

The London School of Economics and Political Science

**Children of Immigrants in Central Athens at the Turn of  
the 21<sup>st</sup> Century:**

A study of inferiorisation, ethnicised conflict, criminalisation,  
and substance misuse

Pericles Papandreou

A thesis submitted to the Department of Social Policy of the London  
School of Economics for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, London,

June 2009

UMI Number: U615964

All rights reserved

INFORMATION TO ALL USERS

The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.

In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion.



UMI U615964

Published by ProQuest LLC 2014. Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author.  
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.

All rights reserved. This work is protected against  
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.



ProQuest LLC  
789 East Eisenhower Parkway  
P.O. Box 1346  
Ann Arbor, MI 48106-1346

THESES  
F  
9109



1205993

## **Declaration**

I certify that the thesis I have presented for examination for the MPhil/PhD degree of the London School of Economics and Political Science is solely my own work other than where I have clearly indicated that it is the work of others (in which case the extent of any work carried out jointly by me and any other person is clearly identified in it).

The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. Quotation from it is permitted, provided that full acknowledgement is made. This thesis may not be reproduced without the prior written consent of the author.

I warrant that this authorization does not, to the best of my belief, infringe the rights of any third party.



## **Abstract**

This study examines the adaptation pathways followed by the children of immigrants who arrived in Greece in the 1990s. Its main objective is to assess these youths' vulnerability to assimilation into the marginalised and deviant segments of the host-society. It draws primarily from a inner-city school-survey, interviews with secondary-school students of immigrant parentage, and young defendants of foreign nationality who were contacted at the Juvenile Court of Athens. The research examines, first, the extent to which immigrant-origin youths experience segregation along 'ethnic' lines, the gravity of ethnicised conflict in inner-city milieus, and the impact of victimisation by violent racism. Second, it explores young newcomers' involvement in violence, delinquency and drug use. Finally, it considers their treatment by the police, and their processing by the youth justice system.

The study finds that the most serious forms of ethnicised violence and aggressive racism were related to an initial phase of contact, which was marked by widespread xenophobia and conflict between indigenous and foreign-born youths. Despite the hostile elements of the reception regime, there is no evidence that any sizeable group of immigrant-origin youths has adopted an 'adversarial outlook' which might resist interaction with broader society. By contrast, among the main determinants of immigrant-origin youths' over-involvement in some forms of property and violent offending - as suggested by data from both police records and self-report surveys - are their fast assimilation into the norms of the majority society, and their close and antagonistic interaction with same-age nationals. However, the research findings also suggest that the overrepresentation of foreign-born youth in official crime statistics is also due to the 'targeted' over-policing of delinquents with specific migrant-ethnic background.

Overall, the findings indicate areas of concern but paint a rather different picture from that suggested by negative stereotypes. In practice, the risk that immigrant youths will become assimilated into marginalised segments of the host society is effectively limited by both the relatively small extent of migrants' residential segregation in Athens, and the small size of the criminal underworld.

## Acknowledgements

My work was funded by the Greek State Scholarship Foundation whose support is gratefully acknowledged. I also acknowledge my gratitude to Hellenic Ministries of Justice and Education that provided me research access to the Juvenile Court of Athens and a number of secondary schools. Without that support I should have never been able to undertake this study.

Moreover, I am especially grateful to professor C.D. Spinellis for providing me with unpublished police statistics the analysis of which was critical for the development of many arguments throughout this thesis. I also wish to thank the scientific coordinator of the 2003 UMHRI school survey, professor A. Kokkevi for granted me access to survey data. Many thanks are due to the scientific coordinator M. Terzidou, T. Fotiou and other researchers of the Greek REITOX Focal Point for their kind assistance with the UMHRI dataset. I owe a particular dept to the then head of Probation Service of the Juvenile Court of Athens I. Tsagarelli, and probation officers D. Papastathi, P. Zagoura, and Y. Prantalo for their cooperation, which facilitated vastly the interviews with the immigrant young offenders.

I am indebted to Professor Tim Newburn, Director of the Mannheim Centre for Criminology at the LSE, who supervised the thesis with persistent interest and tactful support throughout the course of my doctoral studies. During the three or so years in London I have benefited hugely by the intellectual climate of LSE in general, and the research seminars of the Mannheim Centre for Criminology and the department of Social Policy, in particular. This was a learning experience which continues to inspire me. Moreover, I received encouragement and advice from the small community of fellow research students and colleagues at the Social Policy department of LSE. I owe a great deal to Mike Shiner for advice on the construction of survey questionnaires he has generously offered me at the early stages of my project.

Most core ideas and arguments in this thesis were first tried out in a number of BSC and ESC meetings and other conferences. Thus, I am grateful to organisers who invited me and to colleagues who offered feedback.

In writing this thesis I have incurred too many debts to family members, colleagues, and friends in Athens. A special thank goes to my sister Lena who assumed the role of research assistance at critical stages of my PhD project. I'm also grateful to Sophie Kazakou who watchfully have read almost every draft and gave me careful suggestions. Over these years, I was benefited from discussions on immigration and cognate topics with Lina Ventura.

I would like to thank the Therapy Centre for Depended Individuals for afforded me the time off, research access, excellent IT support and library services, that at various points helped enormously my study. Special thanks are due to Soteria Tsiotra whose extensive professional practice with children of immigrants and genuine appreciation of field work details, eventually engaged her in the transcription of some interviews.

Above all, I would like to express my gratitude to young people of immigrant ancestry who agreed to take part in the research than made this thesis possible.

# Table of Contents

LIST OF TABLES.....	VIII
LIST OF FIGURES.....	VIII
<b>Chapter 1 .....</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>Introduction .....</b>	<b>1</b>
1.1 MINORITIES AND IMMIGRANTS IN GREECE .....	5
1.2 IMMIGRANT SETTLEMENT PATTERNS.....	14
1.3 CHILDREN OF IMMIGRANT PARENTAGE .....	16
1.4 THEORETICAL ISSUES AND DEBATES .....	19
1.5 TERMINOLOGY AND NATIONAL CONTEXT.....	32
<b>Chapter 2 .....</b>	<b>35</b>
<b>Episteme, Methods, Data .....</b>	<b>35</b>
2.1 WHOSE SIDE ARE WE ON? .....	35
2.2 METHODS AND PROCEDURES .....	38
2.3 INTERVIEWING YOUTHS OF IMMIGRANT PARENTAGE .....	46
2.4 RESEARCHING ACROSS MULTIPLE DIVIDES .....	55
<b>Chapter 3 .....</b>	<b>58</b>
<b>The Reception Context of Central Athens .....</b>	<b>58</b>
3.1 INTRODUCTION .....	58
3.2 PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARDS IMMIGRANTS .....	58
3.3 XENOPHOBIA AND EXCLUSION: THE BASELINE OF FOREIGN-BORN STUDENTS' EXPERIENCE.....	62
3.4 ETHNIC VIOLENCE? .....	73
3.5 THE ROLE OF THE RACIST GROUPS OF FAR RIGHT .....	85
3.6 CONCLUSIONS.....	91
<b>Chapter 4 .....</b>	<b>93</b>
<b>Negotiating Identifications and Long-Term Prospects .....</b>	<b>93</b>
4.1 YOUTH, MIGRATION, IDENTITY .....	93
4.2 THE FOOTBALL TERRAIN AS THE TOUCHSTONE OF NATIONAL ALLEGIANCES .....	94
4.3 THE CASE OF VORIOEPIROTES STUDENTS .....	110
4.4 WHO WANTS AND WHO IS ALLOWED TO BELONG TO THE NATION? .....	112
4.5 CONCLUSIONS.....	132
<b>Chapter 5 .....</b>	<b>136</b>
<b>New Dangerous Classes in the Making?.....</b>	<b>136</b>
5.1 ALTERITY, YOUTH, VIOLENCE AND MORAL PANICS .....	136
5.2 POLICE STATISTICS.....	138
5.3 SELF-REPORT STUDIES.....	143

5.4 QUALITATIVE FINDINGS .....	149
5.5 CONCLUSIONS.....	177
<b>Chapter 6 .....</b>	<b>179</b>
<b>Engagement in Property Crime and Drug Use.....</b>	<b>179</b>
6.1 INTRODUCTION .....	179
6.2 JUVENILE PROPERTY DELINQUENCY DURING THE 1990S: UNRAVELLING CRIME STATISTICS.....	180
6.3 FINDINGS OF 2003 UMHRI SCHOOL-SURVEY .....	184
6.4 THE 2004-05 SCHOOL SURVEY OF INNER-CITY ATHENS .....	197
6.5 THE NATURE OF PROPERTY OFFENDING: EXPLORING QUALITATIVE DATA.....	201
6.6 THE RIDDLE OF DRUG USE BY MIGRANT YOUTH: EXPLORING QUALITATIVE DATA.....	211
6.7 SUMMING UP.....	218
<b>Chapter 7 .....</b>	<b>222</b>
<b>Extent and Models of Policing.....</b>	<b>222</b>
7.1 INTRODUCTION .....	222
7.2 EUROPEAN TRENDS IN THE POLICING OF MIGRATION .....	223
7.3 IMMIGRATION POLICING IN GREECE.....	228
7.4 SCHOOL SURVEY FINDINGS.....	233
7.5 PERCEPTIONS OF ABUSIVE POLICE PRACTICES: QUALITATIVE FINDINGS.....	244
7.6 CONCLUSIONS.....	250
<b>Chapter 8 .....</b>	<b>254</b>
<b>Youth Justice Processing .....</b>	<b>254</b>
8.1 INTRODUCTION .....	254
8.2 YOUTHS REFERRED TO THE COURT AND THEIR CHARGES .....	258
8.3 DISPARITIES IN COURT DISPOSITION.....	261
8.4 FROM THE VIEWPOINT OF PROBATION SERVICE .....	270
8.5 CONCLUSIONS.....	273
<b>Chapter 9 .....</b>	<b>278</b>
<b>Conclusions, and the Way Forward .....</b>	<b>278</b>
9.1 REVIEW OF FINDINGS .....	278
9.2 DOWNWARD ASSIMILATION?.....	287
9.3 CODA .....	289
<b>References .....</b>	<b>295</b>
<b>Appendix I: List of Interviewed Students in Inner-City Secondary Schools .....</b>	<b>322</b>
<b>Appendix II: Profile of Research Participants in the Juvenile Court of Athens .....</b>	<b>324</b>
<b>Appendix III: The 2003 UMHRI school-survey .....</b>	<b>329</b>
1. INTRODUCTION .....	329
2. THE PROFILE OF SURVEY RESPONDENTS.....	330

3. THE QUALITY OF 2003 UMHRI SELF-REPORT DATA .....	331
<b>Appendix IV: Questionnaire of 2004-05 Inner-City School Survey.....</b>	<b>337</b>
<b>Appendix V: The Greek Youth Justice System .....</b>	<b>353</b>
<b>Appendix VI: The Central Municipality of Athens: .....</b>	<b>356</b>
<b>Relative Residential Concentration of Immigrants.....</b>	<b>356</b>

## List of Tables

1.1: Actual Population: Greeks and Foreigners, Aged 5-19 .....	17
2.1: Profile of 2004-05 Inner-City Sample (n=300) .....	42
5.1: Alleged Offenders aged 7 to 17, Recorded by the Police, 1999-2003, Selected Violent Offences.....	141
5.2: Alleged Violent Offenders aged 7 to 17 by Nationality, 1999-2003 .....	142
5.3: Percentage of Students admitting Violent Offences in the Last 12 Months by Country of Birth and Sex.....	146
6.1: Police Statistics: Alleged Offenders aged 7 to 17 by Nationality, 1999-2003 .....	182
6.2: Chi-Square of Property Offending in the Last 12 Months by Country of Birth and Sex .....	186
6.3: Lifetime Prevalence of Drug Use by Country of Birth.....	189
6.4: One-Way ANOVA Mean Values of Lifetime Drug Scales by Country of Birth and Sex .....	190
6.5: Three Categories of Students' Engagement in Offending: Comparison of Key Characteristics .....	194
6.6: Prevalence of Lifetime Offending of Inner-City Students, by Country of Birth and Sex .....	199
7.1: Odds Ratios for Males Students' Lifetime 'Troubles with the Police' .....	234
7.2: One-Way ANOVA of the Scale 'Troubles with the Police' in the Last 12 Months.....	236
7.3: Percentage of Inner-City Students who have 'Ever' been stopped by the Police.....	238
7.4: Odds Ratios for Inner-City Students' Lifetime 'Stop and Check' by the Police .....	239
7.5: Value of Ratio $\Phi$ by Country of Birth .....	241
8.1: Cases Processed by the Juvenile Court of Athens, by Type of Offence .....	260
I: Demographic Characteristics of 2003 UMHRI Respondents.....	331
II: Chi-square of students proportion agreeing with the statement by ethnic group.....	333
III: Inconsistency between questions related to lifetime prevalence of substance use.....	334

## List of Figures

5.1: Trends for more Serious Violent Offences attributed to Suspects aged 13 to17, known to Police, 1984-2002 .....	140
5.2: Male Students' Mean Scores of Violent Scales by Country of Birth .....	147
6.1: Police statistics: Offences against Property, 1989-2002 .....	181
6.2: Male Students: one-way ANOVA of Property Offending Scales by Country of Birth.....	185
6.3: Female Students: one-way ANOVA of Property Offending Scales by Country of Birth.....	187
6.4: Ethnic Groups' Volume of Offending.....	195
6.5: Average Lifetime Offending of Inner-City Students .....	197
7.1: Number of Immigrants Deported of Expelled .....	229

7.2: Percentage of Students having Problematic Contacts with the Police by Country of Birth.....	235
8.1: Foreign Youths' Representation at Various Stages of the Juvenile Justice System .....	255
8.2 Number of Undocumented Foreign Youths Referred to the Juvenile Court of Athens, 1999-2007.....	259
8.3: Distribution of Juvenile Court Dispositions across Ethnic Groups.....	264
8.4: Percentage of Defendants Tried in their Absence by Court Disposition and Nationality, 2002-03 & 2003-4 .....	266
8.5: Juvenile Court of Athens: Number of Youths Sentenced to Custody by Nationality, 1996/97 - 2003/04 .....	268
8.6: Police Statistics: Alleged Offenders aged 7 to 17, 1999-2003.....	269

---

# Chapter 1

## Introduction

---

*Migration is the icon of the global age (Sennett 2006: 2)*

The fall of the Berlin wall in 1989 was a crucial turning point for European migration. The collapse of the Soviet block triggered large-scale migration from the former USSR, Eastern Europe, and the Balkans towards Western Europe. However, earlier migratory networks from Southeast Asia, Africa and the Middle East continued to contribute to the growth of European population (Castles 2000: 80). In addition, the disintegration of Yugoslavia and the subsequent Balkan wars populated the waves of asylum seekers throughout the 1990s (Schierup et al. 2006: 30). These contemporary migratory movements were particularly evident in Southern Europe. According to estimations in the late 1990s the four southern EU countries alone had received three million mostly undocumented immigrants (King 2001). The streams persisted during the early 2000s. In 2005 alone international migration increased the population of EU by almost two million (Muenz 2006).

Although the volume of contemporary migration flows to Europe and the US is comparable, there are two distinct characteristics of the European migratory movements: first, the speed at which migration has grown since the 1990s was extraordinarily fast, and second, a large proportion of these flows were unauthorised, and occurred despite the official rhetoric and policies aiming at restricting them (Papademetriou 2003). This rapid and profound social change was met by hostility and anti-immigration sentiments by the electorate in most European countries. Anxieties about large-scale and poorly-regulated migration have turned immigration into a major public issue and a political tinder-box across the West (Papademetriou 2003: 80). As immigration flows increase the default position of public opinion across major western destination countries seems to be in favour of a more restrictive immigration policy (Simon and Lynch 1999). In Europe, such public opposition is rooted in both legitimate and exaggerated fears and concerns linked either to the erosion of national identity, the destabilisation of the welfare state, or to the undermining of public order (Huysmans 2000). Against this backdrop, a domestic political



agenda has emerged to suggest how society can react to what members of the elite or lay people perceive as threat posed by immigration to their identity. Moreover, Huysmans (2000) argues, immigration has grown into not only a high ranked 'security' issue in contemporary Europe but also a nodal point for many policy issues.

However, at the turn of the millennium, the realisation that immigration is not to be discontinued or even to be reversed changed the focus of policymaking from the fallacy of enforcing zero-migration (often in a heavy-handed manner) to the question of integration of immigrants and their descendants. In this area existing EU or national policies are widely considered as inadequate (Spencer 2006). Integration measures are piecemeal and recent migrants or older minorities' socioeconomic advancement unsatisfactory.

Although such issues remain highly debatable, in both academic and government circles, a series of dramatic events, some of which occurred as I was conducting this research, left no doubt about the failings of the policies aimed at promoting integration and reducing ethnic or 'racial' inequalities. In the summer of 2001 British South Asian Muslim youths had a protagonist role in the disturbances that shocked the northern cities of Burnley, Bradford and Oldham (Abbas 2005; Alexander 2004a; Webster 2003). Nevertheless, interest in the marginalisation of UK's northern Muslim communities and the alienation of their youths has been sidelined by culturally essentialist notions of jihadist Islam, which prevailed after the suicide-bombing of London's transportation on 7 July 2005 (Abbas 2007).

Even more tightly coupled to the failure of integration policy (or the lack thereof) were the riots of November 2005 in French *banlieues*, which dominated international news. The rioters were mostly Maghrebin second and third generation youth who live in the destitute immigrant *cités*, in the periphery of Paris, Lyon, and Lille and other French metropolises (Haddad and Balz 2006). According to many commentators the riots graphically revealed the persistence of migrant-origin youths' exclusion and thus deprived the French assimilationist republican model of much of its credibility (Suleiman 2005). The extraordinary resonance of the events outside France led Balibar to suggest that they represent a type of 'revolt of the excluded' that is generalised transnationally, from LA, California, to Paris, France (Balibar 2007). What seems more certain is that the French riots established a spectre that constantly reminds Western governments of the urgent need for efficient integration policies concerning the children of immigrants.

In Germany, the long-awaited acknowledgment that this immigrant-receiving state has become an 'immigration country' was accompanied by the epochal citizenship 'reform' of 1999. The new citizenship law introduced the *jus soli* principle (citizenship by birthright) in order to facilitate the naturalisation of the immigrant second generation. However, for a host of reasons, the new legislation only marginally affects the largest and most disadvantaged group among the second-generation: that of children of Turkish migrants (Alba 2005; Diehl and Blohm 2003). Nevertheless, despite concerns about the withdrawal of Turkish-origin immigrants into a 'parallel' society, available preliminary evidence suggests that their descendants want to be part of the host society, though progress is generally expected to be slow (Anil 2007; Diehl and Schnell 2006). The more recent readjustment of German civic integration policy, which was introduced in 2004, was towards further convergence with current EU directives. These newly established European policies, Joppke argues tend to shift the burden of adjustment heavily towards the individual migrant, and are often marked by a coercive thrust. Such 'obligatory' measures were pioneered by the new Dutch model of repressive civic integration policies (Joppke 2007).

Although in line with these EU-wide developments the 'immigrant integration' debate in Greece follows its own pace; in part because the history and development of the immigration phenomenon itself are quite distinct from the Western European experiences. As I write, the emerging theme in Greek media accounts and political debates, which has started to gain attention by competing with the 'security' concerns relevant to immigration, is the one regarding the naturalisation of the immigrant second generation. Journalists, scholars, and activists stress the plight of immigrant-origin children, who despite having been raised and educated in Greece, and anticipating their future in the country, are running the risk to be permanently excluded from citizenry. The first relevant policy response appeared in December 2008. New legislation enabled born-in-Greece children of foreign nationals to apply for a 10-year residence permit upon their coming-of-age; on condition of parents' legal residence and their completion of compulsory schooling in the host country.

However, scholarly engagement with immigrant-origin children's mode of integration into the Greek society is still in its infancy. As it is only since 1990 that immigrants from the Balkans, Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union started to arrive in Greece in substantial numbers, until recently the bulk of domestic immigration research has been

exploring policy initiatives or negative aspects of the reception context. However, a number of publications have explored actual processes and basic issues concerning the socioeconomic adaptation of the first generation of immigrants (among them : Cavounidis 2004b; Fakiolas 2003b; Karydis 1996; Kasimis et al. 2003; Labrianidis and Lyberaki 2001; Lazaridis 2001; Mavreas 1998; Papataxiarchis 2006b; Psimmenos 1995; Triandafyllidou and Veikou 2000; Trubeta 2000a; Vaiou 2007; Ventoura 2004).

The scarcity of research is more evident as far as the Greek criminological literature is concerned. The involvement of the immigrant second generation in crime and deviance was briefly examined by Karydis (2004) and Spinellis (2007), but so far there is no Greek study engaging at some extent with an empirical assessment of the topic. Important questions like the one asking how the immigrant-ancestry children perceive and respond to the treatment they receive from the dominant group and the institutions of the host society, or whether nativist hostility and structural exigencies undermine their prospects of integration, and predispose the deviant transition of a segment of them, need to be addressed in an theoretically informed and methodologically comprehensive way. The key objective of this thesis is to provide detailed answers to elements of such overarching questions.

#### ***Overview of the thesis***

The core of this introductory chapter is divided in two parts: The first provides background information essential for the comprehension of contemporary migratory movements towards Greece. It opens with a brief overview of the modern Greek migration history, and proceeds to a presentation of the basic facts regarding the 'new migration' of the 1990s: namely, the causes that shaped migratory trajectories, the size, make-up and composition of the immigrant populations, the reception context in central Athens, the policy responses of successive Greek administrations, the settlement patterns of immigrants, and the integration of their children into the schooling system. The second part reviews theoretical issues and debates relevant to the process of immigrant-origin children's adaptation and incorporation. Central to this discussion is the US and European literature on the 'new immigrant second generation' and the 'segmented assimilation' theory. Yet, the pessimistic predictions of the theory are critically refined and expanded through the examination of classic criminological theories on the involvement of migrant or minority youths in delinquency and drug use.

Chapter 2 begins with an overview of the adopted epistemological and methodological approach, and of the politics of representation that entails the study of social marginality and criminalisation. It details research sites and the employed research strategy, methods and fieldwork procedures. Moreover, it describes key characteristics of the various samples on which this research is based. Finally it reflects upon the effect that nationality, social class and generation differentials can have on ethnographic research with youths of immigrant ancestry.

Chapters 3 through 8 provide the empirical findings of this study. Chapter 3 examines immigrant youth's experiences of xenophobia, segregation, ethnicised conflict, and victimisation by violent racism within inner-city schools and neighbourhoods. Chapter 4 explores how young people of immigrant parentage identify themselves in terms of ethnic or national belonging and how they make sense of their place in the new societal context. Such identifications are exposed through their interpretation of history or even more significantly through their negotiation with contemporary discourses and policies specific to the Greek reception regime, be they exclusionist or assimilationist. The focal point of Chapter 5 is interpersonal violence. It examines the engagement of non-national youths in violent conduct norms through the examination of official statistics, quantitative self-report data, and ethnographic material.

Chapter 6 explores the engagement of immigrant-origin youths in property delinquency and substance misuse. Further to statistical analyses it employs qualitative data offered by the interviewed young people of immigrant ancestry in order to test theoretical explanations of immigrant-origin youths' deviancy. Chapter 7 probes the nature of immigration policing in Greece, and addresses the question of whether the Hellenic police treats young people of immigrant parentage unevenly. Chapter 8 scrutinises youth justice statistics and explores the effect that immigrant-ancestry referrals' foreign nationality has on the processing of their cases by the juvenile court of Athens. The final Chapter 9 draws conclusions and addresses policy issues.

## **1.1 Minorities and immigrants in Greece**

For the most part of the 20<sup>th</sup> century Greece has been a highly homogeneous society wherein minorities or migrants were not considered to be an issue (Mavrogordatos 1983: ch. 5). This was basically due the large exchange of populations that took place in the aftermath of the Greco-Turkish War of 1919-22 and the defeat of the Greek army by the

troops of the ascending Turkish nationalist movement of Kemal Atatürk (Papataxiarchis 2006a: 40). They were followed one year later by the remainder of Christian populations of Asia Minor and Eastern Thrace subject to the provisos of the treaty of Lausanne between Turkey and Greece that foresaw the compulsory exchange of populations (Ladas 1932: 335). Although it is impossible to know the actual number of refugees who entered the country, it was probably in the order of 1.25 to 1.5 million, which at that time represented something like one quarter of the Greek population (Hirschon 1988: 37). During the same period roughly 300,000 ethnic Turks were deported from Northern Greece (Amitsis and Lazaridis 2001). This population exchange resulted in a Greek population consisting of almost 95 per cent of Orthodox Christians, and 97 per cent of Greek-speaking people in the 1950s (Clogg 2002: x).

Since Greece was a rather underdeveloped country until the 1970s, it did not constitute an attractive destination for economic migrants. On the contrary, it was for the most part of its history a country of emigration, sending large numbers across the Mediterranean, the Black Sea and beyond. During the first three decades after WW II, Greece was still acting as a labour supplier to the highly developed world. It is estimated that during the period 1945-73 nearly one million Greeks, one-sixth of the then Greek population, left the country. Half of them went to West Germany or other economically advanced European countries, and the other half set off for traditional overseas emigration destinations of the US, Canada, and Australia (Fakiolas 1999; 2000).

Labour emigration towards Western Europe and North America was not a Greek peculiarity. Since the late nineteenth century and until the 1930s emigration to the Americas was a massive phenomenon for the Mediterranean Europe, Italy, Spain, Greece and Portugal in particular. While the mass emigration from Southern Europe re-gathered momentum after WWII, this time it had different destination (King 1995). During the 1950s and 1960s millions of Southern Europeans escaped from poverty at home and settled in Western Europe, providing the cheap labour that fuelled the post-war economic boom (Castles and Kosack 1973). In summary, Southern Europe acted as the labour-reserve that made the successful operation of European Fordism possible.

However, after the 1973 'oil crisis', and due to economic recession and decline of industrial employment, the flow of South European migration started to reverse direction (Castles 2000: ch. 3; Kassimati 1984: ch. 2). In 1974 repatriated Greek guest-workers outnumbered out-flows for the first time (Emke-Pouloupoulos 2007: 100). Fakiolas

estimates that from 1974 until 1986 more than 300,000 Greek guest-workers had repatriated from West Germany and other countries of northern/western Europe (Fakiolas 1999). In the 1970s Greece also received large numbers of ethnic-Greeks who left Cyprus, Egypt, Turkey, and Zaire forced by war, upheaval, or civil conflict (Fakiolas and King 1996). According to Emke-Poulopoulos (2007) their number approximated 200,000. The important fact is that towards the end of the 1980s both emigration and repatriation flows faded away (Fakiolas 2000).

#### ***Older minorities***

In early-1980s, and prior to the start of the massive immigrant influx of the 1990s, the most significant minority groups within the Greek population were the Muslim and the Gypsy-Roma people. The Muslim minority of Thrace actually comprises three ethnic groups: Muslims of Turkish origin, Muslim Pomaks (a Slav-speaking group who live in Western Thrace along the border with Bulgaria), and Turkish-speaking Muslim Roma (Karakasidou 1995; Meinardus 2002). The three groups' overall size is estimated at 120,000 people, the majority of whom live in Thrace. However, some Muslim Gypsies, in the five to ten thousand range, live within the Athens conurbation, generally under impoverished circumstances (Madianou 2005; Trubeta 2001: 175-177). The second significant minority group in Greece that of Gypsies is estimated at 120,000. Most of them have abandoned the traditional nomadic way of life and nowadays dwell in deprived areas at the outskirts of many towns and cities (Dousas 1997).

#### **1.1.1 The entrants of the 1990s**

The 1990s were marked by an unexpected and epochal turnaround of Greek demographics. At the beginning of the 1990s, immigrants from non-European Union countries accounted for three or four percent of the Greek population. But at the end of the same decade, according to estimates based on the 2001 census, their number was close to 1.15 million, which constitutes 10.3 per cent of the national population (Baldwin-Edwards 2004). Thus, in a decade, Greece jumped from being one of the world's least immigrant-dense countries to being nearly as immigrant dense as the United States (Papademetriou 2002).

The collapse of the Balkan totalitarian regimes in the early-1990s was of critical importance for the development of new migration flows towards the European South, and Greece in particular (Anthias and Lazaridis 1999; Fakiolas and King 1996; King et al.

2000). The dethronement of dictatorships in Rumania, Bulgaria and Albania was followed by a prolonged period of political instability, and economic deterioration. The majority of the Balkan states were in the agonising throes of transition to a viable market-economy as well. Especially in Albania and Bulgaria, the chaotic domestic situation, and the lure of an ideally conceived West forced a significant part of these countries' population, mostly youths, to emigrate. The predominance of the Balkan and Eastern European former communist countries among the sources of the immigration flows towards Greece clearly singles out the Greek case from the recent migratory experiences of other southern European countries (Cavounidis 2002), as illustrated by the composition of the immigrant population. According to the 2001 census, approximately 56 per cent of the foreign nationals to Greece were Albanians, but the presence of other Balkan nationalities was also significant. Five per cent of the census respondents originated from Bulgaria and three percent from Rumania. The states that emerged out of the former Soviet Union (FSU), namely Georgia, the Russian Federation, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan accounted for seven per cent of the foreigners that the census enumerated. All the other migrant ethnic-groups were much less numerous (Baldwin-Edwards 2004). As far as the gender balance is concerned, information became available through both the 2001 census and the various regularisation programmes. According to these data some migrant groups are predominately female, namely those from the Philippines or the Ukraine. The sex distribution for Asian migrant populations to Greece is reversely skewed: Pakistani, Indian, Bangladeshi groups are almost exclusively male (Baldwin-Edwards 2004; Cavounidis 2001; 2003).

#### ***The case of Albanians***

The Albanian communist regime was the last to collapse in Eastern Europe. Albanians started to emigrate some months before the country's first democratic elections in March 1991, when the border controls relaxed. Previously travel abroad was almost totally forbidden, with only diplomats and members of the government having the opportunity to see the outside world (Korovilas 1999). In order to ease social pressure the transient government or Ramiz Alia turned a blind eye to the mass exodus of young people to Italy. Besides, large numbers had already started to cross the mountainous borders and entered neighbouring Greece as illegal immigrants (Vickers and Pettifer 1997 : 40). The opening to the world of a country hermetically sealed for almost half a century brought to a halt the

central command system of the economy. The ensuing pressing economic needs gave to Albanian emigration exceptional dimensions in relation to the size of the population. For most poor families migration was the principal survival strategy (Labrianidis and Kazazi 2006).

According to estimates of Albanian scholars, during the 1990-93 initial post-communist phase one-tenth of Albanian 1991 population of 3.4 million people left the country. Thus, by 2000 an estimated 800,000 Albanians were abroad, compared to some 2.5 million who remained within Albania. Of those 500,000 settled in Greece and 200,000 in Italy (Barjaba and King 2005: 3,10). Smaller numbers set out for Western Europe and North America where pre-WW II migrations had created substantial Albanian communities. Overrepresented among them was the economic, professional, and scientific elite and their offspring. However, among those who decided to settle as labour-migrants in Greece the majority originated from the Southern rural part of the country. Thus a study of K r  <sup>1</sup> revealed that the destination of nine in ten immigrants was Greece (Arrehag et al. 2006). Especially in Athens only rarely can one find Albanian people whose birthplace lies north to the Tiran -Durr s<sup>2</sup> axis.

Amongst those who first left Albania were the ethnic-Greeks of the southern part of the country. This was particularly the case for the Greek-Albanian border region, which is a Greek-speaking area with officially recognised minority status. The vernacular term for ethnic-Greeks originating from this region of Albania is *Vorioepiotes* because they themselves as well as many Greeks, of all sides of the political spectrum, still refer to southern Albania as '*Vorios Epirus*'<sup>3</sup>. Since nowadays Epirus constitutes the western part of mainland Greece, Albanians perceive the term not as a mere geographical reference, but as revealing irredentist intentions.

The roots of the dispute go back to 1914 when the particular border region was granted autonomous status (Veremis 2004). This happened just two years after the foundation of the Albanian sovereign state. At that point Albania's territory had been partitioned and the disputed zone had been seized by Greek troops for almost two years (Stavrianos 2002 [1958]: 711). Then the Greek army was replaced by Italian troops, and in effect the whole of Albania came under Italian control until 1918. Although officially independent, the

---

<sup>1</sup> K r   is a provincial town located at the south-east edge of the country

<sup>2</sup> Tirana is the capital, and Durr s the major Adriatic port of Albania.

<sup>3</sup> Northern Epirus, in Greek usage.



country was in effect, due to its economic underdevelopment, heavily reliant on Italian financial and technical aid. Finally Mussolini formally annexed Albania in 1939, and the next year the Italian army attacked Greece through the Albanian territory (Vickers 1999).

After World War II, power was seized by the communist party and the partisan forces of Enver Hoxha. They imposed the most dogmatic and totalitarian of East European regimes of state socialism on Albania; a system based on hermetic isolation and punishing autarky. The ruthless suppression of religious rights and ethnic minorities was a direct outcome of the regime's official atheism, nationalism, and pathological suspicion towards all kinds of enemies. The treatment that the Greek minority received during Hoxha's period was not an exception to this rule of deprivation of liberties (Mparkas 2003). Seemingly, repression and forced assimilation was often combined with the selective incorporation of ethnic-Greeks into the ranks of the state apparatus (Baltiotis 2003: 70). As a result of Cold War divisions the Greek-Albanian bilateral relations remained frozen for almost 45 years. Only in 1984 did the relations start thawing out following a series of Greek initiatives (Vickers and Pettifer 1997: 192). At that point the Kakavia border check-point opened for the first time after WW II, and limited numbers of *Vorioepiotes* were allowed to visit their relatives in Greece (Clogg 1993:429). Nevertheless, it was only in 1987 that Greece formally withdrew claims to Northern Epirus. It was the advancement of bilateral relations that enabled the official termination of the state of war between the two countries, which had been declared in 1940 (Abrahams 1996; Larrabee 1999). Against this background and the ongoing disputes regarding the treatment of the Greek minority of Albania, many Greeks do not refer to all Greek-Albanian immigrants as *Vorioepiotes*. The use of the term is considered more appropriate in reference to someone who identifies with the Greek nation.

However, the Greek government's policy towards the Greek minority in Albania, has sought to prevent their permanent migration to Greece, and to sustain the presence of ethnic-Greeks in Albania. Thus, the Greeks of Albania were long denied the Greek citizenship that was granted to other repatriated members of the Greek diaspora. However, they were given a Special Identification Card, Temporary Residence Permit, social security, and medical care coverage (Triandafyllidou and Veikou 2000). As Fakiolas (2001) reports, despite the Greek state's efforts to keep them in Albania, ethnic-Greeks have made their own choices, and the majority of young people have settled in Athens. Eventually in 2005 the then administration issued a Ministerial Decision, which seemingly

accepted the fait accompli, and offered ethnic-Greeks of Albania long-term residence status (Emke-Poulopoulos 2007: 226).

### ***The 'pyramid' crisis***

A second wave of Albanian immigrants arrived to Greece in the spring of 1997, in the wake of Albania's informal investment scheme' bankruptcy (Jarvis 1999), which nullified \$1.3 billion savings, equal to half of the country's 1996 GDP (Korovilas 1999). Much of the lost capital had been accumulated by Albanian emigrants working in Greece and Italy (King and Vullnetari 2003 9) The collapse of the so-called 'pyramid' schemes sparked the outbreak of protests against the government of Sali Berisha, armed riots, and finally the dismantling of the police and armed forces. The collapse of all state powers, the looting of military arsenals by rioters in the south and by the government's political supporters in the north, and the seizure of control by armed groups and gangs especially in the south of the country resulted in the killing of 2,000 to 3,000 men (Jarvis 1999; Lawson and Saltmarshe 2000). The events of 1997 gave power to criminal gangs, who not only seized the opportunity to expand their triangular smuggling enterprises of oil, arms and narcotics (Chossudovsky 2000), their 'protection' rackets, but also eventually even to substitute authorities in the arbitration of disputes (Lawson and Saltmarshe 2000). Thus dramatically ended a short period of economic recovery, which lasted until 1996, and was substantially supported by the remittances of the Albanians who were already in Greece and Italy (Korovilas 1999; Martin et al. 2002). Therefore, those who fled from Albania during 1997-98 were desperate not only because of bankruptcy, but also having lost faith in the prospects of Albania's economy in the foreseeable future. At this point many male immigrants who had previously worked abroad on a temporary basis in order to send their earnings back-home made the decision to settle with their family in Greece. Thus, the 'pyramid' crisis was critical for the transformation of seasonal or cyclical Albanian migration towards Greece to permanent settlement.

### ***Ethnic-Greeks from the former Soviet Union***

Another significant immigration influx towards contemporary Greece was that of the Pontian ethnic -Greeks of the former Soviet Union (FSU). Historically, the Pontians constitute one of the most ancient Greek settlements along the southern coast of the Black

Sea<sup>4</sup>. In the aftermath of Russo-Turkish war of 1828-29 and various subsequent events the Greeks of *Pontos* started to migrate, in large numbers, to Orthodox Russia, the wider Caucasus region, and Crimea in particular. Their departure culminated during 1915-23 due to the deadly policies of the ascending nationalist Young Turks (Xanthopoulou-Kyriakou 1991). They were welcomed by Tsarist Russia and their communities flourished. However, during the Soviet era and following Stalin's persecution hundreds of thousands of Pontians were displaced from Caucasus to Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan (Agtzidis 1991).

The last part of the Pontian migratory relocations was towards Greece. After 1989 and until 1999, more than 150,000 people fled *en masse* to Greece, principally forced by poverty but also by civil war, and rampant social upheaval in Georgia, Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, and Armenia (Kassimati 1993 79-83). The peak year for Pontian *omogeneis*'<sup>5</sup> coming was 1993, and their migration stream faded out after 1999. The Greek state launched substantial favourable policies aiming at stimulating the return and integration of former USSR Pontians. Seemingly, the adopted summary procedures for the establishment of would-be immigrants' Greek origins enabled other desperate FSU nationals to obtain a relevant certificate from rogue local Greek Consulates. Upon their arrival in Greece most of the FSU immigrants secured the status of Pontian *omogenis* and consequently access to the generous educational, housing, employment, tax exception, healthcare and social security policies (Christopoulos 2005; Christopoulos and Tsitselikis 2005). Moreover specific legislation (Laws 2130/1993 and 2790/2000, several Ministerial Decisions) defined the concept of repatriated Greeks and facilitated through summary procedures the naturalisation of Pontian immigrants from the former USSR (Emke-Pouloupoulos 2007: 726).

Despite the fact that the majority of Pontian *omogeneis* had applied for, and received by February 2001, the Greek nationality (103,573 individuals), they continue to face severe socio-economic problems and their integration into the host society remains fragile (Fakiolas 2001; Halkos and Salamouris 2003). For instance, within the conurbation of

---

<sup>4</sup> In Greek usage: *Pontos*.

<sup>5</sup> In Greek usage foreign nationals of Greek-origin are termed *omogeneis* (of common ancestry). Out of confidence in 'communality of descent' Pontian immigrants are officially termed *palinnostoudes* (repatriated) although historically this group of ethnic-Greeks have never lived within the borders of Modern Greek state (Mavreas 1998).

Athens the major areas of Pontian settlement are the peripheral and impoverished boroughs of the metropolitan Western part. According to all available indicators, their communities are both socially isolated and economically marginalised. What could partly explain the inwardness of Pontian communities is that many Pontians were when they first arrived were Russian-only-speaking people (Mavreas 1998), strongly attached to the social, political and economic system of the countries they came from (Halkos and Salamouris 2003). Even after their naturalisation, the Greekness of FSU-Pontians remained somehow contested, for commentators argued that the policy provisions that privileged them were only related to the Greek traditions of political clientelism and patronage. At any rate, immigrant-ancestry children of FSU-Pontian origin are often called little-Russians by their schoolmates (Diamanti-Karanou 2003).

#### ***Regularisation programmes***

A particularly salient fact about 1990s immigration to Greece was the illegal entry and the irregular residence and employment status of the vast majority of immigrants. Despite the magnitude of these unauthorised migratory flows Greece was the last Southern European state to introduce a regularisation policy (Lazaridis and Poyago-Theotoky 1999). In the first Greek legalisation programme of 1998, 370,000 immigrants were granted a white card (temporary resident card valid for up to three years), while 220,000 received a green card (long-term resident card valid for five years). Although this regularisation effort constituted a major step forward it left an estimated 400,000 immigrants undocumented (Fakiolas 2003a). The second regularisation programme, which was launched in the summer of 2001, attracted 360,000 applications. Since a fraction of the first programme participants did not manage to renew their permits the extent of overlap between applicants in the two programmes is unknown (Cavounidis 2006). However, the Immigration Act 3386/2005 offered a third opportunity to undocumented migrants to legalise their status. But only 145,000 irregular immigrants took advantage of this opportunity (Lianos et al. 2008), although the deadline for applications was postponed more than once (Cavounidis 2006). The below-expectation results of the legalisation programme were partly due to hard-to-meet prerequisites, in terms of a minimum of social security contribution, for the bulk of irregular immigrants are employed in the extended informal sector of the economy (Cavounidis 2006). Arguably, for the same reason a segment of irregular immigrants do not see much point in legalising their status. The demand of the informal economy is for

unregistered 'flexible' labour, and unless sanctions against the employers are imposed, large parts of the immigrant population, older arrivals and newcomers alike, will remain undocumented (Fakiolas 2003b). Since the Greek legislation which foresees such sanctions is not enforced, employers have little incentive to formalize their employment relationships with migrants (Cavounidis 2006). At any rate, in 2005 the cumulative effect of the three Greek regularisation programmes was that 604,215 immigrants were granted valid residence and work permits (Lianos et al. 2008).

## 1.2 Immigrant settlement patterns

Greek geographers' recent work acknowledges the distinct settlement patterns of the various migrant groups (Rovolis and Tragaki 2006). Albanian residential distribution, for instance, approximates relevant patterns of the Greek population. As the 2001 Greek census showed, almost half of the Albanian immigrants to Greece reside within the Athens conurbation, which is also home to almost 38 per cent of the Greek population. Within Greater Athens, the Albanian settlement is the most spatially dispersed of all migrant groups (Arapoglou 2006). Their absence of spatial concentration partly results from the enormous size of the particular migrant population in both absolute numbers and relative to the size of other migrant groups (Rovolis and Tragaki 2006).

In general, the residential segregation of the immigrant population is lower in Athens relative to other Southern European metropolises<sup>6</sup> (Rovolis and Tragaki 2006; Vaiou 2007: 25). Both 'social class' and 'ethnic' concentration are not pronounced within the Athenian urban landscape. This does not preclude the existence of 'ethnic' pockets of extreme impoverishment and marginalisation in those few inner-city locations that serve as areas of initial reception and transient settlement for the newly arrived immigrant waves (Hatzivasileiou et al. 2007; Psimmenos 1995). Such areas can be found around *Metaxourgio*, which lies west to *Omonia Square*<sup>7</sup> (Vaiou 2007: 60).

---

<sup>6</sup> Let alone in comparison with the ghettoised inner-cities of US metropolises. The analogy with the American ghetto is considered as counterproductive in many other European countries as well. For a well known criticism from France refer to Wacquant (1993), and for an evaluation of the situation in the UK see Peach (1996).

<sup>7</sup> See Appendix VI.

Owing to a period of unplanned and hectic urban development which started in the 1950s and lasted until the 1970s Athens' socio-spatial fabric is dense, compact and unvarying (Leontidou 1990). This type of urban milieu facilitates the intermixing of social classes, native and immigrant populations (Arapoglou 2006; Arapoglou and Sagias 2007; Maloutas 2004; Maloutas and Karadimitriou 2001). To a large extent, the various immigrant groups cohabit in the same lower-class neighbourhoods, one next to the other, and mixed with Greek nationals who are earlier long-term residents. Unlike northern European cities, the urban population of Athens tends to frequent common urban spaces, taverns, bars and coffee-shops (Leontidou 1993). As regards housing, immigrants often occupy the lower floors of the same multi-storey apartment building, while Greeks reside in the upper level. This is especially the case in inner-city areas (Vaiou 2007: 49). Consequently, researchers of Athens' socio-spatial development have convincingly contested the universality of Chicago school assumptions and the relevance of Burgess' zonal model<sup>8</sup> in particular, and drawn attention to Athens' distinct mode of 'vertical residential differentiation' (Leontidou 1990: 233-235; Maloutas and Karadimitriou 2001; Vaiou 2007: 49).

#### ***The central municipality of Athens***

The central municipality of Athens attracts a large proportion of Greece's immigrant population. According to the 2001 census, 140,625 individuals<sup>9</sup> were found to reside within the inner-city, which coincides with Athens central municipality (Vaiou 2007). More recent statistical information gathered by Drettakis suggest that in 2003-06 the foreign nationals of central Athens numbered 205,941, or one-quarter of the residents. This means that central Athens has attracted almost twenty seven per cent of the immigrant population to Greece (Drettakis 2008).

Although relative to other ethnic migrant groups Albanians are less concentrated into the inner-city (Arapoglou 2006) because of their numerical preponderance they constitute more than half of the inner-city immigrant population. By contrast, migrants originating from other former communist countries, such as Poles, Bulgarians, Rumanians, and

---

<sup>8</sup> Chicago's pattern of residential segregation and mobility was mapped by Ernest Burgess' model of concentric zones (Park et al. 1967).

<sup>9</sup> A decade earlier the 1991 census found in the central municipality of Athens only 30,790 residents of foreign nationality.

Ukrainians have a significant presence among the central Athens residents, for their degree of 'centralisation' is more extended than any other immigrant group (Arapoglou 2006).

It was the availability of low-cost old properties, the outcome of a long process of inner-city transformations, which was the critical pull factor responsible for the concentration of immigrants in the central municipality of Athens in the 1990s. During the 1950s central Athens' neighbourhoods like Kypseli, and Patisia still had an upper-middle class allure, for as in other Southern Mediterranean metropolises, affluent social groups used to live quite close to the city centre of Athens (Leontidou 1990). It was the suburbanisation process that initiated the deterioration of these areas. The 1970s and the 1980s were marked by the gradual fleeing of a part of the upper middle class strata towards north-eastern and south-eastern suburbs of the city (Leontidou 1993; Maloutas 2004; Vaiou 2007: 49). The depopulation of these areas resulted, among other things, in a surplus of unoccupied flats that were available for low-cost rental. Thus in the 1990s this large stock of substandard flats housed the numerous newly arrived immigrants (Vaiou 2007). Eventually, in 2001 approximately one-fifth of Kypseli residents that the census enumerated were immigrants. Almost half of them were Albanians, but also significant was the presence of Poles (nine per cent) and Bulgarians (five per cent) (Hatzivasileiou et al. 2007).

### **1.3 Children of immigrant parentage**

Today, eighteen years after the 1990 turning point, the Greek polity and academia started to explore the issue of the so-called 'second generation'. A clarification is necessary here: since most children of immigrant parentage who reside in Greece were born abroad, strictly speaking, they cannot be defined as a second generation. The term technically refers to children of immigrant parentage born in the host country. Rumbaut (2004) mentions that Thomas and Znaniecki in their seminal study 'The Polish Peasant in Europe and America' (1918) coined the term 'half-second generation' to describe foreign-born youths coming of age in the US. Rumbaut prefers to label '1.75' the cohort who migrated in early childhood (ages 0-5 years old) for their experiences and adaptive outcomes are closer to those born in the host society, the second generation *per se* (Rumbaut 1997a; 2004). However, in the European literature, under the heading 'second generation', are usually lumped together all children of immigrant ancestry who were under the age of 15 upon their arrival in the host country (Killias 1989).

**How many children?**

Any estimate of the population of immigrant-origin children in Greece starts from the March 2001 census which recorded almost 150,000 foreign individuals belonging to the age bracket 5 to 19 years old. This figure constitutes eight percent of the general population of the same age (*Table 1.1*). But it is a widespread view that the census under-recorded immigrants, especially those without valid permits.

**Table 1.1: Actual Population: Greeks and Foreigners, Aged 5-19**

AGE	GENERAL POPULATION	FOREIGNERS	PERCENTAGE OF FOREIGNERS
5-9	546,014	42,814	7.8
10-14	587,802	45,842	7.8
15-19	728,918	59,635	8.2
TOTAL	1,862,734	148,291	8.0

*Source: National Statistical Service of Greece, 2002*

The consensus amongst scholars is that foreigners represented in 2004 more or less 10 percent of the total population, and not 6.7 that the census recorded (Baldwin-Edwards 2004). Based upon this assumption and after a linear correction I reached the rough estimation that children of immigrant parentage in 2004-05 comprised roughly 11 per cent of the same age population.

**Secondary School Students of Immigrant Parentage**

More reliable are the data regarding youths of immigrant ancestry who attend state schools. Both the Institute for the Greek Diaspora Education and Intercultural Studies (IPODE), and the National Statistical Service (ESYE) have conducted school censuses. Despite their inconsistencies, these statistics clearly show the growing presence of immigrant students in all levels of education. In the mid-1990s students of immigrant parentage constituted only one per cent of the total school-population (Damanakis 1997: 50). Almost a decade later, in academic year 2003-04 their proportion jumped to nine percent (Gotovos and Markou 2003).

Data specific to Athenian inner-city schools and the academic year 2004-05 became available by a school-census conducted by the Hellenic Migration Policy Institute (IMEPO). According to these data, the proportion of foreign students at the level of lower secondary schools (Gymnasiums) was 23 per cent, and 11 per cent at general upper



secondary schools (Lyceums). However, it was nearly double the Lyceum ratio the proportion of foreigners among technical/vocational upper secondary school students (Yiannitsas et al. 2008). These are figures concerning students of foreign nationality who attended schools of Athens' 'first regional jurisdiction of secondary education', which more or less overlaps with the central municipality of Athens. Repatriated ethnic-Greek students were not included in the previously presented statistics, for their naturalisation probably rendered enumeration a challenging task. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that the actual proportion of students of immigrant parentage was higher than that indicated (Yiannitsas et al. 2008). Moreover, it has to be stressed that in the most immigrant-dense neighbourhoods, like Patisia and Kypseli, sometimes half of Gymnasium enrolment was of immigrant parentage.

#### ***Ethnicity and Country of Birth***

In early 2000s, the overwhelming majority of students of immigrant parentage were of Albanian origin (more than 80 percent), a fact reflecting not only the preponderance of Albanians amongst the country's immigrant population, but also their greater extent of family reunification and permanent settlement. The second important migrant group of students were those born in the former USSR. Most students of foreign nationality were born abroad. According to the nation-wide 2002-03 IPODE school census only 15,500 pupils or 10 per cent of foreign nationals were born in Greece, and almost all of them attended primary schools (Gotovos and Markou 2003). For this reason in the framework of this study, which is based on data collected during 2004-05 from secondary-school-age youths of immigrant ancestry, the country of birth is used as a rough proxy of nationality.

#### ***Residence Status***

Another significant parameter relates to the legal status of immigrant students. A relevant estimate was calculated by Lianos *et al.* (2008) on the basis of the 2004-05 school-census which was conducted by IPODE. This enumerated 113,463 students of foreign nationality. A concurrent study of ESYE provided estimates of the number of school-age foreigners whose residence status was legal. Thus, Lianos *et al.* estimated that 26,573 youths or 23.4 per cent of foreign-national students were descendants of irregular immigrants.

This significant proportion of undocumented students reflects the fact that children's enrolment to school is not contingent on immigrant parents' legal residence in Greece. The integration of these children into state schools clearly constitutes an achievement of the Greek polity and the educational system in particular. It is worth noting that the acceptance of irregular immigrants' children into schools was initially denied by the Ministry of Interior Affairs, and in effect was implemented only after recommendations from many independent human rights bodies and the Greek Ombudsman. Eventually, the 2005 immigration law guarantees the children's entitlement to education irrespective of their immigrant parents' regular or 'unauthorized' residence status.

## **1.4 Theoretical issues and debates**

### **1.4.1 The question of immigrant incorporation**

A central question for the sociology of immigration concerns the incorporation of immigrants and their descendants in their host society. The conventional understanding of this process is based on the North American experience of large-scale immigration, mostly of European origin, which lasted from 1880 to 1920. More specifically, it was the key concept of 'assimilation' which shaped both the American self-understanding and conventional wisdom across the globe. The 'canonical' conception of assimilation was synonymous with the prediction of linear and irreversible adoption of the cultural patterns of the host society's dominant group by successive immigrant groups<sup>10</sup> (Alba and Nee 2003: 23-27). Migrants' acculturation in middle-class WASP norms was seen to occur either in tandem with or prior to the advancement of structural integration, to the point that ethnic and linguistic markers would totally disappear (Rumbaut 1997a).

After 1965, a new era of mass immigration to the US from Latin America and Asia, revived scholarship on migration and cast a critical look on normative assimilation theory. Besides the 1980s and 1990s witnessed the celebration of ethno-racial diversity and an unprecedented development of 'multicultural' integration policies in all Western countries of immigration. However, in late 1990s the realisation that the social basis for ethnic distinctiveness has been eroded among Americans of European ancestry contributed to the rehabilitation of the discredited notion of assimilation by reappraisals of its sociology and

---

<sup>10</sup> The classic account of assimilation is that of Warner and Srole (1945).

historiography (Alba 2000: 221; Alba and Nee 2003: 273; Brubaker 2001; Joppke and Morawska 2003). The re-making of assimilation theory by Alba and Nee (2003) clearly repudiates assimilationist policies aiming to impose 'Anglo-conformity', by stressing that adaptation is a two-way process: the 'mainstream' is also subject to change through the incorporation of minority cultural and religious elements. The thus re-made assimilation theory is more compatible with European academics and policy makers who prefer to use the term 'integration' in order to describe the policy goal regarding new immigrants or older ethnic minorities (Favell 1998).

### ***The new second generation***

Significant in this respect is the contribution made by the study of the 'new second generation' which arose from the post-1965 migratory influx towards the United States. The sociologist Portes and his co-authors suggest that the process of adaptation for children of post-1965 immigrants is segmented, due to the heterogeneity of the host society and the diversity of migratory flows. Thus, although assimilation remains paramount, divergent adaptation trajectories and outcomes are at play. The critical question posed is not whether assimilation will occur or not, but to which societal sector immigrants' children will assimilate. Some youths take the conventional straight-line pathway of assimilation leading to well-paid blue-collar jobs and eventually professional occupations, while others are assimilated into marginalised strata. However, as the central argument of 'segmented assimilation theory' goes, the chances of incremental upward social mobility for the contemporary second generation are bleak, for the availability of intermediate economic opportunities has been compromised by deindustrialisation and the advent of labour market bifurcation (Portes and Rumbaut 2006: 258-260; Portes and Zhou 1993; Zhou 1997). Thus the theory predicts that the contemporary second generation runs the risk, to a greater extent than immigrants' offspring at the beginning of the twentieth century, of following a pathway of either stagnation or downward mobility. The most important contingencies that could determine particular immigrant groups' susceptibility to 'downward assimilation' are the following: (a) the peril of racialisation because of their non-white phenotypes, (b) the hostile reception by authorities and the native population (c) the weak family structure, (d) the absence of ethnic networks and institutions that can offer resources.

This North American body of research is also relevant to the European context. As Grul and Vermeulen explain, the reason is that the post-WW II immigrant second generation in Europe came of age at roughly the same time as the American one (2003:996). Thus, since mid-1990s there started to emerge some Europe-based studies relevant to integration or educational attainment, and more recently to labour market transitions of guest workers' descendants, which opened a field of significant cross-Atlantic dialogue (among the European studies which are informed by 'segmented assimilation' theory are the following: Colombo et al. 2009; Diehl and Schnell 2006; Silberman et al. 2007; Thomson and Crul 2007).

However, the 'segmented assimilation theory' was criticised on various grounds. A number of scholars argue that its predictions are excessively pessimistic (Alba and Nee 1997: 8; Perlmann and Waldinger 1997). For instance, empirical evidence regarding the critical case of the Mexican second generation offers little support to the prediction of 'downward assimilation' (Waldinger and Feliciano 2004). Another argument is of historical character and maintains that the difficulties of the 'new second generation' are in fact anything but new. The children of yesterday's peasant migrants also had to move ahead in a variety of ways (Waldinger 2007).

Despite such criticism, a central tenet of segment assimilation theory remains valid: it concerns the possibility that a part of today's second generation will join the most disadvantaged and racialised minorities, the inner-city 'rainbow underclass' (Portes and Rumbaut 2001: 45). This potential is seen in the resilience of ghettoisation in US central cities and the immigrant-origin youths' exposure to their youth gangs, and the subculture of drugs and crime (Portes and Rumbaut 2006: 260-264). The most compelling evidence of downward assimilation concerns the rapidly increasing arrest and incarceration rates of second-generation Mexicans, Salvadorans, and West Indians (Portes and Fernández-Kelly 2008; Rumbaut 2005). Arguably, students of criminology cannot afford to ignore such evidence.

Thus, several US-based researchers have turned to this substantial body of theory and research in migration studies and examine the hypothesis of 'downward assimilation' from a criminological perspective (Bankston 1998; Martinez 2002; Morenoff and Avraham 2006). In a parallel effort, European criminologists have already stepped into the examination of the educational, socioeconomic, ecological, familial, cultural and identity factors that account for ethnic differences in involvement with crime of successive

immigrant generations (Junger-Tas 2001; Smith 2005b; Vazsonyi and Killias 2001). However, there is still the need for more European research on these topics which would be informed by theoretical advances and empirical findings not only from the US but also neighbouring countries (Killias 1989). Yet, from a European standpoint, it is imperative to evaluate the relevance of segmented assimilation theory assumptions, for it seems to be more specific to the structure of US economy and the particular context of American central cities (Alba 2005: 42; Thomson and Crul 2007: 1036).

The remainder of this section reviews classic theories of sociological criminology on the involvement of immigrants or minorities in crime and drug use. These are influential theoretical themes that informed the development of this study's set of research hypotheses and guided the analysis of its empirical findings.

#### **1.4.2 Immigration and crime: Early theoretical premises**

Despite its recent currency, concern about immigrants and crime is not a novel phenomenon. In the British context it was already an issue in 1876 when Pike examined the effect that migration had on crime (Pike 1971). At that time it was the migration of Irish labourers into Britain that was widely perceived as responsible for increases in criminality. Pike's discussion of the official statistics concentrates on the correlation of urban crime with internal migration. His conclusion is that 'in the counties in which there is most immigration there is most crime, and in the counties where there is least immigration there is least crime' (Pike 1971). Although he linked mobility with increased criminality, his study avoided either supporting or rejecting the attribution of crime and other urban pathologies to the Irish immigrants.

On the other side of the Atlantic, the prolonged and massive immigration into the United States made the subject of migrants' criminality a major area of criminological enquiry during the first half of the twentieth century (Mears 2001). One of the initial discoveries of the American scholars was that immigrants appeared to exhibit higher rates of serious criminality in comparison with their compatriots of the homeland. The explanation that Sutherland offered is in line with Pike's argument: any form of mobility tends to increase criminality (Sutherland 1934). The reasons are related to the fact that as mobility offers increased opportunities for contact with divergent value systems, it leads to the weakening of social control mechanisms, and to the diminution of the value placed on 'reputation' (Clinard 1963). This explanation is suggested in relation to both internal and external migration (Sutherland 1934).

However, as early as in 1911 the US Immigration Commission which examined the issue of crime committed by immigrants clarified that foreign-born persons commit fewer major offences than native-born persons of the same sex and age. In short, although mobility and poverty tend to increase offending by immigrants, the aggregated crime rate of the latter is still lower than that of the natives (Sutherland 1934; US Immigration Commission 1919). Nevertheless, when various immigrant groups are examined independently a great deal of variation in the rates of offending and imprisonment is revealed. Sellin's later careful examination of the Wickersham Commission report (1931) and of a number of other studies, allowed him to conclude that 'while most foreign-born groups do not come in contact with the law as frequently as the natives, some have much higher rates of crime than the later' (Sellin 1938: 78). Not only do crime rates vary widely among different immigrant groups but also the types of crimes committed also vary according to the nationality of immigrants. Furthermore, even when one group has low rates for most offences, its engagement with specific types of crime might be extremely high (Sellin 1938). According to Sutherland (1934), the reason that certain types of crime are characteristic of certain national groups is that these crimes also tend to be wide-spread in their country of origin.

Taken together, these scholars' conclusion was that the foreign-born were on average committing fewer major offences than the natives. However, an important distinction drawn by them, was between the criminality of the foreign-born and their children. Although statistical evidence was rather weak it was generally believed that the second generation of immigrants had -for some types of offending- higher rates than the American-born children of American-born parents (Tonry 1997). The argument was that the latter, not being able, as were their parents, to make comparisons with the country of origin, focus their concerns exclusively on their current living conditions. Alienation, blocked opportunities, lack of role models, were identified among the causes leading the second generation to increased delinquent involvement. Again, a careful examination of the available data avoids the indiscriminate demonization of the second generation. The statistics indicate that the highest rates of criminality were found among second-generation immigrants who had grown up in urban ghettos and were in contact with delinquent subcultures (Sellin 1938). In such cases the second generation not only appeared to exceed the crime rates of the natives but also had the tendency to be similar to them in terms of the kinds of crime committed (Sutherland 1934). For example, the American-born children of

Italian immigrants committed mostly property offences whereas their peasant-origin fathers exhibited high rates of violent crimes (Mannheim 1965).

For many years such theoretical explanations framed the sociological wisdom regarding immigration and crime, and thus is usually referred to the literature as the traditional model. The arguments advanced in the 'downward assimilation' literature in some aspects echo these early theoretical lessons.

#### **Limitations of the Traditional Model**

The rich body of research that American criminology produced from the 1920s to 1940s, is often reduced to a simplistic postulate arguing that the foreign-born immigrants are not responsible for increases in criminality, but their children might be so. In several cases the credibility of this simplistic explanation has been challenged by empirical findings (Waters 1999). At the same time, globalisation and the recent radical changes in the nature of immigration in Europe and elsewhere, limit the usefulness of the early explanatory models. Some of the key challenges to the traditional model are described bellow.

- The reasons behind the decision to migrate affect the adaptability of certain ethnic groups. Immigrants to early twentieth century United States and post-war Western Europe, were not only 'pushed' by poverty at home but also were attracted by the prospect of integration and prosperity abroad. Today, stresses Marshall (1997), the collapse of the Soviet Union and the communist block, war and ethnic tensions in the Balkans and elsewhere, as well as political or religious conflicts, intensified hugely the so called 'push factors' which gave birth to new migratory movements.
- On the other hand, the 'pull factors' which are related to the possibilities of prosperous integration in receiving countries have been weakened significantly due to Western Europe's prolonged recession and its high level of structural unemployment. The new immigrants of the 1990's who left their home countries *en masse* because of war, discrimination or upheaval now face limited prospects of integration in the host countries. Thus, their first generation is argued to be more likely to engage with criminality than the immigrants of older, more prosperous times (Marshall 1997). In short, it is likely that differences in the reasons leading to migration also have a bearing on crime, concludes Tonry (1997).
- Immigration policies that avoid or postpone the regulation of unauthorized immigrants keep large groups of people in illegality for a prolonged period of time. This has two

interwoven results: the first is that undocumented immigrants are extremely vulnerable to victimisation, and the second is that unavoidably they are engaged in illegal activities (Marshall 1997).

- The type of entrance and the undocumented status of immigrants could also have long-term consequences for their engagement with crime. Huge numbers of immigrants, in order to enter illegally into the host country, are relying on criminal networks. This is especially true in the case of Southern Europe because of its extended and porous borders. These criminal networks rarely limit their activities to the trafficking and exploitation of immigrants and refugees. They are often connected to circuits of prostitution and drug smuggling (Lazaridis 2001; Leman and Janssens 2008). The fall of the wall that was separating Eastern and Western Europe led to the unification of all sorts illegal and black markets and consequently resulted in increasing rates of Mafia-like crime. Many scholars express fear that the reliance of existing patterns of immigration on smuggling networks, transforms certain ethnic communities to mechanisms of logistic support of the latter (Albrecht 1997; Marshall 1997; Sun and Reed 1995).

On the other hand, regardless the ominous predictions which are based on structural arguments, subsequent generations of Asian migrants, in US and Europe, continue to demonstrate lower crime rates than the native population (Tonry 1997). For instance, Bangladeshi and some other south Asian people who are living in the United Kingdom exhibit markedly lower official and self-report rates of offending in comparison with the white majority population (Bowling and Phillips 2002; Sharp and Budd 2005; Smith 2005b; Webster 1995).

### **1.4.3 Explanations of migrant-origin youths' engagement in delinquency**

#### **• Disorganisation Theory**

Despite the fact that immigration loomed large in early research published by the scholars of the Chicago school, an explicit reference to immigrant youthful delinquency was only made by Shaw and McKay in their classic study of the Chicago's zones in transition (Shaw and McKay 1942). They suggested that urban neighbourhoods with high concentration of foreign-born families were the areas with the most elevated rates of juvenile delinquency (Shaw et al. 1929; Shaw and McKay 1942). The key argument was that the children of



successive immigrant groups, after a period of exposure to the environment of the slum, develop common patterns and rates of delinquency. As ethnic groups move out of the poorer inner-city areas, their rate of juvenile delinquency starts to drop. Consequently, these authors pointed out, high rates of crime are a function of the slum areas of first immigrant settlement (Shaw & McKay, 1942). Empirical research has in general confirmed Shaw and McKay's theory associating juvenile delinquency with deteriorated urban areas.

The characteristics that make such urban areas 'disorganised' and eventually criminogenic are varied, according to Shaw and McKay, and include ethnic heterogeneity, residential mobility, deprivation, and the strong presence of social attitudes that are in conflict with the norms of the law. They went on to stress that at the roots of the breakdown of social control was the inability of the immigrant parents' value-system to respond to the problems of the new environment. The native-born children of immigrants are more exposed to the value system of the neighbourhood and thus are likely to develop allegiance to delinquent subcultures.

The appeal of the Shaw & McKay 'disorganisation' view of immigrant communities waned rapidly after the publication of Whyte's "Street Corner Society" (1943). Whyte's study of an Italian slum area of Boston illustrated significant forms of community organisation and networking and therefore somewhat discredited the disorganisation theory' account. Furthermore, criminological criticism usually points to the structurally deterministic connotations of disorganisation theory (Newburn 2007a: 195). A close examination of data reveals that crime rates vary substantially among different ethnic groups, although all of them lived in the same disorganized areas. Additionally, the patterns of youthful crime seem to be distinct for each ethnic group. And -even more significantly for the validity of the theory- Chicagoan scholars of the 1930s never managed to isolate the disorganising effects of the immigration process itself from the structural circumstances of specific neighbourhoods (Waters 1999).

Despite this fair criticism, Shaw and McKay's arguments about the significance of the neighbourhood context have efficiently refuted vernacular understandings of the crime-immigration link that revolve around reified ethno-racial conceptions. Moreover, recently scholars have demonstrated a renewed interest in Shaw and McKay's theory due to the fact that great numbers of new immigrants are concentrating again in poor inner-city areas of US and Europe (Waters, 1999). The difficulties that their integration poses in the

contemporary lean times, leads many to re-examine the relationship between immigration and crime.

Thus, the social disorganisation theory has been revitalised by Sampson and his co-authors through the introduction of the notion of collective efficacy (Bottoms 2007). The US-based research of these authors confirmed that neighbourhood structural factors have an effect on crime rates (Sampson et al. 2002; Sampson and Raudenbush 1999; Sampson et al. 1997). However, it seems that these neighbourhood effects are significantly mediated by social processes, notably by parenting practices. The salience of the relations with parents, namely the link between weak or erratic parental practices and juvenile delinquency has been confirmed many times in criminological literature (Gottfredson and Hirschi 1990: 99). It may be the case that conflict with parents does cause delinquency, but it does so only insofar as it weakens pre-established social bonds between parents and children, weakens their conventional values, and reinforces allegiance to their streetwise peers. Some authors argue that models focusing on the problems of cultural discontinuity and intergenerational conflict offer advanced explanatory capacities concerning contemporary immigrant youthful delinquency (Waters 1999).

### **Strain Theory**

For the most part in sociological criminology, children of economic immigrants are not seen as very different from other lower-class youths. The causes of their deviant behaviour are considered to be the classic causes of juvenile delinquency. Thus a natural candidate when looking for a theoretical explanation of immigrant youths' engagement in delinquency is strain theory. Its classic formulation by Merton (1938) anticipates that individuals belonging to lower-classes are likely to engage with crime because they lack legitimate means to achieve monetary success or other culturally prescribed goals.

More specific to the questions posed by juvenile delinquency in 'ethnic' neighbourhoods was the work of A.K. Cohen (1955). According to Cohen's account lower-class boys aspire to achieve middle-class status, the value of which is fostered by the school system. The realisation that they are denied such status is for many young people the source of embittered frustration and strain. In order to cope with this sort of status frustration some boys reject middle-class values and join up groups or gangs of like-minded boys. These groupings of urban youths set up alternative cultural subsystems that

deny normative values, praise delinquency and in essence are "non-utilitarian, malicious, and negativistic" (Cohen 1955: 25).

The subsequent work of Cloward and Ohlin highlighted another significant aspect: predisposition to embark on a delinquent pathway is not always enough for being successful in crime unless illegitimate means are available: for instance residence in a slum area where a delinquent subculture thrives offers youths access to models of criminal success (Cloward and Ohlin 1960). One can conclude that, on the collective level, the ability of an immigrant or ethnic group of youths to engage in delinquency is in accordance with the differential availability of legitimate and illegitimate means able to offer material and status success (Muncie 2004: 104). In other words, Cloward and Ohlin's contribution brought together Mertonian strain theory with Sutherland's differential association theory and its emphasis on the collective forms of deviance, and the role of peer groups (Sutherland 1934).

The relevance of the classic strain theory to the study of delinquent immigrant youths is further stressed by -the much neglected- fact that many of the gangs that strain theorists studied in US metropolitan slums were ethnic gangs composed of immigrant boys. Downes and Rock commented that it is odd that Cloward and Ohlin did not see ethnicity as a significant variable (Downes and Rock 2003: 147). The reason for this intentional avoidance is, Waters argues, probably due to American sociology's disciplinary shift that occurred during the 1950s: from immigrant communities, disorganisation and intergenerational conflict that were the focus of the previous generation of Chicago sociology their interest relocated to crime rates among lower classes and ethnic minorities who only incidentally were immigrants (Waters 1999: 24). As a matter of fact, this disciplinary shift was an effect of the steep decline in the numbers of US foreign-born population after 1920 (Bursik 2006). Apparently, in the 1950s strain theory had a broader application for it was not only related to circumstances of immigrant first phase of settlement but it was primarily applicable to the problems of the immigrant second generation. Therefore, strain theory is also significant for this thesis and the interpretation of immigrant youths' nature of involvement in property crime patterns.

The most common critique levelled at strain theory is that it overpredicts crime among the lower-classes (Bohm 2001). The revision of strain theory by Agnew is a step forward for it addresses the question of what type of strains are more likely to be related to crime. He posited that people are more likely to turn to crime when strains (1) are likely to be seen

as unjust; (2) are seen as high in magnitude; (3) are associated with low social control; and (4) are easily resolved through crime (Agnew 2001). Such strains are likely to include core goals such as "money –particularly the desire for much money in a short period of time", as opposed to the gradual accumulation of savings (Agnew 2001), thrills/excitement (Katz 1988), and masculine status (Anderson 1999; Messerschmidt 1993).

Furthermore, Agnew contends that exposure to chronic prejudice and discrimination, and work in the secondary labour market, are among those strains that increase the likelihood of crime (Agnew 2006). Noticeably, a limited number of studies suggest that the effect of economic inequality on crime rates is especially strong when such inequality is due to discrimination against racial/ethnic groups (Blau and Blau 1982); perhaps because the strain related with 'poverty in the midst of plenty' is more likely to be seen as unjust in such circumstances (Cullen and Agnew 2006: 145).

#### **1.4.4 Immigrant-origin youths and substance misuse**

Often a starting point for the effort of assessing immigrant-origin youths' involvement in substance abuse is their representation among the clients of drug-treatment services. Right from the outset, it has to be stressed that such analyses based on institutional samples have little to offer to questions related to the differential involvement in drug use of immigrant and native populations. Only over long periods of time and along with other sources of data, might such observations offer a sound indicator. Available data from such sources show that the Greek national network of drug treatment services attracts an overwhelming native population of problem drug-users. According to the REITOX focal point<sup>11</sup>, the proportion of non-nationals in 2005 was only 3.3 per cent of problematic drug users who approached services seeking help (UMHRI 2006: 34). My analysis of the Treatment Demand database of KETHEA<sup>12</sup> for the period 2000-06 offered similar results: Greek nationals constituted 98 per cent of agency's clientele (N=12,938). Moreover, the ethnic breakdown of its small group of foreign-national problematic drug-users was not proportional to the composition of the youthful migrant population in Greece. Only one-third of the foreign drug abusers were of Albanian origin. This proportion is well below

---

<sup>11</sup> This is one of the 26 National Focal Points that constitute the European Information Network on Drugs and Drug Addiction (REITOX). The network submits annual reports to the European Monitoring Centre on Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA).

<sup>12</sup> KETHEA (Centre of Therapy for Dependent Individuals) is a Greek agency providing drug treatment and rehabilitation through a nation-wide network of services.

the Albanian share within the youthful part of the immigrant population, which is almost 80 per cent.

The picture painted by police statistics is different however. The share of immigrant juveniles among alleged drug offenders is more or less proportional to their numbers in the general population (detailed police statistics are presented in Chapter 6, section 6.2.1). Moreover, in subsequent stages of the youth justice process an incrementally increasing representation is evident. According to the 2000-01 disposition statistics of the Juvenile Court of Athens, 11 per cent of the 188 adolescents who were adjudicated for drug offences were of foreign nationality<sup>13</sup>. The end result of the criminal justice attrition process is evident in prison statistics. In July 2002, thirty-six per cent of the foreign youths who were held in Greek juvenile reformatory institutions, had either been convicted or been remanded for drug-related offences. In other words, drug offenders of foreign nationality represented a significant 18 per cent of juvenile prisons' inmates.

The disparity between the criminal justice statistics and the drug services statistics poses puzzling questions. In short in Greece it remains controversial, as much as in many other countries, whether (a) immigrants experience drug problems to a lesser extent than natives (b) or they experience problems equally but perceive the services as inaccessible, inappropriate and/or unsafe for them (Awiah et al. 1992: 7). Arguably a possible explanation might be that the vast majority of recent immigrants still have little engagement in the misuse of illicit psychotropic substances, although some of them are involved in either wholesale or street-level drug trafficking.

### **Acculturation, strain, and drug use**

The prediction of strain theory is that 'crime occurs where there is cultural inclusion and structural exclusion' (Young 1999: 81). Without doubt, in the case of immigrants and their children, 'cultural inclusion' constitutes part of the broader process of acculturation.

The notion of acculturation refers to the process of cultural and psychological change that follows intercultural contact (Berry 1997). In its simplest form acculturation theory foresees the linear and unidirectional process of gradual adjustment to native mainstream culture<sup>14</sup>. In most cases -this model goes on- acculturation advances hand-in-hand with

---

<sup>13</sup> For a comprehensive presentation of the Juvenile Court of Athens' disposition statistics refer to Chapter 8.

<sup>14</sup> However, even in its early versions Berry's acculturation theory was sophisticated enough to maintain distance from assimilationist determinism. Moreover, latter on Berry proposed that the stressful effects of

experiences of xenophobia and prejudice, poverty and segregation, and eventually blocked or restricted access to social mobility. It is then likely that acculturation might entail strain, termed in the relevant psychological literature as 'acculturative stress' (Berry et al. 1987), which in turn is linked to the onset of problem behaviours in general, and drug use in particular (Rodriguez et al. 1993; Vega and Gil 1998; Vega et al. 1993). More elaborate models of acculturation offer conceptualisations that take into account the complex interrelationships between ethnic awareness, perception of discrimination, cultural diversity and conflict. Cultural and ethno-national identification could be idiosyncratic and identification with a culture of origin at one dimension can be independent with the other dimension which is related to the interaction with the culture of the host society (Berry et al. 2006; Oetting 1993; Padilla and Perez 2003). A bidimensional model convincingly suggests that the immigrant youths most likely to engage in deviant groups and to be heavily drug-involved are those who have been unable to establish a solid cultural identification with either the mainstream with the host society or of their ethnic community (Oetting 1993: 52).

A serious shortcoming of the 'acculturative stress' perspective is that it leads to overprediction of drug use prevalence among immigrant populations. Robust and consistent findings of mainly US research refute the 'stress hypothesis'. Especially, the contention that migration constitutes a risk factor associated with drug use is negated and it is suggested that immigrants are less likely to use licit and illicit drugs than are native-born citizens (Amaro et al. 1990; Brown et al. 2005; Gfroerer and Tan 2003; Johnson et al. 2002). Even more significantly, the same body of research contends that the risk of foreign-born youth in connection with substance use increases with the length of time they have in the host country.

#### ***The epidemiological paradoxes of assimilation***

Such empirical findings relating to drug misuse have been classified by the sociology of immigration under the heading of 'epidemiological paradoxes' of assimilation (Rumbaut 197b). At the core of the epidemiological paradox lies the counterintuitive finding that immigrants often show better health outcomes than their national peers in spite of their poorer socioeconomic status (Hayes-Bautista 2004). Outcomes of such nature include

---

acculturation are not direct and unavoidable and depend upon a host of moderating individual and group factors (Berry 1997; Berry et al. 1987).

physical, mental health, and psychosocial adjustment. The latter dimension made current psychological research devote more attention to the fact that the immigration process, despite its inherent adversities, is frequently perceived positively by self-motivated immigrants for the important opportunities for personal development it offers (Motti-Stefanidi et al. 2007). However, it seems that these advantages do not last long. Assimilation into the cultural traits of the host society is associated with adverse health outcomes. Contrary to conventional assimilationist discourse, argues Rumbaut (1997b), the change from foreign, which is perceived as inferior, to native norms of conduct and consciousness, which are perceived as superior, is not always for the better.

However, a recent empirical examination of whether this 'paradox' is relevant to the socio-cultural and psychological adaptation of immigrant youths living in five European countries resulted in inconsistent findings and therefore offered mixed support for the hypothesis (Sam et al. 2008). Moreover, a recent Greek study reports that immigrant students had on average worse indicators of school adjustment than their Greek classmates, but did not differ from them (significantly) in the extent of their self-reported emotional problems (Motti-Stefanidi et al. 2008).

## **1.5 Terminology and national context**

At this point, some clarifications of the terminology employed is necessary. For, despite the blossoming of international research in the field of migration and citizenship, the understanding of the topic to a large extent still remains bound to each country's relevant experiences and scholarly traditions.

Britain, with its colonial past, has been classified by Castles and Miller (2003), as belonging to the imperial model of immigration. This was definitely the case in the most significant era of immigration which opened in 1948 and concerned the moving of former colonials from the Caribbean and the Indian subcontinent to the metropolis. As Modood explains, in fact that was not about pure immigration but rather something between a 'country to country' movement and a movement from an outlying province of an empire to its ruling capital (2005: 471). Although the Commonwealth newcomers were endowed with equal citizenship status from the beginning, in practice, the citizenship of black people in Britain has been frequently considered by many as questionable and problematic. Thus, in the British context, theorists and activists from the left have considered that the very term 'immigrant' is not simply descriptive but has actual connotations undermining

the entitlement of black and Asian minorities to full legal and social citizenship (Cook 1993: 142).

Nevertheless, on the other side of the Atlantic, in the US, which is self-described as a country of immigrants, the epithet 'immigrant' has a more positive meaning, and, because of more or less permanent migration influxes, the distinction between 'migrants and hosts' was never especially significant. The same pattern held in all 'settler' countries, at least until the 1990s. Thus the concerns of US liberal academics, with regard to the labelling of newcomers by the native white majority, are different in nature from those prevailing in the UK. Because of the persistence of racial discrimination, scholars' concern regarding the children of non-white immigrants that arrived in the United States after 1965 was whether dominant whites would see them less as immigrants and more as non-whites (Gans 1992: 177; Portes and Zhou 1993: 83). Thus, minorisation is considered as more harmful for the prospects of the immigrant second generation than any other form of labelling (Kasinitz 2008; Kasinitz et al. 2004a: 280).

In Greece, the country's historical experiences have to a great measure also shaped the way that public and policy discourses classify newcomers of the 1990s and their children. For instance, Voutira (2004: 145) argues that, unlike the situation elsewhere in Europe, the term 'refugee' is currently used in Greece as a term of honour, mainly due to the idealised image that the incorporation of the 1920s' Asia Minor ethnic-Greek refugees occupies in collective memory. Furthermore, even the term 'immigrant' has positive connotations in Greece, for it invokes the memory of the long Greek tradition of emigration and especially the more recent experience of large-scale labour emigration towards Western Europe, Canada and Australia which peaked during the 1960s (Kassimati 1984: 18). Thus, Greek exclusionist and xenophobic discourses tend either to target 'aliens' in general, or specific nationalities, notably 'Albanians'. Even the rhetoric of the far-right refrains from attacking 'immigrants' directly, let alone 'refugees'. On the other hand, the legal fact regarding immigrants in Greece is that at least upon arrival they are not entitled to membership of the Greek civic community, and hence they cannot make legitimate claims on citizenship. In this respect, the philosophy of the legal regime of immigrants' reception in Greece has parallels to that of Germany, for the closure of citizenry to newcomers in both countries is underpinned by an 'ethnic' understanding of nationhood (Brubaker 1992)<sup>15</sup>. Accordingly, at

---

<sup>15</sup> However, in Germany, except for political rights, long-settled non-citizen immigrants possess rights virtually identical to those of German citizens (Brubaker 2001: 538).



least in the language of the Greek official immigration policy, there is a clear distinction between repatriated ethnic Greeks and economic migrants (Triandafyllidou and Veikou 2000). However, the question of whether there is a difference in the treatment the two migrant groups actually receive at the societal level is likely to receive a less clear answer. In sum, the social sciences lexicon through which the issue of immigrants' incorporation is debated in Greece is quite different from the British one, mainly because of the uniqueness of UK's legacy of race relations management and the tradition of ethnic minority political mobilisation<sup>16</sup> (Joppke 1996; Modood 2005). Moreover, from a sociological point of view, in Greece, the distinction between economic immigrants, refugees, and asylum seekers has little impact on the adaptation trajectories, and is difficult to operationalise (Arapoglou 2006).

---

<sup>16</sup> But even within the British context, concern has been recently raised about whether the conceptual and political framework of the 1970s and 1980s is still relevant to the sizable migration from the East, which appears to have more similarities than differences to the situation throughout Europe (Favell 2001; Favell 2008).

---

## Chapter 2

### Episteme, Methods, Data

---

#### 2.1 Whose side are we on?

As Becker argued some time ago, it is not possible to do social research that is uncontaminated by values and political sympathies (Becker 1967). The research on issues lying within the highly politicized field of immigration, ethnicity and criminal justice is such a case par excellence. Moreover, as Albrecht argues, the topic of 'immigration, ethnicity and crime' is not only most sensitive but also is susceptible to political exploitation (2002).

However politicized a research area is, Becker's call for an explicit political commitment, did not imply epistemological partisanship advocating the overlooking of 'difficult' issues and the elaboration of a picture tailored to suit researchers' sympathies with the group under study (Hammersley 2001). Therefore, the only legitimate choice is to follow the difficult route that Cohen suggested, by maintaining a 'double loyalty', both to social justice values and to the principles of honest intellectual inquiry (Cohen 1998: 99, cited in Liebling 2001).

With such theoretical reflection in mind, the starting point for this study's handling of representation tensions is to document, to the greatest extent possible, the adversities that immigrant-origin youths encounter, in terms of segregation, racism, or discrimination. Further to the documentation of such strains, the study's second aim is to examine the nature of young people's involvement in violent or delinquent activities. This strategy aims to guard against the possibility of one-sided negative portrayal of disadvantaged youths who have the same origin with the research participants of this study. Such misreading of immigrant-origin youths' social reality, frequently feeds into sensational journalistic accounts which by their turn further their inferiorisation, marginalisation, and criminalisation. In my view, the adopted approach makes possible the coupling of an antiracist commitment with broader ideals, like those of an inclusive society without extreme inequalities, of social development and children welfare, of a democratic and accountable police, and a non-punitive youth justice system.

In conclusion, I have attempted to avoid portraying this study's youthful subjects in 'black and white', either as good or bad, by allowing the complexity, ambiguity and fluidity of their strengths and weaknesses to be revealed (Back 2004: 209). Furthermore, the adopted overall research approach is a post-positivist one, insofar as this thesis has a special interest in the interactional dynamics inherent in the processes of either becoming a member of a new society, adopting its cultural ways, identifying with an 'ethnic' migrant group, or becoming an adherent of a youthful deviant subculture.

### **Research questions**

This study investigates a range of issues which are deemed to be relevant to the following overarching concern:

Are the descendants of immigrants to Greece susceptible to 'downward mobility'?  
In other words do they assimilate *en masse* to deviant segments of the domestic society?

Nevertheless, in early 2000s it was impossible to predict rigorously the pathways of adaptation followed by immigrant-origin children who arrived in Greece during the 1990s. Future studies that will follow these youths' transition to early adulthood might be able to address this question in a definite way. Inevitably, the current thesis is only able to deal with the issue of immigrant second generation 'downward mobility' in an exploratory way (Glaser and Strauss 1968: 189; Stebbins 2001). Thus, it focuses on tracing a host of factors that might potentially compromise the outcomes of immigrant-origin youths' adaptation process. In order to collect tangible evidence regarding their extent of downward assimilation a set of specific research questions was defined from the outset. This set of questions corresponds to key mechanisms which may decisively affect the outcome of the adaptation process as they have been identified by the relevant literature (see section 1.4 of Chapter 1). The objective of the chapters that follow is to address each of the following questions:

1. What is the nature and extent of ethnicised segregation in youthful inner-city milieus?
2. How do youths of immigrant origin reflect upon a reception climate which oscillates between the polar opposites of exclusionism and assimilationism?  
How do they make sense of their place and prospects in their new homeland?

3. Do anti-immigrant sentiments and racism force youths of immigrant parentage to embrace 'ethnic' or 'native' oppositional cultures?
4. What forms of strategic conduct<sup>17</sup> do immigrant youths use in order to subvert the hierarchy of status between established natives and newcomers?
5. How is engagement in violence, property delinquency, and drug use distributed across youthful 'ethnic' groups?
6. What are the most important casual mechanisms which stand behind immigrant-origin youths' deviant adaptations?
7. To what extent might immigrant-origin youths' officially recorded delinquency reflect proactive policing or other forms of uneven treatment by the police?
8. What does their engagement with the system of youth justice suggest about immigrant-origin children's criminalisation<sup>18</sup>?

In order to pin-down the mechanisms which are responsible for immigrant-origin youths' deviant coping, issues of quantity, prevalence, or frequency of problem behaviours were investigated as well as the relational and situational dimensions of the studied phenomena. The latter was imperative in order to put the findings of this study in a developmental perspective which takes into account the shifting asymmetrical power balance between natives and newcomers. The aim is to document immigrant-origin youths' particular phase of adaptation in central Athens as deployed at the beginning of 21<sup>st</sup> century. Hopefully, the chapters that follow provide substantial evidence as to underpin the contention that the particular period constituted a significant turning point for the phenomenon of immigration to contemporary Greece.

#### **Sites of Research**

In order to answer such questions a research design was employed based on two major components. Their locus was (a) the secondary system of state education, and (b) the youth justice system. The segments of ethnic migrant youth who were in contact with these two

---

<sup>17</sup> By strategic conduct social actors demonstrate their discursive and practical consciousness as regards the dialectics of power and control. Refer to Giddens' discussion (1984: 288-292) of Willis' 'Learning to Labour' (1978).

<sup>18</sup> According to Melossi's definition (2003: 386; 2005: 15) criminalisation refers to a process of interaction and mutual reinforcement between (a) certain social groups' involvement in specific kinds of officially recorded crime, and (b) increased attention and amplified penalisation by agencies of social reaction, both formal and informal.

systems were expected to follow -to a certain degree- different pathways of integration into the new societal context. Sections 2.2 and 2.3 that follow describe these research components.

## **2.2 Methods and procedures**

The research strategy was pragmatic aiming to capture as much of the phenomenon at hand as possible and to produce close-knitted relevant evidence. Triangulation, which is a combination of multiple methods, both qualitative and quantitative, was employed in order to secure in-depth understanding of the respondents' points of view, to enhance the rigour of the investigation and to address threats to the validity of the findings (Denzin 1988; Denzin and Lincoln 1998: 4; Robson 2002: 69). The fieldwork I undertook during 2004-05 comprises the following main research components:

- An inner-city school survey: A questionnaire was completed by 300 students attending seven upper-secondary schools in central Athens.
- Interviews with 27 students of immigrant parentage who were recruited in the surveyed inner-city schools. (An outline of this student sample is presented in Appendix I.)
- Interviews with 36 young defendants of foreign nationality who were contacted at the Juvenile Court of Athens. (The profile of the youths who were interviewed in the Juvenile Court is presented in Appendix II.)
- Interviews with three experienced probation officers of the Juvenile Court of Athens.

In addition to this fieldwork, I analysed data which were collected in 2003 by University Mental Health Research Institute (UMHRI) through a survey of secondary schools. Within this thesis' limited space the presentation of UMHRI findings focuses on violent offending, property delinquency, drug use, and experience of policing (Appendix III presents an outline of the Athenian student sample, and discusses methodological issues pertinent to the analysis 2003 UMHRI data). Moreover, for many core chapters of this thesis the starting point is the critical examination of police statistics regarding youthful delinquency and drug use. Finally, Chapter 8 scrutinises youth justice statistics specific to the operation of the juvenile court of Athens.

### **2.2.1. The 2004-05 inner-city school-survey**

The main objective of this school-survey was to provide estimates of offending and problem behaviours among students of inner-city secondary schools and to establish comparisons between different 'ethnic' groups. The following section outlines the methodology of the inner-city school survey.

#### ***Method***

The employed method was a self-report survey. It is a method used by all major delinquency and problem behaviour studies at national or transnational level (Flood-Page et al. 2000; Graham and Bowling 1995; Hibell et al. 2004; Johnston et al. 1995; Kokkevi et al. 1992; Spinellis et al. 1994; Tsiganou et al. 2004). The advantage of self-report studies over official crime statistics is in providing estimates of offending which are unbiased by the attrition and selection process (Bowling and Phillips 2002: 98). Furthermore, the self-report method is particularly suitable for the study of juvenile populations (Junger-Tas and Marshall 1999).

In practice, my 2004-05 school survey adopted the techniques of recent Greek self-report studies of delinquent and problem behaviours (Kokkevi et al. 2000; Spinellis 1997; Tsiganou et al. 2004). The method of answering the questions was self-completion (paper and pencil). In the context of Greek secondary schools, this method provides adequate safeguards of anonymity and confidentiality.

#### ***Questionnaire***

The student self-administered questionnaire covered a wide range of topics. Its development was based on a number of well-known self-report studies of delinquency and drug-use, which include 2003 ESPAD (Hibell et al. 2004), Mentoring Plus (Newburn et al. 2005), and Youth Lifestyles Survey (Flood-Page et al. 2000). It contains measures relevant to students' socio-demographic background, school attendance and performance, social life and leisure-time activities, victimisation, emotional strain, police encounters and criminal justice involvement, delinquency, drug-use, attitudes, family life and employment. Its 16 pages contained a total of 67 main multiple-response questions. (An English language copy of the questionnaire is attached in Appendix IV.)

**Fieldwork period and Procedures**

The implementation of any survey or study in Greek state schools is contingent on the access permission by the Ministry of Education<sup>19</sup>. To this end I submitted a detailed research proposal to the Hellenic Pedagogical Institute, accompanied by a letter from my supervisor at LSE. The evaluation of proposals for school-based research is among the statutory missions of Pedagogical Institute (2002). Then it accordingly advises the Ministry of Education. Eventually, in March 2003 I was granted permission to conduct research in a number of schools, on condition of students' voluntary participation, and anonymity of administered questionnaires. The schools that were included in the sampling frame were those with the highest proportion of immigrant students (theoretical sampling, see Glaser and Strauss 1968). The school selection was facilitated by student-census statistics that were made available by the Institute for the Greek Diaspora Education and Intercultural Studies (IPODE), in early 2003.

Despite the official permission, the headmasters of two schools refused to cooperate. Their schools were replaced by the next ones in the sampling frame. Hence, the non-probabilistic sample I managed to obtain comprised seven Lyceums and TEEs<sup>20</sup> which are located within the inner-city areas of Patisia, Kypseli, and Galatsi (see map in Appendix VI). According to the studies, presented in Chapter 1, section 1.2, these are urban areas of dense and relatively stable immigrant settlement. Moreover, in 2004-05, a large segment of the particular inner-city immigrant population consisted of families with children attending secondary schools.

The survey was piloted in April 2003 in a large Lyceum whose proportion of immigrant students was relatively moderate. Piloting was critical for the improvement of the self-administered questionnaire. In its final version some new questions were added, the wording and the sequence of the questions was revised in order to enhance the data quality and the completion rate. The main phase of implementation took place in 2004-05 and involved seven secondary schools. I visited every school in order to introduce my

---

<sup>19</sup> The overall policy of the Ministry of Education is to restrict Greek academic community's access to schools (Kyridis and Chronopoulou 2008: 29).

<sup>20</sup> In 2005, the Greek upper secondary education was comprised of two types of schools: comprehensive schools or Lyceums, and technical vocational schools or TEEs. Students graduating from Lyceums had access to Universities, while students who successfully completed TEEs had access only to technological institutes of tertiary level (Efklides 2007).

research to headmasters, and to set up appointments for the carrying out of the survey. Headmasters in their turn informed teachers and parents.

The questionnaire was handed to each classroom by me or a research assistant and then we remained available for help, if needed. Before the completion the students were asked to read the information sheet which constituted its cover. This cover sheet clearly stated, in Greek and Albanian, that participation in the survey was voluntary, anonymity was guaranteed, and their personal data would be treated in strict confidence. It also offered instructions on how to fill out the questionnaire. Participants were asked to leave blank any question that would make them feel uncomfortable. Moreover, they were told not to write their name anywhere in the questionnaire. The sheet also contained information on the nature and the purpose of my research, although it was agreed that headmasters and teachers had done that previously. At any rate, in order to secure the respondents' informed and voluntary participation I personally briefed them in every classroom. Namely, I repeated to them that participation in the survey was voluntary; that anonymity was guaranteed for the questionnaire did not record information that could disclose their identity; that their responses would be treated confidentially for nobody would have access to raw data but myself; and that they were free to withdraw at any time<sup>21</sup>.

Only a small number of students, around two per cent, chose to decline participation. A similar proportion was absent on the day of the survey administration. My impression is that those who remained in the classroom were curious or even intrigued by the prospect of participating in a survey of such unusual focus. For many of them, the foreign-born in particular, the fact that the results were to be reported in a British University added credibility to the process, especially as regards the confidential handling of their self-reported sensitive information. Respondents were told to leave completed questionnaires into a ballot-like box.

A total of 300 questionnaires were usefully completed and included in the analysis. On average, the questionnaire was filled out by most students in 40-45 minutes. However, those foreign students whose command of the Greek language was poor were in need of more time and assistance. The nonresponse rate for the offending items of the questionnaire was 4.3 per cent. The majority among those who left at least one question about offending blank were male students born in Greece.

---

<sup>21</sup> Consent was eventually secured by the completion and return of the survey questionnaire. This removed the need for written consent (Oxford Brookes University 2000: section 5.4).



### Description of the inner-city sample

This section presents key characteristics of the students who participated in the 2004-05 school survey (*Table 2.1*). This school-based sample comprised 300 youths, most of whom were sixteen to seventeen years old when surveyed. All of them attended the 2<sup>nd</sup> grade of either Lyceum (82 per cent) or Technical-Vocational school (18 per cent) of central Athens. The sample consists of slightly more male students than females.

**Table 2.1: Profile of 2004-05 Inner-City Sample (n=300)**

PERCENTAGE		PERCENTAGE	
SEX		ACADEMIC EXCELLENCE	
Male	53.2	Greece-born	14.8
Female	46.8	Albania-born	16.0
COUNTRY OF BIRTH		Other	19.2
		PLANS FOR STUDIES AFTER SCHOOL	
Greece	63.8	Greece-born	87.9
Albania	27.5	Albania-born	87.8
Other	8.7	Other	92.3
TYPE OF SECONDARY SCHOOL		PRIVATE TUITION BESIDES SCHOOL	
Lyceum	82.0	Greece-born	76.2
Technical/Vocational	18.0	Albania-born	64.6
LENGTH OF RESIDENCE OF FOREIGN BORN		Other	61.5
		SCHOOL TRUANCY	
Less than Five Years	8.7	Greece-born	39.2
Five to Eight Years	36.5	Albania-born	45.8
Nine to Twelve Years	36.5	Other	25.0
Thirteen or More	18.3	DROP-OUT OF FRIENDS	
CHRONIC UNEMPLOYMENT OF PARENTS		Greece-born	19.1
		Albania-born	26.3
Greece-born	7.2	Other	26.9
Albania-born	14.8	ALIENATION DUE TO STEREOTYPING	
Other	26.9	Greece-born	12.5
WORK BESIDES SCHOOL		Albania-born	16.4
Greece-born	17.6	Other	31.8
Albania-born	38.3		
Other	50.0		

### The ethnonational origin of inner-city students

In the framework of this school-survey, students' country of birth was used as a proxy of their nationality. In 2004-05, as section 1.3 documented, almost all children of economic migrants who were in upper secondary schools were foreign-born. In order to indicate this indirect measurement of ethnicity, when this thesis refers to surveyed students'

ethnonational groups, it places the term 'ethnic' in inverted commas<sup>22</sup>. It is reasonable to assume that all foreign-born students of the surveyed inner-city schools were children of economic migrants.

Almost two-thirds (64 per cent) of the student sample was born in Greece. Students of Albanian ancestry, including ethnic-Greeks of Albania, constituted the major 'ethnic' migrant group within the inner-city secondary schools during my fieldwork (28 per cent of the sample). All other ethnonational origins were represented in smaller numbers and thus had to be aggregated. The birthplace of half of these students was one of the states that emerged out of the former Soviet Union. The others were born in Eastern European and Balkan countries.

#### ***Phase of adaptation***

Central to the process of immigrant-origin youth's adaptation to the new homeland is the length of their stay in Greece. A significant 18 per cent of inner-city immigrant students declared that their length of residence in Greece exceeded 12 years. Since students mean age was 17 years old, it is evident that this subgroup of foreign-born students had in effect been raised and educated in the host country. Quite similar in this respect were the foreign-born students whose length of residence in Greece was in the range from nine to twelve years (roughly 37 per cent). At the time of the survey, only nine per cent of the foreign-born students had less than five years length of residence in the country.

These figures reveal that in 2004-05 the bulk of foreign-born secondary school students of central Athens have been raised in the host country. However, a substantial minority among youths of immigrant origin were newcomers.

#### ***Academic performance and school drop-out***

Education has long been regarded by US and European scholarship on immigration as having critical consequences for the future life chances of immigrant-origin children, and consequently as being central to certain immigrant groups' strategy for upward intergenerational mobility (Levels and Dronkers 2008; Portes and Rumbaut 2001; Rumbaut and Portes 2001). For many descendants of immigrant families the field of

---

<sup>22</sup> This treatment is in accordance with a more general awareness as regards the risks of using crude and essentialist ethnic categories. As Gunaratnam argues, researchers have to work both *with* and *against* ethnic categories, at the levels of epistemology and methodology (2003: 29).

education offers a much-needed opportunity to demonstrate their commitment to an ethos of hard work and achievement, and their ambition for a better life.

This model seems adequate to describe the strategy of many students of immigrant parentage who attend upper secondary schools in Greece. Cases of outstanding academic performance gained public attention when Albanian students who excelled in school were denied the right to carry the Greek flag in commemorative parades, because of the local communities' fierce reactions (see section 4.4.4 of Chapter 4). The 2004-05 inner-city survey offers comparative information regarding students' academic performance per 'ethnic' group. Fifteen per cent of Greek students reported that their grades during the previous academic semester were in the range from 18 to 20<sup>23</sup>. The corresponding proportion of high achievers was 16 per cent among the Albania-born, and 19 per cent among students born in 'other' countries. Comparable rates of native-born and migrant-origin students reported attending some form of after-school classes (*frontistirio*<sup>24</sup>). Moreover, the proportion of those students who reported an intention to continue studies after secondary school is approximately similar across the studied 'ethnic' groups (*Table 2.1*). These findings are telling for the determination of academic excellence and upward mobility demonstrated by those students of immigrant ancestry who manage to continue on upper secondary schools despite the linguistic and socioeconomic exigencies their families face.

However, it is sensible not to look at the immigrant-origin youths through rose-tinted glasses. At the upper secondary level, a significant proportion attend non-demanding Technical and Vocational Schools (IPOSE 2008) while working at the same time. Truancy is more frequent among the Albania-born students than the native-born (*Table 2.1*). Moreover, many immigrant students coming from a family with less social capital (Bourdieu 1986) find it hard to continue school and drop out before the completion of compulsory nine-year schooling. Actually, only half of immigrant Gymnasium cohort continues on to upper secondary school (IPOSE 2008). This explains why a higher

---

<sup>23</sup> The grades in secondary schools range from 0 to 20. Consequently, grades ranging from 18 to 20 indicate academic excellence.

<sup>24</sup> Private cram schools (*frontistiria*) thrive in Greece. Because of the poor quality of teaching in state secondary schools almost all students who are planning to sit a higher education competitive entry examination attend *frontistiria*. In addition, many attend such private schools in order to learn a foreign language. The ensuing cost for families is considerable.

proportion of immigrant-origin respondents of the inner-city school survey reported that they have friends who have discontinued school (*Table 2.1*). Ethnographic data from this study indicate that the dropout rate is higher for male immigrant students than females, since boys are often under pressure by family needs and cultural norms to fulfil a bread-winning male role model. Thus, many enter the full-time labour market upon the completion of one or two years of the lower secondary school (Gymnasium). A study based on the 2001 general population census and the subsequent school-censuses estimates that in 2004-05 some 44,000 school-age children of immigrant background either had never enrolled or dropped-out from school (Lianos et al. 2008: 14).

### **Employment**

Significantly more immigrant-origin students than same-age native-born students reported that their parents were unemployed frequently or 'all-the-time' (*Table 2.1*). This simple indicator of socioeconomic position suggests that even among the better-off immigrant families who manage to send their children to upper-secondary schools substantial numbers struggle under precarious socioeconomic conditions. Presumably, this explains why the share of Albania-born students who reported that they had a job besides school (38 per cent) was double that of same-age native-born (18 per cent). Similarly, half of students born in 'other' countries reported that they were in need to work besides school. Besides, their parents' rate of frequent or chronic unemployment was more than three times the rate of same-age native-born.

### **2.2.2 Quantitative data analysis**

All analyses of self-reported quantitative data which are presented in this thesis were carried out using the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS), version 14.0. A variety of statistical methods for group comparisons was used. When a simple comparison between two groups was needed the employed method was the chi-square statistic. When there were more than two groups examined, one-way ANOVA and post-hoc contrasts were used in order to test all pair-wise differences in group mean values (Tabachnick and Fidell 2000; 2007). The Bonferroni technique of pair-wise comparisons was employed for it is less conservative than others, and more suitable when the number of comparisons is small (SPSS 1999). This analysis of variance approach was used in order to compare 'ethnic'

differences in mean delinquency scores (i.e.: theft, assault), problem behaviour scores and mean extent of 'ethnic' groups' surveillance by the police.

When the dependant variable is dichotomous and predictors are either continuous or categorical, logistic regression is an appropriate method of analysis (Hair et al. 1998; Hosmer and Lemeshow 2000). Logistic regression is an especially attractive method for it remains robust even when the assumptions of multivariate normality and equality of variance/covariance matrices across groups are not met. Since the method generates dummy variables for each category of a categorical predictor, it provides a way to assess the predictive importance of categorical variables with more than two levels. The constructed models' goodness of fit was tested by using the Hosmer and Lemeshow statistics.

## **2.3 Interviewing youths of immigrant parentage**

The qualitative part of this study relies on open-ended interviews with youths of immigrant parentage who were either secondary school students or had been referred to the youth justice system. These interviews explored youths' migratory histories and their formative experiences. This made possible the identification of factors within school, community, or the criminal justice system which seem to have the potential to be detrimental to their mode of adaptation in the host society.

Thus, the ethnographic narratives place quantitative results into perspective, and underpin the development of theoretical arguments relevant to their interpretation. As Cullingford (1999: 23) argues, 'quantitative methods are eventually capable of describing complex psychosocial phenomena rather than explaining them. On the contrary, qualitative data from systematic open-ended questions can reveal underlying processes'.

### **2.3.1 Combining Life Story and Critical Incident Techniques**

The adopted interview approach was basically a semi-structured one. The backbone of the interviewing methodology draws from the life story technique (Atkinson 1998). Narrative accounts are particularly relevant to the study of migrants' adaptation. One such is Thomas and Znaniecki's seminal study of Polish migration to the US (1918), which actually introduced the life-history technique in sociology. Prominent among the numerous studies that continued this time-honoured tradition is Morawska's study (1985) of the coping and

adaptive strategies employed by East Central European migrants to Pennsylvania, and their US-born children.

Equally significant is the contribution of the life-history technique in criminological scholarship. Chicagoan criminologists like Clifford Shaw and Edwin Sutherland relied extensively on life-histories as means of both exploring social psychological processes and evaluating theoretical assumptions (Frazier 1978).

However, the exclusive focus of this study on immigrant-ancestry children limits the usefulness of the life story approach. Apparently, for most of the interviewed youths their current experiences are more significant than narratives relevant to the migratory experiences they went through. Moreover, the research questions that this study poses focus on a range of incidents and events which occur in school, community or in contact with the system of criminal justice. Of such character is the exploration of violent confrontations, incidents of racist aggression, instances of natives' exclusionist mobilisation, and cases of discriminatory treatment by the police. The objective of interviewing was to understand the meaning of such events and incidents from the standpoint of immigrant youths. When I had to lead the interview towards the exploration of such events, the method employed was informed by Flanagan's critical incident technique (1954). In practice, I asked interviewees to tell me significant stories relevant to the previously mentioned range of topics.

For all these reasons, which are related with the nature of this study, I employed a hybrid research method combining the merits of life-story and critical incident techniques<sup>25</sup>. Such a methodological adaptation does not seem to be a radical innovation. In practice, researchers have indirectly recognised the advantages that such a convergence offers. For instance, Chase (1999) suggests that examining a submerged story within a life-story could probably be the richest part of the interview, the one that reveals more about the individual. Atkinson too recognises the advantages of the incident technique when he suggests the invitation of actual stories through open-ended questions rather than chronicling things that happened; for, "it is in stories from a life that we really learn who the person is" (Atkinson 1998: 31).

---

<sup>25</sup> German social researchers are currently using similar hybrid techniques that combine narrative interviews with topical interviews (Scheibelhofer 2008).

### 2.3.2 Interviewing at the Juvenile Court of Athens

The source of recruitment for this research component was the juvenile court of Athens, which handles the cases of hundreds of immigrant-ancestry offenders every year. Every attempt was made in order to keep this sample's balance regarding key characteristics, such as ethnic origin, and gender. The profile of 36 respondents of foreign nationality who were interviewed in the Juvenile Court is presented in Appendix II.

#### *Field procedures*

In summer 2002, I addressed a formal letter to the Ministry of Justice requesting permission to conduct research in the juvenile court of Athens and the special detention centre for youths in Avlona. In support of my application prof. Koniavitis wrote to the Director of Correctional Policy in his capacity as the supervisor of my state scholarship. Eventually, after relevant correspondence with the Ministry of Justice and the submission of clarifications specific to the design of the study, permission was granted in December 2003, but only in regard to the juvenile court of Athens. The terms under which interviewing of young defendants was allowed were outlined by the head of the Probation Service (doc: r.n.:799/02.12.2003). According to these terms, appointments with potential interviewees had to be arranged by probation officers. Prior to each interview probation officers had to contact both the minor and his/her parents in order to obtain their consent. The respondents were introduced to me by their first name only, in order to protect their anonymity<sup>26</sup>. Access was also granted to the Court's statistics, but not to the records of the

---

<sup>26</sup> Because of the primacy put by the Ministry of Justice on young participants' anonymity and the confidential treatment of their accounts, the signing of a consent form by them was not possible. In practice, producing a form and requesting a young person's signature at the outset of each interview, was not only counterproductive as regards the establishment of rapport (Wax 1980: 282), but also contradicted the previously given assurances of anonymity and confidentiality (Dench et al. 2004: 68). Instead verbal consent was obtained. Given the multiple vulnerabilities of the youths who participated in the current study, this form of verbal agreement arguably served their best interests. In Greece, verbal consent is the 'norm' in social research, both qualitative and quantitative, as opposed to medical research wherein signed consent is considered to be mandatory. It can be said that the Greek regulatory policy promotes the set of ethical guidelines described by Bulmer (2001: 50). Analogous suggestions concerning the avoidance of inflexible formal methods of gaining consent are emphasized by Miller and Bell (2002: 54-67) mainly in relation to persons who identify themselves as belonging to socially excluded or marginalized ethnic groups (the relevant literature is usefully reviewed by Dench et al. 2004: 67-68). There has already been a substantial amount of critique regarding the adoption of the biomedical research model as the standard model for

interviewees. The explicit intent of these procedures was to protect participating minors' personal data and to ensure the confidential treatment of their accounts. Another tacit concern of the Probation Service was to prevent the linking of the sensitive information offered by respondents to disclosures that might be harmful to their cases.

All interviews were carried out in the premises of the juvenile court on those weekday afternoons that the Probation Service was on duty. The room I used for interviews was adjacent to the courtroom, and during court session it hosted the meetings of solicitors with their youthful clients. In the afternoons it was vacant and thus available to me. When interviewing was in progress its door was closed. Next door was a large window overlooking the corridor of the establishment, where friends or parents of interviewees were often waiting. Overall, the particular interviewing setting was familiar to participants and helped them to feel relaxed and confident about the confidentiality of the process.

Most interviews were recorded by a microcassette device which was placed on the desk. The youths' permission to audio-record our conversation was always asked before turning the tape recorder on. I explained to them that this was only meant to assist me to recall their account. Most of them had no objection to being interviewed in front of a microphone. However, in two cases, permission was refused and I had to take notes. The average duration of interviews ranged from 60 to 90 minutes. In the cases that interviewees offered especially rich information a second interview was attempted. The recruitment of interviewees ended when (a) I had secured the inclusion in the sample of all major ethnic migrant groups, and types of offenders, and (b) the themes in interviewees' accounts started to be repeated, which indicated that sampling had likely reached saturation.

#### ***Gaining access and obtaining consent***

Clearly, the fact that the Ministry of Justice granted me permission to conduct interviews in the juvenile court was all-important for the development of this research project. The scarcity of criminal justice empirical research in Greece attests to the difficulties of gaining research access to court or prison populations. Nevertheless, to obtain such a precious formal permission in effect constitutes only the first step. In practice, issues of negotiation and confirmation of access pervaded the whole research project (Robson 2002: 296).

---

conducting social research (i.e.: Gotlib Conn 2008; Wax 1980), and the need for critical and flexible adaptation of ethical principles in international and cross-cultural research settings (Tilley and Gormley 2007).



For instance, the realisation of interviews with defendants of immigrant ancestry was contingent on the cooperation of individual probation officers. These officials were formally assigned the role of youths' advocates as regards their participation in my research project (Bachman and Schutt 2008: 211). Inevitably, such responsibility was accompanied by a wide margin of discretion as regards probation officers' stance towards my study. Their willingness to refer interviewees to my study had to be negotiated independently, 'over and above' the formal permission obtained by the top management of the Probation Service. Thus, I had to develop rapport with each and every one of them in order to explore the possibility of cooperation. However, conflict of interest or other forms of institutional politics were not absent from the particular criminal justice setting. A number of probation officers from the outset were reserved towards a doctoral study which was probably perceived as either a burden beyond statutory duties, a covert evaluation of the Service performance and hence a threat, or simply a third party research project likely to take advantage of their professional expertise. Eventually, the bulk of research participants were referred by only a small number of probation officers.

Even more significant was the task of securing the voluntary participation of potential young interviewees. To this end the official permission of the Ministry of Justice was not an adequate substitute for participants' informed consent for two reasons:

The first was relevant to the imperative of respecting young persons' rights: specifically I wanted to make sure that potential participants were in a position to make a choice and to exclude the possibility that they were tacitly forced to participate in my research by virtue of their vulnerable position vis-à-vis the youth justice institution that gave its consent on their behalf (British Society of Criminology 2006: section 4.3). In order to ensure that the youths were fully informed and that they freely agreed to participate I gave each of them an information sheet, providing all the basic facts about my study, in Greek and Albanian (Shqip). Furthermore, I repeated to every one of them that participation in the study was voluntary, that they would not be identifiable by the presentation of their account that they could withdraw without adverse consequences at any point, and finally I explicitly asked for their consent. Only one young person declined participation from the outset. In another case I was the one who took the decision to cancel the interview for ethical reasons. The police officer who escorted the particular young offender in the juvenile court insisted on having him handcuffed during the interview, despite my protests. Thus, instead of

interviewing, I only had a small talk with the young person, while he was waiting to be adjudicated by the court.

The second reason was related to concern about the quality and validity of the offered data, especially in response to sensitive questions (i.e. those aiming to probe their involvement in delinquency, and their treatment by the police). Thus, I had to distance myself from the juvenile court and probation service officials by emphasising my role as a researcher affiliated with an academic institution. More than that was deemed to be necessary and justifiable: since all interviewees were 'foreigners' I also felt like revealing my distance from the 'native' frame of reference as a whole which was the effect of doing research under the supervision of a 'foreign' university. Since I had myself lived abroad for long periods, during my doctoral studies, the claim about 'detachment' from native agendas was substantial enough.

However, obtaining consent was considered "not as a once-and-for-all prior event, but as a process, subject to negotiation over time" (Hornsby-Smith 1993, cited in Dench et al. 2004). The main reason is that inevitably young defendants were not from the outset fully aware of the whole range of topics covered by the interview guide. Thus, special effort was made to overcome social distance and to build a 'bridge of trust' with the interviewees. Apart from the selection of an appropriate tone when questioning, equally important in this respect was the familiarity I was able to demonstrate with their country of origin and my genuine interest in their personal migratory history. Even more significant for 'trust building' purposes were the parts of the interview guide that aimed at eliciting youths' potential negative experiences of xenophobia, racism, and mistreatment by law enforcement.

### ***Debriefing***

Often during the interview, but mostly towards its end, unpleasant memories prevailed and some youths' anxiety and sadness was obvious. Many of them recalled stressful life-events: incidents of racism, violent conflict, harassment, ill treatment, but also embarrassment and arguments with the parents that flowed out of their delinquent involvement. I tried to keep my reactions to those parts of the offered stories as neutral as possible. Since the topic of this thesis was not to investigate in depth of the impact of traumatic experiences, I did not attempt to explore, beyond a certain level, their significance. Moreover, the closing process of the interview had to deal with such sad memories by bringing the person 'back' to the optimistic perspectives of his/her life. Part of this debriefing procedure was the informal

chat that I had after each interview with the young people on matters relevant to their future plans, either these were relevant to studies, work, or leisure time activities.

#### ***Avoiding undue stress***

Ethical guidelines invariably stress that it is the researcher's responsibility to keep intrusive questions to the minimal possible level in order to avoid potential adverse impact of the research process on the psychological well-being of participants. Sometimes it was difficult to go beyond minimal responses of research participants. A young female drug user, for instance, demonstrated her ability to avoid questions on deviant involvement by keeping her responses to a minimal level. In such cases, when all attempts to 'build trust' failed I had to skip the particularly sensitive questions in order to avoid exerting undue stress on particularly vulnerable youths.

#### ***Responsibility towards research participants***

From the outset of this research project I was strongly influenced by the distinction drawn by Matza between the premium put by researchers on the 'appreciation' of deviant behaviours, and the 'correctional' perspective of normative accounts (1969: ch. 2). Since my engagement with the subjects of this thesis was from an appreciative standpoint, I tried to communicate to my respondents, throughout the interviewing process, a stance of empathy and respect, and to make clear that their 'value' as persons was not to be judged on the basis of past involvement in deviance, delinquency, and drug misuse. However, also clear to me were the drawbacks of such an appreciative stance, for it could be misconceived as either approval or approbation of violent behaviours or delinquent activities. Such a possibility was to be avoided, not only for obvious ethical reasons, but also for reasons relevant to the data credibility. A communicated sense of tacit approval could lead to the exaggeration of the self-reported deviant activities.

All in all, although I was never an adherent of 'correctionalism', I had to leave behind my professional conceptual framework, which was the outcome of some ten years of work in the field of drug rehabilitation services, in order to fully embrace the research perspective of *verstehen* (Weber 1949). However, often towards the end of each interview I had to return again to my professional experience and offer advice to a number of interviewees on the handling of particular difficulties and strains. Namely in order to

control youths' anxiety relevant to the adjudication of their case, to offer tips on social care services, or offer advice regarding substance misuse problems.

### **2.3.3 Interviewing secondary school students**

This research component relies on semi-structured interviews with 27 students of immigrant parentage, who were recruited from the same inner-city schools that were included in the sampling framework of 2004-05 survey. All interviewees attended the 2<sup>nd</sup> grade of either Lyceum or TEE. On average, they were 16-18 years old, and most of them had arrived in Greece during their early childhood. The interview guide intended to explore the immigrant students' history of immigration, the stressful aspects of adaptation, their experiences of discrimination and racism, their family life, involvement in delinquency and drug use and their relevant attitudes. Since significant numbers of the youths I interviewed lived and attended school in the same inner-city neighbourhoods, in many cases I had the opportunity to crosscheck students and offenders' accounts.

The recruitment of student interviewees involved several visits to each school I had earlier surveyed. Critical to this form of snowball sampling was the cooperation of headmasters. I described to them the ideal prospective interviewee as a student of immigrant parentage who is 'socially smart' and thus in a position to comment on school and community life. Initially, I had to spend several mornings in teachers' office exploring possibilities and discussing their suggestions. However, since the students already knew about the nature of my study, many of them took the initiative to approach me and volunteered to be interviewed. During the interview, a number of them suggested other youths of immigrant parentage that were in a position to offer informed views relevant to the examined topics. Through such 'snowball' research referrals I managed to develop a balanced sample as regards the critical dimensions of gender, ethnicity, and school type. A description of this student sample is presented in Appendix I.

The field procedures and ethical considerations in schools were not significantly dissimilar to those described previously in relation to interviews conducted in the juvenile court. Nevertheless, it is clear that in schools interviews were more frequently carried out in a relaxed way. Students were interviewed in empty classrooms or teachers' offices. In all cases the space used allowed for private communication. The mean duration of each interview was 50 minutes. In a number of cases I had the opportunity to arrange repeat interviews.

### **2.3.4 Analysis of qualitative data**

Informants' statements and narratives cannot be taken at face value. They have to be interpreted as indications of the informants' perspective (Becker 1958). The narratives of the self are the means by which self-identity is understood and becomes coherent (Giddens 1991: 76). Thus the storytellers are the first interpreters of the stories told, and telling their life story at a given time is also a way to 'reconstruct' their identity (Bruner 1986; 1987). Obviously such 'reconstruction' takes place under the constraints imposed by social structure and is embedded in the frame of power struggles (Giddens 1979: 59-94). The interpretive perspective, and its special focus on eliciting meaning, is central to this study's effort to shed light not only to the adaptation strategies of immigrant-origin youth but also to the ways in which they make sense of their place and their prospects in the new homeland. Likewise, an interpretive approach was adopted in order to capture the interplay between agency, culture and structural strain which facilitated and reinforced the deviant coping of some migrant origin youths.

The analysis had to follow the demanding methods of qualitative analysis whose aim is to recognise common patterns and substantial differences in the accounts of interviewees. The procedures followed were the generic methods suggested by the literature: transcription of tape-recorded interviews, data examination and interpretation, coding, search for categories and themes.

The life-story part of the interview was already organised around open-ended questions. The broad areas covered by these open-ended questions provided a preliminary basis for the creation of a set of categories. The stories about critical incidents were by nature very different in their context. Thus, I had to abstract the content of these stories in a form both suitable for analysis and faithful to the interviewees' words. In some cases (i.e.: as regards students' ethnic identification, or offenders' treatment by the police) it was necessary to treat analytical categories in a quantitative manner so as to produce 'quasi-statistics' (Becker 1958).

In order to protect the respondents' anonymity the presentation of their accounts in this thesis is done by using fictitious names. Besides, the collected survey data were always anonymous. The survey questionnaires, the original interview tapes and transcripts are kept in a locked filing cabinet. Further to such precautions, certain personal details that could potentially expose respondents' identity were withheld from the quotations presented throughout this thesis.

## 2.4 Researching across multiple divides

This section discusses the effect that my status and position had on research participants' responses and accounts. From the outset, I was particularly anxious about the methodological and political challenges emanating from the fact that I had to interview people who were very different from me in terms of ethnonational background, age, educational, and socioeconomic status. The social distance and power differential was even more pronounced in the case of my research interactions with immigrant-origin youths who were in contact with the criminal justice system. By all measures I was an 'outsider' as regards the population I was planning to study.

The well known 'insider' doctrine maintains that members of an ethnic or 'racial' minority group are better placed as regards the study of social problems encountered by the particular group. In its strongest version the doctrine holds that a dedicated 'insider' alone is in a position to understand such minorities' experiences and to grasp their predicament by virtue of group membership (Merton 1973). As Young explains (2004: 189-190), the strong 'insider' position was adopted in the late 1960s by African American scholars in the US, principally in response to the perceived pathologisation of inner-city black communities by 'culturalist' accounts produced by white researchers, such as the Moynihan Report on the black family (for a British perspective see Lawrence 1982). A consequence of the controversy over the Moynihan Report was that liberal social scientists shied away from engaging with problems of inner-city 'racial' or ethnic minorities until mid-1980s (Massey and Sampson 2009; Wilson 2009). Likewise in Britain there was observed a turning away from this kind of empirical research (Back 2004: 206). The void was partly filled by populist media accounts apparently lacking the merits of systematic scholar work, to the benefit of conservative views (Massey and Sampson 2009; Wilson 1991). According to Russell (1992:670), the furore over the Moynihan Report was partly responsible for the construction of a criminological taboo which prevented the discipline from analysing the interrelation of 'race'/ethnicity and crime and from rebutting simplistic and stigmatizing media representations.

Contemporary approaches have moved away from the strong version of the 'insider' doctrine which assumes that only minority scholars can produce knowledge about the experiences of minority groups (Gelsthorpe 1993: 92; Phillips and Bowling 2003: 273). Equally rejected are the exponents of the opposite doctrine which holds that only

disinterested outsiders can undertake an objective analysis of the issues at stake (Phillips and Bowling 2003). Moreover, at the epistemological level there is growing dissatisfaction with claims of privileged access to 'truth' and 'authentic' experience of minoritised subjects by virtue of group membership, emic understanding and a genuine interest in avoiding harming the reputation of the particular minority ethnic communities (Alexander 2004b: 139-144; Rhodes 1994: 548, cited by Gunaratnam 2003).

However, it is difficult to resolve such thorny dilemmas in an abstract and definite way. Reflecting upon fieldwork experience of conducting interviews with youths of immigrant-origin led me to some situated responses to the aforementioned ethical, methodological and epistemological concerns.

A number of youths were rather hesitant to answer questions about sensitive issues. However, through the 'building trust' efforts, rapport was established in most cases, and young people expressed their views, and were rather open about their deviant activities. This is not to imply that youths of immigrant-origin talked to me about their deviant involvement as they might have done to a young person of the same ethnic origin and similar social status. In all likelihood, the revealed truths are inherently 'partial' (Clifford 1986: 7). However, as the quotations throughout this study confirm, many offered 'thick' descriptions of deviant and delinquent activities. Moreover, my perception is that even when interviewees' accounts were somehow brief, in large measure they were precise. In many cases I had the opportunity to crosscheck such descriptions of 'high-profile' deviant incidents with more than one interviewee.

What seems to me certain is that my native background did not represent a hindrance as far as reporting on incidents of ethnicised conflict, racist aggression, and harassment by the authorities was concerned. On the contrary, my impression is that many youths of immigrant parentage gladly elaborated views and narrated negative experiences to an 'outsider', who had signalled his respect to their ethnic background and expressed concern about their lived experiences. A notable number of young foreign-born respondents took advantage of the interview setting in order to open a dialogue, to submit testimonies, to offer insights, and to document the case of their migrant group. This resulted more often than not in a second interview with the same informant. Such advantages of being an 'outsider' were anticipated by Young in his critical reflection on ethnographic fieldwork with low-income African American men (2004: 197-198). The essential point here is that even in the course of social polarisation across ethnic or racial lines, members of the

conflicting groups seek to engage in the process of interaction and intellectual exchange (Merton 1973: 130).

For reasons of a different nature, a number of ethnic-Greek respondents, whose alignment was with the native side of the ethnicised conflict, were pleased to explain to me the causes of their enmity with other immigrants. Obviously, they were willing to report such views to a person of the same ethnic background, who in their eyes represented the interests of the native establishment. In all cases, I had to conceal and even to blur my position as regards the reported issues of ethnicised conflict, racist aggression, and harassment so as to avoid being given 'adapted' responses. Therefore, the negotiation of my subject position was always like walking on a tightrope. The endeavour of researching sensitive issues across an ethnicised divide always necessitates a constant oscillation between proximity and distance with participants.



---

## **Chapter 3**

### **The Reception Context of Central Athens**

---

#### **3.1 Introduction**

Xenophobic attitudes of the native majority frequently play a critical role for the initiation of a cycle of interactions which jeopardizes immigrant youths' prospects for integration into the host society, and inevitably shapes their self-identity (Portes and Rumbaut 2001; Portes and Zhou 1993). The present chapter focuses on immigrant youth's experiences of xenophobia and racism, and starts with a review of recent general population and school surveys that capture the climate of opinion towards immigrants in contemporary Greece (section 3.2). The empirical part of the chapter is based exclusively on qualitative material offered by secondary school students of immigrant descent. The interviewed students' perceptions of discriminatory and exclusionary treatment are presented in section 3.3, whereas section 3.4 documents the gravity of ethnicised conflict, and victimisation by violent racism within inner-city schools and neighbourhoods. The bulk of the empirical material on which this chapter is based was drawn from students born in Albania. The reasons are twofold: they represented the vast majority of the interviewed students (21 out of 27 student interviewees) and they were the ones facing the most hostile attitudes by the majority-population.

#### **3.2 Public attitudes towards immigrants**

An important source of data regarding European societies' stance towards immigrants and minorities is the Eurobarometer (EB) survey that collects public opinion data across all EU Member States. The most recent data are those collected in 1997, 2000 and 2003. Equally useful is the European Social Survey (ESS), a 2002-03 study that was conducted in 22 European countries with the aim of 'monitoring public attitudes and values'. Based on these sources the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (Coenders et al. 2004a; b; c) provided cross-national and longitudinal comparisons based on a range of ethnic exclusionism indicators.

According to the ESS cross-national dataset, Greece had the highest proportion of respondents in favour of restrictive policies towards immigrants originating from poor countries (87 per cent). The ESS average proportion of respondents with similar views was 50 per cent. Likewise, half of the surveyed Europeans were in favour of a mono-cultural society in which the majority of people share the same customs and traditions. Greece again had the highest rate of citizens displaying a critical stance towards the ideals of diversity and multiculturalism (77 per cent). Moreover, EB findings regarding 'resistance to multicultural society' indicate that the proportion of the public displaying a critical attitude towards the ideal of a multicultural society has been growing notably in Greece over the last six years. With regards to the issue of social relations with members of ethnic groups, 21 per cent of the surveyed Europeans expressed their wish to avoid social interaction with migrants. The corresponding proportion, within the Greek sample, was almost double that (39 per cent). According to 2002-03 ESS, 58 per cent of the European sample felt that immigrants pose both an economic and a cultural threat. Greece had the highest rate of respondents perceiving the foreigners as a societal threat (85 per cent).

It comes as no surprise then that seven out of eight Greek nationals (87 per cent) support repatriation policies for migrants who have committed serious crimes. However, the average for all ESS countries was also very high (70 per cent). Furthermore, the EB dataset indicates that the proportion of the public in favour of repatriation policies of legally established immigrants has grown significantly in recent years, in many countries, including Greece. Another widespread view -in Northern European countries in particular- is that minorities and immigrants should give up their religious or cultural behaviours that may be in conflict with the national law. Such contemporary European views are primarily directed towards Muslim immigrants (Modood 2003). However, fears of cultural incompatibility are comparatively less spread in Italy and Greece. Insistence on conformity to law was strongly favoured by people living in Nordic, Western and Central European countries, whereas people living in Mediterranean countries appeared to insist much less on such conformity. It is likely that such differences also reflect variations in the appeal of the law-and-order ideal between the European North and South.

Interestingly, opposition to the idea of issuing civil rights for legal migrants is less widespread in Greece than among the general European public. Greek respondents were to a greater extent supportive of the proposition that legally established immigrants from

outside the European Union must have the same social rights as the Greek citizens, as well as that naturalisation and family unification should be easier for them.

As regards the determinants of ethnic exclusionism, it was found that the higher the net migration flows have been in preceding years, the more citizens of a country were in favour of restrictive immigration policies (Coenders et al. 2004b). It was also found that the size of an economy (level of GDP) is negatively correlated with resistance to immigration and diversity. These patterns certainly hold true in the case of Greece that combines the highest net increases of migrant influx in Europe, a less developed economy, and the strongest exclusionist attitudes. With reference to public opinion and attitudes towards specific countries of origin and groups of foreigners residing in Greece, both the EKKE 1996 survey which studied xenophobia in the region of Macedonia (Michalopoulou et al. 1999), and the 1993 national survey of the Lambrakis Research Institute (Voulgaris et al. 1995) indicate that Greeks' most negative anti-migrant feelings are held towards Albania and Albanians.

On the whole, most forms of ethnic exclusionism were found to be emphatically supported by the Greek public. According to both EB and these Greek surveys, from 1990 onwards, a significant majority of Greek respondents believed that their country has received too many immigrants (Kafetzis 1999: 74). On the other hand, these ardent attitudes do not imply that immigration ranks high in Greek public concerns. EB 2004 suggests that Greek respondents were worried about the problem of unemployment to a greater extent than all other Europeans. Three out of four Greeks (75 per cent) picked out unemployment as the most important problem of their country, while the European average was 45 per cent. By way of comparison, only six per cent of the surveyed Greeks were preoccupied with immigration (European Commission's Representation in Greece 2004). Hence, it appears that the strong ethnic exclusionist stance of the Greek public towards immigration is not the outcome of a pervasive moral panic regarding immigration, but is rather correlated with economic concerns and unemployment in particular. However, this says little about the ideological underpinnings of the widespread opposition to cultural diversity. In this area, the preference of Greek respondents for the *status quo ante* is noticeable and thus arguably constitutes a reversion to an ethnically homogeneous society and welfare state that safeguards civil and social rights for all citizens.

### 3.2.1 The stance of indigenous students towards immigrant classmates

The few available studies with an exclusive focus on young people appear to be in broad agreement with the findings of the previously discussed pan-European public opinion surveys of general population. One of them is the 2001 European study of young people (15-24 years of age), which was conducted in 15 countries. According to this particular study, young Greeks' rates of xenophobia and hostility towards immigrants were among the highest (European Commission 2001, cited in Dimakos & Tasiopoulou 2003).

The lack of large-scale national studies of Greek students' values towards classmates of foreign nationality makes the examination of cross-sectional school surveys with a different overall focus absolutely necessary. One of these school-surveys is the students' violent behaviour survey which was conducted by the National Centre for Social Research (EKKE) during the academic year 1999-2000 (Tsiganou et al. 2004). The sampling procedure was representative, nation-wide and stratified, and the collection of information employed the administration of self-report questionnaires to students of public schools. The EKKE study painted a picture of a rather coherent and inclusive school community. The ideal of solidarity was found to be important for most students who appreciated the friendship of their mates. The overwhelming majority (83 per cent) reported good or very good relations with their foreign classmates. Nevertheless, five per cent of students reported that they could not tolerate students from other countries, and an additional three per cent reported bad relations.

In 2006, EKKE conducted another survey on school violence, which involved 102 schools in the municipality of Athens. This Athenian study was in broad accordance with the above mentioned national one. Namely, 80 per cent of the 2,003 surveyed students of primary and secondary schools reported that among their friends were class-mates of native as well as immigrant parentage (Kottaridi and Balasi-Adam 2006).

Although not comparable *sensu stricto*, the account offered by the few available studies of racism and xenophobia among students in provincial areas of Greece appears to be quite different. In 2001, Dimakos and Tasiopoulou (2003) studied the attitudes towards immigrants of one hundred secondary school students of an urban centre in Northern Greece. A semi-structured questionnaire probed students' values and beliefs. The results classified respondents into those taking a negative stance towards immigrants (39 per cent), positive (28 per cent), or neutral (32 per cent). Again an alarming five per cent of the surveyed students adopted extremely hostile views towards immigrants. Significantly, to

date no Greek study has examined the receiving end of the xenophobia equation: namely the experiences and the views of immigrant students.

### **3.3 Xenophobia and exclusion: the baseline of foreign-born students' experience**

The present chapter, which aims to contribute towards the filling of this gap in the literature, draws almost exclusively from the biographical accounts of the interviewed youths of immigrant parentage who attended inner-city Lyceums and technical-vocational secondary schools (TEEs). The accounts offered by the interviewed young offenders of immigrant origin are not included in this section's analysis, although in general, their experiences were not very different from those of students. However, the interviewed foreign-born students were more talkative when the discussion touched issues related to racism, and were more assertive in condemning the natives' stereotypes and racist attitudes. Youths of immigrant ancestry that were in contact with the criminal justice system were - by their very position- hesitant in criticizing instances of xenophobic hostility. Probably, their engagement in delinquency made the majority of them shy away from any effort to denounce the specific stereotypes that link immigration with crime. The following discussion with Mario, an Albanian-born young offender illustrates the feelings of collective responsibility and guilt:

*PP: ... I see. So you Albanians are proud people.*

*M: That's true! Most Albanians are nice people. But with all these things I have done, I can't be very proud... Since I got involved in all these things I feel guilty. As if people are pointing at me: he is a thief.*

Moreover, the fact that most immigrant young offenders had dropped out of school or never attended classes after their arrival in Greece isolates them from the youthful social milieu of secondary schools, where the interaction of 'ethnic' groups is pervasive<sup>27</sup>.

---

<sup>27</sup> A large study of 1.5 and 2<sup>nd</sup> generation of immigrants to New York, which started in 1998, documented a similar pattern. More likely to report perceptions of discrimination and racism were the better-off respondents. Lack of perceptions of discrimination was frequently due to poorer immigrant youths' isolation from the majority society and its institutions. The better-off immigrant young people were more likely to

Nevertheless, some of the foreign-born young offenders were critical of their treatment by the police. Their perceptions and experiences are presented in Chapter 7.

The remainder of the present chapter discusses a range of themes that emerged as significant in the stories told by the interviewed students of immigrant ancestry. At first differences in immigrants' reception between provincial areas and the capital of Athens are discussed; differences that are part and parcel of distinctive modes of migrant adaptation in the particular settings. Secondly, special attention is given to immigrant youth's perception of the role that the media play in shaping society's stance towards the issue of immigration. The focus then shifts to examine violent confrontations between native and immigrant youth and the role of the racist groups of the far right.

### **3.3.1 The reception of immigrants in provincial areas**

For many immigrant families their first area of settlement in Greece was a provincial town or a rural village. In such areas, demand for seasonal work in the extensive Greek agricultural sector has always been high. The influx of uprooted Albanian immigrants after 1990 gave the kiss of life to Greek agricultural production, by keeping wages and prices at a low level. Large numbers of these initially temporary labourers eventually settled in these areas and either brought over their families or married Greeks. Their presence demographically invigorated and profoundly transformed these areas (Kasimis et al. 2003).

An account, which seems to be typical of the hostile reception that many immigrant-origin children faced upon their arrival in Greek provincial towns, was offered by Lefteris. He is a quiet Albanian student of TEE with a stable and supportive familial environment. He is an excellent student and his aim is to study biochemistry. He explains that he does not need to work in parallel to schooling, for his parents "work hard to provide us with everything we need for our studies." He was born in Korçë, which is a small city of the Greek minority zone of southern Albania, and his family's faith is Orthodox-Christian, but their ethnic background is Albanian. His parents were forced to migrate when they lost all their savings, which had been invested on the 'pyramids'. Moreover, during the prolonged chaotic unrest, Lefteris was wounded by a hand grenade and was in need of hospital treatment. He recounts his early migratory experiences, when his family initially settled in a town in Central Greece.

---

meet and interact with natives and thus had more face-to-face experiences of discrimination (Kasinitz et al. 2004b: 11).

At the beginning there was a lot of racism around....The people's stance... In the primary school there was a lot of fighting. Greek boys used to beat us up. I remember that once we were playing football in the schoolyard. One of us kicked the ball over the yard fence. We weren't able to reach it. Immediately the whole school started to beat us up. 'Stupid Albanians' you know.... Another time we were playing in a nearby village. One of us scored a goal and immediately they attacked us by throwing stones... In Gymnasium things were better. We knew the language better, we knew how to behave, and things were better...

In Athens the climate was calmer. He reports that currently most of his mates are Albanians but he also has two or three Greek friends. However, earlier in the year, he and his best friend were thinking of leaving Greece for Italy. Edida, a female Albanian student of the same TEE school as Lefteris, had also initially settled in a small town and could thus compare immigrants' reception in Athens with that in the provincial areas:

Here, in Athens, people are cool. But in the villages they are not like this. We have lived in L. (central Greece). The people's attitude is hostile there. For example, if you are looking for a job, they ask where you come from. And if you are a foreigner they are very reserved. Even if they do hire you, you are in probation for a period, before they give you the job for good.

The more xenophobic attitude of people living in semi-urban or rural areas in comparison to those living in cities appears to be a universal pattern. According to EB and ESS findings, all forms of exclusionist attitudes were more prevalent among people living in the countryside (Coenders et al. 2004c: 23). The realities of rural racism in the UK has only recently attracted the concern of criminologists (Chakraborti and Garland 2004). It seems that in many English rural areas with low minority ethnic population density, 'low-level' harassment or less tangible forms of racism are a particularly common characteristic of the lives of minority ethnic communities (Malcolm 2004: 80). Those who have extensive interaction with migrants or ethnic minorities, namely the urban population, tend to be more open to strangers than people living in provincial towns or the countryside are. In rural Greece of the early 1990s, xenophobic sentiments were in the main triggered by the massive arrival of Albanian migrants. Frequently the manifestation of such sentiments was through the expression of mistrust towards foreigners, the fear of crime, and the demand

for stricter border control and local policing. In one of the few studies of immigration in rural Greece, Kassimis *et al* report that local people differentiate between that group of immigrants that have settled down and seasonal labourers. The latter were perceived by locals as unable to adjust to communities' norms and thus are the recipients of much hostility (Kasimis et al. 2003). On several occasions during the 1990s local authorities imposed night-time curfews on immigrants working temporarily in the farms, while villagers set up vigilante groups (Vidali 2007a: 862).

Thus, the treatment of those immigrant families who eventually stayed in small towns and villages acquired its own pattern. A number of interviewed Albanian students reported instances of an inclusive stance in the rural villages or small towns where their families stayed for some time upon their arrival. After a probationary period, Greeks 'adopted' these families, and in many cases employers or landlords either baptised kids and adults alike, or offered an orthodox-Christian wedding to couples who had been married in Albania by civil ceremony. The baptism of Muslim families in Roman Catholicism as a symbolic ceremony sealing their integration into the host society was also documented in South Italy (Zinn and Rivera 1995). Thus immigrants willing to 'fit in' to the local norms and values had to adopt various coping strategies. The Hellenisation of their names and the conversion to Orthodox- Christian faith are among some very common adaptation strategies (Hart 1999). No matter whether these adaptation strategies are instrumental or subversive to stereotypes, their effect is to facilitate migrants' assimilation into local culture. Thus, Fotis, a *Vorioepiotes*<sup>28</sup> student with roots in Yannena, observed that in this provincial town of Epirus:

....Albanians' behaviour is very different. There they are part of the society, they have been introduced into the Greek culture, and they are nice in company. Here in Athens it is enough to have eye contact with an Albanian kid in the street for an argument to erupt. In Yannena they don't even bother to look back at you.

Greek provincial communities are still characterized by close-kin social life, religiosity and an ethos of mechanical solidarity (Durkheim 1997 [1893]). It seems that after their introductory, not-rarely brutal confrontation with immigrants, local people leaned towards

---

<sup>28</sup> Ethnic-Greeks of Albanian nationality and Greek Orthodox Christian faith. They predominantly originate from the 'minority zone' to the south of Albania, where they were the majority of population.



a more inclusive and hospitable attitude. But hospitality in traditional settings, as cultural anthropologists have argued, is nothing less than a powerful mechanism which through the imposition of specific restrictions and obligations to newcomers initially incorporates them into a hierarchical framework and eventually harnesses their alterity (Herzfeld 1991: 81-129; Papataxiarchis 2006a: 2-7). A rich documentation of this articulation of exclusion/inclusion dynamics in rural Greece can also be found in the detailed life stories of Albanian immigrants that Nitsiakos collected (2003).

### **3.3.2 Inner-city lines of exclusion**

In central Athens the dynamics of xenophobia and exclusion seems to be subtler but, at the same time, the lines of ethnic segregation are more entrenched and with far reaching consequences. A baseline account of foreign-born youths' experience of mundane forms of prejudice was offered by Flabia, an ethnic-Albanian student born in Tepelenë. She states that personally she has never experienced racism. However, when I asked her "what has annoyed you most all these years you spent in Greece" she replied:

It's the rejection. Once, I remember, I was playing in the nearby park. A lady asked me where I came from. When she heard my reply she gave me a queer look and her behaviour changed immediately. Some other time we were playing in front of a house. A ball broke a window. "Who broke the window?" "The Albanian boy" went everybody immediately. But the particular boy was not even in the country at the time, because he was in Albania.

Many respondents, like Flabia, although well aware of xenophobic stereotypes had not reported any personal experience of aggressive racism. This was more frequently true among girls than boys. Christos, an ethnic-Greek student from south Albania, suggested an explanation for Albanian boys and girls' differentiated perception of racism, which probably holds true for other migrant groups as well:

Girls are always more cool than boys. Boys are more thin-skinned and more fanatical about nationalism. Girls do focus on their lives, their studies, and they don't engage in ethnic enmity.

Tamara, an excellent Lyceum student, who arrived from the FSU only five years ago made clear that ethnic tension and segregation in her secondary school, where a significant

minority are students of immigrant background, is only associated with the prejudiced stance of Greeks towards their Albania-born classmates:

I am lucky; I haven't experienced racism first-hand. But in general there is a lot of tension in the school. Even about a student with whom they grew up together, all the way from primary school and on Greek kids keep on saying: "He is an Albanian." I don't like the overtone when they say this. I believe that segregation is a situation specific to children from Albania. I have never faced this kind of attitude. For instance, black kids from Africa are never treated this way.

The other day, our teacher gave us in class a short-story by an Albanian writer<sup>29</sup> in order to see how their literature is. A Greek guy tore his copy in pieces and the teacher expelled him. The students from Albania said nothing, but I believe that they had been insulted. There is not everyday tension but I believe that there is deep segregation. I think that possibly Greeks look down on them. This is because Greeks pour scorn on Albania, as a country.

The contempt that many native students hold for their Albania-born classmates in part reflects Greek people's ambivalent stance towards neighbouring states. This ambivalence is related to the Balkan dimension of their own national identity, Greece's very Balkanness. Although nowadays Greeks show "no particular enthusiasm about their Balkanness", on the other hand they are not in denial of this dimension of their national identity (Todorova 1997: 44). However, "there has been historically an excess of superiority complex vis-à-vis the rest of the Balkans" maintains Todorova as far as Greeks are concerned. Such attitudes have their roots in the fact that Greece used to be central to the Balkan cosmos from the early nineteenth century and until WW II. Then, the country's severance from the rest of the Balkan Peninsula during the Cold War, its gradual integration into the European economy and institutions, and especially its accession to the European Union reinforced the Western side of national consciousness. The toppling of the authoritarian regimes and the abrupt reunification of the Balkan Peninsula in the early 1990s were received in Greece with mixed feelings. On the one hand, the fact that the very exposure to the forces of the free-market environment and western consumerist culture led the ex-communist Balkan states to economic collapse, societal breakdown and depopulation caused by mass out-migration, undeniably bolstered Greek national self-confidence. Initially these dramatic

---

<sup>29</sup> Tamara was referring to the well-known Albanian writer Ismail Kadare.

developments, which acquired the proportions of "liquidation of the real or symbolic dimensions of Balkan neighbouring states' sovereignty" (Kafetzis 1999: 25), were perceived as having a positive impact on Greece. The privileged position of Greece in the region was stressed by its relatively advanced economy, a stable democracy, and a sense of security stemming from its membership in various western institutions. Thus, immigrants arriving in Greece from Albania, Bulgaria, or Romania in the 1990s were typically treated scornfully, as representatives of the economically impoverished, and culturally retarded Balkan hinterland. Ventoura (2004: 196) borrows the Habermasian term "chauvinism of affluence" (1992) to describe such derogatory and exclusionist attitudes towards Balkan immigrants to Greece.

Nevertheless, in the long run, the very restoration of multifarious forms of exchange and mobility within the Balkan peninsula appeared as posing a threat to the exclusive position of Greece (Ventoura 2004). The phobias emanated from the concern that instead of Greece consolidating its European identity, it would become part of what Westerns understand as Balkan turmoil. On top of such 'existential' fears, the frightening element in the Balkan immigrants' image is that they mirror the host country's own fairly recent experiences of poverty, parochialism and large-scale labour emigration (Balakaki 2003: 220). Consequently, the rejection of immigrants should be seen as an attempt to repress the spectre of the country's recent backwardness, and concomitantly a confirmation of its newly acquired and still brittle European status (Ventoura 2004). All taken together, the antipathy towards Balkan immigrants had the form of zero-sum vertical status differentiation<sup>30</sup>: it is as if the imperilled prestige of Greeks depends on the inferiorisation of immigrants. Moreover, the perpetuation of the hierarchical relation between natives and immigrants is legitimised through an evolutionary narrative: because immigrants are assigned to an archaic phase of development, their treatment as inferior tends to become 'naturalized' and thus invisible in hegemonic constructions. Analogous instrumental discourses -denying Albanian immigrants any cultural specificity, and reducing them to replicas drawn from Italy's impoverished- past were documented in Italy by Mai (2002).

The implications that entrenched xenophobia and ethnic segregation have for ethnic-Albanian children were unceremoniously described by Jenan, a Lyceum student who was

---

<sup>30</sup> This way Malešević (2004: 26) rephrases Weber's interpretation of poor whites' racial antipathy towards black slaves in the southern states of US (1978: 391).

born in Tirana to Muslim parents. He expressed the resentment and alienation that many Albanian youth feel, but out of pragmatism or pride, prefer hiding:

Greeks' stance towards us is very important for how we Albanians feel in this country. I mean that it is not only the name calling that hurts, but the overall stance. In general Albanians feel like strangers and we will always feel this way. It is impossible not to be insulted or not react to people implying things about you.

### **3.3.3 The salience of the media stereotyping**

The possibility that some of the young immigrant respondents avoided mentioning unpleasant racist experiences to a Greek researcher cannot be ruled out. However, even those who didn't report first-hand experience or racist treatment or discrimination had something to say about the role of television. According to most interviewees TV's contribution to the construction of hostility between natives and immigrants is critical. The main theme in their criticism was the stigmatizing effect of the way that media portray immigrants. Because of this almost unanimous criticism of the media's role, it comes as no surprise that two of the Albanian respondents said that they don't like to watch TV at all, for they feel it propagates the stereotype of the criminal Albanian immigrant. Kostas, an Albanian-Greek student, born in Durrës, elaborated on the topic:

The TV influences a great deal the way people think about people of foreign nationality. This is the reason I'm not watching TV. Because they don't show the good things that Albanians do. They only show the bad things. They broadcast the bad stories because this is what people like to see. Bad stories sell more than good ones. So, if you are Albanian you are a bad guy by definition. But when people have contact with Albanians, when they talk with them, little-by-little their mind changes. They understand that there are bad and good Albanians. Like with all other peoples.

Negative stereotyping appears to be a universal method used by powerful groups for the selective exclusion of a particular group of outsiders. A classic example was offered in the study by Elias and Scotson of a suburban community in the English Midlands which received successive waves of internal migrants, mainly during WW II (1965). In the particular community, both established and outsider groups were working-class people of British nationality. Nevertheless, "the established group tends to attribute to the outsider

group as a whole the 'bad' characteristics of that group's 'worst' section... There is always some evidence to show that one's group is 'good' and the other is 'bad' ... Attaching the label of 'lower human value' to another group is one of the weapons used in a power struggle by superior groups as a means of maintaining their social superiority" (Elias and Scotson 1994: xix, xxi). To put it in Weber's broader terms, it is this way that the superior-status-group's sense of honour is sustained, this sense being "the conviction of the excellence of one's (ethnic group) own customs and the inferiority of alien ones" (Weber 1978 [1922]: 391).

In an era dominated by mass media and TV in particular, the damaging capacity of such universal methods of instrumental stereotyping has increased immensely, and thus it is difficult to overestimate their role in the process of stigmatisation of immigrants or minorities (Cohen 1972; McRobbie 1994). Even *Vorioepiotes* students who usually were very quick in blaming ethnic- Albanian youth as crime-prone, at the same time argued that the media never show "The human side, meaning the difficulties of a family that have come from Albania. They only show criminals, the ugly side of the story." It appears that, even ethnic-Greeks from Albania are significantly affected by the negative portrayal of Albanian immigrants. Yet, other Albanian students complained that the media disproportionately depict Albanians as criminal, and downplay other ethnic minorities' engagement in crime. Marco, an Albanian secondary school student, emphasised the power that TV has in shaping public opinion:

The mass media have done a great deal of harm during the 1990s. When a crime was described, the anchorman reported "it is certain that the perpetrator is Albanian. The owners of the house said that his use of the Greek language was poor." Such things left their stamp on people's mind. People watch the news every night, so the way media present things, shapes people's mind. A week latter, when another crime surfaced, people thought, 'he must be the same Albanian, or a compatriot of him'. But even if eventually it was proven that the perpetrator was Polish, Romanian or Russian, people never blamed Romanians or Russians. Their mind is stuck to Albanians. For instance, Sorin Matei<sup>31</sup>, the

---

<sup>31</sup> A Greek-Romanian convict, one of the most wanted criminals in late 1990s. After his last escape, and while being chased by police, Matei took hostage a family-of-four. The hostage crisis ended into bloodshed after his hand grenade went off following a clumsy police raid. Greece was shocked by the police fiasco that left behind one hostage dead and eight policemen injured, as well as by the curious death of Matei some days later in the prison hospital.

criminal who has done so much harm, was Romanian. But a Greek nationalist does not treat Romanian children the same way he would treat Albanians, if Sorin Matei was Albanian.

However, Albanian respondents' claim that the media stigmatises the criminal involvement of their own ethnic group at a greater extent than other immigrants is not confirmed by empirical research. Moshopoulou's meticulous study of the crime coverage of two major Greek dailies (2005) provided ample evidence of over-reporting of immigrants' engagement in criminal activities throughout the 1990s. According to Moschopoulou the portrayal of criminality of the two particular dailies holds immigrants responsible for three times more crime than the police statistics attribute to them for the same period. On the other hand, the study did not confirm the hypothesis of disproportionate and more unfavourable representation of Albanians in comparison with alleged perpetrators of other foreign ethnic-origin (Moshopoulou 2005: 426). However, in effect, the latter finding has little significance for the creation and reproduction of stereotypes, argues Moshopoulou. Since media tend to inflate the depiction of immigrant crime, and Albanians comprise the most numerous immigrant group in Greece, they frequently hold a central role in crime news.

Thus, the principal factor behind the consolidation of the stereotype of Albanian criminality and other interlocking fears is the sheer magnitude of the Albanian migration to Greece. The fact that, in a period of 15 years the number of Albanian immigrants in Greece reached 600,000, which roughly represents six per cent of the Greek population may, at least partly, explain why this particular migratory group was depicted by the native population as its 'constitutive Other' (Hall 1996b: 4).

Seemingly, the impact that the media stigmatisation has on Albania-born youths is not uniform. Most of the present study's respondents of Albanian ancestry, although not in denial of their compatriots' involvement in crime, never exhibited an obsequious attitude. Because of their relatively strong numerical presence in inner-Athens, they were felt confident enough to rebut xenophobic stereotypes imposed upon to them by mass media, and even to display their ethnic self-confidence. The counter argument that many Albanian respondents employed was best summarised by Kostas' dictum: "Like any other people, we also have bad guys amongst us."

Moreover, in these neighbourhoods where ethnic segregation is most entrenched, Albanian youth's response to media stereotypes has sometimes the character of harsh

retaliation. Achilles, a 17-year-old *Vorioepirotos* student describes the reaction of the Albanian children that arrived *en masse* in 1997:

These kids reacted very negatively to the way the media characterized them. At the end of the day they did not accept the friendship offered to them by Greek kids. The rivalry that media promoted eventually entered their psychology. I mean that the same way that the media made Greeks hate Albanians they also made Albanians hate Greeks.

Overall, what seems to be uniform is the young immigrant interviewees' description of the media as the principal agent responsible for the social construction of a demonised immigrant Other, and consequently for the proliferation of anti-immigration discourses. As in Italy (Mai 2005), in Greece also, most Albanian immigrants, mainly rely on the Greek TV in order to obtain information about their own ethnic group and to develop an understanding of their collective trajectory in the host country. Only a few young people reported having access to the Albanian satellite TV, and none referred to it as something relevant or contributing to their appreciation of current affairs.

Moreover, the fact that most Albanian youths I interviewed expressed an assertive and not ambivalent stance towards stigmatizing media-representations rebuts the possibility of stigma-inferiorisation, similar to what Mai observed at the level of collective consciousness of his Albanian respondents in Italy (2005)<sup>32</sup>.

---

<sup>32</sup> Italy is the second major location of Albanian migrant settlement, after Greece. At the end of 2003, there were 234,000 legally residing Albanian immigrants in Italy (Zinn 2005). Thus, the number of Albanians in Italy is roughly half the size of their population in Greece. Furthermore, the Italian population is five times greater than Greece. The lower concentration of Albanians in Italy, when compared with Greece and inner-city Athens in particular, is probably the major factor accounting for the immigrants' inability to rebut racist and xenophobic discourses in Italy. Moreover, because Italy, as a former colonial ruler of Albania, represented the "post-communist embodiment of Albanian's aspirational Westernness" (Mai 2005: 547), young Albanians appear more keen to measure themselves and their own group with the yardstick imposed by the particular host society. Their receptivity to the hegemonic discourses is more profound in the Italian case when compared with Albanians living in Greece, in the sense that Albanian immigrants' willingness to be integrated to the former host country is greater than to the latter.

### 3.4 Ethnic violence?

The only Greek study examining the extent of racist violence against immigrants and minorities is the one compiled by the National Focal Point for Greece of the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC & Baldwin-Edwards 2005). The major shortcoming of the study is related to the fact that data collection and monitoring of racial violence are almost non-existent in Greece, as the police do not separately record racial incidents or racist aggression. Thus, it comes as no surprise that some of the Greek detectives who were interviewed by Antonopoulos (2006a) claimed that it is not part of their duties to investigate whether racism is involved in cases of violent crimes against foreigners. Moreover, according to Antonopoulos most of the interviewed officers seem to believe either that "there is no such thing as racist violence in Greece" or that "racist violence is usually an act of natives' self-defence." Nevertheless, the limited available sources of information (mainly press and NGO data) allowed the EUMC report to reach the conclusion that racist serious "attacks on the person are not noticeably on the increase: in fact, the most serious incidents occurred in 1999" (Baldwin-Edwards 2005).

#### 3.4.1 The need for analytical disaggregation

Apart from the scarcity of police data, which is a Greek particularity, a perennial problem encountered by every investigation of racial violence is the problem of definition. In his UK study of violent racism, Bowling had to disentangle contesting definitions of his research topic; for each agency that is reporting on the intersection of violence and race conceptualises the problem differently (Bowling 1998: 3). The police, for instance, focus on racial incidents; other central or local government agents talk about racial harassment, attacks, or racist violence. Victim surveys, on the other hand, typically highlight isolated incidents rather than ongoing events.

However, the definitional complexity seems to be even more profound, and not only emanating from the different conceptual frameworks and discursive agendas that various agencies pursue. Bowling acknowledges that violence involving members of ethnic minorities is a complicated phenomenon, and that racist violence is only a specific form of it, which has manifest connections and overlaps with all other forms of violence. In order to overcome such conceptual difficulties he drew the analytical distinction between *racist violence* and *violent racism*. The first is a subcategory of violence and the second the



violent form of racism. Bowling's main concern is the second phenomenon (Bowling 1998: 13).

Another work relevant to this thesis is Desai's ethnographic study of Bangladeshi youths' conflict with rival youthful groups in north London. Desai engages in the study of a variety of forms of conflict, and unlike Bowling, his starting point is violence *per se*, not racism. Thus apart from racism, Desai also seeks to incorporate into his explanation of youth conflict other determinants of violence, namely aggressive and exclusive sentiments of territoriality and particular notions of masculinity (Desai 1999). With regard to group confrontations, Desai's handling of the term 'racist violence' refers to conflicts "which are expressive of, shaped, or legitimated by racist discourses." "Racialised violence, in contrast, is a broader term which refers to conflicts in which the actors involved perceive themselves as members of racialised groups and act upon this perception" (Desai 1999: 18).

Desai's definitional clarifications are relevant to the interpretive dilemmas of the present thesis. However, in Athens, the segregation of young people of immigrant ancestry is due to the construction of an ethnic rather than a racial boundary. Ethnicisation means then that immigrant youths' feelings of 'ethnic' belonging do not stem solely from their common descent. The ethnicisation of their group-membership is, to a large measure, imposed upon them by the natives' attempts to secure and defend a position of privilege (see Banton 2008). Furthermore, informants themselves use essentialised versions of ethnic identity, of which researchers are sceptical (Anthias 2002). In other words, their ethnic identity is shaped "partly by heritage and partly by racism and the political and economic relations between groups in the host country" (Modood et al. 1997: 9). Thus, the examination of the multifarious violent encounters between native young people and their non-national counterparts cannot be based on the folk concepts of either participants or other parties (Banton 2000; Wacquant 2002).

Out of such considerations, I follow the explicit call of scholars like Banton (2000), or Brubaker and Laitin (1998), who argue convincingly in favour of both the disaggregation of the phenomena usually lumped together under the term 'ethnic violence', and the adoption of a range of appropriate theoretical approaches. Thus, my attempt to do justice to the complexities detected in the field resulted in the following analytical distinctions and the corresponding causal schemata:

(1) The violent incidents most frequently reported by interviewed immigrant students and offenders, concern individual confrontations with Greek youngsters, in which *prima facie* racism does not appear to be the most important explanatory factor. Even if such violent incidents appear as 'ethnic' and build on the lexicon of racism, racism is not their cause. In analysing the respondents' forms of individual engagement in violence, the principal concern is to place them within the broader interpretive frames of social class, gender, and subcultures. The second part of Chapter 5 is devoted to this analytical task.

(2) A second category of violence concerns street fights between rival 'ethnic' groups of male youngsters. I refer to these forms of collective confrontations as *ethnicised violence*, for the perpetrators themselves act as if the putative ethnic difference is the source of violence. Obviously, this analytical category is distinct from 'ethnic violence', which is a category of practice<sup>33</sup>, produced and reproduced by social actors<sup>34</sup>. Against this background, the introduction of the term *ethnicisation* aims to avoid "the shift of political, social, power and similar conflicts to an ideological plane and, thus, the reduction of social-political complexity through the disregarding or further concealing of conflict sources" (Trubeta 2003: 99). As it has already been implied, the process of *ethnicisation* may be initiated by the dominant society, but it also involves the self-understanding of the affected group itself. The analysis of respondents' account of *ethnicised violence* is the aim of sections 3.4.2 & 3.4.3 that follow.

(3) Violent encounters between Greek and foreign-born youths, in which racism is the principal explanatory dimension in question, are also explored in the current chapter. Apparently, when the aggression is inspired and organised by the militant groups of the extreme-right the causal role of racism is undeniable. The role of far-right in orchestrating racist aggression against youths of immigrant background is examined below, in section 3.5.

<sup>33</sup> According to Bourdieu, 'categories of practice' is something akin to 'folk' or 'lay' categories, meaning categories of everyday social experience (Brubaker and Laitin 1998). Such emic conceptions have to be distinguished from the experience-distant categories used by sociological analysis of ethnic relations (Banton 2007).

<sup>34</sup> Among them are the perpetrators themselves who codify "the putative ethnic difference as being integral rather than incidental to the violence" (Brubaker and Laitin 1998: 428).

### 3.4.2 The spiral of reactions and the ethnicisation of violence

An incident of ethnicised group-fighting typically involves only school students, and both its set-off and culmination take place within the school-area or its surroundings. According to the foreign-born students of inner-city schools I talked to, these scuffles were not rare, since they tended to take place at least once every two-three months. However, the informants' perception is that in previous years they used to occur more frequently and to be more vicious. An estimation of the extent of violence that was perpetrated across 'ethnic' lines in its seemingly peak period of the late 1990s is offered by the V-PRC school survey, which was conducted in 1999 on behalf of the Greek Ministry of Education - General Secretary for Youth. According to the survey findings four out of ten students of secondary Athenian schools had witnessed violent fighting between students of Greek and foreign nationality (Artinopoulou 2004: 86). The vast majority of such incidents involved the 'oppositional pair' of ethnic-Albanians and native Greeks.

Fotis, the *Vorioepiotes* student, confirmed that fighting between Greek and Albanian students was at its peak during 1997-99 when he attended primary and lower secondary school (Gymnasium). Since he has thrown in his lot with the Greek side of the conflict, his account holds Albanians responsible for the incidents:

To tell you the truth I believe that Albanians are responsible for most of the punch-ups. They used to bring 10-20 guys outside the school and every afternoon we had a war-like situation. I remember that I used to return home with black and blue eyes, and my stomach sick because of the punches. So many kids became members of gangs for self-protection reasons. Well.. gangs: you can say companies, groups of mates, whatever. All serve the same need.

According to ethnic-Greek students who were born in Albania the roots of boys' engagement in such 'ethnic rivalry' games go back to the late 1990s and were the outcome of a surge in immigration from Albania. Many interviewees' accounts document the despair of Albanian immigrants and their children who lost everything in the 'pyramid' schemes of 1997 and experienced the subsequent upheaval and armed riots (Jarvis 1999; Korovilas 1999). A number of Albania-born respondents, who came to Greece after 1997, had either first hand experience of the civil disorder or had even been injured (a typical

case is the previously cited Lefteris). Most of them used the term 'war' to refer to the events that took place in Albania during the spring of 1997<sup>35</sup>.

It seems that at some point both native-born and *Vorioepiotes* students started to perceive the arrival of large numbers of conflict-ridden children from Albania as a threat. Achilles, a fervent *Vorioepiotes* student, voices the natives' narrative of 'invasion' around which 'ethnic' boundaries of exclusion were constructed. He is a highly achieving 17-year-old student who came from Albania with his family in 1990, as early as the Greco-Albanian border opened:

In 1997 when I was in the first year of secondary school things were really bad. At that time a large number of immigrants arrived, a huge wave. They were outraged because they had lost everything in Albania. They come from a rough situation, and some had brought guns with them. The kids had experienced this rough situation and were not able to settle down to a calm climate. They created problems. I remember that at noon we used to leave the school area immediately, because they used to come asking for money. We couldn't sit outside the school and talk because they were aggressive. They used to threaten even me, although I'm Albanian. They had classified me to the other side because my mates were Greeks. They attended the 1<sup>st</sup> year of secondary school but they had scant command of the language. Although they were so many of them, the school did not provide language support classes. So they kept repeating years. That was a very bad thing. Because they made their own circle, they were together all the time, and eventually they took to the streets. ...It was a war.

It is likely that this rhetoric of understanding of the problems that uprooted children were facing was part of a tactic of ethnic rival's pathologisation: the immediate response of Achilles' mates to the invasion of alleged 'problematic' foreigners was to close their ranks. Lampros, another *Vorioepiotes* student from the same school, gave a suggestive account of the Greek camp's trench-warfare tactics against Albanian male rivals:

They have been here for only 6 or 10 years and they believe that they can take us for a ride, dominate the people of this country, control this school. We are head-to-head. If I have an argument with an Albanian kid he will gather up all Albanians he knows, all ex-convicts. An Albanian kid, 12 years old, probably has a brother who knows the entire Albanian

---

<sup>35</sup> See Chapter 1.

mafia. They think that only they can do these things, but some day they might have the trouble they are asking for. They demonstrate a tough style and they think that we will receive smacks and chicken out. They threaten us, "I will burn your home." And I reply, "if you want it, I can give you my address." So, this is not a problem, because we are united like a fist. We have isolated the Albanians we have in this school. We told them you are in this side and we are in the opposite. We are not messing with you, and you are not messing with us. Otherwise, you will be in trouble. They know us, so they cause no problems any more.

#### ***The view of the ethnicised outsiders***

Students of ethnic-Albanian migrant background refuted such claims and put the blame for the initiation of hostilities on the provocative or abusive behaviour of their Greek schoolmates. Spyros, an ethnic-Albanian TEE student, described -in carefully neutral way- incidents of fighting with Greek kids. Firstly, he stated that neither he nor his Albania-born mates bothered much about such things. Then, he challenged the Greek side's allegations: according to his view, the fighting and clashes were part and parcel of newcomers' multifarious struggle for status parity with their native counterparts. He justified the choice of such drastic tactics by invoking the principles of agonistic<sup>36</sup> social interaction between men: "Even in the case you deal with a saint, you need to show some toughness." The saying reveals that notwithstanding their avouchment to the contrary Albania-born boys actually did care about fighting. The reason seems to be simple: their experiences in the host society had convinced them that they had to fight their way towards reciprocal recognition. An incident of group fighting typical of boys' agonistic rituals is the following one:

It happened a month ago, or something like this. We had played a football match, Greeks against Albanians, and the Greeks had lost. Then they started calling us names and the like. Two of them who were playing 'macho' went out of the school and told us: come out to 'talk' again. All the others stepped outside the school and so we had a fight with them.

However, not all forms of 'ethnicised' fighting remain within the relatively safe area of ritualistic confrontations of the school milieu. Occasionally, the accumulated tension erupts to large-scale and serious violent incidents. Christos, the Albania-born student who

---

<sup>36</sup> Contest-seeking, aggressive interactions between individuals.

attended another inner-city Lyceum, reported an incident of considerable severity. The street fighting started for unclear reasons outside the school's gate and continued at the nearby park with the participation of more young men in both rival groups.

They had a fight here, and immediately they decided to meet in the park, to settle the dispute. They used the mobile phones to spread the word, and in minutes they got the mob together. I saw many of them run towards the park, in a warlike rush. They had their fighting there, and the leader of the Albanians, a guy with a very 'bad' reputation, stabbed a kid. At this point the 'meeting' ended and all left, except for the stabbed kid. Fortunately, he survived.

Since Christos is a quiet boy who seems to detest all forms of violence, he strongly condemns the hatred that gears Greek and Albanian boys against each other:

All this is very brutal. To take a stick, a thick stick and hit the other guy on the head, or to take an iron rod and hit on the head it is the result of all this hating. Both sides have so much hatred! I see all this hatred and I can't understand how it was happened in the first place. For me, if you are 18 years old and you do such things, you are a criminal.

How then, do foreign-born students explain the eruption of ethnicised violence? An answer was offered by Emilio, a non-national student originating from central Albania, who like Christos also refrains from the Greco-Albanian 'games' of street-fighting. His account insisted on the irrationality of such violence. In order to emphasise the nonsensical nature of aggression he drew parallels with representations of English hooliganism that he was acquainted with through movies:

It is like the 'golden era' of hooliganism in England. If you were Manchester or Liverpool, the opposite team's fans were even likely to kill you. There they had huge groups fighting each other. You can say that it is the same here. Or better that the conflict between Greeks and Albanians is one step before this stage. Because we haven't reached the point when either an Albanian or a Greek kid might fear to come to school.

The most remarkable aspect of the analogy that Emilio drew is his need to resort to something as distant as the spectre of foreign hooliganism. Arguably, this reflects the remoteness of the academically oriented children of immigrant parentage from the

collective forms of violence that are perpetrated along the 'ethnic' boundary. As probably most other schoolchildren of their age, these respondents denounced the absurdity and brutality of ethnicised violence. Their perception of fierce street-fighting as novel is probably due to the fact that public aggression is not characteristic of either the ethos of inner-city schools or the local norms and traditions of inner-city neighbourhoods. It seems that in Athens the emergence of such forms of urban violence was accelerated by the ethnicisation of the conflict between established native youths and immigrant newcomers. Critical in this process was the particularly hostile climate towards young people of Albanian origin.

By 2005 it seemed that in most schools the warlike situation had abated. However, some interviewees asserted that in specific inner-city localities fighting between rival 'ethnic gangs', although less fierce, continued to happen, more-or-less every two or three months. Jenan's review of the state of affairs did not leave room for unfounded optimism. According to him, it is the deep-rooted hostility that leads to violence eruptions from time to time:

When we look at particular neighbourhoods we see that Greeks and Albanians always bear a grudge against each other. They both wait to see which side is going to make the next move. In general, an 'industry' of reactions is at work. One side stirs reaction by the other. Well, much of this is temporary. But if an Albanian guy does something wrong, nobody will say: "Well you know, Albanians are nice people, don't pay them back." Such a thing does not exist.

#### ***The response of the school community to ethnicised violence***

In the aftermath of the serious clashes that Christos recounted, the school's head-teacher imposed disciplinary sanctions against both the native and foreign-born students who engaged in the fighting. Actually, this was the only case during my two-year fieldwork that I became aware of a headmaster or other school-authority intervening in the course of conflict. This does not mean that teachers' attitudes are racist or xenophobic. On the contrary, all teachers I had the opportunity to talk to informally during the course of the two-year-long fieldwork gave me the impression that they lean towards the ideal of inclusive education and are distant from racist or xenophobic discourses. In addition, explicit racist ideas were unanimously condemned by all student interviewees. In my view,

this reflects the influence of the liberal curriculum and the overall tolerant and egalitarian ethos of Greek secondary schools.

Intriguingly, at the same time, most of the teachers appeared to be ignorant of the violent conflicts that took place in their own schoolyard. The more informed teachers stated that they simply were not able to deal with incidents of either 'ethnic' or racist violence, for they lack the means and the training. At this point it must be pointed out that only one out of three Athenian schools has access to psychological support services, and only two out of five metropolitan schools have access to supporting social workers (Kottaridi and Balasi-Adam 2006). Probably because of their perception of helplessness many teachers preferred turning a blind eye to problems associated with racism and ethnicised violence.

### 3.4.3 Correlates of ethnicised violence

The adoption of the analytical angle of *ethnicised violence* does not imply that rival groups of Greek and immigrant youths enjoy equal power-status. Apparently, immigrants' very position -as newcomers as well as the recipients of discriminatory or even racist treatment by the majority population- shapes a hierarchical relation between the two groups, which is omnipresent but not omnipotent. When the conditions allow it, the relation between dominant and subordinate groups of youths is contested by the latter.

#### *Location and timing*

It is thus important to stress the situational and contextual character of this study's findings as regards ethnicised violence. The previously presented confrontations were relevant to a particular phase of migrant settlement in central Athens and to the situational exigencies that flowed from nativist reactions. One all-important determinant of the observed forms of ethnicised violence is that during my fieldwork the proportion of foreign-born students in schools of central Athens was much higher than the national average. As the statistics in section 1.2 documented, in the most immigrant-dense neighbourhoods of inner-city, sometimes half of the lower-secondary school enrolment was of immigrant parentage. It is exactly from these neighbourhoods and these secondary schools that the sample of my own 2004-05 school survey was drawn and the interviewees of immigrant parentage were recruited. The proportion of foreign-born students in those upper secondary schools that were included in the sampling framework of my school-survey was 30 to 40 per cent (see



*Table 2.1*). The near balanced 'ethnic' composition of the surveyed schools has two critical consequences. Firstly, even in inner-city areas of the highest immigrant-concentration, schools are not immigrant ghettos and young people of immigrant background coexist and interact with students of Greek nationality. Secondly, the initial phase of this intense and multifaceted everyday interaction between approximately equally numbered groups of native and foreign-born youth encompasses the possibility of contest along ethnicised boundaries. Because of the previously mentioned situational and contextual factors I cannot confidently generalise the findings of this chapter from inner-city Athens to Greece as a whole.

#### ***The shifting power balance***

The role that the shifting power balance has for the contingency of conflict between newcomers and the natives is well established in the sociology of ethnic and race relations. In the theoretical essay introducing the second edition of 'the established and the outsiders' study, Elias pointed out that an overt and prolonged conflict between groups of established and outsiders is usually triggered by an asymmetrical power balance that is shifting in favour of the outsiders (Elias and Scotson 1994: xxxi). The reason is that less uneven power relations critically undermine the inferiorisation of the outsiders (Mennell 1994: 183). By way of contrast when the power differential between the two groups is great and uncontested, the tension remains quiescent (Elias and Scotson 1994: xxxi).

Elias' insightful observation that conflict is contingent on a particular configuration of the power relations is reminiscent of the Chicago school legacy and more specifically of the work of Robert E. Park and his 'race relations cycle'. Park's model of race relations encompasses the tensions and adjustments that follow the entrance of migrants in metropolitan areas (Park and Hughes 1969 [1921]: 574). The 'race relations cycle' was seen by Park as a universal, progressive and irresistible process (Malešević 2004: 67). The cycle includes an initial phase of racial or ethnic competition which frequently evolves to conflict. Later, according to the model, accommodation and assimilation might follow, when ethnic groups' relations reach a new point of equilibrium. (Solomos 2003: 15; Solomos and Back 2000: 110). Despite the normative limitations of the second half of his model, Park's view of race relations was -in principle- not essentialist or naturalistic. The significance of Park's 'race relations cycle' to the effort of this study to explain immigrant youth's reception in inner-city areas is mainly related to the timing of the peak period of

conflict<sup>37</sup>. In the light of Park's developmental model, the intense collective violence along ethnic lines that were observed during 1999-2000 might be understood as the temporal outcome of 'ethnic' groups' initial contact. During this phase immigrant youths were fighting their way to secure their position in school, neighbourhood, and Greek society at large.

In short, the situational and contextual character of 'ethnicised violence', are related to the concentration of immigrants in inner-city areas and the phase of initial contact of immigrants and natives. Already towards the end of my fieldwork, most evidence appeared to support the conclusion that most fierce instances of 'ethnic' conflict belonged to the past, and that the agenda of the day for most immigrant youth had shifted to individual striving for upward mobility, either in school or workplace.

#### **External sources of ethnicisation**

The qualitative material presented suggest that a "guerrilla warfare" is waged between established sections and "socially produced outsider groups of the younger generation" (Elias and Scotson 1965:112). The asymmetrical and shifting power relations between established and outsiders constitute the principal dynamics responsible for group fighting and other confrontations that have been described. However, almost always the contest between newcomers and established sections of the youthful population, most notably between young Greek nationals and Albania-born immigrant youths, takes on ethnic coloration. In other words, the process of *ethnicisation* builds upon and frequently overrides the latent dynamics of power and status contest. *Ethnicisation* prevails for the rival groups of youths in order to consolidate their boundaries draw from the cultural resources of the Balkan ethnoscape (Appadurai 1990) and the imagery of contesting nationalisms. It is as if the Balkan patterns of identity formation were superimposed over the inner-city figuration of power differential between established and outsiders. This Balkan dimension is especially important in explaining the conflicts between Greeks and Albanians.

Hence, appears to be particularly relevant the *segmentary opposition* model of collective identification, which according to anthropologist Laurie Hart defined the Greco-Albanian relations in the multiethnic geographical regions of Epirous and West

---

<sup>37</sup> More elaborated explanations of the timing of racial violence, based on 'competition' and 'power-threat' perspectives are presented by Olzak (1992: 113).

Macedonia, where the two ethnic populations used to live either together or in close proximity until the first quarter of 20<sup>th</sup> century (1999: 201). According to the Greek anthropologist Papataxiarhis (2006a: 28) within the logic of *segmentary opposition* the collective identity of a group is constructed through an explicit and oppositional reference to other neighbouring groups, with whom it is bounded through relations of affinity and interdependency. In my view, the *segmentary opposition* models pins down agonistic interactions that rely on conflict in order to resolve issues of identity through the maintenance of relevant boundaries. The key role of conflict within these forms of interaction make them sociologically relevant to the previously presented forms of *ethnicised* violence. Findings specific to the influence of such mechanisms are presented in the next chapter and section 4.2.3 which discusses the legitimacy of the ideal of romantic nationalism.

#### ***The irrelevance of localism***

On the contrary, other territorial dimensions of ethnicisation -that the relevant Anglo-Saxon literature suggests- do not emerge as significant in Athens. An ethnographic study that shaped the sociological understanding of violent conflict between youths belonging to rival ethnic group is Suttles' work on Chicago's area in transition (1968). The study builds upon earlier Chicago School research of the impoverished urban areas undergoing massive transformations in the ebb and flow of immigrant ethnic groups. According to Suttles' explanatory scheme of 'ordered segmentation', street corner groups of co-ethnic young men consider particular areas as their territory and treat same-age members of other neighbouring ethnic groups as enemies. Of principal importance for the articulation of ethnicity with territory is the spatial segregation of migrant ethnic minorities. Ghettoisation is a perennial feature of North American large metropolises that still fuels racial or ethnic tension (Gans 1997; Wilson 2003; Wilson and Taub 2006). In the UK context interlocking discourses of localism and lower class masculinity were considered by many scholars as cultural resources responsible for much of the observed racist or racialised violence (Cohen 1993; Desai 1999; Webster 1996; 1997). However, the dense geography of Athens, its rather unvarying urban nexus, and in particular its patterns of intermixing of social classes, native and immigrant populations limit the explanatory usefulness of such theoretical schemata. Instead of "nationalisms of neighbourhood" (Cohen 1988; Cohen 1993) the prevailing forms of territoriality that underpin ethnicised violence between native and

immigrant youth in Athens are rather the effect of loyalties to national soils than the expression of affection to urban localities.

### **3.5 The role of the racist groups of far right**

Several UK studies have shown that violent racism is patterned rather than random (Desai 1999; Hesse et al. 1992; Webster 1996). In Athenian inner-city neighbourhoods and schools, the factor that appears to be responsible for the exacerbation of violence across 'ethnic' lines is related to the role of the racist groups of the far-right. In districts and schools where racist groups are present 'ethnic' hostility appears to be more entrenched and outbursts of violent racism are more frequent and vehement. However, according to interviewees' accounts, even in these areas outbursts of aggressive racism provoked or perpetrated by far-right militants are neither a pervasive nor an everyday phenomenon. A large-scale example of such racist aggression was the violent attacks against celebrating Albanians that followed the football game between the national teams of Albania and Greece (an examination of the role of far-right in those vicious incidents is provided in Chapter 4). Obviously, the recognition of the rarity of such manifestations of pure racism does not deny the fact that violent outbursts draw from the resources of pervasive xenophobia and vernacular racist imagery, and that they have far-reaching consequences, for they create long-lasting grievances.

According to Baldwin-Edwards (2005: 11), the main extreme-right groups that were active in Greece in mid-2000s were Golden Dawn (GD), Front Line, and Greek Front. GD is the largest group with an estimated 300-strong membership, and a combination of neo-fascist and ultra-nationalist ideological references. Despite its small organisational basis, the GD's candidate who participated in the 1996 local elections under the platform 'Athens a Greek city' was supported in the municipality of Athens by one and half per cent of the electorate. However, in particular inner-city localities, with historical right wing political affiliations, far-right groups have deep local roots and enjoy support that exceeds the average electoral representation. The elevated appeal of far-right xenophobic politics in the particular neighbourhoods is to a certain extent based on a *community degeneration* discourse (for similar findings see Back 1996: chapter 2; Webster 2003). The factual basis of this discourse is the decay of those inner-city neighbourhoods which in the 1950s enjoyed an upper middle class allure. It seems that some earlier residents attribute the degeneration of community (meaning the long process of urban environment's decay and

the immiseration of life in inner-city) to the recent 'invasion' of foreigners. It is certain that the decline of the particular neighbourhoods had started much earlier than the 1990s and the large-scale arrival of immigrants. According to the literature presented in section 1.2 the deteriorating transformations have been initiated in the 1970s when upper middle class strata started to move towards the suburbs of the city.

On the whole, in the late-1990s the handy scapegoating of migrants for all inner-city evils enabled the far-right to launch a large-scale hate campaign in the particular neighbourhoods. Marco recounts the period when his school was demarcated as a GD's territory:

Those years we had students coming to school with shaved heads, and on every wall of the school we had graffiti of Golden Dawn. Actually they had written the group's name above school fascia and they had also painted a swastika on the basketball court.

Such craving for real or symbolic control of the 'terrain' is symptomatic of the group's paramilitary logic. The foundations of the group's influence were the realm of populist xenophobia but it was only through the provocative manipulation of 'ethnic' violence that GD thrived. Through a politics of fuelling violence and promoting ethnicisation the group not only bolstered its legitimacy but also advanced recruitment. Lampros, the ethnic Greek from Albania, who was keen to justify the action of GD gives a description of the battle field, which seems to have been the busiest during the 1999-2001 period:

Each group was made up of four or five students. They used to start arguments in school and then they went out to fight. They were fighting for no reason at all. Just because one group were foreigners and the other racists. I've heard that in some instances fighting involved screwdrivers, or knives. That was one year ago. Now things have relaxed. Probably because these GD kids have graduated. However, the group still have members among students but things are not that bad anymore.

Other immigrant students confirmed the estimation that the golden days of the racist group have been over since 2002. Spyros, the Albanian TEE student commented:

Nowadays, kids do not follow them anymore, at least as they used to. Some students are actually against them. For instance, I know Greek students who say 'I love my country' and they wear in the school T-shirts with the Greek flag on them. But they say I can't stand

Golden Dawn nerds.... They say, there is no room for fascists in the school. Whoever wants to play it tough and likes rows must go outside the school.

Thus, with regards to violent racism, students' social environment appeared to be penetrated by the two contesting influential narratives: the one stemming from the formal curriculum and overall school ethos and the other from the vernacular discourses of 'neighbourhood degeneration' and 'alien invasion'. Because of the former set of influences even the most fervent anti-Albanian *Vorioepiotes* students felt obliged to mention that they see extreme-right groups as an unwanted presence into school, for all the upheaval they create. At the same time because of the entrenching of 'ethnic' polarisation they frequently looked forward to those groups, as an external reserve, useful for the case that their rivalry with 'purely' Albanian students would escalate out of control. Typically their threat towards rival Albanian students was: "Behave or we'll bring in the Golden Dawn."

Since the school's context and overall ethos is not tolerant of the racist ideologies and the hate campaign of the extreme-right, it appears that these groups transferred the centre of their activities to neighbourhood streets. This way the schools became quieter places but the mobilisation of racist radical right had an impact on the social geography of entire neighbourhoods<sup>38</sup>. Jenan described one of the organised racist operations against a cultural gathering of Athenian Albanians, which happened in tube station of central Athens:

Here, Golden Dawn is always doing things against Albanians, like attack them when they come out of the trains. For instance, that happened once when people were returning from a concert of Albanian singers, one of those taking place in Athens every now and then. GD attacked them in Victoria station. They beat them up despite the fact that they were old people, women, and children with them.

---

<sup>38</sup> As I write the conclusions of this thesis, it appears that the focus of racist groups' 'hate campaign' has moved towards the western 'working class' boroughs of Athens. This shift is relevant not only with the described decline of racist aggression's legitimacy in the neighbourhoods of central Athens which in the 1990s became settlement areas for Albanian and other migrants from former communist states, but also with the development of new migratory inflows and settlements. In 2008-09 became clear that militant racism started to attacking the smaller and thus more vulnerable groups of recently arrived migrants, of Pakistani or Afghan origin and Muslim faith. This probably represents a tactics of taking advantage of to the gradual concentration of Asian migrants in some parts of central-western Athens, and the emergence in the urban landscape of new forms of xenophobia and racism.

It is reasonable to assume that the perpetration of such large-scale racist attacks would be impossible without the tolerance of the police forces at the local level. Or at least this seems to be the assumption of all engaged parties, both Albanians and GD sympathisers. Achilles' description of a GD retaliatory attack against an Albanian café provides some support to this hypothesis.

I think that the owner of this café is an Albanian or a *Vorioepiotes*. Anyway, two years ago the place was raided by members of the Golden Dawn. They were armed with clubs. They smashed chairs and everything, broke some heads, and arrested the leader of foreigners. Then the police arrived but as I was told, they covered up the members of the Golden Dawn (laughs).

A rather typical instance of racist attack in neighbourhood streets is the one that happened to Enrit, an ethnic-Albanian Lyceum student. He also referred briefly to immigrant youths' counter-mobilisation:

E: In our neighbourhood there is more than one racist group. One night on my way to visit a friend I got chased by a group of racists -with the full weight of the term. They were 10 guys and one of them recognised me. They belong to a racist group, something like the Golden Dawn. I can't recall the name of their group, because there is more than one racist group here. Members of these groups are children not only from my school but also from other neighbourhoods. One night they met a friend of mine outside his home. They attacked him and beat him up. He ended in hospital with broken bones.

*PP: Is there any Albanian group that has been formed in defence to such attacks?*

E: Yes, there is one or two groups. In one of them also Greeks participate. The second is made up of Albanian young people exclusively. They come from many city-centre neighbourhoods. Most of them are school-age kids; Fourteen to seventeen years old. However, I am out of all these, 'cos I don't like trouble.

One has to bear in mind that, according to all available evidence, efforts of collective resistance on the part of ethnic-Albanian youth appeared to be rudimentary and rather short-lived. In this sense, there is little in common with young Asians' forms of resistance and vigilantism in the north of England, that Colin Webster observed (1996; 1997). Jenan gave his explanation on the reasons restricting Albania-born youths' collective mobilisation

against racism and their preference for individualised or even counter-action and revenge tactics:

More or less we remain static, meaning there is no massive reaction from our side. But two or three guys might do something really bad to one of those responsible for the attacks. Not many of them, just one. Like I know one, "I will go tomorrow and break his car, burn his house", many things might happen, but not massive action. Because we are in a foreign country, and we are not able to do many things.

Notwithstanding the soundness of Jenan's argument pointing to the difficulties stemming from an overall negative societal environment, it is still difficult to understand the absence of Albanian collective forms of resistance to racism. Additional light on the issue is thrown by Mai's study of the associations that Albanian youths formed in Italy in order to confront stigmatisation (2005: 256). According to Mai, the limits of all Albanian initiatives at the collective level are mainly related to the preference of Albanian immigrants for individualised life trajectories and adaptation strategies, which by its turn emanates from the rejection of the communist-era experience of enforced and abusive collectivism.

### **3.5.1 The extent of immigrant victimisation**

The acknowledgement of the serious and deleterious impact of the neo-fascist groups' activities must not lead us to write off all racist attacks as the work of such organisations. The Greek dailies occasionally report incidents of violent crime against immigrants perpetrated by native individuals, whose motivation is racist beyond reasonable doubt. For instance, the infamous case of P. Kazakos who, in October 1999, randomly shot at migrants in the streets of Athens, resulting in two dead and seven injured. His motivation was, as he stated in court, that he hated foreigners (Baldwin-Edwards 2005: 20). Nevertheless, references to racist attacks or other forms of racist harassment perpetrated by individuals or groups of Greeks who were not related to right-wing groups were very rare in young immigrant informants' accounts. It seems that attacks of such nature are not common in young people's everyday ethnicised interaction.

At this point it is useful to bear in mind the relatively low prevalence of violent victimisation in Greece, when compared with other European societies. A confirmation of this reality was offered by the European Crime and Safety Survey (EU ICS) of 2004. The



employed methodology made use of interviews with householders, which were carried out via telephone (Van Dijk et al. 2005). According to the survey's findings the last-year victimisation rate for assaults and threats in Greece was 2.4 per cent. The proportion of respondents who reported that they had been a victim of an assault with force or a threat of force in the year preceding the survey in the UK was twice the Greek rate (5.4 per cent).

Moreover, violent victimisation by strangers is also rare among students of Greek secondary schools. Only two per cent of the 2003 UMHRI school survey's respondents reported a lifetime experience of such violent attack by a stranger. The proportion of Albanian students who have been attacked by a person unknown to them was much higher (5.5 per cent) and the difference from their Greek counterparts significant at the 0.005 level. Nevertheless, it remains unclear, whether the extent of Albanian students' violent victimisation is the consequence of racist violence or the outcome of life-circumstances related to the very nature of undocumented migration, exposure to street-life, or even intra-ethnic victimisation. Of equal concern are the EU ICS findings that are related to ideologically motivated crime against immigrants. Respondents who identified themselves as immigrants were asked whether they had fallen victim to any crime because or partly because of their nationality, race or colour, religious belief or sexual orientation (Van Dijk et al. 2005: 52). Greece was found to have the second highest rate of 'hate crime' against immigrants (almost 14 per cent).

However, according to the qualitative findings of this chapter, the situation of inner-city migrant communities of Athens as regards violent racism is not comparable with that of London. The pervasiveness of racial attacks and other forms of abuse against the ethnic migrant communities of London's East End has been documented by several studies (Bowling 1998: chapter 7; Sampson and Phillips 1992: 7). For instance, repeated incidents of racist violence committed spontaneously by groups of local young people under the form of hate arsons, stone throwing, threatening, or attacking strangers appear to be relatively absent from the everyday life of immigrant-origin youth and their families in central Athens. To accept that the extent of violent racism in Athens is lower than in other European metropolises is not to say that a harmonious coexistence of ethnic groups prevails. It rather constitutes a linear extension of Greece's lower rates of violent crime and victimisation. The potential for an escalation of violence is ever-present and the section of the next chapter on football related racist violence provides a suggestive example.

### **3.6 Conclusions**

Elias and Scotson contend that the 'established' against 'outsiders' dynamics, which they studied in a small community of the English Midlands, provides a universal framework for the understanding of the exclusionary stance of the ruling native majority towards power-inferior immigrants, foreigners, or newcomers. The common feature of all these cases is that although people appear just to move physically from one place to another, in fact they always move from one social position to another (Elias and Scotson 1965: 157). When the migrants have different skin colour or other physical characteristics the problem is usually discussed from the angle of 'race relations'. When newcomers are of different nationality from the earlier residents most sociologists trace problems of 'ethnic minorities'. But all these problems are simply "established-outsider relationships of a particular type" and their understanding is in the main a comprehension of changes in power differentials. For the socio-dynamics of these groups' relations is not due to their individual characteristics, but is determined by the "manner of their bonding" (Elias and Scotson 1994: xxx). The Eliasian sociology with its focus on the figuration of asymmetrical and shifting power relations between established and outsiders, appears as an appealing overarching conceptual framework for the interpretation of the tensions and conflicts that were part and parcel of the phase under examination of interaction between native and immigrant youths. Additional, and in essence derivative explanations, highlight specific aspects of the examined established-outsider relationship, namely the role of national geopolitical anxieties, and the impact of discourses of invasion and degeneration at the national and local level.

The appropriateness of the Eliasian perspective in explaining the patterns of anti-migrant hostility in contemporary Greece could also be substantiated via the historical examination of the negative experiences that preceding migratory populations had upon their arrival in Greece. The only significant antecedent, comparable in scale with the 'new immigration' of the 1990s, concerns the influx of ethnic-Greek refugees who fled from Asia Minor in 1922 (see section 1.1). The conditions that refugees faced upon their arrival have analogies with those that 1990s immigrants encountered. They were compelled to take unskilled jobs, exploitation was rife and wages very low (Hirschon 1988:39). Very soon Asia-Minor-refugees were associated with negative stereotypes. The most usual form of native abuse was to call them as 'sons of Turks' or simply 'Turks', despite the fact that they had the same religious faith and ethnic consciousness as the natives. Moreover, in

many rural areas the hostility of the native peasants and economic conflict mainly over land distribution, soon led to open clashes and in some cases to violent attacks against refugees, and their property. (Katsapis 2003; Kontogiorgi 2006:175). Thus, Elias' contention that the relations between established and outsiders essentially are not ethnicity-specific, but in all cases share a common denominator of instrumental inferiorisation and exclusion is further validated by the negative aspects of Asia Minor and Easter Thrace ethnic-Greek refugees' reception in interwar Greece.

Nevertheless, it is also clear that the adoption of a pure 'rational action' approach<sup>39</sup> is unable to provide a comprehensive explanation of ethnic phenomena (Malešević 2002) for it is by definition insensitive to the multifarious historical and discursive roots of ethnicised conflicts. Elias himself did not claim that his theoretical framework was all-embracing. Because of his seminal work in the field of historical sociology Elias was in a position to discern that the contribution of history and culture was not adequately captured by the 'established-outsider' analytical model. He admits that group affective experiences and fantasies, which sometimes appear as 'protean historical phantoms', are "neither rational or irrational" and in any case they have "a structure and dynamics of their own" (Elias and Scotson 1994: xxxvi). Thus, the additional analytical angle that is imperative to call in, for the analysis of ethnicised conflict and violence, is the one of nationalism. The role of nationalism has been mentioned in the present chapter in relation to the process of ethnicisation of the conflict between native and immigrant youth. It is the process of *oppositional segmentation* which eventually shapes a pair of oppositional nationalisms. However the issue of nationalism *per se* is properly discussed in the chapter that follows.

Finally, also significant are the findings suggesting that in Athenian inner-city neighbourhoods and schools the exacerbation of violence across 'ethnic' lines is frequently related to the role of the racist groups of far-right. However, it seems that the most serious forms of ethnicised violence and most vicious incidents of racism were also the outcome of the initial phase of interaction between native and immigrant populations which was determined by widespread xenophobia, 'ethnic' segregation, and the workings of vicious cycle of reactions. In 2005 when I was towards the end of my fieldwork all evidence indicated a phase-shift in the process of immigrants' settlement into the Greek society and central Athens in particular.

---

<sup>39</sup> Brubaker and Laitin (1998) distinguish between rational action and culturalist approaches in the study of ethnic confrontations.

---

## Chapter 4

### Negotiating Identifications and Long-Term Prospects

---

#### 4.1 Youth, migration, identity

This chapter examines a host of factors that emerged as significant for the formation of the foreign-born youths' nature and extent of identification with their ethnonational origin. It also examines their perception about how they fit in their new societal context.

It has to be stressed, right from the outset, that a process of identity formation is paramount for all youths: they have to discover who they are and where they would like to belong (Erikson 1968). Moreover, a process of 'becoming' is also inherent in the migratory experience. Immigrants and their children face restricted and uncertain life-circumstances, an unfamiliar linguistic and cultural context; in their effort to 'appropriate' any available social space, unavoidably engage in new goals and dilemmas (Morawska 1985: 3). Eventually, within particular situational, normative, historical, and material constraints they deal with the performance of identity (Hall 1996a). Thus, the resolution of identity issues is even more puzzling for adolescents of immigrant parentage. It is within this ongoing complex developmental process that foreign-born youths' ambiguities and certainties of allegiance and identification have to be understood.

Moreover, ethnic identification is not the outcome of detached immigrant youths' self-understanding. Frequently, factors external to the individual result in an imposed identification (Waters 1990). Prominent among such external factors are the negative attitudes of natives towards particular migrant groups, which in effect impose ethnic labels on them synonymous to a subordinate status. On the other hand, immigrant youths' self-identification does not simply reflect the dominant stereotyping. On the contrary, immigrant-origin youth demonstrate their agency through identity strategies intending to counter inferiorisation, to subvert stereotypes, and advance individual and group status.

However, the attitude of the native majority remains of critical importance. Despite common oversimplifications, the stance of the Greek society towards immigrants and their offspring was not uniform in the early 2000s. The multitude of societal attitudes included two polar opposites that appeared as particularly significant for the negotiation of

immigrant-origin youths' identification: at the one end one recognises the forces that favour assimilation and at the other end of the spectrum those that further their exclusion and marginalisation. The examination of the role these opposites have for the framing of foreign-born youths' identities is attempted through the presentation of two sets of events. The first relates to the outburst of racist violence that followed a football match between the national teams of Albania and Greece in September 2004. Arguably, this set of events stands out as one of the worst confrontational experiences that youths of Albanian parentage have encountered at the collective level. The scale and severity of the incidents calls for the examination of the way that young informants of Albanian origin interpret their cause and evaluate the impact they have on their collective status.

The other set of incidents occurred within numerous schools during the 1990s and early 2000s, and was relevant to the reaction of Greek students against those Albanian schoolmates, who were elected to carry the Greek flag in commemorative parades, for their academic excellence. Here the question posed to immigrant informants, but also to the Greek society at large, goes beyond the flag issue *per se* and is about the criteria ascribing membership to the Greek nation. Hence, the flag-encounters also shed light on Albanian youths' stance towards other important issues: their prospects and the way they make sense of it.

## **4.2 The football terrain as the touchstone of national allegiances**

Arthur Koestler, who was born in Hungary but emigrated to the UK and was eventually granted British nationality, argues that there are two types of patriotism (Kapllani 2006a). One is related to the identification with the society in which you live while the other, which constitutes the strongest identification, is the patriotism of football. Cricket is not a different case, at least for Commonwealth people. Thus, in the 1980s, Norman Tebbit, a British Conservative parliamentarian, suggested that all immigrants to UK must pass through a cricket test of their loyalty to Britain (Solomos 2003: 212). The rationale of such tests remains highly contestable: Koestler for instance, although proud of being a British citizen, was a firm supporter of the Hungarian national football team. Likewise, contemporary British Asian youths although explicitly emphasising their Britishness, shift their allegiances when the Indian or Pakistani cricket team arrives in the UK (Modood 2005: 470)

Many of the immigrant youngsters I interviewed, had to decide, in analogous situations, which allegiance was stronger for them. And, as with Koestler and British youths of Asian ancestry, for many of them the bond with the birth country was irresistible when a football game was involved. Both Kostas and Spyros are students born in Albania, by an ethnic-Greek father and an Albanian mother. Both have Greek names and are orthodox-Christians. They declared that their nationality is Albanian, and that they support the Albanian team when it plays against Greece. The arguments they offered in explaining their support were almost identical. Spyros expressed their point of view most clearly: "I supported Albania. In football, it is reasonable to support your birth country. Even if they don't know how to play the game at all, you support them."

But even Vladimir, the Pontian student from Georgia, who aligns with Greeks when they fight with Albanian youths, and was the one who told me that "the school would be a much better place if all students were Greeks", still feels that football is beyond contextual or tactical allegiances. For instance when the Greek national football team was playing with Russia he supported the latter. He sounded somehow apologetic: "I liked the Russian team more. Well, you know, I am used to Russians. You know how it is..."

On the other hand, Anna, a *Vorioepiotes* TEE student originating in southern Albania, does not engage in such subtle ambiguities. She has been in Greece for 15 years and her impeccable mastery of the language as well as her style and dress-code make her indistinguishable from her trendy Greek girlfriends. Since she is a girl -hence not supposed to be interested in football- but also a sprinter she was able to develop an argument invoking athletic spirit in order to distance herself even further from any reference to Albania:

What happened after the Greece-Albania match was really bad... They put other things above athletic spirit, meaning the problems between Greece and Albania. I support a team not on the basis of where I come from. I only support the best team. So I supported Greece, for the team was better.

It seems that Anna's posture is typical for many female immigrants to Greece, not necessarily or exclusively of ethnic-Greek background. Ethnic-Albanian girls that I interviewed avoided references to the problematic aspects of interethnic relations and were talkative only about their activities, friendships, academic issues and plans. According to Besevegis and Pavlopoulos' (2006) study of immigrants' acculturation and adaptation

strategies, female immigrants were willing to a greater extent than males to cut ties with the culture of mother country and to seek assimilation into Greek society. Male immigrants of all national backgrounds were found more likely to adopt a strategy of adaptation revolving around the preservation of their ethnonational identity .

#### **4.2.1 Arenas of contesting nationalisms**

It is well known that because of their mass appeal international sporting events have always been an important arena for the confirmation of national identities. International football matches in particular, since their institutionalisation during inter-war, both inculcated national feelings and provided a 'safety-valve' for national tensions, which were to be harmlessly dissipated in symbolic pseudo-struggles (Hobsbawm 1992: 143). This function of sports in relation to nationalism builds upon their more mundane purpose as a socially approved conduit for the expression of collective aggression (Elias and Dunning 1986: 84-90). Hence, the metaphoric resonance of war and football is frequently prevalent in both media discourses and lay imagery (Bishop and Jaworski 2003). The football game, that took place in October 2004 between the national teams of Greece and Albania, as part of the 2004 World Cup tournament, was not an exception. Yet, the event and its aftermath offered a yardstick to gauge the salience of ethnicised conflict in youthful milieus and the importance of ethnic allegiances for both native and Albanian-born youngsters. My understanding of what followed this particular game is that it didn't only operate as a spark that allowed the outburst of the latent conflict along ethnic lines but that it was also marked as a turning point for the formation of ethnicised identities.

The summer of 2004 was a landmark for the history of Greek football. Against all odds, the national team won the European Football Championship for the first time. The entire nation was mesmerised by the onward march of the Greek national team and when the final victory came on 4 July 2004, large jubilant crowds thronged the streets of Athens and all other major cities. As many commentators highlighted, the victory offered the opportunity of a symbolic overcompensation to an imperilled national pride and depressed national mood. By being a Euro Cup champion Greece deceptively appeared to have favourably resolved its historical difficulties and ambivalences towards its incorporation to Europe<sup>40</sup>.

---

<sup>40</sup> In a like manner, a perennial aim of national football in neighbouring Turkey (Kozanoglou 1999: 121) is to prove the country's might against hegemonic West, and Europe in particular.

Such functions of sports are not limited to the South-East periphery of Europe, a *locus classicus* of ethnic nationalism. The dependency on sports for the reinforcement of ethnic bonds and national self-esteem is equally strong within countries normatively typified as belonging to the realm of civic nationalism<sup>41</sup>. For instance, the cricket triumph of England over Australia in 2005, and the celebrations that followed led Gilroy to observe Londoners' "deep yearning for restored greatness" (Gilroy 2006)<sup>42</sup>, a craving almost identical with the one manifest in Athens, the evening of 4 July 2004.

It comes as no surprise then, that the defeat of the Greek football team by the national team of Albania, which came only a few months after the Euro triumph, not only deflated the illusions of grandeur, but even worse, was felt as having the proportions of a national catastrophe. From the outset the Tirana football stadium, where the match was played, hosted a range of tensions linked one way or another to the two countries' turbulent bilateral relations. Arguably, at the particular match the Greeks were eager to defend the recent precious national achievement against an opponent that was perceived as inherently inferior and primitive, representing a hardly existing nation. After all in the 1990 meeting of the two national football teams the Greek fans chanted:

You don't have a country [homeland]/  
You don't have a people/  
What are you doing here/  
On this playing field?  
(Hart 1999: 197)

The derogatory message of the slogan, comments Hart, was clear: "Having no place and no people, the Albanians cannot even constitute a national team." Albanians, on the other hand, had probably seen in the 2004 match a chance to put their country on the European football map by beating the title-holder. In an almost identical way with Greeks some

---

<sup>41</sup> For a criticism of the Manichean distinction between ethnic and civic nationalism see Brubaker (1998: 299)

<sup>42</sup> In the UK context such excessive jubilation was conceived by Gilroy -in his essay 'Melancholia or Convivial Culture'- as symptomatic of people's obsessive anxiety about the faith of British identity, in the face of their inability to come to terms with the loss of the British imperial grandeur. Thus British public mood is shadowed by melancholia which, according to S. Freud, is a state of pathological sadness interspersed with manic elation, and self-hatred. (Gilroy 2004). In this climate the hostility towards immigrants is due to the fact that they invoke images of reverse colonisation (Gilroy 2006). In the case of Greece such mourning and anxiety was not related to the loss of empire but rather to the equally painful loss of national grandeur and the failure of national aspirations.



months ago, they desperately wanted to challenge, in the seemingly favourable field of football, the for them adverse and rigid hierarchies of economic and geopolitical global order. For other Albanian fans the aim was probably to confirm their national superiority in the field of sports and physical strength, since in their perception the affluent Greeks had become 'soft'. The expectation of teaching the arrogant and exploiting employers of many compatriots a lesson was also likely to be in the agenda of many Albanians. Thus, a dynamic Albanian lobby had been mobilised in support of their national team months before the match, and the game was played in a tense atmosphere.

In any event, the evening of 4<sup>th</sup> September 2004, immediately after the end of the game, Albanian immigrants celebrated the victory of their national team at the city centre of Athens, in large numbers unseen before in public places in Greece. They were confronted by riot police and a rampaging mob of Greeks, the gamut of which ranged from hooligans to Golden Dawn thugs. According to the Albanian columnist and writer Kapllani, the aftermath of this violent night left 350 Albanian immigrants injured. The most tragic incident happened in a village on the island of Zante, where a celebrating young Albanian man was stabbed dead by a Greek-American (Kapllani 2004). A description of that violent Athenian night was offered by Kostas, the Greek-Albanian student from Durrës, who was among the Albanian national team fans:

I watched the match at home. But I was curious about the celebrations, and that's why I went to Omonoia (square). I walked with the Albanians on Patision Avenue down to Omonoia. I've seen everything there, beatings everything... Basically, when we arrived at Omonoia, the MAT<sup>43</sup> confronted us and, well, we spread to different streets. The MAT beat the Albanians, and forced them to retreat. Then the Greeks, who were behind the MAT, chased the Albanians by knocking them around. In most cases the MAT took the side of the Greeks. It is reasonable. Basically, in the case of a similar situation the police behaviour in my country might have been the same. After we had watched the clashes, we left. After all, we went there only to celebrate not to fight.

Other Albanian youths were probably not only celebrating a football victory but they also had the rare opportunity to make their presence visible through a rare demonstration of symbolic defiance. I observed them on Patision Avenue, fervently waving red Albanian

---

<sup>43</sup> Units of Order Restoration: Greek riot police

flags and marching down towards the centre at a fast and tense pace, as if they were crossing enemy territory. After all, metropolises not only nurture ethnic minorities' discontent but also provide the skills and the venue that enable the grievance to gain a hearing (Lal 1995: 426) and thus invite marginalised minorities to exert a "politics of visibility" (Keith 2005: 79). I asked Kostas if the celebration march was a manifestation of subterranean tensions. He replied:

It seems so. Probably they were fed up with the treatment they receive. I don't know. It looked like an outburst. It was like the opponent they had won in the game, was their biggest enemy. They were behaving as if this was the case... But I don't know what made them feel this way, what they had experienced...

The night was rough not only in the historical centre of the city but in many neighbourhoods as well. According to Albanian informants, the disturbances in the inner-city neighbourhoods mainly took the form of attacks against the passing cars of celebrating Albanians. Spyros explains: "When a car was passing with people waving an Albanian flag, Greeks sitting in the cafés threw ashtrays, bottles, chairs whatever they had at hand. They even attacked people and smashed their cars."

However, the main axis of the clashes was Patision Avenue, for it links the city centre with the most Albanian-dense districts of the city<sup>44</sup>. These districts are also bastions of the groups of the far-right. Marco, recalls the pogrom-like attacks against passing Albanian youngsters that took place in the middle of Patision Avenue where the tiny America Square is located:

That night I saw a crowd of 100-200 Greeks standing on America Square. They stopped every passing car in Patision Avenue, every motorbike. They wouldn't check license plates or something. They didn't care. They'd ask Greeks, do you have your identity card with you? Are you Albanian or Greek? If he replied that he didn't have his identity card they'd beat him up. When a red moped passed by, or if they saw a red T-shirt<sup>45</sup> they were like: "Oops! What are you?" If he was dark skinned enough he was attacked by 50 of them. After such events people got frightened.

---

<sup>44</sup> Refer to the attached map of central Athens (Appendix VI)

<sup>45</sup> The Albanian flag is red with a black two-headed eagle in its centre.

Marco, who is familiar with the culture of the Greek football fans in his secondary school was in a position to analyse what drove some of them that night on America Square:

They were swearing, they were shouting, "Albanian, you will never become Greek..."<sup>46</sup>, "Albanians and Turks, you both..."<sup>47</sup> Doesn't matter the chants they were shouting. What is important is that they were very angry. Were they irritated just because they had lost a game? Well not really, they were well pissed off because they had lost from the very people that are hosted in their country. And they probably were angry because of the insults that the 200-300 Greeks who travelled to Tirana for the game had suffered.

Spyros refutes the perception that all Greeks that attacked Albanians were followers of far-right groups, but at the same time on the other highlights the potential that football nationalism has for turning into overt racism:

The guys from my school that took part in the attacks against Albanians after the match were not militant members of far-right groups. They did so, not out of political conviction but rather in a way of following their friends. For instance, throughout that year kids from my school used to go to every game of the national team that was played in Greece. They used to hold a banner reading the number of the school and "Hellas". And also a blue cross, which is a Golden Dawn symbol. They were a core group of ten but in particular games they were followed by some forty children. These kids think that going to the match and swearing at the opponent is a nice thing to do.

Analogous attempts by far-right groups to use football as a favourable area of intervention and a basis for recruitment have also been observed in the UK during the late 1970s and 1980s (Back et al. 2001: 21; Bufford 1991). Jenan, who was Marco's co-student, attempted a review of the Euro 2004 events:

It is not like something terrible happened. I know that the Albanian fans made trouble in Tirana. But in my opinion they never came to Greece to say: "Ah! we beat you, we have a better team", or even "we are better people than you." And, if you remember, when Greece

---

<sup>46</sup> The most infamous racist chant of the far-right: "Δεν θα γίνεις Έλληνας ποτέ, Αλβανέ, Αλβανέ".

<sup>47</sup> An adapted sexist chant originating from football hooliganism.

won the Euro Basketball Cup many Albanians and other foreigners celebrated along with Greeks.

The complaint, with all its bitterness, also reads like this: "Although we beat you, we never said that we are better people." The implicit allegation levelled at Greeks could be that "you never treated us in such a noble way." On the contrary, "you're always looked down on us as if we were inferior, of no human value."

#### 4.2.2 A note on the articulation of racism with nationalism in Greece

The accounts presented above reveal a clear overlap or even articulation of racist and nationalist discourses. Still, the relation of nationalism and racism remains a complicated theoretical issue. One well-known perspective, put forward by Anderson, refutes this relationship: "the dreams of racism actually have their origins in ideologies of *class*, rather than in those of *nation*" (Anderson 1991: 149). The romantic ideals of patriotism inspire love for the motherland and even self-sacrifice, but unlike racism, they do not necessarily prompt hate for foreigners whose right to a national belonging is recognised<sup>48</sup>. The opposite view, namely the assertion that the ideology of racism derives from nationalism was advanced by Nairn, on the basis of his study on English nationalism since 1945 (Nairn 1981). A critical review of this famous debate between Anderson and Nairn, and a compelling theoretical argument pointing out to the limitations of both theses, is provided by Robert Miles (1987). Although Miles was in broad agreement with Anderson's argument that racism is not a secondary or derivative form of nationalism, he confirms Nairn's analysis about the nature of English nationalism, and especially its need to resort to racism. Nevertheless, *contra* both Anderson and Nairn, Miles contends that the interrelation of the two ideologies is not fixed. As such, only in particular historical contexts and specific conjunctures because of their overlapping characteristics is there a potential for the articulation of these two ideologies. Following Miles, I will argue in favour of separating conceptually racism from nationalism, and I will analyse each in its own terms.

---

<sup>48</sup> Anderson concludes that "the fact of the matter is that nationalism thinks in terms of historical destinies, while racism dreams of eternal contaminations, transmitted from the origins of time throughout an endless sequence of loathsome copulations: outside history" (Anderson 1991: 149).

In the framework of the current study, the starting point of such examination is the foundation of the modern Greek state in 1830 and its varied constitutive notions of national identity. Initially, under the influence of nineteenth-century European neoclassicism, exponents of ancient Greek antiquity and of the liberal ideals of Enlightenment put forward a definition of the nation with exclusive reference to Hellenic identity. Phyletism, which is confidence in racial superiority, was rather unknown at that point, since the nation's foundation myth was based on notions of unsurpassed cultural heritage (Skopetea 1988: 172). By mid-century, and because of the nation's ambition to incorporate unredeemed brethren and territories beyond the puny realm of the newly independent revolutionary state, a national self-understanding prevailed that favoured references to the Byzantine imperial legacy and thus reinforced the bonds with the Orthodox Church<sup>49</sup> (Kitromilides 1989; Koliopoulos and Veremis 2002: 228). Accordingly, Orthodox faith and the Greek language with their ecumenical appeal among Balkan Christians "became the building blocks of Greek nationalism" (Veremis 1989b). In doing so, the Greek national project provoked, by the end of the nineteenth century the emergence of rival nationalisms in the neighbouring orthodox Balkan states. The ensuing fierce contest over the same territories of the declining Ottoman empire put an end to the appeal of Orthodox ecumenity, and intensified the homogenisation project of Balkan national communities by bringing to the fore ethno-racial references (Veremis 1989a). However, as Mazower underscores, Balkan states' policies towards minorities only exceptionally resorted to the principles of biological racism. For instance, by learning the language, and perhaps modifying one's name, assimilation was possible for Albanians, Vlachs and Slavs in Greece (Mazower 2000: 110).

Because of this legacy -in the Greek context- it is racism that needs to draw legitimacy from patriotism and nationalism rather than the other way round. Thus, the Greek anti-migrant populist right and the militant groups of the far-right in their effort to legitimise an overtly racist agenda have to resort to discourses of ethno-racial nationalism. In the conjuncture of 1990s and the massive arrival of immigrants such reactionary political projects were clearly facilitated by the widespread xenophobic reactions. It is this particular context which created the potential for the articulation of racism with a version of nationalism revolving around notions of ethnic insularity and biological ancestry.

---

<sup>49</sup> The here presented sketchy historical account cannot do justice to the complexity of this transition from one ideal type of ethnic identity to another.

The ideological mixture of nationalism and mixophobia observed in Greece during the 1990s bears resemblance to what Martin Barker termed as 'new racism' (Barker 1981). In France, analogous discourses which target immigrants and minorities and construct them as irredeemably incompatible with the prevailing cultural norms or traditions have been described as 'cultural' or 'differentialist' racism (Balibar and Wallerstein 1991; Taguieff 2001).

However, critics have argued that racism is not the only ideology that attempts the naturalisation of the differences between socio-historical groups. Sexism employs the same means in order to reproduce gender hierarchy (Miles 1987). In general, all discriminatory or exclusionary ideologies, to one degree or another, resort to naturalistic arguments in order to enhance their legitimacy (Trubeta 2000b: 148). Moreover, it is not clear what analytical advantage this new conceptualisation of racism offers for the study of immigrant reception in Greece. Although the phenomenology of exclusionism in Greece undeniably resembles Taguieff's 'communautarist racism' (1995), the temptation to adopt a theoretical approach that equates the exclusionist potential of ethnocentrism or even nationalism with the ideology and effects of racism entails the risk of over-predicting the extent of racist tensions and violence<sup>50</sup>.

#### ***Balkan cultural affinities***

After all, narratives of cultural incompatibility between natives and Balkan immigrants are markedly absent from the metropolitan setting of Athens. As was mentioned in Chapter 3, contemporary Greeks are not in denial of the Balkan dimension of their identity. On the contrary in the 1990s a renewed interest in the Balkans and their culture was observed in Greece (Tziovas 2003: 8). This interest proliferates narratives of a shared Balkan past that traces its roots in the Orthodox world (Kitromilides 1996) and the dense commercial (Stoianovich 1960) and cultural exchanges of the pre-nationalist Balkan society of the eighteenth century.

---

<sup>50</sup> Furthermore, it is not necessary to invoke racism and its rigid biological hierarchies in order to interpret ethnicised conflict or ethnic violence. On the contrary, even in the most heinous forms of ethnic aggression that emerged in the Balkans of 1990s, the process involved is likely to have been related to what S. Freud termed as "the narcissism of small differences." For instance, the Serb soldiers that Ignatieff interviewed in 1993, insisted that they "were the same" as their Croatian rivals and former neighbours. Nevertheless, both sides were devoted to the business of killing each other (Ignatieff 1995)

Particularly significant for the argument of cultural affinity between Greeks and Albanians is the historical case of the Albanians who settled in Greece between the 13<sup>th</sup> and 16<sup>th</sup> century and eventually formed several sizable Arvanitic<sup>51</sup>-speaking communities in mainland Greece and the islands (Ducellier 1994). To a large measure Arvanites participated actively in the 1821-33 struggle against the Ottoman rule (Dakin 1973: 123; Koliopoulos and Veremis 2002: 233). Thus, the Greek state that emerged out of the War of Independence frequently referred to Albanians as a 'brother nation'. According to Skoulidas (2002: 174) Orthodox Albanians were -until 1839- scarcely perceived by the Greek press as a distinct population. Even later, a Greek royal decree of 1904 treated both Greeks and Albanians of foreign nationality as '*omogeneis*', as people belonging to the same kin, despite the fact that the process of Albanian nation-building had -at that time- already started (Baltsiotis 2004: 308). Apparently, this also has to be considered as an attempt by the newly formed Greek state to incorporate its Albano-phone populations and to claim disputed territories beyond its borders. As a matter of fact, such assimilationist tactics proved successful only with regard to the Orthodox Arvanitic communities within the Greek territory. In contemporary Greece Arvanitika is not widely spoken anymore, and Arvanites do not feel nor are they seen by the state as a minority (Gefou-Madianou 1999: 416).

Against this historical background, it is no surprise that experiences of exclusion and racism that the immigrant respondents to the present study reported were not because their culture is perceived by natives as irremediably different. On the contrary, it is more likely that they were rejected for being seen exactly as similar to the Greeks, but of a 'primitive' stage of Greece's socio-economic development. In addition, the fact that even young people of immigrant background, and the Albania-born in particular, did not report a perception that their cultural references were incompatible with those of their Greek counterparts diminishes the potential to add a cultural layer to the otherwise pervasive ethnicised tensions.

#### 4.2.3 The legitimacy of romantic nationalism

Of particular importance is the way that immigrant-origin youth chose to interpret the motives of the Greeks who attacked the celebrating Albanian football fans. In Marco's words:

---

<sup>51</sup> An old version of the Tosk dialect of the Albanian language.

In my opinion, these episodes are not demonstrations of racism. They are either expressions of ultra-nationalism or I don't know .... brainlessness. And I don't think that Greeks on the whole are xenophobic, on the contrary I believe that Greece is a very hospitable country.

Marco's reference to brainlessness of the few probably suggests an effort to comprehend racism as the dark side of human nature (Lamont et al. 2002), but says little about the content of what he terms as 'ultra-nationalism'. He preferred to explain the attacks as hooliganism, an unavoidable side-effect of football culture. Other respondents reminded me that Albanian fans had attacked Greek fans in Tirana and displayed offensive behaviour when the Greek anthem was played before the match. On the other hand, the 'hospitality of the many' argument not only indicates foreign-born youth's perception of the extent of xenophobia or violent racism, but also complements the previous explanation about the 'exceptionality of evil'. The students of immigrant parentage who expanded further on the topic placed the argument within a set of collectively adopted priorities: they explained that for them the most significant aspect of immigrants' reception in Greece is that ordinary citizens and businesses offer jobs to them. It is exactly this attitude of the majority that allows them to better their lives:

On my part, I'll always love Greece. By that I mean that I love Greeks too. Because Greeks are supporting us by offering employment. My cousin is an electrician. When he started he used to work in the construction industry, but now he runs his own business.

Erion

Thus, almost all Albanian students who chose to express a view on the topic had the tendency to downplay the importance of the events by broadening the review-angle of the situation. This was probably a rhetorical device aiming to conceal suppressed fears and grievances caused by violent racism. In order to circumvent negative experiences they tend to focus on and reaffirm their most important interests and priorities. It seems that out of such necessities Albanian youths almost uniformly adopted a tactics of tension de-escalation.

Jenan was also careful not to blame the patriotism of Greeks for the racist attacks. For him everyone belongs to a nation and national ties and allegiances are a natural and inalienable people's right. In this framework, ethnic tensions or violence could be seen as



an unavoidable and unpleasant side-effect of the interaction of ethnic groups. His objection, which was rather a matter of taste, was rather directed against the desecrated expressions of nationalism (Brubaker and Feischmidt 2002: 707), against the ways that Greek young people 'consume' the nation:

I do believe that these episodes weren't expressions of racism but the outcome of ultra-nationalism. This is a word I have found, and I believe explains best the attitude of Greeks. OK I've got no problem with that. The Greeks love their country too much. I know kids who say I love my country and they come to school wearing T-shirts with the Greek flag on it. Well done! They are in their country. I can't blame them, I am not against that. Well, wearing every day at school the flag T-shirt seems weird to me.

In Jenan's words one can see both the legitimacy of ethnic nationalism and traces of a detached and critical stance. The latter stems from his very position as an outsider that made him sensitive not only to the excessive manifestations of nationalism but also to the exclusionist potential of even its most trivial forms, those that routinely occur in multi-ethnic youthful milieu. Nevertheless, although he stands at the receiving side of 'ultra-nationalist' exclusionism, he is still not able to resort to alternative narratives of belonging other than the ethnonational. The reason is, as Spyros explained, that nationalism and ethnic separatism are not unknown among youths of immigrant parentage:

On the other hand, it is not only Greeks who love their country or are nationalists. Other guys who live here, who are immigrants are also nationalists. They may have Greek friends, but, in general, they are against Greeks. You can also find groups of immigrant young people who keep among their compatriots. They don't like to have contacts with others. Not only Albanians but also Bulgarians.

On the whole, many Albanian young men's conception of national belonging lies within the ideological framework of romantic nationalism<sup>52</sup>. Undeniably, Albanian and Greek

---

<sup>52</sup> According to Smith (2001: 22) the core doctrine of traditional nationalism encompasses the following propositions: (a) the world is divided into nations, each with its own character, history and destiny, (b) to be free, every individual must belong to a nation, (c) global peace and justice require a world of autonomous nations. To a large measure, the accounts of the immigrant respondents, and Albanians in particular, echoed this set of assumptions.

youths' nationalism reflects notions rooted in the legacy of the Balkan nation-building and its inherent ideology: the romantic nationalism of the nineteenth century. As we have seen in the previous section in the post-1850 Balkans contesting projects of national formation emerged that were based on notions of common ancestry (Roudometof 1996). On top of such a legacy the collapse of the South European authoritarian regimes in the 1990s led to the rekindle of the nationalist logic as the ultimate basis of resolving the question of ethnic relations in ethnically mixed areas (Smith 1995: 80).

Foreign-born youth's 'generosity' in offering legitimisation to their Greek classmates' nationalism has to be interpreted through a particular double hermeneutics: at face value, statements of such a nature indicate Albanian-born youths' strong sentiments and ties with the motherland. On the second level they could be interpreted as a rhetorical device aiming to rebut ethnic exclusionism and racism (Lamont et al. 2002). The recognition of the Greeks' right to adhere to the ideals of romantic nationalism represents an indirect way to underscore their own right to be respected through a collective ethnic identity that will be accepted by natives. Thus, their appeal to universalistic principles of nationalism is a means to confront Greek exclusionism through a rhetorical invoking the universal rights of all people, all nations. The strategic aim of such rhetoric is to pursue a politics of reciprocal recognition.

#### **4.2.4 The impact of racist hatred: one step back**

What is the impact of racist violence, like the incidents described above, for the long-term prospects of students' everyday inter-ethnic relations? In a previous section we have shown that the Albanian respondents who chose to talk about racist aggression tended to downplay the importance of the events. They argued that it was only a game that went wrong, and attributed the racist hostility to a trivial hooligan mentality of a small group of Greeks or to ultra-nationalism. Marco's account, which is telling about the subtleness of youths' interethnic relations and the limits that every-day interaction poses to the extent of racist violence, offers credibility to the previously presented moderate evaluations:

I watched the game in a friend's house through the Albanian satellite channel. On my way home I crossed America Square. There was a group of Greeks shouting at and attacking passing cars with Albanians. Among them I recognized 10-20 lads from my school, so I wasn't afraid that I would be attacked. Well, it isn't like they are members of the far-right groups. They were just watching the match in a nearby café and then followed the others

and participated in the chanting along with others with shaved heads and tattoos. These people were very angry so I hurried up to cross the avenue, 'cause you never know. And as I was crossing, a guy from school shouted out: "Hi Marco!" As if nothing wrong was going on. Of course he knew that I am Albanian. The next day everything was back to normal. So I asked them what they were doing the last night. "We had nothing against you" they told me. "We were after some Albanian kids that told us that our team is useless."

Apparently, it was easier for the young perpetrators of the racist abuses to attack unknown Albanians. Familiarity with the Other can undermine the ability to express irrational hostility. As Berger and Luckmann maintain, in a face-to-face encounter the Other is fully real, and the schemes of typification extremely vulnerable (Berger and Luckmann 1967: 45-48). On the other hand, the undermining of stereotypes is probably more likely to occur in the case of students, due to the effect of everyday interaction and to the limited legitimacy of racist discourses within Greek secondary schools. In this respect, students' co-socialisation eventually moderates the extent and intensity of racist confrontations.

*Prima facie*, the quietness that followed the racist attacks of 4<sup>th</sup> September 2004 seems to validate the downplaying evaluation of those Albanian respondents who felt like talking about the events. However, many Albanian students avoided any reference to the episodes. Others revealed that in the aftermath of the episodes, their anxiety and cautiousness were elevated. Jenan, the Albanian Lyceum student who best expressed the Albanian youths' resentment, also clarified the collective response to these negative experiences:

In schools and the neighbourhood there wasn't any continuation of the clashes the day after the match.. After all, there are so many friendships between Greeks and Albanians. Most of my friends, for instance, are Greeks. But the Albanians did feel alienated. They took a step back. "Let's wait one or two weeks", they said to themselves, "And then we can be friends again with the Greeks."

"We remained static" was the typical phrase that these Albanian students kept repeating in describing their stance after the shock of the extensive racist aggression. Erion, another ethnic-Albanian student of the same school details the tactics of 'motionlessness' and the hard feelings underneath it:

Erion: The next day our side did nothing. No chants, no stupid things in order to avoid troubles. We said, let it pass.

*PP: But Albanian guys were buttoned up, weren't they?*

Erion: Albanians are always buttoned up!

*PP: Any more heated reactions?*

Erion: A friend of mine (Albanian) was very pissed off. He had many Greek friends, and he knew that they had done nothing wrong, like swearing at Albanians. But he was like I don't want to talk to them any more. He was like, "I don't care, they are Greeks, and this is enough for me."

Kostas, who leans towards a more flexible handling of such hot issues, explained the self-restraining attitude on which the survival of many inter-ethnic friendships depends:

With Greeks I have no problem. Basically, what I am trying to do is to build a 'base'. I mean that I am trying to have patience. Some Greek guys have different viewpoints. I am saying to them, you are right, although my opinion is that they are wrong. For instance after the match I didn't tease them, "ah, we won" and the like, in order to save our friendship. But my friends are broad-minded Greeks. I don't mess up with people that have a superiority complex towards foreigners. So my Greek friends are also careful, they say nothing to me. Because an insult to your ethnic identity is like an insult against your mother. It's the same thing. So we don't pay attention to such things and we do have a good time together.

It is obvious that friendships built upon such shaky foundations have narrow limits. Spyros is a young boy of Albanian ancestry who attended an inner-city secondary school with substantial immigrant enrolment. He is acutely aware of the division along ethnic lines, since he has been repeatedly told by Greek schoolmates that he "doesn't belong to Greece". This does not mean that he does not have any Greek friend. The reverse seems to be the case. He acknowledges that not all Greeks have the same stance towards immigrants. Nevertheless, in most cases inter-ethnic friendships never cross the predefined borderlines:

Imagine a Greek and an Albanian student that are friends. Even if they decide to go out to the boulevard together for a walk, the Greek will have at the back of his mind that the other is an Albanian. Of course there are many nice Greek boys, and you can be friends with them. Then you get to know the family of your Greek friend, the father and mother, and they even invite you to their home. However, later, when he sits alone with his father, he

will tell him "OK but your friend is an Albanian." "I know father, but he is a nice bloke."  
So for them, there are also good Albanians, but somehow they are always Albanians.

### 4.3 The case of Vorioepirotos students

The fact that all the informants of this section were foreign-born youths of foreign nationality prevents the presentation of the opposite view, namely native youths' view of the issues at hand: ethnic segregation, discrimination and racism. However, an account of probably the most vehement anti-Albanian views in contemporary Greek society was offered by a small number of *Vorioepirotos* students (three out of a total of eight *Vorioepirotos* students).

The Greek-Albanian respondents of this study who declared themselves *Vorioepirotos* clearly adopted a self-identification aiming to delineate the boundary with other co-national ethnic-Albanian youths who are willing to maintain ties with Albania (for similar observations see Veikou 2001: 306). In their interviews, in order to communicate their distinct *Vorioepirotos* identity that differentiates them from other Albania-born youths, they insisted on reporting that their family fled Albania as early as possible, that they hardly understand the Albanian language, and on demonstrating their proficiency in Greek by using formal language in many instances.

An account of Albanian ethnic-Greeks' resentment towards the totalitarianism of the Hoxha regime was offered by Christos, the *Vorioepirotos* Lyceum student. He was born in a Greek-minority village in the area of Gjirokastër. His extended family left Albania *en masse* in 1990, since the border controls relaxed. An indication of his kin's fervent Greek ethnic consciousness is that his father, uncle, and grandmother attempted to cross the border clandestinely through the mountains in the wild 1960s. Only his uncle managed to make it, while the other two returned to Albania and according to his account the whole kin was displaced to Durrës, in central Albania. In Greece, Christos has many friends. But none of them is Albanian:

Maybe they are nice blokes. But the fact they are Albanians is off-putting. I don't want to hear about Albania or Albanians. Above all, they don't understand the place I come from. A purely Greek village, only two kilometres from the border, where everybody was Orthodox and spoke Greek. The Albanian kids in our school come from central Albania and are dyed-in-the-wool Albanians.

The strong nationalist sentiments that some descendants of the Greek minority of Albania expressed should also be seen against the background of the fully-fledged eruption of nationalism in post cold-war Balkans. The retreat of universalistic ideological or supranational economic levees which opened a new era of bloody disputes over borders and territories and the uproar of brutal ethnic conflict in the region made even Karl Popper regret the fact that after 1989 "communism has been replaced by this ridiculous nationalism" (Popper 1997 cited in Leoussi 2002). The dissolution of Yugoslavia triggered among other developments the rekindling of Albanian irredentism at least in Kosovo and Macedonia and thus the spread of the idea of 'Greater Albania' (Chossudovsky 2000; Derens and Geslin 2006; Mazower 2000: 126). On the domestic front the resurgence of Albanian nationalism was also relevant to the dire need of the post-communist regime to consolidate its power in the absence of a viable economy. Hence, resort to nationalism represents an attempt of the 'old-new' ruling elite to reconcile with resentful factions of the population (Larrabee 1999). This context explains why Sali Berisha, the first elected president of Albania after the fall of totalitarianism, quickly played the card of tension with Greece, and in 1992 launched a campaign of prosecution against the civic, religious and educational rights of the Greek minority (Baltsiotis 2003: 70; Konidaris 2005: 71 - 73).

However, the 'over-identification' of some *Vorioepiotes* with the *ingroup* of native Greeks is probably also a manifestation of the tendency of upwardly mobile persons and groups to identify with groups of higher status and power (Adorno et al. 2001 [1950]: 82). At any rate, *Vorioepiotes'* ardent Greek nationalist feelings did not always secure acceptance and inclusion in the motherland. On the contrary, it seems that their militant nationalist and anti-Albanian feelings set them apart from the average same-age children who appear to adopt a more relaxed stance towards the issues at hand.

Moreover, the instrumental exclusionist attitude of many Greeks towards the 1990s newcomers is often not inclined to distinguish between ethnic-Greeks and foreign ethnics. Probably many Greeks feel that *Vorioepiotes'* common-ancestry is not good enough reason to offer them cordial reception and fair treatment. Christos denies status-similarity to other immigrants, but is also aware of his group's in-betweenness:

Some challenge my nationality. I say to them, look at what my card writes: if your ethnicity is Greek you can't be an Albanian. I am more Greek than you are. I see the Greek flag and my eyes mist. They don't know what happened to us up there. Besides, the Greek

state immediately recognized that we are Greeks; it gave us this special identity card. This is good. But not being able to be a citizen of the country you belong to is a strange thing. There, Albanians used to call us Greeks and here we are called Albanians!

Having a *omogenis* identity card does offer membership to the imagined ethnic community (Anderson 1991), but only partly provides access to welfare resources and even more rarely facilitates fair treatment in the labour market. Achilles, the *Vorioepiotes* Lyceum student, although strongly identifies with Greeks, is also aware that most problems are common with other immigrants. He refers to his father's troubles in the Greek labour market:

My father used to lecture in the University of Gjirokastrë. Here he worked for 8 years in a carpet factory. The job was irrelevant to his qualifications, and the exploitation enormous. He used to work without any social benefits, health coverage, nothing. On top of that, the business went bankrupt. He had to hire a lawyer in order to claim his wages. My mother was an accountant. Here, for the last 4-5 years, she has been working in a fast-food place.

Previous research on the integration pathways of *Vorioepiotes* in Greece has also underscored the wide gulf between the rhetoric of official policy towards brothers and sisters from Albania and the realities of the exploitative labour market and widespread indiscriminate exclusionism towards migrants (Pavlou 2003; Veikou 2001).

#### 4.4 Who wants and who is allowed to belong to the nation?

A controversy regularly occurring after 2000, with significant impact for schools and the broader community, concerns the participation of immigrant students of secondary schools in commemorative parades as flag-bearers. Student parades are part of the celebrations of two Greek national remembrance days: the first is on 28<sup>th</sup> October and celebrates the refusal of Greece to give in to the Italian troops that invaded the country from Albania in October 1940. The second anniversary commemorates the eruption of the Greek struggle for independence from Ottoman rule on the 25<sup>th</sup> March 1821. According to custom the flag in these parades is carried by the school's best student.

The first 'flag' episode, which triggered fierce reactions and attracted much public attention, was related to Odysseus Cenaj a secondary school student of Albanian origin. In

autumn of 2000, Cenaj happened to have the best marks in his school, in the small town of Nea Michaniona, in Northern Greece. Consequently, he was eligible to carry the flag in the parade celebrating the national anniversary. Nevertheless, many students and their parents, as well as populist political or media agents raised fierce protests against the possibility of a descendant of the WW II foes carrying the flag in a parade commemorating the resistance against the Axis forces. Eventually, although Cenaj received broad support from leading state and societal figures, including the President of the Greek state, he relinquished his right. In the ensuing months the Ministry of Education passed legislation mandating that the student eligible to carry the flag in parades is the one with the highest marks irrespective of his/her nationality. Nevertheless, the controversy remained alive and three years later when Cenaj was re-elected best student, he was again forced to step down because of the recurrence of parents and students' protests (Baldwin-Edwards 2003; Kapllani and Mai 2005; Tzanelli 2006). Similar but not equally intense episodes continued to appear throughout 2004 almost exclusively in provincial towns of Greece.

Numerous studies have shown the significance of rituals and practices of commemoration for the projection of politically fitting interpretations of the national past into the present (Brubaker and Feischmidt 2002; Roudometof 2003). Greece is not an exception, and from the very beginning the 'flag' dispute was not only about the participation of immigrant students in parades, but about their participation in the national community in general. The polemical public debate that followed, but also the swift legislative regulation of students' entitlement to flag-bearing, significantly undermined the legitimacy of racist discourses defining national identity in terms of common biological ancestry. The hegemonic understanding of nationhood that emerged out of this debate, at least at the governmental level, mainstream newspapers, and academic circles, was the one proposing an Isocratic conception of membership in the Greek nation and firmly rejecting a racial criterion of inclusion (Tzanelli 2006).

Isocrates was a famous Athenian orator of the 4<sup>th</sup> century B.C., who urged the overcoming of divisions between Greek city-states and promoted pan-Hellenic union. The historical context of his political intervention was the aftermath of the wars between Athens and Sparta, a period during which Greek city-states started to become overshadowed by the ascent of Filippus II of Macedons (Cawkwell 2000). Isocrates *Panegyricus* speech, which was published in 380 B.C., contains the clearest exposition of



his conception of a unifying cultural basis of Hellenic identity beyond the blood-ties of city-states' citizenry:

So far has Athens left the rest of mankind behind in thought and expression that her pupils have become the teachers of the world, and she has made the name of Hellas distinctive no longer of race but of intellect, and the title of Hellene a badge of education rather than of common descent. (Freese 1894 Panegyricus § 50)

This cosmopolitan ideal that combines the pride of an Athenian citizen with the realisation of unavoidable demise of city-state particularism was considered as prophetic for the open-door membership, on which the Hellenistic world was later based<sup>53</sup>. However, the contemporary invocation of the Isocratic ideal frequently comes with its own mixed bag of ideological interpretations. Many commentators argue that the ideal points towards an inclusive model of nationhood that repudiates racial criteria of national belonging. Tzanelli for instance (2006: 43), admits that the *raison d'être* of the Isocratic argument is incompatible with the racist ideology that rejects the possibility of proselytism of the Other. Apparently, this point is of critical importance in the struggle against the exclusionary discourses of the far right.

On the other hand, the assimilationist overtones are overt in the contemporary invocations of Isocrates by the political elite. Namely, the aspiration to repeat in the field of immigrant integration the success of the nineteenth and early twentieth century Greek project of nation-building, which developed through the gradual incorporation of territories often inhabited by an ethnically diverse assortment of populations. A major premise of this prolonged nation-building project was the promotion of Greek education in the irredenta as well as within the borders of the Greek state (Kitromilides 1989:170; Koliopoulos and Veremis 2002:157).

Thus, against the racist campaign of far right and quasi-mainstream xenophobic demagoguery, the political, economic, and intellectual elites -each one for its own reasons- are tempted to respond to the challenges of immigration by turning once again to assimilatory ideals that have proved their might in incorporating ethnically alien populations. In this

---

<sup>53</sup> Hence, the innovative merits of the Isocratic argument of the 4th century B.C. should be judged against the context of his own time.

context and during the parliamentary discussion of the immigration bill<sup>54</sup>, in August 2005, the leader of the major opposition party PASOK<sup>55</sup> proposed to grant to immigrants legally residing in Greece for at least seven years the right to participate in local elections. The Interior Minister of the conservative government promised to examine the issue after the implementation of the then scheduled new regularisation programme (Matsi 2005). Despite such positive prospects, the noticeable dependency of the Greek immigration policy debate on an argument dating back to 4th Century B.C is symptomatic of its poor development. It seems that the popularity of the Isocratic ideal among the elites is probably exactly due to the ambiguity of its interpretations. This vague ideal provides a convenient consensual reference point covering everything between modern cosmopolitanism and old-style assimilation. However, even this common denominator is still much distanced from civic conceptions of citizenry which are considered as not viable in the Greek context. This way the Greek public policy accommodates contesting tensions emanating (a) from the international 'human rights' regime, which advocates the blurring of the boundary between citizens and aliens (Sassen 1993: 103); and (b) the retreat of multiculturalism in many liberal states' public discourse and policy (Barry 2001; Joppke 2004), and the return of assimilation under new conceptual formulations (Alba and Nee 1997; Brubaker 2001).

However, in order to judge which pathway the incorporation of immigrants is more likely to take in Greece, apart from historical debates and the investigation of the native elites' intentions what is necessary is an examination of what appeals to youths of immigrant ancestry.

#### **4.4.1 Hellenisation and Albanian ethnic assertiveness**

It is exactly the immigrant students' viewpoint regarding not only the 'flag' issue *per se* but also its association with the broader question of their status in Greek society that is missing in prior relevant research. An opportunity to fill this gap was offered by the immigrant students who participated in this study and their accounts of the 'flag' controversies. In 2005, when I interviewed Kostas, an Albania-born TEE student with Greek roots, it appeared that -at least in most schools- the 'flag disputes' had lost their impetus. However,

---

<sup>54</sup> Later became the immigration law 3386/2005.

<sup>55</sup> Panhellenic Socialist Movement: the centre-leftist party that was founded by A. Papandreou after the fall of junta.

the reverberations of the controversy were still significant for the framing of immigrant students' thinking:

Kostas: This year an Albanian girl was the best student, and she was elected to bear the flag at the 28<sup>th</sup> October parade. So there was much talk in the school whether the Albanian girl should carry the flag. Basically, a Greek boy was very angry about the matter. He would go to the teachers' office to protest, he would talk to other students, he would threaten to bring his friends into the school, and in general he would make a fuss about it. Basically if I were Greek probably I would do similar things.

*PP: Was he the second best student?*

Kostas: No! He is one of the worst students. He just wanted the one who will carry the flag to be Greek. However, only two or three students took his side. The matter was discussed and most students were open-minded. The teachers also supported the Albanian girl. After some days the issue melted away. Finally, the Albanian student carried the flag in the parade. However, she didn't take the matter personally. Actually, she told the guy "If you need support, I will provide you with some friends of mine." In general, I believe she saw the whole thing mostly as a school obligation. She didn't carry the flag with the passion or the emotions of a Greek student in her position.

The need for clarification about the Albanian flag bearer's lack of national passion and emotions seems to emanate from Albanian students' uncomfortable position. On the one hand, they appreciate the fact that their compatriots seized the opportunity to succeed in the open competition for educational excellence within the Greek school. On the other, they feel threatened by the consequences of such successes for the challenges they put to their ethnic self-identification. Thus, in their perception, the 'flag' prize comes with a certain cost for their ethnonational identity that they cannot afford. Jenan again expressed best the feelings of a number of Albanian respondents:

I will tell you what I believe. If you love this country and you are a good student of this school, you have the right -by the law- to bear the flag. If you like to do it, although you are a foreigner, if this suits you, you don't have to ask for nobody's permission, even if you were black, you were Albanian, or whatever. But of course the matter is different if you are Albanian, you live in this country, and you simply learn the language, you are being educated in Greek civilization, and then you are going and bear the flag. It is not a bad thing, but it is like you are trying to put aside you own country. I don't mean you are a

traitor, I can't call these kids traitors, I can only say that they are people with two mother-countries. Sometimes you can see them this way. For instance this guy, Odysseus Jenai, says I am Albanian, I will never renounce my country, but I also love Greece and that is why I want to bear the Greek flag. I love Greece but I also do love Albania. But at some point he has to decide, either Greece or Albania. If I were him, if I was the best student, I wouldn't carry the flag, 'cause I wouldn't feel that this is right. Why refuse it to the Greek who would be behind me, who is in his own country. Basically, it is how you feel, not what is on paper or your identity card. You can be Albanian in your heart and simply live in Greece, this is not a problem.

Jenan's argument is telling. The right to carry the flag was seen with suspicion not only by a part of the Greek society but also by some Albanian respondents who, although comparatively well integrated in Greek society, consider this symbolic gesture as a step too far for their ethnonational group. By their own position as newcomers they appreciate the advantages that a cosmopolitan postulate of citizenship offers for their structural incorporation. On the other hand, they share with their Greek nationalist classmates the same conceptual understanding of who is eligible to be a member of a nation. Both sides detest the blurring of the national border.

One has to ask what lies at the root of Albania-born youths' need to defend their ethnonational self-identification? It is reasonable for young people, born abroad and actually having a precarious legal status in Greece to seek to retain ties with a motherland and its culture. Moreover, many of them -Albanians in particular- reported that they have the opportunity to travel regularly to their country of origin, to visit grandparents, for summer vacations, to participate in hometown festivities or family celebrations, or even for their parents vote in national or local elections. Seemingly, this high level of mobility intensified after the turning point of Albania's 1997 'pyramids' crisis, and Greece's first legalisation programme in 1998; the first ruined hopes for the prospects of Albanian economy and the second made long-term settlement in Greece look viable. Consequently, the Albanian migration towards Greece ceased to be a back-and-forth movement of male labourers and a large part of them sought family reunification and permanent settlement. Although the Albania-Greece migration system is not cyclical anymore it is likely that migrants' lives cut across national boundaries bringing the two societies into close

interaction if not into a single social field<sup>56</sup>. Within this field, migration does not necessarily entail broken cultural ties anymore, as the traditional model of transatlantic migration presumed. On the contrary, such a migration system facilitates the maintenance of a form of national identity that appears as a linear extension of attachment and affection for the ancestral land. In short, this migration system enables Albanian migrants' 'linear ethnicity'. Moreover, it is reasonable to assume that for first-generation migrants linear ethnicity is more significant than for their offspring.

However, ethnic identification as with any other form of identification, is in fact a dynamic and complex social phenomenon (Waters 1990: 16). Originating from a motherland does not lead directly to a stable identification with the putative primordial characteristics of an ancestral group<sup>57</sup>. Despite its reifying conceptualizations ethnic identity is always 'in process', not the result of a definite subsumption into a reference group (Brubaker and Cooper 2000). Young people, in particular, may experience changes in their ethnic identification at particular points of their life-cycle (Waters 1990). In this section, which presents viewpoints of young immigrant origin people about interethnic relations, racism and their status in Greece, predictably most of them defined themselves in

---

<sup>56</sup> The Albania-Greece migration system, because of the two countries proximity, ease of travel and communication and age-long migratory ties, has analogies with the patterns of Mexico to US migration and in particular rural immigrants' transnational pathways of adaptation (Roberts et al. 1999). In general, labour migration from Albania to Greece seems "to be embedded within a wider framework of mobility, which also involves flows of goods, services and capital, as well as information, signs and images" (Labrianidis and Kazazi 2006). Labrianidis and Kazazi further argue that Albanian labourers who migrate back and forth gradually adopt 'dual identities'. On the basis of substantial empirical research, Cavounidis reports that in 2000 almost 60 percent of the newly legalised migrants to Athens visited their country of origin at least once during the previous year. Nevertheless, since only one percent of Athens' migrants worked abroad during these visits, the pattern of their movements cannot be considered as cyclical migration. The large share of migrant couples and families among the Albanians that have settled in Athens significantly contributes to this matter (only 16 % of female Albanian nationals and 40% of the males declared unmarried) (Cavounidis 2004a).

<sup>57</sup> For instance, UK research illustrates the pressures and challenges that the strong national self-identification of Kosovo Albanian refugees faces in the British context. The interaction with the political, social, economic and cultural environment of the host country facilitated the emergence of identity transformations, redefinitions and ruptures that have an uneasy symbiotic relation with this community's commitment to a rigidly defined culture of the motherland (Kostovicova and Prestreshi 2003).

terms of national origin. This is equally true for the nationally proud Albanian respondents and *Vorioepiotes* alike.

Nevertheless, it would be wrong to assume that all immigrant-origin children engage to the same degree or invest the same amount of energy in resolving the complexities of the post-migration ethnic identity. It has already been mentioned that although the females of the student sample declared their nationality, they were uniformly not interested in justifying the ethnonational part of their identity. For them identificational ambiguity usually emerges in relation to the issue of religion. A typical account was that of Flabia, who was born to ethnic-Albanian non-religious parents in Tepelenë. Upon her arrival in Greece she was baptized Christian Orthodox. Nevertheless, she was not very certain about religion: "In Albania, in general, religion is not an issue. The communist regime's dogma was atheism. They even killed a relative who was a priest. Now, my mother regularly goes to church. However, on my part, I don't know where I stand in relation to religious faith."

Aurelia, who originates from Tirana, is a more complex case. Her father is a Catholic, and her mother a Muslim, but she was baptized an Orthodox when arrived in Greece. The reason was that "I had to live in Greece...", she explained. As a child she used to practise but now she is in doubt about religion. She only referred to her father's remarks regarding her trendy clothing style preference and her mother's objections to prolonged partying and night-outs with a peer group from her technical school of nursing as a cause of family arguments<sup>58</sup>. She can speak Albanian but her ability to read and write is limited: "My father tries hard to teach me the language. Every time we return from summer time vacations in Tirana, -we spend August there- he brings along books, to teach me reading and writing. But usually I am bored."

Aurelia's boredom is probably related to the fact that she is fascinated with her outgoing school peer-group and she doesn't like spending summers in Tirana with her cousins. In the case of Zelda, another Albanian girl from Tepelenë it was the academic part of schooling that absorbed her. She attended the 2<sup>nd</sup> year of upper secondary school and her

---

<sup>58</sup> According to many respondents of this study, Albanian parental practices are very different for boys and girls. In practice after the age of 16 parents do not intervene a lot in boys' lifestyle, as long as they contribute to the family income. In contrast their control on girls is strict and usually the pressure is for them to acquire educational credentials. Thus girls' acculturation in Greek non-academic lifestyle is objectionable for Albanian parents. In this case some intergenerational value discrepancy is evident. On the other hand, some academically oriented Albanian-born female respondents voiced the parental viewpoint by criticizing Greek parents' permissiveness and lack of control on their daughters' dating practices.

academic performance was outstanding. She was about to graduate with good marks in order to secure her enrolment at a US college, probably in New York, where most of her relatives had already moved. Although her school was one in which violent confrontations between Greeks and Albanians were frequent, she denied having heard anything about them, for "this is boys' business." She equally denied having noticed the racist graffiti painted on the schoolyard walls. Probably she adopted this 'blind' stance because she didn't trust a Greek male researcher. But it could be equally true that her 'ignorance' was not a fake but an indented one. She just wanted her own striving for academic excellence to be undistracted by setbacks related to the old country. In other words, she didn't like the idea that silly fights between boys could interfere with her all-American academic plans.

It seems that the option to bypass national allegiances was not available to most male respondents of this study. For instance, Spyros, the TEE student, born in Gjirokastrë a town within the Greek minority zone of Southern Albania: his grandfather was a Greek citizen, born in Athens who had relatives in southern Albania. He was visiting them when WW II broke out. For the following fifty years it was impossible for him to cross the 'Iron Curtain' that the Cold War had erected. Spyros's family left Albania as soon as the border opened, looking for a better life and the grandfather's house in Athens. According to Spyros' careful description of his roots, both parents are Albanian nationals, but his father is of Greek ancestry and his mother's background is Albanian. His mixed ethnic roots exacerbate the 'translation' complexities inherent in the process of migration. Nevertheless, he does not seem to care much: "Either my nationality or citizenship is Greek. I am not sure which one of these two things is the case. In any case, I am *omogenis*."

Despite Spyros' Greek background and fluency in Greek it seems that upon his arrival he had more or less the same reception that the majority of Albanian children experienced. Although he stated that nowadays he has as many Greek friends as Albanians, it seems that his early negative experiences in Greece consolidated his self-identification as an Albanian national. Thus, when a football game ended in group-fighting between Greek and Albanian students, sometime before his interview, he was on the Albanian side.

Albanian-born young immigrants of mixed Albanian and Greek ethnic origin are juggling competing allegiances and attachments. In general they are pursuing individualised trajectories of integration and they seek to reduce tensions by having good relations with all sides of the ethnicised border. However, most of them 'choose' to reaffirm their Albanian nationality in the face of natives' hegemonic nationalism, their exposure to

slurs related to their origin, and indiscriminate racist treatment<sup>59</sup>. It seems that an assertive stance towards ethnic roots provides these children with a protective boundary and a point of reference to establish their self-worth (Portes 1999; Portes and Rumbaut 2001: 148). After all, as Hannah Arendt has pointed out: "One can resist only in terms of the identity that is under attack" (cited in Bhatt 2004).

#### **4.4.2 Perceptions of the historicity of Greco-Albanian rivalry**

Say that Albania was a normal country, or even a nice place to live. If I were in that Albania and immigrants came to my country, I wouldn't bother if an American or a Turk immigrant, even an Italian came. But if he was Greek that's another story. If a Greek immigrant celebrated with his national team in my country I would be really cross. I don't mean it personally; I am just trying to explain how people feel. Because so many things have happened, so-called crimes, stabbings in the back. The Greeks blame us for so many things.

Marco

---

<sup>59</sup> Portes (1999) terms 'reactive ethnicity' the type of ethnic identity formation that highlights the role of a hostile context of reception in accounting for the rise rather than the erosion of ethnicity among a particular migrant group. Yet he differentiates linear from reactive ethnicity. The former is not reinforced through reaction. Although I fully appreciate the salience of such interactions, and the transactional nature of ethnicity (Nagel 1994), I don't consider 'reactive ethnicity' an appropriate term for interpreting the process that forges young Albanians' strong national self-identification. Portes employs 'reactive ethnicity' in a way specific to US social landscape and in relation with groups that turn away from integration and "immigrants who are in the country, but are certainly not of it, preferring to see themselves as belonging elsewhere both socially and economically" (Portes 1999: 465). Thus the term is used interchangeably with immigrant youth's assimilation into the 'adversarial subculture' of downtrodden segments of native minorities (Portes and Zhou 1993). The majority of Albanian-identified youth of this study, ethnic-Albanians and Greek-Albanians, do not follow this mode of incorporation. On the contrary, it seems that the extent of their national assertiveness positively correlates with the degree of their integration in the main of Greek society. However, it has to be mentioned that in 2001 'Legacies', Portes and Rumbaut's influential study of the immigrant 'new' second generation in the US, reactive ethnicity was not any more associated exclusively with immigrant groups that 'refuse' to integrate (Portes and Rumbaut 2001: 148). Within this broader conceptualisation the most interesting empirical analogy with Albanian-born immigrants in Greece is again that of Californian Mexicans, immigrants and native born, who responded to Californian state's anti-immigrant policies by reaffirming their ties with their Mexican cultural heritage and ethnonational identity (Portes and Rumbaut 2001; Rumbaut 1997b).



Strong feelings like those expressed by Marco give away many Albanian respondents' perception of a profound and insurmountable Greco-Albanian rivalry. Jenan, the Muslim student originating in Tirana, whose family came to Greece some ten years ago, made equally strong statements. My question about what is specific in Greco-Albanian relations that is responsible for such hostility received an elaborated treatment from him. Since both his parents held comparatively well-paid skilled jobs, he does not need to work parallel to school, and he is heading for university studies. He states that nowadays most of his friends are Greeks. However, some problems in his relationship with them are difficult to overcome, and apparently he has thought a great deal about them:

Jenan: The past and history always play a great role in people's relations. Many things have happened and people do remember them. Episodes during the Ottoman occupation. I 've read about them, and also know them from my father's stories.

*PP: What do you have in mind?*

Jenan: What I mean? Greeks have a grudge against Turks, from the time of the Ottoman occupation and at that time Albanians used to help Turks. By the same token, on many recent occasions some Albanians, not all of them, behaved very badly to Greeks. They have done crimes, killings, kidnappings, many things. Well if I was in my country and a foreigner did these things maybe I would behave even more outrageously.

*PP: But Albanians and Greeks have also fought together in many instances...*

Jenan: Well, on the other hand, also important was the Islamisation of many Albanians by the Turks. However, these are very old stories. If we, Greeks and Albanians, are civilised enough, we can talk about history. We have a lot in common; there are things that unite us, but also ... other things that both sides cannot forget. The *Vorioepiotes* for instance detest the entire Albania and they are like ...hurray Greece. I can understand.

Jenan's vague account which emphasises rivalry in Greco-Albanian relations probably reflects the climate of ethnic polarisation within the school. However, the historical events he mentioned are not only part of the secondary school curriculum, but have also been further discussed with his father<sup>60</sup>. Nevertheless, Jenan considers possible the two people's

---

<sup>60</sup> For instance, he mentioned the fact that the quasi-autonomous Albanian tribes supplied the Ottoman army with contingents of inexpensive fighting men and recruits (Durham 1971; Hasluck and Hutton 1954). These irregular Albanian troops that were in the service of the Turks were considered responsible for atrocities that

reconciliation through a balanced reading of their respective national narratives, and the appreciation of commonalities. Panayotis, another Greek-Albanian Lyceum student, focuses on the impact of more recent historical events, namely the 1999 NATO-led bombing campaign against Yugoslavia and the resulting military intervention in Kosovo:

The Albanian children that were in Greece during the Kosovo bombardment probably haven't been much influenced by the fact that Greeks supported Serbs. But the children that were in Albania at that time are a different story. The children that used to live in Albania at the time of the Kosovo war heard one version of these events, whereas we in Greece quite another. It was a real-war situation and that caused an additional source of hostility between Greeks and Albanians.

In all likelihood the 1990s wars of Yugoslavia and the ensuing redrawing of borderlines was the chief factor that made the reinterpretations of history popular throughout the region. Albanian immigrants to Greece have watched this geopolitical process and it is likely that their allegiances were different from those of most Greeks who actively opposed the NATO air campaign against Yugoslavia in June 1999 (Ali 1999: 62; Pesmazoglou 2000: 310). In general, the 1990s NATO intervention in the Balkans accentuated Greeks' alienation from the policies of the 'West'. By contrast, many Albanians felt that these policies were in immediate support of their suffering co-ethnics of Kosovo and that in the long-term they were serving historical Albanian national aspirations<sup>61</sup>. These conflicting geopolitical national allegiances reinforced many Greeks' phobic tendency to see in the presence of Albanian immigrants the spectre of a migrant 'fifth column' serving foreign interests.

How significant is the past for the shaping of Greco-Albanian contemporary relations? According to a 2003 ICAP survey of a sample of 1,002 Greeks, aged 18-64 years old,

---

ravaged Greek populations during various phases of the Greek struggle for independence (Skoulidas 2002; Stavrianos 2002 [1958]: 189).

<sup>61</sup> A different coupling of the relation between domestic ethnic groups and geopolitics has been observed in France. In this case, it is the alignment of France with western policies towards the situation in the Middle East that has some impact on the relations between native-born French people and minorities of Maghrebin origin and Muslim faith. In France these marginalised young people are taking refuge in identifying with the 'global nation' of Islam (Kastoryano 2005). Body-Gendrot refers to this coupling of the domestic with the global processes as the "internalisation of the exterior" (2004: 160).

history is quite important. Sixty five percent of the sample reported that history is responsible for the rivalry in Greco-Albanian relations (Xatjigeorgiou 2003). The commentator Robert Kaplan described the Balkans as "a region of pure memory", where the processes of history and memory are constantly creating a multiplying effect for conflict and violence (Kaplan 1993). In a similar vein, others seem to believe that "these Balkan people... unfortunately produce more history than they can consume domestically"<sup>62</sup> (Vickers 1999: quotation introducing chapter 4). The Greek historian P. Kitromilidis (2003: 19) rejects such clichés by arguing that "those who know more and have a sense of the complexity of the history of the region tend to be more modest and circumspect in their judgments and pronouncements." Moreover, prominent figures of the Balkan historiography like Maria Todorova (1994: 460) and Mark Mazower (2000: 133-134) renounce the 'neo-orientalist' discourse of 'balkanism' which portrays the destiny of the region as being hostage to the powers of history and culture. They argue that the history of the Balkans does appear as less violent and confrontational when one compares it for instance with 20<sup>th</sup> century Europe. Roudometof (1999: 242) has taken the argument a step further by contending that it is the reorganisation of the region according to the Western European model of nation-state that is responsible for post-Cold-War actual or potential ethnic conflicts in South-eastern Europe.

The previously cited accounts of Albanian respondents suggest that the westerners' essentialist and ossified iconographies of the region as prone to conflict due to its own history have also been internalised by local people (Kitromilides 2003: 19; Tziovas 2003: 1). However, Albanian youths' need to come to terms with the conflicting aspects of Greco-Albanian historical relations can better be understood as part of their negotiation of boundaries with the constitutive Other, their Greek schoolmates. During this process although it appears as if they invoke "an origin in a historical past with which they continue to correspond" actually they are "using the resources of history, language, and culture" in order to explore questions of identity pertinent to what they might become, how they have been represented and how that bears on how they might represent themselves (Hall 1996b: 4).

---

<sup>62</sup> The catching phrase belongs to the Victorian short-story writer H.H. Munro (1870-1916) who used the pen-name Saki.

#### 4.4.3 Are ethnic pride and assimilation true enemies?

What appears as a paradox is that those Albania-born youths who were more assertive about their national identity were the very ones better adapted to the host society and its youthful lifestyles<sup>63</sup>. Young people of Albanian ancestry who had spent less time in Greece or were more socially isolated were more likely to be timid in expressing their national feelings; probably out of hesitation or -even more notably- by being less exposed to adverse interactions with the natives and the process of ethnicisation. This does not imply that the firm national self-identification of the more 'acculturated' Albanian respondents is solely the outcome of the process of ethnicisation. The characteristics of the Albania-Greece migration system that underpins Albanian migrants' *linear ethnicity* was previously presented in Section 4.4.1. Furthermore, I tried to probe these nationally proud Albanian youths' perception of their status in Greece by inviting their responses to the chant of the far right: "Albanian, you will never become Greek."

Erion's attitude was unequivocal in denouncing the racist rejection in advance. For him no matter how much the incorporation of Albanian immigrants in Greek society might proceed it will never manage to alter their national identity. Consequently, the nature of their presence in Greece will remain *contractual*:

As far as I know, I don't think that any Albanian-Albanian wants to become Greek. Well if someone wants to fix his papers, to have an identity card, or even to be naturalized, this is for practical reasons. The *Vorioepiotes* are a different story. They want to be Greeks.

---

<sup>63</sup> Chicago School sociologists, Park, Thomas, Znaniecki and Wirth observed that pre-World War I immigrants participating in ethnic institutions and celebrating ethnic difference fared best in the world outside their group (Lal 1995: 430). In the framework of the more complex post-1965 immigration to US, some migrant groups (i.e. Cubans) also adopted an effective adaptation strategy predominantly depending on resources made available through the institutions and the economic niches of the co-ethnic community (Portes and Zhou 1993). Lal refers to this phenomenon as the 'ethnicity paradox'. However, here I am interested in posing the reverse of Lal's 'paradox': better integrated young immigrants of Albanian origin appear keener in manifesting their ethnic identity. Unlike the US it seems that this tendency is not grounded on advantages offered by ethnic networks and migrants' institutions for such bodies remain markedly underdeveloped in Greece and thus exert little influence on Albanian immigrants' life-chances. More important for the young immigrants who managed to adapt better could be the link of self-esteem with ethnic pride. As Modood has pointed out "for members of minorities, individual self-esteem critically hangs upon group dignity and group status" (Modood 1992:5 cited in Lal 1995).

In the same vein as the previously cited respondent, Jenan also rejected the exclusionist chant as irrelevant and offered a complementary explanation that highlighted the parallels with the Greek guest-workers of the 1950s in order to stress the temporality of Albanian migrants' presence in Greece:

The chant is irrelevant, because Albanians do not want to become Greeks. Racists never asked if an Albanian wants to become Greek. What bothers me most is the rejection in advance. We are like the Greek immigrants in Germany or America. While they were there they continued to support Greece wholeheartedly. And one day they returned back to their mother-country.

Kostas, took the arguments of other Albanian respondents a step further by arguing that all provisions that enhance the position of Albanians in Greece to something beyond the status of migrant labourers are not necessary. It is worth noting that Kostas is Orthodox, his father is ethnic Greek while the mother is of Albanian background:

*PP: What could help immigrants to have a better life here in Greece? Some people say a long term residence permit or even offering them dual nationality might be helpful.*

Kostas: The long term permit could be helpful as a financial relief. Because we pay € 2,000 per year only for 'papers'. We are fed up with paying all these years.

*PP: Apart from the financial thing does the long term permit makes any difference in everyday life?*

Kostas: Not really, because only now and then we have to renew the permits. Well it would help people not to lose a day's wages waiting in queues to have their 'papers' renewed. Now the dual nationality thing is rubbish. Your nationality is only one and has to do with the place you were born in. Your birth place is your nationality. You can't change this.

*PP: The proposal for immigrants voting in local elections? Is there any good in electing representatives at the local council?*

Kostas: Well, we pay taxes, and many decisions affect us too. But, on the other hand we are immigrants we don't have any reason to be involved a lot. We are somewhere in-between locals and foreigners. The provisions you mentioned are related to secondary aspects of migrants' life, so they are not necessary.

The understanding of Albanians' position in Greece as temporary labour migrants probably draws not only from the analogy with the Greek guest-workers of the 1950s (Castles 2000)

but also from the legacy of the pre-World War II seasonal Albanian migration known as *kurbet*<sup>64</sup> (Mai and Schwandner-Sievers 2003). The centrality of the "we are like you were in Germany" parallelism in these accounts reveals a need to stress the temporality of migrants' presence in Greece, to overemphasise the *contractual* character of all gestures of adherence to the Greek way of life, like the adoption of a second 'Greek' name, and the conversion or rediscovery of Orthodox Christianity, or even the use of false documents presenting themselves as *Vorioepiotes* (De Rapper 2004; Hart 1999). In short, many Albanian immigrants in Greece like their counterparts in the United States and Western Europe during their early stages of settlement feel that citizen status is of minor importance, and have little incentive to seek naturalisation (Sassen 1993: 102).

Nevertheless, save pragmatism, explicit in Albania-born young respondents' indifference to naturalisation is the manifestation of commitment to their Albanian national roots. Even further, underneath the previously cited accounts one discerns a strong reservation towards real or putative assimilationist Greek state-policies towards immigrants. It seems clear to me that the young Albanian respondents who professed their ethnonational identity felt that this is an identity under threat. This explains the need to reject policies like those of dual nationality or even voting in local elections, as an unwelcome blurring of the distinctiveness of the ethnic or national boundaries. Probably the rejection of the spectre of assimilation by this group of assertive young Albanians also has to be interpreted as a rebuffing of what they perceive as a chameleonic survival tactic of many compatriots of them. We have seen previously in relation to the 'flag' controversies that for Jenan "people with two mother-countries", although not exactly "traitors" proper, had to decide between "either Greece or Albania"<sup>65</sup>.

Useful in order to get a deeper understanding of this stance, is the ethnographic evidence which comes from the other side of the Greco-Albanian border and the Albanian-speaking Christian villages of Lunxhëri, a mountainous region facing the town of Gjirokastër in Southern Albania (De Rapper 2005). On the basis of his fieldwork in this region anthropologist De Rapper reports that during the communist times these Albanian-

---

<sup>64</sup> The word derives from Turkish and refers to the age-long practice of temporary labour migration of male artisans which was embedded in the agro-pastoral context of their rural communities.

<sup>65</sup> "Being both Albanian and Greek is equal to being nobody" vehemently exclaimed another young Albanian informant who had spend some time working in Greece, and has probably gone through the 'straits' of ethnicisation (Kretsi 2005: 207).

speaking Orthodox Christian villagers used to be called 'Greeks' by Muslim Albanians. However, the 1990s mass emigration resulted in, among other significant transformations in Southern Albania, a renegotiation of ethnic and religious boundaries, namely the opposition of Lunxhots against Muslim and Vlach co-nationals<sup>66</sup>. (De Rapper 2004). In short, Albanian-speaking Orthodox Christians felt necessary to reassert their Albanian national identity by accusing migrants to Greece belonging to all other ethnic groups of Southern Albanian of being susceptible to Hellenisation. For instance, the Vlachs, who in communist times held an inferior social position, in the era of migration to Greece have managed to advance their relative position through the adoption not only of a 'grecophile' attitude but even a rejuvenated Greco-Vlach identity<sup>67</sup>. The resentment of Lunxhots is in particular fuelled by the favouritist treatment of 'grecophiles' of Southern Albania by the Greek consuls not only in terms of visa and work permit granting but also in terms of allocating scholarships to the youth, and securing pensions for the elderly (Kretsi 2005: 205-207; Tsitselikis and Xristopoulos 2003: 32).

Orthodox Albanians' relations with the Greek minority of Albania appear to be more ambiguous: the complexity of this relation is a result on the one hand of the history of Greco-Albanian national antagonisms, and on the other of the reconfirmed salience of a shared membership in Orthodox Christianity, the overall cultural proximity, and finally the two groups' intermarriage<sup>68</sup>. In keeping with the regional legacy of ethnic groups' complex

---

<sup>66</sup> Vlach or Aromanian people live in Northern Greece, Southern Albania, and FYROM, speak a romance language, and have traditionally been livestock breeders (Schwandner-Sievers 1999).

<sup>67</sup> In Albanian such pro-Greek groups are termed as 'filogrek'.

<sup>68</sup> Based on a study of a Soros Foundation, Baltiotis (2003) reports that one in two marriages of Albania's ethnic-Greeks is to a member of another ethnic group. Before 1990 the Albanian national identity was prevalent among the offspring of such marriages especially in the towns of the minority zone where the intermarriage rate was much higher than in villages. Furthermore he argues that currently, in the major urban centres of the Greek minority zone, the children of mixed ethnic parentage as well as many children with both parents of ethnic-Greek origin, juggle allegiances to an Albanian national identity and to a Greek one (Baltiotis 2003: 75). Along with Kretsi (2004) I would rather consider a step-too-much the employment of the 'double identity' scheme for its essentialist connotations. It is more likely that these double identities represent mutable self-understandings, a form of 'code-switching' (Waters 1994) that occurs amid manifest redefinitions of ethnic-groups' boundaries in South Albania. Each of these self-identifications could appear as more salient in specific contexts and vis-à-vis particular audiences.

and rapidly shifting allegiances<sup>69</sup> many of them recognised having some Greek background. Moreover, in the context of migration to Greece sometimes declare themselves as *Vorioepiotes* in order to facilitate access to the labour and housing markets. All in all, according to De Rapper's succinct conclusion, Lunxhotes for being potential Greeks they choose to be Albanians (De Rapper 2005: 192).

Likewise, on the other side of the border and the metropolitan centre of Athens we have seen that the emotionally inscribed identity strategy that young Albanians respondents clearly prefer is the one best expressed by Jenan: "To be Albanian at heart while simply living in Greece." It seems that in early 2000s such a stance was representative of the feelings of most youths of Albanian immigrant background. A significant Greek study in the field of social psychology, which employed Berry's conceptual framework of 'acculturation strategies'<sup>70</sup>, found that Albanian respondents 'scored' quite high on measurements of both willingness to maintain contact with other members of their ethno-cultural group and willingness to develop relationships with the larger society (Besevegis and Pavlopoulos 2006). Consequently, Albanian immigrants were classified as -in the main- pursuing an integration strategy combining willingness to maintain their national identity with aspirations for incorporation and social mobility within the new societal context.

Eventually, it seems reasonable to assume that the need of the most assertive Albanian respondents to overemphasise their national consciousness exactly emanates from their relatively high level of integration into Greek society. Thus, their nationalism has to be seen as a means of defence against the spectre of assimilation. By explaining the paradox at hand in this way, one cannot resist the temptation to draw analogies with the case of pre-WW I European immigrants to the US. For them:

Assimilation, instead of washing out the memories of Europe, made them more and more intensely real. Just as these clusters became more and more objectively American did they become more German, or Scandinavian, or Polish.

(Bourne 1916 : 86) cited in Portes (1999)

---

<sup>69</sup> At this point is useful to turn to the logic of oppositional segmentation which was identified by anthropological studies within Greece's 'New Territories' (Papataxiarchis 2006a: 28; 2006b:440).

<sup>70</sup> In the framework of Berry's cross-cultural psychology (1997) immigrant identity strategies are conceived as acculturation strategies (Berry et al. 1992: 357). Berry's theory discerns four types of such strategies: integration, assimilation, segregation or marginalisation.



Albanian-born youths who have achieved a fair level of acculturation and incorporation feel the need to counterbalance it by reserving a more intimate sphere related to their Albanian origins, in order both to anchor themselves against the adversities of an unfamiliar environment and to avoid the peril of cultural depletion. What differentiates them from the case of the previously mentioned pre-WW I European migrants to US is that their strong ethnic self-identification, underpinned as it is by nativist stereotypical portrayal, regional nationalism, and occasional tensions in Greco-Albanian relations, is less certain that it is going to pale swiftly into the state of 'symbolic ethnicity' (Gans 1979). The latter is an optional type of leisure-time ethnic membership revolving around the consumption of ethnic symbols. However, it remains to be seen whether ethnic assertiveness is only relevant to foreign-born children and the context of 1990s, or children born in Greece by Albanian parents will later on insist on considering ethnonational heritage as central to their self-understanding.

#### **4.4.4 The long-term prospects**

But if labour immigration is perceived as temporal, who are those who mostly want to return back to Albania? Aurelia explains:

Our fathers, who were raised in Albania, say that "at some point we have to return." But first we have to raise some money, in order to have something to eat. My father, for instance, grumbles all the time that we have to return. He can't stand his job. In Albania he was a medical doctor and here he works as a male nurse. He is not young any more, he is fifty-three, and is tired.

We know that although most labour migrants envision their migration as a short-term project eventually they tend to stay at the host country much longer than they had initially anticipated (Castles 1985). For immigrant families that have school-age children the reason that makes them likely to decide to stay in Greece is related to children's prospects<sup>71</sup>. These children's words are themselves very informative about the way they make sense of their future chances:

---

<sup>71</sup> The Albanian parents interviewed by Cavounidis reported that the more their children advanced in school the more difficult it becomes for them to return to Albania (2004a: 88).

There are families who either don't want or don't expect to return. Basically, because of the children... 'Cause my parents or another child's parents who are older, one day they will return. They're going to have some pension, and at any event they have a house there. In other words they have a base in Albania. But I don't have any. I am trying to build a basis here. If I return back there I will be at point zero. Here I have reached ..say.. number eight. But I do exist. I have made a start. I can't say that I am the best or that I've secured a place at university, and that my future is on the safe side. But I keep trying...

Jenan

However, we who have been brought up here, we intend to stay. The advantages are more than the negative things. Some Albanians are thinking about going to the US or to Belgium to work for two or three years and then returning here or to Albania. Well to settle down again with the family and everything in another foreign country is very difficult. To start from scratch again... even thinking about it is too much hassle.

Enrit

For me it is simple. I can't speak Albanian, so there is nothing I can do back there. Other people like me say: "I am thinking of selling my house in Albania and buying something here."

Spyros

However, it has to be mentioned that a small number of immigrant-origin youths explicitly reported their intention to settle abroad either because they were fed-up with Greece or in order to better their chances in education and employment. Usually the plan is to join relatives in the USA or Germany<sup>72</sup> after secondary school graduation in order to attend college studies or in other cases to seek employment that offers a career prospect. However, most of those who are thinking of the possibility of a next migration project don't nurture any illusion about the situation elsewhere. Probably the most important factor when engaging in further migration plans is that foreign-born youth want to challenge the idea that the limited opportunities that Greece offers is the only chance they have:

For me it is like I want to leave, I don't mind leaving Greece, but simply I don't want to go back to Albania. The situation in Tirana is now better, but don't get too excited. Still it is not much different from the city as it was when we left. My brother lives in Milan but right

---

<sup>72</sup> The two countries have large Albanian communities.

now I can't go there, 'cause I still have some problems with my papers. Anyways the situation there is the same as in Greece. I mean in relation with Albanians. They are treated the same way. Not only in Milan but all over Italy. Well, when I have finished Lyceum probably I will join my brother to study at university, and then I will go elsewhere. I have cousins in the UK, in London. I would like to go there but I don't know yet.

Aurelia

For the group of Albanian-identified and Greek-Albanian male students who in effect were raised in Greece, work part-time while attending a technical school, do not have university plans and do not seek to 'escape' elsewhere, the meaningful option is to strive for a decent position within Greek working classes. Kostas explained best what future makes sense for the youths that have been imparted their parents' immigrant ethic of hard work, perseverance, and loyalty to the ethnic group:

We are focused to our lives. Many Albanians I know have managed to buy a house by working hard. Little by little they've increased their wage. They have accepted the fact that they are going to stay in this country. All those years they haven't seen any improvement in Albania. So if you are ready to work hard and you don't like to drink coffee all day you can do well. If you look after your money and you don't spend mindless, you can manage. Me, I want to finish Technical School, then find a job, so to have my life rolling.

## **4.5 Conclusions**

The most important findings of this chapter are, firstly, those related to foreign-born students' perceptions of their place in the society in which their families have settled, and secondly, to the outcomes of immigrant-origin youths' engagement with the social process that shape and sustain ethnic boundaries (Barth 1969). Entailed in this process of defining membership to the nation are the discursive opposites of migrants' rejection and assimilation, for they delineate specific criteria of inclusion and exclusion. The interviewees' relevant negotiations exposed the extent of their various forms of ethnonational identifications.

Before presenting these findings a note of warning regarding their contextual specificity is deemed necessary. It has to be stressed that overall the interviewed young immigrant students of inner-city secondary schools degree of acculturation and fluency in

Greek was rendering them practically indistinguishable from their Greek classmates. Significant in this regard is the fact that, although all of them were foreign-born, only two had less than five years of residence in the host country. Approximately fifty percent of the interviewees had been in Greece for ten or more years. The majority of interviewed ethnic-Greeks of Albania belonged to this group of long-resident youths for their families migrated as soon as the Greco-Albanian border has opened. A smaller part of ethnic-Greeks of Albania migrated in 1997 following Albanian 'pyramid' crisis.

The overwhelming majority of the respondents (three quarters) were children born in Albania and three others were born in Georgia. Only eight out of 27 students had an 'ethnic' -to Greek ears- first name. All but four were Orthodox Christians. Yet, five respondents explicitly reported that they had been baptized after their arrival in Greece. An additional contextual factor to bear in mind is that the inner-city schools that all these foreign-born students attended have been until at least 2003 arenas of ethnicised conflict, typically between Greeks and Albanians. However, after this turning point the exclusionary attitudes of a large part of the native population were gradually overwhelmed by integrationist elite discourses and state policies with explicit or implicit assimilatory connotations.

The foreign-born students' varied reactions to the challenges posed by the exclusionist and assimilationist polar opposites of the Greek reception regime were of critical importance for the performance of corresponding types of ethnic identification. Although these types of identification partly overlap and are in a state of flux, at the examined phase of migrant integration students' perception of ethnic identity can be ideally classified as follows:

- The largest part of foreign-born students (approximately four-fifths) was not very vocal about issues related to their ethnonational identity, although it was clearly not in denial of it. Even among the Albanian-born this was the case for more than half of the respondents. The foreign-born students of this category were aware of the exclusionary or even racist attitudes of many Greeks but they trusted that through resources and opportunities available to them within the host society they could circumvent such adversities and pursue their long-term interests and aspirations. Female students' attitudes are more frequently representative of this category's preference for individualized life-trajectories, irrespective of the existence of academic aspirations. For this group of foreign-born youngsters an immigrant identity appears to prevail, in

the sense that their ethnonational identification rather constitutes a linear extension of their nationality, a mere reflection of the fact that they were born abroad. Thus, even Pontian ethnic-Greeks support Russia in the event of a football game against the national team of Greece. In general, these youths are not keen to relinquish their bond with the motherland. Nevertheless, gradually their most vivid and affective ties are with segments of the host society. Because of their non-assertive identification with a national origin and their tendency to downplay discriminatory experiences, respondents belonging to this category were likely to be swayed by various native youthful cultures.

- Youths who self-identified as *Vorioepiotes* forged an ardent Greek identity combined with strong anti-Albanian feelings. In schools where they had significant presence they reinforced boundaries separating them from ethnic-Albanian classmates. However, it seems that eventually their militant nationalism backfired in the sense that most Greek children distanced themselves from their agenda. Because of their eagerness to become Greek nationals, they did not want to be considered as immigrants any more. And indeed because of language proficiency, their long-residence, and finally their determination for upward social mobility they already had a high level of cultural and structural assimilation and most of them headed for university studies.
- The interview material offered by a number of Albanian-born male students (6-8 respondents) revealed assertive Albanian ethnonational identification. The group of Albanian-identified boys was on average well acculturated and integrated into their multi-ethnic school environment. Typically, they were intelligent, mature, and socially 'smart' young persons. However, their educational performance was rather modest either as Lyceum or as TEE students, and at best their aspirations were for technical/vocational studies and skilled blue-collar jobs. These youths' strong Albanian national identification has been reinforced by past incidents of racist confrontation and everyday discrimination. In this sense what differentiated their self-identification from the immigrant identified youths of the first category is that their ethnicity has been amplified through an acute awareness of the native exclusionary attitudes. Half of the students who asserted an Albanian national identity were of a mixed Greek-Albanian parentage and of Orthodox faith. It seems that these children had to stress their Albanianness for their boundary with the ethnic-Greeks of Albania is difficult to be established in their case. Consequently, they were more likely than the children born to two Albanian parents to oppose future state-policies aiming to advance immigrants'

civic status and enhance their participation. Such policies were perceived by them as an additional threat to the singularity of their national allegiance. Overall, it seems that this small group of assertive Albania-identified youths in a way voiced values, and adaptation strategies of the broader community of Albanian migrant labourers in Athens. After all, these youths destined themselves to follow up their parents' path by joining the ranks of an ethnically hued segment of Greek working classes. Their stated preference was for a mode of societal incorporation similar to that of guest workers in Western Europe, albeit without anticipating or hoping for swift 'repatriation'. Probably in the near future their multilayered identities will include an accenting class identity along with a retained national-origin identity. But arguably there will hardly be room for hyphenated ethnic identifications (i.e.: a Greek-Albanian identity).

Finally, despite the negative aspects of immigrants' reception regime in Greece there is no evidence in this chapter's interview material that a youthful immigrant group was running the risk of adopting an 'adversarial outlook' denying interaction with broader society. Respondents' fleeting references to Albanian-born youths who out of reaction to racism turned verbally against all Greeks also made clear that these were youths who had many Greek friends. All in all, the state of interethnic affairs in 2005 inner-city Athens was characterized by reluctant but significant forms of contact and mixing.

---

## Chapter 5

### New Dangerous Classes in the Making?

---

#### 5.1 Alterity, youth, violence and moral panics

On Monday 28 March 2005, a car stopped next to 18-year-old student Vasilis Mamopoulos, in the Athens costal suburb of Ellinikon. Only Michalis, one of the three young men who exited the car, knew Vasilis Mamomoulos since both attended the same secondary school. The other two, one 17-year-old Albanian and one 21-year-old ethnic Greek born in Egypt were hired by Michalis to assist him. The three met in a café. Michalis and Vasilis started to quarrel over a sum of € 5,000 that the first had lent to the second, a year before. According to the police, the Albanian adolescent was holding Vasilis Mamomoulos down when Michalis shot him twice with a sawn-off stun-pistol killing him. The three perpetrators entered the car and escaped. Later they got rid of the pistol by throwing it to the sea. According to the police, Michalis admitted that the other two were not aware of his intentions<sup>73</sup>.

The horrible crime gained considerable publicity and triggered widespread concerns about the escalation of violent crime in Greece. Although this was not the first time that the media's attention focused on the issue of violent youthful crime, the nature of the particular crime was considered to be different from what was usually of interest for the press. However, the publicity it gained and the debate that it provoked, did not reach the level of moral panic. The most likely explanation for the relative absence of alarmist discourses is related to the fact that both the main perpetrator and the victim were Greek citizens and children of well-off families. The fact that the two of them attended a private school in a relatively affluent neighbourhood of the city make them unsuitable representatives of the youthful 'dangerous other'. With regards to the non-national perpetrators, what seems

---

<sup>73</sup> Ta Nea, 31-03-2005; Kathimerini, 31-03-2005; To Vima 03-04-2005.

important is the element that professor of psychology and columnist Tsalikoglou brought to the fore (2005). She drew a parallel between the auxiliary role that the Albanian young man played in the particular crime and the roles that the labour market assigns to Albanian labourers. Whether this case is an exemplar of foreign youths' participation in a criminal division of labour is a question that will to be examined later in section 6.5.2, on the basis of ethnographic data.

Very different was the treatment that the press and TV in particular reserve when the protagonist in a violent crime is an immigrant, preferably an Albanian. Among the most striking examples was the exhaustive and sensational coverage of three incidents of public bus hijackings by Albanians that occurred over the period 1999-2004 (Papailias 2003). Many newspaper front pages and countless hours of TV footage seized the opportunity to construct spectres of instinctually violent and inherently criminal Albanians that threaten everybody's security. The publicity that such stories received is indicative of what the mainstream media consider as 'newsworthy'. At any rate, media's hyping up of foreign criminality shapes the collective imagery and contribute to the exaggeration of crime-related concerns, which around the end of 1990s culminated in widespread anxiety about foreigners, crime, and violence and a reshaped political agenda, the top of which was occupied by the 'citizens' security' and 'imported crime' discourses<sup>74</sup>. At a lesser degree anxieties were directed towards a more 'traditional' enemy, which also seems to go out of control: the 'unruly youth' in general.

The next section 5.2 examines whether the available police statistics justify such fears. There are three additional major sections in the current chapter. Section 5.3 presents self-report data that were collected in Athens by the 2003 UMHRI school-survey in order to examine questions relevant to the prevalence of violent behaviours. Section 5.4 is based on qualitative data gathered from interviews with students and young offenders of immigrant ancestry. The aim of this section is to make sense of immigrant-origin youths' engagement in violence, either as perpetrators or victims. The final section presents the most significant findings and offers conclusions.

---

<sup>74</sup> Probably because of its decisive political impact and its heavy load of symbolic bearings on Greek society, the Flamur Pili story became the theme of the semi-documentary film 'Hostage', which was directed by C. Giannaris. The film had negative reception by both the audience and critics in Greece, for many felt that the fictionalised presentation of Pili's struggle for honour restoration and masculine dignity offered justification to his unlawful acts.



## **5.2 Police statistics**

All attempts to examine crime trends in Greece rely heavily on police statistics (Pitsela 2004). As in other parts of the world, the data produced by the Greek police only partially capture the extent of crime and delinquency. Furthermore, it is well known to criminologists that criminal statistics are partly a by-product of the operation of the law enforcement agencies and are heavily affected by the changes in police policies. Thus, the fluctuation of these statistics frequently reflects the intensification or relaxation of the law enforcement practices rather than real variations of the crime and delinquency phenomenon (Maguire 2007; Muncie 2004: 17; Newburn 2007a: 50-61; Pitsela 2004: 448-454)<sup>75</sup>. Since police practices and priorities are so important for the production of official statistics, it is useful to note that -to a large extent- the Greek police are a self-ruled corps and despite recent improvements, it is still far away from fully embracing the spirit of professionalism. A propensity for retreat and apathy, whenever the political conjuncture allows it, seems to be a core element of its organisational ethos (Lambropoulou 2004 :105).

Nevertheless, in the case of youthful violent crime, like assaults, bodily harm, and vandalism, police statistics are not a function of the intensity of policing, but rather depend, to a large degree, on public reporting. Police data regarding homicides and robberies are considered as relatively reliable, for victims and witnesses are more likely to report such violent crimes and the police are more likely to take action. By contrast, police statistics related to assaults and bodily harm offences are less reliable and represent only a portion of the actual prevalence of this type of delinquency (Courakis 2004). This is probably due to the fact that Greek society is more tolerant towards the violent young offender than the thief, and consequently the public is less willing to report violent incidents to the police (Nova-Kaltsouni 1993, cited in Pitsela 2004 : 472). Moreover, even in the case when the victims themselves report a violent offence to the police, it is not certain that it will be recorded in police figures, for sometimes the officer in charge might decide not to process the case, and thus does not proceed to the actions mandated by the law (Pitsela 2004: 459).

---

<sup>75</sup> Thus this seems not to be a Greek peculiarity but a rather universal phenomenon: for instance, Farrington's (1992) explanation for the statistical decline in juvenile crime of UK in the late 1980s attributes it to the changes in the British police policies (cited in Newburn 2002).

A more specific limitation of the police recording practices is the one that is specific to violent offending. Stanko (1994: 33) notes that the police "do not treat every reported incident of violence as criminal by recording it as such." Even recorded violent crime is very heterogeneous: for instance the statistics of Greek Criminal Justice aggregate several types of street crime under the rubric of robbery that are not violent to the same extent (muggings, bag snatching, and violent robberies)<sup>76</sup>.

Whatever the caveats, it is notable that police statistics reveal a more complicated picture than the alarmist oversimplified accounts of mainstream media. Official statistics regarding juvenile delinquency are released from the Greek Ministry of Public Order and concern alleged offenders aged 7 to 17 years old. According to these statistics children, aged 7 to 12, commit relatively few offences in general, and even fewer violent acts in particular (Spinellis and Tsitsoura 2006). Thus it is reasonable to exclude children from the examination of the over time change in the volume of serious violent offending. The relevant Courakis' study (2004: 187-202) is based on police statistics concerning suspects aged 13 through 17 year old<sup>77</sup>. The part of these data which is illustrated in *Figure 5.1* concerns intentional homicide, intentional bodily harms and robberies (including street robbery of bags). In the Greek context, these categories constitute the more serious forms of violent offending by young people.


The data of *Figure 5.1* suggest that violent offending by young people was declining in Greece until 1988. It seems that a period of slight but steady increase of violent offending committed by youths, aged 13 to 17, started after 1989. This pattern holds when the examination focuses on robberies: despite the significant fluctuations, the overall trend after 1989 and for ten years was a growing one. The number of recorded intentional bodily harms and robberies started to fall after 1999.

---

<sup>76</sup> Another classification difficulty arises from the fact that not all juveniles participating in a violent crime are personally violent. Rutter et al (1998: 108), refer to the differences of instrumental, angry, and sadistic aggression from "expressive" violent crime "which is not particularly directed towards a victim but is rather the result of frustration or boredom." It is well known that Kartz challenged the division between 'expressive' and 'instrumental' use of violence, by questioning the economic rationality and emphasising the sensual attraction of stickups (Katz 1988).

<sup>77</sup> According to Courakis (2004) the bulk of youth crime that appears in police statistics have been committed within the conurbation of Athens.

**Figure 5.1: Trends for more Serious Violent Offences attributed to Suspects aged 13 to17, known to Police, 1984-2002**



Source: Courakis 2004: 202

At this point, it is important to stress that the number of robberies committed by young people and all forms of recorded violent crime in general started to rise prior to the onset of mass influx of immigrants in Greece. The overall pattern of the statistics regarding assaults is rather stable, although there are evident periods of sharp increase (1993-95 and 1997-99). The number of homicides committed by children and adolescents is very small in Greece and remained so over the examined period. These findings support the claim of Baldwin-Edwards (2001) who rejects the myth of 'imported criminality'. He locates the onset of the crime rising trend in the 1980s and partly attributes it to the intensified modernisation and urbanisation of the Greek society.

The additional police statistics<sup>78</sup> which are presented below in *Table 5.1*, are considered to be more reliable than the previous, due to some modernisation of police recording practices (Spinellis 2007; Spinellis and Tsitsoura 2006). This dataset concerns alleged offenders, aged 7 to 17 years old, keeps record of their nationality, and covers the period 1999-2003, which is significant for this study. As *Table 5.1* indicates, the number of violent offenders is fluctuating over the period under examination, but the overall trend is clearly not escalating. Since robbery is the violent offence that is more consistently recorded by police statistics, the number of robbery suspects basically drives the overall

<sup>78</sup> Statistics that were issued by the Hellenic Ministry of Public Order but remain unpublished.

trend. However, when the numbers of suspects for sexual offences are examined separately, a rather rising pattern is revealed. Nevertheless, the number of victims reporting rape to the police is small. In the course of 2002, which was the worst year, the police recorded 19 minors as suspects for rape<sup>79</sup>.

**Table 5.1: Alleged Offenders aged 7 to 17, Recorded by the Police, 1999-2003, Selected Violent Offences**

TYPE OF OFFENCE	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
ASSAULT	55	44	37	51	36
HOMICIDE	8	4	0	2	3
ROBBERY	99	36	68	39	38
RAPE	5	14	14	0	19
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>167</b>	<b>98</b>	<b>119</b>	<b>92</b>	<b>96</b>

*Source: Ministry of Public Order, Unpublished Police Statistics*

All in all, the findings presented in the present section suggest that the trend of recorded violent offences was downward after 1999. This confirms Greek criminologists' consensual view, which argues that in spite of the media's sensational reporting the engagement of children and adolescents in violent crime in Greece remains rare (Pitsela 2004: 468; Spinellis 2007). On the other hand, police deal with only a fraction of youthful violent behaviours. In addition, some justification to public fears about the spread of violence might be offered by the possibility of a change not so much in the volume of recorded violent crime but rather in the nature or the severity of violent acts committed by young people. The criminologist Farsedakis, has argued in favour of such an explanation which suggests an increase in the severity of juvenile violent behaviours and crime. The same scholar considers the police statistics inherently inadequate to shed light to the evolution of the phenomenon in Greece (Nesfyge 2003). This is a hypothesis that cannot be examined by employing official crime statistics, but it will be assessed later in this chapter on the basis of qualitative data, and as far as violent offending of immigrant-origin youths is concerned.

<sup>79</sup> One has to bear in mind Tsigris contention that in Greece only 6 out of 100 rapes are reported to the police (Tsigris 1996).

### 5.2.1 The nationality of alleged violent offenders

The issue, which is closely related to the core questions asked by this study, concerns the nationality of those arrested for violent offences or crimes. According to *Table 5.2*, over the period 1999-2003, the police recorded 572 youths, aged 7 to 17, as suspects for 'violent against the person offences'. More than a quarter of those alleged violent offenders were of foreign nationality. The particular proportion suggests a substantial overrepresentation of non-national youth among violent offenders, which is even more elevated when particular serious crimes like homicide, robbery, or rape are examined separately.

**Table 5.2: Alleged Violent Offenders aged 7 to 17 by Nationality, 1999-2003**

TYPE OF OFFENCE	PROPORTION OF FOREIGNERS (PER CENT)		
	NATIVES	FOREIGNERS	
SIMPLE BODILY HARM	119	11	8.5
FELONIOUS BODILY HARM	25	8	24.2
GRIEVOUS BODILY HARM	38	21	35.6
LETHAL BODILY HARM	1	0	0.0
INTENDED HOMICIDE	10	2	16.7
ATTEMPTED HOMICIDE	2	3	60.0
ROBBERY	130	56	30.1
COMPLICITY TO ROBBERY	63	31	33.0
RAPE	33	19	36.5
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>421</b>	<b>151</b>	<b>26.4</b>

*Source: Ministry of Public Order, Unpublished Police Statistics*

As far as the assaults are concerned, an interesting pattern emerges: the more severe the nature of the offence the more elevated seems to be the representation of foreign youth. The most straightforward explanation would be that foreign minors or adolescents engage more frequently with extreme forms of violent conduct and offending. Alternative interpretations underline first, the role that the ethnicity of the putative offender plays in shaping the public's differential propensity to report a violent crime to the police. Antonopoulos' small-scale survey, which employed a non-probabilistic sample of Greek residents of Patra<sup>80</sup>, suggests that the Greek public is more likely to report crimes to the

<sup>80</sup> A major Greek city and the country's most significant sea-port to Adriatic. Because of its function as gateway to Western Europe the city attracts large numbers of irregular immigrants (Papadopoulou 2004). According to recent media accounts (Kanistras 2009), some 2,500 undocumented transit migrants mainly of Middle Eastern, Asian, or African origin remain in Patra's makeshift camps waiting to be smuggled to Italy.

police committed by migrant offenders than crimes committed by Greek offenders (Antonopoulos 2006b). A second explanation, focuses on the impact that the discretionary powers of the police might have in the process of recording. As was mentioned previously, a large number of the offences that are reported to the police are neither recorded nor further action taken. In such cases, police officers decide to restrict their actions to an informal cautioning of minors and do not form charges (Pitsela 2004). The criteria that guide officers' decision to divert juveniles from the criminal justice system or to charge them with less serious offences include very subjective assessments i.e. of his/her pro-social orientation, character, and parental supervision. Given the prejudices and stereotypes that many members of the police force share, their wide discretion could work to the disadvantage of juveniles of immigrant or lower class parentage (Pitsela 2004). Several UK studies documented the discriminatory effect of the police ability to make decisions on juvenile offenders (reviewed by Smith 1994; 1997). A positive development in this area is that the most recent reform of the Greek youth justice (Act 3189/2003 art. 45 a) formalises the diversion practices and entrust the Prosecutor with the ability to discontinue prosecution of juvenile offenders charged for misdemeanours.

However, in the absence of Greek studies examining the possibly discriminatory police practices during reporting, the question whether the official criminal statistics offer a distorted account of the immigrant-origin youths' engagement in assaults remains open. The discretionary powers of the police are much more limited in the case of homicide, in which an almost 30 per cent of the alleged offenders were of foreign nationality.

### **5.3 Self-report studies**

Since to a substantial extent police statistics reflect the policing priorities, they are likely to be relatively unreliable, especially when immigrants' participation in delinquency and crime is concerned. Therefore, it is necessary to examine additional sources of data regarding the engagement of young people in violence and violent crime. The self-report studies and school surveys offer the advantage of shedding light on youthful violent behaviours that go unnoticed by the system of criminal justice.

### **5.3.1 Past research**

Artinopoulou's review of European and Greek research on school violence refers to the school survey that the V-PRC Institute conducted in 1999 on behalf of the Greek Ministry of Education, General Secretary for Youth (2004). According to the findings three out of ten students (29 per cent) had witnessed violent fighting between students of Greek and foreign nationality. A specialist study on students' violence was conducted by the National Centre for Social Research (EKKE) during the academic year 1999-2000<sup>81</sup> (Tsiganou et al. 2004). According to this study's findings violent encounters between students are frequent, for one out of five Lyceum students confirmed first-hand knowledge of many incidents of assaults against co-students. Violence seems to be more prevalent in the Gymnasium and more serious in the Lyceum. The opinion that violence has been escalating during the recent years was voiced by 39 per cent of Lyceum students. The students' background was found to be predominantly middle-class. The ideals of solidarity remain strong amongst most students, who value the friendship of their mates highly. The overwhelming majority (83 per cent) reported good or very good relations with foreign students. Nevertheless, a considerable proportion of students (five per cent) reported that they cannot stand students from other countries, and three per cent reported bad relations. The researchers' conclusion is that the extent of violence in the Greek secondary school is still at low levels, but the severity and seriousness of some still rather isolated incidents constitutes an area of concern<sup>82</sup>.

---

<sup>81</sup> The EKKE school-survey was introduced in Chapter 3, section 3.2.1.

<sup>82</sup> The only study allowing for cross-national comparisons regarding the engagement of students attending Greek schools in violent behaviour is the more recent self-report school survey that the University of Mental Health Research Institute (UMHRI) conducted in the framework of Health Behaviour in School-aged Children (HBSC) study of WHO (Currie et al. 2004). According to the study's findings, students in Greece are less involved with bullying, either as victims or perpetrators, when compared with other European countries. On the contrary they are more likely to engage at least once during the last 12 months in physical fighting to a greater degree than their same age counterparts in the other 34 countries and regions that participated in the study. Actually Greece ranks second among 35 countries regarding this measurement, with 55 per cent of the 15-year-old male students and 30 per cent of the same age female students reporting participation in brawls. The HBSC average for participation in this form of aggressive behaviour was 49 per cent for boys and 21 per cent for girls (UMHRI 2005b: 7). However, the findings concerning young people's more frequent or systematic (three or more times in the previous 12 months) involvement with physical fighting reveals a rather different picture: it seems that students of Greek schools, aged 11, 13 and 15 year

### 5.3.2 The 2003 UMHRI school-survey

This section is devoted to a detailed analysis of the data produced by the 2003 UMHRI school survey. It focuses on the Athenian dataset of the school-survey and presents representative findings that are related to a range of students' violent behaviours.

#### *Lifetime prevalence of fighting*

The survey's question "*have you ever had scuffle or fight?*" offers information on the lifetime prevalence of fighting among students. Three out of five respondents reported they had done so. As was expected, the rate of boys who admitted lifetime experience of fighting was much higher (78 per cent) than of girls (43 per cent). But contrary to mainstream wisdom, the proportion of those who reported that they had *never* engaged in violent fighting was higher among foreign-born boys (28 per cent) than those born in Greece (21 per cent). The difference was tested as statistically significant (Pearson Chi-Square=4.5;  $p<.05$ ).

#### *Incidence of violent behaviours*

More detailed and thus more useful are the questions asking the students '*how often*' they have engaged in a number of offences (last year incidence measures). The response set for this set of questions was: *never, 1-2 times, 3-5 times, 6-9 times, 10-19 times, 20-39 times, and finally 40 times or more*. Thus, the collected data allow estimations not only of the lifetime prevalence of deviant behaviours but also of their frequency and thus enables the comparison of the various 'ethnic' groups relevant mean scores. These 'ethnic' groups' mean values were compared by using post-hoc Bonferroni pair-wise contrasts provided by one-way ANOVA. According to the results illustrated in *Table 5.3* and *Figure 5.2* the most widespread active violent behaviour among students is physical fighting with another person:

- i. More than a quarter of the respondents (26 per cent) admitted participation in physical fighting *during the last 12 months*. The higher rates of fighting were reported by boys born in Greece (43 per cent), and 'other countries' (47 per cent). All differences between boys' various ethnic groups did not reach the level of

---

old, engage in physical violence only occasionally. Consequently Greece appears about the middle of the corresponding 35-countries wide ranking.



statistical significance. The only statistically significant finding concerns the difference between girls born in the former Soviet Union (FSU), 18 per cent of whom reported involvement in fighting, and their counterparts born in Greece (11 per cent). According to one-way ANOVA's post- hoc Bonferroni contrast, their score differs significantly at the 0.05 level. However, it is important to note that the finding was based on a small FSU group (66 girls born in FSU in total).

**Table 5.3: Percentage of Students admitting Violent Offences in the Last 12 Months by Country of Birth and Sex**


		Country of Birth				TOTAL
		Greece	Albania	FSU	Other	
MIXED INTO A SCUFFLE	MALES	42.9	37.5	34.9	47.2	42.5
	FEMALES	11.2	12.0	18.2	10.4	11.6
GROUP FIGHT	MALES	25.1	38.5	27.9	32.1	26.1
	FEMALES	6.8	8.0	9.1	8.3	7.1
BEATEN SOMEONE UP BADLY	MALES	14.6	15.4	16.3	28.8	15.3
	FEMALES	3.1	4.0	4.5	8.3	3.4
HIT A TEACHER	MALES	4.0	3.1	7.0	11.5	4.3
	FEMALES	0.4	1.0	-	2.1	0.5
USED A WEAPON TO GET SMTG	MALES	2.4	4.7	7.0	11.3	3.0
	FEMALES	0.7	-	1.5	-	0.7

*All data are expressed in percentages*

- ii. Active participation in a group of youths fighting against another group during the last 12 months seems to be limited to one sixth of the sample (16 per cent). Girls were much less likely to engage with group fighting (7 per cent) than boys (26 per cent). One quarter of Greece-born boys and two fifths of the Albanian-origin admitted having done the offence during the last 12 months. The significant finding is that foreign-born boys were 1.5 times more likely than boys born in Greece to have some engagement in group fighting *during the last twelve months*. Albanian-origin boys had the highest rate of participation in group-fighting. The odds of

Albanian-born boys having such experience were almost double that of Greeks (significant at the level of 0.05)<sup>83</sup>.

**Figure 5.2: Male Students' Mean Scores of Violent Scales by Country of Birth**



- iii. Almost fifteen per cent of the boys and three per cent of the girls reported that in the *last-12-months* they "had beaten someone to such an extent that medical help or a doctor was needed". The proportion of male and female students born in 'other countries' who admitted having committed the offence was significantly elevated. The boys belonging to this group were more than two times as likely as native-born students to report engagement in the particular delinquent behaviour. Students born in Greece were the least likely to engage in this violent form of fighting.

<sup>83</sup> Have done a violent offence during the last-12-months is dichotomous variable. The odds ratios of the various 'ethnic' groups were calculated by a simple logistic regression model, which regresses the log of the odds ratio of committing the offence on the dummy variable of birth country.

- iv. Four per cent of male students born in Greece admitted having hit a teacher in the last-12-months, as did three per cent of those born in Albania, and seven per cent of those born in FSU. The highest rate was of the male students born in 'other' countries (12 per cent). The odds of hitting a teacher for male students of this group were three times higher than the corresponding ratio for boys born in Greece (significant at 0.01 level). The proportion of girls admitting the offence was negligible.

On the whole, the '*last-twelve-month*' prevalence of most violent behaviours is small among secondary school students who participated in the UMHRI study. The only exception is individual physical fighting. The most striking finding is the overrepresentation, among those admitting participation in some form of violent behaviour, of students of the 'born in other countries' group. Half of the students, who were classified in this group, were born in highly industrialised countries like USA, European states, Canada, Cyprus; and the other half in economically underdeveloped countries of the Balkans, Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East. It seems that for obviously disparate reasons students coming from so different cultural backgrounds share a tendency to engage in violent behaviour and crime.

Equally interesting are the findings related to the boys of Albanian parentage. They reported engagement in individual brawls or hitting teachers at a lower level than the boys born in Greece. On the other hand, they reported the highest rate of participation in group fighting of all 'ethnic' groups. Moreover, they were more likely than Greeks to report that they used a weapon in order to steal from a person (*Table 5.2* and *Figure 5.2*). Understandably, the newcomers in a country are perhaps more inhibited than natives in committing aggressive acts against the authority of a teacher. Besides, the implications for an immigrant student from Albania, are more serious than for a Greek student. The plausibility of such factors does not rule out the possibility that teachers' authority is much more established in the cultural context of Albania and this continues to shape the behaviour of students born in the neighbouring country.

The contradictory findings concerning involvement in 'group fighting' on the one hand, and 'individual fighting' on the other pose more challenges to interpretation. Individual fighting is the most common violent behaviour among male adolescents (*Table 5.2*). It seems that Albanian-origin boys who attend secondary school are –on average– more

'conformist' than their native peers. This is probably due to the effort of those Albania-born students who are academically oriented to disassociate from the negative stereotypes of natives as regards their ethno-national group. However, a minority of the Albanian boys appear to be disaffected from conventional school values, and are probably oriented to a greater extent than their Greek counterparts towards a violent peer-group culture. The section 3.4.3 of Chapter 3 presented the process of ethnicisation which is accountable for the escalation of the confrontations between groups of native youths and newcomers in the immigrant dense neighbourhoods of central Athens. Interview material documented the workings of a 'spiral of reactions' that fuels fighting and other forms of violence between rival single-ethnicity street-groups. Moreover, it seems certain that the peer group, as a socialisation milieu, is more important for immigrant-origin youth than for natives, for such forms of socialisation are inherent to the life-circumstances of the recently arrived young immigrants.

The next section examines the ways that foreign-born boys and girls engage with violence which *prima facie* appear to be distinctively 'foreign' or 'ethnic'. An attempt will be made to re-conceptualise these gendered attitudes and practices towards violence within a broader interpretive frame that takes account of the interlocking dimensions of ethnicity, and social class. The overall aim is to keep "all the levels -social realities, masculinities, and crime- in view" (Jefferson 1996).

## **5.4 Qualitative findings**

This qualitative part of this study draws from the life-histories of youths of immigrant parentage that I contacted in the Juvenile Court of Athens and the secondary schools of central Athens.

### **5.4.1 What is distinctive about foreign-born youths' violence?**

It is well known that in the multi-ethnic environment of contemporary metropolises ethnic identities frequently provide the spark for masculine confrontation (Polk 1994: 180). As Jenan explains, even if ethnicity is not what is 'really' behind boys' violent fighting, it is almost impossible to ignore it:

...Most times these things start for petty reasons. Ethnicity is not the only important thing. Meaning, the first thing a boy is thinking is not "Ah.. This guy is an Albanian." The first

thing is thinking is "He is chatting my girl up. I don't care where he comes from. What pisses me off is that he is chatting my girl up." But of course the other thing is always at the back of his head. Later on, the Greek guy will think "He took my girl and he is Albanian... Ah... I will round my mates up to beat him."

Whatever the trigger is, it seems that most of young male respondents had plenty of opportunities either to observe or to participate in violent encounters. If violence between teenagers is pervasive in inner-city neighbourhoods the question that arises is what is distinct about the engagement in violence of the boys and girls who came from Balkan and other ex-communist countries in the 1990s? Giorgos, an ethnic-Greek student born in southern Albania voices the native student's answer to the question. This is blaming Albanian boys for propensity to disproportional use of violence:

Upon their arrival the boys from Albania formed groups. At some point six lads were beating up a guy who only said to them "What are you doing here?" In a verbal exchange or argument they immediately used to start a fighting. They had brought the rough situation of Albania with them. They couldn't take it easy.

Elias, another Lyceum student with roots in the Greek minority of Albania, although acknowledging the role that racism plays in fuelling conflict, expressed the same angle of interpretation: "The cause of most arguments and fighting is racism. But also the Albanians make trouble. Sometimes a group of five to ten beats up a guy because of a stupid argument. Then people get annoyed."

The ethnographic material presented in Chapter 3 suggests that *Vorioepiotes* students like Giorgos overemphasise explanations that pathologise their 'ethnic' rival, and justify further marginalisation of newcomers (see the account of Achilles in section 3.4.2). Consequently, it is crucial to take into account the interactions that eventually contributed to the violent behaviours of the most strained youths of immigrant origin (Tsiakalos 2000: 90). It is also significant to bear in mind that the self-report data which were collected in 2003 (that were previously presented in the present chapter's section 5.3.2), refute the claim that Albania-born youths were involved in individual violence to a greater degree than their counterparts born in Greece.

However, a significant part of ethnic-Albanian respondents confirmed that upon arrival, which on average took place around the mid-1990s, their engagement in violence was

extensive. Marko, a 19-year-old young man from southern Albania, who was found guilty at the Juvenile Court for assaultive violence, describes the violent world of his youth: "When we were 12 to 14 years old we used to fight all the time. Sometimes one against three or even five, but more usually a group against another group."

Marko and a number of other interviewees had experienced the upheaval and the armed riots of 1997 that followed the collapse of Albania's pyramid investment schemes (see also the story of Lefteris in section 3.3.1). Many of them were not able to cope with the adaptation exigencies and during the transition period of 1997-99 dropped out from school. Their trajectories were different from those followed by the subsequent cohorts. Immigrant-ancestry children who had a better starting point were able to focus more on academic issues. Marco noticed the difference: "Guys changed after 2000. I don't know why, maybe it is the way they are thinking, these kids are not the same as those who were at school at my time....For us these kids turn out to be mugs, mama and daddy's boys."

Swedish research on Balkan refugees (Martens 1997) led Tonry to stress the salience of traumatic experiences inflicted by war and conflict for migrants' subsequent dysfunctional adaptation in the host country and their high rates of violent offending (Tonry 1997: 24). Likewise, this study's qualitative findings concerning foreign-born youths' extensive engagement in violence can partly be interpreted by the combined effects of conflict and disorganisation in the motherland and marginalisation in the host society<sup>84</sup>. However, not all foreign-born youths, who were violence prone, had conflict-related traumatic experiences, and thus additional explanations are needed.

#### *Intra-ethnic violence*

There is evidence suggesting that not all violent encounters are related -directly or indirectly- to the conflict between newly arrived immigrant teens and their native counterparts. The victims of aggression are frequently kids of the same ethnic origin as the perpetrators. Recent research by Courakis, et al. (2003) based on Juvenile Court of Athens records reveals that minors of foreign nationality -Albanians in particular- frequently resolve their disputes by using physical violence. Such in-group violence can constitute a significant factor that contributes to the overrepresentation of the foreign-born youths in violent offences that police record.

---

<sup>84</sup> War or civil conflict related experiences were reported by students born in Albania, Georgia, and Iraq.

An incident of victimisation by stranger, which happened for no obvious reason, was narrated by Didi. He is a shy 16-year-old kid from central Albania, who was not related to the world of streetwise immigrant youths. His parents stayed back in Albania, and he lived with his older brothers and sisters, in a poverty-stricken flat. The evening we talked, he looked exhausted for he was working ten hours a day, carrying greengroceries in an open market, for a wage of 20 Euros. He recalls that: "One night, I was walking in the boulevard, when accidentally I bumped into another Albanian guy. Without a word the guy knocked me down." Apparently, his vulnerability attracted the aggression of a stronger young man who was looking to attack someone anyway in order to bolster up his street reputation.

This sort of violent aggression probably reflects the fact that many of these children of immigrant descent originate from isolated mountainous areas. In order to explain why some of them engage disproportionately in interpersonal forms of violence, it is probably more useful to see them rather as village-boys who came to the city, than as foreigners who migrated to Greece. According to Shelley's 'crime and modernisation' theory, interpersonal violence is more common in agricultural societies. As industrialisation and urbanisation advances, crime against the person decreases and crime against property becomes more prevalent (Shelley 1973). When these foreign-born kids migrated to the metropolis of Athens they brought with them the half-warm memories of a cultural framework within which the demonstration of physical violence is the touchstone of the interaction between young men<sup>85</sup>. The actualisation of such violent references is contingent on the conditions of the initial phases of settlement in a new and sometimes hostile environment, in the sense that it is the more alienated and strained immigrant-origin youths who become violent. At any rate, intra-ethnic violence between newly arrived immigrant-origin children and adolescents also suggests that the cultural background of confrontational violence is partly rooted in the society of origin.

#### **5.4.2 Greeks don't like fighting**

As part of their process of alienation from school, a number of immigrant boys became gradually attracted to street life and started to exhibit aggressive behaviour far beyond the

---

<sup>85</sup> More broadly, as the ethnographic work of M. Herzfeld in mountainous Crete has identified, the between men' interactions in such areas are powerfully shaped by a contest-seeking mentality, in other words an 'agonistic' pattern (Herzfeld 1985: 124).

school setting. The story that follows is illustrative. Andrea was 18 years old and under probation when I interviewed him. He was born in the southern part of Albania where ethnic Greeks were the majority and in the early 1990s his entire family migrated to Greece. A year before our meeting he was found guilty in the Juvenile Court of Athens for the beating of a fellow student. He claimed that although the fighting started between him and the other boy into the schoolyard and during a football game, he was not responsible for the inflicted injuries. According to his account his mates were the ones that attacked and beat up the other guy later on outside school. Andrea attributes the victim's decision to charge him to his reputation as the 'toughest lad' of the school. It seems that although he was a foreigner and his left leg was somehow stunted<sup>86</sup> Andrea managed to climb to the top of 'hard guys' hierarchy:

Eh, we used to go out, and ....you know what, 'why he is looking at me?' We walloped the other guy. It was like this. Because he was 'looking' at us, because it was something that we didn't like on him. Meaning that usually it wasn't a serious reason. Something irrelevant... always. It wasn't that he swore at my mother or done something to me. For instance, it was that I didn't like the way he walked, instead of that he wore a nice flyer jacket and I wanted to take it from him. That's it, for no good reason.

Regardless of how it might appear *prima facie*, O'Donnell warn us that such "violence is never irrational or meaningless" (2003). The meanings that boys and young men attach to their violent 'conduct norms' seems to be multi-faceted. One readily recognises the excitement that physical violence and domination over an 'opponent' offers. Nevertheless, the critical observation is that most incidents of interpersonal violence are public, and there is little evidence of domestic or intimate violent behaviour in respondents' accounts<sup>87</sup>. Consequently, the primal concern of violent youths is to demonstrate publicly a 'hard guy' identity. Part of this type of public exhibition is to prove your masculinity not only to bystanders but also to your informal peer-group, your mates.

---

<sup>86</sup> In this respect, Andrea is reminiscent of Doc, the leader of the immigrant youths' street-corner group that W.F. Whyte studied in an Italian neighbourhood of Boston (1943).

<sup>87</sup> Actually, only a small number of boys and girls reported incidents of harassment. However, one has to bear in mind that a large part of domestic violence remains undisclosed in victims' accounts.



### ***The peer group***

Research has shown that central to macho masculinity is the value of reciprocal loyalty and support among mates or lads of the in-group (O'Donnell and Sharpe 2000: 14). Recounting his own street-life Andrea described a frenzied engagement in fighting, petty stealing, vandalism, and rowdiness, at the period he supposedly attended secondary technical school. According to his account the most amusing activities were the 'fighting with other groups' and the 'hide and seek' game with the police. Neither fear nor sense of risk restricted him:

At that time I had no fear at all. I had my mates, twenty guys, to back me. There was no case, whatever happened to me, at the end of the day, I was the one who fuck them. The worst that could happen to me was to be beaten up at some point.

If you are with girls, you always need to spend money. One way or another... But on the other hand if you are a figure among your mates, say you've flattened five guys, and they've seen you, that's important. You are above everybody else. You've made a good name, and you need to preserve it. The most important thing is your group and the name you've made among them.

It is evident that the reliance on the group of mates is not limited to the mere practicalities of fighting. In Bourdieu's words "manliness must be validated by other men, in its reality as actual or potential violence, and certified by recognition of membership of the group of 'real' men" (2001: 52). Andrea's stories expressively stressed the crucial role that the peer-group played in his search for respect. His mates admired his 'madness', and offered him unconditional loyalty. The advantages that the microcosm of the peer-group offers are in close correspondence with the unattainable demands that conventional society poses on the members of the informal groupings. That is why the group is so significant for deviant lads' 'campaign for respect'.

### ***How to pick a fight***

Readiness to use violence and aggressiveness seems to be commonplace in the everyday interactions of the most deviant foreign-born young immigrants I interviewed. The repertoire of escalation tactics, as it was described by the boys who used to pick fights, is not strange to the literature on adolescence violence. Relevant findings have been reviewed by Katz (1988: 99-113) and more recently by Mullins (2006: 83-93). The most common

triggers range from 'eye contact', accidental, or 'feign' bumps, to aggressive flirting with other people's girls. These lads' repertoire also includes the possibility -as Katz suggested- to gain pleasure not only by physically prevailing over the opponent, but also by displaying the ability to orchestrate the provocation manoeuvres, thus leaving no choice to the unsuspected other, rather entering into a battle with predicted for him unfavourable outcome. A list of the relevant 'techniques' employed by immigrant-origin young men was offered by Mario, the 17-year-old offender of Albanian parentage, who, after a series of burglaries in Greece and Albania, was imprisoned for four months:

You look at him aggressively, as if something is strange about him. You look at him and wait. He tells you "What are you looking at?" You can respond "Mate, I wasn't looking at you", or "I am looking whatever I like to look." And that's how the fight begins. Greeks are not doing this; they don't come and ask: "Why you are looking at me." Only Albanians are doing this stuff. The Greek way is that if you are looking at him, he and his mates are going to mock and laugh at you: "Look how this guy is looking at us." Then the Albanian is going to throw a cigarette or an ice cube from his drink, or the glass at their side. Or he is going to pretend a slipping so to bump the guy at the shoulder, or even make him fall. So at some point the Greeks cannot afford anymore to pretend they ignore the provocations and the fighting starts. Some other time an Albanian lad stares at one's girlfriend. He winks and makes gestures until the other guy is pissed off and ... then 'boom-boom'.

According to Mario's account the strategic aim of immigrant young men's employed methods is to trespass the border that separates them from their native counterparts and to challenge their scornful attitude by dragging them to physical rather than verbal forms of confrontation.

#### ***Opposition masculinity***

In responding to another question about fighting, Erion, an ethnic-Albanian juvenile court defendant, recalled grievous incidents of racist violence and narrated the prowess of an Albanian 'tough' guy:

It happened to a friend of mine in a café. Everybody in the café got up and repeatedly slapped him, for his brother was a tough lad, who had beaten up a lot of Greeks. The Greeks were pissed off and that is why they slapped the kid. Then he heard about, he took a knife, went out alone, found the one he thought was responsible, stabbed him three times,

the other guy fell, and the next day he left the country. He returned from Albania only four months later. Boom, boom, he hit with the knife and left.

Erion's role-model is clearly this 'Albanian hero', the guy who defended his smaller brother and his ethnic pride against racist natives, who was smart, able to act swiftly and violently. Furthermore, Erion elaborates on the meaning of valour for Albanian men, by stressing the importance of group solidarity: "The pride of the Albanian man is that he never lets down the other, his friend. He is in his heart, blood of his blood. No matter how strong the enemy is, when there are two friends, one will never let the other down." It is not only Albanian youths who aspire to such idealised forms of ethnic masculine toughness, combat brotherhood and loyalty. Vladimir, the Pontian TEE student from Georgia, doesn't like other students of foreign nationality much. However, when the discussion comes to the topic of fighting, he explains that the appeal of Greekness is not extended into such fields:

I can't rely on my Greek friends when I bump into a fighting. Basically I do believe that Greeks don't like fighting. They are 'all talk' and little 'action'. I am used to the 'Russian' code. For a Russian guy, a strange 'eyeing' is sufficient reason for asking explanations. And then the standard next step is blows, kicks and the like. Russians are tough. My friends are 'Russians' in their ways. One evening we were in a park and some Albanians were hassling a 'Russian' girl. We told them to leave her alone, you see that she don't like you, she is 'Russian', one of us. A fight started and the Albanians produced flick knives. But a larger number of us had knives, and our knives were bigger, they were hunting knives. So they retreated.

In short, the qualitative material presented so far suggests that a significant proportion of the interviewed boys of immigrant origin did not feel like denying either elevated actual involvement or 'experience' in violent confrontations. On the contrary, it appears that they see the arena of fighting as a favourable strategic terrain, offering the opportunity to express tacit or explicit attitudes towards the native same-age youths.

In many parts of the world, working or lower-class boys who lack or reject other conventional means employ masculinity as a resource in their struggle to challenge the hierarchy of status. What makes fighting a widespread cultural norm amongst them is that rival middle-class or conformist boys are less likely to be involved in physical aggressiveness. Middle-class boys' masculinity is accomplished through academic and

professional success not violence. Since this pathway is not available to them the alternative that some lower-class or ethnic-minority boys choose is to announce openly their opposition to the school system and to their middle-class counterparts by taking to the street and involving in physical violence (Messerschmidt 1993: chapter 4).

A typical example in the literature of the 1970s of this type of oppositional masculinity, are 'the boys' of an inner-city neighbourhood of Liverpool, as they were portrayed by Howard Parker. The particular neighbourhood was renowned for its working-class tradition of toughness, and the boys -although less concerned with fighting than their fathers - could still "get into fight for almost no apparent reason" (Parker 1974: 145). Similar in attitude were the Midland working-class lads of Paul Willis' seminal study. The lads displayed their opposition to authority and to conformist classmates by inverting the usual school values and embracing an alternative prestige system. Within their counter-school culture "violence and the judgment of violence is the most basic axis of the 'lads' ascendance over the conformists." Moreover, the "perennial themes of symbolic and physical violence" were also celebrated outside school, during nights out in bars, and efforts to "pick a fight" (Willis 1978:34 -37). According to the conclusion of Geoff Pearson "fighting has certainly been a focal concern of successive post-war British youth cultures" (Pearson 1994 : 1179).

Almost identical was the 'macho' attitude of a number of working-class young men that Panayiotopoulos studied in Athens of the early 1980s (1998: 218). However, towards the end of the eighties, the working class culture, which was dominant in the western part of Athens, was drastically undermined by economic restructuring, de-industrialisation and the decisive shift of Greece towards a service-based economy. These changes in the societal, economic, and familial structures were so pervasive that they challenged traditional gender relations and conception of masculinity. The massive expansion of the tertiary education, the spread of youth unemployment, the blossoming of leisure-time industries, the sway of the global youth consumerism contributed to the middle class 'take-over' of youth culture in Greece. In other words, identification with the traditional masculine role-models became unpopular among boys. The official school curriculum clearly contributed to the subversion of the old type of dominant masculinity. Research documents the emergence of new hegemonic masculine roles in youthful milieus, in response to the challenges that a changing society poses to traditional gendered self-concepts (Deliyanni-Kouimtzi 2004; Deliyanni-Kouimtzi and Sakka 1998).

Consequently, fighting amongst young men was a rare event in public places such as pubs or bars in the eighties<sup>88</sup>. As part of the middle-class take-over, a politically-correct ethos towards physical encounters prevailed. Nevertheless, this dominance was not in the absence of other polarized deviant cultural systems which were related to side-effects of on-going urbanisation; namely the collapse of traditional forms of informal control and the emergence of marginalised youthful populations. These side-effects are probably behind the slight but steady increase of violent offending that police statistics started to record in late 1980s (see section 5.2).

However, the entrance into the metropolitan landscape of large numbers of immigrant-origin youths in the 1990s consolidated the emerging new lower-class social identities and youthful 'tough' masculinity, in particular. Consequently, the re-emergence of lower-class masculinity appears to be, to a large extent, the outcome of the 'agonistic' interaction between immigrant-origin boys and their Greek counterparts (see also Chapter 3). Through such opposition tactics, at the micro-social level, the immigrants' subordinate masculinity contributed to the transformation of the dominant forms (a case that could be placed within the analytical framework of Connell and Messerschmidt 2005).

In short, the striking similarities between lower-class and ethnic-minority young men's construction of normative masculine practices challenge explanations of immigrant-origin young men's violent conduct norms which are based on ethnicity solely. Long ago Wolfgang argued (1958: 188, cited by Polk 1994) that race is not the defining factor for working or lower-class men's violent conduct norms: "Quick resort to physical combat as a measure of daring, courage, or defence of status appears to be a cultural expectation, especially for lower socio-economic class males of both races."

However, the way that some of this study's foreign-born respondents presented their own attitudes towards the use of violence indicates that their lower-class status pokes through the ethnic identity. Given that for most of them assimilation is advancing at a fast pace (see the relevant findings of Chapter 4), it is plausible to predict that as soon as they become part of the working classes and they proceed to take on adult roles and fatherhood the ethnic hue of their oppositional masculinity will be absorbed by those homologous lower-class gendered norms and expectations which are conducive to violence.

---

<sup>88</sup> On the other hand, mediated collective forms of violent confrontations broke up frequently mainly within the domains of youthful movements, militant political activity, or football hooliganism.

**Code switching**

As with other lower-class youthful populations, the violent behavioural norms are not only exhibited by the extremely street-oriented ethnic young men. Lfteris is a quiet Albanian student of TEE with a stable and supportive familial environment. Despite his academic orientation he is also literate in the lexicon of violence:

Recently I was teasing a girl outside school. Her Greek boyfriend started a fight with me, and I flattened him. Then he brought ten friends and kicked me. The next day I found them in the square and I broke their bones. I was with ten of my boys.... Like the other day, when I was in Larisa (r.n.: major town in continental Greece) to visit my best friend. He showed me in a café the two Greeks that gave him bruises all over his body. We beat them in the middle of the street. I broke their bones. I don't know how, but actually I broke one guy's arm ...

Likewise, Vladimir's group-fighting experience seems not to be in conflict with his overall conformist orientation. In this respect, he and Lfteris are representatives of the immigrant-origin young people who attend technical-vocational secondary schools (TEEs). Most of these immigrant kids work while studying<sup>89</sup>. Their aspiration is to gain the skills and the credentials that open the gate to a skilled working-class profession. The low academic requirements of TEEs offer these youths the opportunity to stay off the streets, to maintain a significant degree of social integration and eventually to obtain a certificate. Even if the TEEs students are in contact with the cultural values of the working-classes or they even have connections with delinquent peers, at the same time they are not alien to the world of the 'better off' immigrant kids that strive for academic success. In short, students of TEEs are also familiar with the violent norms of the street. At times, a number of them either find it useful to adopt such self-presentation or even actually resort to physical violence. As Elijah Anderson underlined, even 'decent' and law-abiding young inner-city people need to develop a behavioural repertoire that includes the ability to code-switch when the circumstances call the use of violence (Anderson 1999: 36). By the same token, 'street'

---

<sup>89</sup> A number of Albanian responders who were students in a technical secondary school reported that they managed to be accepted by providing forged documents certifying that they had the compulsory period of schooling in Albania. Also many of them are older than the other students, for they have missed several years either due to home country's upheaval or due to the turbulence of migratory life history.

young people are not always acting in a 'street wise' manner. It all depends on the audience they are performing for, and the venue (Sampson and Bean 2006: 25)

### ***Maturing out***

Violence as means of doing masculinity is predominantly an enterprise of boys and adolescents. Yet most young men do not feel like proving their manhood through the agonistic rituals of violent confrontation. As Heidensohn and Gelsthorpe pointed out, what is considered to be 'hegemonic masculinity'<sup>90</sup> changes across the life-course (2007). Andrea's description of the way he left street life firstly recognised, with a self-reflective taste for demystification, that the respect of other young people he managed to gain as a street-fighter was rather directed towards a persona than a person:

Above all, it is that people respect you. And then other guys hear that he's beaten quite a few, so don't mess with him, because he is a yob. And then from mouth to mouth you create a reputation that probably is empty, non-existing. Maybe they have seen you fighting once, but your reputation is much greater. They are afraid of you without you having done them any harm.

The exhaustion of the symbolic games that led to the establishment and maintenance of a 'good name' were initially replaced by other rewarding activities, in this phase in monetary terms: "I and four or five others used to go from one school to another. We used to stand outside the school, to pick up a guy. 'Why are you looking at me,' then 'gimme some change,' 'I don't have money,' then we let him have the blow. That's it what I was doing at that time: I was asking for money, not stealing mobiles or other things." However street crime is a risky operation, and as Andrea admitted, the perpetrator of violent offences is eventually also vulnerable: "Another time I was trying to mug a kid. Kid I said? He was around my age, I mean..., but we consider him a mama's boy. I was telling him 'drop some change' and the like when a bigger guy who was passing, smacked me and knocked me out."

Previous research has consistently shown that victimisation is relatively frequent among youths who have a history of violent behaviour. On the top of all other reasons

---

<sup>90</sup> The concept of 'hegemonic masculinity' was introduced by Connell's work on masculinities (1995). It attracted serious criticism and was later reformulated in collaboration with Messerschmidt (2005).

related to their deviant lifestyle violence can result out of contact with other equally violent or delinquent youths (Lauritsen et al. 1991; Smith and Ecob 2007).

However, for Andrea the moment of truth came not with his victimisation but with the realisation that the appeal of a lad's 'tough' identity is restricted to the male population. Unlike the north American gang, portrayed by the relevant literature (for instance: Miller 2001), in Athens, the typical loose and short-lived immigrant youthful group is exclusively male in its composition, without an adjoined group of girls. Because of the circumscribed nature of their social world the boys resort to school or community for dating purposes. A side function of the boys' reliance on school's girls is the realisation of the fragility of their 'prestige' when it comes in contact with the conventional world. Thus, Andrea eventually became uncomfortable with this 'tough guy' image, for he realised the long-lasting drawbacks that such a reputation entails:

I had made a certain name. I mean in the school everybody respected me. At least that is what I thought at that time. But later I started to see other things... I was trying to approach a girl –you know- but she knew that I had done this and that, and she was trying to dodge me. Meaning, that although you might have decided 'I am not going to do these things any more', your name could still make girls avoid you.

Soon Andrea left behind his tough-guy reputation and street-life altogether. He made the transition to working-class role by taking a stable job as paramedical staff in a central hospital of Athens. Significant for such transitions is the recognition of the loose and ephemeral character of the fighting or otherwise deviant groupings of young immigrants, which reflects the overall limited extent of youth crime in Greece.

#### **5.4.3 The staging areas of violence**

In urban areas, young people become associated with specific areas of the city. In Elijah Anderson's terminology the 'staging areas' of a city are the hangouts where young people gather, their own public space (Anderson 1999: 76). Inevitably, such public spaces also stage -among many other events- violent confrontations between young people. In central Athens, the 'staging areas' that host public displays of violence are predominately the small ugly squares that interrupt the densely packed metropolitan landscape.



The scarcity of non-commercial public space in the inner-city (namely, youth clubs, sports or cultural centres) affects all adolescents in Athens, and thus many of them frequent some nearby neighbourhood square. Apparently, newcomers have even fewer options available to them. Thus, in inner-city areas where immigrants represent more than one-fifth of the residents, the squares are often exclusively occupied by youths of immigrant descent. Most evenings, groups of immigrant boys and young men meet and congregate there. Later on, some of them carry on to cafes, to meet mates or girlfriends, others make a stop over their way to billiards and others return home.

Only some of the groups, and consequently only the particular squares where they usually meet, have a 'bad' reputation as 'staging areas' for violence and/or delinquency. Besides, the engagement in delinquency or violence of those young people of immigrant background who are 'members' of these loose deviant groupings is very uneven. Usually, only one, the 'leader' or 'chief' of the group and a small cadre around him are systematically violent or delinquent. The young man who is recognised as 'leader' has the reputation of the more extended engagement in delinquency. At the periphery of the grouping are children who are neither violent nor delinquent.

In central Athens, the degree of the migrant residential segregation is not pronounced (see section 1.2 of Chapter 1). Obviously, the spatial proximity is a crucial factor for the promotion of 'ethnic' interaction. The interviewed students provided evidence of 'ethnic' mixing, and in this respect confirmed the salience of the educational institutions for the promotion of normative youthful identities and cultures. Those most likely to socialise within groups of only co-ethnics are the immigrant-origin children who never attended school in Greece, dropped-out early, or don't care much for school. Their single-ethnicity groups demonstrate the need of these boys of immigrant origin, who are alienated from educational institutions and the society at large, to take refuge in their own ethnic framework of reference.

The centre-stage positioning of the neighbourhood-square within young immigrants' social space is evident in the story of Gentir, a 16-year-old boy from central Albania, who was charged with stealing a car. His friends are mainly same-age streetwise young Albanians. As was described in Chapter 4, the humiliating defeat of the Greek national team in 2004 resulted in widespread racist attacks by Greeks against celebrating Albanians. However, according to Gentir, nothing happened that night for "Greeks do not dare to touch us, since in our square we outnumber them." This story exemplifies the typical

territorial claims of the loose groupings of streetwise youth of immigrant parentage: such claims only have to do with the tiny square of their neighbourhood. Unlike the violent groups of youths in United States (Yablonsky 1962) or the United Kingdom (Parker and Newcombe 1987) that strive to exercise real or symbolic power over inner-city areas, the loose groups of deviant youths in Greece are not preoccupied with territorial 'ownership'. It is likely, that the groups' small size, short lifespan, and limited capacities are reflected to the diminutive magnitude of the space they feel belongs to them and aspire to control<sup>91</sup>.

On the other hand, the more 'conformist' youths of immigrant ancestry avoid the neighbourhood-squares where their streetwise compatriots hang out. Demetrious, an ethnic Greek student I talked with, was born in southern Albania, and attended a General Lyceum, for his aim was to gain a University degree. His aspiration was fully supported by both his parents, who were graduates of Albanian universities. Demetrious, like many other *Vorioepiotes* identifies strongly with Greeks, although he shares most of the problems that immigrant-origin youths encounter. Because of his in-between position he had access to the views of both native and immigrant youth. Although he is aware of all the violent encounters that take place in the neighbourhood, he never engages with fighting himself. He even refrains from going to the neighbourhood-square because:

This is not a place for normal children; it's a place for thugs. In that square frequented a guy from Albania who was a real thug, very thug! At the age of sixteen he was the leader of a gang, and he had already been deported three-four times. Since he was a kid, he always used to carry a knife with him. He never went to school in Albania. Here he used to fool around in the squares.

Inevitably, the need for socialisation is more pronounced in the case of the newly arrived immigrant children, and thus the neighbourhood-squares play a key role in their reception. The story of Nino exemplifies this: He arrived in Greece after the riots of 1997 in Albania. His family was very poor so he never managed to attend school. During his early days in Greece he had to busk with his accordion, although he only knew to how play four Greek songs. He practically begged like many other immigrant street-kids in Greece (Altanis and Goddard 2004). Now he is working in the construction industry. His command of the

---

<sup>91</sup> Of particular relevance are also the findings of Chapter Tree, section 3.4.3, documenting the relative absence in Athens of 'nationalisms of neighbourhood'.

Greek language is still very poor. All the other Albanian boys that Nino met in the square had already many years in Greece behind them and consequently were fluent in Greek. He commented that "some of them didn't even speak Albanian any more." Moreover, he described the induction rites in the 'staging area' of his neighbourhood's group of Albanian children and the critical role that the publicly demonstrated use of physical violence has for the maintenance of the "chief's" status:

All kids were there in the square, and one of them was the 'chief'. An Albanian. Once I was passing by and he told me "come here, where you come from?" I said from Albania. "Albania where?" I said "Elbasan, and you?" He replied something that was a lie. Then he told me "why you are speaking so badly?" I responded "what are you talking about?" Boom, he punched me out. I said "why are you hitting me", and left running. I don't like the square, every night brawls break out. You are afraid to go there. Stay two hours in the square and you will see punches being throwing.

However, usually the groupings of immigrant young people are not the only players in the neighbourhood-square. Apart from parents with children, the other social group that occupies the squares' benches long hours are the pensioners. Although the two groups' relations are frequently tense, and provocations are not rare, it seems that they have reached a state of symbiosis. Nino recalls: "Once an old man swore at me: 'fuck your Albania'. This happened because one of my friends -little crazy- was teasing him. He said 'are you making fun of me? Fuck your Albania, fuck your home!' That was very nasty... The square has good 'grandfathers' and bad. Most of them are good."

Because of the presence of such bystanders, a dispute that erupts in one of the squares cannot be settled on the spot. Fighting continues often into the Park of Mars, which is the only major park in the west side of central Athens. Thus, the Park of Mars is central Athens' second important 'staging area' for the public display of physical violence.

Vladimir, who was student in a technical/vocational school when interviewed, described several group-fighting incidents. In Athens he resides in a disreputable downtown area where immigrants are the majority. He was born in Georgia but also spent some years in Russia when he was a child. Although he is a Pontian ethnic-Greek, he oscillates between a Greek and a Russian ethnic and socio-lingual identity (in anthropological glossary 'code-switching', see Gal 1987; Van Boeschoten 2006). All his mates are Pontian ethnic-Greeks, born in the FSU. He described them as brawny and fit

guys. Besides, Vladimir himself is an athlete of Greek-Roman wrestling, a typical sport for many Pontians from Russia. His account describes the 'noble battles' that the park often hosts:

Two years ago, we were in the square playing football with some Albanians for a bet. We won, but they didn't want to pay the bet. So I told them, "round up as many as you like, we'll round up ours, and we are going to 'meet' as groups in the park." The 'meeting' was arranged at six in the afternoon at the Park of Mars. It was January, and it gets dark early, but six o'clock was the right hour. The others were twenty-five guys, all Albanians. We were eighteen, mostly Greeks, but I also had with me my 'Russian' friends. After the fighting I stayed two days in hospital, because my arm had been broken. Other guys were checked by the police, others were arrested. Because in such group fights eventually the police roll up.

#### **5.4.4 Nice girls and 'bad' girls**

The attitudes and normative practices of foreign-born girls regarding violence are very diverse. At the one end of the spectrum are positioned the Albania-born girls. Many of them, especially those of Muslim background, reported an austere regime of parental supervision, which is at odds with the standards of the Greek mainstream. A number of them not only appeared fully supportive of their parents' value system, but also were critical of what they perceived to be the Greek girls' more liberal lifestyle. However, a significant number of Albania-born girls had already embraced a more easygoing lifestyle, and thus were very similar in attitude to the same-age girls of Greek nationality. Despite such important variations, the overall reported involvement in violence of Albania-born girls remained limited.

By contrast, the attitude towards violence of the girls who were born in FSU emerged as quite distinct. Both qualitative and quantitative data (see the findings of 2003 UMHI school survey, which are illustrated in *Table 5.3*) place them towards the higher-end of the spectrum. The following story illustrates the case in point: Nantia, a 17-year-old Pontian ethnic Greek was born in Kazakhstan. At the time I interviewed her she lived in an impoverished town, some 15 km west of Athens, where a sizeable Pontian community has settled since the late 1980s. The town has the reputation of a Russo-Pontian ghetto, although many 'native' working class people also lived there. Nearby there is also a settlement of Roma people. The relations of the three social groups that cohabit in this

impoverished setting were tense and occasionally racist protests of native Greeks against Pontians, but also Pontians against Roma people erupted. When interviewed Nantia was under probation for her involvement in a brawl. Her 'tough' attitude is unmistakable:

*PP : Have you ever been attacked by an unknown guy? A kid or an older guy that beat you?*

Nadia: I was the one who beat them, if they told me something nasty.

*PP: OK if it was one guy that insulted you, I understand that you could beat him. But what if they are two or four?*

Nadia: Even four are not a problem for me. If they are five or six, I can also find five or six to back me. Once I was in a club and an old guy (r.n.: Greek) told me "you were starving in your country, and here you found a gulp of bread, but now you talk so much." Eh, I threw a wooden rob that hit him. Then several men intervened, a hell...

Another 17-year-old Pontian girl born in Kazakhstan settled in Greece with her mother and a smaller brother. She left school without credentials in order to take care of her baby brother. She did not attempt to show a 'tough' profile to me, but on the other hand she demonstrated in-depth knowledge of the grammar of 'fair fighting':

Once I got into a fighting with another girl. She hit my friend who was just a small girl. I asked her for an apology. But she was not a straight person, so she told me several things, and we started fighting. Punches, kicks, everything... Finally I gave her one that knocked her down. She wasn't unconscious, probably she was very frightened. Later she was OK. However, the police arrived, she filed a complaint, and I was charged.

Such aggressive encounters between girls were rare occurrences within the sample of this study, among students in particular. None of the girls that attended General Lyceum reported any involvement in violent fighting. Yet, a number of female students attending TEEs reported acquaintance with incidents between girls, and commented that they did not consider them as entirely inappropriate. Almost all incidents reported by girls were short and not serious encounters, so-called 'catfights'. As in the study of Phillips (2003) which examined the aggressive behaviour of young female students of a further education college in South London, the female students of the TEEs who had fights with other female students did not engage with entrenched hostility. Thus, it seems that only the Pontian

girls, who lived in the impoverished ghetto-like community, had extended experiences of offending, violent / sexual victimisation and drug use.

These findings highlight the variety of gendered attitudes and practices regarding physical violence and aggression. Depending on the culture of origin and the social setting the girls in this study embrace different or even polarised notions of femininity and value very diverse norms towards violent conduct. The 'bad-girl' femininity of the interviewed Pontian female offenders underlines the non-static character of gender identities (Messerschmidt 2002) in the sense that although these girls valued the traditional feminine role, at the same time, displayed no hesitation to engage with aggression in a manner similar to that of boys. Such behavioural similarity between boys and girls as regards violence was a distinctive characteristic of the respondents born in the former USSR.

#### ***Boys' stance towards women***

On the other hand, the absence of incidents of violent behaviour against girls in the stories of the male immigrant respondents of this study is notable. Even the young offenders' code of conduct favoured a "gentleman's stance" towards the female members of their social world, and none of them felt like using derogatory terms in narrating stories in which women played a role. The traditional understanding of the masculine role demanded they take responsibility for protecting women. Moreover, the defence of the pride of female relatives seems to be central to the honour of the Albanian boys and young males. Mario explains that:

The worst thing that can happen to us is swearing at our mother or sister, or beating my mother or sister. If someone does these things I could kill him. These two, mother and sister, are important and sensitive matters, that hurt Albanians most, that piss us off. Not fighting and beatings with sticks and bullshits. If you have done these things, you might be hit with a knife, being stabbed. This is our 'mania': mother and sister.

Arguably, it is likely that many sisters or even mothers would be uncomfortable with such a 'manic' interpretation of traditional paternalism. However, this is not the worst facet that tradition reserves for women. Namely, it seems that some of the 'ethnic' youths who are attached to the criminal underworld prefer to adhere to the darkest side of the Balkan patriarchal traditions that favour paternalistic, oppressive, exploitative treatment of women

and legitimise violence against them<sup>92</sup>. An extreme incident, indicative of this dark side, was narrated by Giorgos an ethnic-Greek adolescent born in Albania. The incident concerns the kidnapping at knifepoint of a fourteen-year-old girl by an Albanian man and his friends:

A boy, an Albanian, about thirteen years old had an affair with a girl from Greece. A group of Albanians, big guys, from the Patisia area I think, told him, leave her alone or we are going to kill you. Because one of them was fond of the girl. My friend, the Albanian boy, didn't pay attention. One evening he was with his girlfriend and twenty mates at the square. They came with a car, they had knives, and took the couple. They stabbed him in the chest but he managed to survive. His mother told me that he was stabbed twice close to the heart. The police later found the girl. It's unbelievable! They were twenty guys at the square and they done nothing...because they were terrified.

#### **5.4.5 Lethal cultural traps**

According to a number of accounts, knives are readily available to those immigrant boys and young men who have a streetwise orientation. The predictable tragic consequences are illustrated in the story of the killing of a nineteen-year-old Albanian young man by Timo a sixteen-year-old co-ethnic. Some students and juvenile offenders of immigrant descent that I interviewed were aware of the crime's details. According to their accounts Emmiliano the victim, was the tough leader of the neighbourhood-square. An interviewee from the juvenile court told me that he was also involved with drug dealing. However, a student from the local secondary school had a different story to tell: Emmiliano had 'business' disputes with a group of adolescents from his hometown, Elbasan, after a jointly committed burglary, and that is why he was looking to locate them and settle the score. At any rate, all accounts agree that Emmiliano was asking people if they knew the

---

<sup>92</sup> In Albania, for instance, the collapse of all state powers during the crisis of 1997 gave power to the criminal gangs (Lawson and Saltmarshe 2000). The ensued institutional vacuum and lawlessness invited the re-emergence of 'tradition' and customary laws, which were sometime strategically used in order to justify violence (Schwandner-Sievers 2001: 97). The re-enactment of these rural patriarchal traditions by the criminal elements of ethnic Albanian communities affected women disproportionately. Many girls were kidnapped, raped or forced into prostitution either in Albania or other countries According to UNDP, the EU, the US State Department, the UK Home Office, ethnic Albanians have been heavily involved in women trafficking and prostitution rackets throughout Europe (Arsovska 2006).

whereabouts of this group of compatriots when he met Timo. He asked him where he was from. Timo said from Elbasan. Then he asked if he knew the other guys, those he was trying to catch. Timo said no, but the other replied, "since you are from Elbasan you must be friends with them", and knocked him down. All immigrant boys I talked agreed that Timo is a very timid boy that never fought, even when others beat him. He used to work hard in open markets in Albania and Greece.

However, this time the bleeding Timo called his friends from a near by café to help him "to finish this business." They all agreed to "finish this business", and used their mobiles to round up their friends. Soon twenty boys on mopeds -each moped ridden by three- took off looking for Emmiliano. According to his own account, Timo was carrying a flick knife. When I asked him where he found the knife, my respondent replied that "I found it in the boulevard. It was in a bag that was hanging on a tree." When they located Emmiliano, Timo told him "you shouldn't have beaten me up" and stabbed him twice, killing him. The Albanian boys, who witnessed the crime, said that the victim only managed to say, "Now you fucked my mother."

Another Albania-born boy who was convicted of murder is Arno. We talked just a week after his release from the correctional institution of Avlona, in which he served five years. At the time he committed the homicide, he was 14 years old. The victim was an older boy, an ethnic-Greek from Albania. According to Arno, he was known as the neighbourhood's 'tough guy' and the one who used to provoke him at all times. The fatal night, Arno told me, all kids from Albania were in the neighbourhood's square and the victim was teasing him once more. In an "evil moment", he stabbed him to death with a screwdriver. Apparently, he could not find a way of getting around subjugation or humiliation other than this disproportionate and lethal use of violence. It is not clear what the verbal exchange was but the fatal wounding came almost immediately afterwards. He was bitter about his mates, who, although present at the scene, did not intervene: "...because guys always enjoy watching arguments and bloody fighting. That's why I believe that mates are no good."

In the correctional institution Arno had ample opportunities to observe violent encounters mainly between Greek and Albanian young inmates. Like Mario, Arno also holds the view many immigrant youths' attitude to violence is different from what most native youths consider as normal:



Arno: Greeks don't pay attention. Only very few of them pay attention to things like "why he is looking at me like this" or other stupid things like this. The foreign guys do pay attention to words, like swearing, especially when it is about the family, sisters and the like.

PP: *So, is it a 'style' thing, that guys from abroad have a different 'style'?*

Arno: No, it is not a 'style' thing. I believe that it is backwardness, that we are outdated.

PP: *In Albania, for instance, do people usually behave like this?*

Arno: Yes, until some years ago, people used to be hot-tempered. But now, I have been told, people have changed, they've become like Greeks. They don't bother with minor things; people look ahead, beyond these things.

In both cases of confrontational killing, a very young Albanian boy with little or no involvement in deviant activities, found it difficult to tolerate being affronted by an older co-national. In both cases the crimes were committed in front of a group of peers, who appear to have the function of an *archaic chorus* which observes, evaluates, and tacitly orchestrates the moves of the tragic protagonists<sup>93</sup>.

#### ***The Kanún in Athens?***

Thus, one cannot resist the temptation to see in the above crimes and especially in the epic way they were narrated by protagonists, bystanders, and the wider audience of the immigrant youth, the sway of the traditional cultural norms and morals of Albanian society. Codes of masculine honour have been formalised in Kanún of Lek Dukagjini<sup>94</sup>, the customary law that has been observed by ethnic-Albanians since the 15<sup>th</sup> century<sup>95</sup>.

---

<sup>93</sup> Research has shown that in the presence of street-mates assaults are more likely to be fatal (Riedel and Welsh 2002, cited in Mullins 2006: 18).

<sup>94</sup> The word Kanún is probably derived from the Greek κανών, which means 'rule'. Notably, another corpus of customary rules, which was observed in Kabylia this time, is known as the 'qanun of Ighil Imula' (Bourdieu 1990: 101).

<sup>95</sup> Kanún sets up the rules concerning revenge obligations and retaliatory killings to restore honour. However its corpus also foresees conflict resolution processes which are based on the arbitration powers of the elders. The orally transmitted customary law ruled the social life of the mountainous and isolated Albanian tribes, especially in the northern part of the country. The Ottomans who ruled the country for four and a half centuries either had no interest or did not manage to subdue Albanian warrior tribes (Durham 1971; Hasluck and Hutton 1954). Furthermore, it seems that the tribal structure and the observance of Kanún still operated

Specifically it is the Kanún rule decreeing that: "A man who has lost his honour is socially dead as long as he does not restore his honour which is only possible by the spilling of blood" (Voell 2003), that provides the cultural framework within which the young men's readiness to respond violently to affronts to their honour could be understood.

However, it is well known that customary laws defining gendered behavioural norms and values are not only found in Albania. The specific aspect of Albanian culture is part of the androcentric Mediterranean heritage of honour and shame that has been observed in isolated peasant communities in countries like Greece, Italy, Spain, Egypt, and Turkey (Bourdieu 2001: 6). For instance, in mountainous parts of the Greek island of Crete, one can still observe not only traces but also functioning elements of the 'idiom' of masculine contest which structures the agonistic interactions between men (Herzfeld 1985; 2008).

In criminological terms, the broader question that emerges in relation to ethnic-Albanian youth engagement in confrontational and lethal violence has to do with the validity of Sellin's 'cultural conflict' thesis (Sellin 1938). According to Sellin (1938: 63-66) elevated rates of violent crime are sometimes due to the migration of the members of one cultural group that adhere to a customary law of honour, to a developed country adhering to a formal criminal law. One of his examples was related to the migration of Kabyle people of Algeria, to France. Revenge practices mandated by their customary law were predictably in conflict with the French criminal law. In such a case we have persons caught in the middle of conflicting cultural norms of conduct.

However, this study's empirical evidence provides little support to the version of 'cultural conflict' thesis that is conceived in narrow legalistic terms. Although all Albanian respondents of this study were born in Albania, on average had spent a part of their childhood there, and they frequently visit their hometown, none had any clue either about the Kanún or other explicit rules related to honour and blood feuding. Probably this is related to the fact that none of the Albanian respondents was born in the northern part of the country and the highlands in particular, where most scholars locate the legacy of Kanún.

However, a recent significant study of the perceptions of violence in the context of Albania revealed that despite the quite poor actual knowledge of the Kanún a significant element supported self-interpreted 'traditional' norms that promote violence and honour

---

after the end of WW II. Under Enver Hoxha's totalitarian regime Kanún and its underpinning, the feudal clan structure, were effectively outlawed.

crime (Arsovska and Verduyn 2008). In the light of these solid findings, the conviction (see the previously cited views of Arno) that the evolution of social life in Albania has decisively undermined the set of conduct norms revolving around the defence of pride and honour looks overoptimistic. Regardless of how extended the explicit knowledge of Kanún is, it is likely that in poverty-stricken areas of the country, or isolated sectors of the Albanian society people attempt to counterbalance disorganisation, lawlessness, and corruption through adherence to an appropriated set of the core values of tradition<sup>96</sup>.

Thus the reinvention of the ideological core values of an archaic manliness by the most marginalised Albanian immigrant youth in Greece, though not necessarily associated with the prevailing habitus<sup>97</sup> of today's Albania, it represents a symbolic effort not only to restore 'imperilled masculinities', but also a 'wounded' national pride. As Lea and Young stressed some time ago in relation to West-Indian youth in the UK, the strains that second-generation immigrants face in the host country might result in the development of a plurality of subcultural solutions. Such youthful subcultures are the outcome of a dual process: on the one hand, assimilation to the host society, and on the other hand, the rediscovery or reconstruction by some youths of elements of the culture of origin (Lea and Young 1984: 124-127).

Finally, it has to be stressed that the majority of the youthful ethnic-Albanian community prioritise references to the other elements of their national heritage, such as the equally timeless Albanian tradition of kurbet<sup>98</sup>, in order to underpin their preference for a

---

<sup>96</sup> Recent anthropological research in post-communist Albania (Schwandner-Sievers 2001; Voell 2003) also points to such direction. It documents the role that inadequacy of elected governments and a series of serious crises played for the creation of a vacuum in state powers that was filled in by the reinvention of 'Albanian traditions'. A notable indication supporting this view is the re-emergence of blood feuding in post communist Albania. According to Vickers and Pettifer (1997) 60,000 people were engaged in blood feuds in Albania in 1996. Another source estimates that 2,300 families were hiding because of feuds (Kikia 1999 cited in Schwandner-Sievers 2001). The causes of these feuds might be banal but the implications dreadful, indicate Lawson and Saltmarsh (2000 :138): "In numerous instances of pride being hurt in one way or another and, under the name of honour, bloodshed was the result. This would start a cycle of reciprocal killing which had great economic and social cost."

<sup>97</sup> The notion of habitus was used by many theorists, including N. Elias (1996). However, it was Bourdieu who refined it, both empirically and theoretically, in each of his major works (Wacquant 2008). According to Bourdieu, habitus is a historically produced system of durable, transposable dispositions that among other things structure people's gendered bodily practices and their responses to social encounters (1977; 1990).

<sup>98</sup> Seasonal labour migration.

labour migrant identification and to sustain their hard-working ethos (see the telling findings of Chapter 4, sections 4.4.3 & 4.4.4).

#### **5.4.6 The short-lived 'ethnic' subculture of violence**

The experiences of immigrant youth either as perpetrators or as victims of violence bring to the fore the inner-city's disparate realities. A minority of immigrant youths stray apart from the hardships and conformism of the majority of the same-origin kids and through the interaction with deviant segments of the host society are gradually absorbed in street life. By its turn, the extended street-life experience of some of these 'tough guys', gradually leads them to the development of a violent identity. To use Willis' (1977: 36) expression eventually all their interactions "borrow from the grammar of the real fight situation."

Thus, the so-called 'Kanún' heritage does not have to be seen as ossified culture, the very essential of Albanianness. It is rather an assortment of cultural resources, from which the streetwise young people of Albanian parentage draw cultural references, which in their eyes seem likely to nullify the inferiorisation process which is imposed upon them by the host society. When the actualisation of such cultural references is combined with assimilation into delinquent segments of the Greek society, streetwise young men of immigrant ancestry embrace and simultaneously reinforce a locally situated 'subculture of violence'. In most cases young men's systematic engagement in violence is only short-lived. The limited extent of ethnic segregation in Athens and the likewise shallow criminal underworld preclude the prolonged isolation from mainstream society of even the most streetwise oriented boys of immigrant origin.

Moreover, in the long run, the reworking of traditions aiming to justify their immersion in a violent subculture does not serve these street-kids' best interests; let alone the interests of their immigrant communities. When things go out of control the state agents of social control always remind streetwise kids that the monopoly on violence remains their privilege. But before that point there are the reserves on which the natives can rely -when the escalation of violence necessitates it- which overwhelm the fighting capacity of individual immigrant 'tough' guys. Achilles, the ethnic-Greek student from Albania, gave me an example:

Basically, the story is that an Albanian, 18 to 19 years old, has beaten the cousin of a Greek friend of mine. He asked him to back off. He told him in explanation: "You are a tough guy and everything, you have proved that, but what is the point of messing up with a 13-year-

old boy?" But then the Albanian hurled insults at him. So, my friend called his father, who is a bouncer, he is involved in the underground nightlife. He came here, and in broad daylight, in the middle of the boulevard stuck a gun on the head of the Albanian guy and told him to keep his hands off the kid otherwise it is not certain if he is going to see his country again.

Similar is the story of Danny's beating by a Greek mob. However, in the case of Danny it was the criminal justice system that put an end to his violent career. He is an 18-year-old adolescent, from northwest Albania, who had an already developed career in burglary. The stories he told provide the opportunity to glance at a delinquent lifestyle which is imbued with the culture of violence. At the first interview, he showed me bruises all over the arms and a black-and-blue eye, and then started to detail with calculated calmness:

A month ago I was in front of a café trying to rip out a rail preventing parking. One guy was staring at me. I said to him, "what are you looking at?" He said, "fuck you." I said, "may I have a word with you?" I let him have two-three punches, boom-boom. I broke his teeth and nose. I let him on the ground and left. Then he rounded-up fifty people and knocked me out.

His friend and partner in crime Mario, who was with him at the incident, was more eloquent in describing the second -not so victorious- phase of the fighting:

Maybe it was that we were dried up (r.n.: their drug of choice was free-base at the time), so we were dizzy and that's how the fighting between Danny and the Greek guy started. Then he told his friends that ten Albanians attacked him and gathered 50 to 90 persons with sticks and the like. They caught up us at the high street. Danny ran and entered a taxi, to slip away. But they stopped the taxi, wrested him out, and beat him up with sticks, fists, and kicks. He managed to escape and run to the police station. His back was black, his arms here, legs here and here, his forehead was cut over the eyebrow. Then his father came to the police station and took him to hospital. He stayed in hospital several days. Just as he left the hospital he came to my home. He told me "get up, we have business to finish." We took clubs and we started looking for the kids that had beaten us. We found two in the square, and we opened their heads. They got four-five stitches each. Then we got six other guys. We broke the arms of one of them, and all got it in the ribs, with an iron rod. Then we heard that the guy, the arms of whom we had broken, had nothing to do with the fighting. We rang him up and said that we were a million times sorry.

The decision to ask forgiveness from the uninvolved victim, after a massive demonstration of toughness and fighting prowess was probably a tactical move to avoid further escalation and retaliations. Thus, what was impressive in these adolescents' actions was the in-depth knowledge of an integrated set of battlefield procedures, from which they drew every time they had to solve a problem of tactics. For instance, the clear-cut way that Danny understands the revenge practices is very telling:

Danny: I was badly beaten up. Some days later when I felt better, we chased them. At the end of the day, when we found them, one got stitches on the head and another got a broken arm.

*PP: But had these guys you attacked been involved in your beating?*

Danny: They were at the spot, but they didn't hit me. Why should I bother if they were actually responsible or not. They were there at the place, where I was beaten up. This is enough for me. I don't care what you have actually done. It wasn't my fault in the first place but I was also fucked up.

Apart from the typical techniques of neutralisation (Sykes and Matza 1957), i.e.: "wasn't my fault", Danny expresses clearly the 'collective responsibility' principle without trying to cover it up under any further justification. For someone to be on the wrong place gives enough excuse to count as a legitimate target of vengeance. For Danny such overt and ruthless cynicism is clearly a quality that a 'bad guy' needs to demonstrate in order to survive in street life, to prevail over opponents and to maintain his reputation.

In another interview, Mario revealed that the two of them had asked for advice, on the appropriate revenge tactics from older Albanian guys that they knew from the square in which they used to hang out, but received a mixed bag of responses. Others were in favour of a massive counter-attack, others of de-escalation. Then as we have seen, Danny resumed his role as the hardened leader, and called his crew with the cinematic phrase: "Get up we have business to finish." Decisiveness, hard-heartedness, and fighting prowess are key virtues of the leader of any delinquent and violent group. These virtues were also on place in another occasion, when Danny informed the police against his Albanian accomplices of one burglary. After that, his partners were arrested, convicted and imprisoned. His excuse for snitching on his partners to the police was that they took the lion's share from the burglary. More probable is that he tipped off the police in order to gain his own freedom.

When he was asked if he was afraid of their rage, he demonstrated the firmness that the street life had taught him: "If I am afraid?... Well, the sure thing is that after their release from prison, these guys are going to chase me. Balls! If they like to come, they are welcome. I'll wait for them."

### ***Theoretical explanations***

The 'subculture of violence' theory of Wolfgang and Ferracuti (1982) is based on a reformulation of Sellin's cultural variance thesis. The theory's proposition is that within a certain segment of the population or in particular geographical areas, the excessive use of violence can be better explained by cultural traditions rather than structural factors. In their 'selected culture case studies' Wolfgang and Ferracuti made a fleeting reference to the Albanian moral code of *bësa*<sup>99</sup> and vendetta (1982 : 280).

The 'subculture of violence' theory has been widely criticized. Its application in the case of violent crime and the US ghettos has been seen as inappropriate principally for being tautological. Violent behaviours are used to infer the existence of a subcultural system which in turn is used to explain behaviour (Sampson and Lauritsen 1997: 332). Second, it disregards the fact that subcultures are mutable and incomplete. Third, it conflates inner-city minority youth's adaptation to structural constraints and opportunities with the internalisation of norms (Wilson 1987). Fourth, it suggests that the ghetto-specific practices, deriving out of social isolation and concentrated poverty, continue to influence behaviour no matter what the contextual environment (Sampson and Wilson 1995). And finally, it promotes a stereotyping view of the inner-city black youth that associates them with a pathological culture (Madriz 1999).

Much of this plausible critique is addressed by Elijah Anderson. His nuanced and interactionally complex studies of Philadelphia's inner-city African-American communities (Anderson 1990; 1999) approached the problems from a structural as well as cultural standpoints, and probably provide the best contemporary accounts of a 'subculture of violence' (Cullen and Agnew 2006: 107).

Even in the case of first generation immigrants who originate from disparate socio-developmental contexts, and their foreign-born children, the original conceptualisation of 'subculture of violence' theory seems inadequate. In order to explain the overrepresentation of immigrant youth in police statistics concerning violent offences, (as they were presented

---

<sup>99</sup> Word of honour, truce.

earlier) the incorporation of both structural and cultural concepts is necessary. In a parallel effort with the literature on the subculture of street-life, the theoretical work on masculinities and violent crime (Messerschmidt 1993; 1997; 1999; Newburn and Stanko 1994) also takes account of both structure and agency in a comprehensive way. The recognition of the fact that all 'subcultures of violence' put a high premium on 'macho' behaviour proves the overlapping of the two converging bodies of criminological theorizing (Levi et al. 2007).

## **5.5 Conclusions**

There is a broad agreement between police statistics and self-report data, in the sense that both sources suggest an overrepresentation of young people of immigrant parentage in serious forms of violent behaviour which are most likely to be brought to the attention of the police. On the other hand, students born in Greece admitted participation in less-serious forms of individual fighting to a greater extent than most groups of foreign-born youth.

It seems that on average, the Albanian boys who managed to remain on the academic track and to continue studies in upper secondary schools are more 'conventionally' oriented than their Greek classmates, or that they have good reasons to avoid involvement in scuffles. For these Albania-born students, as well those young offenders who disengaged from street life, the display of violent masculinity represents a parochial cultural code, which gives away the isolation and relative underdevelopment of the country of origin. Consequently, it is perceived by them as an unwanted hindrance to their struggle for integration into the host society.

However, some young people of immigrant parentage are oriented to a greater extent than their native-born counterparts towards a violent peer-group culture. Their aggression is frequently directed towards not only Greeks but also co-ethnics. They display gendered attitudes towards the use of violence which indicate that their lower-class status interlocks with their ethnic identity. Historically, this development is rooted in both the troubled circumstances that forced many Albanians to migrate to Greece, and in the adverse conditions of immigrant settlement in a frequently hostile environment. The ethnicisation process in central Athens, which was described in Chapter 3, eventually affected all migrants, and fuelled the agonistic form of interaction between immigrant young males and their Greek counterparts.



Excessive engagement in violence seems to be a core element of the lifestyle of only a small group of persistent juvenile offenders. These immigrant-origin youths, developed an inward mentality that idolised violent masculinity. The absence of ghettoized areas of immigrant settlement prevents prolonged immersion in a violent street-code. Moreover, those most imbued with an appropriated ethnic 'macho' subculture are at serious risk of being victimised and/or of being caught by the net of the criminal justice system.

The existence among immigrant male respondents of such polar value-systems towards the use of violence does not mean that the practices of streetwise boys of immigrant parentage are entirely different from those of their academically oriented peers. This chapter's qualitative findings do not support a dualistic framework of appreciation. It was found that a number of otherwise 'conformist' children of immigrant parentage are familiar with the street code, and at times either find it useful to adopt such self-presentation or even resort to physical violence. Such code-switching, as regards violent behaviour is more frequent among students of TEEs.

In short, this chapter's findings highlight young respondents' diversity of gendered norms and practices as regards physical violence and aggression. Depending on the culture of origin and the social setting, the boys and girls of this study, value and exhibit very different norms towards violent conduct. The diversity and fluidity of these gendered attitudes is even more pronounced in the case of girls. The interviewed FSU-born female offenders are exemplars of a 'bad-girl' femininity, while the Albania-born girls were found to be more likely to adopt the 'conformist' version of femininity.

Last but not least, the re-emergence of lower-class social identities and youthful 'tough' masculinity in particular, into the metropolitan landscape of the 1990s cannot be attributed to the entrance of large numbers of immigrant youths alone. In part, this development can be attributed to the 'agonistic' interaction between young men of immigrant-origin and their indigenous counterparts.

---

## Chapter 6

### Engagement in Property Crime and Drug Use

---

#### 6.1 Introduction

The aim of the present chapter is to present empirical findings regarding the extent and nature of immigrant youths' involvement in property offending and misuse of illicit psychoactive substances. The chapter is organised in two parts: the *first part* addresses the question of 'ethnic' differentials in the extent of property offending and drug use by using data stemming from two types of sources:

- (a) police statistics concerning property crime and drug use which cover the period from 1999 to 2003 (section 6.2), and
- (b) self-report data obtained by the 2003 UMHRI survey which was conducted in secondary schools located within greater Athens (section 6.3), and my own 2004-2005 school survey which was conducted in neighbourhoods of central Athens 'where large numbers of immigrants reside (section 6.4).

Such examination led to the conclusion that the findings which are based on self-report and police statistics are in broad agreement, in the sense that both indicate an overrepresentation of youths of immigrant ancestry in some types of property offences (mainly shoplifting and theft from vehicles), and a roughly proportional representation in drug legislation violations. The possibility that overpolicing or other forms of uneven police practice constitute an additional significant factor, which can partly considered to be responsible for immigrant youths' disproportionate engagement with criminal justice system, is tested in the next chapter.

The *second part* of the present chapter (sections 6.5 and 6.6) is devoted to the exploration of the criminological theories that best appear to explain the mechanisms - specific to the context of inner-city Athens- that stand behind immigrant-origin youths' deviant transitions. These criminological theories have been discussed in section 1.1.4 of Chapter 1. The test of theories is based on qualitative data offered by the interviewed young people of immigrant ancestry. The analysis highlights the central position that strain theory has in any interpretation of immigrant youths' delinquency. In the case at hand the

strain flows from what Lea and Young have termed as the dual process of assimilation and rejection (Lea and Young 1984: 138). Namely, the tension between immigrant youths' fast assimilation into the lifestyle and the consuming norms of the host society and their limited access to goals and goods that the dominant culture values. Social disorganisation theory seems to be of lesser explanatory capacity for the data at hand. This is mainly due to the spatially diffused pattern of immigrant settlement, which leads to low overall segregation levels in the case of the metropolis of Athens. The most significant disorganisation effect in Athens is seemingly the one that the migration circumstances have upon the structure of families and on immigrant parenting practices. It is possible that inadequate parenting has consequences on children's likelihood to engage in delinquency.

Self-report data indicate that drug misuse is relatively less prevalent among youths of Albanian parentage than among native youths. However, other 'ethnic' youthful groups of immigrant ancestry are overrepresented in drug use statistics. The investigation in section 6.6 suggests the adoption of a theoretical model that explains the level of drug use that each youthful immigrant group has at the time of arrival by the relevant cultural norms of the country of origin. Moreover, the model foresees that as far as immigrants' cultural and structural integration advances in a linear manner, eventually the drug use rates of 'ethnic' minority youths and of native youths will become similar. Assimilation into a drug sub-culture is also possible whenever youthful segments of the migrant communities go through a mode of adaptation which is determined by dissonant acculturation, impoverishment and spatial segregation (Portes and Rumbaut 2006: 261-264).


## **6.2 Juvenile property delinquency during the 1990s: unravelling crime statistics**

As in the previous chapter, the present introductory examination of juvenile property crime trends is based on nationwide official criminal statistics that focus on minors aged thirteen to seventeen who were reported or otherwise brought to the attention of the police. These data, elaborated as they are by Courakis (2004: 187), cover the period from 1989 to 2002, during the high point of immigration in Greece. The subset of Courakis' data that is illustrated in *Figure 6.1* concerns only property offences.

The shortcomings and flaws of police statistics are well-known to criminologists and have been discussed earlier. However, it is difficult to entirely disassociate the fluctuations

observed in *Figure 6.1* from true rises and falls of juvenile delinquency, and furthermore to ignore the pattern-similarities with the concurrent influxes of immigrants throughout the 1990s. Besides, all dramatic changes that occurred during the 1990s in important areas such as (a) the demographic composition of the youthful population (Emke-Poulopoulos 2007), (b) the politics of policing and police practices (Vidali 2007a: 857), (c) the reporting behaviour of the public towards alleged offenders belonging to immigrant communities (Antonopoulos 2006b), were closely related to immigration. Moreover, during the last decade of 20<sup>th</sup> century there were no substantial changes in the legislation concerning juvenile delinquency. On the other hand, the reform programme of the Hellenic Police that has been implemented since 1995 and the restructuring efforts that intended to address the public's elevated fear of crime by intensifying the police patrol work probably had some impact on the level of recorded crime or even the 'counting rules'<sup>100</sup> (Vidali 2007a: 883).

**Figure 6.1: Police statistics: Offences against Property, 1989-2002**



Source: Courakis 2004: 187

At any rate, the first sharp increase of the 'actual' or 'amplified' rate of property crime occurred during the period 1990-92 when the first wave of immigrants crossed the northern borders of Greece. The second peak emerged during 1997-98 when the country received a new wave of desperate immigrants who fled from Albania after the bankruptcy of the

<sup>100</sup> Mostly informal rules.

'pyramid' investment schemes, and the ensuing collapse of almost every state power. It seems that after this second peak of 1999, minors' property crime rates started falling again, and/or law enforcement became more relaxed. A robust confirmation of the hypothesis linking the immigrant flows of the 1990s with rising youthful property crime is impossible, for Courakis' dataset does not keep record of alleged offenders' nationality.

### 6.2.1 Ethnic variance in juvenile delinquency

Given the limitations of the data illustrated in *Figure 6.1*, it is necessary to turn to the more reliable national police dataset that keeps a record of the distinction between youths of Greek and foreign nationality, and covers the period from 1999 to 2003 (*Table 6.1*).

**Table 6.1: Police Statistics: Alleged Offenders aged 7 to 17 by Nationality, 1999-2003**

	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003
<b>I. All offences</b>					
<b>GREEKS</b>	20,811	22,461	24,459	24,373	18,762
<b>FOREIGNERS</b>	1,435	1,600	1,716	2,016	1,919
<b>PER CENT OF FOREIGNERS</b>	7%	7%	7%	8%	9%
<b>II. More Serious Offences *</b>					
<b>GREEKS</b>	1,274	1,051	1,043	1,213	1,021
<b>FOREIGNERS</b>	445	322	315	329	388
<b>PER CENT OF FOREIGNERS</b>	26%	23%	23%	21%	28%
<b>III. Property Offences only**</b>					
<b>GREEKS</b>	824	698	798	939	758
<b>FOREIGNERS</b>	367	257	276	275	275
<b>PER CENT OF FOREIGNERS</b>	31%	27%	26%	23%	27%

\* *Excluding traffic, begging, electronic games/gambling, and illegal entry offences*

\*\* *Attempted and completed theft, robbery, accomplice to theft and robbery*

*Source: Ministry of Public Order, Police Statistics, unpublished data*

According to the data illustrated in the first part of *Table 6.1*, the contribution of the foreign youth to the overall problem of juvenile delinquency is limited, for their proportion does not exceed nine per cent. Given that in 2001 foreign youths' share of the same-age general population is crudely estimated to be eleven per cent (see section 1.3), it appears that the overall foreign contribution to the problem of juvenile delinquency remains normal and provides no ground for particular concern (Karydis 2004:215). However, it has to be stressed that the bulk of juvenile offences that police statistics record are breaches of the traffic law (Pitsela 2004; Spinellis 2007; Spinellis and Tsitsoura 2006). In 2003 for

instance, out of 21,839 recorded alleged offenders 20,125 were youths recorded for violations of the laws concerning vehicles and traffic. Greek youths are overrepresented within this category, for their access to vehicles is greater than of the same-age economic migrants. The share of foreign youth within traffic law violators is small but increases rapidly as their cultural and structural integration advances: in 1999 non-nationals represented 1.8 per cent of traffic offenders but in 2003 their share was more than three times greater (6.3 per cent). On the other hand, the violators of the 'aliens' law' are almost exclusively minors of foreign nationality<sup>101</sup>. Foreign minors are also the majority of those arrested for begging<sup>102</sup>. The exclusion of all violations of minor importance<sup>103</sup>, which are distributed unevenly across ethno-national groups (motoring offences, begging, electronic games/gambling, and illegal entry offences), allows a meaningful examination of differential involvement in more serious delinquent behaviour. Relevant data are illustrated in part II of the *Table 6.1* (more serious offences). The average share of foreign youth among this category of offenders was 24 per cent for the period 1999-2003.

Equally instructive is the separate analysis of the statistics concerning property offences only (*Table 6.1, part III*). Consistent throughout the period under examination is the overrepresentation of foreign juveniles amongst recorded property offenders. The average proportion of the foreign minors in property crime statistics was 27 per cent, which is more than twice their proportion in the general population.

The recorded violations of the drug law also need to be examined separately. The overall number of the recorded juvenile suspects for drug-law violations (unlawful sale, purchase, possession, or use of prohibited psychotropic substances) dropped almost 60 per

---

<sup>101</sup> The Act 1975/1991 and its replacement Act 2910/2002 regulate procedures and requirements of entry, stay and employment of foreigners. According to these laws irregular entry is an offence. The law also penalises traffickers of Greek nationality or Greek accomplices of illegal entrants. However, the law enforcement mainly focuses on illegal entry of foreign nationals. Thus in 2004 the Police statistics recorded in total 437 minors as alleged violators of the 'aliens' law'; of which 397 or 91 per cent were of foreign nationality (Whyte 1943).

<sup>102</sup> Minors reported for infringement of the article 407 of the Greek Penal Code. During the under examination period of 1999-2003 as alleged beggars were recorded 1,485 minors of which 88.4% were of foreign nationality. Most of the minors of Greek nationality that were arrested for begging were of Roma origin.

<sup>103</sup> Offences of minor importance that are not part of the Greek penal code but are foreseen by a series of special laws (Nebengesetze) or clauses (1960).

cent from 1999 to 2003. This dramatic decline concerns mainly the number of Greek alleged drug offenders. Since the prevalence of drug use among youth appeared to drop by 30 per cent during the same period in Greece (UMHRI 2005a), one can assume that the decline in police statistics reflects not only the decline in drug use but also a change in police work priorities and a policy of looser enforcement of drug laws. Although the number of non-nationals, aged seven to seventeen, who were recorded as violators initially followed the declining trend of their Greek counterparts, after 2001 it started to grow again. On the whole, the average proportion of foreigners amongst drug-law offenders for the period 1999-2003 was a moderate 13.5 per cent. Unlike the drug-scene of other countries (Killias 1997; Paoli and Reuter 2008; Vazsonyi and Killias 2001), the participation of immigrant youths in drug offending statistics remains limited in Greece, despite the higher likelihood of drug users or dealers of foreign nationality to draw the attention of the police.

## 6.3 Findings of 2003 UMHRI school-survey

### 6.3.1 Property offending

The findings most relevant to the study of delinquency derive from last-12-month UMHRI measurements of offending and problem behaviour. Again, the 'ethnic' groups' mean values were compared by using Bonferroni pair-wise contrasts provided by one-way ANOVA (*Figure 6.2*).


#### *Shoplifting*

The first relevant question asks 'how often have you taken something from a shop without paying for it, during the *last 12 months*'. Students' responses indicate that shoplifting was the most widespread property offence among this Athenian sample of secondary school students. A substantial proportion of students (17 per cent) admitted committing the offence at least once in the preceding 12 months. According to data presented in *Table 6.2*, male students' rate of shoplifting (23.4 per cent) was double the rate of females (11.3 per cent). The gender difference was tested very significant (Pearson Chi-Square=81.5;  $p < .001$ ). The magnitude of the difference necessitates the separate examination of male and female students' involvement in delinquency and problem behaviour.



Among male students, the highest last-12-month prevalence rate was of those born in 'other' foreign countries (32.7 per cent). The prevalence of shoplifting among Albanian male students (24.6 per cent) was somewhat higher than among Greek male students (23.1 per cent). Among male students the lowest prevalence rate (18.6 per cent) was that of the FSU<sup>104</sup> boys. On the contrary, FSU girls had the highest rate of shoplifting during the prior 12 months in the females' group. The lowest rate was of girls born in Albania (Table 6.2).

**Figure 6.2: Male Students: one-way ANOVA of Property Offending Scales by Country of Birth**



The examination of the reported frequency of shoplifting does not change the prevalence picture much. The score of 'other countries' boys was the highest (Mean=2.08; SD=1.918) and its difference from the mean values of all other groups was tested statistically significant at the 0.05 level (ANOVA /Bonferroni pair-wise contrasts). No other difference was found to be statistically significant.

Female students born in Albania had the lowest score of shoplifting of all male and female groups (Mean=1.05; SD=0.219). Their involvement was effectively negligible (Figure 6.3). Girls of FSU origin had the highest score among female students (Mean=1.47; SD=1.070). The mean difference of the latter group from that of Greek and Albanian girls was statistically significant at the 0.05 level. The finding indicates a more

<sup>104</sup> FSU: born in one of the states of the Former Soviet Union.



even gender distribution of offending among students of FSU origin, in comparison with all other 'ethnic' groups.

**Table 6.2: Chi-Square of Property Offending in the Last 12 Months by Country of Birth and Sex**

		Country of Birth					
		Greece	Albania	FSU	Other	Average	P
		(n=1,131)	(n=65)	(n=43)	(n=54)	(n=1,293)	
MALES	TAKEN SOMETHING FROM A SHOP	23.1	24.6	18.6	32.7	23.4	.000
	TAKEN SOMETHING WORTH €10	11.7	21.5	14.0	19.2	12.6	NS
	USED A WEAPON TO GET SOMETHING	2.4	4.7	7.0	11.3	3.0	.001
		(n=1,233)	(n=101)	(n=66)	(n=48)	(n=1,448)	
FEMALES	TAKEN SOMETHING FROM A SHOP	10.7	5.0	24.2	22.9	11.3	.001
	TAKEN SOMETHING WORTH €10	5.4	5.0	9.1	8.3	5.6	NS
	USED A WEAPON TO GET SOMETHING	0.7	0.0	1.5	0.0	0.7	NS

*Data are expressed as percentages, chi square tests for df=18*


Male and female students who admitted 20 or more instances of shoplifting in the previous year constituted only 1.2 per cent of the sample. Among these frequent offenders, 71 per cent were born in Greece and the rest 29 per cent in Albania, the FSU, United Kingdom, former-Yugoslavia, Latin America, and Iraq.

### Stealing

Almost 9 per cent of all students reported that at least once *during the last 12 months* they had taken something, not belonging to them, worth 10 € or more. Male students born in Albania had the highest prevalence rate of stealing (21.5 per cent). The proportion of boys born in Greece that admitted committing the offence was almost half (11.7 per cent). The prevalence of stealing among boys born in 'other' countries was 19.2 per cent and in the FSU 14.7 per cent. The lowest rate of stealing of all groups (5 per cent) was reported by female students born in Albania but their difference from other female groups was statistically not significant (Table 6.2).

Despite their high prevalence, the frequency of stealing that Albania-born male students reported was mainly '1-2 times'. Thus their mean value (Mean=1.28; SD=0.650) was below the scores of the other two groups of immigrant male students. (FSU mean =1.37, SD=1.176; 'Other countries' mean=1.52, SD=1.393).

**Figure 6.3: Female Students: one-way ANOVA of Property Offending Scales by Country of Birth**



Only the difference between the score of the 'other countries'-born boys and their Greek counterparts (Mean=1.21, SD=0.758) was tested statistically significant at the 0.05 level (ANOVA, Bonferroni pair-wise comparisons). Amongst the male and female repeat offenders who reported that they had stolen '20-39' times or '40 or more' times, during the last 12 months, none was of Albanian origin. Seventeen were of Greek origin, two were born in the FSU, one was Iraqi, and one of Latin-American origin.

#### ***Used a weapon in order to get money or goods***

This link between instrumental violence and delinquency was explored by a question asking whether the student had used a weapon *during the last 12 months* in order to get something from a person. Less than two per cent of the sample (1.8 per cent) admitted having done this at least once. However, the prevalence among male students was higher: 2.4 per cent for boys born in Greece, 4.7 per cent for those from Albania, 7.0 for FSU originated, and 11.3 for the group of all other non-nationals (Table 6.2). The differences

between groups were significant (chi-square=16.818, df=18,  $p<.001$ ). Only nine Greeks and one from the FSU female students admitted having done the offence (0.7 per cent of the female students). The prevalence of the offence among females was too low to allow any meaningful comparison.

The comparison of male 'ethnic' groups' reported frequency of using a weapon in order to steal with one-way ANOVA (Bonferroni pair-wise contrasts) reveals that the score of the boys born in 'other countries' (mean 1.34, SD=1.224) had statistically significant difference from all other three 'ethnic' groups' mean values at the 0.05 level. All other male 'ethnic' groups had quite similar scores (*Figure 6.2*). Seventy per cent of the fourteen students who admitted having done the offence six or more times during the last 12 months were of Greek origin.

### 6.3.2 Engagement in substance abuse

#### (a) Use of marijuana or hashish

The average *lifetime* prevalence of cannabis use among the UMHRI sample of Athenian students was 10.2 per cent (*Table 6.3*). This figure is slightly above 9.5 per cent, which was the nation-wide average estimation that the UMHRI announced for its 2003 school-survey (UMHRI 2005a)<sup>105</sup>. It is reasonable to expect that the prevalence of drug use in metropolitan areas, like the conurbation of Athens, is higher than the national average. The last-12-month prevalence among students was 8.0 per cent, and the prevalence of systematic use (last 30-days) was 5.1 per cent.

<sup>105</sup> It is worth noting that the lifetime prevalence of cannabis use among secondary school students is substantively higher in the UK. According to the 2003 ESPAD school-survey 38 per cent of 16-year-olds reported lifetime use of marijuana or hashish (Hibell et al. 2004: 218). Previously, the 2000 ONS school survey suggested that the lifetime prevalence of illegal drug use for 15 year old students was 32 per cent (National Centre for Social Research and National Foundation for Educational Research 2001). Estimates stemming from general population crime and lifestyle studies, like the BCS or YLS, indicate even higher rates of drug use among young people (Flood-Page et al. 2000; Ramsay et al. 2001).

**Table 6.3: Lifetime Prevalence of Drug Use by Country of Birth**

	Greece	Albania	FSU	Other	Average
INHALANTS	13.7	8.4	13.8	9.8	13.4
CANNABIS	9.3	9	18.3	27.5	10.2
TRANQUILLISERS	4.3	4.8	12.8	6.9	4.7
ECSTASY	1.7	2.4	3.7	7.8	2.1
LSD	1.7	0.6	2.8	6.9	1.9
COCAINE	1.6	0.6	2.8	4.9	1.7
CRACK	0.6	0.6	0.9	2.9	0.7
HEROIN	0.5	0.6	1.8	2.0	0.8
AMPHETAMINES	0.4	0.0	0.9	2.9	0.5

*Data are expressed in percentages*

The lifetime prevalence of cannabis among girls was lower (7.5 per cent) than boys (13.1 per cent). The gender difference in the lifetime prevalence of cannabis use was found statistically very significant (chi square=23.72 significant at the 0.001 level). Equally significant were the differences between boys and girls in the reported frequency of cannabis use during the last 12 months, and the last 30 days.

According to the data of *Table 6.3*, the proportion of those admitting lifetime use of cannabis was the same for Greek and Albanian students (9 per cent), but the corresponding rate for students born in the FSU was double (18 per cent) and more than triple for those born in 'other' countries (28 per cent). However, the low lifetime prevalence of cannabis use for the Albanian students is misleading, for it represents an average of very uneven prevalence rates of boys and girls. In fact, the girls of Albanian origin had the lowest rates of all groups (5 per cent), and the Albanian boys were above the average (15 per cent). The highest prevalence rate for all measurements of cannabis use was reported by the boys of the 'other countries' category. Almost one-fifth of the boys belonging to this category reported systematic use of cannabis (use during the *last 30 days*). Among girls, the highest rate was reported by the girls born in the FSU.

#### **Ethnic variance in the frequency of cannabis use**

The frequency of cannabis use reported by the four 'ethnic' groups broadly follow the prevalence patterns (*Table 6.4*). Male students born in 'other' countries reported the highest

lifetime frequency of cannabis use. According to one-way ANOVA / Bonferroni test, their score differs significantly (at the 0.005 level) from the mean value of the frequency reported by males born either in Greece or in Albania. The level of cannabis use by 'other' country born male students was also found significantly higher than that of native-born in the last-12-month and 30-day measurements, which are not illustrated in *Table 6.4*.

**Table 6.4: One-Way ANOVA Mean Values of Lifetime Drug Scales by Country of Birth and Sex**

		Country of Birth									
		Greece		Albania		FSU		Other			
		(n=2,364)		(n=166)		(n=109)		(n=102)			
		M	SD	M	SD	M	SD	M	SD	F	P
Males (n=1,293)	INHALANTS	1.35	1.07	1.15	.592	1.42	1.33	1.35	1.18	.749	.523
	CANNABIS	1.36	1.19	1.51	1.43	1.77	1.66	2.15	1.97	8.09	.000 <sup>A,B</sup>
	TRANQUILLIZERS	1.07	.441	1.06	.300	1.07	.457	1.15	.737	.537	.657
	ECSTASY	1.06	.464	1.05	.211	1.02	.152	1.30	1.25	4.14	.006 <sup>A,B,C</sup>
	HEROIN	1.03	.334	1.03	.248	1.14	.915	1.26	1.10	6.04	.000 <sup>A,B</sup>
Females (n=1,448)	INHALANTS	1.28	.946	1.15	.684	1.27	.851	1.38	1.62	.765	.514
	CANNABIS	1.21	.896	1.13	.702	1.41	1.18	1.40	1.25	1.96	.118
	TRANQUILLIZERS	1.09	.486	1.06	.239	1.32	.880	1.17	.663	4.845	.002 <sup>D,E</sup>
	ECSTASY	1.02	.163	1.00	.000	1.12	.755	1.10	.515	5.973	.000 <sup>D,E</sup>
	HEROIN	1.01	.110	1.00	.000	1.11	.747	1.00	.000	6.064	.000 <sup>D,E,F</sup>

A: significant difference between those born in 'other countries' and in 'Greece'

B: significant difference between those born in 'other countries' and in 'Albania'

C: significant difference between those born in 'other countries' and in the 'FSU'

D: significant difference between those born in the 'FSU' and in 'Greece'

E: significant difference between those born in the 'FSU' and in 'Albania'

F: significant difference between those born in the 'FSU' and in 'other countries'

Above the average level of lifetime cannabis use, but not statistically different, were the scores of the male students born in Albania and the FSU (*Table 6.4*). Within the group of female students, the highest lifetime, 12-month and 30-day frequency of cannabis use was reported by girls originating in the FSU. Girls born in Albania or in Greece had consistently the lowest rates of all measurements of cannabis use. However, all female differences regarding cannabis use were found to be statistically insignificant.

**(b) Use of inhalants**

In almost all European countries cannabis is by far the most popular drug among secondary school students. However, many surveys have shown that in Greece the prevalence of inhalants (volatile substances) is higher than that of cannabis (Hibell et al. 2000). The UMHRI 2003 survey confirmed this exception. The proportion of students who reported that some time in their life they have sniffed glue, gasoline or other volatile substance was 13.4 per cent (*Table 6.3*). The use of inhalants is higher among 14-year-old students. Older youths usually discontinue the use of inhalants. Moreover, data on the frequency of use reveal that the use of inhalants is rather occasional and not systematic for all age groups. Male students born in the FSU reported the highest frequency of lifetime inhalant use and males born in Albania the lowest. However, the between 'ethnic' groups differences in the use of inhalants did not reach statistical significance.

**(c) Use of tranquillisers /sedatives**

Having used this type of licit drugs at some point without a doctor's prescription was admitted by 4.7 per cent of students. Systematic use (at least once during the last 30 days) was reported by 1.0 per cent of the sample (*Table 6.3*). Moreover, 3.2 per cent of the sample reported lifetime use of alcohol with pills. The prevalence of non-prescribed tranquillisers /sedatives was higher among foreign-born female students than among their male compatriots or Greeks. The statistically most significant finding concerns the female students originating from the FSU, who had the highest level of tranquilliser /sedative use, and a significant difference from the corresponding scores of their Greek and Albanian counterparts (*Table 6.4*). The last finding is probably related not only to their strain but also to patterns of drug use which are common in the former communist countries of origin.

**(d) Use of 'hard drugs'**

The use of 'hard drugs' is relatively rare amongst students of Greek secondary schools. Having used, one or more illegal psychotropic substance, like heroin, cocaine, crack, ecstasy, LSD or other psychedelics, and amphetamines, at least once in their lifetime, was admitted in total by 132 students, or 4.7 per cent of the sample. Males represented 53.8 per cent of the students who admitted such more serious drug involvement. At the time they were surveyed a significant 27.3 per cent of this group of drug users attended vocational secondary school (TEE), a proportion which is more than double the share of vocational

school students in the UMHRI Athenian sample (see *Appendix III, Table 1*). Finally, this group of hard-drug-involved students was predominantly composed of students born in Greece (80 per cent). *Table 6.3* illustrates prevalence estimations concerning the use of individual illicit psychotropic substances:

- *Hallucinogens*: LSD and ecstasy (MDMA) are relatively widely used illicit drugs in the context of the Greek drug scene. Lifetime prevalence rate was 1.9 per cent for LSD and 2.1 for Ecstasy. The highest prevalence rates for hallucinogens (6.9 per cent LSD and 7.8 'ecstasy') was reported by students originating from 'other countries'.
- *Cocaine*: A significant 1.7 per cent of the sample was reported to have tried cocaine sometime in their lives. Again the involvement of students born in 'other countries' was much higher than the average (lifetime prevalence: 4.9 per cent).
- *Heroin*: The use of heroin by students is very rare in Greece. The prevalence estimation for this Athenian sample was found to be 0.8 per cent. Systematic use (during the last 30-days) reported only 4 students out of a total of 2,799.

All the above findings are consistent with UMHRI national estimations (2005a). When all measurements are taken into account, the most important findings of this school-survey regarding drug use have to do with the disproportionate involvement of the male students born in 'other countries', and female students originating from the FSU.

### 6.3.3 A typology of 'ethnic' groups' involvement in offending

The interest of this study in developing a typology of secondary school students' delinquent involvement is related to its parallel focus on juvenile justice system. The students who admitted persistent offending are probably more similar to the youths who are 'known' to the police, and are referred to the juvenile courts than to the general student population. However, in the context of the UK, attempts to classify young people according to their criminal involvement have been frequently related to 'bifurcatory' youth justice policies of the 1990s. Such policies were informed by the notion that a small number of young people are responsible for a disproportionately large part of crime and thus should be liable to more severe penalties (Newburn 2007b). Nevertheless, it remains doubtful there is any clear-cut way of delineating persistent offenders from the rest of delinquent adolescents, in terms of either volume of offending or criminal specialisation. Hence, any definition will inevitably be somewhat arbitrary (Hagell and Newburn 1994: 122).

In the framework of the 2003 UMHRI school-survey the only available means of defining the seriousness of delinquent involvement is via the frequency of self-reported offending. Following as closely as possible the suggestions of other studies (i.e.: the first definition examined by Hagell and Newburn 1994), the adopted classification criterion led to the formation of three groups of students:

- In the first category are classified the most frequent or persistent offenders.
- The second category is the one of occasional delinquents which consists of those who -in the main- reported two or three incidents of offending.
- The last category comprises those who did not report any of the examined offences during the prior-12-months. This is the group of non-delinquents.

The composite index on which the assessment of the overall delinquent involvement was based, was created by summing up the following seven *previous-12-month* measures of offending: (1) deliberate damage of school property; (2) stealing something worth at least €10; (3) Shoplifting; (4) violence resulting in medical attention; (5) arson; (6) hitting a teacher; and (7) having used a weapon to get something.

The challenge in summing up these seven offending scales is due to the response set of frequency questions which was not a open-ended but comprised a range of fixed frequency categories. Specifically, the response set for these scales was: 1-2 occasions, 3-5 occasions, 6-9 occasions, 10-19 occasions, 20-39 occasions, and finally 40 occasions or more. Thus each response option is defined by a lower frequency and an upper frequency (i.e.: 6 times to 9 times). By adding these seven variables two composite indexes were created: one based on the lower end and one based on the upper end of each self-reported frequency range. Eventually, the delineation of the three clusters of students was conservatively based on the lower composite index.

- According to these calculations, the students who had not been involved in any of the seven summed up offending behaviours during the last 12 months were 1,901 or 68 per cent of the sample (*Table 6.5*).
- Some engagement in the examined forms of offending was reported by 898 students.
- As *Table 6.5* indicates, only 3.2 per cent of the total sample, which comprises 90 students, reported frequency of offending that was equal to or higher than '20 to 35



offences' during the previous 12-months and thus were classified as 'persistent offenders'<sup>106</sup>.

**Table 6.5: Three Categories of Students' Engagement in Offending: Comparison of Key Characteristics**

	Persistent offenders	Occasional offenders	Non delinquents
N	90	808	1,901
(%)	(3.2)	(28.9)	(67.9)
MEAN AGE	16.52	16.33	16.26
(SD)	(1.173)	(1.316)	(1.292)
SEX (%)			
Male	85.6	64.5	38.3
Female	14.4	35.5	61.7
COUNTRY OF BIRTH (%)			
Greece	81.6	86.8	86.2
Albania	2.3	5.1	6.6
FSU	3.4	4.3	3.9
Other	12.6	3.8	3.3
VOLUME OF OFFENDING (N)	5,165	2,319	0
MEAN FREQUENCY OF OFFENDING	57.83	2.82	0
(SD)	(54.395)	(3.015)	0
CONTACT WITH THE POLICE (%)	37.8	8.9	1.2
LIFETIME USE OF CANNABIS (%)	34.1	19.7	5.3
LIFETIME USE OF HEROIN (%)	7.8	0.5	0.4


<sup>106</sup> The mean age of the persistent offenders was only slightly higher than the mean age of the other two groups, and the between three groups age differences were not significant (Table 6.5). The ratio of males to females among the group of persistent offenders was close to typical sex ratio of criminal justice populations in Greece (85 per cent males). The three groups differences in their sex ratio were found statistically significant (chi-square=209.56, df=2, p<.001). The distribution of the various types of secondary school enrolment (to general or vocational, morning or evening school) was not significantly different for all three examined groups. The lifetime prevalence of cannabis use among this group of persistent offenders (34.1 per cent) was more than six times higher than among non-delinquents (5.4 per cent). Even among students of the second group whose self-reported offending was infrequent, almost one fifth had lifetime experience of cannabis. The between groups differences were found significant (chi-square=182.43, df=2, p<.001). The difference of persistent offenders from the other two groups was even more pronounced in the case of heroin use (chi-square=69.55, df=2, p<.001).

The total volume of self-reported offending, which was calculated by using the lower composite index, was 7,484 offences. The 90 students belonging to the group of persistent offenders admitted responsibility for 69 per cent of the total volume of offending<sup>107</sup>. The mean number of offences reported by the latter group was 57.8, while the corresponding figure was only 2.8 for the group of occasional offenders.

#### *The volume of offending by 'ethnic' group*

With regard to students' ethnicity, the most important finding is that the volume of offending is distributed disproportionately across 'ethnic' groups (*Figure 6.4*). Students born in Greece and Albania had a share of offending which was smaller than their proportion in the study sample. In particular, Albania-born students' offending was 1.6 times less than the expected by their share in the sample. The reverse is true for the students born in FSU and 'other' countries. They admitted responsibility for a greater number of offences than would be expected by their proportion in the study sample. The most pronounced case of over-involvement in offending was that of students born in 'other' countries: their reported volume of offending was more than three times higher their share in the 2003 UMHRI sample.

**Figure 6.4: Ethnic Groups' Volume of Offending**



<sup>107</sup> Only in the case of the Albania-born students the volume of offending that was reported by persistent offenders was smaller than the volume reported by petty offenders of the same origin.


In other words, what is notable is that the representation of students of Albanian parentage was greater among non-delinquents than among offenders and persistent offenders in particular. The proportion of students of FSU background was broadly the same across the three groups, but the proportion of students born in 'other foreign countries' was much higher among persistent than occasional offenders and non-delinquents (*Table 6.5*).

## 6.4 The 2004-05 school survey of inner-city Athens

The previous section 6.3 was devoted to the analysis of the UMHRI dataset which was collected from lower and upper secondary schools located within greater Athens. The current section presents the findings of my own smaller scale school survey, and relates them with the UMHRI representative findings. Section D of the inner-city school survey questionnaire (see Appendix IV) contains a list of twelve questions related to delinquency. Section Z of the questionnaire is devoted to the use of controlled drugs. In both sections, students were asked whether they had ever committed the offence or violation. Moreover, they were asked whether they had done so during the last 12 months.

The *lifetime* prevalence rates for a selection of offences are provided in *Figure 6.5*. Offences that involve violence had higher prevalence among inner-city students than property offences. The finding is consistent not only with the 2003 UMHRI results, presented previously in Chapters 5 and 6, but also with earlier Athenian self-report studies (Spinellis et al. 1994)<sup>108</sup>. Notable in the Greek context is the '*lifetime*' rate of fighting in a public place, like the street or a football ground. According to *Figure 6.5* one-third of the respondents reported *lifetime* experience of such fighting.

**Figure 6.5: Average Lifetime Offending of Inner-City Students**



<sup>108</sup> The reverse is suggested by several British self-reported studies: on average property offending among their sample was more common than violent offending (Flood-Page et al. 2000; Graham and Bowling 1995).

As far as drug use is concerned, only a small part of the inner-city sample (10.5 per cent) reported that they had used cannabis at some point in their lives. This lifetime prevalence of cannabis use is the same as the corresponding finding of 2003 UMHRI survey (10.2 per cent) cited previously in section 6.2.

The property offence most frequently reported by inner-Athens students was snatching something that belonged to someone else. Fifteen per cent of the students admitted having done so at some point in their lives. A similar proportion (about 12 per cent) said that they had 'ever' *stolen something from a car, motor bike, or moped*, while 11 per cent of the students' sample reported having taken *'something from a shop or a store worth at least €5'* without paying for it.

### 6.3.1 Ethnic variance in self-reported delinquency and drug use

The sample of the 2004-05 inner-city school survey enabled the formation of three groups according to students' country of birth. Students born in Greece were classified in the first, those born in Albania in the second, and students born in 'other' countries in the third (see *Table 2.1*). As in the case of 2003 UMHRI survey here also the country of birth serves as an adequate proxy of students' ethnic background. Comparisons between the three 'ethnic' groups are limited by the small size of the inner-city sample. Since sex distribution of offending is very different across 'ethnic' groups, there is a need for separate examination of male and female students.

The data in *Table 6.6* suggest that there are marked differences in the nature of delinquency reported by each group:

- Male students born in Greece were more likely than students of the two other groups to report that in their lifetime they had snatched something from a person. Similarly their lifetime prevalence of cannabis use is the highest compared with other groups of male students. However, all these differences were not identified as statistically significant (*Table 6.6*).
- Male respondents born in Albania and 'other countries' reported rates of shoplifting and stealing from a car or moped that were higher than the rates of male respondents born in Greece. As *Table 6.6* indicates, these differences reached statistical significance only for the comparison between Albania-born students those born in Greece. The group of those born in 'other countries' is too small to allow for statistically significant comparisons. As it can be inferred from *Table 6.6* Albania-born boys were twice as

likely as those born in Greece to have ever "taken something from a shop or a store worth at least €5 without paying for it", and were almost twice as likely "to have stolen something from a car, moped or motorbike".

**Table 6.6: Prevalence of Lifetime Offending of Inner-City Students, by Country of Birth and Sex**

		Country of Birth				Sign.
		Greece	Albania	Other	Average	
		(n=107)	(n=39)	(n=11)	(n=157)	
MALES	STOLEN ANYTHING FROM A SHOP WORTH €5	11.8	23.7	30.0	16.0	.08 <sup>a</sup>
	SNATCHED ANYTHING FROM A PERSON	19.6	13.2	10.0	17.3	NS
	STOLEN ANYTHING FROM A CAR OR A MOPED	16.7	31.6	20.0	20.7	.05 <sup>a</sup>
	JOY RIDING	2.9	5.3	10.0	4.0	NS
	USE OF CANNABIS	18.6	10.3	9.1	15.8	NS
		(n=80)	(n=42)	(n=15)	(n=137)	
FEMALES	STOLEN ANYTHING FROM A SHOP WORTH €5	6.3	2.4	13.3	5.9	NS
	SNATCHED ANYTHING FROM A PERSON	10.3	14.6	20.0	12.7	NS
	STOLEN ANYTHING FROM A CAR OR A MOPED	1.3	2.4	.0	1.5	NS
	JOY RIDING	.0	2.4	.0	0.7	NS
	USE OF CANNABIS	6.3	0.0	13.3	5.1	NS

*Data are expressed as percentages*

*a: The significance of Cramer's V test computed for a 2x2 table containing only students born in Greece and Albania.*

- The examination of last-12-month rates of shoplifting confirms the lifetime picture: some experience with this type of offending was reported by eight per cent of male students born in Greece, 13 per cent of those born in Albania, and 30 per cent of those born in 'other' countries. All in all, inner-city male Lyceum students born in Albania were more likely than those born in Greece to engage with property offences (though not to steal from a person).

Of special interest is the offence of stealing from a vehicle, for it is the most widespread property offence among inner-city male Lyceum students. Apparently, the finding reflects the broad availability of mopeds and motorbikes in Athens and the youths' preoccupation with 'motorised' cultures. A careful analysis of data refutes the possibility that the elevated rates are due to the particularities of a locality and/or the activity of a local group of students. Young offenders are distributed across most of the surveyed general Lyceums and technical / vocational secondary schools. Fifty-five per cent of them were born in

Greece, 39 per cent in Albania, and 6 per cent in 'other countries'. About one-fifth of students who have been engaged with stealing from vehicles also reported having taken a motorbike without the owner's permission. Slightly more than the half of this group have been in contact with the law enforcement agents (53 per cent). Thus, a significant minority of property offenders (47 per cent) reported that they had never been stopped and checked by the police.

Female students were less than half as likely to report lifetime experience of any type of offending (30 per cent had done so) than male respondents (70 per cent). Although this disparity holds across all examined offences, it was less distinct for the offence of stealing from a person. Particularly low rates of offending have been reported by girls of Albanian background (20 per cent). The most frequently reported offence by Albania-born girls was snatching from a person. For this type of offending their rate was similar to that of Albania-born males (*Table 6.6*). The highest level of offending was reported by the girls of the 'other countries' group (40 per cent). Lifetime use of cannabis was admitted by only girls born in Greece and the former Soviet Union.

Male students born in Albania, who participated in the 2004-05 inner city survey, were less likely than those born in Greece to report engagement in fighting. Specifically, the proportion of Albania-born admitting experience of fighting in "public places like football ground or the street", in the past 12 months, was 21 per cent, while the corresponding native-born rate was 31 per cent. The fairly analogous question in the 2003 UMHRI school survey probed whether respondents 'gotten mixed into a brawl at school or at work'. The rate of Albania-born boys admitting having done so was 38 per cent, which is lower than the native-born boys' rate (43 per cent). Thus, the findings of both school surveys are very much in line, and indicate a common pattern as far as such trivial forms of individual fighting are concerned.

Findings concerning less common and more serious forms of violent offending like assaults appear to follow their own pattern. In 2004-05 inner-city survey Albania-born boys were as likely as native-born respondents to admit having beaten someone up to such an extent that medical help was needed (the last-year-rate for this form of severe assault was identical for those 'ethnic' groups and equal to 7.9 per cent). In the previous chapter, we have seen that according to 2003 UMHRI findings, boys born in Greece and Albania had roughly similar past-12-month rates of having beaten someone up severely (14.6 for native-born and 14.4 for Albania-born). Thus, again both surveys indicate a broadly similar

picture, but the extent of reported aggression in 2004-05 inner-city survey was lower than in 2003 UMHRI survey. It is likely that this discrepancy is a function of the substantial presence of Gymnasium students among the 2003 UMHRI sample (According to *Table I of Appendix III*, Gymnasium students represent 30.8 per cent of this sample). On the other hand, all respondents of 2004-05 inner-city survey attended upper secondary schools. We know from other Greek self-report school surveys that violent behaviours are more frequent in lower secondary schools than upper (Tsiganou et al. 2004)<sup>109</sup>.

## 6.5 The nature of property offending: exploring qualitative data

This section is devoted to the analysis of qualitative data, which are based on the life-histories of delinquent young people of immigrant ancestry who were interviewed at the Juvenile Court of Athens but also at secondary schools of central Athens. Strictly speaking it is not possible to use such stories in order to compose the 'archetypical immigrant delinquent youth'. No single case could be representative of all "the many variations of personality, of the permutations of situations and the diversity of experiences" (Burgess 1930: 184) of the thousands of immigrant minors who every year entered the Juvenile Court of Athens. Issues of validity, reliability, and representativeness of life-histories always raise important concerns. Thus, special effort has been devoted to the selection of the presented data so as to avoid the risk of illustrating 'sensational' cases and to reflect broadly representative categories of juvenile court's foreign-born defendants.

The aim is to use such autobiographical data as 'general empirical cases' against which the validity of theories explaining immigrant youths' development of delinquent behaviour can be tested (Frazier 1978). This is attempted through an analysis of the way that interviewees define and explain their own or other immigrant youths' involvement in property offending.

---

<sup>109</sup> However, it is probable that the Lyceum based estimates of violent behaviours underrate the prevalence of such problems among young people of immigrant-ancestry. This hypothesis is related to their elevated rate of school dropout, most of which occurs prior to the transition to upper secondary school, and affects disproportionately the most alienated students of foreign nationality. It is reasonable to assume that this attrition process reduces the prevalence of violent behaviours among the offspring of migrants who managed to carry on to upper secondary schools. Overall, Gymnasium based estimates of violent behaviours appear to suffer to a lesser degree from problems of differential representativeness.



### **6.5.1 Family and neighbourhood disorganisation**

The fact that in Greece immigrants and ethnic minorities do experience a much lower degree of concentration and spatial segregation than ethnic and racial minorities of the US urban ghettos<sup>110</sup> is definitely limiting for the application of the disorganisation theory to the present study and its findings. However, although neither immigrant ghettos nor concentric circles exist in Athens, some inner city areas are immigrants' first choice for settlement upon their arrival (Zarafonitou 2002). Because of their high degree of residential turnover these areas are relatively disorganised and gradually lose their native population. The natives' escape by its turn reduces the inner-city electorate and consequently diminishes municipal authorities' incentive to invest political energy and funds into these areas.

According to a number of this study's young respondents who had lived for a period in the inner-city neighbourhoods of immigrant' first settlement, these are 'tough' areas, with high rates of crime, and widespread violence. "It is not safe to walk in these streets after dark. It is even more difficult to walk along with a girl" explained Florian, a boy of Polish origin who used to live in one of these areas and was very much into street fighting. Such views have been confirmed by reports that leaked from the Metropolitan police of Athens in 2003<sup>111</sup>. It seems that most immigrant families either avoid, or do not stay long in the areas. Thus, the vast majority of this study's respondents, both students and the juvenile court defendants were young people living in more stable inner-city neighbourhoods. Robust evidence about inner-city crime was offered by Zarafonitou's significant 'fear of crime' study (2002: 111-115). Her inquiry was based not only on self-report data but also police statistics from five municipalities located within Greater Athens. One of them was a district in the centre of the city with a large immigrant population. Not only had the police precinct of this inner-city district recorded the highest absolute numbers of crime during 1996-97, but also the surveyed residents had the highest level of self-reported fear of crime (1938). The fears of inner-city respondents were not so much related to property crime but

---

<sup>110</sup>See the relevant discussion of Chapter 1.

<sup>111</sup> The last months of 2007 the prosecutor of the Supreme Court ordered the Hellenic Police to ensure the round of clock enforcement of the law in inner-city Athens. The ordinance was a response to the leak of confidential reports documenting dramatic escalation of street-level crime in Athens and these areas in particular (Y. Souliotis, Kathimerini, 15/12/2007).

in the main related to offences against the person like assaults, robberies, and sexual violence. Equally elevated were the concerns related to drug and local prostitution scenes.

#### ***Helpless immigrant parents?***

The evidence offered by young informants suggests that traditional views of parenting are more prevalent among immigrant parents than among Greek parents. They reported that their parents insist on having dinner together with them and are more conservative about children's choices in dressing, lifestyle, and leisure time activities<sup>112</sup>. In my view, such attitudes are symptomatic of parents' fear that children are acculturating too fast into the native lifestyles. In the case of Albanian immigrant parents, fears of losing control are typically related to their female children. Boys who are working and contribute to the house expenses are in effect beyond parental control.

However, the value-system of immigrant parents and their views about 'ideal' forms of parenting are not the only factors at play. Life-circumstances and constraints inherent in the immigrant condition appear to prevail in many cases. Most immigrant parents work long hours and in practice children spend much time unsupervised. The migration circumstances also have a significant bearing on the structure of immigrant families. Self-elected immigrants do not constitute a representative cross-section of the sending country's population. For instance, for many female immigrants originating from the former Eastern European countries the decision to migrate was correlated to the fact that they were single mothers. An Albanian young offender who was raised by his lone mother explains:

Well, if a child of my age did what I have done, the parents could have kicked him out of the door. In a normal family... Basically most families of the streetwise kids have no idea of what's going on. I am telling my mam that I am going out for coffee. Ok, she says to me, go. She is not in a position to check what I'm doing. For she works very much, she doesn't know about Greece, and she doesn't know her son's mates. I have mates in every part of the city.

Similarly to parents, immigrant youths also appear to be more 'traditional' than the average native young people. For instance, they value the family reputation somewhat more than their Greek peers and are –at least in principle– more mindful to protect the 'name' of the

---

<sup>112</sup> On parental practices see also Chapter 4, section 4.4.1.

family. According to the findings of the inner-city school-survey 74 per cent of the Albania-born students consider it as very important not to 'blemish' the name of the family. The corresponding proportion of the native-born children was 69 per cent (statistically not a significant difference). However, according to both previously presented school surveys, foreign-born boys were slightly less likely than native boys to report harmonious relations with the father<sup>113</sup>. The discrepancy between these two findings is instructive. Many young people of immigrant background initially have at their disposal 'traditional' cultural models, which were brought from their country of origin. However, as their integration into the host-country's youthful milieus advances, gradually this cultural 'toolkit' started to look 'parochial' for most of them. According to the conclusions of Chapter 4, most children of immigrants rapidly assimilate into the host country's milieu, be it the school system, the neighbourhood, the construction site, or the underworld of deviant peers. In all cases, the pace of their acculturation is much faster than that of their parents. Consequently, at some point a degree of intergenerational conflict is likely to emerge. Such intergenerational gap of values is most pronounced, has pathological dimensions, and occurs more frequently only when immigrant-origin children assimilate into the deviant segments of the host society.

However, the youths I came across in the juvenile court of Athens during 2004-05 gave me the impression that when immigrant boys start to engage heavily with deviant peer groups there is little that their parents can do in order to prevent the escalation of delinquent involvement. It is plausible to hypothesise that immigrant parents' difficulty in handling their delinquent offspring is due to two additional reasons, on top of the previously mentioned long working schedule. First, in the country of origin they used to rely on informal social networks of kinship and community in order to control children's misbehaviour. Such networks are either too weak or non-existent in the metropolitan areas of immigrant settlement. And second, they lack the resources that native parents have in

---

<sup>113</sup> According to the findings of 2003 UMHRI survey the lowest mean score for problems with the father was reported by boys born in Greece. The foreign-born boys were more likely to report unsatisfactory relation with the father (F: 5.78, p: 0.016). The highest extent of problems with the father was reported by boys born in the former Soviet Union. The relation with the mother was found to be equally satisfactory for all 'ethnic' groups. On the other hand the results of the 2004-05 inner-city school survey reveal difference of marginal importance. For instance to argue with the parents 'frequently' or 'very frequently' reported 32 per cent of the native-born and 33 per cent of the Albania-born students.

order to offer their children alternatives to the deviant culture of the streetwise life. A case in point is the story of Saadi (Case No. 1).

*Case No. 1.*

Saadi was born in Iraq in 1988. His family fled Iraq when he was 12 years old for his father was facing persecution. Saadi, his parents and his two younger sisters settled in a working class district of Athens within a small Iraqi community. His early years in Greece were difficult for Saadi. He didn't speak the language and unlike his sisters he was never sent to a Greek school. Nevertheless he managed to learn the language by watching TV and through his friends. He didn't want the company of other Iraqi youth much, so almost all his mates were Greek boys and girls.

Soon he started to work in a car station. His specialisation was in painting lorries and other large vehicles. He describes himself as a proud craftsman, already able to take on well-paid contracts. The problem is that he was the family's main breadwinner. Instead of working, the father was killing his time playing cards. Saadi claimed that not only he supported his fathers' gambling with his salary but on top of that he was also beaten up by him regularly. "There was nothing I could do with him. Whatever I said to him ended up in beatings." In order to avoid the worst his mother sent him to live with another Iraqi family.

Alienated from his family<sup>114</sup> and the Iraqi community he started to mess with the Greek streetwise youths of the working class district. Some of them were at school but most were working. Their principal source of excitement at that time was joyriding. They used to steal mopeds, motorbikes, and sometimes cars from the neighbourhood for kicks. Soon he was arrested for stealing a motorbike. He claimed that police officers beat him up in order to force him to admit responsibility for other vehicle thefts. However, the court gave him a second chance and only passed probation supervision order on him. But the last time we spoke he had amassed a roughly twenty additional charges for vehicle thefts.

However, it seems that he enjoyed the street-reputation he had made in vehicle crime: "When a motorbike is stolen in the neighbourhood they always come to me. You know, the things you've done stay with you for ever. You can turn in a priest, but even then your 'name' is not gonna change." Despite the record of criminal charges he had built up, he refrained from engaging in more serious property crime, like burglaries. "I've never done this yet. It's too early for me for those things." For him crime was a second craft. Even the prospect of a custodial sentence was seen by him as part of the thrills of a risk taking career. Eventually the Juvenile Court gave him a six-month-custodial sentence.

Saadi didn't like drugs and detests drug takers. He has only tried cannabis that some friends gave him a few times only. "You can smoke pot if you wanna try it. But you can't mess up with other drugs. These things are not a joke." His attitudes, taste, values, accent, made him indistinguishable from the other streetwise lads of the working-class districts.

<sup>114</sup> Adolescents who experience parental violence can be expected to spend more time in peer oriented leisure activities as a means of escaping the difficult situation at home, and are therefore at a greater risk of involvement with delinquent peers (Titzmann et al. 2008).

### 6.5.2 Pressured into crime?

In their study of the link (mythological in the main) between Hispanic Immigration to the US and crime, Hagan and Palloni argue that young male illegal immigrants may be most likely to become involved in petty property crime as they attempt to satisfy basic subsistence needs while moving through the early stages of seeking, finding, losing, and regaining employment (Hagan and Palloni 1999). A number of young immigrant informants recalled some involvement in petty delinquency of such nature when they arrived in Athens and their family was living well-below the poverty line. More certain is that upon their arrival many Eastern European immigrants were mesmerised by the glitter of western consumerism. This was particularly the case of Albanians due to their country's extreme isolation and the absolute scarcity of consumer goods (i.e.: the story of *Erlind*, below presented as Case No. 2).

#### *Case No. 2.*

Erlind was born in a town located around the middle of Albania. In 2000 the whole of his Roma family emigrated to Greece. They were unemployed for a long time. Their plan was to work and raise some money so as to return home and renovate their house. At that time he was 10 years old but he had never attended school: probably due to their Roma way of life or because of the chaotic situation that followed Albania's 1997 pyramid crisis.

In Athens the family settled in an inner city neighbourhood and a two-bedroom flat. Soon Erlind's brother got married and the newly married couple joined the family and occupied one of the bedrooms. His two younger sisters attended primary and secondary school. "They are girls so they have to go to school." At the age of 13 Erlind enrolled in a primary school. He only stayed for a month. His brother asked him to join the workers at a construction site. He worked there for a year cleaning the site and carrying raw materials. At that time his father was working for a contractor laying telephone cables in the city of Athens. His mother was working in houses as a domestic cleaner.

He learned to speak Greek at home from television and he practised at the construction site. He cannot read and write. Every afternoon he played football at the nearby square with three other boys from his hometown.

Then the father was injured at the back and was treated in a hospital. He was unable to work as a navvy anymore. In order to meet the rent and grocery expenses the parents and Erlind started selling clothes at a flea market. There he saw an old bicycle at the side of a street. He used a pair of pincers to cut the chain that locked the bike. He "just wanted to bring the bicycle home and have it repaired by his father." He just wanted it and took it. He was caught red-handed and taken to the police station. They didn't mistreat him: "only a little. A smack." Later he was brought to the police headquarters and in front of the minors' prosecutor. He "signed some papers."

The father smacked and told him: "don't do it again." "OK I'll never do such thing again. I never had done that before. Not even in Albania."

The court ordered the measure of "responsible parental supervision" and left him free. His future plans are to return to work and to continue playing football with his compatriot friends. Maybe when the older sister starts working he will be able to return to school.

The Albanian-born writer Kapllani describes the first visit of a young Albanian villager in what in his eyes was a temple of western consumerism, (actually a parochial supermarket), and the spontaneous petty theft that he committed (2006b). Such unrestrained desire to participate in consumer society seems to be behind the 'almost' symbolic shopliftings that a number of immigrant boys and girls committed. Unplanned and almost non-utilitarian thefts of perfumes, clothes, shoes, bicycles are exemplars of this sort of engagement in petty delinquency, which is rarely followed by repeat offending. But for most immigrant youth their expectations grow hand in hand with their acculturation. Most acculturated youth aspire to have the level of consumption that middle-class native youths have.

Jamal is an Albanian young man who attends 1<sup>st</sup> grade of TEE in tandem with working in the construction industry. He was brought before the Juvenile Court with the charge of stealing gasoline from a moped in order to fill his own. His wrongdoing was relevant to his struggle to meet basic subsistence needs. Thus, Jamal does not show solidarity with those better-off immigrant youths who engage in property offences:

It is not the case that they are stealing out of necessity. If they are in need they have to find a job. The guys who steal, it isn't that they're broke. Simply they want more than they can afford. Maybe his father gives him 3 Euros, but what he needs is 20 or 30. He wants to go out to the clubs to have a night out with his girlfriend. I am different: when I'm broke I don't take the girlfriend out.

I also asked Andrea, the under probation Albanian informant, what brings immigrant youths to the juvenile court. His answer also specifies what delinquent youths' objects of desire are, their taste in the area of 'masculine capital' (Mullins 2006: 69):

Why they are here?... They've done that for themselves. Nobody forced them to...'cause they see someone have something nice and they want that for themselves. For example they envy nice clothes. So they steal from a shop or an old lady.... What is important for them? Motorbikes and cars play a massive role. Girls, mobile phones. These are the things that count.

It has to be stressed that the link between strain, which stems from the differential access to culturally valued goals, and property offending seems to be more extensive among the children of immigrant parentage who have left school than those who attended school and

pursued the academic path. More than half (55 percent) of the foreign-born defendants I interviewed in the juvenile court of Athens had either left prematurely or never attended school in Greece. The immigrant students that have chosen to chase upward mobility through academic success are in effect buffered by the pressures of relative deprivation. On the contrary for those who are out of school the need for money and valuables is pressing.

Obviously, this is not to say that every immigrant kid who does not attend school is crime-prone. On the contrary, as the analysis of Chapter 4 has shown, most children embrace the working and investing ethos of their immigrant parents. Moreover, they look down on their compatriots who are following the delinquent pathway. Skeder, an Albanian TEE student, not only suggested a mutually exclusive distinction between college boys and street-corner boys, but also made it clear that the choice of a delinquent career leads nowhere: "Those who are stealing are kids who have left school. But if you steal one day you will land in prison. You are going to steal one or two years at most and then you will be locked in..."

Another Albanian defendant wanted to clarify that immigrant offenders' decisions to engage in property delinquency do not represent a response to discrimination and racism, at least not a direct one. Such strains, specific to migrants' inferiorisation, do not seem to be among the principal factors that create pressures that are linked to involvement in property crime. This does not offer support to Agnew's (2006) prediction that those who experience prejudice and discrimination are more likely to engage in property crime. However, this negative evidence should not be hastily interpreted as a solid empirical basis. The following story that was offered by an Albania-born student of Greek origin allows us to take a glimpse of young people's worlds divided as they are by hierarchies of origin and wealth, and the likely ways of revenge:

We were gathered at the flat of a Greek mate to spend some time. We ordered pizza and it arrived around 11:30 -12:00. At the same time the moped of my Greek friend was stolen. Finally he found it, a week later, and the police said that the thief was a foreigner. He was the same guy who had brought us the pizza. I believe he did it for fun. If he wanted to take it apart and sell it for spare parts he 'd have plenty of time to do it. I think he did it for kicks. If it'd been Greeks those who took the moped it 'd have been already dismantled and sold in parts.

**Stages of deviant transitions**

Chapter 5 presented ethnographic data related to the sites of immigrant youths' everyday gatherings, namely the small squares and the tiny parks of inner-city Athens (section 5.4.2). These places are invariably the meeting point for the recently arrived immigrant youths. However, in the long run the streetwise youths and those who have left school are more likely to stay on<sup>115</sup>. These loose groupings serve a range of aims apart from the fundamental one which is the youths' need for socialisation. Initially it could be the fear of an unknown context and the need for mutual support that keeps immigrant-origin children together. At this stage it is likely that the group will clash with other mono-'ethnic' groups of youths for a host of reasons some of which racism-related. This way the hostile reception climate and the polarisation of youths along ethnicised lines (as documented in Chapter 3) facilitate the spread of collective and individual forms of violence in inner-city youthful milieus.

On the whole, this study's qualitative data, (for example the cited story of *Gentir*, Case No. 3), support the hypothesis that these groupings have -at the early stages of immigrant youths' settlement- a conflictual orientation<sup>116</sup>. Later on, some of these near-groups (Yablonsky 1959), the ones that remain active, are likely to be transformed into delinquent groups that offer a small number of immigrant youths access to illegitimate means and a conduit for the cultural transmission of criminal roles. Young men with an already developed involvement in crime take advantage of these loose-groups of compatriots as a reserve from which they recruit novices. A number of immigrant young offenders reported that they have been hired by others for instance in order to help with the stealing of a radio from a car.

---

<sup>115</sup> The analogy is with the classic sociological account of the groups of non-academically oriented youths that gather in the street corners of US immigrant-dense slum areas (Whyte 1943).

<sup>116</sup> Here I am referring to Cloward and Ohlin's contention that some youthful gangs -the ones that are located in the most disorganised areas, where even organised crime is absent- usually take the form of conflict gangs. In more organised areas, where criminal subcultures exist, the learning of crime is possible because of the presence of older offenders and a stable criminal sector (Cloward and Ohlin 1960).



*Case No. 3.*

Gentir was 16 years old when I met him at the Juvenile court of Athens. In 1995 his family left their home, a town south of Tirana, sold everything and migrated to Greece. Most of their relatives did the same. After several stopovers they settled in an immigrant-dense neighbourhood of inner-city Athens. There Gentir, the family's only child, graduated from primary school and enrolled in the secondary. But he didn't like school much so he dropped out on the 2nd grade of Gymnasium, and started working with his father at a gas station. The mother worked as an office cleaner. He recalls a childhood without many problems. It was the parents who had gone through strains and difficulties.

At the gas station he was making €35 a day but since he lived with the family he had to contribute to the house expenses.

In 2004 his mates were 20 - 25 Albanian boys. Most of them had a work and only one or two attended evening-school. Some of them were older, 19-year-olds, and had done time in the juvenile prison for car thefts. All of them used to gather every night in an inner-city square and to spend their time there until 2am. Then they used to spend the rest of the night into a club. At the square most boys shared a joint, but the older boys already had a taste for cocaine. At the club they used to have liquor drinks and sometimes 'ecstasy'. At that time Gentir used to spend €30 a week on hashish. However, he and his mates have a low opinion of heroin takers for they consider them losers. Most of the times they speak Albanian, and they are strong enough in their neighbourhood so nobody dares to mess with them.

Gentir claimed that his friends were not active in crime. However, he was caught while he was attempting to steal from a truck. The court ordered him to follow a treatment program for this hashish indulgence. He didn't consider hashish taking a problem. "The only thing I want from the program is the attendance certificate" he told me. Predictably, he soon stopped attending. Last summer he spent four months in Albania. He wants to leave Greece and maybe try to find his way at the Netherlands. He thinks that his stay in Greece is already prolonged.

At the level of petty delinquency this development can happen within the confines of the local groupings. But for those who are heading for a criminal career the decisive turn happens when they start working for the established criminal rings that are usually at the hands of natives (refer to *Case No. 4* presented below). A number of young offenders, those most heavily involved with crime, claimed that they had been contracted by natives for specific criminal enterprises. To the extent that this auxiliary mode of criminal involvement is typical for the structure of immigrant criminality, one can argue -together with distinguished Italian criminologists- that the way in which foreigners replaced natives at the lower end of the legitimate labour market is replicated by their mode of participation in the criminal division of labour (Palidda 1994 cited in Melossi 2003). This predicament matches with the literal meaning of the description of immigrants as 'a reserve army of delinquents' which was coined by Calavita (2003).

From the point of view of statistics, the critical factor upon which the 'opportunity' for an apprenticeship in crime depends is the existence in the local context of a sizeable

criminal sector. And since the size of the criminal 'underclass' -either native or foreigner- remains relatively small in Greece, as all the comparative international studies of crime reveal, the possibility of foreign-born young offenders to develop a career in the realm of the Greek criminal underclass remains equally limited. Eventually, according to both police and juvenile justice data the number of serious young offenders -of foreign or native nationality- remains rather small (According to *Table 6.1* the number of non-national youths who are recorded by the police as responsible for more serious offences ranges from 300 to 450).

## **6.6 The riddle of drug use by migrant youth: exploring qualitative data**

The attitudes of foreign-born young interviewees towards drug use offer indications that could be useful in interpreting the findings of the self-report school surveys, previously presented. The majority of the interviewed youths of immigrant origin held negative views of drug taking and drug users. It seems that these views directly reflect the attitudes and norms regarding substance misuse which are embedded in the cultures of origin. Since such views are origin-specific, the averaging of the reported views could conceal a great deal of variation regarding drugs-related attitudes and experiences.

(1) Consequently, it is necessary to examine separately the stance of distinct immigrant groups towards drug use, starting from the group of the Albania-born youths. Drug use was very limited in early 1990s Albania, the place where this study's Albanian respondents and their parents came from. Furthermore, it is significant the fact that most immigrant families did not originate from the capital, Tirana, but from small towns and villages of the southern part of the country. An Albania-born student of Greek ethnic background, whose family migrated to Greece in 1991, voices the contempt of the academically-oriented immigrant youths towards such pathologies of the host society: "I do smoke, I buy a pack regularly. But nothing like pot. Only Greeks do drugs. It's a Greek game. You know, pills, 'buttons', 'ecstasy'. Go now to the schoolyard, behind the canteen, and you'll find many kids doing pot. But if it is not in your nature....you don't mess with these things."

This perhaps helps to explain why Albania-born respondents of both school surveys reported a rate of cannabis use which was slightly lower than that of their native-born classmates. However, the interviews with three Albanian youths, who arrived in Greece more recently than the average, revealed attitudes towards cannabis smoking which were more 'relaxed', and thus different from the average stance that the inner-city school

survey's findings suggest. Probably this is due to the on-going westernisation of Albanian society and its youthful culture in particular. An impact more specific to the societal attitudes towards drug use has the recent expansion of marijuana plantations in the south of Albania. This marijuana cropping is mainly for export to the Greek<sup>117</sup> and Italian markets (Ruggiero 2000). However, it seems that the domestically-produced cannabis is also readily available and thus partly consumed at the local level. Because of this development, youths who either left Albania after 1997 or maintain frequent contact with relatives at the motherland have attitudes and experiences related to hashish taking which are not very different from those held by indigenous youths. Nicko, a young Albanian offender, who arrived in Greece after 1997, exemplifies the average case in terms of both stance and experience: "I have tried hashish once or twice. You know, hashish is not like a real drug. It is for the case when something gets on your nerves. It relaxes you. All other drugs are dangerous and I don't want to die."

Heavier involvement in drug culture is rare for Albanian youths unless it is facilitated through participation in a delinquent lifestyle. Furthermore, music offers an alternative cultural 'gateway' to drug use. It seems that a section of the Albania-born youth does not identify much with the modern-Greek music and its folkish forms. For various reasons, including the allure of the global music scene and their difficulties with the Greek language, they are fans of techno or hip-hop music genres. Consequently, their drugs of choice are associated with rave music scenes. For instance, they are more likely to consume -on a recreational or experimental basis- 'ecstasy' and hallucinogens than sedatives.

---

<sup>117</sup> Police statistics show a considerable involvement of some ethnonational groups in drug trafficking in Greece. According to Hellenic Police, particularly important is the role of Albanian rings in the trafficking of cannabis and heroin (2005). However, ethnographic data of this study suggest that the street-level involvement of Albanian nationals in the dealing of hashish is very limited. Even more marginal is their role in the street-level dealing of heroin and other class-A drugs. Albanian rings' area of specialisation is rather wholesale trafficking. Available secondary data lend support to the hypothesis that the Albanian clandestine networks that initially specialized in trafficking desperate immigrants over the Greek-Albanian border, soon expanded their activities to the smuggling of guns, drugs and the exploitation of young women (Lazaridis 2001; Leman and Janssens 2008). On the whole, the case remains that "Albania's poverty, its conversion to free market economics, the breakdown of formal controls, and its coastline, provided ideal conditions for a two-way trading in weapons, oil, drugs, tobacco, stolen vehicles and migrant smuggling." (Lewis 1998: 224)

The previously mentioned rapid developments in Albania's drug scene complicate the task of testing the 'convergence hypothesis', which refers to the relation between Albanian youths' duration of residence in the 'host country' (see Table 2.1) and their engagement in drug use. However, the two heroin users of Albanian nationality I interviewed were not late arrivals in Greece. Quite the opposite: they had left Albania in the early 1990s and had practically been raised in Greece<sup>118</sup>. These youths had not much contact with their co-nationals, and had been assimilated into delinquent segments of inner-city youthful population. In their case the relation between delinquency and drug use is best described by the theoretical model which postulates that it is a criminal lifestyle that causes the engagement in drug abuse<sup>119</sup>. This gateway hypothesis is even more plausible in the case

---

<sup>118</sup> To the same conclusion leads the examination of the socio-demographic details of those Albanian drug addicted minors, who had received treatment during 2003-07 by the specialist centre for adolescents STROFI, which is located in inner-city Athens, (personal communication with STROFI's chief researcher Sp. Zotou, 01.04.2008).

<sup>119</sup> Although the literature is quite consistent in documenting the general association between drug use and crime, the existence of a casual relationship between them remains controversial. All possible casual associations have received support from research findings. According to Walters (1994) the explanations that have been proposed are four: (a) drug abuse causes criminal involvement, (b) a criminal lifestyle leads to the engagement in drug abuse, (c) both deviant behaviours are associated but their link is reciprocal, and (d) the association between crime and drug abuse is spurious and both behaviours are linked only by sharing similar risk factors.

In the case of Albania-born heroin or cocaine abusers, which is under examination here, the explanation with the best fitting to the data is the delinquent lifestyle explanation. The foundation of this gateway hypothesis is the finding that delinquency is a more prevalent behaviour among adolescents than drug use (Elliott et al. 1985). Moreover, for most youths the involvement in petty delinquency precedes the onset of drug use (Elliott et al. 1989). Thus, it seems to be more likely that delinquency is the cause of most drug misuse than the reverse. In order to examine this and other gateway effects a British study using the YLS dataset found that transitions from truancy and minor crime to drug use appear more frequently than progressions from drug use to crime (Pudney 2002). Moreover, when the focus is on heroin users it seems that the majority of them had been involved in some form of criminality before starting using heroin (Hammersley et al. 1990).

One of the more influential studies (and quite relevant to the case at hand) that support the explanatory primacy of delinquency in the drugs-crime link was Burr's research in a South London area during the 1980s (Burr 1987). Burr studied delinquents, aged 15-25 years old, who used to take heroin by employing the then new 'chasing the dragon' route of administration. Because of the area's entrenched deprivation and extended criminal sector, the majority of her study sample had already developed a delinquent orientation before starting using heroin. Hence, these youngsters' drug habit developed as an extension of their delinquent behaviour. Young criminals, Burr argues, not only find heroin attractive but they are also the youthful group

of immigrant cocaine users (refer to *Case No. 4*). An Albania-born young defendant at the Juvenile Court of Athens referred to cocaine as the 'mafiosi' drug of choice. In his social world, the young people of immigrant ancestry who use to demonstrate the habit of consuming cocaine were those linked to the criminal underworld.

*Case No. 4.*

Danny was born in a seaport of central Albania. I talked with him several times at the juvenile court of Athens and the probation service during 2004 when he was 18 years old. His family, consisting of five persons, left Albania as soon as the border opened. His stepfather is of Greek origin so Danny spoke some Greek. They resided in a working class neighbourhood of inner Athens. They saved some money and in 1993 they returned to their hometown to start a fishing business. However, his father's fishing nets were ruined by thieves and thus a year or so later they had to return back to Greece for a second time.

Danny graduated from compulsory schooling and continued to a technical secondary school (TEE) in the same neighbourhood. "I was no good at school but I managed to carry on. A bit of cheating here, a bit of cheating there, you know how it is." In 2004, Danny supposedly still attended TEE, though only rarely he was at school. Nevertheless, he was well-known among other students of Albanian origin as a kid that had taken the wrong way.

At primary school Danny had no friends. He is not very talkative about the situation at home but it seems that it wasn't a place that he liked to stay at. His engagement in offending started early. While at primary school he sneaked into the teachers' office on a payment day and stole everybody's salary. Without doubt that was quite an amount of money as he explained to me with pride. When Danny was 13 years old he met Mario another boy originating from central Albania.

They not only became friends but also partners in delinquency. Soon the two of them were sneaking into schools and frontistiria<sup>120</sup> in order to snatch teachers' bags and purses. Their next delinquent step was the business of 'taking' vehicles. Initially, mopeds and motorbikes and later on cars. At times they were also working for an immigrant trafficking ring. They used to steal trucks from Athens in order to collect irregular Iraqi and Kurd refugees left from traffickers to remote coasts of northern and central Greece. At the peak of their career they were full-time burglars. "We have screwed everything up, from Glyfada to Kiffisia<sup>121</sup>. Shops, kiosks, garages, churches, everything." Sometimes they used to collaborate with two other guys of Albanian origin. They had formed an 'organisation'. Danny was the mastermind of the party for he had an eye for opportunities.

After a successful burglary of a video studio the two friends had an argument with the other two older partners over the splitting of profits. Danny thought that the stolen electronic stuff was worth

most easily able to support the expensive habit. The overall factor responsible for the extensive and rapid spread of heroin use in South London during the 1980s was, stresses Burr, the area's thriving criminal subculture.

However, it seems that drug use holds greater importance for the maintenance of a criminal career than that of crime for the maintenance of a drug addiction (Elliott et al. 1989). In general, although the two deviant lifestyles are distinct, they share many themes, rituals, behavioural patterns that operate as links of reinforcement.

<sup>120</sup> Private cram schools.

<sup>121</sup> Meaning that they have targeted the whole region of greater Athens, from southern to northern districts.

€20-30.000. He and Mario were so annoyed for being given only €300 for the job that they snitched the other two to the police.

At some point Danny worked as a drug courier. He delivered free base cocaine with his bicycle for a Greek middle man. The cocaine was imported from Albania by an Albanian national. This involvement in the drug scene was critical for Danny and Mario: soon they both became addicted to free base coke. The last time I talked to them each of them was consuming 4 to 10 gr. of coke every day and spent €800 per week. Apparently, the need to finance their expensive addiction exacerbated the two boys' engagement in criminality. In 2004 Danny had amassed charges for 19 thefts and burglaries. He was ordered by the court to present himself to the police station twice a month. But he told me that he is "not going there anymore." He claimed that the reason was the officers' behaviour which was –according to him- "terrible." He accused them of repeated harassment and severe beatings. On the other hand he claimed that one of his burglaries was done on behalf of a man that was introduced to him as a police officer. The man gave him the tip about the place and claimed most of the profit. In order to escape from the surveillance of the police Danny fled to Albania.

Eventually, by the end of the year Danny was adjudicated by the court and received the sentence of five years immediately enforced custody. His friend Mario was remanded in custody.

(2) It is likely that the same reasons, namely the salience of the culture of origin, made youths who were born and spent their early childhood in countries of the economically developed world have more favourable attitudes towards drug-taking. In such cases, drug-use rates are an extension of the prevalence of use of 'soft' drugs like hashish in the US, UK, Germany, Australia, and other highly industrialised parts of the West. A number of students of such origin, probably the offspring of repatriated Greek immigrants, were surveyed by the 2003 UMHRI study and were placed into the category of those born in 'other' countries. The relevant to them quantitative findings indicated particularly elevated rates of most forms of deviant behaviour, delinquency, and drug use (*Tables 6.2 and 6.3*). Thus, empirical evidence supports the hypothesis of 'cultural transmission' in the case of the youths born in countries of the economically developed world and their involvement in deviant behaviours. However, it also has to be taken into account that such youths probably feel more alienated in the host society than their immigrant peers of Balkan, and Eastern European background for they do not belong to any sizeable community.

(3) What also seems distinctive is the case of students and young offenders who were born in one of the states that emerged after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. According to available research, the use of illicit and licit psychotropic substances in the Russian Federation has been growing at a rapid pace since the 1980s, especially among women (Pridemore 2002). In 2003, the proportion of Moscow students who reported having used marijuana or hashish was about the same as the average of western European countries. Equally elevated was the proportion that reported use of any illicit drug other than

cannabis<sup>122</sup> (Anderson et al. 2007). Among the frequently cited causes that make Russia a 'land fit for heroin' are the dismantling of rigid Soviet control, the difficulties of economic transition, the destabilising of societal structures, the spread of consumerism, and last but not least, the increase of crime rates and the availability of illicit and licit psychotropic substances (Observatoire Geopolitique des Drogues 2000; Pridemore 2002). Cannabis is the most widely used drug in Russia for its illegal production thrives in all the FSU countries. But heroin also seems to be in abundance due to the 'route' that brings the Afghan production to the Russia Federation through Tajikistan (Observatoire Geopolitique des Drogues 2000).

The influence of the country of origin drug-scene was evident in some accounts offered by the FSU-born young offenders and students not only in relation to their drug-related attitudes but also in relation to active drug taking trajectories. A number of respondents referred to other young people (siblings or mates) who started taking cannabis or opiates while living or visiting Georgia or Kazakhstan<sup>123</sup>. Nevertheless, it could be wrong to assume that the elevated levels of drug-use reported by young people of FSU origin are principally due to the transmitted influence of the birthplace culture, a mere reflection of Russian people appetite for indiscriminate consumption of psychoactive substances. In line with the theoretical approach that was adopted in Chapter 5 in relation to the interpretation of violent behaviours, here also we eschew the shortcomings of culturalist approaches and reject the notion that immigrant youths' problem behaviours simply reflect some transmitted cultural essence handed down from the country of origin (Lea and Young 1984: 131).

Thus, the causes of the heroin epidemic that hit the communities of the FSU-born immigrants are in the most part related to this immigrant group's mode of adaptation into the Greek society. It has to be restated here that although a significant part of FSU-born immigrants are of Greek origin (Pontian Greeks) and they have received support from the Greek state, their cultural and structural integration remains rather poor. Significant for the

---

<sup>122</sup> At any rate, above Greek prevalence figure for self-reported drug-use which is lower than ESPAD's average and close to Sweden's corresponding prevalence figures (Anderson et al. 2007).

<sup>123</sup> Little is known about Georgia or Kazakhstan's drug scenes. However, apart from lawlessness, and the threat posed by organised crime, the spread of drugs were also among the factors that Pontian-Greek informants referred to as contributing to their decision to leave Georgia and other parts of the former Soviet Union for the unknown to them 'motherland' (Anthogalidou et al. 2005).

problem of maladjustment and drug use in particular seems to be the residential segregation of the Pontian communities, their entrenched poverty and protracted marginalisation (see Chapter 1, section 1.1).

As far as young Pontians are concerned, they appear to encounter significant adaptation problems resulting in high criminality rates and drug abuse (Ballas 1995). Greek-Pontian respondents of this study, who used to live in impoverished areas of segregated FSU settlement at the outskirts of the city of Athens<sup>124</sup>, offered accounts that portrayed this migrant niche as a site combining a unique extent of ethnic 'closure', a local culture of social deviancy and a core group of immigrant heroin abusers<sup>125</sup>. Two interviewees admitted that they had been abusing class A drugs for a long time. A 17-year-old Pontian girl concluded the situation of her community: "It is rumoured that many of our kids are on drugs. For no reason, or probably because they have gone through tough situations." Since she was heavily involved with delinquency and drug taking she was also in a position to know what is going on in the local drug scene: "Basically it is the Roma people who sell drugs. However, some of our kids are also in the business of dealing heroin. But they are only few, because we have some basic rules that we follow. We don't sell to our kids. For we think that it is wrong, because this shit is death."

The case of the Pontian segregated settlement and its problems with 'ethnic' drug sub-culture and crime is still exceptional in Athens and reminiscent of the situation in the immigrant 'banlieues' of French urban periphery<sup>126</sup> (Wacquant 1993). What seems certain is that in these locales the factors that are at work and produce the exacerbation of social pathologies are pertinent to the existence of a segregated and marginalised 'ethnic' community and thus other than those suggested by the 'convergence hypothesis'.

---

<sup>124</sup> Because of this residential pattern FSU-born students are absent from my own 2004-2005 inner-city school survey. However, they were present in 2003 UMHRI student sample. Their self-reported rates of drug use were noticeable (refer to Table 6.3).

<sup>125</sup> Since a number of drug-related deaths of young Pontians has been recorded by the Police and publicised by the media it is widely assumed that this 'ethnic' migrant group heavily engages in the use of opiates (Ballas 2000: 108). Moreover, this indication has been confirmed by outreach work in Pontians areas of settlement in the outskirts of Greater Athens, (with my participation), which came across a great deal of problematic drug use.

<sup>126</sup> However, the size of the Pontian settlements and the scale of their problems are tiny in comparison with the French 'banlieues'.



## 6.7 Summing up

This chapter investigated the extent and nature of immigrant youths' engagement in property delinquency and drug use. The examination employed a range of data sources: official crime statistics, the UMHRI school survey of 2003, my own inner-Athens school survey, and interview material offered by youths of immigrant parentage at the Juvenile Court of Athens and a number of inner-city secondary schools.

- The first half of this chapter has shown that as far as property crime is concerned there is a broad agreement between police statistics and self-report data. The findings stemming from these two sources point in the same direction. The involvement of immigrant-origin youths in certain types of property crime is out of proportion to their numbers and above the rates reported by indigenous youths.
- However, although school survey self-report data suggest that foreign-born youths engage more frequently than native-born in impersonal forms of property offending, it was native-born students of inner-city schools who admitted the highest rate of theft from the person (*Table 6.8*).

The aforementioned broad conclusion about the over-involvement of immigrant youths in some forms of property offending does not mean that the analysis of these two categories of data resulted in identical findings. Specifically, migrant groups' extent of disproportionate self-reported offending cannot explain alone the magnitude of foreigner alleged offenders' over-presentation in the corresponding police statistics. Thus, it is also necessary to examine whether the police are using different tactics or discriminate against immigrant youths when enforcing the law. Such forms of uneven police practice might constitute an additional significant factor, which could be partly responsible for immigrant youths' disproportionate engagement in criminal justice system. It is with the examination of this vexed question that the next chapter engages.

- Equally notable is that the share of students of Albanian origin was greater among non-delinquents than among offenders and especially persistent offenders. The proportion of students of FSU background was broadly equally distributed across groups, but the representation of students born in 'other' foreign countries was much higher among persistent than occasional offenders and non-delinquents.

Thus, the more general conclusion is that the delinquency rate of youths of Albanian origin does not justify the currency of the 'criminal Albanian' stereotype (see section 3.2.3). Other youthful ethno-national groups, smaller in size than the Albanian, reported more extended

and more serious involvement in offending. Thus, confirming the conclusions of Chapter 3, the negative stereotyping of Albanians is largely due to the tension between established natives and a group of outsiders that have become 'frighteningly' numerous. Thus, more than the crime rate *per se* it is the size of a populous migrant group the factor that makes it a 'threat'.

The exploration of qualitative data suggests several casual mechanisms that appear to be at play in the case of foreign-born youths' engagement in property delinquency. The involvement of recently arrived immigrant youths in petty property crime is often associated with the urgency of basic needs (i.e. the cited case of Jamal) or in order to gain access to goods that the same-age native children have in abundance (i.e. the theft of an old bicycle by Erlind). Understandably, this type of offending is frequently one-off, and amateurish in nature.

- However, for the majority of foreign-born property offenders, whose family has managed to gain a degree of structural integration into the host society, offending is not related with extreme forms of poverty. Quite relevant in explaining the largest part of immigrant-origin youths' involvement in property crime is strain theory (as it was presented in Chapter 1, section 1.4.2), which attributes such delinquency to the discrepancy between their fast assimilation to the norms and expectations of the majority society and their limited access to the culturally valued goals and consumer goods. This qualitative finding provides an explanation for the high rates of shoplifting and stealing from vehicles that was reported by foreign-born respondents of the inner-city school survey. The same set of qualitative data also suggest that such strains are likely to be greater among the youths who have left school, for these children lack access to any mechanism of swift upward mobility, and thus are liable to the unmediated pressure of relative deprivation.
- The relevance of 'social disorganisation' factors (see the theoretical discussion of section 1.4.2) in explaining the involvement of young immigrants of inner-city Athens in delinquency is mainly through the problems that immigrant parents encounter and less through the 'pathologies' of immigrant neighbourhoods, for the latter are not significantly segregated and overlap with native residential areas. Many immigrant parents work long-hours and thus are unable to support and effectively supervise their children who acculturate fast to the norms of the inner-city.

Eventually, the critical factor that limits the likelihood of the most strained young immigrants developing a career in crime is the relatively small size of the Greek criminal underworld. Since the availability of 'illegitimate means' is in short supply, most of the 'fighting crews' that immigrant streetwise youths form in their early adolescence dissolve quickly, and do not provide chances for an escalation of delinquent involvement. According to both self-report and juvenile court data the number of repeat or serious offenders of foreign nationality remains rather small.

- As far as drug use is concerned, the school-survey findings indicate that the lifetime-prevalence of cannabis use is slightly lower among Albania-born students than it is among the native-born. Qualitative data suggest that this outcome is likely to be related to two antagonistic processes. On the one hand, there is ample empirical evidence that the majority of children of Albanian origin, especially those who left their homeland in the early 1990s, consider drug-use as a Greek youth trait. This stance likely reflects the cultural norms towards drug use of the early 1990s Albania. On the other hand, as the acculturation of this ethno-national group advances, Albanian youths assimilate not only into the mainstream but also into deviant segments of the Greek youthful population, and thus gradually their prevalence of drug use approximates that of the native youthful population. This explanation describes the master trend at play and is consistent with the 'convergence' process which is identified by the US research on drug use by ethnic migrant communities (see section 1.4.4).
- Moreover, according to qualitative evidence, it seems that for the small part of the Albania-born youths who have a streetwise orientation their involvement in delinquency operates as a gateway for the initiation of drug misuse. Thus, the 'convergence' process which takes place in central Athens is paralleled by the westernisation of youthful culture in neighbouring Albania, and the spread of marijuana cropping. This development, which is responsible for the heightened availability of cannabis on both sides of the Greco-Albanian border, has a bearing on Albania-born immigrant youth attitudes and actual involvement in drug use.
- Of a different nature seem to be the mechanisms that are responsible for the elevated rates of delinquency and drug use among youths either born in the FSU or the economically developed countries of the West, in comparison to the native-born rate. *Prima facie* it seems that this discrepancy directly reflects the fact that the prevalence of deviant behaviours is higher in the country of origin than in the host country.

Furthermore, the influence of the 'culture of origin' explains why problems with delinquency and drug use are, in the case of the FSU-born, more equally distributed across gender than within all other 'ethnic' groups. Nevertheless, the most important factor associated with the distinct case of the FSU-born Pontian youths is clearly their mode of adaptation to the host society which is defined by residential segregation in communities that are located on the periphery of Greater Athens. It seems that these socio-spatial vulnerabilities give rise to a deviant segment of the FSU communities, which combines ethnic 'closure' with delinquency and misuse of 'hard' drugs.

---

## Chapter 7

### Extent and Models of Policing

---

I had a good time at Fier. Life is also good here. But if I was in my country the police officer would never call me "you damn Albanian".

*Erion*

For instance, you are sitting in the nearby park and you have a chat with your mates. Suddenly the cops crop up... At the sight of the patrol car you run. Even if you have done nothing, even if you have your papers with you, you'll run. It is a reflex action. Because they gonna nick you and you'll waste three hours in the police station, and on top of it, they are gonna smack you. That's standard...

*Andrea*

#### 7.1 Introduction

Policing constitutes a relatively under-researched area in Greece. It is only recently that studies of the development and organisation of the state Greek police have started to appear (Papanicolaou 2006: 78). Among the sociologically informed studies the most significant are those by Lambropoulou (1994; 2004), Papakonstantis (2003), Vidali (2007a; b), and Stergioulis (2008). Nevertheless, still scant is the research-based evidence about specific aspects of police work, and most significantly for the topic of this thesis, almost non-existent is the scholarship about the treatment of the minors of immigrant descent by the Hellenic Police. The empirical findings of this study, which derive from two school surveys and numerous interviews with youths of immigrant background, seek to begin to fill this particular gap in criminological literature. Specifically, the current chapter deals with four analytical tasks: (i) it investigates the extent and methods that immigration policing employs in Greece; (ii) it looks at whether the Hellenic police disproportionately use their powers towards young people of immigrant parentage; (iii) it develops an account of foreign-born young offenders' experience of discrimination and ill-treatment; (iv) it relates these findings to the challenges regarding governance and accountability that the Hellenic Police is currently facing.

The structure of the chapter is as follows: Section 7.2 discusses key current European trends in the area of immigration control. Some brief reference is also made to three significant European national cases of domestic immigration policing. Section 7.3 documents the Greek legacy of the 1990s as regards the adopted policing policy in the area of unauthorised immigration. This section also reviews immigrants' allegations of harassment that were levelled against Greek Police. This section serves as a prelude to the next one (section 7.4), which presents core evidence from the 2003 UMHRI and the 2005-05 inner-city school surveys regarding students' self-reported contact with the police. Central to the articulation of this chapter's argument is section 7.4.3, which assesses 'ethnic' variance in offending students' experience of policing. This assessment revealed a pattern of 'targeted' over-policing towards Albanian young delinquents. Section 7.5 draws from qualitative material and provides data on immigrant youths' perceptions of the police. Interviewees' numerous allegations of mistreatment at various stages of engagement with the police are presented separately. Finally, section 7.6 offers some conclusions and discusses wider implications.

## **7.2 European trends in the policing of migration**

Among the changes that the end of the Cold War brought are the relative diminution of concerns about a massive East-West conflict in Europe, and the ascent of a 'low security' agenda (Mitsilegas et al. 2003: 46). This shift meant the abandonment of an understanding of security based solely on military threats operating at the state level (Katzenstein 1996). Moreover, already from the early 1990s, around the top of this new security agenda are considerations regarding immigration. In Turnbull and Sandholtz's view the perception of immigration as a threat, far from being based on solid evidence, "grew out of a significant shift in the cultural framing of the borders and their functions. In this context of flux and change, various actors mix the issues of policing and immigration for political advantage (Turnbull and Sandholtz 2001: 211). As a result of the discursive linking of immigration with such perceived 'security' threats, since the mid 1990s all European countries have tightened the conditions controlling the entry, residence, employment of foreigners through a considerable expansion and intensification of policing activities at the border and the domestic level. Since migration affects both the sending and the receiving countries, it also shapes the relationship between the two states. In the case that the sending country is a neighbouring one, this additional dimension, by its turn, gives rise to security concerns

about the alliances of the immigrants and the political stability of the host country<sup>127</sup> (Sasse 2005). Thus the securitisation of migration legitimates not only the shift of the political agenda in many interconnected areas of policy but also the assignment of prominent roles to the army, the police and other police-like forces (Huysmans 2000:757).

After the Madrid bombing attacks of 11 March 2004, the murder of the filmmaker Theo van Gogh by a Muslim extremist in the Netherlands in fall 2004, and the suicide bombings of London's mass transport in July 2005, by British-born young Muslims of Pakistani-origin, the temptation to couple immigration not only with organised crime but also with organised terrorism must have been close to irresistible for European governments and the European Union alike. In May 2005 the European Commission launched its five-year detailed Action Plan for Freedom, Justice and Security (the so-called Hague Programme), which combines policies related to terrorism, migration management, visa policies, asylum, privacy and security, and the fight against organised crime (The European Commission 2005).

### **7.2.1 The militarisation of border control**

It is important to note that the securitisation shift has been driven by the imperative to control illegal immigration, which is perceived as the most threatening form of migration<sup>128</sup>. The reason is simple: no government wants to give its electorate the impression that it has lost control of the borders (Claude-Valentin 2004). On the contrary in an era marked by globalisation many political agents and officials tend to overcompensate the undermining of national sovereignty by resorting to a rhetoric that symbolically confirms the importance of the border controls as means of protecting core national values (Weber and Bowling 2004). In accord with this rhetoric, many European governments use the army in order to prevent irregular immigrants from crossing their borders.

Italy for instance systematically engages its navy in the patrolling of the Sicilian coasts, which are heavily used by criminal rings and human-traffickers for the mass landing of

---

<sup>127</sup> The relation of the emigrant to his/her homeland is frequently over-determined by decades of conflictual and asymmetrical relations between the two countries. Thus the 'suspicion of treason, even of apostasy' frequently enshrouds immigrants (Sayad 1999 cited in Bourdieu and Wacquant 2000).

<sup>128</sup> People who enter a state's territory without authority and the necessary documentation are considered as illegal (Mitsilegas et al. 2003 : 42).

irregular immigrants from Africa and the Middle East<sup>129</sup>. The mission of the Italian navy was clarified by Umberto Bossi<sup>130</sup>, Berlusconi's then minister of reform, in the Italian daily *Corriere della Sera* in June 2003: "The influx of illegal immigrants should be stopped by the navy's canons." The Straits of Otranto, where the distance between Italy's Adriatic coast and Albania is a mere 70 km, have been patrolled by the Italian Coastguard since the start of the Albanian exodus. On 29 March 1997 in one of the most well-known and tragic incidents in the history of contemporary Albanian immigration, an Italian coastguard vessel collided with an rickety Albanian boat, resulting in the drowning of 87 Albanian would-be migrants, many of whom were women and children<sup>131</sup> (King 2005). On top of this already heavily militarised immigration control, the Berlusconi government enacted, in summer 2002, new stricter immigration legislation, which mandated the tightening of border controls, the imprisonment of illegal entrants, and the speeding up of deportations. Moreover, some months later a state of emergency was declared in the country's ports (Claude-Valentin 2004).

In the early 1990s, the Greek army was also responsible for patrolling the border with Albania, usually in collaboration with the local police forces. Later, in 1998, a significant part of guarding duties was transferred to a new 1,000-strong border-police (founded by Act 2622/1998). In 1999 the border-police was reinforced with 1,500 guards and extended its area of jurisdiction to the entire northern border of Greece. In 2005 the force of frontier-guardians had already doubled its size to 5,000 and in 2008 the minister of Interior announced that this force was going to be merged with Hellenic Police (Athens News Agency 2008). The army is still guarding the Greece-Turkey border across river Evros, in Thrace. The Aegean sea-route constitutes part of the Hellenic Coastguard's jurisdiction. Although Coastguard is under the command of the Ministry of Mercantile Marine it is a semi-military force. The Aegean sea-route is heavily used by Turk traffickers and their Greek accomplices for the distance between Greek islands like Lesbos, Chios, Samos and the Turkish mainland is only a few kilometres. Indicative of the importance of this sea-

---

<sup>129</sup> In recent years, Italy's Sicilian channel has replaced Spain's Gibraltar straits as the favoured point of entry of immigrants and refugees from Africa. The end of this route is Lampedusa, a tiny Italian island which is located only 80 miles away from the north African coast (Carter and Merrill 2007).

<sup>130</sup> Leader of the separatist and xenophobic Italian party *Northern League*.

<sup>131</sup> Collisions with vessels transporting would-be immigrants have continued to occur along Italy's southern borders after this incident, some of which with deadly consequences (Lutterbeck 2006).



route for the entry of potential refugees and immigrants into the European Union are the official data of the Ministry of Mercantile Marine, according to which the Hellenic Coastguard arrested 344 traffickers, confiscated 216 boats and smuggling vehicles, and intercepted 14,454 irregular immigrants during 2000-02 (Bardounias 2003). The same official sources estimate that the decade 1992-2002, at least 197 immigrants lost their lives in their effort to cross the Aegean Sea. Since the traffickers frequently send boatloads of desperate immigrants across the Aegean on dispensable rickety vessels, undoubtedly hundreds more have drowned in additional incidents that went unnoticed. Evidence collected by the 'Pro-Asyl' group not only details the inhumane and degrading treatment of newly arrived refugees by the Hellenic coast guard, but also documents systematic refoulement in the open sea of vessels and small inflatable dinghies loaded with refugees, and their diversion towards the Turkish coast, a practice that might be responsible for many unrecorded deaths (Pro Asyl 2007).

### **7.2.2 Patterns of domestic policing of immigration in the UK**

Weber and Bowling argue that the policing of migration is an example of the emerging punitive regulatory system (2004). However, the policing of migrants in many European countries -at times- resembles the early forms of domestic policing of the sizeable group of 'New Commonwealth' labourers, that have started arriving in Britain since 1945.

In the British context, the 1969 Immigration Appeals Act institutionalised deportation for those who broke the conditions of entry (Solomos 2003). However, it was the 1971 Immigration Act which substantially restricted black Commonwealth citizens' entry and settlement in Britain, introduced tighter border controls, but also intensified domestic immigration controls. This piece of legislation gave police and immigration authorities the power to question, to arrest and detain suspects (Bowling et al. 2003).

In practice, after the implementation of the 1971 Immigration Act, the policing of immigrants took the form of stop-and-search operations, and raids on homes and workplaces, aiming to check the immigration status of people of African, Caribbean and Asian origin. Throughout the 1970s such operations took 'witch hunt' proportions and became a major source of suspicion and mistrust between the police and minority communities (Gordon 1983, cited in Bowling and Phillips 2002). In this way 'coloured immigration' framed Black and Asian people's experiences of policing (Bowling et al. 2003: 530). Of special concern were the consequences that the Special Patrol Group's

operations had for the further alienation of black and multiracial communities (Hall et al. 1978). During the 1970s several studies on the relation between second generation West Indians and the police detailed growing tension and hostility, which from-time-to-time reached 'open warfare' proportions. The appearance of a series of urban disturbances and confrontations between the police and black youths, including the Chapetown clashes in 1975, the 1976 major outbreak of unrest in Notting Hill carnival, and the August 1977 encounters in the London Borough of Lewisham, constituted a watershed that left little doubt about the grim warnings of the early studies of the 1960s and 1970s<sup>132</sup>. Solomos' review of the same body of research (2003: 123) highlights three particularly important and contentious allegations that black communities levelled against the police:

- (a) That young blacks were being categorised as a 'problem group' by the police and thus were more likely to be questioned or arrested.
- (b) That the police used excessive violence when dealing with black suspects.
- (c) That police attitudes and practices fuelled the hostility between white and black communities.

Yet, police power to stop and search continues to be until today at the heart of public concern regarding 'race' and policing (Delsol and Shiner 2006). Smith's review of research on police stops from the 1980s and 1990s concludes that black people –but not south Asians- tend to be targeted by the law enforcement system and thus are more likely to be stopped by the police. The large-scale practice of stop-and-search has led to a deterioration in relations between Afro-Caribbeans and the police (Smith 1997; 2005b; Smith et al. 1983:1064-1070). Against this background, recent year trends towards military models of immigration policing, which among other things intensify stop-and-search 'swamps', bring back to the fore concerns about the criminalisation of 'ethnic' communities (Bowling et al. 2003).

Furthermore, the moral panics about 'bogus asylum seekers' of the 1990s led to the revival of intense internal controls, and a resurrection of the 'pass laws' of the 1970s. According to commentators, in a number of cases Immigration Service's raids aiming to implement deportation orders led to deaths (Fekete 2003; 2005). Yet, those immigrants who manage to remain on British soil are likely to be subjected to intense police

---

<sup>132</sup> Such confrontations and forms of violent protest, which were first evident in the 1970s, became a recurring feature of police and black youth encounters in many British inner-city localities in the 1980s.

surveillance by way of frequent checks of identification documents, and immigration status.

At the institutional level, the new coercive powers of the British Immigration Service are significant for they blur the boundaries between police and immigration officers' jurisdictions. Immigration officers have the power to act independently, to search, seize, arrest and detain for prolonged periods. These newly-acquired enforcement duties seem to be popular among immigration officers, who see deportations as the most interesting part of their job (Weber and Bowling 2004).

All in all, the 'migration' of coercive powers from the criminal justice system into administrative agencies is considered as dangerous by Weber and Bowling, since due processes are not safeguarded and abuse is alleged to be systematic (2004).

### **7.3 Immigration policing in Greece**


A useful starting point for the examination of the forms that immigration policing has taken in Greece since the turning point of 1990 is an exploration of Greek police officers' attitudes towards immigrants. The most relevant study was conducted in 1998 by the criminologist and justice official Vagena-Paleologou. Her survey of 412 police officers of Athens revealed that almost three-quarters of them (72 per cent) blame immigrants for the increased rates of unemployment (Vagena-Palaiologou 2006). More than one-third (36 per cent) consider foreigners exclusively responsible for the elevated rate of criminality in recent years. However, the majority (57 per cent) attribute only part of the crime rise to foreigners. Finally, 14 per cent expressed the view that the treatment of immigrants must be harsher than of Greeks, and favoured forced deportations (Vagena-Palaiologou 2006).

And indeed mass deportations of irregular immigrants, mostly of Albanian nationality, were a common expression of the aggressive forms that domestic policing of immigration took during the 1990s. The aim of the large-scale police 'broom' operations that involved the storming of squares in major Greek cities was to round up as many Albanians as possible. Then, the police used buses to return them forcibly to the Albanian border. Sometimes the expelled were not even offered the opportunity to collect their belongings and savings. In other cases, according to allegations, police officers destroyed the documents on the pretext that they were forged, and summarily expelled the immigrants (Vidali 1999). The legal backing for these summary expulsions lies on a 'Police

Cooperation Agreement' between Greece and Albania that includes a 'readmission' clause (Amnesty International and International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights 2002).

According to unconfirmed data that were released at various points from the Ministry of Public Order (*Figure 7.1*), more than 2.5m undocumented immigrants, mostly Albanians, have been expelled from Greece throughout the period 1990-2003 (Fakiolas 2003a).

**Figure 7.1: Number of Immigrants Deported or Expelled**



Source: Ministry of Public Order, cited in (Linou 2003) and (Baldwin-Edwards 2004)

The average rate of administrative and judicial expulsions for this period is estimated to 200,000 per year (Baldwin-Edwards 2004). Given that the total number of Albanian immigrants in Greece never exceeded 650,000 it is evident that after each 'broom' operation a large number of the deported immigrants, managed to return to Greece through the same clandestine routes. Hundreds of thousands of irregular immigrants were sent back to Albania during large-scale deportation operations that followed conjunctures of deterioration of the Athens-Tirana bilateral relations. Such was the character of the massive deportation operation of June 1993: earlier that year Greece lodged a protest with the Albanian government regarding the maltreatment of the Greek minority by Albanian police. The situation further deteriorated in June 1993 with the expulsion of a Greek Orthodox cleric. Mitsotakis' government retaliated by expelling thousands of Albanian immigrants (Tzilivakis 2004). During autumn 1994 when the Greek-Albanian relations were again at a critical point over the charges of espionage faced by five figures of the

Greek minority of southern Albania, Greek police rounded up as many as 100,000 Albanians and deported them.

Youths of foreign nationality were also targeted during the massive expulsions of the 1990s. According to data from the Ministry of Public Order which had been presented by the Greek Ombudsman in a special report concerning the 'administrative detention and expulsion of foreign minors', there were fewer than 2,000 deported minors the period 1999-2001 (Greek Ombudsman 2005). It is almost certain that this dataset severely underestimates the number of minors who were deported during the 1990s. Periodical statistical releases of the Ministry of Public Order revealed notably higher numbers. Only in 1994, for instance, the statistical-year-book of the Juveniles Division of Athens Metropolitan Police indicates that the prosecutor ordered the deportation of 407 minors of foreign nationality, who had been arrested within greater Athens<sup>133</sup> (Nova-Kaltsouni and Koutouzou 1995). One can assume that the number of foreign minors that were deported nationally was higher than that, which only represents the outcome of arrests made within the conurbation of Athens.

It was only after 2000 that the intense patrolling of both sides of the border by Greek and Albanian forces diminished the illegal crossings. The roughly concomitant legalisation programme of 2001<sup>134</sup> signalled a pro-integration shift of immigration policy, which resulted -among other things- in the drastic reduction of the number of deported persons, to 20-30,000 per year (Baldwin-Edwards 2004; Pavlou 2007).

### **7.3.1 Allegations of police harassment**

Concerns about the ill-treatment of immigrants by the Hellenic Police heightened in June 2007 following the appearance on the web of a mobile-phone video showing a police officer verbally and physically abusing two young immigrant arrestees in the presence of five other officers, in a central Athens police station. Unfortunately, the heated debate that followed the broadcasting of the video by the national television only dealt superficially with the broader question of the Hellenic Police's methods of policing immigrants.

---

<sup>133</sup> They constituted 56 per cent of all foreign arrestees.

<sup>134</sup> The procedures of the legalisation programme of 2001 were stipulated by the Act 2910/2001 'On the status of aliens and naturalisation'.

However, the Greek section of Amnesty International (AI) has repeatedly expressed particular concern about the persistence of human rights violations, and ill-treatment of immigrants and refugees by police in Greece. In its Annual Report of 2005 the organisation refers to a widely publicized incidents of ill-treatment of refugees by police officers (AI 2005b). In the first days of December 2004, a man of Afghan origin escaped from police custody at the court of Athens. Plainclothes police officers, in an effort to find him, raided houses and a refugee guesthouse in the area and rounded up 60 Afghan immigrants, at least 17 of whom were under 18 years of age. According to refugees' testimonies, in one of these operations, police officers subjected a dozen asylum seekers to brutal beatings and execution threats at gunpoint. Later the same day they led two refugees -one adult and one minor- to the garage of St. Panteleimon police station. At this site they allegedly beat them severely, stripped them, photographed and tortured them systematically (AI 2005a). Doctors of the Centre for the Rehabilitation of Victims of Torture who examined and interviewed some of the victims said that the torturing took place under the supervision of a senior officer and that the methods employed (bastinado, death threats) provide evidence of training in 'physical interrogation techniques'. Finally, an internal police investigation was launched and two officers were charged with torture, assault, together with other minor offences (Bailis and Peloni 2005; Varouhakis 2005).

At any rate, with or without systematic training in interrogation using torture, the incident described above is not an isolated one. A couple of years later an international group of lawyers and activists documented the systematic use of similar techniques of torture during refugees' interrogation by coastal guards in the island of Chios (Pro Asyl 2007). Furthermore, between September 2003 and April 2005 some ten Albanian unauthorized migrants suffered serious injuries, for police officers had severely beaten and otherwise ill-treated them. The view of AI is that the police or the border guard frequently not only use excessive or unjustifiable force in carrying out their duties, but in addition seek to 'punish' the immigrants or refugees after their arrest, probably with a view to deterring further arrivals. In a number of cases the perpetrators' xenophobic and racist motivation is beyond doubt (2005a).

The harassment of detained persons by Greek law enforcement officials has been documented in many cases. According to the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT), which visited Greece in autumn 2001, the ill-treatment is mostly inflicted during questioning and consists of

kicks and blows with hands, baton, or various other objects. Symptomatic of the pervasiveness of such practices is the fact that the interviewed head of the Coast Guard Police at Piraeus Port made clear to the committee that he was in favour of the use of slaps during the interrogation of drug dealing suspects. The CPT concluded that Greek authorities "are seriously underestimating the scale of the problem of ill-treatment of persons deprived of their liberty by law enforcement officials." (Council of Europe 2002: 17)

The police culture that tolerates the use of force during questioning in police premises also affects adolescent detainees. One out of three exemplary cases of ill-treatment, which was presented in AI's 2002 report, concerns two boys, 13 and 14 years old of Greek nationality. Both were charged with having stolen money from their employers. They were arrested in August 1994 and taken to the police station of Kassandra, Halkidiki in northern Greece. Three police officers were subsequently accused of having kicked and beaten the two boys with a truncheon and a wooden rod in order to make them confess the theft. The boys were also sexually humiliated and threatened to be raped with a rod. The police officers denied the charges but, five years later, a Misdemeanours Court convicted them of offences against human dignity. However, in 2000 the Appeals Court of Thessaloniki acquitted the three officers (AI & IHFHR 2002: 44).

In all likelihood, this was not the worst case of police brutality that went unpunished. According to the available official statistics<sup>135</sup> in the period 1996-2000 concerning the prosecution and conviction of law-enforcement personnel for torture or ill-treatment 163 complaints were filed, 34 are pending, but not a single police officer was convicted. Only in 2001 a police officer was ordered by the court to pay a pecuniary penalty for insulting and forcibly cutting an Albanian youngster's long hair (AI & IHFHR 2002). The most recent data of the Ministry of Public Order reveal that during 2002 forty-two citizens' complaints concerning police harassment were filed, eight police officers were convicted, in thirty-one cases the prosecution ended because of lack of evidence, and twenty cases are still pending. In one case the police officer who was convicted for the brutal beating of a Roma youth had to pay a €40 fine (Nesfyge 2005). In summing up the situation AI argues that:

---

<sup>135</sup> Greece's fourth periodic report to the UN Committee against Torture, which was submitted on 21 January 2002 reviews cases that arose during the period 1996-2000.

The law enforcement officials alleged to have committed serious human rights violations have benefited from effective impunity. Despite frequent complaints, few have been prosecuted, fewer brought to trial and still fewer have been convicted. Even when convicted, the sentences imposed have always been nominal -suspended prison sentences. (AI & IHFHR 2002: 85)

However, still very little research-evidence is available as regards the treatment of minors of immigrant descent by the police. Such evidence, which derives from interviews with youths of immigrant ancestry, is presented below in section 7.5.

## **7.4 School survey findings**

The following three sections detail quantitative findings regarding the problematic encounters that foreign-born students from Athenian secondary schools had with the Greek police in the early 2000s.

### **7.4.1. Been in 'trouble' with the police: Findings from the 2003 UMHRI school-survey**

The UMHRI school survey offers the opportunity to analyse self-reported frequency of having problematic contact with the police<sup>136</sup>. Overall, 7.5 per cent of students reported that at some point in their lives they had such problems with the police. Boys reported having more trouble with the police than girls. As in many other studies (for instance those reviewed in McAra and McVie 2005), the proportion of male students that had problems with the police (11.7 per cent) was three times higher than the proportion of female students (3.7 per cent)/ (chi-square test significant at 0.001level). Because of this difference the subsequent statistical analysis focuses exclusively on male students.

Lifetime problematic contact with the police is a dichotomous criterion variable. Consequently the adopted method of statistical analysis is logistic regression. The

---

<sup>136</sup> A measure of students' *lifetime* contacts with the police that resulted from unlawful or problematic behaviour, other than being under the influence of alcohol or drugs, is offered by UMHRI survey's question 'have you ever had troubles with the police?' In addition, UMHRI asks separately about problematic contacts with the police which were due to the consumption of alcohol or illicit drugs.



estimated model, which is presented in *Table 7.1*, regresses the log of the odds ratio of having 'troubles' with the police on the dummy variables of age and birth country. The reference category for 'birth country' is Greece, and for 'age' is '16 years old'. The model shows that the probability of having 'troubles' with the police increases as the age of the respondents advances. For instance, 19-year-old male students were an estimated four times more likely to have problems with the police than 14-year-old male students.

More suggestive for the questions posed in the present study are the results which are related to the second categorical variable. The model shows that being foreign-born is positively related to the probability of ever having had problems with the police. Foreign-born male students were 1.6 times more likely to have 'troubles' with the police than their native-born counterparts ( $p=0.053$ ). A measure of the model's overall fit is given by Hosmer and Lemeshow's test. The non-significant chi-square value indicates statistically non-significant difference between predicted and observed values of the depend variable, which is a core characteristic of a reliable model.

**Table 7.1: Odds Ratios for Males Students' Lifetime 'Troubles with the Police'**


*Logistic Regression Model Results*

CHARACTERISTICS	NO (N=1,172)	YES (N=155)	EXP (B)	SIGNIF.
CONSTANT			0.64	.000
AGE				
14	79	5	1.0	
15	339	31	1.4	.517
16	260	39	2.3	.086
17	250	36	2.2	.117
18	204	32	2.4	.075
19	40	12	4.0	.015
COUNTRY OF BIRTH				
GREECE	1,009	122	1.0	
FOREIGN	134	28	1.6	.053
MODEL FIT		CHI-SQUARE	DF	SIGNIF.
HOSMER & LEMESHOW TEST		1.758	5	.882

However, the 'foreign-born' category is a statistical construct that may lump together - among other things- various ethnic migrant groups' differentiated treatment by the law enforcement officials. The breakdown of aggregated data reveals a great deal of 'ethnic' variance (*Figure 7.1*).

The proportion of male native-born students who reported lifetime problems with the police was 10.8 per cent. Male students born in Albania, who are members of the largest youthful group of immigrant ancestry, reported only slightly higher rates of lifetime problems with police than their indigenous counterparts (12.3 per cent). Much higher was the corresponding figure for the FSU-born boys (18.6 per cent) and for those born in all 'other countries' (22.2 per cent). Only the difference between male students born in 'other countries' and those born in Greece tested as statistically significant (at the 0.02 level). The magnitude of this difference is behind the statistically significant finding of the logistic regression model presented in *Table 7.1*.

**Figure 7.2: Percentage of Students having Lifetime and Last-12-Month Problematic Contacts with the Police by Country of Birth**



A subsequent question in the UMHRI questionnaire asks how often 'you got into trouble with the police for something you did' *during the last 12 months*. The vast majority of students (95.4 per cent) reported that they had not had such problems with the police during the period under question. The greatest extent of problems with the police because of their misbehaviour or offending was reported by male students of the 'other countries' category. As *Table 7.2* indicates, all their pair-wise tested mean differences from other groups were found statistically significant at the 0.05 level (one way ANOVA, Bonferroni post hoc comparisons). This incidence finding is consistent with the picture painted by the *lifetime* measure.

**Table 7.2: One-Way ANOVA of the Scale 'Troubles with the Police' in the Last 12 Months**

		N	MEAN	SD	P*
MALES	GREECE	1,127	1.12	0.520	.000
	ALBANIA	65	1.08	0.407	.000
	FSU	42	1.19	0.594	.012
	OTHER	53	1.57	1.461	--
FEMALES	GREECE	1,230	1.02	0.172	NS
	ALBANIA	100	1.01	0.100	NS
	FSU	66	1.02	0.123	NS
	OTHER	48	1.00	0.000	--

\*The P value refers to post hoc Bonferroni comparison with male students born in 'other countries'

However, the most notable finding is that Albania-born boys had the lowest mean value of frequency (Table 7.2). Equally low was their prevalence rate (4.6 per cent). Greek boys were more likely to have *last-12-month* troubles with the police resulting from their wrongdoing. Their prevalence rate was 7.9 per cent. In the light of the previously cited *lifetime* finding, the incidence figures suggest that in previous years Albanian male students' elevated contact with the police was in part due to their overpolicing rather than to their deviant lifestyle. This is probably due to the diminution, after 2001, of the most aggressive forms of immigration policing and of the intensive checks of immigration status<sup>137</sup>. However, the other two groups of foreign-born male students have problems with the police that seem to persist over time. Such *12-month* troubles were reported by 12 per cent of the boys born in the former Soviet Union, and 22 per cent of the boys born in all 'other' countries.

#### **7.4.2. Been stopped and 'checked' by the police in the inner-city: Findings from the 2004-05 school-survey**

The current section presents findings related to policing of inner-city students. It is based on data collected by the school-survey I conducted during 2004-05 in secondary schools of

<sup>137</sup> It is the 2001 regularisation programme the most significant factor behind the relaxation of migration policing.

central Athens. The relevant question in the survey asked students whether they had "ever been stopped by the police in order to have their 'papers' checked."

The activity of checking people's 'papers' i.e.: identification card, driving licence, vehicle ownership documents, immigrants' residence permit etc represents a core element of police work at the street level. According to the 1991 Presidential Decree no.141, which is the handbook of police work in Greece (Vidali 2007a: 926) and its article 74 para.15.θ, officers who are on patrol have to check the identity of people who look reasonably suspicious; furthermore they can lead to the police station and detain for further examination individuals that either lack identification documents or whose behaviour provides a reasonable basis for suspecting that they will commit crimes. It is evident that the Hellenic Police's code of practice lacks the essential safeguards and the standardisation of practices that can prevent the unaccountably discretionary exercise of their stop and search powers. Equally absent are the procedures of reliable recording and monitoring. In practice, officers can stop, check the ID card, or even bring a person to the police station in order to authenticate his or her 'identity', solely on the basis of suspicion. By way of contrast, the British Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE) stresses that 'reasonable suspicion' cannot be based on generalisations or stereotypical images' and demands instead justification on an objective basis (Delsol and Shiner 2006; Newburn 2007a: 607).

The significant discretion that the Hellenic police have in exercising their 'stop and check' powers makes the research of this area significant for the exploration of immigrant-origin youths' engagement with the criminal justice system. More specifically, it has to be asked whether particular forms of policing have an impact on these youths' itinerary through subsequent stages of the criminal justice system.

According to the findings of the 2004-05 school-survey that are illustrated in *Table 7.3* almost one quarter of inner-city students (23.6 per cent) reported that they have been stopped by the police *at least once in their lifetime* in order to have their 'papers' checked. This rate is more than three fold the proportion of the 2003 UMHRI student sample that reported lifetime experience of having 'troubles' with the police (7.5 per cent). This difference is partly due to the fact that being stopped by the police is not considered as 'trouble' by many law-abiding students. However, the 'stop and check' finding of the inner-city survey is suggestive of the relatively intensive police surveillance that is imposed upon all youths who reside in the centre of the city. Albania-born students' rate (23.5 per cent)

was only slightly higher than that of their native-born schoolmates (21.1 per cent). Nevertheless, the corresponding rate of students born in 'other' countries was double the rate of students born in Greece (42.3 per cent). Most students who were classified into this small group originated from one of the states that emerged out of the FSU, the Balkans and other parts of Eastern Europe.

**Table 7.3: Percentage of Inner-City Students who have 'Ever' been stopped by the Police**

	Country of Birth			Total %
	Greece %	Albania %	Other %	
NO, NEVER	78.9	76.5	57.7	76.4
YES	21.1	23.5	42.3	23.6
TOTAL	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

In order to assess the statistical significance of the differences illustrated in *Table 7.3* a logistic regression model was constructed. The independent variables of 'truancy', 'country of birth', and 'gender' are predictors which were entered in the model through a stepwise procedure based on the criterion of greatest Wald coefficient. The reference category for 'birth country' was Greece, and for 'gender' female. The frequency of truancy was treated as a continuous variable.

According to the results of this logistic regression model presented in *Table 7.4*, the probability of being 'stopped and checked' by the police increases by a factor of 1.7 (on average) as the frequency of truancy also increases from one response level to the next. Eventually, students who play truant at least once a week are an estimated twenty times more likely to be stopped and checked by the police than their peers who do not play truant at all. This finding can be explained in two ways: (a) it is reasonable to assume that young persons who are not at school are in fact 'available' on the street for longer during daytime and consequently they are more likely to attract the attention of the police<sup>138</sup>, (b) young

<sup>138</sup> Available populations are "people who use public places where and when stops or searches are carried out. Availability will, therefore, be greater for people using public places where there are frequent stops or searches than where they are infrequent. Similarly, availability will be greater for people using places at times when stops or searches are frequent, than at times when they are infrequent" (Miller and MVA 2000: 9). It is widely accepted that the populations which are most 'available' to police stop and search powers are

persons' truancy is likely to be part of a developmental process that leads them to a streetwise lifestyle. Thus students who systematically play truant are also likely to engage in other deviant activities and/or delinquency. By adopting a deviant lifestyle their propensity to be checked by the police increases.

Equally suggestive are the results which are related to the categorical variable of 'country of birth'. The model shows that the probability of Albania-born students being 'stopped and checked' by the police is not significantly different from that of their native-born counterparts (*Table 7.4*). By contrast, students born in 'other' countries are an estimated five times more likely than native-born to be 'stopped and checked' ( $p=0.001$ ). However, the small size of this group and its statistical 'artificiality' makes any attempt to interpret the above mentioned dramatic difference rather speculative.

**Table 7.4: Odds Ratios for Inner-City Students' Lifetime 'Stop and Check' by the Police**

*Logistic Regression Model Results*

CHARACTERISTICS	WALD	EXP (B)	SIGNIF.
CONSTANT	48.86	0.07	.000
TRUANCY	19.01	1.69	.000
COUNTRY OF BIRTH			
GREECE	10.93	1.0	.004
ALBANIA	.17	1.18	.682
OTHER	10.69	5.42	.001
SEX			
FEMALE		1.0	
MALE	8.78	2.9	.003
MODEL FIT	CHI-SQUARE	DF	SIGNIF.
HOSMER & LEMESHOW TEST	5.952	7	.545

The findings that are related to the role of gender can be considered as unsurprising, for they confirm previously presented findings. Male students are three times as likely to be 'stopped and checked' by the police than female students<sup>139</sup>. On the whole, the empirical

young men of working class or minority ethnic backgrounds (FitzGerald and Sibbitt 1997; Jefferson 1993; Waddington et al. 2004).

<sup>139</sup> The model's goodness of fit was tested by the Hosmer and Lemeshow's statistics and was found statistically more reliable than other models with fewer predictors.

evidence stemming from inner-city secondary schools of Athens does not back the hypothesis that Albania born youths are subject to disproportionate policing.

The issue that might compromise the robustness of the finding is the one concerning the representativeness of the inner-city sample. In early 2000s, the students of immigrant parentage who have managed to stay on in upper secondary schools represented only a part of the same-origin youthful population. Many children of immigrant parentage never managed to enrol in Greek schools, and many other left school around the first grade of Gymnasium (see section 2.2.1). Thus, it is likely that the surveyed foreign-born students were the most educationally talented ones or/and those coming from better adapted and more supportive families. Although a clear-cut separation from the out-of-school youths can not be sustained, it is reasonable to assume that, on average, immigrant students are less exposed to streetlife and consequently to the attention of the police.

However, those Lyceum or TEE students who frequently engage in delinquency share attitudes and lifestyle with the same-age streetwise youths who are out of school. Moreover, the students who reported persistent offending are probably similar enough to the youths who were referred to the juvenile courts. Consequently is imperative to examine the extent of policing that the delinquent part of the surveyed student population experiences. This issue is explored in the next section.

### **7.4.3 Comparative extent of policing**

In the section 6.2.4 of the previous chapter the surveyed secondary-school students of the UMHRI study were classified according to their self-reported volume of offending into three groups: (i) Non-delinquents (N=1,901); (ii) Occasional delinquents. (N=808); and (iii) Repeat or persistent offenders (N=90). The present section uses these calculations in order to explore the way that delinquent students' frequency of problematic contact with the police is related to their degree of involvement in delinquency. This exploration is attempted through the introduction of the indicator  $\Phi$ , which is the ratio of the number of self-reported police problematic contacts to the volume of self-reported offending:

$$\Phi = \frac{\text{N of self-reported problematic contacts with the police}}{\text{N of self-reported offences}}$$

It is reasonable to assume that ratio  $\Phi$  provides -within the limits of a self-report study- a measure of the extent to which a particular group of delinquents is subjected to the exercise of police powers. Obviously, ratio  $\Phi$  was calculated *only* for students who had admitted at least one offence<sup>140</sup>. For an alternative calculation of the same indicator one can divide each 'ethnic' group's mean score for lifetime police 'troubles' by the group's corresponding mean offending. Both methods lead to identical results, according to which the ratio of police contacts to volume of offending was 16 per cent for students born in Greece, 21 per cent for the Albania-born, 11 per cent for those born in the FSU, and 7 per cent for those born in all 'other' countries (Table 7.5).

**Table 7.5: Value of Ratio  $\Phi$  by Country of Birth**

COUNTRY OF BIRTH	GREECE	ALBANIA	FSU	OTHER
$\Phi$ (%)	15.8	21.3	10.7	6.6

*The ratio  $\Phi$  is expressed in percentages*

These are findings which can be considered as relatively unaffected by the possibility of underreporting on the part of students of immigrant origin. Even if they tried to distance themselves from negative stereotypes, there is no reason to assume that students' willingness to report delinquent involvement differs from their inclination to admit police contacts resulting from their wrongdoing<sup>141</sup>.

The straightforward interpretation of the finding suggests a clear differentiation of police practice towards the studied youthful 'ethnic' groups. Students of Albanian parentage that have committed an offence are more likely to attract the attention of the

<sup>140</sup> Students belonging to the second and third category of section 6.2.4' classification.

<sup>141</sup> However, one has also to bear in mind the appraisal of Junger-Tas concerning the response validity of self-reported data in the case of juvenile studies. (Junger-Tas 1994: 9). Based on the results of a large Dutch self-report study she argues "that juveniles are far more inclined to talk with relative openness about their delinquent behaviour than they are about their contacts with the juvenile justice system or the police" Admitting contacts with the authorities may be perceived by juveniles "as more shameful and stigmatizing" than admitting offending (Junger-Tas and Marshall 1999: 331). Even if this pattern was at play in the case of 2003 UMHRI school-survey it is more likely to have an impact on minority students' willingness to report contacts with the police. Thus its probable effect is to bolster rather than to undermine the finding that is relevant to Albanian offenders' highest  $\Phi$  value.



police than the young offenders belonging to any other 'ethnic' group. It is highly likely that subject to disproportionate exercise of police powers not only are the deviant secondary school students of Albanian ancestry but also the streetwise Albania-born youths who do not attend school. It seems that police officers view Albanian youths that are 'known to them' or more 'visible' at the street level as a 'problem' group or a threat, and thus they keep them under tight surveillance. Undeniably, this kind of 'targeted overpolicing' contributes to the overrepresentation of young people of Albanian origin in police statistics<sup>142</sup>, at least in relation to specific types of offending; mainly street-level delinquency<sup>143</sup>.

It has to be stressed that the finding regarding the 'targeted overpolicing' of Albania-born delinquent youth is not at odds with this chapter's broader inference. Namely, the findings presented in sections 7.4.1 and 7.4.2 refute the hypothesis that in 2003 Albania-born students -as a whole- were subjected to proactive and indiscriminate forms of policing similar to those witnessed in the 1990s. Foreign-born youths' fast pace of integration into the host society inevitably prevents the expansion of the proactive forms of policing beyond a narrow circle of streetwise 'usual suspects'. Moreover, the limited capacities of Hellenic police, and even more significantly, the moral foundations of a liberal democratic state cannot either afford or tolerate the prolongation of such controversial methods of policing that violate statutory norms. Thus it is likely that in the 2000s, instead of targeting the community of ethnic-Albanian youth as a whole, policing bears down heavily only on members of the particular migrant community who engage in street-level delinquency. Besides, some police officers' view is that immigrant offenders' treatment must be harsher than that of Greeks for their wrongdoing severely violates the hospitality offered by the Greek society (Vagena-Palaiologou 2006)<sup>144</sup>.

---

<sup>142</sup> According to the Police statistics concerning juvenile delinquency in Greater Athens during 1999, 64 per cent of the alleged against property offenders were of foreign nationality and 80 percent of them were of Albanian origin (Karydis 2004: 223).

<sup>143</sup> Hellenic Police's activity is mainly reactive, depending on public reporting of crime. Thus, as Pitsela explains, the recording in criminal statistics of the classic and especially the more serious forms of crime remains relatively unaffected by the intensification of relaxation of police action. Overzealous policing would probably result only in the inflation of police statistics that are related to street level crime or the violation of special legislation (Nebengesetze), i.e.: the drug legislation (Pitsela 2004: 460).

<sup>144</sup> Such police attitudes are partly reflecting the xenophobic climate which was still widespread in Greece of early 2000s. Thus, it is likely that some police officers adopt 'transmitted' prejudices (Reiner 2000: 126).

At any rate, this form of 'targeted overpolicing' of delinquent youths of Albanian origin has to be considered as a form of police discrimination against them. By way of comparison, it is noticeable that the group of delinquent students who 'were born in FSU and 'other' countries are not subject to a level of police control proportional to their involvement in delinquency. Chapters 5 and 6 have shown that their self-reported rate of violence and property delinquency is the highest. Moreover, the 2003 UMHRI findings suggest that male students born in FSU and 'other countries' had the greatest extent of problems with the police because of their misbehaviour or offending. Yet, it seems that the intensity of police powers that are exercised towards these groups of 'ethnic' migrant youths remains below what is proportional to their extent of wrongdoing.

Nevertheless, the question whether this focused form of police discrimination is responsible for the overall overrepresentation of Albanian youth in police statistics remains open. On the balance of available evidence, the 'targeted overpolicing' of the small group of Albania-born delinquent youth cannot be held accountable for the full magnitude of Albanian youths' disproportionate representation in criminal justice statistics (for the overrepresentation of Albanian youths in police statistics see Karydis 2004). Inevitably the other significant factor at play is Albania-born youths' disproportionate involvement in some forms of offending. The analysis of school-survey data in Chapter 6 indicates that Albania-born students engage more frequently than native-born youth in some forms of property offending. Such forms of delinquency should in the main be regarded as a product of the adaptation exigencies and the strain induced by social structure.

Overall, a careful reading of the empirical evidence which is presented in the current and the previous chapter suggests that (i) youth of immigrant ancestry disproportionately engage in some forms of offending, and (ii) that the police disproportionately exercise their powers against delinquent youths of Albanian origin. Thus available evidence points towards a broad model of interpretation, which according to Reiner's typology can be termed as interactionist (Reiner 1993: 3). The interactionist approach was originally developed, in the context of UK, by Lea and Young, in an essay that introduced the 'left-

---

Reiner argues that in such cases the police act as a passive conveyor-belt for community prejudices. They are in particularly influenced by native victims' readiness to report as perpetrators minority youths even when they are not certain about the actual circumstances of their victimisation. A Greek study by Antonopoulos confirmed that native respondents were more willing to report to the police crimes committed by migrants than similar crimes committed by Greeks (Antonopoulos 2006b).

realist' criminology: these writers' interpretation of empirical evidence led them to stress the existence of a pattern that combines increased black offending and uneven treatment by the police (Lea and Young 1984). Thus 'left realism' rejected both the hypothesis of 'pure' discrimination on the part of criminal justice system that stands behind the radical critique (i.e.: Gilroy 1987), and the conservative 'no discrimination' position that attributes the disproportional engagement of black youth with criminal justice exclusively to their elevated rate of offending and deviant behaviour (i.e.: Wilbanks 1987). Against these polarised positions the 'left-realism' argument is more elaborate and remains more convincing. According to Reiner's authoritative review, it seems clear that the disproportionate arrest rate of blacks is the product of the mutually reinforcing interaction between the delinquent involvement of a small proportion of minority youth and the police stereotyping (Reiner 2000: 132). The findings of the current section lend support to a similar interpretation of the empirical reality of immigrant youth's involvement in offending and engagement with the Greek criminal justice system: the elevated rates of involvement in particular forms of offending reinforce police officers' stereotypes of and thus inflate the arrest rate for youths of Albanian origin.

## **7.5 Perceptions of abusive police practices: qualitative findings**

This section presents qualitative data that were drawn from interviews with 27 students in secondary schools serving catchment areas of central Athens, and 36 young defendants in the Juvenile Court of Athens. Firstly, interviewees were asked whether they had ever been stopped by the police, and secondly they were probed to describe the context of these contacts, and the officers' behaviour. Moreover, in the case of immigrant young offenders, additional questions were asked aiming to explore their more extended experiences that arose out of the circumstances of their arrest, questioning, and detainment.

### **7.5.1 Stop and check of 'papers'**

It is notable that most of the interviewed students<sup>145</sup> reported that the police had never stopped them (either in a vehicle or while on foot) in order to check their ID or immigration status during the last two years. This qualitative finding is in broad agreement

---

<sup>145</sup> Fifteen students out of twenty-seven. Mostly Lyceum and to a lesser extent TEE students who were born in Albania and other eastern-European post-communist countries and were brought up in Greece

with the 'policing' results of the 2004-05 inner-city school-survey, which are presented in *Table 7.3*. A plausible interpretation relates these findings to the fact that most of the surveyed and interviewed students of immigrant ancestry had physical characteristics, dress-code, manners, and language proficiency that rendered them almost indistinguishable from their native peers. It seems that the *fait accompli* of acculturation along with the legalisation programme of 2001 and the ensuing regularisation of the residence status of many immigrant families, contributed to the diminution of the 'stop and check' police tactics after that turning point. On the other hand, most immigrant young offenders but also a significant part of TEE students reported more frequent problematic contacts with the police and held an unfavourable opinion of law enforcement agents more often. The reasons behind these elevated rates are not directly related to their offending, but rather to their overall 'streetwise' lifestyle that makes these youths more visible and exposed to police attention. These 'streetwise' youths frequent squares, billiard rooms, and pubs that are under close police surveillance; they are also likely to drive mopeds or motorbikes, so they are bound to be more frequently subjected to police powers.

Not all immigrant respondents who had contacts with the police were quite sure about their legal status and the statutory powers of the police. However, an ethnic-Greek student born in Albania was confident that the law enforcement agents will treat him in a proper way: "If you are below 18 years old you can say to the police, I am a minor and I don't have my documents with me." In practice, such a relaxed approach is not an option available to every youth of immigrant ancestry. On the contrary, many children of ethnic migrant background reported having difficulties in convincing officers that they do not pose a threat to law and order. An Albania-born young student recalls:

I've been stopped by the police twice. They asked for my documents. I said "I don't have them with me, 'cause I'm a minor." They responded "minor ... bullshit. Come to the police station." So I called, from the station, my mother, and I asked her to bring my papers. That is how I was released.

The experience of the youth that had been stopped by the police is far from being unvarying. According to another Albania-born student, the checks are frequent, but the officers' behaviour is usually faultless: "If you gonna talk to them nicely they also gonna be very kind."

However, a significant minority of the respondents (12 interviewees), mostly young offenders but also students of immigrant parentage expressed annoyance and anger either at the unreasonable frequency of the stops and checks or the treatment they receive during such interactions with the police. An ethnic-Albanian young offender with extended engagement in streetlife recalls the days when the stop and check police practice was at its height:

The case could be that one day the police checked me on the street, kept me in the station to double check me, released me and after two hours recaptured me. It was like a routine. I knew that I was to be stopped and then kept in the police station for about two hours, maximum three. That was during 1998-1999.

*PP: What was the behaviour of the police like?*

Now you touch a serious issue. I've met good cops and bastards. It depends... the person matters. Once I was smacked so hard that I was stunned. There are some people in the police, real hayseeds. I don't know where they come from. They think that they have the power, that they are something. Their menu is "don't talk, shut up", then a slap and the like.

Greek citizens' analogous negative views towards the police resulting from inappropriate behaviour during 'stop and check' operations are not an oddity. Allegations of malpractice and discrimination have repeatedly raised public concern about the way that the police's coercive powers are performed. The 2003 report of the Greek Ombudsman detailed persistent violations of the due process governing the stop of suspects by the police, checking of their ID card and remand in the Police Station in order to verify identity and check whether they are fugitives (Kaminis and Tsapogas 2003: 3). According to the Greek Ombudsman such violations stem from misconceptions and inappropriate interpretations of what constitutes 'serious suspicion of perpetration of a criminal act'. The 'informal disciplinary investigations' that were conducted by the police in response to relevant citizens' complaints came to the conclusion that in areas of high criminality indiscriminate arrests are necessary and suspects have to be remanded to police station for verification of their ID without the precondition of 'reasonable' and 'individualised' suspicion (Kaminis and Tsapogas 2003). Vidali considers such reasoning as symptomatic of the Hellenic police mentality. Nevertheless, the large scale police operations which target particular parts of the population and punish them at a collective level are extreme forms even for the Greek version of militarised policing (Vidali 2007a: 958). And since we know that 'police

discretion is not an equal opportunity phenomenon'(Newburn and Reiner 2007: 915) one can expect that such forms of policing which clearly violate the due process are more likely to occur when the target is a member of an ethnic migrant or minority community.

### **7.5.2 Harassment while at police custody**

Even if a youngster of immigrant ancestry is able to demonstrate his/her residence permit to the police officer checking the immigration status at the street, he or she frequently has to spend two or three hours in the police station. As we have seen previously the power to remand a person checked in the street to the police station is officially justified by the need to confirm the person's identity and check outstanding criminal charges against him or her. Many of the interviewees who have been detained at a police station reported ill-treatment, including offensive language, humiliation, intimidation, bullying, and beatings. A typical description of alleged harassment at the police station is offered by a boy of Bulgarian origin who was brought to the Juvenile Court of Athens for hashish possession charges:

I was checked twice in the surroundings of the school along with my friends. They got us in (r.n.: the police station). When we were about to be released the Big one (r.n.: a senior officer) told us "you can get out now, but our dogs will be sent after you. To see who the big lad is then." And they let us pass the gate. We were very scared. Another time we were again in the police station and although we showed our papers we were waiting for our records to be fetched. We were held in a room. They were beating us and they used bad language, harsh words. At some point, because one of the girls that were with us gave the wrong address to the police, the woman officer grabbed her from the hair and slapped her.

An Albania-born boy, who had been caught driving without a licence, witnessed humiliation practices but assigned them to 'bad' police officers only:

Once a friend asked me to get his moped and fill it with gasoline. But then the police stopped me. They took me in (r.n.: the police station). I called my friend and he came with the documents proving the ownership of the moped. A bad police officer took my friend's licence and acted as if it was toilet paper. I said, "It's a shame to tear it up." The good police officer said "leave them." So, there are good and bad police officers.

On the whole, a number of the interviewees (12 in total) told me stories that paint a picture of deep-seated racist attitudes by police officers. It seems that some officers act as if they are in an open clash with 'dangerous alien invaders'. The experience of an Albania-born TEE student is telling:

Once I was with a mate, hanging out and laughing in front of Multiplex cinema. A plainclothes policeman came, asked me "why you are laughing", and gave me a blow to the face. I told him "I am not laughing at you. I am talking to my friend and we are laughing. I am going to sue you" He swore at me and started beating me again. Then he took me to the police station. I reported to the duty-officer what had happened. "Shut up, you damn Albanian" he said and started to beat me up. They kept me for six hours, but since my papers were in order they let me go.

It is likely that the undercover police officer of this story perceived the loose behaviour of the pair of immigrant youth as cockiness challenging his authority<sup>146</sup>. His colleague at the police station also felt that the Albanian adolescent's assertiveness was even more provocative justifying additional disciplinary lessons to be taught. Arguably, such understanding of police work is not justified by the police's statutory mission, which is the control of crime. The motivation behind these forms of ill-treatment is clearly racist and has analogies only with 'social disciplinary' models of policing that seek the subordination of sections of society which are perceived by the police as the enemy (Choongh 1998 cited in McAra and McVie 2005). Because of such experiences of discrimination and harassment, the sentiments of the ill-treated youths towards the police are -in some cases- strong. These tense feelings peak at the time of young offenders' arrest: "Once they stopped me just in front of my school. I was handcuffed and taken away with a patrol car. After these things happen, you start to hate them." The arrest of another young offender of Albanian origin involved police abusive behaviour towards family members, which triggered his powerless rage:

When the police arrived, I was sleeping because the previous was a night out. My sister was at the house and opened the door. She woke me, told me that two men were asking for me. I was in underwear. Asked them what it's all about. They told me to come out for a moment, and handcuffed me. I told them to let me wear my clothes. At this point, one

---

<sup>146</sup> Several British observational studies have stressed the key role that perceived 'contempt of the cop' plays in triggering hostile police action (Reiner 2000: 126).

policeman said something to my sister and I got mad. If I had a knife I could've slaughtered him. Whatever the consequences, I don't care about the consequences. If I had anything in my hand, I could stab him to death.

*PP: What did he say to your sister?*

Something like shut up. And she burst into tears. She was 15 years old at the time.

### **7.5.3 Questioning of a suspect**

The beating of immigrant youths during their remand in the police station is not rare for it was reported by almost one third of the interviewed foreign-born young offenders. Furthermore, it seems that abusive treatment is even more likely to occur during a suspect's questioning. In particular, when the police seek to elevate their performance indicators, they are apparently tempted to use force in order to 'persuade' young suspects to assume responsibility for a great volume of unresolved property crime. The following extract is typical of young offenders' relevant allegations:

I was arrested for shoplifting. They took me to the police station and then to the detectives. They kept asking me: how much have you done. How many times have you done this or that. Their behaviour was very bad. Although I hadn't done all those things, they kept beating and telling me to admit responsibility, so to let me go. But I didn't accept their offer. I was kept from 12:00 at noon until midnight. The one who was beating me was in plainclothes.

Slapping the interrogated minor seems to be widespread when the questioning concerns petty charges. If the alleged offences are more serious the interrogation practice seems to involve more severe beatings. Indicative of the incorporation of harassment into the questioning process is that the beatings are typically inflicted by a group and under the supervision of a senior officer. An Albania-born boy who witnessed the killing of an Albanian young man by his mate and compatriot named Timo<sup>147</sup> offered the following description:

When I was arrested, Timo hadn't been caught yet. They beat me up a lot to tell them where Timo lived. Nobody else knew his home. They punched me down here (r.n.:

---

<sup>147</sup> Section 5.4.5 of Chapter 5 analyses the tragic events.



stomach), and slapped me over here (r.n.: face). Boom-boom. They were many, three to four, and also a big guy (r.n.: senior officer). One of them had a beard. They held me three hours in the police station and five days in Alexandras (r.n.: the police headquarters that host the Juveniles subdivision).

The ones who reported repeated experiences of harassment were the young offenders of immigrant ancestry who were under probation. The following story by Danny<sup>148</sup> makes one think that the maltreatment and pressure that some immigrant young offenders receive by the police is 'endless':

I have to appear every month's first and sixteenth at my neighbourhood police station. But I never go because they treat me so badly. They stop me at the street, they beat me up, and hold me to the ground. They do this on purpose, because they have a 'power complex'. Then, they want to know about other burglaries. They ask me who have done that, and every time they arrest me they turn me into blue and black. Fists, slaps, kicks, and everything. They keep telling me "if you don't give us the one who did this burglary we are not going to record that you came to the station. Last time, when I was leaving they asked me to go again the next morning. But I never went back.

The accounts offered by interviewed young offenders of immigrant ancestry support the hypothesis that harassment by the police during interrogation is not exceptional but constitutes a relatively widespread practice<sup>149</sup>. However, given that the design of the present study does not include the interviewing of native young offenders, it is not possible to test the hypothesis that immigrant youths face harassment during questioning more frequently than their native counterparts.

## 7.6 Conclusions

The UMHRI school-survey findings show, as regards immigrant-origin youths' extent of policing, that Albania-born boys reported only slightly higher rates of *lifetime* problems with police than their native-born counterparts. Moreover, they reported the lowest of all student 'ethnic' groups' rate of *last-12-month* troubles with the police which were related to

---

<sup>148</sup> A summary of Danny's life-story was presented in section 6.6.3 of Chapter 6.

<sup>149</sup> Human Rights organisations documented similar allegations. Section 7.3.1 reviews this body of evidence.

their own wrongdoing. Elevated rates of such 'troubles' with the police were reported by the boys born in the former Soviet Union, and in all 'other' countries. These results are consistent with the findings of the 2004-05 survey of inner-city schools. According to this survey Albania-born students' *lifetime* rate of being 'stopped and checked' by the police, while on foot or on a vehicle, was only slightly higher than that of their Greek schoolmates. On the contrary, students born in 'other' countries were found an estimated five times more likely than their native-born counterparts to be 'stopped and checked' by the police.

Many offending students of immigrant origin are not committed to the academic path of upward mobility. They encounter forms of policing which are considered to be analogous with those experienced by their streetwise compatriots who are not at school. Thus, in order to probe the experiences of streetwise youths this chapter assessed the extent of policing to which the subgroup of delinquent students is subjected. To this end, police initiated encounters were calculated as a proportion of respondents' degree of self-reported involvement in delinquency. It was found that offending students of Albanian origin were more likely to be subjected to police action than offenders belonging to any other 'ethnic' group. Specifically, although the group of delinquent students who were born in FSU or 'other' countries reported frequent contacts with the law enforcement agents, they still were not subjected to a level of police control proportionate to their involvement in delinquency. This constitutes a form of uneven police practice which partially contributes to the overrepresentation of young offenders of Albanian origin in police statistics. Thus, the finding lends support to the assumption that Albanian youths' elevated arrest rates are the product of the mutually reinforcing interaction between their disproportionate involvement in particular forms of offending and police stereotyping. However, 'overpolicing' appears to focus exclusively on the 'usual suspects' of the ethnic-Albanian migrant community.

FitzGerald (1997: 56) has pointed out that we must abandon the idea that direct discrimination against minorities is endemic in all criminal justice stages. As with direct discrimination, harassment is not endemic in every Greek police station and not the prevailing issue of every interaction between police and immigrant youth. Nevertheless, many interviewed young offenders of immigrant ancestry seem to consider the possibility of ill-treatment and racist abuse by the police as an always present possibility. In addition, a significant minority of them reported incidents of serious ill-treatment by the police. Such incidents usually take place in police stations during detention or questioning. This

finding underlines the salience of an institutional culture that fosters readiness for power-abuse and enables outbreaks of racist and brutal behaviour. The evidence offered by the respondents supports the view that delinquent immigrant minors, because of their twice vulnerable position, as immigrants and as young offenders are frequently treated as 'police property' (Lee 1981). Predictably, the reactions of youth who have received such treatment range from anger and hostility towards the police to grief and shame.

These episodes of ill-treatment cannot be viewed as the product of an all pervasive police-immigrant rivalry for such evidence does not exist. In interpreting similar findings of a 1987 Swiss study, Killias refers to the possibility that immigrants positively evaluated the police of the host country because their comparisons were still predominately made with the behaviour of the police in their countries of origin (Killias 1997). Indeed some of the Albanian juvenile offenders I interviewed reported experiences of police brutality acquired during summer visits in their country of origin, and thus were able to make comparisons. These youths in line with the majority of the immigrant youths were leaning towards the view that 'the police are doing their job' the way that, according to their horizon of experience, 'the police always do their business'. However, it is not certain whether this stoical stance can be considered as a compliment to the Greek police.

On the whole, it seems that the protracted and heavy reliance of successive Greek administrations of 1990s on policing as an almost exclusive means for the 'management' of irregular immigration created a legacy that has left its marks. Frequently the police treat the deviant part of immigrant youths as their 'property'. In all likelihood they are allowed to do so for the native majority leave the handling of the immigrant 'problem' to the police and for a long period turn a blind eye to the manner that non-nationals are treated (Lee 1981: 53-4 cited in Reiner 2000: 93).

Out of this conjuncture punitive and social disciplinary forms of immigration policing emerged in Greece either earlier or concomitant with similar trends in other European countries. The handling of irregular immigration and the mass deportation operations of the 1990s were proved to be not only a burdensome duty for the Greek police. By campaigning against illegal migrants the Greek police seized the opportunity to line up with the xenophobic sentiments of large segments of the population, and thus to enjoy much needed gains in legitimacy terms. It has to be highlighted that in the 1970s and 1980s Greek police faced a disaffected or even hostile societal stance, mainly due to their record as an oppression arm of the military junta. A large part of the population held the view that

the police were a ghost of the past, quite out of pace with the tectonic changes that the Greek society and polity underwent in the post-junta period (Vidali 2007b: 338). In the early 1990s because of their inability to undergo any substantial reorganisation towards a more professional model, and their subsequent failure to have an impact on the rising crime rates (Lambropoulou 2004), the handling of illegal immigration provided a handy solution to older and contemporary police legitimacy crises: in practice, it was more difficult to improve the property crime clear-up rate than to run a mass deportation operation. At any rate, as Vidali indicates, in the mid-1990s in parallel with a reorganisation effort that led -among other things- to the adoption of a 'comprehensive metropolitan police station' model, the relation of the police with the Greek public entered an era of reconciliation. A reconciliation which was partly cemented by ascending fear of crime. Furthermore, such reconciliation also contributed to the consensual view of a large part of the public that immigration was the new 'internal' threat and that the Hellenic police -despite all their inadequacies- were the only guarantor of security (Vidali 2007b: 458). Along with these legitimacy gains, the handling of the 'immigration crisis' enabled the Greek police to accumulate powers and resources. Unlike the situation in the UK, the control of immigration in Greece is not assigned to a special police force. From this point of view, I will further argue that in the case of Greece the policing of immigration was instrumental to the postponing of necessary organisational police reforms and the re-emergence of authoritarian and brutal forms of policing that draw from the forces' unmourned past.

---

## Chapter 8

### Youth Justice Processing

---

*Equality before the law is a social fiction (Sellin 1935: 217)*

#### 8.1 Introduction

The question of whether foreign delinquents face discriminatory processing by the criminal justice system, which eventually leads to unfavourable sentencing disparities, is one notoriously difficult to answer through empirical research (Tonry 1997). Still it is a pressing issue demanding exploration, for foreigners are significantly overrepresented among inmates of Greek prisons. According to unpublished statistics of the Hellenic Ministry of Justice the average proportion of foreign inmates for the period 1997-2003 was approximately 46 per cent of the total prison population<sup>150</sup> (Lambropoulou 2005).


Furthermore, of utmost seriousness is the question relevant to the overrepresentation of immigrant-origin youths in the juvenile detention institutions of Greece. It is well known that imprisonment exerts a singular influence on the development of youthful subsequent criminal trajectories (Courakis and Stathopoulou 2007; Greek Ombudsman 2008). Immigrant-origin youths' overrepresentation in prison statistics is a persistent phenomenon. For instance, in July 2002, 540 juveniles were held in all three major 'Special Detention Institutions for Youngsters' of Greece (Ministry of Justice 2003). More than half of them (52 per cent) were of foreign nationality. Two years later, in March 2004, there were 497 confined minors and young adults, and the proportion of foreigners among them was 55 per cent (Courakis 2004:327). Further, in May 2008, the total number of youths committed to Greece's principal detention facility for juveniles, that of Avlona, was 329, of whom the majority (67 per cent) were of foreign nationality (Papastergiou 2008).

---

<sup>150</sup> According to a recent press release of the Ministry of Justice (October 2007) the disparity is even more pronounced: in 2007, fifty per cent inmates in Greek prisons were of foreign nationality.

This remarkable and persistent overrepresentation is the cumulative outcome of gradual increases in the representation of foreign youths at each successive stage of processing by the youth justice system (*Figure 8.1*). According to my calculations, presented in section 1.3, children and adolescents of immigrant parentage represented a gross 11 percent of the same-age general population. Police statistics covering the period 1999-2003 indicate that the proportion of foreign youths among alleged offenders, aged 7-17 years old, was 24 percent for all recorded offences less traffic, begging, electronic games, and illegal entry violations. According to the statistics of the juvenile court of Athens, although foreigners were during 2002-03 & 2003-04 an average 29 percent of the referred youth, their share among those who received custodial sentences was 41 percent. And finally, during 2002-04, more than half of the inmates of Greek 'special institutions' for youngsters were young offenders of foreign nationality.

**Figure 8.1: Foreign Youths' Representation at Various Stages of the Juvenile Justice System**



*Sources: (1) Ages 5-19, ESYE 2001 adjusted census data, (2) Police statistics 1999-2003, all offences but minor violations, (3) Juvenile Court of Athens, Intake statistics (2002-3 & 2003-4), (4) Juvenile Court of Athens, sentencing statistics (2002-3 & 2003-4), (5) Ministry of Justice, Prison statistics 2002*

However, the previously documented escalation in foreign youth's representation at successive stages of the youth justice system, does not offer enough support to the hypothesis of minority youths discriminatory treatment on the part of the Greek juvenile justice system. It is entirely possible that immigrant offenders' nature of engagement in delinquency, namely offence type, offence severity and prior criminal history accounts for

their overrepresentation in prison statistics. A third theoretical hypothesis is that immigrant youths' escalating contact with the criminal justice system is the result of interaction between criminal justice's selection bias and ethnic differences in involvement in youth crime (Pope and Feyerherm 1995). The attempt in the current chapter to examine this set of hypotheses is only tentative, but represents a necessary first step, since there is no other study examining the dispositional disparities of the Greek system of juvenile justice.

Thus, the current chapter provides additional evidence on the issue of ethnic migrant youth overrepresentation in youth justice statistics and assesses the effect of their ethnonational status on the juvenile court of Athens' dispositions. The analysis of intake statistics as regards the cases of the youths who were referred to the juvenile court of Athens during the judicial years 2002-03 and 2003-04 is presented in section 8.2. As has already been mentioned, one-third of the court's intake was of foreign nationality. Moreover, two-thirds of foreign youthful referrals were of Albanian origin. The core findings of the chapter are presented in section 8.3 which analyses aggregated disposition statistics of juvenile court of Athens. Such aggregated data are adequate for identifying broad patterns, but inadequate for locating the factors that are responsible for the observed disparate outcomes. The emergent primary areas of concern are those related to the following two patterns of disparity: (i) foreign young defendants' disproportionately lower acquittal rate: for instance, the proportion of Albanian youths who were acquitted by the court was two and half times lower than that of their Greek counterparts; and (ii) the disproportionately higher probability of foreign youth to be sentenced to confinement: even during the least punitive judicial years Albanian young offenders had the highest custody rate. The analysis of the juvenile court intake and sentencing statistics is supplemented with qualitative data offered by interviewed probation officers. Section 8.4 utilises such system-insiders' point of view as an aid in identifying the organisational practices and legal criteria through which the youthful defendant's ethnicity/nationality influences judicial assessments of their cases. Finally, Appendix V offers a summary account of the development and the guiding principles of the Greek youth justice system.

### **8.1.1 The Juvenile Court of Athens**

In this study, the exploration of youth justice's dispositional disparities will be based on the most reliable statistics that detail the workings of juvenile justice system in Greece, deriving from the juvenile court of Athens. This court serves one third of the country's

population (3.2 millions) and consequently handles a large part of the national youth justice caseload. Its role is also central to the processing of delinquent youths of immigrant parentage. Since the conurbation of Athens has attracted the largest part of the country's immigrant population, almost half of the immigrant-origin children, aged 6 to 19 years old, who live in Greece, reside in Athens (ESYE 2001 census). However, the court's statistics cannot be seen as a straightforward indicator of the trends of juvenile delinquency in Athens. The court's annual intake does not necessarily correspond to the number of juveniles that metropolitan police refer every year to the juvenile court, but is limited by juvenile court's capacity. Thus, Spinellis and Tsitsoura pointed out that the court's annual statistics reflect -more than anything else- the number of cases the court is able to handle (2006). Attorneys' strikes or organisational reforms have a direct impact on these statistics. This suggests that in Greece, as elsewhere in Europe, the criminal justice system tends to balance itself out (Aebi et al. 2000). In order to minimize the effect of such 'internal dynamics' fluctuations, the current examination of the court intake and its sentencing practices will be based, whenever this is possible, on aggregated statistics that cover more than one judicial year.

The juvenile court of Athens actually comprises three courts. According to Act 3189/2003 the three-judge juvenile court processes the more serious offences. The jurisdiction of this court is over misdemeanours for which there is a provisioned sanction of minimum five years in custody (PC 113 1b) (Courakis 2004). The Penal Code (art. 18 2) when referring to minors mentions only misdemeanours, (Courakis 2004: 295; Spinellis 1992: 40), because even offences that would be felonious crimes if committed by adults, are treated as misdemeanours when minors are involved. The single-judge juvenile court deals with less serious offences and petty violations. The three-judge appeal court examines appeals against the three-judge juvenile court dispositions.



## 8.2 Youths referred to the Court and their charges

During the judicial years 2002-03 and 2003-04 6,006 defendants, 8 to 22 years of age were referred to the juvenile court of Athens. The processing by the court of young people older than 18 years old (the upper age-limit of juvenile court's jurisdiction according to Act 3189/2003<sup>151</sup>), is due to prolonged delays in the administration of justice that render the court unable to keep up with the flow of police referrals. Since the juvenile court's jurisdiction depends on the age at the time the offence was committed, the defendant might not be a minor anymore by the time of his/her trial. Most defendants are males. Females represent less than 10 per cent of the referrals.

Of foreign nationality were 1,731 youthful defendants or 29 per cent of the court intake. The overwhelming majority of the foreign defendants were of Albanian origin (67 per cent). Much less numerous were the groups of Iraqi and Bulgarian nationals and those originating from the southern parts of the former-USSR. The majority of undocumented foreign youths (54 per cent) who were adjudicated for breaches of the 'immigration' law during 2003-04 resided in inner-city Athens. Considerable numbers also reported as their residence a number of Greater Athens' working class boroughs (i.e.: Kalithea, Tavros, Moshato, Elefsina, Aspropyrgos).


The residence status of the foreign youthful defendants has a significant impact on their legal position before the law. Police statistics of the period 1999-2003 indicate a trend of moderate decrease in youths' arrests for breaches of the immigration law<sup>152</sup>. The court data of *Table 8.1* are in broad accordance with the declining trend of the police statistics. In the judicial year 2003-04 the court processed 148 violations of the 'immigration law' (Acts 1975/1991, 2910/2001<sup>153</sup>). The previous judicial year the cases involving immigration status violations were two and half times more (365). In one-third of these cases the undocumented foreign youth were charged with additional offences. However, the statistics of this period are rather misleading. As *Figure 8.2* suggests after the judicial year 2003-04 the number of referred youths of immigrant parentage whose residence status was irregular increased sharply.

<sup>151</sup> Previously, the upper limit was 17 years of age completed.

<sup>152</sup> Slope coefficient: -9

<sup>153</sup> The legislation regulating the entry and residence of aliens which was recently reformed by Act 3386/2005.

**Figure 8.2** Number of Undocumented Foreign Youths Referred to the Juvenile Court of Athens, 1999-2007



Source: Ministry of Justice, Juvenile Court of Athens, my elaboration

The observed fluctuations in the numbers of undocumented minors of immigrant descent who are referred to the court reflect the complexity of the phenomena under examination. Presumably, the decline observed during 2002-04 has to be attributed to the impact of the regularisation programmes, and the ensuing legalisation of the residence status of many immigrant families and their children. The same programmes probably had contributed to the relaxation of immigration policing (Greek Ombudsman 2005). However, the on-going character of irregular immigration to Athens very soon re-produced large numbers of minors who are referred by the metropolitan police to the court for infringement of the 'immigration law'. Thus in 2005-06 half of the adjudicated foreign youth of Albanian origin were those who were found guilty for 'immigration law' violations. However, alongside the partial persistence of Albanians' legal and social marginalisation, it is the irregular arrival of new ethnic migrant groups that increases even further the numbers of non-citizens<sup>154</sup>. On the whole, the court time-series of *Figure 8.2* indicate that the link between undocumented status and criminalisation remains active, and constitutes an important parameter that potentially penetrates all interactions between immigrant youths and the youth justice system through the accumulation of vulnerabilities.

<sup>154</sup> According to a 2008 study of the Hellenic Migration Policy Institute (IMEPO) the records of primary and secondary schools lead to the estimation that there are still more than 220,000 undocumented migrants in Greece (Lianos et al. 2008).

A large part of the cases (43 per cent) that had been processed by the juvenile court of Athens during the two judicial years under examination concern offences related to vehicles and traffic<sup>155</sup> (Table 8.1). This is not surprising for approximately 90 per cent of offences that police statistics attribute to minors are traffic violations. Prominent among the more serious cases processed by the court are property offences (14 per cent), while the person offences are much less numerous. Other miscellaneous offences accounted for an additional 26 per cent of the court's caseload.

**Table 8.1: Cases Processed by the Juvenile Court of Athens, by Type of Offence**

<i>Type of Offence</i>	<b>Three-Judge Juvenile Court</b>		<b>Single-Judge Juvenile Court</b>		<b>Total</b>	
	n	%	n	%	n	%
TRAFFIC OFFENCES	13	6	2,151	45	2,164	43
OTHER	62	28	1,232	26	1,294	26
THEFT	13	6	691	14	704	14
ROBBERY	70	31	6	-	76	2
AGAINST PERSON	20	9	48	1	68	1
DRUG OFFENCES	25	11	155	3	180	4
IMMIGRATION STATUS	20	9	493	10	513	10
TOTAL	223	100	4,776	100	4,999	100

*Source: Ministry of Justice, Juvenile Court of Athens, Years 2002-03 & 2003-04, my elaboration*

The three-judge juvenile court of Athens processed the cases of 223 defendants, 6 per cent of whom had been charged with theft, 31 per cent with robbery, 9 per cent with against the person offences, and 11 per cent with drug offences. The proportion of foreign defendants among those referred to the three-judge court was 26 per cent. Since the average proportion of foreign youth among the referrals of both the single-judge and the three-judge juvenile courts was higher (29 per cent), there is no *prima facie* indication that minors of foreign nationality are disproportionately transferred to the three-member court, in which they face harsher sanctions. It is obvious that this observation does not refute the basic fact which is related to foreign youths' remarkable overrepresentation among all juvenile courts' intake.

<sup>155</sup> Minor traffic offences are not referred to the court, unless the relevant fine is not paid on time.

The court statistics of the judicial year 2002-03 indicate that 18 per cent of the defendants charged with traffic offences, 35 per cent of the defendants charged with theft, 17 per cent of those charged with drug offences, and 16 per cent of those with robbery charges had a record of previous convictions and/or sentences. The breakdown of these figures by ethnic group is impossible for the recidivism statistics lack information on nationality.

### **8.3 Disparities in Court Disposition**

#### **8.3.1 Past research and theoretical perspectives**

Studies of juvenile court processing have established the overrepresentation of minorities within the juvenile justice system of United States. Moreover, minority overrepresentation increases dramatically as one moves to later stages in processing. Empirical evidence supports the view that the application of criminal law principles accounts for most of the observed variance in juvenile court sentences (Bishop and Frazier 1996; Feld 1999; 2003). Nevertheless, Pope and Feyerherm (1990) argue that race effects are common in the juvenile justice system (more than in adult systems), because of the greater level of discretion and greater informality that characterise juvenile justice systems (cited in Sampson and Lauritsen 1997). The link between discretionary powers and discriminatory potential has, nevertheless, also been documented in studies of the adult criminal justice systems. For instance, the British study of Hood (1992) of five Crown courts in the West Midlands, found that the disproportionate rates of African/Caribbean custodial sentences was higher for offences at the middle level of seriousness, where the judges' discretion was greatest (cited in Bowling and Phillips 2002).

Specific to the treatment of ethnic minority young people was Mhlanga's comprehensive study of juvenile court's dispositions (1997). His multivariate analysis of all male referrals in the London borough of Brent showed differences that could not be explained by racial differences in delinquent involvement. Mhlanga's most important findings were (i) that there was a greater probability of cases involving African/Caribbean defendants being acquitted by courts on the grounds of insufficient evidence; and (ii) if convicted, young African/Caribbean defendants were more likely to receive custodial sentences. A more recent British study of eight Youth Offending Teams' areas investigated 17,054 case decisions and confirmed that a much higher proportion of cases involving young black males were acquitted or discontinued (Feilzer and Hood 2004). According to

the same study the proportion convicted was much higher in cases involving young men identified as of mixed parentage than in cases involving white, black and Asian males or males of other ethnicity. The proportion of black men being sentenced to custody was slightly higher than the rate of white and Asian males. However, the characteristics of the cases largely justified the observed raw differences in custody rates. Consequently, as regards the use of custodial sentences, there was no evidence suggesting unfair discriminatory treatment of black males, compared with white males. However, if a black male was convicted in a Crown Court his probability to receive a custodial sentence of 12 months or more was 6.7 times that of a white male (Feilzer and Hood 2004).


Apart from empirical work several theories have attempted to explain the uneven treatment of minorities by the criminal justice system. Sampson and Lauritsen (1997) consider as more convincing the 'conflict' perspective, which relates discrimination to the reaction of criminal justice system towards the symbolic threats posed to elites by the increasing presence of minority groups. Traditional conflict theory suggests that court officials may treat minority persons more harshly for they are dissimilar from those in power and are deemed threatening to their interests (Chambliss and Seidman 1971; Quinney 1973; Turk 1969). A more specific theoretical statement was suggested by Tittle and Curran' (1988) study of 31 counties of Florida which found strong evidence of discriminatory processing of non-white youth by juvenile courts, only in the counties with the largest proportions of non-white and young people. Other studies also documented the discriminatory treatment of groups that are perceived as threatening to the mainstream society, especially when reaching a threshold size (Hagan and Peterson 1995; Liska 1992; Sampson and Lauritsen 1997).

### 8.3.2 Patterns in Juvenile Court dispositional outcomes

The juvenile court of Athens' prevailing dispositions are of the following seven types: (1) *acquittal*: the case is dismissed or no further action is taken; (2) *diversion or release*: the new youth justice legislation concerning eight to eighteen-year olds (Act 3189/2003) foresees procedures of reconciliation between the youthful author of the offence and the victim (Art 122 e PC). Moreover, when the defendant is over 18 years old and the hearing concerns petty offences committed when between 13 and 18 years of age, the court might decide to decline of jurisdiction and dismiss the defendant without any sanction or penalty (Demetriou 2007); (3) *reprimand* administered by the judge during the court hearing (Art 122 1a PC); (4) *responsible parental supervision* (Art. 122 1b PC). Yet, the new youth justice legislation foresees the sanction of inadequate parental supervision of neglect (Art. 360 1 PC); (5) *supervision by a probation officer* (Art. 122 1d PC); (6) *pecuniary penalty*: short-term imprisonment disposition which is converted into fine (Art. 82 PC); (7) *immediately enforced custody*: according to the law (Art. 127 PC) custodial sanctioning of persistent young offenders constitutes the judge's *ultimum refugium*. The principal legal reasoning which justifies such harsh adjudication is to deter youths from re-offending (Pitsela 2004: 222; Spinellis and Tsitsoura 2006: 319). Thus, it is not surprising that the vast majority of those confined in Greek special institutions are young adults with a history of recidivism<sup>156</sup>. The court might order the confinement of a youth 13-18 years of age in a correctional institution for a determinate period of time (Art. 127 PC). The minimum period of confinement is 6 months and the maximum 20 years.

According to aggregated court disposition statistics (*Figure 8.3*) acquitted or other or otherwise discontinued were the cases of almost half of those referred to the juvenile court (47 per cent of the referrals). Three-fifths of those who were adjudicated by the court received a 'parental supervision order'. Four hundred youths or 13 per cent of those adjudicated during the examination period were putted under the formal supervision of the Probation Service were placed. Finally, custodial sentences were passed to a small proportion of the youths referred to the court (2.3 per cent).

<sup>156</sup> For instance, according to the National Statistical Service on 31 December of 2001 incarcerated were 51 adolescents 13-17 years of age, and 278 young adults aged 18-20 years old. In May 2008 in all 'special institutions' were held 60 adolescents and 378 young adults.

**Figure 8.3: Distribution of Juvenile Court Dispositions across Ethnic Groups**

Source: Ministry of Justice, Juvenile Court of Athens, judicial years 2002-03 & 2003-04, my elaboration

As Figure 8.3 illustrates the court's seven types of dispositions are unevenly distributed across the three groups of young offenders (Greek nationals, Albanian nationals, and other foreigners). The examination of aggregated statistics for judicial years 2002-03 & 2003-04 led to a number of observations regarding notable patterns of court outcomes:

- (1) The court data showed that there were substantial variations in the proportion of acquitted cases in relation to the nationality of referred youths. The proportion of Greek defendants who were acquitted by the court was two and half times higher than that of their Albanian counterparts (Figure 8.3). And finally, the proportion of the 'other' foreign defendants acquitted by the court was almost half the proportion of the Albanians. Likewise, the proportion of Greek young adults whose cases were discontinued or dismissed by the court was more than three times higher than that of Albanian young adults.



The examination of specific types of offences emphasises even further the ethno-national disparities in acquittal rates. The large category of traffic offences offers a suitable test case. The youths who had been referred to the juvenile court of Athens, during the judicial year 2002-03, with charges related with traffic offences only (breaches of traffic regulations & of the Act 2170/93) were 2,207. The vast majority were of Greek nationality and only 11 per cent were foreigners. The proportion of Greeks whose cases were dismissed by the court was 48 per cent and of foreigners 10 per cent, although both groups were equally likely to be absent during their trial (85 per cent of both groups' young defendants were absent). In principle, there is no reason to assume the referred foreign youths were more likely than their Greek counterparts to have committed more serious traffic offences or to have repeated them. The most reasonable possibility is that juvenile judges prefer to impose mild reformatory measures, namely 'parental supervision' in the cases of foreign youth instead of dismissing them.

The study of property offences offers further indications of the judges' hesitation to acquit foreign youths. In the year 2002-03, 248 youths with theft charges were referred the court, of which 42 per cent were of foreign nationality. The court acquitted 32 per cent of the Greeks and 17 per cent of the foreigners. This disparity was balanced again with the measure of parental supervision, which was imposed on 51 per cent of the foreign defendants and only 23 per cent of the Greeks.


The large number of 'parental supervision orders' that were passed on foreign youths is to a certain extent also associated with a particular handling of immigration status violations. In the judicial year 2002-03, for instance, the measure of parental supervision was imposed on 586 foreign youths. Almost half of them (47 per cent) had only been charged with breaches of immigration law.

(2) A legal factor that substantially contributes to a favourable disposition is the defendant's presence at the court hearing. When a case is tried *in absentia* the court assumes that the defendant admits the charges. According to 2003-04 court statistics, 80-90 per cent of the acquitted or the reprimanded minors were present at their court hearing (Figure 8.4). The reverse was the case for those at the punitive end of the dispositional spectrum; an average 85 per cent of the young defendants who were given either custodial or imprisonment-converted-to-fine sentences had been tried in their absence. With regard to the nationality of those acquitted, 84 per cent of the Greek defendants were present to



the court hearing that led to the dismissal of their charges. By contrast, only 51 per cent of the foreign minors that were acquitted appeared at the court on the day of their court hearing.

**Figure 8.4: Percentage of Defendants Tried in their Absence by Court Disposition and Nationality, 2002-03 & 2003-4**



Source: Ministry of Justice, Juvenile Court of Athens, my elaboration

(3) On the other hand, the lower acquittal rate of foreign youth does not seem to provide support to a hypothesis of biased and overzealous policing which draws immigrant-origin youth *en masse* into the criminal justice system on relatively weak evidence. In this respect, the processing of immigrant youths by the Greek juvenile justice appears to follow a different pattern than that observed in the case of African/Caribbean defendants in the UK<sup>157</sup>. Theoretically, it is possible either that the Greek juvenile prosecutors and judges align themselves with the police and avoid acquit or discontinue weak cases referred to the court, or that the charges are indeed based on sufficient evidence. *Prima facie*, the fact that almost half of the acquitted foreign defendants were absent in the court hearing that led to the acquittal of their cases, refutes the hypothesis of biased processing of foreign youths' cases. However, the charges of acquitted foreign

<sup>157</sup> As it has already been mentioned African/Caribbean or Asian youth had higher acquittal or case termination rates than white young defendants for their prosecution was more often based on insufficient evidence (Barclay and Mhlanga 2000; Feilzer and Hood 2004; Mhlanga 1997).

youths were mainly on beggary, illegal entry and other petty violations (almost 80 per cent of the cases). Apparently, in such cases the judge has little choice other than to acquit. The critical question, which remains open, is how the juvenile court handles foreign defendants' cases which are related to offences within the middle range of offence seriousness, where the judicial discretion is more wide (Bowling and Phillips 2002: 184).

(4) Immediately enforced custody or short-term imprisonment, which is typically converted to a fine, are among the harsher sentences that the juvenile court can impose. According to *Figure 8.3* young Albanian nationals had the highest custody rate (3.5 per cent). The rates for 'other' foreigners (2.8 per cent) and for Greeks (1.9 per cent) were substantially lower.


The average length of the imposed custodial sentences was also different for each one of the examined groups of young offenders. Non-nationals were more likely to receive lengthy custodial sentences than Greeks. For instance, the proportion of Albanians among those who had been given six to twelve months of custody was 23 per cent and was 57 per cent among those sentenced to custody for one to three years. Finally, half of those sentenced to long-term custody (four to twenty years) were Albanians. Obviously, such lengthy custodial sentences contribute substantially to the overrepresentation of Albanians among confined youthful populations.

However, it has to be stressed that the characteristics of the cases that led to custodial sentences also varied in relation to ethnicity. Foreign youth were more likely to receive custodial sentences for violence against the person offences. Thus, their proportion (60 per cent) among those who were sentenced to custody for charges related to violent offences (homicide, robbery, rape, kidnapping) was substantially higher than as against their proportion among the property offenders who received custodial sentences (35 per cent).

All in all, the disparity in the severity of penal sanctions between Greek and foreign offenders is pronounced. However, their involvement in offending of the kind most likely to attract a custodial sentence is also varied. In the absence of crucial data on legally relevant factors, like number of the offences dealt with at the hearing, recidivism, offence severity and aggravating circumstances, it remains open whether ethnonational disparities in custody rate were entirely justified by differences between these case characteristics that could legitimately be taken into account.

(5) It is the examination of the change over time in court custodial dispositions that could help to transcend the inconclusiveness of the previous discussion. The sentencing statistics of *Figure 8.5*, are very suggestive in explaining the legacy of disproportionate confinement of foreign youth in Greek youth reformatory institutions. *Figure 8.5* illustrates the number of young defendants who were sentenced to custody by nationality. Until 2002 foreign youth, although a minority within those referred or even the adjudicated, represented the majority of those who received custodial sentences. It is only during the last two judicial years of the illustrated dataset that the pattern has been inverted.

**Figure 8.5: Juvenile Court of Athens: Number of Youths Sentenced to Custody by Nationality, 1996/97 - 2003/04**




Source: Ministry of Justice, Juvenile Court of Athens

Namely, during the period 1996-98 four out five youths sentenced to custody were of foreign nationality. Within five years, this proportion decreased to two-fifths. In comparison with such fluctuations, the numbers of Greek nationals who received custodial sentence remained relatively stable. It is difficult to attribute the statistically very significant negative slope of foreigners' custodial trend<sup>158</sup> exclusively to the reduction of their involvement in serious offences. The examination of the police data for the five-year period 1999-2003, shows fast declining trends for Greek young alleged offenders as

<sup>158</sup> Regression line B coefficient: -33.5, significant at 0.001 level

against to the trend of foreigners<sup>159</sup> (Figure 8.6). Although the previously mentioned long delays in the operation of the Greek juvenile justice system render any comparison between police and court statistics only indicative, it is plausible to assume that the observed change in foreign youths' custodial rate has to be attributed -at least partly- to shifts in juvenile justice system's attitude towards them.

**Figure 8.6: Police Statistics: Alleged Offenders aged 7 to 17, 1999-2003**



*Source: Ministry of Public Order, Police Statistics, unpublished data*

The previously mentioned 'ethnic' differences in the nature and circumstances of the adjudicated offences probably account for a substantial part of the observed 'ethnic' disparities in custodial rates. A complementary explanation, which in theory could account for a part of the variance, is one that attributes the uneven odds for Greek and Albanian defendants to be sentenced to custody to the elevated likelihood of young defendants of foreign nationality being absent from their trial. However, the examination of court statistics refutes this hypothesis. According to 2003-04 court disposition statistics (Figure 8.4) the proportion of those who were tried in their absence and sentenced to custody was roughly the same for Greek (86 per cent) and foreign young defendants (83 per cent). Nevertheless, it is likely that during the late 1990s a larger proportion of immigrant young

<sup>159</sup> B coefficient for foreign suspects: -10.7, significant at 0.6 level. The number of recorded Greek alleged offenders dropped almost three times faster (B coefficient: -34.4, significant at 0.4 level)



defendants have been adjudicated *in absentia*, for either their immigration status was more frequently irregular or their family was still on the move.

#### **8.4 From the viewpoint of Probation Service**

The only Greek study that explores the attitudes and stance of Greek judiciary towards immigrants is the survey of 250 judicial officials which was conducted during 1998-2003 by Vagena-Paleologou (2006). According to her more significant findings 61 per cent of the surveyed judges held the view that the number of immigrants in the country is too high. More than 88 per cent of them believed that migrants are either totally or partially to blame for an increase in the crime rate over the last decade. A notable 36 per cent of the surveyed judges considered foreigners *exclusively* responsible for the current elevated rates of criminality. In general, they didn't consider immigrants as dangerous but 62 present believe that foreigners are more often perpetrators rather than victims of crime. In addition they believe that equality before the law and foreign defendants' rights are safeguarded by the Greek system of criminal justice to the same level that Greeks enjoy (Vagena-Palaiologou 2006; 2008).

The absence of analogous studies with special focus on the attitudes of juvenile court judges rendered necessary the exploration of the view of officials who are part of the broader professional culture of the Greek system of juvenile justice. To this end, I have conducted interviews with three experienced probation officers. One of the interviewees was -at the time- head of the Athenian Probation Service for juveniles and the other two were responsible for the compilation of the court's statistical yearbook. In order to confirm and supplement my quantitative findings I asked them to comment on my analysis of the court statistics, and especially on 'ethnic' disparities in acquittal and custodial dispositions. All three of them offered valuable information on juvenile court and probation officers' mentality and practices towards defendants of foreign nationality. It has to be emphasised that although the interpretations that probation officers offered were in broad accordance, not all three of them agreed on every stated opinion or hypothesis. Some topics have been discussed by one interviewee only. Apparently, further research and a larger sample are needed in order to thoroughly explore juvenile justice officials' interpretations of 'ethnic' disparities in court's dispositions. However, the issues raised by interviewees were very suggestive. According to them:

The system of juvenile justice operates on the assumption that foreign youths are ignorant of the host country's framework of rules and norms. Many judges, prosecutors and probation officers feel that foreign referrals have either to comply with the rules of the host country or to return to their homeland. In the case of Greek minors the assumption is that they are aware of the rules and moral standards but their internalisation is inadequate, for their personality is immature. In their case, the welfare tradition of the Greek juvenile justice calls for a deeper understanding and examination of the minor's problems and needs, an assessment that guides the selection of the most relevant and individually tailored interventions. For instance, when dealing with a Greek petty offender, the judge feels safe to adopt a 'child's best interests' approach because of perceived reliability of native institutions. The judge can rely on the pro-social influence and informal control functions of extended families, school and community networks. This is especially likely when the family is stable, parents have a job, the child attends school, and the family owns its house. Obviously most immigrant youths and their families do not fit into this model.

By way of contrast, when the juvenile judge deals with non-Greeks charged with petty offences, the priority is different. Namely, the perceived priority is to affiliate foreign youth to host country's institutions that will foster the internalisation of social norms and rules. Thus, non-Greek petty offenders are more likely to be put under formal probation even if the nature of their wrongdoing does not justify the imposition of this reformatory measure. Nevertheless, in judges' view the imposition of reformatory measures is not perceived as harsher treatment. Foreign youths are -to some extent- seen as cultural aliens, and thus their problems, needs, and strengths, are less likely to be comprehended, considered, and addressed.

Interestingly enough, probation officers believe that youths of immigrant parentage respond better to their supervision than native youths. The contact with the criminal justice system is a more frightening process for the former group. After all, foreign youths risk more things than native young children who break the law. Presumably, the parents of foreign petty delinquents usually assume a more energetic role during the process of formal probation. Both judges and probation officers consider the more traditional parenting practices of immigrant families, as a valuable means of facilitating effective reformatory interventions. Therefore, they put pressure on immigrant parents who have lost children's control, mainly because of their demanding working hours and other adverse life circumstances, to assume their role. All in all, the combination of judges' anxiety about

immigrant youth's prospects, the lack of specialist educational or training alternatives, and a managerial pragmatic attitude render the foreign defendants more likely than Greeks to be put under the supervision of their parents instead of having their cases dismissed or otherwise discontinued.

Additional factors also prevent the acquittal or diversion of foreign referrals. For instance, they don't have a stable address. Frequently their parents' application for residence permit is pending; their papers have to be translated or to be confirmed. Sometimes police refer them to the court without any contact details but the mere indication 'of unknown residence'. Therefore, in many cases it is difficult for the service to contact them before their trial, and this difficulty partly explains why many of them do not appear in their hearing. In the case of traffic law violations, some Greek adolescents who were caught driving without licence manage to obtain the licence before the court hearing. This way they secure that the judge will dismiss the case. But foreign youths lack the culture of dealing with public services.

A different dynamic is at work when the judge deals with serious offences committed by foreign youths. In the case of serious immigrant-origin offenders 'deeds' are considered more important than 'needs'. Consequently, the likely sanctions passed to serious offenders of immigrant parentage are higher than those imposed on Greeks whose cases have similar characteristics. The justifying argument is that the foreign serious offender not only violated the law but also the trust of the host society. This constitutes a 'double violation' of the law. However, the imposition of the penal sanction of detention in a correctional institution by the juvenile court is the judges' last resort and therefore a rare occurrence. In practice, such severe sanction is passed only in instances of more serious offences, when the defendant is older, has a record of prior offending, has had previous contact with juvenile justice and all other imposed educational or reformatory measures have been proved ineffective.

The high numbers of detained foreign offenders that marked the 1990s were also the outcome of a broader societal climate. Immigration came as a shock to the isolated and relatively homogeneous Greek society of the early 1990s. This is especially true in relation to the Albanian immigration. Nevertheless, the initial reaction of the Greek society was rather sympathetic towards immigrants, and started to change only when Albanian adults committed a series of crimes against defenceless aged people in villages and suburbs. Thus, it is likely that the system of juvenile justice initially adopted a 'stern' reaction. This

overreaction is -at least- partly responsible for the large number of Albanian youths sentenced to confinement during the 1990s. As Albanian families and youths are consolidating their position in the host society, gradually other ethno-national groups are currently those most disproportionately represented among those referred and adjudicated by the juvenile court of Athens.

## **8.5 Conclusions**

Reiner argues that most research on race and criminal justice engages with the impossible task to "pin down the chimera of 'pure' discrimination" (1993: 4). The starting point of his contention is basically methodological and stresses the inability to hold constant more than few 'legally relevant factors' that could legitimately be taken into account. This limitation, Reiner propounds, undermines any effort to show -in a conclusive way- a residual race or ethnicity effect that reflects discriminatory practices.

At any rate, the fact that available information on juvenile justice in Greece is mainly in the form of aggregated data prevented my engagement with any elaborated statistical examination of the classic question of whether the disparity in the court's sentencing outcomes is the result of 'ethnic' differences in the nature and volume of offending or is rather the result of biased processing in the system of youth justice. It is also beyond the reach of the current study to provide a robust evaluation of the contribution of all extralegal factors that contribute to immigrant youths' vulnerability before the law. However, the observed patterns in the court dispositions that were previously documented in section 8.3 do indicate a number of areas of concern. I would like to stress further their salience in the light of the previously presented views of juvenile probation officers.

- The current disproportionate lower acquittal rate of foreign petty offenders is an indication that judges are hesitant to dismiss weak cases involving non-native youths. Presumably, such reservation and cautiousness emanates from the application of those 'neutral' legal criteria that inform judges' decisions. The legal reasoning behind judicial decisions is related to a risk profiling of immigrant young defendants and the assessment of their probability of re-offending. The interpretation of immigrant youths' collective disadvantages as risk factors calls for more intervention in their case than in the case of native youths, who more frequently fulfil a middle-class stereotype. The following case characteristics could be considered as indicators of a poor prognosis for defendants of immigrant ancestry: the precarious if not irregular status of foreign-born



youths in the host country; their lack of permanent residence; the inability of probation officers to reach parents; a history of poor school performance or dropout; their occasional forms of employment. In short, judges' perception is that parents' lack of socio-economic resources and children's alienation from mechanisms of socialisation and informal control elevate the propensity for law-breaking. So, instead of dismissing weak cases of immigrant defendants judges might prefer to impose mild reformatory measures, predominantly the measure of 'parental responsive supervision' and 'formal probation'. Eventually, since 'alien' defendants are rather opaque in the eyes of juvenile justice officials, and offending is more likely to be seen in their case as the result of collective characteristics and not personal circumstances and inadequacies, they are less likely to receive the special, individualised treatment that the guiding principles of Greek juvenile justice mandate. Obviously, such practices raise concerns relevant to the principle of minimum intervention and the consequences of labelling. However, the findings of Pitsela and her colleagues (2003), according to which only one in five young offenders has ever been contacted by juvenile probation officers, limit the salience of such considerations. In practice, the Greek probation services' understaffing and their wider organisational inadequacies automatically produce a tendency towards a non-intervention perspective.

- At this point it is useful to recall that judges and other criminal justice officials are imbued with the ideas, beliefs, anxieties and prejudices of their social environment (Sellin 1935). Immigrant youths having illegally entered the country appeared suddenly and in large numbers in police statistics and the Greek juvenile courts. Difficulties in confirming the identity of undocumented immigrant young offenders fed into suspicion about their real age and criminal record<sup>160</sup>. As Quassoli has pointed out, the judges' standard working 'solution' to such problems is to consider all immigrant defendants' identity uncertain by definition (Quassoli 2001: 154). In the case of serious or career foreign young offenders, uncertainty about their real age might make them liable to the full rigour of criminal law, as if they were adults. All in all, it seems likely that during the 1990s, in response to widespread fears about 'imported crime', the Greek judiciary adopted a 'tough on foreign crime' stance. When the processed case involved persistent offenders of immigrant background the primacy of the welfare principle drew back, and considerations related to public security and the general prevention of crime

---

<sup>160</sup> The view expressed by a former juvenile judge in our personal communication.

prevailed. Probably the Greek judiciary felt that the appropriate response was to ensure that the majority of youthful newcomers would not be allowed to think that committing crimes has no consequence, and that delinquents would be deterred from re-offending (Roberts 2004). Support for this interpretation is offered by the US research that attributes minority youth's differential sanctioning by juvenile justice to the elites' response to objective or symbolic threats posed by rapidly increasing populations of youthful outsiders (Sampson and Lauritsen 1997; Tittle and Curran 1988). Similar responses to real or alleged surges of crime caused by young immigrants have also been reported in other European countries. Albrecht (2004:456) for instance, refers to German political debates of the 1990s, which questioned the adequacy of conventional welfare youth justice measures when dealing with young immigrant violent offenders, and young career criminals. For this part of immigrant youthful population the sanctions of secure detention and deportation were deemed as the appropriate response. More parallels with the Greek case seems to have the treatment of immigrant youth by the particularly tolerant Italian juvenile justice system, during the 1990s. According to Nelken (2006: 168), the response of the system has been 'bifurcated' between Italian-born youngsters and immigrant or gipsy youth. The latter two groups are more likely to receive prison sentences and since 1990 have actually replaced Italian-born youth in prisons.

- It is reasonable to assume that the recent dramatic decline of custodial sentencing rate for youths of immigrant parentage does not correspond to an equally substantial reduction in the volume of their offending. At least in part, this change has to be attributed to a gradual shift in youth justice stance towards defendants of immigrant origin, and the adoption of more flexible attitudes. After all, it seems that shortly afterwards the high point of the 1990s moral panics about foreign crime and dangerous youth has abated in Greece. Probably this was the outcome of the realisation that society is not facing a substantial and steady increase in youthful crime rates, and that the inevitable changes in the volume and nature of delinquency are manageable. Thus, the reform of youth justice that was introduced in 2003 by Act 3189 took a direction against the elsewhere-prevalent current of punitive populism, and confirmed the welfare framing-concepts and tolerant ethos of the Greek juvenile justice system. Nevertheless, traces of a punitive attitude towards more serious foreign offenders are arguably still present in the mentality of judges. According to interviewed probation

officers, there still seems to be at work the interaction between the more serious and violent offending of a small number of foreign youth and a 'just deserts' judicial stance towards them. However, it is plausible to conclude that systematic discrimination on the basis of ethnicity/nationality does not play a major role anymore in accounting for 'ethnic' disparities in custodial outcomes. Seemingly in the majority of cases the judicial decision to detain appears as 'inevitable', as a mere outcome of interactions that took place at earlier stages of engagement with law enforcement and criminal justice system. At this final stage, where the effects of disadvantage and bias have been accumulated, confinement could be decided on the sole basis of whether parents are able to control and supervise a persistently reoffending child (Bishop and Frazier 1996).

- The swift departure from the initial punitive response of youth justice system towards young offenders of immigrant parentage partly emanates from the profound changes which emerged in the wider context of immigration to Greece. The turning point seems to be the amnesty program of 2001, which symbolically signalled the policy shift from containment and law enforcement to the integration of immigrants and their offspring (Glytsos 2005). The regularisation of a large proportion of immigrant families undermined the discursive and real link between illegal immigration and crime, and rendered meaningless the most aggressive forms of policing of immigration that emerged in the 1990s. At the level of juvenile justice the impact of the regularisation programmes was constructive for they reduced the number of undocumented immigrant young referrals during 2002-04, and indirectly contributed to diminished rates of foreign young offenders' confinement. However, the dynamic nature of contemporary immigration flows to Greece demands the constant monitoring of the criminal justice responses. After 2005, a new surge of undocumented young immigrants became evident in juvenile court intake statistics. According to all available evidence this development was not followed by an increase in the volume of foreign youths' cases that received custodial sentences. Apparently, when compared with the magnitude of irregular migration of the 1990s, this new wave of undocumented immigration is not perceived as a major societal threat and thus does not initiate punitive impulses. Moreover, it is the overall departure of public policy from its initial defensive stance towards immigration that constrains the process of deviance

amplification and enables a hopefully long-lasting decarceration turn in the processing of immigrant youth by the system of juvenile justice.

---

## Chapter 9

### Conclusions, and the Way Forward

---

The aim of this final chapter is to review the major empirical findings presented in chapters three through eight, to recap and expand theoretical arguments, to indicate directions of further research, and to discuss policy implications.

#### 9.1 Review of findings

##### *Inferiorisation and ethnicised contest*

This thesis has documented the last days of central Athens' initial phase of interaction between natives and the immigrants who left ex-communist countries of the Balkans and FSU in the 1990s. The arrival of large numbers of young immigrants in the inner-city took by surprise what until then had been the isolated and relatively homogeneous communities and schools. This initial phase of contact was marked by widespread xenophobia, and increased ontological insecurities.

In support of such a view there is the evidence offered by many interviewed students of immigrant ancestry who reported experiences of rejection, and exclusionary treatment aiming at their inferiorisation. It seems that such experiences permeate critical realms of exchange and interaction between indigenous youths and foreign-born newcomers. However, it appears that an extremely intolerant or openly racist stance towards migrants exhibited by only a small but vocal minority of native-born youths.

I have argued that, in the main, nativist enmity emanates from the fear that the arrival of large numbers of undocumented immigrants and their children is rapidly changing the power balance in favour of newcomers. Indigenous youths' attempts to secure and defend a position of privilege contributed to the construction of a powerful boundary along ethno-national lines, and the proliferation of ethnicised contest, conflict, and violence within schools and the community. The most serious incidents of ethnicised violent confrontations, and group fighting in particular, involved the 'oppositional pair' of young ethnic-Albanians and same-age Greek nationals. The targeting of the single more sizeable

group of newcomers reveals the instrumental aspects of the attempted inferiorisation and the centrality of conflict perspectives for the conceptualising of nativist reactions. However, in addition to ethnicisation dynamics, the construction of 'ethnic' boundaries was vastly facilitated by the logic of 'segmentary opposition' and the discourse of nationalism, which loom large in the cognitive horizon of all contesting parties, both autochthonous young people and their counterparts of Balkan origin. For newcomers themselves, such 'agonistic' interactions and group confrontations were often seen as a necessity, part of their struggle to gain a foothold.

Further to such dynamics, the role of far right has been critical to the exacerbation of ethnicised violence and racist aggression in the inner-city areas I studied. In those schools where militant groups of the extreme-right were active, 'ethnic' enmity was more entrenched and pervasive, and the outbursts of racist violence more frequent and serious. Therefore, it is likely that in such urban areas the racist groups are in part responsible for the elevated rates of victimisation by a stranger which was reported by students of Albanian ancestry.

According to the analysis of life histories, it seems that in 2004-05 this initial phase was fading out in central Athens: racism was encountering losses of legitimacy, and thus schools were increasingly becoming sites of tolerance and integration. The exhaustion of conflictual dynamics creates opportunities of further development for the vibrant intercultural sociality and dialogue that was tacitly growing in the youthful milieus of central Athens along with the exclusionist and racist reactions. Such phase-shift points towards the emergence of youthful social identifications in urban areas that carry the potential for overcoming the circumscriptions of one-dimensional understanding of social positions that ethnicisation imposes.

Nevertheless, one has to assess the trends that eventually occurred in central Athens with some caution, for they cannot confidently be considered as definite, and they cannot be extrapolated to other parts of the metropolis in which the migration phenomenon involves other ethnonational groups, was deployed later, and probably follows different patterns. In 2008-09, the changing character of ongoing migration to Athens, already enabled the emergence of new 'cultural' forms of xenophobia and racism (Barker 1981; Taguieff 2001) that are targeting migrants of Asian origin and Muslim faith, in areas of recent migrant concentration. New urban migratory frontiers, new social geographies of racism, and arguably a pressing demand for additional local studies.

***Assimilation and the dilemmas of membership***

The study examined how young people of immigrant parentage maintain a social sense of themselves, how they negotiate their ethnonational difference, and what they think about their prospects in the new homeland. For many of them such viewpoints and expectations have been determined by experiences of convivial interethnic relations on the one hand, and manifestations of prejudice and racism on the other. For others the interpretation of history, and the refutation of either exclusionist or assimilationist governmental policies and vernacular attitudes paved the way towards self-identification in terms of ethnic or national belonging. Thus, the data generated from interviews suggest a typology of ideal types of young people's orientation towards the interwoven issues of making plans for the future, and 'choosing' an ethnic identity.

First, it seems that in 2004-05 the majority of foreign-born youths, although in effect raised in the new societal context, considered premature and vexing the question about the endpoint of their ever-increasing incorporation in youthful milieus, institutions of mass education, and workplaces. Instead, they preferred to state their nationality and acknowledge their migrant identity-position. These interviewees strategically choose to outwit nativism by focusing on their everyday activities and personal plans, and by avoiding entanglement with the troubles arousing from the knotty problems of ethnonational identification. In short, central to their adaptation tactics was the promotion of a 'socially neutral operating identity' (Smith 2008). It can be said that most of the interviewed girls belong to this category, for their preference was for pragmatic goals and individualized pathways.

Second, for a smaller segment of immigrant-origin respondents the formation of ties and affiliations with the 'host' society was the most important concern, for they were forging ahead towards an unhyphenated Greek identity. Many young ethnic-Greeks of Albania were found in this group. Because of their eagerness to acquire full membership to the nation, many wanted to distinguish themselves from ethnic Albanian youths.

Third, a small number of Albania-born boys displayed an assertive Albanian identification. In my view, they insisted on an ethnonational self-ascription in order to redress the depreciation of this dimension of self-understanding and to counterbalance natives' hegemonic nationalism. Moreover, they stated a preference for a mode of incorporation and corresponding state policies that will not result in a blurring of the ethnic

boundaries between foreign ethnics and nationals, and consequently they preferred to envisage their future as migrants in a foreign country. What differentiates their self-identification from the immigrant identity-position of the first category is that in their case the negative aspects of the reception regime led to a over-accentuated ethnonational consciousness (for similar findings see Skrobanek 2009). This is not to say that their essentialised national identification constituted a mere reaction to intransigent nativism and persistent discrimination. I have argued that it has rather to be conceptualised as a classic form of 'recognition politics', an attempt to claim status parity, within the assumptions of romantic nationalism. Besides, recognition is a question of social status: misrecognition, accordingly, does mean social subordination (Fraser 2000).

In conclusion, these young men's tendency to overemphasise their allegiance to the motherland mainly emanates from their relatively high level of integration into Greek society. The need for a reinforced 'ethnic' bulwark against assimilationism suggests that they perceived the process of cultural integration as a threat of 'cultural depletion'. These adolescents' response tactics was to seek to turn the tables on the binaries of exclusionist or assimilationist doctrines by insisting on recognition and respect.

In conclusion, despite the hostile elements of the reception regime and the grievous incidents of racist aggression, the process of integration appears to prevail over exclusionist discourses, practices, and policies. Moreover, this study has not produced evidence that in 2004-05 any sizeable youthful group of immigrant ancestry was adhering to an 'oppositional' subculture, promoting 'self segregation', and denying interaction with the broader society.

#### ***Ethnicisation and violent conduct***

Individual physical fighting is the commonest violent behaviour among male adolescents. Boys born in Greece reported elevated rates for less-serious types of violent conduct, like involvement in a scuffle. Conversely, male students of immigrant background reported more extended engagement in severe forms of violent offending which are most likely to be brought to the attention of the police.

The most significant quantitative finding concerns the overrepresentation of students of immigrant background, among those admitting participation in a group of young men fighting against another group. Arguably, this form of fighting is partly related to the ethnicisation process and the violent confrontations between groups of indigenous youths



and newcomers. Ethnographic evidence suggests that in the immigrant-dense areas of central Athens such groupings are formed by ethnically marked youths, and that they have a mainly conflictual focal concern, loose structure, and therefore typically are short-lived. Nevertheless, at times the 'fighting crews' that persist longer than average are likely to facilitate the deviant transitions of those youths who stay on, by providing the basis for joint delinquent activities. This way the hostile reception climate, racism, and the polarisation along ethnicised boundaries set up a mechanism which eventually paves the way for the criminal transition of some young men.

This study's ethnographic data suggest that experiences of lawlessness and disorganisation in the motherland and inferiorisation in the 'host' society are often at the roots of the extensive engagement in violence of a segment of foreign-born youths. Furthermore, some marginalised boys of immigrant origin act as if they do consider fighting as a favourable strategic terrain for the overturning of the status hierarchy between indigenous youths and newcomers. Consequently, in my view, the glorification of 'new-traditional' manliness by some marginalised adolescents and young men of ethnic migrant background represents a form of strategic conduct (Giddens 1984) aiming at restoring 'imperilled masculinities', or even a 'wounded' national pride. Therefore, the formation of 'ethnic' neo-traditional masculinities suggests, more than everything else, an intersection of lower-class position with ethnonational identity. I have stressed that such 'ethnic' violent subcultures are short-lived, mutable and have no fixed contours, and therefore should be conceptualised as relational, intersubjective, and performative (Sampson and Bean 2006). On the other hand, it has to be emphasised that for many immigrant-origin youths the display of 'macho' masculinity represents a cultural code related to parochial geographical parts and marginalised societal sectors of the motherland. Consequently, the concern of many, the academically oriented ones in particular, is to disassociate themselves from such drawbacks that jeopardise their efforts for integration and upward mobility.

The emergence in the late 1990s of 'tough' forms of violent behaviour in the metropolitan landscape was in part a by-product of the spread of 'agonistic' interactions between immigrant young men and their Greek counterparts. This way the arrival of immigrant boys reinforced the revival of lower class masculinities, a development already initiated in the late 1980s, before the onset of mass immigration, by new forms of urban inequality and the marginalisation of youthful strata. Likewise, the entrance of young females of immigrant-ancestry in Athens rendered more visible the transformations of

social identities that challenge the normative conceptions of feminine attitudes and practices regarding physical violence. For instance, both qualitative and quantitative data indicate that the socially marginalised girls originating in countries of the former USSR had extended experiences of violence, offending, and drug-use.

#### ***Structural strain and property crime***

The examination of police statistics and self-report data suggests that the involvement of immigrant-origin students in certain types of property crime (mainly shoplifting and theft from vehicles) is out of proportion to their numbers in the general population. On the other hand, native-born students were more likely to admit stealing from the person than their counterparts of immigrant background.

In addition, estimates based on the calculation of the total number of self-reported offences indicate that youths of Albanian-ancestry admitted responsibility for a proportion of the total volume of offending which was smaller than would be expected by the size of their group. In other words, the representation of students of Albanian parentage was relatively small among the category of persistent or repeat offenders. On the contrary, the overrepresentation among persistent offenders of youths born in 'other' countries was striking. Their sum of self-reported violent or property offences was disproportionate. This group comprises young people originating from a disparate range of foreign countries, including both the highly industrialised 'West' and the economically underdeveloped 'Third World'. These youths are probably more alienated in their new societal context, than their peers of Balkan, and Eastern European background, for they do not belong to any substantial ethnic migrant community. The most significant conclusion is that the involvement in delinquency of students of Albanian origin does not justify the currency of negative stereotypes. Consequently, the stigmatisation of Albanians as 'criminals' is largely due to the perception that their sizable migrant group poses a 'threat' and not to their over-involvement in crime *per se*.

The exploration of ethnographic data suggests a number of plausible theoretical explanations for immigrant-origin youths' involvement in property delinquency. Prominent among them are interpretations that emanate from strain theory, for it stresses the discrepancy between immigrant-origin youths' fast inclusion in the norms and expectations of the majority society and their limited legitimate access to normatively valued goals and consumer goods. Social disorganisation theory seems to be of lesser relevance to the case

of immigrant settlement in Athens, and its most significant effects are indirect, mediated by parenting practices.

#### ***Acculturation and substance misuse***

Official sources and self-report data indicate a roughly proportional involvement of young people of migrant-ancestry students in violations of drug laws. For instance, Albania-born students reported a lifetime prevalence of cannabis use which on average was somehow lower than that of their indigenous classmates. The same self-report studies also suggest that the corresponding rates for female students born in the FSU and male students born in 'other' countries were significantly higher than the average prevalence figures.

Such empirical findings regarding the drug use of immigrant-ancestry youths are broadly consistent with the 'convergence hypothesis' and the epidemiological paradoxes of assimilation documented by the literature (Rumbaut 1997c). This study suggests that upon arrival each youthful immigrant group exhibits an involvement in drug use which is approximately a linear extension of the relevant cultural norms of the country of origin. However, as their cultural adaptation advances, foreign-born children assimilate in the youthful population of the 'host' society, and thus gradually their patterns of drug use approximate that of the indigenous population. However, when their socialisation is not to the mainstream but to streetwise peer groups it is probable to adopt a delinquent lifestyle and to have extended experiences of more serious drug use.

The effects of the local context for the mode of adaptation and the development of problem behaviours are witnessed in the exceptional case of the FSU-born Pontian youths. What singles out them from the experiences of most other youthful migrant groups settled in Athens, is their significant degree of residential segregation into communities located at the urban periphery. The combined effects of impoverishment, and social isolation heightens the risk that some young Pontian-Greeks were found themselves immersed in local delinquent and drug abusing subcultures.

#### ***Experiences of policing***

According to self-report data, the extent of policing experienced by secondary school students is on average around the same across major ethnonational groups. For instance, in 2004-05 inner-city survey, the proportion of Albania-born students who reported lifetime experience of being "stopped by the police in order to have their 'papers' checked" was

only slightly higher than that of native-born students. It seems that the language fluency (Gogonas 2009), and the fast cultural integration of most young people of immigrant ancestry makes them almost indistinguishable from their indigenous peers. In addition, the Greek legalisation programme of 2001, which signalled a pro-integration shift of immigration policy, contributed to the diminution of the most aggressive forms of immigration policing that were witnessed during the 1990s. Besides practical limitations, it was impossible for a liberal state to tolerate *ad infinitum* large-scale police 'broom' operations, and summary expulsions of unauthorised migrants that violate the due process.

Taken together, these self-report findings refute the hypothesis that students of Albanian ancestry are indiscriminately subject to overzealous police surveillance. Nevertheless, this study also suggests that excessive or biased uses of police powers do take place, but they focus primarily on those youths of Albanian ancestry who are involved in delinquent activities. This subgroup of Albanian 'usual suspects' is more likely to be subjected to overpolicing than young offenders belonging to any other 'ethnic' group. It is reasonable to assume that such uneven police practice contributes to the overrepresentation of young offenders of Albanian origin in crime records.

Also significant are the findings pertinent to the treatment of young immigrants by the police. A significant minority of interviewees reported perceptions of ill-treatment and racist abuse. A number of interviewees who had been detained at a police station detailed incidents of harassment involving racist language, humiliation, intimidation, bullying, and beatings. Most allegations of abusive treatment are linked to the process of questioning at police station. According to these young offenders' accounts, harassment by the police during interrogation is not exceptional but rather constitutes a routine practice.

Such allegations of routine abusive practices carried out by police officers constitute a major area of concern. They carry the ominous potential of exacerbating immigrant origin youths' feelings of alienation and resentment, facilitating their criminalisation, and establishing entrenched hostility towards the police. Therefore, it is imperative that future research should continue to monitor such socially disadvantaged and vulnerable youths' experiences of mistreatment by the police during the critical instances of interaction that this study highlighted.

***Disparities in youth justice processing***

Immigrant young peoples' pronounced overrepresentation among juvenile detention institutions' inmates constitutes the end-result of the criminalisation process. The question, which remains open, is whether the disparity in imprisonment and other court statistics reflects differences in delinquent involvement, or is to some extent the effect of discriminatory processing by the youth justice system.

However, this study finds that particular patterns in the dispositions of the juvenile court of Athens raise concerns, and thus call for further investigation. First, it appears that the acquittal rate is higher for young nationals than for defendants of foreign nationality. According to court statistics the judges when dealing with weak cases involving foreign youth are hesitant to dismiss them, and prefer to impose mild reformatory measures, mainly 'parental supervision' orders. It appears that the application of certain neutral criteria in sentencing decisions works to the disadvantage of foreign young defendants. For instance, their familial-circumstances are often marked by the exigencies of migration.

Second, the rate of young Albanians who have been given immediately enforced custodial sentence was the highest of all ethnonational groups. However, their involvement in offending of the kind most likely to attract a custodial sentence is also elevated. It is the introduction of the time-dimension which offers more compelling arguments. The examination of the custodial sentencing trend for the period 1996/97 - 2003/04 reveals that prior to 2002 the disproportionate imprisonment of foreign youth was much higher. This decline of the young defendants of foreign nationality custodial rate has to be attributed, more than anything else, to a swift departure of Greek judiciary from the initial punitive reaction towards 'foreign crime' which shaped the legacy of 1990s.

Presumably after 2003, and the diminution of penal excess, much of the immigrant-origin offenders' imprisonment rate has to be attributed to their engagement in serious or repeat offending. It is reasonable to assume that the interactions most likely to contribute to their criminalisation had occurred at previous stages of engagement with the criminal justice system, most notably in interaction with the law enforcement. However, this study's reliance on aggregated data prevents the proper exploration of the observed ethnic disparities and the proposed explanatory arguments. Multivariate research of the decisions taken in at critical stages of youth justice process, and in relation to offences at the middle level of seriousness is urgently needed.

## 9.2 Downward assimilation?

Having summarized the key findings of this study, I shall now put them in the framework of the broader challenges. According to the estimates presented in Chapter 1, the majority of immigrant-parentage children attend state schools. As the inner-city school survey finds (see *Table 2.1*), outstanding students are more likely to be immigrant-origin youths than autochthonous, despite the language deficit and the stark socioeconomical disadvantages they confront. Such performance is indicative of some foreign-born children's determination to prove themselves in the field of academic accomplishment, and the premium that many immigrant families put on promoting the life-chances of their descendants. However, the success of these overachievers should not obscure the problems that the major proportion of immigrant-origin children still face. One has to remember that almost half of the immigrant cohort that enters Gymnasium leave school before enrolling in the upper secondary level. Moreover, fifty percent of the immigrant youths that carry on, attend technical-vocational schools, and many of them also work whilst attending school, either on a part- or full-time basis. This underscores the importance of vocational education for the prospects of a large portion of immigrant-origin youth who lack the support, the skills, or the drive necessary for the pursuit of the academic path. In the context of less prosperous contemporary times, in many countries, large numbers of immigrant children tend to follow the pathway of vocational education (Portes and Fernández-Kelly 2008; Worbs 2003).

Yet, the real challenges for the integration of immigrant youth and their transitions to adult roles are ahead, and derive from the fact that education does not always offer a ladder for professional occupations in Greece, for the unemployment rate amongst the university educated youths is very high. On the other hand, the fact that their undocumented parents who started at the very bottom of the occupational ladder, managed to establish their position within the working class, improved their housing and living conditions through hard work (Labrianidis and Lyberaki 2001), and sent their children to school, makes the downward mobility of their descendants less likely. Nevertheless, it seems equally improbable that large numbers will be lifted upwardly by education, by being assimilated in middle or professional classes. Since the unemployment rate for low-skilled or blue-collar jobs remains limited in Greece (Labrianidis et al. 2004), the odds are that the majority of the contemporary second generation will move in a 'parallel' pathway within the ranks of the country's new lower classes. The implications of the current global

recession will make even more improbable the scenario of swift upward mobility for it seems to have a disproportionate impact on precarious immigrant employment (Kanellopoulos 2008: 163; Migration News 2009; Sacchetti 2009). Thus, I see as relevant to the case of Balkan immigration to Greece the arguments of Waldinger and his co-authors, who refute both classic and downward versions of assimilation theory, and consider most realistic, as regards the prospects of the offspring of Mexican immigrants to US, the 'working-class incorporation' scenario (Waldinger et al. 2007).

Undoubtedly, the most worrying failings of the adaptation process concerns the over-involvement of immigrant-origin youth in some forms of violent and property offending. It has to be reiterated that most of the offending that these young people admitted is one-off, and amateurish in nature. In the long run, despite the significant structural exigencies they encounter, their arrival did not transform radically the extent and nature of youth crime in Greece, or at least it did not changed it in ways different to those already on track. On the contrary, it is the receiving country, with its powerful informal dynamics, which not only invites irregular immigration but subsequently shapes the adaptation pathways of immigrant-origin youth by allocating social positions for them within its social hierarchy, that offers both mainstream and deviant openings. As with the informal sector of economy, the demographic structure, the housing market, the social security system, migration is only temporarily is altering the fundamentals of the Greek society. Here I follow Portes who argues that, despite how it looks or was feared initially, migration is likely to bring about only marginal transformations in receiving societies' constitutive elements. Immigration instead of causing drastic social change often reinforces the existing power structure and the system of values (Portes 2008). More specifically in relation to crime and to the questions posed by this study, the critical factor that appears to limit the likelihood of the most strained young immigrants to develop a career in delinquency is the relative scarcity of criminal opportunities, which is due to the relatively small size of the Greek criminal underworld.

All taken together, the broad picture of the immigrant second generation's engagement with problem behaviours, does not support the pessimism of Portes and Zhou's 'downward assimilation' thesis (1993). This research has provided a modicum of support for a more optimist perspective. Unlike the situation in US metropolitan areas, the risk of immigrant youth for downward assimilation along the marginalised segment of the Greek society is also effectively limited by the absence of inner-city ghettos.

Nevertheless, one should guard against a rose-tinted outlook, for the risks to immigrant youth which are related to the criminalisation process are not negligible. Even petty forms of delinquency have a significant impact when large numbers are involved. Many youths will fail victim to crime, or will be assimilated to the most marginalised groupings of their new homeland. Eventually even a petty involvement in delinquency will lead to disproportionate numbers of immigrant-origin children ending up in the criminal justice net, with predictable consequences for deviancy amplification. It is not difficult to imagine that the initial punitive reaction of the youth justice system -documented by this study- had not only resulted in juvenile prisons overcrowded with immigrant-origin youths but also in the development of a cadre of career adult criminals of immigrant background.

### 9.3 Coda

There is heuristic value in reviewing and classifying the most fundamental and persisting sources of criminalisation which are likely to continue imperilling the integration of second- and third-generation of immigrants to Greece, by looking at them through the lenses of the integrated framework of understanding proposed by Young in the 'Vertigo of Modernity' (2007). In this book Young imports into criminology Fraser's bifocal social justice agenda, which combines concerns of redistribution and recognition (Fraser 2000; Fraser 2003). In my reading, the theoretical framework laid out by Young, although primarily concerned with the precariousness of late modernity and the task of constructing a global analytical perspective, also breaths new life into classic strain theory. Thus, apart from its usefulness in understanding the major transformations of our time, Young's bifocal model is especially well suited to encapsulate neatly the baseline causal processes behind the forms of immigrant-origin children's deviant coping, that this study indicated:

- The first casual process is relevant to economic inequality that takes the form of relative deprivation. In the case of immigrant youths, property crime is 'called forth' by the strains caused by entitlement to consumption of culturally valued goods which is often denied by structural exclusion. This discrepancy is likely to be even more important for the next immigrant generation for it is probable that their concerns will focus exclusively on local conditions, and they will not be able or interested, as were their parents, to make comparisons with the country of origin. Blocked opportunities, and assimilation to deviant subcultures, are bound to become even more significant for the delinquent involvement of the native-born children of immigrant background.



- The second causal process is of the reverse nature, and is pertinent to the legal and political exclusion from full membership of the nation. It can be conceptualised as entitlement to a nominal civic incorporation or minimal structural assimilation, without either status recognition or acceptance to the 'ethno-cultural' community. We have seen that the exposure to the insults of discrimination, misrecognition, and protracted disembeddedness, and the harms inflicted by police harassment may pave the way for disaffection and anger, which are often behind compensatory forms of macho masculinity and aggressive conduct.

With such theoretical reflection in mind, I turn to policy suggestions concerning the future of ethnic-migrant youth. First, I shall consider more specifically state policies relevant to the 'recognition' dimension:

- The most pressing policy issue concerns the breaking of the link between young people's illegal residence status and criminalisation. This study has shown the multifarious detrimental effects that 'undocumented status' has on the adaptation pathways of immigrant-origin youths. It is responsible for the entrenching of social isolation and alienation, the over-involvement in deviant peer groups, the frequency of negative encounters with the police, the legal vulnerability before the juvenile court. Finally, the precariousness of legal status is also likely to be consequential for the downgrading of educational prospects by some youths of immigrant ancestry. It is evident that immigration policy matters enormously in all these areas. First, it is imperative to break the vicious cycle that undermines the life-chances of immigrant-origin children by legalising their residence status. According to IMEPO, irregular are more than one-fifth of students of foreign-nationality (see Chapter 1). This is a reasonable extension of the most recently introduced legislation which offers long-term residence status to born-in-Greece children of foreign nationals upon their coming-of-age, and the graduation of compulsory schooling. Obviously, the proposed follow-up amendment makes more tenable the incentives for school retention that are already in place.
- In addition to the legalization of residence status, citizenship remains indispensable for all policies aiming at integrating the descendants of immigrants. The Greek nationality code which is almost exclusively based on the *jus sanguinis* principle foresees that children born to parents of foreign nationality will be also foreigners, unless their

parents have been naturalised meanwhile (Christopoulos 2007). Only the 'returning' co-ethnics of Greek Diaspora Special have favouritist access to naturalization procedures. The current ethno-hereditary definition of the nation's boundaries dictates that the relevant procedures for non-Greek foreigners take a long time (they must have more than ten years of legal residency), are costly, opaque, and uncertain. It is thus imperative for the Greek polity to transcend the limitations of the current citizenship law which are related to its exclusive anchorage in lineage, and to offer foreign-born young people of immigrant ancestry, who wish to cast their lot with the new homeland, the opportunity of naturalisation upon entering young adulthood.

- The optional naturalisation of foreign-born children who have been raised and educated in the 'host' country would constitute a major reform for it will assign to large numbers of non-ethnics full citizenship and political rights. Thus it will constitute a significant gesture of inclusiveness, which will open the way for birthright citizenship (*jus soli*) for the subsequent immigrant generations. Such a gesture is likely to be appealing even for those members of the immigrant '1.5' generation who will opt for permanent residence and a civic form of integration. Besides the amendment of naturalization law, the participation of legally residing immigrants in municipal elections would be significant. This would probably be a decisive factor for the introduction of public policies that will redress the inner-city decay.
- The recently observed de-escalation of penal repression practices in youth justice is a very positive development. The urgent need is that this positive development in youth justice will be followed by analogous reforms in law enforcement mentality and practices. More specifically, is imperative to introduce in the curriculum of the police initial or continuous education of courses aimed at (i) raising awareness regarding the problems encountered by migrant ethnic communities and their youthful segments (Foster 2003); (ii) acknowledging overt and covert xenophobic attitudes and racist elements of police organisational culture; (iii) identifying and responding to racist victimisation; (iv) promoting commitment to democratic policing, accountability, and adherence to human rights standards (Bowling et al. 2003). Moreover, since training is not always guaranteeing the transformation of police organisational culture, there is a clear need for an *explicit* code regarding the investigation and prosecution of racist crime by the police. In addition to existing *internal* controls, accountability will greatly benefited by the enforcement of an *external* independent complaint system which will

effectively monitor police failings by investigating allegations of police harassment (Trevor 2003).

However, securing legal status and making access to naturalization easier might address issues of 'recognition' but will not overcome the risks of relative deprivation and socioeconomic marginality. In order to ensure that the immigration experience of Greece will continue to be a 'success story' a second tier of public policies is necessary. Policies that will acknowledge the structural moorings of the previously mentioned challenges, and will sustain accordingly immigrant second generation's aspirations by raising their access to socioeconomic resources and restringing the sway of downward dynamics. In other words, if the administration wishes to take effective action in this area it is crucial to secure that ladders of upward mobility are in place, and that the causes of marginalisation will be tackled. More specifically the following are deemed essential:

- The proliferation of 'adaptation' classes and compensatory educational programs in all schools that are located in areas of migrant settlement. These have to be measures aimed at facilitating school enrolment, and retention for students of migrant background. The typical example is language classes for children who have started schooling in the country of origin. In 2008, the existing initiatives were concentrated in some only schools, were often ill equipped, underfinanced, and assigned to ordinary teachers who frequently rely on inappropriate instructional methods. Thus, instead of fostering students' subsequent integration into schools, along with autochthonous youths, by enhancing their skills and fostering an ethos of educational achievement, these programmes have developed a reputation of a 'dead-end' form of education, which is reproducing educational segregation along 'ethnic' lines, and is lowering academic standards (Therianos 2008).
- The modernisation of technical/vocational secondary education which already attracts a large portion of immigrant-origin youths. The objective would be to enhance systems' efficiency in providing substantial skills that are on demand in the word of work. This way the offspring of immigrants will be able to move ahead, by either becoming self-employed or claiming better jobs than those held by their parents.
- The incorporation into the mainstream school-curriculum of cultural awareness and language courses, accessible to all pupils, that will raise knowledge and respect

towards migrants' countries of origin, is critical for the promotion of intercultural understanding. Despite official announcements, the implementation of such initiatives remains very limited in Greek schools. Finally, schools should devote greater effort in order to get parents involved in school life and to sustain their children's academic effort, for they often have a scant knowledge of the Greek educational system, and are overwhelmed by long work-hours. (Nicolaou 2000).

- The design and implementation of theoretically informed prevention programs in youth justice settings, that will have a positive impact on school failure, violence, offending and drug taking among youths of immigrant ancestry. Such prevention efforts must be broad and multifaceted rather than focusing on a single problem behaviour (Newcomb 1995). In the context of juvenile court, the priority is for brief interventions that will assess the needs of a substantial portion of immigrant-origin defendants, in order to refer those at risk of re-offending or developing drug problems to appropriate treatment facilities. The proposed model strikes a balance between the principle of minimum intervention, which is at the core of youth justice officials' professional philosophy, and the perspective of drug counsellors whose main focus is on young people's extensive needs (Newburn and Elliot 1999).
- The second youth justice priority is linked to the overrepresentation of young inmates of foreign nationality in juvenile custody facilities. The imperative to provide drug treatment to the population of young foreigners in custody calls for a comprehensive and structured initiative along two modalities: initially the objective should be to prepare release from custody and referral to community-based treatment agencies, either residential or outpatient; and subsequently to address thoroughly young people needs and through the collaboration of multiple community partners to promote inclusion to the world of education, training, and work.
- The current study has also provided suggestive evidence regarding the correlation of drug use with the socioeconomic context and the adaptation mode followed by particular migrant groups. Thus, prevention planners should design situational interventions that appropriately consider the multifarious problems experienced by immigrant-origin youth in urban pockets of advanced marginality, entrenched poverty, and subcultural norms favourable to crime and drug use.
- Either in the domain of school, neighbourhood, or youth justice there is a great deal of scope to involve ethnic migrant communities in prevention initiatives. This study's

findings indicate that youths' close attachment to their respective ethnic communities might under certain circumstances be associated with more positive adaptation outcomes regarding school performance and problems with violence, offending, and drug use. Behind this recommendation lies the idea of selective acculturation which implies that a degree of cultural mooring to the country of origin is likely to enhance children's self-esteem and insulate them from corrosive elements of the reception context (Portes and Rumbaut 2001: 280).

---

## References

---

- Abbas, T. (2005). Recent Developments to British Multicultural Theory, Policy and Practice: The Case of British Muslims. *Citizenship Studies*, 9, 153 - 166.
- (2007). Muslim Minorities in Britain: Integration, Multiculturalism and Radicalism in the Post-7/7 Period. *Journal of Intercultural Studies* 28, 287-300.
- Abrahams, F. (1996). *Human Rights in Post-Communist Albania*. Helsinki & New York: Human Rights Watch.
- Adorno, T. W., Frenkel-Brunswick, E., Levinson, D., & Nevitt Sanford, R. (2001 [1950]). The Authoritarian Personality. In E. E. Cashmore & J. Jennings (Eds.), *Racism: Essential Readings*. London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi: Sage.
- Aebi, M., Barclay, G., Jehle, J.-M., & Killias, M. (2000). European Sourcebook of Crime and Criminal Justice Statistics: Key Findings: Council of Europe.
- Agnew, R. (2001). Building on the Foundation of General Strain Theory: Specifying the Types of Strain Most Likely to Lead to Crime and Delinquency. *Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency*, 38, 319-361.
- (2006). *Pressured into Crime: An Overview of General Strain Theory*. Los Angeles, Calif.: Roxbury Pub.
- Agtzidis, V. (1991). The Persecution of Pontic Greeks in the Soviet Union. *Journal of Refugee Studies*, 4, 372-381.
- Alba, R. (2000). The Melting Pot: Myth or Reality? In S. Steinberg (Ed.), *Race and Ethnicity in the United States : Issues and Debates* (pp. 211-222). Malden, Mass.: Blackwell Publishers.
- (2005). Bright vs. Blurred Boundaries: Second-Generation Assimilation and Exclusion in France, Germany, and the United States. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 28, 20-49.
- Alba, R., & Nee, V. (1997). Rethinking Assimilation Theory for a New Era of Immigration. *International Migration Review*, 31, 826-874.
- Alba, R. D., & Nee, V. (2003). *Remaking the American Mainstream: Assimilation and Contemporary Immigration*. Cambridge, Mass. ; England: Harvard University Press.
- Albrecht, H. J. (1997). Ethnic Minorities, Crime, and Criminal Justice in Germany. In M. Tonry (Ed.), *Ethnicity, Crime, and Immigration : Comparative and Cross-National Perspectives*. Chicago, Ill. ; London: University of Chicago Press.
- (2002). Fortress Europe? Controlling Illegal Immigration. *European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice* 10, 1-22.
- Alexander, C. (2004a). Imagining the Asian Gang: Ethnicity, Masculinity and Youth after 'the Riots'. *Critical Social Policy*, 24, 526-549.
- (2004b). Writing Race: Ethnography and the Imagination of the Asian Gang. In M. Bulmer & J. Solomos (Eds.), *Researching Race and Racism*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Ali, T. (1999). Springtime for NATO. *New Left Review*, I, 62-72.
- Altanis, P., & Goddard, J. (2004). Street Children in Contemporary Greece. *Children & Society*, 18.
- Amaro, H., Whitaker, R., Coffman, G., & Heeren, T. (1990). Acculturation and Marijuana and Cocaine Use: Findings from HHANES 1982-84. *American Journal of Public Health*, 80, 54 - 60.
- Amitsis, G., & Lazaridis, G. (2001). Policies of Immigration's Regulation in Greece. In G. Amitsis & G. Lazaridis (Eds.), *Legal and Socio-Political Aspects of Immigration in Greece*. Athens: Papazisis [in Greek].
- Amnesty International (2005a). Greece: Out of the Spotlight. The Rights of Foreigners and Minorities Are Still a Grey Area: A.I.
- (2005b). Annual Report: A.I.

- Amnesty International, & International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights (2002). Greece: In the Shadow of Impunity. Ill-Treatment and the Misuse of Firearms. Athens: A.I.
- Anderson, B. (1991). *Imagined Communities: Reflections of the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. London, New York: Verso.
- Anderson, B., Hibell, B., Beck, F., Choquet, M., Kokkevi, A., Fotiou, A., Molinaro, S., Nociar, A., Sieroslawski, J., & Trapencieris, M. (2007). Alcohol and Drug Use among European 17-18 Year Old Students. Data from the ESPAD Project. (pp. 156). Stockholm; Sweden: The Swedish Council for Information on Alcohol and Other Drugs (CAN) and the Pompidou Group at the Council of Europe. Stockholm.
- Anderson, E. (1990). *Streetwise: Race, Class, and Change in an Urban Community*. Chicago; London: University of Chicago Press.
- (1999). *Code of the Street: Decency, Violence, and the Moral Life of the Inner City*. New York: W.W Norton.
- Anil, M. (2007). Explaining the Naturalisation Practices of Turks in Germany in the Wake of the Citizenship Reform of 1999. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 33, 1363-1376.
- Anthias, F. (2002). Where Do I Belong? Narrating Collective Identity and Translocational Positionality. *Ethnicities* 2, 491-514.
- Anthias, F., & Lazaridis, G. (1999). *Into the Margins: Migration and Exclusion in Southern Europe*. Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Anthogalidou, T., Karakatsani, P., & Papanikolaou, E. (2005). Pontian Immigrants from Russia: Life Stories, *Electronic Journal 'Politico Kafeneio' [in Greek]*.
- Antonopoulos, G. (2006a). Greece: Policing Racist Violence in the 'Fenceless Vineyard'. *Race and Class*, 48, 92-100.
- (2006b). Public Reporting of Criminal Activities to the Police in Greece: Is There a Difference When the Offender Is Migrant? *European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice*, 14, 135-160.
- Appadurai, A. (1990). Disjuncture and Difference in the Global Cultural Economy. In M. Featherstone (Ed.), *Global Culture: Nationalism, Globalization and Modernity* (pp. 295-310). London: Sage.
- Arapoglou, V. (2006). Immigration, Segregation and Urban Development in Athens. *The Greek Review of Social Research [in Greek]*, 11-38.
- Arapoglou, V., & Sagias, I. (2007). Urban Development Processes and Patterns of Immigrants' Spatial Segregation in the Wider Athens Area. *Geographies: a Biannual Review on Spatial Issues*.
- Arrehag, L., Sjoberg, O., & Sjoblom, M. (2006). Post-Communist Cross-Border Migration in South-Eastern Albania: Who Leaves? Who Stays Behind? *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 32, 377 - 402.
- Arsovska, J. (2006). Understanding a 'Culture of Violence and Crime': The Kanun of Lek Dukagjini and the Rise of the Albanian Sexual-Slavery Rackets. *European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice*, 14, 161-184.
- Arsovska, J., & Verduyn, P. (2008). Globalization, Conduct Norms and 'Culture Conflict': Perceptions of Violence and Crime in an Ethnic Albanian Context. *British Journal of Criminology*, 48, 226-246.
- Artinopoulou, V. (2004). *School Violence: European Research and Polices*. Athens: Metaixmio [in Greek].
- Athens News Agency (2008). 11.04.08.
- Atkinson, R. (1998). *The Life Story Interview*. Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage Publications.
- Awiah, J., Butt, S., & Dorn, N. (1992). *Race, Gender and Drug Services*. London: Institute for the Study of Drug Dependence.
- Bachman, R., & Schutt, R. K. (2008). *Fundamentals of Research in Criminology and Criminal Justice*. Los Angeles ; London: SAGE.
- Back, L. (1996). *New Ethnicities and Urban Culture: Racisms and Multiculture in Young Lives*. London: Routledge.

- (2004). Writing in and against Time. In M. Bulmer & J. Solomos (Eds.), *Researching Race and Racism*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Back, L., Solomos, J., & Crabbe, T. (2001). *The Changing Face of Football: Racism, Identity, and Multiculture in the English Game*. Oxford: Berg.
- Bailis, P., & Peloni, A. (2005). *Ta Nea* 27/01/2005.
- Balakaki, A. (2003). Locked into Security, Keyed into Modernity: The Selection of Burglaries as Source of Risk in Greece. *Ethnos*, 68, 209–229.
- Baldwin-Edwards, M. (2001). Crime and Migrants: Some Myths and Realities, *International Police Association Conference*. Samos.
- (2003). Ohi to Ohi-Day. Athens: Briefing for EUMC, Vienna.
- (2004). Statistical Data on Immigrants in Greece. Athens: Mediterranean Migration Observatory.
- (2005). National Analytical Study on Racist Violence and Crime. Athens: European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia, RAXEN National Focal Point for Greece.
- Balibar, E. (2007). Uprisings in Banlieues. *Constellations*, 14, 47-71.
- Balibar, E., & Wallerstein, I. M. (1991). *Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities*. London ; New York: Verso.
- Ballas, K. (1995). A Preliminary Report on Health, Migration, and Mobility in Greece: The Pompidou Group, Council of Europe.
- (2000). Addictive Substances: International and Greek Dimensions of the Problem. In K. Kassimati (Ed.), *Social Pathologies Afflicting Socially Excluded Groups* (pp. 103-112). Athens KEKMOKOP [in Greek].
- Baltsiotis, L. (2003). The Greek Minority of Albania: An Approach within a Transition Society In K. Tsitselikis & D. Xristopoulos (Eds.), *The Greek Minority of Albania*. Athens: Kritiki & KEMO [in Greek].
- (2004). Nationality and Naturalisation in the Greece of Immigration: Contradictions of an Ineffective Policy In M. Paulou & D. Christopoulos (Eds.), *The Greece of Immigration*. Athens: Kritiki & KEMO [in Greek].
- Bankston, C. L. (1998). Youth Gangs and the New Second Generation: A Review Essay. *Aggression and Violent Behavior*, 3, 35-45.
- Banton, M. (2000). Ethnic Conflict. *Sociology*, 34, 481-498.
- (2007). Max Weber on 'Ethnic Communities': A Critique. *Nations and Nationalism*, 13, 19-35.
- (2008). The Sociology of Ethnic Relations. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 31, 1267 - 1285.
- Barclay, G., & Mhlanga, B. (2000). Ethnic Differences in Decisions on Young Defendants Dealt with by the Crown Prosecution Service. London: Home Office.
- Bardounias, N. (2003). *Kathimerini* 30.01.2003.
- Barjaba, K., & King, R. (2005). Introducing and Theorising Albanian Migration. In R. King, N. Mai & S. Schwandner-Sievers (Eds.), *The New Albanian Migration* (pp. vi, 218 p.). Brighton: Sussex Academic.
- Barker, M. (1981). *The New Racism: Conservatives and the Ideology of the Tribe*. London: Junction Books.
- Barry, B. (2001). *Culture and Equality*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Barth, F. (1969). *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization of Culture Difference*. Bergen; London: Universitetsforlaget ; Allen and Unwin.
- Becker, H. S. (1958). Problems of Inference and Proof in Participant Observation. *American Sociological Review*, 23, 652-660.
- (1967). Whose Side Are We On? *Social Problems*, 14, 239-247.
- Berger, P. L., & Luckmann, T. (1967). *The Social Construction of Reality : A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge*. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
- Berry, J. W. (1997). Immigration, Acculturation, and Adaptation. *Applied Psychology: An International Review*, 46, 5-68.
- Berry, J. W., Kim, U., Minde, T., & Mok, D. (1987). Comparative Studies of Acculturative Stress. *International Migration Review*, 21, 491-511.



- Berry, J. W., Phinney, J. S., Sam, D. L., & Vedder, P. (2006). Immigrant Youth: Acculturation, Identity, and Adaptation. *Applied Psychology: An International Review*, 55, 303-332.
- Berry, J. W., Poortinga, Y. H., Segall, M. H., & Dasen, P. R. (1992). *Cross-Cultural Psychology: Research and Applications*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Besevegis, E., & Pavlopoulos, V. (2006). Acculturation Strategies and Adaptation of Immigrants to Greece, *Paper presented at the conference "Immigration to Greece: Experiences, Policies, Perspectives"*. Institute of Immigration Policy. Athens [in Greek].
- Bhatt, C. (2004). Contemporary Geopolitics and 'Alterity' Research. In M. Bulmer & J. Solomos (Eds.), *Researching Race and Racism*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Biafora, F., & Zimmerman, R. (1998). Patterns of African American Adolescent Drug Use. In W. Vega & G. Gil Andres (Eds.), *Drug Use and Ethnicity in Early Adolescence* (pp. xviii, 234). New York ; London: Plenum Press c1998.
- Bishop, D. M., & Frazier, C. E. (1996). Race Effects in Juvenile Justice Decision-Making: Findings of a Statewide Analysis *The Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology* 86, 392-414.
- Bishop, H., & Jaworski, A. (2003). 'We Beat 'Em': Nationalism and the Hegemony of Homogeneity in the British Press Reportage of Germany Versus England During Euro 2000. *Discourse & Society*, 14, 241-271.
- Blau, J. R., & Blau, P. M. (1982). The Cost of Inequality: Metropolitan Structure and Violent Crime. *American Sociological Review*, 47, 114-129.
- Body-Gendrot, S. (2004). The France Dilemma of Race. In M. Bulmer & J. Solomos (Eds.), *Researching Race and Racism*. London & New York: Routledge.
- Bohm, R. M. (2001). *Primer on Crime and Delinquency*. Belmont, CA Wadsworth Publishing Co.
- Bottoms, A. E. (2007). Place, Space, Crime, and Disorder. In M. Maguire, R. Morgan & R. Reiner (Eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Criminology* (pp. xxvii, 1185 p.). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Bourdieu, P. (1977). *Outline of a Theory of Practice*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- (1986). The Forms of Capital. In J. G. Richardson (Ed.), *Handbook of Theory and Research for the Sociology of Education* (pp. 241-258). New York: Greenwood Press.
- (1990). *The Logic of Practice*. Cambridge: Polity.
- (2001). *Masculine Domination*. Cambridge: Polity.
- Bourne, R. S. (1916 ). Trans-National America. *The Atlantic Monthly*, July, 86–97.
- Bowling, B. (1998). *Violent Racism: Victimization, Policing, and Social Context*. Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press.
- Bowling, B., & Phillips, C. (2002). *Racism, Crime and Justice*. Harlow: Longman.
- Bowling, B., Phillips, C., & Shah, A. (2003). Policing Ethnic Minority Communities. In T. Newburn (Ed.), *Handbook of Policing*. Devon: Willan Publishing.
- British Society of Criminology (2006). Code of Ethics for Researchers in the Field of Criminology.
- Brown, J. M., Council, C. L., Penne, M. A., & Gfroerer, J. C. (2005). Immigrants and Substance Use: Findings from the 1999–2001 National Surveys on Drug Use and Health, (DHHS Publication No. SMA 04–3909, Analytic Series A-23). Rockville, MD: Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, Office of Applied Studies. .
- Brubaker, R. (1992). *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany*. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press.
- (1998). Myths and Misconceptions in the Study of Nationalism. In J. A. Hall (Ed.), *The State of the Nation : Ernest Gellner and the Theory of Nationalism* (pp. vii, 317 p.). New York: Cambridge University Press.
- (2001). The Return of Assimilation? Changing Perspectives on Immigration and Its Sequels in France, Germany, and the United States. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 24, 531–548.
- Brubaker, R., & Cooper, F. (2000). Beyond "Identity". *Theory and Society*, 29, 1-47.
- Brubaker, R., & Feischmidt, M. (2002). 1848 in 1998: The Politics of Commemoration in Hungary, Romania, and Slovakia. *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 44, 700-744.
- Brubaker, R., & Laitin, D. D. (1998). Ethnic and Nationalist Violence. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 24, 423 - 452.

- Bruner, J. S. (1986). *Actual Minds, Possible Worlds*. Cambridge, Mass ; London: Harvard University Press.
- (1987). Life as Narrative. *Social Research*, 54, 11-32.
- Bufford, B. (1991). *Among the Thugs*. London: Mandarin.
- Bulmer, M. (2001). The Ethics of Social Research. In G. N. Gilbert (Ed.), *Researching Social Life* (pp. 45-57). London, Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage Publications.
- Burgess, E. W. (1930). Discussion In C. R. Shaw (Ed.), *The Jack-Roller: A Delinquent Boy's Own Story* (pp. 184-97). Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
- Burr, A. (1987). Chasing the Dragon: Heroin Misuse, Delinquency and Crime in the Context of South London Culture. *British Journal of Criminology*, 27, 333- 357.
- Bursik, R. J. (2006). Rethinking the Chicago School of Criminology: A New Era of Immigration. In R. Martinez & A. Valenzuela (Eds.), *Immigration and Crime: Race, Ethnicity, and Violence* (pp. x, 238 p.). New York and London: New York University Press.
- Calavita, K. (2003). A 'Reserve Army of Delinquents': The Criminalization and Economic Punishment of Immigrants in Spain *Punishment & Society* 5, 399-413.
- Carter, D., & Merrill, H. (2007). Bordering Humanism: Life and Death on the Margins of Europe. *Geopolitics*, 12, 248-264.
- Castles, S. (1985). The Guests Who Stayed. The Debate on 'Foreigners Policy' in the German Federal Republic. *International Migration Review*, 19, 517-534.
- (2000). *Ethnicity and Globalization*. London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi: Sage.
- Castles, S., & Kosack, G. (1973). *Immigrant Workers and Class Structure in Western Europe*. London: Oxford University Press for the Institute of Race Relations.
- Castles, S., & Miller, M. J. (2003). *The Age of Migration*. New York: Guilford Press.
- Cavounidis, J. (2001). The Applicants of the First Greek Program of Immigrants' Legalization. In G. Amitsis & G. Lazaridis (Eds.), *Legal and Socio-Political Aspects of Immigration in Greece* (pp. 91-111). Athens: Papazisis [in Greek].
- (2002). Migration in Southern Europe and the Case of Greece. *International Migration*, 40, 45-70.
- (2003). Gendered Patterns of Migration to Greece. *The Greek Review of Social Research [in Greek]*, 110, 221-238.
- (2004a). *Research of Migrants' Economic and Social Integration* Athens: Employment Observatory [in Greek]
- (2004b). *Study of Migrants' Economic and Social Integration*. Athens Employment Observatory [in Greek].
- (2006). New Elements of Greek Policies Concerning Irregular Migrants: The Policy of Regularisation of Unauthorised Migrants. Strasbourg: Council of Europe.
- Cawkwell, G. L. (2000). Isocrates. In S. Hornblower & T. Spawforth (Eds.), *Who's Who in the Classical World*: Oxford University Press.
- Chakraborti, N., & Garland, J. (2004). England's Green and Pleasant Land? Examining Racist Prejudice in a Rural Context. *Patterns of Prejudice*, 38, 383-398.
- Chambliss, W. J., & Seidman, R. B. (1971). *Law, Order, and Power*. Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Pub. Co.
- Chase, S. E. (1999). Taking Narratives Seriously: Consequences for Method and Theory in Interview Studies. In R. Josselson & A. Lieblich (Eds.), *Making Meaning of Narratives* (pp. xiii, 282 p.). Thousand Oaks, Calif. ; London: Sage.
- Choongh, S. (1998). Policing the Dross: A Social Disciplinary Model of Policing. *British Journal of Criminology*, 38, 623 - 634.
- Chossudovsky, M. (2000). The Criminalization of Albania. In T. Ali (Ed.), *Masters of the Universe? : NATO 'S Balkan Crusade*. London: Verso.
- Christopoulos, D. (2005). The Last Twenty Years of Greek Citizenship. *Synchrone Themata [in Greek]*, 91, 22-31.
- (2007). Comparative Particularities of the Greek Citizenship Law and the Administrative Practices Regarding the Naturalization of Foreigners In X. Kontiadis & T. Papatheodorou (Eds.), *The Reform of Immigration Policy*. Athens: Papazisis [in Greek].

- Christopoulos, D., & Tsitselikis, K. (2005). Treatment of Minorities and *Homogeneis* in Greece: Relics and Challenges, *KEMO*.
- Claude-Valentin, M. (2004). Preventing Illegal Immigration: Juggling Economic Imperatives, Political Risks and Individual Rights. Strasbourg: Council of Europe.
- Clifford, J. (1986). Introduction: Partial Truths. In J. Clifford & G. E. Marcus (Eds.), *Writing Culture: The Poetics and Politics of Ethnography: A School of American Research Advanced Seminar*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Clinard, M. B. (1963). *Sociology of Deviant Behavior*. New York: Holt Rinehart & Winston.
- Clogg, R. (1993). Greece and the Balkans in the 1990s. In H. Psomiades & S. Thomadakis (Eds.), *Greece, the New Europe and the Changing International Order*. New York: Pella.
- (2002). *Minorities in Greece: Aspects of a Plural Society*. London: Hurst & Company.
- Cloward, R. A., & Ohlin, L. E. (1960). *Delinquency and Opportunity: A Theory of Delinquent Gangs*. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press.
- Coenders, M., Lubbers, M., & Scheepers, P. (2004a). Majority Populations' Attitudes Towards Migrants and Minorities. Report 1: Overview of Theories, Hypotheses and Results on Attitudes of Majorities Towards Minorities. Nijmegen: European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia.
- (2004b). Majority Populations' Attitudes Towards Migrants and Minorities. Report 4: Results from the European Social Survey 2002-2003. Nijmegen: European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia.
- (2004c). Majority Populations' Attitudes Towards Migrants and Minorities: Results from the Standard Eurobarometers 1997-2000-2003. Report 2. Nijmegen: European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia.
- Cohen, A. K. (1955). *Delinquent Boys: The Culture of the Gang*. New York: Free Press.
- Cohen, P. (1988). The Perversions of Inheritance: Studies in the Making of Multi-Racist Britain. In P. Cohen & H. S. Bains (Eds.), *Multi-Racist Britain: New Directions in Theory & Practice* (pp. 98-118). Basingstoke: Macmillan Education.
- (1993). *Home Rules: Some Reflections on Racism and Nationalism in Everyday Life*. London: New Ethnicities Unit, University of East London.
- Cohen, S. (1972). *Folk Devils and Moral Panics: The Creation of Mods and Rockers*. London and New York: Routledge.
- (1998). Intellectual Scepticism and Political Commitment. In P. Walton & J. Young (Eds.), *The New Criminology Revisited*. London; New York: Macmillan; St. Martin's Press.
- Colombo, E., Leonini, L., & Rebughini, P. (2009). Different but Not Stranger: Everyday Collective Identifications among Adolescent Children of Immigrants in Italy. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 35, 37 - 59.
- Connell, R. W. (1995). *Masculinities*. Cambridge: Polity.
- Connell, R. W., & Messerschmidt, J. W. (2005). Hegemonic Masculinity: Rethinking the Concept. *Gender Society*, 19, 829-859.
- Cook, D. (1993). Racism, Citizenship and Exclusion. In D. Cook & B. Hudson (Eds.), *Racism and Criminology* (pp. 136 - 171). London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi: Sage.
- Council of Europe (2002). Report to the Government of Greece. Strasbourg: European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT).
- Courakis, N., & Stathopoulou, E. (2007). Problems of Recidivism: Results of a Follow-up Study of the Criminal Histories of Detained Youths. In C. D. Spinellis (Ed.), *Supporting Juvenile Delinquents* (pp. 143-159). Athens: Sakkoulas [in Greek].
- Courakis, N., Zagoura, P., & Yalanou, M. (2003). Delinquent Groups (and Gangs?) of Minors in Greater-Athnes. *Penal Reason [in Greek]*, 2205 - 2218.
- Courakis, N. E. (2004). *Law of Delinquent Minors Athens - Komotini*: Sakkoulas [in Greek].
- Crul, M., & Vermeulen, H. (2003). The Second Generation in Europe. *International Migration Review*, 37, 965-986.
- Cullen, F. T., & Agnew, R. (2006). *Criminological Theory: Past to Present* Los Angeles, Calif.: Roxbury Park.

- Cullingford, C. (1999). *The Causes of Exclusion: Home, School and the Development of Young Criminals*. London: Kogan Page.
- Currie, C., Roberts, C., Morgan, A., Smith, R., Settertobulte, W., Samdal, O., & Barnekow Rasmussen, V. (2004). *Young People's Health in Context. Health Behaviour in School-Aged Children Study: International Report from the 2001/2002 Survey*. Copenhagen: WHO Regional Office for Europe.
- Dakin, D. (1973). *The Greek Struggle for Independence, 1821-1833*. London: Batsford.
- Damanakis, M. (1997). *The Education of Repatriated and Foreign Pupils in Greece. An Intercultural Approach*. Athens Gutenberg [in Greek].
- De Rapper, G. (2004). 'We Are Not Greek, But...': Dealing with the Greek-Albanian Border among the Albanian-Speaking Christians of Southern Albania. *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, 4, 162-174.
- (2005). Better Than Muslims, Not as Good as Greeks. In R. King, N. Mai & S. Schwandner-Sievers (Eds.), *The New Albanian Migration*. Brighton: Sussex Academic Press.
- Deliyanni-Kouimtzi, V. (2004). Gender Identities and School: New Approaches and Empirical Findings from the Greek Educational System, *Report*. Thessaloniki: Aristotle University of Thessaloniki [in Greek].
- Deliyanni-Kouimtzi, V., & Sakka, D. (1998). Adolescent Male Identities and School, *Report*. Thessaloniki: Aristotle University of Thessaloniki [in Greek].
- Delsol, R., & Shiner, M. (2006). Regulating Stop and Search. *Critical Criminology*, 14, 241-263.
- Demetriou, X. (2007). The Reformatory and Therapeutic Measures for Young Offenders. In C. D. Spinellis (Ed.), *Supporting Juvenile Delinquents* (pp. 63-97). Athens: Sakkoulas [in Greek].
- Dench, S., Iphofen, R., & Huws, U. (2004). An EU Code of Ethics for Socio-Economic Research, *Project Respect*. Brighton: The Institute for Employment Studies.
- Denzin, N. K. (1988). *The Research Act: A Theoretical Introduction to Sociological Methods*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
- Denzin, N. K., & Lincoln, Y. S. (1998). Introduction: Entering the Field of Qualitative Research. In N. K. Denzin & Y. S. Lincoln (Eds.), *Strategies of Qualitative Inquiry*. Thousand Oaks, London, New Delhi: Sage.
- Derens, J.-A., & Geslin, L. (2006). "The Dream of a Greater Albania." *Monde Diplomatique*.
- Desai, P. (1999). Spaces of Identity, Cultures of Conflict: The Development of New British Asian Masculinities. London: Unpublished PhD thesis, Goldsmiths College, University of London.
- Diamanti-Karanou, P. (2003). Migration of Ethnic-Greeks from the Former Soviet Union to Greece, 1990-2000: Policy Decisions and Implications. *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, 3.
- Diehl, C., & Blohm, M. (2003). Rights or Identity? Naturalization Processes among 'Labor Migrants' in Germany. *International Migration Review*, 37, 133-162.
- Diehl, C., & Schnell, R. (2006). 'Reactive Ethnicity' or 'Assimilation'? Statements, Arguments, and First Empirical Evidence for Labor Migrants in Germany. *International Migration Review*, 40, 786-816.
- Dimakos, I., & Tasiopoulou, K. (2003). Attitudes Towards Migrants: What Do Greek Students Think About Their Immigrant Classmates? *Journal of Intercultural Education*, 14.
- Dousas, D. (1997). *Rom and Racial Discrimination*. Athens: Gutenberg [in Greek].
- Downes, D. M., & Rock, P. (2003). *Understanding Deviance*. Oxford: Clarendon.
- Drettakis, M. (2008). "Immigrants Represent One-Quarter of the Residents in Athens Central Municipality." *Eleftherotypia* 06/11/2008.
- Ducellier, A. (1994). *The Albanians in Greece (13th-14th Century): The Migration of a Community [in Greek]*. Athens: Goulondri Foundation.
- Durham, M. E. (1971). *High Albania*. New York: Arno Press.
- Durkheim, E. (1997 [1893]). *The Division of Labour in Society*. New York: The Free Press.
- Efklides, A. (2007). Greece. In J. J. Arnett (Ed.), *International Encyclopedia of Adolescence* (pp. 2 v. (xxii, 1119, 70 p.)). New York ; London: Routledge.

- Elias, N. (1996). *The Germans: Power Struggles and the Development of Habitus in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Elias, N., & Dunning, E. (1986). *Quest for Excitement: Sport and Leisure in the Civilizing Process*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- Elias, N., & Scotson, J. L. (1965). *The Established and the Outsiders. A Sociological Enquiry into Community Problems*. London: Frank Cass & Co.
- (1994). *The Established and the Outsiders: A Sociological Enquiry into Community Problems. 2nd Ed.* London: Sage.
- Elliott, D. S., Huizinga, D., & Ageton, S. S. (1985). *Explaining Delinquency and Drug Use*. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications.
- Elliott, D. S., Huizinga, D., & Menard, S. (1989). *Multiple Problem Youth: Delinquency, Substance Abuse, and Mental Health Problems*. New York: Springer-Verlag.
- Emke-Pouloupoulos, I. (2007). *The Challenge of Migration*. Athens: Papazisis and Greek Society for Demographic Studies [in Greek].
- Erikson, E. H. (1968). *Youth and Crisis*. New York & London: W.W. Norton.
- European Commission (2001). *Young Europeans in 2001. Technical Report*. Brussels: European Commission, Directorate Generale for Education and Culture.
- European Commission's Representation in Greece (2004). *Eurobarometer: Public Opinion in the European Union. National Report: Greece*. Athens: European Commission.
- Fakiolas, R. (1999). Socio-Economic Effects of Immigration in Greece. *Journal of European Social Policy*, 9, 211 - 229.
- (2000). Migration and Unregister Labor in the Greek Economy. In R. King, G. Lazaridis & C. Tsardanidis (Eds.), *Eldorado or Fortress? Migration in Southern Europe*. London and N.Y.: MacMillan.
- (2001). The Integration of Greek Pontians in the Greek Society. In G. Amitsis & G. Lazaridis (Eds.), *Legal and Socio-Political Aspects of Immigration in Greece*. Athens: Papazisis [in Greek].
- (2003a). The Second Legalisation of the Illegal Immigrants in Greece. *International Migration Review*, 37, 1292 - 1302.
- (2003b). Regularising Undocumented Immigrants in Greece: Procedures and Effects. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 29, 535 - 561.
- Fakiolas, R., & King, R. (1996). Emigration, Return, Immigration: A Review and Evaluation of Greece's Postwar Experience of International Migration. *International Journal of Population Geography*, 2, 171 -190.
- Farrington, D. P. (1992). Trends in English Juvenile Delinquency and Their Explanation. *International Journal of Comparative and Applied Criminal Justice*, 16.
- Favell, A. (1998). *Philosophies of Integration: Immigration and the Idea of Citizenship in France and Britain*. Basingstoke: Macmillan.
- (2001). Multi-Ethnic Britain: An Exception in Europe? *Patterns of Prejudice*, 35.
- (2008). The New Face of East-West Migration in Europe. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 34, 701 - 716.
- Feilzer, M., & Hood, R. G. (2004). *Differences or Discrimination? : Minority Ethnic Young People in the Youth Justice System*. London: Youth Justice Board.
- Fekete, L. (2003). *Analysis: Deaths During Forced Deportation*. London: Institute of Race Relations.
- (2005). The Deportation Machine: Europe, Asylum and Human Rights. *Race and Class*, 47.
- Feld, B. (1999). A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to the Centenary: Social Structure, Race and the Transformation of the Juvenile Court. *Punishment & Society*, 1, 187-214.
- (2003). Politics of Race and Juvenile Justice: The Due Process Revolution and the Conservative Reaction, *The Justice Quarterly*, 20, 765-800.
- FitzGerald, M. (1997). Minorities, Crime, and Criminal Justice in Britain. In I. H. Marshall (Ed.), *Minorities, Migrants, and Crime: Diversity and Similarity across Europe and the United States*. Thousand Oaks, Calif. ; London: Sage.

- FitzGerald, M., & Sibbitt, R. (1997). Ethnic Monitoring in Police Forces: A Beginning, *Research Study No. 173*. London: Home Office.
- Flanagan, J. (1954). The Critical Incident Technique. *Psychological Bulletin*, 51, 327 - 358.
- Flood-Page, C., Campbell, S., Harrington, V., & Miller, J. (2000). Youth Crime: Findings from the 1998/99 Youth Lifestyles Survey. London: Home Office
- Foster, J. (2003). Police Cultures. In T. Newburn (Ed.), *Handbook of Policing*. Devon: Willan Publishing.
- Fraser, N. (2000). Rethinking Recognition: Overcoming Displacement and Reification in Cultural Politics. *New Left Review*, 3, 107-120.
- (2003). Social Justice in the Age of Identity Politics: Redistribution, Recognition, and Participation. In N. Fraser & A. Honneth (Eds.), *Redistribution or Recognition? A Political-Philosophical Exchange*. London and Frankfurt: Verso and Suhrkamp.
- Frazier, C. E. (1978). The Use of Life-Histories in Testing Theories of Criminal Behavior: Towards Reviving a Method. *Qualitative Sociology*, 1, 122-142.
- Freese, J. H. (1894). *Isocrates' Orations Vol. I*. London: George Bell & Sons.
- Gal, S. (1987). Codeswitching and Consciousness in the European Periphery. *American Ethnologist* 14, 637-653.
- Gans, H. J. (1979). Symbolic Ethnicity: The Future of Ethnic Groups and Cultures in America. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 2, 1-20.
- (1992). Second-Generation Decline: Scenarios for the Economic and Ethnic Futures of the Post-1965 American Immigrants. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 15.
- (1997). Toward a Reconciliation of "Assimilation" and "Pluralism": The Interplay of Acculturation and Retention. *International Migration Review*, 31, 875 - 892.
- Gefou-Madianou, D. (1999). Cultural Polyphony and Identity Formation: Negotiating Tradition in Attica. *American Ethnologist*, 26, 412-439.
- Gelsthorpe, L. (1993). Approaching the Topic of Racism: Transferable Research Strategies? In D. Cook & B. Hudson (Eds.), *Racism and Criminology*. London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi: Sage.
- Gfroerer, J. C., & Tan, L. L. (2003). Substance Use among Foreign-Born Youths in the United States: Does the Length of Residence Matter? *American Journal of Public Health*, 93.
- Giddens, A. (1979). *Central Problems in Social Theory: Action, Structure and Contradiction in Social Analysis*. London: Macmillan.
- (1984). *The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- (1991). *Modernity and Self Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age*. Cambridge: Polity Press in association with Basil Blackwell.
- Gilroy, P. (1987). The Myth of Black Criminality. In P. Scraton (Ed.), *Law, Order and the Authoritarian State*. Milton Keynes: Open University Press.
- (2004). *Melancholia or Convivial Culture*: Taylor & Francis.
- (2006). Multiculture in Times of War, *Anthony Giddens Professor in Social Theory Inaugural Lecture*. LSE.
- Glaser, B. G., & Strauss, A. L. (1968). *The Discovery of Grounded Theory. Strategies for Qualitative Research*. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson 1968.
- Glytsos, N. (2005). Stepping Form Illegality to Legality and Advancing Towards Integration: The Case of Immigrants in Greece. *The International Migration Review*, 39, 819 - 840.
- Gogonas, N. (2009). Language Shift in Second Generation Albanian Immigrants in Greece. *Journal of Multilingual and Multicultural Development*, 30, 95-110.
- Gordon, P. (1983). *White Law: Racism in the Police Courts and Prisons*. London: Pluto Press.
- Gotlib Conn, L. (2008). Ethics Policy as Audit in Canadian Clinical Settings: Exiling the Ethnographic Method. *Qualitative Research*, 8, 499-514.
- Gotovos, A., & Markou, G. (2003). Repatriated and Foreign Students in Greek Education. Athens: Institute for the Greek Diaspora Education and Intercultural Studies - Ministry of National Education and Religion. [in Greek].

- Gottfredson, M. R., & Hirschi, T. (1990). *A General Theory of Crime*. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press.
- Graham, J., & Bowling, B. (1995). *Young People and Crime*. Great Britain: Home Office, Research and Planning Unit.
- Greek Ombudsman (2005). Special Report: Administrative Detention and Expulsion of Foreign Minors In G. Kaminis & G. Moshos (Eds.): Greek Ombudsman for Children's Rights [in Greek].
- (2008). Press Release: Detention Institutions for Minors: Greek Ombudsman for Children's Rights [in Greek].
- Gunaratnam, Y. (2003). *Researching Race and Ethnicity: Methods, Knowledge and Power*. London: SAGE.
- Habermas, J. (1992). Immigration Et Chauvinisme Du Bien-Etre. *La Revue Nouvelle*, XVC, 76-84.
- Haddad, Y. Y., & Balz, M. J. (2006). The October Riots in France: A Failed Immigration Policy or the Empire Strikes Back? *International Migration*, 44, 23-34.
- Hagan, J., & Palloni, A. (1999). Sociological Criminology and the Mythology of Hispanic Immigration and Crime. *Social Problems*, 46, 617-632.
- Hagan, J., & Peterson, R. D. (1995). *Crime and Inequality*. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press.
- Hagell, A., & Newburn, T. (1994). *Persistent Young Offenders*. London: Policy Studies Institute.
- Hair, J. F., Anderson, R. E., Tatham, R. L., & Black, W. C. (1998). *Multivariate Data Analysis*. Upper Saddle River, N.J.: Prentice Hall.
- Halkos, G., & Salamouris, D. (2003). Socio-Economic Integration of Ethnic Greeks from the Former USSR: Obstacles to Entry into the Greek Labour Market. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 29, 519 -534.
- Hall, S. (1996a). Foreword. In C. Alexander (Ed.), *The Art of Being Black: The Creation of Black British Youth Identities*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- (1996b). Introduction: Who Needs 'Identity'? In S. Hall & P. Du Gay (Eds.), *Questions of Cultural Identity* (pp. viii, 198 p). London ; Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage.
- Hall, S., Critcher, C., Jefferson, T., Clarke, J., & Roberts, B. (1978). *Policing the Crisis: Mugging, the State, and Law and Order*. London: Macmillan.
- Hammersley, M. (2001). Which Side Was Becker On? Questioning Political and Epistemological Radicalism. *Qualitative Research*, 1, 91-110.
- Hammersley, R., Forsyth, A., & Lavelle, T. (1990). The Criminality of New Drug Users in Glasgow. *British Journal of Addiction*, 85, 1583 -1594.
- Harrison, L. (1997). The Validity of Self-Reported Drug Use in Survey Research: An Overview and Critique of Research Methods. In L. Harrison & A. Hughes (Eds.), *The Validity of Self-Reported Drug Use: Improving the Accuracy of Survey Estimates*. Rockville, MD: NIDA.
- Hart, L. K. (1999). Culture, Civilization and Demarcation at the Northwest Borders of Greece. *American Ethnologist*, 26, 196 - 220.
- Hasluck, M. M., & Hutton, J. H. (1954). *The Unwritten Law in Albania*: Cambridge University Press.
- Hatzivasileiou, S., Varouhaki, E., Papasimaki, K., & Tounta, F. (2007). Residential Patterns of Immigrants in the Neighbourhoods of Athens: Kypseli, Sepolia. In N. Vaiou (Ed.), *Gender, Migration, Urban Space*. Athens-NTUA: Conference Paper [in Greek].
- Hayes-Bautista, D. E. (2004). *La Nueva California: Latinos in the Golden State*. Berkeley; London: University of California Press.
- Heidensohn, F., & Gelsthorpe, L. R. (2007). Gender and Crime. In M. Maguire, R. Morgan & R. Reiner (Eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Criminology* (pp. xxvii, 1185 p.). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Hellenic Pedagogical Institute (2002). Specifications of Research Proposals. Athens [in Greek].
- Hellenic Police (2005). Criminal Organisations in Greece. Athens: Division of Public Security, Department of Criminality's Analysis [in Greek].

- Herzfeld, M. (1985). *The Poetics of Manhood: Contest and Identity in a Cretan Mountain Village*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
- (1991). *A Place in History: Social and Monumental Time in a Cretan Town*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
- (2008). "Interview to M. Pournara: Political Patronage: How Shepherds' Animal Rustling Transformed into Organised Crime in the Mountains of Crete." *Kathimerini [in Greek]* 31-08-08.
- Hesse, B., Rai, D., Bennett, C., & MacGilchrist, P. (1992). *Beneath the Surface: Racial Harassment* Aldershot: Avebury.
- Hibell, B., Anderson, B., Bjarnason, T., Kokkevi, A., Morgan, M., Ahlstrom, S., & Balakireva, O. (2000). The 1999 ESPAD Report: Alcohol and Other Drug Use among Students in 30 European Countries (pp. 362). Stockholm: CAN.
- (2004). The ESPAD Report 2003: Alcohol and Other Drug Use among Students in 35 European Countries. Stockholm: CAN & Pompidou Group at the Council of Europe.
- Hindelang, M., Hirchi, T., & Weis, J. (1979). Correlates of Delinquency: The Illusion of Discrepancy between Self-Report and Official Measures. *American Sociological Review*, 44, 994-1014.
- Hindelang, M. J., Hirschi, T., & Weis, J. G. (1981). *Measuring Delinquency*. Beverly Hills ; London: Sage.
- Hirschon, R. (1988). *Heirs of the Greek Catastrophe: The Social Life of Asia Minor Refugees in Piraeus*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Hobsbawm, E. J. (1992). *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hood, R., & Cordovil, G. (1992). *Race and Sentencing: A Study in the Crown Court : A Report for the Commission for Racial Equality*. Oxford; New York: Clarendon Press ; Oxford University Press.
- Hornsby-Smith, M. (1993). Gaining Access. In G. N. Gilbert (Ed.), *Researching Social Life*. London: Sage Publications.
- Hosmer, D. W., & Lemeshow, S. (2000). *Applied Logistic Regression*. New York, Chichester: Wiley.
- Huizinga, D., & Elliott, D. (1986). Reassessing the Reliability and Validity of Self-Report Delinquency Measures. *Journal of Quantitative Criminology*, 2, 293 - 327.
- Huysmans, J. (2000). The European Union and the Securitization of Migration. *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 38, 751 -77.
- Ignatieff, M. (1995). Nationalism and the Narcissism of Minor Differences. *Queen's Quarterly*, 102, 13 - 25.
- IPODE (2008). Distribution of Foreign and Ethnic-Greek Students, 2006-2007. Athens: Institute for the Greek Diaspora Education and Intercultural Studies [in Greek].
- Jarvis, C. (1999). The Rise and Fall of the Pyramid Schemes in Albania. Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund, European Department.
- Jefferson, T. (1993). The Racism of Criminalization: Policing and the Reproduction of the Criminal Other In L. R. Gelsthorpe (Ed.), *Minority Ethnic Groups in the Criminal Justice System*. Cambridge: Cambridge Institute of Criminology.
- (1996). Introduction in the Special Issue on Violence. *British Journal of Criminology*, 36.
- Johnson, T. P., VanGeest, J. B., & Cho, Y. I. (2002). Migration and Substance Use: Evidence from the U.S. National Health Interview Survey. *Substance Use and Misuse*, 37, 941-972.
- Johnston, L. D., O'Malley, P. M., & Bachman, J. G. (1995). National Survey Results from the Monitoring the Future Study, 1975 -1994. Rockville, MD: NIDA.
- Joppke, C. (1996). Multiculturalism and Immigration: A Comparison of the United States, Germany, and Great Britain. *Theory and Society*, 25, 449 - 500.
- (2004). The Retreat of Multiculturalism in the Liberal State: Theory and Policy. *The British Journal of Sociology*, 55, 237 - 257.
- (2007). Beyond National Models: Civic Integration Policies for Immigrants in Western Europe. *West European Politics*, 30, 1-22.



- Joppke, C., & Morawska, E. (2003). Integrating Immigrants in Liberal Nation-States: Policies and Practices. In C. Joppke & E. Morawska (Eds.), *Toward Assimilation and Citizenship: Immigrants in Liberal Nation-States* (pp. 1-36). New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Junger-Tas, J. (1994). The International Self-Report Delinquency Study: Some Methodological and Theoretical Issues. In J. Junger-Tas, G.-J. Terlouw & M. Klein (Eds.), *Delinquent Behaviour among Young People in the Western World*. Amsterdam, New York: Kugler Publications.
- (2001). Ethnic Minorities, Social Integration and Crime. *European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research*, 9, 5-29.
- Junger-Tas, J., & Marshall, I. H. (1999). The Self-Report Methodology in Crime Research. *Crime and Justice: a review of research*, 25, 291-367.
- Junger, M. (1989). Discrepancies between Police and Self-Report Data for Dutch Racial Minorities. *British Journal of Criminology*, 29.
- Kafetzis, P. (1999). A Theoretical Approach to Xenophobia. In C. Michalopoulou, P. Tsartas, M. Giannesopoulou, P. Kafetzis & E. Manologlou (Eds.), *Macedonia and the Balkans: Xenophobia and Development* (pp. 253p). Athens: Alexandria Publications and National Centre of Social Research [in Greek].
- Kaminis, G., & Tsapogas, M. (2003). Statutory Preconditions Justifying Enquiry and Remand by the Police, *Findings*. Athens The Greek Ombudsman [in Greek].
- Kandel, D. B., Simcha-Fagan, O., & Davies, M. (1986). Risk Factors for Delinquency and Illicit Drug Use from Adolescence to Young Adulthood. *Journal of Drug Issues*, 16, 67 - 90.
- Kanellopoulos, K. (2008). Characteristics and Labour Market Participation of Immigrants. In J. Cavounidis, A. Kontis, T. P. Lianos & R. Fakiolas (Eds.), *Immigration to Greece: Experiences, Policies, Perspectives*. Athens: IMEPO [in Greek].
- Kanistras, E. (2009). "Unwanted 2,5000 Souls in Patra." *Kathimerini*.
- Kaplan, R. D. (1993). *Balkan Ghosts: A Journey through History*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Kapllani, G. (2004). The Invisible Man and the Racist Violence. *Synchrone Themata [in Greek]*.
- (2006a). "Mundial and Football Patriotism." *Ta Nea* 20/06/2006.
- (2006b). *Small Diary of Borders* Athens Livanis [in Greek].
- Kapllani, G., & Mai, N. (2005). Greece Belongs to Greeks! The Greek Flag and the Albanian Student. In R. King, N. Mai & S. Schwandner-Sievers (Eds.), *The New Albanian Migration*. Brighton & Portland: Sussex Academic Press.
- Karakasidou, A. (1995). Vestiges of the Ottoman Past: Muslims under Siege in Greek Thrace. *Cultural Survival Quarterly*, 19, 71-75.
- Karydis, V. (1996). *The Criminality of Immigrants in Greece: Questions of Theory and Anti-Crime Policy [in Greek]*. Athens: Papazisis.
- (2004). Crime and Immigration: The Question of the Second Generation In M. Paulou & D. Christopoulos (Eds.), *The Greece of Immigration*. Athens: Kritiki & KEMO [in Greek].
- Kasimis, C., Papadopoulos, A. G., & Zacoboulou, E. (2003). Migrant in Rural Greece. *Sociologia Ruralis*, 43.
- Kasinitz, P. (2008). Becoming American, Becoming Minority, Getting Ahead: The Role of Racial and Ethnic Status in the Upward Mobility of the Children of Immigrants *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences*, 620, 253-269.
- Kasinitz, P., Mollenkopf, J. H., & Waters, M. C. (2004a). Becoming New Yorkers: Ethnographies of the New Second Generation. New York: Russell Sage.
- (2004b). Worlds of the Second Generation. In P. Kasinitz, J. H. Mollenkopf & M. C. Waters (Eds.), *Becoming New Yorkers: Ethnographies of the New Second Generation*. New York: Russell Sage.
- Kassimati, K. (1984). *Emigration-Repatriation: The Question of Second Generation*. Athens: National Centre of Social Research [in Greek].
- (1993). *Pontian Repatriates from the Former USSR: Social and Economic Accession*. Athens: General Secretariat of Emigration, Centre of Social Morphology and Social Policy [in Greek].
- Kastoryano, R. (2005). Territories of Identities in France Social Sciences Research Council.

- Katsapis, K. (2003). Confrontations between Natives and Refugees in Interwar Greece. In G. Tzedopoulos (Ed.), *Beyond the Catastrophe: Asia Minor Refugees in Interwar Greece*. Athens: Foundation of Hellenic World - Under the Auspices of Greek Parliament [in Greek].
- Katz, J. (1988). *The Seductions of Crime: Moral and Sensual Attractions in Doing Evil*. Basic Books.
- Katzenstein, P. J. (1996). *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Keith, M. (2005). *After the Cosmopolitan? Multicultural Cities and the Future of Racism*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Killias, M. (1989). Criminality among Second-Generation Immigrants in Western Europe: A Review of the Evidence. *Criminal Justice Review*, 14.
- (1997). Immigrants, Crime, and Criminal Justice in Switzerland. *Crime and Justice: a review of research*, 21, 375 - 405.
- King, R. (1995). *Mass Migration in Europe : The Legacy and the Future*. Chichester: Wiley.
- (2001). *The Mediterranean Passage: Migration and New Cultural Encounters in Southern Europe*. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press.
- (2005). Albania as a Laboratory for the Study of Migration and Development. *Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans*, 7, 133 - 155.
- King, R., Lazaridis, G., & Tsardanidis, C. (2000). *Eldorado or Fortress? : Migration in Southern Europe*. Basingstoke: Macmillan.
- King, R., & Vullnetari, J. (2003). *Migration and Development in Albania*: Sussex Centre for Migration Research.
- Kitromilides, P. (1989). 'Imagined Communities' and the Origins of the National Question in the Balkans. *European History Quarterly*, 19, 149-194.
- (1996). "Balkan Mentality": History, Legend, Imagination. *Nations and Nationalism*, 2.
- (2003). In the Pre-Modern Balkans...: Loyalties, Identities, Anachronisms. In D. Tziouvas (Ed.), *Greece and the Balkans: Identities, Perceptions and Cultural Encounters since the Enlightenment*. Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Kokkevi, A., Madianou, D., & Stefanis, K. (1992). *Drugs in Greece: Substance Use in School Population*. Athens: UMHRI [in Greek].
- Kokkevi, A., Terzidou, M., Politikou, K., & Stefanis, C. (2000). Substance Use among High School Students in Greece: Outburst of Illicit Drug Use in a Society under Change. *Drug and Alcohol Dependence*, 58, 181-188.
- Koliopoulos, J., & Veremis, T. (2002). *Greece: The Modern Sequel*. London: Hurst & Company.
- Konidaris, G. (2005). Examining Policy Responses to Immigration in the Light of Interstate Relations and Foreign Policy Objectives. In R. King, N. Mai & S. Schwandner-Sievers (Eds.), *The New Albanian Migration*. Brighton & Portland: Sussex Academic Press.
- Kontogiorgi, E. (2006). *Population Exchange in Greek Macedonia: The Rural Settlement of Refugees 1922 -1930*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Korovilas, J. P. (1999). The Albanian Economy in Transition: The Role of Remittances and Pyramid Investment Schemes. *Post-Communist Economies*, 11.
- Kostovicova, D., & Prestreshi, A. (2003). Education, Gender and Religion: Identity Transformations among Kosovo Albanians in London. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 29, 1079-1096.
- Kottaridi, G., & Balasi-Adam, E. (2006). Violence in Everyday Life of Students Attending Schools of Athens. Athens: EKKE (National Centre for Social Research), Institute of Social Policy [in Greek].
- Kozanoglou, C. (1999). Beyond Edinre: Football and the National Identity. In G. Armstrong & R. Giulianotti (Eds.), *Football Cultures and Identities*. Basingstoke, England: Macmillan.
- Kretsi, G. (2004). Review Article: K. Tsitselikis, D. Xristopoulos (Ed) the Greek Minority of Albania. *Synchrona Themata [in Greek]*.

- (2005). Migration, Power and Memory in Southern Albania. In R. King, N. Mai & S. Schwandner-Sievers (Eds.), *The New Albanian Migration*. Brighton: Sussex Academic Press.
- Kyridis, A., & Chronopoulou, A. (2008). *On Scientific Ethics and Practices*. Athens Gutenberg.
- Labrianidis, L., & Kazazi, B. (2006). Albanian Return-Migrants from Greece and Italy: Their Impact Upon Spatial Disparities within Albania. *European Urban and Regional Studies*, 13, 59-74.
- Labrianidis, L., & Lyberaki, A. (2001). *Albanian Immigrants in Thessaloniki: Paths of Prosperity and Overviews of Their Public Image*. Thessaloniki: Paratiritis [in Greek].
- Ladas, S. (1932). *The Exchange of Minorities: Bulgaria, Greece, and Turkey*. New York: The Macmillan Company.
- Lal, B. B. (1995). Symbolic Interaction Theories. *American Behavioural Scientist*, 38.
- Lambropoulou, E. (1994). *Social Control of Crime*. Athens Papazisis [in Greek].
- (2004). Citizens' Safety, Business Trust and Greek Police. *International Review of Administrative Sciences*, 70, 89 - 110.
- (2005). Crime, Criminal Justice and Criminology in Greece. *European Journal of Criminology*, 2, 211-247.
- Lamont, M., Morning, A., & Mooney, M. (2002). Particular Universalisms: North African Immigrants Respond to French Racism. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 25, 390-414.
- Larrabee, S. (1999). Greek Security Concerns in the Balkans. In V. Coufoudakis, H. Psomiades & A. Gerolymatos (Eds.), *Greece and the New Balkans: Challenges and Opportunities*. New York: Pella.
- Lauritsen, J. L., Sampson, R. J., & Laub, J. H. (1991). The Link between Offending and Victimization among Adolescents. *Criminology*, 29, 265-292.
- Lawrence, E. (1982). In the Abundance of Water the Fool Is Thirsty: Sociology and Black 'Pathology'. In University of Birmingham; Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies. (Ed.), *The Empire Strikes Back: Race and Racism in 70s Britain*. London: Hutchinson & Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies.
- Lawson, C., & Saltmarshe, D. (2000). Security and Economic Transition: Evidence from North Albania. *Europe - Asia Studies*, 52, 138 - 148.
- Lazaridis, G. (2001). Trafficking and Prostitution: The Growing Exploitation of Migrant Women in Greece. *The European Journal of Women's Studies*, 8.
- Lazaridis, G., & Poyago-Theotoky, J. (1999). Undocumented Migrants in Greece: Issues of Regularization. *International Migration*, 37, 715-740.
- Lea, J., & Young, J. (1984). *What Is to Be Done About Law and Order?* Harmondsworth: Penguin Books
- Lee, J. A. (1981). Some Structural Aspects of Police Deviance in Relations with Minority Groups. In C. D. Shearing (Ed.), *Organizational Police Deviance: Its Structure and Control*. Toronto: Butterworths.
- Leman, J., & Janssens, S. (2008). The Albanian and Post-Soviet Business of Trafficking Women for Prostitution: Structural Developments and Financial Modus Operandi. *European Journal of Criminology*, 5, 433-451.
- Leontidou, L. (1990). *The Mediterranean City in Transition: Social Change and Urban Development*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- (1993). Postmodernism and the City: Mediterranean Versions. *Urban Stud*, 30, 949-965.
- Leoussi, A. (2002). Theories of Nationalism and the National Revival. *Geopolitics*, 7, 249-257.
- Levels, M., & Dronkers, J. (2008). Educational Performance of Native and Immigrant Children from Various Countries of Origin. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 31, 1404-1425.
- Levi, M., Maguire, M., & Brookman, F. (2007). Violent Crime. In M. Maguire, R. Morgan & R. Reiner (Eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Criminology* (pp. xxvii, 1185 p.). Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press Inc.
- Lewis, R. (1998). Drugs, War and Crime in the Post-Soviet Balkans. In V. Ruggiero, N. South & I. R. Taylor (Eds.), *The New European Criminology: Crime and Social Order in Europe* London: Routledge.

- Lianos, T., Kanellopoulos, K., Gregou, M., Gkemou, E., & Papakonstantinou, P. (2008). An Estimation of the Number of Unauthorised Aliens in Greece Athens Institute of Migration Policy [in Greek].
- Liebling, A. (2001). Whose Side Are We On? Theory, Practice and Allegiances in Prisons Research. *Br J Criminol*, 41, 472-484.
- Linou, K. (2003). Understanding Greek Immigration Policy. In D. Keridis & C. Perry (Eds.), *New Approaches to Balkan Studies*: Brassey's Inc.
- Liska, A. E. (1992). *Social Threat and Social Control*. Albany: State University of New York Press.
- Lutterbeck, D. (2006). Policing Migration in the Mediterranean. *Mediterranean Politics*, 11, 59-82
- Madianou, M. (2005). Contested Communicative Spaces: Rethinking Identities, Boundaries and the Role of the Media among Turkish Speakers in Greece. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 31, 521 - 541.
- Madriz, E. (1999). Overview. In R. Gottesman & R. M. Brown (Eds.), *Violence in America: An Encyclopaedia* (pp. 648p.). New York: Scribner.
- Mai, N. (2002). Myths and Moral Panics: Italian Identity and the Media. In R. D. Grillo & J. C. Pratt (Eds.), *The Politics of Recognizing Difference: Multiculturalism Italian-Style* (pp. xxi, 286 p.). Aldershot: Ashgate.
- (2005). The Albania Diaspora-in-the-Making: Media, Migration and Social Exclusion. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 31, 543 - 561.
- Mai, N., & Schwandner-Sievers, S. (2003). Albanian Migration and New Transnationalisms. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 29, 939 - 948.
- Malcolm, D. (2004). Outsiders Within: The Reality of Rural Racism. In N. Chakraborti & J. Garland (Eds.), *Rural Racism* (pp. xiv, 210 p.). Cullompton: Willan.
- Malešević, S. (2002). Rational Choice Theory and the Sociology of Ethnic Relations: A Critique. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 25, 193-212.
- (2004). *The Sociology of Ethnicity*. London: SAGE.
- Maloutas, T. (2004). Segregation and Residential Mobility: Spatially Entrapped Social Mobility and Its Impact on Segregation in Athens. *European Urban and Regional Studies*, 11, 195 - 211.
- Maloutas, T., & Karadimitriou, N. (2001). Vertical Social Differentiation in Athens: Alternative or Complement to Community Segregation? *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 25, 699-716.
- Mannheim, H. (1965). *Comparative Criminology. Vol. 2*: Routledge & K. Paul.
- Marshall, I. H. (1997). Minorities and Crime in Europe and the United States: More Different Than Similar. In I. H. Marshall (Ed.), *Minorities, Migrants, and Crime: Diversity and Similarity across Europe and the United States*. Thousand Oaks, Calif. ; London: Sage.
- Martens, P. L. (1997). Immigrants, Crime, and Criminal Justice in Sweden. *Crime and Justice*, 21, Ethnicity, Crime and Immigration: Comparative and Cross-National Perspectives, 183-255.
- Martin, P., Martin, S., & Pastore, F. (2002). Best Practice Options: Albania. *International Migration*, 40, 103-118.
- Martinez, R. (2002). *Latino Homicide: Immigration, Violence, and Community*. New York, London: Routledge.
- Massey, D. S., & Sampson, R. J. (2009). Moynihan Redux: Legacies and Lessons. *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences*, 621, 6-27.
- Matsi, A. (2005). "They Won Three Years." *Eleftherotypia* 03/08/2005.
- Matza, D. (1969). *Becoming Deviant*. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall.
- Mavreas, K. (1998). Dimensions of Social Exclusion: Pontian and Voroioepiotes Refugees in Greece. *Journal of Social Research [in Greek]*, 185-218.
- Mavrogordatos, G. T. (1983). *Stillborn Republic: Social Coalitions and Party Strategies in Greece, 1922-1936*. Berkeley, Calif. ; London: University of California Press.
- Mazower, M. (2000). *The Balkans*. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson.
- McAra, L., & McVie, S. (2005). The Usual Suspects? Street-Life, Young People and the Police. *Criminal Justice*, 5, 5 - 36.

- McRobbie, A. (1994). The Moral Panic in the Age of the Postmodern Mass Media. In A. McRobbie (Ed.), *Postmodernism and Popular Culture*. London: Routledge.
- Mears, D. P. (2001). The Immigration - Crime Nexus: Toward an Analytic Framework for Assessing and Guiding Theory, Research, and Policy. *Sociological Perspectives*, 44, 1 - 19.
- Meinardus, R. (2002). Muslims: Turks, Pomaks and Gypsies. In R. Clogg (Ed.), *Minorities in Greece: Aspects of a Plural Society* (pp. xix, 203 p.). London: Hurst & Company.
- Melossi, D. (2003). 'in a Peaceful Life'. Migration and the Crime of Modernity in Europe/Italy. *Punishment & Society*, 5, 371 - 397.
- (2005). Security, Social Control, Democracy and Migration within the 'Constitution' of the EU. *European Law Journal*, 11, 5-21.
- Mench, B. S., & Kandel, D. B. (1988). Underreporting of Substance Use in a National Longitudinal Study. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 52, 100 - 124.
- Mennell, S. (1994). The Formation of We-Images: A Process Theory. In C. Calhoun (Ed.), *Social Theory and the Politics of Identity*. Oxford UK & Cambridge USA: Blackwell.
- Merton, R. K. (1938). Social Structure and Anomie. *American Sociological Review*, 3, 672-682.
- (1973). The Perspectives of Insiders and Outsiders. In R. K. Merton & N. W. Storer (Eds.), *The Sociology of Science: Theoretical and Empirical Investigations*. Chicago, Ill.: University of Chicago Press.
- Messerschmidt, J. W. (1993). *Masculinities and Crime: Critique and Reconceptualization of Theory*. Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield.
- (1997). *Crime as Structured Action : Gender, Race, Class, and Crime in the Making*. Thousand Oaks, Calif: Sage Publications.
- (1999). Making Bodies Matter: Adolescent Masculinities, the Body, and Varieties of Violence. *Theoretical Criminology* 3, 197 - 220.
- (2002). On Gang Girls, Gender and a Structured Action Theory: A Reply to Miller. *Theoretical Criminology*, 6, 461-475.
- Mhlanga, B. (1997). *The Colour of English Justice: A Multivariate Analysis*. Aldershot: Avebury.
- Michalopoulou, C., Tsartas, P., Giannesopoulou, M., Kafetzis, P., & Manologlou, E. (1999). *Macedonia and the Balkans: Xenophobia and Development*. National Centre for Social Research, Athens Alexandria Publications [in Greek].
- Migration News (2009). Vol. 16, No. 2: University of California, Davis, CA.
- Miles, R. (1987). Recent Marxist Theories of Nationalism and the Issue of Racism. *The British Journal of Sociology* 38, 24 - 43.
- Miller, J. (2001). *One of the Guys: Girls, Gangs, and Gender*. New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Miller, J., & MVA (2000). Profiling Populations Available for Stops and Searches. In London (Ed.), *Police Research Series. Paper 131* Home Office
- Miller, T., & Bell, L. (2002). Consenting to What? Issues of Access, Gatekeeping and 'Informed' Consent. In M. Mauthner, M. Birch, J. Jessop & T. Miller (Eds.), *Ethics in Qualitative Research*. London: SAGE.
- Ministry of Justice (2003). Prison Statistics. Athens
- Mitsilegas, V., Monar, J., & Rees, W. (2003). *The European Union and Internal Security: Guardian of the People?* Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Modood, T. (2003). Muslims and the Politics of Difference. *The Political Quarterly*, 74.
- (2005). Ethnicity and Political Mobilisation in Britain. In G. C. Loury, T. Modood & S. M. Teles (Eds.), *Ethnicity, Social Mobility, and Public Policy: Comparing the USA and Uk* (pp. 457 - 474). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Modood, T., Berthoud, R., Lakey, J., Nazroo, J., Smith, P., Virdee, S., & Beishon, S. (1997). *Ethnic Minorities in Britain: Diversity and Disadvantage*. London: Policy Studies Institute.
- Morawska, E. (1985). *For Bread with Butter: The Life-Worlds of East Central Europeans in Johnstown, Pennsylvania. 1890-1940*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Morenoff, J. D., & Avraham, A. (2006). Immigrant Assimilation and Crime: Generational Differences in Youth Violence in Chicago. In R. Martinez & A. Valenzuela (Eds.),

- Immigration and Crime: Race, Ethnicity, and Violence* (pp. 36-63). New York: New York University Press.
- Moshopoulou, A. (2005). *Immigrants' Criminality: Presentation of the Phenomenon in the Evening Press (1990-1999)* Athens - Komotini: Sakkoulas [in Greek].
- Motti-Stefanidi, F., Pavlopoulos, V., & Kaponi, K. (2007). Acculturation and Psychosocial Adaptation of Repatriated Pontian Adolescents. In S. Christogiorgos (Ed.), *Psychodynamic and Psychosocial Aspects of Child Psychiatry* (pp. 549-567). Athens: Kastaniotis [in Greek].
- Motti-Stefanidi, F., Pavlopoulos, V., Obradovic, J., & Masten, A. S. (2008). Acculturation and Adaptation of Immigrant Adolescents in Greek Urban Schools. *European Journal of Developmental Psychology*, 5, 45-58.
- Mparkas, P. (2003). The Greek Minority During the Hoxha Regime In K. Tsitselikis & D. Christopoulos (Eds.), *The Greek Minority of Albania*. Athens: Kritiki & KEMO [in Greek].
- Muenz, R. (2006). Europe: Population and Migration in 2005. *Migration Information Source*, Migration Policy Institute.
- Mullins, C. W. (2006). *Holding Your Square: Masculinities, Streetlife, and Violence*. Cullompton: Willan.
- Muncie, J. (2004). *Youth & Crime*. London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi: Sage.
- Nagel, J. (1994). Constructing Ethnicity: Creating and Recreating Ethnic Identity and Culture. *Social Problems*, 41, 152-176.
- Nairn, T. (1981). *The Break-up of Britain*. London: NLB.
- Natalino, K. W. (1981). Methodological Problems in Self-Report Studies of Black Adolescent Delinquency. In G. F. Jensen (Ed.), *Sociology of Delinquency: Current Issues* (pp. 144p.). Beverly Hills: Sage Publications.
- National Centre for Social Research, & National Foundation for Educational Research (2001). *Smoking, Drinking and Drug Use among Young People in England in 2000*. London: The Stationery Office.
- National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement (1931). Report on Crime and the Foreign - Born: U.S. Government Printing Office.
- Nelken, D. (2006). Italy: A Lesson in Tolerance? In J. Muncie & B. Goldson (Eds.), *Comparative Youth Justice*. London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi: Sage.
- Nesfyge, L. (2003). "Unripe Gangs." *Ta Nea* 29/09/2003.
- (2005). *Ta Nea* 15.03.2005.
- Newburn, T. (2002). Young People, Crime, and Youth Justice. In M. Maguire, R. Morgan & R. Reiner (Eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Criminology*: Oxford University Press.
- (2007a). *Criminology*. London: Willan.
- (2007b). Young People, Crime, and Youth Justice. In M. Maguire, R. Morgan & R. Reiner (Eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Criminology*. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press.
- Newburn, T., & Elliot, J. (1999). Risks and Responses: Drug Prevention and Youth Justice, *DPas, Home Office*. London: Goldsmiths College, University of London.
- Newburn, T., & Reiner, R. (2007). Policing and the Police. In M. Maguire, R. Morgan & R. Reiner (Eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Criminology*. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press.
- Newburn, T., Shiner, M., & Young, T. (2005). *Dealing with Disaffection: Young People, Mentoring and Social Inclusion*. Cullompton: Willan.
- Newburn, T., & Stanko, E. A. (1994). *Just Boys Doing Business? : Men, Masculinities and Crime*. London ; New York: Routledge.
- Newcomb, M. D. (1995). Drug Use Etiology among Ethnic Minority Adolescents: Risk and Protective Factors. In G. J. Botvin, S. P. Schinke & M. A. Orlandi (Eds.), *Drug Abuse Prevention with Multiethnic Youth* Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage Publications.
- Nicolaou, G. (2000). *Integration and Education of Foreign Pupils: From 'Homogeneity' to Multiculturalism* Athens: Hellinika Grammata.

- Nitsiakos, B. (2003). *Testimonies of Albanian Immigrants* Athens: Odysseas [in Greek].
- Nova-Kaltsouni, C., & Koutouzou, E. (1995). *Juvenile Delinquency*. Athens: Ministry of Public Order [in Greek].
- O'Donnell, I. (2003). A New Paradigm for Understanding Violence? Testing the Limits of Lonnie Athens's Theory. *British Journal of Criminology*, 43, 750 - 771.
- O'Donnell, M., & Sharpe, S. (2000). *Uncertain Masculinities: Youth, Ethnicity, and Class in Contemporary Britain*. New York: Routledge.
- Observatoire Geopolitique des Drogues (2000). The World Geopolitics of Drugs 1998/1999.
- Oetting, E. R. (1993). Orthogonal Cultural Identification: Theoretical Links between Cultural Identification and Substance Use. In M. R. De La Rosa & R. J. Adrados (Eds.), *Drug Abuse among Minority Youth: Methodological Issues and Recent Advances* (pp. 157). Rockville, MD: National Institute on Drug Abuse.
- Olzak, S. (1992). *The Dynamics of Ethnic Competition and Conflict*. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press.
- Oxford Brookes University (2000). Ethical Standards for Research Involving Human Participants. Code of Practice.
- Padilla, A. M., & Perez, W. (2003). Acculturation, Social Identity, and Social Cognition: A New Perspective. *Hispanic Journal of Behavioral Sciences*, 25, 35-55.
- Panayiotopoulos, N. (1998). *The Outcasts: The Special Institutions for Youngsters*. Athens: Kardamitsas [in Greek]
- Paoli, L., & Reuter, P. (2008). Drug Trafficking and Ethnic Minorities in Western Europe. *European Journal of Criminology*, 5, 13 - 37.
- Papademetriou, D. (2002). Irresistible Attraction, *Economist*.
- (2003). Managing Rapid and Deep Change in the Newest Age of Migration. *The Political Quarterly* 74, 39 - 58.
- Papadopoulou, A. (2004). Smuggling into Europe: Transit Migrants in Greece. *Journal of Refugee Studies*, 17, 167-184.
- Papailias, P. (2003). 'Money of Kurbet Is Money of Blood': The Making of a 'Hero' of Migration at the Greek-Albanian Border. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 29, 1059–1078.
- Papakonstantis, G. V. (2003). *Hellenic Police: Organisation, Policy and Ideology*. Athens: Sakkoulas [in Greek].
- Papanicolaou, G. (2006). 'Greece'. In J. Trevor & T. Newburn (Eds.), *Plural Policing: A Comparative Perspective*. London and New York Routledge.
- Papastergiou, V. (2008). "Minors Behind Bars: Basic Concepts and Numbers." *Avgi* 12.07.2008.
- Papataxiarchis, E. (2006a). The Burdens of Alterity. In E. Papataxiarchis (Ed.), *Adventures of Alterity: The Production of Cultural Difference in Contemporary Greece* Athens: Alexandria [in Greek].
- (2006b). The Status of Alterity in the Greek Society. In E. Papataxiarchis (Ed.), *Adventures of Alterity: The Production of Cultural Difference in Contemporary Greece* Athens: Alexandria [in Greek].
- Park, R. E., Burgess, E. W., & McKenzie, R. D. (1967). *The City*. Chicago ; London: University of Chicago.
- Park, R. E., & Hughes, E. C. (1969 [1921]). *An Introduction to the Science of Sociology*. Chicago: Chicago University Press.
- Parker, H., J. (1974). *View from the Boys. A Sociology of Down-Town Adolescents*. David & Charles: Newton Abbot etc. 1974 .
- Parker, H. J., & Newcombe, R. (1987). Heroin Use and Acquisitive Crime in an English Community. *British Journal of Sociology*, 38, 331-350.
- Pavlou, M. (2003). The Greeks of Albania in Greece, *The Greek Minority of Albania*. Athens: KEMO & Kritiki [in Greek].
- (2007). Racism and Discrimination against Immigrants and Minorities in Greece: The State of Play. Athens: HLHR-KEMO.
- Peach, C. (1996). Does Britain Have Ghettos? . *Royal Geographical Society*, 21, 216-235.

- Pearson, G. (1994). Youth, Crime, and Society. In M. Maguire, R. Morgan & R. Reiner (Eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Criminology*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Perlmann, J., & Waldinger, R. (1997). Second Generation Decline? Children of Immigrants, Past and Present-a Reconsideration. *International Migration Review*, 31, 893-922.
- Pesmazoglou, S. (2000). *Kosovo: The Double Hubris*. Athens Patakis [in Greek].
- Petoussi, V., & Stavrou, K. (1996). Greece. In D. J. Shoemaker (Ed.), *International Handbook on Juvenile Justice* (pp. xv, 327p.). Westport, Conn. ; London: Greenwood Press.
- Phillips, C. (2003). Who's Who in the Pecking Order? *British Journal of Criminology*, 43, 710 - 728.
- Phillips, C., & Bowling, B. (2002). Racism, Ethnicity, Crime, and Criminal Justice. In M. Maguire, R. Morgan & R. Reiner (Eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Criminology* (pp. 580 - 619). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- (2003). Racism, Ethnicity and Criminology. Developing Minority Perspectives. *British Journal of Criminology*, 43, 269-290.
- Pike, L. O. (1971). Migration and Urban Crime. In W. G. Carson & P. Wiles (Eds.), *Crime and Delinquency in Britain*. London.
- Pitsela, A. (1988). Greece. In A. M. van Kalmthout & P. J. P. Tak (Eds.), *Sanctions-Systems in the Member States of the Council of Europe: Deprivation of Liberty, Community Service and Other Substitutes*. Deventer: Kluwer.
- (2004). *Penal Responses to the Criminality of Minors* Athens - Thessaloniki: Sakkoulas [in Greek].
- Pitsela, A., Symeonidou-Kastanidou, E., & Kaiafa-Gibanti, M. (2003). Policy of Crime Deterrence and Youth: Findings of Empirical Research. In N. Kourakis & N. Koulouris (Eds.), *Policy of Crime Deterrence* Athens-Komotini: Sakkoulas [in Greek].
- Polk, K. (1994). Masculinity, Honour and Homicide. In T. Newburn & E. Stanko (Eds.), *Just Boys Doing Business? Men, Masculinities and Crime* (pp. 166 - 252). London & New York: Routledge.
- Pope, C. E., & Feyerherm, W. (1995). *Minorities and the Juvenile Justice System: Research Summary*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Dept. of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention.
- Popper, K. (1997). *The Lesson of This Century: Karl Popper Interviewed by Giancarlo Bosetti*. London: Routledge.
- Portes, A. (1999). Conclusion: Towards a New World - the Origins and Effects of Transnational Activities. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 22, 463-477.
- (2008). Migration and Social Change: Some Conceptual Reflections, *Theorizing Key Migration Debates*. Oxford University.
- Portes, A., & Fernández-Kelly, P. (2008). No Margin for Error: Educational and Occupational Achievement among Disadvantaged Children of Immigrants. *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences*, 620, 12-36.
- Portes, A., & Rumbaut, R. (2001). *Legacies: The Story of the Immigrant Second Generation*. Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press.
- Portes, A., & Rumbaut, R. G. (2006). *Immigrant America: A Portrait*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Portes, A., & Zhou, M. (1993). The New Second Generation: Segmented Assimilation and Its Variants. *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences*, 74 - 96.
- Pridemore, W. A. (2002). Social Problems and Patterns of Juvenile Delinquency in Transitional Russia. *Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency*, 39, 187-213.
- Pro Asyl (2007). *The Truth May Be Bitter, but It Must Be Told: The Situation of Refugees in the Aegean and the Practices of the Greek Coast Guard*. Frankfurt: Pro Asyl & Athenian Group of Lawyers for the Rights of Refugees and Migrants.
- Psimmenos, I. (1995). *Immigration from the Balkans: Social Exclusion in Athens*. Athens: Papazisis [in Greek].
- Pudney, S. (2002). *The Road to Ruin? : Sequences of Initiation into Drug Use and Offending by Young People in Britain*. London: Home Office.



- Quassoli, F. (2001). Migrant as Criminal: The Judicial Treatment of Migrant Criminality. In V. Guiraudon & C. Joppke (Eds.), *Controlling a New Migration World* (pp. 150 - 169). London: Routledge.
- Quinney, R. (1973). *Critique of Legal Order; Crime Control in Capitalist Society*. Boston,: Little.
- Ramsay, M., Baker, P., & Gouldon, C. (2001). *Drug Misuse Declared in 2000: Results from the British Crime Survey*. Great Britain: Home Office Research, Development Statistics, Directorate.
- Ramsay, M., & Percy, A. (1996). *Drug Misuse Declared: Results of the 1994 British Crime Survey*. London: Home Office.
- Reiner, R. (1993). Race, Crime and Justice: Models of Interpretation. In L. Gelsthorpe (Ed.), *Minority Ethnic Groups in the Criminal Justice System: Papers Presented to 21st Cropwood Round-Table Conference 1992*. Cambridge: University of Cambridge - Institute of Criminology.
- (2000). *The Politics of the Police*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Rhodes, P. J. (1994). Race-of-Interviewer Effects: A Brief Comment. *Sociology*, 28, 547-558.
- Riedel, M., & Welsh, W. (2002). *Criminal Violence: Patterns, Causes, and Prevention* Los Angeles, CA Roxbury Publishing Co.
- Roberts, B. R., Frank, R., & Lozano-Ascencio, F. (1999). Transnational Migrant Communities and Mexican Migration to the U.S. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 22, 238-266.
- Roberts, J. V. (2004). Public Opinion and Youth Justice. In M. Tonry & A. N. Doob (Eds.), *Youth Crime and Youth Justice: Comparative and Cross-National Perspectives*. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press.
- Robson, C. (2002). *Real World Research: A Resource for Social Scientists and Practitioner-Researchers*. Oxford UK ; Madden Mass.: Blackwell Publishers.
- Rodriguez, O., Adrados, R. J., & De La Rosa, M. R. (1993). Integrating Mainstream and Cultural Explanations of Drug Use among Puerto Rican Youth. In M. R. De La Rosa & R. J. Adrados (Eds.), *Drug Abuse among Minority Youth: Methodological Issues and Recent Advances* (pp. 157). Rockville, MD: National Institute on Drug Abuse.
- Roudometof, V. (1996). Nationalism and Identity Politics in the Balkans: Greece and the Macedonian Question. *Journal of Modern Greek Studies*, 14, 253 - 301.
- (1999). Nationalism, Globalization, Eastern Orthodoxy: 'Unthinking' the 'Clash of Civilizations' in Southeaster Europe. *European Journal of Social Theory*, 14, 253 - 301.
- (2003). Beyond Commemoration: The Politics of Collective Memory. *Journal of Political and Military Sociology*, 21, 161 - 169.
- Rovolis, A., & Tragaki, A. (2006). Ethnic Characteristics and Geographical Distribution of Immigrants in Greece. *European Urban and Regional Studies*, 13, 99-111.
- Ruggiero, V. (2000). Criminal Franchising: Albanians and Illicit Drugs in Italy. In M. Natarajan & J. M. Hough (Eds.), *Illegal Drug Markets: From Research to Prevention Policy* (pp. 203-218). Monsey, NY, USA: Criminal Justice Press.
- Rumbaut, R. (1997a). Assimilation and Its Discontents: Between Rhetoric and Reality. *International Migration Review*, 31, 923 - 960.
- (1997b). Paradoxes (and Orthodoxies) of Assimilation *Sociological Perspectives*, 40, 483 - 551.
- (2004). Ages, Life Stages, and Generational Cohorts: Decomposing the Immigrant First and Second Generations in the United States. *International Migration Review*, 38, 1160 - 1205.
- (2005). Turning Points in the Transition to Adulthood: Determinants of Educational Attainment, Incarceration, and Early Childbearing among Children of Immigrants. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 28, 1041-1086.
- Rumbaut, R. G. (1997c). Paradoxes (and Orthodoxies) of Assimilation *Sociological Perspectives*, 40, 483-511.
- Rumbaut, R. G., & Portes, A. (2001). *Ethnicities: Children of Immigrants in America*. Berkeley; New York: University of California Press; Russell Sage Foundation.
- Russell, K. K. (1992). Development of a Black Criminology and the Role of the Black Criminologist. *Justice Quarterly*, 9, 667-683.

- Rutter, M., & Giller, H. (1983). *Juvenile Delinquency: Trends and Perspectives*. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
- Rutter, M., Giller, H., & Hagell, A. (1998). *Antisocial Behavior by Young People*. Cambridge, UK ; New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Sacchetti, M. (2009). "American Dreams Deferred: Recession Batters Immigrants at All Economic Levels." *Boston Globe*.
- Sam, D. L., Vedder, P., Liebkind, K., Neto, F., & Virta, E. (2008). Immigration, Acculturation and the Paradox of Adaptation in Europe. *European Journal of Developmental Psychology*, 5, 138-158.
- Sampson, A., & Phillips, C. (1992). *Multiple Victimisation: Racial Attacks on an East London Estate*. London: Home Office, Police Research Group, Paper No 36.
- Sampson, R. J., & Bean, L. (2006). Cultural Mechanisms and Killing Fields: A Revised Theory of Community-Level Racial Inequality. In R. D. Peterson, L. J. Krivo & J. Hagan (Eds.), *The Many Colors of Crime: Inequalities of Race, Ethnicity, and Crime in America* (pp. 8-36). New York: New York University Press.
- Sampson, R. J., & Lauritsen, J. L. (1997). Racial and Ethnic Disparities in Crime and Criminal Justice in the United States. In M. Tonry (Ed.), *Ethnicity, Crime, and Immigration : Comparative and Cross-National Perspectives*. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press.
- Sampson, R. J., Morenoff, J. D., & Gannon-Rowley, T. (2002). Assessing 'Neighborhood Effects': Social Processes and New Directions in Research. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 28, 443-478
- Sampson, R. J., & Raudenbush, S. W. (1999). Systematic Social Observation of Public Spaces: A New Look at Disorder in Urban Neighborhoods. *The American Journal of Sociology*, 105, 603-651.
- Sampson, R. J., Raudenbush, S. W., & Earls, F. (1997). Neighborhoods and Violent Crime: A Multilevel Study of Collective Efficacy. *Science*, 277, 918-24.
- Sampson, R. J., & Wilson, W. J. (1995). Toward a Theory of Race, Crime, and Urban Inequality. In D. Peterson Ruth & J. Hagan (Eds.), *Crime and Inequality*. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press 1995.
- Sasse, G. (2005). Securitization or Securing Rights? Exploring the Conceptual Foundations of Policies Towards Minorities and Migrants in Europe. *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 43, 673-93.
- Sassen, S. (1993). *Losing Control? Sovereignty in an Age of Globalisation*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Scheibelhofer, E. (2008). Combining Narration-Based Interviews with Topical Interviews: Methodological Reflections on Research Practices. *International Journal of Social Research Methodology*, 11, 403 - 416.
- Schierup, C.-U., Hansen, P., & Castles, S. (2006). *Migration, Citizenship, and the European Welfare State: A European Dilemma*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Schwandner-Sievers, S. (1999). *The Albanian Aromanians' Awakening: Identity Politics and Conflicts in Post-Communist Albania*. Flensburg, Germany: European Centre for Minority Issues (ECMI).
- (2001). The Enactment of 'Tradition': Albanian Constructions of Identity, Violence and Power in Times of Crisis. In B. E. Schmidt & I. W. Schroder (Eds.), *Anthropology of Violence and Conflict*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Sellin, T. (1935). Race Prejudice in the Administration of Justice. *American Journal of Sociology*, 41, 212 - 217.
- (1938). *Culture, Conflict and Crime*. New York: Social Science Research Council.
- Sennett, R. (2006). *The Culture of the New Capitalism*. New Haven & London: Yale University Press.
- Sharp, C., & Budd, T. (2005). *Minority Ethnic Groups and Crime: Findings from the Offending, Crime and Justice Survey 2003*. Online Report Research Development and Statistics Directorate, Home Office.

- Shaw, C. R., Cottrell, L. S., Mackay, H. D., & Zorbaugh, F. M. (1929). *Delinquency Areas. A Study of the Geographical Distribution of School Truants, Juvenile Delinquents, and Adult Offenders in Chicago*. Chicago: University Press.
- Shaw, C. R., & McKay, H. D. (1942). *Juvenile Delinquency and Urban Areas; a Study of Rates of Delinquents in Relation to Differential Characteristics of Local Communities in American Cities*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Shelley, L. I. (1973). Crime and Modernisation: The Impact of Industrialization and Urbanization on Crime. In M. B. Clinard & D. J. Abbott (Eds.), *Crime in Developing Countries: A Comparative Perspective* (pp. xv,319p.). New York: Wiley.
- Silberman, R., Alba, R., & Fournier, I. n. (2007). Segmented Assimilation in France? Discrimination in the Labour Market against the Second Generation. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 30, 1 - 27.
- Simon, R., & Lynch, J. (1999). A Comparative Assessment of Public Opinion Towards Immigrants and Immigration Policies. *The International Migration Review*, 33, 455-467.
- Skopetea, E. (1988). *The 'Model Kingdom' and the Great Idea: Aspects of the National Question in Greece*. Athens Polytypo [in Greek].
- Skoulidas, E. G. (2002). The Perception of the Albanians in Greece in 1830s and 1840s. In S. Schwandner-Sievers & B. J. Fischer (Eds.), *Albanian Identities: Myth and History*. Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana University Press.
- Skrobanek, J. (2009). Perceived Discrimination, Ethnic Identity and the (Re-) Ethnicisation of Youth with a Turkish Ethnic Background in Germany. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 35, 535 - 554.
- Smith, A. D. (1995). *Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era*. Cambridge: Polity.
- (2001). *Nationalism*. Cambridge: Polity.
- Smith, D. J. (1994). Race, Crime, and Criminal Justice. In M. Maguire, R. Morgan & R. Reiner (Eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Criminology*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- (1997). Ethnic Origins, Crime, and Criminal Justice in England and Wales. In M. H. Tonry (Ed.), *Ethnicity, Crime, and Immigration : Comparative and Cross-National Perspectives. Vol. 21 of Crime and Justice: A Review of Research* (pp. 551 p). Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
- (2005a). The Effectiveness of the Juvenile Justice System. *Criminal Justice*, 5, 181-195.
- (2005b). Ethnic Differences in Intergenerational Crime Patterns. *Crime and Justice: a review of research*, 32, 59 - 125.
- Smith, D. J., & Ecob, R. (2007). An Investigation into Causal Links between Victimization and Offending in Adolescents. *The British Journal of Sociology*, 58, 633-659.
- Smith, D. J., Gray, J., & Small, S. (1983). *Police and People in London*. London: Policy Studies Institute.
- Smith, R. C. (2008). Horatio Alger Lives in Brooklyn: Extrafamily Support, Intrafamily Dynamics, and Socially Neutral Operating Identities in Exceptional Mobility among Children of Mexican Immigrants. *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences*, 620, 270-290.
- Solomos, J. (2003). *Race and Racism in Britain*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Solomos, J., & Back, L. (2000). *Theories of Race and Racism: A Reader*. London ; New York: Routledge.
- Spencer, S. (2006). The Challenge of Integration in Europe. In D. G. Papademetriou (Ed.), *Europe and Its Immigrants in the 21st Century: A New Deal or a Continuing Dialogue of the Deaf?* Washington, DC and Lisbon: Migration Policy Institute; Luso-American Foundation.
- Spinellis, C. D. (1992). *Greek Law of Minor Offenders and Victims: A Discipline under Development*. Athens/Komotini: Sakkoulas [in Greek].
- (1997). Key-Findings of a Preliminary Self-Report Delinquency Study in Greece: Contribution to the 1992 International Self-Report Project. In C. D. Spinellis (Ed.), *Crime in Greece in Perspective*. Athens - Komotini: Sakkoulas [in Greek].

- (2007). Foreword. In C. D. Spinellis (Ed.), *Supporting Juvenile Delinquents* (pp. 17-24). Athens: Sakkoulas [in Greek].
- Spinellis, C. D., Apospori, E., Kranidioti, M., Symiyiani, Y., & Angelopoulou, N. (1994). Key-Findings of a Preliminary Self-Report Delinquency Study in Athens, Greece. In J. Junger-Tas, G.-J. Terlouw & M. W. Klein (Eds.), *Delinquent Behavior among Young People in the Western World: First Results of the International Self-Report Delinquency Study*. Amsterdam: Kugler.
- Spinellis, C. D., & Tsitsoura, A. (2006). The Emerging Juvenile Justice System in Greece. In J. Junger-Tas & S. H. Decker (Eds.), *International Handbook of Juvenile Justice*. Dordrech:: Springer Netherlands.
- SPSS (1999). *Spss Base 10.0 Applications Guide*. Chicago, IL: SPSS Inc.
- Stanko, E. (1994). Challenging the Problem of Men's Individual Violence. In T. Newburn & E. Stanko (Eds.), *Just Boys Doing Business? Men, Masculinities and Crime*. London & New York: Routledge.
- Stavrianos, L. S. (2002 [1958]). *The Balkans since 1453*. London: Hurst & Company.
- Stebbins, R. A. (2001). *Exploratory Research in the Social Sciences*. London: Sage.
- Stergioulis, E. (2008). *The Sociology of the Police*. Athens Papazisis [in Greek].
- Stoianovich, T. (1960). The Conquering Balkan Orthodox Merchant. *Journal of Economic History*, 234 - 313.
- Suleiman, E. (2005). France: One and Divisible: Social Science Research Council.
- Sun, H.-E., & Reed, J. (1995). Migration and Crime in Europe. *Social Pathology*, 1, 228-252.
- Sutherland, E. H. (1934). *Principles of Criminology*. Chicago: J. B. Lippincott.
- Suttles, G. (1968). *The Social Order of the Slum: Ethnicity and Territory in the Inner City*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
- Sykes, G. M., & Matza, D. (1957). Techniques of Neutralization: A Theory of Delinquency. *American Sociological Review*, 22, 664-670.
- Tabachnick, B. G., & Fidell, L. S. (2000). *Computer-Assisted Research Design and Analysis*. Boston: Allyn and Bacon.
- (2007). *Using Multivariate Statistics*. Boston [Mass.] ; London: Pearson/A&B.
- Taguieff, P.-A. (1995). *Les Fins De L'antiracisme*. Paris: Michalon.
- (2001). *The Force of Prejudice: On Racism and Its Doubles*. Minneapolis, Minn.: University of Minnesota Press.
- The European Commission (2005). The Hague Programme: Ten Priorities for the Next Five Years: The European Commission.
- Therianos, K. (2008). Programmes of Compensatory Education for Foreign or Repatriated Students: Prospects, Limits, and Potential. In J. Cavounidis, V. Karydis, I. Nikolakopoulou-Stefanou & L. Stylianoudi (Eds.), *Immigration to Greece: Experiences, Policies, Perspectives*. Athens: IMEPO [in Greek].
- Thomas, W. I., & Znaniecki, F. W. (1918). *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America: Monograph of an Immigrant Group*. Boston: Richard G. Badger
- Thomson, M., & Crul, M. (2007). The Second Generation in Europe and the United States: How Is the Transatlantic Debate Relevant for Further Research on the European Second Generation? *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 33, 1025 - 1041.
- Tilley, S., & Gormley, L. (2007). Canadian University Ethics Review: Cultural Complications Translating Principles into Practice. *Qualitative Inquiry*, 13, 368-387.
- Tittle, C., & Curran, D. (1988). Contingencies for Dispositional Disparities in Juvenile Justice. *Social Forces*, 67, 23-58.
- Titzmann, P. F., Raabe, T., & Silbereisen, R. K. (2008). Risk and Protective Factors for Delinquency among Male Adolescent Immigrants at Different Stages of the Acculturation Process. *International Journal of Psychology*, 43, 19-31.
- Todorova, M. (1994). The Balkans: From Discovery to Invention. *Slavic Review*, 53, 453 - 482.
- (1997). *Imagining the Balkans*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Tonry, M. (1997). *Ethnicity, Crime, and Immigration: Comparative and Cross-National Perspectives*. Chicago, Ill. ; London: University of Chicago Press.

- Trevor, J. (2003). The Governance and Accountability of Policing. In T. Newburn (Ed.), *Handbook of Policing*. Devon: Willan Publishing.
- Triandafyllidou, A., & Veikou, M. (2000). The Hierarchy of Greekness: Ethnic and National Identity Considerations in Greek Immigration Policy. *Ethnicities*, 2, 189-208.
- Troianou-Loula, A. (1999). *The Service of Supervisors of Juvenile Courts in Greece*. Athens-Komotini: Sakkoulas [in Greek].
- Trubeta, S. (2000a). Reflections on the Representation of the Other and Racism in Greek Society *Journal of Social Research [in Greek]*, 137 - 176.
- (2000b). Reflections on the Representation of the Other and Racism in Greek Society *Journal of Social Research [in Greek]*, 137-176.
- (2001). *Constructing Identities among the Muslims of Thrace. The Cases of the Pomaks and the Rom*. Athens: Kritiki & KEMO [in Greek].
- (2003). 'Minorisation' and 'Ethnicisation' in Greek Society: Comparative Perspectives on Muslim Immigrants and the Thracian Muslim Minority. *History and Culture of South Eastern Europe - an Annual Journal*, 5, 95-112.
- Tsalikoglou, F. (2005). "Uncomfortable News." *To Vima* 03-04-2005.
- Tsiakalos, G. (2000). *Guide of Anti-Racist Education*. Athens: Ellinika Grammata [in Greek].
- Tsiganou, I., Daskalaki, K. I., & Tsampardi, D. (2004). *Images and Representation of Violence in the Greek School* Athens: EKKE (National Centre for Social Research), Institute of Political Sociology, Nomiki Vivliothiki [in Greek].
- Tsigris, A. (1996). *Rape: A Theoretical and Empirical Examination of the Factors Influencing Victim's Reporting to the Police*, PhD Thesis, Panteion University [in Greek].
- Tsitselikis, K., & Xristopoulos, D. (2003). The Greek Minority of Albania: Instances of Uncertainty as National Truths. In K. Tsitselikis & D. Xristopoulos (Eds.), *The Greek Minority of Albania*. Athens: Kritiki & KEMO [in Greek].
- Turk, A. T. (1969). *Criminality and Legal Order*. Chicago: Rand McNally.
- Turnbull, P., & Sandholtz, W. (2001). Policing and Immigration: The Creation of New Policy Spaces. In W. Sandholtz, N. Fligstein & A. Stone Sweet (Eds.), *The Institutionalization of Europe* (pp. xviii, 273 p.). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Tzanelli, R. (2006). 'Not My Flag!' Citizenship and Nationhood in the Margins of Europe (Greece, October 2000/2003). *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 29, 27-49.
- Tziliavakis, K. (2004). *Athens News* 06.08.2004.
- Tziovas, D. (2003). Introduction. In D. Tziovas (Ed.), *Greece and the Balkans: Identities, Perceptions and Cultural Encounters since the Enlightenment*. Ashgate.
- UMHRI (2005a). 2004 Annual Report on the Drug Situation in Greece. Athens: Reitox Focal Point.
- (2005b). Adolescents' Health: Dimensions, Conditions, Context. Vol. 2. Athens: University of Mental Health Research Institute [in Greek].
- (2006). National Report (2005 Data) to the EMCDDA ; Greece: New Developments, Trends, and in-Depth Exploration of Selected Issues. In M. Terzidou (Ed.). Athens: REITOX Focal Point [in Greek].
- US Immigration Commission (1919). *Report on Immigration and Crime*: Vol. XXXVI.
- Vagena-Palaiologou, E. (2006). *Racism and Xenophobia: An Inquiry of Police and Criminal Justice*. Athens: Nomiki Bibliothiki [in Greek].
- (2008). Racism and Xenophobia in Contemporary Greece: The Stance of the Institutions of Formal Social Control (Criminal Justice and Police). In J. Cavounidis, V. Karydis, I. Nikolakopoulou-Stefanou & L. Stylianoudi (Eds.), *Immigration to Greece: Experiences, Policies, Prospects* (pp. 98-117). Athens: IMEPO [in Greek].
- Vaiou, N. (2007). Interwoven Everyday Realities and Socio-Spatial Transformations of the City: Female Migrants and Natives in the Neighbourhoods of Athens. Athens: NTUA School of Architecture [in Greek].
- Van Boeschoten, R. (2006). Code-Switching, Linguistic Jokes and Ethnic Identity: Reading Hidden Transcripts in a Cross-Cultural Context. *Journal of Modern Greek Studies*, 24, 347-377.

- Van Dijk, J., Manchin, R., Van Kesteren, J., Nevala, S., & Hideg, G. (2005). The Burden of Crime in the EU, a Comparative Analysis of the European Survey of Crime and Safety (EU Ics) 2005, *EUICS Report*.
- Varouhakis, M. (2005). *Athens News* 21/01/2005.
- Vazsonyi, A. T., & Killias, M. (2001). Immigration and Crime among Youth in Switzerland. *Criminal Justice and Behavior*, 28, 329-366.
- Vega, W., & Gil, A. G. (1998). *Drug Use and Ethnicity in Early Adolescence*. New York ; London: Plenum Press c1998.
- Vega, W. A., Zimmerman, R., Gill, A., Warheit, G. J., & Apospori, E. (1993). Acculturation Strain Theory: Its Application in Explaining Drug Use Behavior among Cuban and Other Hispanic Youth. In M. R. De La Rosa & R. J. Adrados (Eds.), *Drug Abuse among Minority Youth: Methodological Issues and Recent Advances* (pp. 157). Rockville, MD: National Institute on Drug Abuse.
- Veikou, M. (2001). Performing Ethnic Identity: Greek-Albanian Immigrants and Their Every-Day Experiences In A. Mavrikis, D. Parsanoglou & M. Paulou (Eds.), *Immigrants to Greece* Athens: Ellinika Grammata [in Greek].
- Ventoura, L. (2004). Nationalism, Racism and Immigration in Contemporary Greece. In M. Paulou & D. Christopoulos (Eds.), *The Greece of Immigration*. Athens: Kritiki & KEMO.
- Veremis, T. (1989a). From the National State to the Stateless Nation (1821 - 1910). *European History Quarterly*, 19, 135-148.
- (1989b). Introduction. *European History Quarterly*, 19, 135-148.
- (2004). *The Balkans from 19th to 21st Century: Construction and Deconstruction of States*. Athens: Patakis [in Greek].
- Vickers, M. (1999). *The Albanians: A Modern History*. London: I.B. Tauris.
- Vickers, M., & Pettifer, J. (1997). *Albania: From Anarchy to a Balkan Identity*. London: Hurst.
- Vidali, M. (1999). Living in a Policy Vacuum: The Plight of Albanian Immigrants in Greece. *Central Europe Review*, 1.
- Vidali, S. (2007a). *Crime Control and State Police: Ruptures and Continuities in Crime Control Policy*. Athens-Komotini: Sakkoulas [in Greek].
- (2007b). *Criminality and the Police*. Athens-Komotini: Sakkoulas [in Greek].
- Voell, S. (2003). The Kanun in the City: Albanian Customary Law as a Habitus and Its Persistence in the Suburb of Tirana, Bathore. *Anthropos*, 98.
- Voulgaris, G., Dodos, D., Kafetzis, P., Lyrizis, X., Mixelopoulou, K., Nikolakopoulos, E., Spouldalakis, M., & K., T. (1995). The Perception and the Treatment of Other in Contemporary Greece: Findings of an Empirical Research. *Greek Review of Political Science [in Greek]*, 81-100.
- Voutira, E. (2004). When Greeks Meet Other Greeks: Settlement Policy Issues in the Contemporary Greek Context. In R. Hirschon (Ed.), *Crossing the Aegean: An Appraisal of the 1923 Compulsory Population Exchange between Greece and Turkey*. New York, Oxford: Berghahn Books.
- Wacquant, L. (1993). Urban Outcasts: Stigma and Division in the Black American Ghetto and French Urban Periphery *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 17, 366-383.
- (2002). Scrutinizing the Street: Poverty, Morality, and the Pitfalls of Urban Ethnography. *American Journal of Sociology* 107, 1468–1532.
- (2008). Pierre Bourdieu. In R. Stones (Ed.), *Key Contemporary Thinkers*. London and New York: Macmillan.
- Waddington, P. A. J., Stenson, K., & Don, D. (2004). In Proportion: Race, and Police Stop and Search. *British Journal of Criminology*, 44, 889-914.
- Waldinger, R. (2007). Did Manufacturing Matter? The Experience of Yesterday's Second Generation: A Reassessment. *International Migration Review* 41.
- Waldinger, R., & Feliciano, C. (2004). Will the New Second Generation Experience 'Downward Assimilation'? Segmented Assimilation Re-Assessed. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 27, 376-402.

- Waldinger, R., Lim, N., & Cort, D. (2007). Bad Jobs, Good Jobs, No Jobs? The Employment Experience of the Mexican American Second Generation. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 33, 1-35.
- Wallace, J. M., & Bachman, J. G. (1993). Validity of Self-Reports in Student Based Studies on Minority Populations: Issues and Concern. In M. De la Rosa & J. R. Adrados (Eds.), *Drug Abuse among Minority Youth: Methodological Issues and Recent Advances*. Rockville, MD: US Department of Health and Human Services.
- Wallace, J. M., Bachman, J. G., O'Malley, P. M., Johnston, L. D., Schulenberg, J. E., & Cooper, S. M. (2002). Tobacco, Alcohol, and Illicit Drug Use: Racial and Ethnic Differences among Us High School Seniors, 1976-2000. *Public Health Reports*, 117, S67-S75.
- Walters, G., D. (1994). *Drugs and Crime in Lifestyle Perspective*. Thousand Oaks, CA; London: Sage Publications.
- Warner, W. L., & Srole, L. (1945). *The Social Systems of American Ethnic Groups*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Waters, M. C. (1990). *Ethnic Options: Choosing Identities in America*. Berkeley: University California Press.
- (1994). Ethnic and Racial Identities of Second-Generation Black Immigrants in New York City. *International Migration Review*, 28, 795-820.
- Waters, T. (1999). *Crime & Immigrant Youth*. Thousand Oaks, Calif. ; London: Sage Publications.
- Wax, M. L. (1980). Paradoxes of 'Consent' to the Practice of Fieldwork. *Social Problems*, 27, 272-283.
- Weber, L., & Bowling, B. (2004). Policing Migration: A Framework for Investigating the Regulation of Global Mobility. *Policing & Society*, 14, 195 - 212.
- Weber, M. (1949). *The Methodology of the Social Sciences*. Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press.
- (1978 [1922]). *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology, Vol. I*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Webster, C. (1995). *Youth Crime, Victimisation and Racial Harassment: The Keighley Crime Survey*. Bradford: Centre for Research in Applied Community Studies, Bradford & Ilkley Community College Corporation.
- (1996). Local Heroes: Violence, Racism, Localism and Spacism among Asian and White Young People. *Youth & Policy*, 53, 15 - 27.
- (1997). The Construction of British 'Asian' Criminality. *International Journal of the Sociology of Law*, 25, 65-86.
- (2003). Race, Space and Fear: Imagined Geographies of Racism, Crime, Violence and Disorder in Northern England. *Capital & Class*, 80, 95-122.
- Whyte, W. F. (1943). *Street Corner Society: The Social Structure of an Italian Slum*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Wilbanks, W. (1987). *The Myth of a Racist Criminal Justice System*. Monterey, Calif.: Brooks/Cole.
- Willis, P. (1978). *Learning to Labour*: Saxon House.
- Wilson, W. J. (1987). *The Truly Disadvantaged: The Inner City, the Underclass, and Public Policy*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- (1991). Studying Inner-City Dislocations: The Challenge of Public Agenda Research. *American Sociological Review*, 56, 1-14.
- (2003). The Roots of Racial Tension: Urban Ethnic Neighbourhoods in the United States, *Economic and Social Research Council's Lecture*. LSE.
- (2009). The Moynihan Report and Research on the Black Community. *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences*, 621, 34-61.
- Wilson, W. J., & Taub, R. P. (2006). *There Goes the Neighborhood: Racial, Ethnic, and Class Tensions in Four Chicago Neighborhoods and Their Meaning for America*. New York Knopf.
- Wolfgang, M. E. (1958). *Patterns in Criminal Homicide*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania.
- Wolfgang, M. E., & Ferracuti, F. (1982). *The Subculture of Violence: Towards an Integrated Theory in Criminology*. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications.

- Worbs, S. (2003). The Second Generation in Germany: Between School and Labor Market. *International Migration Review*, 37, 1011-1038.
- Xanthopoulou-Kyriakou, A. (1991). The Diaspora of the Greeks of the Pontos: Historical Background. *Journal of Refugee Studies*, 4, 357-363.
- Xatjigeorgiou, A. (2003). *Eleftherotypia* 18/12/2003.
- Yablonsky, L. (1959). The Delinquent Gang as a near-Group. *Social problems*, 7, 108 -117.
- (1962). *The Violent Gang*. New York,: Macmillan.
- Yiannitsas, D., Mavrommatis, Y., & Avramidi, T. (2008). The Presence of Foreign Students in Secondary Education. In J. Cavounidis, V. Karydis, I. Nikolakopoulou-Stefanou & L. Stylianoudi (Eds.), *Immigration to Greece: Experiences, Policies, Perspectives*. Athens: IMEPO [in Greek].
- Young, A. A. (2004). Experiences in Ethnographic Interviewing About Race: The inside and Outside of It. In M. Bulmer & J. Solomos (Eds.), *Researching Race and Racism*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Young, J. (1999). *The Exclusive Society: Social Exclusion, Crime and Difference in Late Modernity*. London: Sage.
- (2007). *The Vertigo of Late Modernity*. London; Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage.
- Zarafonitou, C. (2002). *Fear of Crime*. Athens: Sakkoulas [in Greek].
- Zhou, M. (1997). Segmented Assimilation: Issues, Controversies, and Recent Research on the New Second Generation. *International Migration Review*, 31.
- Zinn, D. L. (2005). The Second Generation of Albanians in Matera: The Italian Experience and Prospects for Future Ties to the Homeland *Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans*, 7.
- Zinn, D. L., & Rivera, A. (1995). Notes on a Displaced Womanhood: Albanian Refugee Women in Southern Italy. *Anthropology of East Europe Review*, 13.



## Appendix I: List of Interviewed Students in Inner-City Secondary Schools

	DATE OF INTERVIEW	TYPE OF SCHOOL	NAME	SEX	COUNTRY OF BIRTH	ARRIVAL IN GREECE	ETHNIC IDENTIFICATION
1	02-11-2004	Lyceum	Achilles*	Male	Albania	1990	Ethnic Greek
2	03-11-2004	Lyceum	Zelda	Female	Albania	1990	Albanian
3	03-11-2004	Lyceum	Fotis	Male	Albania	1990	Ethnic Greek
4	14-12-2004	TEE	Spyros*	Male	Albania	1994	Albanian
5	14-12-2004	TEE	Vladimir	Male	Georgia	1991	Ethnic Greek
6	11-02-2005	TEE	Joanna	Female	Albania	1990	Ethnic Greek
7	11-02-2005	TEE	Edida	Female	Albania	1997	Albanian
8	11-02-2005	TEE	Kostas*	Male	Albania	1990	Albanian
9	16-02-2005	TEE	Christina	Female	Cyprus	1988	Ethnic Greek
10	16-02-2005	TEE	Marie	Female	Albania	1990	Ethnic Greek
11	18-02-2005	TEE	Anna	Female	Albania	1990	Ethnic Greek
12	18-02-2005	TEE	Lefteris	Male	Albania	1997	Albanian
13	22-02-2005	TEE	Grigor	Male	Georgia	1996	Ethnic Greek

14	08-03-2005	TEE	Athena	Female	Albania	1994	Ethnic Greek
15	09-03-2005	TEE	Emilio	Male	Albania	1997	Albanian
17	23-03-2005	Lyceum	Elefteria	Female	Albania	2003	Ethnic Greek
18	23-03-2005	Lyceum	Christos	Male	Albania	1998	Ethnic Greek
19	13-04-2005	Lyceum	Aurelia	Female	Albania	1997	Albanian
20	13-04-2005	Lyceum	Jenan*	Male	Albania	1994	Albanian
21	14-04-2005	Lyceum	Flabia	Female	Albania	1998	Albanian
22	20-04-2005	Lyceum	Erion	Male	Albania	1997	Albanian
23	20-04-2005	Lyceum	Enrit	Male	Albania	1997	Albanian
24	19-04-2005	Lyceum	Lampros	Male	Albania	1990	Ethnic Greek
25	19-04-2005	Lyceum	Tamara	Female	Georgia	2000	Georgian
26	02-05-2005	Lyceum	Loukas	Male	Albania	1992	Ethnic Greek
27	03-05-2005	Lyceum	Marco*	Male	Albania		Albanian

\* Interviewed twice

## Appendix II: Profile of Research Participants in the Juvenile Court of Athens

	Date of Interview	Name	Sex	Country of Birth	Religion	Age	Arrival in Greece	Schooling History	Work	SR Delinquency	SR Drug Use
1	22-12-2003	Jamal	Male	Albania	Atheist	17	1999	12 years schooling in Albania; in Athens, attends evening TEE.	Besides school works in constructions.	Petty theft; Traffic law violations; Assault.	--
2	28-12-2003	Mario	Male	Albania	Muslim	15	1994	Attends Gymnasium	--	Traffic law violations; Assaults.	--
3	30-12-2003	Andrea	Male	Albania	Orthodox Christian	18	1990	4 years in Albania; in Greece until 2 <sup>nd</sup> Gymnasium.	Full time work in health care sector.	Assaults and bodily harm; Shoplifting; theft; Street robbery; Arson.	Hashish regularly; inhalants.
4	10-01-2004	Apostolos (ethnic Greek)	Male	Kazakhstan	Orthodox Christian	19	1989	Attends evening vocational school	Full time work in constructions	Assault; Traffic law violations; Shoplifting.	--
5	04-02-2004	Florian	Male	Poland	Catholic Christian	15	1994	In Greece until 1 <sup>st</sup> of Gymnasium	Worked for 3-4 months	Assault; Graffiti.	Hashish
6	04-02-2004	Yiannis	Male	Bulgaria	Orthodox Christian	17	2000	6 years in Bulgaria; In Greece 1 <sup>st</sup> of Lyceum	--	Petty theft.	--

7	05-02-2004*	Mahir	Male	Albania	Muslim	18	1997	4 years in Albania; In Greece until 2 <sup>nd</sup> of Gymnasium	Worked for 1 month	Shoplifting	--
8	18-02-2004	Diran	Male	Armenia	Orthodox Christian	16	1997	2 years in Armenia; 4 years in Greece.	Works occasionally	Auto theft.	--
9	03-03-2004	Ervin	Male	Albania	Muslim	17	1997	4 years in Albania; None in Greece	Full time work in constructions.	Accomplish to murder	--
10	04-03-2004	Didi	Male	Albania	Muslim	18	1995	7 years in Albania; In Greece 1 <sup>st</sup> Gymnasium	Full time work in open markets.	Theft from vehicles; Undocumented immigration status.	--
11	17-04-2004	Roberta	Female	Albania	Orthodox Christian	18	1997	4 years in Albania; In Greece lower vocational school.	--	Shoplifting	--
12	17-04-2004	Erion	Male	Albania	Orthodox Christian	18	1990	In Greece until 2 <sup>nd</sup> of Gymnasium.	--	Motorbike theft	--
13	07-05-2004	Daniel	Male	Albania	Orthodox Christian	17	1999	7 years in Albania; In Athens evening school.	Works	Bodily harm.	--
14	12-05-2004	Erlind	Male	Albania	Atheist	19	1998	4 years in Albania; No schooling in Greece	Worked for 6-7 months	Drug possession and trafficking; Traffic law violations.	Hashish

15	19-05-2004	Yiorgos (ethnic Greek)	Male	Albania	Orthodox Christian	18	1990	Dropped out from school on 2 <sup>nd</sup> Gymnasium.	Now full time work	Street robbery.	--
16	19-05-2004	Polina	Female	Albania	Muslim	19	1997	7 years in Albania; In Athens TEE	--	Shoplifting.	--
17	25-06-2004	Victor	Male	Georgia	Orthodox Christian	16	2002	8 years in Georgia, --	--	Assault.	Hashish
18	25-06-2004	Hatouna	Female	Georgia	Orthodox Christian	16	2000	6 years in Georgia; 2 <sup>nd</sup> Lyceum	--	Shoplifting.	--
19	16-06-2004	Arno	Male	Albania	Muslim	19	1997	6 years in Albania; In Athens until 2 <sup>nd</sup> Lyceum	Imprisoned	Lethal Bodily Harm.	Hashish
20	09-06-2004	Grigor	Male	Bulgaria	Orthodox Christian	18	1997	6 years Bulgaria; In Athens 3 <sup>rd</sup> Gymnasium	--	Drug use; Bodily harm.	Hashish
21	31-06-2004*	Mario	Male	Albania	Orthodox Christian	17	1997	5 years in Albania; In Greece until 1 <sup>st</sup> Gymnasium	--	Burglaries; Thefts; Drug possession and trafficking; Assaults; Property damage.	Hashish Crack
22	10-7-2004*	Saadi	Male	Iraq	Orthodox Christian	16	2000	Primary school in Iraq.	Works as craftsman	Auto and motorbike thefts, joyriding.	Hashish
23	20-07-2004	Anestis (ethnic Greek)	Male	Albania	Orthodox Christian	19	1994	8 years in Greece	Works in constructions	Theft	--
24	09-09-2004	Klodian	Male	Albania	Orthodox Christian	18	1998	6 years in Albania.	Works full time in constructions	Petty theft.	--

25	29-09-2004	Jon	Male	Albania	Catholic Christian	16	1996	1 year in Albania; In Athens, was attending 3 <sup>rd</sup> Gymnasium	Occasionally works in constructions.	Petty theft.	--
26	07-10-2004	Natalia (ethnic Greek)	Female	Kazakhstan	Orthodox Christian	19	1992	In Greece only until 2 <sup>nd</sup> evening Gymnasium	Worked in factories	Assault; Shoplifting; thefts from vehicles.	Hashish; LSD; Heroin.
27	15-10-2004	Milto	Male	Albania	Muslim	15	2000	Attends Gymnasium	--	Assault	--
28	02-12-2004	Gentir	Male	Albania	Orthodox Christian	16	1995	In Greece, school until 2 <sup>nd</sup> Gymnasium.	Works in a car station	Theft from vehicle; auto theft.	Hashish
29	02-12-2004	Stefan	Male	Ethnic Polish, born in Greece	Orthodox Christian	18	--	9 years in Poland; In Athens evening school.	Works in open markets. Served time in juvenile institution.	Theft from vehicles, joyriding of motorbikes; shoplifting.	Hashish
30	07-12-2004*	Danny	Male	Albania	Orthodox Christian	17	1990	10 years in Greece, until 1 <sup>st</sup> of TEE	--	Burglaries; Thefts; Drug possession and trafficking; Assaults; Property damage.	Hashish Crack
31	08-12-2004	Marco	Male	Albania	Catholic Christian	17	1996	Attends vocational school	Works full time	Assault; Bodily harm.	--
32	10-12-2004	Panayiotis (ethnic Greek)	Male	Albania	Orthodox Christian	19	1991	Eight years of school in Greece.	Imprisoned	Burglaries; Assaults.	--
33	15-12-2004	Pyrno*	Male	Albania	Muslim	18	1992	Primary school in Albania; No school in Greece	Works occasionally in construction sites.	Petty theft	--

34	15-02-2004	Erlind	Male	Albania	Muslim	14	1997	No school in Albania, or in Greece.	Works in construction industry and open markets.	Bicycle theft	--
35	22-12-2004	Stavro	Male	Albania	Orthodox Christian	17	1990	Attends vocational school	--	Petty theft; Traffic violations	--
36	22-12-2004	Nantia (ethnic Greek)	Female	Kazakhstan	Orthodox Christian	18	1990	School in Greece; Dropped out at 1 <sup>st</sup> of Gymnasium	Works in cafes or the clothing industry	Assault; thefts; shoplifting.	Hashish; Heroin

**\* Interviewed twice**

---

## **Appendix III: The 2003 UMHRI school-survey**

---

### **1. Introduction**

Various parts of this thesis are based on analyses of self-report data which were collected by the Mental Health Research Institute (UMHRI) during March and April 2003. In March 2004, UMHRI offered me access to the subset of survey data which was collected within the area of greater Athens. Since the sampling method of my own school survey was theoretical and the resulting sample non-probabilistic, there was a need to anchor the findings of this small-scale survey within a reference framework that is representative of the overall situation in Greater Athens.

The state-of-the-art methodology of 2003 UMHRI and its large sample of 2,799 Athenian students ideally served the above-mentioned need. However, to provide a straightforward comparison of the two survey findings remains a complicated task. Discrepancies are not solely due to obvious area differences (central Athens vs. greater Athens), but also due to the fact that the surveys were not concurrent, and that the age structure of their samples was not the same: namely, 30.8 percent of the 2003 UMHRI respondents attended the 3<sup>rd</sup> grade of Gymnasium. In the 2004-05 inner-city survey all students attended the 2<sup>nd</sup> grade of Lyceum.

### **Sampling**

A multi-stage random sampling procedure was used by the 2003 UMHRI school-survey. On the first stage, Greece was divided into four geographical strata. It was the geographical stratum of greater Athens (prefectures of Athens and Piraeus) provided the analysed here dataset. In the next stage of sampling secondary schools were randomly drawn, proportionally to their size. The final stage was the random selection of the surveyed classes within each school (Hibell et al. 2004: 247). Thus, the 2003 UMHRI sub-dataset I analysed can be considered as representative of the Athenian stratum, and offered valid estimates.

### **Measures**

As in most other research of this type, the UMHRI schedule collected self-report data for a range of problem behaviours and explanatory factors. The questionnaire consisted of a



comprehensive battery of questions that include sociodemographic items, academic performance, leisure time activities, self-reported delinquency, problems with the police, use of 15 drug-classes, familial relations, victimisation items, and psychological well-being. The response to incidence questions was a categorical set of frequencies: 'never', '1-2 times', '3-5 times', '6-9 times', '10-19 times', '20-39 times', and finally '40 times or more'. The recall period for such frequency scales was lifetime, last-12-months, and last-30-days. The sections of the questionnaire exploring the use of cigarettes, alcohol, and drugs were extensive and comprehensive.

Equally comprehensive was the section aiming to pin down respondents' ethnicity. The main relevant question asked about students' 'birth country'. Other questions asked about the nationality of the father, and the mother. However, the absence of a follow up multiple choice question asking whether subjects' citizenship is 'Greek', 'foreign', or '*omogenis*' does not facilitates the distinction between students of foreign birth and nationality, 'ethnic' Greeks, and naturalised '*palinnostoudes*'. The 33-page-long questionnaire resulted in the development of 372 variables. Obviously, only few of them were analysed in the limited space of the current thesis.

## **2. The profile of survey respondents**

The 2003 UMHRI school survey adopted the methodology of ESPAD, which was a European-wide study of secondary school students (Hibell et al. 2000). The Athenian sample of the survey was large enough to contain a substantial number of students of foreign nationality. From the particular geographical area and classes a total of 3,019 students filled out the questionnaire. The inclusion of four evening schools into the sampling framework resulted in the presence of adults in the original sample. Since the nature of my research focuses on adolescents and young adults, it was necessary to exclude such cases. Eventually all implemented checks for outliers reduced the size of the sample to 2,799 respondents.

### ***The 'ethnic' composition of students***

The design of the survey did not anticipate the oversampling of any 'ethnic' student group. It is the large size of the overall sample itself that produces substantial numbers of students of Albanian ancestry, which was the major ethnic migrant group within the Greek secondary schools during my fieldwork. The other large 'ethnic' group consisted of

students born in former USSR (FSU). All other ethnonational origins were represented in smaller numbers and thus had to be aggregated.

**Table I: Demographic Characteristics of 2003 UMHRI Respondents**

KEY CHARACTERISTICS	N	PERCENTAGE
<b>SEX</b>		
<i>Male</i>	1,327	47.4
<i>Female</i>	1,472	52.6
<b>COUNTRY OF BIRTH</b>		
<i>Greece</i>	2,634	86.2
<i>Albania</i>	166	6.1
<i>FSU</i>	109	4.0
<i>Other</i>	102	3.7
<b>LENGTH OF RESIDENCE OF FOREIGN BORN</b>		
<i>Less than One Year</i>	5	1.4
<i>One to Three Years</i>	41	11.2
<i>Four to Six Years</i>	68	18.6
<i>Seven or More Years</i>	252	68.8
<b>TYPE OF SCHOOL</b>		
<i>General</i>	2,444	87.3
<i>Technical/Vocational</i>	355	12.7
<b>GRADE</b>		
<i>3<sup>rd</sup> Gymnasium</i>	863	30.8
<i>1<sup>st</sup> Lyceum</i>	740	26.4
<i>2<sup>nd</sup> Lyceum</i>	672	24.0
<i>3<sup>rd</sup> Lyceum</i>	524	18.7

Eventually, four categories were developed: students born in Greece, born in Albania (this category includes ethnic-Greeks of Albania), students born in one of the countries that used to be part of the former USSR (likely to include a number of Pontian palinnostoudes), students born in 'other' countries of both the economically developed and the so-called Third World. The sample includes more female than male students. This is especially true for the 'ethnic' groups of immigrant students (those born in Albania, former USSR, and the so-called Third World).

### 3. The quality of 2003 UMHRI self-report data

Although the self-report method has advantages over other approaches of measuring delinquent and problem behaviours, like the study of arrestees or institutionalised youths, it

has been frequently criticized. For instance, Huizinga and Elliot have warned us that the quality of self-report data (SRD) cannot be taken for granted (1986).

**(a) Representativeness**

A known problem of student self-report surveys is the undersampling of the disadvantaged populations (i.e.: school dropouts or truants), among which (a) ethnic minority youth is overrepresented and (b) more delinquents or drug users can be found (Junger-Tas and Marshall 1999; Kandel et al. 1986; Rutter and Giller 1983: 31; Wallace et al. 2002). Consequently, this type of study captures information mainly related to less serious offences (Bowling and Phillips 2002; Hindelang et al. 1979). In order to address such sampling bias problems, a part of the present study employs 2003 UMHRI school data, and focuses on persistent young offenders and their experiences (refer to sections 6.3.3 & 7.4.3). Thus, the effect that the partial coverage of the population of immigrant youth has on the prevalence estimations can be addressed by extrapolating from this subset of data.

**(b) Reliability**

Most US self-report student-based studies have arrived at similar findings regarding ethnic / racial differences in drug use (Biafora and Zimmerman 1998). Since such findings are replicated across studies and time, they can be considered as reliable (Wallace and Bachman 1993). In the framework of the current study, threats to reliability of the inner-city survey findings were effectively addressed by comparing them with corresponding findings of the 2003 UMHRI school survey. It was found that these studies were roughly consistent. Whether such findings can also be considered as valid is however a question that is much more difficult to answer.

**(c) Validity**

Particularly relevant to the present study is the possibility of differential validity, meaning that the validity of SRD measures might vary across 'ethnic' groups. Several studies found that minority youths tend to underreport their delinquent activities (Hindelang et al. 1981; Huizinga and Elliott 1986; Junger 1989; Ramsay and Percy 1996) or marijuana use (Mench and Kandel 1988). For instance, ethnic minority respondents refused more frequently than whites to complete offending and drug use items of the British Crime Survey (Bowling and Phillips 2002; Phillips and Bowling 2002). In addition, Junger-Tas has argued that SRD validity of recently arrived immigrant groups may be low (1994).

However, there is a growing literature which attests to the validity of ethnic differences in self-reported drug-use (Harrison 1997; Wallace and Bachman 1993). Moreover, there is evidence that underreporting by minority students is less extensive when a self-completed questionnaire is administered, rather than when questions are given and responded to verbally (Killias 1997; Mench and Kandel 1988). Fortunately, the self-completed method was employed in both inner-city and UMHRI school surveys. Since it is impossible to examine the validity of the observed ethnic differences against any external criterion, the only option is inferential: namely to examine the surveys' internal indications of validity, such as missing data analysis, the reported willingness to answer honestly, attitudes towards adherence to rules and actual involvement in delinquency and substance abuse.

The following section employs such testing methods in relation to UMHRI survey data, with favourite results for internal validity.

### 3.1 Attitudes towards the rules and construct validity

Three questions were aiming to explore students' attitude towards adherence to rules. The first asked them to indicate whether they agree or disagree with the statement: "You can break most rules if they don't seem to apply". The second statement was "I follow whatever rules I want to follow", and the third "In fact there are very few absolute rules in life".

**Table II: Chi-square of students proportion agreeing with the statement by ethnic group**

	STATEMENTS	GREECE	ALBANIA	FSU	OTHER	TOTAL	P
MALES	YOU CAN BREAK MOST RULES	48.5	51.9	60.0	60.5	49.4	NS
	I FOLLOW THE RULES I WANT TO	64.9	83.3	82.9	63.2	66.3	.006
	VERY FEW ABSOLUTE RULES	74.8	68.6	81.3	75.0	74.7	NS
FEMALES	YOU CAN BREAK MOST RULES	38.1	35.4	52.8	59.4	39.2	.015
	I FOLLOW THE RULES I WANT TO	57.3	56.1	66.7	70.3	58.0	NS
	VERY FEW ABSOLUTE RULES	77.4	74.7	89.8	80.6	77.8	NS

*Data are expressed as percentages, chi square tests for df=3*

The response set ranged from "totally agree", to "agree", "don't know", "rather disagree", and "totally disagree". Table II illustrates the proportion of students who either "totally" or "rather" agree with the statements. The first statement is the most directly linked to rule breaking. Almost half of the male students and two fifths of the female adopted a rebellious stance towards rules, which is typical for many adolescents. The proportion of immigrant-origin boys agreeing with the violation of most rules was greater than that of

indigenous boys, but the between 'ethnic' groups differences were not found significant. On the contrary, significant were tested the differences between girls born in "other countries" and those born in Greece or Albania ( $p < .03$ ).

Towards adhering to whatever rules they like were leaning 66.3 of the boys and 58.0 of the girls. In this respect significant was the difference between the boys of Albanian or USSR background and the boys born in Greece ( $p < .005$ ). On the whole, the findings indicate that previously presented 'ethnic' differences in self-reported offending is related in mostly consistent ways to students' attitudes towards rule breaking.

### 3.2 Reliability of findings concerning lifetime use of substances

For many classes of psychotropic substances the UMHRI questionnaire contains two types of questions. The first is a direct lifetime prevalence question for the specific substance, and the second is one that asks the age at the first use for the substance. Since the second question offers the response option "never", it provides an alternative way to measure lifetime prevalence. The prevalence rates that the two questions generated were generally not the same. *Table III* illustrates the inconsistencies between the two measures of lifetime prevalence.

**Table III: Inconsistency between questions related to lifetime prevalence of substance use**

	Question 1*		Question 2**		Difference
	N	%	N	%	N
CIGARETTES	1,511	55.4	1,509	55.8	-2
BEEN DRUNK	1,391	51.0	1,383	50.7	8
CANNABIS	278	10.3	275	10.2	3
TRANQUILLISERS	130	4.7	119	4.4	11
ECSTASY	57	2.1	49	2.1	8
HEROIN	19	0.7	14	0.6	5

\*Question 1: Self reported lifetime prevalence for the substance

\*\*Question 2: Age at the first use of the substance

A reasonable explanation of the lower prevalence rates that the second question systematically generated for most substances, is the one offered by Hibell *et al* (2000): Some students, who had tried a drug once or twice, do not define themselves as users, and thus respond "never" to the questions about the age of first use. In general, the inconsistency between the two measures is very low and thus the findings can be considered as *very reliable*. As expected, the more socially accepted the use of a substance the lower is the

level of the observed inconsistency. Thus, the difference is next to zero for cigarettes, and relatively very small for the use of alcohol or cannabis. Drugs with lower prevalence demonstrated relatively higher inconsistencies.

Students of foreign nationality were more likely than Greeks to underreport their drug involvement in the second question. Thus, the answers given by immigrant-origin students to the drug-use questions have to be considered somehow less reliable than those offered by students born in Greece.

### **3.3 Missing values**

Previous research suggests that members of racial minorities are more likely to fail to complete questions about delinquency (Hindelang et al. 1981; Natalino 1981 cited in Junger-Tas and Marshall 1999) or drug use (Wallace and Bachman 1993). Although the non-completion rate in the UMHRI school survey is comparatively very low it is still possible that it has introduced bias in the estimated ethnic differences in the prevalence of problem behaviour. Thus the examination of the study's missing data was necessary. The question about the last-12-month cannabis use had the highest non-completion rate, for it was left unanswered by 41 students or 1.5 per cent of the sample. The vast majority of them were born in Greece. Of Albanian origin were the one-tenth of those who did not supply an answer to the particular question. Consequently, unlikely the previously cited US studies, the overrepresentation of ethnic minority youth among those who failed to answer the drug-use question was quite limited. In the question about "police troubles" the number of non-responses was much smaller (23 cases), but still the distribution of nationalities similar. However 14 out of the 23 who have chosen not to answer the question had also left blank the questions about their country of birth and the parents' nationality. The same pattern was roughly the case for the offending items of the questionnaire.

### **3.4 Reported willingness to answer honestly**

Giving a false answer in a self-report survey is another way of concealing deviant activities. A chance to examine students' willingness to give true answers is offered by the hypothetical question "If you ever used marijuana or hashish, do you think you would have said so in this questionnaire?" The first response option to the question which is that "I already said that I have used it" gave students a chance to revise the report they had made previously in the direct question about lifetime experience of cannabis use. The overall extent of inconsistency was found small, but somewhat higher for boys born in Albania,

the FSU. The other four answering options of the same hypothetical question about honesty that range from "probably yes" to "definitely no" allowed a direct measurement of ethnic differences in the willingness to admit the particular problem behaviour. The proportion of non-drug-using students who stated that in the case of having used cannabis they definitely would not admit it, was 5.7 per cent for the Greece-born, 12.3 per cent for the Albania-born, 9.9 per cent for the FSU-born, and 12.2 per cent for those born in other countries (Pearson chi-square=15.9,  $p$  level< .001). One possible interpretation is that students of immigrant descent feel to a greater degree than their Greek counterparts that cannabis use is socially undesirable. However, it also seems reasonable to assume that immigrant youths, in an effort either to distance themselves from popular negative stereotypes or to avoid perceived risks associated with providing sensitive information, were more hesitant than Greek respondents to reveal involvement with deviant activities.

---

## Appendix IV: Questionnaire of 2004-05 Inner-City School Survey

---

### **Pyetësi...**

Pyetësi që ke në duar ka për qëllim studimin e mënyrës së jetesës dhe të problemeve të adoleshentëve të moshës tënde.

Nuk bëhet fjalë këtu për ndonjë testim njohurish, për pasojë nuk mund të bëhet fjalë dhe për përgjigje të sakta apo të gabuara. Ajo që na intereson është mendimi juaj dhe ato që ju do të deklaroni në pyetësor. Për këtë do të të luteshim të lexosh me kujdes pyetjet dhe të përgjigjesh me sinqeritet.

Të gjitha përgjigjet e tua do të mbeten të mirëbesueshme. Përveç kësaj pyetësi është anonim. Për këtë do të të luteshim të mos shkruash emrin tënd gjëkund.

Në asnjë mënyrë nuk do të bëhet e mundur njohja jote nga përgjigjet që do të japësh në këtë pyetësor.

### **...dhe si do ta plotësosh**

Në shumicën e pyetjeve mund të përgjigjesh duke shënuar një X në kutinë që është ngjitur me pyetjen. Që tju përgjigjesh të gjitha pyetjeve nuk do të të duhen më tepër nga 45 minuta. Në qoftë se nuk kupton ndonjë pyetje, personi që meret me këtë studim do të të ndihmojë.

Pjesëmarrja jote në këtë studim është fakultative. Në qoftë se për ndonjë arsye nuk dëshiron të përgjigjesh për ndonjë pyetje, është e preferueshme ta lesh vendin bosh.

Të falenderojmë për bashkëpunimin tënd.



## A. About you

1) Are you male or female?

Male

☐ <sub>01</sub>

Female

☐ <sub>02</sub>

2) In which year were you born?

1 9

3) Your month of birth?

Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. May June July Aug. Sept. Oct. Nov. Dec.

☐ <sub>01</sub>☐ <sub>02</sub>☐ <sub>03</sub>☐ <sub>04</sub>☐ <sub>05</sub>☐ <sub>06</sub>☐ <sub>07</sub>☐ <sub>08</sub>☐ <sub>09</sub>☐ <sub>10</sub>☐ <sub>11</sub>☐ <sub>12</sub>

4) In which country were you born? ▶ Please tick only one

Greece

☐ <sub>01</sub>

Poland

☐ <sub>06</sub>

Albania

☐ <sub>02</sub>

Pakistan

☐ <sub>07</sub>

Bulgaria

☐ <sub>03</sub>

Egypt

☐ <sub>08</sub>

Rumania

☐ <sub>04</sub>

Philippines

☐ <sub>09</sub>

Former Soviet Union

☐ <sub>05</sub>

Other

☐ <sub>10</sub>

If other, please specify:

5) Which of the following best describes your religious beliefs? ▶ Please tick only one

Christian Orthodox

☐ <sub>01</sub>

Muslim

☐ <sub>04</sub>

Other Christian Dogma

☐ <sub>02</sub>

Other religion

☐ <sub>05</sub>

Hindu

☐ <sub>03</sub>

None

☐ <sub>06</sub>

6) How many years have you lived in Greece (either with or without your family)?

All my life: ☐ <sub>01</sub>

Some time: ☐ <sub>02</sub>

Please specify No of years:

7) Which is your citizenship? ▶ tick all that apply.

Greek

☐ <sub>01</sub>

Foreigner

☐ <sub>02</sub>

If other, please specify:

## B. About school

8) In general, how much do you like or dislike school? ▶ Please tick only one

Like it a lot	Like it a little	Dislike it a little	Dislike it a lot	Don't know
<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>01</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>02</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>03</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>04</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>05</sub>

9) In general, how well or poorly do you get on with the other students?

Very well	Fairly well	Neither well nor poorly	Not so well	Not at all well
<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>01</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>02</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>03</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>04</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>05</sub>

10) What were your average grades during the past school term?

18 – 20	14 - 17	10 - 13	Below 10
<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>01</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>02</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>03</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>04</sub>

11) During the last six months, have you stayed out of school for a whole day without permission?

No ☐<sub>01</sub>      Yes ☐<sub>02</sub>

▶ if NO, skip to question 13.

12) If YES, about how often did you play truant from school?

1 day a term	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>01</sub>
1 day a month	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>02</sub>
2-3 days a month	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>03</sub>
1 day a week	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>04</sub>
2-3 days a week	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>05</sub>
More than 3 days a week	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>06</sub>
It varies	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>07</sub>

13) How old were you when you first truanted for a whole day from school?

10 years old or less	11 years old	12 years old	13 years old	14 years old	15 years old	16 years old or more
<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>01</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>02</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>03</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>04</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>05</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>06</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>07</sub>

14) Have you ever been expelled from school for one day or more?

No ☐<sub>01</sub> Yes ☐<sub>02</sub>

► if YES, how many times:

15) Are you attending frontistirio (private tuition in mathematics, English etc )?

No ☐<sub>01</sub> Yes ☐<sub>02</sub>

16) How important do you think education is for your future? ► Tick the most appropriate option only.

Very important	Fairly important	Fairly unimportant	Very unimportant	Don't know
<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>01</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>02</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>03</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>04</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>05</sub>

17) Are you planning to continue studies after school?

Yes ☐<sub>01</sub> No ☐<sub>02</sub> Don't know ☐<sub>03</sub>

► if NO, skip to question 19

18) If YES, where you would like to go? ► Please tick only one box only.

TEI	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>01</sub>
UNIVERSITY	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>02</sub>
Other	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>03</sub>

► If OTHER, please describe:

### C. About your free time and friends

19) How many really close friends would you say you have? ► Please tick one box only.

0	1-2	3-4	5-6	More than 6
<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>01</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>02</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>03</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>04</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>05</sub>

20) How many of them have the same ethnic origin as you? ► Please tick one box only.

0	1-2	3-4	5-6	More than 6
<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>01</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>02</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>03</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>04</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>05</sub>

21) On an average day, how many hours do you spend with your friends after school:

No of hours:

22) In what language do you normally speak to friends outside school? ► Please, tick the most appropriate option only.

Greek ☐<sub>01</sub>

Other ☐<sub>02</sub>

23) How do you spend your spare time? Indicate which of the following you have done in the last 30 days. ► Tick all that apply.

Played sports. ☐<sub>01</sub>

Went cinema, or a concert. ☐<sub>02</sub>

Went to a football match or other sporting event ☐<sub>03</sub>

Had a ride with your moped or motorbike ☐<sub>04</sub>

Went out for a coffee with friends ☐<sub>05</sub>

Eaten out (in a fast food taverna etc) ☐<sub>06</sub>

Went to a party ☐<sub>07</sub>

Went to a bar, or club ☐<sub>08</sub>

Hung around in a square or a park ☐<sub>09</sub>

Played a musical instrument or take part in another hobby ☐<sub>10</sub>

Read a book that interests you ☐<sub>11</sub>

Played electronic games ☐<sub>12</sub>

Watched TV ☐<sub>13</sub>

None of the above ☐<sub>14</sub>

24) Of the friends you know the best, how many:

A. Are planning to quit school? ► Please tick only one box.

None of them    Some of them    Half of them    Most of them    All of them

☐<sub>01</sub>

☐<sub>02</sub>

☐<sub>03</sub>

☐<sub>04</sub>

☐<sub>05</sub>

B. Do things that might get them in trouble in school? ► Please tick only one box.

None of them    Some of them    Half of them    Most of them    All of them

☐<sub>01</sub>

☐<sub>02</sub>

☐<sub>03</sub>

☐<sub>04</sub>

☐<sub>05</sub>

25) In general, do you feel that are you treated fairly by your teachers?

Always	Mostly	Sometimes	Rarely	Never
<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>01</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>02</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>03</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>04</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>05</sub>

26) Have there been times, in the last 12 months, when you have been concerned about one of the following problems? ▶ Please tick only one box for each reason

		Often	Some Times	Never
I.	Lack of friends	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>01</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>02</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>03</sub>
II.	Lack of leisure time	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>01</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>02</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>03</sub>
III.	Lack of money	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>01</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>02</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>03</sub>
IV.	Racism because of your ethnic origin or religion	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>01</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>02</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>03</sub>

27) In the last 12 months, has anyone threatened or insulted you out of home (excluding members of your family or relatives)?

No ☐<sub>01</sub> Yes ☐<sub>02</sub>

28) If yes, how often has this happened in the last 12 months?

Once	Twice	Three times or more
<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>01</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>02</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>03</sub>

29) In the last year, have you been attacked out or home and robbed, either by someone you know or by a stranger? (taken from you money, mobile phone, clothes etc);

No, never ☐<sub>01</sub> Yes ☐<sub>02</sub>

30) If yes, how often have you being attacked and robbed, in the last 12 months?

Once	Twice	Three times or more
<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>01</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>02</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>03</sub>

31) How well did you know him/her;

Very well	We have talked at some point	I have seen him before	Never saw him before
<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>01</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>02</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>03</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>04</sub>

## D. About offending

32) Have you ever experienced any of the following?

	No, never	Yes
I. Been stopped and checked by the police	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>01</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>02</sub>
II. Been arrested and charged by the police	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>01</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>02</sub>
III. Been convicted of a criminal offence	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>01</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>02</sub>
IV. Spent time in jail	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>01</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>02</sub>

33) Listed below are a number of things you might have done. For each one please indicate whether you have ever done it. Then, please indicate whether you have done it in the last 12 months or whether you have done it but not in last 12 months. ► Tick one box only for each line.

	Never Done	Done, in last 12 months	Done, but not in last 12 months
I. Driven a moped, motorcycle or car without licence	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>01</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>02</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>03</sub>
II. Driven a moped, a motorcycle or car knowing that you have drunk more than the legal amount of alcohol	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>01</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>02</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>03</sub>
III. Written or sprayed graffiti on walls or other surfaces	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>01</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>02</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>03</sub>
IV. Stolen anything from a shop, supermarket or department store worth more than € 5	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>01</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>02</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>03</sub>
V. Stolen anything out of a moped, motorcycle or car	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>01</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>02</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>03</sub>
VI. Bought or sold stolen goods	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>01</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>02</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>03</sub>
VII. Taken away a moped, motorcycle or bicycle without the owner's permission, not intending to give it back	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>01</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>02</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>03</sub>
VIII. Snatched anything from anybody	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>01</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>02</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>03</sub>
IX. Damaged or destroyed, something belonging to someone else (like a car, public telephone, bus etc)	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>01</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>02</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>03</sub>
X. Taken part in a fight in a public place (such as a football ground or in the street)	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>01</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>02</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>03</sub>
XI. Beaten or hurt someone to such an extent that you think or know that medical help or a doctor was needed	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>01</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>02</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>03</sub>
XII. Set fire, purposely or recklessly, to something not belonging to you	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>01</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>02</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>03</sub>

► if you never did any of these offences skip to question 34

**34) How old were you when you first did one of following?**

	<b>10 years old or less</b>	<b>11 years old</b>	<b>12 years old</b>	<b>13 years old</b>	<b>14 years old</b>	<b>15 years old</b>	<b>16 years old or more</b>
I. Driven a moped, motorcycle or car without licence	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>01</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>02</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>03</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>04</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>05</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>06</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>07</sub>
II. Driven a vehicle knowing that you have drunk more than the legal amount of alcohol	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>01</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>02</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>03</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>04</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>05</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>06</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>07</sub>
III. Written or sprayed graffiti on walls or other surfaces	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>01</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>02</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>03</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>04</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>05</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>06</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>07</sub>
IV. Stolen anything from a shop, supermarket or department store worth more than 5 €	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>01</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>02</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>03</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>04</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>05</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>06</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>07</sub>
V. Stolen anything out of a moped, motorcycle or car	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>01</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>02</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>03</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>04</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>05</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>06</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>07</sub>
VI. Bought or sold stolen goods	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>01</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>02</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>03</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>04</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>05</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>06</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>07</sub>
VII. Taken away a moped, or other vehicle without the owner's permission	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>01</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>02</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>03</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>04</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>05</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>06</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>07</sub>
VIII. Snatched anything from anybody	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>01</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>02</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>03</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>04</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>05</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>06</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>07</sub>
IX. Damaged or destroyed, something belonging to someone else	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>01</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>02</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>03</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>04</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>05</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>06</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>07</sub>
X. Taken part in a fight in a public place	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>01</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>02</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>03</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>04</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>05</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>06</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>07</sub>
XI. Beaten or hurt someone to such an extent that medical help or a doctor was needed	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>01</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>02</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>03</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>04</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>05</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>06</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>07</sub>
XII. Set fire, purposely or recklessly, to something not belonging to you	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>01</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>02</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>03</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>04</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>05</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>06</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>07</sub>

## F. About cigarettes

35) Have you ever smoked cigarettes? Which of the following statements best describes you?

- I have never smoked a cigarette ☐<sub>01</sub>    ▶ skip to the question 38
- Sometimes I smoke but only on special occasions ☐<sub>02</sub>
- I smoke regularly ☐<sub>03</sub>
- I used to smoked but now I have give it up ☐<sub>04</sub>

36) If you have smoked a cigarette during the last 30 days, how many cigarettes have you smoked on average?

- none ☐<sub>01</sub>
- Less than a cigarette per week. ☐<sub>02</sub>
- Less than a cigarette per day ☐<sub>03</sub>
- 1-5 cigarettes per day ☐<sub>04</sub>
- 6-10 cigarettes per day ☐<sub>05</sub>
- 11-20 cigarettes per day ☐<sub>06</sub>
- Over 20 cigarettes per day ☐<sub>07</sub>

37) How old were you when you:

- |                                 | 10<br>years old<br>or less             | 11<br>years<br>old                     | 12<br>years<br>old                     | 13<br>years<br>old                     | 14<br>years<br>old                     | 15<br>years<br>old                     | 16<br>years old or<br>more             |
|---------------------------------|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|
| I. Smoked your first cigarette? | <input type="checkbox"/> <sub>01</sub> | <input type="checkbox"/> <sub>02</sub> | <input type="checkbox"/> <sub>03</sub> | <input type="checkbox"/> <sub>04</sub> | <input type="checkbox"/> <sub>05</sub> | <input type="checkbox"/> <sub>06</sub> | <input type="checkbox"/> <sub>07</sub> |
| II. Started smoking regularly?  | <input type="checkbox"/> <sub>01</sub> | <input type="checkbox"/> <sub>02</sub> | <input type="checkbox"/> <sub>03</sub> | <input type="checkbox"/> <sub>04</sub> | <input type="checkbox"/> <sub>05</sub> | <input type="checkbox"/> <sub>06</sub> | <input type="checkbox"/> <sub>07</sub> |

## G. About Alcohol

38) I would like to ask about your views of alcohol? ▶ Please tick one box in response to each statement

- |   | Strongly<br>Agree                      | Agree                                  | I am<br>not sure                       | Disagree                               | Strongly<br>Disagree                   |
|---|--|--|--|--|--|
| I. Drinking alcohol is bad for the health                                       | <input type="checkbox"/> <sub>01</sub> | <input type="checkbox"/> <sub>02</sub> | <input type="checkbox"/> <sub>03</sub> | <input type="checkbox"/> <sub>04</sub> | <input type="checkbox"/> <sub>05</sub> |
| II. You can not go out with friends and have good time without drinking alcohol | <input type="checkbox"/> <sub>01</sub> | <input type="checkbox"/> <sub>02</sub> | <input type="checkbox"/> <sub>03</sub> | <input type="checkbox"/> <sub>04</sub> | <input type="checkbox"/> <sub>05</sub> |
| III. Drinking alcohol has no place in family life                               | <input type="checkbox"/> <sub>01</sub> | <input type="checkbox"/> <sub>02</sub> | <input type="checkbox"/> <sub>03</sub> | <input type="checkbox"/> <sub>04</sub> | <input type="checkbox"/> <sub>05</sub> |



	Strongly Agree	Agree	I am not sure	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
IV. Once you have started to drink is difficult to control the use of alcohol	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>01</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>02</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>03</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>04</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>05</sub>
V. Alcohol causes many road accidents	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>01</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>02</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>03</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>04</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>05</sub>
VI. Drinking alcohol is not as bad as people say	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>01</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>02</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>03</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>04</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>05</sub>
VII. Alcohol drinking is against my religious beliefs.	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>01</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>02</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>03</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>04</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>05</sub>
VIII. It is easier to make friends when you are drinking alcohol.	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>01</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>02</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>03</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>04</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>05</sub>

39) Listed below are different types of alcoholic drink. For each one please indicate whether you have used it the last 30 days, and if you have, how many times you have done so ► Please tick one box at each line

	none	1-2 times	3-5 times	6-9 times	10-19 times	20 –39 times	40 and above
I. Beer (a glass)	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>01</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>02</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>03</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>04</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>06</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>06</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>07</sub>
II. Wine (a glass)	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>01</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>02</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>03</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>04</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>05</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>06</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>07</sub>
III. Alcopops (a bottle)	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>01</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>02</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>03</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>04</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>05</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>06</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>07</sub>
IV. Whiskey, Vodka, Ouzo, Tsipouro or other spirit (a glass)	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>01</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>02</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>03</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>04</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>05</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>06</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>07</sub>

► if you are not drinking alcohol skip to question 42

40) If you had ever had an alcohol drink, how old were you when you had your first alcoholic drink;

10 years old or less	11 years old	12 years old	13 years old	14 years old	15 years old	16 years old or more
<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>01</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>02</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>03</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>04</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>05</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>06</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>07</sub>

41) How many times have you been drunk during the last 30 days?

None	1-2 times	3-5 times	6-9 times	More than 10 times
<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>01</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>02</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>03</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>04</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>05</sub>

## H. About other substances

42) I would like to ask about your views of cannabis (also known as hash, grass, marihuana and black)? ► Please tick one box for each statement to show how much you agree or disagree with it.

	Agree a lot	Agree a little	I am not sure	Disagree a little	Disagree a lot
I. Using cannabis is bad for the health	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>01</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>02</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>03</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>04</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>05</sub>
II. Using cannabis is not a problem	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>01</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>02</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>03</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>04</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>05</sub>
III. Regular use of cannabis affects people's abilities	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>01</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>02</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>03</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>04</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>05</sub>
IV. It is easier to make friends when you are using cannabis	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>01</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>02</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>03</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>04</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>05</sub>
V. Cannabis use brings troubles in ones life	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>01</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>02</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>03</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>04</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>05</sub>
VI. Those who sell cannabis should be prosecuted	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>01</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>02</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>03</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>04</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>05</sub>

43) Have you ever tried cannabis?

No, never ☐<sub>01</sub> Yes ☐<sub>02</sub>

► If NO, skip to question 46.

44) If YES, how many times?

	None	1-2 times	3-5 times	6-9 times	10-19 times	20-39 times	40 and above
I. In your life until today	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>01</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>02</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>03</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>04</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>05</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>06</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>07</sub>
II. During the last 30 days	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>01</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>02</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>03</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>04</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>05</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>06</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>07</sub>

45) How old were you when you smoked cannabis for first time;

10 years old or less	11 years old	12 years old	13 years old	14 years old	15 years old	16 years old or more
<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>01</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>02</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>03</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>04</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>05</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>06</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>07</sub>

46) Listed below are different drugs. Please answer to the following questions:

- Which of these drugs, if any, have you personally ever tried? ▪ Which of these drugs, if any, have you used during the last year? ▪ Which of these drugs, if any, have used during the last month?
- Please tick one box only for each drug

	Ever tried	Used in the last year	Used in the last month
I. Tranquillisers, or Barbiturates without prescription	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>01</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>02</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>03</sub>
II. Solvents (gas, glue, gasoline)	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>01</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>02</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>03</sub>
III. Ecstasy	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>01</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>02</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>03</sub>
IV. Anabolic steroids	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>01</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>02</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>03</sub>
V. Amphetamines	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>01</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>02</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>03</sub>
VI. Methadone	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>01</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>02</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>03</sub>
VII. Semeron	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>01</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>02</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>03</sub>
VIII. Cocaine	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>01</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>02</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>03</sub>
IX. Crack	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>01</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>02</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>03</sub>
X. Heroin	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>01</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>02</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>03</sub>
XI. Ketamine	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>01</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>02</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>03</sub>
XII. LSD	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>01</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>02</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>03</sub>

▪► If you have never tried any of the above drugs please skip to question 48

47) How old were you when you first tried:

	10 years old or less	11 years old	12 years old	13 years old	14 years old	15 years old	16 years old or more
I. Tranquillisers or barbiturates without prescription	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>01</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>02</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>03</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>04</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>05</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>06</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>07</sub>
II. Solvents (gas, glue, gasoline)	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>01</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>02</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>03</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>04</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>05</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>06</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>07</sub>
III. Ecstasy	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>01</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>02</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>03</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>04</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>05</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>06</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>07</sub>
IV. Anabolic steroids	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>01</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>02</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>03</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>04</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>05</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>06</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>07</sub>
V. Amphetamines, Speed	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>01</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>02</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>03</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>04</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>05</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>06</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>07</sub>

VI.	Methadone	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>01</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>02</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>03</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>04</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>05</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>06</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>07</sub>
VII.	Semerone	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>01</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>02</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>03</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>04</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>05</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>06</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>07</sub>
VIII.	Cocaine	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>01</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>02</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>03</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>04</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>05</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>06</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>07</sub>
IX.	Crack	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>01</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>02</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>03</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>04</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>05</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>06</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>07</sub>
X.	Heroin	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>01</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>02</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>03</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>04</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>05</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>06</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>07</sub>
XI.	Ketamine	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>01</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>02</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>03</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>04</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>05</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>06</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>07</sub>
XII.	LSD	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>01</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>02</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>03</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>04</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>05</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>06</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>07</sub>

48) Of your friends that you know best, how many use regularly the following substances:

**I. Alcohol**

None	A few	About half	Most of them	All of them	I do not know
<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>01</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>02</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>03</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>04</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>05</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>06</sub>

**II. Cannabis**

None	A few	About half	Most of them	All of them	I do not know
<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>01</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>02</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>03</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>04</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>05</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>06</sub>

**III. Other substances**

None	A few	About half	Most of them	All of them	I do not know
<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>01</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>02</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>03</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>04</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>05</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>06</sub>

**I. ABOUT YOUR FAMILY**

49) In general, how do you get on with your father?

Very well	Fairly well	Fairly badly	Very badly	I never see him
<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>01</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>02</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>03</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>04</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>05</sub>

50) In general, how do you get on with your mother?

Very well	Fairly well	Fairly badly	Very badly,	I never see her
<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>01</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>02</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>03</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>04</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>05</sub>

51) How often do you get upset with your parents because they do not understand what young people want or like?

Never

☐ <sub>01</sub>

Rarely

☐ <sub>02</sub>

Sometimes

☐ <sub>03</sub>

Usually

☐ <sub>04</sub>

Always

☐ <sub>05</sub>

52) How often do you eat an evening meal with either of your parents?

Every day

☐ <sub>01</sub>

5-6 times a week

☐ <sub>02</sub>

2-3 times a week

☐ <sub>03</sub>

Once or twice a week

☐ <sub>04</sub>

Once or twice a month

☐ <sub>05</sub>

3 – 4 times a year

☐ <sub>06</sub>

Less often

☐ <sub>07</sub>

Other

☐ <sub>08</sub>

53) How often do your parent(s) or guardian know where you are when you go out in the evening?

Always

☐ <sub>01</sub>

Usually

☐ <sub>02</sub>

Sometimes

☐ <sub>03</sub>

Rarely

☐ <sub>04</sub>

Never

☐ <sub>05</sub>

54) Have you ever run away from your home for one or more nights without your parents' permission and without telling them where you were going?

No

☐ <sub>01</sub>

Yes

☐ <sub>02</sub>

55) How important do you think is to avoid doing anything that could embarrass your family?

Very important

☐ <sub>01</sub>

Fairly important

☐ <sub>02</sub>

Fairly  
unimportant

☐ <sub>02</sub>

Very unimportant

☐ <sub>03</sub>

56) What is your father's job?

► please describe:

57) What is your mother's job?

► please describe:

**58) How often would you say your family has suffered financial hardships because of parent(s) unemployment during the past 12 months?**

<b>Always</b>	<b>Usually</b>	<b>Sometimes</b>	<b>Rarely</b>	<b>Never</b>
<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>01</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>02</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>03</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>04</sub>	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>05</sub>

**59) Who you currently living with? ► tick all that apply**

Father	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>01</sub>	Brother(s) / Sister(s)	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>05</sub>
Mother	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>02</sub>	Grandparent(s)	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>06</sub>
Step Father	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>03</sub>	Other relatives	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>07</sub>
Step Mother	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>04</sub>	Other people	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>08</sub>

**60) What is the highest level of schooling your father completed?**

No school at all	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>01</sub>	Completed secondary vocational school	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>05</sub>
Some primary school	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>02</sub>	Graduated from post-secondary vocational education	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>06</sub>
Completed lower secondary school	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>03</sub>	Graduated from college or university	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>07</sub>
Graduated from upper secondary school	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>04</sub>	Postgraduate studies	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>08</sub>

**61) What is the highest level of schooling your mother completed?**

No school at all	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>01</sub>	Completed secondary vocational school	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>05</sub>
Some primary school	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>02</sub>	Graduated from post-secondary vocational education	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>06</sub>
Completed lower secondary school	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>03</sub>	Graduated from college or university	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>07</sub>
Graduated from upper secondary school	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>04</sub>	Postgraduate studies	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>08</sub>

**62) In which country were your parents born? ► tick one or two boxes.**

Greece	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>01</sub>	Poland	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>06</sub>
Albania	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>02</sub>	Pakistan	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>07</sub>
Bulgaria	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>03</sub>	Egypt	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>08</sub>
Rumania	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>04</sub>	Philippines	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>09</sub>
Former Soviet Union	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>05</sub>	Other	<input type="checkbox"/> <sub>10</sub>

If other, please specify:

### ***J. About work***

**63) During the last 12 months, have you had a job, while you were attending school?**

Yes ☐ <sub>01</sub>

No ☐ <sub>02</sub>

► *If NO skip to question 67*

**64) On average, how many hours per week do you work, during the last 12 months?**

**No of hours:**

**65) What is your main reason for working? ► *Tick the most appropriate option only.***

To make some extra money ☐ <sub>01</sub>

Because it is interesting to work ☐ <sub>02</sub>

To stop me from being bored ☐ <sub>03</sub>

Because it might lead to a full-time job ☐ <sub>04</sub>

Helping out in family's budget ☐ <sub>05</sub>

Other ☐ <sub>06</sub>

**66) What is the longest period of time you had a job?**

**No of months:**

**67) How easy or difficult was to understand the questions of this questionnaire?**

**Easy**

**Neither easy  
or difficult**

**Difficult**

☐ <sub>01</sub>

☐ <sub>02</sub>

☐ <sub>03</sub>

*Thank you for your time*

---

## Appendix V: The Greek Youth Justice System

---

The first separate Greek juvenile court started to operate in Athens just before WW II with the enactment of Act 2135/1939 (Spinellis 1992: 90). Already from its early days, the operation of the Greek juvenile system has been mainly guided by the principle of child welfare (Courakis 2004: 228). However, this welfare orientation was solidified in legislation only in the 1950s. Furthermore, the contemporary Greek juvenile justice's overarching welfare orientation dictates that minors' best interests are served by minimum *state intervention*, the preference *for treatment over punishment*, and the *special and individualised* character of juvenile offenders' treatment (Petoussi and Stavrou 1996; Spinellis 1992:35-41). These directing principles are coupled with the safeguarding of young people's individual rights in the court and the aim of prevention of delinquent behaviour, though in a non-punitive way (Spinellis and Tsitsoura 2006)<sup>161</sup>. Evidence of the Greek juvenile justice system's tradition of tolerance is offered by the 2003 survey of Pitsela and her colleagues. Only one out of three surveyed young offenders who had experienced contact with a juvenile court considers his/her treatment as stern. An equal proportion (28 per cent) feel that the court's disposition was fair and 15 per cent as lenient (Pitsela et al. 2003).

According to the recent reform of juvenile justice legislation, which was introduced by Act 3189/2003, children aged below eight years are not subject to Penal Law and are under the jurisdiction of welfare services. Adolescents eight to thirteen years of age are not considered criminally liable (Art. 126 PC) and thus the juvenile courts can only impose reformatory or therapeutic measures on them. Under exceptional circumstances related to the commission of serious penal offences, only youths of the age bracket 13-18 years old (Art 127 PC) are penally liable. In general, the sanctioned behaviours are the same for minors as they are for adults, for the Greek Penal Code does not define status offences. The only 'special' behaviour that Greek legislation regulates is related to the admission of under-aged youths in games-rooms (Spinellis 1992).

---

<sup>161</sup> However, as in every other country, the operation of Greek juvenile justice constantly accommodates inherent tensions between those two guiding principles (see Courakis 2004: 253; Smith 2005a)



In line with juvenile justice practices in other countries, the Greek constitution (96 par. 1 C) guarantees that the trial of youthful defendants is not public, but is conducted behind 'closed doors' (Spinellis 1992: 98). The only persons present in the judicial hearing are the juvenile judge, the juvenile public prosecutor, family members, the defence attorney, the probation officer and the defendant. To a considerable extent the procedures of the juvenile courts are non-formal and non-threatening and the judges are provided with extensive discretionary powers.

Significant to critical stages of the process is the role of the probation officers. Actually the 'Probation Service' is located in the seat of the juvenile court of Athens and constitutes an integral part of it. It is a small unit, which in 2003 was staffed with 15 probation officers. Arguably the term 'probation officer' does not offer an accurate description of their role (Troianou-Loula 1999: 165). Some writers prefer to translate the Greek term describing these state employees as 'juvenile supervisors' (Petoussi and Stavrou 1996). Among their statutory pre-trial duties (Presidential Degree 49/1979) is to interview and sometimes visit the home of the referred youth, and thus to conduct 'social research' on the life-circumstances, familial functioning, health history, school performance and psychological traits of the referred youth and to compile a 'social enquiry' report. Within their report probation officers also make judgments about youth's character, attitudes, and motivations that influence the outcome of legal processing. Thus their confidential report, which is filed with the judge, ends up with suggestions on the most appropriate treatment. The significance of probation officer's report and recommendations for the trial of minors emanates from the prevailing welfare orientation of juvenile justice in Greece. The judges have to take into consideration the 'social inquiry' report and probation officers' suggestion, for their decision has to be relevant to the 'moral character', the socio-psychological profile and the needs of the defendant. In the case that the imposed by the court measure is formal probation, after the hearing the same officer who conducted the initial 'social inquiry' is assigned the supervision of the youth and thus has regular meetings with the young person and his/her parents (Troianou-Loula 1999: 189-202).

The bulk of the Greek youth courts' dispositions consists of non-institutional measures (Pitsela 1988: 155; Spinellis 1992:125). The range of reformative, educational, and therapeutic measures, available to the juvenile judge was widened in 2003 by the youth justice reform (Act 3189/2003). The new law also introduced provisions of diversion and mediation (Spinellis and Tsitsoura 2006). However, most of the new measures remain

theoretical because of the inadequate reorganisation of the existing services and absence of the new institutions that are necessary for their implementation.

## Appendix VI: The Central Municipality of Athens: Relative Residential Concentration of Immigrants



This map was developed by D. Vaiou *et al.* (2007) and was published in the Greek daily Kathimerini (10-06-2007). It is based on 2001 census data and illustrates the ratio of concentration of immigrants in each city-block to the average concentration of immigrants in the 59 municipalities of the Athens' conurbation.