. The images themselves more and more closely approximate to the structuring, that underlies the whole period. That structuring itself emerges from the closed-space in emergent quanta. The 'quantization' of the structuring itself reveals a further kind of distortion to the medium in which the structural system appears. It is necessary to extend the model of the structural system and its ontology further in order to explain the way, in which structure emerges, and the new kind of distortion that appears.

There is a dialectic between the formal system and the closed-space of ambiguity, that allows the structural underpinning to appear in specific quantal steps. The formal system is overly definite and precise, while the closed-space of ambiguity is in compensation unclear and vague. The formal system must be considered as a whole, and the closed-space, which forms the background on which it appears, must also be taken as a whole. The nature of the movement within the closed-space is erratic change, which makes the stationary formal system visible. It appears over time that the formal


system is projected on the screen of the whole of the closed-space. Its transformations appear as the charting of the movement of that background as a whole. It is a closed-space and as a whole it contains the formal system, which may only appear in the 'clearing' it provides. It is an artificially-bounded arena, within which discourse may be carried on, and in which there is an artificial lighting, by which presented objects may be seen. It is the Platonic 'Cave'.<sup>63</sup> It is only when one considers the nature of the walls<sup>64</sup> of the cave itself, that one sees the whole of the closed space of ambiguity, and realizes that what happens in the cave (i.e. the relation between the sophist and the prisoner and the fire, barrier, objects, and images) is directly connected with what defines the space in which it happens (i.e., the darkness and its being an underworld scenario). The dialectic between the cave as scenario and what happens within it, is the means by which the structural underpinning is seen. The basic elements of the cave of the 'Clearing-in-Being' which provide the closed arena, within which the formal system appears and undergoes transformation, then disappears, are that an artificial boundary is set; that boundary circumscribes the arena of the closed-space completely, and within that boundary there occurs a minimal erratic change. The erratic change of the whole of the closed-space

is determined by the structural level of the system, that appears within the closed-space. The 'fire' that lights the cave in Plato's metaphor, is precisely this erratic change. It is an artificial lighting. Upon the background of erratic non-random<sup>65</sup> change, constant motions and stationary positions may be seen, which comprise the formal system. On the background of continuous movement and constancy processes the becoming of the system (i.e., accelerations and decelerations of continuous movements), and emergent events as transformations may be seen.

#### FIGURE 3

Processes are transformational changes, bounded and controlled by the structural system, while 'becoming' describes transformations that are changes in the system itself. These transformations are emergent, when the whole of the patterning of the system changes. It is as if the structural system were a filter, by which the shimmering of the erratic change of the whole of the closed-space in which it appears may be seen. The ambiguous erratic change is trapped by the bounds of the formal system. However, in order to contain it, the structural aspect of the system must appear in the changes of the system itself, as it attempts to contain the volatile and erratic changes which it

FIG 3



also attempts to track. The delay-period shows up as this tracking, which eventually means the entire system must transform itself into another patterning in order to continue tracking the changes in the whole of the closed- space. The period of time between complete systemic pattern-changes is the emergent quantum. It is the emergent quanta that show up the structure of the closed delay-period.

In this way it is seen that the formal system and the closed-space comprise a whole which in its action over time reveals the underlying structure through dialectical moments, which taken together form a pattern. The whole gestalt of the closed-space formal structural system, which, by the positing of constant forms, allows the inaccessible physiognomy of the whole to be seen as changes over time, appears as a series of emergent events. These emergent events, that trigger complete pattern changes, indicate the form of the pattern-dictating template. This ideational template lies behind the whole of the closed-space/formal-structural system gestalt, and its patterns that appear in the gestalt are deflections of the core patterning of the template. The changes in the patterning within the closed-space occur when the boundary of the closed-space, which is like an asymptotic limit, is approached. This is called the 'cusp' in Rene

Thom's catastrophe theory. It is as if one were in a room, and there were within it an invisible boundary, which if approached and touched it, the entire pattern of the room would change completely, so one would think one had entered another room.


#### FIGURE 4

However, one has not moved at all; it is the same room, merely rearranged during the jump across the transformational gap that the boundary of the closed-space represents. By watching the different patterns that appear, when one touches the boundary of the closed-space, it is possible to construct a picture of the template that produces the different patterns. Thus, two things may be explored: the nature of the boundary of the closed-space, and the structures that appear when its boundary (cusp) is traversed. The nature of the boundary is the subject of ontology, while the relation of the patterns that appear within the boundary to each other are the concern of the dialectical-structuralism, underlying the formal system.

Not only does the formal system's pattern change, but also, as structure emerges, it does so in quantal bursts. Thus, the transformation of the structure itself, as it arises out of the dialectic between closed-space and system, must be considered

FIG 4


APPROACH TO ASYMPTOMATIC LIMIT OF BOUNDARY



EXTENT OF GRID  
OF FORMAL SYSTEM  
ANALAGOUS TO A ROOM  
OR IN CATASTROPHE THEORY  
THE CONTROL SPACE

BOUNDARY OF  
CLOSED SPACE

THE BOUNDARY OF THE CLOSED SPACE  
IS TO THE EXTENT OF THE FORMAL  
SYSTEM AS THE CUSP IN THE CATASTROPHE  
THEORY IS THE CONTROL SPACE  
THE DIFFERENCE IS THAT THE BOUNDARY  
REPRESENTS THE 'N' DIMENSIONAL  
ACCUMULATION OF DISTORTIONS OF  
ALL HIGHER DIMENSIONAL SPACES



closely. Where the gestalt of closed-space/ structural-system is in constant quantal transformational change, the structure which appears out of it is eidetically constant. The basis of all ideational patterning is this constant unfolding of forms in precise quantal bursts. Each of these is a precise description of the further warping of the medium, within which the presentation appears which then becomes the closed-space, and which folds in on itself in a specific pattern, so as to create pockets within the delay-period. This means that the boundary of the closed-space not only provides an outer wall which encloses the formal system, but that this boundary folds through itself within the closed-space itself in specific patterns. So, in order to understand the nature of the boundary of the closed-space, it is necessary to see how structural intra-folding is possible. It is by structural intrafolding that the overdetermination that occurs within the closed-space is controlled. Each element within the closed-space has simultaneously a place in several possible gestalt patternings. By the quantal changes from one patterning to another, composed of the same elements, this overdetermination which is the core of the ideational template becomes accessible.


The quantal structural phases are the same for

everyone. They are eidetic in the sense that Husserl's ideas, such as  $\pi$ , are universal.<sup>72</sup> It is not, however, because it is the structure of the 'mind', but because it is the inner differentiation of the core of the ideational template. Man has in our time wholly identified himself with the life form of the ideational template, and thinks that it is his own core. This structure is best known through mathematics, and appears there as the unfolding of the regular polytopes of 'N' dimensional space, sometimes called Platonic solids. The unfolding of higher dimensional spaces each with its own intrinsic structure, exemplified by the regular polytopes, which come out of them, is the analogy for the closed-space's infolding on itself and its structural relations. In this paper I will not go into an exegesis of these forms,<sup>73</sup> but only point out that these mathematical icons are a representation of the intrinsic form of the core of the ideational template. Their meaning goes far beyond what the mathematical forms indicate. Each form indicates a level of exegesis of the ontology of the structural system as an exemplification of the formation of the core of the ideational template.

#### FIGURE 5

The insight that what is described in philosophy as the closed-space in which the transformation of the

FIG 5



structural system occurs may be described by the analogy of multidimensional space, and that the higher dimensional regular polytopes were the key eidetic forms, which indexed the unfolding of forms within the closed-space in a universal way, is what allows the precise exploration of the ideational template. The extreme ambiguity of the closed-space/formal-structural system gestalt is balanced by the extreme clarity and precision of the structural unfolding that appears within it. Thus, another gestalt occurs between the presentation of eidetic structure and the background of the closed-space/formal-structural system gestalt. In this, the further warping of the medium of the arena of the presentation appears as a third kind of Being. This is called 'Hyper Being' by Merleau-Ponty.<sup>83</sup> It is the Being of cancellation. Philosophically it is seen as the cancellation of Process Being<sup>84</sup> (i.e. temporalized Being as a mixture of presence and absence) and Nothingness.<sup>85</sup> It describes the transition points between different dimensional patterning templates. The ideational template is not just one single patterning mechanism (template), but a range of unfolding patterning mechanisms, which come out of each other in an unending progression, which describes an indefinite number of stages of infolding of the closed-space on itself. This infolding measures the penetration of formlessness

into the formal system. This series tends toward pure deformation of the closed-space, which is the final type of distortion of the presentational medium. Merleau-Ponty calls this Wild Being.<sup>86</sup> Pure deformation<sup>87</sup> is the ideal, and is equated with non-deformation,<sup>88</sup> which would appear if the ideational template were never brought into play in the first place. The relation between these four types of Being, described by modern ontology, is an exact description of the boundary of the closed-space, for in pure deformation every point of the boundary would, by virtue of complete infolding and overdetermination, be the same point.<sup>89</sup> The description of the manifestation of this single point which is the whole<sup>90</sup> of the closed-space, within which the structural system appears, is the means of the complete ontological description of artificial emergence.

The manifesting of the single point is diffracted by the endless series of distortions, so that the whole of the closed-space appears as a mirage, or an illusion made up of myriad reflections of that one primal artificially emergent event.<sup>91</sup> This occurs when one goes ahead or lags behind the timing of Time for an instant. In that the closed-space, the delay-period of ambiguity, is generated with all its overdetermination by simultaneous patternings held

apart by structural compartmentalisation. Structural over-determination registers the entry of formlessness into the arena of formal differentiation. The point is that in the timing of Time formlessness is the key element. In the successive laying down of the pattern of the opposites there is an emptiness, because of their disconnection and the lack of distortion. Thus the ontological description of genuine emergence is given in the disconnected ideational template, which registers this emptiness. That emptiness is the absence of a medium to undergo distortion. Space-time falls away as the ideational a priori filtering template is disconnected. The difference between the finite realm of the closed-space and the infinitude, that lies beyond it vanishes. The endless series of distortions occurs when infinitude is embedded into finitude. By that the complete form of the ideational template is seen, as it cancels itself out. In this process two models of coming into manifestation appear: that of the fragmentation of Being which is the centre of the ideational template, and that of the disconnected shell of the template. The former is the picture of artificial emergence that begins by giving Being to forms, and the second is that of genuine emergence, that registers the emptiness of form (its lack of Being) and indicates the primacy of the opposites over form.


Seeing the difference between the disconnected shell of the ideational template, and the centre which is the four states of Being, is the central point of this chapter. To make connection between the segments of the shell of the template is to attribute a connecting medium to sustain the connections. If no connections are made, then no sustaining medium need be posited: the solidity of forms vanishes. The positing of a connecting medium at the surface of the template makes necessary the fragmentation of that medium, when the depth of the template is reached. The time-period between the first positing of the connecting medium at the surface and the reaching of the complete fragmentation of that medium in its depth, is the full explanation of the delay-period. If no sustaining medium is posited at the surface, and thus no connections, then the delay-period is never entered. Fragmentation of the surface of the template means the necessity of the underlying unity of the single source is preserved. Because fragmentation in depth follows the structural fault-lines that radiate through the delay-period's closed-space, there is a differentiation of the sustaining medium into four interrelated kinds of Being. The really interesting thing is not the qualities of these different kinds of Being, but instead how formlessness or qualitylessness (emptiness) enters into them as the interstices

that separate them one from another. This is the fundamental difference between the two types of manifestation, indexed by the disconnected shell and the centre of the core of the ideational template, called respectively genuine and artificial emergence. In the former emptiness is precisely that which is brought to the fore and indicated, whereas in the latter it is hidden and suppressed.

#### FIGURE 6

What occurs in the fragmentation of the connecting medium is that a continuous medium is posited, where everything is purely present for full inspection. This is itself an artificial and unnatural situation. The opposites are never both present for inspection at once. In order to combat the effect of time on the creation of this unnatural state of affairs the set of opposites that are made fully present are built into twin antinomic constructs. This means that, since the two opposites cannot be held in vision together more than an instant, they are connected to other opposites rather than to each other. This is also an artificial and unnatural state of affairs. Connecting the opposites to each other is only possible conceptually. It can only be artificially induced, and then only for an instant. To sustain the illusion of that connection, it is necessary to connect it to an imaginary set of

FIG 6




conceptual opposites. The conceptual opposites are held in theoretical vision as a stand-in for the opposites, that could not be held together for more than an instant. Holding two opposites together means that the distinction between them is blurred. Thus, ambiguity occurs. The conceptual twins are always connected to the 'origin', which is the ideal point where the pure presencing of all the opposites together is hypothesised to occur. The temporal development within the delay-period is from one presencing of opposites from either twin together to another. This supplies the dialectical moments of which the delay-period is comprised. At the end of the delay-period the twins cancel each other. In cancellation structure appears as the dead or finished dialectic. Changes in the pattern of the distribution of opposites between twins during the working out of the delay-period are coded into the code-pool from the beginning.

#### FIGURE 7

The first distortion that occurs by the artificial juxtaposition of the opposites is compounded in the juxtaposition of the conceptual twins (grid and landscape). This compounding is Process-Being. The period of cancellation of the twins is prolonged by the coding of structure into them. However, as the twins rotate through their dialectical moments and

FIG 7



pattern phases, they work out their cancellation. The ideal of an endless delay-period is pure deformation, meaning infinity embedded within finitude. This is Wild Being. The possibilities of structural embedding are as endless as the number of higher dimensions. Therefore, the delay-period may be extended indefinitely by appealing to ever deeper structural levels. The crisis of overall cancellation builds up and up. The ideal continuity of endless delay (immortality) appears as Wild Being. The series of dimensional shifts forms a series of repetitions, over which is spread the illusion of continuity, masking the crisis of cancellation. That is the ideal of pure transformation, in which all the systemic reference marks change at each moment.

Surface continuity of pure presence is transformed into continuity in depth. But this is only possible by the fragmentation of the medium of Being into four. The entry of cancellation and process modes into continuity is necessary, in order to produce the illusion of continuity in depth out of the illusion of surface continuity. The surface continuity is temporalised; then made into quanta which are then made into a deep continuity again. This is the process of the ideational template, being applied to itself. It is the idealisation of ideation. The

ideational template can never lead beyond itself. It can only produce images of itself. Michael Henry call this ontological monism,<sup>92</sup> where the transcendental movement of producing an illusory continuity is seen to ground itself. This is not solved by introducing an idea of ontological dualism, as Henry does, which disconnects the centre of the template from its surface, but only by dismantling the surface, so that the depth of the fragmented centre does not arise.

Through the first phase of the chain of reasoning detailed above, a picture of how the ideational template is itself constructed as a patterning device, producing endless, possible patterns, is shown. Its shell is the connection of opposites, which occurs in the medium of pure presence, which is an artificially constructed situation, where the illusion of simultaneous views of the two opposites is presented. This continuity is created by using the background of the single source to connect the opposites conceptually. The conceptual merger of the single source with the opposites has four stages. First, the single source is used as a background for the connection of the opposites that are artificially held together. The single source is interpreted in this context as Pure Presence (i.e. presence without absence). Secondly, the impos-

sibility of holding the opposites together on the background of the conceptualised single source appears as the shifting of the opposites in relation to the background, or in relation to each other. This is interpreted as the temporalisation of the connective medium. It is here that artificial time appears. The first artificial juxtaposition of the opposites is only possible in a frozen moment of time. It begins to deteriorate immediately. In order to draw attention away from that deterioration, attention is shifted to another pair of opposites, held in a similar juxtaposition. There then arises the concept of 'twins', that serves to connect the series of opposites. 'Process Being' appears as this temporalisation, or deterioration, of the series of juxtapositions of opposites. Once the twins appear, there is the possibility of structural encoding which extends the delay-period of artificial time even further. The single source is reinterpreted from being a spatial continuity (Pure Presence) into the temporal continuity of the delay-period (Process Being), and then reinterpreted again as discontinuity between patterned quantal phases (Hyper Being). Once the discontinuities appear as regular eruptions of formlessness into the continuity of time, then the single source can be conceptually considered as this formlessness. However, this is only a stage in the process of estab-

lishing a depth-continuity, where the single source is seen as pure transformation, and the delay-period is seen as endless. This is where the single source has been fully amalgamated with the series of opposites. It has become the foreground and the series of opposites, plus their different patternings, have become the background. The form of manifestation of the ideational template, which is its centre, is merely the transformation of the concept of the single source from background into foreground continuity. Deep continuity is where the repetitions are no longer seen -- neither the repetitions of opposites juxtaposed in dialectical moments of contradiction, nor the repetition of movement from one dimensionality to the next in endless series. This transformation of the concept of the single source from background to time, from the temporal continuity of the delay-period into formlessness, from formlessness into foreground continuity, is an attempt to capture and contain it conceptually. This is the central task of the ideational template. It brings forms into manifestation, only to capture formlessness. It creates dialectical moments and structural patterning phases, only in order to bring to the foreground the deep continuity of the illusorily endless delay-period.

The disconnection of the segments of the shell of

the ideational template by not positing continuity, gives Being to the single source alone, and because of this, Being is never fragmented. The opposites are never seen together as connected. When they are brought together, they vanish, and only the single source is seen. Since the elements, that make up the shell of the ideational template, are never seen together, no distortion is produced by the movement of thought. The stillness of thought is in the witnessing of each of the opposites, or of the single source. If one does not have this stillness of thought, then the closest one may come to apprehending the disconnection between the segments of the shell of the template within the universe of discourse (i.e. the delay-period) is to use the quantization of the structural aspect of the universe of discourse to display that disconnection in a conceptual way. This is the object of the argument concerning emergence. By giving a series of pictures which are related by structural discontinuity, rather than syllogistic continuity, one is using the feature of the delay-period, which is closest to the form of the ideational template's shell, in order to model it.

In the argument concerning emergence, one begins with the single source, and works toward the unfolding of the ideational template, which is the

opposite direction from that taken in the argument concerning nihilism. The argument concerning nihilism began within the universe of discourse, and worked toward the single source. It could never reach it from that starting point, and the closest it could get is the positing of the non-nihilistic distinction, but such a distinction cannot be made in that ambience by the very nature of the ambiguity, which it contains. The argument concerning emergence is, on the other hand, about the arising of a non-nihilistic distinction from the single source. That distinction is ultimately between the use of the ideational template in disconnection or in connection. When it is used in disconnection, genuine emergence is seen. When it is used in connection, artificial emergence arises that obscures genuine emergence, turning that genuine emergence into something which comes into conflict with ideation and crushes it. It becomes an image of the crisis of cancellation, inherent in the working of the ideational template itself. The use of the ideational template in connection results in disconnection, as the use of it in disconnection results in the recognition of the inherent connection of the single source. The disconnection that results from connection may be used to model the disconnection that results in inherent connection. Disconnection is sharp distinguishing. So the sharp

clear-cut distinctions; that occur within the structure of the closed-space, may be used as a model for the non-nihilistic distinction. Those distinctions within the structure need the background of the nihilism of the closed-space of the delay-period to be seen; whereas the non-nihilistic distinction does not need the nihilistic background to be seen. Thus, with the non-nihilistic distinction, one has gone out of the Platonic cave into the light of the sun. The non-nihilistic distinction is not in relation to nihilism at all. The nihilism does not arise, because the template is held in disconnection. The pure distinction is between the opposites, that are never seen together, or between them and the single source. This distinction is made, based on the underlying pure connection of the single source: it arises directly from the single source. Such a clear-cut distinction, is the purification of the nihilistic opposites by the application of disconnection to the shell of the ideational template. It takes the nihilism out of oppositeness, that occurs there, because of the ambiguity of the delay-period. The non-nihilistic distinction is like a 'potency' of the nihilistic opposites, because it presents pure oppositeness, in their disconnection from each other, and from the single source, upon which the opposites are still completely dependent, and which contains pure

connection. It is like a 'potency', because in it none of the nihilism, that results from the use of the ideational template for connection, is left to blur the distinction in any way. The only thing approaching the clarity of the non-nihilistic distinction in the delay-period is the breaks between emergent quanta. Therefore, these may be used to construct a model of the arising of the non-nihilistic distinction. This is, however, only a model, made up of a series of structurally related pictures. Each picture has a different pattern. The clarity of the distinction between them rests on the production of a compensating unclearness and ambiguity. Clarity of distinction, without this compensating ambiguity, is what is being modelled. So this means of understanding the non-nihilistic distinction is inherently flawed.

Picture A: There is a single source. This statement cannot be understood in the arena of discourse that is dedicated to the conceptual domination of the single source by capturing it descriptively and converting it into different sorts of Being. The ideational template cannot capture the single source. It comes from it, like all the other forms and opposites in existence. The single source dominates the ideational template. The ideational template's disconnection is only a means of indicating

the single source. One moves from opposite to opposite; from another opposite to its opposite; and again from yet another opposite to its opposite. The series is not tied together. The opposites are not connected by anything, other than that, if one of a pair of opposites comes into view, then it is certain that its opposite will follow, as Socrates said at the beginning of the Phaedo. If, in this process, one brings the opposites into disconnected, non-contradictory juxtaposition, then they both disappear (cancel each other out), and the single source appears. When the formless appears, it does not mean that forms disappear. This is the myth that all the misuse of the ideational template is based on. The attempt to impose formless continuity on form makes the forms appear to disappear. Purification of forms by ideational disconnection allows the formless to be seen in the forms themselves. No-form is the purified form, and not the absence of form as blankness. The opposites of disconnection at the beginning, or at the surface, and connection in the end, or in the depth, are held in disconnected non-contradictory juxtaposition. There is only the single source in existence.

Picture B: Everything (form, qualitative opposite, and oppositeness of things) arises and returns to the single source. Genuine emergence is this

arising and return, for in it the single source is continuously indicated. Arising and returning are opposites. They must be held together in disconnected juxtaposition. They are surface (shell) and depth (centre of the core). The second picture is of how the disconnected opposites constantly indicate the single source in their disconnected succession. Each laying down of a pattern of opposition within the clear register of the forms comes from the single source, and is timed by it. This is the source's appearance as Time. This is one of the many qualities of the source, which are indicated by the play of the opposites with respect to it. Thus, whereas in Picture A, the formlessness of the single source was indicated, in Picture B, the laying down of the succession of opposite qualities within the transparency of the forms, which constantly indicate that formlessness, appears.

Picture C: the distinction between genuine and artificial emergence arises from the source. This distinction only becomes necessary when the forms are focused on, instead of the opposite qualities. Then the forms become muddy with ambiguity, and solidified by structuralisation. This all comes from the attempt to connect the opposites, rather than realizing their essential disconnection. Connecting the opposites is fundamentally the genera-

tion of an illusion. Within this illusory ambience, in which connections are apparently sustained over time, disconnections between the patterning of emergent quanta appear. These seeming appearances of new patterns are taken as an image for the laying down of new patterns of the opposites, which come in succession by the timing of Time. Thus artificial emergences are made to stand in for the genuine emergences which are the timing of Time. Artificial emergence covers over genuine emergence. Within the realm of artificial time the non-nihilistic distinction between genuine and artificial emergence can only be indicated, because the single source cannot be reached, until the dislocation of the ideational template's shell occurs. The ideational template is a form that appears from the source. It is either used in connection or disconnection. Accordingly, one either witnesses genuine emergence or artificial emergence. One cannot witness emergence until one changes the way that the ideational template is used. The non-nihilistic distinction may only occur in experience, and cannot be approached in discourse, unless that discourse is based on the necessary change in experience. The two uses of the ideational template, which produce the distinction between genuine and artificial emergence, are possibilities set in it from the first, i.e. since the ideational form comes from the

single source, along with everything else, and this possibility of two uses is coded into it, then the distinction between genuine and artificial emergence comes from the single source.


Picture D: The distinction between artificial and genuine emergence is necessary in order to know the single principle more fully. This means that the whole of the ideational template's complete elaboration is necessary to strengthen the pointing of the opposites in disconnection toward the single source. If the opposites in disconnection were all that there were, and the template could not be used for connection, then the transition from the opposites in disconnection to the single source would never have been made. The template used in connection points toward its use in disconnection. The gross tool of power and manipulation points toward the subtle use, which comprehends the opposites, that in turn points toward the single source. If the ideational template did not have these two sides, then the single source could never have been seen. This is because there is not just a myriad of disconnected opposites, but the means of apprehending the opposites has two directions as well -- from the surface connection to depth- disconnection or from surface disconnection to depth-connection. There is a fundamental disconnection between these two direc-

tions. If it were not for the disconnection between the opposite directions of the template, i.e. that the means of knowing opposites was itself in the form of disconnected opposites, then there would be no access to the single source. The disconnection of the directions of the use of the template holds, no matter how it is used. So, disconnection is coded into the template in such a way that, if any one looks deeply into it they must find disconnection. If one connects, then one arrives at disconnection. If one disconnects, then one arrives at the single source. This is because disconnection is between the opposites and between the opposites and the single source. It has two aspects. These two aspects are connected. The connection of the two aspects of disconnection is opposite to the two directions the ideational template uses.

#### FIGURE 8

The proof that the core of the ideational template still manifests itself, even if the template is used in the direction of disconnection, is that underlying<sup>93</sup> the number series is the binary harmonic. The number series, i.e. the natural numbers, is the means of indexing the series of repeated forms by attaching diacritical marks, distinguishing identical forms. This series seems to be of indefinite in extent both directions from zero, whether they

FIG 8



are interpreted as real numbers or not. When indefinite extent is interpreted as endlessness, then infinity becomes attached to the series. Infinity is the ramification, the double-mirroring, of the mirroring of the number series at the zero point. Thus, as Francis points out, zero and infinite are conceptual opposites. Each element in the number series has an internal coherence, which is expressed by its associated dimension in the series of higher dimensions.<sup>94</sup> For instance, the internal coherence of the number four is the articulation of fourth-dimensional space. The articulation of the internal coherence of each numerical value appears in the regular polytopes associated with its equivalent dimensional space. B. Fuller has shown that, underlying the number series is a cycle of eight moments (indexed by what he calls 'indigs' which are repeated summations of digits until only one remains). This eight-fold cycle is the third level of the unfolding of a progressive bi-section, and the progressive bisection's unfolding may be shown to be tied to the levels of complexity exhibited by the regular polytopes of the third and fourth dimensions. This typing of the stages of the progressive bisection to the series of regular polytopes of the third and fourth dimensions suggests that underneath the indefiniteness of the number-series is a definite

articulation with a finite limit, so that the series of numbers is contrasted to the finite permutational matrices of its opposites in a remarkable way. It is this permutational matrix, based on the binary harmonic, which will be used instead of the opposite forms, to form a contrast to the qualitative opposites in the logic of disconnection, that appears in the next chapter. The progressive bisection is called harmonic, because of its dovetailing with the series of regular polytopes, that mark the levels of complexity of structure, limits the unfolding of the progressive bisection, which would otherwise be endless. The levels of unfolding of structure become harmonic thresholds of complexity, in which its wave-length/quanta are dictated by the progressive bisection's form. Basically, here the linear number series is contrasted with the underlying cyclical nature of the progressive bisection, and structure is contrasted with harmonics. The core of the ideational template may be seen to face either toward 'Picture B' in which the binary harmonic manifests itself, or toward 'Picture C', in which the number series manifests itself. The binary harmonic provides a complete context for the description of the interaction of the opposites in the laying down of the timing of Time. That makes the contrast of the qualitative opposites with the opposite forms no longer necessary.

The disconnection between the two directions of the template (i.e. facing toward Pictures A & B or toward Pictures C & D) and the connection between the two disconnections (i.e., that between the opposites and between the opposites and the single principle) are twin images of the same thing. The former is the basis of the fragmentation that appears in the centre of the template, while the latter is the basis on which the disconnection of the shell of the template works. The disconnection of the opposites and the disconnection between the opposites and the single source, is the sign of a strong connection of dependence between each of the opposites and the single source which is independent of the opposites. This strong connection is one of origination and dependence -- not of relationship. The two directions have just such a connection. Thus the direction of first connection (toward Pictures C and D), which makes the whole structural system arise, comes directly from the single source, and by it one goes into the ideational template endlessly. Also the direction of the first disconnection (toward Pictures A & B), which lets one bypass the morass of the working-out the form of the ideational template to see other forms, comes directly from the source. By these two possibilities of going into the template, or 'by-passing' it, as it is part of the means of knowing oppositeness itself, there is

doubled oppositeness. These are opposite ways of knowing opposites. 'Double oppositeness' (between opposites and between opposites together and single source) is opposite the doubled disconnection necessary to disassemble the triads formed by the shell. Here we see two views of the same cognitive formation that appeared when the two separate cognitive modes based on oscillation and reiteration were discussed. This fourfold formation<sup>96</sup> is the cognitive model, that is the basis of the binary harmonic, which in turn is the basis of all numbers. By fourfold formation is meant, first, the primordial establishment of disconnected opposites, such as inward and outward, and second, the interpretation of those opposites on the basis of two disconnected cognitive modes. The first mode sees only sensory information, i.e. pairs of qualitative opposites, and this is based on the ability to oscillate between reference points. The second mode sees only indications of the single source in the meanings of these opposites, and this is based on the ability to circle around a single point. By permutation the two primordially established opposites (i.e. inward/outward) and the two cognitive modes combine to present a fourfold configuration, which must be recognised as the basic model of cognition, when the illusion of the form of the ideational template is drawn aside. The twin views

of this formation is what makes it appear as the ideational template. Twinning of the shell and the centre of the template happens around the templates structural core, which is the binary harmonic seen from one direction, and from the other direction is the number-series, standing also for the series of higher dimensions. The ideational template results from the conceptualization of the fourfold form of cognition. The four-fold form of cognition is the means of transition between opposites, which continually indicates the single source. The conceptualization of the four-fold formation occurs when the experiencer (transcendental subject) of the experienced (transcendental object) is withdrawn from the locus of cognition. The four-fold formation appears purely in the realm of disconnected opposites. When the opposites of experiencer/experienced and oppositeness/single source are kept in disconnection, but recognised as the description of the same locus of cognition, then the four-fold formation occurs. It is turned into the ideational template, if the opposites of the four-fold formation are connected.

The set of structurally defined pictures (A, B, C, D) is a gross simulation of the four-fold cognitive formation, based on the full elaboration of the ideational template. The moments of the four-fold

formation are not structurally related. They are a description of the unified process of cognition, rather than a disconnected set of pictures of the unfolding of the ideational template. A full exegesis of this unified process is not possible in the limits imposed by the structural model. For that the possibility of a logic of disconnection must be explored, within which the spirit of the disconnection of the shell of the ideational template is represented. Only then is it possible that the imaginary form of the template might disappear and the lattice of the four-fold cognitive function be seen fully.

## CHAPTER 5

The argument concerning emergence and the argument concerning nihilism cancel each other out within the universe of discourse governed by ideation, which is used as a means of connection. By their cancellation the limit of the ideational template's use as a means of connecting opposites is reached. In cancellation one is brought up against pure discontinuity. Thought that begins by connection must end by confronting discontinuity as cancellation. This is why antinomic opposition is the sign of pure reason, and why cancellation of antinomic opposites is the highest philosophical experience. It is only reached by one whose thought undergoes a transformative process, so that it goes from one extreme to another. When the two extremes are brought together, cancellation occurs. However, in this case by taking emergence and nihilism as opposites, it has been possible to present a complete unfolding of the form of the ideational template within the transformative space between the beginning of the delay-period and cancellation. The recognition of the

form of the ideational template leads to the recognition, that it is possible to disconnect the elements of its shell from the beginning; and thus avoid completely the arising of a formal system and its structural elaboration. So, at the end, there is a new beginning. That is to say, that, if thought can incorporate disconnection from the beginning, then the end will not be cancellation. One will not enter the delay-period of ambiguity, and mixture of the opposites will not occur. The task then becomes the construction of a 'logic of disconnection'. In other words this study would be incomplete if it did not present at least an approach toward the alternative to the use of the ideational template in connection. However, the development of a logic of disconnection entails the facing of the awesome situation that the disconnection of the opposites entails. For the intellect it is the step out of the closed-space of the period of ambiguity and the safety of logical connections into an arena where an admission of incapacity is the first step.

The logic of disconnection is embedded in the Platonic dialogues, and the study of the Phaedo in this essay shows how the logic of disconnected opposites may be clearly differentiated from the mixture of opposites by ideational processes. There is

no-where else that one may turn to within the western tradition for any enlightenment concerning these issues, all thinkers after Plato may be seen clearly to fall under the description of sophistry that Plato gives. The westerners have read Plato for centuries, and then acted out the role of the sophist that he describes so clearly! This is because they have all assumed that logic of connection was the correct methodological basis for thought. Plato witnessed the results of the use of the logic of connection in his own time, and wrote his dialogues to display the social form that it takes. One must learn and apply the methodology that Socrates displays in the dialogues, rather than listening to the ideas being discussed. The methodology is the important aspect of the dialogues. The accusation that the citizens of Athens brought against Socrates was that he made the weaker argument overcome the stronger. Socrates does not refute this. The logic of connection seems outwardly strong, but is inwardly fragmented. Disconnection seems weak and implausible beside the tremendous possibilities for control and manipulation contained in the logic of connection; but in the end it proves stronger, because it points to a deep inner connection, to which the logic of connection has no access. Human wisdom, says Socrates, comes by holding on to ignorance and recognising that

wisdom belongs to God.<sup>1</sup> The one who displays an outward show of wisdom is discovered to be really ignorant twice over, because he is unaware of his ignorance. The seemingly weak argument is the one which holds to opposites and disconnects them. The seemingly strong argument makes connections between opposites, and finally leaves them for a fascination with form. Socrates does not make the weak argument overcome the stronger, but it is in the nature of existence that the strong, which does not move toward weakness by choice, is moved there by force, and ends up defeating itself. Socrates questions his interlocutors concerning opposites, and discovers that they contradict themselves because they mix up the opposites. He is only seen to dismantle their systems of thought because he holds to the disconnection of the opposites in his dialogue. The methodology of holding to opposites and their disconnection, when maintained in the context of the application of the principle of no secondary causation, gives a cohesive description of what a logic of disconnection must concern itself with. Speaking about opposites in disconnection as a means of indicating the single source is the complete methodology for the destructuring of the ideational template.

The exegesis of the Platonic dialogues is one route

that one might follow, in the display of the logic of disconnection. However, men in the western tradition have been reading these dialogues for centuries, and still they have all become sophists. The problem is to realize the meaning of the difference between the logics of connection and disconnection in our own time. Like Athens in Plato's time, the cycle of the logic of connection has gone full circle, and by looking at the place that contemporary ontology has arrived at in the fragmentation of the concept of Being, it is possible in this time to get a complete picture of the workings of the ideational template. By recognition of that cycle that begins with connection and ends with fragmentation, it is possible to explore what the movement in the opposite direction would entail. Somehow, the men of the western tradition cannot make the connection between what they read in the Platonic dialogues and what is happening in their own time. This is because, somehow, men have disappeared, and all that is seen is the conceptual system. To speak of philosophers being sophists is somehow inadequate, when they are completely overwhelmed by, and have become slaves to, the dialectical unfolding of the ideational template. The recognition of the description of the master/slave dialectic between sophist and his dupe, the prisoner in the cave, which Plato describes in such detail and which

appears in the western tradition as the difference between the subject and Dasein<sup>2</sup> for instance, or in the difference between scientist and Bricoleur<sup>3</sup> as another example, is submerged under the slavery of both to the ideational template, that produces the cave, in which they are both trapped. (As in Waiting for Godot by Beckett,<sup>4</sup> Pozzo and Lucky reappear, with the slave leading the blinded master. The inevitable exchange of roles occurs, and seems funny in the landscape of complete nihilism that Vladimir and Estragon face.<sup>5</sup>) Thus a view of the structural system and its ontology is more important at this time, than a view of the sophist and his ruses. The vehicle, by which the show of knowledge was made, has taken on a life of its own, and the men have been lost sight of completely.<sup>6</sup> Men have become merely the vehicle for the self-transforming of the structural system, that is the product of the ideational template. When disconnection of the shell of the template occurs, then the whole of the mirage produced by the ideational template disappears, and only men are left. They appear naked. When one looks at the men themselves, it is clear that they have been debased instead of exalted by their slavery to the conceptual system, that has completely engulfed their existence. In order to make the necessity of a logic of disconnection clear to men such as these, it is necessary to present it

in terms that they will understand in this time.

The place to begin is with Hume, for by taking his argument further than he himself did, one comes up against disconnection. It may be that there are no a priori synthetic judgements, as Kant would call them. If this is true, i.e. if the ideational template does not function as a prototypical connecting device before experience, if there is no noumenon that acts as a model for the construction of all objects to be presented to the understanding as a filter for sense-experience, which makes it conform to the projected (a priori) model, then the situation is that one is awash in sensory stimuli, and chaos would seem to have to be the final outcome. This distinction between the alternatives of the prototypical use of the ideational template for connection and for chaos is obviously nihilistic. Chaos is, in fact, a specific kind of order. It is the order of erratic change. It is the ideational template that turns all sensory experience filtered out by it into chaos, in order to have a background upon which to see the structural system which results from the use of the ideational template to make a priori synthetic connections. If a priori synthetic connections are rejected, then understanding and sensory experience must be seen in a completely new light. One is faced with the stopping of all

thought by the disconnection of the shell of the ideational template. In the face of this contingency, which causes the whole philosophical and scientific edifice of the western tradition to evaporate, the men of the western tradition have shrunk back. Why is it that no one has taken Kant's extreme positing of the Humean argument of disconnection, and explored it? It is set out clearly by Kant himself. Why have all the philosophers since Kant operated within the problematic, that he has defined, instead of directly questioning the position on which that problematic is based. The denial of a priori synthetic judgements brings us face to face with disconnection of the shell of the ideational template in its strongest form.

Therefore, let us begin with the denial that a priori synthetic judgements are possible. This means that the opposites are disconnected, and further that the opposites are disconnected from any third, either on the same or any higher or lower plane of existence. This immediately puts out of play the developments of the philosophical tradition since Kant, which are basically transformations of the arena of philosophical discourse that he defined. Kant idealized the syllogism, and made it a priori. From that point on, the formal system became autonomous and men lost control of it. All

the developments of the structural system and its concomitant ontology recorded in the works of subsequent philosophers are completely dependent on this deification of the logical process, represented by the syllogism. By denying the possibility of a priori synthetic judgements, one is freed from any reference to the rest of modern and contemporary philosophy, which merely explores the ramifications of the positing of their possibility. One has recognised the form of the ideational template's use as a means of connection, and turned away from it. The denial of the possibility of a priori synthetic judgements makes the two sets of distinctions between a priori/a posteriori and analytic/synthetic evaporate. This is because, as he points out clearly, all analysis is based on prior synthesis. If no synthesis occurs, then analysis is impossible. Analysis before experience is impossible; it is a blank category. An a priori synthesis is the basis of both a posteriori analysis, and synthesis. If the a priori synthesis does not occur, then these two latter processes of the intellect cannot either. It is that a priori synthesis is the first connection of the opposites, which begins the delay-period. If this primary connection does not happen, then all the separation and connection of the opposites within the delay-period does not occur. In fact, the empty category of a priori analysis, which

for Kant is impossible, is the indication that, lurking behind the show of a priori synthesis, is its opposite -- a priori disconnection. A priori/a posteriori may be interpreted to mean outside and inside the delay-period. A priori analysis, if it occurred, would mean that the delay-period could not exist. With a priori analysis the spectre of the use of the disconnection of the ideational template appears. What is being deemed here is that the transcendental subject is the source of a priori synthesis. If the subject assumes as its role a priori analysis (Kant's impossible category), then the source of a priori synthesis shifts immediately to the single source.

If a priori synthesis is denied and one looks for the meaning of a priori analysis in the formation of a logic of disconnection, then where should one begin? Again, it seems that Hume has hit the mark. He says, that the greatest mystery of the universe is found in one's own body. When you make an intention to move a limb, and it moves, there is no access to the power by which that movement takes place. The intention or will, and the movement of the limb, are essentially disconnected. The intention is inward, and the movement is outward. These are opposites. In the human being they are essentially disconnected. Merleau-Ponty speaks of

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this disconnection in terms of the 'chiasm' of touch/touching.<sup>7</sup> The power which connects the two is never seen. Now, when one speaks generally of a power, then it seems to be a third thing between the intention and the movement. Let us begin by applying the rule of the disconnection of the opposites and the principle of no secondary causation to this situation. When disconnection is taken as the rule, then man must immediately refer to his own experience, because everything else is blown away. By denying a priori synthesis it is not possible for the power which moves the limb to be some connection outside our experience. A priori analysis comes to mean the facing of the counter intuitive disconnections, that appear in our own experience.<sup>8</sup>

The inward and the outward are essentially disconnected. This is because in our own experience we do not know how we move our own limbs, except that we have secondary explanations concerning neurons and muscles, etc. These explanations merely beg the question, by bringing in matters that we have even less access to. Now, if we accept that we have no access to the power by which we move our own limbs, then we may either assume a priori synthetic connection, or convert the power into a mystery, as Hume does. The methodology of the logic of disconnection is to first recognise the disconnection between the

inward and the outward. Then, to disconnect these opposites from the power, which is beyond experience, but whose power may be seen in the coordination of inward and outward effects. Once the disconnection between these three elements has been undertaken, then the principle of no secondary causation may be applied. This principle indicates that everything is conditioned (i.e. arranged for the best) by a single source, and thus utterly dependent on the single source. It is the single source that gives rise to both the intention to move in the inward, and the movement in the outward. Now, the key point is that, either one looks at the inward intention (the subtle), or the outward movement (the gross). Both cannot be seen at once. Likewise, if the opposites of inward or outward are being looked at, then the single source cannot be seen.

In terms of this very situation let us look at the fact that what appears are two opposite realms of inward and outward. Within these two realms appear another set of opposites of intention and action. Thus, there are two sets of opposites involved here. One set defines in its disconnection the locus of experience and the other set also appears within that locus as disconnected. The locus and the pattern of opposites, that appear within it, are

essentially disconnected from each other as well. One must look more closely at the locus and at its nature. As Hume points out the greatest mystery of the universe appears there. Now, by the application of the disconnection of opposites and the principle of the single source, we have a way of looking at this mystery, that avoids both the pitfalls of Kant and Hume's explanations of the situation. Positing a priori synthesis, or converting the power into a mystery, are nihilistic and conceptual opposites, which deny human experience of this mystery. The mystery disappears, when it is realised that the opposite realms of experience are disconnection, and what appears in both of them arises from the single source.

Kant attributes to man three faculties: sense, understanding and reason. Reason is either practical or pure, i.e. applied to understanding, or not applied to understanding. Reason is the faculty of making connections, using logic. If we deny the possibility of a priori synthesis, then both reason and understanding are attacked and, as Hume says, they are converted into a merely useful illusion. This is precisely what they are. For Hume, then, one is left with just sensory experience and illusory connections, based on the seeming continuity of experience. These are again nihilistic opposites.

The application of the disconnection of the opposites and the principle of the single source to Hume's recognition of the awesomeness of the human being's capacity to experience the movement of his own body by will allows a different picture of human faculties to appear. By disconnecting opposites, then affirming the single source, one has already thereby divided human experience into two realms, the experience of the opposites, and the affirmation of the oneness, which cannot be seen at the same time as the opposites. The first might be called sensory, and the latter meaning. The whole of the description of the human mystery pointed out by Hume can be contained in the division of the locus of the appearance of that mystery into inward/outward and sensory/meaning. Intention is meaning. Movement of the limb is sensory. The intention points to the wholeness of the movement as a complete action. Thus, it points to the single source. The opposites of intention and action are in another way both sensory, and meaning is the power that moves them both. Sensory is the experience of, or information about, the disconnected qualitative opposites, and meaning is the indication of the oneness, that conditions or lies behind these opposites. Inward/outward and sensory/meaning permute with each other, to make up what may be called a four-fold cognitive formation,<sup>9</sup> which is the core-description of the

locus of experience of the manifestation of the power of conditioning of the single source, as it appears to the human being. The logic of disconnection is based on the recognition of formation of this locus, by means of the binary harmonic, and the appearance within its context of all the other opposites, which man experiences.

This description is essentially different from that of Socrates, given in the Phaedo, because the qualitative opposites are contrasted to the formation of the locus in which they appear, rather than to opposite forms. This maintains the uniformity of the process of disconnection, and gives a firm foundation for developing a logic of disconnection. The point is to avoid the fascination with forms, which is the means by which the delay-period is conjured up. The connection of the opposites in terms of forms leads to a giving of primacy to form, and the attempt to hold on to forms. All this is avoided by the rigorous application of the disconnection of opposites, and the principle of a single source to the human experience. Then the contrast that is necessary between qualitative opposites and opposite forms, in order to see the discontinuity between qualitative opposites, clearly disappears, because the contrast of the locus and the opposites that appear within it is substituted. This is a much

stronger intellectual statement, since it leaves form altogether. It puts at the centre of experience the power that determines and moves everything.

Hume points out that this power of the single source manifests itself in the mind in the connection of thoughts, in our bodies and in the universe. Since the realm of thought has been traced to the use of language as a control-technique, which appears as the syllogism, and when applied to existence as a means of generating specific control techniques manifests as the ideational template. The disconnection of the syllogism that is an icon of the shell of the template, which creates conceptual triads as the basis of formal systematics, immediately brings thought up against the problem of disconnection. Thought as a separate realm, or a third thing, separating the body's experience of power and the experience of that power in the universe, vanishes. The self appears as opposite the universe. The fourfold formation of the locus of cognition applies to both. That is to say, that one recognises that the locus of inward/outward and sensory/meaning are the realms, in which both the self and existence come into manifestation as a patterning of qualitative disconnected opposites.

Just by looking carefully at what Hume has said, and applying the disconnection of opposites and the principle of a single source gleaned from the study of the Socratic dialogue, the Phaedo, there is already a firm basis for a construction of a logic of disconnection.<sup>10</sup> The outline of this logic will be presented in a set of 81 pictures, to which commentary will be appended. In the development of the logic of disconnection from the recognition of the form of the locus, and the pattern of opposites that appear within it, there are four crucial steps. Each step is in fact an elaboration of the form of the four-fold cognitive formation of the locus. First there is the positing of the permutations of the pairs of opposites, which does not mix the opposites of the pairs themselves, that constitutes the locus. Secondly, there is the addition of another set of opposites, that give further definition to the locus. These are the opposites somewhere/nowhere. Third is the idea that there is an instantaneous, or more properly, out-of-time interchange of the opposites. Fourthly, there is the constant indication of the single source at every step in the process of the recognition of interchange. Each of these steps appears from the consideration of what the disconnection of opposites and the principle of the single source means. Therefore, before presenting the outline of the

logic of disconnection and its commentary there will be a brief exposition of these four points.

Consider the locus of the experience of the power of the single source. It is made up of the disconnection of the realms inward/outward, and the disconnection of the types of experience that appear in these realms, into sensory/meaning: that is, information about qualitative opposites, and indication of oneness. Both these are language processes. Therefore it might be said that the disconnection of the shell of the ideational template allows language to cease to function as a technique for forging connection and controlling the experience of time, and lets language function on a more basic level, as the means of recognising and distinguishing opposites, and of indicating the single source. In the beginning of the *Apology*, which is the opposite dialogue to the *Phaedo*, Socrates differentiated between the language of the open spaces of the city and the rhetoric of the court. He says he will speak the first thing that comes to him, and that will be the truth. The control of language by thought is differentiated from spontaneous language. For Socrates spontaneous and truthful language is that which holds to opposites and which indicates meanings. Once language is re-evaluated, being no longer a means of control of experience, but instead

a means of recognising and holding apart the opposites and of indicating oneness, then the impossibility of separating man's experience from language becomes clear. The creation of the realm of thought is just such a separation. It creates a completely artificial realm, which is the universe of discourse, in which artificial speech (rhetoric) and artificial connections (logic) are produced. Spontaneous, true speech completely fills the locus of the experience of the power of the single source. This complete filling-up manifests itself as the permutation of the two sets of opposites inward/outward and sensory/meaning. This permutation gives the locus its form because the separation of the opposites must be rigorously maintained. It is of a fundamentally different kind from that which produces the twins of nihilistic opposition. Permutation points to the fact that the locus is a single place of the manifestation of the power of the single source, which appears as a set of opposite realms, in which manifestation of that power can occur. One must not forget that it is the individual man who is the locus of the experience of the single source.

The permutation of the opposites outward/inward and sensory/meaning must rigorously maintain the distinction between the opposites. It is emphatically

not the mixture of the opposites themselves, which would inaugurate the delay-period of ambiguity. This permutation of the two sets of opposites is the unfolding of the four-fold formation of the locus, which allows the opposites to be brought together in this way. Permutation, while rigorously maintaining distinction, produces an alternative to the grid of correspondences, that appears in the grid-landscape model of the formal system.

That this alternative describes the locus of experience, rather than form and the essence (i.e. core attributes) of forms, is a major step away from the fascination with form that is so dangerous. This permutation is a way of exploring the meaning of the description of the locus of the experience of the power of the single source by these two oppositions. It allows the locus to be seen as 'single', with all its aspects interrelating, though distinction between opposites is rigorously maintained. Inward-sensory in the example given, taken from Hume, is the appearance of the intention. Outward-sensory is the apprehension of the movement of the limb. Inward and outward meaning are the ways these events indicate the single source, whose power they exemplify.

Since the mixture of the opposites in the locus pro-

duces a further set of opposites, not all of these may be apprehended at once. Only one of a pair of opposites isolated or permuted may be seen at once. A further distinction is necessary to make this clear in relation to the locus of permuted opposites. The distinction between somewhere/nowhere will represent this situation, that arises only with the permutation of opposites. When the inward sensory is 'somewhere' then outward meaning is 'nowhere' and so on with all the four realms of manifestation of experience. The whole of the locus then becomes a further permutation of all these opposites. Permuted opposites are not merely disconnected, so that either one opposite or the other is seen, but rather the distance across the quadrant of permutation must be represented. This is because there is a set of oppositions transversal to whatever permutation of opposition-in-mixture is being considered. The two transversal opposites that cut across the locus (i.e. IS/OM or OS/IM) are such, that if one of a set is being considered (is somewhere), then the other is nowhere -- out of sight or in absence. Either the opposites opposite each other in the locus are somewhere/nowhere, and the two sets of opposites are disconnected, or the two sets of opposites are somewhere/nowhere and the opposites opposite each other are disconnected. In this way the two versions of the

locus which are numbered "3" and "4" in what follows, are forged into a single picture of the locus.

Once the programme of permutation of the opposites of the locus has been understood, then it is necessary to go on to the next step, which is the introduction of the concept of the out-of-time instantaneous interchange of opposites. That is to say, that whatever opposite appears as part of the locus, or within the locus, it inevitably turns into its opposite, in such a way that the disconnection between the opposites is maintained, and the single source is indicated. This is a key point, because in terms of a logic of disconnection the single source is indicated by the interchange between the opposites. It is indicated because the opposites remain disconnected in their interchange: there is no continuum. The change to the opposite involves the complete discontinuity of the two opposites, which change into each other without that discontinuity being crossed in any way. Since the discontinuity is not "crossed" this means that, when one opposite is being withdrawn and the other is being substituted this must occur in some way 'out-of-time', i.e. with complete discontinuity. This withdrawal and substitution indicate the single source, because only the single source has continuity, which

goes on through the appearance of the complete discontinuity of instantaneous interchange. It means in some way, that underlying every qualitative opposite is its opposite. The opposite of every opposite is its truth, because it will inevitably be inter- changed for it instantaneously (out-of-time) through the appearance of a discontinuity that indicates the source. The logic of discontinuity models this process of interchange.

An example of interchange may be seen modelled in the Apology. Meletus admits that he thinks that everyone but Socrates does the young of Athens good, and that only Socrates does them harm. Socrates points out the ludicrousness of this on the analogy of horse trainers, and says that the truth must be, that few people do the young good in terms of training them, and many do them harm. Socrates says that what Meletus says indicates that he never gave any thought to the education of the young at all. This is not the best possible example of the interchange of opposites, but I have used it, because it appears in the Apology, which is the opposite of the Phaedo. The point about the example is that Socrates allows the position of Meletus to become manifest and then, by appeal to the analogy of the horse trainer, turns it over, to indicate the truth. The truth is indicated by moving to the opposite posi-

tion. The appeal to analogy allows the interchange to occur and the truthfulness of the second position, that becomes manifest in that interchange, indicates the single source.

In the Phaedo opposites are said to come from opposites and there are two processes of generation between them. The dead gives rise to the living, and the living to the dead.<sup>11</sup> But the process of going from dead to living is separated from the process of becoming dead for something living. According to the logic of disconnection the change in these processes from one opposite to the other is, however, not continuous. The change is an out-of-time interchange. Death comes at a certain instant, and life comes at a certain instant. The appearance of continuity must be broken by the knowledge that discontinuity is the rule. This is marked in the Tibetan Book of the Dead by the appearance immediately after death of the Great Straight Upward Path i.e. the route out of the cycle of birth and death back to the single source. This may be interpreted as the point at which out-of-time interchange occurs.

The interchange occurs by one of the opposites being withdrawn, and the other appearing when the conditions are correct. The bringing together of the


conditions gives the impression of continuity in the two processes of generation. This is registered by discontinuity between the two processes of generation. One is either going in one direction toward life, or the other toward death. If one switches direction, then it is as if one process of generation is withdrawn and the other substituted. What is true for the two directions of generation is true for the opposites interchanged in those processes of generation. It is as if the moment of interchange were out-of-time. The single source is indicated. Each opposite 'runs into' the single source separately, rather than adjoining the other. But that running-into makes the opposite disappear and its opposite appear. It is like a folding fan, which is closed one way then opened the other, keeping the one edge of the fan still. The logic of disconnection concerns the witnessing of this interchange, as it occurs in existence by the appearance of the opposites in the locus. The object of the logic of disconnection is to give an adequate descriptive device, so that this witnessing may be facilitated.<sup>12</sup>

The whole point in seeing the interchange of disconnected opposites is, that by it the single source is continually indicated. Since there is, at every moment, an interchange between one opposite and its

opposite, there is continual indication of the single source. It is becoming aware of this indication, which is the important point. The fact that opposites are constantly interchanging means that the single source is always present in some aspect. If one follows the interchange of opposites to see the opposites, then they are all that is seen, but if you follow the interchange, in order to see the constant indication of the single source, then that is what will appear. All the use of the ideational template for connection, as if the synthetic a priori were true, indicates the logic of disconnection, and the logic of disconnection indicates the possibility of constantly being in tune with the manifestation of the single source.


What follows is a condensed presentation of the logic of disconnection. It is presented in a set of 81 pictures. At the end of this set of pictures is a commentary, which will explain the points more generally. The set of pictures presents more concretely the four steps of the development of the locus, that have just been explained.

- 0. One
- 1. inward/outward
- 2. sensory/meaning
- 3. inward-sensory/outward-meaning  
or  
inward-meaning/outward-sensory
- 4. inward-sensory/inward-meaning  
or  
outward-sensory/outward-meaning
- 5. nowhere/somewhere
- 6. inward-sensory-nowhere/inward-sensory-somewhere  
-----  
inward-meaning-nowhere/inward-meaning-somewhere  
or  
outward-sensory-nowhere/outward-sensory-  
----- somewhere  
outward-meaning-nowhere/outward-meaning-  
somewhere



- 8. One locus
- 9. Each term in the locus is the opposite of what it appears: (→)  
  
ISn→OMs      OMs→ISn      IS→OM      I→O  
IMn→OSs      OSs→IMn      IM→OS      O→I  
OMn→ISs      ISs→OMn      OS→IM  
IMs→OSn      OSn→IMs      OM→IS
- 10. The one locus is made one, by the interchange of opposites without movement across boundaries.
- 11. This interchange occurs at every level of the unfolding of the locus of oppositions.
- 12. The one locus made one by the interchange of opposites points to the One.

13. There is only the single source.
14. The locus has two directions: toward greater or lesser differentiation.
15. Differentiation occurs by the binary harmonic, that underlies the number system, and appears in thresholds of complexity according to the regular polytopes of each dimension.
16. The thresholds of complexity mark the point where interchange of opposites without movement occurs. The first such node of interchange occurs at the fourth level.

Level 1	1	1	
Level 2	I/O	**	2
Level 3	S/M	****	4
Level 4	n/s	*****	8
			16

Direction toward lesser  
differentiation  
Direction toward greater  
differentiation

17. one
18. high/low  
long/short  
fast/slow  
fine/gross  
light/dark  
etc. } The pattern of disconnected opposites is laid down by the timing of Time in each moment.
19. inward $\equiv$ (dark)/outward $\equiv$ (light)
20. inward-sensory $\equiv$ (dark)/outward-meaning $\equiv$ (light)
21. inward-sensory-nowhere $\equiv$ (dark)/outward-meaning-somewhere $\equiv$ (light)
22. opposites appear in opposite segments of the locus at each level.

23. The laying down of the pattern of myriad opposites in the locus at each instant is the action of the single source.

24. The pattern of disconnected opposites is a single pattern.

25. This one pattern is made one by the interchange without movement of each of the opposites within it.

high	→	low	low	→	high
long	→	short	short	→	long
fast	→	slow	slow	→	fast
fine	→	gross	gross	→	fine
light	→	dark	dark	→	light
etc.			etc.		

26. The locus, differentiated by the binary harmonic, and the pattern of opposites which have the form of a 'swarm' are opposites. One is harmonic disconnection, whereas the latter is pure disconnection.

27. The interpenetration of these two kinds of disconnected opposites (loci and pattern) indicate the one in stillness and movement.

28. The one locus made one, and the one pattern made one, together indicate the one more strongly than the locus did alone.

29. There is only the single source in existence.

30. Forms appear in the interpenetration of these two kinds of disconnection, which are pure transparency. Forms appear by seeing boundaries instead of opposites.

31. The pure transparency is the connection between the two kinds of disconnection. The disconnection of the locus which is ordered, and the disconnection of the pattern whose order is not apparent, i.e. not determined by the ideational template, shows the progressive entry of formlessness into disconnection. The formless disconnection of the pattern is the analogy for the disconnection between the single source and the whole realm of the opposites.

32. If the forms are focussed on, instead of the two sets of opposites, and one attempts to hold on to the fleeting vision of the forms, instead of looking at the transparency within which they occur, then formalization occurs. The delay-period appears.
33. G. Spencer Brown describes the development of the formal system in Laws of Form. He begins by introducing the connection of the opposites (inward and outward) and the crossing of the boundary which differentiates the connected opposites. In this model the ideational template used for connection appears.
34. Structuralization occurs when the formal system is temporalised. This means when the time of the delay-period enters into the formal system that appears within it.
35. Structural system and it's ontology give a complete picture of the working-out of the forms, projected by the ideational template.
36. All this is dependent on the transformation of the transparency of the disconnection of opposites into the closed-space of the delay-period. The binary harmonic appears there as the infolding of higher dimensional spaces.
37. The four types of Being describe the complete coming into manifestation dictated by the ideational template within the closed-space.
38. This can only be remedied by the disconnection of the shell of the ideational template, i.e. disconnecting opposites from each other, and from the single source. And by the return to the four-fold formation of cognition, which is seen in the meeting of the locus of opposites, and the pattern of opposites that appears within it.
39. one
40. 1--inward
41. 1--outward
42. 1--inward $\equiv$ (high)
43. 1--outward $\equiv$ (low)

44. 1--inward-sensory $\equiv$ (dark)
45. 1--outward-meaning $\equiv$ (light)
46. 1--inward-sensory-nowhere $\equiv$ (fine)
47. 1--outward-meaning-somewhere $\equiv$ (gross)
48. 1--inward-sensory-nowhere $\equiv$ (fine $\rightarrow$ gross)
49. 1--inward-sensory-nowhere $\equiv$ ( $\rightarrow$ gross)
50. 1--inward-sensory-nowhere $\rightarrow$ outward-meaning-somewhere $\equiv$ ( $\rightarrow$ gross)
51. 1--outward-meaning-somewhere $\equiv$ ( $\rightarrow$ gross)
52. 1--outward-meaning-somewhere $\equiv$ (gross $\rightarrow$ fine)
53. 1--outward-meaning-somewhere $\equiv$ ( $\rightarrow$ fine)
54. 1--outward-meaning-somewhere $\rightarrow$ inward-sensory-nowhere $\equiv$ ( $\rightarrow$ fine)
55. 1--inward-sensory-nowhere $\equiv$ ( $\rightarrow$ fine)
56. Complete interchange without movement shows that the opposites within the locus and the pattern are one, without bringing them together artificially.
57. This interchange occurs on each level of differentiation of the locus.
58. 1--inward-sensory $\equiv$ (dark $\rightarrow$ light)
59. 1--inward-sensory $\equiv$ ( $\rightarrow$ light)
60. 1--inward-sensory $\rightarrow$ outward-meaning $\equiv$ ( $\rightarrow$ light)
61. 1--outward-meaning $\equiv$ ( $\rightarrow$ light)
62. 1--outward-meaning $\equiv$ (light $\rightarrow$ dark)
63. 1--outward-meaning $\equiv$ (dark)
64. 1--outward-meaning $\rightarrow$ inward-sensory $\equiv$ ( $\rightarrow$ dark)
65. 1--inward-sensory $\equiv$ ( $\rightarrow$ dark)
66. 1--inward-(high $\rightarrow$ low)
67. 1--inward-( $\rightarrow$ low)
68. 1--inward $\rightarrow$ outward $\equiv$ ( $\rightarrow$ low)

69.  $1--outward \equiv (\rightarrow low)$
70.  $1--outward \equiv (low \rightarrow high)$
71.  $1--outward \equiv (\rightarrow high)$
72.  $1--outward \rightarrow inward \equiv (\rightarrow high)$
73.  $1--inward \equiv (\rightarrow high)$
74.  $1--inward \equiv (high) \rightarrow outward = (low)$   
     $--inward-sensory \equiv (dark) \rightarrow outward-meaning \equiv (light)$   
     $--inward-sensory-nowhere \equiv (fine) \rightarrow outward-meaning-somewhere \equiv (gross)$
75. And so on, with all the pairs of opposites in the locus, and all the opposites of the pattern of opposites that appear in the locus at all levels.
76. By this the opposites in their interchange point to the single source.
77. Constant referral back to the single source is the only way to maintain the purity of the formation of the cognitive locus.
78. Terms of the form " $1-X \equiv (a)$ " can only be seen on the background of terms of the form " $X/Y$ " and " $(a)/(b)$ ". The difference between the two types of terms epitomises the disconnection of the opposites from the single source.
79. Single source cannot be contained by any description by conceptualisation.
80. There is only the single source in existence.
0. One

## COMMENTARY:

0. Underlying this whole series is the indication at every step of the one, the single source. The series itself arises and returns to the one. Every step says "one!" However, the development of a way to say one, without meaning something other than the single source, depends on beginning with surface disconnection. Thus, we register in the beginning the one, the indication of which will be approached successively throughout the series of pictures.

1. This series of pictures stands in opposition to the formal system. The best example of a formal system is the model G. Spencer Brown makes of one in Laws of Form.<sup>13</sup> There he says that all form is based on there being a boundary with an inside and an outside and on the crossing of that boundary. In this way he simplifies the formal system down to its basic constituents. Here the formal system does not arise, because the emphasis is on opposites rather than form. The opposites are in pure disconnection, and the boundary of their artificial juxtaposition never appears. Since the boundary never appears, there is no crossing of the boundary. The pure disconnection of the opposites is marked by the symbol "/". Inward and outward appear in reference

to the locus of experience, described by the four-fold formation of the centre of cognition. The centre of cognition registers either inwardness or outwardness primarily. This is not the inside or outside of forms, as in G. Spencer Brown's model of the formal system, but inward or outward of the centre of cognition.

2. There is the disappearance of the disconnection between inward and outward, and the appearance of sensory/meaning. It may well have been written as follows:

1. inward/
2. /outward
3. sensory/
4. /meaning

These four represent the form of the locus of cognition in its four-fold pattern. The four-fold pattern means a pair of opposites-disconnected together in disconnection with another pair of opposites-disconnected. Only one of the elements of a pair may appear at once. The point of the four-fold form of cognition, is that it allows the permutation of opposites without the connection of the opposites. Inward may be juxtaposed with meaning or with the sensory; but it may never appear mixed with the outward. Sensory means the information about pairs of opposites. Meaning means the refer-

ence of those to the single source. Outward means surface, and inward means depth. Thus it is seen that the four-fold model of cognition is a description of the disconnection of the shell of the ideational template. This formation does not produce a net of connections like the formal system, but instead a disconnected set of juxtapositions. There is no imaginary set of nihilistic twin concepts, to which the opposites are attached.

3 & 4. The field of juxtapositions is a free-flowing lattice, instead of a set of static correspondences. These (i.e. pictures 3 & 4) are two images of this free-flowing lattice. Free-flowing means effervescent, in their appearing juxtaposed in different ways through disconnection.

5. In the free-flowing lattice of juxtapositions that make up the locus of cognition, there is only the positions of juxtaposition as they appear. When they are not manifest they are 'nowhere', i.e. absent and inaccessible, and then, when they manifest, they become 'somewhere'. The lattice of juxtaposition spontaneously ripples between being-nowhere and being-somewhere. That is in spacetime/timespace and out-of-spacetime/timespace. When it is out-of-spacetime, it has returned to the single source. Somewhere is juxtaposition; nowhere is

disconnection.

6. With the addition of the disconnection between somewhere and nowhere, the free-flowing lattice is increased in the number of its juxtapositions.

7. If the free-flowing lattice were to be seen all-at-once, then it would be seen to be a single locus of treble juxtapositions of terms. That locus appears as disconnected realms of manifestation of opposites to the centre of cognition.

8. That locus is one in it's depth. It's depth oneness is the single source, which is first indicated statically by the oneness of the free-flowing lattice, described as if it were seen all-at-once as a locus of realms of possible manifestations. Seeing the locus as one is a conceptualisation. All that appears is the disconnected srealms of manifestation, identified by the field of juxtapositions. This is the unfolding of the four-fold pattern of cognition, that occurs when the ideational template is used strictly in disconnection.

9. Now the key is, that there is an interchange between the points of juxtaposition, without movement or transcendence of the boundary between opposities (either straight-forward or surreptitious).

This happens by the deep connection of the opposites in the locus through the single source. This means that, if you begin at one point in the locus, it may interchange instantaneously out of timespace/space-time for its opposite in the next moment. Whichever of the opposite realms appears, it becomes its opposite. Interchange without movement is the means by which the single source is dynamically indicated in the free-flowing lattice of juxtapositions. The principle of interchange without connection-movement or transcendence, whether straight forward or hidden, is the key to existence. It is stated by Socrates in the Phaedo, as has been seen. It makes possible a viable explanatory science based on the principle of no secondary causation. The dynamic of the interchange is the way Time times everything in existence. Traditional western science, lost in the ideational sleep, still discovers this principle over and over, -- but has no means of modeling it adequately. It is said that light is particle or wave. It is said that the observer can measure velocity or position. These are examples of nihilistic oppositions. However, what they point to is interchange across pure discontinuity, and the locus of that discontinuity is within the observer, that is, within the locus of cognition. This instantaneous interchange occurs when any opposite is referred to the single source. By that reference

the opposite in hand is interchanged for its opposite.

10. By instantaneous out-of-timespace/spacetime interchange between opposites, the synthetic oneness of the locus is made one, or is given effective unity. This would be the description, if what we were dealing with was the formal system. Synthesis and unity are Kant's terms. What is being described here is different because the whole lattice is fragmented by pure discontinuity. Instead of synthesis, there is the field in which the free-flowing lattice of the nodal points of the locus cluster. Instead of unity, which takes place in time, there is the out-of-timespace/spacetime of interchange of opposites, which occurs because the opposites, by which Time is discriminated, are each referred to Time itself. The one locus is never synthesized, but always remains a cluster. Synthesis is spatial continuity and contiguousness. The one locus has the oneness of clustering, where the actual space-time/timespace, that envelops the different realms of the cluster, is articulated into many separated envelopes. The one locus is made one by the interchange of opposites between realms in articulated envelopes that fragment timespace/spacetime.<sup>14</sup> This occurs by the reference directly to the single source. The fragmentation of the cluster is not

smoothed out by this reference to the single source. There is no substratum or meta- level, by which passing between the clustered fragments is made possible. The interchange is instantaneous and out-of-time. The out-of-time is a concept that does not make sense in the western tradition, based as it is on the use of the ideational template for connection. The out-of-time is pure disconnection in spacetime/timespace, which is connection by the single source. Out-of-timeness is the nature of Time itself. As Heidegger rightly says, Time is itself not temporal.<sup>15</sup>

11. The process of making one appears at every level of the unfolding of the locus by interchange at each of those levels.

12. The complete process of reference to the single source at each of the levels points dynamically to the single source.

13. The statement, that there is only the single source in existence, returns the whole process of the unfolding of the locus and its being made one, to the single source. The locus and the interchange of opposites only exist as a surface fragmentation, which points to depth-oneness. That pointing is dynamic, but in direct contradiction to the proces-

1

ses of synthesis and unity, which are the means of making spatial and temporal connections respectively in the structural system.

14. The locus has two directions: one direction is that of its unfolding according to a binary progression, and the other is that of the progressive condensation of interchange between opposites. By unfolding and then infolding through interchange, the one from which that unfolding comes is indicated. These two directions are not the same as the two directions in the use of the ideational template. Those two directions were toward connection or toward disconnection. Once the direction toward disconnection has been taken, then the locus appears according to binary differentiation. Interchange of opposites is not a form of connection. It maintains disconnection by dynamic transformation through reference to the single source.

15. In the use of the ideational template, it is seen how the closed-space infolds according to the differentiation of higher dimensional spaces, and that how that succession of higher dimensional spaces is the full meaning of the number series (i.e. the number is the external coherence of the internal coherence of the dimensional space). Each number of the number series is essentially discon-

3

nected, so mathematics collapses. The internal articulation of the series of higher dimensional spaces is the series of regular polytopes and underlying the number series there is a binary harmonic. The series of regular polytopes shows the harmonic nature of the binary progression. If the binary progression arises through disconnection, then that harmonic, which is seen in the regular polytopes still underlies that progression. The nodes of the binary harmonic are the points, where the backward flow of interchange between opposites begins. The first harmonic node, where interchange occurs, is marked by the icosahedron-dodecahedron pair in the third dimension and the pentahedron in the fourth dimension. The icosahedron-dodecahedron pair are the external coherence and the pentahedron (i.e. the fourth dimensional simplest regular polytope) is the internal coherence of the same node or threshold of complexity, where instantaneous interchange occurs. The binary harmonic progression only appears by the use of the ideational template in connection. When it is used in disconnection, this underlying harmonic remains hidden. However, it is the explanation of how the locus ends at eight realms, and why interchange between these realms is the next harmonic level.

16. Understanding the interchange of opposites at

the binary harmonic node of 16 positional differentiations is the key to understanding how the locus does not go on to become an unending progression. Its only reason for arising is the dynamic indication of the single source. The first node where the backward flow of interchange occurs is at the point of minimal necessary differentiation for that indication to occur.

17. Now a new phase of unfolding from the one will begin. In this phase there will appear a means by which the one may be even more strongly indicated.

18. A new series of opposites now appears. These opposites are not in the form of the locus as a progressive, disconnected mixture. Rather they are all disconnected one from the other. They make up the pattern of disconnected, qualitative opposites laid down in each moment by the timing of Time. This swarm of patterned opposites may be of unlimited number. Since it is a swarm it is not possible to know how many there are. They are by their nature uncountable.

19-22. The pattern of swarming opposites appears in the realm of the locus of cognition. If at any level of the locus's differentiation there appears one opposite, then its disconnected opposite falls

automatically in to the opposite realm of the locus.

23. The action of the single source is the laying-down of a pattern of opposites, swarming within the locus. The swarm of opposites therefore indicates the one in a different way from the locus. The swarm indicates the single source by the fact that, whatever the pattern is within the locus at that moment, it has come from the single source.

24. The swarm of the pattern is one. As the locus was one. Except the oneness of the locus is by binary progression, whereas the oneness of the pattern is formless. The binary progression in dislocation is the simplest form. The oneness of the pattern is beyond that simplest formation. It is one only by virtue of the oneness of the single source.

25-27. The pattern of opposites that swarm in the locus also undergoes the interchange of opposites. The interchange of opposites in the pattern and in the locus complement each other. By it the formless oneness of the pattern is made one. This indicates the formlessness of the single source. The lattice of the locus is only there to indicate the formlessness of the swarm. The making-one of the pattern

drives the indication of the single source deeper. One might say that the one is indicated by the stillness of the locus, and by the movement of the pattern. The formlessness of the disconnection of the pattern is only comprehensible by the binary form of the locus. Disconnected interchange is not dependent on the binary positioning of the locus -- it can occur without any positioning.

28. The oneness of the single source is indicated more strongly by the formlessness of the pattern being made one.

29. In this way we return again to the single source, even more strongly than we did in the first place. The continued coming back to the single source by ever stronger indications is the whole point of this exercise.

30-38. These pictures concern the arising of form within the area made transparent by the interpenetration of the two kinds of disconnection between loci and pattern. Since the entry-into-form is the province of the ideational template used in connection, it has already been explored in depth in the preceding chapters. These pictures are only here to show how quickly the devolution of the disconnection occurs.

39. The last phase of the development of the logic of disconnection occurs beginning with the one.

40-56 and 57-80. Here is presented a modelling of the revolution of the entire locus, and its patterning, by interchange of the opposite realms of the loci, and the pattern of opposites they contain. The key-feature here is that every picture is referenced to the one. This referencing to the one at every stage of unfolding and interchange by the notation "1..." is the main point. This form of constant referencing may only be undertaken on the background of the opposites of the locus and pattern. It is the model of the disconnection between the opposites and the single source. In this a full picture of the use of the ideational template in disconnection has been given. Continual indication of the one is what gets covered over by the emphasis on form, when it appears in the transparent realm between the loci and pattern. Constant indication of the one, plus disconnection of opposites, plus interchange out-of-time gives a powerful means of indicating the single source through the appearance of the qualitative opposites in the loci. The loci are emphasized instead of the opposite forms, as in Plato's presentation. In this way the pitfalls of concentration on form are avoided completely.

Notice the difference between the loci and pattern, and the grid-landscape model from the ideational template used in connection. The former are completely based on disconnection, whereas the latter is completely based on connection. From the latter there is the unfolding and then infolding of the closed-space, and by that the arising of structure. Here, because disconnection is rigorously maintained, one avoids formalisation, and goes directly to the indication of the one. Continual indication of the oneness of the single source is the highest function of cognition. Conceptual descriptions of it are not possible, so long as the ideational template is maintained in disconnection. Only continuous indication without conceptualisation gives the correct view of the processes of the manifestation of opposites in existence, and their instantaneous interchange out-of-time.

0. The whole of the series of pictures indicates the one, and returns to the one.

What has been presented above is an image of a logic of disconnection, which gives an in-depth view of how the ideational template is used in disconnection. It is, in fact, the alternative to the grid/landscape model, constructed of disconnected opposites instead of correspondences. Neither nihilism nor emergence appears in the logic of disconnection. The laying down of the pattern of opposites is genuine emergence. There is no need for interference phenomena to be generated for the disconnected opposites to be seen. And each of the distinctions between opposites is clear, and furthermore, because there is no nihilistic background effect, they are non-nihilistic. Artificial time is not generated, and structural discontinuities that produce emergent events do not occur. Radical surface fragmentation indicates depth-connection of the single source. The intellect is led to see the single source in everything. Causality drops away because the single condition, upon which every existent is based, is brought to the forefront. Genuine emergence is the appearance of that single condition in every phenomenon. This appearance occurs in the logic of disconnection as the arising between the opposites of locus and pattern of the referencing of every term to the single source. This referencing indicates the disconnection/connection of the single source (the

independent) from/to every existent thing (the dependent).

The general form of the logic of disconnection is as follows:

1--The opposites manifest themselves in disconnection. 1--From between disconnected opposites, when they disappear, appears the indication of the single source. 1--There is only the single source.

The time-form of man is seen in the disconnection of the ideational template. When the template is disconnected, the four-fold formation of cognition appears and the logic of disconnection follows axiomatically. By appreciating the logic of disconnection, a picture of the time-form of man appears. Man is the indication of the single source. Man's time-form is the reception of the timing by Time. It is not that the observer somehow interferes with the observation of phenomena, but that all science must be the science of the locus of observation. The imprecision of a science based on ideational connection, that verifies the split between observer and observed and focusses on the observed forgetting the observer, must be replaced by the precision of the logic of disconnection, which does away with this split. In that logic of disconnection the

time-form of man, rather than the time-form of the ideational template is seen. The time-form of the ideational template is subsidiary to the time-form of man. The former is limited, and tied to the differentiation of form, whereas the latter is more expansive and undifferentiated, in tune with the manifestation of formlessness. It might be said that the time-form of the ideational template comes from the disconnection of man from language. By this disconnection, language is turned into technique. From that unfolds artificial time.

When man identifies himself with language as something outside himself, then he becomes trapped into thinking that there is a difference between the timing of language (logos) and the timing of nature (physis). Instead the time-form of language is only part of the differentiation of man's time form. By it the opposites are recognised, and the one is indicated. Yet, by using language in such a way to indicate the single source, man faces toward the out-of-timeness, which enters into his own time-form. This he recognises, because of the undifferentiated part of his being. He is much more than Dasein (being there). He is being-no-where, as well. Only the logic of disconnection uses language to chart this openness. Otherwise the timing of discourse comes to the fore, when it is placed as a

grid over the external events, then the artificial delay-period is entered.

However, when man turns to the vastness of his own time-form, away from the narrowness of the time-form of mathematised or technicalised language (which even though it can describe time in so many ways, cannot but indicate the out-of-timeness by which Time is indicated) he sees that all the connections he made become like particles of dust. Man retreats within the cave of the delay-period because the vastness of the sea of disconnection, on which there are no way-marks, is too much for him. The precision of the logic of disconnection is balanced by the awesomeness of the open-spaces in which conceptualizations are blown away. Man is left with his (lived) biological time, and its relation to the incomprehensibility of cosmological time. This incomprehensibility of the vastness of the interplay of all the separate time forms in the cosmos is the analogy for the vastness of formlessness within man's own time-form. Man, with the physical sciences, based on the narrow connecting-template, discovers that the cosmos is made up of dust: the dust of the atoms and the dust of the stars. The correct vehicle for understanding the dust of existence is the logic of disconnection. But it man realises that the clouds of macrocosmic and micro-

cosmic dust do not just occur at the extremes of size, but that the creation is shot through and through with disconnection. The logic of disconnection discovers precisely this same pattern in life, in man's direct relation to existence. Man's direct relation to existence is qualitative. That direct experience is of the myriad forms, and the endless swarm of opposite qualities. The logic of disconnection, based on the binary harmonic, addresses man's own experience of the universe by differentiating the levels of complexity of the interaction of opposite qualities. The logic of connection, on the other hand, is the basis of the science of dust (micro- & macro-cosmic), which is remote from direct experience and is founded on the differentiation of the number series. Micro- and macro-cosmic fragmentation into dust points, if understood rightly, to the deep connection of the single source. If man is caught in the middle between these, and pursues a programme of ideational connection, then he misses the point that the whole of the universe is out to indicate. Man must instead pursue a programme of disconnection in which he constantly indicates and watches the indication of the single source. In this way he is in harmony with the universe. Even quantitative science based on ideational connection discovers cosmic disconnection. Existence does not change at its midpoint.

It is just as disconnected there in Man's direct experience, even though this may not be intuitively obvious. Man does not see clouds of dust; he sees either opposites or forms. If he sees opposites, and holds them in disconnection, then the indication of the single source arises between the opposites. If he sees forms, then structuralisation occurs that eventually leads back to disconnection by separation of emergent phases.

Disconnection is the rule because everything in existence points to the single source. This is seen clearly in man, because the greatest mystery in the universe is how man can move his own body. Hume notes that we have no access to the power by which we move our own bodies. If we say that we do it, we are connecting ourselves to the movement by a speculation. Nietzsche in turn says 'It' and not 'I' thinks. So, intention and movement both have an unknown source. If we want to study existence, then it is necessary to begin with this fundamental disconnection between our awareness of the movement of our bodies, and our intention to move them by willing their movement. The intention is inward, and the awareness of movement is outward. These two realms must be held in disconnection. Inward/outward is the primary distinction of the human creature in relation to that power by which movement is

effected, and by which intention arises. The disconnection between intentions inwardly and movements outwardly is one of the most awesome matters in existence. This is because, despite the disconnection, there is perfect harmony between what appears inwardly and outwardly. There is the illusion that I move my hand, although I do not have access to the power by which it occurs. Disconnection here allows freedom, because the single source is indicated by the harmony between what appears inwardly and outwardly. This is completely different from the attempt to connect the subject and object surreptitiously, as Kant does by constructing a mythical transcendental realm. If straightforward and surreptitious connections are avoided, then the single source is indicated constantly.

The inward and outward are sensory realms, in which opposites appear. Their meaning is that the single source is indicated by every movement in the harmony between inward and outward. In just the same way every opposite that appears, inwardly or outwardly, is an indication of the single source because of precisely the same inability to experience the power that connects them in every case. Yet the harmony of the interchange of the opposites is experienced, maintaining disconnection at every point, when this harmony makes one think that connection would be a

valid assumption giving freedom and an open space to witness the miracle of the manifestation of the single source's deep connection. The speculation of connection, based on harmony, without access to the power by which connection is made, gives a false view of existence that leads to inner fragmentation. Maintaining the fragmentation of the opposites in disconnection leads to the realization that there is a real connection that underlies the harmony that appears in the inward and outward and between the opposites that appear there.

In the western tradition the only place that the science of opposites appears at all is in the Platonic dialogues. Most of these dialogues are commentaries on the nihilistic conditions, that result from the connective use of the ideational template. The places where the pure doctrine of opposites appears are very scarce and usually couched in metaphor. Once, however, one realises the possibility of the disconnection of the ideational template, then it is a simple matter to construct the logic of disconnection. This logic has been worked out to a fine science by the ancient Chinese, and is presented in the Tao Te Ching and the I Ching. Using these Chinese texts as models it is relatively easy to recognise the science of opposites in Plato's works when it appears. The

greatest teacher of the science of opposites is, however, existence itself. If one begins with oneself and the disconnection between inward/outward, then whatever opposites that are seen follow the pattern of disconnection, interchange, and indication of the single source. The laws by which existence works are incontrovertible and everywhere displayed. It is only by man's producing an artificial world, wholly based on the temporality of language that disconnects that temporal form of the ideational template from all the other time-forms and imposes it on all of them, that he loses sight of the science of opposites.

## CONCLUSION

In this essay a beginning has been made in the move toward the deconstructing of the ideational process, based on a recognition of its depth consequences. This deconstructing depends on the use of the embedded ideational template in an entirely different way of handling opposites. The recognition of this different approach to opposition leads to the institution of a scientifically precise modelling of primary causation. The Science of Quantity is replaced by a Science of Quality, which makes the roots of Greek science comprehensible again. In that science there were four basic states of hot, cold, wet, and dry, and four basic elements that occurred from the combination of these states called earth, air, fire, and water. It is clear from the writings of Aristotle, that these 'elements' did not refer to sensible aspects, but instead to unseen archetypes which gave rise to the qualitative differences recognised in sensible phenomena. The point is that quantitative science rests on the manipulation of the number-series, interpreted as a 'Real number continuum'. This continuum is reflected or mirrored at the point

zero, which gives rise to twin-images that cancel each other out. Further, the mirroring is itself mirrored and ramified by the concept of infinity, which delays the cancellation, and provides structured underpinning. Infinity is a conceptual mask which covers over the pure discontinuity of the out-of-timeness, that fragments the series of natural numbers. By applying discontinuity as a principle to the number-system the science of mathematics collapses. The number series can only be viewed as a disconnected series, which it is impossible to move along or manipulate.

At that point one is thrown back to the binary harmonic, which underlies the number series which survives the impact of disconnection. The binary harmonic suggests a cluster of qualitatively distinguished permutational nodes. With respect to the development of the logic of disconnection, the cluster of nodes at the level differentiation into eight has been identified with the locus of experience in man, by means of the working out of consequences of the four-fold cognitive formation. The differentiation of the cluster of disconnected nodes at the level of four might be identified with the four states and four 'elements' of Greek classical science. Because this level of differentiation may be identified with the geometrical icon of the

tetrahedron, which has articulation of components in the order of 4 (points) 6 (edges) and 4 (sides), it is possible to see the transformation, via the mediation of the six bipolar degrees of freedom, of 4 states into 4 elements at this level of articulation. Recognition of different qualitative states within the swarm of qualitative opposites that appear within the locus of experience is a higher and more precise expression of experience scientifically than the quantitative description of cosmic dust's interactions, based on the continuity of the number series. The western scientific and philosophical tradition has lost contact with its own Greek roots, in which may be seen the archeological remnants of what may be a more sophisticated and experientially-grounded science than that we possess today. These archeological remains are considered quaint proto-science, because the deep metaphysical principles on which they are based are no longer appreciated. The recovery of qualitative science may take place only by the use of the ideational template in disconnection, which makes quantitative science vanish as a possibility.

It is only qualitative science which addresses phenomena at the level of man's experience of them. The swarm of disconnected opposites that appear in the locus of experience cohere according to the

articulation of the four states and the four elements. This means that the four-fold cognitive formation, which gives rise to the locus, is mirrored in the coherence of the swarm of oppositions, according to states and 'elements', that appears in the locus. In this manner the logic of disconnection constructs a formation for a revival of the science of qualitative opposition. Qualitative science is based on the recognition of organically appearing differences. Many of the seeming counter-intuitive effects currently being explored in Relativity Theory and Quantum Mechanics actually appear natural implications at the level of human experience, when the logic of disconnection and the archaic science of qualitative differences are applied as explanatory devices. That is to say, the effects of depth discontinuity appear at the surface of human experience when the ideational template is applied in disconnection by the recognition of the usefulness of the binary harmonic. The exploration of the archeological evidence of the science of qualitative opposition based on the transformation by mixing of the four states (hot, cold, wet, dry) into the four elements (earth, air, fire, water), is a task which goes beyond the limits of the current study. That exploration must be carried out on the firm foundation of grasping the significance of the logic of disconnection of opposites. The western

scientific and philosophical tradition reduces all previous scientific and metaphysical endeavours to its own level of merely imaging ideational processes. It is possible to see that mathematical precision, which is held up as the highest feature of western science is, in fact, crude in relation to the precision of the logic of disconnection and qualitative opposites, based on the binary harmonic. Here it is only possible to provide a transition between the logic of connection and the logic of disconnection, in terms of an understanding of the implications of both in relation to contemporary metaphysics. Going beyond cancellation-experience, which is the furthest reach of ideational comprehension, depends on the understanding of the form of the ideational template, which underpins all ideational processes and on applying disconnection to it.

The structure of theoretical systems, when temporalized, gives rise to the phenomenon of emergence. This key phenomenon allows the ontological mould to be articulated into the ideational template which governs the deep structure of ideational processes. The recognition of the complete cycle of the working out of the ideational template's form leads to the possibility of disconnecting its shell. The shell is, in fact, the syllogism, which is recognised to

be an artificial connection between qualitative opposites and between them and the image of the out-of-time single source. The logic of disconnection shows how the opposites may be seen in disconnection, without the focus on form which is implied in Socrates' description. From the logic of disconnection the science of qualitative opposition is glimpsed beyond the science of quantification. Ironically the science of qualities is based on a fundamental quantization in the temporal sense of quanta differentiated by the binary harmonic, with each permutational node qualitatively differentiated. It is the development of a full appreciation of the science of qualities, which is the next natural step that would be based on an exploration of the archeological remains of this science in the Greek texts.<sup>1</sup> The thought that western science and philosophy may be a degeneration from a metaphysically superior, more ancient, scientific tradition will be startling to many. However, this is a very real possibility, which must be explored with the kind of openness which Feyraband suggests in his book Science in a Free Society. Genuine competition between alternative world views must be based on the recognition of the flaws inherent in their different metaphysical bases. The science of primary causation is a hitherto unconsidered contender as a basis for a comprehensive scientific approach to existence,

which is metaphysically more sophisticated than the approach to existence taken by the western scientific and philosophical tradition.

FOOTNOTES

## FOOTNOTES

## - INTRODUCTION -

- 1. This term is used, in the sense defined, by G. H. Mead in his works. BIB 106, 540, 565, 224 (p2, pp14-15) <sup>for example</sup>
2. The classic example of the appearance of something new, which called for a complete restructuring of the world, is the arrival in the Americas of the Spanish. The Indians asked them where they came from and they pointed to the ships. The Indians could not see the ships, which were in plain view, and maintained that the Spanish had come out of the water. The Indians' world view did not allow for the existence of sailing ships, so they could not perceive them.  
  
The appearance of men out of the sea who told them of sailing ships made necessary a whole new way of looking at the world. Likewise, any newly discovered phenomena may change the whole view one has of the world. By explaining the newly discovered phenomena it may be that the basis for explaining recognised phenomena may have to be radically re-evaluated. G. H. Mead calls this 'rewriting history'. At each emergent event all of history must be reconstructed to account for its appearance.
- 3. The classic example of a change in theoretical perspective that changes what is seen of the world is the shift from Newtonian to Einsteinian Physics. A change in the way of conceptualising phenomena makes it possible to look at things hitherto not considered relevant, and allows hitherto unseen phenomena to appear. Cf. Zahar (BIB 181).
4. Theoretical perspective means the set of concepts one uses to understand the world, the way in which they are connected to each other, and the method by which they are applied to the world.
- 5. This term is used in the sense that Heidegger discusses in Being & Time (BIB 265) with reference to 'worldhood'. <sup>p 91-145</sup>
6. By 'dynamic relation' is meant that Theoretical perspective and what is seen in the world are completely inter-embedded. Any change in one necessitates change in the other. The point is that this has two directions and it takes time

for the wave of change to move from perception to theory or from theory to perception.

✓ The reference here is to Feyerabend in Against Method (BIB 288) where he shows that perception is a micro-theoretical procedure. Concomitantly theory is a macro-perceptual procedure. Where perceptual devices are operationalized theories, so too, theories operationalize conceptual perspectives. 31 pp 69-91

7. Transformative change means

✓ "Episteme changes" Foucault (BIB 187) <sup>xx-xxiv</sup>

✓ "Paradigm changes" Kuhn (BIB 9) pp 18-19 & pp 52-111

✓ "Epochs of Being" Heidegger (BIB 188) pp 1-75

These authors are all referring to the same

phenomenon - the phenomenon of emergence - in different contexts. Other examples, such as

✓ Whitehead's use of the term 'epoch' in Process and Reality (BIB 190), could be cited. How this 784 p 337

phenomenon could occur is the highest metaphysical problem in the western tradition. What seems to happen is that, in a tradition at a certain point, an emergent event occurs. This emergent event indicates that a break in the continuity of the tradition has occurred. The emergent event signals the advent of a new period in which the world will be conceptualised differently. It takes time for the full significance of the new patterning of theoretical perspective/world to appear. This new patterning slowly appears as it is imaged in different works that are related as dialectical moments. The new patterning lasts for a specific duration until a new emergent event occurs and the tradition undergoes another transformational change. Transformation indicates that the different durational periods are based on each other. The same elements are merely rearranged to make the new patterning appear. The tradition displays what Monod (BIB 77) calls Teleological Filtering which means goal seeking, without a specific predefined goal, by narrowing down of alternatives.

Heidegger calls this hermeneutics -- see his

✓ detailed explanation of this process in Being & Time. (BIB 265) pp 182-211

8. Theoretical-perspective/world is a single complex which, all of a sudden, appears repatterned. It is as if this repatterning occurs at the centre of the complex and moves from being a vaguely understood difference, that cannot be quite pinned down, to a very specific representation which is clearly understood. When it is vague then it is still covered over by representations of the last patterning of the complex, which are slowly

patterning of the complex, which are slowly cleared away as representations of the present complex become more well defined and understood.

It appears as if emergence either comes from the world, or from the theoretical perspective. Either of these apparent sources only indicate a depth repatterning of the theoretical perspective/world complex.

9. Politics here means a stratagem for intervention in existence whose purpose is to gain power.
10. Stasis means the denial of the change which is endemic in existence. Its denial causes it to build up and break whatever dam is constructed to hold it back. Thus change appears in bursts (quanta).
11. Connection means referencing, by oscillation, between two entities or concepts. By repeated oscillation the illusion of continuity between the two is built up. This illusion is the basis for conceptual connection which appears as a solid link that traverses from one entity to the other. However, this apparent link is based on the illusion of continuity which is, in turn, based on the activity, of oscillating between the two entities, which is a method of dealing with discontinuity.
12. The parts of the theoretical perspective are the concepts being used to understand particular phenomena which are, in turn, based on the categories which describe all phenomena.

The Kantian categories are a description of the basis for the formal system. The prototype of the formal system is advanced and things that fit it are considered while those that do not are ignored. The categories are statements of ontological assumptions which determine the limits within which any specific concepts must function.

13. 'States-of-affairs' mean situations which arise by the conjunction of beings in the world. These may be causal (diachronic) or simultaneously arising (synchronic).
14. The duration of the epoch changes depending upon what level of the tradition one is looking at. Heidegger sees epochs of Being; Foucault, at a level which is not so deep, sees

Epistemes; and Kuhn, at an even more shallow level of analysis, sees paradigms. There is no doubt that the quantisation of the tradition is different at different levels of analysis.


This is what shows that it is a structural system. The different levels of quantization is the means by which the continuity of the tradition is maintained in the face of change. However, whether these levels mentioned are the best, for conceiving the western tradition with respect to science and philosophy, must be studied further.

15. FIGURE 9

Each dialectical moment is like a fragment of a hologram which can reveal the whole picture. Each dialectical moment is like different fragments of the same picture, and the quantum is like the whole picture. It is by making holograms of the different fragments that through time a representation of the whole photograph is produced. This whole picture is like the structure of the Quanta. (cf Chapter 3, footnote 3)

16. The burst occurs because, when theoretical perspective is held static, change builds up behind the dam of stasis being set up. As change builds up its character it changes into random change which is the nihilistic opposite of stasis. When the shift to holding the world static is made this randomised change is released all together.
17. This is called the scientific method.
18. This is because Quantization is at different intervals at different levels of the tradition so that there is, at some level, continuity when a discontinuity is occurring at another level. An example of this is the micro movements of the human being in response to speech. Different parts of the body move in relation to different quantisations of the speech. The head moves to the tune of the sentence, the arm to the tune of the word, the shoulders to the tune of the paragraph etc. So the body tracks the quantum patternings of speech with different parts of the body simultaneously, the wholeness of speech is the wholeness of the body. Cf. Condon (BIB 104).

FIG 9



19. Where change, without the structural system, would be a waterfall of difference, it is turned into a graduated series of locks in which change is only allowed to occur in one lock at a time as the ship is passed, from one to another down the stream.

20. Mediation is the key term with respect to structuralism. Structuralism and semiotics are two aspects of the same thing. In terms of philosophy it is all based on Husserl's (BIB 325) introduction of 'essence' between neomatic nucleus (particular) and idea (universal). Husserl said that one could recognize "chairness" or "lion-ness" without seeing lots of chairs but by only seeing one example. Between induction and deduction there was a third category of conceptual perception. Adorno calls this 'essence perception.' By placing this intermediate level between concept and its cover concept (cf. Negative Dialectics BIB 160) the foundation of the structural system was defined. Structure results, as Rosen has pointed out (BIB 297), from the diacritical marking of forms which otherwise would be indistinguishable repetitions. These diacritical marks indicate structure and are themselves signs. pp 47-53  
pp 69-70 & p 157  
p 62

Idea(Form repeated until illusion of continuity is produced)

=

Form

+

Sign(Structure)

+

Trace(Interference; Sludge)

+

No Trace(Absence of interference)

Heidegger took essence perception and gave it an ontological foundation in Being & Time (BIB 265). Dasein (Being-in-the-World) became the sign. It was at this point, by the shift from form to sign, that the different kinds of Being began to be recognised as underlying the process of ideation. pp 32-35

IDEA                      TYPES OF BEING

=

Form-----Being as Pure Presence

+

Sign-----Process Being

+

Trace-----Hyper Being(cancellation of Process  
Being + Nothingness)

+

No Trace---Wild Being

IDEA            TYPES OF MODALITY

=

Form-----Present-at-Hand

+

Sign-----Ready-to-Hand

+

Trace-----In-Hand

+

No Trace---Out-of-Hand

✓ What is called ideation in this essay is the process of producing Ideas in the meaning of the term used by Husserl in "Ideas" (BIB 325). What is meant by ideation is well explained in Descartes' Rules for the Direction of the Mind (BIB 285).

pp 48-50

21. That is we are trapped by it because it is embedded within us. We are completely saturated by the way of looking at the world which has been evolved within this tradition.
22. Using Plato's distinction between knowledge and opinion as a standard, it is clearly seen that all truth within the western tradition is only of a kind which is accessible through opinion.

The phenomenon of emergence characterises the arising of semi-stable bases for constructing opinions. By opinion some aspects of that which might be known to one by sure and direct knowledge may be grasped. Thus, some aspects of the truth appear to the one engrossed in the process of constructing opinions and then, finding these opinions true in some aspects and false in others, having to construct other opinions in a process that approaches the limit of knowledge.

23. There is no doubt that in the process of speculation, or positing opinions, there is some part of truth which is seen, but this is mixed, in unknown proportions, with falsehood. Given the recognition of the process of emergence, one must immediately ask whether what appears in that process is true or not. From the perspective of knowledge, if the truth is mixed with any falsehood at all, it is

false. From the perspective of speculation different standards are applied which allow the consideration of the relative truth of descriptions.

- 24. Ontology concerns the truth of what is known, whereas epistemology concerns the means of knowing. This essay concerns ontology because both the ontological form (i.e. standards of truth) and the ideational template (prototypes for modeling descriptions) are seen as divorced from man as knower. They are the means of fabricating opinions with which men have identified. The epistemology underlying this investigation is that man cannot know. Knowledge is 'being-known,' rather than knowing. Men can only opine from themselves and, as long as they are engaged in speculation, this cuts them off from the possibility of knowledge. cf. the Poem of ~~Anaxagoras~~ <sup>Parmenides</sup>, Freeman (BIB 195). pp 41-46
- 25. The truth, which exists unmixed with falsehood in knowledge, appears to opinion, and speculation, as it undergoes the process of emergence in terms of the limited standards of truth associated with the pre-construction of opinions. Unmixed truth can only appear to the one engaged in opinion fabrication by way of the limitations that have been placed on truth by the engaging in that process.
- 26. In the western tradition it is the categories, whether of Kant or Hegel, which define how the world is preconstructed.
- 27. The noumena (i.e. proto-typical pre-construction of ideal 'object x') of Kant is the example which applies here. Phenomena are the filling in of the ideal object with sensory differentiation. The construction of the noumena is based on the categories which define the diacritical system the object must be preconstructed to fit.
- 28. Man sees before him images of the process of description he uses. Their reality is only as great as the reality of the process they come from, no more. Reality means the relation between the truth seen through the process of speculation and the truth unmixed which is an object of knowledge.

29. Conceptual in the sense described by Kant in The Critique of Pure Reason (BIB 365). Foucault gives a geneology of this process in the Order of Things (BIB 187). Conceptualisation involves the production of representations and the generalisation of representations through the process of making caricatures. The roots of this process is described by Francis Yates in the Art of Memory (BIB 397). pp 257-275  
pp 17-77

30. By 'ontological mould' is meant the relations between different kinds of truth recognised in the western tradition. These give an image of ideation in depth because different components of ideation have different truth standards associated with them.

31. A template is a model or prototype which is laid over something in order to produce a standardised image. Ideation is based on an interlinked series of templates of different complexities. They inform the mould of the ontological differentiation of acceptable truth.

The process is as follows:

- a. Descriptions of the world are produced by ideation (ie. by the production of representations).
- b. This means of producing representations, of a generalised sort from specific material, has specific rules of induction and deduction.
- c. The different layers of the ideational process give rise to different kinds of truth.
- d. These kinds of truth, taken together, form the ontological mould.
- e. Within the ontological mould appears the ideational template which is its differentiation.
- f. The application of various levels of the ideational template to the ontological mould produces the differentiation of the mechanism of description-production by means of ideation.

Thus the ideational template is a means of internal differentiation of the mechanism of ideation itself.

- 65
32. The classic statement of this distinction occurs in Being and Time (BIB 299) as a whole but specifically in the Introduction and more specifically in Section I, paragraph 6 entitled The Task of Destroying the History of Ontology. Here Heidegger specifies his departure from Kant and Descartes in terms of their philosophies. pp 41-48

Heidegger was the first to open up exploration, in depth, of the ontological mould, thereby permitting the discovery of the role of the ideational template which informs that mould. Before Heidegger the philosophers of the western tradition were only concerned with surface effects of ideational phenomena, not their depth.

33. Priority and originality are opposites and they correspond to another set of opposites cancellation and clarification.

Priority means first in order of discovery.

Original means first in order of genetic unfolding from the origin.

The originality may not come first in order of discovery.

Before Heidegger philosophy searched for firsts - for first principles which might serve as a firm foundation. After Heidegger the search was for origins from which the whole of a formal system, from first to last, unfolds.

The unfolding from an origin is based on antinomies which cancel. Cancellation of antinomies takes time and results in clarification.

Cancellation is last in order of collapse back into the origin.

Clarification is last in order of discovery. It is the result of the whole process which would not be there if the process, which in itself is illusory, had not occurred.

- 34. Another clear statement of this distinction occurs in Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics (BIB 378) where Heidegger advances the concept of dasein as a perspective from which to analyse Kant's work. pp 233-238
- 35. This is the first principle of phenomenology enunciated by Husserl cf. Ideas (BIB 325) pp 83-84
- 36. Early Greek Thinking Heidegger (BIB 402) pp 102-123
- 37. Categorical Frameworks, Korner (BIB 111) pp 37-62
- 38. Legitimation of Belief, Gellner (BIB 287) p 203
- 39. Rules for Direction of Mind & Discourse on Method, Descartes on method (BIB 285)
- 40. What is a Thing, Heidegger (BIB 426) pp 1-54
- 41. Take Wittgenstein's Tractatus (BIB 574) as an example. Language games result when the Linguistic Description pulls free of the verificational process --Philosophical Investigations (BIB 575).
- 42. cf. Whitehead: Process & Reality (BIB 190) and Melhuish, G.: The Paradoxical Nature of Reality (BIB 575). p 34 p 19-42
- 43. cf. Sussare: Course in General Linguistics (BIB 70).
- 44. For an overview of what is mean by Structural System, see System & Structure, Wilden (BIB 57) pp 202-205
- 45. cf. Being & Time p.30 (BIB 265) Heidegger.
- 46. cf. Being & Time, The phenomenological method of investigation (BIB 265). pp 49-62
- 47. A taste of the politics comes through in The End of Philosophy, Heidegger (BIB 188), but becomes readily apparent through Adorno's critique of Heidegger in Negative Dialectics (BIB 160). pp 84-110 pp 61-131
- 48. An Introduction to Metaphysics, Heidegger (BIB 174). pp 52-75
- 49. Here it will be convenient to see the Structural System in its guise of Transformational Grammar as developed by Noam Chomsky.

50. That is language as a Proto-logico-mathematical System such as Transformational Grammar attempts to represent it.
- 51. cf. Gadamer, Truth & Method (BIB 406). pp 235-240
- 52. cf. Schutz, Reflection on the Problem of Relevance (BIB 35).  
cf. Gr<sup>h</sup>ahoff, The Structure of Social Inconsistencies (BIB 109).
- 53. cf. Persig, Zen & The Art of Motorcycle Maintenance (BIB 243): Castanada, Tales of Power (BIB 169).  
These are two popular accounts of what is <sup>b</sup>Being described here.
- 54. Henry, Essence of Manifestation (BIB 266). pp 255-234
- 55. Being & Nothingness, Sartre (BIB 239). p 633 definition pp 3-45
- 56. Merleau-Ponty, The Visible & the Invisible (BIB 269). pp 73-78  
pp 87-91
- 57. Heidegger, The Question of Being (BIB 180). p 83
- 58. Mirroring of cancellation is here an analogy between enantiomorphic opposites and the Antinomic Opposition of the Concept of Being and the Concept of Nothingness. Enantiomorphic opposites are the same thing rotated through the fourth dimension. Bragdon, A Primer of Higher Space. (BIB 125)
59. By cancellation the analogy of cancelling two complex equations across an equality-sign, until only zero is left on both sides, is evoked to describe the seeming substantialness of two antinomic opposites, at one point in time, which disappear as illusory at a later point in time.
- 60. "Antinomic" is taken from Kant's Antinomies -- pp 384-483  
Critique of Pure Reason (BIB 365) --  
specifying arguments which take opposite premises and which can both be proven independently by pure reason and not disproven.
- 61. Reference to ontological monism. cf. Henry The Essence of Manifestation (BIB 266). pp 47-134

- 62. cf. Nagarjunas' Dialectical Logic, Verdu (BIB 257) pp 3-4
- 63. cf. Verdu (BIB 257). p 106 pp 54-55
- 64. Merleau-Ponty, Visible and the Invisible p 13 p 76 p 115 (BIB 269).
- 65. cf. Footnote 33. chapter 1.
- 66. It is taken as axiomatic that everything has a shell, core, and core-of-the-core and by specifying these, in respect to any entity, one has adequately detailed that entity. This goes one step further than the standard Aristotelian delineation of entities as existing with essence and attributes. It corresponds, in this case, to Husserl's notion of differentiating Noematic Nucleus, Essence, and Idea. The Shell is the changing attributes which have an external coherence. The essence is the internal coherence of these attributes. The Idea is the relation between these two coherences that has a continuity or stability between objects and intersubjectivity. cf. Husserl Ideas (BIB 325). op cit.
- 67. cf. Merleau-Ponty, The Visible & Invisible (BIB 269), for the opposition and cancellation of the ontological concepts of Being & Nothingness. p 99
- 68. ✓ cf. M. Henry, Essence of Manifestation (BIB pp 438-456 266).  
 ✓ cf. Heidegger, The Question of Being (BIB 180). pp 79-91  
 ✓ cf. Derrida, (BIB 414, 415). p 23 p 67
- 69. ✓ cf. M. Henry, Essence of Manifestation (BIB pp 47-134 266).
- 70. cf. My series of working papers called "Studies for the Structure of Theoretical Systems in Relation to Emergence" (Unpublished manuscript) to be referred to from this point forward in the footnotes as "Studies". For a detailed presentation of ontological monism see Studies Section 1, Part B, Subsections 2.7 to 2.26
- 71. "Ontological Dualism" means that "Being" does not give rise to itself but is given rise to by something other than it which is unknown but utterly determines Being. M. Henry appeals to the theology of Meister Eckhart as a basis of this view. The concept of ontological dualism begins to pave the way to an understanding of

primary causation, but it is not the correct ontological basis for a metaphysic of primary causation that must rise above both Ontological Monism and Dualism.

72. Ontological Monism and Dualism.

73. This discontinuity is the precise subject of any study of emergence whether explained in terms of the metaphysic of ontological dualism or ontological monism.

- 74. ✓ cf. Derrida (BIB 414, 415),<sup>pp 67-69 SP PP 129-160</sup> for his term "Differance" which is the concept indicated here.

75. cf. Studies Section 2, Part A, Subsections 2.1 to 2.6 for relation of sameness to transcendence.

76. It is not the explanatory frameworks of Ontological Monism and Ontological Dualism that is important but the elusive phenomena of discontinuity.


77. The ontological mould is that which the explanatory frameworks of Ontological Monism and Dualism are fitted into, and fill up, in order to define the point of discontinuity that is really interesting. Without the articulation of the mould by one explanatory metaphysical framework or the other, the point of discontinuity cannot be approached.

78. Once this step has been made it is very difficult, in spite of slogans like Husserl's 'Back to the Phenomena', to re-trace one's steps to reapproach the particular.

FIGURE 10

- 79. The threshold of Appearance is a horizon of Process-Being (i.e. Heidegger's mixture of Being & Time), it stands for the concept Being outside of the circle in which individual  
✓ beings appear. As B. Fuller, Synergetics (BIB 431) points out beings must appear as "overlapping visibility durations" that are non-simultaneous and differentiated minimally into four units. cf Studies, Section 2, Part B, Subsection 2.15. The necessity of four units for minimal appearance to theoretical sight will not be emphasised in this essay as it was amply covered in the Studies.<sup>p 239</sup>

FIG 10: ONTOLOGICAL MOULD



80. Even though the beings that appear above the threshold of appearance are differentiated the interval between their appearance and pure undifferentiated appearance is itself not differentiated. Yet we know that this interval must have three parts: Shell, core, and core of core. The differentiation of the space between the point at the center and the circumference can only occur by developing the concept of the Ideational Template soon to be introduced.

- 81. ✓ For an attempt of Adorno, Negative Dialectics pp 135-163 (BIB 160).

- 82. cf. Jacob, The Logic of Living Systems (BIB 177).

Note how, in Jacob's description of evolution, he identifies as a crucial problem four changes in the patterning of organisms. These changes of basic patterning are the quantal transformations of living organisms associated with the Episteme Changes described by ✓ Foucault, Order of Things (BIB 187) and The Epochs of Being described by Heidegger in The End of Philosophy (BIB 188). This example shows that the quantal transformation of entities is not just a theoretical phenomenon.

✓ Also cf. Waddington, Tools for Thought (BIB 466) for a description of the counter-intuitive results of complex systems which is another way of looking at the something. pp 104-228


- 83. This is to say the transformation, in discrete quanta of the basic patterning of organic beings, such as that which Jacob (BIB 177) describes. cp c.7

84. FIGURE 11

85. Internal articulation means an invisible structuring which lies beyond the threshold of appearance. It is hypothesised on the basis of the Quantal transformations of what is seen.

- 86. The suggestion that it is possible to specify the sub-structure beyond the threshold of Appearance on the basis of the phenomenon of emergence has, to my knowledge, never been made before. This substructure will be known as the ✓ Trace. What Derrida (BIB 414, 415) calls traces are deteriorating signs and are not true traces. For a full exposition of the concept pp 46-48 p 141

FIG 11  
FOOTNOTE 84



of trace see Studies, part 4, and also the outline of the argument presented in the Studies from this point further in the footnotes called The Outline (unpublished manuscript).

87. Because the concept of the internal articulation of the Ontological mould has not been suggested before, the "Ideational Template" which represents the articulation of that mould is a theoretical metaphysical object that is presented in this essay for the first time.
88. The idea here is basically that the hypothesised internal articulation of the ontological mould controls all quantization of pattern changes or transformations-of-being which appear beyond the threshold of appearance.
89. The shell has the form of the syllogism by which the particular being, that appears above the threshold of appearance, is connected to the Cover Concept (cf Adorno Negative Dialectics BIB 160) "Being" signified by the horizon of the threshold itself. This corresponds to what was defined in the Studies by the relation of the "Axiomatic Platform" to the "Manifold" cf. The Outline.
90. The core of the Ideational Template corresponds to what was called the Icon of Dimensionality in the Studies. cf. The Outline.
91. The centre of the core of the Ideational Template corresponds to the four states of Being in the Studies (cf Section 4). These were further articulated by their relation to four modalities that were contrasted to four types of transcendence defined by the Kantian Categories that appear in Pure Presence Being. The relation between the four kinds of transcendence of classical metaphysics, the four modalities that were discovered by contemporary metaphysics, and both of their relations to the Four States of Being formed the basis for the development of the Studies. The Four States of Being and their respective modalities are as follows.

Pure Presence---Present-at-hand  
 (Four kinds of transcendence  
 defined by Kantian categories  
 included here)

Process Being---Ready-to-hand

Hyper Being-----In-hand

Wild Being-----Out-of-hand

The addition of the modality "out of hand" is the author's own contribution which merely rounds out a clear and logically symmetrical schema. Modalities will not be discussed in this essay. For more detail, see the Studies.

92. For a detailed picture of this process cf. Studies, Section 4.
- 93. For a detailed look at the ontological relation between Being and Nothingness, cf. the end of Section 3 of the Studies. Sartre's book Being and Nothingness (BIB 239) begins to deal with the issues, and Merleau-Ponty in The Visible and Invisible (BIB 269) squarely confronts the relation between these two ontological concepts. op cit  
op cit
- 94. The concept of the arising of matter-antimatter particles which spontaneously appear for a certain duration and then vanish again cancelling each other out is the primary model for the relation of all antinomic oppositions. op cit  
✓ cf. Ridley Time Space & Things (BIB 447).
- 95. ✓ For this term cf. Heidegger, Being & Time (BIB 265). pp 31-35
- 96. cf. my interpretation of the section "Perceptual Faith and Interrogation" (pp. 95-104 in The Visible and the Invisible by Merleau-Ponty) in Studies, at the end of Section 1, and also note what Vershoven (✓ Philosophy as Wonder (BIB 277)) and Muntz (✓ The Mystery of Existence (BIB 254)) have to say about philosophical experience. I define the experience of cancellation as "Astonishment". p 98  
p 9  
p 12-13
- 97. ✓ cf. Blum, Theoria (BIB 184) and McHugh, On the Being of Social Inquiry (BIB 245). p 3  
pp 12-20
- 98. ✓ cf. Gadamer, Truth & Method (BIB 406). pp 234-305
99. For a critique of the concept movement in thought, see the Studies Section 2 where it is dealt with in relation to the concepts Sameness and Transcendence.

100. By self-form is meant the source of one's own self as intersubjective entity that exists in Heidegger's sense. The source of the self shows itself in the temporal transformations of any individual self as it lives and works through time.

-101. ✓ cf. Heidegger What is Called Thinking (BIB 185) p 137

-102. ✓ cf. Blum, (BIB 184), on Aristotle. pp 1-63

-103. This unified perspective regards emergence to occur in four distinct phases. This is expressed by different authors in different ways, but a close look shows that all agree fundamentally.

Stage 1 Beyond threshold of Clearing-in-Being (closed-space) (un-imagined)

Stage 2 At threshold of Clearing-in-Being (closed space) (un-noticed)

Stage 3 Within threshold of Clearing-in-Being and first noticed.

Stage 4 Secured and comprehended.

It was this uniform model which made me start looking for examples of significant four-fold conceptual categorizations, and attempt to distinguish them from insignificant ones.

Some examples are:

✓ Gelven, Winter Friendship & Guilt (BIB 336): Risk/Ambivalence, /Hierarchy of Significance/Transcendence. pp 31-37

Bateson, "A Theory of Play & Fantasy" (BIB 61): Meta Communication/Meta Linguistics Explicit/Implicit. cf. Double Helix unpublished manuscript.

Blum, Theorizing (BIB 184): Four stages of method Plato/Aristotle/Descartes/Hume.

✓ Heidegger, Being & Time pp. 30-31 (BIB 265): Leap/Disclose/Arrive-at-structures/ Make available. W 30-31

- ✓ Heidegger, Introduction to Metaphysics (BIB 174): Becoming/Appearance/Thought/Ought. pp 93-206
- ✓ Heidegger, Poetry, Language and Thought. (BIB 71). pp 97
- Castenada, Journey to Ixtlan, p. 97 Stages of Power (BIB 169).
- Steiner, After Babel (BIB 258), pp. 296 & 301: Trust/Agression/Incooperation/Reciprocity.
- Mead, G.H., Philosophy of Present, pp. 16-18.
- McTaggart, p. 91 (BIB 225).
- ✓ R. McKeon (BIB 205): Rhetoric/Logic/Grammar/Dialectic.
- ✓ K. Burke, Grammar of Motives (BIB 219) & Permanence and Change (BIB 218): Four Tropes
- ✓ Foucault, M. Archeology of Knowledge (BIB 214): Four discursive formations. Order of Things (BIB 187): Epistemes. pp 200
- ✓ Plato, Phaedra (BIB 227). 251A
- Tymieniecka, p. 71 (BIB 215).
- ✓ Aristotle, The Four Causes and Four kinds of Motion (BIB 578).
- Stenzel (BIB 231), pp. 102-103 Reference to Sophist 253 D.
- Wilden, System & Structure (BIB 57), p. 370 Figure 3.
- ✓ Kant, Critique of Pure Reason (BIB 365): Antimonies. op 24.
- ✓ Schopenhauer (BIB 244). The fourfold root of the principle of sufficient reason.
- ✓ W. Watson (BIB 595).
- ✓ Ingarden, Time & Modes of Being (BIB 253)
- ✓ Warriner (BIB 550). pp 26-27 & pp 38-39

This list gives examples of what I felt to be significant four-fold category schemes relating, in different ways, to the four phases of emergence. An example of an insignificant four-fold category scheme is Crews, Wm. Four Causes of Reality, (BIB 578).

It was not until I discovered that O'Malley in The Sociology of Being (BIB 379) defined the study of the interstices between categories, rather than the categories themselves, that it was possible to move away from these different category schemes to their common ontological origin in the Four States of Being.

pp 50-60

Thus, in this essay, only the model of the four states of Being will be discussed. The model of the four states of Being is the means of generating the interstices of any particular system of concepts such as those indicated above.

104. cf. Heidegger, Question of Being (BIB 180).

cf. Rosen, (BIB 236, BIB 299).

cf. Magnus, (BIB 305).

cf. Polanyi, (BIB 302).

cf. Aschenbrenner, (BIB 304).

cf. Blocker, (BIB 294).

cf. Nietzsche, (BIB 267).

cf. Gouldsblom, (BIB 731)

105. By "vanished" I mean that the argument which appears in The Outline did not, at first, admit the simple substitution of the word nihilism for the word emergence which would, I thought, be all that was necessary. The impossibility of a simple substitution caused me to explore the difference between the connotations of the terms. This in turn led me to see that, instead of being able to substitute one for the other, it was necessary to turn the whole argument upside down to accommodate the change. From my previous experience with conceptual twins -- explored in detail in the Studies -- this made me recognise that these two concepts were antinomic opposites. I had not appreciated this before. Because Emergence & Nihilism are merely opposite explanatory frameworks it becomes obvious that, when the two frameworks are brought to bear on each other, the whole argument would vanish. It is like trying to have parallel lines both intersecting and non-intersecting simultaneously. This option does not exist for human reason.

- 106. Antinomic opposites are described by Kant in  
 ✓ Critique of Pure Reason (BIB 365). *op cit*
- 107. The quick change from one antinomic opposite to the other as a theoretical experience is an interesting experience. The line of argument which I had worked out in the Studies and simplified in the Outline vanished by this quick movement. In the experience of that movement in time it occurred to me that both opposites must arise from a single source. I had articulated one argument and in a flash I saw the opposite of it become manifest. I had not worked out the opposite argument but it was obvious when it was before me in my theoretical perception.
- 108. Each separate antinomically opposite argument is a realm of secondary connection. In one realm the causes flow in one direction, and in the other realm the causes flow in the other (Induction and deduction are examples). Between the two realms of secondary connection all that can exist is primary causation.
- 109. As long as one is working out an argument with no reference to its antinomic opposite one is in the realm of secondary causation. At the point where the two faces of the opposite arguments appear and cancel then primary causation is indicated.
- 110. The evidence for this is that one must be in the operational mode of one antinomic opposite argument or the other. If one attempts to withdraw to the pure argument, from these operational explanatory frameworks of practical argumentation, then the argument, or set of concepts, vanishes because it has no material or content.
- 111. The form of the argument, either right side-up or inverted as its twin, is static. This stasis of the empty concept is in contrast to the flow of material which informs the concept and distinguishes it from its opposite.
- 112. The concept is broken when the opposite materials that inform it in its separate contexts of antinomically opposite arguments are brought together. When this is done the concept must change. It is this transformation of concepts that leads to "Paradigm Changes" in Kuhn's sense (BIB 9). The change of concepts points toward the threshold of appearance via *op cit*

the most general stable concept. This is the concept of Being of Parmenides cf. Freeman (BIB 195). The relation between Static concept and informing material (Hyle. cf. Husserl, Ideas BIB 325) in flux, the Static Hyle and the transforming concept points toward the essence of manifestation (Beyond the gates in Parmenides Poem).

op cit  
pp 226-23

- 113. cf. Tart (BIB 580).

114. cf. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, (BIB 365) pp. 315 - 326, "Transcendental Ideas".

115. Causation is merely a static way of looking at the same phenomenon as emergence describes. In the unfolding of causes, emergence appears as meta-causation. Another term which might be used, instead of causation, is learning. cf Bateson (BIB 61) for different levels of learning. By applying the terms causation, Emergence, or learning to the same phenomena, very different scenerios are seen. This is an example of the application of different distinctions to the same matter.

- 116. ✓cf Blum (BIB 184) Who speaks of 'Firsts.'. pp 92-93  
✓cf Said (BIB 377). pp 29-78

117. cf Footnote, Introduction, 114.  
cf My paper, Double Helix (Unpublished manuscript).

118. cf Footnote 114 above.

119. cf Studies; Section 3, Part D.

- 120. cf Studies; Section 2, Part E, for a detailed treatment of the ontology of dialectics.  
✓✓ See also Baum, A.J. (BIB 126) and Bunge (BIB 467).

- 121. ✓cf. Monod (BIB 77). pp 98-113

122. By single source is meant a non-numerical, as opposed to a numerical, oneness which is beyond the power of conceptualisation to describe. Numerical oneness is opposed to Twoness and from these opposites the number series is produced. The primary cause is however, the non-numerical oneness beyond the "marriage" of one and two to produce the number series. For one and two substitute the Chinese philosophical terms "Yang & Yin". The single source is not, however, equivalent to the Great Ultimate (Tai Chi) or the Thagata Garbha (Womb of thus-come) which is the Buddhist equivalent.

It is not the numerical oneness of all-there-Is which is the unification of Yin & Yang. This merely places the One/two opposition at a higher logical type and does not approach at all non-conceptual oneness. For analysis of conceptual oneness are the Studies section 3 from subsection 102. The Great Ultimate or the unification of Yin & Yang as all phenomenal Being will be dealt with under the rubric of the western concept of First in this essay. cf Verdu (BIB 257).

123. The Truth of Appearance.

124. Correspondence truth.

125. ✓ cf. Plato's Republic (BIB 279) and Sallis' ✓ Commentary, Being & Logos (BIB 278). *Book 7 514-521 pp 444-454*

126. cf. my Paper Double Helix. Designated-as-real means intersubjectively agreed upon reality.

127. cf. Studies, Section 3, Part D.  
✓ See also, BIB 568 de Nicolas p. 73.

128. To an extent that this occurs in this text. The author does not pretend to be outside the realm of ideational discourse, but within it pointing towards an alternative.

129. These two domains of discourse are not established here because this would mean giving this essay a radically different form not conducive to the execution of a dissertation.

130. FIGURE 12

131. ✓ cf. Hofstadter, D. (BIB 498). *pp 495-548*

132. ✓ cf. Wilden (BIB 57) for definition of these terms. *p 97*

133. ✓ cf. de Nicolas (BIB 558) p. 45.


134. ✓ cf. Newton-Smith (BIB 581).

135. ✓ cf. Heidegger, M. (BIB 87): *p 15*  
Spacetime = 3 dimensional space + linear time.  
Timespace = past, present & future + no-where.

136. ✓ cf. Grunbaum, A. (BIB 582).

137. ✓ cf. Blandshard (BIB 273). What Blandshard does with space in the Poetics of Space might also be done with regard to time.

FIG 12



- 138. ✓ cf. Sui (BIB 551). *p 49-128 & p 15*
- 139. ✓ cf. Adorno (BIB 160). *p 162-163*
- 140. cf. The Outline (G4).
- 141. cf. Derrida (BIB 415). *pp 70-87*
- 142. cf. Sartre (BIB 389). Sartre calls this the *pp 11-117*  
deviation of instruments.
- 143. See footnote 138.
- 144. cf. Klapp (BIB 510). This book presents another way of looking at the issues. There is no doubt that Western Metaphysics, in its highest development and sophistication, is crude and even trivial when compared to Chinese, Indian or Buddhist metaphysics. However, we cannot but start from where we are. The attempt to jump out of the western tradition without recognising that it is imprinted on us, at a biological level, merely leads to the misrepresentation of other traditions by unconsciously imposing the process of ideation on them. It is necessary to deal with ideation on our own home ground so that we may move on to a mature metaphysical approach to existence, as the Chinese or Indians did centuries earlier.
- 145. Western Metaphysics is a completely fictitious set of assumptions about the nature of existence that only seems to have substance  
✓ (cf. Burke, BIB 218) because of the self-fulfilling nature of the presuppositions. *p 21-22*  
*§ BIB 219*
- 146. You are not going to see anything other than what you hold up to a mirror. *p 21-24*
- 147. ✓ cf. O'Malley (BIB 379) with regard to insight. *pp 7-8*
- ✓ 148. ✓ cf. de Nicolas (BIB 558) p. 50.
- 149. For an analysis of the Western Tradition in terms of the concept of Sophistry see Studies, section 2.
- 150. For the role of oblivion in western Philosophy see Studies section 3.
- 151. cf. Blum (BIB 184). *21-63 contrast between Aristotle & Plato relation to forebearers.*
- 152. cf. Bateson (BIB 61).
- 153. Feyerabend (BIB 288). *p 165-169*

154. cf. Outline, (G5).
- 155. cf. Burke (BIB 218). p299
- 156. cf. Kant, (BIB 365). op cit
157. For the difference between thought that moves and thought that does not, see Studies, Section 2 on the relation between Sameness and Transcendence.
158. No thing may be said to be related to the single source explicitly, all relations are simultaneously non-relations.
159. The fundamental form of thought has four different concrete manifestations that each have geometrical icons. These geometrical icons are Knot, Torus, Tetrahedron and Mobius strip. For detailed explanation of this point see Studies and Outline.
- 160. ✓ cf. Lacan (BIB 427, 428), and Wilden (BIB 57). -p1-30  
✓ See the discussion of the Imaginary/Symbolic/Real.
161. This impossibility will be called, in Chapter 5, an out-of-time interchange.
- # 162. cf. Hume, (BIB 515). cf Chapter 2.
- ✓ 163. cf. Lao Tzu (BIB 569): doctrine of inaction.
164. cf. Bleibtreu (BIB 118): what is true of animals in terms of their experience of temporality being different is true of all things.
- # 165. cf. Gould, (BIB 522).
- 166. cf. Derrida (BIB 415). pp 70-87
- 167. cf. Heidegger (BIB 402).
- # 168. cf. Baudrillard (BIB 424).
- 169. cf. Persig (BIB 243).
170. See footnote 160. See also my paper, Double Helix.

## FOOTNOTES - CHAPTER 1

1. cf. Plato, (BIB 227).
2. cf. Jung, (BIB 586).
3. The nature of the relation between the One and Many was a key issue in Greek philosophy that became submerged in later western philosophy. cf. Plato's Parmenides (BIB 227); for what is left of Parmenides' work, see Freeman (BIB 195). Other authors dealing with this subject later are Plotinus (BIB 590), and Hermes Trismegistus (BIB 383).
4. As background for this discussion, Sallis (BIB 307), and Ballard (BIB 286) should be consulted.
5. ✓ cf. Bohm, (BIB 591).
6. In terms of philosophy in the western tradition once Kant classified the soul, along with God and the world, as the domain of Metaphysica Specialis (Theology), as opposed to Metaphysica Generalis (concerned with epistemology and ontology), such problems as the immortality of the soul have been considered passe. However, the problems of a philosophical nature that were phrased in this terminology have persisted only to be spoken about in other ways. In this essay, the problematic of the immortality of the soul will be accepted in order to see what Plato has to say here, through Socrates, about the topic that this essay concerns.
7. cf. Aristophanes The Clouds (BIB 592)
8. BIB 227, p. 79.
9. BIB 227, my insert, p. 80.
10. Jung's concept of synchronicity is the beginning of an appreciation of how this might be possible. cf. BIB 542.
11. Socrates has obviously undergone the transformation spoken of in the Republic in terms of the forcible release of the prisoner from the cave. cf. Plato, (BIB 279) for why this is the inverse of the ideational template, cf Studies, Section 4.


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- ✓ 12. cf. Descartes, (BIB 285).
- ✓ 13. cf. Leibniz (BIB 448).
- 14. cf. Plato (BIB 227), p. 84.
- ✓ 15. cf. Blum (BIB 814 & 593) for relation of Socrates to his interlocutors.
- ✓ 16. cf. Pepper (BIB 554).
- 17. cf. Plato (BIB 227), p. 84.
- ✓ 18. Movement is another of those concepts that has submerged in the western tradition. Philosophical treatments of movement are few. However, one interesting treatment of what is being referred to here is Merleau-Ponty (BIB 189). p 13 et al  
 ✓ cf. also Weiher, (BIB 311).
- ✓ 19. cf. Ali al-Jamal, (BIB 576) for a similar treatment of opposites as that found in Plato.
- ✓ 20. For a modern treatment of the relationship between Visible and Invisible, cf. Merleau-Ponty (BIB 260). See also Fuchs (BIB 413). pp 149-155
- 21. Plato, (BIB 227), p. 85 (my insert)
- 22. Plato, (BIB 227), p. 85
- ✓ 23. ✓ cf. Brown (BIB 476). By form is meant outline of-object. This is abstracted from the contents or qualities. p 1-3
- 24. The analogy here is matter and anti-matter.
- ✓ 25. cf. Harrison (BIB 316).
- ✓ 26. The most precise analysis of this in modern philosophy is, of course, Husserl's (BIB 325).
- ✓ 27. ✓ In Husserl's terminology the noematic nucleus (BIB 325). See also Buckler (BIB 416). pp 241-24
- ✓ 28. ✓ cf Merleau-Ponty's analysis of pointing and grasping as opposite modes of perception in Phenomenology of Perception (BIB 72). This book is, of course, a re-writing of Being & Time from the point of view of abnormal psychology. Looking at quality instead of form is the visual equivalent to the two technological (praxis) oriented modalities Presence-at-hand and Ready-to-hand. p 103 p 122

- 29. cf. Denbigh, (BIB 259).
- 30. ✓ cf. Adler, (BIB 251); Murphy, (BIB 247); Jameson,  
 ✓ (BIB 138); Heller, (BIB 364); Gadamer, (BIB  
 ✓ 422); Perelman (BIB 467).
- 31. ✓ cf. Levi-Strauss, (BIB 168); Broekman, (BIB 453);  
 ✓ Katz, (BIB 454).
- 32. The catastrophe theory of R. Thom is one means  
 ✓ recently used to model this process cf. p. 11-12  
 Waddington (BIB 466), also Schulman, (BIB  
 479).
- 33. The boundary of the form is pictured here as  
 analogous to the dividing line between the  
 opposite qualities which cannot meet.
- 34. Plato, (BIB 279).
- 35. Plato, (BIB 227), p. 66.
- 36. cf. Sallis (BIB 307). pp 401-450
- 37. Plato, (BIB 227), p. 43.
- 38. Plato, (BIB 227), p. 43.
- 39. The concept referred to here is that the array  
 of opposite qualities is constantly changing to  
 indicate the single source. Pleasure and pain  
 are examples of qualitative opposites so that  
 their alternation on Man is literally timed  
 (i.e. the exact moment when the interchange  
 will occur is determined) by the indicated  
 single source one of whose names is Time.
- 40. Thus the wheel of samsara (life and death)  
 spoken about in Buddhist philosophy, is  
 relevant here. See the Buddaha's four noble  
 truths and 8 principles.
- 41. Brown pictures this possibility of contact as p. 2  
 the crossing of the boundary between the  
 opposites, this is one of the assumptions of  
 his 'laws of form' (BIB 476).
- 42. cf. Tao te Ching for another example of this  
 view of opposites. Lao Tzu, (BIB 569).
- 43. Plato (BIB 227), pp. 41, 42.
- 44. Plato (BIB 227), p. 42.

- ✓ 45. cf Plessner (BIB 124).
- 46. cf. Kant (BIB 627).
- 47. cf. Brown (BIB 476). *Brown develops his formal system right to the point where temporalization appears.*
- 48. I.e. the contents of the form (outline) is formalised by being given structure. cf. Rosen, (BIB 297).
- 49. For definition of Sophist, cf. the dialogue The Sophist (BIB 227).
- 50. The value of such an elucidation is shown in The Studies.
- 51. cf. Heidegger On Time & Being (BIB 87) (Time p 16 has nothing to do with 'times').
- 52. cf. Husserl Phenomenology of Internal Time Consciousness (BIB 594). pp 48-50
- 53. Wm. James (BIB 628).
- 54. FIGURE 13
- 55. Plato, (BIB 227).
- 56. cf. Studies, 3.83 to 3.88.
- 57. Plato, (BIB 227), p. 90-91.
- 58. de Nicolas (BIB 558, p. 83): concerning the mirror of thought and Fleshlessness.
- 59. cf. Wittgenstein (BIB 574, 575).
- 60. Plato (BIB 227), p. 92.
- 61. cf. Bosserman (BIB 229), p. 91.
- 62. cf. Pawley, (BIB 583), pp 164-186
- 63. Plato, (BIB 227), p. 91.
- 64. For the difference between Pattern and Structure, see Outline.
- 65. cf. Outline, Prelude: Potency and diamond metaphysics.
- 66. That is by way of out-of-time interchange. See Chapter 5.
- 67. Plato, (BIB 227), p. 81.

IG 13



68. cf. Picard(BIB 588) pp 129-131 <sup>↓</sup> pp 72-81

## FOOTNOTES - CHAPTER 2

1. For the application of this model of sophistry applied to western philosophy, see the Studies.
2. Kant, (BIB 365, p. 55).
- ✓ 3. Hegel, (BIB 596). pp 228-240
4. Hume, (BIB 515, p. 57).
5. cf. Plato's distinction between Knowledge and Opinion (BIB 227). *meno 97d Republic 5.476d-78 6.508d-510a*
6. For the role of transcendence in western philosophy, see the Studies, Section 2. *Theaetatos 170b sq Phaedrus 247d sq*
7. Section VII.
- ✓ 8. cf. de Nicolas' use of the term fleshless (BIB 558). *p172 & op. cit*
9. Hume, (BIB 515), p. 63.
- ✓ 10. Camus, (BIB 598).
11. cf. Studies: The nature of the mirage.
12. cf. Studies, section 2, Subsection 24. Plato, (BIB 227).
13. Theaetatos, Plato (BIB 227), the uninitiated (246), those who drag to earth (155-56), nb. the children of the dragon's tooth fought by Cadamus.
14. Hume, (BIB 515).
15. Hume, (BIB 515), p. 64.
16. Hume, (BIB 515), p. 64.
17. Hume, (BIB 515), p. 64.
18. Hume, (BIB 515), p. 64-65, my italics.
19. Hume, (BIB 515), p. 66.
- ✓ 20. Berkeley, (BIB 627).
- ✓ 21. Dallas, (BIB 567). p<sup>73</sup>

22. Hume, (BIB 515), p. 76.
- ✓ 23. Rosen, (BIB 236). ~~pp~~ p 55
- ✓ 24. cf. Naess (BIB 310) and Sextus Empiricus (BIB 309). p 2-7
- ✓ 25. Kant (BIB 365).
- ✓ 26. I follow Patton's exegesis completely in this regard (BIB 358).
27. Kant (BIB 365). pp 120-151
28. That is, the inner totality of soul connected to the outer totality of World by the Infinity of God, cf. Studies, Section 3.
- ✓ 29. cf. the different disguises of the Sophist (BIB 227).
30. In the form of the auction is exemplified all the elements of the form of the ideational template's social manifestation.
- ✓ 31. cf. Persig (BIB 243). op cit
- ✓ 32. Heidegger (BIB 188, Sec. XXVI).
- ✓ 33. Hegel (BIB 597). p 50
- ✓ 34. nb. Differance; Derrida (BIB 414 & 415). op cit
- ✓ 35. Nietzsche (BIB 267). p 263 #474 See also Adorno Bib 11 p 148
- ✓ 36. This is the fourth dimensional aspect of the system: Bragdon (BIB 125).
37. cf. analysis of the terms Limit and Boundary. Studies Section 3.
38. cf. Smelt (BIB 323).
- ✓ 39. cf. Sartre, Deviation of instruments (BIB 389), op cit  
cf. the myth of Tantalus, Graves (BIB 282). vol 2 pp 25-28
- ✓ 40. cf. Wittgenstein (BIB 575). op cit
- ✓ 41. Watson (BIB 455). p 100, 114
- ✓ 42. Rosen (BIB 297). pp 246 - 261
- ✓ 43. Fuller (BIB 431, p. 254).

- / 44. Hughes (BIB 450, p. 27).
- / 45. Munz (BIB 49).

## FOOTNOTES - CHAPTER 3

1. By this I mean that Kant excludes the concepts of *Metaphysica Specialis* whereas Hegel deifies them in the form of the Absolute Idea which is the ultimate mixture. i.e., Hegel says that *metaphysica specialis* is the way the world works. In this concept there is an attempt to mix the concrete opposite particular and the absolute. Finitude is infinitude! Where Kant maintains a clear distinction between the realm of the finite and the infinite, Hegel mixes even these opposite concepts. Hegel sets out to prove the opposite of Kant and takes the opposite premises to him. These philosophies are antinomic opposites.
2. If one looks carefully at the form of the Kantian categories, it is obvious that Kant built the dialectic into these categories. However, he did not use this aspect of their structuring to do anything. Hegel's system sets the categories in motion and uses the dialectical structuring, that Kant built into the categories, to do this. For instance: in the 'Table of the Categories' there are four sections -- i.e. of quality, of quantity, of relation, and of modality. Under each of these headings there are three major headings. Some are paired concepts and some are not. In any case, these three major headings are dialectically related such that, for instance, unity and plurality are synthesised in totality. We can only deduce from this that Hegel was ultimately a Kantian who became lost in the categories.
3. Referring to the footnote 15 of the Introduction, it is possible to elaborate on this diagram and point out that, unlike form that may be apprehended at a glance, it takes time for structure to manifest. The time it takes is the appearance of successive dialectical moments. When the dialectical moments are taken together, as a finished picture of what is manifesting through them, then the underlying structure is reconstructed. This picture may be shattered by the advent of another dialectical moment in which new quanta are defined, or merely made more precise by the shift in perspective. Dialectical moments that begin quanta are very different from those that

elaborate on a quantum's motif. Kant's philosophy is an example of a dialectical moment that began a new quantum in the advance of the western philosophical tradition. Hegel's philosophy elaborates on Kant's and so lies within the quantum inaugurated by Kant giving a fundamentally different view of the same system.

4. The western tradition has just passed into a new quantum. The quantum of the structural-dialectical system has worked itself out and a new quantum has been inaugurated. Foucault (BIB 187) called for this new age without realising that M. Henry (BIB 266) had already ushered it in by the definition of the difference between Ontological Monism and Ontological Dualism. With the appearance of the twin of Ontological Monism, it falls -- they cancel and a new era, episteme, or epoch of being is positively entered. This is the era of Trace as against the era of sign-structure-dialectic. Derrida attempts to approach the concept of trace and frames it in terms of the deterioration of signs using the concept of erasure. This concept is not adequate but is a first dialectical moment in the new era where the materials of the old era are used to model that which is manifesting in the new era. Erasure is not the correct concept of trace which is better modeled in terms of the indentations on the next sheet of paper in a pad when writing occurs on the top pad. cf Wilden (BIB 57, ch. 11) on Freud's mystic writing pad model of memory. P 303-343
5. An excellent exposition of these elements is found in G. Spencer-Brown (BIB 476).
6. It is with Husserl's philosophy that the specifically structural element emerged and overtly separated itself from the formal system. This was by the definition of the essence as a halfway house between Idea and Noematic nucleus (The concept of probability wave in Quantum mechanics as half way between possibility and probability is a corresponding manifestation of the structural element as separate from the formal, cf. Zukav (BIB 621)). 908 128  
). This was the point of reversibility in the quantum of the structural episteme ended by Henry. At the point of reversability, the underlying structure of the quantum becomes manifest in its own right. In the phase of the quantum the modeling of the dialectical moments

is done entirely with material from previous quanta in the tradition, whereas after the point of reversability the unique features of that which is being modeled are recognised and given their own definition.

7. cf. Outline for a more precise delineation of this process.
8. This is very similar to what has occurred in the structural-dialectical episteme of the western philosophical tradition. Kant defined a way of thinking represented by metaphysica specialis and called it pure reason, excluding it from the realm of metaphysica generalis. It was precisely what he defined out that Hegel used as the basis of his philosophy. One might refer to Lefevre's (BIB 468) experimental problem of how to drill two holes halfway through a wall from each side, without communicating between the two drilling parties, so that these two half holes join. The transformation between the parties that must pass over the wall is the model for what Kant excluded and Hegel included. The problem is how to cross an uncrossable barrier without going through it. Hegel appealed to the concrete Absolute. Those who reject this possibility of thought to surpass itself by a surreptitious route, adhere to Kant's restrictions but have spent most of their efforts to locate a way of doing just what has been excluded while adhering to the rules of exclusion. Heidegger, using Husserl's definition of essence, managed finally to do that in Being & Time.
9. i.e. a system of argumentation that excludes the possibility of the thing it is set out to find beforehand so that the search is only an approach to an asymptotic limit which can, by definition, never be reached.
10. This form of self-defeating argument is made, by some, to appear particularly engaging. cf. Hofstadter (BIB 498). p246-274
11. The way I went down is expressed in the Outline and my going down it is preserved in the Studies.
12. This study is a metacommentary on the program of the Outline which rejects that program and attempts to give a view of what lies beyond it.

- 13. An excellent account of what is meant by nihilism and emergence is given by de Nicolas (BIB 558) in the chapters on Asat and Sat (Languages of Non-Existence and Existence) respectively.
- 14. ✓ i.e. Nietzsche (esp. BIB 267, but also, 186, 206, 312, 441).  
       ✓ Heidegger (BIB 180).  
       ✓ Rosen (BIB 236, 299).
- ✓ 15. ✓ De Nicolas calls this phenomenon 'background' (BIB 558, p. 90).

The phenomenon which I attempted to understand in terms of Nihilism was the figure-ground relation between the emergent event which is current and the antecedent emergent events which appeared before this one, which has been solidified into the history of the tradition. cf. Wilden (BIB 57, ch. 11) on emergent events turned into the trace structure.

- 16. G. H. Mead used the term emergence to specify this figure-ground relation specified in fn. 15. When I recognised that the philosophers meant the same thing by nihilism as G. H. Mead meant by one of the senses of the term emergence, I began using the term nihilism to specify this sense of the term of emergence and separate it from other meanings of the term emergence. When I attempted to use the term artificial emergence to specify this special sense of the term emergence I realised that this sense defined as nihilism was opposite the other sense of the term which specified genuine discontinuity that engendered novel emergences that were in some sense genuine. This cancellation of artificial emergence and genuine emergence as conceptual markers made me realise that genuine emergence was neither of these, meaning that both were, in some sense, artificial. This led to the search for a firm basis for analysing the new meaning of genuine emergence which the principle of a single source provides.
- 17. I had never compared the two senses of the term emergence before to realise that they covered what were actually opposite ideas. Artificial emergence, nihilism, is an attribute of the figure-ground relation between the novelty and past novelties which leads to boredom because of the constant presentation of 'novelties'. Emergence proper is the complete change in the


patterning of this figure-ground relation in order to combat this boredom (which leads, of course, to meta-boredom in the one who expects scientific revolutions). The two mechanisms entail each other and, in fact, are a restatement of the same mechanism from two points of view. The second mechanism takes the first figure-ground relation as the figure in a second figure-ground relation where the ground is a structural substratum underlying the episteme changes. The kind of change is symbolised in Carlos Castenada being pushed through a door by Don Juan and ending up in a different place on a different day. There was a complete scene change. The orientation to the new surroundings takes a while, even for one expecting such a scene change. Moving from one episteme or quantum is much like this, only in intellectual terms. The ground is the structural relation between all possible scene changes and the figure is the relation between the current novelty and past novelties coded as traces into history. These two relations are a micro and macro-view of the same thing. It is analogous to the mobius strip. The two views appear to be different things but actually, when viewed globally, in relation to each other, are seen to be the same thing.

18. ✓ Adorno (BIB 511) criticizes any philosophy that ends up as being composed of antinomic opposites. Antinomic opposites, when they appear in anyone's thought, mean that the thought path involved was merely going round in circles. Only an immature thinker, or one who never follows up their own ideas thinks they are immune from this. Reaching this point is the first glimmer of philosophical maturity. Adorno avoids it by never constructing a system. Different thinkers avoid it in different ways. The experience is, however, the definitive philosophical experience. It is equivalent to actually traveling around the mobius strip and discovering that it is only one-sided. This is completely different from the information that it is one-sided. It is looping the loop, as they say. The travel through the paradoxical situation epitomised in ✓ Hofstadter's EGB (BIB 498) is different from standing out side and looking in at it. It is the difference between information and tasting by experience. p1482149
19. Adorno saw no way to go beyond the antinomies except by glimpses. He accepted them and p152 pp 684-71

attempted to work through them. Ultimately, the presence of the antinomies means that no philosopher has anything to say because none can escape them. Whatever one says, it is undermined by the approach of the opposite statement that ultimately must be resorted to unless one accepts silence. Just as pleasure and pain alternate on man, so too any intellectual position calls up its opposite. If one holds onto a single position then, if one does not release it, one will eventually have to say its opposite in order to continue articulating that initial position. At that point the position has cancelled with its opposite. As Rosen (BIB 236) says the saying of the position is then equal to silence and this is the point of the advent of indemic Nihilism: where nothing means anything any more.

20. There are very few clear elucidations of the antinomic process of the cancellation of conceptual forms. Adornos Negative Dialectics is the best contemporary example. p 76 + p 136
21. This is because we have been through the structural quanta of the western tradition and are just entering the quanta of Traces (cf. footnote 4, chapter 3).
22. FIGURE 14
23. cf. Chapter 3, footnote 14.
24. Kant (BIB 365). op cit
25. cf. Rose (BIB 511).
26. cf. de Nicolas (BIB 558), p. 82.
27. Simply the author experienced for himself this key philosophical experience that the whole western tradition is set up to describe & avoid, and fails to do either adequately.
28. In this experience it becomes quite obvious that the thought thinks the thinker. In it the master-slave dialectic between thinker and his thought reverses.
29. cf. Gadamer (BIB 406) reconstruction is the correspondence standard of truth. op cit  
Understanding requires understanding more than the author did of his own work. This means realising Appearance as a standard of truth for

FIG 14 WESTERN PHILOSOPHICAL TRADITION





of the difference between structure and dialectic follows.

- ✓ 43. Levi-Strauss (BIB 168).
- ✓ 44. cf. Catastrophe theory; Zeeman (BIB 599).
- 45. This insight was provided by Chris Collinge, a fellow graduate student at the LSE, and has been a significant tool for the analysis of structure as the temporalisation of form.
- 46. It only appears at the end of the Quantum.
- ✓ 47. cf. Sussare (BIB 70).
- ✓ 48. cf. Francis (BIB 400) on relation of zero to infinity.
- ✓ 49. cf. de Nicolas (BIB 558), p. 45.
- ✓ 50. cf. Wilden (BIB 57), p. 404: origin = goal.
- 51. Plato (BIB 227); (author's insert).
- ✓ 52. Lanigran (BIB 526), Miles (Bib 520), Rebbi (BIB 518), Bullough (BIB 517).
- 53. cf. Studies Section 4, for the way pictures of what is beyond ideation are only other pictures of ideation.
- 54. Simulation of what will be called, in Chapter 5, out-of-time interchange.
- ✓ 55. ✓ Plato (BIB 227).
- ✓ 56. cf. Dallas (BIB 567). p95
- ✓ 57. cf. May (BIB 333).
- 58. cf. Studies, Section 2.
- 59. In terms of modern western philosophy, Kant excludes this surreptitious route by excluding the model of metaphysica specialis in which 'god' is the connection between Soul and world in a non-empirically provable way. Except for those, like Hegel, who championed the use of metaphysica specialis type arguments involving surreptitious routes, most philosophers accepted Kant's limitations on thought. However, Husserl opened the arena of different modalities by the definition of essence as a halfway house between Idea and noematic nucleus

(particular), and Heidegger used this route to define precisely the kind of operation that Kant had forbidden within the arena delimited by Kant's rules and without breaking these rules. Heidegger does this in Being & Time. cf. Studies, section 3, on Heidegger's Illusion. cf. Being & Time (BIB 265) on the 'Call of Guilt'.

pp 312-318

60. Applying this formulation of two cognitive modes to the mobius strip is interesting and leads to the extension offered in Chapter 5, the locally apparent opposite sides of the mobius strip are globally the same. There are two ways to move between the opposites sides. One may either go around the surface 360 degrees to end up on the opposite side or one may cross the single edge separating the sides. These respectively are the circular and oscillatory modes of cognition. They are combined here in such a way that the circular route could be a surreptitious access to the other side. Another means of access which will be offered as an alternative, in chapter 5 of this essay, is to realise that the mobius strip is, ideally, a sheet of points -- it is only one point thick. In this case, any point 'A' on one side is its opposite point 'B' without moving at all. The realization of this is analogous to that which will later, be called out-of-time interchange between opposites.
61. Like longitude and latitude being laid over the globe. cf. this model was first used in the Outline.
62. Different metric systems give different views of the same landscape. For instance, by changing metrics in physics certain physical constants actually disappear from the equations.
63. cf. Studies, Section 2.
64. cf. Hofstadler (BIB 498). p11
65. cf. Heidegger (BIB 265). p488
66. cf. Outline.
67. Sartre (BIB 389, 390). op cit
68. Adorno (BIB 160). p147
69. Merleau-Ponty (BIB 72). pp 143-153, 197, 219

70. Merleau-Ponty (BIB 269). *pp 98-99 / p 131 fn*
71. Pure presence, Process Being, Hyper-Being, Wild Being. cf. Introduciton. fn. 91.

The four kinds of being refer to the ontological basis of the outward technological project. They are the centre of the core of the ideational template.

72. Like Hume and Berkeley, Descartes and Leibniz, or Kant and Hegel.

- A 73. Like Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, Henry, and Derrida.

74. This is analysed in detail in the Studies.

75. An analysis of conceptual oneness, in terms of the concepts interpenetration and intrapenetration, appears in Sections 3 and 4 of the Studies.

76. Kant posits God as being beyond the bounds of the finitude which the ideational template models. By God, Kant means infinity. Infinity/finitude is the basic distinction on which the whole of the structure of Kantian philosophy is built. God-infinity is interpreted by the author as 'conceptual oneness'. In the studies, a major motif is "what happens when conceptual oneness is brought inside the realm of finitude".

77. Conceptual oneness provides the framework for understanding the connection between beginnings and ends posited by the structural underpinnings of the finite delay period.

78. CANCELLATION ————— PRODUCTION OF  
| OPPOSITES  
|  
IDEAL MERGER OF TWINS ————— CONCEPTUAL  
WITHOUT CANCELLATION ONENESS

79. ie. four kinds of Being.

80. The two sets of four are twins, and cancel.

81. Those trapped in the delay period do everything possible to avoid cancellation occurring. The point is to let it occur.

82. Nihilism exists already as a manifested component of the world. cf. de Nicolas (BIB 558): the language of ~~the~~ Sat. cf. Rosen (BIB 236) on the endemic nature of Nihilism. pp 29-38  
p 206, p xx
83. It, nihilism, manifests in man as antinomic opposition.
84. The consequences in man are boredom and indifference (cf. May, BIB 333) and in the world are the manifestations of Technosis. cf. Biram (BIB 623).
85. This is to say that if nihilism is not looked at in terms of its disastrous effects but as a system then it takes on a different physiognomy. Seeing it as a system means noticing that, although it has many different concrete appearances, these appearances take on the same patterning in every case.
86. For the coherent essence <sup>p 45</sup> of nihilism recognised by Heidegger (BIB 180); but not by Rosen (BIB 236) who sees it as pure incoherence because he refuses to look at it as a system. p 140
87. Systematics, i.e. the form of the structural system allows us to recognise that the systematic effects of nihilism are only the result of the movement of the structural system. The structural system produces nihilism in order to be seen.
88. Ontology is the underpinning of the structural system in its basis on the Four Kinds of Being.
89. Conceptual oneness is an attempt to solve the fragmentation of the four types of being by bringing about the impossible merger of finitude and infinitude.
90. As is shown in the Studies in detail, this whole system is only there to indicate the possibility of the non-nihilistic distinction that the mixture of the delay period is designed to preclude. The camouflage, meant to hide this possibility, when read another way points directly to it.
91. cf. Outline preface.
92. The way to go beyond the camouflage is not to

get rid of it but to use it as a means of purification.

- ✓ 93. ✓ cf. Elluel (BIB 624).
- ✓ 94. ✓ cf. Burke (BIB 218) sub-stance: that which *op cit* stands below that which is a foundation. Ideation is baseless.
- 95. The point is not to get rid of nihilism but to recognise its positive function in existence.
- ✓ 96. Rosen (BIB 236). *op. cit.*
- ✓ 97. Rosen (BIB 236). pp 28-55
- ✓ 98. Adorno (BIB 160). pp 61-133
- ✓ 99. Heidegger (BIB 180) *op cit*
- ✓ 100. cf. Zukav (BIB 621). pp 133-134
- ✓ 101. cf. Klapp (BIB 510).
- 102. Op Art is an example of the kind of shifting meant here.
- ✓ 103. Zusne (BIB 439). p 29
- 104. cf. Studies; Section 2.
- ✓ 105. Monod models the structural system in terms of biology (cf BIB 77) pp 82-130
- ✓ 106. Kant's categories are another definition of the minimal constituents of the structural system (cf BIB 365). pp 104-119
- 107. cf. Studies; Section 3, 'Heidegger's illusion'.
- ✓ 108. cf. Heidegger (BIB 87). p 17
- ✓ 109. cf. Heidegger (BIB 188). pp xiii-xiv
- ✓ 110. cf. Heidegger (BIB 265). p 214 & pp 401-403
- 111. Singularity is called the Hiatus in the Studies. Here the space-time singularity, related to black holes in space, is used as the metaphor. The black hole is an anomalous, theoretically possible natural form where the force of gravity is too strong for light to escape. At the center of the black hole is the space-time singularity where the laws of

physics are violated - what is there is not covered by the laws of physics, cf. Kaufmann (BIB 626). Here the 'singularity' is a point in the structural system that is not bound by its rules although the system allows the singularity to be defined.

112. In the Studies the Manifold and the openly-closed system are defined as opposites. The manifold is the realm in which the unfolding of the axiomatic framework takes place. The axiomatic framework defines the formal system which is transformed into the structural system. The structural system may be defined as opened or closed. There are certain specific circumstances where the structural system takes on a third form called 'openly-closed'. This is when its boundaries are stable like a closed system but where singularities (hiatus) are defined by the structure which allows information to appear inside the system from outside the system without crossing the boundaries of the closed system. The special circumstances of the appearing of an openly-closed system and the manifold are the same formation appearing in opposite forms. Conceptual oneness is applied to the Manifold through the concept of dimensionality. These higher dimensions, in the manifold, interact with the structural system making the openly-closed system possible. An example of the openly-closed system is chess, cf. my analysis of chess, Studies, Appendix 2.
113. Kant's infinitude is interpreted here as conceptual oneness. Conceptual oneness has two manifestations: Interpenetration (this is a standard term in Buddhist metaphysics meaning the inherent coalescence of forms), and Intrapenetration which means that all the forms must be already inside any one form. Thus any form has access to the conceptual oneness of the whole universe (modeled as the higher dimensions unfolding in the manifold) from within and outside itself.
- ✓ 114. This bringing in of conceptual oneness into the realm of finitude is exemplified in the studies as the Novum. The novum is the ultimate emergent event. The coherence of the clearing-in-being (cf. Castenada - 'Tonal') and the external coherence (cf. Castenada - 'Nagual') are brought together and the Clearing-in-being

4

vanishes via the appearance of the novum. When this occurs the slate is erased completely, the entire realm of artificial delay periods is wiped away, leaving only the timing of Time. It is the definition of this possibility which allows the delay periods, and the illusions that appear within them, to be seen, cf. Studies.

✓ 115. cf. Wilden (BIB 57). p 356-361

116. cf. Studies; Appendix 2.

117. cf. Heidegger's illusion, Studies; Section 3.

118. For detailed explanation see Studies; Sec. 3.

119. For a more thorough explication, cf. Outline.

120. This question is posed more fully in Studies; Sections 3 & 4.

✓ 121. This implication, that all forms conceptually unite beyond the delay period, is wrong. It is propaganda, cf. Elluel (BIB 624).

122. cf. Outline; Preface.

123. It is not at a meta-level or a higher logical type.

✓ 124. Derrida would say differAnce, (cf. BIB 414, op cit. 415).

✓ 125. cf. Heidegger (BIB 146). pp 23-41

## FOOTNOTES - CHAPTER 4

1. ✓ -Epochs of Being, Heidegger (BIB 188). *op cit*  
 ✓ -Epistemes, Foucault (BIB 187). *op cit*  
 ✓ -Periods of paradigm dominance between  
 Scientific Revolutions, Kuhn (BIB 9). *op cit*  
 ✓ -Synchronic Moments Between Diacritical Shifts,  
 Sussare (BIB 70).
2. A patterning principle is a source of a series  
 of motifs each of which are again the source of  
 many different patterns.
3. The shell of the template is the means of  
 connecting concepts into triads which is most  
 clearly modelled in the axioms of logic, or in  
 the traditional syllogism. In the triad, two  
 elements of the same level are connected to  
 higher/lower level elements. See my Double  
Helix paper. The logic of disconnection  
 inserts discontinuities between these three  
 elements.
4. Nb. footnote 3, chapter 4. The discontinuities  
 between the structurally related quanta (cf.  
 chapter 4, footnote 1) are analogous to the  
 discontinuities posited by the logic of  
 disconnection.
5. The discontinuous argument may be modelled on  
 the form of quantum logic (cf. de Nicolas, BIB  
 558 --Appendix 2)
6. Nb. footnote 4, chapter 4. Discontinuity in  
 the logical process is at the beginning, and  
 discontinuity between the periods that make up  
 a tradition, or a chain of reasoning, is at the  
 end.
7. I.e. the thesis here is that the process of  
 connection, carried out automatically by the  
 shell of ideation, blocks the perception of  
 genuinely emergent events. This blocking is  
 done by the production of a kind of camouflage,  
 or noise, called here artificial emergence.
8. I.e. the changes of motifs from the same  
 patterning principle that is the core of the  
 template, footnote 2, chapter 4.
9. No one in the whole history of philosophy has  
 ever questioned the logic of connection. It is

only with Henry's (BIB 266) unveiling of the presupposition of ontological monism that it presents itself as a necessity. The kind of discontinuity that is suggested between elements of logic already appears in the discontinuity between segments of the tradition or segments of the chain of reasonings. Even quantum logic, which rejects the distributive laws does not reject connection implied by logical sum and product. It therefore gets disconnections in the lattice of sentences analogous to the breaks in traditions. PP 49-133

10. Of its core, the patterning principle, and the center of its core -- the fragmentation of the concept of Being.
11. The idea here is that the logic of connection is a mechanism that continues spinning a web. In the first instance it is the mechanism itself that is the shell of the template but, by implication, the web which comes from it may be called the shell of the template as well.  
In the web cuts, gaps, or discontinuities appear that cannot be explained in terms of the logic of connection that is the mechanism that produces the web. Each of the parts of the web, like the moving geological tectonic plates on the earth, are based on a different motif. By these motifs, similarly, a patterning principle is hypothesised that is called the core of the ideational template.
12. This is a description of what happens, in the logic of disconnection, that makes the mixture of the opposites impossible.
13. The point here is that the logic of disconnection ignores a fundamental component of the ideational template, this appears later in a counter-productive way as discontinuities in the web of connections in the template. The logic of disconnection recognises this fundamental component from the first and thus deals with its ill effects immediately.
14. cf. the Outline.
15. ✓ cf. Manning (BIB 506).  
✓ cf. Schreier (BIB 484).  
✓ cf. Hurewicz (BIB 481).  
✓ cf. Kendall (BIB 480).  
cf. Section 2 & 3, Studies & Outline.  
✓ cf. White (BIB 456), p. 152-153.

- 16. cf. Coxeter (BIB 503).
- 17. The tetrahedron, as Fuller (BIB 431) <sup>report</sup> recognised, is the minimal visible conceptual form. Yet the actual geometrical form is not of that great an importance. It is the form that thought takes of which it is one marker. There are four markers of a geometrical kind for this simplest thought-form. They are the tetrahedron, torus, Mobius strip, and knot. Each of these have 720 degrees of rotation in common. It is as if the basic thought form appears in geometrical terms by this tetrahedron of forms. Each of the other geometrical forms are also merely markers for the harmonic thresholds of complexity of thought whereon the least interference is encountered to the motion of thought.
- 18. Formlessness - No form - is the opposite of form. It has the same relation to form as Appearance (Being) has to correspondences (beings). In the relation of Higher dimensional polytopes there is a clear analogy of the relation of no-form to form. Only a certain portion of the unimaginable higher dimensional forms may be rotated into 3 dimensional space at one time and the rest is Nowhere. The relation of nowhere to somewhere is another way of appreciating this which will appear again in Chapter 5.
- 19. cf. footnote 18, chapter 4.
- 20. That is, by seeing the series of higher dimensional spaces, with their corresponding regular and other polytopes, as a whole. This is done by considering zero and 'N' dimensionality and their relation to zero and infinity. cf. Studies, Section 3.
- 21. cf. Studies, Sections 3 & 4.
- 22. This is usually, imaged in mythological treatments, in terms of incest and murder of the parents. cf. the Greek gods and descriptions in the Rig Veda: Graves (BIB 282) & de Nicolas (BIB 558). <sup>pp 119</sup>
- 23. Nietzsche (BIB 267). <sup>of it</sup>
- 24. In the Studies the genuinely emergent event that shatters the nets of correspondences in the Clearing-in-Being was called the Novum. cf. Studies, Section 1. The God (One) from Beyond Being is the father of the analogy of the Sun which creates the mother of New-Being from the interaction in

25. cf. footnote 15, Chapter 1.
26. This is the rationale behind the choices, in consumerism, between different products.
27. In the Studies, the ultimate intensification was called the 'Clearing-of-Being' and this was identified as the opposite of the 'Clearing-in-Being'. They are related as Castenada's (BIB 169) 'Nagual' and 'Tonal' respectively. *op cit*
28. This is the age of saturation of the human self-form by nihilism, cf. May (BIB 333).
29. cf. Berger (BIB 8).
30. The forms and opposites as they appear from the single source by genuine emergence.
31. It makes them visible...like the move from atomic to sub-atomic physics does.
32. This final genuine emergence that erased the artificial emergences' cumulative effects is called a Novum in the Studies. It is the appearance of the external coherence of the Clearing-in-Being inside the Clearing in Being so that it re-aligns with the internal coherence of the Clearing-in-Being to produce its cancellation. Called the Clearing-of-Being.
33. I.e. Wild Being.
34. It freezes the motion of connective thought.
35. Dialectical moment.
36. Produces an illusory continuity.
37. Look at any text book and see how essentially unrelated points in the argument are tied together to appear as a continuous argument.
38. For the human being approximately 24 frames per second is the threshold for the appearance of the illusion of continuity. Cinematic technique is based on this.
39. Or motif, or scenario.
40. cf. Tiryakian (BIB 191). *plc*
41. Presentation of one motif or gestalt pattern is the withdrawal of others, thus it is the manifestation of the ontological framework of presentation and withdrawal. Cf Heidegger (BIB 4 *op cit* 52).

42. cf. Studies, Section 4.
43. This study began as an exploration of the sociology of creativity and, after reading all the literature on creativity which I found extremely barren, I turned to philosophy for inspiration. My study of philosophy centered around ontology and my conclusion is that creativity, as it appears, is nothing other than the manifestation of artificial emergence if it is radically novel, and nihilism if it is only a variation of existing forms and processes already manifest. Creativity is merely the display of the ideational form in another manifestation and the truly creative act is that which breaks into the arena of genuine emergence so that the source of true creativity -- the single source -- is indicated or glimpsed.
44. Mead (BIB 106, 540, 565). *op cit*
45. Foucault (BIB 187). *op cit*
46. Heidegger (BIB 188). *op cit*
47. Kuhn (BIB 9). *op cit*
48. cf. Zahar (BIB 181). *op cit*
49. cf. de Nicolas (BIB 558), p. 82.
50. Infinity is the doubling of mirroring -- two mirrors placed opposite each other creating an infinity of images (Hughes, BIB 450). Thought used to study itself produces the same effect. p 15
51. Physis is the mirror opposite to Logos in Greek thought. The problem is to see what there was before Physis and Logos separated. That is genuine emergence. The point is that they never did separate, we merely entered an artificial delay period in which the split seemed to be real.
52. Spacetime-timespace, cf. Special theory of relativity in Zukav (BIB 621) and Heidegger (BIB 87), or Being, 'ether', may be taken as an interpretation of the medium. pp 156-158!  
p 15  
*For 'Ether' cf. Derrida (BIB 415) p 147*
53. cf. Studies for an in depth presentation.
54. Kuznetsov (BIB 507).

- 55. cf. Derridas' critique of Husserl (BIB 415).
- 56. At this point the model of the mnemonic comes into play, cf. Yates (BIB 397), and the Studies. *op cit*
- 57. In mathematics this is group theory.
- 58. This is done by placing the complexity of the system at exactly the complexity of one of the harmonic thresholds of complexity marked by the geometrical regular solids.
- 59. In the Outline this is called the openspace. Openspace suggests its transparency and seeming openness. However, here it is identified with the delay period which is closed.
- 60. cf. Heidegger (BIB 265). *op cit*.
- 61. See the use of the metaphor of the cave from Plato's Republic to describe the closed space in Studies, Sec. 4.
- 62. This is the insight of C. Collinge in personal communication.
- 63. cf. Studies, Section 4, for an in-depth analysis of the Clearing-in-Being using the cave metaphor of Plato as it's basis.
- 64. For an analysis of the walls of the Clearing-in-Being, cf. Studies, Sec. 3-4.
- 65. cf. Galileo's analogy of a pen drawing on the sea after a boat. Feyerabend (BIB 288) and Galileo's dialogues. *pp 82-83*
- 66. The closed-space within the boundary of the 'Clearing-in-Being' has the nature of 'Minimal Erratic Change' that makes the Formal System visible.
- 67. The formal system (as open system or closed system) is constructed according to the plan, laid out in Monod's Chance & Necessity (BIB 77), of successive layers of random variance and invariance or stillness and motion. *op cit*
- 68. With respect to the formal system either 'what is processed by it' may change or the processing system may change. Processing is the transformation of materials from outside


the system. Changes in the system itself are more rare and are part of the 'becoming of the system' according to teleonomic principles. Emergent events may occur with respect to either of these two processes of becoming. Transformation is the nature of discontinuous change and may be part of a Process, Becoming, or emergent event.

#### FIGURE 15

cf. Outline, F22-23.

- 69. The erratic change makes visible the nihilistic opposites of motion/stillness or random change/invariance.
- 70. The filtering system's narrowing of the range of allowed change, in pseudo-goal-orientation, makes visible the emergent changes in processed materials and the becoming of the system.
- 71. The whole system seems to be goal oriented in the sense, defined by Monod, of narrowing allowable changes (BIB 77). p115§
- 72. Husserl (BIB 320 & 325). *op cit*
- 73. cf. Outline.
- 74. Tetrahedron/knot/torus/mobius strip.
- 75. Cube-octahedron.
- 76. Icosahedron-dodacahedron.
- 77. Five cell polytope of 4 dimensional space.
- 78. 16 cell - 8 cell polytopes.
- 79. 24 cell polytope.
- 80. 120 cell - 600 cell polytopes.
- 81. 6 cell polytope of five dimensional space.
- 82. The knot of paradox is the concentration of all the erratic change, generated by the structural system, into a single place which appears as a paradoxicality of the kind defined, by Russel, as a class being a member of itself in Principia Mathematica.

FIG 15



- 83. cf. Merleau-Ponty (BIB 269). *op cit*
- 84. Process Being=Time + Being. cf. Heidegger (BIB 265). *op cit*
- 85. cf. Sartre (BIB 239). *op cit*
- 86. cf. Merleau-Ponty (BIB 269). *op cit*
- 87. Identity of form and no-form.
- 88. That which is there before the formal grid is generated (before the split between Logos and physis).
- 89. cf. Section 4, Studies.
- 90. For the identity between zero & infinity see Francis (BIB 400).
- 91. cf. Section 4, Studies.
- 92. Henry (BIB 266). *pp 47-134*
- 93. cf. Fuller (BIB 431) on 'Indigs' and their eight-fold harmonic cycle. This is the proof that the binary harmonic underlies the Number series because it can be converted into this cycle based on powers of 2. *pp 756-771*
- 94. In this essay the higher dimensional spaces will be considered as the internal coherence of the numbers with which they are associated.
- 95. In de Nicolas' book and its musical sequel by E. McClain (BIB 557 & 558), the binary harmonic is referred to specifically. They call the binary harmonic octave female and barren until fertilised by odd prime numbers. It is precisely this barren octave structure that has the form of formlessness, i.e. the fertilization is the beginning of the delay period. It is the generation of the rest of the number series that must be avoided if we are not to enter into the delay period.
- 96. cf. Dallas (BIB 549). *pp 21-53*

## FOOTNOTES - CHAPTER 5

1. Or the single source.
- 2. cf. Heidegger (BIB 265). *pp 86-90*
- 3. cf. Levi Strauss (BIB 168). *pp 16-20*
- 4. Beckett (BIB 630).
5. Vladimir and Estragon may be easily replaced by Rosencrantz & Guildenstern in T. Stoppards play (BIB 631).
- 6. As Foucault has said the mythology of 'Man' is finished (BIB 187). *op cit*
- 7. cf. Merleau-Ponty (BIB 269). *pp 130-135*
- 8. cf. O'Malley's distinction between Categorimatics and diagramatics for another approach to what is meant here by the distinction between A Priori Synthesis and Analysis. (BIB 379) *op cit*.
- 9. cf. Dallas (BIB 549). *op cit*
- 10. ✓ See also Ali al-Jamal (BIB 576) and Lao Tzu  
✓ (BIB 569).
11. cf. Gadamer on the Platonic dialogues (BIB 422).
- 12. An example of the out-of-time interchange may be found in the idea of the instantaton. cf. Rebbi (BIB 518).
- 13. Brown, (BIB 476). *op cit*
14. cf. also Zukav (BIB 621), p. 216, 240, & 243
- 15. Heidegger, On Time & Being (BIB 087). *pp*

## FOOTNOTES - CONCLUSION

1. In addition to Greek sources, traditional Chinese Philosophy would be an invaluable source of information concerning archaic qualitative sciences. The eight trigrams and the 64 hexagrams of the I Ching constitute two specific descriptions of thresholds of complexity of the binary harmonic. In Islam there is also the traditional Science of the Sands (Ilm al-Raml) in which another level of the binary harmonic is described. A preliminary study of these three sources suggests that a coherent universal archaic science of qualitative states, based on the binary harmonic, once existed. The scholastic problem is not just to archeologically reconstruct this archaic science, but to make it real, on a practical level, in our own time in terms which are accessible to those, at present, immersed in contemporary quantitative science. A beginning toward this end has been made by T. & D. McKenna in The Invisible Landscape (BIB 667).

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