Explaining irredentism: the case of Hungary and its transborder minorities in Romania and Slovakia

by

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DECLARATION

I hereby declare that the work presented in this thesis is entirely my own.

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This thesis seeks to explain irredentism by identifying the set of variables that determine its occurrence. To do so it provides the necessary definition and comparative analytical framework, both lacking so far, and thus establishes irredentism as a field of study in its own right.

The thesis develops a multi-variate explanatory model that is generalisable yet succinct. It builds critically on Donald Horowitz's theory of irredentism (1985;1991) which, like many studies of ethno-nationalism, underperforms due to a bias towards rationalism, materialism and individualism. The present study improves explanatory value by identifying three further variables that tackle ethno-territorial retrieval on its own terms. It argues that irredentism is primarily determined by shared ethno-national identity and the political system factors that condition its politicisation domestically and internationally. The resulting combined model is applied in two, variable-centred parts. First, it is quantitatively tested on a dataset of irredentism which the thesis collates based on its novel definition of irredentism. Second, the theory is applied in a historic case study of so-called "inconsistent irredentism" (Saideman 1998), i.e. an instance where retrieval was abandoned in an outwardly identical setting and therefore must result from factor change over time. The chosen example is that of the Hungarian irredenta in the interwar period (1920-1940), contrasted with its absence in the post-communist era (1989-2005). To enhance generalisability, the thesis adds a comparison across space by examining Hungary and not one, but two transborder Magyar minorities (in Southern Slovakia and Transylvania).

By offering a comprehensive definition of irredentism this thesis unifies previously disjointed cases for analysis. It avoids a rationalist and materialist bias in favour of what genuinely matters: namely the ethno-national bond and the factors shaping its politicisation. Because this approach does greater justice to ethno-national movements it furnishes a more explicative, generalisable and, potentially, predictive model of irredentism.

3

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Raphael, your belief in me has been staunch and unwavering. Thank you for your precious love, your sense of humour and wonderful loyalty. You have taught me so much.

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I dedicate this thesis to my grandparents György Mátyás Füzesi and Rebeka "Gabi" Füzesi (née Galambos).

TABLE OF CONTENTS

6

8

11

LIST OF MAPS

LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES

ACRONYMS

CSO / KSH

Központi Statisztikai Hivatal / Central Statistical Office (CSO) of the Republic of Hungary

FIDESZ

Fiatal Demokraták Szövetsége / Alliance of Young Democrats (party in contemporary Hungary)

FKGP

Független Kisgazda Párt / Independent Smallholders Party (party in both interwar and contemporary Hungary)

HTMH

Határon Túli Magyarok Hivatala / Government Office for Transborder Hungarians / Government Office for Hungarians Abroad

MÁÉRT

Magyar Állandó Értekezlet / Hungarian Standing Committee (contemporary body comprising transborder Magyar organisations and Hungarian government representatives)

MDF

Magyar Demokrata Fórum / Hungarian Democratic Forum (party in contemporary Hungary)

MIÉP	*Magyar Igazság és Élet Pártja* / Hungarian Justice and Life Party (in contemporary Hungary)
MKP	*Magyar Koalíció Pártja* / Party of Hungarian Coalition (in post-communist Slovakia)
MSZP	*Magyar Szocialista Párt* / Hungarian Socialist Party (party in contemporary Hungary)
MVSZ	*Magyarok Világszövetsége* / World Federation of Hungarians
NIT	*Népies Irodalmi Társaság* / Association for Popular Literature (interwar Hungary's secret irredentist ministry for Transylvania)
OMP	*Országos Magyar Párt* / National Hungarian Party (in interwar Romania)
RMDSZ	*Romániai Magyar Demokrata Szövetség* / Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (DAHR) (in contemporary Romania)
SZDSZ	*Szabad Demokraták Szövetsége* / Alliance of Free Democrats (party in contemporary Hungary)

Introduction

> *"If Poles should now march into Danzig or Czechs into Reichenbach, the first thing to do is to train a German irredentist movement. I myself cannot do this, for reasons of health I am unsuitable. But every nationalist must do it. Irredenta means: nationalism based upon revolutionary violent means."*
>
> Max Weber, 1918[1]

On the stuff World Wars are made of

More than eighty years after Max Weber had thus urged for an irredenta that Hitler was to implement, the citizens of Erevan cut down the last trees of Armenia's capital in order to survive the harsh winter of 1991. For the sake of retrieving their ethnic brethren from adjacent Azerbaijan they had accepted war and penury. Newly independent Armenia was also undeterred by the complicated military operation this involved, occupying an Azeri populated corridor in order to reach the kindred enclave of Nagorno Karabach. At about the same time, the Milosevic government in Belgrade warned Yugoslavia's secessionist republics that it would prevent them from taking along local Serbs as stranded minorities. The latter in turn readied themselves to join their ethnic parent state by whatever means this would require. The following years illustrated their respective determination to achieve this goal, notwithstanding human sacrifice, economic ruin and the broad array of international sanctions.

Irredentism is fascinating. Few other ethno-national movements elicit such passions, such a willingness for sacrifice. More than any other situation of communal politics it builds on the imperative to remedy the fragmentation of an ethnic group and of its ancestral territory. Irredentist folklore frequently

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[1] Letter to Professor Goldstein, November 13, 1918, quoted in Dronberger (1971:248).

expresses this idea in metaphors of physical truncation, like the Somali song which asks "how can an amputated man sleep comfortably at night?" (Neuberger 1991:99). Irredentism is a simultaneously puzzling and yet forceful, affirmation of nationalism. It challenges our conventions about self-determination as coterminous with secession, as an ethno-national group's pursuit of a sovereign state unit. Rather than independence it is here unitary statehood, the Gellnerian congruence between group and state, that matters. Retrieval is thus also the clearest rejection of being ruled by ethnic strangers. More than any other confrontation between an ethnic minority and its host state, irredentism signifies the latter's incapacity to retain a minority's political consent and loyalty. These are not only withdrawn, but *transferred* onto another state which, because of its kindred nature, is deemed more legitimate. All this seems especially remarkable in an age where many see the state as increasingly irrelevant, ethnicity as irrational, and nationalism as outdated. Finally, irredentism has proven more explosive than any other form of ethnic conflict. Arguably the cause of both World Wars (Midlarsky 1992; Zartman 1992), the triangulation between ethnic parent state, transborder group and its host state is found to be more intractable and tense than any other type of conflict (Carment and James 1995; Moore and Davis 1998), for it links inter-communal with inter-state strife. Adding to this is the scarring legacy of enmity and mistrust left behind on both these levels.

For more than two centuries now, ethno-territorial retrieval has been a reality of both domestic and inter-state politics. The recent Balkan wars, as well as ongoing conflict in ex-Soviet republics and in Africa and Asia, prove its continued virulence. And the sheer number of "multi-state nations" (Ryan 1995:6) holds more in store for the future: "of the 230 groups in the Minorities at Risk project" Gurr observes, "nearly two thirds have kindred groups in adjacent countries: 66 (29 per cent) have one cross-border kin group, 47 (20 per cent) have kin groups in two or more neighbouring countries, 34 (15 per cent) ... have kindred in three or more countries" (1992:1). High time then we paid attention.

Badly defined, badly explained: the lack of "irredentism theory"

Remarkably for such a salient subject we still know very little about it. To start, with, what exactly is irredentism? Retrieval is difficult to pin down because it straddles academic disciplines (international relations, government, sociology), presents a misfit in ethnic conflict taxonomies (being both internal and external to the state), and sparks disagreement over actors, methods and time frames. It hence still lacks a broadly recognised definition that would standardise approaches. As a result, irredentist examples are wrongly categorised and analysed out of the context of their cohort. For example, even T.R. Gurr's authoritative *Minorities at Risk* dataset lists irredentist cases in no less than four out of his seven categories. In short, irredentas still go unrecognised as an aggregate group of cases, being consequently mistaken as "prerogative of the few" (Horowitz 1991). Elaborating a workable conceptualisation, a comparative analytical framework that comprehensively defines and describes irredentism, is hence the first concern of this study. Whatever the merits and drawbacks of the descriptions that have been presented until now (see chapter 1), I define irredentism as 'the *bilateral* and *simultaneous* pursuit by both parent state and its ethnically kindred brethren in a foreign state of ethno-territorial retrieval across inter-state borders'.

My other - and principal - focus is to find out how irredentism works, by which factors it is determined. This is where the lack of a comparative framework bears consequences. So far there is no such thing as an "irredentism theory" (Gavrilis 1999), a coherent and cumulative body of literature researching retrieval. Presently, there exist a handful of mostly unrelated studies that often cover a whole range of phenomena together with irredentism. Even when they focus specifically on retrieval, they use diverging definitions and concentrate on different numbers and combinations of actors. Most explanations are low on generalisability because they are monocausal, case-specific accounts, while the few multi-variate analyses in turn are imprecise in their definitions or low in parsimony. Only one theory combines quantitative and qualitative testing of its variables. Finally, nearly all are rooted in a normative-rationalistic understanding of what ethnic groups strive for. I contend that, over and above

methodological-definitional problems, this is the main reason why irredentism has so far not been satisfactorily explained. In overview we can broadly differentiate existing accounts along two axes:

The number of actors they see as determining irredentist politics

- *Single actor accounts* locate decision making and agency with exclusively one party, on whom the proposed causal variables then focus. The overwhelming majority of these models are parent state oriented, due to this actor's clear advantage in terms of power and resources.

- *Bilateral analyses* limit their attention to those two groups immediately pursuing retrieval – the parent state *and* its transborder ethnic brethren. Their deliberations and actions are seen in various ways as mutually relevant or even complementary, though most accounts strongly lean towards the state as the more powerful player.

- *Triadic interpretations* of irredentism extend agency beyond the retrieving and retrieved to the affected host state. Usually, the nature of minority vs. host-state interactions is emphasised due to its reverberation onto the other relationships within the triangle (host state vs. parent state and parent state vs. transborder community).

- *Multi-actor models* finally either differentiate the existing parties into further sub-groups (e.g. leadership vs. electorate / clientele) or draft in even further ones, such as regional powers, international organisations, NGOs etc.

The motivational bases they assume for irredentism

- *Instrumentalist accounts* attribute irredentism to the elite- or, less frequently, group interests it is seen to serve. Based on normative premises of rationality and individualism, they discard identities and ideas as entirely manufactured and (ab)used at will. The focus here is on competition for economic resources and / or power, often together with the structural-strategic scope for irredentism (parent state

19

expansionism) and comparative risk assessments (e.g. minority security).

- *Ideational approaches* explain irredentism primarily in the light of the notions it involves - nationalism and self-determination. Past experiences, competing or transforming nationalisms, symbols and territoriality are cited as determinants. These studies are more likely to analyse the group as a whole. However, they overwhelmingly support their interpretation with instrumental aspects.

- *Identificationist analyses* argue with the non-rational (as distinct from irrational) elements of ethno-nationalism by presenting the emotional and psychological power of ascriptive ties as primary factor. The level of analysis ranges from strictly elite-focused down to encompassing the whole group. Combined accounts realistically incorporate interests and ideas to varying extents, often in function of or constrained by, ethno-national identity.

In summary, a cross-tabulation of explanations along these two criteria yields the following clusters below.

Table 1.1 Overview of irredentism literature[2]

Type of model* / Number of actors**	Instrumentalist	Ideational	Identificationist	Combined instrumentalist-ideational	Combined instrumental-identificationist	Combining all three
1 PS	Von Hippel (1993) (IR) Saideman (1998) (IR) Andreopoulos (1981) (CP)			Katsiyiannis (1996) (IR) Carment & James (1995) (IR) Van Evera (1994) (IR)		
1 TC				Reichman & Golan (1991) (GY)		
2 PS +TC	Saideman & Ayres (1999, 2000) (IR/PS) Gavrilis (1999) (CP) Posen (1993) (IR)	Kitromilides (1990) (HY)	Connor (1980) (CP)	Ambrosio (2001) (IR)	Horowitz (1985, 1991) (CP) Neuberger(1991)(HY)	Füzesi (2006) (CP)
3 PS +TC+HS	Suhrke & Noble (1977) (CP)		Brubaker (1996) (SOC)			Weiner (1991) (IR)
4 (sub-differentiated or several actors)	Suhrke (1970) (CP)					

Key: * **Type of model:** multi-variate models are in bold script, quantitative studies underlined.

** **No. of actors:** PS = Parent State; TC = Transborder Community; HS = Host State

***Disciplines** are abbreviated: CP = Comparative Politics; GY = Geography; SOC = Sociology; HY = History; IR = International Relations

Given this heterogenous choice of studies, the question arises which particular type of approach should serve as base for an improved analysis, and why so. A closer look however reveals the scarcity of useful models available for constructive theory building:

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[2] Included are all theories that specifically or even indirectly explain irredentism, whether they profess to do so or not, and independently of whether their particular definition of irredentism is compatible with my own.

1. Only theories that deal concretely with irredentism are relevant. Excluded are those covering a whole array of similar phenomena (Connor 1980; Posen 1993; Van Evera 1994; Brubaker 1996) and those explanations targeting retrieval, but using fuzzy definitions and thus compromised data (Saideman and Ayres 1999, 2000).

2. Theories which restrict irredentism to one ethnic actor, usually the parent state, are not useful because they ignore the crucial components of bilateral consent and activism that define ethno-territorial retrieval (Andreopoulos 1981; Reichman and Golan 1991; von Hippel 1993; Carment and James 1995; Katsiyiannis 1996; Saideman 1998; Ambrosio 2000). Other approaches in contrast disqualify themselves because they confuse agency and structure by including the host state as actor, instead of as conditioning environment (Weiner 1991; Brubaker 1996). Some are in turn unworkable because they introduce multiple or internally over-differentiated actors, thus creating unnecessarily complicated settings that are neither generalisable nor parsimonious (Suhrke 1970; Suhrke and Noble 1977).

3. Mono-causal models are unable to explain complex processes such as irredentism, especially not across the vastly different scenarios of several dozen cases. They are for this reason discarded, even if some argue convincingly for their own specific examples, (Saideman 1998; Gavrilis 1999). Conversely, we can also rule out models with an unfeasibly large number of factors (Saideman and Ayres 2000), and those that profess to be more descriptive than explanatory (Kitromilides 1990; Weiner 1991; Carment and James 1995).

By progressive elimination we have narrowed the focus to one realistic and workable theory we can build on: Horowitz's model on the "structural bias" for or against irredentism (1985; 1991).[3] It is a multi-variate, irredentism-specific explanation which includes both ethnic actors. Drawn from comparing case studies in post-colonial Asia and Africa and contrasting against secession, this

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[3] Neuberger's intelligent application of Horowitz's grid to post-colonial Africa (1991), is left aside as affirmative (if mildly critical) reiteration.

is a generalisable, predictive explanation of retrieval. Given however its prescriptive bias towards rationality and correlate under-estimation of identity, his theory only grasps part of the irredentist phenomenon. This, and our overview, consequently indicates what the present study will need to include in order to furnish an improved theory of irredentism. For one, any analysis needs a reasoned and cohesive analytical framework. Secondly, "a study of nationalism must follow a comparative method" Kohn (1967:9-10) rightly insisted, "it cannot remain confined to one of its manifestations." Based on the definition I present, this study has tried to collate all identifiable cases of irredentism in order to test both Horowitz's variables and my own. Thirdly, if we want to find out what determines irredentism, we need to apply them in a historic case study, ideally an example of "inconsistent irredentism" (Saideman 1998). Since retrieval is abandoned here in an outwardly identical setting, the change in group behaviour must stem from factor change over time. I have chosen Hungary's interwar irredenta (1920-1940), which has been discontinued in the post-communist period (1989-2006). To this contrasting of time periods I have also added a comparison across space by examining not one, but two transborder Magyar minorities, namely in Southern Slovakia and Transylvania. Given their differences in size and homogeneity, as well as their historical-sociological divergences, this should provide additional verification.

Case study: the Hungarian irredenta

In order to understand the merits of this particular case, it is worth taking a brief look at the two time periods and the actors that form the subjects of this comparative study.

Hungary's partition in 1920 under the Trianon peace treaty constituted a persisting national trauma: for the first time in the country's millennial existence ethnicity and territory did no longer coincide, a fact that had hitherto been commonsensical. Magyars had naturally equated their country with the historic territory of its foundation in the ninth century A.D. After World War I, these "Crownlands of Saint Stephen" disintegrated under the boundary drawing of

23

Great Powers who applied the Wilsonian principle of self-determination with remarkable selectivity. Thus Hungary lost seventy per cent of its territory (retaining merely 92 963 of the former 282 876 square kilometres) and one third of its *Magyar speaking* population alone (estimated at around 3 million; see maps 1.1 and 1.2). The majority of these went to Romania and Czechoslovakia as the treaty's main beneficiaries, with about 1.7 million and 893 586 ethnic Hungarians respectively.[4] Following partition, interwar Hungarian politics revolved around Trianon's integral revision, principally focusing on the two largest severed territories: Transylvania[5], now Romanian, and 'Upper Hungary'[6] in Czechoslovakia.

Both at home and across the newly drawn borders, irredentism, as core of a general territorial revisionism, became the unanimous cause célèbre of the Magyar nation. In Hungary, support for retrieval was irrespective of age, class or political affiliation and persisted through the entire interwar period (Balogh 1988:55; Zeidler 2001:33-43;159-191). Indeed, "no Hungarian government could survive without seeking 'justice for Hungary' " (Balogh 1988:57). The theme was a rallying cry for a deeply divided nation just emerging from civil war. Its genuine appeal however also served to divert public attention from the country's numerous socio-economic problems which worsened with the conservative freeze on reform. Hungary's difficulties were collectively blamed on the "Trianon Diktat", with irredentism acquiring the promise of a national salvation. Budapest's policies represented a blend of vigorous campaigning

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[4] In terms of total population losses, Hungary retained of about 20.8 million inhabitants only 7 980 143 million (János 1982:205)

[5] "Transylvania" denotes here more than the former historic region (roughly 57 000 km² on its own). Instead, it describes *all* territory lost to Romania in 1920 (103 093 km²) and subsequently referred to and seen as, part of 'Erdély' (Transylvania). This includes Romanian-annexed areas of the Hungarian kingdom - the historic Partium area (counties Máramaros, Szatmár, Szilágy, Bihar, Arad) and the *Bánság* / Banat region (Temes and Krassó-Szörény) - plus the 9 counties of Transylvania proper further east. Not included in this dissertation are the Csángó Hungarians (*Csángómagyarok*) and their areas, because they are situated outside Transylvania, beyond the Carpathians.

[6] The name 'Felvidék' (Upper Hungary) is sometimes used to summarily denote all areas annexed to Czechoslovakia. This thesis however adheres to its tighter, more frequent definition of the former administrative region within the Dual Monarchy ('North-Western Felvidék) including the Csallóköz area. Thus excluded from my examination is the adjacent but distinct, territory of *Kárpátalja* ("Subcarpathia" or Ruthenia). This was also ceded to Czechoslovakia under Trianon and at the time contained a Hungarian minority of 123 000 (1930). It, too, was subject to interwar Magyar irredentism, and was retrieved separately in March 1939. Today, it is part of Ukraine and home to around 152 000 Magyars, though unofficial estimates put the figure at 200 000 (HMTH 2005c).

abroad, secret negotiations with Europe's two other revisionist powers - Fascist Italy and later Nazi Germany - while retaining a low profile on the issue when confronted with powerful disapproval.[7]

Traumatised by their sudden change to minority status, ethnic Magyars across the borders, were equally unwilling (and arguably unable) to accept their situation. Subject to forced assimilation and discrimination by their new host states, their reaction could however not afford the same vehemence. After an initial spell of protest and civil disobedience, transborder Magyar attitudes overwhelmingly settled into a defiant siege mentality, characterised by communal self-reliance via tight internal organisation. The goal was to consolidate and survive until retrieval would eventually occur. Like their mainland kindred, minority Hungarians were convinced that national truncation was only temporary because it was untenable in its historic injustice. They viewed their presence in the successor states "...by no means as acknowledgement of this illegal fact [i.e. Hungary's partition], but as living and permanent protest against this cruelly unjust decision made against us and without us..." (Hoensch 1967:19).[8] The Magyar irredentist slogan of *"nem, nem, soha"* ("no, no, never" - the triple refusal of Trianon) thus represented the credo of virtually the entire nation.

At the end of the 1930s it finally seemed as if Hungary's "active foreign policy" (*aktív külpolitika*) had achieved the irredenta.[9] The two Vienna Arbitrations of 1938 and 1940 restored at Hitler's will all of the *Felvidék* ("Upper Hungary", i.e. Southern Slovakia) and the northern part of Transylvania (see map 1.3). A pyrrhic victory it was, since Budapest was now indebted to the Axis powers, as

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[7] Foreign Minister Kánya complained to US envoy Montgomery "that he considered revisionism insanity, but that there was nothing he could do about it since the Hungarian people were not quite sane on the subject and foreign policy could not be divorced entirely from politics" (Hoensch 1967:12).

[8] Ethnic Magyar MP Dr. Lajos Körmendy-Ekes, stating his community's attitude in the Czechoslovak parliament on June 2, 1920, two days prior to Trianon's signing.

[9] The term used at the time was 'revision'. Contemporary Hungarian historians still like to distinguish between legalistic treaty renegotiation (revision) and irredentism ("recovery of national territories under foreign rule" - see for instance Zeidler 2001:50-1). This may be because of irredentism's negative connotations (Ben Israel 1991: 31; see also section 1.5.2), but presumably also seeks to underline entitlement. I contend that revisionism is instrumental part of irredentism (especially in this case), and that it is therefore a means to an end rather than a separate category in its own right.

whose ally it subsequently joined and lost the war - together with the retrieved territories. During the following 45 years, the USSR's military and ideological domination of the region pre-empted Magyar irredentism from resurfacing.[10] With the collapse of communist regimes in Hungary, Slovakia and Romania, independent foreign policy and the issue of national truncation has re-emerged. Hungarian irredentism however, has not.

Today, Budapest's foreign policy is emphatically non-irredentist and cooperative, up to the point where it faces accusations of sell-out and neglect of its minority Magyars (see e.g. BBC 1995). After some initial inconsistencies, Western observers agree that by March 1993 Hungary had clearly "rejected all thought of changes in the country's frontiers by force. The entire political spectrum in parliament supported this new defence concept" (Schöpflin 1993:14-15).[11] Hungarian public opinion equally endorses this stance. Despite the continued affective and symbolic value especially of *Erdély* (Transylvania) to mainland Magyars, they are "not primarily concerned with righting the wrongs of Trianon." Indeed, the matter is regarded as "first and foremost an intellectual issue" (ibid.:10).[12] Mainland extremists calling for revision like the Independent Smallholder Party's faction under József Torgyán, or István Csurka's Hungarian Justice and Life Party (MIÉP), are scarce and receive a lukewarm response at best. Marginalised by mainstream politics, their dwindling electoral support[13] basically reflects domestic social issues and is "minimal on the question of the minorities" (Schöpflin 1993:12). Post-communist Hungary has very deliberately assumed the role of an ethnic patron, acting as a protective power by securing cultural reproduction and constitutionally anchored collective rights for its ethnic kin in the region.[14] The conclusion of Basic Treaties with all host states, laboriously negotiated and

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[10] Arguably both Romanian and Hungarian irredentist aspirations about Transylvania's post-war status were briefly used as Soviet divide and rule tactics in 1945-6. This however was a matter of political engineering rather than ethnic group choice.
[11] See also Bárdi (2004a) or Zellner and Dunay (1998:205-297)
[12] See also Szarka in Brunner (1996:165) for the role of intellectuals in this matter.
[13] In the 2002 and 2006 parliamentary elections Csurka's MIÉP respectively received only 4.37 and then 2.2 per cent, both below the 5 per cent electoral threshold for participation in the legislature.
[14] This self-defined role is set out in the amended Hungarian constitution of 1989. Article 6, paragraph 3, stipulates that "the Republic of Hungary feels responsible for the fate of those Magyars living outside of its borders and promotes their relations with Hungary."

unilaterally instigated by Budapest, proves amongst others its commitment to the status quo.

Contemporary transborder Hungarians have equally rejected retrieval. Neither Romanian nor Slovak Magyars seek to rejoin Hungary – in fact they even adapted their plans for local autonomy in order to underline their moderation (see for instance Duray 1999; Egyed 2000 and Ríz 2000). They continue to be sizeable minorities within their respective host states (see maps 1.5, 2.6. and 3.5). The political platforms of Hungarian minority parties, nearly co-terminous with their electorates' opinions, today demand collective recognition as *nation-constituting groups*, instead of past defectionism.[15] Sociological surveys conducted amongst Transylvanian and Slovak Magyars show that strong regional identities have emerged, while affiliation to the parent state has transformed and is even becoming tenuous in some respects (Gereben 1995, 1999a, 2001; Lampl 1999; Langman 1997; Veres 1997). Most tellingly perhaps, the mainland referendum of December 2004 about dual citizenship for transborder Hungarians was received by the latter with very mixed feelings and, upon its failure, with downright rejection. All of this is not only remarkable in a comparative historical perspective, but also in view of their continued problems within both Romania and Slovakia.

In short, one or more conditioning factors must have changed for both mainland and minority Magyars in such a way that they do not consider a post-communist irredenta as option.

Concept formation and constructive theory-building: towards an explanation of irredentism

This thesis has two linked aims. It firstly seeks to establish irredentism as a field of study in its own right. It will show that retrieval is a clearly definable fact of both modern history and contemporary politics, it is neither infrequent nor indistinct. Chapter 1 thus establishes a comparative analytical framework for

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[15] See the respective electoral program of the Romanian Magyar party RMDSZ (2005) and the detailed self-description of the Slovak Magyars as "co-nation" by Együttélés Politikai Mozgalom / Political Movement Coexistence, Slovakia (2005).

irredentism by devising a workable definition and, collating all cases based on it, by describing its universal characteristics.

Secondly, my study will demonstrate that retrieval is determined by a clear set of factors that partly interact in a positive feedback effect. It aims to provide a generalisable explanatory model about its occurrence by building on Donald Horowitz's hypotheses about ethno-territorial retrieval. Two complementary methods will be used to achieve this. Chapter 2 will undertake quantitative testing of Horowitz's and my own variables on the collation of cases established by my definition. By converting each factor into measurable indicators it will probe its explanatory value across cases. Chapter 3 to 7 in turn will apply each variable in depth to the inconsistent Hungarian irredenta. Through the Magyar case study we will be able to compare factor changes and the extent of their causal effect across both time (inter-war versus post-communist periods) and space (Felvidék versus Transylvanian irredenta).

Both quantitative and empirical evidence will show that Horowitz's three factors are merely secondary elements in the decision-making of actively or potentially irredentist groups. They are flawed by the normative liberal bias that dominated the study of ethnicity and nationalism until recently. Premising individualism, materialism and rationality, such approaches see ethnic collectives as merely functional groups. They systematically under-estimate or discard the ethno-national bond that is so central to group behaviour, and particularly to irredentism. From their perspective ethno-nationalism - as opposed to "civic-territorial" nationalism - is either "irrational" or merely instrumental to elites. Depending on the view taken, it is varyingly explained away as reaction to - or deficiency in - cosmopolitan modernity (retardation or contact theory), or indeed as surrogate struggle for power and economic resources (relative deprivation theories). Horowitz's three variables faithfully mirror this prescriptive take. In his view irredentas firstly depend on whether they bring a comparative economic advantage, tackled for the Hungarian case in chapter 3: minorities will want to unite if the parent state is better off, the latter in turn will not retrieve without gaining material benefits. Secondly, irredentist projects are determined by parent state calculations about

28

demographic and strategic feasibility. Chapter 4 will thus examine his suggestion that retrieval is more likely when the minority is situated in a compact, homogeneous and border-near position. Finally, Horowitz emphasises elite ambitions (subsumed in chapters 6 and 7): minority leaders may object to the pooling of their power which retrieval entails, while mainland elites do not want to divide theirs in case the joining group differs enough to insist on retaining its own representatives. Such reluctance is only offset by mainland leaders' personal ties to the transborder region or group, but - and here comes the caveat - this is only effective in "patriarchal" (read: backward) societies.

Because of the omission - or re-casting - of a group's central gist, such explanations "are a poor guide to ethno-nationally inspired behaviour" (Connor 1994:74) and, consequently, to irredentism. To be clear, the problem with Horowitz's theory is not that irredentists are invested with rationality, but rather the normative slant on what they should be concerned about: power, feasibility, material benefit. My explanation in contrast re-focuses on what actually matters to irredentists, and thus joins the growing non-prescriptive literature on ethno-politics that corrects the fallacies described above (e.g. Connor 1994 and 2001; McGarry 1995; McGarry and O'Leary 1993 and 2004; Kymlicka 2001 a, 2001b and 2002).

Irredentism is, as I have noted above, principally concerned with solidarity rooted in shared identity and with the twin components this inherently commands: nation-state congruence (nationalism) and freedom from domination by non-members (self-determination). Changes within this engine and its conditioning factors will result in irredentist inconsistency. Where do these changes stem from? Like Milton J. Esman (1994) and Walker Connor (1980; 1994; 2001) I see ethno-national movements - including retrieval - as affected by a combination of subjective/internal and objective/external givens. "Problems posed by the external environment are as likely as historical experiences and collective aspirations of the group to determine its dynamics – its definition of problems, needs and strategies. The polar extremes of primordial givens and instrumental opportunism seldom account for the real

behaviour of ethnic communities" (Esman 1994:14). In short, ideas, interests and identities all matter. Yet Esman (ibid.) also points out that specifically "homeland groups" (which irredentists are by definition) are governed more by the essence-side of these two poles. So the three components are not quite equal. For one, elites and their interests are as much constrained by ethnicity as the masses they lead. Secondly, and retrieval is exemplary for this, identity is not one option amongst many but prevails over all other sources of mobilisation. The ethno-national bond enjoys ultimate priority, simply because "ethnicity normally taps deeper layers of socialisation, experience, emotion, and pride than collective identities that are more instrumental to the individual" (ibid.:15). This is why Horowitz's interest-driven account captures so little of retrieval.

What my three variables consequently focus on are irredentism's identity component and the two factors affecting its correlate self-determination (ideational) element. I will start with the former. Chapter 6 probes changes in the strength and nature of the ethno-national bond[16] on which irredentism is crucially based. Ethnicity is made up of a set of traits by which members recognise each other and differentiate themselves from other groups.[17] Even if these features are not always externally verifiable (e.g. common descent), they are nevertheless perceptually "real" to the group, and therefore analytically important. Connor summarises this brilliantly: "it is not *what* is, but what people *believe is* that has behavioural consequences" (1994:75, emphasis original). Furthermore, the intangible or constructed nature of markers does not mean that they can be used randomly: "ethnicity cannot be politicised unless an underlying core of memories, experience or meaning moves people to

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[16] Within the study of nationalism and ethnicity this work follows the modernist school. It posits nationalism as modern phenomenon and group identity as relying on both constructed and objective criteria. The internal cohesion based on these features is however empirically real and thus a (co-)determinant of group mobilisation. This follows moderate constructivists such as Gellner, Kedourie, and Walzer, while leaning somewhat further towards an identificationist premise. Conversely, my view opposes instrumentalist accounts like Brass' or Hobsbawm's.

[17] I understand an ethnic group as "...any collective identity and solidarity based on inherited culture, racial differences, belief systems and sentiments of common nationality" (Esman 1994:16). I furthermore add here the group's association with a defined ancestral territory, which it may or may not inhabit completely or exclusively. This broad delineation is necessary because the primary bases of differentiation vary from group to group, but are equally valid in their diversity (e.g. religion, race, cultural-linguistic heritage). "Ethnic" thus denotes groups whose identity and solidarity are based on shared criteria, which can according to individual case in- or exclude any combination of such traits.

collective action.... Either way, the *solidarities* are authentic, not imagined, constructed or fantasised" (Esman 1994:14, emphasis added). In other words, the flexibility of groupness and its (sometimes selective) politicisation by ethnic entrepreneurs does not make it any less strong or genuine.[18]

This is what my variable reasons with. If we accept that identity informs nationalism, then shifts or changes in group identity must (at least in part) cause changes in national aspirations. Irredentism mobilises both parent state and minority as a (self-perceived) cohesive community. I suggest that retrieval is centrally dependent on one particular basis of cohesion, namely kinship conceived in the narrow, literal sense: a (perceived) shared ancestry. Integral to this organic understanding of the nation is residence on and identification with, ancestral homelands. Much like its subjectively shared blood, the irredentist group has a shared subjective 'map image' of its soil. In short, retrieval is an expression of ethnic nationalism, it needs exclusive, narrowly conceived markers to preserve cohesion across boundaries. A group's identity can however shift due to changing markers. This in turn entails changes in their politicisation, i.e. in that group's nationalism and its goals. Cultural and civic markers instead of ethnic-exclusive ones are more voluntary, inclusive and thus no longer provide the precise demarcation of membership and territory vital to irredentas. They furthermore do away with the need to (re)unite 'dismembered' nations, and thus allow for differentiation of communal and political loyalties which irredentas automatically equate. In such settings retrieval is longer commonsensical nor even desirable to a group. So the ethno-national bond may well be "beyond reason" or "non-rational" as Connor (1994) stipulates, but the effects of its change on irredentism are not: when the "self" in self-determination ceases to be clear-cut, then so does the project.

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[18] I have made an effort to avoid reifying ethnicity wherever possible. This study wholeheartedly acknowledges the need for an internally differentiated analysis of ethnic actors, yet it is severely limited by research design and -scope. For instance, Astri Suhrke's (1970) remarkable study attempts to do so yet falls well short of that goal. Throughout I try to avoid an overly monolithic examination by noting any significant divergences within Magyar elites (mainland and transborder) as well as between them and their respective electorates. Overall however, the multi-variate explanatory model presented in this thesis cannot afford internally well differentiated actors, not least because its argument aspires to be parsimonious and universally applicable. Also, the limitations of quantifying (i.e. reducing and operationalising) social facts preclude in themselves a more nuanced examination.

This is where two further factors tie in, this time external to the group and objective, if not to say rational. Looking within the framework of the state, the politicisation of ethnicity is surely conditioned by the regime type in which it is set. Chapter 7 will argue that it is democracy that matters here, since - as Lijphart (1999; 2002) reminds us - research has confirmed it as the unique setting capable of managing ethno-nationalism. Democracy matters differently for our two actors. In terms of the parent state, the absence of democratic institutions or incomplete democratisation allows for ethno-nationalism to become state policy (Snyder 2000; Snyder and Mansfield 2000a and b). The strong institutions of consolidated democratic systems in turn severely limit the conflation of group and state interests, both by the civic nationalism they foster as well as via mechanisms of accountability and deliberation. Institutional performance can thus help to shift group identity to different bases.

For the transborder kindred in turn the particular character of a democracy is relevant: is it majoritarian or consensus based? Since even substantive democracies are in some form "culturally coded" (Schöpflin 2004), i.e. since there is no such thing as an entirely 'civic' nationalism, assuaging an irredentist minority's aspirations *within* the host state means introducing consociational features as described by Lijphart (1977). Power-sharing acknowledges the central importance of a group's identity and can accommodate its yearning for self-rule via either segmented and / or territorial autonomy. This is especially likely to succeed once a group's identity and thus its national aspirations have transformed (see above), and further reinforces this trend. By contrast, the less accommodative the host state is - pursuing assimilationist policies or establishing hegemonic control (Lustick 1993) - the more a minority will seek retrieval, or in case of compromised cross-border affinity, convert its exit strategy into secessionism.

My third variable, presented in Chapter 5, reasons conversely with the international (dis)incentives for irredentism. Even more than secessions, retrieval has seemingly insurmountable odds stacked against it since the international system is by default governed by a restrictive consensus about redrawing boundaries. Still, the history of irredentism shows slight, temporary variations in world-political attitudes, windows of opportunity that tolerated this

particular variant of national self-determination. I suggest that such periods - though often short and area-biased - encourage retrieval. What furthermore promotes parent state irredentism is the existence of a supportive patron power, usually irredentist itself and in regional vicinity. Minority defectionism in turn is heightened by international disregard for its treatment within the host state. A restrictive consensus, absent friends and externally supported minority rights or power-sharing cannot by themselves dissuade irredentism, yet they do modulate its methods and vehemence. When combined and interacting with our previous two factors, they can however be decisive. Given pre-existing or developing changes in group cohesion, inter-state restrictions and incentives double up with regime-specific ones (parent state), or promote ethno-national aspirations within existing boundaries (minority).

Making sense of irredentism means making sense of ethno-nationalism. Central to explaining both is a re-evaluation of group solidarity and of its imperatives bar any normative bias. My model explains inconsistent retrieval via changes in and feedback effects between, its primary engine - shared ethno-national identity - and the domestic and international factors that condition its politicisation.

1. Defining irredentism

"Today most people would rather be governed poorly by their ethnic brethren than well by aliens, occupiers or colonisers... indeed to be ruled by ethnic strangers is perceived as worse than oppressive."

Joseph Rothschild (1981:14)

1.1 Introduction

Ethno-territorial retrieval represents one of the methods by which communal groups seek nation-state congruence, it is self-determination of a special kind. Yet irredentism is little explored, it constitutes so far something of a black box: at one end, there is a communal group bisected by borders which it either accepts, or conversely challenges via secession or demands for autonomy. At the other, one finds the (re-)union of that group and its territory within an ethnically kindred state. What is in between has largely remained unexplained. Ethno-territorial retrieval thus represents the unknown in an equation whose other components — the ethnic group, the state etc. - research has so thoroughly investigated.

The description and classification of real-world phenomena always bears the double risks of arbitrariness and reification[1], yet this does not explain the absence of an attempt. In contrast to highly researched issues like genocide, there is no scholarly agreement over *what* irredentism actually denotes. Yet neither is this disagreement generating any debates, indeed this particular subject seems to lack the usual challenge and response patterns of academia. Instead, the study of retrieval is rarely cumulative and at best sporadically recursive, i.e. irredentism can take any meaning to anybody. The literature consequently abounds with definitions which, based on minimal cross-

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[1] See for instance Sartori (1984:15-63) on the trappings of concept analysis.

referencing, mutually ignore and contradict one another.[2] Alternatively, some do not even attempt clarification, contending that "although irredentism is conceptually distinct from ethnicity, separatism, pan-cultural movements, and border skirmishes, it is in fact best characterised as an active mixture of all these ingredients" (Chazan 1990: 141). Given that the scientific analysis of reality crucially depends on consistent and workable descriptions, it is therefore unsurprising that research to date lacks a comprehensive, universal theory of irredentism.

There is in short the need for a precise, differentiated and *reasoned* definition of irredentism in order to subsequently elaborate on the variables that condition its occurrence and demise. The lack of conceptualisation testifies not only to the disregard of ethno-territorial retrieval as a political reality, but as a *field of study*. Hence my task here is not merely to describe and establish what an irredenta is, but – equally importantly - what it is *not*. Based on this definition, we will be able to collate all irredentas and compare irredentas in their essential and therefore universal, qualities. Opening the black box of irredentism thus entails the development of a comparative analytical framework for it.

1.2 Irredentism as a concept

Irredentism needs to be coined as concept – i.e. as a notion or idea in social science – and subsequently categorised as real world phenomenon as well as described in its standard attributes. Turning to the concept first, it requires distinction into variants: irredentism is in fact conceptually heterogeneous and consists of two rarely differentiated subtypes.[3]

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[2] Compare for example Landau's (1991) definition that centres on ethnic affinity ("...expression of passionate interest in the well-being of an ethnic or cultural minority...") with Ben-Israel's (1991) materialist emphasis on the homeland ("... irredentism pertains in the first place to territory demanded by a state"). Some definitions concentrate on the minority (Reichman and Golan 1991), while most others focus exclusively on the parent state (e.g. Saideman 1998, Chazan 1991, von Hippel 1993, Yagcioglu 1996, Mayall 1990). Only few are bilateral (Suhrke 1970, Connor 1980, Horowitz 1985).
[3] The only exception to date is Horowitz in Chazan (1991:10). The types are, however, distinguished without consequence for his subsequent analysis.

1.2.1 Differentiation – "irredentism" has two faces

The first variant, which I call *type 1* or *conventional*, is the most frequent form of irredentism and will form the subject of this work. It features the situation of a parent state (A) and its transborder ethnic brethren (B) which is situated in a neighbouring host state (C).

Figure **1.1.** Representation of a conventional irredenta

These movements seek to detach land and people from one state in order to re/incorporate them into another. Interwar Hungary and the Transylvanian Magyar community in Romania provide a good example of such an irredenta. A type 1 irredenta is potentially *anywhere* possible, provided two basic structural requirements are fulfilled:

- the existence of a parent state. This is a state where one ethnic group is numerically and/or politically dominant as titular nation, i.e. where other groups cannot thwart the retrieval of ethnic kin.
- the existence of one or more ethnically kindred communities in an adjacent state or states, ideally - but not necessarily - in a compact, border-near situation.

The second, less frequent, variant is what I label so-called *unificationist (or type 2) irredenta*. It is not to be confused with pan-movements - mere cultural projects to create a larger entity, like for instance pan-Islamism (see Landau 1991:91-92 and 1995:180-182). Instead, it applies only to pursuits involving common kinship and a shared idea of and attachment to, an ethnic homeland. However, these can sometimes start off on the cultural plane and grow into an

unificationist irredenta.[4] Type 2 irredentas consist of an ethnic group (a, b, c, d) which is dispersed across several host states (I., II., III.) and lacks a parent state of its own. It seeks to establish the latter by detaching and unifying land from several states. Apart from the more widely known Kurdish and Basque cases, the Baluchi, Palestinians and Ewe provide further examples of this irredentist type.[5]

Figure 1.2. Representation of a pan-movement

In sum, the difference between the two variants is one of joining as opposed to creating, a political unit. However, these distinctions are somewhat ideal typical. For one, we have to take into account irredentism's dynamic character. Empirical evidence shows an evolutionary connection between the two categories. Thus, unificationist irredentas develop into the conventional type after having successfully established a core parent state; they function as a sort of transitional stage.[6] Indeed, many conventional irredentas are follow-ups to an unificationist irredenta: they logically continue where the preceding project of retrieval ended.[7] This is how the Greek Megali movement and the Italian, German, Romanian, and Somali cases evolved. I would argue that this

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[4] Cases like the Megali Idea and Pan-Germanism did invoke cultural-linguistic arguments, but the actual irredentas they spawned were primarily underpinned by (perceived) shared ancestry and a 'map image' of communal homelands – see also chapter 6 .

[5] Unificationist irredentas occur in two different situations. One is where the irredentist minority challenges a majority in the host country, be that mono-ethnic (e.g. Kurds versus homogeneous Turks) or multi-ethnic (Basques versus heterogeneous Spain). In the second scenario, the unificationist group is a domestic majority itself (e.g. Germans pre-1871, Romanians in Moldova and Wallachia prior to 1859).

[6] I am not aware of instances where this development was reversed. The relation between the two types seems unidirectional.

[7] The few type 1 irredentas not preceded by unificationist movements are generally those involving a historic parent state that was however subsequently dismembered via secession (like Yugoslavia) or partition (e.g. Ireland, Hungary).

also describes the current Palestinian situation[8]. Put into a nutshell, our identified subtypes appear more continuous than discrete, they function as *phases* of the same process.

Secondly, there is also the problem of borderline cases, which are difficult to classify. Some movements want to turn their host into a parent state (i.e. into one which they dominate) exactly by retrieving ethnic kin. This makes the situation reminiscent of type 2 irredentas, with two or more kindred groups in different states wishing to unite. But, in contrast to unificationist irredentas, these movements do not want to defect. To the contrary: the envisaged political unit already exists, and this would in turn indicate a type 1 case. An example are the Ibo, Yoruba and Hausa in Nigeria, who respectively demand to be reunited with their kin from neighbouring countries in order make Nigeria – which they equally share – into a parent state they dominate. The same is true for Djibouti's Afars, who wish to retrieve fellow Afars in Eritrea and Somalia in order to outnumber the local Somalis with whom they share their bi-national state. Yet another case are Afghani Pashtuns, today a medium-sized communal group in their country, who wish to incorporate enthusiastic fellow Pashtuns in Pakistan in order to restore their former demographic and political dominance within Afghanistan. I have resolved that, since none of these groups actually dominates "their" state, i.e. since there is no parent state integral to the definition of conventional retrieval, they all remain sub-variants of unificationist irredentas.

Thirdly, the presence or absence of a parent state can be expected to generate very different determinants for the two irredentist categories, and my thesis will only focus on those for the more frequent, conventional irredentas. Firstly, there is an appreciable qualitative contrast as to their aims. Building a new political entity is incomparably more ambitious - and difficult - a goal than joining a pre-existing one. Furthermore, the constellation of actors is radically different. Type 1 features a bilateral situation in which the retrieving unit

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[8] The areas currently under Palestinian self-government represent a gradually consolidating, but as yet semi-sovereign, Palestinian parent state. Much like the nineteenth century Greek case, the latter is the product of a partially successful unificationist irredenta. The territories (still) left out yet inhabited by ethnic kin, are perceived as essential Palestinian homeland (most notably East Jerusalem). These areas are now the subjects of a conventional irredenta.

nevertheless ultimately takes the lead. In contrast, a unificationist irredenta like that of the Basques or Kurds involves multiple equal players, i.e. kindred ethnic groups. These have to co-ordinate their goals and activities against the different backgrounds of incentives and deterrents of their respective host countries. What logically follows from these considerations is that such irredentas should have a far lower success rate than conventional ones. Oddly enough, my statistical evidence suggests the exact opposite. What we can nevertheless assume for certain is that irredentist prerequisites must vary in character and weight *across* these two subtypes, and it will make an interesting future research project to establish to what extent they do so and how.

1.2.2 Conventional irredentism defined: actors and features

But let us return to conventional irredentas. Although we know now what they entail and how to recognise them, we still lack an operationalised definition. For reasons I shall detail below, I propose the following formula:

> Irredentism is the *bilateral* and *simultaneous* pursuit by both parent
> state and ethnically kindred brethren in a foreign state of ethno-
> territorial retrieval across inter-state borders.

Ethno-territorial retrieval represents *one* policy pursued by *two* distinct actors whose behaviours interact, i.e. they are not independently variable.[9]

Irredentist actors: the parent state

Let us look at our actors first. Parent states display a few basic attributes. They are invariably a sovereign political entity which is either politically and / or numerically dominated by one communal group. The term "sovereign" denotes here the formal freedom to determine domestic and foreign policies, but not the Weberian monopoly on the legitimate exercise of coercive power. Were one to apply that criterion, it would disqualify a number of irredentist states,

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[9] Horowitz (1985:286) claims the opposite: "the desire to pursue irredentism and the desire to be retrieved are thus independently variable."

such as Somalia or Armenia. In other words, there are parent states that are themselves challenged in their authority, but nevertheless perfectly capable of pursuing retrieval.

The feature of demographic or political dominance is vital for three reasons. Firstly, as we have seen, the criterion neatly distinguishes our two irredentist types as well as similar, but different events (see below). Secondly, it is the very gist of irredentas to unite an ethno-national group and its ancestral grounds within an entity that it 'owns', i.e. one that is *not* controlled or (co-)defined by ethnic strangers. The linchpin is hence not exclusivity (indeed many parent states contain minorities), but control: others are tolerated, provided they subordinate to the titular nation, there is no shared statehood. Finally, 'dominance' describes a state that is capable of irredentism without *decisive* opposition by its own minorities. These may worry that retrieval would upset the domestic ethnic balance at their expense (Horowitz 1985:284; Neuberger 1991:106). I distinguish here between situations of *genuine* and *qualified* homogeneity, i.e. *variations in the freedom of political action* even a dominant ethnic group has (see section 4.2, below).[10] Genuine homogeneity describes parent states where titular groups exercise perfect control over politics. This may be because there really are no minorities or, crucially, because existing ones have no veto power. Parent states marked by qualified homogeneity in turn contain what I call *important retaliating minorities*. These are able to apply anti-irredentist leverage either politically (Hungarians in Romania threatening withdrawal of their crucial governmental support at the prospect of Moldova's retrieval), demographically (non-Malays in Malaysia protesting against any retrieval of Thai Malays), and/or economically (like Moldova's Dniester-Russians who seceded with their economically important territory in 1990 fearing union with Romania). While such hindrances are not decisive in themselves, they may add to the considerable adversity irredentas typically face.

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[10] Neuberger (1991:104) equally observes these variations and has attempted a differentiated typology of retrieving states along the axis of domestic ethnic pluralism. Horowitz (1991:17) in contrast reasons in binary terms, i.e. parent states with domestic minorities are likely to be unattractive to transborder kin and also unable to retrieve.

40

Irredentist actors: the transborder minority

The transborder group is ethnically kindred[11] to the mainland population. In other words, ethno-national affinity is a defining feature of irredentism. "Non-ethnic" irredentas (Neuberger 1991:103; Yagcioglu 1999) are, as Horowitz (1991:11) agrees, consequently a contradiction in terms. Ethnic ties between parent state and those cut off crucially underpin an irredenta, they make sense of it. The two actors may well have "sub-group cleavages" as Horowitz calls them (1985:285), such as clans (as in the Somali or Albanian cases) or different religious denominations (e.g. Muslim and Christian Palestinians). But internal differences such as tribe, religion or dialect are no automatic impediments to irredentism. These are irrelevant as long as there is a shared set of exclusive ascriptive features based on which that ethno-national group defines itself. As I will show in chapter 6, it is rifts in this component that contribute to the unmaking of an irredenta.

Let us return to the transborder community. In most cases it will form a demographic and / or political minority within an ethnically different or multi-ethnic, state. There are a few exceptions to this, i.e. cases of a kindred group that in fact occupies its own sovereign state. Invariably, however, their separation into this distinct state has been imposed externally and will be resented to some degree. The mainland is still regarded as "true" parent state, hence the definitional term "foreign state" still applies. There are only a handful, but nevertheless interesting, examples for this: interwar Austria, the GDR, Greek Cyprus and post-Soviet Moldova. For matters of convenience I will refer to the transborder group throughout as "minority" and generally theorise for the classical minority setting.

Territory: communal homelands as 'map image'

A third definitional feature has to do with the transborder community's territory. Hence also the double-barrelled synonym I use for irredentism: ethno-*territorial* retrieval. The reason why irredentists cannot be satisfied with simple population transfers is because that area is part of the entire group's ancestral

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[11] I characterise all cases as ethnic groups, since "there is no objective reason to call a few hundred thousand Basques a nation, and the ten million Ibos, who possess a well-defined territory, a language and a culture, a tribe" (Neuberger 1986:23).

homeland. An irredenta's underlying notion is always one of remedying a subjectively unnatural or illegitimate division of the group and, by implication, of this communal territory as one of its central markers. Irredentists are by definition "homeland groups" (Esman 1994:14), which means that the ancestral area forms integral part of its collective identity. It is inseparable from the rationale and emotional appeal of the entire project. Examples of the Hungarian obsession with Transylvania spring to mind, the importance of Jerusalem to Palestinians, or the Serbian passion for Kosovo. Transborder kin should therefore not be referred to as "diasporic", since the term implies a dispersed group settling away from or beyond, its homeland.[12] Irredentists invariably define themselves as natives, so to say as "first nations", in their territory.[13] They feel endowed with a superior right to 'their' ancestral soil. As chapter 4 will show (and thereby disprove Horowitz), they will consequently want to retrieve of it as much as possible, whether or not they inhabit all of it or share it with other groups. Only where this directly conflicts with recovering kindred, i.e. usually under duress (like when Nazi Germany set the conditions for Hungary's retrieval of Transylvania in 1940) will parent states prioritise people over land.

Confusingly, the unit ethno-territorial retrieval seeks to recreate is quite often reified. When has there ever existed the unified Hellenic state Greek irredentists desired to restore? What ethnic Italian entity had to be re-created by retrieving South Tyrol, the Veneto and Fiume? This is especially true for non-European cases. There, irredentist demands and rationales often build on colonial – that is artificial and arbitrary - arrangements and couch them in ethnic terms. This usually mixes with homeland references of pre-colonial history.[14] Neuberger (1986:30) also points out that homelands, as well as the

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[12] Walker Connor (1986:16) correctly insists on the appropriate use of the term:"(...) the working definition of a diaspora might well be 'that segment of a people living *outside* the homeland'" (emphasis added).
[13] Naturally, this claim is emphatically contradicted by the respective host country. Romanians for instance maintain that it was them, and not Hungarians, who first settled Transylvania. Djibouti's Afars are similarly at pains to prove that the local Ise Somalis moved well *after* them into that area.
[14] After all, the memory of historic states, such as the Kongo Kingdom or the Pashtun tribal confederacies, is alive. Indeed, irredentism in the Third World often represents a desire to return to the status quo ante. Yet my point is that ethno-territorial retrieval in these settings should not be automatically equated with a total and principled opposition to any colonial arrangement.

mother states in post-colonial irredentas, are very much based on "the notion that colonial political units (like Djibouti) and administrative entities (e.g. Kenya's Northern Frontier District) are indivisible units for self-determination". Examples are Somali irredentism, the Libyan irredenta towards northern Chad (citing the 1935 French-Italian Treaty of Rome), or Ewe desires to re-create German Togoland because it mostly coincides with their homeland.

While this collective 'map image' and its notions of entitlement are highly subjective, the political will generated by this territorial marker of identity is very real. Retrieval is about regaining "completeness". The lacking unit can range from a mere city (Fiume) or administrative entity (the Kenyan Northern Frontier District), to an entire historic region (Transylvania or Kashmir) or a statelet (Northern Ireland), or even, as mentioned, an entire sovereign state.[15] To repeat, what these rather diverse units have in common is their perception as national territory, "as part of an ethno-cultural homeland, as part of a historic state, or as integral part of one geographic whole" (Neuberger 1991:97; see also Connor 1986:16-18; Carment and James 1995:84). As long as this 'map image' of the homeland is integral to a group's ethnic kinship, irredentism is the commonsensical answer. Chapter 6 will amongst others demonstrate that when this nexus is broken, when ethno-national identity comes to de-prioritise territory in favour of cultural and / or civic aspects, we have a causal contribution to irredentist inconsistency.

Requisite definitional features: bilateral desire for retrieval

Beyond the two actors, our definition clears several misunderstandings about irredentism and thus provides a conclusive, all-encompassing description. Firstly, it stipulates a two-actor approach. Just like genocide must conceptually consist of a group of perpetrators on the one hand, and of a separate group of victims on the other, there must be two distinct parties actively involved here. It is the *consensual* wish for retrieval, i.e. within both the parent state *and* the transborder community, that qualifies as an irredenta. Everything else deserves distinct labelling. A state's unilateral policies to incorporate a

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[15] Judging by area size, one could categorise large-, medium- and small-scale irredentas. Saideman and Ayres (1999; 2000) see size as crucial determinant of irredentism, an argument which is challenged by the very diversity of these cases.

disinterested or even reluctant population with its territory remains nothing else but annexationism, a simple act of expansion, even if that group is ethnically kindred. Hence the relevant criterion is not whether the rationale or discourse of a revisionist state is irredentist, but whether its brethren reciprocate the pursuit of retrieval. Examples of such annexationist attempts disguised - and hence mistaken - as irredentas would be Saddam Hussein's 1991 invasion of Kuwait on the grounds of recovering Iraq's 19th province, and China's aspirations towards Taiwan.[16] No wonder then that many studies erroneously reduce irredentism to mere state expansion clothed in nationalist rhetoric or, even worse, to a type of diversionary war (see below). Recognising the consent of *both* parties sorts irredentism from these policies.

In contrast, the purely one-sided wish of a transborder ethnic group for retrieval poses greater problems for judgement. It certainly does not count as genuine irredenta, because it fails to satisfy the criteria of simultaneity and reciprocity. However, unlike the single-handed attempts by some states, this pursuit has no other ambition but the one it professes. The ulterior motive *is* incorporation on the basis of transborder ethnic affinity. Moreover, it cannot impose itself on the other party because it is pursued by the weaker player in the game. Such "orphaned irredentas" (to take up the family imagery these movements employ) do exist and represent a curious territorial exit strategy. They can either arise without a parent state's encouragement (see the irredentist Crimean and Kazakh Russians ignored by their parent state), or persist after the mainland has unilaterally abandoned retrieval (arguably among them are the enosist Greeks of Cyprus or the Somalis in Ethiopia). Lacking parent state support, such minority demands eventually convert into other territorially defined responses, such as autonomy seeking movements or secessionism.[17]

The bilateral criterion is important to understand decision-making, but does not imply equality between the irredentist actors. The relationship is inevitably

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[16] Even Chazan's informed volume on irredentas accepts rhetoric as actual fact when it defines retrieval as "attempts by existing states to annex adjacent lands and the people who inhabit them *in the name of* historical, cultural, religious, linguistic or geographical affinity" (1991:139, emphasis added).
[17] See Horowitz (1991) on the relative infrequency of irredentas versus secessions and for the elasticity of ethno-territorial claims (1985:231-2).

skewed in favour of the more powerful party, namely the retrieving state. Only the parent state has the capacity to actually *achieve* an irredentist project, thanks to its military and financial resources, its bargaining power in international relations, and its capacity to act as a sovereign unit on its own behalf[18] - a crucial attribute lacking in the transborder minority. This inherent imbalance also explains the dominance of unilateral, parent state-focused definitions of irredentism (e.g. Neuberger 1991, Landau 1991, Ben-Israel 1991, Saideman 1996). Connor (1980:162-3) cautions that such one-sided analysis leads to mistaken conclusions: "analysts tend to perceive such movements [irredentas] as being artificially induced, since they receive their major impetus from governments across the border." He reminds that "government appeals to ethno-political yearnings require a popular desire, no matter how incipient, (...) governments can act as a successful catalyst of ethno-nationalism only when the necessary ingredients are present." Hence to omit minority choices (as opposed to capacities) means overlooking half of the input in an irredentist process.

At the opposite extreme, there are approaches that posit irredentism as the product of a triadic or even four-dimensional, relationship (Brubaker 1993; Suhrke 1970; Suhrke and Noble 1977). My fundamental disagreement with these models in turn is their untidy distinction between actors (i.e. those who pursue retrieval) and the independent variables that influence their decisions. The latter may well be agents in their own right (states, regional or international bodies etc.), but they remain external-structural determinants to the activity of the parent state and its transborder kindred. Thus the host state for example, often included as player, can only figure as (important) part of the shaping environment in an irredenta.

Requisite definitional features: simultaneous irredentism

The requirement of simultaneity follows from the logic of irredentism as a consensual project. If both actors do not yet or no longer pursue retrieval at the

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[18] This is the main reason why I do not consider the foreign policies of Hungary's national communist regime. My case study deliberately leaves a 50 year gap between 1944 and 1989, since Budapest was during this time little more than a German, and later Soviet satellite, unable to make independent (and therefore representative) policy choices.

same time, we are again dealing with either an orphaned irredenta or an annexationist project. Simultaneity also highlights the dynamic character of irredentism, the parallel activism of both players over the *same stretch of time*. Retrieval is a process, not an event or sudden crisis, it can have a life span of over a century before it is either achieved or abandoned.

This brings us to a related problem in our definition. When does retrieval start and end? And who initiates it? To start with, the rise and demise of an irredenta can only be approximated since it is a process, not an event. Still, the above definition does provide a time frame of sorts. As soon as both actors pursue the same goal of retrieval simultaneously, an irredenta is born. This may come along in a gradual build-up process (as in the case of the two Germanies), or be dramatically triggered by events such as a partition (Kashmir, Ireland, Hungary), imperial breakdown (see Nagorno-Karabach, Moldova), unilateral secession (Krajina, Republika Srpska), and de-colonisation (e.g. Somali territories in Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti). In order to pinpoint starting dates concretely, I have usually taken a key moment in each case, one in which irredentist feeling or activity was first externalised by both actors in an unmistakeable manner. An irredenta formally ends, when either or both of the two parties abandons the project, or when it has been accomplished. As a rule, if abandonment occurs, it often comes from the parent state. Minorities rarely if ever, give up first, although a possible future case might be Nagorno-Karabach, which seems to flirt with independence instead of retrieval. Interestingly, abandonment by the parent state does not stop minority irredentism immediately. As mentioned above, there exist numerous examples of "orphaned irredentas" persevering quite undeterred for years, even decades, in their struggle for reincorporation.

Despite these relatively clear start and end points, the timing of irredentas remains problematic however, for reality frequently forbids such tidy compartmentalisation. This is because retrieval does not have a life cycle as such, and, although there arguably are discernible stages, there is no linear progression to those either. Instead, irredentas experience ups and downs and proceed at changing paces, yet ultimately in a cumulative way. After growing

bilateral activism in the early 1920s, the Austro-German pursuit to retrieve South Tyrol for instance paused with the so-called Devil's Pact of 1939, which ostensibly settled the irredentist antagonism between the Axis partners. Yet the project gathered momentum again once Mussolini's fall became imminent, and was accomplished within weeks of the latter's arrest in 1943. Hence, my stringent definition of irredentism allows for certain latency periods in order to accommodate its dynamic character.[19] Alternatively, one would have to refer to each occurrence as new, separate irredenta (e.g. the South Tyrolean irredenta of 1920, of 1943 and so on) which would be analytically inconvenient and empirically wrong. These fluctuations may be strategic (as in the case above), or due to minor / temporary changes in the very factors that are, once they transform more decisively, also responsible for irredentist inconsistency. The "irredentist inconsistency" of my study means a definite and broadly endorsed discontinuation of irredentism in either or both players. In contrast to their former agendas, they now regard existing border arrangements as permanent, if not always legitimate, and no longer seek to revise them. The bi-lateral abandonment of retrieval by Germany and the Alsatians after 1945 (see Gutmann 1991) and contemporary Magyar choices in Eastern Europe both represent good examples.

The related question of which side casts the initial impulse for retrieval is hard to answer, there seems to be no pattern. Connor (1980:163) notes in the same vein that "governments may take the initiative in raising an irredentist claim, but most unionising movements originate in ethnic groups on either side of the border, and those groups then press for governmental support." It should be noted here that the two parties' decisions are not necessarily independent of each other, as Horowitz maintains (1985:286).

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[19] Rather than drawing a binary picture of terminated and ongoing irredentas, it is useful to introduce the notion of a latent irredenta. This applies where neither actor has formally renounced irredentist politics, and/or where retrieval still appears to form the ultimate or ideal goal for both parent state and transborder kindred. In other words, latency is also given when both actors still regard their division by state borders as temporary.

1.3 Filling in the gaps: the characteristics of ethno-territorial retrieval (based on Dataset 1)

The next step on from our definition is to collate all cases that qualify in order to find and describe general features. As of now, there is still no adequate dataset on retrieval (see also next chapter).[20] The problem is that of recognition: due to erroneous or lacking definitions, most irredentas are simply not labelled and analysed as such. The German reunification has not been thought of as a successful irredenta, despite presenting a good example. The Irish Republican movement has rarely been referred to as irredentism. Somalia's protracted conflicts with neighbouring states that contain significant numbers of its ethnic kin have simply been tagged as post-colonial wars. Conversely, an example like Zionism is mistakenly cited as "classic case of irredentism" (Ben-Israel 1991:33-4), although it involves overwhelmingly diasporic communities. With a workable concept now in place, we can however draw all genuine cases under one logical heading and summarise their features.

The Descriptive Dataset, below (see Dataset Manual 1 for codebook and value label views), has attempted to do so. Dataset 1 collects all cases chronologically on the basis of our working definition, recording their various attributes into a global collation on conventional (type 1) irredentism which spans the period from the first assertion of the national principle in 1789 until present. A few caveats are necessary beforehand. Despite best efforts, the present compilation of 55 conventional irredentas is unlikely to be complete.[21] The statistical population size is small, the last wave of irredentism is recent and still ongoing, hence we have to infer and generalise with reserve. The set also includes a few anomalies. There is for instance the case of Cyprus, which counts as conventional irredenta although it does not quite conform to the classical situation outlined above. Cyprus, consisting since 1974 of two

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[20] Saideman and Ayres' studies of irredentism (1999; 2000) are based on Gurr's general Minorities at Risk dataset. Moore and Davis (1998) have statistically analysed transnational ties and state foreign policy, but their compilation includes all kinds of relationships from mere patronage down to irredentism.
[21] On the basis of the above definition, I have also found 14 unificationist irredentas which make up a separate dataset for future research.

political units, is not adjacent to the parent state (Greece) and it is not claimed by a rival state – Turkey never tried to retrieve the island, neither in part nor as a whole (Landau 1995:195). But because of the consensual and simultaneous wish of Cypriot and mainland Greeks for "enosis" (union) under the Megali (Greater Greece) idea, the case qualifies.[22] Another exceptional case is that of Austria, figuring as both retriever and retrieved. From 1920 onwards it was an irredentist state itself when it lost South Tyrol, whilst being simultaneously subject to the Nazi German irredenta which sought the nineteenth century Greater German Solution (Großdeutsche Lösung). Also, for the sake of a larger population size and the associated degrees of freedom in statistical testing, we also do not differentiate between the classical retrieval of minorities from a host state, and consensual unifications of kindred countries with a mainland (e.g. Nazi Germany and Austria, West-Germany and GDR, Romania and Moldova). Finally, also included are cases where irredentism co-exists with other variants of self-determination, like secession (e.g. Kashmir).

1.3.1 The global incidence of irredentism over time and space

Geographical distribution

The goal of irredentism is to unite a group and its ancestral grounds within a political entity that its own kin controls, and these two prerequisites limit its geographical occurrence. Retrieval is definitionally contingent on the concept of the state, or more accurately, on that of the *nation state* (Neuberger 1991:104). Ernest Gellner (1983:4) reminds us that nationalism - which provides retrieval with its rationale - is "parasitic" on the concept of the state. Hence nationalism, and irredentism with it, "only emerges in milieux in which the existence of the state is already very much taken for granted."

Secondly, irredentism presupposes an ancestral territory (see above), which accounts for its complete absence in the Americas[23] and Australia. Small

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[22] This project was successfully opposed by the British mandate power and Turkey, until Athens officially abandoned the irredenta under these pressures, forcing its kin to accept independence in 1958 instead of incorporation. Enosist factions in both mainland and Cypriot Greek politics exist until today, but the idea is not longer governmentally endorsed.
[23] Bolivian claims against Chile over the Litoral de Atacama-province, annexed in 1904, do not qualify as irredenta. Although the claims are still upheld - there is a national commemoration

native populations aside, they are overwhelmingly made up of diasporic communities who, by definition lack, the crucial attachment to a communal area. Being immigrant societies, such settings also pre-empt the core aspiration of retrieval, for none can function as parent state, as a political entity where one *ethnic group* is dominant. So while the concept of the state is well established here, it has preceded - indeed generated - the nation, rather than vice versa. Irredentism's problem, the problem of nation-state incongruence, hence does not even arise.

For these reasons, conventional irredentism still proves to be an overwhelmingly European phenomenon. Of the 55 identifiable cases, 45 are European – an impressive 16 of which occurred in Western Europe, a region allegedly free of the ethno-nationalism. It is mainly the period of de-colonisation which has provided the few non-European exceptions to this rule: I have found 5 African, 4 Asian and only 1 Middle Eastern irredenta. One may speak of irredentist waves which, as corollaries to the waves of modern state formation, progressively expanded from the European birthplace to other parts of the world. [24]

Global spread in clusters

Judging from the dataset, the occurrence of retrieval may be organised into four successive waves in world history (Chazan 1991:142-143).[25] Since irredentism strives for the creation or completion of parent states, these periods are linked to the four waves of modern state creation that for instance O'Leary (1998:61) suggests.[26] As such, irredentist surges have been spawned

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day and a tenth star on the national flag to symbolise the lost area - the local population there has not voiced a desire for retrieval. In other words, the case does not fulfil the criterion of bilateralism. The 1836 Texan defection from Mexico and its subsequent entry into the United States in 1845 is not an irredenta either, because the union was not based on ethnic affinity.

[24] Irredentism has no domino effects because it is contingent on a certain set of factors that condition its occurrence or demise. Demonstration effects, however, are possible, as my model will argue: the existence and/or proximity of successful irredentas shapes both actors' decisions on retrieval (Horowitz 1985: 279 argues the same for secessions). One such instance are the successful German irredentas for interwar Magyars.

[25] Chazan's phases (1991:142-3) are only roughly outlined. Based on the collation of irredentas, I have modified their timing somewhat, re-labelled them, and finally linked them to the context of modern state formation.

[26] There are several alternative chronologies, most notably Charles Tilly's sociological account (1975:632-8). This distinguishes only three phases and dates them from a much earlier point onwards (1500-1700, 1650-1800, 1800-1950).

by either revolutions (1789 and 1989-90), and / or imperial collapse (1919, 1989-90), and / or World Wars (1919, 1940). They represent brief anomalies in the Westphalian status quo consensus that has governed modern international relations.

Rather than variations in success rates or -frequency, our irredentist waves consequently describe thematic groups. Each wave unites cases which arose among similar circumstances (e.g. imperial disintegration following WW1) and thus base themselves on the same contemporary paradigm (Wilson's Fourteen Points). A closer look reveals that cases cluster at certain junctures of each wave. This means that we can differentiate alternating active and latent sub-periods (see chapter 5). Active periods are brief and normally situated at the start and / or end of a wave. Still marked by the major international upsets described above, they represent brief windows of opportunity for irredentism. Latent periods in turn seem to be the default mode, mirroring the traditionally restrictive inter-state consensus against self-determination and border changes. Confusingly, such periods are not expressly prohibitive. Often, the international system ostensibly upholds a permissive attitude (e.g. by extolling self-determination in the UN Charter), whilst in fact *acting* restrictively, frequently with an area bias.[27] The dataset shows irredentism as stagnant or gestating mainly during restrictive phases. Active-permissive phases in contrast witnessed virulent and / or successful, retrieval.

Coming to our thematic waves then, the first, which I call "Native", saw the birth of the irredentist concept. Interestingly, a label for retrieval emerges only about halfway through this period, drawn from the Risorgimento's cry for *Italia irredenta*, a redeemed Italy. The Native Wave was made possible by the philosophical changes of the French Revolution, which introduced the national principle. Irredentas are thus inherently modern phenomena, corollaries to a type of political project that did not exist before 1789. They are certainly not "an age-long phenomenon" in world history (Ben-Israel 1991:31-2).[28] The First Wave "centred on the delineation of the boundaries of core European states..."

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[27] For instance, the Anti-Colonial phase saw an overall tolerant stance towards border revision only in Africa and Asia, whilst maintaining a firm status quo attitude towards it in Europe.
[28] Ben-Israel (ibid.) understands irredentism as an "archetypal force" of atavistic territory-marking that nationalism merely provided with a modern rationale and mode of self-expression.

(Chazan 1991:142) and was therefore particularly a period of unificationist irredentism in both Western and Eastern Europe – the cases of Italy, Germany, Greece and Romania spring to mind. Conversely, because this time of nation state creation was still relatively poor in parent states only 22, mostly short-lived, cases date from that period. Starting somewhere in the early 1820s, it lasted through the whole of the nineteenth century, during which it intensified, until the peace treaties of the First World War (1918/1920), which sealed the making of this order.

The revisionism that the latter provoked, together with imperial collapse and the international acceptance of ethnic boundary drawing, thematically unites the second, "Wilsonian", wave of irredentism. This stretches from about 1919 until 1939. Sandwiched between the World Wars, this comparatively brief era of only two decades was very prolific, generating 16 cases. It is unsurprisingly the one most associated with irredentist movements, displaying powerful examples such as the German and Hungarian ones, and marking the onset of the Irish pursuit of retrieval.

The following Third Wave is associated with the prolonged process of decolonisation. It occupies most of the twentieth century (1940-1988), and mainly centres on the Third World (the two exceptions are Japan and West Germany). Practically repeating the scenario of European state formation from a century ago, it displays a high tide of unificationist irredentism – see for instance the Somali, Bakongo, Pashtun, Baluchi, or Afar examples. In the few cases where these unificationist irredentas were achieved (Somalia), or where an ethnic group already possessed a parent state (Japan, Malaysia or via prior partition as with West Germany and Pakistan), this period also generated seven cases of conventional irredentism. A brief word of clarification is necessary here about the character of this irredentist period: it is not *part of* anti-colonialism, but *distinct from and successive to*, it. As Neuberger (1986:10) brilliantly distinguishes, "anti-colonial self-determination is, from a post-colonial perspective, statist and conservative, while ethnic and secessionist self-determination is revisionist and wants to tear down the current state system." As a rule, the ethnically diverse states created by

arbitrary colonial partition were, upon independence, themselves challenged by component groups (like the Somalis) or by ethnically homogeneous sub-units (e.g. the Northern Chad).

The current Fourth Irredentist Wave is still ongoing, and thus has to be judged carefully. Because it was sparked off by the fall of the Iron Curtain (1989/90) and the end of the bi-polar freeze of the inter–state system, I call it the wave of the "New World Order". The Fourth Wave has so far produced nine cases. Thematically, it seems to take up the unaccomplished cases of the Wilsonian Wave (e.g. Armenia, Serbia) and once again centres on Europe. Irredentism has thus practically returned after a brief excursion into the Third World during the second half of the twentieth century. The reasons relate back to my above discussion of actors and irredentist sub-types. Conventional irredentas are necessarily more rare in formerly colonial settings, because arbitrary border drawing resulted in very few parent states, i.e. ethnically majoritarian or titular units. Where this was nonetheless the case (like in Swaziland), or where this arose due to independence (Pakistan, Somalia), ethno-territorial retrieval was indeed sometimes attempted. In most cases, however, communal groups remain scattered among several host states and thus strive since de-colonisation for parent state establishment in unificationist movements. Since conventional irredentas normally follow the successful creation of nation-states (see above), we may hence expect their future increase in the Third World.

Against the trend

As a final observation, these waves of occurrence do not mirror general findings on communal conflict in the literature. The latter almost unanimously describe a linear increase of ethnically defined antagonism over time (see for instance Connor 1972:327-32). Notably, there is no parallel with data from T.R. Gurr's *Minorities At Risk* project. His quantification of mobilised communal groups all over the world shows a sustained rise in ethnic conflict over the twentieth century, globally as well as on each continent (Gurr 1994:98, 350-2). Why irredentism does not seem to "go with the flow" is at this point difficult to explain and once again calls for future research.

1.3.2 Success and failure: how did irredentism fare over two centuries?

The criteria for irredentist success on the other hand, can be quite diverse and, depending on which ones are employed, may render markedly different outcomes.[29] Given that this thesis argues against liberal normative, materialist explanations of irredentas, it is important to conceive of success as broadly as possible in order to avoid reification or charges of research bias. We can thus define success in terms of immediate, short-term results: has an irredenta achieved its goal at any point in time, however brief and disadvantageous that victory might have been? The rates of temporary success are reasonable: less than half of all finished or ongoing cases have proven a complete failure (i.e. 23 out of 53 recorded outcomes). At first glance then, irredentism appears to stand a better than 50 per cent chance. If, however, we apply stricter criteria of success, the picture looks less positive. Durability is the first - what percentage of irredentist gains was able to sustain themselves until today? Since this is an ex post assessment, we have to look here at terminated cases only. No less than 23 out of the 42 completed irredentas fail this criterion, meaning that in the long term most have lost again what they retrieved. There are only 19 rather exceptional success stories, and all but one of these successful irredentas are European. The tally gets even worse if we analyse the extent of these successes. Some irredentas achieve a part of their goals and then either content themselves (like the Serb designs for Sandjak of Novi Pazar/Raska and Danish aspirations for Schleswig), or continue to pursue unification with the remainder (an example is Greece's quest for the whole of Epirus). Once again, I adopted a generous approach, counting even minimal or partial gains as victory, as long as they were lasting (see above). However, of the 19 winners above, only 11 retrieved all they set out for.[30] The remaining 8 united only a part of their homelands and kin. This means a rather meagre global success rate of 26 per cent (11 out of 42 terminated cases).

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[29] Ambrosio (2002:22-24) has conceived of success / irredentist outcomes in an even more differentiated continuum, from "full withdrawal of claims" up to "actual annexation".

[30] They are: Greece (Aegean Macedonia, Ionian Islands, Crete); France (Alsace); Romania (Transylvania); Italy (South Tyrol); Denmark (South Schleswig); Poland (Gdansk); Germany (Saarland and the former GDR), and Japan (Ryukyu-Okinawa). Although it is true that some of these cases suffered temporary setbacks (brief interruptions of sovereignty over their territories due to exchange irredentas), they ultimately managed to retain these retrieved units permanently.

In short, even when success is broadly conceived, irredentism proves only just worthwhile. If at all, retrieval seems only viable as a short-term strategy. In the long term, and with a view to its declared goals (complete retrieval), it displays a story of dismal failure, making for a poor instrument of self-determination. Like secession – the other territorial exit strategy – it also creates more problems than it resolves. This is because its explicit win-lose mentality will engender pre-emptive measures by host states. These are always repressive, and sometimes even genocidal. If successful, it may lead to counter-challenges in the form of exchange irredentas, forced restitution, population transfers, or secessionism by stranded minorities. The different reasons for failure also show that irredentist conflicts are very difficult to resolve. More than half of all projects are forcibly ended by external coercion and great power interference. Secondly, these figures severely challenge suggestions that conventional irredentism is calculating or rational, in that it is attempted again and again in spite of its sorry long-term record. Horowitz's carefully deliberating groups would only need to open a few history books of the past two centuries in order to see for themselves that retrieval does not pay off. Still, there are globally no less than nine – possibly even more – conventional irredentas that are of recent birth and ardently pursued.

The category of failed cases is also interesting, because it provides information about how irredentist activity ends - as distinct from what ends the actual *desire* for retrieval, which is the ultimate subject of this work. Failures are remarkably heterogeneous. There are first of all projects that have been abandoned by the parent states ("orphaned irredentas"), mostly via official governmental renouncement towards the host state. Examples are Malaysia's public abandonment in 1948, or Somalia's gestures in 1978, 1981 and 1988 towards Djibouti, Kenya and Ethiopia respectively. These account for merely 3 cases out of the total of 23 terminated irredentas. In short: parent states rarely "just let go". Neither do minorities for that matter. Following Horowitz' tenets (1991) there also ought to be irredentas that were traded by transborder kin for the more self-interested option of secessionism. There is, however, only one such 'converted' irredenta. In the case concerned, that of the Thai Malays, desires for local autonomy crucially *followed* the abandonment of irredentist

projects, i.e. it was not causal. Thirdly, we can identify irredentas that were abandoned bilaterally, like the Swazi example, or that of the Chadian Muslims and Libya. These add up to a mere three. Conversely, by far the largest number of irredentist failures are down to "coerced termination." These irredentas - 16 in total - were cut short by the external factor of a World War, and the subsequent imposition or occupation by victorious Great Powers (one may think here of the aftermath of interwar German and Hungarian irredentas or Greece's forced return of Asia Minor in 1923). This reveals irredentism as tenacious ethno-national movement which is routinely suppressed.

Finally, a brief word on the average life span of irredentism. Of our 55 cases, there are 42 terminated irredentas, i.e. meaning these have clearly left behind both active and any latent periods. As explained above, an irredenta ends if either or both actors abandon the project, or if it has been accomplished. Accordingly, I define a conventional irredenta as failure if it has ended and never achieved even a temporary incorporation of the population and territory it sought to retrieve[31] – obvious examples would be here the Kenyan Somali or Greek Cypriot cases. Terminated cases ranged from merely 5 to an impressive 125 years. Given that campaigns lasted 36.70 years on average, it is again clear that irredentists do not give up easily.

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[31] "Incorporation" denotes here a scenario where the population and territory become both legally and actually part of the parent state. The criteria can be illustrated in two examples. Although Somalia briefly managed to occupy almost 90 per cent of the Ogaden in the war against Ethiopia, that territory had at no point become *part of* Somalia. This is because the host state was neither defeated (it actually won the conflict), nor was there any legal arrangement (such as an inter-state treaty, a UN resolution, international recognition, or international arbitration) endorsing Somali occupation. Interwar Hungary in contrast, achieved her two irredentas via the Vienna Arbitrations of 1938 (Southern Slovakia) and 1940 (Northern Transylvania) in which the respective host countries signed their rights away, albeit under pressure. Although Budapest used normatively reprehensible means (coercive diplomacy) and the victories proved short-lived, these two cases of retrieval do represent examples of actual incorporation.

1.3.3 Irredentist strategies and counter-strategies

Two centuries of irredentism display a set of trademark instruments and of combinations in which these are used. My point here is that both actors pursue retrieval in several, well observable ways over and apart from violence. The study of these characteristics has often been neglected in favour of - far fewer - spectacular confrontations. Secondly, we need to note that although striving for the same goal, actors' strategies diverge because of their difference in leverage. The parent state can afford a range of activities, while its transborder brethren risks a standardised set of repressive measures by its host state.

Parent state methods

Mainland irredentism typically translates into expansionist military and foreign policy concepts, antagonistic parent-host state relations (including full-scale war), campaigning at home and abroad for border adjustments, and the prominence of irredentist questions in domestic politics. It is accompanied by the disproportionate use of state resources (budgetary, military etc.), the existence of irredentist governmental bodies or ministries, biased curricula in state schools, and constitutionally enshrined commitments to, or symbols of, retrieval. The latter sometimes entails the extension of citizenship to transborder ethnic kin, thus equating civic and political loyalties with shared ethnicity. A final characteristic is the overall positive attitude of parent state public opinion, manifesting some kind of popular mandate for irredentism. Here components include significant electoral approval of irredentist party platforms, the success of single-issue interest groups, private initiatives, and of popular rallies. Further revealing is supportive or complacent domestic media coverage on the politics of retrieval, which often advertises the plight of minorities.

Minority strategies

Transborder minority irredentism in contrast has to be more subdued, since it risks host state retaliation. One universal feature is subordination to the parent state, in terms of identity (as mere enclave or periphery incapable of autonomous survival) and, consequently, political action. The more this relationship between local leaders and the parent state government is skewed

into receiving and executing the latter's orders, the stronger that community's political allegiance and thus wish, for retrieval. In sum: the measure of how much the transborder group lends itself as instrument to mainland irredentist policies describes the degree of its own determination. As I will show in chapter 6, this is based on the causal link between group identity and political allegiances that co-determines irredentism. Generally, minority irredentism manifests itself in abstentionism (i.e. the refusal of consent and thus of legitimacy to the host state) and / or self-segregation as community. Minority party platforms will not be explicitly irredentist, but use proxy notions of external self-determination, group solidarity, autonomy, etc. Further typical are industrial action, sabotage, protest rallies, and various forms of civil disobedience. More rarely, these groups form alliances (electoral and occasionally military) with other disaffected minorities in their bid to challenge the much more powerful centre.[32] Although the parties involved agree on their strategies and the usefulness of pooling efforts, these associations prove usually short-lived. This is because they are instrumental and ultimately aim for diverging goals. Sometimes, irredentist minorities also engage in violent uprisings (see below).

Joint strategies: the use of violence

There are multiple combinations of these strategies, and yet irredentism is often crudely reduced to, or equated with, a violent crisis. Some irredentas are indeed ready to employ violence, often early in their existence, whereas others never take this step. Some develop an armed minority militia from the outset (e.g. like in Northern Ireland, in Cyprus until 1958 or in Kashmir), supported by the parent state to varying degrees, and sometimes joined by the latter's military when the moment appears most favourable (as Armenia did in Nagorno-Karabach or Somalia in the Ogaden). In other cases, the parent state (e.g. rump Yugoslavia) and its kin (Krajina Serbs) join forces from the outset in order to conduct an integrated military campaign for maximum success. Other minorities take in comparison long to adopt armed activism (as in Cyprus), or

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[32] There are several examples for this: since 1947, the Baluchis and Pashtuns in Pakistan have been co-operating with one another as well as with autonomist Sindhis in order to achieve their respective unificationist irredentas. Somali irredentists allied themselves with Oromo secessionists in Ethiopia in the 1970s. Hungarians in both interwar Transylvania and Czechoslovakia joined forces with local German communities.

permanently confine themselves to token actions like riots (Okinawa, interwar South Tyrol) or assassinations. Finally, and this will figure as secondary factor in chapter 5, many irredentas seek for powerful patron states. These provide military aid (as the Soviet Union's help to Somalia) or military-diplomatic leverage for the irredentist project (see Nazi Germany's backing for Hungarian claims, and colonial British encouragement for the Thai Malays). In sum, there seems to be no gradual and linear build-up that makes violence the kind of ultimate or last resort comparative evidence of communal strife normally proves it to be.[33] This paradox ties in with my earlier observation that there seems to be no pattern of stages within irredentist processes.

Other joint strategies

Remaining with shared policies, irredentas use more subtle means. The resort to intergovernmental negotiations (like Swaziland's 1982 attempt to retrieve its co-ethnics from South Africa in a proposed land-deal) is more an exception than the rule. However, many movements try hard to move within the bounds of legality. One may just recall Hungary's 'settlement' with Romania in the Second Vienna 'Arbitration' of 1940, conducted under the auspices of Nazi Germany. Such ostensibly non-coercive approaches are often reinforced with appeals to the inter-state community. These divert the focus away from the parent state's claim, with its pejorative connotations of balkanisation and ethnic warfare, and emphasise the more respectable demand for minority self-determination (see below). What form of self-determination that minority group then opts for – autonomy, independent statehood or irredentist unification – will then have to be accepted. Hence Germany's demands at Munich in 1938 were irredentist in character, yet that term was never explicitly used (see Ben-Israel 1991:31). Somalia, Pakistan, Armenia and Hungary have amongst others all pursued this strategy together with their respective ethnic brethren, either in combination with, or as a substitute for, state directed irredentist policies.

Countering irredentism: host state strategies against irredentist minorities

Let us also look briefly at the other side of the fence. The way host states counter irredentas is remarkably standardised. As a rule, the instruments

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[33] See for instance Gurr's observation (1994:365) that "ethno-political conflict usually begins with limited protests and clashes that only gradually escalate into sustained violence."

employed to preserve territorial integrity are repressive and retaliatory in character, rather than accommodative. Irredentist minorities are delivered to their host state's measures as an "internal affair" under the latter's sovereignty, which in turn reinforces their disaffection, as I will argue in chapter 5. Conversely, as chapter 7 will demonstrate, pluralist-consociational democracies are able to pre-empt or assuage minority defection.

Most host states are, however, not accommodative and typically use two tactics: the de-legitimisation of irredentas and, secondly, hegemonic control (McGarry and O'Leary 1993).[34] To start with, host states go to great lengths to alter the ethnic demography of an irredentist region so that majoritarian justifications for defection become invalid. This territorial control can be achieved by "cosmetic" means - by administrative redistricting (like in Northern Ireland, most notoriously in Derry, to manufacture local Protestant majorities), and / or manipulated censi (e.g. interwar Romania's handling of figures in Transylvania). More profoundly, control is sought via forced resettlement programs, what John McGarry (1998) calls "demographic engineering".[35] This state-directed movement of ethnic groups is "used to create 'demographic facts' on the ground which undercut the claims of competitors, strengthens one's own claims, and present accomplished facts at negotiations" (McGarry 1998:627). Interwar Poland sought to pre-empt a German irredenta in East Prussia by moving Polish refugees from Russia and Ukraine into the contested "Corridor" areas immediately after 1918. Re-settling ethnic Italians and providing generous financial incentives for further settlers, were part of Mussolini's notorious *Italianità* policies in South Tyrol against local German irredentists. The same measures were used against Magyars in Ceauçescu's Romania, and recently by Belgrade in Kosovo, where Bosnian Serb refugees were meant to colonise ethnically 'cleansed' Albanian areas.

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[34] McGarry and O'Leary (1993:23-6) define control as co-optive or coercive system of ethnic domination. It makes an overtly violent ethnic challenge to the state order either unthinkable, or unworkable for the subordinated minority. In the present application, the conflict would be about territorial self-determination, both internal (autonomy) and external (retrieval).
[35] McGarry explicitly describes the use of demographic engineering for cases "when sovereignty over a minority region is disputed – the irredentist threat" (1998:627).

Often corollary to these territorial tactics is electoral control. This can take several forms: gerrymandering, vote rigging and, very importantly, the manipulation of plebiscitarian choices. The gerrymandering of voting districts prevents a clear expression of popular sovereignty and of an irredentist mandate in elections and referenda. Northern Ireland serves once more as sorry example of this instrument, coupled with the manipulation of suffrage and the introduction of plurality rule. Vote rigging and interference into the process of ballot casting was a regular device against the irredentist Magyar minority in interwar Romania. Offering impossible choices in a referendum in turn applies specifically to de-colonisation, where plebiscites were commonly used, seemingly in order to honour popular sovereignty. Yet potentially irredentist voters were simply not offered the option for (re)union, but could only chose between continued colonial rule and independence in a new state they did not wished to be part of. This is true for cases like the Pakistani Pashtuns during the partition of India, the Cypriot Greeks in 1958[36], or the Somalis of Djibouti in 1977. Direct democracy was thus cynically misused in order to prevent an act of self-determination. In short, instead of sorting out competing ethno-national aspirations, such referenda served to preserve reified state units created by the departing colonial powers.

Centralisation and the revocation of autonomy are yet another tactic to contain irredentist activity. India's progressive infringement on the federal division of powers in the last two decades was arguably as much in response to Kashmiri irredentism, as a help to further fuel the latter. Belgrade's withdrawal of Kosovo's autonomy in 1989 was not only part of a Serb nationalist agenda, but also reactive to the increasingly assertive Albanian irredentist currents that had developed since the mid-1980s. Kenya abandoned its colonially imposed federal constitution in 1964 only one year after independence in order to tackle the irredentist Somali *shiftas* (guerrillas) in its Northern Frontier District.

The establishment of economic domination frequently accompanies these measures of territorial control. The land reforms and new legislation in interwar Romania and Czechoslovakia deliberately undermined the livelihood of their

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[36] For instance, a plebiscite organised by the Greek Cypriot Bishop Makarios in January 1950 showed a 95,7 per cent desire of that community for *enosis*, i.e. retrieval by the Greek state.

respective Magyar minorities lest they should have the means/leverage to challenge the recent incorporation of Transylvania and the Felvidék. Under General Zia's regime, Islamabad employed a strategy of targeted under-investment towards mainly Baluchi areas in order to foster a Punjabi ascendancy that would keep Baluchi irredentism at bay. Northern Ireland's Nationalists endured discrimination in state social services as well as in both public and private employment (e.g. via clientelist labour markets and systems of ethnic patronage). Interwar Italy finally rendered its recalcitrant Südtiroler minority economically dependent on Rome, so that "by the mid-1930s, car, machine, and steel industries had established, on government orders, branch factories and offices in the Bolzano area" (Eyck in Montville 1991:221).

Given this array of powerful instruments, the resort to coercive measures to thwart minority irredentism is relatively rare. Still, there are notable examples where a host state felt so threatened that it employed ethnically skewed policing and paramilitary units (Spain's Basque region), or even its regular armed forces (India, Ethiopia, Azerbaijan, Northern Ireland).

Repression is finally often complemented with a less tangible, but powerful instrument: forced assimilation. To undermine a group's ethno-national identity, the very foundation of irredentism, means tackling the threat at its root. The usual methods are well known: linguistic repression, biased schooling, banning minority culture and its national symbols etc. For irredentist cases, these may also extend to the re-writing of history in order to deny or challenge the claim to ancestral territory that underpins retrieval. When it came to the de-colonisation of Djibouti for instance, both the French administration and the Afar ethnic group sought to hinder the irredentist Somali community. Hence both portrayed local Somalis as recent arrivals that furthermore lacked any attachment to the territory because of their life as pastoralist nomads. Using the theory of Greco-Dacian continuity, the Romanian state persistently characterised Transylvanian Hungarians as "usurpers" and "settlers" who came to that region long after Proto-Romanians allegedly had. It followed that the Magyar inter-war irredenta there had an inferior, even illegitimate, claim to that land. In addition, many host states – like Romania, Great Britain, France,

Kenya, India or Thailand - preventatively refuse to recognise their minorities as nations. This denies them legal protection as such groups as well as the corollary right to self-determination that would in turn justify irredentist or secessionist, defection.[37]

Host state tactics versus irredentist minorities can thus be summed up as undermining the legitimacy of the irredentist project statistically, politically and ideologically, preventing or falsifying the expression of popular sovereignty in the irredentist group, and employing economic and military repression. Moreover, when dealing with an irredenta a host state faces twin challenges. Like in a secessionist case, one is from within, posed by what the centre regards as disloyal periphery. Yet at the same time, and much worse than in a mere separatist struggle, host states also have to tackle the external threat posed by the minority's parent state. Domestic communal conflict thus links with antagonism at inter-state level – the very feature that made irredentism the co-author of two World Wars (Midlarsky 1992).

Countering irredentism: host states tackling the retrieving state

Host states often defend themselves against parent states irredentism by forming a regional alliance or ad hoc (military) co-operation with other threatened states (Weiner 1991:671-2). Examples of such anti-irredentist alliances are the interwar Little Entente against revisionist Hungary and Germany, or the Kenyan-Ethiopian Pact of 1964 (renewed in 1980 and 1987) to counter Somalia's prolonged efforts for retrieval. In 1974, Pakistani and Iranian forces briefly worked together in order to crush Baluchi irredentists, while the mid-1990s saw periods of Bosnian-Croat military collaboration against the Serbian irredenta in the Krajina. Another tactic is occasional counter-irredentism, i.e. retaliating in "a "two-can-play-this game technique" (Connor 1980:169). Both Ethiopia and the partly Afar state of Djibouti reciprocated claims onto irredentist Somalia, stating that the latter was in fact a lost territory of theirs, rather than vice versa. The same is true for Moldova

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[37] Occasionally, there are also host governments who retro-actively "de-nationalise" a minority in order to deny its right to territorial defection. One of the most notorious cases is that of the Ibo, whose status was lowered to that of a 'tribe' by the Nigerian Government in order to outlaw the attempted Biafran secession of 1967.

versus Romania, or India versus Pakistan. Clearly, this strategy serves once more to de-legitimise irredentist desires by confusing or relativising them. Finally, the most common instruments employed by host states are those of conventional diplomacy, ranging from complaints to international bodies and the inter-state community in general (see for instance interwar Poland's and Czechoslovakia's appeals) over rare attempts for inter-governmental solution (e.g. the United Kingdom versus the Irish Republic), down to military threat and war (India versus Pakistan in 1947 and 1965, Ethiopia versus Somalia in 1964 and 1977, or Azerbaijan versus Armenia intermittently since 1988).

1.4 What irredentism is consequently not, and why

Concept building and -analysis entail amongst others the use of negative definitions. Relations and possible confusion with other phenomena need to be described and eliminated, based on what I have so far established - namely what irredentism indeed *is*. The following will thus briefly rectify some erroneous categorisations.

1.4.1 Irredentism versus state-expansion[38]

Firstly, we need to address the issue of state expansion, a policy so often mistaken for and justified as, irredentism. We have already distinguished retrieval from mere annexationism. But how is one to explain instances of genuine irredentism that simply "overdo" it? To start with, I have explained above that ethnic homelands can stretch beyond the settlement areas of the transborder minority. Interwar Hungarian demands initially referred to the whole of Transylvania, including stretches that were almost homogeneously Romanian, but which were regarded by both local and mainland Magyars as indispensable communal territory. For this very same reason, the Greek

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[38] This is particularly widespread among scholars of international relations (e.g. Mayall 1990 and 1994; Carment and James 1995; Kegley and Wittkopf 1999) and historians (Ben-Israel 1991). They only pay attention to the frequently irredentist rhetoric of annexationist states and consequently label such border disputes as 'irredenta'. Thus Von Hippel (1993) for instance, cites cases like the Falkland dispute or the Syrian invasion of Lebanon as irredentas.

concept of "enosis" naturally meant the retrieval of the entire isle of Cyprus, notwithstanding the local Turkish community. Furthermore, since irredentism always translates into antagonistic parent-host state relations, retrieval becomes a geopolitical issue, on top of the ethnic dimension. Kashmir for example, only partially Muslim, forms the strategic border region between two hostile states and is thus very salient to Pakistan not least for that reason. Italian aspirations for the whole of South Tyrol instead of merely the Italian-settled Trentino, surely involved the fact that it would provide that country with a formidable natural frontier, the Alps. In short, retrieval is not conducted behind a Rawlesian veil of ignorance. Once a leadership undertakes such a risky enterprise[39] it will do so with an eye on maximum rewards – so to say under the premise " if it's worth doing, it's worth doing properly." The point is that irredentism can be opportunistic, but that does not make it a sham. Ethnic contiguity sometimes does not constitute irredentism's *sole* motive reason, but it is always the most important one.

1.4.2 Retrieval as mere diversionary war

It is similarly misleading to brand the phenomenon as a type of diversionary war. This is usually the interpretation of elite-persuasion theorists (e.g. Roudometof 1996 or Saideman 1998). As I will discuss in chapter 7, retrieval is not completely devoid of this component – this is why irredentas hardly occur in liberal democratic contexts.[40] Interwar Hungary, or indeed Serbia and Somalia - the cases Saideman cites – serve as good evidence. In all these instances, under-performing or weak institutions were legitimised by nationalism (Snyder and Mansfield 2000a, b). However, each time this instrumental use would have been impossible without the mainland populations' enthusiastic support and the transborder minorities' response.

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[39] The 'riskyness' of irredentism derives not only from external problems like war, economic sacrifice, international sanctions, etc., but a failed project often entails the fall of the regime that pursued it. Examples are the case of Somalia's Siad Barré or that of the unsuccessful Greek junta in 1974 (see Landau 1990).

[40] There are three notable exceptions to this rule: Japan, the Irish Republic and West Germany count as irredentist parent states, yet they also qualify as democracies. Interestingly however, the Irish state's irredentism decreased dramatically *after* the patriarchal De Valera years, i.e. in the period where Ireland is generally seen to have de facto matured into a liberal democracy.

Connor (1980:162-3) quite rightly reminds that "appeals to ethno-political yearnings require a popular desire, no matter how incipient, (...) governments can act as a successful catalyst of ethno-nationalism only when the necessary ingredients are present." In addition, how can this approach account for a case like Gabriele d'Annunzio's famous raid on Fiume in 1919, a moment when mainland irredentists took matters into their own hands – in defiance of their own government and of the Paris Peace Conference? Finally, the suggestion is untenable because irredentism is shaped by several, interacting factors.

1.4.3 Retrieval versus diaspora politics

Next, irredentism must also be clearly distinguished from the realm of diasporic politics, i.e. the triangular relation between a minority and its parent and host state. Ethno-territorial retrieval is not an integral part or extreme form of diasporic politics. One crucial difference consists in the fact that the host state is not a mere onlooker here, an external variable affecting an ethnic dyad, but that it is an actively involved, equal partner. Secondly and more essentially, diasporic politics aim at finding solutions *within* the framework of the status quo whereas irredentism seeks to alter it. Thirdly, irredentists live on their homelands which diasporic groups by definition do not (see Connor 1979).

1.4.4 Irredentism and other forms of self-determination

Irredentism is commonly mistaken for other territorial strategies communal groups pursue, such as secession and movements for autonomy. Even T.R. Gurr categorises irredentist cases as either of these two in his taxonomy (1993:296-7). Minority irredentism is often confounded with separatism under the blunt criterion that it involves territorial defection. What happens afterwards – reunion, as opposed to independence – is overlooked. Autonomy envisages merely internal self-determination, i.e. a solution *within* the host state. Secessions on the other hand, are similar in that they involve defection, yet with the goal of founding a separate, independent state. Confusingly, however,

minority irredentism can convert into either of these options. My study will show that this is a side effect of a change in causal variables. As a variation, irredentas and secessions can occur in the same setting, like in Kashmir, Southern Thailand, Moldova. This has led to erroneous conclusions about a conceptual "overlap" (von Hippel 1993:2,10), and even to the belief that "... the two are sufficiently similar to permit a discussion in irredentist terms" (Suhrke 1970:187), or vice versa. Following Horowitz (1991), I argue in contrast that the two not only have different goals, but that they are also determined by different causal factors.

1.5 Making sense of it all

Irredentism denotes the bilateral attempt of self-aware communities for political and territorial unification. Central to both is the *translation of ethno-national identity into politics.* It is based on and restricted by, the nature, strength and endurance of group affinity which commands rule by and reunification with, one's own.

1.5.1 Categorising retrieval

Irredentism is the translation of shared group identity into politics. It naturally commands self-determination, i.e. it rejects rule by ethnic strangers, and thereby pursues the nationalist principle - congruence of that group and its homeland territory with one state. Both ideational elements of retrieval follow directly from the politicisation of ethnicity.

On nationalism
Irredentism is a sub-type or phase of nationalism as a sizeable part of the literature recognises.[41] Nationalism provides irredentist politics with the rationale (as distinct from motivation) and vocabulary for its conduct. How are we to imagine for instance the retrieval of Fiume, without the arduous rhetoric

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[41] See for instance Yagcioglu (1996), von Hippel (1993, 1994), Kitromilides (1990), or Landau (1995).

of Gabriele D'Annunzio's writings, the emotional mass gatherings in the name of a unified Italy, and finally, the march of several thousand under the writer's personal leadership, seizing the city without any bloodshed? Non-European irredentas like Somalia's, or projects with religiously defined ethnicity like the Thai-Muslim irredenta or the Kashmiri case, are no exceptions.[42] Also, the terminology of "redemption," reminiscent of biblical language, invests the targeted territories with the religiosity and holiness nationalism lends to the *fatherland*. The speech and symbolism of retrieval are equally indicative. The recurring organic and family metaphors of irredentist discourse use nationalist language – one remembers here the frequently painted image of a "maimed" body or talk of lost "brothers" and "sisters." Emblems such as the royal Hungarian one with the now lost Transylvanian rivers in it, and flags like Somalia's, depicting five stars for all the regions to be retrieved, fulfil the same purpose visually. In short: irredentism is *expressed* in the language of nationalism, *relies* on nationalist fervour and, most importantly, is *made possible* by the nation-state formula.

Self-rule

Irredentism is, secondly, an act of self-determination. The problem here is that "people confuse self-determination and independence" (Neuberger 1986:61), and thus see retrieval as something different, lesser (and less justifiable) or even as "anachronistic" (von Hippel 1993:11). Yet ethno-territorial retrieval does "very well mean self-determination, as long as it reflects the authentic will of the population" (Neuberger 1986:63). Having said that, one still feels that this particular act of self-determination is somehow qualitatively different from secession. This is because the different stress on its constituent components. Cassese's (1995) distinction of external versus internal self-determination helps us to understand this. The ordinary exit strategy of secessionism is only concerned with external self-determination, that is "to be free from foreign interference which affects the international status of that state" (Cassese in Kolodner 1994:196). The importance is here to achieve a titular state of one's

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[42] Ethnic ties are mostly defined in religious terms by Muslims in Kashmir and Jammu. Pakistanis, more specifically Punjabis, add a historical-racial dimension to the issue, for they identify Kashmir to be their ancestral homeland and local resident kin as kindred communal group.

own, to become a sovereign actor within inter-state relations. Irredentism, in contrast, already possesses independent statehood. The pressing issue here is that it is incomplete: sovereign self-rule does not cover the *entire* group and the *entirety* of its ancestral grounds. Consequently, one must 'redeem' such kin and homelands from rule by others. Minority irredentism emphasises in addition the internal aspects of self-determination, i.e. the "control over everyday political, economic, social and cultural conditions" (Kolodner 1994:204) which minorities feel the host state denies. Defecting to a state that is 'owned' (defined and controlled) by the group does away with this problem. Hence for instance the fact that cross-border kindred often retains or acquires the citizenship of its parent state in advance (one may cite here for instance the Moldovans, Karabach-Armenians or Thai Malays). For them, there is no need to found a state, but only to "remedy" the incongruence posed by international borders.

1.5.2 The dangers of irredentism

Donald Horowitz remarks that "ethnic conflict is intractable, partly because it is highly conducive to zero-sum outcomes" (1991:115), and irredentism is indeed the very epitome of this win-lose mentality. The absoluteness of defeat or victory comes from the fact that rivalry over population and territory is fought on two different, yet interlocking, levels. For one, it is two ethnic groups – the majority nation and the minority – opposing one another in what usually translates as a conflict between centre and periphery. This is no different in secessions, which generally turn out to be savage and bitter enough. Yet there is, in addition to the internal war within the host country, an antagonism at inter-state level over a disputed population and ancestral territory. This is why retrieval is more likely to escalate (Horowitz 1985:288). Midlarsky posits that, while secessions only cause regional military conflicts, irredentas have co-authored one, perhaps even two, World Wars (1992:173).

Not only are there multiple levels to irredentist conflicts, but also more than one issue dimension. Frequently adding to the emotionally charged character

about kindred blood and soil are more sober geopolitical considerations, like in Kashmir, South Tyrol or Cyprus. The contested territory becomes thus disproportionately important: it contains ethnic kin, it is a homeland *and* it is a strategic area. Hence also the numerous cases of "exchange of irredenta" between two rival countries (Reichman and Golan 1991:61), as in Kosovo, South Tyrol, Transylvania or Silesia. They represent geographic "hot spots" of irredentism that prove sheer endless cause for trouble. Given these intermeshed components of conflict, it is unsurprising that situations of retrieval are difficult to resolve. As we have seen above, it takes a major change in inter-state relations or direct external intervention in order to suppress (as distinct from ending) them. In short then, irredentas are more intractable and devastating than most other situations of ethnic conflict.

This destructive potential is amongst others also the reason for irredentism's bad reputation. Interestingly, retrieval was viewed already in the nineteenth century as the prerogative of anarchist troublemakers, hence its "pejorative connotation, probably imprinted on it by bomb throwing in Trieste" (Ben Israel 1991:31). What is more, while secessions can be portrayed as a noble cause in that they involve the birth of a new nation state, retrieval smacks of inter-state sabotage, minority disloyalty, and of undermining territorial sovereignty. Irredentists also apply double standards. Parent states actively pursuing retrieval, such as Romania, Pakistan or Serbia, have been or are simultaneously targets of irredentist challenges, which they in turn denounce, de-legitimise and repress. Defectionist minorities are no different in this respect. During the early 1990s, Kosovar Albanians for instance were very uncomfortable with the prospect of a further increase in the Serb majority in Yugoslavia via retrieval, whilst they themselves began to flirt with both secession and irredentism. Adding to all this finally, is irredentism's uncomfortably particularist rationale. Arguably, this is what spoiled international sympathy for groups like the Sudeten Germans or the Felvidék Magyars. Being acts of self-determination, the irredentist understanding of "freedom" is not one of *democratic* but of *national* self-government, i.e. of being ruled by fellow ethnic kin for better or for worse, whether elected or not.

2. Comparative Hypothesis Testing Of Irredentist Variables

"This sense of order-in-complexity is very strong in comparative social science because it is not difficult to make sense of an individual case (...). The challenge comes in trying to make sense of the diversity across cases in a way that unites similarities and differences in a single, coherent framework."

Charles Ragin (1987:19)

2.1 Introduction

The definitional mapping of irredentism above necessitated the collation of a dataset recording all of its characteristics (Dataset 1). In keeping with the dual purpose of this thesis, i.e. to define *and* explain retrieval, this chapter now moves beyond the descriptive by also quantifying and testing irredentism's causal variables. This aims to strengthen the external validity of my model whilst also making it more transparent to non-expert scrutiny. Large-scale findings furthermore prepare the ground for my Hungarian case study, which will examine each of the tested variables in depth (chapters 3-7). Finally, by adopting what Ragin (1987:69) terms "the combined comparative approach", my thesis not least challenges rational explanatory approaches like Horowitz's with their very own methods.

Although necessarily modest because it deals with descriptive data, this chapter hence aims to complement, support and illustrate my theory of irredentism. It uses a separate dataset (Dataset 2), composed of the population of Dataset 1, and tests across these the causal factors that Horowitz (1985;1991) and myself respectively present. Horowitz never explicitly claims universality when theorising about irredentism. Nevertheless,

both sources speak in general terms, citing illustrative cases from across a wide time span and from all three continents where irredentism occurs. Most significantly, he formulates conclusions without concession to contextual specifics or outlier cases, thus signalling that he assumes his variables to hold independently of time or place. This provides reason enough to probe his model in the same general terms it was conceived. Comparative hypothesis testing will demonstrate that Horowitz' three variables alone fail to explain the majority of irredentas, while the addition of mine increases generalisability and explanatory power. In short, the purpose of this chapter is to establish a preliminary overview about how useful each suggested variable is.

2.2. How *not* to do it – earlier attempts to statistically test irredentist factors

As the preceding chapter explained, irredentism has hardly been quantified in its own right. In fact, even statistical research on territorial disputes more generally is sparse as Huth's overview (1996:13) observes.[1] Carment and James (1995) are amongst the few to have specifically examined border conflicts with an *ethnic connotation*, although these were borrowed from a wider dataset and wrongly grouped together as "irredentas". In a similar vein, Moore and Davis (1998) assess communal boundary disputes with the help of the Conflict and Peace Database (COPDAB). Saideman and Ayres' work (2000) however is exceptional in that it explicitly treats ethno-territorial retrieval and its causes, even though simultaneously juxtaposing secessionism. Given the similarity of their dataset in terms of focus it merits a closer look, not least in order to argue the value and necessity of my own work.

Saideman and Ayres' quantitative investigation of irredentist causes

In "*Determining the Sources of Irredentism: Logit Analyses of Minorities At Risk Data*" Saideman and Ayres (2000) address two interrelated questions.

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[1] Paul K. Huth's (1996:72-85) work on territorial disputes in general also includes a quantified section on irredentism. Based on carefully assembled own data, his approach focuses however on the factors affecting the probability of disputing territory, hence he is treating irredentism merely as an independent variable.

Primarily, they seek to understand "under what conditions will an ethnic group unite with their ethnic kin elsewhere" and, to a lesser degree, why some groups seek reunion while others pursue independent statehood instead. Their puzzle is the variation across cases and space, instead of time and space, but we share the focus on irredentism's causal variables. Five alternative factors are considered and re-formulated into 15 hypotheses: the nature of the group itself; the group's kin; contagion processes; ethnic security dilemmas and the end of the Cold War. Deriving these hypotheses from relevant research, the Yugoslav case, as well as from their own previous work, they argue that irredentism and secession are alternative choices largely driven by the same factors and differentiated by only a few. Based on their quantitative findings, the authors present as determinants the relative size of the population and territory to be retrieved, the dominance or separatist behaviour of its kin in a neighbouring state, and potential economic decline in the host state. Political, ethnic and economic discrimination, the intensity of inter-ethnic differentiation, as well as the regime type in the host state are also tested for and found to be of little or no statistical importance. According to Saideman and Ayres, the choice between the alternatives of secession and irredentism is decided by a group's political and geographical situation within a region.

Shortcomings

So what is 'wrong' with their study? To start with, Saideman and Ayres undertake a summary treatment for what my definitional chapter has demonstrated to be two very distinct phenomena. Departing from the premise that both irredentism and secession are territorial defections, they examine their causal determinants in one single study. The conflation of the very differing goals, desires - and we may extrapolate, causes - which fuel these two exit strategies is questionable. Furthermore, such definitional imprecision leads to tautological hypotheses. For instance, because they omit defining parent states the authors test whether "groups whose kin dominates a nearby state will be more likely to be irredentist" (hypothesis 6a). The consequence are self-confirming results that add to these problems. Finally, Saideman and Ayres' approach to understanding retrieval bears exactly the marks of instrumentalism I disagree with. Rationalised hypotheses abound, such as

suggestions about regional contagion processes of ethnic conflict as cause (hypotheses 7 and 8), or lower likelihood of defectionism from a wealthy state (hypothesis 11). Once again, all of these propositions are tested on irredentists and secessionists indiscriminately.

These problems are further compounded by key aspects of methodology and data usage. To start with, one may question the use of logistic regression - an inferential statistical method - when working with overwhelmingly descriptive data. By that I mean data stemming from social science concepts that are difficult to measure (e.g. the level of minority-majority ethnic differentiation), and whose quantifiable indicators - which yield the values used for inference - often fit them imperfectly. Such generosity is bound to produce outcomes of compromised validity.

Secondly, the use of a ready-made dataset is questionable when exploring such hitherto uncharted territory. Instead of collating original research tailored to their inquiry (and based on consistent definitions), Saideman and Ayres test their 15 hypotheses against of T.R. Gurr's *Minorities at Risk* (MAR) datasets (Phases 1 and 3). Regardless of MAR's own merits and imperfections this poses problems of adequacy, simply because they were not specifically designed to investigate irredentism, nor even territorial exit strategies more generally. Gurr collects and categorises ethnic groups according to 'rebellion', i.e. the nature, extent and purpose of their violent behaviour. Some irredentist groups do indeed resort to violence, but, as I have shown above (section 1.3.3), the majority does not. In other words, the use of force is by no means a definitional marker which would ensure that all irredentas are detected and consequently included, into a dataset. In short, although Gurr's and Saideman and Ayres' data categories (i.e. the units of observation) partially overlap, they are not *congruent*.

One can hence question whether Saideman and Ayres are able to generalise authoritatively from their findings. Phases 1 and 3 of Gurr's dataset represent respectively the 1980s and 1990s – merely two decades within more than two centuries of irredentist activity. As I have proposed in chapter 1, ethno-

74

territorial retrieval experienced four distinct global waves since 1789. By only analysing what I have labelled the "Post-Colonial" wave (1949-88), or more precisely its last quarter, and a part of the current "New World Order" wave (1988-), findings are hardly representative. To the contrary, they may be actually distorted. It is not even arguable that these few cases are in fact a deliberately chosen subset. This would have required either random sampling from the *entire* period of irredentist occurrences (i.e. from the early nineteenth century until today), or the choice of two time-periods and their cases in the interquartile range. To do so would demand the collation of original data, simply because Gurr's does not pre-date the 1950s.

Founding an inquiry upon borrowed statistics also reinforces an inherent problem of quantitative analysis which Ragin (1987:vii-xi) repeatedly points to, namely that of having to gear hypotheses to the possibilities and limitations of the quantitative method. An investigation is even further limited if the parameters are constrained by the dataset's content itself, because someone else collated it with entirely different questions in mind. Were I to use Gurr's material, I would be unable for instance to test for the presence or absence of irredentist protector powers because such details are simply not recorded. This rather loose fit between the logic of data quantification on the one hand and its use on the other, affects both variables and units of analysis. Is the unit of analysis Gurr means - the ethnic group as collective social actor - identical with the way Saideman and Ayres understand it?

To summarise then, Saideman and Ayres' examination achieves a lot but is flawed by using borrowed data. Failure to introduce operational definitions as well as the wholesale adoption of cases collated on entirely different criteria, translate into erroneous sampling and distorted, often counter-intuitive conclusions. These are furthermore founded on biased assumptions about the calculative rationality in irredentists. For all these reasons, Saideman and Ayres' work cannot serve as alternative to or basis for, this present inquiry. While sharing many of the same methodological challenges, it tries to remedy them via original research but also respects the limits they set.

2.3 Dataset 2: limitations and methodology

I will explain below how the complexity of this task has constrained my choices in methodology. For one, there were the difficulties associated with quantifying, accurately recording, and not least finding data for irredentas stretching over more than two centuries. Furthermore, inferential methods are precluded because I use descriptive data and because my population size is very small . As a consequence, I have devised testing as a simple, but reliable exercise which will be able to furnish some preliminary insights into the usefulness of individual variables.

2.3.1 Problems of quantification and how they are dealt with

The novelty of my research – as first to analyse retrieval based on largely *self-compiled* data – is simultaneously its weakness. Before presenting and testing irredentist factors in my own dataset, some explanation is hence necessary about the statistical problems of both units and variables, and about how they have been treated. Dataset Manual 2 (below) provides furthermore a detailed account of coding, indicators and value labels for each variable.

The unit of observation
First off a brief word about the comparability of cases. This thesis has defined a macro-social unit – the irredenta – which can be recognised by a clear set of actors and behaviours. It treats irredentism not as abstraction, but as workable concept of a real-life phenomenon. For this reason, as well as due to the systematic comparative illustration of my model within a case study, problems of context-dependency are set aside.

Measurement problems and data availability
To start with, the quantification of the social science concepts that compose my variables poses continuing problems, since many do not exist in measurable form. In order to still test them statistically, it was hence necessary to select indicators – that is "observable evidence of an abstract concept

permitting classification" (Champney 1995:5). In some cases this was easy, e.g. fleshing out Horowitz's variable on relative host and parent state country prestige with economic indicators and diplomatic status. Where necessary variables have been adapted to the methods employed, e.g. by conversion into binary mode in order to be able to then collapse them into combined factors (see Dataset Manual 2, Appendix). Sometimes this was hampered by limited data availability, which means that some variables were weakened by missing data or low reliability.

Alternatively, I was able to adopt indicators and corresponding measurement from widely recognised databases, most notably the Polity IV Dataset's values on extent and type of democracy in the host and parent states. Following Huth's example (1996), such borrowed values have then been re-coded into a dummy variable in order to make it fit with my general coding (Polity IV already includes this).

For one variable finally, the fit between concept and indicators (validity) was too difficult to achieve. My third irredentist factor about changes in the nature and cohesion of ethno-national identification across a group, is hence missing from this statistical analysis. Because of its inherent context dependency for each case (both historically and sociologically), it posed the problem of specifying indicators and relevant observations. Furthermore, standardised data availability on these criteria is extremely limited (particularly for less recent irredentas) and would have required an amount of research disproportionate to its use here. Consequently, I am only able to argue and test its hypothesis[2] in my Hungarian empirical study below (see chapter 6).

Capturing factor changes and variation over time

A second major problem was the need to respect variance over time within my independent variables, resulting from the fact that irredentism mostly develops and exists over long periods of time. The challenge was for individual values to summarise a particular aspect during an irredenta's entire life span, including possible variation over that time. This would have required for each single value the year-by-year collection of data, or alternatively interquartile range

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[2] This would be Hypothesis 10: Shifts within ethno-national identity decrease the likelihood of irredentism. See chapter 6 for how change in a group's collective identity away from ethnic-exclusive characteristics undermines the cohesion irredentism builds on.

77

recording of the first and third quarter of an irredentist period, and the subsequent calculation of means. Instead, the problem has been tackled by simply rendering values *substantive* instead of chronological, meaning that I consistently selected the category that applied for the longest time or that was most representative of an actor. Thus for instance in the Greek Cypriot irredenta the variable for parent state regime reads "anocracy", because for the overwhelming part of this case's 126 year long duration Greece's political system displayed anocratic features.

Internal variation

Unlike my first dataset, which merely described irredentism's group characteristics, here it was crucial to create variation within the dependent variable (conduct of an irredenta). I have therefore introduced a distinction in my cases in order to create variation within the dependent variable. The dataset's population thus falls into two categories, differentiated according to whether or not irredentist inconsistency has occurred (see variable 2, Dataset Manual 2, Appendix). All factors have thus been tested against this dependent variable.

Briefly put, the difficulties associated with measurement, categorisation and quantification have been met with awareness. As I have tried to show above, they have been treated in a consistent manner: solved or avoided where possible, and acknowledged in their limitations where inevitable.

2.3.2 The methods employed

The choice of methodology in this chapter is determined by the data used – with regard to its levels of measurement (mostly nominal and ordinal), its nature (descriptive, as opposed to inferential), and the dimension of testing (multivariate). As mentioned, problems both with the gathered data's validity and reliability unfortunately do not allow for complex statistical operations or inferential methods. Furthermore, as Ragin (1987:10) warns, "the greater the theoretical and empirical specificity, the smaller the number of cases relevant to the investigation." I have chosen not only a narrow definition of ethno-territorial retrieval, but have also differentiated it into subtypes (see chapter 1), of which only one is treated here. This effectively means that methodology is further restricted by the small size of the statistical population. It threatened degrees of freedom problems if the number of variables exceeded the number of cases.

Comparative Hypothesis Testing

Given the simple descriptive data at our disposal, there is a solid way by which to put my argument into practice. Simple hypothesis testing, a non-parametric method, gives us an idea about how relevant individual factors are in broad application across irredentist cases. By testing each variable's significance across all irredentas we learn its relative statistical significance, i.e. whether and to which degree it improves an explanation. Each of our proposed causal factors translates as a hypothesis (factor X affects whether or not irredentism is pursued) which is tested against the opposite assumption, the null hypothesis (factor X makes no difference / expected frequencies will equal observed frequencies). The resulting probability-value indicates whether we can reject this null-hypothesis of independence between the two variables at a specified significance level (five per cent). At this most basic of levels we can thus see whether a hypothesis is comparatively important or not. Such a test also furnishes a Proportional Reduction in Error (PRE) measure, i.e. a summary of just *how much association* there is between the dependent variable (occurrence of irredentism) and any particular variable.

2.4 Which factors help explain irredentas? Comparative hypothesis testing (chi-square test for independence)

Chi-square tests are the simplest way of assessing the strength of an explanation. Unlike in the case study below (where each chapter deals with one variable) Horowitz's and my own factors are disaggregated into their component hypotheses. These are tested individually on an equal basis in order to obtain a differentiated evaluation of their explanatory power (see Dataset Manual 2 for coding and indicators). Furthermore, whereas his model does not apply all variables to both irredentist actors, mine does, because I have defined irredentism's as something that is bilaterally pursued. Where applicable I will therefore additionally test them as combined variables. Conversely, those factors that are by their nature relevant to only one actor (like intra-group cleavages for the parent state or prestige-benefit for the minority) have been examined separately in keeping with their logic.

2.4.1 Breakdown of variables into component tenets

Hypothesis 1: Ethnoterritorial homogeneity of both irredentist actors determines whether they decide for retrieval.

Horowitz (1985:284-285) convincingly reasons on the importance of ethnic and territorial homogeneity in both irredentist actors. For the parent state, the transborder territory should be ethnically as homogeneous as possible in order to avoid incorporating recalcitrant minorities. Transborder kindred ought to be compact (minimally scattered) and border-near on this homeland, so as to enable 'neat' boundary drawing. Horowitz's also assumes for calculative behaviour in the minority group. He mentions that it may be unwilling to be retrieved if a substantial part of the community risks being left behind due to unfavourable geographical distribution (1985:286). Furthermore, the minority for its part, is also likely assess how predominant its own ethnic group is in the parent state. Thus the more homogeneous the latter is, the better (1985:285). After all, for them the very sense of an irredenta is to join a political unit that their *own* kin controls. By the same token Horowitz points out that the parent

state will also be more free to conduct retrieval the less ethnic strangers it contains. This is because "such schemes threaten to alter domestic ethnic balances, groups disadvantaged by them will oppose them." (1985:284)

A note of distinction is necessary here. In contrast to Horowitz I hold a parent state *by definition* to be one in which an ethnic group is demographically and/or politically dominant, and therefore at least factually capable of irredentism without *decisive* domestic opposition by worried minorities (see section 1.2.2). Because of this narrower conceptualisation, I evolve Horowitz's variable by linking political control to the *leverage* enjoyed by domestic groups, rather than to their mere presence (see section 4.2). I hence distinguish between situations of *genuine* and *qualified* homogeneity - i.e. charting *variations in the degree of political freedom* even such a dominant ethnic group has. Parent states marked by qualified homogeneity contain what I call 'important retaliating minorities'. These are able to apply anti-irredentist leverage either politically, demographically and/or economically.

Hypothesis 2: The existence of sub-group cleavages deters a parent state from retrieval

Horowitz (1985:285) also proposes that the presence of cleavages between parent state and transborder kindred will hamper the parent state's readiness for retrieval. These rifts may be religious, tribal, ideological, or along other divisive lines. He is not clear about whether such cleavages *generally* compromise the will for retrieval, or only if parent state elites see them as threatening the domestic political, religious or tribal balance. When probed on this point in conversation he stressed the latter criterion, yet the relevant passage (1985:285) is formulated quite broadly: "...examples show once again that seemingly cohesive groups are not as solidary as they look from afar – and that sub-group cleavages have a prominent bearing on irredentist decisions."

This is not necessarily contradictory, for it can be argued that the retrieval of kindred with distinct features is in itself bound to have domestic repercussions of some sort. This may be it because it alters the composition of an electorate or political clientele, the clout of a particular tribal subgroup, or the domestic religious balance, etc. Then again, such an impact surely cannot be always

81

gauged beforehand: parent state leaders may simply lack information in the first place to evaluate what they might face. This, besides, would represent a typical rational actors problem. Continuing then in a Horowitzian vein of risk and benefit calculation, one could consequently assume that *any* distinct trait in the transborder minority should deter parent state elites from irredentism. Whether in its wider or narrower sense, this notion deserves testing.[3]

Hypothesis 3: Irredentism depends on whether it materially benefits the actors involved

No doubt ethno-territorial retrieval means for both parties to risk a lot – militarily, diplomatically, politically, and even concerning national psychology. With regard to the mainland, Horowitz (1985:286) duly remarks: "given the significant risks and dubious rewards of irredentism, states that ardently pursue strategies of retrieval probably have some specially compelling reasons to do so." The presumption is that irredentism must literally "pay off" for the parent state.

Consistency once again requires applying this originally parent state -centred factor to the minority as well. After all, its risks are arguably even greater than the parent state's for they are *existential* - ranging from forced assimilation over expulsion down to genocidal retaliation by the host state. Hence, if reincorporation is rationally chosen, it must be profitable. This means the minority ought to accede to a wealthier state where its material situation and life-chances will discernibly improve.[4]

Hypothesis 4: Minority considerations of relative country prestige.

According to Horowitz, transborder ethnic kin decisions on irredentism are also influenced by the a host state's standing in the world. Without detailing what "prestige" exactly denotes, he sees it as an "aggravating factor" (1985:286). Accordingly, this test will examine whether retrieval was more readily endorsed

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[3] Horowitz (1990:17) subsequently also mentions the emotional impact of cleavages, i.e. the parent state's possible rejection of what they see as "rustics who lived too long under an alien regime." However, this point has more to do with my own factor about identity shifts (chapter 6) than with strong, definable traits like dissenting ideology, or with ascriptive features like a different religion or tribal allegiance. In consequence, this more emotive component of the cleavage-hypothesis – little stressed even in the original text – is not taken into consideration.
[4] Horowitz (1985:286) hints at this when remarking "it is generally more attractive to be retrieved by a rich rather than a poor state", but does not expand this point.

where it entailed a benefit in prestige, which I take to mean joining a parent state with a superior diplomatic and / or economic status within the inter-state system.

Hypothesis 5: Both actors are more inclined to pursue irredentism if their elites are affected by particularised affinity

Horowitz advances another, interesting factor which I have named 'particularised affinity'. Judging by his examples (1985:286-287) and my own research across cases, particularised affinity denotes some intimate personal connection of parent state elites with the territory to be retrieved. This acts in addition to the general ethnic bond on which irredentism is founded. It means leaders may have been born, raised or schooled there, their families may originate from that area, they have or had property there, they belong to the particular subgroup that inhabits the area etc. 'Elites' include politicians and office holders, individuals involved in policy-making and -implementation (lobbyists, expert advisers, upper echelon bureaucrats), and, to a lesser extent, opinion-makers (eminent personalities of public life such as journalists and editors, writers, artists etc.).

Once more this factor should be applied to minority elites, too. I would suggest personal salience matters here for the same reasons, i.e. it enhances irredentist proclivities because retrieval is also biographically / individually important. Thus minority elites may have been born, raised and / or schooled in the mainland, their families may originate from the parent state, they have or had property there, they belong to the particular subgroup that inhabits it, etc. The term 'elites' describes in this case persons in the minority's political leadership (higher ranking politicians, civil rights activists, heads of any minority militia), and, here equally importantly (whereas only second-ranking in the parent state), those individuals who *personify and are seen to defend* the group's cultural-linguistic identity: writers, actors and other artists, journalists and editors, philosophers etc.

Hypothesis 6: Leadership interests in the minority adversely affect its readiness for irredentism

In Horowitz's view, the irredentist desires of minority elites are minimised by the fact that reincorporation simultaneously means merged leadership pools, and thus a reduction of their own role / status (1990:16).[5] Parallel then to the parent state leaders' fears of tipped domestic balances, this is the minority's self-interest factor.

Hypothesis 7: Irredentism is less likely when both actors are in a democratic setting

"...Discontented, territorially compact, transborder ethnic groups ... with the potential to be retrieved, find retrieval by the putative irredentist state undesirable. This may be because that state is poorer or ... *more authoritarian* than the state in which they are now encapsulated." (Horowitz 1990:16, emphasis added). This side-remark draws our attention to the potential factor of regime type in the host and parent states respectively, which Horowitz however, amongst others a keen scholar of democratic theory, never exploits.

My model in turn maintains that democracy matters in irredentist choices, yet it does so differently for each actor. Concerning the parent state, irredentism is practically incompatible with substantive democracy and (successful) democratisation. The civic nationalism and correlate pluralism its institutions engender minimise the potential for ethnopolitics. In contrast, compromised institutions due to incomplete democratisation (anocracy) allow for ethno-nationalism. Because in this scenario the state is not defined by strong, efficient institutions it exists in function of an ethnically defined polity, and this informs leaders and their policies. In short, irredentism is very likely in anocratic settings and unlikely in substantive democracies.

Minority irredentism conversely is affected by the specific political and institutional setting within the host state. Non-democratic systems and many types of democracy provoke disaffection by denying minorities self-government and collective institutional recognition. Conversely, democracies that practice partial or full consociationalism can remedy or prevent irredentism. This is because power-sharing responds to the twin desires that

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[5] Gellner (1983:135-6) interestingly argues the same point when explaining why two or more parts of a group are not driven to (re)unite.

84

drive retrieval. Consociation means a group can acquire political control over itself and its territory as well as attain collective equality for its distinct national aspirations without having to defect. To generalise then, here is a high propensity for defection from a host state where these conditions are not, or only minimally, satisfied. Conversely, the more pluralist and specifically consociational elements it contains, the more it secures its minority's loyalties.

Hypothesis 8: Actors are more likely to decide against irredentism if the inter-state system is negatively disposed towards retrieval

and

Hypothesis 9: The existence of a patron power positively influences actors' decisions on irredentism

I further propose that a parent state will assess whether and how much room for manoeuvre there is internationally. Irredentist movements are greatly aided by the proximity of other irredentas, i.e. by an international context where border changes based on ethnic criteria and the preference for mono-ethnic states are either tolerated, or even explicitly acknowledged. The interwar period, marked by Wilsonian ideas of self-determination and the instrumentally used German irredenta, embodied such a context. Conversely, in an era like today, where the opposite is true, ethnic retrieval faces bleak prospects and may be refrained from for this reason.

Minorities will equally assess the international acceptance of border changes. Their criteria differ however from those of the mainland. Firstly, they also assess windows of opportunity in international attitudes, primarily via demonstration or deterrent effects from other, nearby irredentas. If the latter are permissive, minorities' will intensify their irredentist activity. Secondly, irredentist minorities will mirror their parent state's behaviour: the more compliant it is, the more they will be and vice versa. Because they see themselves as enclaves they behave in function of this fact, sometimes to the point where they act as instruments of parent state politics (see section 1.3.3 and chapter 6). Finally, the international attitude towards the legitimacy of minority national aspirations matters too: is it denied and suppressed, or endorsed, even if only within the limits of sovereign state boundaries? In other words, are minority rights issues "internationalised" (Kymlicka 2002)? Such

supportive attitudes can be enshrined in international treaties, agreements, regimes, and depend on levels of enforcement. International denial of the validity of minority nationalism means inefficient or absent scrutiny. This in turn will make a group feel delivered to its host state's policies. Generally, irredentist conduct will radicalise in such situations, especially when coupled with a phase of systemic permissiveness like in the 1930s. Conversely, the more minority aspirations are upheld externally the less aggressive minority behaviour will be.

2.4.2 Relative Statistical Significance of Factors: Outcomes

<u>Ethno-territorial homogeneity (Hypothesis 1)</u>

Let us look at the statistical outcomes (see Appendix for encoding and indicators). Starting with Horowitz's variables, the factor of parent state heterogeneity (PSHOM) has turned out to be insignificant. However, let us remember that Horowitz's original argument of parent state ethnic homogeneity is an integral definitional trait (see chapter 1) rather than an intervening factor. I hence had to differentiate it in order to make it applicable, converting it into qualified homogeneity - i.e. whether there are any important domestic minorities which may impede the mainland's conduct of irredentism. Consequently, this outcome means rather that my own reinterpretation is fairly irrelevant, or at best useful for particular case studies where extreme variation helps to account for irredentist inconsistency.

Interestingly, the ethno-territorial homogeneity of the transborder kindred group (MINHOM) also proves statistically insignificant. The probability of non-association between this variable and the occurrence of irredentism is actually quite high (0.170 – well above the 0.05 threshold). This is an important finding: like Horowitz, many studies assume that territorial and demographic feasibility matter to parent states (e.g. Suhrke 1975; Saideman 1999; Saideman and Ayres 2000). As a consequence of these results, the combined variable of both actors' ethno-territorial features (COMBHOM) is also insignificant, with even higher probability values for non-association.

86

Material benefit to either irredentist actor or both (Hypothesis 3)

Even more remarkably, the tests have shown that overall neither actor seems to be concerned with the material benefits of reincorporation. Both parent state (PSECON) and minority (MINECON) have tested soundly insignificant on this, and so has their combined variable (COMBECON). This seems to align well with the many examples of economically self-destructive, near-idiotic attempts at retrieval. Admittedly however, this variable is weakened by missing data, which cautions about these results. It is also possible that the indicators used here (key economic and human resource data) did not fully capture material advantages. In some instance these may be defined in terms of a strategic / geopolitical gain for the parent state, but then again Horowitz never suggests this. Furthermore, arguably *any* increase in territory represents a net gain to a state. Minorities in turn bear little sign of profit-seeking in their defection to often poorer kindred states. Even within the limits of this test it looks as if irredentist groups do not use their sense of business – on either side of the border.

Self-interested considerations in both actors' elites impede irredentism (Hypotheses 2 and 6)

A further argument of Horowitz's is not supported by large-scale testing: that of leadership interests in the parent state (CLEAVAGES) and the transborder minority (MINSELF). Having collated and tested these variables separately, it becomes evident that their common denominator – the fear of losing power due to merged leadership pools and shifting domestic political/religious/tribal balances – does not sway potential irredentists from their pursuit. Minority self-interest, indicated by simultaneous attempts for alternative solutions in order to preserve local power bases (e.g. autonomy-negotiations with the host state, secessionist attempts), simply does not appear decisive. However, due to Horowitz's vagueness about what counts as sub-group cleavages, I have construed this factor in the widest possible sense. I have assumed that *any* major cleavage between parent state and minority could act as a deterrent, because it will affect internal ratios in some way (see above). This generalised theory can now be rejected. With it we can also discard more specified versions, because they would be a subset of the above, i.e. instances where

these differences clearly *will* threaten current balances of power in the parent state. This subset would furthermore have to display a dramatic (and unlikely) drop in the probability value for the null hypothesis in order to offset that of its overall population, which is a sound 0.339 and thus well beyond the critical level 0.05. All in all then, in the light of such evidence a conceding side remark by Horowitz (1990:17) gains new value: "of course leadership interests are not always overriding. Leaders may be, and sometimes are, overruled by an avalanche of ethnic mass sentiment."

The parent and host state's prestige matter to the minority (Hypothesis 4)

Given the so far unsupported rational choice premise in irredentism, the result of the PRESTIGE variable is remarkable. It proves significant, and at 0.002 quite soundly so. This is matched by a moderate measure of association at 0.402 (the latter indicates on a scale from 0 to 1 the strength of connection between this variable and our dependent factor IRREDENTISM YES/NO). The strength of this finding is however relativised by a low proportional reduction in error (PRE) value of 11.1 per cent – meaning that the inclusion of this factor improves our prediction about irredentism by only that much. At present I have no real explanation for this outcome. Why would a minority care for the prestige of a parent state if it ends rule by ethnic strangers? Why, conversely, would host state prestige matter if a minority has no share in it because of discrimination or repressive policies? Given its counter-intuitive results, this variable needs future re-testing within a bigger set of cases. Because of its PRE weakness I will however not explore it further in this thesis.

Personal ties of the leadership towards the respective other actor matter (Hypothesis 5)

Particularised affinity in contrast is not only intuitively convincing but statistically supported for both actors separately (PSAFF and MINAFF) as well as in combination (COMBAFF). Whether tested in differentiated or binary form mainland affinity (PSAFF) for instance vindicates Horowitz beautifully by displaying strong measures of association (0.877 and 0.791 – both close to 1) and very good PRE values (69.0 and 73.9 per cent respectively). It is noticeable that this factor seems somewhat less important for the minority's

part (the p-value is with 0.044 quite close to the borderline to 0.05), and thus also yields less impressive association (0.351 – weak to moderate association) and predictive value (a PRE of 16.7 per cent). The combined variable of both actors' affinities is nevertheless remarkable, showing both strong connection to the dependent variable (0.826) and a considerable improvement in predicting ethnic group decisions (63.2 per cent). I would however add a note of caution, since there is a likely interaction with democracy here (see also chapter 7). This is because non-democratic regime types are clearly more conducive to the translation of particularistic / personal motivations than others – especially the less politics is based on civic appeals, and the more leaders are free of institutional review and accountability.

International attitudes and patronage influence irredentist decisions (Hypotheses 8 and 9)

Turning to my own variables now, we tested the suggestion that irredentists act if they can take advantage of diplomatic windows of opportunity. The first of these was the existence of a patron power, which has rendered an insignificant probability value at 0.477. This means that the occurrence of irredentism does not necessarily depend on backing by a stronger power (or conversely parent state irredentism does not hinge on that country being so powerful that it can act as its own patron). I had secondly suggested international permissiveness as possible factor. Here testing has produced a probability value that is just about significant (0.043). Irredentas obviously use international laxity as windows of opportunity, but do these determine their occurrence? The PRE value clarifies this question: since it is only 26.1 per cent, our ability to predict the incidence of irredentism is only moderately higher than without taking this factor into account. These results tie in with what I have argued from anecdotal evidence in the previous chapter: irredentists will modulate their timing and methods, but overall embark on their risky business regardless of external help or approval (see chapter 5) .

Democracy in host and parent state respectively shapes minority and mainland irredentism (Hypothesis 7)

The final chi-square test probes the last of my own suggested variables: the regime type situations of both the transborder minority and its parent state. Both are strongly supported by the results, they are significant (comfortably below the p-value with 0.03 and 0.01 respectively). This means that, first of all, the majority of irredentist parent states is indeed anocratic (i.e. experiencing stalled or as yet incomplete, democratisation). The politicisation of ethnicity seems obviously harder in stable autocratic systems, or conversely within established democracies. Chapter 7 will build on this observation by arguing that anocracies have features uniquely conducive to ethnopolitics. Secondly, the outcomes show that irredentist minorities routinely occur in environments that do not accommodate their demands as groups. This may be either because the host state is not democratic, or because the particular type of democracy is antagonising. It may be ethnically biased (explicitly in Ethnic States, covertly as in Republican-Liberal democracies), or not recognise collective identities such as ethnicity and thus alienate groups via civic integrationism (Civic-Individualist systems). Testing of the combined variable (COMGOV) has however produced a slightly less convincing probability value (0.42 – weak association), which points to the fact that another variable may be involved even if there is an ideal pairing in terms of regime type. I argue that this variable is identity, i.e. the very gist that anocratic / non-accommodative systems than allow to be politicised for irredentism.

2.5 Conclusion: what explains irredentism so far?

Chi-square testing has provided good, and in some cases even strong, support for my arguments. The broad picture across two centuries and 55 cases demonstrates that parent states and their ethnic brethren do not primarily engage in cost-benefit calculations when deciding about ethno-territorial retrieval. Geographic and demographic feasibility do not seem to matter very much. Significantly, material advantage appears irrelevant to either irredentist actor, and so do the existence of tribal, religious or political cleavages, and

associated elite interests which Horowitz cites. Rationality within irredentism –
at least in the way it is conceived by Horowitz - is hence a secondary issue at
best. This applies even when looking at the 'common sense' factors I have
proposed myself: inter-state attitudes and the existence of external patronage.
The relevance of Horowitz's country-prestige variable stands as remarkable
exception here, especially because it contradicts other results: why would a
minority care about international standing (both economic and diplomatic)
whilst, as the tests have shown, simultaneously disregarding the foreign
political or material impact that may arise from defection? Admittedly, future
testing with more cases is necessary here to see whether this peculiarity holds
as well as to confirm the very consistent results of other variables.

For now then, Horowitz's propositions enjoy the benefit of the doubt at least
statistically. Simultaneously, this quantified comparison has also established
credibility for my proposed model. When ethnic actors decide on whether
irredentism, with all its risks and shaky record of success, is "worth it", they
must reason in different categories to those suggested by Donald Horowitz.
But reason they do. I argue that it is democracy and its specific constraints and
opportunities for each irredentist actor, that plays an important part (see
chapter 7). This furthermore combines with the statistically untestable but
empirically crucial, factor of intra-group cohesion (see chapter 6). World
political opportunities – be they general (international consensus towards
irredentism) or specific (irredentist patron power) – are not decisive, but weigh
in as strong reinforcing factor (see chapter 5).

Multivariate statistical analysis can however only achieve so much in terms of
arguing its case. Shortcomings typically associated with the method's
requirements such as breaking down cases into variables, simplifying
assumptions about causes and their interactions, or observing average effects
rather than individual variation[6], call for the complementary empirical approach
which respects complexity and historical specificity. Hence the following
chapters will examine each variable in detail via the case study of Hungarian
irredentism's inconsistency.

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[6] The problem of assuming for average or equivalent effects across all cases (i.e. disrespect
for context-dependency) is due to parameter setting in order to specify relevant observations.
It can normally be solved by splitting the statistical population into sub-samples, which is
however impossible here due to the very small population size.

3. Much Pain, Little Gain: The Political Economy of Irredentism

> *"(...) Defining ethno-national conflicts in terms of economic inequality is a bit like defining them in terms of oxygen: where you find the one, you can be reasonably certain of finding the other. Yet while no analyst, to my knowledge, has blamed the presence of oxygen for ethnic conflict, several have been prepared to blame economic discrepancies between groups."*
>
> Walker Connor (2001:115)

3.1 Introduction: materialism, rationality and ethno-nationalism

Ethno-national movements are routinely interpreted as driven by resource competition, self-interested elites and / or economic deprivation. Early works such as Hirschman's *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty* (1970), Rabushka and Shepsle's *Politics in Plural Societies* (1972) and Vandenberghe's *Ethnic Phenomenon* (1981) established this as a standard approach within the nascent field of ethnicity and nationalism studies. Subsequent research has further elaborated on the idea of ethnic collectives as kindred interest groups (e.g. Breton and Galeotti 1995; Hardin 1995; Fearon and Laitin 1996). More recently, this approach has focused on explaining specifically ethno-territorial movements. Nafziger and Richter's comparison of Biafra and Bangladesh (1976), Meadwell (1991), Hechter (1992) and Berkowitz (1997) have all offered materialist accounts of secessionism. Irredentism, overlooked as "lesser" phenomenon, has received scant yet similar treatment, notably from Carment and James (1995) and Saideman (1998;1999)[1].

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[1] In a later, quantitative study Saideman and Ayres ironically find no causal link between economic differentials on the one hand and irredentas and secessions on the other (2000:1131, 1136).

3.1.1 Horowitz's model and the political economy of irredentism

Donald Horowitz's theory of irredentism (1985;1991) proposes economic interest as one of the main motives for the costly project of retrieval. With regard to the parent state Horowitz (1985:286) observes: "given the significant risks and dubious rewards of irredentism, states that ardently pursue strategies of retrieval probably have some specially compelling reasons to do so." The presumption is that irredentism must literally 'pay off' in order for the parent state to risk it. He is less clear about the minority, yet remarks in passing that "it is generally more attractive to be retrieved by a rich rather than a poor neighbour" (ibid.), without however expanding on this point.

A few adjustments are necessary in order to test Horowitz's suggestions. Firstly, for reasons of consistency I need to apply this mainly parent state - centred factor to the minority as well. After all, it faces arguably even greater risks than the parent state for they are *existential* - ranging from forced assimilation over expulsion down to genocidal retaliation by the host state. Hence, reincorporation must be profitable for the minority, too – meaning it ought to accede to a wealthier state where its material situation and life-chances will discernibly improve. Second, because Horowitz provides only rudimentary pointers these need fleshing out. It is for instance not clear whether he suggests irredentism as driven by opportunism, or conversely by need (relative economic deprivation). In order to keep with the most favourable interpretation I will adopt the broadest reading and examine both. Since this thesis is a comparative exercise, my emphasis will however lie on the deprivation argument. Furthermore, we are given no indicators for this variable. Is the parent state swayed by natural resources in the coveted region, highly skilled labour, additional tax revenue, important industries or trade and infrastructure? Similarly, is it a stronger national economy and better job opportunities that attract a minority, or rather regional development, more generous welfare provision, and redistributive policies? In fact, it is arguable that minorities expect material improvement independently of all the above, simply from the fact that they (re)join a kindred state, i.e. one that does not discriminate against them. Conversely, some host states may be so wealthy

that minorities are better off staying, despite (perceived or real) discrimination. My analysis will hence take into account macro-economic indicators as well as making a more specific appraisal. Whether both actors actually have access to such sophisticated information is deliberately set aside for the (unlikely) sake of argument. Finally and most importantly, is this rationality rooted in objective economic givens, or is it enough if an actor merely *believes* retrieval will bring advantage? In order to cover the latter point I will hence also look actors' subjective takes on irredentism's differential payoffs.

3.1.2 The (poor) economic rationale of irredentism

Irredentists are not primarily concerned with the material advantages their project confers. Such an approach portrays ethnopolitics as substitute or secondary struggle for more primary problems like economic differentials or retardation, incomplete or ongoing modernisation, or indeed as elite opportunism (see also McGarry 1995:127-9; Connor 1994 and 2001). "In line with this view, the real problem was held to be that some people felt left behind in the process of modernisation, and once a certain level of economic development was achieved and accessible to all citizens, people would stop mobilising on the basis of ethnocultural affiliation" (Kymlicka 2000:206). As a mere by-product of some other, deeper problem, ethnic mobilisation is implied to be temporary and fading once 'objective' factors have changed. Secondly, this assumes a free market of ideas, i.e. that ethnic groups and their elites have an open choice between materialist and cultural bases for ethno-nationalism. This further premises that self-interested elites persuade their political clientele of a particular course of action. Both are core doctrines of liberal orthodoxy, and are rather normative. Obvious questions arise however, not least why ethnicity still seems to trump most, sometimes even all, other mobilising factors in that marketplace - especially when it flies in the face of material advantage. Explaining ethnopolitics in terms of material interests dismisses the salience of ethnicity and ignores its power to mobilise groups.

94

This chapter will argue two points. Firstly, I will show that despite appearances Hungary's interwar irredenta made overall little material sense. This is contrary to generally held views in Hungarian historiography. Comparison with today's economic situation reveals furthermore an insufficient change in conditions in order to explain both actors' contemporary renouncement of irredentism. In fact, today the parent state has roughly about as little to gain and the minorities have as much to gain from retrieval, as they respectively did eight decades ago. This in turn leads to my second argument: nationalism drove economics, not vice versa. Even though interwar Budapest frequently invoked an economic rationale for the project, irredentist planning and conduct were a function of ethno-nationalism. Although economically discriminated against, Magyar minorities were most frustrated about forced assimilation and political repression within their host states. The material problems from their situation only further fuelled the defectionism which these other factors had created. In short, Horowitz and those arguing for materialist explanations tie group rationality to the wrong criteria. Rather than looking at the endogenous factors really important to irredentists – identity, self-rule - such approaches root behaviour in external circumstances.

3.2 Hungary's considerations then and now

Much of the Hungarian literature on Trianon and its consequences centres around the economic ruin inflicted by partition. The irredentas are therefore generally considered as profitable, which in turn would support Horowitz's theory. I will argue against this commonly held view in Magyar historiography. While it is true that the 1920 peace treaty was explicitly designed to make Hungary economically dependent on - and thus docile towards - its neighbours (Zeidler 2001:22-24), subsequent interwar developments reduced the material necessity to retrieve the severed populations and their territories. Among these developments were the country's rapid recovery to pre-WW 1 levels, but also its increasing need for modernisation, specifically in terms of social and rural reform. In fact the truncation, much as it was traumatic, turned out to be useful. Hungarian governments were aware of this, yet continued to raise the material

aspect for diplomatic and ideological reasons. My point here is that, despite some of its rhetoric, Budapest's *prime* motive for retrieval was not economic.

3.2.1 Parent state irredentism between the wars: a discussion in general comparative terms

Prior to examining the economic merits and drawbacks of Hungary's interwar irredenta the case offers some general points which do not fit with materialist explanations. This is regardless of whether we test irredentism as driven by economic opportunism or hardship.

In terms of opportunity, a state that pursues retrieval mainly for economic reasons will likely concentrate on wealthy territories, whilst abandoning or de-prioritising less profitable ones. At the very least, such a parent state can be expected to cherry-pick upon re-annexation, i.e. to recover only affluent areas within a coveted territory. Most irredentist cases militate against both suggestions. Of the five areas Somalia sought to retrieve it prioritised the Ogaden region of Ethiopia, one of the poorest, but symbolically most important. Nineteenth century Greece and Risorgimento Italy respectively recovered kindred regions indiscriminately, whether it was the rich Veneto and (temporarily) Smyrna, or poorer parts such as Lazio and the Ionian Islands. Hungary's case is no exception here. The only partitioned territories interwar Hungary renounced of happened to be wealthy ones. Premier Bethlen withdrew Budapest's claims over the now Austrian Burgenland and over Croatia, which was part Magyar inhabited in the north and a millennial vassal territory of the Kingdom (Romsics 1991:189). Furthermore, the mainland's demands for the remaining territories were in no way selective: both the Voyvodina and Transylvania contained poor stretches (the latter more so than the former), and Kárpátalja (Ruthenia) was in fact so deprived that contemporaries referred to it as "land of the poor" or "starvation area" (Szarka 1998:23). The Felvidék stands alone as reasonably prosperous territory coveted by Hungary.

If one argues from the viewpoint of relative economic deprivation, then poor states are presumably more inclined to irredentism than affluent ones.

96

Although criteria of wealth vary according to regional and historical context, a cursory survey of the descriptive dataset shows a roughly even distribution between downright poor irredentist states (like Somalia, Libya or Afghanistan) and medium to well-off ones such as Japan, West Germany, Italy, Denmark or Sweden. There is moreover an impressive number of cases where parent states claimed regions that would have lost their wealth upon retrieval (Northern Ireland, Okinawa Ryukyu, Nagorno-Karabach) or that were simply poorer to start with (e.g. the GDR or Moldova).

Thirdly, if economic duress spawns or reinforces parent state irredentism, then periods of growth and affluence must conversely dampen it down. The impact of the world economic crisis from 1929 onwards provides a good testing case here. Its effects hit East Central Europe later that year. Irredentist elements within Hungarian foreign policy should have spiked during that time, but in fact do not align. They crucially *preceded* those years (with the onset of Bethlen's "active foreign policy" in 1927), experienced a lull precisely *because* of the domestic difficulties caused by the crisis (1929-32), and then picked up because of changes in domestic and international parameters (see sections 5.2.1 and 7.2.1).

Looking finally at irredentism's domestic pay-offs, it may be perhaps revealing which stratum within the parent state most supports the project. Much has been made of the fact that those who personified Hungary's irredenta – aristocratic statesmen like Bethlen, Teleki, Horthy or Apponyi - all had lost vast landed estates in the partitioned territories. Especially communist historiography liked to link irredentism to this leadership's half-hearted rural reform, thus portraying retrieval as stopgap solution to aristocratic encroachment on land (see e.g. Juhász 1988). There is however little mileage in both suggestions. Firstly, irredentism was never tied to resolving the problem of mass landlessness, but was rather held up as panacea for the nation's general woes (loss of status and empire, national humiliation etc., see below). Analyses of interwar foreign policy and biographical studies furthermore do not support this interpretation (see e.g. Pritz 1982, 1985; Romsics 1991, 1998; Fülöp and Sípos 1998; Zeidler 2001; Bárdi 2004b). While the irredenta certainly was instrumentalised for other, domestic agendas (see section 7.2.1) this was not one of them. Secondly, Hungary's irredentist

constituency comprised all classes, party affiliations, occupational and generational groups (L. Nagy 1987; Balogh in Borsódy 1988:55). Particular societal centres of irredentism were conservative institutions like the army (Lorman 2005) and the Catholic Church (Zeidler 2001:166). They can be argued – at a stretch – to benefit from an expanding Hungary. Yet retrieval was generally "the strongest legitimate factor creating a national consensus" within interwar Hungary (ibid.:188), and hence cannot be singled out as the profit-generating project of a particular domestic group.

3.2.2 Ideology over figures: the comparative dis/advantages of interwar retrieval

The case for irredentism: economic impact of partition

Considering the sheer devastation Trianon had brought on, one could commonsensically assume for Hungarian revisionism to be preoccupied with economic recovery. Already prior to 1920, the country's de facto truncation, war, partial occupation and imperial collapse had brought on catastrophic conditions (see Berend 1969:172-3). The peace treaty now deprived Hungary of the rich agricultural areas which had generated its main source of income: the Csallóköz region within the Felvidék, Transylvania proper, as well as the south-eastern Banat and Bácska regions. Hungary's revenue from agricultural export, its former economic backbone, was thus broken. Partition also brought a loss of markets, which had had a complementary function within the domestic division of labour. "New international borders separated Hungary's industrial base from its sources of raw materials and its former markets for agricultural and industrial products. Its new circumstances forced Hungary to become a trading nation. Hungary lost 84 per cent of its timber resources, 43 per cent of its arable land and 83 per cent of its iron ore. Because most of the country's pre-war industry was concentrated near Budapest, Hungary retained about 51 per cent of its industrial population, 56 per cent of its industry, 82 per cent of its heavy industry, and 70 per cent of its banks" (Burant 1989). As a consequence, "there was (...) a marked disproportion between its resources of raw materials and its manufacturing capacity". "In other ways too the internal

economic balance was seriously upset: for instance only 11 per cent of the iron ore and 15 per cent of the timber was left within the new boundaries" (Berend 1969:170). Both these facts meant the start of a "vicious circle" that made the country dependent on foreign trade. "For the economy to function, and for industry to be put on its feet, foreign currency and raw materials were essential, but these could be secured only by the export of agricultural produce. This again was impossible; the place of these missing agricultural products should have been taken by competitively-priced manufactured goods, but to produce these was impossible without importing raw materials" (Berend 1969:173-4). As a by-product the country also experienced problems of internal capital accumulation, forcing it to resort to foreign loans.

Hungary's was further crippled by Trianon's devastation of its infrastructure, which had hitherto functioned in a complementary way. Eminent here was the case of Hungary's railway system. Arranged in a radial grid which centred on Budapest, it was purposefully truncated by partition, leaving only 42 per cent behind (Berend and Csató 2001:148). Most of Hungary's few urban centres (a meagre 16.7 per cent) ended up either outside of the new borders, or conversely atrophied because their tributary regions had now been cut off. Such newly peripheral areas also experienced population flight towards Hungary's remaining industrial areas (Kovács 1989:79-83). The two single greatest sources of damage in this respect were the respective loss of Transylvania and Southern Slovakia.

To summarise, the Hungarian Kingdom had been within the confines of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, a self-sufficient entity that sustained its economy and the wider region with exports of its vast agricultural surplus. With its internal division of labour and its complementary markets and infrastructure, it was praised as perfect organic unit. Geographic-economic arguments were thus amongst the strongest raised against Trianon (Zeidler 2001:53-54). An endless stream of interwar publications, both governmental and private, sought to illustrate the damage and unviability caused by truncation (see e.g. Buday 1921; Laky 1923; Fenyő 1929). In short, judging by purely its losses, interwar Hungary would indeed have had enough reason to pursue an economically motivated irredenta.

The case against irredentism: modernisation and changing world economic conditions

The problem though is that the material logic does not withstand closer inspection. Within a decade after partition it became obvious that for all the talk about truncation and historically organic units, the rump of Hungary was performing rather well. Agricultural output had recovered to pre-1914 levels already by 1925, while industrial production regenerated to former standards by 1928 (Zeidler 2001:48). Granted, economic growth was both slow (amounting to not quite 30 per cent over twenty years), and uneven (with agricultural stagnation and little expansion in heavy industry). Yet it nevertheless proved the truncated mainland viable against all predictions – and against revisionist propaganda. More importantly, the onset of competitive overseas production turned the recent past of "natural" or "complementary" regional markets into a nostalgia. Berend (1969:178) describes how protectionism had shrunk intra-regional trade by the late 1920's to 10 to 15 per cent of the successor countries' pre-war exchange. No irredenta could have remedied the fact that Hungarian goods - both agricultural and industrial – were now unable to keep up with cheap grains and production methods from the West. In one word then: by the second half of the 1930s, i.e. when the irredenta began to seem achievable, there no longer was a strict economic need or logic for Hungary to retrieve its former territories.

I would like to take this argument a step further. In purely economic terms, truncation turned out to be a necessary and even moderately beneficial, downsizing. Trianon, for all its misery and injustice, ultimately rejuvenated the national economy by forcing its interwar modernisation and industrialisation, precisely in order to compensate for lost resources and initial lack of domestic employment. The very fact of partition meant that Hungary "gained in industrial strength, for within its new boundaries, which enclosed about a third of its former territory, there remained about 55 per cent of its industry and 41 per cent of its population" (Berend 1969:170). Thus for instance the country retained 80 to 90 per cent of its printing and engineering plants (ibid.). While before the war around two thirds of the population had earned their living from agriculture that proportion now sunk to just half of all employed. This initial

head start in modernisation was partly consolidated during the interwar period. The need to remedy the above-mentioned gap between domestic resources and manufacturing capacity drove development further. For instance, Hungary's hitherto sorely underdeveloped consumer goods and light industries now rapidly expanded.[2] Hungary's traditional dependence on Austrian and Czech industries sharply decreased (Berend and Csató 2001:146). Admittedly, this process of shifting economic gears was painful: the domestic decline of former stronghold sectors like grain production and food processing often entailed unemployment and local problems. Budapest's neo-corporatist governments proved furthermore unwilling to comprehensively reform and adapt the country. More abstractly, these developments traumatised Magyar nationalism even further by contrasting its rural, retrogressive self-image with an increasingly modernised reality.

Albeit brutally, partition also reduced the already vast extent of socio-economic problems interwar Hungarian governments had to tackle. These included the desperate - and ultimately unsuccessful - struggle for land reform, social and educational welfare to counteract deprivation (illiteracy, infant mortality, public health deficits, poverty) and the need to redress infrastructural and urbanisation backlogs (see János 1982:149 ff.; Berend and Csató 2001:151-154).

Finally, within the international context of falling agricultural prices and cheap imports (due to increasing primary sector mechanisation and larger scale production in North America), Trianon pre-emptively shed Hungary of what would have soon become increasingly unprofitable, burdensome areas. The decline of associated industries like that of the mainland's giant milling sector, would have been magnified even further. Berend (1969:176) rightly reminds that "the economic unity of the empire rested on the integration of backward agrarian regions with others that had attained a standard of industrial development comparable to that of West Europe." At the onset of an

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[2] Particularly striking is the rapid development of Hungary's previously minimal textile industry. "In comparison with pre-war standards, production in the Hungarian textile industry had doubled by 1925, trebled by 1929, and by the end of the thirties had reached four times the pre-war figure; the import of textiles, which in 1913 accounted for 70 per cent of total home consumption, now covered only 2-3 per cent" (Berend 1969: 179).

increasingly competitive and industrialised era which soon experienced the hitherto greatest crisis within capitalism, Hungary had been forcibly rid of those largely rural regions and left with a more modern, workable core (Berend and Csató 2001:146-9).

Ideology over figures: interwar political thought and the economics of retrieval

The question is therefore whether and to what extent policy-makers were aware of this, and secondly, why economic arguments still figured prominently. The profitability of irredentism was to a considerable extent merely a discourse, rather than actually important. Budapest's three concrete irredentist plans[3] reveal hardly any concern with economic criteria. Instead, they focused on what was crucial to irredentists: to retrieve the maximum possible amount of transborder kindred and ancestral territories, of the Crownlands of St. Stephen (see section 4.4). Prime minister Bethlen's and Teleki's designs both faithfully mirrored this theme and cited the retrieval of ethnic Magyar areas as core but minimum, demand (see also section 5.2.1). The only exception was Premier Gömbös' plan of 1934, with its emphasis on material and geo-strategic aspects. Of all designs however it was also the most irrelevant because it was never adopted: unpopular with the cabinet and the wider political establishment *precisely for dropping the Crownlands notion*, it died with its maker in 1936 (Zeidler 2001:150-5).

Conversely, Hungarian governments did worry whether they could actually *afford* retrieval. Several studies describe Budapest's grave concerns about re-integrating the Felvidék community, which had been used to much higher social standards and services within Czechoslovakia (Hámori 2001:569-574; see also Püski in Békény and Dányi 2000:111). This spawned a costly special program in the wake of re-annexation (1938) which had to be repeated upon the return of impoverished Northern Transylvania in 1940 (Püski ibid.:117).

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[3] Interwar Hungary refused to specify its irredentist designs until the 1930s. Concrete maps were mainly circulated by academics, journalists, and the Revisionist League, with varying and ambiguous levels of official endorsement. Only three politicians presented precise plans - either as heads of government (Gömbös) or as retired statesmen in publications and lectures (Teleki and Bethlen). These also were exactly the personalities who singularly summed up interwar Magyar politics most - both in terms of impact and representation (see section 7.2.1). For these reasons they are selected here as solidly revealing of irredentist policy-making.

So if the economics of it all mattered in fact little, why was there such a pronounced emphasis on this aspect? For one, the irredenta was part of continued imperial thinking and served as panacea in Hungarian domestic politics. Imperial resurrection was seen to remedy all of Hungary's problems – not least its myriad socio-economic ones. Trianon had been the 'cause' for all the nation's woes, hence regaining everything it had cut off would automatically mean national salvation. State and group interests fused, retrieval replaced reform as solution. This view was promoted by politicians as well as enthusiastically endorsed by the population (see section 7.2.1). Ambrosio (2002:18) notes that irredentist states typically extol the "remedial nature" of retrieval, based on "the belief that (...) the interests and rights of the nation as a whole are not (and likely cannot) be satisfied unless all members of the nation dwell within the same polity." Glenny (1996:15-26) observes in the same vein: "most nationalisms are based on the assumption that a state which encompasses all members of one nation can overcome all major social and economic evils." No wonder then that material arguments were quoted by those least experienced in this field, but most fervently irredentist. Thus Count Teleki, twice prime minister and an academic, was a life-long proponent of the empire's re-establishment. Considered as the architect of Hungarian irredentism, he seamlessly integrated Magyar national desires with macro-economic and ethnographic reasoning for retrieval. Count Bethlen, the founder of Hungary's "active foreign policy", argued along the same lines (see below). Prime minister Imrédy, a banker and trained economist, in turn suspended his managerial judgement when it came to the irredentist achievements during his term (Ormos 1998:186). In contrast, where economic sense conflicted with irredentism, the latter won. Zeidler (2001:77) thus describes how Budapest actually rejected a customs union which Austria and Czechoslovakia proposed to alleviate the 1929 crisis, precisely because it worried a successful solution by economic means alone would jeopardise its case for irredentism. In short, because retrieval was seen as panacea – a feature common in irredentas – economic arguments were made to fit the project, *not* vice versa.

Secondly, the economic discourse was not least for foreign consumption (see section 5.2.1). By the early 1920s, successive interwar Hungarian governments had understood that their emotive (and sometimes downright

103

arrogant) irredentist reasoning proved counter-productive abroad. Furthermore, it had become obvious that the Great Powers applied Wilsonian principles of national self-determination very selectively. Hence it made little sense to keep demanding them for Hungarian minorities and their own right to nation-state congruence. Instead, the economic case for border revision was thought of as more dry-eyed and therefore persuasive, to the outside world. A whole string of academic institutes and faculties were founded in order to produce research which would support this. Good examples for its use were former premier Teleki's international lectures on Hungary's 'unviability' as truncated country, or prime minister Bethlen's so-called 'economic propaganda' between 1923 and 1927 (Kovács 1994:88).

In short, the economic side of Hungarian irredentism was part discourse, part tailored to what actually mattered: ethno-national completeness. Material interests within parent state irredentism, as far as they objectively existed, were a means to a nationalist ends as well as to support a strategic-pragmatic switch in irredentist diplomacy.

3.2.3 Is retrieval really any less profitable today?

To make a counterfactual for the contemporary period is not difficult: Hungary is economically more advanced than its post-communist neighbours Romania and Slovakia. Retrieving today's Felvidék and Transylvania would thus be an obvious and unaffordable mistake. Therefore, rather than belabouring this point, the following section will draw a few parallels to the interwar period, thus showing that the problems retrieval would create today were in fact already existent at the time. The point is that objective economic criteria and the costs associated with retrieval have not changed enough to account for Hungary's inconsistent irredenta.

How profitable were the retrievals of 1938 and 1940 respectively?

The retrieval of the two regions both posed economic difficulties, yet in opposite ways. By the 1930s, the Felvidék had a considerably different socio-economic situation from that in mainland Hungary. Czechoslovakia's generous

104

social policies and successful economic redistribution had created a local society and economy very different from Hungary's. Retrieving the region would and then really did mean, cutting it off from its investors, its markets, its higher wages and employment (see for instance Zeidler 2001:227; Hámori 2001:574). The Hungarian government worried in advance whether it could literally afford such a differently run entity and commissioned internal reports on the matter (Hámori 2001:572-4). The outcome was a large-scale social programme in order to bridge the transition on retrieval. Entitled "Hungarians for Hungarians", it was one of the most costly campaigns for interwar Hungary – one that the state could furthermore not afford. Budapest's coffers had already been emptied by premier Darányi's ambitious public investment ("Győr") programme from earlier that year. As a result, mainland Hungarians were asked to donate – and matched the governments meagre 1.5 million with a staggering 6 880 750 Pengős (Hámori 2001: 577-583).

The recovery of Northern Transylvania in 1940 brought the opposite problem, namely of having to compensate for local underdevelopment. "It complicated matters that it was Transylvania's economically more backward, poorer areas which were returned. [The government] tried to counter this *beyond its powers* by organising social aid campaigns, infrastructural investments and with supporting Hungarian cultural institutions" (Püski in Békény and Dányi 2000:117, emphasis mine). By now operating in the context of a wartime economy, Budapest was even less able to finance these areas. National emergency budgets were furthermore depleted from heavy flooding in the previous winter. To rely again on public donations seemed an obvious, if risky, way out. The responsible government commissioner thus confidently declared that "I expect from these collections (...) at least as much of a result as from the 'Hungarians for Hungarians' movement." He was mistaken – contributions were much lower this time, amounting to merely 218 100 Pengős, one thirtieth of the previous campaign (Hámori 2001:621-222).

The point here is that Budapest's behaviour does not suggest rational calculations. In both cases the government knew the costly challenges reintegration would pose, knew it could not finance them, but still went ahead relying on uncertain sources.

The burden repeated

In terms of improving Hungary's economy, retrieval would not bring any appreciable benefits today either. Minority Magyar regions are both lagging behind not only Hungary but also their respective host states.

For starters, they do so in terms of per capita income (as I will show below, see section 3.3.3,). Should they be retrieved today, both minority populations would also present a demographic and labour force liability, rather than an asset. Minority unemployment continues to be well above mainland average (see section 3.3.3). Presumably, this in itself does not pose a lasting problem because the dynamic Hungarian labour market would absorb these unemployed. For example, the region of Northern Hungary is currently experiencing such rapid economic growth that it actually suffers from labour shortages. As a result, it is already employing considerable numbers of ethnic Hungarians from adjacent Slovakia who commute across the border. Similarly, several tens of thousands of ethnic Magyars work in mainland Hungary under the terms of the Status Law (Lampl in Fábri 2003; HTMH 2005a and 2005b). Such examples are however not generalisable. A look at minority Magyars' professional distribution across economic sectors and at their educational lags (below) shows that there would be a considerable mismatch between people's skills and available jobs.

For starters, both transborder communities fare badly in their levels of higher education relative both to their host societies and to the Hungarian mainland population. Higher and university education levels are low compared to the mainland's 12.0 per cent (KSH 2002d:table 1.1), with only 3.6 and 5.3 per cent among Romanian and Slovak Hungarians respectively. Figures for mid-level schooling show similar disparities. Secondly, both communities are ageing, with exceptionally high rates of retirees (Felvidék Magyars 20.6 per cent in 1991, Transylvania 19.7 in 1992, Varga 1998:table 32; Lanstyák 2000:55). Given that mainland Hungary is already battling with the demographic and social costs of a shrinking and ageing population, this figure would be a burdensome addition. Thirdly, adding to these are crass disparities in income and employment (see below). Finally, a breakdown in terms of occupational sectors highlights once more the minorities' problematic underdevelopment in relation to the mainland. Around a quarter of Magyars in both transborder

communities still gain their living from agriculture (Lanstyák 2000:55-6; HTMH 1999a), compared to a mere 6.2 per cent in Hungary as of 2002 (KSH 2002c). The reasons for these discrepancies lie in late and incomplete industrialisation as well as in the targeted underdevelopment both regions have suffered in their respective host states.

In short, retrieval today would require Hungary to undertake an enormous exercise of socio-economic redistribution quite like the one it faced in the late 1930s. Given the similarly unfavourable balance sheet in both time periods, it is clear that here the differentials in profitability cannot explain the mainland's inconsistent irredentism.

3.3 Economic considerations of minority Magyars

The inconsistent irredentism of transborder Hungarians in turn is similarly at odds with interpretations of relative deprivation or, conversely, of opportunism. Firstly I will illustrate that persistent material discrimination within their host states provided both Felvidék and Erdély Magyars with as much reason to defect in the interwar period as it arguably does today. Following partition their local ascendancy was dismantled, after World War II they endured collective reprisals for pursuing irredentism, and today their life chances and home regions are still below national host state averages. Furthermore, minority desires for retrieval in the interwar period display little genuine evidence of economic motives. Thirdly, it is commonly assumed that minorities are always better off joining their parent state, not least because this removes prejudicial treatment. I will show that, at least for the case of the Felvidék Magyars, this is not true. Acceding their poorer kindred state indeed promised freedom from discrimination, but more fundamentally meant trading in Czechoslovakia's higher standards of life and welfare provision from which they also benefited.

3.3.1 Interwar minority irredentism: a discussion in general terms

Before launching into a detailed analysis of the Magyar case it is worth probing the political economy of minority irredentism first in general terms. As mentioned above, two strands of argumentation are possible here: economic deprivation and opportunism.

Starting with the first, interwar Europe had several minority areas economically similar to Transylvania and the Felvidék that showed no signs of defectionism. Belgian Flanders and Scotland come to mind as counter-examples for Transylvania. All three had important industrial centres with large rural backdrops and were governed by ethnically different dominant groups. Mainly agricultural Southern Slovakia in turn compares with Wales or Slovenia, both of them non-defectionist entities. Comparative studies have furthermore shown that socio-economic disadvantage without the cohesion of a threatened ethno-national identity translates either into social protest, or resignation and crime (e.g. Gurr 1970; 1994; 2000).

Following the logic of relative economic deprivation, a minority will be more keen to defect if it is subject to - or believes itself the subject of - discriminatory policies by the host state. I will show below that this was indeed the case for Hungarians in both Romania and Czechoslovakia. Yet it will also become clear that a switch back to Hungary did not hold much material promise for either community. Furthermore, some groups still enjoy better life chances in states that do discriminate against them – Felvidék Magyars and Estonia's Russian community are both cases in point. Finally, this argument fails to explain irredentist alienation from the state amongst economically advantaged groups. There have been enough instances where irredentist minorities acted against their own material interests (e.g. nineteenth century Ottoman Greeks, Romanians within Austria-Hungary, Kenyan Somalis, or Okinawan Japanese).

As above, there is also the question of an irredentist constituency within the minority. The answer at first appears to support a materialist agenda: the strata within these Magyar communities that had lost most from partition were also those that most supported the irredentist project. Zeidler (2001:202-6) describes that the middle classes were the strongest supporters of irredentism within the minorities. Intellectuals and workers (agrarian as well as industrial)

were somewhat less involved. Hungarian Social Democrats in the Felvidék, though representing only a small faction, even denounced the return to a "feudal Hungary" where land reform was impossible (Hámori 2001:574). While this would then neatly fit elite-persuasion arguments about nationalism, Nodia (2000:172) points out that such reasoning actually reifies itself: "the self interest of the seller cannot explain the success of a political program because all sellers are self-interested. Occasionally, a dishonest salesman may sell damaged goods to a naive consumer, but the extraordinary and continuing popularity of nationalism during the last two centuries does not allow us to take consumer fraud seriously as an explanatory variable."

Finally, if relative deprivation were to chiefly motivate irredentist minorities, then their drive for defection would surely increase in times of economic hardship, and conversely abate with improvement. Like above we can probe this for the period between 1929 and 1932, when the world economic crisis made its effects felt in the region. If irredentism is about remedying material grievances, then the desire for retrieval should have been at its most intense during this time. The late 1920s and early 1930s however were exactly the high time of alternative, non-irredentist voices within the minorities (see section 6.2.1). Both communities had produced small but vocal liberal factions, respectively called Transylvanianism and New Faced Magyars. These rejected retrieval, and saw the post-partition fate as opportunity for internal social reform and co-operation with the majority nations. In turn, efforts by the host state to 'buy off' irredentism remained ineffective. Czechoslovakia's late attempts at (amongst others) economic co-optation[4] in 1937-38 proved fruitless towards its already radicalised Magyar minority. Instead, the intensification of minority disaffection and activism directly mirrored developments in host state politics and at international level (see section 5.3.1 and 7.3.1 below).

To interpret Horowitz's variable as opportunistic irredentism is not convincing either. The idea that transborder Magyars wanted retrieval because it 'paid' ignores the suppression and discrimination that both host states inflicted on them precisely on the suspicion of their disloyalty (see below and section

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[4] For instance, from September 1938 onwards Prague accorded to Hungarian areas considerable municipal and regional funds, as well as higher unemployment benefits for Magyars in Komárom city.

7.3.1). This assumes that groups hold out for years, even decades as in this case, for an ultimate material reward while accepting in the meantime misery for exactly that stance.

3.3.2 Comparative dis/advantages in the interwar period

The case for economic irredentism: large scale and institutionalised socio-economic discrimination

After 1920, both host countries dismantled the material assets of local Magyars in order to establish economic control[5] in the newly gained territories. In the first instance this was achieved by openly discriminatory land reforms.

Romania's 1921 reform benefited the majority nation at the expense of Hungarians because it "was carried out much more strictly in Transylvania than in the *Regat* [pre-1920 Romania], even though 40 per cent of the land in the latter belonged to large landowners, while the proportion in Transylvania was only 10.8 per cent" (Illyés 1982:90). Whereas land seizures in the *Regat* had fixed ceilings, no such limits were prescribed or kept in Magyar inhabited regions. Moreover, compensation for expropriated lands in Transylvania was set at the prices of 1913, whereas those for the Regat were fixed at the more valuable rates of 1917. As a consequence, the payouts covered merely 1 to 2 per cent of the real value. Even this was not paid out in cash, as in other parts of the country, but converted into government bonds which effectively meant no reimbursement. The blow to private Magyar property was compounded by the expropriation of Magyar churches, which had by then become vital cultural centres for the community. Romania thus seized an astonishing 95 per cent of all Catholic assets in Transylvania and 45 per cent of Protestant property (Sebess 1921; Diószegi 1990:35; Zeidler 2001:196).

Czechoslovakia's two agrarian reforms of 1919-20 were equally discriminatory and devastating. These allowed agricultural labourers (overwhelmingly ethnic Slovaks) to seize up to two thirds of land from their former landlords (mostly

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[5] "Control" (Lustick 1979) has been described as institutionalised ethnic dominance or exclusionary domination model within an ethnically diverse state. It is compatible with formal liberal democracy (like in Czechoslovakia) 1990), and contingent on the dominant group's capacity to manipulate the institutions and/or leadership of the subordinate group.

ethnic Hungarians). The authorities in turn confiscated Magyar properties at three times the national average. Compensation payments covered only 50 to 60 per cent of actual asset worth. Ethnic Czechs and especially Slovaks, many of them new settlers in the Felvidék, received proportionally twice as much land during redistributions as Hungarians. This meant that out of 600 000 expropriated acres, Magyars received (or leased) back a meagre 35 000 (Szarka 1998:21-23; Zeidler 2001:196). These measures were closely connected to Prague's policy of colonisation (see section 4.3.1), which further affected the minority's livelihood. For instance, between 1918 and 1921 alone "70 000 members of the Slovak League, civil servants and investors moved to the territory" (Kocsis and Kocsis-Hodosi 1998:61-2). These new settlers were to fill the posts of ethnic Hungarians who had been made redundant (see below).

These measures hit both communities hard and sharply reduced their means of economic sustenance. Local Magyars respectively set up extensive co-operative networks in order to protect themselves (credit unions, retail societies, farming and consumer associations etc.) and achieved moderate success until in Romania these were prohibited, too (Szarka 1998:23; Hunyadi 2000, 2002; Gaucsík 2003). Life chances were further unequal because of discriminatory taxation, commercial and labour legislation. Romanian fiscal policy thus routinely taxed Transylvania at higher rates, with revenues exceeding those from the rest of the country by 205 million Lei for the period 1924-1926. A law for the "protection of national labour" prescribed that a minimum of 75 per cent of staff and 60 per cent of management within any commercial, economic or industrial enterprise had to be ethnic Romanian. The Industry Act of 1936 finally abolished minority chambers of commerce and expropriated their assets to state-run chambers of commerce (Illyés ibid.:92-3). Magyars in Czechoslovakia had disproportionately low shares in civil service posts and public procurement (Hoensch 1967: 20-1). Hungarian civil servants and teachers suffered mass redundancy due to discriminatory requirements they could or would not fulfil: compulsory Czech and Romanian language examinations and – only for Magyars - an oath of allegiance to the host state (Illyés 1982:91; Mócsy 1995:248, 254).

To sum up then, both minorities indeed suffered discriminatory treatment by their host states and would have had objective material reasons to seek retrieval.

The case against economic irredentism: external vs. internal discourse and the contrast between Czechoslovak social state and feudal Hungary

This seemingly clear-cut case for material motives acquires however cracks if we look at the discrepancies in minority discourse about it. Minority irredentism is more covert and careful, but revealing in the nature and respective priorities of its grievances. Interwar publications by both communities give a good idea about these. Foreign language material – mainly complaints to the League of Nations – indeed prevailingly centred on expropriations. As I will however show in section 5.3.1, this was in line with the more veiled, 'technical' arguments against Trianon during the 1920s. In contrast, publications in Hungarian – i.e. those meant for their own and mainland consumption – differed from this emphasis. The main themes transborder Magyar authors presented were those of native language schooling (Balázs 1929; Jancsó 1935; Jócsik 1939), restrictions on culture and media (Olay 1930; Berey 1940), their political struggle against repression (Berey 1941) and global surveys about their fate (Jancsó 1927; Borsódy 1938 and 1939; Jócsik 1940). For instance, Fazekas' (1993) authoritative compilation of interwar Felvidék writings contains only one article (Hantos 1938) about economic deprivation. Similarly, interwar Magyar party programs do not particularly emphasise this point beyond decrying the summary expropriations (Bárdi 1997a, 2000b; Popély 1990; Angyal 2000a, 2000b). Instead, they concentrate in their demands on self-rule (autonomy – with a view to eventually defect) and identity preservation (e.g. native language schooling) – the very points that I posit as central to irredentists. While this is no conclusive proof against the *existence* of any economic agenda, it tells a good deal about its low priority.

As for Czechoslovakia's Hungarians, there was also an arguable dilemma about retrieval. By the 1930s the Felvidék had a very different socio-economic situation from mainland Hungary's. Although minority Magyars had been crudely downsized in their means of sustenance (see above), they also

benefited from the liberal social provisions of their host state – examples included unemployment insurance, strong trade unions, social housing, health care and restrictions on child labour. Unemployment figures were even for middle class Hungarians considerably lower than in the mainland (Hámori 2001:570-1). In contrast, Hungary offered a scenario of stalled social reform and rural misery, which was furthermore stuck in feudal structures: "the system of great estates [had] essentially remained intact, so that 526 families still held more than 30 per cent of the land in a country in 1930" (Berend and Csató 2001:152). Both Prague and Budapest were aware that this would directly pit ethno-nationalism against socio-economic advantage, and engaged in a veritable propaganda war from the mid-1930s onwards in order to sway the minority's mind. The Hungarian government commissioned internal reports on the matter and also sought to 'polish' its bad social image (Hámori 2001:572-4). It needn't have worried. When retrieval became reality in November 1938, the community unanimously welcomed it.

3.3.3 Comparative dis/advantages today

Continued discrimination and detrimental historic legacies
In the contemporary period, both communities contend with detrimental, institutionalised economic legacies and with their cumulative damage from the last eight decades. These make minority Magyars actually "worse off" today than in interwar times period, both compared to Hungary and within their own host states. In a Horowitzian logic this should again drive them to defectionism - which it does not.

Slovakia's 520 000 Hungarians (9.7 per cent of its population) are still hampered in their economic development by discriminatory legislation. The Beneš Decrees[6] were a post-war retaliatory measure against Czechoslovakia's irredentist Sudetengerman and Magyar minorities. Issued between 1945 and 1948, they form a collection of 89 edicts, laws, decrees and statutes in order to

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[6] The generic name describes presidential and constitutional edicts by Edvard Beneš as well as regular laws and statutes, governmental decrees issued by Prague and Decrees of the Bratislava-based Slovak National Council.

implement the government's punitive Košice program of April 1945. This consisted of deportations, internments, trials in 'people's courts', revocations of citizenship, and forced labour. The measures also legitimised the expulsion of some 2.5 million ethnic Germans and 130 000 Hungarians. From an economic point of view they were nothing short of devastating due to the large-scale confiscation of property. A total of 570 000 acres of fertile land was seized from ethnic Hungarians without compensation. Expropriations further included businesses, factories, private homes, mines, stock holdings, as well as bank accounts and deposits. The few remaining Hungarian owned businesses and farms faced compulsory appointment of government managers, which amounted to de facto expropriation (Vancouver Society 2001:4; Vígh 1998).

All but two Decrees continue to be valid until this day in Czechoslovakia's successor states. Slovakia has repeatedly refused to repeal the remaining 87, declaring them as 'dormant'. Tellingly, the government has stated that "we do not wish yet another wave of claims for restitution, nor the reinterpretation of Europe's post-war order."[7] This means that post-communist privatisations, restitutions, compensations, and with them the life chances of entire communities in Slovakia, are ethnically skewed.[8] The Decrees' legal discrimination prevents ethnic Magyars from recovering their assets and from seeking material compensation.[9] In an internal report the Hungarian government has found that "until today these Decrees put the Magyar community living in Slovakia at a disadvantage" (HTMH 2002:1). This furthermore compounds earlier socio-economic damage to the community. Already targeted in the aftermath of partition, when its local ascendancy was dismantled by administrative and land reforms (see above), the Decrees took what was left, or what four years of Hungarian rule had restored. So the cumulative effect of two waves of agricultural confiscations makes this group

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[7] Slovak Foreign Ministry spokesman Jan Figel as quoted in the Slovak daily SME on 27.02.2002 (SME Editorial 2002).

[8] The 1991 Act on Re-Privatisation allows exclusively the restitution of properties seized *after* February 25 1948, i.e. after the Decrees had been implemented. But even Magyar assets nationalised subsequent to that date are still of "unsettled" legal status. For example, in the majority Hungarian Csallóköz area of the Felvidék the legal status of 80 per cent of land was still "unsettled" in 1999.

[9] Czech and Slovak courts have so far ruled against all Magyar and Sudeten German claims. The exceptional victory in the Rudolf Dreithaler case (1997) against the Czech government failed to set a precedent.

even worse off today in comparison to interwar times. According to Horowitz's logic, such institutionalised economic disadvantage and the cumulatively worsened socio-economic situation, should make this group irredentist.

Until recently Romanian Hungarians struggled with similar problems. Here the issue was specifically about properties that had been seized from the community between 1945 and 1953 – assets such as agricultural co-operatives, communal lands and forests, assembly buildings, etc. The fact that only individuals could demand the return of properties put Romania's 1.5 million Hungarians at a considerable disadvantage during the whole first decade of post-communist restitution and re-privatisation. Despite repeated demands and legal challenges, the problem was not addressed until 2001, following pressure on the government by the RMDSZ, the Magyar party in constructive opposition. The resulting decree finally recognised communal property as form of ownership which was eligible for restitution. As a result, more than 120 hectares of lands and forests were handed back in 2002 alone in the Transylvanian counties of Hargita, Kovászna and Maros (HTMH 2002a). The issue of church property – vital because most Magyar language schools are run by denominations – was only settled in 2002-03.

Unfavourable comparisons: how much better off are minorities today?
Discrimination aside, there remains the question of opportunity. In other words, the differential between host and parent state may be such today that it can explain the absence of irredentism. Two levels of analysis are necessary here: cross-national, i.e. global, macro-economic comparisons between the two countries, and internal, i.e. verifying whether equalities or differences between host and parent state actually apply to the minority and its region.

When examining macro-level data it is not immediately clear whether Magyars would have reason for economic irredentism, i.e. whether defection to mainland Hungary would pay off. After a period of lagging behind, Hungary's rapid growth in the late 1990s, both host countries have recently caught up. Macro-economic indicators yield overall favourable comparisons: only the Romanian and Hungarian GDP per capita rates diverge significantly (2 920

US$ versus 8 270 US$), but not their annual inflation figures (9.3 per cent versus 7.2 per cent) nor their respective unemployment rates (6.2 per cent versus 5.9 per cent). Growth figures have recently turned to Romania's advantage (8.0 against Hungary's 3.9 per cent). At first look, the Slovak economy yields a similarly positive incentive to stay: its annual GDP per capita approaches Hungary's at around 6 480 US$, real growth is at 5.5 per cent and the annual inflation is merely 3.5 per cent. Unemployment, however, is still at 17.4 per cent (Hungarian Central Statistical Office; Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic; World Bank 2005; all figures as of December 2004).

Yet what of the micro-level, do ethnic actually Hungarians benefit from recent improvements in the Slovak and Romanian economies? In other words, is their specific situation within the host states also part of this levelling with Hungary's success? The Slovak case first. Out of the Felvidék's four counties, three consistently show much higher unemployment than the 17.4 per cent national average (at 20.3, 26.6 and 25.2 per cent for Nyitra, Besztercebánya and Kassa counties respectively). This is not surprising in view of lower education levels amongst the minority, e.g. the 5.3 per cent of ethnic Magyars with a college diploma or university degree is half of the Slovak rate of 10.4 per cent. Slovak per capita earnings in 2004 had grown a healthy 10.2 per cent compared to the previous year. Yet except for the region around Kassa, majority Hungarian areas do not reach this national average (15 825 Slovak crowns). In fact, their earnings are lower even within their own counties. Furthermore, there still is a marked shortage of private capital in Hungarian regions. The recent inflow of monies stems from governmental and EU sources, and hence only benefits local authorities. That in turn has only been facilitated by Magyars' securing key ministries like agriculture and regional development (see section 7.3.2). Finally, the main economic indicators of the three Felvidék counties above are all without exception *below* those of the national average. It hence appears that the recent Slovak economic miracle benefits mainly the majority nation (Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic; HTMH 2005b; Ivan 1997; Lelkes 2003).

Matters are no better in Romania. In both my interviews with leading Romanian Magyar politicians there was unanimity that their community's current economic situation within their host states was worse compared to interwar times (Interviews 1 and 2). While Transylvania as a whole approximates national economic indicators, there are pronounced differences within the region. The most successful county, Kolozs, is among those with the lowest percentage of ethnic Hungarians and second only to the Bucharest region (Csákó in Fábri 2003:27). Unemployment figures in majority-Magyar counties are 5 to 8 per cent above the national average. In 1999, roughly a decade into post-communism, the ratio of ethnic Magyars in the management of state owned companies in Transylvania was vastly disproportionate. For instance, in the city of Nagyvárad which is to 33.2 per cent Hungarian, only 5 out of 96 state owned companies had Magyars in leading positions (HTMH 1999a). Privatisation, too, was ethnically skewed until the RMDSZ' participation in government forced a change in the late 1990s. Until then, "Hungarians [were] an exception in privatisation committees" (Tőkés 1995). Given that Transylvania as a whole is Romania's most wealthy and advanced region, these figures are all the more indicative of continued discrimination

In sum, opportunistic irredentism would appear to make little sense with Romania and especially Slovakia rapidly nearing Hungary's standards. Present and future EU integration (Romania is set to join in 2007) promise to further narrow existing gaps. Yet while their host countries by now reach Hungary's wealth, ethnic Magyars largely do not share that prosperity because of continued material disadvantage within their respective national economies. Sociological research shows that both communities are aware of this situation and that they have a bleak outlook on their material future (Csákó in Fábri 2003). So although there is a good theoretical case for irredentism as favourable opening, it is not seen as such. Once more economic facts do not coincide with minority politics.

3.4 Conclusion: retrieval does not (necessarily) pay

I have shown above that the changes in economic criteria for both ethnic actors are insufficient to explain their change in behaviour. For Hungary, irredentism did not pay off in the interwar period. Despite established beliefs and sentiment, the retrieval of both regions was costly, rather than profitable. Budapest knew this in advance, as well as the fact that it could not afford these costs. Modernisation, regional protectionism, and changes in the world economy first of all meant that the Hungarian Kingdom's complementary market, as well as its wealth from agriculture could not be resurrected. As for the coveted territories, the Felvidék was wealthier and socially more advanced than the mainland. Although mainly agricultural, it had secure markets within Czechoslovakia which recovery cut off. This in turn meant an expensive reintegration program upon its return. Re-annexed Northern Transylvania in contrast, had rural deprivation problems that would compound those in the parent state. Given the mainland's neo-corporatist reluctance to reform, this meant further magnifying the country's socio-economic stalemate. Today's situation looks similar: this time both Erdély and the Felvidék are poorer than the mainland. Hungary would have to nurse both areas up to its standards, and would gain very little from the minority labour force.

As for the minorities in turn, I have tried to demonstrate that they have been in both time periods comparatively disadvantaged within their host states. While Transylvania was and is richer than the rest of Romania, local Hungarians are consistently underprivileged. The Felvidék community was targeted in its means of sustenance in interwar times and today still lags behind national averages. Both minorities are furthermore worse off today because of cumulative expropriations and resulting adverse conditions. In other words, according to theories of economic deprivation they would have to be just as irredentist now. Finally, if retrieval is opportunistic, then at least Magyars in interwar Czechoslovakia acted squarely against their interests. They opted for irredentism despite faring better in their discriminatory, but socially advanced host state.

My explanation for these discrepancies was that economic factors, where they are cited, follow irredentist imperatives, and not the other way round. For all

their rhetoric, interwar Hungarian governments ultimately did not plan with an eye on profitability. The 'economic propaganda' of the 1920s was just that: convincing foreign powers with more technical arguments after nationalist ones had failed. Minority Hungarians in turn were principally incensed by political deprivation and threats to their identity. The different emphases in their foreign and Hungarian language publications show that they, too, invoked economic maltreatment mainly strategically, namely for external consumption.

Retrieval is not pursued because it pays. In this case and in general, material reasoning – if it is employed – is made to fit the project, rather than vice versa. That fit may be sometimes close, but like in this example, it is often rather tenuous. Neither are economic grievances the driving force behind irredentism. "Claims of economic injustice (real or imaginary) can act as a catalyst or exacerbator, and are often to be found in ethno-national propaganda", Connor explains. "But this acknowledgement of a catalytic role for economic forces is quite removed from a perception of economic deprivation as a necessary precondition of ethno-national tensions. Economic differentials are but one of several possible catalysts" (2001:121). For Hungarian irredentism they were not even the main one.

4. Irredentism is not a Question of Feasibility: Ethno-Territorial Homogeneity

> "If a profound correlation and spiritual connection exists between people and country, then it certainly exists between our people and our country! Of course I am referring to the thousand-year-old country, the land wreathed by the mountains in a semi circle... it is the vessel in which this Hungarian blood was mixed and the palette for the colours of our culture."

> "This „territory of the sacred crown", unified and unchangeable for a thousand years. ...Hungary is like a living body, which cannot be hacked at or extended...its severed parts have sooner or later knitted back together...the Hungarian has always been able to look upon this unified and complete piece of land as his own and no other. This thousand-year-old legal state of affairs is a greater and truer reality in his eyes than the changing situations created by the chance operations of politics."
>
> Gyula Szekfű (1939:54-55; 69)

4.1 Introduction

Irredentism is first and foremost concerned with translating shared identity into a shared political-territorial unit. Creating or restoring nation-state congruence has two notional components. For one, "redeeming" transborder kindred and ancestral lands implies self-determination, riddance from rule by ethnic strangers. At the same time, uniting the missing parts of population and territory within the parent state is seen as remedying the latter's previous truncation.

Rarely, however, are the textbook givens in place on the ground. Firstly, more often than not irredentist regions are significantly mixed in their ethnic composition. In addition, their territory may extend beyond kindred settlement areas because it is instead subjectively defined by history and notions of ancestral homelands. Both scenarios are conflict-laden, for they entail the

problem of also retrieving ethnically unrelated, and therefore normally hostile, groups. Equally difficult is the geographically dispersed distribution of a kindred minority. This situation may lead to merely partial retrieval, resulting in stranded hostage communities. The reality of parent states is similarly complex. Although by definition under the demographic and/or political dominance of one group, titular states frequently include minorities of their own. These in turn may view an irredentist project as inimical to their own interests, and thus mount internal opposition.

In short, the local realities of retrieval may be so complicated as to threaten the actual project. To what extent then is the condition of ethnic and territorial homogeneity within the two actors decisive? Does variance in this factor help explain the irredentist inconsistency we witness in a case like Hungary's?

4.1.2 A look at theory

Throughout this thesis I demonstrate that retrieval is primarily conditioned by factors endogenous to the two ethnic actors concerned. Of all the Horowitzian arguments that seek to establish a calculative rationale for irredentist politics (economic factors, leadership interests, gains in prestige), that of ethno-territorial homogeneity is the sole with direct relevance to this premise. This is because it seems to affect the very essence of an irredentist project: realising perfect nation-state congruence. Questions of feasibility, risk and profit, as this thesis demonstrates, matter little to irredentists. Yet this does not mean they are 'irrational', rather that their assessments focus on different criteria. This may be one of them. Anything that detracts from or undermines, their core goal - namely uniting a cohesive group and its ancestral grounds under one roof - could weigh critically. Examining therefore whether or how this factor influences irredentas is not only plausible, but vital.

Horowitz's model, in consensus with the wider literature[1], treats this as commonsensical variable. It posits that the 'structural bias' for or against an irredenta significantly depends on the degree to which the retrieving state and its claimed brethren are homogeneous in terms of constituency and space (1985:284-5). He is however somewhat contradictory about the degree to which this is an anterior calculation. So while he asserts that these concerns decide whether "putative irredentists will (...) become irredentists in action" (ibid.), he later seems to perceive it as ex post problem: "when irredentism gets going, it usually involves ethnic cleansing, so as to eliminate troublesome minorities in the region to be retrieved" (2003:10).

Concerning parent state calculations, the claimed territory should be ethnically as homogeneous as possible in order to avoid reincorporating recalcitrant other minorities. The geographic distribution of local kin ought to be ideally compact and border-near, so as to enable 'neat' boundary drawing. In addition, there is an equally important internal aspect. The mainland will be more free to conduct retrieval the less ethnic strangers it contains. Since the (re)incorporation of populations inevitably entails a shift in the domestic ethnic balance, thereby upsetting inter-group distributions of power, it is likely to be opposed by those whom it affects detrimentally (Horowitz 1985:284). A multi-ethnic parent state thus runs the risk of having its irredentist designs thwarted by other groups. Consequently, "it is tempting to say that irredentism is the prerogative of homogeneous states" Horowitz concludes (1985:282)

The transborder minority, for its part, is also invested with a cost-benefit rationale. It is likely to assess how predominant its own ethnic group is in the parent state – the more homogeneous, the better (ibid.:285). After all, for them the very sense of an irredenta is to join a political unit that their *own* kin controls. Willingness to be retrieved might further depend on whether a substantial part of their community may be left behind in stranded enclaves, in case their settlement structure is unfavourably dispersed (ibid.:286).

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[1] Research on irredentism and ethno-territorial movements in general broadly agrees on both the importance of this variable, and almost concomitantly, on the fact that it must determine ethnic actors' decision-making along the lines of cost-benefit calculations. See for instance Meadwell (1991); Hechter (1992); Van Evera (1994:17-20), or Saideman (1999).

4.1.3 Argument and method

This chapter will empirically test Horowitz's predictions for both the Felvidék and Transylvania in a cross-time comparison. It will demonstrate a mismatch or at best partial overlap, between theory and irredentist politics, thus disproving its suggested rationale of calculated risks and payoffs. It will go on to explain why questions of demographic-geographical feasibility are in fact not very relevant to retrieval – both generally, and in the Magyar case. Instead of evaluating external, physical conditions, mainland and minority consider territory primarily via two components. Firstly, a 'map image' of their homelands, which often stretches further than kindred settlements and thus automatically contains other groups. This is acceptable to irredentists because they prioritise national completeness over homogeneity. Secondly, it is the changing prominence of this ancestral territory within a group's ethnicity, rather than its physical conditions, which justifies or ends projects. Within these parameters finally, irredentism takes what is at that moment obtainable. Driven by ideology and opportunism rather than structural givens, irredentists seize on whatever brings them a step closer to their goal.

4.2 Ethno-territorial homogeneity within interwar and contemporary Hungary

As noted above (see sections 1.2.2 and 2.4.1), this particular variable needs stretching because of inherent conceptual differences. In contrast to Horowitz I hold a parent state *by definition* to be one in which an ethnic group is demographically and/or politically dominant. This being 'owned' by a titular group is what makes it a parent state. It also enables that state to conduct irredentism without *decisive* opposition from any domestic minorities, which may well be present, but subordinated. Because of this narrower conceptualisation, I evolve Horowitz's variable by linking political control to the *leverage* of potentially dissenting domestic groups rather than their mere presence. Equating political control with perfect homogeneity is simply too crude a measure and would simultaneously disqualify a good many successful

123

irredentist states. Also, domestic minorities are not in and by themselves a hindrance unless they are equipped with some sort of power. I hence refine Horowitz's variable by distinguishing between *genuine* and *qualified* homogeneity (section 1.2.2). This differentiates a titular group's *political freedom of action* versus domestic minorities. Parent states of qualified homogeneity contain what I term *important retaliating minorities* who are able to apply anti-irredentist leverage either politically, demographically and/or economically. Genuine homogeneity on the other hand describes parent states where the titular group exercises perfect control over national politics. Here minorities either lack leverage, or really just do not exist. The below examination of the Hungarian parent state will be conducted alongside these evolved criteria.

Should this first Horowitzian tenet hold, we would expect to find a demographic and / or political weakening in the titular group's dominance versus potentially objecting minorities[2] within the parent state. The stark contrast between Budapest's interwar irredentism and post-communist renouncement, ought to be causally mirrored by domestic changes in Hungary's ethnic and territorial composition. In short, our cross-time comparison would need to describe initially favourable conditions for retrieval, which contrast with contemporary hindrances. In line with our extension of Horowitz's variable, the following four indicators will be used to detect causal changes over time: shifts in the ratios of Hungary's ethnic demography, avenues of political opposition available to its minorities, and lastly, their power to use economic resources or geographical situation as anti-irredentist leverage. In examining these factors, I will show that that this variable does not square with realities. Hungary's ethno-territorial homogeneity, and therefore its internal freedom to act as irredentist parent state, has in fact remained unchanged and even partly improved.

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[2] It should be noted that there is no evidence of any opposition, active or latent, by domestic minorities to interwar Hungary's irredenta. Horowitz's projections are applied hypothetically.

4.2.1 Demographic control

Looking first at the parent state's ethnic demography, interwar conditions were certainly ideal. Magyar demographic dominance in post-Trianon Hungary was overwhelming. This is because the very partition that had caused the irredenta had simultaneously created an ethnically very homogenised rump state. Thus the titular nation accounted for some 92.1 per cent (Jakabffy 1994:43; Lőkkös 2000:372), while the minority population hovered around 7 per cent (ibid). Due to assimilation this small percentage kept decreasing further during the 1920s and 30s (Szarka 1996:4-5).[3] In addition, it was quite diverse in composition, consisting of seven recognised groups (Lőkkös 2000:372) - a fact that would have further hampered any collective action.

Non-irredentist, contemporary Hungary has retained these textbook parent state conditions. In fact, the country's minority population has further decreased. This is partly due to the wartime genocide of Hungary's Jewish and Romany communities.[4] In addition, the effects of post-war emigration (Bugajski 1994:401), minority assimilation (Szarka 1996:5-6), the expulsion of half a million ethnic Germans (Fejős 1996:3)[5], and a population exchange with

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[3] All Hungary-related data stems from the censi of the Central Statistical Office. Of the three Hungarian population counts in the interwar period - 1920, 1930 and 1941 - I use that of December 1930. This is because it recorded a by then stabilised national demography, i.e. after refugee flows had ebbed down and post-1920 border settlements like Sopron had been completed, but also because it was the last census before the first successful irredenta of 1938 (retrieval of the Felvidék). Post-communist Hungary has so far conducted two censi - 1990 and 2001, of which I am using the latter. Comparing 1930 and 2001 statistics entails however the problem of their differential data gathering. Before 1941, Hungarian statisticians recorded ethno-national belonging exclusively via the criterion of native tongue. Since then, self-declaration has been added as more accurate indicator. Figures between these two categories diverge radically, with the linguistic category always outnumbering self-professed identity. While aware of this discrepancy, data availability compels me to use these two different methods when comparing across time. As a related fact, pre-1945 censi discriminated Hungary's Jews as "racial" minority, supporting their anti-Semitic bias via the fact they also spoke Yiddish and/or German. Once we count their numbers from the 1930 census correctly, namely as part of the titular Hungarian nation, we arrive at an even lower minority percentage for interwar Hungary.

[4] Hungary's Jewish community suffered a murderous reduction from 825 000 to 250 000 during the war, and diminished by another 170 000 due to post-war emigration (Bugajski 1994:401; Fejős 1996:3). The 2001 census, now recording it as denominational group, lists a mere 12 871 individuals or 0.12 per cent (Central Statistical Office 2001b:2). The Hungarian Roma community in contrast has recovered. It has become Hungary's single largest minority at 1.86 per cent (Central Statistical Office 2001a:3), with a projected further growth to reach one tenth of the national population by 2035 (Kurdi 2001:3).

[5] The country's ethnic Germans, formerly its most significant and organised minority, suffered the same post-war expulsion as in Poland and Czechoslovakia (Szarka 1996:5). This reduced their share from 5.5 per cent in 1930 to 0.61 in 2001 (Central Statistical Office 2001a:3).

Czechoslovakia[6], caused Hungary's minority figures to drop to a mere 3.08 per cent by 2001 (Central Statistical Office 2001a:3). Furthermore, this very small percentage is today even more atomised than formerly, being now composed of 13 recognised minority groups (Central Statistical Office 2001a:1). And the Roma, as single largest community amongst them, are themselves in turn highly differentiated (Kurdi 2001:3-4). For all these reasons, any putative opposition to irredentism would be no obstacle.

4.2.2 Hungary's territorial homogeneity

Sheer numbers are however not the only bargaining chip for potentially dissenting groups: they may possess leverage by virtue of their geographical location or distribution. This was however not the case for interwar Hungary. Drawing on the 1930 census, Jakabffy (1994:43-44) expressly notes that "...the minority nationalities do not form a coherent bulk of population". Examining the country's four largest minorities - Germans (5.5 per cent), Slovaks (1.2 per cent), Croatians and Romanians (0.5 and 0.4 per cent) - he goes on to describe their largely "disjointed" distribution in what were furthermore majority Magyar populated regions (ibid.). Rónai's work, based on the same data, cartographically confirms the above for each group at the national level (1945:115-147) as well as highlighting the dispersal of non-Magyars by region (ibid.:105-113). This means that no single or combined minority population was settled compactly or homogeneously enough[7] to potentially threaten Budapest with a territorial withdrawal of allegiance, such as autonomy or even secession.

This fact still holds true in post-communist Hungary. Both the last census (Central Statistical Office 2001a:10) as well as recent research (Kurdi 2001)

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[6] The forced population exchange of 1947-49 between Hungary and Czechoslovakia reduced the Slovak minority from being the second largest at 1.2 per cent in 1930 (Jakabffy 1994:43), to a current percentage of 0.17 (Central Statistical Office 2001a:3).

[7] To some extent, ethnic Germans were an exception here. They clustered in three separate areas of Hungary: around Budapest, in the Great Hungarian Plain to the west, and around Pécs in the south-west. These areas were however small and still majority Magyar, with the minority's growth furthermore offset by both assimilatory and migratory changes (Szarka 1996:5-6).

show that today no single minority exceeds the 10 per cent mark within any region. Even counting a combined tally only yields a maximum of 7.11 per cent, this for the region of Northern Hungary (CSO:ibid.). Few groups are furthermore compactly settled. Most minorities are widely dispersed, and those that do cluster - Croatians, Germans, Romanians, Serbs - are exactly the smallest minorities. Given that minorities never reached critical mass and / or control at any point in time, it follows that territorial concentration also cannot figure as causal for Budapest's policy change on irredentism.

4.2.3 Economic pressure by retaliating minorities

So far I have compared fairly visible indicators, which proved invalid. There are however more subtle means of pressure potentially dissenting minorities can apply. The first of these regards economic power - i.e. leverage via ownership of capital, assets, and industries or via the provision of key services (e.g. dominance in banking, finance etc.).

With regards to the minorities of post-Trianon Hungary, it makes sense to examine in this respect the two largest single communities, since all others were simply negligible in size. The country's ethnic Germans were with nearly half a million individuals (5.5 per cent) by far the most significant group, followed by a Slovak population of 1.2 per cent. Szarka (1996: 6-8) analyses the evolving occupational structure of both minorities in the interwar period and concludes that "(...) in comparing census data of 1920 and 1930 we can observe [in both groups] the preservation of a mainly agrarian character, in the case of ethnic Slovaks even a strengthening." Let us remember here that Hungary's rural population, to which these minorities overwhelmingly belonged, suffered exceptionally low life standards, incomes and educational conditions. So great was the extent of rural underdevelopment and disadvantage, that land reform, or rather its numerous aborted attempts, remained the most salient domestic issue all through the Horthy era. Granted, "(...) within both the agricultural population and the industrial labour force those belonging to the two minorities had an above national ratio of self-employed, land- or factory owners" (ibid). However, at the same time their level

127

of employment was much lower than that of ethnic Magyars. Apart from the fact that there is no historical record of opposition to retrieval amongst these minorities, they would clearly not have had the economic means to enforce it.

In contemporary Hungary once again no single group stands out as endowed with significant material leverage. A brief look at the two largest communities - Roma and ethnic Germans (1.86 and 0.61 per cent respectively) illustrates this point well. Hungary's gypsy population is in fact notoriously *dis*advantaged in terms of socio-economic status as well as life chances. Despite governmental efforts, "...members of the Roma community continue[d] to suffer from widespread discrimination in education, employment, the criminal justice system and access to public services, health in particular" (EU Commission 2002:31). Contrastingly, Hungary's ethnic German community is doing well. Increasingly urbanised since 1945, it has departed from its traditional occupational background in industry and agriculture and acquired mainly intellectual, middle-class professions (Kurdi 2001:10-12). During post-communism it has experienced an additional boost in status, thanks to its mastery of German, an advantageous language (ibid.). Nevertheless, it is a very small group, and not endowed with any special material bargaining chip it could use in a hypothetical challenge versus Budapest.

4.2.4 Political leverage from domestic minorities

In terms of demography, territory and economics then, both time periods display no "important retaliating minorities" to speak of. Yet even otherwise insignificant groups may be able to apply anti-irredentist leverage through political institutions.

Once again there is no evidence of domestic minority opposition to Hungary's single-minded irredentist drive. In any case, the realities of the authoritarian Horthy-era (see also chapter 7) would have pre-empted political avenues. To start with, ethnically based parties did not exist. Neither the constitution nor electoral laws facilitated such representation, e.g. by adjusting the country's

128

PR system with lowered electoral thresholds, weighted voting, autonomies, or mutual vetoes. The reason lay with Budapest's continued, albeit more covert, assimilationist policies (Szarka 1996:4-7; Gratz 2001:198-99), which the country's political spectrum consensually supported (Tilkovszky 1998:51-54).

Then there were the conditions that prevented political challenges in general. Suffrage was severely restricted. Only in the capital and major cities were elections conducted in secrecy. The bi-cameral parliament was largely hostage to a conservative and nationalist unelected upper house. Executive dominance, together with a severe curtailing of parliament's powers, characterised interwar Magyar politics (see Földes and Hubai 1999:260-63). For all these reasons, direct political pressure - electoral retaliation, lobbying, parliamentary input etc. - was impossible for any hypothetical anti-irredentist minorities.

Given these institutional impediments, we need alternatively to look for potential extra-parliamentary channels they could have used. Once again it makes sense to focus on the only two demographically significant groups of the period - Germans and Slovaks. The latter can be disregarded here, since it was largely splintered and apolitical - indeed purposefully kept so by both local and government officials, by being organised merely in cultural associations (Tilkovszky 1998:47). Ethnic Germans in contrast were institutionally unified and vocal. Their Hungarian German Cultural Association, founded in 1924, was despite its name an organ of political interest representation. As *Volksdeutsche* they were well conscious of their leverage as "either bridge or dividing gap between Hungary and Germany" (Gratz 2001:196), the country Budapest desperately courted as irredentist ally. Yet instead of pushing against Budapest's revisionist plans, they effectively functioned as Nazi Germany's internal pressure group in *shaping* it (ibid.:199-203). They did so whilst simultaneously extracting domestic advantages for their own community. Funded and instructed by Berlin, the Association's role in the late 1930s was to ensure that Hungary's foreign policy in general and irredenta in particular,

complied with Nazi plans for the region (Ormos 1998:215).[8] Prime Minister Imrédy for instance was reproached in 1938 for failing to maximise the Felvidék's retrieval by having responded inadequately to the German minority's demands, which Berlin had orchestrated (Tilkovsky 1998:73). Thus the only political minority input inter-war Hungarian governments experienced was bullying by proxy on *how* to conduct retrieval, instead of blocking it.

What of the contemporary situation then? Within post-communist Hungary's democratic framework presumably even a small or disparate group of dissenters has the potential to affect national policy-making. Yet as of early 2004, the country has still no guaranteed parliamentary representation for its minorities. The Roma, today's single largest minority group, feel notoriously disenfranchised in national politics, not least due to their above-mentioned socio-economic disadvantage. Although the constitution codifies both the "representation of the national and ethnic minorities living within the territory of the country" and their right to "collective participation in public life" (Article 68, paragraphs 2 and 3), these measures operate so far only at the level of local / municipal autonomies set up in 1995. Hungary's Law on the Rights of National and Ethnic Minorities (Law 1993:LXXVII), celebrated as landmark, similarly obliges the government to resolve the question of minority representation. More than a decade later concrete results are however still outstanding, because successive bills suggesting specially lowered electoral thresholds fail to pass parliament. Thus "Hungary has a well-developed institutional framework protecting the interests of its minorities and promoting their cultural and educational autonomy" (EU Commission 2002:30). Yet it continues to lack electoral-institutional adjustments to enable parliamentary representation on an ethnic basis (OSCE-ODIHR 2002:6-7), and with it minority enfranchisement in national politics. Tilkovszky (1998:197-8), in a comparative analysis of Hungary's twentieth century policies on this issue, concludes that it is essentially due to a mixture of indifference, genuine incomprehension as well

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[8] This was not at all a selfless exercise. Ormos (ibid.) mentions that parts of the community expected to be rewarded by Berlin for their service by being put in charge of Hungary once the latter would have been occupied by German troops. Tilkovszky (1998:69-76) gives a detailed account of this triangulation between the German minority, Budapest and Berlin, relating how the aspirations of the former two were ultimately played off against each other by Nazi Germany.

as continued assimilationist attitudes within mainland Magyar society. The double imperatives of safeguarding ethnic pluralism and improving minorities' life chances have, within the panoply of post-communist problems, not been understood or accepted as priorities (ibid.). The bottom line remains therefore that policies in present-day Hungary, including the renouncement of retrieval, continue to be unaffected by the political input of domestic minorities.

4.2.5 Summary

In order to apply and test Horowitz's first tenet, this examination had to evolve and differentiate it. It therefore looked for variations within mainland homogeneity in several key aspects, rather than for its mere existence.

Neither criterion in which this section has examined Hungary's domestic minorities shows empirical changes that would explain the abandonment of retrieval. The mainland displays during both periods an ideal-typical scenario of titular group dominance, free to conduct ethnopolitics without retaliating domestic groups. Interwar Hungary was an example of perfect (as opposed to qualified) homogeneity. Its ethnic and territorial givens guaranteed unfettered internal freedom to pursue irredentism. No single minority group would have been capable to successfully challenge the mainland's irredenta. Even a hypothetical concerted effort by all domestic non-Magyars is more than likely to have faced resounding defeat. Small in size, diverse in composition, and devoid of significant alternative bargaining chips - legislative, economic or geographical - their opposition or consent simply was immaterial. Non-irredentist, contemporary Hungary has retained all the above ideal-typical conditions and continues to display complete titular group dominance. If anything, Budapest possess today an *even more perfect* degree of manoeuvre within domestic politics. All of this suggests that Horowitz's point, expanded here to cover all possible aspects, is simply not useful. If nothing else, this finding now increases the burden of proof on the second part of his variable.

4.3 Ethno-territorial homogeneity of the areas to be retrieved: Transylvania's and Felvidék's suitability for retrieval then versus now

The next task then is to examine the two irredentist areas individually[9] and compare their "suitability" for retrieval across time. Once again, if Horowitzian tenets are to explain the contemporary abandonment of Hungarian irredentism, one would expect a worsening in local conditions. Extrapolating from his model, this section will explore three key indicators. Firstly, how border-near were and are these Magyar populations within both host countries? Secondly, how compact or dispersed were Magyar settlements in Transylvania and Felvidék then, as opposed to now? Finally, how ethnically mixed were and are their settlements? It will become clear that such structural givens do not determine retrieval. The cross-time comparison of both Transylvanian and Felvidék realities pointedly underlines that "irredentism is hardly ever an automatic sequel to a situation of proximity and ethnic percentages" (Ben-Israel 1991:33).

4.3.1 The Magyar minority in the Felvidék: good feasibility improved

Given the contemporary absence of irredentism, today's situation ought to have worsened in most of these Horowitzian factors. Yet paradoxically, local criteria display an overall improved 'structural bias' for a hypothetical irredenta. As will become evident, the area's ethnic and territorial make-up has not only preserved those features advantageous to retrieval, but also largely shed those that caused (moderate) difficulties in the interwar period.

Border proximity

The human geography of Felvidék Magyars has remained unchanged in this first criterion. Their settlements were and continue to be, directly adjacent to Hungary's northern border, occupying a parallel strip of some 25-50 kilometres

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[9] Unless stated otherwise this section quotes throughout data from the territories retrieved by Hungary in 1938 (Felvidék /Southern Slovakia) and 1940, and *not* the respectively much larger areas they were part of and which Hungary had lost in 1920 (i.e. Slovakia as a whole with Ruthenia, and historic Transylvania, which included the Bánság / Banat and Partium).

width within Czechoslovakia's and now Slovakia's, south. This theoretically convenient situation for retrieval has remained precisely the same when comparing the interwar and post-communist periods (see maps 2.2 and 2.4-2.6). In other words, the Magyar community continues to concentrate "in South Slovakia along the 550-kilometer long Slovak–Hungarian state border, on an unbroken linguistic territory totalling 9,000 square kilometres." The single difference lies in its size, because "this is an area of about 2,000 square kilometres less than in 1918" (HTMH 2005a). While these givens perfectly rationalise the minority's retrieval in 1938 along Horowitzian tenets, they fail to explain why Magyars do not capitalise on the same feasibility today.

Group compactness and spatial spread

In view of such constant and ideal border closeness, it may be variation within the minority's concentration that has since made the difference.

In 1938, the year which saw the Felvidék's retrieval, a local Magyar writer proudly remarked that "the local Hungarian community is in terms of settlement in an advantageous position, for more than 90 per cent of our bulk lives in closed unity" (Varga in Borsódy 1938:36). Indeed, of all Hungarian minorities in the Carpathian basin their situation was the singularly most compact, making the First Vienna Award Budapest's only irredenta to largely mirror ethnic fault lines (see maps 2.2. and 2.3).

Closer scrutiny however reveals some problems within the Felvidék's seemingly ideal conditions. The minority's geographical compactness was namely undermined by interwar Czechoslovakia's text-book demographic engineering (McGarry 1998).[10] Its large-scale colonisation programme systematically undermined the very ethnic and territorial coherence of Magyar Felvidék areas that made them attractive for recovery. This ought to have deterred Hungarian plans for several reasons.

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[10] Czechoslovakia's President Thomas Masaryk opined: "we have to take account of the fact that not a single Hungarian will abandon his faith in the recovery and retrieval of Slovakia. It is exactly for this reason that Slovakisation must occur in a planned and incremental manner" (Popély 2001:80).

Firstly, it laterally disrupted the hitherto coherently Magyar strip of settlements along the border into three large disjointed areas (Arató 1977:65; Révay in Fazekas 1993:38-39). By 1930, the linking settlements around Balassagyarmat and south-east of Kassa respectively had disappeared.

Secondly, progressive Czechoslovak colonisation also blurred the ethnic border that divided Slovakia mid-way (Révay 1938 in Fazekas 1993:36-9; Kocsis and Hodosi-Kocsis 1998:61-2). It specifically targeted northern Felvidék towns (see below), which, as hitherto Hungarian strongholds, had demarcated the community.

Thirdly, by the late 1930s this process had furthermore transformed nearby ethnic Magyar settlements into outlying island areas (see maps 2.1 and 2.2). This so-called Northern Diaspora represented 6 per cent Felvidék kindred, i.e. around 70 000 people (ibid.:64; G. Kovács 1989). Their solitary and exposed situation in the midst of densely Slovak settled areas made them simply ineligible for border adjustment. At retrieval in 1938 Hungary indeed recovered 94 percent of the minority, i.e. 728 904 Magyars (Kocsis and Hodosi-Kocsis 1998:64), but had to leave these people behind. We know from contemporary sources that this was a painful compromise for both ethnic actors – which however failed to deter them. It was foreseeable that Tiso's newly independent Slovakia would retaliate against any hostage Magyar minority, as it indeed did (Szarka 1998:39-41). For Budapest's irredentist government - the self-anointed defender of transborder kin - this bore the risk of moral-political embarrassment. Furthermore, there was severe domestic criticism that accepting purely ethnic boundaries signed away the rights to Hungary's historic crownlands, territories regarded as Magyar homeland. For the Felvidék Hungarians in turn, leaving behind trapped members was dilemmatic. To openly accept it risked internal disunity, yet to reject it meant endangering the irredenta itself. Furthermore, it meant yet another traumatising partition, this time right within their midst (Duka Zólyomi 1942 in Fazekas 1993).

Finally, unless retrieval occurred by force (something Budapest was very reluctant about), there would be further tradeoffs. It was for instance clear that no rump Czechoslovak or new Slovak state would be prepared to cede the Slovak capital Bratislava / Pozsony. This meant an additional loss of 26 974

Magyars (Kocsis and Hodosi-Kocsis 1998:58), who were otherwise contiguous with the community's bulk. Other towns also promised to involve a hard and possibly fruitless haggle (see Szarka 1998:36). Especially the town of Nyitra with several ten thousand Hungarian inhabitants would be hard to secure, because it stretched as Magyar peninsula far into Slovak ethnic territory. All of these factors implied that Magyar decision-makers on both sides of the border had to accept in advance leaving behind further stranded Hungarians. In the event, under the 1938 First Vienna Award the hitherto contiguous Magyar communities of Bratislava / Pozsony and Nyitra indeed remained with Slovakia, causing the number of stranded kindred to double. So while interwar conditions for irredentism were overall good, feasibility was compromised and worsening without however affecting the bilateral will for retrieval.

The contemporary Magyar abandonment of irredentism stands in stark contrast to an advantageous, even improved, minority concentration. Like in interwar times, there is once again minimal dispersal (see maps 2.4-2.6). Today, "the overwhelming majority (92.2 per cent) of the Hungarian population lives ... on an unbroken linguistic territory" (HTMH 2005a; Lanstyák 2000:51 quotes 91.8 per cent for 1991). Admittedly, an interruption to their settlement strip (south-east of Kassa) has survived into contemporary times. Yet this may be less of a real obstacle than subject to Slovak census methodology: according to the Government Office for Transborder Hungarians (HTMH 2005a) this lateral gap in Magyar demography only shows up in statistics based on nationality, but not in those based on language use (HTMH 2005a).

While the contiguity of Magyar settlement areas has remained constant, they cover less territory today. Their spatial spread has decreased from around 11 000 km^2 in 1918 (HTMH 2005a) and 9913 km^2 in 1930 (Varga 1938 in Fazekas 1993:43) to merely 9 000 km^2 in 2003 (HTMH 2005a). Having molten down to a regional and demographic core since 1945, the transborder group is now more compact (Kocsis and Hodosi-Kocsis 1998:69-76). While worrying for the community's survival, this represents an advantageous development for a hypothetical irredenta in several respects.

Firstly, due to postwar expulsions, colonisation, and sustained assimilation, both the share and overall number of Magyars in Southern Slovakia's towns have drastically fallen. The nowadays predominantly rural and small-town dwelling character of the minority (Gyurgyík 1993:16; Kocsis and Hodosi-Kocsis 1998:69; Lanstyák 2000:52-3; HTMH 2005a) therefore largely pre-empts the former risk of losing kin in symbolic or contested urban settings. Thus for instance even the Magyars of Bratislava-Pozsony have decreased significantly, numbering today only 20 312 (Lanstyák 2000:52) and thus are today a smaller group to lose. Moreover, the few majority Slovak towns that do have significant Hungarian populations (e.g. Pozsony-Bratislava, Nyitra, Kassa, Nagykürtös) are without exception directly adjacent to the main Hungarian inhabited region (Lanstyák 2000:47).

Secondly, the reduction has also eliminated the dilemma of leaving behind enclaves. The Northern Diaspora has disappeared (Csáky 1996:6) - although there is a slow increase in other isolated smatterings since the 1970s (Gyurgyík 1994:19; Lanstyák 2000:52). Furthermore, even the few existing islands are not inherently problematic. The largest, east and south-east of Nyitra, are "gradually decreasing because of development in the vicinity of Nyitra, Slovak immigration, and linguistic assimilation (ibid.:75). Leaving behind these declining enclaves would presumably cause a lesser sense of loss than the interwar abandonment of fully functioning Magyar islands did.

Clearly, the compactness-argument also fails to account for variation in Magyar irredentist behaviour. While the latter has changed, the spread of Felvidék Hungarians has evolved from already good to optimal retrievability.

Reticent others, or transborder group homogeneity

The homogeneity of Felvidék Magyar areas, i.e. their share of hostile ethnic strangers, may be a more useful factor.

Under Horowitzian criteria, the interwar minority's inter-mixing with other groups was not favourable to reunion. This feature was furthermore rapidly worsening due to Prague's demographic engineering (see also above). Felvidék cities, traditionally Hungarian and crucially determining the region's national character, formed a particular target for these policies. Within merely

twenty years the urban Magyar population suffered dramatic reductions, like in Kassa (from 66.5 per cent to 14.3), Galánta (83.1 to 33.5 per cent) or Léva (the percentage declining from 88.9 to 38.9).[11] Rural areas in turn were seen to with blanket colonisation: "70 000 members of the Slovak League[12], civil servants and investors moved to the territory (...) between 1918 and 1921", while a further "69 colonies (...) were established in the Hungarian ethnic territory between 1919-1929" (Kocsis and Kocsis-Hodosi 1998:61-2). The effect was a drastic decrease in the number of homogeneous and majority Magyar settlements, which dropped by 115 and 43 respectively within the decade following Trianon (Révay 1938 in Fazekas 1993:34-37; Varga 1938 in Fazekas 1993:43). The resulting loss of 540 km^2 of Hungarian settled territory caused an alarmed minority writer to warn that "the ground is slipping from under our feet" (Varga 1938:ibid.). According to Horowitz's variable these developments ought to have deterred Hungary most. They meant that ethnic kin no longer formed a clearly distinct unit in terms of composition. Exactly where to draw a border without including Slovaks, which area to target for retrieval, became increasingly difficult to see.

The influx of settlers into Magyar settlements meant that retrieval would include potentially reticent Slovaks. Their nature should have mattered to a hypothetically calculative Budapest. For the most part these were colonists who literally owed their livelihoods to Prague's nationalising agenda, and at the clear expense of local Hungarians. Due to lacking and often skewed information (see below) Hungary was however not in a position to clearly ascertain just how large their share would be. Consecutive interwar censi described ever-increasing tallies of Slovaks and Czechs, surging from pre-independence (1910) percentages of 57.9 and 0.0 to 68.4 and 3.7 per cent respectively by 1930 (Kocsis and Hodosi-Kocsis 1998:56). Though propagandistically exaggerated, and summarising Slovakia as a whole (rather than specifically for the Felvidék region), these figures were not encouraging. Granted, some non-Magyars could be expected to leave at the prospect of

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[11] These figures respectively stem from the Hungarian census of 1910 and the Czechoslovak national census of 1930. All data is calculated for the present administrative territory of the mentioned territories / cities and can be found in Kocsis and Hodosi-Kocsis (1998:58-9). Lőkkös (2000:149-151;293-301;361) goes into even more detail, recording demographic changes county by county.

[12] The Slovenska Líga was a private, yet government-sponsored nationalist association which pursued its declared goal of the area's "re-Slovakisation" (see also section 7.3.1).

border revision, and indeed did (ibid.:64). Then again, given that the 1920 partition had transformed Hungary into an ethnically near-homogeneous state (see above), arguably the incorporation of *any* different group represented an undesired side effect in this logic.

As a result of assimilation and statistical manipulation, minority figures had furthermore decreased from a pre-war level of 30.2 per cent (1910) to a mere 17.6 per cent by 1930 (Kocsis and Kocsis-Hodosi 1998:56;61). Together with the rise in hostile settlers, a dwindling Felvidék community implied increasing ethnic diversity in the latter's settlement area, and the spectre of reincorporating reticent populations. Had the Hungarian parent state approached retrieval on the basis of Horowitz's stated criteria, it would have had to at least carefully assess this risk. Yet at the period Budapest was not really able to verify demographic figures for itself. Although its own information gathering about transborder kindred was prolific (Bárdi 1997a; Török 2001:60), it was mostly qualitative as well as repeatedly inaccurate (Hámori 2001: 573-5), and varied across minorities (Angyal 2000c:166-7). This in turn meant that Hungary had to ultimately rely on skewed host state censi.[13] In other words, mainland politicians faced unquantified risks in a crucial criterion, but chose to act notwithstanding. This either indicates that interwar decision-making focused on other factors, or that it was simply not calculative about questions of ethno-territorial homogeneity.

Eventual reincorporation in November 1938 under the First Vienna Award indeed brought 15.6 per cent of other nationalities in the reverted territory. These were mainly Slovaks, with between 11.9 (Jakabffy 1942:47) and 13.2 per cent (Kocsis and Hodosi-Kocsis 1998:64). Budapest knew well that this was a politically mobilised group which, as the willing subject of anti-Magyar policies, might not acquiesce to being reincorporated into Hungary. Instead of

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[13] Bárdi (1997a; 2004a:62-3) explains how the mainland considered it partly as 'technical' intelligence for the purpose of immediate assistance to transborder kindred but also as 'strategic' information which would support ethnically based (and thus internationally acceptable) irredentist demands. Information gathering included socio-economic data and the communities' internal political attitudes. Demographic statistics and their development however were difficult to gauge from abroad, not least due to initial bilateral refugee flows and subsequent demographic engineering in the host states. Indicative of this problem is the fact that both times soon after retrieval Hungary conducted censi in the Felvidék (15 December 1938, after six weeks) and Transylvania respectively (31 January 1941, four months later).

being deterred however, Hungary chose upon re-annexation to co-opt these individuals by extending citizenship (Kocsis and Hodosi-Kocsis 1998:64, footnote 72) and ensuring a favourable redistribution of lands.[14]

Today's situation contrasts with interwar diversity. Retaliatory expulsions and resettlements under the unlawful Beneš Decrees (1945-8), but also forced assimilation during communism[15], have downsized the remaining Felvidék Magyars into a remarkably homogeneous territorial-demographic core. The community is today 520 000 strong and makes up 9.7 per cent of Slovakia's population (Slovak census of 2001). As an unintended and historically ironic result, their current situation is less ethnically intermixed and therefore theoretically more retrievable, than in the interwar years. Post-communist statistics reveal that an impressive "77.2 per cent of Slovak Hungarians still live in numerical majority" within their settlement area. Indeed, "in this respect [they] rank first, ahead of all other transborder Magyar communities" (Lanstyák 2000:51). Hungarians make up at least 10 per cent in any of the 523 Felvidék settlements where their language is spoken. In 272 of these they form 80 per cent, and in another 150 they still have majority of over 50 per cent. Prior to the ethnically biased administrative redistricting of 1996, half of the ten southern Slovak districts were to 40 per cent or more Hungarian (HTMH 2005a;). In short, today's minority lives with a minimum of ethnic intermixing.

A potential problem in terms of diversity is the community's dwindling size. At present it is only slightly smaller than in the interwar era, having decreased by roughly 120 000 individuals to a tally of 608 221 (HTMH 2005a). Yet it is further shrinking. A considerable and growing part of this decrease it is due to inter-marriage (Gyurgyík 1994:17). While "at the beginning of the 1930s hardly 10 per cent of marriages were mixed (...), their share had reached 30 per cent by the beginning of the 1990s" (Lanstyák 2000:73). Unlike assimilation, this

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[14] Hámori (2001:610, footnote 248) points to the little-known, but here crucial, fact that governmental re-distribution of land after the 1938 reincorporation was in terms of nationality (but not class) pointedly even handed. It did not "reward" the retrieved Felvidék Magyars for their irredentist loyalty (see also Szarka 1998:39). In fact they were actually at a slight disadvantage, receiving 42.7 per cent of reassigned land in contrast to the 43.43 per cent handed out to local Slovaks.

[15] Policies to forcefully homogenise the region were pursued throughout communist rule and still enjoy continuity. For instance Husak's "normalisation" backlash after the 1968 Prague Spring was used to abrogate Magyar schooling and language rights, cultural organisations and hitherto tacitly tolerated cultural representation (Szarka 1998:58-60).

development causes ethnic intermixing and thus impacts directly on group homogeneity and with it retrievability. Then again this is a long-term concern, and mainly affects geographical fringe areas of the Magyar community rather than its main settlement bulk (ibid.).

A detailed look at this factor has shown its limited use. Changes in local conditions already *during* the interwar years as well as *between* the compared time periods both disproved predictions. By contrasting the developments of the 1920s and 30s with the contemporary Felvidék situation it has become clear that interwar Hungary pursued irredentism under moderately good but uncertain conditions, while conversely not acting on what is today a much improved 'structural bias' in this factor.

4.3.2 The Transylvanian Magyar minority: a 'structural bias' from bad to worse

The much larger Magyar community in Transylvania displayed pre-existing disadvantages, such as a historically multi-ethnic region and dispersed Magyar settlement patterns. Like its ethnic kindred in Southern Slovakia, it was also manipulated in terms demography and territory in order to pre-empt irredentism. Speaking in Horowitzian criteria, conditions were - and today continue to be - so unfavourable that the very occurrence of an irredenta in the first place is difficult to explain. So while the improved 'structural bias' in today's Felvidék renders paradoxical the *absence* of a contemporary irredenta, lasting adverse conditions in Transylvania conversely beg the question why the interwar campaign ever existed at all.

Border proximity
Interwar retrieval of Transylvanian Magyars faced a decisive problem: here the main part of the community was located far away from the Hungarian border. The retrieval of Transylvanian kindred would not be feasible with a simple boundary shift. Instead, it would have to establish either an untenably meandering boundary or leave behind trapped kindred. According to the

Romanian census of 1930, Transylvania's Hungarians only made up 26.7 per cent of the region's total population (Kocsis and Hodosi-Kocsis 1998:113). The sizeable community that this nevertheless was - totalling at 1 353 288 - settled however mainly away from the mainland. In fact, less than half of all Magyars in Romania (i.e. 608 603 individuals in 1930) lived in the seven counties that were directly adjacent to or near, the border (ibid.:116).[16] The community's majority stretched eastwards in a large crescent into central Transylvania and the Szeklerland. Their distribution thus lay well beyond comfortable reach and defied the construction of defendable boundaries (see map 3.1).

If anything, this awkward situation has since worsened. To start with, the overall percentage of Magyars in Transylvania has shrunk further, standing at only 19.3 per cent in 1992 (Kocsis and Hodosi-Kocsis 1998:113; Hungarians in Romania as a whole make up 6.7 per cent of the population). Critically, it is exactly the border near settlements that are hard hit by this decrease. This is furthermore an ongoing trend: the percentage of Magyars settling near the border has further diminished not only in comparison to the interwar years, but even during the last, post-communist decade (compare maps 3.3 to 3.6). Thus, the same seven Transylvanian counties quoted above accounted in 1992 for only 35.19 per cent of the transborder community (or 571 901 out of 1624 959). Ten years on the figure has dropped to just under a quarter, i.e. to 24.84 per cent, or 355 799 out of the total, further reduced population of 1 431 807 (Romanian National Office of Statistics 1992; 2002).[17] The community's bulk continues to live in central and eastern Transylvanian counties, with the heaviest concentrations (i.e. 45.2 per cent as of 1992) in the remote Szeklerland of eastern Transylvania (Kocsis and Hodosi-Kocsis 1998:127).

Looking at this first indicator, a worsening in the 'structural bias' has indeed taken place over time. Then again, given the discouraging scenario already back in the 1930s, it is hard to see how the irredentist enterprise 'made sense'

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[16] These counties are not part of historic Transylvania proper, but the Romanian-annexed territories of the Hungarian kingdom that were subsequently referred to and seen as, part of "Erdély" / "Transylvania" together with the actual historic regions further East. They are the counties of the historic Partium area (Máramaros, Szatmár, Szilágy, Bihar, Arad) and of the Bánság / Banat region (Temes and Krassó-Szörény).
[17] The Hungarian Government Office for Transborder Magyars (HTMH 2005b) quotes a somewhat higher figure of 28 per cent.

in the first place. So far then, this indicates either that border proximity does not figure prominently in calculations, or indeed that retrieval is not chiefly guided by feasibility.

Group compactness and spatial spread

The difficulty of reincorporating a minority that stretched so far inland into the host state was aggravated by the fact that its settlements did not cohere. Magyars were dispersed into roughly four areas which, like in the Felvidék, were increasingly separated from each other in the course of deliberate interwar settlement policies. Border-near towns as well as -counties were particularly targeted. So were strategic connecting areas in counties Arad, Bihar and Szatmár, in order to disjoint Hungarian settlement stretches (Varga 1994:29-32; compare maps 1.2 and 3.1). This erosion was to some extent balanced by the fact that Magyars clustered in four large islands: in the Szeklerland (i.e. the eastern counties of Maros, Kovászna and Hargita), in the north western county of Szilágy, along the border, and in the Kalotaszeg region west of Kolozsvár. Still, in between there were vast areas of scattered enclaves, especially in central Transylvania (counties Kolozs, Fehér and Beszterce-Naszód) and in the south, the so-called Banat region (counties Temes and Krassó-Szörény). Together, these made up almost a third of the community in 1930 (439 012 out of 1 480 721, or 29.64 per cent) (Kocsis and Hodosi-Kocsis 1998:116). It was thus clear from the outset that the transborder community would have to be split in case of retrieval, and this is indeed what happened in 1940: 450 000 Hungarians, a whole third of the minority, remained in Southern Transylvania with Romania.

Erdély's division into a retrieved North and "trapped" South was neither a desirable nor rational compromise for Magyar irredentists – to the contrary. The repercussions for remaining kindred would be predictably worse than in Slovakia. Unlike Tiso's puppet state, controlled by Berlin and ironically owing its very existence to German and Hungarian irredentas, the Romania of Antonescu's Iron Guards had no reason for self-restraint. And indeed, retaliation against remaining Hungarians was harsh (Diószegi and Süle 1990:45 ff.). Given the numbers and severity, and not least Transylvania's

142

identity as integral region, partition could be expected to present a grave setback to Teleki's government. Budapest was well aware of these dangers yet still pushed for and then accepted, the Second Vienna Award.

For Transylvania's Hungarians in turn, any dismemberment of their historic region and community was deeply divisive and hence remained anathema, even more than among their Felvidék brethren (see above). This was due to the community's historic character and more cohesive sense of self, one not created by Trianon's arbitrariness. And still, there was solid and tacit support for irredentism (Bárdi 1997:43-35; Zeidler 2001:199-200). Transylvanian Magyars thus conceived of retrieval rather loosely, as some sort of all-embracing rescue by the mainland, very much in the sense of a miraculous, biblical, redemption (ibid.). In short, despite the predictable and agonising sacrifice involved, the majority of local Hungarians held out for the mainland to intervene.[18]

Today, the Transylvanian minority's unfavourable distribution differs little from that of interwar times. In terms of irredentist feasibility the picture has remained bleak, even counting the few changes that have occurred since. The group's spatial spread has at least kept within the territory. Despite the Ceausescu era's demographic engineering, Transylvania still contains 98.8 per cent of all Romanian Hungarians (Varga 2002:7-8). In other words, while ethnic Romanian migration has flooded into the region, the minority itself has not been dislocated beyond it into the host country. Hungarians continue to live in the same four main areas within Transylvania, covering about 103 000 square kilometres of settlement territory (HTMH 2005b). They still pose the problem of a geographically disjointed community which would be very difficult retrieve. For one, more than a third of the minority (37 per cent) continue to live compactly in the Szeklerland, the remote and cut off Magyar enclave in Transylvania's east. Their proportion has actually increased from the interwar figure and continues to rise even during post-communism: 538 681 (1930) versus 668 462 (2002) (Kocsis and Hodosi-Kocsis 1998:116; Romanian National Office of Statistics 2002). The single largest and most concentrated part of the minority is thus simultaneously also the most unreachable (compare

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[18] See for instance Pomogáts (2001:188-189) for contemporary reactions to Transylvania's partition. Although decrying the kin left behind even liberal intellectuals welcomed retrieval.

maps 3.3-3.6). Secondly, unlike in the Felvidék, shrinking minority numbers have not significantly 'tidied' geographical concentrations. Only the strategically awkward enclaves in central and southern Transylvania have decreased considerably. Especially islands in the south have almost disappeared, dropping from nearly 10 per cent of the interwar community to a mere 4.4 per cent in 1992 (Kocsis and Hodosi-Kocsis 1998:116, 127). Furthermore, another 35 to 37 per cent (HTMH 2005b) of the minority still cluster in the same, largely disjointed patches following the Romanian-Hungarian border, with especially big gaps between the large communities of Bihar, Arad and Temes counties. Finally, a further 16-18 per cent of Magyar areas stretch into central Transylvania, where once again we see non-contiguous settlements in Beszterce-Naszód, Fehér and Hunyad counties. Overall then, geographical dispersal still prevents a redrawing of feasible boundaries, which in turn does not explain why group behaviour has changed.

Reticent others, or transborder group homogeneity

The interwar community's dispersal meant that the territories harboured considerable swathes inhabited by ethnic Romanians (see map 3.1.). From the outset it was hence clear that any irredenta had to reckon with retrieving these, as well as other local groups. In a Horowitzian vein, this in itself should have acted as a powerful brake on the irredentist drive of Hungarian elites - which it did not.

Transylvania was historically an ethnically mixed region, something that parent state leaders were fully aware of when planning (see section 4.4, below). Even the frequently invoked pre-partition percentages[19] showed that only one county was to more than 90 per cent ethnically homogeneous (Udvarhely county with 95 per cent Magyar inhabitants, subsequently re-districted by Bucharest). In terms of administrative regions with 75 to 90 per cent homogeneity, Transylvania mustered four Romanian and two Hungarian ones respectively. The rest were ethnically diverse, although communities tended to

[19] Figures here stem from the last census before partition, conducted in 1910, and often taken as comparative point of reference in interwar times when making sense of biased host state data.

mingle only to a limited extent, following in some parts an urban (Hungarian) versus rural (mostly Romanian) divide (Diószegi and Süle 1990:18).

By the 1930s, figures were even more daunting: of the five and a half million Transylvanians, 58.3 per cent (3 234 157) declared themselves as Romanians and merely 26.7 per cent (1 480 721 individuals) were Magyars (Kocsis and Hodosi-Kocsis 1998:113). This ratio, although exaggerated by skewed statistics, furthermore resulted from an ongoing and worsening trend. Bucharest's demographic engineering had re-settled around 400 000 Romanians into the region (Diószegi and Süle 1990:17). As a result, both urban and, to a lesser extent, rural Magyar areas were modified in their ethnic make-up. Of the formerly twenty eight major Transylvanian cities which were to 50 per cent or more Hungarian, only nineteen had remained by 1930. The town-dwelling thirty per cent of Magyars was furthermore surrounded by majority Romanian counties (ibid.:18). Thus cut off from the larger community backdrop, their forced assimilation accelerated, and with it the Romanian domination of cities. Urban Magyar life, which had hitherto crucially defined the region's national character, was thus irrefutably diluted. The majority nation's rural takeover, mainly facilitated by an ethnically targeted land reform, complemented this change in ethnic balance. This was especially true in Southern Transylvania (resettling for instance abandoned Saxon villages) and in western border counties Szatmár and Bihar (Varga 1994:29-31; Kocsis and Hodosi-Kocsis 1998:115). In sum, by 1930 – a decade before retrieval - the proportion of Magyars in what would become annexed Northern Transylvania had already dropped from a 1910 figure of 51.4 per cent to merely 38 per cent (ibid.:116; compare also maps 1.2 and 3.1).

Like with the Felvidék, parent state irredentist planning did consider ethnically foreign populations (see section 4.4, below). It was clear that the Romanian settlers would have meant and then did mean, a large trapped minority. Since their livelihoods were directly linked to the Romanian nationalising project, they could be expected to be particularly hostile. In addition, they came mostly from the Regat (i.e. core Romania beyond the Carpathians), and were thus unfamiliar with Hungarian and less educated than their Transylvanian kindred.

The final outcome did not reflect any such concerns. Northern Transylvania, ceded to Hungary in 1940, represented just under half of the region (see map 3.2). It contained a total population of some 2.2 million of whom only 51.4 per cent (1 123 216) were Hungarians and, incredibly, 42.1 per cent (or 920 206) Romanians.[20] Conversely, a good third of the minority (around 400 000 Magyars) was left behind in Southern Transylvania with Romania. The fact that Budapest actually ended up retrieving almost even numbers of kin and ethnic strangers does not convince of this as carefully weighted irredentist factor.

Today, "the ethnic picture of Transylvania has become simpler and less diverse at the expense of the national minorities and in favour of the Romanians" (Kocsis and Hodosi-Kocsis 1998:125).[21] To some extent this means simplified conditions for any hypothetical retrieval. Though geographically disjointed, about three quarters of contemporary Magyar areas are characterised by moderate or even minimal intermixing (Varga 1994:38-45, see also maps 3.3 and 3.6). So while Transylvania overall has become even more ethnically Romanian since the interwar period, surviving Hungarian areas within it have preserved or slightly increased their homogeneity. As of 1992, 28 per cent of the minority lived in localities that were to 90 per cent or more Magyar (Kocsis and Hodosi-Kocsis 1998:127). These settlements concentrate in eastern Transylvania, the Székely / Szekler area. In the majority Hungarian counties (particularly Hargita and Kovászna) the Romanian population does not surpass 12 to 15 per cent, in and around the town of Székelyudvarhely it is even around 2 per cent (HTMH 2005b). Another 56.9 per cent of Magyars inhabit settlements where they form the absolute majority (ibid.:127), in what are however ethnically mixed counties. These lie in central Transylvania (counties Kolozs, Maros and Szeben) and its north-western, border-near parts (Szatmár, Szilágy and Bihar counties). Really extensive ethnic intermixing only

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[20] The considerable contrast to population data from only a decade before (see paragraph above) was due to several reasons. Firstly, the Romanian national census of 1930 was skewed, re-categorising Jews, Gypsies and others who professed a Hungarian identity, thereby artificially shrinking minority numbers. Secondly there were large exchange flows of refugees upon partition in 1940 which altered figures (see Jakabffy 1942;Zeidler 2001:217-18).
[21] Even this statement needs to be modified somewhat in the light of the since published 2002 census. Whilst in the 1992 census 5.7 million Transylvanians declared themselves Romanians, it was now only 5 393 552 individuals who did so. While this still does not counterbalance the dramatic drop of Magyars by 193 152 persons within the same decade, it has somewhat limited the discrepancy between ratios.

applies to less than a fifth of the community (or 18 to 20 per cent according to HTMH 2005b), which lives mainly in the south (counties Krassó-Szörény, Temes, Arad, Hunyad).

The 19 majority Magyar towns of 1930 have reduced to 14 in the post-communist era, nine of which are situated in the remote Szeklerland. Inter-ethnic ratios have been further distorted by Magyar emigration and demographic engineering during Romania's nationalist communism, which increased Transylvania's ethnic Romanians by an additional 1 million (Hodosi-Kocsis 1998:120-4; Varga 1994:38-49). Hence "former Hungarian cultural centres ... have become populated by a majority of Romanians by now, while in Marosvásárhely, which was almost purely Hungarian, half of the population are Romanians" (HTMH 2005b). This demographic trend continues today, with urban centres losing Magyar populations to either emigration or, curiously, to the surrounding countryside (Varga 2002:8-9). The shrinkage of especially town dwelling Magyars (dipping by a further 1.9 per cent even between the two censi of 1992 and 2002; ibid.) may mean in the long term an increase in ethnic intermixing. Overall however, while this community is sadly shrinking (by nearly 190 600 even over the last decade), it does so in a to retrieval advantageous way by melting into an ever more homogeneous core. In this respect at least, irredentism today would actually find a mildly more feasible set of structural circumstances.

4.3.3 Summary

A strange picture emerges. Evidence in Horowitz's key criteria on the ground does not match up with the political choices of our two actors - the Hungarian parent state and its respective transborder communities. In fact, prediction and historical reality are most often diametrically opposed.

Although the interwar Felvidék's set up was favourable enough to explain retrieval, it was compromised by worsening demographic conditions. Throughout the 1920s and '30s, but especially by the time Hungary was about

to reincorporate the area, systematic "Czechoslovakisation" had partly undermined Horowitzian criteria for recovery. Prague's colonisation policy achieved its three foremost goals: the dilution of homogeneously Hungarian inhabited areas (especially along the neat ethnic border internally dividing Slovakia), laterally disjointing the hitherto cohesive Magyar strip, and downsizing its percentages both statistically and in real terms. Contrary to what happened, these changes should have been discouraging according to theory: all of them complicated the irredentist project, all of them took increasing effect as the period progressed. They also meant that successive parent state governments were dealing for nearly two decades with unknown quantities of risk - a circumstance likely to dissuade any rational actor.

Comparison with today in turn actually demonstrates an improved feasibility for retrieving Slovakia's Magyars. Border proximity is unchanged and ideal. The minority's demography and dispersal have both decreased and thereby consolidated advantageously. Former outlier settlements have ceased to exist, urban Magyar populations outside of the minority's bulk have decreased. Much more than in the interwar period, the risk of abandoning trapped kin and having to accept internal partition is thus minimised. Finally, ethnic intermixing within the minority-inhabited zone is nowadays lower, both on the regional and communal levels. In contrast to the 1920s and 30s, with their massive and uncharted influx of settlers, the demographic balance between minority and majority has furthermore stabilised and would today pose a calculable problem for retrieval.

In the Transylvanian case Horowitz's assertions only partly coincide with evidence on the ground. While they potentially account for Hungary's non-irredentism today, they do not explain why the interwar irredenta was regarded as feasible in the first place. Already at the time of Trianon's signing, the criteria of border-proximity, compactness, and homogeneity were so unfavourable that they simply fail to rationalise any irredenta. Most Magyars lived far away from the Hungarian border, many settlement areas were unconnected and some localities – especially towns – showed increasing inter-mixing. Not only were conditions impossible from the outset, but in addition

and like in the Felvidék's case above, they partly worsened due to interwar Romania's manipulation of Transylvanian Hungarian demography. Given the fact that these measures were progressively implemented over the course of the 1920s and '30s, mainland and minority determination should have waned in the same manner as these policies were unfolding their increasingly hindering effects.

As for today, the Transylvanian community's situation in terms of proximity and spatial spread has admittedly become even more adverse over the past half century. The minority's spatial distribution has slightly worsened in that an ever greater part of its bulk lives in the remote east, far away from the border. Also, minority areas are even more disconnected due to post-war Romanian settlement policies, thereby cumulatively adding to interwar demographic engineering. Arguments about a worsening bias (which would account for irredentist inconsistency) thus do apply in these criteria. On the other hand, the community's homogeneity, while far from optimal, has actually slightly improved. This once again does not square with predictions.

Comparative historical evidence has demonstrated that a differential benefit rationale cannot explain the fluctuating Hungarian irredenta. Secondly, evidence here is all the more compelling against Horowitz because it is cumulative. Viewed together with the parent state factors above, they contradict his projections throughout. Given that feasibility on the ground and potential disadvantages hardly mirror group behaviour, one consequently has to ask whether they are at all important to irredentists and if so, on what alternative premise.

4.4. Magyar nationalism: did or do Hungarians care at all?

The results of this analysis are so far rather counter-intuitive - irredentist inconsistency does not seem explicable via change in what one would assume to be vital physical conditions. The problem, at its very basic, is once again the underlying assumption of irredentists' cost-benefit calculations (which indeed

149

would respect external realities), rather than their ideology (where feasibility and homogeneity matter little). At the beginning of this chapter the two had seemed potentially reconcilable, exactly because endogenous factors would have compromised irredentist ideals. However, once we examine these ideals two things emerge instead: one, irredentism strives for congruence of nation and state not just in terms of population, but also ancestral territory. Because these homelands often contain mixed populations, the idea of homogeneity as factor, however commonsensical, was wrong: irredentism seeks not so much an exclusive nation-state (i.e. devoid of ethnic strangers) as a *complete* one. Secondly, because territory is an primary ethnic marker which vitally determines the extent and ambitions of retrieval, changes in its prominence as part of a group's identity are crucially responsible for the inconsistency of irredentism. It is in this point that the Hungarian case has seen considerable change.

4.4.1 Map image of Magyar territories and implications for Horowitz' variable

Irredentism has a dual concern with ethnic kindred as well as the group's ancestral grounds[22] (see e.g. Neuberger 1991:97-8). Evidently the two are not always perfectly congruent, which in turn conflicts with Horowitz's ideas about ethno-territorial homogeneity. Chapter 1 (section 1.2.2) has described how ethnic homelands exist as 'map image' in the collective identity of a group, meaning that they are often not objectively verifiable in their extent. They can stretch beyond the transborder minority's present-day settlement areas and will be consequently claimed irrespective of ethnically different inhabitants. This is not least true for the Hungarian case. Traditional Magyar homeland perceptions have always stretched beyond kindred settlement lines (Haynes 1995:89; Zeidler 2001:25). They encompass the Crownlands of St. Stephen,

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[22] Chapter 1 (section 1.4.1) noted that, with regards to territory irredentism also involves some secondary concerns. Since it translates into antagonistic parent-host state relations, retrieval often involves geo-strategic considerations. These in turn may conflict with homogeneity – the region of Jammu-Kashmir is a case in point. Not least, irredentism is frequently instrumentalised within expansionist / imperialist policies, an aspect which also partly fits this case study.

150

millennial territories of the 896 A.D. state foundation framed by the 'natural' boundary of the Carpathian mountains. Though much de-prioritised, this view still holds true today (Csepeli 1997:194-198). Historic Transylvania for example describes a vast area that always had been and still is, only partially peopled with ethnic Hungarians yet continues to be regarded as ancestral heartland. Similarly, it is the Felvidék as a whole, i.e. including its Slovak-populated stretches, which counts as indispensable communal territory to both local and mainland Magyars. This entails two important consequences.

4.4.2 First implication: completeness over homogeneity

The first implication is that retrieval is mainly preoccupied with uniting the ideal or opportunistically available, maximum of kin and homelands within a state. Keeping ethnically different populations out during this process is a secondary concern here which occurs, if at all, as afterthought.[23] As type of nationalism (pursuit of nation-statehood) irredentism does not prioritise the creation of an exclusive state unit, i.e. one which contains *only* one group. Rather, the important thing is that this state contain *all* members of the group – and that the particular group be in control (demographically and / or politically) if there are minorities. This does not conflict with the exclusive ethnicity typical of irredentist groups (see section 6.1.2): it serves to cement solidarity *within* the group, rather than hostility against others. So as long as the state is 'owned' (i.e. dominated and defined) by this titular group, minorities are accepted and are not seen to detract from the perfection that irredentism tries to (re-)create. Here is the basic misconception of Horowitz's variable and the reason for its explanatory weakness above. It assumes for uniform priorities (here: homogeneity) across all nationalist projects, secessionist and irredentist, whereas they spring from different grievances (creation of a titular state versus remedying its demographic and territorial truncation). The fundamental rationale of irredentism is about national *completeness* (rather than necessarily

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[23] Population expulsions, forced transfers and even genocidal campaigns in order to homogenise coveted regions are not the norm for irredentas. If and when they occur these measures are taken during (e.g. Serbian Krajina) or, rarer even, after successful retrieval (e.g. the 1923 Greco-Turkish population exchange following the incorporation of Thrace), but do not compromise irredentism in advance.

exclusivity), the achievement of nation-state congruence (the coincidence of communal homelands and kin with state borders) via their 'redemption' from foreign ethnic rule (self-determination) (see section 1.5.1).

Indeed in some cases and notably here, minorities are purposely factored in because they suit the particular historical trajectory of the irredentist group's nationalism. For instance, the imperial and civilising mission-element which characterised Magyar nationalism in the late nineteenth century described Hungary as ethnically diverse, but Hungarian-led and -defined nation state. Other groups were seen as naturally subject to Magyarisation – assimilation into the dominant, "superior" culture. Though subsequently superseded by a more exclusive conception of Hungarians identity, this view continued in the interwar period. In this way nation-stateness is not diminished or endangered as long as there is a clear and non-negotiable hierarchy in domestic group relations - the very opposite of a shared, consociational state. This applies even if a parent state is already (near) perfectly homogeneous and risks diversity by retrieving mixed areas. Post-Trianon Hungary is just one amongst many example here.[24] In short, it's about reuniting all members and territories in one state and 'owning' it. Others are tolerated, even deliberately factored in, as long as these conditions hold.

A look at interwar political thought - both governmental and public – illustrates this perfectly. Hungary's ethnic nationalism never meant exclusion of, but *superiority over*, ethnic strangers. The state concept of Saint Stephen (*Szentistváni állameszme,* see also chapter 6) dominated political thinking for the entire interwar period (Romsics 1998:18-20; Gratz 2001:193-196). Broadly speaking, instead of classic nation-stateness it envisages a multi-ethnic, but titular Magyar state in which Hungarians dominate.[25] Not only does it reconcile

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[24] Other cases include post-Soviet Armenia versus Karabach and its Azeri-populated 'corridor', the Irish Republic's designs on the Northern Ireland despite local Unionists, twentieth century Greece versus Asia Minor and Cyprus which both included large Turkish populations, etc.

[25] There are considerable variations on this theme. At its least liberal, the concept drew heavily on the Christian roots of Hungary's foundation and the corollary sacrosanctness of its borders. Especially in its late nineteenth century interpretation, it did not envisage inter-ethnic egalitarianism within Hungary but conceived of a Magyar civilising mission (domestic and regional), based on notions of cultural supremacy. Interwar politicians, endorsed this version, especially aristocrats like Counts Bethlen, Andrássy, Klebelsberg and Teleki. In a more modern interpretation, first pioneered by Jászi in 1929 and then Hevesy in 1931, it

with the notion and reality of domestic ethnic pluralism, but it includes the latter by design. Ample evidence documents that interwar Hungarian governments were not only unfazed by the potential of retrieving ethnically mixed territories, but that this was purposeful. In fact, Romsics (1998:62;117), Szarka (1998:25) and Zeidler (2001:145-6) all describe that the patrician elite even hoped to win back the Hungarian kingdom's former subject nationalities, confident that surely they must have meanwhile recognised the unviability of their independent statehoods![26] In short, Hungarian political thought was historically adjusted to contain ethnic strangers within state boundaries - albeit never on an egalitarian footing.

Contemporary political thought in Hungary and resulting foreign policies strongly contrast with these points. Although the St. Stephen notion persists today (Haynes 1995:95;98 vs. Schöpflin in Borsódy 1988:128), it does so in a modified, more liberal vein. It has been reinterpreted as exemplary path for the return to Europe, or as former foreign minister Jeszensky put it, one that made Hungarians "fall in line with the most advanced ideas then prevailing in the West" (ibid.: 95). As foreign policy principle, the St. Stephen concept now encompasses ideas about regional co-operation rather than aspirations of Magyar imperial domination. In domestic terms, it correspondingly envisages Hungary as culturally defined, homogeneous nation-state. Ironically, this in turn means that today the ethnic inter-mixing of transborder territories *would* actually matter. In a Horowitzian logic, Budapest should therefore take advantage of the now partly improved retrieval conditions among its

encompasses notions of communal co-operation and mutual accommodation under the auspices of a regional shared fate. Today, the St. Stephen notion is understood as historical antecedent of peaceful ethnic pluralism within the Carpathian Basin, as original solution that is reaffirmed in Hungary's trajectory towards Euro-Atlantic integration.

[26] In contrast, the mainland's right wing resented pre-war Hungary's former nationalities as 'traitors' and suspected remaining non-Magyars of further disloyalty (Tilkovszky 1998:51). Yet, and this is noteworthy, such attitudes did not result in scrutiny to avoid retrieving ethnic strangers within desired territories. Rather, concern centred on how these should be dealt with upon reincorporation. Even the Arrow Cross party, for all its talk about racial purity, did not show any effort to avoid non-Magyars in its generally little-known plans (Ungváry in Romsics 1998:117-131). Party chief Szállasi's 1935 publication adhered to the Crownlands concept, merging notions of ethnic and wider imperial retrieval into one project about the "united ancestral Magyar lands" (ibid.:120). The larger conservative mainstream upheld throughout the interwar years the patrician Saint Stephen notion. Since interwar Hungarian cabinets recruited themselves exclusively from these two camps (see chapter 7), policy formulation for the two irredentas was certainly not cautioned by the prospect of trapped ethnic strangers.

transborder kindred (greater concentration and thus homogeneity). The reason why it does not ties in with the next point.

4.4.3 Second implication: what matters are not the physical changes within a territory but rather territory's changed importance within ethnicity

The second consequence of the 'map image' namely affects *the way* in which territory is a decisive variable. We have established that structural changes – the proximity, distribution and density of kindred – miss the point because of a group's extended perception of homelands and the resulting need for completeness rather than unfettered homogeneity. Crucial instead is how important these homelands are within the very identity that irredentism politicises. Because territory is a primary ethnic marker which vitally determines the scope and ambitions of retrieval, any changes in its *prominence* as part of a group's identity vitally affect the irredentist project. As long as the 'map image' of the homeland is integral to a group's ethnic kinship, irredentism is the commonsensical answer. Chapter 6 will demonstrate that when this nexus is broken - when ethno-national identity comes to de-prioritise territory in favour of cultural and / or civic aspects - we have a causal contribution to irredentist inconsistency.

How did this translate into irredentist planning about territory? Exactly *because* Hungarian national identity was inextricably linked to identification with a historic state entity (e.g. L. Nagy 1987:14-15) and regional superiority, interwar irredentism tacitly or explicitly included the wider goal of its *integral* restoration (Romsics 1998; Ormos 1998:186 ff.; Gergely and Pritz 2000:85; Zeidler 2001:125-157). This is why Budapest remained pointedly ambiguous about the extent of its territorial demands (Romsics 1998; Gergely and Pritz 2000:85-6; Zeidler 2001:125-158). It feared both to jeopardise the chance of retrieving larger parts of the Magyar homeland, and to incur popular wrath by being seen to renounce the Crownlands notion (ibid.). Bethlen emphasised this nexus between irredentist mandate and territorialised identity in March 1928: "...We

154

cannot accept this as just, and the Hungarian nation *would crucify any politician who were to sign a second Trianon*" (Kovács 1994:89-90, emphasis mine). The mainland government thus only ever endorsed ethnic boundaries indirectly, by having the semi-official Hungarian Revisionist League do so in April 1929 (Kovács 1994:85).[27] At the same time Budapest retained a 'dual optic' of 'optimal' (read: integral) and 'minimal' (ethnically based) demands, pragmatically leaving a wide range of scenarios of which it hoped to achieve the best.

The fact that Hungary ended up post retrieval in 1941 with a mere 0.8 per cent increase in non-Magyars[28] hardly confirms Horowitz, simply because this was not a planned outcome For one, precise policy lines on this issue varied with each interwar government (see below), and this was due to well-calibrated opportunism (Ormos 1998:210). Second, Hungary depended so heavily on Nazi Germany's patronage that the final irredentist acquisitions were significantly shaped by Berlin's interests (Ormos 1998:194 and 223; Zeidler 2001:126; see also chapter 5). Balogh (1988:60) reminds in this context: "Transylvania had such a mixed population that any ethnic claim, on either side, was dubious at best. (...) The ethnic composition of these territories, although important as far as world opinion at the time went, *was not the determining factor in their final fate* [emphasis mine]."

Of the three concrete irredentist plans presented or intimated by Budapest[29] none were concerned with feasibility or avoiding non-Magyar populations.

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[27] Kovács (1994:74-88) details how the Hungarian government's deliberate policy of vagueness came under severe pressure in the course of 1929. Lord Rothermere's campaign about purely ethnic boundaries, domestic reactions to it, and also the end of Hungary's decade-long international isolation, all forced Budapest to take a stance, for which the Revisionist League served as smokescreen.

[28] After completing the two irredentas (and reincorporating Ruthenia) the country was in 1941 to 92.9 per cent ethnic Magyar against 92.1 in 1930 (Lőkkös 2000:372).

[29] Even after the 1927 launch of Hungary's "active foreign policy", the Foreign Ministry was instructed to refrain from detailing demands, to the effect of leaving its diplomatic staff in a permanent limbo of embarrassing contradictions, denials and retractions. Concrete maps were mainly circulated by academics, journalists and the Revisionist League, with varying and ambiguous levels of official endorsement. Only three politicians presented precise plans, either as heads of government (Gömbös) or as elder statesmen via "private" publications and lectures (Teleki and Bethlen). It is no coincidence that those who dared to do so were exactly the personalities who singularly summed up interwar Magyar politics most - both in terms of impact and representation. The two counts stood for Hungary's patrician-oligarchic ruling classes, while Gömbös was the most visionary and energetic of the rising reactionary-fascist

None paid particular attention to minority dispersal, and only one appears to have taken account of border proximity. Prime minister Gömbös' plan of 1934 emphasised material and geo-strategic aspects. While making sure to include all border-near brethren, it omitted the outlier communities in central and eastern Transylvania. This in turn meant that out of the 6.7 million total retrieved, only 1.7 million would be Magyars and thus would have raised Hungary's domestic minorities to a staggering 37 per cent (Zeidler 2001:150-5). Although Gömbös' plan vindicates Horowitz' predictions about border proximity, it does not support those about homogeneity or minority distribution. Even this is irrelevant however, for the plan was never actually adopted: unpopular with the cabinet and the wider political establishment *precisely for dropping the Crownlands notion*, it died with its maker in 1936. In contrast, the remaining two designs - by prime ministers Bethlen and Teleki respectively - pursued exactly this theme and cited the retrieval of ethnic Magyar areas as core but minimum demand (see also chapter 5).

These views also extended to the transborder minorities and mainland public opinion.[30] The period's most popular slogan is revealing - "extra Hungariam non est vita – si est vita, non est ita" (there is no life outside Hungary, if there is, it is unlike it). István Milotay, interwar Hungary's most influential and prolific political journalist, mirrored his broad readership's attitude by maintaining that retrieval of Hungarian inhabited areas was absolutely indispensable, but only as mere *minimum* (Lengyel in Romsics 1998:98;103-4). The Hungarian Revisionist League was a semi-official propaganda instrument and pooling ground for societal activism. Its president Ferenc Herczeg, declared that "the so-called Rothermere-line [demarcating purely ethnic boundaries] is not a Hungarian proposal ... the Hungarian nation does not surrender its right to territories it held for a thousand years" (Romsics 2001b:55). The same attitude was voiced by influential industrialist Miksa Fenyő, who in a specially authored

figures supported by middle-class electorates (see chapter 7). Of the twenty years between Trianon (1920) and the Second Vienna Award (1940) these three incumbents alone cover seventeen years of prime ministerial office between them (Teleki 1920-21 and 1939-41; Bethlen 1921-31; Gömbös 1932-36). For these reasons they are selected here as solidly revealing of irredentist policy-making.
[30] Interwar minority Hungarians, especially in Transylvania, also continued to share this expanded sense of Magyar ancestral homelands. Especially their revanchist middle classes, deprived of a millennial ascendancy and hit hard by the change in their fortunes, firmly upheld imperial ideas of St. Stephen's Crownlands.

book stressed that "the revision must be more than the re-annexation of the ethnically, exclusively or predominantly Hungarian regions along the frontiers" (Fenyő 1929). The plans he and his contemporaries boldly advocated would have raised the domestic percentage of non-Magyars from 11.51 to 18 per cent (Kovács 1994:86) - obviously not something viewed as deterrent by either mainland society or government.

Chapter 6 will show how today Magyar ethno-national identity no longer prioritises adhesion to and membership in, the millennial Hungarian state unit. To be sure, communal homelands like Transylvania still hold enormous emotional appeal, yet, together with ancestry, these are no longer the *principal* markers of Hungarian identity. This means that the two vital irredentist conditions have ceased - shared blood cementing solidarity across borders, and the shared 'map image' of territories defining the extent of irredentist goals. As a result, shared statehood has ceased to be an imperative. Hungary no longer sees itself as truncated, former transborder enclaves now feel as separate Magyar communities in their own right. Retrieval is consequently no longer viewed as commonsensical, nor even desirable. Today, Magyars understand themselves as a cultural nation, defined by a common language and heritage. The mainland has moved from traditional nationalism (congruence of political and communal boundaries), to what Csergő and Goldgeier (2001; 2004) call 'trans-sovereign nationalism' (creating institutions to link the nation across state boundaries) exactly because territoriality has been superseded by culture which in turn non-political institutions can easily contain. Budapest's consistent foreign policy principle during post-communism has thus been "to change the quality, rather than the location of state borders" (Bárdi 2004b:137).

Once again the governmental line is reflected by mainland public opinion. The Crownlands are no longer indispensable to Magyar existence and this translates accordingly into popular views on foreign policy. Attitudes especially towards integral (i.e. non-ethnic) revision are today overwhelmingly negative, and the meagre support has slipped further during post-communism (Csepeli 1997:196-7; Bárdi 2004b:136). Only 5 to 6 per cent of mainland Hungarians

wish for a (peaceful) redrawing of borders (Tabajdi and Barényi 1998:71). Instead, language and heritage are ranked high as markers (Csepeli: ibid; HTMH 2000). Along with indicators of cultural self-definition recent polls have furthermore found strong attitudes of civic nationalism in the mainland (Shulman 2002:565-578).

4.4.4 Minorities: homogeneity vs. completeness

A final word is necessary regarding minority irredentism. For one, Horowitz proposed that the parent state's homogeneity may be important to them. I have shown above that Hungary has remained ideal typical in this respect, which in turn does not explain variation in the minority's readiness to be retrieved. More importantly the entire premise of national 'purity' as main irredentist concern has been refuted.

Secondly, it had also been suggested that transborder minorities may factor in their own dispersal when deciding about retrieval. Once again however this very commonsensical argument had proven weak in testing above. Yes, the possibility of partial retrieval posed a moral dilemma and even risked unaffordable internal divisions for Hungarians in interwar Transylvania and the Felvidék. Zeidler (2001:201-2) explains how their irredentism remained purposely vague because likely scenarios would have "(...) counted on the re-annexation of Magyar populated border areas, but renounced the return of (...) outlying Hungarian communities." And still, both minorities fervently supported and then welcomed retrieval (Bárdi 2004b:73;86) – despite losing, especially in Transylvania, substantial parts of their own. While this seemingly contradicts the irredentist emphasis on completeness, it actually makes perfect sense for two reasons. Chapter 6 will explain how irredentist minorities, amongst them interwar Magyar ones, see themselves as mere enclaves, 'severed' appendages of the parent state that are in an unnatural and precarious situation. Loyalty towards and identification with, the mainland triumph all other affiliations, not least that towards the 'artificial' community of the enclave (transborder Hungarians tellingly described themselves at the time as

'communities born out of force'). As a consequence, accepting their own partition as a price for returning into the national fold was squarely in line with priorities. Secondly, such attitudes reflect once more the above mentioned opportunism characteristic of irredentists: after all borders, even if still unsatisfactory, can always be further revised.

Today's minority attitudes in turn can only be outlined by extrapolation. The most helpful indicator are current demands for autonomy within Romania and Slovakia respectively. A decade and a half into their post-communist existence, Magyar minority organisations have produced a string of autonomy proposals: more than ten in Romania (Salat 2004) and at least three in Slovakia. Of the three possible forms these can take (personal, local and regional autonomy), both Transylvanian and Felvidék Hungarians have consistently advocated the regional variant (Ríz 2000:85-6)[31]. This is indicative because it reflects changes in Magyar identity in the importance of community and territory. While personal autonomy attributes choice to the minority individual alone, and the local option restricts itself to specifically Hungarian settlements, the self-governance of a whole area demonstrates the self-conscious, regionalised and increasingly civic identity Hungarian minorities have developed (see chapter 6).

4.5 Conclusion: ideology over feasibility

Horowitz's variable, however obvious and logical at first sight, does not hold. Detailed investigation of all parent state variables in both time periods firstly demonstrates that irredentist inconsistency is not tied to change in the stipulated factors. Contemporary Hungary's domestic minority situation is invariably favourable, so the parent state is in this respect as free to conduct an irredenta as in the interwar period. Secondly, the "structural bias" within areas to be retrieved also does not hold. I have shown that according to

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[31] Demands for personal autonomy were overall rare and usually in response to specific discriminatory measures or legislation by the host state (Ríz 2000:ibid.). An example would be the Party of Magyar Coalition (MKP)'s 1996 draft proposal on linguistic personal autonomy in the wake of the restrictive Slovak language law passed that year.

Horowitz's criteria, the Felvidék's retrieval was actually not without problems. Conversely, its recovery would be more justified in the current, significantly improved conditions I have described. As for Transylvania, the 1940 retrieval of its truncated, ethnically mixed northern part soundly contradicted projections about the importance of border proximity, compactness and homogeneity. Furthermore, Erdély's situation today is insufficiently different from these dismal conditions to explain the irredentist inconsistency.

I have argued that what matters about territory in irredentism is not structural feasibility, but the central nexus with identity. The problem lay with the variable's basic assumption, namely what irredentism wants and that it is therefore determined by objective, external factors rather than those *internal* to its actors. This manifested itself in three points. The unitary nation-stateness which the variable posits for the mainland is not a necessary prerequisite of irredentism. Neither is it an absolute precondition for the parent state's ability to act, nor for the minority to desire retrieval into it. Titular dominance (ownership) by the group is enough in both aspects. Secondly, the importance of retrieving ethnic homelands is overlooked. The territory envisaged in the group's 'map image' must be recovered, regardless of whether it stretches well beyond kindred settlements and mostly regardless of whether it is ethnically diverse. Finally and consequently, this misinterprets the nation-state irredentism seeks to re(create) – and thus misunderstands the structural components that hinder or help it. Retrieval aims for completeness, rather than exclusivity. As a result, feasibility and demographic conditions which affect nation-state 'purity' do not matter much because irredentism's primary goal is the inclusion of a maximum of kindred population and ancestral territory. In this pursuit irredentists are chiefly guided by their identity, both with regards to territory (its physical extent and prominence as ethnic marker) and groupness (mainland preferred over enclave). Whatever brings irredentists closer to these goals – even if imperfectly – they will pursue.

5. Taking Cues from the Outside? Irredentism and International Factors

"Many governments hold transborder causes in more esteem than the traditions of international law"

Walker Connor (1980:172)

5.1. Introduction: the international dimension within irredentism studies

Irredentism has been traditionally defined as phenomenon of international relations and often analysed exclusively through that prism. However, since the latter rarely conceives of ethnic groups as aggregate, sub-state actors, irredentism's essential character as ethno-national movement has been largely ignored in those studies (Mayall 1978; Midlarsky 1988[1]; Zartman 1992; Von Hippel 1993; Katsiyiannis 1996; Carment 1994; Carment and James 1995 and 1998).

Conversely, among the theories which do treat retrieval in that vein, very few include the inter-state environment as variable but see it instead as mere backdrop (Neuberger 1986 and 1991; Ben-Israel 1991; Reichman and Golan 1991; Brubaker 1996). Sociological and comparative political studies for their part, centre almost entirely on domestic factors (Kitromilides 1979 and 1990; Andreopoulos 1991; Landau 1990, 1991 and 1995; Yagcioglu 1996; Saideman 1998 and 1999). Horowitz (1985;1991), whose model serves as baseline here, is a good example. He concedes that "the more calculative quality of state decisions probably makes deterrence more effective" (1985:287). Ultimately, however, the inter-state factor is in his view secondary because "it is (...) the domestic rather than the international consequences that constitute the principal disincentive to irredentism" (1985:282). As a result, the two

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[1] In a later work Midlarsky (1992) does consider ethnicity and sees it as irredentism's uniquely explosive aspect. He argues that while secessionist challenges have only caused regional wars irredentas (i.e. conflicts that involve transborder ethnic ties) are to a considerable measure responsible for the outbreak of both World Wars.

161

explanatory approaches have so far figured almost in mutual exclusion, each failing to deliver comprehensive explanations. Rare exceptions here are Suhrke (1975; 1977) and Ambrosio (2002).

5.1.1 International factors and irredentist inconsistency

In chapter 1 I had found that the global proliferation of retrieval corresponded to the four bouts of modern state creation (section 1.3.1) as suggested by O'Leary (1998:61).[2] Linking nationalism to modernity and industrialisation, I was thus able to organise the historical occurrence of irredentism in parallel, grouping it thematically into four successive waves: Native (1789-1918), Wilsonian (1919-1940), Anti-Colonial (1941-1988), and New World Order (1989-ongoing).[3] Closer analysis revealed that each of these periods in turn alternated between short, active phases and extended latent ones. The latter are sub-periods during which the international system reverts to its default, status-quo consensus. Confusingly, such periods are not expressly prohibitive about ethnically defined border changes. Often the international system ostensibly upholds a permissive attitude (e.g. by extolling self-determination in the UN Charter) whilst in fact *acting* restrictively, often with an area bias.[4] It was mainly during restrictive phases that irredentas were in stagnant or gestation mode. Active-permissive phases in contrast frequently saw them thrive and / or accomplish their goals.

This means that irredentist actors mirror fluctuations between active-permissive and latent-restrictive phases. They assess and respond to, international attitudes and the level of irredentist activity these allow or conversely necessitate. While this does not decide the internal *want* for

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[2] These are a) the revolutionary period in the Western hemisphere (1789-1825), b) the period following World War I, c) the phase of Asian and African decolonisation (1946 to the 1980s); and d) the years following the Soviet Union's demise in 1991.

[3] Section 1.3.1 (above) explained how irredentism has spread in a progressive global wave, proliferating beyond its original European mainstay (waves I and II) onto Africa and Asia in the course of the twentieth century (waves III and IV). The diffusion of irredentism has however stopped short of immigrant societies - Australia as well as the Americas - primarily because the modern state there has distinctly preceded nations in the Gellnerian sense. Additionally, their ethnic heterogeneity pre-empts the logic of group cohesion so central to irredentas.

[4] For instance, the Anti-Colonial phase displayed tolerance towards border revision only in Africa and Asia, whilst maintaining a firm status quo attitude in Europe.

irredentism[5], it suggests that world political factors do modulate its external *conduct*. In doing so they interact with or even compound, irredentism's endogenous factors significantly enough to contribute to an overall explanation. The question thus remains one of gauging their precise impact and explanatory weight.

International restrictiveness / permissiveness matters somewhat differently to parent states than to minorities. This chapter hence proposes a set of two, linked criteria for each irredentist actor which it will test in the Hungarian case. Parent states are affected by international systemic cues and more immediate backing from an irredentist patron power. Minorities in turn react to demonstration effects from parent state behaviour and neighbouring irredentas, as well as to levels of international protection. In the light of the evidence, this chapter will argue that the international environment is a useful secondary factor in explaining irredentist inconsistency. Ultimately, however, it remains subordinate to irredentist actors' ideology (ethno-nationalism) and to the regime type within which they operate. Both in this case and others, international givens do not *by themselves* decide an irredenta, but rather reinforce or limit domestic / group-internal imperatives[6] and thus significantly condition its methods and level of diplomatic activism.

5.2 Irredentist parent states versus the inter-state consensus

The international system variable has two main aspects for irredentist parent states. The first and principal instance concerns the international systemic

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[5] This is in line with Moore and Davis' (1998) statistical findings about ethnic dyads displaying comparatively less co-operative behaviour within the inter-state system, i.e. reacting less to its environmental influences.

[6] Ambrosio (2001) undertakes a very similar examination of the international determinants of irredentism, but comes to largely the opposite conclusion. His two-level model restricts itself to two variables: the level of international toleration and the level of ethno-territorial nationalism in the kin state. He argues that "(...) decision makers of potentially irredentist states are caught in a nexus of pressures, opportunities, and constraints at the domestic and international levels" (ibid.:16). Ambrosio's 'level of international toleration'-variable differs from mine in several key aspects, most prominently because it only treats "forcible annexations of territory" (ibid. 21), as which he counts irredentism. Given that this excludes many irredentist cases (amongst them all Hungarian ones), and because it also lacks internal differentiation (time period, location), it is not used here.

toleration for ethnically defined border changes. Indicators for a favourable phase are: endorsement or even explicit promotion of the mono-ethnic state as desirable or ideal, acceptance of revisionist policies and discourses, as well as swift and full diplomatic recognition of secessions and irredentas. The more geographically close these apply, the better, given that permissiveness is often regionally selective. Parent states will intensify irredentist tactics if the inter-state system is positively disposed towards retrieval. Restrictiveness by contrast leads to moderation in irredentist diplomacy, but cannot end the actual desire for retrieval.

This first, systemic factor combines with a second, more immediate aspect. A parent state's irredentist behaviour is furthermore shaped by the existence of a patron power (see e.g. Weiner 1991:670). A patron is an allied state that is more powerful[7] and either ideologically revisionist, or at least instrumentally benevolent. Regional proximity is once again important, exactly because of the frequent area bias in permissiveness. Normally such backing is actively sought, if necessary even in contradiction to previous policy orientations or at the expense of other ties.[8] Patronage cannot offset international restrictiveness, but it mitigates the latter. Conversely, in more permissive phases it further widens the room for manoeuvre. Lacking patronage in turn does not deter irredentists, no matter what the international juncture. Several givens can be indicators of help: concrete alliances and treaties (e.g. Hungary and the Axis Powers), military support in terms of materiel, personnel and / or advice (for instance Somalia and the USSR), or diplomatic backing and encouragement of the cause by a third party (e.g. late nineteenth / early twentieth century Serbia and Tsarist Russia). In some cases of course, the

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[7] 'More powerful' means that such a state is able to successfully assert its foreign policies even in the face of external disapproval or coercion.

[8] To Myron Weiner (ibid.) irredentist Bulgaria exemplifies this phenomenon. "In the First World War, Bulgaria sided with the Central Powers against Russia, with the expectation that a German-Austrian victory would lead to its acquisition of Macedonia. The persistence of the claim to Macedonia was a decisive factor in Bulgaria's decision to join with Austria, Hungary and Germany in the Second World War against Yugoslavia, Romania, Czechoslovakia and the Allies. To the very end, Bulgaria's revisionist goals dominated its foreign policy, even when it meant becoming a supporter of Germany's efforts to occupy all of the Balkans militarily. Bulgaria had literally cut off its own nose to spite its face. Moreover, Bulgaria's alliances with Germany ran counter to deeply felt historical, religious and cultural associations with Russia, thus demonstrating the overwhelming role that irredentist sentiments have played in the choice of allies."

parent state itself is militarily and geo-politically powerful enough to act as its own patron (e.g. Nazi Germany). If not, it is likely to seek one where possible. The modulating impact of these factors on mainland irredentism can be traced in two key areas: the use and content of propaganda and the extent of compliance with externally imposed parameters.

5.2.1 Mirroring realities: interwar Hungary and the changing Wilsonian environment (1918-40)

Brief but selective permissiveness (1918-21): open irredentist resistance

The years between 1918 and 1921 saw a genuine preparedness to allow, even sometimes encourage, changes in the status quo. As a transition phase replete with the uncertainties of post-imperial collapse, it appeared to offer room for negotiation. "The five years following World War I namely was the era of the peace treaties' creation, coming into force and implementation, the era of the building and stabilisation of the new order" (Zeidler 2001:60). Given the regional proximity of successful irredentist bids, Hungary had theoretically reason to nurture hope: Italy had seized Trieste, Romania annexed Bessarabia, and Poland occupied significant Lithuanian and Russian territories. Confusingly, however, this apparent window of opportunity was selective and biased, for the short-lived permissive order only applied to former Great Power allies while, as both Trianon and the other Paris treaties showed, it was explicitly designed *against* the losers of he Great War. Hungary thus pointed in vain to the contradiction between its own fate – the loss of three million Magyars - and Wilsonian ideals. Furthermore, international constraints on the mainland's sovereignty remained severe even after partition. In 1921, the country was still partially occupied, its position isolated (with Italy blocking its acceptance into the League of Nations), whilst its military and fiscal capacities were severely reduced and externally monitored. In addition, there were debilitating domestic conditions from wartime devastation, partition, triple regime change[9] and the barely ended civil war.

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[9] Between 1918 and 1921, Hungary experienced democratic-republican government (October 1918-March 1919), a communist revolution (March to November 1919), which in turn was fought by Christian-conservative forces. These were immediately acknowledged as legitimate

Budapest was hence receiving mixed messages during this brief first sub-phase of the Wilsonian wave: punitive national truncation conflicted with generally promoted self-determination. The misinterpretation of this ambiguity as 'opportunity' in turn translated as short spike in mainland irredentist activity. While ostensibly bowing to external pressure, Hungary simultaneously entertained adventurous schemes[10] and sought irredentist patronage in the run up to Trianon. The quest was unsuccessful. London was unwilling, while other potentially revisionist countries (Germany, the USSR, Bulgaria, Austria, Italy) were unavailable, albeit for a panoply of different reasons (Juhász 1988:61-3; Pölöskei and Gergely 1997:55-6; Ormos 1998:122-125; Zeidler 2001:71-75). Yet given the deceptive international opportunities, this lack of backing did not moderate Hungary. Thus Budapest's delegation to the Trianon negotiations boldly cited the Magyar claim to *the whole* of the former kingdom, and with it a civilising mission over resident 'subject' peoples (Zeidler 2001:29-30). This insistence on ascendancy and ancestral territory was commonsensical to Hungarians (see section 4.4), yet struck a sour note with the Great Powers and successor states: neither did such rhetoric suit the Wilsonian spirit, nor Hungary's status as wartime loser. This assertiveness continued even following partition in June 1920, for instance in the confrontation with Austria over the still occupied Őrvidék / Burgenland. Despite its international isolation, the mainland insisted on its claim throughout the second half of 1922. Eventually, Budapest did concede the region under severe pressure, yet also achieved a December plebiscite for Sopron city and its surroundings - which promptly voted for irredentist retrieval (see Ormos 1998:94-8 on the Venice Agreement).

government by the Great Powers (November 1919). Confirmed by subsequent parliamentary elections (January 1920), they consolidated Hungary in the new constitution (February) as monarchy under a substitute regent (Admiral Miklós Horthy).

[10] Prime minister Károlyi had declared in 1919 that "the Hungarian government will formally protest, but bows before the conference's decision" (Ormos 1998:45). However, the same period (1918-20) also saw desperate and unrealistic plans, ranging from a proposed Bavarian-Austrian-Hungarian challenge to the peace treaties over retaining the Őrvidék / Burgenland, down to re-occupying Ruthenia with potential Polish help (see Ormos 1998:84; Zeidler 2001:61)

Restrictive consensus vs. beginning patronage (1922-35): muted irredentism

The subsequent period between 1922 and 1935 presented interwar Budapest with an increasingly solidified status quo system. Hungary realised that the leeway for any action had begun to decrease rapidly from 1921 onwards (Zeidler 2001:62-3). That spring the Great Powers ratified Trianon, whilst its regional neighbours began to organise into a hostile military alliance, the Little Entente. Its members - Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Yugoslavia - were the very assimilationist host states Hungary intended to retrieve its Magyar minorities from. Hungary's disarmed and downsized military compared badly to their "instantaneous and unconditional" collective defence system. Most importantly, the "Little Entente's public opinion scrutinised even the minutest revelation within Hungarian foreign policy from which one could conclude a revisionist pursuit" (Gergely and Pritz 2000:86-7). Even "in the second half of the 1920s the room for movement of Hungarian foreign policy was unchangingly limited. Acceptance into the League of Nations and the loan [from the latter] counted undoubtedly as diplomatic successes, but also tied the government's hands. The country was essentially under the League's financial and military supervision" (Pölöskei and Gergely 1997:87; see also Juhász 1988:96). Budapest hence now complied with external parameters by changing to more a muted, preparatory irredentism unaffected even by beginning patronage. This is visible in two connected areas during these years: a changed irredentist discourse and diplomacy.

Budapest understood that the new borders were upheld by the Great Powers rather than the successor states' own solidity. It thus continued to seek diplomatic and military patronage for its goals (Pritz 1995:224-5, 234, 238; Gergely and Pritz 1998:86-7; Zeidler 2001:69). However, since Hungary had "an ambivalent relationship with the victorious powers", its "overtures towards them remained for years without success" (Zeidler ibid.:71, 73). Instead, it therefore sought to remedy diplomatic ties, which necessarily entailed moderation - precisely in the ultimate interest of irredentist goals. Bethlen had declared upon taking office in 1921 that his principal aim was "to widen the nation's foreign political horizon." Towards domestic criticism of thus effectively giving up on retrieval "the government (...) justified its determination with the

fact that international political life since the peace treaties took place in the League of Nations, and Hungary could only break out of its diplomatic isolation if it partook [in it] as independent state and equal member" (Juhász 1988:80-1). Foreign secretary Bánffy was even clearer about this so-called "integrative manoeuvre": "with targeted and sustained work Hungary can contribute to the gradual remodelling of the League's spirit, and could in time use [it] for its own goals". This way "the time will come - perhaps faster than we think - when we can raise the revisionist question, put it on the agenda within the League of Nations" quipped Albert Apponyi, Budapest's representative to the body (Zeidler 2001:64-5). The country's readmission to the international community was eventually achieved with accession to the League in 1922. Zeidler (2001:52) describes this as "the phase of gathering strength, matched by relative foreign political passivity."

Parent state behaviour became somewhat bolder after Hungary had secured Fascist Italy's irredentist patronage in April 1927.[11] In addition, two major international constraints had fallen away: Budapest's fiscal and military supervision by the League respectively expired in the summer of 1926 and spring 1927. "The Great Power support (...) enabled Hungary to step out of its foreign political passivity" (Zeidler 2001:76). Thus, only seven weeks later Prime minister Bethlen's keynote speech launched his "active foreign policy". Shortly afterwards the Hungarian Revisionist League was founded. Although not a governmental body, it was boldly semi-official in that it included along influential personalities also members of the Hungarian Upper House (Kovács 1994:82).

The mainland was nevertheless well aware that external backing could not outweigh the continuing status quo consensus, and behaved accordingly. This is for instance illustrated by Hungary's reaction to the 1927 Rothermere campaign. Entitled "Justice For Hungary" the Daily Mail's editor had engaged in (unsolicited) activism for Trianon's revision along ethnic Magyar borders. This crucially occurred three months *after* securing Mussolini's help. Yet Bethlen revealingly stated that "*until the international situation allows it* I am

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[11] Private correspondence between Mussolini and Bethlen shows that this "Treaty of Eternal Friendship and Arbitration" was meant as far more than its title suggested. Both sides pledged mutual consultation and harmonisation in foreign policy.

not prepared to bring the nation into worldwide embarrassment for the sake of overzealous patriots" (Kovács 1994:87; emphasis mine). So while Trianon's "peaceful revision" was now declared as governmental policy, this was done only domestically[12] and still without any details – as stipulated by that very treaty. Irredentist discourse now also introduced legal reasoning alongside economic and technical arguments. This stress on rights and entitlements mirrored greater assertiveness, but also implied negotiation and continued compliance *within* imposed norms. This was furthermore self-effacing, even defensive. Invoking the twin legal bases for his government's bid, Bethlen argued that "these two provisions of international law[13] render (...) accusations untenable", and so "engaging with revisionist questions can therefore not be labelled irredentist" (Kovács 1994:88). Patronage therefore "did not mean that the Hungarian government slammed - or intended to slam - the door behind itself in either London or Paris. To the contrary" (Ormos 1998:127), Hungary simultaneously continued to nurture relations with both.

Together with adopting its "integrative manoeuvre", the parent state also changed the way in which it sought to influence and inform international public opinion about the Magyar cause. The adjustment resulted from two important realisations. For one, the Hungarian government came to understand that its insistence along the imperial St. Stephen notion was anachronistic and inadvertently counterproductive. It also began to comprehend the selectiveness of the Wilsonian permissive consensus.[14] Hungary's other main argument - the loss of three million ethnic Magyars – had been palpably ignored although it contradicted the very ideals of the period (Juhász 1988:68; Ormos 1998:79-81).

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[12] It would take until 1930 for Hungary to voice its claim in an international forum, with count Apponyi's speech at the League of Nations. This daring move was once again moderated by a strongly legalistic and diplomatic tone.

[13] Budapest's new legal reasoning based itself on two very general and probably overvalued, provisions. Paragraph 19 of the League of Nations' Pact granted the theoretical possibility of boundary revision. The same was raised in the Millerand Letter, a conciliatory note by the Great Powers which accompanied the Trianon Treaty in 1920. Given that both were at the time nearly a decade old, their sudden use by Hungary is all the more indicative.

[14] Alternatively, Hungary had encountered zero sum thinking: "If Slovakia was to belong to Hungary", Thomas Masaryk reasoned in 1919, "two million Slovaks would find themselves under the Magyar yoke. Vice versa comparatively only half a million Hungarians are in Slovakia, and those do not live in repression. It is under all circumstances more just that half a million should be subordinated to two million" (Szarka 1998:13).

As a result, Hungary practiced strategic moderation via change to 'technical' arguments, proxy irredentism, and studied evasiveness on the subject. Firstly, in the early 1920s Hungarian politicians switched away from arrogant rhetoric, with foreign secretary Teleki admonishing that "our diplomats should be characterised by (...) modest self-conduct" (Gergely and Pritz 1998:66). Ideological statements of regional superiority, but also the legitimate call for ethnic borders, ceded to functional arguments. Instead of emotional and ideological appeals, Budapest now cited legal, economic and geographic factors to make the irredentist case (Zeidler 2001:52). The line was now carefully objective, quoting "scientific" facts and figures about the truncated country's alleged unviability. These were produced by a string of newly founded research bodies and delivered in former prime minister Teleki's international lectures, or prime minister Bethlen's new 'economic propaganda' between 1923 and 1927 (Kovács 1994:88). In contrast to domestic discourse, Budapest would henceforth no longer justify retrieval for what it demanded - namely the recovery of transborder kindred and of the ancestral Magyar territories of St. Stephen's Crown.

Secondly, together with its changed discourse the government now placed the irredentist "ball" now into other courts. In line with its legalistic approach (see above), Budapest began to highlight Hungarian minority grievances.[15] Invoking transborder Magyars' right to self-determination it suggested either autonomy or referenda as solution, both with an implicit view to eventual reunion (Pritz 1995:236; Gergely and Pritz 2000:85; Zeidler 2001:140).[16] This was irredentism by proxy: the innocuous citing of Wilsonian principles avoided putting Budapest into a revisionist role and instead placed any irredentist initiative on the minority. In this sense, Hungary was seen to merely press for the implementation of what were internationally recognised concepts. This

[15] Bárdi (1995b) describes how Budapest's irredentist sub-ministry specially budgeted for printing and dissemination of material that documented Magyar minority grievances for the League of Nations.

[16] Referenda were rare, precisely because many minorities would have immediately voted for reunion. Also, the international community's attitude grew increasingly restrictive and geographically selective as the Wilsonian period wore on, opposing referenda on the grounds that they set dangerous precedents. A rare exception for Hungary was the plebiscite in the Austrian-annexed town of Sopron and its surrounding region in 1921-2 (voting for reunion with 72.5 and 65 per cent respectively). Autonomy in turn was feared as precursor to eventual defection. Indeed, Magyar minorities demanded autonomy not least in the hope of eventual retrieval (Csáky 1996:4; Zeidler 2001:202; Bárdi 2004b:73-4).

strategy was repeated with regards to propaganda: more explicit irredentism was once again relegated to proxy actors, not least because the peace treaty had outlawed outright agitation. Budapest thus reigned in domestic extremism and in 1921 placed all private irredentist initiatives under its covert, instrumental control (Gergely and Pritz 2000:84; Zeidler 2001: 88-94,126-7).[17] There evolved "between them and official foreign policy essentially a clearly discernible division of labour". This "lent an favourable contrast to the conciliatory policies pursued by the government in front of the victorious powers." Relegating 'extremism' to tightly controlled private groups with a "broad societal base" thus "acted advantageously in that it lent official politics a greater possibility of manoeuvre" (Pritz 1995:235).

Thirdly, Hungary developed the covert financing and direction of its minorities in a preparatory irredentist scheme (Bárdi 1995a, 1995b, 2004b; Angyal 2000c; Török 2001). Although this secretive process[18] had started well prior to Trianon, the apparatus came into its own only after 1921-22 - parallel to increasing international rigidity. It was specially budgeted for, with mounting figures throughout the early twenties. Funding priorities and amounts differed between minorities (Angyal 2000c:146-167), but the goal was the same: to sustain (and thus discreetly control) the communities and thereby prepare future retrieval (see also section 6.2.2). One of the project's leading figures, Benedek Jancsó, summarised this strategy as follows: "they were able to take the territory away from us, but once the opportunity arises we can take it back under favourable and fortunate circumstances, because it [the territory] will not disappear. The homeland is not made up of mountains, valleys, rivers and plains, but of those people who live in it. If however the Hungarian community

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[17] A 1921 prime ministerial survey lists a total of 31 irredentist leagues and associations, 20 political movements, and ten registered bodies. Their activity first focused on newly separated transborder kindred (information gathering, encouragement, refugee help), but also began targeting international public opinion. In May 1921 the government dissolved the most extreme (i.e. potentially embarrassing) groups, and outlawed any reference to the territorial integrity of neighbouring host states. Recognising however their potential value as proxy actors, Budapest placed them three months later under an official body headed by Teleki (Zeidler 2001:ibid.; Bárdi 1995a).

[18] Activities were first channelled via the prime minister's office, with all correspondence having to be handed back for destruction. Innocuously named respective offices handled the various minorities: the Rákóczi (later Thököly) Federation for the Felvidék, the Saint Gellért Society for the Voivodina, and the now Romanian Bánát and the Popular Literary Society (NIT) for Transylvania. From 1927 onward these were centralised under the Revisionist League.

is lost, wholly or in part, on these areas as a result of foreign repressive rule, then we will also lose our strongest legal entitlement to these territories" (Bárdi 1995a:8).

Strategic moderation, finally, also meant that Hungary avoided making concrete irredentist demands (Pritz 1995:239-240; Hoensch 1967:10-11; Balogh 1988:54). To get "onto the territory of dangerous concreteness", as an internal memo called it, would automatically narrow Hungary's options. It would then be "forced to bargain about the belonging of small territorial strips, and then of villages" shuddered Bethlen. Yet if conversely Budapest was to lay claim on its entire former realm, "then the Magyar nation would appear as if it was again intent on subjugating other nations" (Juhász 1988:74; Pritz 1995:236-9; Gergely and Pritz 2000:85). Hence Bethlen practised a "dual optic" (*kettős optika*) which left all options open: it differentiated between "minimal" (ethnic) and "optimal" (integral) retrieval. This ambiguity was carefully maintained even after Hungary had won Mussolini's backing. In fact, the Duce had to wait until 1934 until he received a concrete plan. The point here is that imprecision resulted not only from *present* inter-state restrictiveness, but was also maintained because Budapest could not foresee the degree and selectivity to which it or potential patrons would support Magyar irredentism *in the future*.

Part of this dilemma lay at home though. Chapter 6 will explain how interwar irredentism included imperial Hungary's integral restoration (i.e. beyond kindred settlement areas) because Magyar ethnicity tied itself to this ancestral territory. As a consequence, leaders could ill afford to voice lesser demands. Bethlen described this nexus well in his groundbreaking second irredentist speech of March 1928: "We did not (simply) lose provinces. We have been partitioned. Ours is not the case of Alsace-Lorraine. Ours is the case of Poland. Germany has renounced a province [Alsace], but we cannot renounce eternally of a third of our kind. We cannot accept this as just, and the Hungarian nation *would crucify any politician who were to sign a second Trianon*" (Kovács 1994:89-90, emphasis mine). Furthermore, "the desire for territorial integrity determined thinking also in the highest echelons" (Zeidler 2001:146). Indeed, Admiral Horthy publicly rejected ethnic criteria for

annexation as too moderate (Hoensch 1995:117), and the cabinet disapproved of Lord Rothermere's 1927 campaign not least for the same reason.[19] So while ambiguity kept all foreign political options open, it much more fundamentally came from the imperatives of group identity, which demanded the entirety of the territory that defined "Hungarianness".

Patronage combines with renewed permissiveness (1935-40): aggressive Magyar irredentism

This restraint changed when the Wilsonian era switched back into a more permissive international consensus, with the period between 1935 and 1940 increasingly building a revisionist momentum. Multilateralism was clearly ending: the Disarmament Conference had disintegrated in 1934 after two years of fruitless negotiation, the previous year Nazi Germany had left the palpably powerless League of Nations. Crucially, Hitler's increasingly daring recoveries - the Saarland region, Austria, then the Sudeten German areas - proved that the inter-state community had once again widened the leeway for border changes. Great Power appeasement not only tolerated irredentism, but the unravelling of the very order that had caused Hungary's partition.

Facing these developments, "Hungarian foreign policy (...) precisely interpreted [them] ...from the viewpoint of its interests and goals" (Zeidler 2001:69). Budapest had long understood that the borders dissecting Magyar kin and ancestral territory depended on the very Great Power guarantees which these changes now eroded. The demonstration effects of successful Italian and German irredentas in the region[20] combined with direct irredentist patronage from both. Although there never was a formal treaty with Nazi Germany (Pritz 1982:270), the Hungarian government acted from the mid-1930s onwards increasingly with assurances about Berlin's backing. Domestic pressures further underlined this window of opportunity. Mainlanders'

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[19] An internal government directive even instructed diplomatic staff to reject the 'minimal' border revision proposed by Rothermere (Hoensch 1967:10-11, footnotes; Ránki 1976:559; Kovács 1994:87).

[20] Hungarian prime minister Imrédy saw these as "examples" for Hungary (Ormos 1998:193), while Romanian Foreign Minister Titulescu warned: "any yielding of territory would only mean the beginning of a process. After the first concession demands for further [ones] would follow, and so on. Just like with the war reparations. (...) This process would also be repeated with territorial questions" (Pritz 1995:240).

"everyday irredentism did not really take notice of the realities of world politics"
but was rather an "inward looking, defiant reaction" (Zeidler 2001:188). Public
pressure was hence wholly ideological, as Teleki complained.[21] It was also
influential (Pritz 1995:231-3), and became more so because irredentism
developed exactly at that time into the main area of convergence between
competing aristocratic and middle class elites (see section 7.2.1).

The convergence of international attitudes and patronage thus caused parent
state irredentism to become progressively open and assertive. It reached its
peak after the Munich agreement of September 1938, faithfully in parallel with
appeasement politics. Confrontation firstly began to translate into Magyar
irredentist propaganda, both in terms of tactics and content. Hungary
abandoned all previous discretion in manipulating its transborder kindred, who
were now openly funded by the Hungarian Foreign Ministry. Secondly,
Hungary emulated the return of bilateralism and power politics. Precise
irredentist plans were now presented, first in Bethlen's international lectures
(1933), then by Prime minister Gömbös (1934). Factual reasoning now turned
into demands. These were less and less addressed to Western capitals and
international bodies, but rather directly to individual host states. The tone also
sharpened: Hungary first called for improvement in the treatment of Hungarian
minorities (1937), then for immediate autonomy, and finally, citing Axis
backing, demanded the return of whole areas (1938-40) (see e.g. Román
1994). In tandem, Budapest ceased its policy of complying with the Great
Powers. Most significant here was the rupture with London by refusing to
condemn the 1935 Abyssinia crisis, sparked off by revisionist ally Mussolini.
Hungary finally also left the League of Nations in 1939, the very forum via
which it had hoped to achieve irredentism.

Nazi Germany's patronage also changed Hungary's irredentist goal-and
priority setting. Not only was the alliance unequal in need, but Berlin also used
both the domestic German minority and Budapest's increasing economic

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[21] "Our public opinion has gone mad. Get everything back! With any means, through any help,
no matter at what cost. (...) The Magyar public has lost its mind over all the propaganda and
patriotic phrases" (Zeidler 2001:57-8).

dependency as bargaining chips (Bérend and Ránki 2002).[22] Now the "dual optic" came to a watershed choice between territory and fellow Magyars because neither Germany nor Italy supported integral retrieval.[23] In a wider sense this forced a trade-off between sovereignty and external support, because the retrieval of both kin *and* ancestral realm had also meant regaining former great power status (Pritz 1995:226). The fact that the two had now become alternatives was an agonising dilemma to the government[24], while the mainland public - encouraged by the Felvidék's (1938) and then Subcarpathia's retrieval (1939) - denied or ignored it (Ormos 1998:209; Zeidler 2001:85). Opportunism eventually prevailed. Hungary took whatever it could retrieve, even if incompletely (see also section 4.4). Even count Teleki, a veteran defender of the St. Stephen notion, endorsed this upon his return to office and applied it to Transylvania's partial retrieval in November 1940 (Ormos 1998:224). In the interest of securing at least some Magyar territories Budapest complied with its "powerful protector", as Bethlen had called Berlin (Balogh in Borsódy 1988:59).

5.2.2 Uniting domestic and international status quo consensus: Post-communist Hungary (1989-2005)

International ambiguity and Magyar renouncement of retrieval (1989-1993)

The collapse of the Soviet empire initiated a new irredentist wave, with the international consensus reverting to a more permissive stance between 1989

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[22] Pritz (1982:265-6) describes for instance an early altercation on this issue between Hitler and foreign minister Kánya in 1934. The "Führer" made it clear that his support for the Felvidék irredenta depended on Budapest's concessions to its domestic German minority. As described in section 4.2.4, this group acted not only as leverage but to some extent as agent, for Berlin (Tilkovsky 1998:73; Gratz 2001:196-203).

[23] "The two Great Powers' foreign political aspirations namely crossed Hungarian designs in several instances" (Zeidler 2001:79). Hitler had told Gömbös in 1933 that he would only support territorial demands towards Czechoslovakia, but no resurrection of St. Stephen's realms - a line he adhered to throughout. Mussolini had his own designs in the Balkans and thus rejected Hungarian aspirations for retrieving the Voivodina.

[24] Historians disagree on this point. Pritz (1982:271) maintains that "also during this period they [the government] are not prepared to renounce the restoration of the country's territorial integrity as ultimate goal" (Juhász 1988:69,74 even argues this never wavered). Others in contrast believe that leading politicians - Bethlen, Teleki and certainly Gömbös - effectively accepted realities, yet kept the integral irredenta as ideal and official goal. "The government did not publicise its dilemma, but this factor was described clearly in speeches, publications and within opposition circles" (Zeidler 2001:82-3; see also Romsics 1998:8-9).

and 1993. This initial laxness moreover applied specifically to East-Central Europe, and was thus ostensibly favourable: it included the swift recognition of ex-Soviet and former Yugoslav republics and acceptance of Czechoslovakia's Velvet Divorce. However, not only was this window of opportunity short and devoid of patronage, but - like the initial years of the Wilsonian period - it was also qualitatively skewed. While it tolerated the self-determination of *pre-existing* sub-state units, the inter-state community remained consistently hostile to fresh cuts along ethno-territorial criteria. A few examples illustrate this well. Croatia's independence in 1991 was quickly welcomed by both individual states (Germany, Austria) and the EU, yet Zagreb's subsequent bid to retrieve kindred from Bosnia in 1993 was met by an international arms embargo. Similarly, Serbian irredentism towards its enclaves in Bosnia encountered international sanctions and, eventually, military intervention in 1995. Greece's belligerence at FYROM's titular use of "Macedonia" in 1991 met stern warnings from both Brussels and NATO.

Budapest did not pick up on this brief permissive spike. Unlike in the Wilsonian period's initial years, regional developments this time clearly spelt out the rules of selectiveness. Neither was there any potential for irredentist patronage. The few actively irredentist states in the region[25], Croatia and Serb-dominated rump Yugoslavia, proved a warning example in their respective failures. "Whatever it were to do, Hungary always has to bear in mind the requirements of regional and international stability" George Schöpflin remarked, "for since the outbreak of nationalities conflicts in Yugoslavia the international community reacts more sensitively to the eventual dangers of destabilisation that may result" (1998:130). The negative demonstration effects in the Balkans were thus today's equivalent of the encouragement provided by interwar German irredentas. Furthermore, there was no regional state with a similarly truncated nation and / or sufficient independent power bases (military and diplomatic). Russia, the sole to vaguely qualify, never embarked on such a policy. Finally and most importantly, post-communist Hungary now had both a changed

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[25] Admittedly, Dataset 1 lists several further contemporary irredentas in the region: Romania (versus Moldavia), Belarus (versus Poland and Lithuania) and the Albanian irredentas. Since the two former are however low-grade/dormant, while the latter counts simultaneously as Type 2 (unificationist) irredentism, Serbia and Croatia are taken as only regional Type 1 cases where retrieval was actively pursued.

sense of identity and a domestic political system which both precluded irredentism (see chapters 6 and 7). A quickly consolidating democracy barred ethno-politics via pluralism, accountability and rival civic-institutional legitimacy. In tandem, Magyar identity no longer tied itself to the ancestral grounds which the St. Stephen principle tried to recover. Fomented not least by the impact of democracy, which promoted an alternative, civic identity, Hungarian ethno-nationalism had deterritorialised and become culturally defined. Together with resulting minority self-assertion across the borders, this in turn ended the other main basis for irredentism: perfect group solidarity. Mainlanders and transborder kin today regard each other as related, but separate communities. This process has been active since late communism and is still growing (Csepeli 1992/97:241-254; HTMH 2000; Shulman 2002). Hungary's early renouncement of retrieval thus not so much bowed to international disincentives as married them with pre-existing and developing domestic responses on this issue.

Despite some initial slip-ups[26], Budapest thus began to elaborate a course faithful to these domestic and international givens. The result was the so-called "Antall-doctrine" of March 1993: reaching Euro-Atlantic integration, a neighbourhood policy based on friendly co-operation, and the (...) national policy for transborder Magyar interests" (Ríz 2000:81-2). Arguably, the main priority within this policy triangle was for economic and political reinsertion into the Western hemisphere via NATO and EU membership. The success of such aspirations was in turn crucially contingent on the resolution of any pending ethno-territorial concerns and of resulting regional tensions. Hence Hungary also started to develop its neighbourhood diplomacy, not least as part of a self-consciously legalistic ethnic patronage for its kin. "Only this kind of foreign policy can cement the country's favourable international judgement" reaffirms even the current government's foreign political manifesto (2002:section 9.2).

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[26] The most notorious of these incidents was premier Antall's 1991 dictum of "feeling as the prime minister of fifteen million Hungarians". His rhetorical inclusion of transborder Magyars into the mainland's political community alarmed regional neighbours, who took it as thinly veiled irredentist announcement. Some contend that the first three years of post-communist foreign policy (1990-1993) were deliberately ambiguous on the question of transborder Magyars in order to test the waters. In my view, this was more the result of regime change and -adjustment. If, however, one was to agree, then such ambivalence would precisely echo the brief period of international relaxation.

<u>Restrictiveness re-established: compliance, integration and 'virtual nationalism'</u>
<u>(1994-2005)</u>

Following this permissive interlude, the contemporary New World Order wave of irredentas has settled back into its default, Westphalian status quo consensus. There is marked reluctance to accept *any* territorially defined change in the region.[27] Budapest has been consistent in its initial policy and responsiveness to outside cues. For instance, during the negotiations for the Basic Treaty with Romania in 1995-6, Magyar insistence on collective rights and regional autonomy caused both the US and German governments to question Hungary's commitment to its non-irredentist policy-line. "After it declared its support of autonomy for Hungarian minorities abroad, the Horn government was in danger of seeing its progress toward joining NATO disappear overnight" and thus reacted quickly to a weak Romanian overture." (...) Were it not for the American reaction (...) Hungary would have been more hesitant about the Romanian-proposed compromise" (Shafir 1996:30). Germany's reprimands on this issue (Zellner and Dunay 1998:240-242) were equally hitting home, given especially that country's support for Hungary's early EU accession.

Another, more recent, example is the Hungarian reaction to Brussels' critique of the Status (or Preference) Law. Long planned and formulated to aid Magyar minorities financially and culturally, its 2001 passing alarmed especially Bucharest and Bratislava.[28] The latter turned to the European Union, who set

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[27] The only exception since has been support for and subsequent acceptance of, East Timor's independence from Indonesia in 2001.

[28] Since the Law legislated on their citizens, the two states accused Budapest of interference into their internal affairs. They especially opposed the plan for local Magyar minority parties to set up parent state financed and -directed offices on host state soil. These would register applicants as ethnic Hungarians, and issue them with a *Magyarigazolvány* (a certificate of benefit entitlement). This was seen as effectively irredentist, because the legislation on transborder kindred arguably included the latter into the parent state's polity. In a logical non sequitur, Bucharest and Bratislava simultaneously alleged discrimination to their majority ethnic citizens. This involved three main Status Law provisions. For one, transborder Magyar families would receive modest financial benefits, such as an annual book stipend if they chose to school their children in local Hungarian language institutions. Secondly, transborder Hungarians were offered free university or vocational education in the mainland, provided they then returned to their communities. Finally, the Law granted registered Hungarians each year a visa-free, three-month work stint in the mainland. Apart from foreseeable legal complications with Hungary's prospective EU accession in May 2004, this denied a labour market advantage so eagerly sought by many ethnic Romanians (Chiriac 2001). Given that the Law is based on the free choice of ethno-national identity (i.e. open to *any* person), and strictly tied to non-immigration to Hungary, allegations of irredentism are unsubstantiated.

up the Venice Commission to investigate their complaints. Its findings, published in spring 2002, admonished Hungary in several respects, and asked it to modify the Law accordingly. Though at first reticent due the ongoing electoral campaign, the new government eventually agreed to do so. Despite considerable domestic disapproval and transborder disappointment, incoming premier Medgyessy engaged in bilateral talks with the host states by late 2002, and parliament passed the modifications in early 2003.

Such close compliance even on lesser issues is furthermore shared throughout Hungarian mainstream politics. Post-communist governments have only varied in the ranking of Antall's three priorities, and in how pro-active or reactive they were towards accepted diplomatic parameters (Pritz 2001:74-5; Bárdi 2004a:68-77). The FIDESZ-led centre-right coalition (1998-2002) under Viktor Orbán proved the most assertive on the minority question and wanted to shape, rather than merely react to, external givens. However, it also shared its predecessors' endorsement of international parameters, not least because of its other prioritised goal – NATO and EU accession. A study at the time thus notes that "the guiding principles of the Hungarian Republic's official foreign policy have, independently of governmental change, remained essentially unaltered" (Ríz 2000:81-2). On a more anecdotal level, all of my interviewees from the FIDESZ government repeated this position.[29]

International restrictiveness and its acceptance are further compounded by the immediate regional outside – an inverse equivalent of interwar patronage. While the regional closeness and backing of the interwar Axis reinforced eventual permissiveness, the presence of two other desirable alliances nearby – NATO and the EU - acts today as further, albeit positive, constraint. This applies in two ways.

Firstly, NATO and the EU are the very organisations dominating Budapest's priority-triangle. Therefore their pre-condition for accession - i.e. to settle relations with the host states (see for instance EU Commission 2002:123,136)

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[29] Interviews with András Király of the Prime Minister's Office, with Károly Grúber of the HTMH, and with Balázs Csuday of the Hungarian Foreign Ministry (Interviews 6, 7 and 8 respectively). See especially the interview with Attila Demkó, policy analyst in the Foreign Division of Prime Minister Orbán's Office (Interview 4), and his forwarded email (dated 6.03.2002) to Romanian journalist Ionel Sorin.

- mattered. In 1998, the year prior to Hungary's NATO accession, US Defence Secretary William Perry thus reminded Hungary that the alliance was "not willing to import security problems." István Bába, deputy secretary of state in the foreign ministry, thus duly portrayed the 1998 Basic Treaty with Slovakia in that very vein: "Slovakia is one neighbouring country whose interests after (and during) settling the problematic issues are identical with Hungary's, as both countries want to be integrated in the EU, NATO, and other Western European organisations" (Zellner and Dunay 1998:318). Apart from its incentives, such integration is arguably also an added, and more immediate tier of restraint: the common decision-making and legal frameworks of EU and NATO had already helped to contain ethno-territorial tensions between two of their other members - Greece and Turkey. Now that Hungary has reached both NATO membership (1999) and EU accession (2004), it is furthermore keen to prove its credentials within both organisations. Tellingly, the present government's foreign political manifesto devotes a whole part exclusively to linking these strands. Entitled "Democratic Hungary - a reliable partner", it describes the essential connections between regime consolidation, regional stability, Euro-Atlantic integration, and support for transborder minorities (Government of the Republic of Hungary 2002:section 9).

Secondly, rather than as obstacle, EU accession and its correlate abrogation of borders, is actually seen as solution to Magyar national truncation. The strategy has been dubbed 'virtual nationalism' (Csergő and Goldgeier 2001, 2004) or, for Ireland's similar case, 'technocratic anti-partitionism' (Lyne 1990).[30] The mainland has moved from traditional nationalism (congruence of political and cultural boundaries), to what Csergő and Goldgeier (2001; 2004) call 'trans-sovereign nationalism' (creating institutions to link the nation across state boundaries). This is exactly because territoriality has been superseded by culture, which in turn non-political institutions can easily contain. In order to reach this goal, the host states must also join, which in turn is yet another reason for Hungary's neighbourhood policy ("this is also why we support our neighbouring countries' preparations for integration and accession process" explains the current foreign political manifesto; Government of the Republic of

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[30] See also Keating and McGarry (2001) on this issue.

Hungary 2002:section 4.1.7). Budapest's consistent foreign policy principle during post-communism has thus been "to change the quality, rather than the location of state borders" (Bárdi 2004b:137). The current administration sums up this strategy as follows: "the government is convinced that a historic opportunity is opening for the reunification of the Hungarian nation within the European framework. (...) In the long run, the situation of the transborder Hungarians can be settled in a lasting and reassuring manner exclusively within the framework of European integration" (ibid.: sections 4.1.7. and 7.1.4.). Unlike in the interwar years, when Budapest waited for an international constellation within which border revision was possible, it has today used an environment where boundaries are becoming increasingly irrelevant.

5.2.3 Summary

Demonstration effects, windows of opportunity, and deterrents do not decide a mainland's irredenta, but they do condition the timing and means it chooses. The method and openness of interwar Hungary's irredentism clearly correlated with the variations in international (non-)permissiveness. Today's inter-state environment in turn has even shaped Budapest's comparatively modest overtures (e.g. backing for transborder Magyars' regional autonomy, Status Law), to the point where Hungary accepted to disgruntle its ethnic kin in the process.

The impact of international systemic givens combines with patronage. When the two concur, they reinforce each other (like during the last part of Wilsonian period) and intensify irredentist tactics. Contrastingly, when they do not, then patronage can only buffer the restrictive effect of international parameters (like in the middle years of Wilsonian era). In such phases irredentist parent states will test the waters, but remain ultimately compliant. When patronage is altogether absent, mainland perceptions of leeway and opportunity are entirely decided by external cues, as in second part of the current phase and also when they are misread, as at the onset of the Wilsonian period. While such a conjuncture cannot end the *internal desire* for irredentism, it is likely to minimise (though not prevent) its foreign political manifestations.

181

Finally, with its incentives and deterrents the international factor as a whole is able to compound or limit the endogenous factors that principally affect irredentism. Phases of international permissiveness and patronage compounded an independently existing drive for retrieval, which Hungary's domestic politics furthermore enabled. Conversely, I have demonstrated how the pressures and rewards from NATO and the EU cement non-irredentist attitudes generated by identity and system political change.

5.3 Minority irredentism and international attitudes

Minorities will equally assess the international acceptance of border changes. Their criteria differ however from those of the mainland. Firstly, here, too, irredentist activity is modulated by the absence or existence of windows of opportunity. For minorities this means demonstration or deterrent effects from other, nearby irredentas and from parent state behaviour. Irredentist minorities will mirror the mainland's conduct: the more compliant it is, the more they will be and vice versa.[31] This is because they see themselves as enclaves and part of the same political community (see chapter 6). As a result, they behave as a function of this fact, sometimes to the point where they act as instruments of parent state politics (see section 1.4.2). Secondly, what also matters is the *way* in which the international system is restrictive. Is it repressive or validating? In other words, does it simply deny the legitimacy of minority national aspirations or compensate for imposed limits by endorsing them within sovereign state boundaries? Even if such support only covers internal (as opposed to external) self-determination, the extent to which minority nationalism is upheld as legitimate counts. Allardt (1979) for instance describes how attitudinal change of post-war Western democracies towards minority nationalism contributed to an increasing reformulation of minority demands in cultural-linguistic, rather than ethno-territorial terms. Such supportive attitudes can be enshrined in international treaties, agreements or regimes. Crucial, however, is whether these are "internationalised" (Kymlicka 2002), i.e. whether how states treat their minorities is seen as a matter of

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[31] In contradistinction to Horowitz (1985:286) I had already established that mainland and minority decisions are *not* independently variable (section 1.2.2).

legitimate international concern, monitoring and intervention. These can be carried out by international or regional bodies (e.g. the UN, OSCE or EU) or indeed by parent states, if this is tolerated (examples would be Denmark or the contemporary Irish Republic).[32] Essentially, this describes the degree to which a group's situation is hostage to a host state's "internal affairs". International denial of the validity of minority nationalism means inefficient or absent scrutiny. This in turn will make a group feel delivered to its host state's policies. Generally, irredentist conduct will radicalise in such situations, especially when coupled with a phase of systemic permissiveness, like in the 1930s. Conversely, the more minority aspirations are upheld externally, the less aggressive minority behaviour will be.

In short, minorities are sensitive to the degree the inter-state environment provides a safety net to their existence. It further sharpens or conversely mitigates, their responses to regional diplomatic cues.

5.3.1 Fluctuating permissiveness, no internationalisation: Hungarian minorities in the interwar period (1918-40)

Brief but selective permissiveness (1918-21): open irredentist resistance

To transborder Hungarians the beginning of the Wilsonian period also held ambiguous external cues. Several nearby irredentas had succeeded (e.g. Romania's and Poland's), so the international support for self-determination was clearly more than lip service. But the way in which Hungary's partition was enforced showed that the international community also upheld what Kymlicka (2000) so aptly terms the "myth of ethnocultural neutrality". With regards to minorities, as Schöpflin (2004:100) explains, "it was simply assumed (...) that their consent could be taken granted and ethnicity was disregarded as a factor in consent – in many circles it still is. The long-term, indeed permanent membership of a particular state was, in effect, imposed on ethnic minorities by fiat. The state order as it emerged after 1918 (...) was declared sacrosanct

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[32] Suhrke (1975:203) calls this a "pattern of neutralising conflicts" between host and parent state, i.e. a legal or diplomatic framework within which the parent state is accepted to legitimately act as backup. In her view its presence crucially contributes to mitigating minority irredentism, while its absence (i.e. when parent state monitoring is pre-empted or de-legitimised) has the opposite effect.

and minorities were left to the care of ethnic majorities, because the ethnic quality of majorities was screened out and was assumed to be civic." The beneficiaries of Wilsonianism - Poland, Romania, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia - were thus hardly tied to responsibilities for their new minorities. Although signatories to individual Treaties of Minority Protection in 1919, none made moves to ratify and implement these. Some, as in Romania's case, did not even recognise them.

Vindicated by the Wilsonian endorsement of national sovereignty, interwar host states[33] thus declared minorities as strictly internal affairs (e.g. Román 1994:100). This in turn bound the parent state's hands to affect their treatment through legitimate-diplomatic channels and contributed to the siege mentality felt by transborder Hungarians. Bilateral relations between interwar Hungary and the two host states were characterised by confrontation (Bárdi 2000a:30). This in turn brought more retributions against Magyar communities and further reinforced their sense of an internationally tolerated hostage situation (see e.g. Pritz 1982:85; Szarka1998:19-20). All of these aspects combined into a sense of considerable vulnerability among transborder Magyars, who hence believed that the stalemate could only be resolved by external redemption.

Last but not least, there was the mainland's assertiveness. Budapest had mistaken the confusing external signals as opportunity for irredentist action (see above). For minority Magyars therefore this period equally generated, or rather maintained, a certain sense of defiant hope and activism. At first, they reacted with civil disobedience: Felvidék Magyars organised strikes (Hoensch 1967:14), demonstrations (Szarka 1998:14-15), and refused oaths of allegiance to the new Czechoslovak host state (ibid.) Transylvanian Hungarians did likewise (Illyés 1982:72). Directly before and following partition, they mounted ever more formalised opposition to the Trianon settlement.

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[33] This even applied to Hungary itself. Thus premier Gömbös expressly underlined in a 1934 letter to Hitler that the domestic German community was an internal matter (Pritz 1982:265).

<u>Restrictive consensus and apparent international protection (1922-35): muted</u>
<u>irredentist activity</u>

The demonstration effects of Budapest's increasing moderation as well as apparent systemic support for minorities, brought adjustment among transborder Magyars. Parallel to their parent state, both minorities now also attempted to work within the givens of the new, imposed order. Their low-key irredentism was, however, equally due to the sheer need to survive as ethno-national group in what were nationalising states. Romania's and Czechoslovakia's assimilationist policies (see section 7.3.1) forced the Magyar communities to self-organise and defend their interests. Unlike their mainland kin, Transylvanian and Felvidék Hungarians could no longer indulge in "revanchist, ineffective fist shaking" and "depressive (...) pseudo-romanticism" over Trianon as contemporary historian Szekfű sharply remarked (Zeidler 2001:191). The same approach thus served both defensive adjustment and a more guarded, preparatory irredentism. It consisted of three strategies, which not only mirrored Budapest, but which were also financed and instructed by it: alliance building, internal consolidation and international lobbying.

Allies meant for transborder Magyars other domestic minorities who faced forced assimilation, electoral hindrances and, who nurtured a latently revisionist stance. Thus both communities formed electoral alliances with local German parties: somewhat earlier in Transylvania (1927, 1932) than in Southern Slovakia (1929, 1935).[34] Co-operation was also sought on the issue of autonomy, most prominently (and unsuccessfully) with secessionist Slovak groups, whom Budapest encouraged and financed until 1929 (Szarka 1998:24-5; Angyal 2000c:135;153-4).

The new guarded course was also characterised by self-organisation (Bárdi 2002). Collective paralysis now ceded to internal structuring of minority life, not least under mainland instruction (see sections 6.2.1 and 6.2.2). And while the minority's bulk remained staunchly conservative (i.e. rejecting their 'unnatural' situation and expecting eventual retrieval), its former abstentionism now

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[34] Voting alliances were, however, also formed with liberal host state parties, often with Budapest's encouragement. See Mikó (1941:274-284), Diószegi and Süle (1990:39-43), Bárdi (1997a) and Szarka (1998:24-27).

changed into political assertiveness towards the host state (as "thorn in its side"). Partly this was due to pressure from reformist factions within the community, which forced self-renewal and activism in host state politics (Szarka 1998:22, 27; Zeidler 2001:199-201; Bárdi 1997a, 2004a:73-4). The change, however, also resulted from Budapest's strategic promotion and financing of minority consolidation in preparation for a more permissive international stance (see above).

Finally, minority Magyars also changed their irredentist propaganda. This had two reasons. One was Budapest's new international lobbying (see above), which they imitated. The other reason was an increasing impression that multi-lateralism and the League of Nations really did internationalise and help minority grievances. This came from several similar cases in which the League had supported irredentist minorities: above all, the Sopron referendum (1922), but also the case of the Åaland Islands (1921) as well as the disputes over Upper Silesia (1922), and over the Memel region (1923). Magyars consequently now switched from nationalist protest to legal reasoning via petitions and complaints. Lobbying of individual Western governments took second rank to activity in international bodies, especially in the League of Nations. Czechoslovak Magyars systematically documented and reported abuses between 1923 and 1931 (Vígh 1993:43; Szarka 1998:22), and the Transylvanian community lodged a prolific 34 complaints. From 1925 the latter also started to partake in the annual European National Minority Congress, while their Felvidék brethren attended both the Interparliamentary and League Unions respectively. So focused were both minorities on these initiatives, that for instance the Felvidék Magyars had a quasi foreign minister (MP Géza Szüllő). A contemporary mainland publication even agonised that such minority activism, "risked to forget about its internal tasks, [instead] organising all its work, political attitudes towards foreign political powers" (Magyar Statisztikai Társaság 1938:134).

Neglect compounds incentives from rising permissiveness: resurgent minority irredentism (1935-40)

Between 1935 and 1940 permissive international attitudes reappeared, as evidenced most strongly by the successful retrieval of nearby German communities. This showed what was now possible and set a precedent that must have appeared repeatable. A celebratory publication after the Felvidék's successful retrieval revealingly states that the stir among the Sudeten Germans caused by Hitler's election "was also not without consequence among [Czechoslovak] Hungarians" (Magyar Statisztikai Társaság Államtudomanyi Intézete 1938:36-37). The persisting international neglect of minorities made irredentism appear as only promising solution. Appeals for protection had proven sorely discouraging: by 1930 the League had considered exactly *three* minority Magyar petitions.[35] Throughout, minority concerns had been either politicised or ignored. International lobbying and participation in international forums thus ceased, for instance Transylvanian Hungarians stopped attending the European National Minority Congress in 1937. Having "experimented with petitions to the League mainly in the twenties" as Zeidler describes, minority Magyars "practically stopped from the mid-1930s. The reason for this was in part the Council's disinterest, partly the fact that the 'example setting' Polish Germans had put an end to the petitionist movement following the 1934 Polish-German treaty. Hitler had transferred the politics of nationalities onto a different level" (2001:66).

Like Budapest, transborder Hungarians also realised that their host states were only upheld by the goodwill or interest of those Great Powers who had enabled their existence after World War I (see e.g. Szarka 1998:30). Of recent historical origin, fraught with internal contradictions, and often repressing a multi-ethnic make-up, these host states now proved feeble creations. This in turn fuelled secessionist and irredentist hopes within their minorities. As a consequence, the Felvidék minority radicalised politically (Szarka 1998:ibid.) and took increasing instruction from Budapest. Thus the Hungarian

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[35] Sheer figures are illustrative here. According to a 1939 summary drawn up by Budapest, the League had received 881 complaints until mid-1938. Of these 392 had been rejected on grounds of procedural mistakes, 483 were referred to lesser instances, and only 6 were actually presented to the Council. Three of these came from Magyar minorities and did not receive satisfactory treatment (see Zeidler 2001:38).

government's directive to pool strength by unifying the two local Magyar parties was heeded in June 1936 despite their ideological differences (Zeidler 2001:201). During the following two years until retrieval in November 1938, Felvidék Magyars all but abstained from Czechoslovak politics. Preparing for reunion, they now focused on internal consolidation. Prague's increasing attempts for co-optation[36] were ignored (Szarka 1998:33; Hámori 2001:573). What little voting across the ethnic cleavage there had been now ceased almost entirely. With the exception of the few so-called "activists", Magyar electoral consolidation, already in the making since the 1935 parliamentary vote, peaked in the local elections of May 1938 - two months after the demonstration effects of Austria's *Anschluss*, as Vígh stresses (1993:53-57).

The Transylvanian community reacted similarly, partly because of external developments, but also in response to domestic Romanian politics. They too, reinforced internal consolidation, aligned increasingly with mainland propaganda, and hoped for a rescue (Romsics 1998:162-7, 186). However, they were less radical than the Felvidék Hungarians in sealing themselves off. This was mainly because they could not afford to. Unlike Prague, the Romanian government made no eleventh-hour gestures to its Magyars. Quite to the contrary. International events, and in particular the successful Felvidék irredenta in 1938, sparked sharpening domestic attacks. Hence this particular community's self-harnessing was primarily concerned with warding off host state threats. External factors thus compounded its accelerated preparation for retrieval. As one of its leaders explained in retrospective, "the Hungarian Party took the basic view that the minority question in Romania was unresolvable, and that therefore the Magyar community had to hold out - at times with active, at other times with passive resistance - until help arrived from outside" (Bárdi 1997a:33).

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[36] These gestures were political, material and legislative. Newly elected president Edvard Beneš, known for his anti-Magyar feelings, offered Felvidék Magyar community leader count János Eszterházy a ministry without portfolio in September 1936. Prague now also elaborated a long-awaited minority statute which, completed in 1938, came too late. From September 1938 Hungarian areas also received considerable municipal and regional funds, as well as higher unemployment benefits for Magyars in Komárom city.

5.3.2 Post-communist minorities and international relations

<u>Variance in permissiveness – assertion of internal self-determination (1989-93)</u>

The onset of post-communism spawned another, New World Order wave of irredentas (1989-93). Many of them were close-by and failed resoundingly. Finding themselves now in "nationalising states" (Brubaker 1996), transborder Hungarians were also keen observers of precedents set by non-irredentist minority groups (Interview with Csaba Takács).[37] They were thus clearly aware of the limitations that this ostensibly permissive international consensus imposed on managing their own situation. Furthermore, Budapest had chosen early on a course of compliance and integration, which in itself gave a powerful cue. Once again, however, the resulting minority behaviour was also affected by domestic politics, namely by host state democratisation.

A good example, albeit by extrapolation, is the change in minority demands for autonomy during these years. Given that transborder Hungarians no longer pursue irredentism today, we can examine fluctuations in this lesser instance of self-determination as good indicator. Autonomy plans presented by both minorities fell into the brief permissive interlude of the period between 1989 and 1993. Slovak Hungarians presented two proposals for territorial autonomy - one in summer 1993, the other in February 1994 - while the RMDSZ submitted its draft bill to the Romanian parliament in November 1993. Conversely, in the following years minority leaders dropped their demands for autonomy, thus complying with international restrictiveness despite potentially angering their communities (see e.g. Zalatnay in Tabajdi and Barényi 1998:69-70). In addition, Budapest reduced support for their autonomy plans following its own bilateral treaties with Romania (1996) and Slovakia (1998), in exact response to restrictiveness (Ríz 2000:83-85, see above). Arguably, however, the timing also stemmed from response of Magyar elites to domestic democratisation. As part of a strategic shift within both minority leaderships, their emphasis had switched away from autonomy to allying with local pro-democracy forces, and to thereby attain governmental participation and co-

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[37] For instance, during my interview with Transylvanian Hungarian politician Csaba Takács (Interview 1) I was repeatedly referred to similar cases (e.g. that of the Slovenians in Italy) which he and the community see as "precedents and testing grounds".

nation status (see section 7.3.1, and also Bárdi 2004a:76). In other words, minority leaders were carefully factoring in the international, yet principally reacted to democratisation in their host states.

<u>Restrictiveness combines with internationalisation: domestic and European integration (1994-2005)</u>

From mid-1993 onwards international attitudes once more reverted to their default status quo consensus. Europe was a particular focal point of this change, as evidenced by the 1993 EU Stability Pact (which singled out Hungary's minority problem) and, not least, by military action against Serb positions around Sarajevo in 1995. Budapest's avid compliance with these policies (e.g. by being the first Central European state to endorse the Stability Pact) set a further pointer to minorities, together with its declining support for their collective rights from 1994 onwards. EU enlargement into Central and Eastern Europe came at this time increasingly into the foreground. The restrictive consensus Brussels both represents and enforces affected minority behaviour in two ways. Attainment of EU membership speeded up host state democratisation in general and domestic accommodation of minorities in particular. This was not least a result of close monitoring, even pressure, from Brussels and other organisations regarding minority treatment, which became a main accession criterion. Secondly, the EU fulfils Magyar aspirations to achieve a "reunification" of sorts via borderless European integration (see below).

Both Magyar communities recognised that their host states democratised and afforded them more equal participation exactly because they strove for EU accession. It is for this reason transborder Hungarians soon inextricably linked their own fate with the EU accession of their respective host countries. Furthermore, once achieved, membership would also entail the Union's general legal benefits of minority protection. These connections were made at a very early stage. For instance, the RMDSZ third party congress of 1993 already emphasised that "the Romanian Hungarian community's collective incorporation into domestic [i.e. Romanian] society is part of the country's integration into European society."

The change was premised on the twin mechanisms of European integration - "socialisation" and "conditionality" (Nodia 2004:2-3). Regarding the first, i.e. Europe's transforming effect on the attitudes and behaviour of political actors, minority Hungarians doubted it alone would be enough to help their aspirations (see e.g. Duray 2000:198). As for the second, however, it was increasingly pushed by active international involvement. The EU namely not only stated its Copenhagen criteria for accession, but, together with other organisations, also employed them as proverbial carrot and stick throughout the 1990s. In contrast to interwar international attitudes, "EU policy tends to favour a security-based approach aiming at consensual settlements over the enforcement of universal norms" (Brusis 2003:13). A few select instances illustrate this well. The start of Slovakia's accession talks was made conditional on the passing of its 1997 language law. Although criticised as insufficient by Felvidék Magyars, it enabled official use of Hungarian on a local level and would not have passed without external pressure (Hamberger 2004:108). In August 2001, Brussels directly intervened into the crisis surrounding Slovakia's territorial-administrative reform. The ethnic Magyar MKP feared deliberate ethnic redistricting when their coalition partner SMK suddenly insisted on reducing the twelve planned regions down to eight. When the SMK threatened to leave the coalition over the issue, Enlargement Commissioner Verheugen pointedly underlined the nexus between government stability and the inclusion of minorities on the one hand, and Slovakia's accession on the other. The SMK then accepted the original twelve regions plan, which was subsequently passed. The recent push in Romania's minority legislation between 2001 and 2004 (regarding especially the long-standing issue of property restitutions) neatly paralleled the precarious conduct of EU accession talks. Finally, most studies agree that host state elites accept the governmental participation of minority Magyar parties not least because of associated democracy credentials with the EU (see e.g. Bárdi and Kántor 2000:161; Blénesi 2004:75; Hamberger 2004: 108).

No doubt these interventions have contributed to the improvement of host state provisions towards their Magyar minorities, thus crucially reinforcing the irredentism-preventing effects of pluralist / inclusive democracy. Some maintain that inconsistent application and domestic interests have dampened

their impact (Hughes and Sasse 2003; Vermeersch 2003). Others, however, see them as principally responsible for minority accommodation, down to describing the emerging power-sharing practices as "EU-induced consociationalism" (Brusis 2003:6; 8-13, see also section 7.3.2). In this vein, international restrictiveness and its (dis)incentives have clearly contributed to the emergence of pluralist democracy, the very regime type able to prevent or assuage minority irredentism.

Such intervention by Brussels and other regional bodies rests not least on a changed international view of minority aspirations and host state sovereignty. In contrast to the formerly turned blind eye, "something did change after 1989, especially as a consequence of the wars in Yugoslavia, as a result of which minorities were seen as a potential or actual target of ethnic majorities and, therefore, in need of the protection of the European order" (Schöpflin 2004:100). Kymlicka (2002) describes this as the "internationalisation" of minority rights issues. This in turn rests on a historically recent re-evaluation of minority nationalism by the international community as legitimate, and thus as entitled to expression and mobilisation (ibid.; see also Allardt 1979). Today, both host states are tied into in the OSCE's increasingly standardised minority protection regime. They are furthermore bound by the first multilateral legally binding document on this subject, namely Council of Europe's 1994 Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities.

As a consequence of their reappraisal, regional bodies now make attempts to enforce these norms by using their diplomatic leverage. Although there is so far a mixed verdict on the actual impact on the ground (see e.g. Gál 2000), it is not least the international community's normative change that helps prevent minority radicalism. As another result of the re-think (and here also due to EU conditionality), parent states have been able to build legitimate channels of involvement. A "pattern of neutralising conflicts" (Suhrke 1975:203) has unfolded between Hungary and the respective host states. Deemed to crucially mitigate irredentist situations, it consists of institutionalised bilateralism

between Budapest, Romania and Slovakia via the two Basic Treaties.[38] Admittedly, this development carried initially a double meaning for transborder Magyars. On the one hand, the treaties were suspected as yet another sell-out of minority interests.[39] On the other, they were also received as guarantee that their host countries have - however tentatively - acknowledged Hungary's say concerning the minorities. The element of security that this affords is in stark contrast to their interwar hostage situation.

Together with these 'protective' components, the EU's Eastern enlargement matters as avenue to "virtual nationalism" (Csergő and Goldgeier 2001; 2004). Tellingly, this was the principle Romanian Hungarian leader Béla Markó reiterated in a recent speech in Budapest (Markó 2005). Like for Budapest, the prospect of a borderless Europe not only presents an alternative way to 'reunite,' but is in its unique conditions curiously appropriate for the now cultural definition of the Hungarian nation. Moreover, the EU's decentralisation and regionalisation effects, and the precedents these created for minorities in other countries like Spain, support group aspirations for greater self-government. Miklós Duray, leader of the Felvidék community, draws these interlocking points together beautifully:

> The key question (...) is how the dismembered Hungarian
> nation can be reintegrated without any conflicts over the
> unchangeable Trianon borders. (...) It can be assumed that
> the only possibility is the creation of a new 'nation structure'.
> For this, three fundamental aspects must be taken into
> consideration: state borders, different political environments
> and Hungarianness. This means that borders must be bridged,
> the realities of politically diverse environments must be taken
> into account and Hungarianness must be freed from being
> under the 'rubble' of the way of thinking that prevailed during

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[38] Bilateral Treaty on Good Neighbourly Relations and Friendly Co-operation between the Romanian and Hungarian Republics, signed 19 March 1995 in Paris. Bilateral Treaty on Good Neighbourly Relations and Friendly Co-operation between the Slovak and Hungarian Republics, signed 16 September 1997 in Bucharest.

[39] See Tőkés's *Open Letter to Prime Minister Gyula Horn* (1996) as well as Shafir (1996:32) on Felvidék Magyar politicians' Markó and Duray's reactions.

the post-World War II period and communism. Under such conditions, a federalist nation-structure based on local governmental authorities can develop, which, on the one hand, creates a co-national relation between the Hungarian community and the majority nation of a given country, and on the other hand, creates a culturally unified Hungarian nation consisting of politically independent units. (Duray 2000:200, quoted in Bárdi 2004a:74).

No statement could outline more clearly the interlocking and reinforcing effects of the international factor on the two variables that are principally responsible for irredentist inconsistency: democracy and identity change.

5.4 Conclusion: the international as modulating factor

Comparative historical evidence from the two time periods confirms that irredentist tactics - as distinct from the actual *desire* for retrieval - do respond to external cues. World political factors modulate the way irredentism is conducted. We have seen above how they have shaped the interwar irredentism of both the Magyar mainland and its transborder ethnic kin, even to the point of mirroring temporary fluctuations. Both parties' irredentist activism intensified during the Wilsonian period's two permissive phases, whilst displaying more guarded diplomacy in between. Patronage for Hungary and international neglect towards minorities respectively emphasised diplomatic opportunities. An inverse and less dramatic pattern is discernible today. Hungarians on both sides of the borders have overwhelmingly endorsed the current restrictive consensus. Yet their strategies and public positions have shifted even within this narrow context, by faithfully reflecting the initial leniency and subsequent conservatism of the current New World Order-period. Both actors are influenced by negative demonstration effects from Yugoslavia as well as by the borderless alternative that the EU's restrictive regional system offers. Last but not least, transborder Magyars enjoy and use the latter's leverage against host countries' nationalising pressures. Their

194

response to internationalised scrutiny (or conversely to the de-legitimisation of their national aspirations) is corresponds to how patronage or its absence, affects parent states. So while permissiveness combined with third party backing amounts to a window of opportunity for the mainland, for minorities it is external invalidation of their nationalism and precedent cases which build up urgency.

The fact that this variable has *shaped* irredentism (in timing, tactics and even somewhat in content) but not *decided* it (thereby not answering the central problem of inconsistency) already indicates its secondary importance. The Magyar case shows well the uses and limits of explaining irredentism in terms of international relations. The contrasting interwar and contemporary situations illustrate how mainland, and to a lesser extent transborder, activism mirror the turns and twists of interwar diplomacy. But, as we have seen subsequently, both are also heavily influenced by domestic constellations in a two-way relationship. The fact that Magyars felt the need to reunite in the first place was in turn rooted in a shared identity which rationalised this particular type of nationalism. In conclusion, the international factor contributes indirectly to explaining irredentism. The more it coincides with the internal factors primarily determining retrieval (ethnicity and regime type), the stronger its impact. Windows of opportunity do not by themselves make an irredenta and deterrents do not prevent it, if the endogenous conditions are not in place.

6. Identity: Irredentism's Primary Variable

"Regardless of what happens to Hungary, one thing has to remain: the affective unity of all Hungarians. If we cannot save the country in its thousand-year old shape from the great catastrophe we have to save the nation. Even if their homeland is torn apart, Hungarians must remain as one. Hungarian culture cannot be ripped to pieces and snatched away from us: it remains ours forever. Greed, the thirst for revenge and ignorance can do whatever they like with the country, the nation shall remain as one and shall be indivisible. No matter what they do to us, Hungarians shall hold hands with Hungarians across frontiers and artificial dividing lines and shall stick together in spirit and in truth. The soul of the eternal Hungarian will forever hover above the ruins of old Hungary."

Aladár Schöpflin, literary critic, 1919[1]

6.1 Introduction: Ethnic identity and its politicisation

Irredentism is the very politicisation of ethno-national identity. Shared, exclusive ethnicity makes for intra-group solidarity, infuses retrieval with its rationale (national self-determination), and defines its scope (a group's constituency and ancestral territory). Conducted in its name, retrieval seeks to complete or restore nation-stateness. Explaining irredentism hence means to include ethnic identity and its variation as decisive factor in its own right. Nevertheless, the study of ethnicity and nationalism still finds it difficult to treat identity as real or independent social fact, primarily because this collides with standard premises of individualism, rationality, and materialism.[2] This is not least true for the sparse literature on irredentism. In most cases it takes ethnic identity for granted, i.e. considers it as environmental given (Saideman 1998; Saideman

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[1] Quoted in Farkas (2001:356-7).
[2] On this point see for instance Esman (1994:11), Connor (1996), McGarry (1998), or Kymlicka (2001a), who all concur in their critique.

and Ayres 1999 and 2000; Reichman and Golan 1991). Some accounts, notably those based on international relations theory, omit it to a great degree (Ben-Israel 1991; Carment and James 1995; Von Hippel 1993; Weiner 1971). Finally, a few include it as determining variable (Suhrke 1975; Suhrke and Noble 1977; Kitromilides 1990; Yagcioglu 1996), stress its instrumentalisation by elites (Andreopoulos 1981; Gavrilis 2000), or isolate it as in some way influential (Weiner 1991:668; Chazan 1991; Gutman 1991; Neuberger 1991:105; Landau 1990, 1991 and 1995; Brubaker 1996; Ambrosio 2002:111).

6.1.1 Horowitz's take on ethnic identity within irredentism

Donald Horowitz's theory of irredentism does not omit the factor of group cohesion, but attaches no overwhelming prominence to it either. He briefly considers the impact of mainland elite identities ('particularised affinity'), but sees it as essentially conditioned by hierarchical leadership patterns which consequently subordinates this to regime type (Horowitz 1985:286-287; see chapter 7). It is however indicative that Horowitz assumes a group's shared ethnicity to be insufficient on its own, and that it therefore needs a personalised "top up" within the parent state elite. In a second, and for this analysis more salient, perspective he addresses the identity variable at the group level of irredentist politics. Two lines of reasoning are distinguishable here: for one, a caveat about internal cleavages (tribal, religious or political) which limit cohesion between mainland and minority, and consequently spoil retrieval. Secondly, he generally dismisses shared ethnicity as sufficient cause for irredentism.

Intra-group cleavages
Internal divisions between parent state and transborder kindred, Horowitz argues, may work against irredentism. He quite rightly reminds that "...seemingly cohesive groups are not as solidary as they look from afar", and that so-called "...subgroup cleavages have a prominent bearing on irredentist decisions" (1985:285). However, we are not told which these divisive cleavages are, or alternatively, how to recognise them. Furthermore, is their impact tied to certain criteria, or alternatively to their scale / extent? As already discussed in chapter 2, I have derived indicators from the supporting examples provided in

his text. They respectively list rifts along religious, tribal and ideological-political lines.[3] Bewilderingly, this means we are talking about both cross-cutting issues as well as rival identities. Since my model uses Esman's (1994:14-15) dual definition of ethnicity as both essential and externally conditioned, other "real" identities and solidarities (political, religious, tribal etc.) pose however no challenge. This is because "the more politicised ethnicity becomes, the more it dominates other expressions of identity, eclipsing class, occupational, and ideological solidarities."

Group identity

In a later work Horowitz returns to the role of identity and its explanatory power within cases of irredentism (1991:14-15). He warns against assuming ethnicity and kinship as firm, and against apportioning them too much weight when making sense of irredentas. ("To define irredentism as an attempt to retrieve kindred people across boundaries is to assume that people know each other, that kinship and ethnicity are firm"). Rather, "ethnic identity is variable over time and over context".[4] Kinship is therefore "convertible", and so are in turn a group's political demands. "One of the major problems with irredentism" Horowitz explains, "is that the ethnic affinity of the core of a putative irredentist state may not extend to people at and beyond the periphery, and those are the very people who are to be retrieved" (ibid.). While this correctly highlights variation within identity as a somehow problematic point for retrieval, he dismisses it as fickle, rather than investigating it. I shall argue below that, quite to the contrary, herein lies one of the main reasons for irredentist inconsistency.

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[3] Horowitz's sub-variable of internal cleavages had proven insignificant in statistical testing, displaying high probability values for the null hypothesis (see section 2.4.2). This refutation is all the more impressive since basic testing in binary mode (existence or lack thereof) revealed that a majority of irredentas actually does possess one or more potentially disruptive intra-group cleavages (Dataset Manual 1, variable 21 - out of 55 cases 22 possess cleavages, 7 are unknown and 26 count as largely homogenous)

[4] The assertion itself is not problematic, but the conclusions drawn from it. As explained in the introductory chapter, by adopting Esman's definition (1994) my work actually concurs with the idea of a continuum between primordial essence and instrumental function of ethnicity. However, Horowitz is wrong to take the very involvement of ethnic entrepreneurship as proof that group identity is constructed. In fact if anything, its politicisation and use indicate it as something that has an authentic basis. Ethnic solidarities are (moderately) flexible not because of their feebleness, as Horowitz reasons, but in response to contextual stimuli – i.e. environmental threats and opportunities. In moments of crisis, ethno-national identity will override all other, individual and / or less deeply rooted motives.

198

6.1.2 Changes in ethnicity affect its politicisation (nationalism)

Retrieval, as I have described above, is the political translation of a group's ethno-national identity. Irredentist groups are invariably groups that (chiefly) identify themselves in exclusive terms. Among these criteria are, importantly, the ancestral homeland and a clear, narrow membership by descent. These define the scope of an irredenta and make for its rationale: to (re)unite what so evidently and exclusively belongs together. The more exclusive the definition of constituency, the greater the imperative for shared statehood and to be governed by one's own. The political unit that this demands – a state that comprises all of kin and soil – thus rests on the idea of a community of fate. Hence also the family and corporal metaphors retrieval uses. Irredentism, in other words, needs to be underpinned by a certain type of group identity: it is an expression of ethnic nationalism.

A group's identity can however acquire different or additional sources, it can shift.[5] When it changes into a type that lacks or fudges these narrow and precise criteria, irredentism no longer makes sense. The new markers of groupness generate a different type of nationalism, i.e. a translation of affinity into politics which does not demand political (re)union. Which markers are these? So far the literature has distinguished a conventional dichotomy between "ethnic" and "civic" bases of nationalist mobilisation (Kohn 1967; Plamenatz 1976; Nairn 1997). This, however, posits false opposites (Smith 1991:13) and does not differentiate between ethnic and cultural identification (see e.g. Kymlicka 1999, 2001b:244-5; Lecours 2000). Shulman (2002) therefore proposes a tripartite model along a continuum of decreasing exclusiveness. Group identity and its political expression as nationalism is either ethnic (defined by ancestry and race), cultural (religion, language and traditions) or civic (marked by state territory, citizenship, consent as well as political ideology, institutions and rights). I would expand the ethnic category by one more criterion, which characterises all irredentist groups: residence on and identification with, ancestral homelands (as distinct from the legally defined territory of a civic nation).

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[5] Several studies have observed such shifts in the bases of group identification and nationalism: see for instance Breton (1988), Lecours (2000), and Latouche (2001) for Québec, Hallik (1996) for Estonia, or Sekulic (2004) for Croatia.

No group will make a full quantum leap to these civic markers which pre-empt ethno-territorial movements. When their self-view changes, most will shift one level away from exclusiveness, to a national definition mixing citizenship with language and heritage. The balance between these two elements depends on individual case and juncture. Because they lie along a continuum, they are in fact sequential. The decisive first shift therefore is towards a culturally based identity, whose anti-irredentist effects subsequent civic components reinforce. While cultural nationalism can very well serve as basis for secessions or autonomy, it is useless for retrieval. This is because (re)union needs a strongly cohesive, positive definition of the group, whereas secession is more defensive, identifying itself against a majority and thereby emphasising what it is *not*. „Cultural nationalism" Kymlicka explains, "defines the nation in terms of a common culture, and the aim of the nationalist movement is to protect the survival of that culture. Examples of cultural nationalism include the Québécois or the Catalans in Spain" – movements defending their identity against linguistically and culturally dominant majorities (2001:243-4). Hence it is the shift from primordial to cultural markers that kills irredentism.

How does this work? Group identification based solely or mainly on ethnic criteria provides all the requisite ingredients for retrieval. In contrast, a culturally anchored self-understanding crucially undercuts the necessary bases for irredentism. Firstly, identity is no longer principally tied to blood and soil. While ancestry and territory provide irredentist projects with a clearly defined constituency and map image, culturally based ethnicity is a looser association. It is more voluntaristic. Irredentism cannot restore national completeness where the defining traits – language, heritage, traditions – are more inclusive and thus do not describe absolute solidarities. Secondly, culturally defined groupness also allows for diverse but equal versions of group membership. This precludes what is essential to irredentist scenarios: the subordination and dependency of 'unviable' enclaves, and their consequent need for 'redemption' by their parent state. Conversely, it does allow for independent, local alternatives of group identity: parent states cease to regard themselves as truncated, transborder communities no longer feel as hapless satellites. This leads on to the final point: these local variants have now the potential to be politically autonomous from each other. Whether or not they will be, and how completely, depends on the

strength of civic loyalties which a democratic political environment fosters (see also sections 7.2.2 and 7.3.2). Ethnically defined groupness generates a nationalism that extols political loyalty based on blood ties, on a community of fate. Existence in separate states is inconceivable, because the group sees itself as kindred political community. In contrast, national definitions based partly or even prominently on civic markers (citizenship, state territory and institutions) separate political and cultural-communal allegiances into different spheres of belonging. Membership is now (also) a question of consent and participation. This automatically excludes parts of the group beyond the border. Solidarity within the group thus becomes even more tenuous, because it is conflicted in its bases (cultural versus civic).[6] Above all, this further reinforces that fact that identity can no longer command (re-)union of kindred and homeland.

Of course, few groups and their states source their identity exclusively from one of the three ideal types outlined above. Most are mixtures of ethnic, cultural and civic elements, and none – not even liberal-individualist democracies – will completely lack communal, exclusive components. I argue, however, that irredentism is only possible in those who principally emphasise ethnic traits at the expense of other characteristics (or even exclusively, because no others exist). The above described 'shift' towards a mixed cultural-civic identity is not an inevitable trajectory. While it occurs in some irredentist groups, thus ending their pursuit of national completeness, it does not and will not in others. However where it does take place, the move down the continuum is irreversible: groups that develop into self-ascriptive collectives will not revert to exclusiveness. In other words, once irredentism loses its basis it will not re-occur.

Identifying the causes for this shift from primordial to cultural and then ethnic would go beyond this chapter's scope, but prior experience of statehood appears to matter. The more recent and / or precarious the owning of a titular state, the more exclusive group's self view and tenacious its irredenta. For

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[6] Although civic and cultural elements provide the standard twin bases of nationalism in democracies, they are conflictual in settings where the titular nation is spread over several states. This is because political-institutional criteria automatically exclude transborder kin, while cultural ones include them.

instance, Hungary's often quoted millennial statehood was in fact frequently interrupted (via Turkish and later prolonged Austrian rule), and only really recovered with internal self-rule after 1867. Conversely, one can exclude common normative explanations. Amongst these figure the simple passing of time (disproven by the longevity of many irredentas like the Irish, Greek, Serb or Italian cases), modernisation, affluence (wealthy, advanced groups are irredentist too – see chapter 3), or some historical-political maturation process (refuted by repeated, unsuccessful, and disastrous attempts like Somalia's, Pakistan's or Bulgaria's). Similarly untenable is the suggestion of the "ethnicity erasing" effects of communism. If anything, the precise opposite applies: exactly because communism has created "civic deserts", many successor states now legitimise around an ethnic theme (Brubaker 1996; Schöpflin 1996). Greek, Serbian, Armenian, Croat and Albanian irredentism are all cases in point. Compounding factors, however, exist. These seem to be generational change within the group, divergent landmark experiences between mainland and its separated enclaves and, above all, the experience of democracy. As for the development of civic identities, I will show in chapter 7 how democratic governance generates these. For the mainland, strong and effective democratic institutions build civic nationalism, thus pre-empting the void of solidarity that ethno-politics otherwise fills (Gellner 1983, 1992; Nodia 1994, 2000). Consociational democracy, or features thereof, in turn provide transborder minorities with a political environment where they can eschew the irredentist option. This is not least true for the Hungarians, whose increasingly political-institutional self-definition has measurably grown under post-communism and continues to do so. In this way, democracy accelerates and cements the shift in identity and nationalism that is responsible for irredentist inconsistency.

This case study will demonstrate how Magyar irredentism has ceased due to changes in the group's ethno-national identity. Hungarian ethnicity and therefore Hungarian nationalism, have lost their ethnic-exclusive characteristics requisite for an irredenta – among them identification with a homeland and a narrow, clear definition of group constituency. Magyarness today is defined by cultural-linguistic markers, which cannot translate into irredentism. Furthermore, this self-view is increasingly rivalled by civic components in both the Hungarian parent state and the transborder communities. National identity is thus

202

becoming even more tenuous in its solidarity because it relies on conflicting elements. In order to comprehensively present this argument, the following chapter will outline changes in Hungarian self-understanding and show how these translated into a changed, non-irredentist kind of nationalism. It hence contrasts the two time periods in terms of the nature and cohesiveness of Magyar ethno-national identity, and shows how this respectively translated into very different intra-group relations and national aspirations.

6.2 Magyars between partition and retrieval (1920-1940)

Hungarian identity during the interwar period

Hungarian identity had historically contained all three strands of identification – ethnic, cultural and civic. The Hungarian Law of Nationalities of 1868 for instance shows a liberal, civic-political conception of the nation[7]. Yet at the same time, assimilation policies pointed to a cultural understanding of Hungarianness. Magyarisation thus worked to turn the Kingdom's "nationalities" - Romanians, Slovaks, Croats and Serbs - into Hungarians. Descent, i.e. an ethnic definition of the nation, remained important. It was exclusively ethnic Hungarians who held political office within the Habsburg Empire's devolved Hungarian government. A Magyar ascendancy largely monopolised land, property and middle class professions (civil service, education etc.) even in ethnically diverse areas like Transylvania. Unsurprisingly thus, the precise content of "Magyarness" was never pinned down: the nation was simply equated with a historic state which it owned not exclusively, but as titular and dominant group.

The Trianon partition changed this. Group and state no longer coincided. The nationalities had proven 'disloyal' by pursuing their own statehood. Interwar Hungary and the freshly separated minorities thus fell back onto a narrow self-definition. For both actors "Magyarness" significantly revolved around what was lost, what had to be restored. This meant two things. For one, the recovery of the millennial "Crownlands of St. Stephen". Magyars regarded this as their ancestral territory, its conquest signifying both their birth and survival as nation.

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[7] „All citizens of Hungary (...) form a single nation – the indivisible unitary Magyar nation – to which all citizens of the country belong, irrespective of nationality."

The famous credo of the time, taught in every mainland school, was that life was not worth living outside this Hungary (*"extra Hungariam non est vita, si est, non est ita"*). Secondly, there was the blood-based community of fate. With the state and its institutions destroyed, with non-assimilated compatriots having deserted, this was what remained. Hungarians on both sides of the borders felt unity in grief, trauma and anger, forming a "community of suffering" (Haynes 1995:89). Notions of national catastrophe were pervasive (L. Nagy 1987:5; Zeidler 2001:10). Culture, history and language were no longer in function of statehood, like before, but merely accessory to what now reliably identified a Hungarian: ancestry. Crucially then, this was a conception of identity about one, indivisible Magyar ethnic group and its homeland. This provided both the imperative and the clearly defined identity, necessary to irredentism. Both actors' choice for retrieval was thus in function of this identity.

6.2.1 Minorities by force: dependent enclaves and recalcitrant host state citizens

Self-view: "communities by force"

The freshly partitioned Hungarian minorities saw themselves as *kényszerközösségek*, or "communities forced together" (Bárdi 1997:32 and 1998:55; Szarka 1998:10). They were arbitrary sub-units of the Magyar group, by-products of a partition which had been concerned with very different objectives.[8] Apart from Transylvania[9], they lacked any significant history of autonomous thought or political action, not least due to Hungary's centralised

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[8] Hungary's demographic and territorial dismemberment was quite "(...) decisively tailored by great-power interests; the notion of self-determination (...) lent only retrospective justification to that" (Zeidler 2001:24).

[9] At first glance Transylvania is an exception in both respects. Its liberal, protestant heritage made for a political and literary apartness which is often described as "opposite pole" to Budapest's Catholic baroque traditions (see e.g. Pomogáts 2001:126-128; Kibédi Varga 2002:5-6). This combined with a proud history as independent principality and subsequent political distinctness even within re-unified, nineteenth century Hungary. The community was furthermore sizeable, numbering at 1.6 million in 1930 (Kocsis and Kocsis-Hodosi 1998:113). On the other hand, however, this historic Transylvania was not identical with what Trianon had partitioned away, and this in turn severely compromised this prior, distinct identity. The actual territory annexed was only partly congruent with the historic one (see Lőkkös 2000:31, 41-42) and its Magyar population had been drained by a significant exodus of mainly middle class refugees towards Hungary (107 035 individuals according to Kocsis and Kocsis-Hódosi 1998:114, Mócsy 1995:242 even quotes 222 000, i.e. a loss of 13.2 per cent).

past.[10] Largely devoid of prior regional identities, shaken by war, partition, and drained by refugee flows, these communities were in the years after Trianon weak and disoriented.

Consequence 1: intra-group relations - cohesion means subordination

Irredentism relies on the notion of an ethno-national core and a periphery. For one, this is because the project requires it, requires the weaker party's subordination to the mainland as a willing instrument in pursuit of their common goal. Secondly and more crucially, because this underpins irredentism's very rationale: the need to reunite, because the centre is incomplete, and because a periphery by definition cannot - should not - exist by itself. The key elements here are incompleteness for the parent state and inequality and non-viability for the minority. This is expressed in the very idea that kin needs 'redeeming' from the yoke of ethnically foreign government. Irredentist folklore reflects the same concept in its metaphors of a body and its lost limbs (see chapter 1). Yet once less exclusive markers (culture, language, heritage) become primary, this whole logic and its imperative for retrieval is in trouble. This is because culture can be independently re-produced, maintained and added to. Identity is no longer necessarily or exclusively in function of a putative core. This in turn allows for multiple centres within an ethnic group which are equal and capable of independent survival. There is no longer a state of national incompleteness. Retrieval is in this scenario no longer crucial, nor even desirable.

Forcibly separated from the organic whole of the Hungarian nation, both transborder communities viewed themselves as mere Hungarian enclaves, something that is typical for irredentist minorities. There was a deep-seated insecurity over their capacity to survive on their own, and anxiety over their initial disorganisation (see Török 2001:66; Varga in Fazekas 1993:54 and Ölvédi in Fazekas 1993:19-20). Their collective identity was defined by and ultimately dependent on, the Hungarian parent state. Hungary was the point of reference for "Magyarness" and its belonging. Minority Hungarians' own status

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[10] While Transylvania could at least salvage some of its former self, Czechoslovakia's Magyars did not benefit from any pre-existing sources of autonomous regional identification. The Felvidék had never acquired a historically distinct role within the former Hungarian kingdom, and thus remained until 1920 strongly oriented towards the capital Budapest. It was also smaller, (608 221 Magyars in 1930), and devoid of a local intellectual tradition like Transylvania's. Not only did this disadvantage the community's self-galvanisation, but it also caused an even stronger sense of truncation and leaderless abandonment (Vígh 1993:66; Magyar Statisztikai Társaság 1938: 9-16; Kocsis and Hodosi-Kocsis 1998: 56).

conversely was something incomplete or lesser because they were citizens of other countries.

This self-view as mere enclave translated into subordination to the Hungarian parent state. Transborder ties were regarded as lifeline: there was a collective expectation of eventual help from Budapest, a deep trust in being saved. Both minorities thus submitted to mainland hegemony over their affairs, displaying ideal typical irredentist attitudes described in chapter 1. At times this was less pronounced in Transylvania, with its independent political traditions.[11] For the most part, however, minority politics were a mirror image of mainland conditions: a patrician-conservative leadership, marginalised peasants and workers and negligible left-wing or liberal factions. The respective leaderships willingly co-operated with parent state indoctrination through training in mainland universities and government co-ordinated study programmes (Pálfy 2001; Török 2001; Bárdi 2004b). In short, it was Hungary who built, shaped and determined the minority's identity, thus ingraining political allegiance and emphasizing dependency.

Consequence 2: political behaviour as a function of identity – nation equals polity

The kinship underpinning irredentism is conceived in the narrow, literal sense: it describes a (perceived) shared ancestry. This organic understanding of the nation prevents transborder communities from socialising into minority existence. Enclaves find it unnatural and inconceivable to live (or remain) outside their titular state. This means that they do not distinguish between communal and civic-political allegiances. Both lie with the mainland alone. Furthermore, their subordinate status limits political autonomy from the mainland. These factors consequently rule out any accommodation with the respective host state. Instead, resistance and self-isolation is a logical, even necessary answer. Because (narrowly defined) identity legitimises political authority there is little chance of accepting existence outside of a state owned by kin.

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[11] During the mid-1920s there was arguably a temporary autonomy towards the parent state. With the latter's hands tied by international restraints, Transylvanian leaders "acted at the end of the twenties no longer as figures of the Budapest government, but as representatives confirmed in Romanian political elections pursuing not Hungary's but Transylvanian Magyar politics" (Bárdi 1997a:10-11). Simultaneously the share of Transylvanian university students within mainland institutions began to fall and return to Kolozsvár (Pálfy 2001).

The stance of both minorities towards the nationalising Romanian and Czechoslovak host state can best be described as "defensive political struggle". It was marked by a siege mentality and narrow, sectarian political platforms. Famously, the Erdély minority's identification towards its host society was that of "thorn in the foreign side" (*örlő szú az idegen fában*). The Felvidék group took a very similar stance, with one of their MPs programmatically declaring to the Czechoslovak parliament that their presence "...by no means as acknowledgement of this illegal fact [Hungary's partition], but as living and permanent protest against this cruelly unjust decision made against us and without us...." (Szarka 1998:18).[12] Unlike today, there was limited engagement with host state politics and little understanding of the crucial connection between general democratisation and improving their own fate. Instead, there was a staunch denial of realities, a conviction that this untenable situation as minority would not last for good. Consequently, Magyar identity had to be consolidated, bolstered and preserved, not least against the assimilatory pressures of the nationalising Romanian and Czechoslovak host states (see section 7.3.1.). The Transylvanian Hungarian party OMP thus "assumed that the minority question in Romania was unsolvable, and that therefore the Magyars had to hold out, by resisting sometimes actively and at times passively, until such time as the solution *arrives from the outside*" (Bárdi 1997:34-35, emphasis mine).

The exception were small reformist factions in both Erdély and the Felvidék.[13] Revealingly, their new *kisebbségi realizmus*, or "minority realism", called for a rethink on identity which in turn offered non-irredentist political choices. It conceived of Magyarness in cultural, rather than ethnic terms. This enabled the distinction of a cultural identity with a titular state (Hungary) from political

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[12] A contemporary publication similarly contrasted that "while the truncated Hungary was forced to sign and ratify the Trianon dictate, the Felvidék Magyars did not acknowledge it for a moment" and that this "remained throughout the guiding principle of their politics" (Magyar Statisztikai Társaság Államtudomanyi Intézete 1938:31).

[13] In the Felvidék, these were the "Hungarians with a New Face" (*Újarcú Magyarok*) and an association named Sarjú (Second Crop), while in Transylvania it consisted of an entire intellectual group, with literary circles like the *Erdélyi Szépmíves Céh* and numerous publications, among them the two journals *Hitel* (Creed) and *Erdélyi Helikon*. These 'Transylvanianists' were able to draw on the legacy of a historically autonomous local identity, for "the Hungarians of Transylvania have traditionally had a strong identity and consciousness of their own which *did not automatically identify them with the Hungarian state*" (Schöpflin 1988:144, emphasis added). Although articulate, their ideas were "historicised and idealised" (Zeidler 2001: 200) and found little popular support.

allegiance towards it. Secondly, these intellectuals emphasised internal self-renewal, a separate minority identity, and thus political independence from the mainland. A sign of this was their break with mainland patrician politics by appealing to new sociological strata like workers, young people, and the hitherto marginalised peasantry (e.g. Mikó 1932; Popély 1990:97-106). They rejected irredentism and Budapest's hegemonic interference. The so-called "Transylvanianists" objected via a considerable literary output, while the Felvidék reformers countered with "some measure of self-irony and resignation" (Zeidler 2001:192; 203-204).[14] Well ahead of their time, these conceptions were not endorsed by the two minorities (Balogh in Romsics 1998:156-167; Zeidler 2001: 199-202; Pomogáts 2001:116). However, they foreshadowed the subsequent change in minority identity and corollary political behaviour that characterise both communities today.

Overall the "rhetoric of national injury stood much closer to and was much deeper rooted in, the psychology of the Transylvanian Magyar community", and the same was true in the Felvidék (Zeidler 2001:199). Transborder Hungarians remained recalcitrant citizens of their host states, precisely in function of their self-view. Dušan Kováč (1990:90) summarises this nexus between identity and minority irredentism quite clearly. The Felvidék community "(...) did not create a positive relation with Czechoslovakia and was closely entwined with the Horthy regime's endeavours to liquidate / do away with Czechoslovakia. Just like the German parties, the Magyar minority's parties were immediately directed from abroad - Hungarians from Budapest, Germans from Berlin. (...) What motivated the Hungarian minority's anti-Czechoslovak stance was the refusal to identify itself with its minority situation. What this is all about is the (...) problem of the minority's identity."

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[14] For instance, a Felvidék reader's letter protested that "we expect from Budapest *neither good advice nor unsolicited and romantic national grief (...) they should not constantly lecture us, the minority, about our situation and tasks*" (ibid., emphasis original).

6.2.2 The Hungarian parent state: truncated redeemer readying for national salvation

Self-view: dismembered, "bleeding Hungary"[15]

Corresponding to the minorities' self-view as unviable limbs, Hungary saw itself as unsustainably truncated. Partition had caused a fervent debate about the definition of Hungarianness. It revolved around two contending poles: culture and history on the one hand, and racial-biological arguments on the other (Haynes 1995: 89-91; Romsics 1998; Farkas 2001; Dow 2002).[16] Few exceptions apart, the latter conception prevailed among both elites and public opinion. It described Magyarness as kinship of shared ancestry, which in turn made national and homeland dismemberment unacceptable. This combined with the reversal of Hungarian ethnic ascendancy, military defeat, and disarmament, temporary occupation by former 'subject peoples', economic ruin, and not least the shameful acceptance of war guilt and reparations payments (Zeidler 2001:42). In short, the sense of absolute solidarity and injustice engendered an almost missionary zeal to remedy incompleteness.

Consequence 1: intra-group relations - cohesion means hegemony

As I have outlined above, the close family-like cohesion of kinship imposes respective tasks on both actors. Complementary to the subordination of transborder brethren it entails for the parent state the imperative to regain completeness via hegemony. The minority and its retrieval becomes a project, and secondary aspects of cohesion like culture are put to its use.

Budapest thus strategically promoted and financed minority consolidation in preparation for a future irredentism (Bárdi 1995a, 1995b, 2004b; Angyal 2000c; Török 2001). The project's dual goal was to ensure the communities remained Hungarian despite forced assimilation, and to thereby preserve the bases for

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[15] „Vérző Magyarország" (Bleeding Hungary) was the title of a bestselling volume edited in 1921 which has become a standard work of Hungarian literature. It comprises articles, poems and essays on the irredentist theme by virtually all eminent figures of Magyar literary and political life.

[16] Examples are the Turanianism debate about Magyar racial origins and Prohászka's theory (1936) about biologically defined national traits. These were countered by influential political thinkers like Mihály Babits or Gyula Szekfű, who argued for cultural-historic characterisations of Magyarness. Both, however, stressed the millennial territory's importance in determining the national collective.

irredentism. This strategy was specially budgeted for (with mounting figures throughout the early twenties) and tightly organised into respective offices.[17]

Hungary's financial help enabled minority Magyars to survive materially, organisationally, and culturally as kindred communities. Funding priorities and amounts differed between minorities (Angyal 2000c:146-167), but the rationale was explicitly strategic. Benedek Jancsó, one its chief architects, explained: "they were able to take the territory away from us, but once the opportunity arises, we can take it back under favourable and fortunate circumstances, because it [the territory] will not disappear. The homeland is not made up of mountains, valleys, rivers, and plains, but of those people who live in it. If, however, the Hungarian community is lost, wholly or in part, on these areas as a result of foreign repressive rule, then we will also lose our strongest legal entitlement to these territories" (Bárdi 1995a:102).

Funding simultaneously allowed the parent state government to discretely retain control over transborder Magyars. Because identity became politics, it was not only a question of preserving, but also of engineering it. Prime minister Bethlen tellingly asserted that the mainland "maintains for itself the right to instruct and decide in important political questions" (Szarka 1998:27). Especially towards Felvidék Magyars Budapest was interfering and politically directional, not least because 50 to 70 per cent of monies were channelled into the minority's party apparatus (Angyal 2000c:151-2;160-7). A few examples illustrate this well. For instance, Budapest recognised Transylvania's conservative leadership in the so-called Kolozsvár Centre as *the only legitimate political representation* of the Erdély community. Hungarian Premier Bethlen cited the two feuding Felvidék party leaders to Budapest in August 1926, like unruly schoolboys (Szarka 1998:24-27). In 1932, Hungary forced the Felvidék community into changing to a more compliant leadership, and then in 1936 overtly pressurised its two main parties to unite in anticipation of retrieval (Angyal 2000c:155-164). Financial dependency also facilitated covert intelligence gathering and recruitment of future minority elites, especially amongst the larger Transylvanian Magyar community (Török 2001:60-5). In sum, shared kinship rationalised Budapest's ability and authority to manipulate its minorities.

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[17] They were the Rákóczi, later Thököly, Federation (for the Felvidék), the Saint Gellért Society (targeting the Voivodina, and the now Romanian Bánát) and the Popular Literary Society (NIT) (for all Romanian territories of Eastern Hungary).

<u>Consequence 2: waiting for salvation – irredentist conditionality of parent state</u>
<u>politics</u>

Much like in the case of the minorities, domestic political behaviour in the mainland derives from the imperatives of identity. Ambrosio (2002:18) notes that irredentist states typically extol the "remedial nature" of retrieval, based on "the belief that (...) the interests and rights of the nation as a whole are not (and likely cannot) be satisfied unless all members of the nation dwell within the same polity." Glenny (1996:15-26) observes in the same vein: "most nationalisms are based on the assumption that a state which encompasses all members of one nation can overcome all major social and economic evils." Since the state is an expression of the organic whole that is the ethno-national group, it cannot operate successfully in truncation and needs to make completeness its priority.

Interwar Hungarian politics worked as a function of this principle. State policy was legitimate, party platforms only likely to muster support, if they served and subscribed to irredentism. This conflation of group and state was not least enabled by weak political institutions which left ethno-nationalism unrivalled as only focus of identity, mobilisation and allegiance (see section 7.2.1). Virtually all areas of political life were hence shaped by or even subordinated to, the irredentist agenda. Of course this concerned first and foremost foreign policy: no single diplomatic move between the wars happened without retrieval in mind (see section 5.2.1). Economic planning similarly adjusted to an irredentist rationale, rather than vice versa (see section 3.2.2). Zeidler (2001:77) describes for instance how Budapest actually rejected a customs union with Austria and Czechoslovakia, proposed to alleviate the 1929 crisis, precisely because it worried a successful solution by economic means alone would jeopardise its case for irredentism. Even lesser policy areas were put in the service of retrieval, often with palpable drawbacks. Kovács (1989:82-4) thus describes Budapest's refusal to re-district and develop truncated counties after 1920 in the hope of future retrieval, causing local economies to further atrophy. Finally, party statutes across the entire political spectrum (including the communists) extolled irredentism, as did public speeches (Gergely et al. 1991; Romsics 2000; Zeidler 2001:127). The idea was that, because dismemberment had caused Hungary's problems, restoring completeness would equal national salvation.

6.3 Magyars in the post-communist period (1989-2005)

Contemporary Hungarian identity

Hungarian national identity has shifted from ethnic-exclusive to cultural, and also increasingly civic, markers. Sociological surveys in both actors show furthermore that this is an ongoing and growing development during democratic transition and consolidation. Parent state respondents thus show continuously declining identification with ancestry and soil since the late 1970s, and an increasing equation of Magyar ethnicity with liberal, self-ascriptive criteria in the course of the post-communist period. Alongside heritage and language, there is a strengthening identification with political and institutional markers such as citizenship (Csepeli 1989:43-46, Csepeli 1992/97:241-254; HTMH:2000; Shulman 2002:567-578). Similarly, minority Hungarians tie belonging today to cultural, and now also civic, criteria ever more emphatically (Gereben 1995; Veres 1997; Langman 1997; Lampl 1999; Lanstyák 2000).

As consequence of this changed self-view, Hungarian nationalism and its political goals have changed as well. Because cultural markers create a more loosely defined unity, Hungarians on both sides of the borders are developing into self-conscious communities. In addition, because both mainland Hungary and minority host states have undergone successful democratisation, these respective Magyar communities have developed separate civic identities and thus become politically autonomous from each other. Loyalties exist now also towards the respective domestic polities, which makes for some conflict with the cultural unity of Hungarians. Unlike in interwar times therefore, "...national group-boundaries are objectively unknown, there are only unclear ideas about the latter's scope". Furthermore, "the ancestral homeland cannot be politically and legally delimited as in the [interwar] concept of a *Staatsnation*, but (...) it is rather a living space that one cannot rationally grasp" (Veres 1997:28-30).

Distinct formative experiences during communism and its breakdown

A brief word is necessary here about the impact of the communist period between 1945 and 1989 which separates our two time spans. The fact that Soviet domination imposed mutual isolation between parent state and minority Magyars and forcibly silenced nationality questions, is often taken as self-evident explanation for the abandonment of Hungarian irredentism. As stated

212

above I disagree, not least because in other cases (Armenia, Croatia, Serbia) communism was unable to tackle irredentism by ideological impact or duration. The communist interlude merely compounded the unfolding shift in identity by putting both the mainland and the minorities through very different collective experiences. These galvanised (rather than caused) the already emerging separate Magyar identities which cultural bases had enabled. The parent state experienced during this time a „redefinition of Hungarian identity based in particular upon the 1956 revolution". This event above all others „relocated Hungary's 'traditional values' within the mainstream of Western liberal history" (Haynes 1995:93). Mainland Hungarians view this as the one juncture where their country started its "return to Europe", proving that it differed from "Eastern" autocratic-totalitarian strands. Importantly, Romanian and Slovak Hungarians were not part of this experience[18], but lived in turn through their own crucial events. Magyars in post-war Czechoslovakia suffered collective punishment for their former irredentist stance under the Beneš Decrees, enduring forced population exchanges, property and land seizures, deportation, internment, forced labour etc. Their lasting impact still affects the community's economic situation, created a deep-seated sense of insecurity (Janics 1989; Vígh 1998) as well as a second intellectual braindrain (Szarka 1998a: 51-53). Two decades later, parts of their community were actively involved in the 1968 Prague Spring and suffered subsequent retaliation under the so-called normalisation programme.[19] Transylvanian Hungarians, on the other hand, were exposed to Romania's national communism, an exception throughout the region. Ceaucescu's policies of forced assimilation (so-called "systematisation") as well as ethnically targeted political persecution (Tófalvi 1994) created something of a siege mentality amongst the local Magyar community, a shaping experience in

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[18] Transylvanian Hungarians, whose excited attention never translated into involvement, felt the impact of the 1956 uprising via retaliatory measures (Tófalvi 1997, 1998b). By alleging that Nagy's revolutionary programme demanded Transylvania's retrieval, Romania declared any manifestation of solidarity with Budapest as treason (Tófalvi 1998a). Thus the uprising served as excuse for increased assimilatory repression, e.g. by abolishing the "Hungarian Autonomous Region" and via show trials against ethnic Magyars (Tófalvi 2001). Furthermore, Romania's willing role as the place where Nagy and his cabinet were deported to and executed, served to establish an example to the local minority.

[19] Husak's "normalisation" following the Prague Spring basically reinforced assimilatory pressures via political disenfranchisement and cultural repression. It purged high ranking ethnic Magyars from the Slovak National Council (notably Rezső Szabó and László Dobos) and curtailed the tacit ethnic representation that the cultural association CSEMADOK had carved out for Magyars. Furthermore, the public use of Hungarian was restricted, while Magyar schools and kindergartens were forced to adopt Slovak as first language (Szarka 1998:58-60).

its own right. The toppling of that regime, sparked off by the ethnic Hungarian bishop László Tőkés' resistance, created a brief moment of civic solidarity with Romanian fellow citizens and provided another distinct experience. The political system change of 1989 finally, unfolded very differently in the parent state and the respective host countries. In fact, the Magyars as nation lived through the three different types of anti-communist revolution identified by research: the regime collapse in Czechoslovakia, negotiated transition in Hungary and violent overthrow in Romania (Friedheim 1993; Ekiert 1991:287).

6.3.1 Minority Hungarians today: assertive towards Hungary, co-nations in their host-states

Self-view: from "forced" to "committed communities"

Both communities are "minority building" (Kántor 2001), i.e. they are asserting their own brand of Magyarness. The former image of forced separation has been replaced by the concept of "committed communities" (Bárdi 2004a), of self-conscious Magyar collectives. Minority Hungarians display in sociological surveys strong regional loyalties and local patriotism, which furthermore trump loyalties towards both the parent state and, to a lesser degree, towards the host state (see below). In short, they are socialised into their minority situation. This means firstly that they see themselves as equal to mainland Hungarians, not as occupying some lesser status. At times, the minorities even describe their Hungarianness as superior against what they see as a Westernised, distorted version in the mainland (see e.g. Langman 1997:119). Secondly, this self-assertion has opened up the scope for autonomous minority politics. Democratisation in Romania and Slovakia in turn enabled its increasingly rewarding conduct, and thus entailed the development of civic allegiances towards host state and their own community (see section 7.3.2). Both these facts preclude irredentism today.

Consequence 1: intra-group relations - equality and assertion

The cultural markers in contemporary Hungarian national identity fail to clearly define a constituency and boundaries for the irredentist project. Furthermore, they do not distinguish a core and a periphery. Consequently, relationships

214

between minority and mainland are now on an equal footing, there is no longer a pressing need to (re)unite what is no longer viewed as unsustainably separated.

Unlike their self-view as enclaves in the interwar period, both communities are today secure in their identity. In fact, they feel more confident than mainland Hungarians. They are very organised as communities, and are working towards being completely self-sustained Magyar societies (Kántor 2001). This includes not least their capacity to reproduce their own elite. Contemporary Hungarian minorities thus relate to their ethnicity and collective future positively (seeing its defence and development as "task"), and stress it over and above all other attachments short of family ties. This emphatically positive self-image furthermore improves inversely to tense relations with the respective majority nation: the more difficult it is to live a Hungarian identity, the more positively it is seen and prioritised (Veres 1997:21, 27; Gereben 1995:201-4;1999:14-15, 20). Furthermore, being a minority Hungarian no longer means deriving all national characteristics from the mainland. Instead, there is an increase in local cultural references, e.g. literary and historical figures (Veres 1997:49-51). The Magyar language, finally, has become 'pluricentric' (Kontra and Saly 1998) – local variations have asserted themselves in what used to be a highly standardised idiom. Given that language is the 'integrator of nations' (Deutsch 1966), this further strengthened a self-conscious minority identity and undermined cross-border unity (Lanstyák 1996; 1998). In short, both in terms of language and heritage, i.e. in the markers that today co-define Magyarness, the mainland is ceasing to act as sole and principal reference point for being Hungarian.

This self-assertion is accompanied by an increased distancing from the mainland. Bárdi (2000a:5) observes for instance that usage of the term *anyaország* (motherland) for Hungary has almost ceased within the minority press. Sociological surveys show that attachment to the home region either rivals that to Hungary, or actually overtakes it (Veres 1997:29; Lampl 1999:12; Lanstyák 2000:62-4). Ties to the mainland are hence perceived pragmatically, i.e. as a resource. Both mainland and Transylvanian politicians stressed in my interviews how the minorities use their connection to Budapest instrumentally (Füzesi 2001). Hungary's involvement into minority affairs is now only accepted if it serves the communities' local interests. A case in point would be the financial help for the Magyar language universities in the Felvidék and

Transylvania (opened in 2003 and 2004 respectively). Otherwise, there is considerable suspicion towards the mainland, which contrasts sharply with interwar attitudes of trust. Hungary's forced neutrality towards its kin during four communist decades has engendered a lasting feeling of abandonment, distrust and bitterness amongst Magyar minorities. Notwithstanding Cold War realities, this circumstance is still viewed as unforgivable abdication of responsibilities, even as betrayal. This attitude was outlined by both mainland and Transylvanian interviewees (interviews 1,2 and 6-8). In this vein, parts of contemporary minority historiography have also reinterpreted interwar Hungarian irredentism. Depending on the particular interpretation, the irredenta enjoyed no minority backing at all and was either utterly imposed by Budapest, or achieved via manipulation (see e.g. Borsódy 1988; Popély 1990). Instead, it is portrayed as mainland Hungary's cynical, self-interested policy in which Transylvanian and Felvidék Magyars played little or no part, but for which they endured severe host state retaliation (see above). Resentment and distance have further grown with what are seen as present letdowns: the conclusion of Basic Treaties with the host states (denounced as sell-out in exchange for Hungary's EU hopes), the Status Law (feared as both internally divisive and as engineered population drain – see Dobos and Apró 2000; Kántor 2002), and its subsequent re-negotiation (seen as concession to Brussels' pressure on Budapest). Most disappointing, however, was the Hungarian referendum of December 2004, where mainlanders failed to even muster a sufficient turnout to vote on dual citizenship for their co-ethnics.

Consequence 2: civic and ethnic belonging distinguished

I had explained above how an organic understanding of the nation and the hierarchy it imposes, limit autonomous political behaviour in minorities. Because there is no self-conscious community to speak of, there is little scope for independent political goals over and beyond resistance. National membership primarily based on culture contrastingly allows transborder communities to socialise into minority existence. Whether they can do so, and thereby separate civic from communal loyalties, depends on the domestic regime type. I will argue in chapter 7 that a host state can decisively influence and even hasten this further shift in minority identity by offering consociational features which

accommodate what actively or formerly irredentist groups covet: self-rule (autonomy) and shared rule (co-owning a state).

The development of what I have termed "quasi-consociational practice" in both Romania and Slovakia has enabled both Hungarian minorities to become committed and integral parts of host state domestic politics (see section 7.3.2). Political power, collective recognition as well as an increased measure of control over their own affairs at local level, increasingly cater for Magyar demands and have thus established stakeholder involvement. In their own slogans, Hungarians have thus gone from their former stance as "thorn in the foreign side" to "partner nations" (*szerződéses nemzet*). Their former abstentionism has ceded to an actively sought and by now permanent, pivotal role in Slovak and Romanian national politics (see section 7.3.2). As a consequence, they have increasingly developed a civic allegiance towards their host states (see e.g. Culic 2001). Thus Romania for instance is rated as first choice as home country with 47 per cent (Veres 1997:29). This unfolding "civicness" is however at a less advanced stage than that in the mainland (see below), and is arguably even qualitatively different: it is accompanied by strong cultural elements, and by a focus on the minority community and its region (Kántor 2001; Lampl 1999:13; Gereben 1997:29/30; Langman 1997:118/119). This is for two reasons. Firstly, it is because both Romania and Slovakia continue to be nationalising states (Brubaker 1996). Secondly, the minorities are still in the process of differentiating themselves from Hungary. Hence the building of civic loyalties goes hand in hand with the above-described "community-building". Nevertheless, Hungarians in both countries show high approval ratings for the fact that their respective parties have for the last decade consistently prioritised participation in Romanian and Slovak politics over the task of "community building" (Hamberger 2004:116;122; Bárdi and Kántor 2000:157-8).

217

6.3.2 Hungary today: trans-sovereign nationalism

Self-view: between cultural and increasingly civic nationhood

Because Magyar national identity is no longer based on identification with ancestral territory, contemporary Hungary does not see itself as truncated. Mainland Hungarians tie nationhood instead to both culture and language on the one hand, and on the other, to a growing identification with the political institutions of the Hungarian state. This latter component has tangibly increased in the course of democratisation (Csepeli 1989:43-46, Csepeli 1992/97:241-254; HTMH:2000; Shulman 2002:567-578). In consequence, there is also no longer a sense of absolute solidarity transcending boundaries. Hungary does maintain a constitutional responsibility towards fellow Hungarians across the borders.[20] Nevertheless, the general interest and sympathy is now also accompanied by apprehension. For instance, mainlanders have voiced concerns about being overwhelmed by kindred "guestworkers" due to the Status Law (HTMH 2000 survey; Dobos and Apró 2001). Similarly, one of the main points of debate in the run up to the referendum on dual citizenship in December 2004 concerned the potential cost to tax payers from welcoming 3 million additional citizens.

Consequence 1: equality and diversity mean an end to hegemony

Unlike cohesion based on kinship, culturally-based nationhood does not imply a hierarchy of actors. In contrast to the pattern of subordination and hegemony, shared language and heritage allow for multiple centres of the nation and therefore for equality among them. No single unit has a monopoly on determining the conditions of collective belonging, though there may be less and more significant focal points. Intra-group politics hence change in function of this, i.e. irredentism is under these conditions impossible.

The Hungarian parent state of today no longer entertains a national hegemony towards the minorities. This is illustrated in its legalistic, institutionalised approach on both the collective and individual level. The former was achieved by the establishment of the Hungarian Standing Committee (MÁÉRT) in 1996, a publicly accountable forum reuniting all regional Magyar minorities and the

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[20] Article 6, paragraph 3 of the Hungarian constitution stipulates that "the Republic of Hungary feels responsible for the fate of those Magyars living outside of its borders and promotes their relations with Hungary."

mainland. It is an open, accountable, framework for exchanges between the mainland and the transborder communities, which most importantly functions on a multi-lateral, egalitarian basis. The MÁÉRT serves to openly discuss inter-Hungarian relations and Budapest's policy making towards the minorities and their host states. Individual relations between the mainland and its transborder kin in turn have been formalised within the legal framework of the Status- or Preference Law. Although the subject of minority suspicions as another way to assert control over them (Dobos and Apró 2000; Interviews 1 and 2), it was not only drawn up but is now also implemented, in close co-operation with minority organisations. The Hungarian government continues to finance the transborder communities, but with several important differences to interwar times. Firstly, the allocation and size of resources has become increasingly transparent over the course of the post-communist period. Budgeting is subject to parliamentary discussion and review as well as to deliberation within the Standing Committee. The flow of monies has become more and more de-centralised, with different foundations looking after separate funding domains (a good example is the Sapientia Foundation for the running of the private Hungarian language university in Transylvania). Most importantly, the priorities and rationale are entirely different. Bárdi's detailed analysis (2004b:208-238) describes Hungary's priorities as ensuring self-sustaining transborder communities. This concentrates on areas like Magyar language education, the erection of a network of cultural institutions, and supporting the development of local business. In telling contrast to interwar practice, one particular concern is to secure independent minority elite reproduction in local Hungarian language universities. In short, instead of hegemony in order to restore completeness, Budapest envisages today what former Premier Orbán described as "multiple small Hungarian worlds" (Heti Hírmondó 2001).

Consequence 2: conflicting cultural and civic self-views in the mainland
Contemporary domestic politics in Hungary reflect the two conflicting bases of its national definition. The problem is that the mainland's political-institutional self-view automatically excludes transborder kin, while they are included in its cultural-linguistic definition. Hence the unity of the Hungarian nation as a whole is ultimately at stake in the long run. Fowler (2004a) describes how this conundrum has led to competing elite views on the "national question".

Conservative parties, most notably FIDESZ, argue that the Hungarian state in its present form does not adequately express and realise the nation's identity and interests. The liberal-socialist camp in turn is against divorcing nationhood from citizenship and legal territory. This dilemma translates onto the popular level, too. Shulman (2002:567-578) describes palpably contradictory results from the International Social Survey Program. Thus, living in Hungary is ranked highly by mainland Magyars as criterion for national membership and, to a lesser extent, being born there, but at the same time linguistic mastery is rated as fundamental. Hungarian post-communist politics is thus replete with attempts to synthesise or reconcile these two divergent components. The 1996 Millennial Commemorations of Hungary's foundation were one such example, followed by the Status Law (2001), its rewriting (2003), the FIDESZ-instigated referendum on dual citizenship (2004), and finally, a governmental Proposal on the Constitutional Status of Hungarians Living Abroad (late 2005). Perhaps the best summary of this situation is that the mainland has moved from traditional nationalism (congruence of political and ethnic boundaries) to what Csergő and Goldgeier (2001; 2004) call 'trans-sovereign nationalism' (creating institutions to link the cultural nation across state boundaries). This is exactly because ancestry and territoriality have been superseded by more voluntaristic criteria, of which in turn only culture can maintain transborder unity via shared, non-political institutions (see also Kántor 2005).

6.4 Conclusion: from indivisible Magyar ethnicity to "multiple Hungarian universes"

"Ethnicity" Esman writes, cannot be politicised unless an underlying core of memories, experience or meaning moves people to collective action" (1994:14). When that 'core' changes in content, so do the solidarities they engender and the political agenda these demand. The ethno-national identity of Hungarians has transformed and thereby changed the content and goals of Hungarian nationalism. Magyar ethnicity has shifted from ethnic-exclusive characteristics (chief among them identification with a homeland) to cultural-linguistic, and increasingly, civic markers.

During the interwar period, Magyar ethno-national identity was principally conceived of in ethnic-exclusive terms. As a consequence, allegiance and loyalty could only be to the group and to the state it owned. This applied within both mainland and minority communities, apart from very few respective exceptions. The *szentistváni állameszme* (state-concept of Hungary's founder St. Stephen) was now applied to those of Magyar descent only: they and their millennial territory primarily defined being Hungarian. Culture and heritage were seen only in function of that, hence Budapest had no qualms about treating the transborder Magyars like deviant, manipulable enclaves. Indeed, culture and language were systematically used by the mainland government to prepare for future retrieval, shape minority leaderships and thereby remotely control these communities. The latter in turn remained as unselfconscious enclaves, accepting and readily submitting themselves to such treatment. Accordingly, they froze in denial of their new situation, remaining politically and culturally dependent on Budapest. They saw being "redeemed" as the only conceivable solution to their situation. This engendered typical irredentist behaviour in both actors. Minorities logically chose defensiveness and self-isolation within the host state in anticipation of retrieval. In Hungary itself, all political-societal processes were made dependent on the national salvation that reunion would bring.

Today, Hungarian identity is defined by heritage and language as well as an increasing civic attachment to the different states in which Magyars live. The Hungarian nation as cultural unit has more inclusive markers which cannot furnish the absolute solidarities and describe the clear territorial extent irredentism needs. It is furthermore egalitarian – transborder minorities are alternative, equal Hungarian societies instead of dependent enclaves. Hungary in turn is no longer a truncated national centre, but increasingly defined by its institutions. The resulting intra-group relations are thus inimical to retrieval: the parent state has abandoned national hegemony, its kin is assertive and self-conscious as society apart. Both actors are furthermore increasingly tying Hungarian national identity to civic criteria, such as citizenship, political participation and consent. In Hungary this comes from successful democratisation, for Romanian and Slovak Magyars this derives from ongoing quasi-consociational integration into their host states. This means that both actors have been able to separate their political allegiances from communal

belonging. Given that irredentism crucially equates nation and polity, this is a further important hindrance to retrieval. Secondly, the respectively emerging civic loyalties also mean increasingly conflictual and therefore tenuous, bases to the Hungarian national identity. This is especially felt in Hungary proper. Its more and more prominent political-institutional criteria of belonging automatically exclude the minorities, thus threatening the frequently professed cultural cohesion of the Magyar nation.

This chapter has shown that an ethno-national identification based on narrowly conceived markers is crucial to irredentism. Shifts within a group's identity, due to changing markers, entail changes in their politicisation, i.e. in the nationalism shared identity generates. Cultural and civic bases of group identity, instead of ethnic, exclusive ones undermine the very axiom irredentist projects rest on: namely that retrieval is necessary because international borders divide *what organically constitutes one*.

7. Regime type matters: the impact of democracy

"Democracy is a political form suitable only to rich, well-structured and highly cultured countries.... In countries where the above conditions are absent, democracy may become seriously debilitating to national existence, especially in times of national crisis, or when the country is faced with social problems of considerable magnitude. In such instances, democracy easily degenerates into ruthless political conflict, because the complete freedom of speech and assembly are potent instruments of misleading masses."

Prime Minister Bethlen, 1922[1]

7.1 Introduction: regime type and retrieval

The nexus between the pursuit of irredentism and regime type has been recognised, although not necessarily treated, by a number of authors. Most tend to focus on the parent state, presumably because of its position as stronger player. The arguments put forward give a mixed, even contradictory, picture. Connor (1980:164-5) for instance observes that "the form of government within a [parent] state is a key variable." In his view, democratic polities are more prone to retrieval due to their very sensitivity to public opinion. Given the pressure on elected elites to act, "democratic governments are less flexible than authoritarian governments when they are involved in an irredentist situation." Landau (1990:242-3) conversely argues that in democracies irredentism is "left to opposition groups" (mostly because they can "afford" controversial platforms), whereas in non-democratic regimes it is likely to be governmental policy. This ties in with Weiner's earlier observation that democratic governance suffers with the rise of irredentism (1971:676). Some, finally, concentrate on regime-dependent variations within

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[1] In Berend and Csató (2001:149-150).

minority irredentism. Roudometof (1996) is one of the few to do so, by linking the desire for retrieval to declining minority rights.

7.1.1 Donald Horowitz's (sparse) take on regime type and irredentism

Horowitz, otherwise an eager student of democracy's impact on ethnic conflict, does not include this potential variable in his analysis of irredentism. Indeed his model seems to assume for uniformity across regime types when it comes to retrieval. He concedes that "the irredentist decision...is susceptible to all the forces and constraints that impinge upon policy decisions in general" (1985:282), yet omits that these limitations are exclusive to a *particular type* of regime. Thus the cost-benefit calculations he invests ethnic leaders with, and especially their *freedom of action*, are posited as immune to regime-specific constraints or incentives. Irredentist electorates or political clienteles in both the minority and the mainland appear likewise untouched by their political environment. In fact, democracy only appears as a feature of parent state attractiveness to undecided transborder kindred: "...Discontented, territorially compact, transborder ethnic groups ... with the potential to be retrieved, find retrieval by the putative irredentist state undesirable. This may be because that state is poorer or ... *more authoritarian* than the state in which they are now encapsulated" (1991:16, emphasis added). Why a more democratic regime would be attractive is not detailed. In short, the theory omits democracy's central importance as determinant of irredentist inconsistency.

The possibility of a particular political system affecting the scope for irredentism is raised only in conjunction with another factor: the identity of parent state elites. Regarding irredentas in Africa and Asia, Horowitz observes: "...though a claim is asserted on the basis of ethnic affinity in general, the source of the affinity is more particularised. In each case, traditional transborder ethnic affinities can be identified, but in each case there is something more: personal links between rulers of the irredentist state and the group or the territory to be retrieved. (...) In each case, irredentism has been sustained, not merely by ethnicity, but by kinship in a

224

more direct and narrow sense" (1985:286-287). Crucially, Horowitz links this factor of what I have termed 'particularised affinity' to the parent state's political system: "...each of these irredentist states was governed by a patrimonial regime in a traditional society where kinship could operate largely unfettered" (ibid.). In his analysis then, regime type is at best a secondary conditioning factor. Let us nevertheless take note of Horowitz's implicit assumption that factors specific to a certain government may facilitate the conduct of ethno-politics.

7.1.2 Democracy or democratisation and group propensity for irredentism

I maintain that democracy or democratisation does matter in group decisions for or against irredentism. The form of government in the host and parent states respectively has a central impact on whether minority and mainland choose retrieval. Democracy is, however, *differently relevant* for each actor in his decisions. When situated in a democratic framework, both actors are respectively conditioned by its constraints (pluralism, accountability, and the fostering of civic-institutional legitimacy within the parent state) and incentives (collective equality and some form of internal self-determination for the minority).

7.2 Irredentist parent states, democratisation and democracy

When looking at irredentist parent states in the Dataset 2, two things stand out: very few are consolidated democracies, while most of them are in some state of regime transition towards democracy. Historically, irredentist surges have followed either revolutions (waves I and IV), World War, and / or imperial collapse (waves II and III – see section 1.3.2). In short, they took place in post-authoritarian settings. Mansfield and Snyder's (1995;2002a;2002b) quantitative research suggests a systematic connection between democratisation and aggressive foreign policies based on nationalism.[2] Their theory employs a definition and measure of

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[2] This emulates one of Van Evera's *Hypotheses on Nationalism and War* (1994:32-3), which posits the "strength and competence of independent evaluative institutions" as key criterion. In an

225

democratisation that captures causative institutional changes. Building on the Polity datasets' composite index for regime type, they use its three principal criteria as main indicators: the extent of the constraints placed on the chief executive as well as the openness and competitiveness of political participation and of executive recruitment.[3]

Based on these, two stages of transition are distinguished: one from autocracy to anocracy, a volatile intermediate situation where elements of both regime types are in evidence, and a second phase shifting to consolidated, peaceful democracy.[4] Mansfield and Snyder observe that states undergoing phase one (partial or incomplete democratisation) are more prone than other regime types to engage in military disputes.[5] Such 'anocratic' states are furthermore likely to become involved in conflict with regimes of all types. They do so as initiators, rather than as temporarily weak targets. This behaviour is confirmed as monadic, or internal, to the state in question, which in turn concurs with my model's basic argument that irredentism has primarily endogenous causes.

The reasons for this pattern lie in the institutional vulnerability typically associated with early or stalled democratisation. Most post-authoritarian settings are weakly institutionalised, which means they cannot cater for broadening political participation. Elites hence resort to ideology, and more often than not this is nationalism (Snyder 2000). They do so for two reasons. They may try to compensate for the absence of legitimacy which institutionally established

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international relations theory of irredentism, Carment and James (1995:94) also cite elite institutional constraints, albeit only as intervening variable, and not as strictly bound to democracy or to a particular type thereof. Executive constraint, executive regulation, and participation constraints all mean that "the stronger the state in terms of autonomy from domestic pressures, the better its position to oppose (or alternatively to impose) an extreme ethnic foreign policy." Other research conversely suggests that democratisation decreases ethnic conflict, and that it is rather established regimes, including established democracies, which are more likely to experience severe ethnic conflict (see Saideman et al. 1999).

[3] For an explanation of this choice see Mansfield and Snyder (2002a:311-4 and 2002b:535). The present study uses the same criteria (see also section 2.4.1 and Dataset Manual 2, Appendix).

[4] Jaggers, Marshall, and Gurr's Polity score assumes for the core qualities of democracy and autocracy as defining opposite ends of a governance scale that ranges from -10 (fully institutionalised autocracy) to +10 (consolidated democracy). Rather than a distinct form of governance, anocracies are a middling category which mixes these systemic features and thus ranges between -5 and +5.

[5] Their theory has so far only been applied to one irredentist state, namely Gavrilis' (2003) analysis of late nineteenth century Greece, where it is however combined with variables derived from security studies.

democratic procedures normally confer. They do so by taking advantage of vestigial authoritarian powers and as yet low accountability. Nationalism thus serves to close the gap between popular demands and underdeveloped institutions. Alternatively or in addition, leaders may feel threatened by rival elites, and respond by forging political-corporate coalitions that share the same vested interests. In this scenario, nationalism is employed as (lowest) common denominator in politics. Nationalism is useful for both situations, because it is "a state-building ideology that holds out the promise of either gaining a state for a people that lacks one or strengthening the capacity of an existing state to better serve the distinctive aims of a people" (Mansfield and Snyder 2000b:531). Irredentism, with its core tenet of national union as cure-all, describes this scenario well.[6]

Maturing transitions and established democracies in contrast, display the "presence of strong institutions that regulate mass participation. These institutions guarantee that the officials making foreign policy will be accountable to the median voter, who bears the costs and risks of military conflict" (2002b:530) – or, in this, case, a risky foreign policy such as retrieval.

In order to apply Mansfield and Snyder's neo-institutionalist theory a few modifications are necessary. For one, since not all irredentas involve military conflict (see section 1.3.3), this model has to widen their explanation to the more general category of external antagonism. The authors partly do so themselves, referring to "foreign disputes" (2002b:532) and underlining that "incomplete democratic transitions heighten the prospect of various types of military disputes, *including those short of war* (2002b:530, emphasis added; see also 2002a:310). Parent state irredentism falls well within this category, being an aggressive foreign policy that challenges another state's sovereignty.

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[6] Mansfield and Snyder (2000b:531) relate foreign political aggression to nationalism's "...appeals [based on] the political exclusion of ethnic or ideological 'enemies of the nation'." Irredentist groups do define themselves in ethnic-exclusive terms, taking kinship literally as extended family. The motivator here is however not xenophobia, but rather solidarity: the *in*-clusion of co-ethnics and their liberation from rule by ethnic strangers.

A second, more important, modification concerns the role and nature of nationalism. In Snyder and Mansfield's explanation, nationalism and ethnicity serve as mere instruments of elite interests, without any independent motive power or rootedness in collective identity. This implies that politicians are not convinced of their own nationalist appeals, although the authors concede that they may find themselves "trapped by rhetoric" because their supporters and rivals have "internalised" what started off as cynical ploy (ibid.:532). In this view, irredentism would merely be one type of diversionary war, much like Saideman portrays it (Saideman 1998; Saideman and Ayres 1999; Saideman and Ayres 2000). The problematic elite persuasion-thesis has already been discussed and criticised above (see e.g. introduction and sections 1.4.1-1.4.2). It is hence enough to reiterate here that ethno-nationalism is not one amongst many bases of mass mobilisation, but commands a power of its own that in crisis trumps all other identities, interests, and ideas. Whether or not it is instrumentalised, it is successful as political agenda *because it fulfils a pre-existing collective need.* Hence, while it affords some leeway for political (ab)use, it constrains leaders and their interests as much their electorates.

Consequently, the theory needs correcting with regards to its uni-directional causation. "Imperfectly formed institutions" as Snyder and Mansfield reason, "can facilitate elites' ability to exploit their power in ways that promote a belligerent foreign policy" (2002b:534). What of the inverse? Given the autonomous power of ethno-nationalism, I argue that such "imperfectly formed institutions" are equally unable to limit popular, 'bottom-up' pressure for nationalist diplomacy such as irredentism. This pressure is furthermore likely to be pronounced exactly during times of political transition which see populations draw on the certainties of collective belonging. In other words, while Snyder and Mansfield's dismissive view of nationalism considers solely the lack of 'top down' institutional constraints, the realities of ethno-nationalism require a two-way theory. Popular demands are as important as elite supply, and what is more, both can be genuine. To summarise, feeble institutions within anocracies mean that elites may as much 'persuade' their political clienteles of irredentism as they are pressured by the latter, or both.[7]

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[7] Regardless of whether irredentism works to their advantage, "political elites may be as passionately committed to the unification of the group as the masses" Connor reminds (1980:186),

In connection with this we also need to readjust the authors' functionalist assumptions on democracy. In Snyder and Mansfield's view, it is because of distortions in this otherwise free marketplace of ideas that nationalism has a chance. The democratic peace is ensured because of an effective competition between motivational bases (material and cultural), which consolidated democratic institutions sustain and channel. Implication: enough information will allow the cost-conscious median voter to dryly assess and reject the nationalist option. Democracy is thus reduced to merely securing a level playing field, with pluralism and accountability unmasking nationalism as self-interested, cynical, and costly. This leaves unexplained why nationalism still manages to get a strong democratic mandate and to override other political cleavages. The argument implies that the 'rational' enterprise of democracy is incompatible with 'irrational' nationalism. In fact the opposite is true: democracy (and democratisation) build on nationalism because it helps define and unify the self-determining community.[8]

Problems arise where "the ethnic flesh of nationalism remains untamed" by malfunctioning or stalled democracy. In other words, when there is a "lack of a robust political expression for national feeling, (...) when [people] have no political or institutional achievements to take pride in" (Nodia 1994:15). In such situations nationalism is left as the main or only component to hold together a polity, to fill a political vacuum (Gellner 1992). It no longer merely underpins the political consensus, but replaces it: the nation principally defines itself via shared culture or, as in irredentism's case, ethnicity. The state is reduced to expressing (here: reuniting) this organic entity. The fact that political entrepreneurs use this and are able to, is hence only co-responsible. So while Snyder and Mansfield are correct about the nexus between institutional underperformance and ethno-nationalism, they partly miss out on causation. Institutional efficiency in democracy pre-empts nationalist foreign policies like irredentism not just via scrutiny of leaders and the pluralism of motivational bases, but because of its *transformative impact*. It

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and "even if they are not, governments may have little choice when there are internal pressures for annexation."

[8] Democratic nationalism, i.e. the cohesion based on shared nationalism within democratic polities, is seen to actually *ensure* the proper functioning of representative institutions and widespread participation - see e.g. J.S. Mill's *Considerations on Representative Government* (1958 [1861]:230;232-3) or Moore (2001).

"sublimates" the nationalism of masses and elites "into patriotic esteem for the institutions and achievements created by a democratic (not just ethnic) 'we' " (Nodia 1994:ibid.). So cohesion is primarily (though not exclusively) characterised by consent and participation, rather than by belonging and loyalty to an undifferentiated community of descent. Consequently, what makes irredentism and democracy nigh irreconcilable is democracy's creation of an alternative, voluntaristic loyalty. Although ethnic and cultural elements usually still figure as back up, the nation is significantly defined by institutions. This undercuts two fundamental conditions on which retrieval rests, namely group identity based on shared kinship and the state's ownership by and thus subservience to, that group. Conversely, irredentism and anocracy are so uniquely suited for each other because politics faces mounting participation (unlike in authoritarian systems) but cannot yet provide a consensus via institutions (unlike in democracies). Nationalism not only fills the gap, as Mansfield and Snyder recognise, but is here also unrivalled as galvanising factor and thus inverts the relationship between nation and state.

In short, parent state irredentism is practically incompatible[9] with substantive democracy and (successful) democratisation. The civic nationalism and pluralism its institutions engender minimise the potential for ethnopolitics. In contrast, compromised institutions due to incomplete democratisation allow for ethno-nationalism. Because in this scenario the state is not defined by strong, efficient institutions it exists in function of an ethnically defined polity and this informs leaders and their policies. As we shall see, interwar Hungary and its domestic politics fit this description closely. Conversely, the institutions of consolidated democratic systems - as which post-communist Hungary by now counts - severely

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[9] A few cases in the Dataset form exceptions to this rule: West Germany, Japan and the Irish Republic count as consolidated democracies whilst pursuing retrieval (versus the GDR, Okinawa-Ryukyu and Northern Ireland respectively). Two explanations are possible: on the one hand, these regimes may have been merely "rhetorically" irredentist. On the other, and more plausibly, irredentism existed despite democratic politics because the (re-)birth of these states was closely associated with national truncation. The irredentist question thus existed as integral part of domestic politics, as yet another historically inherited cleavage. In contradistinction to anocracies however, it was not the dominant or single generator of the domestic consensus and thus did not rule foreign policy.

limit the conflation of group (ethnic) and state (civic) interest. This is especially applicable where the collective identity to be politicised has already transformed away from an 'ethnic' definition (as with the Magyars) - a trend which democracy reinforces, and which international disincentives support.

7.2.1 Interwar Hungary and its irredentism (1920-1940)

<u>After Trianon: the widening and fragmentation of Hungary's political spectrum</u>
Together with partition, the end of World War I had brought the end of the Dual Monarchy and of its conservative order. After the violent defeat of Béla Kun's brief Soviet government, Hungary's traditional political class – its landed aristocracy – took control again. However, it faced a widened and uncomfortably fragmented political spectrum.

For one, there was an external pressure to democratise. Imposed by the victorious Entente, but soon losing its substance, this principle had to be heeded at least outwardly (Földes and Hubai 1999:261-2). Secondly, traditional patterns of electioneering were now threatened by the onset of 'modern' politics, such as the formation of mass parties and the increasing use of the media (Boros and Szabó 1999:235-6). Even more challenging was the political landscape's sudden diversification. Wartime modernisation had enlarged new social strata: the lower middle class and urban industrial workers. There was also the newly enfranchised rural population, with its pressing need for agrarian and social reform. Especially among these strata, the conservative-patrician leadership still feared the remnants of Kun's supporters. The greatest challenge, however, came from the middle classes. This was the stratum most injured by partition, making it irredentism's most loyal constituency within Hungary. Trianon and the chaos of civil war and occupation had in their eyes discredited the old order. Their rage over national humiliation was enhanced by the personal losses partition brought, such as professional dislocation (especially for demobilised officers), separation from family, and the loss of properties (Zeidler 2001:49;161). Their ranks were bolstered by the mass of Magyar refugees from the newly separated territories - scores of former imperial administrators and military, doctors, lawyers, teachers, university

faculty, etc., who more than shared these grievances. Vocal and numerous, these people in particular further radicalised the already discontented middle class (Mócsy 1983 and 1995; Zeidler 2001:204).

Horthyist Hungary as anocracy

The conservative patrician leadership was intent on 'consolidation'. This was "not just system stabilising, but [system] preserving" (Pritz 2000:106). It hence sought to co-opt the middle classes, whilst pursuing a divide and rule strategy towards the rest (Földes and Hubai 1999:86; Boros and Szabó 1999:281). Interwar Hungary's newly enfranchised strata were kept at bay via the weakness of its institutions.

For starters, pluralism and the mechanisms of accountability were considerably curtailed. Given the fact that elections were constantly rigged (especially in rural districts), voters routinely intimidated, and the secrecy of the ballot only kept in 20 per cent of districts, electoral input was distorted. Electoral laws were soon progressively restricted again, throttling suffrage from 29.5 per cent in 1922 to 26.6 per cent four years later (Földes and Hubai 1999:260-6; Boros and Szabó 1999:235-42). These measures minimised support for the two camps that would have meant competition in parliament: the Catholic-Monarchist faction on the right, and the Smallholders and Social Democrats on the left (Pritz 2000:61).

This was compounded by an already sanitised political landscape. As another consequence of Kun's Soviet experiment, Hungary's surviving leftist spectrum provided a feeble challenge after decimation and exile due to the subsequent White Terror. Thus opposition from outside of the ruling reactionary parties was considerably reduced for the entire interwar period.

Parliament consequently often functioned as rubberstamp. Feudal and corporate interests furthermore retained legislative veto powers by manning the country's unelected Upper House. This reinforced their already disproportionate hold over the lower chamber, where mandates, rather than being acquired via political competition, usually "followed" eminent societal positions (Boros and Szabó 1999:315-21). This also applied to cabinet members, who were rarely recruited from parliament, but acquired mandates only after appointment to their posts. Governments and ministries were thus overwhelmingly composed of landed

aristocrats. Indeed, the first fourteen years between 1919 and 1932 saw an uninterrupted succession of three counts as prime ministers. Hungary's entire institutional design as constitutional monarchy embodied this deadlock. Policy making, especially in the area of foreign affairs, was correspondingly marked by executive dominance. Successive pairings of assertive prime and foreign ministers monopolised and personalised the domain, with parliamentary review, critique, and modifications figuring at best as cosmetic (Pritz 1995:223-225).

The political freeze was backed up by paternalistic social policies that disabled social mobility and reform (Pritz 2000:73-77).[10] Together with the pronounced vote rigging in rural areas, this kept tight control over Hungary's destitute agrarian population, which at the time accounted for over 50 per cent of the population.

The press finally, historically a 'fourth estate' in Hungary, "became subject to a series of repressive measures", in part because of its leftist leanings, but mostly "in order to prevent the embarrassment of the government in the conduct of foreign affairs" (János 1982:216). In short then, post-World War I Hungary possessed the anocratic institutional features that Mansfield and Snyder describe: low executive constraint, exclusive governmental recruitment, and minimal political competition.

Bridging the legitimacy gap, rallying the nation: Magyar retrieval as panacea

Hungary's deliberately stalled, underperforming institutions were thus unable to forge a civic-political expression to national cohesion. It was nationalism that provided in this context both a cohesive glue and legitimising rationale. In mainland Hungary, irredentism represented "the strongest legitimate factor to generate a national consensus" (Zeidler 2001:188). In a society deeply divided by recent civil war and stuck in the apathy of defeat and hardship, retrieval was invoked to unify and mobilise the population (ibid.:57;188 ff.). Governments directly used domestic irredentist propaganda, but also encouraged private initiatives with a view to secure support for themselves (Pritz 2000:84). Virtually all analysts agree that interwar Hungarian foreign policy, specifically the question of retrieval, had overwhelmingly domestic sources (Juhász 1988:70-1; Pritz 1995:236; Gergely and

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[10] The strategy held throughout the period: in 1938, after sixteen failed attempts for land reform, over 10.000 square kilometres of arable land was still owned by only 80 magnate families (Hoensch 1995:131).

Pritz 1998:106-7; Ormos 1998). In a textbook scenario of Mansfield and Snyder's description, institutional failure thus allowed a regime to legitimise itself via nationalism whilst denying its citizens democratic pluralism, social redistribution, and modernisation.

A consensus built on nationalism in turn affirmed what irredentism posits axiomatically – the organic unity of group and state interests. The country's difficulties were collectively blamed on the "Trianon Diktat", with irredentism thus acquiring the value of a national salvation. Retrieval, not reform, was the way out. Restoring the Hungarian Kingdom automatically meant restoring the socio-political order that had ruled it. Unaccountable actors like the Catholic Church, the army and the state bureaucracy contributed their influential support to this idea. Hungary's Catholic hierarchy for instance, repeatedly affirmed that patrician rule, Christianity, and territoriality were historically inextricably fused for the Magyar nation. Albeit under a modified, now corporatist paradigm, this trend continued with the middle class' accession to government in the 1930s. Official slogans extolled "united force for national union" which, in the governmental program's words, required that "the maximum of the nation's energies be available to the realisation of national goals" (Boros and Szabó 1999:263; Pritz 2000:100). The 'salvation principle' marginalised the few who objected to this subordination of domestic politics to the national question. While supportive of retrieval itself, the social democrats for instance linked irredentism to the opposite – further democratisation (Romsics 1998:72). Hungary's communists similarly made it conditional on social redistribution.[11] Otherwise patriotic voices raised related caveats: influential writers like Zsigmond Móricz and László Németh, or liberal politicians like Oszkár Jászi. Unlike Mansfield and Snyder suggest, the main obstacle for these dissenters was not the lack of democratic avenues of evaluative debate and policy review. Their objections were in fact well publicised, yet found little resonance. Rather, the problem was that anocratic institutional weakness could not provide an alternative,

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[11] Interwar communism, though becoming progressively more status quo oriented, still followed the Marxist-Leninist endorsement of national self-determination. Even Kun's short lived Soviet Republic of 1919 upheld this principle, not least to galvanise support.

civic footing for politics which would have made sense of arguments that distinguished societal from national concerns.

Integrating a diverse coalition: elite co-optation via irredentism

Domestically, irredentism did, quite like Mansfield and Snyder posit, fulfil a coalition building role. Politics under the Horthy regime was mainly played out between two rival social segments: the old landed nobility and the predominantly middle class New Right. Their otherwise very different agendas converged on a "policy of turning back to the political situation of pre-war Hungary" (Hoensch 1995:108). Irredentism provided in this sense a synthesis between retrogressive corporatist politics and revanchist designs for recovering "Greater Hungary". Also, both agreed that irredentism pre-required Hungary's conservative consolidation (Zeidler 2001:44). Throughout the 1920s, this brought a coalition of sorts on these terms, with the middle class right being co-opted as junior partner. The first decade after Trianon under the stabilising lead of counts Teleki and Bethlen was thus characterised by guarded irredentism abroad (Pritz 1995:226). Domestic conservatism translated into Budapest's tentative lobbying of Paris and London, careful eroding of Hungary's post-WWI isolation, and its moderation despite Mussolini's encouragement. Faithfully reflecting domestic politics, irredentism during this period was all preparatory work, diplomatic ambiguity, and accepting international restrictions (see section 5.2.1).

The years between 1929 and 1932 changed this domestic balance, and irredentist politics with it. With the effects of global economic depression hitting Hungary, the destitute agrarian population now mobilised in national politics (Pritz 2000:80). This resurrected the hitherto marginalised Smallholders and Christian parties (Boros and Szabó 1998:281). The changed internal power ratio ended co-optation and increased competition within the right, but did not generate nationalist outbidding as in Snyder and Mansfield's prediction. After the somewhat bolder moves of 1927-8 (announcement of revision, treaty with Mussolini), the next four years saw domestic stalemate – the so-called *statárium*. The governments of counts Bethlen and Károlyi became absorbed with increasing domestic problems, such as mass strikes. Budapest's foreign policy was accordingly in stagnation. Rather than elite

235

rivalry, it was outright elite *change*, i.e. the governmental takeover by the middle class right, which would re-energise Hungary's now increasingly aggressive irredentism.

The hitherto uninterrupted succession of aristocrat premiers came to an end in 1932, with Gyula Gömbös, a vicar's son, taking office. This was cemented by the seismic shift of the 1935 elections, which ended the nobility's legislative dominance and prompted a clean reversal of roles (Boros and Szabó 1998:260-66). This sea change took place throughout Hungary's institutions, with special consequences for irredentism. Associated in the 1920s with defeat and failure to protect Hungary's territorial integrity, the military was in the early 1930s deliberately purged of its circumspect and cautious old Austro-Hungarian ranks (Zeidler 2001:130). It now became replete with young, dissatisfied and radical officers from the middle class who came to represent "an independent factor" in foreign policy formulation (Fülöp and Sipos 1998:98) and saw their principal task as "salvaging the country" (Ormos 1998:107). Similarly, the more experienced, careful aristocratic staff within the Foreign Ministry retired in these years or were made to. Their places were filled with mainly middle-class, assertive individuals (Pritz 1995:225-7, 235-6), often via clientelism to guarantee their allegiance, or "soundness". This changeover in the diplomatic body brought a re-think on irredentist goals: whilst their aristocratic predecessors had favoured integral revision, this new guard was more opportunistic by accepting retrieval along ethnic lines (Romsics 1998:72).

Interwar Hungary's institutions became more authoritarian and illiberal: etatism, technocracy, corporatism (now in turn co-opting the gentry as junior partners) were all part of the 'new politics' (Ormos 1998:195; Földes and Hubai 1999:266-9; Pritz 2000:98-101). Gömbös' reforms emulated fascism in stressing revolutionary self-renewal and Mussolini's 'sacro egoismo'. This so-called "neo-nationalism" and corporatist solidarity, rather than conservative stability, were seen as the way to recover transborder kindred and St. Stephen's realm. Budapest's irredentist foreign policy visibly radicalised as a result of the changes in leadership and paradigms. On the international stage, Hungary now fully switched to the revisionist camp by

236

courting Nazi Germany as irredentist patron, increasingly defying status quo powers, openly voicing Magyar claims, and finally, by even leaving the League of Nations (see section 5.2.1).

How much of a ploy? Elite convictions and popular pressure

Weak anocratic institutions cannot sublimate nationalism into a civic expression, and I had argued above that this applies regardless of whether it is the sentiment of elites or masses. As a consequence therefore, the (ab)use of nationalism and its encroachment on the state constrains the politics of both the population and its leaders.

Hungary's stalled institutions indeed not only faced parochial interests, but the ethno-national reflexes of both political incumbents and population. While leaders may have found irredentism convenient for their legitimisation, it is equally true that they were themselves unable to think but in 'imperial' terms. Diaries, correspondence, speeches, and essays from across the entire political spectrum show that the notion of Hungary accepting its boundaries remained inconceivable to politicians and opinion-makers alike (Szinai and Szűcs 1965, 1972; Romsics 1998; Romsics 2000:125-223). To remind of Horowitz's suggestion about particularised affinity, most members of Hungary's elite had indeed some personal connection to the partitioned areas. For instance, regent Horthy and premiers Bethlen and Teleki, all had family backgrounds in Transylvania. Prominent irredentist politicians like Bajcsy-Zsilinszky had studied there, and leading civil servants had recruited themselves from the ranks of minority refugees after Trianon (Mócsy 1995). Then again, literally everyone in the country had family ties, friendships, memories or life experiences to do with the lost territories (Zeidler 2001:49). Hence Hungary's leadership was not exceptional in this respect, nor, I would argue, was it therefore exceptionally motivated.[12] Rather, its continued imperial thought had to do with the fact that the crucial condition for irredentism - an ethnically exclusive, rather than culturally or institutionally anchored identity -

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[12] As a general point, the existence of personalised ties in irredentist elites over and above ethno-national ones may be a fact of correlation, rather than causation. In other words, exactly because there is a popular drive for retrieval, because politics is defined by kinship, leaders with a credible, connected background are supported or elected.

was still intact (see chapter 6). The elevation of ethnic-emotive logic into governmental politics was the order of the day, to the point where "foreign policy not only was unable to keep itself independent of these reactions, but was built on these very bases" (Zeidler 2001:55-57). Accordingly, both sets of elites conducted foreign policy with "diplomatic ignorance, primitive Hungarocentrism" and a "biased clutching (...) of national history" (Pritz 1995:235; see also Kovács 1994:89-90). In other words, due to its own nationalism, interwar Hungary's political class was path dependent on irredentism.

Mainland Hungarian society in turn was intensely politicised, Its castrated electoral input found expression as well as considerable weight through nationalist activism. The "cult of irredentism", heavily imbued with Catholic religiosity, literally encompassed all aspects of society (Zeidler 2001:159-190). Thus governmental and church led propaganda (via statues and memorials, place names, public holidays, stamps, irredentist prayers, processions and masses as well as extensive inculcation in schools) was more than matched by private initiatives. These included commemorative and protest marches, many associations and clubs (including the semi-official and internationally operating Revisionist League), and a prolific irredentist output in popular music, consumer articles and literature – to the point where there existed a veritable irredentist industry. Such zeal also produced quirkier aspects, such as a 1931 transatlantic flight by two Magyar pilots to achieve 'Justice for Hungary', or competitions in fashion design and flower shows with an irredentist theme.

There are repeated instances of popular opinion outdoing the governmental drive for irredentism, even attacking its moderation, like during Rothermere's 1927 campaign for 'Hungary's Place in the Sun'. As a matter of fact, mainland sentiment left leaders with precious little alternative to retrieval. Foreign Minister Kánya complained to US envoy Montgomery "that he considered revisionism insanity, but that there was nothing he could do about it since the Hungarian people were not quite sane on the subject and foreign policy could not be divorced entirely from politics" (Hoensch 1967:12). Count Teleki, twice prime minister and one of irredentism's chief ideologues, voiced similar concerns to an aide: 'our public

opinion has gone insane. [Take] everything back! No matter how, with whose help, no matter at what price. (...) We will die in this, this will push us into war" (Zeidler 2001:57).

Essentially, "no Hungarian government could survive without seeking 'justice for Hungary'" (Balogh 1988:57). Popular pressure for retrieval held irrespective of age or class (ibid.:55), and persisted through the entire interwar period. In consequence, virtually all interwar party programs contained a commitment to irredentism, be it as token lip service or, more frequently, as substantive goal (Gergely, Glatz et al. 2003).

So, exactly because they had based their legitimacy on nationalism, both traditional and alternative elites in Hungary were ultimately more hostages to than in control of, irredentism.[13]

7.2.2 Hungary in the post-communist period (1989-2005)

Democratisation in Hungary: political diversification and elite competition

Much like the situation after World War I, the onset of regime change and transition in 1989 confronted established elites with a sudden, unsettling diversity of political competitors. Within a mere 5 month period – between September 1988 and January 1989 – Hungarian politics was transformed into a genuine multi-party system. Four decades of monopoly government thus ended so to say overnight, witnessing simultaneously the re-birth of so-called 'historic' parties (Smallholders, Liberals, Social Democrats), new movements (FIDESZ, the Hungarian Democratic Forum, the Alliance of Free Democrats), and even the disintegration of the Communist Party (into the Socialists and the rump party itself). Furthermore, there was little space for divide-and-rule tactics: in March 1989 the opposition forced the ruling party to accept a dialogue strictly on a multilateral basis.

This time, however, developments did not prompt the interwar stranglehold on institutions and use of nationalism by panicked old elites. Unlike then, this

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[13] This beautifully mirrors Walker Connor's observation that "governments can act as successful catalyst of ethno-nationalism only when the necessary ingredients are present. Once in flower, ethno-nationalism is not apt to respond to governmental attempts at curtailment" (1980:163).

transition was a negotiated one, with multiple built in safeguards and compensations for the departing leadership. These both gave it assurance against any popular revanchism, and crucially, maximised its chances of surviving as dominant, if perhaps not sole political player.

Several aspects of Hungary's negotiated transition (between March 1989 and 1990) made this possible (Földes and Hubai 1999:297-307). For one, although regime change set in suddenly, it initiated a gradual process, rather than crisis management following catastrophic national events, like after World War I.

Opposition leaders furthermore firmly committed themselves to keeping transition peaceful. One may also add here the presence of Soviet troops as – perhaps merely speculative – safety belt for Hungary's ruling party. Interwar elites, in contrast, had not enjoyed such guarantees, fearing instead a resurgence of Kun's violent revolution of 1919.

Thirdly, unlike the hiatus caused by the civil war of 1919, the status quo elites of 1989 enjoyed the unbridled advantages of incumbency. This meant full control of administration, security services and the media, electoral prominence (as the 'safe option'), and, last but not least, experience. The 'Dunagate' scandal about secret service surveillance of opposition leaders in the run up to the first free elections exemplifies just how consciously they used this head start. Most importantly, however, communist elites managed to set the conditions of democratisation with regards to institutional arrangements. Their opposition to a new constitution (in favour of merely amending the existing one) prevailed in the Roundtable negotiations. This in turn enabled them to pre-empt both a constituent assembly (as demanded by the opposition), and influenced subsequent democratic legislatures (as of 2006 Hungary still operates on this amended statute). The Communists also secured their agenda on the office of the presidency: its scope (veto powers over government), its mode of election (direct popular vote), and timing (prior to free elections) were all designed to ensure the post to their candidate. The semi-presidential layout this would have resulted in was, however, defeated in a subsequent referendum[14], thus leaving Hungary as parliamentary

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[14] The popular referendum of November 1989 defeated these provisions, thereby effectively ending much of the control on transition the ruling party had until then. Crucially, this only occurred *after* the

democracy with a largely ceremonial head of state. Finally, negotiations about Hungary's electoral system saw the largest Roundtable parties team up to engineer a framework which would maximise their own seat shares (Benoit and Schiemann 2001). The adoption of a mixed member PR system, and the opposition parties' compliance with the Communist electoral law, all favoured the ruling party, disadvantaging especially the smaller movements that had split from its body.

Thus instead of stalling institutions and freezing Hungary into an anocratic state of suspended animation, the assurances of the 'pacted transition' (Linz) simultaneously enabled democratisation to proceed and prevented non-civic forms of nationalism from legitimising and determining politics.

Post-communist Hungary's swift transition to consolidated democracy[15]

Democratisation in Hungary proceeded at rapid pace and was already considered as 'consolidating' in 1990 – indeed the country's Polity score on democracy reached the +10 high mark in 1991. In contrast to the interwar period, all three of Mansfield and Snyder's criteria materialised in the course of the first post-communist decade.

Judging by the four elections of the post-communist period, governmental recruitment first of all is wide open. Each election saw an exchange of executive leadership, and this not just in terms of ideology (conservative-Christian in 1990 and 1998, socialist in 1994 and 2002), but even in the changing composition of parties *within* governmental coalitions.[16] This (now regular) alternation is new and

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proverbial point of no return for Communists i.e. after all other concessions had been made and a date for the first free elections set.

[15] Snyder (2000:195) has previously presented a fine-tuned, but also far less parsimonious, model specifically for post-communist states. Their different behaviour stemmed from differences in patterns of democratisation, specifically '(1) the state's degree and timing of economic development, (2) the degree to which democratisation threatened elite interests, and (3) the nature of its political institutions during the transition' (ibid.: 195). Snyder further lists the presence of ethnic-based federal structures, clientelist administrations, the level of urbanisation illiteracy, infant mortality, and civic political culture. This thesis remains with the later, generalised, theory published with Mansfield.

[16] Overall, six parties have acceded government in changing coalition formations. While the Socialists chose the Alliance of Free Liberals twice (1994, 2002), the two Christian-conservative coalitions saw considerable diversity (1994: Hungarian Democratic Forum, Smallholders, Christian Democrats in 1990 versus FIDESZ, Hungarian Democratic Forum, Smallholders in 1998).

exceptional in modern Hungarian history, which until 1990 had seen only once an opposition being voted into office - namely in 1905 (Földes and Hubai 1999:332). Secondly, political competition in contemporary Hungary is generally open – the voting process is untampered with and there is an electoral ombudsman. On the other hand, it also displays tendencies of electoral concentration and disproportionality which (deliberately) limit parliamentary pluralism. This is due to two circumstances. For one, it stems from hurdles in the electoral system negotiated in 1989. Intent on keeping smaller or new competitors at bay, outgoing and new elites secured a mixed-member system. It involved both a double-ballot majority vote and a party list PR system with an initially 4% national threshold, as well as strict requirements for the distribution of party support to be eligible for list seats on the two-tiered allocation system. This has meant in practice that only 6 out of Hungary's 29 or so parties actually gain mandates. Furthermore, the double-ballot encourages 'split ticket' voting, resulting in disproportional outcomes: in 1990, the Hungarian Democratic Forum won 42.5 per cent of parliamentary seats with 24.7 per cent of the party list vote, while in 1994 the Socialists won 33 per cent of the party list vote, but 54 per cent of the seats. The additionally introduced National Compensation List (allocating 58 surplus seats) does little to redress these imbalances, or to help smaller parties to secure seats (Földes and Hubai 1999:301-4, 345-8).

The other reason concerns Hungary's electoral threshold. It is high compared to the size of its electorate, which numbers at around 7.5 million. Having originally set it at 4 per cent on both constituency and national lists in 1990, an electoral reform raised it in 1993 to 5 per cent (with joint party lists requiring 10 per cent). This puts smaller parties once again at a disadvantage, as it changes both electoral behaviour (due to strategic voting) and radically narrows access to the legislature: while only 6 parties failed to reach the quorum in 1990, it was 13 in the 1994 elections). One of these is the Hungarian Justice and Life Party (MIÉP), the sole party with an irredentist platform, which managed to overcome the hurdle only once, in 1998.

Executive restraint, finally, is considerable and based on several sources: institutional, internal and public. Firstly, Hungary's interwar executive dominance has been replaced by parliamentary strength (in fact, Attila Ágh describes the current state as 'overparliamentarised'). Post-communist prime ministers are elected by, and directly accountable to, the unicameral legislature. The need to form voting blocks and coalitions places further limits on executive autonomy. The judiciary finally, is independent from executive influence, but "proved to be weak against the government's efforts to use supreme law to satisfy political and bureaucratic needs" (Szikinger in Zielonka 2001:418). In this sense then, "Hungary's overly strong parliament has become supra-constitutional. (...) The fact that eleven modifications to the Basic Law have been adopted since the initial 1989 amendments reflects the fact that parliament possesses constitutional authority, placing political-legislative interests above all other institutions" (ibid.:415).

Hungary's executives also face internal checks and balances. Post-communist practice has established the presidency as an additional tier of control. Partly depending on the particular incumbent, Hungary's heads of state have deliberately watched over any resurgence of executive dominance over politics. Árpád Göncz's two terms (1990-2000) were expressly themed on this line (notably preventing the use of the military to end a fuel strike in the autumn of 1990), Ferenc Mádl (2000-05) formulated a milder role as arbiter between government and opposition, but new incumbent László Sólyom (2005-10) in turn stated executive restraint as his principal goal.

Furthermore, contemporary executive action is not least limited by the autonomy of Hungary's bureaucracy. Specifically, personal and attitudinal continuity in the bureaucracy would make the conduct of irredentism very difficult. In this vein, it is arguable that the legacy of communism and its doctrinal rejection of ethno-nationalism has effectively shaped the Hungarian state into a non-revisionist path-dependence. A potential illustration is the experience of the FIDESZ administration (1998-2002): more assertive and pro-active on the minority question than all previous governments, and with a comfortable majority in the legislature, it

repeatedly collided with a critical and autonomous state bureaucracy.[17] Thus unlike in the interwar years, even a potentially irredentist government would at present not have the necessary support of, and control over, the wider executive apparatus.

Last but not least, Budapest governments are confronted with a vigorous and diverse civil society. A good illustration is provided by the public outrage that ensued in 1995-96, when the government fired the managers of the state owned television channels because of their overly critical coverage.

Today consequently, Hungary's institutions display the very strength and thus potential for engendering civic nationalism that they lacked in interwar times.

No irredentist pressure from below: the mainland Hungarian electorate today

In addition to these systemic safeguards and the absence of stalling elites, popular pressure for irredentism is practically non-existent. István Csurka's Hungarian Justice Party MIÉP, the only party to openly advocate retrieval[18], has been relinquished to the margins of Hungarian politics via ever decreasing electoral results which fall consistently below the parliamentary threshold. To briefly return to Horowitz's suggestions about particularised affinity, such disinterest may be partly due to overall fewer personal ties with the transborder region on the popular level. Post-communist Hungary's leadership, however, still displays significant numbers of minority émigrés or those linked in other ways (Bárdi 2004a:72; 200b:238-244). A good example is former foreign minister Martonyi, who is of Transylvanian parentage. Yet it is noteworthy that these 'special features' are not politically relevant in absence of popular demand. While public and media interest in the fate of transborder Hungarians is considerable and steadily rising, there is no desire for retrieval. In fact, a series of sociological surveys shows that the mainland's meagre support for irredentism has fallen in parallel to progressing democratisation (Csepeli 1989:43-46; Csepeli 1992/97: 241-254; Tabajdi and Barényi 1998:71;

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[17] For instance, one of my FIDESZ interviewees, Attila Demkó, complained about the "communist" bureaucracy's anti-government stance which risked undermining Orbán's nationally assertive program (Interview 4).

[18] József Torgyán, former leader of the otherwise conservative Independent Smallholder Party (FKGP), repeatedly affirmed his commitment to revision. His endorsement in a public speech at Trianon's 80th anniversary (4 June 2000) whilst holding office as minister for agriculture caused a scandal, drawing his subsequent resignation and departure from the FKGP.

Bárdi 2004b:136). Furthermore and in tandem, there has been an equation of Magyar identity with liberal, self-ascriptive criteria centring around cultural and, increasingly, civic-political themes (HTMH:2000; Shulman 2002: 565-578). Finally, the most tangible evidence of the separation between polity and nation came with the failure of the December 2004 referendum on dual nationality for neighbouring kindred. Initiated by a FIDESZ-led coalition of the right wing opposition, it came comparatively closest to an attempt at ethnopolitics, at making Magyar nation and state congruent. Its rationale was to ensure transborder Hungarians would not be cut off following Hungary's recent EU accession and the Socialist government's 'sell-out' of the Preference Law. Despite this self-evident logic, and the opportunity to punish the unpopular government[19], the turnout was so low as to invalidate the referendum. Only 37.4 per cent went to the polls, and of these a narrow majority of 51.5 per cent (around 17 per cent of Hungary's total population) approved.

As a result, post-communist Hungarian governments have been able to do what would have been tantamount to political suicide during the interwar period: to pointedly distinguish the interests of the Hungarian state from those of the Hungarian nation - and to overall prioritise the former (see e.g. Bárdi 2004:15). There have been no real exceptions to this line. Antall's famous dictum of 1990 about 'feeling in spirit as the Prime Minister of 15 million Hungarians' pointed to a different approach, yet never actually went beyond such rhetoric. More substantial was the FIDESZ-led administration's (1998-2002) programmatic announcement of a new synthesis: "It is a specific characteristic of Hungarian foreign policy that it has to argue a double interest - that of the Magyar state and nation. (...) [It] has to serve the national and state interest together, the two are inseparable, and especially not opposable to each other. (...) The [present, socialist-led] Hungarian government needs to stop considering transborder Hungarians as a burden that further drains the country's slight reserves. (...) [They] do not detract, but add to Hungary's strength" (Lőrincz, Németh et al. 1998:325-7). While this appears like another conflation of group and state interests, it is in fact an attempt to combine,

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[19] The national referendum of 4 December 2004 was a double vote, encompassing approval or rejection of the government's plans to privatise the health service. Ironically, the figures here were more decisive, with 65 per cent opposing the move.

rather than trade off, liberal democratic with national principles (see foreign secretary Németh's essays on this, ibid.:40-2;158-160). Not least, it reflects contemporary Hungary's slightly conflicted self-definition as state of a regionally dispersed, cultural nation versus as increasingly politically defined entity (see chapter 6). Primacy has therefore ultimately remained with the Hungarian state, as a function of which, it is argued, the wider national community will benefit. In the words of the electoral program, "a Hungary that is gradually integrating [into the EU] and economically strengthening, serves the interests of (...) transborder Hungarian minorities" (ibid.:300).[20] This prioritisation has been clearest in those repeated instances when Budapest traded off care for its transborder brethren against Euro-Atlantic integration (see section 5.2.2).

7.2.3 Summary

The contrast across the two time periods in terms of regime type demonstrates well which domestic political conditions irredentism needs in order to thrive.

In the interwar period, Hungary's weak institutions enabled irredentism not only because they could not check its instrumental use, but due to their failure to channel the ethno-national reflexes of both political elites and population. Precisely *because* institutions were unable to create a civic nationalism, the ethnic variant (irredentism) was left as only point of societal consensus. This in turn left unrivalled the crucial basis for irredentism: an ethnically exclusive, rather than culturally or institutionally anchored, national identity. It made sense of what retrieval posits axiomatically, namely the organic unity of group and state interests. Thus over and above irredentism's political expediency, both sets of elites were convinced of, and led by, their own nationalist appeals. In other words, the conversion of Magyar identity into a self-serving political agenda was only successful because it had intrinsic value to both leaders and the masses, i.e. because ethnicity was still

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[20] Actual policy-making on the ground was conducted accordingly. Firstly, the Orbán government's Status or Preference Law served at least as many of Budapest's interests as those of minority Hungarians - to a point where the latter suspected it as essentially self-serving measure. Furthermore, and this speaks for itself, it was exactly under this administration that Hungary achieved NATO membership as well as started and completed EU accession negotiations.

cohesive and tied to exclusive, territorial markers. Mainland Hungarians were hence outdoing their own leaders on the irredentist score, thus actually constraining their policy choices, instead of being manipulated. Rather than merely facilitating an imposed agenda, interwar Hungary's stalemated institutions consequently faced a two-way drive for retrieval both from above and from below, which they could not counter.

Post-communist Hungary contrasts sharply with the scenario of eighty years ago. It shows the institutional performance and legitimacy of a consolidated democracy. Old elites have reacted very differently at the onset of political diversification and participation. Institutions have been able to develop, guaranteeing constraints on the executive as well as open and competitive political participation and executive recruitment. This means, firstly, that the mechanisms of pluralism and accountability are in place which Mansfield and Snyder see as crucial in preventing nationalist foreign policies. More importantly, strong institutions preclude ethno-nationalism in Hungary because they foster a strengthening civic identity. Group identification is no longer principally based on shared, exclusive features (ancestry as well as loyalty to and residence on, ancestral homeland). Today, mainland Hungarians increasingly display such a civic identification (as well as culturally based self-views), exactly in tandem with progressing democratic consolidation. Secondly, a Hungary that works does away with the idea that the state merely expresses the organic unity of kin and soil and hence cannot truly function without it. This is conversely how the country's truncation had seemed to 'make sense' of its interwar problems. Finally, and as chapter 5 has shown, these processes are reinforced and supported by international constraints and incentives. In this way, democracy, changes in ethno-national identity, and external conditioning combine in their anti-irredentist effects.

7.3 Minority irredentism as a function of consociational accommodation in the host state

Irredentist minorities are highly disaffected groups. They feel that their twin desires are unfulfilled: living in a state defined by their ethno-national identity and for them to rule themselves and their territory (self-determination). As a consequence, they withdraw or withhold their political consent and loyalty from their host state. Instead, their allegiance rests with a state that naturally guarantees their national aspirations because it is titular, i.e. it is 'owned' by their group. The question is, therefore, whether there is a particular institutional framework able to prevent this by catering for minority nationalism within a host state.

While host states generally tend to choose repressive measures towards irredentas (see section 1.3.3), non-democratic ones do so routinely and with minimal success. Comparative research shows that democratic systems in turn outperform all other regime types when it comes to accommodating disaffected minorities (e.g. Gurr 1993:290-2; Lijphart 2002:39). This is because only democracies rest on the twin concerns of consent and legitimacy, which in turn require adjustment to minorities. The trouble is that democracy does not accommodate in a manner that specifically satisfies irredentist groups. Firstly, most of its variants[21] do not officially recognise and protect collective identities. Identity, however, is the very condition these minorities tie to the legitimacy of institutions and governance. Denial or even repression of ethnicity in the name of civic integrationism, will thus only exacerbate their grievances. Second, democracy is not an *impartial* framework, despite its longstanding "myth of ethno-cultural neutrality" (Kymlicka 2000:183-187). Because democracies routinely rely on nationalism to help cohesion (see above), all are to some degree nation-building or -maintaining. Even ostensibly value-free, 'civic' democracy is "culturally coded" in the language, myths and symbols of a particular group – mostly the dominant majority. This is unproblematic in societies where there is a consensus about

[21] I use here Smooha's (2002a) fivefold typology of democracy which categorises along to two combined criteria: state neutrality and collective recognition towards minorities. The resulting continuum lists individual-liberal democracies first, then republican liberal and multicultural regimes in the middling range, and consociational and ethnic democracies last.

national identity, i.e. ethnically homogeneous states or immigrant societies. In bi- or multi-national settings conversely, this very consensus is absent. Here minorities are further alienated by what they see as exclusiveness and / or assimilationism. This can stretch along a continuum described by Smooha (2002a), ranging from ethnic democracies, where the bias is explicit and constitutionally enshrined, down to republican-liberal and individual-liberal regimes, which marginalise by false neutrality or enforced universalism. So democracy as generic regime type is not enough to offer a solution. In fact, a wealth of cases shows that it may actually aggravate the grievances that fuel irredentist defectionism.[22]

The satisfaction of minority aspirations within a host state thus depends on a *particular type of democracy*, namely one that offers non-majoritarian/consensual features. This is recommended by both the theoretical literature - see Kymlicka's (2000) "multi-nation federalism" or Connor's umbrella concept of "political control" - as well as in the conclusions of Gurr's empirical survey (2000:290-2; 323). Most systematic, and used in this study, is Lijphart's consociational model (1971,1977). So far, consociationalism has been used in several latently or active irredentist scenarios: South Tyrol, Northern Ireland, post-Dayton Bosnia, Macedonia.[23] This type of accommodation exactly addresses the source of minority disaffection because it offers collective recognition, and thus a measure of equality (power-sharing) as well as self-rule of some sort (autonomy). It thus validates national aspirations and generates stakeholder involvement within a polity that is not their titular state. In doing so, it furthermore recognises collective identities, unlike other types of democracy. To generalise for our model, there is a high propensity for

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[22] Chazan's authoritative compilation observes this in general terms (1991:148-9), and Brubaker (1996) equally links minority irredentism to "nationalising" policies in the host state. McGarry and O'Leary (2001:189) explain specifically for the Irish Republican case that "(...) it has been the denial of the national identity of the minority community, the denial of institutional recognition and equality for that national identity, and the denial of their right of national self-determination as a result of a poorly conceived partition of the island in the 1920s which has regularly occasioned conflict." Kymlicka (2000:188) describes how formerly repressive democracies have learnt their lessons on this subject: "when the state attacks the minority's sense of distinct nationhood, the result is often to promote rather than reduce the threat of disloyalty and secessionist movements." Therefore, "in the experience of Western democracies, the best way to ensure the loyalty of national minorities has been to accept, not attack, their sense of distinct nationality."

[23] I exclude Cyprus' failed consociational government after independence in 1960, because here power-sharing was instituted for the Turkish minority which had no irredentist desires. Instead, it was the Greek majority which pursued union (enosis) with the Greek mainland.

defection from a host state where these conditions are not, or only minimally, satisfied. Conversely, the more pluralist, and specifically consociational elements it contains, the more it secures its minority's loyalties.

The first component of consociational politics addresses the irredentist need to define and thus own a state. Within the framework of a host state, this means co-ownership via collective equality for a minority's ethno-national identity, i.e. its institutional recognition as equally valid and legitimate. The idea here is a 'shared state', which entails far more than is included the shorthand of "*power*-sharing". It means consensual settlement along ethnic lines, instead of enforced 'universal' (read: majority-biased) norms. Lijphart's three criteria for this are a coalition government of group elites (executive power-sharing), veto rights for each party involved, and proportionality with regards to political participation, civil service posts and public funding. By implication, shared statehood also means that a polity does not construct or maintain its national identity against a minority group. This requires a change in majority attitudes. Kymlicka (2002:21) stresses here the "de-securitisation" of domestic politics. This means that the host state ceases to treat an actively or formerly irredentist group as a disloyal liability to its security, and thus no longer refuses its demands on principle. In short, power-sharing practice "involves the right of minorities to demand resources from the state in which they live (...) in order to secure their cultural reproduction, access to the material and symbolic goods of the state and the capacity to acquire voice" (Schöpflin 2004:100-1). These elements may be laid down in formal documents and legal-symbolic milestones (e.g. constitutional acknowledgement of co-nation status), or merely rely on informal and unwritten agreements / understandings among group elites. They may furthermore extend to the whole state (sovereign consociation) or only the disputed territory (regional consociation).

The second aspect of consociational politics - what Lijphart calls "segmental autonomy" - caters for irredentists' need for self-rule. Autonomy can have two facets: territorial or institutional. The first is obviously preferable to a homeland group. However, its territorial distribution may impede the devolution of power to a single unit which furthermore ought to cover most of its homeland. Host states are

250

also usually reluctant about this. They (wrongly)[24] suspect this as a precursor to defection as well as fear accusations of national sell-out from their own majority. If that is the case, inter-ethnic elite co-operation often has to precede any territorial arrangement in order to build up trust as well as leverage. As a consequence, minorities may have to opt, at least in the beginning, for sectoral sovereignty in the management of their affairs. Despite irredentists' emphasis to self-govern both kin *and* soil, they are amenable to such arrangements. "The desire that the destiny of the nation be in the hands of members of the nation should not be simply equated with separatism. The essence of the national self-determination imperative is *choice, not result*" (Connor 2001:122; emphasis added). Hence, Connor observes, most groups are prepared to settle for something less than defection - in this case irredentism - provided there is compensation in terms of a "meaningful autonomy", as he puts it (ibid.:124). Because there are political and cultural concerns besides territory that are significant for the minority, self-government can cover these domains, or indeed be a mix. Frequent manifestations are independent minority institutions (e.g. a Hungarian language university in Transylvania), control over vital areas to do with identity preservation (such as education), or power over policy sectors deemed crucial by the particular group (e.g. agriculture in the case of the largely rural Slovak Magyars).

In order to argue this theory for cases of inconsistent minority irredentism, a few adjustments are necessary. Given what is important to irredentists – defining and thus 'owning' a state, controlling their own kin and territory - consociationalism's aspects of self-rule and political control have greater priority than others. Lijphart (1971:10-14) actually makes the same point in general terms. He does not insist that all four components (elite coalition, minority veto, proportionality, and autonomy) be in place for consociational democracy. Because he distinguishes between mass and elite culture within groups, he identifies elite accommodation and segmental autonomy as the essential characteristics (ibid.:11). The remaining two elements evolve as a consequence. I shall hence analyse the contemporary absence of Magyar irredentism primarily on these two principal conditions, together

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[24] This suspicion is even supported by some theorists (e.g. Nordlinger 1972:32), but has been refuted in large scale surveys (see e.g. Gurr 2000).

251

with the above-mentioned criterion of 'desecuritisation' (shared stateness), which I take to be their combined outcome. I will also point to the fact that, in practice, these two principal conditions seem to require sequencing or even trade-offs between each other. Secondly, exactly because consociational theory is beautifully flexible on its main criteria, I argue that their satisfaction is one of degree. So while all or most of its four conditions may exist within a host state, these may (as yet) only function in certain policy areas, at certain junctures, in particular regions, or only towards one select minority. Examples would be Finland's conduct towards its Swedish minority, or, as I will show below, Slovakia's and Romania's conduct towards local Hungarians. I have termed such scenarios 'quasi-consociational practice'. Finally, consociations need, in Lijphart's own admission, an external threat or pressure in order to last. In my case study such pressure does not exist, but I will suggest that there is conversely an external *incentive* which has the same effect: integration into NATO and the EU.

To summarise, minority irredentism is affected by the specific political and institutional setting within the host state. Non-democratic systems and many types of democracy provoke disaffection by denying minorities self-government and collective institutional recognition. Conversely, democracies that practice partial or full consociationalism can tackle or prevent irredentism. This is because power-sharing responds to the twin desires that drive retrieval. Consociation means a group can acquire political control over itself and its territory as well as attain collective recognition, even equality, for its distinct national aspirations without having to defect. These measures can take advantage of beginning minority differentiation from mainland group identity as well as strengthen it (see chapter 6). Giving transborder communities a stake in their host state (i.e. by recognising them as nation-constituting groups), as well as an outlet for their increasingly autonomous politics (by letting them build their own institutions) fosters a civic nationalism that rivals politicised bonds based on culture and kinship. In this case study, we will see that both interwar Romania and Czechoslovakia adopted ethnically exclusive and majoritarian systems towards their Hungarian minorities. Their effects were nothing short of radicalising. The same two post-communist host states in contrast have, after brief initial periods of relapse, both established what I

call 'quasi-consociational practice'. While this practice is conjunctural and piecemeal rather than contractual and comprehensive, it has cumulative effects which increasingly cater for the twin national demands of local Magyars. Together with the changes in Hungarian identity (which it reinforces), this significantly contributes to the abandonment of retrieval.

7.3.1 Interwar Magyars: repression, discrimination and forced assimilation

Following partition, Transylvanian and Felvidék Hungarians found themselves in two new host states which equally repressed their aspirations, despite differing in their institutional setup and subsequent development. Both host states feared independent minority organisation and activity, suspecting disloyalty and sedition (Zeidler 2001:193-5; 198-9). In fact, Czechoslovakia and Romania regarded their own stability and survival as conditional on the neutralisation or elimination of their minorities. Notwithstanding their different institutional settings, both thus imposed the very pre-emptive restrictions Kymlicka describes for securitised societies.[25] These denied Magyars their identity as well as political control through self-rule and share of power. By doing so, Prague's and Bucharest's worries became self-fulfilling.

Nationalising states: no institutional-constitutional equality and recognition for identity

Firstly, despite their markedly different constitutional frameworks, both countries had regime types in which the state sides with the majority (Smooha 2002a:426) – something that is particularly antagonising to irredentists. Because Czechoslovakia

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[25] Kymlicka (2002:21) describes a situation as securitised when "relations between states and minorities are seen, not as a matter of normal democratic politics to be negotiated and debated, but as a matter of state security, in which the state has to limit the normal democratic process in order to protect the state. Under conditions of securitisation, minority self-organisation may be legally limited (e.g. minority political parties banned), minority leaders may be subject to secret police surveillance, the raising of particular sorts of demands may be illegal (e.g. laws against promoting secession), and so on. Even if minority demands can be voiced, they will be flatly rejected by the larger society and the state. After all, how can groups that are disloyal have any legitimate claims against the state? So securitisation of ethnic relations erodes both the democratic space to voice minority demands, and the likelihood that those demands will be accepted."

and Romania were nationalising polities, they denied any institutional recognition, let alone equality, to their Hungarian minorities.

Romania was first conceived as democracy, but had by the late 1920s stalled into an anocracy, and finally degenerated into dictatorship in 1938. This in itself limited its accommodative potential towards local Magyars. More importantly, Romania was an ethnic state. Its first constitution of 1923 declared the country as "unified, indivisible national state". It named an ethnically defined titular nation. Various provisions spelt out a clear majority bias, such as Article 22 which designated Orthodoxy as state religion while Hungarians were mostly Protestant, and in lesser numbers, Catholic and Jewish. The subsequent 1938 constitution was even more openly discriminatory, stipulating for instance Romanian ethnicity for any member of government (Article 67). While it spoke about the universal applicability of obligations, the same formula was not used when it came to citizen's *rights* (Illyés 1982:93-4). Such exclusiveness relegated all other identities to a lower rank, and it went further by actually *invalidating* the Magyar community's national distinctness.[26] The reasons lay in the recency of Romanian nationalism as well as its historical assertion against imperial Magyar rule. Hungarians were merely Romanians who had 'gone astray' in their identity. As the devastating education law of 1924 (see below) put it, "those citizens of Romanian origin who have lost (or forgotten) their mother tongue owe it to their children to have them educated in exclusively Romanian speaking public or private schools" (article 8; Diószegi and Süle 1990:25). Simultaneously, Romanian authorities scanned Magyar surnames for any Romanian 'origins' and forced such families to school their children in majority institutions (ibid.:29; Zeidler 2001:197). Interwar Romania thus was a place where "the state belongs to the majority, not to all of its citizens, and the majority uses the state as a means to advance its national interests and goals. (...) [It] imposes various controls and restrictions on the minority in order to prevent subversion, disorder and instability." Thus, Smooha continues, "the minority encounters the hard problem of potential disloyalty to the state because it can

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[26] Smooha describes ethnic states as generally non-assimilationist (1990; 2001; 2002a).

neither be fully equal in nor fully identified with, the state" (2001:25). This is exactly what Transylvanian Magyars faced – and hence decided to leave.

Czechoslovakia, too, was a nationalising state. Typical for a liberal-republican democracy, it made inclusion conditional on the acquisition of a titular language and culture. This, as I have explained above, is in itself antagonising to minorities, because these bases are rarely if ever ethnically neutral. Like in Romania, this titular nation was furthermore nascent and thus insecure. These two circumstances implicitly spelt confrontation with those groups (Magyar and German) who had divergent national identities and wanted those recognised. To founding President Masaryk, the Republic and its nascent Czecho-Slovak character had precedence over the minorities: "we can't wait for minorities to tell us what they want, what they claim, what they desire. We can't tailor our concessions according to how vociferously they demand advantages" (Vígh 1993:56). Prague hence soon curtailed its generous constitutional liberties for minorities via a series of laws tellingly entitled "In Defence of the Republic" (1925, 1936, 1938). Anti-Magyar elements were integral to the construction of this new titular nation. The forced assimilation in the Felvidék was throughout referred to as 're-Slovakisation', a return to the alleged status quo ante that 'turned' Hungarians 'back' into Slovaks. Masaryk advised on this issue: "we have to take account of the fact that not a single Hungarian will abandon his faith in the recovery and retrieval of Slovakia. It is exactly for this reason that Slovakisation must occur in a planned and incremental manner" (Popély 2001:80). Here too, the institutional repression of Hungarian identity thus went together with its wholesale invalidation. Amongst Hungarians, such treatment first provoked deep-seated distrust towards their host state and soon increased internal resistance (Popély 2001:83-4). "This (...) was an indispensable component to the [minority's] politics of grievance (Szarka 1998:22). Prague's behaviour thus exacerbated, if not created, the irredentist disaffection within its Hungarian community (Vígh 1993:57).

Political powerlessness at local and national level
This political systemic refusal to accommodate minorities translated into various nationalising policies. For instance, Romania and Czechoslovakia both instituted

255

sustained programs weakening the minorities' economic bases of sustenance (see section 3.3.2), which Prague particularly complemented with large scale colonisation in the Felvidék (see section 4.3). Two issue areas were particularly relevant, because they concerned the core desires of irredentism: political control (and correlate self-rule) on the one hand, and national-cultural recognition on the other. Discriminatory practices in the former, and forced assimilation pressures towards the latter, in turn radicalised already discontent Magyar minorities.

Interwar Romania used a broad array of measures to suppress Magyar participation in politics. It banned the first Hungarian party in 1922, after only 16 months of existence. Its successor, the National Hungarian Party (OMP), survived until 1938 when it was also banned. Romania's majority voting system led to gross distortions for minority parties: while the country's Magyar population hovered around 10.87 per cent (in 1930), the OMP was never able to get more than 3 per cent of parliamentary seats and just 2.52 per cent of senatorial mandates. This was despite its position as sole Magyar party, which furthermore commanded strong loyalty and mobilisation among its voters (Bárdi 2000b). In addition, elections were routinely rigged within Transylvania: Magyar voters were intimidated, their polling cards seized and their ballots stolen, Hungarian candidates were disqualified for unnamed reasons, local party leaders arrested and Magyar electoral registers lost or rewritten (Diószegi and Süle 1990:39-43; Mikó 1941). Journalists and papers who tried to report about these and other practices faced legal prosecution and multiple prison sentences (Berey 1940.)

The Magyar community's self-organisation was also undermined by Romania's administrative redistricting of 1925. The new county boundaries were drawn to cut through contiguous Hungarian settlement areas (notably in the northern counties of Bihar, Szilágy and Szatmár), thus creating local ethnic Romanian majorities in what had been overwhelmingly Magyar units (ibid.:37; see also section 4.3). The reform simultaneously abolished every form of self-government, based on the constitutional principle of state centralisation. Given that Romania's pre-1920 territories had already been centrally run, this generally worded law in fact explicitly targeted Transylvania (Illyés 1982:192).

Fearing minority political activity, Prague equally took to electoral engineering immediately in 1920: constituencies in Magyar areas of the Felvidék were gerrymandered in such a way that Hungarian districts required 40 per cent more votes to secure a seat than Slovak ones (Vígh 1993:45). Czechoslovakia also soon curtailed constitutional liberties via a series of laws entitled "In Defence of the Republic" – specifically against its sizeable minorities. The first of these restricted in 1923 the freedom of assembly and speech for minorities, and also imposed controls over their parties (e.g. requiring party statutes to be submitted for approval lest they contain subversive elements). Censorship focused on minority publications, with Magyar papers suffering repeated raids, prolonged suspensions, or even bans and legal prosecution (Turczel 1992). The Czechoslovak government only allowed Magyars disparate organisation into small parties. Even then their meetings were frequently forbidden or attendance fined for 'subversive behaviour'. When Hungarians attempted to unite into an umbrella organisation in late 1920 this was outlawed on procedural grounds (Popély 2001:84-90).

Independent local organisation was equally undercut – local government was castrated (1921) and self-governing towns were placed under the control of their respective districts (1922). Since religious organisations were the backbone of Magyar life, all faith-based self-administration was suspended, minority church property expropriated on a disproportionate scale, and property rights over remaining assets were curtailed (Szarka 1998:20-1). In both interwar Romania and Czechoslovakia, ethnic Magyars remained politically disenfranchised and hence unable to influence their own fate.

Cultural reproduction and forced assimilation
Political activism aside, Romania and Czechoslovakia regarded the *very existence* of minority nationalism as threat to their respective nation-building efforts and reacted in very similar ways. Both hence practiced policies of forced assimilation, though once more differing in their methods. Language and minority schooling are the most indicative items here.

In Czechoslovakia, matters were again down to discrepancies between ostensibly liberal legal provisions and their implementation. While the 1920 language law prescribed bilingualism in localities where minorities made up 20 per cent, the use

257

of Hungarian was simply banned in qualifying areas (Vígh 1993:45). Magyar language publications were routinely seized, speaking Hungarian in public led to being arrested and searched at random (Szarka 1998:16-7). The ethnically biased re-districting of 1922 had furthermore ensured that many Felvidék regions no longer reached the stipulated threshold for bilingualism, which a 1928 law then further raised to 50 per cent. Private nationalist associations like the *Slovenska Liga* ("Slovak League"), *Sokol*, and *Narodna Ochrana* ("National Defence") threatened Magyar-speakers and destroyed most local Hungarian signs and symbols in one long campaign (Popély 2001:81-85). Given that authorities ignored these activities, and that these groups were state-subsidised and -settled in the Felvidék, they functioned as agents of official policy exactly like McGarry describes (1998:615-16).

In tandem with language repression Magyar education practically ceased to exist. Almost seventy-five percent of Hungarian teachers in Czechoslovakia were made redundant, which meant not only a loss of employment to the community but the de-Magyarisation of their educational institutions (Mócsy 1995:248). Important Hungarian high schools in the Felvidék were closed (e.g. in Léva and Rozsnyó) and so were the only Magyar law faculty, all Hungarian universities but one, and the minority's vocational colleges (Szarka 1998:21). Prague only funded Slovak-language schools and heavily subsidised *Slovenska Liga* teachers to settle and take over (Jócsik 1939; Vígh 1993:79-85). In short, the generous provisions of Czechoslovakia's 1919 law on minority education were simply never applied.

In keeping with its character as ethnic state with an abortive democratisation, Romania's policies were more explicit and worsening. Until 1926, Hungarian language commercial signs and notices were forbidden and thereafter had to juxtapose more prominent translations (Illyés 1982:91). From 1928 onwards, all Magyar names were Romanianised in public records and personal documents, authorities rejected names that had no Romanian translation or equivalent. Taxation and accounting had to be in Romanian (1928), lawyers could use only Romanian in court (1931). Cinemas were allowed to show films exclusively in "cultural languages" (i.e. German, English, French) – not Hungarian. Postal services rejected mail addressed in minority languages. Regardless of minority

percentages, local administration operated solely in the majority language, and from 1936 onwards any use of Hungarian could incur an officeholder's immediate suspension (Diószegi and Süle 1990:21-2; Zeidler 2001:197).

Immediately in 1920, an expert commission had found any minority language education to be "incompatible with the Romanian national interest". The subsequent enforcement of a unified, nationalised Romanian school system all but did away with Magyar schooling. A 1921 law ended state financing for Hungarian denominational schools (vital for the community), but was careful to exempt German institutions from that rule. Magyar teachers were deprived of their pension rights and made redundant, because they failed the new, compulsory Romanian language exam. Ethnic Romanian teachers in turn received a doubled salary and a plot of land if they settled in Transylvania. Further mass closures of minority institutions followed a 1925 law, because it required an all-Romanian school board and prior licensing. Thus already by the mid-1920s, only one in eight Magyar children attended a Hungarian primary school, one in seven went to a Hungarian high school. By 1933, there was no Magyar kindergarten. There also was no Hungarian university, all eight had been converted into Romanian institutions (Balázs 1929; Jancsó 1935; Diószegi and Süle 1990:22-32; Zeidler 2001:197-8).

7.3.2 The long and winding road to co-nationhood: Magyars in contemporary Romania and Slovakia

The situation today increasingly differs from interwar times. Both host states display an organically and selectively evolving consociational pattern – 'quasi-consociational practice' as I call it - which has cumulative results. Born out of convergent political interests rather than normative conviction, this practice has developed over the last decade and looks set to continue. It is not formalised, constitutionally enshrined, nor in fact much referred to as "consociational". But this in itself is far from detrimental: Lijphart (2002:53-4) in fact argues that informal agreements are more flexible and empirically imply a greater level of trust.

Executive powersharing[27]

What Schöpflin describes as "capacity to acquire voice" (2004:100) has been no easy feat for contemporary Magyar minorities. Executive power-sharing only materialised several years into the post-communist transition, thus leaving some initial years of political marginalisation not unlike the interwar period. Hamberger (2004:105) describes this situation as "double opposition" - both against nationalist governments (Meciar's and Iliescu's) and, due to their ethnicity, even *within* the parliamentary opposition. However, in contradistinction to interwar times, Hungarian electoral participation was free of harassment and irregularities. No minority parties were banned or raided. Hungarian minorities have been consistently represented according to their population size within the legislatures of both countries.[28] Most importantly, exactly because their identity had decoupled from that of the mainland (see chapter 6), local Hungarians immediately reacted to this marginalisation by demanding their right as constituent nations.[29]

With the onset of post-communist consolidation, both polities started to develop two political camps, namely "between parties that support radical or extreme forms of nationalism, intolerance and authoritarian rule as against those that espouse broadly liberal and pluralistic values" (Partos in Ágh 1998:204). This forced host state elites into compromise with ethnic Magyar parties. In order to tip the balance towards reform, they began to recruit Hungarians into their alliance, building on a commonality of interest and the understanding that victory would entail host state accommodation. Towards the mid-1990s, both the Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania (RMDSZ) and the party of Hungarian Coalition (MKP)[30]

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[27] Another (but even according to Lijphart, lesser) area of power-sharing is lagging behind: proportionality in civil service. Regarding Romania's civil and legal service, Schöpflin (2004:95) notes that, as of 2003, Magyars are still absent from diplomatic positions, higher police and army posts. No minority quotas have been introduced.

[28] Both host states operate on list PR systems (albeit with closed electoral lists), with 5 per cent thresholds. In Romania, national minorities are even guaranteed one seat in the Chamber of Deputies independently of reaching this percentage (a 'right to mandate'), but this applies only to governmentally *recognised* groups - which Magyars are. In other respects, however, Romania's new electoral law of 2004 still puts national minorities at a disadvantage according to the OSCE (2004:6).

[29] See e.g. Szarka (2004a:87-91) for the textbook consociational demands put forward in 1992 by the then three Slovak Hungarian parties.

[30] The MKP was founded in 1998 by uniting the three previously independent Slovak Hungarian parties: Együttélés Politikai Mozgalom (Political Movement Coexistence), Magyar

thus functioned as opposition partners to the increasingly autocratic rule of President Iliescu and Premier Meciar respectively. Watershed change came with the victory of resulting reformist coalitions in Romania (1996) and Slovakia (1998), which included Magyar parties. Premier Ciorbea's coalition (1996-2000) not only comprised three ministers from the RMDSZ, but also depended on ethnic Hungarian votes in the Romanian assembly. The first post-Meciar government, elected in October 1998, equally comprised three Slovak Magyar ministers. Ethnic Hungarian parties in both Romania and Slovakia have since become a permanent fixture in domestic politics, finding themselves as virtual "kingmakers" in successive national elections. Their co-operation has been vital, either within government (Romania 1996-2000 and 2004-08; Slovakia 1998-02 and 2002-06), or in constructive opposition bound by formal agreement (Romania 2000-04). This solidified, enduring 'co-operation in exchange for accommodation' has been described as one displaying select 'consociational' features (Bárdi and Kántor 2000:151 ff.; Brusis 2001; Hamberger 2004; Szarka 2004a:95 ff.), albeit with various caveats regarding durability (see e.g. Shvetsova 2002).

Informal veto powers

Although neither Magyar minority party possesses formalised veto powers, I argue that both wield a considerable informal veto which grants them leverage. Their threat to withdraw from the coalition (or from constructive opposition) is a powerful tool. For one, both Romania and Slovakia have been at pains to prove their democratic credentials to Western partners, particularly in their endeavour to secure EU and NATO accession. Both organisations imposed the central pre-condition of minority accommodation, and hence the "token Magyar" in government became essential. Upon acceding the first coalition in 1998, the Slovak Magyar MKP for instance was aware that it could either serve as mere fig leaf, or conversely hold solid bargaining power. It made that leverage clear in subsequent coalition talks.

Kereszténydemokrata Mozgalom (Hungarian Christian Democrat Movement), and the Magyar Polgári Párt (Hungarian Civic Party). This was in order to face the oncoming Slovak elections and subsequent coalition talks as one Hungarian block.

Secondly, Western integration and investments are subject to successful political reform and continued stability. Romanian and Slovak politicians, but also public opinion, have come to recognise ethnic Magyar parties as reliable and responsible coalition partners in an otherwise unstable party landscape (see e.g. Hamberger 2004:106). They have proven to continuously carry and defend reform programs, not least because their own interests are directly intertwined with successful democratic consolidation. In fact, they have sometimes done so in opposition to their own interests.

Finally, beyond reform programs the very survival of governmental coalitions continues to depend on the RMDSZ and MKP respectively. Most analysts regard Slovak elite interests as the chief motive for accommodating local Magyars (see Hamberger 2004:105; Szarka 2004a:85). Admittedly, veto via withdrawal is a blunt instrument and has so far shown mixed results when threatened. Lijphart (2002:44), however, stresses just how strong an impulse for co-operation this means: "the more usual inclination of parties is to want to be included in cabinets. Because the only way for ethnic or any other parties not just to enter but also to stay in the cabinet is to reach compromises with their coalition partners, they have a very strong incentive to compromise." Elite cooperation thus continues to be uneasy, yet it is working.

Political control

Executive power-sharing has secured political control and increasing equality for Magyars in several ways. First and foremost, it translated into office holding. Hungarian minorities secured what were key posts for their respective situations. The Slovak Magyar MKP secured the portfolios of regional development, minorities, environment and agriculture (02-06 cycle). It furthermore provides six state secretaries, all in important ministries (e.g. foreign affairs, economy, finance, education). MKP party chief Béla Bugár is the Slovak parliament's vice-president. The RMDSZ currently holds four governmental portfolios (Public Works and Territorial Management, Education, Cultural and European Integration, Commerce as well as IT and Telecommunications). At present, no less than eighteen Romanian governmental bodies are headed or co-chaired by Hungarians. Furthermore, in the current legislative cycle both minority leaders hold the post of

deputy premier within their host states - RMDSZ president Béla Markó in Romania (2004-08), and deputy leader Pál Csáky in Slovakia (2002-06).

Partaking in government also entailed the historic first of having a daily input in Romanian and Slovak national legislation. Though short of many announced goals, these advances achieved more than at any juncture in the interwar period. Crucially for this study, they concerned many of the very grievances that had formerly driven Magyars to defection. Legislative input brought some tangible benefits for both communities (see also below). These have materialised especially after Hungarian parties started to demand advance concessions in exchange for their participation, which they initially did not. In terms of securing general rights, both minorities have achieved their host countries' signing and ratification of the European Charter for Regional and Minority Languages. Romanian Hungarians have successfully pushed through the 2002 Anti-discrimination Law. Respective constitutional amendments in Romania (2003) and Slovakia (2001) have eliminated several enshrined ethnic biases (see below). Both communities have made headway on the restitution of seized private, church and communal properties via key pieces of legislation. Chief among these were the 1997-98, 2001 and 2005 laws in Romania regarding property restitution. Slovakia still upholds the Beneš Decrees, which prevents reclaiming of or compensation for, assets seized during collective punishment (see section 3.3.3). However, the MKP achieved in 2004-5 that anonymous properties be put under the control, and now ownership, of local authorities. Since many Felvidék municipalities are Magyar-run (see below), this has been seen as significant partial victory.

Governmental participation has also resulted in a governmental institutional structure for minority accommodation and collective recognition in Romania (Bárdi and Kántor 2000:165, 172) and Slovakia (Hamberger 2004:107,110). Romania has established a National Anti-Discrimination Council (with a Hungarian president), an Ombudsperson for National Minorities in 2001, as well as a Ministry for Minorities (subsequently abolished between 2000-04, and then re-appointed in the current cycle 02-06). Slovakia has set up a Standing Parliamentary Committee on Minorities, and it is headed by an ethnic Hungarian. The country has as yet to

establish a so-called Bureau for Minorities, something that the MKP has scheduled for the 2006 parliamentary agenda, together with cultural funding (see below). Blénesi (2004:75) stresses furthermore the value of gathering experiences from governmental participation, and of generally raising awareness about the minority's problems.

Analysts agree that this acquisition of political control is a key factor in minority Hungarians' loyalty as host state citizens (see e.g. Szarka 2004a:96). Nándor Bárdi (2004:76) explains: "beyond concrete results achieved in Romania, Slovakia... (attenuating anti-Hungarian feelings, obtaining funds for development, acquiring positions in the course of privatisation, reaching compromises on language policy, etc.), the most important achievement was that the Hungarian elites, as representatives of a political community, became more organically integrated into the political life of the respective countries." The link between political power on the one hand, and moderation on the other, is clearly traceable: "The other side of this process was the behaviour of Hungarian minority political elites in this situation, as represented by *Hungarian minority parties joining coalition governments or granting their support to the governing party*" (Bárdi 2004:ibid., original emphasis). Mainland Hungarian research, however, is sceptical about the consociational aspects of Romanian and Slovak politics, exactly because of their opportunistic, instrumental nature (Bárdi and Kántor 2000, Hamberger 2004). As explained above, I take a different view: the absence of a normative compulsion to power-share is certainly disappointing, but it is exactly *because* Magyar cooperation is needed - and lastingly so - that the minorities have a power to bargain. Furthermore, although many criticise these host state concessions as quick fix, token gestures - Schöpflin (2000:276) calls them "short-termism" – this does not diminish their cumulative effects. Kymlicka (2002) reminds that this is exactly how the profoundly changed Western response towards minority rights evolved.

Self rule: institutional / segmental autonomy
No concrete form of autonomy has been established – as yet – in either Romania or Slovakia. However, at the time of writing (February 2006), the Romanian parliament is discussing a draft Law on National Minorities, which amongst others,

sets out a national framework for cultural autonomy. The Slovak assembly still has to pass a Minority Law, due since 2004. What is instead materialising gradually and by piecemeal, sectoral achievements, are two things. For one, segmental autonomy in key areas concerning identity. Secondly, a territorial autonomy by proxy, i.e. self-administration of majority Magyar areas at local level. Both of these developments concern the very self-rule over matters salient to minorities which, if absent, fuels defectionism. Though some within the two communities do not see segmental autonomy as satisfactory, minority party behaviour reveals its prioritisation as pragmatic and widely supported strategy.

Education and Language

After eight decades, minority Hungarians have now in both host states a Magyar-language university. Both are the direct outcome of governmental participation: the MKP made this a pre-condition for its second time in coalition in 2002, following the RMDSZ' example which had demanded this in exchange for signing the so-called 'Protocol' as party in constructive opposition. The Babes-Bolyai university in Transylvania thus opened in September 2003, followed a year on by the Hungarian Selye János university in the Felvidék town of Komárom. However, the former is still surrounded by petty controversy, and both have to be financed by Hungary and private donations.

The Slovak minority language Law (1999), and its equivalent in Romania (2001), have respectively secured the use of Hungarian in communities and public offices. Although tied to what the minorities see as high local thresholds (20 per cent), and hampered by administrative re-districting in Slovakia (2000-1), these measures have been implemented on a considerable scale. In Romania, there have been furthermore significant gains in state funding for Magyar cultural life. The budget for the National Office for Minorities increased from 6 billion Lei (1997) to 62.6 (2000), the Ministry of Culture widened its financed Hungarian programs from 67 (1997) to 300 (in 2000), and a proportionate percentage is allocated for the care and establishment of Magyar cultural sites (Bárdi and Kántor 2000:173). Slovak Magyars have presented for debate this year (2006) their legislative proposal for proportionate cultural financing.

In the all-important area of native language education finally, Romanian Hungarians have been particularly successful. They have broadened the range of recognised Hungarian diploma and also achieved an educational reform on curricula. The new education law of 1999 furthermore guarantees native language schooling from kindergarten to university. These, however, notably exclude the Csángó Hungarians outside of Transylvania (Bárdi and Kántor 2000:170). In Slovakia, one of the first achievements were bi-lingual report cards. An estimated 98 per cent of Magyar schools are state owned (Szarka 2004:94), but since the 2004 decentralisation measures schooling has been placed under the authority of local governments. This, in turn, provides greater control over education within majority Hungarian areas which have control over local government. This indirect method, however, does not cover the full 80 or so per cent of minority children who attend Hungarian language state schools.

Informal regional self-rule

Given that regional autonomy is still a sensitive issue in both host states (see below), Magyar parties have successfully pursued a complex, indirect strategy. They have attained informal territorial self-rule by achieving minority representation within local self-governments in majority Hungarian areas. This has been complemented by their governmental role, which ensured the application or creation of facilitating legislation and – importantly – an increase in state funding for the local level.

This arrangement has solidified, and it is expanding even further. For instance, in Romania, the number of Magyar-led municipal sub-prefectures has held steady at eight over the past ten years, while Hungarian county prefects went from two (1996-02 cycle) to four (2002-06 period). The extent of local self-rule is even more pronounced in the Felvidék: there are at present 237 towns run by Hungarian mayors, and out of 3607 local authority representatives in Slovakia 2140 are Magyar. In Romania, however, this method has had the disadvantage of being uneven, since Hungarians in Transylvania are more scattered (see map 3.5). Thus areas with smaller minority percentages have been unable join up (Bárdi and Kántor 2000:162, 165).

Self-government has been furthermore underpinned with enabling secondary legislation. This meant Hungarians achieved in both host states enforcement of the breakthrough laws on subsidiarity. In Romania, this concerned legal frameworks for management and allocation of municipal funding, for communal properties, for concessions and the legal status of roads. In order to make local authorities capable of action, this also included laws on local referenda and civil servants (Bárdi and Kántor 2000:169).

Last but not least, Magyars have secured a considerable allocation in state funds for regions. In Slovakia, this was not least due to getting control over the key ministries which channel EU regional funds. Contrastingly, a Budapest ministerial memo criticises Slovakia's persistent underinvestment in Magyar-inhabited areas, remarking that ethnic Hungarians "are required to be faithful and loyal without being able to get the same share, (...) as tax payers from the budget which had been accomplished on an equal basis with the Slovaks" (HTMH 2002:1).

Institutional autonomy

Both minorities have achieved the creation of independent or state-funded, separate institutional structures in several vital areas (Bárdi and Kántor 2000:165;173). A few respective examples illustrate the considerable advances in this area.

Between 1996 and 2000, the Romanian Ministry for Culture for instance placed all 120 cultural institutes in Romania under local self-rule, which meant that those in Hungarian areas are now headed by ethnic Magyars. The Romanian Ministry for Education created a separate Minority Secretariat and an independent Chief Executive responsible for Magyar language instruction. These were complemented by new chief and special education supervisors for Hungarian language instruction in every county. Of Romania's 12 touristic regions, the three majority Hungarian ones were placed under secretaries from that minority. The State Ownership Fund (responsible for the privatisation of state owned property) now also has proportional shares of Hungarians in all regional and county offices. This was particularly important, given that the minority had suffered discrimination in exactly this area during the first decade of post-communism (see section 3.3.3).

In Slovakia, matters are still lagging behind. State television and radio now have an independent Hungarian directorate. The Slovak government has furthermore pledged in 2001 to progressively institute a minority-run system training teachers for Magyar-language state schools.

Shared rule versus self-rule in the Magyar experience: trade-offs or sequential conditionality?

The fact that both minorities are increasingly equipped with their own infrastructure is seen as perhaps one of the most significant results of minority elite participation in government. Yet power-sharing and its informal self-rule results are not viewed uniformly as a blessing and solution. There is dissatisfaction in both communities because the MKP, and especially the RMDSZ, have increasingly acted as ethnic parties, rather than developing independent minority institutions. This has caused a rift within both Transylvanian, and to a lesser extent, Felvidék Hungarian politics (Aspeslagh in Tabajdi and Barényi 1998:167-169; Bárdi and Kántor 2000:7-8). Their respective "radical" wings oppose co-nationhood (collective equality via power-sharing and primarily segmental self-rule). Instead, they envisage a parallel minority society (internal self-determination in which a territorial autonomy would generate independent minority institutions). In their view, such a "state within a state" (as the RMDSZ's Kolozsvár declaration of 1992 called it) is the safest way to guarantee the survival of their communities, because both host states still have biased constitutional frameworks (see below). In short, the existing leaderships stand accused of having prioritised their own interests at the expense of their communities.

This rift is, however, not representative: despite being portrayed in both minority and mainland media as widespread internal divisions, these "conflicts primarily concern the inner circles of political and cultural elites" (Bárdi and Kántor 2000:7). Opinion surveys amongst the wider minority Magyar communities confirm this. Slovak Hungarians thus consistently approve of their umbrella party's governmental role (91 per cent in 2001) and - crucially - link it directly to the what they perceive as steady improvement of their affairs (Hamberger 2004:116;122).

Romanian Hungarians are more critical of their elites, but still overwhelmingly identify with their activities: in 2000 it was 80.6 per cent who saw concrete results from the RMDSZ' work, 68.3 per cent thought that their "leaders were frequently successful in asserting the Hungarians' interests" (Bárdi and Kántor 2000:157-8). So, while there is a measure of internal dissent (especially in Transylvania), communities support the pragmatic prioritisation of shared-rule elements over self-rule.

In sum, both parties have stressed the elite concert aspects of consociationalism over and above territorial autonomy and the internal 'building' of their respective communities. Instead, they have sought to achieve these latter goals in two, indirect ways. For one, they have focused on segmental autonomy which, secondly, entailed piecemeal reform via governmental participation. In order to do this, they have consolidated their leverage by making themselves indispensable (read: reliable) political partners. This sequential strategy has occurred to the partial dissatisfaction of their respective communities, more so in Transylvania than in the Felvidék.

Shared stateness, attitudes and de-securitisation
Kymlicka (2002:20-1) argues that East and Central European countries are still securitised. To a certain extent this is true. For instance, the mere term of 'autonomy' engenders such strong associations with secession amongst the Romanian public that minority elites resort to alternative wording (Decker 2005:35). Most observers agree, however, that Magyar participation in host state governments has engendered significant change in majority attitudes as well as setting a historic precedent (e.g. Bárdi and Kántor 2000:151). Especially in Slovakia, the image of Hungarians - at least in political life - has acquired positive connotations: the MKP has been the only party to increase its popularity compared to the previous governmental cycle (98-2002) and displays even some cross-ethnic voting (Csáky 2004:22). Hamberger (2004:105-6; 110) notes for instance that, by 2002, Magyar participation in government had become "commonsensical". Although fears about its disloyalty still exist, the minority is seen as integral part of Slovak domestic politics, and as guarantor of domestic democratisation. MKP

president Bugár has been rated Slovakia's second most popular politician in 1999. By 2003, the MKP figured as most approved of all governmental parties, even amongst supporters of the Slovak parliamentary opposition (ibid.:116,120,123)! Similarly, in the last Romanian elections of 2004 the RMDSZ has been the only party associated with the governing coalition to escape an electoral backlash. Here too, Hungarians are by now viewed as established player in Romanian national politics and as consistently advancing political stability and reform. Polls amongst both communities furthermore indicate that minority-majority relations are bilaterally seen to have improved significantly since governmental participation (Bárdi and Kántor 2000:164,127; Blénesi 2004:77-80).

Such tangible attitudinal advances have as yet to be translated into constitutional amendments. These still bear nationalising features which keep Romania and Slovakia ethnically exclusive. The evolving measure of shared stateness in daily political practice is thus still contradicted by statute. Some analysts (e.g. Bárdi and Kántor 2000:180-1; Szarka 2004a:94) consequently see no scope beyond the mere ad-hoc "consociational practice" that is currently at work. They deem even the basic requirements for institutionalised power-sharing as structurally impossible, because both host states and local Magyar communities respectively engage in nation-building. I will argue below that, although these hindrances are significant, they are neither final, nor absolute.

Firstly, Romania and Slovakia continue to display serious constitutional biases. Both still define the polity in ethnically exclusive terms. Romania's constitution declares the country a "national state" (Article 1.1). The Slovak preamble differentiates between the "Slovak people" and the "members of national minorities and ethnic groups living in the Slovak Republic". Both designate the titular majority language as official idiom: in Romania without further caveat (Article 13), in Slovakia (Article 6) relativised with such an "ambiguous formulation" that it could be "circumvented ...and not curb nationalist practice" (Szarka 2004a:86-7). Such provisions implicitly deny non-majority groups as co-nations who also characterise the country. Regarding specifically territorial autonomy, both host states have a very limited constitutional scope. Romania, despite its historically distinct areas,

insists on a centralised system (see constitutional Articles 1.1., 3 and 4.2). However, since there is a growing (and cross-ethnic) constituency pressing for federalisation, this may well soften over time. Slovakia's statute in contrast does extend the possibility for local government (Articles 64-71), but its particular stress on "indivisibility" and "integrity" (Article 3) has so far been used to reject Magyar demands for autonomy (Szarka 2004a:ibid.). Then again, both host states' present or impending EU membership (Romania is set to join in 2007) promises to widen the scope for regionalism via subsidiarity and devolution, and this is something both minorities explicitly count on (Csergő and Goldgeier 2001; 2004).

Secondly, political mobilisation in both host states still resorts at certain junctures to securitised discourse. OSCE observers of the 2000 elections in Romania for instance, expressed concern over the use of anti-minority discourse by the Greater Romania Party, which became the largest opposition party in parliament with 25 per cent. Hamberger (2004:110) and Szarka (2004a:94) similarly observe that anti-Hungarian campaigning still occurs. Then again, this rhetoric is less and less successful over time. For instance the Greater Romania Party's electoral share has almost halved in the last elections of 2004 (sliding down to 13 per cent). In Slovakia, Vladimir Meciar has been unable to stage a political comeback on such platforms, and the above quoted Slovak polls about Hungarians in national politics outline a positive trend.

Finally, there is what can be broadly termed the "burden of history". This presents unresolved and real impediments to equality for Magyars in both post-communist countries. These can be symbolic and attitudinal, like the persisting view of the two national histories as conflicting and mutually exclusive. Others have legal and economic effects. An example is Slovakia's refusal to abrogate the discriminatory Beneš decrees, or to at least extend an official apology (see also section 3.3.3). In consequence, ethnic Hungarians are still denied compensation for deportations, forced labour, internment or the considerable material expropriations. The associated collective stigma and discrimination sadly echo interwar Czechoslovakia's Defence of the Republic Acts (see above). This amounts to what many see as second class citizenship. Transylvanian Magyars, too, are still

confronted with injurious gestures. The orchestrated anti-Hungarian riots of 19-20 March 1990 in Marosvásárhely, resulting in three Magyar deaths and many injured, have still not been investigated. In fact, former president Iliescu recently declared the minority as responsible.[31] Another good illustration is Romania's national holiday on 1 December, which celebrates Transylvania's annexation, the very event Hungarians regard as catastrophe. Yet there are also signs of change. Both Schöpflin (2004:96-7) and Bárdi (2004:17) describe in this context the first manifestations of an accepted, shared history between majority nations and Hungarians and underline just how significant this is for the realisation of co-nationhood. Official Romanian reactions to the Hungarian national day (15 March), formerly a tense affair when celebrated by the minority, have transformed profoundly. Originally considered as sign of disloyalty and as provocative in its historical meaning,[32] today Romanian dignitaries habitually either attend or forward their well wishes.

7.3.3 Summary: from interwar exclusion towards post-communist co-nations

Democracy itself, as I have explained above, is not a panacea, but rather the pre-requisite framework in which a minorities can forgo irredentism when presented with consensual politics. Interwar Romania and Czechoslovakia did, for differing reasons but in very similar ways, not present such an environment. Following partition, Transylvanian and Felvidék Hungarians found themselves in two new host states which equally denied their aspirations, despite differing in their institutional setup and subsequent development. Romania emerged as ethnic anocracy, an ethnically defined nation-state with a quickly stalling democratisation. Expressly biased against its minorities, it practiced forced assimilation and ensured exclusive political control to its titular majority. Czechoslovakia's republican liberal democracy antagonised because it imposed cultural homogeneity in the public

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[31] The riot was sparked by local Hungarians holding candlelit vigil for native language schooling. Eyewitnesses maintain that police watched on as ethnic Romanian rioters were bussed into the city from the surrounding region. Iliescu's remarks came on 25 March 2005, shortly after the 15th anniversary of events.

[32] The day commemorates the Hungarian revolution of 1848 against Austrian rule which saw Magyars and Romanians fight on opposite sides.

sphere, and a value consensus on the terms of its two dominant (if not equal) ethnic groups. Endeavouring to forge a new Czecho-Slovak majority nation, as well worried about its substantial minorities, this civic nation-state state soon contravened its own liberal constitutional provisions. Smooha (2002a:426) actually notes that in both these types the state sides with the majority, something that is particularly antagonising to irredentists (see above). Despite their systemic differences, Romania and Czechoslovakia indeed shared nationalising policies, discriminatory positions and assimilationist pressures which in turn radicalised their already discontent Magyar minorities.

The contrast with post-communist Romania and Slovakia is not a stark one. Overall, both states are still nationalising polities. But the differences are appreciable, and more so as time goes by. Their evolving consociational patterns - as distinct from fully formed, deliberately introduced structures - have not developed by design. In their make up they are the cumulative outcome of mainly ad-hoc co-operation. Nor are they backed by some normatively satisfying commitment to inter-ethnic dialogue. Instead, outside pressures, majority elite interest, and minority moderation have made for conjunctural advances. Concessions by both titular majorities are reluctant, diluted, and come with considerable trade-offs to the minority. And yet, these patchy and opportunistic manifestations of shared rule are gradually growing and becoming irreversible, becoming thus sustainable in their effect. This is not least true for the minority's aspirations for self-rule, which its leaders have realised as contingent on governmental participation, and thus took the risk to de-prioritise. In Bárdi and Kántor's view, it is the "creation and institutionalisation of consociational politics" that matters (2000:186). Pushed by their Hungarian minorities as well as by external pressures, both host states have made significant headway towards establishing such a framework, thus providing Magyars with at least part of the necessary stakeholder involvement and the prospect for more. Whether this will ultimately evolve into a sustained *political will* for accommodation (Bakk, Horváth and Salat 2004:159) is yet another matter.

7.4 Conclusion

This chapter has argued that democracy is able to mitigate and even prevent, irredentism. Crucially interacting with, as well as promoting, shifts in group identity it has been relevant to parent state and minority in different ways.

Irredentism in the mainland is practically incompatible with substantive democracy and (successful) democratisation. Democratic institutions engender civic nationalism, accountability and pluralism, which in turn render ethnopolitics all but impossible. Although the constraints and deliberative elements which Mansfield and Snyder stress within democracy are important, I have emphasised its transformative impact on nationalism. It bases cohesion primarily (though not exclusively) on consent and participation, rather than tying it to belonging and loyalty to a kindred group. Consequently, what makes irredentism and democracy nigh irreconcilable is democracy's creation of an alternative, voluntaristic loyalty. Even though ancestry and culture may continue to underpin some of the civic consensus, the nation is primarily defined by institutions. This undercuts two fundamental conditions on which retrieval rests, namely group identity based on shared kinship, and the state's ownership by and thus subservience to, that group. Conversely, the weak institutions typical of stalled or incomplete democratisation (anocracies) are ideal for irredentism. This is because there is an increase in participation (unlike in authoritarian systems), which, however, lacks a civic consensus carried by institutions (unlike in democracies). Cultural, but especially ethnic nationalism, not only fills the gap, as Mansfield and Snyder recognise, but provides here also an unrivalled focus of cohesion and thus inverts the relationship between nation and state. Here the state exists in function of an ethnically defined polity, which in turn informs both leaders and their electorates.

Minority irredentism can be addressed by a different aspect of democracy. Because irredentist minorities are disaffected groups, their defectionism can be addressed by partial or full consociationalism. This is because power-sharing responds to the two desires that drive retrieval. Consociation means a group can acquire political control over itself and its territory as well as attain collective recognition, even equality, for its distinct national aspirations without having to

274

defect. Power-sharing thus validates national aspirations and generates stakeholder involvement within a polity that is not a minority's titular state. In doing so, it also recognises collective identities, unlike other types of democracy. These measures can furthermore take advantage of beginning minority differentiation from mainland group identity as well as strengthen it. In contrast, other regime types including other types of democracy, alienate irredentist minorities further by what they see as exclusiveness - implicit, as in falsely neutral civic systems or open, as in republican or ethnic states. Because irredentist groups desire nation-state congruence (living in a state that they define and own) and self-determination (to be governed by their own), even multiculturalist democracies will not do. In consequence, neither civic integrationism nor repression – both methods routinely practiced by host states – will be able dissuade irredentist minorities.

Conclusion

Nationalist sentiment is deeply offended by violations of the nationalist principle of the congruence of state and nation; but it is not equally offended by all the various kinds of violation of it. It is most acutely offended by ethnic divergence between rulers and ruled.

Ernest Gellner (1983:134)

The study and its goals

Having analysed inconsistent irredentism in the Hungarian case, it is time to return to the aims and arguments stated at the beginning of this thesis. My goal was two-fold: firstly, to determine what irredentism is, which players it involves, how it can be recognised, what methods it uses, and also, what it is therefore not. The assumption was that ethno-territorial retrieval is a conceptual category in its own right, and that it hence needs treatment as such.

After establishing this, I secondly tried to explain what makes irredentism work, or conversely, what stops it from working. My aim was to build a generalisable explanation. Particularly useful for this purpose was the phenomenon of "inconsistent irredentism" (Saideman 1998) – i.e. a situation where retrieval is first pursued and then subsequently abandoned, in an outwardly identical setting. This would reveal the causal factors which had changed over time. Following a survey of the sparse literature on the topic, I adopted Donald Horowitz's (1985; 1991) model as point of theoretical departure. I argued that the three variables it puts forward – elite interests, economic benefit from retrieval, and its feasibility with regards to ethno-territorial homogeneity – have a rationalist bias which makes them unable to explain irredentism. The assumption here was that ethno-national collectives are not simply kindred interest groups. Instead, they are driven by their shared identity and its imperatives: nation-state congruence (nationalism) and freedom from foreign rule (self-determination). I therefore suggested an alternative set of factors

276

which would affect these drivers: a) shifts in group identity and therefore in nationalism, b) change towards a regime type, i.e. democracy, which restricts the politicisation of this identity and whose institutions rival it as basis of nationalism, and finally c) variations in the extent to which the international community tolerates irredentism as movement of self-determination.

The variables of both models, formulated (and in part fleshed out) as hypotheses, were then tested in two ways. Statistical testing of each quantifiable factor across my dataset of irredentas sought to establish a preliminary overview of individual explanatory strength. This was followed by in-depth, detailed application of these variables to the case of inconsistent Hungarian irredentism. The empirical analysis compared factors both across time (the interwar versus the contemporary period), and across space (by studying two separate irredentas conducted by Hungary). Below I will summarise and discuss my findings from both main sections.

Irredentism defined

My first concern was to define and conceptualise irredentism. This question imposed itself because to date there still is no 'irredentism theory' that relies on a sufficiently standardised and workable understanding of what exactly retrieval is. Chapter 1 elaborated a formula that distinguished agency from structure (i.e. the conditioning environment), differentiated irredentism from other ethno-territorial movements (notably from secessionism), and which categorised it within the study of nationalism.

Irredentism, in my definition, is the *bilateral* and *simultaneous* pursuit by both parent state and ethnically kindred brethren in a foreign state of ethno-territorial retrieval across inter-state borders. It is perhaps the most literal translation of kinship amongst the phenomena of ethno-nationalism. The collective solidarity it rests on endures despite physical and political separation, through time, and in defiance of risks and deterrents. Irredentism has a standard set-up of actors with standard characteristics: a parent state 'owned' by the titular group (though not necessarily homogenous), and a

transborder minority settling (part of) what both regard as ancestral grounds. These parties relate to each other in a typical pattern. The minority views itself as forced enclave, unable and above all unwilling, to survive outside the mainland. The latter in turn conceives of itself as 'redeemer' of kin and communal territory. The glue holding them together is a shared ethno-national identity, defined by exclusive characteristics of which group territory (as subjective, common 'map image') is an important part. This is what retrieval politicises, this is what gives the project its rationale.

A survey of cases based on my definition and on the resulting dataset revealed a number of interesting features. Ethno-territorial retrieval can experience active and latent phases. Furthermore, these can alternate, which means it is a non-linear process. The political units irredentism tries to (re)create have often never existed historically, or they reify prior colonial or imperial boundaries. This, however, does not make them any less desirable, for these (ideal) states are demarcated by the group's ancestral homelands, which they are supposed to encompass as completely as possible. Irredentists identify strongly with these territories, have a clear and shared idea of their extent, and feel a superior entitlement to them. They typically tie their own history, cultural, and sometimes even (perceived) biological characteristics to these regions. When irredentism faces a head-on choice between kindred people and the lands that define the group as a whole, it will likely choose the former – but only under duress.

Irredentist struggles have poor success rates. They are frequently long-lived and intractable, yet do not regularly involve large-scale violence. In fact, it is the challenged host states who routinely use coercion, and my survey has described their array of repressive methods. The destructive potential of retrieval – as arguable cause for both World Wars – comes therefore rather from the multiple levels it involves. It simultaneously pits groups against groups, and states against states in a zero-sum game. Like secession, irredentism attacks state sovereignty and territorial integrity, and therefore runs counter the restrictive consensus of modern international relations. But what makes irredentism vastly more unpopular internationally is that it does so *to the advantage* of a neighbouring state. Rather than independence, this particular variant of self-determination has national (re)union as goal.

278

Domestically, irredentism has the unpalatable side of minority disloyalty, and with it the uncomfortable truth that to many, legitimate governance means governance by their own kind. Irredentism is what frequently gives minority nationalism its bad image.

Finally, the goal of retrieval is ethno-national completeness, both in terms of population and homeland. Intrinsic to this is the logic of national solidarity and self-rule. Ethnic purity or exclusivity is at best secondary here: the stress on shared ancestry in irredentism serves to cement all-important internal cohesion, not to select others out. In short, the important thing is that the titular state encompass what identity has defined. This also explains irredentism's historical and geographical concentration: ethno-territorial retrieval is contingent on modern statehood, self-conscious groups, the existence of ethnic homelands, and the ideology of nationalism. As a result, irredentism is a modern phenomenon and continues to concentrate in Europe. While it has spread in (so far) four themed waves beyond its birthplace to Africa and Asia, it eschews diasporic and immigrant societies.

Operating against success ratios, international realities and liberal norms, irredentism would seem to thoroughly conform to the stereotype of "irrational" nationalism. Alternatively, groups or their leaders must have ulterior reasons to pursue it, and drop the project when they no longer do. I have argued that neither view is correct. Irredentism does not run riot, neither does it serve as means to other ends. It is determined by a clear set of endogenous factors that are connected to its motives. When these factors change, groups discontinue retrieval.

Irredentism explained: why is retrieval inconsistent?

Irredentism is essentially made possible by a combination of two factors. First, it needs an ethnically exclusive, rather than culturally or institutionally anchored, group identity. This identity is based on shared (perceived) ancestry and a common 'map image' of communal homelands. It crucially carries the project because it is unitary and thus solidary across boundaries. It clearly

279

describes the membership and geographical extent of who and what needs to be (re)united via *ethno-territorial* retrieval.

Second, irredentism requires a political regime that allows or even promotes, the politicisation of this identity for each actor. In the parent state's case, stalled or incomplete democratisation (anocracy) does so by failing to provide an alternative, civic-political consensus for national politics. With ethnic nationalism as principal or even only common denominator, the state is reduced to express a nation's organic unity. Weak institutions furthermore cannot check the political entrepreneurship - genuine or instrumental - that takes advantage of their failure. Irredentism in transborder minorities in turn is promoted by an ethnically-biased or -exclusionary regime within their host state. This alienates them by denying two fundamentals: collective recognition and thus a measure of equality ('owning' the state), and desired self-determination (here in some compensatory, internal arrangement like autonomy).

Finally, international factors compound or conversely mitigate these endogenous drivers, and thus modulate the methods and openness of irredentism's conduct. Relative laxity towards retrieval (mainly evidenced by regional precedents), patronage and invalidation of minority nationalism respectively create windows of opportunity or urgency that shape, but do not determine, activism.

Irredentist inconsistency occurs when there is change in one or preferably both, of these principal factors. When a group's ethno-national identity becomes culturally and / or institutionally defined rather than rooted in exclusive-ascriptive criteria, the crucial basis for irredentism is no longer intact. The parent state no longer sees itself as 'truncated' or incomplete, the transborder minority does not feel as hapless, unviable enclave suspended in an unnatural (because separated) situation. A self-view based on criteria other than shared kinship no longer conceives of the ethno-national group as organic whole, as extended family, that needs to be reunited. Communal territory, which described the necessary expanse of the group's nation-state, ceases to be a prominent marker. Instead, the nation is defined by heritage and language. These provide a lesser, because more voluntaristic, cohesion

280

and solidarity. In addition, where nationalism starts to consist of civic elements, membership is based on consent and participation, which in turn excludes those on the respective other side of the border.

The political systemic environment can both take advantage of such developments as well as further them. Successful democracy in the parent state generates civic nationalism, i.e. a rival source of cohesion and allegiance. Institutional performance furthermore prevents ethnicity's politicisation because it impedes the fusion of group and state interests. Democracy within the host state in turn can assuage or even prevent minority irredentism if it extends consociational concessions. This is because it responds to those twin desires that fuel minority alienation. Consociational practice means a group can acquire political control over itself and its territory, as well as attain collective recognition for its distinct national aspirations without having to defect. This combines with transformations in group identity in a mutually reinforcing mechanism. Weakened affinity with the parent state generates minority self-assertion and thus changed desires for self-rule: rather than retrieval these will either be secession (if the host state makes no allowances) or conversely, autonomy (if it does). Host-states in turn can take advantage of this shift by fostering via concessions this distinction between civic and cultural loyalties.

International factors can also reinforce these two endogenous developments. Clear restrictive signals regarding border changes (exemplified by precedents) and lack of powerful backing will modulate, though not stop, mainland irredentism. For minorities, domestic solutions like consociational practices and legal protection need external monitoring, even pressure, in order to work. In this particular case, the external disincentive to irredentism is at the same time a positive incentive for alternatives. The Magyar case is a particularly good illustration here. The EU is unique in its simultaneous deterrence of irredentism whilst supporting and rewarding several replacement aspirations to its components: for the minority, consociational rights and regionalism or autonomy within the host state (a variant on the self-determination theme), for both actors the borderless "reunion" (satisfying the now mainly cultural-linguistic identity that they share). What explains discontinuity in an irredenta are changes in this triangle of primary and secondary variables.

What of Horowitz's factors?

My theory adopted Donald Horowitz's explanation of irredentism as baseline. It tested its three explanatory variables both statistically across all collected cases, as well as by applying them to the Hungarian example. While all suggested factors seemed logical, I found little evidence for their validity either across or within cases. My thesis argued that these tenets were flawed because of their rationalist bias. It did so by showing that that they were secondary to the endogenous variables that are principally responsible for irredentism, namely group identity and prevailing regime type.

The feasibility of retrieval: ethno-territorial homogeneity (chapter 4)

Ethno-territorial homogeneity seemed the most commonsensical of Horowitz's suggested factors – after all this would directly affect both the feasibility of retrieval and the 'purity' of its outcome. In order to be easily retrievable, a minority ought to be in a border near position, settled with minimal dispersion and be minimally intermixed with other groups. However, viewed under this criterion many if not most, irredentist projects prove nonsensical, such as Ireland's designs on the majority Protestant six provinces or Armenia's endeavour for Nagorno-Karabach, which is deeply embedded in Azerbaijan's heartland. For the Hungarian example the factor was able to explain why the interwar Felvidék was retrieved, but conversely could not tell us why it is today any less attractive, despite having preserved all its advantageous features: local Magyars continue to be border near and their settlements are even less dispersed and intermixed than in the interwar period. Transylvania's case in turn was very different. Its ethnic and territorial homogeneity scored in both time periods so badly on this variable that this factor seemed irrelevant. Only a small (and furthermore shrinking) part of local Magyars dwells near the Hungarian border, whilst their bulk lives in the remote east of Transylvania. Their settlement structure is not and never was, cohesive. As for ethnic intermixing finally, their situation shows actually today an improvement over interwar conditions, i.e. there is a slight increase in local Hungarian majorities.

I have shown that this variable, however commonsensical, misses the point. This is because irredentism specifically is about national completeness, rather than purity. Completeness in turn means not only retrieving kindred people but also ancestral soil (often also inhabited by ethnic strangers), because that territory is integral to what drives irredentism – namely that group's identity. The Hungarian example, with its 'map image' of St. Stephen's crownlands illustrated this principle well.

Pay-offs from retrieval: the political economy of irredentism (chapter 3)

Horowitz also suggested economic benefit as irredentist motive. Given that retrieval involves high risks and sometimes considerable costs (diplomatic, military and economic), irredentists may be motivated by pay offs. With very few cases in the dataset supporting such claims, the Magyar case has confirmed the weakness of a materialistic explanation. Two approaches were possible here: opportunity and necessity (deprivation).

As for minorities, there is little evidence in the first place that they desire retrieval for these reasons. I have shown that interwar Hungarian minorities mainly stressed economic grievances for foreign consumption, as strategic adjustment in propaganda. Secondly, I have illustrated in a cross-time comparison how both Magyar minorities have had as much reason to defect in the interwar period as they arguably have today. This is because of continued material discrimination within their host states. Following partition, their local ascendancies were crudely dismantled. Today, both minorities would still have concrete material incentives to rejoin a comparatively better-off Hungary. Although their host states are beginning to reach parity with Hungary, local Magyar communities are still worse off because their life chances and home regions are still lagging behind national host state averages. They are furthermore suffering from cumulative economic damages, such as two waves of expropriations. In other words, relative economic deprivation persists and has arguably even worsened, without however causing renewed irredentism. Finally, even if transborder communities had acted out of opportunity, comparisons would have been difficult for them to make. For instance, defection from a discriminatory host state does not automatically mean improvement, because discrimination may still be offset by the host's overall

higher standards and life chances in comparison to the mainland. This was arguably the case for interwar Czechoslovakia's Magyars. They chose Hungary over a host state that, although in many ways discriminating, offered superior social provisions from which even they benefited.

Irredentist parent states in turn invoke material benefits more often, but as I have argued, they do so invariably in function of ethno-territorial unity. This is also why their economic justifications are based on what turns out to be a subjective rationality. As a result, retrieval rarely makes economic sense, and Hungary was a good example for this. I have shown that although partition had indeed inflicted enormous damage, truncation was more of a nationalist than an economic problem. The country not only recovered, but also finally modernised because the territorial losses had left it with an industrial core. Changes in the regional and world economy meant that retrieval of the lost, often rural areas like Northern Transylvania would in fact be a burden. Recovering the Felvidék conversely meant reintegrating a region in many ways socially more advanced while suddenly depriving it of its revenue and markets. Today the burden would be repeated, this time because both Transylvania and Southern Slovakia are less developed than the mainland. In short, there is too little differential in gain across the two time periods to explain the abandonment of Hungary's irredentism. Furthermore, the country's interwar situation has shown that the overall balance sheet for retrieval was resoundingly negative – exactly because the main motive was ideological. So when it comes to irredentism, most states – like Somalia, Armenia, Serbia and not least interwar Hungary – seem to leave their calculators in the drawer.

Elite interests: particularised affinity, cleavages, and the preservation of independent power bases

Finally, Horowitz proposed respective elite interests in the two irredentist actors as decisive. My theory did not examine these in detail because it argued that these in fact each depend on the primary variables of group identity and prevailing regime type. Minority leaders' concerns about having to pool power upon reunion and thus to lose influence rely on a scenario where groupness is no longer homogenous, i.e. where a transborder community is actually *able* to entertain aspirations of its own. I have argued that this is impossible where a

284

minority still conceives of itself as hapless enclave, cut off from but still belonging to, the mainland body politic. This in turn is contingent on an ethnic, exclusivist self-definition of the group which is unitary and solidary (see chapter 6).

As far as mainland elites are concerned, particularised affinity has indeed turned out to be an impressively frequent feature of many irredentist states (see chapter 2). But it does not in itself explain their policies. In the Hungarian case mainland elite affinity has been all but equal in the two time periods while generating very different policies. Leaders' personal ties matter only within a political system where a) such personal bias goes unchecked or unrivalled and b) where nationalism is the main or only basis of societal consensus. Both are due to the institutional weakness in anocracies, the single most frequent regime type within irredentist parent states (see chapters 2 and 7).

Horowitz finally also suggested the existence of intra-group cleavages as factor. These would be political, tribal or religious divisions between minority and the mainland, which parent state leaders would see as threatening. I have argued that such fault lines only present themselves as impediment to irredentism where that group's solidarity has already shifted onto less uncompromising, less exclusive bases. As long as a collective defines itself via kinship – shared descent (blood) and the attachment to ancestral grounds (soil) - this cannot be rivalled or upset by other attachments (see chapter 6).

Qualifications

This thesis can only serve as preliminary attempt to explain irredentism. In order to build a generalisable theory, it has taken the liberties most works of comparative politics take – stripping away contextual specifics, creating categories, and drawing parallels. This, however, also counts as its weakness: further application of this explanation to other cases (e.g. non-European or nineteenth century) may find too loose a theoretical fit. At the same time, some of its arguments will inevitably have been informed by the particulars of its empirical example. The Magyar irredenta and its discontinuity is a textbook instance, so much so that it contributed to my understanding of the ideal

typical variables that determine retrieval. In contrast, my mapping of irredentism in all its standard characteristics based itself on the largest possible survey of cases, but will no doubt have missed important regularities as well as exceptions.

In order to test and apply Horowitz's factors, I had to interpret them, not least by deriving indicators that made into them workable variables. Throughout I have tried to do so faithfully to his work and with the most favourable reading – not least because they have been critiqued as representatives of an entire approach to ethnicity and nationalism. In this vein, the reader may dispute my particular understanding of democracy, nationalism, and their interaction as well as my insistence on the undiminished political realness of a subjective category like ethnicity.

The way in which I have chosen to treat my case study may similarly meet objections. In large parts of this work theoretical parsimony has forced me to treat both ethnic actors as unitary, something that especially today does not apply. Transborder Hungarian politics for instance is vibrant and diverse, especially recently, with factions materialising among Transylvanian Magyars. Similarly, I have concentrated on the tangible, and historically unprecedented, advances of Magyar minorities within their host states without hopefully downplaying the continuing adversity they face. Furthermore, Trianon and its consequences continue to challenge objective research. Given persisting (and politically convenient) suspicions in neighbouring countries, some will disagree with my premise that the chapter of Magyar irredentism is truly closed. Inside Hungary, historiography still categorises this case as revisionism (legitimate, peaceful and legalistic), as opposed to an irredenta (aggressive, unlawful). Many Hungarian accounts are less critical of the failures in interwar Hungary's democratisation and omit or ignore their pivotal connection with irredentism. My argument about the economic folly of Magyar irredentism also runs against established views. The mainstay of source material I have used on these points is thus a selection of innovative or unorthodox contemporary Hungarian research.

My statistical tests finally have been necessarily modest due to missing data, its descriptive nature, difficulties in quantification and, not least, the magnitude of the task at hand. I have tried to work within these limitations as well as to explain the choices they required. Thus while the quantitative part of this thesis leaves room for improvement, it fulfils its original purpose to complement, support and illustrate my theory of irredentism.

Expanding irredentism studies - a research agenda

By establishing irredentism as a new field of study, this thesis has tackled one main question while raising a whole host of others. My descriptive dataset of collated irredentist cases has furnished more information about the nature and general features of retrieval than I had opportunity to use in this work. Amongst these so far unexploited insights are irredentism's surprisingly sparse use of violence (despite it being able to trigger World Wars), regularities in the extent and durability of irredentist successes, and the prominence of particularised affinity in both actors' leaderships. Even more intriguing are the outlier cases and exceptions both datasets have uncovered, most notably the few democratic irredentist parent states. Furthermore, because my study has only focused on one category of retrieval (conventional irredentism), unificationist irredentas still remain to be described and explained in an equally systematic way. Given how topical some of these movements are right now - one may think of the Iraqi Kurdish situation or Spain's continued grappling with ETA - this will make for important and rewarding research.

My theory, too, can only be a first attempt, and needs further testing in other empirical studies to verify or improve its generalisability. Particularly interesting here are those few exceptions where the transborder group occupies its own, imposed, state (e.g. the GDR, Greek Cyprus, post-communist Moldova) - what amendments do such cases require? Further large scale statistical testing is also necessary. This will have to complete what is by no means a finished list of irredentist cases. It will also have to improve the quantification of my model's variables and, notably for the key factors of identity and

287

consociational-democratic accommodation, solve the problem of how to measure them. This may also require compromises in the name of theoretical succinctness.

Beyond these model-specific issues, there are the salient themes my study has touched upon. Three deserve to be emphasised. First, there is the way qualitative changes within ethnicity affect nationalism and thus group behaviour – especially with regards to demands and their accommodation. This ties in with the ongoing revision of nationalism typology (Connor 1994; Lecours 2000; Nikolas 2000; Kymlicka 2001 a and b; Shulman 2002 and 2004). Are these shifts in nationalism really irreversible and universally hastened by democracy (as I argue), and what other factors bring them about? Can we apply this approach beyond irredentist groups? Second is the accommodation of minority nationalism within democracies. I have argued that consociational features are the most promising avenue here for actively or formerly irredentist groups. However, power-sharing arrangements are notoriously difficult to implement and maintain. The question arises whether other similar, less complex routes exist specifically for irredentist groups – e.g. Kymlicka's model of Group Differentiated Citizenship within liberal democracies (1995). Closely connected to this finally is the theoretical problem within consociational practice which the Magyar case has again highlighted. It seems Lijphart's two primary criteria require a trade-off or sequencing between each other, despite being posited as equals in his theory (1971:10-14).The real-life tension between elite accommodation and self-rule elements of (quasi-) consociational scenarios is difficult, not least because these are the very features capable of satisfying irredentist desires.

Normative and Practical Implications

At its very basic this study is a contribution to reformed liberal views on ethnicity, nationalism and collective rights. It argues against what Nodia (1994:4) so aptly terms the "scientistic attitude" of Western social science. Despite valuable contributions, this attitude's central fallacy (and explanatory

288

downfall) has been to impose a normative view about ethnic actors, what they want and how they must behave. Throughout this work I have tried to demonstrate that what we need to engage with is not what we think *ought* to matter (strategic-demographic feasibility, questions of material and political advantage), but with what *does* matter. What is important to irredentists is a shared ethno-national identity and a resulting drive to redeem kin and territory (self-determination). The fact that these are intangibles does not make them and their power any less 'real'. The fact that they do not fit orthodox liberal ideas gives no licence to ignore them or explain them away.

If this study furnishes any prescriptive elements, then this would be one. The problem is not to assume rationality, but to do so in a normative way. Reasoning within the logic of irredentism requires acceptance of ethnicity as genuine and legitimate force of mobilisation. Instead, research has largely remained with value laden judgements and the liberal conventions of materialism, modernity and individualism. The explanatory factors it habitually derives from these - economic determinism, power calculations, political retardation, civic inequality, etc. - will only capture part of reality, and the less relevant one at that. Horowitz's analysis of irredentism is a prime example here. As long as we continue to see ethno-nationalism as outdated or substitute struggle which the West has allegedly overcome and which modernisation will 'cure', we have little chance of explaining and managing its expressions.

This normative bias extends well beyond theory into the realm of policymaking. Western Europe has recently begun to redress its view of nationalism as illiberal or transitory reaction to the pains of modernity. More importantly, its repressive responses have given way to a more accommodative stance. EU regionalism, autonomy regimes and the adoption of consociational features mirror an erosion in the dogmatic rejection of collective rights. Ethnic minority or sub-state nationalism is being acknowledged as legitimate. On a wider scale, world politics has emulated this paradigm shift and "internationalised" minority rights (Kymlicka 2002), most notably with recent interventions in East Timor, Bosnia and Kosovo.

And yet, policy makers still often respond to the contrary. The contemporary Hungarian situation is a good example of such persisting contradictions, or dare we say it, of such double standards. The recent controversy surrounding the Preference (Status) Law and the EU's criticism betray a continued rejection of the legitimacy of ethno-national bonds. While their domestic accommodation has become acceptable, Hungary's case shows that when a state, rather than a minority, runs counter to the dominant civic discourse, this continues to be viewed as unacceptable. Western democracies will not tolerate divergence, notwithstanding their own reliance on particularistic elements to define and bind together their polities. Their denial about the role of ethno-national identity in politics – at home and elsewhere – generates blanket bans. Budapest's legalistic attempt to openly regulate shared ethnicity and its fragmentation was a prime example. While the Hungarian case is safe in its alternatives, this undifferentiated veto is dangerous. As long as even such moderate, problem-solving overtures are seen as threat, the doors remain wide open to irredentism.

APPENDIX

APPENDIX – MAPS

Map 1.1 The Trianon partition of 1920
(Source: Rónai 1993 [1945])

Map 1.2 Ethnic Hungarians left outside the new borders (based on the last pre-war census of 1910)
(Source: www.sulinet.hu and author's own editing)

293

Map 1.3 Irredentist re-acquisitions 1938-41
(Source: designed by Péter Tófalvi at http://www.tofalvi.com)

Map 1.4 Hungarians in the Carpathian Basin in 1991
(regional distribution)
(Source: Kocsis and Hodosi-Kocsis 1998)

Map 1.5 Hungarians in the Carpathian Basin in 2001-2
(by respective community size)
(Source: Government Office for Transborder Hungarians HTMH at
http://www.htmh.hu/en/033_map/text037/doc_upload/back.jpg)

1910

Hungary

Hungarians in percent

- 50 <
- 20—49,9
- 1 000 fő. 10—19,9

Map 2.1 Ethnic Hungarians on the territory of present-day Slovakia in 1910 (based on the Austro-Hungarian census of 1910)
(Source: Kocsis and Hodosi-Kocis 1998)

1930

Hungary

Hungarians in percent

- 50 <
- 20—49,9
- 1 000 person. 10—19,9

Map 2.2 Ethnic Hungarians on the territory of present-day Slovakia in 1930 (based on the Czechoslovak National Census of 1930)
(Source: Kocsis and Hodosi-Kocis 1998)

Map 2.3 The First Vienna Award of 1938 (Retrieval of the Felvidék)
(Source: Hungarian National Library, online map collection at
http://mek.oszk.hu/01900/01906/html/index229.html)

Map 2.4 Ethnic Hungarians on the territory of present-day Slovakia in 1991 (based on the Czechoslovak National Census of 1991)
(Source: Kocsis and Hodosi-Kocis 1998)

297

2001

Legend:
- Slovaks
- Magyars
- Roma
- Ukranians, Ruthenians
- Other

Map 2.5 Ethnic Hungarians in Slovakia in 2001 (overall distribution)
(Source: Forum Minority Research Institute, based on the Slovak National
Census of 2001, at http://www.foruminst.sk/images/album1_img/154-1-2440-
Album_Img-500.jpg)

2001

Percentage of Hungarians
- 80.1 – 100.0%
- 50.1 – 80.0%
- 20.1 – 50.0%
- 10.1 – 20.0%
- 1.1 – 10.0%

Map 2.6 Ethnic Hungarians in Slovakia in 2001 (by county)
(Source: Forum Minority Research Institute, based on the Slovak National
Census of 2001, at http://www.foruminst.sk/images/album1_img/154-1-2443-
Album_Img-500.jpg)

Map 2.7 Magyar inhabited Slovak counties by name (2001)
(Source: Government Office for Transborder Hungarians HTMH at
http://www.htmh.hu/en/?menuid=11)

299

Map 3.1 Ethnic Hungarians in Romania in 1930
(Source: Rónai 1942 [1993], based on the Romanian census of 1930)

Map 3.2 The Second Vienna Award of 1940 (Retrieval of Northern Transylvania) (Source: László Sebők Map Collection at
http://sebok1.adatbank.transindex.ro/)

Percentage of Hungarians

■	*80,1 – 100,0%*
■	*50,1 – 80,0%*
■	*20,1 – 50,0%*
■	*10,1 – 20,0%*
□	*1,1 – 10,0%*

Map 3.3 Ethnic Hungarians in Romania in 1992 (by county)
(Source: Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania - RMDSZ at
http://www.rmdsz.ro, based on the 1992 Romanian National Census)

Percentage of Ethnic Magyars

>90%
75-90%
30-50%
20-30%
19-20%
10-13%
9,5-10%
7-9%

Map 3.4 Ethnic Hungarians in Romania in 1992 (breakdown of percentages by county)
(Source: Székely National Museum at
http://www.szekelyfoldert.info/sznm/muzeum/img/Magykis.jpg)

2002

Map 3.5 Ethnic Hungarians in Romania in 2002 (overall distribution)
(Source: Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania - RMDSZ at
http://www.rmdsz.ro, based on the 2002 Romanian National Census)

2002

Hungary

Percentage of Hungarians

- 80,1 – 100,0%
- 50,1 – 80,0%
- 20,1 – 50,0%
- 10,1 – 20,0%
- 1,1 – 10,0%

Map 3.6 Ethnic Hungarians in Romania in 2002 (by county)
(Source: Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania - RMDSZ at
http://www.rmdsz.ro, based on the 2002 Romanian National Census)

Map 3.7 Magyar inhabited Romanian counties by name (2002)
(Source: Hungarian Government Office for Transborder Hungarians at
http://www.htmh.hu/en/?menuid=11)

APPENDIX – DATASET MANUALS

Dataset Manual 1 (Descriptive Dataset)

- **List of cases - Dataset 1**
- **List of variables - Dataset 1**

List of Cases – Dataset 1

Value Label	Case Name
01	Aegean Macedonia – Greece
02	Epirus – Greece
03	Ionian Islands – Greece
04	Cyprus - Greece
05	Thrace – Greece
06	Veneto – Italy
07	Rome and Lazio – Italy
08	Fiume – Italy
09	South Tyrol – Italy
10	Trieste – Italy
11	Southern Schleswig – Denmark
12	Crete – Greece
13	Transylvania – Romania
14	Alsace – France
15	Bosnian Serb Territories – Serbia
16	Eastern Rumelia – Bulgaria
17	Northern Bukovina – Bulgaria
18	Pirin Macedonia - Bulgaria1
19	Sandjak – Serbia
20	Kosovo - Albania1
21	Macedonia - Albania1
22	Northern Greece - Albania1
23	Northern Epiros - Greece
24	Aaland Islands – Sweden
25	Danzig - Poland
26	Lithuania – Poland

List of Cases – Dataset 1 (continued)

Value Label	Case Name
27	Alsace - Germany
28	Saarland - Germany
29	Silesia – Germany
30	South Tyrol - Austria
31	Sudetenland – Germany
32	Southern Slovakia - Hungary
33	Transylvania – Hungary
34	Voyvodina (Bacska, Banat) – Hungary
35	Northern Ireland- Republic of Ireland
36	North Western Frontier Province (Pakistan) – Afghanistan
37	Kwazulu Natal - Swazi Kingdom
38	Southern Thailand – Malaysia
39	Austria - Germany
40	Okinawa/Ryukyu – Japan
41	Kashmir – Pakistan
42	GDR - Germany (FRG)
43	Djibouti – Somalia
44	Northern Frontier District (Kenya) – Somalia
45	Ogaden – Somalia
46	Northern Chad – Libya
47	Nagorno Karabach - Armenia
48	Kosovo - Albania2
49	Macedonia - Albania2
50	Northern Greece - Albania2
51	Bosnian Serb Territories – Serbia 2
52	Krajina - Serbia
53	Moldova - Romania
54	East Jerusalem/Autonomous Territories - Palestine
55	Lithuania - Belarus

1 CASE   Case

Measurement Level: Nominal

Cases were collated on the basis of the definition in chapter 1, above, including unusual and outlier cases treated in section 1.2.2. They are displayed chronologically (see above for a summary list). Each pursuit counts as new observation (case). So for example the Greek irredentas of Cyprus, Crete, Aegean Macedonia obviously share the same parent state actor (the newly independent Hellenic state), but are separate cases because they involve different transborder communities and homeland regions. Names of disputed regions are used according to frequency in the literature.

Projects of retrieval that experienced interruptions or latency periods of more than ten years are also counted as distinct cases. These irredentas are marked numerically as they involve identical actors and goals. Thus for instance the respective Albanian-Kosovar irredentas between 1912-1944 (Kosovo – Albania1) and 1990-present (Kosovo – Albania2) are listed separately due to the intervening communist period which put irredentism on hold.

Similarly, irredentas which have achieved partial success (see section 1.3.2) are marked as completed but then re-listed as new case from that date if they continued to pursue unification with the remainder. An example is Greece's quest for Epirus, which was successful for the region's southern part in 1881/1913 (Treaty of Berlin, then actual incorporation during the Balkan Wars). Conversely, the pursuit for union with the Albanian-owned north continued throughout the twentieth century into the 1990s and is hence listed as new, separate case.

2 REGION   Global Region

Measurement Level: Nominal

Continents are subdivided into thematic world regions that cohere culturally and / or politically. Some cases cut across these, e.g. Germany, situated in Western Europe, trying to retrieve Silesia from Poland, Eastern Europe. Here

309

always the parent state's category is taken as decisive, because the minority seeking retrieval identifies itself with the former and is also seen as its integral part.

Value   Label
1.00   Western Europe
2.00   Central and Eastern Europe, including the Balkans
3.00   Middle East and North Africa
4.00   Africa (sub-Saharan)
5.00   Asia

3 IRREDWAV Irredentist Wave

Measurement Level: Nominal

As already outlined this thesis divides the global occurrence of irredentism into four chronologically successive waves (see sections 1.3.1 and 5.1.1). Each wave groups cases that arose among similar circumstances (e.g. imperial disintegration following WW1) and which thus display a common justifying rationale (for instance Wilson's Fourteen Points). Hence also the stark variation in length across periods.

Value   Label
1.00   Native (1789-1918)
2.00   Wilsonian (1919-39)
3.00   Post-Colonial (1940-88)
4.00   New World Order (1989- ongoing)

4 START   Start Decade of Irredenta

Measurement Level: Scale

Irredentas are processes that generally evolve in a cumulative, though not necessarily linear, build-up (see section 1.2.2). Only some display a sudden, traceable starting point in history (e.g. a partition like Trianon). Hence where a case lacks such a watershed my thesis pinpoints a start decade instead. When

doing so, it is safer to focus on parent state politics since minority irredentism is more covert due to risks of host state retaliation. In the absence of any incisive event I thus date a case from the point in which retrieval clearly becomes a legitimate or even defining component of mainland politics. Manifestations include revisionist governmental programmes and foreign policies, official propaganda, irredentist constitutional provisions (see also variable 18), mainstream party platforms and electoral manifestos, speeches, as well as representative manifestations of mass culture (e.g. in literature, press, consumer goods etc.).

5 END   End Date of Irredenta

Measurement Level: Scale

An irredenta formally ends when either of the two parties abandons the project (failure – see below and variable 14), or when it has been accomplished lastingly (variable 13). Both these situations can be traced to certain key events. „Accomplishment" (i.e. incorporation) denotes here the fact that the population and territory in question have been placed both actually and legally under the parent state's sovereignty. Two contrasting examples illustrate the difference. Although Somalia briefly managed to occupy almost 90 per cent of Ethiopia's Ogaden region in September 1977, the case does not count as accomplished irredenta: neither was the host state defeated (Ethiopia actually won the conflict), nor was there any legal endorsement of military reality (e.g. an inter-state treaty, a UN resolution, international recognition or Great Power arbitration). Interwar Hungary in contrast achieved its two main irredentas via the Vienna Arbitrations of 1940, in which the respective host countries signed their rights away, even if under pressure. Regardless of the normatively reprehensible means they used (coercive diplomacy), and their short-lived nature, these instances count conversely as success. Furthermore, both complete and partial recoveries of areas are rated as successes as long as the above criteria are fulfilled (e.g. Denmark's and Serbia's respective partial recoveries of Schleswig and the Sandjak/Raska qualify as successes).

"Failures" (see also section 1.3.2) can be differentiated according to their respective cause into four categories: orphaned, converted, bilaterally

abandoned and coerced. 'Orphaned' irredentas have been unilaterally abandoned by parent states. They are mostly characterised by public governmental renouncements, often via treaties, towards the host state. Unilateral abandonment by the minority in turn usually means irredentism's 'conversion' into a different territorial exit strategy, such as secession or autonomy. Thirdly, some irredentas are abandoned bilaterally. This manifests itself in the cessation of co-operation between minority and parent state, the termination of mainland support (see below), bilateral public distancing from the other party and its cause etc. Finally, there are irredentist failures due to "coerced termination." These were cut short by external factors such as a major regional or World War and / or the factual termination of the parent state's foreign political sovereignty (e.g. via Soviet domination).

6 DURATIO1 Absolute Duration

Measurement Level: Scale

Those cases that have clearly ended (i.e. that are neither ongoing nor latent) are measurable in their absolute duration between a starting date or -decade and key events that mark a finishing point (see variables 4 and 5, above). Some irredentas admittedly experience a hiatus – e.g. Poland's pursuit of Gdansk from 1918 onwards was interrupted by Nazi German occupation (1939-44) and finally succeeded in 1945. In order to be taken into account such interruptions have to last 10 years or longer (see variable 1, above). Once again these pauses are recorded for the parent state, because it is the more powerful player as well as the destination for the irredentist minority. This dataset applies two of the three criteria which Polity IV sees as severely disrupting a polity (namely 'foreign interruption' and 'anarchy'), because these are severe enough to also disrupt state directed irredentism. It uses Polity IV's regime type data for this and subtracts such periods from the overall duration of an irredenta.

7 DURATIO2   Duration: Absolute and Until 2003

Measurement Level: Scale

Here both terminated as well as ongoing and latent irredentas are measured, either from their start date / decade until their respective ending point, or in lack of definite termination, relative to the year 2003. Interruptions are again taken into account where appropriate.

8 PRECEDT2   Preceded by a Unificationist (Type 2) Irredenta

Measurement Level: Nominal

This lists whether a case was preceded by a unificationist (Type 2) irredenta, i.e. whether it follows the initial establishment of a parent state via multiple retrieval (see section 1.2.1).

Value   Label
0.00   No
1.00   Yes
99.0   Missing value

9 STATUS   Current Status of Case

Measurement Level: Nominal

All cases are assessed according to their present situation. Ongoing cases are recognised on the basis of the indicators for irredentist activity described in chapter 1. Terminated irredentas are differentiated into success and failure (see variable 5). Resting or latent irredentas, i.e. where activism has subsided but there is no ending discernible according to the stated indicators, are treated as separate category and not grouped as terminated.

Value   Label
1.00   Success
2.00   Failure
3.00   Latent
4.00   Ongoing
99.00   Missing value

10 OUTCOME   Absolute Outcome: Success/Failure

Measurement Level: Nominal

Here only terminated cases are evaluated, since only they can be assessed as to their final results. For criteria and indicators of success and failure see variable 5, above.

Value   Label
0.00   N/A (not applicable)
1.00   Success
2.00   Failure
99.00   Missing value

11 EXTSUCCES   Extent of Success

Measurement Level: Nominal

Success is further differentiated, this time according to its demographic and territorial extent. All long-term achievements are considered on how completely they have been able to recover their transborder territory and ethnic kindred. 'Partial' success denotes a state in which a lasting recovery has gained less than the whole of the minority group and homeland territory, thus falling short of announced and / or intended goals. 'Complete' retrieval in contrast describes the full accomplishment of both these goals.

Value   Label
0.00   N/A (not applicable)
1.00   Partial
2.00   Complete
99.00   Missing value

12 STSUCCES Short Term Success (Durability)

Measurement Level: Nominal

Success can also be differentiated according to durability. The present categories examine success in terms of immediate, short-term results: has the irredenta achieved its goal at any point in time, even if only briefly and illegally? For criteria and indicators of success see variable 5, above.

Value Label
0.00 No
1.00 Yes
99.00 Missing value

13 LTSUCCES Long Term Success (Durability)

Measurement Level: Nominal

This variable examines which of the irredentas that have enjoyed short term success under variable 12 were able to subsist, i.e. which cases have proven to last until present (year 2003).

Value Label
0.00 No
1.00 Yes
2.00 Undecided as yet
99.00 Missing value

14 FAILURE Reason for Irredenta's Failure

Measurement Level: Nominal

This variable only examines terminated cases of retrieval. A conventional irredenta counts as failure if it has ended and never achieved even a temporary incorporation of the population and territory it sought to retrieve. Failed irredentas are distinguished according to their causes (see variable 5, above): unilateral abandonment by the parent state ('orphaned' projects - 1.00), unilateral abandonment by the minority ('converting' its desire for

territorial defection into either secession or demands for autonomy – 2.00), bilateral abandonment by both parties (3.00), or coerced termination (4.00) due to military defeat, Great Power hegemony or similar.

Value	Label
0.00	N/A (not applicable)
1.00	Orphaned
2.00	Converted
3.00	Bilateral
4.00	Coerced

15 INCONSIS   Irredentist Inconsistency across Time

Measurement Level: Nominal

This variable assesses whether an irredenta displays definite and bilateral discontinuity across time. A case qualifies if, once terminated, it has remained so until present (year 2003) in an outwardly identical setting. In contrast to their previous agendas, parent state and transborder kin now regard existing border arrangements as permanent (if not always legitimate) and no longer seek to revise them (see section 1.2.2). Temporary fluctuations (such as brief, often strategic abatement of irredentist activity) and latency periods (cessations of 10 years or more without clear renunciation) do not qualify as cases of inconsistency.

Value	Label
0.00	No
1.00	Yes
99.00	Missing value

16 MINVIOL   Minority Violence

Measurement Level: Ordinal

This variable measures the extent to which an irredentist minority uses violence against its host state in order to achieve retrieval (see section 1.3.3). "No violence" refers to the virtual absence of incidents (peaceful pursuit of unification), while "occasional riots" labels the unorganised and spontaneous occurrence of violence on a minor to medium scale. "Organised militancy" describes in contrast the strategic and co-ordinated insurrection of an ethnic militia (e.g. IMRO, IRA) in order to achieve retrieval.

Value	Label
0.00	No violence
1.00	Occasional Riots
2.00	Organised Militancy
99.00	Missing value

17 PSTVIOL   Parent State Violence

Measurement Level: Ordinal

Now the extent is measured to which an irredentist parent state employs violence against a host state and / or its allies in order to retrieve ethnic kin and territory (see section 1.3.3). The variable distinguishes in ascending order several pairings of strategies and instruments. Coercive behaviour is hence measured by type (non-military vs. armed) and level of involvement, i.e. whether the mainland acts indirectly (by delegating to the minority), directly (by intervening itself) or both (co-operation between mainland and transborder kin). Hence non-military support to transborder minority violence (e.g. by supplying intelligence or granting cross-border refuge to militiamen) is coded as the weakest form of using force, since it is both delegated and not violent in itself except for its ulterior motive. Second comes explicitly military aid to the minority - training, arms, funding etc., in other words items that incur mainland expenditure for that goal. By its nature, this category automatically includes the previous category of non-military items. Third is direct military intervention by the parent state, independent of local minority militancy. Most powerful, finally,

317

is the combined approach of military intervention and support for kindred insurgents, due to the cumulative effects of such a strategy. In cases where more than one of these combinations was used over time I have recorded the strongest.

Value	Label
0.00	None
1.00	Non-military support for transborder minority
2.00	Military aid to transborder minority
3.00	Military intervention
4.00	Both military aid and intervention
99.00	Missing value

18 CONSTIT   Constitutionally Enshrined Irredentism

Measurement Level: Nominal

This records the existence of a constitutional commitment to retrieval in binary mode. Indicators are clauses for the re-joining of territories (West Germany), explicit territorial claims (Republic of Ireland), the provision of empty parliamentary seats for MPs of missing' territories (Somalia), the maintenance of a constitutional status quo ante to signify the continued belonging of territories to the parent state (interwar Hungary's continuity as kingdom without a monarch), etc. (see section 1.3.3).

Value	Label
0.00	No
1.00	Yes
99.0	Missing value

Dataset Manual 2 (Variable Dataset)

- **List of cases - Dataset 2**
- **List of variables - Dataset 2**

List of Cases – Dataset 2

Value Label	Case Name
01	Aegean Macedonia – Greece
02	Epirus – Greece
03	Ionian Islands – Greece
04	Cyprus - Greece
05	Thrace – Greece
06	Veneto – Italy
07	Rome and Lazio – Italy
08	Fiume – Italy
09	South Tyrol – Italy
10	Trieste – Italy
11	Southern Schleswig – Denmark
12	Crete – Greece
13	Transylvania – Romania
14	Alsace – France
15	Bosnian Serb Territories – Serbia
16	Eastern Rumelia – Bulgaria
17	Northern Bukovina – Bulgaria
18	Pirin Macedonia - Bulgaria1
19	Sandjak – Serbia
20	Kosovo - Albania1
21	Macedonia - Albania1
22	Northern Greece - Albania1
23	Northern Epiros - Greece
24	Aaland Islands – Sweden
25	Danzig - Poland
26	Lithuania – Poland

List of Cases – Dataset 2 (continued)

Value Label	Case Name
27	Alsace - Germany
28	Saarland - Germany
29	Silesia – Germany
30	South Tyrol - Austria
31	Sudetenland – Germany
32	Southern Slovakia - Hungary
33	Transylvania – Hungary
34	Voyvodina (Bacska, Banat) – Hungary
35	Northern Ireland- Republic of Ireland
36	North Western Frontier Province (Pakistan) – Afghanistan
37	Kwazulu Natal - Swazi Kingdom
38	Southern Thailand – Malaysia
39	Austria - Germany
40	Okinawa/Ryukyu – Japan
41	Kashmir – Pakistan
42	GDR - Germany (FRG)
43	Djibouti – Somalia
44	Northern Frontier District (Kenya) – Somalia
45	Ogaden – Somalia
46	Northern Chad – Lybia
47	Nagorno Karabach - Armenia
48	Kosovo - Albania2
49	Macedonia - Albania2
50	Northern Greece - Albania2
51	Bosnian Serb Territories – Serbia 2
52	Krajina - Serbia
53	Moldova - Romania
54	East Jerusalem/Autonomous Territories - Palestine
55	Lithuania - Belarus

List of variables on the working file Dataset 2

1 CASEID   Case

Measurement Level: Nominal

For selection criteria of all 55 chronologically recorded irredentas see section 1.2.2 and the Descriptive Dataset (variable 1, above) .

2 IRRED INCONSIS   Irredentist Inconsistency across Time

Measurement Level: Nominal

The dependent variable against which all factors were tested. For indicators of conventional irredentism see variable 15, Dataset1 (above).

Value	Label
1.00	Yes
2.00	No
99.00	Missing Value

3 PSHOM   Ethno-Territorial Homogeneity of Parent State

Measurement Level: Ordinal

Value	Label
1.00	Important retaliating minorities
2.00	Ethnically homogenous or nearly
99.00	Missing value

A parent state is by definition one in which an ethnic group is demographically and/or politically dominant. It is thus at least factually capable of pursuing an irredenta without *decisive* opposition by its own minorities. These may worry that retrieval would upset the domestic ethnic balance at their expense (Horowitz 1985:284; Neuberger 1991:106). However, there are still *variations in the freedom of political action* even such a dominant ethnic group has, because any present minorities may still pose *significant* (because leveraged)

obstacles to retrieval (see sections 1.2.2 and 4.1.3). Value 2.00 describes parent states where titular groups exercise perfect control over politics. This may be because there really are no minorities or, crucially, because existing ones have no veto power. Parent states marked by qualified homogeneity in turn contain what I call *important retaliating minorities* (value 1.00). These are able to apply anti-irredentist leverage either politically (Hungarians in Romania threatening withdrawal of their crucial governmental support at the prospect of Moldova's retrieval), demographically (non-Malays in Malaysia protesting against any retrieval of Thai Malays) and/or economically (like Moldova's Dniester-Russians who seceded with their economically important territory in 1990 fearing union with Romania). Threats of minority violence are not taken into account because they are normally ineffectual versus much stronger states. While such hindrances are not decisive in themselves, they may add to the considerable adversity irredentas typically face.

4 MINHOM   Ethno-Territorial Homogeneity of Minority
Measurement Level: Nominal

This variable assesses the geographical and demographic distribution of transborder kin. Criteria are respectively: a relative majority (50%) of the minority living in a concentrated, minimally inter-mixed manner (1.00), living dispersed but along the inter-state border between host and parent state (2.00) or – Horowitz's ideal case scenario for retrieval – bearing both features (3.00). In case none of the above applies, a score of 0.00 was awarded.

Value   Label
0.00   None
1.00   Compact/homogenous settlement
2.00   Border-near settlement
3.00   Compact and border-near
99.00   Missing value

5 COMBHOM   Combined Ethno-Territorial Homogeneity of Parent State (PS) and Transborder Community (TC)

Measurement Level: Nominal

Combined variable recording all possible pairings of both irredentist actors' different situations regarding ethno-territorial homogeneity.

Value   Label

1.00   TC neither border-near nor compact, PS ethnically homogenous

2.00   TC neither border-near nor compact, PS has retaliating minorities

3.00   TC border-near, PS homogenous

4.00   TC border-near, PS has retaliating minorities

5.00   TC compact but not border-near, PS homogenous

6.00   TC compact but not border-near, PS has retaliating minorities

7.00   TC compact and border near, PS has retaliating minorities

8.00   TC compact and border near, PS homogenous (Horowitzian ideal case)

6 PSECON   Economic Benefit for Parent State from Retrieval

Measurement Level: Nominal

This variable assesses the potential or actual material benefit from retrieval to the parent state (see chapter 3). The criteria are local economic factors, regarding both human capital and the regional economy (data used according to availability). Indicators thus include in various combinations the level of unemployment amongst transborder kin, its average education and/or vocational skills, levels of literacy etc. Regional wealth was captured via local economic growth rates, host state investment and foreign direct investment into that area, levels of regional infrastructure, and the region's general character (primary-agricultural, secondary-industrial or tertiary-service economy). Rather than awarding scores on these features and then establishing critical levels for economic profit, judgements are based on the region's overall situation. Verdicts were given regardless of a parent state's own situation and only regarding the intrinsic material benefit brought by retrieval.

Value   Label

0.00   No

1.00   Yes

99.00   Missing value

7 MINECON   Economic Benefit for Minority from Retrieval

Measurement Level: Nominal

This records whether retrieval brings material advantages to the transborder minority. One criterion is comparative-quantitative, evaluating the parent state's key economic indicators versus those of the host state's (annual growth and inflation rates). The second criterion is qualitative. It assesses discrimination, i.e. whether the minority actually does get a share in its host country's wealth, regardless of whether the latter is wealthier than the parent state. In case of socio-economic discrimination (lower public investment in minority areas, higher levels of unemployment, lower average of education, lower life expectancy and higher infant mortality than majority nation), retrieval is taken to be economically profitable for the minority. This applies unless such disadvantages are offset by an overall higher standard of living when compared to an overall less wealthy parent state – an example would be the fate of Estonia's Russian minority.

Value   Label

0.00   No

1.00   Yes

99.0   Missing value

8 COMBECON   Combined Economic Benefit for Parent State and Transborder Community

Measurement Level: Nominal

Summary variable recording all possible combinations of both irredentist actors' different situations in terms of a material benefit from retrieval.

Value   Label

1.00   No actor benefits

2.00   TC does not benefit, PS does

4.00   TC benefits, PS does not

5.00   Both actors benefit

9 CLEAVAGE   Are there any Intra-group Cleavages?

Measurement Level: Nominal

This variable records the existence of tribal, religious or strong ideological cleavages within the irredentist group as a whole, i.e. between the minority and its parent state.

Value   Label

0.00   No

1.00   Yes

99.00   Missing value

10 PRESTIGE Prestige-Benefit for Minority via Retrieval

Measurement Level: Nominal

The variable records whether retrieval means for the minority incorporation into a state with higher international standing. Criteria are comparative economic strength as well as international status (membership in powerful regional associations which can be military and / or economic, changed diplomatic position due to recent defeat or victory in war, targeting by international sanctions etc.).

Value   Label

1.00   Yes

2.00   No: HS prestige higher or equal

99.00   Missing value

11 MINSELF   Minority Elites' Self-interest Adverse to Irredentism

Measurement Level: Nominal

This variable records any self-serving minority elite interests that *run counter* to the irredentist project. These can be parallel aspirations to independent statehood or endeavours to strike a deal with the host state government in order to preserve local power. This precision is necessary because Horowitz (1985:285; 1990:17) assumes that the very existence of self-interest among minority elites compromises their desire for retrieval. Such leadership interests manifest themselves in significant co-operation with the host state government about an alternative settlement whilst still pursuing retrieval. "Significant" co-operation does not include the mere agreement of a ceasefire for example, but describes negotiations / agreements about co-optation (local autonomy, governmental participation, economic rewards etc.) in exchange for abandoning irredentism. Another indicator is the existence of important factions within the minority pressing for alternatives to retrieval (e.g. Kashmiri Muslim endeavours for secession rather than retrieval by Pakistan). Furthermore, I had observed that the relationship between irredentist minority leaders and the parent state government is skewed into receiving and executing the latter's orders, and that the strength of such subordination describes a minority's political allegiance and thus wish for retrieval (section 1.3.1). In light of this observation I hence also count as sign of self-interest any major disagreements between parent state and minority elites over the conduct and outcome of retrieval.

Value   Label

0.00   No

1.00   Yes

99.0   Missing value

12 PSAFFIN   Particularised Affinity of Parent State Elites

Measurement Level: Nominal

This variable measures both the existence and extent of particularised affinity in mainland elites. Particularised affinity is given when significant parent state

individuals have some intimate personal connection with the territory to be retrieved *beyond* the general bond on which irredentism is founded. This means they may have been born, raised or schooled there, their families may originate from that area, they have or had property there, they belong to the particular subgroup that inhabits the area, etc. Significant individuals are those in government positions (heads of state and government, cabinet members), persons directly associated with the policy-making process (members of parliament, members of expert committees to the legislature, policy advisers, senior civil servants) and, to a lesser extent, opinion-makers (eminent personalities of public life such as journalists and editors, writers, academics, artists, etc.). I have recorded 'some' or 'moderate' affinity (value label 1.00) when it applies to merely few such figures. Where this feature is in turn wide-spread or frequent I have assigned value label 2.00 (extensive/strong).

Value   Label
0.00   None
1.00   Some/Moderate
2.00   Extensive/Strong
99.0   Missing value

13 PSAFF2   Particularised Affinity of Parent State Elites

Measurement Level: Nominal

The same variable as above (no.12), but recorded with less differentiation into binary mode. Any case that the previous variable described as 'moderate' or 'strong' is awarded value label 1.00 (yes – there is personal affinity). Negative outcomes have remained with value 0.00 (no affinity). This simplification minimises the number of distribution over cells, thus maximising the degrees of freedom for chi-square testing (see section 2.4).

Value   Label
0.00   No
1.00   Yes
99.00 Missing value

14 MINAFFIN   Particularised Affinity of Minority Elites

Measurement Level: Nominal

This variable measures both the existence and extent of particularised affinity in minority elites. Particularised affinity is given when these possess some intimate personal connection with the parent state population and territory *beyond* the general ethnic bond on which irredentism is founded. They may have been born, raised, or schooled there, their families may originate from the parent state, they have or had property there, they belong to a particular subgroup that inhabits it etc. The term "elites" describes persons in the minority political leadership (higher ranking minority party politicians, civil rights activists, leaders of any existing minority militia) and, here equally importantly (whereas only second-ranking in the parent state), those individuals who *personify and are seen to defend* the group's cultural-linguistic identity: writers, actors and other artists, journalists and editors, philosophers etc. See variable 12 (above) for how value labels have been accorded.

Value   Label
0.00   None
1.00   Some/Moderate
2.00   Extensive/Strong
100.0 Missing value

15 MINAFF2   Particularised Affinity of Minority Elites

Measurement Level: Nominal

The same variable as above (no. 14), but recorded with less differentiation into binary mode in order to reduce the number of distribution over cells, thus maximising the degrees of freedom for chi-square testing. For an account of how value labels have been accorded see variable 13 (above).

Value   Label
0.00   No
1.00   Yes
99.00 Missing value

16 COMBAFF   Combined Value of both Parent State and Transborder Community Elites' Particularised Affinity

Measurement Level: Nominal

Summary variable recording all possible combinations of both irredentist elites' particularised affinities towards the respective other side (based on binary variables 13 and 15).

Value   Label

1.00   No particularised affinity in either actor

2.00   PS affinity, but none in TC

4.00   TC affinity, but none in PS

5.00   Particularised affinity in both PS and TC

17 PSGOVERN   Regime Type of Parent State

Measurement Level: Ordinal

This variable describes the regime type within the parent state. Values are taken from the Polity IV (2003) dataset and recoded into ordinal categories. Jaggers, Marshall and Gurr's Polity score assumes for the core qualities of democracy and autocracy as defining opposite ends of a governance scale which ranges from -10 (fully institutionalised autocracy) to +10 (consolidated democracy). Anocracies (stalled or developing cases of democratisation) are a middling category which mixes these systemic features and thus ranges between -5 and +5. I thus assigned value labels to cases depending on their placement within this scale (see also section 2.3.1). Categorising regime types over the whole life-span of an irredenta also brought up the problem of (sometimes multiple) regime change. In such cases I have referred to Polity IV's (p4v2003 dataset) translation of 'standardised authority codes' to normal scale polity values for the period (irredentist life span) treated.

Value   Label

0.00   Autocracy

1.00   Anocracy

2.00   Democracy

99.00 Missing value

330

18 PSGOV2   Regime Type of Parent State

Measurement Level: Ordinal

The same variable as above (no.17), but recorded with less differentiation into binary mode in order to reduce the distribution over cells, thus maximising the degrees of freedom for chi-square testing. Value 1.00 includes both autocracies and anocracies. Democratic regimes (Value 2.00) are only those that have an established track record or which are considered to have successfully completed democratisation, i.e. passed beyond the anocracy stage.

Value   Label

1.00   Non-democratic

2.00   Democratic

99.00 Missing value

19 HSGOVERN   Regime Type of Host State

Measurement Level: Ordinal

This variable describes the regime type within the host state. Regime types are ranked in descending order according to how accommodative they are towards defectionist minorities on the latter's *own terms*, i.e. by extending collective rights, power-sharing and some measure of self-rule, and thus how likely they are to minimise their disaffection. Non-democratic regimes are not differentiated since they are assumed to be either inherently repressive on this score or to co-opt inconsistently and without legal-constitutional guarantees. Democracies in turn are distinguished along Smooha's fivefold typology (2002a) which categorises along two combined criteria: state neutrality in terms of ethnicity, and collective recognition of minorities.

Value   Label

1.00   Non-democratic state

2.00   Ethnic Democracies

3.00   Republican Liberal Democracies

4.00   Individual-Liberal Democracies

5.00   Multicultural Democracies

6.00   Consociational Democracies or containing consociational features

99.00   Missing value

20 HSGOVERN   Regime Type of Host State

Measurement Level: Ordinal

The same variable as above (no.19), but recorded with less differentiation into binary mode in order to reduce the number of distribution over cells, thus maximising the degrees of freedom for chi-square testing. Following Smooha's typology (see above), I have categorised states as non-accommodative (Value 1.00) if they are non-democratic, ethnically biased, civic integrationist (Republican-Liberal Democracies) or if they do not recognise group identities (Individual-Liberal Democracies). Accommodative regimes (Value 2.00) in turn are Multicultural Democracies, Consociational Democracies, or those democracies that contain consociational features (i.e. what I have termed 'quasi-consociational practice' – see chapter 7)

Value   Label

1.00   Non-accommodative

2.00   Accommodative

99.00   Missing value

21 COMBGOV   Combined Regime Situations of Parent State and Transborder Community

Measurement Level: Nominal

Combined variable recording all possible pairings of both irredentist actors' different situations in terms of their respective political regime contexts.

Value   Label

1.00   No actor in a democratic / accommodative democracy

2.00   PS democratic, TC in non- accommodative democracy or in a non-democratic regime

4.00   PS non-democratic, TC in accommodative democracy

5.00   Both actors in democratic / accommodative democratic regimes

99.00 Missing Value

22   IR   Attitude of Inter-State System

Measurement Level: Nominal

This variable describes the inter-state system's general disposition towards border changes during the particular sub-period within the four thematic waves of irredentism (see sections 1.3.1, 5.1.1 and Dataset 1, variable 3). Exceptions for particular cases were recorded where appropriate. For example, despite the restrictive inter-state consensus after 1989 the international community exceptionally approved Germany's reunification.

Value   Label

1.00   Permissive

2.00   Restrictive

99.00 Missing value

23 PATRON   Presence of a Patron Power

Measurement Level: Nominal

The variable assesses whether an irredenta enjoys significant support from a third party and/or protection by another revisionist power. Several indicators are taken as sign of an irredenta's patronage: revisionist military alliances (Hungary and the Axis Powers), military support in terms of materiel, personnel and/or advice (Somalia and the USSR), and diplomatic backing/ encouragement of the cause by a third party (nineteenth century Serbia and Tsarist Russia). If a parent state is militarily and geopolitically powerful enough to act as its own patron (e.g. Nazi Germany) the case was also coded as positive value.

Value   Label

0.00   No

1.00   Yes

99.00 Missing value

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358

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