

The Rise of Polri:

Democratisation and the Political Economy of

Security in Indonesia

Jacqueline Baker

Department of Government

London School of Economics and Political Science

Thesis Submitted for the Degree of *Doctor in Philosophy*

18 June 2012

Abstract

In Indonesia, successful democratisation from military authoritarian rule has pushed the military ‘back to the barracks’ and restored the rule of law. This process of moving from authoritarian-military to civil-juridical authority has taken place in multiple ways across the political system, however most notably in the rise of the police as an institutional actor, the restoration of their authority over domestic and national security and law enforcement.

Scholarship shows how criminality and the criminal contingent have been crucial in every way to state formation in Indonesia. Throughout history, the security institutions have mediated those forms of criminality and the state’s overarching relationship with the illicit. One of the ways the relationship between the state and criminal practices has manifested itself has been in the mechanisms of illicit extraction and accumulation broadly known as “corruption”. Despite the regularizing effects of democratisation, the security sector continues to be resourced primarily by a vast illicit economy, called the off-budget economy. I show how Polri’s new authoritative role in security and law enforcement has opened up the spoils of this economy to the police in two important criminal economies; the gift economy of indigenous Chinese traders and the illegal gambling economy in Jakarta.

This thesis demonstrates how the transformation from military-coercive to civil-juridical modalities of power has not improved the quality of Indonesia’s democracy or rule of law. Rather, democratisation has caused a restructuring in the political economy of security and facilitated the rise of Polri as a perverse political actor within

the Indonesian state and society. The intimacy of the Indonesian state with illicit practices has been reconfigured anew.

Table of Contents

Title Page.....	1
Abstract.....	3
Table of Contents.....	5
Acknowledgements.....	7
List of Tables, Figures and Photographs.....	12
Introduction.....	25
Democratisation and the Illicit Financing of the State	25
Genealogy of a Criminal State	33
The Structure of Polri	41
Connecting Capital and Coercion.....	45
The Structure of the Dissertation.....	49
Methods for the Study of Tubers.....	53
Section One: The <i>Parman</i> Economy.....	62
Chapter II: The Civilianisation of Patronage.....	63
The Art of Fictive Accountancy.....	68
The Anti-Bureaucratic Bureaucracy	75
<i>Cukongism</i> : The Gift Economy of <i>Tionghoa</i> Patronage.....	80
The Militarisation of Sino-Capital in the Golden Triangle.....	94
Foundations, Cooperatives and <i>Cukong</i> in ABRI's Charity Economy.....	99
State Budgets and Fiscal (In)Adequacy.....	110
New <i>Tionghoa</i> Civil Society and the Machine of Patronage.....	114
Chapter III: Disequilibrium and the Gift.....	129

The Nervous System	139
Principles of the Gift.....	152
Anatomy of <i>Tionghoa</i> Patronage: Origins.....	155
Anatomy of <i>Tionghoa</i> Patronage: Reciprocity Denied	162
Fidelity and the Limits of Knowledge.....	170
Section Two: The <i>Parmin</i> Economy.....	181
Chapter IV: The Rise and Fall of Casino Gambling.....	183
An Anthropology of Urban Gaming.....	185
<i>Judi</i> and the Metropolitan City.....	198
The Criminalisation and Consolidation of the New Order State	212
Licit and Illicit Gaming in the Late New Order	218
‘ <i>Judi Jadi Gila</i> :’ Democratisation and the Liberalisation of the Criminal Economy.....	229
Chapter V: Sutanto’s Twin War on Vices.....	249
<i>Pemberantasan!</i> The End of Casino Gambling.....	251
Parman vs Parmas: Beyond the Meaning of Money.....	262
Pacts of Licit and Illicit Worlds.....	276
Turning Law into <i>Lahan</i> : The War on Drugs 2004-2009.....	286
Extraction and the Economy of Torture.....	298
Conclusion.....	314
Bibliography.....	318
Appendices.....	347

Acknowledgements

This thesis is for the people of Indonesia. For 13 long years as I have stomped across your terrain you have met my idiocy and impertinence with grace, you have treated me with the greatest of generosity, flattered my ego and greeted me with a disarming humbleness. You have called me your *teman* [friend], given me what I asked when you could and showed me the error of the question itself when you couldn't.

Indonesia has given me far more than my country or I have ever given her and this she has done without keeping score. Of her some 250 million people, I owe a particular debt to Ola Santoso, Achmad Suaedy, Lies Marcoes, Herbin Siahaan, Christine Susana Tijin, Yosep Adi Prasetyo, Karaniya Dharmasaputra, Heri T. Prihatono, Udin Syamsuddin, Danang Widoyoko, Setiawan Cahyo Nugroho, Ricky Gunawan, Christine Tambunan, Bambang Umar Widodo, Yeni and Dian. I also owe a special debt of thanks to my research assistants Ferry Siahaan, Dewi Astuti, Risna Karini, Muslichah Setiasih and Hangga Prastiwi. It seems hardly fitting that I thank you for your assistance in my research, when in fact it was you who taught me so much of how to research this sprawling, bewildering archipelago. Many other people go unappreciated here. As Caroline Nordstrom observes in Global Outlaws, those who have contributed to the work are those least likely to want to be recognized in print and so this list is partial by necessity and not neglect. My debt to the persons who gave me their time and confidence must be paid in other ways.

To Ken Crompton, Peter Binks, the Board of Directors and my fellow scholars of the John Monash Foundation who not only generously provided financial support to my education but who slapped me on the back and rooted for me all the way. I also

gratefully acknowledge the assistance of the LSE's Department of Government, the Australian Friends of the LSE and the Central Travel Fund of the University of London for their generous assistance in this doctoral project. In Indonesia, this fieldwork was graciously supported by LIPI and the Freedom Institute.

The course of this dissertation has been fundamentally changed by the input and support given to me by a series of excellent scholars who have taken the time to share with me their thoughts, methods and support for my work. I am hugely indebted to Marcus Mietzner, Loren Ryter, Joshua Barker, Douglas Kammen, Gerry Van Klinken, Santiago Villaveces, Peter Van Tuijl, Kirsten Schulze, Alice Hills and Mercedes Hinton. I owe a special debt of thanks to Gillian Nevins and Tim Parritt from Amnesty International who spent hours tutoring me on the analysis of police structures and policy. I continue to be inspired by the originality, daring and depth of thought of fellow ethnographers of the police such as Eric Hanstaad, Olly Owen, Julia Hornberger and, especially, Bea Jauregui. My experiences of coming to know Indonesia have been inextricably bound up with my growing intimacy with a loose and shifting group of people one might refer to as 'the Indonesianists' but whom I prefer to think of as my siblings in the scholarship of the region. After so long in the area there are too many of you to list here, but a few in particular have been with me all the way. For their support and generosity of spirit I thank Angie Bexley, Antonia Staats, Rachael Diprose, Rebecca Henschke, Quinton Temby and Dave McRae.

At the London School of Economics, I owe a deep debt to my *kakak kelas* [older siblings] Claire Smith and Nai Chng Rai and contemporaries Sarah McLaughlin, Sofia Sebastian, Guy Burton, Aude Michelet, Emilie Hitch, Gabor Somogyi and

Elizabeth Franz for their support during fieldwork and write up. Special thanks go to Michael Buehler who gave me so much of his time, energy and wit as I grappled with this project. I thank Laurens Bakker and especially Lee Wilson for lending me their considerable experience and wisdom on certain sections of the draft. To Dr Fenella Cannell for her sharp insightful comments, always gently and perceptively served. Finally to my supervisor, Professor John T. Sidel, who combines humour and humility with a truly humbling intellect and unique ability to inspire. I simply could not have asked for a better supervisor.

Thank you to my parents, siblings and little '*Gesu*' for the gifts of understanding, patience and the odd kick while I fussed, flapped and complained. I also thank Tanzil Rahman, Kirsty Umback, Matteo Columbo and Chris Lucas for lending me their considerable talents in putting this thesis together. I owe special debt of thanks to Jacky Hicks for her astute comments, rigour and unfailing support in the final drafts. This dissertation would not have been completed at all without the support of the marvelous Mr Piero Moraro who has rescued me, and this body of work, in more ways and more often than is possible to remember. Every page of this thesis, and the thousands more it took to produce them, indexes a moment of his love, selflessness and abiding humour in what is truly a remarkable partnership. How lucky I am to have the rest of my life to make it up to him.

And finally to David Pinson, my partner in crime in the capital, for all the 'shits and giggles', for best-friendship in and out of Jakarta, for generosity of place and privilege, hot showers and the luxury of washing machines. To 'Pak Devid' who loved literature, life and laughing. To 'Pak Devid' who would joke about being a

mere footnote in this dissertation and yet who is wholly inextricable from every part of this work. To ‘Pak Devid’, in whose loving memory this thesis is dedicated. You are so very, very missed.

List of Tables, Figures & Photographs

Figure 1: Diagram of State and Public Accountability of Polri.....	13
Figure 2: Organisational Structure of the Regional Police Station.....	14
Figure 3: Organisational Structure of the District Police Station.....	15
Figure 4: Organisational Structure of the Sectoral Police Station.....	16
Table 1: Rank of Polri.....	17
Figure 5: Current Territorial Structure of Coercive Apparatus (2008).....	20
Figure 6: 2003 Map of Police and Military Territorial Presence in Jakarta.....	21
Figure 7: Map of Field Site – Menteng Dalam.....	22
Photograph 1: Dalmas Officers, <i>Hari Bhayangkara</i> [Anniversary of Police].....	23
Photograph 2: Propam Officers, <i>Hari Bhayangkara</i>	23

Chapter I

Photograph 3: Woman Prays for Protection and Prosperity at the Jin De Yuan Temple, Glodok.....	62
Table 2: Department of Defence/ Polri Budget 2001-2009 (Trillions of Rupiah)....	75
Photograph 4: Polda Metro Jaya's Densus 88 Building under Construction.....	94
Table 3: Subsidiaries of <i>Yayasan Brata Bhakti</i>	107
Table 4: Budgetary Development in the Defence and Security Sector in Trillions of Rupiah (1973-74).....	111
Table 5: Annual Budgetary Development of Hankam during <i>Repelita VI</i> (Billions of Rupiah).....	112
Figure 8: Excerpt from National News, Man of Today Insp. Gen. Adang Firman...123	
Figure 9: Excerpt from National News, Yayasan Tzu Chi.....	125

Chapter II

Photograph 4: Mural Crocodile versus Gecko.....173

Photograph 5: *Gerakan Oposisi Mahasiswa* Protest.....174

Photograph 6: The Crowd Boos Anggodo Widjojo.....175

Chapter III:

Photograph 7: Casino Workers Fill Jakarta's Bars.....181

Figure 10: Map of Jakarta's Main Gambling Sites.....182

Photograph 8: Man and Fighting Cock.....189

Photograph 9: *Bajai* Drivers Betting Cigarettes on Dominos.....195

Table 6: Revenue Sources DKI 1974-80.....208

Photograph 10: The Fourth Floor of Harco Mangga Dua.....237

Photograph 11: Harco Mangga Dua.....238

Photograph 12: Kaliber II (*sebelas*).....239

Chapter IV

Table 7: Seizures of Marijuana, Heroin, Ecstasy and Shabu by Indonesian Police
2004-2009.....292

Table 8: Number of Criminal Suspects on Narcotics Charges per Year 2004-2009.300

Figure 11: Cartoon from Human Rights Training for AKPOL students, the Asia
Foundation & Pusham UII.....311




Figure 1: Diagram of State & Public Accountability of the National Police. The black arrows denote state accountability. The blue arrows denote bodies designed to provide public accountability of the police. Note that Polri are directly under the President and that the newly established KOMPOLNAS has the dual function of overseeing the police as well as collecting public complaints about them.

STRUKTUR ORGANISASI POLDA STANDAR

STANDARD REGIONAL POLICE STATION




Figure 2: Organisational Diagram of Regional Police Station (Polda)




Figure 3: Organisational Diagram of District Police Station (Polres)

STRUKTUR ORGANISASI POLSEK
ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE OF
SUB-DISTRICT POLICE




Figure 4: Organisational Diagram of Sectoral Police Station (Polsek)

Table 1: Ranks of Polri

Senior Officers: Perwira Tinggi (PATI)

Jenderal Polisi	Police General	Four Gold Stars	General
Komisaris Jenderal Polisi KOMJEN Pol	Commissioner General of Police	Three Gold stars	Lieutenant General
Inspectur Jenderal Polisi IRJEN Pol (formerly MAYJEN)	Inspector General of Police	Two Gold Stars	Major General
Brigadir Jenderal Polisi BRIGJEN Pol	Brigadier General of Police	One Gold Star	Brigadier General

Middle officers: Perwira Menengah (PAMEN)

Komisaris Besar Polisi KOMBES Pol	Senior Police Commissioner	Three Gold Melati (Melati = Jasmine Flower)	Colonel
Ajun Komisaris Besar Polisi AKBP	Adjunct Senior Police Commissioner	Two Gold Melati	Lieutenant Colonel
Komisaris Polisi KOMPOL	Police Commissioner	One Gold Melati	Major

Junior Officers: Perwira Pertama (PAMA)

Ajun Komisaris Polisi - AKP	Adjunct Police Commissioner	Three Gold Bars	Captain
Inspektur Polisi Satu - IPTU	First Police Inspector	Two Gold Bars	First Lieutenant
Inspektur Polisi Dua IPDA	Second Police Inspector	One Gold Bar	Second Lieutenant

Senior Enlisted Officers: Bintara

Ajun Inspektur Polisi Satu – AIPTU	Adjunct First Police Inspector	Two Silver Double Chevrons (pointing up)	Chief Warrant Officer
Ajun Inspectur Polisi Dua - AIPDA	Adjunct Second Police Inspector	One Silver Double Chevrons (pointing up - M)	Warrant Officer
Brigadir Polisi Kepala - BRIPKA	Senior Police Brigadier	Four Silver Chevrons (Pointing up)	Sergeant Major
BRIGADIR Polisi	Police Brigadier	Three Silver Chevrons (Up)	Master Sergeant
Brigadir Polisi Satu BRIPTU	First Police Brigadier	Two Silver Chevrons (Up)	Sergeant 1 st Class
Brigadir Polisi Dua BRIPDA	Second Police Brigadier	One Silver Chevron (Pointing Up)	Sergeant 2 nd Class

Junior Enlisted Officers – Tamtama

Ajun Brigadir Polisi ABRIP	Adjunct Police Brigadier	Three Red Chevrons (pointing Down)	Corporal
Ajun Brigadir Polisi Satu ABRIPTU	Adjunct First Police Brigadier	Two Red Chevrons (pointing Down)	Corporal 1 st Class
Ajun Brigadir Polisi Dua ABRIPDA	Adjunct Second Police Brigadier	One Red Chevron (pointing Down)	Corporal 2 nd Class
Bhayangkara Kepala - BHARAKA	Police Agent	Three Red Slanted Bars	Police Agent
Bhayangkara Satu BHARATU	Police Agent 1 st Class	Two Red Slanted Bars	Police Agent 1 st Class
Bhayangkara Dua BHARADA	Police Agent 2 nd Class	One Red Slanted Bar	Police Agent 2 nd Class
Pegawai Negeri Sipil - PNS	Civil Servant		

**Since 1998 Polri have changed rank twice, in July 2000 and again in January 2001.*

Where police officers are named in this thesis, their position and rank are stated in accordance with standards of the time.




Figure 5: Current Territorial Structure of Coercive Apparatus (2008). Note that the Kodam and Korem do not correspond exactly to the territorial structure of Polri. In 2010, under the leadership of Kapolri Bambang Danuri, Polri simplified its territorial system by erasing a layer of lesser police stations between the polda and the polres, such as the polwil and polwiltabes (Perpres, 2010).




Figure 6: 2003 Map of Police and Military Territorial Presence in Jakarta. The yellow areas represent heavy industry while the orange is private, corporate land. Each division represents a *kecamatan* [subdistrict] of the city. Note that this map is of the province zoned as DKI Jakarta and does not include other new property developments discussed in the following chapter such as the Jabotabek region of Tangerang, Bekasi, and Bogor. (Dinas Pertahanan & Pemetaan, 2003)



Figure 7: Map of Central Jakarta showing field site, the ward of Menteng Dalam in the subdistrict of Tebet.



Photograph 1 & 2: On the day of the police anniversary [*Hari Bhayangkara*], public order (Dalmas) troops display their skills. They are watched over by a one star (Brig. Gen) general (behind) and a one-jasmine

flower police commissioner (front) from the police internal affairs division (Propam). Behind them bereted troops from the mobile brigade (Brimob) stand to attention.¹

¹ Photographs by Author. 01.07.08.

Introduction

‘The days of coup-making by the military are over in this country. The police, on the other hand, will pose quite a few problems’.

Argentine Police Officer, 1984²

‘Now days, the police are the pretty girl of politics, to be fought over by the political powers’.

Three star Polri general.

‘*Uang, uang, uang, semua di sini tentang uang*’.

‘Money, money, money, everything here is about money.’

One star Polri general at HQ.

Democratisation and the Illicit Financing of the State

This thesis is about the off-budget economies of Indonesia’s security apparatus, how these criminal economies are shaped and rearranged by a process of ‘successful’ democratisation, and what in turn those effects say about the state’s ongoing relationship to illicit practices.

² Quoted in Eaton, Kent, 2008, ‘Paradoxes of Police Reform: Federalism, Parties and Civil Society in Argentina’s Public Security Crisis’. *Latin American Research Review*, vol. 43, no. 3, pp. 5-34.

We know much about what happens, or at least what should happen, when military-authoritarian states undergo democratisation. Militaries surrender their prominent positions in politics and domestic security to defer to civilian supremacy. The political structure of the state and its decision-making processes are opened up and subject to liberalising forces. At the same time, states undergo a process of entrenchment through the strengthening of the rule of ‘law’ and institution building. Case studies of democratisation generally look at these tangible, ‘sunlit’ (Bridenthal, 2012) elements of the state - militaries, elections, local politics, civil society and law – in order to evaluate the tenor and quality of the democratisation process. Certainly this approach has a strong following in the study of Indonesia’s recent democratisation. In this dissertation, I take a different view and demonstrate that we get a very different kind of understanding of the potentials and limits of democratic change by looking at the hidden criminal practices central to the state’s existence. For the purposes of this dissertation, I narrow my focus to the off-budget economy that sustains the Indonesian security sector, principally the National Indonesian Police (Polri). By the ‘off-budget economy’, I am referring to divergent and hidden sources of cash, gifts and other material resources that together illicitly finance the police institution and its agents.

Politically embedded studies of the ‘off budget economy’ are not a feature of the literature on democratisation. Indeed, ‘off-budget economy’ is not a term common to the political science literature. A comparable, though dissonant, literature on a parallel concept, the ‘extra-budgetary economy’, exists in the scholarship on public finance and fiscal management. Much of this scholarship is dominated by publications from the IMF or the World Bank. Here, extra-budgetary funds (EBF) ‘refer to general

government transactions, often with separate banking and institutional arrangements that are not included in the annual state (federal) budget law and the budgets of subnational levels of government' (Allen & Radev, 2010). EBF complement regular budgetary funds, but because they are accumulated through institutional entrepreneurship, the EBF are managed with different or decreased stringency. They are a flexible revenue source, provided by voluntary donation or through enterprise, available for contingent purposes and largely unregulated. For instance, foreign aid is a source of EBF. So too are voluntary donations to the United Nations. What is remarkable is that since the 1980s EBF increasingly constitute a primary, rather than a supplementary, revenue source. If organisations are increasingly funded 'off the regularising track' of public revenues, this raises questions about whether priorities are being made in the public or donor interest (Vaughn et al. 1996).

As well as transactions, states also establish 'extra-budgetary' operations, accounts or entities that lay outside the purview of public funding (Allen & Radev, 2010). An extra-budgetary unit might raise money through the imposition of levies in order to fund services. The extra-budgetary nature of these entities raises important questions about the state's ability to discipline its various internal components and know its real fiscal position. However, this literature underscores that one of the biggest problems with extra-budgetary funding is that their flexible and under-regulated nature leaves them open to misuse and corruption.

EBF are a prominent feature of the fiscal system of developing and transitional states with decentralized or decentralising governments, such as in Russia (Ross, 1987), highly fragmented power structures such as Lebanon or dominant militaries such as

Nigeria (Omitoogun & Oduntan, 2006). EBF are a feature of state financing in every state in Africa (Levy & Kpundah, 2004, pp. 198). This is also due to unreliability and inefficiencies in the public funds transfer system, leading for instance in Mozambique, to entire ministries relying solely on EBF to fund governance (ibid, pp. 170).

The literature on EBF and fiscal irregularity is most developed in the case of China, where the relationships between local and central governments are central to the life of the regime. These reforms – ‘eating from two kitchens’ - have created the conditions for the expansion of an extra-budgetary economy so great that it is known informally as the ‘second budget’ (Wang, pp. 87, 95). Indeed, the estimated total sum of this budget far exceeds that of public revenues (ibid, also, Pei, 2008, 177-8).

In an important article that brings together the literature on public finance and corruption in developmental states, Lu argues that EBF in local Chinese governments form the basis for a system of ‘organisational corruption’ (2000). The levying of taxes and fees are one way in which local governments extract EBF. This is in keeping with theories of state predation, where the apparatus of extraction studied is lawful (Levi, 1981; Tilly, 1986; Thies, 2007; Thies, 2009) though illegitimate. However, local governments also use criminal means to accumulate EBF. They levy illicit charges, use regulatory powers unlawfully, fail to report earnings, establish secret ‘slush funds’ and companies to monopolise local resources and contracts. Closeted from the central fiscal apparatus, extra-budgetary funds feed a vast internal economy –‘wining and dining, gifts and bribes’ - for the career advancement of and power-hoarding by state officials (2000, 281). Lu’s analysis shows us the importance

of opening up the analysis of state predation to criminal activity by demonstrating how methods for the extraction of unregulated state finance traverse licit and illicit worlds. In their own analysis of local government budgets in China, Lin and Song use the terms ‘off-budget’ and ‘extra-budgetary funds’ interchangeably (2007, pp. 63). This is indicative of the way state predation adopts legal and illegal forms which often reinforce and bolster each other to maximize illicit extraction.

Lu argues that extra-budgetary financing is a critical tool of what he calls “organised corruption”, which he defines as ‘illicit action ...by a public agency to achieve monetary or material gains for the agency as a whole through the use of its power or monopoly’ (ibid, 274). Lu concludes that organised corruption in China is a transitional phenomenon that scores a precise moment in Chinese state formation when the developmental state meets a traditional administrative system. His notion of corruption as organised or institutionalized critiques conventional definitions of corruption – such as ‘the abuse of public office for private gain’ (Nye, 1967) - that approach ‘corrupt’ practice as merely an expression of individual deviance. Rather, Lu’s idea of ‘organised corruption’ nods to the overall structural context in which extra-budgetary funds are accumulated and the fact that the beneficiaries of EBF are not just greed-driven state officials but whole branches of local government that rely upon the shadow economy to enact practices and performances of governance. By locating ‘corruption’ in local government ‘organisation’, Lu protects our *idea* of the state. Local institutions act in predatory and criminal ways, while federal authorities are motivated by the same positivist regulatory and legal impulses that we expect of states.

But there is a clear tension between the failure or inability to eradicate localized ‘organised corruption’ and reaping the benefits from it. After all it is the federal authorities that have reduced their allocations to their provincial tiers, encouraged self-financing and taken an ambiguous stance on illicit revenue-raising activity, oscillating between a feigned ignorance and a stern ‘crackdown’. ‘Organisational corruption’ fails to recognize that the Chinese state has created the specific configuration of social, political and economic life under which EBF can flourish, undermining ordinary tax revenues and giving life to a vast subterranean economy that underpins and finances the workings of the state. As a theoretical concept, ‘organisational corruption’ reinforces a positivist distance between state and illicit practices. The criminality of the state is an aberrance that stands outside of and in opposition to the formal and functional purpose of governance. Rather, in this thesis, I propose that all states extend themselves through illicit practices; indeed, that states are criminal by nature.

Critical legal and anthropological scholarship of the state has much to offer the study of the criminality of states. As Smart observes, ‘the modern state is not made up of law and order alone, but a complex web of the legal and illegal’ (1999). The focus on ‘the convergence of legal and illegal practice’ (Bridenthal, 2012) exposes the idolatry of the State and its disciplining technologies of law and regulation (Nuitjen & Anders, 2007), and details the perverse and indirect ways in which the fixing of law ‘creates the conditions under which criminal economies flourish’ (Heyman & Smart, 1999). In this literature law mystifies and masks state predation. Law claims a democratic applicability, immutability and replicability and yet ethnography has shown us how

law is situated and indeterminate (Ling, 2011, Hoag, 2011). Thus, it is law itself that acts the midwife to its own violation (Nuitjen & Anders, 2006).

Ethnography has shown how states, through law, produce and prey upon structures, groups and practices that it simultaneously marks as ‘criminal’ (Heyman & Smart, 1999; Roitman, 2004; Nordstrom, 2010, Coutin, 2005, Penglase 2009, Naylor, 2010). This literature has shown how the power to determine illegality is itself productive for states; substantiating arguments for its own aggrandizement and militarisation (Caldiera, 2000, Tilly, 1985), justifying neoliberal policies (Comaroff & Comaroff, 2006; Galemba, 2008), supplying cheap, easily disposable streams of labour (Hansen & Stepputat, 2005, Coutin, 2005), freeing monies and markets from public scrutiny (Roitman, 2004) as well as ‘parsing individual and groups lives into categories’ (Penglase, Kane & Parnell, 2009; 109). This generates specific kinds of citizens (Caldiera, 2000; Roitman 2004, Hansen & Stepputat, 2005, Comaroff, 2009) and ‘guilty’ subjectivities (Griffin, 2011). This rich and detailed literature illustrates the centrality of law to state predation and consequently, the poverty of the ‘corruption’ concept, ‘organised’ or ‘individual’.

However, most scholarship in this vein has fixed its ethnographic gaze on politically stable if ‘disorderly’ post-colonies. This critical literature has been much less attentive as to how political change has transformed the embedded illicit practices of states. Democratisation is particularly interesting to the study of criminal states for two reasons. Firstly, democratisation beckons a wholesale reorganisation of the distribution of political power. This is a celebrated aim of democratisation however, empirically rich studies have repeatedly thrown up the perverse and unintended

effects of power's dispersion (Ryter, 2009; Hadiz, 2003, Shakow, 2011). In Indonesia, for instance, democratisation from military authoritarian rule under President Suharto has given rise to the emergence of plethora 'mini-Suhartos' (Nordholt & Van Klinken, 2007) studded across a decentralising political system. Given that patterns in crime have long reflected the complex configurations of political power, it stands to reason that democratisation will reorganise the modalities of extraction, modes of accumulation and instrumental parties invested in the state's relationship to the criminal world. Oddly, the reorganisation of state criminality occurs in ways that maintains the performance of successful democratisation rather than fatally undermining it.

Secondly, one of the central tenets of democratisation is that it promises a regularisation of state processes and a regulatory disciplining of populations, by reinstating the rule of law. In this way, democratisation marks an important moment in state formation, fixing definitively the practices of the state to an objectified, articulated body of knowledge we call law. Theoretically, rule of law assures 'political rights, civil liberties, and mechanisms of accountability which in turn affirm the political equality of all citizens and constrain potential abuses of state power' (O'Donnell, 2004). Rule of law pledges the effective, responsive functioning of government and provides the requisite stability for free markets to flourish. In this way, rule of law promises a new political modernity, an alluring prosperity, and a leveling of the irregular, corrupt and criminal ripples of the post-authoritarian state. However, if we presume that all states at all levels of formation make instrumental use of criminal worlds, then democratisation represents a critical moment wherein the forms and ideology of illicit extraction contract, expand or are otherwise reorganised.

If the forms and degree of state criminality traverses a spectrum, from the overt criminality of pariah and authoritarian narco-states (McCoy, 1999) to the sophisticated illegality of established democracies reaping profits from laundered monies (Sharman, 2011), then democratisation marks the critical mid-way point in the reconfiguration of the state's relationship to criminal practice. Because democratisation reorganises political power and regularises the state, democratisation heralds new players, new means of extraction, new logics of criminality and new scales of illicit accumulation. This thesis examines the changes democratisation has brought in the illicit financing of the Indonesian state and argues that exercises to strengthen the rule of law have in fact provided a new basis upon which to extract and accumulate illicit wealth.

Genealogy of a Criminal State

Indonesia is an ideal case study to examine the relationship between political change, law and illicit practice because the New Order's own relationship to law veered between extremes of fetish and ambiguity³. As scholarship has demonstrated, the dimensions of the regime's criminality were multiple, even national (Siegel, 1998). In 1965-66 the regime led by General Suharto established itself in a military coup – a moment of legal exception that became known as the New Order. Paradoxically, the New Order founded itself in a sustained period of rural chaos in which hundreds of thousands of suspected Communists were effectively massacred by military officers and ordinary civil agents working in tandem. Despite coming to power on a pledge to

³ Siegel, James, 1998, *A New Criminal Type in Jakarta: Counter Revolution Today*, Duke University Press, Durham. Ryter, Loren, 2002, 'Youth, Gangs and the State in Indonesia', PhD thesis, University of Washington, Washington.

restore a *negara hukum* [state of law] (Lev, 2000), the civil-juridical order of law was repeatedly trumped by military coercion in the state's management and manufacture of communist and 'criminal' threats. It was this disorientating oscillation between rule of law and its calculated fracture that characterised the kind of fraught, contingent order that the regime sought to install.

First, communists and then criminals were designated as the great specters of disorder and illegality under the regime. And yet the New Order state's own relationship to criminality was direct and literal. The state party, Golkar [*Golongan Karya*, or the Functional Groups party], regularly nurtured and employed criminals and gangsters known as *preman* to disrupt elections, tarnish the opposition and legitimise General Suharto's epic thirty-two year presidency. Similarly ABRI [*Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia*], the New Order's primary coercive apparatus that subsumed the national police [Polri] under the military, carried out extrajudicial law enforcement and defensive tasks through nationalist militia and *preman* [state-sponsored gangster] organisations.

In 1983 when this groomed criminal contingent grew unruly, their tattooed corpses mysteriously littered the morning markets, stations and cinemas. The killings, known as Petrus, took place with the applause of the middle classes for whom the coercive-authoritarian nature of the state rightly eclipsed legal process. Repeated references to Petrus in the literature on criminality in Southeast Asia (Barker, 1999; Pemberton, 1994; Siegel, 1998) agree that the execution of thieves marked a critical moment in state formation in which the basis for legitimate state authority was revealed as essentially coercive rather than legal, as the regime had repeatedly claimed. The broad

swell of support for the mass execution of thieves suggested something too of the unique way in which extrajudicial violence under the New Order could dispel the boundaries between state and society (Mitchell, 1991; Ryter, 2002). Observes Bourchier,

Perhaps the most telling cleavage which the Petrus episode helped to illuminate was not between ‘the state’ and ‘civil society’ but between those within the state whose concept of authority is ultimately based on the force of arms and those who aspire to a future in which *law* replaces violence as the most effective medium of social control (1990; 201. My italics).

What made Petrus more than an instance of utilitarian or instrumentalised state criminality was the way in which the practice of the *killings* and their discursive forms revealed an unexpected and intimate envy between the state and the plebian criminal classes. Notes Siegel, ‘to the state, the menace was an attraction. It was the lethal power that the state wanted for its own...the state itself took on the form of a criminal in order to obtain this power’ (1998, pg 9). That the New Order sought to periodically mimic the criminal in order to possess something of his power shows the regime’s complex, often contradictory, relationship to law and its curious recognition that power resides in legal and socio-cultural orders alike.

Compounding its violence, the New Order was also a kleptocratic regime *par excellence*. The president parceled out monopolies to mainly ethnic Chinese [Tionghoa] cronies in return for kickbacks to his family and other courted political power brokers, such as ABRI. Moreover, by simultaneously overpopulating and then under-resourcing the bureaucratic apparatus, President Suharto encouraged the state’s

institutions and its agents to build their budgets from the harvest of illegal tithes, bribes, industries of vice, foundations and businesses (McLeod, 2008). By promoting the individual entrepreneurial fiscal ethic of state institutions, Suharto weakened the capacity of the state to function as a coherent bureaucratic structure. Aside from their magnetic loyalty to the executive, the President created a state whose components functioned independently as primarily business enterprises. State institutions were networked but lateral ties were strained as institutions competed for the legal and regulatory authorities that would yield illicit rents.

Within the internal hierarchy of the state, ABRI's authority over coercion and its proximity to the President meant that the institution's fiscal claims trounced all others. This turned the Indonesian armed forces into one of the most formidable economic players in the country (Rinakit, 2005; McCulloch, 2003; HRW, 2006, Crouch 1978, Crouch, 2010, pp. 161-69). Akin to many other militaries in Burma, Egypt or Pakistan (Siddiqua, 2007), ABRI's fiscal deprivation lent legitimacy to a vast 'business octopus' of formal enterprises with significant stakes in the country's timber, tourism, shipping, warehouse, palm oil and fishery industries. A review of military enterprises conducted in 2006 found 219 legal enterprises established as co-operatives and foundations that provided extra-budgetary funding for local commands (Crouch, 2010, pp. 168). ABRI also held primary stakes in the black markets of luxury vehicles, petrol and firearms (Yunanto, 2002). The military was deeply invested in the industries of vice, providing protection and investment funds for the illicit gaming, narcotics and sex work industries. This strong illicit element separates off-budget economy from a wider literature on state predation and extrabudgetary funding, which examines activities that lawful but illegitimate (Levi, 1981; Tilly, 1986; Thies, 2007;

Thies, 2009). As in China's local governments, the off-budget economy of the security apparatus levered lawful authority, securitized power and illicit practice to maximize extraction.

A second hierarchy within the armed forces ensured the spoils were distributed according to an idiom of siblinghood; first to the army, then the navy, then their air-force and finally, to the 'littlest child' [*anak bungsu*], the police. From this vast stratified off-budget economy, bloated by protection rackets, untendered contracts and coerced monopolies, monies percolated upwards on a political hierarchy over which Suharto presided.

The New Order's off-budget economy was configured and organised in other important ways. Crucially, not all illegalities were the same and the moral stratification of illegal practice is suggestive of the remarkable tenacity of law to shape the contours of its own transgression. As this thesis will show, the criminal practices of the New Order elite were differentiated by their proximity to and capacity to mime law. For instance, the President cherry-picked the most legally congruent and structurally embedded opportunities for fiscal misconduct for himself and his cronies (the awarding of development contracts, charitable foundations and the national lotto) and left the most criminally apparent forms of racketeering (such as the 'dirty work' of providing protection to illegal economies or the collection of rents from a groomed criminal class) for his franchisees. In so doing, Suharto created the discursive subject of the *oknum*, the corrupt or aberrant state official. The *oknum* is recognisable in Western discourse as the proverbial bad apple or the official who abuses public office 'for private gain' (Nye, 1967). The function of the *oknum* was to place an individual

face on state corruption and ‘produce’ the rule of law. As such, the *oknum* disguised and preserved the underlying structure of the state’s intimate relationship to illegality (Ryter, 2002).

But the shadow economy was not an incidental mechanism of corruption and individual greed. Rather, in the workings of this shadow economy lay the very stuff of governance (Ascher, 1999). The New Order’s longevity was partially due to the support it received from the international state system that credited the regime for its consistent acts of statehood, its centralized development programs and generous expansion into the ordinary lives and territory of Indonesians. However, these programs were not funded, as widely thought, through the miraculous combination of ‘Asian values’ and quasi-liberal economic policies. Rather, institutions forced to seek out their own operating budgets drew the funds for their governance projects from the wellspring of illicit monies and protection rackets that made up the shadow economy of the state (ibid). In this way, the legitimate practices and processes of everyday statecraft for which Indonesia was much feted were produced by and dependent upon the state’s own criminal deviance.

The 1997 Asian financial crisis lifted the lid on Suharto’s fiscal sultanate, revealing the myths of Indonesia’s economic success. When ordinary Indonesians and students hit the streets in early 1998 calling for his resignation, they were united by a deep sense of anger about the criminality of his rule neatly surmised in popular chant of ‘KKN’ [*korupsi, kolusi dan nepotism*] or ‘corruption, collusion and nepotism’. The multiple demands of the time have been squeezed into the shorthand of ‘democratisation’. Protestors called for human rights, for the separation of police from

the military and for freedom of speech. There is no doubt that Indonesians wanted political power to be dispersed democratically, but the calls for the supremacy of law, the regularisation of governmental process and the end of government corruption were the most strident of all.

Deserted by a heavily factionalised military, the New Order collapsed with the May 1998 resignation of Suharto thus initiating Southeast Asia's single most successful transition to democracy. In thirteen short years, Indonesia's democratisation process has met the primary benchmarks for a consolidated democracy. Indonesia has held four national elections, resoundingly declared free and fair. Civil and political liberties are dignified in law. Indonesia has reorganised and devolved the state's internal balance of power by embarking upon the world's biggest decentralisation process.

Some of the country's most celebrated democratic triumphs have been in the security sector, the reform of which is a key milestone in the democratisation literature (Stepan, 1998; Karl, 1990). ABRI has been dismantled, stripped of its political privileges and its business empire. Critically, democratisation has reformed the security sector, establishing the police and the military as two separate institutions whose forms and functions follow the conventional in/out of traditional state organisation⁴. This means that the power over everyday security, the military's greatest fiscal and political asset, is today handled by the civilian arm of coercion; the national police [Polri].

⁴ Notes Bayley on the difference between police and military: 'an army is publicly constituted to use force just as police are, but its jurisdiction is *external to the collectivity*. An army uses force to *defend* a community from threats *outside* itself; a police force *protects* against threats from *within* (my italics) (Bayley, 1975, pp. 329).

Restoring police ‘back on the streets’ and militaries ‘back to the barracks’ is an uncontested benchmark of democratic consolidation. However, in Indonesia, where state authority is a prized economy, the rise of the police has fundamentally disturbed the military’s off-budget economy. After decades of resource deprivation and sibling humiliation, the police intend to exact their rightful share of the security economy. This thesis shows how illicit mechanisms of extraction that were central to the military’s off-budget economy have been intercepted by Polri, reflecting the wider reorganisation of the security sector and the retreat of the TNI in the post-authoritarian era. Democratisation and ‘security sector reform’ has effectively rerouted the streams of illicit wealth to the police. The expansion of the police’s off-budget economy has been justified within Polri and incentivized by the state by underfunding the police, delaying reform of fiscal management practices, and failing to implement the mechanisms of public and state oversight over the police that would inhibit the growth of such an economy.

By drawing attention to the perverse ways in which the democratic reorganisation of the state’s coercive apparatus rearranged the mechanisms of illicit accumulation from military to police, I show how democratic regime change, with all its attendant proclamations of restoring ‘the rule of law’ and reestablishing of civilian control over the military, in fact aggravates the illicit political economy of security within the state’s coercive institutions and leaves the underlying structure that provides moral and economic incentives to seek illicit financing untouched.

The Structure of Polri

Polri is a new institution and old institution, a distinction that reflects the number of transformations the Indonesian state has undergone since the birth of the republic in 1945. Polri was the very first institution recognized by the new Indonesian republic and is thus, the state's oldest body. But by the late 1950s in a period known as the Guided Democracy, the police institution was slowly subsumed into ABRI, where the police became the final and least important, fourth sibling of the security sector. Their separation from ABRI in 1999 makes the national police one of the first institutions created in the *reformasi* era⁵.

Today, Polri bask in the pride of being an 'independent' and 'autonomous' institution. These two words are an important part of all of their policy statements and 'master-plans' for reform. For the police, institutional independence is a spoil won after three decades of being the least respected, least resourced fourth sibling under ABRI. As such, Polri guard this independence jealously and invoke the bad old days of New Order authoritarianism when it is threatened. Ironically, they see the main threat to that autonomy in reformists and democrats who protest that the current system of oversight, their direct supervision by the Indonesian president, politicises the police [See Figure 1]. The police argue that they are also overseen by parliament, via Commission 3, and the newly established police commission (Kompolnas) that is a hybrid body that has the conflicting mandates of providing state and public oversight. However, because the President is a person not a body, it falls to Polri to manage policing (in that they draft the laws, design reforms, and administer the budget) and

⁵ This separation effectively forged the military as well as ABRI was dissolved and the TNI (National Indonesian military) was reinstated to house the army, airforce and navy.

implement policing. In this way, Polri have established an effective monopoly on policing in the republic.

To manage these two tasks effectively, Polri's internal bureaucracy is vast. Within Polri HQ [Mabes Polri], there is a law department, operations department, panel of experts to the Kapolri, procurement and planning department (where the budgeting is organised) and centralized departments for all of Polri's regional level schools (SPN) and national level academies (AKPOL and PTIK). Outside of Mabes Polri, Polri's tiers mimic that of government. They have a regional level station [polda] in each province, a district station [polres] for each district, a sectoral station for each subdistrict and police posts under those. Each tier is overseen by its relevant chief of police; the Kapolda [regional police chief] at the regional level, the Kapolres [district police chief] at the district and the Kapolsek [sectoral police chief] at the subdistrict. Each tier is fitted with a department for criminal investigations, intelligence and patrol although the regional and district stations boast far more sophisticated managerial and operational systems. As with Indonesia's wider democratic decentralisation, the district level tier (Polres) has been 'empowered' with new authorities and resources. All of this vast infrastructure and Polri's 400 000 strong personnel sits below the Kapolri (the national chief of police) and the penultimate cop, the Indonesian president.

Figures 2-4 represent the structure of Polri in neat organisational charts. One observes quickly that Figures 2-4 bear the same shape, a central trunk with branches extending out, as if the institution were arranged like an upside down tree. These are ultimately representations of authority: power flows downward and out

from a key decision making unit or station. In Jakarta, figures 2-4 are important artifacts affixed to the desks of the every police analyst and development consultant in Jakarta. One document in particular, the internal map of Mabes Polri (not figured here) is marked expressly ‘not for copy’. This only increases its currency and trade for gifts, debts and favours. The document is classified because everybody, civilian and police, believes that secreted within the tree is a hidden pattern of appointments that will shed light on Polri’s opaque internal politics, its illicit fiscal flows and points of criminal accumulation. Experts often point to certain departments, postings or stations that command material gain or political influence. In Mabes Polri, the Kapolri rallies influence by posting allies to the heads of criminal research and planning and development departments. There is even talk that draws lines off the page, tying certain departments and officers to the forces of capital, political parties or the executive. In this model, police are clients tied through relations of debt and reciprocity to a resource-rich patron. Strung together and multiplied, dyadic ties become tree-like clusters below a patron who distributes resources (Scott, 1972).

However, ethnography reveals alternative ways of knowing the police institution. Outwardly, the police are a tree but beneath the surface, they bear all the characteristics of the tuber, submerged and hidden, with its multiple knotted arms weighed down by bulbous growths and peculiar extensions. The illicit financing of the police gives the institution the shape of a rhizome. The structure of the rhizome is dictated by principles of autonomy, ‘connection and heterogeneity’ (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004a), or as my informants call it, *gaul ke mana-mana*, or hanging out everywhere. The rhizome is formed through the ceaseless impulse of officers to make the kinds of internal and external connections that will yield illicit gains, political or

material to feed the off-budget economy. The police are fractured by their relationships to ethnic Chinese capital, political parties, goons, the criminalized class, timber barons, plantation owners, religious leaders, NGOs and other claimants to ‘community representation’. In this way, the police organisation is constantly agglomerating new, subterranean chains of power and privilege that disturb and jar their arboreal arrangements, both formal and patrimonial.

As one would expect, humps and protuberances form around seniors and their factions, fraternities and alumni (Barker, 1999). But the rhizome is ‘anti-genealogical’ as other connections and growths override traditional lineages of authority. Democratisation and the fragmentation of power have lent an entrepreneurial zeal to the middle and lower officer ranks. Whereas under the New Order rank organised and disciplined practices of illegality – it would be unthinkable for the lower rungs to challenge illicit practices ‘backed’ by a General – the kind of rational-legal authority aspired to by the rise of the civil-juridical displaces the source of authority outside the charismatic or patrimonial attributes of the person. Perversely, by attaching the exercise of authority to office rather than person space has been opened up for junior officers to destabilize the money-making schemes and rackets of their senior officers and their networks in private and public office. This has given impetus to junior officers to form asymmetrical connections with more senior political and economic figures, to subvert the fate of rank and seniority in order to cut in to illicit modes of accumulation. Deleuze and Guattari observe that the rhizome, unlike the tree, ‘assumes very diverse forms, from ramified surface extension in all directions to concretion into bulbs and tubers... any point of the rhizome can be connected to anything other, and must be’ (1983; 11).

Because of this, the police rhizome operates in ways unknown to itself and more often in contradiction to its divergent parts. This incoherence - this *hyperpoliticisation* of the force – is an antidote to the formation of political ideology. Whereas scholarship reminds us of the diverse ways that police are distinctly *political* (Reiner, 2000; Jauregui 2010), the literature does not address why that politicisation has not made the police more ‘military-like’. Why don’t police initiate coups to save the nation? Why don’t they play the role of national guardian? Such questions are important given that police have a monopoly on *legitimate* coercion in a democracy; where they have inherited the powerful historical mantle of domestic security from the military; where they, more than any other security institution, determine the quality of that democracy and who from the polity can participate in it and how; where they sit directly below the president and are unencumbered by effective oversight and where they have the fiscal might to establish a serious role in the economic sector. In all of these ways, the Polri of contemporary Indonesia could establish themselves as a formidable powerbroker of the democratic era. But cultivating the police as tuber, not a tree, inhibits professionalisation, cohesion and political intent. It reduces the demands of the police to one simple request, that of autonomy, so that the principles of connection, fracture and heterogeneity might proceed unhindered. The principle political beneficiary of this tuberous structure is not Polri, but the president who directly oversees the police.

Connecting Capital and Coercion

As expected, points of connection on the rhizome cluster most densely around private capital. These connections feed the off-budget economy. In Indonesia, private domestic capital is primarily controlled by a minority Chinese ethnicity who comprise just 3-4% of the population. In this dissertation, I use the term of their choice - Tionghoa - to refer to ethnic Chinese Indonesians whose presence in the region far precedes European colonialism but whose migration to Indonesia peaked in the early 20th century as industrialising Dutch East Indies demanded cheap, indentured labour for its plantations and mines. Jakarta, then Batavia, was the principle settlement for Chinese migrants and their commerce. Throughout their reign, the Dutch encouraged Tionghoa entrepreneurship to motor the colonial economy. This policy reached its most concentrated point in the late 19th century with the tax farm system that established Tionghoa monopolies over critical sectors of the economy while withholding their citizenship rights by establishing the Tionghoa as a racial 'minority' whose fiscal prowess threatened the natives to the archipelago. Subsequent indigenous regimes, suspicious of Tionghoa loyalty, continued this approach throughout the 20th century and the threat of violence shadowed Tionghoa lives. Throughout this period, geopolitical strains provoked local questions as to the true nature of Tionghoa identity. These moments of tension were resolved by massacre. Tionghoa were attacked under Japanese colonial rule, during China's shift to communism and in the 1965 anti-communist massacres that consolidated New Order rule.

This policy of estranged intimacy continued during the New Order. Under President Suharto, a select group of Tionghoa conglomerates dominated a centralist, authoritarian economy. Tionghoa capitalists received vast untendered contracts in

return for substantial stakes for the upper political class in their ventures. Although the oligarchy operated primarily at the national level, this basic union of state and capital was replicated below at every tier of government. At all levels, ABRI officers, particularly the army and the special forces, benefitted from the politico-business oligarchy. Tionghoa entrepreneurship was instrumental to maintaining the military's menagerie of foundations, charities and ventures vested in the Indonesian economy. In exchange for access to capital, the Tionghoa, whose security the state willfully and persistently undermined, received private security provisions from the most coercive and powerful institution within the state. This fundamental idea of reciprocity and mutual gain constituted the basis of the military's vast off-budget economy under the New Order.

Chua argues that the 1997 Asian financial crisis dismantled the politico-business oligarchy and policies of economic protectionism for Tionghoa conglomerates. Since the crisis, the advance of neoliberal economic policies that comes packaged with modern democratisation has uniquely privileged Tionghoa big business. Economic de-regularisation has freed capitalists of their prior dependence on the political class and the sheer spread of their assets have placed them in the pole position to succeed in a new free market economy (2010). In this analysis, Tionghoa capitalists are whittled down to purely instrumentalist economic actors who wield extraordinary power against the state.

But a view from the subterranean depths of the Polri rhizome reveals a divergent truth of a persecuted minority who continue to replicate the politico-business oligarchy despite the absence of economic utility. Chapter One illustrates how misuse and

misallocation of public revenue funds on the ground means that the '*parman*' economy (see below) of Tionghoa gift-giving and patronage, not public revenue, continues to be the primary resource of the security sector. Chapter One demonstrates how the oligarchic structure of ABRI, mainly army and special forces officers, and Tionghoa capitalists under the New Order has been transformed into an economy of 'gifts' and patronage trafficked to the police. This reorientation of Tionghoa resources has followed the democratic reorganisation of the state coercive apparatus. The chapter evidences how this is as true for Chua's Jakarta-based 'big Chinese businessmen' as it is for the city's small and medium traders.

The flow of gifts embeds Tionghoa capitalists into the Polri rhizome, connecting capitalist and officer in unique relationships. Thus whereas matters of human resources are in theory decided by an official, if authoritarian, hierarchy leading up to the Kapolri, in fact Tionghoa gift-giving furnishes this minority with significant sway over the traffic of postings, positions and academy placements so critical to the careers of Polri officers. But again this suggests a shadow parallel hierarchy, when in fact, as Chapter Two highlights, the ethics of reciprocity and volunteerism embedded in the gift are frequently contravened. Gifts are coerced. Friendships are violated. This suggests an organisation of power far more complex than the simple hierarchies of the patron-client relationship. The rhizome plots the relationship between capital and coercion on an evenly footed, horizontal plane, which explains why the connections are so vulnerable to acts of disloyalty leading to rupture. This does not affect the functioning of the police rhizome in any way that is meaningful. The rhizome is dictated by the principle of 'asignifying rupture' wherein connections

broken are restlessly renewed (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004a, 10). The rhizome ‘can be connected to anything other and in fact must be’ (*ibid*, 7).

The Structure of the Dissertation

This thesis is in four chapters, organised according to illicit economy in two sections entitled ‘The *Parman* Economy’ and ‘The *Parmin* Economy’. In the first two sections of Chapter One, ‘The Art of Fictive Accountancy’ and ‘The Anti-Bureaucratic Bureaucracy’, I interrogate public financing of Polri and how elite level pilferage, the stratifications of rank, the internal primacy placed on individual entrepreneurship combined with the bureaucratic dysfunctions of Polri’s accounting system produce a state of institutional bankruptcy. This wilful bankruptcy, accepted by officers as a routine condition of the postcolonial state, gives rise and justification to what is known as ‘the off-budget economy’, a vast shadow economy designed to finance policing across the archipelago and supplement low staff wages. This economy is fed by criminal practices of violent extortion, illicit extraction and rent seeking on a hyperbolic scale. Feeding this economy is the central preoccupation of a commissioned officer. Contrary to classic definitions of corruption that place personal greed as deviant to public office (Nye, 1967), I show how in systems of endemic fiscal irregularity – systems we often refer loosely to as ‘organised corruption’ or ‘systemic corruption’ - personal practices of illicit accumulation and illegal entrepreneurship are integral to institutional financing and everyday securitized authority.

Within Polri, economies of illicit revenue are generally classified as ‘parman’, ‘parmin’ and ‘parmas’ indexing their respective ‘business’, ‘criminal’ and ‘community’ origins. It is important to underscore that these subfields of off-budget financing do not unfold out to neat taxonomies of descending genus but are instead used as a generalised heuristic classifier, denoting the various scales of police understanding of the ‘licitness’ of derived monies. Polri have multiple ways of characterising the off budget economy but for the purposes of this thesis, I have arranged the sections and chapters by this folk taxonomy.

Section One looks at ‘parman’ or patronage financing by Tionghoa capitalists and Section Two at ‘parmin’ or ‘criminal’ financing through Jakarta’s illicit gambling economy. In each section, I combine historical and ethnographic sources to paint a picture ‘before’ and ‘after’ of the security sector’s dependence on that economy prior to and following the fall of the New Order.

In Chapter One, ‘Foundations, Cooperatives and *Cukong* in ABRI’s Charity Economy’ outlines the off-budget economy of ABRI under the New Order. I show how generals were structured into formal business arrangements where Tionghoa traders were either recruited to manage military owned enterprises or generals were enfolded into Tionghoa-run businesses as executive commissioners. By being associated with a locally venerated military officer, Tionghoa traders and big business alike became known as *cukong* [invulnerable puppeteers of the state]. They could ward off the repeated threats to enterprise (from other Tionghoa traders, but mainly from a predatory rabble of players, brokers, gangsters and security officers) and provide a secure environment for fiscal accumulation. In return, officers received at

least a stipend and a ready resource base and partnership for their various projects and procurements. Choice officers were granted a stake in the business. We then return to the critical question of how and why the New Order state created the conditions for ABRI dependence on criminal practices and illicit economies markets flourish. ‘State Budgets and Fiscal Inadequacy’ examines low fiscal allocations and ABRI’s subsequent dependence on the off-budget economy as a form of Presidential control.

‘New Tionghoa Civil Society and the Machine of Patronage’ details the collapse of ABRI’s charity institutions that constituted such an important part of their off-budget economy with the fall of the New Order and the rush by Tionghoa capitalists to provide patronage to Polri. The shape of Tionghoa patronage did not initially take the form of foundations and direct business involvement that characterised the New Order. Rather, the impulse to patronise has taken on the florid forms of democratic, civic engagement that chime with democratisation. In this section I examine new Tionghoa media and NGOs as a critical site for Tionghoa-Polri relations and predict that as this economy develops, it will increasingly take the form of structured business relations that we saw under the New Order. The following chapter, ‘Disequilibrium and the Gift’, re-examines the power relationships between Tionghoa and security agents in light of a Tionghoa settler history of actual and threatened violence in the Indonesian archipelago. In contrast to political economy approaches, I argue that fear, not power, animates practices of Tionghoa gift giving to the police. In a series of four intimate portraits of Tionghoa-police relationships, I show how police coerce gifts, deny fidelity and violent reject Tionghoa claims for reciprocity. In this way, I show how the off-budget economy is embedded in and reflects the asymmetrical structure of political power in Indonesia.

Section Two examines the parts of the off-budget economy that Polri officers explicitly cast as ‘criminal’ or ‘parmin’, that is gambling, narcotics, and the underworld of the Jakarta nightlife. The state security apparatus has long provided protection to these industries in return for a stable monthly stipend. The first part of Chapter Three, ‘An Anthropology of Urban Gaming’ underscores the significance of economic play in the maintenance of regimes, colonial and modern, as well as the depth and diversity of gaming across socio-economic groups and hence, the absurdity of prohibition. In ‘Judi and the Metropolitan City’, I then focus on the organisation and Tionghoa ownership of casinos in Jakarta during Governor Sadikin’s term in the 1960s and show how this industry is intimately tied up in futuristic visions of the capital and in turn, to alternative political visions by the military elite for the relationship between law and state. In ‘The Criminalisation and Consolidation of the New Order state’ and ‘Licit and Illicit Gaming in the Late New Order’ I tie the politics of the legalisation and criminalisation of casinos to vulnerability in Suharto’s presidency and the stratification of criminal, corrupt practice (legal but criminal, illegal but sanctioned, illegal and illegitimate) among the military elite. Finally, ‘*Judi Jadi Gila*’ [Gambling Goes Crazy] examines how democratisation, the fragmentation of political power and the rise of the police as a contending player in Jakarta’s underground protection economy, liberalised illicit casino ownership.

The fourth chapter of this thesis, ‘Sutanto’s Twin War on Vices’ examines the 2005 shut down of the illicit gambling economy despite the industry’s mammoth and regular contributions to Polri’s off-budget economy. In ‘Pacts of Licit and Illicit Worlds’, I argue that the industry was closed down because it provided the political

and security elite with the means to challenge the status quo. In the latter part of the chapter, ‘Turning Law into Lahan’, I explore how the drying up of gambling money impacted upon the personal and institutional finances of the police and address the question of how officers made up for the shortfall. I contend that rather than expand and institutionalise their protection for the narcotics industry, officers tortured minor offenders netted in the war on drugs to coerce bribes. In this way, I show how paradoxically, law and its exercise criminalises the force further.

Together, the chapters show how states create the conditions under which criminal economies flourish and upon which they depend. I show how democratisation can fundamentally rearrange those economies and the means of their extraction and accumulation. In the case of Indonesia, democratisation gave the police the means and moral authority to diversify and inflate the off-budget, cutting into an economic terrain that was formerly the preserve of the military, specifically the army. Critical processes of democratisation, such as exercises strengthen the rule of law, merely strengthened the means by which Polri could claim illicit rents. In sum, I conclude that states, even states where democratisation is considered successful, have deeply embedded criminal practices.

Methods for the Study of Tubers

How does one study a thing whose surface form belies a vast hidden presence? Polri are at once an institution of the state bound by formal strictures, legal authorities and organisational hierarchy and concurrently, a rhizome that lives in the shadow zone, a space that has its own ‘characteristics, temporalities and dimensions’ (Coutin, 2005,

174). The lives of Polri as a rigid institutional hierarchy and as a rhizome, flattened and dispersed, are not mutually exclusive. They exist concurrently and weigh in upon each other in strange ways. The practices that occur within each domain have real material effects that are crucial to the maintenance of legality (Coutin, 2005, 174). Thus the question becomes how to study the fringes of order, where formal and informal intersect in curious and perverse ways, ‘with uneven and indeterminate consequences’ (Sandvik in Hoag, 2011).

In many ways, this strange point of intersection is best studied by ethnography. Ethnography is particularly adept at mapping the ‘multiple layers of power within complex bureaucratic structures’ (Kubick, 2009). It is attentive to the ways that representations of institutions as rational, ordered machines are a form of ‘magic legalism’ (Sandvik in Hoag, 2011) and the banal, ritualised managerial practices and linguistic forms that whisk away irregularity and deviance (Mosse, 2005). At the same time, the stalwart of ethnography, participant observation is deeply challenged by practices our informants wish to hide.

Because practices of crime and corruption occupy spaces that ‘resist the researcher’s gaze’ (Gupta, 1995; 38), an ethnography of illicit fiscal activity hinges in part upon what Blundo calls, ‘emic descriptions’, or discursive interactions with informants (2008, 35). Here, the researcher becomes attentive to the way that criminality and deviant activity is performed and packaged in ‘secret idioms, symbols and codes’ (Anders and Nuitjen, 2008). In my own work, I noticed the way that Bahasa lurches into registers and peculiar grammatical forms – subjects divorced from object, objects divorced from verb – all bound up in a stammer of pauses, winks, emphatics that

maintained the congeniality of the conversation but deftly concealed the response. I came to see my interviews and engagements with informants as discursive scripts in which associative meanings were generated through other types of communicative and vernacular performances, such as tone, gesture, silence, acronym, the incongruous use of honorifics (*Pak, beliau* for similarly ranked officers), shifts in pronoun, word substitution and passive word orderings (*ter* rather than *di*, or the use of the root verb).

Researching state criminality presents a further challenge for traditional means of documenting ethnography. Revisiting recordings and field notes, I remember feeling shocked to find nothing in the way of ‘information’. The moments of revelation that I recalled and were searching for in my notes had no physical evidence. Without memory, field notes were ‘dead data’ (Jackson, 1990; 10) and in this way, the field note as the primary basis of anthropological evidence, were more like mnemonic devices to recall a series of performances that were paradoxically aimed at revelation and concealment. Not only did the absence of words have particular consequences for my own acts of ‘translation’ as work was written up, at home surrounded by field notes, I felt an anxiety to ‘triangulate’ my ‘evidence’ in quantitative and statistical forms that would lend credence to the scraps of my participant observation.

Speech being so slippery and observations of transgression so thin on the ground, it is little wonder that anthropologists have been drawn into studying state corruption as if they were acts of witchcraft (Haller & Shore, 2003, Blundo, 2008; 28). In this way, anthropology becomes drawn into studying the talk of corruption as a popular mechanism for envisioning the state (Gupta, 1993), as a way of forming an autonomous moral community, as a means of understanding the unpredictable ‘magic

of the state' (Hoag, 2011) or to interrogate the 'criminalising optic' of own visions of exchange and legitimacy (Hasty, 2005; 271). But without a direct discussion of the very fact of corruption and state deviance, being lulled into an analysis of its discursive forms feels like the kind of theoretical side-stepping that political anthropology took when it exchanged wholesale the study of postcolonial politics for power (Spencer, 1997). Departing from the normative fact of state corruption and illicit forms of wealth generation, we return to the question of how to observe that which has been concealed.

To answer this, I return to my own experiences mapping the rhizomatic life of Polri. Conventional anthropological studies of the police situate themselves in a site of plain existence; the precinct (Jauregui, 2010, Barker, 1999, Hornberger, 2006). Here, the anthropologist's geographical scope is clearly delineated by the precinct's realm of legal authority under which fall a limited number of potential informants. However, much like Haanstad (2010), I found this approach restrictive and an ineffective tool for understanding the 'hidden faces and inaccessible mechanisms of power' to which the precinct was subjected (Blundo, 2008). Only by stepping back and identifying multiple field sites and groups of informants could I see the multifarious and uncharted ways that the rise of the police was experienced in the subterranean world of illicit capital. As Indonesia's political system sustained the rupture of democratisation, fragmenting and multiplying potential sources of power, I found myself slowly untangling from a specific geographical site, and following instead 'the people...the metaphor...and the plot' (Kubick, 2009; 48) through space and time.

Plainly, this called for a mixed methodology. I started with a solid term 'doing

ethnography' in a subdistrict of South Jakarta among the *orang keamanan* [men of security] who form a topography of securitized power in the Indonesian capital. To 'do ethnography', I tagged alongside a newly formed Betawi gang who had emerged as part of the fragmentation of power in the city. I followed their anxieties about regional elections, their racketeering, legal strategising and criminal activities as a way of understanding the kinds of cultural, coercive and political resources needed to operate in the space of non-existence. The location of this period is shown in Figure seven. The real benefit of this period was that I came to understand that criminality and corruption was not as cloistered practice a practice as it initially appeared. Indeed, for a practice that is supposed to be secret, individual and incriminating, in Jakarta the display of illicit gain is tremendously overt and purposeful. Because the suggestion of illicit wealth generation serves power and its accrual, the oblique signs of and invitations to its practice are always on exhibition whether as fetishized commodities, the corporeality of the body (Robertson 2006; 8, Bayart, 1999), in language or specific forms of practice and associations marked 'democratic'. Thus my period of traditional 'ethnography' was an internship in the ways illicit wealth generation was enacted, interpreted and invited in the city.

From these small, localized networks, I gradually expanded my range of informants, and eventually came to traverse the city with a motley cru of police and military officers, private security guards, neighbourhood policing groups, political parties, state sponsored gangs, ethnic and religious youth organisations, neighbourhood security groups, brokers, fixers and lawyers. In so doing, I was able to establish a fragmented participant observation wherein one is conscious that 'sporadic' and 'occasional' 'universe of petty corruption' that one is permitted to observe only

gesture to a broader structure of illicit practices. In this way, I was always aware that ‘every observation *in situ* [was] linked to other spaces that resist the researcher’s gaze’ (Blundo, 2007; pg 38).

To access those other spaces, I turned with an unease that persists, to a series of ethnographic interviews. Like Ortner, I continue to feel anxious about the authenticity of the interview, which lack the texture and grit of a localized, truly participant ethnography (Forsey, 2010). Complicating matters, because I was interested in the kinds of criminal formations, structures and economies that intersected with police corruption, I collapsed conventional distinctions between ‘ethnographic’ and ‘political’ interviews (Spradley, 1979; Blundo, 2007). I carried out over 110 semi-structured interviews with members of the security, political and business elite. This included ethnic Chinese businessmen who prop up the police financially, members of the parliamentary commissions responsible for oversight of the coercive apparatus, policy drafting teams internal to the police and the military and members of the newly-minted national police commission. Among that number were a handful of police officers of different rank with whom I would regularly meet to check the veracity of the claims I heard and understand police perspectives on those claims. Formally, as I explained to my interviewees, I was trying to establish a claim of ‘truth’, that is to ‘assess’ the police’s reform process according to conventional political science barometers and to establish the who, what, where and when of the illicit dimensions of Polri’s fiscal life. But during our meetings, senses heightened by my term of participant observation with the street gang, I cultivated what Forsely calls, the ‘ethnographic imaginary’: where the ethnographer probes the potential, unexpected strands of social and cultural life that at first glace seem unconnected to

the immediate research question (2010, 566-9). In between a battery of 'normative' questioning, I would occasionally 'rest' the formal interview - marked by gesture and a relaxation in gait - to follow alternative veins of questioning. Furthermore, I was attentive to the ideas of legitimate and illegitimate power, coercion, wealth, accumulation, consumption that were embedded in responses as well as the performative and discursive dimensions of speech.

I also interviewed over approximately one hundred Jakartans who shared a very different interface with the police: Jakarta's drug users, recidivists, illicit casino workers, sex workers, squatter communities, abandoned street children and incarcerated population. Without family, identification [KTP], address or full name, many of these interviewees occupied a 'space of non-existence' (Coutin, 2005). I approached these sources under the auspices of a human rights organisation, but as anthropologist, the responses that were most interesting to me was in the brackets of 'rest'. In the grey zone of the ethnographic interview, interviewees strayed from the script of violations to reveal ambiguous and paradoxical relationships with police. Sex workers who spoke on tape about beatings, rapes and extortion at the hands of the police, giggled in their hands afterwards about securing an officer as a boyfriend for protection. Similarly recidivists who displayed on their legs the scars of bullet wounds by errant officers, spoke of earlier intimacies with the police in various criminal-entrepreneurial projects. Their legal non-existence made them more vulnerable to the coercive power of the police and hence more likely to seek to 'net' officers through the carrot of the police's illicit economy.

Crucially, researching police corruption meant stretching the boundaries of fieldwork from somewhere ‘out there’ to primary source data generated from and about the state. During my fieldwork I built newspaper databases, excel spreadsheets charting officer promotion paths correlated to recruitment and alumni groups. I hoarded budgets, audits, police assessment reports, trial transcripts, regulations, corporate profiles and newspaper archives. I allowed the knowledge I had developed from ethnography to navigate and decode these vast and disparate representations of the police. Most critically, ethnography showed me how the rhizome and its multitude of connections made itself manifest in public documentation. It wasn’t that the rhizome intended to stay hidden, but rather that it came to the surface in unexpected ways. I learnt to map its workings, not in national dailies or political analyses, but in obituaries, private newsletters, corporate social responsibility reports and charity and religious websites.

Like Tarlo, I tried to understand these documents not just as hard, authoritative ‘data’ as a political scientist would but as cultural artifacts (Tarlo, 2001). I was particular interested in the assumptions and boundaries of knowledge delineated by these primary sources and in the ways that their juxtaposition against ethnographic ‘evidence’ could reveal the limits of documentation. Far from the promise of an ordered, even hegemonic truth, when I drew them into dialogue with participant observation, interviews and oral histories, the quantitative and normative revelations of audits, budgets and organisational assessments revealed themselves as partial and fragmented. It took a year of primary data research understand how empirics could animate this documentation (particularly the news archives), showing the hidden paths through which illicit wealth generation was advertised, articulated and mapped.

This could only happen when the link between data and conclusion became unstuck and when findings were rotated or turned inside out. Where primary source data was able to establish links between the police and various illicit economies, only ethnography, with its sense of the lived experience of transgression, could delineate the divergent size and scope of the illicit economies upon which the rhizomic structure of the police institution relied.

The final step of my methodology, and the most critical, was to excerpt parts of the thesis and circulate it amongst a number of informants, both new and long-standing police, for critique and correction. By my informants' own request, the chapter fragments were not translated into Indonesian although often I had the luxury of sitting with the informant and talking out each paragraph. I have come to regard this step to be the most important part of any methodology to study illegality. Rather than the final step of 'fieldwork', time and time again, it has been a critical device to elicit new data under revitalised relations of trust. Parts of this draft have thus been discussed intensively with my informants and the analysis and historical accounts provided in chapters two, three and four in particular have been subject to a process of debate and discussion that borders on co-construction. This has long been a part of the ethnographic method, however Mosse reminds us that in certain politically-charged contexts, the process has important limits. I have been mindful that some forms of analytic knowledge must necessarily be subject to an ethnographic distance that is productive though perhaps not 'consensual' in ways that our informants might recognise (2006). Hence the responsibility for this thesis and its errors lies solely with me.

Section One: The '*Parman*' Economy



Photograph 3: At the Buddhist Jin De Yuan temple in the predominantly *Tionghoa* suburb of Glodok, a woman prays for protection and prosperity.

Chapter I

The Civilianisation of Patronage: Polri, TNI and Post-Authoritarian Shifts in Gift-Giving

‘Patron itu subur, itu gengsi...’

‘to have a patron makes [a police officer] fertile, makes one prestigious.’

Female police colonel, 2007⁶.

‘Indonesia wasn’t made in a parliament. It was made in *kongsi-kongsi* like these.’

Tionghoa businessman dining with three star police general, 2008.⁷

This chapter begins by examining some of the issues around state budgeting that lead the coercive institutions to depend so heavily on practices of gift exchange as tenured patronage ‘*partisipasi teman*’ [participation from friends] ‘*parman*’ to fund individual officers, units and departments, stations and their operations. As the primary actors in private enterprise, *parman* patrons most coveted by the coercive apparatus are ethnic Chinese Indonesians [*Tionghoa*]. By taking a historical approach to this interior current, I examine how practices of gift exchange between *Tionghoa* capitalists and

⁶ Retired Police General. Interviewed by author (15 November, 2006).

⁷ Field notes. (6 February 2008).

the coercive apparatus trace a trajectory of coercive-political power from military to police as power itself has transformed from authoritarian-coercive to civil-juridical.

In the final part of this chapter, I illustrate how once-forbidden forms of *Tionghoa* social organising and community expression, such as print media and civil society groups, has facilitated the re-routing of the gift economy of the coercive apparatus.

•

Is Jakarta's Polda Metro Jaya the only police station in the world to be glorified with its very own coffee-table book? Glossed and embossed, text is incidental; it's the images that are the book's true intent. Released in 2005, the book celebrates the 2004 renovations to the Metro Jaya building, and its new ornamental array of vehicles and weaponry. On page ten is the money shot: the new façade of Metro Jaya is a modernist, stern mosaic of grey cement and ejaculating foundations, framed by date palms. The glory of Metro Jaya far outstrips that of its ranked superior, MABES Polri, a sprawling complex in grimy yellow and brown located just down the road on Jalan Trunojoyo. This tropical security chic is Polda Metro Jaya's idea of a civil security force for a new democratic Indonesia. But for all of Metro Jaya's pomp, the viewer's eyes are tugged to the right to the building's southeast where a squat grey skyscraper sits, crowned in golden initials, AG.

This is Artha Graha. Artha Graha is a conglomerate that, since the demise of the New Order, has grown to leviathan proportions. It is Artha Graha that owns the adjacent slab of land known as the SCDB development, whose central coordinates make it one of the most lucrative pieces of real estate in the capital. Whilst more frequently

associated with a young *peranakan* [mixed race, Indonesian-Chinese] entrepreneur called Tomy Winata, Artha Graha is in fact jointly, though not equally, owned by Winata and his older *totok*⁸ [patron, Sugianto 'Aguan' Kusuma. Although neither originate from Java - Winata is originally from West Kalimantan and Kusuma from Palembang - they have forged the conglomerate's identity by baptising it in Bahasa Kawi, a form of classical Javanese. Artha Graha means 'house of money.'

The release of the coffee table book followed months of media speculation as to the source of the estimated Rp 660 billion [\$US74 million] needed to pay for the renovations. Metro Jaya had started work on new buildings for Densus 88 (the recently formed Anti Terrorist Squad) and Brimob. There was to be a glossy auditorium, a three-story Al-Kautsar mosque, a five-story car park, new boarding houses (*asrama*) for the commissioned officers and the refurbishment of the official residences of the officer class (Koran Tempo, 15 February 2005). With no funds allocated from the 2004-05 APBN⁹ and no supplementary funds proposed to parliament, Indonesians and their legislative representatives began to wonder where had Kapolda Metro Jaya Irjen Firman Gani obtained the liquidity to pay for this grand gentrification?

⁸ A *totok* is a person of Chinese descent who is perceived by the *Tionghoa* community to have a strong commitment to Chinese or Confusian values in every day life, speak in Chinese dialect and tend to be of Confusian or Buddhist religion. A *totok* is a relational category in that it is juxtaposed with *peranakan*. *Peranakan* are Chinese-Indonesians who are considered to have mixed blood, have lost Chinese language or dialect and have an assimilated 'Indonesian' identity. It is also important to note that the categories of *totok* and *peranakan* exist primarily for *Tionghoa* themselves as shifting, ontological categories of self-understanding and differentiation, not as fixed categories of 'Chineseness'. This is not Suryadinata's approach. His scholarship has consistently sought to define between essentialised *totok* and *peranakan* communities (see for instance, Suryadinata 1978, 1997), however his most recent scholarship (2008) has acknowledged that these two categories are beginning to breakdown in the wake of reduced Chinese migration.

⁹ Anggaran Pendapatan Belanja Negara is the state budget, proposed annually by the government and approved by parliament.

Irawasum¹⁰ Komjen Binarto helpfully tried to resolve the matter of the mysterious funds by conducting a review and concluding that because no state funds were involved, no state funds had therefore been corrupted and Kapolda Irjen Firman Gani was in the clear (*ibid*). Kapolri Jenderal Dai Bachtiar argued that some of the money had been allocated from the ABT¹¹ (a statement quickly negated by Komisi III), but ongoing financial neglect of the police by the state meant that for important operational and strategic matters the Kapolda Metro Jaya, Irjen Firman Gani, was forced to rely on donations. Rather than deny or disprove anything, police comments to the media instead focused on Polri's etiquette of philanthropy. The Kapolri insisted that police acceptance of donations was right and proper for patrons who were *ikhlas* [sincere and wholehearted]. However if it transpired that police had forced [*paksa*] the donations, well then, that would be a disgrace [*tercela*].

For his own part, the man at the centre of the storm, Kapolda Irjen Firman Gani, issued a statement rejecting outright the idea that the renovations he oversaw relied on external funding. He then immediately proceeded to add that if the building did use donations from patrons [*pemberi sumbangan*] then those patrons would have signed contracts that attested [*perjanjian yang menegaskan*] to the charitable nature of their gifts. Hence, the police were in no way obligated [*tidak ada ikatan apapun*] to the patrons (Tempo Interaktif, 8 September 2004). In later comments, the Kapolda called the patrons, '*hamba Tuhan yang peduli dengan keamanan*' [servants of God who cared about security]. Indeed, what better way to show it than to gift the regional police station a sizeable, three-story mosque? Gani indicated that men of such pious humility guarded their anonymity rather than sought vulgar attention (Tempo

¹⁰ The General Oversight Inspectorate.

¹¹ The Anggaran Belanja Tambahan or the Additional Expenditure Budget.

Interaktif, 27 December 2004). Seasoned journalists, police analysts and political observers of Jakarta were having no truck with such opaque pronouncements.¹²

The extensions sit unapologetically on Artha Graha's SCBD development, with the logical conclusion that the land and, by extension its renovations, had been funded by Tomy Winata. The police's coffee table book, released after the furor and designed to celebrate Polda Metro Jaya, is more pointed in its acknowledgements, thanking a consortium of *Tionghoa*-owned real estate and construction businesses owned by Soetijpto Nagaria (Summarecon), Tomy Winata (Bank Artha Graha), Sugianto 'Aguan' Kusuma (PT Mandiri Ditpacipta & PT Multi Artha Pratama), Hary Tanusoedibjo (otherwise known as Hary Tanoe of Bimantara group) and Suwarno M Serad (who works for Budi Hartono's PT Djarum).¹³

Neither was this one off incident. 2005 was for Polri both the year of the coffee book and the year of the audit. The state audit agency's (BPK) 2005 report on Polri only raised more awkward questions about the true sources of Metro Jaya's financing. The BPK noted significant variations in Polri's report to the BPK compared to documents compiled by Polri's own logistical bureaus. The report singled out the yawning gaps in the Polda Metro Jaya balance sheet [*neraca*], specifically the omission of land worth some Rp 12 586.79 billion [US\$1.5 million], Rp 63.83 billion [US\$7 million] in building and infrastructure and a further Rp 38.58 billion [US\$4.5 million] in

¹² Nominee for National Police Commission. Interviewd by author (17 November 2006).

¹³ Among the list of those thanked for assisting in the publishing of the coffee table book that celebrated Metro Jaya include Francis Moniaga who, the year previously, had been taken in by Metro Jaya for questioning regarding a criminal offense, but not charged. Curiously, some names in the list also resembled, but did not match precisely, that of known gambling tycoons important to the police force, such as Rudy Chandra (Rudi Rajamas), Aliong and Winarta (eg, Edi 'Porkas' Winata). Chapter V addresses these figures.

undeclared equipment and vehicles.¹⁴ As one of only three regional police stations to actually submit a financial report to the state auditors,¹⁵ the unaccountable wealth of Metro Jaya office is just a drop in the ocean of assets under Polri's control. The report observed that 2700 hectares of Polri land, or 82% of the total land in Polri's use (according to figures compiled by the logistical bureau) was undeclared to the state and undocumented by official certificates of ownership (BPK, 2004, p.13).¹⁶ From the scant resources available to them, the state auditors report estimated that in 2004 alone, a year in which Polri's state budget was some Rp 7.9 trillion [US\$880 million] (see Table 1), Polri had generated undocumented assets from donations, grants [*hibah*] and private equity to the tune of Rp 163.13 billion [US\$18 million], or some 2% of their state funding. But the sums that the state auditors were capable of detecting were in fact only a sliver of a colossal, partially documented and individually managed, subterranean institutional economy.¹⁷

The Art of Fictive Accountancy

In October 2003, LPEM-UI, a university think tank commissioned by Mabes Polri and Partnership for Governance Reform, held a seminar with the top brass of Polri announcing the results of their investigation into the financial woes of the institution. The survey prosaically revealed what everyone in the room and indeed everyone in

¹⁴ See BPK. Pg 5.

¹⁵ The report also praised Polda Metro Jaya for being one of the three provincial stations, out of a total of thirty-one polda, to routinely compile financial reports and to have submitted them for BPK's inspection. *Ibid.* Pg 13.

¹⁶ This is an area roughly the same as the borough of Westminster, or inner city London.

¹⁷ Indeed, I would venture that because these figures rely on the auditor's comparison between the sloppy, permissive inventories of wealth compiled by the MABES logistics bureau and those sent to a hostile BPK, they are staggeringly understated and only haphazardly accurate. Not only does the BPK have no access to the financial reports of most of the Polda, Polres and Polsek, but they cannot examine the accounts of individual officers, many of which act as holding pens for donations later distributed to Polri in the form of operational funds or infrastructure.

Indonesia knew already: that a ‘serious discrepancy between the funds needed by the police and the official funds allocated through government budgets’ existed. The report also confirmed other long-standing, well known problems that plagued Polri’s budgetary distribution such as the indecent proportion of funding for Mabes’ command system and the overwhelming allocations for salary procurement and infrastructure (between 70-90%) at the expense of operational costs to maintain security and rule of law. Buried in the fine print of their presentation lay a map of the dysfunctional systems of accountancy that, like the police itself, was heavily stratified to ensure the ongoing wealth of the starred officer class and keep the lower ranks under-resourced and in desperate competition.

LPEM-UI’s breakdown of the 2002 police budget showed that 25% went to programs at the central office at Mabes Polri and 70% to the police’s command structure, the polda, polres and polsek that make up the front line of police work. The vast proportion of that sum was and continues to be dedicated to salaries, rather than programs and policy implementation. Moreover, funding disbursements to the polsek and polres were made largely at the regional polda level, trickling through the system from Mabes to polda and polda to polres/polsek with the allocated sums shrinking down to just a fraction of their stated value. The polda was receiving their budgets from Mabes with 15% less of what had been allocated, the polres saw pilferage rates of around 45% while the polsek estimated that the discrepancy between their actual funds and the funds that they received to be around 54%. These, however, were only estimations as the research showed that over 85% of polsek officers and 65% of polres officers had not been informed of the true figure for their budgeted funds. Ongoing secrecy around budget allotments allowed senior ranking officers with the

ear of the Derenbang (the two starred ‘Deputy Kapolri for General Planning and Development’ located at Mabes Polri) to request the reordering of funds. This entailed deleting or skimming line items and eating into polsek and polres budgets to suit new contingencies and upcoming projects that would arrest the attention of the public and their superiors.

Nonetheless, the source of Polri’s financial woes was not in fact that the existing system was too permissive in its management of funds. The system was negligent when seniors commanded their sums and stultifyingly bureaucratic when the juniors staked their claim of the budget. Although the separation from ABRI also meant an unyoking from the ABRI financial flows that had for so long disadvantaged this fourth sibling, the substitute system built by Polri in 2000 and 2001 only reenacted the same principles of militarised New Order accounting: the privilege of the powerful to pilfer at the expense of the lower ranks. Polri’s system of accounting retained not just the standard military methods of notation and documentation, but the same emphasis on hierarchy that gave considerable discretion to the Kapolri and the Derenbang to authorise and determine the size of fiscal transfers to the command system.

The hierarchical, serpentine system of financing the command ensured that transfers were not only filched as they moved through the system, but crucially that they moved through at torpid pace. LPEM-UI’s data estimated that transfers (not just of money but also of petrol and electricity subsidies) from Derenbang at Mabes to the distributing arm of the Polda took on average 3-5 weeks and then an additional few weeks to get to the polres and polsek. The report found that funding transfers proposed at the beginning of the financial year arrived in March or April and those

applied for in the last quarter didn't arrive at all. These congestions in the flow of funds created a surplus in the budget of sometimes up to 20-40% of the allocated APBN, leading to a convulsion of ineffective, easily-corruptible crash spending programs at the polda and Mabes level in the last half of the financial year.

Such fiscal constipation meant that polsek polres, polda and Mabes, had adopted the practice of undertaking activities first and receiving the tardy leftovers of proposed financial transfers months after. This system relied on official and unofficial income sources, with officers saying that they often paid for operational activities by drawing on the Anggaran Belanjaan Tambahan or the revenues gathered from the police's authority over the licensing of motor vehicles and their drivers. However, the sums provided by police 'donors' and the economy of *perkara* [criminal 'cases'] are just as important to maintaining the institution.

Section II of this thesis addresses the police's reliance on illicit, criminal revenues, called 'parmin' [*participasi kriminal*, or criminal participation] funds, and the importance of 'an economy of law' to police financing (parmas, *partisipasi masyarakat* or community participation funds). In this section, our concern is with patronage from the business-sector, known within the police by the euphemism parman [*participasi teman* or the participation of friends]. Parman foot the bill for police operations, for equipment and infrastructure and for the cost of transportation including vehicles and motorbikes. The report noted that parman also gift *hibah tanah* [land endowments] including buildings and their maintenance or renovation:

The term parman...is sometimes used negatively as a compensatory payment [*imbalan uang*] for the provision of a security service for a person or a company. As it turns out the role of

parmas [participation of the community] and parman is given highest priority for the acquisition of supporting funds, from the perspective of both size [of the donations] and frequency... The tendency to use the contributions [*jasa*] of parman is not just at the polsek level but also at every level of the command system, starting from polres, polda until Mabes Polri. (LPEM-UI, 2003, p. 15)

This economy of patronage is not merely a modest stopgap in a leaky fiscal system. Rather, the parman economy uniformly represents the most important spending source for Polri at all levels across the territorial command. To give a sense of the scale, officials interviewed at Polda West Papua stated that they believed 65% of their budget, and that of the polres, polsek and pospol, came from parman donations (2003, appendix 14). When researchers visited the affiliated polres, officials there estimated that they needed around Rp 3 trillion [US\$335 million] to run the station, while APBN allocations only came to Rp 1.3 trillion [US\$145 million]. The Rp 1.7 trillion [US\$189 million] shortfall was made up from off-budget source and parman donations. At the polsek level, the situation was dire with parman donations making up 96% of the annual budget. Broken down by station unit, figures were just as dramatic. Reskrim eked out between 1- 14% of their budget from the APBN, while patrol (samapta) between 10 – 17%. The discrepancy was covered by parman and other off-budget economies. These figures are a far cry from the fiscal discrepancies the BPK has been able uncover using official accounting sources.

Such fantastical sums of money are an interior current hurrying through the police institution, directing its decisions, policies and human resource movements. They are neither legal nor recognised by the police institution and as such they are subject to the whim of the officer or unit that has successfully courted the funds. Only 50% of

officers interviewed by LPEM said that the donations were noted in a separate financial accounting archive, and my own interviews suggested that the parman economy straddled both ends on an irregular spectrum of formalisation practices, ‘depending on the leadership.’¹⁸ One reskrim officer detailed an advanced system for the distribution and notation of her unit’s off-budget parman economy which rested in the authority of the accountant, independent from senior officers.

My unit is like this: I have to give [*kasih*] to my superior [*atasan*]. I have to make a routine payment [*menyetor*] every month for the needs of the organisation. What’s covered [*dikover*] by this budget is just so minimal. I give this [sum] to the accountant. He’s the one who filters it down and distributes it for budgetary needs [*kebutuhan anggaran*], for instance to administration [department], who don’t have a budget.

She then added, [*in Engl*], ‘but the money is easy come, easy go. We don’t have to be responsible for it [unlike the APBN].’ Although the officer bemoaned the staggering wealth of the senior officer class, she then added, ‘as long as officers don’t take from the budget, taking from [the parman economy] is their right [*hak mereka*].’¹⁹ What this contradictory and confusing series of statements suggests is that even when off budget revenue is disciplined by the same rationalising methods of the APBN, use of this body of funds is not perceived with the same moral strictures as the state budget.

The LPEM study found that presence of the parman economy deeply destabilises the legitimacy and accountability of Polri’s use of the state budget. Because the parman economy supplants official Polri spending, and because transfers for proposed activities arrive after the fact, distributed funds as well as the leftovers from the fiscal

¹⁸ Criminal Research Officer, Interviewed by author (1 October 2006).

¹⁹ Ibid.

year tend to be seen by officers as ‘free’ to be used for other activities, including personal needs. The disjuncture between real police spending and state allocations is in fact so great that police spending reports and the funding transfer requests are entirely fictionalised. The bureaucracy of financial applications to the Derenbang and reporting of expenditures is undertaken by specific external or internal contractors who perform the necessary bureaucratic hurdle jumping to release or account for funds. Contractors are paid a percentage of the money they are able to ‘extract’ or ‘justify’ from Derenbang at Mabes Polri according to their mastery of the system. Again, this behaviour is not exclusive to the revenue-scarce wilderness of the polsek, but occurs at every level of the command system, including Mabes Polri itself.

When the researchers finished their presentation to Mabes Polri, a silence swept the hall. The scholars worried that they had said too much and that the starred officers would react defensively, or worse, deny the results altogether.²⁰ To their great relief, officers applauded their work and their final recommendations for performance orientated budgeting, greater fiscal flexibility and direct transfers to the polres. In 2004, significant changes were made to the police financial system which sought explicitly to muzzle Mabes Polri’s discretionary authority over the budget, taking away transfer and procurement privileges. Today, 90% of the police budget is controlled and distributed by the Provincial Treasury Offices [*Kantor Pelayanan Perbendaharaan Negara*] directly to the polda and polres, who distribute to the polsek. As Table 1 shows, state allocations to the police have also increased dramatically, from 5 trillion in 2001 to over 25 trillion in 2009. A significant jump in

²⁰ The researchers were not entirely upfront about their findings. There are considerable gaps in the reports submitted to Mabes Polri and Partnership for Governance, let alone the published public report of their findings. Researchers were extremely careful to ensure that their findings did not explicitly focus on the full scale of fiscal chicanery going on in Polri, including their alliances with the criminal world. Researcher LPEM, interviewed by author, (13 June 2006).

police funding occurred in 2005, the year that Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono was elected president, appointing as National Police Chief his former ABRI school-mate, General Sutanto.

The Anti-Bureaucratic Bureaucracy

Table 2: Department of Defence/Polri Budget 2001-2009 (Trillions of Rupiah)²¹

Budget	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
Polri	5.287,5	5.499,1	6.739,5	7.908,9	12,020	17	22	23	25,7
MOD ²²	9.243,8	9.874,8	12.021,9	13.741,9	22	28	32,6	33,7	35

However, despite the surge in funds, police continue to echo the refrain that fiscal inadequacies lie at the heart of poor policing and ongoing corruption. This justification has surprising traction with the Indonesian public and government. Although it is generally accepted that the national policing institution is fragile and under-resourced, it is remarkable that public, parliamentary and academic debate has never raised the question as to how Polri know, estimate and quantify the revenue shortfall. To have the capacity to do so, each of Polri's stations from Mabes to the lowliest polsek, would need teams of accountants noting every fiscal deficiency, have an astute sense of the cost of legitimate and workable policing programs and have conducted fine-toothed resource needs assessments that are sensitive to local and regional security needs. In order to make the comparison between need and shortfall,

²¹ Figures have been compiled from newspaper articles reporting the annual budget. As a result, they may be imprecise to the hundreds of thousands.

²² The Ministry of Defence budget includes departmental costs as well as all funding for the three forces of TNI, the army, navy and air force.

police policy makers and number crunchers would have to have an intimate sense of how a bureaucratic institution runs effectively and efficiency.

The fact is stations and their supervising command structures have very little ability to accurately demonstrate to the Department of Finance, beyond salaries, what actual operational and institutional needs they have because stations have no benchmark for assessing the minimal level of personnel, equipment or facilities needed to deliver policing services in their specific areas (ICITAP, 2005, p 11).²³ LPEM asked officers to list their expenses and estimate an ideal sum that would cover their operating costs. Officers from the community relations department, (then *Bina Mitra* now Bimmas) declared that just five additional line items would be needed to better engage with the community: snacks and souvenirs for group meetings, snacks for officers leading the meetings, a monthly car rental and a per diem for officers on the trip (LPEM-UI, 2003, Appendix 1). Reskrim faired little better, adding obscure line items for ‘incentives’ and *silaturahmi* [friendship] costs for forensics and, remarkably, the prosecution. At the same time, officers neglected to volunteer funding for basic human rights standards of policing such as access to medical services for detainees, food for detainees and the establishment of custodial registers, none of which are currently funded by the state budget. All of the aspirational budgets created by a range of officers, from the patrol troops to the intelligence, revolved around the immediate staples of lunch, snacks and transportation.

The fact is that the police simply do not have the fiscal management systems to make the link between spending and institutional capacity. Under the current management

²³ Also, Pers.Comm. Department of Finance. 10.10.06.

of data, there is no way for them to accurately gauge the efficiency and effectiveness of spending or to map broad patterns in the distribution of finances and identify where deficiencies lie. This would not only require sophisticated internal bureaucratic machinery to make internal assessments, but also the ability to link such human and technical resources with research into local security environments, patterns in crime, and community needs. It requires *ilmu* in information gathering and database management which Polri simply does not have, nor has ever shown an interest in establishing (ICITAP, 2005, p.15).²⁴ In February 1999, at the precipice of separation from ABRI, a police spokesman announced Polri's calculation for their first autonomous budget in over 30 years. 'If you want us to be good, we need around 900 billion [*Kalau mau baik...sekitar 900 milar per tahun anggaran*],' (Kontan, 22 February, 1999) then a seemingly astronomical sum for the revenue-starved police service. By 2001, as Table 1 shows, parliament was already passing Polri budgets of more than five trillion.

Despite a 500% increase in funding in just 8 years and substantial changes to the disbursement system, the problems persist. In 2006, the US Department of Justice's International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) commenced a survey of the operating conditions of polres and polsek in the provinces of Bali, East Java and South Sulawesi. Their research found strong continuities with

²⁴ The ICITAP program for district and subdistrict police appraisal, conducted between 2005-2007 attempted to provide polsek and polres with just these very skills, taking administrative and supporting officers through evidence-based planning strategies to build the capacity to conduct institutional and environmental assessments. The outcome of the project was to help stations establish the very basic nuts and bolts of institutional bureaucracy, from auditory and inventory tracking systems and standard operating procedures, to job descriptions and internal mechanisms for inter-departmental information-sharing. This program ran in three provinces, Bali, East Java and South Sulawesi. Despite support from Kapolri Sutanto, the pilot project was never made policy by Mabes Polri's Director for Planning and Development. Indeed, the Derenbang was openly hostile to the project. The Derenbang maintained that instead of the focus on individual station and locality assessment, the project should instead establish 'templates' for the staffing and equipment of police stations according to geography and environments eg, beach stations, hinterland stations and so forth. (Pers. Comm. 12.03.07)

LPEM's 2002 findings. At the district and sub-district level, there was 'a lack of a reliable system [sic] for collecting accurate data from the stations as basis for both headquarters and regions to plan and budget; and as an obvious consequence, an extremely poor planning and budgeting process based at best on anecdotal information and at worst on hunches from desk officers in Jakarta or in the regions' (Villaveces, 2010). The ICITAP project found no reliable information on budgets, expenditure or criminal records and no information on workload. This meant they were unable to plan current and future spending or policing and security priorities in line with the resources available to stations and the needs of the territories and communities they served.²⁵ The project concluded that accounting systems were patchy, haphazard or absent and led to falsified financial reporting. The decentralisation of procurement authorities to the polda and polres were slowly, steadily being clawed back by Mabes with the collusion of the national parliament.²⁶ Fiscal bottlenecking and budgetary theft remained strong and many officers at the polsek level reported signing budget dispersal forms and not receiving the actual funds. Operational budgets remained nil at the polsek and polres levels and officers were operating on less than half of their allocated funds. Two years later in 2008 the Indonesian Forum for Transparent Accountancy issued a press statement that merely reiterated the point. State funds were either misallocated or spent wastefully with only Rp 211 billion [US\$24 million] of the Rp 18 trillion [US\$2 billion] allocated to the police in 2007 spent on law enforcement activities (Kompas, 15 January 2008).

One Wakapolsek noted,

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Retired police general, interviewed by author (6 April 2007). The general argued that businessman cum Golkar parliamentarian Setya Novanto in particular sought to gain from the return of procurement privileges to the Derenbang.

You know, I'd rather be below a ministry or the governor, that way we might actually get some infrastructure and equipment quickly. We don't feel these new funds at all. The polres is eating up all the money. We did get some new cars. But unfortunately, we don't have the funds to fix them or to pay for the petrol. I set up a deal with local businesses where they supply us with five litres a day.²⁷

He went on to add that Eka Cipta Widjaja's ITC malls had donated the land and building of police posts in his area. Parman donations continued to be the primary and most reliable source of funding. Most tellingly, LPEM's final, and arguably most important, recommendation was that the parman economy be formalised into legitimate, documented, accountable donations to the police. This recommendation was completely neglected by subsequent reforms to the police financial system.

In his ethnography of Cilengka precinct in West Java, set in the twilight of the New Order, Barker writes of the 'data room'. This was a designated space filled with maps, statistical makeup of the community and other 'criminogenic' information about Cilengka presumably to aid preventative policing. When unveiled to visiting officials, they immediately burst into praise and proclamations that such an endeavour should be replicated across the country. But in daily life, the data room is wholly irrelevant to the Cilengka precinct's workings. It is dark and vacant, its knowledge frozen and protected from use by strategically placed curtains.

One decade on, the metaphor of the data room to symbolise Polri's relationship to certain rationalising forms of knowledge is still relevant. Polri has willfully failed to

²⁷ Wakapoltsek, South Jakarta, interviewed by author (6 April 2007).

establish the external and internal surveillance mechanisms to establish the kind of rational, ordered institutionalism associated with state governance. To do so would require a management and systematisation of particular forms and kinds of knowledge important to state architecture that the police, under the New Order could not, and today will not, institutionalise. What Barker's data room illustrated was the way that alternative logics of knowing [*ilmu*] persist and work to unpick the fiction of the rational, ordered, state institution that the police strives so hard to portray. And today, one decade on, the police continue to subtly defend these forms of knowledge and the practices they engender in ways that undermine the democratising impulse that dominates contemporary, post-authoritarian Indonesian politics.

Cukongism: The Gift Economy of Tionghoa Patronage

Most of Indonesia's private wealth and commerce is controlled by ethnic Chinese Indonesians, who, if the dubious results of the 2000 census are to be believed, make up less than 1% of the population. For reasons outlined in the following chapter of this section, I prefer to use the term *Tionghoa*. Although a fantastically diverse community, the *Tionghoa* are united by a strong trading presence across the board, from small business to Indonesia's corporate giants. In Solo, some 80% of local trade is said to be *Tionghoa* owned (Purdey, 2006, p. 126). At the other end of the scale, the 2010 Forbes list of Indonesia's ten richest people includes nine *Tionghoa* capitalists who run some of the most powerful conglomerates in the country. Parman is thus not an ethnically blank category of the neutrally rich. The term is shorthand for a historical patronage relationship between the coercive apparatus and *Tionghoa* capital that has its roots in the ethnic stratification of power, known as *cukongism*. *Pribumi*

Indonesians understand this relationship as essentially a patron-client exchange, in which the *Tionghoa* patron, the ‘*cukong*,’ exchanges gifts of capital for political privilege and legal immunity. In contrast, patrons and their donees articulate the exchange as one of selfless, voluntary giving cementing a sincere camaraderie based on mutual respect and common interest. Both parties distinctly refer to each other as ‘*teman*’ [friends] and insist repeatedly that the money is given and never requested [*tidak minta*]. The following chapter will dissect *cukongism* and ambivalent power relations that patrons are drawn into. The focus of this chapter is its significance to the coercive apparatus and the way that the current of the *Tionghoa* gift exchange economy has been reorganised in line with the reconfiguration of coercive power in the post-authoritarian period.

The gift economy of *Tionghoa* patronage is a band-aid for the institutional incompetence, centralised budget-making and personal greed of the AKPOL-educated officer elite. It is a flexible, untrackable current of capital darting through the organisation creating indebtedness by supplying property, construction, material goods and cash on a scale that significantly undermines state funding. *Tionghoa* capital is also a substructure of the Polri institution in that it substitutes for state allocated operational funds that have been siphoned off by upper echelons of the police. It underwrites choice drug and gambling busts and anti-terror exercises, community policing events and intelligence gathering. *Tionghoa* money also sponsors institution-building and knowledge exercises such as seminars, legal draftings and networking events. Capital flows can be long term and invested in individuals. It is then re-circulated into other officers, units and departments or

stations. It can also be event based with single patrons or a *kongsi* [group or cartel] of businesspeople making large donations based on need.

For the most part, the territorial instinct overrides the institutional premise of rational distribution. Because every unit, station and department of Polri ‘works on its own, as if it were its own company’ [*kerja sendiri, kaya perusahaan sendiri*],²⁸ the circulation and distribution of off budget revenue is not compensatory. Each functional unit or station territorialises a resource for which it may have direct functional responsibility or over which it may claim authority because it falls within the radius of perceived legal or coercive strength and patronage flows follow this management of *lahan*. Thus, samapta [the patrol department] relies heavily on their authority over the surveillance of territory, leading to lucrative protection rackets and a side economy in ensuring public protesters don’t get too close to their targets. Reskrim’s [criminal research] power of extraction is linked to their exclusive power to determine and declare a criminal act and the Bimmas department [community relations] on the ability to enfold and connect new patrons to the police. Similarly, Lalu Lintas’ [traffic police] control of the motor vehicle registry is a gargantuan economy for the institution, bringing in revenues that, until 2004, were not returned to the state.²⁹

²⁸ Police General, interviewed by author (6 November, 2006).

²⁹ In a classic example of the stratified nature of ABRI financing, under the New Order, ABRI took a 20% cut of the profits Mabes Polri made on every license and motor vehicle registered with the police. Even after 2004, the control of this economy continues to be important to the revenue-making of the police. BPK audits for 2005 found that Polri’s traffic directive was charging at least double the amount for standard issue driving licenses [SIM/STNK] (around Rp 176,000 [US\$19] but sometimes up to Rp 600,000 [US\$66]) and only haphazardly recording the number of licenses issued to the Department of Finance (Widoyoko, D. 2003). BPK also complained that although the money was now being returned to the state under non-tax state income [Penerimaan Negara Bukan Pajak], Polri were deliberately sitting on annual SIM/STNK revenues so as to pilfer the returns in interest (BPK, 2005).

The legal authority of a department or unit over a series of functions related to law, traffic or intelligence, also yields illicit funds based on the perceived authorities radiating from the original mandate. For instance, the *lalu lintas* and *samapta* departments have the authority to levy fines based on traffic violations, an important source of funds for the department. Indeed, Jakartans like to joke that *razia* [police raids] increase exponentially in number and severity of fines in line according to proximity to important police and religious events. However, this authority to fine has bulged and mutated into territorial forms allowing the extraction of sums that represent neither a bribe nor a fine.

By way of example, take Jakarta's transport system. The giant, tangled web that represents the Jakarta bus system is an important source of revenue for *polsek* and *polres*. Bus drivers who traverse a specific *wilayah* elect a *timer* who guard the boundaries between *wilayah*, for instance between the subdistrict of Rawasari and Salemba. Each time a driver runs the route, perhaps dozens of times a day, he gives a sum of a few thousand to the *timer* who at the end of the day will divide the funds between the patrol and traffic police of the various *polsek* and *polres* that lie within that area, providing each with around Rp 100,000-200,000 [US\$11-22] per day.³⁰ The *timer* does not work for the police. He is elected by the drivers, sometimes based on affiliation to various *ormas*, who inform the police by formal letter [*surat edaran*] that this individual is permitted to negotiate going rates with the police and refer to him in case of any conflict between officers and drivers. What must be emphasized here is that the the sum paid for crossing into the territory of a particular traffic police does not represent a bribe for clearly the police have no legal authority over the movement

³⁰ If the *timer* is giving the traffic police of the *polsek* Rp 200,000 [US\$22] per day, this is revenue of around Rp 73 million [US\$8 200] per year, a tidy sum for a small cash-strapped department.

of people. Plying the bus from one subdistrict to another breaks no laws. Instead, the sum is rather more akin to a toll that recognises official police juristication over a certain *wilayah* and *anticipates* their legal authority to fine within that territory based on violations to traffic laws.³¹ The sum gives the bus driver a pass to enter the traffic police's territory and grants the driver immunity against potential traffic violations and other attempts at extortion whilst in the territory. The sums that the *timer* gives to police are an example of the ways that legal and territorial authority become intertwined and mutually reinforcing. Fiscal extraction comes not from the originary capacity to fine, but from a halo of presumed and indeed, illicit authorities that come of that first legal entitlement. Thus illicit fiscal flows appear to sketch the path of legal authority in ways that are disorientated and complex.

This example shows the capacity of individual police departments to bring in revenue which, if rationally circulated and shared, could potentially make up for the drought in resources [*kering*] experienced by other units and departments. But Polri finances do not circulate but rather cul de sac in specific areas to be mopped up by assigned officers according to a complex, sometimes internally conflicting scale of seniority, rank and individual prowess. Moreover, stations, units, departments, working groups, right down to individual commanders and the officers under their authority do not leave themselves open to severe social and political sanction by overtly requisitioning the wealth of other areas. Not asking for money is to be *ikhlas*; it shows your sacrifice for the institution, stressed one middle-ranking reskrim officer. A supervisor will

³¹ Field notes (15 March 2007). My informant recounted a situation in which he was pulled up by the police for a traffic violation. Although he was guilty of the offense, he immediately asserted, 'You can't arrest me. I've paid my money to the *timer*. If you haven't received your money, then you have to work it out with the *timer* and your people, not me' and promptly put the bus into gear and drove off. This illustrates how the sum draws police and drivers into a relationship of negotiated rights and obligations.

invite his junior [*anak buah*] to come to him to resolve monetary issues, but this is just theatre. There is no *prestasi* [prestige] in doing so.³² Rather, a subordinate's silence about the financial situation of the one's unit is also to impress upon a senior that one has one's own stock of revenue, sources of patronage and enigmatic ways of generating income that sees one's *prestasi* ripen in the eyes of management.

'Fulfilling my duties as an officer without asking for money is what makes me remarkable [*hebatnya saya*] in the eyes of authority,' added the officer.³³ Getting noticed by senior officers for one's fiscal prowess is crucial to future rotations and the generation of further monetary possibilities. One female officer said,

If you are not fit operationally [*tidak mampu secara operasional*; a euphemism for an officer's ability to bring in revenues to the force], you'll be isolated [*kamu tersingkir*]. It's a kind of test for promotion. I was offered one [a promotion] but I was worried that I wouldn't be able to pay the kapolsek enough. I didn't want to go crazy having to look for money [*tidak mau dipusingkan dengan nyari uang*]. But the men are up for it [*Laki2 mau aja*]. That's why the police are mainly men. That's the obstacle for women. That's why women can't hold a posting for very long [*tidak lama menjabat*]. Look at that female officer who became Kapolres in Depok. She didn't last very long, did she?³⁴ They [women] have good policing skills and the community likes them. If they were smart [*pandai*], they'd show their ability to find patrons [*cari teman*] using their feminine wiles [*kelembutan wanita*].³⁵

Not only does the structure of social capital within the police create the very inefficiencies in fiscal management that further increase the reliance upon the

³² Mid ranking police officer, interviewed by author (07 March 2007).

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ The officer is referring to Adjunt Senior Police Commisioner (AKBP) Ratnawati Hadiwijaya who on the 5th of May 2005 was promoted to Kapolres of Depok only to be urgently removed in early August. There was some suggestion at the time by Kapolda Firman Gani that she had allowed the detention of a suspect and evidence outside of the police station, however, amongst officers in Jakarta it was widely believed that she simply wasn't able to keep her part of the territorial command financially afloat.

³⁵ Mid ranking police officer, interviewed by author (10 November 2006).

patronage economy, but that very economy operates in gendered ways that works to shut women out of further advancement in the police.

Indeed, the *Tionghoa* gift economy is masculinised to its very core. Some forms of patronage are long term, with individual stellar officers sponsored throughout the life span of their careers or during certain key moments, such as when the police beneficiary holds a certain strategic position. While rank and position are, what Gambetta calls, immediate barometers by which clients can judge the quality of the guarantee (Gambetta, 1996), there are other locally informed ways that bear upon capital's decision to back a police officer. A rising 'man of prowess' can be judged by the quality of his police patron, the factions to which he is aligned within the police or the deference he attracts from junior officers or important civilians. The quality of an officer's *gaul* [association/friendship] with *preman* and the criminal element is also an indicator that '*dia punya massa, dia punya kekuatan*' [he can galvanise the masses, he has power],³⁶ thus bolstering the worth of the investment. In order to not embarrass the officer, gift-giving can initially be timid. Relationships emerge through masculine spaces and modes of bonding such as late nights in clubs or gambling dens or the gift of female sex workers. One officer at PTIK proudly showed me photos on his phone of a young slumbering, naked girl. She was a Chinese sex worker who had been gifted to him for the night by a '*teman cina*' [*Tionghoa* friend]. A 'friendship' is struck up by the mutual implication of parties in the transgression of laws and norms. Later, gifts inflate. Patronage comes to infuse

³⁶ Mid ranking police officer, interview by author (18 September 2006).

every aspect of an officer's life, providing cars, scholarships for children, homes and Harley Davidson motorbikes.³⁷

From Polri's perspective, long-term patronage of this kind is considered integral to keeping starred officers continually focused on the task of policing, rather than having to pursue too many other forms of revenue-raising. For this reason, meeting and maintaining a patron is considered by police superiors an integral rite of passage and as a rising officer circulates through postings and departments, he is expected to establish contacts and patronage networks that will serve the institution in the future. Patronage is also assumed for officers in higher education, and for those in certain key positions, such as reskrim and senior command positions in the centres of capital of Surabaya, Medan or Jakarta, or when going through the higher education institutions for the officer corps, PTIK, the new police Masters program KPK and the senior management courses at SESPIIM. At PTIK, my informant told me that to his knowledge all of his classmates, including himself, had support from a *Tionghoa* patron.³⁸

Access to liquidity, in the form of a *Tionghoa* donor, also brings greater mobility within the police institution. *Tionghoa* patrons supply the capital integral to the bidding and counter-bidding process required to circulate upwards into more lucrative or prestigious positions. Monthly *amplop* [envelopes] from the *Tionghoa* patrons

³⁷ However, interviews with police officers suggested that this was not always so. An officer arriving into posting of clear interest to capital, such as the head of criminal research in a border area, will on the first day find himself gifted with the luxuries of his new position such as a new house or car.

³⁸ Junior ranking officer, interviewed by author (11 April 2007).

supply the funds from which the monthly *setoran* [salary deduction] payments to the departmental or station chief of staff is paid³⁹.

Finally, the debt of patronage engendered by an individual commander's relationship to *Tionghoa* capital will also be passed on or circulated as 'gifts' are 're-gifted' to third parties, such as the junior *anak buah* below the commanding unit officer. A former senior police commissioner with the police explained,

'You can't be promoted/rotated [*naik*] without the Chinese class [*golongan cina*]. They have an incredible influence on postings [*posisi*]. There are bribes [*upeti*] he must pay and he'll also give [*memberikan*] facilities...to become a *kapolsek*, you must [*mesti*] have a patron [*friend*]. We don't have a merit system. This is why we have this system.⁴⁰

Maintaining and even amassing patrons can help an officer ward off further bids on his position from other ambitious officers who use their own patronage revenue to shift stationed personnel. One reskrim officer at Central Jakarta's lucrative Taman Sari polsek told me that his patrons had to fight off three bids for his position during the two years of his tenure by upping their fiscal support. In this way, *Tionghoa* patrons become mired in turf wars against each other through the deployment of their respective officers.

Tionghoa patronage is also rendered in kind, through the permissive use of facilities and goods in a patron's possession. As such for the police, *Tionghoa* patronage rearranges the city spatially; officer 'beats' are arranged around a topographical map of patron venues where an officer might get a free meal, some *uang rokok* [cigarette

³⁹ This is discussed in more detail in Chapter VI.

⁴⁰ Retired Police General, interviewed by author (15 November 2006).

money], meet other officers and make contacts with other potentially important *Tionghoa* entrepreneurs. A researcher of the police finds on-duty and off-duty officers pooling in certain bars, hotels, clubs, karaoke joints and malls but also at the local level, at select coffee shops and *warung*, gathering on a particular strip of land or below a banner. Within the police, these gathering points are markers of affiliation to be ‘read’ by colleagues and competitors. Informants who knew nothing of each other, separated by legality, profession, class and ethnicity jiggled nervously with the fizz of possibility when they talked of Saturday nights down at the notorious gambling den Hotel Crown on Jalan Harum Wuruk. Dinners with generals were always at Winata’s Pacific Place or the 4am buffet at the Hotel Hilton where one never saw a bill and afternoons were spent at certain golf courses or the Senayan shooting range. And so one comes to see how *Tionghoa* patronage reshapes the city spatially into hubs where gift-giving, male showmanship and further fiscal potential intersect. Thus, patronage is not merely a relationship but a spatial exercise in urban geography. What officers in the West know comfortably as ‘the beat’ is in Indonesia not a neutral exercise in patrolling uninterrupted, sovereign terrain but a circuit of political and fiscal potential clustered around nodes of capital.⁴¹ Under these circumstances, is it any wonder that the figures that Barker details in the Cilengka data room so meticulously map the precinct’s *Tionghoa* population? These are the sites to be patrolled, awaiting the emergence of fiscal possibility.

Thus, the gift economy of *Tionghoa* patronage circulates through Polri on two necessarily interconnected levels. On the individual level, *Tionghoa* liquidity is crucial for officers to fund rotations, promotions and higher education. This capital

⁴¹ I thank Olly Owen for his fruitful comparative insights in our conversations around this topic.

also allows officers to amass a loyal following of *anak buah* by regifting the spoils of patronage to juniors and maintaining the favour of superiors by recirculating *Tionghoa* money upwards as monthly *setoran*. Patronage money from *Tionghoa* donors builds internal police patronage by indebteding junior officers to a senior and currying favour with superiors. Officers also designate *Tionghoa* funds for the gift economy that flows between juniors and visiting or introduced senior and retired officers. It falls to these juniors to provide senior ranked station guests with petrol, girls, drugs, nights out on the town, or simply in the form of *amplop* [envelopes] to see them safely on their journey – all paid with *Tionghoa* funds. At the same time, the gift economy of *Tionghoa* patronage is a gargantuan shadow economy of Polri, seeping through the institution, filling in where allocated budgets have been pilfered or skimmed or simply fail to reflect the everyday needs of a station, department or unit.

Patronage thus marries perceived individual and institution needs in ways that are complex and often asymmetrical but morally defensible to its beneficiaries and the institutional structure in which they operate. *Cukongism* operates as a double bind that render the norms and laws of social systems internally incoherent. On one hand, *Tionghoa*-police patronage friendships are illicit relationships because they contradict laws and popularly articulated social norms on police neutrality in law enforcement and public sources of police funding. However, within the police institution and the wider political body, entertaining good relations with *Tionghoa* patrons is seen as so integral to the well being of the institution that the social and professional life of an ambitious officer is by design circuited around points of interface with *Tionghoa* business figures. These points of convergence include the reservation of Wednesday

afternoons at the National Police Schools [SPN] solely for visiting ‘community members’, politicians and other important, capitalized figures known as ‘*pembina*’ [guardians]⁴². Police also compete for specific geographic postings, such as Medan and Surabaya or departmental assignments, such as our reskrim officer in the major ‘entertainment’ district of Taman Sari in Jakarta.⁴³ As such, the parman economy creates stark disparities between different geographic areas within the command, between territories dense with parman and those without. The LPEM survey found that AKPOL-trained [Police Academy] officers circuited a ‘bureaucratic itinerary’ of areas rich in private capital and that the low prestige SPN [National Police School] graduates clustered around stations located in areas of low private enterprise (Blundo, 2007, p. 47). It was often rumoured within the police that Tomy Winata had a hand in the selection of the Police Chief of Metro Jaya [Kapolda] or the National Chief of Criminal Investigation [Kabareskrim]. Although such allegations can’t be proven, it is instructive that officers strongly believe they have to circulate within institution as a way of ‘doing the rounds’ with its patrons, and that this orbit of the territorial command forms the bedrock of police strategising for rotation and promotion.

Thus, the gift economy of *Tionghoa* patronage fulfils thickly intertwined individual and institutional interests, though it would be a mistake to suggest that these interests are met equally or that institutional interests prevail in situations where they conflict. This alignment of institutional and individual interest is precisely where conventional definitions of corruption, as the misuse of public office for personal gain, wholly miss the point. Indeed, ‘corruption’ is a deviant, transgressive practice, enveloped in

⁴² Retired Police General, interviewed by author (17 July 2008).

⁴³ Figure 6 shows the high density of police and military stations in the central entertainment areas of Jakarta. Taman Sari boasts two Kodim, two Koramil and a Polsek. The map, of course, cannot show the flocks of non-stationed police and military officers circling the area on a given night. See Chapter III for more details.

secrecy. Polri officers engaged in the pursuit of off-budget revenue are under no illusions about the strict legal definition of their practices. But practice trumps law it sustains important relations of exchange and transaction within the institution and between the institution and the wider apparatus of the state. Simply put, it is a social practice rather an individual offence and it is this very fact that makes corruption within the police systemic (Znoj, 2007, p. 54). Chapter VI of this thesis interrogates these relations further.

The fact that a torrent of *Tionghoa* capital is diverted through the state's coercive apparatuses is in itself nothing new to the scholarship of security in Indonesia. The relationship between state *keamanan* and private capital has a historical trajectory that outlasts the republic itself, with individual patronage relations only a small subset of a wider, structural relationship. *Tionghoa* entrepreneurship funded the *pribumi* segments of the colonial *beamtenstaat* (Sutherland, 1979). The military offensive against the Dutch during the revolution was funded by an alliance between *Tionghoa* smugglers, traders and football stars with the nascent political and military elite (Twang, 1998; Cribb, 1998) and the 1950s saw the rise of one of the most celebrated *totok*-military couplings in the history of the New Order, that of Liem Sioe Liong and the young would-be President Suharto himself. As military businesses transformed, fragmented and formalized, becoming increasing complex and diversified after the military seizure of former Dutch owned industries in 1957, relations between *Tionghoa* big business and the military elite too became more sophisticated. Then when Suharto rose to power in 1965 on the back of a massacre of genocidal proportions, *Tionghoa* capital affixed itself to the coercive apparatus in such a way as to construct what Chua calls 'a mutually beneficial politico-business oligarchy,'

(2008) concentrated in nodules around positions, units and battalions which possessed extraordinary political and coercive potency, such as Kopassus, Kostrad (of which Suharto was a commander in 1965), the Siliwangi (West Java) and Diponogoro (Central Java) regional command, the Presidential guard and the army in general.

Seen in this light, *Tionghoa* capitalists sinking such large sums of money into the police in the wake of the political transition to democracy suggests that the vast economy of *Tionghoa* capital, like the politics of territory, has also been subject to the see-saw switch of the reorganisation of the coercive apparatus. *Tionghoa* capital, once marked thoroughly green, was realigning itself following the rise of the civilianisation of the coercive apparatus. The following section will explore Sino-military cooperation during the New Order.



Photograph 4: Polda Metro Jaya's Densus 88 building under construction despite ongoing suspicion that land and funds were donated by Tomy Winata's Artha Graha [AG]. AG's headquarters dwarf the station (Photo by Hendarto, 2005).

The Militarisation of Sino-Capital in the Golden Triangle

Officially, Polda Metro Jaya neighbours Lot#1 of the 42 hectares of prime real estate that make up the Sudirman Central Business District (SCBD). Zoned between three of the city's main arteries Jalan Sudirman, Jalan Rasuna Said and Jalan Gatot Subroto, the area is marketed as 'Jakarta's Golden Triangle' despite its uncanny resemblance to a cross, or more fittingly, a pirate's X. Alongside Metro Jaya's recent property expansion, the Golden Triangle is home to the Jakarta Stock Exchange, the World Bank, USAID, Tan Kian's Ritz Carlton, a series of exclusive serviced apartments built by Agung Sedayu (another property group jointly owned by Winata and

Kusuma), a golf range, an exclusive auto and electronics mall, the biggest pool hall in Southeast Asia and most recently, Pacific Place, which in a city of extreme-lux shopping malls, boasts itself, ‘the foremost destination for shopping and lifestyle.’ SCBD has been constructed ‘to accommodate your requirements of a place to experience your success,’ a success safeguarded by the ‘total security complex’ offered by management (www.scdb.com).

Seen from Jalan Sudirman, the Artha Graha building, with its flaxen initials winking over the city, is staked before this hoard of skyscrapers like a picket in turf. Artha Graha is the mother company to PT Danayasa Arthatama, a holding company that owns, develops, manages and secures the luxury that proliferates in the Golden Triangle.⁴⁴ PT Danayasa Arthatama is also in part owned by Sugianto ‘Aguan’ Kusuma, owner of conglomerate, Agung Sedayu Group. In 1990, PT Danayasa Arthatama surprised financial observers by acquiring a majority share in a state-owned company (BUMN) called PT Jakarta International Hotel Development (PT JIHD). With funds from PT JIHD, in 1991, PT Danayasa Arthatama proceeded to pay Rp 7.5 trillion [\$US836 million] for the SCDB development, then a ‘fantastical sum for central Jakarta real estate.’ (Gatra, 17 March, 2003) To clear the site of its pesky, tenacious residents and landowners (most of them migrants who settled there from the 1950-70s), PT Danayasa Arthatama hired Yoris Raweyai to galvanise his Pemuda Pancasila henchmen (Tempo, 31 May, 1999).⁴⁵ The violence used to deterritorialise evidently paid off because by 1999 Human Rights Watch valued the property at an estimated US\$ 3 billion dollars (Human Rights Watch, 2006, p. 34).

⁴⁴ Below this company are 19 other subsidiaries involved in tourism, luxury housing, retail, property, trading and construction. Most of these companies have a stake in the SCBD development.

⁴⁵ In this interview, Raweyai admits that he has known Tomy Winata since 1975 when Winata was contracted to build the residence for Irian Jaya Kodam. His relationship with Winata and Aguan deepened in the 1980s.

Previously, neither Winata nor Kusuma had ever managed a property deal that came even close to that sum. Uncannily, in the year of the SCDB purchase, Kusuma's Agung Sedayu group completed its first big construction project: the Harco Mangga Dua complex in Central Jakarta.⁴⁶

On the face of it PT JIHD was a rather ordinary little enterprise. Its portfolio encompassed a few luxury, but now increasingly dated hotels, such as Jakarta's Hotel Borobudur,⁴⁷ the Hotel Kartika and its sister hotel in South Kuta, the Kartika Plaza Bali. The SCBD development was a new endeavour for PT JIHD and some would say the company was punching way above its weight. However, PT JIHD was in fact one of dozens of subsidiaries⁴⁸ grouped under PT Tri Usaha Bakti (Truba), a holding company under the auspices of *Yayasan Kartika Eka Paksi* (YKEP). YKEP was and continues to be the Indonesian army's largest and most notorious foundation.

The marriage of army (PT JIHD) and *Tionghoa* (PT Danayasa Arthatama) interests through the Golden Triangle investment was also reinforced by the earlier appointment of Siliwangi officer, Letnan General TB Silalahi to *Komisaris Utama* [First Commissioner] of PT Danayasa Arthatama and Bank Artha Graha.⁴⁹ Silalahi's

⁴⁶ Chapter III specifically looks at the Harco Mangga Dua complex and its integral role in the illicit gambling economy.

⁴⁷ For a time, Hotel Borobudur's in-house night club, Musro, was the place to see and be seen among Jakarta's rising *Tionghoa* and military elites. Security staff to the hotel were supplied by the army and Kopassus. In recent years, symbolic of the reorganisation of the coercive apparatus, Hotel Borobudur has come to be guarded by Brimob and Kopassus. In early 2010, it was also the site of anti-terrorism training by Densus 88.

⁴⁸ HRW notes that in 2001, by the time of YKEP's substantial decline, the foundation had eleven subsidiaries and 22 joint ventures (pg 34). In 2000, Kompas reported that YKEP had 43 subsidiaries, while Indonesian Corruption Watch's independent report on military businesses gave a figure of 44 companies and 22 joint ventures (2006).

⁴⁹ One of the first ventures of the Winata-Kusuma-army prism was the take over of Yayasan Siliwangi's Bank Propelat. By 1989, Bank Propelat was Rp 600 billion [US\$67 million] in the red thanks to corrupt lending practices and bad debts. Winata-Kusuma took on the bank, renamed it Bank Artha Graha and by 1992, they enjoyed a majority share through PT Karya Nusantara Permai and PT

appointment was the first in a procession of senior military figures with commissioner status in the Artha Graha empire. The military commissioners were ostensibly positioned within Artha Graha to represent YKEP's stake in the partnership, but the true effect of their appointment was to provide a halo of militarised protection around Winata and Kusuma's business dealings. This spectacular theatre of *Tionghoa*-military partnership represented an intensification of the Sino-military business empire in an era characterised by militarised relationships with 'oligarchic capitalism' (Chua, 2008). Land that Polda Metro Jaya would receive as gift some 14 years later under Indonesia's new civilian democracy, was in 1991 a shining beacon of the iron clad alliance of Jakarta's *Tionghoa* tycoons and the army in late New Order capitalism.

However, the SCBD alliance also heralded a new configuration of *Tionghoa*-military entrepreneurship which broke with the earlier patterns of military *cukongism*⁵⁰ organised around a revolving but familiar cast of primarily *totok* figures such as Bob Hasan, Liem Sioe Liong (Bogorsari), Mochtar Riady (Lippo Group), Sjamsul Nursalim (Gadjah Tunggal Group), Prajogo Pangestu (Barito Pacific Group), Sukanto Tanoto (Royal Golden Eagle International), Eka Tjipta Widjaya (Sinar Mas Group), Harry Tanoe and Rachman Halim. As Chua observes, these business elites had amassed capital on the back of a highly protectionist, centralised, industrialising state

Cerana Artha Putra respectively. Yayasan Siliwangi had only a 40% stake in Bank Artha Graha. Bank Artha Graha is today one of the top commercial banking firms in the country.

⁵⁰ Suryadinata (1997) explains that a *cukong* (formerly spelt *tjukong*) is Hokkein for master or boss and has long been used to describe aggressive business entrepreneurs, who often represented informal leaders for certain parts of the *Tionghoa* community. Only in the New Order did *cukong* come to represent a set of relations, in which *Tionghoa* businessmen provided capital and directional support to the *pribumi* political and military elite in exchange for economic, political and security privileges. At the same Suryadinata (1997) notes that as New Order *cukong* became closer to the state, they harboured increasingly less inclination to 'lead' the *Tionghoa* community. This has not been the case for Tomy Winata who has put his money behind a significant number of *pribumi*, *Tionghoa*, state and civil society activities.

economy in which a corps of politico-bureaucrats saw the alliance with *Tionghoa* capital as the best path to the cooptation of a rival class, the exclusion of *pribumi* entrepreneurs who might demand political privileges, and personal enrichment (Chua, 2008, p. 50-55).

By 1991, the year of the SCDB purchase, the capital base of the politico-bureaucrats had fattened considerably, decreasing their reliance on *Tionghoa* big business.⁵¹ For their own part, *Tionghoa* capitalists were edging into international markets and increasing their autonomy from the state. Liberalisation and selective deregulation profited both parties, and reforms to the banking sector saw a host of *Tionghoa* conglomerates open banks as personal cash cows, increasing their access to the colossal jab of credit needed to make Jakarta's most costly property deal. With inflation and interest rates equally paired, 20-25% of all lending fuelled the massive property boom that transformed the urban landscape and intensified spatial segregation (Studwell, 2007, Chapter 6). Hence, Kusuma and Winata's break into the big league of *Tionghoa* conglomerates occurred at a time in which Sino-military alliances were transitioning into a new phase which would, as Chua illustrates, eventually see *Tionghoa* big business free themselves of their dependency on the state.

Before the SCBD purchase, very few had heard of Sugianto Kusuma or Tomy Winata. However since 1991 the SCBD purchase has consistently ranked as one of the most profitable slabs of real estate in the country and Artha Graha has grown into a true megalith, with major stakes in mining, tin, oil, gas, agriculture and finance.

⁵¹ Ibid.

Indeed, Winata's recent cornering of the emerging hybrid-rice market is a replication of the kind of cartel common during the New Order, supplying a constant cash flow that is certain to launch Artha Graha into Indonesia's top ten most wealthy conglomerates. As Chapter II describes, Sugianto Kusuma has established himself as a property tycoon and is reshaping the face of Indonesia's urban spaces into lifestyle malls and luxury apartments. In June 2010, Kusuma's net worth of US\$625 million saw him ranked number 21 on the Forbes list of wealthiest Indonesians, up from number 25 the previous year. This year, Winata is curiously absent from the list.

Foundations, Cooperatives and *Cukong* in ABRI's Charity Economy

Yayasan Kartika Eka Paksi (YKEP) was the army's largest foundation established to provide for the welfare of army personnel. After a series of Sino-military businesses ended in scandal, bankruptcy and a prohibition on any further economic activity (Widoyoko, 2003, p. 26-30), General Umar Wirahadikusumah, a rising star from the Siliwangi command who replaced Suharto in Kostrad in 1967, established YKEP in 1972. YKEP was not the first foundation of the armed forces. That distinction goes to a Polri *yayasan*, Badan Sosial Pusat Kepolisian Indonesia (later known as Brata Bhakti) which was established in 1952.⁵²

Throughout Indonesia's constitutional democracy in the 1950s and the guided democracy of the 60s, independent revenue-raising was an acknowledged part of leading a command, battalion or department. Indeed, with the nationalisation of

⁵² Senior staff *Yayasan Brata Bhakti*, interview by author (24 April 2008).

Dutch industry, the military swaggered into an increasingly important role in the economy. In 1957, as head of Central Java's Diponegoro military command, Suharto had met this objective by establishing *yayasan* with business interests in primary commodities, agricultural produce and shipping in league with Semarang's large population of *totok* traders, including Bob Hasan. Elson notes that through these activities Suharto's military and civilian staff were 'allocated positions which entitled them to percentages of profits' in private business and in state enterprises.⁵³ From the late 1960s onwards, YKEP, and the dozens of foundations established by ABRI and civilian government branches, departments and agencies, represented a legalisation of the enterprise Suharto had initiated and then been condemned for at Diponegoro.

The *yayasan/kooperasi* system lent a charitable front to the control of some of the best contracts in the country. YKEP, like hundreds of other military and police foundations established for the welfare of their personnel, had a vast investment portfolio that spanned forestry, manufacturing, services, mining, transportation, university education and the diamond in the tiara that was the SCDB development. At

⁵³ Elson's writing on this part of Suharto's life is interesting for its caution. He is reserved about three of the most popular understandings of this period of Suharto's life; 1) that through Diponegoro's business empire, he formed a life-long alliance with *totok* trader Liem Sioe Liong 2) that these business activities led to his dismissal for corruption by Nasution in late 1959 and 3) that these activities formed the basis for the blatant, franchise style corruption that characterised the New Order state. Liong appeared to be a smaller player in Diponegoro's businesses than foster child of Gatot Subroto, Bob Hasan. Elson argues that Suharto's own reputation amongst his men was not one of greed or self-advancement but selfless devotion and fiscal moderation and Nasution's decision to transfer him appeared to be more a matter of internal politicking than serious allegations of personal enrichment. (Elson, 2001, p. 60-75). More recently, Jenkins has categorically rejected this line, suggesting that Suharto's 'fund-raising' while at the Diponegoro post was blatantly geared towards self-enrichment. In league with his primary financial officer, 'they squeezed and cajoled ethnic Chinese businessmen. They imposed illegal levies on the copra trade. They seized the assets of foreign-owned businesses. They set up a lucrative smuggling operation, bartering sugar for rice. They sought 'assistance' from the manufacturers of *kretek* [clove] cigarettes. They controlled, 'unofficially', the distribution of kerosene in Central Java'. Suharto was driven by such excessive greed that it agitated military elites in Jakarta, leading to his eventual dismissal. The *yayasan* that Suharto set up while at Diponegoro were instrumental to his growing wealth (Jenkins, D, 2010, p. 17-26).

its height, YKEP was associated with around Rp 314 billion [US\$35 million] worth of 13 affiliated firms and 26 joint ventures (Rieffel & Dharmasaputra, 2008), the profits of which brought in around Rp 30-50 billion [US\$300-500,000] per year (Ishak, 2008). YKEP also specialised in obtaining state contracts to provide shoddy, overpriced services to their own captive markets, such as PT Bhakti Wira Husada's provision of pharmaceuticals to the army medical unit (Widoyoko, 2003, p. 59).

Although it was the most expensive, the SCBD initiative was only one of 26 other joint ventures with international capital and Suharto-allied-*Tionghoa* funds. Through PT Tri Usaha Bhakti (Truba), a military company established in 1968 and moved below YKEP auspices when the ban on military businesses came into place in the early 1970s. YKEP developed significant stakes in timber, aviation, transportation, metals construction, forestry and plantations. By 1996, Truba's assets had grown so profitable that it pegged the company as 140th on Indonesia's biggest conglomerate list. Truba's 51% share in International Timber Corp was shared with Bob Hasan (35%) and Bambang Trihatmodjo (14%). Hasan and Tommy Suharto also partnered with Truba through Sempati Air and Truba's timber interests in Kalimantan were in league with *Tionghoa* local, Jos Soetomo, through PT Sumber Mas.

As Robison observed in 1986, partnering with *Tionghoa* capital alleviated the fact that on their own military businesses,

remain small, undercapitalised and struggling. Generally they flourish only with entry into joint enterprise with Chinese or international capitalists. It's the latter who provide the capital, the management and the broad corporate structures to turn these sets of political resources into real profits (Robinson, 2008, p. 256).

Robison's work underscored how the military used its political clout to lever logging and mining concessions with very small sums of investment of Rp 2-3 million [US\$222-335]. Production would lie fallow until the military negotiated joint ventures with big *Tionghoa* business who would supply the project with an artery of capital and the expertise to manage it. Robison proposed that in fact, the military's investment in the partnership was the very concession itself. Military officers provided only the security and prestige of partnership in return for a cut of profits. Unlike other financially autonomous militaries such as those in Pakistan (Siddiqua, 2007), Russia (Brommelhorster & Paes, 2003) or Congo (ibid), the unique racialised structure of the Indonesian economy relieved Suharto's generals from the messy work of business strategy and management. This helped maintain a system that would have collapsed far earlier than it eventually did had it been entirely self-run.

Little wonder then that the pattern of military (particularly army) businesses mimicked the strategies and structures of Indonesia's numerous *Tionghoa* conglomerates: random diversification around a series of vertically integrated cartels that supplied a core cash flow (Studwell, 2007). In the signature style of most *Tionghoa* conglomerates, YKEP raised enough capital to allow them to dominate entire production chains.⁵⁴ This is known as vertical integration and it allowed YKEP to determine how much profit and loss showed up on the books, diverting funds so that companies appear less wealthy than they actually were or to obscuring profits siphoned into military pockets. With 'too much easy cash and too much easy credit' (ibid, p. 82) the generations of army generals and the patron *cukong* that partners with

⁵⁴ Retired Police General, interview by author (11 April 2007).

YKEP diversified in order to establish more monopolies in other sectors of the economy rather than work at building dedicated, competitive companies with maximised earnings. Studwell observes that this is a classic symptom of ‘a license-based operating environment in which competition is limited by the state and so any new business opportunity is to be grabbed at’ (ibid). But I would push this argument further. Vertical integration is an extreme modality of territorialisation writ large on the national economy. It is not yen for limitless power that drives the will to monopolise through the indiscriminate purchase of companies, arranged and rearranged below holding companies in a labyrinth order too dense to be penetrated by any one auditor. Rather I propose that underlying the need to territorialise the sector grinds a deep nervousness about the temporal and political limits of their great empires. It is the plunder mentality of an imposter awaiting exposition. Vertical integration within a wider pattern of random diversification speaks of the desperate, mechanistic strategy of those who live in uncertain patrimonial exchange systems. This will be explored further in the following chapter.

The alliance between *Tionghoa* capital and the off-budget army economy created other queer protuberances in the New Order economy. Since the nationalisation of what agrarian state industry under Sukarno’s Guided Democracy and the industrialisation of that industry under the New Order,⁵⁵ the military had played a role as advisors, commissioners and managers of state companies and increasingly of Suharto-owned companies. With the expansion of joint enterprises between the military and *Tionghoa* capital, this too entitled army officers to cushy positions on the

⁵⁵ Sungkar notes that although the state economy of the Dutch East Indies had industrial, commercial and financial wings, by the time of its 1957 nationalisation its agricultural investment consisted of over 400 estates. By comparison, under the New Order, of the 200 companies controlled by the state, 23% were in industry, 19% in agriculture, 16% in finance and 10% in public works. (Sungkar, Yasmin. 2008, p 98-99).

board for retired or senior officers. As with TB Silalahi's permanent post as commissioner for Winata's PT Danayasa and Bank Artha Graha, it was increasingly unclear whether officers were there to represent military business interests or their individual stake-holdings and as the greening of private enterprise intensified, the distinction between the two became progressively blurred. In this way *Tionghoa*-military patronage was a two way street. As military businesses clung to their *cukong* so too did *Tionghoa* business scramble for *beking* from an appropriately potent military officer. This was a classic semiotic display to competitors and potential extortionists. The exchange was this: if *Tionghoa* capital provided the military with the smarts to turn their concessions into a business empire, then the military provided *Tionghoa* with security against the threat of competition. Enveloped in a halo of senior Kostrad and Kopassus officers, the power of their *beking* lay in their ability to extend power by association; by conferring the imagined power of their networks, legal immunity and coercive muster. Ethnic Chinese businesspeople spoke to me repeatedly of the need, not to align with or court, but specifically to '*tempel*' [to plaster or patch] a military general to their capital as a potent *pribumi* face to protect their investments.

As the largest foundation run by the oldest sibling of the coercive apparatus, YKEP established the signature style of the vast web of foundations and cooperatives that made up the revenue-raising wings of the army, navy, air-force, police and, too often forgotten, their hundreds of individual territorial, geographic and command incarnations. In the year that Wirahadikumah established YKEP, the police, navy and airforce established their main vehicles for off-budget fundraising. Well known among them include the Navy's Yayasan Bhumyamca, which had around 32

companies in 2000 and the airforce's Yayasan Adhi Upaya, whose 10 companies were invested in construction, property, construction, airlines and pharmaceuticals (HRW, 2006, p. 35-36). Moreover, through PT Angkasa Pura, the airforce was able to maintain a major, ongoing stake in the commercial and state airline industry.

As the youngest sibling of ABRI, Mabes Polri's efforts to intercept state and private commerce were channeled mainly through Yayasan Brata Bhakti (YBB). YBB is ironically the oldest of all the foundations of the coercive apparatus, which today oversees around ten trade, insurance, and forestry companies (see Table 2). Now regulated by the Foundation Laws of 2004, capital is no longer raised through partnership with the private sector although its activities continue to receive guidance (*pembinaan*) from the Kapolri, Wakapolri and Irwasum. Officials at YBB resolutely argue that the foundation no longer operates as a 'mask' [*topeng*] for Polri's business interests and insist that most of the companies under its auspices are idle or unprofitable.⁵⁶

Like the army, the police also established its cooperatives, such as Inkopol [*Induk Kooperasi Polri*] which runs a transportation and storage warehouse [*gudang*] network favoured for Bulog and state agri-businesss distribution and storage contracts. In 2004, the cooperative was credibly accused of illicit sugar and rice smuggling. In the 1990s, Inkopol also partnered profitably to computerise the Traffic Directive's vehicle registration and licensing, firstly through Suharto's daughter, Siti

⁵⁶ Interview. Yayasan Brata Bhakti. 24.04.08. Comparatively, however, YBB's self stated income appears to be quite buoyant. In a recent comparison of *yayasan* managed by state departments YBB is second only to Bank Indonesia [the central bank] in takings. So great is Yayasan Kesejahteraan Karyawan Bank Indonesia's Rp 5.3 trillion [\$US 590 million] yearly income (YKKBI, or the Prosperity Foundation of Employees of Bank Indonesia), that the researchers were unable to include it on the graph. (Rieffel & Dharmasaputra, 2008, P. 40).

Hardiyanti Rukman's PT Permatasakti Persada and then after 1998 with Golkar parliamentarian Setya Novanto's PT Prima Nugraha Sejahtera Raya.⁵⁷ In the post-authoritarian era, Inkopol has won a host of state contracts, such as for ballot printing and transportation in West Java's 2008 regional election, the 2004 election in Central Kalimantan and the botched 2006 election in Banten.⁵⁸ In 2003 with Puskopol [*Pusat Kooperasi Polisi*], Inkopol shared a Depnakertrans contract to return migrant workers [TKI] to their homes from Terminal 3, Sukarno Hatta airport. At the regional level, Puskopol, along with Primkopol [*Primer Kooperasi Polisi*] enjoyed juicy contracts in coal mining and petrol transportation, which at West Kalimantan's Senakin mine led to accusations of protecting illegal mining in 2005. Foundations, cooperatives and other individually-run enterprises operate at every level of the policing apparatus however, very little is known about their activities.

⁵⁷ In these contracts, Inkopol is not a partner, but acts as a broker, dispersing the money to the contractor. The BPK report strongly criticized this practice as Inkopol's accounting of their management of these contracts to the state is in lump sums rather than detailed and inventoried budgets.

⁵⁸ The 2006 Banten election was marred by accusations of incorrectly printed ballot papers and poor distribution of voting cards. On the day of the election, parliamentary members of the DRPD found fraudulent ballot papers. Rival parties, such as the PKS, took the case to Polda Banten however, the issue was not resolved.

Table 3: Subsidiaries of Yayasan Brata Bhakti⁵⁹

Yayasan Brata Bhakti	Ownership	Profit 2007	Dividends 2007
PT. Bara Induk	YBB owns 20% share. PT used to have HPH for approx 180 000 hectares in Serang (Maluku), Riau and North Sumatra. Accused of illegal logging national forests in Riau and North Sumatra. HPH not renewed in 2003.	N/A	Rp 700 million [US\$79 000]
PT Tana Trisna	90% share. Industrial feeders, cold storage, Polri supplies, shrimp, timber, chemical supplies.	N/A	N/A
PT Panca Trisna	90% share. General trading & supplier to Polri	Rp 1 billion [US\$112 million]	Rp 500 million [US\$56 000]
PT Braja Tama (Karangsetra)	90% share. HPH in West Kalimantan & hotel & swimming pool in Bandung.	Rp 1 billion [US\$112 million]	Rp 480 million [US\$56 000]
PT Braja Tara	90% share. General trade and explosive equipment	Rp 20 million [US\$2 300]	N/A
PT Brata Sarana Bhakti	90% share. Construction.	N/A	N/A

⁵⁹ Yayasan Brata Bhakti, interview by author (24 April. 2008). I am indebted to Karaniya Dharm Asaputra for his guidance during this interview. My figures have been checked against his in Rieffel & Dharmasaputra, 2008, p 40).

PT Asuransi Bhakti Bayangkara	51% share. Insurance company. Currently, Polri's traffic directorate are illegally extract a Rp 30,000 levy for insurance from PT ABB for driver license applicants.	Rp 2.1 billion [US\$235 million]	Rp 600 million [US\$67 000]
PT. Sapta Pirsa Mandiri	35% share. Loss Adjustment and Surveying.	N/A	N/A
PT.Sekom Bayangkara (2001)	35% share, a subsidiary of Japanese company, Secom Ltd Security guards, equipment and management. Former police general and current secretary of the police 'watchdog' Kompolnas Ronnie Lihawa owns 25% share. In 2009, the company's estimated value was up by 15%.	Rp 1.25 billion [US\$140 million]	Rp 400 million [US\$45 000]
Citra Graha Lestari Persada (1999)	55% share. Parking at Samsat, Dan Mogot & storage.	Rp 130 million [US\$15 000]	Rp 40 million [US\$4 500]
Bimantara Building	YBB owns the 3087 metres of land upon which Gedung Bimantara stands in Kebun Sirih, providing the head	US\$20,000 per year donation [<i>sumbangan tetap</i>].	Rp 73 million [US\$8 200]

	<p>quarters for Bimantara group. Bimantara group was owed by Suharto's son, Bambang Trihatmodjo but Bambang Hary Iswanto Tanoe) purchased a majority 40% share. In 2010, the build operating transfer agreement between Bimantara group and YBB will expire. Hary Tanoe was also listed as a donor to the Metro Jaya coffee book.</p>		
--	---	--	--

As Table two shows, Polri's economy of charities, cooperatives and foundations by and large failed to attract the level of liquidity, diversification and joint entrepreneurship associated with the pattern established by army *yayasan* and *kooperasi*. Most of the contracts Polri *yayasan* entertained, like transportation for Bulog, were just a sliver of a much more lucrative industry muscled out of the state economy. Polri failed to build vertically integrated cartels and to effectively piggy-back on *Tionghoa* dominance in the private sector to create conglomerates on the same elephantine scale as the army.

Moreover the executive boards of *Tionghoa* conglomerates were entirely devoid of the active or retired Polri officers, suggesting that here too, the cream of Polri's crop had been cut out of a significant off-budget economy. As the youngest sibling in a military state, partnering with the national police had minimal talismanic or economic value. What good was a police general on the board when he could be so easily trumped by an army general? What awe could a police general inspire? The police couldn't claim to wield the magic of extreme coercion like a Kopassus or Kostrad, or wily connections of a Diponegoro or Siliwangi army general. Polri under the New Order was a poor man's fetish. For security of mind and capital, nothing beat aligning one's business interests with the kind of political, coercive and legal potency the army possessed. The army's supreme power to deterritorialise counter claims was precisely what the *Tionghoa warga asing* [foreigners] needed to give oomph to their own feeble territorial claims. Hence, Kusuma and Winata's attraction to YKEP was first and foremost premised on the 'security' of investment that YKEP could provide, conceived not in liquidity or financial stability but in coercive and political might. New Order Indonesia chained coercion, political influence and financial gain into a reliable sequence.

State Budgets and Fiscal (In)Adequacy

Like Polri's clutching at the parman economy, the official line for the military's establishment of an economy of 'philanthropy' was that foundations and co-operations allowed the army to assist its personnel and make up the shortfall in

revenue from the state.⁶⁰ Experts routinely estimate that the APBN only meets 30% of the overall needs of the armed forces. As such, lack of state funding was and continues to be the first and primary justification for military businesses, criminal activities and *Tionghoa* patronage. In 1991, the year of the SCDB purchase, the state budget for *Pertahanan & Keamanan* or Hankam [Defence and Security] surpassed the one trillion rupiah mark for the first time (APBN, 1992). However, as Table 1 and 2 show, the Hankam budget as a percentage of GDP had been falling since the first development plans [*Repelita*] of the New Order. During this period, no other ASEAN country registered such slow growth of military expenditure (Crouch, 1988). If ABRI was the jewel in the crown of the New Order, then why such diligent neglect?

Table 4: Budgetary Development in the Defence and Security Sector (Trillion Rupiah) (Years 1973-74 (End of Five Year Development Plan [Repelita] 1 - 1993-94 (End of Repelita V)⁶¹

Budget	1973-74	1978-79	1983-84	1988-89	1993-4
Total APBN	1,98	8,08	19,38	38,16	62,33
Hankam Budget	0,294	0,916	2,164	2,737	4,239
% of APBN	14.9	11.3	11.2	7.2	6.8

⁶⁰ PT Tri Usaha Bhakti (also known as PT Truba), the holding company for YKEP was in fact established in 1968 to channel funds to pensioned officers. After the founding of YKEP four years later, PT Truba divested all of its shares to YKEP (Syahnakri, 2005, pg 97-110).

⁶¹ Reproduced from APBN 1998.

Table 5: Annual Budgetary Development of Hankam during Repelita VI (Billions of Rupiah)⁶²

Budget	1993-94	1994-95	1995-96	1996-97	1997-98	1998-99
Total APBN	62,322	69,749	78,024	90,616	101,086	147,210
Hankam Budget	4,239	5,008	5,996	7,009	7,415	9,648
% of ABPN	6.8	7.18	7.69	7.74	7.34	6.55

Analysts frequently couple decreases in military expenditure with the fluctuating price of oil that caused a recession in mid-1980s New Order. Indeed, Tables 1 and 2 show how the trend in decreasing military spending stabilised to 6-7% of GDP in the more prosperous 1990s. For its own part, ABRI argued that the reduction in funding was not externally derived, but in fact in line with the overall planning of the Repelita programs and increasing need to divert funding to government programming in other sectors (Kuntjoro & Simatupang, 1989). Most scholars of ABRI have been content to point out the deficiency in military funding as the inevitable outcome of a developing economy in which fiscal shortcomings are the norm. However, this line of thought fails to account for ABRI's submission to ongoing financial disregard. This is particularly so when one considers that by the 1980s, 24% of Suharto's cabinet originated from military and ABRI directly controlled 100 appointed seats in parliament and indirectly many more through their dominance in Golkar (Rinakit, 2005, p. 45). While military influence in government had certainly flagged compared

⁶² Reproduced from APBN, 1998.

to the 1980s, their control of parliament, ministerial positions and the Department of Defence was more than enough to push through greater fiscal allocation of the APBN.

Rather, the sudden decline in military spending also correlates with other, uncharted reconfigurations in the workings and logics of the New Order state and the unfurling of alternative economies available to the swelling military and bureaucratic elite.

Beginning in the mid 70s, when rumblings began amongst the military elite about his presidency, Suharto also nurtured the state's development of a diverse, consolidated criminal economy to allow for the large-scale arboreal accumulation of clients under Suharto's patronage and ward off further political provocation. McLeod has written skillfully of this economy of New Order state corruption as a giant franchise system institutionalised through deliberately low budgets and salaries (McLeod, 2008).

Franchisees, struggling with the revenues of the APBN, were effectively encouraged to collect private taxation for a moderate 'tax' circulated upwards to the franchiser. A significant part of this economy included the *yayasan/kooperasi* economy in which all parts of the military and the bureaucracy partook and which frequently circulated its 'tax' to the Suharto franchise by partnering with conglomerates approved or owned by the president himself.

What needs to be stressed is how this vast, complex economy was neither furtive nor incidental to the real business of governance and public accountancy, but wholly endorsed by New Order state elites and morally legitimised by outstanding fiscal incompetence experienced as deficiency. In this way, the relationship of the legal to the criminal, formal to informal, official into *oknum*, state official to private patron, became nothing short of umbilical. Crucially, by eroding these key distinctions of

law, Suharto implicated the state and its agents in the vast machine of corruption he oversaw, thus securing silence regarding his tenure as president and his financial dealings.

New *Tionghoa* Civil Society and the Machine of Patronage

Marked in Indonesia's cities by unprecedeted rioting targeting private enterprise, the 1998 fall of the New Order dealt a staggering blow to the marriage of coercion and capital for Jakarta's *Tionghoa* population. Although executive boards continued to appoint their talismanic military partners to commissioner positions, the allure of playing *cukong* to military generals diminished in the context of demilitarisation, decentralisation, democratisation and the increasing fiscal transparency of the state. The pressure to unravel military business empires was so great in the immediate post-*reformasi* period that laws restructuring the *yayasan* were passed in 2001, well before laws reforming the police (2002) and the military (2004). However, there have since been considerable delays in the process of assessing TNI wealth and reclaiming state assets.

The Ernst and Young audit of YKEP that accompanied the 2001 *yayasan* laws showed a capital structure in decay reflecting many years of embezzlement by the generals. With the twin pressures of the Asian financial crisis and the emergence of a decentralized, competitive market, many military businesses collapsed. In 2000, YKEP returned a net loss of Rp 8.21 billion [US\$915 million] and total contributions to the defence budget from the *yayasan*-cooperative economy slumped to 1% in 2000 and 0.7% in 2001 (HRW, 2006, p. 15).

Although generals occupied strategic seats on the board of YKEP, they had little real operational influence and were in a poor bargaining position in relation to their *Tionghoa* partners. Indonesian Corruption Watch concluded from the Ernst and Young audit that YKEP's various investments with Winata-Kusuma were ultimately unfavourable to the interests of the military. In many instances, foundations or generals were listed as non-cash partners of conglomerates, substantially lessening their bargaining power. Government delays in restructuring the military businesses also gave the generals a chance to extract any remaining value from the companies by selling them to their *Tionghoa* partners. In 2005 Major General Kiki Syahnakri, a representative of YKEP who joined the bank as a commissioner in 2000, facilitated the sale of TNI's falling stake in Bank Artha Graha for Rp 151 billion [US\$16 million] without first seeking state permission (Bali Post, 9 September, 2005). Winata and Kusuma owned companies also steadily swallowed YKEP's share in PT JIHD, reducing military holdings in the company to small stakes owned by individual generals such as Syahnakri and Silalahi.

This structural uncoupling of the military and *Tionghoa* big business was also underscored by disenchantment with the military as a provider of *beiking*. The 1998 riots had proved spectacularly that *Tionghoa* gift giving to the military bore no fruit in the community's time of need and with the political winds turning in favour of more civilian forms of power, *Tionghoa* conglomerates began a concerted shift in the politics of patronage to political parties, politicians and police. Thus, the democratic reorganisation of the coercive apparatus initiated a corollary reorganisation of the

structure of the economy of *Tionghoa* patronage. The gift economy went from targeting the army and TNI to a preoccupation with Polri.

Although *Tionghoa* patronage had long supplemented Polri's official budget, the police suddenly became more important to the *Tionghoa* business community and indeed Indonesia's wider political, intellectual and criminal elite for several reasons. Democratisation and its parallel enthusiasm for the rule of law above coercive might meant that the police were no longer just law enforcers, but gripped the power to distinguish between legality and illegality. In post-authoritarian Indonesia, the expedient of law had become ever more complicated, with confusing accusations of illegality flung by parliament, civil society, the anticorruption commission (KPK), and business competitors. As democracy deepened and rule of law increasingly became the most important modality of governance, it was increasingly clear to political society that police relations needed to be cultivated.

Moreover, as we have seen, the rise of Indonesia's police state was paralleled by a dramatic expansion in the official police budget, bringing with it a host of new contracts and tenders to be won by the entrepreneurial few. In 1999, through PT Putra Pratama, Sugianto Kusuma got in with the police early by linking up with then deputy head of planning and development, Adang Dorajatun, to sell weaponry to Polri at double the retail price. In the same year, Tommy Suharto and Eka Cipta Widjaya together courted the police to obtain an untendered contract to sell Timor sedans to the force, which exploded dramatically when Cipta Widjaya's attempts at double-

dealing the police to undercut Suharto became spectacularly public⁶³. Even then, Kapolri Roesmanhadi got in on the act by calling in his *Tionghoa* golf buddies to request donations towards the renovation of Mabes Polri (Media Indonesia, 14 December, 1999). The rise of the police as a figure of authority in *keamanan*, the increasing emphasis on law as a means to resolve political and economic disputes and the opening up of the police procurement economy effectively kicked off the great *Tionghoa* stampede for *teman polisi* [a police friend].

The question of measurement requires careful address. For how do we measure this reconfiguration in the *cukong* economy? Estimates of monetary worth fall flat given the size and scale of the *yayasan* economy under the New Order and the deflation, though not eradication, of that economy as a legitimate economic activity for the coercive apparatus in the democratic era. As for the individual patronage economy, even Hoegeng, Indonesia's beloved police chief under Sukarno, wrote in his memoir of the gift economy of *Tionghoa* patrons (Yusra & Ramadhan, 1993, p. 210). Most *Tionghoa* business owners had routinely funded the police and the military and continued to give monthly donations to both of them even after *reformasi*. A medium-sized business owner explained, 'however much you have, you have to give [*kasih*] it to them. And you have to give it to them equally. Why? Because both of them carry weapons [*karena dua2nya pake senjata*].'⁶⁴

Yet, my interviews with police and military, their civilian orbit of academics, analysts and experts, *Tionghoa* businesspersons, lawyers and activists, *preman*, gamblers, and other undefined men of prowess were intriguing. Of hundreds of interviewees, every

⁶³ Tommy Suharto initiated a law suit against Cipta Widjaja, arguing that he had erroneously priced the sedans.

⁶⁴ *Tionghoa* businessman., interview by author (6 March 2007).

single person who discussed this subject with me, from police and military officers, to *Tionghoa* businesspeople, lawyers and activists, to *preman*, gamblers other criminal elements, categorically stated that the single defining feature of *reformasi* for *Tionghoa* big business relations with the state was this very switch in emphasis from the patronage economy from the military to the police. On their own, however, the interviews were unconvincing. Individuals could talk of their own allegiances to the security apparatus, divided between police and military, but few could show hard evidence of a broader switch amongst the elite *Tionghoa* business community and most admitted that for the most part, private enterprise ensures their patronage extends to both sides of the coercive apparatus. Only the small businesses at the local level, too cash strapped to keep up dual *setoran* payments, would have the temerity to ally with either police or military.

The recalibration of the Chinese business community from military to police is best viewed in relation to the florid cultural forms and social organisations that have long sustained the particular form and weight of the organisation of power in Southeast Asia. Efforts by the elite *Tionghoa* business community to warm relations with Polri have tended to piggyback on the new citizenship activities sweeping the overall *Tionghoa* community since the loosening of strictures on the community's activities post-*reformasi*. These have included religious organisations, civic NGOs and new forms of *Tionghoa* media. Much has been made of the post-authoritarian outpouring of *Tionghoa* cultural, political and social expression in recent scholarly literature (Heidhuis, 2006). Nagata praises the 'spontaneous' flowering of *Tionghoa* civic engagement (2003). Heidhues writes of *Tionghoa* organisations growing 'like mushrooms after spring rain' and Tan of new social organisations and political parties

that sprang up after 1998 as a means by which ‘ethnic Chinese’ engage in and build a new Indonesia (Tan, 2004).

But as the primary sponsors and donors of these organisations and as *laupan* [boss] within the community, elite business interests have the power to use these new forms of social volunteerism to court and cultivate connections within, and channel funds to, the police institution. A wealth of organisations were established in the wake of the May 1998 riots including Brigadier General (TNI) Teddy Yusuf’s Panguyuban Social Marga *Tionghoa* Indonesia (PSMTI – social organisation of *Tionghoa* Indonesia) and Perhimpunan Indonesia Keturunan *Tionghoa* (INTI – or Association of Indonesians of *Tionghoa* descent), established by Eddie Lembong. Although these organisations began life with an outreach mandate to warm relations between the *Tionghoa* community and *pribumi* Indonesians, INTI in particular has become extremely political, with *totok* Indonesians lining up to be involved on the board. With the early death of *Tionghoa* political parties in 1999 and 2004, other interest groups have flourished: friendship organisations or mini-parliaments with Hong Kong or Chinese cities, clan [*marga*] associations, business societies organised around clan or region, *Tionghoa* literature or art groups, charities such as Sugianto Kusuma’s Tzu Chi, and religious organisations such as Matakin and Siti Hartati Murdaya’s Walubi. Others are distinct curios such as the West Kalimatan Volunteer Fire Brigade, overseen by the governor, kapolda, danrem and bupati, who elected an entirely *totok* board and 21 *totok* ‘advisors.’ Or what of the Jambi Hash House Harriers, whose membership is entirely comprised of elderly *Tionghoa* men dressed in expensively casual playsuits, led by the local Kapolda? This membership seems at odds with the international frat-boy ethos of the Hash House Harriers that couples long distance cross-country

running with extreme beer drinking. Police are not the only social group targeted by the new *Tionghoa* civil society organisations. Activities circulate on a rotation between youth groups, political parties, Islamic leaders, regional government and regional TNI. But police events capture the most attention and detailed reporting.

Tionghoa media has experienced a parallel explosion. During the New Order, written Chinese characters were prohibited on the grounds that they dissuaded *Tionghoa* national ‘integration’. President Abdurrahman Wahid’s lifting of the ban on the public use of Chinese languages was the springboard for a renaissance in Mandarin and Bahasa-based *Tionghoa* media, a flourishing not seen since the turn of the 20th century (Suriyadinata, 1997). Ted’s Siong’s *International Daily News* (Guo Ji Ri Bao) is known as the *naga* (dragon) of the *Tionghoa* media, having spectacularly defeated *Universal Daily News*, a pro-Taiwan Mandarin rag owned by a consortium of Taiwanese and Indonesian businessmen. By allying with the *Jawa Pos* for distribution, *International Daily News*, an aggressively pro-China, Mandarin newspaper, eventually achieved national distribution and captured the *totok* market when *Universal Daily News* folded in mid-2008. This pro-China stance is also carried through to *International Daily News*’ *peranakan* sister publication, *National News*. With a circulation of around 50,000 per day, the newspaper is not available in ordinary retail outlets but must be subscribed to through agents. I subscribed but in the two years I received the paper I was never presented with a bill. According to Lee, a senior editor,⁶⁵ *National News* is primarily distributed amongst the employees

⁶⁵ *National News* is in fact edited by Mochtar Siahaan, a long-time journalist with few credited articles or columns. Siahaan, a Batak, was selected by Ted Sioeng to work with Lee (who also edits *International Daily News*) because of the quality of his police connections. For instance, although national police chief General Sutanto was reputed as extremely clean and virtually impenetrable to business interests, some of my *Tionghoa* interviewees speculated that Siahaan was the sole gatekeeper of access to the national police chief. Again, this is merely rumour. What was clear was that Lee and

of the elite *Tionghoa* conglomerates who sponsor the paper. The list of patrons of *National News* reads like a who's who of *Tionghoa* elite business: Tomy Winata's Bank Artha Graha, Eka Cipta Widjaya's Sinarmas, Sugianto Kusuma's Agung Sedayu Group, Prajogo Pangestu's Barito Pacific and Trihatma Kusuma Haliman's real estate giant Agung Podomoro. The newspaper also receives substantial contributions from a host of other regionally based *Tionghoa*-owned corporations such as Maspion (East Java), Olagafood (Medan) and GRC Board (West Java). The Jambi *Tionghoa* community is also an especially strong financier of the paper.

According to Lee, he and Sioeng designed *National News* with the specific purpose of establishing a forum for the increasing intimacy between police and the *Tionghoa* community. 'We wanted to present a non-biased image of the police and give voice to the police, who are not normally heard,' noted Lee.⁶⁶ The headline is generally devoted to goings on within the Yudhoyono government, while the rest of the paper covers news in China and the *Tionghoa* stronghold of Glodok. The paper also dedicates a daily spread of its respectably sized broadsheet to the latest cars, mobile phones and Chinese and Indonesian celebrities.

Page five, entitled 'Police Line' is a full page devoted to positive stories about police operations and policies. A side column called 'Police on My Mind' features attractive youth and their positive feelings about the police and the reform process. On page two, entitled 'Man of Today,' a feature officer of Kapolres rank or above is presented which details the officer's policing principles, professionalism, past achievements and

Siahaan were in a deep conflict about the future of *National News*, with Lee insinuating that Siahaan had no experience or capacity as senior editor. Lee, interview by author (9 April 2007). *Tionghoa* Businessman, interview by author, 16 March 2007.

⁶⁶ Lee, interview by author (9 April 2007).

official telephone lines. Large portraits of officers glow below copy snapped from B-Grade VHS titles, ‘The Simplicity of a Strategist,’ ‘A Student of John F Kennedy’ and ‘Eternally Vigilant in the Fight against Crime.’⁶⁷ As Figure 7 shows, generally the officer’s entire CV is published alongside photos of the officer’s family and children and choice comments on the science of policing.

⁶⁷ For instance, see Kapolda Metro Jaya Ir.Jen Adang Firman’s profile on 6 December 6, 2006.



Figure 8: The Page 2 Man of Today, Kapolda Metro Jaya, Irjen. Adang Firman. The article is titled ‘The Simplicity of a Strategist.’ On the left hand side of the page is the General’s resume and biography and on the right, a description of his career pathway. The story below the lead is titled, ‘Making Polda Metro More Professional and Moral’ (National News, 6 December, p. 2).

But if *National News* is the window through which *peranakan Tionghoa* elites see and monitor police, then so too does it function in reverse as a spectacular space in which *Tionghoa* elites can be witnessed, registered and identified by both its *peranakan* readership and the Polri stations who are given a free subscription.⁶⁸ The middle pages of the broadsheet are awash with colour photos, picturing recent activities by *Tionghoa* social and religious organisations at the national level in a section patriotically entitled ‘Indonesia: I am in Love.’ This spread of altruism and wholehearted civic engagement is bordered in red ink in which advertisements for the newspaper’s main sponsors are placed. Articles cover the opening of new Buddhist and Mandarin schools, corporate events, the elections within regional *marga* [clan] societies, and recent meetings with important politicians and police and military generals. Many *Tionghoa* social organisations undertake committed charity work, such as blood drives, donations of *sembako* (the nine basic necessities for living) for underprivileged *kampung* using corporate sponsor products (Olagafood is a big donor), health check drives, or fund raising for *pesantren* [traditional Islamic schools], inviting local police to witness or present gifts along with their *Tionghoa* corporate sponsors. Other events focus explicitly on police policies such as supporting anti-narcotics events or promoting various police policies. All are accompanied by large colour photographs with extended captions in black bold font naming key persons of the organisation and their position. Often too, there are events that specifically aim to contribute to assisting the police.

In June 2007, Yenni Thamrin, a well-known *Tionghoa* nationalist, brokered the signing of an MOU between the Republic of China police school and PTIK. Photos

⁶⁸ I saw this newspaper first at Mabes Polri however Lee informed me that the paper was distributed to officers in the territorial command as well.

show Thamrin in full police uniform leading the delegation through the police grounds. Similarly, when Taiwan Buddhist Tzu Chi went on a charitable mission to build the ‘Great Love Village’ in Aceh in December 2006, Sugianto Kusuma is photographed deep in conversation with Wakapolda Aceh Brigjen Rismawan. Another article, entitled ‘Struck by the impressiveness of the police’, celebrates the acceptance of young *peranakan* from Jambi into Polri. Lam Han Kiong, the young would be officer stands proudly in his uniform calling on *Tionghoa* to ‘never feel doubt about entering all sectors [*lini*] of life in this country. There is no longer a difference, especially not an ethnic one. ‘The proof is in the pudding: even I have become a police officer’ (National News, 2007, p. 11).



Figure 9: National News’ ‘Indonesia I am in Love’ section reports on patriotic gift-giving by new *Tionghoa* civil society groups. Here, Sugianto ‘Aguan’ Kusuma’s Tzu Chi Foundation has gifted US\$27 million including a new housing complex, mosque and school to the village [*desa*] of Panteriek in Banda Aceh after the 2004 tsunami. He is pictured talking to the Wakapolda of Banda Aceh. In the fourth photograph from the left, parliamentarian and *Tionghoa* big-businessman Murdaya Poo appears 3rd from the left (National

News, 2006, p. 11). Along the newspaper header are advertisements for Kusuma's Mangga Dua Square, Eka Cipta Widjaja's Sinarmas and Rudi Setiawan's Embossindo Utama.

This is not reporting so much as a showcase or, as a *Tionghoa* businessman called it [in Engl.], 'a show of force'⁶⁹. Leaders of the business community with whom I spoke referred to the involvement of elite Chinese business in new social movements as a 'sandiwara' [theatre] to display the quality and rank of a capitalist's association with the police force. Participation in *Tionghoa* civil society is a way to develop a public profile [*cari imaj*] and obtain strategic friendships [*cari hubungan*] with the police. Social organisations are a conduit for *Tionghoa* business interests to obtain access to the state and Kadin (the Indonesian Business Association), to funnel money to obtain contracts or to partner business with investors. One *Tionghoa* businessman noted, 'under Suharto, the one thing we could do was give contributions [*sumbang*]. The way of the Chinese is still the way of the New Order [*gaya Orba*]: *sumbang*.'

Anthropologists such as Comaroff & Comaroff warn us of allowing our theoretical lens to be infected by the millennial rapture of the 'civil' in our cross-cultural analysis of 'civil society'. A solid body of empirically rooted scholarship has accumulated analysing the self-proclaimed gift-giving of Western NGOs through Maussian eyes of the self interested gift (Comaroff & Comaroff, 1999). Civil society's euphoric capture of the political imagination as as a mystical, universal site for producing the common good has come at the same time as the state has seen increasing deinstitutionalisation and dispersement (Comaroff & Comaroff, 2006). The anthropology of civil society presents such social organising as a technology of mystification, scrambling the wider structures weakening the state within a self-

⁶⁹ *Tionghoa* Businessowner, interview by author (3 March 2007).

aggrandising trope of universal good. But *Tionghoa* assessments of their own social organising suggest something different again: of gift giving as a form of perverse political practice and communication from a community that has, for centuries, been denied active forms of political expression. Is this what explains the dominance and comfort of *sumbang* as political practice over more practical forms, the reluctant support for the *Tionghoa* political party versus the scramble for election to the NGO board?

Five years after *reformasi*, more traditional forms of courting the coercive apparatus were starting to emerge alongside of the festival of *Tionghoa* civic-mindedness. While the gifting of commissioner positions to retired elements of the military remained – TNI General Endriartono Sutarto at Eka Cipta Widjaja’s PT Bank Eksekutif International and Let Gen. TNI Soetedjo at Widjaja’s Pulp and Paper and army generals Silalahi and Syanakri heading up positions at Winata’s Artha Graha – for the most part, *Tionghoa* conglomerates shied away from the kind of talismanic coercive politics that had characterised their executive boards in the New Order. However, by 2006, retired police generals were beginning to appear on the boards of known patrons of the police including appointments to Nagaria’s Summarecon, Sjamsul Nursalim’s Gajah Tunggal and Hari Tanoe’s Bhakti Investama.⁷⁰ Similarly, at the regional and local level, pensioned police officers are filling the boards of medium enterprises.⁷¹ Echoing this trend, police, as army generals did under the New

⁷⁰ Since 2006, Snr. Com. Posma Lumban Tobing had held a commissioner position in a range of companies under Hary Tanoe’s control. In that same year, former Kapolri Dibyo Widodo was also appointed to President Commissioner of Gadjah Tunggal. In 2009, Irjen Edi Darnadi was appointed at Summarecon.

⁷¹ For instance, Irjen (purn) Logan Siahaan is the Independent Commissioner of Jakarta based PT Asuransi Wanamekar Handayani and former Kapolri Dibyo Widodo is President Commissioner of Jakarta property developer, PT Indonesia Prima Property & PT Panen Lestari Basuki.

Order, have also begun to filter into *pribumi* and state enterprises.⁷² High-ranking generals have taken up positions at Tommy Suharto's Humpuss and state enterprises such as PT Timah (the state tin company operating out of Bangka Belitung) and PT Perkebunan Nusantara V (the state agricultural company specialising in fertilizer and most recent biodiesel). Whether these represent the tendrils of the kind of financial empire building and patronage capitalism on the scale of the New Order army remains to be seen. Certainly, at the regional and district level, police businesses continue to operate in obscurity with impunity.⁷³

•

The disenchantment with the soldier as a figure of security - as the securer of states, places, practices, and capital circulation - has seen a corollary switch in the illicit gift economy of *Tionghoa* patronage. This vertebrae of gifts and capital that sustains the state's institutions has also changed in size and economic scale, from that of a structural alliance in the form of joint ventures, to a loose, shifting economy aligned around personal relations, departments and positions. That said, echoes of that early structural alliance between *Tionghoa* capital and the coercive apparatus has emerged in recent years perhaps signaling the future establishment of more economically-embedded forms of patronage and gift-giving between *Tionghoa* big business and Polri. The following chapter interrogates the obligations and fidelity of these bonds known popularly, and, as we will see, crudely, as *cukongism*.

⁷² In 2008, Brigadier General Karyono entered PT PNV after a career in Inkopol and Irjen Polisi Drs Insmerda Lebang joined the board of commissioners at PT Timah. After stepping down from head of the police in 2008, General Sutanto was appointed by the president to lead Pertamina, a position formerly held by distinguished heads of the TNI. In 2009, Irjen. Rubani Pranoto joined PT Petrokimia Gresik.

⁷³ Retired Police General, interview by author (31 April 2008). Police general, interview by author (13 January 2006).

Chapter II

Disequilibrium and the Gift: *Cukongism* Reconsidered

‘For if exchange underlies everything, why is that what takes place looks like anything but an exchange?’

Deleuze & Guttari, *Anti-Oedipus*.

‘Some of it is given voluntarily. However, the other part is forced [*terpaksa*].’

Executive Summary, Financial Mapping of Polri, 2002 (LPEM, 2003)

‘..if you have a nice looking office, they are going to get you.’’

Young *Tionghoa* businessman.⁷⁴

‘*Ada hadiah untuk saya, ga?*’ [Is there a gift for me or what?]

One star police general negotiating the release of goods at Tanjung Perak port, Surabaya.⁷⁵

The previous chapter demonstrated the significance of patronage and gifts by *Tionghoa* traders to the police’s off-budget economy. This second chapter in the section will explore the functionality and endurance of that economy by looking at its structural and historical underpinnings.

The material presented in Chapter I supports the master narrative of the Chinese big business literature which presents Indonesia’s big entrepreneurial *cukong* appear as

⁷⁴ Young *Tionghoa* Businessman, interview by author (21 March 2007).

⁷⁵ Field notes (12 December 2006).

free, strategising agents driven by the desire to aggregate vast amounts of capital or political privilege. In the New Order, utilitarian *Tionghoa* strategising for economic dominance is presented as having given way to a symbiotic politico-bureaucratic oligarchy in which *Tionghoa* big business established a strong capital base in exchange for a steady set of returns funneled back to the state. In the post-*reformasi* period, *Tionghoa* capital has surpassed the political elite. The democratisation, decentralisation and deregulation of the economy, the lifting of anti-*Tionghoa* policies and continuation of Indonesia's predatory form of capitalism has allowed for a reshuffle in the *cukong* relationship in favour of capital (Chua, 2006). As Chua argues, New Order *cukongism* as the reciprocal exchange of capital for political privilege or economic concession contained within it the seeds of Tionghua big business' liberation and eventual discarding of the *pribumi* elite.

However, the literature on *Tionghoa* *cukong* has focused on the upper echelons of the economic community, rarely kneeling down to observe the extent to which practices of state tribute, patronage and benefaction have been a part of the socio-economic lives of *Tionghoa* traders, landowners and capitalists of the lower classes. This has been made even more remarkable by the fact that, as the previous chapter illustrated, is it the ward level *polsek* – the veritable atom of the police apparatus - that relies most heavily on parman funds donated by local, not national, *Tionghoa* traders and landowners. By examining the lives of middle and lower class traders in this chapter, I argue that the scholarship of *cukongism* needs to take a far more nuanced approach to *Tionghoa*-state relations than brute political economy suggests. Ongoing, familiar practices of *pribumi* extortion and racism and the long history of violence and its threat suffered by the *Tionghoa* community have given rise to a system in which

cukongism, presented as convivial gift-giving, is the only perceivable means of managing the threat. Placed within a genealogy of threat that precedes even the republic, gift-giving represents the modality of a pariah economic minority with no legitimate territorial claim to inscribe themselves on the Indonesian *socius* (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004a). Where territorialisation is the inscription of social relations on a space, gift-giving is the initial attempt to establish those very relations.

While at the elite level *cukongism* helped *Tionghoa* tycoons forge a symbiotic relationship with the *pribumi* political classes that, as Chua elegantly argues, eventually freed ‘Chinese big business’ from its constraints, at the lower classes the patronage economy is a closed and suffocating loop. At the middle to low class level, capital restraints have not allowed *Tionghoa* traders to succeed the *pribumi* political class. At the same time, the new citizenship rights for *Tionghoa* in the democratic era do not function on the ground in the day to day of state administration. For the vast majority of *Tionghoa*, old power relations remain undisturbed. As such, the system of patronage and gift-giving continues unchanged but for a greater investment in the Indonesian police.

Ethnographic evidence shows that, despite the couching of the gift economy in cordial terms of generosity, authentic friendship and unsolicited donations [*tidak minta*], police beneficiaries of this interior current of capital repeatedly violate the reciprocity ethic. But if the defining characteristic of reciprocity is the semblance of equivalent exchange, then *Tionghoa* patronage of the state is inequitable in that the obligations of exchange are only sporadically and arbitrarily met by police donees. The police’s nonchalant shrugging off of the reciprocal obligations of the gift suggests that

Tionghoa claims to belong to the Indonesian *socius* by ‘patronage-as-inscription’ are rejected. The dysfunction of *Tionghoa* gift giving contrasts with police fidelity in *pribumi* patronage relationships and shows us how the off-budget economy is deeply embedded in the wider matrix of social power relations and cultural tropes about territoriality and legitimacy.

•

A classic problem for the study of Indonesia’s *Tionghoa* is definition. How do we define a people with history that came in waves of denied belonging, deliberate alienation and forced ‘assimilation’? A people for whom the ascription of identity could not be separated from colonial and republican projects of state and nation and for whom the exploration of identity was railed on a single binary logic of assimilation/ non-assimilation? The scholarship is largely divided in two: descriptive and historical studies of *Tionghoa* identity formation versus structuralist analyses of the state and ‘Indo-Chinese Big Business.’ Together, they paint a community with the face of Janus, at once a pariah subject in search of a shifting socio-political identity, and scheming, moneyed agent with the political elite at his behest.

In part, the schizoid subject has emerged from serious problems that lie in the definitions of *Tionghoa*. Race, being in the abstract distastefully primordial and in the empirical, intermarried for generations with *pribumi*, is immediately excluded as a marker of being *Tionghoa*. Rather, academics such as Skinner, Gungwu and Suryadinata advocate a definition of *Tionghoa* based on democratic self-identification. Being *Tionghoa* is established through practices (Gungwu calls them

‘norms’) marked Chinese (and hence presupposing its binary, *pribumi*) and then read as a system of signs: the use of Mandarin, residential and office address, urbanity, Chinese surnames, education, or membership of funeral, religious or literature or business associations.

Scholar of Chinese capitalists, Chua, weakly criticises the identity scholars as essentialising a primal *Tionghoa* identity (2008, p. 13). But in fact, the opposite is true; this is practice theory writ large. By emphasising *Tionghoa* practices as determinate of ethnic membership, Chinese identity scholars unintentionally imagine *Tionghoa* identity as constructed and performative. We recall Astuti’s coastal Vezo of Madagascar, where folk theories of Vezo identity formation are pitted against their sibling binary, the Masikoro of the hinterland. He is Masikoro when seasick on the boat, but to master tricking Spanish mackerel to bite the line is to be ‘very Vezo’ (1995). One becomes Vezo in the intimate, everyday practices of doing and association.

So too our scholars’ idea of being *pribumi* or *Tionghoa*. She is *Tionghoa* when she eats steamed pork buns [*bakpao*], is active in INTI or engages in trade. But when she engages in activities coded *pribumi*, living in south Jakarta, eating *nasi uduk*, hanging out with other *pribumi* friends, she is being *peranakan* or displaying the element of her *pribumi*-nationalist ‘Indonesian’ identity. It is a triumph of Javaneseness.⁷⁶ A *pribumi* Jakartan does not inhabit *Tionghoa* identity when in conversation with

⁷⁶ In his classic text, Solo in the New Order (1986), Siegel also noted that ‘when Chinese are thought to follow Javanese customs, it is taken as a sign of the superiority of Javanese ways rather than the conversion of Chinese into Javanese identity’. See, Chapter 3.

girlfriends she drawls ‘*gua*’ and pointedly refers to you as *lu*.⁷⁷ The *pribumi* is not deterritorialised when she takes her Sunday lunches as *dim sum* or rents a *kos* [rented room] in the *Tionghoa* stronghold of Glodok. Only the practices of the *Tionghoa* are strictly policed, by *pribumi* and scholar alike, to tally with the regime of signs of Indonesian citizenship and community.

Where contemporary scholarship has failed the *Tionghoa* is its reproduction of the defining characteristic of the pariah minority: the very inability to self-ascribe modes of representation. Lacking ethnographic content, there’s no sense as to the meaning-making of *Tionghoa* lives. Moreover, absent from scholarly analysis of *Tionghoa* is the ugliness of race and how racist practices of exclusion force the formation of protective allegiances, identities, groups and their attendant ritual practices. Certainly race, as ethnicity, is a construct and not a valid scientific unit but these constructs live out vivid lives in the social structure and political imaginations of ordinary Indonesians. *Tionghoa* are, to *pribumi*, ‘urban,’ ‘clannish,’ ‘disloyal,’ ‘opportunistic,’ ‘money driven,’ and ‘corrupt’ as per Coppel’s definition but he too strategically avoids acknowledging that these markers begin with one crude characterisation. *Sipit* [slanty-eyed], hiss my *pribumi* informants. *Anjing sipit* [slanty-eyed dogs], they spit. Or the chant, *Cina bajingan, mata lu sipit* [bastard Chinese, your eyes are slanted]. *Tionghoa* are distinguished by *pribumi* first by their eyes, envisioned as *sipit*, and racially different from *pribumi*.

⁷⁷ The etymology of both terms – *gue/gua* and *lu* is Hokkien Chinese. Skinner notes that amongst the mestizo Chinese Baba communities of Malaysia and Singapore, the usage of *gue* and *lu* is common. Skinner is reluctant to make comments on *peranakan* creole-Malay given its complexity and the lack of sources, however, the usage of *gue/gua* and *lu* is very common amongst young Jakartans and old Jakartans of the street. In contemporary Indonesian visual culture, *gue/lu* is a widely understood sign of the distinctive, modern, trendy Jakartan youth. Ironically, *lu* is just as often spelt ‘*loe*’, taking on the attributes of Dutch-inflected pre-1972 Bahasa Indonesia. I have also seen *lu* represented in a kind of shorthand ‘*lw.*’ (Skinner, 1996)

Burdened by the ugly legacy of physical anthropology, the shudder of head pincers and taxonomies of racial development, contemporary social scientists have nothing to say on race but for the denial of its scientific use. Rather, the discipline and many others like it have come to use the term ‘ethnicity’ on a vast scale of interpretation, from a mere cipher for ‘biological race’ to more fluid, constructivist processes of social identity formation. With race the classifier spurned, what then is the anthropologist to do with informants who speak of little else or, rather than utter the word, just grin at me making the sign, with a single finger, of the slanted eye? *Cina*. By excluding *pribumi* constructions of race from definitions of *Tionghoa*, scholars have denied this divergent and often fractious community the acknowledgement that it is in fact not the inadvertent practice theory of the identity scholars nor the genetic fact of the eye-shaped *sipit* that has forged *Tionghoa* community. Rather this diverse and dissimilar community of *Tionghoa* has to a great extent been corralled together by the surveillance eye of the *pribumi* that identifies its own territorialised racial makeup as a kind of politico-economic entitlement and observes *Tionghoa* racial difference as alien and a license to extort and terrorise.

Budiman evidences the inability of self-definition admirably. A snippet from a news program shows a weeping man whose wife and two daughters have burned to death in a fire started by rioters in May 1998. He begs the camera in Bahasa, ‘What sin have I committed to justify this ordeal? I am not a Chinese anymore, my eyes are not slanted, I cannot speak Chinese and I am poor. I even joined the Hansip [the

neighbourhood security patrol].⁷⁸ The construction of identity, as Appiah notes, involves dual processes of self-authorship and external definition because ‘we write in a language we did not ourselves make’ (2005, p. 156). Identity thus is in part derived from the response to facts outside oneself, things that are beyond one’s own choices.

Who then, are the *Tionghoa*? My argument suggests that we cannot begin to answer this question without first recognising *what* is *Tionghoa*? *Tionghoa* is a distinct *state* of *keamanan*, or more accurately, the inexorable fragility of it build around an imagined racial identity and an economic disposition. Only then can we begin to speak of membership to the community in terms of a very specific, anxious reply to the vital lack of *keamanan*. Members of the *Tionghoa* are defined by a preemptive response: a safe-house built of capital, state-patronage, social networking and community organising, the paradoxical will to invisibility, flushed by moments of regime spectacularity to display protection. It is for this reason I insist on the use of *Tionghoa*, rather than the ‘Chinese,’ ‘ethnic Chinese,’ ‘overseas Chinese’ or ‘Chinese-Indonesian’ terms that speak of regional and international ties. *Tionghoa*, on the other hand, is understood here as a uniquely Indonesian identity born in part of structural and systematic *pribumi* practices of exclusion, extortion and violence. As such my definition owes a debt to Coppel’s 1983 definition of *Tionghoa* as both internally and externally derived (Coppel, 1983, p. 42). The *Tionghoa* are a class-diverse group whose membership is not just a matter of their willing, meaningful, nostalgic or explorative engagement with a changing series of practices marked both inside and outside as *Cina*. This definition recognises that *Tionghoa* is a category born less of the willing expression of identity than of fear, where the hiss of *Cina*, real

⁷⁸ As in Chapter II, *Tionghoa* are normally exempt from or unwelcome in neighbourhood security organisations (Budiman A. 2005 p. 95-104).

or imagined, has driven a people to seek protection in each other and specific socio-cultural practices of security-making.

Chinese came first as traders circulating the southern rim of the South China sea, then in the 16th and 17th centuries as sojourners huddled in the centers of maritime trade, (not puny Batavia, but in the metropolises of Tuban or Semarang or Banten⁷⁹) and then finally, during the rise of the industrial age in a great surge of human desperation, as coolies snared in the indentured labour that fed the tax farm economy.⁸⁰ High migration flows continued even after the dismantling of the tax farm system, pumping contracted labour into the tin mines of Bangka or the tobacco fields of Deli until well into the 1930s. A century of this unique economy of labour meant that now tens of thousands of the hundreds of thousands came and stayed, as immigrants proper⁸¹ and unlike some of their 16th century Chinese predecessors who ‘assimilated’ completely when upward mobility beckoned, increasingly developed

⁷⁹ Measured in units of ‘fighting men,’ Jakarta in 1608, had a piddling 4000 and by 1618, this had only risen to six or seven thousand. This compared to Tuban, which Reid estimates to be populated by around 30,000 in 1608, the 250,000 in Semarang which by 1650, or Banten, which by 1680 supported some 700,000 men. (Reid, 1980, p. 238)

⁸⁰ As Anderson has noted, the Dutch East Indies company is unique in the annals of corporate history for so infrequently does one find a company so enamoured by acting like a state ‘quite aside from considerations of commercial advantage’ (1983, p. 479). From the very beginning, the chief revenues of the company relied on the levying of fees; on exports, imports, the tithes of the productions of the field and the tax upon farms. The Dutch government, when it took over from a bankrupt and beleaguered firm in 1800, maintained and expanded the tax farm system. The system was little more than rent seeking (Tilly, 1985); auctioning exploitation rights for resources over which the Dutch had no legitimate claim to predominantly Sino-enterprise. This was a remarkable form of colonial exploitation in that it demanded limited investment from the Dutch government, for a high rate of return. There was however, a snag in the system; with size of one’s wealth measured not in property, but in accessible manpower, indigenous labour was intersected by a patronage system that extracted rents that capitalists found too taxing on their profits. In 19th century Java, the only ‘free labour’ was foreign (Reid, 1988, p. 129). The tax farm economy relied on labour from the wild provinces of Southern China, and, to a limited extent, India.

⁸¹ Chinese labour contracts show that in exchange for a passage to the Dutch East Indies, a coolie was obligated to work for three years and, if infringed, one was fined heavily or indebted to further rigorous labour beyond the initial agreement (Stoler, 1995). Trocki is masterful in his portrayal of how opium was vital to the maintenance of coolie debt, ensuring that their labour would continue undisturbed by illness, desertion, collective protest or savings (2000). As such, the structure of 19th century Chinese coolie labour, as opposed to an analogous migration flow from East India was designed to keep them there (Studwell, 2007). One must not, however, exaggerate the figures of this phase of migration. Sugihara shows that from year to year, the differential between immigrants and emigrants to the Southeast Asia was around 10-000 to 50 000, or no more than 25% (Sugihara, 2005).

what Skinner (2008) calls a creole, mestizo identity. The 17th, 18th and 19th centuries saw Chinese migrants engage in a mixture of practices Skinner marks as *pribumi* or Chinese, emerging into a community that eventually came to be known as *peranakan*. This was particularly so in the urban centres where colonial sensibilities of *keamanan* limited Chinese mobility.

The Chinese settler class traded in the cities but also lived rurally as agriculturalists, married Balinese and *pribumi* slaves, adopted out their light skinned girls, but kept their half-caste sons, patronised Javanese literature in the courts and spoke a complex, ever-changing mix of creole Javan Malay-Hokkein. On the foundation of a so-called Chinese legacy and increasing competence in *pribumi* culture, began the emergence of a distinct *peranakan* group. This group was defined by their limited ability to inscribe themselves on the Dutch East Indies locality, its people and territory.

Peranakan were posited as incomplete natives and yet superior to the arriving migrants who, with their pernicious attachment to China, stubbornly Hakka, Canton or Teochew tongue and preference for non-Dutch education, were known by all the inhabitants as ‘stinking *sinkeh*’ [newcomer] (Twang, 1998, p. 19-21). This community of new arrivals, later known as *totok*, too sneered at *peranakan*’s willing embrace of the *pribumi* contagion and took the tenacity of their own authentically Chinese practices and the crisp snap of dialect as a sign of cultural superiority.

Despite their mutual distaste for each other, Chinese migrants new and old remained socially estranged. In Batavia, the colonial preoccupation with keeping the city in a state of order saw urban and agrarian space itself rezoned racially. Segregating the groups geographically gave rise to separate legal, taxation, administrative and civil

society systems. Chinese communities, *totok* and *peranakan* alike, settled north on the west banks of the Ciliwung river and around its mouth, leading to Jakarta Bay. Colonial encouragement of professional specialisation kept Chinese communities in money lending and intermediary trade. *Totok* and *peranakan* credit and economic activity directly bankrolled the colony, as it would over one hundred years later in the 1945 republican revolution and later again, during Suharto's New Order.

The Nervous System

The freedom to trade, however, did not translate into the freedom to make political demands. In 1740, on the outskirts of Batavia, the Dutch response to rioting by the Chinese community over the forcible transmigration of a surplus of Chinese labourers in the wake of the sugar mill crisis was close to genocidal. 10,000 lives were lost in what has become known as the Tangerang massacre. Shackled Chinese captives queued 'like sheep' to have their throats cut. Others were murdered by their Dutch neighbours for want of a pig.⁸² 'In short, the Chinese nation was almost totally massacred that day, guilty or innocent, all and sundry,' observed Ary Huysers (Blusse, 1986, p. 95).

Although the colonial era would not oversee a massacre of this scale again, Sidel (2006) encourages us away from conventional tropes about anti-Chinese violence. Distinct from Purdey (2006), who argues broadly that the attacks follow a pattern of

⁸² Blusse is struck by the quote from a Dutch trader: "I myself had to join in. I knew that my Chinese neighbour had a fat pig, I intended to take it away from him and bring it into my house. When my boss, the master carpenter, saw this, he slapped me and told me to kill the Chinese first and then to plunder. I therefore took a rice pounder and with it beat to death my neighbour with whom I had so often drunk and dined." In Blusse, 1986, p. 95.

political change in Indonesia, Sidel narrows the focus of analysis to demonstrate that the attacks on *Tionghoa* property and much less frequently, person, correspond to broader cycles of ‘heightened ambiguity, anxiety and anticipation with regard to the position of Islam and those forces claiming to represent it in Indonesian society’ throughout the 20th century (Sidel, 2006). Moreover, the cities, townships and ‘nodal points of mobilisation’ in episodes of ‘anti-Chinese violence’ correlate to major urban centres where trade and capital by a growing Muslim merchant class was under threat by or restrained by *Tionghoa* capital. In urban centres, *peranakan* and *totok* were subject to anti-Sino riots and attacks from *Sarekat Islam* in the first decades of the 20th century.

Japanese troops encouraged *pribumi* attacks on Chinese during their invasion, and then, as occupiers, targeted them as potential dissidents. The Pontianak affair of October 1943 saw 854 *Tionghoa* amongst the 1,500 executions. Neither was *keamanan* assured by *totok* financing of the independence struggle.⁸³ Nights were the most terrifying as the patrolling KNIL [Royal Dutch East Indies Army] troops ended their shift, leaving the *Tionghoa* huddled in a security vacuum.⁸⁴ Then came the roaming gangs of *laskar* [Islamic militia] to loot and thieve. Repeated attacks were punctuated by large-scale massacres with 600 *peranakan* *Tionghoa* murdered in Tangerang by Islamic militia and then one year later the discovery of 30 charred corpses, legs fused together, in Mergonsono, near Malang (Berdoeri, 2004). Each attack saw trade come to a halt and tens of thousands of *Tionghoa* refugees huddle together in great numbers.

⁸³ See Twang for an excellent analysis of the rise of the *totok* entrepreneurs such as Liem Sioe Liong who forged relations with the nascent ‘people’s army’ to finance the new republic.

⁸⁴ Hari Silalahi, interview by author, 11 June 2008.

Other strategies in search of security whirred into action. Around the country *Tionghoa* social organisations were formed to lobby for the end of the attacks, ‘Indonesian-Chinese’ friendship associations sprung up to declare loyalty to the republic, *Tionghoa* traders funded conferences on how to safeguard their communities, Chinese delegations rotated through local governments, and then, finally, a last desperate straw: the community’s attempt to take back the provision of *keamanan* by force by establishing *Po An Tui*, an exclusively *Tionghoa* armed police force.⁸⁵

Although the organisation was formed to protect *Tionghoa* life and property, it was (and continues to be) met with a near hysterical response from *pribumi* leadership and denial of existence from leaders of the contemporary *Tionghoa* community.⁸⁶ For what *Po An Tui* represented to *pribumi* was a brazen proclamation of territorial entitlement, signified by the marking out of *Tionghoa* geographies by patrol and

⁸⁵ There is very little available information on *Poi An Tui* and many *Tionghoa* historians and leaders today continue to deny that the organisation was formed at all. What published data there is appears to be fatally entangled in Cold War and New Order rhetoric. In *Tjomboek Berdoeri*, *Po An Tui* is linked to the *Staatswatch*, a *Tionghoa* policing organisation formed by the Dutch. On the other hand, Silalahi argues that *Po An Tui* was established with the joint permission of Syahrir, a leading figure in the revolution, and the Dutch military as a response to the ongoing attacks on the community. However, it appears that due to the centralised organisational structure of KNIL versus the rumbling, autonomous chaos of the *laskar*, *Po An Tui* became better affiliated with the KNIL who would sometimes be seconded to its ranks. This did not go un-protested by the *Tionghoa* community who were fearful of further reprisals but in truth the opening of new *Po An Tui* branches did appear to trail Dutch territorial victories eastwards. *Po An Tui* was very strong in Medan where newspaper archives suggest that it patrolled with the Dutch police, but also opened branches in Jakarta, Tangerang, Bogor, Sukabumi, Tegal and Pekalongan. In Yogyakarta, the heart of the republic, the organisation was rejected. Despite this setback, it does appear that in some cities, *Po An Tui* managed to establish a working relationship also with the young *Tentara Rakyat Indonesia* (Indonesian army), suggesting that the policing organisation were practically not ideologically motivated. Staffed by armed *Tionghoa* youths, the organisation operated at night to function similar to today’s *siskambling*, erecting gates and roadblocks. Military and Islamic sources argue that the organisation engaged in heinous acts of torture of *pribumi*, sabotaging the revolution. Documents published through the years of the New Order accuse *Po An Tui* of being a Kuomintang stooge and an agent in the G-30-S/PKI coup. But if names are a reflection of function, a similarly-monikered Nanking organisation, *Po An Tui*, is translated in the literature as ‘Peace Preservation Troop.’ This would suggest that its primary, national goal was simply to protect the lives and property of highly vulnerable *Tionghoa* communities.

⁸⁶ Ryter provides an account of *Po An Tui* in Medan, drawing on military sources that condemn the organisation for violence, racism and an anti-nationalist position. See, (Ryter, 2002, p. 50).

picket and their defence in the bearing of arms. *Pribumi* accused the organisation of being Dutch stooges and of undermining the revolution. Even after its rapid shut down in 1949, sixteen years later its name would resurface in connection with the so-called Communist coup. The 1965-67 massacres that followed, fuelled by the murderous plaiting of personal vengeance, local politics and national ideology, targeted *Tionghoa* in particular and founded the New Order. Other dramatic incidents of anti-Chinese violence, displacement and financial ruin were to follow. Dayak attacks on rural Chinese by the Kalimantan/Sarawak border during Sukarno's *konfrontasi* sent a wave of thousands of refugees across the area (where, incidentally Tomy Winata would have been a mere 9 years old). Property attacks on the *Tionghoa* in 1974 chimed with the Malari riots, again in 1980 Solo, and again in 1984 in the wake of military-Muslim violence at Tanjung Priok. Property and churches were the focus of anti-Chinese riots across Java in the twilight years of the New Order and the months leading to Suharto's downfall, and then, culminating spectacularly, in the May 1998 riots that continue to reverberate within Jakarta's *Tionghoa* community.

Recalls Budi, the entrepreneurial son of *totok* parents,

When the riots (the early clashes between security forces and the students) happened, I was a student at Tarumanagara.⁸⁷ We joined the fight [*perjuangan*]. We thought; we are citizens too, we are equal. A few weeks later came May 1998. We thought this is our punishment. We thought, well, this is what we get for trying to be equal. Now the only important thing to me is my business.⁸⁸

⁸⁷ University Tarumanagara is known amongst the *Tionghoa* as a *totok* university, comparable to its sibling, Trisakti, which is a university for *peranakan* *Tionghoa* but also Jakarta's 'rich kids'. Tarumanagara attempts to meet the needs of wealthy *totok* parents who can't quite afford to educate their children overseas. An exorbitant entrance fee maintains the exclusivity. However, the sprouting of *Tionghoa* education facilities is not just about class. *Tionghoa* students find it difficult to access *pribumi* and state education facilities because of unspoken racial quotas.

⁸⁸ Budi Harjono, interview by author (8 July 2008).

Tionghoa attempts as a community to inscribe themselves on the territory of Indonesia through intermarriage, rural residence, willing cooptation into the projects of colonial powers, outright political activism, coercive organisation and entrance into the state bureaucracy were subverted by colonial and post colonial policies which shunted them into an economic domain to finance the state. As entrepreneurs, *keamanan* was guaranteed only for the few individual tycoons who collaborated and financed the careers of the rising political stars of the republic. These *tauke* [big bosses], lauded within some segments of the community as the pioneers of a more secure *Tionghoa* future, were also increasingly the source of the community's vulnerability as spectacular *cukong* practices of patronage and gift giving provoked the ire of *pribumi*. Hence, the history of *Tionghoa* 'belonging' in Indonesia has been 'a deliberately constructed vicious circle. By emphasising the Chinese as a functional group consigned to trade, Chinese exclusivity was fostered, which in turn cultivated anti-Chinese sentiments among the local people and manifested itself as ethnic segregation' (Chua, 2008, p. 32).

The aggregate of centuries of episodic violence and its sudden absence, structural obstruction to the social and political benefits of citizenship, and the maintenance of wealth without security, has brought about for the *Tionghoa* a persistent state that Taussig would call 'The Nervous System...illusions of order congealed by fear' (1992, p. 12). The *Tionghoa* Nervous System is a deep, underlying anxiety masked in the relentless pursuit of capital, denial of structural threat, clinging to and wooing of talismans of the security apparatus, and the aggressive policing of the community from within. Both stalwarts of the literature - the studies of *Tionghoa* identity and those of Chinese big business - 'merely absorb and conceal the violence

in...universities, workplaces, streets, shopping malls, and even families where like business, it's terror as usual' (ibid). For the structurally disempowered and the racially marked, violence is not the series of intermittent episodes that histories of 'anti-Chinese' violence present. Violence does not occupy nodes strung along linear time, but rather by *Tionghoa* interpretation, violence in Indonesia is a loop that threatens to recreate itself over and over again.⁸⁹

Little wonder the practices of contemporary *Tionghoa* betray a fixation with *keamanan*. This is particularly evident in *Tionghoa* movement and spatial claims. The vast numbers of Indonesia's rural and semi-rural *Tionghoa* (once the majority of the *Tionghoa* population) have and continue to urbanise at a rapid rate,⁹⁰ accommodated in large gated communities built by *Tionghoa* conglomerates who also construct the titanic malls that are represented within the community as an important pivot of *keamanan*. *Tionghoa* property tycoons such as Eka Citpa Widjaja (Sinar Mas group), Tomy Winata (Artha Graha), Sugianto 'Aguan' Kusuma (Agung Sedayu), Ciputra and Jan Darmadi (Darmadi Group) discussed in Chapter II are so frequently talked about as rising or fading *laupan* [big bosses] because when a community's circulation in the city is so heavily circumscribed, the opening of new perimeters of mobility – malls, hotels, housing estates, 'lifestyle centres' - in which to mingle is a major spatial reordering, even a liberation. For this reason, *Tionghoa* property tycoons are more important to the community than the multiple other forms of commercial activity in

⁸⁹ Once is reminded of writer El Saadawi's description of her own circumcision, aged six. 'I lay in a pool of blood. After a few days, the bleeding stopped and the *daya* peered between my thighs and said, 'all is well. The wound has healed, thanks be to God'...but the pain was like an abscess deep in my flesh...*I did not know what other parts in my body there were that might need to be cut off in the same way. So I lay in bed, my eyes wide open in the dark. I had no idea what fate had in store for me.*' My italics. To the victim, the act of violence presupposes a repeat (El Saadawi, N, 2007, p. 63).

⁹⁰ Political decentralisation has meant that financial opportunities at the regional and district level have dramatically increased and *Tionghoa* communities have risen to meet that need. Nonetheless, one finds frequently that *Tionghoa* entrepreneurs make their money in the regions, but maintain property in the cities, often going there to retire.

which *Tionghoa* dominate. Within Jakarta's diverse and intensely socially-policed *Tionghoa* community, the spatial restrictions that they experience find their echo in a kind of introverted, bunker mentality. My interviews and everyday chatter recorded in my field notes recount a chorus of criticism, particularly from young *Tionghoa* 'activists' such as those affiliated with JATIM [*Jaringan Tionghoa Muda*] about the perils of *Tionghoa* commercialism manifest in '*budaya ruko*' [*ruko* or shophouse culture] or '*budaya mal*' [mall culture]. Observed one young *Tionghoa* intellectual, 'the Chinese think that they are supreme in commerce because they are born with it. They don't understand that they are oppressed and there is nowhere else for them to go.'⁹¹

To secure the *keamanan* of space and property, *Tionghoa* rely on strategic partnerships of which debt and patronage are an integral part. My informant, Diana, grew up in Solo where her father and his family owned the string of gold shops targeted in Siegel's description of the November 1980 riots. During the New Order, her father kept on the payroll a two star general from the airforce and members of the army's elite force Kopassus, allowing one guard to accompany him in full view. They lived in a big house on the main street surrounded by Chinese neighbours, which like the gold shops they worked in, were purpose built with large *papan* [wooden blinds or screens] to shutter the windows and fortress the home. Behind their house, were the resident of the *kampung* who were kept on side through the provision of employment and the constant lending of micro-credit, for weddings, funerals, surgeries and the like - small sums of a few million rupiah that more often than not would not be paid back.

⁹¹ *Tionghoa* activist, interview by author (12 March 2007).

Instability in business was subdued in three ways; a) by plying the gold trade with genial family members, b) by enveloping other large *Tionghoa* traders who had Kopassus *beking* into the mutually dependent organisations known as *kongsi*, and c) by deploying Kopassus to ‘*menakutkan*’ [frighten] other *Tionghoa* competition allowing the *kongsi* to proceed undisturbed. Thus when, in November 1980, the rumble of the riots came, Diana recalls,

I remember in 1980, I was told to go home quickly by *mami*. Then the shop was closed quickly, and we attached triplex to each window. For hours afterwards, stones were thrown at our home. It seems like Kopassus tipped off my parents, so we were *aman*...We gave employment [*kasih kerjaan*] to the whole *kampung* behind us and at the end it paid off. [When the rioters came] they protected us, *ini cina baik* [these are good Chinese], they said.⁹²

The sponsorship of Kopassus by Diana’s father was returned by the tip off that the city was going to experience a riot, giving the family time to secure their property and children against threat. Gift-giving in the form of micro-credit to the potentially hostile surrounding neighbourhood meant that when the rioters came, neighbours were able to vouch for their kind-hearted, civic behaviour and despite stone-throwing, the family was protected from the burning and looting that other homes and gold shops were subjected to.

Seen from the Nervous System, patronage and gift exchange is the primary means by which politically-disempowered *Tionghoa* traders spread indebtedness to be returned, not merely as the gift of political favouritism or waiver of law, but as the gift of

⁹² Field notes (2 May 2010).

keamanan. Unless there is a direct threat, the *keamanan* provided is not physical but rather, it functions first and foremost on as a protective, preemptive measure to ward off harm, much like an amulet or a talisman. In this way, officers are wielded as protective objects that inspire fear and caution and extend the agency of their user. Officers are thus, to borrow from Gell, a ‘technology of a kind of militarist enchantment’ in their ability to inspire caution and convey warning to *pribumi* looking to extort fellow *Tionghoa* business competition. Like Gell’s Kula-canoe, the officer is objectified by the *Tionghoa* patron as a ‘potent psychological weapon.’ The power of the *Tionghoa* patron-police officer relationship resides in its quality of spectacularity and its ability to stir the political imagination of the audience into a fantasy of presumed power conferred upon the *Tionghoa* benefactor. *Cukong* relationships are a site where Gell’s enchantment of technology (the wonder and magic inspired by how the thing came to exist, or how the relationship came to be) and the technology of enchantment (the coercive/legal powers of the officer himself) collude (1992).

Nonetheless, as we have seen in the previous chapter, the relationship is internally couched in a language of decorum and courtesy. Police insist they are helping [*bantu*] a friend [*teman*] who has met undeserved misfortune negotiate the complexities of law and the state.⁹³ Police officers at PTIK in receipt of scholarships reject the idea that that they are in any way beholden to their donors.⁹⁴ ‘To call it a *cukong* is too connotative,’ they frowned. ‘As if [*seolah2*] when you don’t hold the position [*menjabat*], the relationship ends [*hubungannya sudah selesai*]. A good friend [*teman*

⁹³ Field notes (12 December 2006).

⁹⁴ Cocong’s relationship with Polri is discussed in Chapter III.

baik] is different, they will still befriend you after you retire.⁹⁵ For their own part, *Tionghoa* businessmen flatter and fawn over their blushing police generals, filling their glasses and calling out to the table ‘this man, this man will one day be Kapolri! If not president, *ya ngak Pak* [isn’t that right Pak]! Mark my words we should keep an eye on this one!⁹⁶ Their every statement is cheered, agreed with or overly emphasised and great elaborations are made around their consumption, from the loud impatient calling of wait staff to take the order, to the addition of dishes and of course the secreting of the bill.⁹⁷

The figure of the *cukong*, from the New Order’s Liem Sioe Liong and Bob Hasan to today’s Tommy Winata, Sugianto Kusuma or Eka Cipta Widjaja, is mimicked and replicated at all levels of the *Tionghoa* trading classes as a means to secure *keamanan*. The ‘Nervous System’ concept helps explain the patterns seen in the last chapter of patronage exchanges clustering around the state coercive apparatus, with transactions increasing in pomp, worth, and urgency as one works up the ranks and specialised units of force within and between the coercive apparatus. It is not enough to merely sponsor a two star general whose rank-cum-authority alone would yield the political favours and legal exceptionalism to ensure *Tionghoa* business priorities prevail. Instead, as we have seen, *Tionghoa* capitalists engage in gift-orientated patronage of multiple kinds and targets – from the elite, hyper-coercive forces of Densus 88, Paspampres and Kopassus to neighbourhood micro lending and social organisation charity drives - as a means to ensure their *keamanan*.

⁹⁵ Field notes (11 April 2007).

⁹⁶ Field notes (6 February 2008).

⁹⁷ Field notes. (6 February 2008).

What these practices suggest is a grave error in the literature on ‘Chinese Big Business.’ Scholars such as Chua argue rightly for an analysis of *pribumi* state and *Tionghoa* business relationships that take class seriously, concluding that in the post-authoritarian period, the demise of ‘Indonesia’s predatory form of capitalism as well as the discontinuation of overtly anti-Chinese polices’ allowed *Tionghoa* capitalist elites to reconfigure their relationships with the *pribumi* political elite from mutual dependence to the emancipation of capital. Strictly speaking, *Tionghoa* big business no longer needs its amulets from the coercive apparatus. And yet, while *Tionghoa* conglomerates such as Artha Graha no longer maintain a structural relationship with military businesses, tycoons like Winata keep the flow of capital to the coercive apparatus by other means. The question arises: why keep the troops on the payroll at all if capital is now so fully detached from political power? Why seek out police so aggressively?

The answer I was given over and over by businessmen in the capital was much the same that Winata gives Chua, ‘you cannot put all money on one horse, because the uncertainty of winning is too high. Besides this, the president now changes at least every 10 years’ (2008, p. 128). Similarly, founder of INTI Eddie Lembong explained to me,

For the Chinese, *perlindungan* [protection] is very important...[The military] are our social values, our culture. [If I got rid of my military connections] I would be seen by the community as a bad person. They would say, oh look at Pak Eddie, he used that man and now he just gets rid of him just like that. Also, we don’t want anything coming back at us. If I hurt his feelings today, who knows what will happen tomorrow.⁹⁸

⁹⁸ Eddie Lembong, interview by author (5 April 2007).

Conventional political science conceives of democratisation as telos - a steady, even inevitable, progression towards a stable democratic form of governance. But even here in Southeast Asia's most successful democratic test case, the *Tionghoa* subject, for whom political change has only ever brought further discrimination, violence and financial loss, democracy is a vulgar, recalcitrant political system. Democracy is inherently risky and inconstant: what with its fixed presidential terms, its civilian caprice, its goading of political change and baiting of political competition and its central, most unpredictable plank - the public election. Seen through the 'Nervous System,' democratisation does not decrease illicit patronage relations but multiplies and fragments them.

Secondly, Chua's analysis of relations between capital and the state fixates on the few elites that make up Chinese big business, rather than the class diverse group of *Tionghoa* traders and the myriad relationships they must establish and negotiate at all rungs of state and coercive bureaucracy. Tycoon capitalists represent only a very small group among the capitalist class and indeed, even during the New Order, Suharto maintained limits on their fiscal, social and political capital (Sidel, 1998, p. 163). In contemporary, democratic Indonesia, there is still a divide between a handful of the fiscally-endowed who have limited mobility and the rest of the *Tionghoa* business classes with their strictly curbed mobility. Most lower, middle and upper middle class traders I knew continued to struggle to obtain identity cards, business licenses and certificates for land, hiring indigenous *preman* as brokers to negotiate with local police and government for fear that their own faces would substantially delay proceedings or further increase the illegal tithes to which they are submitted.

Despite significant changes to the citizenship status of the *Tionghoa* through successive post-authoritarian governments from Habibie to SBY, the bulk of the *Tionghoa* community continue to live extremely circumscribed lives of limited mobility and territorial claim. Budi drove me around Bekasi, pointing out familiar, safe sites,

I only *isi ban* (fill my tyres with air) here in front of my house. Everywhere else people look at me and tell me that the price is Rp 150,000 [US\$16]. But here I know the real price.⁹⁹

Others comfort themselves in simple acts of heroism,

The hardest thing is to be an outcast of both groups. The ones stuck in between, who can't assimilate but who don't want to be *totok*.¹⁰⁰ They are the ones that confront the bigotry of the *pribumi* every day. I still catch the Busway even though every time I get on, I hear someone say, look there's a *cina glodok* scuttling out of his *kampung* [spoken in Bahasa/English].¹⁰¹

Chua argues that *Tionghoa* big business has been emancipated from their former *pribumi* associates. But at the upper middle, middle and lower levels of the *Tionghoa* community, a genuine absence of *keamanan* continues to define the ebb and flow of everyday life in the capital. *Tionghoa* big business, seeing themselves as the leaders [*laupan, tauke*] of this community cannot help but know this.

⁹⁹ Budi Harjono, interview by author (9 July 2010).

¹⁰⁰ The use of the word *totok* here emphasise my argument that to be *Tionghoa* is a set of practices, not an ethnic identity. In my informant's sentence, *totok* is the opposite of the verb assimilate. *Totok* is here also defined in terms of mobility. Being *totok* is being unwilling and unable to catch the newly constructed commuter busway, which slices through the city from the *Tionghoa* dominated areas in the north to the *pribumi* south.

¹⁰¹ Young *Tionghoa* Activist, interview by author (12 March 2007).

By omitting the centuries of threat, structural discrimination and coercive impotence of the *Tionghoa* community that make up the ‘Nervous System,’ scholars such as Chua and Studwell reduce the pursuit and securing of patronage by *Tionghoa* big business solely to utilitarian goals of profit maximisation. In fact, the objective of *cukongism* is historically intermeshed with the underlying, anxious need for *keamanan*. What all of this suggests is a system by which the gift of patronage and the counter-gift of *keamanan* is not merely an instrumentalist economy of exchange but rather, as Deleuze and Guattari suggest, a means of inscription and belonging. Allies in desire, one for capital, the other for *keamanan*, the *Tionghoa* and the police seek each other out (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004b, p. 202). *Tionghoa* mark officers of the coercive apparatus not merely for the direct, instrumental security they will receive, but rather for the powerful social spectacularity of the mark, the association it gives them and the social message, ‘*wah, ini orangnya ga main2. Ada jendral*’ [Hey, this guy is no small fry, lit, is not playing around. He has a general on his side]¹⁰². On the part of police, the investment of the Chinese *cukong* is a recognition of the officer’s power to coerce, both in line with law and above and beyond it. To possess a *cukong* is a statement of faith. And so gift giving appears as a collaboration in ‘a *socius* of inscription, where the essential thing is to mark and be marked’ (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004b, p. 154).

The Principles of the Gift

There are three main qualities of the gift:

¹⁰² *Tionghoa* Businessman, interview by author (6 April 2007).

- 1) the gift economy is the signature of asymmetrical relationships and the exchange of incommensurable goods and services,
- 2) the gift economy displaces and obscures the vulgarity of debt and the obligations of its return with a language of disinterested, civic charity, and
- 3) the receipt of the gift obliges repayment.

In his work on the Maori, Mauss argued that the gift contains the spiritual essence of its owner, known as 'the spirit of the gift' (2002). No recipient could keep such an intimate nugget without the moral and legal compulsion of return. In contrast to commodities, Mauss sees gifts as inalienable within functionalist economics - a seamless looping together of the obligation to give and the obligation to return.

Sahlins, who examines the gift economy as a form of primeval trade, contradicted this view by arguing that forms of reciprocity shuffled along a continuum from the altruism of Malinoswki's pure gift to 'self-interested seizure, appropriation by chicanery or force' (1972, 119). This led him to surmise that there are three main forms of exchange;

- a) balanced reciprocity of the kind described by Mauss,
- b) generalised reciprocity that occurs within kin groups in which accepted forms of stratification and rank cause the reciprocity of the exchange to keel towards one actor or group, and finally,
- c) negative reciprocity where parties jostle and scheme to maximise their share.

Sahlins argued that these three forms of exchange could be directly correlated to kinship distance wherein the politics of 'chicane' occupied 'the most peripheral distance' (ibid, 198).

The gift and patronage relations have been a long-standing feature of anthropological discussion, but most recently they surface in attempts to map out an anthropology of corruption. Scholars have structured their retort to the normative moralising of international anti-corruption institutions and their banners demanding that the ‘cancer’ of corruption be rooted out, by relativising ‘corruption’ as a particular form of meaning-making at the local level (Harrison, 2006; Anders & Nuijten, 2007). For instance, Yang argues that gift-giving for *guanxi* [social connections] is a counter response to dominant, redistributive modes of state power (1989). Here, gift-giving is as much a cultural as it is material performance, part of the wider practices of social-interconnectedness that do not tally with ‘western’ norms of state-like behaviour. Anthropology’s determination to focus on local level interactions and meaningful social encounters as a pointed counter to ‘the disciplining agendas of northern powers’ (Harrison, 2006) has left some parts of this literature completely oblivious, indeed, willfully uninformed as to the power of capital and the sheer size and import of shadow economies. Worst of all this literature is the keeper of impaired records on the ruinous impact that corrupt systems and illegal state practices can have on the lives of ordinary people. The anthropology of corruption struggles to confront the unethical and exploitative behaviour of our informants.

With this in mind, let us take another look at the practice of gift exchange and patronage between *Tionghoa* businessmen and the Indonesian police. On the face of it, *Tionghoa* patronage of the police displays some of the textbook features of the gift. *Tionghoa* benefactors, though materially rich, are security-poor and the gift economy exchanges their wealth for highly coveted *keamanan*. But let us examine these premises of the gift more closely for I wish to argue that the tenets of gift exchange

are here wholly dysfunctional and negate the political economic approach of the ‘Chinese big business’ literature. I do this in the following section by presenting ethnographic and interview data to dissect the gift economy of patronage between *Tionghoa* capitalists and police.

Anatomy of *Tionghoa* Patronage: Origins

Wahyu is a 49 year old *peranakan* businessman who lives on the Duta Mas property estate in West Jakarta. He is not rich, but his father owns a few properties in central Jakarta which Wahyu manages. He speaks in a ramble of English and Indonesian, springing from subject to subject in no clear order. His facts are not construed, he evidences them with medical reports and receipts, but his narrative is oddly ordered. His story only comes together with patient repeat listenings. I met Wahyu at one of Jakarta’s legal aid bureaus where his case-worker looked exhausted and happy to share the burden. I asked Wahyu if he was a member of INTI or PSMTI and he barked immediately that he had no truck with ‘those kinds of organisations that provide legality’.¹⁰³ He does not play patron to the security apparatus not just because money is tight. As his rambling and restless mind attests, he is too socially queer to strategise and woo an officer. He has also set an antagonistic distance between himself and the protective realm of the *Tionghoa* community. As such, Wahyu is a rare breed - an unprotected *Tionghoa* capitalist in the city.

¹⁰³ Chapter I interrogated INTI and PSMTII as part of the new wave of post-authoritarian *Tionghoa* civil society and found the organisation to be channeling money to the police apparatus in return for protection for its members.

Wahyu owns a property in Roxy, a suburb in inner West Jakarta. Like his home in Duta Mas, Roxy is an estate developed and managed by PT Duta Pertiwi, a subsidiary of Eka Cipta Wijaja's megalith, the Sinar Mas group. Roxy bears all the hallmarks of *Tionghoa* enterprise. Its streets and complexes are lined with workaday *ruko* [shophouse] selling electronics, mainly mobile phones. Wahyu owns a house here, renting it out on yearly leases. In 2007, two young *pribumi* women held the lease. He called them 'wanita bilyar' [lit; women who work at billiard parlors] meaning Wahyu thinks they are sex workers.

After the Islamic fasting month of 2007, Wahyu discovered that the young women had *pulang kampung* [returned to their place of origin outside Jakarta]. They had done so with the profit reaped from illegitimately selling his property to the head of the Roxy police post [*Kapospol*]. Wahyu reported the matter to the property [*tanah dan harta*] crimes section of Polda Metro Jaya in January 2008, but they refused to accept his complaint based on zoning restrictions and forwarded it instead to Polres Central Jakarta. He returned many times to the Polres, to provide copies of his land ownership certificate [*hak milik*] but apart from this basic administration, nothing happened.

Three months later in April 2008, Wahyu returned to Roxy to see that the *Kapospol* had renovated the front of the property, readying it to become a mobile phone shop. He became so angry that he rushed in and tore at the new structure. Immediately the *Kapospol* and his two other deputies arrested him for destruction of police property. They spoke into their walkie-talkies and had a police car come and take him away. At Polres Central Jakarta, Wahyu waited for hours while he was made a suspect. When

he received a call from his neighbours telling him that the cops were rebuilding the property again, he rushed to the internal affairs division at the station and filed a formal complaint against the officers. He also saw the chief of the Polres and demanded he investigate the officers. He was charged with destruction to property and released. A few days later, Wahyu attended a promotion party from a mobile phone provider where he met a few cops who gave him a name of a female officer to file his complaint for him at the Polda. The following day he did this, telling the internal affairs officer everything.

The day after, on the 1st of May, Wahyu was called into the Polres regarding the charge against him for destruction of police property. While in the waiting room, an employee of the *Kapsopol* called Heri turned up and started a fight with him. ‘*Mulutmu lapor ke mana2. Sekarang giliran kita*’ [Your mouth reports us everywhere. Now it’s our turn] he said. They brawled in full view of everyone but only Wahyu was locked up. You have hurt Heri very badly, they told him. In the cell he was beaten and kicked by officers and his ears battered.¹⁰⁴ They poured water over his clothes and stripped him naked, handcuffed and left him standing without food or water from 2pm until 7 the next morning. The following day, Wahyu was defiant. He announced to the head of the station that if he didn’t control his staff and return his property, Wahyu would report him to the National Police Headquarters. The *Kapolres*

¹⁰⁴ In testimonies of torture that I have collected since 2002 from military abuses in East Timor in the early 1980s to the massacres of 1965 to the torture of political activists in the late 1990s and finally, the torture of criminal suspects in the post-authoritarian period, ears have featured prominently as a target of abuse. They have been lopped off and souveniered or shot at or next to. Wahyu described a technique common to criminal suspects in Indonesia, ‘cuffing’ the ears. Worldwide, this technique is known as the *telefono*. First documented during the British counterinsurgency campaign in Kenya in 1955, the *telefono* is now employed primarily by police interrogators across the developed and developing world. By slapping the ears, the aim is to damage the inner membranes of the ears or break the eardrums ‘producing giddiness, panic and permanent aural damage’ (Rejali, 2007, p. 339-40).

became angry. 'You talk too much,' he yelled and Wahyu was taken to another cell and beaten up.

On the 4th of May, Wahyu demanded to go to hospital. He wanted his wounds recorded by a medical official so that he could prove the torture later in a court of law. But he was taken to the official police hospital where he was put in a cell with six other bodies. One of the occupants had died and the others were in need of medical attention but they all lay there, unattended. Sometimes a medic arrived and insisted that Wahyu attend to them. Wahyu himself was denied medical care. While he was in prison, anonymous police officers rang various members of his family - his uncle, his aunt, his brother, '*setiap saudara yang kaya*' [each of my family members who are rich] - explaining that Wahyu was in the police hospital as a detainee facing charges of assault. The officer explained that for about Rp 10 million [US\$1116], Wahyu could be freed from all charges. They ignored his offer.

On his 16th day in hospital, Wahyu was visited by a police psychiatrist who required him to fill in a psychological test with 500 questions. The doctor calculated his results and declared him mentally ill. Immediately after this medical diagnosis, the violence, extortion and abuse ceased. He was released as a *tahanan kota* [prisoner of the city] and in the following months he heard nothing more about his case. His wife visited the *Kapospol* who was running the business out of the Roxy property and they cut a deal whereby she shared in a limited amount of the profits of his business.¹⁰⁵

¹⁰⁵ Wahyu. Interview by author (7 July 2008).

Wahyu told me that his wife and the police had a ‘reconciliation’ [in English],

although he separated his own wishes from his wife’s actions.¹⁰⁶

Wahyu’s experiences are instructive on many levels. While he legitimately owns property in the capital, the legal tenure of his land ownership in the form of the certificates he showed Polda did not transfer into the legitimate, defensible right of territoriality in the eyes of *pribumi* ‘billard women’ and the police. Despite his repeated attempts to appeal to law, his land was taken and territorialised anew by the *Kapuspol*’s renovations. The financial investment of the head of the police post into the property is an act of demarcation, a way of marking new territorial ownership, much like the flag or the sign. Land left fallow disentitles territorial claims but the bustle of activity is grounding for proprietorship (Li, 1998). Through home renovation, the *Kapuspol* staked his picket into Wahyu’s territory.

Little wonder that the renovations incensed Wahyu, leading to a single-minded attack targeted exclusively at the refurbishments that shrink his claim to territory. His

¹⁰⁶ This chapter argues that a specific, localised relationship has emerged between the coercive apparatus and the ethnic Chinese business community, born of political, social and economic flows over hundreds of years. Nonetheless, if elements of Wahyu’s story sound remarkable, even unbelievable, the reader can be reassured that the modality of madness to coerce employed here by Polri is common to the police abuse of whistleblowers worldwide. For instance, in 2009, Precinct 81, Brooklyn, New York, whistleblower Adrian Schoolcraft was committed to a psychiatric hospital by his deputy chief after he tried to report police corruption and misconduct using 17 months worth of taped recordings. When his father, also a police officer, tried to locate him, the police, police internal affairs and FBI did not know or could not say his whereabouts. Schoolcraft was effectively disappeared by the police into the state mental health system. In his narrative of the mounting tensions at the precinct, Schoolcraft recounts that rumours were circulating that the chief of the station was going to force him out on psychiatric grounds. He also worries, as in the case of Wahyu, that his seniors will ‘provoke’ him into something that would lead to his shooting. Leaks from Schoolcraft’s meetings with the police doctor, police psychiatrist and police internal affairs tipped off the precinct and district chief that he was going to report them. Schoolcraft was eventually confined against his will and without informing his kin in a mental hospital for six days. He was in effect, ‘disappeared’ by the medical system. In their narrative, the NYPD argued that Schoolcraft was acting erratically, swearing at supervisors, barricaded himself in his home and was a danger to himself. The tapes showed this to be untrue. To this date, Schoolcraft’s case against the NY police department is ongoing. (*The Right to Remain Silent: This American Life*. 2010, radio program, National Public Radio, 13 Sept).

appeals to the law are remarkable given that they are made to the very agent that targets him for extortion. Wahyu's attempt to challenge the police legally mark the beginning of a period in which his relationship with the police shifted from petition to violence: the categorical theft of his land supported by the police establishment, his imprisonment and torture, the extortion of his family members, the complicity of the medical establishment, and his final condemnation of madness which throw any further legal claims into awry. The police have revealed their hand and the full extent of their power over Wahyu's property, family, life, freedom and sense of objective reality. Wahyu's wife capitulated and the violence of the police was tamed by a relationship of patronage to the *Kapuspol* whereby his use of the land went unchallenged in exchange for a small percentage of the profit of his business. This transforms Wahyu's wife into a fully-fledged *cukong*.

But who is the *cukong* here? What is *beking* when it is so violently derived? Wahyu's narrative raises questions about the origins of contemporary patronage relationships between middle class *Tionghoa* capitalists and the state coercive apparatus, undermining the logic of voluntarism or self-proclaimed missions of civic duty that underpins gift-exchange and patronage relationships. It also calls into question the meta-narratives of 'Chinese big business' that propose an equilibrium between the *Tionghoa* capitalist whose ruthless pursuit of money hitchhikes aboard *pribumi* desires for political power. In these models of patronage and gift giving, the interests of both parties are met, thus rooting patronage in a self-sustaining equilibrium. What Wahyu's case suggests is in fact that the contemporary patronage relationships between *pribumi* and *Tionghoa* can also be born of ongoing violence, both structural and real. Wahyu's choice to abstain from patronage relationships with the coercive

apparatus invites theft, violence and extortion that ends only when a patronage deal is struck.

The following is an exchange I had with a Betawi gangster who discussed with me the origins of his ‘*teman2 Cina*’ [Chinese friends]. How did you become such a big *preman* in the first place Jambul?, I asked. Jambul leans over, grinning like the Cheshire cat and says slowly,

Well, I liked drinking. And you know, when I start drinking, I start thinking about money. *Terutama dari Cina* [Especially Chinese money]. So, I’d get a big rock and throw it. *Hancur* [destroyed]. The next day, they’d fix it. So I go in and break it again. And so again, they fix it. And eventually rather than get a *tukang* [labourer] in every day – that’s Rp 50,000 [US\$5.5] just for the labour alone – they call me in. ‘Pak Jambul,’ they said, “we’ve got a problem with our *keamanan* [security]. *Amanin deh* [Protect us, would you]”. Ha ha ha...

I would turn off the electricity to their houses and offices. I would lock them in there for hours. They couldn’t breathe. And so that was my technique [*modus*]. It grew from there. I wasn’t trying to find trouble [*cari masalah*]. I was trying to find money. I always picked on the Chinese. I wrecked stuff and then they asked me to fix it. I collected their debts [*nyagih*]. We’d target a *totok langsung* [directly]. We’d grab his cash as if were *maling* [thieves]. That was the model. I had about 10-12 boys, six guarding the *Cina* and the others thieving from them... [At first] I was paid Rp 500,000 [US\$55] per month. They just gave it to me. They already knew [*mereka sudah tahu*].¹⁰⁷ *Ngak ada yang minta* [No-one demanded money from them]. Between the years 1982-1990, I’d be making five to six million per month.

¹⁰⁷ Absent of the object, this sentence, *mereka sudah tahu*, can be read in two ways, both of which ultimate settle on the same meaning. Jambul is suggesting that either they already ‘knew’ the price they should pay, or they already knew that the exchange, their security for his employment, should take place. Either way, the *Tionghoa* businesspeople ‘already knew’ how to temper the rent-seeking situation. Compare this to Gupta’s informants, who complain that they lack the cultural savvy to negotiate bribes and one begins to see how the skilled management of extortion is a developed trait of Indonesia’s *Tionghoa* presumably because of their historical vulnerability to it. (Gupta, 1995).

I'd see a new *bengkel* [auto mechanic]. I'd say to the *anak-anak* [from *anak buah*, his 'boys'], go bring their sign [*spanduk*] down. And oh *sialan* [damn it]! Out would come a Kopassus! I would get an earful [*dimaki-maki*]. 'Who are you looking for here!?' *Cina itu dekingan Kopassus. Kopassus semua* [Those Chinese were the financiers of Kopassus. They financed the whole lot]. If you ask me, they're better off with us *preman*. At least we stick around but with the *aparat* [state coercive apparatus], they're always off looking for more opportunities.¹⁰⁸

Like the *preman*, the police coerce a patronage relationship with *Tionghoa* capital, turning the courtesy and volunteerism of the gift economy on its head. The conventional literature of the gift economy is in other ways reversed: it is not the beneficiary of the gift who is weak, captured by capital and implicated by the moral economy into repayment. Rather, it is our donor. Explains a one star retired general:

The very *function* of the police is to establish a relationship with forms of enterprise [*jenis usaha*] that have something that needs to be secured, a hotel, a factory. The police look for problems; a foreigner who didn't report himself, you patronise a prostitute, you don't report your earnings. If you don't have the police protecting you, you'll be interrogated [*diperiksa*] daily. From this relationship, the police plant their interests [*menanam kepentingan*] and the Chinese hope that at one point the police will feel obliged to return the favour [*saling bantu*]. This is what the police call "community participation" [*partisipasi masyarakat*]. But, "participation" emerges from the police authority to investigate [*dari kewenangan polisi untuk memeriksa timbul partisipasi*]¹⁰⁹.

Anatomy of *Tionghoa* Patronage 2: Reciprocity Denied

¹⁰⁸ Field notes (12 February 2007)

¹⁰⁹ Retired Police General, interview by author (7 November 2006).

The reciprocity ethic is a key element of the patronage relationship. The obligation of the returned gift is what closes the loop of gift-exchange and binds benefactor and beneficiary in greater symmetry. Hence, the practice of reciprocity is in fact an acknowledgement of likeness. Its denial is a rejection of group membership. This means that reciprocity and its inverse (negative reciprocity a la Sahlins) delineate the boundaries of community. Seen from this perspective, Lim Sioe Liang's relationship with President Suharto begins to look remarkably egalitarian. The granting of monopolies on cloves, wheat and flour were exchanged for *setoran* payments and the opening of joint business opportunities to support the initial capitalisation of the President's family members. Liang's lucrative clove monopoly was shared with Suharto's half brother Probosutedjo and Suharto's eldest daughter Siti Hardiyanti Rukmana and her younger brother Sigit Harjojudanto forged their respective business empires on the profits made from their 30% ownership of Liang's BCA.¹¹⁰

Unlike big business, for middle class *Tionghoa* capitalists, the principle of exchange is negotiated and uncertain. Despite the obligations of the gift, the provision of protection and privilege remains contingent on the will of the officer-beneficiary on the ground. We see this in the following narrative from a young *Tionghoa* businessman called Budi Hardjono.

In June 2006, a gaggle of journalists were invited to join a police raid in West Java which, Polri promised, would likely uncover the hiding place of notorious, fugitive terrorist, Noordin Muhammad Top. The trip yielded not Top but Marsin, a Sundanese

¹¹⁰ Although one might recall Suharto's 'thinly veiled extortion' in the wake of the 1990 opening of the Jakarta Stock Exchange, where the president proposed that the 100 firms who had placed their shares on the market offer 25% of their shares to Indonesian *kooperasi* as a way of atoning for their vast wealth accumulation. Eventually, the 31 primarily *Tionghoa* businessmen who were later called to Suharto's ranch gave 1% of their worth to *kooperasi*. (Heidhuis, 2006).

labourer who confessed to killing his former employer Ali Harto Winata, a *totok* Chinese who ran a company specialising in construction materials in Bekasi. A dozen journalists from the biggest news agencies in the country, bored by the fruitless excursion to Cirebon, ran instead with the Marsin story.

Certainly, the murder of Winata and the subsequent revelation of his killer was newsworthy in its own right. Four years earlier, in November 2002, the criminal detective unit of Polres Bekasi arrested Winata's own eldest son Budi Harjono for his murder. Bekasi police officers invited journalists to their reconstruction of the murder and paraded Budi before a national audience as a monster for whom even filial bonds meant nothing. After six months in detention, a court acquitted Budi Harjono in 2003 due to a string of procedural errors on the part of the *reskrim* officers. Regardless, police maintained his guilt and pointed to his signed confession as evidence. Media coverage of the arrest of Marsin the real killer drew pointed attention to Budi's *salah tangkap* [mistaken arrest], initiating a disciplinary review for the investigating officers at Polda Metro Jaya.

Today, Budi's family live calculated and compact lives. Their home in Bekasi shares the same site as the family trade and although already in their late 20s, Sri Eni's two sons, Budi and the younger Tommy, live at home to manage the business. A4 framed photos of Winata and his wife Sri stare out over the moldering tiles and the broken furniture of the old pastel lounge room. The only evident wealth lies in the stacks of wood and metal piping that tower over the front yard and Budi's car, a slick black machine with bucket seats. They attend an evangelical church where the membership is largely *Tionghoa* but they do not hold membership of any other social organisation.

Budi was arrested 5 days after his father's murder. At that stage, Budi, Sri and Tommy had been unofficially detained in separate rooms in Polres Bekasi for days.

At first they acted like my friend. They said, 'why don't you tell us [*cerita*] your story?' But when I did, they beat me and said, 'you're lying.' When I asked for a lawyer, they brought out a baseball bat and swung it, missing my head by just a few centimeters. My mother (who had been beaten badly by Marsin in the attack and required surgery) kept telling them that Marsin did it, but they already had a *skenario* [scenario] worked out for me. They beat me the first day, the second day, the third day. They fired a gun right next to my brother's ears. They tried to force me through brutality to confess but it didn't work. I said to them one day, 'Where is your proof? There is evidence, Pak. Why don't you look at that? You have a block of wood. There are fingerprints on it.' I said, 'you can't do this, this is not in line with the law' and they said, 'this is my law' [*ini hukum saya*]. Then, they found a way to get at me. Mugiono, the interrogating officer, told me I had to sign a police investigation report or my mother would not be released from detention for her surgery. He said, 'your mama is gonna die.' I thought, my father is dead, must my mother die too? So, I agreed to sign the police investigation report. It was already filled in with my confession. I thought, this is the greatest drama [*sandiwara*] in the world.

Budi's mother, brother and *pembantu* [housemaid] signed statements under duress that Budi was the perpetrator of his father's murder.

Why wasn't Marsin arrested from the beginning? ...As far as I see it, at the start, the issue was money [*soal uang*]. Marsin didn't have any money. His family didn't have any money. If I was made a *tersangka* [suspect], they thought we'd shell out [*keluarkan*] money so that the case didn't go to trial... Sugeng, the *kasadserse* [chief of staff of criminal detectives] approached my uncle and said that he wanted to go on the haj [*naik haji*] but had no money.

We said, arrest Marsin and if you want compensation, then we'll work it out [*kalau Bapak mau imbalan, itu urusan belakangan*]. But then the case became about their promotion. The minute I confessed, they were all promoted [*naik jabatan*]. After I was formally made a suspect [*tersangka*], they never asked for money again.¹¹¹

In 2006, four years later, the media coverage of Budi's case snowballed in the weeks after the flopped terrorist expedition and Marsin's arrest. Aside from numerous magazine and newspaper interviews and even a Wikipedia entry, Budi was invited to speak on a TV talk show on a panel with notorious Glodok gangster, *peranakan* Anton Medan.¹¹² On air, Medan crassly announced that 'Budi is a Chinese, so [*jadi*] he's rich, that's why he was freed [*makanya dia bebas*].'

Herein lay the subtext of the recent media storm around Budi Harjono. Public interest in his case did not in fact lie with the procedural errors of his case. Torture, false arrests and forced confessions were a dime a dozen and who thought the police were clean anyway? Public interest in the case was generated because of Budi's race: as the son of a *totok* Chinese, what was he doing getting so far into trouble with the law in the first place? Wasn't he making his regular payments to the security services? Where were his patronage networks, his *kenalan* [people he knows], his *koneksi* [connections]? With all that money and power, aren't the Chinese invulnerable to the law?

¹¹¹ See Chapter IV for more on fiscal extraction and cases, which I refer to as the economy of law.

¹¹² Nationally, Anton Medan is renowned as a Jakarta gambling tycoon cum *preman* cum Islamic preacher. His role in Jakarta's illicit casino industry is explored in Chapter III.

I posed these very questions tentatively to Budi, in the darkness of his car. He went silent and when he answered, his voice broke. ‘*Mereka tutup mata*’ [lit. They shut their eyes]. When he finally spoke again he said,

There are three ways that the Chinese find strength [*cari kekuatan*] in this country. Church, social organisations, and contracts with the *aparat* through *setoran*. INTI doesn’t do anything anyway, *mana perlindunanya*?! [what protection!?]. These days, I just stick with the church. I think that’s why now the Chinese have turned to religion. To find *keamanan*.

Budi did not elaborate on his family’s former police beneficiaries – we do not know their rank, department or station.

In late 2006, Kapolri Sutanto ordered head of Metro Jaya police, Irjen Pol Adang Firman to subject Mugiono, Budi’s interrogating officer, Sugeng, the chief of staff, and other arresting officers to an internal disciplinary trial. However, Firman resisted and the officers went unpunished. Why would Firman risk his relationship with the national chief of police with such a blatant act of insubordination? The officers could have been protected, either by other senior police or by patrons of their own, *pribumi* or *Tionghoa*, escorting them through the ranks of Polri. If that was the case, it’s possible that Budi’s police beneficiaries did not have the authority to overturn his arrest and detention, but usually, this is only evident after a prolonged negotiation and repeated requests for funds.

Rather, ‘to close one’s eyes’ to the distress of one’s patron is a snub of a different sort altogether. It is an *apriori* decision to overturn the reciprocal obligations of the gift economy. It is a denial of indebtedness and, it is also its inverse, a statement of

autonomy in the face of the moral net cast by the patron's repeated, regular presentation of the gift. If 'partnership is not merely the privilege but the duty of reciprocity' (Sahlins, 1974) then the shrugging off of the ethic of repayment is a denial of the initial fact of partnership. Without the necessary final step of recompense, all the courtesy, decorum and backslapping that signifies the *Tionghoa*-police gift economy is nothing but a mask for Sahlins' concept of negative reciprocity: 'the attempt to get something for nothing with impunity' (1974, p. 309). And like Deleuze and Guattari, Sahlins recognises that if reciprocity is an acknowledgement of kinship, coresidence and belonging to the community, then its denial is the unsociable extreme. Herein lies the crux of the fragility of the *Tionghoa*-police gift economy: in refusing the obligation of reciprocity, the police negate *Tionghoa* claims of likeness, common citizenship and community. And so even here in *cukongism*, the supposed ultimate domain of *Tionghoa* power and influence, *Tionghoa* are vulnerable and subject to betrayal. Indonesia's few choice *Tionghoa* tycoons maybe emancipated from the political elite, but for the vast majority of *Tionghoa* entrepreneurs, capital's power to patronise and indebt is outbid by the power of race to delegitimise and deterritorialise.

Seen from this light – the fragility of exchange as opposed to its mechanic inevitability – the history of *Tionghoa* relations with the police and military coercive apparatus reveals itself anew. The repeat incidences of violence that have cost the *Tionghoa* community their lives and livelihoods over the years since the founding of the republic appear now not merely as an outbreak of racial-economic tension, but as a series of chronic betrayals. Each riot, threat and act of destruction of *Tionghoa* property is a rejection of the years of courtship and false camaraderie culminating in

that final grotesque, orchestrated act of perfidy: the anti-Chinese riots of 1998.

Starting in the first months of 1998, as the financial crisis was beginning to crunch, thousands of Chinese homes and *ruko* were looted and burnt down. The riots first fanned out across Indonesia. They started from its Christian majority, Eastern islands, and steadily narrowed and moved inward, hitting the capital in May. The riots lasted 35 hours and were identified in 50 different locations in the city, mainly clustered in its commercial heart.

But why didn't you leave Glodok before the riots? I ask my *peranakan* friend. He shrugs, 'we didn't think it would affect us because beforehand Pangdam Sjafrie [Maj.Gen. TNI Sjafrie Syamsoedin] promised us that we would all be *aman*. He said that there would be no violence in Jakarta.' Instead, 'when I went out in Glodok on the 15th of May, there was no *keamanan* at all. And when the rioters came, they went directly for the electronics and companies, they wanted TVs and mobile phones and electronic goods. In the crowd, I saw many faces I knew.'¹¹³

Jakarta's central Chinatown of Glodok was set alight and burnt to the ground (although my informants recalled that the investments of the political elite, such as Glodok and Mangga Dua's gambling dens and nightclubs were ringed by Marines). Other *Tionghoa* communities in Kelapa Gading and Permata Hijau were able to secure the services of the Marines to guard their residential estates for the princely sum of Rp 500 million [US\$56 000].¹¹⁴ But many did not, and terrified by the possibilities, had their military beneficiaries chauffeur them in luxury cars to Sukarno-Hatta airport. For this privilege beneficiaries remembered, sometimes

¹¹³ Field notes (11 April 2007).

¹¹⁴ *Tionghoa* businessman, interview by author (20 March 2007).

laughing, that they demanded the sum of the vehicle itself. An ethnic Tionghoa businessman observed, ‘1998 taught us that the protection of TNI wasn’t everything [*beking TNI bukan segalanya*] so now we don’t show off our photos with the generals so much anymore.’¹¹⁵ 1998 was an epoch in the history of the gift economy of *Tionghoa-aparat*, exposing partnership for perfidy. Ten years later, *Tionghoa* have increased their support for the police but for no more stability than when they funded the military. The very fact this flawed, traitorous patronage economy continues is an indication of the community’s ongoing sense of vulnerability. Tionghoa debt produces neither *keamanan* nor belonging and democratisation. Moreover, for all promises of newly restored citizenship, Indonesia’s political democratisation has not made the Tionghoa more *aman* but in fact, ever more anxious of the rapid changes in government and threat of violence that each change brings. Notes a Tionghoa activist, ‘ultimately, they know that as long as we continue to feel *tidak aman*, they will make money out of us.’¹¹⁶

Fidelity and the Limits of Knowledge

Insp. Gen. Pol (Purn) Bibit Rianto current Deputy Head of the Anti Corruption Commission (KPK) was the star attraction of a small, intimate meeting of journalists in a plush office in central Jakarta. Having the power to investigate corruption in all institutions at all ranks, KPK is considered by most people to be the unblemished, messiah of good governance and, by state officials, the most fearsome body in contemporary Indonesian politics. Before we gathered, my *Tionghoa* journalist friend joked that Rianto is not like a proper police officer, in that he comes off as *lugu*

¹¹⁵ Field notes (16 March 2007).

¹¹⁶ Field notes (12 March 2007).

[guileless and friendly]. Certainly, this is the impression that Rianto gave as he shyly came into the room, shaking hands. It was not Rianto who was nervous however, but his awe-struck audience, comprised of around ten *pribumi*, one or two *Tionghoa* and me.

Rianto took his seat at the head of the table and told a story to break the ice: As a young, bumbling copper, shoes never shined, shirt always crumpled, Rianto was always in trouble for slovenliness at the *apel* [morning roll call compulsory for military and public service staff]. One day the Kapolres, inspecting the troops, stops before his polished young *anak buah*, eyes narrowing. ‘That’s a nice shirt Bibit.’ Rianto grinned back, ‘*bajunya dibeli cina*’ [This shirt was bought by a Chinese]. The audience laughed. Rianto added in the voice of the commander, ‘What are you becoming a Marine [*Emang kamu jadi Mariner*]?’ Rianto paused and the crowd laughed again. Rianto then added the punch-line. ‘*S2 saya juga dibeli oleh teman saya di Glodok*’ [My masters was also paid by a friend in Glodok] and began to giggle. Again the people around the table tittered.¹¹⁷

Rianto meant his tale to describe a rite of passage, of his transformation from an inept, unworldly copper to a polished proper officer. In doing so, he was trying to play down his own megastar status on the national political scene and build affinity with this audience of sweaty-palmed young journalists. The transformative ingredient in Rianto’s narrative is the ‘*teman Glodok*’ [friend from the predominantly Chinese area of Glodok], a euphemism for *Tionghoa* patron whose funding progressively extends his professionalism and advances his career, as they often did for the Marines during

¹¹⁷ Field notes (3 May 2008).

the New Order. My interest is not so much in the tale itself, as its very telling and the laughter it ignited. Being illegal and socially distasteful, why did Rianto feel free to admit the fact of his Tionghoa patron to a room of strangers? And why did the audience respond with humor?

One and a half years later, in October 2010, Insp. Gen. Pol (purn) Babit Rianto, and Chandra M Hamzah, both deputy Chairman of the KPK, were first made suspects and then arrested by Polri's national chief of criminal investigation, Com. Gen. Susno Duadji. The charge was alleged abuse of power while investigating a corruption case involving *peranakan Tionghoa* businessman, Anggoro Widjojo. As Director of PT Masaro Radiokom, Anggoro was alleged to have bribed officials within the Forestry Department to win the US\$12 million contract for a radio communication system procurement project. Police accused KPK officials Rianto and Hamzah of taking bribes to drop the Anggoro case and allowing him to seek refuge in Singapore. However, the arrests of the deputy chairmen took place against a backdrop of increasing police envy of the anti-corruption commission's investigative powers. The KPK protested that its deputies were being framed and that they had wiretapped recordings Anggoro Widjojo's brother, Anggodo Widjojo wheeling and dealing with officials from the prosecution and the police to have the deputies arrested. The KPK also released transcripts of these conversations to the public, but without the recognition of voice, the words sat unconvincingly on the page.

However, public defence of the KPK was swift and generated an energy that seasoned observers such as Wimar Witoelar compared with *reformasi* and the 1998 collapse of

the New Order.¹¹⁸ When the head of the police's criminal investigation unit, Com. Gen. Susno Duadji sneered at the KPK's objections and likened them to a *cicak* [gecko] trying to take on a *buaya* [crocodile, an often used euphemism for the police], he inadvertently furnished the case with mascots which transformed scattered protests into a full blown anti-corruption movement. Gecko and crocodile fought it out on posters, cartoons, street murals, t-shirts, hip hop lyrics, banner, email attachments, facebook groups and blogs. Hundreds of groups were formed online with daily postings of colossal volumes of news articles, satire and images, while on Jakarta's streets, activists camped in front of the KPK to show their support.



Photograph 4: In Jakarta, an artist paints a mural of a crocodile's mouth tied shut by a gecko (Kompas, 16 September).

¹¹⁸ Pers. Comm. 04.11.09.



Photograph 5: Members of the ‘Student Opposition Movement’ protest in Jakarta on 2 November 2009 (Jurnal Grafisosial, 3 September, 2009).

The sheer volume and speed of images generated and circulated and recirculated around the gecko and crocodile metaphor in many ways made strategic sense. As representations, they did not defame nor directly identify culprits within the state and so avoided overt messaging that may have aroused the defamatory ire of the police and the attorney general’s office. However, a stock of images emerged aggressively and pointedly targeting *Tionghoa* brother of the fugitive, Anggodo, who the public suspected of playing *cukong* to the police in order to have the KPK arrested. Anggodo was depicted in police uniform brandishing the hallowed four stars of the national police chief, often with the captions ‘*Kapolri swasta*’ [the private sector police chief] or ‘the real Kapolri.’¹¹⁹ These generated images of Anggodo illustrated

¹¹⁹ I only heard this term used in connection with one other person, Arief Cocong, whose role as a Jakarta gambling tycoon is explored in the following section.

long-circulated rumours of *Tionghoa* patronage and dictatorship of the inner workings of the national police.



Photograph 6: Activists boo a doctored image of Anggodo Widjojo in police uniform at the November 8, 2010 protest at the Welcome to Jakarta roundabout, central Jakarta. Activists yelled, 'Who is this?' 'Korruptorrrrr!' screamed back the crowd. The banner was thrown into the crowd and stamped on (detiknews, 8 November, 2009).

On the 7th of November 2009, the day the constitutional court ordered the tapes be broadcast live in court, Jakarta stood still. Even in Gambir station, haunt of Central Jakarta's street food hawkers, taxi drivers, homeless kids, pickpockets and *preman*, a crowd gathered around a street seller's television set to watch the airing of the tapes. The tapes of the wiretapped conversations implicated among others, the deputy attorney general and the police chief of criminal investigations in a conspiracy to create a false charge of bribery against the two KPK deputies in a bid to have them drop the case against Anggoro. The main voice throughout the four hours was that of Anggodo Widjojo, brother of the fugitive, who is heard speaking with and talking

about members of the police elite to arrange for his brother's freedom and the arrest of the deputies. This appeared to prove the rumours that the accused *Tionghoa* businessmen had undue influence over the police and had bribed officers for the arrest of the KPK deputies. Rianto and Hamzah were released later that day and Anggodo was arrested and charged with attempted bribery and obstruction of justice. Chief of Criminal Investigation Com. Gen. Susno Duadji, whose voice was heard on the tapes and who Anggodo referred in code to as *Truno 3*¹²⁰, was rotated from his position but ultimately not charged. The KPK took over Anggodo's case and in May 2010, Anggodo went to trial¹²¹. The whole incident only confirmed the *cukong* master narrative.

In the months proceeding his public downfall, Com. Gen. Susno Duadji, the reviled criminal detective responsible for the arrest of Rianto and Hamzah, began to reveal other skewed cases in the national police's portfolio in a bid to secure his own freedom. In a great garble of names and finger pointing, the name of a Javanese diplomat cum BIN operative cum military supplier emerged called Sjahril Djohan, a 'case-broker' [*markus*], who works with the police to manage the cases of bureaucrats who had gotten in sticky situations regarding procurement contracts, money laundering, tax and other financial crimes against the state. Djohan is a *pribumi* Indonesian who, like the Widjojo brothers, has undue influence over the police.

Djohan's relationship with the police was clustered around his 'friendship' with a small group of generals who served between 2001-2004 in Metro Jaya police station.

¹²⁰ The code comes from the street name of Polri Headquarters in Kebayoran Baru, South Jakarta, *Jalan Trunojoyo*.

¹²¹ Rianto and Hamzah were released but by November 2010, they continued to face charges of bribery pressed by Polri.

Makbul Padmanegara served as chief, Bambang Danuri as his deputy and Nanang Sukarna as chief of criminal investigations (Asiaviews, 3 June 2010). When the case broke in 2010, Danuri was already National Police Chief and Sukarna his spokesman, and Makbul had served his term as Vice Chief of Police beginning in 2007.

Beginning in 2006, Djohan served formally at the national police quarters as ‘expert staff’ for the Directorate of Anti-Narcotics under then Chief of Criminal Investigations Makbul Padmanagara and his successor Bambang Danuri and had the authority to issue secret memos and directives (ibid). Crucially, when Djohan’s relationship with former Vice Chief of Police came to light, Makbul acknowledged the fact of their friendship and noted that Djohan shared a ‘sibling’ relationship with other generals, including his original accuser Duadji. In the weeks that followed, a string of public figures lined up to defend Djohan, including former head of the Directorate of Narcotics, Brigjen Indradi Thanos, Marzuki Djarusman, former Attorney General under the Abdurrahman Wahid administration and hot-shot lawyer, Hotman Sitompul stepped up to represent Djohan declaring, ‘he has done a lot to help this country, using his various skills’ (ibid). Despite the defence of ‘friendship’ that the police and political elite put up in Djohan’s favour, in May 2010, he was charged with bribery.

Djohan is not an individual case. This section has examined *Tionghoa* patronage, but Polri also has its *pribumi* patrons. Political party power-brokers, senior bureaucrats, and parliamentarians hold sway over certain positions and departments within the police. One example is Golkar legislator Setya Novanto. Novanto holds long-standing police procurement contracts including the provision of *jarkom/ arkom* [computerised licensing systems and military equipment] to Polri through his

companies such as PT Citra Permatasakti Persada. He has also successfully manoveured onto successive parliamentary commissions dedicated to the oversight of police, law and the national budget since 1998.¹²² Within the police, Novanto's patronage is legendary,¹²³ and when his name has been associated with the misappropriation of state funds as it was in the Bank Bali case in 1999, and various rice import scams in February 2005, July 2006 and again in February 2010, allegations of wrong-doing have been quickly smothered. The treatment of the police's *pribumi*, as compared to its *Tionghoa* brokers, could not be more different.

This comparison of *pribumi* and *Tionghoa* patrons tells us much about the racial stratification of patronage. The gift economy of *Tionghoa* patronage is a secret that is simultaneously public knowledge. We see this in the first instance in Rianto's telling of the story of his own rise to power and the immediate ascription a police general's uniform to the figure of Anggodo. But we have seen too the dysfunction and chicanery in *Tionghoa* gift giving to the police. Middle and upper class *Tionghoa* are forced into patronage relationships with the security apparatus by deliberate and repeated threats to their security, but once engaged the reciprocity of that relationship is subject to the preference of the police beneficiaries. These two key features of the relationship – its public familiarity and its negative reciprocity – are in fact interlinked. Police can speak so freely of their *Tionghoa* patrons precisely because their fidelity to them is so precarious. In the eyes of the police, the haphazard,

¹²² Setya Novanto served in the Golkar faction of Parliamentary Commission I from 1999-2001 when the commission managed issues such as foreign affairs, defence, policing and intelligence. From 2001-2004, he was on Parliamentary Commission II, dealing with law and policing. In 2004, the functions of parliamentary commission II were taken on by parliamentary commission III where Novanto sat until 2008. From 2004-2008 he also headed the commission's budgetary committee, deciding upon the police budget. While in this position, he teamed up with MABES head of logistics and planning Brigjen Tjuk Sukiadi to contest the Kapolri's decision to decentralize procurement authorities within Polri. Retired Police General, interview by author (11 April 2007).

¹²³ Field notes (11 April 2007).


arbitrary nature of their reciprocity decreases the moral wrongdoing of allowing oneself as a member of the state to be so freely captured by capital.

Thus, speech and the freedom with which it circulates tells us something of fidelity and of the quality of patron-client relationships. In the two years of my fieldwork, not one officer spoke freely about the economy of *pribumi* patronage funneling through the institution, while only a little prodding would bring forth conspiratorial stories of *Tionghoa cukong* who attempt to lever influence over the institution by issuing payoffs. Moreover, at the moment of threat, when all of Jakarta was howling for the head of Anggodo Widjojo, police put up no defence. At the very same time, the police moved rapidly to issue statements of camaraderie with the *pribumi* patron, Djohan when public opinion threatened his reputation.

These two cases of fidelity and speech and fidelity show us something of the moral economy of patronage that fuels the police institution. Corruption is in theory a taboo, haloed by an unspoken secrecy. But as Nuijtens and Anders remind us corruption is bound up in ‘ambivalent dialectics of concealment and publicity and the hidden continuities between the illegal and the legal, and the moral and the immoral’ (Anderrs & Nuijten, 2007, p. 27). Within the heart of Polri’s patronage economy, there are patrons who may be exposed through the certain, delineated speech acts and those who are not. The illicit bribes, tithes and gift-based *cukongism* that can be spoken of in select instances, even poked fun at as Rianto does, is the corruption that does not truly bind at the precise moment in which the return gift of *keamanan* is called for. These are relations that do not truly exert influence at the most crucial moment. The potential denial of reciprocity and the lurch into brute extortion is what

makes the *Tionghoa* gift economy admissible in the partially concealed, shadow realm of things that are known and yet unproven. In comparison, the illicit patronage economy of the *pribumi* political and economic elite elicits neither jokes nor gossip. *Pribumi* patronage is not a social fact acknowledged by crowds of protestors or ridiculed in images or phrases. The fact of *pribumi* patronage is hidden and never disclosed and in their moment of need, the reciprocity of *keamanan* that the *pribumi* patron demands is activated and mobilized. The figure of the *cukong* versus the *pribumi* ‘friend’ shows us the ways that corrupt practices within the institution of the police are embedded in the asymmetrical operation of structural power within Indonesia.

Section Two: The *Parmin* Economy.



Photograph 7: In 2007, Jakarta's bars were filled with hundreds of casino workers awaiting the reopening of Jakarta's illicit gambling industry.



Figure 10: Map of Main Casino and Machine Gaming Areas post-1998.

Chapter III: The Rise and Fall of Casino Gambling

...and what's the biggest illegal economy in this country? It's gambling [*perjudian*]. It's bigger than any other income...and who is the biggest gambler [*bandar judi*] in the country? It's that man who has an office behind the Kapolda Metro Jaya, that man who runs Artha Graha.

Who do you think I am I talking about?

Middle ranking police officer.¹²⁴

Section One has explored how the hierarchy of the criminal world in New Order Indonesia mirrored the political elite in its corresponding governing structures and the way that the democratic reorganisation of the coercive apparatus has scrambled authoritarian allocations of turf and their spoils. Section One traced the impact of democratisation on the *Tionghoa* gift economy of patronage. Section Two will examine the impact of democratisation on the reorganisation of the coercive apparatus from the perspective of Jakarta's illicit gaming economy until its demise in 2005 under Kapolri Sutanto's 'war on vice.' This chapter shows that where the reorganisation of power in the bright *siang* [daylight] of formal politics appeared muddled or even reversed in the curious, distorted looking glass of Jakarta's *dunia malam* [nightlife], the processes of democratisation appeared to be marching forward to a dementedly teleological beat.

This section maps the critical off-budget economy of illicit gambling and its relationship to political transformations within the state. The chapter examines the fluctuations in the legal status of casino gambling in central Jakarta and the way that

¹²⁴ Middle ranking police officer, interview by author (12 December 2006).

the persistent illegality of everyday gaming [*perjudian*] created an untraceable parallel economy of mammoth proportions, funneling untrammeled sums of capital to the personal, corporate and political projects of Indonesia's elite, including the national police. The system continued until Kapolri Sutanto, championed by President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, shut down the gambling economy in all its forms in mid-2005. Although the economy of gambling as it is described here no longer exists in Jakarta, the forms of gambling outlined in the following pages continue today albeit ensnared in a dramatically different relationship with the state. Where before the relationship between the police and gambling tycoons was structural, organised and evenly disbursed, today what forms of gambling persist are protected in secret fitful grabs that can change with the rotation of leadership. For this reason, I have chosen to write this section in the past tense. The war on drugs, the final segment of this section, is written in present tense because it is ongoing as are its practices of torture and extortion.

As we have seen in Chapter I, Polri's dependence on various sources of off-budget revenue is born of deliberate police mismanagement and corruption of the state budget leading to severe resource shortages in the police territorial command. Moreover, a conspiracy of cultural structures – the shame around requesting funds from one's senior, the prestige and necessity of cultivating a network of *Tionghoa* patronage for one's internal career progress, and the motor of personal greed – emboldens officers to run their units and departments from various off-budget economies known euphemistically as parman [*partisipasi teman*], parmin [*partisipasi kriminal*] and parmas [*partisipasi masyarakat*]. The first section of this dissertation examined the complexity of the parman economy and the way in which cultural and historical structures delineated the form, dimensions and boundaries of those

economies. Similarly, this section examines casino gambling and the illicit narcotics trade as two crucial pillars of a vast criminal economy that has historically fed police coffers. This source of revenue is broadly known as parmin [*partisipasi kriminal*, or criminal participation]. However, as we will see in the following chapters, for Polri officers, that which is ‘criminal,’ like ‘territory’ or ‘patron’ (*teman*) in our previous sections, is defined both subjectively and relatively in ways that contradict simple dichotomies of legal and illegal within the formal strictures of ‘law.’

An Anthropology of Urban Gaming

Similarly, for many ordinary Indonesians particular forms of gambling [*perjudian*] by certain persons, at certain times was not necessarily deviant behaviour but merely one further example of the ways in which public mores and that strange, unfathomable law of the state departed. Despite a long history of prohibition, gambling has been a constant in the lives of the residents of Java. Indeed, because gambling is a performative social space wherein the self experiments and showcases her negotiation with uncertainty, such practices are ubiquitous across time, space, class, gender and religion (Malaby, 2002). Witness the service of animal combat to royal Javanese power in the pre-colonial and early colonial era or the religiosity of attaching little slashes of sharpened iron to bandy legs to gut a fellow cock in seconds (Reid, 1998, p. 193). Writing in 19th century colonial Java, Crwfurd declared the ‘Indian Islanders passionately fond of play...a market day in every part of the country where open gaming is not absolutely prohibited, men and women, old and young, form themselves into groups for the purposes of play’(ibid). Accounts of colonial Java are peppered with reports of bidding and betting between children on crickets and grasshoppers, between men on the toss of *kemiri* seeds or the flutter of kites, or of the

gatherings of kept *Indische* women and their love of the *kertu* [cards] or dice (Tilly, 1973; Raffles, 1930; Rush, 2007; Barrow, 1806; Knight, 1834).

A substantial subset of the colonial literature of play specifically addresses gaming practiced by the torrent of Chinese coolie-sojourners pouring into the Dutch East Indies to labour on the revenue farms that made up the backbone of the colonial economy. Monopoly concessions for mining and agricultural revenue farms were parceled out to Chinese capitalists who largely drew upon this wellspring of imported Chinese (and Indian) labour for production. Trocki details the way in which concessions for gambling and opium were often owned by a *kongsi* of the same merchant class who were issued state monopolies on important commodities such as pepper, rubber and tin mining. Opium and gambling being the only sources of medicament and entertainment for cramped and laboured bodies, the Chinese coolie would indulge only to find himself rapidly amassing debts to the company, demanding in turn lengthier and more lethal terms of service (2000). In theory at least, the gambling dens were only open to the Chinese, the government positioning itself as the protector of the indigenous against such foul habits. As such, Cribb agrees that '[in East Sumatra] gambling became an important means for planters to keep their workforce tied by bonds of indebtedness' (Cribb & Kahin, 2004, p. 152). Not only were 'such arrangements central to the labour control system in these parts of Southeast Asia,' (Trocki, 2000) but as Rush observes, it was this very system of ethnicised, bonded labour that underwrote the cost of empire building and the provision of infrastructure in Java 'to make the authority of the central government thorough and comprehensive ' (2007, p. 2).

In contemporary Indonesia, gambling is regulated by Article 303 of the Criminal Code, which deems the practice's greatest crime its affront to common decency (*kesusilaan*) and for this transgression, the law suggests a maximum imprisonment of 10 years for gamers engaged in practices 'where the possibility of gain is hinged upon fortune.' Article 303 does not differentiate between gamers and their hosts, between 'indigenous' and 'modern' forms of gaming nor the scale of their stakes. Indeed, Article 303 is a surprisingly simplistic law for an archipelago with such a rich and diverse history of gambling and a tenacity for play that far outlasts the legal doctrines and enforcement practices of the various regimes that have incoherently and arbitrarily attempted to prohibit, co-opt, or gain from it.

Despite Article 303, gaming continues to be as pervasive in the lives of Indonesians as is it meticulous in its ability to divide and stratify according to ethnicity, sex, material power, religion, skin colour and citizenship. Jakarta is the obliging host to an untold number of forms and types of *perjudian*. By far the most popular is *togel* [an acronym for *toto gelap* or illegal lotto] which relies on the correct selection and sequencing of numbers and pictures, lending the practise the same terrifically easy, vanilla thrill of most other cheap, coupon-based number games such as keeno or lotto (Siegel, 1986, fn 322).¹²⁵ Until the crackdown on 'vice' in 2005, *togel* was a multi-million dollar industry run by *peranakan* coordinators and their fleets of indigenous,

¹²⁵ Although Siegel's ethnography of Solo in the New Order shows us that the fastidious, interior ways people select their lotto numbers, as individual, associative speech acts, it is anything but simplistic. Javanese establish complex, personal systems with 'wild associations' designed to convert numbers found into selected lotto entries. Siegel notes that during his ethnography of gambling, the government had banned all forms of gambling except the national lottery, run through national agents. However, the idiosyncratic bets and bids he writes about are all conducted through an illegal network of lotto agents. It speaks to the classic anthropological problems of 'the ethnographic present' that frustratingly, I am unable to locate at precisely what phase in the legality of gambling Siegel writes. Siegel, J. 1986. Pg 149-58, 322n2. One is reminded of Spencer's call to political anthropologists to observe more attentively 'political time' as located in 'political space' (2007, p. 125).

mixed-sex *kampung*-based vendors throughout the city. Unlike casino gaming, *togel* was everyman's game and not prescribed into *kongsi*. For Jakarta's illiterate, undereducated and female underclass, *togel* was a net employer of tens of thousands,¹²⁶ a viable means of social mobility and an integral part of the collective play and fantasising of Jakarta's urban poor.¹²⁷ Like casino gambling, much of the profits of this illicit market have wound their way into the budgets and pockets of local level stations in Polri's territorial command, although the starred officer class would not deign to accept funds from such a blue-collar revenue stream.¹²⁸

As in Geertz's Bali circa 1958, in post-authoritarian Jakarta, regular affectionate throngs of men continue to cluster in their secret, purposeful male spaces to dual their cocks in weekly events known as *sabung ayam* (Geertz, 1978). There have been some small adjustments to the practice since Geertz's ethnography. Today the cock is too much of a financial investment to subject it to the monstrous little blades of a rival.¹²⁹ Moreover, rather than bust up the events, one finds that in fact it is a nostalgic coterie of *kejawen*-orientated [Javanese mystical belief] officers and *preman* who run them. Other tabloid forms of gambling in the city include card games such as *poker*, *remy*, *macok*, *cap sha*, *ceki*, *kartu leng*, *kartu jeblok* or *qui-qui*, and games of the dice, such as *tasyaw* [a kind of roulette in which players pick rolled numbers coloured red or

¹²⁶ In fact, so significant is *togel* to the economy of the poor that even the ultra-conservative Majelis Ulama Indonesia has struggled to take its usual reactionary stance to the practice. For instance, in 2004, Secretary of MUI Central Java, Achmad Rofiq stated that 'the problem of *judi* is complicated, *kan* [you know]. It's true that [*memang*] all religions don't permit it, but this matter has to be seen in light of the reality that the government cannot provide a labour market. The solution to *togel* is not just matter of issuing a ban.' (DetikNews, 5 August, 2004)

¹²⁷ *Togel* also generates a host of service economies, such as a large market in prediction prophets, also known as *dukun togel*, many of whom operate through the internet.

¹²⁸ Kapolres and kapolda were most certainly on the take from the founders of *togel* networks, but they would not stoop to directly receiving monies from individual, working class vendors.

¹²⁹ In Jakarta, cock-rearers spend Rp 3-4 million [\$US 335-445] on a variety from Bangkok.

blue] or *dadu kobrok* [a picture and dice game in which they are covered by a plate or coconut.]¹³⁰ In the wake of the 2005 crackdown, these games are increasingly establishing online presences and large Jakartan followings propelled by the proliferation of internet and mobile phone technology in the capital.



Photograph 8: Man and his cock.¹³¹

As one scales the city's socio-economic ladder, so too do the differences in forms of *perjudian* become more than merely ornithological. Before mid-2005, the upper end of Jakarta's gambling scene was broadly known as casino [*kasino*] gambling. For the intimate *Tionghoa* community of central and west Jakarta that service and frequent it,

¹³⁰ Variations on these games are also played across the country, however their names can differ substantially.

¹³¹ Photograph by author. 17.08.07.

this level of gambling is parsed in two: as casino [*kasino*] and machine [*mesin ketangkasan*] gambling.¹³² As the name suggests, machine gambling relies on the use of mechanised devices to facilitate games of chance. What in the Western world might affectionately know as ‘pokies’ or slot machines, are in Jakarta divided meticulously into *bola setan* [Satan’s ball wherein players pick winning numbers between 1-18], *bola ketangkasan* [a ball game of skill], *mickey mouse* [or MM, a computerised, seven-card game played individually on a monitor for around Rp 20,000, US\$2.3 a shot,] Happy Royal, *keno*, and another similar number-selection game otherwise known as UFO. Although *mesin ketangkasan* was available in 1970s Jakarta, these forms of mechanised gambling gained a strong following in the mid to late 1980s using machines and software imported, legitimately and illegitimately, from Taiwan and more recently, Southern China. Nonetheless, mechanised economic play of this kind is notoriously capricious. In Jakarta, such is the appetite for gaming that new, amusing rearrangements of gambling *lagi ngetrend* [currently in vogue] can be eclipsed within the year by some other transnational permutation offered at another venue.

Casino gambling sat at the very apex of the gaming hierarchy and fiscal clout. Casinos were high-capital, exclusive endeavours that offered its patrons the full gamut of vice from *ketangkasan* machines to tables awash with baccarat, roulette, blackjack and poker. Unlike *togel*, which one finds peddled in the *kampung*, or the cockfight, which shelters in the shadows of the coercive apparatus,¹³³ casino and machine gambling dens were set up in the basement of clubs and bars, occupying whole floors in malls, apartment complexes and abandoned state-owned buildings.

¹³² This has important methodological implications as figures giving of numbers of illicit ‘casino’ in the capital may or may not include machine [*ketangkasan*] gaming halls.

¹³³ The two regular cockfights that I attended in Jakarta in 2006-07 were always in some kind of physical proximity to potent sites and persons of the coercive apparatus.

Any casino worth its salt brandished luxury VIP rooms ornamented with indigenous and illicitly-trafficked South Chinese girls. The tables here boasted starting bets running well into the hundreds of millions of rupiah and an invitation into these secret rooms was highly coveted, with entry alone often commanding a fee. But once inside, the casino was a liminal, transformative space where time, legality and history held still. The casinos were open 18 or sometimes 24 hours a day and with no windows, dawn lost its usual powers of regulation. The executive casinos also prided themselves on being 24 or 18 hour ‘one-stop-shops’ in which illicit narcotics, almost always amphetamines, and women were on offer. Although casino managers did not usually concern themselves with the complications of direct trafficking, it was their job to make both girls and pills readily available. Their plentiful supply would keep players tethered to the place, even if that night the tables were ill-starred [*meja mati*].¹³⁴ Indeed, so abundant was the provision of both that wandering, gawking police and military officers were often tipped in ‘especially pretty women’,¹³⁵ just as the casino workers were rewarded in ecstasy tablets, collecting dozens of them a night. Shrugged one floor manager, ‘we were always ‘on’ [*on*]. We ate them like fried peanuts [*kacang goreng*].’¹³⁶

For players, wins were secured in two primary ways. Most of those who bet came in clutching a specific *jimat* [amulet], usually ‘something difficult to obtain.’¹³⁷ The most prized lucky talisman was a malformed skink or small lizard with two rears and two tails [*kadal yang berbuntut dua*], which would often be smuggled into the casinos in handbags or carefully in pockets. Indeed such was the demand for the double-

¹³⁴ Anton Medan, interview by author (23 June 2010). Also Casino worker, interview by author (7 October 2009). Field notes(27 February 2007).

¹³⁵ Anton Medan, interview by author (23 June 2010).

¹³⁶ Casino Worker, interview by author (14 October 2009).

¹³⁷ Ibid.

assed gecko that the illicit casino gaming industry propelled an obscure parallel market in which these mutant trophies would sell for millions of rupiah. Players would also seek out *meja hoki* [winning or lucky tables, *hoki* is a *Tionghoa* term] that brandished a *dealer* or *banker* they believed to harbour good fortune. The lucky banker would be talismanised: players would arrive in time for her shift and trail her over the course of a career as she circulated through Jakarta's network of casinos. For a small time dealer in an exclusive casino, to be fetishised in this way was a kind of *hoki* in its own right, generating substantial tips to boost the Rp 6-8 million [US\$670-890] they earned per month (2004 figure, including standard tips).¹³⁸ In this way, the fortunes of casino workers and the players they serviced balanced precariously on the outcome of the die leading both to fetishise the logic of the *meja hoki* and the *meja mati* [dead table].

Unlike *togel* or cards which were scattered in the plebian spaces throughout the city, casino gambling thumped at its very heart from the neighbourhoods of Glodok, Mangga Dua, Sunter and Kelapa Gading, bridging the municipalities of Central and inner West and North Jakarta (See Figure 10). Most casinos fell within the administrative sub-district of Taman Sari (See Figure 5). Though centre-pieced in this way, Jakarta's illegal casino gambling industry was not able to propagate itself with egalitarian zeal. Instead, the casinos and gaming halls tended to huddle closely to large resident populations of ethnic Chinese who made up the city's spatial core and who would surround it, protect it and supplement it with an intimate kin of labour. It was not that *pribumi* were not allowed to work the casino floor, but unlike the other forms of gaming in the city, their labour was limited to one of the casino's thousands of cleaners, security officers, food runners or sex workers. At most, a

¹³⁸ Ibid.

pribumi would be allowed to work four or five machines. *Peranakan* Chinese often started at this low level, hoisted into the business by friends or family, but they could rise much quicker than *pribumi* and if proven trustworthy could find themselves on a ladder of escalating, militarised ranks leading to positions of increasing proximity to the chips. An entrepreneurial *Tionghoa* casino worker might first prowl a number of slot machines, graduating to managing more and more machine staff as *kepala regu* [head of the regiment], then onto the position of *dealer* on the tables. One of the highest positions a casino employee could aim for was that of *jangket* - the cashiers that changed money into chips. But opportunities for this were rare, dominated as they were by *peranakan* women or *totok Tionghoa* of direct kin to the management.¹³⁹

In this way, discipline and control, the two central concerns of one's labour force in the gaming industry, were mapped onto kinship networks and whiteness of skin. Where this failed as a strategy for disciplining nimble fingers, brute violence was called in and most casino workers can recall the battering of a colleague until unconscious. So high were the stakes for advancement that life on the casino floor was competitive and envious [*ngiri*]. One small rumour could quickly seed a worker's dismissal. Given that Jakarta's gambling proprietors were an intimate coterie, elbow deep in the hotel, nightclub, restaurant, sauna and bar industry, discharge for stealing or cheating was in effect a blacklist [*blacklist*] from the entertainment sector for life.

¹³⁹ As a broad observation, in Java women are widely regarded as superior managers of money than men and as it was explained to me, this is why trusted *peranakan* women are so readily taken on as casino cashiers. Hildred Geertz was one of the first to trumpet the 'astonishing degree of female dominance' in income management and a 1988 survey of Jakarta women found that more than 70% of women (employed and unemployed) managed the household finances. Anthropological scholarship on gender and financial clout in Java has sought to refine this statement in line with structural inequalities or cultural ideas about desire and control (Brenner, 1998, p. 168-9). I could find no substantive ethnographic work on income management and *Tionghoa* families although of the few Jakarta *peranakan Tionghoa* families I knew, it was typical that money management was in the hands of the wife (Wolf, 2000, p.85-104. Also, Papanek, 1988, p. 79; Carsten, 1989).

Aficionados of casino gambling were also primarily ethnic Chinese, both Indonesian and international. Some exceptions notwithstanding, casinos tended to operate a racialised door policy in which the only *pribumi* allowed to cross their threshold were reliable, *aman* Christian minorities such as the Batak or Manadonese who wouldn't blab, call in the Islamic militias, or lever their political connections to forfeit payment. However, maintaining the racial purity of the casino was also justified by management and employees in that *pribumi* were resistant to the frenzy of gambling in ways that *Tionghoa* were not, pawning their mobile phones, motorbikes, cars and even homes for a *meja hoki*.¹⁴⁰

A final difference between casino gambling and its more proletarian forms lay in the structure of its management. With such staggering amounts of capital generated, Indonesia's history of casino industry ownership has been one of centralised, national-level control by a small number of heavily capitalised, politically-connected *Tionghoa* investors organised into *kongsi* of mutual gain. Below this monopoly, sat a lower rank of trusted, provincial-level *Tionghoa preman* and fixers who managed the dirty, everyday work of running the casinos and who often steadily graduated to investors in their own right. This was in stark contrast to the cockfight or mass lotto, which tended to reflect district or sub-district level political patterns of small time kingpins jostling for territorial control. In the case of the cockfight, hosts were uniformly *pribumi* and male while *togel* was run by *peranakan* men and women with *pribumi* vendors. This was because, unlike the chip or the cock, the exchange of the lotto coupon for money was a face-to-face relationship that required mutual trust. Membership of a common territory was crucial to its mass appeal.

¹⁴⁰ Interview. Casino Worker. 14.10.09.



Photograph 9: Bajai drivers steal off in the evenings before dinner to bet cigarettes on paper dominos.

With such diversity of gaming, the slot machine, the dice, the playing card, the cock and the coupon are not neutral material artefacts of a singularly foul vice for either Indonesians or the police. Rather, they are intimately associated with various societal groups of varying economic and moral heft. Thus while economic play is ubiquitous, understanding gambling in Indonesia is complicated by its kaleidoscopic optic in

which the morality of gaming is dependent on the precise angle of the observer. *Tionghoa* of north Jakarta who frequented the casinos and the *mesin ketangkas* sneer at the cockfights and card games of the city's *pribumi* underclass as the compulsive acts of undisciplined addicts, who are '*kurang terdidik secara mental*' [mentally unschooled] (Social Department, 2003, p. 92). Lower to middle class urban *kampung* will gladly play host to *togel* and the *peranakan* that run it, but find morally reprehensible the casinos they associate with wealthy *totok* whose wealth is ill-gained and whose play is protected by elite political patronage. Housewives and mothers are overwhelmingly in favour of continuing the ban on *perjudian* for fear that the monthly household kitty will be lost on some ratty cock and yet vendors of *togel* coupons are also mothers who rely on the illicit revenue to keep their children schooled. Gambling is a form of economic play that unites the inhabitants of the capital, but the very diversity of its form allows debates about *perjudian* to follow the socio-economic lines of discrimination and distrust that segregates the lives of its residents.

Despite this immense flora of play, this chapter focuses narrowly on the economics of casino and machine gambling. As we will see, this slice of the illegal gaming industry was monopolised by an important criminal and political elite that maintained intimate relations with and unprecedented influence over the state coercive apparatus. As such, this economy is an important lens by which to observe the dynamics and politics of the civilianisation of security and the rise of Polri. The first part of this chapter writes a genealogy of casino gambling in New Order Jakarta, focusing specifically on Kopkamtib's reissuing of a prohibition on gaming after fourteen years of its legalisation and taxation. This chapter shows the ways that states willfully

create the conditions under which criminal economies flourish by charting the important role that the legalisation and prohibition of gambling had in creating a capital base for elites of the New Order during the 1980s. I argue that the 1981 re-administration of the ban on gambling was a way for President Suharto to distribute resources and exert control over a growing and increasingly alienated client base within the coercive apparatus. By allowing the casino industry to proliferate, President Suharto drew the men of the coercive apparatus into an interior, illegal economy upon which they were dependent and fatally tainted. The second section examines the impact of democratisation on this illegal economy and illustrates the way that the reorganisation of the coercive apparatus simultaneously rearranged the structure of the casino economy by fracturing the structures of patronage and freeing up this illicit market to a variety of players where police *beking* was crucial. It argues that casino gambling constituted a significant dimension of exchange in the relationship between Jakarta's ethnic Chinese community and the state coercive apparatus and indeed, there is evidence to suggest that the industry formed a shadow economy for the political elite of the entire New Order state. Thus, as democratisation swung the national police into ascendancy on the see-saw of territorial authority, the revenue of illicit casino gambling increasingly became a stalwart of the off-budget economy of the national police and of its individual elite officer class until the industry's termination proper in mid-2005. The reader should bear in mind that the structure of gambling that I describe here, both in the Suharto and the post-authoritarian eras, has been expunged from Indonesia's economic and social landscape. Why and how that occurred, and what that means for contemporary patterns of off-budget police financing, is the subject of Chapter IV.

Judi and the ‘Metropolitan City’

Early New Order fantasies of building a modern Indonesia rested on the premise of exploiting the nation’s natural resources. Much academic attention has focused on the expansion of the oil, gold and timber industries and the New Order’s capitalisation on outer island resources to feed the growth of the centralised bureaucratic state.

Certainly, by the early 1980s the central government was the principle beneficiary of natural resource exploitation with 40% of the GDP levied from corporate income tax on oil (Sivaramakrishnan & Green, 1986, p. 111). However, provincial government revenue-making has been the subject of considerably less attention. Because of their limited taxation powers, provincial governments made up their budgets by either procuring part of the exploited resource or levering their share from the central government. But for resource deficient provinces such as Jakarta and Yogyakarta, this was not a viable option. With Jakarta’s 1961 baptism to ‘*Daerah Khusus*’ [special region] status, the DKI administration earned a hazy, negotiable bundle of taxation powers that, in theory at least, gave the DKI Jakarta administration increased economic autonomy compared to the provinces of the outer islands (Sethuraman, 1976, p. 45).

In the 1960s, Jakarta’s economy was dominated by the tertiary sector with trade and services contributing more than half of DKI Jakarta’s annual revenue and banking, finance and tourism making up the rest. These sources of income could not keep up with the rate of population growth (which hovered at 4.6% in Jakarta) and urbanisation, which was 3.7% per year. The rapid rate of urbanisation was putting a severe strain on the city’s ability to provide urban services. A 1969 survey of

kampung conditions in Jakarta found that 65% had no private toilet facilities, 80% had no electricity and 90% had no piped water. Literally half the city's residences were temporary shelters with earthen floors and thatched roofs where residents paid private vendors over five times the going rate for water (Sivaramakrishnan & Green, 1986, p. 196). In the eyes of Indonesia's political elite, if Indonesia was ever going to be 'modern,' this seething squalor clogging up the capital had to be tackled and that required money and a hearty dose of military discipline.

The twins of discipline and extraction came in the form of President Soekarno's 1966 appointment of Let. Gen. Ali Sadikin to DKI Governor. This was one of the President's final outgoing decisions in what had become a lame duck presidency under the Old Order. As outlined in Chapter II, this practice was known as *kekaryaan* - where cushy civilian posts as governors, mayors and sub-district heads circulated amongst the military top brass. While the practice was common under Soekarno, it was during the mid 1970s that *kekaryaan* reached its zenith. Although *kekaryaan* was to decline again by in the mid 1980s, Malley states that during the first decade of the New Order, the number of army generals holding provincial governorships alone increased from 40% to 78% as Suharto abandoned his support base among the civilian, provincial elites in favour of a central, militarised state machine (Malley, 2003, p. 107). Sadikin's own installation as DKI governor fit neatly within this first wave of *kekaryaan* appointments as President Suharto sought to divide the spoils of civilian leadership among potential rivals from within the military. The general's first act as governor was to rearrange the city's civilian administration along military lines, merging the bureaucracy of the 'resident' [the *pamong praja*] with that of the governor to form a neat, hierarchical line directly under himself (Pratiwo & Nas, 2005). And although Sadikin liked to say that he had given little thought to urban

concerns prior to his position as governor, in truth ‘Bang Ali’ [elder brother Ali] had sketched the makings of his master plan for the city well before his appointment (Ibid).¹⁴¹ In the blueprint he presented to the Jakarta Regional Council entitled, ‘the Master Plan of Jakarta 1965-85,’ Sadikin conjured visions of the capital as the ‘Metropolitan City’ (always in English, always capitalized) (Abeyasekere, 1989, p. 217) on par with those he had seen in the United States and Holland (Sadikin, 2007). The Metropolitan City was one in which city life was developed in accordance with *teknologi*. Jakarta was to be,

capable of placing itself as the Country’s Capital and as an International City up to proper and universal standards, and [being] the vessel of national as well as international aspirations. (Silver, 2008, p. 111)

The Master Plan detailed new canals, purification plants and electricity networks. It proposed to double the activity of Tanjung Priok port, reclaiming land and extending quays. Sadikin dreamed of new airport facilities and an underground metro system, new health centres, museums and cultural hubs (Sethuraman, 1976). He planned new residential houses in Jakarta’s south and west that could fit neat nuclear families, subjecting the problem of ‘urban excess’ to the cleansing, modern logic of ‘urban rationality’ (Kusno, 2000, p. 108).

More than all of this, in fact more than anything, ‘Bang Ali’ hankered for roads. The Master Plan detailed great highways and intricate, looping networks of fresh, black bitumen that would slice through the city, trafficking his modern labour force across

¹⁴¹ There is some contention about Sadikin’s role in the drafting of the Master Plan. Although most authors writing of this period credit it directly to Sadikin himself, Silver argues that the governor had little input into the Master Plan (2008, p. 111)

its ever-expanding dimensions. The road was also a territorialising device, furrowing into the bloated tracts of unmapped, unplanned *kampung* that pushed the city's boundaries further and further beyond their administrative perimeters. Roads meant mobility and with the freedom to move, the crusty, primordial affiliations of ethnicity and place born of the city's residential arrangements would be stripped back, leaving only the pebble-smooth core of the national subject. Only with roads could this dream of Jakarta as the great circulatory and monetary hub of the nation be realized.¹⁴²

Indeed from Sadikin's appointment onwards, DKI Jakarta lavished no less than half of its development budget (a whopping one quarter of the total provincial budget) on laying the very road surfaces that today are divvied up into turf by Jakarta's gangland community.¹⁴³ Within the first three years of Sadikin's appointment, Jakarta's streets increased by over 300km, or 20% of their total surface area (Sethuraman, 1976, p. 1976). Before he was deposed by President Suharto in 1977, Sadikin would oversee the construction of 1,312 kilometers of road, 45 bridges, 7 bus terminals, 390 bus shelters, 15 overhead bridges and the purchase of over 1000 buses (Biography of Ali Sadikin, 1971). Sadikin's close relationship with then upcoming property and construction entrepreneur, Ciputra (Tjing Haw Tjie) meant that many of his

¹⁴² The importance of roads, traffic, transportation and circulation to the New Order has been remarked upon by a series of scholars of Indonesia, from Pemberton to Siegel, Shirashi to Sidel. Scholars of criminality such as Barker and Ryter also write of the importance of mobility, and the power to traverse, to mystical, criminal power. Roads and transportation were also the bread and butter capital base upon which Suharto's children built their considerable business empires. The key idea in all of these works here is significance of territorial flows and the claim of extraction to the maintenance of Javanese power. For a summary of some of this literature, see Sidel's 1998 discussion of traffic, political, fiscal and straight up mechanical, in the New Order.

¹⁴³ See Section 1.

companies won the tenders for this reconstruction of Jakarta as the Metropolitan City (Ramadhan, 1986; p, 295; Silver, 2008; Suryadinata, 1995, p. 204).¹⁴⁴

To pay for this grand transformation of the cityscape at Ciputra's prices, the Sadikin administration took World Bank advice by capitalising on the city's cheap, surplus labour and attempting to expand on its nascent manufacturing base (Abeyesekere, 1989, p. 217). On the advice of the foreign consultants, taxation also came under particular scrutiny as an underutilised revenue stream. But, although Sadikin would later protest that he was simply protecting 'the little people,' the truth was that taxation required an extractive capacity that the provincial government simply could not muster (Emmerson, 1972, p. 26). To tax public use of goods and services, the administration needed to sharpen its surveillance eye, to map and identify its citizens, their consumption and behavioural patterns and organise that into rational, accessible forms of *ilmu* that could extract and profit. DKI Jakarta might now operate along military lines, but it was still far from operating like a disciplined governmental machine. The city then, as today, could barely control the waves of migrants that descended upon it, let alone map and tax their habits of consumption. What Sadikin needed was to open up new, bounded fields of taxable income and for that, he followed the example of his contemporaries in Thailand, Malaysia and Brazil by legalising the practice of gambling.¹⁴⁵

¹⁴⁴ Ciputra has a giant property empire. Soemitro writes that Ciputra owned 30% of the shares in PT Pembangunan Jaya, owned by DKI Jakarta, which gave him a veritable monopoly on Jakarta development projects. Ciputra also had a host of military generals providing him with *beking* such as Maj.Gen. Soedjono Hoemardani along with Sadikin who later served as the president commissioner of PT Pembangunan Jaya.

¹⁴⁵ Less known is that Sadikin also initiated the economy of the hajj, which today stands as another great, murky revenue spinner for the state.

Just as the colonial state before it, the new republic turned to the management of vice. What with its lights, glitter and high-rollers, casino gambling fit perfectly with his utopian image of a capitalist modernity forged of glass, concrete and steel that was Sadikin's signature vision for the capital. Legalising the trade would not only fit the hyperbolic aesthetic of post-Soekarno authoritarian modernity, but taxing it heavily would mean that the gloss worthy of an International City could further be polished with the profit. Moreover, as Sadikin details in his memoir, it was not as if he was inventing an industry, but rather making an existing one manifest before the extractive capacity of the state (Sadikin, 1995, p. 49). Since the birth of the republic, Jakarta's industry of casino gambling had been grounded in illicit *beking* relationships between *Tionghoa* businessmen and rogue military figures (Ibid). These 'bad apples' were known by the state as *oknum* whose illegal actions were individual and discrete rather than institutionalised and systematic.

Judi proliferated in the primarily *Tionghoa* quarters in central and west Jakarta, an irregularity that flew in the face of Sadikin's pledges to restore rule of law and discipline to the capital (Kusno, 2000, p. 108). For fellow retiring ABRI officers such as Nasution, Sudirman, Kawilarang and National Police Chief Hoegeng, 'officers of a Calvinist bent who regretted the passing of the old values' (who would later join Sadikin in Fosko and the Petition of 50) this kind of military corruption tugged at the image of the modernist, legal Indonesia that they had strived to establish (Jenkins, 1984, p. 247). Scholars such as Kusno criticise Sadikin for his demand to discipline 'urban excess,' transforming those poverty-stricken, *kampung*-dwelling Indonesians into modern, national subjects below the state. But the governmentality angle of postmodern scholarship neglects the fact that the state itself was far from a rational

machine. Sadikin's legalisation of gambling applied the logic of rationalising and disciplining 'excess' to the Indonesian state itself. By sanctioning the dice, Sadikin, now a civilian free of the patrimony of the Suharto's military, effectively snatched from the military elite a lucrative industry that had long lay beyond the formal extractive capacities of the state. In so doing, he brought a solid dose of so-called 'urban rationality' to the state itself.

In mid 1967, Sadikin exercised his authority as Governor to exact a tax on gambling licenses as per UU No. 11, 1957, which legislated that *kepala daerah* (regional heads) had the power to grant gaming licenses strictly to *Tionghoa* dealers, based on the argument that it was integral to 'Chinese' culture. Although it seems unlikely given the centralised nature of the New Order, in his 1992 autobiography Sadikin is adamant that he did not request the permission of President Suharto or the DPRD, not wanting to 'burden' [*memberatkan*] either of them (Ramadhan, 1992, p. 64-5).

Sadikin's model of legalised gambling openly recreated the Dutch colonial system of tax farming by putting the casinos out to tender and paying a percentage of profits to the DKI government (Forum, 1995). The licenses were to be bestowed on the premise that only ethnic Chinese could take part in the practice of gaming. Sadikin writes that of the seven proposals he received, the decision was made to grant the gambling concessions to two entrepreneurial *Tionghoa* businessmen, 'Apyang' and 'Yo Putshong.' Sadikin insists he knew neither previously (Ramadhan, 1992, p. 66).

Sadikin's choice of these two entrepreneurs was curious to say the least. The gambling concessions were shaping up to be some of the most lucrative contracts in the country and yet despite the vast pool of Sadikin's pet moguls and *Tionghoa*

regime cronies living in the capital, the contracts went to two financial nobodies. Apyang was a young, cash-strapped *Tionghoa* entrepreneur, known as Atang Latief, or Lauw Tjin Ho, who lodged [*numpang*] with his wife in a run-down [*lumuh*] rental on Gang Baru, neighboured by scavengers and other second-hand vendors (Gatra, 2006). Who ‘Yo Putshong’ might be, is not known. In the literature on gambling this name only ever appears once: in Sadikin’s own autobiography. What is clear from historical record is that the casino tenders were also won by a Betawi *Tionghoa* called Apyang Jinggo, otherwise known as Dadi Darmadi, father of Yan Darmadi (Foek Yoo Yan), who would also go on to become one of the great *Tionghoa* cronies of the Suharto regime. At the time, Yan Darmadi was also another financial *persona non grata* who dabbled in illicit gaming in the Mangga Besar area with a consortium of investors known as ‘*Kelompok Kota*.’

Yet together, Latief and Yan Darmadi would establish some of the greatest nightspots in Jakarta’s history. Jakarta’s *dunia malam* glistened with the lights of exotic new names that beckoned like the new, polished steel that shone in the *siang*. There was Ancol’s Hai Lai and Copacabana at the Horizon Hotel, Djakarta Theatre (NIAC) on Jalan Thamrin, Petak IX (PIX) in Glodok and Lotto Fair at Proyek Senen. Sadikin also granted licenses to other forms of gaming. The DKI administration ran a lottery, opened up machine gambling [*ketangkasan*] at the Jakarta Fair and granted licenses for horse racing at Pulo Mas and dog racing at Senayan (Sadikin, 1997, p. 130). Today most of these entertainment venues continue to shadow the skyline with the other concrete realisations of Sadikin’s ‘Metropolitan City’ – Taman Marzuki Ismail, Blok M, the Hilton, Chandra Kartika and the Istiqlal Mosque. The house of cards was

as integral a part of Jakarta's modern future as the houses of culture, theatre, retail consumption and God.

How exactly the licenses for gaming venues were parceled out between the pair is unclear. Newspaper reports confuse ownership of each of the casinos, attributing them separately to either Latief or Darmadi. Through a number of published interviews, I can establish that Darmadi certainly had his hands in Copacabana and Petak IX, while Latief started out his career as casino tycoon at Djakarta Theatre (NIAC). However, as years passed, the responsibility for NIAC seemed to fall into the hands of Damardi. Some argue that so gossamer thin was Latief's capital base that he was just a front man for Darmadi's gaming empire.

However, such individualised notions of capital and its workings fail to account for the specific forms of kinship and exchange that has long characterised Indonesia's uneasy, risk-adverse, *Tionghoa* business community. What appears most plausible is that Darmadi and Latief both started out as the front men for one or two anonymous *kongsi* of *Tionghoa* investors and as their respective capital grew, they themselves became primary investors in the industry. If the *kongsi* was ever plural, by the 1981 end of the legalised gambling era, it had merged into one. Rather than compete, the investors appeared to take on significant stakes in each other's venues. When Jan Darmadi returned from a NY business school in 1971 to take over the reins of his father's gambling empire, he complained that he had become the public face of legalised gambling, rather than the multitude of investors who he represented. Although the DKI government gave the license for NIAC to Latief, on the books Darmadi owned 80% of the shares in NIAC and PIX. He in turn argued that his share

was in reality only 49-51% while other investors under his name took up the remaining portion (Tempo, 1981). He also argued that his own share in Ancol's Copacabana was only 25%.

However the ownership was divvied up, from this capital base in Jakarta the duo exported their variety of casino development to other urban centres throughout the country. Surabaya, with its large ethnic Chinese and business community, was an important centre for gaming and Darmadi alone supplemented up to a quarter of the city's annual budget from his casino revenues (Mahrus, 1995).

In DKI Jakarta, Sadikin's reforms to the extractive tax apparatus and attempts to remake the city as a manufacturing Mecca for international investors were restructuring the economy. But meeting the city's enormous appetite for construction and public infrastructure meant that gambling became, as in Surabaya, a crucial mainstay of the economy. There were canals to build, sanitation and drainage to secure, highways to lay, public transport systems to run, a billowing army of khaki-clad technocrats to pay and campaigns to be implemented to 'Jakartanise Jakartans' and the surge of domestic immigrants arriving with the stars of a Metropolitan City in their eyes (Abeysekere, 1989, p. 220). Property tax, that trusty plinth of other Asian metropole economies, made up a mere 4% of DKI's annual revenues (Sivaramakrishnan & Green, 1986, p. 200). The city hobbled along on the income earned from taxes on motor vehicle transfers and registrations and development and tourism taxes. The gambling revenue, coupled with regular infusions from the central government, meant that the city's low tax rates, poor enforcement and inadequate cadastral surveys, could be overcome. In 1968, one year after its legalisation, 29% of

the provincial budget came from gambling revenues (Cribb & Kahin, 2004, p. 380). Profit from the city lottery, around Rp 60 million [US\$6700] in 1967, was minuscule compared to the enormous clout of Glodok (Emmerson, 1972, p. 26). By 1970, the casinos were bringing in Rp 2 billion, [nearly US\$ 5 million], to provincial government coffers, inciting other provincial governments in East and West Java and North Sumatra to open up their *dunia malam* to the great money-spinner of *judi* (Sadikin, 1995, p. 50).

With such massive fiscal flows pouring into DKI Jakarta coffers, it was only a matter of time before the central government muscled in on the act. In 1974, with the issuing of Law No. 7, the authority of the governor to extract taxable revenue from all forms of gambling was retracted. As the following table shows, from 1974-81, DKI profits from the casinos increasingly became the property of the central government (Sivaramakrishnan & Green, 1986, 200).

Table 6: Revenue Sources DKI Jakarta, 1974-1981 (in millions of rupiah, 1981 prices).

Source-own revenue	1974-75	1975-76	1976-77	1977-78	1978-79	1979-80	1980-81	Growth rate
Taxes	40,305	43,075	45,180	44,713	51,665	51,509	65,790	8.5
Gambling	19,632	18,411	18,366	17,621	15,509	11,460	9,017	-12.2
Charges	9,107	11,171	10,943	12,853	13,519	12,492	15,583	9.4
Ipeda (property tax)	4,555	4,515	4,463	4,402	5,359	5,122	5,425	3.0
Enterprises	646	764	862	1,023	1,957	1,556	2,051	21.2
Other	7,599	10,314	11,390	12,047	10,872	12,016	13,750	10.4

Subtotal	81,844	87,250	91,204	92,659	98,881	94,154	11,616	5.3
Other Revenue								
Grants	27,608	38,309	46,682	50,672	50,038	49,128	57,135	12.9
Loans	1,928	4,984	9,727	11,321	9,439	7,465	8,489	28.0
Total	111,380	130,543	147,613	154,652	158,358	150,747	77,240	8.1

If the loss of revenue wasn't enough, the DKI government also found itself increasingly subject to criticism from Islamic and youth groups [specifically, a tetchy anti-gambling organisation that called itself *Generasi Muda*] who objected to the city's dependence on *haram* [forbidden by Islam] sources of money. Sadikin had anticipated such arguments and countered that his legalisation of the illicit casino gambling industry was about transforming the natural, cultural tendency of Jakarta's ethnic Chinese community into much needed revenue for the city, and its *pribumi* population. 'I needed lots of money to build schools, clinics and roads...Yes, I know *judi* is *haram*, but we needed to think of the little people' (Tempo, 2005). Like colonial approaches to criminality and disease before it, gambling was constructed as a contagion that through territorial and fiscal practices, could be localised so as not to infect. The state's authorisation of gambling was zoned in the 'Golden Triangle' that stretched for one kilometer across Petak IX, Pancoran and Asemka¹⁴⁶ where residents felt the pull of the dice as 'part of the culture.' The government even made sure to support games of a strictly Chinese nature, such as *Hwa Hwee* which depicted historical personalities from 12th century China and to publish clues only in the

¹⁴⁶ Although with Hailai and Copacabana in Ancol and Jakarta Theatre perched at the head of Jalan Thamrin, its clear that the geographical flank of the *lokalisasi* policy was a lot more flexible than on paper.

Tionghoa press (Emmerson, 1972). To further quell concerns, Sadikin promised to establish a criteria to classify *pribumi* who showed signs of the disease [*kecanduan*, or addiction]. Like the tattooed criminal contagion of the early 1980s, Sadikin promised that Jakarta's frothing, dice-mad *pribumi* would be placed on official lists that would disallow their entrance [*masuk daftar*]. Nonetheless, within months of its authorisation, Islamic scholar Alwi Shihab recalls that unlicensed slot-machines jangled in the corners of every hotel and shabby *panti pijit* [massage parlour] across the city (2002, p. 128). Despite the localisation policy, *pribumi* found *Hwa Hwee* equally amusing and for the five months it was allowed it 'transformed the city into a huge night gaming room of thousands upon thousands of players' (Emmerson, 1972, p. 26). Shihab too writes of the *pribumi* as possessed [*keranjangan*] by the *Hwa Hwee* opiate and, the ultimate insult, of the scurry to consult the occult powers [*gaib*] that would help them win. The administration eventually withdrew its support for *Hwa Hwee* but the damage to the policy had been done as practices of gambling had crept well outside of the so-called 'Golden Triangle' between PIX, Pancoran and Asemka. *Lokalisasi* had failed on two counts; both to contain the contagion and also to keep all gaming revenue within the purview of the administration. This in turn gave leverage to growing complaints from religious and youth organisations that gambling be shut down.

In May 1973, head of Kopkambib, General Soemitro banned gambling and popular lotteries outside the urban capitals of Jakarta, Medan and Surabaya. Although Kopkamtib, the New Order's Operational Command for the Restoration of Security and Order, was officially established to purge the Communist contagion and other forms of political opposition, Suharto's machine of control took peculiar interest in

Jakarta's gambling industry and initiated 'special security [*keamanan*] action' for the casinos. Given that the head of Kopkamtib was second only to President Suharto in the governmental hierarchy, who was to tell him that the economy of gambling was out of his brief?

In 1973, this all-powerful body for *keamanan* prohibited jackpot throughout the country and took over the issuing of lotto licenses. For the coterie of retired military generals who made up the provincial elite, the 1974 passing of legislation that centralised the taxation of gambling coupled with the 1975 Presidential Decree on the prohibition of gambling was a stark reminder of who was really in charge. With gaming now regulated by the centre, Head of Kopkamtib Soemitro and the Minister for the Interior began discussions as to the fate of the casinos, bringing together the historical policy of 'localisation' with the New Order's centralising impulse. 'Our plan' observed General Soemitro, 'was to close down all the gambling places by 1975 and then to move them to an island provided by us' (Ramadhan, 1996, p. 322-3). However, the policy of an island casino never came to pass since by 1977, rivalry between Ali Sadikin and President Suharto saw the term of gambling's most powerful spokesman come to an abrupt end. In April 1981 Kopkamtib, then led by Admiral Sudomo, closed down the gambling circuit in the Indonesian capital and Surabaya. This decision initiated a massive labour dispute between ethnic *Tionghoa* entrepreneurs and the thousands of casino workers under their employ in both provinces.¹⁴⁷

¹⁴⁷ Caught between the see-saw legality of the Indonesian gaming industry, the casinos' vast number of labourers (*karyawan*), are a crucial element of their historiography. The issue of representation was significant to the cause of the workers. Initially, workers in Jakarta formed the P3HK to represent them at their first mediation [*musyawarah*] in March 1981. However, on allegations that the organisation was acting like a 'calo' [broker], Serikat Buruh Parawisata [the Union of Tourism Workers] stepped in. Neither was able to reach an acceptable settlement. Labourers demanded four

The Criminalisation and Consolidation of the New Order State

The 1981 reinstatement of the ban on gambling was justified by the state on urgent humanitarian grounds: the vice of gambling drugged the little people [*wong cilik*], pushing them into poverty, infecting their youth and leading them away from the path of Islam (ibid). However, historians of Jakarta such as Abeyesekere and Ryter largely agree that flipping the switch of legality on gaming practices in the capital was less about placating religious groups than restoring an important off-budget institutional economy to a jittery and cash-strapped military (Abeyesekere, 1989, p. 220; Ryter, 2002, p. 169). Certainly, Sadikin's own bitter statements made at the time confirm this view of events. In 1973, beleaguered by reporters to respond to Kopkamtib's ban on gambling he declared,

Gambling in the city of Jakarta is official [*resmi*] as per legislation [*undang-undang*]. Thus, it's legal [*legal*]. Better that it is legal than it goes on out of sight [*sembunyi-sembunyi*]. If it goes underground [*gelap-gelapan*], who do you think profits? Come on, answer! Who benefits [*untung*] if it goes underground? I heard people mutter their responses and they were dead right. It was those who back up the gambling, those rogue elements [*oknum*] of the military who are well connected to the authorities (Ramadhan, 1992, p. 67)¹⁴⁸.

times their monthly salary which was rejected on the ground that it would start a precedent that would frighten other investors. Despite the failure to come to an agreement, Jan Darmadi sat in Hall B Senayan on 4 April 1981 doling out envelopes with a blue coupon to recoup Rp 2 million [US\$222] to employees of Jakarta Theatre and Petak IX (in Surabaya, the severance pay amounted to Rp 3 million [US\$335]). Most stated that they would not cash the coupon in with Bank BNI. Workers of Hailai and Copacabana Ancol continued their dispute pleading, 'We are disciplined [*disiplin*]. We are not making trouble. But the severance pay is only twice our monthly salary. It's not even enough to rent a home. (See, 'Pesangon Judi Lanjutkan' & 'Pelajaran Buat Saya'. 1981. *Tempo* 06/XI. 11 April. <http://majalah.tempointeraktif.com/id/email/1981/04/11/KT/mbm.19810411.KT49253.id.html>. Accessed 8.11.09). Less easily mapped are the thousands of sex workers, pimps, escorts, dancers, drug dealers, food and cigarette vendors, taxi drivers, landlords, *kos* [cheap boarding house] owners and catering companies that provide support services to the casinos and their staff. The changing nature of the legality of casino gambling, from legal to illegal and across the spectrum of greys that constitute official tolerance for the industry, effects an phenomenal and immeasurable rip in the economy of the poor and lower class.

¹⁴⁸ I have drawn my translation of this fragment in part from Ryter, 2002, p.185.

However, in their analyses neither Ryter nor Abeyesekere situate the disallowing of gambling within the political context of the day. Those last final years of gambling's thirteen year grace period overlapped, not coincidentally, with a period of unprecedented internal upheaval for President Suharto regarding the political role befitting ABRI and the duration of Suharto's tenure as President. Generational change combined with surging recruitment rates within ABRI were beginning to change the dynamics of power within the regime. By the mid 1970s, Suharto found himself in a confrontation with a cabal of powerful retirees and former revolutionaries who still commanded considerable power and yet were not in the president's inner circle where resources, privilege and power were circulated. Stranded in a political limbo, they were known loosely as the *Sakit Hati* [Hurt Feelings] brigade (Jenkins, 1986).

Suharto's problems did not end there. Kopkamtib head, General Soemitro, locked in a rivalry with Ali Murtopo, reportedly had his eyes on the presidency and in 1974 was replaced as Kopkamtib head by none other than President Suharto himself. It wasn't until 1978 that deputy Admiral Sudomo took over the reins of the security powerbroker. From 1976 onwards, the circulation of rotations and promotions among the upcoming military brass began to lag as Suharto and his band of old guard supporters delayed deciding who could be trusted, creating a band of disaffected officers whose mobility within the state was curtailed (The Editors, 1977). As Jenkins details, young officers from the military schools began to meet privately to discuss the principle of ABRI's *dwifungsi*, culminating in the Seskoad paper that argued decisively that the armed forces were to have no other political doctrine bar upholding

the 1945 Constitution (Jenkins, 1986, p. 62-66). Jenkins concludes, ‘in this document, one hears closely the voice of the officers of a principled cast of mind, a group committed above all to the notion that ABRI’s behaviour should be posited on certain moral values, a group concerned by the apparent backsliding and decline in standards that had taken place under the New Order leadership ‘ (Ibid, p. 66).

Meanwhile, from 1977-8, a group of powerful but politically isolated retired military generals known as the Brasildi group gathered to discuss the military’s storming of schools and universities in the 1978 election campaign and the future of ABRI’s role in politics. Within Polri, young officers such as Farouk Muhammad began to wonder if the police weren’t better off separated from the military and the drafts of the criminal code increasingly took a stand against military intervention in matters of criminal investigation.¹⁴⁹ Not coincidentally, discussion of the integrity of law took place in a period of rising criticism of the president over the business dealings of his family and ostentatious displays of wealth. Many of these criticisms had their roots in a stratum of military and police leadership who had suddenly found their investigations into institutional corruption or other criminal acts by state officials cut short or buried. As Kapolri, Hoegeng had been forced by President Suharto to surrender the Sumarijem rape investigation to the central investigative bureau of Kopkamtib known as Teperpu in the ultimate subordination of law to the New Order’s coercive institutions (Santoso, 2009, p. 97).¹⁵⁰ Hoegeng’s police career was eventually ended for uncovering a car smuggling racket between *Tionghoa* broker Robby Tjahjadi [Sie Tjie It] and Suharto’s wife, Madame Tien (also known as

¹⁴⁹ Insp. Gen. Farouk Muhammad, interview by author (27 September 2006).

¹⁵⁰ At the time, Hoegeng asked, ‘Why Terperpu? Doesn’t the body normally just deal with cases of a political dimension, like PKI? Did Suharto see the Sumarijem case as more than just a criminal event?’

Madam Tien Percent) (Jenkins, 1986, p. 244).¹⁵¹ In Palembang and Aceh, Maj. Gen. Ishak Djuarsa had been ‘shocked into disbelief’ by the illegal activities of member of the Suharto family (Jenkins, 1986, p. 245). Emboldened by the outburst of public condemnation of state corruption, ABRI generals, who themselves were often embedded in relations of collusion and fiscal gain, began to call for greater humility and restraint from the executive.

In 1978, a new military discussion forum known as Fosko formed out of the ashes of Brasildi under *Yayasan Kartika Eka Pakti*.¹⁵² Fosko called for ‘corrections’ to be made to the implementation of the duel functions of the military. After being forcibly retired from the governorship, General Ali Sadikin aligned himself with Fosko. In 1978, with Nasution and a number of other ABRI generals including police General Imam Hoegeng, he joined a group of civilian bureaucrats and intellectuals in setting up the Institute of Constitutional Awareness. The aims and views of the two bodies overlapped to the point that by 1980, Jenkins concludes that ‘there was a broad and somewhat unique alliance between a number of retired senior officers and ‘retired politicians’ with linkages to the student movement’ (Jenkins, 1986, p. 248).

This movement of statesmen, war heroes, parliamentarians, literati and retired military generals found its voice in what came to be known as the *Petisi 50* or the Petition of Fifty released on May 13, 1980. The key ABRI icons of *Petisi 50* included ‘father of the army’ General Nasution, beloved General Ali Sadikin, the unimpeachable General Imam Hoegeng and the outspoken General Jasin.

¹⁵¹ Meanwhile, Suharto and Tjahjadi went onto found the profitable textile business Kanindotex. (Santoso, 2009, p. 113).

¹⁵² The business dealings of this foundation are examined in Chapter I of this thesis.

The premise of the petition was that the sanctity of Pancasila was being used for political purposes and General Suharto's presidency was increasingly riddled with power-hoarding and corrupt practices. Petitioners called for the upholding of the rule of law, tolerance for legitimate political practices such as political opposition and curtailment of the military's political role, and discussed these ideas at weekly meetings well into the 1980s. Revenge however, was swift.

Crucially, it did not take the legal form of an outright ban on the group, but rather a slow, devastating fiscal and cultural severing from public and state life.¹⁵³ In 1981, the year Sadikin's contracts for *judi* were abandoned because of the nationwide ban on gambling, signatories to the petition found themselves forced out from their jobs, work permits and business licenses expired without renewal and credit lines to state banks dried up. Sadikin's children found themselves routed outside of the fiscal circuit, unable to obtain lines of credit.¹⁵⁴ M Jasin's construction project for a shopping centre in Bandung was suddenly abandoned by local government and his personal bank account was mysteriously raided. Jasin's dentist daughter found herself under pressure to withdraw from Gatot Subroto hospital. Slamet Bratanata's consultancy firm went bankrupt after companies began giving him a wide berth. The dissenters found themselves subject to travel bans, curtailing their mobility and the national press refused to circulate their image or statements. Unable to move or make money without the patronage of Suharto, it was a kind of 'civil death' (Aspinall, 2005, p. 61). Indeed, it was a fitting form of political assassination that distinguished the key preoccupations of the New Order: capital, mobility and performance.

¹⁵³ Oddly, in his autobiography, President Suharto accuses the group of breaking the law and insinuates that their punishment too was as per the law. (Santoso, 2009, p 139).

¹⁵⁴ Of this time, Sadikin lamented, 'I was stuck [*dicekal*]. My children became victims. They couldn't borrow money from the bank, were not given the opportunity to do business. At the same time, others were receiving trillions.' (Santoso, 2009, p. 133).

Ryter and Abeysekere fail to connect the see-saw legal politics of gaming with this greater dual of visions, between a state of law and a state of neopatrimony, and a more general problem facing Suharto as to how to placate the military powerbrokers of past and future generations. In 1981, it fell to Admiral Sudomo, head of the Kopkamtib and trusted ear to the President, to thoroughly discredit the petitioners, among them the patron of legalised gambling, and isolate them from public life. In the same year, it was also within Sudomo's brief to sound the death knell for casino gaming. That these two events coincided and fell beneath the same super-body for '*orde dan keamanan*' [order and security] was not by chance. Prohibiting dice and alienating reasoned dissent shared the same underlying net of logic.

These seemingly unrelated elements - the disgrace of the petitioners and the forbidding of the dice as vice - were in fact part of a wider process whirring at the heart of the New Order regime. Section One of this thesis illustrated how power in the New Order was conceived in both its legal and criminal forms. The state's aggressive 1981 re-posturing took place both in the surface world of everyday public politics and in its subterranean counterpart, where the 'heresy' that was rooted out was that perverse legalisation of an economy that had once been an important part of the fiscal recompense of the military elite. Illicit gaming had two main strengths for the coercive apparatus: mammoth profits seemingly generated out of air and a need for *beking*. By re-prohibiting the world of gaming, President Suharto was creating a lucrative economy for the upcoming generations of ABRI that might challenge him on grounds of his own illegality. In the subterranean world of *judi* they too could reap the benefits of the continuation of the New Order and be drawn into the fold of the criminal regime as *oknum* [rogue, criminalised officers]. Thus, to pinpoint that instant

when the regime sought out its image in the criminal looking glass, would be to return to 1981 and Admiral Sudomo's announcement of the prohibition of casino gambling, for this was the precise moment that marked the criminalisation, and the consolidation, of the New Order Indonesian state.

It is unsurprising thus that Jenkins observes that those who did not join or bowed out of Petition 50 were richly rewarded with favours, positions and fiscal opportunities. Maj. Gen. Sumitro, one time rival and advocate of Kopkamtib's dismantlement, was awarded logging concessions in Irian Jaya through his company PT Rigunas and a juicy contract for ABRI procurement purchases through PT Tjakra Sudarma (Jenkins, 1986, p. 253). Maj. Gen. Ishak Djuarsa, who also sympathised with the movement, joined him in business. Soemitro was said to have been tasked with the job of approaching the dissidents and coaxing them into silence in exchange for 'big projects' (Ibid). YKEP, once the home of the revolutionary Fosko, went on to build one of the biggest military business empires of the New Order. And for General Sudomo, loyal acolyte of the president, suppressor of dissent and brave warrior against the evils of casino gambling, what could be more what could be more befitting than a big, fat stake in the new national lottery known as SDSB?¹⁵⁵

Licit and Illicit Gaming in the Late New Order

SDSB was only the later incarnation of a series of national sports lotteries initiated by the state after the 1981 prohibition on gambling. In 1985, a national football pool

¹⁵⁵ Such was his profits from the scheme that SDSB was often jokingly said to be short for 'sudomo Datang Semua Beres' [Sudomo Arrives, Everything Gets Sorted Out] and Sudomo himself as 'Minister of the National Lottery'. (Wilson, 1992, p. 108-9. Also, Anton Medan, interview by author (23 June 2010).

known as Kupon Berhadiah Porkas Sepak Bola, or Porkas [Forecast] was introduced to support the country's sporting programs. In 1987, the lottery earned the government Rp 29 billion [US\$3.3 million] (Tempo, 2004). Nonetheless, the lotto met severe condemnation from *Nahdlatul Ulama* and *Muhammadiyah* though controversially not by the Indonesian Council of Ulama, the MUI (Van Bruinessen, n.d.).¹⁵⁶ In 1988, Porkas was replaced with Kupon Sumbangan Olahraga Berhadiah [KSOB], which allowed gamblers to place their bets on the actual scores of the matches and not just the no-frills Porkas choice of M-K-S [*menang, kalah, seri*] or win, lose or draw. Expanding the betting options in KSOB proved to be a profitable move, earning Rp 1.2 trillion [US\$135 million] that year (Tempo, 2004). The following year, the national lotto was reformed again into Sumbangan Dermawan Sosial Berhadiah [SDSB] which differed again in that it offered a range of three different coupons at a whopping Rp 5000 [US\$0.50], Rp 10,000 [US\$1.00] and Rp, 15,000 [US\$1.50] each. Previous incarnations of the lottery had only offered one coupon at a relatively affordable Rp 300 [US\$0.03] or Rp 600 [US\$0.07]. The price of the coupons did not appear to dissuade betters and revenues brought in well over Rp 1 trillion [US\$112 million] per year until the lottery was discontinued in 1993.

The license to administer this changing procession of national lotteries and extensive network of agents, distributors and sub-agents lay solely with one foundation [*yayasan*] known as *Yayasan Dana Bhakti Kesejahteraan Sosial* (YDBHS or the Foundation of Loyal Aid [for] Social Prosperity). YDBHS was established on the order of President Suharto and the Department of Social Affairs in 1980. Although the foundation purported to channel billions of rupiah to various charities and social causes throughout the country, it was through the forms of legal gambling managed

¹⁵⁶ Van Bruinessen gives an excellent account of MUI and the Porkas storm.

by this foundation that the President came to monopolise the mammoth revenues of the legal gaming industry. Moreover, the foundation found itself increasingly drawn into other state development projects. With a 1990 presidential decree, the foundation received contracts to reclaim and redevelop state land from unplanned settlements around Jakarta city centre (Inpres, 1990).

Given the juicy processions of concessions and grants, it is unsurprising that some of the biggest names in New Order capital clustered beneath the YDBHS' wings.

YDBHS was first under direction by the Suharto's eldest son, Sigit Harjojudanto¹⁵⁷ and then daughter Tutut Hardiyanti Rukmana.¹⁵⁸ Also involved were cronies such as Henry Pribadi (Napan Group), Suharto's cousin Sudwikatmono (Subentra Group), Admiral Sudomo (who, now as Coordinating Minister for Security and Political Affairs, had the pleasure of presenting the weekly prize monies to their lucky winners). There were also *Tionghoa* big businessmen such as Robbie 'Ketek' Sumampouw, who enjoyed monopolies on coffee and sandalwood after the invasion of Timor Leste and who later also managed Tommy Suharto's clove industry.¹⁵⁹ From the gambling world, Apyang Latief and Eddie 'Porkas' Winata also held stakes in the national lotto.

Sadikin legalised gambling in order to fold its revenues into the state through taxes. Although the logic of his tender system smacked of fishy dealings and his own business interests remained opaque, the fact is that under the governor a mapped

¹⁵⁷ Sigit built up his massive business empire from revenues amassed through his major stake in Liem Sioe Liong's Bank of Central Asia, managed by the Salim Group. Liong appears in Chapter I of this thesis.

¹⁵⁸ Tutut was also the recipient of contracts to build Jakarta's toll roads and as outlined in Chapter I, managed the traffic police's contract to put motor vehicle licenses on an electronic database.

¹⁵⁹ Napan Group in particular was known for its close business relationship with Bimantara Group owned then by Suharto's son Bambang Trihatmojo. Bimantara Group and its new owner, Hari Tanoe appear in Chapter I of this thesis.

tranche of revenue coursed through the DKI tax system to be reallocated into recordable, audited public projects. In stark contrast, the philanthropic structure of President Suharto's new lotto economy meant that its revenues incurred special tax exemptions for the foundation and its private partner, PT Artha Dana Kriya (Department Keuangan, 1991).¹⁶⁰ The proceeds from gambling were also granted immunity from public audits (McGlynn & Sulistyo, 2007, p. 225). For the record, YDBHS did make small, arbitrary grants of a few million rupiah to favoured foundations such as the Cancer Foundation [*Yayasan Kanker*] or the Foundation for the Care of Handicapped Children [*Yayasan Untuk Pembinaan Anak Cacat*] who often sported commissioners [*komisaris*] from the in-circle of the New Order political elite. Grant-making to these 'civil society' organisations was at the sole discretion of YDBHS or, the Suharto family. Moreover, the real sums of money were being transferred to foundations within the nest of the Suharto family, such as Tutut's *Yayasan Tiara* which received Rp 1 billion [US\$111 000] in 1993 for the cryptically titled *Bahana Suara Pelajar* [Echo of Student Voices] program, (Tempo, 1993) or lent out at high interest rates to in-group entrepreneurs as liquidity for their various projects.¹⁶¹

A range of other important social and political institutions also came to rely on injections of national lotto revenue including the civil servants' wives association, *Dharma Wanita, Nahdlatul Ulama*, various faculties of *Universitas Indonesia*, *Partai*

¹⁶⁰ Secondary source research has not revealed who the founders and directors of this company might be. By the early 1990s, *Tempo* too wrote an editorial asking who was behind the company and by what process had they come to win the SDSB tender with the foundation? (Tempo, 1993).

¹⁶¹ In 2005, Eddy Yuwono, Director of PT Sari Kebon Jeruk Permai was imprisoned awaiting trial for his failure to pay back a Rp 161 billion [US\$17 million] grant made by the foundation in 1998 for his purchase of land in Kebon Jeruk for big residential development (Gatra, 2005). In 1993, *Tempo* also reports that Partai Demokrat Indonesia pleaded for YDBKS funds for philanthropic activities around their yearly summit. (Tempo, 1993).

Demokrat Indonesia [the Democratic Party of Indonesia, PDI] and the state party Golkar (Tempo, 1993). Despite this circulation of funds, in 1992 money spent on grants came to a mere Rp 40 billion [US\$4.5 million] of the company's fiscal reserves, just a fraction of the company's capital base (Ibid). By late 1993, the waves of protests organised throughout the country by an increasingly robust Islamic student movement had made their mark and the national lotto was eventually banned in its entirety in the same year (Aspinall, 2005, p. 132). The government's capitulation on SDSB should be read both within a lineage of other pro-Islamic concessions that occurred in the same decade such as the regulation on Islamic clothing, banking and food labeling as well as a rare concession to public opinion, which was increasingly disgusted by Suharto's particularly crude brand of patrimonial statesmanship. The rejection of SDSB, thus, was an early warning sign of things to come.¹⁶²

Part of the reason for the largesse of the foundation's earnings was that by introducing ever more wily forms of sports lotto, President Suharto effectively nationalised the people's inclination for economic play that had until 1986, been localised and contained by extremely profitable but nonetheless, small-scale *togel* and various card and dice games. By banning all forms of *perjudian* and legalising the national sports lotto, Suharto effectively seized control of the thousands upon thousands of individual

¹⁶² In fact, despite the ban, legalized gambling as a cash cow for the New Order elite continued albeit in alternative form. After the 1981 ban on casino gambling, Atung Latief entered a venture for a casino on Australia's Christmas Island, with Frank Woodmore, a Perth property developer. The casino was a joint project with the Australian government designed explicitly to attract high rollers from Indonesia now that Indonesia had instituted the ban. Although the contract was signed in 1987, in 1990, Latief's company operating out of Singapore, Lawu and Sons, sold a controlling interest to Robby Sumampow who opened the casino in 1993, the year of the ban on the national lotto. Mismanagement on Christmas Island meant that the casino only profited for one year, 1994, and in 1998 closed down after Indonesian officials banned the charter flights. This is unsurprising given that 1998 heralded the year of the *judi* 'explosion' in Jakarta. Over US\$ 2 million in unpaid wages and salaries, severance pay and redundancy packages is still owed to the people of Christmas Island (Joint Standing committee on the National Capital and External Territories. 2001). The case has still not gone to trial and the government is debating using the decaying casino to house asylum seekers given that conditions in their own facilities have become cramped.

streams of revenue returned to local kingpins throughout the country and redirected the flow directly into his personal pocket. Suharto's brand of mass-based gambling directly contradicted Sadikin's neo-colonial approach of *lokalisasi* where the state capitalised on the unquenchable betting habits of pariah minority. This strata of high-class casino gambling was in principle banned outright but in reality continued unabated in the back alleys and entertainment spots of central Jakarta as well in Indonesia's other major urban centres. If Suharto reserved legal, mass-based gambling revenues for himself, his cronies and his family, it was this subterranean industry of illicit gambling that was opened up to the generations of ABRI officers that swore allegiance to him. In criminal logics of New Order power, the preservation of the regime entailed the transformation of officers into *oknum*.

Back on the streets of Jakarta, in the wake of Kopkamtib's 1981 ban on casino gambling, a colossal realignment of patronage was taking place as casino and *mesin-hall* managers and owners attached themselves to a suitably potent military general who would grant their enterprise the all-important *beking* needed to continue to operate. Just as in the world of *Tionghoa* conglomerates detailed in Chapter III, *beking* in the criminal sphere of illicit gaming was arranged in accordance with ABRI hierarchy. Unlike the rest of the coercive apparatus, police commanders were never given the opportunity to install their subordinates as casino security. This denied them an important wellspring of revenue from both the moonlighters and tycoons that commissioned them. However, like the rest of the apparatus, police officers were indeed in the receipt of the regular, monthly installments of *setoran* from the sub-district level upwards. However, the stratification of ABRI *beking* could be clearly seen in the police generals' inability to make, break or protect the gambling tycoons. This had financial repercussions in that police generals featured less frequently as

shareholders and investors in the various glitzy nightspots cum casinos that lit up Jakarta's *dunia malam* [nightlife]. As in the corporate world, army generals were naturally preferable to any of the arms of the ABRI family, least of all Polri.¹⁶³ There was also a secret ranking within the army that put the Siliwangi, Diponegoro, Paspampres [Presidential guards] and military police at the very top of the internal apex. Figure 5 shows the importance that the coercive apparatus placed on the gambling revenues. In the administrative ward of Taman Sari, the very geographic nucleus of the illicit gaming industry, there were no less than two military Koramil and two Kodim and only one lowly polsek. Such an intricate security system made this small wad of land the most over-defended 4.5 square kilometers in the country.¹⁶⁴

With such a convoluted, slippery security system in place, someone had to ensure that fiscal flows were peacefully, though not necessarily equitably, dispersed amongst the military. The organisation that took on that role was SKOGAR, Jakarta's military garrison whose authority to prosecute ABRI personnel gave them the unique role of coordinating the divvying up of the spoils of turf. The precious *lahan* of the casino economy was divided horizontally between the sub-district to the provincial layers of the Koter command and vertically, between the various branches of ABRI to ensure no ugly spats or wars between the men of the coercive apparatus and consequently, unwanted media attention.¹⁶⁵ To further ensure military control over Jakarta's *dunia malam*, the Head of the Tourism Service [*Kepala Dinas Pariwisata*] within the DKI

¹⁶³ In his thesis, Ryter argues that the gambling tycoons preferred to hire gangs rather than military to provide protection (2002, p. 170-1). I doubt in fact that this is true as the tycoons would never leave themselves so exposed to the potential for a military backlash. Protection from the gangs was likely more obvious as gangs took up the outer positions of the casinos, while military personnel tended to guard the rooms inside. Moreover, the spectacle of security seen from the street does not necessarily map in detail the actual pay-offs going to the generals for their protection and the use of the men in their command. The real fiscal flows are invisible.

¹⁶⁴ For example, this can be compared with neighbouring ward, Kalideres, which is thirty kilometers squared and boasts only one polsek for security.

¹⁶⁵ Casino Worker, interview by author (27 February 2007).

administration was traditionally dominated by an ABRI figure or a civilian with a military shadow.¹⁶⁶

The rise of military *beking* incited a corollary boom in the provision of private protection as Jakarta's thick nest of military-backed gangs returned to take their place in the radiating hierarchy of security that protected the gambling dens. During the 1980s and especially in the 1990s, many of the juiciest contracts went to Pemuda Pancasila however the gambling economy was such that many a gang boss' career was made from the profits of subcontracting men to the casinos. In the 1980s and 1990s, these included the notorious Timorese military informant and king of Tanah Abang, Hercules, the Muslim Ambonese Ongen Sangaji, Jhon Kei so named for his successful organisation of preman from central Maluku's Kei islands, Ambonese Basri Sangaji, Arit from Surabaya and the gang of Madurese known as Sakera who controlled parts of Tanah Abang and around Sarinah.

The rearrangement of power and capital was not just occurring at the level of the casinos' external *beking* relationships but also internally, as Darmadi and Latief graduated their capital base from the now illicit gambling industry to the formal economy. With the revenues from *judi*, Yan Darmadi and brother Edy Darmadi established an extensive property empire in the Bekasi and Setiabudi areas of Jakarta and Nusa Dua in Bali administered by a network of fifty odd subsidiaries beneath the 'Darmadi Group.' From territory and property, the group diversified into textiles, transportation, plastics manufacturing and travel. When in the late 1980s, New Order banking policies further deregulated the restrictions on banking competition, Darmadi

¹⁶⁶ Activist Timor Leste, interview by author (1 May 2007).

joined the stampede of *Tionghoa* big business owners by investing in Panin Bank and Bank Susila Bhakti, the former becoming one of the country's six largest private banks. By 1996, Darmadi Group was one of the top thirty conglomerates of the late New Order (Chua, 2006, Appendices Table 1). Darmadi continued to maintain his stake in the illegal gambling industry until the late 1990s through investments in 1001, Copacabana and other casinos associated with a *kongsi* of gambling tsars that emerged in the mid 1990s.¹⁶⁷ However on the flip-side of the licit business world, the sheer size and scope of his expanding financial interests coupled with his increasing antipathy towards the increasingly mechanised gaming coming down from Taiwan, meant that the Darmadi faded into the background as a mover and shaker in Jakarta's illegal gaming industry.¹⁶⁸

Following Darmadi, Atang Latief moved into the property, plastics and food industries, but the jewel in his corporate portfolio was Bank Bira, a small to medium sized bank that by the 1990s was heavily invested in the murky industry of syndicated off-shore debt (Matsumoto, 2007, p. 216 n42). With the 1998 Asian financial crisis, the bank collapsed entirely. Latief borrowed Rp 325 billion (US\$ 34.7 million) as a BLBI [Bank Indonesia Liquidity Support] loan and promptly skipped the country to Singapore. By 2006, he was a broken man, on the run from the Indonesian government, reportedly prone to rages and reclusiveness. With a chronic gambling addiction, he would disappear for months at a time gambling away the entire family fortune. In the heat and sweat of the card tables, Latief would find himself staking his

¹⁶⁷ *Tionghoa* casino worker, interview by author (14 October 2009).

¹⁶⁸ However, gaming appeared to touch the lives of its beneficiaries in unexpected ways. For Darmadi, the glitz and glamour of the casino industry continued to define the family's most important public rituals. In the 1980s, when daughter Rini Darmadi married, Jan Darmadi was said to have flown out planeloads of guests from Jakarta to Las Vegas, hiring out every room of Caeser's casino and commissioning Frank Sinatra and Diana Ross as entertainment. Latief too took his holidays in Las Vegas, even buying property on Rodeo Drive.

homes and land, losing up to US\$ 10 million in a single bid. And yet his wife lamented, ‘no amount of money would ever be enough. It would disappear on the betting table’ (Gatra, 2006). Unsurprisingly, given his life-long addiction to the card and the dice, Latief maintained a much higher profile in the gaming industry in the post 1981 period, putting his money into a number of new enterprises with the burgeoning new elite of the gambling industry, Anton Medan, Hong Lie, Eng San and Nyo Beng Seng. Domestically, asides from his stake in regular casinos, Latief invested in gambling dens of the nautical variety. On weekends, his luxury boats such as the Coral Princess (with Eng San) and the Orient Sun (with Sugeng Pranoto) would ply the un-policed waters around Jakarta’s Thousand Islands in the Java Sea. Indeed, it was this move into the aquatic potentials of casino gaming that carved out an important and lasting role for the marines in the casino protection industry. Latief also sought to expand his gambling empire regionally, sharing Australia’s Christmas Island venture with the Sumampouws and with Eng San, Nyo Beng Seng and Hong Lie in an ill-fated Cambodia deal that would end in 1994 with Beng Seng’s murder.¹⁶⁹

So close was the new *Tionghoa* gambling elite to elements of the ABRI coercive apparatus that many among them, like Anton Medan, directly credited their rise to a series of individual pacts and deals made with key military and police generals. Medan himself attributes his rise to gambling tsar between 1986-91 to his agreement

¹⁶⁹ Nyo Beng Seng, otherwise known as Suyadi Dharmansyah, was the owner of Irama Tama recording company and had business ventures in electronics. He was heavily invested in high class, executive gaming at Ancol’s Copacabana but also had ventures in Macau, Perth, Las Vegas and Malaysia’s Genting Highlands. In so far as he was an integral player in the world of illegal gambling, Beng Seng was known as a clean businessman who kept his books. With Hong Lie, Eng San and Latief, Beng Seng invested in a casino in Cambodia but the deal soured when Beng Seng demanded his return. Eng San and Hong Lie hired a killer to stab Beng Seng in his second wife’s mansion in the Medan Chiense area of Pluit, north Jakarta. Future Kapolda Metro Jaya, then head of criminal research Metro Jaya, Nur Faizi, had Eng San arrested and put away for murder but oddly, in 1997, the Jakarta High Court overturned the guilty verdict and freed Eng San. Anton Medan, interview by author (23 June 2010). 23.06.10. See also, Gatra, 1996.

to work as a police informant in exchange for the arrest of Hong Lie.¹⁷⁰ With Hong Lie temporarily imprisoned, Jakarta was a wide open *lahan* just waiting for harvest by someone like Medan who had the capital and military contacts to open a host of machine and casino gaming venues throughout the city.

Crucially, nowhere in my secondary research or interviews is ‘Cendana,’ the code word for Suharto, his family and network of cronies, mentioned as a patron of gaming. No doubt money in the form of *setoran* was circulated up to Suharto and his in-group, but apart from Tommy Suharto’s brief flirtation with a Singaporean casino in the 1990s, the Suharto family steered well clear of any direct involvement in the *judi* economy. In the eyes of the agents of the state, Cendana money was ‘legal’ in so far as it was nefariously levered from a constant, skewed procession of untendered state contracts, monopolies and outright theft masked as nationalistic philanthropy. In the eyes of the political elite, the lotto industry generated forms of what Roitman calls ‘sanctioned wealth’ that could be easily circulated or recruited as the capital base for other business ventures (Roitman, 2005). Revenues from the casino economy, however mammoth, were sourced from the subterranean world of criminality and hence, were a form of deviant, unsanctioned wealth reserved for those lower ranked minions from the coercive apparatus who had to scrabble about with Central Jakarta *preman* and whose criminalisation might one day be used against them. In this way, even in the cold mechanical heart of New Order corruption, the acquisition of capital did not follow the strictures of a pure economic logic. As we will see in the second chapter to this section, corrupted revenue, like corruption itself, is not a blanket category of equal value but rather masks divergent accumulative practices and

¹⁷⁰ Anton Medan, interview by author (23 June 2010).

behaviours (Jauregui, 2007). Money (even illegally gained) was to the internal agents of the state ‘a socialised category’ of varying legal, licit and moral weight (Cannell, 1999, p. 102). As such, what appeared as the brute acquisition of revenue was in fact the reproduction of a particular kind of socio-political order internal to the New Order state.

By the mid 1990s up until the fall of the New Order, a *kongsi* of three or four *Tionghoa laupan* controlled the most exclusive and notorious casinos and machine gaming venues in the city, many of which continue to loom large in the wayward weekend fantasies of even today’s middle-aged clubbing scene. Among them were Pasar Baru’s Classic Hotel, *Kunir* on Jalan Kunir (later known as *Kunir lama*, or old *Kunir*), the nightclub *Pelangi* [rainbow] in Mangga Besar and No. 82 on central Jakarta’s Jalan Gadjah Mada (also known as Gadjah Mada 82) and the gaming centre known in shorthand as *Kelapa Gading*, because of its location on Kelapa Gading boulevard. In the final years of the New Order, this small circle would add two new additional investors who brandished impeccable military credentials. In 1995, fresh from Jakarta’s most talked about *Tionghoa*-military property deal, Tomy Winata and Sugianto ‘Aguan’ Kusuma took their first foray into Jakarta’s illicit gaming economy just as things were about to change forever.¹⁷¹

Judi Jadi Gila: Democratisation and the Liberalisation of the Criminal Economy

¹⁷¹ This was not Kusuma’s first entrance into central Jakarta nightlife. In 1988, Aguan propped up his burgeoning property portfolio with a popular nightclub planted next to the Jakarta Towers known as ‘stardust’. Anton Medan, interview by author (23 June 2010).

If the fall of Suharto initiated a transition to democracy in the world of public politics, below ground in the criminal domain, a liberalisation of the market was taking place. The civilianisation of security coupled with the unfastening of patron client relations from their singular, militarised source meant that the logics of *beking* were now subject to the kind of decentralised, egalitarian mania that, above ground, was sweeping the political world. By the end of 1998, the first signs of the effectiveness of democratisation could be read in the feverish mushrooming of gambling venues throughout the city. Grimy new gambling dens sprang up in the traditional areas of vice in central Jakarta, that is, along Jalan Gadjah Mada, Jalan Haram Wuruk, Jalan Kunir, Jalan Pancoran, in the blocks around ASEMKA and spotted around Mangga Dua. But quickly the traditional geographical boundaries of Sadikin's *lokalisasi* scheme became cramped and cheap casino and machine gaming venues burst forth, spreading throughout the city's eastern, western and northern fronts. Gambling had, in the words of one police general, gone crazy [*judi jadi gila*].¹⁷²

Until this point, casino and machine gambling had been concentrated in the hands of a small and powerful *Tionghoa* elite known as 'the consortium [*konsortium*],' but by 1999 it appears that this group had been split into two *kongsi* with relatively friendly relations, known as the Palembang and Medan groups [used in Bahasa as in the corporate sense: *grup*]. Some put the timing of the split down to a brutal gang war outside the Ketapang gaming hall known as the Ketapang incident.¹⁷³ Certainly,

¹⁷² Retired police general, interview by author (11 April 2007).

¹⁷³ The Ketapang incident was essentially an old-school, territorial faceoff between two rival gangs centred around a small mickey-mouse gambling den known as Kasino Royalti Ketapang. Christian Ambonese security guards under Milton Mantuanakota and Ongky Pieters became embroiled in a fight with local Betawi Muslims in which a *mushollah* [small room for Islamic observances] was reportedly violated. The battle against the Christian Ambonese quickly escalated, drawing in Muslim Ambonese toughs under Ongen Sangaji, Yoris Raweyai's men from Pemuda Pancasila and the newly formed FPI in a two-day frenzy of violence that left fourteen dead (many of whom were in fact *Tionghoa* casino workers who burned to death sheltering inside). In the aftermath of Ketapang, the government returned

Harco Mangga Dua, Jakarta's biggest and most elite casino, rose to prominence in the immediate wake of the riots, changing hands from the Palembang to Medan group.¹⁷⁴

However, the precise details of how and why the Ketapang spat reorganised the internal hierarchy of the casinos and their owners remain opaque and for the most part, where scholarship that has addressed this event it has been content to repeat rumour, knowing little about the actual dynamics of the casino industry at the time (Braithwaite, 2010, p. 152, Aditjondro, 2001).

It seems more likely that in these first tender years of democratic transition, as Jakarta's *judi* industry became ever more bloated with investors, two parts of one whole increasingly socialised in different circles, and eventually broke off to become independent. Certainly in terms of organisation and capital, the Medan and Palembang group differed substantially. The Medan group had more experience in the industry and the capital to be more reckless [*berani*] with their investments. Where the Medan group invested heavily in high-class casinos, the Palembang group leant towards dominance in the market of machine gaming. They even had wildly differing systems of labour, salary and discipline on the casino floor.¹⁷⁵ But precisely because the Medan and Palembang group carved up the high-class casino market so neatly, the two groups could enjoy intimate fraternal relations. The groups shared premises, as they did at Harco Mangga Dua, and staff. They pooled resources, used each other's

hundreds of the Muslim and Christian *preman* back to Ambon, igniting a religious war that raged for five years and took thousands of lives. Close to Maj. Gen Suaedy Marasabessy and General Wiranto, Ongen Sangaji's role in provoking the war for a rogue element of the military is widely acknowledged in Jakarta, even among his colleagues. Indeed, Sangaji appears to have attracted considerable flak from the *preman* and Ambonese community for inciting such a serious rupture in Indonesian *keamanan*. For this reason, when Sangaji founded an interfaith Malukan *preman* group, it was widely read on the street as an attempt to make amends with the wider Malukan community in Jakarta. One may also be cynical, given that the group's formation occurred just prior to his announcement of running for parliament.

¹⁷⁴ Casino Worker, interview by author (7 October 2009). Also, Casino Worker, interview by author, (14 October 2009).

¹⁷⁵ Casino Worker, interview by author (07 October 2009).

gaming technicians, machine technology and legal ‘fixers’ [*markas*] with the police and frequently swapped ownership of venues,¹⁷⁶ and went into partnership with each other. Come Christmas, New Years Eve or Imlek, these two groups of the consortium would come together to host a cosy, boozy gathering at Rajamas on Jalan Haram Wuruk or K7 on Jalan Kunir, inviting the extended kin from Indonesia’s other great *judi* centres (Surabaya, Batam, Semarang, Medan and Jambi) as well as the fleets of Metro Jaya and Mabes generals that protected them.¹⁷⁷

For these reasons, untangling precisely who made up the two groups is a vastly complicated exercise in forensic criminal genealogy. At times, the Medan group appears to consist of Tomy Winata, Sugianto Kusuma, Medanese *Tionghoa* Arief Cocong and Rudi ‘Rajamas’ Sutanto. Gambling old-timers, Ajin and brother Awi were most definitely of the Palembang group. Where the rest of the fray lay in this ethnic division of proprietorship is anyone’s guess.

An easier exercise is to identify the members of the consortium and their prize venues. The consortium included the above six as well as Yoris Raweyai of Pemuda Pancasila, Edi ‘Porkas’ Winata, Yasmin (a property developer), Sugeng Pranoto, Hadi Rustam (who had the distribution rights for Sony), Iwan Tjahyadikarta (formerly of DIPO International Bank), Kwee Haryadi Kumala, Eng San, Johnny Kusuma and Arie Sigit. Each of the associates brought a series of skills to the group. Yasmin, Hadi Rustam, Winata and Kusuma and brother in law Johnny Kusuma provided capital. Ongen Sangaji and Yoris Raweyai did not possess much of an asset base, but their respective histories at the centre of Jakarta gang-life earned them the respect of *ormas*

¹⁷⁶ *Markus* is short for *broker kasus*, a kind of fixer of legal cases with Polri. See Chapter IV.

¹⁷⁷ Anton Medan, interview by author, (23 June 2010).

and *preman*, old and new, thus warding off any challenges from Indonesia's criminal world. Ahjin, Eng San, Sugeng Pranoto, Arie Sigit and Edi 'Porkas' Winata were old time, New Order figures in Jakarta's *dunia malam*. Arief Cocong and Rudi 'Rajamas' Sutanto both managed a series of important venues and were often identified as the face of illicit gambling in the capital. Susanto also owned *Berita Kota* daily which provided the consortium with a media mouthpiece and Arief Cocong's contacts with the coercive apparatus were legendary. Below these men lay an important, shifting strata of *Tionghoa* criminals, gangsters, toughs, managers and their kin who took on the everyday running of the various venues and frequently served as the consortium's primary interface with low level cops, officers and *preman* involved in an individual gaming hall's protection. Significantly, the consortium also nurtured the capital investments of national political figures such as General Wiranto and Governor Sutiyoso.¹⁷⁸

Clustered in the hands of the consortium were the glitziest and most spectacular casinos, gaming halls and nightclubs of city. With the fall of Suharto, the consortium expanded and consolidated its enterprises, opening new entertainment venues and placing gaming options in the clubs, hotels and saunas under their control. On Jalan Haram Wuruk, Rudi opened NeoRajaMas, Pelangi and took over control of nightclubs Stadium and 1001 (*Seribu Satu*), placing machines in their backrooms and bottom floors. Along Jalan Kunir, the consortium expanded Kunir lama and Hotel Classic and opened up K7, a mammoth new 'one-stop' entertainment spot. Jalan Gadjah Mada brandished Gadjah Mada 82 and 85. In the Thousand Islands, luxury

¹⁷⁸ Casino Worker, interview by author (11 April 2007). Casino Worker, interview by author (7 October 2009). Field notes (9 February 2007).

boats ferried 30-40 elite gamers out to Navy-owned land on Ayer Island for fevered weekends of girls and *judi*.

But the jewel in the consortium's crown was the monument to luxury gaming housed on the fourth floor of Harco Mangga Dua mall. The mall itself had been built by Sugianto Kusma's Agung Sedayu group in the same year as PT JIHD's joint venture with YKEP in that other Golden Triangle on Jalan Sudirman. Like most of Jakarta's malls, Harco Mangga Dua sheltered a rabble of independent vendors hawking pirated DVDs, polyester bedding and cheap Korean appliances under the dull throb of fluorescent lighting. Only here at Harco, the fourth floor boasted executive gaming at its very finest and most complete [*paling lengkap*]. To the right of the elevator, the floor was dominated by *bola ketangkasan*, where Mickey Mouse, UFO, Keno, Happy Royal and other forms of machine gambling would warble for your attention at Rp 400,000 [US\$45] a shot. Taking a left would direct one to what Jakartans in the industry called the *kasino* proper, where tables offered the traditional card based games of roulette, blackjack, baccarat and poker. Behind the gaming machines lay the all-important VIP corner.

Security at Harco was paramount. This was not simply about fear of attack from the FPI, FBR or any other *preman*-Islam permutation set up by General Wiranto and former Kapolda Nugroho Djayusman that ran riot in the years after the transition. In the casino business, the punters were willing to forgive a protest outside (as the consortium's 1001, Rajamas and Stadium all experienced) or even an initial, limp raid. Only a second attack revealed to the crowd that a casino's proprietors did not have the political clout or finances to properly secure *beking*. The clients would stay away for fear that the venue was *kurang aman*. Harco's managers, the last and most

prominent of which was Arief Cocong, were far too well-connected to allow Jakarta's most premier casino to be the stage for such loutish forms of politics.

Maintaining an exclusive casino hinged upon an owner's ability to effect a perfect, elegant theatre of *keamanan* that would reassure the gamers. At Harco, nothing was left to chance. Indeed, the structure was not unlike a traditional Javanese court. Around the exemplary centre of floor four, *keamanan* fanned out in concentric, hierarchical circles. At the furthermost post that marked the entrance to the parking lot lingered an East Indonesian (mainly Floresian) gang who extracted money for parking. In the middle of the lot, the Bantenese, new on the scene, took over entangled with representatives from the notorious Sakera and Arit gangs. In the lobby on floor one, Amboinese guards under Ongen Sangaji kept a careful watch. At the first sign of insecurity they would shut down the lift, sealing in the clientele upstairs. By the time a gamer reached the fourth floor, this gaggle of new and old-time *preman* was replaced by military men in sleek black safari suits. These were the low ranking marines, military police and officers from the presidential guard [*paspampres*], paid a pittance at anywhere between Rp 20-50,000 [US\$2.2-5.5] per day. If that week raids by the Islamic militia had particularly spooked the gamers, the Kopassus snipers would make an appearance.¹⁷⁹ Much to the reassurance of the casino's patrons, shopping malls such as the one that housed Harco were protected by shoot-on-sight laws in case of rioting. To further proof the fortress, casino employees were stationed all night out by the parking post where their sole function was to hand out sealed envelopes of Rp 10,000 [US\$1.1] to the hundreds of dawdling vehicles that ferried

¹⁷⁹ Not only did SKOGAR continue to organise the layers of military security provided to the casinos but within each casino, these multiple layers of moonlighting officers were coordinated by an internal body known as 'Guntur,' so named after the Jakarta sub-district that houses the headquarters of the military police. In the casino, Guntur was the military police who coordinated and monitored the leagues of moonlighting officers. Casino Worker, interview by author, (11 April 2007).

low-ranking agents of the coercive apparatus to the site.¹⁸⁰ Distributors of the *uang rokok* would record the license plate but most nights, the officers would simply swap cars and head straight back again for a second or third envelope.

If these security proceedings seemed unnecessarily labyrinthine and costly given the wide disbursement of *setoran* and gift payments amongst the police, the military, the Islamic militia, the journalists and the national provincial political elite, then indeed they were. In Java, repeated spectacular ritual displays are integral to the performance of territoriality and power. But there were similarly more prosaic reasons for the convoluted nature of the consortium's security investments, articulated ironically in a gambling metaphor by Tomy Winata himself,

‘Up until now, the businessmen don’t want to be seen supporting just one party...It will be the end for many businessmen who supported the wrong person. You cannot put all money on just one horse because the uncertainty of winning is too high’ (Chua, 2006, p. 174).

So too within the criminal world, the isolation of one gang of *preman* could bring problems for the whole operation. Indebtedness is key to Winata’s philosophy of power.¹⁸¹ By bringing in as many gangs to the fold as possible, relations between the different layers of security gentry were courteous, deferent and orderly. Harco Mangga Dua’s elaborate dance of *keamanan* was orchestrated and synchronised by much feared, old time *Tionghoa preman* such as Teddy Uban and Amiauw, otherwise

¹⁸⁰ Casino worker, interview by author, (7 October 2009).

¹⁸¹ This was a recurring theme in every single one of the dozens of my conversations with police, *preman*, NGOs and *Tionghoa* activists about Winata. Where models of aggressive economic competition and capital maximisation might argue the opposite, to Winata, keeping everyone on the payroll, regardless of cost, is essential to the preservation of power.

known as David Tjioe, who in 2003 also coordinated the attack on *Tempo* after journalists accused Winata of masterminding the Tanah Abang market fires.¹⁸²



Photograph 10: The fourth floor of Harco Mangga Dua, now returned to retail.¹⁸³

¹⁸² In 2004, respected news magazine *Tempo* accused Winata of commissioning a fire at Southeast Asia's largest textile market in Tanah Abang which led to his winning of a local government contract for its refurbishment. One week later, the *Tempo* office was ransacked by *preman* who beat up reporting journalist Ahmad Taufik while Metro Jaya police, then under Makbul Padmanegara, stood by. The case led to seven lawsuits filed by Winata against *Tempo* and editor in chief Bambang Harymurti was sentenced to a year behind bars for libel. Soon after, Winata purchased local daily, *Harian Jakarta* and *Pilar* as well as the station, JakTV and ceased to entertain a prominent public role. (Lamoshi, Asia Times, 2004).

¹⁸³ Photograph by Author. 21.06.10.



Photograph 11: Built by Sugianto Kusuma in 1991, owned by Tomy Winata and run by Arief Cocong, Harco Mangga Dua was the crème de la crème of the Jakarta casino scene.

But if democratisation prompted an expansion in the entrepreneurial ventures of the consortium, then it also wore away at their monopoly, exciting a host of new wannabe tycoons into the industry. These individual businessmen of the post-authoritarian era became known in central Jakarta as *pemain gerilya* [guerrilla players] for their tenacious, even recalcitrant, claim on what was clearly consortium turf. Among them was Yengky who opened up Gadjah Mada 80 uncomfortably close to the consortium's stalwarts of Gadjah Mada 82 and 85. Separately, a *pribumi* known as Martin successfully bargained on the fact that Jakarta's *pribumi* wouldn't mind the gritty floors and shoddy lighting as long as machines were cheap and the deposit [*uang muka*] was scotched. At ASEMKA and Kaliber II, entire floors of machines and card games operated 24 hours a day to whoever wanted in. Apoh, a Medanese

Tionghoa, also reckoned on idea of taking casino and machine gambling to the *pribumi* and *peranakan* masses, focusing less on cards and more on machines, *tasyaw*, *bola setan*, and *Pai-Q*. Apoh opened up a few major low-class gambling venues at Kali Jodoh and Pancoran as well as smaller dens in Sunter Pomodoro, Lippo Cikarang, Jatinegara Kelapa Gading Blok A and Green Garden. He stocked his venues with cheap Rp 50 000 [US\$5.5] prostitutes from West Java and ensured a rotating carousel of B-grade *artis* [celebrities] that would bring in the punters seeking a bit of pizzazz to the night's proceedings. Slot machines also sprouted on the bottom floor of Sarinah, the Hotel Mandarin, Lokarsari's Hotel Prince and the Hotel Sahid. In Dukuh Atas, between 2003-4, even the notorious Timorese militia leader Eurico Guterres was said to have installed a few machines.



Photograph 12: Kaliber II (sebelas) was one of the many independent casinos appealing to a lower class clientele to open in the aftermath of the fall of the New Order.¹⁸⁴

¹⁸⁴ Photograph by Author. 21 June 2010.

Fuelling the *judi* boom was the simple fact that investing in machine gambling was cheap relative to its bumper gains. Machines quickly drew in millions of rupiah, only cost somewhere between three and four million each and as long as one had access to a trustworthy technician they could easily be programmed to a profitable lose rate.¹⁸⁵

For an ambitious hustler with limited capital, it was a win-win situation.

This was as long as the *gerilya* gamblers could secure concrete, long-term *beking* from the police. Anton Medan observed,

If you opened a casino, the most important thing to weigh up was not how much you won, or how much you lost, but how long could you handle paying the bribes [*upeti*] to the Polsek, Polres, Polda, Mabes Polri.¹⁸⁶

Although the military continued to play their bit roles on the front line of casino protectionism, the reorganisation of the coercive apparatus and the rise of the police as a significant player in the security politics of the state had positioned Polri second only to the Governor as the most important player in the illegal gaming market. With Polri now in charge of *keamanan*, the gates to the *judi* market swung wide open as senior officers from MABES and Metro Jaya sought to maximise income that had for years been limited or denied to them. Further complicating matters, as Chapter III

¹⁸⁵ The import of gaming machines appears at least to be partially supported by the Department of Sport who had legally been bringing in *ketangkasan* (skill) machines from at least as early as the 1990s. For the consortium, Arief Cocong worked with a subsidiary of the military foundation, Yayasan Bina Dana Sosial, called PT Indo Argo to bring in the gaming machines and it seems that at least some of these may ended up on the open market being sold to the *guerrilla* gamblers. It would not be implausible to speculate that Cocong's direct involvement in the machine gaming import industry may explain how the consortium were later able to regain dominance over the gambling economy. Nonetheless, given the threat that machine gaming presented to the consortium, it is unlikely that Cocong and PT Indo Argo were the machines' sole suppliers (Junaidi, 2002).

¹⁸⁶ Anton Medan interview by author, (23 June 2010). For the record, I have adjusted this sentence to the past tense. Medan spoke in the present tense as he argues that some forms of *judi* are still available in the capital. Indeed, they are but as we will see in the following chapter, it is of a vastly different form and relationship to the state.

outlines, decentralisation was shifting the political scales over to the provincial and sub-district levels of governance. This animated the autonomy and ambitions of Jakarta's kapolres and the kapolsek who were no longer content to mop up the scraps of *setoran* payments to their seniors at Metro Jaya and Mabes Polri.

This is not to suggest that the police were the only ones to profit from the illicit gaming industry. Monthly *setoran* payments were still routine at every level of the Jakarta military *koter* and the DKI administration. Gambling revenue was also percolating through the wider central state, paying for the seminars, operations and legal drafting exercises of the various government departments and, crucially, for the national and regional election campaigns of political parties and their individual candidates. So important was the gambling money as a cash cow for Indonesia's new multiparty electoral system, that party civilian militia such as Megawati's *satgas* PDI-P [Democratic Party of Struggle] sprung up as *keamanan* for casinos in central Jakarta in the early years of the transition (Tajuk, 2009). But above the Islamic *preman*, political powerbrokers, party hacks, military generals and DKI bureaucrats all clamouring for kickbacks, the civilianisation of security and the rising importance of the rule of law in the new democratic era, had propelled Polri to kingmaker.

In the recollections of the police generals, the punters, the casino employees and the Islamic militia members who purported to shut them down, the rise of the guerrilla gamblers correlates directly to Kapolda Metro Jaya Nur Faizi's 1999-2000 term.¹⁸⁷ Despite his best efforts, the Kapolda was an unlikely pick for Kapolri and although his name was floated briefly along with that of Nugroho Djayusman for Wakapolri,

¹⁸⁷ Casino Worker, interview by author (05 April 2007). Retired Police General, interview by author (11 April 2007). Former FPI member, interview by author (26 February 2007).

by January 2000, Nur Faizi probably knew that his reign over Metro Jaya would be the political and fiscal apex of his career. Opening up the gambling industry to multiple players could set the general up for life, providing capital for post-pension business ventures and any future political campaigning. Nur Faizi's aggressive move into the casino industry was flanked by deputy Makbul Padmanegara, who would later himself become Kapolda Metro Jaya.

So began an era of unprecedeted collusion [*kolusi*] between Polri and Jakarta's gambling tycoons. Polda Metro Jaya took money from whoever wanted to venture into the business, inciting a boom in the industry.¹⁸⁸ But Nur Faizi and Padmanegara could also be tough. Would-be gambling tsars who did not pay enough or did not pay with routine consistency were raided and closed down in a great theatre of law enforcement, prompting a renegotiation of *setoran*. Nur Faizi also had a soft-spot for his favourites. The Kapolda was particularly close to Apoh, which helps explain his meteoric rise on the gambling scene and his immunity to attack from either the roaming bands of Islamic militia that prowled central Jakarta or the police.¹⁸⁹ Nur Faizi was also careful to cultivate strong relations with the investors of the consortium. When the first president of the democratic era, Abdurrahman Wahid, ordered the Kapolda to arrest Tomy Winata on suspicion of illegal gambling on Ayer Island, Nur Faizi refused to act. Just months later in October 2000, the Kapolda and no less than thirty-one of his senior Metro Jaya staff were rotated and, in an exceptional move, replaced with officers of a higher rank with no prior experience at the station (Suara Pembaruan Daily, 2000). This was unusual because most Kapolda, including Noegroho Djayusman and Nur Faizi himself, had previously served at

¹⁸⁸ Retired Police General, interview by author (11 April 2007).

¹⁸⁹ Casino Worker, interview by author (11 April 2007).

Metro Jaya in a criminal investigative capacity and earlier held posts as Kapolres of central or west Jakarta, where the network of casinos lay thick on the ground.

By appointing Mulyono Sulaiman and a host of alien staff to Metro Jaya, Wahid was hoping to sever the bond between the casino operators and the police, a move that ultimately did little to change the underlying dynamics of corruption and collusion that characterised Metro Jaya's relationship to *judi*. Unlike other illicit economies where the potential for extraction relies on the capacity for criminal detection and the threat of law enforcement, where gambling was concerned, '*kami didatangi oleh bandar sendiri*' [the gamblers came to us].¹⁹⁰ It was easy money, gifted without exertion or ultimatum. Moreover, by tending a new generation of gamblers, Nur Faizi had in effect enlarged the pool of off-budget revenue pooling into the institution. Cash-strapped and under internal and external political pressure, few kapoldas, kapolres and kapolseks had the fortitude to such massive revenues.

By 2000-1, such were the sums coursing through central Jakarta that Governor Sutiyoso, himself a strong proponent of legalising the dice, decided to take action. Around this time, casino workers report witnessing tours of local parliamentarians escorted through Harco Mangga Dua.¹⁹¹ In 2001, supported by Governor Sutiyoso and former Governor Ali Sadikin, the provincial parliament commissioned a *Universitas Indonesia* think tank, known as Pusat Penelitian Pranata Pembangunan [P4 - Research Center for Instituted Development], to work with members of the consortium and the main *gerilya* of the industry to calculate the scale of the economy and the potential revenue for the city. At the same time, the provincial administration

¹⁹⁰ Middle Ranking Police Officer, interview by author (12 December 2006).

¹⁹¹ Casino Worker, interview by author (07 October 2009).

began accepting proposals for the redevelopment of Jakarta's Thousand Islands district as Indonesia's own gaming Mecca. Amongst a host of international bids from Macau, Las Vegas, Australia and Holland, TNI foundation *Yayasan Bina Dana Sosial* and Tomy Winata and were fast off the mark to lobby local government for gambling contracts, with Winata even hosting President Megawati and husband Taufiq Kiemas' jaunt to the islands (Junaidi & Emmanuelle, 2002). Despite the wealth of elite support for the proposal, the rise of political Islam as a discourse, modality of civil and criminal mobilisation and vehicle for multiparty politics meant that the national and provincial elites treaded gingerly. 'Just think about it as throwing the gamblers into the sea,' pleaded Governor Sutiyoso (Gatra, 2002).

In late April 2002, UI research centre P4 held a press conference that gave fresh impetus to the pro-*judi* camp. The centre concluded that the thirteen premier [*kelas kakap*] casinos proper in central Jakarta had an individual turnover of between two and ten billion rupiah per night, with a total intake of around Rp 130 billion [US\$15 million] per night (Gatra, 2002; Junaidi, 2002).¹⁹² Nearly ten thousand workers were directly or indirectly involved in the industry, with one casino hiring between 1000-1500 persons alone. The centre also found that the average executive casino paid around Rp 150 million [US\$17 000] in *upeti* [bribes] to police and military personnel per night and because of that the coercive forces would likely block any attempt to legalise the industry.¹⁹³ Anton Medan, ever spectacular, pronounced the publicised findings of the report too conservative and argued that his sources indicated that

¹⁹² The study further claimed that around 30 illegal lotteries operated in the city's five mayoralties, bringing in Rp 48 billion [US\$5 million] per week.

¹⁹³ Chapter I outlined the ways that off-budget finances enter and circulate amongst the police. Given that *parmin* money was likely filtered through the police as individual, institutional and departmental grants and monthly allowances, it seems strange that the centre would come up with a 'per night' figure. It is my sense that the Rp 150 million [US\$16 million] to which the centre refers is only the money distributed nightly in envelopes by the Harco Mangga Dua gate. See Gatra, 2002.

Harco Mangga Dua was single-handedly making in excess of Rp 1 trillion [US\$112 million] per night, while lower status gambling centres such as those in Sunter and Kalijodoh were bringing around 300 billion per night. Adrian Mahuelete, secretary of the Indonesian Entertainment Business Association also presented data that estimated that there were actually between 35-50 illegal gambling dens operating in the city, with a total daily turnover of Rp 200 billion [US\$23 million].¹⁹⁴ One business proposal handed to the government predicted that legalising the gambling industry would contribute Rp 1.5 – 1.8 trillion [US\$168-200 million] to the city's crudely derived Rp 9.3 trillion budget [Rp 1 billion] (Junaidi & Emmanuele, 2002).¹⁹⁵ Whatever the true worth of the illegal gambling industry, the taxable returns to city and state coffers stood to be nothing short of titanic.

Ultimately, the combined political and fiscal muscle of the Governor, President Megawati and the consortium did not have the leverage to pull the legalisation off. Sutiyoso's relationship with the provincial parliament was fractious and truculent and in that self same week as the *judi* decision, the parties were threatening a vote of no confidence. The national Islamic elite that so disliked President Megawati had come out squarely against the issue. Facing a September election, Governor Sutiyoso announced to the city in July 2002 to 'forget it' [*lupakan saja*] (Jakarta Post, 2002). It

¹⁹⁴ Although the UI results initially appear more likely than the ramblings of an old *preman* and the speculations of the Indonesian Business Society, there is much to caution us against our immediate trust in them. Firstly, the public nature of these reports means that in order to gather data, certain pacts and compromises are made between report commissioners, researchers and with interviewees. Secondly, often the constricted nature of the research brief commissioned means that information often crucial to our understanding of the workings of an illicit economy is left by the wayside for fear of inciting offence or vengeance. Moreover, as we saw in the case of the LKEM (Chapter III), researchers tend towards self-censorship when information is seen as too sensitive or damaging to certain parties. For this reason, one would be foolhardy to categorically reject alternative submissions of casino incomes (Gatra, 2002; Junaidi, 2002).

¹⁹⁵ In 2002, the sources of revenue open to the DKI administration had still not sophisticated, although Sadikin's masterplan to rope the city in roads had opened up new forms of revenue. In that year, 75% of the city's income was derived from vehicle tax.

was a feeble end to an issue of such political significance and yet it preserved Sutiyoso's reign for yet another term.

Within the illicit gaming industry it was common during times of political debate, local or national elections, *mutasi* within the political or security elite or the renegotiation of *setoran*, for the various proprietors of the casinos to 'relax' the machines [*stel*]. The year 2002 saw the casino's longest hiatus in years as the tycoons closed their doors, kept employees on base salaries and waited out the political storm. With their illegality confirmed, the casinos reopened as usual in July, only this time, the cards were dealt anew. In 2002, Nur Faizi's deputy, Makbul Padmanegera, successfully strategised to the position of Kapolda Metro Jaya. From this period until the entrance of his successor, Insp. Gen. Firman Gani, the consortium reasserted their control over the market. Many of the *gerilya* gamblers were shut down by contracting either Metro Jaya police officers or FPI to undertake night-time raids of the clandestine casinos, destroying or confiscating machines and table equipment in the process.¹⁹⁶ The use of the Islamic militias to war against select casinos was fitting given Wiranto's involvement in their establishment and his fiscal interests in the industry, particularly in the lead up to the 2004 elections.

To some extent, this process of corporate assassination had occurred prior to the 2002 suspension of the casinos. In 1999, when the consortium had three truckloads of Metro Jaya police shut down Yengky's den on Gadjah Mada, he reportedly stormed into Rudi Sutanto's Stadium nightclub screaming bloody murder. 'But we are both

¹⁹⁶ Casino Worker, interview by author (5 April 2007). Casino Worker, interview by author (7 October 2009).

Medan Chinese!' [*kita sesama Cina Medan!*], he reportedly screeched.¹⁹⁷ Now the cycle of threat and vengeance was heating up. Industry stalwart, Copacabana was raided by police, its *Tionghoa* management arrested and 130 of its *mesin ketangkasan* destroyed. A series of small bombs were found in June 2002 in front of nightclubs 1001 and Eksotik and in the parking lot of Sarinah department store where there were known to be a number of machines (The Straits Times, 2002).¹⁹⁸ Martin joined forces with Ongen Sangaji, Sakera and Arit granting him immunity from the purge. Apoh's empire of budget gaming dens were cleared given his police connections and the prediction that their shabby premises did not poach the consortium's executive clientele. By 2003-4, new ventures in the sector had to seek permission [*ngomong dulu*] from Arief Cocong or face attack [*digrebek*].¹⁹⁹ The consortium's control over the gambling market was restored.

•

The New Order state was the criminal state *par excellence*. By examining the realms of legality in which Jakarta's illicit gaming industry operated, this chapter has explored the way in which Suharto and his cronies produced and reproduced distinctions between the forms of illegality in which they engaged and other *oknum* modes of criminality in order to maintain power. In this way the New Order state ushered in, to use Roitman's terms, an 'ethic of illegality' which concurrently served an instrumentalised political purpose (Roitman, 2006). The gambling economy was a means by which Suharto permitted rolling generations of the coercive and political

¹⁹⁷ Casino Worker, interview by author (11 April 2007).

¹⁹⁸ An equally plausible argument for the tensions in gambling community is offered by Chua, who suggests that Taufiq Kiemas orchestrated a number of attacks on Winata's enterprises after he was angered by the sums Winata contributed to his wife, Megawati Sukarnoputri's election campaign. (Chua, 2006, p. 185).

¹⁹⁹ Casino Worker, interview by author (7 October 2009).

elite to participate in the prevailing modes of accumulation and reward that characterised the New Order developmentalist state, whilst simultaneously reserving the network of state concessions and monopolies - the most 'licit' and most productive - modalities of accumulation for his own family.

Like the sections traversing the economy of gift and territory before it, this section on Jakarta's subterranean *dunia malam* points to the umbilical relationship between the illicit and the licit, between criminal world and the *siang* of Indonesian state governance and law. Indeed, just as Ryter, Anderson, Siegel and Cribb have observed, in Indonesian state formation, criminality has been an auxiliary rather than a rival to the regime of law. The political transition brought about by the fall of the New Order initiated two analogous but distinct processes in the illicit economy of gambling. The first was a process of fragmentation away from the military as the primary talisman of *beking* to other civilian, religious and coercive forms. The second was a coalescence of capital around the totem of Polri to correlate with the civilianisation of the security apparatus. The failure of the state to legalise gambling maintained this siblinghood of licit and illicit. Crucially too, it preserved capital's leverage over the policing apparatus.

Chapter IV: Sutanto's Twin War on Vices

'...but we also want to be seen [*dianggap*] as moral individuals [*orang moral*]!'

Three star police general.²⁰⁰

This chapter explores the complex, contextual and changing relationship of morality in illicit extraction and exchange by and within the Indonesian state. As the previous chapter outlined, under the New Order, the lucrative *judi* economy was not divvied up equally between the various elements of the state. Rather President Suharto and inner circle seized the most licit elements of that economy, while leaving the illegal, but no less lucrative, dimensions of that industry to the lower rungs of the political and security elite. After the fall of Suharto, the democratic reorganisation of the coercive apparatus facilitated a corresponding rise in the role and financial 'cut' of the police in Jakarta's illegal casinos and gaming halls over the military who had previously been sought after by the gambling tycoons as the most secure form of *beking*. This chapter charts the peculiar politics of Polri's 2005 'war on gambling' and the severe impact of the termination of the *judi* revenues on the policing institution, showing how considerations of 'licitness' and morality intersect with political economy and rent seeking within the Indonesian police.

Drawing on anthropological approaches to money, I show how corrupted monies from the off-budget parmin and parmas economies are distributed in different and

²⁰⁰ Police General, interview by author (19 July 2006). Special thanks go to Lee Wilson and Laurens Bakker for their prescient comments on this section.

complex ways throughout the institution depending on police perceptions of the ‘licitness’ of their derivation. I demonstrate how, in accordance with Bloch and Parry’s seminal work on transactional orders, unsanctioned, easily-acquired *judi* money is washed of its illicitness by dedicating the revenue to the maintainence of kinship relations between ranks. The rotation of *judi* money from short term to long-term transactional cycles, decontaminating money for kin unity, shows how ideas of morality operate even within corrupt exchanges and serve their perpetuation.

The second section of this chapter continues to trace the perverse line of morality within police corruption by grappling with the question of how Polri replaced the vertebrae of *judi* revenue on the ground. I argue that rather than expand upon the institution’s tepid protection of the illicit narcotics industry, Polri’s *reskrim* officers intensified their economy of rent-seeking associated with dispensing their law enforcement duties in the parallel war on drugs. I illustrate how the stabilisation of this means of extraction required the use of torture against the lumpen criminal body. Using Agamben’s notion of ‘bare life’, I show how practices of state violence are highly stratified by class and reserved for the body of the drug user and small time dealer. Within the police, the use of torture on the criminal subclass is a more legitimate means of resource extraction than the establishment of an illicit protection racket around the traffic of illicit narcotics. In this way, internal patterns of police torture and illicit accumulation refract the stratifications of power within wider political society in Indonesia.

Finally, this exploration of the dual war on vices and its subsequent effect on patterns of police corruption tells us something of the hidden continuities between law and its

inverse, transgression. This is not a new theme in the scholarship on law. Derrida and Benjamin have long established the paradox of the necessity of coercion in law, wherein ‘the legal and the lethal inhabit one another’ (Comaroff & Comaroff, 2006, p. 31). But the empirical evidence presented here shows that at the critical time of democratisation in which law enforcement and the strengthening of the rule of law is experienced as ‘fetish’, the very dimensions of criminality are themselves under contestation in ways that show law’s inherent indeterminacy. At the same time, such is the mystical authority of law that the language and practices of jurisprudence inflect even law’s subversion by its own enforcing officers. Thus, even where law as an instrument of power overrides its potential to constrain power, it does so in ways that make the *negara hukum* or state of law appear rational, orderly and lawful.

•

‘Pemberantasan!’ The End of Casino Gambling

When General Sutanto was nominated to National Police Chief (Kapolri) in July 2005, replacing a corrupt, largely self-governing and heavily politicised term under General Da’i Bachtiar, it surprised few. After all, General Sutanto was *angkatan ‘73*, a 1973 graduate of the National Military Academy (AKABRI) and, crucially, a classmate of newly elected President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. For Indonesians who had long learnt to keep an eye on the transformations within the state coercive apparatus, this nomination of an AKABRI schoolmate to National Police Chief was logical, if disappointingly predictable. Indeed, the president’s chummy relationship with the Kapolri has structural rather than kinetic origins.

In April 1999, President Habibie separated the police and the military by presidential decree but placed them both under the control of the Department of Defence.²⁰¹ One year later, Abdurrahman Wahid's fractured relations with the military and concerns about the weakness of the police vis a vis the military led to the drafting of TAP MPR VI and VII.²⁰² However, these special decrees did not clearly separate between defence [*pertahanan*] and security [*keamanan*] functions and in a concession of the police, they moved Polri out from the militarised direction of the Department of Defence to under the direct powerful patronage of the president, rather than the department of the Interior or the newly recalibrated Department for Law and Human Rights. The TAP MPR attempted to compensate for the lack of civil bureaucratic control by bisecting the power of the president with a new body known as Kompolnas [the National Police Commission] which was to weigh in on presidential decisions about policy direction and the nomination of the Kapolri.

By 2002, regulatory dawdling from the presidential office meant that Kompolnas was still years from being established. Without a civilian bureaucracy to administer police affairs, Polri's legal division took over as they had during the years of ABRI, only this time they were not overshadowed by military headquarters pruning back attempts at police self-determination.²⁰³ The resulting draft was a wish list of authorities free of public, bureaucratic or external accountability. By merging Kompolnas with a public

²⁰¹ Within the police, Insp. Gen Adang Darajatun and his band of assistants such as Brig. Gen. Edhi Susilo and Brig. Gen. Syafriyadi were responsible for drafting the new direction of police reform which they did in an extended pamphlet widely known within the police as 'the blue book.'

²⁰² Marzuki Darusman, interview by author (1 July 2008). Retired Police General, interview by author, 11 April 2007. A TAP MPR is a special decree from the People's Legislative Council, the highest legislative body.

²⁰³ Specifically, Insp. Gen. (purn) Logan Siahaan played an instrumental role in drafting the laws. Golkar parliamentarian Gunanjar, interview by author, 17 April 2007. Logan Siahaan, interview by author (12 June 2008).

complaints board, the draft essentially rendered the new commission too feeble for bureaucratic and public accountability and the issue of moving the police below any other department was completely off the agenda. Vulgar politicking with a hand-picked ad hoc parliamentary committee ensured that the draft was largely passed without substantial amendment.²⁰⁴ Thus, UU 02/2002 essentially preserved the special relationship between the police and the president. A retired officer known for his criticism of Polri observed,

We were all emotional at the time. We could only think to put the police under the president.

We didn't think of civilian control. We just wanted to be far from the TNI and far from the department. We were scared of political intervention again. We didn't think that being below the president would be being below a political body in itself.²⁰⁵

Hills examines the structures of the police in Ghana, Kenya, Uganda and Zimbabwe to conclude that the police in authoritarian and newly democratising states are merely the technical-coercive arm of political elites and their stratagems for power and resources (Hills, 2007). African policing, she argues, is 'an expression of presidential preference' (ibid, p. 420). This is not the power differential of the Indonesian example. Instead, the police-presidential axis operates in a finely balanced symbiosis by which the police deliver the security outcomes necessary to maintain the standing

²⁰⁴ In the thousands of pages of parliamentary debate that I have examined on the 2002 Police Act available at National Parliament, not once did a political party, invited expert or police or military officer raise the issue of the politicisation of the police under the president. The sole mention of this structure is made by the *Fraksi Kebangkitan Bangsa*, the political wing of *Nahdlatul Ulama*, who observed that the direct relationship between the police and the president will uncomplicate [memberpendek] bureaucracy, increase efficiency and 'give absolute authority [*kewenangan absolut*] to the police chief to tackle issues of governance' (Sekretariat Jenderal Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, 2002). Security sector reform NGOS were similarly lax in their attentiveness to the 2002 draft, putting their energies into military reform. In the words of one highly respected activist, 'We forgot about the police!' RIDEPI, interview by author, 22 September 2006.

²⁰⁵ Retired Police General, interview by author, 11 April 2007.

and legitimacy of the government in exchange for overlooking Polri's failure to implement key democratic reforms and the ongoing abuse of power.

Consequentially, after Da'i Bachtiar's blatantly political term under President Megawati Sukarnoputri,²⁰⁶ few had high hopes for the progression of police reform under new Kapolri Sutanto. There was little public fanfare around President Yudhoyono's inauguration request to his former classmate to tackle the '*Lima Jenis Kejahatan*' (five types of crime) that threatened the integrity of the republic. Gambling, drugs, smuggling, logging and other forms of corruption were established problems that attracted a stock standard refrain of political rhetoric – *pemberantasan!* [exterminate!] - and yet continued unabated from administration to administration since the beginning of the republic. The very idea of rule of law in the Republic was often dismissed by people as farcical. But within a week of his tenure, General Sutanto had not only pledged an assault on the offenses that led to a steady leaking of state coffers but also the vices he deemed 'impacted upon the community,' such as narcotics.

The drug trade was an area that the new Kapolri knew something about. In the first 200 days of Yudhoyono's presidency, while Da'i Bachtiar served out the rest of his term, Sutanto had been appointed head of the Anti-Narcotics Agency (BNN). A highly strategic position, this particular rotation (*mutasi*) drew Sutanto in from the cold hinterland of police education and back in the running for the upcoming *Kapolri* throne (Irjen Pol Sutanto Jadi...n.d). As head of BNN, Sutanto had brought to the

²⁰⁶ Bachtiar is known among the police force for his open support for the president. Come the 2004 elections, the Wives Association of the Police, a structure that parallels in rank and hierarchy, the structure of Polri, were instructed to vote for Megawati Sukarnoputri. Police Analyst, interview by author (28 July 2007). Police General, interview by author (12 December 2006). Field notes (20 November 2006).

position a five pronged strategy to reinvigorate the war against drugs, one that strategically mixed strong punitive and harm-reduction approaches²⁰⁷. As Kapolri, he took the unusual step of retaining his position as head of BNN to signal his commitment to eradicating the illegal use and traffic of narcotics.

Curiously, Kapolri Sutanto also declared the opening of a new front in the battle against crime. Just two weeks after his inauguration, he pledged ‘a war on gambling’ and announced he had extracted pledges from the kapolda to shut gambling down within seven days (Jenderal Polisi Sutanto Beri Kontrak, 2005). In his public pronouncements, Sutanto discussed *perjudian* in its most unqualified form, giving the populace no indication as to precisely which amongst their everyday medley of economic play was warred upon. Either way, it was of little consequence because few believed that the Kapolri’s promise to eradicate gambling was genuine, or even achievable. Questions too arose from civil society as to whether the war against gambling should in fact be a priority in an archipelago facing such staggering legal and security issues (Indonesian Corruption Watch, 2005).

Oddly, the process of *pemberantasan* barely seemed to happen at all. There was a common echo of support from all 33 of Sutanto’s inherited kapolda,²⁰⁸ the scattered

²⁰⁷ Under Sutanto’s leadership as Kapolri and head of BNN, Indonesia opened the largest narcotics rehabilitation institution in the world in Lido, Sukabumi. (See, Pusat Rehabilitasi Narkoba...n.d). Research conducted in June and July 2008 suggested that this institution and others like it is not without the problems that affect the structures of governance in Indonesia. Rehabilitation institutions have been folded into the patterns of corruption, abuse and discrimination that shape the lives of Jakarta’s urban poor. However, in my talks with NGO activists and academics working in the sector, I have been reminded that that although there are problems with the harm reduction policies, their very integration in the fight against illicit narcotics represents a significant and positive policy shift for the Indonesian government.

²⁰⁸ Surprisingly, Sutanto did not seek to move Bachtiar’s crew of Kapolda until December 2005. At this point, he replaced 13 of senior generals with his own men. Sutanto’s strategy during most of his term of leadership was to maintain his strength in the territories, where the ‘real’ policing was done. Sutanto

arrests of some unknowns and small fry and then nothing. Within the first eight weeks of General Sutanto's leadership, gambling in all its myriad forms – *togel*, cockfighting, card games, dominos, football betting [*bola judi*] leading right up to that great, glittering lattice of casino high rolling and machine gaming strung up in the city's centre - had completely disappeared from the social landscape of Jakarta. This was similarly so in all of Indonesia's other major cities. It was as if the felted green tables and buzzing queues of slot machines in the casinos had simply folded in on themselves and vanished overnight. By mid October 2005, Indonesian Police Watch released a public announcement 'saluting' the 'prestigious police work' of General Sutanto wherein '99% of gambling in Indonesia has been closed down' (Setahun SBY-JK... 2005).

Cynics pointed to the tenacity of small pockets of 'vice' scattered throughout the capital, reiterating a reliable old narrative of conspiracy and governmental theatre. They argued that the war on gambling was a fraud and, with a little tenacity, the intrepid gamer could stumble easily across examples of gambling's casual infringement on the rule of law. Indeed, there is no doubt that the ban was pockmarked by the odd weekly cockfight, the rumours of a Saturday night casino in an isolated plantation, or the occasional stray *togel* seller.²⁰⁹ But where previously gambling operated largely in the open, 'yes, illegal, but as if it was legal' observed one of my informants from the casino industry, now it was hidden and marked with a murmur of disquiet.²¹⁰ In the capital the sporadic arrests continued, made up

hoped that by stocking the regions with his men, they would provide leverage against his enemies at home in Mabes Polri. Sutanto kept his friends close but his enemies even closer.

²⁰⁹ These forms of gaming were pernicious enough for me to be able to witness them first hand during my fieldwork.

²¹⁰ Casino Worker, interview by author, 7 October 2009.

primarily of *togel* sellers and card sharks, as evidence that the police war claimed its foes.

The effect of the war on gambling in the capital was dramatic and yet, this great, grinding shift in the world of criminality passed through the annals of the city completely unnoticed. To date, there is no public record of tens of thousands of the urban poor - the men, women and families of my field notes – whose livelihoods depended on revenue from the casino industry and whose lives hardened into a series of disquieting choices when those funds ran dry. Such was the consortium's strength that a number of their employees could transfer to other retail labours in its members' hotels, bars, clubs, restaurants, brothels, petrol stations and grocery stores.

Nonetheless, thousands of workers either directly employed by the consortium or living from it remotely via its cleaning, catering, sex, drugs, and *jimat* service industries found themselves suddenly unemployed or underemployed. This mass of labour pooled into new areas, pushing into garbage recycling, prostitution, the production of narcotics (specifically amphetamines), *kaki lima* [food vendors] and for those who had connections, low-level white-collar labour.

Tellingly, even two years after the eradication of gambling, Jakarta's grimy bars, clubs and pool dens still held the lives of the industry's idle labourers in suspension. These were the fraternities of middle and inner layer security men, machine operators, fixers, the floor managers and money handlers who slept all-day and skulked in late at night to smoke cigarettes and play pool. All were still waged by their former employers, though without the added benefit of tips this monthly stipend only comfortably supported the young and single. Few among this brotherhood of gaming

believed that the industry could be erased so easily and their talk orbited endlessly around a speculated date for the reopening of the casinos. Men gossiped about seeing the slot machines hauled out of storage, about the effect of the 2007 provincial elections on permeability of the gambling ban, of the quiet promises of candidates and political parties to reignite the industry, about the possibility of gambling's legalisation and about the new ventures that their former bosses were opening. Most of all, they talked of themselves and wider Jakarta, as *lapar* [hungry].

To look for the truth amongst the indefatigable patter of gossip is to miss its significance in historical trajectory of Indonesian gaming and its relationship to the state. The anthropology of gossip shows how such speech straddles the divide of public and private, gathering in cavities of social uncertainty. The circuit through which this exploratory discourse flows defines the group. Indeed Gluckman observed that gossip is 'the hallmark of membership' (Gluckman, 1963; Lancaster, 1992) that in this case, helped to playfully constitute and reconstitute that membership well after its grounding structures - labour, place, capital, geography, time, ethnicity and skin colour – had been pulled out from underneath it. Moreover, that communities of ex-gaming staff continued to meet and define their lives around a rudimentary economy of a now absent set of practices is indicative not only of how remarkable and unexpected the ban was and how political it was seen to be. It is also testimony to how those working on the vulnerable, changing borders of legality interpreted the sites, limits and internal relations of state authority in time of unprecedented democratic political change. A slight shift in political power - a new city mayor or a new regional police chief allied to old power - and this layer of casino middle management, along with the bosses that continued to pay their salaries, expected to be

back in the game. In the matter of casino gaming, rule of law was mercurial and state power was only a temperamental queue of changing personalities. Until then, even a full two years after the eradication of gambling, they watched and waited.

As far as gossip was concerned, only one group brooded more on the ban than its labourers and this was the Indonesian national police. At all ranks of Polri, Sutanto's reasoning for prohibition on gambling was dissected, debated and pored over. Few accepted the idea that it was a vice that needed to be expunged from the social landscape and even fewer again argued that the popularity of gambling was *haram* or not in standing with the world's biggest Islamic country. Theories were restlessly sketched out to explain the ban. Some argued that President Yudhoyono and through him, General Sutanto, was a pawn of the US-dominated, Singaporean gambling industry and that domestic prohibition would mean that Indonesia's high rollers would hot foot it across the border for the newly planned Marina Bay casino.²¹¹ Christian officers, who frequently and justifiably complained about being passed over for promotions, naturally pointed the finger at the growing Islamisation of the structures of governance.²¹² Others remembered the heated political debates of 2002 that pushed for legalised zones where casinos could operate and said that the ban was a momentary prohibition to calm the Islamists before the new gambling dens were unveiled.²¹³ Some police officers whispered that Sutanto had been tough on gambling back in his home province of East Java, and hinted darkly of a family tragedy affiliated to the dice.²¹⁴

²¹¹ Marina Bay is owned by LA Sands, a major gambling multinational. Mid ranking police officer, interview by author, 12 December 2006.

²¹² Mid ranking police officer, interview by author, (12 December 2006).

²¹³ Police General, interview by author, (10 December 2006).

²¹⁴ Field notes (10 April 2008).

However, for most police officers the most compelling piece of evidence explaining the sudden ban on gambling lay in Sutanto's career pathway to Kapolri. Officers pointed to Sutanto's truncated stint as Kapolda of North Sumatra [*Sumut*] in 2000 as crucial to the psychology of the new prohibition. In 2000, as Kapolda Sumut, Sutanto is reputed to have fallen out with Olo Panggabean, a Christian Toba Batak with Chinese ancestry whose name is synonymous with illegal gambling in North Sumatra's provincial capital of Medan.

Born in 1941, Sahara Oloan Panggabean headed the rival gang to Pemuda Pancasila, IPK, or *Ikatan Pemuda Karya* [Youth Workers Association]. IPK was established by elements of the military in partnership with Chinese entrepreneurs frustrated with Pemuda Pancasila's monopoly on protecting illegal commerce in Medan. Ryter notes that during the New Order, IPK raised the stakes of the competition by breaking out of the protection industry and moving heavily into illegal gambling (Ryter, 2000; Ryter, 2009). In Medan, as in Jakarta, the fall of Suharto and the disbandment of ABRI reorganised gangland territoriality. Only here, unlike in the capital, clear lines were drawn between the coercive apparatus: Polri was affiliated with Pemuda Pancasila and IPK with the regional military command. In 1999, then Kapolda Brig. Gen Sutiono attempted to close down IPK owned gambling outfits to PP's benefit, but it ended violently. Shots were fired at Olo Panggabean's residence, the famed 'white house,' and in the ensuing battle one Brimob (Mobile Police Brigade) member was killed (Ryter, 2009). The following year, Sutanto took up the reigns as Kapolda and declared the end of *judi*.

It is impossible to guess whether Kapolda Sutanto's demand that Panggabean shut down his gaming ventures was a function of the police chief's genuine enthusiasm for eradicating gambling, his inherited affiliation to Pemuda Pancasila or the simple desire to assert his authority over Medan's criminal royalty. Either way, Sutanto's attempt to discuss the end of *perjudian* face to face was snubbed by Panggabean's dispatch of a minor to represent him at the crucial meeting. Then, just seven months into Sutanto's term, Panggabean used his leverage with Kapolri Bimantoro to have the general rotated to Kapolda of East Java. That this was a posting of similar stature to the Medan position was hardly mollifying for an officer with the obstinacy to challenge the likes of Panggabean.

The ejection from Medan blighted Sutanto's career for years. In October 2002, the very same month of his appointment to national police chief, Da'i Bachtiar rotated Sutanto to the dusty tumbleweed of police education. As head of SELAPA [*Sekolah Lanjutan Perwira*, or Polri's advanced school for middle ranking officers], Sutanto was alienated from the circuits of power and prestige that characterise police career mobility. His appointment to chair of BNN in the twilight of Bachtiar's term saved his career from petering out in the bowels of a national police training school. Hence, when the ban on *perjudian* came so hot on the heels of Sutanto's appointment to National Police Chief, police officers surmised that Sutanto was using his position to exact his revenge. Mid-meal, one junior ranking officer put down his fork suddenly and glared at me,

If you see Sutanto during this thing you are doing, I want you to ask him: 'Is his war against *judi* something he truly wants to do from his heart, or is it really just about dealing with the *trauma* he has from Medan?²¹⁵

At the time of my ethnography, this was the question asked over and over again in the halls of stations across the country. Why had Kapolri Sutanto, career officer and presidential lackey, so rankled the likes of the police, the political elite and the criminal elements of *Tionghoa* big business in order to extinguish a little vice like gambling?

Parmin versus Parmas: Beyond the Meaning of Money

For a middle ranking, ambitious regional police chief with his sights set on obtaining the three stars needed to be in the running for Kapolri, the North Sumatra position is one of Polri's most strategic. Indeed, a posting as regional police chief in North Sumatra, just like its parallel posting in East Java, appears in the career genealogies of nearly all of Polri's National Chiefs. Kapolri Imam Santoso Hoegeng wrote of his 1956 appointment to Medan,

North Sumatra is a difficult [*berat*] region in Indonesia. It is the testing ground [*wilayah ujian*] for the career of a police officer. Medan, or North Sumatra is usually seen as a regional *test case* that promises two possibilities. If you have succeeded, then your career will skyrocket [*melejit*]. But if you fail, yeah, you hit a dead end [*ya masuk kotak!*]. So there's an uncertain feeling of worry or apprehension if you are assigned there. Just don't fail. This

²¹⁵ Middle ranking police officer, interview by author, (14 December 2006).

pattern [*pamor*] is not only just in the police but also in the military! (Yusra & Ramadhan, 1993, p. 210).

Medan's sheer size as one of Indonesia's largest cities and third largest economy is certainly part of its importance. The city's population is, like Jakarta and Surabaya, seen as a challenge to conventional practices of urban policing. But, as scholars such as Ryter and Hadiz have so skilfully outlined, Medan's significance in the national arena lies in its reputation as the heartland of criminal politics (Hadiz, 2003; Ryter, 2002). Hadiz asserts that 'arguably, no region matches North Sumatra in terms of the sheer political power and influence of the *preman* (Hadiz, 2003, p. 127). According to Hoegeng, an established relationship of collusion and corruption existed between the *oknum2* ABRI in 1950s North Sumatra. 'By bribing state officials, those Chinese [sic] freely smuggle and gamble!' (Yusra & Ramadhan, 1993) Nonetheless, despite the depth and tenacity of this off-budget economy, for Hoegeng at least, it remains a professional, individual choice whether to intervene.

Nearly fifty years later in contemporary Indonesia, the significance of a posting in Medan was similarly explained me by middle ranking and retired officers as a testing ground for a budding Kapolri. The rule still holds: Medan will make or break the career of an officer of the coercive apparatus. But their narratives suggested that today Hoegeng's logic of the professional police officer is now inverted. Ambitious Kapolri jostle for a position from their superiors in North Sumatra because here one builds crucial patronage relationships with the business (*parman*) and criminal (*parmin*) communities. These connections propel the career of an individual officer upwards and keep the policing institution flush with funds through undocumented donations that are often criminally derived. In these contemporary narratives, the

distinction that Hoegeng held between Polri officer as *oknum* and officer as professional, collapses. It is in police institution's benefit that the officer cultivates a privateer quality from his officialdom, not least his own, dissolving the boundary between state and illegality, *oknum* and officer. As in the parman economy, police corruption in contemporary Indonesia operates in ways that frustrate attempts to narrow corruption's definition down to 'illegal actions for private gain' (Meier, Holbrook, 1992, p. 136). Within the Indonesian national police, the undifferentiated, morally laden practice we know as 'corruption' is first and foremost a social system deeply embedded in institutionalised structures of power and the internal, hierarchical relationships that make up those structures (Anders & Nuijten, 2007, p. 15).

Like the parman and parmas economy, the parmin economy is regarded by the police as a necessary and regular interior current of revenue that derives, as the name suggests, from *partisipasi kriminal* [lit. criminal participation]. Similar to the parman economy, parmin funds are quietly justified by the gross inconsistencies in the circulation of state revenue to the police as well as the insatiable greed of the officer class, who vertically distribute its profits to obtain prestige postings and maintain positions. However, as we will see, the parmin, parman and parmas economies do not function in precisely the same way, draw in similar revenues or travel the same internal circuits.

Chapter V outlined how and why gambling revenues came to occupy a unique place in the off-budget economies of the police in the post-Suharto era. In Jakarta, Batam, Surabaya, Medan, Manado and Jambi, off-budget revenues from gambling far outstripped the monies derived from any other major subset of the parmin economy,

including the important trades of illegal logging, illicit narcotics, petrol smuggling or gun running.²¹⁶ There are a number of structural and cultural reasons for the importance of gambling as a revenue stream for the police. First, is the sheer size of the gambling economy, which generated hundreds of billions of rupiah per day across the archipelago. Secondly, unlike the illegal logging or fishing industries, the productivity of *judi* did not inflict losses on the state economy and as such could operate relatively undetected. Also, as we have seen, casino gambling was largely run by a centralised elite who established intimate relations with national level decision-makers, the fiscal consequences of which trickled down through state institutions. Extraction was not up to the entrepreneurial gusto of individual units or officers but rather, gambling was a pre-existing, reliable mechanism pumping a stable quantum of revenue into the system. The illicit gambling industry was also an important way for budding entrepreneurial officers to be introduced to the technical complexities of systems of modern day finance. Police generals, fearing the chance and competition of the modern financial markets, were attracted to the *judi* economy because it offered a way for nervous generals to invest their money with absurdly inflated returns.²¹⁷ Finally, Polri's inordinate reliance on the gambling economy was also because officers from generals down to non-commissioned personnel tended to regard the practice of gambling (as opposed to its proceeds) as a relatively minor vice of little moral import. There are many social, political and cultural reasons for this. Indeed, systems of surveillance and policing everywhere are only ever a reflection of wider social norms.²¹⁸ This is particularly true for the Indonesian police. Its officers

²¹⁶ Middle Ranking police officer, interview by author, (12 December 2006).

²¹⁷ Police General, interview by author, (22 February 2007).

²¹⁸ Binde and Curnow argue that in Southeast Asia and the Pacific, the moral ambiguity around gambling is linked to its ability to function as a positive generalized form of reciprocity. Gambling thus, is an exchange system in which surplus is redistributed or cash 'socialised' (Curnow, 2008, p. 378). Also, Binde, 2005; Curnow, 2008; Mitchell, 1988).

are uniquely placed to witness first hand the gulf between legal, licit and moral codes in a region where economic play has such a long history and where modern forms of mechanised gambling could be so easily confined to a pariah minority.

For all of these reasons, not only did gambling also constitute one of the largest revenue streams within the parmin economy, but relative to the gift (parman) and community participation (parmas) economies, it was an even and dependable flow of funds upon which the policing apparatus could rely. Take the example of Adjunct Police Commissioner [*ajun komisaris*] Cecep, a former head of criminal research (*kaditserser*) at a Central Jakarta polsek in which gambling was known to be rife.²¹⁹ He recounted that in the period just before the war on gambling, he received casino and machine revenues [*setoran*] from five *Tionghoa* line officers [LO] managing sites operating within the district of his authority. From Kim, Ajin and Asiong, Cecep was paid a monthly stipend of Rp 500,000 [US\$55]. From Koh San, he collected a further Rp 1.5 million per month and from Ahuy, Cecep received Rp 1 million [US\$111].

Cecep accepted the differences in sums as a function of the size, stability and legal indemnity of a gambling enterprise. Larger outfits, such as those beneath the umbrella of the consortium, gave less in their individual payments to the lower rungs of the police because they distributed monies so widely and routinely throughout the institution and the quality of their *beking* was so unshakeable. Ostensibly, their stipend was payment in return for protection. But in truth, no lowly sectional head would have the clout or connections to seriously threaten a consortium-backed enterprise. If, as we have seen in the previous section, elaborately articulated ‘gifts’

²¹⁹ Details and dates of this source’s appointment are necessarily oblique given the ease with which this individual could be identified. Junior ranking officer, interview by author, (7 March 2007).

from *Tionghoa* businesspeople are in reality crudely levered through discrimination and extortion, then ironically the monthly consortium-issued protection payments to low ranked officers were as close to true ‘gifts’ as the off-budget financial system ever got.²²⁰ On the other hand, for the *gerilya* gamblers and other small time operators, monthly *setoran* payments were larger because their zone of protection was frequently limited to the administrative district in which they functioned, calling for greater displays of prowess and authority from the few officers in their salary.

Each month, Cecep gathered revenue from gaming totalling Rp 5.5 million [US \$613]. His own salary was a mere Rp 2 million [US \$222]. Within his station, similar amounts were received by fellow heads [*kanit*] of intel [intelligence], samapta [patrol] and the head of the new narcotics department. The most deserving of the money was the head of the criminal investigation department [*kaditsperse*] who held the power of prosecution. It being out of their sphere of authority, the traffic police, administrational head and community relations officers cannot in theory requisition gaming funds although Cecep said it was possible that they received a small cut. The head of the station, his deputy and the head of staff [*kasad*] obtained gambling payoffs potentially three to four times Cecep’s Rp 5.5 million as well as other perks such as scholarships for their children, homes, vehicles and access to the pot of one-off ‘donations’ from the tycoons.

Cecep also outlined the other sources of financing available to him. Although I asked directly a number of times, Cecep insisted that he did not receive money associated

²²⁰ I would speculate that the regular payments to the police juniors was in fact part of the negotiated deal between police generals and gambling tycoons. Police will argue that that providing sources of *lahan* is a moral obligation of seniors but if it is, it is regularly violated. Making sure juniors got a pay off from the gambling economy built up an officer’s prestige and did not require the exertion or sacrifice.

with the prostitution or narcotics industries that flourished in his neighbourhood. However, he did procure a further five – ten million rupiah from what he referred to as the industry of *kasus* [cases]. Within the police, *uang kasus* is generally categorised as an important subsection of the *parmas* [community participation] economy. *Uang kasus* [case money] is the sum a criminal investigator will extract from a plaintiff requesting police assistance to resolve a criminal or civil act.

According to the state budget, criminal research officers are issued a sum between Rp 500 000 [US\$ 55] - 2.5 million [US \$279] to cover investigation costs depending on the case's 'size' [*kecil - sedang - besar*].²²¹ However, as Chapter III outlined, because these funds are often substantially delayed, pilfered or only issued after the fact, officers frequently justify the extraction of *uang kasus* as covering the shortfall of the state. Explains a young criminal research officer,

We don't have the budget for cases. We only get about Rp 500,000 per case and we have to pay for stationary and paper! So, we take it from people. When someone comes in with a case, they normally pay between two – five million in 'administrational' fees. We don't ask [*minta*] for the money. They give it voluntarily [*berikan dengan rela*]... I mean, you know what our budget looks like. We don't want to be corrupt, but we are forced to ask them to pay. It's a vicious circle [*lingkaran setan*]. [Masa] do I really have to use my wages that are only just enough [*pas-pasan*] to pay for their cases?! We want to reform, but it's a vicious circle.²²²

When a person brings a case to the police, they are generally required to pay this fee. The officer above stated that it is between two and five million rupiah but in truth, the real sum is calculated in accordance with the size and severity of the case and the police's estimated wealth of the plaintiff. During my fieldwork, no-one I interviewed

²²¹ UNICEF Child Protection Officer , interview by author, (31 July 2008).

²²² Junior ranking criminal research officer, interview by author, (1 October 2006).

would speak of the sums they paid to the police to resolve a criminal or civil case. In all likelihood, aggrieved families and plaintiffs feared their '*uang kasus*' would be read as a means of eradicating an enemy or resolving a vendetta by having the disputing party arrested, sometimes on false grounds. Often, this is precisely the case, particularly where the potential benefit is the obliteration of a political or business rival.

However, for Polri, the *kasus* economy is a see-saw of fiscal potential. Police broker their powers of arrest and prosecution between plaintiffs and criminal suspects, levering payments out of both sides. From the accused, sums of a stupendous size are secured. A high-level corruption case with national exposure could potentially bring in billions of rupiah to criminal research departments in Mabes or at the polda level. In one of Indonesia's biggest banking scandals in the past decade, the family of just one of over a dozen suspects in the case privately told me that they had single-handedly paid out over Rp 3 billion [US \$335 million] to Bareskrim (or the central criminal research department of Mabes Polri) over the two years the case was investigated.²²³ The money was not paid in one painful outlay, but accrued slowly and insidiously. With each meeting, criminal investigation staff demanded Rp 100-200 million [US\$ 11 000 - \$22 000]. Meetings would be called in expensive five star hotels around the capital, where officers would invite their friends and family to stay the weekend and present the accused with the bill. The accused was provided with a menu of options – flee to Singapore, fall ‘mysteriously’ ill, obtain ‘treatment’ in a police hospital or at home, remain in detention in a deluxe room or have a Sunday outing. The options themselves were a pick and mix of possibilities, all of which had

²²³ Confidential Source, interview by author, (21 March 2007).

their price. Sometimes the money was demanded in US dollars and all payments were made in cash, never money transfers that could be tracked by the PPATK [Centre for Financial Reporting and Analysis]. The sibling of the defendant who brokered many of the transactions declared, ‘you know, I used to think the police and the prosecutor [*jaksa*] were ok. But now I hold a *pembantu* [housemaid] in greater esteem than them...When I go in there, they look at me like I am walking money [*uang jalan*].’²²⁴

Despite its worth, at the district and sub-district commands, Cecep maintained that the *kasus* economy is not an inexhaustible font of profit but in fact subject to extremes of fluctuation [*fluktuatif*] and the uncertainties of exchange. A criminal research officer cannot control who might be arrested or commission police action that month, nor can he predict their fiscal potential. Either way, there are still outlays to be reckoned with: costs for fuel, officers to muster into action, per diems to calculate, and prosecutors and judges to enlist. Corruption has a key performative element, requiring intimate knowledge of tact and etiquette and adherence to certain ‘discursive scripts’. For the wily officer, it is up to him to deploy the secret idioms, codes and symbols of corruption and transfer these into a personal repertoires of power that will ensure his cut is not diminished (Gupta, 1995; Anders & Nijten, 207, p. 17). It is nerve-wracking, risky work for potentially little gain. Compared to the gambling economy, the profits from *uang kasus* are volatile and dependent on the prowess of an officer in haggling and mediation. Furthermore, unlike the monthly-apportioned

²²⁴ Ibid.

setoran from the gambling tsars, the profits of *uang kasus* for a criminal research head can be eaten into by the Kapolsek and his deputy claiming their rightful spoils.²²⁵

The final drawback of the *kasus* economy is that it has its internal limits since not every case is open for extraction. The *kasus* economy is invisibly regulated by what is internally known as ‘the ten code’ which acts as a check upon the corruption by bifurcating the desire (masked as institutional imperative) for revenue accumulation with the social considerations of personal prestige (and hence career) and intergenerational relations.

We never did more than 10-3. Meaning out of 10 cases, we never ‘do’ more than 3 cases to finance the whole thing. You pick out the cases. This is the case to make you look good to the public. This is the case to make your superior look good and these are the cases to get the money to do your job and also to live decently according to your rank. And this 10 code is not only in the police. It is also in the prosecutor and also in the judge system [*sic*]. Even amongst very corrupt prosecutors or judges, sometimes you get a clean decision. A clean process because from the beginning they think, this is for the public, I want to look good. A lot of people feel that corrupt police are corrupt in everything, but no, they pick. They have this 10 code and they decide where is their limit.²²⁶ [in Engl.]

For all of these reasons, police dependence on the gambling revenues was infinitely preferable to other forms of off-budget income generation.

Money occupies multiple meanings and social roles, though unlike the intricacies of accumulation, reciprocity and exchange, anthropological scholarship has been much

²²⁵ Criminal cases need to be signed off by the head of the station.

²²⁶ Confidential Source, interview by author, (30 June 2008).

less adept at mapping what Maurer calls, the ‘many sides of the coin’ (2006). In officer accounts of the circuitry and redistribution of the police’s off-budget revenue, we see a complex, historical and multiplicitous response to the fiscal rewards of the parmin, parman and parmas economies suggesting that money is not the depersonalised instrument of singular valuation and blanket commodification presented by scholars of structuralism (Maurer, 2006). Instead, the differentiated use of off-budget revenue indexes both the morality of the transactional system from which it derives and the moral cause for which it will be used. While all of his monies are in effect ‘illegally’ obtained, Cecep’s underlying logic of redistribution and budgeting of the Rp 10-15 million [US\$1100-1680] he receives in non-APBN derived funds suggests that different tranches of monies must be circulated through different transactional systems in order to take their place in the wider social and economic order of the police institution.

Cecep was insistent that the Rp 5.5 million he derived from *judi* profits had to be dedicated to operational and institutional costs. *Uang setan* [the devil’s money], he recited, *dimakan jin* [must be used for entertainment]. It was not that the practice of *judi* itself was immoral – police were united in the idea that gambling, like prostitution, constituted a victimless crime - but that its proceeds were ‘hot’ [*panas*] and thus could not be ‘saved’ [*tidak menabung*]. Subekti’s ethnographic account of gambling in 1980s Glodok similarly describes the way that the *Tionghoa* community regarded profits from gambling as *uang panas* [hot money]²²⁷ which should be immediately consumed in household and daily expenses (Subekti, 1980). The money

²²⁷ In Lim’s 1981 study of a Malay fishing village in Brunei, cash earned through commercial fishing is also described as ‘hot’ (Carsten, 1989, p.136).

should never be used as *modal* [net capital inflow]²²⁸ because revenue won at the gaming tables was intrinsically perishable: ‘*uang yang tidak bisa disimpan, akan selalu habis*’ [money that could not be saved, would always be expended] (ibid, p. 120). Thus, while gaming yields could be used to ‘*cari duit*’ [find/ make money], they could not be directly embedded in stable, long lasting fiscal structures that make up a recipient’s asset base.

In a landmark text, Parry and Bloch argue that while money might mean something different to everyone, its cross-cultural uses within whole transactional systems incur significant regularities. Money earned in short-term, impersonal, acquisitive exchanges, wherein the transaction appeared to be individualistic or ill-gotten, is ‘unsanctioned wealth’. This money is deviant in that it is unjustly or inequitably acquired. To transform unsanctioned wealth into a more ‘licit’ form, money is recycled into long term transactional orders that work to maintain a specific social or cosmic order that transcends the individual (Parry & Bloch, 1989). In her study of a Malay village in Langkawi, Carsten illustrates how women mediate the proceeds of male exchanges made through commercial fishing: ‘in their passage through the house, the central symbol of kin unity, and through the hands of women, [earnings] become imbued with the ideals of kinship and thus ‘socialised,’ or ‘cooked’ (Carsten, 1989, p. 132). Similarly, Brenner argues that in Java’s Solo, *kasar* [coarse] money can be made *halus* [refined] through women’s domestic practices (Brenner, 1998, p. 168). Women, as the lower-status partner within the relationship, decontaminate money and convert it into a consumptive good that lends itself to kin unity.

²²⁸ The use of the term *modal* here is confusing as *modal* can also mean one’s ‘investment’ which suggests that this variety of money can indeed be used to generate more money. I have interpreted *modal* here as capital reserves not capital investments or working capital.

Within the Indonesian police, *uang judi* could not be directly pocketed by the direct recipient of the monthly envelope. To transform the money into a more stable form, middle ranking officers recycled their instalments of *uang judi* into meeting operational and departmental needs. Cecep used his allowance to buy ‘petrol,’ ‘printing ink’ and for other *kesulitan anak buah* [problems of my staff] which crop up.²²⁹ The availability of these funds meant that among his *anak buah* [juniors] and his seniors, Cecep was known as a good leader who was able to run his unit well [*dengan baik*]. By this, it was meant that Cecep could undertake criminal investigations, keep the unit functioning and meet a certain, circumscribed number of his juniors’ [*anak buah*] needs. Cecep also circulated this part of the money (though not all) upwards to his seniors as *setoran* to maintain his posting as kaditserse within the vicious, competitive world of transfers [*mutasi*] and promotions. In this way, the unsanctioned, individual sources of wealth received from gambling revenues were subordinated to long-term cycles that ensured the fraternity and hierarchy of the junior-senior relationship. Hot money, thus, is an uncivil, polluted thing of transition and liminality, wedged between short and long term transactional orders. Hot money is transformed by its service to maintaining particular, perverted orders of power within the police whose very existence, paradoxically, close the loop and demand reliance on ill-gotten revenue (Maurer, 2006, p. 24).

Being unreliable, the *kasus* money was destined for very different purposes altogether. Unlike *judi* money, which was dedicated to departmental, institutional and career outlays not covered by the APBN, Cecep redistributed *kasus* money laterally across police networks. The money was circulated amongst colleagues in police

²²⁹ Junior Ranking Officer, interview by author, (7 March 2007).

training courses who were temporarily exiled from the normal circuits of revenue generation. It was used to curry favour amongst a fraternity of Polda Metro Jaya staff, visiting police dignitaries and other important officers from the regions by supplying their consumptive needs such as petrol, hotels, and the all important cash envelopes pressed into hot hands upon departure. This was money invested in the gift economy of ‘servicing friends’ [*melayani teman*]²³⁰ and developing a lattice of indebted horizontal relationships which are essential to the operational and political capacity of an ambitious officer. Unblemished by a relationship to the criminal world, *kasus* money unlike *judi* money, was clean and adaptable. As sanctioned wealth, it was even ‘entertainment money’ [*uang hiburan*].²³¹

In describing Cecep’s system for the ‘cooking’ or laundering of the proceeds of the parmin and parmas economies, I do not wish to present this system as a static, functional machine in which the potential personal profits of the short term cycle are monastically denied. Cecep cleaned his short-term, ill-gained acquisitions in long-term transactions that stabilised the political and social order of Polri. But this system is frequently situationally redefined and renegotiated. Money, being better approached as a repertoire or an index than a specific representative meaning, lends itself particularly well to paradox, pragmatism and problem solving (*ibid*, p. 30). When pushed, Cecep admitted bashfully that he sometimes used the gambling money for his own holidays (which, in the Indonesian example, suggests a redistribution of the money amongst his own family) and if he saved its proceeds, he never kept it for long periods before its consumption. Cecep then argued that his savings of the *judi* tranche were not a means of building his own capital base, but pegged for exhaustion

²³⁰ Junior Ranking Officer, interview by author, (7 March 2007).

²³¹ Junior Ranking Officer, interview by author, (7 March 2007).

on his next bout of schooling at the officer training college [PTIK]. Hence, in a roundabout kind of way, the *judi* money was being invested back in the institution. Cecep was clearly embarrassed by this line of questioning and yet had readied answers to justify his transgressive saving of perverse, unsanctioned wealth (Roitman, 2005). Taussig reminds us that these kinds of contraventions do not signal the moral irrelevance of the system. Just as legal orders create their counterpart of violation, moral orders invite the ‘tabooed possibility’ in which the sacred is defaced (Anders & Nuijten, 2007, p 11). This is not a negation of the Polri’s order of illicit monies, their acquisition and consumption, rather ‘transgression...suspends a taboo without suppressing it’ (ibid).

Pacts of Licit and Illicit Worlds

The parmin economy is not just about the provision of discrete and segregated monthly payoffs to Mabes Polri, Metro Jaya and the subordinate territorial apparatus. Like the parman economy, parmin patrons support the institution with sizeable grants for infrastructure, operational support, equipment and building construction and renovation. Because of the large scale investments required, parmin contributors also have a significant role to play in the police’s internal system of rotations, promotions and educational opportunities that lead to rises in rank.

Before its demise, the gambling consortium’s role in the operation of this system at Mabes Polri and Metro Jaya was considerable. The primary interface between the consortium and the police was a Medan *Tionghoa* called Arief Cocong, a powerful

member of the consortium and owner of Classic Hotel. As outlined in the previous section, Cocong himself was not a heavily capitalised member of the consortium but a stalwart in Jakarta's gambling scene and his alliance with the consortium elevated him from nightclub and casino manager to the broker between the gambling tycoons and Polri. In our interviews, Cocong was often called 'Kapolri *Swasta*,' or private sector National Police Chief by *Tionghoa* casino workers, *Tionghoa* corporate heads and police officers alike.²³² Attendance at the PTIK [Higher School of Police Science] is a prerequisite for rising the ranks to middle level officer, and, according to one source, every single junior officer in residence there had obtained their position at the school by 'speaking to Cocong' [*ngomong ke Cocong*].²³³ Funding for their position at the school often came from an assortment of parman and parmin donors (as well as an officer's own transgressive squirreling away of 'illicit' money) but the strategising needed to secure a placing itself was mediated through Cocong. This was similarly so for middle level officers wanting to graduate to the stars of senior leadership through SESPI (Police leadership school). In accordance with the will of the consortium, Cocong also organised officers' subsequent postings after graduation given that his influence among the kapolres and kapolda of the territorial apparatus was considerable. Winata himself was frequently said to have direct influence over key positions such as Chief of Metro Jaya, National Chief of Criminal Investigation [Kabareskrim] and Wakapolri.

Moreover, the pattern by which capital leveraged its influence over the police was not limited to Jakarta alone. This system was devolving along with Indonesia's colossal

²³² *Tionghoa* business-owner, interview by author (5 April 2007). Junior ranking officer, interview by author, (11 April 2007). Casino Worker, interview by author, (7 October 2009). Anton Medan, interview by author, (23 June 2010).

²³³ Junior ranking officer, interview by author, (11 April 2007).

process of political decentralisation. The *judi* economy had liberalised ownership and geography, establishing powerful nodes in the regional centres where decentralisation had given way to increasingly concentrated fiscal flows. As licit and illicit capital flows devolved to the regions, Kapolda across the country were setting up similar relations of influence with gambling tycoons old and new. In Batam, under the leadership of Kapolda Snr. Com. Anton Bachrul Alam, a gambling cruise ship was flouting Indonesian borders by plying international waters to pick up clients in Singapore (Suara Karya, 2005). Alam wasn't even a senior, starred officer. If the gaming tsars could flaunt Indonesia's very own sovereignty on the *beking* of a mere police commissioner, then there was no end to their grip on the Indonesian police (ibid).

Thus, General Sutanto's war on gambling was not about family *trauma*, kowtowing to foreign corporations, old vendettas or even teaching the gambling tycoons a hard lesson in respecting the law. It was a calculated, sovereign move, designed to discipline his fractious and traitorous force, who had for years subverted the centralised hierarchy of police national command and competed amongst each other for the favours of the consortium. Bisected and disordered by the pursuit of political influence and external capital, Sutanto's war on gambling was in fact a declaration of territorial authority wherein the attentions and allegiances of the vast, sprawling police command were forcibly returned to the centre. The exchange for securing greater fiscal control of the police for the state was a far greater proportion of the APBN than ever seen in the history of Indonesian state policing.

Table Two shows that the biggest leap in Polri funding occurred under Sutanto's tenure. Polri's APBN allocation more than doubled in size from Rp 11 trillion [Rp 1.3 billion] in 2005 to Rp 24.8 trillion [Rp 2.8 billion] in the 2009 financial year. Like scattered filings to a magnet, the war on gambling was intended to compel police allegiance back to the command by intensifying their financial dependence on the police apparatus.

Moreover, the speed with which gambling was shut down suggests that rather than an combative assertion of law through detection and arrest, the closure of the casinos was a planned, pacted withdrawal by the illicit gaming industry that had come at the behest of the very top echelon of governance, the president himself. The new president had his own reasons for wanting the closure of the casinos. After all, the *judi* economy was not just a simple protection industry for the police or the military. It was a gargantuan parallel economy of unlaundered cash that snaked billions of rupiah through government departments, parliamentary commissions, legislatures, cabinets and the finances of opposition parties through 'gifts' and 'donations'. Without fiscal control of government, SBY's presidential authority was undermined.

Not to mention, the continuing traffic of *judi* funds also left open the potential for the funding of rivals. In his study of *Tionghoa* big business, Chua observes the fear of political party partisanship in a democratic system and a tendency to make overtures to all potential centres of power (Chua, 2006). Accordingly, in the 2004 national election, the consortium had also scattered their support amongst the major political parties. Retired Let.Gen T.B Silalahi, a long time business partner of Tomy Winata and First Commissioner of Artha Graha, funnelled gambling money to Yudhoyono's

electoral campaign by serving on his *tim sukses* [campaign team]. Winata also pumped significant sums into the campaign of Yudhoyono's opponent, the then incumbent President Megawati Sukarnoputri.²³⁴ Ironically, Winata's own presidential preferences were only laid bare on the casino floor:

On the last day before our holidays [*liburan*], before Harco shut for the campaign season, each person [*anak*] was given Rp 50,000 [US\$5.5]. Our managers called it 'holiday money,' but the gist [*intinya*] was to vote for [*ngoblos*] Megawati. They said to us, if Yudhoyono wins [*naik*], we'll all be shut down. They had predicted everything already.²³⁵

What this suggests is that even before his election to power, Yudhoyono had conferred with the consortium, conveying his intention to shut down the *judi* economy. To do this, he needed the compliance of the gambling tycoons and Polri. Only after more than nine months of rule, was the president able to regain control of what had been a largely pro PDI-P police leadership by installing General Sutanto as Kapolri. Driven by a mutual desire to rationalize the corruption and narrow its pool of beneficiaries, together the president and the National Police chief were able to bring about one of the dramatic movements in Indonesian capital since the 1998 Asian financial crisis.

This colossal shift in the subterranean, criminal economy was effected through a hyper-real simulation of law enforcement in which the boats, malls and warehouses that housed the casinos were subject to a series of raids only to discover empty rooms

²³⁴ Chua reports that husband Taufiq Kiemas complained that Winata's donations to the campaign were 'not enough'. One wonders if in fact the source of his irritation was that money he claimed as rightfully Megawati's was in fact divided between the two opposing candidates. (Chua, 2006, 174, 185).

²³⁵ Casino Worker, interview by author, (14 October 2009). Casino Worker, interview by author, (7 October 2009).

scattered with the remains of gambling paraphernalia. ‘At the time of the raid, there were no actual gambling activities taking place,’ confirmed Snr. Com. Pol Anton Bachrul Alam of the raids on the Leisure World and Omar III cruise ships, suspected of shuttling avid gamers between Singapore and Batam. ‘But there were remnants [*bekas-bekas*] of gambling by its passengers. If we see these boats in waters around Batam, we will arrest them. We continue to maintain surveillance [*pemantauan*]’ (Suara Karya, 2005). What would be the sovereign theatre of law enforcement without the conspicuous rituals of arrest and prosecution? (Hansen & Stepputat, 2005, p. 29). Because all rituals require the enacting of violence, the war on gambling had to be seen to claim its foes:

Junior Ranking Officer: I was asked [*minta*] to prepare others [*siapkan yang lain*].

Interviewer: Did you do this because they [the gamblers] were your friends [*teman*] or because you were ordered to [*diperintah*]?

Junior Ranking Officer: Ordered to.

Interviewer: Who ordered you to? Your supervisor?

Junior Ranking Officer: Yes.

Interviewer: Was that because he was just protecting his friends or...

Junior Ranking Officer: [interrupts]. He was ordered to by his supervisors [*atasannya lagi*]

Interviewer: Did that only occur in your station?

Junior Ranking Officer: [laughter] I am just a drop in the ocean.²³⁶

Thus, the mass arrest and imprisonment of a proxy straggle of riff-raff, vendors, low ranking casino employees and urban poor marked a crucial shift in the political relations between the state and the elite echelons of the criminal economy. In this

²³⁶ Junior ranking police officer, interview by author, (14 December 2006).

way, the enforcement of law on the lumpen criminal body masked changes in the structures of power within political society.

Given the history, conviviality and interdependence of state-criminal relations, it was only fitting that one of the few genuine acts of law enforcement in Indonesia's history of the *judi* economy occurred through a series of elite pacts and compromises that demonstrated the contradictions and 'limitations of Perfect Law' (Heyman & Campbell, 2007, p. 195). In 2005, a treaty emerged between the domains of the licit and the illicit. For the political prize of shutting down the gargantuan black market of casino gaming, the Indonesian state and its police force had to enter into a series of Faustian bargains that served the business interests of a heavily-capitalised consortium preparing to divest itself of its greatest, most lucrative asset.

Since the closure of the *judi* economy, Ajin, Awi, Arief Cocong and Rudi Sutanto have developed their holdings in the Jakarta entertainment industry branching out into new clubs, bars and karaoke joints in central Jakarta. Apoh moved his assets into property and retail such as electronics and grocery stores in central Jakarta. Sugianto Kusuma, as we have seen in Chapter I, transformed Agung Sedayu to one of the premier real estate companies in the capital. Through his chairmanship of the Federation of Hakka Associations, Sugeng Pranoto now develops business relations between Indonesian *Tionghoa* and China and has the exclusive ear of the president. Former preman such as Ongen Sangaji and Yoris Raweyai have pursued their fiscal fortunes through the rough and tumble of popular politics. Johnny Kusuma heads up PT Artha Graha Investama and David Tjioe landed a plum job as managing director of Winata's PT Maritim Timur Jaya, where he twisted the Sea and Fishery

department's arm for trading concessions for Winata's Tual fish farms.²³⁷ At the same time, Tjioe used the company to smuggle arms and drugs into the country before fleeing to China with several billion rupiah of Winata's money.²³⁸ At Winata's behest, Tjioe is currently wanted by Interpol.

Despite the eradication of the *judi* funds, Winata's power over the police has not waned. As Section Two outlined, Winata is a substantial contributor to what police identify as the parman economy wherein *Tionghoa* big business make 'gifts' of land, infrastructure, equipment. The parman economy also yields substantial, regular stipends between entrepreneurial officers and their benefactors, including Winata. Winata's influence over the police is levered through his ongoing control of the system of transfers, shuffles and promotions at all levels of Polri. At PTIK, all graduating officers continued to negotiate their transfers, shuffles and promotions within the police through Arif Cocong on behalf of Winata, to the extent that even two years after the war on gambling, Cocong continued to be known as the *Kapolri Swasta* [private national police chief].²³⁹

In 2005, Winata and other *Tionghoa* big business figures strategised to have their man, Makbul Padmanegara appointed as Vice Chief under the Kapolri Sutanto and successfully campaigned to place Jusuf Sangkar next to Kapolri Sutanto as a personal expert [*staf ahli*] during his term.²⁴⁰ Sangkar was presented to the public as an expert on policing, but in fact he was there as an important interface between the Kapolri and

²³⁷ In 2006, the Anti-Corruption Commission investigated Tjioe and Winata for allegedly funneling money through the Sea and Fisheries Department's charitable foundation (YDKP) to Minister Rokhmin Danuri. During 2002-5, the foundation collected around 15 billion rupiah from taxing the budgetary sources of the departments' regional and central and through this 'gift' economy.

²³⁸ Anton Medan, interview by author, (23 June 2010).

²³⁹ Junior ranking officer, interview by author, (11 April 2007).

²⁴⁰ Confidential Source, interview by author, (3 November 2006).

Tionghoa big business. In this way, private capital could personally instruct the boundaries and limitations of Sutanto's reform of the police apparatus. What all of this suggests is that Winata's fiscal control of the police apparatus has been streamlined back from a stratified stipend to officers stationed in gaming territories to a more discretionary, but no less influential, fund attached to certain police positions, postings and projects.

For Tomy Winata himself, his personal recompense for giving up the country's most bankable illicit economy was a significant and growing stake in a licit and appropriately banal economy of similar titanic value: rice. Indonesia comprises the world's third biggest market for rice, second only to that of China and India. Indonesia's annual consumption of rice is twice that of its regional neighbours and in 2006, the Asia Development Bank christened the country the world's biggest net importer of paddy (Asia Development Bank, 2006). In August 2005, just one month after the closure of the casinos, Indonesian Vice-President Jusuf Kalla oversaw the signing of an MOU between PT Sumber Alam Sutera (PT SAS), the agro-business wing of Artha Graha, and Chinese company Sichuan Guohao Seed Industry, to develop new hybrid rice varieties. Kalla's presence at the signing was an effective about-face on the Yudhoyono government's previous policies regarding the legality of rice varieties developed by PT SAS. As Winata himself explained, Artha Graha's ability to enter the hybrid rice market relied upon the reclassification of hybrid PT SAS seeds from 'illegal' to 'legal'²⁴¹.

²⁴¹ Winata himself explains the changes in the government's stance on the hybrid rice program. 'In 2005, in South East Sulawesi, an issue occurred when there were paddy hybrid seeds planted in Konawe that had not gone through proper procedural process. The director general instructed to remove all the plants. Thankfully the chief of the local police and the local government were encouraged by the National Chief of Police and the Department of Agriculture not to destroy the plants as the project was considered a social welfare project. The problem happened till 2006 when the

In 2007, 60% of the government programs to increase rice yields were managed by Artha Graha (World Investment News, 2009). In November 2009, Jusuf Sangkar, aide to Kapolri during the shut-down of the gambling industry, reappeared as President Yudhoyono's personal advisor on food security and energy, attending PT SAS's various harvests in Banten and Lampung, along with the local military command, local government and Tomy Winata himself (Bantan Provincial Government, 2010).

At the harvest, Baran Wirawan, the secretary for the Minister of Agriculture announced, 'the government will continue to develop the hybrid seed program because this variety is able to create enormous harvests' (Republika, 2010). He went on to address the hundreds of farmers present warning them that 'if farmers continue to develop independently, prices in the market for hybrid rice will decrease' and encouraging farmers to join the government program and its approved stock of hybrid seeds. Events such as these around the country have provided Winata with a platform to transform his popular image as a shady tycoon built on ill-gotten wealth to a fervent nationalist, champion of the rights of the poor and advocate for Indonesia's farmers.

One month after Sangkar's appointment, the government announced its plans to create an 'Integrated Food and Energy Estate' in Merauke, West Papua, of up to half a million hectares. PT SAS then lodged a proposal for a large slab of land for its hybrid rice plantations. The Indonesian government then announced that it expected its own

government *considered the seeds legal (sic)*. The total investment for this project was US\$ 30 million and could feed up to 5,000 people and by this solve a national problem. We became a new player admired by international companies. At that time they did not want to import the seed from China as *it was considered illegal*. Together with our project the government launched a program to increase two million tons of the national rice production (*sic*) and our company managed around 60% of the program' (World Investment News, 2009).

demand for hybrid seeds to increase by 25% per year until 2014 in order to meet domestic and export demand with hybrid rice programs.

Through these programs, the Yudhoyono government has effectively paved the way for Winata to become one of Indonesia's largest suppliers of hybrid rice seeds in one of the world's biggest consumers of rice. In so doing, Winata has effectively swapped his dominance in the biggest industry of the criminal world for a major, expanding stake in the most primary commodity of the Indonesian market.

Paradoxically, the pact of reciprocal exchange between the government and Winata rested on his acceptance of the prohibition proper of the gambling industry and the reclassification of PT SAS' hybrid rice seeds from illegal contraband to legal, government-sanctioned public good. Here, 'law is not just the medium by which politics is played out' (Berkowitz, 2006), but state efforts to strengthen the rule of law in a period of democratisation has demanded the rearrangement of the very relationship between the criminal and the legal. Democratisation and the subsequent pressure to become a *negara hukum*, or a state of law above coercion, redraws the perimeters of the criminal and the legal alike.

Turning Law into *Lahan*: The War on Drugs 2005-2009

With the termination of gambling funds, Polri found itself wedged anxiously between its expanding membership and an evaporating pool of illicit revenue.²⁴² In Jakarta, as in Indonesia's other urban centres, the severing of this most reliable and routine

²⁴² A recruitment drive to attain membership numbers to rival and best that of TNI has been one of the signature policies of the police's reform package. By January 2008, the number of Polri officials, including civilian staff, totaled 370 626 persons. In early 2005, this number was 284 391, representing an increase of some 31%.

current of off-budget police financing led to intense financial stress within Polri, creating ruptures in the grid of vertical and horizontal relationships that undergird the institution. Officers at every level were foraging for new sources of revenue to make up for lost earnings. I witnessed generals aggressively chasing business opportunities or reaching out to businessmen, sourcing new ways of protecting ‘legitimate’ private enterprise.²⁴³

However, the strains were greatest on the mass of officers clustered at the middle to lower ranks, those who made up the frontline of everyday policing. This was the layer of officers closest to the everyday means of extraction, the interface between the Indonesian state and its people, and at the same time were the most vulnerable to the demands of vertical extraction from the officer class. ‘*Kami bingung nyari uang*’ [We are at a loss for how to get money], implored a commissioned officer.²⁴⁴ 2005-2008 saw a significant spike in media reports about low-ranked police officers shooting themselves, their spouses and colleagues. Although the immediate cause of the tragedies could be attributed to the usual trials and tribulations of love, envy and alcohol, the subtext of the reports was one of severe financial stress within the police institution.

For instance, in March 2007 at Semarang city police station, Brigadir Satu Martinus Hance Kristianto, disgruntled at the prospect of being rotated [*dimutasi*] out of the lucrative division of internal affairs [provost], shot at the mounted frames of General Sutanto and Central Java Kapolda, Inspektur Jenderal Doddy Sumantyawan on the station wall. In the siege that followed, Kristianto took one senior officer hostage and

²⁴³ Police General, interview by author, (22 February 2007).

²⁴⁴ Unidentified Commissoned Officer, interview by author, (23 March 2007).

shot dead station deputy head Ajun Komisaris Besar Liliek Purwanto before he was himself shot by Brimob (Liputan.com, 2007). Amongst the officer class, the outrage was not directed at Kristianto or the system of rents and extraction that demands monthly rents for job postings. Instead officers spoke of blood on Sutanto's hands and of the desperate search for new, stable forms of revenue that could substitute the *judi* economy.²⁴⁵ As following sections of this chapter will show, the war on drugs, second in priority as it was to the war on gambling, provided just this very opportunity.

Wars on crime are characterised popularly and by the state as instances of 'Perfect Law' (Heyman & Campbell, 2007, p. 215) in which the sovereign applies a discrete, separate canon of law to a narrowly and often perversely defined sub-sector of the criminal market. Scholars of the state, crime and corruption have often shown these wars to be perversely theatrical (Haanstad, 2008). They are frequently violent performances which like all practices, require a combination of banal reiteration and spectacular ritual to form the basic referent of the state – that of sovereignty (Hansen & Stepputat, 2005, p. 7). In the face of 'internally fragmented, unevenly distributed and unpredictable configurations of political authority,' (Ibid, p. 3) wars on crime invoke the re-fortification of borders, the delineation and disciplining of the degenerate criminal body within, and the reclamation of legitimate violence for the state. Scholarship has shown the mimetic, hollow quality of wars against crime, whether because state actors themselves are strategising agents, deeply invested in the economy of the very trade they are trying to root out (McCoy, 2007) or due to the slippery qualities of law and its discretionary application itself. As Heyman and

²⁴⁵ Fieldnotes (12 April 2007). Unidentified Commissioned Officer, interview by author, (23 March 2007).

Campbell illustrate, the strictures of ‘Perfect Law’ are easily punctured by gendered relations of kinship, reciprocity, local intimacies and other tacit acceptances of illegal activity by the state (2007). As we have seen, for the eradication of gambling to be effective, a theatre of law enforcement had to take place at the expense of the criminal body. However as we will see the war on narcotics, having the relatively genuine intent to eradicate, required the transgression of law in other, violent and perverse ways. In both cases, the very source of law enforcement and the implementation of ‘Perfect Law’ invited law’s very infraction.

The previous section presented evidence that demonstrates that the flurry of raids, arrests and prosecutions that made up Sutanto’s war against gambling was a largely theatrical exercise that masked high-level politicking and manoeuvring that occurred at the heart of the executive. In contrast, because of the unique structure of the illicit narcotics industry, I argue that the means of revenue gathering provided by the war on drugs provides us with a nuanced and complex illustration of the ways that agents of corruption combine material interest and morality to create modes of revenue generation that are not legal, but licit (Pardo, 2004). Despite being starved of revenue, Indonesian police officers have not established a parallel protection economy for the market of illicit narcotics even though the war on drugs must simultaneously put a premium on any such service. Instead, officers choose to develop and intensify mechanisms of rent-seeking around the *kasus* economy. Through the widespread arrest, torture, blackmail and prosecution of small-time drug offenders, criminal investigations units are able to make up for the shortfall of gambling revenues and stabilise a new economy of off-budget finance for the police institution.

That abuses of legal procedure and brute violence are deemed preferable to a protection economy around narcotics producers and dealers indicates the ways in which morality and corruption are drawn into complex relationships that ‘create internal distinctions within the field of illegality, beyond the simple dichotomy between conformity to and deviance from formal rules’ (ibid, p. 14). Indeed, what the torture of small-time narcotics offenders suggests is that practices of police corruption refract a wider template of ideas about legitimate and illegitimate targets of abuses of power that chime with notions of state sovereignty and power. As Agamben reminds us, the criminal body may be killed, but not sacrificed. The torture of criminal body, that ‘form of life that is beyond the reach of dignity and full humanity and thus not even a subject of benevolent power, is the most elementary operation of sovereign power’ (Hansen & Stepputat, 2005, p. 17).

As we have seen in Section 1 of this thesis, in Indonesia the torture of the criminal body by the *kampung* is an accepted practice of territorial identification. The torture of certain specific criminal bodies by police similarly accumulates widespread public support for ‘the public excuses in the police, what it would excuse in itself’ (Bayley, 1996, p. 286). Thus, the form that this new mechanism of police corruption is taking is not an aberration of social norms but a statement of affirmation for wider conceptions about the relationship between the debased, criminal body, legitimate citizenship and the logic of sovereign violence.

Sutanto’s anti-narcotics drive was hardly the first of Indonesia’s attempts to ‘eliminate’ the drug trade. Even during the Suharto years, the ritual of burning illicit booty or showcasing trafficked narcotics hauls on sateen blue tablecloths before the

press, was a staple of police work. This was however, the first time a *Kapolri* had maintained personal responsibility for such an operation and committed so comprehensively to a strategy of harm reduction and supply minimalisation through unprecedented levels of inter-departmental and international coordination.²⁴⁶ As a result, there were some significant successes in the early months of Sutanto's tenure. In November 2005, the newly established narcotics unit within MABES Polri raided the third biggest amphetamines factory in the world in Banten amid a series of significant Metro Jaya seizures of chemical precursors and product clustered primarily around Central, North and West Jakarta and Tangerang. Most of those arrested were (and continue to be) *peranakan Tionghoa* producers and their *pribumi* dealers and couriers.

This was no theatre: the successes of the drug war are directly measurable on the ground. Throughout the country, drug users continue to complain that the supply of marijuana from Aceh and heroin (*putaw*) from South Asia is becoming increasingly stilted (see Table 7). In the major cities, the drought on *putaw* is forcing innovative solutions. Indonesia's *pemakai putaw* (heroin users) are becoming accustomed to counterfeiting or bribing pharmacists and doctors to obtain Subutex prescriptions. Ground up, mixed with water and injected, the synthetic substitute opioid gives a similar high.²⁴⁷

²⁴⁶ Twenty six departments were involved in the effort to reduce the drug supply including immigration and the department for health.

²⁴⁷ Thank you to Gabor Somogyi for clarifying this point.

Table 7: Seizures of Marijuana, Heroin, Ecstasy and *Shabu* by the Indonesian Police 2004-2009 (Polri, 2009)²⁴⁸

Narcotic (in grams)	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009 (March)
Marijuana ²⁴⁹ (millions of grams)	8.5	22.8	11.7	31.8	140.7	9.5
Heroin ²⁵⁰	13,528	19,799	11,902	14,691	29,053	1,224
Ecstasy (in no. pills)	251,078	255,016	466,907	1,195,305	1,091,204	150,490
<i>Shabu</i> ²⁵¹	28,406	262,803.	1,241,200	622,356	709,854.	73,519.

These achievements notwithstanding, the continuing war on *narkoba* has achieved nowhere near the level of success as the war on gambling. The supply of synthetic drugs in particular seems impervious to the stringent enforcement of law. Freed from the traditional impediments of territory - agricultural farming, high-start up rates, long and complicated supply chains, labyrinthine transportation routes and international borders - the production of amphetamines is thriving domestically. The drug trade's tenacity, as compared to the overnight disappearance of *judi*, is often cited as proof that the police provide *beking* to traffickers of illicit narcotics. In fact, it means the reverse. The ongoing struggle to halt the circulation of illegal drugs highlights in

²⁴⁸ Adapted from Polri, 2009, p. 20-21. Irjen Sutanto replaced Irjen Makbul Padmanegara as head of BNN in March 2005. I Made Pastika was appointed head of BNN in December 2005. In June 2008, Gories Mere moved from Detachment 88 to replace Pastika. Bambang Hendarso Danuri took over as Kapolri at the end of September, 2008.

²⁴⁹ Almost all of Indonesia's marijuana supply is grown in Aceh, transiting through Medan or Jakarta to the rest of the archipelago. *Ibid.* pg 12.

²⁵⁰ The measuring unit is not given. Heroin comes to Indonesia via the 'Golden Crescent' of Karachi, Kathmandu/New Delhi/Dubai and Medan/Jakarta or Pekanbaru. *Ibid.* pg. 10.

²⁵¹ This is methamphetamine hydrochloride also known as ice or crack, widely associated in Indonesia (as in the West) with youth culture, nightlife and productive work.

stark relief just how close the gambling industry was to state structures. In contrast, the economy of illegal narcotics is a ‘*rapi*’ [neat, ordered] industry, in that it is discrete, professionalised and operates free of the crude cultural politics of protection that characterises Indonesia’s criminal sub-terrain.²⁵²

If as Gupta has shown us, the murky internal workings of the state are often discursively constructed by civilians as a powerful, coherent sector of high politicking and conspiracy (Gupta, 1995), the state’s internal agents are also given to similar processes of reification. The internal life of Polri is one of concentrated speculation, elaborate political strategising, gossamer alliances, and innumerable crosses and double crosses. Curiously, there is frequent disjuncture between the belief in the pervasiveness of the institution’s corrupt practices and the actual empirical evidence of wrongdoing (Pardo, 2004, p. 9).

At the senior levels of Polri, there was intense discussion that the financial stress caused by the realisation of the prohibition on gambling had forced lower-rung officers to turn to the trade of trafficking narcotics to generate revenue.²⁵³ There was no doubt that the absence of stable proceeds from the gambling trade turned lower and middle ranking officers to providing protection to drug dealers. In the wake of Sutanto’s war on *judi*, one officer confessed that, ‘we at the bottom [*di bawah*] look for money through fraternisation [*gaul*]...now we are closer to the criminals, including drug dealers.’²⁵⁴ Moreover, certain types of drug taking are routine within the police community. Pine observes the way that the use of amphetamines has become normalised amongst professionalised working cultures most vulnerable to

²⁵² Field Notes (24 March 2007)

²⁵³ Field Notes (22 March 2007).

²⁵⁴ Low ranking police officer, interview by author, (21 March 2007).

demands for productivity at a certain, fetishised *speed* (Pine, 2007). Members of Polri, beholden as they are to the prestige economy of a burgeoning transnational criminal justice complex, are not immune to these cultural flows.²⁵⁵ The work of *reskrim* and *intel* officers tends to occupy peculiar hours, working well into the night and missing the 7am *apel* [roll call]. The recreational use of amphetamines such as ecstasy [*inex*] is fairly widespread amongst officers, particularly those in *reskrim* or intelligence who have access to an ongoing stash of narcotics through the evidence locker.²⁵⁶ The liberal supply of amphetamines is part and parcel of lubricating the horizontal, internal relationships on '*hiburan*' [entertainment] work outings.

But despite the prolific use of drugs by officers, the police's involvement in the narcotics trade is heavily circumscribed. *Narkoba*, sniffed Indonesia's dealers, users, *preman* and officers, is for the *cerecere* or the *ikan teri* (anchovies) of the police apparatus.²⁵⁷ These are the coarse and unseemly non-commissioned officers who extort rents from even the most plebeian potentials for revenue, like the prostitutes who live in shacks along the rail-road or unorganised street urchins. Again the derivation of revenue, even illicit monies, possess complex internal borders of varying legitimacy that shape the contours of practices of corruption. Another senior officer told me of a very well-known general, who as Kapolda in eastern Indonesia, had

²⁵⁵ In Bangkok, the US Government has established the International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA) which offers highly coveted placements to its criminal investigation courses to CID officers around the region. The prestige and potential job advancement that participation in these courses offers means that a significant economy for these placements has emerged within Polri. For an uncritical but detailed analysis of global police education (Kratcosk & Das 2007). By contrast, Hanstaad calls these initiatives evidence of 'a burgeoning criminal justice industrial complex' wherein the biometric and surveillance technologies of the West are exported to repressive policing systems (Haanstad, 2008, p. 23).

²⁵⁶ Field Notes (10 February 2007). The problem is so severe that in late 2008, then Chief of Criminal Research and current National Chief of Police, General Bambang Hendarso Danuri proposed institutional and policy changes that would actually provide immunity to the detective class from the Polri's disciplinary code under the reasoning that officers needed to consume illicit narcotics as part of being 'under cover'. Bareskrim Officer, interview by author, (20 July 2008)

²⁵⁷ Ibid.

pursued money with such dogged relentlessness that he had established relations with local drug producers and traffickers.²⁵⁸ Rather than rejoice at the opening up of a new source of revenue for the station, this morally distasteful economy made other senior officers in the Polda extremely nervous. The Kapolda was known as *gila* [mad, or out of control] and his perceived greed significantly weakened his authority.

Unlike the illicit gambling industry where the power of the tycoons was mirrored in the shifting hierarchies of the national political elite, *narkoba* has no *beking* for who can take pride in being associated with it? Within the Indonesian police, practices directed at the pursuit of illicit capital do not freewheel unbound from social and moral norms. Rather, these social and legal norms play out perversely within the range of practices of corruption, delineating its safe and ambivalent terrains. The anthropology of corruption frequently criticises academic scholarship for conflating corruption's two distinct meanings: unlawful activity and moral deterioration (Anders & Nuijten 2007). But for those involved in corruption, the overlap between morality and practice is necessary to its perpetuation.

As such, relationships between police and dealers of narcotics appear to be secret, individualised, short term and subject to intense fluctuation. Being socially distasteful, they are fragile and, crucially, this limits their ability to yield maximum revenues. This reveals a second field of overlap between morality and institutionalised corruption, that the twinning of moral values with certain corrupt acts has real material effect. If institutional mechanisms of illicit wealth creation are to be effective, reliable and fiscally prosperous, they need to be embedded in practices that

²⁵⁸ Field notes (9 September 2006).

are shared and social. The disparity with the off-budget economy of gambling could not be more stark. Where associations with big league gamblers were passed on from posting to posting and where funds were distributed regularly, evenly and widely, associations with drug dealers are individual, hidden, temporary and maintained by lower rung officers. In the narcotics industry, *beking* is not watertight. As testimonies from drug users and dealers revealed, once a small to medium time dealer was labelled TO, *target operasi* (operational target) within the drug war, protection from an individual officer becomes worthless.²⁵⁹

The fact remains that the war on drugs was and continues to be a serious affair for Polri policy makers and hence, the illicit drug industry can never be a long-term, financial substitute for the illicit gaming industry. Under General Sutanto's tenure, the key police secondment to the National Body on Narcotics was filled by solid and reasonably 'clean' police professionals.²⁶⁰ The immense weight of social disapproval for drug taking coupled with the level of buy-in from Polri's top brass for the war on

²⁵⁹ At risk of over-complicating my argument, there is one group of dealers who are clearly protected by the police and these are the thin band of former middle level *Tionghoa* casino employees who maintain a foothold in Jakarta's entertainment industry by working as managers in the clubs and bars of the consortium. Because alcohol and entrance fee revenues are on the whole quite low, these individuals keep the floor awash with amphetamines turning their hospitality staff into small time dealers. The managers are well known to the police and left alone, but the clubs do tend to be occasionally raided by *reskrim* officers. If the managers get 'too big' in the amphetamines industry, turning into producers rather than facilitators of the trade, they are subject to *negotiated* arrest and prosecution. Clearly this constitutes a form of protection of the narcotics industry however that very protection is grounded in the former *beking* relationship between Polri and casino gambling. Field Notes (20 June 2010).

²⁶⁰ In March 2005, General Sutanto himself was appointed to Kepala Pelaksana Harian at the BNN by then Kapolri Dai Bachtiar, replacing General Makbul Padmanegara. From the time General Sutanto was made Kapolri (July 2005) until December 2005, Sutanto kept the position empty, maintaining personal responsibility for the operation against illegal narcotics. In December 2005, he appointed General I Made Pastika to the position who held it until June 2008, when he was replaced by General Gories Mere. Pastika and Mere, both non-Muslims close to international police donors were known to be professional, trustworthy officers loyal to the Kapolri. In his career, Pastika had two particularly significant experiences, firstly as Kapolda Papua during the assassination of Theys Eluay where he managed to avert major violence between Jakarta and the Eluay's mourners in Jayapura and secondly as Kapolda Bali when the first Bali bomb attack in Kuta in 2003. General Gories Mere's work in the anti-terror squad, Detachment 88, had received similar acclaim and he was frequently referred to as the golden boy, '*anak 'mas'* of Sutanto. The appointment of these two police heavyweights to the BNN signifies the extent to which General Sutanto took the war on drugs as a major priority during his term.

drugs means that the establishment of closer relations between Polri and the illicit drug industry to replace the gambling industry is a highly risky undertaking for career officers.

And so the conundrum for the average Polri officer: the war on vices doubled up in this way had stripped police officers (and indeed, the rest of the political, security and bureaucratic elite) of their financial security while the internal, moral limits of corruption do not allow the simple substitution of one illicit economy for another. How could officers safely and securely supplant their income? What off-budget economy in the realm of police authority had the necessary qualities of stability, moral respectability and sociability to provide for the force at all levels?

The answer lies in the police's traditional mainstay, the law itself. Newly restored to the institution, their authority over the domain of law is now invulnerable to attacks by other coercive institutions. Moreover, the overall context of democratisation calls for the kind of institutional professionalism and strengthening of rule of law exercises that General Sutanto so aggressively pursued with the dual wars on vices. What the war on gambling took away could be replaced through the implementation of law itself, at a time of unprecedented legal activity, of wars against Yudhoyono's '*lima jenis kejahatan*,' wars against corruption, illegal logging, illegal fishing, petrol smuggling and of course, the punitive strategy that made up the war against drugs. All of these factors collided to one spectacular, unintended consequence; that of intensifying the shift of the off-budget police economy from one of crude, illicit protectionism to the realm of legality itself.

In this way, the severance of systematic and institutionalised ties to Indonesia's illicit sites of gaming changed the face of the off-budget parmin economy of the police to a parmas economy, moving illicit police financing from the protection of the physical coordinates of territory to a greater reliance on extraction and rent seeking based on the authorities of rational governance. In the eyes of Polri's membership, this represented a move from a straight up 'criminal' territorial economy to a more 'legal' economy in which revenue is generated from the legitimate authorities exercised by the institution.²⁶¹ 'Sekarang kita jual perkara [now I sell cases],' an officer shrugged.²⁶²

Extraction and the Economy of Torture

The war on drugs is largely carried out by *reskrim* officers organised into individual task forces [*satgas*] either subsumed beneath or working in conjunction with the new narcotics unit. These satgas are often highly autonomous and led by an up and coming career officer with the tasks of designing anti-narcotics operations and locating funding for operations as well as the livelihood of his men. Because of the autonomy they enjoy, particular satgas are often said by the criminal underworld to possess individualised temperaments and operate in signature 'styles.'

Despite the diversity and the cult of personality around the *satgas*, some broad patterns emerge in the police's *modus operandi* of the drug war. Officers seek to *pegang* [grip, or hold sway over] dealers from their areas, who can be held to ransom

²⁶¹ Police General, interview by author, (22 February 2007).

²⁶² The use of *kita*, 'we', generally include everyone present, including the addressee. However as the officer was speaking directly to me with only *preman* around him, I translate *kita* in this context to mean, I. Unidentified Commissioned Officer, interview by author, (21 March 2007).

against a raft of potential charges. This is a policy known as '*satu dilepas, 2 ditangkap*' [one is let go for two to be caught]. Through *gaul* [repeated fraternisation and acts of gift-giving, such as the sharing of cigarettes and food] and a monthly salary (sometimes up to Rp 1 million [US\$112]), these low level criminal offenders are groomed and mobilised to capture other bigger, dealers. People entangled in this relationship are often pitied by the wider drug community as *cepu* [pawn], *spion* [spy] or *informan* [informants]. For the criminal suspect, forced alliances with the national police are fragile, ungovernable and ultimately treacherous as they can sometimes serve as good fillers when officers fail to meet the monthly arrest targets set up by the Kapolri. These targets do not distinguish between charges of use, possession (as addicts or couriers, many of the latter being children) or the severity and quantity of the narcotics trafficked and it is this deficiency that makes the urban poor and addicts so very vulnerable to arrest and demands for extraction.

The *kasus* economy, as we have seen, is not a new dimension of the off-budget illicit economy and if stabilised its potential for revenue are mind-boggling. The strengthening of the Anti-Corruption Commission under the Yudhoyono government and the ongoing war on corruption has done much to pin down *kasus* money as a regular and shared source of revenue as Indonesia's political and business elite scramble to the Polda and MABES Polri to cut them an easier deal. However, at the bottom rung of the *kasus* economy, Sutanto's war on drugs nets tens of thousands of users, couriers and low-level drug dealers whose fiscal clout is limited (See Table 8). If this unwanted congregation of social riffraff could be made productive, then the gains to the polsek, polres and polda stood to be enormous. The question was how

could an entrepreneurial officer compel payment from a class of people with so little to lose?




Table 8: Number of Criminal Suspects on Narcotics Charges 2004-2009. The data for 2009 ends in March. If arrests continue at that same rate, the number of arrested for 2009 will be 36,796, just above the figures for 2007. I have not been able to find any police data which differentiates these numbers based on type of charge (Polri, 2009, p. 19).

Herein lies the rub for the poor and the vulnerable that make up a significant subset of Jakarta's illicit narcotics industry: tilling the framework of law into fertile *lahan* requires a malevolent twinning of a police force's legal functions, the authority to the lawful use of coercion and the provision of law enforcement. The use of torture during arrest and interrogation is integral to the process by which the enforcement of law transfers its financial rewards. Violence gives extortion its urgent edge. This is how practices of torture in criminal arrest and detention actually increase at the very same time that Indonesia is consolidating one of the world's most successful transitions to democracy.

By 2007, just 18 months into General Sutanto's war on drugs, human rights, legal and harm reduction organisations were beginning to notice a disturbing spike in cases of police abuse of drug users. In 2007, the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture visited Indonesia, touring prisons and interviewing inmates. In his report, he noted that 'detainees interviewed indicated that ill-treatment was used primarily to extract confession, or in the cases of drug related crimes, to receive information on drug suppliers. In a number of cases, detainees were offered to be spared in return for the payment of a substantial amount of money.' Although Nowak's report was released to the press, its findings generated very little public interest.²⁶³ In 2008, the Jakarta Legal Aid institute released a report suggesting that of the 367 detainees surveyed in the greater Jakarta region, 81% had been subject to some form of physical, verbal or psychological violence (Jakarta Legal Aid, 2008). In a 2007 survey of 1106 drug users, Jangkar, the Indonesian harm reduction network, found that over 60% of participants had experienced physical abuse from the police and over 36% had

²⁶³ Nowak's report preceded Indonesia's obligatory submission to the UN Committee Against Torture in 2008. Although Polri did not respond to Nowak's report, Polri's Legal Division headed up by Arianto Sutadi did liaise and respond to NGOs submitting their reports to the committee.

negotiated bribes.²⁶⁴ Again, once announced to the public, the findings failed to generate any static. A report issued one year later by Amnesty International echoed Jangkar's results, declaring that suspects interviewed by Amnesty International were beaten or subjected to other forms of torture or other ill-treatment unless they could pay bribes' (Amnesty International, 2009, p. 40). In all the reports, testimonies of arrests formed a clear pattern of beatings followed by demands for bribes. The story of 'Irfan,' featured in the 2009 Amnesty International report was typical of the testimonies.

I was arrested in February 2008, I was done in by a police informant. I had about a gram of the stuff on me. When I was arrested, I was beaten, punched, slapped. They said, 'where's your dealer, you're a dealer aren't you?' They said, 'don't worry, we'll free you as long as you tell us the name of someone who uses, who has some money, do you know anyone like that?' I gave them the name of my dealer but still they drove me to the football field in Tangerang.

They took out their guns and said, why don't you run across that field? I knew if I did it, I would be shot. One of the officers closed my eyes and I thought it was actually going to happen so I yelled, 'but Pak, I'm not a thief, Pak, I'm just a drug user. I don't harm anyone else, I just harm myself! Pak, don't beat me, I've got no money, I'm just a user.' After that, he stopped. We got back in the car. When we were in the car they said, do you want to do '86'?²⁶⁵ Pay us Rp 200 million [US\$22 000] and we'll set you free. I don't have that sort of money, so I thought, I'll just do my time (Ibid, p. 26).

²⁶⁴ The disparity of some 30% between users alleging violence and bribery is no surprise. In my own interviews, I found that criminal suspects speak far easier of torture, in which power relations are so clearly distorted, than bribery, where suspects fear that their moral authority as a victim of the state is compromised by the mutually beneficial outcomes that graft provides. Extracting comprehensive stories of corruption from defendants in the criminal justice system requires a serious methodological shift, from large scale polling to fine tuned, protracted ethnographic interviewing.

²⁶⁵ To 86 is the euphemism for paying a bribe to escape charge.

Polri torture follows an established repertoire that is unique to the institution. In almost every other country in the world, the risk of torture increases with the length of detention.²⁶⁶ This is not the case in Indonesia, where torture is almost always front-loaded to the beginning of the judicial process prior to detainment.

Interviews with criminal suspects revealed a script of violence and extortion: users or addicts are captured, often at night, by two or three plain clothed officers during or just after the purchase of marijuana, *shabu* [amphetamines] or *putaw* [heroin] from their routine, trusted dealers. They are tortured (usually beaten, sometimes with a large, heavy object), squeezed into an unmarked vehicle and driven around the city, sometimes for hours [*dibawah keliling*]. In the car, criminal suspects are beaten and their hands and feet are burnt with cigarettes before being offered release for an initial, very large payment. For users and small time dealers, payments range anywhere from one to 200 million rupiah (US\$ 100 – US\$ 20,000). The exact sum depends on an idiosyncratic calculation which includes factors such as how officers surmise the severity of the crime (measured usually in grams of illegal narcotic or willingness of the officer to ‘plant’ larger amounts on the offender) multiplied by police perceptions of the capital accessible to offenders and internal factors, such as upcoming costs for operations and pressure from supervisors. Nonetheless, this sum could be bargained down as much as a quarter of the initial amount. *Tionghoa* users consistently feel that bribes for release were higher than for other ethnicities.

Most users are extremely frightened and disorientated during this bargaining process. Rejection frequently leads to an escalation in the violence, such as threats to be killed

²⁶⁶ I thank Tim Parritt for this point.

whilst sustaining beatings and kickings or being driven to certain spiritually potent sites – graveyards, empty fields, ‘*hutan*’ [forest] – and threatened with a gun.²⁶⁷ These incidents usually end shamefully, with suspects crying and begging for their lives. Irfan in the story above was ordered to run across a field. He refused, surmising that he will be shot in the back and his death reported as proper police procedure for halting an escaping suspect. Many other testimonies gathered corroborated Irfan’s experience. Repeat offenders are sometimes shot in the calves or feet or pistols are placed on their side on their shins or tops of their feet and fired.²⁶⁸ The violence here is urgent because agreements made in the car, on the field or in the graveyard go unlogged by other officers and superiors at the station who are expecting their cut.²⁶⁹ Officers making the arrest can thus choose to split it between themselves or others in their *satgas*, outside of the knowledge of the chief of staff, head of station and his deputy.

Torture outside the station, at the site of arrest or in the car, is also designed to draw a suspect into a humiliating perfidy. For the poorest of the poor, the value of bribes are often dropped if a suspect can hand over [*nyanyi*, to sing, or *menunjuk*, to point out] someone with greater fiscal potential.

Ibu Cici was shamed by her own treachery. She cried when her friend was bundled into the back seat, thumbs tied together behind his back. ‘*Saya daya sama polisi. Bok, sorry Bok, habis ngak tahan digebukin*’ [I was tricked by police. Bok, I’m sorry Bok,

²⁶⁷ Traditionally, to enter these kinds of spaces one would have to ask permission from the ‘spirits,’ particularly at the spiritually loaded times in which officers are hauling criminal offenders across their threshold. That police routinely barge into such areas uninvited, and indeed make them their own sites of police authority, speaks of Polri’s territorialisation of the spiritual world.

²⁶⁸ Urban squatter, interview by author, (15 July 2008).

²⁶⁹ Unidentified Commissioned Officer, interview by author, (23 March 2007).

its just that I couldn't handle being beaten up].²⁷⁰ Ferry, a heroin addict, described his arrest just six months after the declaration of the war on drugs in a central Jakarta marketplace at midnight. He was beaten with a wooden plank, mainly on the shins and legs, and then caged under a rattan chicken coop.

Confess!' They said, 'Confess!' But the *buser*, who seemed to have a higher job position, said, enough of this, just take him to the station. I was taken to the main road. But we didn't get into a police car. We went in a cab. We were three, and I was in the middle and as the cab drove, they bargained with me. 'Hey can you get us Rp 40 million [US\$4500] tonight? If you can get the 40, I'll let you go.' I said, 'I don't have any money, I don't have anything like that.' He said, 'Ok, you tell us a friend who is also a user, but pick someone with some money, someone who can provide us with some cash. Do you know someone like that?' I said, 'its midnight, how do I find someone like that? I don't know anyone like that.' They said, 'Ok. Fine.' And then they started to beat me, 'Then you are going to die,' he yelled. 'You are going to die.'²⁷¹

Suspects are drawn into the torture and processes of extraction of the accomplices they ratted out. A female narcotics courier told me that at the start of the war on drugs,

They took us to a house in Cempaka Putih.²⁷² It was empty, but it was the place for Team 5.²⁷³ There were lots of cars there, but no-one was wearing a uniform. They took me there, but they didn't hurt me, they just threatened me with a gun. One officer grabbed my shirt and said, why don't you take it off for us? There were ten officers from other units watching me and I cried and said, please *Pak*, don't do this. Eventually he stopped. In another room, the

²⁷⁰ Urban squatter, interview by author, (15 July 2008).

²⁷¹ Amnesty International. 2009. Pg 19.

²⁷² A suburb of central Jakarta.

²⁷³ Narcotics unit 5 of Metro Jaya.

Nigerian was being tortured and they made me watch. They electrocuted him, washed him down with water, and electrocuted him again. It went on for ages. We were there from 9pm till 2am, but I only watched a bit of it. I was crying and screaming. That boy [*cowok*] was tortured over and over again. The police said to me, ‘tell him Sri, tell him that if he just confesses, it will all be over. Tell him he just has to give us his account number [*rekening*].’ Turns out he had hundreds of millions of rupiah in there. The police wanted to know the PIN number. Because the police are basically just robbers [*perampok*].²⁷⁴

If no deals for release are made and if this process fails to extract the names of richer users and dealers, suspects are then taken to the station where they are held separate from other detainees in a room habitually used by arresting *satgas*. Processes of interrogation are known as starting one’s BAP or *Berita Acara Pemeriksaan* [police investigation report].²⁷⁵ Writing the BAP usually begins within a few hours of arrival at the station at 2 or 3am, and often involves different officers from the personnel that conduct the arrest. Interrogation is intimately involved with confession and punctuated by different modes of torture.

Suspects claim that they are kicked by booted feet, beaten with pistol butts punched, slapped, stripped, hosed down and forced to sit in air-conditioning or their fingers are crammed underneath chair legs and sat on and burnt with cigarettes. Less frequently, offenders are electrocuted, tied up and soaked in *bak mandi* [a ceramic tub for holding bathing water] for hours, groped or raped. During the writing of the BAP and for the period that this report is inconclusive, the suspect’s family and extended kin are called

²⁷⁴ Sri – Heroin courier, interview by author, (14 July 2008).

²⁷⁵ The BAP contains the police’s investigation of the subject, including witnesses, documentary and physical evidence and questioning, including a suspect’s ‘confession’. The BAP’s primary use is by police investigators and prosecutors in court. The BAP is the first and most important lead into the criminal justice process for a plaintiff or a defendant because all other procedural steps will flow from this singular document. Laying a charge also requires the prior writing of the BAP.

by telephone, told of the plight of the suspect and asked for money. Very often, suspects do not broker their own freedom but the terms and conditions of their release or reduced charge are conducted through these midnight phone calls to kin.²⁷⁶

Back at the station, they beat me again. We did the BAP at midnight. While we did it, they yelled at me and hit me. They just wanted money out of me so they put me under pressure. They said, ‘come on, don’t you want to 86? If you don’t have the money for it, what about reducing the evidence? If you’ve got some money, we can reduce it.’ For Rp 5 million [US\$558] the 1gm of *shabu* I had became 0.145. This meant that the article of the penal code they would charge me under went from article 62 to 60. Everything was about money, the entire BAP could be changed. Everything. (Amnesty International, 2009, p. 40).

The use of torture for the *kasus* economy is spatially defined. Torture occurs, reoccurs, escalates or recedes in the hazy space between ‘arrest’ and ‘detention.’ The finite points of legal procedure – arrest, register, interrogation, detention – are suspended and deferred so that the torture of the criminal body takes place only when the legal status of that body is indeterminate. In stark contrast to police violence elsewhere, in Indonesia practices of police torture are clustered only in the ambiguous, roily spaces in which the state is keenly absent. Observe in the testimonies of victims; the officers in civilian wear, the ‘unmade worlds’ (Scarry, 1985) of the unmarked cars, the taxis, the hours of aimless driving in the night, the graveyards, forests, abandoned fields and marketplaces and the secret homes around Jakarta independently contracted by a *satgas* commander for the purposes of torture. At the police station, the criminal body remains unlogged by the custodial registers and is kept segregated from the detainees in sealed waiting rooms, interrogation cells

²⁷⁶ Many suspects report if their extended kin were financially better off, they were also contacted by the police. Curiously, suspects had not passed on their details.

and even the offices of commanding personnel. Practices of torture are reserved for the liminal, transitional zones where the suspects have nothing, ‘no status, insignia, secular clothing, rank, kinship position, nothing to demarcate them structurally from their fellow[s]’ (Turner, 1967, p. 98). This is a form of liminality that is spatially, not temporally defined because these are Jakarta’s permanent, roaming bands of ‘bare life’...the in between forms of life, uncoded substances without fixed belongings, unprotected’ (Hansen & Stepputat, 2005, p. 275). What is remarkable is the extent to which structuring of torture in liminal space mimics the phase of violence subject to new police cadets at the academy and indeed, the forms of ‘hazing’ and torture experienced by violence workers worldwide (Barker, 1999, p. 178-84).

The corruption of arrest procedures and prosecution only ever occurs here, ‘betwixt and between’ identity, status and place, where the realities of the charge can be lent a shadowy, blurred quality. Here the sums are agreed upon (the actual exchange occurs tomorrow) and the official account of the offence is cobbled together line by line in the police investigation report. Dealer or user? Producer or courier? 1 gram or 10? How many witnesses? It is not until the financial deal has been struck that the subject transfers into the next phase of criminal procedure. With the presentation of the arrest warrant [*surat penangkapan*], the care of the suspect is relinquished to the wardens in detention where the violence-extortion nexus takes a different form entirely and illicitly gained revenues traverse alternative circuits through the police station.

It is important to acknowledge limits in corrupt or violence systems, for both have a tendency to be represented as pathological or cancerous and therefore infinite. At what point does the logic of the *kasus* economy no longer apply? Whose criminal

body may be sacrificed, and never killed? The answer, of course, lies in the stratifications and ordered, unjust hierarchies of class. The war on drugs netted thousands of the middle and upper class whose fiscal clout and connections immunised their bodies from the violence levelled at the lower class. Michael, a law student at an upper class Jakarta university, explains,

I was arrested in ... 2008 while I was getting my stuff. I bought 14 tabs of ecstasy. I drove out of *Kampung Ambon*, and suddenly I was cut off by another car. The driver got out and was holding a gun at me. He said, 'Get out of the car Pak. There's no need to panic. Don't move. We're just doing our job so be cooperative.' I was surrounded by about 10 plain-clothed officers but they showed me their ID. When we got to the station it was night, so they said, take a rest first and we'll start tomorrow. At 10am, they started doing the investigative report. There was no violence. I was offered a lawyer by the police, but I said my dad would come, because he's a lawyer. The police knew that. They didn't ask me for my dealer's name. I was not offered '86.' I was not offered to 'play the prosecutor.' They didn't ask me for anyone else's names. My letter of arrest and detention was sent to my home.²⁷⁷

In democracies, ongoing, systematic and relatively candid patterns of police torture cannot be simply ascribed to individual or even institutional traits in which violence is normalized by 'authoritarian pathologies', 'police culture', 'rotten apples' or 'violence-prone' individuals (Worden, 1996). These various explanations for police brutality presume a strict delineate between civilian and police 'culture'. This boundary has its epistemological orgins in the conceptual drawing of a determined, clear line between state and society itself when in fact ethnographic interrogation shows how the 'edges of the state are uncertain; societal elements seem to penetrate it on all sides, and the resulting boundary between state and society is difficult to

²⁷⁷ Michael, interview by author, (28 July 2008).

determine' (Mitchell, 1991, p. 88). Police violence is not randomly distributed but rather 'pain itself is grounded in culture and history' (Silverman, 2001, p. 21). Like the violence against the *Tionghoa*, practices of torture are bound up in citizenship and sovereignty. The body of the junkie, like the body of the *maling* [thief] is the body that looks like us (Siegel, 1998) but may be beaten, bruised, whipped, and electrocuted because the criminal body stands apart from the political body as its inverse. Even patterns of instrumentalist rent-seeking refract the status of the criminal as an internal other.



Figure 11: Excerpt from Human Rights Training handbook for AKPOL cadets. The title above reads:

Don't do this Mr and Ms Police! The title below declares: 'Attention! The torture of detainees or defendants is prohibited!!' The figure shows a police officer explaining his actions to a criminal suspect he is electrocuting on the feet. 'If I don't do this to you, you'll never confess!' he says. The criminal suspect cries for mercy and eventually relents, confessing that he indeed committed the act. A second officer says, seemingly to a mixed audience, 'Who else would like to have a go?' and a journalist [pers] flicks up his hand and says, 'I want to! Is hitting allowed?' Although the cartoon is childish, almost humorous, it suggests that society too is deeply invested in sustaining and tolerating practices of torture against criminal suspects. In

2008-9, the Asia Foundation recommenced its program of human rights training for the police at AKPOL and it is likely that this book is no longer used in the curriculum (PUSHAM UII, n.d).

•

In 2007, the capital's central bars and clubs teemed with the idle men of the newly terminated gambling industry in mourning. Across the city, on its very fringes, squatted the prisons and correctional facilities where wardens complained of cells newly groaning with the bruised and battered bodies of men and women on threadbare narcotics charges as couriers and users and low level pushers. What linked these two seemingly divergent phenomenon was a perverse, cataclysmic series of changes to the mechanisms of exchange in which the fantasies of a rational and lawful order by a president and his police school mate, constrained as they were by the politics of capital, met the cultural conceptions of morality, money and licit, legitimate exchange of the police institution.

The war on vices twinned the termination of casino gambling with a war on narcotics, divesting the police of the central pillar of its parmin economy. Rather than establish a parallel protection economy for the narcotics trade, the moral calculus of Indonesian police corruption expanded and developed the *kasus* economy in ways that replicated the community's exclusion of 'bare life,' bodies subjected to biopolitics, but not involved in politics' (Stepputat, 2005, p. 62). Like the decontamination of 'hot money' [*uang panas*] through its vertical and horizontal circulation among police kin, this chapter has shown that even tortuous acts of illicit accumulation, which are by

definition transgressive or deviant, trace perverse lines of morality, legitimacy and licitness embedded within political society.

Finally, the findings of this chapter reinforce the conclusions of Section One in arguing that the move from coercive-authoritarian to civil-juridical governance has stimulated a parallel change in the methods and targets of illicit resource extraction. The police have abandoned the protection economies around the gambling and narcotics industries, either by the force of the police command or by the force of moral norms, and moved toward the exercise of law as a means for criminal extraction. This has meant that processes of illicit accumulation have been further enfolded within the state.

Democratisation is frequently associated with rising lawlessness and surges in criminality and post-authoritarian Indonesia have been no stranger to that debate. But as this chapter has shown, attempts to enforce the rule of law have led to a further enfolding of criminal practices within the body of the state, from a brute protection industry around criminal acts to an increase in practices where tithes and bribes are levered from the laws and authorities of the state. The new criminality of the police ‘does not so much repudiate the rule of law or the licit operations of the market, as appropriate their forms and recommission their substance’ (Comaroff & Comaroff, 2006, p. 5). In this way, we see how successful democratisation can unfold at the same time as the state’s relationship to criminality is hardening behind the mask of law.

Conclusion

Criminality and illicit practice has been a constituent element in the formation of the Indonesian state and despite its regulating promise, democratisation has not eradicated this critical delinquent element. The state's dependent relationship to illicit practices continues though no longer in identifiably 'criminal' practices. This thesis shows the way that the rise of the police and the dramatic expansion in their off-budget economy has paralleled the demise of traditional opportunities of illicit extraction and the enfolding of new mechanisms of corruption within the forms and practices that come bundled with democratisation such as the fragmentation of power, the exercise of law, civil society and democratic security sector reform.

At the same time, the findings of this thesis do not chart a simple, static seesaw motion between TNI and Polri. Democratisation may not lead necessary to an idealised and lauded democracy, but nor does it merely reassign old players to new political pegs. Multiple pressures pull the form and organisation of state criminality into different and sometimes conflicting arrangements. For instance, although this dissertation charts the triumph of the police over the military, in fact the reconfiguration of the off-budget economy has taken place on top of the contours of New Order arrangements of power. The TNI retains its territorial grip and many of the spoils of power and patronage that comes with it. Most police officers, along with many ordinary Indonesians, believe that democracy is only one more phase in the long and convoluted criminal politics of the Indonesian state. For this reason, what appears as a "demilitarization" of state force is popularly taken as merely a

“reorganisation”, which will inevitably be reorganised anew in favour of the military or some other security body. This explains the frenzied nature of Polri’s illicit accumulation and the absence expansion of off-budget economy that feeds it.

Other things suggest that the findings of this dissertation are only a snapshot of a relationship in transition. The failure of the police to reciprocate appropriately to their Tionghoa patrons. The fiscal pressure created by eradication of the all-important casino economy, that central funding source for the entire Indonesian state. The fragmentation of power, ushering in a never-ending crowd of fixers, brokers, middle men and other ‘mini Suhartos’ intercepting lines of authority to claim their ‘cut’ which has increased corruption ‘costs’ exponentially. All of these things suggest that state criminality as it is today is not a functioning system and that the state’s relationship to illicit practices is likely to shift again in response to the points of friction.

In this thesis, I have drawn attention to invisible connections of cause and consequence pulsing below the surface of the city as the country’s experiences the multiple, asynchronous and often contradictory processes of democratisation. I have linked the demise of Jakarta’s illegal gambling economy to the intensification practices of state violence against the urban poor and the rise of the capital’s new commodity and property tsars. I have correlated emergent *Tionghoa* civic practices with the increasing frenzy of rites of tribute and benefaction to the unstable, democratic state. This correspondence between seemingly disparate phenomenon, actors and markets are not born of my informants conclusions but are mine alone to be responsible for.

Contributions to a body of knowledge do not just fill gaps in scholarship. More often their impact is to reveal them or spur questions about possible crevices that lie below the surface. This thesis is no different. I wish to issue caution to the reader against conflating this hidden face of Jakarta with an inner kernel of ‘truth’ that exposes the lie of everyday state order and legality. Instead, we must understand that whatever ‘facts’ are revealed here have been rudely yanked out and decontextualised from the covert practices and networks of power that underpin, subvert, sustain and engage with what we conventionally know as the political system. So exposed, they are naked and bereft of the alternative constellations of knowledge that sustain, explain and contextualise them. It is our task to recognize the creation of knowledge as precisely that - a creation - placed into clear, digestible narratives that serve an explanatory purpose. We must discern their revelation as always and necessarily partial and question the perimeters and packages in which they are served. Thus, the key problematic of the material presented in this thesis is not its divulging of ‘truth’ or otherwise, but its implicit boundaries. How does it come to be that these particular subterranean patterns of power are within the range of that which might be known?

To answer that question, we must return to the two primary subjects of this thesis: the figure of the Polri officer and the *Tionghoa* entrepreneur as the gambling tycoon, benefactor or property tsar. This thesis conjoins the figure of coercion and law with that of capital and unlike the others, this partnership came first and foremost on the suggestion of my informants. But why is it specifically *their* illegal practices and illicit revenue flows that emerge in this work and not those of the myriad other actors who ply Indonesia’s political landscape and are embedded in similarly powerful

networks and extractive mechanisms? The answer lies in the hidden twinning of the Polri officer and the Tionghoa capitalist. Both represent what Jauregui calls ‘an Internal Other’, an inferior but necessary subject within Indonesian political society (Jauregui, 2010, p. 14). Police and the *Tionghoa* perform sullied functions within modern Indonesian society. The *Tionghoa* run the economy and are seen as fatally infected by vast accumulations of wealth controlled by their communities. Similarly the police’s brutalisation and terrorizing of the lower class comes at the behest of the wider community who shrug off such sticky obligations. The figure of the *Tionghoa* and the police officer have something uniquely uncanny and treacherous to them.

Is it this that made their illicit practices knowable to me? Taxi drivers dropping me off at Mabes Polri or Artha Graha would issue dark warnings to be careful. Informants appeared initially reluctant, and yet were still disposed to speak of Tionghoa and police and their illicit practices. What all of this suggests is that within the domain of the secret, internal stratifications make certain perimeters of knowledge possible and others concealed completely. So, this thesis should be read for its gaps – the absence of sustained discussion around the criminality of a post-authoritarian military, the silence around indigenous business relationships with the police, the fixation with one set of Tionghoa business entrepreneurs at, conceivably, the expense of other rival groups. In this way, the reader must see this thesis as revealing as much as it conceals because the research upon which it rests was formed out of the asymmetrical and perverse lines of legitimacy and deviance within the society in which data was collected. Knowing this should make us rather more attentive to unearthing other missing narratives of democratic regime change.

Bibliography

Maps

Dinas Pertahanan dan Pemetaan, 2003, *Peta DKI Jakarta*, Dinas Pertahanan dan Pemetaan, Pemerintah Indonesia, Jakarta.

Newspaper Articles, authored

Anggoro, Kusnanto, 2003, 'Perish the False Hope of Real Military Reform', *Jakarta Post*, 30 December.

Friedman, Thomas, 2000, 'Foreign Affairs: What a Mess!', *New York Times*, 3 October.

Junaidi, Achmad, 2002, 'Illegal gambling business generates huge money', *Jakarta Post*, 16 April.

Junaidi, Ahmad, 2002, 'Bina Dana Sosial Foundation Wants to Provide Island Casino Security', *Jakarta Post*, 19 April,
<http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2002/04/19/bina-dana-sosial-foundation-wants-provide-island-casino-security.html>. Viewed 26 January 2008. Jakarta Post Archives.

Junaidi, Ahmad & Emmanuelle, Annastashya, 2002, 'Taufik Kiemas, Tommy Winata 'meet' in Thousand Islands', *Jakarta Post*, 18 April,
<http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2002/04/18/taufik-kiemas-tommy-winata-039meet-thousand-islands039.html>. Viewed 26 October 2010, Jakarta Post Archives.

Jusuf, Muhammad, 2009, 'Security Services Booming After Ritz Carlton & JW Marriot Bombing', 28 August, *All Voices News*.

Lamoshi, Gary, 2004, 'Jakarta Court Puts Media Freedom Behind Bars', *Asia Times*, 18 September, http://atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/FI18Ae01.html, Viewed 25 January 2008.

Mahrus, Zuhri, 1995, 'Perjudian, Peta Bisnis dan Mafia' in *Forum*, No, 9, 14 August, From database apakabar@clark.net.

MacIntyre & Ramage, 2008, 'Indonesia has Changed and So Must Our Attitude To It', May 27, *The Age*, <http://www.theage.com.au/news/opinion/indonesia-has-changed-and-so-must-our-attitude-to-it/2008/05/26/1211653933526.html?page=fullpage#contentSwap1>. Viewed on 9 December 2010.

Muradi Clark, Clark, Muradi, 2007, 'HUT TNI dan bentrok TNI-Polri', Web blog entry, *Muradi Clark Daily Blog*, 9 October,
<http://muradi.wordpress.com/2007/10/09/hut-tni-dan-bentrok-tni-polri/>. Viewed 19 September 2010.

Schuman, Michael, 2002, 'A Failed State?' *Time*, 21 October, <http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,366363,00.html>, Viewed on 12 October 2010.

Sidel, John, T, 2007, 'The New Trinity: Religion, Knowledge & Power', *The Straits Times*. October 24.

Newspaper Articles, Author Unknown.

'Ada Kesalahan Administrasi dalam Pembangunan Gedung Detasemen 88', 2005, *Koran Tempo*, 15 February 2005, <http://antikorupsi.org/indo/content/view/3884/2/> Viewed on 22 April 2010.

'Agum Mudik ke Jakarta', 1996, *Gatra*, 3 February, No, 12, II, Viewed on apakabar@clark.net database.

'Ali Sadikin: Demi Judi, Saya Rela Masuk Neraka', 2005, *Tempo*, No. 04/XXXIV/21 - 27 Maret.
<http://majalah.tempointeraktif.com/id/arsip/2005/03/21/WAW/mbm.20050321.WAW107736.id.html> , Viewed 2 June.

'Anggaran Polri Tak Rasional: Imbasnya Ditanggung Rakyat', 2008, *Kompas*, 15 January.

'Artha Graha Making Life Better', 2009, *World Investment News*, http://www.winne.com/country/sea/indonesia/2009/cr/cp/arta_graha_network/index.php. Viewed 8 October 2010.

'Aset Habis Buat Judi', 2006, *Gatra*, No. 18 Beredar Senin, 13 Maret, http://www.gatra.com/2006-03-14/versi_cetak.php?id=92982, Viewed 11 October 2010.

'Biography of Ali Sadikin', The 1971 Ramon Magsaysay Award for Government Service, *Ramon Magsaysay Awards*, 31 August 1971.
<http://www.rmaf.org.ph/Awardees/Citation/CitationSadikinAli.htm>. Viewed on 13 October 2010.

'Bisnis Taipan Beragam Stigma', 2003, *Gatra*, Jakarta, 17 Maret, http://www.gatra.com/2003-03-17/versi_cetak.php?id=26297. Viewed 19 April 2010.

'Bisnis Jasa Keamanan Yang Menggiurkan', 2007, *Bisnis Indonesia*, 22 May.

'Criminal Gangs May Be Behind Latest Jakarta Blast', 2002, *The Straits Times*, 12 June.

'Dari Lotere ke Lotere', 2004, *Tempo*, 19 Januari, <http://majalah.tempointeraktif.com/id/arsip/2004/01/19/LU/mbm.20040119.LU87967.id.html>. Viewed 16 October 2010.

‘Dijengkang Dana SDSB Mitra Lama’, 2005, *Gatra*, No. 26. 9 May, <http://www.gatra.com/artikel.php?id=84222>, Viewed 16 October 2010.

‘DPR Pertanyakan Luran Golf Kapolri’, 1999, *Media Indonesia*, 14 December.

‘Forget Plan to Establish Gambling Den, Sutiyoso Says’, 2002, *The Jakarta Post*, 22 July.

‘Giatkan Razia & Siskamling’, 2010, *Sriwijaya Post*, 21 February, http://www.sripoku.com/view/27801/giatkan_razia_dan_siskamling. Viewed 21 February 2010.

‘Hamba Tuhan di Gedung Anti-terror’, 2004, *Tempo Interaktif*, 27 December, <http://majalah.tempointeraktif.com/id/arsip/2004/12/27/NAS/mbm.20041227.NAS95386.id.html>, Viewed 24 April 2010.

‘Ini Lho Asal Sejarah Cerita Cicak dan Buaya’, 6.11.09. *Kompas*, <http://www.kompas.com/read/xml/2009/11/06/02033489/Ini.Lho.Asal.Sejarah.Cerita.Cicak.dan.Buaya>, Viewed 20.05.10

Departmen Pertahanan, ‘Irjen Pol Sutanto Jadi Kalakhar BNN’. <http://www.dephan.go.id/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=6556>. Viewed 02 February 2010.

‘Interview with Mr Tomy Winata’, 2009, *World Investment News*, <http://www.winne.com/dninterview.php?intervid=2598>, Viewed on 14 August 2010.

‘Jenderal Polisi Sutanto Beri 'Kontrak' Untuk Semua Kapolda’, 2005, 11 July, <http://www.kapanlagi.com/h/0000072214.html>, Viewed on 09 February 2010.

‘Kesederhanaan Seorang Ahli Strategi’, 2006, *National News*, 6 December, pp. 2.

‘Lagi Berpuasa, Sopir Angkot Duel’, 2010, *Pos Metro Balikpapan*, 21 August, <http://www.metrobalikpapan.co.id/index.php?mib=berita.detail&id=41236>, Viewed 21 August 2010.

‘Mabes Polri Harus Membangun 120 Mapolres’, 2004, *Suara Karya*, 13 May.

‘Mutasi’ Beking di Meja Judi, 2000, *Tajuk*, No. 9. 02 July, Apakabar Database, apakabar@igc.org, Viewed on 19 November 2009.

‘Mutasi Istimewa di Mabes Polri’, 2000, *Suara Pembaruan Daily*, 18 October, Apakabar database, indonesia-p@indopubs.com, Viewed 22 October 2010.

‘Omset Judi Jakarta: Ladang Subur di Tempat Keberuntungan’, 2002, *Gatra*, 22 April, No. 23. VIII. <http://www.gatra.com/2002-04-23/artikel.php?id=17066>, Viewed 19 Janaury 2010.

‘‘Overhaul’ untuk Polisi’, 1998, *Tempo*, 13/XXVII 29 Desember, <http://majalah.tempointeraktif.com/id/arsip/1998/12/29/NAS/mbm.19981229.NAS98840.id.html> Viewed on 08 February 2010.

‘Pelajaran Buat Saya’, 1981, *Tempo*, 11 April, 6/XI, <http://majalah.tempointeraktif.com/id/email/1981/04/11/KT/mbm.19810411.KT49253.id.html>, Viewed 8 November 2009.

Banten Provincial Government, ‘Panen Raya Korem 064 dan Artha Graha Peduli Pandeglang Capai Swasembada Beras’, 2010, *Bantan Provincial Government*, 17 February, http://www.bantenprov.go.id/home.php?link=brt_dtl&id=6761. Accesed 17 February 2010.

‘Pemerintah Dorong Pengembangan Benih Padi Hibrida’, 2010, *Republika*, 28 Maret, <http://bataviase.co.id/node/147803>, Viewed 7 November 2010.

‘Penjualan Saham di Artha Graha Disorot’, 2005, *Bali Post*, 09 September, <http://www.balipost.co.id/balipostcetak/2005/9/9/n3.htm>, Viewed 13 June 2010.

‘Perjudian, Peta Bisnis dan Mafia’. 1995, *Forum* No, 09, 14 August, Apakabar database <http://www.hamline.edu/apakabar/basisdata/1995/08/01/0003.html>. Viewed 21 December 2009.

‘Permintaan Jasa Keamanan Meningkat 50%’, 2003, *Bisnis Indonesia*, 07 February.

‘Pesangon Judi Lanjutkan’ & ‘Pelajaran Buat Saya’, 1981, *Tempo* 06/XI, 11 April, <http://majalah.tempointeraktif.com/id/email/1981/04/11/KT/mbm.19810411.KT49253.id.html>, Viewed 8 November 2009.

‘Penumpang Kapal Wisata Diduga Lakukan Perjudian’. 2005, *Suara Karya*, 8 December, <http://www.suarakarya-online.com/news.html?id=129139>, Viewed 02 April 2008.

‘Polda Metro Jaya Bangun Gedung Densus 88 Anti Teror’, 2004, *Tempo Interaktif*, 08 September, <http://www.tempo.co.id/hg/nasional/2005/01/04/brk,20050104-55,id.html>, Viewed 22 April 2010.

‘Polisi berwajah Anggodo Jadi Bulan-Bulanan Massa’, 08.11.09, *detikNews*. <http://us.detiknews.com/read/2009/11/08/101642/1237366/10/poster-polisi-berwajah-anggodo-jadi-bulan-bulanan-massa>. Viewed on 21 May 2010.

‘Polwiltabes Semarang akan Undang Bandar Togel’. 2004, *DetikNews*, 5 August.

‘Pundi Judi Mau Tapi Malu’, 2002, *Gatra*, No. 23, Vol. VIII, 22 April, <http://www.gatra.com/2002-04-22/artikel.php?id=17036>, Viewed 09 November 2009.

‘Pusat Rehabilitasi Narkoba Terbesar di Lido’, 2005, *Pdpersi.co.id* <http://www.pdpersi.co.id/?show=detailnews&kode=3463&tbl=cakrawala>, Viewed 04 December 2010.

‘Satpam-Pembantu Diadu’, 2010, *Surya*, 4 March.
<http://www.surya.co.id/2010/02/08/satpam-pembantu-diadu.html>. Viewed 4 March 2010.

‘SDSB’. 1993, *Tempo*, 20 November, pdpersi.co.id.
<http://majalah.tempointeraktif.com/id/arsip/1993/11/20/KL/mbm.19931120.KL5571.id.html>, Viewed 15 October 2010.

‘SDSB: Siapa Diberi Sumbangan?’ 1993, *Tempo*, 13 November,
<http://majalah.tempointeraktif.com/id/arsip/1993/11/13/NAS/mbm.19931113.NAS3660.id.html>, Viewed 14 October 2010.

‘Selamat Datang di Kaum Sipil’, 1999, *Kontan* No. 21, Vol. 3. 22 February.

‘Setahun SBY-JK Tutup Total’, 2005, kapanlagi.com
<http://www.kapanlagi.com/h/0000086681.html>, 13 October 2005. Viewed on 01 September 2009.

‘Sebuah Metafor: Cicak Lawan Buaya’, 2009, Jurnal Grafisosial, 3 November,
<http://grafisosial.wordpress.com/2009/11/03/sebuah-metafor-cicak-dan-buaya/>
Viewed on 20.05.10

‘Tergugah Lihat Polisi Gagah: Bripta Lam Han Kong’, 2007, *National News*, 11 May, pp. 11.

‘The Gatekeeper’, April 2010, AsiaViews, 03/VII/2010,
<http://new.asiaviews.org/?content=153499ym32ddw4&headline=20100423113537>, Viewed on 20.05.10.

Title Unknown, *Media Indonesia*, 14 March 2005.

‘Tragedi di Kantor Polisi’, 2007, Liputan6.com, 17 Maret,
<http://berita.liputan6.com/progsus/200703/138807/class='vidico'>. Viewed on 7 November 2010.

‘Wawancara Yorrys Raweyai: Saya Paling Anti-Judi’, 1999, *Tempo*, 31 May.
<http://majalah.tempointeraktif.com/id/arsip/1999/05/31/INT/mbm.19990531.INT95648.id.html>. Viewed on 4 June 2012

Wawancara Dengan Ali Sadikin’, 2007, *Impact Q TV*, September 20, no.62, Jakarta, online video, <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KbkDMqCG1cA>, Viewed 11 October 2010.

‘Wujudkan Keamanan, Polisi Mitra Masyarakat’, 2010, *Jambi Express*, 10 March, <http://www.jambiekspres.co.id/index.php/radar-jambi/10657-wujudkan-keamanan-polisi-mitra-masyarakat.html>, Viewed 10 March 2010.

‘Yayasan Tzu Chi Mencerahkan Hari Esok Aceh’, 2006, *National News*, 19 December, pp. 11.

Photographs, Internet

Hendarto, Joko, Polda Metro Jaya, Posted 23 May 2005,
<http://www.skyscrapercity.com/showthread.php?t=215937> Viewed on 23 April 2010.

‘Ini Lho Asal Sejarah Cerita Cicak dan Buaya,’ 6.11.09. Kompas,
<http://www.kompas.com/read/xml/2009/11/06/02033489/Ini.Lho.Asal.Sejarah.Cerita.Cicak.dan.Buaya>. Viewed 20.05.10.

‘Polisi berwajah Anggodo Jadi Bulan-Bulanan Massa’, 08.11.09, detikNews,
<http://us.detiknews.com/read/2009/11/08/101642/1237366/10/poster-polisi-berwajah-anggodo-jadi-bulan-bulanan-massa>. Viewed on 21.05.10.

‘Sebuah Metafor: Cicak Lawan Buaya’. 03.11.09, Jurnal Grafisosial,
<http://grafisosial.wordpress.com/2009/11/03/sebuah-metafor-cicak-dan-buaya/>
Viewed on 20.05.10.

Photographs, Internet

Hendarto, Joko, Polda Metro Jaya, Posted 23 May 2005,
<http://www.skyscrapercity.com/showthread.php?t=215937> Viewed on 23 April 2010.

‘Ini Lho Asal Sejarah Cerita Cicak dan Buaya,’ 6.11.09. Kompas,
<http://www.kompas.com/read/xml/2009/11/06/02033489/Ini.Lho.Asal.Sejarah.Cerita.Cicak.dan.Buaya>. Viewed 20.05.10.

‘Polisi berwajah Anggodo Jadi Bulan-Bulanan Massa’, 08.11.09, detikNews,
<http://us.detiknews.com/read/2009/11/08/101642/1237366/10/poster-polisi-berwajah-anggodo-jadi-bulan-bulanan-massa>. Viewed on 21.05.10.

‘Sebuah Metafor: Cicak Lawan Buaya’. 03.11.09, Jurnal Grafisosial,
<http://grafisosial.wordpress.com/2009/11/03/sebuah-metafor-cicak-dan-buaya/>
Viewed on 20.05.10.

Photographs, Internet

Hendarto, Joko, 2005, *Polda Metro Jaya*, Photograph by Joko Hendarto, Posted 23 May 2005, <http://www.skyscrapercity.com/showthread.php?t=215937>, Accessed on 23 April 2010.

‘Ini Lho Asal Sejarah Cerita Cicak dan Buaya.’ 2009, *Kompas*, Posted 6 November.
<http://www.kompas.com/read/xml/2009/11/06/02033489/Ini.Lho.Asal.Sejarah.Cerita.Cicak.dan.Buaya>, Accessed 20 May 2010.

‘Polisi berwajah Anggodo Jadi Bulan-Bulanan Massa’, 2009, *detikNews*, Posted 8 November, <http://us.detiknews.com/read/2009/11/08/101642/1237366/10/poster-polisi-berwajah-anggodo-jadi-bulan-bulanan-massa>, Accessed on 21 May 2010.

‘Sebuah Metafor: Cicak Lawan Buaya’, 03.11.09, *Jurnal Grafisosial*.
<http://grafisosial.wordpress.com/2009/11/03/sebuah-metafor-cicak-dan-buaya/>
Accessed on 20 May 2010.

Podcasts

This American Life, 2010, *The Right to Remain Silent*, This American Life, National Public Radio, broadcast, 13 Sept 2010.

Reports, Institutional Author

Indonesian National Police & International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program, 2007, *Blueprint for Strengthening Polres & Polsek*. Indonesian National Police & International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program, Jakarta.

Department of Social Affairs, 2003, *Dampak Perjudian Togel Terhadap Ketahanan Social Masyarakat: Keluarga Miskin Perkotaan*, Department of Social Affairs, Government of Indonesia, Jakarta.

Indonesian Organisation for Migration, 2007, *Evaluation Report IOM Project Part One, Phase Two Strengthening the Indonesian National Police Through Institution Building, Funded by the Royal Netherlands Embassy*, International Organisation for Migration, Jakarta.

Jakarta Legal Aid, 2008, *Exposing Crimes with Crimes: Survey of Torture by the Police in Jakarta and Surrounding Areas in 2008*, Jakarta Legal Aid, Jakarta.

Lembaga Penyelidikan Ekonomi dan Masyarakat Fakultas Ekonomi Universitas Indonesia, Markas Besar Kepolisian Republik Indonesia & Kemitraan Bagi Pembaharuan Tata Pemerintahan di Indonesia, 2003, *Financial Mapping: Reformasi Berkelanjutan Institusi Polri Bidang Manajemen Keuangan dan Anggaran Laporan Tahap Akhir Output 1 – Ringkas*, Lembaga Penyelidikan Ekonomi dan Masyarakat Fakultas Ekonomi Universitas Indonesia, Markas Besar Kepolisian Republik Indonesia & Kemitraan Bagi Pembaharuan Tata Pemerintahan di Indonesia, Jakarta.

Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan, 2005, *Hasil Pemeriksaan Laporan Keuangan Kepolisian Republik Indonesia Tahun 2004*. Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan, Government of Indonesia, Jakarta Pusat.

United Nations Human Settlements Program, 2008, *Housing Finance Mechanisms in Indonesia*. 2008. United Nations Human Settlements Program, Nairobi.

International Crisis Group, 2003, *Indonesia: Managing Decentralisation and Conflict in South Sulawesi*, International Crisis Group, Jakarta.

Asia Development Bank, 2006, *Indonesia: Strategic Vision for Agriculture and Rural Development*, Asia Development Bank, Philippines.

International Organisation for Migration, 2008, 'Indonesian Migration in Facts and Figures'. International Organisation for Migration, viewed 25 August 2010, www.iom.or.id.

International Organisation of Migration, 2009, *IOM-POLRI Cooperation Newsletter*. 2009. International Organisation for Migration, Jakarta.

World Bank, Bappenas, PSPK-UGM, 2006, *Justice for All?: An Assessment of Access to Justice in Five Provinces of Indonesia*, World Bank, Bappenas, PSPK-UGM, UNDP, Jakarta.

Department Keuangan, 1992, *Keuangan Negara, Perkembangan Moneter dan Lembaga-lembaga Keuangan (APBN 1991)*. Departemen Keuangan, Republik Indonesia, Jakarta.

Departmen Keuangan, 1999, *Keuangan Negara, Perkembangan Moneter dan Lembaga-lembaga Keuangan, (APBN 1998)*. Departemen Keuangan, Republik Indonesia, Jakarta.

Biro Pengendalian Personel Polri Bagian Penyediaan Personel, 2008, *Laporan Sementara Perkembangan Animo RIM Taruna/Taruni AKPOL TA 2008*, Biro Pengendalian Personel Polri Bagian Penyediaan Personel, Mabes Polri, Jakarta, 30 July.

Indonesian Corruption Watch, 2005, 'Pernyataan Kapolri Sutanto Mengenai Penegakan Hukum dan Pemberantasan Korupsi'. *Laporan Bidang Hukum dan Monitoring Peradilan*, Indonesian Corruption Watch, Jakarta.

Sekretariat Jenderal Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Republik Indonesia, *Proses Pembahasan Rancangan Undang2 tentang Kepolisian Republik Indonesia*. 2002. Sekretariat Jenderal Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Republik Indonesia, Jakarta.

Joint Standing Committee on the National Capital on the National Capital and External Territories, 2001, *Risky Business; Inquiry into the tender process and the sale of Christmas Island Casino and Report*. Joint Standing committee on the National Capital and External Territories, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra.

Save the Children UK, UNICEF & Departmen Sosial, 2007, *Someone That Matters: The Quality of Childcare Institutions in Indonesia*. Save the Children UK, UNICEF & Departmen Social, Government of Indonesia, Jakarta.

Mabes Polri & ICITAP, 2005, *South Sulawesi's Police: Acting Locally, Thinking Nationally with a Global Perspective*, Mabes Polri & ICITAP, Jakarta.

UN Habitat, 2008, *State of the World's Cities: 2008-09. Harmonious Cities*, UN Habitat, Earthscan, London.

Human Rights Watch, 2006, *Too High a Price: The Human Rights Cost of the Indonesian Military's Economic Activities*, Human Rights Watch, Vol, 18, No 5C, New York.

Amnesty International, 2009, *Unfinished Business*. Amnesty International, London.

Speeches

Sudarsono, Juwono, 2009, Chatham House Asia Program, *Military and Democracy in Indonesia*, Lecture, 17 April, Lecture.

Texts & Journal Articles

Abeysekere, Susan, 1989, *Jakarta: A History*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

Abrams, Phillip, 1988, 'Notes on the Difficulty of Studying the State' *Journal of Historical Sociology* vol, 1, no, 1, pp. 58-89.

Alagappa, Multhiah, 2000, *Political Legitimacy in Southeast Asia: The Quest for Moral Authority*, Stanford University Press, Stanford.

Allen Richard, Radev Dimitar, 2010, *Extrabudgetary Funds*, Fiscal Affairs Department, International Monetary Fund.

<http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/tnm/2010/tnm1009.pdf> Viewed 2 June 2012.

Altbeker, Antony, 2009, 'The Building of the New South African Police Service: The Dynamics of Police Reform in a Changing (and violent) Country' in Mercedes S, Hinton & Tim Newburn, *Policing Developing Democracies*, Routledge, London, pp. 260-279.

Anders, Gerhard & Nuijten, Monique, 2007, 'Corruption and the Secret of Law' in *Corruption and the Secret of Law: A Legal Anthropological Perspective*, Ashgate, Hampshire, pp. 1-26.

Anderson, B, 1972, 'The Idea of Power in Javanese Culture' in Claire Holt, *Language and Power: Exploring Political Cultures in Indonesia*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, pp. 1-70.

Anderson, Benedict, 1983, 'Old State, New Society: Indonesia's New Order' *Journal of Asian Studies*, vol, 2, no, 3, May, pp. 477-496.

Anderson, Benedict, 1998, *The Spectre of Comparisons: Nationalism, Southeast Asia, and the World*, Verso, London.

Ascher, William, 1999, *Why Governments Waste Natural Resources: Policy Failures in Developing Countries*, JHU Press, Maryland.

Asiwaju, Kemi & Marenin, Otwin, 2009, 'Policing Nigeria: Challenges and Reforms' in Mercedes S, Hinton & Tim Newburn, *Policing Developing Democracies*, Routledge, Milton Park, pp. 280-306.

Aspinall, Edward, 2005, 'Elections and the normalisation of Politics in Indonesia', *Southeast Asia Research*, vol, 13, no, 2, pp.117-156.

Aspinall, Edward, 2005, *Opposing Suharto: Compromise, Resistance and Regime Change in Indonesia*, Stanford University Press, Stanford.

Aspinall, Ed, 2009, *Islam and Nation: Separatist Rebellion in Aceh, Indonesia*, Stanford University Press, Stanford.

Aspinall, Edward & Mietzner, Marcus, 2009, 'Problems of Democratisation in Indonesia: An Overview' in *Problems of Democratisation in Indonesia: Elections, Institutions and Society*, ISEAS, Singapore, pp. 1-20.

Astuti, Rita, 1995, *People of the Sea: Identity and Descent among the Vezo of Madagascar*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Barker, Joshua, 1999, *The Tattoo and the Fingerprint: Crime and Security in an Indonesian City*, PhD thesis, Cornell University, Ithaca.

Barker, Joshua, 1999a, 'Surveillance and Territoriality in Bandung' in Vicente L, Rafael & Rudolf Mazrek, *Figures of Criminality in Indonesia, the Philippines and Colonial Vietnam*, SEAP Publications, Ithaca, pp. 95-127.

Barker, Joshua, & Van Klinken, Gerry, 2009, 'Reflections on the State in Indonesia', *State of Authority: The State in Society in Indonesia*, Cornell Southeast Asia Program, Ithaca.

Barrow, J, 1806, *A Voyage to Cochinchina in the years 1792 and 1793*, London.

Bayley, David, H, 1971, 'The Police and Political Change in Comparative Perspective', *Law and Society Review* vol, 6, no, 1, pp. 91-112.

Bayley, David, 1975, *The Police and Political Development in Europe*, Princeton University Press, New Jersey.

Bayley, D, H, 1985, *Patterns of Policing: A Comparative International Analysis*, Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick, N.J.

Bayley, David, 1996, 'Police Brutality Abroad' in W,A Geller & H Toch, *Police Violence*, Yale University, New Haven, Conn.

Bayley, David, H, 2006, *Changing the Guard: Developing Democratic Police Abroad*, Oxford University Press.

Beeson, Mark, Bellamy, Alex & Hughes, Bryn, 2006, 'Taming the Tigers: Reforming the Security Sector in Southeast Asia' in *Pacific Review*, vol, 19, no, 4, pp. 449-472.

Binde, Per, 2005, 'Gambling, Exchange Systems and Moralities', *Journal of Gambling Studies*, vol, 21, no, 4, Winter, pp. 445-79.

Blundo, Giorgio, 2007, 'Hidden Acts: Open Talks, How Anthropology can 'Observe' and Describe Corruption' in Monique Nuijten & Gerhard Anders, *Corruption and the Secret of Law: a Legal Anthropological Perspective*, Ashgate, England, pp. 27-52.

Blusse, Leonard, 1986, *Strange Company: Chinese Settlers, Mestizo Women and the Dutch in VOC Batavia*, Foris Publications, Dordrecht.

Bourchier, David, 1994, 'Crime, Law and State Authority in Indonesia' in Arief Budiman, *State and Civil Society in Indonesia*, Monash University Centre for Southeast Asian Studies, Clayton, pp. 177-211.

Brenner, Suzanne, 1998, *The Domestication of Desire: Women, Wealth and Modernity in Java*, Princeton University Press, Princeton.

Bridenthal, R, 2012, 'The Hidden History of Crime, Corruption, and States: An Introduction', *Journal of Social History*, vol. 45, no. 3, pp. 575-581.

Brommelhorster, Jorn & Paes, Wolf-Christian, 2003, *The Military as an Economic Actor: Soldiers in Business*, Palgrave-McMillan, Hampshire.

Brown, David & Wilson, Ian Douglas, 2008, 'Ethnicized Violence in Indonesia: Where Criminals and Fanatics Meet', *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*, vol. 13, no. 3, pp. 367-403.

Babant, Nils, 2006, 'Sorcery, Corruption and the Dangers of Democracy in Indonesia', *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute (JRAI)*, vol 12, pp. 413-431.

Caldeira, Theresa, P.R, 2000, *City of Walls: Crime, Segregation and Citizenship in San Paulo*, University of California Press, Berkeley.

Campbell, George, L, 1995, *Concise Compendium of the World's Languages*, Routledge, London.

Cannell, Fenella, 1999, *Power and Intimacy in the Christian Philippines*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Carsten, Janet, 1989, 'Cooking Money: Gender and the Symbolic Transformation of Means of Exchange in a Malay Fishing Village' in Jonathon Parry and Maurice Bloch, *Money and the Morality of Exchange* Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 117-141.

Carsten, 1997, *The Heat of the Hearth: The Process of Kinship in a Malay Fishing Village*, Oxford University Press.

Cassman, Joel F, 2002, 'Building the Rule of Law: A Model of Police-Military Relations in Latin America in *Low Intensity Conflict and Law Enforcement*', vol. 11, no. 1, pp. 1-28.

Chevigny, Paul G, 1990, 'Police Deadly Force as Social Control: Jamaica, Argentina & Brazil', *Criminal Law Forum*, vol, 1, no, 3, Spring, pp. 389-424.

Chua, Christian, 2006, *Chinese Big Business in Indonesia: The State of Capital*, PhD Dissertation, National University of Singapore, Singapore.

Chua, Christian, 2008, *Chinese Big Business in Indonesia: The State of Capital*, Routledge, London.

Columbijn, Freek, 2002, 'Maling, maling! The lynching of petty criminals' in Freek Columbijn & J, Thomas Lindblad *The Roots of Violence in Indonesia* ISEAS, Singapore, pp. 299-330.

Comaroff John & Comaroff Jean, 1999, 'Occult Economies and the Violence of Abstraction: notes from a South African Postcolony' in *American Ethnologist*, vol, 26, no,2 May, pp. 279-303.

Comaroff, J & Comaroff J,L 1999, 'Introduction' in *Civil Society in the Political Imagination in Africa: Critical Perspectives*, J, Comaroff & J,L Comaroff, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, pp. 1- 43.

Comaroff J, & Comaroff, J,L, 2000, 'Millenial Capitalism', *Public Culture*, vol, 12, no, 2, pp. 291-301.

Comaroff, John & Comaroff, Jean, 2006, 'Law and Disorder in the Postcolony: An Introduction' in *Law and Disorder in the Postcolony*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, pp. 1-56.

Coppel, Charles, 1983, *Indonesian Chinese in Crisis*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

Coutin, Susan Bibler, 2005, 'Contesting Criminality: Illegal Immigration and the Spatialization of Legality' *Theoretical Criminology* vol. 9 no. 1, pp. 5-33.

Coutin, Susan Bibler, 2003, "Borderlands, Illegality and the Spaces of Non-existence" in eds, Richard Perry & Bill Maurer, *Globalization and Governmentalities*, University of Minnesota Press, pp. 171-202.

Crouch, Harold, 1978, *The Army and Politics in Indonesia*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca.

Crouch, Harold, 1988, 'The Military Mind and Economic Development' in J, Soedjati Djiwandono & Yong Mun Cheong, *Soldiers and Stability in Southeast Asia*, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, pp. 49-72.

Crouch, H. 2010. *Political Reform in Indonesia after Soeharto*. Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore.

Cribb, Robert, 1991, 'Problems in the Historiography of the Killings In Indonesia' in Robert Cribb, *The Indonesian Killings, 1965-66: Studies from Java and Bali* Centre for Southeast Asian Studies, Melbourne, pp. 1- 44.

Cribb, Robert & Kahin, Audrey, 2004, *Historical Dictionary of Indonesia*, Scarecrow Press, Maryland.

Cribb, R, 2008, *Gangsters and Revolutionaries: The Jakarta People's Militia and the Indonesian Revolution 1945-49*, Equinox Publishing, Singapore,

Cronin, William, 1991, *Nature's Metropolis: Chicago and the Great West*, W,W norton & Co, New York.

Curnow, Jane, 2008, 'Making a Living on Flores, Indonesia: Why Understanding Surplus Distribution is Crucial to Economic Development', *Asia Pacific Viewpoint*, vol, 49, no, 3, December, pp. 370-80.

Dahl, Robert, 1992, 'The Problem of Civic Competence' in *Journal of Democracy*, vol, 3, no, 2, pp. 45-59.

Deleuze, Giles & Guattari, Felix, 2004a, *A Thousand Plateaus*, Continuum, London.

Deleuze, Giles & Guattari, Felix, 2004b, *Anti-Oedipus*, Continuum, London.

Djamin, Awaloeddin, 1995, *Pengalaman Seorang Perwira Polri*, Pustaka Sinar Harapan, Jakarta.

Downes, Mark & Keane, Rory, 2006, 'Police Reform Amid Transition: the Organisations for Security and Cooperation in Serbia', *Civil Wars*, vol, 8, no, 2, pp. 181-196.

Eaton, Kent, 2008, 'Paradoxes of Police Reform: Federalism, Parties and Civil Society in Argentina's Public Security Crisis', *Latin America Research Review*, vol, 43, no, 3, pp. 5-32.

Editors, 1977, 'Current Data on the Indonesian Military Elite, *Indonesia*, volume 23, April, pp. 175-90.

El Saadawi, Nawal, 2007, *A Daughter of Isis*, Zed Books, London.

Elson, R,E, 2001, *Suharto: A Political Biography*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Emmerson, Donald, K, 1972, 'Gambling and Development: The Case of Djakarta's 'Flower Organisation' in *Asia*, no, 27, Autumn, pp. 19-36.

Escobar, 1995 in Harrison, Elizabeth, 2006, 'Unpacking the Anti-Corruption Agenda: Dilemmas for Anthropologists' *Oxford Development Studies* vol,34, Issue,1, March, pp. 15-29.

Feith, Herbert, 1963, 'Dynamics of Guided Democracy', in Ruth T, McVey *Indonesia*, Southeast Asia Studies, Yale University, New Haven, Conn, pp. 309-409.

Feith, Herbert, 2006, *The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia*, Equinox Publishing, Singapore.

Ferguson, James, 1990, *The Anti-Politics Machine: 'Development', Depoliticisation and Bureaucratic Power in Lesotho*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Finer, S, E, 2002, *The Man on Horseback*, London, New Brunswick.

Firman, Tommy, 2004, 'New Town Development in Jakarta Metropolitan Region: A Perspective of Spatial Segregation' in *Habitat International* vol, 28, pp. 349-368.

Fuller, Chris & Harriss, John, 2001, 'For an Anthropology of the Modern Indian State' in *The Everyday State and Society in Modern India*, C,Hurst & Co, London, pp. 1-31.

Gambetta, Diego, 1996, *The Sicilian Mafia: The Business of Private Protection*, Harvard University Press.

Geddes, B, 1999, 'What Do We Know About Democratisation After Twenty Years?', *Annual Review of Political Science*, vol, 2.

Geertz, Clifford, 2001, *Available Light: Anthropological Reflections on Philosophical Topics*, Princeton University Press, Princeton.

Geertz, Clifford, 1973, 'Deep-play: notes on a Balinese Cockfight' in *The Interpretation of Cultures*, Clifford Geertz, Fonata, London.

Gell, Alfred, 1992, 'The Technology of Enchantment and the Enchantment of Technology' in *Anthropology, Art and Aesthetics*, J, Coote & A, Shelton, Clarendon Press, Oxford, pp. 40-63.

George, Kenneth M, 1996, *Showing Signs of Violence: The Cultural Politics of a 20th Century Headhunting Ritual*, University of California Press.

Glaeser, A, 2000, *Divided in Unity: Identity, Germany and the Berlin Police*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago.

Gluckman, M, 1963, 'Gossip and Scandal', *Current Anthropology*, pp. 306-17.

Gungwu, Wang, 1988, 'The Study of Chinese Identities in Southeast Asia' in Jennifer W Cushman and Wang Gungwu *Changing Identities of the Southeast Asian Chinese Since World War II*, Hong Kong University Press, Hong Kong, pp., 1-23.

Gupta, Akhil, 1995, 'Blurred boundaries: the discourse of corruption, the culture of politics, and the imagined state' in *American Ethnologist* vol, 22 no, 2, pp. 375-402.

Haanstad, Eric, 2008, *Constructing Order through Chaos: A State Ethnography of the Thai Police*, PhD Dissertation, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Wisconsin-Madison.

Hadiz, Vedi, 2003, 'Power and Politics in north Sumatra: the Uncompleted *Reformasi*', *Local Power and Politics in Indonesia: Decentralisation and Democratisation*, Edward Aspinall and Greg Fealy, ISEAS, Singapore, pp. 119-31.

Hansen, Thomas Blom & Stepputat, Finn, 2005, 'Introduction' in *Sovereign Bodies: Citizens, Migrants, and States in the Postcolonial World*, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1-38.

Haritos-Fatouos, Mika, 2003, *The Psychological Origins of Institutionalized Torture*, Routledge, London, pp. 195-200.

Harrison, Elizabeth, 2006, 'Unpacking the Anti-Corruption Agenda: Dilemmas for Anthropologists' *Oxford Development Studies* vol, 34, Issue,1, March, pp. 15-29.

Hasty, Jennifer, 2005, 'The Pleasures of Corruption: Desire and Discipline in Ghanaian Political Culture' *Cultural Anthropology*, vol. 20, no. 2, pp. 271–301.

Hefner, R, W, 2002, 'Civil Islam, Democratisation, and Violence in Indonesia: A Comment' in *Review of Indonesian and Malaysian Affairs* vol, 36, no, 1, pp. 67-75.

Heidhues, Mary Somers, 2006, 'Chinese voluntary and Involuntary Associations in Indonesia' in Khun Eng Kuah-Pearce & Evelyn Hu-Dehart, *Voluntary Organisations in the Chinese Diaspora*, Hong Kong University Press, Hong Kong, pp. 77-98.

Herbert, Steve, 1997, *Policing Space: Territoriality and the Los Angeles Police Department*, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis.

Heyman, Josiah McC, & Campbell, Howard, 2007, 'Corruption in the US Borderlands with Mexico: The Purity of Society and the Perversity of Borders', in Monique Nuitjen & Gerhard Anders, *Corruption and the Secret of Law*, Ashgate, Hampshire, pp. 191-218.

Hills, A, 2000, *Policing Africa: Internal Security and the Limits of Liberalisation*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder.

Hills, Alice, 2007, 'Police Commissioners, Presidents and the Governance of Security' *Journal of Modern African Studies*, vol, 45, no, 3, pp. 403-23.

Hinton, Mercedes, 2006, *The State on the Streets: Police and Politics in Argentina and Brazil*, Lynne Rienner, Boulder.

Hinton, Mercedes S, & Newburn, T, 2009, 'Introduction' in *Policing Developing Democracies*, Routledge, London, pp. 1-27.

Honna, Jun, 2003, *Military Politics and Democratisation in Indonesia*, Routledge, London.

Houngnikpo, Mathurin C, 2010, *Guarding the Guardians: Civil-Military Relations and Democratic Governance in Africa*, Ashgate, Surrey.

Hoag, Colin, 2011, ‘Assembling Partial Perspectives: Thoughts on the Anthropology of Bureaucracy’ *Political and Legal Anthropology Review*, vol, 34, no 1, pp. 81-94.

Hornberger, Julia, 2004, “My police – your police”: the informal privatisation of the police in inner city Johannesburg’ in *African Studies*, vol, 63, no, 2, pp. 213-230.

Hornberger, Julia, 2007, *‘Don’t Push this Constitution Down my Throat!’ Human Rights in Everyday Practice, An Ethnography of Police Transformation in Johannesburg, South Africa*, PhD Dissertation, University of Utrecht, Utrecht.

Huntington, Samuel, 1991, ‘Democracy’s Third Wave’, *Journal of Democracy*, vol, 2, no, 2, Spring, pp. 12-34.

Huntington, Samuel, 1991, *The Third Wave: Democratisation in the late Twentieth Century*, University of Oklahoma Press, Norman.

Ishak, Otto Syamsuddin, 2005, ‘The Sociology of Military Business in Indonesia’ in Mochtar Nurhasim, *Practices of Military Business: Experiences from Indonesia, Burma, Philippines and South Korea*, The Ridep Institute & Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Jakarta.

Jauregui, Beatrice, 2007, ‘Policing in northern India as a Different Kind of Political Science: Ethnographic Rethinking of normative ‘Political Interference’ in Investigations and Order Maintenance’, *Journal of Asian Policing*, vol, 5, no, 1, July, pp. 15-48.

Jauregui, Beatrice, 2010, *Shadows of the State, Subalterns of the State: Police and ‘Law and Order’ in Postcolonial India*, PhD Dissertation, University of Chicago, Chicago.

Jenkins, David, 1986, *Suharto and His Generals: Indonesian Military Politics 1975-1983*, Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, Cornell University, Ithaca.

Jenkins, David, 2010, ‘One Reasonably Capable Man’ in Ed Aspinall and Greg Fealy, *Suharto’s New Order and its Legacy: Essays in Honour of Harold Crouch*, Asian Studies Series Monograph 2, Australian National University, Canberra, pp. 17-26.

Jones, Sidney; Liehawa, Irjen, Ronny; Villaveces, Santiago and Priambodo, Ignatius, 2004, *Reforming the Indonesian Police Mobile Brigade: An Evaluation of Human Rights Training and Assessment of Major Issues for Reform*, Unpublished Report, Partnership for Governance Reform in Indonesia, Jakarta, pp. 30-1.

Juska, Arunas, 2009, ‘Privatisation of State Security in Lithuania, *Policing and Society*, vol, 19, no, 3 September, pp. 226-246.

Karl, Terry Lynn, 1990, 'Dilemmas of Democratisation in Latin America', *Comparative Politics*, vol, 23, no, 1, October.

Kenichiro, Arai, 2001, 'Only Yesterday in Jakarta: Property Boom and Consumptive Trends in the Late New Order Metropolitan City' in *Southeast Asian Studies*, vol, 38, no,4.

Kingsbury, Damien, 2003, *Power Politics and the Indonesian Military*, RoutledgeCurzon, London.

Knight, Amy, W, 1988, *The KGB: Police and Politics in the Soviet Union*, Unwin Hyman, Boston.

Knight, C, 1834, 'Barbarous Combats in Java' in *The Penny Magazine of the Society for the Useful Diffusion of Knowledge*, The Society for the Useful Diffusion of Knowledge, London 3, pp. 408.

Kratcoski, Peter C, & Das, Dilip K, 2007, *Police Education and Training in a Global Society*, Lexington Books, Lanham.

Kubick, Jan, 2009, 'Ethnography of Politics: Foundations, Applications, Prospects' in Edward Schatz *Political Ethnography: What Immersion Contributes to the Study of Power* University of Chicago Press, Chicago, pp. 25-52.

Kuntjoro-Jakti, Doradjatun & Simatupang, TAM, 1989, 'Indonesia Defence Expenditures in the Period of the New Order 1967-85' in Chin Kin Wah *Defence Spending in Southeast Asia* Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, pp. 109-33.

Kusno, Abidin, 2000, *Behind the Postcolonial: Architecture, urban space and political cultures in Indonesia*, Routledge, London.

Lancaster, Roger N, 1992, *Life is Hard: Machismo, Danger and the Intimacy of Power in Nicaragua*, University of California Press, California.

Lev, Daniel, S, 1985, 'Colonial Law and the Genesis of the Indonesian State' in *Indonesia*, vol, 40, Oct, pp. 57-74.

Levi, Margaret, 1989, *Of Rule and Revenue*, University of California Press, California.

Lev, Daniel S, 1996, 'Between State and Society: Professional Lawyers and Reform in Indonesia' in *Making Indonesia* Daniel S, Lev & Ruth McVey, Southeast Asia Program Cornell University, Ithaca, pp. 144-163.

Levy B & Kpundeh, S, 2004, *Building State Capacity in Africa: New Approaches, Emerging Lessons*, World Bank, Washington, DC.

Li, Tania Murray, 1998, 'Working Separately but Eating Together: Personhood, Property and Power in Conjugal Relations', *American Ethnologist*, vol, 25, no, 4, november, pp. 675-694.

Lin, S & Song Shunfeng, 2007, *The Revival of Private Enterprise in China*, Ashgate Publishing, Hampshire.

Los, Maria, 2002, 'Post-communist fear of crime and the commercialisation of security', *Theoretical Criminology*, vol, 6 no, 2, pp. 165–188.

Lu, X, 2000, 'Booty-Socialism, Bureau-preneurs and the State in Transition' *Comparative Politics*, vol. 32, no. 3, pp 273-294.

Lunduis, Jan & Lundahl, Mats, 2000, *Peasants and Religion: A Socioeconomic Study of Dios Olivorio and the Palma Sola Movement in the Dominican Republic*, Routledge, London.

MacIntyre, Andrew and Douglas Ramage, 2008, *Seeing Indonesia as a Normal Country: Implications for Australia*, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Canberra.

Mainwaring, Scott, O'Donnell, Guillermo & Valenzuela, J Samuel, 1992, *Issues in Democratic Consolidation*, University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame.

Malaby, T, 2002, 'Odds and Ends: Risk, Mortality and the Politics of Contingency,' *Culture, Medicine and Psychiatry*, vol, 26, no, 3, pp. 283-312.

Malley, Michael, 2003, 'New Rules, Old Structures and the Limits of Democratic Decentralisation' in Edward Aspinall and Greg Fealy *Local Power and Politics in Indonesia*, ISEAS, Singapore,

Marenin, Otwin, 1985, 'Policing Nigeria: Control and Autonomy in the Exercise of Coercion', *African Studies Review*, vol, 28, no, 1, March, pp. 73-93.

Marks, Monique, 2004, 'Researching Police Transformation: The Ethnographic Imperative' *British Journal of Criminology*, vol, 44, pp. 866-888.

Mauss, M, 2002, *The Gift: The Form and Reason for Exchange in Archaic Societies*, Routledge, Milton Park.

Masaaki, Okamoto, 2008, *The Privatisation of Violence in Indonesia: Toward An Equilibrium between Formal and Informal Security*, Unpublished paper.

Matsumoto, Yatsuyuki, 2007, *Financial Fragility and Instability in Indonesia*, Taylor and Francis, Milton Park.

Maurer, Bill, 2006, 'The Anthropology of Money' in *Annual Review of Anthropology*, vol, 35, pp. 15-36, [http:10.1146/annurev.anthro.35.081705.123127](http://10.1146/annurev.anthro.35.081705.123127), Accessed on 04,11,10.

Mboi, Aloysius Benedictus, 2009, 'Pilkada Langsung' in Maribeth Erb, Priyambudi Sulistiyo, *Deepening Democracy in Indonesia? Direct Elections for Local Leaders Pilkada* ISEAS, Singapore.

McCoy, Alfred W, 1972, *The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia*, Harper & Row, New York.

McCoy A, 1999, 'Requiem for a Drug Lord: State and Commodity in the Career of Khun Sa,' in Josiah McC. Heyman, *States and Illegal Practices*, Oxford, Berg, 1999, pp. 129-67.

McGlynn, J & Sulistyo, H, 2007, *Indonesia in the Soeharto Years: Issues, Incidents and Images*, NUS Press, Singapore.

McKinley, R, 1981, 'Cain and Abel on the Malay Peninsula' in *Siblingship in Oceania: Studies in the Meaning of Kin Relations*, Ed, M, Marshall, University Press of America, Lantham, pp. 335-387.

McLeod, R, H, 2008, 'Inadequate Budgets and salaries as instruments for institutionalizing public sector corruption in Indonesia' in *South East Asia Research*, vol, 16, no, 2, pp. 199-223.

Meier, Kenneth J & Holbrook, Thomas M, 1992, 'I seen my opportunities and I took 'em: Political Corruption in the American States', *Journal of Politics*, Vol, 54, no, 1, pp. 135-155.

Message, Kylie, 2005, 'Territory' in Adrian Parr, *The Deleuze Dictionary*, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh.

Mietzner, Marcus, 2006, *The Politics of Military Reform in Post-Suharto Indonesia: Elite Conflict, Nationalism and Institutional Resistance*, Policy Studies 23, East-West Centre, Washington.

Mietzner, Marcus, 2009, 'Indonesia and the Pitfalls of Low-quality Democracy: A Case Study of the Gubernatorial Elections in north Sulawesi' in A Ufen, M Bunte, *Democratisation in Post-Suharto Indonesia*, Routledge, London, pp. 124-49.

Mietzner, Marcus, 2009, *Military Politics, Islam and the State in Indonesia: From Turbulent Transition to Democratic Consolidation*, ISEAS, Singapore.

Mitchell, T, 1991, 'The Limits of the State: Beyond Statist Approaches and their Critics' in *American Scientist Review*, vol, 85, no 1, pp. 77-96.

Mitchell, W, E, 1988, 'The defeat of hierarchy: Gambling as exchange in a Sepik society', *American Ethnologist*, 15, 638-657.

Morris, Rosalind, 2010, 'Accidental Histories, Post Historical Practice? Rereading Body of Power, Spirit of Resistance in the Actuarial Age' in *Anthropological Quarterly*, vol, 83, no, 3, Summer, pp. 581-624.

Murray, Alison J, 1991, *No Money, no Honey: A Study of Street Traders and Prostitutes in Jakarta*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

Nagata, Judith, 2003, 'Local and Transnational Initiatives Towards Improving Chinese-Indigenous Relations in Post-Suharto Indonesia: The Role of the voluntary Sector', *Asian Ethnicity*, vol, 4, no,3, October, pp. 369-81.

Naylor, T, 2010, 'The underworld of gemstones', *Crime, Law and Social Change*, vol 53, no. 2, pp 131-158.

Neild, R, 2001a, 'Democratic Police Reforms in War-Torn Societies', *Conflict, Security and Development*, vol, 1, no, 1, pp. 21-43.

Neto, Paulo de Mesquita, 2006, 'Public-Private Partnerships for Police Reform in Brazil' in *Public Security and Police Reform in the Americas*, John Bailey & Lucia Dammert, University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh, pp. 44-57.

Nordholt, Henk Schulte & Van Klinken, Gerry, 2007, 'Introduction' in *Renegotiating Boundaries: Local Politics in Post-Suharto Indonesia* KITLV Press, Leiden, pp. 1-30.

Nugroho, Setiawan Cahyo, 2002, 'Barracks (sic) Kids', *Latitudes*, May, vol, 16, pp. 45-9.

Nursalim, Mochtar, 2002, 'Postur TNI Sebagai Kekuatan Pertahanan' in Indria Samego *Anatomi Kekuatan TNI Sebagai Alat Pertahanan Negara*, P2P LIPI, Jakarta.

Nye J, 1967, 'Corruption and Political Development: A Cost-Benefit Analysis', *American Political Science Review* vol, 61, pp.17-27.

O'Donnell, G.A. 2004. 'Why the Rule of Law Matters' *Journal of Democracy*, vol. 15, Number 4, pp. 32-46.

O'Donnell, Guillermo & Schmitter, Philippe C, 1986, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions from Uncertain Democracies*, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore.

Omitoogun, W & Oduntan, T, 2006, 'Nigeria', in Budgeting for the Military Sector in Africa: The Processes and Mechanisms of Control, SIPRI, OUP, Oxford, pp. 154-179.

Pei, M, 2008, *China's trapped transition: The Limits of Developmental Autocracy*, Harvard University press, Cambridge.

Papanek, Hanna & Schwede, Laurel, 1988, 'Women are Good With Money: Earning and Managing in an Indonesian City' *Economic and Political Weekly*, vol, 23, no, 4, October 29, pp. 73-84.

Pardo, Italo, 2004, 'Introduction: Corruption, Morality and the Law' in Italo Pardo *Between Morality and the Law: Corruption, Anthropology and Comparative Society*, Ashgate, Hampshire, pp. 1-18.

Parker, Lyn, 2003, *From subjects to citizens: Balinese villagers in the Indonesian nation-state*, NIAS Press, Singapore,

Parry, Jonathon & Bloch, Maurice, 1989, 'Money and the Morality of Exchange' in *Money and the Morality of Exchange*, University of Cambridge Press, Cambridge, pp. 1-33.

Pemberton, John, 1994, *On the Subject of 'Java'*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca.

Penglase, B, 2009, States of Insecurity: Everyday Emergencies, Public Secrets, and Drug Trafficker Power in a Brazilian Favela, *Political and Legal Anthropology Review*, pp. 47-63.

Pereira, Anthony W, & Davis, Diane E, 2000, 'New Patterns of Militarized Violence and Coercion in the Americas in *Latin American Perspectives*', vol, 27, no, 2, March, pp. 3-17.

Pine, Jason, 2007, 'Economy of Speed: the New Narco-Capitalism', *Public Culture*, vol, 19, no, 2, pp. 357 -366.

Pine, Jason, *Neomelodica Music in the Margins of Organised Crime in Naples*, Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press (forthcoming).

Pratiwo & Nas, Peter J,M, 2005, 'Jakarta: Conflicting Directions' in Peter J, M Nas *Directors of Urban Change in Asia* Routledge, New York, pp. 78-95.

Przeworski, A, 1986, 'Some Problems in the Study of the Transition to Democracy', in G, O'Donnell, P, C, Schmitter and L, Whitehead, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives*, John Hopkins Press, Baltimore , pp. 47-63.

Punch, Maurice, 1985, *Conduct Unbecoming: The Social Construction of Police Deviance and Control*, Tavistock Press, London.

Purdey, Jemma, 2006, *Anti-Chinese Violence in Indonesia, 1996-1999*, Singapore University Press, Singapore.

PUSHAM UII & The Asia Foundation, no date, *Inilah Buku HAM untuk AKPOL!* PUSHAM UII & The Asia Foundation, Jakarta.

Raffles, S, T, S, 1830, *The History of Java* (Edition 2) John Murray, London.

Ramadhan, KH, 1992, *Bang Ali: Demi Jakarta 1966-1977*, Pustaka Sinar Harapan, Jakarta.

Ramadhan, K,H, 1996, *Soemitro: Former Commander of Indonesian Security Apparatus*, Pustaka Sinar Harapan, Jakarta.

Reid, Anthony, 1980, 'The Structure of Cities in Southeast Asia, 15 – 17 Centuries' in *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies*, vol, 11, pp. 235-250.

Reid, Anthony, 1988, *Southeast Asia in the Age of Commerce 1450-1680: volume One: The Lands below the Winds*, New Haven and London, Yale University Press.

Reid, Anthony, 1997, 'Entrepreneurial Minorities, Nationalism and the State' in Daniel Chirot and Anthony Reid *Essential Outsiders: Chinese and Jews in the Modern Transformation of Southeast Asia and Central Europe*, University of Washington, Seattle & London, pp 33-74.

Reiner, R, 2000, *The Politics of the Police*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

Rejali, Darius, 2007, *Torture and Democracy*, Princeton University Press, Princeton & Oxford.

Rieffel, Lex & Dharmasaputra, Karaniya, 2008, *Tata Kelola Yayasan Pemerintah: Ujian Bagi Reformasi Birokrasi*, Brookings Institution & Freedom Institute, Washington DC & Jakarta.

Rinakit Sukardi, 2005, *The Indonesian Military After the New Order*, ISEAS, Singapore.

Roberts, Simon & Palmer, Michael, 2005, *Dispute Processes: ADR and the Primary Forms of Decision Making*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Robison, Richard & Hadiz, Vedi, 2004, *Reorganising Power in Indonesia: The Politics of Oligarchy in an Age of Markets*, RoutledgeCurzon, London & New York.

Robinson, Richard, 2008, *Indonesia: The Rise of Capital*, Equinox Publishing, Jakarta.

Roitman, Janet, 2005, *Fiscal Disobedience: An Anthropology of Economic Regulation in Central Africa*, Princeton and Oxford, Princeton University Press.

Roitman, Janet, 2006, 'The Ethics of Illegality in the Chad Basin' in J Comaroff & J Comaroff, *Law and Disorder in the Postcolony*, University of Chicago Press, pp. 247-272.

Rouquie', A, 1986, 'Demilitarisation and the Institutionalisation of Military Dominated Polities in Latin America, Some Problems in the Study of the Transition to Democracy' in G, O'Donnell, P, C, Schmitter and L, Whitehead, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives*, John Hopkins Press, Baltimore.

Ruhl, J, Mark, 2004, 'Curbing Central America's Militaries' in *Journal of Democracy*, vol, 15, no, 3, July, pp. 137-151.

Rush, James, 2007, *Opium to Java: Revenue Farming and Chinese Enterprise in Colonial Indonesia*, Equinox Publishing, Jakarta.

Ryter, Loren, 1998, 'Pemuda Pancasila: Last Loyalist Free Men of Suharto's Order? *Indonesia*, no, 66, October, pp. 45-73.

Ryter, Loren, 2000, 'A Tale of Two Cities Part 1', *Inside Indonesia*, 63, July-September.

Ryter, Loren, 2001, 'Pemuda Pancasila: The Last Loyalist Free Men of Suharto's New Order' in *Violence and the State in Suharto's Indonesia* ed, Benedict Anderson, Southeast Asia Program Publications, Cornell University, Ithaca, pp. 124-155.

Ryter, Loren, 2002, *Youth, Gangs and the State in Indonesia*, PhD Dissertation, University of Washington, Washington.

Ryter, Loren, 2009, 'Their Moment in the Sun: The New Indonesian Parliamentarians from the Old OKP in *State of Authority: The State in Society in Indonesia*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, pp. 45-73.

Sadikin, Ali, 1977, *Gita Jaya: Catatan*, Pemerintah Daerah Khusus Ibu Kota Jakarta, Jakarta.

Sadikin, Ali, 1995, *Tantangan Demokrasi*, Pustaka Sinar Harapan, Jakarta.

Sahlins, Marshall, 1972, *Stone Age Economics*, Aldine de Grutyere, New York.

Salmon, Andrew & Kaldor, Mary, 2005, 'Principles for the use of the military in support of law enforcement operations' in *A Human Security Doctrine for Europe, volume 1, Part 3* Marlies Glasius & Mary Kaldor, Routledge, Milton Park, pp. 231 – 246.

Samego, Indria, et al, 1998, *Bila ABRI Menghendaki': Desakan-Kuat Reformasi Atas Konsep Dwifungsi ABRI*, Mizan Pustaka, Bandung.

Santoso, Aris, 2009, *Hoegeng: Oase Menyejukkan Di Tengah Perilaku Koruptif Para Pemimpin Bangsa*, Bentang, Yogyakarta.

Scarry, Elaine, 1985, *The Body in Pain*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

Schatz, Edward, 2009, 'Introduction: Ethnographic Immersion and the Study of Politics' in *Political Ethnography: What Immersion Contributes to the Study of Power*, Ed, Schatz, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, pp., 1- 22.

Schulte Nordholt H, & Van Klinken, G, 2007, 'Introduction', *Renegotiating Boundaries: Local Politics in Post-Suharto Indonesia*, KITLV Press, Leiden, pp. 1- 30.

Schumpeter, J, 1943, *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy*, G, Allen & Unwin, London.

Scott, James C. 1972, 'Patron-Client Politics and Political Change in Southeast Asia', *American Political Science Review* vol. 66, no. 1, pp. 91-113.

Sebastian, Leonard, 2006, *Real Politik Ideology: Indonesia's Use of Military Force*, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore.

Serra, Narcis, 2010, *The Military Transition: Democratic Reform of the Armed Forces*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Sethuraman, S,V, 1976, *Jakarta: Urban Development and Employment*, International Labour Office, Geneva.

Shakow, M, 2011, ‘The Peril and Promise of Noodles and Beer: Condemnation of patronage and hybrid political frameworks in “post-neoliberal” Cochabamba, Bolivia’, *Political and Legal Anthropology Review*, Vol, 34, No. 2, pp. 315-336.

Sharman, J.C. 2011, ‘Testing the Global Financial Transparency Regime’, *International Studies Quarterly*, vol, 54, pp. 981-1001.

Shaw, Mark, 2002, *Crime and Policing in Post-Apartheid South Africa: Transforming Under Fire*, Hurst & Co, England.

Shihab, Alwi, 2002, *Betawi: Queen of the East*, Republika, Jakarta.

Shore, Cris, 2002, ‘Introduction: Towards an Anthropology of Elites’ in Cris Shore & Stephan L, Nugent *Elite Cultures: Anthropological Perspectives*, Routledge, London, pp. 1-21.

Siddiqua, Ayesha, 2007, *Military Inc*, Pluto Press, London.

Sidel, J,T, 1998, ‘Macet Total: The Logics of Circulation and Accumulation in the Demise of the New Order’ in *Indonesia* no, 66, October, pp. 159-194.

Sidel, John T, 2006, *Riots, Pogroms, Jihad: Religious Violence in Indonesia*, Cornell University Press.

Siegel, James T, 1986, *Solo in the New Order: Language and Hierarchy in an Indonesian City*, Princeton University Press, Princeton.

Siegel, James, 1998, *A New Criminal Type in Jakarta: Counter-Revolution Today*, Duke University Press.

Silverman, Lisa, 2001, *Tortured Subjects: Pain, Truth and the Body in Early Modern France*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago.

Sivaramakrishnan, K,C & Green, Leslie, 1986, *Metropolitan Management and the Asian Experience*, Economic Development Institute of the World Bank, Oxford University Press.

Skinner, G William, 1996, ‘Creolized Chinese Societies in Southeast Asia’ in Anthony Reid *Soujourners and Settlers: Histories of Southeast Asia and the Chinese*, Allen & Unwin, St Leonards, pp. 51 – 93.

Skinner, G William, 2008, 'Change and Persistence in Chinese Culture Overseas: A Comparison of Thailand and Java' in *The Chinese Diaspora in the Pacific: The Pacific World*, volume 16, Ashgate, Hampshire: pp 53-68.

Sklansky, David Alan, 2008, *Democracy and the Police*, Stanford University Press, Stanford.

Soeharto, Swipayana, G & Ramadhan, K,H, 1991, *Soeharto, My Thoughts, Words and Deeds* Citra Lamtoro Gung Persada, Jakarta.

Soemantri, Gumilar, 2004, 'Urban Expansion and Suburbanisation in the Capital Cities: A comparative study of Tokyo and Jakarta' in Hiroyoshi Kano, *Growing Metropolitan Suburbia: A Comparative Sociological Study of Tokyo and Jakarta*, Yayasan Obor Indonesia, Jakarta, pp. 13-27.

Silver, C, 2008, *Planning the Megacity: Jakarta in the 20th Century*, Routledge, Milton Park.

Small, Michelle, 2006, *Privatisation of Security and Military Functions and the Demise of the Modern Nation-State in Africa*, Occasional Paper Series, vol, 1, no, 2, ACCORD, Durban.

Spencer, Jonathon, 2007, *Anthropology, Politics and the State: Democracy and Violence in South Asia*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Steedly, M, 1999, 'The State of Culture Theory in the Anthropology of Southeast Asia', *Annual Review of Anthropology*, vol, 28.

Stepan, Alfred, 1998, *Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone*, Princeton University Press, Princeton.

Stepan, Alfred & Linz, Juan J, 1996, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation*, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore.

Stepan, A, 1991, 'Paths Towards Redemocratisation: Theoretical and Comparative Considerations' in , O'Donnell, P, C, Schmitter and L, Whitehead *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives*, G, John Hopkins Press, Baltimore, pp. 64-84.

Stepputat, F, 2005, 'Violence, Sovereignty and Citizenship in Postcolonial Peru' in T,B Hansen & F Stepputat *Sovereign Bodies: Citizens, Migrants and States in the Postcolonial World*, pp. 61-81.

Stevens, Alan M & Tellings, A, Ed Schmidgall, 2004, *A Comprehensive Indonesian-English Dictionary*, Ohio University Press, Ohio.

Stoler, A, L, 1995, *Capitalism and Confrontation on Sumatra's Plantation Belt, 1870-1979*, Michigan, Michigan University Press.

Studwell, Joe, 2007, *Asian Godfathers*, Profile Books, London.

Subekti, Taat, 1980, *Perjudian Dalam Masyarakat Tionghoa di Daerah Glodok, Jakbar*, Fakultas Ilmu-ilmu Social, Universitas Indonesia, Jakarta.

Sugihara, Kaoru, 2005, 'Patterns of Chinese Emigration to Southeast Asia, 1869-1939' in *Japan, China and the Growth of the Asian International Economy, 1850-1949*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 244-274.

Sungar, Yasmin, 2008, 'Indonesia's State Enterprises: From State Leadership to International Consensus in *Journal of Indonesian Social Studies and Humanities*, vol, 1, pp. 98-99.

Suryadinata, Leo, 1986, *Pribumi Indonesians, the Chinese Minority and China*, Heinemann Asia, Kuala Lumpur.

Suryadinata, Leo, 1995, *Prominent Indonesian Chinese: Biographical Sketches*, ISEAS, Singapore.

Suryadinata, Leo, 1997, *The Culture of the Chinese Minority in Indonesia*, Times Books International, Singapore.

Suryadinata, Leo, 2008, 'Chinese Indonesians in an Era of Globalisation: Some Major Characteristics' in Leo Suryadinata, *Ethnic Chinese in Contemporary Indonesia* Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore.

Sutanto, 2005, *Polri Menuju Era Baru Pacu Kinerja Tingkatkan Citra: Refleksi Pemikiran Jenderal Polisi Drs Sutanto*, Yayasan Pengembangan Kajian Ilmu Kepolosian, Jakarta.

Sutherland, Heather, 1979, *The Making of a Bureaucratic Elite, The Colonial Transformation of the Javanese Priyayi*, Heinemann, Singapore.

Syahnakri, Let,Gen Kiki, 2005, 'The Restructuring of Kartika Eka Paksi Foundation: the Army's Effort Toward Professionalism' in Mochtar Nurhasim *Practices of Military Business: Experiences from Indonesia, Burma, Philippines and South Korea*, ed, The Ridep Institute & Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Jakarta, pp. 97-110.

Tan, Mely, 2004, 'Unity in Diversity: Ethnic Chinese and Nation Building in Indonesia' in Leo Suryadinata *Ethnic Relations and Nation-Building in Southeast Asia: the Case of the Ethnic Chinese*, ISEAS, Singapore, pp. 20-44.

Tanner, M, S, 2000, 'Will the State Bring You Back In? Policing and Democratisation,' *Comparative Politics* vol, 33, no, 1, pp. 101-124.

Tanter, Richard, 1994, 'The Totalitarian Ambition: Intelligence and Security Agencies in Indonesia' in Arief Budiman *State and Civil Society in Indonesia*, Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, Monash University, Clayton, pp. 215-288.

Tarlo, Emma, 2001, 'Paper Truths: The Emergency and Slum Clearance through Forgotten Files' in Chris J, Fuller & Veronique Benei *The Everyday State and Society in Modern India*, , Hurst, London, pp. 68-90.

Taussig, Michael, 1992, *The Nervous System*, Routledge, New York.

Thies, Cameron G, 2007, The Political Economy of State Building in Sub-Saharan Africa, *Journal of Politics*, Vol, 69, Issue 3, pp. 716-731.

Thies, Cameron G. 2009. Conflict, Geography, and Natural Resources: The Political Economy of State Predation in Africa. *Polity* 41, Vol, 4, pp. 465-488.

Tilley, R, 1973, *A History of Playing Cards*, Studio Vista, London.

Tilly, C, 1985, 'War Making and State Making as Organised Crime', in B, Evans, D, Rueschmeyer and T, Skocpol *Bringing the State Back In*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, pp. 169-191.

Tilly, Charles, 2000, 'Processes and Mechanisms of Democratisation', *Sociological Theory*, vol, 18, no,1, March, pp. 1-16.

Tornquist, Olle, 2002, *Popular Development and Democracy: Case Studies with Rural Dimensions in the Philippines, Indonesia and Kerala*, Centre for Development and the Environment, Oslo.

Trocki, C, A, 2000, 'Drugs, Taxes, and Chinese Capitalism in Southeast Asia' in T Brook and B, T, Wakabayashi *Opium Regimes: China, Britain and Japan 1839-1952*, Berkeley, University of California Press, pp. 79-104.

Turner, Victor, 1967, *The Forest of Symbols: Aspects of Ndembu Ritual*, Penguin, New York.

Twang, Peck Yang, 1998, *The Chinese Business Elite and the Transition to Independence 1940-1950*, Oxford University Press, Kuala Lumpur.

Uldriks, N, and P, V, Reenen, 2003, *Policing Post-Communist Societies: Police Public Violence, Democratic Policing & Human Rights*, Intersentia, Antwerp.

Van Bruinessen, Martin, no date, *Islamic State or State Islam?*
<http://www.let.uu.nl/~martin,vanbruinessen/personal/publications/State-Islam.htm>, Accessed 16,10,10.

Van der Kroef, Justus, 1985, "Petrus": Patterns of Prophylactic Murder in Indonesia' in *Asian Survey*, vol, 25, no 7, July, pp. 745-759.

Vaughan P, Mogedal, S, Walt, G, Kruse Stein-Erik, 1996, 'WHO and the effects of extrabudgetary funds: is the Organisation donor driven?' *Health Policy and Planning*, vol 11, no. 3, pp. 253-264.

Villaveces, Santiago Izquierdo, 2010, 'Building internal and external constituencies for police reform: an Indonesian case study' in *International Journal of Police Science and Management*, vol 12, Issue 2, pp. 183-94.

Vincent, Joan, 2002, *The Anthropology of Politics: A Reader in Ethnography, Theory and Critique*, Blackwell Press, Oxford.

Von Tangen Page, Michael & Hamill, Olivia, 2006, *Security Sector Reform and its Role in Challenging Radicalism*, DIIS Working Paper no, 10, Copenhagen.

Wang Shaoguang & Hu A, 2001, *The Chinese Economy in Crisis: State Capacity and Tax Reform*, East Gate Publications.

Webber, Douglas, 2006, 'A Consolidated, Patrimonial Democracy? Democratisation in Post-Suharto Indonesia', *Democratisation*, vol, 13, no, 3, pp. 396-420.

Widoyoko, Danang, 2003, *Bisnis Militer Mencari Legitimasi*, Indonesian Corruption Watch & National Democratic Institute, Jakarta.

Wilson, Bu, 2009, *The Exception Becomes the norm in Timor Leste: The Draft National Security Laws and the Continuing Role of the Joint Command*, Issue Paper 11, RegNet, Centre for International Governance and Justice, Australian National University, Canberra.

Wilson, Donald, W, 1992, *The Indispensible Man Sudomo: The Continuing Journey*, Yayasan Persada Nusantara, Jakarta.

Wilson, Ian, 2002, *The Politics of Inner Power: The Practice of Pencak Silat in West Java*, PhD, Thesis, Murdoch University.

Wilson, Ian, 2006, 'Continuity and Change: The Changing Contours of Organised Violence in post New Order Indonesia', *Critical Asian Studies*, vol, 38, no, 2, pp. 265-297.

Wilson, Ian, 2010, 'The Rise and Fall of Political Gangsters in Indonesian Democracy' in Ed Aspinall & Marcus Mietzner *Problems of Democratisation in Indonesia: Elections, Institutions and Society*, ISEAS, Singapore, pp.199-218.

Wilson, Lee, 2006, *Unity or Diversity: The Constitution of a National Martial Art in Indonesia*, PhD Dissertation, Darwin College, Cambridge University.

Wolf, Diane, 2000, 'Beyond Women and the Household in Java: Re-examining the Boundaries' in Juliette Koning, Marleen Nolten, Janet Rodenburg and Ratna Saptari *Women and Households in Indonesia*, Curzon Press, Surrey, pp. 85-104.

Worden, Robert E, 1996, 'The Causes of Police Brutality: Theory and Evidence in Police Use of Force' in W,A Geller & Hans Toch *Police Violence*, Yale University Press, New Haven, pp. 23-51.

Xiaobo, Lu, 2000, 'Booty Socialism, Bureau-preneurs, and the State in Transition: Organisational Corruption in China', *Comparative Politics* vol, 32, no, 3, pp. 273-294.

Yang, Mayfair Mei-Hui, 1989, 'Gift Economy and State Power in China' in *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, vol, 31, no, 1, pp. 25-54.

Yang, Twang Peck, 2004, *Elite Bisnis Cina di Indonesia dan Masa Transisi Kemerdekaan 1940-1950*, Niagara, Yogyakarta.

Young, Craig, Diep, Martina & Drabble Stephanie, 2006, 'Living with a Difference: the Cosmopolitan City and Urban Reimaging in Manchester' *Urban Studies* vol, 43, no, 10, pp. 1687-1714.

Young, M, 1991, *Inside Job: Policing and Police Culture in Britain*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.

Yunanto, S, Nurhasim, Mochtar, Noorsalim, Mashudi & Maharani, Curie, 2005, 'The Structure of Indonesian Businesses: When Will it End?' in Mochtar Nurhasim, *Practices of Military Business: Experiences from Indonesia, Burma, Philippines and South Korea*, The Ridep Institute & Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Jakarta, pp. 17-82.

Yusra, Abrar & Ramadhan K,H, 1993, *Hoegeng, Polisi: Idaman dan Kenyataan*, Pustaka Sinar Harapan, Jakarta.

Appendix 1: Sites of Reported Polri-TNI Clashes 2001-2010

	PLACE	DISTRICT	PROVINCE	KODAM
2001	POLRES MADIUN CITY	MADIUN	EAST JAVA	V/BRAWIJAYA
2001	SAMPIT PORT	WEST KOTAWARINGIN	CENTRAL KALIMANTAN	XII/TANJUNGPURA
2001	SAMPIT	WEST KOTAWARINGIN	CENTRAL KALIMANTAN	XII/TANJUNGPURA
2001	LATA SIRIMAU, AMBON	AMBON CITY	MALUKU	XVI/PATTIMURA
2001	AMBON	AMBON CITY	MALUKU	XVI/PATTIMURA
2001	SERUI YAPEN WAROPEN	YAPEN WAROPEN	PAPUA	XVII/TRIKORA
2001	POLRES ACEH BARAT	WEST ACEH	ACEH	ISKANDAR MUDA
2001	PALU	PALU	CENTRAL SULAWESI	VII/WIRABUANA
2002	BINJAI	LANGKAT	NORTH SUMATRA	I/BUKIT BARISAN
2002	BOGOR	BOGOR	WEST JAVA	II/SILIWANGI
2003	DUMAI	BENGKALISRI	RIAU	I/BUKIT BARISAN
2003	POLOPO	LUWU	SOUTH SULAWESI	VII/WIRABUANA
2003	MEMPAWAH	PONTIANAK	WEST KALIMANTAN	VI/TANJUNGPURA
2004	SEUNEUBOK BACE	EAST ACEH	ACEH	ISKANDAR MUDA

2004	HARMONI, JAKARTA	CENTRAL JAKARTA	DKI JAKARTA	KODAM JAYA
2005	WAIHAONG	AMBON	MALUKU	XVI/PATTIMURA
2005	POLSEK CIBINONG	BOGOR	WEST JAVA	VI/SILIWANGI
2005	PALU	PALU	CENTRAL SULAWESI	VII/WIRABUANA
2005	NABIRE	NABIRE	PAPUA	XVII/TRIKORA
2006	ASRAMA BRIMOB TANTUI	AMBON CITY	MALUKU	XVI/PATTIMURA
2006	SAMARINDA	SAMARINDA	EAST KALIMANTAN	XII/TANJUNGPURA (this has since been divided)
2006	MANADO	MINAHASA	NORTH SULAWESI	VII/WIRABUANA
2006	PUBLIC FIELD, ATAMBUA CITY	BELU	NUSATENGGARA TIMUR	IX/UDAYANA
2006	MUSI RAWAS	MUSIRAWAS	SOUTH SUMATRA	II/SRIWIJAYA
2006	POSO	POSO	CENTRAL SULAWESI	VII/WIRABUANA
2007	POLRES BANTAENG	BANTAENG	WEST SOUTH SULAWESI	VII/WIRABUANA
2007	PUNCAK JAYA	PUNCAK JAYA	PAPUA	XVII/CENDRAWASIH
2007	POSO	POSO	CENTRAL SULAWESI	VII/WIRABUANA
2007	MAKASSAR CITY	MAKASSAR	SOUTH SULAWESI	VII/WIRABUANA
2007	PALLANGGA	GOWA	SOUTH SULAWESI	VII/WIRABUANA

2007	POLEWALI MANDAR	POLEWALI MANDAR	WEST SUMATRA	I/BUKIT BARISAN
2007	BULELENG	BULELENG	BALI	IX/UDAYANA
2007	JAILOLO	WEST HALMAHERA	NORTH MALUKU	XVI/PATTIMURA
2007	HARMONI, JAKARTA	CENTRAL JAKARTA	DKI JAKARTA	KODAM JAYA
2008	MANGGAR CITY	EAST BELITUNG	BANGKA BELITUNG	II/SRIWIJAYA
2008	MAKASSAR	MAKASSAR	SOUTH SULAWESI	VII/WIRABUANA
2008	MASOHI	CENTRAL MALUKU	MALUKU	XVI/PATTIMURA
2008	SERPONG	TANGERANG	BANTEN	KODAM JAYA
2008	BULUKUMBA	BULUKUMBA	SOUTH SULAWESI	VII/WIRABUANA
2008	TOBELO	NORTH HALMAHARA	NORTH MALUKU	XVI/PATTIMURA
2009	MAKASSAR	MAKASSAR	SOUTH SULAWESI	XVI/PATTIMURA
2009	TERNATE	HALMAHARA TENGAH	NORTH MALUKU	XVI/PATTIMURA
2009	ROKAN HULU	ROKAN HULU	RIAU	I/BUKIT BARISAN
2009	WAMENA	JAYAWIJAYA	PAPUA	XVII/CENDRAWASIH
2009	POLSEK PONDOK GEDE	BEKASI	WEST JAVA	KODAM JAYA
2009	MUSI RAWAS	MUSI RAWAS	SOUTH SUMATRA	II/SRIWIJAYA
2009	PALEMBANG	PALEMBANG	SOUTH SUMATRA	II/SRIWIJAYA

2009	PEKANBARU	PEKANBARU	RIAU	I/BUKIT BARISAN
2009	POLRES MAMUJU	MAMUJU	WEST SULAWESI	VII/WIRABUANA
2009	POLRES TOLIKARA	TOLIKARA	PAPUA	XVII/CENDRAWASIH
2010	POLRES MAMUJU	MAMUJU	WEST SULAWESI	VII/WIRABUANA
2010	POLRES MENTAWAI	MENTAWAI	WEST SUMATRA	I/BUKIT BARISAN
2010	KOTA KALABAHY	ALOR	NUSA TENGGARA TIMUR	IX/UDAYANA
2010	MEDAN	MEDAN	NORTH SUMATRA	I/BUKIT BARISAN
2010	TIMIKA	MIMIKA	PAPUA	XVII/CENDRAWASIH
2010	LABUHAN BATU	MEDAN	NORTH SUMATRA	I/BUKITBARISAN
2010	PADANG	PADANG	WEST SUMATRA	I/BUKIT BARISAN
2010	MUARA ENIM	MUARA ENIM	SOUTH SULAWESI	VII/WIRABUANA
2010	SERUI	YAPEN	PAPUA	UNKNOWN

Appendix 2: Glossary

Note for users: This glossary references Stevens and Tellings' 2004 A Comprehensive English-Indonesian Dictionary, published by Ohio University. Although meanings are checked against this source, I have adjusted definitions where appropriate. Where acronyms are more familiar, I have classified them under the acronym and provided the expanded version in brackets. Lit denotes a literal translation and (Pol) is used for terms exclusive to the police.

•

ABRI - [*Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia*] The body that incorporated the Armed Forces of Indonesia, including the Navy, Air-force, Army and Police. ABRI was dismantled in 1999 when the police force was made independent.

Adik-kakak - a sibling relationship.

Agung Sedayu – A Jakarta-based property company owned by Sugianto ‘Aguan’ Kusuma.

AKABRI – [*Akademi Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia*] the Armed Forces Academy of the Republic of Indonesia.

AKPOL – [*Akademi Kepolisian*] Polri’s police academy.

Anak buah – golden child, clientalist underlings, juniors under one’s supervision.

Anggaran Belanja Tambahan (ABT) – Additional Expenditure Budget.

Anggaran Pendapatan Belajar Negara (APBN) – National Revenues and Expenditures Budget.

Angkatan Darat (AD) – the Indonesian Army.

Angkatan Laut (AL) – the Indonesian Navy.

Angkatan Udara (AU) – the Indonesian Airforce.

Angkatan Bersenjata – the Armed Forces.

Artha Graha – ‘The House of Money’, a conglomerate owned by Tomy Winata and Sugianto ‘Aguan’ Kusuma.

Asrama – boarding house.

Babinkamtibmas - Lit. Security and Social Order Guidance Body or Community Policing Officer.

Babinsa – [Bintara Pembina Desa]. Lit. Village Guidance Officer stationed at the Koramil.

Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan (BPK) - State Audit Agency.

Bakorstanas – Coordinating body for national security established in 1988 to replace Kopkamtib.

BAP [*Berita Acara Pemeriksaaan*] – the police investigative report that records the interrogations of the suspect, witnesses and documentary evidence of the crime. The BAP is required to lay a charge.

Beking – patronage, protection, backing.

Betawi – ‘indigenous Jakartan.’

Brimob – [Lit. Mobile Brigade]. Polri’s centrally commanded, militarised police.

BUMN – State-owned company.

Buser [*buru sergap*] – Lit. Pursuit and Attack, the arresting unit of Polri’s criminal research department. Buser are field staff who do not interrogate or write case files.

Cendana – the leafy, plush street in Menteng, central Jakarta where the Suharto family residence is located. *Cendana* is frequently used to euphemise the Suharto family’s role in illicit dealings.

Cicak Lawan Buaya – gecko vs. crocodile, shorthand for the 2009 showdown between the Anti Corruption Commission and Polri in which Polri has been credibly accused of being paid by businessmen to set up the deputies of the Commission.

Cina – Chinese, including ethnic Chinese citizens of Indonesia.

Cukong – Hokkien term, used in colloquial Indonesian for a wealthy Chinese businessperson who bankrolls the political and military elite.

Cukongism – the practice of exchanging *Tionghoa* capital for security, economic or political concessions.

Curanmor – Motorbike theft and thief.

Daftar Isian Proyek Anggaran (DIPA) – Issuance of Spending Authority. The reporting system by which state departments, institutions and units account for state funds.

Dandim – District military commander.

Dandramil – Sub-district military commander.

Danrem – Garrison military commander (Korem).

Densus 88 – Polri’s counter-terror department that manages threats to national security such as counterterrorism, armed crime and insurgency.

DKI [Daerah Khusus Ibu Kota Jakarta Raya] - Greater Jakarta Special Administrative Region. The special province of Jakarta divided into the districts of East, West, North, South and Central Jakarta.

DPO [Daftar Pencarian Orang] – (Pol.) list of wanted persons.

DPR [Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat] – The People’s Assembly of the Republic of Indonesia.

Dukun – a shaman, traditional healer, sorcerer. See also *orang pintar*.

Duit – colloquially used to describe money, like cash, moolah or dosh. Originally Dutch to denote the copper coin that gradually replaced the picis by 1780.

Dwifungsi – [lit. dual functions] the ideology that justified ABRI’s socio-political role in Indonesian governance and daily life.

Forum Kemitraan Polisi dan Masyarakat (FKPM) – Police and Community Partnership Forum.

Golkar – The Party of Functional Groups, who with the military, made up one of the pillars of the New Order.

Hankam [*Pertahanan dan Keamanan*] – Defence and Security.

Hansip [*Pertahanan Sipil*] – Civil Defence.

Hibah tanah – donated land.

Hoki – luck or lucky, a term used primarily by *Tionghoa*.

Ilmu – knowledge, both scientific and non-rational in form.

Irwasum - Head of the General Oversight Inspectorate of the National Police.

Jago – rooster, champion martial artist (in West Java), gangster.

Jambret – purse snatcher, pickpocket.

Jawara - Bully, gangster, local martial arts champion. See also *jago* and *preman*.

Judi – Gambling. Also *perjudian*.

Kamnas [*Keamanan Nasional*] – The shorthand for the National Security Bill, drafted by the Department of Defence in 2007 and since buried.

Kampung – a village or residential area for the lower classes. Though often thought of in romantic terms, affixing the ... –an to become *kampungan* describes a boorish person or behaviour.

Kantor Pelayanan Perbendaharaan Negara – Provincial Treasury office.

Kapolri – National Chief of Police

Kapolri Swasta - Lit. ‘informal’ National Police Chief. A turn of phrase to describe a kind of *cukong* relationship specific to the police.

KASAD – Military or police chief of staff.

Kapolda – Regional Police Chief.

Kapolres – District Police Chief.

Kapolri – National Police Chief.

Keamanan – Security.

Kecamatan – Sub-district level governance.

Kekaryaan – A practice of appointing retired and active military generals to civilian bureaucratic and leadership posts that reached its zenith in the New Order.

Kelurahan - Ward level governance.

Ketangkasan – literally, skill. Usually associated with a ball game such as pin ball or, in the instance of Indonesia’s illegal gaming industry, a slot machine or *keno*.

Kodam – District level military command.

Komisaris – Commissioner, usually of a state or private corporation.

Komisi III – National Parliamentary Commission III, responsible the oversight of law and policing.

Komnas HAM – National Commission for Human Rights.

Kompolnas – National Police Commission.

Kongsi – Joint venture or business association. Frequently, *kongsi* is used in place of cartel.

Kooperasi – Cooperative.

Kopassus – the Special Force Command of the Indonesian Army that deals with specialized national threats such as insurgency and counterterrorism. Known for their sniper capacities.

Kopkamtib - Operational Command for the Restoration of Security and Order.

Koramil – Sub-district level military command.

Korem – Garrison level military command.

Kostrad – the Indonesian Army's Strategic Reserve Command.

Koter [*Komando Daerah*] – Military Command System.

KPK [*Komisi Anti-Korupsi*] - Anti Corruption Commission.

Inkopol – Holding Company for the Polri Cooperative.

Intel – Intelligence departments and agents within the police.

Lahan – Fertile, tilled land that brings wealth when harvested. In urban environments, the term is slang for one's turf.

Laupan – Hokkien term for boss.

Lembaga Permasarakatan (LP) – State jail.

Linmas [*Lindungan Masyarakat*] - National Community and Community Protection body.

Mabes Polri: the national headquarters of Polri.

Maling - Thief.

Marga – Clan.

Markas – A kind of 'broker' who works exclusively with the police to 'fix' legal cases.

Metropolitan City – the specific vision for Jakarta under Governor Maj.Gen Ali Sadikin that determined the city's policy and planning initiatives.

MPR [*Majelis Perwakilan Rakyat*] – People's Legislative Council.

Mutasi – A term employed by employees of the state to describe the rotation of job postings.

Narkoba – Narcotics, usually illegal.

Oknum – A 'bad apple' within the state corps, a rogue, individual whose uses his or her authority as a public official for personal gain.

Orang pintar – A shaman who heals, ruptures and predicts. See also, *dukun*.

Ormas [*Organisasi Masyarakat*] – Community organisation, more frequently used as a euphemism for Indonesia's post-authoritarian variety of non-state aligned criminal gangs.

P21 – (Pol) The name a complete case file is given when it is accepted by the prosecution.

Pamong praja – the indigenous ruling class of the colonial state.

Pancasila – The five principles of National Ideology as proclaimed by President Sukarno.

Pangkat – Rank.

Panti Asuhan – Orphanage or child care institution, often providing residential care.

Parman [*partisipasi teman*] – (Pol) Euphemism for donors to the police from the private sector.

Parmas [*partisipasi masyarakat*] – (Pol) Euphemism for donors of the police institution from members and institutions in the community.

Parmin [*partisipasi kriminal*] – (Pol) Euphemism for donors of the police institution from criminal networks or individual bosses.

Partai Demokrat – the Democratic Party led by President Susilo Yudhoyono.

Paspampres [*Pasukan Keamanan President*] – the Presidential Security Guard usually made up of elite, career-minded officers from various sections of the military, or as in President Abdurrahman Wahid's time, the police.

PDI-P – the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle, led by Megawati Sukarnoputri who served as president from 2002-2004.

Pembinaan – Nurturing guidance.

Peranakan – Indonesian born Chinese of mixed Chinese Indonesian parentage.

Perkara – (Pol). Case.

PKI [*Partai Komunis Indonesia*] – The Indonesian Communist Party.

Perjudian – gambling, also *judi*.

Pesantren – Islamic school offering a mix of Islamic and 'modern' education, usually offering board to its students.

Polda Metro Jaya – Jakarta Regional Police Station.

Polmas [*Polisi Masyarakat*] – Community Policing.

Polres – District level police station.

Polsek – Sub-district level police station.

Pos Pol – Police post administered by the polsek.

Preman – Gangster, criminal, state sponsored thug, see also *jago* and *jawara*. Also, the name for an un-uniformed member of the security apparatus.

Pribumi – ‘indigenous’ native of Indonesia with Malay racial characteristics.

Propam [*Divisi Profesi dan Pengamanan*] – (Pol) Internal affairs.

Protap – (police) Standard Operating Procedures.

PTIK [*Perguruan Tinggi Ilmu Kepolisian*] – The Advanced School of Police Science, located in Jakarta. A mandatory part of any officer’s education if they are to advance in the institution.

Purnawirawan (Purn.) – Retired officer.

Putaw - Low grade heroin.

Reformasi – Reformation, the title of the movement that instigated democratisation.

Repelita – Five Year Development Plan.

Reserse, also serse. – Criminal Investigation.

Reskrim [*Reserse Kriminal*] – Department for Criminal Investigation found at every level of the police command system.

Ronda – Traditional neighbourhood patrol.

RT [*Rukun tetangga*] – Neighbourhood Association.

Rumah Sakit – Hospital.

RUU [*rancangan undang-undang*] – draft national legislation.

RW [*Rukun Warga*] – Citizen’s Association comprised of RT.

Satgas – police task force, usually associated with specific criminal investigations.

Satpam [*Satuan Pengamanan*] – private security guard.

Sembako – nine basic necessities comprising salt, salted fish, sugar, cooking oil, kerosene, laundry soap, rough textiles.

SDSB – [*Sumbangan Dermawan Social Berhadiah*] The later incarnation of a series of national sports lotteries between 1986-1991. Profits from the lotteries were supposed to go to sports and other worthy causes.

SESPIM [Sekolah Staf dan Pimpinan Kepolisian Negara Republik] – Police Leaders School.

Setoran – (Pol) a monthly or regular rent extracted by seniors.

SKEP [*Surat Keputusan Edaran Polri*] – Decree or edict issued by the Kapolri.

Shabu – [also, *shabu-shabu* or *sabu*] - Methamphetamine hydrochloride, an addictive stimulant.

Siliwangi command – West Java military command.

Siskamling [*Sistem Keamanan Lingkungan*] – Neighbourhood Security System.

SPN [*Sekolah Kepolisian Negara*] – National Police School.

Sumbang – to donate.

Taipan – boss (Hokkien).

Tauke – boss.

Terpaksa – forced.

Tionghua – Indonesian citizen of Chinese descent.

TO [*Target Operasi*] – (Pol) Target of Operation.

Togel [*Toto Gelap*] – A popular variety of lotto, rather like bingo but involving numbers and pictures.

Totok - a person of Chinese descent who is perceived by the *Tionghoa* community to have a strong commitment to Chinese or Confusian values in every day life, speak in Chinese dialect and tend to be of Confusian or Buddhist religion.

UU [*Undang-Undang*] – Law, act.

Visum – medical certificate.

Wilayah – Region, territory, area. Also, in slang use, turf.

Yayasan – Foundation. During the New Order, charitable enterprises to masked illicit businesses run by the state and its elites.

The Cast

Adang Darajatun [also, Dorojatun] – Served as Wakapolri. He is often presented as a ‘reformist’ because of his role in drafting the ‘blue book’ in 1999, Polri’s blueprint for reform and later, as Wakapolri, his role in supporting community policing. During his career, he has faced credible charges of corruption on several occasions and has faced an internal ethics trial. In 2007, Darajatun ran for governor of Jakarta with Islamic party PKS but lost to former Governor Sutiyoso’s choice, Fauzi Bowo. Through his wife, Nunun Nurbaiti, the Darajutuns possess a substantial business enterprise with interests in defence contracts, telecommunications and palm oil. In 2010, Darajatun’s wife fled to Singapore in need of ‘medical treatment’ after allegations emerged of her distributing cheques issued by an Artha Graha-owned company to lubricate the nomination of Miranda Goeltom to the senior deputy governor of the Bank of Indonesia.

Agung Podomoro Group – Run by Trihatma Kusuma Halim, the group specialises in Jakarta property development. The group has risen to prominence in the latter years of the first decade after *reformasi* due to big property projects such as Podomoro City and Perumahan Sunter Podomoro. It is currently raising money through an IPO.

Artha Graha – Tomy Winata’s giant, sprawling conglomerate with interests in property, tourism, telecommunications, finance, insurance, tin and most recently, agro-industry with the launch of a massive hybrid-rice project.

Jenderal Dai Bachtiar – Served as Kapolri from 2001 to 2005 under the Megawati administration. Although he kicked the reform process along slowly, approving a series of research projects run by the Partnership for Governance Reform designed to reform the police, he also ran a largely corrupt ship and made few attempts to conceal his political leanings. In the 2004 elections, with Megawati versus Yudhoyono, he instructed the force to use the votes of their families and wives to vote for PDI-P. Under the Yudhoyono administration, he was farmed out as ambassador for Malaysia. He and a host of other pensioned officers also run LCKI, a consultancy/ think tank designed to capture foreign funding by supporting criminal justice reform.

Aburizal Bakrie – Chairman of the Golkar party and Bakrie and Brothers. Under the latter, is the subsidiary Bakrieland, the ‘largest superblock developer in Jakarta,’ according to their website. Bakrieland is renowned for its developments around the main artery Jln Rasuna Said, including the popular Taman Rasuna. Bakrieland also develops Jakarta’s toll roads and water in Jakarta’s east. Bakrie and Brothers have invested heavily in energy, mining and bio-fuels. In 2007, the year after the Lapindo disaster, Bakrie was listed as Indonesia’s richest man. In 2010, he had dropped to number four.

Fauzi Bowo – He served as Governor Sutiyoso’s deputy before running against Wakapolri Adang Darajatun for governorship of Jakarta in 2007. He has an instrumental role running the pan-Betawi body, Bamus, and is linked to its plethora civilian militia.

Ciputra – owns Ciputra group which specialises in property, media and retail in the capital. After taking a massive hit in the Asian financial crisis, Ciputra's company has begun developing property throughout the country and in Vietnam.

Citra Bhayangkara - a Polri established community policing group found predominantly in Jakarta.

Arief Cocong – Medan *Tionghoa* Manager of various illegal gambling casinos in central and west Jakarta. Often known as the '*Kapolri swasta*' or the private National Police Chief for his reputed contacts within Polri.

The Consortium - the term used to describe a range of investors and actors in high class gambling industry, including Sugeng Pranato, Tomy Winata, Sugianto 'Aguan' Kusuma, Edi 'Porkas' Winata, Arief Cocong, Rudi Sutanto, Yoris Raweyai, Ongen Sangaji, Hadi Rustam, Kwee Hariyadi Kumala, Johnny Kusuma, Arie Sigit, Iwan Tjahyadikarta (Eng Tiong).

Kapolri Bambang Danuri – Under Kapolri Sutanto, Danuri appeared as a clean, reformist officer during his tenure as Kapolda for North Sumatra and as head of Bareskrim, where he even commissioned a white paper for reform. As a result, Danuri was outgoing Kapolri Sutanto's choice for Kapolri but upon being appointed in 2008, he has largely run a fractured messy term, dithering over a number of serious scandals to rock the police such as the KPK affair and the discovery of inflated bank accounts of senior generals.

Dadi Darmadi – (Apyang Jinggo). He served as the front man for a series of investors in Jakarta's gambling scene while it was legalised under Governor Ali Sadikin.

Yan Darmadi - (Foek Yoo Yan) Ran his father's contracts for Jakarta casinos under Governor Ali Sadikin, building a big enough capital base to invest heavily in property, hotels and retail in Jakarta and throughout the country through PT Jan Darmadi Investindo and PT Jakarta Setiabudi International. Before the crisis, Darmadi's group was one of the top thirty companies in the country. In 2007, Darmadi was listed by Forbes as Indonesia's 30th richest man.

Kapolri Awoeluddin Djamin – Served between 1978-82 and oversaw important changes within the police including legislation for private security companies and the code of criminal procedure, KUHAP. Djamin continues to be seen as Polri's most 'intellectual' police officer, by dint of having a PhD from the University of Southern California and writing prolifically about the force, but he offers very conservative visions of reform. His influence within Polri remains strong.

Susno Duadji – Was appointed Kabareskrim [Head of Criminal Investigation] under Danuri but became embroiled in the *cicak-buaya* case of 2008 in which he appeared to set up KPK Deputy Chairmen Chandra Hamzah and Babit Rianto for arrest. After being forced to resign as Kabareskrim due to overwhelming public pressure, Duadji began a strategy of seeking public influence by dishing the dirt on other police generals based on information gathered during his 2004 secondment to the Financial

Reporting and Analysis Centre (PPATK). Duaji is currently facing criminal charges regarding allegations of corruption. Ranking in 2010 was Com. Gen.

Nugroho Djayusman – Kapolda Metro Jaya from 1998-99. Close to General Wiranto and self-confessed advisor and advocate to many new civil militias in Jakarta and Medan, particularly Front Pembela Islam.

Eka Cipta Widjaja – Cipta Widjaja was heavily embedded in the New Order regime and the Suharto family owned a significant stake in Sinar Mas. The group is largely propped up by a significant stake in pulp and paper which has led to credible claims of illegal logging. Sinar Mas also has an important property flank of the business which constructs residential and retail estates in Jakarta through PT Duta Pertiwi.

Nur Faizi – Kapolda Metro Jaya from 1999-2000 before being ousted by Abdurrahman Wahid for his failure to arrest Tomy Winata on illegal gambling charges. Final rank was Insp. Gen.

FBR [Forum Betawi Rempug] – the Betawi Brotherhood Forum is a Jakarta based *ormas* [mass based organisation] established in 2001 by now deceased K.H. Fadloli el-Muhir. The group purports to restore the fruits of development to the ‘Betawi,’ the city’s original inhabitants. However, in reality it is a shifting mass of various old time and new *preman* who have aggressively taken over large strips of the capital, including parts of profitable central Jakarta.

Kapolda Adang Firman – Appointed to Kapolda Metro Jaya at the time of Kapolri Sutanto’s war against gambling and drugs. Despite initial calls that he wasn’t up to the job, Firman lasted well over three years as Kapolda.

Forkabi [Forum Komunikasi Anak Betawi] – the Communication Forum of Betawi Kids. Often twinned with FBR, Forkabi was established around the same time for similar reasons. Like FBR, Forkabi has an ongoing and brutal rivalry with the Madurese gangs that ply the city. However, Forkabi has been far less successful at taking over the resource rich areas of the city.

Front Pembela Islam - A hardline Islamic militia that appeared after the disbandment of the Pam Swakarsa. FPI is known for its violent tactics and spectacular attacks, initially on places of sin but increasingly on ethnic and religious minorities across the country. FPI is a complex and contradictory mix of *preman* tactics and religious fundamentalism.

Irjen Firman Gani – Close to Kapolri Da’i Bachtiar, Firman was appointed Kapolda Metro Jaya during 2003-2004. With the change of political winds that occurred under Sutanto, Gani was rotated to an educational position until he retired.

Golkar – The party of functional groups, the main political vehicle for the New Order.

Trihatma Halim – Took Agung Podomoro group over from his father. He is currently rated in the top twenty richest of Indonesia.

Chandra M Hamzah – Deputy Head of the Anti Corruption Commission. He was arrested by Polri on corruption in 2009 but later freed when tapes showed that the head of Criminal Investigation colluded with Anggoro Widjojo to have him arrested. In October 2010, the charges of bribery against Hamzah and Rianto were dropped.

Hanura – People’s Conscience Party, founded by General Wiranto in 2006 after his defeat in the 2004 national elections. For the 2009 national elections, Wiranto amassed a central board consisting mainly of police and military generals disappointed that their support of his administration in the second round of the 2004 presidential elections had not translated into real political positions.

Harco Mangga Dua – Built by Sugianto Kusuma’s PT Agung Sedayu Group in 1991 for retail purposes. Harco housed Jakarta’s most exclusive casino from 2000-2005.

Kapolri Hoegeng – Much respected national police chief from 1968 to 1971. Renowned as a clean cop with high morals, he was eventually alienated by President Suharto. He went onto join Sadikin and Nasution in the Petition of 50.

Hotel Borobudur - Located near Kodam at Lapangan Banteng, the hotel was once owned by YKEP’s PT JIHD. Since the transition to democracy, the Hotel has changed hands to Discovery, a subsidiary of Tomy Winata’s Artha Graha.

Humpuss Group – A large shipping company 60% owned by Suharto’s favoured son, Tommy Suharto.

ICITAP - International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program funded by the US Department for Justice and Department of State.

Inkopol [*Induk Kooperasi Kepolisian*] – A police cooperative with extensive business interests.

INTI – [*Perhimpunan Indonesia Tionghoa*] Association of Indonesians of *Tionghoa* descent established by Eddie Lembong in the wake of the 1998 riots in February 1999 to assuage pribumi-*Tionghoa* relations. Today functions as a nation-wide pressure group.

International Organisation for Migration – International NGO working on migration issues worldwide. This branch in Indonesia has pushed the boundaries of IOM work by establishing a national community policing program with European Commission and Royal Netherlands Embassy support.

PT JIHD - Jakarta International Hotels and Development. In 1991, acquired PT Danayasa Arthatama, the owner and main developer of the Sudirman Central Business District (SCBD). This acquisition has changed JIHD's corporate status from a single asset/hotel owner to a mixed-use property developers, ranging from hotels to commercial offices, shopping centers, residential, and serviced apartments. Owned by Tomy Winata and Sugianto Kusuma.

Kosgoro [*Kesatuan Organisasi Serbaguna Gotong Royong*] – a civil militia/ business outfit formed by Golkar in the late 1950s.

Sugianto ‘Aguan’ Kusuma – Palembang *Tionghoa* based in Jakarta and owner of Agung Sedayu group, a major player in property in Jakarta. Kusuma is Tomy Winata’s senior and they have partnered in initiatives together since the early 1980s. Kusuma is also active in Tzu Chi, a well-regarded Taiwanese charity with branches all over the world.

Atang Latief – (Lauw Tjin Ho) A *Tionghoa* entrepreneur who made his fortune in the legalised gambling industry during Sadikin’s term as Governor. After a series of bank investments tied up with the Asian financial crisis, Latief skipped the country with a substantial BLBI loan [Restructuring authority]. He returned to Indonesia to face charges in 2006 but by 2010, the case was still unresolved and Latief was living in Singapore.

Ronnie Liehawa – Former Kombes (Senior Police Comissioner) in Polri. Secretary for the national police commission (Kompolnas), consultant to IOM’s community policing program and to Dai Bachtiar’s consultancy, LCKI. He is a major shareholder in PT Secom, a Japanese-Polri partnership towards providing private security. Since the terrorist attacks in Jakarta, this company holds many of the major hotel security contracts throughout the country.

Liem Sioe Liong (Salim group) – Once considered the richest individual in Indonesia, Liem Sioe Liong started his career in business in Kudus, Central Java, by providing supplies to the armed forces, particularly while Suharto headed up the Diponegoro command. He expanded into textiles and banking and during the New Order and was handed monopolies on cloves and flour which allowed him to expand into cement and food production. In many of these initiatives, Liem Sioe Liong was forced to partner with Suharto’s children. Liong has also been associated with other Suharto cronies such as Ciputra, Eka Cipta Widjaja, Henry Pribadi and Mochtar Riady. Son Anthony Salim now runs Salim group. He was ranked 9th richest Indonesian in Forbes 2010.

Lippo Group – Established by New Order *cukong* Mochtar Riady, and currently run by his son James Riady. Lippo Group established a capital base in banking, expanding to property estates in the Jabotabek region in the 1980s and 1990s. Currently, Lippo group is investing in education in China.

Mitra Jaya – A group of civilian toughs, businessmen and ward-level leadership formed to assist the Koramil in everyday policing.

Soetijpto Nagaria - In 1975, established Summarecon Agung, a property giant responsible for several large residential estates throughout Jakarta and retail buildings in and around Central Jakarta. Nagaria was a donor in the Polda Metro Jaya renovations.

Setya Novanto – Curried favour with Golkar through Kosgoro and was the recipient of a number of contracts supplying Polri before becoming a Golkar parliamentarian after the fall of Suharto. In parliament, he has played an active role on the commissions dedicated to police oversight and budgeting. Accusations of corruption have repeatedly been brought up against him, but never pursued. Setya Novanto is

associated with the Nova group, a diversified conglomerate with interests in granite, entertainment, and export-import, but also a number of other companies such as PT Hexatama Finindo and PT Prima Nugraha Sejahtera Raya.

Nur Faizi - Kapolda Metro Jaya from 1999-2000. Final ranking at retirement was May.Gen.

Ongen Sangaji – Sangaji's career in Jakarta's gangster politics has been closely linked to his relationships with General Wiranto and kin, retired Let.Gen Suaedy Marasabessy. As the leader of one of the most fearsome Muslim Ambonese *preman* groups in the capital, Sangaji had a dominant role in the protection industry of central Jakarta night spots and hotels which after 1998, graduated into a stakeholder position in gaming halls. In 2007, Sangaji renounced his life in the Jakarta underworld for a life in politics as deputy head of the Jakarta branch of General Wiranto's Hanura party. Sangaji's band of *preman* have also been credibly accused of fanning the flames of a civil war that broke out between Muslims and Christians in late 1998.

Makbul Padmanegara – Between 1983-86, Padmanegara served as Kapolsek in various stations in central Jakarta, including Taman Sari. In 2000, he served as Wakapolda for Metro Jaya under Kapolda Nur Faizi then going on to take the Kapolda position where he was accused of sympathising with Tomy Winata in the Tempo affair. In 2005, Padmanegara was Kabareskrim and then went on as Wakapolda under Kapolri Sutanto. In 2010, Padmanegara retired.

Pamswakarsa – A generic term for private security forces but more frequently used to refer to the Islamic gangs formed by Wiranto to support the MPR against the students in the 1998 Special Session. Many Pamswakarsa troops went on to join other Islamic militia in the capital such as FPI and FBR.

Olo Panggabean – Was an early member of Pemuda Pancasila until in 1969, he broke off and formed rival group, IPK which ruled North Sumatra's gambling world until Kapolri Sutanto declared an end to the industry in 2005. Panggabean died in 2009.

Partnership for Governance Reform – An institution that mediates international funding for democratisation and reform in Indonesia through the initiatives of national stakeholders. Under Adrianus Meliala, Partnership's police program was instrumental in commissioning a series of important policy papers on the Indonesian police, recommending strategies for the reform of recruitment, human resources, education, fiscal and community policing systems.

Paguyuban Sosial Marga Tionghua Indonesia – Established by Eddie Lembong and Teddy Yusuf in the wake of the 1998 riots in Jakarta, PSMTI and INTI were originally one social organisation founded to provide mutual aid to the *Tionghoa*. In 1999, Lembong accused PSMTI of being too *Tionghoa*-centered and split from the body to establish INTI. Like INTI, PSMTI is widely regarded as a networking organisation that facilitates relations between a middle-aged, male business elite and the state.

Pemuda Pancasila – A nation-wide organisation of state-sponsored *preman* that achieved notoriety during the New Order. Headed by Yapo Soerjosoemarno and deputy, Yoris Raweyai.

Petition of 50 – A document signed in 1980 by disaffected generals, intellectuals and parliamentarians raising concern that the spirit of Pancasila was being abused. Notable ABRI signatories include Sadikin, Hoegeng and Nasution.

Po An Tui – A national, grassroots policing organisation established by *Tionghoa* youths to protect *Tionghoa* property and trade during the revolution against the Dutch colonial government. The single instance in Indonesian history in which *Tionghoa* have mobilised themselves for their own security.

Puskopol – Police Cooperative with branches at every level of the police territorial command.

Yoris Raweyai – Former deputy head of Pemuda Pancasila and key player in the executive casino industry. Currently, Raweyai is a Golkar legislator for Irian Jaya and head of the newly established Dewan Adat Masyarakat Papua [Traditional Culture Council for Papua]. Raweyai's relationship with Tomy Winata started in the 1980s, although this relationship came to light most notably in Winata's use of Pemuda Pancasila to clear land around Sudirman for the SCDB development. Raweyai is of Chinese-Irian descent.

Bitib Rianto – Graduate of AKABRI 1970, Rianto embraced a role in the police reform movement by writing a series of books on Polri's reform and taking responsibility for the direction of the institution in the wake of the 1999 split from ABRI. Nonetheless, these machinations did not win him any real traction for his bid to become Kapolri to replace Roesmanhadi and Rianto retired from the force in 2000. In 2007, Rianto was appointed Deputy Chairman of the Anti Corruption Commission where he pursued police corruption most notably imprisoning former National Police Chief Rusdihardjo for embezzlement and former prosecutor Urip Tri Gunawan for receiving bribes. Tensions between the criminal justice system and the KPK ran high, climaxing in 2009 when Kabareskrim Susno Duadji ordered the arrest of Rianto and his colleague Chandra M Hamzah allegedly for receiving bribes from *Tionghoa* businessman Anggodo Widjojo. Tapes played in the constitutional court proved that the police had conspired with the Widjojo to have the deputies arrested. Anggodo Widjojo was convicted for bribery and sentenced to five years imprisonment.

Haji Rizieq Shihab – Notorious founder and head of Front Pembela Islam, the Islamic Defenders Front.

Siti Hardiyanti Rukmana – Eldest daughter of President Suharto, otherwise known as Mbak Tutut. Under the New Order, Rukmana's empire of companies in telecommunications, agribusiness, toll road construction and shipbuilding under the Citra Lamtorogung group substantially profited from a raft of government contracts. Her company PT Citra Permatasakti Persada also won the tender to computerise the police licensing system in the late 1990s. Rukmana's substantial capital base was built through a 30% share of Liem Sioe Liong's Salim group and her chairmanship of Yayasan Dana Bhakti Kesejahteraan Sosial, the foundation that organised the national

lottery from 1986-1993. Rukmana also chaired Golkar in the 1990s and announced her desire to run for president in the 2004 elections.

Ali Sadikin – Controversial governor of Jakarta from 1966-77 famous for legalising gambling and whose charisma and outspoken nature put him in direct conflict with President Suharto. Sadikin was an important member of a number of ‘discussion’ groups in the 1970s and 1980s that criticised the New Order.

Jusuf Sangkar – Purportedly the first civilian to earn a PhD in policing from the newly established KIK advanced policing centre at PTIK, Sangkar proceeded to serve as special advisor to Kapolri Sutanto during the period of his tenure as Police Chief. In the second term of the Yudhoyono presidency, Sangkar reappeared as the President’s advisor on food security, propelling forward the administration’s policies on hybrid rice.

TB (Tiopan Bernard) Silalahi – Major General in the Indonesian military and former secretary general in the New Order bureaucracy. In the military Silalahi was close to Edi Sudrajat and General Bagus Sudjana through these ties, became friendly with Tomy Winata, dispensing contracts to him from their positions in the military and government. Silalahi and Sudrajat, along with a number of other senior generals and the Jakarta governor were deeply invested in the SCDB deal. At the time, Silalahi was a director for PT JIHD. Silalahi went on to serve as president commissioner for Bank Artha Graha. Silalahi was also active in the first term of the SBY government, first as one of Yudhoyono’s campaign team and then as a special presidential advisor until 2006.

Ted Siong - Of Indian ethnic origin but purportedly brought up by *Tionghoa* parents, the businessman otherwise known as Pak Gatot is known for his holdings in *Tionghoa*-related media and as a pro-China lobbyist for *Tionghoa* business. Siong owns International Daily News and the obscure pro-Polri, pro-SBY rag, National News.

Suharto – Military General who ruled Indonesia for 32 years in a period known as the New Order. Although Suharto’s regime was known to be brutal and kleptocratic, his death in 2008 initiated a wave of mourning among the political elite.

Tommy Suharto – Reportedly a favoured son of former President Suharto, to the public he has long been thought of as a rogue from even his teenage years when on a Saturday night he would shut down Jakarta’s main artery, Jalan Thamrin in order to race his collection of Italian sports cars. Tommy Suharto served four years of a fifteen year sentence for ordering the assassination of Supreme Court Judge, Syafiuddin Kartasasmita after he charged him with graft. Recently, Tommy Suharto has been making a strong comeback in the business world, with a luxury property development in Bali and through his major shipping company, Humpuss, which happens to brandish a retired police officer as commissioner.

Yapto Soerjosoemarno - Part Dutch, Jewish and Javanese gangster best known for his leadership of the biggest *preman* outfit under the New Order, Pemuda Pancasila. In 2001, Yapto formed the Pancasila Patriot Party but won no seats in the 2004 elections. For the 2009 elections, Yapto contested through the renamed Patriot Party

but fared even worse than the last. Yapto continues to head up Pemuda Pancasila but is struggling to find a new, post-Suharto identity for the organisation.

Soemitro – Head of Kopkamtib from 1973 to 1974 before being sidelined for his alleged ambitions to become president. He played an important role in weakening Petition of Fifty by luring members away with offers of state contracts.

Juwono Sudarsono – Widely respected academic from the Institute of Technology Bandung and the University of Indonesia who served two terms as Defence minister under two different administrations. Under the beleaguered presidency of Abdurrahman Wahid, Sudarsono took a frontal approach to military reform and spoke frankly about the problems facing the institution, even going so far as to point the finger at rogue military factions for the bloody civil wars that flared during the first years of democratic transition. Under the Yudhoyono presidency, Sudarsono has repeatedly shielded the military from key reforms such as the dismantling of military businesses, courts and the territorial apparatus. He is closely aligned to the think tank, Propatria as many on the board are old academic colleagues.

Sudomo – Navy Admiral that replaced President Suharto himself as Kopkamtib Head from 1978 to 1983. He became famous for his effective dismantling of internal military dissent against President Suharto. In the same year, he also re-prohibited gambling. Later, as Coordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs, his reward as Coordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs was a share in the profits of the national lotto.

Megawati Sukarnoputri – Daughter of beloved president Sukarno and leader of the opposition, the Party of Democratic Struggle [PDI-P]. Megawati led the country from 2001-2004 before losing the election to President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. Her term was characterised by deference to both institutions of the coercive apparatus in exchange for political support in the wake of Abdurrahman Wahid's own dramatic removal from power. Unsurprisingly, democratic reform of the coercive apparatus stalled dramatically.

Robbie ‘Ketek’ Sumampouw – Crony of the Suharto family. Awarded monopolies on coffee and sandalwood after the invasion of Timor Leste. Later Sumampouw managed Tommy Suharto's clove industry. The Sumampouws were also a heavy investor in Jakarta's gambling economy, purportedly owning Hai Lai in Ancol and shares in many of the consortium's premier casinos.

Rudi Sutanto - Medan Chinese and owner of several celebrated nightclubs and gambling dens around central and west Jakarta such as Rajamas, Neorajamas, Stadium, Pelangi and 1001. A core member of the *kongsi* of businessmen involved in the gambling industry from the late 90s until 2005.

Kapolri Sutanto – Graduated along with President Yudhoyono in AKABRI's 1971 class, Sutanto was the president's first nomination for Kapolri. Sutanto served from 2005-2008. The former national chief of police is known for being conservative, somewhat aloof and poor with words but nonetheless his term did more for the democratic reform of Polri than any police chief prior or since. Not only did he shut down the gambling economy but, with civil society organisations, he commissioned a

series of powerful external interventions into the financial, community relations, human resources, knowledge management and recruitment systems of the police. These policies were ultimately not taken up under the term of his successor. Sutanto was also not a raving democrat. His collection of Harley Davidson motorcycles and luxury home in Pondok Indah was well known. Quietly, he also maintained relations with *preman* and *Tionghoa* business communities but these were much pruned back compared to other Kapolri before and after him.

Governor Sutiyoso – Former Letnan General in the Indonesian army and appointed governor of the capital from 1997 -2007, until his civilian deputy Fauzi Bowo was elected. Deeply involved in the gambling industry as well as the Islamic *preman/ormas* groups that have come to characterise Jakarta's *preman* scene.

Kiki Syahnakri - A Major General in the Indonesian military former vice chief of staff and operations assistant during the independence of Timor Leste, Syahnakri led the team that audited YKEP. Internationally Syahnakri is wanted as a war criminal for his role in inciting pro-Indonesian militias in Timor Leste but domestically, he continues to play a vocal role in the direction of the military. Syahnakri is President Commissioner of Bank Artha Graha.

Bambang Harry Iswanto Tanoesoedibjo (Harry Tanoe) – *Tionghoa* President of Bimantara Group and media mogul.

Bambang Trihatmodjo – Third child of Suharto and founder of Bimantara Citra, a conglomerate with major media, property, and hotel interests. The conglomerate was hit hard by the Asian financial crisis and Hari Tanoe acquired a 30% share.

Abdurrahman Wahid - Former chairman of Indonesia's biggest Islamic organisation, *Nadhatul Ulama*, Wahid effectively outmaneuvered Megawati Sukarnoputri to become the first president of the republic after the fall of Suharto. Wahid's presidency was bold at best and downright unpredictable at worst. He embarked on aggressive reform of the Indonesian military which would have been successful had in other areas his own leadership skills not been so erratic. It was under Wahid's presidency that the TAP MPR IV/VII was issued, splitting the police from the military and placing the police under the president. Wahid also politicised the police, firing Kapolri Bimantoro on a whim when he realised the General would not support his tenure as president. He attempted to replace the general with his deputy, General Chaeruddin but the vast majority of officers did not recognise this as legitimate and so both generals served at the same time until Wahid was eventually impeached in mid 2001. Wahid is fondly remembered by the *Tionghoa* community for his reforms to their citizenship and cultural rights. Wahid passed away in 2009.

Walubi – Religious NGO established by Siti Hartati Murdaya as her vehicle for charitable and religious publicity and is embedded in a sometimes vicious rivalry with Matakin which prefers to emphasise the religious element of Buddhism. Things came to a head in 2007 when both institutions planned separate and distinct ways of celebrating Imlek. President Yudhoyono negotiated a truce between the institutions by attending both of their celebrations.

Dibyo Widodo – Kapolri from 1996-8 and former assistant to President Suharto. Currently President Commissioner of PT Angkasa Interland.

Agus Widjojo - Graduate of AKABRI 1970 who served as head of the territorial command during the transition to democracy and head of the MPR [People's Legislative Council]. Widjojo advocated for reform of the Koter apparatus although he was careful to word his proposals in softer terminology than that of other reformists. Among the generals of the national police, Widjojo is known as the midwife of Polri, for his reformist role in separating the police institution from ABRI.

Tomy Winata – Pontianak *Tionghoa* with a mysterious background who appears to have courted military contracts in Kalimantan, Irian Jaya and West Java as early as in his teens. Maintained close links with Kostrad and Kopassus and was often thought of as the ‘*anak buah*’ of military general Edi Sudrajat. Winata obtained national attention when in 1991, Artha Graha acquired a majority stake in PT JIHD, a military company, and went on to develop one of central Jakarta’s most lucrative property deals of the 1990s. Since the SCDB deal, Winata has openly patronised general TB Silalahi and Kiki Syahnakri who both hold plum jobs as commissioners in his Artha Graha conglomerate. Artha Graha has expanded aggressively into banking, international finance, tin, coal, fishing, textiles, construction, post-tsunami development, and most recently, hybrid rice. Winata is building a profile as one of Indonesia’s major philanthropists through his NGO Artha Graha Peduli.

Agus Wirahadikusumah - Major General in the Indonesian army who established Yayasan Eka Kartika Paksi. By 1998, Wirahadikusumah, as Chief of Staff of ABRI (KSAD) had become known as a reformist who advocated that the military should return to its professional roots and relinquish its political, territorial, economic and social roles. Wirahadikusumah died in, some believe, suspicious circumstances in August 2001. He died largely alienated by the political elite because of his ideas on military reform.

Wiranto – Served as Head of ABRI and Minister for Defence during the fall of Suharto and was widely praised for not seizing power at the time of the transition to civilian rule. Wiranto oversaw and encouraged the separation of the police from the military, while at the same time attempting to rebuild a territorial role for the army through proposals for the national security council, Ratih (*rakyat terlatih* or trained people) and the expansion of Koter. In 2004, despite criticism that his actions in Timor Leste made him a war criminal, he stood as a contender against Yudhoyono and Megawati for president. He did not, however, make it to second round and thus threw his resources and supporters towards Yudhoyono’s nomination in the hope that he would be rewarded in the new administration. This did not happen however and in 2006, the former general formed Hanura, the People’s Conscience Party, which effectively gathered together disaffected political elites isolated from the Yudhoyono government. Wiranto challenged the presidency again in the 2009 elections, this time as vice to Jusuf Kalla, but only received 12.4% of the vote.

Yayasan Brata Bhakti – Polri’s national foundation where profits are directed to the welfare of officers. Although the foundation is supposed to be separate from the police institution, its internal structure mirrors that of the police executive, with the Kapolri, Wakapolri and Irwasum heading up the ‘advisory’ board.

Yayasan Dana Bhakti Kesejahteraan Sosial – A foundation with close ties to eldest son Sigit Harjojudanto and daughter Tutut Hardiyanti Rukmana of President Suharto that managed the national sports lottery from 1986-1991.

Yayasan Kartika Eka Paksi – The army's largest and most notorious foundation, established in 1972. The foundation's primary holding company is known as PT Tri Usaha Bhakti which oversaw a huge diversified network of companies that pumped back to the military and its officer class. The foundation became notorious for its partnership with Artha Graha in the 1990s and became the focus of much civil-society attention after the fall of Suharto. Currently PT Tri Usaha has interests in the palm oil industry.

Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono – Former general in the Indonesian army, turned cabinet minister under the Abdurrahman Wahid and Megawati Sukarnoputri administrations. In 2003, he established *Partai Demokrat* which, despite only winning 7.5% of the vote in the 2004 legislative elections, became his political vehicle to win the 2004 and 2009 presidential elections.

