

**THE ANTECEDENTS AND CONSEQUENCE  
OF TRADE UNION COMMITMENT IN  
A DEVELOPING COUNTRY:  
THE CASE OF NIGERIA.**

**FRANKLIN OMOBHUDE OIKELOME**

**Submitted for the Degree of Doctor of  
Philosophy in Industrial Relations,  
London School of Economics and Political Science,  
University of London**

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


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## ABSTRACT

This thesis examined the antecedents and consequence of trade union commitment in Nigerian trade unions. Data obtained from 512 unionised employees in Nigeria was analysed using mainly correlation and regression analysis. From the results, the significant predictors of union commitment were factors associated with union characteristics and perception namely union instrumentality perception, satisfaction with union leadership and early union socialisation experience. Sector was a significant moderator in the model: union commitment was greater in the public sector while union participation was greater in the private sector. Males participated significantly more in union activities than females although there was no significant gender difference in union commitment. Factors associated with union attitudes were found to moderate the relationship between union commitment and union participation. Union commitment was also found to predict union participation in the overall model as hypothesised. The qualitative study involved personal interviews as well as content analysis of relevant union materials including logbooks. The results confirmed the relevance of the unions' settings and specific individual experiences to the quantitative findings. The overall findings provided limited support for the view that antecedents of union commitment differ across countries or contexts. Because some of the findings were partially consistent with those from the western literature, it cautions against generalising a notion that western models are dysfunctional in developing countries. The applications, implications and limitations of the findings were discussed.

## **DEDICATION**

To the Almighty One, the Lamb that sits upon the throne

## **ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS**

I am highly indebted to God who provided the strength and sustenance for me to see this project through. When things seemed difficult and situations untoward, He made a way and supplied much needed grace.

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## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS (IN ALPHABETICAL ORDER)

ALG	Agege Local Government
AP	African Petroleum
ANTUF	All Nigeria Trade Union federation
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
EIU	Economic Intelligence Unit
EPZ	Export Processing Zones
HMB	Health Management Board
HRD	Human Resource Department
IAP	Industrial Arbitration Panel
IA	Influencing Agents
IUD	Internal Union Dynamics
IR	Industrial Relations
JOBSAT	Job Satisfaction
LUF	Labour Unity Front
MAXBEL	Marxist Beliefs
MHWUN	Medical and Health Workers Union of Nigeria
NAFCON	National Fertilizer Company of Nigeria
NEPA	National Electric Power Authority
NITEL	Nigeria Telecommunications Limited
NECA	Nigerian Employers Consultative Association
NIC	National Industrial Court
NLC	Nigerian Labour Congress
NRC	Nigeria Railway Corporation
NCTUN	National Council of Trade Unions of Nigeria
NWC	Nigerian Workers Council
NTUC	Nigerian Trade Union Congress
NCMU	Nigerian Coal Miners Union
NTC	Nigerian Tobacco Company
NUPENG	National Union of Petroleum and Natural Gas workers
NUHPSW	National Union of Hotel and Personal Services
NUT	Nigerian Union of Teachers
NCSU	National Civil Service Union
NNFL	Nigerian National Federation of Labour
NNPC	Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation
NUFBTE	National Union of Food, Beverage and Tobacco Employees
NULGE	Nigerian Union of Local Government Employees
OCQ	Organizational Commitment Questionnaire
PENGASSAN	Petroleum and Gas Senior Staff Association of Nigeria
P-UMR	Perception of Union-Management Relations
P-DMP	Perception of Decision-Making Process
P-ID	Perception of Information Dissemination
PTI	Petroleum Training Institute
RWU	Railway Workers Union
RD	Radiography Department
SAP	Structural Adjustment Program
SEWUN	Steel and Engineering Workers Union of Nigeria
SPSS	Statistical Package for the Social Sciences
SM	Satisfaction with Management

SUL	Satisfaction with Union Leadership
SOEXP	Early Union Socialisation Experience
SATLIFE	Satisfaction with Life
TUC	Trade Union Congress
UC	Union Commitment
UI	Union Instrumentality
UN OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
ULC	United Labour Congress
UP	Union Participation
UPO	Union-Politics Orientation
UJM	Union Joining Motive
WFTU	World Federation of Trade Unions

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# Chapter 1

## Introduction

Academics, social theorists, employers of labour and trade unions have shown considerable interest in the subject of union commitment (Barling et al, 1992). There is a growing recognition of the importance and relevance of union commitment, especially among trade union practitioners. The need for unions to devise effective ways of maintaining and retaining the commitment of members in order to ensure the former's continued existence has been noted<sup>1</sup>. Related to this is an observation that beleaguered unions especially need the support of a loyal constituency in order to weather the storms of unfavorable and hostile situations (Jose, 2000).

Unions generally are confronted with challenges, which threaten their continued relevance in the world's scheme of things. Some of these challenges are represented by the universal trend towards greater liberalization of economic and political regimes and a waning influence occasioned by a decline in union densities (Galenson, 1994; Undy et al, 1995). Globalisation and privatisation have put many people out of employment in Zambia, while in Nigeria trade union rights are being systematically reversed<sup>2</sup>. The South African trade unions in the mining industry alone lost more than 40,000 workers to privatization in 1987 (Molapo, 1999). This situation has prompted calls for new approaches and strategies on the part of unions if they are to remain major actors

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<sup>1</sup> At an ILO seminar titled: Organised Labour in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century: Trade Unions and Organising Strategies”, Jan/Feb 2001.

<sup>2</sup>The 89<sup>th</sup> conference of the International Labour Organisation where members discussed extensively the impact of globalisation on the economies of member countries, Nigerian Vanguard, Thursday, 26th July, 2001

contributing to dynamic and equitable growth (Valkenburg, 1996; Otobo, 1997; Sunmonu, 1997).

### **1.1. Problem Statement**

This treatise is specifically about trade unions in Nigeria, so comments on the problems confronting the unions there as they relate to the subject under discussion is pertinent.

Basically, the unions are experiencing a decline, which is partly related to retrenchment-inducing policies of government and general membership apathy. The former is partly engendered by a privatization program<sup>3</sup> embarked upon by the federal government, which will result in 20% of the civil service employees losing their jobs<sup>4</sup>. The Nigerian civil service has about 1 million employees<sup>5</sup>; so about 200,000 stand to lose their source of livelihood.

Hundreds of civil servants at the state level are already in the job market having been retrenched by various state governments. For example, at least 21,000 employees were laid off by three state governments between 1999 and 2000. In Kwara State, the state government sacked 5,000; 10,000 workers were retrenched in Lagos state while in Osun State, the state laid off 6,000 workers<sup>6</sup>. An estimated 18,000 NEPA workers would be

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<sup>3</sup> The National Council on Privatization inaugurated in July 1999 evolved a three-phase implementation process. The first phase include the privatization of commercial and merchant banks and cement plants. The second phase involves hotels, and motor and vehicle assembly plants. The last phase entail the privatization of National Electricity Power Authority (NEPA), Nigeria Telecommunications Limited (NITEL), National Fertilizer Company of Nigeria (NAFCON), Nigerian Airways and Petroleum Refineries. The first phase was completed in December 1999 and progress is on going with regards the remaining two phases ([www.nigerianembassy.nl/invest\\_privatisation.htm](http://www.nigerianembassy.nl/invest_privatisation.htm)).

<sup>4</sup> African Perspective, Issue no 26, 5 May 1999

<sup>5</sup> ibid.

<sup>6</sup> Committee for a Workers' International, Press Release. December 19 2000.

retrenched before it is privatised according to a report<sup>7</sup>. Nigeria Railway Corporation (NRC) has already laid off 1,000 workers as part of its plan to restructure the organisation<sup>8</sup>. Similarly, no fewer than 1,000 staff of the Nigeria Airways have been relieved of their jobs<sup>9</sup>.

The Nigerian private sector is not exempt from the problem. For unions in the private sector, redundancies are mainly related to the economic situation in the country. For example, the African Petroleum plc retrenched hundreds of its staff across the country in early 2002, citing economic reasons. In a particular state (Port-Harcourt), a whole installation (branch) was reportedly closed down and all the staff retrenched<sup>10</sup>. The question may be asked as to how this situation affects the union. In response, it can be argued that one of the consequences of privatisation, for the unions, is a gradual erosion of their constituency. The unions have already witnessed a drop in their density from 11 to 10% between 1994 and 2000<sup>11</sup> (Harper, 2001). More job losses could result in a further slump in union density. This situation threatens the life of the unions, which need members to maintain their existence and relevance (Barling et al, 1992).

The question at this juncture relates to the relevance of union commitment to the situation described above. Firstly, the unions need their members' loyalty and support in these circumstances if they are to provide a credible and effective 'resistance' to management.

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<sup>7</sup> Nigerian Tribune, 27th October, 2000

<sup>8</sup> Daily trust, Abuja. January 17, 2002

<sup>9</sup> The vanguard, Lagos. January 4 2002

<sup>10</sup> From a source within the company's head office based in Lagos.

<sup>11</sup> This figure may be inaccurate. There are no current official figures; the assistant national registrar of trade unions told the author union officials are either slow in supplying periodic information or sometimes provide wrong figures to deliberately mislead auditors investigating union accounts.

Clark et al (1993) argued that the overall effectiveness of labour is closely tied to membership support. To try and counter the situation or at best alleviate the effects of the redundant policies by obtaining the best possible deal for affected workers, the unions need their members to be loyal and to actively support their activities. In their negotiations with managements, unions need to be confident that they have the support of a committed membership, which is ready to back them all the way. Their ability to collectively bargain with employers from a strong position depends heavily on the loyalty of their constituency (Barling et al, 1992). The unions' struggle for relevance amidst the tides of economic realities may not succeed without the workers expressing unwavering solidarity.

Secondly, the slump in workers' numerical strength in the present situation should be a concern to unions because in a sense, the proportion of workers who belong to a union is the most visible symbol of union strength (Rogers, 1993). The point being that the erosion of unions' membership base means they have less people they can rely on in the event of public rallies or mass demonstrations. For instance, large turn outs at public rallies often indicate a popular support and protests involving a large number of workers may end up becoming important watersheds<sup>12</sup>. In the same vein, some of the problems which the Nigerian trade unions faced in the pre-structure era (before 1978) centered on the fact that the unions were very ineffective partly due to the existence of loosely organised unions with very few members (Tokunbo, 1987). Consequently, most of them were incapable of providing any meaningful opposition to managements (Ubeku, 1983).

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<sup>12</sup> The French revolution, sparked off by bread scarcity and the mass demonstration of half a million in Belgrade, which ended the reign of Serbia's former leader Milosevic are good examples

The amalgamation of the fragmented unions along industrial lines in 1978 bolstered their figures from a few hundreds into thousands and played a role in their subsequent effectiveness (Fashoyin, 1987). Thus, against the backdrop of a persisting trend represented by decreasing membership, there may be some implications for the union's future efficiency and militancy.

The other dimension of the problem faced by Nigerian trade unions is membership apathy towards union activities. A demonstration of apathy towards union activity by workers is often interpreted as signifying a lack of commitment (Cohen, 1974; Fashoyin, 1987). Membership indifference to union activity may occur both at local and national level. At the local level, Cohen (1974, pg. 129) noted the "intermittent interest of most trade union members in the affairs of the union". To cite an example of member apathy at the national level, a nationwide general strike against fuel price rises called for by the Nigerian trade union leaders on January 16, 2002 was called off at the end of its second day. The first day of strikes paralyzed the country, but by the next day, some buses and cars began to return to the streets and many offices reopened. According to a report, "the strike was not holding firm, and calling it off was a humiliating defeat for the unions"<sup>13</sup>. The lack of support for the strike action by the workers may be attributed to a number of reasons, but in the final analysis, it does represent a lack of commitment by members on the occasion. The union leaders consequently appeared weak and their authority and legitimacy seemed undermined.

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<sup>13</sup> BBC news, 17 January 2002.

An understanding of commitment is vital for the unions because failure to understand members' union related behaviours could turn out to be a serious and potential omission for unions (Kuruvilla et al, 1993). Behavioural scientists argue that people are not born with their attitudes and behaviours intact (Clark, 2000). Thus, in order to elicit particular behaviours from their members, unions need to first identify, understand and nurture the right conditions capable of producing such desired behaviours. Thus, commitment (an attitude) and union participation ( its behavioural consequence) can be elicited from members if unions (1) understand the circumstances or factors associated with them and (2) take appropriate steps in creating or fostering these circumstances.

An accurate way to measure union commitment has been established thus making it possible to examine the relationship of union commitment to a wide range of factors, including union participation. Union-focused behavioural research has found that a wide variety of attitudes and opinions are ultimately manifested in a broader attitude known as union members commitment. This research has shown that individuals who are more satisfied with their union's performance, their treatment by union officials, the operation of their grievance procedures and their first year's experiences with the union are more committed to or supportive of the union than members who have negative attitudes about their experiences (Clark, 2000).

The relationship between commitment (an attitude) and member participation in union activities (a behaviour) has received particular attention (Gordon et al, 1980; Gallagher and Clark, 1989) and the former has been identified as a key antecedent of the

willingness to participate actively in the union (Bamberger et al; Fullager and Barling 1989; Fuller and Hester 1998; Kelloway and Barling, 1993; Sverke, 1997). In other words, members who have high levels of commitment are more likely to participate in union activities such as meetings, rallies, and elections. Highly committed members have also been found to be more willing to go on strike in support of bargaining demands (Barling et al, 1992), more likely to support political action by the union (Fields et al, 1990) than members with low levels of commitment. In sum, the relationship between commitment and participation in union activities is clear. High levels of participation in union activities can lead to more effective unions. Strategically, this suggests that if a union wishes to become more effective through increased member participation it can do so by raising the level of member commitment to the union (Clark, 2000).

Gordon M.E. and Nurick, A.J. (1981) made a significant attempt in investigating the concept of union commitment with a view to identifying its main dimensions. The study identified four dimensions of union commitment using factor analysis and correlational data. Factor analysis was used to identify the statistical structure of the construct and correlational data was employed to provide evidence of the construct validity of the dimensions identified. Factor analysis produced four interpretable dimensions: union loyalty (39%) of common variance, responsibility to the union (19%), willingness to work for the union (17%) and beliefs in unionism (13%). Union loyalty denotes a feeling of pride in the union (Ladd et al, 1982) and also implies a desire to retain union membership (Klandermans, 1989). Responsibility to the union refers to those day-to-day behaviours that are required for normal role fulfillment while the willingness to work for

the union reflects the voluntary nature of behavioral acts that go beyond those required for normal role fulfillment. Schneider (1985) suggests that the willingness to exert effort beyond that normally required for membership of an organisation is the hallmark of commitment.

Barling et al (1992) argued that the willingness to work for the union supercedes the feeling of responsibility to it since the former not only includes the fulfillment of dependable role behaviours, but also encompasses behaviour that go beyond prescribed roles. Belief in the values and goals of unions is akin to Kanter (1968)'s concept of ideological conformity and support. Basically it reflects a belief in the goals of unionism as against a union-specific belief (Barling et al, 1992). This dimension is consistent with Porter and Smith's (1970) definition of commitment as a belief in the values and objectives of the organisation. In the aftermath of Gordon et al's (1980) original study, many researchers investigated the structure of union commitment and the dimensionality of the measuring instrument they provided. While some works have challenged the four-factor structure (Friedman and Harvey, 1986), most of the available research suggests that the four dimensions of union commitment are valid, generally stable and operational (Ladd et al, 1982; Thacker et al, 1989; Tetrick et al, 1989; Wellington et al, 1996).

Union participation has various dimensions and includes formal activities such as attending union meetings, voting in elections and holding union office and also informal activities such as discussing union issues with colleagues, reading union literature and helping in union campaigns (Kelloway et al. 1995). Substantive issues concerning union

participation will be dealt with in greater detail in subsequent chapters under literature review. It should suffice at this stage to point out the importance of membership participation to trade unions. Member participation is important for the following reasons:

1. **Mitigating Sectionalism:** Active involvement by a cross section of members is necessary if sectionalism is to be avoided. At workplace level, sectionalism may act to defeat the achievement of collective goals. This was aptly demonstrated by Smock (1969)'s study of coalminers located in the eastern part of the country. Workers were torn in between two opposite factions of union leadership each vying for sole authority. Intrigues, plots and counter plots by the two camps effectively hampered the business of union administration and weakened the position of the unions with management.
2. **Policy initiative and Legitimacy:** Trade unions rely on their membership both for policy initiative and implementation. Trade unions serve claims on employers which are drawn up on behalf of their members. In situations of employer opposition the union must be capable of mobilising its members in order to strengthen its hand in negotiations. If a trade union fails in this regard, both its external legitimacy and bargaining authority are undermined. Again, the example cited earlier about the failed strike action by the Nigerian Labour Congress becomes relevant. The seeming nonchalant attitude of the workers to the strike cast a shadow on the authority of the union leaders. Thus, a low level of membership involvement can undermine the legitimacy and authority of trade

unions. Similarly, the extent to which a trade union claims to speak on behalf of its members on social and political issues will depend on the extent to which it involves its members. Involvement, in turn, will affect the extent to which a union's social and political commitments are honoured by its membership.


3. **Moderating oligarchy:** Trade unions are frequently attacked on the basis that they are undemocratic organisations, which seek to articulate the aims and objectives of a vociferous and militant minority while ignoring the true preferences of the majority of its members. Membership participation thus viewed becomes a test of internal democracy. Some authors have portrayed union leaders in the country as displaying autocratic behaviour, often not allowing democratic involvement of members when taking decisions (Cohen, 1974; Smock, 1969). Membership involvement in union affairs has been shown to moderate oligarchy in trade unions (James, 1984). A trade union which can demonstrate high levels of membership participation can therefore claim to be something other than an oligarchy.
4. **Resisting infiltration:** Low levels of membership participation, particularly in union elections, may favour the interests of minority groups who seek to gain control of key positions in the formal organs of union government. When members are not committed to using their voting rights or are nonchalant about the democratic procedure within their unions, a few union activists may succeed in dictating the affairs of the union (Cohen, 1974; Fashoyin, 1987).

5. **Good leadership:** When ordinary members who possess the necessary qualifications, skills and other good leadership qualities do not aspire to the positions of leadership, the unions consequently lose out on whatever positive impact their participation might have engendered. Invariably, the best candidates may end up not getting elected to offices. The paucity of capable union leaders within the Nigerian labour movement have been noted (Otobo, 1995; Tokunbo, 1985).
6. **Assisting union administration:** Trade unions depend heavily upon lay activists to ensure that the interests of members at workplace level are adequately serviced to minimise disaffection and avoid the possibility of dissatisfied members transferring to another union. Furthermore, it also ensures that the burden of work on full-time officers is reduced to manageable levels.
7. **Developing members:** Participation in the internal affairs of the union provides the opportunity for members to develop the knowledge, skills and confidence necessary to contribute to debate and policy formulation within the union. Having received this training, members may become more aware of the political process generally (within and outside of the unions) and be better equipped to contribute to it.

Since union participation is a consequence of union commitment, it can be argued that the importance of union participation described above also underscore the relevance of

union commitment. The significance of membership commitment to the achievement of union objectives thus makes it part of the very fabric of unions (Gordon et al., 480). This study represents an attempt to investigate the causes and consequences of union commitment in the Nigerian context. The effort to identify the determinants of union commitment and involvement in trade union activities by union members in the country would necessarily require a carefully formulated model of investigation. Barling et al., 1992) proposed a psychological model of union commitment (Fig. 1.1) based on Gordon et al (1980)'s initial work and other subsequent studies (Barling et al, 1992; Fullager & Barling, 1989; Fullager et al, 1992; Thacker et al, 1992). In this model the authors distinguished between antecedents or causes of union commitment and the consequences of union commitment. Under antecedents, they outlined twenty-five factors under seven main categories of demographics, personality/work beliefs, union attitude/beliefs, role experiences, work experiences, structural characteristics and environmental characteristics. The products of the interaction between these antecedents and union commitment were outlined as consequences. These include participation in union activities, perceived industrial relations climate, strike propensity, support for political action, support for endorsement of political climate and turnover.

**Fig 1.1. Antecedents and Consequences of Union Commitment (Barling et al, 1992).**



## 1.2 Rationale for Research

It is surprising that no Nigerian study appears to have empirically investigated the relationship between union commitment and member participation. This situation may

be explained by a suggestion that researchers in developing countries seem to shy away from an unqualified adoption of western theories in their analysis of IR problems relating to their own setting (Fajana, 1995). This argument is often based on a notion that western models are dysfunctional when it comes to investigating issues in developing countries. Thus most Nigerian studies seem to be based on descriptive or historical analysis, thereby making the Nigerian industrial relations literature replete with works of this nature (Yesusfu, 1962; Fashoyin, 1980; Diejomaoh, 1979; Kraus, 1979). Union surveys in the country seem not to be paying any particular attention to the subject of union commitment as portrayed in the western literature. It is the aim of this research to address this particular gap between the two literatures.

Also, this study is predicated on the recognition that there are wide diversities in national systems of industrial relations arising from contextual differences (Dunlop, 1958; Poole, 1986) and these differences could cause predictors of union commitment to differ across countries or contexts (Barling et al, 1992:93). The social system in any country has other sub-systems including the economic system, the political system and the industrial relations system. An industrial relations system therefore overlaps with the other subsystems in the other social system. In its development, an industrial relations system comprises three groups of actors: the workers and their unions, the employers and their associations and the government agencies concerned with the workplace and work community. Contextual factors, which contribute to the variations in industrial relations in any country, include technology, market or budgetary constraints, power relations and

status of the actors and an ideology, which binds the industrial relations system together (Wilczynski, 1983; Berg, 1968; Fox, 1985).

In every system, the three actors together create the “web of rules” to govern the workplace and community. These rules are made within the constraints imposed by the contexts and their ideology, and take a variety of forms in different systems including agreements, statutes, decrees, regulations, awards policies and practices and customs. Of the actors in the system, the government agencies in some systems may have such a broad and decisive role that they can override the hierarchies of managers and workers on almost all matters. For example, in former communist countries, no separate role was envisaged for employers and workers’ trade unions. They must operate within the directives of the political party and the guidelines of the state plan.

In other systems, the role of the government may be so minor and constricted as to permit consideration of the direct relationships between the two hierarchies with little reference to governmental agencies. Thus under the Anglo-Saxon model (e.g. United Kingdom), the approach is based on the *Laissez faire* doctrine which permits employers and unions reasonable latitude to determine their own affairs within a framework established. Yet in other systems, the workers hierarchy or even the managerial hierarchy may be assigned a relatively narrow role. This is the position in some developing countries where the government of those countries plays a more active role in industrial relations. For instance, the collective bargaining process under these systems is hedged about with constraints. Such constraints include the significant role of the law and wage

determination policies of the governments. Nigeria will conveniently fit into this last category.

Hofstede (1980) argued that the development of any social theory is influenced by an interaction of external influences (e.g. trade and scientific discovery), geographic, economic, demographic, historical, technological factors and cultural factors such as a group's value system. This implies that one cannot understand one element (e.g. in our case, causes of union commitment) without its social context. Similarly, Lawrence (1987) and Pfeffer (1982) underscored the importance of appreciating social context and its influence on theory development. Avdan and Adler (1991) also suggested that cultural values often influence the direction and outlook of research depending on the country involved and they cited the example of the United States where cultural values have fundamentally framed management research.

Across the world, trade unions have varied functions, which may affect the value of joining (and possibly the intention to remain in membership) and consequently may make generalising from research findings from one country to another problematic (Hartley, 1992). Otobo (1995) argued as follows:

*"In a dynamic situation involving the transformation of the state and economy over time, the role of trade unions is best seen as constantly changing, making unrealistic any notion of a union role which may be regarded as 'constant', 'representative' or 'typical'...given the colonial and subsequent geopolitical and ideological developments, the*

*language which have been used in describing unions and the conception of their role in Nigerian society have been borrowed or, at least greatly influenced, by external forces...the socio-political setting of any country, its own economic, legal and other institutional arrangements, serve to impose limits on what trade unions may do".*

But the debates generated by this controversy have mostly remained armchair theorising which often times are mostly conjectures. The most plausible means of resolving disputes of this nature is to conduct empirical enquiries. Arguably, not all the factors advanced in fig. 1.1 will necessarily apply in the Nigerian context. Those that may be relevant might not be that significant in their measure of predictiveness. Conversely, influential factors in the Nigerian context may actually be inconsequential in western settings. For example, although union loyalty was predicted by job alienation for white-collar workers and by job alienation for blue-collar workers in South Africa (Fullager and Barling, 1989), no such relationship emerged in Canada (Barling et al, 1989). Likewise, extrinsic job dissatisfaction had a direct effect on union loyalty among white-collar workers in South Africa, but not in Canada.

Furthermore, while the four commitment dimensions did not predict union turn over in America (Gordon et al, 1980), they did in Klanderman' s (1989) Dutch sample. Focusing research effort on the applicability of an existing model across geographical divides will help to determine the extent to which that model can apply in a different context. Therefore, research questions need to focus on the extent to which existing theories may

be parochial, restricted or universally binding in their applications. Thus we may ask: to what extent is the union commitment model shown in figure 1.1 appropriate for explaining union dynamics within the Nigerian trade unions?

### **1.3 Objective of study**

Against the backdrop of the foregoing, this study seeks to investigate the factors responsible for the development and sustenance of union commitment amongst trade union members in Nigeria. Having established the importance of union commitment, this understanding will not be complete without knowing if an existing model is adequate in explaining situations on a context-specific basis, especially in a developing country. Using fig. 1.1 to develop the study's theoretical framework, the objective is to identify the predictors of union commitment and how this links with union participation for the Nigerian sample. Since the model is based mostly on studies conducted in developed countries, this study provides an opportunity to make comparisons with findings in the western literature in the final analysis. Another objective is to fill the gap in the western conceptualisation of union commitment and current research products within the Nigerian literature with special emphasis on whether the commitment-participation link portrayed in the western literature can be applied to the Nigerian situation.

### **1.4 Significance of Study**

The significance of a study of this nature is of both theoretical and practical consequences. The knowledge to be gained from the investigation of a standardised model of union commitment amongst Nigerian union members is of unprecedented

research value to the Nigerian industrial relations literature. The paucity of empirical contents of the Nigerian literature on trade unions has been decried (Matanmi, 1992) but little it seems has been done to empirically ascertain what some authors seem to take for granted. This study attempts to advance empirical validated accounts of what determines members' commitment to the union and the implications this has for different aspects of union participation. The practical significance of this study will be of interest to union leaders who may wish to address union membership apathy through an effective application of ideas that may help to enhance the development and sustenance of commitment amongst members. More specifically, labour leaders in developing countries need to be able to understand the processes leading up to the development and sustenance of union commitment. Hopefully, this study should be of some assistance in this regard.

## **1.5 Structure of Thesis**

The structure of this thesis is as follows. Chapters 2 and 3 are wholly devoted to literature review; the former focusing on mainly western studies while chapter 3 is devoted to Nigerian studies. In both chapters, the aim is to critically examine existing research that is significant to the present study by summarizing relevant studies, evaluating them, showing the relationships between different works, and showing how they relate to present study. This provides the context for the present research by looking at what work has already been done in the area of union commitment. Chapter 4 is devoted to the methods adopted in both quantitative and qualitative research. It entails the definition of the activity of research is, describes the model used for investigation,

steps taken in securing access to samples, pilot study, the main population sample, the rationale for their selection, the scales of measurement employed for the investigation, the research hypotheses, the administration of questionnaires, response rates and the techniques employed for data analysis. Essentially, there were two quantitative surveys.

The multivariate analysis and descriptive statistics of the research (first survey) are shown in chapter 5. Test for missing data, reliability tests and factor analysis were used to ascertain and improve the dependability of the research instruments employed in the study. Afterwards, test of correlation was used to test for the model's hypothesized relationships. Chapter 6 uses multiple regression to further elaborate on the nature of the relationships uncovered in chapter 5 and to pinpoint the most predictive independent variables for the dependent variables. Chapter 7 is primarily concerned with the analysis of data obtained from the second quantitative survey and uses multiple regression and other methods of statistical analysis. In chapter 8, the results of the qualitative investigation are presented. In chapter 9, a conclusion of the themes of the research and their implications are presented.

## Chapter 2

### Literature Review

#### Introduction

In this chapter, an attempt is made to identify the antecedents and consequences of union commitment from various studies conducted mainly in America and Europe in order to put the proposed study into perspective. A primary basis for the concerted attempt to formalise a definition of union commitment was the data already available on organisational commitment. Initial research in the area of union commitment considered commitment as a zero-sum commodity, which postulates that commitment to a union precludes commitment to the employing institution. This mutual exclusivity principle stimulated interest in investigating the extent to which union growth competed with loyalty to the employing organization. However, several empirical studies (Dean, 1954; Purcell 1953; Stagner, 1954) indicated a positive relationship between company and union commitment, which contradicted the zero sum theory and led to the formulation of the concept of dual commitment or dual loyalty. This positive relationship between company and union commitment was found to be a function of the perceived labour-management relationships existing in the workplace between the unions and the employer (Angle and Perry, 1986).

The process by which commitment is built up, the factors influencing commitment and the resultant outcomes of commitment have been extensively studied. To measure union commitment, scales parallel to the "organizational commitment questionnaire" (OCQ) scale (Porter et al, 1976) have been constructed. Some scales are unidimensional (Porter et al. 1976), while others model union commitment as a multidimensional concept (Gordon et al, 1980). Gordon et al (1980) developed a 30-

item measure of union commitment, based on the attitudinal approach and drawing partly on the existing organisation commitment literature for questionnaire items. Their research produced a four-factor measure of commitment comprising ‘union loyalty’ (reflecting a sense of pride and an awareness of the benefits of union membership), ‘responsibility to the union’ (referring to the members’ willingness to fulfil day-to-day obligations to the union, for example by providing information to the union and supporting others’ use of the grievance procedure), ‘willingness to work for the union’ (reflecting the willingness to participate in union activity beyond that normally expected of the rank and file member), and ‘belief in unionism’ (reflecting a general belief in the concept of trade unionism). While there have been debates about the dimensionality of the construct (Fullager, 1986; Kelloway et al, 1992; Thacker et al, 1989) much of the subsequent research has utilised the Gordon et al (1980) scales, or items derived from them.

Since Gordon et al’s (1980) study, numerous studies have been conducted to investigate the structure of union commitment and the dimensionality of the measuring instrument they provided. Ladd et al (1982) demonstrated the validity of the dimensions of union commitment in samples of engineers, technicians and non-professional workers who were members of white-collar unions. Fullager (1986) conducted a test of the union commitment measure in Africa and five factors emerged (essentially Gordon et al.’s four factors plus a factor Fullager labelled “loyalty to the Employing Organisation and Work”).

Friedman and Harvey’s (1986) work provided the first direct challenge to the four factor structure. Although based on Gordon et al’s (1980) data, they used a different

data analytic strategy (namely, an oblique confirmatory factor analytic model), and found support for two dimensions, namely union attitudes and opinions (which incorporated the loyalty and belief in unionism factors) and prounion behavioural intentions (comprising the responsibility and willingness dimensions). Friedman and Harvey (1986) noticed that their findings are consistent with Fishbein and Azjen's (1975) theory of behavioural intentions.

In an attempt to resolve the apparent confusion, Thacker et al (1989), in a direct contrast to the two- and four-dimensional models using confirmatory factor analytical techniques, suggested that Gordon et al.'s four dimensions provide a more accurate perspective of the dimensionality of union commitment than do Friedman and Harvey's (1986) two factor structure, but that the four union commitment dimensions are substantially interrelated. Tetrick et al (1989) also showed that the four factors were stable over an eight-month period and that there was some causal ordering among these four dimensions. Specifically, belief in unionism influenced union loyalty and feelings of responsibility to the union. In turn the willingness to work for the union was predicted by loyalty and responsibility. Tetrick (1989) further showed that belief in unionism was the most stable of the four dimensions and union loyalty the least stable.

Iverson and Ballard (1996)'s study examined the stability of the dimension of union commitment as proposed by Gordon et al (1980) in the cultural context of New Zealand. Results indicate that union commitment is best represented by the four factors of union loyalty, responsibility to the union, willingness to work for the union and belief in unionism. The factors displayed discriminant validity as evidenced by

the differential relationships and explained variances with a common set of explanatory variables. Thus, most of the available research suggests that the four dimensions of union commitment are stable and valid.

## **2.1 Antecedents of Union Commitment**

Based on previous research and the theory developed in the organizational commitment literature, several antecedent variables of union commitment have been identified (Gallagher and Clark, 1989), and include the demographic characteristics of the workforce, individual beliefs, union characteristics, work experiences, structural characteristics and industrial relations climate.

### ***Demographic / Personal characteristics***

Several studies have found no significant relationship between age and union loyalty (e.g. Bemmels, 1995; Deery et al, 1994; Magenau et al, 1988; Sherer and Morishima, 1989), while others have found a significant positive relationship (Conlon and Gallagher, 1987). Organisational commitment researchers have suggested that older workers are more strongly committed to their organisations because of the investments they have made in their jobs and their achievement of a better job fit over time (Meyer and Allen, 1997). In the same vein, older members' higher commitment level may be a reflection of their future ambition to contest for leadership positions having been in the union far longer; they might also feel they are best placed to lead the union.

Gordon et al (1980) found that female members' expression of union loyalty was more positive than male workers although males participate more in union activities.

This apparent discrepancy may not be due to gender per se, but rather to differences between men and women with respect to diverse variables such as the greater experience of work/family conflict among working women, lack of opportunity or discrimination. The traditional family responsibilities of women may limit their ability to work for the union, while the fact that most union leaders are men restricts the availability of female role models and may limit the attraction of an activist 'career' for women (Gallagher and Clark, 1989). A survey of union leaders in the United States for instance indicates that women are underrepresented in top union positions (Dale, 1992).

Marital status has not usually been included in studies of union commitment (Barling et al, 1992). However, Magenau et al (1988) found no significant relationship between 'family status' (a composite index of marital status and the presence of children in the household) and commitment to either organisation or union. But this is not to suggest that marital status should be conclusively discarded as inconsequential. Concerning education, there seem to be mixed findings. Some have found no significant relationship between education and union commitment (Barling et al, 1990; Fukami and Larson, 1984; Magenau et al, 1988), while others found a negative relationship (Bemmels, 1995; Deery et al. 1984). It seems likely that the impact of educational level will reflect composition of the particular sample being investigated. For example, Deery et al (1994) used a sample of 249 white-collar unionists in Australia while Barling et al (1990)'s data were obtained from 100 members of a white-collar union in Canada. Cultural factors may thus account for the difference.

Ethnicity in Nigeria, is a very important variable which has influenced the people's history, politics and geography (Warmington, 1960; Otobo, 1997). The country is a predominantly multicultural society with different tribes and languages all co-existing as a nation. Consequently, some problems faced by the unions may have been related to divisions and factionalisations on ethnic lines (Smock, 1969; Tokunbo, 1987).

Smock (1969)'s investigation revealed that around 36 percent of his respondents said they would prefer to have top officers of the union from their part of Ibo land. Also unskilled workers were more likely to say they wanted the top officers to come from their area than skilled workers. Similarly, in another study, union members' support for a labour party was influenced by ethnic considerations (Melson, 1975).

#### ***Individual Beliefs, Personal Characteristics and Political Inclinations***

Several studies have shown that individuals who become members of organisations and who have realistic expectations of the benefits offered by that organisation, are less likely to leave voluntarily than if they hold unrealistic beliefs (Wanous, 1980). There is also research evidence suggesting that the extent to which the expectations of new organisation members are met has a direct, albeit limited influence on commitment (Grusky, 1966; Steers, 1977). Fullager and Barling (1989) showed that for privileged workers (i.e. workers with access to decision making), the work ethic predicted union loyalty.

However the work ethic is only one of many belief systems (Bucholz, 1978). Others such as the Marxist belief system and the humanistic belief system may be related to union commitment, particularly because they predict union attitudes (Barling et al, 1991). Likewise psychological conservatism which reflects the fear of change, might

be particularly salient in the context of industrial relations: first, psychological conservatism predicts union attitudes (Barling et al, 1990) and second, change is a central element of the industrial relations process (Bluen and Barling, 1988). Glick et al (1977) have suggested that the relationship between satisfaction and participation is moderated by personality characteristics. Satisfaction is positively correlated with participation among members who express high needs for participation in decision making, achievement, and personal growth. For union members whose needs for accomplishment and growth are relatively weak, participation may follow dissatisfaction with the union.

The relationship between work values and union commitment seems to be moderated by race (Fullager and Barling, 1989). Among white “affluent” workers, work ethic beliefs are more important determinants of union commitment. By contrast, among black disenfranchised workers, Marxist-related work beliefs are stronger predictors of union commitment. The indication here is that greater personal feelings of alienation and exploitation, and a strong development of class consciousness, cause greater loyalty to the union among less privileged sectors of the blue-collar labour force.

With regards to politics, studies of American unions have found evidence that a majority of members supported their union’s involvement in the political process. These same studies however have also found that 20 to 45 percent of a union’s members typically oppose their union’s participation in these activities (Delaney and Masters, 1991). Clark (2000) argued that if union political action programs desire to enlist members’ support for union-endorsed political candidates and union-supported

legislation, they must first convince their members that involvement in politics is a legitimate and important endeavour for the union.

Fields et al's (1987) investigation of the relationship between union commitment and members' support for their national union's political involvement revealed a positive and significant relationship between union commitment and members' political support, suggesting that members' identification with the union influences their views about the propriety of the national's political involvement. This study also found the same relationship between the members' perception of his or her local union instrumentality (influence on economic and non-economic issues in the workplace) and support for union involvement in politics. Finally, the research found that female members are more supportive of union political involvement than are male members. Numerous studies have shown that a majority of union members vote for union-endorsed candidates. One such study suggests that on average, American union members vote for endorsed candidates a rate 15 to 20 percentage points higher than non-members (Delaney et al, 1990). This is balanced, however, by the fact that a significant number of members ignore their union's endorsement, sometimes providing the margin of victory for candidates opposed by labour (Clark, 2000).

### ***Union Characteristics and Perceptions***

Several studies suggest that union commitment is closely related to union leadership characteristics, attitudes towards the unions (general and specific attitudes) and early union socialisation experiences. These are discussed below.

### Union leadership styles

Studies have shown an association between participative styles of leadership and increased membership involvement and participation (Gallagher and Clark, 1989). Morishima (1995), using a single item measure of allowing members to have influence on how the union is run, found it to predict union loyalty significantly among Japanese white-collar and technical workers. Similarly, Magenau et al, (1988) found that member' perceived degree of influence in union decisions was the most significant predictor of union commitment for both union activists and rank and file members. Sverke and Sjoberg (1994), in a study of Swedish public-sector white-collar workers, found that the perceived responsiveness of local union leaders was a positive predictor of union commitment.

In another study, responsibility to the union and participation in union activities were predicted by member perceptions of shop stewards' leadership qualities (Kelloway and Barling, 1993). It has been argued that participatory leaders can build upon surges of membership interest and participation to increase the strength of workplace unionism (Darlington, 1994; Fairbrother, 1989; Fosh, 1993). A participatory style stresses the importance of communications, consultations and the involvement of members in decision-making.

Members' participation in union activities has been found to vary with union leaders' interpersonal skills and with their accessibility to members (Nicholson et al, 1980). Fosh (1993) similarly identified how the changing patterns of swells and depressions in membership participation were influenced by leadership style. The style and character of leadership exerts a critical influence on how the union organization is

responsive to general membership aspirations and the way in which collective awareness and the activism of the mass of workers is stimulated (Hyman, 1979). Much research on leadership has been given over to the development of typologies attempting to categorise leadership behaviour. Perhaps the best known of the typologies is that of Batstone et al (1977). Batstone et al (1977) identified two union leadership styles. The first the 'delegate' has the mandate by members to do no more than carry out their wishes. By contrast the second style the 'representative' adopts a leadership role, and takes personal initiatives as well as executing policies according to the wishes of their membership. On two dimensions of power – the initiation and control of issues in procedural terms, and the maintenance of an ideology and set of institutions – it was the representative leaders that were demonstrably more effective.

Glick et al (1972) identified a link between leadership style and the quality of union-management relations and found that the latter was an important influence on membership satisfaction with their union. Their evidence raises questions about the nature of the engagement between unions and management in the workplace and the way in which the union leader manages this relationship. There is much debate on whether or not unions should emphasise the shared interests that exist between them and management rather than stressing adversarialism (Bacon and Story, 1996; Kelly, 1996). Green et al (2000) argue that the terms of any cooperation with management at the workplace need to be carefully formulated if the support of members is to be maintained. Many writers agree that the employment relationship involves a dialectic of conflict and co-operation.

Attitudes towards supervisor behaviour have been suggested as an antecedent of commitment to both organisation and union. There is a great deal of research evidence confirming the positive impact on organisational commitment of participative management styles, good communication and supportive supervisor behaviour (Mathieu and Zajac, 1990; Meyer and Allen, 1997). ‘Supervisor support’, reflecting the extent to which the supervisor is perceived as acting fairly, allowing participation and acting in the best interests of staff was included in the study by Magenau et al (1988). Results showed no significant impact on organisational commitment but a negative impact on union commitment for union stewards only (i.e. not for rank and file members) in one of the two years studied. Bemmels (1995) found a positive relationship between the extent to which the supervisor displays ‘consideration’ towards employees and organisational commitment and a negative relationship with union commitment. The reverse was found in the case of the extent of the supervisors’ concern for ‘structure’. Overall, it seems that a positive view of the relationship with the supervisor may favour commitment to the organisation but may undermine commitment to the union in some cases.

Recent research has suggested that there are two general styles of leadership in organisations. Transactional leadership is the traditional approach of most leaders. This form of leadership motivates people by exchanging rewards for services rendered. A transactional leader identifies roles organisational members must play to achieve the organisation’s objectives. At the same time, these leaders discern what the members need from the organisation and communicate to them how the organisation will fulfil those needs in exchange for the members performing the necessary roles (Bass, 1990).

A second style of leadership that has received a significant amount of attention is transformational or charismatic leadership. Transformational leaders focus their efforts on communicating group goals to the organisation's members and endeavour to convince members to put those goals above their own (Wagner and Hollenbeck, 1998). These leaders work to transform the organisational culture, challenging members to do more than has been asked of them. Evidence suggests that this approach can generate more membership involvement than transactional leadership (Bass, 1998). Several studies have found that transformational leadership is associated with higher levels of member satisfaction with and commitment to an organisation than are other leadership approaches.

A transformational leadership style is also associated with higher levels of member participation and performance (Bass and Avolio, 1994; Shamir et al, 1993). Some of these studies have looked at union officer and steward leadership styles and have concluded that transformational leadership has a positive effect on union members' "loyalty, sense of responsibility and actual participation in union activities" (Kelloway and Barling, 1993, p.263). In addition, work on transformational leadership has found that leaders can be taught to practise this style of leadership (Bass, 1998). This suggests that transformational leaders are not simply "born", but rather can be developed.

Transformational leadership is applicable at all levels of leadership, be it national and local levels (Bass and Avolio, 1990). Several studies have examined the extent to which union stewards can be taught to use the transformational leadership approach

and the impact this approach has on members' participation. In one such study some of the stewards in a local union of Canadian public employees were given a one-day training session on transformational leadership while others were not. Those who received the training were also given periodic follow-up sessions to ensure that they were practising effective transformational leadership (Kelloway and Barling, 1996; Kelloway, Barling and Cantano, 1996). After several months, members in the units with stewards who were practising transformational leadership showed significantly greater satisfaction with their local union. Those in units led by stewards who had not received training showed no increase in membership satisfaction.

Additional research at the local union level has also found links between transformational leadership, as practised by stewards, and increased membership commitment and participation (Kelloway and Barling, 1993). These findings are significant because they demonstrate the effectiveness of transformational leadership in a union context. The research shows that local union leaders can with appropriate training, learn to practise the transformational style of leadership. It also shows that transformational leadership is more effective at shaping members' attitudes toward the union and increasing members' participation in the organisation than the more common transactional approach.

#### Union Attitudes: general and specific attitudes

The focus of research on union attitudes seems to be based on a premise of behavioural science that individuals are not born with their attitudes and beliefs in place, but are rather, in large part, the product of experiences to which people are exposed and information they receive from a variety of sources. This suggests that a

person's attitudes about unions can be influenced either directly or indirectly by a union or by individual union activists (Clark, 2000). A distinction is made between general attitudes and specific attitudes towards unions. General attitudes towards union include how individuals view the institution of organised labour, its goals, achievements, and leadership, in the abstract (Youngblood et al, 1984; Kochan et al, 1986). A 1989 study found that these general attitudes about unions tend to centre around two issues – “the big labour image” and “union instrumentality” (Clark, 2000).

The image of unions as ‘big labour’ involves the extent to which people view unions and union leaders as self-interested, opposed to change, autocratic, overly focused on politics and “blue collar” in orientation. In contrast, general “union instrumentality” reflects people’s evaluations of the labour movement’s ability to deliver or to give members their money’s worth for the dues they pay. This might involve the degree to which unions are able to win higher wages, better working conditions or favourable legislation (Clark, 2000).

Both dimensions of general attitudes towards unions were reflected in some surveys which indicated that approximately 69 percent of the overall workforce thinks employees are more successful in getting problems resolved with their employers when they bring these problems up as a group rather than as individuals. Yet less than 43 percent say they would definitely or probably vote for a union if given the chance (Clark, 2000 p. 24). Behavioural research suggests that general beliefs often have deep roots and that once in place, they are not easily changed. Research also suggests that these beliefs are very important and play a key role in shaping related

attitudes throughout a person's life (Zimbardo and Ebbesen, 1970; Youngblood et al, 1984).

Attitudes about specific unions focus on how an individual views the specific union that represents, or is attempting to represent them. Research on unionism has suggested that specific union beliefs can be grouped into three important dimensions – “instrumentality”, “union satisfaction” and “perceived union support”. Specific union instrumentality refers to the extent to which individuals feel that a given union is able to win tangible gains on behalf of its members (Deshpande and Fiorito, 1989).

Research has found beliefs about the union's instrumentality to be a strong predictor of both attitudes of commitment to the union and behavioural participation in union activities (Fullgar and Barling, 1989; Kelloway et al, 1990; Bamberger et al, 1999; Fuller and Hester, 1993; Sverke and Sjoberg, 1994). For instance, Bamberger et al (1999), identified union instrumentality as a key antecedent of union commitment, their results also suggesting that instrumentality plays a key role in building pro-union beliefs.

Although specific union satisfaction shares some similarities with instrumentality, it also represents a members' feelings concerning the representation that a member receives from the union in his or her workplace. The research suggests that member satisfaction is not simply a matter of unions delivering tangible gains at the bargaining table but also involves the extent to which the union's leadership keeps members informed, gives them a say in running the union and is responsive to their concerns (Fiorito et al, 1988; Jarley et al, 1990; Iverson and Kuruvilla, 1995; Snape and Chan, 2000).

More recently, research in this area has also suggested that members' specific attitudes towards the union reflect the degree to which they believe that their union leadership values members' contributions and cares about their well-being (Shore et al, 1994). Using data from a survey of a large steelworker local union, two researchers found evidence that a strong positive relationship exists between members' perceptions of union support and their levels of commitment to the union (Fuller and Hester, 1998). A few studies also indicate that specific union beliefs may exert significant influence on the unionisation process of workers in Nigeria (Fashoyin, 1987; Warmington, 1960; Cohen, 1974).

### Early Union Socialisation

Interaction with established union and organisational members is the primary avenue whereby recruits internalise the implicit mores of the organisational or union climate and refine their initial expectations concerning the organisation and their roles (Van Maanen and Schein, 1979). Early socialisation experiences have been found to be consistently and positively correlated with all aspects of commitment to the union. Positive socialisation experiences in the first year (e.g. the extent to which the new member is supported, encouraged or ignored; whether the goals of the union were clearly set out) were positively correlated with all four dimensions of union commitment (Gordon et al, 1980).

Building on the general research on socialisation and on the 1980 union study, a larger, national study of early socialisation experiences in a union setting was conducted in the early 1990s (Clark et al, 1993). In this study, members who had

joined the union during the past four months were surveyed in an effort to gather information about their early formal and informal socialisation experiences. Information was also gathered about their levels of commitment to the union. Among this group of new members, formal socialisation experiences were defined as organised orientation programmes conducted by union officials and designed to introduce the new members to the union. Informal socialisation experiences included contacts or experiences with more senior members of the union that were not organised by the union but provided information to the new members about the organisation, its values, goals and customs as well as its expectations of the membership.

The results of the study indicated that simply having a formal socialisation experience (an organised new member orientation program in this case) by itself did not lead to higher commitment on the part of the new member. Rather, it was the quality of the formal socialisation experience that shaped the commitment level. Specifically, the study indicated that the range and amount of information presented both verbally and in written form, had an influence on members' commitment. Another aspect of this finding was that formal and informal socialisation experiences each made an independent contribution to membership commitment.

In other words, formal orientation sessions and subsequent informal socialisation experiences each had a separate and unique impact on the members' commitment to the union. This suggests that the union can have the maximum effect on commitment by providing both positive formal and informal socialisation experiences (Clark et al, 1993). One study showed that new members with negative attitudes towards the

union frequently were the same members who complained that they rarely saw their union steward or representative. One such new member suggested that his attitudes toward the union had been greatly influenced by the fact that it was six months before he found out who the union steward was in his part of the plant (Clark and Gallagher, 1992). Research has suggested that a union members' perception of the steward has a significant influence on their perception of the union (Barling et al, 1992).

It has also been found that exposure to unions well before an individual becomes a part of a bargaining unit can have a significant effect on attitudes toward unions. This study found that children who are made aware of their parents' activism and involvement in unionism are far more likely to feel positive about unions than children who had no such exposure (Clark, 2000 p. 64). Two other studies provide indirect support for the link between union socialisation and union commitment. Fukami and Larson (1984) found that a variable they called "social involvement" predicted union loyalty. All four items that made up this social involvement scale focussed on the extent to which respondents interacted with fellow workers and hence union members. Through such interactions, some socialisation may have occurred (Van Maanen and Schein, 1979).

### ***Work Experiences***

Previous research has identified a relationship between various features of the job and organisational commitment (Mathieu and Zajac, 1990), the argument being that jobs richer in autonomy, variety, scope and challenge (Hackman and Oldham, 1980) are likely to lead to a more fulfilling experience of work and stronger commitment.

Research on union commitment has often failed to find such a positive relationship

(Deery et. Al, 1994; Fukami and Larson, 1984; Sverke and Sjoberg, 1994), although Sherer and Morishima (1989) did find a positive relationship between 'job influence' and union commitment.

### Job dissatisfaction

Some studies found that job satisfaction is positively related to union commitment (Gordon et al, 1980) whilst others still find a negative relationship (Fullager and Barling 1989). Some found it to be a significant predictor of organisational commitment but not of union commitment (Deery et al, 1994; Magenau et al, 1988). Fullager and Hester (1998) found that the relationship between job satisfaction and union commitment is moderated by perceived industrial climate, with more adversarial climate being associated with a significantly negative correlation and vice versa.

A possible explanation for this is that, in adversarial climates, job satisfaction may imply a relative lack of employee grievances and so fail to generate support for the union (whilst dissatisfied workers turn to the union). In a more positive climate, job satisfaction may be credited to the achievements of the union and thus help build union commitment (and some dissatisfied workers may see the union as ineffective). In a study Gordon et al (1980) found that white-collar workers who were dissatisfied with extrinsic aspects of their jobs were more willing to be actively involved in the union. Similarly, belief in the philosophy of organised labour was stronger among those workers who felt that their extrinsic needs were not being satisfied. Satisfaction of intrinsic needs was not associated with either beliefs in organised labour or willingness to work for the union.

Gordon et al (1984) found that although union loyalty was significantly associated with extrinsic and intrinsic satisfaction in a sample of technicians, a similar association was not found among engineers. Similarly, while job dissatisfaction and union commitment were significantly associated in the United States and South Africa, this was not necessarily the case in Canada (Barling, Wade and Fullagar, 1990).

This seems to suggest that the relationship between union commitment and extrinsic / intrinsic job satisfaction is not moderated by a simple blue-collar vs. white collar distinction. Several factors, such as the nature of the membership and the type of union under investigation, appear to influence this relationship.

Barling et al (1990) found that while overall work satisfaction predicted company commitment, it did not predict union loyalty, and suggested that situational factors may account for this. The community college teachers they studied had recently been on strike and were legislated back to work. Yet the measure of global dissatisfaction used in that study did not include the specific dissatisfactions the union members had been experiencing, namely their weekly teaching load. In addition, the source of the dissatisfaction was probably viewed as being the board of Regents, rather than work per se or direct supervision.

In the study by Kelloway et al (1990), intrinsic and extrinsic dissatisfaction exerted somewhat different effects on the four dimensions of union commitment. Intrinsic job dissatisfaction exerted a direct influence on union loyalty, willingness to work for the union, and belief in unionism. Extrinsic job dissatisfaction exerted no direct effects, but did influence these same three commitment dimensions indirectly through

its effects on the perceived instrumentality of the union in resolving union members' dissatisfaction. As a result, these studies emphasise factors that must be taken into account in understanding the relationship between job dissatisfaction and union commitment. Barling, Wade and Fullagar's (1990) findings suggest that the nature of the dissatisfaction must be considered. In addition, the likelihood that dissatisfaction exerts indirect effects on union commitment is also raised (Kelloway et al, 1990).

A 1980 study looked at why workers become interested in union representation. To shed light on that issue, the study used the data from an earlier study in which employees who had been involved in a union election were interviewed at two points in time. The first interview was conducted immediately after the election was announced; the second interview took place following the election. The 1239 randomly selected employees interviewed in the study were drawn from a wide variety of sectors and geographic locations and represented different unions and different bargaining unit sizes. The study found that initial interest in voting for a union was stimulated by job dissatisfaction. Specifically, the study found that it was dissatisfaction with working conditions rather than the nature of the work itself that led to an interest in unionisation. A second analysis of the data in this study showed that a second factor, perceived job insecurity, also causes workers to vote in favour of union representation (Brett, 1980).

#### Promotion and alternative job opportunities

Better promotion opportunities may contribute to greater organisational commitment (Magenau et al, 1988). But they might conceivably undermine union commitment to

the extent that promotion offers an alternative route to improved pay and conditions in contrast to the collectivist approach offered by the union.

### Pay equity

Although pay equity is unrelated to union commitment (Fukami and Larson, 1984), differential relationships may exist between perceived pay equity and union commitment across varying levels of occupational status and differing types of jobs. For example, perceived inequity in wages is positively and significantly related to the willingness to unionise among blue-collar workers (Kochan, 1979). In the same vein, dissatisfaction with wages is significantly related to support of the union (Kochan, 1979). Thus it could be that the relationship between perceived equity and union commitment may not only differ among different types of workers but that the effects of objective wage levels and subjective perceptions of pay are also different (Barling, 1990).

### Job Alienation

Fullagar and Barling (1987) suggested that workers might be more predisposed to become committed to labour organisations if they were in alienating work situations which provide the worker with no power or control. This lack of power or control may arise due to the place of work being controlled and mechanised or broken down to simplify the work process. Other reasons may be because the place of work does not provide sufficient information for the worker to plan and predict his or her work environment, does not have the potential to satisfy their social needs and does not offer the worker the opportunity to self-actualise. The effects of both job dissatisfaction and alienation, however are arguably moderated by perceptions of the

union's instrumentality in improving conditions of work where the organisation has been unresponsive ( DeCotiis and LeLouarn, 1981; Kochan, 1980).

Studies showing a relationship between job involvement and union attitudes or commitment have been conducted in India (Pestonjee et al, 1981) and South Africa (Fullager and Barling, 1989). In empirically investigating the relationship between job involvement / alienation and unionisation, Pestonjee et al (1981) found a significant negative correlation between job involvement and attitudes towards unions ( $r = -0.58$ ) in a sample of 200 blue-collar textile workers in Northern India.

In a sample of blue-collar workers in South Africa, Fullagar and Barling (1989) found that the relationship between job involvement and union loyalty was moderated by race (reflecting different levels of occupational). Affluent, white union members who were loyal to the union manifested higher levels of job involvement than black workers, for whom job alienation predicted loyalty to the union. Barling et al (1990) and Kelloway et al (1990) however, found no relationship between job involvement and union commitment and the former attributed this to situational factors. Where the relationship between management and labour is poor, job involvement would attain less importance than current behavioural concerns as a predictor of union loyalty. Furthermore, job involvement would be less important as a predictor of union loyalty among workers of lower occupational status who are more alienated from decision-making processes. A further situational explanation of findings from these studies resides in the national context in which these studies were conducted. However, no relationship emerges between job involvement and union commitment among Canadian samples (Barling et al, 1990; Kelloway et al, 1990)

### Life dissatisfaction

It has been argued that market context and socio-political variables are capable of affecting commitment to labour organisations (Adams and Krislov, 1974; Roomkin and Juris, 1978). Since rates of inflation, unemployment, consumer price index, etc. have the capability of influencing the ability of workers to afford decent feeding, accommodation, health care and education for themselves or / and their family, there could be a relationship between satisfaction with various life and union commitment levels.

**Table 2.1 Inflation Rate 1995 – 2001 in % (September figures)**

1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001
78.5	37.4	11.6	8.2	9.8	6.5	18.4

Source: Federal Office of Statistics

The Labour Force survey in Nigeria indicated that overall unemployment rate amounted to 18.1% in December 2000, rising from 3.6 percent in 1999<sup>1</sup>. Also, between December 2000 and December 2001, average consumer price level rose by 16.5 percent; in many centres, prices of household goods, clothing, and transport fares rose<sup>2</sup>. Since late 2000, inflation rose sharply in the country, reaching 18.4% in September 2001. The single digit inflation rate attained in Nigeria between 1998 and 2000 was attributed largely to favourable agricultural harvests and the pursuit of less expansionary fiscal monetary policies<sup>3</sup>. An EIU Country Report<sup>4</sup> on Nigeria states that it will be difficult to bring inflation back into single digits because of the increase

<sup>1</sup> Federal office of Statistics, 16<sup>th</sup> November 2001.

<sup>2</sup> Federal office of Statistics, 31<sup>st</sup> January 2002.

<sup>3</sup> CBN Annual Report and Statement of Accounts for the year ended 31<sup>st</sup> December 2000.

<sup>4</sup> The Economic Intelligence Unit Limited 2002.

in domestic fuel prices in early 2002 and the lack of serious efforts to curtail government expenditure.

### ***Structural Characteristics***

A number of structural characteristics have been identified as being associated with commitment to organisations. These include size, span of control, the extent of formalisation, functional dependence and decentralisation of the organisation (Steers, 1977; Stevens et al, 1978). Certain structural characteristics of the union are argued as capable of affecting the extent of union democracy and participation. These include not only such factors as size and span of control, but also degree of open admission policy, extent of decentralisation of collective bargaining and rank and file accessibility to political participation.

Gallagher and Wetzel (1990) suggested that the perceived voluntariness of association could affect union commitment. Because the four unions they studied all had a union shop agreement, they could not address their hypothesis directly, so they focussed on the perceived voluntariness of association, asking individuals whether they would have joined on their own volition. Workers who reported being in the union involuntarily reported less loyalty, willingness to work for the union or responsibility to the union. Even though Gallagher and Wetzel could not contrast the commitment of members operating in open vs. closed or union shops directly and problems of retrospective recall might have clouded employees' recollections, the conceptual and practical significance of this issue suggests that it certainly is an area warranting further investigation.

### ***Industrial Relations Climate / Environmental Characteristics***

The state of relations between management and the union has been identified as an antecedent of both organisational and union commitment (Magenau et al, 1988).

Generally, the expectation is that favourable perceptions of the relationship will be reflected in stronger commitment to both due to cognitive consistency between the role of employee and union members in workplaces with more co-operative union-management relations.

Angle and Perry (1986) and Magenau et al. (1988) found some empirical support for this claim in North America, as did Deery and Iverson (1998) in their sample drawn from the Australian financial services industry. Interestingly, in their sample of Australian public-sector workers, Deery et al (1994) found that industrial relations climate was positively related to organisational commitment but negatively linked with union commitment, suggesting that the findings on dual loyalty may need to be tested more widely.

Market context and social-political variables are also argued as capable of affecting commitment to labour organisations. Economic recessions are said to produce labour unrest because of retrenchments and a climate that facilitates exploitation of labour market conditions. Consequently, a swing in favour of unionisation may occur (Adams and Krislov, 1974). Unions thrive during periods of low unemployment or rapid employment growth ( Roomkin and Juris, 1978). Although these trends have not been supported unequivocally ( Fiorito, 1982; Sheflin et al, 1981), they do suggest the probable role of labour market influences on union commitment.

## 2.2 Dual commitment

Researchers have long shown an interest in whether or not it is possible for employees to be highly committed to both their union and their employer at the same time, a phenomenon known as 'dual allegiance', dual loyalty or 'dual commitment' (Angle and Perry, 1986; Stagner 1954). Magenau et al. (1988) provide three possibilities. First, employees may perceive the work situation as an integral whole, with organisation and union as aspects of this whole rather than as distinct entities (Stagner, 1954).

Those who perceive their overall work situation favourably will then display dual commitment. Several studies have tested for this by examining the distinctiveness of the organisational and union commitment constructs, usually by conducting a factor analysis of the pooled commitment items (Sherer and Morishima, 1989; Sverke and Sjoberg, 1994). The finding that organisational and union commitment are distinct constructs with different antecedents contradicts this notion and suggests that there are two distinct attitudes in organisational and union commitment.

Secondly, 'cognitive consistency theory' suggests that when relations between management and union are perceived to be positive, employees will find it possible to commit to both organisations and union, but that these commitments become inconsistent where relations between the two are perceived as being directly antagonistic. The findings of a relationship between positive industrial relations and both forms of commitment lend some support to this view (Angle and Perry, 1986).

Thirdly, exchange theory suggests that commitment to organisation and union are largely independent, perhaps with distinct antecedents and are determined by the extent to which individuals perceive a beneficial exchange with each. The findings that organisational commitment is influenced by favourable perceptions of the job, and union commitment by a favourable evaluation of the union's performance support such a view (Magenau et al, 1988). This suggests that organisation and union are not necessarily competing for employee commitment, since it may be feasible to have rewarding exchange relationship with both.

Some studies have suggested that organisational commitment is a positive predictor of union commitment (Bamberger et al, 1999; Iverson and Kuruvilla, 1995). This is consistent with a dual loyalty view of the relationship between organisational and union commitment and again suggests that union commitment is not an expression of negative attitudes towards the organisation. However, while the majority of studies do provide evidence of dual loyalty, some studies have found a negative correlation between organisational and union commitment (Fullager and Hester, 1998; Reed et al, 1994; Deery et al, 1994; Guest and Peccei, 1993).

This inconsistency may reflect differences in the institutional and industrial relations contexts of the various samples. It may be, for example that in organisations with a history of adversarial industrial relations and calculative, low trust union-management relationships, employees will express loyalty either to organisation or to union and interpret these as conflicting loyalties, in line with cognitive consistency theory. Reed et al, (1994) find some support for this at the country level, with Japanese studies showing a stronger correlation between organisational and union commitment than

that shown in Western studies, perhaps reflecting what has been a less adversarial industrial relations climate in Japan.

The experiences with the job and employer could be summarized with variables like organizational commitment, job satisfaction (both intrinsic and extrinsic), and attitudes towards the supervisor. The labor relations climate is indicated by variables such as the perceptions of the employee about the quality of labor-management relations and the employee's attitudes towards the grievance procedure. The union experiences that affect an employee's union commitment include socialization processes, knowledge of the contract, perceptions of the union steward, and previous union affiliations.

Previous empirical analyses indicate support for the concept of dual commitment. Job satisfaction was found to be positively related to company commitment and extrinsic job satisfaction indicated a definite positive relationship with union commitment (Gordon et al, 1984) but the relationship between intrinsic job satisfaction and union commitment was ambiguous. Empirical support exists for the view that an employee with a poor relationship with a supervisor may perceive the union as a protector and hence display higher union commitment levels (Martin et al, 1982).

A positive relationship has been found between the perceived quality of labor-management relations and union commitment levels, lending further support to the concept of dual commitment (Fukami and Larson, 1984; Angle and Perry, 1986). Further, it was found that when employees view participation programs as improving labor-management relations, their union commitment levels increase. Satisfaction

with the existing grievance procedure was found to have a positive relationship with union commitment (Clark et al, 1988). Irrespective of whether unidimensional (Fukami and Larson, 1984) or multidimensional (Gordon et al, 1980) measures of commitment were employed, socialization experiences played a significant role in determining commitment levels. This relationship is consistent with the theory in organizational entry. Knowledge of the contract also had a positive impact on commitment levels (Clark et al, 1989; Martin et al, 1982).

### **2.3 Consequence of Union Commitment: Union Participation**

The literature on the consequences of union commitment has focused primarily on members' participation in union activities. In this section, the survey-based research is reviewed along with some quantitative studies of the factors influencing union participation. Commitment to the union has been identified as a key antecedent of the willingness to participate actively in the union (e.g. Bamberger et al, 1999; Fullager and Barling, 1989; Fuller and Hester, 1998). Broadly speaking, the literature suggests that commitment to the union precedes participation, since commitment is essential in providing the necessary motivation to participate (Bamberger et al, 1999; Fullager and Barling, 1989; Gallagher and Clark, 1989).

Participation includes formal activities such as attending union meetings, voting in elections and holding union office, and also informal activities such as discussing union issues with colleagues, reading union literature and helping in union campaigns (Kelloway et al, 1995). Participation encourages majority rule at union meetings, acts as a check on oligarchic tendencies within the union leadership and provides the means of informing union leaders about membership needs (Anderson, 1978).

Some forms of participation, for example, attending meetings or discussing with colleagues, require little effort or initiative whereas others, for example standing for union office, require a great deal of sustained effort and individual initiative. This raises the issue of the dimensionality of participation. Thus McShane (1986) identifies three dimensions: 'meeting participation', which involves attending union meeting, 'voting participation', consisting of voting in union elections, and 'administrative participation', which involves holding office or sitting on a union committee.

Furthermore, each of these dimensions was found to have different antecedents. Kelly and Kelly (1994), using a different measure, find a two-factor structure, one based on routine rank and file forms of participation and the other on more demanding 'activist' behaviours. Others however, find some limited support for a unidimensional approach (Kuruvilla et al, 1990) and Kelloway and Barling (1993) argue for a sequential approach, with participation moving cumulatively from relatively easy to more demanding forms.

Some studies examine actual behaviour, for example with members responding to questions on their frequency of participation in various union activities over the previous 12 months (Kelloway and Barling, 1993), resulting in a backward-looking measure of participation. As an alternative, many have looked at respondents' intention to participate say over the coming year (Kelly and Kelly, 1994). This produces a measure of behavioural intent and is forward-looking, which is arguably a more meaningful dependent variable in a cross-sectional study; moreover, it may

reflect opportunity rather than inclination to participate, whereas a behavioural intent measure may focus on willingness alone.

Klandermans used a basic rational choice theory – expectancy-value theory – to develop a model of union activity. According to this approach, union participation is a function of the material, social and goal-related costs and benefits of participation and the perceived value of the outcomes of participation (Klandermans, 1984, 1986).

When the benefits of union activity are perceived as high, and the costs low, then willingness to participate will be high. Klandermans's findings support research that has used similar rational choice theories to predict union-certification voting behaviour (Montgomery, 1989; Zalesny, 1985).

Expectancy-value theory, therefore with its emphasis on cognitive factors, has considerable utility in explaining not only why individuals vote for unions, offer loyalty to their bargaining units, and actively participate in them, but also why they choose to decertify them. Expectancy theory also has considerable flexibility in that it accounts for differing perceptions and expectations across different types of membership, union and situation. Consequently, union membership is seen as varying over time and situations rather than being a stable phenomenon.

In a longitudinal study investigating the antecedents and consequences of union loyalty, Fullagar and Barling (1989) showed that perceived union instrumentality influences union participation in several ways. First, perceived union instrumentality affects union participation directly. Second, perceived union instrumentality acts as a moderator of the effect of union loyalty on union participation. Thus individuals who

are loyal to the union and perceive the union as being instrumental in attaining valued outcomes are more likely to participate in formal union activities (such as attending meetings, holding a union office, grievance filing) than their counterparts who do not see the union as being instrumental in this respect. Third, perceived union instrumentality influences union participation indirectly by affecting union commitment, which in turns leads to union participation. Thus more specific attitudes toward the local union have been found to be important predictors of participation (Anderson, 1979; Kuruvilla et al, 1990).

***Fishbein and Ajzen (1975)'s Theory of Reasoned Action.***

Several studies have used Fishbein and Ajzen's (1975) theory of reasoned action in examining the relationship between union commitment and participation (Kelloway and Barling, 1993; Sverke and Kuruvilla, 1995; Sverke and Sjoberg, 1995). This approach sees attitudes and subjective norms as predicting behavioural intentions, which in turn predict actual behaviour. Attitudes have been measured in terms of both affective and instrumental commitment.

Thus Kelloway and Barling (1993) include union loyalty with the perceived instrumentality of union, while Sverke and Sjoberg (1995) and Sverke and Kuruvilla (1995) use their instrument and affective commitment dimensions. Subjective norms reflect the extent to which significant others such as family, friends and co-workers express support for union participation, and have usually been measured as the product of the perceived normative beliefs of others and the individual's motivation to comply with such beliefs (Kelloway and Barling, 1993; Sverke and Kuruvilla, 1995; Sverke and Sjoberg, 1995).

Behavioural intentions have been measured as the willingness to work for the union (Kelloway and Barling, 1993), as the declared likelihood of continued membership and active participation in the future (Sverke and Kuruvilla, 1995; Sverke and Sjoberg, 1995), or as voting intentions in union representation elections (Montgomery, 1989). Actual membership, participation and voting behaviour have been measured as backward-looking self-reports. In some studies, this has been measured at the same time as the other variables (e.g. Kelloway and Barling, 1993; Sverke and Kuruvilla, 1995), but in line with the wider research on the theory of reasoned action, it seems more appropriate to measure actual behaviour in subsequent time period to the attitudinal variables which are hypothesised to predict it (e.g. Sverke and Sjoberg, 1995). The findings of these studies provide considerable support for the theory of reasoned action. In general, union commitment emerges as a predictor of the intention to participate, which in turn predicts actual participation (Kelloway and Barling, 1993; Sverke and Kuruvilla, 1995; Sverke and Sjoberg, 995).

Some results suggest that subjective norms directly predict the intention to participate (Kelloway and Barling, 1993, their first of two samples). However, Sverke and Sjoberg (1995) find no such significant relationship. This may reflect the fact that their measure of subjective norms was too general, relating to significant others desiring the individual to be a union member rather specifically to participate in union activities (Sverke and Sjoberg, 1995), although Kelloway and Barling (1993) also find no significant direct relationship between subjective norms and behavioural intention in their second sample, using a more specific participation-focussed measure. Thus the role of subjective norms as a direct predictor of the intention to participate

warrants further research. One possibility is that it may have an indirect impact on behavioural intentions, mediated by union commitment (Kelloway and Barling, 1993).

The theory of reasoned action assumes that the behaviour in question is volitional, so that behavioural intentions provide a sufficient explanation of actual behaviour. In fact, many types of behaviour are not necessarily under volitional control, but are also affected by such factors as personal skills and abilities and by the availability of sufficient time or opportunity. This is explicitly recognised in Ajzen's revision to the theory of reasoned action, known as 'the theory of planned behaviour' (Ajzen, 1991). This includes an additional predictor of behavioural intentions and of actual behaviour, 'perceived behavioural control', defined as the degree to which the individual's ability to perform in question is perceived by the individual to be volitional.

#### ***Newton and Shore's (1992) Typological Analysis***

Newton and Shore (1992) proposed a model of union commitment based on an ideological or value-based commitment on the one hand and instrumental commitment on the other, with commitment ranging from positive to negative attitudes on each. They developed a typology of membership attachment in terms of two dimensions, with positive commitment on both dimensions labelled as 'union attachment' and negative attitudes on both as 'union opposition'. They suggest that those with positive attitudes toward the union on one dimension and negative on the other are in a position of cognitive dissonance and would tend to adjust their attitudes into a consistently positive or negative set of attitudes in order to avoid the tension of dissonance.


Newton and Shore (1992) suggested that those in the union attachment group can be further categorised on the basis of their degree of positive attitude on the two dimensions. 'Identifiers', with highly positive attitudes on both dimensions are expected to show very high levels of union support and activity, while 'positive free agents' with low levels of commitment on both dimensions are likely to show levels of attachment to and participation in the union. Those with high levels of value-based commitment alone, the 'identifiers', are expected to show quite high levels of support and to be active in the union, while the 'instrumentals' whose commitment is largely instrumental, are likely to participate in the union in a calculative way and so mainly in activities which have a clear expected pay-off (e.g. participation in strike action) and which involve the expenditure of limited personal time or resources.

Apparently, there is broad support for these hypotheses about the four groups in the union attachment quadrant. Heshizer and Lund (1997) find that members with high levels of value-based commitment were more willing to participate in those types of union activities which involve personal sacrifice and time than were those whose commitment was mainly instrumental. Sverke and Sjoberg (1995) find that the four groups differ in terms of their intention to participate in union activities, with value-based commitment being associated with higher levels of participation and intention to remain in membership.

## 2.4 Sector and Union Commitment

At this juncture, it is pertinent to investigate whether there is any significant difference in the union commitment levels of private and public sector union members. So far, from the studies reviewed above, certain predictors of union commitment have become apparent. The relevance of sector at this point can be argued using the union commitment model (fig. 2.1). The first question relates to the *predominance* of relevant predictors within each sector. For example, to what extent are the effects of the factors associated with union attitudes (e.g. instrumentality perception) greater in the private sector unions as against the public sector unions? Assuming there are significant differences in the pervasiveness of predictors across sector, then one could argue that a significant difference in the union commitment of the members might also result.

**Fig. 2.1 Sector, Antecedent Factors and Union Commitment**



The next pertinent question to ask is this: is there evidence in the literature which suggest the likely existence of significant differences in the level of occurrence of significant predictors within the two sectors? Apparently, there are. Some of these can be explained against the backdrop of observed differences in terms of union

efficiency, organisation, union structure and membership growth / decline (Marki and Ignace, 1990; Troy, 1989; Moore and Raisian, 1987; Reid et al, 1990; McDonald, 1992; Leo, 2001; Hanson, 1998; Bennet, 1991; Gunderson, 1986; Yesufu, 1962; Anaba, 1969; Fashoyin, 1980).

It has been argued that the efficiency of a union is capable of influencing the union instrumentality perception of its members (Clarke, 2000). Union efficiency may be assessed in specific areas such as wage levels, working conditions or in a broad sense of the union fighting for workers' welfare. Marki and Ignace's (1990) study based on a sample of 4,093 individuals highlight the relative impact of trade unions in the two sectors. They studied whether trade unions affected the earnings gap between male and female workers in Canada. Looking at the public and private sectors separately, results indicated that unions substantially reduced the male-female differential only in the public sector.

Based on this study, one may suggest that public sector unions are probably more efficient in reducing male-female differential in Canada. In this context, it can be argued that union instrumentality perception is probably higher in the public sector and this situation may boost the chance of a higher union commitment for members there. Admittedly, it might not be sufficient to determine the variation in union commitment levels across sector solely on the perceived difference in the influence of only one predictor. This thus makes it imperative for a systematic approach to comparatively examine all relevant predictors within the two sectors. Apart from union instrumentality, variations in the effect of other predictors such as work factors (e.g. job dissatisfaction, career opportunities) might also be relevant. In essence, a

cumulative effect of the variations might be significant enough to result in a substantial difference in union commitment across sectors.

The type of union organisation within each sector is also relevant to union commitment. In a situation whereby union joining in a particular sector is dominated by closed shop agreement as against voluntary joining in the other sector, differences in the levels of union commitment may result. This notion is supported by Gallagher and Wetzel (1990)'s findings which suggested that perceived voluntariness of association could affect union commitment. Steers (1977) and Stevens et al (1978) also found that sector differences in structural characteristics resulted in variations in union commitment. Structural characteristics such as size, span of control, degree of open admission policy, the extent of formalisation, functional dependence and decentralisation of the organisation, extent of decentralisation of collective bargaining and rank and file accessibility to political participation were reportedly all linked with commitment to the union. In Nigeria, these characteristics appear not only to vary based on industrial lines, but also according to sector (Ubeku, 1980).

The fortunes of private and public sector unions in Nigeria have fared somewhat differently especially since the introduction of the trade union ordinance in 1938. Prior to 1938, trade unionism flourished mainly in the public sector due to the opposition of private employers. The ordinance helped to enforce recognition within the private sector and resulted in the unions' numerical growth and an escalation of trade union activity there (Fashoyin, 1980). Ironically, private sector unionism has been acknowledged to be more vibrant even though trade unionism started in the

public sector (Yesufu, 1969; Anaba, 1969; Fashoyin, 1980). Tokunbo (1985) noted a significantly higher level of agitation and strike activity within the private sector.

There is apparently no data on the relationship between union growth or decline and union commitment across sector. All the same, Otobo (1997:52-54) argued that successive military governments engaged in a “systematic destruction of the civil service”. This has given rise to a suggestion that in terms of meeting the expectations of members, public sector unions were relatively weaker. The public servants’ employers - the military - ruled by decrees and their attitude to workers demonstration was usually unorthodox. Strike activity or mass demonstration by workers was often met with detention for union leaders or / and a dissolution of the union’s executive council (Otobo, 1997).

The legacy of military rule is arguably more pronounced in the public sector in terms of how members view their unions’ instrumentality although in a broad sense, military rule impacted upon unions in both sectors (Adewunmi, 1997). Also related to this is the calibre of union leaders within the two sectors. Due to alleged interferences by previous governments in union elections (sponsoring pacifists or candidates with liberal tendencies) some union leaders in the public sector were perceived as compromisers (Akinlaja, 1999). Past studies have suggested that members are less likely to participate in union activities if they think their leaders have been bought over by management (Smock, 1969). Furthermore, the recent tide of privatisation sweeping the nation also raises questions about the future of the public sector unions in the country. The public sector unions arguably have more to do in demonstrating their relevance to their members in the current situation. It

remains to be seen how this situation has affected union commitment within both sectors, but a guess is that commitment is probably less in the public sector. Based on the above arguments, the proposed research will investigate union commitment and participation based on an hypothesis that sector will be a significant moderator in the model.

## Summary

There is a degree of consistency across studies in many of the key findings and the longitudinal studies lend some credence to the assumed causal ordering of variables.

There is also some consistency with the findings of qualitative and case study research – on union participation, for example. At this stage, there is a body of findings around which a consensus appear to be emerging. In summary, the research findings suggest that:

1. Not all demographic factors are consequential in their impact on union commitment. Gender is an influential variable in the union loyalty of members: women have stronger union loyalty than men. although they are less likely to participate actively in the union; there is an inconclusive relationship between age and union commitment.
2. Union attitudes are crucial factors in the unionisation process. Employees' union satisfaction, perception of the instrumentality of the union and perceived union support are important factors influencing their union commitment; union socialisation is also a positive predictor of union commitment. The availability and leadership qualities of union

representatives may be significant in building members' commitment and / or willingness to participate actively in the union.

3. Research on the influence of work-related factors is inconclusive.

Dissatisfaction with various aspects of their jobs may or may not lead to union commitment, depending on the members' background (e.g. nationality).

4. Dual commitment exists amongst members; commitment to the employing organisation is a positive predictor of union commitment but not always; when employees perceive a positive industrial relations climate, they are more likely to commit to both employer and union.

5. There is a positive causal ordering between union commitment and participation in union activities.

One weakness arising from the above research findings relates to the fact that it might not be reasonable to assume that these findings will automatically apply to union members in Nigeria without conducting an empirical investigation (Gallagher and Clark, 1989). The union members' peculiar experiences in terms of their socio-economic, political, geographical and historical background arguably underscore the need for a context-specific approach. For instance, the role of ethnicity appears not to have been sufficiently explored in the western literature. This situation may be due to the predominantly homogeneous nature of western societies.

The Nigerian studies have their shortcomings too, one of which is that none apparently has investigated the subject of union commitment per se. But the studies are nonetheless significant in that from them, deductions may still be drawn concerning the possible predictors of union commitment for Nigerian union members against the backdrop of the factors identified in the western literature. In view of this, the next chapter has been devoted to a detailed and comprehensive review of Nigerian studies with the objective of identifying hypothetical predictors as well as the studies' weaknesses and how they can be improved upon.

## Chapter 3

### Nigeria: Context, Trade Unions and Literature Review

#### Introduction

This chapter describes the socio-economic and political scene in Nigeria from its conception as a nation state, through its colonial era and up till contemporary times. The objective is to assist the reader in appreciating the context within which labour and management relations have evolved and how these institutions have directly or indirectly affected this relationship. The chapter is also concerned with the review of Nigerian studies, which are relevant to the proposed study.

One of Nigeria's most significant and distinctive features is the size of its population. The country represents about 20 percent of the total population of sub-Saharan Africa and is about twice the size of that of the next largest country in Africa, Egypt. The population is estimated to be 123,337,822 (World Fact book, 2001) and the population growth rate is 2.67%. The country has a relatively young population with only 3% aged 65 years and above (table 3.1). Recent projections have proposed that the current population is likely to double before the middle of this century. This means that the country could expect to deal with a population of more than 200 million probably within the next twenty-five years (CIA, 2001). These projections suggest that population growth would be an issue of central concern for Nigeria for some time to come in the sense that agricultural production, industrial and other economic output with provision of health and other social services would need to double within this period. This situation is a challenge of historic proportions for Nigeria with obvious implications for the supply side of the Nigerian labour market and generally for industrial relations.

**Table 3.1. Age Structure according to male and female (CIA, 2001)**

Age structure	Male	Female
0-14 years: 44%	27,181,020	26,872,317)
15-64 years: 53%	33,495,794	32,337,193
65 years and over: 3%	1,729,149	1,722,349

### **3.1 Political History**

Before the arrival of the British colonial government, Nigeria was made up of many nationalities, which were later brought together to constitute the current Nigerian state. The British unification process took the form of consolidating all the nationalities into one state system, which it divided into three regions suspended over two societies. The Northern region is predominantly Arabic with little African culture but almost no European influence. The two southern regions are predominantly African societies with strong European influence (Akinola, 1999).

The country is multi-ethnic with over 250 different ethnic nationalities and languages. However, four ethnic groups together account for over 60% of the country's total population: the Fulanis and Hausas live mainly in the north; the Ibos predominate in the southeast and the Yorubas in the southwest. The Edos, Ibibios, Kanuris, Nupes, Tivs, Chamba, Ekoi and Ijaw are smaller but still important groups. The remaining other groups are quite small in comparison (Uma, 1973). English is the official language but in many Nigerian cities Standard English is spoken side by side with the "pidgin" or a mixture of English and local languages. Nigeria is a secular state although two main religions are widely practised in the country: Christianity and

Islam. Christians are predominantly in the south while a majority of northerners are Muslims.

Islam permeates other institutions in Nigerian society, and has contributed significantly to Nigerian pluralism. A few isolated mission stations and mission bookstores, along with churches serving southern enclaves in the northern cities and larger towns can be found in the north. To adapt fully to northern life, non-Muslims have to remain in an enclave, living quasi-segregated lives in their churches, their social clubs, and even their work. In contrast, becoming a convert to Islam was the doorway to full participation in the society. People from the middle belt (of ethnic minority origin), especially those with ambitions in politics and business, generally adopted Islam. The main exception to this rule was Plateau State, where the capital, Jos, was as much a Christian as a Muslim community, and a greater accommodation between the two sets of beliefs and their adherents generally occurs (Clark and Linden, 1984).

The majority of Christians are found in the south although there are a significant number of Islamic adherents as well. Some families have members (extended) from both faiths although this is not very common. The Yoruba area traditionally has been Protestant and Anglican, whereas Igboland has always been the area of greatest activity by the Roman Catholic Church. Other denominations abound as well. Presbyterians arrived in the early twentieth century in the Ibibio Niger Delta area and had missions in the middle belt as well. There has been a gradual upsurge in the number of churches in the south within the last decade. The presence of two or more churches on a single street is a common sight in the south of the country most

especially in states like Lagos and Edo. Generally speaking, Nigerians are very religious people (Peel, 1968; Panden, 1973; Kastfelt, 1994).

Religious conflicts have been known to occur mainly in the north of the country but are now becoming increasingly common also in the south. Christian-Muslim rivalry was a factor in the build-up to the civil war of 1966, with anti-Igbo pogroms in the North encouraged in part by radio broadcasts reporting alleged anti-Muslim atrocities in the South (Enwerem, 1995). Because religious crises fuel political instability and generate a general climate of insecurity, which can be bad for business, would-be foreign investors are usually careful about investing in the economy.

The British used a system of running the country known as indirect rule in which the country was ruled through local chiefs. This was intended to keep the peace by disturbing ordinary Nigerian life as little as possible but even then local people sometimes rebelled against the appointed leaders. On Oct. 1, 1960, Nigeria gained independence becoming a member of the British Commonwealth of Nations and joining the United Nations. But the British system of colonialism had done nothing to unify Nigeria or prepare it for independence. The historical conflicts between north and south, and other inter-regional fighting, made the idea of a unified republic unworkable (Balewa, 1994).

Organized as a loose federation of self-governing states at independence, the nation faced an overwhelming task of unifying a country with 250 ethnic and linguistic language groups. In 1963, three years after independence, Nigeria became a Federal Republic, which by implication officially brought to an end British influence on the

political, economic and social policies of the country. As a result of a series of political upheavals and fracas, Nigeria experienced serious political instability by the end of 1965. By 1966 the dream of a flourishing democracy was floundering amidst a series of massacres, inter-regional hostilities and, finally, a military coup that installed the first of a series of military governments.

Many political leaders, including the prime minister and the premiers of the western and the Northern regions, were killed during the military take-over. For a few months it seemed things had finally returned to normal but things came to a head in the following July when another military coup took the place of an earlier one.

Subsequent developments precipitated a bloody civil war between 1967 and 1970, amongst which was the attempted secession by the former eastern Region. The war left behind nearly 1,000,000 dead. Shortly before the civil war, the four regions of the country (West, East, North and the Mid-West) had been replaced by a twelve-state structure.

In 1975, a bloodless coup ushered in a new military government. In 1976, the new military government created seven more states thereby making the country a nation of 19 states. The country was eventually returned to civil rule in 1979 after elections were held. An oil boom in the 1970's buoyed the nations' economy and by the 1980's Nigeria was considered an exemplar of African democracy and economic well-being. But the military again seized power in 1984, only to be followed by another military coup the following year. In September 1987, the total number of states increased from 19 to 21 with the addition of two more states. This tally was

subsequently increased to 30 in September 1991 with the creation of nine new states, apparently to ease ethnic tensions prior to the elections.

Serious outcries - both locally and internationally - greeted the cancellation of the results of the presidential election held on June 12, 1993, by the military regime of General Babangida. Intense international pressures and pro-democratic demonstrations eventually made the regime abandon its plans of self perpetuation and to set up an interim national government consisting of appointed civilians. This government was subsequently sacked by another military ruler, Gen. Sanni Abacha, who proceeded to dissolve all organs of state and bodies that had been established under the transitional process, replaced the state governors with military administrators and prohibited political activity. Sanni Abacha died of a heart attack on June 8, 1998, and was succeeded by another military ruler, who also pledged to step aside for an elected leader by May 1999.

In Feb. 1999 free presidential elections were held and led to a victory for Olusegun Obasanjo. But the president acknowledges that his administration faced very daunting tasks one of which is poverty. Surveys conducted by Nigeria's Federal Office of Statistics show that in a 16 year period that began in 1980 (the year the oil boom years of the 1970s began to go bust), the percentage of Nigerians living in poverty rose from 28 percent to 66 percent. Numerically, while 17.7 million people lived in poverty in 1980, the population living on less than US \$1.40 a day rose to 67.1 million by 1996. Within the same period the percentage of the rural poor increased from 29 percent to 70 percent, while the share of the poor in the urban areas rose from 18 to 55 percent.

Those classified as the core poor (the poorest of the poor - living on about US \$0.70 a day), increased from six percent to 29 percent of the population. Equally telling was the geographical distribution of poverty within the country. While the percentage of the poor ranged between 55-60 percent in the south, in the north they ranged between 70-78 percent of the population. "Despite its oil wealth, Nigeria has performed worse, in terms of basic social indicators, than sub-Saharan Africa as a whole and much worse than other regions of the developing world, such as Asia and Latin America," says a Situation Assessment Analysis published in 2001 by Nigeria's National Planning Commission and the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF).

President Olusegun Obasanjo set a goal to reduce the population of Nigerians in poverty by half by 2015. But achieving such a target would require an economic growth rate of 7-8 percent a year for 15 years. In his first three years in office, he has recorded an average growth rate of 2.8 percent yearly<sup>1</sup>. Perhaps, realising that no dent has been made on poverty, Obasanjo's government has developed an Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy. Under this plan, he is seeking the assistance of donors to work on four key areas, identified as youth empowerment, development of rural infrastructure, social welfare services, as well as natural resource development and conservation. Overseen by the National Poverty Eradication Programme, chaired by the president himself, it has set a target of ending absolute poverty in 10 years.

### **3.2 The State and Industrial Relations**

The government has always played an influential role as far as the conduct of industrial relations in the country is concerned. Right from colonial times, the role of

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<sup>1</sup> Source: UN OCHA Integrated Regional Information Network, 11 Jun 2002

the state has tended to be interventionist in labour-management relations. It was alleged that the formation of the first ever trade union in the country in 1912, was apparently at the instigation of the colonial authorities (Yesufu, 1962). Also the colonial masters saw the need to promulgate the first trade union ordinance in 1938 with the objective of regularising and ordering the establishment and activities of trade unions (Cohen, 1974). Essentially, the model of industrial relations, which has evolved in Nigeria, has both elements of voluntarism and elements of state control. In 1955, the Federal Government confirmed its adherence to the voluntary ethic in industrial relations. However, the principle of collective bargaining was not well articulated during this period and there was no established procedure for collective bargaining.

Government's failure to encourage procedures for joint negotiations had two major consequences. First, the situation was exploited by a number of employers. Thus, in spite of the Nigerian Employers Consultative Association (NECA)'s efforts in encouraging the collective bargaining process, many employers refused to recognise the development of unionism in their organisations and this in turn, discouraged the development of collective bargaining as a process of regulating the employment relationship. Secondly, because there were no avenues within the civil service by which unions could pursue their grievances in respect of conditions of service, they resorted to political agitation each time which resulted in the setting up of commissions of inquiry (Ubeku, 1983).

The first major shift in government away from voluntarism in industrial relations occurred in 1968. Nigeria was going through the traumatic experience of civil war.

The military administration promulgated the Trade Disputes (Emergency Provisions) decree 1968. This decree banned strike and lockouts and made arbitration compulsory (Oluyemi-Kusa, 1992). As regards the settlement of trade disputes, the Trade Disputes Act 1976 has elaborate statutory machinery for the settlement of disputes. Since 1976, Government guidelines on income policy, productivity and prices have been a persistent feature of Nigerian Industrial relations. An obvious implication of the policy is that the exercise of free collective bargaining remains circumscribed by limits and restrictions. Furthermore, union activity is not allowed in organisations classified as essential services. In these industries, the freedom of workers to negotiate collectively with their management for the improvement of conditions of service is virtually non-existent.

It is pertinent to mention that under military regimes, the element of state control in industrial relations was notoriously highhanded. The Babangida (1985 – 1993) and the Abacha (1993 – 1998) regimes were military governments which used excessive measures leading to the emasculation of trade unions and detention of union leaders (Oluyemi-Kusa, 1992:58-59). For example, in 1987, the Nigerian Labour Congress (NLC) was banned and several union activists were detained for protesting against fuel price hike. One of the worst spells experienced by the unions occurred between 1993 to 1998 under Gen. Sanni Abacha. In addition to dissolving the NLC, his regime also jailed several union activists for their parts in the pro-democracy campaign against the military.

Trade unionism ostensibly became a hazardous activity to conduct or engage in. State security operatives with the aim of breaking such gatherings often infiltrated trade

union symposiums, seminars and rallies or arresting suspected “coup plotters”. Such was the reign of terror and corruption the regime unleashed on the country that the news of his sudden death from a heart attack was greeted with rapturous acclaim all over the country. The reaction from the northern part of the country was notably sombre and relatively subdued, but there were ecstatic scenes of celebrations down south. The development was described by some as an incredible opportunity for democracy. It was indeed an opportunity, which the country has since capitalised upon and has resulted in the emergence of a new democracy in the country.

### **3.3 Economy**

The nation’s industries consist of crude oil, coal, tin, columbite, palm oil, peanuts, rubber, wood, hides and skins, textiles, cement and other construction materials, food products, footwear, chemicals, fertilizer, printing, ceramics and steel. The industrial production growth rate is 4.1 percent (CIA, 2001). The labour force is 42.84 million with agriculture having 54%, industry, 6% and services, 40% and the unemployment rate is 28 percent. The largely subsistence agricultural sector failed to keep up with rapid population growth and Nigeria, once a large net exporter of food, now imports food. The economy continues to be hobbled by political instability, corruption and poor macroeconomic management. At the heart of the problem, has been a crisis of governance and public management, which has its roots in the competition among rival elites and their ethno-regional constituencies for control of the huge rents that accrue to the state from the operations of the petroleum industry<sup>2</sup>.

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<sup>2</sup> According to a Situation Assessment Analysis published in 2001 by Nigeria’s National Planning Commission and the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF).

The ethno-religious rivalry prevalent in the country right from the early days of independence from Britain in 1960 degenerated into three years of civil war when the southeast attempted to secede as Biafra. The end of the civil war in 1970 coincided with the oil boom years and the country's emergence as a major oil exporter. But in the following years dominated by military and civilian rulers from the mainly Muslim north, the oil wealth was largely mismanaged. Most of it was dispensed as political patronage through fraudulent contracts awarded by those in government to cronies. Apparently, most of the country's oil wealth was frittered away and nothing was saved for the rainy day. The result was that once the oil boom years ended in the early 1980s the country was beset with a monumental economic crisis. The worst hit were the poor, who got no benefits from the upswing of national income during the boom years.

Faced with severe balance of payments problems in the mid 1980s, the then military ruler, General Ibrahim Babangida, adopted International Monetary Fund- and World Bank- advised Structural Adjustment Program (SAP). The key objective of SAP was to ensure Nigeria serviced its external debt of US \$28 billion and maintained macro-economic stability, while cutting back on social spending. While a growth rate of 5.4 percent a year was achieved between 1987-92 (against 1.8 percent a year between 1981-86), the proportion of the core poor rose from 12 to 14 percent within the period. It continued to grow in the subsequent years. Starved of funds, social service institutions began to decay and service delivery in schools and hospitals sharply declined. (The World Bank estimates that public spending per capita on health is less than \$5 and as low as \$2 in some parts of Nigeria, contrary to \$34 recommended for

low-income countries by the World Health Organization). Infrastructure and utilities, under the weight of mismanagement for years, also began to collapse.

Thus the country's economic problems have been compounded by rate of inflation, monetary and fiscal policy, autonomy and effectiveness of monetary institutions and authorities, extra-budgetary expenditures and budget deficits, official housing, health and educational policies, elite-generated political crises and tensions, sourcing of raw materials, pricing policies of trading and manufacturing industries, activities of middlemen and market women and men, etc. (Otobo, 1998:42). Nigeria's erstwhile military rulers failed to make progress in diversifying the economy away from over-dependence on the capital intensive oil sector which provides 30 percent of GDP, 95 percent of foreign exchange earnings and about 80 percent of budgetary revenues. The government's resistance to initiating greater transparency and accountability in managing the country's multibillion dollar oil earnings limited economic growth and prevented an agreement with the IMF and bilateral creditors on a staff-monitored program and debt relief.

### **3.4. Labour law**

Labour Decree No. 21 of 1974 calls for a 40-hour workweek, 2 to 4 weeks annual leave and overtime and holiday pay; there is no law prohibiting excessive compulsory overtime. The law also establishes general health and safety provisions, some of which are aimed specifically at young or female workers. It requires that the factory division of the Ministry of Labor and Employment inspect factories for compliance with health and safety standards. Employers are required to compensate injured workers and dependent survivors of those killed in industrial accidents. Employers

must compensate injured workers and dependent survivors of those killed in industrial accidents but enforcement of these laws by the ministry of labor seems to be largely ineffective<sup>3</sup>.

All workers, except members of the armed forces and other employees designated as essential by the Government, may join trade unions. Essential workers include members of the armed forces and government employees in the police, customs, immigration, prisons, federal mint, central bank, and telecommunications sectors.

Nigeria has signed and ratified the International Labor Organization's (ILO) convention on freedom of association, but Nigerian law authorizes only a single central labor body, the Nigeria Labor Congress (NLC). Nigerian labor law controls the admission of a union to the NLC, and requires any union to be formally registered before commencing operations. Registration is authorized only where the Registrar of Trade Unions determines that it is expedient in that no other existing union is sufficiently representative of the interests of those workers seeking to be registered. 29 industrial trade unions are registered formally by the Federal Government and a minimum of 50 workers is required to form a trade union.

The law provides for both the right to organize and the right to bargain collectively between management and trade unions. Collective bargaining occurs throughout the public sector and the organized private sector. Complaints of anti-union discrimination may be brought to the Ministry of Labor for mediation, conciliation, and resolution and the Labor Minister may refer unresolved disputes to the Industrial Arbitration Panel (IAP) and the National Industrial Court (NIC). The law protects

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<sup>3</sup> Newswatch, October 6, 2002.

workers from retaliation by employers (i.e. lockouts) for labor activity through an independent arm of the judiciary, the Nigerian Industrial Court. Trade unionists have complained, however, that the judicial system's slow handling of labor cases constitutes a denial of redress. The government retains broad authority over labor matters, and often intervenes in disputes it feels challenge its key political or economic objectives. However, the era of government appointed "sole administrators" of unions is now over, and the labor movement is increasingly active and vocal on issues seen to attest the plight of the common worker, such as deregulation, privatization, and the government's failure to advance its poverty alleviation program.

A worker under a collective bargaining agreement may not participate in a strike unless his union complied with the requirements of the law, which include provisions for mandatory mediation and for referral of the dispute to the Government. The law allows the Government discretion to refer the matter to a labor conciliator, arbitration panel, board of inquiry, or the NIC. Workers have the right to strike; however, certain essential workers are required to provide advance notice of a strike. There are no laws prohibiting retribution against strikers and strike leaders, but strikers who believe that they are victims of unfair retribution may submit their cases to the IAP with the approval of the Labor Ministry. The decisions of the IAP are binding on parties but may be appealed to the NIC. In practice the decisions of these bodies infrequently carry the force of law.

Workers and employers in Export Processing Zones (EPZ) are subject to Decree No. 63 of 1992, which provide for a 10-year amnesty on trade unions from the startup of an enterprise. The law provides that there shall be no strikes or lockouts for a period of 10 years following the commencement of operations within a zone. In addition the

law allows the EPZ Authority to handle the resolution of disputes between employers and employees instead of workers' organizations or unions<sup>4</sup>. Staff of the Authority and workers employed by companies operating in the EPZ cannot go on strike. The ILO considers the legislation governing its operation as contravening the principles of the right to organize and bargain collectively and the incentives for promoting investment in the zone therefore limiting the exercise of trade union rights.

Minimum wage is set by law and reviewed infrequently. For example, the National Minimum Wage (Amendment) Act 2000 № 1 requires every employer to pay a minimum wage of ₦5,500.00 per month to every worker under his establishment. The new wage review has, however, set many state governments and their employees on a collision course. While some states claim that they cannot afford the stipulated ₦5,500.00, labor unions and state workers insist their wages should be the same as those of federal workers. An employer is barred from granting a general wage increase to its workers without prior government approval. However, in practice the law does not appear to be enforced effectively; strikes, including in the public sector, are widespread and private sector wage increases generally are not submitted to the Government for prior approval. The Government retains broad legal authority over labor matters and often intervenes in disputes seen to challenge key political or economic objectives.

### **3.5. Grievance Settling Procedure**

Procedures exist on how employers and workers (or their representatives) may pursue mutually acceptable steps for conflict prevention and resolution. Experts regard these

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<sup>4</sup>*International Labour Organisation (1995). Sixth Survey on the Effect Given to the Tripartite Declaration of Principles concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy. Bureau for Workers' Activities*

procedures as “grievance procedures” and they usually form part of a collective agreement (Akinlaja, 1999). Their essential property stipulates a step-by-step approach to conflict prevention or resolution. Starting with an employee’s consciousness of being aggrieved, the procedure recommends that he has to take up his point of grievance with his immediate supervisor, thus kicking off a series of steps that may be referred to as “in-house grievance procedure”. Should he not be satisfied with the solution provided by his supervisor, he takes the matter up with his departmental manager. If he is still not satisfied, he reports to the branch of his union within his working unit, which is mandated to refer the case to management at the immediate local level.

Failure to arrive at an agreeable solution warrants filing a report with the leadership of the union at the branch level, which takes up the case with management of the company. Unsuccessful negotiation at this point pushes the matter to the national union. The National Union Secretariat of the union intervenes by seating both parties at a round-table meeting, with view a to resolving the matter. However, when finally the National Secretarial of the union fails to also reach an agreement with the management, then the trade dispute provisions are supposed to take effect. That closes the in-house grievance procedure. The national union and the management, subsequently agree to disagree and thereafter subject themselves to the process of Legal Trade Dispute Settlement.

In 1976, the government enacted the Trade Disputes Decree to regulate procedures applicable to strike situations. The decree dictates that when a dispute arises, an individual mutually selected by rivals, steps in to arbitrate between the quarrelling

parties. According to the 1976 legislation, the two-pronged arbitration structure comprises of the IAP and the NIC. Each arbitrating body has a unique structure mirroring the tripartite nature of the international Labour Organization. In other words, it comprised representatives of workers, employers and government.

Whenever there is a problem which an in-house branch finds impossible to resolve, it passes it across to the national union. If at that level they are still unable to resolve the problem, the national union and management now have a defined area of disagreement. In the process of settling and resolving this defined area they might agree to have a mediator whom both parties have confidence in. If the mediator is effective, then the matter is regarded as permanently settled. However, if it is impossible to resolve the issue, the dissatisfied party may formally raise an objection and the next step (which is conciliation) will follow. Such a step falls in line with section 4 (1) and Section 2 of the 1976 decree.

The minister then appoints a conciliator usually drawn from the Industrial Relations Department of the Federal Ministry of Labour and Productivity, who examines the issue in contention but he lacks power of enforcement. His mandate ends with assisting both parties to reach a consensus on the sore points. All he is armed with is moral authority, entrenched through the confidence, which both parties repose in him. But as a conciliator, he wields the power to make recommendations. If both parties agree with him, the matter is settled at this level of conciliation. But if one party kicks against the conciliator's recipe, the minister will then refer the matter to the IAP in conformity with section 6 (4) and sections 7(1) of the 1976 decree.

The IAP has at least 10 members of which two must be representatives of employers and two representatives of workers. The IAP chairman on reception of a case will constitute an arbitration tribunal made up of one arbitrator acting solo or with assessors picked by the disputants or multiple arbitrators under the chairman or vice chairman. The panel invites both disputing parties to submit memoranda on the day of the hearing. They may decide on legal representation or they may present their case directly. According to IAP regulations, a case should be dispensed with in the space of 42 days, although the period can be extended by the minister. The IAP often encourages settlement outside the panel with a view to getting the disputants to produce a joint memorandum. If that happens, the panel asks both sides whether they are satisfied. Such an agreement becomes a consent award and is seldom disputed by either party. But if it happens that a dispute lingers past the IAP stage because one or both disputants contest the judgment of the arbitration panel, the minister has no choice than to refer the matter to the NIC.

The structure of the NIC mirrors that of the arbitration panel, with a government appointee sitting as the president, while NLC and NECA have representatives or choose to present their own case. NIC normally is the final appellate court on industrial matters but sometimes disputants may go, as far as to the Federal Court of Appeal to challenge its judgment, but such are the exceptions. In majority of the cases, industrial disputes end with the industrial court. Its judgment merely goes to the honorable Minister of Labour and Productivity for final confirmation. His confirmation seals the ruling and forecloses the reopening of the decided case (except in open court).

### 3.6 History of Trade Unionism

The exact origin of the Nigerian labour unions still remains a bone of contention amongst industrial relations writers and commentators. Seibal (1973) regarded guilds, carpenters, mutual societies, etc. as the originators. These were pre-colonial organisations with well-structured form of membership recruitment and administration. Fajana (1995) however contests this claim on the grounds that these associations were not in wage employment. Diali (1971) suggested that trade unionism is an import of colonialism by noting that Nigeria's pattern of industrial relations is based on the British system (being an erstwhile colony and protectorate of Britain) with its freedom of association and free collective bargaining.

The British government actively promoted the development of trade unions in most former British colonies. A circular dispatch sent out from a colonial office conference, for instance, emphasized that it was the duty of colonial governments to "take such steps as might be possible to smooth the passages of such organizations as they emerge, into constitutional channels" (Roberts, 1964). This colonial influence reflected two objectives: firstly, a desire to promote stable and responsible unions and secondly, a wish to avoid encouraging political movements that might have adverse effects on the economic development and good government of the territories concerned. But Fajana (1991) argued that employers and the colonial administration both opposed the formation of labour unions on reasoning that trade unions would rival the authority already accorded natural rulers. Similar accounts by Akpala (1965) and Fruend (1981) also seem to support the allegations that workers were usually persecuted for joining trade unions during the colonial era. The source of trade unionism in Nigeria thus remains debatable.

Table 3.2 shows a summary of the major highlights in the history of the unions. Between 1930 and 1931, worsening economic situation and dissatisfaction with existing service conditions led to the formation of Railway Workers Union (RWU) and the Nigerian Union of Teachers (NUT) in 1931. The former felt the National Civil Service Union (NCSU) was not protecting their interests. The latter's reasons centred on dissatisfaction with existing service conditions, which had deteriorated as compared with the early years of the century.

**Table 3.2 highlights in the history of the Nigerian Labour Movement**

1912	First trade union (Nigerian Civil service Union) formed
1931	Breakaway: Railway Workers Union and the Nigerian Union of Teachers.
1938	Trade Union Ordinance formally legalising trade union in the country was enacted.
1940s- 1970s	Complex groupings of unions and central organisations with allegiances to different world centres. Several hundred unions and four competing trade union centrals.
1976	The Nigerian Labour Congress was formed (NLC)
1978	Major reorganisation of the over 1000 unions into 42 affiliated industry based unions.
14, July 1994	NLC declared a nation-wide strike in support of the president-elect of June 12, 1993 whose victory was annulled by the military.
18, August 1994	NLC executive committee dissolved by military; trade union leaders detained; administrators appointed to head unions.
5, September, 1994	Workers forced to go back to work; strike effectively ended.
12 <sup>th</sup> February, 1996.	Further trade union amendments; trade unions restructured from 41 Industrial Unions to 29.
June, 1998	Executive committee of NLC reinstated; policy of non-interference in trade union affairs adopted by military government; detained union leaders released.
27 January, 1999.	A new NLC executive elected with Adams Oshiomole as president.

Later on, the Trade Union Ordinance – conferring the legal rights for unions to negotiate and strike – was passed in 1938. The Nigerian trade union ordinance laid

down the mode of registration of trade unions and prescribed the rights and obligations of unions in the employer-employee relationships. This gave impetus to trade union development in the country. Within two years of passing the law, registered trade unions had increased to fourteen with a membership of over 4000. Nigerian trade unions have a history of divisions and disagreements on the basis of ideological issues. Between the 1940s and 1960s, complex groupings of unions and central organisations with allegiances to different world centres dominated the Nigerian industrial relations landscape.

The post-war period saw the emergence of the Trade Union Congress (TUC) whose sole purpose was to improve wages. By the end of 1949, factions arose in the TUC resulting in the Nigerian National Federation of Labour (NNFL) and the TUC proper. In 1950, the first Nigerian Labour Congress (NLC) was formed and affiliated with the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) in 1951. Between 1953 and 1959, more factions – All Nigeria Trade Union Federation (ANTUF), National Council of Trade Unions of Nigeria (NCTUN) and a second Trade Union Congress of Nigeria (TUC) – emerged. The post independence period witnessed more confusion within the industrial relations landscape. Between 1960 and the civil war years, political and ideological considerations further led to the balkanisation of the Nigerian labour movement. By 1973, there were four competing labour centres: the Labour Unity Front (LUF), the Nigerian Workers Council (NWC), the Nigerian Trade Union Congress (NTUC), and the United Labour Congress (ULC). The government finally created a single central labour organisation in 1976. In 1978, after several failed attempts at uniting the various factions within the labour movement, the government finally reformed and reorganised the labour movement on the basis of what it

described as “limited intervention and guided democracy”. The role of the government since then became increasingly interventionist.

**Table 3.3 The strength of the Nigerian Trade Unions as at 1976  
(Tayo Fashoyin 1981)**

No. of Unions	Membership
1	50,000 – over
6	20,000 – 50,000
1	10,000 – 20,000
15	5,000 – 10,000
76	1,000 – 5,000
280	250 – 1,000
426	50 – 250
105	1 – 50

**Table 3.4. Observed changes in the structure of unions  
since 1978 (Trade unions of the world, 2001).**

Year	Number of unions
1978	42
1986	42
1988	41
1990	41
1995	41
1996	29


Before 1978, there were a lot of registered trade unions that were ineffective. An illustration of the union’s explosive growth in the wake of the promulgation of the trade union ordinance in 1938 is shown in table 3.3. The reorganisation of 1978 however served to strengthen the unions by merging and organising them based on

industrial lines (table 3.4). In 1995, there were around three million members and 41 registered industrial unions, (Otobo, 1995). In 1996, due to unions contesting and disputing areas of jurisdiction, the federal government carried out a further reconstruction of the labour movement resulting in a further merging of industrial unions thus reducing the total number of the unions to 29. Meanwhile, the union leadership of the NLC had been disbanded (the union was run by a sole administrator) for their role in calling for a general strike to protest the annulment of the 1993 presidential election by the military dictatorship of Babangida. Increased international pressure and internal unrests engendered by the activities of democracy campaigners eventually compelled the military rulers to release political detainees (amongst whom were union leaders), organise elections and return the country to civil rule. The NLC leadership was subsequently restored by which time it was time for a new executive to be elected. Elections were held and Mr. Oshiomole emerged as the NLC president in 1999 with a four year mandate.

### **3.7. Trade Union Structure and Organisation**

Union organisation is based on industrial sectors and may cut across different occupations. Thus for example, the National Union of Petroleum and Natural Gas Workers (NUPENG) represents all workers below the management level in the Oil and Gas sector in the country. Workers include technicians, administrative staff, etc. Similarly, the Medical and Health Workers Union of Nigeria (MHWUN) represents all Para-medical staff in the health sector including technicians, medical record officers, catering officers, dispensing assistants, orderlies, x-ray assistants cleaners, and others in this category.

**Fig. 3.1 Structure of union organisation**



Union organisation occurs at various levels including branch/company level, regional, zonal or local government level, state level and national level. The structure of union organisation is similar across industrial sectors (fig. 3.1). At the branch or company level, workers are usually organised by representatives from the national union. For instance, if workers in a particular company are non-unionised, the national union under whose jurisdiction the company falls under may decide to organise a branch in that company. The regional or zonal Organising Secretary then undertakes the task of organising the workers. The process usually culminates in an election to elect union officers. The criteria for contesting for any post depends on the constitution of the union. Most constitutions require that a potential candidate must be a member in good financial standing in the affairs of the union for some months (usually six) preceding their nomination and election. Typically, a branch executive committee comprises of a chairman, vice chairman, secretary, assistant secretary, treasurer, etc.

Any member of a branch executive may decide to contest for a position within a zonal or Local Government Area Council. The councils meet periodically (e.g. every three months) but elects new officers every three years or four years depending on the particular union. Similarly, zonal officers can contest for posts at the state executive council and officers at the latter may vie for positions within the national executive council. The criteria of eligibility may vary slightly from union to union but it is generally a precondition that contestants are consistent due-paying members over a relatively long period of time prior to election period (Akinlaja, 1999).

### **3.7 Research: Literature Review**

Even though several studies have investigated union-related issues in Nigeria, none seem to have addressed the possible causes and consequences of union commitment per se. In particular, while existing research operationalises union commitment as a distinct construct capable of predicting union participation (Barling et al, 1992), this link has yet to be acknowledged within the Nigerian industrial relations literature. This is probably a consequence of the lack of a model, which describes the union commitment-participation link within the Nigerian context. Most of the studies reviewed in this section are quite old, the most recent being Fashoyin (1987). Efforts aimed at finding more recent Nigerian studies on the subject proved abortive. A search of major journals and periodicals (both Nigerian-based as well as international journals) for any current Nigerian study on the subject all had negative results. The author while in the field in Nigeria, personally searched relevant databases in institutions such as University of Lagos, Institute of Labour research, the NLC's department of education and research to mention a few. This situation further reinforces the rationale for this research and aptly underscores the reason why this

study is so urgently needed. The Nigerian studies may be grouped into three categories: historical studies, historical / case studies, and case studies<sup>5</sup>.

What is known about the administration of Nigerian unions - and in particular, membership participation - has been mainly based on general observation or historical research. Examples of these studies include those by Yesufu (1969), Kilby (1967), Remy (1975), Ananaba (1969), Peace (1979), Ubeku (1983), Tokunbo, (1985); Diejomah, (1979), Etukudo, (1977), and Otobo, (1987). Studies that have combined historical and observational research with the survey of attitudes of people in specific unions include those by Warmington (1960), Melson 1973), Smock (1969), Cohen (1974) and Lubeck (1975). These studies were mainly directed towards an analysis of ideology or class movements and where the attitudes of the workers were assessed, the general attention has been focussed on the extent of knowledge or familiarity with union activities.

Examples of case studies include the studies of Remy (1975) and Fashoyin (1987). Remy' s research attempted to demonstrate that the behaviour of industrial workers is strongly influenced by the type of industry in which they are employed and by the nature of the wider urban environment in which they live. Fashoyin (1987)'s study of the internal dynamics within Nigerian trade unions tried to provide a broad assessment of the attitudes of the rank and file towards their unions and the extent of members' involvement in policy-making functions of their unions. These studies, shed some light concerning union activity in Nigeria and from the review of a few pertinent ones done below, conclusions can be drawn on the general outlook of

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<sup>5</sup> The list presented here is by no means exhaustive; only those that are relevant to the study have been selected.

labour-management relations, union attitudes of members and relations between unions and their members in the country. Since none of the studies was particularly concerned with a methodical investigation of questions relating to the causes and consequences of union commitment, direct evidence on this is not obvious from the review. Most of the studies understandably gave insufficient information about the wider dimensions of members' attitudes towards their unions due to the nature of their enquiry.

Warmington (1960)'s study of the Cameroons Development Corporation<sup>6</sup> union and its members, was conducted in 1954 and involved a survey of 661 employees (all men). The study had its origin in a series of sociological and economic investigations of some of the problems connected with plantation labour during that period. The author employed questionnaire methods in investigating the attitudes of the plantation workers towards their union. The questions were open-ended, so the respondents were able to provide their own answers in their own words. Most of the workers expressed favourable union attitudes.

It is apparent from the study that the workers had certain expectations of their unions and were willing to embrace the union as long as it had a good record of achieving results. Although Warmington observed that some workers did not understand the traditional concept of trade unionism, their experience in their various tribal associations probably helped them to relate the union to an organisation, which should provide some benefits, and as such most of them expected this from their union. The union leaders usually considered more educated ("book men" as they were referred to

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<sup>6</sup> The Southern Cameroons, the territory in which the C.D.C Workers' Union operated was a part of the Federation of Nigeria (south of the country). The unions' development took place within a framework of law and administration shared by all Nigerian trade unions.

by the workers) commanded respect because they could approach the white “oga” (master) whom they usually held in trepidation. But the workers were not afraid to go on strike on the orders of their leaders. The perceived superiority of the white managers must have also encouraged or discouraged workers from getting involved with the unions (e.g. the author noted that “such is the prestige of the European that many of the men doubt whether the union leaders have any power to put forward their points with any chance of success” (pg. 119).

Some methodological lapses need highlighting. Firstly, the absence of female workers on the plantation leading to the sample being exclusively male meant that it was not possible to compare the influence of gender on the variability of responses. Secondly, no attempt was made to explore the relationships between the responses. This situation suggests that Warmington’s picture of the ordinary members’ general outlook may be inadequate. For instance, the assertion about skilled or more educated workers being more enthusiastic and militant (pg. 121) appears to border on mere speculations since there was no supporting empirical data.

Thirdly, the open-ended format of the questionnaire items meant that the author had to use his discretion to decide which categories each response belonged to. Considering the weight of the sample used (over 600), analysing the responses must have involved a considerable degree of complication; also there is the chance that some degree of author’s subjectivity might have come into play. Related to this is the admission by the author that many of the respondents were not very articulate in the medium used for the interviews (pidgin English) and their comments and explanations were often briefer than the respondents desired (pg. 98). The process of analysis would have

been more reliable if the author had employed a multiple choice format thus ensuring uniformity in standard. Lastly, the conditions under which the workers lived at the time were very different and unique. The study was conducted when Nigeria was a colony of Britain before attaining her independence in 1960 and it seems difficult to conceive of labour-management relations of that era and workers' general attitudes towards organised labour as being divorced from the dynamics of colonialism (Cookery, 1978).

Cohen (1974)'s survey was carried out in 1968, a period of relative labour quiescence induced largely by the appeals of the Federal government not to 'rock the boat' during the conduct of war operations in the East<sup>7</sup>. The purpose of the survey was to examine the background and investigate the attitudes of a small group of workers towards their union, their fellow workers and their position in society. The sample comprised seventy members of the Ibadan University Workers' Union (whose secretary claimed a committed membership of 280 persons), who were stratified by skill and then more or less randomly selected. By local standards, the sample was a very well educated labour force, about 40% having attained high primary (Standard VI) and 21% Secondary education.

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<sup>7</sup> As a result of a series of political upheavals and fracas, Nigeria experienced serious political instability by the end of 1965. By 1966 the dream of a flourishing democracy was floundering amidst a series of massacres, inter-regional hostilities and, finally, a military coup that installed the first of a series of military governments. Many political leaders, including the prime minister and the premiers of the western and the Northern regions, were killed during the military take-over. For a few months it seemed things had finally returned to normal but things came to a head in the following July when another military coup took the place of an earlier one. Subsequent developments precipitated a bloody civil war between 1967 and 1970, amongst which was the attempted secession by the former eastern Region. The war left behind nearly 1,000,000 dead. Shortly before the civil war, the four regions of the country (West, East, North and the Mid-West), had been replaced by a twelve-state structure.

The study showed that union members expected the union to provide a highly circumscribed set of services. When the union fulfils these expectations, the members are prepared to demonstrate their support by joining the union, paying dues and going out on strike. Also observed within the union membership was the formation of a self-conscious identity, an element of consciousness, and a measure of understanding of the group interests, and a critical awareness of the workings and failures of the organisations that represents workers. Furthermore, the workers had an unexpected high measure of political sophistication in understanding political issues and were also prepared to adopt political stances of a fairly radical nature. But as is seen later, this has been shown not to necessarily translate into continued support for a labour party.

Interestingly, in Cohen's study, very few members expected social benefits from their unions (2%), a sharp contrast to Warmington's (1960) finding in which most respondents expected unions to provide benefits (40%). The reason for this apparent discrepancy could lie in the samples' understanding of the philosophy of trade unionism in relation to the existence of tribal organisations providing social benefits. In the latter, the workers' idea of modern trade unionism was inaccurate and because they thought the union not to be any different from the tribal associations with which they were already accustomed, most joined expecting benefits while others joined because of external pressures (friends, supervisors). But in the former, workers demonstrated union instrumentality perception in relation to workplace issues thus demonstrating a classical understanding of the purpose of trade unions (Webb and Webb, 1920). The difference thus lay in the ability of the workers to differentiate the roles of their trade unions from the roles of their tribal unions or organisations, which

provided social benefits. Methodological weaknesses in the study are identical to the one cited in reference to Warmington's. In addition to these, Cohen's sample was arguably too small. Also, the lack of the use of statistical tests to verify the presence of relationships between the responses also makes it difficult to make deductions about causal inferences amongst the study's variables.

A sophisticated analysis of the political attitudes of Nigerian workers was provided by Melson (1971) who views workers' political attitudes as being governed by the 'cross-pressures' of ethnicity and class. These inconsistencies were divided into 'descriptive' and 'prescriptive' inconsistents. The former claimed to support a labour and an ethnic party simultaneously, the latter claim to support a labour party but in practice support an ethnic party. The sample surveys was carried out largely during the last six months of 1964, when at the beginning of the period the author was able to assess the support for a labour party immediately after the stirring events of the June 1964 General Strike and at the end of the period when he could examine what support remained as the Federal elections of December 1964 drew near.

The results showed that (a) the 88% who indicated some support for a labour party had dropped to 41% in October-December; (b) the 5% who had indicated in July that they would support an ethnic party (only) had increased to 41% later in the year; (c) the percentage which was cross-pressured in July (69%) had dropped to 19% by the time the elections were due. In a four-month period, the labour party apparently lost up to half its support thus suggesting that the large number of 'inconsistents' belied the real strength of the support for a labour party and gave an illusory picture to those who were trying to organise workers politically on the basis of class solidarity. One of

the difficulties in evaluating the continuing relevance of the findings is that the declining support for a workers' political party in 1964 might have been a function of the particular character of the labour parties then existing and the circumstances surrounding the December election. The significant changes which have occurred within the labour, political and geographical landscapes puts in doubt the study's continuing relevance.

Smock (1969)'s study of a fifty-five randomly selected rank and file members of the Nigerian Coal Miners Union (NCMU) was part of an extensive investigation into the activities of the union leadership. The study took place between 1962 and 1963 shortly after the country regained its independence from the British in 1960. The emphasis was placed on members' attitudes concerning the distribution of power within the union. Results showed a widespread dissatisfaction with the way the union was being run and suggests that trade union members have certain expectations concerning how they expect their union to be run by their leaders. The members were dissatisfied with the status quo and preferred to exercise more influence over the decision-making process.

The attempt by Smock to proffer explanatory variables for the various responses (test of correlations) is an improvement on the earlier studies, which have appeared to be mainly concerned with just identifying the workers' attitudes only. The preferences of the workers with regards to the style of their union leadership were found to differ based on the members' demographic characteristics (education, skill, urban/rural experience). The shortcomings of the study include the fact that firstly, the sample was too small. Secondly, no attempt was made to relate the union leadership attitudes

with union participation. This would have afforded the opportunity to appreciate how this affected members' interest and involvement in union activities. Thirdly, the study is too limited in scope. For instance, other factors capable of influencing union leadership attitudes (e.g. union instrumentality perception) were not investigated. The variables of demography alone are arguably not sufficient to explain the members' responses.

The case material used by Remy (1975) was obtained from a multinational corporation in a non-industrial city: the Nigerian Tobacco Company (NTC) Zaria, Northern Nigeria in 1969-1971. Personal and employment histories were obtained from the NTC personnel department files of a random sample of 100 employees. The author also observed workplace interaction on the factory for four to five hours daily over a six-month period and later interviewed a sample of twenty-four production workers in their homes. The author argued that the behaviour of industrial workers is strongly influenced by the type of industry in which they are employed and by the nature of the wider urban environment in which they live.

Three types of industries were identified on the basis of their wages in total costs, local intermediate goods in their final product, ownership, capital intensity and management attitude towards workers. The first type labelled *subsidiaries of multinational corporations* is foreign-owned, a second category, *international corporations*, produces and markets a single product in several countries while *Nigerian-owned processing industries* constitute the last category. The author's study seem to lend some credence to the view that economic and social setting of industrial unions in Nigeria varies along two axis – type of industry and urban context.

However, more empirical work exploring the relationship between workers and their environment is needed to give precision to this notion. Nevertheless, the study does highlight the importance of the urban environment as an influence on worker behaviour and trade union action. A few reservations may be expressed about the continuing relevance of certain aspects of the study. For instance, the grouping of the industries in the country into three types might be considered inaccurate in the current era. Political events, technological advancement and globalisation have arguably impacted upon the industrial landscape resulting in different patterns of alignments, fusions and conglomerations between multinationals, international corporations and Nigerian-owned industries. Consequently, it might not be possible to fit every industry in the country exclusively into one particular category as the author suggested.

Lubeck (1975)'s study focussed on the relationship between leaders and members of factory trade unions from the perspective of the inarticulate yet experienced unskilled factory worker. The study, conducted in Kano (Northern Nigeria), an area second only to Lagos in industrial development in the country, provided an empirical evaluation of the experience of an emerging social category as it struggles to deal with the inequalities associated with urban industrial labour. The study which involved a total of 140 workers, demonstrates that bad corrupt leadership - be it political or union leadership - militates against union organisation in the country. The author singled out job security as being the predominant issue for the workers.

The methodology employed in the investigation, especially the data analysis aspect, appears not to be adequate or robust enough for one to make reliable causal inferences

from the study. Also the influence of other factors such as the personal and demographic characteristics of respondents were not explored in order to find out whether for instance women differ in their union attitudes. Furthermore, it can be observed that the attitudes of the respondents towards their job were not measured in the survey. Thus the conclusions by the author about job security being the most influential issue in determining the loyalty of members appear to be based on general observations and lacked any empirical support. Nevertheless, the study represents a fair analysis of the reasons for the demise of unions in Kano during the period.

Fashoyin (1987)'s investigation into the internal dynamics within Nigerian trade unions was concerned with providing a broader assessment of the attitudes of the rank and file towards their unions and to determine the extent of the former's involvement in policy making functions of unions. Consequently, an attempt was made to explain the relationship between unions and their members viewed from the perspective of the latter. Involved in the study were six hundred union members randomly selected from a stratified list of 36 industrial unions based in the Lagos metropolitan area.

The study's findings indicate that the workers have shown considerable interest in union affairs and purposefully join unions on the expectation that through the unions they would enjoy improved wages and conditions of service, a preservation of their rights as workers as well as job security. Education had no influence on regularity at meetings, reading union notices or participating at union proceedings or meetings. Many workers appeared to meet only their minimum obligation by paying dues, but remained inactive while those who attended meetings levy charges of autocracy against leaders. Those who did not show interest in unions and failed to attend

meetings regularly were often denied access to vital information or disallowed adequate participation at meetings. According to the author, this showed the reluctance of leaders to follow basic democratic process – respect for constitutional procedures and individual rights, acceptance of objective criticisms and lack of service to their constituents. A few criticisms of the study are indicated below.

Firstly, the verdict reached on the nature of the relationship between union participation and demographic variables (e.g. union tenure and propensity to contest elections; education and regularity at meetings) may not be regarded as conclusive as the statistical method of analysis used can hardly be described as rigorous (cross tabulations only). More advanced methods of analysis such as correlation and regression may need to be employed. Secondly, there was no attempt to link union participation with likely explanatory variables of job satisfaction, union socialisation experiences, union beliefs and life satisfaction. These factors have also been known to impact on union participation (Barling et al, 1992).

Thirdly, there was very little or no information given about the individual settings of the sample investigated with respect to their companies, union history, organisational structure, industrial relations climate, etc. This information is vital in explaining the attitudes of the workers to their unions. Fourthly, opinion and attitudes of union members may well have changed since this study was conducted especially considering the significant changes that have occurred in the industrial relations framework in the country since then. For example, the unions have been restructured twice, first from 42 to 41 in 1986 then from 41 to 29 in 1996<sup>8</sup>. Also the NLC has

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<sup>8</sup> Federal Republic of Nigeria Official Gazette, No. 74, Vol. 83, 1996.

been proscribed and de-proscribed and union leaders detained on more than one occasion by successive military juntas, the last of such episodes occurring under the military dictatorship of Abacha (1996 – 1999). Normality was restored (de-proscription and release of detained union leaders) towards the end of 1999 in the run up to the presidential elections which ushered in the current democratic dispensation.

Fifthly, the study employed no particular model or framework in its investigation (e.g. no flow chart or diagram setting out the variables and pattern of relationships) so its conclusions were rather general and sketchy. For example, in his conclusion the author stated that “the main source of apathy among members is therefore neither the lack of education nor because workers do not appreciate the important role a union plays but it may be sometimes that many union members are not naturally disposed to involve themselves in union affairs because they believe that elected leaders have this responsibility” (pg. 30).

### **3.8. Conclusion**

All the studies reviewed give prominence to an array of problems facing Nigerian unions. Workers are said to purposefully join unions and expect the latter to engage in fighting for better wages and working conditions, job security and other issues. All the studies seem to express the view that there is general apathy within the union membership with members performing poorly in terms of attending meetings, voting and speaking regularly or in the actual running of the unions. A few discrepancies exist in findings between the studies (e.g. the influence of education on union participation of members). These differences may be partly a reflection of the differences in the time period (i.e. colonial and post-colonial era), geography (e.g.

east, west, south of the country), politics (e.g. military rule, civilian rule), economy (e.g. high inflation, economic prosperity) and industrial setting (e.g. management-labour relations) of the studies.

For example, Fashoyin's sample had a higher level of educated respondents than the rest as well as the respondents displaying a higher level of awareness about the purpose of organised trade unionism. This situation is most likely related to the significant societal changes of post-independent Nigeria. In the same vein, due to their locations, Lubeck (1975) and Remy (1975) had predominantly ethnic Northerners in their sample, Smock (1960) had predominantly Easterners while Warmington (1960), had predominantly southerners. It has been suggested that there are more uneducated people in the north in comparison with other parts of the country (Wali, 1991).

Kano state for example is predominantly Muslim and according to Wali (1991), 99 percent of women in Kano are illiterate females and this is typical for most of northern Nigeria. She noted that although females represent 70% of the population, less than 2% of them are educated enough to care properly for their home and children. The author states that:


*"Suspicious of western education, Islamic tradition in this part of Nigeria has given its girls very little opportunity to be educated beyond Arabic for religious purposes. They do, however, often engage in street hawking as early as age four. By the time they reach age twelve, they are usually married and are confined to their marital homes. By the time they are thirty they are likely*

*to be discarded and left alone with four or five children to support".*

Thus it can be argued that these factors may have contributed to the differences in findings between the studies. This notwithstanding, certain factors might be relevant in our consideration of possible influences on members involvement in union participation: union instrumentality perception, union leadership attitudes, job dissatisfaction (e.g. wages, working conditions) union beliefs, political orientation, educational background, ethnic origin, industrial setting or environment, and union tenure (fig. 2.1). It could be hypothesised that these factors possess the capacity to affect members' involvement within the unions.

The connection between explanatory variables identified in the studies was largely ignored or insufficiently examined. Most of the studies were preoccupied with a description of the problems the unions were facing such that little or no effort was spent on a thorough empirical analysis of the interrelations between the explanatory variables. Also none of the studies reviewed operationalised union commitment nor distinguished it from union participation (fig. 3.1). It will be recalled from the previous chapter that the relationship between commitment and member participation has received particular attention in other literatures (Gordon et al, 1980; Gallagher and Clark, 1989). This research has found that commitment is closely tied to participation in union activities (Fullagar and Barling, 1989; Kelloway and Barling, 1993; Sverke, 1997).

**Fig. 3.1. A diagrammatic Representation of Preliminary Assumptions from Nigerian Studies.**



The proposed study thus represents an attempt to improve on these deficiencies. In the first instance, the relationships between all explanatory (independent) variables and their effects on union participation will be investigated. Also, the other variables, which have been somewhat implicated but not empirically investigated, will be assessed. Furthermore, by measuring the union commitment of Nigerian union

members with a view to exploring its relationship with union participation and other factors, the author will not only be bridging the gap observed within the Nigerian literature, but will be testing an assumption that the union commitment-participation (UC-P) link is not restricted to western environments but is also applicable in the Nigerian context. It will be recalled that some researchers in developing countries are of the view that models developed in western countries will be dysfunctional in developing contexts (Fashoyin, 1995). The next chapter is concerned with the methodology employed in the research. It includes a discussion of the research hypotheses, definition of the activity of research and a description of the model used for investigation.

# **CHAPTER 4**

## **Research Methodology**


### **Introduction**

This chapter sets out the procedure involved in the quantitative and qualitative research reported in subsequent chapters. The model for investigating the study's propositions which have emanated from previous discussions in chapters 2 and 3 is first described. This is followed by a description of the quantitative and qualitative aspects of the research which includes how access for research purposes was sought and obtained and how the research instrument was compiled, tested and implemented. The characteristics of the survey samples are also presented with a description of the techniques used to analyse the data obtained from the research.

### **4.1 Model for Investigation**

Gordon and colleagues (1980) took the initial steps toward the development of a formal model of union commitment (see chapter 1). Since then, other authors have made attempts to incorporate these antecedents into a single, comprehensive model. These models typically include union participation as a key consequence of union commitment (Sverke & Kuruvilla, 1995). For the proposed research, the model (fig. 4.1) relies on an identification of relevant antecedents from western studies reviewed in chapter 2 and the Nigerian studies reviewed in chapter 3. This approach hinges on the view that not all antecedents advanced in western-based models will necessarily apply in the Nigerian context. Conversely, factors, which may be significant in the Nigerian context, could turn out to be of no significant consequence in settings outside Nigeria. As pointed out in chapter 1, there is variation in the relative impact of antecedents in different countries (Fullager and Barling, 1989; Barling et al, 1989).


**Fig. 4.1 Model for Investigation.**



The model (fig. 4.1) takes the view that factors associated with union characteristics and perception (union instrumentality perception, satisfaction with union leaders, early union socialisation experience), work or life experiences (job satisfaction, satisfaction with life, attitudes towards management), union beliefs (ideological beliefs and union-politics orientation) and demographic variables (gender, ethnicity, education, membership tenure, sector and age) all exert an indirect effect on union participation via union commitment. Alternatively, the union commitment antecedents exert a direct effect on union participation. This latter view is supported by Fullager and Barling (1989)'s study which indicated a direct causal path from

union instrumentality perception to union participation. Barling et al's (1992) model only presents union participation as the direct consequence of union commitment while omitting the alternative independent link of the antecedents to union participation.


**Fig. 4.2 Union Characteristics as Moderators**



Also pro-union attitudes are expected to moderate the relationship between union commitment and union participation (fig. 4.2). Newton and Shore (1992) argued that prounion attitudes that are themselves causally preceded by union instrumentality perceptions shape union commitments thus suggesting that the link between union instrumentality and union commitment, rather than being direct, is mediated by prounion attitudes. Also, in Fullager and Barling's (1989) study, it was found out that union instrumentality perception moderated the relationship between union loyalty and its antecedents of early socialisation experience, life satisfaction and work ethic beliefs. This means that high levels of perceived union instrumentality strengthened the relationship between the predictor variables and union loyalty.

This study intends to investigate the extent to which prounion attitudes will moderate the union instrumentality-commitment link for the Nigerian sample. Hypothetically, the attitudes of the members towards their union leaders will moderate the extent to which the former's instrumentality perception predicts their commitment to the union. This moderation effect may be stronger in unions where leaders are perceived positively by their members. It is possible that as Fullager and Barling (1989) found out, union instrumentality perception would moderate the union commitment-participation link for the Nigerian sample

**Fig. 4.3. Internal Union Dynamics, Union Commitment, Union Participation and Union Characteristics.**



## 4.2 Internal Union Dynamics and Union Commitment (fig. 4.3)

At this juncture, it is necessary to discuss the relevance of the impact of what the author has labelled “*internal union dynamics*” on the union commitment process for the Nigeria sample. These factors were identified in the course of the literature review. However, in order to understand how the concept fits into the overall model, a discussion of the rationale for their inclusion is necessary.

The term *dynamics* refer to a pattern or process of change, growth, or activity while *group dynamics* is described as the interacting forces within a small human group<sup>1</sup>.

The term *Internal Union Dynamics* thus simply refer to an interactive system or process taking place between union members, union leaders and management within the unions’ local environment (workplace). Most of the studies on this interactive process by Nigerian authors seem to revolve round the issues of union joining, union-management relations and union democracy. Highlighted are the nature of the union leaders’ interaction with management, extent to which the leaders are willing to share information with their members as well as involve them in the decision-making process. Related issues concern the process of union membership such as how workers joined the unions or who influenced them to join and what their motives were for joining (Fashoyin, 1987; Smock, 1969; Cohen, 1974; Lubeck, 1975).

Investigating the relationship between these dynamics and the existing models of union commitment is necessary as there is sufficient evidence to suggest that there could be a connection between the two. This is now explained below.

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<sup>1</sup> Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary & Thesaurus.

### ***Influencing Agents (IA) and UC.***

Influencing agent(s) are those individuals through whose persuasion, insistence or encouragement workers decided to become members of the union. Some workers however join the union on their own volition while others seemingly have to be persuaded by friends, union leaders or in some cases management. Fashoyin (1987) found that of a total of 588 respondents, 72% said they joined on their own, 11% said they were persuaded by union leaders, 9% by friends while 8% claimed that management made them to join. The study found a relationship between knowledge about union meetings and source of motivation for joining the union. In particular, those who willingly joined the union or were persuaded by union leaders tended to know when a meeting was going to be held more often than those who joined through other sources. Furthermore those who willingly joined the union or were persuaded by co-workers were more likely to depend on the latter for information about union meetings. Also those who were persuaded to join by union leaders were more than anybody else likely to depend on the latter for information about union meeting. These relationships were significant (sig.  $P < .0001$ ). These results suggest that there could be a relationship between the members' source of union joining and their participation in union activities.

Furthermore, an elaboration of the results indicated that more males joined on their own volition and through union leaders while more females joined through friends and management (sig.  $p < .001$ ). The implication of this to union commitment is such that it raises some relevant questions concerning some of the existing findings on union commitment. For example Gordon (1980) suggested that female members are more committed to their unions than male members. Assuming this holds true for the

Nigeria sample, one may ask: to what extent can this situation be explained by Fashoyin (1987)'s finding above? One possible scenario is that the female members' commitment to the union may be partly a function of a sense of loyalty or obligation towards their persuasive agents (friends and management). In other words, it is possible that their participation in union activities is influenced by an unconscious /conscious effort to live up to the expectations of their respective persuasive agents (Okoronkwo, 1985; Olajunmoke, 1985). Okoronkwo (1985) and Olajunmoke (1985) both suggested that female union members in Nigeria require more support and encouragement to facilitate their increased participation in union activities. On the other hand, if men turned out to be more committed than women, one may arguably explain this within the context of men being more independent and assertive than women. Other pertinent questions may be asked: are those who join on their own volition likely to have a higher instrumentality perception than others? Does this mean they are more likely to be more committed to the union? If the answer to the latter is yes, to what extent can their commitment be attributed to the fact that they joined on their own?

### ***Union Joining Motive (UJM) and UC***

The question of motive or underlying reasons for joining the union is related to the expectations which the workers may have of the union when joining. Fashoyin (1987) investigated some motives which included "to win more wages and better working conditions; to get protection from being sacked; to enjoy social benefits from the union; because union is capable of fighting for workers; because most people join; and the union has more time / resources to deal with management ". His result showed that of 600 respondents, 81% cited instrumental reasons (win wages =28%;

fight for workers= 53%). Those that joined based on the last two reasons (because most people join; and the union has more time / resources to deal with management) were 2% and 7% respectively.

This raises some pertinent questions in relation to the present study: to what extent are instrumentally motivated joiners committed to the union compared to others? Can their motive for joining be of any relevance to the union commitment-participation link in the sense that it may strengthen or weaken it? These questions are more relevant when considered that there are workers with no apparent instrumental reasons for joining (admittedly they are very few but arguably could be significantly higher in a different sample). Can it be assumed that this category of members will be less committed than their instrumental counterparts? How do they eventually become committed based on instrumental considerations if and when they do?

#### ***Perception of Union-Management Relations (P-UMR) and UC***

This refers to how members perceive the relationship between their unions and their employer / management in the workplace. The state of relations between management and the union has been identified as an antecedent of both organisational and union commitment (Magenau et al. 1988; Angle and Perry, 1986; Deery and Iverson, 1998). It can be argued that the link between satisfaction with union leaders and union commitment is mediated by perceptions of union / management relations. In other words, a positive view of the union-management relations may either exert a negative or positive impact on the attitudes towards union leaders. This is in a sense analogous to the manner in which prounion attitudes have been argued to mediate the link between union instrumentality and union commitment (Newton and Shore, 1992).

Smock (1969)'s and Warmington (1960)'s studies suggested that the attitudes of the members of the Nigerian coal workers union and the Cameroons Development Corporation union respectively, to their leaders, were often influenced by the members' perception of the latter's relationship with their unions. Similarly, Akinlaja, (1999) described a situation whereby some workers often interpret a perceived friendly / good union-management relations as signifying compromise or betray of members by union leaders. Some studies have equally shown that members' commitment to the union is predicted by a perceived negative relationship between unions and management (Deery et al, 1994). Thus the satisfaction with leadership factor in the model may be strengthened or weakened depending on the state of union-management relations in the workplace and how it is perceived by members. This situation in turn impacts on union commitment according to the model.

***Perception of Decision-Making Process (P-DMP), perception of Information Dissemination (P-ID) and UC***

Decision-making and effective dissemination of information within the union are both important aspects of a union government. A participatory style of leadership has been argued to lead to increase in membership interest and participation (Darlington, 1994; Fairbrother, 1989; Fosh, 1993). Information dissemination is vital in the sense that without it, members will arguably find it difficult to display an up-to-date knowledge of important developments within the union. The calibre of information varies and so does the seriousness with which members may view its lack or restriction. For example, workers may be not be happy about insufficient information concerning meeting times and venues but may be incensed at misinformation over wage or related

issues. Avenues through which members are informed about meetings include notice boards, fellow-co-workers or union leaders. According to Fashoyin (1987), 61% of respondents said they were adequately informed about when a meeting was to take place and the most popular source of information was the union notice board.

The rationale for investigating members' perception of the decision-making process and information dissemination as separate factors from the variable of satisfaction with union leadership can be represented by a pertinent question: would members be willing to accommodate or tolerate leaders seen to be obtaining results and getting the job done even if the leaders may be perceived as being autocratic in their styles of leadership? This scenario has been played out in the wider societal context when military coups toppling democratically elected governments in the country during the first and second republic were greeted with relief and cautious optimism in the country. The toppled politicians were so corrupt and inept to the extent that it seemed that military rule was welcomed as a viable alternative by Nigerians. Some political commentators even argue that the best government ever enjoyed by the country was the one headed by Murtala Mohammed<sup>2</sup>, a military head of state. Thus it is possible that for the Nigerian sample, some members may not be too bothered about being left out of the democratic process provided the unions are effective and dynamic in terms of winning higher wages, promotions, allowances, etc.. Conversely, union democracy

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<sup>2</sup> Murtala Mohammed, (1975-76)'s policies won him broad popular support and his decisiveness elevated him to the status of a national hero. More than 10,000 public officials and employees were dismissed without benefits, on account of age, health, incompetence, or malpractice. The purge affected the civil service, judiciary, police and armed forces, diplomatic service, public corporations, and universities. Some officials were brought to trial on charges of corruption. Singling out inflation as the greatest danger to the economy, he was determined to reduce the money supply that had been swollen by government expenditures on public works. He was assassinated by a fellow soldier in 1976.


could become an issue if the leaders are perceived to be failing generally in their responsibilities and not meeting with workers' expectations.

Related to the above argument is the apparent discrepancy in findings concerning members' perception of the decision-making process as it affects commitment. As mentioned earlier, existing findings suggest that democratic style of leadership generally tend to lead to increase in union participation. However Fashoyin (1987)'s study of the Nigerian union members seem to negate this concept. The study found that although majority of respondents (47%) claimed that decisions on union matters were taken at meetings of all workers (an acceptance of democratic process within the union), attendance at meetings was low and involvement such as speaking even lower. Further investigation revealed that when asked to identify the problems perceived to be facing their unions, most of the respondents (50%) mentioned leadership incompetence and personality conflicts between leaders. This suggests that the union officials' democratic style of leadership by itself was apparently insufficient to guarantee the members participation. Failure in other areas of leadership has the potential of negatively affecting membership participation. Thus it would be interesting to know the extent to which perception of the decision-making process and information dissemination would moderate the impact of satisfaction with union leadership on the union commitment of members.

In conclusion, a better understanding of the union commitment process for the Nigerian sample would arguably necessitate the union commitment-participation link being further explored within the context of the union dynamics described above. This study argues that there is a relationship between the union dynamics and the

union commitment process or in other words, internal union dynamics exert significant influence on the process of union commitment. Sector is expected to moderate the effect of these union dynamics (fig. 4.4). This is based on the view that differences in union settings in terms of structure, organisation, leadership factors, etc. across the public and private sector is expected to engender a significant difference in the dynamics being explored.

**Figure 4.4 Sector as a moderating variable in the relationship between IUDs, Union Commitment, Union Participation and their Antecedents.**



### ***Summary of Hypotheses***

- (1) Attitudes towards management, extrinsic job satisfaction and satisfaction with life will have a direct effect on union commitment level and union participation;

(2) Demographic characteristics will have a direct effect on union commitment levels as well as union participation;

(3) Perceptions about the instrumentality of the union, union socialization experiences, and attitudes towards union leaders will have a direct influence on the union commitment levels and union participation;

(4) Marxist beliefs and union-politics orientation will have a direct effect on union commitment levels and union participation.

(5) Pro-union attitudes will act as moderators within the model; union commitment will predict union participation.

(6) Internal Union Dynamics will exert a significant impact on the predictors of union commitment and the union commitment.

(7) The influence of the internal union dynamics will vary across the private and the public sector i.e. sector will be a moderator in the model.

#### **4.3 The Research**

The research had quantitative and qualitative aspects. There were two quantitative surveys: the first one took place between November 1999 and January 2000 while the second was conducted concurrently with the qualitative research between February and April 2002. The two quantitative surveys are described below, but first a word on the pilot study.

##### **(a) Quantitative Research**

###### ***Pilot Study***

A pilot study was first conducted to determine the appropriateness of research questions and how well they are understood by the respondents. Thirty questionnaires

were randomly distributed to the union members through the assistance of one of the union officers within the company. Twenty questionnaires were returned in all (66.67% response rate) and it was observed that the items were well understood.

### ***First Survey***

Random sampling was used in selecting the sample. Practice has been in favour of randomisation as a method for selecting a sample (Tryfos, 1996). Four Industrial Unions based in the South of the country participated in the study. The unions organise workers within the petroleum, health, and manufacturing sectors of the economy. The selection procedure was based on the criteria of accessibility and cost effectiveness. With regards the former, it has been rightly noted that one of the main problems confronting researchers in Nigeria is of a bureaucratic nature (Matanmi, 1992). Many employers view researchers with suspicion and often decline to assist them with their enquiry and it was thus necessary to have a strategy to cope with this exigency.

By working through a list of contact addresses of the 29 industrial unions in Nigeria, the author was reliably advised about the relative accessibility of some unions and also provided some useful contacts. On the issue of cost effectiveness, Tryfos (1996:60) noted that "...the practical solution to the sample problem is often to simply select as many elements as the budget and other resources permit". Aware of the limitations imposed by time restriction and financial availability, the branch unions eventually selected were within commuting distances and mainly based within townships and industrial areas with easy and affordable commuting access.

The private sector unions selected are affiliated to the National Union of Petroleum and Natural gas workers (NUPENG) and National Union of Food, Beverage and Tobacco Employees (NUFBTE) while the public sector unions are affiliated to the Medical and Health Workers Union of Nigeria (MHWUN) and the Steel and Engineering Workers Union of Nigeria (SEWUN). All the unions, which participated in the study, are house or branch unions and situated in the south of the country. A description of the settings of the unions is briefly given below.

- (i) NUPENG: *African Petroleum plc*. AP commenced business in 1954 when BP bought over Atlantic Richfield. BP became AP in 1978 when 40% of the shares were sold to Nigerians following the indigenisation decree of 1977. The company is involved in the refining, distribution and marketing of natural gas and petroleum products such as chemicals, lubricants and insecticides. The company, situated in the south of the country and formed in the 1960s has established and consolidated its position as a leading marketer of petroleum and related products in Nigeria.
- (ii) NUFBTE. *FoodTech plc* is the administrative headquarters of one of the country's foremost food companies engaged in the manufacture of dairy products, sea foods, cocoa, sugar and non-alcoholic beverages, etc. and of related products such as distilling, rectifying and blending of spirits, wine etc. The company was established in the 1930s.

(iii) MWUHN. Two *General hospitals*, and one *Health Management Board*.

There are three branch unions represented in almost every health institution in the country: one catering for doctors, one for nurses and another for Para-medical staff. The latter took part in this study and comprises mainly technicians, medical record officers, catering officers, dispensing assistants, orderlies, x-ray assistants cleaners, and others in this category.

(iv) SEWUN. *SteelTech* is a government-owned metal manufacturing company. The company was founded in the late 1970s, located in the south of the country and basically manufactures steel products. The house union, which took part from this company, represents all categories of workers below the management cadre including plant workers and those involved in administration.

#### Research Instrument

A self-administered questionnaire was used. A questionnaire offers a cost effective way of reaching a large enough sample of trade union members to gather sufficient information on which to establish statistical relationships. The anonymity offered by a self-administered questionnaire allowed respondents privacy and the opportunity to express their views in a non-judgemental atmosphere. Most items used in the questionnaire were selected on the basis that they had already appeared in published work, and that they were potentially applicable to the Nigerian trade union environment. Demographic information was first required such as state of origin, gender, educational qualification, age, and tenure as a union member. The research

instrument was also designed to assess the variables introduced in the research propositions. The dependent variables are union commitment and union participation. The independent variables are union instrumentality perception, job satisfaction, early union socialisation experiences, life satisfaction, Marxist beliefs, union-politics orientation, management satisfaction and union leadership satisfaction.

### Union Commitment.

Scales from Gordon et al's (1980) factor analytical studies were employed to assess union commitment. There were five questionnaire items (questions 6-10), which were meant to reflect a sense of pride in the union, the union's achievements, perception of other members' reliability and trustworthiness. The variable was scored on a 5 point scale from strongly agree to strongly disagree.

### Formal Union participation.

This was measured using scales that assess attitudes about participation in and knowledge of union activities. They are union meeting attendance, voting in union elections, speaking at meetings, contributing at meetings and campaigning for candidates. There were four questionnaire items (questions 22-27). The variable was scored on a 3-point scale (e.g. attend very often - very rarely; contribute very often – rarely contribute).

### Union Instrumentality Perception.

This was measured using scales, which assess the possible benefits that the union could achieve for its members in the areas of job security, fair labour practices, working conditions and overall benefits (Gordon et al, 1980; Fashoyin, 1987). There

were six questionnaire items (questions 11-16). This was scored on a 5-point scale from strongly agree to strongly disagree.

#### Job Satisfaction.

Warr et al's (1980) job satisfaction scale was employed here. Three questionnaire items were used to measure extrinsic satisfaction such as satisfaction with salary, job conditions and standard of living (questions 34-36). This was scored on a 7-point scale from extremely satisfied to extremely dissatisfied.

#### Early Union Socialisation.

Early union socialisation experiences were assessed using Gordon et al's (1980) scales. Respondents were asked to what extent they understood their union's goals (scale from very good understanding to very little understanding) and the support and encouragement they received from other union members (very great amount to very little amount). Two questionnaire items were used (questions 20-21). The variable was scored on a 4-point scale.

#### Life Satisfaction.

Warr et al's (1980) scale, which assesses satisfaction with various aspects of individual life, was used. One questionnaire item was used to assess this variable (question 37). The variable was scored on a 7-point scale from extremely satisfied to extremely dissatisfied.

### Marxist Beliefs.

Buchholz's (1978a, 1978b) scales were used to assess the belief that the manner in which work is currently organised entails exploitation by the ruling class. Two questionnaire items were used from this scale (28-29). The variable was scored on a 5-point scale from strongly agree to strongly disagree.

### Union-politics orientation.

Grounded measures were adopted to assess the orientation of the respondents. Workers responded to one questionnaire item concerning whether unions should form their own political party or not (question 27). The variable was scored on a 5-point scale from strongly agree to strongly disagree.

### Management Satisfaction.

Grounded measures were also employed to measure the attitudes of the workers towards management. There were three questionnaire items concerning whether management are fair, can be trusted and doing their best for workers (17-19). The variable was scored on a 5-point scale from strongly agree to strongly disagree.

### Union Leadership Satisfaction.

Grounded measures were employed here to reflect the way in which respondents perceive union leaders (responsible, democratic, united). There were three questionnaire items (questions 28-30). The variable was scored on a 5-point scale.

The questionnaires were randomly distributed to union members in the four establishments. In each case, the author was assisted by the contacts in distributing

the questionnaires. Typically, the researcher explained the purpose of the survey and that it was totally confidential. Completed questionnaires were then returned to the shop stewards and were usually collected by the researcher about two days later. 700 questionnaires were randomly distributed and three hundred and forty nine (349) questionnaires were returned. Preliminary examination of the data for completeness of response, legibility and other signs of the care with which the items were answered resulted in the elimination of unusable questionnaires. A total of three hundred and seventeen (317) usable questionnaires remained in the sample, corresponding to forty five percent (45%) of respondents from the four branch unions (this compares favourably with results cited by Nicholson et al., 1981, Hartley et al., 1983).

#### Sample Characteristics

Table 4.1 shows an overview of the demographic information concerning the subjects that took part in the survey. Most of the respondents have had some education, the great majority (75.4%) claiming to have attained some post secondary school qualification. There was a higher response rate in the private sector (75.1%) than in the public sector (apparently there were more willing participants from the private sector). The table also shows that the sample was predominantly male (77.2%). This seems to be a fair representation considering that the ratio of women to men within the working population in general is small and bearing in mind a suggestion that female representation in the labour movement in Nigeria is relatively insignificant (Fashoyin, 1987). The age distribution indicates that the average worker in the branches sampled is relatively young the majority of respondents being less than 40 years old. Nigeria's labour force has been argued to be between dominated by workers who are less than 35 years old (Fashoyin 1987). There were more

southerners (86.1%) than northerners in the sample most likely as a result of the fact that all the respondents from the two ethnic divisions live in the south of the country. The study was restricted to the south of the country mainly because of ethnic tension and skirmishes which made it practically unsafe and an unviable proposition to draw any sample from there at the time.

The author was unable to statistically determine the comparability of the research sample to the original population for the simple reason that reliable data on the number of union members in each participating firm could not be obtained. This situation is arguably an indication of a general lukewarm approach to book-keeping by the union officials concerned. The union officials were unable to supply current estimates of their membership due to reasons ranging from organisational restructuring and on-going redundancies (African Petroleum) to unreliability of the automatic dues check-off system (the membership figure is supposedly calculated based on the number of workers regularly paying their dues). An alternative option explored by the author was to get the information from personnel (which hopefully would have demographic details on employees). However, attempts were only partially successful<sup>3</sup>. A recent estimate for African Petroleum was given as 89 senior staff, 84 junior staff (no information was available on contract staff workers). Unfortunately this information was not available according to gender, age, etc. which would have made it possible to conduct some statistical analysis.

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<sup>3</sup> In the case of African Petroleum largely due to the fact that the author was a former employee and still has contacts within the company

The 1996 edition of “trade unions of the world”<sup>4</sup> puts NUPENG membership at 200,000; NUBFE, 32,000; MHWUN 100,000; (no figure was provided for SEWUN). The 2001 edition incidentally had no information on membership strengths, save that the total union membership in Nigeria is about 4 million. During a visit to the Trade Union Registry, the Assistant Registrar of Trade Unions (National) whom the author spoke to confirmed that there are no current reliable data on the unions as far as membership is concerned. When asked his views on the figures above, the registrar expressed cynicism. He blamed the current situation on union officials who allegedly fail to comply with the rule stipulating regular updates of their membership and when they do, some provide wrong information in order to make their figures add up for auditors investigating union accounts. He declined the author’s request for any latest figures claiming it would be unprofessional of him to supply “unreliable information”.

Nevertheless, there are indications which suggest that the sample may not be all that dissimilar to the original population in terms of certain parameters. This is evident from comparisons with Fashoyin (1987)’s sample<sup>5</sup> whose respondents apparently share similar characteristics in terms of age distribution, gender, education and membership tenure. Pertinently, both samples were randomly selected from branch unions based mainly within Lagos metropolis and affiliated to national industrial unions within the country. Based on his sample, Fashoyin (1987) described a typical trade union membership in Nigeria as young, reasonably educated and significantly consisting of more men than women. It would be fair to argue that this description is still applicable today as reflected by the author’s sample. Table 4.2 shows the

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<sup>4</sup> published by Cartermill International Ltd.

<sup>5</sup> Consisting of six hundred union (600) members randomly selected from a stratified list of 36 industrial unions based in the Lagos metropolitan area.

summary of the valid and missing responses on biographical information of the respondents. With the exception of age, where 7 responses are missing, all other responses are valid. Missing responses on age is probably due to oversight on the part of respondents or a reluctance to disclose their ages. But the survey was anonymously conducted so it may be assumed that it was an oversight.

**Table 4.1 Characteristics of the Survey Sample (N=317).**

Characteristic	Frequency	%
Gender		
Male	245	77.2
Education	72	22.7
Primary School	17	2.8
Secondary School	79	21.8
Membership Tenure	217	75.4
1 – 5 yrs	101	31.9
6 – 10 yrs	96	30.3
11 – 15 yrs	63	19.9
Sector	57	18.0
Public	79	24.9
Age	238	75.1
21 – 29 yrs	30	9.5
30 – 39 yrs	182	57.4
40 – 49 yrs	84	26.5
50 and above.	14	4.4
Ethic Group		

Northerners	44	13.9%
Southerners	273	86.1%

**Table 4.2 Summary of Missing Data**

		ETHNIC GROUP	GENDER	AGE	EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND	MEMBERSHIP TENURE	SECTOR
N	Valid	317	317	310	317	317	317
	Missing	0	0	7	0	0	0

## Second Survey

A second quantitative survey was carried out because after analysing the first survey and interviewing people, the author realised that there was the need to know more about the internal dynamics of the unions involved. The questionnaire used in the second survey had items on the dependent variables (union participation and union commitment), the main significant predictors (instrumentality perception, satisfaction with union leadership and early socialisation experience) and the internal union dynamics items. The survey took place in the same unions where the qualitative research was conducted, namely NUPENG and MHWUN. These two were used for the second quantitative survey (instead of the four used in the first survey) because they were the only 'accessible' unions for the qualitative research both of which were conducted concurrently. Consequently, these two unions formed the focus of the analysis of the internal union dynamics presented in chapter 7.

Three hundred (300) questionnaires were randomly distributed across the branch unions. One hundred and forty (140) questionnaires were distributed in African

Petroleum (AP) and 160 across 5 branch unions of MHWUN. There are three separate branches in AP: NUPENG organises junior staff and contract / casual staff separately while PENGASSAN organises the senior staff. MHWUN branches were randomly selected from across the Lagos metropolis. The branches are HMB (Health Management Board), RD (Radiology Dept), HRD (Health Records Dept), ALG (Apapa Local government) and PHY (Psychiatric Hospital Yaba). After the data had been treated for unusable questionnaires and incomplete responses, around 195, useable materials remained corresponding to 65% response rate overall (AP=59.2 %; MHWUN=70%).

#### Sample Characteristics

The respondents characteristics (table 4.3) in this survey appear to be similar to those in the first survey (table 4.1). This may be because some members who took part in the first survey probably also participated in the second survey<sup>6</sup>. There were more respondents in the public sector (57.4%) this time although the difference is marginal compared to the first survey. This is most likely due to the relatively higher number of MHWUN branches surveyed. Also with the introduction of the third category of “easterners” in the ethnicity variable, the proportions of northerners to southerners seemed to have changed considerably in comparison with the first survey suggesting that some respondents may have decided on a “more appropriate label”.

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<sup>6</sup> The survey involved two of the four unions involved in the first survey.

**Table 4.3 Characteristics of the Sample (N=195)**

Characteristic	Frequency	%	valid	Missing
<i>Gender</i>				
Male	136	69.7	194	1
Female	58	29.7		
<i>Education</i>				
Primary School	24	12.3		
Secondary School	87	44.6		
BSc/BA	72	39.9	193	2
MSc.	10	5.1		
<i>Union Tenure</i>				
Less than 1 year	24	12.3		
1 – 5 yrs	51	26.2		
6 – 10 yrs	67	34.4	191	4
11 – 15 yrs	24	12.3		
16 – 34 yrs	25	12.8		
<i>Job Tenure</i>				
Less than 1 year	9	4.6		
1 – 5 yrs	28	14.4		
6 – 10 yrs	63	32.3	195	0
11 – 15 yrs	48	24.6		
16 – 34 yrs	47	24.1		
<i>Sector</i>				
Private	83	42.6	195	0
Public	112	57.4		
<i>Age</i>				
Less than 18	2	1		
19 – 24yrs	8	4.1	194	1
25 – 34yrs	84	43.1		
35 – 44yrs	73	37.6		
45 and above.	27	13.9		
<i>Ethic Group</i>				
Northerners	11	5.6		
Southerners	141	72.3	184	11
Easterners	32	16.4		

<i>Marital status</i>				
Single	42	21.5		
Married	136	69.7		
Separated	8	4.1	195	0
Widowed	9	4.6		
<i>Staff category</i>				
Junior	87	44.6		
Senior	85	43.6	194	1
Other	22	11.3		
<i>Union office</i>				
Yes	54	27.7	195	0
No	141	72.3		
<i>Family responsibility</i>				
Yes	167	85.6	188	8
No	20	9.8		

**Table 4. 4 Response rate**

	No. distributed	No. Used	Response rate
Private	140	83	59.2%
Public	160	112	70%
Total	300	195	65%

**Table 4.5 sectors by staff category**

Sector		Staff category			Total
		Junior staff	Senior staff	Other	
Sector	Private	31	30	21	82
	Public	57	55		112
Total		88	85	21	194

### Questionnaire

The questions in respect of union commitment, union participation, union instrumentality, satisfaction with union leadership and socialisation experiences in the first survey were replicated for the second survey. The number of questionnaires given out and the response rate is shown in table 4.4. The additional items included in the second survey questionnaire were adapted from Fashoyin (1987)'s study:

1. How did you become a member of your union? This is a 4-point scale item.
2. Why did you join your union? This is a six-point scale item.
3. Relations between managers and the union are very good. This is a 5-point scale.
4. How are decisions made in your union? (this has a 4-point scale format).
5. How well informed does your leaders keep you on what is happening in the union? This has a 4-point scale format.

Additional demographic variables were investigated and include marital status, family responsibility, job tenure and office holding. The rationale for including *marital status* is based on the premise that married people may have lesser degree of freedom to participate in union activities due to their commitment. The same rationale is applicable to members with one form of family responsibility or the other e.g. sheltering extended or close relatives, sponsoring their education, etc. This category may also include single members. The relevance of *staff category* is underscored by the variation in the staff typology inherent in the two sectors (table 4.5). In African Petroleum, three categories of workers – senior staff, junior staff and contract or

casual workers – exist whereas in the MHWUN branches, there are mainly junior and senior staffs.

What is more, in African Petroleum, the senior staff workers are represented by PENGASSAN<sup>7</sup> (Petroleum and Gas Senior Staff Association of Nigeria) while the contract / casual staff also has their own union although this union is part of NUPENG<sup>8</sup>. In contrast, MHWUN organises both senior and junior workers irrespective of their grades and positions. In all the MHWUN branches where this study was conducted, both senior and junior staff belong to the same union. In the first survey, there were only 2 categories represented in the variable of ethnicity, but this was modified in the second survey to include easterners in order to distinguish them from the southerners since this was not accounted for in the first survey.

### Statistical Techniques for Data Analysis

The statistical methods usually employed for verification of the hypotheses are regression, correlation, or path analytic techniques. Though additional methods exist like Manova, logit analysis and so on, such special methods are applicable for investigating only certain research questions (and only when the data are available in certain form). Given the range of available methods, a natural question that arises is whether the choice of the research method affects the conclusions or the implications inferred. Conclusions drawn from correlation and regression analysis have been conducted for issues like bargaining outcomes (Anderson 1979a), local union

<sup>7</sup> The relevance of this union has been questioned by NUPENG who viewed it as an artificial dichotomy (Akinlaja, 1999).

<sup>8</sup> Against the backdrop of NUPENG's struggle against the use of contract/casual workers in the oil and gas industry, the decision was made by the national leaders to organise these workers under a separate union so that they can have a more effective platform in negotiating with management. At the time of the study, the union had been in existence for about a year meeting separately from the main NUPENG branch union and having their own elected union officials.

participation (Anderson 1979b), local union democracy (Anderson 1978), and arbitrator acceptability (Briggs and Anderson 1980). In particular, Viswesvaran, et al (1993) examined the determinants of union commitment using correlation, regression, and path analysis. For the particular model and data analysed by the authors, differences in inferences from the alternative methods were found to be relatively minor when comparing the regression and path analysis results, but these two methods yielded results substantially different from those generated by correlational methods.

Taking note of the observations made above, the three methods of correlation, multiple regression and path analysis were employed in analysing the results.

Although the use of multiple regression would probably suffice, the inclusion of path analysis was informed by the need to prove beyond doubt the validity of the study's findings. Furthermore, factor analysis was used to ascertain the factorial validity of the research instrument. Reliability tests and descriptive statistics (e.g. t tests, tests for mean differences and standard deviations) were initially carried out. Details regarding these tests are also dealt with in subsequent chapters.

#### **4.4 Qualitative Research**

The main purpose of the research was to investigate in detail the specific context of the branch unions in terms of their history, background, structure, union government, etc. This information is arguably necessary in order to fully elaborate on the quantitative findings with the aim of proffering explanations for the quantitative results. The study involved mainly NUPENG and MHWUN unions. The NUFBT and SEWUN branch unions were not included mainly because the author was only able to succeed in securing access in African Petroleum and the MHWUN branch unions.

The author had the rare privilege of accessing pertinent union records (logbook) and documents of which their analysis helped to elaborate on the quantitative findings.

The qualitative study included interviews with randomly selected ordinary members and general secretaries from both national and branch levels as well as content analysis of union records / logbooks.

#### Personal Interviews and Content analysis.

In both African Petroleum and the MHWUN branches, personal interview sessions were held with union officials and randomly selected members (table 4.6). The level of union leaders targeted was based on the understanding that they are the custodians of their union's records and also have more insight into what goes on within their unions. African Petroleum has two main branches in Lagos state: its head office (mainly administrative) and a depot at Ijora which also has an administrative complex.

This research took place in the latter where there are three separate branch unions (NUPENG (contract staff), NUPENG (junior staff) and PENGASSAN (senior staff) ).

In NUPENG (contract staff), there are 8 union officials: chairman, vice chairman, secretary, assistant secretary, treasurer and three ex-officio members. The assistant secretary claims they represent 90 members. In NUPENG (junior staff), there are 8 union officials: chairman, vice-chairman, secretary, vice-secretary, treasurer, financial secretary and two ex-officio members. The secretary claimed they represent between 90 and 100 members (however personnel records has junior staff workers as 84).

PENGASSAN (senior staff) has 7 union officials: chairman, vice chairman, secretary, assistant secretary, treasurer and two ex-officio members. The chairman claims they represent between 90 and 100 (personnel record however has senior staff members at 89).

MHWUN has 23 branches scattered all over Lagos state. Some of these unions often share buildings or locations with other unions e.g. National Union of Local Government Employees. The officers interviewed were based at the five branches which took part in the second survey. HMB has 10 union officials: chairman, vice-chairman, secretary, financial secretary, treasurer, auditor and 4 ex officio members. The secretary claim they represent between 250 and 300 members. In RD, there are 10 union officials: chairman, vice-chairman, secretary, treasurer, auditor, ex-officio, financial secretary and 4 ex-officio members. The secretary claimed they represent 30 members. In HRD there are 8 union officials: chairman, vice-chairman, secretary, financial secretary, treasurer, auditor and 2 ex officio members. The secretary claim they represent 50 members. In ALG, there are 7 union officials: chairman, vice-chairman, secretary, assistant secretary, treasurer and auditor. The secretary claims they represent between 175 and 180 members. In PHY, there are 10 union officials: chairman, vice chairman, secretary, assistant secretary, treasurer, auditor, public relations officer, and financial secretary. The chairman claims they represent 300 members.

The main method of interview used is the structured interview method, a method which permit comparability between responses (Patton, 1987). The questionnaire was designed with the sole objective of obtaining as much accurate information as possible concerning the unions' settings. The demographic information on the interviewees is shown in table 4.6. Questionnaires used to interview members and leaders were designed differently but in each case intended to obtain information which could help to explain the findings in the quantitative section of the research

(see appendix for the questionnaires). The sessions lasted between 20 to 40 minutes and were tape-recorded. In addition, the unions' log books and other relevant union documents (e.g. constitution, newsletters, bulletins, etc.) were content analysed. It should be noted that when reporting on the outcome of the qualitative research, the author employed pertinent data from the second quantitative to enhance the points being made.

**Table 4.6 Demographic information on interviewees**

<b><i>NUPENG (junior staff)</i></b>	<b><i>MHWUN</i></b>
1. Assistant General Secretary (branch)	1. General Secretary (national)
2. Chairman (branch)	2. General Secretary (HMB)
3. Senior Organising Secretary (National)	3. General Secretary (RD)
4. Member	4. General Secretary (HRD)
5. Member	5. Chairman (ALG)
<b><i>PENGASSAN (senior staff)</i></b>	6. Chairman (PHY)
6. Chairman (branch / national)	7. Head, women's wing (National)
7. Member	8. Research and Statistics Unit Secretary (zonal)
<b><i>NUPENG (Contract/casual staff)</i></b>	9. Member (HMB)
8. Chairman	10. Member (RD)
9. Member	11. Member (HRD)

## Summary

Attempts have been made in this chapter to describe the methods employed in the study. The theoretical framework upon which the investigation is predicated has been adapted from Barling et al (1992)'s model of union commitment and the research propositions advanced have been based on empirical findings as well as suggestions from Nigerian authors. Preceding the main study was a pilot study, which was first carried out in order to ascertain the appropriateness of research tools and techniques.

Three hundred and seventeen respondents participated in the main study drawn from four branch unions - two public and two private sector unions - located in the southern part of the country. A second survey investigating internal union dynamics was conducted and involved 195 respondents. The main statistical method of data analysis employed in the study is correlation and multiple regressions. The qualitative research involved interviews of union officials and a few randomly selected ordinary union members.

# CHAPTER 5

## Results: Exploratory and Descriptive Analysis

### Introduction.

The next two chapters are concerned with multivariate analysis of research data aimed at testing the hypotheses advanced in chapter 4. All statistical analysis was done using the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS). This chapter entails a description of the preliminary tests done to treat missing data and to establish the reliability and factorial validity of the questionnaire items used in the study. This is followed by correlation analysis and descriptive statistics used in the initial testing of the study's hypotheses. Multiple regression and path analysis were subsequently dealt with in chapter 6. Firstly, the procedure for dealing with missing data is explained.

### 5.1. Missing Data

Where data are missing for some individuals, the sum of the responses as an index was not used since the total score will not reflect the number of responses. In this situation, the mean score of the non-missing values was used (Cramer and Bryman, 2001).

### 5.2 Reliability Analysis Scale (alpha).

The reliability of a measure refers to its consistency. This notion is often taken to entail two separate aspects: external and internal reliability. External reliability is the more common of the two meanings and refers to the degree of consistency of a measure over time. Internal reliability is particularly important in connection with multiple-item scales. It raises the question of whether each scale is measuring a

single idea and hence whether the items that make up the scale are internally consistent. It is this aspect of reliability that we are concerned with.

A number of procedures for estimating internal reliability exists two of which can readily be computed in SPSS. First, with *split-half reliability*, the items in a scale are divided into two groups and the relationships between respondent's scores for the two halves are computed. A correlation coefficient is then generated which varies between 0 and 1 and the nearer the result is to 1 – and preferably at or over 0.8 – the more internally reliable is the scale. The second and widely used one is called *Cronbach's alpha*. The *Cronbach's alpha* essentially calculates the average of all possible split-half reliability coefficients. The rule of thumb is that the result should be 0.8 or above. Both split-halves and alpha estimates can be readily calculated with SPSS and since it is the most currently widely used, *Cronbach's alpha* was employed. The results are presented in table 5.1..

**Table 5.1 Reliability coefficients**

Variable	N of Items	N of Cases	Alpha
Union Participation	4	316	.7909
Union Commitment	3	311	.8314
Union Instrumentality	6	314	.8405
Satisfaction with management	3	314	.7847
Socialisation experience	2	315	.5506
Satisfaction with union leadership	3	314	.7195
Marxist beliefs	2	315	.5516
Job satisfaction	3	309	.7478

As can be seen from the table, the results suggest that all measures (with the exception of the ones for socialisation experience and Marxist beliefs) demonstrate internal

reliability. Initially there were five items constituting the union commitment scale, but one item was removed in order to boost its reliability. The reliability coefficient for union commitment was initially .6015, but deleting the said item increased its reliability to .8314. Thus one advantage of using the SPSS for reliability tests is its ability to spot 'rogue' items thereby improving overall scale reliability.

The low alphas recorded by socialisation experience and Marxist beliefs might not be unconnected with the small number of items. But this situation does not necessarily call for a discarding of the scales in question, but rather for an exercise of caution in interpreting eventual outcomes in the final analysis. It will be recalled that at the methodology stage, a trade off was done between obtaining a good response rate and having a lengthy questionnaire since it was generally observed that Nigerian respondents do not respond very well to lengthy questionnaires (Matanmi, 1992). .

### **5.3. Factor Analysis**

Factor analysis is primarily concerned with describing the variation or variance which is shared by the scores of people on three or more items. Items which go together constitute a factor and factor analysis refers to a number of related statistical techniques which helps us to determine them. They assess the degree to which items are tapping the same concept. If people respond in similar ways to questions concerning two different concepts, this may imply that the two concepts are not seen as being conceptually distinct. If however their answers are unrelated, this could suggest that two concepts can be distinguished.

In other words, factor analysis makes it possible to assess the factorial validity of the questions which make up our scales by telling us the extent to which they seem to be measuring the same concepts or variables. Factor analysis has been aimed at trying to make sense of the bewildering complexity of social behavior by reducing it to a more limited number of factors. A good example of this is the factor analytic approach to the description of personality by Psychologists such as Eysenck and Cattell (Eysenck and Eysenck, 1969; Cattell, 1973).

The initial step in conducting a factor analysis using SPSS is to compute a correlation matrix for all the items which make up the scales of all the variables under investigation. If there are no significant correlations between these items, then this means that they are unrelated and that we would not expect them to form one or more factors. In other words, it would not be worthwhile to go on to conduct a factor analysis. Consequently this is the first stage in deciding whether to carry one out. The correlation matrix for the items used in the study shows that all but very few of the items are significantly correlated, either positively or negatively, which suggests that they may constitute one or more factors.

The reliability of the factors emerging from a factor analysis depends on the size of the sample although there is no consensus on what the size of the sample should be. There is agreement, however, that there should be more participants than variables. Gorsuch (1983) proposed an absolute minimum of five participants per variable and no fewer than 100 participants per analysis. It has also been suggested that if the main purpose of the study is to find out what factors underlie a group of variables, it is

essential that the sample should be sufficiently large to enable this to be done reliably (Bryman and Cramer, 2001). The sample size ( $n = 317$ ) is considerably large enough.

The difference between principal-components analysis and principal-axis factoring lies essentially in how they handle unique variance. In principal components analysis, all the variance of a score or variable is analyzed, including its unique variance. In other words, it is assumed that the test used to assess the variable is perfectly reliable and without error. In principal-axis factoring, only the variance which is common to or shared by the tests is analyzed – that is an attempt is made to exclude unique variance from the analysis.

The first factors extracted from an analysis are those which account for the maximum amount of variance. To increase the interpretability of factors, they are rotated to maximize the loadings of some of the items. These items can then be used to identify the meaning of the factor. In general the meaning of a factor is determined by the items which load most highly on it. Which item to ignore when interpreting a factor is arguable. Conventionally, items or variables which correlate less than 0.3 with a factor are omitted from consideration since they account for less than 9 per cent of the variance and so are not very important. Many researchers emphasize all loadings in excess of 0.3 regardless of whether any variables are thereby implicated in more than one factor (Bryman and Cramer, 2001, pg. 268).

**Table 5.2 Total Variance Explained**

	Initial Eigenvalues			Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings			Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings
Factor	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %	Total
1	7.690	27.465	27.465	7.259	25.926	25.926	5.219
2	2.595	9.269	36.735	2.153	7.690	33.617	2.892
3	1.965	7.017	43.752	1.504	5.372	38.989	2.486
4	1.613	5.759	49.511	1.147	4.098	43.087	4.048
5	1.590	5.678	55.189	1.005	3.590	46.677	1.246
6	1.320	4.715	59.903	.871	3.109	49.786	4.862
7	1.132	4.043	63.946	.681	2.433	52.220	2.632
8	.908	3.244	67.190				
9	.845	3.018	70.208				
10	.755	2.697	72.906				
11	.699	2.496	75.402				
12	.643	2.297	77.699				
13	.627	2.241	79.939				
14	.572	2.044	81.984				
15	.543	1.940	83.924				
16	.510	1.823	85.747				
17	.473	1.688	87.435				
18	.450	1.609	89.044				
19	.421	1.505	90.549				
20	.386	1.378	91.927				
21	.367	1.310	93.237				
22	.327	1.169	94.406				
23	.307	1.095	95.500				
24	.293	1.047	96.547				
25	.267	.955	97.502				
26	.257	.917	98.419				
27	.229	.816	99.235				
28	.214	.765	100.000				

Extraction Method: Principal Axis Factoring.

The initial factors produced by a principal-components analysis of all the questionnaire items and the amount of the variance they account for (their eigenvalue) are presented in tables 5.2. The variance accounted for by the first factor is 7.690 or 27.5 per cent of the total variance. The total variance explained by the seven factors is 7 (i.e. the sum of their eigenvalues). To work out the proportion accounted for by any one factor, we divide its eigenvalue by the sum of the eigenvalues and multiply by 100 to convert it to a percentage. Thus the proportion of

variance accounted for by the second factor is  $9.26/28$  multiplied by 100 equals 9.2 percent.

**Table 5.3 Structure Matrix Factor**

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Union commitment4	.834						
Union commitment1	.776						
Union commitment2	.764						
Union commitment3	.665						
Job satisfaction3		.801					
Life Satisfaction		.755					
Job Satisfaction1		.677					
Job Satisfaction 2		.598					
Satisfaction with management2			.756				
Satisfaction with management 1			.735				
Satisfaction with management 3			.729				
Union participation1				.831			
Union participation 3				.697			
Union participation 2				.655			
Union participation4				.588			
Socialization experience 2				.486			
Socialization experience 1				.373			
Marxist beliefs2					.669		
Marxist beliefs1					.560		
Union-Politics orientation					.424		
Union instrumentality3						.846	
Union instrumentality2						.781	
Union instrumentality4						.762	
Union instrumentality1						.705	
Union instrumentality5						.654	
Satisfaction with union leadership2							.698
Satisfaction with union leadership 1							.628
Satisfaction with union leadership 3							.533

In interpreting the loadings, cognizance is first taken of the structure of the loadings which is indicative of the pattern of responses to the various individual items. The table (5.3) shows the oblique rotation produced by the oblimin method and the unique variance each factor contributes to a variable. All items above 0.3 have been emphasized in keeping with research traditions (Bryman and Cramer, 2001). Union commitment items appear to contribute to most of the variance overall, followed by

job and life satisfaction items, satisfaction with management items, union participation items, Marxist beliefs and union-politics orientation items, union instrumentality items, and satisfaction with union leadership items, in that order. All the items load under different factors thus suggesting that they are factorially distinct hence we can be reasonably confident about the factorial validity of the items.

#### **5.4. Correlation**

The idea of correlation is one of the most important and basic in the elaboration of bivariate relationships. Measures of correlation indicate both the strength and the direction of the relationship between a pair of variables. Correlation entails the provision of a yardstick whereby the intensity or strength of a relationship can be gauged. To provide such estimates, correlation coefficients are calculated. These provide succinct assessments of the closeness of a relationship among pairs of variables. When variables are interval/ratio, by far the most common measure of correlation is Pearson's Product Moment Correlation Coefficient often referred to as Pearson's  $r$ . This measure of correlation presumes that interval variables are being used so that even ordinal variables are not supposed to be employed, although some have debated this (O'Brien, 1979).

Pearson's  $r$  allows the strength and direction of linear relationships between variables to be gauged. Pearson's  $r$  varies between  $-1$  and  $+1$ . A relationship of  $-1$  or  $+1$  would indicate a perfect relationship, negative or positive respectively, between variables. The complete absence of a relationship would engender a computed  $r$  of zero. The closer  $r$  is to  $1$  (whether positive or negative), the stronger the relationship between two variables. The nearer  $r$  is to zero (and hence the further it is from  $+1$  or  $-1$ ), the weaker the relationship.

1), the weaker the relationship. The test of significance of  $r$  indicates whether a correlation could have arisen by chance (that is sampling error) or whether it is likely to exist in the population from which the sample was selected. It gives an idea how likely it is that we might conclude from sample data that there is a relationship between two variables when there is no relationship between them in the population.

Before proceeding to describe the correlation results, it should be noted that correlation is not the same as cause. It cannot be determined from an estimate of correlation that one estimate causes the other, since correlation only provides estimates of covariance, that is, that two variables are related.

**Table 5.4 Correlations**

	UI	SM	SUL	SOEXP	MAX BEL	JOB SAT	UP	UC	UPO	SATLI
<b>UI</b>										
<b>SM</b>		.255** .000								
<b>SUL</b>		.455** .000	.321** .000							
<b>SOEXP</b>		.349** .000	.149** .008	.389** .000						
<b>MAXBEL</b>		.128* .023	.041** .472	.085 .129	.033 .556					
<b>JOB SAT</b>		.245** .000	.313** .000	.183** .001	.262** .000	-.024 .667				
<b>UP</b>		.416** .000	.136* .015	.450** .000	.349** .000	.080 .157	.176** .002			
<b>UC</b>		.735** .000	.266** .000	.744** .000	.438** .000	.061 .275	.204** .000	.438** .000		
<b>UPO</b>		.245** .000	.050 .381	.193** .001	.232** .000	.285** .000	.140* .013	.262** .000	.186** .001	
<b>SATLIFE</b>		.099 .080	0.74 .191	0.51 .367	.177** .002	.057 .315	.606** .000	.113** .045	.097 .085	.099 .080
<b>MEAN</b>	29.87	8.49	10.02	5.47	7.90	10.88	7.72	10.53	2.67	3.18
<b>STD DEV.</b>	4.98	2.92	2.81	1.66	1.74	3.82	2.38	3.25	1.37	1.52

Upper figure = correlation coefficient; lower figure = significance

\*\*Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)

\* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)

### Definition of Labels

*UI = Union instrumentality*

*SM = Satisfaction with management*

*SUL = Satisfaction with union leadership*

*SOEXP = Early union socialization experience*

*MAXBEL = Marxist beliefs*

*JOBSAT = Job satisfaction*

*UP = Union Participation*

*UC = Union commitment*

*UPO = Union-politics orientation*

*SATLIFE = Satisfaction with life*

In Table 5.4 Pearson's correlation coefficients for the variables are presented. It was hypothesized in chapter 4 that there will be significant relationship between the dependent variables and the independent variables in the model. From the correlation results, the process of verifying the extent to which the assertions have been supported is embarked upon. In determining when a correlation can be regarded as large, Cohen and Holiday (1982) suggest the following: 0.19 and below is very low; 0.20 to 0.39 is low; 0.40 to 0.69 is modest; 0.70 to 0.89 is high. However these are rules of thumb and should not be regarded as definite indications, since there are hardly any guidelines for interpretation over which there is substantial consensus (Bryman and Cramer, 2001). The results are presented under the dependent variables of union commitment and union participation.

### ***Union Commitment***

There is a significant positive correlation between job satisfaction and union commitment ( $r = 0.20, p < .000$ ). This suggests that if members are dissatisfied with their working conditions (e.g. salary), this may not necessarily mean the situation will lead to members becoming loyal or committed towards their unions. Similarly, the relationship between union commitment and satisfaction with management is significant and positive ( $r = .27, p < .000$ ). But there is no significant relationship between life satisfaction and union commitment ( $.097, p < .085$ ).

Union instrumentality correlates significantly with union commitment ( $r = 0.73, p < .000$ ). This result indicates that members who have a positive instrumental notion of their unions or feel that their unions are capable of achieving desired objectives are more likely to express positive feelings of loyalty or take pride in their unions. The extent to which members understood the goals of the unions and the amount of support and encouragement they received from members when they first joined the unions is significantly related to their union commitment ( $r = 0.43, p < .000$ ). Thus, the early social influences that the members received from other union members seem capable of influencing the formers' sense of commitment to the union.

Union leadership attitude (satisfaction with union leadership) is significantly related to union commitment thus suggesting that the extent to which members perceive their leaders to be responsible, united and democratic is significantly related to the former's expression of loyalty ( $r = 0.74, p < .000$ ) thus suggesting that members' leadership attitudes are capable of influencing members commitment to their unions. Union-politics orientation has a significant correlation coefficient of .18 ( $p < 0.01$ ). By

implication, members' preference with regards to their unions' forming or not forming a political party appear to be related to their union commitment. Conversely, members' Marxist beliefs and their loyalty to the union appear not to be related ( $r = .06$ ,  $p < .15$ ).

### ***Union Participation***

The correlation between union participation and job satisfaction was positive and statistically significant ( $r = 0.18$ ,  $p < .002$ ) suggesting that involvement in union activities may not necessarily be associated with workers 'discontent. But this could also mean that when members are satisfied with their unions' ability to secure improved wages and better working conditions, they are encouraged to participate in union activities.

There is a significant correlation between satisfaction with management and union participation ( $0.14$ ,  $p < .01$ ). There is thus a suggestion that the notion that workers who are not pleased with management will tend to become involved in union activities may not hold true for the Nigerian sample. It could well be that members are committed to both their unions as well as their organisations (dual commitment). However this is a suggestion rather than a conclusion.

The correlation coefficient of perception of union instrumentality and union participation is significant ( $r = 0.41$ ,  $p < .000$ ). This suggests that members who perceive the unions as capable of fighting for their rights are also the ones more likely to participate in union activities. Similarly, early union socialization experience is significantly related to union participation ( $r = 0.34$ ,  $p < .000$ ). This implies that

members who had good early socialisation experience with their unions are also more likely to engage in union activities. In other words, members' union participation may be enhanced if new members are exposed to the unions at the early stage of their joining.

There is a significant positive correlation between the way members perceive their leaders (satisfaction with union leadership) and the extent of the latter's involvement in their union activities ( $r = 0.45, p < .000$ ). Thus, pro-leadership attitudes may induce the tendency to be involved in union activities. The correlation coefficients for union-politics orientation and Marxist beliefs are 0.26 ( $p < .000$ ) and 0.08 ( $p < .15$ ) respectively. This means that there could be an association between membership participation in union activities and member's orientation or preference with regards to whether they would want their unions to form a political party or not but no association between the former and Marxist beliefs.

Lastly, the hypothesis linking the two dependent variables within the model was considered. It can be seen that the correlation coefficient for union commitment and union participation is 0.44 and this relationship is significant at the .000 level. This suggests that there is a positive relationship between the two variables in the model. Thus feelings of commitment to the union are related to participation in union activities for the Nigerian sample; members who express feelings of pride towards their unions and are proud of its achievements are also more likely to participate in their unions' activities. At this stage, it is apparent that some of the hypothesised relationships are very strong judging from a relative comparison of the size of the correlation coefficients. Starting with the dependent variable of union commitment,

they include union instrumentality perception (.66), satisfaction with union leadership (.55) and early union socialisation experiences (.44). In the case of union participation, a similar pattern appears to emerge: union instrumentality perception (.42), satisfaction with union leadership (.45), early union socialisation experiences (.35). There is also a confirmation of the hypothesis of union attitudes acting as moderators within the model.

### **5.5. Moderated Relationships: Union Attitudes**

Partial correlation co-efficients were computed to test for the hypothesis that union attitudes will moderate the relationships between union commitment and participation as well as the relationship between the former and other antecedent variables within the model (tables A5.1 to 5.3). Partial correlation coefficient tests for spuriousness, intervening variables, multiple causation and moderated relationships (Bryman and Cramer, 2001 p. 247). A summary of the results of the analysis are presented in table 5.5. The role of union attitudes in straightening the union commitment-union participation link is demonstrated. When all factors were controlled, the original correlation coefficient between union commitment and union participation (.43) was significantly weakened (.07). Similarly, controlling for the individual factors exerted a significant reduction effect on the relationships with union participation and union commitment. The only exception being union socialization experience of which its control did not appear to have any major impact.

**Table 5.5 Union attitude factors as moderators in the model**

Variables	Correlation $\beta$ (Table 5.4)	Partial Correlation Coefficients controlling for		
		UI, SUL, SOEXP	UI	SUL
UC/UP	.43	.07		
UC/UI	.73			.45 .69
UC/SUL	.74		.47	.71
UC/SOEXP	.43		.16	.22
UI/SOEXP	.34			.20
SUL/SOEXP	.38		.07	
SUL/UI	.45			.66

## 5.6. Preliminary Analysis on Demographic Variables

In this section, the assumptions relating to demographic variables are tested by first using T statistics (independent samples t test) and F statistics (one-way analysis of variance). These data analysis aim to show if there is any significant difference in mean union commitment and mean union participation between males and females, northerners and southerners, public sector and private sector union members. F test (one-way ANOVA) is used to check for significant group differences in mean union loyalty and mean union participation for membership tenure, age and educational status for the respondents.

**Table 5.6 Descriptive statistics for demographic variables (gender and sector)**

Union Participation	Means	Standard Deviation	Statistics
Male	8.40	2.45	T= 2.84 (P <.01)
Female	7.51	2.30	
Private sector	8.75	2.27	T= 2.92 (P <.01)
Public sector	7.70	2.39	
Union Commitment	Means	Standard Deviation	Statistics
Private	13.9563	4.71866	T = 1.95 (P <.04)
Public	14.8735	4.80776	

The results indicate that although there are variations across groups on union commitment, the only one that appears to be significant is sector; no significant differences emerged for the remaining demographic variables (tables A5.4 and A5.5). This suggests a partial support for the hypothesis that union participation will be influenced by demographic variables. Descriptive analysis carried out to explore mean score differences on gender and sector for the two dependent variables in the model show that males participate more in union activities than females and members in the private sector had significantly higher scores than their public sector counterparts on union participation but the latter did significantly better on union commitment (table 5.6).

## **Summary**

In this chapter an exploration of research data was done including the validating of the study's hypotheses, which were advanced in chapter 4 using correlation analysis and descriptive statistics. The exploration procedure entailed the use of reliability and factor analysis and the outcomes indicate that the research instrument used for the study can be relied upon. The results of correlation analysis suggest that there are significant relationships between the dependent variables and most of the independent variables. However, strong relationships were found mainly between the dependent variables and union characteristics variables namely union instrumentality perception, satisfaction with union leadership and early union socialisation experiences.

The significant correlation between union participation and union commitment also means that the study's hypothesis in this respect has some support. Furthermore, partial correlations tests suggest that union attitudes moderate the relationship between union commitment and union participation as well the relationship between

union commitment and the former. Descriptive statistics involving the demographic variables suggest that for union commitment, none of the variables is significant except for sector. The mean score of public sector members was significantly higher than for public sector members. Gender and sector provided a significant source of variance to union participation. Males scored significantly higher than females while private sector union members scored significantly higher than their public sector counterparts. Overall, there is partial support for the study's hypotheses concerning union commitment and union participation.

# CHAPTER 6

## Results: Multiple Regression Analysis

### Introduction.

Regression is one of the most widely used techniques in the analysis of data in the social sciences and has been described as a powerful tool for summarizing the nature of the relationships between variables and for making predictions of likely values of the dependent variable. Standardized regression coefficients are compared to determine the relative importance of independent variables. They essentially indicate how many standard deviation units the dependent variable will change for one standard deviation change in the independent variable.

The idea of regression is to summarize the relationship between two variables by producing the line of best fit i.e. a line that fits the data closely. Once the line of best fit is known, predictions can be made about likely values of the dependent variable, for particular values of the independent variable. Multiple regression is used particularly when more than three variables are involved. Its analysis is eminently suited for analyzing the collective and separate effects of two or more independent variables on a dependent variable.

In this section, the main task was to conduct multiple regression analysis for the two dependent variables in the model using mainly the optimal scaling regression procedure. Optimal scaling method of regression was used because of the arbitrary nature of category coding of demographic variables within the sample (e.g. gender, sector, ethnic group). Regression with optimal scaling transforms categorical data by

assigning numerical values to all the categories, resulting in an optimal linear regression equation for the transformed variables (Meulman and Heiser, 1999). The method offers three scaling levels for each variable and using non-linear transformations allow variables to be analyzed at a variety of levels to find the best-fitting model. Union commitment was first regressed on all the independent variables and the procedure was repeated for union participation.

**Table 6.1 Regression Models**

Variables	Union Participation			Union Commitment		
	$\beta$	F	Std error	$\beta$	F	Std error
Union commitment	.206*	16.618	.051	-	-	-
Union Instrumentality	.381	53.168	.052	.466*	145.6	.039
Satisfaction with Management	-9.304E-02	3.802	.048	1.630E-02	.184	.037
Satisfaction with Union leaders	.341*	58.020	.049	.348*	77.10	.040
Socialization Experience	.155	11.102	.049	.129*	10.114	.040
Marxist Beliefs	022E-02	1.506	.046	7.033E-02	3.335	.039
Job Satisfaction	-7.756	2.794	.054	-6.004E-02	2.284	.040
Ethnicity	2.726E-02	.346	.046	-6.575E-03	3.075E-02	.037
Gender	.148*	7.399	.046	1.531E-02	.174	.037
Educational Background	6.504E-02	1.987	.046	-5.068E-02	1.909	.037
Age	-4.51E-02	.831	.050	9.730E-03	7.016E-02	.037
Membership Tenure	-7.756E-02	2.611	.048	3.244E-02	.040	.040
Sector	2.78*	10.849	.046	.157*	14.941	.041
Satisfaction with Life	6.285E-03	1.462E-02	.052	-6.118E-02	3.370E-02	.038
Union-Politics Orientation	4.105E-02	.777	.047	6.507E-02	2.808	.039
Multiple R	.668			.803		
R square	.445			.645		
Adjusted R square	.417			.627		
Sum of squares	297.0			297.00		
df	14			14		
Mean square	9.43			13.68		
F	16.119			36.57		
Significance	.000			.000		

## 6.1 Multiple Regression Results

The results of the multiple regression for the model (union participation and union commitment) on all the hypothesised antecedents are presented in table 6.1. In line with the correlation results from the previous chapter, union instrumentality, satisfaction with union leadership and early union socialisation experiences seemed to

be of greater consequence in the model. Other factors such as Marxist beliefs, life satisfaction, job satisfaction, and union-politics orientation were not statistically significant. For union participation, around 44 percent of the variation in union participation was due to the transformed predictors and the main significant predictors are union commitment (20 percent), union instrumentality (38 percent), satisfaction with union leadership (34 percent), and early union socialization experiences (15 percent). Gender ( $\beta = .15$ ) and sector ( $\beta = .27$ ) were the only significant demographic variables. The same union-related factors emerged as predictors for union commitment with around 62 percent adjusted ( $R^2$ ) of the variance being explained by union instrumentality ( $\beta = .46$ ), satisfaction with union leadership (34%), early union socialisation experiences ( $\beta = .12$ ) and sector ( $\beta = .15$ ). It can be seen that around 63 percent adjusted ( $R^2$ ) of the variance in union commitment was explained by union instrumentality (UI), satisfaction with union leadership (SUL), early union socialisation experiences (SOEXP) and sector. The F statistics indicate that the result is significant. None of the remaining demographic variables emerged as statistically significant (tables A6.1 and A6.2).

The multiple regression procedure was repeated using the linear method (table A6.3). The reason for this is because one strong feature of the linear method of regression is that unlike the optimal scaling regression procedure where all variables are entered into the analysis, linear regression's stepwise procedure ensures that only the variables which meet the program's statistical criteria, are included in the final analysis. Eliminating insignificant predictors helps to improve the overall fit of our regression equations (Flood, 1987). However, to use this procedure, categorical variables had to be excluded from the analysis in order to comply with the rule that

the relationship between the variables must be linear and the distance between them interval (Norusis, 2000). The results indicate that union instrumentality perception contributed the most variance followed by satisfaction with union leadership and early union socialisation experience. This result confirms the optimal scaling regression outcome in relation to the predictive status of the three variables in the model.

To identify the variables that are predictive of the different dimensions of union participation, individual items measuring the different dimensions of participation were regressed<sup>1</sup> on the independent variables within the model. The dimensions of participation include attendance at union meetings, speaking or contributing at union meetings, voting at union elections and campaigning for candidates during union elections.

**Table 6.2 Multiple regression: Union Participation scale items**

Items	Predictors	Multiple R	R square	Adjusted R square	Sum of squares	df	Mean square	Sig.
5. Attendance at union meetings	UI=.30, SUL=.30	.504	.254	.249	45.58	2	22.79	.000
6. Contribution (speaking) at union meetings	UI=.23, SUL=.20, SOEXP=.12	.438	.192	.184	30.91	3	10.30	.042
7. Voting at union elections	UI=.21, SOEXP=.19, SUL=.12	.418	.175	.167	32.90	3	10.96	.047
8. Campaigning for candidates during union elections	UI=.25, UPO=.21	.366	.134	.128	22.70	2	11.35	.000

<sup>1</sup> Demographic variables were excluded at this stage of the analysis because they were not significant in the basic (combined items) multiple regression with the exception of sector and gender (these were subsequently explored further). Since the initial multiple regression showed demographic factors not to be of any predictive significance, the author decided to use the general linear regression (step-wise method) for the individual items analysis. In this method, all non significant factors are automatically removed from the final equation and only significant predictors are entered in the final analysis. Demographic factors are not best suited for this method because of their non-linear qualities (Bryman and Crammer, 2000). As a rule, the relationship between the variables must be linear and the distance between them interval (Norusis, 2000).

A summary of the results showed that these dimensions were similarly predicted by union attitude factors (table 6.2). Union instrumentality perception and satisfaction with union leadership appear to be the main sources of variance for attendance at union meetings. They both contributed 30 percent to the variance in union meeting whose adjusted  $R^2$  is 0.25 ( $p < 0.000$ ) (tables A6.4). In the case of 'speaking or contributing at union meetings' (table A6.5), the significant determinants are union instrumentality perception, satisfaction with union leadership and early union socialization experience, each contributing 23 percent, 20 percent and 12 percent respectively. A low overall fit ( $R^2 = .18$ ) is observed ( $p < .000$ ). Voting at union elections (table A6) is shown to be mainly influenced by union instrumentality perception (21%), satisfaction with union leadership (19%) and early union socialization experience (12%). Adjusted  $R^2$  is around 17 percent and result is significant ( $p < .000$ ).

As far as 'campaigning for candidates during union elections' is concerned (table A7), the significant determinants are suggested as being union instrumentality (25%) experience and union-politics orientation (21%) ( $p < .000$ ). There is a low overall fit (adjusted  $R^2 = 0.13$ ) and the possibility of multicollinearity is suggested due to the high tolerance figure (.95). The occurrence of union politics orientation as one of the determinants of 'campaigning for candidates during union elections' may be explained by the apparent association between the two variables since campaigning behavior may be perceived as representing some sort of 'political activity'. A significant correlation was found between union-politics orientation and members' view on whether unions should form their own political party (Chi-square = 35.26;  $p < .000$ ;  $N = 314$ ) (table A6.8).

## 6.2. Testing for Moderated Relationships: Sector

Moderated Regression analysis was performed for sector on union commitment and the results are presented in table 6.3. The results indicate that in both sectors, instrumentality perception and union leadership satisfaction were the main predictors, accounting for around 70 percent (adjusted R square) of total variance in the public sector as against 58 per cent in the private sector (table A6.9 and A10). The connection between union commitment and instrumentality appeared to be stronger in the public sector judging from the size of the coefficients.

**Table 6.3 Moderated regression: Sector and UC**

Union Commitment	<i>Predictors</i>	<i>Multiple R</i>	<i>R square</i>	<i>Adjusted R square</i>	<i>Sig.</i>
Private sector	UI=..27, SUL=.54	.768	.590	.580	.01
Public sector	UI=..55, SUL=.36	.843	.710	.705	.00

To examine whether the relationship between union commitment and the antecedent variables of instrumentality perception and union leadership satisfaction differed across sector, contingency tables were generated, holding sector constant. Before doing this, the non-categorical variables were first dichotomised using a median split. The results (tables A6.11 and A6.12) indicate that sector is not a moderator in the relationship between union commitment and the antecedents of union instrumentality and union leadership satisfaction. In both sectors, low instrumentality and low positive leadership attitudes tended to be associated with low commitment and vice-versa and the chi square results indicate that the results are significant.

### 6.3. Testing for moderated Relationships: Gender

This section includes T test, Chi square analysis and moderated multiple regressions for males and females on the dimensions of union participation. Table 6.6 shows that men perform significantly better than females with respect to overall union participation and the result is significant.

**Table 6.6 T test for gender on union participation**

	gender	N	Mean	T	Std. Deviation	Std. Error Mean
UP	male	244	5.40	2.838	2.454	.147
	female	73	4.51		2.301	.147

(P < 0.005)

Cross tabulations of gender and dimensions of union participation (tables A6.13 to A6.16) indicate that men are more likely to attend union meetings ( $p < .02$ ) contribute at union meetings ( $p < .006$ ) as well as campaign for candidates at union elections ( $p < .09$ ). Men also seem more likely to vote than women during union elections although the chi-square value is not significant. Men perform significantly better than women on all the dimensions of union participation except for voting in union elections.

To find out whether men and women will be significantly different in terms of the antecedents of the different dimensions of union participation, moderated regression analysis was carried out (tables A6.17 to A6.24). Males and females had similar predictor variables for attendance at union meetings. In both cases, union instrumentality perception and satisfaction with union leadership were the significant predictors although there were differences in their adjusted  $R^2$ 's (males = .32, female

= .22) indicating that males had the better fit. Predictor variables for contributing at union meetings for males and females were different; for males, the predictors were satisfaction with union leadership (22%), early union socialisation experience (20%) and union instrumentality perception (20%). Female members on the other hand had early union socialization experience as the sole predictor. The adjusted  $R^2$  for females is less than 10 percent compared to 22 percent for males and a high tolerance level is observed for the former suggesting the presence of multicollinearity.

Voting at union elections, for females, is predicted by satisfaction with union leadership (35%) and union instrumentality perception (26%) (adjusted  $R^2 = .272$ ). Males on the other hand have union instrumentality perception (20%), early union socialisation experience (17%) and satisfaction with union leadership (.16%) as predictors (adjusted  $R^2 = .16$ ). For men, campaigning for candidates during union elections is determined by satisfaction with union leadership (22%) and union-politics orientation (22%) while for women, the predictor is satisfaction with union leadership (42%). There is low overall fit for both sexes (male,  $R^2 = .11$ ; female,  $R^2 = .17$ ). In essence, the moderated multiple regression results suggest that the antecedents for the different dimensions of participation appear to vary modestly across gender.

#### **6.4. Testing for moderated Relationships: Sector and Gender**

To find out whether sector moderates the relationship between union participation and gender, a contingency table was generated showing the interaction between gender, sector and union participation, holding sector constant (table A6.25). The result indicate that in both sectors, the majority of males were in the high level bracket of overall union participation while the majority of females were in the low level bracket.

This result suggests that sector did not moderate the relationship between union participation and gender. Chi square results however show that that this result is only significant in the public sector.

## **6.5 Path Analysis**

Path analysis is the final statistical method of data analysis used in the study and is basically an extension of the multiple regression procedure (Bryman and Cramer, 2001). Path analysis was developed as a method for studying the direct and indirect effects of variables hypothesized as causes of variables treated as effects. The aim of path analysis is to provide quantitative estimates of the causal connections between sets of variables. It is not a method for discovering causes, but a method applied to a causal model formulated by the researcher on the basis of knowledge and theoretical considerations. The method of path coefficients is intended to combine the quantitative information given by the correlations with such qualitative information as may be at hand to give a quantitative interpretation (Pedhazur, 1982).

Path analysis is an important analytic tool for testing causal models. Through its application it is possible to test whether a specific causal model is consistent with the pattern of the intercorrelations among the variables (Pedhazur, 1982:614). In cases in which the causal relations are uncertain, the method can be used to find the logical consequences of any particular hypothesis in regard to them. The methods of testing causal models are eminently suitable for the purpose of testing alternative hypotheses or engaging in “strong inference” (Platt, 1964).

In using path analysis, the focus is on the three variables (union instrumentality perception, satisfaction with union leadership and early union socialization

experience) revealed by the multiple regression analysis earlier. In determining the causal estimates of these variables in relation with union commitment and union participation within the model, the author intends to elaborate on earlier findings.

### ***Assumptions of path analysis***

Pedhazur (1982:582) identified a number of assumptions that underlie the application of path analysis which are as follows:


1. The relations among the variables in the model are linear, additive and causal. Consequently, curvilinear, multiplicative or interaction relations are excluded.
2. There is a one-way causal flow in the system. That is reciprocal causation between variables is ruled out.
3. The variables are measured on an interval scale. True interval variables are variables whose categories are rank ordered as with ordinal variable but the distances between the categories are equal. The other types of interval scale are strictly speaking ordinal, but have a large number of categories such as multiple-item questionnaire measures. These variables are assumed to have similar properties to 'true' interval variables.

### ***Path Diagrams***

The path diagram is a useful device for displaying graphically the pattern of causal relations among a set of variables; it makes explicit the likely causal connections between variables. Figure 6.1 first illustrates how the causal estimates will be determined using union instrumentality (UI) and satisfaction with union leadership (SUL) as examples (the arrows indicate expected causal connections between the

variables). The actual determination of the coefficients for the three variables (UI, SUL and SOEXP) was subsequently carried out as shown in fig. 6.2.

**Fig. 6.1 Path diagram for Union Participation**



An exogenous (independent) variable is a variable whose variability is assumed to be determined by causes outside the causal model. Consequently, the determination of an exogenous variable is not under consideration in the model. An endogenous (dependent) variable on the other hand is one whose variation is explained by exogenous or endogenous variables in the system. Variables of Union Loyalty and Union Participation are endogenous while variables of Union Instrumentality Perception and Satisfaction with Union Leadership are exogenous. The correlation between exogenous variables is depicted by a curved line with arrow heads thus indicating that one variable is not conceived as being the cause of the other. Consequently, a relation between exogenous variables (e.g. union instrumentality and satisfaction with union leadership) remains unanalyzed in the system.

Paths in the form of unidirectional arrows are drawn from the variables taken as causes (independent) to the variables taken as effects (dependent). The two paths

leading from UI and SUL to UL indicate that UC is dependent on UI and SUL. This model is unidirectional, meaning that at a given point in time a variable cannot be both a cause and an effect of another variable. An endogenous variable treated as dependent in one set of variables may also be conceived as independent in relation to other variables.

Thus UC is taken as dependent on UI and SUL and as one of the independent variables in relation to UP. Since it is almost never impossible to account for the total variance of a variable, residual variables ( $e^1$  and  $e^2$ ) are introduced to indicate the effect of variables not included in the model. The connection proceeds in one direction are viewed as making up distinct paths and path coefficients are computed by setting up structural equations, that is equations which stipulate the structure of hypothesized relationships in a model. The symbol of a path coefficient is a  $p$ . The essence of the computed path coefficients is now explained.

### ***Path Coefficients***


Wright (1934:162) defines a path coefficient as: the fraction of the standard deviation of the dependent variable for which the designated factor is directly responsible, in the sense of the fraction which would be found if this factor varies to the same extent as in the observed data while all others (including the residual factors) are constant. In other words, the path coefficient indicates the direct effect of a variable hypothesized as a cause of a variable taken as effect. When variables in a causal model are expressed in standardized form ( $z$  scores) and the assumptions discussed above are reasonably met, the coefficients turn out to be standardized regression coefficients ( $\beta$ 's) obtained in a regression analysis. But there is an important difference between the two analytical approaches. In ordinary regression analysis a dependent variable is

regressed in a single analysis on all the independent variables under consideration. In path analysis, on the other hand, more than one regression analysis may be called for (Pedhazur, 1975:587). At each stage a variable taken as dependent is regressed on the variables upon which it is assumed to depend.

The calculated  $\beta$ 's are the path coefficients for the paths leading from the particular set of independent variables to the dependent variable under consideration.

It has been argued that in computing path analysis with the SPSS, the critical issues to search for are the standardized regression coefficient for each variable ( $\beta$ ) and the  $R^2$  (for the error term paths). Since the path coefficients are standardized, it is possible to compare them directly. The postulated paths are shown in figure 6.2 below.

**Figure 6.2. Path diagram for Union participation**



In order to provide coefficient estimates of each of the postulated paths shown in figure 6.2, we first need to conduct standardized regressions from two equations. The equations are shown below:

$$1. UC = a + x_1 UI + x_2 SUL + x_3 SOEXP + e_1$$

$$2. UP = a + x_1 UI + x_2 SUL + x_3 SOEXP + x_4 UC + e_2$$

Subsequent to this, we compare the total causal effects of union instrumentality perception, union leadership satisfaction, early union socialization experience and union loyalty. The reason for this is to be able to identify the variable that is relatively speaking, the most influential for union participation. In essence, the aim is to be able to advance the most likely causes of union loyalty and union participation. The total effect will be made up of the direct effect plus the total indirect effect. Thus the total effect of each of the four variables (from fig.7.2) on union participation would be as follows:

Total effect of Union instrumentality perception (UI) =  $(p_1) + (p_2)(p_3)$

Total effect of Satisfaction with Union leadership (SUL) =  $(p_5) + (p_4)(p_3)$

Total effect of Early Union Socialization Experience (SOEXP) =  $(p_7) + (p_6)(p_3)$

Total effect of Union Loyalty (UC) =  $p_3$

These four total effects will afterwards be compared to establish which has the greatest overall effect on union participation.

### Equation 1


$$UC = a + x_1 UI + x_2 SUL + x_3 SOEXP + e_1$$

### Equation 2.

$$UP = a + x_1 UI + x_2 SUL + x_3 SOEXP + x_4 UC + e_2$$

Subsequent regression analysis (tables A6.26 and 6.27) show that the standardised coefficients for UI, SUL and SOEXP are .419, .246 and .150 respectively and the  $R^2$  is .425. Thus for  $p_2, p_4, p_6$ , and  $p_8$  in the path diagram (fig. 6.3) we substitute .42, .25, .15 and 0.76 (the latter being the square root of  $1 - 0.425$ ). This is the amount of error arising from the variance in union loyalty not explained by union instrumentality, satisfaction with union leadership and early union socialization experience. The standardised coefficients for UI, SUL, SOEXP and UC are .294, .182, .069, and .152 respectively and the  $R^2$  is .298 (table A6.27). Again we substitute in the path diagram (fig. 6.3)  $p_1, p_5, p_7, p_3$  and  $p_9$  for 0.29, 0.18, 0.07, 0.15 and 0.84 (the latter being the square root of  $1 - 0.298$ ). This is the amount of error arising from the variance in union participation not explained by union instrumentality, satisfaction with union leadership, early union socialization experience and union loyalty.

**Figure 6.3 Path diagrams for union participation with coefficients**



From the path diagram (fig. 6.3), there is a suggestion that the pattern in which the independent variables are related to the two dependent variables is similar. That is to say that UI, SUL and SOEXP all have higher causal estimates to UC than they do to Union participation. The  $R^2$  for UC is higher than the one for UP, conversely, the error estimate for union participation is higher than the one for UC. SOEXP appears not be very effective in influencing UP, but it does exert an indirect effect via its association with SUL (0.39) and UI (0.34) and its direct effect on UC (0.15). The variable that seems to have the greatest effect on UC is UI (0.42). The result suggests that 42 percent of the variance in the former is accounted for by UI. SUL is next most influential variable in influencing UC, accounting for around 25 percent of total variance.

For UP, UI is again the most influential independent variable accounting for 29% of total variance. SUL is also next with 18% of total variance; followed by UC with 15% and SOEXP with 7%. UI and SUL also exert indirect effects on union participation through their significant relationships with each other as well their relationship with SOEXP. The next stage is now to sum up the total effect of each independent variable in the model in order to find out which has the most effect on Union Participation. The fact that we have other variables impacting on UP and UC, but which were not included in the path diagram is denoted by the unexplained variance of 0.84 and 0.76 for Up and UC respectively. The total effect exerted by union instrumentality perception (UI) in the model can be summed up as follows:

$$\begin{aligned}
 UI &= (p_1) + (p_2)(p_3) \\
 &= 0.29 + (.42)(.15) \\
 &= 0.29 + .063 \\
 &= 0.35
 \end{aligned}$$

The total effect of Satisfaction with Union Leadership (SUL) is as follows:

$$\begin{aligned}
 SUL &= (p_5) + (p_4)(p_3) \\
 &= 0.18 + (0.25)(0.15) \\
 &= 0.18 + .0375 \\
 &= 0.22
 \end{aligned}$$

The total effect of early union socialization experience can be summed up as follows:

$$\begin{aligned}
 SOEXP &= (p_7) + (p_6)(p_3) \\
 &= 0.07 + (0.15)(0.15) \\
 &= 0.07 + 0.023 \\
 &= 0.09
 \end{aligned}$$

The total effect of UC in the model is

$$UC = 0.15$$

According to the path analysis results, perception of union instrumentality has the greatest overall effect on union participation (0.35) followed by satisfaction with union leadership (0.22) and union loyalty (0.15). Early union socialization experience

exerts the least effect on union participation (0.09). This result is consistent with the multiple regression procedures, which shows a similar hierarchical pattern of influence.

***Limitations of path analysis (Bryman and Cramer, 2001 p. 214).***

Although path analysis is very useful, certain limitations inherent in the technique needs mentioning. Basically, path analysis cannot confirm the underlying causal structure. It informs us of the relative impact of the variables upon each other but unfortunately cannot validate that causal structure. Since a cause must precede an effect, the time order of variables must be established in the construction of a path diagram. Invariably, our commonsense notions about the likely sequence of the variables in the real world are inevitably reliant on theoretical ideas. And sometimes these conceptions of time ordering of variables will be faulty and the ensuing path diagram may consequently be misleading. Furthermore, the possible confounding influence of other variables not included in the model (residual estimates) makes it necessary to tread cautiously when interpreting these results.

## **6.6. Conclusion**

In this chapter, multiple regression analysis was used to investigate the validity of this study's hypotheses. The multiple regression procedures suggest that union attitudes exert the most influence over the union commitment process. Specifically, union instrumentality perception, satisfaction with union leadership, and early union socialisation experiences predicted union commitment and union participation for the Nigerian sample. The results support existing findings which suggest that when members have a positive perception of the instrumentality of their unions, they are

also more likely to express feelings of loyalty towards their union ( Fullgar and Barling, 1989; Kelloway et al, 1990). Also members who have positive attitudes towards their union leaders are also more likely to be committed to their unions (Kuruvilla, 1995; Snape and Chan, 2000) while those exposed to their union's goals and objectives and are assisted by older members at the early stages of their membership are more likely to become committed to their unions (Van Maanen and Schein, 1979; Gordon et al, 1980).

Union commitment differed significantly across the two sectors with members in the public sector expressing higher level of union commitment compared to their private sector counterparts. In both sectors, high levels of instrumentality and positive leadership attitudes were associated with high levels of union commitment while low levels of the variables were associated with low levels of union commitment. This result seems to support the argument that differences in effectiveness of unions across sector (Marki and Ignace, 1990) could influence members' level of commitment in these sectors.

The significant influence of gender on union participation supports Gordon et al, (1980) and Gallagher and Clark, (1989). Males were more likely to participate in union activities than females; males were more likely to attend meetings, speak at meetings, and campaign for candidates during election periods. There is however no support for any suggestion that males perform better than females when it comes to voting in union elections. Males and females' attendance at meetings appear to be fuelled by their instrumental perception of their unions as well as their pro-union leadership attitudes. For male members, speaking or contributing at union meetings

seemed to be influenced by these same considerations, except that their early socialisation experience also contributed significantly to this tendency. In the case of female members, contributing at meetings was influenced mainly by their early union socialisation experiences. The tendency to vote in union elections – for both sexes – was arguably predicated on the kind of attitudes or opinion the members have of union leaders as well as the former's perception of the instrumentality of their unions. In addition – for men in particular – early union socialisation experiences is a significant contributory factor.

Majority of both males and females had never campaigned for candidates during union elections suggesting that only a few 'politically oriented' members engage in this activity; men were more likely to be in this category. For both male and female union members, attitudes towards union leaders are a determinant of the decision to campaign for candidates at union elections. Gender appeared to moderate the relationship between the antecedents of the different dimensions of participation and union participation although this moderation may be regarded as modest.

The results found no significant relationship between union commitment and education thus supporting Fukami and Larson (1984) and Magenau et al, 1988). Similarly, no significant association was found between union commitment and age which corroborates earlier findings (Bemmels, 1995; Deery et al, 1994). The non-significance of job satisfaction supports the findings of Barling et al (1990) and Deery et al, (1994). The result concerning Marxist beliefs contradicts the findings of Fullager and Barling (1989) which purport that Marxist-related work beliefs are stronger predictors of union commitment among black disenfranchised workers.

The hypothesised relationship between union commitment and union participation was confirmed and supports Bamberger et al. (1999) and Fullager and Barling's (1989) findings that commitment to the union is a key antecedent of the willingness to participate actively in the union. Union commitment, occupying the role of an intervening variable in the model predicted union participation for the Nigerian sample. Multiple regression outcomes for the dimensions of union participation revealed the determinants to include union instrumentality perception, satisfaction with union leadership, and early union socialisation experiences. Only campaigning behaviour was predicted by union-politics orientation. Union instrumentality perception exerted the strongest influence, producing the best prediction for overall union participation.

Results of tests for moderated relationships suggest that gender moderated the relationship between union participation and its significant antecedents. This supports earlier studies (Newton and Shore, 1992; Fullager and Barling, 1989). However, the interaction between gender and union participation appeared not to be moderated by sector. Although public sector union members displayed a higher means scores on union commitment than their private sector counterparts, analysis on union participation indicate that the latter performed significantly better in union participation. In both sectors, most members attend meetings more frequently than they contribute at the meetings, vote in union elections or campaign for candidates during elections. The path analysis results which also indicate that union instrumentality perception has the most overall effect on union participation, followed by satisfaction with union leadership and then union commitment and that these three

factors exert both direct and indirect influence on union participation, confirms the multiple regression findings.

# Chapter 7

## Results: Internal Union Dynamics Analysis

### Introduction

The objective of this chapter is to test the hypotheses which states that

- (1) Internal union dynamics will exert a significant impact on the predictors of union commitment and union participation (fig. 4.3);
- (2) The influence of the internal union dynamics will vary across the private and public sector i.e. sector will be a moderator in the model (fig. 4.4).

As fig 4.4 indicates, the predictors of UC and UP are union instrumentality (UI), satisfaction with union leadership (SUL) and early union socialization experience (SOEXP). The internal union dynamics (IUD) are represented by five items: why did you join your union? = Union Joining Motive (UJM); how did you become a member? = Influencing Agents (IA); relations between managers and the union are very good = Perception of Union-Management Relations (P-UMR); how are decisions made in your union? = Perception of Decision-Making Process (P-DMP); how well informed does your leaders keep you on what is happening in the union? = Perception of Information Dissemination (P-ID).

The data used in the analysis relates to the second survey (see chapter 4 under section 4.3 for details). The rationale for this enquiry and how it relates to existing literature and the reason for focusing on two unions instead of the four from the first survey has already been explained in chapter 4 (under section 4.2). To verify the hypotheses, regression analysis was conducted involving the internal union dynamics, union commitment, union participation, union instrumentality, satisfaction with union

leadership and early union socialisation experience (SOEXP). To test the first hypothesis, multiple regression was done across sector while separate multiple regressions were performed for private sector and public sector respondents to test for the second hypothesis. As this chapter is essentially concerned with verifying the two hypothesis mentioned above, all other statistical information and analysis which may be relevant but not directly essential to this objective (e.g. reliability tests, comparisons of correlation results of the first and second survey, analysis of raw frequencies involving demographic variables and IUD, etc.) can be found in the appendix section. This is to limit the amount of complications thereby enhancing an understanding of the chapter as a whole.

## **7.1. Results: Multiple Regression**

A summary of the multiple regression results (tables A7.1 to A7.5) is shown in table 7.1. In relation to the first hypothesis, Perception of information dissemination contributed the most variance to union commitment (30%) and this result is significant. Similarly, perception of information dissemination was also the most influential factor for union participation, contributing around 30% of the total variance followed by influencing agents (19%). The level of tolerance for both factors however suggested the likely presence of multicollinearity (see tables A7.1 and A7.2).

**Table 7.1 Multiple regression**

Factors	Predictors	Multiple R	R square	Adjusted R square	Sig.
UC	P-ID (.305) P-UMR (.117)	.330	.109	.098	.01
UP	P-ID (.308) IA (.194)	.364	.113	.122	.00
UI	P-ID (.283) P-UMR (.236)	.336	.113	.103	.00
SUL	P-UMR (.345) P-ID (.280)	.411	.169	.159	.00
SOEXP	P-ID (.395) UJM (.199)	.465	.216	.207	.00

Perceptions of union-management relations also appeared to be influential on union commitment although its contribution to the total variance is around 17 percent. In the case of union instrumentality perception, perception of information dissemination again appeared to be the most influencing factor (28%), followed by perception of union-management relations (19%). Union leadership satisfaction was influenced the most by members' perception of the union-management relations (34%) followed by perception of information dissemination (28%). Lastly, early union socialization experience was mostly influenced by perception of information dissemination (39%) and union joining motive (19%).

Because not all the internal dynamics were of significant influence, the hypothesis that the internal union dynamics will be related to the main variables of the research is partially supported. Perception of Information Dissemination and Perception of Union-Management Relations contributed the most variance to union commitment *across sectors*, Perception of Information Dissemination and Influencing Agents contributed the most variance to Union Participation, Perception of Information Dissemination and Union-Management Relations contributed the most variance to

union instrumentality perception, Perception of Union-Management Relations and Perception of Information Dissemination contributed the most variance to union leadership satisfaction while perception of Information Dissemination and Union Joining Motive contributed the most variance to early union socialisation experience.

**Table 7.2 moderated regression results.**

	Both Sectors			Private Sector			Public Sector		
	R	R <sup>2</sup>	Predictors	R	R <sup>2</sup>	Predictors	R	R <sup>2</sup>	Predictors
UC	.330	.109	P-ID (.305), P-UMR (.177)	.443	.197	P-ID (.443)	.301	.090	P-ID (.213), IA (.206)
UP	.364	.133	P-ID (.308), IA (.194)	.270	.073	P-ID (.270)	.376	.141	P-ID (.312), IA (.210)
UI	.336	.113	P-ID (.304), P-UMR (.195)	.474	.225	P-ID (.474)	.256	.066	P-ID (.214)
SUL	.411	.169	P-UMR (.345), P-ID (.280)	.446	.199	P-ID (.334), P-UMR (.269)	.419	.176	P-UMR (.367), P-ID (.308)
SOEXP	.465	.216	P-ID (.395), UJM (.199)	.540	.292	P-ID (.333), UJM (.292), P-UMR (.217)	.472	.223	P-ID (.364), P-UMR (.225)

To test for the second hypothesis, moderated multiple regression was conducted. A summary of the results (table A7.6 to A7.15) presented in table 7.2 indicate that sector seems to moderate the relationship between internal union dynamics and union commitment, union participation, union instrumentality, satisfaction with union leadership and early union socialization experience. In both sectors, combined regression showed that Perception of Information Dissemination featuring consistently as a predictor often combining with other internal union dynamics. But when regressed separately, there appears to be differences in predictors across the sectors both in terms of type of internal union dynamics and their relative beta values.

For example, predictors of union commitment in the public sector included Influencing Agents while private sector only had Perception of Information Dissemination although the general multiple regression results indicate that Perception of Information Dissemination and Perception of union Management Relations were the predictors for union commitment. Similarly, the predictors in both sectors for union leadership satisfaction were Perception of Information Dissemination and Perception of union Management Relations, but while the latter had the higher beta value in the public sector, it was vice versa for the former. The results suggest that sector moderates the relationship between the Internal Union Dynamics and the other variables under investigation thereby confirming the second hypothesis.

A further comparison of the public and private sector trade unions on their internal union dynamics confirms that there are significant differences across sector. 'Fighting for workers' rights' and 'increased wages' were the main considerations for the workers joining the unions in the two sectors (table A7.16). The results indicate that the majority of union members irrespective of sector had instrumental reasons for joining the union thereby confirming earlier findings which have demonstrated that Nigerian workers expect their unions to help fight for worker's welfare especially in areas concerning wages and working conditions (Fashoyin, 1987; Cohen, 1974). The results also indicate that relatively fewer people joined on the basis of enjoying social benefits thus supporting Fashoyin (1987)'s finding but negating Warmington (1960)'s.

More respondents from the public sector joined the union to get protection from dismissal. In the public sector, a higher percentage of respondents joined the unions based on the influence of friends and union leaders whereas in the private sector, more members appeared to have joined on their own volition (table A7.17). although Perception of union-management relations seems to be similar across sectors (table A7.18), it is stronger in the public sector than in the private sector. Most respondents across sectors opined that decisions are made in a meeting of all workers (table 7.19). This confirms Fashoyin's (1987) findings which suggests that in a general sense, there is an acceptance of a democratic procedure within the unions. However, respondents who believed that union leaders were undemocratic in their decision-making were more in the public sector than in the private sector and also the influence of committees in decision-making appeared to be more pronounced in the public sector than in the private sector (table A7.20).

The significant relationship between perception of information dissemination and union commitment and participation across sector confirms earlier studies which have suggested that union leaders perform poorly in terms of communicating with their members (Fashoyin, 1987; Smock, 1969). Perception of information dissemination seems to be of more influence in the private sector given that it impacted upon the dependent variables and their antecedents (satisfaction with union leadership, union instrumentality and early socialization experience) there than it did in the public sector (table 7.2). This may be partly attributed to the existence of three distinct unions within the private sector union investigated thus bringing about variations in the level of union achievement, type of leadership styles and nature of union-management relationships (three distinct branch unions exist in the private sector).

Statistical analysis aimed at investigating the influence of typology of staff representation seem to support this view (tables 7.3 and 7.4).

**Table 7.3 ANOVA results of staff category and IUDs in Private sector.**

		Sum of Squares	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1. Why did you join your union	Between Groups	20.085	10.043	2.645	.078
	Within Groups	288.522	3.796		
	Total	308.608			
2. How well informed does your leaders keep you on what is happening in the union	Between Groups	5.149	2.574	5.268	.007
	Within Groups	38.607	.489		
	Total	43.756			
3. how are decisions made in your union	Between Groups	.754	.377	.401	.671
	Within Groups	70.426	.939		
	Total	71.179			
4. How did you become a member	Between Groups	2.427	1.214	.647	.526
	Within Groups	146.338	1.876		
	Total	148.765			
5. Relations between managers and the union are very good	Between Groups	1.977	.989	1.278	.284
	Within Groups	60.344	.774		
	Total	62.321			

**Table 7.4 ANOVA results of staff category and IUDs in Public sector.**

		Sum of Squares	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1. Why did you join your union	Between Groups	9.948	4.974	1.644	.198
	Within Groups	323.770	3.026		
	Total	333.718			
2. How well informed does your leaders keep you on what is happening in the union	Between Groups	.723	.362	.396	.674
	Within Groups	97.650	.913		
	Total	98.373			
3. how are decisions made in your union	Between Groups	2.291	1.145	.785	.459
	Within Groups	145.923	1.459		
	Total	148.214			
4. How did you become a member	Between Groups	2.802	1.401	.921	.401
	Within Groups	164.297	1.521		
	Total	167.099			
5. Relations between managers and the union are very good	Between Groups	.898	.449	.346	.708
	Within Groups	137.414	1.296		
	Total	138.312			

In the private sector, members' scores on Union Joining Motive and Perception of Information Dissemination significantly varied in accordance with staff typology (table 7.3). This finding suggests that union dynamics engendered when one single union represents all workers in a particular establishment irrespective of cadre (junior or senior staff) differ from those engendered when separate unions exist within the same establishment. However, there was no significant difference between senior and junior members of staff on all the IUD items in the public Sector. Descriptive statistics of staff category and the union dynamics items in the public sector indicate that none of the results was significant (table 7.4).

**Table 7.5 how well informed does your leaders keep you on what is happening in the union (private sector)**

	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	Std. Error
Senior staff	31	3.6129	.55842	.10029
Junior staff	30	3.0333	.71840	.13116
Other	21	3.2857	.84515	.18443
Total	82	3.3171	.73498	.08117

Sig. 0.007

**Table 7.6 why did you join your union \* staff category crosstabulation (private sector)**

	staff category			Total
	Junior staff	senior staff	Contract staff	
To win more wages and better working conditions	11 37.9%	6 20.7%	13 61.9%	30 38.0%
To get protection from being sacked		1 3.4%		1 1.3%
To enjoy social benefits from the union		4 13.8%		4 5.1%
Because most people join	1 3.4%	3 10.3%		4 5.1%
the union is capable of fighting for workers	15 51.7%	11 37.9%	7 33.3%	33 41.8%
the union has more time and resources to deal with mgt	2 6.9%	4 13.8%	1 4.8%	7 8.9%
	29 100.0%	29 100.0%	21 100.0%	79 100.0%


Chi-square = 19.348 (sig.= .03)

Information gap was perceived to be greatest in the junior staff union judging from their mean score which is the lowest of the three groups (table 7.5). This result however should be viewed in the overall context of the apparent communication gap within the unions in general. Results for union joining motives across the three staff categories indicate that 'fighting for workers' rights' was the appeal for the majority of junior and senior staff whereas 'winning higher wages' was the most cited reason in the case of the contract / casual staff (table 7.6). The situation described above may have played some role concerning variations in the impact of internal union dynamics (i.e. being significantly larger in the public sector (union participation) and lower in the public sector (union commitment)).

It would be recalled that the study's two quantitative surveys showed that union commitment was significantly greater in the public sector whereas union participation was significantly lesser there. Ideally the union commitment-participation model assumes a positive causal relationship between the two variables which means that a significantly higher commitment level in the public sector arguably should have resulted in a higher participation level there. The relative impact of internal union dynamics within the two sectors may help to explain this apparent discrepancy (figure 7.2). The first two columns (upper half of the grid) indicate how union commitment is greater in the public sector (>) / lower in the private sector (<). In connection with this finding, IUD impact appears to be significantly less influential in the public sector (<) / greater influence in the private sector (>). In the last two columns (lower half of the grid), union participation is significantly lower in the public sector (<) / higher in the private sector (>). In connection with this finding, internal union dynamics impact

appears to be significantly more influential in the public sector (>) / lower in the private sector (<).

**Figure 7.2 Union Commitment, Union Dynamics and Sector**



In essence, a case is made for a possible interaction between the influence of internal union dynamics on union commitment and union participation within the public sector and private sector. Thus on the one hand, union commitment of members in the public sector was significantly higher than their counterparts in the private sector while union participation was significantly higher in the latter. On the other hand, the influence of internal union dynamics on union commitment was significantly lower in the public sector than in the private sector while in the case of union participation, the influence of internal union dynamics was higher in the public sector than in the private sector.

Thus in the case of Perception of Information Dissemination for example, the significantly higher level of union commitment exhibited by the public sector unions

may be explained as being partly due to the situation whereby members in this sector were less affected (.213) by the problem related to information dissemination in comparison to their counterparts in the private sector (.443). Raw frequencies indicate that just a slightly higher percentage of public sector members (46.4%) compared to the private sector( 45.85%) reported dissatisfaction with the level of information dissemination within the unions. However when it comes to union participation, the situation seems to be the opposite in the sense that Perception of Information Dissemination appear to exert a more significant influence in the public sector (.312) compared to the private sector (.270).

But there is another plausible explanation for the significant difference in participation between the two sectors. This relates to the members viewing their participation as a function of the goal-related costs and benefits of participation and the perceived value of the outcomes of participation. In all the interviews, union leaders were keen to emphasize the point that branch meetings usually received a high turn out only when there are financial or economic matters to be discussed most especially the ones involving wage increases and allowances. From this premise, one can deduce that that workers in the private sector who may not have expressed affective commitment to the union still participated in union activities nonetheless because they perceived the benefits as high, and the costs low. This is also known as a rational choice theory (Klandermans, 1984, 1986). Thus the significantly higher level of union participation in the private sector may not only be due to the influence of the internal union dynamics only but also a reflection of a relatively higher incidence of union activity perceived by members as involving high benefits and low risks. What these results suggest essentially is that the union commitment-

participation link cannot always be taken for granted and may have to be viewed within the context of other union dynamics present at any given time within a union.

## **Summary**

In this chapter, the study's last two hypotheses were tested. Based on the hypothesis that internal union dynamics will significantly influence the union commitment process, regression analysis was done in relation to union commitment, union participation, union instrumentality perception, satisfaction with union leadership and early union socialization experience. Results indicate that the hypotheses that internal union dynamics will exert a significant impact on the predictors of union commitment and union participation was partially supported as perception of information dissemination was the only dynamic that was significant in the model. But the hypothesis that the influence of the internal union dynamics will vary across the private and the public sector was supported.

# **Chapter 8**

## **Qualitative Research: Results**

### **Introduction**

This chapter aims to build on the quantitative findings by facilitating an understanding of the reasons why factors associated with union characteristics and perception were the most significant predictors for the Nigerian sample. These reasons cannot be taken for granted based on findings in existing literature since most studies were conducted in different settings, situations or circumstances. The questions this study hopes to answer include the following:

- (1) To what extent has the structure and organisation of the unions contributed to their commitment levels and participation in union activities?
- (2) Judging from the significant role played by union instrumentality as revealed in the quantitative surveys, how has the unions fared in this respect ?
- (3) Since evidence from the surveys indicate that leadership satisfaction also occupied a central role in the union commitment process, to what extent can it be said that the leaders enjoyed their members' loyalty and trust?
- (4) What sort of union socialisation programme exists in these unions?

The study's methodology embraced a descriptive analysis of the unions' settings and experiences using information obtained from personal interviews of randomly selected union leaders and members (see chapter 4) and analysis of union constitutions, logbooks, newsletters and other relevant documents pertaining to the unions. Pertinent data from the second quantitative survey was also used where

deemed necessary. The study involved unions based in African Petroleum company (private sector) and a government health institution (public sector). The rationale for this approach hinges on the need to draw useful comparisons between the two sectors since the quantitative surveys has shown sector to be a moderator in the model.

However, this process of analysis is not intended to investigate whether a particular sector union is more effective than the other although suggestions along this my arise at some stage. The central objective is to shed more light on the quantitative findings by examining the various circumstances under which the unions have functioned and how these could have influenced the union commitment process of union members.

The research settings are first described followed by analysis of the results which are discussed under union structure and organisation, union actions, union leadership and union socialisation experience.

### **8.1 Description of Settings**

The African Petroleum plc is located in a densely populated and mainly industrialised area in the heart of Lagos and surrounded by several local and international companies. It has two large office complexes, each serving the administrative and production needs of the company and both within walking distance of each other. The administrative block include human resources, accounts / finance, administrative, training and personnel staff while the production block is the loading depot but also has offices and factories. These are where occasional or casual and contract workers and their supervisors are based. Oil tankers, oil dealers, middlemen and contractors can often be seen milling around in this part of the company after completing the necessary paper work in the administrative complex. The company has three in-house unions each representing different categories of staff. NUPENG represents the junior

staff and the casual/contract workers while PENGASSAN represents the senior staff.

In NUPENG (contract staff), there are 8 union officials: chairman, vice chairman, secretary, assistant secretary, treasurer and three ex-officio members representing 90 members. NUPENG (junior staff), has 8 union officials: chairman, vice-chairman, secretary, vice-secretary, treasurer, financial secretary and two ex-officio members representing between 90 and 100 members. PENGASSAN (senior staff) has 7 union officials: chairman, vice chairman, secretary, assistant secretary, treasurer and two ex-officio members representing between 90 and 100.

In the public sector where MHWUN oversees the branches studied, five departments from a federal government health institution - a sprawling hospital complex located in the centre of Lagos - took part in the research. They include Radiology (RD), Human Resources (HRD), Physiotherapy (PHY), Management Board (HMB) and Local Government (ALG). These departments have their own unions representing them even though some share buildings or within the same vicinity with the exception of HMB and ALG both of which have their own separate buildings in different parts of the city but within walking or commuting distance.. HMB has 10 union officials: chairman, vice-chairman, secretary, financial secretary, treasurer, auditor and 4 ex officio members, representing between 250 and 300 members. In RD, there are 10 union officials: chairman, vice-chairman, secretary, treasurer, auditor, ex-officio, financial secretary and 4 ex-officio members, representing 30 members. In HRD there are 8 union officials: chairman, vice-chairman, secretary, financial secretary, treasurer, auditor and 2 ex officio members, representing 50 members. In ALG, there are 7 union officials: chairman, vice-chairman, secretary, assistant secretary, treasurer and auditor, representing between 175 and 180 members. In PHY, there are 10 union

officials: chairman, vice chairman, secretary, assistant secretary, treasurer, auditor, public relations officer, and financial secretary, representing 300 members.

## **8.2 Union Structure and Organisation**


Fairbrother (1989) and Terry (1993) argued that the way in which many workplace unions became increasingly bureaucratised, routinized and centralised during the 1970s contributed to the divergence in the objectives of members and union leaders. In other words, the more professional a union's apparatus becomes, the greater the likelihood of a disparity between the outlook of the leaders and that of the rank-and-file (Lane and Roberts, 1971). This has implication for the commitment and union participation of members in the sense that the situation could engender a gulf between the two thereby affecting the ability of members to form positive attitudes towards their leaders. And as already seen from previous chapters, satisfaction with union leadership is a significant predictor of union commitment. Against this backdrop, the structure and organisation of the two unions are first examined.

### ***NUPENG***

The government of the union is vested in the national delegates conference, national executive council, central working committee, zonal council and branch executive committee (figure 8.1). The supreme authority of the union is vested in the *National Delegates Conference* which is composed of national officers, zonal chairmen and secretaries and branch delegates. The union is administered in between national delegates conference by the *National Executive Council* which comprises all national officers, chairmen and secretaries of zonal councils, the general secretary and other officers from the rank of deputy general secretaries / heads of department and zones.

The *Central Working Committee* consists of the president, deputy president, 4 vice presidents, national treasurer, national trustee, auditor and general secretary, deputy general secretary, senior assistant general secretaries / head of department / zones.

**Fig. 8.1 Structure of Union Government in NUPENG**



The country is divided into four zones namely Lagos, Warri, Port Harcourt and Kaduna zones. The *Zonal Council* meets once in every three months and has the power to elect a chairman, vice chairman, secretary, assistant secretary, treasurer and auditor. The chairman presides over the meeting of the zonal council and in his absence, the vice chairman or any other member nominated by members present. In consultation with the chairman, the secretary summons a meeting of the zone. Two thirds of the members of the council can form a quorum and the zonal conference is held every 3 years before the national delegates conference. *Branch Executive Committee* comprises of the chairman, vice chairman, secretary, assistant secretary,


treasurer and a minimum of 5 other elected members from the units. Branch is defined as meaning the whole or part of the workers, employed in one particular place by a company within the jurisdiction of NUPENG. The branch executive committee is held once in 3 months or as emergency demands and sees to the proper organization of the unit at the grass root, represent the members in appropriate cases and follow the directives of the higher organs of the union in the conduct of its affairs. The branch conference is held every 3 years and the duties of the branch conference are to receive reports on its activities, plan future programmes and elect officers and committee members. Unit election is usually held before a branch delegate's conference.

### ***MHWUN***

The supreme authority of the union (fig. 8.2) is vested in the *National Delegates Conference* and this comprises national officers, state chairmen and secretaries and state delegates. The *National Executive Council* (NEC) has the power to summon an emergency or special National Delegates Conference. The union is administered in between the meetings of the National Executive Council by the *Central Working Committee*, which comprises of the Principal National Officers of the Union. The supreme authority of the union in the state is vested in the *State Delegates Conference* and comprises of the State Principal Officers, Local Government Area Executive Committee Chairmen, elected Secretaries and Chairmen or elected Secretaries of local (unit) branch executive committees. *State executive council* exists in every state consisting of a chairman, a vice chairman, an elected secretary, a treasurer and an internal state auditor. The elected officers with the chairman and secretary of each local government Area Executive committee forms the *State Executive Council* (SEC). *Local Government Area Council* (LGAEC) exists in every local government area and

conforms to the number of local government areas established by the state government.

**Fig. 8.2 Union Government (MHWUN)**



Each LGAEC has *Local (unit) Branches* in its area of jurisdiction and co-ordinates the activities of all local (unit) branches within the local government area. The LGAEC has a chairman, vice chairman, treasurer and an elected secretary. All the chairmen and secretaries of the local (unit) branches within the local government area are usually members of the committees. The LGAEC supervises the activities of the local (unit) branches in its area of jurisdiction and look into member's problems at the grassroots level. It facilitates the implementation of the union's decisions at local

government level, ensures the observance of the union's constitution and carries out other duties assigned by the state executive council. The Branch Executive Committee (BEC) is elected at branch meetings and comprises of the branch chairman, Vice Chairman, Secretary, Treasurer and a representative from each of the sections, which constitute the branch. It is the business of the BEC to provide leadership at the local level in the affairs of the union and ensure regular monthly meetings of the branch.

There is similarity between the private and public sector unions In terms of union government and structure. This is reflected by a hierarchical order which starts with branch level and peaks at national level and this pattern is typical of all industrial unions in the country. However the number of layers of hierarchy in between the top and bottom level depends on individual unions and their constitution as illustrated by NUPENG and MHWUN. MHWUN have more layers and thus appear to be more bureaucratised than NUPENG. But this situation is arguably based on exigency rather than convenience as the health sector is based on a local government system. In Lagos state alone, there are at least twenty local governments while in some states there are over thirty. Not unexpectedly, this situation often poses problems represented by jurisdictional disputes such as one which occurred between members of the Local Government Area Working Council and the State Executive Council.

One main difference between the two sectors relates to branch level union organisation in which there are three separate branch unions in African Petroleum compared to one union in the public sector unions. While MHWUN seems to have succeeded in assuming sole representation of workers in its jurisdiction, NUPENG

and PENGASSAN represents junior (and more recently casual/contract staff) and senior staff respectively in the oil sector. But both unions co-exist peacefully and in harmony, occasionally joining ranks against management. Pertinently, leaders from NUPENG often proceed to assume positions of responsibility in PENGASSAN.

### **8.3 Union Action: union instrumentality**

A union's known record of successes or failures in fighting for the welfare of workers may be partly responsible for a high/low union instrumentality perception of its members. For instance, Fashoyin (1987) observed that the majority of respondents joined unions because they believed the union is capable of fighting for the rights of workers. Arguably, this union instrumentality perception has to be context-specific and not just about "the big labour image" in order for it to be relevant to the members' commitment to the union (Desphande and Forioto, 1989). The crux of this argument is that unions should be perceived as making a difference in their specific domain in order to influence their members' union instrumentality perception.

### ***NUPENG***

NUPENG is renowned for its aggressive and combative approach when it comes to pressing for its rights or fighting for its members' welfare. In some cases this style has yielded dividends both for members and the union as a whole, but in most cases the union has had to submit to mediation or arbitration. Akinlaja Joseph (1999) is the National Deputy General Secretary in NUPENG and was its first National Vice President. Some of the cases cited in this section were obtained from his personal account of the union's travails and triumphs but the events has also been documented

in newspaper archives in the country. The accounts were corroborated by union officials in the branches where they occurred (spoken to by author).

### ***NUPENG versus African Petroleum***

Akinlaja was a former employee of British Petroleum (now African Petroleum) and was its former in-house union president before vacating the post to become the pioneer national vice president of NUPENG (while still an employee of BP). Due to the growing influence of NUPENG in the early 80s shortly after its formation, it was alleged that managements across the oil industry tried to weaken the union by attempting to promote its outspoken leaders to senior positions in their respective companies thereby rendering them ineligible to remain in the union. According to Akinlaja, he was first cajoled to contest against Dubre, the then incumbent National President who had earlier refused to rescind his membership of the union as a precondition for his company's (AGIP Oil) offer of promotion. On Dubre's behalf, NUPENG successfully opposed the company's attempt at suspending him indefinitely for this stance.

It soon became Akinlaja's turn to be promoted by his own company to the position of senior staff in charge of pump maintenance all over the country, but on a condition that he resigned his union position before the letter of promotion would be issued. Akinlaja rejected the condition and was instead issued a letter of redundancy and sacked. On informing the workers about his predicament, the company turned topsy-turvy with visibly angry workers demanding some answers so much so that envisaging a reaction by workers, the company had informed uniformed police to surround the company. Eventually NUPENG's National Secretariat and the central

executive adopted the struggle and immediately summoned a zonal council meeting wherein union branches at that level were informed and told to begin mobilizing for the struggle to get their National Deputy President reinstated. While high-powered meetings were going on, other union leaders showed up in AP installations to sensitize workers towards fighting the injustice.

Meanwhile, management adopted a victimization trick whereby workers known to be actively supporting Akinlaja were given the sack, but offered instant reprieve if they agreed to change camps. At the climax of the crisis, which lasted for about nine months, a labour committee set up by the country's Senate to investigate the matter concluded that Akinlaja's termination amounted to victimization and thus he should be reinstated. Meanwhile, all through the long-drawn battle, the union had been paying in full his remuneration and treating him like a full-time staff member. Thus when faced with the option of returning to AP or continuing with the union, he opted for the latter. In giving his reasons for this decision, the union activist reasoned

*"because a lot of bad blood had been generated, I knew that even if I returned to AP after a year or so, I would still be victimized. By then I would be in the senior staff association (PENGASSAN), which to me was not as effective as NUPENG, and NUPENG would be unable to fight for me at that stage...secondly, I realized that staying in the union's secretariat, I would be in a place where African Petroleum will have no control over my destiny".*

The whole episode had lasted 9 months.

***NUPENG versus Dresser Nigeria Ltd.***

In 1979, in Dresser Nigeria Limited oil workers went on strike prompting the management of the foreign-owned company to dismiss all of them. NUPENG stepped in, but the management refused to accede to the union's wish that the workers be reinstated and that their quest for a better employment deal be granted. The case dragged on and became protracted. With the case generating bad publicity for its business, the company finally caved in, reinstating all the sacked people. The Managing Director was recalled to the oil firm's home country and replaced.

***NUPENG versus Kalil and Dibbo/Trans-Continetal and Trans-Nab***

In 1979, the government intercepted and took to the arbitrators a case involving NUPENG and some haulage companies, Kil and Dibbo, TransContinental and Trans-Nab. The union had issued an ultimatum over the company's refusal to accede to a request that tanker drivers be paid house-rent allowance. Although the matter came before the arbitration panel, both parties settled out of court. The management agreed to pay a rent subsidy of N23 per month. The case ended within three weeks.

***NUPENG versus Schlumberger Nigeria. Ltd.***

In 1985, Schlumberger Nigeria limited moved to abolish a clause in conditions of service in which employees enjoy an automatic 10 percent annual increment to employees. The management claimed it was demotivating its workforce. This angered the workers who issued an ultimatum and thereafter embarked on a strike. Management and union eventually came to an agreement which fixed 5 percent of the

annual increase as automatic with any other percentage based on merit. The case lasted three months from 17<sup>th</sup> December 1985 to 12th February 1986.

#### ***NUPENG versus Total Nigeria Limited***

In July 1990, NUPENG members had altercations with Total Nigeria Limited. It began when the workers asked for profit-sharing concessions from the management. But after a series of negotiations, they settled for N2500 *ex gratia* payment. This came with the understanding that there would be no more cash awards, education endowments and the like. However the following year, a new union executive in the company emerged and made demands for profit sharing and house-rent allowance. Total management declared a trade dispute and a conciliator was appointed for the case. The case was dropped in April 1992 because “there should be honour in agreements” according to NUPENG. Eventually an agreement was reached in which management agreed to housing policy, which provided Total workers with home-ownership grants. No explanation was given as to why the case was dropped.

#### ***NUPENG versus Shell Petroleum Development***

In October 1980, workers in Shell Petroleum went on strike to protest against the company’s decision not to ratify a state issued income-policy in which the regulation stipulated 15 percent as the maximum adjustment that could be negotiated for salaries in the low-income group. Shell management thought this was not relevant to them having given workers over 15 percent adjustments earlier that year. The workers insisted that it applied to the company since this was a new directive by government. The Industrial Arbitration Panel ruled in favour of the management on the ground that the management had earlier granted a more competitive increment than the one

contained in the government regulation. But the panel ordered the management to refund the workers' pay for the period of the strike. The case lasted 10 months.

#### ***NUPENG versus NNPC***

In July 1982, the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation workers asked for some allowances including utility, shift, chemical, out-of-station and housing. They also asked for free products so that like workers in Lever Brothers who get soap and other company products, NNPC employees could get petroleum products which their company produced. But management rejected their demand making the workers to embark on a strike action to press home their requests. Based on the trade dispute declared by NNPC against NUPENG the tribunal ordered the action called off. The management then deducted from the workers' salaries the sum it calculated to be equivalent to the 11 days the strike lasted, following this up with a lockout of the 13 branch leaders of the union. In reciprocation, the union prevented the entire NNPC workforce from resuming. Immediately, the tribunal ruled that preventing the 13 branch leaders of the union from entering the compound was victimization and ordered that they be allowed to return to their duty posts. It also frowned at the no-work no-pay response of NNPC to the strike and ordered that money deducted from the workers' salary be refunded. The trial went on and at the end the IAP failed to give the workers any favorable award on the items that originally led to the trade dispute. The case spanned almost two years.

#### ***NUPENG versus GULF***

In March 1982, workers in Gulf oil commenced a strike action in all the company's locations. This led to the termination of the appointment of four union members on

10 March 1982, which the workers fought to redress with another strike. The company then applied the *no-work no pay rule*. The management alleged that during the strike, four workers at Abiteye Flow station committed sabotage by opening valves to waste crude oil, apart from other misdemeanors. Members of the Arbitration Panel moved to the location of the alleged sabotage but saw no evidence of oil spillage; they became convinced that the allegation was not true. The IAP ordered the embattled workers' recall, while money deducted from staff pay during the strike period should be refunded. The case at this level started on 30<sup>th</sup> March 1982 and ended on 30<sup>th</sup> of July 1985, a period of two years and four months. But gulf oil proceeded to file a protest to the National Industrial Court (NIC), on the ground that the company had appealed the IAP judgment. Two years later, on 2<sup>nd</sup> June 1987, the industrial court reversed the IAP judgment, meaning that the termination of the four workers' appointment stood and the no-work, no-pay status on all the staff subsisted. According to Akinlaja, the industrial appeal court did not visit the depots but only relied on the documented evidence presented by the parties. In all the case spent five years going through the two levels of adjudication.

#### ***NUPENG versus NUHPSW***

In 1992, an inter-union dispute occurred between the National Union of Hotel and Personal Services and NUPENG. The NUHPSW declared a trade dispute against NUPENG over the oil union's jurisdiction. In the oil sector, industrial caterers work for petroleum companies offshore on the high seas and in the firm's guesthouses. On the superficial level, their profession – catering – places them with hotel and personnel services workers but by virtue of work location, convenience, environment and association, they had always fallen within the ambit of NUPENG. In 1992,

NUHPSW said these industrial caterers should be within its own fold and accused NUPENG of usurping the hotel union's authority over them. The IAP ruled in favour of the hotel union. But NUPENG protested the judgment and appealed to the National Industrial Court, which, also upheld the verdict of the lower of the lower of tribunal.

Despite NUPENG's plea on freedom of association, the arbitration panel and the industrial court declared that freedom of association had its own limit and that it must be subjective to "partitioning". The whole process took five years from 1992 to 1997. An interesting aspect of this case is that even today and despite the judgments, it has been impossible for NUHPSW to organize catering in the oil industry. The workers have stubbornly insisted that they belong to the petroleum industry and that their interests were best catered for by NUPENG. Caterers in the oil industry may have by themselves weighed the advantage of being classified as oil workers and concluded that the economic gains often won through NUPENG's intervention far outweighed the political. And the caterers seem determined that a thousand unfavourable judgments will not be allowed to rob them of those gains. At the same time, oil caterers work in similar condition as petroleum workers, eating the same food, taking the same risks in the same environments (on the rigs over the waters of the Atlantic Ocean, in ships or within boats in the swamp). The whole drama exposed the fact that court judgments sometimes are at variance with realities on the ground.

#### ***NUPENG versus Chevron.***

Chevron employs a system of labour contractors, retained by the company to assist in hiring contract staff throughout the company's operational bases in Lagos, Port

Harcourt, Escravos and Warri. In a move to implement a standing agreement with employers and government, the union made moves to unionize the contract workers. However, apparently aiming to puncture this move, Chevron introduced a “service contract” clause in the relationship with its middlemen contractors, making it mandatory to renew their contract yearly with the company. Pressure was thus brought on the contractors to ensure they sacked union activists in their work force or they would have their contracts with Chevron revoked. Two companies soon ran into problem with Chevron. Without thought as to terminal benefits for their workers, Olayinka and Sons and Queeneth Gibson Nigeria Limited had their contracts revoked in December 1998 and February 1999 respectively.

The others quickly got the message, which Chevron used these scapegoats to pass across. In March another contract company Delog Nigeria Ltd. sacked 11 workers, many of them leaders of the emerging NUPENG unit. Workers of Delog Nigeria Ltd. joined by their counterparts in T.A. Amusah and Sons went on strike to press for the reinstatement of their colleagues. The two companies sacked all of them, meaning that 400 workers lost their jobs. Soon a full-scale crisis loomed in the oil industry. Chevron workers went on strike to protest the shoddy treatment meted out to their leaders while other oil workers prepared for a fight. Well aware of the embarrassment the crisis promised the nation in the face of its hosting Nigeria’99 (the under 21 FIFA World Cup), Chevron management bowed. It called the oil workers for talks and all those sacked were reinstated.

### ***NUPENG versus PTI***

The case of Petroleum Training Institute and NUPENG started in 1979 and was concluded in 1994 – 15 years. Later, the petroleum institute enjoyed a pride of place as the sole specialized higher institution that prepared skilled middle-level manpower for the oil industry. The workers and the nation felt the school should enjoy similar conditions of service with NNPC, a parastatal within the oil industry. Both organizations happened to belong to the Federal government. But while NNPC employers enjoyed a unique salary scale, almost competing with the enhanced package in the private sector of the oil company, the PTI kept its workers on a condition of service similar to that which obtained in the relatively unimpressive civil service.

While the union demanded for workers in the institute to be placed on a par with colleagues in the NNPC, the school's management fought to maintain the status quo. Several negotiations later and the school's management still failed to yield, then workers gave a notice of strike. This led the management to declare a trade dispute thus provoking the intervention of the federal ministry of labour which forwarded the case to the Industrial Arbitration Panel. NUPENG lost at the IAP level in 1990. However, NUPENG protested the ruling of the panel and the minister for labour referred the case to the National Industrial Court. Eventually the case ended in 1994 and the verdict was in favour of NUPENG. The implication of this being that some workers who were earning about N1,500 a month instantly shot into an enhanced salary bracket of N10,000. The 1994 judgment also stipulated that the petroleum ministry should pay PTI staffers 10 years arrears of the new salaries, allowances and

benefits beginning from 1984. Many were able to build houses from the millions they received as arrears.

The arbitration procedure has its positive aspects of which the main ones appear to be its prevention of total anarchy in industrial relations within the country and providing a forum and opportunity for disputing parties to come to an amicable settlement. But the process can be too long. The slow processes are sometimes - rightly or wrongly - perceived by workers as deliberate delaying tactics employed by managements. But the problem is that with its composition of two workers' representatives and two employers' representatives, at best, there can only be two courts sitting simultaneously. For a body that is supposed to adjudicate for a work force reputed to be over 20 million-strong, that is grossly inadequate.

There are certain disputes that unionists treat very seriously, such as a company terminating the employment of a particular member because he is a trade union activist. At the arbitration panel, the longer such a dispute lasts, the worse for the worker who is out of employment, no salary; his family suffers. Thus a lengthy period of adjudication becomes injurious to this employees' interest. The GULF employees who had to wait for two years to find out they would never be reinstated after all said and done must have felt let down by the system. Similarly, even though the case of the PTI workers ended on a good note, it took a total of 17 years (it took an extra two years to implement the court's verdict) – a case of justice delayed, justice denied.

The experience of the GULF workers demonstrates why NUPENG favours the aggressive approach and direct dealing with management rather than proceeding to the tribunal. The union tries as much as possible to minimize taking industrial cases beyond the employer-employee level and believes in dropping any issue failing to be resolved at that point. Thus the union rarely declares a trade dispute. But an employer may prefer to declare a trade dispute when negotiations for a collective agreement breaks down, preferring to waste two years at the industrial arbitration knowing full well that during this period, he would have saved a lot money for the company. In this situation, to tackle such an opportunistic move by employers seeking the slow wheels of the law as safe haven, the union devised means of hurting such firms economically not by embarking on direct strike. The economic weapon could include workers shunning overtime. Alternatively they may decide to compromise efficiency. For example, instead of treating a file in two minutes, they may spend three hours working on it. NUPENG employed this style in the early eighties until the employers stopped taking undue advantage of the slow pace of the arbitration tribunal.

Some of the instances described earlier above suggest that NUPENG is a dynamic, and results-oriented union. It can be argued that most workers will not necessarily blame the union for the losses encountered in the process of submitting to arbitration since it is entrenched in law. Nevertheless, in spite of the bureaucratic bottleneck that is the IAP and the NIC, NUPENG has been instrumental in obtaining positive outcomes for its members across its numerous branches ranging from enhanced salary, allowances and other benefits as well as improved working conditions. For example, in terms of the minimum wage, NUPENG agitation has made a significant

difference. Before NUPENG started, the average worker was said to made do with no more than N500. That workers' salary today stands at about N40,000 a month<sup>1</sup>. A haulage worker used to earn N60 a month, with tanker drivers getting about N100, now it has shot up to N7,000 on the average. The seismic sector received a fillip from about N200 pre-NUPENG era, but at the present now receives N15000.

Another example can be seen in the matter of "casual workers". Because part of the oil business is seasonal, especially the exploration part, it becomes inevitable for petroleum companies to hire "contract staff" or "casual workers". Such people's tenure expires as soon as the season closes or the contract ends. And in a short period, these ad hoc staffers find themselves back on the unemployment queue. Because of the nature of the relationship, oil companies – many of them believing that they are doing such employees a favour – show little or no obligation to their welfare. The conditions of service most often tilts heavily in favour of oil firms.

In 1992, NUPENG elected to lighten the cross of these casuals. A meeting was held with government representatives with a view to organizing these contract staff (whether on season or monthly employment) into the union. The idea soon became a reality. A collective agreement was negotiated leading to improved conditions of service which for many would result in higher wages; from a take home pay of N1500 per month to between N6,000 and N15000. (However as the experience of contract staff workers in African Petroleum has demonstrated, this collective agreement is not

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<sup>1</sup> These figures need to be put in perspective in view of prevailing rates of inflations in the country. According to the Federal Office of Statistics (*Statistical News, January 2002*), between December 2000 and December 2001, the average consumer price level rose by 16.5 percent. During the same period, the urban and rural indices showed increases of 16.8 and 16.4 percent respectively. The average annual rate of consumer retail prices in 2001 was 18.9 percent. This means that a fixed market basket of consumer goods and services purchased for N100.00 on the average in 2000 sold for N118.9 on the average in 2001.

automatic and apparently is not being honored by some employers hence the renewed campaign by NUPENG in this regard).


In 2001, NUPENG (junior staff) successfully fought for an increase in their rent allowance. Furthermore, in the same year, the member was able to buy a car from a car grant given to junior staff workers as a result of the union's insistence. Another member cited a personal experience of how instrumental the union is to the resolution of a personal issue. He said

*"I came in with ND (National Diploma) certificate and observed that I have to become a full graduate before I can move to the senior cadre and when I was coming in we were about five. The other four people because of their geographical background were given supervisory grades but I was given a grade three (clerical grade) and we read the same thing and had the same qualification. I decided to further my education which I have done and now I am a B.Sc. holder in Business Administration as well as a Chartered Administrator. Having submitted my certificate, the management now said it is no more automatic (i.e. upgrade to senior cadre) whereas before it used to be automatic. I channeled my problem to the union and they have promised to take the issue up as soon as the on-going downsizing programme within the company is completed".*


Furthermore, at the time of the research, the unions had just successfully secured a deal with management concerning the downsizing exercise which was to see a significant reduction in the population of the workforce in the company. Although the names of the affected workers were yet to be released at the time, every worker the

author spoke to was happy about the deal and said they did would not mind if they were to go or stay. In fact, one member told the author he knew he would not be affected but would actually prefer to be! Apparently, the pay-off was very substantial. Thus in a broad sense, the unions (in general) seem to enjoy a good reputation as far as instrumentality is concerned.

**Fig. 8.3: this union is capable of fighting for workers (N= 83)**



**Fig. 8.4: this union is capable of ensuring that the jobs of members are safe (N = 83).**



This is supported by the responses of the workers to the individual items of the union instrumentality scale<sup>2</sup> (figs. 8.3 and 8.4). However, analysis by staff category indicate that compared to PENGASSAN, NUPENG members (junior and contract staff) seem to have a higher union instrumentality perception as suggested by their mean scores (table 8.1). Even some PENGASSAN members themselves (whom the author spoke to) also expressed the opinion that NUPENG is more effective than their union. A comparison of the degree of sentiments about the perceived instrumentality of the respective unions in fighting for workers is shown in table 8.2. Around 48 percent (Junior staff) and 57 percent (contract staff) of NUPENG members “*strongly agree*” compared to PENGASSAN’s 3 percent. It is therefore not surprising that when it comes to union commitment, NUPENG members had the higher mean scores (table 8.3).

**Table 8.1 Union Instrumentality Perception in AP**

	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	F	Sig.
junior staff (NUPENG)	31	25.3871	3.26269	8.155	.001
Senior staff (PENGASSAN)	30	22.5333	2.88556		
Contract staff (NUPENG)	21	25.6190	3.48534		
Total	82	24.4024	3.46004		

<sup>2</sup> As mentioned earlier at the beginning of this chapter, the data used in this section was from the second quantitative survey involving NUPENG and MHWUN respondents. Wherever appropriate, analysis of the workers’ responses to a few selected individual scale items of union instrumentality, satisfaction with union leadership and union socialization experience was used to further elaborate on the qualitative study.

**Table 8.2 This union is capable of fighting for workers \*staff category**

	staff category			Total
	junior staff (NUPENG)	senior staff (PENGASSAN)	Contract staff (NUPENG)	
strongly disagree			1 4.8%	1 1.2%
Disagree	1 3.2%	1 3.3%	1 4.8%	3 3.7%
not sure	1 3.2%	4 13.3%	1 4.8%	6 7.3%
Agree	14 45.2%	24 80.0%	6 28.6%	44 53.7%
strongly agree	15 48.4%	1 3.3%	12 57.1%	28 34.1%
Total	31 100.0%	30 100.0%	21 100.0%	82 100.0%

Chi-square = 25.57 p = .001.

**Table 8.3 Union Commitment in AP**

	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	F	Sig.
Junior staff (NUPENG)	30	21.2000	2.89351	10.897	.000
Senior staff (PENGASSAN)	30	17.6806	4.14755		
Contract staff (NUPENG)	21	21.3810	2.57830		
Total	81	19.9434	3.73998		

One senior staff in describing the NUPENG members remarked:

*“...those guys are more committed than us...I respect those guys...they know what they want and go all out to get it... normally we wait for them to make the first move.. you know, due to our position some us hesitate ”.*

This line of thinking underscores a major reason why NUPENG appear to be more effective in AP than PENGASSAN. Some of the senior workers believe they have more to forfeit should they decide to appear active in the union. Many may not be

willing to make such sacrifice, especially those who think they have a realistic chance of climbing up to the management cadre.

#### ***MHWUN***

MHWUN has also been relatively useful in representing the interests of its members at all levels. An example of this on a non-branch level is the incident of June 1989 in which the national secretariat was challenged by the federal area council over the sacking of staffers at the headquarters. Although it seems ironic that the union should be accused of unfair dismissal of its workers, yet the way the federal area council officials rose to the defense of its staff (maintained by the national secretariat) demonstrates its instrumentality in this respect. To investigate the record of the union the logbook of the Federal Area Council executive meetings was analyzed. Some meetings were normal executive meetings while others were emergency meetings. The contents of the minutes are presented below (table 8.4).

**Table 8.4. Union Activities**

<b>Date</b>	<b>Notes</b>
13/04/1988	Discussed the removal of the petroleum subsidy by government, its effect on members and how the union should respond.
13/06/1989	The union deliberates on the petition received from some retrenched staffers of the union. The matter received due attention.
10/10/1989	a 30-day ultimatum was given to the federal government to release enabling circular on the union's scheme of service.
23/02/1991	The union demanded immediate adjustment and payment of the minimum wages for members, payment of shift duty allowance and extension of the health salary scale to all health workers. The government accepted to effect the adjustment of the USS minimum wage as requested, confirmed that shift duty allowance would be paid, the minimum wage adjusted USS salaries would be paid while the implementation of the health salary scale was awaiting only circular from the establishment.

24/11/2001	An ultimatum was given to the Federal Government concerning wage/benefits issue.
02/12/2001	Decision was taken to embark on a nation-wide strike on the issue of 22% basic salary increase for workers in the teaching and specialist hospital as contained in an IAP (Industrial Arbitration Panel) award.
12/01/2002	A review of fringe benefits and salary structure for employees in the public service was done. Negotiations between the union and the government had been concluded for an elongated salary grade levels and improved fringe benefits. Satisfaction was expressed concerning the agreement and the efforts of the National Secretariat toward the achievement was acknowledged.
4/3/2002	The General Secretary wrote: "strike action ... was very effective. Branches co-operated with the council by enforcing the strike in their domain despite some management opposition to the strike action. Management used police patrol to terrorize members and the branch officers. In all these, the council were able to counter their action by effectively mobilizing against their (management's) wishes. The refusal of management to pay the December salaries as earlier reported has been reversed and salaries have been paid to members. Although management refused to pay full salary for January, a reasonable agreement was reached between management and the union".

Also, the way and manner the union has pursued the minimum wage issue with government and managements in the various branches also gives an impression of a dynamic and vibrant union. As an attestation to the union's fighting spirit, in May 2000, the federal government approved a new harmonized public service salary structure (HAPSS) and associated allowances for the federal public service. The allowances covers rent subsidy, transport, meal subsidy, utility, etc. The union's use of the strike option to pursue the realization of its demands underscores its resolve to use every appropriate means available to fight for its members. And generally, its members seem to comply with its directives concerning industrial action thus highlighting the former's confidence in the union. The union's calling off its strike

action in the wake of the occurrence of a major bomb blast in Lagos so its members can help to alleviate the situation also demonstrates its magnanimity. It is thus not at all surprising that majority of those who participated in the study expressed a positive instrumental perception of their union.

#### **8.4. Union Leadership**

The literature points to the key role of the union leader in membership behaviour and attitude with some emphasis on the importance of union leaders meeting the aspirations and expectations of membership if they are to maintain the latter's commitment (Nicholson et al, 1980; Fullagar and Barling, 1992; Barling et al, 1992; Gallagher and Clark, 1989). The style and character of leadership exerts a critical influence on how the union organization is responsive to general membership aspirations and the way in which collective awareness and the activism of the mass of workers is stimulated (Hyman, 1979). Fosh (1993) identified how the changing patterns of swells and depressions in membership participation were influenced by leadership style. Fashoyin (1987) observed an inverse relationship between members' union involvement and the autocratic behaviour of union leaders.

#### ***NUPENG***

The role of the union leader in facilitating the union commitment of members is thus very important. This can be illustrated by citing the issue of arbitration for instance. Supposing a matter is referred to the Industrial Arbitration Panel and the panel gives an order (since it has the power to give such order) that there should be *status quo ante*. In other words, everything should return to the pre-strike situation (no strike by workers, no lock-out by employers), pending the determination of the case. Although

the disputants are not compelled to obey the order, like in majority of cases, these particular parties obey.

But obedience to the arbitrating panel's order remains a function of the confidence workers repose in their leaders. Once an order is given and the leaders are willing that the order be obeyed, it would be obeyed as long as the workers have confidence in them. But should the workers' confidence in their union leaders be in question, they would not obey (especially when they consider the order as being opposite to their desires), although this would not be in direct challenge of the IAP or its order. There have been other instances which suggest that union leaders in NUPENG enjoy the support of the majority of their members. And when members have confidence in their leaders, they seem willing to go to any length to stand by them. The case of Akinlaja versus the African Petroleum management (already referred to above) is a typical example of the extent to which workers would react when a popular leader is perceived to be victimized.

Similarly, there was an incident in 1983 during a period of crisis in NUPENG in which a union leader called for a meeting at Shell premises in Warri (South-East Nigeria). At the meeting, the leader briefed the gathering of an encounter he had with the police earlier that day, and warned that he could be arrested in the course of or after the meeting, but felt that he owed an obligation to honour a meeting he himself had called no matter the risks involved. The leader asked them if they wanted him to call off the meeting to which the over hundred workers present responded in the negative. "What will happen if they come to pick me?" he asked them to which they replied: "all of us will go with you." He was in the middle of his speech when armed

policemen stormed the venue. The gathered workers formed a human barricade around him, but he pacified them and asked to speak to the police. Afterwards, the meeting (with the police) lasted for about an hour before he finally went with them to the police station, trailed by the crowd of oil workers. At the station, the workers, quite infuriated, chanted solidarity songs, inviting the DPO to use tear gas to disperse them. They demanded to know the interest of the police in the matter since their meeting had been a worker's meeting and peaceful. Eventually, the leader was freed and left with his workers entourage amidst the chant of solidarity songs.

Another incident which portrays the confidence workers repose in their leaders occurred in 1979 at Keydril Nigeria limited. Workers had gone on strike to protest the delay of implementation of a successful negotiated conditions of service in the company. The scene of the workers' strike was a rig on the high seas off Nigeria's south-east coastline. Up till the time negotiations towards calling off the strike broke down, the management made contact with the workers through a two-way radio. The site was only approachable by helicopter but workers prevented any helicopter from landing by putting huge metal drums on the helipad. To beat the workers, the employers devised a trick which capitalized on the trust the workers reposed in the union. A radio message was dispatched to the workers that the deputy general secretary of NUPENG from Lagos was coming in the helicopter to hold discussions with them thus they should clear the helipad for him to land. The strategy paid off. Such was the employee's faith in the union that they readily bought the idea of discussing their grievances with a NUPENG official. They cleared the pad. When the craft

landed on the rig, troops of mobile policemen stormed out from the helicopter and took over the place.

But it must be noted that not all workers share the same perception of their leaders and thus it is necessary to consider both sides of the issue. Hardly do members offer unconditional allegiance to union officials or exercise blind faith in a union leadership. Leaders must have to earn their members' confidence and support. Thus, the conduct and practices of union leaders are always subject to members' scrutiny and it is not unusual for members to sometimes question their leaders' actions or even accuse them of wrong-doing (e.g. selling out to management, corruption, ineffectiveness, etc.). For instance, some of the members interviewed in African petroleum seem to have an ambivalent attitude towards their union leaders.

On the one hand, the leaders are applauded for their dynamism and dedication (fig. 8.5 and fig 8.6) but in the same breath are accused of not being forthright. The members appear to differ in their opinion as to whether leaders sometimes sell out during negotiations with management. For example one member of NUPENG (junior staff) said


*“...union officials want to be on the side of management instead of fighting directly for the workers' welfare”.*

*Another member from the same union disagreed: “*


*...although other people may view the union as a sell-out, from my own experience, I have not seen my union sell us out because we have a very virile union that will come to*

*you and even swear by their family, so that shows the level of trust".*

**Fig. 8.5 union leaders are very hardworking (N = 83)**



**Fig. 8.6 union leaders are very effective (N= 83)**




But there seem to be a general consensus that the leaders have fallen short of member's expectations in the area of information dissemination. There were complaints which suggests that some leaders hoard information and/or are not easily accessible (fig. 8.7). For example, one NUPENG interviewee said that

*"the issue of information has always been a serious bone of contention we members have with our leaders because of their tendency not to inform us on what is happening".*

Thus accordingly, information dissemination was relatively poorer in NUPENG (table 8.5). An investigation into how the unions pass across information to members revealed that in NUPENG (junior staff) and PENGASSAN the methods are via word of mouth and use of notice boards while in NUPENG (contract staff) the method is by word of mouth only.

**Fig. 8.7 how well does your leaders keep you informed on what is happening in the union? (N =83)**



**Table 8.5 how well informed does your leaders keep you on what is happening in the union**

	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	F	Sig.
junior staff (NUPENG)	31	3.6129	.55842	5.268	.007
senior staff (PENGASSAN)	30	3.0333	.71840		
Contract staff (NUPENG)	21	3.2857	.84515		
Total	82	3.3171	.73498		

\* Mean score is inversely proportionate to information dissemination. So the lower the mean scores, the better the information dissemination.

Further investigation revealed that this situation may be related to the charges of autocracy which was levied against the NUPENG branch president not least by the assistant general secretary. In an interview, the latter made the following statements:

*“...most of the members are not happy with the way the man (chairman) is handling matters without consulting anybody...  
I would have loved to be more committed but our chairman doesn’t give us the encouragement or the opportunity to contribute...commitment is allowing other people’s views and opinion alongside your own and not running a one-man*

*show... what I perceive as a one-man unionism they are having here is not encouraging me... I am often not happy about how the union leadership handles matters...there are certain questions the leaders parry deliberately which infuriates me a lot...I wish I was the chairman or a zonal general secretary".*

If indeed the chairman runs the union autocratically and is not in the habit of informing other executives on union matters as alleged by the assistant general secretary, then it might be difficult for ordinary members to obtain relevant information from other leaders if the chairman is not available. The situation might have been worsened by the chairman's apparent elusiveness. He was hardly in the office and very difficult to "pin down" (the author can attest to this) during this research. To be fair, his elusiveness could have been as a result of the nature of his job which sometimes required him shuttling between the Apapa branch and the company's head office in Broad street, coupled with his involvement with the union's zonal branch of which he is also the chairman.

Still, there can be no excuse by a leader that should justify a perpetuation of information chasm within the rank and file of a union. Another interviewed member opined as follows:

*"Communication flow within the union is the only thing that is lacking. Personally, it is fine because due to my popularity, union leaders want to always communicate with me but I wouldn't say because I am always in tune with them, there is no communication gap. There is a very big, communication gap and that is why we are having certain problems; communication is one of the big problems we are having. The union leaders are not readily accessible*

*although personally I can see any of them whenever I want to”*

The interviewee seemed particularly pleased about his contribution, he continued:

*“Although I am not an executive, on my own I had to ensure that all workers comply (with strike order) including those who are within my domain. This shows my level of commitment.... I am a very popular person, outgoing and even though I am not a union executive, I do more than them...I decided not to be union leader for now because I am already an official in my social club but I am already thinking of running for office and some members are already encouraging me to contest”.*


This interviewee's response proffers an insight into the nature of the relationships union leaders forge with individual members and the possible existence of preferential treatments. Apparently, some leaders are biased towards developing close acquaintance with certain members for certain reasons. One of the reasons which has been suggested relates to the relative popularity or influence of members. Fashoyin (1987) alluded to an “inner caucus” in the unions comprising of members who are often die-hard union activists. It can be argued that these people are usually the first ones to know whatever may be up in the union as well as privy to union-related information. But these are a minority and may not exceed five members or probably few more.

The majority of members across unions also feel that there is unity within the ranks of union leaders (fig.8.8). This is in spite of earlier observations made in the literature about the existence of personality clashes and occasional rivalry

between union officials as well as inter and intra-union disputes. For example, in 1983, a major internal crisis in NUPENG led to two rival factions (i.e. two presidents and two secretary generals) fighting for sole custody of the union's secretariat and the union's account. After a series of court injunctions and counter injunctions, the government eventually intervened in 1986 by dissolving both executives, and appointed a sole administrator with a mandate to hold fresh elections. NUPENG subsequently came back fully in 1987.

Why is the general perception of the rank and file indicative of a coherent and united leadership despite the above? One possible explanation for this is that members probably defined "unity" in the context of the union fighting for workers i.e. a mentality of "them" (management/government) against "us" (workers/leaders). Also some argued that cases of personality clashes or divisions are exceptions rather than the norm and thus cannot be regarded as permanent characteristics of the unions. Alternatively, one could assume that the responses were probably indicative of events at AP in particular and not necessarily of NUPENG in general.

**Fig. 8.8 there is unity amongst union leaders (N = 82)**



**Table 8.6 Union Leadership Satisfaction in AP**

	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	F	Sig.
junior staff (NUPENG)	31	20.7419	2.71990	6.934	.002
senior staff (PENGASSAN)	30	18.2667	2.72831		
Contract staff (NUPENG)	21	20.6190	3.16980		
Total	82	19.8049	3.04468		

Mean scores on aggregate union leadership satisfaction items indicate that the membership attitude is more positive in NUPENG than PENGASSAN (table 8.6). Junior staff NUPENG scored higher than contract staff NUPENG suggesting that overall, members in the former are more satisfied with their leaders. The result was significant as the tables indicates.

### **MHWUN**

It is interesting how MHWUN the union leadership handles discipline within its ranks (table 8.7). The example of the vice chairman who was suspended for two months for a misdemeanor is only one case out of several others. Other examples were reported in a newsletter dated 14/12/1998 which indicated that a total of seven union officials

were dismissed by the union's Central Working Committee: 4 officials (2 organizing secretaries and 2 senior clerical officers) had their appointments terminated on disciplinary grounds; 1 head of department and 1 assistant secretary general were sacked based on official fraud; 1 federal area council chairman was removed from office and banned for 5 years from holding any union's office. All actions were taken on the recommendation of a 3-man investigation panel set up by the union.

It appears that there is no sacred cow as far as the issue of discipline in the union is concerned. For instance, the National General Secretary was asked to proceed on a six-month accumulated annual leave (story also reported in Daily Labour, vol.7 no.2, February 28, 2002). The leave which became effective January 15 2002 was part of the decisions reached by the Central Working Committee which alleged that the GS had no good intention for the union but would rather pursue personal interests at the detriment of the organization. He was forced to go on leave following alleged contradictions in the way and manner he headed a public relations committee set up by the union.

**Table 8.7 Leadership issues: interpersonal conflicts inter-union rivalry, corruption, etc.**

Dates	Notes
18/12/1985	A misunderstanding between the two organs of the union : the state president queried the federal organ representatives for not bringing him up to speed concerning the activities of the assistant organizing secretary who was supposed to be responsible to him but was acting otherwise.
14/09/1988	Rivalry between the two organs intensifies: meeting called to asked the Federal Executives why they decided to stop the payment of their cheques through the State Council. The Federal Executives responded that they took the decision because of frustration due to the non-financial assistance and delay in payment of their shares by the State Council.
22/09/1988	An impending court case with a rival union competing for same members was discussed.
14/07/1988	Branches are not reporting their activities nor submitting their "Branch Activity Report Form" as expected.
17/08/1989	An anonymous letter was written from one of the branches (psychiatric hospital) to the Inspector General of police on cases of fraudulent practices within the union.
23/02/1991	Problems encountered from rival a union (NASU i.e. Non-Academic Staff Union of Nigeria). Secretary noted: "through the steadfastness of our loyal officers and men...we were able to contain them (rival union).."
19/12/2001	Council's vice chairman accused of giving false information as regards a strike action in his branch. He was suspended for 2 months.

The union in a bid to help itself out of a pressing fundamental problem resolved to set up a public relations committee. The committee was given a grant of N500,000.00.


The general secretary headed the committee and allegedly muzzled down other members. He didn't allow others to take part in the committee thereby preventing the committee from functioning. The chairman was summoned by the CWC to defend himself and account for the N500,00.00 granted his committee. His defense and explanations on how the fund was disbursed were not satisfactory hence he was sent on leave to pave way for the new tempo in the union to stabilize. At the time of this study, the GS was yet to be recalled.

One could appreciate why the union needed to adopt a tough stand on accountability and responsible behaviour by its leaders. The union was hit by financial crisis in June 2001 when it relocated to its headquarters in Abuja (Federal Capital Territory) without appropriate cost implication analysis of such a political decision. Sources in the union hinted that the movement affected substantial finances of the union. It was estimated that over N3million was expended on secretarial accommodation, transportation, office partitioning, furnishing and equipment among others. A critical source in the union blamed the problems on the poor secretariat administration. According to the source, excessive, frivolous and unaccountable number of fraudulent travel claims accounted for over 40% of the union's current crisis.


Money incurred via bogus travel claims whereby officials go about their private affairs spending weeks in the process and are paid heavy claims and allowances has allegedly brought the union to its present crisis. Financial recklessness, over invoicing and deliberate diversion of check offs by some state officials and brazen looting of the union's treasury in some instances were the problems cited. At the end of January, 2002, November 2001, staff salaries have not been paid. Over N3.5million left in the union's coffers by the previous executive was squandered without any concrete achievement to show for it beside relocation to Abuja. This situation led to the re-organization of the national secretariat and state councils across the country the consequence of which was the various sackings mentioned earlier. However at the branches where members were asked their opinions about their union leaders, the responses were largely positive with the majority saying that they believed their leaders were very effective (fig. 8.9), hardworking (fig. 8.10) and

responsible (fig. 8.11). This results suggest that to the majority of the rank and file, the leaders are getting the job done. In one of the branches for instance (health management board), there was a successful strike which resulted in increased salary for workers. Similarly, a branch at Apapa had recently successfully negotiated increase in bonuses for its members from N500.00 to N1,000.00.


**Fig. 8.9 Union leaders are very effective (N = 111)**



**Fig. 8.10 union leaders are very hardworking (N = 112)**



**Fig. 8.11 union leaders are very responsible (N = 112)**




But one area which the leaders appear to be lacking is in the area of information dissemination (fig. 8.12), a situation which mirrors a similar position in NUPENG.

The initial impression which these findings convey is one of leaders who are undemocratic and who probably run the unions without consideration for their members' input. Some workers probably feel this way, but this is apparently not the case with most members. A majority of respondents in both unions indicated that decisions within the union are taken in general meetings of workers. Thus, the information gap cited could be related to issues concerned with management-union

negotiations and its outcomes, the bottom line being that many workers feel they are not being told everything they need to know concerning what goes on in the union.

**Fig. 8.12 How well informed do your leaders keep you on what is happening in the union? (N = 110)**



In a way, the issue is related to the question of trust between the members and their leaders. In one of the branches for instance, the union and management meets every two years (biennial contract negotiations) to review workers' contracts. Before the meeting, the leaders normally have a general meeting with their members during which proposed demands are discussed and agreed upon (e.g. car allowance, salary increase, etc.). The next stage entails sending this proposal to management who sets a date for a meeting (usually two days after the notification). This meeting usually takes place outside the work premises and staff buses are used to convey the leaders involved in the negotiation to the venue.

According to the secretary interviewed, the last negotiation which took place in 2000 concluded with the union winning a modest salary increase for the workers. But because the percentage increase which was agreed upon at the workers general

meeting was much higher than what was eventually won, some workers became suspicious. In fact one of the members interviewed said that although he appreciates the efforts of the union in general, he is convinced that union leaders “sell-out” to management during negotiations. But the secretary claimed that they do their best to hold out on their original demands, but sometimes management comes up with genuine reasons why these cannot be met and hence why both parties needed to arrive at a compromise.

This example demonstrates the intricate position which union leaders often find themselves. It is difficult for leaders sometimes to balance their members’ demands and expectations with realistic and achievable goals. But if there is trust, then there is no reason why members should not believe that what their leaders tell them is the whole truth and nothing but the truth. However, trust between two parties is arguably a function of past experiences or precedents. In other words, it is something that is developed over a period of time. Therefore, if members are finding it difficult to trust their leaders, then it is necessary for the latter to discuss these issues with their members, get them in the open and be totally sincere about them (a truth and reconciliation type kind of meeting). This will help set past records straight so that both parties can embark upon building a relationship based on trust, sincerity and openness.

The nature of leadership rivalry in MHWUN appears to differ from that observed in NUPENG. To start with, since its existence, there has never been a situation whereby the national leadership in MHWUN was disputed to the extent that two or more factions tried to seize control of the union (as it occurred in NUPENG). In both

unions however, there have been personality clashes occurring vertically between leaders in the same executive council or horizontally between executives from different strata of union leadership. This situation is neither strange nor peculiar to the unions. It is hardly possible for every single individual within a group situation to see eye to eye or agree on everything. Unfortunately, certain arguments become overheated while some disagreements become personal, leading to clash of personalities. In other cases leaders may fall out over jurisdictions, positions or issues of seniority. But as long as these issues are amicably resolved and not allowed to interfere with the business of running the union, they are usually not terminal.

Inter-union disputes are also a feature of both MHWUN and NUPENG. Although the federal government has supposedly outlined the criteria for the membership of industrial unions, these criteria are often contested in courts. It is not surprising that unions compete with one another over the right to organize workers since there is much to gain from a high membership figure in terms of finance (checked-off dues) and influence (strike action). Arguably when unions are busy fighting one another at the work place and in the law courts (table 8.8), they could be distracted from the business of fighting over issues that really matter to the workers. The tussle between MHWUN and NASU in one of the branches and between the former and NULGE (Nigerian Union of Local Government Employees) in another branch was an unwelcome distraction to the unions and one which must have played into the hands of the management. Besides, it can be argued that non-union members would not have been at all impressed at the activities of the unions. Hence it is necessary for the unions to devise means of resolving these issues peacefully amongst themselves, with the

NLC possibly acting as conciliator. Unfortunately, disputing unions seem happy going to court to settle their differences rather than accept the intervention of the NLC.

### **8.5 Early Union Socialization Experience**

Early union socialization experience has been found to be positively correlated with all aspects of commitment to the union (Van Maanen and Schein, 1979; Gordon et al, 1980). However, Clark et al (1993) found that formal and informal socialisation experiences each made an independent contribution to membership commitment. Formal socialisation involves a systematic program or events aimed at orientating new members into the life of the union whereas informal socialization entails discretionary inductions of new members by existing members or union officials through personal meetings within or outside of the work environment. This enquiry thus needs to establish the type of early socialisation experience the Nigerian members were exposed to.


#### ***NUPENG***

There is no formal programme aimed at socializing new members into the ways and life of the union. In this study, formal socialisation experience is defined as organised orientation programmes conducted by union officials and designed to introduce the new members to the union. In all the interviews held with officials from NUPENG and PENGASSAN, the response was the same: there were no special arrangements or specific program for new members. The normal practice seems to be to leave new members to their own devices and hope they become used to attending meetings,

voting in union elections and so on. New members are ‘socialized’ informally on a one to one basis via interacting with other members in the workplace.

Union leaders may interact with new members on an individual basis such as when a supervisor reports a member to his leader for misdemeanor or the member has a personal grievance to report to the leader. Otherwise, the onus is usually on the new members to make enquiries concerning anything that pertains to the union – if they are interested. One NUPENG member interviewed said that “..when new people join the union, they feel at home, they come we chat, and all that...others will usually refer them to me and I try to orientate them concerning the rudiments of what it really takes to be in the union”. For those with a previous background in trade unionism, integration into the union is relatively faster.


**Fig 8.13 Understanding of union goals (N = 82)**




When asked about their understanding of their union goals within the first few weeks and months of joining the union, around 26% said they had good understanding, just about the same number who said they had very little

understanding (fig. 8.13). In terms of help and assistance received from old members and union leaders, very few respondents complained of outright lack of support (fig. 8.14 and 8.15). This suggests that old members seemed generally willing to help new members of the union. The nature of assistance usually include advising new members on the grievance procedure, offering support when they encounter problems at work (e.g. problems with supervisor), lending support during special occasions (birthdays, weddings, etc.) and offering morale and financial support in times of illness or bereavement.

**Fig. 8.14 support and encouragement received from other members (N= 80)**



**Fig. 8.15 Support and encouragement received from leaders (N = 81)**



**Table 8.8 Union Socialization experience**

	N	Mean	Std. Deviation	F	Sig.
Junior staff (NUPENG))	30	10.0667	3.20488		
Senior staff (PENGASSAN)	30	8.2000	2.57843		
Contract staff (NUPENG)	21	10.9762	2.62905		
Total	81	9.6111	3.02903	6.517	.002

Comparison of the unionization process across the three unions suggests that NUPENG members had a better experience (table 8.8). The tendency to relegate socialization issues to the background in the PENGASSAN union appear to be more pronounced. In a general sense, the results suggest that despite the absence of a formal socialization system within the unions, most members responded favorably to the informal procedure. The absence of an institutionalized mechanism for integrating new members into the union can be explained as due to a variety of reasons. Firstly, finance is arguably a factor. To organize seminars towards orientating new members cost money which the unions complained is in short supply. Apart from the usual cost of general organizing (e.g. hiring a venue, providing induction packs, etc.), some workers often require extra incentive - such as the promise of refreshments - to ensure their attendance. Such workers are usually in the habit of first asking to see the agenda hoping that 'item 7' (traditionally 'menu' at most functions) is there. Some even interpret the acronym *R.S.V.P* (usually at the end of an invitation) to mean 'rice and stew very plenty'!

Another reason can be best explained in relation to the activities of trade unions as they are perceived by the generality of workers. It is argued that the average non-unionized Nigerian worker does not need a lecture to associate a trade union with three things: *class identity, benefits and strikes*. The concept of an

‘association’ or ‘union’ is not new to most workers because many are already members of a tribal and/or social union comprising people of similar identity. Thus, most people know that the union is for the working class as much as an employers association is for the ‘ruling class’. Also, it can be argued that all workers have the idea that trade unions exist for the benefit of workers (even if some exponents of free market economies may disagree) and often use the strike option to obtain these benefits.

Thus, having this basic untutored understanding of the union, it is not surprising that most members rarely complained about the absence of an ‘orientation program on trade unionism’ for new members in the company. Apparently, it is assumed that everybody knows what the union is generally about. When it comes to breaking down these general benefits into specific objectives (e.g. wage increase, improving conditions of service, education of members, promoting industrial harmony, rendering social benefits, etc.) and union strategies, the leaders expect members to learn “on-the- job”.

The socializing of members in non-formal settings (e.g. while at work, in cafeterias during lunch, at bus-stops waiting for bus or on the bus, etc.) seem to compensate for the lack of a more regimented approach. However this does not eradicate the need for the unions to have a well-organized and regular forum to orientate new members on its activities. By so doing the unions stand to help the members to maximize the benefits of the socialization process. Also, the unions cannot afford to be complacent about showing genuine interest in new members’ personal lives and well being as this can enhance and strengthen the

process of bonding with such members. Leaders should not wait until these members are reported by their superiors before having the first individual contact with them. By deliberately initiating personal contacts, leaders open up the possibility for the formation of friendships which have the potentials of growing even beyond the boundaries of trade unionism.

### ***MHWUN***

The analysis proffered in the case of NUPENG concerning the approach of the union concerning the socialization of its members equally applies in this context. Union officials seem to enjoy some financial and social benefits (table 8.9) e.g. loans, mobile phones, etc. perhaps more than ordinary members could aspire. This is not surprising since they are the ones making the decisions by virtue of their positions. This coupled with the other benefits that come with the holding of union office such as honorariums /sitting allowances / transportation allowance, it is not surprising that union leaders in Nigeria are usually more committed to union activities than ordinary members (Fashoyin, 1987).

The union occasionally organizes seminars and workshop programs. A few examples include a 3-day national seminar which took place on the 18<sup>th</sup> to 20<sup>th</sup> June 1996 with its theme on “the Nigerian trade union and the democratic culture”. Another example is a 3-day national workshop on “team building in labour relations” which was hosted on 12<sup>th</sup> –14<sup>th</sup> and 18<sup>th</sup> –20<sup>th</sup> of Sept 2001 for all principal national and state officers, chairmen, secretaries of each MHWUN LGA branches and various management executives. The first one was free (sponsored by the American labour center) but the latter was at a fee of N15,000. By way of organizing seminars both at national and

regional levels, MHWUN appear to be more committed than NUPENG towards the enlightenment and education of its members concerning trade unionism. But the majority of these seminars are usually for high ranking union officials and in some cases are revenue-driven (as in the latter example).


**Table 8.9 Socialization, financial benefits and related matters**

<b>Dates</b>	<b>Notes</b>
13/04/1988	Send-off party organized for a retiring comrade. Sitting allowance which overdue for members also discussed.
14/07/1988	Sitting allowance discussed.
20/10/1988	Traveling expenses of the chairman discussed and transportation allowance (N300.00) approved. A wedding notice of one of the officers was read to members.
9/03/1989	Transportation allowance at N5.00 per visit was approved for officials encountering problems commuting to the office for their duties. Wedding invitations discussed and a loan application by an official (for school fees and attendance at a residential 5 day course) approved.
24/11/2001/	Decision taken to acquire GSM (mobile phones) for executive members.


At the branch level, the socialization situation is not much different from what was observed at NUPENG whereby no special arrangement is made for members' socialization or education (even though the constitution of both unions states this as an objective). The author's observation was that individual branches are seemingly required to see to the education and socialization of their respective members. Hence in one particular branch, one finds some effort being made by the branch executive towards formal socialization of new members whereas in others, reliance is solely on informal method of integrating members. Nevertheless, members' responses concerning what their experience was like within the first few weeks and months of

their journey revealed that the majority of them had at least a fair understanding of the union goals (fig. 8.16), received support and encouragement and support from members (fig. 8.17) and union leaders (fig.8.18).


**Fig. 8.16 Understanding of union goals (N = 111)**



**Fig. 8.17 Support and encouragement received from members (N = 111)**



**Fig. 8.18 support and encouragement received from union leaders (N = 112)**



## 8.5. Conclusion

In concluding, it is necessary to examine the questions set out at the beginning of this chapter in the light of the findings above.

***(1) To what extent has the structure and organisation of the unions contributed to their commitment levels and participation in union activities?***

From the previous chapter (see tables 7.3 and 7.4), the relevance of branch level organisation to the commitment and participation has been suggested and this study simply confirms it. In a situation where one company has one union representing all categories of workers and another has a union for each category of workers, there could be varying degree of effectiveness. For example whilst NUPENG and PENGASSAN are able to focus on the needs of their respective constituents with less distractions, some senior staff members in MHWUN have been known to show resentment towards the latter and there have been reports of attempts by some to actually form a rival union although this has not been successful. This situation also

engenders differences in union policies, organization, style of leadership and leaders' accessibility and these have been known to play a role in facilitating the involvement of the rank-and-file membership, as well as a key role in union-management relations (Barling et al, 1992). In other words, variations in these factors probably results in variations in the commitment level in the two sectors. It would be noted from the previous chapter that perception of information dissemination varied significantly in accordance with staff typology (table 7.5).

***(2) Judging from the significant role played by union instrumentality as revealed in the quantitative surveys, how has the unions fared in this respect ?***

The records of unions in both sectors with respect to fighting for the rights of workers seems laudable enough and NUPENG's record seem to suggest that it is more aggressive and dynamic than MHWUN. In African Petroleum, NUPENG members appeared to have a higher instrumental perception as well as a higher level of union commitment than PENGASSAN members. Furthermore, some revealed MHWUN branches provide some sort of social benefits for their members in the form of loans (to purchase medicines). Officials in these unions also enjoy benefits such as loans for educational purposes, special occasions (e.g. wedding) or to enable them to attend non-union related conferences, seminars or workshops.

Admittedly, it might not be sufficient to form a conclusion on the causes of members' union instrumentality perception based on the evidence presented here alone. Union instrumentality perception could have been influenced by a whole range of other events predating the ones cited in this study; similarly some events not covered could have induced negative perceptions of the unions by some members. At best, it can be

argued that the successes recorded by the unions and covered in this study form a part of the factors that have helped to shape the union instrumentality perception of the members. The unions do have records which appear worthy enough to elicit their members instrumentality perception.

***(3) Since evidence from the surveys indicate that leadership satisfaction also occupied a central role in the union commitment process, to what extent can it be said that the leaders enjoyed their members' loyalty and trust?***

Generally, union leaders in both sectors have the support of their members and this arguably informed the positive correlation between leadership satisfaction and union commitment. In African Petroleum, NUPENG members have a more positive view of their leaders than PENGASSAN members with respect to the leaders' effectiveness. A significant number within the membership in both sectors seemed unimpressed with the level of information sharing within the union. That this situation appeared not to have affected members' overall leadership satisfaction suggests that as long as the leaders are effective in other areas (e.g. winning financial concessions) the members may not be too concerned about the situation.

With regards to information dissemination, NUPENG leaders were adjudged poorer by their members than PENGASSAN leaders were of their members. Most of the branches currently rely on word of mouth and notice boards to pass across information and it may be argued that these mediums are probably not effective enough. The use of newsletters and bulletins are also employed but only at a higher level (national and state) and even then this seemed to be happening only in

MHWUN. But the problem may not be solely connected to the medium of information dissemination. It might also be a function of the willingness of members to believe that their leaders are actually telling *the whole truth*. In other words, there could be a problem of trust such as when members think there is certain information management and union leaders connive to keep from workers (e.g. leaders “selling out” to management by easing up on workers’ demands). This situation was reflected in the NUPENG branch when a member said he appreciates the effort of the union leaders but insisted the latter “normally sell out during negotiations regarding workers’ benefits”. Where this happens to be valid, workers’ confidence and trust in their leaders is shaken and as a consequence the union commitment of the workers affected.

***(4)What sort of union socialisation programme exists in these unions?***

Unions in both sectors lacked any special format regarding the socialization of their new members but informal socialization at the work place may have compensated for this inadequacy. It seems that the relatively weaker influence of early socialization experience is down to the general absence of a formal socialization program within the unions. All the same the informal socialization taking place appear strong since it was almost solely responsible for the factor’s contribution to union commitment and union participation. In a sense, this situation of informal socialization is actually a reflection of the wider society which is characterized by a culture of close-nit extended family relationships. This situation arguably permeates other informal social settings such as tribal unions, social clubs, etc. Consequently, union members may be treating new members as they would members of an extended family thus making it relatively easy for informal socialization to exist and flourish.

## **Summary**

This chapter has attempted to build on the quantitative findings of previous chapters through a qualitative study of the unions' settings and individual experiences. It is apparent from the results that the significance of union attitudes in the quantitative study is arguably related to the branch level organization of the unions, level of active union interventions in matters of economic benefits to the unions, extent to which the leaders are trusted and the manner of early union socialization of members.

# **Chapter 9**

## **Conclusion**

### **Introduction**

This research has investigated the factors responsible for the development and sustenance of union commitment amongst trade union members in Nigeria. In this concluding chapter, the applications, implications and limitations of the study's main findings are discussed against the backdrop of the hypotheses which guided the investigation. First a discussion of the hypotheses is done followed by the implications of the findings, the study's limitations and suggestions for future research.

### **9.1 Discussion of findings**

*Hypothesis 1. Attitudes towards management, extrinsic job satisfaction and satisfaction with life will have a direct effect on union commitment level and union participation.* This hypothesis was not confirmed. In particular the hypothesis of job satisfaction predicting union commitment and union participation were disconfirmed. This supports the findings of Barling et al (1990), Deery et al (1994) and Magenau et al (1988). One possible explanation may be found in the members' perception of union-management relations which the majority of respondents said was very good. Arguably for job dissatisfaction to translate into any gains for unions in terms of members' commitment and participation, the union would need to persuade their members that management is to blame for their job grievances (Premack and Hunter, 1988). However, in the unions studied, members and leaders seemed to be generally positive towards management. For example, the restructuring at AP which saw some

workers being laid off was handled very maturely on both sides after the management explained the rationale for the exercise. Apparently, the measure was aimed at saving the company from liquidation and members seemed happy with the explanation proffered.

Still, it is pertinent to note that correlation results indicated a weak positive correlation between job dissatisfaction and union commitment ( $r = 0.20, p < .000$ ) and participation ( $r = 0.18, p < .002$ ). This suggests that one cannot conclusively dismiss the relevance of job dissatisfaction to the union commitment process. For instance, the most cited reason for union joining by contract/casual workers in AP was "to win more wages and better working conditions". This supports an observation that perceived inequity in wages is positively and significantly related to the willingness to unionise among blue-collar workers (Kochan 1979; Smock, 1969; Fashoyin, 1987). The contract workers seem to have the highest level of job dissatisfaction due to their poor working conditions. It should also be noted that they have their own union within the same company. This suggests that the type of union under investigation may influence the relationship between job dissatisfaction and union commitment.

The non-confirmation of the hypothesis concerning life satisfaction may be due to the fact that only one item was used for the scale. The item was the last of Warr et al, (1980)' 10 item-scale which assesses satisfaction with various aspects of individual life. Members were required to summarise their overall life experience by being asked if they were satisfied with their life as a whole (although a few instances were given in parenthesis such as health, family, education etc. to give the respondents an idea of the various aspects of life worth considering). This situation probably posed

some problems to some who may have preferred to respond in specific terms rather than summarise their overall experiences. An initial questionnaire which was drawn up was perceived to be too lengthy and a pruning was considered necessary.

Although correlation results indicate a weak and positive relationship ( $r = .27$ ,  $p < .000$ ), multiple regression results indicated that satisfaction with management was not a significant predictor of union commitment for the Nigerian sample. There is evidence that a good number of union members were persuaded to join their unions by management. The second highest response across sector (31%) was one in which members claimed they were persuaded by management to join, next to those who said they joined on their own (40%). This supports Ubeku's (1980) observation that managers in Nigeria encourage their workers to join unions.

***Hypothesis 2.** Demographic characteristics will have a direct effect on union commitment levels as well as union participation.* Demographic variables of age, education, membership tenure, and ethnic group were not significantly related to union commitment and union participation. But because gender and sector were found to be significant in the model, the hypothesis that demographic factors will be significantly related to the two dependent variables was partially confirmed. The significance of gender in the case of union participation ( $\beta = .15$ ) supports earlier findings (Gordon et al, 1980; Gallagher and Clark, 1989; Dale, 1992; Okoronkwo, 1985; Olajunmoke, 1985).

Males participated more in union activities than females and this result was significant ( $t = 2.84$ ,  $p < .01$ ). This arguably reflects their higher levels of integration into the

union. Males also did significantly better in all the various dimensions of union participation with the exception of voting in union elections. These results support a similar observation within the Nigerian literature (Fashoyin, 1987; Okoronkwo, 1985; Olajunmoke, 1985). No variation was found for voting in union elections probably because it is a quadrennial event and not as frequent as the holding of union meetings. The knowledge that another election will not come up until another four years may have persuaded female voters - who otherwise would not have participated for one reason or the other - to make the necessary "sacrifice" to vote in the elections.

Also, the persuasion from campaigners during elections may have ensured that women were not significantly outdone by men in voting at elections. It is pertinent to point out that the significant variation in union participation between the sexes occurred despite the fact that males and females did not differ significantly in their level of union commitment. This situation is similar to Gordon et al's (1980) finding except that Gordon et al found females' expression of union loyalty to be significantly higher than males.

The fact that men participated significantly more in union activities than women in the case of the Nigerian sample could be a reflection of other factors such as the greater experience of work/family conflict among working women and their traditional family responsibilities. For example, in one of the unions (MHWUN), a female executive member requested a change in meeting time in order for her to be able to juggle her union role with family responsibilities. She attributed her late comings to meetings and occasional absence as due to these responsibilities. A female union auditor was not so lucky. In one of the union executive meetings, on

observing that she had not been turning up for sometime, the house moved to have an interim replacement for her. Thus, female members were as committed as their male counterparts but their traditional family responsibilities could have played a part in the results on union participation. Sector was a moderator in the model (*beta* = .27).

There were significant differences in union commitment and participation across sector (union commitment:  $t = 3.522$ ,  $p <.000$ ; participation:  $t = 3.522$ ,  $p <.01$ ). This partially supports Roy (1992)'s finding which showed that union commitment is different for public and private sector employees (see below).

The non-confirmation of the hypothesis on education negates studies (Warmington, 1960; Smock, 1969; Lubeck, 1975) which have suggested that the degree of participation of members is predicated on their level of education. There is however support for those that found no significant relationship between education and union commitment (Fashoyin, 1987; Barling et al, 1990; Fukami and Larson, 1984; Magenau et al, 1988). This situation could be related to the fact that most of the respondents have had some education, the great majority having attained some post secondary school qualification. The Nigerian labour force has also become more educated within the last decade (Nigerian Embassy, 2001). The results also suggest that union commitment and participation for the union member in Nigeria is not really about qualifications but about knowing what the union stands for and what it can achieve for the members. Union commitment and participation thus did not discriminate between the various cadres of certificate holders in the sample because of a general awareness of the usefulness of trade unions among the membership.

The result on age supports several studies which have found no significant relationship between age and union loyalty (Bemmels, 1995; Deery et al, 1994; Magenau et al, 1988; Sherer and Morishima, 1989). In the case of Nigerian workers, it can be observed that a significant majority of them are in their thirties which shows that the Nigeria workforce is young. Fashoyin (1987) whose sample had a majority of respondents less than 35 years old also found no significant effect of age on union participation. Lubeck's (1975) observation that union leaders were recruited from older and more experienced workers is supported by this study. In the qualitative study, out of a total of 54 respondents who said they occupied union office, 33% were between 25 - 34 years and 44% between 35 - 44 years and only 3% were between 19-24years. Fashoyin (1987) observed that office holders tended to participate more in union activities. This may not just be informed by the leaders' sense of obligation connected with their status. Financial incentives could have played a significant role by acting as an inducement and source of motivation for the union officers.

Investigation in this study reveal that union leaders are paid honorariums each time they attend meetings. The amount differs according to levels of leadership. For example, in MHWUN, sitting allowance at the national level is N2000 per sitting for the duration of the meeting, state level is N500.00 while the branch level varies from branch to branch but ranges between N250.00 and N300.00.

Union membership tenure was also found not to be a significant predictor for either union commitment or union participation. The present study shows that there is no empirical basis to support any notion that those who have been union members for a longer period will be more committed to the union or engage more frequently in union activities. Although Fashoyin (1987) suggested that there is a positive relationship

between the length of membership in the union and the propensity to contest elections, it should be noted that contesting elections is only one dimension of union participation. From a multidimensional perspective, union tenure appears not to be a significant source of variation within the sample.

Ethnicity was also found not to constitute a significant source of variance in the members' union commitment and participation. This might be due to changing attitudes within the labour movement regarding the objectives of worker representation in relation to clan or tribal affiliations. According to Akinlaja (1999), NUPENG's leaders eschewed tribalism because they realised that irrespective of their ethnic background, they all have the same objective and faced the same threats in the work place. Generally speaking, members and leaders of different ethnic backgrounds get along within the unions studied. In AP for example, the workers interviewed all hailed from different parts of the country and all of them responded in the negative when asked if they observed divisions or problems within the union which were based on ethnicity or tribalism. However, in one union where the general secretary (an easterner) accused the chairman (southerner) of single-handedly running the union, the former claimed that there is tribalism in the union. But the secretary may be either correct or displaying "displacement of aggression" i.e. extrapolating from his personal differences with the chairman to generalise his accusation.

On balance, it appears that the union members are capable of divorcing their ethnic identities from union allegiances and not allowing the former to dictate the latter. This situation should be viewed positively by the unions because it is a good sign if the situation can be maintained. Worker representation should be about the working

class organising to improve the collective lot of workers regardless of their race, ethnicity, colour or creed. Ethnic and tribal considerations exerting a significant effect on the commitment of members can potentially interfere with this collective objective. When a section of a union membership withholds their loyalty to the union because the leader is not “our son” (like the 36% who preferred to have top officers of the union from their part of Ibo land in Smock (1969)’s study) or in protest against “politically motivated” decisions by leaders, the overall effectiveness of the union could be affected.

*Hypothesis 3: Perceptions about the instrumentality of the union, union socialization experiences, and attitudes towards union leaders will have a direct influence on the union commitment levels and union participation.* The hypothesis that union attitudes will impact significantly on the union commitment levels of the members was confirmed. From the results of correlation and multiple regression, the significant predictors of union commitment were factors associated with union characteristics and perception namely union instrumentality perception ( $r = 0.73, p < .000; \beta = .47$ ), satisfaction with union leadership ( $r = 0.74, p < .000; \beta = .35$ ) and early union socialisation experience( $r = 0.44, p < .000; \beta = .13$ ). The results support earlier studies (Fullgar and Barling, 1989; Kelloway et al, 1990; Bamberger et al, 1999; Fuller and Hester, 1993; Sverke and Sjoberg, 1994) and suggest that when members have a positive instrumental perception of their unions, they are more likely to express feelings of commitment towards their union.

### *Union Instrumentality*

The observation that union members in Nigeria have a strong union instrumentality perception is also mentioned within the Nigerian literature (Fashoyin, 1987; Cohen, 1974). However, this research has added to our knowledge by showing the connection between union instrumentality perception and union commitment. The study has demonstrated how Nigerian workers' perceived union instrumentality impacts on their affective commitment before resulting in behavioural commitment (union participation). It is easy to conceive of why the union members expressed a positive instrumentality perception of their unions. Apparently the unions have a record of notable achievements of which the members seemed to be aware. In addition, there were on-going union-management negotiations in some of the branches in which the unions were either making headway or had recorded some breakthroughs. Thus it can be argued that the members' union instrumentality perception was not merely a reflection of a theoretical understanding of what unions are supposed to do but rather was based on their specific perception of what their unions had done or were seen to be doing. Thus the respondents, arguably were not reacting to "the big labour image" (Deshpande and Fiorito, 1989) or expressing abstract general union attitudes (Youngblood et al, 1984; Kochan et al, 1986) but rather demonstrated specific union instrumentality.

### *Leadership Factors*

The results support Magenau et al (1988), Morishima (1995) and Sverke and Sjoberg's (1994) studies which highlighted the role of leadership attitudes. There is a general impression amongst Nigerian authors of a leadership crisis within the labour movement as a whole (Fashoyin, 1987; Smock, 1960; Remy, 1975; Cohen, 1974).

This present study has gone a step further by showing that the attitudes of Nigerian members towards certain aspects of union leadership behaviour significantly predicted the former's commitment to the union. Positive leadership attitudes predicted union commitment for the union members such that the extent to which members perceived their leaders to be responsible, united and democratic was significantly related to the former's union commitment. Furthermore membership satisfaction is not simply a matter of unions delivering tangible gains at the bargaining table but also involves the extent to which the union leaders keep members informed, give them a say in running the union and respond to their concerns. This supports previous studies within the literature (Fiorito et al., 1988; Jarley et al. 1990; Iverson and Kuruvilla 1995; Snape and Chan 2000).

One leadership behaviour which a majority of the respondents were negative was information dissemination. Apparently, members felt union leaders were not up-front with them concerning certain issues. Although the members appear to accept most of what their leaders tell them, they do not believe everything. For example, one member in a particular branch (AP) opined that he believes his leaders usually sell-out when it comes to negotiating with management for members' allowances.

Interpersonal clashes amongst leaders also play a part in the information problem. The case of the union chairman (in AP) accused by the assistant general secretary of single-handedly running the union is a typical example of interpersonal clashes occurring between leaders. In a similar vein, the national general secretary of MHWUN accused the union executive of a particular branch (NAFDAC) of failing in their duty to keep him informed about an issue they had with management.

Nevertheless, it should be noted that overall, most of the respondents seem to have a positive impression of their leaders, believing them to be hardworking and efficient.

### *Early Union Socialisation Experience*

The results of this study support research which has suggested that early socialisation experiences are positively correlated with all aspects of commitment to the union (Van Maanen and Schein, 1979; Gordon et al, 1980). The results also give credence to Clark et al (1993)'s findings which found that formal and informal socialisation experiences each made an independent contribution to membership commitment. It was revealed that the unions studied lacked a formal programme of socialisation for new union members. But despite this apparent omission by the unions, a significant number of respondents still appeared to have experienced a reasonable level of socialisation through the informal procedure. This informal procedure of early union socialisation includes contacts or experiences with more senior members of the union in informal settings both within and outside of the work environment. The support and encouragement members received both in good times (birthdays, weddings, child dedications, etc.) and bad times (bereavement, illness, supervisor problems) formed an important part of this informal socialisation process.

A general excuse for the lack of formal programmes to orientate new members concerning union objectives seems to hinge on a notion that all workers have a basic understanding of the philosophy of trade unionism. From this premise, the unions did not seem to consider a formal approach to union socialisation as all that important or a priority. But this line of reasoning might be tenable only if all new members can be assumed to have had a trade union background (e.g. union member in a previous

organisation or company). But this is not always the case. Even if it is the case, different unions often differ in terms of what provisions and restrictions their members are governed by as set out in their constitutions. For example, the exact nature of social benefits NUPENG and MHWUN offer their members based on their constitution differs. Members would thus need to understand these provisions hence the need for a formal orientation of some sort. For example, MHWUN's constitution stipulates as one of its objectives the "...provision of legal or other assistance when necessary in matters pertaining to the interest of members". But apparently not all members are aware of this provision; even one MHWUN official showed ignorance of this objective.

*Hypothesis 4. Marxist beliefs and union-politics orientation will have a direct effect on union commitment levels and union participation.* Hypotheses concerning union ideological beliefs were not confirmed. Union-politics orientation had very weak correlations with union commitment ( $r = .18$ ,  $p < 0.01$ ) and union participation ( $r = 0.26$ ,  $p < .000$ ). Correlation with union commitment ( $r = .06$ ,  $p < .15$ ) and union participation ( $r = 0.08$ ,  $p < .15$ ) was almost non-existent in the case of Marxist beliefs. Thus Marxist beliefs system did not have any significant impact on the union commitment and participation of the union members. But there is evidence that union-politics orientation significantly predicted one of the dimensions of participation namely campaigning at union elections. More specifically, members who expressed the view that the unions should form a labour party engaged more in campaign activities and vice versa (Chi-square = 35.26;  $p < .000$ ). Thus in this context it can be argued that there is a limited support for the hypothesis that union-politics orientation exert some influence in the union commitment process.

The results also support an observation of the existence of political and economic unionism in Africa (Essenberg, 1985) and Cohen (1974)'s observation that Nigerian workers displayed considerable cynicism about politicians and politics generally. But contrary to Cohen (1974)'s findings that around 45 percent were prepared to tolerate the notion of a workers' political party, around 50% of respondents in this study were not in favour of a labour party compare to 27% who were in favour. This suggests that since Cohen's study, there has been a shift in attitude of the workers.

The workers at the time of Cohen's study might have been willing to support the idea of a labour party despite their reservations probably because of the consideration that everyone deserves to be given the benefit of the doubt. But the current Nigerian workers apparently feel that labour has had its chance considering past abortive attempts (Akinlaja, 1999). Also some of the workers opposed to the idea of a labour party expressed the view that labour leaders cannot be trusted with political power and if elected will become like their predecessors. To further show that this attitude shift is quite significant, the workers were asked (during the second survey) if they were in favour of the recent decision by the NLC to form a labour party. Seventy three (73%) said they did not support the idea.

Nevertheless, the overall union commitment and participation of the members seem not to be affected whatever their perceived orientation. This may be related to the argument that both economic unionists and political unionists seek the same outcomes albeit through different avenues. And since members generally had a relatively high instrumental perception of their unions based on the view that the unions seem to be

getting the job done, there was probably found no need to base their commitment to the union on any particular orientation. Furthermore it is important to stress that the term 'political unionists' and 'economic unionists' were loosely used because they can be fickle, depending on the economic and political mood in the country. Also it has to be taken into consideration that there were other workers (around 20%) who did not fit into any of the labels (Undecided) and were not interested in union policies.

Marxist beliefs as a factor were not significant at all either in the tests of correlation or multiple regression. This result contradicts the findings of Fullager and Barling (1989) who argued that Marxist-related work beliefs are stronger predictors of union commitment among black disenfranchised workers. They found that stronger personal feelings of alienation and exploitation and a strong development of class consciousness characteristic caused greater loyalty to the union among less privileged sectors of the blue-collar labour force in South Africa. But this scenario is very different as far as the present study is concerned. Barling and Fullager's subjects were black workers in an Apartheid South Africa working in an environment where their work situations were *deliberately* structured differently from the whites. Thus the workers were most likely aware that their situation was political rooted. Therefore the idea of seizing economic and political power to change the apartheid system must have appealed to the South African workers and made them more committed to their unions. Not surprisingly, COSATU played a major role in the liberation of South Africa from Apartheid.

But contrast this scenario with the Nigerian situation and it becomes clear why Marxist beliefs probably failed to exert a similar predictive effect on workers' union

commitment. For example the contract/casual workers within the Nigerian oil industry may also feel alienated, exploited and reduced to 'third class citizens' by the various managements but the main difference lie in the perceived source of the problem and perceived options available to address the problem. In the case of the South African black workers, they were probably convinced that their white employers had no apologies for their (workers) predicament because that was the way it was designed to be. In other words, it was a by-product of the apartheid system.

But the workers in Nigeria knew their unions had considerable margins to explore towards reducing the perceived inequality without necessarily having to adopt any Marxist ideology. But this is not to suggest that the Nigerian workers did not subscribe to Marxist beliefs. In the study, 79% of respondents were in favour of workers having more say in the society while 72% believed factories would be better run if workers had more of a say in management. However, these beliefs were not connected with their commitment to the union nor were they associated with their union participation. Their unions arguably could still be effective via negotiations, dialogue and the use of the strike option. Thus, the Marxist beliefs about workers controlling economic and political power obviously had its intuitive appeal to the respondents but lacked predictive value in terms of their union commitment and participation. Perhaps if the situation of the Nigerian workers was similar to the one experienced by the black south African workers of the apartheid era, then the results would probably have mirrored that of the latter.

*Hypothesis 5. Pro-union attitudes will act as moderators within the model; union commitment will predict union participation.* The hypothesis that pro-union attitudes

will act as moderators within the model was confirmed thus supporting earlier studies (Newton and Shore, 1992; Fullager and Barling, 1989). Newton and Shore suggested that the link between union instrumentality and union commitment is mediated by prounion attitudes. Also, in Fullager and Barling's (1989) study, it was found that union instrumentality perception moderated the relationship between union loyalty and its antecedents of early socialisation experience, life satisfaction and work ethic beliefs.

In this study, controlling for union leadership attitudes, instrumentality perception and socialisation experiences resulted in a weaker union commitment-union participation link. This further reinforces the view that pro-union attitudes are the most important factors in the unionisation process. Also, the strength of the union instrumentality perception-union commitment link was significantly influenced by the moderating effect of union leadership attitudes. Similarly, controlling for union instrumentality perception weakened the relationships between union commitment and other union attitudes. It was only in the case of early socialisation experience that a separate control procedure failed to result in a weakening of the relationships between union commitment and other union attitudes. This may be due to observations made earlier on about the absence of formal socialisation programmes which could have helped the unions to maximise the effect of commitment of members.

It was also hypothesised that in addition to the factors impacting on union participation indirectly via union commitment, they will also exert a direct significant influence on union participation. These were confirmed in the case of union attitudes i.e. union instrumentality perception ( $r = 0.42$ ,  $p < .000$ ;  $\beta = .38$ ), satisfaction with

union leadership ( $r = 0.35, p < .000$ ;  $\beta = .34$ ) and early union socialisation experience ( $r = 0.45, p < .000$ ;  $\beta = .16$ ). The results of the influence of union instrumentality perception on participation supports Fullager and Barling (1989) who, firstly, found that perceived union instrumentality influences union participation indirectly by affecting union commitment, which in turn leads to union participation; and secondly that perceived union instrumentality affects union participation directly.

This is an important finding in the sense that it suggests that affective commitment is not the only avenue through which the members' participation in union activities can be obtained. This also probably explains why some workers may occasionally or frequently participate in union activities without necessarily having affective commitment towards their union. Thus, some workers may engage in union activities based on the union's instrumentality while others may be drawn to the meetings through the charisma of a dynamic leader and yet none of these workers may be affectively committed to the union. Thus when the going gets rough thereby affecting the union's instrumentality and the leadership appeal from the standpoint of these workers, they may decide to curtail their involvement.

The results also show that union commitment predicted union participation for the overall sample ( $\beta = .21, p < .000$ ) thus confirming the hypothesis relating the two variables. This result also supports the notion that commitment to the union is a key antecedent of the willingness to participate actively in the union (e.g. Bamberger et al. 1999; Fullager and Barling, 1989; Fuller and Hester, 1998 Gallagher and Clark, 1989). This is a significant finding from the viewpoint of the Nigerian industrial relations literature because previous studies have yet to demonstrate the connection between

union commitment (affective commitment) and union participation (behavioural commitment). This result also suggests that the model could be universally applicable and not subject to cultural or contextual variations. Thus it may be argued that members who are affectively committed to their unions are more likely to participate in formal union activities than those who do not express any affective commitment to their unions irrespective of their geographical or cultural background.

A multidimensional approach to union participation was adopted in this study and the aspects covered included attendance at union meetings, speaking or contributing at union meetings, voting at union elections and campaigning for candidates during union elections. Each of these dimensions were predicted by different sets of antecedents. For meeting attendance, the antecedents were union instrumentality perception and satisfaction with union leadership; contributing at meetings had union instrumentality perception, satisfaction with union leadership and early union socialization experience; voting at union elections was predicted by union instrumentality perception, satisfaction with union leadership and early union socialization experience; lastly, campaigning for candidates had as antecedents early union socialization experience and union-politics orientation. This finding justifies the multidimensional approach and also supports Kelly and Kelly (1994).

***Hypothesis 6 and 7. Internal Union Dynamics will exert a significant impact on the predictors of union commitment and the union commitment; the influence of the internal union dynamics will vary across the private and the public sector i.e. sector will be a moderator in the model.*** Hypothesis 6 was partially confirmed in the sense that not all the five internal union dynamics studied were significant predictors in the

model. Union commitment was significantly greater in the public sector while union participation was significantly greater in the private sector thus confirming hypothesis

7. In accounting for this apparent discrepancy, reference was made to the relative impact of the internal union dynamics on the relationship between pro-union attitudes, union commitment and union participation. In the case of union commitment, perception of information dissemination - apparently the most significant in terms of impact on the pro-union attitudes and the dependent variables - was observed to be of more influence in the private sector. In the case of union participation, perception of information dissemination was more influential in the public sector.

Another explanation for the apparent discrepancy took into account the rational choice theory (Klandermans, 1984, 1986; Montgomery, 1989; Zalesny, 1985). This relates to the members viewing their participation as a function of the goal-related costs and benefits of participation and the perceived value of the outcomes of participation. Branch meetings received a high turnout mostly when financial or economic matters are involved, especially the ones involving wage increases and allowances. Workers in the private sector especially, who may not have expressed affective commitment to the union still participated in union activities nonetheless because they perceived the benefits as high, and the costs low.

In conclusion, the Nigerian workers' attachment to their union is primarily based on the consideration of the latter's instrumentality, leadership behaviour and the informal socialisation experiences that takes place within the union. The impact of internal union dynamics on union attitudes highlights the importance of contextual elements as far as different union settings are concerned. The dynamics partly explained why

union members in the public sector were apparently more committed to their union and yet performed significantly less in union participation. For all the members, the dynamic of information dissemination was perceived as a significant influence in the union commitment process. But it not only referred to intra-union communication mechanisms but also the transparency and sincerity of union leaders in the whole process. Men participated more in union activities but this is not because women were less committed to the union than men but rather because women were restricted by their traditional roles.

## **9.2 Limitations of Study**

Certain limitations of this study need mentioning and a few concerns methodology. Some scales (socialisation experience and Marxist beliefs) had low reliability in the first survey but the reliability estimates were high in the second survey and suggest that this situation need not have any major impact on the overall outcome and application of the study. Also some scales (union-politics orientation and life satisfaction) had too few items. This situation was a trade-off for a good response rate. There was also the inability to obtain data on actual membership of the research population which prevented statistical authentication of the representativeness of the samples used. Nevertheless the samples appear to reflect the average Nigerian worker on some demographic factors (Fashoyin, 1987). Also the study was only limited to the south of the country thus the full impact of the ethnic factor remains inconclusive. Because all the respondents from the three ethnic groups all reside in the south, their attitudes may have been similar due to their sharing the same urban experience. But in defence, at the time of the research until the present, inter-ethnic skirmishes were

taking place in the northern part of the country which made it highly risky and unrealistic to conduct any meaningful study there.

### **9.3 Implications of Findings**

In terms of practical and policy implications, the findings on union instrumentality perception underscore the importance of unions having a record of significant achievements to which their members can relate. In the final analysis, the unions' instrumentality is more likely to be based on members' consideration of this record than on preconceived notions of the "big labour image". It helps when unions have demonstrated some considerable effectiveness in the past but the unions must also be seen by members as relevant in their current situation because past successes may not always guarantee continued success as the decline of unions in the west – e.g. America and Britain - aptly illustrates. Thus, to sustain their members' commitment through the members' perception of the unions' instrumentality, it is essential for unions to strive to maintain a reasonable degree of consistency in their level of performance.

The findings on members' leadership attitudes emphasise that union leaders' conduct and behaviour has the potential of either enhancing or decimating their members' union commitment. Related to this is the need for the leaders to build or rebuild their members' trust. This might necessitate the unions having special meetings whereby grievances, both past and current, are discussed openly with members and dealt with. The reason being that failure to resolve such issues may lead to a situation whereby members might continue to find it difficult believing everything their leaders tells them although they may accept them. In addition or alternatively, avenues can be

provided for members to report any branch official(s) perceived to be abusing their trust to relevant higher authorities within the union.

It is pertinent to note that union leaders may be appreciated and acknowledged by their members for their hard work and yet be accused of not being straightforward. It is therefore very important for the leaders to focus on regaining the trust of their members by being transparent and forthright in their dealings with members. The unions should not relent in punishing errant and corrupt branch union officials so as to instil a sense of confidence into the rank and file some of whom may think some officials are sacred cows or above the law. A system of checks and balances should be in place within the union and also effectively monitored and enforced so that no leader(s) irrespective of their level of leadership is perceived to be circumventing these checks thereby taking the members for a ride. To influence the attitudes of members who are usually distrusting and sceptical in the aftermath of union-management negotiations, the leaders should always brief their members or constituency at every stage of the process before signing a final deal with management. This admittedly should be a standard practice, but apparently, some union leaders seem to unilaterally make the final decision without consultation with their constituency.

Findings on early socialisation experience suggest that unions can maximise the commitment of their members by adopting both the formal and informal structure in their approach. The unions have a need for socialisation programmes aimed at educating members about the activities of their unions. The induction of new members into the union, by providing them with accurate information about union

policies and how the union operates is important. Union leaders have a duty to perform in this respect through initiating contacts with new members and emphasising the importance of workplace unionism. Leaders' approachability, accessibility and amiableness are important ingredients in this process. Where differences do not arise between members and their leaders in terms of class distinction, union members are likely to have greater commitment to their union.

Union leaders should endeavour to fulfil the role of agents of socialization in the union, acting as important as sources of information. Related to this is the need for union recruitment policies to focus on the skills and capabilities of leaders as a medium for union socialization. Socialisation programmes specifically targeted at breaking down social and cultural barriers should be fashioned out by leaders especially in unions where cultural diversity may be salient. New members should be able to receive help and encouragement from other members irrespective of their ethnic, social or religious background. Also union leaders should devise ways of providing social support and direction and integrating the newcomer into his/her role.

Lastly, a comparison of the findings in this study with the research findings within the western literature suggests that first and foremost there is support for the union commitment-participation link. This means that the general argument that context restricts the application of models emanating from developed countries does not apply in this particular case. Some researchers in developing countries are apparently convinced that all theories from the west are bound to be automatically dysfunctional in developing settings (Fajana, 1995). The premise upon which this conclusion is based has its merits (Hartley 1995; Otobo, 1995; Fajana, 1995) but the conclusion by

itself in the absence of an objective enquiry arguably lacks merit. This study has shown that the case of union commitment and union participation existing as distinct measurable constructs with a positive causal link, is applicable within the Nigerian context. In essence, one could argue that union commitment is likely to predict union participation in a developing country just as much as it would in a developed country. Admittedly the strength (i.e. regression coefficient) of this connection may be moderated by contextual factors, but the connection remains nonetheless and probably has a universal applicability. Related to this observation is the support for the view that it is necessary to subject social theories to empirical enquiries rather than settling for tentative generalisations or armchair conjectures. Hopefully this will lead to more research activity in cross-cultural evaluations of social and psychological theories.

In view of the fact that not all the hypotheses based on the model were confirmed, thus providing limited support for the view that antecedents of union commitment differ across countries or contexts, caution still has to be taken in generalising research findings across contexts. One major similarity between the two literatures concerns the case of union attitudes predicting union commitment. It can be argued that this is a reflection of the universal applicability of the general philosophy behind trade unionism. Across the world, the fundamental objective of a trade union is to fight for its members. Globalisation, socio-economic and political realities may engender a transformation in the roles and tactics adopted by unions and the individual experience of unions in different countries may have to reflect this situation. In spite of this however, the basic and traditional principle of fighting for the rights of workers remains the same. If this principle is compromised, the unions would hardly be regarded as trade unions in the fundamental sense of the word. Thus union

attitudes might continue to be correlated with union commitment regardless of context or country.

As far as other factors are concerned (e.g. demographic, work experiences, Marxist beliefs, etc.) the study showed no correlation in the Nigerian context, whereas, in the western studies, evidence seems to point in a particular direction in certain areas (e.g. work experience) but mixed in others (e.g. demographic). Work experiences though mainly significant in western studies (Snape, 2000) were not significant in this study probably because the factor may be related more to the type of industrial workers used and the type of industry in which they are employed (Remy, 1975). Work attitudes in international and multinational corporations may be different from Nigerian-owned industries. Also similar to the situation whereby a typical committed member in terms of demography is difficult to identify from the western literature (Snape, 2000), future studies might need to further explore demographic factors in the Nigerian context.

It is significant to point out that the western literature on union commitment is replete with numerous studies from which definitive conclusions could be made (Snape, 2000). However, this study appears to be the first major attempt in the Nigerian context. Thus while it is acceptable to make comparisons with the western literature at this point, drawing final conclusions might be premature. A body of work exploring different themes on the subject of union commitment in Nigeria or a similar developing context will need to evolve before a definite picture of the antecedents of union commitment for Nigerians can emerge. But this study has at least advanced a provisional outlook.

## **9.5 Future Research**

Future research on union commitment should focus on cross-national collaboration between developed and developing countries in order to bridge the gap between the two. The role of ethnicity should be further established by drawing samples from the northern and eastern part of the country rather than from the same geographical location. Also, dual commitment was not investigated *per se* in this study due to the limited focus of the research. Future union commitment models aimed at developing countries could operationalise it as a unique construct. Research on dual commitment has been criticized for failing to establish dual commitment as a unique construct with significant explanatory power beyond that of employer commitment and union commitment (Bemmels, 1995).

## APPENDICES.

### A1:Questionnaire: First Survey

#### CONFIDENTIAL

#### QUESTIONNAIRE

As attitudes and opinions have been found to differ to some extent according to age and other personal characteristics, it would help if you could give the following details about yourself. Your name is not required. Unless stated elsewhere, please answer each question by putting a tick in the dotted line beside the statement, which most represent your opinion or attitude.

1. What is your state of origin.....
2. Are you male or female (tick one).

Male.....

Female.....

3. What is your highest educational qualification? (tick one)  
primary.....  
secondary.....  
higher institution (OND, HND, BSc, etc.).....

4. How old are you?.....
5. For how long have you been a trade union member? (tick one)  
1-5 years  
6-10 years  
11-15 years  
16-34 years

Please indicate whether you strongly disagree, disagree, undecided, agree or strongly agree with the following statements. Circle one answer only for each statement.

Statements	Strongly disagree	Disagree	Not sure	Agree	Strongly Agree
6. I feel a sense of pride being a member of this union					
7. the record of this union is a good example of what dedicated people can get done					
8. I have gained a lot by joining this union					
9. this union is capable of fighting for workers					
10. deciding to join this union was a smart move on my part					
11. the union is capable of ensuring that the jobs of members are safe					
12. this union helps in improving earnings and conditions of service					
13. this union protects the interests and rights of workers from being encroached upon					
14. this union attends to grievances of members.					
15. management is doing its best for workers					
16. management can be trusted					
17. management's actions towards workers are fair.					

*Questions 18-19:* Within the first few weeks and months of joining your union, to what extent would you say that you:

18. Understood the goals of your union? (tick one)

I had a very good understanding.....

I had a good understanding.....

I had a fair understanding.....

I had very little understanding.....

19. Received support and encouragement from other union members? (tick one)

I received very great support and encouragement.....

I received great amount of support and encouragement

I received a fair amount of support and encouragement

20. How often do you attend your union meetings

I attend very often

I attend sometimes

I attend rarely

21. How often do you contribute (i.e. speak)

I contribute very often

I contribute sometimes

I contribute rarely

22. How often do you vote at union elections?

I vote in all elections

I vote in few elections

I rarely vote.

23. Have you ever campaigned for candidates?

Yes, very often

Yes sometimes

No

Please indicate whether you strongly disagree, disagree, undecided, agree or strongly agree with the following statements. Circle one answer only for each statement.

	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Undecided	Agree	Strongly Agree
24. Union leaders are very responsible.					
25. Union leaders are very united					
26. Union leaders are very democratic					
27. Unions should form their political party					
28. Workers should have more say in the running of society					
29. Factories would be better run if workers had more say in					

management.						
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The following items (30 – 33) deal with various aspects of your job and life and how satisfied or dissatisfied you are with each. Indicate whether you are extremely satisfied, very satisfied, moderately satisfied, not sure, moderately dissatisfied, very dissatisfied, or extremely dissatisfied with each item.

Items	Extremely satisfied	Very satisfied	Moderately satisfied	Not sure	Moderately dissatisfied	Very dissatisfied	Extremely dissatisfied
30. Your salary							
31. Your job as a whole							
32. Your living Standard							
33. Your life in general (i.e. health, education, family, etc.)							

## A2:Questionnaire: Second Survey

### CONFIDENTIAL

### QUESTIONNAIRE

As attitudes and opinions have been found to differ to some extent according to age and other personal characteristics, it would help if you could give the following details about yourself. Your name is not required. Unless stated elsewhere, please answer each question by putting a tick in the dotted line beside the statement, which most represent your opinion or attitude.

1. Are you      male.....      female.....
  
2. What is your state of origin (please state).....
  
3. Are you  
    Single .....  
    Married .....  
    Separated.....  
    Widowed.....
  
4. What is your highest educational qualification  
    Primary school.....  
    Secondary school .....  
    BSc. .....  
    MSc and above.....
  
5. What section or department do you work in ?  
(Please state ). .....
  
6. What is the name of your union?.....
  
7. What type of staff are you?  
    Junior staff.....  
    Senior staff.....  
    Other (please indicate).....

8. For how long have you been working for your current employer?

Less than one year.....

1 – 4 yrs .....

5 – 9 yrs .....

10 – 14 yrs .....

15 and above .....

9. Do you have any dependant(s) (e.g. children, relatives)

Yes.....

No.....

30. What is your age?

Less than 18 yrs .....

19 – 24 yrs .....

25 – 34 yrs .....

35 – 44 yrs .....

45 – 45 yrs .....

31. For how long have you been a member of your union?

Less than one year.....

1-5 yrs.....

6 – 10 yrs .....

11 – 15 yrs .....

16 – 34 yrs .....

32. Are you a union official ?

Yes .....

No.....

33. Have you ever contested for union office before?

Yes.....

No.....

34. How well did you understand the goals and objectives of your union within the first few weeks and months of your joining the union?

I had very good understanding.....  
I have good understanding.....  
I have a fair understanding .....,  
I have very little understanding .....

35. How much support and encouragement did you receive from other union members within the first few weeks and months of your joining the union?

very great amount.....  
great amount.....  
fair amount.....  
little amount.....  
very little amount.....

36. How much support and encouragement did you receive from union leaders within the first few weeks and months of your joining the union?

A very great amount.....  
A great amount.....  
A fair amount.....  
A little amount.....  
A very little amount.....

37. How did you become a member of your union?

I joined on my own.....  
I was persuaded by friends.....  
I was persuaded by union leaders.....  
Management made me to join.....

38. Why did you join your union?

To win more wages and better working conditions.....  
To get protection from being sacked.....  
To enjoy social benefits from the union.....  
Because most people join.....  
The union is capable of fighting for workers.....  
The union has more time and resources to deal with management.....

39. Do you pay your union contributions regularly?

Yes .....

No.....

40. How often do you attend your union meetings

I attend very often.....

I attend occasionally.....

I attend rarely.....

41. How often do you speak at union meetings?

I speak very often.....

I speak sometimes.....

I speak rarely.....

42. How often do you vote at union elections?

I vote in all elections.....

I vote in few elections.....

I rarely vote in any election.....

43. Have you ever campaigned for candidates during union elections?

Yes, very often.....

Yes, sometimes.....

No.....

44. How well informed does your union leaders keep you on what is happening in the union?

Very well.....

Fairly well.....

Rather poorly.....

Very poorly.....

45. How are decisions made in your union?

Through a meeting of all workers.....

Through a committee of the union.....

Union leaders decide.....

Workers are always informed after decision had been taken.....

**Please tick your response to the following statements. The statements refer to your your trade union, organisation and your job.**

Statements	Strongly disagree	Disagree	Not sure	Agree	Strongly Agree
46. I feel a sense of pride being a member of this union					
47. the record of this union is a good example of what dedicated people can get done					
48. I feel great loyalty towards this union					
49. I have much confidence and trust in most members of my union					
50. I have gained a lot by joining this union					
51. this union is capable of fighting for workers					
52. deciding to join this union was a smart move on my part					
53. the union is capable of ensuring that the jobs of members are safe					
54. this union helps in improving earnings and conditions of service					
55. this union protects the interests and rights of workers from being encroached upon					
56. this union attends to grievances of members					
57. I feel very much loyalty to this organisation.					
58. union leaders are very hardworking					
59. there is unity amongst union leaders					
60. union leaders allow members to express their views.					
61. What do you think of the decision by the Nigerian Labour Congress to form a labour party?					

**That is the end of the survey. Thank you very much for your co-operation.**

### **A3: Personal Interview Schedule (Union Officials)**

#### **1. History of trade unionism in the establishment**

- Structure of union
  - Total number of members
  - how many union officers in all?
  - what are their titles/ offices
- When was the union formed?
- History of relations with management / strike history: any records?
- Instances of disputes with management: reasons and outcome
- Nature of executive meetings: weekly, monthly, etc.
- General meetings: how often: weekly, monthly?
- Duration of general meeting (1 hour? 2hours, etc.)

#### **2. Union membership**

- Closed shop /voluntary/optional/compulsory

#### **3. Nature of relations between unions and management**

- Is management supportive
- Antagonistic
- All of the above? None of the above?

#### **4. Does your union provide any social benefits for its members? (e.g. cooperative Schemes, hardship funds, etc.)**

#### **5. Do you have any socialisation programmes for new members?; Do you have any programmes aimed at educating members about the objectives of trade unionism?**

6. Union elections

- When are they held?
  - annually, bi-annually, etc.
- Eligibility criteria
- Balloting procedures (open or secret?)

7. Information dissemination within the union.

- Word of mouth?
- Newsletters
- Notice boards
- Other?

8. Union composition. How ethnically diverse /homogeneous is your membership? Any tribal tensions, divisions, etc?.

9. How are negotiations (over wage and other matters) conducted with management?

- At the departmental level?
- Company level?

10. Describe the grievance settling procedure. If an employee has a grievance, How do they proceed?

11. Give examples of issues within the workplace which have warranted union intervention e.g. wage and benefits (pension, car, housing, allowances, training, etc).

12. Shed more light on the following objectives

- Grievance handling
- Informing workers of union meetings and urging them to attend
- Political education of the union
- Recruiting new members
- Collecting union dues
- Negotiating improvements in employment conditions
- Participating in joint consultative bodies.

13. Information on employing institution.

- When was it established?
- Total number of employees in location
  - males and females
  - graduates and non-graduates
  - employees' job tenure

**A4: Personal Interview Schedules: (Union Members)**

1. How will you describe your experiences since joining your union?
2. How do you relate to new members in your union?
3. Are you satisfied with the way union leaders are handling union matters?
4. Are you satisfied with the level of communication between the union leadership and members?
5. What is your view of union-management relations in this establishment?
6. Do you consider your union leaders to be easily accessible?
7. Do you consider your union leaders to be easily approachable?
8. Have you ever raised any work-related grievance with your union leaders before? If not why not?
9. Have you ever discussed any personal problem with any union leader before?  
If not why not?
10. Do you get along with union members of different ethnic backgrounds?
11. Are your union leaders united and co-operative?
12. Do union leaders seek the opinion of members before taking important decisions?
13. How do you normally receive information concerning union matters?
14. What is your view of union-management relations in this establishment?
15. Overall, do you regard your union as being effective?

### A5: Raw Frequencies: First Survey

#### Union Commitment

Items	Strongly Disagree %	Disagree %	Uncertain %	Agree %	Strongly Agree %	N Valid	N Missing
I feel a sense of pride being a member of this union	9.3	13.4	10.5	42	24.6	317	0
The record of this union is an example of what dedicated people can get done	10.9	17.7	10.1	41.5	19.9	314	3
I have gained a lot by joining this union	11.0	18.4	12.9	36.8	21.0	314	3
Deciding to join the union was smart move on my part	13.1	20.1	12.8	38.0	16.0	316	1

#### Union Instrumentality

Items	Strongly Disagree %	Disagree %	Uncertain %	Agree %	Strongly Agree %	N valid	N Missing
The union is capable of fighting for workers	7.7	12.6	11.6	44.8	23.5	317	0
The union is capable of ensuring that the jobs of workers are safe	9.6	18.6	10.9	41.0	19.9	316	1
The union helps in improving earnings and conditions of service	4.5	9.3	5.5	55.6	25.1	317	0
The union protects the interests and rights of workers from being encroached upon	2.6	12.3	9.0	52.3	23.9	316	1
The union attends to grievances of members	2.3	13.2	12.2	55.0	17.4	317	0

### Satisfaction with Management

Items	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Uncertain	Agree	Strongly Agree	N Valid	N Missing
	%	%	%	%	%		
Management is doing its best for workers	13.6	25.0	15.2	38.0	8.2	316	1
Management's actions towards workers are fair	11.4	29.5	19.7	34.6	4.8	315	2
Management can be trusted	19.2	30.6	27.4	17.7	5.0	317	0

### Early Union Socialisation Experience

Items	Very good understandin	Good understandin	Fair understandin	Very little understandin	N Valid	N Missing
	g %	g %	g %	g %		
Understanding of union goals	12.9	27.8	30.6	28.7	317	0
Support and encouragement from old members	Very great	Great	fair	Very little		
	13.0	27.6	32.1	27.3	315	2

### Satisfaction with Union Leadership

Items	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Uncertain	Agree	Strongly Agree	N Valid	N Missing
	%	%	%	%	%		
Union leaders are very responsible	10	15.2	19.7	40.6	14.5	316	1
Union leaders are very united	8.4	22.9	19.0	36.8	12.9	317	1
United leaders are very democratic	7.5	16.4	12.8	45.6	17.7	315	2

### Union-Politics Orientation

Item	Strongly Disagree %	Disagree %	Uncertain %	Agree %	Strongly Agree %	N Valid	N Missing
Workers should form their own political party	26.7	26.4	20.2	14.7	12.1	314	3

### Marxist Beliefs

Item	Strongly Disagree %	Disagree %	Uncertain %	Agree %	Strongly Agree %	N Valid	N Missing
Workers should have more say in the running of society	4.2	6.5	10.7	45.6	32.9	316	1
Factories will be better run if workers had more say in management	3.2	10.4	13.2	39.1	33.9	316	1

### Job Satisfaction

Items	Extremely satisfied %	Very satisfied %	Moderately satisfied %	Not sure %	Moderately Dissatisfied %	Very dissatisfied %	Extremely dissatisfied %	N Valid
How satisfied are you with your salary?	1.6	6.1	50.5	2.6	11.3	15.2	12.6	313 (4 missing)
How satisfied are you with your standard of living?	1.9	9.6	49.7	5.4	9.3	10.9	11.2	316 (1 missing)
How satisfied are you with your job as a whole?	6.4	27.5	44.4	2.6	5.6	5.8	5.4	315 (2 missing)

### Life Satisfaction

Item	Extremely Satisfied %	Very Satisfied %	Moderately Satisfied %	Not Sure %	Moderately Dissatisfied %	Very Dissatisfied %	Extremely Dissatisfied %	N Valid
How satisfied are you with life in general (e.g. education, health, etc.)	8.2	24.0	43.8	6.0	5.4	5.7	6.1	314 (3 missing)

### Union Participation

Item	Attend very often %	Attend sometimes %	Attend rarely %	N Valid	N Missing
How often do you attend your union meeting?	45.4	35.6	18.9	317	0
How often do you contribute during meetings?	Contribute very often	Contribute sometimes	Contribute rarely		
	25.2	47.9	26.8	317	0
How often do you vote at union elections?	Rarely vote in any election	Vote in few elections	Vote in all elections	N	
	19.9	28.1	51.7	316	1
Have you ever campaigned for candidates?	No never	Yes sometimes	Yes very often	N	
	45.1	37.9	17.0	317	0

#### A6:Raw Frequencies: Second survey (IUD Items)

How are decisions made in your union

		Frequency	Percent
Valid	through a meeting of all workers	113	57.9
	through a committee of union	27	13.8
	union leaders decide	15	7.7
	workers are informed after decision have been taken.	27	13.8
	Total	182	93.3
Missing	System	13	6.7
Total		195	100.0

How well informed does your leaders keep you on what is happening in the union

		Frequency	Percent
Valid	very well	10	5.1
	fairly well	25	12.8
	rather poorly	69	35.4
	Very poorly	89	45.6
	Total	193	99.0
Missing	System	2	1.0
Total		195	100.0

Why did you join your union

		Frequency	Percent
Valid	to win more wages and better working conditions	53	27.2
	to get protection from being sacked	13	6.7
	to enjoy social benefits from the union	19	9.7
	because most people join	13	6.7
	the union is capable of fighting for workers	73	37.4
	the union has more time and resources to deal with mgt	19	9.7
	Total	190	97.4
Missing	System	5	2.6
Total		195	100.0

How did you become a member

		Frequency	Percent
Valid	I joined on my own	79	40.5
	I was persuaded by friends	38	19.5
	I was persuaded by union leaders	14	7.2
	management made me to join	62	31.8
	Total	193	99.0
	System	2	1.0
Total		195	100.0

Relations between managers and the union are very good

		Frequency	Percent
Valid	strongly disagree	5	2.6
	disagree	23	11.8
	not sure	40	20.5
	agree	79	40.5
	strongly agree	44	22.6
	Total	191	97.9
Missing	System	4	2.1
Total		195	100.0

**A7:TRADE DISPUTES**

Year	Trade Dispute	Work stoppage	Workers Involved	Man-Days Lost
1990	174	102	254,540	1339105
1991	204	117	460471	2257382
1992	221	124	238324	966611
1993	160	90	880244	1537890
1994	175	103	1,537,890	2,3429,9461
1995	196	124	1,546,328	235069010
1996	114	101	1,246,119	165901430
1997	97	89	1,128,575	141762772
1998	115	108	1,307,007	180911070

Source: Federal ministry of employment and productivity

## Testing for Moderated Relationships: Union Attitudes

**Table A5.1 Partial correlation coefficients controlling for SUL**

	UC	SOEXP	UI
UC	1.0000 ( 0) P= .	.2207 ( 190) P= .002	.4503 ( 190) P= .000
SOEXP	.2207 ( 190) P= .002	1.0000 ( 0) P= .	.2052 ( 190) P= .004
UI	.4503 ( 190) P= .000	.2052 ( 190) P= .004	1.0000 ( 0) P= .

(Coefficient / (D.F.) / 2-tailed Significance)

**Table A5.2 Partial correlation coefficients Controlling for UI**

	UC	SUL	SOEXP
UC	1.0000 ( 0) P= .	.4732 ( 190) P= .000	.1640 ( 190) P= .023
SUL	.4732 ( 190) P= .000	1.0000 ( 0) P= .	.0742 ( 190) P= .307
SOEXP	.1640 ( 190) P= .023	.0742 ( 190) P= .307	1.0000 ( 0) P= .

(Coefficient / (D.F.) / 2-tailed Significance)

**Table A5.3 Partial correlation coefficients Controlling for SOEXP**

	UC	SUL	UI
UC	1.0000 ( 0) P= .	.7135 ( 190) P= .000	.6959 ( 190) P= .000
SUL	.7135 ( 190) P= .000	1.0000 ( 0) P= .	.6636 ( 190) P= .000
UI	.6959 ( 190) P= .000	.6636 ( 190) P= .000	1.0000 ( 0) P= .

(Coefficient / (D.F.) / 2-tailed Significance)

**Table A5.4 Descriptive statistics and significance tests on demographic variables for union commitment.**

<b><u>Gender</u></b>	<b><u>Means</u></b>	<b><u>Standard Deviation</u></b>	<b><u>Statistics</u></b>
Male	13.95	4.04	
Female	13.75	4.30	$t = .35$
<b><u>Sector</u></b>			
Private	13.9563	4.71866	
Public	14.8735	4.80776	$t = 1.95^*$
<b><u>Ethnic group</u></b>			
Southerners	13.7273	4.4600	
Northerners	13.4652	4.2941	$t = .330$
<b><u>Educational Status</u></b>			
Primary School	13.0980	6.3243	
Secondary School	13.7046	4.4638	
Higher Institution	13.3994	4.1006	$F = .688$
<b><u>Membership Tenure</u></b>			
1 - 5 years	14.0816	4.1618	
6 - 10 years	13.8368	3.8040	
11 - 15 years	12.6491	4.8642	
16 - 34 years	13.0145	4.3120	$F = 1.938$
<b><u>Age</u></b>			
21 - 29 years	14.83	4.136	
30 - 39 years	13.23	4.914	
40 - 49 years	12.17	5.334	
50 and above	12.21	5.177	$F = 1.787$

\*  $P < .04$

**Table A5.5 Descriptive statistics and significance tests on demographic variables for union participation.**

<u>Gender</u>	<u>Mean</u>	<u>Standard Deviation</u>	<u>Statistics</u>
Male	8.40	2.45	
Female	7.51	2.30	t = 2.84*
<u>Sector</u>			
Private	8.7595	2.27706	
Public	7.7017	2.39534	t = 2.922*
<u>Ethnic grouping</u>			
Northerners	7.47	2.2980	
Southerners	7.75	2.5477	t = .427
<u>Educational Status</u>			
Primary School	7.33	2.44	
Secondary School	7.65	2.30	
Higher Institution	7.74	2.38	F = .454
<u>Membership Tenure</u>			
1 - 5 years	7.81	2.2328	
6 - 10 years	7.39	2.3139	
11 - 15 years	7.77	2.5778	
16 - 34 years	8.01	2.3400	F = .96
<u>Age</u>			
20 - 29 years	7.83	2.26	
30 - 39 years	7.66	2.27	
40 - 49 years	7.85	2.50	
50 and above	7.07	2.75	F = .49

\* $P < .01$

**Table A6.1 Multiple regression: Union Commitment (optimal scaling)**

## Model Summary

Multiple R	R Square	Adjusted R Square
.803	.645	.627

## ANOVA

	Sum of Squares	Df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Regression	191.513	14	13.680	36.570	.000
Residual	105.487	282	.374		
Total	297.000	296			

## Coefficients

	Beta Standardized Coefficients		F
		Std. Error	
Ethnic group	-6.575E-03	.037	3.075E-02
Gender	1.531E-02	.037	.174
Educational background	-5.068E-02	.037	1.909
Age	9.730E-03	.037	7.016E-02
Membership tenure	3.244E-02	.040	.664
Sector	.157*	.041	14.941
Union instrumentality	.466*	.039	145.655
Satisfaction with Management	1.630E-02	.037	.184
Satisfaction with Union Leadership	.348*	.040	77.103
Early Socialization experience	.129*	.040	10.114
Marxist beliefs	7.033E-02	.039	3.335
Job satisfaction	-6.004E-02	.040	2.284
Satisfaction with life	-6.118E-02	.038	3.370E-02
Union-politics orientation	6.507E-02	.039	2.808

\* significant.

**Table A6.2 Multiple regression: UP**

Model Summary

Multiple R	R Square	Adjusted R Square
.667	.445	.417

ANOVA

	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Regression	132.022	14	9.430	16.119	.000
Residual	164.978	282	.585		
Total	297.000	296			

Coefficients

	Beta Standardized Coefficients	F	Std. Error
Union instrumentality	.381*	.052.	53.168
Union Commitment	.206*	.051	16.618
Satisfaction with Management	-9.304E-02	.048	3.802
Satisfaction with Union Leadership	.341*	.049	48.020
Early union socialization experience	.155*	.049	11.102
Marxist beliefs	022E-02	.046	1.506
Job satisfaction	-7.756E-02	.054	2.794
Ethnic group	2.726E-02	.046	.346
Gender	.148*	.046	7.399
Educational background	6.504E-02	.046	1.987
Age	-4.516E-02	.050	.831
Membership tenure	-7.756E-02	.048	2.611
Sector	.278*	.046	10.849
Satisfaction with life	6.285E-03	.052	1.462E-02
Union politics orientation	4.105E-02	.047	.777

\* Significant

**Table A6.3 Multiple regression: Union Commitment (linear regression)**

Model Summary

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Change Statistics		
					R Square Change	F Change	Sig. F Change
1	.661	.437	.435	2.44984	.437	240.106	.000
2	.716	.513	.510	2.28239	.076	48.002	.000
3	.733	.537	.533	2.22862	.024	16.043	.000

1 Predictors: (Constant), UI

2 Predictors: (Constant), UI, SUL

3 Predictors: (Constant), UI, SUL, SOEXP

ANOVA

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	1441.043	1	1441.043	240.106	.000
	Residual	1854.526	309	6.002		
	Total	3295.569	310			
2	Regression	1691.101	2	845.550	162.315	.000
	Residual	1604.468	308	5.209		
	Total	3295.569	310			
3	Regression	1770.783	3	590.261	118.843	.000
	Residual	1524.786	307	4.967		
	Total	3295.569	310			

1 Predictors: (Constant), UI

2 Predictors: (Constant), UI, SUL

3 Predictors: (Constant), UI, SUL, SOEXP

Dependent Variable: UC

Coefficients

Model		Standardized Coefficients		t	Sig.	Collinearity Statistics
		Std. Error	Beta			
1	(Constant)	.623		1.787	.075	
	UI	.028	.661	15.495	.000	1.000
2	(Constant)	.624		-.773	.440	
	UI	.029	.520	11.633	.000	.791
	SUL	.052	.310	6.928	.000	.791
3	(Constant)	.952		2.570	.011	
	UI	.029	.482	10.810	.000	.757
	SUL	.053	.261	5.775	.000	.735
	SOEXP	.084	.172	4.005	.000	.818

Dependent Variable: UC

**Table A6.4 Multiple regression: Union Participation (attendance at union meetings)**

Model Summary

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Change Statistics		
					R Square Change	F Change	Sig. F Change
1	.421	.177	.175	.688	.177	67.277	.000
2	.504	.254	.249	.656	.077	31.906	.000

1 Predictors: (Constant), UI

2 Predictors: (Constant), UI, SUL

ANOVA

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	31.845	1	31.845	67.277	.000
	Residual	147.683	312	.473		
	Total	179.529	313			
2	Regression	45.587	2	22.793	52.924	.000
	Residual	133.942	311	.431		
	Total	179.529	313			

1 Predictors: (Constant), UI

2 Predictors: (Constant), UI, SUL

Dependent Variable: Union Participation (meeting attendance)

Coefficients

Model		Standardized Coefficients		t	Sig.	Collinearity Statistics	
		Std. Error	Beta				Tolerance
1	(Constant)	.134		5.311	.000		
	UI	.023	.412	7.956	.000	1.000	
2	(Constant)	.252		7.735	.000		
	UI	.024	.309	5.864	.000	.880	
	SUL	.008	.300	5.701	.000	.880	

Dependent Variable: Union Participation (meeting attendance)

**Table A6.5 Multiple regression: Union Participation (contribution at meetings)**

Model Summary

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Change Statistics	R Square Change	F Change	Sig. F Change
1	.353	.125	.122	.675	.125	.125	43.987	.000
2	.425	.181	.176	.654	.056	.056	21.217	.000
3	.438	.192	.184	.651	.011	.011	4.180	.042

1 Predictors: (Constant), UI

2 Predictors: (Constant), UI, SUL

3 Predictors: (Constant), UI, SUL, SOEXP

ANOVA

Model		Sum of Squares	Df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	20.059	1	20.059	43.987	.000
	Residual	140.912	309	.456		
	Total	160.971	310			
2	Regression	29.140	2	14.570	34.041	.000
	Residual	131.831	308	.428		
	Total	160.971	310			
3	Regression	30.911	3	10.304	24.321	.000
	Residual	130.060	307	.424		
	Total	160.971	310			

1 Predictors: (Constant), UI

2 Predictors: (Constant), UI, SUL

3 Predictors: (Constant), UI, SUL, SOEXP

Dependent Variable: UP (contribution at meetings)

Coefficients

Model		Standardized Coefficients		t	Sig.	Collinearity Statistics	
		Std. Error	Beta			Tolerance	
1	(Constant)	.131		8.958	.000		
	UI	.023	.353	6.632	.000	1.000	
2	(Constant)	.252		8.642	.000		
	UI	.024	.265	4.830	.000	.880	
	SUL	.008	.253	4.606	.000	.880	
3	(Constant)	.278		8.717	.000		
	UI	.024	.235	4.136	.000	.735	
	SUL	.008	.208	3.526	.000	.757	
	SOEXP	.015	.122	2.045	.042	.818	

Dependent Variable: UP (contribution at meetings)

**Table A6.6 Multiple regression: Union Participation (voting at union elections)**

Model Summary

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Change Statistics	R Square Change	F Change	Sig. F Change
1	.343	.118	.115	.735	.118	.118	41.029	.000
2	.405	.164	.158	.716	.046	.046	17.030	.000
3	.418	.175	.167	.713	.011	.011	3.964	.047

1 Predictors: (Constant), UI

2 Predictors: (Constant), UI, SOEXP

3 Predictors: (Constant), UI, SOEXP, SUL

ANOVA

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	22.151	1	22.151	41.029	.000
	Residual	166.287	308	.540		
	Total	188.439	309			
2	Regression	30.891	2	15.445	30.097	.000
	Residual	157.548	307	.513		
	Total	188.439	309			
3	Regression	32.905	3	10.968	21.580	.000
	Residual	155.533	306	.508		
	Total	188.439	309			

1 Predictors: (Constant), UI

2 Predictors: (Constant), UI, SOEXP

3 Predictors: (Constant), UI, SOEXP, SUL

Dependent Variable: UP (voting at union elections)

Coefficients

Model		Standardized Coefficients		t	Sig.	Collinearity Statistics
		Std. Error	Beta			
1	(Constant)	.187		15.186	.000	1.000
	UI	.008	.343	6.405	.000	
2	(Constant)	.276		7.171	.000	.880
	UI	.009	.263	4.733	.000	
	SOEXP	.026	.230	4.127	.000	
3	(Constant)	.305		7.355	.000	.757
	UI	.009	.219	3.668	.000	
	SOEXP	.027	.199	3.461	.001	
	SUL	.017	.121	1.991	.047	

Dependent Variable: union participation (voting at union elections)

**Table A6.7 Multiple regression: Union Participation (campaigning for candidates)**

Model Summary

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Change Statistics	R Square Change	F Change	Sig. F Change
1	.299	.089	.086	.707	.089	.089	30.277	.000
2	.366	.134	.128	.691	.045	.045	15.826	.000

1 Predictors: (Constant), UI

2 Predictors: (Constant), UI, UPO

ANOVA

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	15.150	1	15.150	30.277	.000
	Residual	154.618	309	.500		
	Total	169.768	310			
2	Regression	22.706	2	11.353	23.778	.000
	Residual	147.062	308	.477		
	Total	169.768	310			

1 Predictors: (Constant), UI

2 Predictors: (Constant), UI, UPO

3 Dependent Variable: UP (campaigned for candidates)

Coefficients

Model		Standardized Coefficients		t	Sig.	Collinearity Statistics
		Std. Error	Beta			
1	(Constant)	.138		11.261	.000	1.000
	UI	.024	.299	5.502	.000	
2	(Constant)	.173		11.475	.000	.949
	UI	.024	.250	4.591	.000	
	union-politics orientation	.029	.217	3.978	.000	

Dependent Variable: UP (campaigning for candidates)

**Table A6.8 UPO (unions should form their own political party)**

<b>campaigned for candidates</b>		strongly disagree	disagree	uncertain	Agree	strongly agree	Total
	yes very often	12	8	7	8	19	54
		15.6%	9.4%	11.1%	19.0%	40.4%	17.2%
	yes sometimes	23	29	30	19	19	120
		29.9%	34.1%	47.6%	45.2%	40.4%	38.2%
	no	42	48	26	15	9	140
		54.5%	56.5%	41.3%	35.7%	19.1%	44.6%
<b>Total</b>		77	85	63	42	47	314
		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

N = 314 (Chi-square = 35.26; p < .000).

**Table A6.9 Multiple regression (private sector)**

Model Summary

	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Change Statistics		
Model					R Square Change	F Change	Sig. F Change
1	.744	.554	.549	2.48498	.554	98.219	.000
2	.768	.590	.580	2.39740	.036	6.877	.010

1 Predictors: (Constant), SUL

2 Predictors: (Constant), SUL, UI

Coefficients

Model		Std. Error	Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.	Collinearity Statistics
			Beta			Tolerance
1	(Constant)	1.843		.997	.322	
	SUL	.092	.744	9.911	.000	1.000
2	(Constant)	2.007		-.302	.764	
	SUL	.128	.547	5.237	.000	.481
	UI	.113	.274	2.622	.010	.481

Dependent Variable: UC

**Table A6.10 Multiple regression (public sector)**

Model Summary

	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Change Statistics		
Model					R Square Change	F Change	Sig. F Change
1	.797	.635	.631	1.71160	.635	189.439	.000
2	.843	.710	.705	1.53156	.075	28.133	.000

1 Predictors: (Constant), UI

2 Predictors: (Constant), UI, SUL

Coefficients

			Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.	Collinearity Statistics
Model		Std. Error	Beta			Tolerance
1	(Constant)	1.223		3.436	.001	
	UI	.048	.797	13.764	.000	1.000
2	(Constant)	1.177		1.617	.109	
	UI	.058	.551	7.941	.000	.556
	SUL	.066	.368	5.304	.000	.556

Dependent Variable: UC

**Table A6.11 UI \* UC \* Sector Crosstabulation**

			UC		Total
			Low	High	
Public Sector	UI	Low	32	5	37
			88.8	11.6%	46.8%
		High	4	38	42
			11.1%	88.4%	53.2%
Private Sector	UI	Total	36	43	79
			100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
		Low	84	32	116
			73.7%	25.8%	47.9%
		High	30	92	122
			26.3%	74.2%	51.3%
		Total	114	124	238
			100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Chi-Square Tests

sector		Value	Sig. (2-sided)
public	Pearson Chi-Square	7.919	.005
	N of Valid Cases	79	
private	Pearson Chi-Square	54.495	.000
	N of Valid Cases	238	

**Table A6.12 SUL \* UC \* Sector Crosstabulation**

Public Sector	SUL	Low	UC		Total
			Low	High	
		25	10	35	49.4%
High		14	30	34	44.3%
Total		39	40	79	100.0%
Private Sector	SUL	Low	81 62.8%	28 26.4%	109 46.4%
		High	48 37.2%	78 73.7%	126 53.6%
	Total		129 100.0%	106 100.0%	235 100.0%

Chi-Square Tests

sector		Value	Sig. (2-sided)
public	Pearson Chi-Square	6.691	.010
	N of Valid Cases	79	
private	Pearson Chi-Square	23.348	.000
	N of Valid Cases	235	

**Table A6.13 Meeting attendance and gender Crosstabulation**

		gender		Total
		male	female	
meeting attendance	I attend very often	119	25	144
		48.8%	34.2%	45.4%
	I attend sometimes	86	27	113
		35.2%	37.0%	35.6%
	I attend rarely	39	21	60
		16.0%	28.8%	18.9%
Total		244	73	317
		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Chi square = 7.508 (significance level= 0.023)

**Table A6.14 Contribution at meetings and gender Crosstabulation**

		gender		Total
		male	Female	
contribution at meetings	I contribute very often	67	13	80
		27.5%	17.8%	25.2%
	I contribute sometimes	122	30	152
		50.0%	41.1%	47.9%
	I contribute rarely	55	30	85
		22.5%	41.1%	26.8%
Total		244	73	317
		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Chi square= 10.217 (sig. = 0.006)

**Table A6.15 Voting at union elections and gender Crosstabulation**

		gender		Total
		male	female	
voting at union elections	I vote in all elections	129	35	164
		52.9%	48.6%	51.9%
	I vote in few elections	70	19	89
		28.7%	26.4%	28.2%
	I rarely vote in any election	45	18	63
		18.4%	25.0%	19.9%
Total		244	72	316
		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Chi square= 1.498 (sig. = .473).

**Table A6.16 Campaign for candidates and gender Crosstabulation**

		gender		Total
		male	female	
campaigned for candidates	yes very often	45	9	54
		18.4%	12.3%	17.0%
	yes sometimes	97	23	120
		39.8%	31.5%	37.9%
	No never	102	41	143
		41.8%	56.2%	45.1%
Total		244	73	317
		100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Chi square = 4.811 (sig. level = 0.090)

**Table 6.17 Multiple regression: attendance at union meetings (males)**

Model Summary

R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Sig. F Change
.515	.266	.255	.693	.000
.580	.337	.317	.663	.010

1 Predictors: (Constant), SOEXP

2 Predictors: (Constant), SUL, UI

ANOVA

	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Regression	11.628	1	11.628	24.240	.000
Residual	32.140	67	.480		
Total	43.768	68			
Regression	14.742	2	7.371	16.761	.000
Residual	29.026	66	.440		
Total	43.768	68			

1 Predictors: (Constant), SOEXP

2 Predictors: (Constant), SUL, UI

Dependent Variable: UP (meeting attendance)

Coefficients

	Standardized Coefficients		t	Sig.	Collinearity Statistics
	Std. Error	Beta			Tolerance
(Constant)	.271		2.486	.015	
SOEXP	.053	.515	4.923	.000	1.000
(Constant)	.562		3.559	.001	
SOEXP	.061	.336	2.783	.007	.689
UI	.023	.321	2.661	.010	.689

Dependent Variable: UP (meeting attendance)

**Table A6.18 Multiple regression: attendance at union meetings (females)**

## Model Summary

R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Sig. F Change	
.400	.160	.157	.669		.000
.483	.233	.226	.641		.000

1 Predictors: (Constant), UI

2 Predictors: (Constant), UI, SUL

## ANOVA

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	19.881	1	19.881	44.443	.000
	Residual	104.230	233	.447		
	Total	124.111	234			
2	Regression	28.926	2	14.463	35.251	.000
	Residual	95.185	232	.410		
	Total	124.111	234			

1 Predictors: (Constant), UI

2 Predictors: (Constant), UI, SUL

Dependent Variable: UP (meeting attendance)

## Coefficients

	Std. Error	Beta	t	Sig. Collinearity Statistics	
					Tolerance
(Constant)	.135		18.628	.000	
UI	.009	.400	-6.667	.000	1.000
(Constant)	.201		8.957	.000	
UI	.009	.315	-5.230	.000	.910
SUL	.026	.283	4.695	.000	.910

Dependent Variable: union participation (meeting attendance)

**Table A6.19 Multiple regression: speaking at meetings (males)**

Model Summary

R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Sig. F Change	
.387	.150	.146	.646		.000
.445	.198	.191	.629		.000
.481	.232	.222	.617		.002

1 Predictors: (Constant), SUL

2 Predictors: (Constant), SUL, SOEXP

3 Predictors: (Constant), SUL, SOEXP, UI

ANOVA

Model		Sum of Squares	Df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	17.149	1	17.149	41.136	.000
	Residual	97.132	233	.417		
	Total	114.281	234			
2	Regression	22.584	2	11.292	28.569	.000
	Residual	91.697	232	.395		
	Total	114.281	234			
3	Regression	26.459	3	8.820	23.199	.000
	Residual	87.822	231	.380		
	Total	114.281	234			

1 Predictors: (Constant), SUL

2 Predictors: (Constant), SUL, SOEXP

3 Predictors: (Constant), SUL, SOEXP, UI

Dependent Variable: union participation (contribution at meetings)

Coefficients

	Std. Error	Standardized Coefficients		t	Sig.	Collinearity Statistics	
		Beta				Tolerance	
(Constant)	.129			21.154	.000		
SUL	.015	.387		-6.414	.000	1.000	
(Constant)	.207			10.248	.000		
SUL	.016	.299		-4.716	.000	.859	
SOEXP	.027	.235		3.708	.000	.859	
(Constant)	.227			10.769	.000		
SUL	.017	.220		-3.275	.001	.740	
SOEXP	.026	.203		3.214	.001	.837	
UI	.009	.208		-3.193	.002	.784	

Dependent Variable: UP (contribution at meetings)

**Table A6.20 Multiple regression: speaking at meetings (females)**

Model Summary

R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Sig. F Change
.313	.098	.085	.699	.009

Predictors: (Constant), SOEXP

ANOVA

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	3.561	1	3.561	7.290	.009
	Residual	32.729	67	.488		
	Total	36.290	68			

1 Predictors: (Constant), SOEXP

2 Dependent Variable: union participation (contribution at meetings)

Coefficients

	Std. Error	Standardized Coefficients		t	Sig.	Collinearity Statistics	
		Beta					Tolerance
(Constant)	.273			5.597	.000		
SOEXP	.054	.313		2.700	.009		1.000

1 Dependent Variable: union participation (contribution at meetings)

Table A6.21 Multiple regression: voting at union elections (males)

Model Summary

R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Sig. F Change	
.327	.107	.103	.726		.000
.389	.151	.144	.710		.001
.414	.172	.161	.703		.017

1 Predictors: (Constant), UI

2 Predictors: (Constant), UI, SOEXP

2 Predictors: (Constant), UI, SOEXP, SUL

ANOVA

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	14.741	1	14.741	27.937	.000
	Residual	122.944	233	.528		
	Total	137.685	234			
2	Regression	20.792	2	10.396	20.633	.000
	Residual	116.893	232	.504		
	Total	137.685	234			
3	Regression	23.642	3	7.881	15.962	.000
	Residual	114.043	231	.494		
	Total	137.685	234			

1 Predictors: (Constant), UI

2 Predictors: (Constant), UI, SOEXP

3 Predictors: (Constant), UI, SOEXP, SUL

Dependent Variable: UP (voting at union elections)

Coefficients

	Standardized Coefficients		t	Sig.	Collinearity Statistics	
	Std. Error	Beta			Tolerance	
(Constant)	.147		16.200	.000		
UI	.010	.327	-5.286	.000	1.000	
(Constant)	.223		8.044	.000		
UI	.010	.261	4.119	.000	.910	
SOEXP	.029	.220	3.465	.001	.910	
(Constant)	.258		8.188	.000		
UI	.011	.201	2.968	.003	.784	
SOEXP	.030	.175	2.677	.008	.837	
SUL	.019	.167	2.403	.017	.740	

Dependent Variable: UP (voting at union elections)

**Table A6.22 Multiple regression: voting at union elections (females)**

Model Summary

R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Sig. F Change	
.497	.247	.236	.715		.000
.542	.294	.272	.697		.042

1 Predictors: (Constant), SUL

2 Predictors: (Constant), SUL, UI

ANOVA

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	11.054	1	11.054	21.651	.000
	Residual	33.696	66	.511		
	Total	44.750	67			
2	Regression	13.138	2	6.569	13.507	.000
	Residual	31.612	65	.486		
	Total	44.750	67			

1 Predictors: (Constant), SUL

2 Predictors: (Constant), SUL, UI

Dependent Variable: UP (voting at union elections)

Coefficients

	Std. Error	Beta	t	Collinearity Statistics	
					Tolerance
(Constant)	.280		1.837	.071	
SUL	.055	.497	4.653	.000	1.000
(Constant)	.592		2.705	.009	
SUL	.065	.352	2.797	.007	.688
UI	.024	.260	2.070	.042	.688

Dependent Variable: UP (voting at union elections)

Table A6.23 Multiple regression: campaign for candidates (males)

Model Summary

R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Sig. F Change
.270	.073	.069	.715	.000
.346	.120	.112	.698	.001

1 Predictors: (Constant), SUL

2 Predictors: (Constant), SUL, UPO

ANOVA

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	9.386	1	9.386	18.361	.000
	Residual	119.108	233	.511		
	Total	128.494	234			
2	Regression	15.356	2	7.678	15.744	.000
	Residual	113.138	232	.488		
	Total	128.494	234			

1 Predictors: (Constant), SUL

2 Predictors: (Constant), SUL, union-politics orientation

Dependent Variable: UP (campaigned for candidates)

Coefficients

		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.	Collinearity Statistics
	Std. Error	Beta			Tolerance
(Constant)	.131		12.943	.000	
SUL	.028	.270	4.285	.000	1.000
(Constant)	.175		12.095	.000	
SUL	.028	.223	3.531	.000	.954
UPO	.033	.221	3.499	.001	.954

Dependent Variable: UP (campaigned for candidates)

**Table A6.24 Multiple regression: campaign for candidates (females)**

## Model Summary

R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Sig. F Change
.426	.182	.169	.653	.000

Predictors: (Constant), SUL

## ANOVA

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	6.350	1	6.350	14.872	.000
	Residual	28.607	67	.427		
	Total	34.957	68			

Predictors: (Constant), SUL

Dependent Variable: UP (campaigned for candidates)

## Coefficients

	Standardized Coefficients		T	Sig.	Collinearity Statistics	
	Std. Error	Beta			Tolerance	
(Constant)	.256		5.859	.000		
SUL	.050	.426	3.856	.000	1.000	

Dependent Variable: UP (campaigned for candidates)

**Table A6.25 Gender \* UP \* Sector Crosstabulation**

Private Sector	Gender	Male	UP		Total
			Low	High	
			50 63.3%	136 85.5%	
		Female	29 36.7%	23 14.5%	52 21.8%
			79 100.0%	159 100.0%	238 100.0%
Public Sector	Gender	Male	27 64.3%	31 83.7%	58 73.4%
			15 35.7%	6 16.2%	21 26.6%
			42 100.0%	37 100.0%	79 100.0%

## Chi-Square Tests

sector		Value	Sig. (2-sided)
public	Pearson Chi-Square	3.832	.050
	N of Valid Cases	79	
private	Pearson Chi-Square	2.026	.155
	N of Valid Cases	238	

**Table A6.26 Multiple regression output.**

Model Summary

R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
.652	.425	.419	2.56598

Predictors: (Constant), SOEXP, UI, SUL

**ANOVA**

	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Regression	1520.783	3	506.928	76.991	.000
Residual	2060.864	307	6.584		
Total	3581.647	310			

Predictors: (Constant), SOEXP, UI, SUL

Dependent Variable: UC

**Coefficients**

Model			Standardized Coefficients		t	Sig.
			Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	1.094			5.749	.000
	UI	.033		.419	8.491	.000
	SUL	.060		.246	4.905	.000
	SOEXP	.096		.150	3.149	.002

Dependent Variable: UC

**Table A6.27 Multiple regression output.**

Model Summary

R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
.546	.298	.289	2.01001

a Predictors: (Constant), UC, SOEXP, SUL, UI

ANOVA

	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
Regression	536.142	4	134.035	33.176	.000
Residual	1260.527	312	4.040		
Total	1796.669	316			

a Predictors: (Constant), UC, SOEXP, SUL, UI

b Dependent Variable: UP

Coefficients

		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
	Std. Error	Beta		
(Constant)	.865		10.513	.000
UI	.031	.294	5.446	.000
SUL	.049	.182	2.841	.005
SOEXP	.077	.069	1.177	.240
UC	.051	.152	2.187	.030

a Dependent Variable: UP

**Table A7.1 Multiple regression: UC****Model Summary**

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Sig. F Change
1	.279	.078	.073	3.08498	.000
2	.330	.109	.098	3.04197	.016

1 Predictors: (Constant), P-ID

2 Predictors: (Constant), P-ID, P-UMR

**ANOVA**

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	137.687	1	137.687	14.467	.000
	Residual	1627.429	171	9.517		
	Total	1765.117	172			
2	Regression	192.010	2	96.005	10.375	.000
	Residual	1573.107	170	9.254		
	Total	1765.117	172			

1 Predictors: (Constant), P-ID

2 Predictors: (Constant), P-ID, P-UMR

Dependent Variable: UC

**Coefficients**

Model		Standardized Coefficients		t	Sig.	Collinearity Statistics	
		Beta				Tolerance	
1	(Constant)			19.412	.000		
	P-ID	.279		3.804	.000	1.000	
2	(Constant)			11.617	.000		
	P-ID	.305		4.172	.000	.978	
	P-UMR	.177		2.423	.016	.978	

1 Dependent Variable

**Table A7.2 Multiple regression: UP****Model Summary**

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Change Statistics	R Square Change	F Change	Sig. F Change
1	.308	.095	.090	2.15836	.095	17.633	.000	
2	.364	.133	.122	2.11914	.038	7.276	.008	

1 Predictors: (Constant), P-ID

2 Predictors: (Constant), P-ID, IA

**ANOVA**

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	82.141	1	82.141	17.633	.000
	Residual	782.630	168	4.659		
	Total	864.772	169			
2	Regression	114.814	2	57.407	12.783	.000
	Residual	749.958	167	4.491		
	Total	864.772	169			

1 Predictors: (Constant), P-ID

2 Predictors: (Constant), P-ID, IA

Dependent Variable: UP

**Coefficients**

Model		Standardized Coefficients		t	Sig.	Collinearity Statistics
		Beta				
1	(Constant)			9.533	.000	
	P-ID	.308		4.199	.000	1.000
2	(Constant)			9.928	.000	
	P-ID	.308		4.281	.000	1.000
	IA	.194		2.697	.008	1.000

Dependent Variable: UP

**Table A7.3 Multiple Regression: UI****Model Summary**

	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Change Statistics		
Model					R Square Change	F Change	Sig. F Change
1	.275	.076	.070	3.28821	.076	14.038	.000
2	.336	.113	.103	3.23081	.037	7.131	.008

1 Predictors: (Constant), P-ID

2 Predictors: (Constant), P-ID, P-UMR

**ANOVA**

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	151.782	1	151.782	14.038	.000
	Residual	1848.911	171	10.812		
	Total	2000.693	172			
2	Regression	226.215	2	113.107	10.836	.000
	Residual	1774.478	170	10.438		
	Total	2000.693	172			

1 Predictors: (Constant), P-ID

2 Predictors: (Constant), P-ID, P-UMR

Dependent Variable: UI

**Coefficients**

Model		Std. Error	Standardized Coefficients		t	Sig.	Collinearity Statistics
			Beta				
1	(Constant)	.950			22.693	.000	1.000
	P-ID	.285	.275		3.747	.000	
2	(Constant)	1.371			13.756	.000	.978
	P-ID	.283	.304		4.164	.000	
	P-UMR	.236	.195		2.670	.008	

Dependent Variable: UI

**Table A7.4 Multiple Regression: SUL**

## Model Summary

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Change Statistics	R Square Change	F Change	Sig. F Change
1	.303	.092	.087	2.79844	.092	17.338	.000	
2	.411	.169	.159	2.68565	.077	15.665	.000	

1 Predictors: (Constant), P-UMR

2 Predictors: (Constant), P-UMR, P-ID

## ANOVA

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	135.777	1	135.777	17.338	.000
	Residual	1339.149	171	7.831		
	Total	1474.926	172			
2	Regression	248.766	2	124.383	17.245	.000
	Residual	1226.161	170	7.213		
	Total	1474.926	172			

1 Predictors: (Constant), P-UMR

2 Predictors: (Constant), P-UMR, P-ID

Dependent Variable: SUL

## Coefficients

Model		Standardized Coefficients		t	Sig.	Collinearity Statistics	
		Beta				Tolerance	
1	(Constant)			22.606	.000		
	P-UMR	.303		4.164	.000	1.000	
2	(Constant)			12.396	.000		
	P-UMR	.345		4.874	.000	.978	
	P-ID	.280		3.958	.000	.978	

Dependent Variable: SUL

**Table A7.5 Multiple Regression: SOEXP**

## Model Summary

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Change Statistics	R Square Change	F Change	Sig. F Change
1	.421	.177	.172	2.74473	.177	36.732	.000	
2	.465	.216	.207	2.68679	.039	8.455	.004	

1 Predictors: (Constant), P-ID

2 Predictors: (Constant), P-ID, UJM

## ANOVA

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	276.726	1	276.726	36.732	.000
	Residual	1288.240	171	7.534		
	Total	1564.965	172			
2	Regression	337.758	2	168.879	23.394	.000
	Residual	1227.207	170	7.219		
	Total	1564.965	172			

1 Predictors: (Constant), P-ID

2 Predictors: (Constant), P-ID, UJM

Dependent Variable: SUL

## Coefficients

Model		Standardized Coefficients		t	Sig.	Collinearity Statistics	
		Beta				Tolerance	
1	(Constant)			5.767	.000		
	P-ID	.421		6.061	.000	1.000	
2	(Constant)			6.535	.000		
	P-ID	.395		5.771	.000	.984	
	UJM	.199		2.908	.004	.984	

a Dependent Variable: SOEXP

**Table A7.6 Multiple regression: UC (private sector)**

Model Summary

	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Change Statistics		
Model					R Square Change	F Change	Sig. F Change
1	.443	.197	.186	3.31496	.197	18.118	.000

Predictors: (Constant), P-ID

ANOVA

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	199.104	1	199.104	18.118	.000
	Residual	813.184	74	10.989		
	Total	1012.288	75			

Predictors: (Constant), P-ID

Dependent Variable: UC

Coefficients

Model		Std. Error	Standardized Coefficients		t	Sig.	Collinearity Statistics		VIF
			Beta				Tolerance		
1	(Constant)	1.770			7.077	.000			
	P-ID_	.521	.443		4.257	.000	1.000		1.000

Dependent Variable: UC

**Table A7.7 Multiple Regression: UP (private sector)**

Model Summary

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Change Statistics	R Square Change	F Change	Sig. F Change
	.270	.073	.060	1.80652	.073		5.665	.020

Predictors: (Constant), P-ID

ANOVA

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	18.487	1	18.487	5.665	.020
	Residual	234.974	72	3.264		
	Total	253.461	73			

Predictors: (Constant), P-ID

Dependent Variable: UP

Coefficients

Model		Std. Error	Standardized Coefficients		t	Sig.	Collinearity Statistics	
			Beta				Tolerance	VIF
1	(Constant)	.971			7.161	.000		
	P-ID	.288	.270		2.380	.020	1.000	1.000

Dependent Variable: UP

**Table A7.8 Multiple Regression: UI (Private sector)**

## Model Summary

	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Change Statistics		
Model					R Square Change	F Change	Sig. F Change
	.474	.225	.214	2.95861	.225	21.470	.000

Predictors: (Constant), P-ID

## ANOVA

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	187.934	1	187.934	21.470	.000
	Residual	647.750	74	8.753		
	Total	835.684	75			

Predictors: (Constant), P-ID

Dependent Variable: UI

## Coefficients

Model		Std. Error	Standardized Coefficients		t	Sig.	Collinearity Statistics	
			Beta				Tolerance	VIF
1	(Constant)	1.580			10.899	.000		
	P-ID	.465	.474		4.634	.000	1.000	1.000

Dependent Variable: UI

**Table A7.9 Multiple Regression: SUL (private sector)**

## Model Summary

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Change Statistics	R Square Change	F Change	Sig. F Change
1	.357	.127	.115	2.77787	.127		10.785	.002
2	.446	.199	.177	2.67945	.072		6.536	.013

1 Predictors: (Constant), P-ID

2 Predictors: (Constant), P-ID, P-UMR

## ANOVA

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	83.224	1	83.224	10.785	.002
	Residual	571.026	74	7.717		
	Total	654.250	75			
2	Regression	130.149	2	65.074	9.064	.000
	Residual	524.101	73	7.179		
	Total	654.250	75			

1 Predictors: (Constant), P-ID

2 Predictors: (Constant), P-ID, P-UMR

Dependent Variable: SUL

## Coefficients

Model		Std. Error	Standardized Coefficients		t	Sig.	Collinearity Statistics	
			Beta				Tolerance	VIF
1	(Constant)	1.483			10.107	.000		
	P-ID	.437	.357		3.284	.002	1.000	1.000
2	(Constant)	1.817			6.673	.000		
	P-ID	.423	.334		3.181	.002	.993	1.007
	P-UMR	.346	.269		2.557	.013	.993	1.007

Dependent Variable: SUL

**Table A7.10 Multiple regression R: USOCIAL: (private sector)**

## Model Summary

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Change Statistics	R Square Change	F Change	Sig. F Change
1	.417	.174	.163	2.78076	.174	15.595	.000	
2	.496	.246	.225	2.67570	.072	6.925	.010	
3	.540	.292	.263	2.60991	.046	4.727	.033	

1 Predictors: (Constant), P-ID

2 Predictors: (Constant), P-ID, UJM

3 Predictors: (Constant), P-ID, UJM, P-UMR

## ANOVA

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	120.587	1	120.587	15.595	.000
	Residual	572.213	74	7.733		
	Total	692.799	75			
2	Regression	170.165	2	85.082	11.884	.000
	Residual	522.635	73	7.159		
	Total	692.799	75			
3	Regression	202.363	3	67.454	9.903	.000
	Residual	490.436	72	6.812		
	Total	692.799	75			

1 Predictors: (Constant), P-ID

2 Predictors: (Constant), P-ID, UJM

3 Predictors: (Constant), P-ID, UJM, P-UMR

Dependent Variable: USOCIAL

## Coefficients

Model		Std. Error	Standardized Coefficients		t	Sig.	Collinearity Statistics	
			Beta				Tolerance	VIF
1	(Constant)	1.485			2.616	.011		
	P-ID	.437	.417		3.949	.000	1.000	1.000
2	(Constant)	1.665			3.684	.000		
	P-ID	.432	.355		3.397	.001	.948	1.055
3	(Constant)	1.922			2.028	.046		
	P-ID	.424	.333		3.250	.002	.939	1.065
	UJM	.154	.292		2.863	.005	.942	1.061
	P-UMR	.338	.217		2.174	.033	.987	1.013

Dependent Variable: USOCIAL

**Table A7.11 Multiple Regression: UC (Public Sector)**

## Model Summary

	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Change Statistics		
Model					R Square Change	F Change	Sig. F Change
1	.219	.048	.038	2.63165	.048	4.783	.031
2	.301	.090	.071	2.58585	.043	4.395	.039

1 Predictors: (Constant), P-ID

2 Predictors: (Constant), P-ID, IA

## ANOVA

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	33.127	1	33.127	4.783	.031
	Residual	657.930	95	6.926		
	Total	691.057	96			
2	Regression	62.514	2	31.257	4.675	.012
	Residual	628.543	94	6.687		
	Total	691.057	96			

1 Predictors: (Constant), P-ID

2 Predictors: (Constant), P-ID, IA

Dependent Variable: UC

## Coefficients

Model		Std. Error	Standardized Coefficients		t	Sig.	Collinearity Statistics	
			Beta				Tolerance	VIF
1	(Constant)	.904			21.247	.000		
	P-ID	.275	.219		2.187	.031	1.000	1.000
2	(Constant)	1.050			19.406	.000		
	P-ID	.271	.213		2.167	.033	.999	1.001
	IA	.217	.206		-2.096	.039	.999	1.001

Dependent Variable: UC

**Table A7.12 Multiple regression: UP (public sector)**

Model Summary

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Change Statistics	R Square Change	F Change	Sig. F Change
1	.312	.097	.088	2.34637	.097	10.119	.002	
2	.376	.141	.123	2.30071	.044	4.768	.032	

1 Predictors: (Constant), P-ID

2 Predictors: (Constant), P-ID, IA

ANOVA

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	55.707	1	55.707	10.119	.002
	Residual	517.511	94	5.505		
	Total	573.218	95			
2	Regression	80.944	2	40.472	7.646	.001
	Residual	492.273	93	5.293		
	Total	573.218	95			

1 Predictors: (Constant), P-ID

2 Predictors: (Constant), P-ID, IA

Dependent Variable: UP

Coefficients

Model		Std. Error	Standardized Coefficients		t	Sig.	Collinearity Statistics	
			Beta				Tolerance	VIF
1	(Constant)	.831			6.892	.000		
	P-ID	.252	.312		3.181	.002	1.000	1.000
	(Constant)	.944			7.169	.000		
2	P-ID	.247	.312		3.247	.002	1.000	1.000
	IA	.195	.210		2.184	.032	1.000	1.000

Dependent Variable: UP

**Table A7.13 Multiple regression: UI (public sector)****Model Summary**

	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Change Statistics		
Model					R Square Change	F Change	Sig. F Change
	.256	.066	.014	3.38215	.066	1.282	.279

Predictors: (Constant), P-UMR, UJM, P-DMP, P-ID, IA

**ANOVA**

Model		Sum of Squares	Df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	73.308	5	14.662	1.282	.279
	Residual	1040.945	91	11.439		
	Total	1114.253	96			

Predictors: (Constant), P-UMR, UJM, P-DMP, P-ID, IA

Dependent Variable: UI

**Coefficients**

Model		Std. Error	Standardized Coefficients		t	Sig.	Collinearity Statistics	
			Beta				Tolerance	VIF
1	(Constant)	2.142			10.228	.000		
	P-ID	.373	.214		2.006	.048	.899	1.112
	P-DMP	.305	.091		.853	.396	.907	1.102
	UJM	.207	.012		.110	.913	.925	1.081
	IA	.303	.006		.056	.956	.875	1.143
	P-UMR	.311	.141		1.335	.185	.918	1.090

Dependent Variable: UI

**Table A7.14 Multiple Regression: SUL (public sector)**

Model Summary

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Change Statistics	R Square Change	F Change	Sig. F Change
1	.293	.086	.076	2.61314	.086	8.940	.004	
2	.419	.176	.158	2.49493	.090	10.215	.002	

1 Predictors: (Constant), P-UMR

2 Predictors: (Constant), P-UMR, P-ID

ANOVA

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	61.047	1	61.047	8.940	.004
	Residual	648.706	95	6.828		
	Total	709.753	96			
2	Regression	124.631	2	62.315	10.011	.000
	Residual	585.122	94	6.225		
	Total	709.753	96			

1 Predictors: (Constant), P-UMR

2 Predictors: (Constant), P-UMR, P-ID

Dependent Variable: SUL

Coefficients

Model		Std. Error	Standardized Coefficients		t	Sig.	Collinearity Statistics	
			Beta				Tolerance	VIF
1	(Constant)	.908			20.676	.000		
	P-UMR	.230	.293		2.990	.004	1.000	1.000
2	(Constant)	1.360			11.336	.000		
	P-UMR	.226	.367		3.807	.000	.942	1.061
	P-ID	.269	.308		3.196	.002	.942	1.061

Dependent Variable: SUL

**Table A7.15 Multiple Regression: USOCIAL (public sector)**

Model Summary

	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate	Change Statistics		
Model					R Square Change	F Change	Sig. F Change
1	.418	.175	.166	2.71660	.175	20.144	.000
2	.472	.223	.206	2.65079	.048	5.776	.018

1 Predictors: (Constant), P-ID

2 Predictors: (Constant), P-ID, P-UMR

ANOVA

Model		Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	Sig.
1	Regression	148.659	1	148.659	20.144	.000
	Residual	701.094	95	7.380		
	Total	849.753	96			
2	Regression	189.246	2	94.623	13.466	.000
	Residual	660.507	94	7.027		
	Total	849.753	96			

1 Predictors: (Constant), P-ID

2 Predictors: (Constant), P-ID, P-UMR

Dependent Variable: SOEXP

Coefficients

Model		Std. Error	Standardized Coefficients		T	Sig.	Collinearity Statistics	
			Beta				Tolerance	VIF
1	(Constant)	.933			5.238	.000		
	P-ID	.284	.418		4.488	.000	1.000	1.000
2	(Constant)	1.445			5.248	.000		
	P-ID	.286	.364		3.888	.000	.942	1.061
	P_UMR	.240	.225		2.403	.018	.942	1.061

Dependent Variable: SOEXP

**Table A7.16 why did you join your union \* sector Crosstabulation**

	Sector		Total
	Private	Public	
To win more wages and better working conditions	31 38.8%	22 20.0%	53 27.9%
To get protection from being sacked	1 1.3%	12 10.9%	13 6.8%
To enjoy social benefits from the union	4 5.0%	15 13.6%	19 10.0%
Because most people join	4 5.0%	9 8.2%	13 6.8%
the union is capable of fighting for workers	33 41.3%	40 36.4%	73 38.4%
the union has more time and resources to deal with mgt	7 8.8%	12 10.9%	19 10.0%
Total	80 100.0%	110 100.0%	190 100.0%

Chi-Square = 16.796 (sig. = 0.005)

**Table A7.17 how did you become a member \* sector Crosstabulation**

	Sector		Total
	private	Public	
I joined on my own	44 53.7%	35 31.5%	79 40.9%
I was persuaded by friends	9 11.0%	29 26.1%	38 19.7%
I was persuaded by union leaders	2 2.4%	12 10.8%	14 7.3%
management made me to join	27 32.9%	35 31.5%	62 32.1%
Total	82 100.0%	111 100.0%	193 100.0%

Chi-Square = 15.724 (sig. = 0.001)

**Table A7.18 relations between managers and the union are very good \* sector Crosstabulation**

	Sector		Total
	Private	public	
Strongly disagree	5 4.6%	5 2.6%	
disagree	11 13.4%	12 11.0%	23 12.0%
Not sure	20 24.4%	20 18.3%	40 20.9%
Agree	39 47.6%	40 36.7%	79 41.4%
Strongly agree	12 14.6%	32 29.4%	44 23.0%
Total	82 100.0%	109 100.0%	191 100.0%

Chi-Square = 10.541 (sig. = 0.032)

**Table A7.19 how are decisions made in your union \* sector Crosstabulation**

	Sector		Total
	Private	Public	
Through a meeting of all workers	56 70.9%	57 55.3%	113 62.1%
Through a committee of union	7 8.9%	20 19.4%	27 14.8%
union leaders decide	11 13.9%	4 3.9%	15 8.2%
workers are informed after decision has been taken.	5 6.3% 79	22 21.4% 103	27 14.8% 182
<b>Total</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>

Chi-Square = 17.376 (sig. = 0.001)

**Table A7.20 how well informed does your leaders keep you on what is happening in the union \* sector Crosstabulation**

	Sector		Total
	Private	Public	
Very well	2 2.4%	8 7.3%	10 5.2%
Fairly well	7 8.4%	18 16.4%	25 13.0%
Rather poorly	36 43.4%	33 30.0%	69 35.8%
Very poorly	38 45.8%	51 46.4%	89 46.1%
<b>Total</b>	<b>83 100.0%</b>	<b>110 100.0%</b>	<b>193 100.0%</b>

Chi-Square = 6.826 (sig. = 0.001)

Correlation results analysis involving UC, UP, SUL and SOEXP and descriptive statistics involving UP and UC are shown in table A7.21 and tables 7.22 to 7.25 respectively. It was pertinent to perform these tests to show that the data is comparable with the one obtained in the first survey and therefore the analysis of the IUD items can be applied to both.

**Table A7.21 Correlations: UC, UI, SUL, SOEXP and UP**

	UC	UI	SUL	SOEXP	UP
UC					
UI	.547** .000				
SUL	.660** .000	.698** .000			
SOEXP	.355** .000	.342* .000	.288* .000		
UP	.380* .000	.397** .000	.428 .000	.355** .000	

\*\* Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

\* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

**Table A7.22 Comparisons of Correlation findings (1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> survey)**

	Second survey	First survey
	Involving 2 industrial Unions.	Involving 4 industrial Unions.
	UC	UC
UI	.547**	.735**
UP	.380*	.438**
SOEXP	.355**	.438**
SUL	.660**	.744**

\*\* Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

\* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).

**Table A7.23 Descriptive statistics : union commitment.**

	N	Means	Standard Deviation	Statistics
Private (AP)	82	19.9563	3.71866	.012
Public (MHWUN)	112	20.8735	2.80776	

**Table A7.24 Descriptive statistics : Union Participation.**

	N	Means	Standard Deviation	Statistics
Private (AP)	81	9.2181	1.88721	.000
Public (MHWUN)	110	8.0424	2.52938	

**Table A7.25 Comparisons of descriptive statistics (1<sup>st</sup> and 2<sup>nd</sup> survey)**

	Second survey			First survey		
	Involving 2 industrial Unions.			Involving 4 industrial Unions.		
	Private sector (Mean score)	Public sector (Mean score)	Sig.	Private sector (Mean score)	Public sector (Mean score)	Sig.
UC	19.9563	20.8735	.01	13.9563	14.8735	.04
UP	9.2181	8.0424	.000	8.7595	7.7017	.01

Reliability test indicate that the scales used in the second survey are reliable (table A7.1).

**Table A7.26 Reliability Coefficients**

Variable	N of Items	N of Cases	Alpha
Union Participation (UP)	4	176	.7330
Union Commitment (UC)	5	185	.7972
Union Instrumentality (UI)	6	193	.8220
Socialisation Experience (SOEXP)	3	191	.8373
Satisfaction with Union Leadership (SUL)	5	189	.8552

The analysis of the interaction between the IUD items and demographic factors using descriptive statistics and ANOVA tests is shown in table A7.27. An elaboration of this finding is given in Tables A7.28 to A7.30.

**Table A7.27 Summary of T and F tests results of members' demographic factors and IUD**

	UJM		IA		P-UMR		P-DMP		P-ID	
	T/F test	Sig.								
Gender	.873	.38	1.894	.06*	.888	.37	1.262	.20	.374	.70
Ethnic group	1.016	.36	1.016	.36	.631	.53	1.662	.19	1.647	.19
Marital status	3.814	.01*	3.814	.01*	1.872	.13	1.646	.18	1.586	.19
Membership Tenure	1.253	.625	1.253	.764	.617	.65	.897	.47	.746	.56
Age	1.788	133	1.788	.133	.514	.72	.634	.63	.125	.97
Education	1.760	.156	1.760	.156	.634	.59	1.294	.27	1.319	.79

\*significant one / two-tailed.

**Table A7.28 how did you become a member \* gender Crosstabulation**

	gender		Total
	Male	female	
I joined on my own	64 47.4%	15 26.3%	79 41.1%
I was persuaded by friends	22 16.3%	15 26.3%	37 19.3%
I was persuaded by union leaders	8 5.9%	6 10.5%	14 7.3%
management made me to join	41 30.4%	21 36.8%	62 32.3%
Total	135 100.0%	57 100.0%	192 100.0%


Chi-square = 8.104 (sig. = .04)

**Table A7.29 why did you join your union \* marital status Crosstabulation**

	marital status				Total
	single	married	separated	widowed	
to win more wages and better working conditions	20 47.6%	29 22.1%	1 12.5%	3 33.3%	53 27.9%
to get protection from being sacked	2 4.8%	6 4.6%	2 25.0%	3 33.3%	13 6.8%
to enjoy social benefits from the union	1 2.4%	15 11.5%	1 12.5%	2 22.2%	19 10.0%
because most people join	2 4.8%	8 6.1%	3 37.5%		13 6.8%
the union is capable of fighting for workers	14 33.3%	59 45.0%			73 38.4%
the union has more time and resources to deal with mgt	3 7.1%	14 10.7%	1 12.5%	1 11.1%	19 10.0%
Total	42 100.0%	131 100.0%	8 100.0%	9 100.0%	190 100.0%

Chi-square = 47.377 (sig. = 0.000)

**Fig. A7.1 relations between unions are very good.**



**Table A7.30 why did you join your union \* sector Crosstabulation**

	Sector		
	Private	Public	Total
to win more wages and better working conditions	31 38.8%	22 20.0%	53 27.9%
to get protection from being sacked	1 1.3%	12 10.9%	13 6.8%
to enjoy social benefits from the union	4 5.0%	15 13.6%	19 10.0%
because most people join	4 5.0%	9 8.2%	13 6.8%
the union is capable of fighting for workers	33 41.3%	40 36.4%	73 38.4%
the union has more time and resources to deal with mgt	7 8.8%	12 10.9%	19 10.0%
Total	80 100.0%	110 100.0%	190 100.0%

Chi-square = 16.796; sig.= 0.005



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