London School of Economics and Political Science

Waiting for Citizenship

Pragmatics of Belonging of Burundian Refugees in Protracted Exile
The Case of Ulyankulu Settlement, Tanzania

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DECLARATION

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ABSTRACT

To what extent have refugees in Ulyankulu settlement, Tanzania, developed a sense of belonging and *de facto* citizenship through their agency despite government control? This question forms the basis of the research design of this thesis. Refugees have lived in protracted exile in many countries. The aim of this thesis is to assess such a situation by theorising and empirically unravelling refugees' practices of belonging in a rural settlement. While studies within forced migration literature have been mostly empirical, some theoretical ones suggest that camps are spaces of exception that turn refugees into victims without agency, or spaces of myth-making.

Acknowledging these theorisations, this thesis develops a conceptual framework in which, despite control by governments and international agencies, refugees' agency in developing a sense of belonging and claiming *de facto* citizenship is underlined. Ultimately, this understanding also suggests important recommendations for policy.

Taking the case study of Burundian refugees in Tanzania, who arrived in the 1970s, this research is based on qualitative field research methods using techniques such as participant observation and interviews with refugees, Tanzanian citizens, agents of humanitarian organisations and the government in Ulyankulu settlement and Dar es Salaam in 2012. It analyses discourses concerning the naturalisation of Burundian refugees, and it evaluates practices and narratives of first and second generation refugees concerning their experiences of waiting for citizenship, and everyday negotiations of belonging.

This thesis aims at contributing to forced migration literature, and by its considerations of spatiality and temporality to human geography. As a theoretical contribution, it offers a conceptual framework examining the interplay between exclusion from citizenship and a sense of belonging in the space of refugee camps. Empirically, it analyses the various forms of control over refugees, and sheds light on their interactions with refugees' 'pragmatics of belonging' and 'pragmatics of waiting' for citizenship.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

FOREWORD

When I think back to when I started my PhD and trace the process until now, the refugee situation in Tanzania changed dramatically. In 2010, the President of Tanzania emphatically announced the issuing of citizenship certificates to a select number of 749 Burundian refugees, who had come in the 1970s, in Dar es Salaam. In 2011, the naturalisation and relocation policy, which had been formulated in 2007, was put on hold, leaving the rest of the 162,000 refugees in Ulyankulu, Katumba and Mishamo settlements in a state of heightened uncertainty during my time of fieldwork in the year of 2012. They had already registered for Tanzanian citizenship, were referred to as NNTs (Newly Naturalised Tanzanians) by international organisations and had revoked their Burundian citizenship. From being quasi-citizens already, they became liminal, stateless beings in reality. It was not clear to any actor involved when this period of uncertainty would end. After the final submission of my thesis in September 2014, it was then surprising but relieving to see that the President Kikwete had ultimately decided to hand out the long-awaited citizenship certificates to the (former) refugees in the settlements, without requiring them to relocate to other hosting regions in Tanzania. The naturalisation ceremony occurred as a symbolic action on Nyerere Day, 14 October 2014, which marked the 15th Anniversary of the founding father of the nation Mwalimu Julius Nyerere, who was known for welcoming refugees as guests. This decision was first announced by a representative of the United Republic of Tanzania at the 65th session of UNHCR's Executive Committee held in Geneva, 29 September to 3 October 2014 (meetings 676 and 680). The representative stressed that the state would need support to renew the aging infrastructure and socioeconomic institutions in the settlements in order to facilitate the local integration of these refugees. While this decision ended the period of uncertainty for these Burundian refugees in Tanzania, and indeed ended one of the most protracted refugee situations on the African continent, this thesis aims at contributing to understand refugees' every-day lives, motivations and challenges during a period of complete legal uncertainty - a condition that most refugees face at some point or indeed permanently during their time in exile. This thesis therefore does not deal with the final naturalisation and its consequences but with the period that led up to this critical juncture. In hindsight, one could say that by developing a sense of belonging to the Tanzanian nation, the former refugees indeed played an important role in achieving what they were striving for: *de facto* and *de jure* citizenship.

<div style="text-align: right">19 April 2015</div>

ABBREVIATIONS

CCM	Chama cha Mapinduzi (Party of the Revolution)
CHADEMA	Chama cha Demokrasia wa Maendeleo (Party of Democracy and Development)
COSTECH	Commission of Science and Technology
CUF	Civic United Front
DfID	Department for International Development
DED	District Executive Director
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
ECHO	European Commission's Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection department
FRELIMO	Liberation Front of Mozambique
GIZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit GmbH (German Federal Enterprise for International Cooperation)
IRC	Immigration Removal Centres
MHA	Ministry of Home Affairs
NASCIP	National Strategy for Community Integration
NNTs	Newly Naturalised Tanzanians
NPFL	National Patriotic Front of Liberia
PMO–RALG	Prime Minister's Office – Regional Administration and Local Government
PRS	Protracted Refugee Situation
REDESO	Relief to Development Society
REPOA	Policy Research for Development
TANCOSS	Tanzania Comprehensive Solution Strategy
TCRS	Tanganyika Christian Refugee Service
TZS	Tanzanian Shillings
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNHCR	United Nation High Commissioner of Refugees
UPRONA	Parti de l'Unité pour le Progrès Nationale (Union for National Progress)
VETA	Vocational Education and Training Authority

GLOSSARY

Chagga	An ethnic group in the North of Tanzania, living predominantly in Kilimanjaro region
Dada	Sister; term used for relatives and unmarried female friends
Diwani	Ward Representative
Ha	An ethnic group based in Kigoma Region
Halmashauri	District Council
Hutu	An ethnic group in Burundi, predominantly farmers; considered lower social class than Tutsi especially in colonial times
Jadi	Ancestral Tradition
Kabila	Tribe / Ethnic group
Mama	Mother; used to address mothers and married women in general, mostly in combination with the name of the first born child or the last name (clan name) – e.g. 'Mama Neema', 'Mama Mwanga'
Mfasiri	Translator
Mkimbizi	Refugee
M-Pesa	A mobile-banking service offered by Vodacom
Mtafiti	Researcher
Mwanafunzi	Student
Mwenyeji	Insider, somebody belonging to a place
Mwiko	Taboo
Mzungu	White person
Mgeni	Guest or foreigner
Nchi	Country
Ngoma	Tanzanian dance
Nyamwezi	An ethnic group in the North-West of Tanzania, living predominantly in Tabora region
Nanenane	'Eight eight'; national farmers' holiday on August 8th
Pimbwe	An ethnic group based in Rukwa Region
Sabasaba	'Seven seven'; national holiday on July 7th to commemorate the founding of TANU, and (more recently) to celebrate the Dar es Salaam International Trade Fair
Serikali	Government
Shemeji	Sister in law
Sukuma	An ethnic group in the North-West of Tanzania, living predominantly in Mwanza and Tabora regions
Tutsi	An ethnic group in Burundi, predominantly pastoralists; formerly favoured by Belgian colonialists

Uhamiaji	Immigration
Uhuru	Freedom
Ujamaa na Kujitegemea	Socialism and self-reliance – an ideology promoted by President Julius Nyerere after independence in 1962
Ukoo	Clan
Utamaduni	Culture – a term promoted under President Nyerere
Uraia	Citizenship
Kaswa	Centre village of Ulyankulu settlement
Ikonongo	Village in Ulyankulu settlement, in the west of Kaswa

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INTRODUCTION

1.1   Background

"[...] Population movements in response to demographic growth, climatic change and the development of production and trade have always been part of human history. Warfare, conquest, formation of nations and the emergence of states and empires have all led to migrations, both voluntary and forced" (Castles and Miller, 2003: 70). However, the systematic care for refugees by international agencies only started after World War II with the advent of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The organisation, founded in 1950, aimed to help the one million people who still found themselves uprooted from that conflict. While first envisaged as an agency with a three-year mandate, there has been a proliferation of refugee situations since the 1950s, which destined the agency to keep operating until today. Notably in the 1960s, intra-state war in post-colonial settings in Africa produced refugee movements. Since then, conflicts have continued to cause people to leave their homes and flee to another place or country. In 2013, the UNHCR classified 11.7 million refugees as people of concern (UNHCR, 2013). However, what is striking is not the number of refugees, but the duration in which these people remain labelled as 'refugees' and thus are forced to live in camps and settlements. All in all, in 33 developing countries worldwide, situations exist in which a group of more than 25,000 refugees have stayed for at least five consecutive years in the host country, without the possibility of returning to their home countries. They lack rights enjoyed by citizens and other migrants. These situations have been referred to as "protracted refugee situations" (UNHCR, 2006: 107).

Refugee camps and settlements have been established in many countries in Africa, as a result of people fleeing from post-colonial conflicts. Sudanese and Somali refugees in Kenya, Sudanese in Uganda and Sahrawi refugees in Algeria, for example, have stayed in

the host countries for several decades. One of the most protracted situations exists in Tanzania, where Burundians, who fled from ethnic conflict, have stayed in settlements since the 1970s. This first wave of refugees was settled by the Tanzanian government with help of the UNHCR in three rural settlements: Mishamo, Katumba and Ulyankulu. A second wave of Burundian refugees, who came in the 1990s, was hosted in several camps, mainly in the west of the country. Besides Nyarugusu camp, all of these camps are now officially closed and the refugees have returned to Burundi. While in the formerly mentioned protracted situations in other countries there has been no change, in 2007/08 Tanzania proposed a policy of naturalisation and relocation which offered Burundian refugees citizenship, but also forsaw the closure of the settlements and the dispersal of the Burundians within Tanzania – a process that was supposed to be completed by 2014. However, this initiative was put on hold in 2011 and was indefinitely suspended at the time of fieldwork in 2012. The process of local integration through naturalisation was the starting point of interest for this thesis but research questions were eventually adapted according to the policy environment.

Despite the presence of protracted refugee situations, forced migration is a challenging theme to study because it is normally a temporary phenomenon. Changes can occur suddenly and unexpectedly in accordance with government policies, and in relation to newly erupting wars. Possibly this is the reason why much of the literature on the topic is empirical rather than theoretical. While this study principally aims to make a theoretical contribution in order to "make social life intelligible", it also aims to "make it *better*" by pointing towards some recommendations for policy (Gregory, 1994: 10, original emphasis). By carefully contextualising the case of the Burundian refugees in space and time, and by theorising the space of refugee settlements afresh, this research aims at a new framework for understanding and evaluating protracted refugee situations, in light of empirical findings from the case of Ulyankulu settlement (see location of this main field site in Figures 1.1. and 1.2).

Figure 1.1: Map of Tanzania showing Location of Refugee Camps and Settlements
Source: UNHCR (2014k)

This map shows refugee camps and settlements still open in 2014: Ulyankulu (circled in red), Mishamo and Katumba (here: 'Mpanda') settlements for Burundian refugees who arrived in 1972, Nyarugusu camp for Burundi and Congolese refugees arriving in the 1990s and Kanembwa camp, from which refugees are resettled in the USA. Further, the map shows the location of UNHCR offices in the country.

1.2 Policy and Conceptual Gaps

1.2.1 *The policy gap in humanitarian approaches to refugees*

There is a clear gap in policy regarding what should happen to refugees who are stranded in legal limbo in refugee camps for decades. 'Local integration', which the UNHCR envisages as a durable solution next to the options of repatriation and resettlement has only happened in a planned manner in a few cases – and those cases, on the African continent, are limited to refugees of ethnically similar groups to the ones prevailing in the host

Figure 1.2: Map of Tanzania with Regions, Census 2012
Source: National Bureau of Statistics Tanzania (2012)
(Author's illustration with ArcGIS software)

country. A successful case of local integration including citizenship of a camp refugee population on a mass, rather than on an individual scale, is thus far lacking. This is why the Tanzanian case was of considerable interest to the research on forced migration. However, since that the policy was officially on hold during field research in 2012, the focus of interest in this case shifted towards why the policy failed and how people have been dealing with the uncertainty that remained. A number of studies were commissioned by the UNHCR to shed light on some cases of protracted refugee situations[1]. Later the or-

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[1]Liberian refugees in Côte d'Ivoire, Sudanese and Somalis in Kenya, Sierra Leoneans in Guinea, Liberians in Ghana, Sahrawis in Algeria, Sudanese in Uganda and Guatemalans in Mexico (Kuhlman, 2002).

ganisation selected five situations to focus on illustratively[2]. However, the organisations'
conclusions have yet been tentative, stating that "there is no one-size fits all approach to
PRS" (ibid.: 16) and that it will not be easy to "unlock" these situations (cf. ibid.: 28).

1.2.2   *Conceptual gaps in forced migration literature*

Refugees, control and exclusion from citizenship

Conceptually, refugees have often been portrayed as being both victims of violence in their
countries of origin as well as of being subject to host states' and international organisa-
tions' control whilst in refugee camps. At the same time, refugees are often seen by the
host nation and the international community as perpetrators of violence and as threats
to security. In essence, this paradoxical logic explains why states consider it necessary to
control refugees in the first place: camps offer the dual possibility to care for and control
refugees in order to exclude them from citizenship.

   Rather than taking control as a given however, it is necessary to disaggregate various as-
pects of control and its rationales both theoretically and empirically. It will be discussed to
what extent the camp can be said to be a 'space of control' functioning to exclude refugees
from *de jure* citizenship as well as potential processes of *de facto* citizenship. Further, tan-
gible effects of this control on refugees' and Tanzanian citizens' day-to-day lives but also
mitigating and transforming local processes will need to be empirically scrutinised.

Refugees, agency, citizenship, belonging and waiting

While the agency of refugees has been depicted as violent in most refugee settings and in
refugee literature, agency also needs to be conceptualised in terms of building a sense of
belonging in a 'space of agency' within the camp. The literature on forced migration in
general and on refugee camps in particular lacks a discussion about belonging in relation
to both first and second generation refugees. One might take it for granted that second
generation refugees have integrated into the host society to a higher degree than the first
generation, and that they experience less of a longing to go back to their parents' country

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[2]Afghan refugees in Iran and Pakistan, the Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh, Bosnian and Croatian
refugees in Serbia, Burundian refugees in Tanzania and Eritrean refugees in eastern Sudan (Milner and
Loescher, 2011).

of origin. However, in the spatial set-up of a settlement, such integration is assumed and thus might not correspond to reality. This thesis introduces the concept of 'pragmatics of belonging' to show how refugees can become *de facto* citizens. Furthermore, the thesis presents the concept of the 'pragmatics of waiting' to explain how refugees deal with waiting during a time of uncertainty and legal limbo in the space of the camp.

1.3 The Argument

This thesis argues that on the one hand, while treating refugees as legal, spatial and temporal "exceptions" (Agamben, 2005), the state creates a 'space of control' and thereby excludes refugees from citizenship in the refugee camp justified by the claim that refugees are security threats. However, refugees are neither purely perpetrators nor victims. Over time in protracted exile, refugees develop a sense of belonging to the host nation, which I call the 'pragmatics of belonging', in order to reduce uncertainty. This sense is created by feeling at home, by interacting with citizens and by claiming *de facto* citizenship on an eclectic basis. The camp becomes a 'space of agency' in which this *de facto* citizenship is lived day to day. As an inherent feature of living in uncertainty within this space of agency, refugees also enact a 'pragmatics of waiting', which reconceptualises waiting as an instrumental part of everyday life. In this protracted situation, there is also an emergent day-to-day sense of conviviality between some local government officials and refugees. Functioning as a mutual benefit, the rules of the 'space of control' are not always enforced.

1.4   Choice of Research Context

Tanzania has been chosen as a case study for a protracted refugee situation for several reasons.

Main refugee hosting country in Africa

Tanzania has, by far, hosted the most refugees in the history of the Great Lakes region. Reasons for this include the lack of large-scale warfare since the country gained independence in 1962. Furthermore, it offered support to fellow Africans in a spirit of pan-Africanism, and to members of national liberation movements in the 1960s, 70s and 80s. The country has been lauded by the UNHCR as a benevolent host of refugees for many decades. However, a more nuanced look at history shows a trajectory from a welcoming attitude to a more restrictive one over time. For this study, it was envisaged that the changing reputation of the Tanzanian state would offer fertile ground for clarification along with possibly unexpected research results.

Most protracted refugee case in Africa

The situation of the Burundian refugees is also one of the most protracted in Africa and would therefore be a suitable example. Without making claims to generalisability, this case could be a prototype of how such a situation can arise. While this study emphasises the need for contextualising the refugee situation at hand, international organisations such as the UNHCR have promoted universal solutions for refugees. Insights into this case may therefore infer ideas for other such situations – or, indeed, may infer the main idea that a unique solution needs to be found for each protracted case.

Unique, unprecedented case: Mass naturalisation and relocation

Research on forced migration in Tanzania provided unique insight both in place and time, since the recent offer of naturalisation to Burundian refugees currently constitutes the only process of that scale in Africa. It is also the only example that proposes mass relocation and dispersal in a host country as a solution for a protracted refugee situation. The proposal of this research evolved from the initial aim of analysing the implementation

and the effects of the naturalisation process, towards analysing practices, discourses and feelings of refugees, the state and international organisations during a time of uncertainty. The latter was a non-obvious but in itself intriguing turn in the subject of inquiry.

The wider scale: Aftermath of ethnic strife in the Great-Lakes Region

The situation of the Burundian refugees in Tanzania portrays a part of the aftermath of ethnic strife in Burundi. The conflicts between the Hutu and Tutsi in the post-colonial era have left an imprint not only on Rwanda and Burundi but also on neighbouring countries like Tanzania. The Great Lakes region has struggled with various refugee movements, including refugee militarisation, evident for example in the case of Tutsi Rwandese refugees in Uganda (Mamdani, 2001), and Rwandese in the Kivu regions in the Republic of Congo. The situation of refugees in Tanzania, who came as early as the 1970s, is less well documented. On the other hand, there are several seminal works to draw on in relation to refugees in Tanzania (Malkki, 1995a; Sommers, 2000; Turner, 2010); and it is one of the aims of this thesis to assess the situation of the second generation of these refugees.

Personal and practical considerations

In terms of practical feasibility of the study, Tanzania is known to be a peaceful country and research about this country has proliferated in various disciplines during the last decades. However, gaining permission to do research on refugees has become more restrictive. Although it was not clear whether I would be granted access by the Tanzania Commission of Science and Technology (COSTECH) and the Director of Refugee Services of the Ministry of Home Affairs, I took the risk of possibly being rejected to enter the settlements. As an alternative to locating the research in the settlement(s), I originally planned to conduct research with urban refugees instead. Luckily, however, my research project was not rejected.

The choice of Tanzania also had a personal reason – I had spent about a month in the country to do a publically funded cultural exchange between my home city Berlin and Iringa in the southern highlands of Tanzania in 2006. Seven Tanzanian students took part in a reverse programme and came to Berlin in 2007, and a group of students, including me, supported them during that time. Other guests from Tanzania also came to visit Berlin in previous and subsequent years, and my family hosted them. Furthermore, hearing

from volunteers who went to Tanzania to support local NGOs increased my interest in the place. Hence, knowledge about Tanzania, affinity towards and contacts to the place were reasons to locate the study in that country.

1.5 Research Questions

The topic outlined above led to the following research question:

To what extent have refugees in Ulyankulu settlement, Tanzania, developed a sense of *belonging and* de facto *citizenship through their agency despite government control?*

The answer to this question aims to make a contribution to empirical knowledge, and to theory, on the long-term effects of forced migration, on understanding life in refugee camps and on the process of developing a sense of belonging and of becoming citizens of a marginalised group of people. In terms of empirical material, it focuses on a specific rural field site in Tanzania, Ulyankulu settlement, on which there exists little research. Theoretically, this question requires the conceptualisation of notions of belonging, citizenship, waiting, control and agency; and the interactions between these concepts in the given context. Finally, through this in-depth analysis, the question aims to give recommendations of how to deal with protracted refugee situations in the future.

The main research question stated above can only be answered by clarification of some descriptive elements. These include especially historical and spatial ones.

The first question should be:

How has the area of Ulyankulu settlement been governed before and after the arrival of refugees and how has it developed economically?

A local perspective on Ulyankulu settlement before and after the refugees' arrival is important in order to understand the broad transformations of the area in terms of integration into the wider Tanzanian governance and economy. The governance of the settlement elicits on the one hand the extent and ways in which refugees have been excluded from citizenship but also potential ways in which they may have been included in a process of becoming citizens. Economic transformations elicit elements of refugees' agency within the settlement, and the interaction with people and places outside of it. Chapter

4 – using both literature and interview material – will shed light on the question above. This chapter will also deal with the following question:

How has the Government of Tanzania, in collaboration with international organisations, dealt with refugee influxes over time?

An historical elaboration on this question shall clarify especially the changing content of refugee policies and functions of refugee governance over time both in terms of domestic politics and foreign policy. This question will be answered by recourse to secondary literature. The answer to the two questions above serves to contextualise the following question:

What elements of control have been employed to exclude refugees in the settlement from citizenship by the government and international organisations and why; what are the effects of this control and how has it been mitigated and transformed locally?

Material collected via qualitative methods will flesh out details in order to answer this question in Chapter 5. The final part of this thesis emphasises the perspective of the refugees and aims to tackle the question:

In what ways has the settlement offered the possibility for first and second generation refugees to develop a sense of belonging and to claim de facto *citizenship to Tanzania/Ulyankulu?*

Chapter 6 deals with an empirical answer to this question before this study reaches an overall answer to the question and a conclusion to the thesis in Chapter 7.

1.6   Organisation of the Dissertation

This dissertation is divided into eight chapters. This chapter, Chapter 1, forms the introduction to the thesis as a whole. It explained the background and rationale of the study, the problem that was encountered and deemed necessary for further research; and it formulated research questions.

Chapter 2 develops a theoretical framework in order to analyse the situation at hand. Previous theorisations have framed refugee camps either as supportive or as prison-like spaces. Some have focussed on camps as spaces of myth-making or of politicisation. The current analysis is departing from these previous theorisations and maintains that camps

function to exclude refugees from citizenship but they can also offer space to manoeuvre and develop a sense of belonging. This exclusion is supported by the fact that refugees in Africa do not always belong to an ethnicity of the host nation. Camps are sometimes invisibilised or even abandoned by host governments, which can perpetuate the refugees' exclusion. On the other hand, refugees often find ways to deal with the situation in protracted exile – they develop a 'pragmatics of belonging', which consists of three dimensions: a relational one of integrating with the host community, of feeling at home and of claiming citizenship rights. In times of uncertainty, it is argued, refugees engage in a 'pragmatics of waiting', a way of dealing with the suspended time in future-oriented ways.

Chapter 3 spells out the research design and methodology used for this study. It explains the rationale for choosing a qualitative research strategy in Tanzania, and more specifically Dar es Salaam and Ulyankulu as research sites; it discusses the main research methods used for data collection, participant observation and interviews. It also recounts methods and stages of data analysis, detailed research proceedings, and critically assesses the ethics in the field and the positionality of the researcher.

Chapter 4 endeavours to explain the spatial history, economic situation and local governance within and beyond Ulyankulu settlement. Historically, the settlement has been implicated in nation-wide population movements before and after the arrival of refugees. Economically, productivity has risen disproportionately in Ulyankulu settlement compared to the areas around through the labour of the refugees. In terms of governance, the area used to be ruled by local Nyamwezi chiefs before the arrival of refugees. From 1972 the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) and international organisations were in charge of the camp until from 1985 onwards, Ulyankulu was embedded in the local Tanzanian government structure. With the onset of the naturalisation initiative for Burundian refugees, the MHA and the UNHCR renewed their presence in the settlement from 2007 onwards – a period of non-maintenance followed. This chapter also provides an overview on the changes in refugee policy in Tanzania over time since the country's independence. From an open-door policy under President Nyerere, the country introduced more restrictive policies in the 1990s. Naturalisation, proposed in 2007, therefore came as a surprise.

Chapter 5 examines the idea of the camp as a 'space of control', which functions to exclude refugees from citizenship. It shows how refugee policies have excluded refugees from *de jure* citizenship but also how these have hindered them from *de facto* integrating

in the host community. These policies are in tension with processes of citizen-making on the ground. Through the narratives of government officials, one understands that exclusion from citizenship and control are based on concerns with security as well as purity of the nation With respect to Ulyankulu settlement these security concerns, however, are not based on actual higher crime rates than elsewhere in the country. While effects of the control exerted can be unfavourable for the refugees involved, they have also been transformed and mitigated by processes of conviviality.

Chapter 6 shows that while refugees are indeed restricted in their freedom of movement and do not enjoy citizenship rights, they have used their own agency not only to develop the area economically but also to develop a sense of belonging. They have interacted with Tanzanians inside and outside of the settlement, and most of the refugees feel Tanzanian nowadays. Over time, they have developed creative ways of claiming *de facto* citizenship through a 'pragmatics of belonging' and a 'pragmatics of waiting' to reduce uncertainty.

Finally, Chapter 7 concludes by spelling out empirical and theoretical contributions, by formulating tentative recommendations for policy and by introducing some ideas for further research.

2

LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

"Spatialising the camp, understanding how it is constituted and functions spatially, is a way of grounding geopolitics in the everyday: understanding the small moments and acts that negotiate and constitute broader geopolitical architectures in the spaces of the camp and beyond."

— Ramadan (2013)

Hundreds of thousands of refugees today find themselves in protracted refugee situations (PRS). These are defined as a refugee population of 25,000 refugees or more who are in exile for five or more years in a developing country (UNHCR, 2006: 107) – and most of these populations live in camps or rural settlements. These specific situations have arisen due to a complex interplay between host state and state of origin, the refugees, local population and international organisations, most notably the UNHCR.

My analytical framework shows by which mechanisms of control and for what reasons refugees are excluded from *de jure* citizenship but also how they, on the other hand, can develop a sense of belonging and *de facto* citizenship. First, it is necessary to unpack various forms of state control in refugee camps and settlements since they essentially function to exclude refugees from *de jure* citizenship and can hinder forms of *de facto* citizenship as well. However, the camp should not only be seen as a 'space of control' since refugees have dealt with the actual control imposed and have resisted, negotiated and transformed it through their own agency. In this 'space of agency' refugees are often able to both attain a form of *de facto* citizenship seen as a process as well as partial *de jure* citizenship by making claims to certain rights otherwise reserved to citizens. These forms of incipient citizenship can also be supported by local government officials and host community citizens in a rising sense of conviviality, so that the borders between government's policies of exclusion and refugees' attempts to belong to the nation/host community become blurred.

The first part of this chapter shows that in rural refugee camps in Africa, the host state is creating a controlled space, which functions to exclude refugees from *de jure* citizenship and hinders them from attaining *de facto* citizenship as well. Why is naturalisation not normally offered to refugees? Among those in power, there is a deeply-rooted anxiety about newcomers. Exclusion from citizenship is tied to a belief in a notion of citizenship that is contingent on a primordial belonging to the (host) nation. At the outset, the designated spaces of camps and settlements are designed to be 'legible' to the outsider i.e. to central government officials and international organisations' aid workers. This legibility is created in order to control and manage the newly arrived population in physical and social ways. In order to exclude refugees from citizenship over long periods of time, states eventually often invisibilise and abandon refugee settlements. Since refugees are not believed to be part of the nation, the state finds ways to postpone decisions on a permanent legal status and thereby exclude refugees from the citizenry in temporal ways. Elaborating these multiple ways of controlling and excluding refugees from citizenship control expands the debates about the governance of refugee camps, why and how exclusion from citizenship is transformed and maintained over the course of several decades.

The second part of this chapter concerns the refugees' agency in dealing with these problems of state control and exclusion from citizenship in spatial, legal and temporal ways. It is argued that they develop a 'pragmatics of belonging' in order to reduce uncertainty. This has three dimensions: first, refugees often subvert the given spatial structures both within and outside of the camps and settlements and can thereby develop a relational form of belonging to the host community. Second, they can develop a sense of home in the settlement by performing their every-day life tasks there. Third, they may also find ways claim rights without formally holding *de jure* citizenship. By integrating in this way and by developing a feeling of belonging despite the given structures, they become *de facto* citizens. While waiting for citizenship, their time is used in creative ways and the temporal control is thus not felt in a solely restrictive way. It is argued that refugees thereby develop a 'pragmatics of waiting'. Theoretically, this part of the framework contributes to conceptions of refugee agency, citizenship and belonging, as well as on notions of waiting.

Refugees are subjected to being excluded from citizenship in controlled, and sometimes invisibilised, spaces. Through their 'pragmatics of belonging' and 'pragmatics of

waiting', refugees negotiate their belonging and attain *de facto* citizenship while waiting for governmental decisions despite the control exerted.

2.1   Existing Theorisations of the Refugee Camp

In what ways are protracted refugee situations created and lived in camps and settlements? The UNHCR tends to represent settlements as supportive institutions, where people in need can take refuge and receive aid, thanks to generous international donors and the host country. By contrast, some scholars see them as prison-like places where rights to freedom of movement, political rights and also access to education and employment are denied to refugees via a mechanism of control and containment (cf. Kaiser, 2006; Malkki, 1995a). Humanitarianism thereby sees refugees as innocent victims (ibid.) without a past and without political identities. Through the daily practice of caring, the refugees are treated as "bare life", which Agamben terms *zoe* (1998: 1), outside the national order of things without political agency, or *bios* (Agamben, 1998: 1; Turner, 2010). According to Agamben (2005: 24), the camp is the structure in which the "state of exception", as a suspension of the law, is "permanently realised". Exceptions, in this case refugees, are only included in the nation state through their exclusion (cf. Ramadan, 2013).

While an analogy to Agamben's theory of camps is therefore useful in some ways, it is necessary to point out that there are important differences between the concentration camps that were part of the holocaust on Jews during World War II in Germany about which he wrote, and the refugee settlements or camps that are the subject of this analysis. The "state of exception" that Agamben (2005) refers to is Schmitt's (1985) *Ausnahmezustand* (German: state of exception), which applies to the temporary suspension of law in a state due to a military coup, for example. In World War II Germany, however, this state of exception was created voluntarily for a sustained period of time in order to increase Hitler's power. As Agamben (2014: 1) maintains, "the entire Third Reich can be considered as a state of exception which lasted twelve years". Within this "state of exception", the concentration camps paradoxically created an exception within the exception. With relation to contemporary African refugee hosting countries, they are not normally in a "state of exception". Moreover, Agamben (1998) argues that people, as *homines sacres* (sacred men) in concentration camps could on the one hand be killed but on the other they could not be sacrificed – an idea that stems from Roman law. Refugees, by contrast,

can neither be killed nor sacrificed and the camps in place aim to support them and not to extinguish them. Refugee camps can, however, become remote "spaces of invisibility" (Hammond, 2008: 517, see also Section 2.2.2), in which care for refugees is eventually abandoned. Depending on the situation, this can have detrimental effects on the refugee population. Gregory (2006) furthermore maintains in relation to Guantánamo Bay, where Agamben (2005: 87) detects the "maximum worldwide deployment" of the state of exception, Agamben's theory does not take into account international law nor does it give space to political struggle or resistance. If the "Sovereign is he who decides the exception" as Carl Schmitt (1985: 5) explained, the sovereign in the case of refugee camps is not only the host state but international agencies and policies as well, which influence it. As this thesis shows, the creation of a "space of exception" is not the end but the starting point of analysis, which needs to consider political struggle within it.

In the case of protracted refugee situations in Tanzania, it is adequate to say that the law applied to citizens is suspended when it comes to refugees, as maintained above. However, is the camp only a "space of exception"? What kind of power is exercised within it; in what way is life political within the camp? According to Agamben (1998: 166), in the case of Germany during World War II, the most absolute *conditio inhumana* that has ever existed on earth was realised. This was possible due to the general state of exception in the Third Reich but also due to the secluded and fenced spatiality of the camps. If borders in today's refugee settlements in Africa are not fixed or closed, how is the "space of exception" enforced and how do refugees and local Tanzanians react to it? Agamben's (1998) "space of exception" does not deal with the question of how people inside of it relate to people outside, how people relate to the state or international organisations within it and how they may be influenced by politics in other countries.

Related to a more contemporary issue, Agamben (2014) discusses state power in Athens, arguing that nowadays state violence and control is sanctioned by security reasons that constitute a permanent technology of government – for example with reference to biometric and genetic data collection of citizens. Furthermore, he argues that there is a paradoxical convergence today of an absolutely liberal paradigm in the economy with an unprecedented and equally absolute paradigm of state and police control. The state increases control because it aims to deal with effects and not with causes. The state thereby moved from the sovereign state, the *Ancien Regime*, towards a disciplinary state (Foucault, 1979) and finally towards a control state. Control is more relevant in this context

than discipline since management and control do not necessarily coincide with order and discipline (Agamben, 2014: 6). Concerning refugees, security is often the main reason to extend state and police control to refugees (cf. Daley, 1991; Turner, 2010). The state indeed aims to control the refugee influx as a consequence of warfare in another country – the causes are not and cannot be dealt with by the host state. In the following Sections (2.2.1 – 2.2.4), it will be discussed how and why, in theory, the legal state of exception is enforced by various control measures over the refugees by the government and humanitarian actors. These, it is argued, function to exclude refugees from citizenship.

It should not be assumed that power in camps is only exercised by the state and humanitarian agencies. In some cases refugee camps have been "security islands", referring to the fact that Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon are not under Lebanese state authorities but are ruled by the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) legitimised by the 1969 Cairo Agreement (Ramadan, 2009b: 157-159). In Africa, similar examples exist, for example the Mozambiquan camps in Tanzania in the 1960s and 70s, which harboured and were controlled by the Liberation Front of Mozambique (FRELIMO) (see also Section 4.2.2 below). However, in most refugee camps in Africa a basic governmental structure is given by the host state and international organisations. As will be seen in Chapters 5 and 6 below, the nature and extent of control can vary considerably over time even within one settlement.

Emphasising the relationship between refugees and host communities, with relation to Palestinian refugees, Ramadan (2008) suggests that camps can also be seen as spaces of hospitality, in which refugees are hosted until they return home but in which refugees can also become hosts themselves. This occurred when Lebanese displaced citizens from the war between Israel and Hizbullah in 2006 moved to the Palestinian refugees camps in southern Lebanon, becoming "the guests' guests" (ibid.: 662). As a consequence, the refugees could negotiate the terms of hospitality but, as Ramadan maintains, the hospitality offered to the refugees by Lebanon was relatively circumscribed whereas the hospitality offered to the Lebanese guests was relatively generous (ibid.: 663). Even though some refugee camps in Africa have been placed in remote areas, refugees have over time often developed contact with the surrounding societies, which have either passively or actively participated in 'hosting' the refugees. Positive interactions with the host society are crucial for successful integration, as examples show (see Sections 2.3.1 below). Below, it will be argued that these interactions with the host community also serve to build a

sense of belonging to the host nation amongst refugees. In general, one can say that successful cases of refugee integration have been invisibilised in forced migration literature (Polzer, 2008). One reason for this is that where refugees had actually obtained citizenship (as happened with the Rwandans in Tanzania) many decided to repatriate (Gasarasi, 1990) and could thus not be researched. Furthermore, self-settled refugees in Africa (e.g. Malkki, 1995a; Sommers, 2000) are not seen as cases of 'local integration' since most of them are undocumented or work illegally.

Some authors have also discussed camps as spaces of identity preservation or formation. Due to the secluded nature of the camps they studied, they focus more on dynamics of identity formation between refugees in camps as well as their relationship to Burundi, and less between refugees and their hosts. Malkki, for example, argues that refugees in Mishamo settlement in Tanzania created standardised versions of history in order to come to terms with their own violent pasts (Malkki, 1995a). Refugees also did so in everyday ways, such as through gossip and rumours (Turner, 2010). Both Turner (ibid.) and Malkki (1995a) thus looked at how refugees relate to the past conflict in Burundi, and how their own accounts made them who they were. Malkki (1995a: 153) argues that self-settled refugees in towns (near Kigoma in Tanzania) have not created such mythico-histories but rather employed a "pragmatics of identity" in order to adjust to their new lives in exile (see below, Section 2.3.1).

With reference to Tanzania, Turner (2010) maintains the exceptional space of the camp is not only outside of the law of all nation states but also linked to a reality inside Burundi. Turner (2010) argues that refugees react to changes in the political field in Burundi. The concept of political field is attributed to Bourdieu (Bourdieu and Thompson, 1991), who contends that a political field is like a game in which politicians gain a 'practical sense' and learn how to comply with unwritten rules of the political field in which they are positioned strategically (cf. Turner, 2010: 110). Turner (ibid.) argues that the camp of his research was divided by invisible lines – refugees in fact built emerging political spaces of Lukole A and Lukole B as political agents. In these spaces, different political factions within the camp struggled to define which version of the past should dominate. Semi-educated young men acted as political entrepreneurs, who combatted the depoliticised space of the camp that the humanitarian regime imposed on them. They established networks through political alliances and party allegiance, linked to Burundi. The politics of the camp in Turner's account in Lukole in the 1990s mark a contrast with Malkki's

research in Mishamo settlement in the 1980s. As Turner (2010) maintains, the population in refugee camps can become hyperpoliticised – in relation to politics in the home country – and non-political – by the imposed rules of humanitarian agencies in the host state – at once. Turner (2010: 18) also argues that refugee camps are a parenthesis in time and place, a "waiting room" where refugees are meant to kill time before returning to "normality". He relates this experience to a suspension in time "between the past of one's memories in Burundi – sweet as well as bitter – and one's dreams of a future Burundi" (ibid.). Along similar lines, Ramadan (2009a) refers to camps as spaces of identity formation and preservation, in which a sense of Palestinian identity is produced and reproduced, as temporary spaces drawing meaning of a time-space from their country of origin (Ramadan, 2010).

Considering these theorisations, in the third part of this chapter it will be discussed how refugees, in various generations, are not apolitical beings but are in fact in a 'space of agency', in which they challenge the spatiality and temporality that constitute the camp and develop a sense of belonging and *de facto* citizenship.

2.2 Exclusion from Citizenship in a 'Space of Control'

2.2.1 *Refugees' exclusion from citizenship and spatial legibility*

As mentioned above, in Agamben's view, camps (and settlements) are spaces of exception, in which the law is suspended. In these controlled spaces, refugees are excluded from *de jure* citizenship of the host nation. The *de jure* citizenship referred to here is "a status bestowed on those who are full members of a community. All who possess the status are equal with respect to the rights and duties with which the status is endowed" (Marshall, 1983 [1950]: 253). Following Marshall, the most common interpretation of that political community remains the nation-state (Lazar, 2013: 12). However, in early modern Europe the point of reference was the city, and today some of the most relevant political communities operate on a supra-national scale (ibid.). Recently, in new analyses of the 'right to the city', originally formulated by Lefebvre (1968), the city has re-emerged as a focal point for citizenship. People can have multiple and overlapping forms of citizenship due to membership in various scales of community (such as citiy and nation-state). These mul-

tiple forms denaturalise the automatic association of citizenship with the nation-state. Marshall's liberal *de jure* formulation of citizenship based on individual rights has been challenged in a number of ways. Citizenship, as Aristotle maintained, is not only a formal status but a membership, associated with a "set of practices associated with participation in politics." Furthermore, he argued that political subjectivity cannot be assumed to exist but is something that must be created (ibid.: 2). Therefore, following Ong's formulation (1996: 737), citizenship is both a "process of self-making and being-made", i.e. a process showing how the state (or the community in question) makes citizens and how people make claims of the state (or community). This process can be called *de facto* citizenship. One way for the state to make citizens is through schooling: national schooling systems have indeed long been recognised as key institutions for the development of national identity and civic commitment (Gellner, 1983). Another way is taxing the citizens. However, the processes of subject construction are not only top-down – citizens' and non-citizens' agency is often used to claim citizenship or to claim 'better' citizenship (Lazar, 2013: 11). An example of such agency are the rights to housing and land titles in peripheral neighbourhoods of Sao Paolo claimed by residents in a process of 'insurgent democratic citizenship' (Holston, 2008). Holston (ibid.) argues that differential and contradictory realisations of citizenship are a global phenomenon.

In fact, the use of *de jure* citizenship in the host state as the ultimate solution in African countries has so far been limited since the practice of granting it was often only promoted where there were pre-existing cultural or ethnic affinities (Long, 2010). Due to their cultural affinities, 3,000 Somali Bantu refugees were granted citizenship in Tanzania in 2003 (UNHCR, 2010b), Angolans in Namibia used to be privileged through their refugee status in contrast to forced migrants with other nationalities, who are merely asylum seekers,[1] and 400 Sierra Leonean refugees were assisted to integrate in urban areas in Guinea (Fielden, 2008)[2].

The question remains how and why host states exclude refugees from *de jure* and even from *de facto* citizenship. By putting refugees in camps and settlements, a border is created, which constitutes the separation line not only between states and geographical spaces but also between the 'us' and 'them', the 'here' and 'there', 'insiders' and 'outsiders'

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[1] In 2012, however, the Angolan refugees' status in Namibia ceased (UNHCR, 2013).

[2] A table in Annex 1 summarises collected information on the state of local integration of refugees, their current location in camps and settlements and their countries of origin and destination for selected African countries.

(Newman, 2006), as well as between citizens and refugees. Depending on how well po-
liced or how porous this border is in practice, refugees are excluded not only from *de jure*
but potentially also from *de facto* citizenship as a process of self-making. The reason for
this is that such a border can hinder them from interacting and integrating with the host
community.

The border between refugees and citizens is created by the assumption that refugees
in general stay only for a limited amount of time. They are not awarded the individual
option of attaining citizenship as other immigrants are granted. Even their children, who
are born in the host country, are treated like exceptions and are normally not allowed to
naturalise. This is the case even in countries like Tanzania where citizenship is normally
purely given on the basis of being born on the soil (*'jus soli'*) in comparison to countries
that grant citizenship by descent (*'jus sanguinis'*) (Manby, 2010). Only in a few countries
like Senegal, Mozambique and South Africa individual applications for naturalisation
by refugees are permitted (Manby, 2010). Due to the temporary nature of the refugee
status, the idea of granting of citizenship seems at first unnecessary and paradoxical,
which might be the reason for not automatically including refugees in general migration
laws.

In a setting where refugees live in peace for several decades, are self-sufficient and can-
not return home – what is the rationale for not granting them citizenship? Xenophobic
attitudes towards refugees and their children could go back to a more general hostility
between 'natives' and 'settlers'. As Mamdani (2001) maintains, most histories of geno-
cide go back to a struggle between natives and settlers: first, the genocidal impulse of
the native by the settler, for instance colonial violence, and second the native impulse to
eliminate the settler. The reasons for the struggle between natives and settlers are dif-
ferentiated in various contexts. With relation to refugees in Africa, state actors fear to
naturalise refugees and their children due to a belief in an essentialised notion of identity,
in which belonging and loyalty can only be expressed to one nation, or more broadly a
"fixed home" in one place (Geschiere, 2009: 2-6). This essentialised vision of identity is
based on a theoretical framework, which takes the nation state as the main unit of anal-
ysis. Migrants are seen as a threat to the nation-building process within this framework.
According to Wimmer and Glick-Schiller (2002), modern nationalism fuses four different
notions of people-hood that had developed separately: the people as a sovereign entity,
which exercises political power by means of democracy; the people as citizens of a state

holding equal legal rights; the people as a group of solidarity, like an extended family, and the people as an ethnic community united through common destiny and shared culture. The problem for migrants and refugees is that citizenship is contingent on belonging to the nation, which, in Africa, often also includes belonging to certain recognised ethnic communities within the nation. Citizenship becomes conflated with nationality and ultimately with (local/ethnic) notions of belonging. A politics of belonging resurged in the recent emphasis on autochthony (Geschiere, 2009: 2), rooted-ness in the soil, promoted by ethnic groups or the state in various African countries. In fact, by claiming that certain groups and individuals 'do not belong', they were discriminated against and even had their citizenship taken away – for example as experienced by Northerners in Cote d'Ivoire and Asians in Uganda (Manby, 2009).

Wimmer and Glick-Schiller (2002: 302-308) criticise this view as "methodological nationalism", in which policy-makers seem to take national discourses, agendas, loyalties and histories for granted without problematising them in sufficient depth. The solutions currently propagated for refugees as well as their children, I argue, rule out imminent processes of belonging and ignore local ways of living *de facto* citizenship by the 'refugees' themselves (as discussed in Section 2.2.1). Since refugees are seen as problematic for the concept of nationalism, they are also not allowed to be involved in politics in the host country. If at all, they have been allowed to assume some responsibility within camps and settlements – an extreme case constitutes the rule of the PLO in camps in Lebanon (Ramadan, 2008). In Tanzania, for example, refugees have been in charge of electing village leaders, who have to report to the settlement officer. In literature on other countries such as Côte d'Ivoire and Uganda, refugee leaders are mentioned as well but they are not institutionalised as in Tanzania (Kuhlmann, 2002; Kaiser, 2006 and 2010).

While excluding refugees from citizenship, states take various measures to care and control refugees within settlements from the outset of choosing these designated spaces. The design of camps and rural refugee settlements is reminiscent of what Scott (1998) explains in relation to large-scale social engineering projects, such as in Soviet collectivisation projects and the *ujamaa* village campaigns under President Nyerere in Tanzania. In these cases, society in these spaces was made "legible" by (1), a belief in a rational design or social order related to high modernist ideology (2), a coercive authoritarian state (3) and a civil society which lacks the capacity to resist such plans (4) have led to "a full-fledged environmental and economic disaster" (ibid.: 4). In many camps and settlements,

these points, especially the first three, can be applied. Tanzania's rural refugee settlements were built at the same time as Nyerere's *ujamaa* villages and a similar logic pertains to them. However, in the refugee settlements, a central field for communal activities was not planned and plots for cultivation have varied in size across settlements. Refugee settlements were built in different designs – according to evolving experience with refugee settlements (Armstrong, 1990). Speaking of the Tanzanian context, refugee settlements were made "legible" by instructing refugees to live in a grid-like pattern, which was either been arranged in a nucleated or clustered form, a linear grid pattern or a modular grid (Armstrong, 1990). Each of these forms is understandable for outsiders and allows easy access for the allocation of goods and services, confirming Scott's first point above (ibid.). Oftentimes, districts and regions were chosen, where refugee settlements had already lived previously, since local administration was already familiar in dealing with them (ibid.). Not all settlements in Africa conform to a strict rational design though: Ugandan refugee settlements, for example, have been more spread out without an underlying grid-structure (Payne, 2006). Within Tanzanian settlements, the *society* was made "legible" (Scott, 1998) by grouping people of the same nationality together (Armstrong, 1990). In Uganda, by contrast, some settlements allowed a mix of ethnicities (Payne, 2006). According to Payne (ibid.), this was not advantageous since people avoided interacting across ethnicities. Camps and settlements' structures do seem to support a rational order, which stems from a fear of losing control as it is manifested in violence and chaos. This fear is not entirely unfounded as the many cases of violence and refugee militarisation have shown (see above; Bariagaber, 2006; Turner, 2010; Mogire, 2011).

The state and international agencies thus do operate in an authoritative or paternalistic way (compare Harrell-Bond, 1985): they decide upon where refugees live and how much land they obtain, what types of houses they can establish, who else can live in the settlement, whether and how they can leave the settlement (e.g. only with permits), when they are supposed to repatriate or when a settlement is closed. Although international agencies and the state do often struggle over these questions (e.g. about plot size, see Payne, 2006), the outcome for refugees is one of control. Especially before reaching self-reliance, humanitarian actors reduce refugees to innocent victims (Turner, 2010), who are in a vulnerable state and thus less likely to resist authoritative plans.

2.2.2 *Exclusion from citizenship by invisibilisation and abandonment*

As a control measure in order to exclude refugees from *de jure* citizenship and from belonging to the host nation over long periods of time, they are not only put in refugee camps but are also often invisibilised as a group. Hereby, it is important not only to discuss who or what is invisible but invisible to whom, in what ways and why (Polzer and Hammond, 2008). Invisibility is essentially relational and its impacts depend on the power relations and interests between those who see and those who (not) to be seen (ibid.). Those in power can decide who receives resources, who has the legitimacy to make their voices heard, or who can be harmed or ignored without consequences.

One can note that, on the one hand, once refugees have arrived in the host country, their continued labelling and visibility as refugees is facilitated by keeping them in spatially segregated controlled places, in refugee camps or settlements. Governments and international agencies welcome such settlements because they increase refugee visibility, which attracts foreign aid and helps with claims of burden sharing (Kaiser, 2006: 598). Settlements also help overcome problems of logistics and distribution of aid since refugees are concentrated in a limited space (Bariagaber, 2006). While visibility in camps and settlements is an advantage for refugees and the government alike, it also encourages a situation in which control is possible (see discussion on 'legibility' above), and it is not necessarily a route to empowerment (Polzer and Hammond, 2008).

On the other hand, refugees can become increasingly invisible since camps are normally located in isolated, rural areas at a reasonable distance, e.g. about 50 km, away from the border to be eligible for UNHCR assistance (Bariagaber, 2006). The main reason cited for choosing remote sites is to ensure the refugees' own security but these locations can also function to invisibilise them. Furthermore, it has been argued that when refugees live in camps, competition with the local community is avoided (Mupedziswa, 1993). Furthermore, settlements decrease the 'risk' that refugee populations will be indistinguishable from the host population through integration, failing to repatriate when conditions change in the home country. Such refugee settlements can move from being invisible to being abandoned in cases where the state or other institutions are not present or powerful enough to 'see' all aspects of social life, or do not consider these aspects important enough to regulate (Scott, 1998, cited in Polzer and Hammond, 2008). While such abandonment can reduce state control and offer space for freedom of movement and

claiming *de facto* citizenship to the refugees, it does not reverse the lack of legal status. Instead of being an unintended consequence, invisibilty can also be a deliberate attempt to exclude refugees from certain rights because they do not fit into the legal categories used to define inclusion (Polzer and Hammond, 2008).

There are important differences but also similarities between camps and settlements. In case of an emergency, the first response by the UNHCR is to build a 'care-and-maintenance' camp, offering basic food supplies as well as health care and sometimes education to the people concerned. This type of camp is visible from the outside. Food and other supplies are sometimes flown in by an air-lift to the people in need (such as to the displaced Sudanese in Chad). A refugee camp aims at humanitarian short-term emergency relief. The shelter or refuge that the displaced people find here often consists of tents; more permanent structures are normally forbidden (cf. Sanyal, 2011). Some African governments (e.g. Uganda, Zambia, Ghana and Tanzania) have designed more permanent options of settlement. Within large rural areas, they have given refugees plots of land to cultivate in order to reach self-sufficiency. As acknowledged at UNHCR's Ex-Com 2004, a 'self-reliance strategy' (SRS) fits into UNHCR's wider global strategy of Development Assistance to Refugees (DAR). SRS is defined by the UNHCR as a situation where refugees are enabled "to gain the economic and social ability to meet essential needs on a sustainable and dignified basis" (UNHCR, 2005: 3). In the long term, this option is cheaper than care-and-maintenance camps (Armstrong, 1990). The 'settlement option' has been considered where land was abundantly available and where repatriation could not be carried out speedily (Payne, 2006). While the main difference between camp and settlement is the possibility of self-reliance for refugees in settlements, a lack of human rights, i.e. freedom of movement and citizenship, is present in both cases.

The danger especially in this variant is that self-reliance is seen as a solution in itself – refugees, who are continuously subject to restrictions on freedom of movement and lack citizenship rights, are easily forgotten and invisibilised after reaching that stage. In this case, invisibilisation relates to the state, which has the power to see but does not choose to see those who lack the power to demand or be seen (cf. Polzer and Hammond, 2008). Refugees may, however, be complicit in their own invisibilisation (ibid.). Crisp and Jacobsen (2008) maintain that refugees often create camp-like settlements themselves before humanitarian actors enter the scene for reasons of safety. Some authors also note (e.g. Bascom, 1998) that rural refugees do welcome such settlements because they allow

them to maintain their social practices and hierarchies during exile, and minimise the sense of loss associated with displacement. Furthermore, refugees may seek invisibility where they hide and obscure activities that the state prohibits. They may hide in spaces outside refugee camps or settlements that are normally not accessible to them as non-citizens. Such was the case with refugees in Dar es Salaam who constantly lived in fear of being discovered since they did not possess official work permits (Sommers, 2000). Here they used their invisibility as a shield since they lacked legal protection. As Polzer and Hammond (2008) point out, however, refugees can also subvert or resist their invisibility.

Invisibility can be used by the host state to hide the problem of harbouring populations on state territory, who are excluded from *de jure* citizenship. At the same time, the remote spatiality, lack of support and protection can also function to rule out any inclusion in society in terms of *de facto* citizenship. However, from the perspective of refugees, invisibility can also serve to attain inclusion in the nation, both in terms of *de jure* citizenship as claims-making and *de facto* citizenship as a process. The way how refugees have been invisibilised by the government and international actors, and how refugees have used and/or subverted their invisibility will be further substantiated below and in the following chapters.

2.2.3 *Creation of ethnicities, the exclusion from national belonging and citizenship of refugees in Tanzania*

In contrast to primordialist and instrumentalist accounts of ethnicity, in which ethnicity or tribes are perceived as 'given' or as a false consciousness by self-interested elites, a constructivist approach dominates among scholars of African studies. They see ethnic groups as socially constructed imagined communities (Anderson, 1983; Lynch, 2013). With reference to Tanzania, the Swahili word for 'tribe' or 'ethnic group', which is still used today, is *kabila*. This term signifies a people with the same culture, i.e. the same ancestral traditions or *jadi,* the same language and usually some kind of social organisation.[3] This organisation is based on clans (*koo*, pl.; *ukoo*, sg.), which in turn builds on kinship ties. Clans can differ in their taboos or *mwiko* (Jerman, 1997). These *kabila* are labelled according to varying principles: they can denote a general location, an activity

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[3] This was not always the case in pre-colonial times (Jerman 1997).

or a religious affiliation. The different *kabila* are part of an *nchi* (land), which means a social space that comprised people with the same ethnic consciousness.

An *nchi* did not refer to a territory with borders in pre-colonial times. Under colonialism, however, a new state system was introduced, which contrasted with local conceptualisations. Under German colonialism (1886-1916) political and administrative boundaries acquired significance and ethnic maps included new ethnic categories (Jerman, 1997: 61). The German colonialists invoked a system with 19 civil districts (for example Tabora), two military districts (Iringa, Mahenge), and three provinces or residencies (Ruanda, Urundi and Bukoba). A policy of racial discrimination divided the people into 'whites' and 'coloureds'. Coloureds in turn included 'natives' and 'non-natives'. This principle of 'divide and rule' of the people was supposed to 'maintain order' in the districts. Information on the different tribes residing in the districts was coded in a system citing various characteristics in a colonial handbook. During this time, Swahili was adopted as the administrative language. The education policy favoured Swahili at the expense of the vernaculars (ibid.: 209). Under British colonialism (1920-1961), some functions in the administrative system changed and some ethnicities were created or redefined (Iliffe, 1979).

According to Iliffe (1979) Tanzania comprises about 120 tribes or ethnicities. However, a map of 1958, aiming to show the ethnic situation on the territory in the end of the 1800s, included only 40 "ethnic groups" (Jerman, 1997). In the Census of 1931, the number of "tribes" amounted to 137 in total, whereas in the Census of 1948 it dropped to about 120 tribes – a number, which corresponds to the figure cited above. The last census recording ethnicity was conducted in 1967 after independence.

The number of reported ethnicities on Tanzanian territory has thus fluctuated over time, which reflects processes of redefining ethnicities by the people themselves. In fact, in several African countries' histories, immigrant groups have changed their collective ethnic identity, based on a re-interpretation of their histories (Lynch, 2013), or after an emancipatory struggle to belong to the nation (Hahonou, 2011). These kinds of redefinitions have occurred in Tanzania as well, where people of different foreign ethnicities have become part of the Tanzanian nation (e.g. slaves from Burundi in Chief Mirambo's kingdom or a group of Somali refugees (UNHCR, 2010b)).

After independence in 1962, President Nyerere contributed to decreasing the power of ethnic demarcations by using state administrators to rule locally, instead of chiefs. Forced

villagisation and the strengthening of Swahili as a common language further amalgamated ethnic differences within the Tanzanian nation (Green, 2011). Nyerere's party, the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU), which was born in July 1954, took *uhuru* (freedom) from British rule as its primary objective. It stressed national unity at the expense of African unity (Jerman, 1997: 258).

The created national unity means that some ethnicities might never become part of the nation since they do not belong to what Wimmer (2006: 336) calls the ethnonational core in the nation state. As Wimmer (ibid.) maintains, analytical horizons often stop at what happens within the borders of a national state, obscuring the process of boundary-making and its exclusionary nature towards ethnic groups who are seen as not belonging the core[4]. According to that exclusionary logic, the main ethnic groups from Tanzania's neighbouring countries, such as the Kikuyu, Luo and Kalenjin in Kenya, as well as the Hutu and Tutsi from Rwanda and Burundi are seen as belonging to other nations. These ethnicities are considered to be alien to the Tanzanian nation, even though the monarchy of Burundi, for example, used to be part of previous colonial territories, i.e. German East Africa in the late 19th century (Austen, 1969). Furthermore, having been implicated in war, these ethnicities are feared due to their "violent subjectivities" (Das *et al.*, 2000). The ideas of exclusionary ethnicities and of violent subjectivities influence the construction of Hutu refugees as different, even where they have settled in the host country for generations.

In Tanzania, citizenship can be understood in terms of Yuval-Davis' (1999) notion of the 'multi-layered citizen', which explains that people's rights and obligations towards the state are mediated and often dependent on their membership of an ethnic, racial, religious or regional collectivity. As Manby (2009: 22) says, belonging and the right (or lack of it) to make claims on any particular community "go far beyond the strictly legal or official, and operate at local and regional as well as national levels, and in terms of larger units as well (...) Individuals and communities at the margins of African states may find these structures far more important – for good or ill – than the state itself". According to Mamdani (1996), the creation of ethnicities encouraged a two-tier conception of citizenship that distinguished between national and local citizenship, wherein understandings of who is really 'local' tied the relevant demos with a spatially fixed ethnos. In Tanzania,

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[4]The primary question discussed here is not whether nations are modern inventions (Gellner, 1983) or rather rest on pre-modern ethnic foundations (Smith, 1981). The focus here lies on the effect of the creation of a nation state on those who are excluded from it.

however, possibly due to President Nyerere's villagisation policies, ethnicities nowadays are only loosely fixed spatially and belonging to one ethnicity can change through inter-marriage and population movements. While Tanzanian local and national citizenship are compatible in this context, it is difficult for refugees to achieve multi-layered citizenship since they lack the local belonging to a Tanzanian ethnic group.

2.2.4 *The camp as waiting room: temporal control*

Refugees are not only legally and spatially excluded from citizenship, waiting for the outcome of government decisions can also be seen as a temporal way of suspending the rule of law applied to citizens. Although time and space should be thought together and not be separated (Massey, 2005), temporal ways of exerting control deserve a separate mention. Indeed, most refugees find themselves in a waiting situation – either they wait for an improvement of the situation in the home country or they are waiting for decisions by the host government on their repatriation, resettlement or local integration, for example by naturalisation.

Bourdieu (2000: 228) explains the link between time and power in his book *Pascalian Meditations*: "it follows that the art of 'taking one's time', of 'letting time take its time', as Cervantes puts it, of making people wait, of delaying without destroying hope, of adjourning without totally disappointing, which would have the effect of killing the waiting itself, is an integral part of the exercise of power". Bourdieu (ibid.) continues, "[W]aiting is one of the privileged ways of experiencing the effect of power, and the link between time and power – and one would need to catalogue, and analyse, all the behaviours associated with the exercise of power over other people's time both on the side of the powerful (adjourning, deferring, delaying, raising false hopes, or, conversely, rushing, taking by surprise) and on the side of the 'patient' as they say in the medical universe, one of the sites par excellence of anxious, powerless waiting." While Bourdieu is referring to different actors in power, such as teachers, professors, doctors and government officials, waiting in a protracted refugee situation is the effect of the state controlling the refugees' time.

As Bourdieu (2000) suggests, both the practices of delaying and adjourning on the side of the powerful, i.e. the central state and international organisations, as well as the effects of waiting on refugees should be analysed. How and why does the state make refugees

wait? I argue that bureaucracy can have unintended side effects (cf. Ferguson, 1990) and that the refugees' plight might simply not be a priority of the state – leading to *slow* decision-making. Furthermore, sometimes state actors make decisions '*too fast*', which are publically announced and later questioned by other state (and non-state) actors. Disagreements between different powerful actors as well as changing political and economic priorities may thus lead to a situation of waiting on the side of the subjects. Finally, however, especially considering the reluctance of granting citizenship, the state is intentionally adjourning decisions of integration. It is this adjourning, which leads to the impasse of the many protracted refugee situations today. In contrast to Turner's (2010: 18) conception of the camp as "waiting room" (see above), refugees are seen here not as waiting for normality in the home country (i.e. Burundi). They are waiting for the future as citizens, a future most probably realised in the host state.

2.3 Pragmatics of Belonging and Waiting within and beyond the Camp as a 'Space of Agency'

Despite refugees' exclusion from 'ordinary' spatialities, temporalities and lack of citizenship, they are not really stripped of all agency. While Turner (2010) maintains that camps produce 'bare life' and constitute spaces of exception, he argues that refugees themselves manoeuvred in this temporary space, and that they created pockets of sovereign power outside the reach of the state or international organisations. They were not paralysed by the various attempts of control made. The UNHCR, he maintains, never succeeded in creating apolitical beings and history and politics would "strike back" (Turner, 2010: 9). Furthermore, he argues that the breakdown of class, gender and age hierarchies produced a liberating space for some groups and an 'amoral' space of opportunities; and that they were constantly working on constructing their own political subjectivies (ibid.). Ramadan similarly (2013: 71) argues, "far from producing silenced and disempowered *homines sacri* in Agamben's terms, the camps have proven to be active arenas of agency in which refugees organise and resist their marginalisation, in military and far more mundane ways".

An agent, as consistent with practice theory, is here seen as a body/mind, who "carries" and "carries out" social practices, which make up the social world (Reckwitz, 2002: 252).

Furthermore, an agent is seen as a person who can define his or her life choices and pursue their own goals, even in the face of opposition from others (Kabeer, 1999). In order to achieve these goals, the person will also need the resources necessary to carry them out. Agency can be unconscious or intentional, in which the agent has direct control over her or his behaviour. Agency can refer to decision-making but also to negotiation, deception, subversion and resistance; and it can be individual or collective (ibid.; Scott, 1985). As will be shown in the empirical analysis in Chapters 5, 6 and 7, agency on the side of refugees can be in resistance to the state but it can also work with the state either overtly or in a hidden way. This conception of agency is thus multifaceted. Another form of agency is "conviviality" following Nyamnjoh (2007: 73), who uses the term as denoting a spirit of collaboration and togetherness between the state and individuals or particular groups. As will be shown in Chapter 5, in defiance of the various officially enforced ways of control, a degree of conviviality between refugees, local Tanzanians and some government officials has been playing an important role in the negotiation of life in the settlement.

In the following it will be explained in which ways refugees can act as agents to create a pragmatic sense of belonging by overcoming spatial restrictions, by familiarising themselves with their surroundings and interaction with hosts, and by claiming *de facto* citizenship rights. Refugees have also been agents in terms of transforming the space around them to overcome the 'suspension' in time that marks the idea of a refugee camp.

2.3.1 *'Pragmatics of belonging' and claiming* de facto *citizenship*

While reaching self-sufficiency, refugees can attain a high degree of integration in the host region in part by eroding the governments' provisions of care and control. The host population, i.e. the citizens living around the settlement, are usually not isolated from it but have a lively interaction (cf. Whitaker, 1999; Landau, 2001). Integration occurs from both sides: citizens from adjacent places come to settlements and refugees go to places outside.

Malkki (1995a: 4) explains that displacement and deterritorialisation in the contemporary order of nations presents at least two logical possibilities. The first is that the liminal collectivity of refugees tries to make itself "fit" into the overarching national or-

der, by becoming a "nation" like others. One of their main concerns was purity of their nation. Refugees in Mishamo refugee camp in the 1980s heroised a single collective identity, a Hutu nation in Tanzania. This can also imply a diasporic sense of belonging to the nation of the country of origin. The second possibility entailed an insistence on another order to liminality, a refusal to be fixed within one and only one national or categorical identity, with only one historical trajectory. Malkki (ibid.: 153) calls this subversion of identification the "pragmatics of identity". Among the town refugees in Kigoma, the ability to "lose" one's identity and to move through categories was for many a form of social freedom and even security.

However, there is at least one other, third, possibility: a claims-making on the state and to membership of the host nation as a form of agency, which I call the 'pragmatics of belonging'. This does not constitute a subversion or refusal of identity but in fact identification or an emerging feeling of belonging to the host community and/or the host nation. Belonging in this sense is not a noun-verb, an end-state of group affiliation but an unfinished process, which changes over time.

I argue that this feeling of belonging comes about by at least three dimensions: a relational dimension of interacting with the host community, i.e. by gaining a degree of trust (Calhoun, 2003) and by being recognised, as maintained below; a second dimension of feeling at home, including the main notions of familiarity, haven and heaven (Duyvendak, 2011); and a third dimension of a pragmatic and eclectic form of claiming *de facto* citizenship rights on an individual basis according to arising needs and life choices. However, the regularity and scale at which individual refugees relate to their hosts, feel at home and claim rights creates a collective phenomenon of belonging.

All three dimensions imply a degree of agency on the part of the refugees since they have chosen to relate to Tanzanians, to familiarise themselves with the surroundings through their daily activities and through claiming citizenship rights. As pointed out in the context of women's empowerment (Kabeer, 1999) agency does not carry meaning unless the people in question could actually choose, i.e. they had an alternative. Indeed refugees could have chosen to remain linked to the political field in Burundi (Turner, 2010) and to remain a separate Hutu nation (Malkki, 1995a). However, they chose to relate to Tanzanians and to familiarise themselves with their surroundings e.g. by trading even far outside of the settlement, which happened at their own initiative and in resistance to government control. While not being hyperpoliticised as in Lukole (Turner, 2010), Ul-

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yankulu's refugees' claiming of *de facto* citizenship is a political act (cf. see also "acts of citizenship", Isin and Nielson, 2008).

Gaining a sense of belonging through the aforementioned dimensions is "pragmatic" in the sense of pragmatism developed by John Dewey (1929) – belonging is a practical achievement, it is useful for the future of the refugees in an instrumental way in order to reduce uncertainty and to reduce the social distance to the host society, which can help to claim rights normally reserved for citizens. This sort of 'pragmatics of belonging' is likely to develop where refugees are in protracted exile, since they assume that their future will be spent in the host country. While not able to control their legal status as *de jure* non-citizens, they do not accept this unfortunate 'certainty' and rather exercise future thinking through a sense of belonging in order to maintain hope. This strategy is reminiscent of what Whyte (1997) calls the "pragmatics of uncertainty" to respond to adversity broadly defined (death, disease such as HIV/AIDS, infertility, matrimonial problems).

Pragmatics of belonging: the relational dimension

The first dimension of the pragmatics of belonging is a relational one. Refugees develop a sense of belonging to the host community and nation by interacting with citizens, i.e. by gaining a degree of trust (Calhoun, 2003) and by being recognised. Relating to the host community is also an important step towards become *de facto* citizens. According to Sassen (2003), there are two types of citizens, which do not have full citizenship: those who are 'unauthorised yet recognised' and those who are 'authorised yet not recognised'. This implies that citizenship also means recognition not only by the state but by other citizens belonging to the nation-state or community in question. Refugees are not legally authorised to be citizens but they can be recognised as such by the host community. As mentioned above, refugees usually are not entirely isolated from the host community. This is because the state is often not able to control refugees' agency in the space as envisaged.

In the case of Ulyankulu settlement, for example, the state lost some control over planning of the settlement when an increasing number of refugees came to settle on the edges of the grid structure, creating an uncontrollable "sprawl" (Armstrong, 1990: 199) and thereby also possibly more interaction with the local population. In Guinea, for example, most refugees have lived in small scale and self-reliant settlements close to the border

to Liberia and Sierra Leone, pursuing farming and cooperating with the host population (Fielden, 2008: 8). In Ghana, some camps are near to Ghanaian villages and are not isolated from rural Ghanaian life, as is often assumed of rural settlements (Dick, 2002). Liberian refugees from Buduburam Camp, for example, have spread beyond the camp to live in the adjacent village and surrounding areas in Gomoa District. Refugees have generally lived peacefully alongside with Ghanaian villagers, renting houses from them, trading with them, intermarrying and socialising together. They have sold to one another at the market established by the refugees located at the camp entrance. Ghanaians and Liberians have set up businesses in and around the camp, promoting economic growth in what was once a quiet rural village (Dick, 2002). Some refugees have purchased or leased land from Ghanaian people, even though it is not clear whether they are entitled to do so. In Uganda, while Sudanese refugees who arrived in the country in 1983 have lived in a succession of transit camps, settlements and non-settlement locations, later Ugandan settlements[5] have also been integrated into rural society since the late 1990s – they are ruled by local government structures instead of the UNHCR (Kaiser, 2006). The government has pursued a self-reliance strategy (SRS), even though that has not been completely successful. Furthermore, Sudanese refugees who started crossing the border to Uganda in August 1993 due to a war between the Government of Sudan (GoS) and the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA) lived in proximity with their host population around Ikafe and later Imvepi settlement, Rhino camp and others. Oxfam officer Payne notes (2006: 110) that people in the immediate environment benefited from markets within the settlement, and the trading links between the two communities were vital to the spontaneous and informal integration. A relational dimension can also come about when camps become spaces of hospitality, in which refugees become hosts themselves to internally displaced citizens. As mentioned before, this happened with Lebanese citizens who were hosted in Palestinian refugee camps (Ramadan, 2008). Lastly, it needs to be mentioned that the relational sense of belonging can also imply government officials. Where local government officials live their everyday life in a refugee settlement or in their vicinity, it is likely that they develop a form of 'conviviality' (Nyamnjoh, 2007, see above) together with the refugees and citizens over time. By such forms of conviviality, the border between refugees and citizens can become blurred.

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[5]Uganda hosted large numbers of Sudanese and Zairian refugees in the 1960s, hosted Sudanese again in the 1980s and Congolese as well as Sudanese refugees in the 1990s. Ugandans from the northern border region have themselves also been refugees – many fled to the West Nile in the 1970s (Kaiser 2006, Payne 2006).

Pragmatics of belonging: feeling at home

As a second dimension of the pragmatics of belonging, refugees can develop a sense of home in the settlement and the nation especially in protracted refugee situations. This, according to Hammond (2004: 83), could be called "emplacement" – a process of naming and particularising space but also of emplacing the environment in such a way that it feels like a home. With relation to returnee refugees in Ethiopia, Hammond (ibid.) explains that this involved the interworking of place, identity, and practice in a way to generate a relationship of belonging between person and place. This is an on-going process of gradually expanding the places that people consider to be familiar and safe from a space that was once unfamiliar and dangerous. The dangerous was transformed by use, visitation and interaction instead of mere perception. Emplacement can be differentially experienced by various groups of society; it can be individual but also a shared, social experience (ibid.).

The notion of 'emplacement' builds on an understanding of home that is subjective and hybrid. Whereas particularists believe that home means an attachment to a particular material place, universalists describe people as being "homeless" in today's mobile world; people become increasingly disembedded from local places (Duyvendak, 2011: 8-10). However, both of these positions agree on the importance of home and only disagree over what kind of places can be 'home': whether these places are private or public, particular or generic (ibid.: 28). The latter position allows for home to be mobile: instead of emphasising roots, it accentuates 'routes'. It shows that some people literally "dwell in travel", which invokes a notion of deterritorialised geographies of home. Home does not need to be material, it can also be virtual or a sense of belonging to a community, such as the Muslim *umma* (ibid.: 36). Overall, Duyvendak (2011: 38) maintains that among numerous works on the concept of 'home', three aspects are recurring: home as familiarity, home as a safe haven and home as a "heaven", a place where one feels publicly free and independent. However, some scholars disagree: feminists such as Betty Friedan, for example, have shown that home can also be hell, instead of a haven (cf. Blunt and Dowling, 2006: 15). Home therefore has a multiplicity of meanings for different people. To "feel at home" is a plural and layered sentiment that can be attached to the individual household, the workplace, the neighbourhood and the nation (Duyvendak, 2011: 38). For refugees, 'home' can thus be multi-scalar, referring to the domestic sphere, the refugee and host communities in the settlement, or even the host nation. It can also refer to their country

of origin, their host country or both countries. Some first generation refugees may only consider a specific region, city or village within their country of origin as their 'home' (Mercer et al., 2008).

According to the aforementioned importance of familiarity, refugees can make their new surroundings 'home' through their everyday lives over time. Since ancestors' graves are considered of utmost importance for the feeling of belonging in Africa (Geschiere, 2009), a sense of familiarity may be increased if ancestors are buried in the host country. For second generation refugees, 'home' may naturally be in the host country as they do not have another point of reference. For them, a sense of familiarity and safety is not built over time in exile; it is what they learn from their childhood onwards – just like citizens of the host country.

Refugees' feelings of home may also hinge on the other two aspects mentioned above, i.e. of being safe and at ease both in private (home as a haven) and in public (home as a heaven). In terms of safety, newly acquired feelings of 'home' in the host country can be un-settled when violence occurs there. Feelings of safety may change considerably depending on events and the situation in the settlement and the host country. To illustrate a few examples of insecurity that was either caused by or inflicted on refugees in their host countries, during the past 30 years, Saharawi refugees, who have lived in refugee camps in Algeria since the state Western Sahara was annexed by Morocco in 1975, have waged armed resistance against Moroccan rule with the support of the Algerian government. The Saharawi military, the Polisario Front, have used the camps at Tindouf as a base from which to recruit its soldiers (Milner and Loescher, 2005; UNHCR, 2000). In Guinea, where most refugees from Liberia and Sierra Leone had lived in small camps as self-sufficient farmers near the border since the early 1990s, the refugee populations got entangled in a sub-regional conflict between factions in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea in the late 1990s. Several cross-border attacks on refugee settlements occurred (Milner and Loescher, 2005). In Tanzania, after the Burundian government alleged that rebels were based in Tanzanian refugee camps, relations between Burundi and Tanzania became increasingly strained. In January 2002 three Tanzanian villages close to the border were shelled by the Burundian army (Milner and Loescher, 2005). In Ghana, national security concerns were raised when riots broke out at a camp of Liberian refugees in March 2001. Police were deployed to stop the violence (Dick, 2002). Refugees' own security was threatened when in the 1990s, Somali refugees in camps in the far Northeast of Kenya

have been attacked by bandits called *shiftas*, who searched for food and money. Many refugee women fell victim to rape while looking for firewood outside the camps (Milner and Loescher, 2005).

The feeling of being at ease in public (home as heaven) may also change according to the relationship between refugees and government officials; and according to the freedoms of self-governance that may be granted to refugees in different settings. As could be seen in Section 2.2.1, although refugees are normally not allowed to be involved in politics in the host country, they are often permitted to assume varying degrees of responsibility within camps and settlements. It is argued that considering these various aspects of feeling at home leads to a more realistic understanding than seeing it as an "essentialised point on the map" (Malkki, 1995b: 509). The notion of 'home country' is therefore a misnomer, and is replaced by 'country of origin' in this analysis.

Pragmatics of belonging: de facto citizenship and claims-making

As a third dimension of the pragmatics of belonging, refugees can become citizens unofficially by claiming citizenship rights despite not holding official citizenship certificates and not being included in *de jure* citizenship. This is another important step towards becoming *de facto* citizens. With reference to the Tanzanian case, the state contributes to the process of citizen-making by schooling them according to the Tanzanian curriculum and by taxing them. However, refugees also sometimes claim certain rights themselves that are normally reserved to *de jure* citizens. As will be seen in Chapter 6, in addition to reaching *de facto* integration into the host society in economic and socio-cultural ways (Fielden, 2008), refugees can also informally claim *de jure* citizenship rights, such as a right to freedom of movement, a right to work and a right to participate in politics on an individual and, to some extent, on a collective basis.

In some sense this dimension of the pragmatics of belonging is paradoxical since refugees claim rights in the host state in order to take part in *formal government institutions* (such as schooling/higher education/work) while at the same time subverting the given legal provisions pertaining to refugees. In order to take part in these official institutions, they are pragmatic and decide to be invisible as refugees by 'hiding' their status. The situation is paradoxical since the state uses its resources to school refugees in the camps but then does not allow them to take part in further education or in taking part

in the work force. While already feeling a sense of belonging to the host nation, refugees therefore have to resort to 'hiding' strategies, i.e. 'hiding' from the exceptional refugee laws but not from their fellow citizens who have in many cases recognised them as fellow citizens already. Hiding is often preferred to organising on a collective basis and calling for collective/group rights since refugees do not want to risk losing their 'right to stay' in the settlement and the host country. Where refugees form a sense of belonging in the host state and claim citizenship rights, they want to be accepted as being part of them in order to ultimately become *de jure* citizens instead of subverting the given structures.

Refugees' 'pragmatics of belonging' is significant to acknowledge since by relating to the host society (first dimension), developing a sense of home (second dimension), and claiming rights that are normally reserved for *de jure* citizens (third dimension), refugees indeed become *de facto* citizens of the host state. This understanding embeds refugees' identification in interaction with other citizens that spatially extends beyond the camp. The first two dimensions of the pragmatics of belonging are mostly enacted locally and encourage integration into the host community. The third dimension is more related to rights that are sanctioned by the state and thus it is more directed towards belonging to the wider nation. However, depending on where refugees enact the first dimension and with whom (for example interacting with citizens outside of the settlements), that dimension can also stir a national sense of belonging.

2.3.2 *'Pragmatics of waiting': waiting as productive space*

In various bodies of literature, waiting has been discussed with respect to social and economic uncertainties of young, unemployed people in India (Jeffreys, 2010), Ethiopia (Ralph, 2008) and in comparative perspective (Cole and Durham, 2008). The effects of waiting in closed spaces have been analysed by Auyero (2011), analysing experiences of waiting in the main welfare office of Buenos Aires, Argentina, and by Griffiths (2013), looking at waiting experiences of asylum seekers and immigration detainees in Immigration Removal Centres (IRCs) in the UK. In most of these accounts, waiting has a negative connotation. Auyero (2011) shows how welfare clients become not citizens but patients of the state, using Bourdieu's metaphor of the medical sphere. These people are waiting because they believe they have no other option than to wait for welfare benefits. Jeffreys (2010) analyses the waiting experiences of young men from middle-class and poorer

backgrounds in Utar Pradesh, India, highlighting their temporal and spatial anxieties. He discusses their feelings of temporal rupture, disruption and anxiety linked to unemployment. Griffiths (2013) adds different speeds of time to her analysis, in which asylum seekers and immigration detainees experience their situation: frenzied time, deceleration and suspended time. Most participants of her study viewed time differently in their own waiting situation than for others: one year could feel like many years to those in a waiting situation. Griffiths reaches the conclusion that people in IRCs in the UK suffer a dual uncertainty of time: simultaneous fear of sudden change and never-ending stasis. For those experiencing a dual uncertainty of time, it becomes difficult to see time as a resource.

However, Griffiths (ibid.) also suggests that waiting can be a productive space (Schweizer, 2008), an experience filled with substitute meanings and a meaningful experience in itself (Gasparini, 1995). Furthermore, temporal change is integral to expectations of the future and the lived present (Game, 1997) and certain events may be positive breaks from the past (Griffiths, 2013). In the case of refugees in rural settlements, how is waiting experienced? I argue that refugees do not only develop a 'pragmatics of belonging' but also a 'pragmatics of waiting': refugees experience waiting in various ways, including as a time to be creative through their own agency. Being able to identify with the host nation over time, refugees are waiting in pragmatic ways to build their future in the settlement, for example by resisting the government's prohibitions and building new permanent structures (cf. Ramadan, 2013; Sanyal, 2013), in order to fight for their 'right to stay'. By feeling at home in the host nation, some refugees may also deal with the time of waiting by moving outside of camps or settlements and establish themselves there in a pre-emptive attempt to forgo decisions by the government, for example to send them back to their countries of origin. These acts of waiting are individual ones but, as will be seen in Chapter 6, Section 6.4.3, aspects such as solidarity and faith can play a role in forming a collective waiting experience. Besides, depending on the communication between central government/ international organisations and local government/local aid workers, employees on the ground may also be affected by waiting for central governments' decisions. If they are not immediately informed themselves, they may become less efficient or credible. Furthermore, supranational actors or donors may as well shift their emphasis depending on how long decisions are taking.

2.3.3 *The next generation*

By looking at the first, second and third generations of refugees, this analysis does not primarily attempt to scrutinise how these make sense of their past or of the conflict in Burundi, as Malkki (1995a) and Turner's (2010) analyses have done. The aim is rather to disentangle how these refugees negotiate their present belonging in their everyday lives through their own agency as citizens-to-be of the state of Tanzania. In other words, by developing a sense of belonging to the host nation through their own agency, *de facto* citizenship is claimed and lived. Furthermore, this study interprets the influence of narratives pronounced by state officials and international organisations and how these relate to the refugees' sense of belonging and agency.

The previously analysed contradictions between politicisation in relation to Burundi and the apolitical stance in Tanzania discussed by Turner (2010) do not necessarily hold true for refugee settlements in Tanzania today. In Lukole camp, the politicisation relates to the rift between people from various places of origin in Burundi, who also belong to different social classes (political elite versus farmers) and have different party affiliations. Two main conflictual groups lived in the camps Lukole A and B respectively. In Ulyankulu allegedly there were also divisions between people from various regions of origin in Burundi but these were much less pronounced or visible. Furthermore, in contrast to other settlements, Ulyankulu has been referred to as a place for entrepreneurs before (Turner, 2010: 35), who liked to trade with people in Tabora town from an early stage of living in exile onwards. Acknowledging these differences between the settlements/camps at the outset, however, the point remains that refugees in Ulyankulu are much more directed towards the host country than towards their Burundian places of origin.

Developing a 'pragmatics of belonging' can entail a temporal element: there may be a shift from the first possibility of belonging elaborated by Malkki (1995a, see above), of building a separate and 'pure' (Hutu) nation in a refugee camp, towards the third possibility of an emergent 'pragmatics of belonging' over time as the refugees' stay in exile becomes increasingly protracted and subsequent generations become more and more integrated. The main difference between Ulyankulu and Lukole and other previously analysed camps/settlements, it is argued here, has to do with the fact that most refugees in Ulyankulu today are in the second generation; almost 80% of them were born in Tanzania. In contrast to other analyses focusing on how migrants and refugees form a diaspora

longing for 'home', a notion which refers to their country of origin or the places of origin in their home country (Brah, 1996; Van Hear, 2006; Cohen, 2008; Mercer et al., 2008; further elabored in Section 6.2.3), it is thus argued here that refugees in their second generation are more directed towards the place where they are born and raised in a process of "emplacement" (Hammond, 2004).

Refugees, especially those in the second generation, have created their new lives as *de facto* citizens, in which political life is related to life within the camp as well as to the outside in Tanzania. Life in the camp as part of the host country has long become their 'normality'. While hierarchies of class and gender have formed, refugees still live in a space of opportunities and continue to construct their subjectivities (cf. Turner, 2010). As will be illustrated empirically in Chapter 6, having lived in exile for a long time by now, refugees have developed a 'pragmatics of belonging' to the host nation instead of continuing to create mythico-histories of their country of origin. By assimilating and shaping the spatiality more and more within and to its rural surroundings, especially the new generation has actively engaged in creating this 'pragmatics of belonging' and a 'pragmatics of waiting' in a 'space of agency' as *de facto* citizens until they possibly become *de jure* citizens of their host state as well.

2.4 Conclusion

Theoretical approaches to refugee camps include Agamben's notion of the "state of exception" or rather his "space of exception", which is here seen as a useful starting point to analyse refugee camps. It is useful since it shows that the suspension of legal rights can have a detrimental effect on people's lives and that it is a paradoxical construct. However, there are important critiques of this theory, which cannot be overlooked. First, most African states are not in a permanent "state of exception" as Germany was at the time of harbouring concentration camps. Second, refugee camps aim to support their inhabitants instead of extinguishing them and thus cannot reach the extreme form of treating people as "bare life". Third, refugee camps are not merely a creation of the sovereign nation state but are influenced by international policy (cf. Gregory, 2006), and fourth, Agamben does not take into account the possibility and importance of political struggle and resistance within the camps (ibid.).

Further previous conceptualisations include Ramadan's idea of a "security island" and a "space of hospitality", Malkki's (1995a) notion of a space of identity formation and preservation, Turner's (2010: 18) approach as a site of political struggle linked to the country of origin, and his idea of a "waiting room", which is a space in suspension between a past and a future in the country of origin.

These previous conceptualisations are not adequate to analyse the present case of the Burundian refugees in Tanzania for simple and yet crucial reasons. Ulyankulu is not a security island in Ramadan's sense since it is not ruled by a faction from the refugees' country of origin, as was the case with the PLO in Lebanese camps. While it is important to consider Ulyankulu as a "space of hospitality", this notion only refers to a relational space between refugees and hosts, without considering aspirations of refugees and struggles among them.

Both Malkki's and Turner's approaches are highly relevant but gauged against the reality in Ulyankulu today they overemphasise relations to the country of origin and understate involvement in the political field of the host country. The latter is crucial for this analysis. The difference between Malkki and Turner's approaches and this thesis is in part related to the prolonged time in exile, which refugees in Ulyankulu have stayed in Tanzania, and to the fact that most refugees are now in the second generation.

A theoretical framework for understanding refugee camps in a protracted situation, it is argued here, needs to take account of the ways refugee camps are controlled spaces that function to exclude refugees from *de jure* citizenship, and the ways in which refugees have questioned this control through agency in order to develop a pragmatic sense of belonging and become *de facto* citizens. It is argued that at the outset of setting up refugee camps, the host state together with international organisations aim at controlling refugees by creating a "legible" (Scott, 1999) 'space of control', which is understandable to outsiders. This space functions to exclude refugees from formal citizenship rights but also presents an obstacle to becoming *de facto* citizens unofficially. This exclusion, it is argued, is justified by a belief in exclusionary notions of belonging, which are fixed to a home in one place. States have been hesitant to grant *de jure* citizenship to refugees also since they fear a security threat and an erosion of their control. Over time, the exclusion from citizenship is prolonged by invisibilising and sometimes even abandoning the spaces of control that were initially created. Such abandonment does not reverse the lack of legal status. Section 2.2.3 describes how ethnic and national belonging has changed over time

in Tanzania. It shows that the country has moved towards notions of nationality that operates at the expense of pan-African solidarity and excludes ethnicities of neighbouring countries. This development underscores the prolonged exclusion of Burundian refugees from Tanzanian citizenship. Finally, the reluctance and adjourning of granting citizenship functions as a temporal control by the state over refugees.

However, while these theoretical ideas are generalisable to most refugee camps in Africa, it needs to be considered how refugees have dealt with the exclusion from *de jure* through various types of control. It is suggested here, drawing on literature on agency (Scott, 1985; Kabeer, 1999; Reckwitz, 2002; Nyamnjoh, 2007; as discussed above), citizenship and belonging, that camps can also be 'spaces of agency' where refugees develop a 'pragmatics of belonging' and a 'pragmatics of waiting', which help them attain *de facto* citizenship. Citizenship, it is argued, should be seen both as a process, by which a form of *de facto* citizenship (Sassen, 2003) can be achieved, and as a status, also referred to as *de jure* citizenship (Marshall, 1983 [1950]) here. It implies processes of self-making and being made by state institutions and by living in society (Ong, 1996). Despite their status as non-citizens in the host country, refugees are not necessarily apolitical beings. Instead of forming their own nation or denying any allegiances (as in Malkki's "pragmatics of identity"; 1995a: 153), refugees are directed towards the host state and develop a 'pragmatics of belonging' in order to reduce uncertainty for their future lives. This pragmatics entails first, integrating with their Tanzanian hosts, second, familiarising themselves with their environment and developing a feeling of being at home, and third, claiming rights normally reserved to *de jure* citizens. In order to do so, refugees often need to transgress camp spaces for varying purposes and 'hide' while outside the settlements. In this process they can become *de facto* citizens. Finally, they are not ultimately determined by the suspension in time imposed but act as if their situation was permanent – an approach I term the 'pragmatics of waiting'. The pragmatic way of every-day living, belonging and waiting may be important steps towards having *de jure* citizenship confirmed on paper.

METHODOLOGY

> "The positivist dream of an epistemological state of perfect innocence has the consequence of masking the fact that the crucial difference is not between a science which effects a construction and one which does not, but between a science which does this without knowing it and one which, being aware of this, attempts to discover and master as completely as possible the nature of its inevitable acts of construction and the equally inevitable effects which they produce."
> — Bourdieu (1996)

In order to find out about the protracted situation of the Burundian refugees in Tanzania, the point of view of the government, of international organisations and the development of a sense of belonging and citizenship on the part of the refugees, a qualitative study in Tanzania using methods common to ethnographies was devised. The primary field site was Ulyankulu refugee settlement in Tabora region. The study includes two main research methods: participant observation and semi-structured interviews. While participant observation shed light on the general atmosphere and collective experiences in public places in Ulyankulu settlement, interviews illustrated more detailed individual trajectories and opinions.

All in all, field research took place in three main phases from the end of January 2012 to mid-December 2012: first, living on Zanzibar for two months served the purpose of following an intensive Swahili language course at a renowned university; second, staying in Dar es Salaam for three and a half months allowed me to deal with obtaining research permits and to gain contextual information from key informants; and third, conducting ethnographic research in and around Ulyankulu settlement in Tabora region for five months (April, June, July, August, November), which constituted the core of the research.

In the first section of this chapter the research design is described. It spells out the background of ethnographic techniques that are used in this study, it defines what is meant by the 'field', and it explains how my research questions were altered due to the changing

policy context once I arrived in the field. The second section deals with aspects of data collection: first, it discusses the choices made concerning participant observation in public places in Ulyankulu settlement. Second, it describes the approach taken towards conducting interviews, including access, sampling, selection criteria, and interview guides. It further clarifies the choice and recruitment of research assistants, the use of secondary data, and finally deliberates challenges, including translation, and recording.

The third section of this chapter deals with the different stages of data analysis, the methods used to interpret the data and challenges. The fourth section gives a more detailed account of research proceedings during the preparatory stages in London and Zanzibar, in Dar es Salaam including access to interview partners and the wider importance of my stay there; and finally gives an account of basic demographics and spatiality of Ulyankulu settlement. The last section deals with questions of ethics including a critical discussion of researcher reflexivity, danger in the field, and responsibilities towards participants.

3.1   Research Design

The research design of this thesis aims at answering the research questions that are outlined in Chapter I. In order to increase and complement the existing knowledge base about the creation of, the dealing with, and the solutions proposed to protracted refugee situations, it was vital to follow a holistic approach, in which various actors involved were interviewed and interactions in various public places were observed. This design used qualitative methods, which are inherent in ethnographic studies, and served to develop new theories about such situations in an inductive approach.

In qualitative research using methods common to ethnographic studies the researcher is not an uninvolved observer but gains insights through first-hand experience with research subjects or informants in action (Murchison, 2010: 4). Interactions with these informants can take forms of conversations, interviews, shared rituals and experiences. The research takes place outside of a controlled environment and therefore needs to deal with the complexity of the lives of the informants (ibid.). Ethnography as such was developed at the end of the 19th century and beginning of the 20th century by anthropologists. Methods

common to ethnography are now, however, used in a number of disciplines, including sociology and human geography.

Ethnography has been used to offer implicit or explicit critiques of dominant systems and understandings. Nevertheless, much of early ethnography supported existing systems and structures of power in a context of Western imperialism; and most of this research was stereotypically androcentric, i.e. conducted by white males, who studied 'the other'. Such ethnographies, by being fascinated with cultural difference, drew on an understanding of nationalism and cultural identity that presupposed essential characteristics of groups of people (Murchison, 2010). Furthermore, these ethnographies usually did not include a discussion of the methods used within the ethnography. Later in the 20th century a sustained critique evolved of the early ethnographies. This included a questioning of claims to objectivity and discussions of ethical obligations towards participants. Furthermore, since cultural and social phenomena are not static but are constantly subject to change (Murchison, 2010: 10), the need was pronounced to study the history and change of these phenomena.

While this study follows the approach of gaining first-hand experience in a foreign country, it aims to unravel the complexity of and between the cultural groups studied. Thereby, it aims to prevent an essentialised picture of the informants. Although later ethnographies questioned the exclusive focus on relatively isolated, small-scale, rural communities, this study maintains a more classical ethnographic route in the sense that it is taking a rural setting in Africa as its primary locality. This has the advantage of bringing the local and specific of the field site into focus. Furthermore, it is based on a lengthy stay in the field (albeit not as long as in classical ethnographies) – close to one year in Tanzania and five months in the primary location of ethnographic research. The importance of learning and working in local languages is therefore recognised.

In this study, 'the field' implies the primary field site, Ulyankulu settlement; but also involves preparatory stages in Zanzibar, where a language course was followed, and in Dar es Salaam, where interviews with government officials and organisations was conducted. In Dar es Salaam, the research strategy mainly included interviews, which served to contextualise and interpret findings gained through methods common to ethnographies in Ulyankulu. Therefore, the ethnographic notes taken in Ulyankulu were not taken in isolation or without prior experiences in Tanzania, the wider 'field'. The research design is thus multi-sited, even though methods varied in the different sites. On the whole, research

includes the methods of participant observation, interviews as well as finding secondary material such as maps and charts, which are all key elements in qualitative research using ethnographic techniques. Interviews promise to elicit historical recollections and personal perspectives, whereas participant observation allows focussing on communal events and offers an experiential dimension (Murchison, 2010: 40).

When I started the field research in Tanzania, the naturalisation and relocation policy initiative had not yet been completed and qualitative research would serve to observe a part of that process. As it turned out, no concrete decision was made until September 2012 with respect to the 1972 caseload – the policy was under review by the parliament. In September 2012, after more than half of my research time had passed, Tanzania's Deputy Minister of Home Affairs, Pereira Silima, suggested that the decision to grant citizenship to Burundian refugees may be reversed (Milner, 2013). Although a definite decision had not been made, the planned relocation did not take place as anticipated.

Initially I was interested in following the relocation process or, if already completed, to interview those refugees who had relocated and had already obtained citizenship certificates about their experience with the process of becoming citizens and their future aspirations. However, only 749 individuals had obtained these certificates and since the policy was put on hold in June 2011 (Milner, 2013), I was cautioned by forced migration researchers in Dar es Salaam that it would be too sensitive to interview the naturalised refugees. They explained that interviewing these individuals and publicising details about their lives would make them vulnerable to resentment by other refugees in the settlements who did not have the privilege of being amongst the first round of receiving certificates. Furthermore, resentments could be stirred by the fact that these former refugees were part of "Group A" of refugees (see NASCIP document, explained in Chapter 4, Section 4.4.1), who already resided outside of the settlements in Dar es Salaam and other places in Tanzania. This could be seen as unfair since refugees in the settlements were officially told that they could not be outside of the settlements for longer than two weeks without a permit. After two weeks, they would have to seek renewal of the permit at the Ministry of Home Affairs in Dar es Salaam. Not all refugees had the means to pay the bus fair to reach Dar es Salaam. In fact, "Group A" constituted a tolerated group of refugees outside of the settlements, who had escaped life in the settlements and had found work outside. Publicising their condition could also induce other refugees to move outside of the settlement, which the government aimed to prevent. Drawing more attention to those

refugees who got certificates could in the worst case scenario provoke the removal of their certificates for reasons of fairness to the other refugees. It could potentially also provoke the government to send some "Group A" refugees back to the settlements since officially, refugees had not been allowed to live outside until their official toleration announced in the NASCIP document. Furthermore, publicising details of these refugees' lives could have potentially uncovered processes of favouritism in relation to who was allowed to live outside the settlement and who obtained the first round of citizenship certificates. Judging these concerns as valid, I decided not to continue seeking to interview the certificate holders but to locate my field research in Ulyankulu settlement.

Although the naturalisation and relocation policy was not carried out as planned, I was present in Ulyankulu settlement/Dar es Salaam at a time of uncertainty for all actors involved and this aspect was intriguing in itself. It inspired me to focus on the temporal dimension of my research and to identify experiences of 'waiting' as a major theme emerging for refugees. In 2012, the priority of the government was to finally close Mtabila camp, the last camp still open for the Burundian refugees who came in the 1990s. The focus on that situation may have postponed other decisions concerning the 1972 refugee caseload. Despite the protracted nature of many refugee scenarios including the one I chose to study, my experiences in Tanzania in the year of 2012 show that the field of the study of forced migration is highly volatile and changes at a fast pace: policies change, priorities and funds shift quickly, not only related to refugees' own arrival in the host country and their subsequent behaviour but also according to internal political and economic considerations of the host country. The policy of naturalisation and relocation, however, had been on hold since 2011 with no interim announcement about what would happen to the 1972 caseload of Burundian refugees.

3.2 Data Collection

3.2.1 *Participant observation*

Participant observation is a powerful ethnographic technique because it allows the researcher to appreciate multiple perspectives and to engage different types and sources of data hard to access otherwise (Murchison, 2010: 40). Participant observation is used

to understand the world-views of people from the "inside" in their everyday experiences (Cook, 2005: 167). However, since the researcher is both engaged in observation as well as in participation, s/he inhabits a paradoxical position. Both observation and participation are necessary components of participant observation, in which the scholar is a research tool him/herself. In the course of the stay in the field, the ethnographer finds himself or herself between the *etic*, an outsider perspective, and the *emic*, an insider point of view, in which s/he immerses him/herself into the everyday rhythms and routines of the studied community (ibid.). According to Murchison (2010: 41), participant-observation is often the way to begin doing research. Events can serve to introduce oneself in the research setting, and by observing larger groups of people one can become aware of issues to follow up on. Such initial settings may help with direct questions for later interviews and conversations. Initially, the researcher will be more observing than participating but by increasingly developing rapport with the informants, s/he will be a participant in the setting. It is suggested that the researcher should start with regular and planned observation in an event or a series of events, which can help to structure one's research, and to build relationships with informants (ibid: 42). In this study, for the qualitative data collection, or 'corpus construction' (Bauer and Gaskell, 2000), participant observation was first used in order to gain an impression of the situation that the refugees find themselves in. Public events that could be regularly attended were the central market in Ulyankulu settlement on Wednesdays and Saturdays, and church services on Sundays. Further places visited involved schools and a court, where I attended school lessons and court hearings respectively. Plates that capture impressions from these places of research can be found in the annex (Annex 9).

The market

In the market, I was a participant in the scenario by buying food or clothing, and I was an observer by taking notes on who was selling which kind of items or crops in which location, what services and merchandise were offered in shops around the market place, and who were the customers. It was, however, mostly not possible to overhear conversations due to linguistic and acoustic reasons, so I started to use the market place to meet informants and to arrange interviews with them on another day at their homes. While some were apprehensive about meeting a foreigner, others were interested in this interaction. Many of the sellers came from far away villages; some did not have phone numbers, and

exact addresses do not exist in the settlement. Therefore, most informants from market encounters were shopkeepers or people living in Kaswa, the central village (see Figure 3.2).

Churches

From the beginning, I planned to participate in services on Sundays since most refugees in Ulyankulu are Christian, and churches occupy a central role in the public life of the settlement. Participation in services, however, proved not to be a straightforward task since there were 13 denominations in 2007 (SA3, 2007: 23) and more have been founded since then. Thus it was impossible to attend all of them. Therefore, I identified a few churches of different denominations with varying membership both in terms of numbers and people belonging to the parish, which I aimed to attend during my time in the field. These include the Catholic Church in Kaswa, the Pentecostal Church in Mapigano, and the Lutheran Church in Kaswa. The priests of the Catholic Church were all Tanzanians but the church was attended by both refugees and Tanzanians (e.g. working for the government and international organisations). The church in Mapigano employed mainly refugee pastors and it was predominantly visited by refugees. Both the Catholic Church in Kaswa and the Pentecostal church in Mapigano have a large congregation. By contrast, the smaller Lutheran church was almost exclusively attended by Tanzanians, e.g. teachers working for VETA (Vocational Education and Training Authority), a government institution. Early encounters with future informants at the settlement officer's building and on the market lead to attendance of the Baptist Churches in Ikonongo and in Kaswa, and the Calvary Church in Ikonongo (all mainly attended by and headed by refugees). Interviews were later also conducted with members of the Anglican Church and the Mosque of Ulyankulu (members of these churches were both Tanzanians and refugees). Further churches in the settlement are the Tanzania Assemblies of God, SOWER International Church and many others. The Calvary Church in Ikonongo recently built another building in Taba[1], the Pentecostal church is now split into two different denominations in several villages in the settlement, and the Catholic Church has community groups in each village in the settlement. Membership in the various churches ranges from about 40 people to several thousand members.

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[1]See maps of Ulyankulu below, Figures 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4.

Participant-observation in these churches initially included attending the service and speaking to the pastor, church elders and members of the church after the service. Participating in the service promised to be valuable in order to appreciate which topics priests and pastors would address in front of the parish, to understand the variety in spiritual life among these churches, and to experience in which language sermons would be held and songs would be sung. Participation was highly valued by the pastors, who proved to be gatekeepers to their parishes. They arranged interviews with various members of their churches, introduced me to further informants from other churches, and invited me to public and private events and celebrations. Some spiritual leaders, which I got acquainted with during the research, had double roles in the community of being both (former) government officials and religious leaders. In the course of the research, several religious leaders shared their wide-ranging knowledge about life in Ulyankulu.

Schools

Attending school lessons promised to offer interesting research material. This is because allegedly changes that took place in secondary schooling could show the effects of the planned closure of the settlement; but also because school lessons could offer insights into the content of what students learn in the settlement, and interviews with students would offer insights into their lives in the settlement and their sense of belonging. Again, since there are three secondary schools and 15 primary schools in Ulyankulu settlement, a choice had to be made as to which schools to attend. Ultimately, visits were arranged to two secondary schools (the third one was closed at the time of research in 2012) in Ulyankulu, to one secondary school outside of the settlement, and one primary school in the settlement. In Ulyankulu Secondary School attendance of two lessons was granted, a tour of the school, and interviews with the headmaster and two teachers. In Kanindo Secondary School, conversations with three teachers took place, a tour of the school, attendance of a school lesson, as well as interviews with six students. The secondary school outside of the settlement was visited because allegedly people from Ulyankulu also attended it. In that place, I conducted an interview with the headmaster and was guided through the premises. In the primary school, an interview with one of the teachers was conducted. Further participant observation in schools was not conducted since it may have disrupted the everyday lives of the students, in addition to logistic constraints encountered to reach the schools. Important insights into the conditions of the schools

were gained by physically visiting these places. In the interviews, I could gain an impression of perspectives of students and teachers, not only about school life but about further information on their sense of belonging.

The court

Finally, planned participant observation was conducted in court hearings. According to the settlement officer, arbitration in cases of conflict only takes place in the court outside of the settlement in the village of Ichemba once a month[2]. In the course of the research, two visits to court hearings in that village were arranged. Initial access to these was facilitated through the settlement officer. In these hearings, information could be gathered about the types of cases discussed, pointing towards contested issues in the community. While participating in the hearings, I was in the background listening, observing and recording the court proceedings. These visits to Ichemba also allowed for interviews with the judge and with village leaders, as well as for conversations with people living in the village.

All in all, planned participant observation in these four types of places allowed gaining first impressions about public life in Ulyankulu. More specifically, it elucidated aspects of trading agricultural and other products in the market, which is a main source of income and part of economic life in the settlement, in the spiritual life of the inhabitants of the settlement, in aspects of schooling of the second and third generation of refugees, and in juridical proceedings. Political life was not as easy to access via participant-observation since village meetings, for example, did not take place at the time of research. Therefore, most information about political aspects stems from interviews.

Whenever possible, field notes were made *in situ*, for example in school lessons, church services and the court where I was mostly observing instead of participating actively. During secondary school lessons I took note of the contents (English is the official teaching language), and about student participation. In church services, I noted bible passages, names of songs and other notable proceedings. One service was held in English, others in Swahili. In the court, I noted the interactions between the defendants, the judge and the lawyers (the session was held in Swahili). Other notable occurrences, for example from the market, were recorded *post hoc* since it appeared to me suspicious to take notes

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[2]There was no evidence of village-based arbitrations in Ulyankulu settlement, such as was common in Burundi in precolonial times – "bashingantahe" (Daley, 2007:45; Turner, 2010:33).

in the open space. I digitally recorded and transcribed parts of court hearings and church services to have a detailed account of what happened and to overcome any linguistic problems I encountered during the event. I do not believe that my presence significantly altered the proceedings in the market or in the court. In one of the schools, the teacher formally introduced me in front of the students and they could ask questions to me. Furthermore, in one of the churches, the service was held in English due to my presence. In those cases my presence altered the setting but being aware of these changes to the normal proceedings helps to interpret the events and responses of students/church members.

Planned participant-observation was useful to find interview partners and to contextualise information given in interviews, which proved to be the most in-depth source of information. Participant observation in the public places mentioned above served to understand refugees' day-to-day lives during this time of uncertainty of waiting for the closure of the settlement and the planned relocation and naturalisation.

Next to planned participant observation, I gained further impressions of life in Ulyankulu by living on the campus of VETA vocational school, by walking and driving within and outside of the settlement, and by using services in the settlement, such as restaurants, the health centre and m-pesa banking[3]. In the process I took notes for example about the construction of buildings, tobacco cultivation, gold mining, and access to water.

3.2.2 *Interviews*

While participant-observation allows observing the activities of others, and in some settings to experience that behaviour in action, the researcher should engage in "conversations with a purpose" (Valentine, 2005: 111) surrounding that behaviour in order to understand the motivations underlying it (Murchison, 2010). This method allows a wide-ranging discussion in which interviewees can explain the complexities and contradictions of their everyday experiences (Valentine, 2005: 111). It has to be carefully planned who to interview when, how, where and about what in order to obtain in-depth material that could answer the research question (Murchison, 2010: 44). In this study more specifically, interviews promised to gain insights into individual life histories, feelings of belonging,

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[3] A mobile-banking service offered by Vodacom.

memories of events in the past, as well as aspects of private life to which the researcher could not easily gain access otherwise.

Sampling occurred via a snowball system because, as anticipated, access to participants or meaningful answers often relied on establishing contact with gatekeepers (cf. Valentine, 2005: 117). Gatekeepers are "individuals [...] that have the power to grant or withhold access to people or situations for the purposes of research" (Burgess 1984: 48). Even if this was the aim, it would have been difficult to obtain a randomised sample: such samples can only be obtained in a controlled environment, in which the totality of the population of potential interviewees is known. However, there is no detailed map available of households within Ulyankulu settlement on the whole or within any given village, which would facilitate the creation of a randomised sample. Furthermore, it was not the primary aim of this study to attain a representative sample since the emphasis lay on subjective experiences and meanings attached to citizenship and belonging. The goal was to understand these notions of a variety of informants with internal rigour, instead of striving for external validity or comparability.

Contacts were gained in two main steps: they were first made in public places of participant-observation, and subsequently through the people that were met in such places (see also Section 3.2.1 above). Among initial contacts were refugees of the first and second generations, local Tanzanians and government officials. Religious leaders (both refugees and Tanzanians), who proved to be gatekeepers, introduced me to members of their church, as well as to people in the same or other villages, who belonged to other churches. These again introduced me to further informants. Teachers as well facilitated interviews with their students in Kanindo Secondary School and at VETA school. Some interviews that were arranged in places of participant-observation were one-off events and did not lead to further snowballing. In other cases, several members of the same family could be interviewed. A few respondents were already known by the research assistants (see below) – these include the priests at the Catholic Church, and one informant, who was knowledgeable and generally engaged for the refugee community (known by the second assistant), as well as one family, who were acquaintances of the third assistant. Although one could infer that this questions the credibility of the data obtained, these interviews were among the most fruitful. Research assistants should be seen as part of the research tool that the ethnographer embodies. Furthermore, some of these informants mentioned

above were planned to be interviewed since the beginning even in the absence of an assistant (see planned participation in churches).

Interviews conducted in the field were most of the time solicited (i.e. formal) but some were unsolicited – in a more conversational setting. In general, the interviews were reflexive instead of pre-structured. However, in the beginning of the research, an interview guide was established covering questions to refugees around six themes: 1) the past/life history – relating to their arrival in the settlement (first generation), their educational and work background, 2) life in Ulyankulu – concerning work, family, other activities, satisfaction with the life in the settlement 3) belonging – where and why they belong and whether they still feel like refugees, 4) citizenship and relocation – why they chose naturalisation, what it means for the respondents and where would they relocate to, 5) integration with Tanzanians – who they speak to in their daily lives, and 6) diasporic identity – concerning connections to Burundi, to other refugee camps and settlements and outside of the settlements. The more detailed, initial interview guide can be found in Annex 6 (English version) and 7 (Swahili version). With evolving knowledge, other questions were included, for example about the experience of waiting.

Interviews with central government officials included questions about the reasons for naturalising the refugees and for relocating them and the reasons for halting this process. Interviews with government officials in Ulyankulu aimed at obtaining information about local statistics, events, and opinions about the past, present and future of the settlement. Interviews with international organisations mainly included questions about the role of the organisation in the protection of refugees now and in the past. Differing questions were asked according to the specific position of the person – with relation to the UN-HCR for example interviews were conducted with the Local Integration officer in Dar es Salaam, with an officer responsible for the mass communication campaign concerning naturalisation and relocation of the refugees, with the local head officer in Ulyankulu, and with a women's protection officer.

Interviews with Tanzanians were conducted with members of the central and local governments in Ulyankulu and in the surrounding villages, in the old district Urambo and in the new district Kaliua (see Section 3.4.3), and in the regional administration in Tabora, with teachers in different schools (see above), and the police in Ulyankulu and in Tabora. Further interviews were arranged with Tanzanian citizens of varying ages and places of origin in Ulyankulu settlement, in surrounding villages and in Tabora town. The majority

of interviews with government officials were conducted in English; whereas the majority of interviews with refugees were carried out in Swahili. The language of the interview was chosen by the respondent even though English was preferred if the respondent was indifferent. A few first generation respondents preferred to speak in French, one of the official languages in Burundi.

Most interviews and conversations were conducted in the villages of Kaswa, the central village, and Ikonongo, a neighbouring village (see more detailed spatiality of the settlement in Section 3.4.3). However, some interviews were also held in the villages of Kanindo, Taba, Mkindo, and Mapigano (see Section 3.4.3). Overall, the sampling procedure aimed to cover informants from various backgrounds in terms of age, occupation or position, gender (about one third of the refugee respondents were female overall), as well as ethnicity (next to the Hutu majority at least three informants had Tutsi or mixed Hutu-Tutsi background, and some respondents were Nyamwezi or Sukuma).

The main selection criteria for refugee respondents included a differentiation between refugees of the first and second generation because it was anticipated that this distinction would offer an interesting differentiation for the analysis. As can be seen in Table 3.1 above, all in all, 117 respondents were interviewed in individual interviews (95) and group settings (5 groups, 22 respondents in total). In addition, various conversations took place in informal settings that sometimes led to formal interviews. I took note of some of these conversations, which helped in understanding the context. Within Ulyankulu settlement, formal interviews took place during the months of June, July, August and November. In April, I mainly used the time to familiarise myself with the setting, to introduce myself and to gain first contacts.

Furthermore, about 23 respondents were government officials in Dar es Salaam, Tabora, Urambo, Kaliua, Ichemba, Uyowa and in Ulyankulu. Seven worked in international and national organisations dealing with refugee matters: UNHCR, the UNHCR implementing partner Tanganyika Christian Refugee Service (TCRS) and a former implementing partner, Relief to Development Society (REDESO). All in all 34 respondents were first generation refugees, 33 were refugees in the second generation, and 18 interviews took place with other Tanzanian citizens of various professions and backgrounds in Ulyankulu and Tabora (see table below).

Table 3.1: Total of Interviews Conducted

Respondents	Individual Formal Interviews	Formal Interviews	Total of Respondents		
Refugees			*Total*	*m.*	*f.*
First Generation	20 + 1*	3 (13 people)	34	26	8
Outside of Uly. (1st gen.)	1		1	1	
Second Generation	24	2 (9 people)	33	20	13
		Subtotal	68	47	21
Local Tanzanians					
Ulyankulu	15		15		
Tabora		1 (3 people)	3		
		Subtotal	18	16	2
Media (Dar es Salaam)	1		1	1	
Tanzanian Government					
Dar es Salaam	3				
Tabora	3				
Urambo District	3				
Kaliua District	1				
Ulyankulu	4+1*				
Former Officials Ulyankulu	3				
Ichemba	3				
Uyowa	2				
		Subtotal	23	21	2
Organisations					
UNHCR					
Dar es Salaam	1*		1		
Ulyankulu	3		3		
TCRS					
Dar es Salaam	1		1		
Ulyankulu	1*		1		
REDESO (Dar es Salaam)	1		1		
		Subtotal	7	5	2
Total			117		

In this table: m.=male; f.=female.

*With these respondents, two or more interviews were conducted.

3.2.3   *Research assistants*

For safety and linguistic reasons I decided to take a research assistant on my trips from Dar es Salaam to Ulyankulu. The first research assistant was a Tanzanian, a former volunteer of an NGO, from Dar es Salaam. He accompanied me on the first trip to Tabora in April 2012 and to the settlement in order to introduce myself and to find out about logistics and accommodation. Before travelling to Tabora, his role and details of payment were discussed. His role mainly included assisting in translating when some Swahili words were missing in my vocabulary. The same applies to the second assistant, a Tanzanian university graduate from Dar es Salaam, who accompanied me for three months from June to August 2012. Since aspects such as expenses for food, accommodation, the number of interviews and the possibility of transcribing them in Ulyankulu, were unforeseeable from Dar es Salaam, we fixed and adapted certain modalities concerning payment once arrived in Ulyankulu. The last research assistant, who helped me in the final month of research in November 2012, was a teacher, a local Tanzanian in Ulyankulu – his role and payment were discussed and fixed in the beginning of the work. The fact that my research assistants were generally knowledgeable and interested in the research topic was invaluable for this study.

3.2.4   *Secondary data*

Maps and charts, a centrepiece of much ethnographic research (Murchison 2010:45), serve to collect and organise information found in the field. This study has a clear spatial dimension since the primary field site is located in a demarcated geographical area, and it is a main aim of this research to find a new theorisation of the space of rural refugee settlements. It was envisaged that maps would be important to understand developments of the settlement over time, distances between villages and main locations of public places inside and outside of the settlement, and entry points to the settlement. Maps may also show the priorities and perspectives of the map-makers (cf. ibid.).

Population statistics about the settlement were collected from the National Bureau of Statistics (census data), the UNHCR in Tanzania, the settlement officer, and the district council in Urambo, concerning land ownership, demographics (fertility, mortality and

out-migration, i.e. repatriation), school enrolment and crime data. These sources include maps that are used for the analysis of this study. Other secondary sources include newspaper articles highlighting recent developments in Tanzania concerning refugees and other current affairs, and parliamentary debates concerning the naturalisation and relocation of refugees.

3.2.5 *Limitations and challenges*

It was anticipated from the outset of the research that linguistic problems might occur. Interviews with international and national organisations were held in English only. Interviews with government officials were mainly in English but some were held in Swahili. With refugees and local Tanzanians most interviews were held in Swahili but a few were held in English or French. In Swahili interviews I asked questions which I had prepared prior to the interview. My assistants helped me to formulate spontaneous questions about arising new topics, and translated some answers when I did not understand them fully. This method generally worked very well but at times disrupted the flow of the interview. While the first and second research assistants remained more in the background, the third one, who lived in Ulyankulu himself, may have had the most influence on the research: as a Tanzanian teacher, he showed that he was part of the community himself. Thereby, the interview became more conversational. While his presence surely altered the interview, he was respected and liked by the informants. It cannot be assessed ultimately to what extent he triggered the informants to give insights into their lives or by contrast, deterred them from doing so. Some informants may have believed that the research assistants worked for the government but factual evidence of such ideas was never given. I may have been more approachable to possible informants without an assistant but due to linguistic and logistic reasons, this was not often possible.

In the beginning of the research, when the respondent consented, interviews were taped by an audio voice recorder. This has the advantage of concentrating on the interview without the pressure of taking notes (Valentine, 2005: 123). There were several situations, however, in which it was not possible to record. Such a situation occurred in the beginning of my field research when I conducted a series of group interviews that were facilitated by a gatekeeper in a church. In order to record, I would have had to ask each participant to give consent to recording, which might have deterred them from speaking freely. Although the

information given in the course of the interview was detailed and highly relevant, it was hardly possible to take notes due to bad lighting. Furthermore, taking notes would have disrupted the flow and intensity of the conversation. Some notes were taken by my assistant but a large part was missing. Due to this experience, I decided to conduct individual interviews whenever possible instead of arranging focus groups. Recording was also not an option in situations where interview questions evolved out of an informal conversation, in situations with a noisy background, and in situations in which the respondents explicitly did not want to be recorded. Furthermore, due to these problems, and the fact that it was difficult to transcribe interviews in Ulyankulu with limited access to electricity (for only three hours a day), from mid-July onwards I decided not to record interviews but to directly write down fully substantiated, detailed notes in English.

During the first Swahili interviews that were recorded, there were minimal interruptions due to translations. Whenever I understood the sense of what was said, we proceeded with the interview. Translations were reduced to moments in which I could not follow the interviewee. Switching to hand-written notes was not a problem while working with the second and main research assistant. Since he also took notes, it reduced the possibility of having misinterpreted information during the interview. During the last month of field research translations did not occur just as unobtrusively as before and, as mentioned above, interviews were more conversational and I sometimes had to ask the assistant to translate any missing pieces. Furthermore, some typed electronic interview transcripts were validated in hindsight by the respondents – but this was not always possible in Ulyankulu due to technical limitations.

As mentioned above, in quantitative terms, the sample of people is not large enough to be representative of the camp population counting more than 55,000 people. While a greater number of respondents might have complemented the picture, this study has high internal validity and data was considered saturated when themes reoccurred in the respondents' narratives. On a practical note, a challenge was to juggle various payments for assistants and transport within and outside of the settlement. For each trip to a village inside or outside of the settlement, a motorbike or car had to be rented since there was no public transport in Ulyankulu (see plates depicting transport in Annex 9). Furthermore, conditions of roads and vehicles hindered me from reaching some places of interviews. However, my hosts, assistants, and acquaintances were very helpful in facilitating various aspects of this research.

3.3   Data Analysis

When arriving back in London, 'field materials', i.e. interview transcripts, observations and notes, sketches, maps, diaries and letters (Crang, 2005: 219) were reconsidered as a whole in order to allow for an inductive approach, in which one can write *from* the research data instead of *with* the research data (Murchison, 2010: 173). Thereby, one starts with the specific and arrives at the more general or abstract (ibid.). The writing process overall included three main stages: a detailed research proposal including a literature review, research questions and hypotheses, a timeframe and suggested methodology, which was finalised in December 2011, before going to the field. Then, during the field research throughout the year 2012, data was gathered, and in September/October, while being in Dar es Salaam, a first detailed writing plan for the full thesis was established. After a further period of data collection, the writing plan was revised. At the start of this third and final writing stage, the data was thus sorted into themes, which were noted in a separate document, also called "open coding" (Crang, 2005: 222). In a second step subthemes were identified and important concepts derived that could capture the experiences in the field. Having identified these themes, the initial research questions that were formulated before the field research were reconsidered and adapted in order to cover what would be ultimately incorporated in the thesis. A detailed account of how, why and to what effect the government and international organisations control refugees, was for example not planned initially (see Chapter 5) but it proved to be a necessary and sensible route to take when analysing the data. After having identified and sorted key themes, the theoretical framework was expanded and adapted. In a final step, the empirical chapters were written, by using the organising themes that were identified previously, and by going back to the detailed field data. The overarching research question was carefully kept in mind while writing these chapters in order to connect specific examples with the broader picture, and to eventually give a coherent answer to the research question.

Most of the hand-written notes from the field were only digitised when back in London. Interviews were inserted into the computer-based program NVivo, which is used to organise qualitative data (Crang, 2005: 221). This process entailed a re-familiarisation with the data, which helped to write the empirical (and theoretical) chapters in an efficient way (cf. ibid.). The process of digitising the data entailed sorting and coding it in a systematic qualitative text analysis. In a first step, the data was coded into various cate-

gories of respondents, such as government officials, international organisations, refugees, and local Tanzanians. In a second step, parts of interviews were coded into several key themes within the software. Most codes were "*emic*" ones, i.e. those that are used by the informants themselves, but some were "*etic*" ones, i.e. those that are assigned by the analyst to describe events and attribute theories (ibid., 2005: 224). In reality, many codes are a combination of the two (ibid.: 225). Nevertheless, the epistemological basis of any qualitative research depends on *emic* and *etic* codes. Traditional qualitative research has judged its accounts more reliable the closer they are to representing the world-view of the informants (ibid.: 226). On the other hand, *etic* codes, which are directly related to theory, can uncover unsaid structures (ibid.). This research presents a combination of both coding strategies; but especially Chapter 6 uses *emic* codes in order to represent the point of view of the respondents. In both types of coding, quotes are used to make analytical points.

A further approach used for writing was to identify important research moments and experiences that underlined the argument made in a particular chapter, and that could tell a story (cf. Murchison, 2010: 176). Having participated in these events or moments gives particularly strong evidence to some analytical points made – possibly even more so than some accounts given by respondents, which may have been altered in the course of transmission of the information to me. The importance of some of these research moments – such as the inauguration of class rooms in Ulyankulu (see Chapter 5) – only became clear to me during the writing process.

Some contradictions in the data can be a reflection of tensions between different perspectives of respondents, or of their idiosyncrasies (Murchison, 2010). Some of these contradictions form an important part of the analytic points made, and they have revealed the prevalence of certain powerful discourses (this is apparent especially in Chapter 5). On the whole, data analysis aimed to show the most detailed and complete picture that could be obtained from the data collected in the field, without ignoring or neglecting to reveal tensions and contradictory perspectives.

3.4   The Field: Research Proceedings

3.4.1   *Field Work Preparations: London, UK, and Stone Town, Zanzibar*

Before starting the field work in Tanzania, various preparations were made. Whilst still in London, I received training in quantitative and qualitative research methodology, and I participated in classes concerning contemporary debates in Human Geography as well as humanitarianism before passing the upgrade from MPhil to PhD status in December 2012. A three-month Swahili language course at the School of Oriental and African Studies served as a foundation for further language training in Tanzania. Finally, I applied to the Commission of Science and Technology (COSTECH) in Dar es Salaam for a research permit and obtained information about health, safety, and visa regulations.

Eventually, before embarking on the main period of research, I stayed for two months in February and March 2012 in Stone Town, Zanzibar, in order to participate in an intensive language course at the TAKILUKI Institute for Foreign Languages on Zanzibar. By living in a host family, I did not only practise my Swahili but also learned about key aspects of Zanzibari culture and way of living.

3.4.2   *Field site 1: Dar es Salaam*

The first main field site was Dar es Salaam. Upon arrival, the research permit that I applied for at that Commission of Science and Technology (COSTECH) was issued. The second permit, issued by the Refugee Services Department at the Ministry of Home Affairs, which was needed to enter the settlements, could be secured shortly thereafter. Mainly through Dr. Kweka at the University of Dar es Salaam, I gained a clearer conception about my stay in Ulyankulu settlement, discussing key practical questions of working with a research assistant, transport and accommodation in Ulyankulu. The stay in Dar es Salaam proved to be a good foundation for the next step: research in Ulyankulu settlement. My first field research in Tabora and Ulyankulu settlement therefore took place in the month of April 2012 – see Section 3.4.3 below.

After an insightful first stay in Tabora region and in the settlement, I returned to Dar es Salaam. During the month of May, I conducted contextual interviews (in English) with

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government spokespersons, international organisations and the media: Refugee Services at the MHA, Prime Minister's Office of Regional Administration and Local Government (PMO-RALG), headquarters of the UNHCR, TCRS, REDESO as well as a journalist working for The Guardian in Tanzania.

Gaining access to these interview partners was not a simple task. Some interviews took place spontaneously, for example at TCRS, and some were arranged far in advance, for example at the UNHCR and at the MHA. One politician finally agreed to conduct a phone interview with me after I had contacted him repeatedly over the course of several weeks. Besides the UNHCR, of which I had obtained a valid and helpful email address prior to arrival in Tanzania by another researcher, my preferred method was to present myself in person to the ministry or NGO in question. This is because most websites were out-dated and did not present current email addresses or telephone numbers. Even to find the physical place was not obvious – addresses in Tanzania in general are often vague. In other cases an interview could be arranged for another day. This way, I was ultimately able to secure interviews with all organisations I had planned to speak to. Some additional interviews with parliamentarians were not possible to arrange, since the MPs were in parliamentary session in Dodoma at the time I was prepared to meet them.

In Dar es Salaam, some secondary data could be obtained as well, such as census data of 2002, data on Tabora region and Urambo district held by the National Bureau of Statistics, a map of Tabora at the Mapping Division, and literature on refugees at the library of Dar es Salaam University was obtained. After long waiting times and perseverance, a residence permit of Class C was acquired as well. Although I had originally anticipated to get affiliated with the university and/or possibly the UNHCR, ultimately, my choice of staying independent helped me to maintain maximum flexibility for the research. Nevertheless, the libraries of the university and the research institution REPOA (Research on Poverty Alleviation), as well as COSTECH offered valuable services to me.

After a longer period of field research in Ulyankulu during the months of June, July and August, Dar es Salaam served as a point of reflection on the material collected in the settlement in September and October. This time was especially valuable since recorded interviews could not be transcribed in Ulyankulu due to lack of electricity as well as time constraints. Furthermore, I created an updated plan, detailing how to proceed during the last stage of the research in Ulyankulu.

In Dar es Salaam I was able to familiarise myself with various parts of the city, and kept up to date with current affairs. During the months spent in Dar es Salaam, I stayed in various places, including Mwenge, Mwananyamala, Mikocheni and Kigamboni. Staying in these places allowed me to gain experience with Tanzanian urban living conditions and domestic routines, food, economic life, family (gender) roles and my role of being a foreigner, and with inter-faith and inter-ethnic interactions. Further, I gained insights into some aspects of Tanzanian culture(s) by visiting music, and arts performances, and historical exhibitions. Later, when some of my respondents in Ulyankulu referred to Dar es Salaam, I could connect to their experiences.

While staying in Dar es Salaam, I used some time to travel to different places within Tanzania. The impressions gained in other areas within Tanzania allowed me to appreciate the differences between those regions and Tabora. In the city of Mwanza, the heart of Sukumaland, I was for example able to visit a museum about Sukuma culture, which helped me understand the background of this ethnic group, which also lives in Tabora.

3.4.3 Field site 2: Ulyankulu settlement and surroundings

The second and main research site was Ulyankulu settlement. In fact, there are only few studies located in Ulyankulu settlement in particular. The International Refugee Rights Initiative in collaboration with other institutions published a working paper series[4] on refugees in all three so-called 'Old Settlements' (Mishamo, Katumba and Ulyankulu) but there are not many other in-depth studies. A policy-oriented evaluation concerning the protracted case of the Burundian refugees in Tanzania caseload was published jointly by the UNHCR and a Danish team (Nordic Consulting Group, 2010) – it mentions key points about the settlements, for example on economic productivity, but does not present its more detailed history, governance, spatiality or in-depth experiences of belonging and waiting of the people living there. Furthermore, a group of Norwegian students wrote a field report about the naturalisation process (Kurtovic et al., 2011, unpublished). In Malkki's (1995a) research in Mishamo settlement, narratives about early camp-life in Ulyankulu settlement emerged but these only refer to the time span of 1972 to 1979.

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[4](Hovil and Kweka, 2008; Hovil and Kweka, 2009; Hovil, 2009; and Hovil, 2013).

Other scholars only make isolated remarks about Ulyankulu settlement (for example Daley, 1991: 199#39; Turner, 2010: 35).

In order to understand the nature of fieldwork in this place, it is important to gain an insight into some demographic and spatial details. Across the three settlements, and also in Ulyankulu by itself, 78% of refugees are born in Tanzania, and only 22% were born in Burundi (cf. Figure 3.1 below).

Ulyankulu can be described as a remote rural area – the next city (Tabora) is more than one hour away, even if taking the fastest transport means available (i.e. private vehicles). However, it is less isolated from its surroundings nowadays than Mishamo settlement, where Malkki (1995a) located her study. Borders around the settlement are not clearly demarcated – at most one can see a sign or a post indicating the start of the settlement in some places. The settlement is surrounded by Tanzanian villages. Buses and mini-buses to the city of Tabora and other smaller towns are available on the main square in the settlement. These operate once per day; most of them around 6 a.m. at a cost of TZS 5,000 one way.[5] It takes between one and a half to three hours (during rainy season) to reach Tabora. From Tabora, buses return to Ulyankulu later in the morning and in the afternoon.

Figure 3.1: Place of Birth by Settlement
Source: SA3 (2007:17)

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[5]TZS 5,000 equalled GBP 1.97, at an exchange rate of 0.0004 on 30 November 2012.

Since the settlement area is vast – about 1,200 km² according to an estimate by the UNHCR (2005, cited in Kweka, 2007), 1,000 km² (Malkki, 1995a) or 490 km², taking another estimate (SA3, 2007), and consisting of eleven villages, it was clear that it would take time to get to know the spatiality of the place. It was thus decided not to split time between the three old settlements although I obtained permission by COSTECH and the MHA to access all three settlements. Houses in the settlement are oftentimes far apart. In order to reach a village, which is not adjacent to Kaswa, the central village in the settlement, one has to use a vehicle in order to make best use of one's time. However, from VETA vocational training school in Kaswa, where I lived, the market, the compound of UNHCR, TCRS and the village chairman of Kaswa, Ulyankulu Secondary School, the Catholic Church, Centre Baptist Church, the police station and the mosque of Ulyankulu were within walking distance.

The difference in the two estimates of the settlement area mentioned above stem from the fact that both the refugee settlement (Ulyankulu settlement) and the larger administrative unit around it (Ulyankulu division) bear the name 'Ulyankulu'. The smaller estimate might consider the settlement only, whereas the larger numbers may refer to the division. According to maps drawn by TCRS, twelve villages belong to the settlement: Mirambo, Kaswa, Ikonongo, Mbeta, Mkindo, Makonge, Kanindo, Kanindo B, Usigala, Taba, Imara, and Keza. Population statistics of these villages and their embeddedness in the administrative structure of Tabora region can be seen in Table 3.2 below.

Tabora Region (1 of 30 in the Republic of Tanzania)[6]

Kaliua District (1 of 7 in Tabora, with 21 wards) [previously Urambo District (1/6, 26 wards)] Mwongozo Division [previously Ulyankulu Division (1 of 4 in Urambo)] Ulyankulu Settlement (containing 3 wards of 11 total in Ulyankulu Division)					
Kanindo Ward	22,561	Milambo Ward	25,933	Igombe Mkulu Ward	17,308
Usigala	6,432	Ikonongo	6,897	Keza	5,243
Mapigano	3,447	Kaswa	10,748	Imara	4,974
Mbeta	5,388	Mkindo	5,088	Taba	7,091
Kanindo	7,294	Makonge	3,200		

Table 3.2: Village Population Statistics, Ulyankulu Settlement

Source: based on Census 2012 data

The first TCRS map below (Figure 3.2) is a simplification of the second map (Figure 3.3). In the map by the UNHCR (2009) (Figure 3.4), only eleven villages are listed; Mirambo and Kanindo B are omitted. Kanindo B was a possible extension to the settlement, which had not been built by 2009. Kaswa is indicated where Mirambo was mentioned previously, and Mapigano, a new village, is placed where Kaswa was listed. These changes were nominal only.[7] Maps cannot be easily obtained in the settlement. The one of 1979 used to hang in the office of the *Chama cha Mapinduzi* (CCM) party[8] in the market square in Kaswa; and the map by UNHCR (2009) can be found in the settlement officer's building, which is remote from the centre. As of August 2012, Ulyankulu division included eleven wards: Uyowa, Silambo, Kanindo, Milambo, Igombemkulu, Ichemba, Mwongozo, Kanoge, Sasu, Seleli, and Kashishi, which each consist of several villages. Out of these wards, only three are part of the settlement: Kanindo, Milambo, and Igombemkulu (see Annex 8, listing villages belonging to each ward outside of the settlement). In order to understand the embeddedness of Ulyankulu settlement in its surroundings, and possible interactions between refugees and the local Tanzanian population, it was planned to visit some villages outside of the settlement in addition to those inside.

Ultimately, research was conducted in Ichemba village and Makingi village in Ichemba ward, which is located on the way to Tabora on the south-western side of the settlement. Furthermore, I visited Songambele village and Mwendakulima village in Uyowa ward in the west of the settlement, and Nsungwa village, which is located on the way to Kahama in the north of the settlement. Furthermore, it was planned to conduct interviews with the district commission in Urambo and the regional administration in Tabora. During the period of research, Kaliua became the new district, to which Ulyankulu belongs, and interviews were conducted there as well.

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[7] Conversation with UNHCR officer, 6.1.2014

[8] This office was used by the division officer of Ulyankulu, who belonged to the CCM. Beyond this function, no political activities of the CCM took place in 2012. Allegedly, government officers used to come to Ulyankulu for different functions, but no specific refugee involvement in these is known.

Figure 3.2: Map of Ulyankulu Settlement (1)
Source: Tanganyika Christian Refugee Service (unpublished)

Figure 3.3: Map of Ulyankulu Settlement (2)
Source: TCRS (1979)

Figure 3.4: Map of Ulyankulu Settlement (3)
Source: UNHCR (2009)

3.5   Ethics

3.5.1   *Researcher reflexivity and negotiating positionality*

This section aims at uncovering some of the dynamics between the respondents and me in the field to fulfil the premise of being a reflexive researcher. It is pertinent to assume that the findings of my research were to some extent influenced by my identity traits including gender, race, religion and nationality in a post-colonial setting. Kleinsasser (2000, in Huggins and Glebbeek 2009: 9) defines researcher reflexivity as "(a) the process of critical self-reflection on one's biases, theoretical predispositions, preferences; (b) an acknowledgement of the inquirer's place in the setting, context, or social phenomenon he or she seeks to understand and a means for a critical examination of the entire research process." Relating to part b) above, Huggins and Glebbeek (ibid.) speak of "ethnographic positionality", which they define as "a researcher's location within existing hierarchies of power and the ways in which the researcher's identity and affiliations are positioned among and by others". Considering my positionality, I faced advantages as well as disadvantages.

First, it is to mention that through my educational background in Europe and the fact that I am a white researcher, I have different epistemological and ontological foundations than an African, or in this case Tanzanian or Burundian, researcher. Surely, this influenced my research design. The knowledge gained by an outsider can on the one hand be more neutral than that of a cultural insider but it can also be less complete or insightful. The hope of a cultural outsider is to have a different perspective than an insider, one who does not take processes and behaviours for granted.

Gurney (1985) suggests that women may encounter various problems, such as exclusion by an all-male fraternity, sexual hustling, and being treated with paternalism. She also suggests that one way of finding out whether gender is an issue is to observe how other women in the setting are treated by males. Speaking about refugees in Mishamo settlement and Kigoma town, researchers Liisa Malkki and others noticed that it is difficult to interview refugee women in this male dominated environment (1995a: 50-51). Women spoke in short sentences instead of more sustained narrative forms, they were frightened of the female researcher and referred to their male family members to be interviewed instead of them (ibid.). In Ulyankulu, women were generally more reserved

than men; and the majority of respondents are male, especially in the first generation. However, about one third of respondents overall are female – they pronounced their experiences and points of view clearly.

As Gurney (1985) suggests, novice fieldworkers are advised to adopt a passive or non-assertive role vis-a-vis setting members. At the same time however, the researcher is not supposed to be viewed as incompetent; and a transition towards a more knowledgeable and professional role should occur over time. The various groups of people I interviewed – including government, UNHCR, most refugees and local Tanzanians readily answered my questions and offered insights beyond what I was asking – which I take to be a sign of a combination of being non-threatening and yet knowledgeable as well as understanding. In Ulyankulu settlement, respondents had experience with other female researchers, with African origin and from European countries, such as Dr. Opportuna Kweka, Dr. Liisa Malkki and four female Norwegian students, who came to the settlement a year before me. These experiences may have positively influenced their acceptance of my presence as a female researcher.

Tanzanians and refugees were generally open towards me; but few of the refugees were hesitant when they saw me for the first time. These refugees might have been apprehensive about the fact that I lived with Tanzanians (as described below) and feared links to the government. In one case, a woman who had previously agreed to being interviewed was at first reserved when I visited her, and gave short answers. Later, however, she appeared to be proud that I had come to see her in another village that day. The research required juggling multiple research interactions: interviewing Tanzanians in positions of power would require less time and debriefing than interviews with refugees. It required more time and trust to make them feel at ease. Despite the fact that I lived with Tanzanians, respondents gained trust over time due to continuous interaction with them on a day-to-day basis in public and private spaces. While not constituting a problem, factors of gender and language may have altered some dynamics. A few refugee respondents chose to speak more to my research assistants than to me – probably both because it was easier to communicate with them in Swahili and because they were male. Overall, the presence of my assistants was an advantage since they could fluently communicate with all actors. The respondents accepted them as representing me as an interpreter (*mfasiri*) and assistant (*msaidizi*).

Various strategies to negotiate my positionality in the field were employed. Instead of staying with government or UNHCR employees, I decided to stay on the VETA compound with a Tanzanian female administrator (see also plates in Annex 9). VETA teachers and students include Tanzanians from anywhere in the country, as well as refugees from Ulyankulu. As a learning institution guarded by security, it is comparatively neutral and safe. VETA is a respected vocational training school with branches in most Tanzanian cities. In general, I introduced myself as a student conducting research (*mwanafunzi anayefanya utafiti*) because many people did not know the meaning of a PhD thesis (*tasnifu*) and as a student I would be non-threatening.

However, as in real life, I assumed several identities. Huggins and Glebbeek (2009: 5) note that oftentimes the female researcher becomes excluded from the status of "research scientist". In a private setting, while in the beginning I was seen as a 'guest' (*mgeni*) by my hosts, I was increasingly seen as a sister '*dada*'. I do not have the impression that my domestic role as '*dada*' undermined my researcher status. Next to '*mama*', a term used for married women with children, '*dada*' or '*shemeji*' (sister in law), as some called me, are favourable terms for women (*msichana, mwanamke*) presupposing a relationship of trust. These terms show that I was 'part of the family'. They refer to an 'insider' in contrast to a 'guest' (*mgeni*) or 'white person' (*mzungu*). In terms of clothing, I neither belonged to the young students in uniforms, nor to the office workers in suits or to the farming women wearing a combination of Western clothes and African *kitenge*. My clothes most closely resembled those of urban university students, such as I saw in Dar es Salaam.

In terms of religion, I perceived it as beneficial to show that I was close in faith to both refugees and Tanzanians in the settlement (as a Lutheran Christian), in whose day-to-day lives religion plays a major role. During my research, the Catholic Church provided essential help in terms of transport, food and information. This link was facilitated by my second research assistant, who already knew the (Tanzanian) priests from previous research visits. During the time of research, Burundian and Tanzanian clerics of various denominations invited me to their churches and facilitated interviews. While there is a Muslim minority in the camp and many of the surrounding Sukuma and Nyamwezi people do not have an official religion; the overwhelming majority of settlement residents are Christian. Due to the interaction with the Catholic Church in particular, some may have wondered whether I came as part of a religious mission. The fact that I used the UNHCR and TCRS facilities to access wireless internet from time to time made some believe that I

belonged to the UNHCR as one of my respondents told me. Due to my multiple connections, however, I do not think that any of these positionalities were enforced permanently.

Respondents who saw me for the first time called me '*mzungu*' (white person). Since I was the only white person staying in the settlement for a long time during the year of 2012, '*mzungu*' would be a clear identity marker and refer to me only. The term '*mzungu*' suggests wealth and in reality often turns into meaning 'white sponsor'. Respondents indeed asked for money for their children's school fees, for bricks to build a house, to repair equipment or for drinks. As Gurney (1985) notes, research oftentimes relies on a reciprocal exchange relationship with respondents. Expected favours for respondents can range from small ones like running errands or providing rides to illegal and immoral ones. It is important, therefore, to define the limits of such exchanges. In the beginning of the research I chose not to give any money to respondents in order to ensure equality between participants and to ensure that their consent is truly voluntary. Since many interviews were conducted at a person's home, it was not expected to invite them for drinks or food. Many interviews took place between harvesting and planting seasons, so people would be at home on non-market days, willing to speak to me. Some of the respondents invited me for food or soda. Towards the end of the research, I gave goods such as soaps (which they had asked for) to one church, and participated in fundraising events '*harambee*' of two other churches – one of which occurred after a ceremony and another after a service. In both cases every guest donated. I avoided individual donations as much as possible however. In general I realised that people have a different understanding of money than in Europe: one is expected to share it with relatives, close friends and people in need. Despite the outsider connotations that the status of a '*mzungu*' brings about, this status also opened many doors. The cultural preference for light skin rendered me in a privileged position, which allowed me to speak to all actors involved (see also Goldstein, 2009: 228, writing in a Brazilian context).

Finally, in the post-colonial setting of Tanzania, my race (as a white person), my nationality (being German) and the place of my university (in London) could invoke colonial resentments and bias. As said previously, being white I was often seen as a 'sponsor' but I did not perceive any negative sentiments due to that. This could have been different if I was from Belgium as that country was the colonial power in Burundi. A few respondents compared the Burundians' situation to the Jews who were dispersed in the world. This

shows that the Burundian refugees feel themselves to be a distinct and oppressed people in search for their own place to live in peace.

In general, not being formally affiliated with any group or project within the settlement was beneficial. People were able to make up their own minds of whether they wanted to be interviewed or not. It was an advantage that the second and third research assistants had some insider knowledge because of having conducted research in Ulyankulu previously or living in the settlement permanently.

3.5.2 *Dealing with risks in the field*

Given the fact that I was a (white) female researcher in a male dominated setting, avoiding security risks was an important concern at the outset of the research. While living on Zanzibar and in Dar es Salaam, for example, I experienced robbery, a two-hour non-violent express kidnapping in a taxi by organised criminals. Therefore, the question of what is an acceptable and what is an unacceptable risk while doing research in general, and in Ulyankulu settlement, needed to be reconsidered. As noted in Huggins and Glebbeek (2009: 3) we cannot know when we are in danger but rely on heuristic devices to evaluate our risk. Familiar routines and assumptions about personal safety can be comforting fictions. Researchers are therefore advised to craft a safe research space and to seek cultural insider information about danger and security. Although Tanzania is known for being peaceful and people as hospitable, Tanzanian and expatriate acquaintances affirmed that the way to Tabora was not safe – accidents are frequent and buses had been hijacked several times. It was not advisable to arrive in the city alone in the dark after the 14 hour ride from Dar es Salaam. However, this turned out to be the only possible way: at the start of my fieldwork in Ulyankulu, the ostensibly 'safe' first class of the train from Dar es Salaam to Tabora was not operating, so I was discouraged from taking the train. The UNHCR and TCRS use a helicopter between Dar es Salaam and Mwanza and then go to Ulyankulu by bus, which still takes about six hours. However, they follow their own schedule on a needs basis, so this route was not an option to me.

The security risks referred to above were not attributed to the fact that I would be in a refugee settlement. Despite the long history of violence in refugee settings and the fact that Burundian refugees were said to possess and trade weapons at least in Kigoma

region, I did not necessarily expect that there would be more security risks for me in the settlement than elsewhere in the country. This is because there was no sign in the existing literature that refugees in Ulyankulu would be more violent or criminal than any other (Tanzanian) citizens. In the course of the research, however, the question of whether these refugees were in fact "dangerous" was investigated especially in response to such allegations made by certain research participants, as Chapter 5 shows. One concern at the outset of my research in relation to the refugees in Ulyankulu was related to ethnicity. Were the refugees all victims or had they been also perpetrators in the ethnic violence in Burundi? Had some of them been involved in the ethnic strife in Burundi in the 1990s? Literature on Ulyankulu settlement mentions that refugees in Ulyankulu are all Hutu (and hence assumed to be victims of violence in Burundi in the 1970s) but in fact there are also people of Tutsi origin (who may have been perpetrators in the conflict then). However, it became clear that there were only a few 'tolerated' Tutsi families in the settlement. Furthermore, more than 80% of the refugees are now in the second generation and do not maintain strong ties to Burundi, as is discussed in Chapter 6. There is no evidence that refugees fleeing in the 1990s came to Ulyankulu. In the camps that were opened in the 1990s, the situation is different: Hutu and Tutsi, victims and perpetrators lived in the same camp (Turner, 2010). Turner (ibid.: 18) mentions that he was seen by some as a spy sent by the Tutsi. In fact, despite being white, a Rwandese Tutsi I once met outside of the settlement told me that I looked like a Tutsi. Luckily, these allegations were not voiced by the (Hutu) refugees.

3.5.3   *Ethical responsibility towards respondents and assistants*

While it is necessary to critically discuss my role in the settlement, it is even more important to look at the protection of informants. First, the research permit by the Government of Tanzania allowed me to generally interview anyone in the research areas in Dar es Salaam, Tabora region and Ulyankulu settlement. After presenting myself to the regional commissioner in Tabora, to the district council in Urambo, and to the settlement officer, I had to show my permits to some respondents and once to the immigration officers, who spontaneously checked on me. It was important to behave in a transparent and non-suspicious manner since the government could have prevented the extension of

my research permit. However, ethical clearance is not a one-off event but an on-going process alongside the research.

Despite the fact that I was allowed to officially interview people anywhere within the settlement, most interviews were conducted *in situ*. That means they were conducted at a person's home or at a site of their choice where s/he spends time in his or her day to day life. Sometimes interviews were conducted in private places that gatekeepers recommended – e.g. a room in a church. This ensured that they could feel at ease in their surroundings, instead of travelling to a secret place to be interviewed. As Huggins and Glebbeek mention (2009: 15), in a society ruled by fear and secrecy, secrecy itself could call attention to a foreigner talking to a national; so it is helpful to "hide in the open" and to let the respondent select a public place where the interaction would not be likely to cause suspicion. At the outset of my research I did not know to what extent fear and secrecy play a role in the settlement but being aware of Turner's (2010) research about rumours in Lukole refugee camp in Tanzania, it seemed advisable not to stir additional rumours. Therefore, as long as the interviewee was comfortable with it, it was accepted when the family or neighbours joined during the interview out of curiosity – they could see that the topics discussed were not dangerous and did not raise the interviewee to a privileged position. In interviews where neighbours and family were present, the informant may have spoken less freely. On the other hand, some bystanders intervened and added valuable information to the interview. Whenever possible, the context of the interview is explained in Chapters 6 and 7 in order for the reader to understand the situatedness of the quote at the time. Conducting interviews *in situ* prevented any suspicions being raised by the government and by other refugees; and that they would strain a person's time and resources. This strategy was once jeopardised when government officials suddenly joined at a public place that was chosen for the interview. When they inquired what I was talking about, I ended the interview and left the site in order to protect the respondent.

All respondents participated in the research freely and voluntarily. The purpose of the study was clearly explained to them before the interview: in case of refugees who did not speak English, I mentioned in Swahili that my research was for my university in London, and it was about life in Ulyankulu, i.e. how people live there and what they do in their everyday lives. I asked them whether it was possible to ask them a few questions. Interviewees thus gave their verbal consent at the beginning of the interview and were told that names, specific dates and places would be anonymised. They were able to withdraw from

an interview at any time. In a few interviews some apparently sensitive questions were answered by "*hamna*", which I have taken to mean "I don't want to answer this question". Underage respondents were only interviewed when their parents were informed or when their teachers facilitated the interview. Concerning participant observation, it was not possible to attain consent by all participants. Disclosing my research aims may have been intrusive in the refugees' day-to-day lives and could have altered the findings. However, throughout the time of field research I was transparent and honest about the nature and purpose of the research and the community knew that I was a researcher. Anonymity and confidentiality are upheld in order to ensure the safety and dignity of the participants.

As mentioned above, interviews with refugees who already obtained citizenship certificates were not conducted in Dar es Salaam in order to protect their safety. Instead of pushing respondents to answer sensitive questions, in some cases it seemed advisable to accept that they were reluctant to answer them – since insider knowledge of "dangerous pieces of information" could put both me and respondents in danger (Huggins and Glebbeek, 2009: 19). This was even more so since I was clearly visible at all times; and the settlement officer was updated about my whereabouts: "I heard you went to Urambo yesterday." When asking first generation respondents about their past experiences for example about the war in Burundi and the flight to Tanzania, it was clear that these could increase the respondents' pain. The detail of their answers was left to the interviewees' discretion. Those who did decide to speak in more detail about it were clearly emotionally touched by the theme.

Despite the fact that the research project was explained to the respondents, some people wanted to know about the purpose of this study or of research in general in greater detail. One cleric, for example, asked whether I could do more for the refugees than his church, the government and the international organisations. After explaining the reasons for doing research in general and in my particular case, for example to make otherwise lost voices heard to a wider public, he supported my cause. One respondent owned Malkki's (1995a) book *Purity in Exile* and was proud that he was going to be part of a new study. He and others asked for a copy of my research once it would be finished, and I promised to send one.

A recurring ethical dilemma concerned neutrality when involving various actors in the research. It was difficult not to 'choose sides' – the one of the Tanzanians, Burundians or of international organisations. I felt that it is my ethical responsibility towards cer-

tain respondents to at least raise awareness and inquire about their problems with the UNHCR without revealing names. Unfortunately, I am not sure whether the resulting critical discussions have led to changes in their lives.

3.6   Conclusion

Despite the practical challenges encountered both in the urban setting of Dar es Salaam and the rural setting in Ulyankulu, field research was largely conducted as envisaged prior to arriving in Tanzania. Throughout the year of 2012, a broad range of actors were interviewed, and settings and events experienced through participant observation. The objective of the research design of becoming a participant observer in the settlement was therefore accomplished. The period of field research in Tanzania offered interesting and at times surprising or intriguing answers to the research questions. Overall the choice of research design and methods allowed to gain a deep and multifaceted insight into the dynamics surrounding this protracted refugee situation. By carefully considering the information given by various sources, the empirical data analysis in following chapters aims to give a balanced representation of the situation. A critical reflection on the ethics surrounding this project, including strategies of positionality and responsibilities, illustrates the many decisions that a researcher has to make on a day-to-day basis; and the dilemmas and implications that these can bring about. Following various precautions, it was possible to uphold both the respondents' and my own safety in the field. Due to and despite the various challenges encountered, I developed personal ties to the actors involved, and I increasingly became an insider to local knowledge.

PHASES OF GOVERNANCE IN ULYANKULU SETTLEMENT AND EVOLUTION OF TANZANIA'S REFUGEE POLICY

This chapter details the evolution of the spatiality, economic situation and local governance of the area called Ulyankulu both internally and within the region with reference to the broader evolution of Tanzania's refugee policy, in four main phases (Phase 0 to Phase 3) before and after the creation of the settlement in 1972.

Composed of three arguments, this chapter will firstly reveal how policies of control by colonial powers and the Tanzanian government have shifted and evolved in several stages from colonial to post-colonial times. Despite the fact that President Nyerere welcomed the refugees in a spirit of pan-Africanism, there are continuities from colonial times concerning control over the environment and the population, which can be traced through all phases of governance in the settlement. However, in the very last phase (Phase 3), the settlement was administratively invisibilised because it was supposed to be closed. While this phase is characterised by non-maintenance and abandonment of social services in the settlement, it needs to be seen in the broader context of control since the plan was to relocate the entire refugee population to other regions, and to locally integrate them in receiving regions in an organised and controlled way.

Secondly, this chapter also shows how the treatment of refugees has been similar to that of citizens within the settlement, as they were induced to actively participate in government structures since their arrival in the settlement, and especially during Phase 2. This involvement bears signs of both agency and control. Refugees were, on the one hand, induced by the government to engage in 'self-help', and on the other hand they actively worked on the overall socio-economic development in the settlement and in improving services by their own choices that were central in their everyday lives. They were thereby both participating in citizenship self-making and were being made citizens by the state.

In this process they created a sense of home, which, as argued in Chapter 6, is a main pre-requisite for developing a sense of belonging. At the same time, however, the government developed an increasingly restrictive view on refugee matters.

Thirdly, local Tanzanians have been reclaiming space in the settlement since Phase 2 due to their historical attachment to the land, which dates back to Chief Mirambo's times (Phase 0). Nowadays, Refugees and Tanzanians have been integrating because they both inhabit the same space. The presence of Tanzanians in the settlement is another important prerequisite for developing a sense of belonging, as argued in Chapter 6.

Chronologically speaking, in the 19$^{\text{th}}$ century (Phase 0), Ulyankulu was the centre of Chief Mirambo's kingdom. Later, during British colonial times (1919-1962), the area was evacuated due to tsetse flies. Since the area was vacant, it was used again under President Nyerere's *ujamaa* policy to host tens of thousands of refugees from Burundi, who arrived in Tanzania in 1972. In Phase 1, the Ministry of Home Affairs worked together with the UNHCR and its implementing partner TCRS to build a basic infrastructure. Refugee village leaders were installed and refugees started to cultivate cash and food crops. Since refugees in Ulyankulu became self-reliant in 1985 (Phase 2), the settlement was embedded in local government structures and it turned into a major trading centre in the region. Although a separation between refugees and Tanzanian citizens was maintained by policing the settlement borders, an increasing number of Tanzanians managed to move to the settlement. In Phase 3, the Burundian refugees were included in a naturalization initiative, which was then put on hold and the settlement was administratively invisibilised.

4.1   Phase 0: Ulyankulu Before the Refugees Arrived

4.1.1   *Tanzanians' historical claims to the land: Ulyankulu as centre of Mirambo's chiefdom*

While the Government of Tanzania officially does not allow local Tanzanian citizens to live in the settlement, local Nyamwezi and Sukuma believe it is their right to live in the area. They do not accept the borders to the settlement, and justify their claims to live in the settlement by invoking their historical attachment to the land. In fact, Ulyankulu has been inhabited by Nyamwezi and other ethnic groups for centuries preceding colonial times. Furthermore, interaction with Burundians is not new for the Nyamwezi: Burun-

dian slaves were taken by the powerful Nyamwezi Chief Mirambo in the 19th century and have lived close to Ulyankulu settlement until today. This experience may have shaped local Nyamwezi attitudes towards the presence of the Burundian refugees when they arrived in the area.

Chief Mirambo who reigned over the territory in the last century from 1860 to 1884, is the most renowned ruler in Nyamwezi history. The three chiefdoms of Uyowa, Ulyankulu and Busagari formed the territorial base for Chief Mirambo's activities (see Figure 4.1; Abrahams, 1967). While not belonging to the Nyamwezi aristocracy, he was able to install himself as the Chief of Urambo with the help of trade with ivory and slaves, as well as Western firearms and money. While Chief Mirambo had a good relationship with Europeans, his rule was characterised by antagonism towards Arab traders who were powerful in the region. Tabora was an important base on their trade route extending to Zanzibar. At that time, many neighbouring chiefs joined Chief Mirambo as his allies (ibid.). Those who refused to join him were raided by his forces. However, Chief Mirambo was never the ruler of a centralised Nyamwezi 'empire' or kingdom, as some sources claim. Rather he was the ruler of a loose confederacy of chiefdoms (ibid.). This confederacy expanded to Lake Tanganyika in the South-West and to Buganda in the North.

During his rule, Chief Mirambo went to fight in Burundi and brought back slaves to his kingdom (Kabeya, 1966; Kimambo and Temu, 1969). These slaves used to be called the 'Bagulwe' – 'those who were bought', stemming from the verb *baguru* – 'to buy' in Kisumbwa – or 'Basese' – 'those who are working without payment' (interview with G1). These Bagulwe/Basese eventually blended into the tribe of the Sumbwa, to which Chief Mirambo's father belonged. They used to live in the area of Uyowa, adjacent to Ulyankulu (to compare to a more recent map of the area, see Figure 4.2 below).[1] The superior attitude that Tanzanians presumably had towards the slaves may have impacted on the local Tanzanians' opinion of the refugees. On the other hand, there were rumours in Ulyankulu settlement that the Chief was of Burundian descent himself. Such a connection may have had a positive influence on the relationship between Tanzanians and Burundians in Ulyankulu. However, this connection could not be confirmed by a descendant of Chief Mirambo in the settlement. He explained, however, that Chief Mirambo's origins are contested since he had several wives from different tribes.

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[1] Ulyankulu derives from "walima kata" in Kinyamwezi, which means "farmers with traditional cups" (these cups are hollowed out and look like a pumpkin) (Interview with C1).

Figure 4.1: Map of Chiefdoms, Tabora District
Source: Abrahams (1967:28)

Although Chief Mirambo's chiefdom was handed over to his descendants (firstly to his younger brother Chief Mpandashalo, then to Chief Mirambo's first son Chief Katuya and then to further descendants), the confederacy fell apart after his death (Abrahams, 1967). When Tanzania attained independence in 1962, President Nyerere broke the tradition of chieftaincy and installed village executive officers instead. Chief Mirambo's legacy, however, can still be traced in Tabora region. Several schools are named after him inside and outside of Ulyankulu settlement. In Ulyankulu, tourists can visit the grave and memorial shrine for Chief Mirambo (see Plate 4.1). Acknowledging that in Africa belonging to a certain place is strongly tied to ancestral burial places (Geschiere, 2009), the grave of this important leader bears significance for the Nyamwezi's sense of belonging and attachment to the land. It is probably due to these ties that some descendants of Chief Mirambo have attained important administrative positions within the settlement.

Figure 4.2: Map of Urambo
Source: Mitchell (1984)

Plate 4.1: Shrine of Chief Mirambo in Ikonongo, Ulyankulu
Source: Author (April 2012)

*Text on the shrine: Ruler of East and Central Africa; Ruler Chief Mirambo, born: 1820, passed away: 2 Dec. 1884 [Shujaa wa Afrika Mashariki na Kati; Shujaa Mtemi Mirambo; Alizaliwa: 1820; Alifariki: 2 Des. 1884]

4.1.2   *Population control since British colonial times: Ulyankulu evacuated due to tsetse flies*

Population and environmental control has a long history in Tanzania in general, and in Ulyankulu in particular. During British Colonial times, a major concern was tsetse fly infestations, which has kept human settlement sparse and livestock populations extremely low (Surveys and Mapping Division, 1976: 21). Tsetse flies spread mainly in four regions, one of which was a corridor of cultivation stretching from Mwanza to Tabora. The British tsetse expert C.F.M. Swynnerton launched an anti-tsetse campaign in 1921 (Iliffe, 1979: 270). At the time, the British estimated that two-thirds of Tanganyika was infested with tsetse flies (Iliffe, 1979: 271). Rather than merely treating the symptoms of the livestock disease trypanosomiasis and the sleeping sickness in humans, which results from a bite of a tsetse fly, the British initiated various control measures to eliminate the flies in the early 1920s. A resettlement policy was adopted, which moved people into

settlements large enough to "prevent bush regeneration, leaving the remaining land to tsetse until natural population growth permitted recolonisation" (Iliffe, 1979: 472). The predominant approach with which to attack the flies was 'ecological intervention', including grass burning and the selective destruction of vegetation. Advances were made in five main areas across the country, in Mbulu, Usukuma, Kondoa, Usambara and Uluguru, through specially designed development schemes. These were supposed to protect the peasants and to rehabilitate eroded land (Iliffe, 1979: 472-474).

In Tabora, such schemes enforced shifts of people in and out of the region. An interview in Songambele, located adjacent to the settlement in the Uyowa Ward, revealed that "in 1934 there was an operation under Makwale [a German] to move the Waha to this area [Uyowa] because there were tsetse flies along Maragarasi River" (G1)[2]. Another informant explained:

> "In 1936, people were shifted from Mkindo to Ichemba to escape from tsetse
> flies. Also, the land became unfertile, so they were shifted to fertile soil. [...]
> The children of Chief Milambo now live at Ichemba, a village located between
> Ulyankulu and Tabora" (C1).

According to a further informant (C2), 1938-1958 was the "tsetse fly period" in Ulyankulu, in which people (mainly Nyamwezi) were sent out of the area. When refugees arrived in Ulyankulu in 1972, it was thus sparsely populated and interaction with the host population was initially limited. In the map below (Figure 4.3) one can see that the cattle distribution in Ulyankulu was extremely low until 1976, which also suggests a limited presence of Nyamwezi and Sukuma, who are predominantly pastoralists.

Refugees had to build their livelihoods from scratch; interaction with Tanzanians only occurred gradually over time. Furthermore, as will be seen below, the Tanzanian government continued to initiate population control schemes, which influenced the country (under the *ujamaa* policy; see Section 4.2.1) and refugees (see Section 4.2.4) with lasting effects.

In summary, Phase 0 was thus split in two main sub-phases: first, the Nyamwezi lived in the area, ruled, most famously, by Chief Mirambo in the late 19th century. These Nyamwezi still have an historical attachment to the land, not least because the tomb

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[2] The coding method of interviews is explained in a note under "Interviews: Table of Respondents" following the bibliography. The letter 'G' means 'government official'. Numbers follow the order of appearance of the interview in the text.

Figure 4.3: Distribution of Cattle
Source: Surveys and Mapping Division (1976)
• Cattle distribution (tradition herds) 5,000 head

of their former leader Mirambo is located in Ulyankulu. When the British colonialists arrived, they vacated the area due to environmental reasons. Population control due to environmental protection has been exercised since that time.

4.2 Phase 1: Ulyankulu as New Home of Refugees under Nyerere

4.2.1 *Refugees as a tool of domestic policy:* Ujamaa *and development*

Since Tanzania's independence in 1962, refugee policies were heavily influenced by domestic politics. Milner (2009) explains that Tanzania has hosted two types of refugees: those fleeing conflict in neighbouring (pre-) independent African states and those fleeing wars of national liberation.

The earliest settlement sites for refugees in Tanzania were built in Kagera region in order to host the 130,000 Rwandans who fled from pre-independence violence from 1959 onwards. In order to keep refugees in designated settlements and to secure financial support, a new refugee policy, the Refugees (Control) Act, 1965, spelled out various control measures. It granted the government powers to deport refugees and powers to appoint a "settlement commander to be in charge" of the settlement (Rutinwa, 1996: 292; Daley, 1991: 180; Milner, 2009; Paragraph 4(2) of the Act).

Various authors argue that the settlement of refugees represented an opportunity to attract the financial resources necessary from international donors to encourage economic development of under-populated regions of the country (Holborn, 1975; Tunga, 1987; and van Hoyweghen, 2002). This logic could be traced in the enforced relocations of refugees from Muyenzi settlement to Bushubi (Kagera region), by which the government aimed to grasp the opportunity to clear the bushes at the time still infested with tsetse flies (Milner, 2009: 111). Furthermore, 10,000[3] Rwandans were resettled by the UNHCR from the Kivu province of the Congo (Zaire) to Mwesi settlement in late 1964 (Milner, 2009: 112). This resettlement was demanded by the Congolese government, which harboured negative feelings towards Rwandese, alleging that the refugees supported rebels of the Mulele movement (Gasarasi, 1990: 92). The Tanzanian government agreed since it saw an opportunity to enhance regional security and to foster development through the refugees (Milner, 2009). The costs of this resettlement were shared by the Tripartite Partnership Model, an agreement between the Government of Tanzania, UNHCR and TCRS. Similar tripartite agreements were later concluded for all in all 13 settlements accommodating refugees from Rwanda, Burundi, Mozambique and elsewhere for about 182,000

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[3] 3,000 refugees according to Gasarasi, 1990:92

refugees between 1963 and 1979, to which the UNHCR contributed over US$ 11 million (ibid.).

Furthermore, from the late 1960s onwards the settlement of Burundian refugees and of other arriving refugees was influenced by Tanzania's national policy of socialism and self-reliance (*ujamaa na kujitegema*), which was announced on 5 February 1967 in the Arusha Declaration. The reception and settlement of various groups of refugees were inspired by these maxims. The national policy of socialism and self-reliance called for the establishment of *ujamaa* farming collectives (see Figure 4.4) to encourage self-reliance, an education system accessible to all and free provision of social services for all Tanzanian citizens. The 'villagisation' policy aimed to encourage cooperative farming of both subsistence and cash crops in mutually dependent blocks of ten huts. After initially slow implementation, Nyerere announced that the whole rural population were to live in villages by the end of 1976 – a process that involved forced relocation and eventual resettlement of 75% of mainland Tanzanians. In line with this national policy, the settlement of refugees at that time was channelled by the concepts of permanence and productivity (Milner, 2009).

4.2.2 *Refugees as a tool of foreign policy: wars of national liberation*

While refugees from (pre-) independent states were used as a tool of domestic policy (as seen above), Nyerere's support for refugees fleeing wars of national liberation illustrates his willingness to also use them as a tool of foreign policy (Milner, 2009: 113). Generally, Nyerere's foreign policy was marked by an 'open door' policy in a spirit of pan-Africanism.

Supporting the liberation movements in Southern Africa, Nyerere welcomed approximately 6,000 South Africans affiliated with the African National Congress (ANC) or the Pan-African Congress (PAC) as well as more than 50,000 Mozambicans who fled from the war of national liberation fought between FRELIMO (Liberation Front of Mozambique) and the Portuguese from 1964 to 1974 (Zolberg et al., 1989; Mendel, 1997: 39). In contrast to Burundian and Rwandan settlements, those for Mozambicans remained internally controlled by the liberation movements. FRELIMO, based outside of the settlements, waged a guerrilla war in northern Mozambique for over a decade with the support

31. Plan for a ujamaa village: Makazi
Mapya, Omulunazi, Rushwa, Tanzania

Figure 4.4: *Ujamaa* Village
Source: Scott (1998)

of Tanzania (Milner, 2009: 114). Later refugee flows include those fleeing internal power
struggles in the post-independence context, specifically Burundians and Rwandans (see
below), Ugandans fleeing from Idi Amin's rule in 1971, Mozambicans arriving between
1985 and 1989; as well as individual political refugees from Kenya and Malawi (Mendel,
1997: 40). Ugandans and Mozambicans have returned to their countries of origin (ibid.:
43).

Due to diminishing terms of trade for cash crops and general economic decline, the eco-
nomic support of *ujamaa* eroded in the 1980s. Nyerere eventually agreed to a Structural
Adjustment Programme in 1982 while still sustaining the policy of *ujamaa*. However, this
balancing act could not be sustained, and Nyerere eventually stepped down as President.
He gave way to his successor, Ali Hassan Mwinyi in 1985, who launched the Economic

Recovery Programme (ERP). The thereby taken measures eventually led to the issuance of US$800 million of credits by the IMF in 1986. However, the following austerity measures that aimed at reducing public spending resulted in an erosion of provision of education, health care and clean water, of which citizens and refugees suffered (Milner, 2009: 115). In this economic climate, hospitality towards refugees was not maintained like before. Government officials started referring to refugees as a problem and some refugees were expelled from the country.

4.2.3 *Dispersal and settlement of 1972 Burundians in Tanzania*

The following sections concern the initial settlement and reasons of dispersal of Burundian refugees from the 1970s, who were both the largest group of refugees in Tanzania at the time of fieldwork and the ones who have lived in settlements for the longest period of time. Upon arrival in Tanzania, these Burundian refugees were sent by the Tanzanian government with help of the UNHCR into one of three settlements; Mishamo, Katumba in the region of Rukwa and Ulyankulu in Tabora region. Some were also settled in towns in Kigoma region (Malkki, 1995a). In the settlements, families were granted five and some up to ten hectares of land, as well as financial assistance by the UNHCR. Infrastructure such as roads, schools, water points and administrative centres were established with the help of humanitarian agencies[4]. The three settlements, as mentioned above, were created by the Government of Tanzania along the lines of the *ujamaa* village system, which was introduced in 1973, shortly after the refugees' arrival. The arrival of the Burundians, who are known as skilled agriculturalists, was seen as a blessing for the purpose of producing cash crops, such as coffee and tobacco. Moreover, the refugee situation was expected to attract international funding. According to a headman of Katumba settlement, the refugees and the host community are 'like cousins', and the acceptance of the refugees in host areas was aided by a mutual understanding of each other's mother tongue (Nording Consulting Group, 2010: 20).

The main reason of the original dispersal of this group of Burundian refugees was political persecution by the Micombero regime in Burundi. The latter came to power when

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[4]Africa has pioneered the implementation of such agricultural settlements, and they have now been established in other parts of the world as well. According to Armstrong (1990: 196) every new settlement has encouraged the agencies involved to learn and adapt their approach – the planning of Mishamo, for instance, occurred after 15 years of experience of the TCRS.

Lieutenant-Général Michel Micombero (a Tutsi-Hima from Bururi region) overthrew the incumbent King Ntare V. Ndizeye in a coup supported by parts of the military and the *Bezi* elite in 1966.[5] While declaring Burundi a republic, he abandoned democratic structures under the pretence of bringing stability to the country. Micombero's coup signified the start of a process of militarisation and regionalisation with the Tutsi-Hima as a force in politics. Micombero banned all political parties except the party UPRONA, Union for National Progress, of which he became president and of which most members were Tutsi. An alliance was thus born between the party, the military and Tutsi hegemony. In the years until 1972 – the year of the refugees' dispersal – genocidal violence was directed against Tutsis in central provinces, the *Baganwa* elite and the Hutu majority (Daley, 2007: 66). This led to the traumatic dispersal of several hundred thousand people. While the rich (Tutsi) elite fled to Kenya and other countries abroad (e.g. Belgium), those that came to Tanzania were mainly Hutu farmers. Instead of the usually reiterated dichotomy between Hutu and Tutsi this more detailed history suggests that ethnicity was not a sufficient cause for violence but rather that regionalisation and militarisation were also significant, and that identity was more fractionalised.

4.2.4 *Initial conditions in Ulyankulu, road structure, plot allocation and resettlement to new sites*

Ulyankulu was a convenient choice for the government for the purpose of settling refugees since no-one was allowed, nor wanted to live there, and this was an opportunity to clear the bushes for the government (cf. Milner, 2009). However, the area had to be freed from tsetse flies before settling the refugees there. One respondent explained, "There were a lot of tsetse flies in Ulyankulu. When the refugees came, the UN killed them with helicopters" (G1). Aerial spraying by the UN was thus supposed to render the area inhabitable again.

Despite various control measures taken against tsetse flies, such as by local tsetse control officers reporting to a chief tsetse officer in Dar es Salaam, 60% of the country was still infested in 1976 including the area of Ulyankulu (see Figure 4.5; Surveys and Mapping Division, 1976: 21). One can infer that the fight against tsetse was still ongoing while refugees were living there. As the Voluntary Resettlement Programme in Ethiopia shows

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[5]The Bezi and the Batare historically fought for the Crown since pre-colonial times. Tensions remained until the time of the genocide (Daley 2007).

Figure 4.5: Tsetse Fly and Sleeping Sickness in Tabora
Source: Surveys and Mapping Division (1976)

◺◺◺ Areas infected with Sleeping Sickness T. rhodesiense
▨▨▨ Areas that were cleared since 1964

(Hammond, 2008), moving people into tsetse fly infested regions has also happened in other countries.

Between 1972 and 1975, 54,000 Hutu refugees were brought to Ulyankulu in several large groups, including thousands who had lived in the Tanzania-Burundi border area for several years (TCRS, 1984; cited in Malkki 1995a: 38). Many of them first stayed in Pangale camp, located at 25 kilometres from the South of Tabora town, before being shifted to Ulyankulu (interview with C2). Malkki (1995a) notes that transporting refugees to camp sites was a significant step towards instilling order and regularising their lives. The refugees themselves, however, perceived their surroundings as a dangerous wilderness and referred to it as 'the forest'. According to Christensen (1985) there were a great variety of snakes and the last lion was seen in 1977 when a refugee woman was attacked.

Early infrastructure: creating the grid-like road structure

Within Ulyankulu settlement, some control over the environment was exerted by building a grid-like road structure that connected the villages with roads built by the UNHCR. One respondent explained:

> "They constructed roads starting with Roads 1-19. Road 19 ends at Ikonongo village. They placed these roads in this format: Road 1 is split in two sides; 1A, which is on the right side, and Road 1B, which is on the left side. All of these roads were increasing toward the western side, starting from north heading south of Ulyankulu. Then they ended at Road 19 but the refugees were increasing to flood into Tanzania. Then they constructed Roads 20 up to 27, from north to south. They thought the war would end and things would settle but the refugees continued to come. Then they constructed Roads 28 up to 38. They were also increasingly added towards the western side. Then the refugees continued coming. They constructed Roads 39 up to Road 50. This is why you meet Roads 39 and 40 starting close to Road 19. The refugees continued coming. Then they went to the other side of the River Igombe and constructed Roads 51 up to 63, which were heading toward the west of Ulyankulu" (C2).

The settlement thus expanded with the arrival of an increasing number of refugees. The planning of the area was relatively limited: besides roads, some community centres, schools and few other buildings, the place resembled wilderness. Refugees had to build their own houses on uncleared land – refugee administrators had measured and assigned plots (Malkki, 1995a) but not made them inhabitable. A map created by TCRS (see Figure 3.3), shows that by 1979 seven community centres had been built in the settlement along with 10 primary schools, three dispensaries, five maize mills, one cooperative building, and a stadium. The map furthermore shows information about the water infrastructure in the settlement, revealing the priorities at least of the TCRS at the time (see legend of the map, Figure 3.3). Nevertheless, the road structure served to create a basic 'legibility' of the place (Scott, 1998), created by the UNHCR.

Criteria of plot allocation to refugees in Ulyankulu

According to the Tanzanian government, refugees need basic social services as well as a piece of land to cultivate to reach self-sufficiency (Milner, 2009). In order to understand the spatial organisation within the settlement, a government official explained the guiding principles of land distribution to refugees:

> "Every family got four hectares; 10 acres per family. When you get land here, you have to note where you come from in Burundi – we want people from the same area in their country of origin, so that they can assist each other and so that it is easy to *control* the situation in terms of *security*. They [the people in a particular village/street] would know – this person is a criminal" (G2; emphasis added).

This security concern translates into a spatial distribution of people. According to this respondent:

> "In the South-Eastern part, most people here come from Lake Tanganyika shores, Makamba province. Of course Burundi is a small country – they differentiate themselves according to villages and not provinces. From around this place [Road 1] they were resettled up to Road 6, these are the early-comers."

Thus, the organisation of distributing plots to people occurred according to different areas in Burundi, due to different times of arrival from the conflict in Burundi:

> "In Kaswa [the central village], people come from Nyanza Lake, from Rumonge and Lugara. 60% come from these areas. People from Kanindo are known as Bukemba people [Rutana Province]. People in Ikonongo, Taba and Mapigano came from Lake Tanganyika – for them it was easy to pass the border. The war started in Mugala; they were the first to run. The UNHCR took the people to the villages, except to Kanindo. Later Bukemba was also affected by the war; so they were the last group to come to Tanzania" (F1).

Secondary resettlement of refugees to other sites

The increased influx of Burundian refugees into Tanzania led to the construction of another settlement, Katumba, built in 1973 in what is now Katavi region (formerly Rukwa). A third settlement, Mishamo, was only built several years later, in 1978, in Katavi region (UNHCR, 2012b), due to deteriorating environmental conditions in Ulyankulu settlement. According to Malkki (1995a: 39) half of Ulyankulu's population, which had risen to 60,000, was moved to Mishamo after a survey of land and water resources in Ulyankulu in 1977. Colonial measures of population control for environmental reasons were thus continued by the Tanzanian government, the UNHCR and the TCRS in relation to the governance of refugees. The TCRS created the early maps of the settlement and of population movements (see Figure 4.6 below). One respondent explained:

> "Then floods came. Then they created Mishamo settlement from Ulyankulu settlement. It was for those who were attacked by the floods. The floods covered some places; like Roads 9 up to 12 vanished, and especially Roads 6, 7, 8 and 9. 10A vanished because of the floods. Nowadays if you look clearly, you will not find these roads. They are all in the *pori* [bushland]. Roads 12, 13A, 14, 15, 16 were sent to Mishamo. Road 11A was a bit higher so it is still there. But 11B is in the grassland [*pori*]... People are cultivating there now. Now there is no more heavy rainfall, so there are some Tanzanians, and NNTs[6] coming to live in those areas like Road 12. There are some people living there now but before, people were moved to Mishamo" (C2).

Refugees from Ulyankulu were moved to Mishamo twice due to floods. The first time was in 1978, the second time in 1997:

> "The settlement was opened in March 1972. There were 24,000 people in the beginning. The population grew rapidly. In 1997, when the El Niño floods came, the government shifted 26,000 people to Mishamo settlement. From 1998 to 2008, the population grew to 55,000 people. The population growth rate is 4%. After that, the repatriation of NNTs started" (G2).

In summary, during Phase 1 of governance in Ulyankulu, refugees were welcomed in Tanzania under President Nyerere's domestic policy of *ujamaa* and development in line

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[6]A term used by the UNHCR and the Tanzanian government for the (former) refugees since they registered for naturalisation.

with this foreign policy of supporting wars of national liberation. The dispersal of Burundian refugees in the 70s occurred during the ethnic conflict between the Tutsi-Hima regime of Micombero and the military on the one hand, and the Hutu majority, Tutsi from central provinces as well as the Baganwa elite on the other hand. When the refugees arrived in Tanzania, they were sent to Ulyankulu after having stayed in a transit camp in Pangale. Eventually some were moved to Mishamo and Katumba camps in Rukwa region further South due to environmental reasons. The area of Ulyankulu had to be freed from Tsetse flies, a road structure was built and four-hectar plots were allocated to refugees to cultivate.

Figure 4.6: Map of Refugee Movements in Tanzania
*Source: Malkki (1995a), by Armstrong (1985) for the
Tanganyika Christian Refugee Service*

4.3 Phase 2: Local Government, Economic Development and Integration, 1985 – 2007

4.3.1 *Reaching self-reliance and installing local governance*

Refugee settlements in post-colonial Tanzania came to have two main functions. First, international donors as well as the national government wanted refugees to become self-reliant as soon as possible through the cultivation of subsistence crops for food needs. Furthermore, they emphasised that refugees also have duties towards the host state, for example to fulfill tax requirements, which could be met by planting cash crops[7] (Daley, 1991: 189). Through their incessant labour on the provided land, refugees were eventually able to become self-reliant and agriculturally independent by 1985, which marked the start of a second phase of governance in Ulyankulu.

In 1985 the UNHCR left the management of refugee settlements to the Government of Tanzania (UNHCR, 2012b). They were then placed under local government administration. Ulyankulu was subsequently administered as a division similar to other areas in Tanzania with its own wards and representatives. Refugee leaders continued to rule at the village level, whereas three Tanzanian Ward Representatives (*diwani*) (of the three wards Kanindo, Igombemkulu and Milambo respectively) were representing the people in the district council (*halmashauri*).

Nowadays, according to a study by the consultancy group SA3 (2007: 20), 41% of the refugee population in the three settlements classify their main occupation as farming, and 84% are involved in agricultural activities of some kind. They cultivate food crops, including maize, millet, cassava, rice, beans and potatoes, as well as cash crops, including maize, beans, groundnuts and tobacco (ibid.). Next to farming, they also engage in animal husbandry, keeping chicken, goats, sheep and pigs. In a livelihoods analysis (ibid.: 19) it was found that 15% of the settlement population in Ulyankulu were pastoralists – which hints towards the presence of Sukuma and Nyamwezi in the settlement.

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[7]This emphasis was for example spelled out in a conference in Ethiopia on "Legal, Economic and Social Aspects of African Refugee Problems" in 1967.

4.3.2 *Evolution of social services, economic development and environmental damage*

Refugees' participation in improving social services in Ulyankulu

The second phase of governance is mainly characterised by the treatment of refugees as being similar to citizens within Ulyankulu settlement. From the time of their arrival in the settlements, refugees enjoyed rights to basic social services, such as health care and primary education in Swahili. Next to paying taxes, refugees actively engaged in improving the social services offered, for example by building schools, teaching and learning just like Tanzanians in other parts of the country. This represented an important first step in their *de facto* integration in Tanzania.

In Ulyankulu secondary education was hardly accessible until the 1990s. The first secondary school was opened on the 14th of June 1999 (Interview with G2). This government official explained that, before "the government had no programme for opening secondary schools in Tanzania. First, we had to open primary schools. When the refugees wanted to have education, they were allowed to go to government schools outside of the settlement, e .g. to Tabora." However, this option was only open to a few individuals who were selected by the government (see interview with S1, quoted in Section 6.3.1 below).

Within the last ten years, 15 primary schools (SA, 2007: 18) and three secondary schools were built in Ulyankulu. The building of secondary schools was encouraged by the Secondary Education Development Plan (SEDP) of 2004, which demanded one secondary school per ward. According to a Tanzanian living in the settlement (C1), Kanindo, Ulyankulu and Igombe Secondary Schools were built during this 'community school campaign'. Constituting a form of 'self-help' which has been promoted as a form of popular participation in local development nation-wide by the Tanzanian government since the 1960s (Jennings, 2003) refugees actively engaged in building the schools through their labour with government funds. As a former government officer explained, "The people in Ulyankulu participated in building the school in Kanindo" (C3). Furthermore, reflecting a demand for professional training, the VETA branch in Ulyankulu, built in the 1970s, was one of the first ones in Tanzania. The branch in Ulyankulu was originally an initiative of the Catholic Church with funds from Caritas. Nowadays, VETA is a nation-wide professional training school. 25% percent of refugees in all three settlements are students (SA3, 2007: 19); and about a quarter are educated to Grade 7 and above (SA3, 2007: 18).

Refugees have also been recruited as teachers. In total, there are 302 primary school teachers and 65 secondary school teachers in the settlements (ibid.: 19). As the UNHCR noted in 2010 (Interview with I1), the Tanzanian government recruited 50 refugee teachers in Ulyankulu, 30 in Mishamo and 64 in Katumba; and two medical personnel in Ulyankulu, in addition to Tanzanian teachers and doctors.

Considering Tabora as a whole, the National Bureau of Statistics (2005: 222) notes, "There is still a lot of room given that enrolment rates in the region are inadequate in primary schools and very low in secondary schools. Tabora is one of the most disadvantaged regions in primary and secondary education in the country." While the pupil-teacher ratio for primary schools in Tanzania on the whole was 46:1 in 2012 (World Bank, 2013), it was as high as 204:1 in Urambo district in 2002 (National Bureau of Statistics 2005: 188). As district statistics suggest, refugees are not disadvantaged in comparison to other students surrounding the settlement. Urambo District Statistics for the year of 2012 show that primary schools in the three wards of Ulyankulu settlement have a lower pupil-teacher ratio than five of the eight other wards within Ulyankulu division. Ulyankulu settlement also has a better primary school/secondary school ratio, at five primary schools per secondary school, better even than the urban area of Tabora, which, as a district, has the best ratio within the region with six primary schools per secondary school (National Bureau of Statistics, 2005: 198).

Despite the rising educational standards, only 0.1 to 0.9 percent of the refugees in all three settlements have professions other than farming, and classify themselves as tailors, business service agents, religious professionals, carpenters, housekeepers, salespeople, primary school teachers, builders, fishermen, and nurses/midwives. There are 13 doctors in total, and there is only one lawyer, one judge and four pharmacists or pathologists (SA3, 2007: 19). In fact, as interviews indicate, many qualified professionals may live outside of the settlement as refugees have also increasingly enjoyed education outside of it (in secondary schools, teachers' colleges and university). While some returned to the settlement, others are now working in other Tanzanian cities in a variety of professions including teachers, doctors and religious leaders – and some key informants claimed that even some politicians are refugees, even though this information could not be verified ultimately.

Refugees' contribution to the local, national and global economy

Next to participating in social services, refugees were encouraged to plant food and cash crops not only to be self-reliant, but also to be part of the local, national, and global economy. The district government benefited by receiving refugees' taxes whereas the local market was supplied with food and the global market was enriched by refugees' tobacco exports. Refugees paid their tax duties just like other citizens and they became integrated in various scales of the economy as they interacted with Tanzanian traders and international companies.

A UNHCR consultancy report of the 1990s explains that after self-reliance, refugees should no longer be recipients of state or foreign aid and should instead be encouraged to expand export-crop production for disposal through official channels. This was in accordance with the new agricultural policy of the economic recovery programme (ERP), eventually enabled the issuance of Structural Adjustment Programme loans by the IMF in 1986 (cf. Daley, 1991: 191). Therefore, since refugees arrived in the three settlements in 1972, they were integrated into the national agricultural policy. Parastatals, crop programmes and co-operatives were introduced in the settlements. Tanzania's sisal industry and the Tea Authority recruited workers within the settlements in the 1980s (Daley, 1991: 190).

Eventually, Ulyankulu market became a major trading place in the region (compare Plate 4.2 on a non-market day with Plate 4.3 on a market day). Nowadays, even citizens from around Ulyankulu e.g. from Ichemba, a ward which used to be part of Ulyankulu division, come to the market in Ulyankulu to buy the products they need. There is no comparable market in any of the villages around Ulyankulu. According to a UNHCR briefing note (2012, emphasis added):

> "The food crops [...] grown by the NNTs in the settlements make up a considerable proportion of the arable produce available at markets in Tabora and Katavi Regions, and *contribute significantly to food security in central Tanzania.* [...] It is widely perceived that despite lack of ready access to capital and restricted access to markets, the NNTs contribute substantially to the districts in taxes. [...]".

In fact, Ulyankulu settlement alone produced 34% of agricultural products in Urambo District although the population only constituted 13%. In the other two settlements,

production (42%) and population (34%) of Mpanda District were much more in tune (Nordic Consulting Group, 2010: 19-20).

Plate 4.2: Ulyankulu Market Place on a Sunday
Source: Author (April 2012)

Plate 4.3: Ulyankulu Market Place on a Saturday
Source: Author (June 2012)

Both Ulyankulu and Katumba were located in areas designated by the World Bank for the development of tobacco complexes and tobacco has been promoted as the main cash crop (Daley, 1991). Refugees have indeed increasingly participated in growing tobacco despite the disapproval of the Pentecostal Church (ibid: 191). Nowadays one can see

tobacco curing houses in various places in Ulyankulu (see Plate 4.4), as well as tobacco transports (Plate 4.5) and warehouses full of bags containing tobacco leaves (Plate 4.6). According to the UNHCR (2012b):

> "In Ulyankulu 899 tons of tobacco was produced in 2010/2011 according to the Chairman of Ikonongo Tobacco Primary Society in Ulyankulu Settlement, Mr. Ilambona Alexander. [...] Tobacco production in Mishamo Settlement was measured by the Mishamo Tobacco Office to have been 3,700 tons in 2008/2009 which equalled TZS 1 billion tax revenue for the GoT [Government of Tanzania], and 6,000 tons in 2009/2010 which equalled TZS 1,5 billion tax revenue for the GoT."

A government official in Ulyankulu explained:

> "Up to now there are five cooperatives. Four are taking care of tobacco growers; and one is responsible for other businesses, such as cafeterias. [...] The cooperatives are responsible of making sure that the refugees – by the way they are refugees – are provided with essential inputs for tobacco growing. [...] Most of the tobacco growers are peasants. They make sure they get back money and improve their lives. Food crops and tobacco are two very different things. The tobacco business runs under one individual only – Philipp Morris, the world's biggest buyer of tobacco. He used to come here to Ulyankulu. He proclaimed that he will only buy from the cooperatives. He has a programme for afforestation since tobacco uses a lot of fuel wood" (G2).

The refugees are producing tobacco for export to the global market via cooperatives. They have become much more than subsistence farmers – Ulyankulu today is economically prospering as never before. Refugees are integrated not only into the local or Tanzanian economy; they are integrated into the global economy.

Plate 4.4: Tobacco Curing House in Ulyankulu
Source: Author (November 2012)

Plate 4.5: Tobacco Transport in Kaswa, Ulyankulu
Source: Author (June 2012)

Plate 4.6: Tobacco Warehouse in Ikonongo, Ulyankulu
Source: Author (July 2012)

Refugees' settlement in forest reserves and environmental damage

While refugees behaved and were treated as citizens, engaging in their own development by improving social services via 'self-help' and by becoming part of the economy, a main concern by the government, echoing colonial times, was of an environmental nature. The encouragement of agriculture and especially cash crops such as tobacco in the confines of Ulyankulu settlement came at a cost. Considerable environmental damage was caused over time. Tobacco curing thinned out the forests. The seasonal river, suffering from heavy soil erosion and human activity, has started to dry up. This process threatens the livelihoods of people and animals alike and even has an effect on the water level in Lake Tanganyika (see interview with G4, quoted in Section 4.4.3). Water is nowadays a scarce resource in and around the settlement. During dry season, people in Ichemba need to go to small creeks to fetch water (see Plate 4.8). Water, with muddy consistency especially in the dry season, is transported in canisters from wells and pumps to people's houses (see Plate 4.7).

Encouraged in part by the government, for example through the Secondary Education Development Plan of 2004, schools and some residential areas have been built within the forest reserves that surround Ulyankulu (see Figures 4.7 and 4.8 below). These forest reserves are located next to Kigosi Game Reserve, which is the third largest Game Reserve in Tanzania after Selous and Rungwa reserves, with an area of 7,000 km² (Wildlife Divi-

Plate 4.7: Transport of Water in the Settlement
Source: Author (November 2012)

Plate 4.8: Source of Water for Villagers in Ichemba during Dry Season
Source: Author (July 2012)

sion, 2012; see Figure 4.9). According to a government officer who worked as a ranger in the game reserve, poaching in the near game and forest reserves became common practice (G3). Indisputably, refugees have been responsible for hunting in the game reserves. However, soil erosion and the building of schools in the settlement was encouraged by national and international policies. Furthermore, if the encampment policy had not been

enforced as rigorously, the situation of residing in the forest reserve and of poaching in the game reserve would probably never have arisen in the first place[8].

The onset of environmental damage also shows some conflicting policies by different state ministries. The Ministry of Home Affairs was responsible for settling the refugees in Ulyankulu and the Ministry of Education for building schools in the settlement. These policies overruled some provisions concerning the Game and Forest Reserve, which is administered by the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism. This Ministry, which is in charge of the conservation of natural and cultural resources, has four main divisions: forestry, wildlife, tourism and fisheries. The Ministry, and especially the Forestry Department, has not been powerful enough to prevent environmental damage generated by the growing population of Ulyankulu – or to reverse the encampment policy earlier in order to prevent the damage.

Therefore, instead of questioning their own policies and disputes, refugees are blamed for the damage. This situation is reminiscent of colonial times. Under the Sukumaland Development Plan, for example, the British colonial policy upset the local environmental balance in Mwanza Region by encouraging intensive cultivation of the land, which ultimately led to a decrease in fertility. While on the one hand being overly concerned about the environment, colonialists later blamed the Sukuma for this outcome since the pastoralists had engaged in overstocking (International Bank of Reconstruction and Development, 1961: Annex, p.367). As Chapter 5 will show, environmental concerns were also a reason for the proposed relocation of the refugees and the closure of the settlement.

4.3.3 *Spatial distribution of Tanzanians in Ulyankulu*

Over time, a considerable number of Tanzanians from adjacent villages and further regions in the country have moved to Ulyankulu settlement. Many of them are Nyamwezi from the surrounding areas, some are Sukumas originating from Mwanza region, whilst others are Chagga from Kilimanjaro and further ethnicities from various regions. While the Sukuma and Nyamwezi pastoralists originally came in search of greener pastures, others came as government workers (e.g. teachers), to run a business or simply to cultivate.

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[8]It also needs to be acknowledged that until independence this forest reserve had not existed, as a map in the Atlas of Tanzania of 1956 shows (Survey Division, 1956).

Figure 4.7: Map of Ulyankulu Settlement and Surroundings (4)
Source: UNHCR (2012)

Observing that most people in the settlement spoke fluent Swahili, a government official explained that many people were actually Tanzanians or mixed Burundian-Tanzanians, indistinguishable from the Burundians. The same person estimated that "one third of the people in the settlement today are Tanzanians" (G5). This is surprising since Tanzanians other than government employees have not been officially allowed to live in the settlement and borders of the settlement have been policed. While the refugees' places of origin influenced their distribution across Ulyankulu, the choice of place of residence of Tanzanian citizens in the settlement has been guided by different processes. In order to evade the government's border control, many Tanzanians live in the centre, while areas close to the border and far from the centre were inhabited almost entirely by Burundians. As a second-generation refugee woman explained:

> "In Msimba village [in Mbeta] – Road 7 – most people are Burundians. They are not mixed with Tanzanians, even in primary school they speak Kirundi and even the teachers are Hutu! Msimba is a village along the border of Makingi. It is the area near the settlement officer. There was a gate there. *Tanzanians were not allowed to be there, so most of them penetrated into the interior.* Also in the Northern part [in Igombemkulu] is the border. Most of

Figure 4.8: Satellite Image Ulyankulu Settlement and Reserves
Source: SA3 (2007:35)

*The red circle demarcates Ulyankulu Settlement. Green lines are the borders (in reality not visible) of the forest reserves that surround and cut through the settlement.

them, who used to live there, were Hutu, but nowadays, Sukumas are there to graze their cattle. *The area used to be under patrol of the operation police*" (S2, emphasis added).

Figure 4.9: Moyowosi Game Reserve, 1976
Source: Surveys and Mapping Division (1976)
▒ Game Reserve

In contrast to most Burundians who were given a piece of land to cultivate, Tanzanians who moved to Ulyankulu recently have bought or rented land and houses from those who repatriated to Burundi in 2009, from other refugees or even Tanzanians who left the settlement. As the settlement officer explained, it is officially not allowed for Tanzanians to buy land from the refugees:

> "Actually we don't give people plots right now. [...] The leaders of the villages can allocate the land to someone; we only grace it. [...] If there is vacant land, it can be allocated to members of the same village. Few people apply for the land. We only allocate for use, not for ownership. If it is about public use [e.g. schools], people get another piece of land [as compensation]. Community use is a high priority; we value community use of the land highly. Some people are cheating Tanzanians to sell land to them. Unfortunately many Tanzanians don't know about it – in the process of relocation they [the refugees] have to

leave the place as plain as possible and take the building materials. This is just a camp – in the camp you can only own land temporarily" (G2).

Land rights were thus different in the settlement than elsewhere in Tanzania. Refugees in the settlement only had usufruct land rights in contrast to citizens elsewhere, who can lease village land for 99 years and obtain a land title. While the World Bank and the Tanzanian government have tried to encourage people elsewhere in the country to formalise their usufruct land titles (cf. De Soto, 2006), the settlement area was an exceptional place where the opposite was promoted. Refugees indeed did not enjoy full property rights.

Within the space of the settlement, Tanzanian citizens officially did not even have usufruct land rights. While the refugees' use of land was strongly shaped by government control in the settlement, Tanzanians (besides government workers) were not allowed to live there at all. There was a gap between the official number of Tanzanians in the settlement, who all work for the government, and the reality on the ground. According to the settlement officer:

> "In Ulyankulu, there are 600 recognised Tanzanians. All others are not recognised, they are intruders. The area of the settlement is supposed to be for the Burundian refugees only" (G2).

However, the government did not evict all "intruders". In contrast to the top-down planned plot distribution to refugees, the spatial distribution of Tanzanians in the settlement occurred according to their own practical needs and to arising opportunities. By living in the settlement against the government's rules, they practically evaded the MHA's provisions and called its control into question. As will be argued in Chapter 5 below, this was possible due to leniency on the part of some individual government officers. The presence of Tanzanians in the settlement, as will be argued in Chapter 6, has also been an important prerequisite for the *de facto* integration of refugees in Tanzania, and for their sense of belonging to the nation.

4.3.4 *From 'open door' policy to increasing restrictiveness*

While the treatment of refugees was overall similar to that of citizens within the settlement, at a national level refugee policies became more restrictive after President Mwinyi

took office in 1985. An important reason for this was a scarcity of resources and lack of international support (Nordic Consultancy Group, 2010: 22). Nevertheless, in the 1990s, Tanzania agreed to host the largest influx of refugees up until that time: in 1993, 250,000 Burundians and hundreds of thousands of Rwandans fled genocidal violence. In 1994 the refugee population climbed to 883,300, settling in camps in Kigoma and Karagwe regions (UNHCR, 2000: 312). In March 1995, Tanzania changed its 'open door' policy and closed its border with Burundi to prevent Rwandan refugees in Burundi from coming to Tanzania (Mendel, 1997: 38). Then in December 1996 Rwandan refugees were told to leave Tanzania by the end of that year. An armed intervention was launched against those who did not accept this policy.

There were several reasons for these decisions. First, increasing restrictiveness was effectuated by a changing domestic Tanzanian political environment. Anti-refugee rhetoric started to be spread in the run up to the country's first multiparty elections in 1995, which were implemented partially as a result of international pressure. In general, the political environment became more focused on internal security instead of pan-Africanism (as under President Nyerere) or economic restructuring (as during President Mwinyi's rule) (Nordic Consultancy Group, 2010: 22). In the name of internal security, refugees were redefined from 'welcomed guests' to 'unwanted others.' This was a tactic by the CCM to win support by a larger number of voters as the party promised to deal with the refugee 'problem', portrayed as a threat from the outside. As the outcome of these elections, Benjamin Mkapa, the CCM candidate, was able to secure 62% of the vote.

In the wake of these elections, foreign policy also changed. Unlike Nyerere's acceptance of refugees from struggles for national liberation at the expense of friendly regional relations, the new regime aimed to keep good relations with all neighbours. This change in foreign policy also transpired to the expulsion of the Rwandans, which served to maintain good relations with the Rwandan government (Milner, 2009).

Besides changing politics, another reason for the shift in refugee policy was the nature of the refugee population. Members of the former Rwandan government joined the refugee movement to Tanzania. Therefore, concerns were voiced that the refugees constituted a threat to security. Furthermore, the scale of the influx of refugees was worrisome and international assistance not adequate for these extraordinary large numbers. Finally, the number of arrivals exceeded the capacity of forests and agricultural lands in the hosting areas and therefore caused environmental damage (Milner, 2009 119).

In the decade to come, Tanzania started to become ever more restrictive. The government passed a new Refugees Act in 1998, which issued that all Burundians should move to camps, even those who had arrived in the 1970s. Tanzanian authorities began to round-up Burundians living outside the camps. Furthermore, when crime rates rose in the camps due to overcrowding and food shortages, refugees were prohibited from travelling more than 4 km outside the camps; which curtailed all economic activity between refugees and the local population. The hostile attitude towards the refugees was again fostered during the second multi-party elections in 2000 where the opposing parties used the refugee issue to promise to take local (host) populations' grievances into account by sending the refugees back home (L'Ecluse, 2010: 43).

The National Refugee Policy 2003 formally enshrined the previously announced limitations on freedom of movement and on economic activity. This shows how dramatically asylum policy has shifted: from encouraging self-reliance to confining refugees in isolated and insecure refugee camps (Milner, 2009). Going even further, since 2005 the government has pushed for Tanzania to become a refugee free zone altogether (Nordic Consultancy Group, 2010: 23). During the period from 2002 to 2010, a total of 363,000 refugees were repatriated from the camps with UNHCR assistance.

In the beginning of November 2010, Tanzania held national elections. The incumbent President Jakaya Kikwete, candidate of CCM, won the election but lost a substantial number of votes compared to previous elections. With 61% of the votes, he could still ensure a comfortable majority but the turnout was low. The opposition party, *Chama cha Demokrasia wa Maendeleo* (Chadema) gained a significant number of votes in the 2010 elections, as well as the Civic United Front (CUF; EISA, 2011). Again, the CCM used anti-refugee rhetoric and promised to send all refugees home as a tactic to gain more votes (L'Ecluse, 2010).

In summary, during Phase 2 the government treated the refugees similarly to citizens within the settlement. For example, they participated in building schools just like Tanzanian citizens elsewhere. Refugees also behaved like *de facto* citizens by becoming integrated in the local, national and in the international economy. However, echoing colonial concerns, the government realised that environmental damage was caused over time. In the absence of a solution to the problem, it has blamed the refugees for it. As will be shown in Chapter 5, environmental reasons, amongst others, were later cited as a reason for relocating the refugees as part of the naturalisation initiative. During Phase 2, Tanza-

nian citizens also moved back to the settlement area, seeing it as a preferred place to live, for example for cultivation and the grazing of animals. Within the settlement space, both Tanzanians and refugees have not enjoyed land rights as elsewhere in the country. The political approach towards refugees during that time became increasingly exclusionary as refugees were restricted in their freedom of movement from the settlement.

4.4 Phase 3: The Naturalisation Initiative, subsequent Non-Maintenance and Administrative Invisibilisation to 'End the Refugee Chapter' since 2007

4.4.1 *Citizenship for Burundian refugees*

Against the backdrop of increasing restrictiveness, it seems surprising that the Minister of Home Affairs Lawrence Masha publically announced the naturalisation of more than 162,000 Burundian refugees in April 2010, saying "Let me be the first person to welcome you as Tanzanians and not refugees" (cited in Hassan, 2010). Analysing donor engagement in Tanzania's overall refugee assistance programme in the years prior to this decision suggests that the naturalisation was a means to re-engage donors in general, to draw attention to this population in particular, and to obtain funds for various development projects in the country.

Indeed, since 2000 the UNHCR consistently reported that its programme in Tanzania was adversely affected by limited and unpredictable donor support. In 2001, the budget was reduced by 20% resulting in a struggle to maintain a minimum level of health care and food assistance. Furthermore, in 2002 and 2003 the World Food Programme (WFP) reduced food distributions by up to 50% of the normal rations. The government repeatedly stated that it would only continue hosting refugees if the international community provided the necessary support (Milner, 2009: 125-126).

Naturalising the Burundian refugees appears to have constituted a master stroke to solve many problems and to foster various initiatives. The budget offered by international donors included financial means for the repatriation of refugees who wished to return to Burundi, means for the naturalisation itself and also for the local integration of refugees. In the Old Settlements, 222,036 refugees lived there in 2007 (Hovil and Kweka, 2008). Due

to the government policy, the UNHCR helped wide-scale repatriations of 53,000 of these refugees to Burundi in 2008 and 2009.

Due to the proposal of relocating refugees to various regions in Tanzania (further discussed below), the local integration part of the budget would also benefit receiving regions where development projects would be implemented in order to integrate the refugees (an increased number of students would for example necessitate building new classrooms)[9]. These plans would be carried out by the UNHCR together with the UNDP as part of the new world-wide UN reform initiative 'Delivering as One.' Tanzania was chosen as a pilot country to carry out a UN Joint Programme to enhance cooperation between UN agencies in the country and to act as One UN, starting in 2007. With respect to its Tanzania programme, the UNHCR (2008: 15) mentioned:

> "UNHCR is also supporting 171,000 naturalizing refugees to integrate into their regions of destination. These refugees are from a farming background, are predominantly young, and have already formed extensive links in the informal economy. The One UN JP 1, 'Wealth creation, employment & economic empowerment', is targeting poverty country-wide in rural areas and in unplanned, un-serviced urban areas. The newly-naturalized fit this Joint Programme very closely, and it is planned that this Joint Programme will be extended to Regions hosting the newly-naturalized."

The naturalisation of the Burundian refugees from the 1970s also served to render a population visible again, which was previously invisibilised by UNHCR statistics. From 1985, when they became self-reliant, to 2007, these refugees were not mentioned in UNHCR's Statistical Yearbooks as refugees, and are still only listed as 'other persons of concern'. The government, however, always counted them towards its total refugee population, claiming that it amounted to over 800,000 in 2005 (Milner, 2009: 125). Especially against the backdrop of restrictiveness, officially naturalising the Burundian refugees was seen as a generous move by the international community, and thus constituted a favourable foreign policy move to enhance Tanzania's reputation. At the same time, it allowed the government to use this refugee population as a tool for development, reminiscent of Tanzania's earlier post-independence policies.

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[9]The original NASCIP document envisaged a budget of in total US$144, including US$36 million for 'community based programmes', a 'direct community support component' of US$15.5 and a 'transition, *hosting* and livelihood support' of US$40.75 (Prime Minister's Office 2010-2014: 11, emphasis added).

The process of naturalisation began in July 2007 with a census, followed by a registration process in which refugees were asked to choose between returning to Burundi or receiving naturalisation and staying in Tanzania. Constituting a logistical challenge, the government raised an application fee of $50 (previously $800), which was paid by UN-HCR on behalf of the refugees. While the Tanzanian government played a major role in the process, the UNHCR worked together with the implementing agencies TCRS and the German Association for Technical Cooperation (GTZ; now German Association for International Cooperation, GIZ), on the processing of applications in Ulyankulu (Hovil and Kweka, 2008: 18).

There is a precedent of naturalisation in Tanzania: in 1980, naturalisation was offered to several thousand Rwandan refugees from Muyenzi and Kimuli settlements. Although the implementation was cumbersome and took over a decade to be finished, this seems to have constituted the first mass naturalisation on the continent (Gasarasi, 1990). After a period of resistance by the Rwandese any measure of permanency in Tanzania, they came to value the Tanzanian residence permit and there was an outcry for naturalisation. According to Gasarasi (1990), it was difficult to keep the Rwandese in settlements and therefore, the government had little to lose by granting citizenship to them. The granting of citizenship might have even been beneficial in terms of reducing disruptive political activities. However, only few Rwandese ultimately obtained their certificates. After this precedent about 30 years ago, the Tanzanian government again offered collective naturalisation, this time on an even larger scale.

Why repatriation was not an alternative to local integration

Before discussing details of the naturalisation initiative, it is necessary to briefly explain why the majority of refugees from 1972 have not returned to their country of origin. The strongest push factor is still the security situation in Burundi (Green 2011). Nevertheless between 2002 and 2007, an estimated 378,800 Burundian refugees repatriated to Burundi from around the region; 38,900 of which returned from Tanzania in the year of 2007 only (UNHCR 2007, cited in Hovil and Kweka, 2008: 18).

In fact, the majority of Burundian refugees who came in 1972 *wanted* to go 'home'; they were tired of being labelled 'refugees', of not having access to freedom of movement and political rights. Those who have returned were relieved to have shed their refugee status

and the stigma of a label that had stayed with them throughout their time in exile (Hovil and Kweka, 2009). Those who decided to repatriate via the official route of the UNHCR were allowed to carry a maximum of 100 kg (originally 50 kg) to Burundi. Many had their property stolen without compensation, especially on the Burundian side (returnee from Rutana Province, Burundi, cited in Hovil, 2009: 20). Others became victims of violence (Hovil, 2009). Upon arrival, those who were part of the official repatriation scheme were assisted with housing, legal advice, provision of health care and a cash grant of 50,000 Burundian francs ($45 USD). Only in April 2009 these benefits were extended to the refugees from 1972.

Salient constraints awaited the returning refugees. Burundi had limited resources for reintegration and often inadequate social services. Moreover, refugees faced problems relating to the re-acquisition of land. Those whose land was given to corporate or government ventures could not reclaim their land and were moved to 'peace villages'. These villages had limited infrastructure and land is in some cases barren. Under Burundian law, ownership of land that has been peacefully occupied for 30 years by a particular owner cannot be challenged. Many returnees were able to reclaim a portion of their original land but this was not perceived as fair by many returnees. Hovil (2010) thus proposes that sharing land can only be a short-term solution and that sharing land and moving to peace villages should not be equated with reconciliation, as the government has presented it. The offer of citizenship came at a time at which – especially for those who arrived in 1972 – returning to their country of origin on a collective basis would have been hardly a viable possibility. After having refused to grant refugees citizenship following a normal procedure (as it would be given to other immigrants), mass naturalisation was an option of last resort.

Who was able to register for citizenship; who was excluded?

While the citizenship scheme aimed to be inclusive, 2170 applications for citizenship by refugee applicants and their dependents were rejected after a screening by district and regional Security and Defence Committees that checked the applications in 2007 (UNHCR, 2012; see Table 4.1 below). Scholars raised concern that many applications were rejected for arbitrary reasons (Hovil and Kweka, 2008: 3). Some of these included a 'big family size' or that refugees were 'not cooperative' (Hovil, 2009: 7). Other reasons included where families did not conform to specific structures, e.g. women whose husbands were in

Burundi or children who had not been officially adopted. In the latter case, children were in danger of being separated from their families, especially if the family had opted for naturalisation. Women did not have the option to choose for themselves – only men could decide about repatriation or naturalisation. Anyone with a criminal record – whether in the end convicted or not – could not apply at all and people with disabilities were dependent on their families' decisions. Confusions with the Burundian Swahili accent could have further caused some being denied citizenship (Hovil and Kweka, 2008).[10]

Below one can see a table of submitted, accepted and rejected applications for naturalisation by settlement (Table 4.1). What is striking is that in Ulyankulu settlement there were considerably fewer rejected cases than in the other settlements. Reasons for this are not entirely clear – one possibility is that the Security and Defence Committees in Ulyankulu settlement were not as strict in rejecting applications as in the other settlements (source: personal communication with official in Ulyankulu settlement).

Settlement	Submitted applications			Accepted applications			Rejected applications		
	Appl.	Dep.	Total	Appl.	Dep.	Total	Appl.	Dep.	Total
Ulyankulu	20500	26520	47020	20498	26520	47018	2	0	2
Mishamo	23742	30027	53769	23208	29387	52595	526	629	1155
Katumba	28219	35441	63660	27752	34863	62615	452	561	1013
Total	72461	91988	164449	71458	90770	162228	980	1190	2170

Table 4.1: Naturalisation Statistics Position

Source: UNHCR (2012) *appl.=applications; dep.=dependants

In any case, the above mentioned reasons for rejection were irrelevant to the threshold criteria set for naturalisation under Tanzanian law and thus constitute rights violations. What was supposed to happen to these refugees was unclear.

What did applying for Tanzanian citizenship mean in practice?

In 2007, 79% of the population in the three settlements stated they wished to apply for naturalisation (Hovil and Kweka, 2008: 9). The number of those wanting to return to Burundi (approximately one fifth) roughly corresponded with the number of refugees

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[10]To a Tanzanian, the Burundian Swahili accent for "getting a naturalisation certificate" (*nakata uraia*) sounds almost identical to "I refuse (*nakataa*) naturalisation" (Hovil and Kweka, 2008: 21).

born in Burundi. Around 80% of them belonged to the second generation (SA3, 2007; see Ch.3). In fact, second generation refugees may have already been Tanzanian citizens. Under Tanzanian law, anyone born in Tanzania after 1966 is a Tanzanian citizen (Hovil and Kweka, 2008: Annex). Although *de jure* there is no mention of refugees, *de facto*, this law does not apply to them. Seen in this light, the naturalisation of the refugees already born in Tanzania does not seem very progressive but rather as a retrospective redress of the exclusion of refugees from Tanzanian law. In practice, the refugees only had two options: naturalisation or repatriation. The possibility of resettlement was not considered and protection was not guaranteed in case the refugees did not apply. This pressure might have increased the number of applications.

Ultimately around 160,000 Burundians registered for naturalisation certificates. New-born babies were additionally registered in the subsequent years. The next step, which was to go hand in hand with naturalisation, was the relocation of the new citizens to Tanzanian villages, a process that was supposed to be completed by 2014. According to Hovil (2009: 37) reasons for this relocation were a shortage of land in the settlement regions and the fear that naturalised refugees living relatively close to the borders presented a security risk. The government also feared a 'Burundian enclave' in the settlement region. 'Land grabbing' was another reason: parts of Kigoma region in the west of the country, where about 22,000 Burundian refugees live in villages, as well as Mishamo and Katumba settlements, were to be sold to AgriSol Energy, an agribusiness company from Iowa (Siyame, 2011). Whereas some refugees were to go to places they had chosen, others, who had not specified where they wanted to go or who chose locations that did not have sufficient available land, were to be allocated new homes by the government. A budget was created to give every relocating refugee TZS 300,000[11] per person in order to allow him/her to travel to the destination and start building a house there. However, the question arises whether such relocation would have constituted a new form of displacement, which could have been traumatic. In fact, some NNTs feared they could be stigmatised in their final destinations after relocation (Hovil, 2009).

The strategy employed for the relocation was enshrined in the National Strategy for Community Integration Programme (NASCIP), which planned for the relocation of the NNTs, a total of 35,000 households/families, to over 50 districts in 16 regions. Some criteria for the selection of regions included availability of land and population density.

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[11]TZS 300,000 equalled GBP 120 at an exchange rate of 0.0004 on 30 November 2012).

Group B		
Number	Region	Households
1	Morogoro	853
2	Kigoma	656
3	Tabora	600
4	Rukwa	545
5	Shinyanga	176
6	Pwani	123
7	Kagera	105
8	Mbeya	87
9	Tanga	45
10	Singida	35
11	Iringa	21
12	Dodoma	6

Group C		
Number	Region	Households
1	Dodoma	1450
2	Manyara	969
3	Tanga	965
4	Singida	704
5	Shinyanga	472
6	Pwani	106

Figure 4.10: Ulyankulu Settlement: Allocation of Households by Region, Group B and C
Source: UNHCR (2012)[12]

The UNHCR was charged with the task of administering a mass information campaign in all 16 regions organised from six zonal coordination centres, namely Dodoma, Mtwara, Mwanza, Iringa and Dar es Salaam (cf. Prime Minister's Office, 2010-2014). While the receiving regions were chosen by the government, the NNTs were allowed to travel out of the settlements to 'scout for' suitable locations in selected destination regions in order to make preparations. The means for the transaction of suitable land were to be met by the government. Land could either be purchased by individual private owners or, where not otherwise possible, the government was to facilitate the acquisition of public land, in accordance with the Land Act and Village Lands Act of 1999 (ibid.). In the NASCIP document, refugees were divided into three groups: Group A, which already lives outside of the settlement and does not need to be relocated, Group B, which has chosen a place to relocate to, and Group C, which did not indicate a region to go to. Concerning Ulyankulu, these groups comprised 750, 3,261 and 4,666 households respectively. The tables below (Figure 4.11) show the divisions of Group B and C by regions to be relocated to. In total 7,927 households were identified to relocate from that settlement only (UNHCR, 2012a).

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[12]In the original chart in Ulyankulu Briefing Note (UNHCR, 2012a), two more regions with 6 and 3 households respectively were included in the chart for Group B, but the names of these regions were not included in the legend. The charts of Group B and C above show 13 regions in total. The remaining three regions that were designated as hosting regions in NASCIP are Lindi, Mtwara and Ruvuma. The missing 9 households in Group B were supposed to be relocated to two of the aforementioned regions.

What kind of citizenship was offered? Considering dual citizenship

One concern was that those who opted for Tanzanian citizenship may lose claims to their Burundian nationality since they were asked by the Tanzanian government to renounce their Burundian citizenship when registering for naturalisation (Hovil, 2009). In fact, in Burundi, dual citizenship is allowed by Article 21 of the current law on nationality (Hovil, 2009). As proclaimed by Foreign Affairs and International Co-operation Minister Bernard Membe in October 2010, Tanzania will as well allow dual citizenship in order to benefit from its own diaspora from that time onwards (Nordic Africa News, 2010). This law was a response to pressures from Tanzanian elites abroad (Chachage, 2009). The dual citizenship law has not taken effect yet but it is planned to be enshrined in the newly proposed constitution (Manby, 2014). Roughly half of all African countries have relaxed their dual citizenship laws, often in order to allow their diasporas in the West to retain links to their home country (Manby, 2009: 23).

The question arises whether dual citizenship would also apply to refugees, in case the naturalisation was carried out. According to Burundian law, citizens who have revoked their nationality in order to acquire foreign citizenship are allowed to later reclaim it. The fact that dual citizenship was not allowed might have deterred especially some of the first generation Burundians from applying for Tanzanian citizenship. Considering the dire prospects upon return, this is unfortunate for those who may have opted for return in order to stay Burundians (compare also to Mauritanians in Senegal, who did not opt for Senegalese citizenship since they feared to lose claims to Mauritanian citizenship, Manby, 2010). When the naturalisation policy was put on hold, the situation was highly volatile for everyone: having officially revoked their Burundian citizenship, the (former) refugees were effectively stateless.

Intra-Tanzanian tensions and the reversal of the initiative

While the process of naturalisation was already under way, its implementation occurred in a context of xenophobia and of hostility towards the scheme itself (Hovil and Kweka, 2008). Concern was raised by regional commissioners (Hovil and Kweka, 2009: 8), by parliamentarians the Government of Tanzania (Nordic Consulting Group, 2010: 8) and even by the central government itself. Regional commissioners feared that the arrival of the relocated and naturalised Burundians would jeopardise security and would overall con-

stitute a burden. Moreover, parliamentarians opposed the relocation of refugees because they questioned an investment deal that was to sell some of the land that refugees culti-vated in the Old Settlements to a foreign investor (see Chapter 5, Section 5.2.4). Following these concerns, some government officials claimed that the country had been pushed – as-sumingly by the UNHCR – to naturalise the refugees without consideration of the local community and the future of the country (Prime Minister of Tanzania, cited in Hovil and Kweka, 2009)[13].

However, eventually, the MHA in charge of the naturalisation scheme, and the Prime Minister's Office for Regional Administration and Local Government (PMO-RALG), re-sponsible for administering the local integration of the new citizens, showed positive engagement with the endeavour (Nordic Consulting Group, 2010: 78). Furthermore, even though some Tanzanians see Burundians as combative (Hovil and Kweka, 2009: 8), host communities showed a friendly attitude towards naturalisation (Nordic Consulting Group, 2010: 78). However, despite the fact that the Tanzanian government had accepted the scheme and UNHCR had offered comprehensive funding, regional governments were reluctant to create budgets because this would indicate acceptance of the scheme. District and regional security committees also resisted it (Hovil and Kweka, 2009; cf. evaluation of TANCOSS, Tanzania Comprehensive Solutions Strategy, cited in Nordic Consulting Group, 2010: 78).

Intra-Tanzanian tensions resulting in antagonistic scalar politics effectively prevented a smooth implementation of the scheme: while all national actors were willing to grant *de jure* citizenship, the parliament opposed the relocation, just like regional governments, which were worried about the refugees' presence in their regions after relocation despite naturalisation. Furthermore, the incoherent outcome of the registration for citizenship between the three settlements caused concern (see above). Due to these issues, the gov-ernment eventually announced in 2011 that the policy would be on hold until further decisions would be taken. Concerning the budget for the scheme, by 2008, the UNHCR had offered US$12.1 million[14] (Hovil and Kweka, 2009), which was later adjusted to 12.7 million, then to 22.2 million (DfiD, 2012) and finally to 34.3 million (UNHCR 2008-2009).

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[13]Considering the discussion above, however, the government did initially have a considerable interest in the scheme, so this quote seems to be a retroactive redress of its own policy.

[14]This figure was in fact quoted by Hovil and Kweka (2009:9) as *12.1 billion* but this is likely to be a mistake since other official sources quote figures in *millions* and not *billions* (UNHCR, 2008-2009; DfiD, 2012).

This still only constituted a fraction of what the NASCIP document envisaged, namely 144 million in total in a period of 2010-2014 (Prime Minister's Office, 2010-2014: 11). According to UNHCR's supplementary appeal, the offered budget was allocated for "comprehensive solutions", including naturalisation, local integration of those who wished to remain in Tanzania, repatriation of those who wished to go to Burundi, and reintegration in Burundi (ibid.: 9). Donors included the EC regional protection programme, the USA, ECHO[15], EC-European Development Fund (2nd part), Japan, Belgium, Germany, Ireland and finally the Department for International Development in the UK (DfID), which vouched to cover a funding gap of 6,1 million for the relocation and local integration of refugees in hosting regions (DfID, 2012). When by April 2012, the local integration programme remained on hold, DfID decided to "close this project and relocate the balance of the programme funds to other humanitarian needs in Tanzania" (ibid.: 4).

Given the withdrawal of funding, the reluctance to engage with the scheme by regional governments and the official halt of the scheme announced by the central government, the year 2012 was ones of heightened uncertainty for all actors involved.

4.4.2 *Non-Maintenance and abandonment of Ulyankulu Settlement*

In 2007, the Government of Tanzania, under the Ministry of Home Affairs, took over the task of ending the protracted refugee situation by naturalising the refugees in the Old Settlements. At that time, the UNHCR reestablished its presence in Ulyankulu (UNHCR, 2012b) and the local government structure was dismantled. This marked the beginning of a new phase in the governance of Ulyankulu settlement, which was characterised by an administrative invisibilisation of the settlement and non-maintenance of social services within the settlement. The invisibilisation of the settlement was encouraged by withdrawing local government services, which previously used to be embedded in broader governance structures of the district of Urambo and the region of Tabora. This in turn led to a lack of representation of local Tanzanians and refugees at the district level.

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[15]European Commission, Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection department (ECHO)

Cuts in social services and lack of representation

While the *diwani* were disempowered, village leaders (themselves refugees) have remained in place, from then on reporting directly to the settlement officer, who was assigned by the Ministry of Home Affairs.

> "In Ulyankulu division today, there are no village executive officers [*mtendaji wa kijiji*, employed by the DED[16]], no ward executive officers [*mtendaji wa kata*, employed by DED] and no ward councillor or representative [*diwani*, elected by the people – Tanzanian citizens – in the villages], but village chairmen are still employed [*mwenyekiti*, elected by people – here refugees – in the villages]. Before 2006, they were all here in Ulyankulu" (G5).

According to a former *diwani*, the cancellation of the ward representative structure occurred in order to give more power to the MHA:

> "From 2000 until 2006 I was a ward representative [*diwani*]. Since 2006, there are no ward representatives in the settlement any more. [...] Principally, we worked with the local government. The *diwani* were well known and listened to, they represented the people very well. The UN officers were not considered as leaders at that time. The ward representatives were cancelled so that the MHA has more power over the area" (C3).

The cancellation of the ward representatives also meant that people's opinions were not represented at the district council any more. As a consequence, social services were scaled down:

> "During the *diwani*'s power, different development projects were established in this area, but after they were restricted from being representatives in this area, these development projects stagnated. That's why different properties that were distributed by the government to this area were taken back to the district office and the projects stopped. [...] Like schools, streets, even the hospital are not maintained; the service is not good anymore. Even these tobacco cooperative societies, which were doing tobacco farming, were given subsidies... but nowadays, they don't get subsidies [*ruzuku*] any more" (C3).

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[16]District executive director

Similarly, another former ward representative explained,

> "There were misunderstandings between the settlement officer and us. We did development projects as *diwani*. They did not consider the refugees or Tanzanians; we considered them as the same. [...] During my position I tried to find an accurate communication between the hospital at Road 10 and Urambo Hospital. So I founded a radio call, which is working until now. If solutions were given [at the district council], we brought them back to the people. We built dispensaries, teachers' houses...During this time as *diwani*, I built one teacher's house and four classes; in Makonge three classrooms and toilets of six chambers for each school. I was *diwani* for four villages: Kaswa, Makonge, Mkindo and Ikonongo. Up to now there is no communication between the district government and here. We also built a water tank at the health centre to harvest rainwater" (C4).

As a consequence, Tanzanians living in Ulyankulu felt invisibilised and refugees no longer participated in village meetings:

> "Nowadays, there are many Tanzanians here in the settlement. I think we reach 20,000 people. The government should consider this place and not separate [*kutenganisha*] it from the rest of the area. Also, we are making a big contribution to the food and to the government [through taxes]. Almost every week on Wednesday and Saturday, we take agricultural products from the area taken to other parts or sites where they have contributed [to the food availability]. Other Tanzanians come here to buy maize etc. There is a reason for the government to assist us here. *It is true – we have a very big contribution to the government but it doesn't see us!*" (C4, emphasis added).

Furthermore, according to the village chairman of Kaswa, village meetings used for development purposes have not taken place for a long time. Village meetings are normally held once per month or once in two months. The participants are the hamlet leaders (*vitongoji*), leaders of the lowest administrative units, about the size of a small village. The Village Chairman of Kaswa explained, "Once in a while, there used to be a larger village meeting with all villagers involved." However, "There has not been such a meeting for three years because the settlement might be closed. The purpose of those meetings

was to accelerate certain development projects but nowadays there are no development projects; so there are also no meetings."

Control or abandonment?

Since 2006 (officially, 2007) there have only been a few government officials employed in Ulyankulu. The main government presence, the settlement officer and his assistants, is located in a building far away from the centre of Ulyankulu, at Road 1 (see Plate 4.9). A former ward representative explained that the centre has been abandoned:

> "Government officials from Urambo have not been here even though we as Tanzanians live here as well. In the centre of the settlement here, there is no government service at all from 2006 up to now. It is like a home without mother and father" (C4).

When asked why there are so few government officials in the settlement, the settlement officer said, "These people [i.e. the refugees in Ulyankulu] are lucky to get one or two; the Tanzanians don't have that" (G2).

On the one hand, the settlement commander thus presented the MHA's presence in the settlement as a service for the refugees instead of as a control measure. He commented that "the Tanzanians don't have that", which infers acknowledgement of the disadvantage suffered by the Tanzanians in Ulyankulu, who lack any representation in the settlement since the cancellation of the ward representatives.

On the other hand, he acknowledges that the MHA alone is not able to provide adequate services. Therefore the MHA called some officers of the local government (under the DED, then in Urambo) back to work in the settlement to help out:

> "They have been called up by the MHA to provide social services [...]. There is a ward educational officer, who is supervising teachers at primary and secondary school, a coordinator of educational activities. There are also agricultural and animal husbandry extension officers, who give veterinary and agricultural extension advice to the peasants. Furthermore, there are health officers, like medical officers and doctors. Their two main functions are to eliminate dirty areas and mosquito areas; to look after food sold under dirty conditions. They have offices. For instance the meat that we are eating, it

needs to be checked by the agricultural extension officer; they can say it is unfit for consumption" (G2).

Furthermore, he stated that control is the main function of the MHA in the settlement: "The settlement is administered as a camp; it has a nature of militarism; in villages they don't need a permit. Some people in Kigoma have been arrested for going without permit; in Mpanda also I received a call [...]". The main reason for the Ministry of Home Affairs to be present in the settlement is thus to control the movement of refugees. These accounts show that the Ministry of Home Affairs is the institution holding most power over the settlement. The UNHCR and its partner TCRS (see Plates 4.10 and 4.11) are only mentioned in passing. In fact, while its office is located in the heart of Ulyankulu, its tasks after the 2009 repatriation and the registration of refugees for naturalisation have been limited. A women's empowerment programme has been offered by the UNHCR along with technical support for vulnerable people by the TCRS. Furthermore, the UNHCR has helped to construct both a new building at Ulyankulu Secondary School and an extention of the health centre. Next to these endeavours, officials mentioned that they are mainly waiting for the government's decision on the relocation and naturalisation initiatives. As the government remained silent on the policy, the UNHCR and TCRS eventually scaled down both their activities and staff until they planned to resign entirely. The budget (as shown in Chapter 4) for the relocation and handing out of citizenship certificates was withdrawn in 2013.

Plate 4.9: Settlement Officer's Building at Road 1
Source: Author (2012)

Plate 4.10: Gate to the UNHCR Compound at Road 13, Kaswa
Source: Author (2012)

Plate 4.11: Gate to the TCRS Compound at Road 13, Kaswa
Source: Author (June 2012)

Within the settlement, the Ministry of Home Affairs thus dismantled the previous governance structure. This happened to the detriment of the Tanzanians and Burundians living in the settlement. The abolition of the Ward Representatives had real consequences both in terms of the delivery of social services to the people as well as in terms of representation to the district council. The UNHCR was not filling this gap to the same extent.

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On the one hand, the low government presence in the settlement equalled one of abandonment of important services within the settlement as well as an abandonment of Tanzanians living in Ulyankulu. On the other hand, the power of the MHA was increased in comparison to other government actors. Control of the settlement as such, i.e. control of movements outside of the settlement, was still upheld. Furthermore, the MHA controlled the material landscape of the settlement, as will be shown in Chapter 5. The abandonment of services in the settlement, however, was still realised in the context of control. This abandonment only occurred since the settlement was supposed to be closed. Refugees, however, were supposed to be continuously controlled even after the closure through an organised relocation and local integration process.

4.4.3 *Ulyankulu as a district? Invisibilisation of the settlement*

While the previous section showed changes in the internal governance structure marked by abandonment and non-maintenance, this section analyses the administrative position and eventual invisibilisation of Ulyankulu within the region of Tabora. Previous official announcements proclaimed that Ulyankulu would become a district but these plans have not been realised. In July 2012, Urambo was split into two districts: Urambo and Kaliua. Ulyankulu is now part of Kaliua, which is about 60 km further away from Ulyankulu than the old district capital Urambo. The actual distance of Ulyankulu to Kaliua by car is more than 100 km. Figures 4.11 and 4.12 show the location of Ulyankulu within the former and the new districts. Although Ulyankulu is officially not part of the local government structure, it is still divided into three wards and statistically recorded at the district council just as any other division – as can be seen in a table on school enrolment data of 2012.

Various reasons were given as to why Kaliua was chosen to be a new district over Ulyankulu. The government official in Urambo noted:

> "They [the refugees] were not used to being part of a ward – they have their own administration. The district was bigger. The government wanted people to get more nearby services rather than going far. [...] Ulyankulu will maybe get their own district in the future but we start with Kaliua and Urambo. The problem is there is a reserve there [in Ulyankulu]" (G6).

Similarly, a government official in Kaliua elaborated: "the purpose is to give public services near to the people. People must get all services very near from the administration; rather than having an administration far away like Urambo" (G4).

x – Location of Ulyankulu
* The circle indicates the
location of Tabora Urban area.

Figure 4.11: Districts of Tabora Region 2002
Source: National Bureau of Statistics (2006)

However this official added:

"One reason [for not choosing Ulyankulu as a district] is that about 55% of the Ulyankulu division is covered by refugees, but population-wise, 95% of the dwellers over there are refugees; it would be another Burundi in Tanzania.

Another reason is that the whole area, which is used by refugees, is a reserve area, a national reserve area. Another reason is that the whole area is a good sponge of water reserve: during the rainy season, the area is collecting water under the soil. This water runs from Madarasi until Lake Tanganyika. Water has now been reduced because of cutting trees for cultivation; the area is

x – Location of Ulyankulu
This part belongs to Uyui.

Figure 4.12: Districts of Tabora Region 2012
Source: National Bureau of Statistics Tanzania (2012) (Author's illustration with ArcGIS software)

eroded to the maximum because of human activity there; the water is polluted.

All these reasons were given to President Kikwete. In the election campaign of 2010, he announced openly that Ulyankulu will be a district. But after doing a scientific survey, they found out that it could be possible that Lake Tanganyika would dry up. The president thought deeply, if this is the solution. Now Ulyankulu cannot be a district.

[...] They [the refugees] are bringing problems to our country, when you are bringing them to Tabora, Mwanza...it means chaos. These refugees are in touch with those people in Burundi. They do so; they have a direct commu-

nication like me and you. They just pretend to be very polite but they are not
[...]."

The official thus presented three reasons for not accepting Ulyankulu as a district. Two
reasons were of environmental nature: turning Ulyankulu officially into a district would
rule out the option of closing the settlement. In the long run, population pressures on the
forest reserve would increase and soil erosion of Igombe River would worsen. As could
be seen above, the environmental discourse reaches back to colonial times and it is now
applied to refugees. A third reason reflects the government's fear of refugees as a security
threat and possibly fear of the Hutu's "violent subjectivities" (Das *et al.*, 2000) which was
voiced increasingly since the 1990s (see Section 4.3.4 above and Chapter 5).

A different informant suggested that the Member of Parliament, who was responsi-
ble for Urambo district (Juma Kapuye), influenced the decision of moving the district
from Ulyankulu to Kaliua for personal and political reasons: the government buildings
in Kaliua used to be his hotel and he could count on more voters' support if Kaliua was
the new district. Interestingly, Kaliua was only able to become a district through the in-
clusion of the three wards of Ulyankulu settlement in order to meet the official minimum
requirements for population numbers necessary to form a district (interview with I3).

Scrutinising the reasons given, one can say that, as during British colonial times, the
area was administratively invisibilised and was planned to be vacated via relocation of the
refugees due to environmental reasons. The situation of refugees in Ulyankulu threatened
to become similar to Sierra Leonean refugees in the defunct Boreah camp in Guinea: they
were invisibilised by the official closure of the camp, by recent UNHCR statistics and
by budgetary planning. They were neither legal residents nor refugees, they no longer
obtained social services and the Guinean state was unable or unwilling to provide secure
legal status (Gale, 2008: 538). Concerning Ulyankulu, refugees were then only noted as
'other people of concern' rather than refugees. The withdrawal of the budget for local
integration also made it difficult to imagine whether the naturalisation process would
ever be completed. The attention given to the repatriation in 2012 of Burundian refugees
from the 1990s, who had lived in Mtabila camp, may have fostered the stagnation on the
naturalisation policy and the invisibilisation of the 1972 caseload.

The situation in Ulyankulu also resembled the invisibilisation that occurred when
Ethiopians were resettled from one part of the country to another in a so-called Vol-

untary Resettlement Programme as part of a national food security strategy. The area where they were resettled was remote and characterised by limited infrastructure, a low presence of NGOs and marked by tsetse fly infestation (Hammond, 2008: 518). While the targeted destitute people were highly visible before, they were rendered invisible by the programme, and the aim of food security was not achieved either (ibid.: 521, 530). Refugees from the Old Settlements were also highly internationally visible when they registered for naturalisation. Turning Ulyankulu into a district would have increased their local and national visibility. However, since 2012 Ulyankulu has been further removed from the district capital than ever. As Hammond (2008: 534) notes, "invisibilisation became a way of trying to deny responsibility for the failures; an easier and less expensive option than trying to correct the fundamental problems with the programme."

In summary, the government suggested to naturalise the Burundian refugees in 2007 coupled with an attempt to relocate them to other regions and to close the Old Settlements. This initative was also aimed to serve the development of the hosting regions. Ultimately 80% of the refugees opted to register for citizenship, whereas 20% wished to go back to Burundi and repatriated in 2008/2009. Since the settlements were supposed to be closed, the local governance structure that had been in place before was dismantled. A period of non-maintenance and abandonment followed. Ulyankulu was administratively invisibilised by choosing to embed it in a new district with a distant capital instead of turning it into a district of its own.

4.5   Conclusion

This chapter elaborated the development of Ulyankulu in terms of its spatial history, economic activities, social services and its governance structure in four phases. It also discussed the evolution of Tanzania's refugee policy over time.

Various measures of control could be detected in each phase. Going back to colonial times, the government continued to exercise control over the environment and over the population since the establishment of the settlement. As a control measure during British colonialism, the area was vacated for environmental reasons (Phase 0). Since independence, the Tanzanian government was generally open towards different types and scales of refugee movements under Nyerere's leadership. His foreign policy supported refugees

from other liberation struggles in a spirit of pan-Africanism, while his domestic policy saw refugees from independent states as beneficial tools of development. Having arrived and welcomed in Tanzania, refugees in Ulyankulu were supervised by international and national humanitarian organisations (UNHCR and TCRS) as well as the Tanzanian central government (under the Ministry of Home Affairs) in order to prepare them for life in the settlement. Spatial control was exerted by arranging plots in a legible grid, and the distribution to people from similar places of origin followed a security motive. Eventually due to environmental reasons, a part of the refugee population was shifted from Ulyankulu to another new settlement further south in the country (Mishamo).

Nevertheless, despite these control measures, refugees were treated as *de facto* citizens within the settlement especially in Phase 2, which began when refugees became self-sufficient in 1985. This phase lasted until 2007. Humanitarian organisations withdrew from the area and Ulyankulu was integrated into local governance structures. During this phase, refugees were granted more freedom to show agency in the development of the space especially in economic terms and in terms of 'self-help' to improve education for example by building schools. This type of agency was overt and went hand in hand with the governmental provisions. In general, refugees, like citizens, were part of a larger resettlement and villagisation programme introduced by President Nyerere. They obtained a plot of land to cultivate cash and food crops in order to become self-sufficient and pay taxes. Refugees were also encouraged to produce tobacco for the international market. Over time, they turned the centre village Kaswa into an economic centre within Tabora region. Thereby they have contributed to food security in the region. Echoing colonial concerns, however, the government realised that ecological damage was caused in the settlement area, and made the refugees responsible for it. Overall, living with relative autonomy for more than two decades in this Phase, has shaped refugees sense of belonging, as will be further elaborated in Chapter 6. At the national level, from the 1980s onwards, processes of economic restructuring and of democratisation caused changes in the domestic political environment, which in turn led to an increasingly restrictive approach towards refugees. Foreign policy also changed towards supporting neighbouring governments rather than refugees. The changed approach towards refugees was also a response to heightened insecurity caused by the large-scale influx of refugees in the 1990s. Starting by expelling Rwandan refugees in 1996 and closing the border to Burundi, refugees faced

new limitations concerning their freedom of movement and economic opportunities reinforced by the Refugees Act, 1998 and the National Refugee Policy 2003.

Even though Tanzanians were not allowed to live there, they have increasingly moved to Ulyankulu from Tabora region and beyond. For the Nyamwezi, it is argued, moving back was related to their historical attachment to the land. Before the refugees arrived, Ulyankulu was the centre of Chief Mirambo's rule and his grave can still be found in the settlement (see Phase 0). Those who lived in the settlement were resident in the central villages since the borders used to be more policed. The fact that refugees behaved and were treated like citizens, and increasingly interacted with Tanzanians had important effects on their sense of belonging, as argued in Chapter 6.

In a third phase of governance (since 2007) a large number of refugees with Burundian origins were registered in order to obtain citizenship. A process of relocation to different regions around the country was planned, which proved to be problematic and threatened the purpose of the naturalisation in the first place. It was also problematic that refugees had to renounce their Burundian citizenship when registering for Tanzanian citizenship since they were then effectively stateless after the naturalisation was put on hold. The government, it is argued, initially agreed to the naturalisation in order to re-engage donors and to obtain funds to develop the receiving regions. This was reminiscent of Tanzania's previous approach to use refugees as tools of development. It also aimed to increase its reputation with the donor community as a foreign policy tactic. However, regional governments and parliamentarians opposed the relocation for various reasons, including opposition to a foreign investment deal that would affect the settlement areas. These antagonistic stances were the reason to halt the scheme in 2011. Since the start of the naturalisation initiative, the Ministry of Home Affairs dismantled the administrative structure within the settlement and thinned out the local government's presence in order to prepare for the closure of the settlement. Refugees and Tanzanians in the settlement have not been represented to the district council any more. Within the broader region, Ulyankulu was administratively invisibilised: while the division of Ulyankulu was previously planned to enjoy *increased* importance by becoming its own district, it has been part of a new district located far away since 2012. These developments speak for abandonment of the area, but a discourse of control related to the planned naturalisation and relocation was perpetuated at the same time. A repeated reason for the plan of closing the settlement was environmental degradation. Another reason, was a security

discourse, which the refugees have been subjected to and which has been used to justify control (elaborated further in Chapter 5). The next chapter discusses how measures of control functioned to exclude refugees from citizenship throughout these phases but also how they were in tension with other processes and shifting priorities.

THE CAMP AS A SPACE OF CONTROL? TENSIONS BETWEEN EXCLUSION AND BELONGING

This chapter explores how the refugees in settlements have been excluded from citizenship in a 'space of control' by government policies, how this exclusion has been justified by discourses of various government actors, but also how this exclusion has been in tension with other local process of citizen-making and conviviality, involving refugees, Tanzanian citizens and government officials. In the previous chapter it could be seen that Ulyankulu settlement has undergone three main phases of governance since the arrival of the refugees. It is argued here that throughout the transformations of all of these phase over the course of four decades refugees remained excluded from *de jure* citizenship enforced by the Tanzanian government and international organisations by various means (legal, spatial, temporal and military) but that a process of *de facto* citizenship has enfolded, which included both citizenship self-making and being-made, as explained above (cf. Ong, 1996).

In the first section, it is shown that at a policy level, refugees have been treated as legal exceptions in Tanzania: refugees lack a number of constitutional *de jure* citizenship rights as well as human rights, such as freedom of movement, political participation and the right to work. As depicted in the second part of this section, observations on the ground, however, reveal a central tension between control and exclusion on the one hand, and belonging and elements of *de facto* citizenship on the other hand. In Ulyankulu one can perceive that the government and international organisations restrict refugees from obtaining information; they segregate refugees and citizens in public events, and perpetuate a sense of temporal control. However, observation of such a public event also revealed that refugees had learned forms of demonstrating commitment to the Tanzanian nation in school – they showed their belonging to the nation by dancing Tanzanian dances. The government has supported schooling the refugees, which can be a key element in the process of forming political subjects and *de facto* citizens. This shows that for both the

government and refugees, citizenship is a status and a process. A third part of this section explains how the government has enforced an artificial separation between refugees and Tanzanians by controlling the border with military force. However, this could also be seen as an attempt to protect the refugees from an invasion in their everyday lives.

The second section analyses discourses employed by government actors in relation to the formerly proposed relocation policy. Fundamentally, that policy was the most controversial issue in relation to the refugees in Ulyankulu at the time of fieldwork. The relocation policy was already on hold in 2012 but it was still not clear whether it would be implemented later. These discourses may also show why refugees had been excluded from *de jure* citizenship until the naturalisation initiative was announced in 2007, and why it had not been implemented until the time of fieldwork in 2012. As this section shows, all government actors voiced security concerns in relation to refugees and some also expressed concerns with mixing and purity of the Tanzanian nation. Security was here a generalised national concern – it did not directly relate to local criminality of refugees since numbers of crimes in Ulyankulu were not higher than elsewhere. By proposing the relocation initiative, the central government shifted from a concern with purity towards finding a solution that would permanently eliminate the category of 'refugees'. However, regional governments did not follow this shift and therefore, the relocation initiative was put on hold.

In the third section of this chapter, the effects of the legal restrictions on refugees' lives in Ulyankulu are discussed. While refugees routinely evaded government control, they also faced punishment. However, it becomes clear that at the same time refugees have achieved a degree of conviviality with some government officials, which allowed them some leeway to act in the settlement according to their choice. This chapter shows types and reasons of control and how they have been in tension between acts of exclusion and belonging. This analysis will provide the context for Chapter 6, which will focus on a nascent sense of belonging and citizenship claims-making by the refugees.

5.1 Exclusion from Citizenship in a 'Space of Control' in Tension with Processes of Belonging

5.1.1 *Exclusion from citizenship in legal and spatial terms*

In this part the contents of top-down Tanzanian refugee policies, which were in place in 2012, are discussed in order to demonstrate the legal dimension of government control over the Burndian refugees. It is shown which rights refugees in Ulyankulu lacked in comparison to Tanzanian citizens. Refugees were thereby excluded from *de jure* citizenship but they were also hindered to integrate in the host community in a *de facto* (actual) manner. In addition, this part explores how local Tanzanians were also affected by control measures within the settlement.

The government separated refugees from citizens in political, legal, material and spatial terms through the Refugees Act, 1998, which repeals the Refugee Control Act, 1965, and in the National Refugee Policy 2003. Politically and legally, refugees lacked citizenship rights. In Tanzania, these rights are spelled out by the Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania, 1977 (see Annex 2). Provisions pertaining to the attainment of citizenship and the naturalisation of non-citizens are spelled out in the Citizenship Act of 1995. According to the Act any person can obtain citizenship by birth:

> 5.-(1) [...] Every person born in the United Republic on or after Union Day shall be deemed to have become and to have continued to be a citizen of the United Republic with effect from the date of his birth, and with effect from the commencement of this Act shall become and continue to be a citizen [...].

Furthermore, non-citizens can register for citizenship through naturalisation:

> 9.-(1) Any person who is not a citizen of the United Republic may, being a person of full age and capacity, on making an application in that behalf to the Minister, [...] be naturalised as a citizen of the United Republic, and be granted a certificate of naturalisation.

Refugees, however, were not considered eligible for this provision. Recently, a new Constitution of the Federation of Tanganyika and Zanzibar has been drafted but it has not yet taken effect. The draft by the Constitutional Review Commission will make radical

changes to the framework of citizenship law enshrined in the Act of 1995 (Manby, 2014): the automatic right to citizenship of those born on Tanzanian soil will be withdrawn, which, as Manby (2014) notes, can exacerbate statelessness in the region and constitutes a violation of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child adopted by the African Union in 1990. It is also in tension with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966, ratified by Tanzania in 1976, which spells out in article 24(3) that "every child has the right to acquire a nationality". Tanzania follows the UK and other Commonwealth countries in Africa, which have already changed the system by withdrawing automatic *jus soli* provisions. However, those countries (such as South Africa and Namibia) allow children who are born to legal residents to become citizens. Manby (2014) suggests that government officials may not realise that the change in citizenship law is a drastic one. Most commentators on the new constitution focused on the positive changes in terms of human rights and gender equality but have not mentioned the change in citizenship law (ibid.).

Rights that were curtailed for refugees in Tanzania are freedom of movement, the right to assemble and join associations, and the right to participate in public affairs, i.e. voting and putting oneself forward as a candidate in the political process. Refugees were also not allowed to work outside of the settlement. These rights are spelled out in the Constitution in Articles 17, 20, 21 and 22 (see below, emphasis added; see also Annex 2). While the rights to assemble and to work include "every person", the rights to freedom of movement and to take part in the governance of the country are reserved to "every citizen". The articles in the Constitution echo the corresponding articles in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948 with the difference being that the Declaration includes "everyone" on all four matters (rights to freedom of moment, assemble, take part in governance and work).

Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania, 1977:

> 17(1): *Every citizen* of the United Republic has the right to freedom of movement in the United Republic, and the right to live in any part of the United Republic, to leave and enter the country, and the right not to be forced to leave or be expelled from the United Republic.

> 20(1): *Every person* has a freedom, to freely and peaceably assemble, associate and cooperate with other persons, and for that purpose, express views publicly

and to form and join with associations or organisation formed for purposes of preserving or furthering his beliefs or interests or any other interests.

21(1): [...] with the conditions for electing and being elected or for appointing and being appointed to take part in matters related to governance of the county, *every citizen* of the United Republic is entitled to take part in matters pertaining to the governance of the country, either directly or through representatives freely elected by the people [...]

22(1): *Every person* has the right to work.

Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948:

13(1): Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state.

20(1): Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association.

21(1): Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely chosen representatives.

23(1): Everyone has the right to work, to free choice of employment, to just and favourable conditions of work and to protection against unemployment.

These restrictions do not only relate to refugees in Tanzania but have also been applied in different settings. The reasons for these restrictions are related to security concerns and the assumption that refugees stay only temporarily. Kaiser (2006) notes for example that refugees in settlements in Uganda have not enjoyed freedom of movement. Furthermore, even though the UNHCR promotes the adherence to human rights, it acknowledges:

"[...] All refugees, as indeed all persons, have certain basic human rights. [...] Refugees have the right to freedom of movement. However, it is recognised that, particularly in cases of mass influx, security considerations and the rights of the local population may dictate restrictions" (UNHCR, n.d.: 5).

With reference to Tanzania's refugee policies, material control was exercised since the refugees' arrival. According to the Refugees Act, 1998, next to surrendering weapons to the officers in charge, refugees could be dispossessed of animals and vehicles:

13(1) Detention and Slaughter of Animals: The competent authority may direct that any animal imported into his area from outside Tanzania by any person whom he has reason to believe to be an asylum seeker or a refugee shall be kept in such place as he shall direct or shall be slaughtered or otherwise disposed of.

14. Possession of vehicle of asylum seeker or refugee: The competent authority may take [...] possession of any vehicle in which any person whom he has reasonable cause to believe to be an asylum seeker or a refugee arrived in his area and authorise its use in the area for the purpose of moving asylum seekers or refugees or any store or equipment for their use.

Furthermore, refugees were not allowed to own houses made of durable materials such as burnt bricks in the settlement. Only houses made of un-burnt clay were allowed. This is in tension with Article 24 of the Constitution (see Annex 2), which spells out the right to own property.

Freedom of movement is restricted through Articles 16 and 17 of the Refugees Act, 1998, which prescribes that refugees live in designated areas (see also Annex 3):

17(1) The competent authority in consultation with the Minister or the Director may by order, require any asylum seeker or refugee or group or category of refugees to whom this section applies who is within his area to reside within a designated area whether or not such area is within the jurisdiction of competent authority.

Furthermore, refugees need to obtain a permit in order to move out of the area and can normally only stay outside of the settlement for 14 days:

17(5a) No asylum seeker or refugee shall be allowed to leave a designated area as directed under this section unless he has sought and obtained a permit from Director or Settlement Officer as the case may be, and, subject to such terms and conditions as the Director or a Settlement Officer may prescribe in the permit.

17(5b) No asylum seeker or refugee may be allowed to be out of a designated area for more than fourteen days unless the Director has allowed in the permit

a longer period upon which an asylum seeker or a refugee may stay outside the designated area.

If refugees move out of the settlement without such a permit, they may be imprisoned for up to six months or be liable for a fine of TZS 50,000.[1] As will be seen below, such prohibitions were actually enforced and policed. When refugees moved outside of the camp without documentation, they were subject to harassment by the authorities for suspicion of unlawful presence in the country and they were in risk of being deported. This is due in part to the fact that border officials as well as village executive officers (VEOs) and other officials have not received any special guidance on the handling of refugees and asylum seekers (Rutinwa, 2005). For a refugee in Ulyankulu without legal documentation, showing a permit from the settlement officer to prove that one is allowed to move outside of the settlement for two weeks, has thus been all the more important.

Under Tanzania's National Refugee Policy 2003, refugees have only been allowed to engage in small income generating activities in the camps and settlements (paragraph 17). Otherwise, they could request a work permit from the Director of Refugee Services at the Ministry of Home Affairs and they had to obtain an additional permit from the Department of Immigration (Rutinwa, 2005). The Act of 1998 has not prohibited ownership of immovable property but it was nevertheless discouraged, such as by an announcement by the government of February 9th, 2009 (Annex 4). The state thus exerted a form of control over the material/built landscape within the settlement.

Local Tanzanians were also affected by the prescriptions related to refugees. The announcement of February 2009 with the title "*To stop building houses in the settlement*" (Annex 4) clearly stated that Tanzanians should also be discouraged from building permanent houses, i.e. made out of burnt bricks, in the settlement, and from buying houses or land there. Thus, government control also applied to Tanzanians. In fact, they were officially not permitted to live in the settlement all; refugees and citizens were legally and spatially separated.

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[1]TZS 50,000 equalled approximately GBP 20 (precisely GBP 19.71 at an exchange rate of 0.0004 on 30 November 2012).

5.1.2 *Schooling and information as tools for both exclusion and belonging*

An important part for states to engage in citizen-making is by schooling and various forms of information dissemination. However, withholding certain pieces of information may also be a way to exclude refugees from the process of becoming citizens. As will be seen below, these two processes have been in tension in Ulyankulu. In the settlement, information about rights and responsibilities is officially disseminated to refugees (and to Tanzanians) in various ways.

According to Rutinwa (2005), there have been three main methods of information dissemination in the eleven Tanzanian camps that were still open in 2005, including Ulyankulu, Mishamo and Katumba settlements. The first method was public meetings called by the UNHCR or the government. They have been held by district commissioners, regional commissioners or even ministers. However, these meetings have tended to focus on responsibilities of refugees and have often involved threats to comply, rather than explaining rights to the refugees. A second method was 'protection training' workshops, in which different rights were discussed. They have addressed both refugees and assistance providers. A third method was through billboards and posters, which have been placed at strategic places, in English, Swahili and Kirundi, as well as Congolese and Rwandese languages according to the first language of refugees in the respective camps. A fact sheet about rights and responsibilities was developed as well in 2005 (ibid.). However, since not all refugees are literate, these methods may have had limited scope.

Concerning the first method, in Ulyankulu, announcements were spread within the settlement through general village meetings held by the village chairmen. Sometimes they were joined by other government officials such as the settlement officer. During the time of fieldwork, a public meeting with the regional commissioner of Tabora was held to inaugurate the new buildings of Ulyankulu Secondary School on 2nd August 2012 (see Annex 10). This was the only public event of information dissemination during the time of research – a village chairman confirmed that other public meetings had been suspended since the settlement was supposed to be closed. The school inauguration turned out to be symbolic for the relations between refugees on the one hand and government officials, international organisations and donors on the other hand in this protracted situation. This event demonstrated existing power relations and segregation between the central and regional governments as well as humanitarian organisations, who controlled the occasion,

and the refugees, seen as non-citizens, who were invited to attend and take part in it. At the same time, as discussed below, it showed refugees' belonging to the Tanzanian nation.

The regional commissioner and a delegation of donors, including the Japanese government and UNHCR officials from Dar es Salaam, were present and sat in the shade at the front of the scene. Children and other spectators were partially covered by a temporary plastic roof, but many had to sit or stand through the whole ceremony in the glaring sun (see Plate 5.1). The organisers had decided to drive a new land rover and a motorbike, which was given to the Regional Commission in Tabora by the UNHCR as a present, all the way from Tabora to Ulyankulu and back in order to show the gifts to the refugee public. Refugee children performed Tanzanian dances and songs at the start of the ceremony. I was given a seat in the shaded section with local UNHCR and TCRS employees – in contrast to my assistant and a local Tanzanian with whom I had arrived. The message given by the regional commissioner to the refugees was that they should not lose hope while waiting in face of the uncertain situation concerning citizenship.

The atmosphere and staging of the event reinforced the distance between refugees, government and international actors. The spatial segregation between first and second class seating, the showcasing of expensive presents (vehicles), and speeches are elements of public performance that demonstrated the power of the regional commissioner and international donors, who will ultimately decide the refugees' fate. As Askew (2002) maintains, power can be embedded in performance: refugees performed their gratitude for the new school buildings and their submission to the benevolent donors by entertaining them with their dances.

However, while these dances suggested submission to the government and donors, they also represented a public display of the refugees' belonging to the Tanzanian nation. These dances have been taught to refugees and to students anywhere in Tanzanian schools as variations of local Tanzanian *ngoma* dances for educational purposes (Jerman, 1997; Askew, 2002). They have generally aimed to "reinforce national discipline" (Jerman, 1997: 288), or to "perform the nation" (Askew, 2002). The fact that refugee children performed these Tanzanian dances emphasises that they have, by now, become accustomed to Tanzanian nation-building traditions instead of Burundian ones. The refugees' local tradition, with which government officials expect to be entertained when they visit places, has become a variant of the Tanzanian *ngoma*. This suggests that refugees now belonged to the Tanzanian nation, especially in light of the fact that Burundian dances were indeed still

practiced and promoted by the government and international organisations in the early years after the refugees' arrival in Ulyankulu (see Chapter 6, Section 6.2.3).

Plate 5.1: Ulyankulu Secondary School Inauguration: Performance in the Shade
Source: Author (July 2012)

At this event, one could see that control has not only been exerted over the refugees in legal and spatial terms, but that it has also been temporal. The government adjourned important decisions, such as the formerly proposed naturalisation and relocation, with the effect of perpetuating the refugees' hopes for betterment on the one hand and anxieties on the other hand, without ever satisfying its promises (cf. Bourdieu, 2000; see Section 2.3.2). The event described above constitutes an example of how the government actively prolonged this situation.

At the time of my research, I did not witness any instance of the second method of information dissemination mentioned above, namely that of protection training[2]. This may be because such training is most important in emergency situations rather than in protracted cases (cf. UNHCR, n.d.). Concerning the third method, announcements were spread using a noticeboard at the main square on the wall of the CCM office. In order

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[2]Protection training encompasses instructions on how to ensure the international protection of refugees. International protection is a temporary substitute for the protection usually provided by states to their nationals abroad. The aim of international protection in emergencies is to ensure admission and at least temporary asylum, i.e. to help Refugee Status Determination, to prevent forcible return ("refoulement") and to ensure refugees are treated according to basic human rights standards. The principles of protection are based on the 1951 Statute of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, and the 1967 Protocol, as well as the OAU Convention of 1969 (UNHCR, n.d.).

to combat the problem of illiteracy, information in Ulyankulu was also spread through religious leaders, such as priests and pastors of the various churches in the settlement. Important announcements, such as that of 9th of February 2009, were made at the end of religious services. Persons of authority within the community – such as former village chairmen and religious leaders – possessed some government hand-outs and other written material, such as books. However, written information throughout the settlement was scarce.

While first generation refugees may have learned about the meaning of citizenship in Burundi, second generation refugees learned about citizenship as well as definitions and rights of refugees in school in Ulyankulu (see Annex 5, civics book for Forms 3 and 4). Many people in the settlement possessed radios and had obtained mobile phones. However, due to the lack of electricity, people did not have access to television or the internet. Access to the internet for the general (refugee) public was only available in Tabora town. There was also still no possibility of obtaining newspapers of any kind in the settlement. Judging from participant observation in Ulyankulu, while one cannot say that information was actively withheld from the refugees, public written and oral information dissemination was limited – and often served purposes of control by the government and international organisations. As Rutinwa (2005) points out, the information dissemination that existed emphasised duties instead of rights and thus did not aim to include refugees fully in Tanzania's citizenry.

5.1.3 *Enforcing a separation between refugees and citizens by military acts of repression*

As could be seen above, refugees are excluded from citizenship through national legal provisions but on a local level in the settlement, there is a tension between processes of exclusion from citizenship and citizenship-making on the side of the state. In addition to these processes, the government has also engaged in "everyday acts of repression" (Scott, 1985), which aim to separate citizens from refugees. Several times in the settlement's history the Tanzanian government engaged in rounding up refugees who had, for example, gone outside of the settlement without a permit and conducted business activities in Tabora town. Their legitimate businesses were closed down and the refugees forced back to the settlements; and many to prison (Daily News, July 12, 1985; May 25, 1986; July 9, 1986; cited in Daley, 1991). As shown in Section 5.3.1 below, this practice has contin-

ued until now. However, two specific instances in the history of the settlement show that refugees who live in Ulyankulu are sometimes protected and favoured in comparison to intruding citizens or ricochet refugees.

Military repression of Sukuma intruders in 2010

As mentioned in the previous chapter, Tanzanians have increasingly moved to the settlement area, claiming their rights to the territory that used to be theirs. While most of these Tanzanians came peacefully on an individual basis in agreement with village leaders in the settlement, in 2010 Ulyankulu experienced a larger, unannounced influx of Sukuma pastoralists. They came in search of greener pastures with their herds from semi-arid areas in Shinyanga and Mwanza regions. The area of Ulyankulu promised to be more fertile. These Sukuma arrived in the North-Eastern part of the settlement, in Igombemkulu. Not accepting the presence of this Sukuma group in the settlement, the Tanzanian (operational) police took away the cattle from the Sukuma. The Sukuma, however, did not accept this intervention and started to burn huts belonging to refugees and other Sukuma who were living in the area of Igombemkulu. Eventually, the police took some of the Sukuma to the police station in Ulyankulu, which the Sukuma tried to attack in return. After this attempt failed, the conflict stopped for a while but then erupted again. This time, the police reacted with a stronger force, supported from Urambo and Tabora. They arrested the leaders and sent them to prison in Urambo. Thereafter the group were said to have moved on (interview with I3).

While this intervention served to uphold the separation between refugees and Tanzanians, it may also signify bias by the state against the pastoralist Sukuma population, who thereby experienced disenfranchisement from their land like other mobile populations in Africa (Hogg, 1997; Turton, 1996, cited in Hammond, 2008). Instead of protecting the Sukuma citizens, the government protected the lives of the more settled refugees, who, it could be argued, were in this instance treated more like citizens than the pastoralist.

Rounding up and sending back ricochet migrants from Burundi

Many of those refugees who repatriated in 2009 eventually returned to the settlement even though they had been told that they could not be refugees or citizens in Tanzania once they moved back to Burundi. These 'ricochet migrants' had faced difficulties in

obtaining land in Burundi or could not cope with the education system in Burundi – which is conducted in Kirundi and French instead of Swahili and English as in Tanzania. Realising that Ulyankulu had become their home, they decided to come back to Tanzania. While some of them went to the immigration office in Tabora in order to legally obtain a residence permit before going back to Ulyankulu (interview with G7), many returned to the settlement without documents.

The government, in an attempt to control the situation, rounded up many of these (former) refugees and forcibly repatriated them to Burundi. In this instance, the government's control mechanisms aimed to separate those who had accepted the option of naturalisation and those who had chosen to repatriate. While those who had wished to be naturalised were still protected, others who chose to repatriate were now excluded from any protection. This shows that belonging, in the eyes of the state, involves a conscious decision and a willingness to be citizens. The importance assigned to such a decision was also mentioned by an interview with the Prime Minister's Office, as quoted below (Section 5.2.1, interview with G8).

In summary, the aim of these military acts of repression has been to separate refugees from citizens in order to enforce a 'space of control' in the settlement area. This space, as explained above, was created in the first place by national legal provisions. The government aimed to create a legal and spatial separation between refugees and Tanzanians, a fact that could also be seen in the secondary school inauguration on a small scale. However, that event also showed that refugees had learned in school to perform a sense of belonging to the nation through dances. While the state had thus instilled a sense of citizenship in the refugees, it also restricted information about citizens' rights at the same time. The school inauguration also showed that the government exercised temporal control by adjourning decisions.

It may seem odd that at certain times, such as the repression of the group of Sukuma in 2010, the government was protecting the refugees instead of its own citizens.

On the one hand, this highlights a concern with separation of refugees and citizens and a fear of impurity and losing control. On the other hand, it shows that the government was capable of controlling other populations on its territory as well, even if they were citizens. Ricochet migrants were treated worse than refugees because they once made the decision of repatriation, which in the eyes of the government shows a lack of belonging

to the Tanzanian nation. Citizenship was hence seen as more than a *de jure* status or document by the government.

5.2   Security, Purity and Visibility: Concerns with Naturalisation and Relocation

5.2.1   *Concerns with security and purity at different levels of government*

Government officials at various levels believed that refugees endangered national security in Tanzania. Initially this belief may have been a key rationale for excluding refugees from *de jure* citizenship and for separating them from Tanzanian citizens. After the naturalisation initiative was proposed in 2007, the narrative of refugees as security threats was also used both as a reason at a national level to suggest relocating them to other regions after obtaining citizenship but also, at a regional level, to oppose the idea of relocation. In 2012, this security concern was so prominent that government officials invoked it with reference to various issues. Although the relocation policy had already been put on hold, it was not clear at that time whether it might still go ahead. It was also the most controversial and disputed policy at the time and therefore each actor still held strong opinions about it. As can be seen below, in 2012 all actors had some reservations concerning the relocation. However, as Section 5.2.3 will show, the delay of the implementation of that policy was seen as positive in terms of security on the side of regional actors, but as ambiguous on the side of central government actors, who feared the creation of a 'Burundian enclave'.

When refugees registered for citizenship in 2008, they were asked which region they would like to move to once the settlement would be closed and they would be citizens. As Figure 4.10 showed, their answers were recorded as numbers of households who wanted to move to a certain place. The largest number of households (853 out of 3261) in Ulyankulu said that they would like to move to Morogoro. When asked about this outcome in a phone interview, a spokesperson of the Regional Administration and Local Government of the Prime Minister's Office (PMO-RALG) assumed that the reasons for this choice were the following:

> "The NNTs – most of them don't know the places. They are in the settlements; it is just an assumption they are making. Morogoro is along the cen-

tral railway line. This line goes until Kigoma, which is on the way to Burundi. This way they can easily access Burundi by rail. Also there is abandoned land. The NNTs are good peasants" (G8).

The spokesperson imagined that the first reason why refugees preferred moving to Morogoro was related to the refugees' links to Burundi. Such links were seen as a threat to national security because refugees might be influenced by politics in their country of origin, and could thus become disloyal to the Tanzanian nation. Children were, for example, taught in schools that such links are dangerous (see excerpt of civics book in Annex 5). Furthermore, it was believed that they might smuggle illegal arms and other goods into the country. However, Morogoro is much further away from Burundi than is Tabora. Geographically also, it would be much more reasonable to believe that refugees wish to move to Morogoro due to its proximity to Dar es Salaam. Another reason (which was indeed voiced by some refugees), which the spokesperson did not mention, is that land is known to be especially fertile in the region of Morogoro.

While the outcome of the relocation, due to refugees' choice of destination, was seen as a potential threat to national security, the government's decision of initiating the relocation was also based on security concerns. When asked about reasons for the planned relocation, the spokesperson added:

> "Yes, there are other reasons [for the relocation], like security concerns. It is easy for them to go back to Burundi and to be influenced by other relatives. As Burundians they like to go to Burundi. Now they are Tanzanians, there is no need to go back to Burundi. They decided themselves; they said they wouldn't like to go back to Burundi. Even those who decided to go back, they like to come back here. They lived very comfortably in our country; when they go back, it is different" (G8).

The relocation policy then was a government response to stop people going to Burundi, for security reasons. The decision for naturalisation itself was thus valued by the government as it was believed that it reduced the potential security threat emanating from the refugees. However, refugees' choices were still questioned, as could be seen above – considering that the choice of Morogoro, a main receiving region, was on the railway line to Burundi. In these quotations from the same interview, refugees' own behaviour and choices as well as the government's decisions and its attitude towards the refugees were

immediately related to security. The security narrative was much stronger than any other narrative, for example one centred on economic growth.

Officials at other levels of government confirmed this predominant security narrative. In an interview at the regional administration of Tabora, a government official substituting the Regional Administrative Secretary (RAS) on that day, voiced the following concerns:

> "The camps in the region have detrimental effects. As a direct impact, they cause environmental destruction of the forest reserve. Indirectly, they do not stay in the once identified areas; they are mixing with citizens. Even in Tabora you meet these guys pretending to come from Kigoma. There is a big threat about their behaviour. Tabora has become quite unsafe. When the refugees came from Rwanda and Burundi, they came with weapons. We don't have a civil war here. [...] We are fed up with them. They should go home now.
>
> Apart from illegal killing [poaching] and harvesting, these people are involved in hijacking. Tabora has become very unsafe at night! We have been so kind to them for so long. But they have shown brutality. [...] They should start a normal life. By having these people, Tabora is no longer safe. [...] You give them naturalisation if the country of origin is peaceful. It is difficult to give citizenship to someone who on the last day was holding a weapon in his hand. You are inviting problems!" (G9).

The concerns of the regional administration were thus more localised than the national security concerns voiced by the Prime Minister's Office. The administrator worried that Tabora had become unsafe due to the presence of refugees. In contrast to the national security threat perceived by the Prime Minister's Office – fearing connections to Burundi – the regional administrator spoke about a more concrete local threat posed by the presence of weapons, which have been used to hijack buses among other crimes.

However, besides security concerns, the regional administrator first mentioned that it was problematic that refugees were mixing with Tanzanians citizens, especially outside of the settlement. This shows a concern with 'impurity': the Tanzanian nation was supposed to remain pure and distinguishable from other ethnicities and nations. An integration process which was started by the refugees, rather than by the state, was seen as dangerous. The Regional Commissioner Dr. Rajab Rutengwe of Katavi, where the other

two old settlements Mishamo and Katumba are located, cited similar concerns: "It's not proper and safe for our nation, according to their status, they won't be good to stay there, I don't want to see a new Burundi in my region" (Said, 2012).

At the regional level, opposition to the relocation and the naturalisation were based on the belief that refugees would render the nation improper or impure and unsafe. The prime minister's office, by contrast, mentioned security as a reason *for* the relocation and the implied naturalisation process, arguing that the refugees' own decision to naturalise would reduce the danger. However, as could be seen above, some doubts remained in his narrative.

In the course of the interview, the regional administrator in Tabora equated the refugees with "snakes in your house with fangs and poison". Interestingly, however, he related the situation in Tabora to a broader security concern. According to him, the problem persisted with both Hutu and Tutsi, from Burundi and Rwanda, as well as with the Muha, living in the area of Kigoma in Tanzania. For him, they all had the same dangerous qualities. Rather than a local security problem, the problem persisted with ethnicities from outside of Tanzania.

This reflects a fear of violent subjectivities (Das *et al.*, 2000) of ethnicities and nations from outside of Tanzania, here relating to refugees, which can be found at various levels of government. In an interview with a district level governor, who had recently moved to Kaliua when it became a new district, similar concerns were expressed:

> "[...] if you are going to naturalise them, you will see the consequences. Concerning the planned relocation, in Ruvuma region – I saw it -, it bounces back! In Ruvuma region, they said no! We can be beaten from inside our country, in a case of war! But it is too late... There are so many machine guns here now, in Tabora! They come from Burundi.
>
> These Burundians, they say [they are good people but they are not]. The main source of war was the Hutus, not the Tutsi! The Hutu are warlike! They sometimes go from Ulyankulu to Burundi to fight... Tanzanians and Burundians don't have a good relationship. These rebels there [in Burundi] now, they could be from Ulyankulu! Tanzania and Burundi are not close in terms of security. Around the border, there are a lot of soldiers" (G4).

The quote above was directed generally towards the 'refugees' but specifically towards the Hutu as an ethnic group as well as towards the whole nation of Burundi. These Hutu refugees were seen as threats even though in the conflict of 1972, the Hutu were, in fact, primarily the victims of the Tutsi. Memories of Hutu violence against the Tutsi especially in the 1990s, both in Rwanda and Burundi, may have tainted the perception of the Hutu ethnicity. Although some local concerns were mentioned, in both interviews by the regional and the district administration it could be seen that the security threat was generalised from refugees to the Hutu, to Burundi and even to the Tutsi and to Rwanda, i.e. to ethnicities and nations outside of Tanzania that were considered violent.

The fact that the respondent above linked the reservations concerning the relocation by Ruvuma region to security concerns instead of other reasons such as a lack of vacant land shows that the security narrative trumped other narratives.

At the level of the settlement, security concerns were mentioned as well. In relation to the spatial organisation of the settlement, the settlement officer mentioned in an interview at his office (see also Chapter 4):

> "Every family got four hectares [of land]; 10 acres per family. When you get land here, you have to note where you come from in Burundi – we want people from the same area in their country of origin, so that they can assist each other and so that it is easy to control the situation in terms of security. They [the people in a particular village/street] would know – this person is a criminal" (G2).

Again, the government's decisions, here regarding the distribution of land inside of the settlement, were based on an overall security concern. As can be seen from the above, security concerns were mentioned in a number of contexts and at all levels of government – national, regional, district and at the level of the settlement. At the regional and district levels, refugees were seen as dangerous not only because they constituted a threat to safety but also to the purity of the Tanzanian nation. The decision to become citizens was valued by a national spokesperson but doubts about their national loyalty remained.

5.2.2   *Whose security? National versus human security, criminality and control*

National versus human security

In order to put the security narratives voiced above into context, it is necessary to evaluate the security situation in the settlement. Security in general can be seen as a protection from harm or a state of being free from danger or threat (cf. Oxford Dictionaries online). Yet government officials routinely referred to a notion of security that is centred on the survival of the nation state (Paris, 2001; Figure 6.1 below). Refugees are a military threat because they can be a proxy for international hostilities (cell 1, 'national security') or because they threaten the intra-state security as violent non-state actors (cell 3, 'intrastate security'). Furthermore, they can be an environmental threat to the state (cell 2, 'redefined security'). In contrast to this concept of security, the notion of human security has come into vogue, as first promoted by the United Nations Development Report, 1994. This implies various forms of security for the individual: economic security, food and health security, environmental, personal, community and political security (cell 4). The security threat emphasised above related more to national security than to refugees' and local Tanzanians' human security.

Criminality, policing and security inside and outside of the settlement

Indisputably, violence and criminal acts committed by refugees could endanger Tanzania's intra-state security as well as the Tanzanian citizens' and refugees' human security. Crime data, which was recorded in a book at the settlement officers' building, demonstrated that the most common offences included house-breaking, threatening violence, indecent assault, unlawful entrance to Tanzania, kidnapping, unlawfully acquired property and robbery with violence (in contrast to civil offenses, which are not recorded here). During the period of January to August 2009, for example, fewer than 20 cases were recorded each month. The ethnicity of criminals was recorded: some of the offenses were committed by Sukuma and people of various other Tanzanian ethnicities. A few of them occurred outside of the settlement. Most of them were cases of burglary and theft, some including violence and housebreaking. Rape occurred in a few cases of underage teenagers (who were 16 or 17 years old) and one murder, committed by a Sukuma. The

What Is the Source of the Security Threat?

	Military	Military, Nonmilitary, or Both
States	**Cell 1** National security (conventional realist approach to security studies)	**Cell 2** Redefined security (e.g., environmental and economic security)
Security for Whom? **Societies, Groups, and Individuals**	**Cell 3** Intrastate security (e.g., civil war, ethnic conflict, and democide)	**Cell 4** Human security (e.g., environmental and economic threats to the survival of societies, groups, and individuals)

Figure 5.1: Types of Security
Source: Paris (2001)

number of recorded crimes committed by refugees was thus limited and could not be considered a particular threat to security.

Ulyankulu hosted the only police stations in the vicinity of the settlement. There were two kinds of police in the settlement: the regular police under the Tanzanian government in the centre built a long time ago, and the operational police in Mbeta village, called for by the UNHCR as part of the 'Tanzania Security Package' in 2008. The operational police dealt with crimes of refugees specifically whereas the other was responsible for anyone living in the area.

The 'Security Package' was a response to heightened incidents of murder, armed robbery, hijacking of vehicles, rapes and unlawful possession of arms from war-torn countries across the border from Tanzania between 1994 and 2000 in and near the camps in Northwestern Tanzania, including Ngara, Kasulu, Kibondo and Kigoma areas. After the massive influx of refugees in the 1990s, camps in these areas, located near to Burundi, DRC and Rwanda, became unsafe. While maintaining that law and order was the respon-

sibility of the government, in the aftermath of the genocide in Rwanda, the government of Tanzania and the UNHCR agreed that the latter would arrange a 'Security Package', which would train policemen and women to work in refugee camps for six-month assignments. Their tasks were to patrol the camps, investigate crime reports and escort vehicles to protect them from banditry. As a consequence, crimes inside and around the camps declined overall but gangs continued to terrorise the local population and engaged in carjackings. The Tanzania regular police needed to intervene in certain instances as well as the army (Rutinwa, 2005: 29-30).

With respect to Ulyankulu, the commandant of the regular police explained the relationship between crimes committed inside and outside of the settlement in an interview held in an office of the police station in Ulyankulu:

> "A lot of cases have been reported outside of the settlement; these people here are living peacefully and are coping well with the Tanzanians. Within the settlement the integration is very good; if there is anything, the case is outside of the settlement. This morning for instance, I went there, outside, because somebody was threatened to be killed. It was a Sukuma threatening to burn another Sukuma. [...] We are working with and are concerned with the security of the whole community [*jamii*] here within and outside of the settlement and even outside of the division [Ulyankulu division]" (G10).

In line with the collected crime data, he thus confirmed that refugees in Ulyankulu could not be seen as security threats in terms of personal security, and that the main problem persisted outside of the settlement. In an interview held outside the operational police building with another police officer present, the operational police commandant added to the information above:

> "Of course the Tanzanians seem to be a higher percentage. Because the settlement itself is surrounded by the Tanzanians; there are many. We also work outside of the settlement. They sometimes call us; we are patrolling inside and outside the settlement. [...] Most serious offences, like murder, happen outside the settlement" (G11).

As could be seen in the answers given by the officer at the Regional Commission in Tabora, a major security issue arising from the refugees was the presence of weapons. However, the operational police commandant said:

"Nowadays, there are no weapons found here from Burundi. Some crimes are committed by Burundians and Tanzanians jointly. But this is a peaceful area" (G11).

While the number of crimes and the presence of weapons in the settlement were thus not considered a threat, there was a high likelihood that the number of crimes were higher than officially registered. According to the police commandant of the regular police, the police faced a number of challenges to work adequately:

"[...] The government doesn't consider us. Nowadays, this station doesn't have its own motorbike or car. We need to rent motorbikes and we ask at the UN operation police to get a car; but sometimes the car is not there; it is even used for escorting purposes [of UN officials]. Sometimes cases are reported but we don't have a car; while at the UN there are a lot of cars... we may fail to reach a place because there is no transport.

We are working in a hard environment; there is no lock-up for children and women; only for men; sometimes women are locked up in the corridor. It is not good because policemen are regularly passing from the counter to the office; sometimes there is a bad smell. So it is difficult to stay here at the office.

There is no electricity here but we are waiting to get it. We have sent some requests to get electricity from the UN but there is no response. It is dark here at night, so we have to use torches with batteries. Then they break; you get tired. At Road 28 they have a generator. But it does not work the whole day like at the UN. We only want electricity for this office, not for the policemen's houses. [...] We have an air conditioning here [which is most of the time not working due to lack of electricity] because most of the machines only work in cool climate [i.e. computer, finger print machine]" (G10).

The police thus faced three problems: a lack of transport to reach places of crime, a lack of electricity to record cases at night and to use several devices to help identify criminals and a lack of a place to lock up female criminals. While the operational police was in a somewhat better state – it had a car and electricity at least sometimes – the hardships faced by the police overall may have reduced the number of recorded cases. Nevertheless, the settlement did not seem to be an insecure place in terms of personal security – at least compared to its surroundings. One could also infer that security as such was not

important enough to support a well-resourced police station or at least a prison cell for women.

Even in the broader region of Tabora, it could not be confirmed by the police that refugees had been involved in criminal activities on an increased scale. When visiting the district police in Tabora town and starting to ask about refugee criminality in Tabora, the district criminal officer replied: "I don't have a single record of a refugee committing a crime in my district – if you want aggregate data, you have to speak to the regional criminal officer" (G12). In a subsequent interview at the regional police station in Tabora, the police commander agreed since nationality was not recorded in general:

> "No [we don't have crime records stating the nationality of criminals]. Refugees are treated like other civilians. In brief, crime records or proper records will be from immigration; records about what mistake they have made etc. To get the records here is difficult. *They don't consider the nationality; it is so hard to recognise persons involved in a crime but usually the ones who are involved are Tanzanians. Refugees are small in numbers.*
>
> Illegal immigrants are mostly involved in crime events. When we reach the court, they treat the case like any other foreigner. In the end [after staying in prison] he will be returned to his origin country with immigration officers. A lot of them come from Burundi but they pretend to come from Kigoma. Some people are criminals from their original country; at the first instance he will be seen as disloyal. They came here recently or a long time ago. This has been a problem for so long and it keeps on perpetuating" (G13, emphasis added).

Thus, refugees were few in the total number of crimes committed in the region of Tabora as a whole. However, illegal immigrants, some from Burundi, seemed to cause trouble. Who these immigrants were in particular is difficult to judge – in the absence of documentation, it is possible that they included refugees from Ulyankulu.

Impurity and fear of losing control

As the regional police mentioned, it was difficult to identify the origin of criminals. In contrast to data collected in Ulyankulu, the regional police did not specify a difference between people of varying nationalities. While this was not a cause of concern for the

regional police, it was seen as a problem in Ulyankulu. The operational police officer quoted above, for example, perceived refugees as a security threat because Burundians and Tanzanians collaborated in crimes and it was difficult to identify them:

> "The Burundians and Tanzanians are mixed here, so that is a challenge. Sometimes, somebody is identifying themselves as Sukuma or Chagga, it is difficult to identify them. When you arrest them, they hide their nature. When their relatives come, they say 'no, they are Hutu'!" (G11).

This points to the conclusion that rather than refugees being a security threat in actual terms, the police feared losing control over the situation in the settlement due to the high degree of integration between refugees and non-refugees. They feared 'impurity' of the Tanzanian nation because it would form an obstacle to identification and categorisation. It is not surprising that this fear was mentioned by the operational police, which, contrast to the regular police, employs officers on a rotating basis for periods of one year only and has thus a more limited overview of the settlement in comparison to the regular police and even the settlement commander. The apparent success of refugees in hiding their origins in front of officials begs the question that surely, this could have endangered the validity of crime data recorded, although, as the respondent mentions, ethnicity was often verified by relatives. The operational police commander feared a general security threat due to on-going links to Burundi:

> "They are Burundians; sometimes they don't know the laws of Tanzania. Even though they have been here for 40 years, they get all their goods from Burundi. You can talk to them, if they feel Tanzanian" (G11).

Surely the alleged lack of knowledge and connections within Tanzania that this official refers to stem from the fact that they were not allowed to freely move and work in Tanzania, and, as could be seen above, information was also relatively restricted. The implied security threat concerned an abstract threat to national security posed by the refugees' presence, identity and links to Burundi rather than the threat posed to personal security through individual criminal acts.

All in all, while there *were* crimes committed by refugees inside the settlement and possibly outside as well, many crimes, and the more serious ones in particular, were committed by Tanzanians outside of the settlement. The operational police and especially the regular police in Ulyankulu worked under adverse conditions and had to cover

a vast area – stretching beyond the borders of the settlement over several wards and be-
yond. The actual enforcement and monitoring of the security situation by the police was
not an issue of priority for the government. A main problem that was identified by the
government was that it had lost control over its ability to identify refugees in contrast
to Tanzanian citizens and illegal migrants, and that refugees may have retained general
links to Burundi. A concern about national security was certainly fed by memories of
historic incidents, in which refugees contributed to violence and instability in the region,
such as the Tutsi refugees who invaded Rwanda from Uganda in the 1990s. Furthermore,
the fact that weapons from Burundi were found in Kigoma and possibly also in Tabora
in the past (interviews show contradictory answers about this) must have been a factor
for fearing insecurity stemming from refugees' activities. In the settlement itself, there
were rumours that refugee rebels/soldiers went back to Burundi to fight there. None of
the first generation respondents could confirm this, however. An elderly respondent even
got very emotional when asked about it: "Ce sont des mentis!"[3] (F2, also quoted in 6.2.1
and 6.2.3). It has been claimed many times by the Burundian government, and refuted
by the Tanzanian government that refugees from Ulyankulu and other settlements went
to Burundi to fight (cf. Rutinwa, 2005). In the 1990s, refugees were indeed radicalised
in most camps (Malkki, 1995a; Turner, 2010) but this radicalisation has not endured, at
least with respect to Ulyankulu. Surely, the main reason for this was that the conflict in
Burundi had calmed down since the 1990s. Another reason, however, was that more than
80% of refugees in Ulyankulu belonged to the second generation, who had less memories
and ties to Burundi.

5.2.3 *Security and controlled integration*

In the security narratives above, one could see that the mixing between Tanzanians and
refugees was seen as a security threat and a threat to the purity of the Tanzanian na-
tion. However, it is not true that integration *per se* was seen as a problem. An officer at
the department Regional Administration and Local Government of the Prime Minister's
Office (PMO-RALG) in Dar es Salaam (also quoted above in Section 5.2.1), which was
specifically charged with the task of relocation, mentioned:

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[3] Translation from French (original): "These are lies!"

"The main reason [for the relocation] is what I said. They have been natu-
ralised but they are still seen as refugees. If we leave them there [in the set-
tlements], they are living together. In other areas, they can learn from other
Tanzanians; it will make them Tanzanians. [...]. When they are Tanzanians
[through naturalisation], now let us [the regions] receive them" (G8).

In an interview in Ulyankulu, the settlement officer further explained:

"The question of relocation is important. Here, they will always be recog-
nised as refugees. They should live with Tanzanians; they should not have a
special area to stay in" (G2).

In the eyes of the government, therefore, the refugees would integrate more after having
been naturalised and relocated. They would be able to live like normal citizens and finally
shed their refugee status. Furthermore, relocation would be necessary in order to alleviate
the security threat. In an interview at the MHA in Dar es Salaam, the Director of Refugee
Services mentioned:

"The Government decided to relocate these people in order not to create Bu-
rundian enclaves in the settlements" (G14).

Thus, the two functions of relocation are to promote a controlled (in contrast to a spon-
taneous) process of integration and to diffuse the security threat that a mass of refugees
with high population growth rates may pose. Government officials did not only fear a
loss of control related to the high level of integration between refugees and Tanzanians
inside the settlement but also outside of it. As the PMO-RALG officer maintained:

"Yes, there is an issue of intermarriage. Now they are relocated. The local
integration of those in category A [of the NASCIP document, who reside out-
side of the settlement] – they are married to Tanzanians. This is category A"
(G8).

If it is important to learn from and integrate with other Tanzanians, the question arises
why they could not do so in the settlement regions or in the places they have already moved
to. The spokesperson said:

"[...] The law says Tanzanians are free to move anywhere else. It is just for the
control mechanism we have to relocate them. Then they can move around as
human beings. You cannot stop them from moving. They are relocated first;

later they cannot be stopped from moving elsewhere where they want to go"
(G8).

Therefore, the *planned* integration of refugees into other regions, a process that would have implied relocation and subsequent education and service provision in the hosting regions, was seen by the government as a positive development because the process was initiated and controlled by the government. Furthermore, the planned integration would alleviate the problem of refugees living together in the settlement as a 'Burundian enclave', which was seen as dangerous. The concern of a 'Burundian enclave' was voiced even though the government itself had enforced a separation between refugees and citizens in their day to day lives in designated spaces.

On the other hand, *spontaneous* integration by the refugees through intermarriage was seen as a problem because it endangered the policy of enforcing a separation of refugees and citizens, it created problems with identification and it questioned the legitimacy of government provisions. It further threatened the purity of the Tanzanian nation, as argued above.

The shift from encouraging an exclusionary space for Burundian refugees towards encouraging local integration signifies a changed emphasis from a concern with mixing and impurity towards a focus on getting rid of the category of 'refugees' through 'invisibilisation' by spreading them in Tanzania. Relocation would invisibilise the refugees in the eyes of the international community but not in the eyes of regional governments and local Tanzanians, to whom the newly naturalised citizens would be highly visible. While accepting the potential impurity and insecurity caused by refugees in receiving regions, the national government aimed to render refugees at once invisible to the international community and increasingly recognised and visible in the eyes of the regional governments and local Tanzanians. This shift, however, did not occur at the regional level. Regional governments continued to oppose the relocation, fearing a threat to *their own* regional security and therefore by proxy also to national security. The administrator at the Regional Commission of Tabora, quoted in Section 5.2.1 above, said:

"Never, we cannot accept that as long as there are weapons. There should be a disarmament programme. We are endangering the whole of Tanzania"
(G9).

These different emphases at the national and the regional level caused the relocation policy to be put on hold.

5.2.4   *Land grab as another reason for relocation*

In addition to the security and purity concerns there were further reasons for proposing the relocation: economic aspects also played a role in this decision. First, relocation would have resulted in increased development aid by international organisations benefiting the receiving regions (see Chapter 4). The UNHCR offered to contribute to building capacities of local governments to receive the refugees. According to the UNHCR head officer in Ulyankulu, who was at the time the only international staff employed there:

> "The population will increase in those [receiving] regions; so more social services will be needed. The UN works as one now in Tanzania. The intervention of international organisations will come; but now we are waiting" (I2).

Furthermore, it was assumed that refugees would invest the money they had been saving in the receiving regions after relocation. The settlement officer explained:

> "With this economy, any improvement will show in their way of living. But here in the settlement, they don't improve the life because of the restrictions of the government. They are not allowed to build permanent houses. Those who are adhering to the law, they cannot build houses. This is where being naturalised becomes important. The government wants to relocate them to spend this money. This is a camp; a temporary living environment. If people are building permanent and expensive homes here, no-one will be ready to compensate for the loss later" (G2).

Through naturalisation, refugees would have formal land rights and could enhance development by building houses. It should be mentioned that the lack of permanent investments in the settlement was indeed another concern for security. According to the government official of the regional administration in Tabora:

> "The refugees are donating funds to give to their countries [Burundi and Rwanda]. Ulyankulu has a high potential in tobacco production. Where does

that money go? It is used to support the fighting groups. We want that money to develop Ulyankulu. The big question is: where does that money go?" (G9).

Indeed, refugees were neither allowed to invest inside of the settlement nor in another part of Tanzania. Families who were well off in the settlement therefore invested their money in the education of their children (see also Chapter 6). Whether or not they were remitting money to Burundi for conflict or other purposes could not be confirmed.

Reasons given for the relocation, as could be seen above, were the benefits for the receiving regions, and the thereby diffused threat of refugees living in an enclave. One could thus think that planning the closure of the settlements would have been a consequence of proposing the relocation. However, the following argument suggests that the causality ran the other way around: the relocation was planned because of the closure of settlements. The UNHCR officer in charge of questions concerning the refugees' local integration in Dar es Salaam said:

> "About the relocation: In 2007 they were supposed to be integrated where they were [according to TANCOSS]; I am not sure why in 2008 the decision was made to relocate them. Some reasons mentioned were security issues – even though there is no significant difference regarding the security situation between the settlement and other areas. The settlements are known to be rather peaceful. The government wanted to really integrate them. Further, they expressed the wish to use the Old Settlement areas for "other national purposes" (I1).

With respect to Ulyankulu settlement, the formulation of "other national resources" could hint at the fact that it was supposed to be (re-)converted into a forest reserve – although this was not officially announced. As explained in Chapter 5, the southern and northern parts of Ulyankulu settlement were located in forest reserves, administered by the Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism. Surveys and investigations into the matter of environmental damage, which were conducted in the settlement in recent years, served as a reason to close Ulyankulu settlement in order to protect the forest reserve.

In Katumba and Mishamo settlements, by contrast, the formulation "other national purposes" is a signifier for an investment deal with the U.S. firm AgriSol, which requested the use of the settlement areas to grow genetically modified crops. According to the Oakland Institute (2011), a study into the feasibility of investing in Katumba and Mishamo

settlements was conducted by AgriSol USA in July 2008 – about the same time as the government's announcement to close the camps was made. The former Minister of Home Affairs Lawrence Masha, who announced the decision to naturalise the refugees, became the 'legal advisor' to the firm. In an interview at the Guardian in Dar es Salaam, a journalist who had followed this issue for several years, explained:

After talking to different people, including the refugees themselves and even the district council leaders, the government side, the head of that settlement, it was like there was a push behind. [...] It was because of the AgriSol Company Ltd. that these people were supposed to be relocated to other areas to leave that space for Agrisol Company Ltd. to invest. [...] So, telling them that [...] they are trying to reallocate the refugees [...] it was *just a cover* so that AgriSol Company Ltd. could come to invest" (M1, emphasis added).

The AgriSol deal was one of 22 existing and proposed agricultural investment-related land deals in Tanzania as of December 2010 (Oakland Institute, 2011). Investors from countries such as USA, UK, Sweden, the Netherlands and South Korea are interested in food or biofuel production, such as that made from the jatropha tree. Foreign investment in Tanzania has grown from 0.1 per cent of Tanzania's GDP in 1990 to 32.9% in 2005. Four million hectares of land was requested by these investors in recent years although only a part of it has been granted to them by the government. Some of the agricultural investment deals, often referred to as 'land grabs', have been criticised when the investor could not keep its promise in terms of job creation and compensation to the local population (for example the UK-based investor Sun Biofuels; Carrington, 2011).

In the case of the AgriSol deal, the journalist further maintained that district government leaders were bribed to attend preparatory meetings with the US firm, in which the firm convinced them to agree to the deal. The local population questioned the length of the lease, which was set to 99 years,[4] they were afraid that the genetically modified crops would threaten the growth of local plants as well as discontented since they were not involved in the decision making process. The parliament also challenged the investment decision since they did not agree with the terms of the contract. An opposition politician voiced concern about the investment deal in a meeting on the 2011/2012 expenditure of the Ministry of Agriculture, Food Security and Cooperatives:

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[4]According to the new "Guidelines for Sustainable Liquid Biofuls Development in Tanzania", published in 2010 (Oakland Institute 2011), land for agrofuels can now only be leased over a five year probation period and eventually extend the lease to 25 years.

> "Mr. Chairman, as in North Mara the police are guarding the mine and kill Tanzanians, the same government brings Agrisol to Mpanda and police to protect investors because it is the culture of this government that favours the investors and ignores its people" (Said Amour Arfi, Mpanda Town Constituency, CHADEMA, 26 July 2011, Dodoma).

Although not officially confirmed, the AgriSol deal might have influenced the decision to relocate the refugees from Mishamo and Katumba. The security concerns voiced about the Burundian enclave (see above) thus need to be considered next to other economic and environmental interests.

If the relocation exercise was put on hold in June 2011 (Milner, 2013; or in August 2011 according to the UNHCR, 2014k) due to the reservations about the investment deal and concerns by the hosting regions, it was problematic that the naturalisation of the refugees was tied to the relocation: according to the government, citizenship certificates could only be obtained once a refugee would have moved to his/her final destination.

In summary, this section showed first, that security narratives trumped the policy discourse surrounding the formerly proposed relocation. These concerns were related to national security rather than personal safety. This claim is supported by the fact that criminality in the settlement is in fact lower than outside, and the limited equipment of the police suggests that security was not a current priority in Ulyankulu. Security concerns were related to a fear of impurity of the nation and of losing control over the refugees. However, in order to eliminate the category of 'refugees' on Tanzanian territory, refugees were to be integrated in a controlled manner (i.e. in regions and districts with host families chosen by the government). This suggestion faced opposition by the receiving regions and was therefore put on hold. The relocation also had economic reasons, such as a proposed land deal. The fact that citizenship was tied to relocation was problematic both for refugees and receiving regions.

5.3   Effects and Functions of Control and Conviviality in Ulyankulu

5.3.1   *Every-day implications of control*

Since the refugees' arrival, the MHA excluded refugees from *de jure* citizenship and imposed spatial control by effecting a separation between Tanzanian citizens and Burundian refugees or 'new Tanzanians' in the settlement for reasons of security and purity, as argued above. Sukuma and other Tanzanians have officially not been allowed to live in the settlement (see Annex 4) even though they frequently came to the market in the settlement and started living in Ulyankulu. Residents in the surrounding areas of Ulyankulu, in the broader region of Tabora and beyond have benefitted from this exchange. While only 600 Tanzanians were registered with the government, about 10,000 Tanzanians lived in the settlement actually, as mentioned in Chapter 4.

Legally, refugees from Ulyankulu were not allowed to leave the settlement without a permit. This has had implications for the everyday lives of both Burundian refugees and Tanzanian citizens. A first generation refugee, a farmer who had come to Ulyankulu when he was three years old, outlined the disadvantages of living in the settlement in an interview in Kaswa:

> "Yes, there are a lot of disadvantages. When I am travelling to town for business I have to pass the settlement officer. The policemen can take my money and other property if I don't have a permit. [...] This happened to me frequently. For example, we go with fear if we don't have that permit. I was sent to jail at that time. I went to Tabora for treatment of my eyes; then I was caught by the migration police [...]. I went to jail for 4 days. In order to get out, I had to sell my phone" (F3).

An open conversation held primarily with two other first generation refugees, taking place on 'Kariakoo market' in Ikonongo with interference of various people that visited the market and strongly agreed to what was said by the other two men, revealed:

> "Until now we are not allowed to be outside of the settlement. If we are caught, we face problems and are forced to come back. There was one man in Mnange who opened an office there; he was sent back to Ulyankulu by force.

But if you are found in Mwanza [or another city]...you will be sent to prison and you have to bribe them. If you don't have money, you cannot get out of prison" (F4).

Refugees who were illegally leaving the settlement without a permit thus risked being sent to prison. In the case of the man going to seek treatment for his eyes, obtaining a permit might have been a too slow and cumbersome bureaucratic process for someone facing a health emergency. The man who went to open an office in Mnange (a village outside of the settlement) may not have tried to seek a permit at the settlement officer's office probably because he knew that working outside was not allowed.

Both accounts are examples of refugees who risked being sent back to the settlement and possibly to prison in order to obtain economic and health necessities. They thereby endangered their human security, i.e. their economic situation and health status. In both cases, the achievement of economic capacities or health treatments had the effect of breaking the law with unfavourable consequences on these refugees' wellbeing. There is a constant interplay between control and agency: the refugees have disregarded the law with their own agency and some of them have subsequently faced the bitter consequences of control.

The separation achieved between refugees and citizens also had repercussions for local Tanzanians. Official laws endangered refugees' economic security as well as some Tanzanians' physical security – one Tanzanian was sent to prison because he employed refugees outside of Ulyankulu. His 22-year old son, who ran a small restaurant on the market in Kaswa, explained:

"After completing secondary, I did a short course of four months at Masoma Utalii [college for tourism studies]. I could not succeed in finishing because my father was taken to prison because he employed Hutus on his farm in Sikonge. He had to go to jail for six months. I stopped college when I failed to pay the fees. I stopped it after one month" (C5).

While control was in the first place directed towards refugees, local Tanzanians similarly suffered from it. The artificial separation of refugees and citizens was routinely questioned in refugees and Tanzanians' everyday lives but it was still enforced by the government in many instances.

5.3.2 *Everyday functions of control and conviviality*

One could think that the separation between citizens and refugees functioned in order to preserve control over the refugee population. However, the first two examples in the section above (5.3.1) showed that the enforcement of the separation between refugees and citizens also functioned as a routinised everyday benefit of some individual local government officers, who allegedly accepted bribes from refugees as well as local Tanzanians in exchange for economic and personal security.

The original rationales of control were thereby indeed at least partially invalidated. This transformation had, on the one hand, the effect of further perpetuating the situation of control and top-down power relations between the government and refugees. On the other hand, it gave refugees scope to act in their own interest, such as by moving outside of the settlement or by circumventing the prohibition to build permanent buildings (see Section 5.1.1). This will be further explored in the next chapter. In fact, one could describe the relationship as one of "conviviality" (cf. Edmondson, 2007; Nyamnjoh, 2007, see Section 2.3.1), i.e. a spirit of collaboration and togetherness between the state and individuals or particular groups (as explained in Chapter 2), from which both parties benefit. In this context, conviviality should be more narrowly defined between individual government officials and the refugees.

The situation also bears similarities with Lipsky's (1980) "street-level bureaucracy", which is based on the idea that public implementation of policies depends on the street-level bureaucrats, who are ultimately responsible for implementing them. These bureaucrats often have considerable discretion over the day-to-day implementation of such policies. While dealing with huge caseloads and with inadequate resources, government officials need to negotiate with clients, and to make decisions on a case-by-case basis. Thereby, they vary the extent to which they enforce the rules and laws that they are supposed to follow. Under pressure to meet targets, the difference between the theoretical aim of the policy and the practical outcome can be substantial.

It is argued here that first of all, government officials in Ulyankulu probably lacked the means to enforce the law, for example to stop refugees and local Tanzanians from building permanent structures. The alleged 'bribes' they took therefore rather functioned as 'fines', which served as a punishment for the wrong-doers, a substitute for law-enforcement. Ac-

cepting such 'fines' should therefore not only be seen as self-interested corruption. Furthermore, fines did not only serve as a financial benefit for the officers in question. Cooperating with the refugees and local Tanzanians became a mutual benefit. Constructing houses, for example, would be a benefit for the entire society, including the government officials. If control measures against the refugees' agency (here in the form of resistance) could be avoided, this would benefit everyone.

Some government officials indeed developed a degree of conviviality with the refugees and other Tanzanians in the settlement. This is because some of these 'street-level bureaucrats' personally integrated into the local economy and proceedings of Ulyankulu. They did not only perform their functions as government officials in Ulyankulu, but also took part in everyday life for example by cultivating, and by sending their children to school in the settlement. Some government officials, such as a former police commander of Ulyankulu, decided to stay in the settlement for their retirement since it had long become their home:

> "Yes, I stay here *kwa muda* – forever. I am already retired. [If] the settlement closes, I will be able to stay here. [...] My children go to school here, so it would not be good to move. It would cause disruption" (C11).

This is why the settlement officer, who had already been in Ulyankulu for five years (since 2008), believed that, in order to enforce government control measures over a long period of time, there needed to be a rotation of officers in the settlement:

> "If you stay too long in one settlement, you lose perspective and become too embedded in local processes. It is better if another settlement officer takes over after a while who has a fresh perspective" (G2).

Over time, the degree of conviviality that has been attained with some government officials may have helped refugees to feel at relative ease. Furthermore, as became apparent in the field, there was a hierarchy amongst government officials. Some who did not have the power to make important decisions were simply not listened to. As will be further discussed in the following chapter, the camp was not a place of temporary refuge any more – those that lived there did not wish to return to Burundi. They lived in the time-space of Tanzania. Although the government made them wait for their citizenship certificates – a temporal way of exerting control – most refugees did not live in apprehension of this control.

5.4   Conclusion

As could be seen in the first section, refugee policies, often originating in international agreements but enshrined in national law, attempt to control refugees in various ways. Refugees in Tanzania officially lack important citizenship and human rights. The space of Ulyankulu settlement allowed for an enforcement of this lack of rights, for example through sporadic military acts of repression. The spatial separation of refugees and Tanzanians functioned as a border between refugees and citizens. Power relations were perpetuated and reproduced by restricting information dissemination and were demonstrated in performances as could be observed in the school inauguration event on 2nd August 2012. Such events also served to create a sense of temporal suspension, and to make refugees wait. However, at the same time, the school inauguration showed that refugees *de facto* already belonged to the Tanzanian nation as they performed Tanzanian dances to show their local tradition, which they learned in school. The state thus engaged in acts of exclusion and inclusion at the same time.

Discussed in relation to the formerly planned relocation, government officials voiced various security concerns as well as concerns with the purity of the nation. Such concerns, it is argued, were also the basis of restrictions on citizenship rights such as freedom of movement and voting. However, the perception of what security meant varied between different levels of government. These conceptions of security focused on national security instead of personal safety. Security was a main concern despite the fact that criminality was not very high within the settlement. Government officials within the settlement feared impurity that was facilitated by a loss of control over refugees and the settlement area. The extent of integration achieved informally through refugees' agency triggered new security concerns by the government. However, it was rather the spontaneous character of integration under the current policies of encampment that was seen as a threat. As proposed in 2007, the central government attempted to achieve integration in a controlled way by relocating the refugees to other regions. This was designed to serve as a way to 'invisibilise' the category of refugees while at the same time making them more visible to other Tanzanians as newly naturalised citizens. Other reasons for the formerly proposed relocation included an investment deal and environmental concerns. However, regional governments did not agree with this proposal and the policy was put on hold.

The control exerted in Ulyankulu settlement by the Tanzanian government together with humanitarian actors was routinely evaded by refugees and Tanzanians alike. Refugees often circumvented the control exerted in order to work or to be treated in hospital. Thereby, they risked their own security since without a permit they could be sent back to the settlement and could even be imprisoned. However, refugees managed to circumvent some rules by paying favours to some government officials. Due to limited resources such favours may have been a substitute for law enforcement, functioning as fines. Some officials became so embedded in the settlement proceedings that they had more than just a financial interest in exercising discretion. They developed a degree of conviviality with the refugees, which benefited the entire society. While it may not have completely altered the power relations between refugees and the government, it granted the refugees some room for manoeuvre.

All in all, in the absence of clear borders, control was exerted in the settlement in various ways in order to maintain a separation between refugees and citizens. The main reasons for such control were a national security motive and a concern with impurity. Although control was still upheld in 2012, it was partially attenuated by discretion shown on the part of individual government officials. A will be shown in the next chapter, refugees have in fact developed a sense of belonging to the nation despite the various control measures.

6

PRAGMATICS OF BELONGING, *DE FACTO* CITIZENSHIP AND WAITING IN A SPACE OF AGENCY

While the previous chapter dealt with the various ways in which control has been exerted in the settlement by the Tanzanian government in collaboration with humanitarian agencies, and with the tensions arising between mechanisms of exclusion and belonging, this chapter aims at scrutinising how refugees have dealt with these constraints through their agency. It is argued that refugees have developed a 'pragmatics of belonging', which consists of three dimensions: a relational one based on mutual recognition between refugees and citizens, a dimension of feeling at home, and a dimension of claiming *de facto* citizenship rights. Furthermore, they have engaged in a 'pragmatics of waiting', characterised by a future-oriented way of dealing with the time spent in uncertainty.

The first section addresses the ways in which refugees have interacted with Tanzanians under the constraints discussed in Chapter 5, within and outside of the settlement. It is argued that the first dimension of a developing 'pragmatics of belonging' on the side of the refugees has been relational, created by mutual recognition of refugees and citizens.

A second dimension of this 'pragmatics of belonging' has been the feeling of being at 'home' in the settlement and in the Tanzanian nation. It will be discussed to what extent refugees wanted to be, and indeed already felt like, Tanzanian citizens. Some suffered under the on-going exertion of control and felt confused by their state of liminality. As will be discussed, first and second generation refugees' feelings about this differed in a number of ways. In contrast to previous studies on this refugee population, most of the refugees clearly positioned themselves as citizens and emphasised their good relationship with their Tanzanian neighbours. They therefore did not try to refuse a Tanzanian identity as refugees did in Kigoma, which Malkki (1995a: 153) termed a "pragmatics of identity".

The third section considers how refugees have claimed *de facto* citizenship, seen as a third dimension of belonging, which is interrelated with the other two dimensions. Refugees have claimed *de facto* citizenship by transgressing the government's provisions. They have become increasingly mobile, especially among the second generation. In feeling that they belong to the nation, they have moved outside of the settlement and have found various ways to hide their refugee status from Tanzanian officials in order to compensate for their lack of rights. Most refugees have dealt with their past and their surroundings in Tanzania in pragmatic ways – instead of accepting the 'certainty' of being a non-citizen, they have instrumentally acted as informal citizens to claim rights. They thereby achieved a sense of belonging to the Tanzanian nation, without longing for their supposed Burundian homes.

Finally, as explained in the fourth section, refugees have also dealt with the temporal control exerted in pragmatic ways. Refugees used the time spent waiting for the government to make a decision on their relocation creatively in order to continue their daily activities, to prepare for the future, and to resist aspects of the proposed policies.

As already discussed in Chapter 5, the settlement should not simply be seen as a 'space of control.' Even though the structure of a controlled space has been effectuated by exceptional legal provisions and acts of repression, refugees have formed a pragmatic sense of belonging and waiting in their everyday lives in what could be called a "space of agency". This pragmatics also involves local Tanzanians and some government officials, as discussed in Section 5.3.2 and below.

6.1   Pragmatics of Belonging: Mutual Recognition of Refugees and Citizens

There are various types of interaction between Burundians and Tanzanians in their everyday lives. In this section, their cooperation inside of the settlement, exchanges between the settlement and outside villages and towns, and aspects of intermarriage are considered.

6.1.1   *Everyday interactions despite control: Cooperation inside the settlement*

Despite some contentious points (further discussed below), the relationship between refugees and local Tanzanian citizens has been generally characterised as cooperative. The village leader of Kaswa, who had held his position for 17 years since 1995 at the time of the interview (a first generation refugee who came to Ulyankulu when he was 14 years old) emphasised the aspect of cooperation between the refugees and the local Tanzanians, who were mostly Nyamwezi and Sukuma. He believed that the Tanzanians had an interest in the refugees' naturalisation. He explained:

> "Those [Tanzanians] who live here, they were happy because some of them have married our daughters. We work together in farming; for example they [the Burundians] don't know agriculture of the bushland; they were taught by the Sukuma" (F5).

Tanzanians also emphasised that there is a mutually beneficial relationship between them and the refugees. Despite the spatial separation between refugees and Tanzanians, the government allowed a few Tanzanian students to study in the secondary schools at Ulyankulu and many Tanzanians study at VETA, the vocational training school. Speaking about the closure of Ulyankulu settlement, a 25-year old VETA student (C6), a Nyamwezi from Urambo who studied in the settlement, said:

> "Yes [I heard that the settlement will close soon], but it is a rumour. [...] I feel bad [if the settlement closes]. One reason is that we feel peace and love with most of them. With most of them, we play football here on the ground, maybe others help us with water, shoes, money...Also clothes and other things, we can find there on the market. It will be bad for many students."

Cooperation between Burundians and Tanzanians has increased over time as more and more Tanzanians have moved to the settlement in order to find work, and some to get married (see Section 6.1.3). An increasing number of Tanzanians have built houses in the settlement as well. Notably the relationship between refugees and local Tanzanians has not always been peaceful – Sukumas have fought with refugees over land on which to graze their cattle. According to a first generation refugee in his forties, who experienced such a conflict over his land, "we chase them away but we speak bad words to each other. The police do not listen to us refugees; they favour the Tanzanians" (F1). While the police may

not have settled such disputes, the village leader above mentioned that concerning land conflicts he was responsible for mediating and reconciling those refugees and Sukuma in his village before sending them to the court. When such a conflict happened on a large scale in 2011, the police did take action in order to repress the Sukumas' residence in the settlement (see Chapter 5, Section 5.1.3). On the whole, most refugees emphasised that they lived well together with the Tanzanians in the settlement. There was a lively exchange between the two groups and they recognised each other as legitimate residents.

Viewing themselves as 'Tanzanians' (see Sections 6.2.1 and 6.2.2 below) and interacting with Tanzanian citizens on a daily basis, the distance between refugees and citizens was reduced considerably, if not collapsed. Compared to the situation described in relation to Mishamo settlement in the 1980s (Malkki, 1995a), this is indeed a significant change.

6.1.2 Exchange between Ulyankulu and other places

A lively interaction between Tanzanians and Burundians was not restricted to the settlement. At the administrative level, there used to be an exchange between the office of Ulyankulu division and the surrounding wards, which reported to the division secretary. On an administrative level, Ulyankulu therefore had an important position – and local government officials from villages around the settlement could often be found in the settlement. Tanzanian citizens from outside of Ulyankulu also came to the settlement to go to the market to buy food and utensils, and to be treated in the health centre in the settlement. Refugees, on the other hand, moved to the villages outside of the settlement in order to work. This interaction reached as far as Tabora town and beyond. Some refugees went there to sell their products, and Tanzanians came to the settlement to buy crops to resell them in the market in Tabora. In a small meeting place in Tabora market, where men used to discuss and drink coffee, different opinions were voiced in a conversation that I initiated. Two Tanzanian men who had regular exchanges with the Burundians, had contrasting opinions:

> "The Burundians are not as welcoming to foreign people as Tanzanians. [...] Sometimes they are very rude" (C5).

But an older man noted:

> "They are very loyal – if you lend them money, to collect maize on another
> day, they will not use it in another way, they will use if for that task only;
> otherwise they will return the money to you" (C7).

However, not all residents in Tabora knew of the refugees' presence, and many did
not know details regarding their background. When speaking about my research, some
Tanzanians, whom I met on transit in Tabora, one of which ran a hostel and the other
led a long-term NGO project there, said when asked, "Are there still many refugees?"
(C8), and, "Yes, I know the Hutu and Tutsi live there" (C9), although the overwhelming
majority of refugees were Hutu. In the surrounding wards of Ulyankulu almost everyone
was familiar with the place but in the next biggest town, Tabora, only some people had
been to Ulyankulu, and those with business relations to the place had varying opinions
about the refugees. However, their presence as such was not questioned. At a distance,
it thus seemed that Ulyankulu had become invisible – it blended in with and belonged to
its surroundings.

6.1.3 *Intermarriage between refugees and Tanzanian citizens*

Tanzanians and Burundians have intermarried inside the settlement and outside of it, in
surrounding villages and in further away towns and cities. One respondent, a Tanza-
nian Muslim originally from Kagera in an interview elicited by the Imam of Ulyankulu
mosque, explained why he came to the settlement about eight years ago and how he found
his wife, a refugee, in the settlement.

> "Life was difficult there [in Kagera]; that's why I came here in 'search of life'
> [*kutafuta maisha*]. I came here with my identity card. Here I could work on
> a farm; I could earn at least TZS 400,000 per year. I was employed here but
> there was a misunderstanding because the tobacco farmer failed to give me
> food. The tobacco farmers have to give you food throughout the year. So I
> decided to live here at the centre as a bicycle technician.
>
> [I got married] this year in October [2012]; now we have been living here for
> about a month. [I met my wife] here at Road 13; near to the centre. [...] She
> was working at a restaurant in the centre but now she is farming. I was given

a piece of land by my wife's parents, 1/2 an acre, and one acre we are renting"
(C10).

This respondent thus came to Ulyankulu in search of work and started his married life there. Not only was he (presumably) employed by a refugee, he also obtained a piece of land from refugees through his refugee wife, who had converted to Islam for him. Another couple in a village outside of the settlement met each other when the man, a Nyamwezi, went to Ulyankulu to the market. Soon after they got married and opened a shop outside of the settlement.

Other mixed couples first lived in Ulyankulu and then moved to another place. However, they still come back to the settlement from time to time and kept contact with the family. An 18-year old waiter, a second-generation refugee, explained at a restaurant in Ulyankulu:

> "My brother doesn't have any work – he went to Kahama in 2008. He is farming. In 2009, my other brother moved to Mwanza with his wife, who came from Mwanza. They wanted to live in the city. My brother is a tailor. They come back [to visit] here sometimes" (S3).

The extent of intermarriage within the settlement can be estimated in a remark given by a local government official, who originally came from the south of Tanzania. He explained that it would be difficult to distinguish the refugees from the Nyamwezi and other Tanzanians for interview purposes because they were "all intermarried". Despite official statistics, which state a low percentage of intermarriage (6.19% of families were recorded as one with a mixed marriage or as including a Tanzanian parent; SA3, 2007: 58) empirical findings thus suggest that intermarriage was a common phenomenon.

Marriage patterns thus changed over time. Malkki (1995a: 175) noted that refugees in Mishamo settlement did not approve of marriages between refugees and citizens at the time of her research in the 1980s probably because they saw their stay in Tanzania as temporary. Once exile had become protracted, however, intermarriage, at least in Ulyankulu, became a normal and desired phenomenon since it increased their sense of belonging to Tanzania. A 35-year old (refugee) woman with four children, who had married a Tanzanian man, explained a change over time:

> "At the time the Burundian women [first] went there [to live with the Sukuma inside and outside of the settlement], they failed to do their work – of shifting

around and caring for the cows. Sometimes they used bad words like, 'You are too lazy, you cannot do our work'. [Citizenship means] to feel freedom; to respect each other, especially by the Sukumas who despised us so much. But now they started to marry us; we are integrated" (S12).

As could be seen above, the issue of intermarriage was viewed positively by first and second generation refugees, while government officials feared that they would not be able to distinguish refugees from citizens. One can note that while refugees had been concerned about impurity of their nation at the time of Malkki's research, the concern with purity was rather on the side of the government at the time of field research in Ulyankulu. Refugees had already embraced the idea of becoming part of the Tanzanian nation. One person mentioned that she married a Tanzanian because he was wealthy but others said that they were marrying for love, personal choice, or because they lived outside of the settlement – similar to the town refugees in Malkki's study (1995a). The woman cited above explained, "[I married a Tanzanian] because I liked to [*nilipenda*]. My heart has fallen to him" (S12).

In summary, refugees and Tanzanians integrated with each other to their mutual benefit. Instead of remaining linked to Burundi, refugees interacted with Tanzanians espousing a pragmatic future-oriented way of thinking in order to gain a sense of belonging. Refugees benefited from cooperation with Tanzanians for example by learning farming techniques adequate for the climate and landscape of Ulyankulu, (see quote by F16 below, Section 6.2.3) and Tanzanians benefited from refugees by obtaining products sold in the market. The exchange between refugees and citizens extended well beyond the settlement; some refugees went as far as Tabora town to sell their products; and Tanzanians went to the settlement to buy. Tanzanians have also started marrying refugees, both in the settlement (since Tanzanians moved there) as well as in towns and cities outside of the settlement. This spontaneous integration was feared by some government officials but it was the lived reality of the people living in Ulyankulu as well as outside of the settlement. The spatial and legal separation that was attempted by refugee policy was not legitimate in the eyes of the refugees. Although it was sometimes effective (e.g. when refugees and Tanzanians were sent to prison for not complying with the law), they often bypassed it in their daily routines. Despite the control they faced, a 'space of agency' became manifest, which extended beyond the settlement as it became integrated into the Tanzanian economy and society.

6.2   Pragmatics of Belonging: The Settlement as Home

6.2.1   *First generation: Feeling at home in the settlement and the nation as prerequisite for becoming citizens*

Having developed a relational sense of belonging, refugees also felt that they belonged to the settlement and the nation on account of feeling at home. Some elderly first generation refugees mentioned that they felt at home in their immediate surroundings; they felt close to and at ease with their neighbours and wanted to stay where they were. Not only was a feeling at home an important prerequisite for a sense of belonging (Duyvendak, 2011: 36), refugees also saw it as an important reason for applying for citizenship. A 61-year old first-generation refugee man with 11 children, who worked as a catechist for the Catholic Church in Ulyankulu, said:

> "[The meaning of citizenship] is to feel at home. The people who I find here are my relatives. We live with them like brothers and sisters with the indigenous population" (F6[1]).

First generation refugees felt at home in the settlement and felt too old to start a new life somewhere else. Repatriation and relocation were therefore not their preferred options even when parts of their families had decided to repatriate in 2008/09. A 67-year old first-generation refugee man, whose daughter had repatriated to Burundi along with her husband and in-laws, mentioned:

> "I lived here for all those years, and now I am old, I got no energy to cultivate, that's why I saw it to be good to apply for citizenship. I can't go back to farming again" (F7).

To feel at home also meant to be a normal person in their surroundings. Therefore, citizenship was a natural and logical option for them since they were living contently in Ulyankulu, the same way as Tanzanian citizens, and they saw the Tanzanians as friends.

A 77-year old refugee man, who had been a teacher in Burundi prior to coming to Ulyankulu in 1972, explained:

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[1]One of his sons was among the select few who had already got his citizenship certificate in Dar es Salaam. Unfortunately, I could not interview him since he was travelling at the time of field work.

> "To see the way I live here; I am a normal person. We stayed here for a long
> time. We are living here happily. We live together like friends" (F8[2]).

Some other elderly refugees felt at home in the settlement since they perceived it as a peaceful place in contrast to Burundi. They believed it is still not safe to go back to their country of origin. Furthermore, they said that they had "no place to live in Burundi" (F8) – meaning that they lost their land there and even their families and friends due to war, displacement and old age. A 59-year old refugee man with eight children[3], who taught Catholic religion in primary school, said:

> "I was living here [in Ulyankulu/Tanzania] very well; there is no peace there
> [in Burundi]" (F9).

Some refugees said that they belonged to Tanzania because they were educated according to the Tanzanian curriculum. A VETA-teacher, who had been transferred to Ulyankulu from Katumba settlement, explained:

> "I applied because my whole education I did here; I know nothing about Burundi; I was very young when I came here" (F10).

Some refugees mentioned that they are satisfied with where they were at that moment, and that they belonged "here" ("*hapa hapa*" or "*humu humu*" (for example F2, quoted again in Section 6.2.3 below)). They had become "*mwenyeji*" – a local person who belonged to the place. In their pragmatic view, living contently in one place meant that they belonged to it, without explicit considerations of adapting to Tanzanian language, culture and education, living peacefully with their Tanzanian neighbours, or without mentioning push factors from Burundi. These refugees also saw their naturalisation in pragmatic terms. They believed that they were citizens and not refugees anymore because the government or the UN said so. One could say that the action of having applied for Tanzanian citizenship had, at least in nominal terms, confirmed their attained sense of belonging. Some said they are now "Tanzanian" *because* they applied for citizenship (e.g. interview with F11).

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[2]This first generation refugee had seven children of whom three lived outside of the settlement. His sons had married Tanzanian women, while his daughters had married amongst the refugees. One of his sons, who worked in Tabora town, subsequently agreed to meet for an interview (F17, cited below).

[3]Including the orphaned children of his late brother, who died in the war in Burundi in 1972

Again, for some refugees confirming their sense of belonging by applying for citizenship was a pragmatic decision to protect their families. These refugees engaged in future-thinking and emphasised the next generation: their children should be citizens in order to be free and because it would be difficult for them to return to Burundi. The village leader of Kaswa (see Section 6.1.1) and the VETA-teacher quoted above, explained:

> "From being a refugee, for myself, the meaning of becoming a citizen is to be free and to be able to send my children to school and for them to be citizens also when I die" (F5).

> "Because I remained in Tanzania; it is better for me and my family, for my whole life. Even for my children, even Kirundi – it is difficult for them" (F10).

Some elderly refugees, who lived in the settlement since 1972, said that they liked to live in Tanzania because they were satisfied with the government or because the government took care of them. It seems that these refugees appreciated and were grateful that for decades they had been welcomed and hosted in Ulyankulu. This might still be a legacy of President Nyerere's policies, as he once welcomed them as 'guests' and not (unwanted) 'refugees'. Two first-generation refugees said (also quoted above):

> "Since 1972 the government was taking care of me from that time until now, so that's why I feel like a Tanzanian" (F7).

> "I am satisfied with the government – I feel like I am at home. I am satisfied with the leaders of this government" (F6).

For them, these feelings of belonging were a reason for applying for citizenship. They could imagine becoming *de jure* citizens since they saw the government as being legitimate.

All of these refugees were fully ready to become Tanzanians and believed that they belonged to Tanzania. They did not feel like refugees anymore. For some, feeling at home came about by having become used to the surroundings of the settlement and having interacted with the host population for decades. This feeling led to a localised sense of belonging. For others however, their feeling of home related to the Tanzanian nation as a whole. They contrasted their sense of belonging to Tanzania with a lack of knowledge of Burundi and a belief in adverse circumstances in their country of origin. Furthermore, their sense of belonging to Tanzania came about by being educated according to the Tan-

zanian curriculum and by having been hosted by the Tanzanian government. For all these first generation refugees, reasons for applying for citizenship in 2007 were articulated as a confirmation of their existing sense of belonging to Ulyankulu and the nation. As one refugee said, voting rights, for example, are a confirmation that they have finally "become like them" (F9), like Tanzanians.

Uncertainty of belonging due to lack of de jure citizenship rights

A few refugees were confused about their feelings in relation to their status as Tanzanians or refugees. They found themselves in a liminal position for different reasons. The VETA-teacher quoted above said that he still felt like a refugee since he was lacking citizenship rights.

> "Somehow, because there are some rights I do not have as a Tanzanian, like to vote and be voted and also not to have access to further education...it makes me somehow like a refugee. Even the place we are living – this is a settlement. Perhaps if I go out of this place – perhaps I forget about refugeeness. When I was in secondary school, few knew that I was a refugee; the principal and headmaster. But students? No. I speak Kiswahili like the others, so it is difficult to differentiate me" (F10, in English).

He also mentioned that he could not go to his father's funeral in Burundi without a passport or official documentation. The father had repatriated to Burundi in 2008 and passed away a few years later. The respondent feared losing his job if he went there. While a localised sense of belonging or a sense of belonging to the nation were sufficient reasons to feel Tanzanian for the refugees above, this person emphasised that he did not fully feel Tanzanian since he still lacked *de jure* citizenship rights. The lack of *de jure* citizenship rights mattered for him more in the controlled spatiality of the camp, which made him feel like a refugee. Outside of the settlement within Tanzania, he had become a *de facto* citizen, who could blend in due to his language skills. In an interview with an Ulyankulu Secondary School teacher, held in front of his house in the presence of another teacher, he emphasised that he still felt like a refugee due to the lack of *de jure* citizenship rights:

> "Let me laugh first before I say anything. Of course, you know there is a certain creature, a bird, so I can answer you by saying that I am still a bird [...]. I'm not allowed to have rights like a Tanzanian. There are some loans

from the government; I am not allowed to join it. Also I am not allowed to be employed as a permanent teacher. So you can see I am still in a *dilemma position*. And we still have some barriers. If you want to go outside as a passenger with some luggage, maybe for business, [...] maybe for three or seven days; if you are late you have to report to the district office. You have to report to any district office at the place you are visiting" (F12, in English, emphasis added).

De jure citizenship rights were highly important in his personal life (see below). The difference between these answers and the ones above may stem from the fact that both of these respondents worked for the government as teachers and were therefore more visible to and dependent upon the government. They were evidently under more pressure than others to follow its regulations in order not to lose their jobs.

Uncertainty of belonging as a result of membership of an ethnic or national minority

Another respondent, a pastor at a church in Ikonongo, experienced confusion and uncertainty for a different reason. He explained (in English):

> "I myself still think I'm hanging in two ways. Here in Ulyankulu there are two groups. There are people who applied for naturalisation and there are a second group who remain looking for another option. They wait or they applied to go for resettlement. I am among them. I did not apply for naturalisation. I still wait for resettlement [to a] third country – if there is a country who can take refugees to go to settle for their whole lives, I am among them. I wrote an application to UNHCR, they received my letters. They opened my files [and] told me – you just wait [...] until the time is coming to process resettlement.

> [...] Nowadays, I cannot say I am a Burundian. I am not. Because my status, from the beginning I was a half-cast of mixing bloods between Tutsi and Hima. My father was Mangeni tribe from Muscat, Saudi Arabia. My father was a business man in Burundi. He married a wife from Tutsini tribe. My wife was mixing blood between Tutsi and Himani tribe. That is why I am still waiting. I don't have a large family in Burundi – how can I go there. And my father died. I don't know where my relatives are" (F13).

This refugee was amongst the few who had not chosen either option – repatriation or naturalisation. These refugees chose to remain refugees in the hope of being resettled to a developed country. Long (2010) mentions that refugees in various settings have perfected strategies to gain eligibility for resettlement by the UNHCR. In Ulyankulu some refugees have gone to great lengths to be considered for third-country resettlement. They travelled to and spoke with people in other camps in order to find out about the different possibilities. However, the 1972 caseload was generally not deemed in need of resettlement (according to an interview with UNHCR Ulyankulu, I4) and those who were resettled left the settlement a long time ago.[4]

The refugee cited above did not apply for citizenship since he did not feel that he belonged to the group of people who chose naturalisation. His example showed that the emerging sense of belonging amongst refugees had a collective dimension – for him, belonging to Tanzania presupposed belonging to the community of Hutu refugees, who had opted for naturalisation. On the other hand, possibly because they had a joint cause, those who applied for resettlement also knew each other and some collaborated in their efforts to fight for resettlement.

Advantages of de jure *citizenship*

Most respondents said that they already felt Tanzanian, that they would not like to go back to Burundi and that they would then "be able to vote" or "be free" in general. Only a few respondents urgently needed citizenship in practical terms. A secondary school teacher (also quoted above) said (in English):

> "There are many important points [why it is important to gain citizenship]. The first is to be known as a citizen of Tanzania and also to receive human rights as other Tanzanian citizens. Tanzanians have the right to ask for loans [to go to university], which can support them to have further studies. But on my side as a refugee, as the one who is still waiting for a certificate of naturalisation, I cannot be accepted to have those loans. [...]
>
> The second is that it can help me to transfer from one place to another in this country. Because nowadays you cannot be allowed to go to live any place

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[4]World-wide only 1% of refugees are resettled to developed countries because these countries only accept a small number of people, under their own conditions, to enter every year (Long, 2010).

without the permission of the commander of settlement, the [...] *"mkuu wa makazi"*, the leader of this camp. Before you go there, you have to ask the permission [...]."

[The third is] if you are a citizen, of course you will be a permanent worker. [...] Without getting a naturalisation certificate, you cannot be allowed to be a worker outside of this camp. [...] Of course, myself, I would like to do so [to work outside of the camp]. I have one child here, he is my son. He suffers [...]; it is a kind of cancer. I was in Muhimbili hospital two years ago. They wrote me a letter to be a worker near to the hospital. Since I am a refugee, I wrote a letter to the DED [district executive director], my employer, to give me a transfer but he replied to me, I am not allowed to move out of the camp because I am still a refugee. I still have the letters here and also the answers that I got" (F12).

In terms of employment, another respondent, a primary school teacher who had taught at the school for 32 years, mentioned similar advantages for citizenship[5].

"[I applied for citizenship] because I studied here [...] here I can live in peace. I have every reason to apply. You get sad because the government still doesn't give contracts and pension but everything else is fine; I can live in peace so I feel like a Tanzanian. [...] [A citizen is] a person who lives in a country with peace and with all rights, fundamental rights. I will be very happy; I will not get these problems from the job [any longer]" (F14).

The second conversation supported some points mentioned in the first: citizenship would translate to old-age security and job security. The first conversation, however, showed a person who would benefit in various additional ways from obtaining citizenship. Citizenship would not only improve finances, education etc., for him it was a matter of life and death. Judging from seeing this young boy with cancer, he would not have had much time to live from the time of the interview without going to a specialised hospital. While the UNHCR and the government gave citizenship certificates to 749 refugees in Dar es Salaam, others had to await their fate. This case showed that it would be necessary to give citizenship to both first generation and second generation refugees.

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[5] At the time of interview, he was the only refugee teacher left at the school from initially five, who had been transferred to other schools or had already passed away.

In summary, most first generation refugees developed a familiarity with and localised sense of belonging to the space of the settlement and the people there, including Tanzanians, through their everyday encounters. The settlement became their home. Some emphasised a broader sense of belonging to the Tanzanian nation. They still perceived Burundi as an unsafe place, in contrast to Tanzania. For all, their attained sense of belonging was a prerequisite to apply for naturalisation. Some refugees still felt uncertainty about whether they belonged to Tanzania or were still refugees. For some of these refugees *de jure* citizenship was crucial since they worked for the government and thus had limited room for manoeuvre. Others, who did not feel part of the refugee community for example due to their ethnicity, used their agency to fight for resettlement.

6.2.2 *Second generation*

Having considered feelings of belonging among the first generation, it is necessary to compare them with those of the second and third generation. Second and third generation refugees felt a sense of belonging to Tanzania in pragmatic terms since they were born in Tanzania and they did not know Burundi at all. One respondent, who had recently obtained a Bachelor degree (see Section 6.3.1), explained why it was a problem not to know the country of Burundi very well: he could not speak French – the official teaching language in secondary schools in Burundi – and even Kirundi was difficult after having been educated in Tanzania in Swahili and English.

> "Myself, I enjoy being a Tanzanian; I can't say that I am a Burundian, I have not even been in Burundi a single day; Tanzania is a peaceful country, people are allowed to go here and there; the education format is easier than the Burundian. For us born in Tanzania, we know Kiswahili and English. Once we go to Burundi, we need to know French; we need to know Kirundi deeply. Those who repatriated who were studying at Ulyankulu Secondary School have failed to study because of the study environment – the system of education etc" (S4, in English).

Others, such as a 30-year old mother of four children in the village of Mapigano (S5), summarised their reasons by saying that they did not "feel" Burundi, they "felt" Tanzania- a feeling related to being familiar with surroundings and people, to feel at home. Belong-

ing did not need a further explanation – being born in Tanzania was enough to explain it. A tailor and pastor in Kaswa mentioned in an interview in front of his house in the presence of his wife, a tailor, who did not want to be interviewed, and some of their children: "I feel like a native Tanzanian because I was born here" (S6). In relation to the proposed naturalisation, the same respondent showed another pragmatic way of belonging: he felt Tanzanian because "the president announced it" (S6). Similar to the first generation, second and third generation refugees, such as a man selling mattraces on Ulyankulu market, also said that they were "already used to the environment" (S7) and that it was therefore best to stay.

Comparing these answers to the first generation, the second generation refugees did not mention that they were grateful to Tanzania for hosting them, nor did they emphasise that they felt at ease with their neighbours. While for them it was also important to "feel at home", they saw their relationship with Tanzanians as more natural and inevitable than the first generation. Furthermore, second and third generation refugees had different push-factors from Burundi than the first generation – e.g. emphasising not speaking the language instead of underlining that there was peace in Tanzania. Second generation refugees also did not emphasise that they wanted to feel like 'normal' citizens. They felt fully adapted already. They were born and educated in Tanzania, so there was no need in emphasising this aspect.

Second and third generation refugees did not emphasise belonging as a local phenomenon but as a national one. For most second generation refugees it was not as important to stay in Ulyankulu as for some elderly first generation refugees. Since the second generation felt at home in the nation, moving out of the settlement was less intimidating as well as physically less burdensome than for the elderly. However, as some answers indicate (see quote by S5 in Section 6.3.1), women were less mobile than men due to their children rearing responsibilities.

When it comes to advantages of *de jure* citizenship, which was seen by the first generation as a confirmation of their belonging, second generation refugees mentioned it rather as an additional advantage than a prerequisite. For example, they mentioned that they had a disadvantage by obtaining a school leaving certificate, which still stated "Burundian" as their nationality. A 17-year old male student in Form 4 of Kanindo Secondary School explained:

"I would be happy [to be a Tanzanian]. When you finish Form 4, your certifi-
cate shows that you are a Burundian; if people see that you are a Hutu, they
will not employ you outside of the settlement and if possible, they will send
you back to the settlement" (S8; see also S9 below).

Other respondents mentioned that citizenship was important in order to feel free. A
third generation refugee (also quoted above) said:

"If you are a citizen you can be free you can decide to do whatever you like
instead of breaking the law of the government. So you can decide whatever
you want because you are free, you have rights. But if you are not a citizen,
there are other rights you don't have, for instance to choose a leader. So if you
are a citizen you can easily choose and enjoy the cake of the nation" (S7).

Furthermore, in an interview at her house, a tailor, mother of four children, explained:

"To me, the advantage of being a citizen is to be able to move from one place
to another without fear; and to live in freedom; I can decide myself what to
do and not the government" (S10).

Similarly, a male 16-year old Form 4 Kanindo Secondary School student mentioned:

"No, I feel free; I have felt free since the beginning. But the problem is that
our certificate says that we are refugees, it says 'Burundian' " (S9).

One respondent, a 25-year old man working in a dispensary in Ikonongo, mentioned
that a main advantage of citizenship was that it would facilitate the possibility of taking
part in bringing about political change:

"I would like to vote. I am not allowed to vote or to select the leader. I am
clapping my hands when the president goes into office even though I didn't
do anything – I cannot do anything if I don't like the president. [...] If I want
to talk about rights, I would talk until sunset – even if I get several university
degrees, I would still be recognised as a refugee, so the most important one
is to be able to vote – the other rights follow" (S11).

Some second generation refugees thus mentioned formal advantages of being citizens,
like the right to vote and other fundamental rights. One respondent (see S7 above) equated
citizenship status to "not having to break the law anymore". This answer shows that

refugees perceived breaking the law as inevitable in order to get by and to substitute lacking citizenship rights.

Uncertainty of belonging

Among the second generation, just like the first generation, some refugees said that they were not sure whether they were refugees or citizens, Burundians or Tanzanians. The young medical attendant quoted above said:

> "In that sense I must feel like [a refugee] because I don't have the answer that I can be a Tanzanian or not" (S11).

In the presence of the respondent above and a refugee pastor from the village of Taba (F16), a doctor at the same dispensary added:

> "I really feel like in the middle. [...] Yes, of course [I applied for citizenship]. You can live in the place you were born but you can also be naturalised. Our parents are from Burundi but we are born here. We are not sure where we are. [...] We are not sure yet – are we Tanzanian or Burundian?" (S1)

The first person quoted above felt like he was still a refugee because he did not yet hold the citizenship certificate; he did not yet have formal proof of being a citizen. Here citizenship was seen in nominal and formal terms. The parents of the second respondent did not choose naturalisation but decided to repatriate to Burundi. The fact that a part of the family now lived in Burundi caused some uncertainty to his sense of belonging, but nevertheless he said he felt like a Tanzanian.

These second generation refugees had different reasons for feeling uncertainty about their belonging compared to the first generation. They did not quote ethnicity as a reason, for example. Some second and third generation refugees may have been too young to be in direct contact with the practical consequences of lacking such rights. While the problem of not having secured employment contracts and pensions also befell second generation refugees, respondents did not mention it. Second generation refugees believed that freedom and rights were important in their lives (see above) but they did not quote the lack of it as a reason for uncertainty. Especially the second generation developed different skills and methods to deal with the lack of citizenship rights, such as freedom of movement, as will be discussed in the next section.

While inter-generational considerations caused first generation refugees to apply for citizenship in order to ensure that their children would be safe, for second generation refugees, inter-generational concerns caused uncertainty. Not having been able to register for citizenship themselves (their parents did so), and having parents who decided to repatriate was confusing.

In summary, most first and second generation refugees felt that they were already Tanzanian citizens and not Burundian refugees any more. In general, however, first generation refugees announced a more localised sense of belonging than the second generation. Second generation refugees thought it was not necessary to justify or negotiate their sense of belonging – they thought it was natural to feel Tanzanian if you were born there. Having been educated in Swahili and English were factors that underscored their sense of belonging. Some refugees of both generations still felt uncertain about where they belonged, for different reasons. The first generation mentioned rights and ethnicity as factors, whereas for the second generation it was the lack of an official status and the fact that their parents had repatriated to Burundi.

6.2.3 Diasporic culture and belonging

Belonging: longing for home?

The experience of refugees has sometimes been implicated in the concept of diaspora, a term that originally related to the Jewish Diaspora (Cohen, 2008; Safran, 1991; Van Hear, 2006). Displacement is not perceived as an individual experience but one that stems from a cataclysmic event that traumatises the group as a whole, creating a central historical experience of victimhood (Cohen, 2008: 1). Safran (1991) argued that a central feature of such a diaspora is its relationship to the homeland, including a vision or myth about an idealised ancestral homeland. Descendants should return to it when conditions have improved. At the very least, other scholars mentioned that a characteristic of a diaspora is a 'longing for home', or a 'homing desire' (Brah, 1996), even where they do not actively want to go back. It seems logical to suggest that the first generation has a stronger homing desire than the second generation who is already accustomed to the way of living in the host country. However, in Ulyankulu, even elderly first generation refugees did not have

such desires. In a short interview at his 50th wedding anniversary celebration to which I was invited, the husband said:

> "Since 1972, I have never gone [back to Burundi] to see it there; that is why I applied for citizenship. [*He starts laughing*]. [...] They have bad disturbances [*vurugu*]. When they see a child, they kill it...even cats and mice! That is the Burundians' war!" (F15)

In a long interview at his house, another elderly refugee man (70-years old) explained the situation in Burundi when he fled and was overwhelmed by his emotions.

> "I have not gone back to Burundi. [...] It is not to be spoken about [...] – many were killed in a bad way [*he starts to cry*]. Anybody was killed [...]. My parents were killed for instance because I was working for the government. [*He walks away shortly to wipe away the tears and returns*]. I am sorry, my tears mean – my children, my elder brothers and sisters were killed. No-one, who lives here, was really faced by the war; but I was right there. The people at the top cannot tell the story in depth. Other people [...] will not tell the truth. The government leaders try to hide the truth. But those who were there at the time, they know the truth. In 1961, I was a soldier. I participated in the war for independence [...] We were fighting under the son of Rwagasore, who brought peace. He was the son of a king. [...] He tried to gather us [the soldiers] and insisted that we look after the nation. The soldiers should not work for their personal gain but to shed the blood of love for the nation. The government could not help the people. The president was Mikaeli Michombero, who was starting the war [later Bagaza]. He was killing everybody until the people "*wa chini*" [people in lower positions]. They were killing the people from their own government. [...] President Michombero announced to the soldiers that all Hutus should be killed who could give orders to other people. Those Hutu who remain should be servants who go to fetch water and other tasks without questioning.
>
> Those who went back to Burundi [in the repatriation in 2009] – they came back to Tanzania... They may cause another war – those, who went back to Burundi.

I don't have any ideas [*mawazo*] of Burundi. Those who are really refugees have passed away – why I am still here I don't know. Even at Road 13, the youth look like old people – I don't know why they get old quickly; maybe they have a bad diet or very hard work" (F2).

In these and other interviews one can see that first generation refugees still had the situation of war in their mind when thinking of Burundi. They had shared memories of the war and therefore did not like to go back to the place. They believed that if they went back to Burundi, another war could ensue – this time about land. The respondent above spoke about those Burundian refugees who had recently repatriated but returned to the settlement as illegal migrants because they experienced conflict in the home country. First generation refugees did not like to be reminded about the situation in their country of origin because they found a place of peace in Tanzania and wanted to stay there until the end of their lives.

As the respondent above said, nowadays, he was one of the few in Ulyankulu who still remembered the situation in Burundi[6]. Most people of his age had passed away. As argued by Geschiere (2009), African urban elites have an ongoing relationship with their village of birth due to the importance that is attributed to their ancestors' graves. A sense of belonging to that village is therefore related to being rooted in the soil. A sensible argument to make therefore is that refugees in Ulyankulu may have had a strong relationship to their village of birth in Burundi but over time their sense of belonging shifted to Ulyankulu: they started burying their ancestors at one of three graveyards that were built at different times at Roads 28, 10 and 13. Communal places for burying the deceased of Tanzanian descent (such as Sukuma) were offered at Road 28. These insights support the argument that while the first generation has surely maintained a stronger connection to Burundi throughout the years than the second generation, their 'homing desire' or a 'longing for home' is likely to have decreased over time until they were prepared to become Tanzanians.

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[6]Nowadays, a maximum of ten percent of the people in Ulyankulu are first generation refugees and among those, only few fled Burundi in their adult years. The estimate of ten percent is obtained from the fact that at the time of the survey was conducted by UNHCR in 2007, 22% of the people were first generation refugees in the three settlements of Katumba, Mishamo and Ulyankulu. Since many of the first generation refugees repatriated or passed away since then, and there were many new babies born in the meantime, the percentage of first generation refugees cannot be higher than ten percent.

Second generation refugees in Ulyankulu were also not keen on returning to Burundi and denied all connections. As a secondary student (see Section 6.2.2) explained: "I don't even think about [going to Burundi]" (S9). A refugee woman (see Section 6.2.2) said:

> "No I've never been to Burundi even one day. I do not know how to go there and what to do there, while I do not know the place. No [I don't like to go there because] I cannot go to a place that I don't know" (S5).

Generally, second generation refugees had only limited knowledge and curiosity about their country of origin. To the question "do you know where your parents came from in Burundi?" several respondents – a female secondary school student and the respondent above – answered:

> "There in Burundi? No, I really don't know the place" (S15).

> "That I don't know because I was not born there" (S5).

There is, of course, a possibility that these answers stemmed from a fear of admitting connections to Burundi. Refugees knew from school lessons that connections to Burundi were seen as a security threat or even as illegal by the government: they learned that it was the citizens' responsibility to "ask refugees to refrain from any unlawful acts (offences) like banditry, smuggling, keeping weapons and ammunition, rape and even unlawful *correspondence with their home countries* (emphasis added)" (see Annex 5 – Excerpt of Civics Book for Forms III and IV, Ch.4: Responsible Citizenship).

The hypothesis stating that first generation refugees have a stronger sense of belonging to the home country than the second generation can be refuted. First generation refugees did have memories about the place of origin. However, even first generation refugees did not have a homing desire or a longing for home. Most refugees did not have much interaction with Burundi: they had never been there or never planned to go back. While developing a 'pragmatics of belonging' to the Tanzanian nation, refugees lost a diasporic sense of belonging to Burundi.

Maintaining Burundian culture?

While first and second generation refugees did not seem to have a longing for their country of origin, the following section shows to what extent they have maintained, incorporated or transformed traditions from Burundi into their everyday lives in Tanzania.

Referring to differences between their places of origin and Tanzania, an important aspect was the adaptation to the crops found in Tabora. In a conversation with a doctor at a dispensary and a pastor (see Section 6.2.2), they said:

> "Here [in Tanzania] the culture is different from the culture there [in Burundi]" (S1).

> "The crops are different...There they had food; the weather is enough and the rivers; the life there is different. A big portion of the food is *ugali*[7] [here] – there it is fruits – there were a lot of bananas, here they have *ugali* and beans [*maharage*]. Good potatoes and fruits were available there. Here in Tabora, we were faced with very different vegetables etc. – we found that it was different from Burundi – we couldn't cook very well" (F16).

Being asked about '*utamaduni*' (culture), they said that there were some official cultural shows on certain Tanzanian holidays, with dancers from Burundi and an international audience. In contrast to *jadi* (ancestral obligations), *utamaduni* refers to national culture as promoted by the government with a modern connotation, in distinction to local terminologies (Jerman 1997:69). Since it was expected that refugees would eventually return to Burundi, dances were used to support their culture. Later, refugees mainly learned Tanzanian dances in school in order to "reinforce national discipline" (ibid.: 288), as discussed in Chapter 5.

> "A long time ago we had our culture [here in Ulyankulu] – the government allowed us to use the Burundian culture in elementary school, we had traditional dances – the Deutsche Welle also played this; even the UN was happy about that. They [the dancers] were people from Kigwa – now they went back to Burundi. On 7/7 and 8/8 (*Saba-saba* and *Nane-nane*, Tanzanian holidays) they were having [agricultural] exhibitions at VETA to show our dances; [...] now it is very quiet; maybe [until] three years [ago] they did this [...]" (F16).

While one of the respondents quoted above thought that Tanzanians and Burundians had the same behaviour, another respondent explained that there were many differences in customs between the various Tanzanian and Burundian ethnic traditions. He mentioned the topics of circumcision, and various customs of marriage and partnership.

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[7]*Ugali* is a form of corn mash, which is very common as a main dish in Tanzania with vegetables and other sides.

"The behaviour [between Tanzanians and Burundians] is the same [...]" (S1).

"Burundians go quite straight; the Tanzanians aren't like that. [...] They have about ten wives here; we only have one. Here they marry under 18, there it was not allowed. For example the Wagogo, they practise women's circumcision – we don't have that. There is no male circumcision in Burundi but when we entered in Kigoma – we were surprised. Here, a man can go with a girl for a few days to his home [before marriage] – there it wasn't possible; for example the Fipa – they [the couple] stay at the father's place [for some time] – in the father's room. Here you can marry your cousin [and there you cannot]. There the father is not allowed to visit the daughter's house after marriage [but here he can visit]. About hospitality [*karimu*]: we have a culture of inviting friends" (F16).

These answers showed some general remarks about adaptation to (agri-)culture, organised cultural events and some broad differences in customs of different ethnicities. Another conversation showed how a refugee woman dealt with the cultural difference between her and her Tanzanian husband, who had passed away. When they married, she converted from Catholicism to Islam, his religion. When asked whether she still practiced Burundian customs, she explained:

"Yes, I was used to it; I continued to do so [to kneel before the husband, a custom in Burundi]. It shows respect, isn't it...It even reduces the chance of him liking other women [...] I am the only wife. [...] There are a lot of customs but others were despised so we are not practicing them. You should forgive me to not following the customs of Usambara; we were there only short time. I cannot give an explanation of Burundian customs because I was born here; I only know the customs here" (S12).

Not being fully familiar with either Tanzanian or Burundian customs, she practiced a mix of the two. In Ulyankulu generally, Kirundi was spoken in private but there were few instances of hearing the language in public. Exceptions were some Burundian songs that were sung in a church. However, the service was mostly held in Swahili (or in English, since I was present) and at least half of the songs were sung in Swahili. This is remarkable since church life has been one of the main communal activities that Burundians take part in.

Discussions and observations concerning traditions and 'culture' showed that they changed over time. When coming to Tanzania, refugees adapted to their new surroundings in their everyday lives in pragmatic ways, while only maintaining some of the traditions from Burundi.

6.3 Pragmatics of Belonging: Claiming *de facto* Citizenship

6.3.1 *Moving and travelling outside of the settlement*

An important third aspect of the 'pragmatics of belonging', next to relating to the host population and feeling at home is that refugees have claimed *de facto* citizenship rights, such as the right to education, to work and to vote, especially when outside of the settlement. The action of becoming mobile within Tanzania in itself is a political act since refugees have thereby transgressed the government's provisions.

Lacking *de jure* citizenship rights such as freedom of movement and work permits, refugees were hiding their refugee status through various pragmatic means. In this section, aspects of language, ethnicity, documentation, intermarriage and fake names are considered. Asked for their own reasons for hiding their status, respondents confirmed that it was important to claim belonging to the Tanzanian nation in order not to be discriminated against or humiliated.

One reason for becoming mobile and moving outside of the settlement was education. Among the second generation especially, many went to secondary school until O-level. In Ulyankulu, the first public secondary school opened in 1999 teaching Forms 1 to 4 – before that people had to request to go to secondary schools outside of the settlement. Students who achieved good grades were sent to government secondary schools in order to complete Forms 5 and 6, a prerequisite for university. Private secondary schools did not exist in the settlement. The doctor quoted above, a second generation refugee, who had been born in Ulyankulu in 1973, said:

> "[I studied] in [a government] secondary school in Mpanda [in Rukwa region outside of the settlement]. For non-citizens it was a problem to go outside – out of 70, there were about 4 or 5 who could go to secondary school. There was no secondary school in Ulyankulu at that time; I passed Standard 7 and

was selected to go to Mpanda. Then I went to Nzega Medical School for two years. I got a temporary position in Kitete in 1999; in 2000 I started in Bakota dispensary" (S1).

The refugees were keen to offer their children a good education. The demand for secondary education in the settlement was so high, that even after the first secondary school was built in Ulyankulu in 1999, many children were sent to public schools around the settlement because there was not enough space in the settlement. In court hearings in Ichemba, parents who were accused of having failed to ensure attendance of children in schools were mostly Sukuma and not refugees – which could be a further indicator for the importance refugees assigned to education.

In contrast to these children, who were sent with consent by the government, wealthier families claimed the right of sending their children to study in private or public schools elsewhere in the country without specific permission to do so. The medical attendant (see Section 6.2.2) explained:

> "I studied at Keza elementary school [in Ulyankulu]. Standards 1 to 5. Then I moved. I studied Standard 6-7 in Mwanza town. I passed Standard 7. Then I started Form 1 in Mwanza. There I did Form 1 and Form 2. At the time of the census [in 2006], I was there in Mwanza, not here. Form 3 and 4 I did at the secondary school in Kashishi [near Ulyankulu]; I came here to help my parents to register. I got 26 points – Division 4. Then I went to teacher's college [outside of the settlement]. [However, in the end] I didn't go to that college because I didn't like to be a primary teacher. Then I went back to Mwanza to study at Bismarck-Hospital – Muslims were running it. I went there for one year but they didn't offer a certificate. There was another dispensary in Busweru [in Mwanza]. I started working there for 6 months. In May 2011 I came here for a visit and I was told that there is a small dispensary at Road 43. Then I started to work here. Now I have worked here for one year and three months" (S11).

A university graduate (see Section 6.2.2), who I was introduced to me by UNHCR Ulyankulu and whose family owned a business in Kaswa, mentioned:

> "First of all, I studied in nursery school in 1994. Then I joined primary school in 1995 until 2001, and then in 2002, I joined secondary school, Ulyankulu

Secondary School. We were under the evening class; we learned secondary education at evening time. A few years [later], the system ended. Me and my fellow students we decided to shift to another school, we started afresh. After shifting to another school, only few managed the costs; secondary schools were very expensive. My Mommy has some kind of capital, so she sent me to a private school, namely Uchama Secondary School, where I finished Form 4 in 2006. After finishing Form 4, of course I got good marks; the government selected me to go to Form 5 and 6 to a government school, namely Geita Secondary School. I finished Form 6 in 2009. I came back to my home place; I met with REDESO. After Form 6, REDESO announced the opportunity to sponsor one fresher to join undergraduate studies. I got that opportunity. At University of Dodoma until now. Now I am a graduate" (S4, in English).

However, not all students were as fortunate. A waiter (see Section 6.1.3) said: "I went to elementary school in Milambo [in Ulyankulu]. My parents couldn't send me [to secondary school] because of money." However, he thought education was important: "Yes, I would go [to secondary school], there is no life without education" (S3). Those refugees who could afford it have therefore become increasingly mobile and have managed to claim a right to education.

Besides education, health has been another reason to travel outside of the settlement. A refugee woman (see Section 6.2.2), who had attended school until Standard 7 and got married thereafter, said she had not travelled very much:

"In Tabora I went to the hospital only. It depends on if the child is overwhelmed [by fever] and they tell you to go to Tabora or Urambo [instead of being treated at Ulyankulu Health Centre] and you have to add [infuse] blood, you must go!" (S5)

Therefore, even those first and second generation refugees who did not have other particular reasons, desire or finances for travelling, had to go outside of the settlement sometimes for health reasons and claimed their right to do so.

While travelling outside for health reasons and education may have been of short duration, some refugees moved outside of the settlement permanently due to marriage. A secondary school student interviewed in Kanindo village and a woman, who was introduced by the Imam of Ulyankulu mosque (see Section 6.1.3 and 6.2.3), revealed:

"[My brother] studied at VETA in Nzega. Afterwards it was easy to get a job [there]. [...] He was hiding his identity. He says he is Mchagga or Mnyamwezi. [...] Kinyamwezi he can speak because he lives in Mwanza. [...] He married a Tanzanian. [...] My sister is a tailor – she learned at VETA Tabora. [...] She is hiding her identity to others but not to the husband" (S9).

"I was born here [in Ulyankulu] and I married in Tanga. My children are all Sambara. [I came here] in 1997. I met [my husband] here in 1997. He was working for a tobacco company. At the time, there was another company called Dimon" (S12).

The cities that the relatives of the first respondent and the second respondent moved to are located far away: Mwanza is more than 350 km north of Ulyankulu and Tanga more than 900 km east of Ulyankulu on the coast. While being married to Tanzanians, the brother and sister of the first respondents were 'hiding their identity' to others besides the family. They said they had a Tanzanian ethnicity, such as Nyamwezi, whose language they spoke. The second respondent married a man from the coastal region. When he passed away, she moved back to her family in Ulyankulu.

"I moved back there because I was born here, I have family here; I like the place. [But] I cannot say that I belong here; I feel like Tanga is the best place for me because I also have family in Lushoto. [...] But I am already used to the environment. Even if there is a problem, I can deal with it. I like it here" (S12).

Since she could not obtain a passport or proof of Tanzanian citizenship while being married, she applied for citizenship in the settlement. She did not feel like a refugee because she "did not flee". However, her sense of belonging was influenced by her married life in Tanga.

Some of the respondents above, who were married outside of the settlement, originally went there in order to study or to work. Some other respondents also mentioned that they moved outside in order to work there. The medical attendant quoted above (Section 6.2.2) mentioned:

"Whatever region I choose [when the settlement will be closed], I will go to Dar es Salaam. [...] I just like a different climate/atmosphere. I was already

there. [...] I was doing business with fruits. I was a middleman buying at 500 [TZS] and selling at 700 [TZS] – you get a surplus/profit. [I know] a lot [of people there], also family" (S11).

Besides the reasons above, some refugees also travelled outside of the settlement or even the country in order to go to church or to preach. A pastor of a Baptist church in Ulyankulu (see Section 6.2.1) explained:

> "I don't have any links to Burundi but in Mishamo, there are my fellow pastors. We have a connection. And also in Katumba [I have connections] because we work together. We lead the churches. [We communicate] by using mobile phones. If I need to visit them to supply the gospel I go there. And they come here to preach the word of God" (F13).

All examples cited showed increased mobility of refugees around the country for various reasons. The government has not been able to control the refugees to stay within the settlement. Most refugees above have moved within the country by their own choice, and agency. They have claimed the citizenship rights they were lacking informally. Their sense of belonging to the nation, which they developed in pragmatic ways by familiarising themselves with their surroundings and the host society, enabled them to develop the necessary knowledge, skills and relationships to claim these rights. Especially second generation refugees moved to other places in Tanzania in search of work, marriage and education. While their home was still Ulyankulu, they developed a sense of belonging to their new place of residence as well.

6.3.2 *Hiding refugee status, Hutu ethnicity and Burundian nationality*

In order to be able to study outside of the settlement, go to the hospital, marry or work outside, many refugees were hiding their official refugee status. In other words, in order to claim *de facto* citizenship rights outside of the settlement (such as the right to work), refugees needed to hide their refugee status, Hutu ethnicity and Burundian nationality. As suggested in theory (see Chapter 2, Section 2.2.2), refugees indeed seek invisibility where they hide and obscure activities that the state prohibits. It is argued here that the act of claiming such rights is an important third dimension with which refugees assert their 'pragmatics of belonging'. Here concepts of language, ethnicity and documentation are

discussed. As could be seen above, especially for the second generation it has become rather natural to 'be Tanzanian', so for them to hide their official status was not difficult. However, the first generation also found ways to blend in.

Using language to assert claims to being Tanzanian

When moving in and out of the settlement, many refugees learned to behave like 'pragmatic chameleons' (cf. Malkki 1995a), adapting to their surroundings. This was possible since many were able to speak Swahili very well and oftentimes (at least) two other languages: for example Kirundi and Kinyamwezi. The medical attendant (see Sections 6.2.2, 6.3.1), explained:

> "My parents live close to the Sukumaland, so I learned it myself by talking
> to them. In church in Kashishi [next to Ulyankulu], we were praying and
> preaching in Kisukuma – even the bible was in Kisukuma" (S11).

The university graduate (see Section 6.2.2., 6.3.1), whom I met and interviewed several times in the course of the field work, clarified:

> "I feel like a refugee once I am here but when I moved out of here, for study
> or business reasons, I feel like a Tanzanian; I don't have a sign saying I am a
> refugee, I master Kiswahili better than the Tanzanians" (S4, in English).

First generation refugees, by contrast, did not necessarily speak Tanzanian ethnic languages:

> "I talk to different people [in my everyday life]. We talk to them. For example
> with the Sukuma but I don't talk Kisukuma. I still learn Kisukuma. We teach
> each other the language [Kisukuma/Kirundi]. I can greet and ask for water"
> (F9).

While the second generation spoke Swahili better, the first generation had better Kirundi language skills. A mother of nine children (see Section 4.3.3) explained that her children did not speak Kirundi very well:

> "[...] I can't be sad [about that]; we live here. It is not that I am teaching [the
> children] about culture in Burundi because I came here when I was two years

old, even I don't know. The children call their grandmother '*bibi*' and their sisters '*dada*'. The Burundian words they don't even know" (S2).

A 19-year old female VETA-student confirmed this: "We speak Kiswahili [at home]; Kirundi I only speak a little bit" (S13). Refugees have adapted to their surroundings in order to assert their sense of belonging to Tanzania in pragmatic ways. They needed to do this in order to become *de facto* citizens.

Claiming a Tanzanian ethnicity to hide being Hutu

Being accepted as a *de facto* Tanzanian citizen could be more difficult when a refugee did not speak a Tanzanian ethnic language. But even those refugees (especially the first generation) generally hid their status when outside the settlement or to strangers by saying that they are of the "Ha" ethnicity (singular Muha, plural Waha) from Kigoma speaking Kiha (as already noted for town refugees by Malkki, 1995). Kiha is close to Kirundi; the languages are not easily distinguishable from each other. Once a student told me that she was Ha but later her teacher revealed to me that she was born in Ulyankulu to Burundian parents.

A first generation refugee teacher (F10, see Section 6.2.1) explained how he hid his ethnicity in the past: "I was asked for my tribe but I cheated. I said I am a Pimbwe, the tribe of the prime minister. They live in Mpanda." Asked whether he speaks the language of the Pimbwe, he said: "No, but I speak Kinhangaza, Kiha, Kiruandese and Kirundi." Apparently, even those who did not speak another Tanzanian ethnic language (besides Kiha) preferred to say that they were of a certain Tanzanian ethnicity besides Ha – possibly because it was known that many Burundians disguised themselves as Ha or because there were not many speakers of a certain ethnicity who could reveal the truth.

Hiding one's ethnicity should not be necessary any more if citizenship was given to the refugees. While already feeling like Tanzanians, the refugees believed that their ethnicity would not change. As the VETA-teacher quoted above explained:

> "I am a Hutu – the original ethnicity cannot change but the nationality can change" (F10).

An 18-year old female secondary school student (second generation refugee) believed that the Hutu would be accepted as a new Tanzanian ethnicity once they were granted citizenship certificates.

> "Then I will belong to them; now it is not possible to say that you are Hutu because you will not get employed" (S15).

Another first generation refugee, a secondary school teacher (see Section 6.2.1), explained that his ethnicity would not change if he became a Tanzanian citizen.

> "You know tribes come from God; no one who can change a lizard to be a snake. Lizard, do you know a lizard? To be a snake. Or a snake to be a fish. [*He laughs*]. Tanzanian but originally he is what. [*He laughs*]" (F12).

From these observations one can note that refugees still felt like Hutu (or Tutsi), even if they already felt integrated in Tanzania, have travelled, have registered for citizenship and/or generally felt that they belonged to the country of Tanzania, rather than to Burundi. Both first and second generation respondents agreed that their ethnicity would not change once they would be Tanzanian citizens. One could deduce that in multi-ethnic Tanzania, integration does not depend on ethnicity – one can be integrated as a Tanzanian in cultural, political and economic ways even with a non-Tanzanian ethnicity. However, the strong belief in one's ethnicity without questioning reveals a certain ethnic essentialism. Furthermore, the fact that the naturalisation initiative was put on hold was in part based on a fear of the Hutu ethnicity being based on violent subjectivities (Das *et al.*, 2000). Indisputably the wars in Burundi and Rwanda depended on ethnic essentialism, which was fostered during colonial times (Mamdani, 2001).

Documentation to hide refugee status or Burundian nationality

This section analyses what kinds of documentation refugees used and how they employed it to hide their refugee status and Burundian nationality. This, in turn, was crucial in order to claim the right to work outside of the settlement, and to live as *de facto* citizens. Being able to claim these rights, was an important dimension of refugees' 'pragmatics of belonging'. In order to understand the usefulness of documentation in Tanzania, current use of documentation in the nation is discussed below. In general, documentation remains

limited as the majority still do not possess birth certificates and passports. However, for certain services it is necessary to possess such documents.

Documentation for Tanzanians

The first type of documentation serves to confirm civil status. This type is covered by the Births and Deaths Registration Ordinance (Cap. 108). However, registration of births and deaths is only compulsory if at least one parent is European, American or Asian, or a Somali (Rutinwa, 2005). The first document of identification in a person's life is the birth certificate (*cheti cha kuzaliwa*). However, not many people in Tanzania own one: "[...] Only 16 per cent of under five children are registered across the country; and [...] only 7.7 per cent have birth certificates" (Simbaya, 2013). The government now encourages people to register their children by reducing the cost – it will be free of charge for babies under 5 years and TZS 10,000[8] for older children; and by threatening not to issue any other certificates if one lacks a birth certificate (ibid.).

Other ways of identifying civil status include marriage certificates (*cheti cha ndoa*), which everyone obtains who gets married in a church, a mosque or through a government official, as well as death certificates. Besides, there are (unofficial) certificates of baptism (*cheti cha ubatizo*) through Christian churches, which may serve as identification for some purposes, as well as School Leaving Certificates of primary or secondary school (*cheti cha kumaliza shule ya msingi au sekondari*), which every graduate obtains.

The main document confirming legal status in Tanzania is the passport (*pasi*). However, only wealthier people possess passports because they cost and because a voting ID (see below) suffices as identification in most cases besides travelling abroad. Recently, through the reinvigoration and attempt at harmonisation of documentation within the East African Union, Tanzania has offered the option of a national ID card. The National Identification Authority (NIDA) collected biometric information of 2.6 million Dar es Salaam residents. It also issued the first ID cards to 46 government officials in February 2013 and to 220,000 civil servants and a few selected citizens later in 2013 (Mwachang'a, 2013).

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[8]TZS 10,000 equalled approx. GBP 4 (precisely 3.94 at an exchange rate of 0.0004 of 30 November, 2012).

Furthermore, many people use their voting ID card (*kitambulisho cha kupigia kura*) for identification. According to interviews conducted by The Guardian in Dar es Salaam, many citizens use their voting cards to secure credit facilities from financial institutions, open a bank account, register their property, enter into business agreements and conduct other activities, e.g. to pay school fees for relatives (Ochieng, 2010). Only 11% of Tanzanians (16% in urban areas and 4% in rural areas) own bank accounts according to a survey conducted in 2006 (FinScope, 2007). Since 2008, however, mobile banking has become increasingly popular[9]. A mobile banking account can be obtained by registering your SIM-card for mobile banking. Previously, it used to be possible to register without showing proof of identity. In 2013, however, the government announced that it was then necessary to register with an identity card, and that all unregistered cards would be discontinued to prevent misuse. Many people have, according to the government, used fake names to obtain SIM-cards (Semberya, 2013).

Documentation for refugees

When it comes to certificates of civil status, although a directive was issued to register and document all refugees in Tanzania, it was not implemented due to a shortage of registration clerks and funds (Rutinwa, 2005). The registration of marriages was voluntary. The Refugees Act, 1998 remains silent on the issue of civil registration altogether. Births were recorded by the hospitals where babies are born and also by the UNHCR field offices. Deaths occurring in hospitals were recorded by the government and UNHCR. However, many refugees did not report the deaths of their relatives. Not possessing a death certificate could cause problems for survivors wishing to claim their rights in both countries of asylum and in the country of origin (ibid.).

In Ulyankulu settlement, births and deaths were normally registered through the village leaders' administrations. Since registration for citizenship, all newborn babies were registered at the UN office in order to give them the possibility of naturalisation as well. While refugees did not own birth or death certificates, many did have marriage certifi-

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[9] M-pesa is a system of microfinance pioneered by Vodaphone (M-Pesa, in English: M-Money), but now also available from the firms Tigo (Tigo-Pesa) and Airtel (Airtel Money). It is used by many people (as of 2013 M-Pesa has more than 5 million subscribers, according to TeleGeography, 2 May 2013). It offers the option of transferring money and airtime (credit) through ordinary mobile phones. Shops offering to upload and withdraw money using this system are available everywhere in the country.

cates. Official marriage certificates were issued through churches as well as the mosque (see Plate 6.1).

Concerning documentation to confirm legal status, refugees did not possess any such documents. Furthermore, only refugees who came to the country on an individual basis obtained a document confirming their refugee status. Others had no means of confirming it. Officially, under the Tanzania Passports and Travel Documents Act, 2002, refugees were allowed to hold a Certificate of Identity or a Geneva Convention Travel Document in order to travel outside of Tanzania. This could be obtained by the Director of Refugee Services in Dar es Salaam.

Plate 6.1: Marriage Certificate issued in Ulyankulu
Source: Author (August 2012)

In contrast to Tanzanian citizens, officially refugees could not possess voting IDs, a Tanzanian passport or a national ID card. Whether refugees will be issued with the new Tanzanian national ID card will be seen in the future.

Despite the general lack of documentation, however, many refugees in Ulyankulu did possess mobile phones and therefore used mobile banking. SIM-card registration could be completed in Tabora town. Before 2013, this used to be possible without proof of identity. Now, however, the refugees would either have to stop using the service or use a fake proof of identity in order to obtain it. The mobile banking service of M-Pesa was offered by several shops in Ulyankulu.

Refugees who were married to Tanzanians were not entitled to citizenship. While foreigners married to Tanzanians were allowed to hold a dependant's pass enabling him/her to reside anywhere in the country, this right was not accorded to refugees (Rutinwa, 2005). However, children born out of such a union were officially entitled to hold citizenship of Tanzania (Citizenship Act, 1995).[10]

Given the dearth of documentation, some refugees were hiding their status and sought access to certain rights through fake documentation. An 18-year old tailoring student at VETA with a mother from Ulyankulu and a father from Kigoma said that she had travelled to different places in Tabora region, that she felt free and that she held a voting card. When asked where and how she got the card, she said:

> "[I got it] in Sikonge, last year. [...] I said that I am from Sikonge. My aunt married there; I went there to visit her" (S14).

As a child born to a Tanzanian and a refugee, she would have actually been entitled to citizenship and therefore also to hold a voter ID. However, this presupposes that she would make an individual official application for naturalisation by descent. Saying that she was from Sikonge was not a legal way of obtaining the voting ID. This case shows how easy it could be for refugees to obtain documentation simply by claiming that one was a descendant of a Tanzanian citizen.

The ease of hiding one's status and nationality could also be seen in the fact that many refugees changed their names over time. When refugees were registered to obtain a plot of land at the Settlement Commander's office in Ulyankulu in 1972-1973, their names were recorded in a book. When checking the names of the same individuals nowadays (first generation), one could notice that many used different names in their daily lives to those that were originally recorded. Furthermore, in this book of 1972-73, many of the recorded names were typical Muslim names. These refugees therefore probably used fake names from the beginning, since Burundians are mostly Christian.

Most refugees did not possess a Burundian passport. In a conversation with a doctor and a pastor (see Section 6.2.3), the doctor said: "I don't have a passport of Burundi" (S1), and the pastor added: "I think you are not allowed to have a passport" (F16). Finally, the

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[10]Citizenship Act, 1995, Part III, 9(2) Subject to the provisions of subsection (3), any person of full age and capacity born outside the United Republic whose father was at the time of the birth of that person a citizen by descent may, on making an application in that behalf to the Minister in the prescribed manner, be naturalised as a citizen of the United Republic.

first respondent concluded: "We are not allowed to get a passport to go outside of the country. We can go to Burundi but not for long" (S1). Both respondents thus believed that they were not allowed to have a passport. Their freedom of movement was not only restricted within the country of Tanzania, they also believed they could not travel to another country. This showed a clear lack of information because, as discussed above, travel documents could be obtained by refugees. Furthermore, travelling outside the country by refugees was possible: the elite of Burundian refugees fled in 1993 and settled in other countries, such as Belgium (Turner, 2010).

Some other refugees in certain positions in Tanzania obtained passports even after fleeing from Burundi. This option is called "repatriation without return" (Long, 2010: 22). One respondent, a religious leader, fled from Burundi to Tanzania (Ulyankulu) when he was a child and later moved outside of the settlement to open his own parish. In contrast to most respondents in the settlement, he said that he travelled to Burundi many times to see his relatives but also to go to church in the capital of Burundi, Bujumbura. Due to his profession and since he was travelling frequently, he was requested to have official documentation and thus decided to get a Burundian passport. With this passport, he needed a residence permit in Tanzania, which needs to be renewed every two years. However, when the opportunity of naturalisation arose, he applied for Tanzanian citizenship.

> "For us it is not difficult; it was requested by the bishop. I have a Class C permit for researchers and missionaries; I renew it here in Tabora every two years. We [Burundian refugees] try to become Tanzanians because we pay $500 [every two years] for the residence permit. That's why we applied for citizenship. Like this [as an individual migrant, not part of the refugee mass naturalisation], it is very difficult to become a Tanzanian citizen because you have to pay $5000 [for a passport]. We applied for citizenship because we are not going back to Burundi; I hope to be buried in Tanzania" (F17).

Considering this respondent, it can be inferred that refugees have only obtained a passport when it was necessary for their jobs. Interestingly, this refugee was able to shed his refugee status and become a legal documented resident outside the settlement. By contrast, refugees inside the settlement and many who moved outside of it illegally did not know of such options. Seeking any form of documentation was not facilitated or promoted. Of course, this respondent only had this option since he had the financial sup-

port to renew his residence permit every two years and because he needed the passport to travel both to Burundi and abroad.

In summary, refugees developed various pragmatic strategies in order to hide their refugee status, their ethnicity and their Burundian nationality. They used their language skills to be credible Tanzanians. Furthermore, their language skills helped them to credibly claim to be part of a Tanzanian ethnicity, since admitting to be 'Hutu' would be perceived equally to being Burundian refugee or migrant. Some refugees reinforced their claim to being Tanzanian by documentation, such as illegally obtained voting IDs. Hiding one's status was necessary in order to claim the right to work outside of the settlement and to become *de facto* citizens. A few individuals, who were in respected positions outside of the settlement, officially received Burundian passports and residence permits. Those who obtained Burundian passports were thus not hiding that they were Burundians but they legally shed the refugee status.

Reasons for hiding the refugee status

By hiding their refugee status when outside of the settlement, refugees reinforced their ability to claim *de facto* citizenship rights. They believed that they would have better employment chances or were able to get a government loan that way.

A first generation respondent explained that, in order to be eligible for a government loan to join a college or university, one needed to show the School Leaving Certificate. Since this certificate stated refugee children's nationality as 'Burundian' (see Plate 6.2), they were hiding their nationality: "That's trick in life. You are faking the certificate" (F17). While faking names and certificates is fairly common even amongst Tanzanians, their reasons are different. For example, Tanzanians sometimes conceal their clan names because it could reveal their ethnicity. In contrast to the situation of the refugees, for Tanzanians this only has informal or indirect implications: being of a certain Tanzanian ethnicity could not hinder one from obtaining a government loan, for example. A secondary school student linked the School Leaving Certificate directly to employment:

> "I would be happy [to receive citizenship]. When you finish Form 4, your certificate shows that you are a Burundian; if people see that you are a Hutu, they will not employ you outside of the settlement and if possible, they will send you back to the settlement" (S8).

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In that light, it is also problematic, that the census in August 2012 recorded all refugees as 'Burundians'. Independently of the School Leaving Certificate, the first respondent mentioned above explained that it was difficult to get permission to work outside of the settlement. However, hiding bore the risk of "getting into trouble" (e.g. being deported, arrested or sent back to the settlement). A first-generation refugee man with a shop in Kaswa, who also ran for elections to be the chairman of the village in late 2012, explained:

> "If I want to work outside [of the settlement], the process gets too long. It means you already got your birth certificate and other documents, so you try to be employed as a Tanzanian. But when you are hiding, if you get into trouble, you will not be free" (F18).

While these respondents aimed at getting employment or education through hiding or faking their identity, others did it in order not to be discriminated against. A female student of Kanindo Secondary School (second generation refugee) said that she had lived in Tabora before as a student. When asked how she felt when living there, she explained:

> "Sometimes the Tanzanians can detect that we came from the settlement; they can distinguish us. Sometimes they discriminate / separate us [*kutenganisha*]. [...] When we were there as a group of students, some people started asking us, 'What tribe are you?', and when she [a Tanzanian girl] knew she [a girl from Ulyankulu] belongs to Waha, they found people who speak Kiha so that they can listen to us. They ask us about our tribe – we feel disgust about these questions and we fear to sit with them and discuss, every day they asked. [...] At the time in Tabora, students [from my class] were following me home; they were asking me these questions... [...] Students were trying to separate us students from the settlement from them. Even the government is separating us, so that we cannot work outside of the settlement" (S15).

The university graduate (see Section 6.2.2) responded to the question of whether he told others that he was Burundian:

> "No, we fear humiliation. Only the top administration knows. 100% don't tell that they are refugees. We fear to be exposed. You need an identity card. Us students, we go illegally. Some students are sponsored by the government but the government doesn't know that they are refugees" (S4).

Plate 6.2: Secondary School Leaving Certificate
Source: Author (July 2012)

Considering the refugees' increasing mobility and their enhanced ability to hide themselves in various ways, it is not surprising any more that one respondent, the medical attendant quoted in Sections 6.2.2 and 6.3.1 above, did not want to apply for any of the

options of citizenship, resettlement or repatriation. He preferred to travel and to hide his refugee status:

> "Because young people like to travel [to different cities and do business etc.] so I didn't see the importance [of registering] because I realised that that they would see me in a computer. [...] I applied in the second round. They said that those who are in town and know they did not register should come to Ulyankulu to register. The commander of settlement announced as mass information in every village that they should come and register; otherwise he or she would be recognised as an illegal immigrant or refugee. They said people who didn't register will see fire [*utaona cha moto*]. In 2009, in the last process, I applied. Me and my young brother, we applied for citizenship. The UNHCR people said that we should come" (S11).

This kind of answer is reminiscent of the town refugees of Kigoma in Malkki's study who neither wanted to be refugees nor citizens but preferred to keep their options open (Malkki, 1995a: 164). In the case of the refugees of Ulyankulu settlement, however, most refugees, especially the second generation, felt that they belonged to Tanzania and applied for citizenship since going back to Burundi was not an option for them. The motive behind hiding their refugee status, Hutu ethnicity and Burundian nationality was that they were not allowed to be outside of the settlement, and not because they wanted to be outside of any categorisation.

In summary, even though there was always a risk of being caught, refugees were hiding their official status, ethnicity and nationality for various reasons. They aimed to obtain benefits from the government and they did not want to be discriminated against. Hiding their refugee status helped them to claim the rights necessary to become *de facto* citizens even outside of the settlement. Refugees have thereby asserted their 'pragmatics of belonging' in three dimensions. First, they have cooperated and integrated socially and economically with their Tanzanian hosts. Second, over time they have established a sense of home in the settlement and within the nation. Third, they have become mobile beyond the settlement within Tanzania, which was possible through their hiding strategies. However, they not only hid their nationalities to others – they sometimes also forgot about their refugee status themselves. Their 'pragmatics of belonging' reduced the uncertainty of living without an official status by informally becoming part of the Tanzanian nation.

6.4 Pragmatics of Waiting

While having been pragmatic in their sense of belonging, refugees have also developed a 'pragmatics of waiting.' This is a pragmatic way of dealing with the time they have been waiting for citizenship. This waiting time, as argued in Chapter 2, has been an effect of the temporal control exerted by the Tanzanian government over refugees, which is created by continuously adjourning its decisions on their *de jure* integration (also discussed in Chapter 5, Section 5.1.2). In the first section it is argued that the temporal control exerted has had adverse effects on refugees and local Tanzanians in the settlement. Second, the ways in which refugees and local Tanzanians have dealt with that control are discussed. It is reasoned that they have used their time pragmatically in two main future-oriented ways: a 'business-as-usual' approach and a more pre-emptive approach. Thirdly, it is argued that the pragmatics of waiting also has a spiritual dimension and has been supported by former government officials and religious leaders, who effectively bridged the gap between refugees and citizens.

6.4.1 *Hardships during the waiting time*

The temporal power exerted over refugees, i.e. the adjourning of decisions on the fate of the refugees in Ulyankulu, has had adverse effects on life in the settlement on the whole. Most refugees, such as the university graduate also quoted above, have faced hardships during the waiting time:

> "[...] In this waiting period, we divided the money: half is for the house, half for the business. Business has been slowing – for the whole of Ulyankulu. Others have been affected in agricultural matters. It was in 2011, there was a big hunger in Ulyankulu because people feared to move here, people did not cultivate here, they did not cultivate for example cassava and maybe rice – those food crops which take a long time. Now people have been educated; there was no implementation of things announced, people go on cultivating" (S4).

In fact, refugees were told not to grow long-term crops such as cassava anymore. Therefore, only dried cassava is sold on the market (in contrast to fresh cassava), which can be

stored for a long time (see Plate 7.3 below). Furthermore, since the government planned to close the settlement in 2006, roads have not been maintained; and one school was closed completely (Igombe Secondary School). In Ulyankulu Secondary School, the first grade (Form 1) has been overcrowded as a consequence. At Kanindo Secondary School, only one class remained open in 2012, with more than one hundred students. Refugee teachers did not have contracts any more, not even temporary ones like before. All community development programmes, which were promoted within the district by the district government, such as HIV/AIDS prevention and women's development schemes, were stopped in the settlement. Cultural activities, such as the agricultural fair normally held on the 8th of August, were discontinued as well. While these factors should have constituted strong push factors to leave the settlement, most refugees still saw the settlement as their home and as a safe place, and they were fighting for their right to stay, as argued below.

Plate 6.3: Effects of Control of Cassava Cultivation: Dried Cassava Sold on the Market
Source: Author (November 2012)

6.4.2   *Pragmatic waiting: Business as usual, resistance and preparations for the future*

As could be seen in Section 6.2, most refugees felt at home in Ulyankulu; they already felt like Tanzanians. Those for whom the citizenship certificate did not carry a direct practical meaning stayed with hope. These refugees dealt with tasks in their everyday lives in a pragmatic way and applied a business-as-usual approach. In other words, instead of

building up anxieties about their future, they employed a 'pragmatics of waiting': they filled the waiting time with their day-to-day activities despite the temporal control exerted. Two elderly first generation refugees said:

> "I feel safe; I know in the end of the days we will get them [the certificates]" (F6).

> "I have an expectation, faith and hope. I feel happy, good and stay happily while waiting for the government's decision" (F8).

Most refugees went on with their usual activities: they were studying, farming, and they were doing business within and outside of the settlement. One secondary school student explained that, while waiting for citizenship: "At the moment I am waiting for results from school. I am studying" (S9). An older respondent (first generation) said: "I am farming, I reap, I eat, I am just waiting. Maybe I will be given the certificate so I am staying with expectations" (F9). Their daily lives thus did not change while waiting for citizenship. While aiming to achieve their goals in life, they were largely unperturbed by the temporal control exerted.

These refugees formed a resistance against the relocation – refugees and Tanzanians have been fighting for a 'right to stay' in Ulyankulu, the right to go on with their lives 'as usual'. Tanzanians did not accept that the government wanted to send them out of the area as they believed they have a right to stay where they were since they were citizens. Both refugees and Tanzanians have taken part in building permanent houses in the settlement, which was forbidden by the government (see Annex 4; and Section 6.4.3 below). Some of them have resisted against the cuts of social services and have pressured the government to provide at least most basic services. The former ward representative of Kanindo explained:

> "Yes, you know there were no toilets at the market. The people have gone on strike and kept the taxes in order to pressure the government. So the government sped up the process of building the toilets. They are very new. [...] This year, they are building the house of a doctor and a theatre; that project comes from the MHA and the UNHCR. The toilet was the only project established since 2006 on part of the district council" (C3).

Furthermore, some refugees, who had repatriated to Burundi, came back to the settlement as their prospects were not satisfactory in Burundi (see also Section 5.1.3 above).

They had got into conflict with those who had occupied their land in Burundi in the meantime. Transgressing the prohibition to come back to the settlement after deciding for repatriation, they were therefore also fighting for their 'right to stay'.

Other refugees have employed a second type of pragmatism during the time of waiting by individually preparing for the future. When the settlement would be closed, they wanted to have a place to live. One respondent (also quoted above) revealed that his family had planned to build a house outside of the settlement:

> "The plan of my Mum is to [...] find a house where we can move; we will move to the prepared area. That is the plan" (S4).

Another respondent mentioned that some families had already moved to another region in order to avoid being forced to move. They neither got the cash grant nor the citizenship certificates that were envisaged for those who relocated. As the medical attendant (also quoted above) explained:

> "Some people already moved to Kigoma, Mwanza and Morogoro. About six families I know who moved to Morogoro last year or the year before, they wanted to get money to move from UNHCR but they didn't get it. They also didn't get the citizenship certificate. [...] Some even just started when they got to Morogoro. They wanted to move soon without waiting until the government would force them. Some [destroyed their houses here in Ulyankulu] and some didn't – they sold their houses to other people – Warundi and Wasukuma also" (S11).

However, not all were able to prepare for the closure of the settlement while waiting, even if they wanted to. An elderly first-generation refugee mentioned:

> "I will not be able to build a house somewhere else. I have problems with my legs so I have no thoughts of moving; I will not be able to build a house somewhere else; I am just waiting" (F7).

The afore-mentioned future-oriented refugees did not resist government policies completely but tried to condition their outcome in their favour. This constituted indeed a different instrumental way of dealing with the waiting time. These refugees aimed to improve the final outcome of government's decisions on the adjourned policies. For example, they collectively organised writing an official letter to the government, in which

they stated their discontent with the conditions of the relocation. Instead of demanding for the policy to be reversed in total, they complained about the limited financial assistance promised to them and asked for more support.

Both types of refugees described above did not become apathetic subjects to the temporal control exerted by the government. The latter have actively engaged with the policies at hand and opposed certain aspects. In general, refugees in Ulyankulu have thus been pragmatic in their waiting time in various ways. Most of them, first of all, employed a business-as-usual approach and were thus not perturbed by the temporal control exerted. Some of these refugees resisted the government's plans collectively or individually especially in order to gain a 'right to stay' in the settlement. The ricochet migrants, who returned from Burundi after a failed reintegration there, also resisted the government's plans. Next to asking for basic social services, a general way of resisting the closure of the settlement and thereby to bridge the waiting time was by engaging in constructing permanent buildings of the type that was forbidden in the settlement (see Plates 6.4 and 6.5). Other refugees, however, who had the means to do this, actively prepared for the future and thus pragmatically dealt with the waiting time, e.g. by building permanent houses outside of the settlement. These refugees did not resist the government's plans entirely but rather aimed to use the waiting time to condition the outcome of its policies, for example by asking for adequate compensation for the dislocation from their homes. Depending on the their means and goals in life, refugees thus pragmatically used the waiting time to either resist or pre-empt the government's plans, or to advance their general goals in life without paying attention to the temporal control exerted by making them wait for naturalisation.

Plate 6.4: Making Bricks for the Construction of Houses
Source: Author (June 2012)

Plate 6.5: A 'Permanent' House Built in 2011, Kaswa, Ulyankulu
Source: Author (November 2012)

6.4.3   *Waiting with a mission*

While refugees went on with their daily activities in a 'business-as-usual' approach or prepared for a life outside of the settlement, one could observe that both refugees and local Tanzanians also still invested in projects within the settlement. This can be seen as a way to resist the closure of the settlement, as already argued above. Next to other

buildings such as hostels and small restaurants (see Plate 6.7), it was striking how many churches were built in recent years. The churches Tanzania Assemblies of God (TAG) was built in 2007, The Living Gospel World Mission Church was been built in 2009, the World Missionary Fellowship of the Church of God of Tanzania was built in 2011, and the SOWER International Church was started in 2012. Furthermore, the Pentecostal Church (see Plate 6.6), the Lutheran Church, the Anglican Church, the Calvary Church and others were in the process of extending their premises. While refugees and Tanzanians have been constrained from building houses of permanent materials, this restriction did not seem to apply to most churches. As an elder of the Anglican Church, a Tanzanian and former government official, said: "The government cannot restrict us to build a church; it serves moral and spiritual development" (C11). Religious activities formed an important part in most refugees' lives. Building churches and other permanent houses has become a shared goal of refugees and Tanzanians and a means of resistance against the rules of the 'space of control'. This resistance, however, was only possible since the government could not prevent it or because individual government officials agreed to it, for example in exchange for personal favours (as also argued in Section 5.3.2). Refugees, local Tanzanians and some government officials have therefore engaged in a form of conviviality, to the benefit of all.

Plate 6.6: Construction of a New Pentecostal Church in Ulyankulu Settlement
Source: Author (November 2012)

The pragmatic way of resisting against central government's policies during the waiting time, however, has had more than a material dimension. In the absence of a strong gov-

Plate 6.7: Construction of a New Hostel in Ulyankulu Settlement
Source: Author (November 2012)

ernment presence, religious leaders, who were generally highly regarded by the refugee community and of whom some used to be ward representatives, have attempted to fill the void. In 2007, after the local government services were stopped, the mosque, the Catholic Church and the Pentecostal Church therefore formed a religious union. The former ward representative of Kaswa, now acting as the Imam of the mosque in Ulyankulu, said:

> "Well, after stopping to be a *diwani*, we faced many problems, such as lack of government support. We thought, how can we solve this problem? We thought it is better to have a union to speak in one voice" (C4).

This is remarkable not only since it bridged the divide between religions and different denominations but also because it bridged divides between Tanzanians and refugees. While the Pentecostal Church was led by refugees, the Catholic Church and the mosque had Tanzanian leaders. As the Imam explained:

> "I have already attended many celebrations at the churches and have invited people from different faiths here" (C4).

Overall, faith enjoyed increased importance in this protracted refugee situation. In fact, one second-generation refugee, a tailor and pastor (also quoted in Section 6.2.2), mentioned that he related the presence of Burundian refugees in Tanzania to a mission to preach the Gospel:

"[...] Because we serve God who created heaven and earth we know that during this time we are given by Tanzania we should work on the Gospel so that it is easier to go to Mwanza to preach and to open churches so that we plant the belief of God because [it was prophesised] that to preach the news of the Gospel was God's reason to take us from Burundi to come to Tanzania. So [we were dispersed] to make it easier now for us to preach here and there. But through our [...] prophecy [*kwa kiunabii*], the time will come where some will depart albeit some will remain. But there might be some who will go to Burundi even if we get citizenship. Because one man went to Burundi, a prophet, who told them: who is ready to go to preach in Tanzania? There were pastors and servants of God and not one was ready. Then he said, because you've refused to go voluntarily I will send you there, so this is the point at which war ensued to disperse us here and there to preach the Gospel" (S6).

He thus reinterpreted history: refugees were not in Tanzania because they were forced to flee from conflict but rather to preach the Gospel. In his opinion, the relocation to other regions thus also served the purpose of preaching the word of God.

Since religious life was of high importance in the settlement, the religious union could be seen as a crucial symbol for an extended 'conviviality' between all inhabitants of the settlement, including refugees and Tanzanians of various religions and denominations, and even former government employees. They all resisted the central government's policy of closing the settlement and they did their best to maintain social services and fight for a 'right to stay'.

In summary, the waiting experience was multi-faceted. The main effect of the temporal control over refugees was the slow dismantling of social services and local government's practices to the detriment of all. However, refugees dealt with the waiting time in different pragmatic ways. Some refugees were going on with their daily activities in a 'business-as-usual' approach while maintaining hope and the expectation that they would eventually gain citizenship. Others have been resisting elements of the central governments' policies. This could also be seen as a pragmatic way of dealing with the time of waiting – an instrumental way that aimed to improve the outcome of government's decisions while waiting. Some dealt with the waiting time by using their agency to build houses outside of the settlement. By this, they aimed to pre-empt the implementation of the government's formerly proposed plans.

The most visible form of resistance was the building of churches and other permanent buildings. This served to oppose, on the one hand, the imminent closure of the settlement fighting for a 'right to stay', and, on the other hand, the provisions of control in the settlement, a common goal by refugees and Tanzanians. It is argued that some government officials and refugees have developed a degree of conviviality, which made these developments possible. An extended sense of conviviality could also be detected in the fact that refugees and Tanzanians have worked together in order to fill the void of governmental services provided. For this purpose, a religious union was formed. It bridged the gap between three religions/denominations in the settlement but also between refugees and citizens. Again, instead of building up anxieties about the ultimate government's decisions, refugees and Tanzanians cooperated in a pragmatic way in order to use their time productively, to reinforce their sense of belonging, and to improve life in the settlement.

6.5 Conclusion

This chapter demonstrated how refugees employed a 'pragmatics of belonging' and a 'pragmatics of waiting' in Ulyankulu settlement. The first section showed, first, a relational dimension of creating a pragmatic sense of belonging. Despite the spatial and legal separation between refugees and citizens, an integration process was going on between refugees and local Tanzanians. While evading government control, refugees interacted with Tanzanians in various ways: through cooperation in their daily lives, through trade, and through intermarriage.

A second dimension of the 'pragmatics of belonging' was a sense of feeling at home in the settlement and the Tanzanian nation, which refugees developed over time. The first generation had a more localised sense of belonging, for example due to loss of mobility, but both the first and second generation felt at home in the Tanzanian nation. Despite lacking *de jure* citizenship rights, most refugees already felt like Tanzanians. However, some still felt uncertainty about their belonging to Tanzania, due to the lack of formal recognition by the state, or because of a lack of recognition by other refugees within the settlement. For only a few, such as those working for the government, the citizenship certificate would be of actual practical importance. First generation refugees had long got used to the traditions and (agri-)culture in their environments. Harbouring negative memories of Burundi, they did not want to go back and did not maintain a diasporic

"homing desire" (Brah, 1996). The fact that deceased refugees were buried in Ulyankulu may have supported their feeling of belonging to the place. Second generation refugees denied any connection to Burundi.

A third dimension of the 'pragmatics of belonging' implied the claiming of *de facto* citizenship in Tanzania. Most refugees found ways to live similarly to citizens by circumventing the government's rules. Refugees moved outside of the settlement temporarily as well as permanently. While outside of the settlement, they hid their refugee status, their ethnicity and their Burundian nationality for employment reasons and in order not to be discriminated against. For some first and many second generation refugees hiding their status was an easy task since they spoke Tanzanian ethnic languages fluently and knew how to obtain Tanzanian identity documents. When outside of the settlement, they did not only 'hide' being refugees, they also felt more like citizens and less like refugees themselves. Not being labelled 'refugees' thus had consequences for their sense of belonging. In the absence of citizenship rights, both first and second generation refugees resorted to a 'pragmatics of belonging' through their own agency in order to feel at home and like citizens.

Refugees were not only pragmatic about their sense of belonging; they also dealt with the waiting time in pragmatic ways. Although they were enduring hardships, they went on with their daily activities with a business-as-usual approach and some, who had the means, engaged in future-thinking by preparing for the formerly proposed relocation to other regions. Those who wanted to continue with their lives as usual resisted the formerly planned relocation. The most visible signs of this were the many new permanent buildings in the settlement – constructing this type of building was officially not allowed. Constructing such buildings could be seen as a way of fighting for the 'right to stay' in the settlement. This was only possible because individual government officers did not entirely oppose it. As argued in Chapter 5, a degree of conviviality was attained between government officers and the inhabitants of Ulyankulu. Other refugees used the waiting time by pre-empting the government's plans. They tried to improve the outcome of the ultimate decisions of the government. In the absence of important government services, religion and faith played an enhanced role. By forming a religious union, Burundians and Tanzanians bridged gaps between and beyond denominations in order to live in conviviality in an extended sense.

The settlement became the 'home' of the refugees, within and beyond which they have used their agency in order to live the lives they wanted to live. This agency was employed in overt and hidden ways. Sometimes, the hidden way of transgressing governmental provisions was paradoxically used to take part in state institutions. The extent of integration achieved by the refugees, however, triggered new security concerns by the government and was thus perpetuating a complex interplay of control and agency. The camp, instead of only being a 'space of control', was reinterpreted as a 'space of agency', a space where time was used creatively and belonging was created and lived actively by refugees and local Tanzanians.

CONCLUSION

"[...] Inasmuch as the refugee unhinges the old trinity of state/nation/territory – this apparently marginal figure deserves rather to be considered the central figure of our political history."
— Agamben, 1995

7.1   Empirical and Theoretical Contributions

7.1.1   *Findings and empirical contributions*

This thesis investigated how Burundian refugees' developed a 'pragmatics of belonging', *de facto* citizenship and a 'pragmatics of waiting' during a time of heightened uncertainty in the protracted refugee situation of Ulyankulu settlement. This pragmatics enfolded in interplay between control and agency. The aim of this examination was to find out about the perspectives of different actors concerning belonging and citizenship, and to understand the possible points of contention but also convergence that arose amongst and between them. This analysis also shed light on the creation and effects of refugee policies – which were in tension between control and the agency of local actors.

The findings of this thesis were presented in three chapters. Chapter 4 examined in depth how Ulyankulu settlement was governed since its creation in 1972, how its economy developed and what the refugees' role was therein. This chapter also traced the evolution of refugee policy in Tanzania over time since the country's independence in 1964. Chapter 5 further explored some of the issues raised in the previous chapter. In order to govern the settlement, which forms of control were exerted through refugee policies, how were these enacted on the ground and how were they contextualised by narratives. Chapter 6 ultimately allowed a change of perspective and got to the crux of the argument: how did

refugees experience the situation, to what extent did they develop a sense of belonging in the host country and what were their ideas about their citizenship?

Using literature, interviews and other material from the field, Chapter 5 showed that on the local level the development of the settlement underwent four phases of governance considering both the time before and after the refugees arrived. An analysis of these phases is significant in order to understand how the relationship between refugees, local Tanzanians, international organisations and the government evolved over time. The changes that the settlement experienced in the past four decades were indeed not only drastic but also significant in order to contextualise and comprehend today's situation of this protracted case. Three main arguments were made in this chapter: first, current policies aiming at controlling refugees go back to colonial times. Second, refugees have reached the state of *de facto* citizens within the confines of Ulyankulu settlement in a second phase of governance, which started in 1985. Third, due to their historical connections to the land, Tanzanians have continuously moved to the settlement. This was an important prerequisite for the refugees' on-going local integration.

While analysing secondary historical material, this thesis made, first, an empirical contribution by linking today's discourses to a longer trajectory. It was therefore shown how Ulyankulu was governed before the refugees arrived in Phase 0. A discussion of this early stage is important since the refugee policies proposed by the Tanzanian government in recent years, such as the relocation, can in fact be traced back to measures of environmental damage and population control implemented in colonial times. To reiterate what happened during this Phase, the area of Ulyankulu was first ruled by the Nyamwezi Chief Mirambo in the end of the 19$^{\text{th}}$ century and then vacated during British colonialism in the 20$^{\text{th}}$ century due to infestation with tse-tse flies. The analysis of this stage is also essential since it links the presence of Tanzanians in the settlement today to their own history in Ulyankulu. The presence of these Tanzanians in the settlement was observed during fieldwork and is officially not recognised. Being extremely sparsely populated, it was decided to use the area of Ulyankulu as a refugee settlement in 1972, after the UN reduced the tse-tse fly population by aerial spraying.

Since the arrival of refugees in 1972, three main phases of governance can be characterised. An exploration of secondary material and interviews concerning Phase 1 showed various incipient control measures over the environment and the refugee population since the opening of the settlement. During this set-up phase, the settlement was strongly sup-

ported and supervised by international agencies and the Tanzanian central government. A grid-like road structure was built to accommodate the new arrivals and to create a basic 'legibility' of the space. Criteria for land allocation to refugees depended on place of origin in Burundi, in part for security reasons. To counter the effect of floods, a part of the refugees were resettled in 1978 in a new settlement, Mishamo (Rukwa region).

Another empirical contribution from this chapter was made by the analysis that the settlement moved towards a less controlled space in Phase 2. This phase started in 1985, when refugees became self-reliant. Local government structures were created, which resembled the Tanzanian administrative system. Relating refugees' behaviour to national policies, such as that of 'self-help', showed that refugees were treated like citizens during this time within the settlement. This is despite the fact that Tanzanian policies became more restrictive during that time especially in terms of freedom of movement. Refugees participated in improving social services and they were integrated in the local and the international economy. Ulyankulu became a regional hub in economic terms and refugees contributed substantially to food security in the region. The Tanzanian government received taxes from the refugees. Local Tanzanians started to claim back their 'right to stay' in Ulyankulu due to their historical attachment to the land. The economic and social integration that refugees reached during that period, partially reached by refugees' own agency and encouraged by Tanzanians who moved to the settlement, started to blur the separation between refugees and citizens and contributed to their cooperation. Refugees' citizenship aspirations and their current feelings of belonging need to be gauged against this historical backdrop; i.e. their continuing and increasing integration over time. Photographs taken during the time of fieldwork aimed to underline the arguments made in this part.

Only in 2007, did a major shift occur when the Tanzanian government started to enforce the idea to 'end the refugee chapter' in Ulyankulu. In this third phase, refugees in Ulyankulu settlement were supposed to repatriate or relocate to other parts of Tanzania and be naturalised. This initiative also marked the start of non-maintenance of the camp as local government structures were dismantled and the settlement was to be closed. International organisations were called back to the settlement but their role was limited to monitor the processes of repatriation, relocation and naturalisation. During this stage, the settlement population was administratively invisibilised. Analysing this administrative invisibilisation of the settlement is an important empirical contribution

as it is a novel observation, which has not been mentioned elsewhere. It was a controversial topic at the time of field work and threatened to have disadvantageous effects on the refugee population. Lacking representation, local Tanzanians then felt ignored and invisibilised, whereas refugees and Tanzanians alike were not able to access development services through the local government structure anymore. Instead of creating a new district called Ulyankulu, as it was previously planned, Ulyankulu became part of Kaliua District, whose capital is located further away from the settlement than the former district capital of Urambo. However, the overall policy was still in the context of population control (through the formerly proposed organised process of relocation and local integration) rather than abandonment.

One could say that the degree of control in the settlement space varied over time. Especially during the second phase, it most closely resembled a rural Tanzanian space, and control related mainly to movements inside and outside of the settlement. During the third phase, by closing the settlement, the space was supposed to be dissolved altogether. However, the idea of closing it was not implemented due to resistance from various sides, including refugees.

Furthermore, this chapter showed that Tanzania experienced an important shift from an 'open door' policy under President Nyerere in the 1960s and 1970s towards a more restrictive one in the 1980s and 1990s as enshrined in the Refugees Act, 1998 and the National Refugee Policy 2003. This shift occurred as a result of the changing domestic economic and political environment, as well as of the mass influx of refugees from the genocide in Rwanda and ethnic strife in Burundi in the 1990s and subsequent problems with these new arrivals. During the first multi-party elections in 1995, anti-refugee rhetoric was spread and refugees were increasingly seen as a security threat instead of as welcomed guests. This shift also signified an increasingly restrictive interpretation of Tanzanian nationalism, which conceptualised ethnic groups from outside of Tanzania as a threat.

The empirical contributions of Chapter 5 relate to the findings concerning the types, reasons and effects of government control over refugees in the settlement, but also to the tensions that existed locally between processes of exclusion and belonging.

A controlled space that segregated refugees and citizens served to exclude refugees from citizenship rights. Exceptional legal provisions ensured that refugees did not enjoy the same rights as Tanzanian citizens: they could not make use of freedom of movement

within the country, they were not allowed to work outside of the settlement or to vote in Tanzanian elections. How were these provisions enacted locally? Empirical material gained through participant observation at an event I attended turned out to be symbolic of the protracted situation in Ulyankulu. It revealed a central tension between exclusion and belonging – on the one hand, the event demonstrated a separation between refugees and Tanzanians and unequal power relations enforced by governmental and international actors, and it invoked a sense of suspension of time and waiting through a restriction of information. Paradoxically, on the other hand, performances that the refugees had learned in school also showed the refugees' belonging to the Tanzanian nation. Furthermore, interviews revealed that military control enforced a 'space of control' through sporadic acts of repression. These acts of repression occurred at various times during the settlement's history. They served to create an artificial separation between refugees and Tanzanian citizens, which was enshrined in refugee policies. This is an important empirical contribution as it shows that control was directed towards both Tanzanians and refugees (see discussion of Sukuma invasion in 2010 and *ricochet* refugees in 2012).

The main reason cited by various government actors for the control exerted over the space of the settlement was national security. All government actors conjured up the mantra of security in order to defend their relative stances on current refugee policies. Interviews suggest that the government feared losing control over the situation. This fear implied being alarmed about the refugees posing a threat to security, for by allegedly carrying weapons. But it also implied fear of impurity of the nation, i.e. the fear that refugees would become indistinguishable from Tanzanian citizens. The fear of losing control over the refugees' bodies is linked to a fear of the Hutu's 'violent subjectivities'. This fear persisted even though numbers of crimes in Ulyankulu were not any higher than outside of the settlement. Eventually, the central government shifted from a concern with purity to preferring to invisibilise the settlement. Therefore, the government proposed to relocate refugees in a controlled way to other regions. Security concerns were also a key driver for proposing the relocation of refugees – in order to prevent a 'Burundian enclave'. However, regional governments did not agree with this policy and it was therefore put on hold in 2011.

Another empirical contribution is the finding that some local government officials became so embedded in the everyday life in the settlement that they developed a degree of conviviality with the refugees. Control was exerted with some discretion by some

government officers, who varied the extent to which they implemented the government's rules. Since these officials considered the settlement as their home, the discretion they employed in implementing the government's rules is attributable to more than a mere lack of resources or corruption. They were interested in staying in Ulyankulu themselves and cooperated with refugees. While allegedly accepting personal favours for their discretions, they allowed the segregation between refugees and citizens, between settlement space and surroundings, to weaken.

Chapter 6 made several empirical contributions about the way refugees have developed a sense of belonging to the local area and the Tanzanian nation, how they were claiming *de facto* citizenship rights on a day-to-day basis, and how they dealt with the time of uncertainty. I argued that refugees, despite living in a settlement and being officially excluded from citizenship, developed a 'pragmatics of belonging', which includes a dimension of integration with Tanzanians, a dimension of feeling at home (in the settlement area and in the nation more generally) and the dimension of being able to claim *de facto* citizenship rights outside of the settlement.

The empirical findings showed that refugees and Tanzanians were closely integrated with each other; they were cooperating, trading and intermarrying. Their mutual recognition helped the refugees to gain a relational pragmatic sense of belonging to the local area of Ulyankulu but also to the Tanzanian nation. Refugees moved outside of the settlement despite the government's provisions. Local Tanzanians also moved inside of the settlement, cooperated and traded and intermarried with the refugees. This is an important empirical contribution since it supports the argument that they should not be considered as refugees any more but in fact, as citizens.

Interviews also show that by living in Ulyankulu for a long time, refugees have gained a sense of familiarity, which created a feeling of home. Most first and second generation refugees felt Tanzanian and not like refugees. Refugees did not long for living in Burundi; on the contrary second generation refugees had never been there nor had an interest in going there; and the memories of first generation refugees forbade them to speak about the country in positive terms. This, again, is an essential empirical contribution since it supports the claim that refugees have developed a pragmatic sense of belonging to Tanzania, which is irreversible.

Another significant contribution was made by showing how refugees moved outside of the settlement and claimed *de facto* citizenship rights there, which were normally re-

stricted to *de jure* citizens. These rights included the right to vote, to work and to receive government loans. As mentioned in Chapter 4, within the settlement area, refugees were mostly already treated like citizens: they were educated by the Tanzanian government according to the Tanzanian curriculum and they were taxed like other Tanzanian citizens. Outside of the settlement, refugees had to resort to hiding their refugee status, ethnicity and nationality by acting and speaking like Tanzanians. They adopted various Tanzanian ethnicities on an individual basis since the Hutu were not accepted as a Tanzanian ethnic group. These hiding strategies allowed them to claim the aforementioned *de facto* citizenship rights. Some refugees explicitly stated that they were conscious of what citizenship means in terms of 'rights'. Again, these findings support the argument that refugees developed a 'pragmatics of belonging' and that it was only the formal status that they were lacking in order to become citizens. Despite exceptional legal provisions, temporal control and acts of repression, the refugee settlement, as a space, was in reality breaking down due to inside and outside processes; and the demarcation between Tanzanians and refugees has ceased to exist.

Finally, an empirical contribution is made by analysing how refugees dealt with the temporal suspension of time created by the government by using their time productively and instrumentally in a 'pragmatics of waiting'. Some engaged in a business-as-usual approach, while others individually pre-empted the government's policy of relocation and prepared for the future by, for example, building houses outside of the settlement. However, instead of giving in to the central government's demands of closing the settlement, many refugees and local Tanzanians were building houses, hostels and churches in the settlement and thereby resisted the plan of closing the settlement and relocation collectively. This was possible due to a degree of conviviality, i.e. an exchange of favours in a shared space, between the refugees, local Tanzanians and local government officials. Refugees were not interested in openly revolting against the (central) government as they have long worked on gaining a 'right to stay'. The government, on the other hand, lacked the resources to control the refugees in an all-encompassing way and local officials also benefited from such cooperation on an individual basis.

7.1.2 *Contributions to conceptions of belonging and citizenship*

This thesis aims to make a contribution to understanding the ways refugees can develop a sense of belonging to the host state over time in a protracted refugee situation and the process of becoming *de facto* citizens under circumstances of control in the space of a refugee settlement.

The central premise of this investigation is that refugees lack *de jure* citizenship and initially upon arrival also lack any form of *de facto* citizenship. Refugees, as discussed in Chapter 2 and Chapter 5, are indeed excluded from citizenship by international statutes and national policies. Following the definition of citizenship by Marshall 1983 [1950], this is because they have neither the rights nor duties that would allow them to be full members of the host nation. Even when seeing citizenship as a 'set of practices associated with participation in politics' as Aristotle formulated it, refugees in settlements are hindered from enacting such practices by the remote spatiality of such settlements, rules that apply within these spaces and the restrictions on freedom of movement outside of such settlements. Migrants, it was maintained, are seen as a threat to the nation-building process within a framework that is methodologically nationalist (cf. Glick-Schiller, 2002). The problem for migrants and refugees is that citizenship is contingent on belonging to the nation, which, in Tanzania also includes belonging to certain ethnic groups within the nation. Citizenship becomes conflated with nationality as well as ethnic notions of belonging.

Theoretical insights into exclusion from citizenship should be complemented and expanded by the empirical findings in Chapter 4 and 5 (see also Section 7.1.1). The Tanzanian state feared impurity of the nation and therefore separated refugees from citizens. However, empirical findings also showed that these exclusionary notions of citizenship enshrined in refugee policies were in tension with other local processes in Ulyankulu. While the government separated refugees and Tanzanians via various methods in their everyday lives, it also collaborated in turning them into citizens via schooling and taxing them (cf. Gellner, 1983). Furthermore, some government officials lived in the settlement for extended periods of time, which allowed them to develop a degree of conviviality (Nyamnjoh, 2007) with the refugees. At the discretion of some government officers, similar to Lipsky's (1980) street-level bureaucrats, certain rules weakened in the settlement. Another tension was that while the government's aim was to control refugees, sometimes

this goal led to controlling its own citizens as well – such as when sending the Sukuma invaders out of the settlement by military force in 2010.

Invisibility, it was argued, can function as a control measure to exclude refugees from citizenship. However, processes of visibility and invisibility can be continuously in tension. As shown in Chapter 2, settlements can in fact have enhanced visibility, which increases the likelihood of receiving international aid (cf. Kaiser, 2006: 598). As the case of Ulyankulu shows, the naturalisation initiative served to renew visibility of this group of refugees in the light of the international community, so that foreign funds would support the naturalisation and relocation of refugees, as well as the development of the receiving regions. This initiative occurred after refugees had already obtained self-reliance for 22 years since 1985 and had thus not been a priority group to the international community. In 2011, the entire initiative was put on hold, mainly due to tensions between the regional and central governments of Tanzania. Since the settlement was supposed to be closed, it was administratively invisibilised in 2012, when the district capital became Kaliua instead of Ulyankulu. Although it was not completely abandoned (the MHA, UNHCR and TCRS had a renewed presence in the settlement), essential services were withdrawn. While this invisibilisation had unfavourable consequences on the refugees, they were at the same time seeking invisibility themselves by hiding activities that the state prohibited. While working outside of the settlement, for example, invisibility was used as a shield since they lacked legal protection (cf. Polzer and Hammond, 2008). As Polzer and Hammond (2008) point out, however, refugees can also subvert or resist their invisibility. The development of a 'pragmatics of belonging' and a 'pragmatics of waiting' (see below) is indeed a way for refugees to seek visibility in the eyes of the nation state and its citizens. Although refugees in Ulyankulu had to hide to claim citizenship rights, their ultimate aim was to become *de jure* citizens themselves in the future instead of remaining liminal, invisible beings. Theoretically, this analysis adds to the understanding of acts of visibilisation and invisibilisation as multi-faceted phenomena, which can be carried out by various actors simultaneously at the international, national and individual level.

Refugees themselves have developed a sense of belonging and have engaged in what I call the 'pragmatics of belonging'. As elaborated above, in Ulyankulu settlement, they have cooperated with fellow citizens and gained a degree of trust (Calhoun, 2003). Speaking with Tanzanians and being educated in Tanzanian schools has enabled refugees to feel Tanzanian. Thereby they gained a first, relational, dimension of the 'pragmatics of be-

longing'. Thus, local Tanzanian citizens played their role in turning refugees into citizens as they recognised them as belonging to their country (cf. Sassen, 2003) – they cooperated, traded and intermarried. They have also gained a sense of home, of familiarity, over time – a second dimension of the 'pragmatics of belonging'. This sense has come about by engaging in day-to-day activities of the camp, including cultivation, trading, child rearing and burial. Burial was found to be particularly important in African contexts (Geschiere, 2000). The camp has become a safe haven (Duyvendak, 2011) in contrast to the insecurity experienced (by the first generation) in Burundi. The dimension of the 'pragmatics of belonging', which explains the emerging sense of home in the settlement, closely resembles the process of 'emplacement', which was explained in relation to returnee refugees in Ethiopia (Hammond, 2004).

They thereby gained a feeling of belonging to the Tanzanian nation which helped especially the second generation to claim *de facto* citizenship rights on an individual basis when outside of the settlement, which is the third dimension of the 'pragmatics of belonging'. These rights were normally reserved to *de jure* citizens, such as the right to vote and to work outside of the settlement. As mentioned above, they were able to claim these rights by hiding their refugee status, Hutu ethnicity and Burundian nationality. By this behaviour, in contrast to urban and town refugees elsewhere (Malkki, 1995a; Sommers, 2000), refugees in Ulyankulu aimed to become *de jure* citizens in the future instead of remaining liminal beings or refugees. By acting in these ways, they have also renegotiated the 'space of control' into a 'space of agency'. However, it could be seen that the mechanism of refugees' 'citizenship self-making' intersected with the mechanism of 'being made' (Ong, 1996). As mentioned above, within the area of Ulyankulu settlement, refugees were being made citizens in part through the government, which offered schooling and demanded taxes from the refugees just as from *de jure* Tanzanian citizens. Theoretically, the understanding of citizenship in this thesis supports seeing citizenship as both a process (Sassen, 2003), implying different actors, and a legal status (Marshall, 1983 [1950]), and applies this to the case of refugees in rural refugee settlements. It was shown that this understanding is shared by both refugees and the government.

This understanding of belonging is theoretically novel since it does not hinge on an understanding of refugees as aiming to return 'home', such as a (refugee) diaspora (Van Hear, 2006) that longs for their home country, city or village (Brah, 1996; Mercer et al., 2008; Cohen 2008). It also does not refer to a group which is in continuous preparation

for repatriation (e.g. Palestinians in Lebanon; Sanyal, 2011), or which is hyperpoliticised due to internal factions and close relations to the political field of the country of origin (Turner, 2010). It neither supports the idea of a group which forms its own nation in exile in an ethnic quest for purity (Malkki, 1995a) or the alternative viewpoint of what Malkki (ibid.: 153) termed the "pragmatics of identity", i.e. urban refugees that refused to be categorised, an idea which possibly also finds application in the instance of urban refugees living in fear of being detected (Sommers, 2000).

The 'pragmatics of belonging' instead defines the instrumental process of individuals' sense of belonging in the relational space of the camp, who are future-oriented and therefore want to stay in the host state for pragmatic reasons (cf. Dewey, 1929). They thereby defy the adverse circumstance of living in a camp without citizenship in a quest for familiarity and security and achieve a way of living similar to citizens. Analysing this situation also counteracts the invisibility of successful cases of (*de facto*) integration (Polzer, 2008).

The structure of the camp thus on the one hand aims to prevent refugees from becoming citizens by creating a separation between them and local Tanzanians. On the other hand, however, it forms citizens by educating and taxing refugees and by allowing them to feel 'at home'. Through their agency, refugees can reinforce their citizenship claims both inside and outside of the settlement. While the claiming of political and civil rights happens on an individual basis, a sense of belonging to the camp and to Tanzania is a collective phenomenon in a social network of other refugees living in the camp and interacting with local citizens.

7.1.3 *Contributions to conceptions of waiting*

Another theoretical contribution was made by arguing that while refugees are subject to temporal control, they can deal with this in various ways. The 'pragmatics of waiting' shows that, in contrast to theories that emphasise feelings of uncertainty due to disruptions, deceleration or suspension of time (Jeffreys, 2010; Griffiths, 2013), time is also a resource for refugees, which they use productively. Through this pragmatism, they are also able to defy a suspension in time and feelings of uncertainty while waiting for citizenship. The year of 2012 was a time of heightened uncertainty since the naturalisation initiative was put on hold. Refugees did not know whether they would be citizens,

refugees, be relocated elsewhere in Tanzania or even be involuntarily returned to Burundi. They were indeed effectively stateless. Therefore, it was the best suited time to investigate how refugees, who had over time become *de facto* citizens and were even on the way to becoming *de jure* citizens, would react to this indefinite suspension of their future plans and aspirations. As shown in Chapter 6, refugees employed various strategies to deal with this suspension – they went on with a 'business-as-usual' approach, whereas others employed future thinking in order to pre-empt the government's decisions. Although the settlement was supposed to the closed and it was prohibited, refugees and local Tanzanians continued constructing new buildings in the settlement in order to fight for their 'right to stay'. Furthermore, the conviviality that had developed between government officials and refugees on the ground was expanded to a religious union.

Theoretically, this thesis also hints to an intersecting crisis of refugeeness, ethnic and national belonging. While the Tanzanian government welcomed refugees with open arms after the country's independence in 1964, it developed an increasingly restrictive attitude vis-a-vis refugees over time. Refugees were re-defined from 'guests' to 'others' due to a shift to multiparty politics and the pressure of having to host a large influx of refugees in a short period of time. In some way, this marks an insistence on a new Tanzanian nationalism, supporting a multi-ethnic nation. On the other hand, it reflects the exclusion of certain ethnicities that are not part of the Tanzanian 'ethno-national core' (Wimmer, 2006) and are indeed feared for their violent subjectivities (Das *et al.*, 2000). It remains to be seen whether the Hutu will be accepted as a Tanzanian ethnicity or how the dilemma of the effectively multi-layered Tanzanian citizenship (Yuval-Davis, 1999) will eventually be solved for refugees.

7.1.4 *Contribution to debates about the 'refugee camp'*

This thesis aims to make a contribution to whether and how control over refugees in terms of exclusion from citizenship as enshrined in national policies can manifest, how it is perpetuated over time in a rural settlement in a protracted refugee situation and how this is justified. Ultimately, it was found that while Ulyankulu settlement had characteristics of a 'space of control', considerable tensions existed on the ground between exclusion and belonging. Characterising the space that refugees live in was found to be crucial since a substantial number of refugees in Africa live in camps and rural settlements.

Refugees live in such spaces since camps allow governments and international organisations to care for and control the refugee population. In addition, rural settlements offer the additional possibility of helping refugees to become self-reliant. However, since it is not always possible to resettle refugees or to voluntarily repatriate them, the only option becomes to locally integrate them. Some empirical analyses of refugee situations do hint at a successful *de facto* integration of refugees with the host communities. However, cases of successful *de jure* integration of refugees in Africa including citizenship are scarce. Furthermore, many camps and settlements have been characterised by insecurity either emanating from the refugees themselves or from the outside, endangering the refugees.

It was found that Ulyankulu settlement did not fit the previous theorisations of the camp as a "security island" (Ramadan, 2009a), as a "space of hospitality" (Ramadan, 2008), or as a space of myth-making (Malkki, 1995a). It would also not be accurate to call Ulyankulu settlement a "space of exception" (Agamben, 2005) since this theorisation does not offer a framework for analysing in-depth the control exerted in the settlement. It also does not offer space for analysing the relations between refugees and citizens inside and outside of the settlement, or the influence of international policies. Furthermore, refugee settlements are not built for *homines sacri*, i.e. beings that can be killed but not sacrificed (Agamben, 1998), but for refugees that are supposed to be protected until they can return home.

Thus, it was argued that exceptional legal provisions are just one form of control. These legal provisions need to be permanently and effectively enforced in order to uphold the *status quo* in vast rural refugee settlements without material borders. Physically, the space is thus controlled by creating legibility of the road structure (Scott, 1998), in temporal ways by adjourning permanent decisions (Bourdieu, 2000), e.g. on the granting of citizenship, and through sporadic military acts of repression (Scott, 1985) inside and outside of the settlement.

However, it was argued that the settlement is not only a 'space of control'. While it is seen as such by the government and international policy-makers, refugees are re-interpreting this space in their everyday lives. For them, it is indeed a 'space of agency', in which they routinely transgress the control exerted. This sometimes happens according to their basic needs but also according to their individual plans in life. They have employed agency by spatially questioning and transgressing the settlement space, by using

the time of waiting for the government's decisions productively and, in the meantime, by developing a sense of belonging.

Ultimately, Ulyankulu is a 'space of control' and a 'space of agency' concurrently. Although refugees often face the consequences of control, this control has not been all-encompassing or effective. Furthermore, sometimes control was in the interest of the refugees, for example in the form of 'self-help', which induced refugees to build schools and other buildings, and when the government protected the refugees against the Sukuma. As has been argued in the empirical chapters, control has weakened in Ulyankulu by an emergent sense of conviviality between various actors in the settlement, including some government officials. This was the result of broader processes, for example of local Tanzanians moving to the settlement. Although certain government officials have retained their status as authorities, they granted refugees room for manoeuvre allegedly by accepting personal favours. Given the material control in the settlement, the increased scale of building permanent houses, hostels and churches, a shared goal by refugees and Tanzanians, can be seen as a form of resistance against the closure of the camp, which is part of a struggle for the 'right to stay', as mentioned above. Seeing the settlement as both a 'space of control' and a 'space of agency' is theoretically novel since it shows both top-down and bottom-up processes, it shows tensions between exclusion and belonging, and it analyses both on various levels and in interaction with each other, which has not been done in the same way before.

7.2   Implications for Policy

The first two implications spelt out in this section are directed towards the Tanzanian government in the first instance as it is the sole institution that can directly influence the situation of refugees residing in its territory. The third recommendation is directed towards the UNHCR and other international organisations involved in refugee politics.

1. Dissolving the 'space of control'

First, the 'space of control' as it was upheld for 40 years, became a construct, which was not legitimate in the eyes of the refugees; neither in the eyes of local Tanzanian citizens or even local government officials. Refugees and local Tanzanians have transgressed the

boundaries of the settlement in multiple and irreversible ways. On the one hand, local government officials have turned a blind eye to these processes and have allegedly personally benefited from this situation. On the other hand, refugees and local Tanzanians did not wish a drastic spatial change, i.e. they wanted to stay in the settlement area. Therefore the different actors have developed a way of living together in conviviality, in which the settlement area was still controlled through spontaneous acts of repression but the agency of refugees was not completely curtailed. It may seem convenient to uphold the 'space of control'. However, it would be more fruitful for most actors involved if it was dissolved and turned into a genuine living space without boundaries. The government would not need to use resources to patrol the borders of the settlement and engage in acts of repression, while refugees and local Tanzanians would not have to live in fear of eviction or punishment for transgression of borders.

2. Recognise Burundian refugees as belonging to Tanzania

As shown above, refugees have developed pragmatic ways of belonging as well as of waiting, a form of dealing with the temporal control imposed on them. The 'pragmatics of belonging' has been reinforced in their recognition from other Tanzanian citizens, who have cooperated and even intermarried with refugees. Refugees in Ulyankulu, who were predominantly in the second generation, have not longed for Burundi since their 'home' has become or has always been in Tanzania. Refugees have been educated in the Tanzanian curriculum; they have sought further education in this system themselves and they have engaged in varied and taxed economic activities. They have thus used their time in pragmatic ways. For their economic achievements they have been recognised collectively, e.g. as the third biggest tobacco growers in the region (by international tobacco companies), as contributors to food security (by the UNHCR) and as a tax base (by the government). A formal recognition of their own sense of belonging and their contribution to Tanzania is wanting – on a collective basis, permanent residence should be considered a minimum measure of recognition, and citizenship should be an option for those who urgently need it.

3. Develop an international standard of dealing with protracted refugee situations

Based on this protracted situation and evidence of some other such situations (e.g. in Uganda, Zambia, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Algeria and Kenya) it is possible to spell out some tentative ideas of internationally promoted policy options. As follows from the first recommendation above, the idea that a camp or settlement can be turned from a 'space of control' into a genuine living space for refugees and local citizens without boundaries or exceptional laws should be contemplated throughout the period of hosting refugees. In cases where mass repatriation is not recommended, where refugees themselves are self-reliant, want to stay and work in the host country and would like to become citizens, and where local host communities have lived in peace with the new arrivals, this option could resolve tensions and spare resources.

The time to abandon exceptional rules could be when refugees have reached self-sufficiency. Contrary to what happened in Tanzania, this should also coincide with the granting of formal recognition as legal residents or citizens of the host state (see second point above). Otherwise, as it happened in Tanzania, refugees are pushed back into a state of uncertainty; and opposition to formal integration may arise by the government at a later stage, e.g. for political reasons.

7.3 Ideas for Further Research

Urban refugees

This thesis analysed the situation of refugees in rural settlements. However, while mentioning the fact that many refugees have moved to urban areas and settled there, the scope of this thesis has not allowed interviewing many such persons who live in those areas. Some studies, like Malkki (1995a) and Sommers (2000) and others have succeeded in gaining insights into urban refugees' lives. However, within the Tanzanian context, there are not many such studies and the situation may have changed in the meantime.

There is no recent estimation of the number of refugees in urban areas (Asylum Access Tanzania 2011: 2). In fact, these self-settled refugees have attracted less research than assisted refugees in camps (Kibreab, 1996). A survey with 122 adult and mainly Congolese refugees indicates that reasons for leaving a camp were personal or general in-

security, outbreak of diseases, insufficient services and lack of employment. Among these refugees, only 3% had a permit to temporarily leave the camp, 31% had left a camp without obtaining the necessary permit, and 65% had never lived in a camp (Asylum Access Tanzania, 2011). Willems (2003), who conducted an anthropological study with Burundian, Rwandan and Congolese refugees in Dar es Salaam, explains that these refugees rely on their own social networks to find opportunities for work. This is either in the informal sector as hairdressers, tailors, or daily labourers (see also Sommers, 2000), or they receive financial support from friends and relatives in Tanzania and abroad. While coping with the circumstances by supporting each other, they are, according to Willems (2003), not adapting to the host culture, except in respects in which adapting could have consequences in endangering their personal safety – e.g. not speaking Swahili.

The TCRS declared an increased interest in helping those who live in Dar es Salaam and other urban areas (interview with I5). The UNHCR has also widened its scope to offer protection to urban refugees in its Policy Statement on Refugees in Urban Areas, 1997, which was replaced by the UNHCR Policy on Refugee Protection and Solutions in Urban Areas in 2009 (UNHCR, 2009b). A global analysis of UNHCR's largest refugee operations in urban areas was commissioned in 2012 but it does not include a study on Tanzania (Morand et al., 2012). A coherent national policy on urban refugees is still lacking (Pangilinan, 2012). Since refugees in urban areas are not given a plot of land to cultivate and do not enjoy basic protection in terms of education and health facilities, they may live in a more precarious situation than those in rural settlements. According to Sommers (1999) four categories of urban refugees reside in Dar es Salaam: a few refugees, who are legally living in the city, those who have moved out of camps and are not covered by protection, asylum seekers and those who claim to be refugees but are really economic migrants. Research should be conducted with each of these groups.

Intra-household gender dynamics

This thesis, while looking mainly at inequalities between citizens and non-citizens in the public sphere, does not provide an in-depth analysis of intra-household gender dynamics. It is suggested here that gender dynamics influence the nascent sense of belonging to Tanzania since women engage less in travelling than men. As could be ascertained through participant observation and interviews, women in Ulyankulu settlement bear multiple responsibilities of child-bearing and rearing, cultivating and selling on the market. Men

also engage in cultivation, and they are in charge of buying on the market and trading outside of the settlement. Further research could shed light on how day-to-day tasks and roles are negotiated and resources administered within the household. This could be examined both in the settlement as well as in urban areas, where roles may be assigned differently.

Citizenship as status

This thesis has analysed citizenship as a practice and how it is claimed *de facto* by refugees. As was the original aim of this thesis, one could conduct a follow-up study on those who already obtained citizenship documentation, i.e. *de jure* citizenship as a status. While in 2012 it was not recommended to do research with those 749 people who had already got citizenship certificates, this situation could change in the future if more refugees are given the chance to obtain citizenship certificates. Also, there have been other situations in which refugees were granted citizenship, such as the Somali Bantus in Tanzania in 2000. A follow-up study with these new citizens could shed new light on the relationship between belonging and citizenship. New insights in belonging and *de facto* vs. *de jure* citizenship could also be attained by analysing the situation in other camps and settlements in Africa, where refugees have lived in protracted exile.

7.4 Outlook

In light of the fact that the naturalisation of the Burundian refugees was put on hold, it would be intriguing to know what will happen to this population in the near and in the distant future and whether they will obtain a legal status soon. The new constitution that is currently under review would, however, be a step in the wrong direction, as it does not grant *jus soli* citizenship rights. While under the current *jus soli* laws, refugees born in Tanzanian would theoretically be entitled to citizenship (even though this has not happened in practice), the new constitution eliminates such rights altogether. Currently, the plight of the Burundian refugees is on-going. Even though they developed a pragmatics of belonging, the current situation is hardly satisfying in the long run. Within the settlement, refugees have long been treated as *de facto* citizens, they have increasingly interacted with citizens, and a degree of conviviality with some government officials has

developed. Outside of the settlement, refugees also claim *de facto* citizenship rights but their actions always bear the risk of being detected. Being pragmatic about the waiting time is the most sensible response to temporal control. However, control measures to enforce the government's policies can also be expected in the future. It is possible to imagine that refugees will start resisting such policies on a larger scale if their demand for a permanent 'right to stay' is not heard soon.

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Interviews: Table of Respondents

Note about coding: In order to enhance both readability in the text and anonymity of respondents, it was decided to code government officials with the letter 'G', employees of international/humanitarian organisations with 'I', respondents working for the media as 'M', any other Tanzanian citizens interviewed with 'C', first generation refugees with 'F' and second generation refugees with 'S'. Numbering follows the order in which a quote of the respective respondent appears in the text. The following table reveals information on the respondents' occupation, gender (m/f), general place of interview and month in which it occurred.

Respondent	Place	Date month/year	Code
Government, International Organisations and Media			
Government Officer, m	Uyowa	11/2012	G1
Government Officer, m	Ulyankulu	06 and 07/2012	G2
Government Officer, m	Mwendakulima	11/2012	G3
Government Officer, m	District Commission, Kaliua	11/2012	G4
Government Officer, m	Ulyankulu	11/2012	G5
Government Officer, f	District Commission, Urambo	08/2012	G6
Government Officer, m	Immigration, Tabora	08/2014	G7
Government Officer, m	Prime Minister's Office, Dar es Salaam	06/2012	G8
Government Officer, m	Regional Commission, Tabora	07/2012	G9
Police Officer, m	Regular police, Ulyankulu	11/2012	G10
Police Officer, m	Operational Police, Ulyankulu	11/2012	G11
Police Officer, f	District, Tabora town	08/2012	G12
Police Officer, m	Region, Tabora	08/2012	G13
Government Officer, f	Ministry of Home Affairs, Dar es Salaam	06/2012	G14
UNHCR employee, f	Dar es Salaam	02 and 04/ 2012	I1
UNHCR employee, m	Ulyankulu	06/2012	I2
TCRS employee, m	Ulyankulu	07/2012, 04/2014	I3
UNHCR employee, f	Ulyankulu	07/2014	I4
TCRS employee, m	Dar es Salaam	06/2012	I5
Journalist, m	The Guardian, Dar es Salaam	06/2012	M1

Respondent	Place	Date month/year	Code
Other Tanzanians			
Farmer (retired), Nyamwezi, m	Ulyankulu	11/2012	C1
Priest, Tanzanian, m	Ulyankulu	07/2012	C2
Farmer, former Government Officer, m	Ulyankulu	11/2012	C3
Imam, former Government Officer, m	Ulyankulu	11/2012	C4
Trader, m	Tabora town	07/2012	C5
Student, m	Ulyankulu	11/2012	C6
Trader, m	Tabora town	07/2012	C7
Business man, m	Tabora town	07/2012	C8
NGO worker, m	Tabora town	07/2012	C9
Farmer, m	Ulyankulu	11/2012	C10
Church elder, former Government Officer, m	Ulyankulu	11/2012	C11
First Generation Refugees			
Farmer, m	Ulyankulu	08/2012	F1
Farmer (retired), m	Ulyankulu	11/2012	F2
Farmer, m	Ulyankulu	07/2012	F3
Farmers, m (joint interview)	Ulyankulu	11/2012	F4
Village leader, m	Ulyankulu	08/2012	F5
Farmer (retired), m	Ulyankulu	07/2012	F6
Farmer (retired), m	Ulyankulu	07/2012	F7
Farmer (retired), m	Ulyankulu	07/2012	F8
Farmer (retired), m	Ulyankulu	07/2012	F9
VETA teacher, m	Ulyankulu	11/2012	F10
Farmer, m	Ulyankulu	07/2012	F11
Secondary School teacher, m	Ulyankulu	07/2012	F12
Pastor, m	Ulyankulu	06/2012	F13
Primary school teacher, m	Ulyankulu	08/2012	F14
Farmer (retired), m	Ulyankulu	07/2012	F15
Pastor, m	Ulyankulu	06 and 08/2012	F16
Priest, m	Tabora town	08/2012	F17
Refugee man, m	Ulyankulu	07/2012	F18

Respondent	Place	Date month/year	Code
Second and Third Generation Refugees			
Doctor, m	Ulyankulu	08/2012	S1
Farmer, f	Ulyankulu	11/2012	S2
Worker, m	Ulyankulu	11/2012	S3
Graduate student, m	Ulyankulu	07/2012	S4
Farmer, f	Ulyankulu	06/2012	S5
Tailor, m	Ulyankulu	06/2012	S6
Businessman, m (3rd gen.)	Ulyankulu	07/2012	S7
Student, m	Ulyankulu	11/2012	S8
Student, m	Ulyankulu	11/2012	S9
Tailor, m	Ulyankulu	06/2012	S10
Doctor, m	Ulyankulu	08/2012	S11
Farmer, f	Ulyankulu	11/2012	S12
Student, m	Ulyankulu	11/2012	S13
Student, f	Ulyankulu	11/2012	S14
Student, f	Ulyankulu	11/2012	S15

APPENDIX

A.1   Progress in Local Integration in Selected African Countries

Refugees mainly from (country of origin)	Host state	Comments	Location: Camps, Settlements, Urban areas
North Africa			
Palestine, Sudan, South-Sudan, Somalia (UNHCR, 2014f)	Egypt	Refugees not able to naturalise, unless a refugee is married to an Egyptian or has an Egyptian parent. Palestinian refugee men married to Egyptian women are not allowed to obtain citizenship due to the 1959 decision of the Arab League that Palestinians should not get citizenship in other countries in order to preserve their identity (Manby, 2010).	Saloum camp near Egyptian-Libyan border; refugees otherwise in urban areas (UNHCR, 2014f).
Western Sahara/Sahrawis (Manby, 2010), PRS (Kuhlman, 2002), Syrians, Malians (UNHCR, 2014f)	Algeria	Sahrawis have no possibility to naturalise and stay in isolated camps due to a political failure to resolve the question of state existence. Return to Morocco is possible (Manby, 2010). The situation is unresolved since 38 years. Malians are hosted by Algerian families along the border. Syrian and Malians assisted by the Algerian Red Cross (UNHCR, 2014f).	4 camps for Sahrawis near Tindouf (Loescher and Milner, 2005, UNHCR, 2014f); other refugees in urban areas.
Mali (UNHCR, 2014f)	Mauritania	Local integration is generally not possible in North Africa (UNHCR, 2014f).	Mbera camp; urban areas (UNHCR, 2014f).

(continued)

Refugees mainly from (country of origin)	Host state	Comments	Location: Camps, Settlements, Urban areas
Syria and others (UNHCR, 2014f)	Libya	Local integration is generally not possible in North Africa. Refugee status determination in progress; Memorandum of Understanding with the UNHCR is pending (UNHCR, 2014f).	Detention sites, urban areas (UNHCR, 2014f).
Cote d'Ivoire, Syria (UNHCR, 2014f), DRC, Iraq (UNHCR, 2010c)	Marocco	UNHCR advocates for temporary protection (UNHCR, 2014f).	Urban areas (UNHCR, 2014f).
East Africa			
Somalia, South Sudan, Ethiopia (UNHCR, 2014d); Sudanese and Somali → PRS (Kuhlman, 2002)	Kenya	No right to asylum, no possibility to naturalise, camps run by UNHCR. No refugee law before Refugee Act of 2006. 2010 Constitution might provide new opportunities (Manby, 2010).	Kakuma camp, five Dabaab camps: Dagahaley, Ifo, Ifo 2, Hagadera, Kambioos (UNHCR, 2014g).
DRC, Burundi (UNHCR, 2014k)	Tanzania	1981: Naturalisation of 25,000 Rwandans (but only few got their certificates; Gasarasi 1990). 2003: 3000 Somali (Chogo settlement). Possibly 171,600 Burundians will be locally integrated who wish to be naturalised (since 2007) (Fielden, 2008). No possibility of naturalisation for Congolese.	Nyarugusu camp, Kanembwa camp, Ulyankulu, Katumba and Mishamo settlements (UNHCR, 2014k)
DRC, Sudan (flight in both directions) (Fielden, 2008), Sudanese → PRS (Kuhlman, 2002)	Uganda	Local settlement scheme and land - self-reliance (Fielden, 2008) but no provision for naturalisation (Manby, 2010).	Rhino Camp, Imvepi, Madi Okollo, Ikafe (closed), Palorinya, Pakelle, Kiryandongo, Kyangwali, Kyaka II, Nakivale and Oruchinga (Joint Assessment Team 2005).

Refugees mainly from (country of origin)	Host state	Comments	Location: Camps, Settlements, Urban areas
		Central Africa	
Republic of Congo, Chad, DRC (Fielden, 2008, UNHCR, 2014a)	Gabon	No formal refugee camps, refugees have identity documents but citizenship difficult, Chadian refugees in eastern Gabon successfully integrated (Fielden, 2008).	Not mentioned (UNHCR, 2014a)
Eritrea, Ethiopia, Chad, DRC and IDPs (UNHCR, 2014j) Eritreans → PRS (Milner and Loescher, 2011)	Sudan	Transitional Solutions Initiative (TSI) with UNDP and World Bank to promote self-reliance of refugees in Eastern Sudan (UNHCR, 2014j).	9 camps (UNHCR, 2014j)
Sudan, CAR (UNHCR, 2014b)	Chad	UNHCR works with the *Commission Nationale d'Accueil, de Reinsertion des Refugies et des Patries* (CNARR) to encourage the adoption of refugee law to increase civil status documentation of refugees (UNHCR, 2014b)	12 camps for Sudanese refugees (Breidjing, Iridimi, Djabal, Touloum, Am Nabak, Mile, Kounoungou, Gaga, Zafingel, Treguine, Abga-dam, Koukou-Angarana) and various other locations (2014b), five camps for CAR refugees (Moyo, Haraze, Dosseye, Gondye, Amboko) (UNHCR, 2014b)

(continued)

Refugees mainly from (country of origin)	Host state	Comments	Location: Camps, Settlements, Urban areas
West Africa			
Liberia (Fielden, 2008) (PRS, Kuhlman, 2002)	Cote d'Ivoire	No camps until 1995, then only one camp until 2002. Most refugees settled in Zone d'Acceuil des Refugies (ZAR) with land and employment rights (Kuhlman, 2002). Tabou refugee transit centre was closed and 24,000 Liberians locally integrated; Nicla refugee camp will be an Ivorian village, to be called Zaaglo (Fielden, 2008). Still no solution for 3,400 Liberians who are affected by cessation clause (UNHCR, 2014c).	IDP camps, Nicla camp, settlement in ZAR, Danane and Toulepleu transit centres (UNHCR, 2014c)
Sierra Leone, Cote d'Ivoire (Fielden, 2008)	Liberia	Main people of concern are Ivorians who fled from post-election violence in 2010 (UNHCR, 2014e); 3,563 Sierra Leonian refugees remain who might be locally integrated (Fielden, 2008).	Bahn, Saclepea, New Yourpea, PTP, and Solo camps (UNHCR, 2014e)
Liberia (Fielden, 2008)	Sierra Leone	Eight rural camps, local integration possible (Fielden, 2008); 4100 refugees remain in the country of whom 2700 are locally integrated (UNHCR, 2014l).	8 camps (Fielden, 2008)

Refugees mainly from (country of origin)	Host state	Comments	Location: Camps, Settlements, Urban areas
Liberia, Cote d'Ivoire (UNHCR, 2014l), and Sierra Leone (Fielden, 2008) Sierra Leoneans → PRS (Kuhlman, 2002)	Guinea	Sierra Leonean and Liberian refugees have cultural similarities and common local languages and ethnicities; some 200 Sierra Leonean refugees remain on the old site of Boreah camp, 400 refugees assisted to integrate in urban areas (Fielden, 2008); UNHCR assists 3,500 Liberians that are affected by the cessation clauses, 6,500 Ivorians assisted with basic services in Kouankan II camp (UNHCR, 2014l)	Old site of Boreah camp (Fielden, 2008), Kouankan II camp (UNHCR, 2014l)
Liberia, Togo, Rwanda, Ivory Coast (UNHCR, 2014l); Liberians in Ghana → PRS (Dick, 2002)	Ghana	Naturalisation allowed but practical difficulties (Dick, 2002). Assisted return of Liberians in camps since 2008 following peace in Liberia (Manby, 2010).	Buduburam Refugee Settlement, Krisan Camp, Klikor camp, self-settled in Accra (Agblorti 2011)
Mauritania (Manby, 2010)	Senegal	Anyone from a neighbouring country who has lived in Senegal for five years can opt for Senegalese nationality without further conditions. Many Mauritanians resisted taking Senegalese citizenship because they feared losing claim to Mauritanian citizenship. Others accepted Senegalese citizenship for facilitated travel and work. In 2007, a new government in Mauritania offered repatriation to these refugees. Senegal promised citizenship to Mauritanians who chose not to return (Manby, 2010).	Not mentioned (UNHCR, 2014l)

Refugees mainly from (country of origin)	Host state	Comments	Location: Camps, Settlements, Urban areas
		Southern Africa	
DRC since 1970s (Fielden, 2008; UNHCR, 2014i), further from Burundi, Liberia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone (UNHCR, 2014i)	Angola	Permanent residence permit, announcement to grant legal local integration in 2006 (Fielden, 2008). The protection space for refugees has been reduced in recent years; UNHCR makes visit to Immigration Detention Centres and promotes voluntary repatriation (UNHCR, 2014i).	Kuito camp and Huambo camp mentioned in the press in 1999-2001, but no mention by UNHCR today (UNHCR, 2014i)
Angola, Rwanda (UNHCR, 2014i)	Zambia	Citizenship difficult to attain but Zambia Initiative support micro-finance schemes (Fielden, 2008). In Zambia, a new refugee law was under discussion in 2002 to make it possible for long-staying refugees—including many Angolans—to apply for citizenship but the bill did not pass. The 1970 Refugee Act in place does not allow for naturalisation (Manby 2010). The Government of Zambia has agreed to integrate 10,000 Angolan refugees and some Rwandans locally. Criteria and programmes for local integration have been published and 4,200 refugees have applied for residency permits. (UNHCR, 2014i).	Meheba and Manyanyama settlements (Bakewell, 2000; UNHCR, 2014i)

(continued)

Refugees mainly from (country of origin)	Host state	Comments	Location: Camps, Settlements, Urban areas
Angola (UNHCR, 2014i)	Namibia	Angolans have refugee status while others refugees are asylum-seekers; local integration possible for Angolans; solutions different due to ethnic and political affinities (Fielden, 2008). Angolans' refugee status ceased in 2012. UNHCR promotes local integration. With decreasing numbers in Osire camp, UNHCR took over to assist the refugees from WFP. UNHCR's presence to phase out in 2015 (UNHCR, 2014i).	Osire camp (UNHCR, 2014i)
Angola (Manby, 2010), Namibia, Somalia, Zimbabwe (UNHCR, 2014i)	Botswana	In November 2006, after many delays, Botswana President Festus Mogae agreed to grant of citizenship to 183 long-term Angolan refugees still resident in Botswana (Manby 2010). Increasing numbers live in Dukwi camp due to a strict encampment policy (UNHCR, 2014i).	Dukwi camp (UNHCR, 2014i)
DRC, Rwanda, Burundi (UNHCR, 2014i)	Mozambique	In Mozambique, the 1991 Refugee Act explicitly provides for naturalisation of refugees on the same terms as other foreigners (Manby, 2010). 50% of refugees live in Maratane camp. Refugees enjoy freedom of movement. UNHCR works on refugee status determination in order to prevent statelessness (UNHCR, 2014i).	Maratane camp (UNHCR, 2014i)

Refugees mainly from (country of origin)	Host state	Comments	Location: Camps, Settlements, Urban areas
Not mentioned (UN-HCR, 2014i)	Lesotho	Lesotho's 1983 Refugees Act allows a refugee to apply for naturalisation after six years (12 months before the application and five more years) (Manby, 2010). The country hosts 37 refugees and asylum seekers and UNHCR pushes for unconditional citizenship according with national legislation (UNHCR, 2014i).	No refugee camps mentioned (UNHCR, 2014i)
Refugees: Angola, Burundi, DRC, Rwanda, Somalia Asylum seekers: Bangladesh, DRC, Ethiopia, Somalia, Zimbabwe (UNHCR, 2014h)	South Africa	South Africa's system officially provides for a status transfer from refugee to permanent residence and then to naturalised citizenship. After five years of continuous residence in South Africa from the date that asylum was granted, the Immigration Act allows for the granting of permanent residence to a refugee if he or she will remain a refugee indefinitely. But as of 2008, no refugee had been granted citizenship by this process due to a 10-year time delay and that the laws were only in place in 2000-2003 (Manby, 2010). As of December 2011, Angolans, Burundians, DR Congolese and Rwandese and Somalis have been recognised as refugees with freedom of movement, work permits and access to basic social services. Documentation problems still persist though (UNHCR, 2014h).	No camps, urban refugee locations (UNHCR, 2014h)

(continued)

Refugees mainly from (country of origin)	Host state	Comments	Location: Camps, Settlements, Urban areas
Burundi, the DRC and Rwanda (UNHCR, 2014i)	Malawi	UNHCR will use an approach to deliver basic services to refugees in Dzaleka Camp, psychological support upon arrival. Transport to the camp is a challenge. There is a strict encampment policy. UNHCR supports refugee status determination efforts of the government (UNHCR 2014i).	Dzaleka camp (UNHCR, 2014i)
Great Lakes region, Horn of Africa (UNHCR, 2014i)	Zimbabwe	UNHCR supports efforts of voluntary repatriation and resettlement. It helps ensure that basic needs of refugees are met (UNHCR, 2014i)	Tongogora camp (UNHCR, 2014i)

A.2   Excerpt of the Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania of 1977: Basic Rights and Duties

PART III
BASIC RIGHTS AND DUTIES

The Right to Equality

Equality of human beings
Act No.15 of 1984 Art.6

12.-(1)   All human beings are born free, and are all equal.
(2)   Every person is entitled to recognition and respect for his dignity.

Equality before the law

Act No.15 of 1984 Art.6

Act No.4 of 1992 Art.8

Act No.7 of 1994 Art. 8(1)(k)

Act No.3 of 2000 Art.5

13.-(1)   All persons are equal before the law and are entitled, without any discrimination, to protection and equality before the law.
(2)   No law enacted by any authority in the United Republic shall make any provision that is discriminatory either of itself or in its effect.
(3)   The civic rights, duties and interests of every person and community shall be protected and determined by the courts of law or other state agencies established by or under the law.
(4)   No person shall be discriminated against by any person or any authority acting under any law or in the discharge of the functions or business of any state office.
(5)   For the purposes of this Article the expression "discriminate" means to satisfy the needs, rights or other requirements of different persons on the basis of their nationality, tribe, place of origin, political opinion, colour, religion, sex or station in life such that certain categories of people are regarded as weak or

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inferior and are subjected to restrictions or conditions whereas persons of other categories are treated differently or are accorded opportunities or advantage outside the specified conditions or the prescribed necessary qualifications except that the word "discrimination" shall not be construed in a manner that will prohibit the Government from taking purposeful steps aimed at rectifying disabilities in the society.

(6)   To ensure equality before the law, the state authority shall make procedures which are appropriate or which take into account the following principles, namely:

    (a)   when the rights and duties of any person are being determined by the court or any other agency, that person shall be entitled to a fair hearing and to the right of appeal or other legal remedy against the decision of the court or of the other agency concerned;

    (b)   no person charged with a criminal offence shall be treated as guilty of the offence until proved guilty of that offence;

    (c)   no person shall be punished for any act which at the time of its commission was not an offence under the law, and also no penalty shall be imposed which is heavier than the penalty in force at the time the offence was committed;

    (d)   for the purposes of preserving the right or equality of human beings, human dignity shall be protected in all activities pertaining to criminal investigations and process, and in any other matters for which a person is restrained, or in the execution of a sentence;

    (e)   no person shall be subjected to torture or inhuman or degrading punishment or treatment.

The Right to Life

Right to life
Act No.15
of 1984
Art.6

14. Every person has the right to live and to the protection of his life by the society in accordance with the law.

Right to
personal
freedom
Act No.15
of 1984
Art.6

15.-(1) Every person has the right to freedom and to live as a free person.

(2)   For the purposes of preserving individual freedom and the right to live as a free person, no person shall be arrested, imprisoned, confined, detained, deported or otherwise be deprived of his freedom save only-

    (a)   under circumstances and in accordance with procedures prescribed by law; or

    (b)   in the execution of a judgment, order or a sentence given or passed by the court following a decision in a legal proceeding or a conviction for a criminal offence.

Right to
privacy and
personal
security

16.-(1)   Every person is entitled to respect and protection of his person, the privacy of his own person, his family and of his matrimonial life, and respect and protection of his residence and private communications.

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Act No.15
of 1984
Art.6

(2)   For the purpose of preserving the person's right in accordance with this Article, the state authority shall lay down legal procedures regarding the circumstances, manner and extent to which the right to privacy, security of his person, his property and residence may be encroached upon without prejudice to the provisions of this Article.

Right to
freedom of
movement
Act No.15
of 1984
Art.6

17.-(1)   Every citizen of the United Republic has the right to freedom of movement in the United Republic and the right to live in any part of the United Republic, to leave and enter the country, and the right not to be forced to leave or be expelled from the United Republic.

(2)   Any lawful act or any law which is intended to -

(a)   curtail a person's freedom of movement and to restrain or imprison him; or

(b)   limit a person from exercising his freedom of movement so as to -

    (i)   execute a judgment or court order; or

    (ii)   compel a person first to comply with any obligations arising under another law; or

    (iii)   protect public interest in general or preserve certain special interest or interests of a certain section of the public,

such act or law shall not be construed or be held to be repugnant to or inconsistent with the provisions of this Article.

The Right to Freedom of Conscience

Freedom of
expression

Act No.1
of 2005
Art.6

18. Every person -

(a)   has a freedom of opinion and expression of his ideas;

(b)   has out right to seek, receive and, or disseminate information regardless of national boundaries;

(c)   has the freedom to communicate and a freedom with protection from interference from his communication;

(d)   has a right to be informed at all times of various important events of life and activities of the people and also of issues of importance to the society.

Right of
freedom of
religion
Act No.15
of 1984
Art.6
Act No.4
of 1992
Art.9
Act No.1
of 2005
Art.6

19.-(1)   Every person has the right to the freedom to have conscience, or faith, and choice in matters of religion, including the freedom to change his religion or faith.

(2)   Protection of rights referred to in this Article shall be in accordance with the provisions prescribed by the laws which are of importance to a democratic society for security and peace in the society, integrity of the society and the national coercion.

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(3) In this Article reference to the term "religion" shall be construed as including reference to religious denominations, and cognate expressions shall be construed accordingly.

Person's freedom of association
Act No.15 of 1984
Art.6
Act No.1 of 2005
Art.7

20.-(1) Every person has a freedom, to freely and peaceably assemble, associate and cooperate with other persons, and for that purpose, express views publicly and to form and join with associations or organizations formed for purposes of preserving or furthering his beliefs or interests or any other interests.

(2) Notwithstanding the provisions of subarticles (1) and (4), it shall not be lawful for any political party to be registered which according to its constitution or policy -
- (a) aims at promoting or furthering the interests of -
  - (i) any faith or religious group;
  - (ii) any tribal group, place of origin, race or gender;
  - (iii) only a particular area within any part of the United Republic;
- (b) advocates for the break-up of the United Republic;
- (c) accepts or advocates for the use of the force or violent confrontation as means of attaining its political goals;
- (d) advocates or intends to carry on its political activities in only one part of the United Republic;
- (e) does not permit periodic and democratic election of its leaders.

(3) Parliament may enact legislation which makes provisions for ensuring that political parties operate within the limits and adhere to the conditions set out in subarticle (2) concerning the freedom and the right of persons to associate and assemble.

(4) It shall be unlawful for any person to be compelled to join any association or organization, or for any association or any political party to be refused registration on grounds solely the ideology or philosophy of that political party.

Freedom to participate in public affairs
Act No.15 of 1984
Art.6
Act No.34 of 1994
Art.4

21.-(1) Subject to the provisions of Article 39, 47 and 67 of this Constitution and of the laws of the land in connection with the conditions for electing and being elected or for appointing and being appointed to take part in matters related to governance of the country, every citizen of the United Republic is entitled to take part in matters pertaining to the governance of the country, either directly or through representatives freely elected by the people, in conformity with the procedures laid down by, or in accordance with, the law.

(2) Every citizen has the right and the freedom to participate fully in the process leading to the decision on matters affecting him, his well-being or the nation.

The Right to Work

Right to work

22.-(1) Every person has the right to work.

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Act No.15
of 1984
Art.6

(2)   Every citizen is entitled to equal opportunity and right to equal terms to hold any office or discharge any function under the state authority.

Right to just
remuneration
Act No.15
of 1984
Art.6

23.-(1)   Every person, without discrimination of any kind, is entitled to remuneration commensurate with his work, and all persons working according to their ability shall be remunerated according to the measure and qualification for the work.

(2)   Every person who works is entitled to just remuneration.

Right to own
property
Act No.15
of 1984
Art.6
Act No.1
of 2005
Art.9

24.-(1)   Every person is entitled to own property, and has a right to the protection of his property held in accordance with the law.

(2)   Subject to the provisions of subarticle (1), it shall be unlawful for any person to be deprived of his property for the purposes of nationalization or any other purposes without the authority of law which makes provision for fair and adequate compensation.

Duties to the Society

Duty to
participate in
work
Act No.15
of 1984
Art.6
Act No. 7
of 1994
Art.8(1)(k)

25.-(1)   Work alone creates the material wealth in society, and is the source of the well-being of the people and the measure of human dignity. Accordingly, every person has the duty to –
(a)   participate responsibly and honestly in lawful and productive work; and
(b)   observe work discipline and strive to attain the individual and collective production targets desired or set by law.

(2)   Notwithstanding the provisions of subarticle (1), there shall be no forced labour in the United Republic.
(3)   For the purposes of this Article, and in this Constitution generally, it is hereby declared that no work shall be deemed to be forced, cruel or humiliating labour, if such work is according to law -
(a)   work which has to be done pursuant to a judgment or order of a court;
(b)   work which has to be done by members of any Force in the discharge of their responsibilities;
(c)   work which has to be done by any person due to a state of emergency or any calamity which threatens the life or well-being of the society;
(d)   any work or service which forms part of -
(i)   routine services for ensuring the well-being of society;
(ii)   compulsory national service in accordance with the law;
(iii)   the national endeavour at the mobilization of human resources for the enhancement of the society and the

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national economy and to ensure development and national productivity.

Duty to abide by the laws of the land
Act No.15 of 1984
Art.6

26.-(1)   Every person has the duty to observe and to abide by this Constitution and the laws of the United Republic.

(2)   Every person has the right, in accordance with the procedure provided by law, to take legal action to ensure the protection of this Constitution and the laws of the land.

Duty to safeguard public property
Act No.15 of 1984
Art.6

27.-(1)   Every person has the duty to protect the natural resources of the United Republic, the property of the state authority, all property collectively owned by the people, and also to respect another person's property.

(2)   All persons shall be required by law to safeguard the property of the state authority and all property collectively owned by the people, to combat all forms of waste and squander, and to manage the national economy assiduously with the attitude of people who are masters of the destiny of their nation.

Defence of the nation
Act No.15 of 1984
Art.6

28.-(1)   Every citizen has the duty to protect, preserve and maintain the independence, sovereignty, territory and unity of the nation.

(2)   Parliament may enact appropriate laws to enable the people to serve in the Forces and in the defence of the nation.

(3)   No person shall have the right to sign an act of capitulation and surrender of the nation to the victor, nor ratify or recognize an act of occupation or division of the United Republic or of any area of the territory of the nation and, subject to this Constitution and any other laws enacted, no person shall have the right to prevent the citizens of the United Republic from waging war against any enemy who attacks the nation.

(4)   Treason as defined by law shall be the most grave offence against the United Republic.

General Provisions

Fundamental rights and duties
Act No.15 of 1984
Art.6

29.-(1)   Every person in the United Republic has the right to enjoy fundamental human rights and to enjoy the benefits accruing from the fulfillment by every person of this duty to society, as stipulated under Article 12 to 28 of this Part of this Chapter of the Constitution.

(2)   Every person in the United Republic has the right to equal protection under the laws of the United Republic.

(3)   A citizen of the United Republic shall not have a right, status or special position on the basis of his lineage, tradition or descent.

(4)   It is hereby prohibited for any law to confer any right, status, or special position upon any citizen of the United Republic on the basis of lineage, tradition or descent.

(5)   In order that all persons may benefit from the rights and freedoms guaranteed by this Constitution, every person has the duty to so conduct himself

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and his affairs in the manner that does not infringe upon the rights and freedoms of others or the public interest.

Limitations
upon, and
enforcement
and
preservation of
basic rights,
freedoms and
duties
Act No.15
of 1984
Art.6
Act No.34
of 1994
Ar.6

30.-(1)   The human rights and freedoms, the principles of which are set out in this Constitution, shall not be exercised by a person in a manner that causes interference with or curtailment of the rights and freedoms of other persons or of the public interest.

(2)   It is hereby declared that the provisions contained in this Part of this Constitution which set out the principles of rights, freedom and duties, does not render unlawful any existing law or prohibit the enactment of any law or the doing of any lawful act in accordance with such law for the purposes of-

(a)   ensuring that the rights and freedoms of other people or of the interests of the public are not prejudiced by the wrongful exercise of the freedoms and rights of individuals;

(b)   ensuring the defence, public safety, public peace, public morality, public health, rural and urban development planning, the exploitation and utilization of minerals or the increase and development of property of any other interests for the purposes of enhancing the public benefit;

(c)   ensuring the execution of a judgment or order of a court given or made in any civil or criminal matter;

(d)   protecting the reputation, rights and freedoms of others or the privacy of persons involved in any court proceedings, prohibiting the disclosure of confidential information, or safeguarding the dignity, authority and independence of the courts;

(e)   imposing restrictions, supervising and controlling the formation, management and activities of private societies and organizations in the country; or

(f)   enabling any other thing to be done which promotes, or preserves the national interest in general.

(3)   Any person claiming that any provision in this Part of this Chapter or in any law concerning his right or duty owed to him has been, is being or is likely to be violated by any person anywhere in the United Republic, may institute proceedings for redress in the High Court.

(4)   Subject to the other provisions of this Constitution, the High Court shall have original jurisdiction to hear and determine any matter brought before it pursuant to this Article; and the state authority may enact legislation for the purposes of -

(a)   regulating procedure for instituting proceedings pursuant to this Article;

(b)   specifying the powers of the High Court in relation to the hearing of proceedings instituted pursuant to this Article;

(c)   ensuring the effective exercise of the powers of the High Court, the preservation and enforcement of the rights, freedoms and duties in accordance with this Constitution.

(5)   Where in any proceedings it is alleged that any law enacted or any

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action taken by the Government or any other authority abrogates or abridges any of the basic rights, freedoms and duties set out in Articles 12 to 29 of this Constitution, and the High Court is satisfied that the law or action concerned, to the extent that it conflicts with this Constitution, is void, or is inconsistent with this Constitution, then the High Court, if it deems fit, or if the circumstances or public interest so requires, instead of declaring that such law or action is void, shall have power to decide to afford the Government or other authority concerned an opportunity to rectify the defect found in the law or action concerned within such a period and in such manner as the High Court shall determine, and such law or action shall be deemed to be valid until such time the defect is rectified or the period determined by the High Court lapses, whichever is the earlier.

Extraordinary Powers of the State Authority

Derogation
from rights and
freedoms
Act No.15
of 1984
Art.6

31.-(1)   Apart from the provisions of Article 30(2), any law enacted by Parliament shall not be void for the reason only that it enables measures to be taken during a state of emergency or in normal times in relation to persons who are believed to engage in activities which endanger or prejudice the security of the nation, which measures derogate from the provisions of Articles 14 and 15 of this Constitution.

(2)   It is hereby prohibited to take any of the measures referred to in subarticle (1) of this Article in pursuance of any law during a state of emergency or in normal times in relation to any person, save only to the extent that they are necessary and justifiable for dealing with the situation that exists during the state of emergency, or in normal times dealing with the situation created by the conduct of the person concerned.

(3)   It is hereby declared that the provisions of this Article shall not authorize the deprivation of a person's right to live save only for deaths resulting from acts of war.

(4)   In this Article and the following Articles of this Part, "state of emergency" means any period during which the Proclamation of State of Emergency made by the President in the exercise of the powers conferred on him by Article 32, is in force.

Power to
proclaim state
of emergency
Act No.15
of 1984 Art.6;
Act No.4 of
1992 Art.11

32.-(1) Subject to this Constitution or to any law enacted by Parliament in that behalf, the President may proclaim a state of emergency in the United Republic or in any part thereof.

(2) The President may proclaim a state of emergency only if -
(a)   the United Republic is at war; or
(b)   there is a real danger that the United Republic is about to be invaded and to be in a state of war; or
(c)   there is actual situation of breakdown of public order or non-existence of public security in the Untied Republic or in any part thereof such that it is necessary to take extraordinary measures to restore order and security; or
(d)   there is a clear and grave danger such that the breakdown of public

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order and the cessation of public safety in the Untied Republic or any part thereof are inescapable except by invoking the extraordinary powers; or

(e) there is imminent occurrence of danger, disaster or environmental calamity which threatens the society or part thereof in the United Republic; or

(f) there is some kind of danger which clearly constitutes a threat to the state.

(3) In the event a state of emergency is proclaimed in relation to the whole of the United Republic, or to the whole of Mainland Tanzania or the whole of Tanzania Zanzibar, the President shall forthwith transmit a copy of the proclamation to the Speaker of the National Assembly who, after consultation with the Leader of Government Business in the National Assembly shall convene a meting of the National Assembly within not more than fourteen days, to consider the situation and decide, whether to pass or not to pass a resolution, which has to be supported by the votes of not less than two thirds of all members, in support of the proclamation of a state of emergency issued by the President.

(4) Parliament may enact a law providing times and procedures which will enable certain persons in charge of Government functions in specified areas of the United Republic to request the President to exercise the powers conferred on him by this Article in relation to any of those areas where there exists any of the situations specified in paragraphs (c), (d) and (e) of subarticle (2) and such situation does not extend beyond the boundaries of such areas, and also for the purpose of specifying the exercise of executive powers during a state of emergency.

(5) A proclamation issued by the President pursuant to this Article shall cease to have effect -

(a) if it is revoked by the President;

(b) if fourteen days from the date of the proclamation have lapsed without there being passed the resolution referred to in subarticle (3);

(c) after the lapse of a period of six months from the date of the proclamation; save that a sitting of the National Assembly may, before the expiration of the period of six months, extend from time to time the period of the operation of the proclamation for further periods of six months by a resolution passed by votes of not less than two-thirds of all the members present;

(d) at any time when a meeting of the National Assembly revokes the proclamation by a resolution supported by votes of not less than two-thirds of all the members.

(6) For the avoidance of doubt in the interpretation or application of the provisions of this Article, the provisions of legislation enacted by Parliament and of any other law, concerning the proclamation of a state of emergency as provided for in this Article shall apply only to the part of the United Republic in respect of which the state of emergency has been proclaimed.

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A.3 Refugee Act, 1998, Sections 16–17: Residence in Designated Area

16.Designated area

(1) The Minister may, by notice in the Gazette, declare any part of the United Republic of Tanzania to be a designated area.

(2) The Director of Refugees Services shall appoint a settlement officer to be in charge of such refugees settlement or of such reception, transit or residence area for asylum seekers or refugees.

(3) Every settlement, reception, shall include all the land and buildings within the settlement, reception, transit, or residence boundaries or enclosure and also any other land or buildings belonging or attached thereto and used by the asylum seekers or the refugees.

(4) In any writ, warrant, instrument or other legal document in which it may be necessary, to describe a particular designated area by reference to the name of the place or town where it is situated, or other definite description such writ, warrant, instrument or legal document shall be valid and sufficient for all purposes.

Provided that geographical boundaries shall clearly be spelt out in the declaration and establishments referred to in subsection (1) of this section respectively.

17.Requirement to reside in a designated area

(1) The competent authority in consultation with the Minister or the Director may by order, require any asylum seeker or refugee or group or category of refugees to whom this section applies who is within his area to reside within a designated area whether or not such area is within the jurisdiction of competent authority.

(2) The competent authority in consultation with the Minister, or the Director may require any asylum seeker or refugee or group or category of refugees to whom this section applies who is within a designated area within such competent authority's area to move to or reside in any other designated area whether within such competent authority's area or not.

(3) Any asylum seeker or refugee to whom an order made under this section applies who–

(A) fails to comply with such order; or

(B) fails to move to or take up resident in a designated area in accordance with such order within reasonable time; or

(C) having arrived at a designated area, in pursuance of such order, leaves or attempts to leave such area, except in pursuance of some other order or permit made under this section, shall be guilty of an offence against this Act.

(4) The competent authority or the Director as the case may be, may vary, revise or cancel any order or requirement made by him under subsections (1) or (2) of this section.

(5)(A) No asylum seeker or refugee shall be allowed to leave a designated area as directed under this section unless he has sought and obtained a permit from Director or Settlement Officer as the case may be, and, subject to such terms and conditions as the Director or a Settlement Officer may prescribe in the permit.

(B) No asylum seeker or refugee may be allowed to be out of a designated area for more than fourteen days unless the Director has allowed in the permit a longer period upon which an asylum seeker or a refugee may stay outside the designated area.

(6) Any asylum seeker or refugee to whom a permit or travel document has been issued under this section who fails to comply with the terms and conditions thereof shall be guilty of an offence against this Act.

A.4 Announcement: Prohibition to Build Houses in the Settlement

Jamhuri ya Muungano wa Tanzania Ofisi ya Waziri Mkuu
Tawala za Mikoa na Serikali za Mitaa

Telegrams: Mkuu Wilaya
Telephone: 0732 988332
Fax: 0732988484
Email: *dc_urambo@yahoo.com*

Mkuu wa Makazi
Makazi ya Ulyankulu
S.L.P. 1948
Tabora

9.02.2009

Yah: Kusitisha ujenzi wa majengo ya makazi

Tafadhali husika na kichwa cha hapo juu.

Kufuatia mchakato wa kuwarudisha wakimbizi wote kurudi nchini kwao na kufungwa kwa makambi na makazi yote nchini, makazi ya Ulyankulu inahusika.

Kwa kuwa makazi hayo yatafungwa na hakutakuwa na mkinbizi yeyote atakayebaki ndani ya makazi Wilayani na Mkoa wa Tabora kwa ujumla, nakuagiza kutoa tangazo la maandishi kwenye vijiji, taasisi za kidini zisizo za serikali na serikali kuwa shughuli zozote na ujenzi wa majengo ya aina yoyote, umesitishwa kuanzia tarehe 01/02/2009 isipokuwa kwa kibali maalum cha MKUU WA WILAYA majengo pekee ambayo yamepata ruhusa ya kuendelea na ujenzi ni Chuo cha VETA pekee. Agizo hili ni pamoja na majengo yanayoendelea kujengwa, yasimame.

Kuhusu watanzania wanaoingia makazi bila utaratibu, andaa tangazo rasmi la kuwataka waondoke na wasiingie eneo la makazi na kununua ardhi wala nyumba kwani kwa kufanya hivyo watakuwa wamekiuka sheria. Matangazo yote mawili viongozi wa vijiji na taasisi zilizo ndani.

Nakutakia utekelezaji mwema.

Kassim M. Majaliwa
Mkuu wa Wilaya
Urambo

[Original text, author's illustration]

United Republic of Tanzania – Prime Minister's Office
Regional and Districts Government Administration

Telegrams: District Commissioner
Telephone: 0732 988332
Fax: 0732988484
Email: *dc_urambo@yahoo.com*

Settlement Officer
Ulyankulu Settlement
S.L.P. 1948
Tabora

9.02.2009

To stop building houses in the settlement

Please refer to the heading above.

Following the process of repatriating all refugees back to their home country and closing all the camps and settlements in the country, [this announcement] applies to Ulyankulu settlement.

Constituting a settlement that will be closed and will not host any refugee who will remain inside of the settlement, in the Districts and the Region of Tabora in total, I command you to take this announcement to the villages, religious institutions, which are not part of the government, and the institutions of the government, which have anything to do with the building of houses of any type, in order to halt construction starting from the 1st February 2009 unless allowed by a special permit of the district commissioner. The only buildings that can still be constructed are those of VETA vocational training school only. This directive also concerns buildings, which are in the process of being constructed. This process should be discontinued.

About the Tanzanians, who enter the settlement without patience, prepare an official announcement to ask them to leave and to not enter the area of the settlement and to neither buy land nor house since to do so means breaching the law.

Any of the two announcements [are directed] to the village leaders and the institutions, which are inside of the settlement.

I wish you a good implementation.

Kassim M. Majaliwa
Mkuu wa Wilaya
Urambo

[Translation: Author, 2013]

A.5 Excerpt of Civics Book for Forms III and IV, Ch.4: Responsible Citizenship

Importance of Citizenship (p.53)

1. A citizen receives legal rights for belonging to a certain country, and is protected as a citizen of that country.

2. It is the legal way of being recognised as a person belonging to particular country.

3. The country receives loyalty from its citizens.

4. A person gains legitimacy to makes decisions in the country. For instance, citizens vote for leaders or can be voted for as leaders.

5. A country can also impose its authority upon its citizens to carry out its policies for the development of the nation.

6. A country gets revenue from its citizens through taxes paid by them.

Duties and and Civil Responsibilities of Citizens

(…)

Responsibilities towards special groups (p. 56–58)

(I) Victims of HIV/AIDS, (II) Women, (III) Disabled people/handicapped

(IV) Refugees: These are people who are forced to leave their homeland and live in other places. This forced migration can be due to various social or political problems like war, drought or famine. Tanzania has experienced refugees from Rwanda, Burundi and DRC. Refugees lack houses, nutritious food, social services like education and health services and suffer from loneliness as a result of family disintegration.

(V) Orphans, (VI) The Youth, (VII) Street Children, (VIII) Elderly People or the aged, (IX) Children

Responsibilities of Citizens to Refugees (p.60)

Citizens should:

(I) Give them basic needs as they arrive. Basically this involves giving them food, clothing and shelter.

(II) Give them basic social services like water, medical care and education for their children.

(III) Ask refugees to refrain from any unlawful acts (offences) like banditry, smuggling, keeping weapons and ammunition, rape and even unlawful correspondence with their home countries.

(IV) Prevent refugees from destroying our environment. This involves preventing them from clearing forests for firewood or practising poor farming methods.

(V) Co-operate with the government and non-governmental organisations, including the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), in taking care of refugees until they go back home.

[Original text, author's illustration]

A.6   Initial Interview Guide for Refugee Respondents (English)

The Past (1)

- When did you come to Ulyankulu and why? Please give a short history of your life up to now.

Life in Ulyankulu (2)

- What work do you do here? What did you work in Burundi?
- What is your family situation?
- How do you spend your free time?
- In what political, economic or cultural activities do you participate in Ulyankulu?
- Are you satisfied with your life in Ulyankulu? How would you improve it, if you could?
- What do you value in your life / in Ulyankulu?

Relations to Tanzanians (3)

- In your daily life who do you talk to?
- Do you have personal or economic contacts to Tanzanians?

Citizenship (4)

- When you chose naturalisation, why did you do so? Why did you not decide to repatriate?
- If you receive citizenship, what will change for you?
- If you have to relocate, where would you go? Why? Would you like to relocate?

Belonging (5)

- Do you feel like you belong to the region of Tabora? Or to Tanzania? Or to Burundi? To your colline in Burundi? To Ulyankulu?
- Do you feel like a Hutu? A Tanzanian? A Burundian? Somebody from Tabora? A refugee? A citizen?
- What factors make you feel like you belong? Could possession of land be a factor for belonging?
- Do you think these questions would be answered differently by your parents/children/wives/husbands?

Diasporic Identity/Relations to Burundi (6)

- What are your connections to Burundi? (Economic/ personal links/ visits/ phone calls/ feelings)? What is your relation to these people?
- Do you know people in other settlements and camps? What is your relation to these people?
- Do you know people who live outside of the camps and settlements? What is your relation to these people?

Contacts (7)

- Do you know people who already got their citizenship certificates? Could you give me their phone number(s)?

A.7   Initial Interview Guide for Refugee Respondents (Swahili)

Wakati uliopita (1)

- Ulikuja Ulyankulu lini? Na kwa nini? Unaweza ukatupa/ukaeleza historia fupi?

Maisha ya Ulyankulu (2)

- Unafanya kazi gani hapa? Na kabla Burundi?
- Hali yako ya kifamilia ikoje?
- Unatumiaje muda/wakati wako wa ziada? (Shughuli za kiuchumi, kisiasa, kiutamaduni)
- Umeridhika na maisha ya Ulyankulu? Unaona yaboreshwe vipi?
- Ni vitu gani kwenye maisha unavyoona ni bora hasahasa hapa Ulyankulu?

Mahusiano na Watanzania (3)

- Katika maisha yako ya kila siku unaongea na kina nani zaidi? Una mawasialiano nao?

Uraia (4)

- Kwa nini ulichagua kuwa raia? Kwa nini ulichagua hivyo na sio kurudi Burundi?
- Unapenda kuhama? Kama unatakiwa kuhama unapendelea kuhamia wapi? Kwa nini?
- Kama ukipatiwa uraia wa Tanzania unaona mabadiliko gani?

Kujihisi kama Mwenyeji (5)

- Unajesikiaje kuwa wewe ni mkazi wa Tabora? Wa Tanzania? Wa Burundi? Wa colline? Wa Ulyankulu?
- Baado unajihisi kama mkimbizi? Mhutu/Mburundi/Mtanzania au mtu kutoka Tabora? Kwa nini?
- Ni sababu zipi zinakufanya ujihisi hivyo?
- Labda ni kuwa na ardhi?

Mahusiano na Burundi (6)

- Una mahusiano gani na Burundi? Ya kiuchumi/binafsi/au unatembelea mawasiliano kwa simu?
- Kuna watu unajuana nao wa kambi au makazi nyingine? Una uhusiano gani na watu hao?
- Unafahamiana na watu wanaoishi nje ya makazi? Una uhusiano gani na watu hao?

Kuwasiliana (7)

- Unafahamu watu ambao wamekwisha pata uraia na vitambululisho vya uraia? Una uhusiano gani na watu hao?

A.8 Ulyankulu Division

Uongozi wa Tarafa ya Ulyankulu — Leadership of Ulyankulu Division
Katibu Tarafa (Division Officer)

Mkuu wa Makazi ya Ulyankulu *Settlement Officer*	Mkuu wa Kituo cha Polisi (Uly) *Police Commander (Uly)*
Mganga Mkuu Kituo cha Afya (Uly) *Main doctor of the health centre (Uly)*	Hakimu wa Mahakama ya Mwanzo (Uly) *Judge of the First Court Ulyankulu*
Afisa wa Misitu Milambo *Forest Officer of Milambo*	Mratibu Elimu Kata Milambo *Education Coordinator Milambo ward*
Afisa Kilimo/Mifugo Milambo *Officer of Agriculture and Lifestock Milambo*	Afisa wa Afya Milambo *Health Officer of Milambo*

Ulyankulu Division: Wards and Villages

Kashishi	Sasu	Seleli	Ichemba	Kanoge	Mwongozo	Silambo	Uyowa
Kashishi (Sasu)	Sasu K'ngdeo	Seleli Bulela	Ichemba Makingi	Kanoge Ul'anga	Mwongozo Ibambo	Usonga Nsungwa	~~Uhindi~~ Song- ambele
(Seleli)	Ilege	(Mwen- dakulima)	Nhwande		Mwanluti	Uhindi	~~Nsungwa~~
Iyombo	Mkilingi	Nhanga	Utantamke		~~Kanoge~~		Mwen- dakulima
(Nyasa) Kingwangkoko		Nyasa Busanda	Uliunga(?)				

*The original wards belonging to Ulyankulu Division besides Milambo, Kanindo and Igombemkulu within the settlement were Kashishi, Ichemba, Mwongozo and Uyowa. Later, Sasu, Seleli, Kanoge and Silambo were added as wards. This is why some villages were struck out in the original chart. Further villages that appear twice are in brackets. A few were not very well readable, so these are indicated with a question mark.

A.9 Plates: Market, Churches, Schools, Transport and Research Environment in Ulyankulu

The Market at Road 13, Kaswa, Ulyankulu

From top to bottom: a. Fabrics for Sale, b. Household Utensils, c. Kitenge Shop, d. Refugee Woman Selling Jatropha Syrup (Author, 2012)

Religious Services: Churches and the Mosque in Ulyankulu Settlement

From top to bottom:

a. Centre Baptist Church, Kaswa
b. Choir in Catholic Church, Kaswa
c. Pentecostal Church, Mapigano
d. Ulyankulu Mosque, Kaswa

Right:

e. Pastor in Baptist Church, Ikonongo (Author, 2012)

Schools in and around Ulyankulu Settlement

From top to bottom: Ulyankulu Secondary School - a. In the Classroom, b. Outside Area, c. Donor Plate, d. Lab Door; e. Secondary School in Ichemba with Water Tank (Author, 2012)

Transport in Ulyankulu

Plates (from top to bottom):

a. Main transport in Ulyankulu: Bicycles
b. Oxcart
c. Fuelling the car
d. Motorbike used during fieldwork

(Author, 2012)

The Research Environment

From top to bottom: a. As a Participant-Observer on the Market, b. House where the Researcher lived at VETA Ulyankulu, c. Guesthouse on the VETA Compound (Author, 2012)

From top to bottom: a. Old Electricity Generator at VETA, b. M-Pesa Banking Service Shop in Kaswa, c. Mobile Phone Charging Service (Author, 2012)

A.10   Programme of Inauguration of Ulyankulu Secondary School Extension

JAPAN
Official Development Assistance

United Nations
TANZANIA
Delivering as One

UNHCR
The UN Refugee Agency

Inauguration of Ulyankulu Secondary School extension
2nd August 2012

COMMEMORATION PROGRAMME

13.30 – 13.55	Arrival of Guests
	Welcome songs and dance performance *by students from Ulyankulu Secondary School*
13.55 – 14.00	Introduction *by Master of Ceremony, M. Shamir Wilfred, UNHCR Field Assistant*
14.00 – 14.10	Welcoming remarks and briefing on construction works conducted *by Mr. Alfred Njire, Headmaster of Ulyankulu Secondary School*
14.10 – 14.20	Statement of UNHCR Tanzania *delivered by UNHCR Acting Representative, Ms. Chansa Kapaya*
14.20 – 14.30	Handover Ceremony for

- 2 motorbikes to Urambo District
- 2 LC vehicles to Tabora Regional Commissioner's Office
- 10 tricycles to Especially Vulnerable Individuals

handed over by UNHCR Acting Representative, Ms. Chansa Kapaya

14.30 – 14.50	Inauguration of Ulyankulu Secondary School extension: *Cutting the red ribbon and visit of the newly constructed buildings*
	Cultural entertainment *by students from Ulyankulu Secondary School*
14.50 – 14.55	Thanksgiving remarks by student representatives from Ulyankulu Secondary School
14.55 – 15.05	Statement of the Embassy of Japan *delivered by the Ambassador of Japan, H.E. Mr. Masaki Okada*
15.05 – 15.15	Statement of the Government of Tanzania *delivered by the Tabora Regional Commissioner Hon. Ms. Fatma A. Mwassa*
15.15 – 15.20	Closing remarks by M.C.