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Abstract

The significant proportion of the poor in Indian cities who depend on street trade for their livelihoods are increasingly threatened by eviction as a result of urban development programmes implemented since the mid 1990s.

Research on urban street traders (in particular) and the urban informal economy (in general) in the developing world has primarily focussed on aspects of its social and economic organisation and have treated street traders as a homogenous group with a uniform ability to claim places. In contrast, this research explores the differential intra-city spatial and political processes underpinning street trade, with particular reference to their ability to occupy and defend their trading places, in the city of Bangalore in Karnataka, India. It focuses on the everyday practices and relationships of street traders and explores the role of informal networks that give rise to such differences, through a qualitative research design and a grounded theoretical strategy.

It illustrates the ways in which processes specific to a locale affect street traders' ability to occupy and defend places – an aspect that is overlooked in the theories about the politics of street trade. It argues that the territorial embeddedness of street traders is critical in so far as it affects their ability to draw on a range of networks.

This thesis makes a contribution to knowledge in two ways: by providing an empirical understanding of the intra-city differences in how street traders occupy and defend places from where they can trade; and at a theoretical level on the role of urban place and the politics of street trade. It concludes with a discussion of the implications of the research findings for policies relating to urban poverty and governance of urban space.

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Acronyms

APMC	Agricultural Produce Marketing Corporation
BATF	Bangalore Agenda Task Force
BCC	Bangalore City Corporation
BDA	Bangalore Development Authority
BG ward	Basavangudi ward
BMC	Bombay Municipal Corporation
BMRDA	Bangalore Metropolitan Development Authority
CMC	City Municipal Corporation
DC	Development Controllers
DFC	Department of Foods and Civil Supplies
DSS	Dalit Sangarsh Samithi
EC	Everyday Controllers
E&PN	Economic and Political Networks
G BR	Gandhibazaar Road
G&G	Greens and Greens Retail Market Chain
GOI	Government of India
GOK	Government of Karnataka
HAL	Hindustan Aeronautical Limited
H&CN	Household and Community Networks
ILO	International Labour Organization
IT	Information Technology
ITES	Information Technology Enabled Services
ITI	Indian Telephone Industries
JNGR Fourth Block	Jayanagar Fourth Block
JNGR Ninth Block	Jayanagar Ninth Block
KCS	Kannada Chaluvalike Sangha
KR Market	Krishna Rajendra Market
KR Puram	Krishna Rajapuram
KVWM	Kalasipalayam Vegetable Wholesale Market
NASVI	National Association of Street Vendors in India
NGO	Non Governmental Organization
NPSV	National Policy for Street Vending
NPUSV	National Policy for Urban Street Vending
NSS	National Sample Survey
NURM	National Urban Renewal Mission
PIL	Public Interest Litigation
PSU	Public Sector Units
SASF	Semi Autonomous Social Fields
SC	Scheduled Castes (socially and economically disadvantaged group)
SPN	Spatial Network
ST	Scheduled Tribes (socially and economically disadvantaged group)
UP	Urban Panchayat

1 Claiming Places in Cities for Street Trade

1.1 Introduction

This thesis is a contribution towards the study of the spatial aspects of urban informal economy and its attendant politics. Its central research question concerns the factors influencing differences between street traders in terms of their ability to establish claims on places for their trade and to protect them (Bayat 1997, 2000). Focussing on everyday practices and relationships of street traders in the Indian city of Bangalore, this study provides an understanding of urban process ‘from below’ (Holston 1998; Rodríguez-Garavito and Santos 2005; Santos 2002), and illustrates the manner in which agents *spatial embeddedness*¹ influenced their ability to draw on the political opportunities specific to a *locale*² to claim places. It also develops a critique of the theories on urban informal politics in terms of overlooking the intra-city differences in the socio-spatial processes.

This chapter provides an overview of the thesis. The following section sets out the rationale for this research and my interest in the questions addressed by this study. Gaps in the literature on street traders and research design are discussed in the third and the fourth sections, while the final section outlines the empirical and theoretical contributions of this study.

1.2 Origin of Inquiry: Field Experience and Gaps in Theory

Since the mid-1990s, urban planning and development policies of the regional and national state in India have prioritised the spatial transformation of India’s cities in order to join the rank of ‘world/global cities’ (Friedmann and Doughlass 1998). This is reflected by the discourse of the regional state of Karnataka, which speaks of transforming its capital city ‘Bangalore’ into ‘Singapore’ (Nair 2005). A variety of urban renewal and development programmes have been undertaken under the rubric of ‘mega city’ and ‘city beautification’ programmes. One impact of these interventions is the eviction of street traders, among others, from different wards of the city, resulting in conflicts that began in 1999 and are still ongoing.

The implementation of mega city programmes in Bangalore overlapped with the implementation of a 1989 Supreme Court order which made it mandatory for the local governments to allocate hawking zones and to issue licenses to street traders. In theory, hawking zones offered protection for street traders from regular and erratic evictions. However, their implementation was uneven and mired by conflicts between street traders, local state and other non-state agents. The scheme was discontinued in a city centre ward, due to opposition from street traders, and it was implemented to different degrees in other wards.

Street traders' resistance to the hawking zone programme are often attributed to the influence of local political leaders. However, field observations indicate that the conflict in the centre city ward was with both the local government and NGOs and that street traders' opposition to the programme was due to the type of location earmarked for hawking. Further, anecdotal evidence in relation to the experience of negotiating/subverting eviction at this time suggests inter-ward differences between street traders, and that those involved in similar trades located themselves in a particular place in different ways. They either traded from fixed locations or itinerantly, and informal conversations suggested that their choice of location was influenced by the constraints of occupying a place for their trade.

I became interested in this subject while undertaking a research project on urban poverty and governance and during my work for a poverty alleviation programme. During my subsequent trips to Bangalore, before (1999–2000) and during the exploratory phase of my PhD fieldwork (2003–2005), I observed changes in the density of street trade in different wards. It had decreased in some wards but had increased in one city centre ward. The treatment of street traders following the eviction of 1999–2000 suggested a more severe attitude by the state (as also observed by Hansen (2004) in Africa). The traders were unable to re-encroach immediately, unlike on previous occasions.

Field observations and conversations led to several questions. Why are there differences among them in the way they locate for their trade and in their ability to negotiate eviction? How are street traders' interests addressed in policy? How do street traders claim their location? In the following chapter, I review literature sets on urban informality, considering topics such as informal economy, the anthropology of informal markets, and informal politics and I identify gaps and disagreements into the answers

given to the above questions. Further, although many studies (Benjamin *et al.* 2001; Evers 2000; Robinson 2000, 2006), have argued for understanding city processes as heterogeneous, this focus is shared by very few studies on street traders.

1.3 Why Focus on Spatiality of Street Trade?

1.3.1 Street Trade: A Response to Urban Poverty

Cities in India, as with many others in Asia, Africa and Latin America, are characterized by sharp social and economic inequalities (Dupont 2007; Holston 2008; Nair 2005; Patel 2006; Ruet *et al.* 2002; Srinivas 2001), as manifested in their spatial ecology. Flyovers, large shopping malls, gated developments and enclaves of new economies exist alongside the densely populated squatter settlements and neighbourhoods where the poor among others work and live in the city (Heitzman 1999, 2004; Nair 2005).

Close to a third of India's population living in metropolises, and large cities are estimated to be below the poverty level (GOI 2001; NSS 2007). The urban poor among others are predominantly employed in a variety of small economies grouped under the rubric of 'informal economy' (Amis 2001; Amis and Grant, 2001; Benjamin 2001; Chen 2001; Chen 2005; Chen and Jhabvala 2002; Chen and Vanek 2005; Delphi 2005; Harriss-White 2003; Kundu 2003), with street trading being particularly significant (Bhowmik 2003, 2005, 2007; Chen 2001). The concept of 'informal economy' was developed to differentiate those parts of the economy that are not registered or counted in the National Statistics (ILO 1976), although its usefulness has been debated extensively in the literature (see *World Development* 1978, Fine 1998). While recognizing the concept's limitations, this study draws on it to highlight the legal context in which street traders' establish their claims on places for their trade and uses the term street trade/ers rather than informal trade/ers.

In the 1970s, the dominant assumption in academic studies and policy approaches was that street trade was a pre-modern economic activity (Lewis 1954; Murphy 1990; Smith 1988) which would vanish with the expansion of capitalism (Geertz 1963). Hence, scholars from opposing ideological schools all argued for the state to invest in the creation and expansion of large industries rather than provide support for informal economies (Bromley 1978; Dasgupta 2003; Nand 1998; Portes and Castells 1989; Portes

and Centano 2006; Rakowski 1994). However, informal economies continue to thrive in different cities. Estimates in the studies undertaken by the ILO and others suggest that the informal sector accounts for 40–60 per cent of the total urban employment in many developing countries (Chen 2001; ILO 2002) and between 40–70 per cent in Indian metropolises (Bhatt 1998; Jhabvala et.al 2003; Sudharshan and Unni 2001; NSS 2005). There are no accurate estimates of street traders in different cities (Carr and Chen 2001; Cross 1998a, 2007). Available estimates suggest that between 20–25 per cent of urban populations in Africa (Lund 1998; Skinner 1999) and 15–20 per cent in Asia (Bhowmik 2005; Bhatt 1998; Guha-Khasnabis, Kanbur *et. al.* 2006; Kusabe 2006) depend on street trading. In Indian cities, next to manufacturing, the wholesale and retail trade was the dominant form of the informal economy (GOI 2001; NSS 2007). Many recent studies suggest that the number of poor men and women entering street trading in Indian cities and other contexts has increased due to the influence of neo-liberalism and globalization on urban policies (Anjaria 2006; Babb 2001; Bayat 1997; Bhowmik 2001, 2003, 2005; Breman 2001; Brown 2006; Carr and Chen 2001; Chatterjee 2008; Cross 2007; Friedmann 1998; Mahadeviah 2001; Portes and Benton 2006; Kusabe 2006; Middleton 2003; NSS 2007; UNCHS 2001).

1.3.2 Street Traders' Interests in Location and Impact of Policies

Spatial interests of street traders are rarely addressed in the programmes funded by multilateral and bilateral development agencies, although the exclusion of street traders and the poor in general from urban planning process has been demonstrated in several studies (Holston 1989, 1998; 2008; Kuduva 2005; Middleton 2000; Sarin 1989; Verma 2002). More recently, many governments, including the Government of India, formulated policies to support street traders in securing places for their trade. However, these have not had the intended impact. Although de Soto's work (1989, 2000) prompted a shift in the thinking of international development agencies and national governments to strengthening the property rights of those in informal settlements and economies, this translated predominantly into programmes for providing legal titles for squatter settlements, re-location, or new housing construction. In relation to street trade, the dominant focus has been on upgrading skills (i.e. training) and access to capital, more recently through micro-finance projects (Elyacher 2003).

In the Indian context, the National Policy for Urban Street Vending (NPUSV) announced in 2001, aims to enhance street traders' access to a place for their trade. The courts played a significant role in the formulation of the NPUSV and its implementation. A judgement of the Supreme Court in 1989, in a landmark Public Interest Litigation (PIL) between an evicted street trader and the Delhi Municipal Corporation compelled the Government of India (GOI) to formulate the NPUSV. Subsequently, the National Association of Street Vendors of India (NASVI) resorted to the High courts and other smaller courts to force the regional and the local governments to implement the policy. However, despite the policy's good intention, the available evidence, suggests that post-2000, evictions of street traders' – in frequency and scale – have escalated in different Indian cities (Anjaria 2006³; Bhowmik 2003, 2007). In Bangalore, the apex body of NASVI formed a hawkers' federation in 1999 and also, filed a case in the regional court – the High Court of Karnataka - against the Bangalore City Corporation (BCC), which are documented in a study on Urban Governance, Partnerships and Poverty^{4,5}. The order issued by the High Court forced the Bangalore City Corporation to demarcate hawking zones in the city.

The policy advocates the allocation of hawking zones for street trading and the issuing of licences to traders (Anjaria, 2006). The demarcation of hawking zones has been selective and in locations where trading opportunities are limited and its implementation mired by conflicts between street traders, middle and elite class citizens, and the state in cities in India and outside (Anjaria 2006; Benjamin and Bhuvaneswari 2001; Bhowmik 2007; Brown 2005a, 2005b; Pratt 2006; Sharma 2000).

Several reasons are given for the failure of hawking zones and re-location programmes. These include: (i) a lack of definitional clarity on street trading between different agencies; (ii) discontinuity in municipal policies; (iii) a lack of municipal capacity to implement programmes; (iv) corrupt field bureaucrats and political clientelism; and conflicting laws for regulating trade, public health, crime and urban space (Bhowmik 2005, 2007; Bromley 2000a; Brown 2006; Roever 2004; Shrestha 2006). A closer monitoring of municipalities, together with control of urban planning and development by the regional or national state and involvement of civil society organizations have been suggested, but these courses of action do not take into account opposition by street traders themselves and the shifts in power relations in the city.

Evidence in some studies suggests that in allocating zones for street trading, the state does not take into account street traders' heterogeneous needs and interests (Anjaria 2006; Leduka 2002; Smart 1989). The local states often used hawking zones as a tool to extract high rents or to prevent street traders from locating in productive locations (Anjaria 2006). Moreover, there are contradictions between the provisions of NPUSV and the laws related to policing in Indian cities (Bhowmik 2003).

The court judgements – particularly that of Supreme Court in the PIL case of 1989 - impacted significantly on the way the policy makers and implementers interpreted urban squatters and street traders' interests relating to location. The supreme court judgement drew on an another widely cited legal battles known as the Olga Tellis case, which was fought in the early eighties, between squatter dwellers and the Bombay Municipal Corporation (BMC), The petitioners of the Olga Tellis case argued that provisions for evicting squatters violated their right to life enshrined in the Indian Constitution. While acknowledging citizens' right to livelihoods and therefore, life, the Supreme Court judgment also upheld the state's right to evict squatters when alternatives are provided. However it did not define the nature of alternatives, which affected street traders' in that they can be evicted by the local government and shifted to any location in the city. Consequently, street traders' interests relating to location is often overlooked while demarcating hawking zones.

Prior to the introduction of the NPUSV, the local governments in different Indian cities constructed markets to rehabilitate street traders. Findings in several studies in India and other contexts suggests that the re-location of street traders to enclosed markets have not been popular as it often results in a decline of business and increased costs (Bhowmik 2007; Brown 2006; Donavan 2002, 2008; Evers and Mehmut 1994; Roever 2004; Seligmann 2001, 2004; Smart 1989), which in turn affects those at the lower end of the street trading hierarchy (Evers and Mehmut 1994).

Conflict between street traders and the state, particularly the local state, is not a new phenomenon and has been documented in many studies (Babb 1989; Bromley 1989; Cross 1998a; Jones and Varley 1994; McGee 1973, 1975; McGee and Yeung 1977; Seligmann 2001), but since the mid-1990s responsibility for spatial planning and development functions has shifted away from municipal governments and is now located in variety of parastatal organizations (Ravindra 1996), including a proliferation of new

institutions and public-private partnerships (Batley 1997; Benjamin 2000; Leitner *et al.* 2005). Further, some local governments have amended their Municipal Corporation Act in order to be able to evict street traders (Bandyopadhyay 2009). Therefore, decisions to evict street traders arise from different state institutions, underpinned by a new legal framework, and the conflict between street traders and the state is consequently no longer confined either to local government or to similar organizations across the city. In particular, the mega city programmes formulated in the mid-1990s, and, more recently, the National Urban Renewal Mission (NURM), have signified a shift in power within the state, and street traders among others have been evicted on grounds of public health and urban aesthetics. However, as several scholars argue, the underlying factors are the covert exercise of state power to promote economic globalization (Hansen 2004; Middleton 2003; Setšabi and Leduka 2008).

1.3.3 Literature Gaps: Place–Economy Links and the Process of Claiming Places

The review of literature in Chapter Two indicates a gap in knowledge in relation to three inter-related themes: the *spatiality* of street trade, its *politics*, and the *differences* between street traders in claiming places to trade from.

Linkage between Place and Street Trade

Entering street trade is dependent on an individual's ability to claim places and other resources, in particular, finance clientele and merchandise (Seligmann 2001; Jimu 2005). The significance of place for street traders has been highlighted in few studies on urban poverty (Brown 2001), and the mutual influence of place and economy has been documented in relation to other types of informal economic activity (Tati 2004; Benjamin *et al.* 2001), but there is limited research on the ways in which place affects street trade. Relevant studies in the Indian context have explored the following themes: (i) the urban poverty process (Benjamin *et al.* 1999, 2001; Dutta and Batley, 1999; Kumar 2001; Kumar and Amis, 1999; Kundu 2004; Patel 2003, 2006); (ii) informal economy (Amis 2001; Aziz 1984; Dasgupta 1992; Dasgupta 2003; Harriss-White 2003; Narayana 2006); (iii) informal manufacturing clusters (Benjamin 1996; Holmstrom 1985; Lubell 1991; Shaw and Kavita 2001); (iv) politics of informal economy or of subalterns (Chatterjee 2000, 2008; Gooptu 2001; Jones 1974; Oldenberg 1976; Varshney

2001) and (v) street traders (Banerjee 1981; Dasgupta 1992; Lessinger and Lessinger 2001). According to Bandyopadhyay (2009), although social activists have been writing on the problems faced by street traders, academic research on street trade/ers in India is still in its early stage. The theme proposed for this research, the spatiality of street trade, has not been examined particularly in Bangalore.

The Process of Claiming Places

Bayat's (1997) account suggests that the processes by which street traders claim their places can be broken into two aspects: establishing new claims and protecting or defending the claims they have. Street traders locate themselves in public (Garcia-Rincon 2007) or private places (Brown 2006) in a city for their trade, in violation of state regulations (Sarin 1989). Unlike other forms of illegality associated with informal economy, the occupation of places is visible (Smart and Tang 2005). Studies of street traders and informal economy have investigated extensively the characteristics of their enterprise and their relationship with the formal sector, as well as street traders' strategies to secure finance, forward and backward linkages, and the influence of identity in securing resources (Babb 1989, 2001; Hansen 1989; 2004; Lessinger and Lessinger 2001; Milgram 2001; Seligmann 2001; Sikkink 2001; Staudt 2007). The few studies that have investigated street traders' processes of finding and occupying places use examples from Latin America (Crossa 2009; Cross 2007; Donavan 2002, 2008; Garcia-Rincon 2007), Africa (Hansen 2004; Macharia 1997; Setsabi and Leduka 2008; Setsabi 2006; Skinner 1989), the Middle East (Bayat 1997) and cities other than Bangalore in Asia (Bandyopadhyay 2009; Shrestha 2006). Similarly, in the literature on informal land development, the dominant focus has been on the process of occupying and developing land for housing in Indian cities (Bannerjee 1991; De wit 1989; Mitra 1990; Schenk 2001) and other contexts (Gatabki-Kamau and Karirah-Gitau 2004; Hansen and Vaa 2004; Jenkins 2004; Leduka 2004; Nkurunziza 2005; Nustad 2004; Razzaz 1994, 1998; Wigle 2007; Zhang 2001) or on the impact of informal economy on the spatial ecology of cities and the negative social externalities arising from it (Dewan 2003; Kuduva 2005; Mahadevia 2001; Nair 2005). Further, as Cross (1998b: 44) points out, 'while land invasion [for squatting] has long been recognized as inherently political (e.g. Cornelius 1975), the political nature of informal commerce (street vending)... [has] not been

studied carefully despite the recognition of its sensitivity to state policies' For example, many essays explore the politics of squatter dwellers and private land subdivisions in the two works on urban informality⁶ by Roy and Al Sayyad (2004) and Hansen and Vaa (2004). There were two reasons for this neglect: the dominance of the marginality thesis interpretation of the economic and physical spaces of street trade (Cross and Karides 2007; Roy and Al Sayyad 2004), assumptions of ephemeral nature of informal economies in the mainstream economic and urban literature, and the predominance of class and production relations over spatial issues. Places were predominantly conceptualized as a backdrop for an economy rather as a factor influencing social relations.

There is also a need for further research on street traders' processes and their ability to negotiate evictions in contemporary cities. With cities seeking to globalize, street traders and their trading places are increasingly targeted by different arms of the state through a number of campaigns for 'city beautification', 'good governance', and by mega city programmes. Many studies published since 2000 indicate the escalation of conflict between street traders and the city in relation to place (Anjaria 2006; Bhowmik 2007; Cross and Morales 2007; Crossa 2009; Donavan 2002; Evers 2000; Jimu 2005; Kusabe 2006; Leduka 2002; Rajagopal 2004; Seligmann 2004; Setšabi and Leduka 2008; Stillerman 2006). However, these studies limit their analysis to street traders' relationship with the local government, although, as noted above, place use and development are controlled by different aspects of the state. Stillerman (2006) argues that there is a need for a comprehensive analysis of street traders' relationships with different 'scales' of the state to understand as to when, how and why they were able to subvert the state's efforts to evict them from their trading places. Further, very few studies have explored the urban poor's relationship with parastatals, and street traders' relationship to the state and non-state actors in claiming their places is complex, characterized by both hostility and cooperation (Fernandes-Kelly 2006; Seligmann 2004). There thus exists a gap in understanding about street traders' relationship with the city and how it impacts on their strategies for claiming places.

Differences in Claims

The review found that street traders traded from a variety of locations in a city. Business opportunities and the risk of eviction differed between these locations (Babb 2001; Cross 1998a, 2006; Lessinger 2001; Seligmann 2001), and street traders do not have uniform ability to secure places in different location (Babb 2001; Cross 1998a, 2006; Macharia 1997) or to locate in prime trading places (Bayat 1997; Cross 1998a, 2007; Macharia 1997; McGee 1977; Skinner 1989; Skinner 1999). In addition, not all street traders were able to subvert eviction (Macharia 1997). There is a disagreement in the explanations about why such differences arise in contexts outside India, and the role of social networks embedded in household and community domains, henceforth referred to as H&CNs, as a factor influencing such differences (see 2.3.2 and 2.3.3).

1.4 Research Questions and Design

1.4.1 Research Questions

This study seeks to fill these gaps in the literature by considering the following questions in relation to the Indian city of Bangalore.

- *Why are there intra-city differences between street traders in claiming places for their fixed-place trade?*
- *Do such differences arise due to the influence of social networks?*
- *If so, how and why*
- *If not, what are the alternative explanations?*

Also, the following themes were identified:

- Use of networks in strategies for occupying spaces and subverting eviction
- Influence of networks on street traders' decisions to locate in different places for their trade.
- Factors influencing street traders' ability to negotiate eviction, specifically the extent of their agency.
- Embedding of networks used in the process of claiming places.

1.4.2 Qualitative Research and Grounded Theory

This study was designed as a qualitative research project and it adopts a grounded theory strategy developed by Strauss and Corbin (1998), Corbin and Strauss (2008) Chamraz (2000) Glaser and Strauss (1968), and Glaser (1992), by which to explore the role of social networks through a focus on everyday practices and relationships. This is because existing studies have theorized street traders' processes for occupying places and subverting eviction (Bayat 1997; Cross 1998; Donavan 2002, 2008; Garcia-Rincon 2007; Jimu 2005; Setsabi and Leduka 2008; Stillerman 2006), informal political process (Singermen 1995) and the informal land development process (Razzaz 1994; Leduka 2004), but the relevance of the theories developed in these studies to address the proposed research question could not be ascertained before the field research was undertaken. Further, not many studies have explored the role of social networks in relation to the process of claiming places.

This research draws on social constructivist paradigm, which is underpinned by the assumptions of subjective realism, the local and specific constructions of realities and co-construction of knowledge (Lincoln and Guba 2000). The earlier works of Glazer and Strauss (1968) and Corbin and Strauss (1998) have been critiqued for their positivistic assumptions, specifically for their ontological stance of 'realism' and epistemological stance of 'objectivism'. Chamraz (2000) argues that grounded theory can be developed without embracing positivism and that grounded theories can further rather than limit interpretive understanding. Moreover, grounded theorists have modified the approach over time and at present, a continuum can be discerned between those that are informed by objectivism and constructivism.

As described in Chapter Three, the research was also designed as multiple embedded case studies (Yin 1994); the experience of street traders in seven case-study city wards was documented and analysed, focusing primarily on street traders trading from different types of fixed-place trading locations and where relevant compared itinerant or mobile traders.

Field research was undertaken in two stages, firstly to confirm the feasibility of addressing the research question (as information about street traders in Bangalore is limited, it was difficult to ascertain the relevance of the research questions away from the field), and secondly due to the nature of grounded theory. As Glaser and Strauss

observe ‘generating [grounded] theory and doing research [are] two parts of the same process’ (1968: 17). Therefore, it is difficult to draw a clear distinction between the phases of data collection, analysis and theorizing⁷ (Strauss and Corbin 1998; Chamraz 2000). Moreover, the nature of the phenomenon together with the timing of the research (detailed in Chapter Three) necessitated the continual re-evaluation of data collection strategies and analysis.

Rather than drawing on network theories (Actor network theory, quantification of networks), this study uses approaches developed in anthropology (see Singermen 1995; Seligmann 2004). This is because there is disagreement in the literature about the role of networks, and because networks of street traders are embedded in everyday life and therefore not easily visible, dispersed in different places. As shown in Chapters Five and Six, traders draw on networks flexibly according to their needs at a particular time, and thus their networks do not have a stable structure. Further, my interest is on understanding the influence of networks on a particular process – street traders’ processes of securing places – rather than mapping the structure of their networks or quantifying the strength of ties. The literature is employed to develop themes to guide the field research and subsequently, it is used dialogically to analyze the data; in the words of Corbin and Strauss (2008), it is used as a case for ‘constant theoretical comparison’. As well as using the strategies of Glaser and Strauss and Corbin and Strauss, this study also uses the framework approach developed by Kumar (2005) as a tool to develop a reflexive thinking about the literature and research findings.

1.5 Organization of Chapters

This thesis is organized into ten chapters. The next two chapters consist of the literature review and an outline of the research strategy, and the chapters following consider the various research questions.

Embeddedness in Locales and Street traders’ Ability to Claim Places

Chapter Two outlines a framework to conceptualize the research phenomenon. It argues that there is a plurality of control (Razzaz 1994) relating to the use of place and their development in each ward and that traders’ embeddedness in the semi-autonomous social fields (SASF) (Moore 1973) of locales (Giddens 1985) affects their ability to

negotiate with the controllers in their processes to occupy places and to subvert eviction. This framework departs from the two suggestions in the reviewed studies to explain the differences observed between street traders in their ability to claim place for their trade. These are the traders' embeddedness in organizations (Cross 1998, 2006) or that of their networks in the household and community domains.

Heterogeneous Trajectories of Street Trade in the city

Chapter Four shows how historical and contemporary factors that are specific to each locality have influenced the heterogeneous characteristics of street trade in Bangalore and their trajectories; these factors relate to intra-city differences in the governance of land, local economy and local politics. Further, it illustrates the inter and intra ward differences between street traders in relation to their use of place for their trade and their ability to negotiate/subvert evictions. Confirming other studies (ref.2.2.3), the study shows that street traders differentiate between various types of trading places, in terms of business opportunity and risk of eviction. Moreover, they differentiate between everyday (routine) conflicts and the threat of eviction arising from mega urban development programmes (the development threat). However, in contrast to the dominant suggestion in the literature (with the exception of Crossa's (2009) findings concerning Latin America), street traders were able to subvert these threats, although there were intra- and inter-ward differences in terms of their ability to do so. These differences manifested in the extent of their ability to recapture places in agglomeration and the quality of places captured.

Strategies to negotiate control: Location, Threat and Networked Non-Compliance

Chapters Five and Six explore street traders' use of social networks⁸, and their strategies for finding and occupying places and for subverting eviction. Findings discussed in these chapters underscore a need to move away from an emphasis, common to many studies (as reviewed in Sections 2.3.2 and 2.3.3), on a particular strategy.

Similar to Garcia's findings in Mexico City, street traders in Bangalore used a variety of strategies to find and occupy their places. However, street traders in Bangalore also showed inter-ward differences in their use of group or individual strategies to capture places for their trade, and they entered into negotiation amongst themselves and with the state and non-state agents in each ward. Their engagement with different parts of the

state differed between the time of their occupation, and later, when they needed to subvert eviction. The role of the everyday state (Fuller and Harris 2001) was significant in their negotiations to occupy places but its characteristics varied across the wards. Networks provided the context for securing information, securing membership in groups, and negotiation. However, its use varied by location and was dominant among those trading at agglomeration.

Analogous to the findings in the studies by Cross (1998), Bayat (1997), and Stillerman (2006) (see 2.3.3), street traders' subversive actions were localized. However, in contrast to findings by Bayat (1997) and Cross (1998) but similar to an extent with Crossa (2009), street traders resorted both to overt and covert forms of political actions in subverting/negotiating the threat of eviction. Another key finding relates to the process of negotiation with different 'scales' (Brenner 1990) of the state and other land owners to subvert eviction, an aspect less explored in the literature on informal politics or collective action.

Crossa (2009) does not explain the factors influencing the use of various strategies to subvert eviction, and Chapter Six shows the influence of network relationships and perceptions of threat on street traders' forms of politics and engagement with landowners. Another finding in this chapter relates to the varying influence of both local and extra-local relations and processes in their strategies to subvert the two types of threat. While their negotiations in subverting everyday conflicts was predominantly pitched at the locality, their strategies for subverting developmental threats was discursive and occurred in different political and geographical spaces. Street traders draw on horizontal and vertical networks flexibly to forge alliances with various types of political agents, particularly elected representatives, for their various forms of subversive actions and negotiations with the state, and the use of multiple networks is dominant in negotiations to subverting mega development projects. Similarly, threats influenced the manner in which they drew on their networks at the time of occupying their places and subsequently, in processes to subvert eviction. These findings indicate the significance of mapping not only street traders' relationship to different scales of the state as suggested by Stillerman (2006), but also, their ties to the city.

Chapters Five and Six illustrate that negotiation between street traders and their networks is not always within dyads or triads. Rather, it involves a chain of actors,

including street traders, intermediaries and landowners or the state. Further, findings presented in Chapters Five and Six show the need to consider the concepts of networked action and non-compliance, as developed by Singerman and Razzaz respectively to explain street traders' strategies for claiming places.

Differences: Place-Economy Links and the Role of Networks

Chapter Seven shows how places affect street trade and the role of networks in relation to the differences between street traders' ability to occupy their preferred places and to subvert eviction. Although location is recognized as a key resource for the street trade economy, its specific effects have not been considered in the literature. However, Section 7.1 shows that street traders prefer to trade from agglomerations because of the political and economic advantages associated with agglomerating in a particular place. Further, location and size influence differences between agglomerations in terms of advantages and risks. The experience of street traders in different wards shows that networks influence entry to trade and opportunities for locating in agglomerations, while a shortage of places and opposition accentuate the competition amongst them to locate in agglomerations. This in turn reinforces their reliance on their horizontal or vertical networks to find and occupy places in agglomeration and to subvert eviction.

Differences in Tapping Locality Specific Political Opportunities

In subverting eviction, specifically in situations linked to development threats, traders tap into various types of locality-specific political opportunities: creating a critical mass to strike at the working of a locality; their power as electorates; and the political influence of their alliances (intermediaries) in local or city politics. Street traders' ability to draw on horizontal and vertical networks flexibly during different times influences their opportunities to locate in agglomerations and to negotiate evictions, as shown in Sections 7.1 and 7.2.

The Role of H &CNs in Influencing Differences

Household and community networks (H&CNs) are a particular type of network used by agglomeration traders. Other networks are economic, political and territorial, and their influence and characteristics vary across the wards. In themselves, H&CNs offer only limited explanations for the differences between traders.

Differences: Embeddedness in Locale and Ability to Draw on Networks

Chapter Nine elaborates on the conceptual framework set out in Chapter Two. It shows the manner in which street traders' embeddedness in the physical and the social spaces of each locale influenced their relationship with the controllers and intermediaries. Interdependencies and reciprocal exchanges have emerged between controllers, intermediaries and traders; these are spurred by the conventions of place use, governance of different types of land used by street traders, everyday politics and electoral politics in each ward. Relationship between these agents is characterized by fluid and flexible alliances and their roles and their influence differ across places and time.

1.6 Contribution to Theory and Policy

This study fills a gap in the literature on street traders. Moreover, it illustrates the influence of socio-spatial relations in the analysis of the political economy of street trade. It uncovers new evidence about the process of negotiation between street traders and non-state agents, and about street traders' relationship to different parts and 'scales' of the state. Second, through a focus on the everyday workings of the city, this study interprets an aspect of socio-spatial relations between the city and everyday politics in relation to claiming places. In this way it contributes towards an understanding of the social production of city places. Third, this study illustrates the relevance of concepts developed in other contexts (Singermen, 1995; Razzaz, 1994) to explain street traders' strategies in Bangalore. Both studies are on Middle Eastern cities. Further findings relating to the role of networks as a factor in influencing differences between street traders adds to the contribution of Singermen (1995). This study also underscores a need to move away from a polarized conception of street trader politics as one of either everyday resistance or organized politics. Instead, it shows how dialectical relationships between street traders influence their horizontal alliances and intra-network bargaining, and highlights the need for more grounded studies to understand urban process and relationships. Fourth, findings presented in Chapters Five to Seven illustrate the reflexive influence of structure (threat, location) and agency on street traders' processes of claiming places. Finally, the strength of the grounded theory is the conceptual framework developed from the field data; this is outlined in chapter two. This framework study has analytical significance for making inferences about processes

related to establishing claims on places in general, not only among street traders but among other agents who use similar processes in Bangalore.

2 Place and Politics of Urban Street Trade: A Review of Literature

2.1 Introduction

This dissertation investigates the phenomenon of intra-city differences amongst street traders in terms of their ability to claim places for their trade in an Indian city, using the example of Bangalore. Bayat (1997, 2000a) suggests that there are two aspects to the process by which street traders claim places: making new claims or finding and occupying a place and defending it, by subverting the threat of eviction and displacement. The characteristics of street trade, the variety of locations from where street traders' trade in a city and their process of claiming places are discussed in different sets of urban literature: informal economy, anthropology of informal markets, and informal politics. This chapter reviews relevant studies in these sets of literature and shows that the proposed research question has not hitherto been examined in detail. Further, this chapter argues that the theoretical frameworks used in the reviewed studies are inadequate for theorizing the research question. Instead, it argues for using a grounded theory strategy.

This chapter is divided into five sections. Gaps, disagreements in the literature and questions identified by this review are summarized in the following two sections, while the fourth section outlines a conceptual framework by which to unpack the research question and a conclusion then summarizes the review findings.

2.2 Knowledge gap: Differences in Claiming Places for Street Trade

There is limited existing research on the phenomenon of differences among those claiming places for street trade, and the studies that are available focus on the spatial and political processes underpinning street trade. These have been explored predominantly in cities outside India (Bayat 1997; Crossa 2009; Cross 1998a, 1998b, 2006; Cross and Morales 2007; Donavan 2002; Fernandez-Kelly 2006; Garcia-Rincon 2007; Hansen and Vaa 2004; Seligmann 2004; Setsabi 2006). Little has also been written on the spatial organization of street trade, although the evidence suggests that location is a factor contributing to the differences between street traders in terms of their income and ability

to claim different locations for their trade. Factors that give rise to such differences have not been explained. There is also growing data relating to conflicts over the use of places for street trading in the globalizing cities of the South, and disagreement about the experience of street traders seeking to subvert evictions. This research seeks to contribute towards this growing body of literature.

2.2.1 Debates on Definition

Street trading is a dominant form of informal economic activity (Hart 1973; ILO 2002; Lund 1998; NSS 2007). The definition of informal economy has been extensively debated⁹, and this has led to a sustained research focus on the economic organization of street trade. These studies describe in detail the characteristics of street trade and traders and their relationship with the formal economy. Given the scope of this review, these debates are revisited only briefly below. It is also shown that there is a dearth of information about the spatiality of street trade and its attendant politics.

Street Trade as a 'Sector'

A definition of informal economy, popularized by the ILO, is as an autonomous sector, de-linked from 'capitalist production or market relations' (Gerry and Birkbeck 1981), comprising of all activities that are outside 'wage employment' (Hart 1973), or 'formal enterprises' (ILO 1972, 2002; Sethuraman 1981); and are not accounted as part of a nation's economy (Nustad 2004; Thomas 1992, 1995). Street trade has been conceptualized as a homogenous sector dominated by the poorest of the poor (Hart 1973), particularly women (Babb 2001; Banerjee 1981; Hansen 1989) and new migrants (Bayat 1997). Ease of entry, low capital investment and the lack of a need for skills catalysed the entry of unskilled individuals into street trade (Hart 1973; Thomas 1995; Tokman 1978), undertaking small scale enterprises characterized by low productivity, and low profit margins, and controlled by household members (Evers and Mehmut 1994; Geertz 1963; Hart 1973; Hoffmann 1986; Kambiaya-Senewake 2004; McGee and Yeung 1977; Rogerson and Hart 1989; Sethuraman 1981).

Many studies informed by a Marxist framework have in particular shown the shortcomings of the ILO definition, and they have highlighted the spatial (Santos 1979) and predominantly economic linkages between street trade and retail and wholesale trade in a city (Breman 2001; Bromley 1978, 1990; Birkbeck 1978; Dasgupta 1992; Dasgupta 2003; Gerry 1978; Harris 2006; Mazumdar 1976; Meagher 1990; Peattie 1978, 1987; Portes and Castells 1989); street traders are also incorporated into the national and global circuits of distribution (Brown 2006; Tetchler 1994). Other studies, concerning both Indian cities and other contexts, have shown the heterogeneous characteristics of street traders. Different groups of the urban poor are in street trade, including not just the poorest of the poor but also those that have lost their jobs in the formal sector. Further, both men and women are involved, as well as a range of age groups and migrants (Bhowmik 2005; Brown 2006; Kusabe 2006, Kusabe and Chen 2001; Lyons and Snoxell 2005; Mahadevia 1998, 2001; Nirathorn 2006; Rupkamadee 2005; Shrestha 2006), and their economic activities have been shown to differ in terms of the type and scale of trade, profit generated and mobility opportunities (Bromley 1978; Brown 2006; Dasgupta 1992; Dasgupta 2003; Lessinger 2001; Macharia 1997; Moser 1978; Tetchler 1994; Tokman 1978). Further, entry to street trade is in fact not easy, as it is regulated by social networks (Macharia 1997; Seligmann 2001). Moreover, the contours of street trade vary across cities (Brown 2006; Bandyopadhyay 2009).

Street Trade as a Process

Various studies published in the late 1980s and 1990s shifted the conceptualization of informal economy in relation to the state law from being a ‘sector’ to being a ‘process’ (Brown 2005a; de Soto 1989; Light 2004; Meagher 1990; Nand 2004; Portes *et al.* 1989; Tokman 1992, 1996). Tokman (1996) points out that informal economies form a continuum of activities ranging from illegal to different degrees of quasi-legal activities. Further, the violation of some or all aspects of the law is a feature that cuts across the informal and formal economy (Centeno and Portes 2006).

A common theme in the studies on street traders and informal economy from the 1970s and later decades is the emphasis on defining economic characteristics, specifically ‘class and production relations’ (Cross and Karides 2007), to the neglect of spatial practices and politics (Brown 2006; Cross and Morales 2007; Fernandez-Kelly 2006;

Kusabe 2006; Seligmann 2004; Shaw and Pandit 2001). Moreover, assumptions of informal economies' autonomy from the state (see De Soto 1989)¹⁰; or even hostility, have masked the complexity of their relations with the state and city politics (Fernandez-Kelly 2006).

This study seeks to fill these gaps by exploring the process by which street traders claim their trading places. Acknowledging the blurred and porous boundaries between formal/informal and legal/illegal, this study uses the term 'street trade'¹¹ rather than informal economy. Street traders' place claims may involve different degrees of violation of laws related to the use or occupation of land, through to illegal occupation¹² (Brown 2006; Jaganathan 1987; Smart and Tang 2005). Although agents at various levels of the formal and informal trading hierarchy may also violate land laws, this research is limited to street traders.

2.2.2 Differences between Street Traders

Another theme that has been less investigated concerns differences between street traders in their economic organization and the underpinning factors for this (Tetchler 1994). In particular, although gendered differences between street traders in their scale of trade and of income earned have been noted (Bromley 1978; Moser 1978, 1981), no explanation has been provided as to why such differences have arisen. Further, no explanation has been given about how street traders forge linkages or select trading locations nor have the ways in which location affects trade have been studied.

One area that has been studied includes how forward and backward linkages influence types of trade, the income generated from it, and mobility within the trading hierarchy (Tetchler 1994). Jimu (2005) found that differences in income and mobility are influenced by both the physical and economic spaces of street trade. Location, regulations governing the use of space and patterns of investment in urban infrastructure all affect street traders' income and the stability of their trade (Brown 2006; Brown and Lloyd 2002; Bhowmik 2005; Pratt 2006). It has also been noted that the quality of places occupied by street traders varies according to gender, caste and ethnic backgrounds, affecting business opportunities and, therefore, income (Babb 2001; Blanc 1998; Evers and Mehmut 1994; Hansen 1989; Lessinger 2001; Light 2004; Linn 1983; Pratt 2006).

Although these evidence mention of the role of place as a factor influencing differences between street traders', they have not explored traders' preferences on location, the influence of location on their trade and the factors driving their choice of location.

Tetchler (1994) is one of the few scholars to have explored differences comprehensively, but she does not focus on the spatial aspects of street trade. Evidence from Babb and others concerning the quality of places occupied by street traders is anecdotal and these studies are instead focused on the economic practices of street traders and the influence of identity on their trade. Although it is more than a decade since Tetchler's paper (1994) was published, there is still a very limited focus on the theme of differences, and this study will contribute towards greater understanding by exploring the factors underpinning differences and their implications in relation to claims on places for trade.

2.2.3 Differences in Claiming Places for Street Trade

This section reviews the evidence concerning the spatial organization of street trade and street traders' experiences of finding places for trade and of subverting eviction. It shows that questions about how location is chosen and it affects street trade have not been addressed, and that there is disagreement about street traders' ability to subvert eviction in contemporary cities.

Entry to Fixed-Place Trade

Based on their mode of trade, street traders can be differentiated into two groups: 'fixed-place traders', who trade from a specific place in one or more wards (Cross 1998; Seligmann 2001, 2004; Lessinger 2001; Macharia 1997) and 'itinerant traders' (Murray 1991; Dasgupta 1992), who move around in a locality or between wards and are not tied to any specific trading places (Murray 1991). Factors influencing their entry to their respective mode of trade have not been explained in previous studies.

Nirathorn (2006) notes that street traders begin as itinerant traders and move on to fixed-place trade once their business stabilizes and that fixed-place traders earn relatively higher income than itinerant traders. Moreover fixed-place traders have other advantages, as the work is less strenuous and there are opportunities to develop a regular

clientele. However a weakness in his study is that adequate evidence is not provided to support the claim that fixed-place trade is advantageous. Further, he does not explain the factors driving street traders to enter fixed-place trade and the study focus on street traders in the cities of South East Asia. There is limited focus on the specific situation of street traders in Indian cities in general or Bangalore in particular. Without further research, about why street traders enter fixed-place trade, it is difficult to draw conclusion about the differences between street traders in terms of their ability to find and occupy a place for their trade. Hence, this study will explore the views of both kinds of street traders as to why they chose their location and their particular trade.

Access to a Various Types of Fixed-Place Trading Location

Fixed-place traders either occupy spaces in close proximity to one another to form 'agglomerations' (Macharia 1997), or they are scattered in different places (Sanyal 1991) in a neighbourhood¹³. The characteristics of trading differed between agglomerations in terms of density and type (Babb 2001; Cross 1998a, 1998b; Cross and Pena 2006; Seligmann 2004) as well as time cycle (Brown 2005b; Cross 1998a, Cross and Pena 2006). Street traders' agglomerations develop on places owned by public agencies (Seligmann 2001, 2004), and by private individuals or institutions (Brown 2005a, 2005b; Coe *et al.* 2007; Shrestha 2006; Smart 1989). Moreover, local governments have contracted out the management of places occupied by street traders to private agents (Garcia-Rincon 2007; Shrestha 2006).

While most traders traded from the same place in one ward, some traders enjoyed the flexibility of access to different localities and they used the same place in each locality (Cross 1998a). Cross (1998a) found that traders specializing in a trade clustered in a place, whereas Singermen (2004) notes that traders of different types located in the same place. Further Seligmann (2004) found street traders in a similar trade acted as a clique to control various places in an informal market, and that their influence in local politics determined their ability to control prime trading places. She suggests mapping the 'spatial relationships' (Seligmann 2004:21) to understand the patterns and strategies of controlling places.

Street traders perceived agglomerations as having a high level of de-facto tenure security and a higher chance of tenure¹⁴ regularization by the local government (Cross 1998a). However, business opportunities and the risk of being evicted from the location differed across agglomerations (Cross 1998a, 2006; Macharia 1997). Cross (2006) found that the level of organization among street traders varied between agglomerations. Conflicts between traders and the risk of eviction by the state were high in agglomerations with a low level of organization.

The work of Cross, together with Macharia, Seligmann and other studies reviewed in this section illustrate the differences among fixed-place trading locations and street traders' ability to find a place in them. However, street traders' perceptions about location or their reasons for differentiating between locations have not been explored in the reviewed studies. Another limitation is that many studies focus on one type of location or a market within a ward. For example, Cross (1998) lists different types of fixed-place location in the city centre, but he does not document the factors that give rise to differences between them, the characteristics of street traders in each location or factors determining their access to each location. Davies (1999b) critique of Cross's (1998a) study as having an inadequate analysis of the impacts of location on street trade also applies to many of the studies reviewed here. Both Seligmann and Cross suggest that street traders organize to control their territories and that they may not have uniform access to a particular location, but Seligmann does not explain street traders' engagement in local politics and Cross does not take into account the differences between agglomerations in terms of economic opportunities, ownership and management of land in his analysis of street traders' strategies to claim places.

With the exception of Macharia, other studies reviewed in this section concern the experience of street traders in Latin America. There is very little information about how street traders find locations for their trade at the city centre, and none for street traders in other parts of a city. This study will document the types of fixed-place street trading locations used by street traders in each ward, their perceptions of opportunities and risks, and the factors that influence their ability to occupy in a location.

Access to Different Localities

Street traders trade from different wards of a city, including the city centre ward and newly developing localities in the periphery (Bromley 1978; de Soto 1989; Lessinger

2001; McGee 1973; Murray 1991; Skinner 1989). The characteristics of their clienteles, and therefore their business opportunities (Bromley 2000; Brown 2005; Dasgupta 1992; Linn 1983; King 2006), differ across city localities, as does the frequency of eviction (Bromley 2000; Leduka 2002). Street traders prefer to locate at the city centre, where there is a dense and diverse range of agents, including suppliers, financiers and customers (King 2006; Skinner 1989). However, traders face high competition to secure places here, and they depend on the support of formal traders (Bromley 1978b, 1990, 2000; Neward and Woolward 2000); although, as Dasgupta (1998) notes, street traders in this location do not all have the same kinds of ties and connections with wholesale traders. Tokman and Klein (1996) records hostile relations between street traders and retail traders, while Bandyopadhyay (2009) found intra-city differences in their relationships. Skinner (1989) also notes that new migrants working as street traders have relatively weak ties to other agents in a city and so instead they tend to dominate the periphery of a city. Although these peripheral locations are relatively conflict-free and traders find it easier to occupy places, the volume of trade is less and concomitantly their earnings are likely to be lower.

The evidence from these studies suggests that there are differences both in the characteristics of street trade across different city wards and in street traders' ability to locate in particular areas, although there is disagreement about why this is so. Further, these studies are generally limited by the predominant focus on the city centre ward at the expense of the periphery, although both are needed to explore the impact of intra-city differences in local economy and local politics¹⁵ on the processes by which street traders' claim their place. This is especially pertinent for Bangalore; although there is information on the impact of a mega city programme on street trading in a city centre ward (Benjamin *et al.* 1999, 2001) there is very limited information about street trading in the rapidly growing periphery¹⁶.

Transformation of Urban Space and the Threat of Eviction

Conflict between street traders and the state in relation to the use of place is an ongoing and widespread phenomenon. Local governments in different cities have repeatedly attempted to evict street traders for a variety of reasons, including: the enforcement of law and order; the prevention of epidemics; and pressure from other citizens, in

particular local or corporate economic agents (Anjaria 2006; Bayat 1997; Bhan 2009; Bhowmik 2007; Brown 2006; Cross 1998; Donavan 2008; Garcia-Rincon 2007; Jimu 2005; Kayuni and Tambulasi 2009; Lund 1998; McGee 1975; Neward and Woolward 2000; Rajagopal 2004; Seligmann 2004; Sesabki 2006; Skinner 1999; Tripp 1989, 1997). It is also widely found that street traders do not have a uniform ability to subvert eviction attempts by municipal authorities (Cross 1998; Seligmann 2004; Smart 1989): some lose their places, others secure alternative places in the same ward or in other wards, and there are differences in the quality of spaces secured.

Post 1990s, the scale and frequency of evictions of street traders and squatters have increased in many cities (Anjaria 2006; Babb 2001; Bandyopadhyay 2009; Bhan 2009; Bhowmik 2005, 2007; Bromley 2000a; Crossa 2009; Cross and Karides 2007; Donavan 2002 2008; Hansen 2004; Leduka 2002, 2004; Low 2000; Oldfield and Stokke 2005; Rajagopal 2004; Roy 2004; Seligmann 2004). These evictions are driven by the state's project of transforming the image of cities to attract corporate economies and to promote high end real estate investment and tourism (Crossa 2009; Leduka 2002, Middleton 2003; Rajagopal 2004; Setsabi 2006¹⁷; Setsabi and Leduka 2008; Stillerman 2006). As Bhan (2009:131) observes, these evictions are "the markers of the shifts¹⁸ in urban politics" in Indian cities, where there are middle income and elite group mobilizations against street traders (Anjaria 2006; Bandyopadhyay 2009; Benjamin 2007 Rajagopal 2004).

Although street traders in some cities manage to evolve strategies to subvert eviction in spite of the shifts in urban governance (Bandyopadhyay 2009; Crossa 2009; Roy 2004), the dominant view is that such opportunities are limited (Babb 2001; Donavan 2008; Friedmann 1998; Hansen 2004). Further, Roy (2004) found while all street traders in Calcutta in Indian were evicted, not all are resettled, which raises the question as to why such differences arise.

With the exception of Anjaria, Bhowmik and Rajagopal, who focus on Mumbai, and, Roy and Bandyopadhyay, on Calcutta, many studies considered for this part of the review predominantly consider cities outside India, in Latin America, South East and South Asia. This research seeks to contribute towards this gap through exploring street traders' experiences with subverting eviction in Bangalore.

Further interventions by the state(s) may not target street traders across different wards uniformly (Bromley 2000; Bandyopadhyay 2009), while street traders in Indian cities are also affected by the politics of nativism (Nair 2005) or by identity politics. Consequently, the nature of the threat faced by street traders, and opportunities to subvert eviction, differ across a city. Therefore, this study will investigate *inter- and intra-ward patterns* in relation to the nature of threats faced by street traders, their strategies, and their *ability to subvert eviction* at the city centre ward and at the periphery.

2.2.4 Conclusion

This section has reviewed studies on street traders in the literature sets on informal economy, informal politics and anthropology of informal markets. As shown above, the economics of street trade and street traders' as 'economic actors' (Cross 1998) has been documented extensively. Street traders locate in a place to trade (Seligmann 2004) and their claims on places are contested by the state and by non-state agents. There is a dearth of evidence in relation to the impact of spatial organisation on the economics of street trade and in relation to the political agency of street traders, and although intra-city differences in location and ability to negotiate are suggested in the reviewed studies, it is difficult to infer why from these studies. There is also disagreement and gaps in understanding concerning street traders' ability to subvert contemporary threats in other contexts. Therefore this study will address the following question: *Why are there intra-city differences between street traders in terms of claiming places to trade from a fixed-place?*

Following Bayat (1997, 2000), this study considers two aspects to the problem: occupying a trading place and holding on to a trading place. It documents the experience of street traders trading at the city centre ward and at the peripheral wards in the Indian city of Bangalore and maps the following themes (i) the space-time organization of street trade in each ward; (ii) the characteristics of street trade in different locations of a ward; (iii) street traders' perceptions about fixed-place trade and various types of fixed-place trading locations; (iv) their process of finding and occupying a place for fixed-place trade and subverting eviction; and (vi) factors influencing their opportunities to find places in various locations and their ability to subvert eviction.

Although the studies reviewed below, do not explore the phenomenon of differences proposed for this research, their findings provide an insight into the factors that may have a bearing on street traders' opportunities to claim places for their trade.

2.3 Factors Influencing Differences in Claiming Places

Few studies have considered both occupying a place and subverting eviction while several studies have focussed on the phenomenon of subverting eviction. They disagree about the factors influencing differences between street traders in relation to their place claims, which relates to the role of social networks embedded in household and ethnic relations, henceforth referred to as H&CNs.

2.3.1 Political Clientelism and Place Claims

Several works on squatter settlements and private plotted developments in Indian cities (Baken 2003; Benjamin 2000; De Wit 1989; De Wit and Berner, 2009; Jones 1972; Nelson 1979; Oldenberg 1976; Schenk 2001; Sharma 2004; Walton 1998) and few studies on street traders in India (Bandyopadhyay 2009; Roy 2004) and outside (Cross, 1998a; Crossa 2009) illustrate the significance of political clientelism for poorer groups to claim land and physical infrastructure. Studies on the poor's political participation¹⁹ in Indian cities also show that they rely on political parties (Chatterjee 2002, 2008; Devas and Amis 2004; Harris 2005; Varshney 2007) and particularly, on field bureaucrats and elected representatives of the local government (Etemadi 2000, 2004; Chatterjee 2002, 2008; Corbridge 2005; Devas and Amis 2004; Fuller and Harris 2001; Gupta 1995; Jones 1974; Oldenberg 1976) to tackle their individual and collective problems and that the boundaries of state and society are blurred (Fuller and Harris 2001; Gupta 1995).

Clientelism^{20,21} is defined as a relationship between agents of unequal power and status and which is particularistic, private and anchored loosely in law (Baken 2003; Cross 1998; Fox, 1994; Kauffman 1974). It involves a specific type of 'dyadic'²² exchange' (Cross 1998:76), based on the principle of reciprocity and the maintenance of which depends on the return that each actor expects to obtain by rendering goods and services to the other and which ceases once the expected awards fails to materialize (Baken 2003:16; Shefner 2001). In political clientelism, clients exchange their votes and other

forms of political support in return for a patron's support to secure material resources for collective or individual consumption (Auyero 1999; Baken 2003; Cross 1998b).

There are three positions on political clientelism. One, a view dominant in studies on social movements and collective action is that clientelism is regressive to the interest of street traders and that it is a mechanism by which the state and political elites co-opt and control the poor, limit their demands and prevent their horizontal mobilisation for collective action (Appadurai 2001; De wit and Berner, 2009; De Wit 1989; Schrumann 1989; Nair 2005).

Another view is that clientelism is a useful channel for securing public resources for those who were excluded from the formal or state systems (Auyero 1999). Acknowledging that it is a double edge sword²³, Cross (1998a: 21) argues that it "... provides (street traders) and their leaders the ability to continuously thwart the attempts of ...officials to control them". His work illustrates how the clientelistic structures of the Mexican state and its political parties, which are built around the competition between various political entrepreneurs (street-vendor leaders, elected representatives and bureaucrats) politicizes street traders at the local level and also, compels the patrons to produce tangible results for their clients. Further, he points out that "by assuming that clientelism precludes manoeuvrability on the part of client groups, the debate overlooks another possibility: that social movements can take advantage of clientelism" (Cross 1998b: 46).

While Bayat (1997) notes that social movements do not arise among street traders, other studies suggests that the impact of movements in terms of reconfiguring clientelism is unclear and that a vast majority of poor still secure their resources through their political patrons (Gay 2006; Harris 2005; Walton 1998). Further, some scholars argue that the poor are strategic actors and that their participation in clientelism is influenced by their structural position; overtime, they learn to bargain effectively with their patrons (Cornelius 1975; Fox 1994; Shefner 2001). Moreover, clientelism can take different forms²⁴ in a city and the relationship between patrons and clients changes over time (Batley 2001; Gay 2006; Fox 1994). Further, the boundaries between movements, political parties and the state are fluid (Bandyopadhyay 2009; Etemadi 2000, 2004; Lowe, 1986).

An intermediary position is that relationship between patrons and clients is a complex mix of exchanges, conflicts, domination, and subversion (Auyero, 1999; 2001). Auyero (1999) argues that clientilistic networks are to be seen as 'relational' and 'experiential' matrix that links patrons, brokers and clients in an ongoing problem solving networks and as intricate webs of material and symbolic resources.

Besides, clients have unequal ability to enlist the support of their patrons (Auyero, 1999, 2000, 2006; Batley 2002; Benjamin et.al 2001; Gay 2006). Although Benjamin et.al (2001) study focussed on Bangalore, their study does not explain the factors influencing such differences. Further, street traders' places of residence and trade are not always the same (Benjamin *et al.* 2001; Seligmann 2004). As political constituencies are defined around the place of residence, some street traders' face constraints in terms of enlisting the support of elected representatives in the wards where they trade (Shrestha 2006)²⁵ . Not much is known about street traders' relationship with political parties in Bangalore. Therefore this study will map the channels used by street traders' to negotiate their claims with state and non-state agents in Bangalore; their relationships and the factors that influence their bargaining power.

2.3.2 Street traders' Organizations and their Ability to Tap Clientilistic Opportunities

Singermen (1995) argues that social networks constitute a lifeline for agents in the informal economy and provide an avenue for enacting their political and economic strategies. Networks offer both invisibility and flexibility and network transactions are governed by norms of trust and reciprocity and underpinned by custom and cultural ethos. Further she notes that studies on the poor's political participation overlook the significance of social networks and informal institutions as these are associated with patron-client ties that would disappear over time.

Street traders depend on social networks to enter trade, and to acquire knowledge about markets, trading skills, and other resources (Alexander and Alexander 2001; Hansen 1989; Lyon 2007; Seligmann 2001; 2004). However, access to these networks is restricted, being embedded in household, gender or ethnic domains, and they are acquired inter-generationally (Seligmann 2001; Steinhauf and Huber 1996). Moreover,

agents may not have a uniform ability to draw on their networks (Lessinger 2001; Varcin, 2000). These findings suggest that differences between street traders' situations may be due to the efficacy of their H&CNs.

These studies are, however limited: Singermen investigates the politics of informal economy and other studies predominantly focuses on women traders; Seligmann (2001) has drawn attention to the gap in knowledge about the political and economic strategies of men in informal trade and the characteristics of their networks. Further these studies do not investigate the role of social networks in relation to the process of claiming places. Singermen suggests a complete exclusion of street traders from the state, even though the state controls the use and development of land in cities (Davies 1999b). Unlike other forms of informal activity, occupation of public places for street trading is '...fixed and difficult to hide' (Smart and Tang 2005:80) from the state or non-state agents. In fact, evidence from studies of street traders and informal land development for housing shows that agents draw on their relationships with the state and non-state actors in negotiating their claims to a place (Battesti 2006; Nkurunziza 2007; Puig 2006; Razzaz 1994, 1998; Tati 2004; Wigle 2007; Varcin 2007). Further, Varcin (2000, 2007) suggests that street traders and the state are linked via social networks embedded in ethnic and religious domains and that the degree of such linkage influences the state's ability to control street trade. However, Varcin does not explore the specific role of networks.

Singermen's work and other studies imply that the flow of resources is uniform among members of a network and that members of a household or an ethnic community have a uniform ability to enlist the support of their networks. This is contradicted by findings on the household as a bargaining unit with members having uneven power to claim resources (Curtis 1986), and on power relations and fluid alliances among members of an ethnic or caste group (Nagar and Leitner 1998). In addition, findings in economic and political sociology show that the strength of relationship between non-ascriptive tie nodes affects the flow of information and its quality between members of a network (Granovetter 1973, 1985; Mische 2003; Portes and Sensenbrenner 1993; Uzzi 1999); and the type of support extended (Auyero 1999, 2006; Bian 1997).

Macharia (1997) found that agglomeration traders negotiate for their place both individually with previous occupiers and as a group, with the local authority.

Consequently, street traders from specific ethnic groups dominate particular trades and places. However, street traders' use of H&CNs varied in their negotiations with the local state. In addition to H&CNs, they also drew on political networks, and municipal politics influenced their patterns of network usage. Moreover, there were gender differences in their network portfolios: women drew on networks more to fulfil household responsibilities, while men used networks to secure their place and for political activities. Further, in subverting eviction by the local state, street traders appealed to the higher scales of state. It is difficult to interpret the use of networks in this context.

Lazar (2007) found the use of spatial networks among street traders in processes for subverting eviction. Informal markets emerge along busy thoroughfares connecting different localities and where different types of political and economic agents congregate. These sites enable street traders to forge networks with agents outside their ethnic group and to draw on them for their economic and political actions. However, it is not clear from her evidence how street traders occupy their places or whether they have a uniform ability to draw on their networks for political actions.

In contrast to the studies of Seligmann and Singermen reviewed above, Macharia's and Lazar's studies indicate that both municipal politics and traders' identity affect their use of networks and their ability to draw on them and that a focus on H&CNs may not be adequate to explain the differences between them. Moreover, Macharia's findings illustrate that street traders' engagement with the State(s) differ in their processes to occupy a place and to subvert eviction. Finally, studies of Macharia and Lazar together with Singermen, Seligmann and others illustrate the role of social networks on street traders' processes to claim resources in African, Middle Eastern and Latin American cities. Very little is known about this aspect in the Indian context. In the light of these gaps and disagreements, a question arises about the role of social networks embedded in household and community relations as a factor influencing differences between street traders' situations in Indian cities.

Cross (1998a) argues that street traders' ability to thwart eviction is related to the level of their organization²⁶. Their organization fulfils two functions²⁷ viz., internal regulation of the way a place is used by a group and mobilisation of collective responses to attacks on their interests by officials or other groups. Besides forming an organization, leaders must find patrons within the State and political parties to channel their demands. As

patrons negotiate only with a leader, it gave these individuals more power over other traders and the ability to organise other traders. As leaders rather than individual traders control the space, street traders who do not belong to an organisation find it difficult to claim prime trading spaces. Further he notes that street traders' form organization only when they face a threat of eviction²⁸. Their agglomerations evolve very slowly as the initial occupiers attract clients and new traders, and start validating a market zone until it gets to the point when a third party lobby for their removal. These findings suggest that street traders' use different strategies to find place and to subvert eviction and that their embeddedness in an organization influences their ability to subvert eviction.

Cross (1998a) found street traders in Mexico City form several organizations of varying size; they compete with one another to secure prime location. Competition between street trader leaders²⁹ provides members with the opportunity to vote with their feet if leaders do not fulfil their interest. Similarly, leaders shift their allegiance when a political agent or field bureaucrat fails to fulfil their demands. Thus, the presence of several competing organizations rather than affecting street traders' bargaining power provide them with more space for manoeuvring their patrons. However, he also suggests that leaders' have uneven bargaining power with their patrons and their power is influenced by the size of their organization. In other words, a leader's ability to mobilize resources viz., skills and time to mobilize street traders and build connections with political parties affects their ability to secure prime trading locations for their organization.

Cross and Pena (2006:53) differentiates street traders' organizations into four types viz., the lassiez-faire model; the government regulatory model; social-institutional model and the mafia-regulatory model and concludes that socio-institutional model, are more effective in negotiating with their patrons and the State. These are membership organizations and are incorporated into party structures, which provide space for vendors to manoeuvre the state. Similar findings relating to differences between street traders' organizations in their forms and in their effectiveness are reported by other studies (Shrestha 2006; Brown 2006³⁰).

Cross's study focus is not on the role of H&CN. Nevertheless, it illustrates the influence of patron-client ties on street traders' organizations. Such ties are described as 'vertical networks' (Auyero 1999) and can be differentiated from traders' horizontal networks,

which emerge between agents in similar situation. It is difficult to infer from the evidence in his study (1998a) about the specific ways in which street traders' or their leaders draw on their horizontal networks. Findings in several studies on collective action and movements show that these ties influence organizational process in three ways; members' enrolment, socialization, and alliance building (Diani and McAdam 2003; Gould 2003; Passy 2003; Purkayastha and Subramaniam 2004).

It is also difficult to infer about street traders relationship with various types of non-state agents, particularly with those in the local economy from the studies by Cross and Macharia. Findings in some studies suggest this is in fact a significant aspect (Bromley 1978; Neward and Woolward 2000; Seligmann 2004; Skinner 1998; Varcin 2000) and that it varies in different wards of a city (Bandyopadhyay 2009). Hence it will be useful to explore whether street traders draw on the support of non-state agents in different localities in a city? If so, what are their characteristics? Do already-existing ties influence traders' ability to enlist their support? When and why do non-state agents support street traders?

Studies by Cross, Shrestha and Brown together with Macharia, Crossa, and Lazar show that street traders' strategies to claim places and their organizational forms vary in a city and across different cities. In addition, they suggest different explanations for the differences observed between street traders' in their ability to claim places for their trade viz., traders' embeddedness in organizations and their ability to draw on social networks.

In the Indian context, Jagnathan (1987) suggests that traders' find their places on their own; while Singh (2000) notes of four types of street-traders organizations in Mumbai in India viz., informal coalitions formed for a specific purpose; organizations created by a leader; affiliates of a trade union and political parties. However, it is not clear from his study whether their organizational forms affect street traders' ability to claim a place, as suggested by Cross and Pena (2006) and the extent to which they draw on their H&CNs.

In light of the above-mentioned disagreements and gaps in the literature, the question arises: 'Do intra-city differences between street traders in claiming a place for fixed place trade arise due to the influence of H&CNs? If so, why? If not, what are the alternative explanations?

2.3.3 Strategies and the Use of Networks to Occupy Places

Bayat (1997) argues that street traders encroach on public places individually and quietly for their trade. Their process of finding a place is characterized by ‘quiet, atomised and prolonged mobilisation...’ (1997:7). New migrants dominate urban street trading, and they have either no or weak ties in the city. Their ability to find a fixed trading place is determined by their knowledge of the city and their willingness to take risks. Further, he suggests that street traders mobilise for collective action only when they face a threat of eviction. Until such time, they encroach on their own in the contexts controlled by authoritarian politics and they negotiate their access to public spaces through their patrons in democracies.

Similarly, Seligmann suggests that street traders’ spatial knowledge, – that is, their knowledge of how space is organized and when it could be (re)occupied – affect their ability to find new spaces, while Dasgupta (1992) sees the difference between migrants and native street traders in an Indian city in terms of the reliance on vertical networks. Migrants draw on their ethnic ties with wholesale traders to enter trade and to secure place, capital and merchandise, while natives have to rely on their own resources. Hence natives form organizations and unions to negotiate with wholesale traders to negotiate for prices. It is difficult to understand from this study how natives negotiated for their places.

Street traders in some cities inherited (Pratt 2006), rented or purchased their trading places (Brown 2005b; Garcia-Rincon 2007; Sharma 2004), suggesting that ‘quiet encroachment’ (Bayat 1997; 2000) may be just one strategy used to find places. Further, Brown (2006) found a wide variety of claims to a space in agglomerations where there are different daily time cycles of street trade.

The work of Bayat, Garcia, Brown and Sharma and the studies reviewed above in 2.3.2 show a disagreement in relation to strategies used by street traders. Bayat argues that street traders’ are completely excluded from the state in Tehran, but in the Indian context their relationship with the state is complex, and marked by selective inclusion and exclusion. Therefore, the relevance of his theory to the Indian context remains to be established. With the exception of Dasgupta (1998) and Jaganathan (1987), the other studies reviewed here are from non-Indian contexts, and have only limited applicability to the situation of Bangalore.

2.3.4 Strategies and the Use of Networks to Subvert³¹ Eviction

There are two broad approaches in the studies of how street traders subvert eviction; these are everyday forms of resistance (Scott 1985, 1987) and collective action. However, there are disagreements over the significance of particular strategies, in relation to subversive actions on the one hand and engagement with the state on the other. These studies have also inadequately considered the role of networks.

Covert or Overt Action?

Findings in some studies suggests that street traders predominantly resorted to a variety of strategies that are quiet, covert and subtle (Ledula 2002; Pratt 2006; Singermen 1995; Tripp 1989, 1997). Covert strategies are aimed at subverting state actions by stealth (Benjamin 2000), or pre-empt it by tapping into contradictions within the state's rules (Razzaz 1994, 1998). These strategies draw on traders' 'spatial routines³² and relationships' (Seligmann 2004; Stillerman 2006).

Scott (1985,1987) and Tripp (1997) argue that overt protest constitutes a small part of the strategies used by informal economic agents to subvert state rules, and that the dominant emphasis on organized confrontational politics in the literature has masked the importance of covert or quiet forms of subversion that do not have a discernible form of organization. Other studies, however, show that street traders engage in organized collective action at a local level to stall evictions (Cross 1998, 2006 (see above); Evers 2000; Seligmann 2004): they form associations, unions and federations in some cities to bargain with wholesale traders and the state (Bandyopadhyay 2009; Bromley 1978a; Babb 1989, 2001; Dasgupta 1992; Lazar 2007; Seligmann 2001, 2004). Further, alliances between various networks of street traders and associations are often fluid (Nagar and Leitner 1998; Seligmann 2004). Seligmann (2001, 2004) argues that while location, identity and trade are among the factors that influence street traders' organization, it is difficult to predetermine the trajectory of their influence.

Critiquing the theories of organized collective action, Bayat (1997) argues that street traders' subversive actions manifest as episodic conflicts that are 'shaped [by] the physical and social spaces of the street' or as 'street politics'. These spontaneous protests (Bayat 1997, 2000) are characterized by an absence of organization or leader; but they

are also a way for providing visibility and an identity for engaging with the state. This visibility catalyses other agents in the locality with grievances over the state to join the protests. Their ability to disrupt the functioning of the city via such protests constitutes a key weapon with which to attract the attention of the state (Auyero 2006). Contentious politics which takes the forms of riots or street protests, arise in democratic contexts when clients are excluded from patron's networks or when their patrons are not able to or willing to intervene on their behalf (Gay 2006; Shefner, 2006).

Gooptu (2001) suggests that the mass mobilization of informal economic agents along the lines of caste, religion and ethnicity has emerged in India. Recently, there have been other attempts to mobilize street traders in some Indian cities (Bhowmik 2005, 2007). An example is the NASVI formed in 1998, which is a coalition of trade unions and voluntary organizations working for street vendors spread all over India discussed in the earlier chapter³³.

Discussions relating to traders' strategies and their effectiveness have predominantly emphasised *either* the "everyday forms of politics" or the "collective action". In contrast, few studies show that street traders in a city engage simultaneously in different forms of actions (Crossa (2009) and traders' strategies differ according to their relationship with the State and political parties (Bandyopadhyay 2009; Etemadi 2004; Nnkya 2006).

Evidence from a few studies suggests that informal social networks play a complex role in subversive actions by street traders. One view is that such networks constrain the emergence of large-scale collective action and hence the ability to subvert eviction (Appadurai 2001; Schrumann 1989; Seligmann 2001). Other evidence suggests that social networks provide an avenue for negotiating quietly, mobilizing for collective action (Singermen 1995; Seligmann 2001); but also for connecting with the state (Macharia 1997). There is also disagreement about the forms and scale of street traders' subversive actions.

Besides their engagement in political action, both squatter dwellers and street traders resort to the judiciary to protect their interests relating to location (Brown 2006; Etemadi 2004; Bhan 2009). The poor in India used the Public Interest Litigations³⁴ (PIL) to subvert eviction during the decades of the seventies and the eighties (Rajamani 2007; Ramanathan 2004) but such spaces for manoeuvring eviction have reduced since the

nineties (Bhan (2009; Ramanathan 2004). Recent judgements³⁵ on several PIL cases relating to environmental protection, implementation of urban planning and development policies have led to the large scale eviction of squatters and street traders in Indian cities (Bhan, 2009). These judgements are by the Supreme Court of India and hence, have set the precedent for similar cases filed in the high courts and other smaller courts, through which street traders in cities like Bangalore seek to stall evictions. Moreover, post 1990s, the courts do not stop with issuing orders but extend their role to overseeing its implementation (Rajamani 2007). They have emerged as a parallel administrative and executive body over which both bureaucrats and politicians have limited influence. Consequently, a judgement in favour of eviction erodes the spaces that street traders' have to for manoeuvre evictions³⁶ through political representatives.

The strategies used by street traders in Bangalore to subvert eviction are not known, and with the exception of Benjamin (2000), the studies reviewed in this section examine subversion of eviction in African or Latin American cities, and Benjamin's study does not have a specific focus on street traders. Gooptu (2001) and Dasgupta (1992) have explored the circumstances of informal economic agents in other Indian cities, but their studies were undertaken prior to the introduction of neo-liberal urban policies in 1991. Although Bandyopadhyay work is on street traders in Calcutta in India, its political context differs from Bangalore. The Left party dominates the state politics in Calcutta and it has a history of organizing street traders' to form unions; whereas, regional parties dominate in Bangalore, and, each party is constituted of several competing coalitions (Manor 2000). Moreover, the poor in Bangalore maintain their connections simultaneously with more than one party (Benjamin et.al, 2001). Further there is a disagreement over the influence of social networks on street traders' organization in the studies by Seligmann, Singermen, Macharia, Appadurai and Schrumann. Moreover, Mische (2003) argues that agents are embedded in more than one network and that their relationships in each of them influence their patterns of drawing on these networks at a particular time. It is therefore useful to explore not only whether and how street traders use their networks in subversive actions, but also how network relationships influence their decisions relating to engagement in subversive action and their alliances.

With the state's priorities for urban planning and development now shifting, there is a need for new research on the following topics: (i) the nature of the threat faced by street traders in different wards; and (ii) the form of their subversive actions and how networks

are used. This needs to be known in order to assess street traders' ability to subvert evictions in Bangalore.

Engagement with the State: Scales of State and the Use of Networks

There is a disagreement in the studies under review about street traders' engagement with different scales of state in their strategies to subvert eviction. Findings in some studies suggest that street traders evicted from their trading places do not enter into any negotiation with the state and that they re-occupy their spaces once the state reduces its surveillance (Bayat 1997, 2000; Tripp 1997). By contrast, other studies show that street traders engage with either the local (Benjamin 2000; Lazar 2007; Seligmann 2004) and/or higher scales of the state (Bandyopadhyay 2009³⁷; Garcia 2007; Hansen 2004; Macharia 1997; Stillerman 2006) in negotiating and subverting evictions initiated by the local state (Macharia 1997; Hansen 2004).

Benjamin (2000) argues that poor and non-poor groups' engage with the state(s) through different circuits. While the former forge alliances with field bureaucrats and elected representatives to lobby the local government, non-poor groups engage with senior bureaucrats at the local and higher scales of the State. Tripp (1997) and Bayat (1997) assume street traders are totally excluded from the state, and Cross (1997, 2006) analysis focus on traders' relationship with the local state.

In fact, however, the use of space and its development is regulated by a multitude of institutions³⁸ in cities, of which the municipal government is only one (Benjamin 2000, 2008; Pinto 2000). Besides, the responsibility for street trading is split between different departments within the local or the municipal government (Brown 2005). Moreover, the project for transforming the cities of the South into a global arena is being implemented through new institutional arrangements and laws controlled by higher scales³⁹ of governments (Benjamin *et al.* 2006, 2008; Hansen 2004). Thus, conflicts relating to place are played out in different geographical locations and political levels (Brenner 2000), and street traders may have to engage with different types and scales of states, with differing impacts on their ability to subvert eviction and therefore influencing their politics and alliances⁴⁰ for negotiating with the state. There is a gap in information on this subject, and this study focuses on questions of both whether and

‘where, who, when and how’ (Corbridge 2005), as well as which aspects of the state street traders engage with in processes to negotiate eviction.

2.3.5 Factors Influencing Differences: Role of Trade, Threat and Networks

Bayat (1997) suggests that the nature of a trade influences street traders’ decision to locate in a fixed place or to trade itinerantly. In contrast, Dasgupta (1992) has found that street traders’ decision to enter a particular type of trade and location is not linear. For example, one group of traders in an Indian city decided on their location and then entered trade, while another group decided on their trade first. Moreover, the choice of trade and location among some street traders was influenced by the support they received from their horizontal and vertical networks embedded in trade. Further Jaganathan (1987) and Brown (2006) argue that fixed place traders’ decide on their place based on calculations of competition and the costs of a place (i.e., user fee, bribes, transport costs).

Besides the disagreement between Bayat, Jaganathan, Brown and Dasgupta about the role of networks as a factor influencing traders’ decisions, these studies have a weakness in that they do not explore street traders’ own views on location and the factors that influence their choice in selecting their current locations. Dasgupta’s study is about street traders in Calcutta, while Bayat has studied Tehran; Brown and Leduka explored the views of street traders in the cities in Nepal and Africa respectively. Setsabi (2006) notes that several studies mention about street traders’ preferences on location (for example: Brown 2006; Brown and Lloyd-Jones 2002; Dierwechter, 2002; Harrison and McVey 1997; Skinner, 1999; Yankson, 2000), but do not explain traders’ reasons for their preferences. Thus, there is a gap in information about the views of street traders in Bangalore. Therefore, this study focuses on street traders’ perceptions on fixed place trading and their reasons for selecting their current location.

According to Tripp, street traders are able to subvert eviction via covert strategies. The high cost of ensuring compliance influences the state to accommodate street traders and over time to change its policies towards street trading. On the other hand, Bayat (1997) argues that ‘street politics’ provides an avenue for street traders to air their grievances,

but that their ability to subvert eviction depends on a regime's willingness to accommodate street traders.

Several studies show that street traders in many cities tap into various types of political opportunities via localized collective action to subvert eviction (Bandyopadhyay 2009; Cross 1998; Crossa 2009; Etemadi, 2002, 2004; Fernandez-Kelly 2006; Garcia-Rincon 2007, Macharia 1997; Nnkya 2006). These include opportunities created by clientilistic politics, the co-option of field bureaucrats, and taking advantage of both contradictory rules and practices between different state agencies, and disputes between landowners.

Appadurai (2001) argues that to subvert contemporary threats it is now necessary to mobilize the poor across cities, due to the new forms of governmentality underpinning the strategies for urban development (Appadurai 2001; Leitner et al 2007; Ghosh 2005). In his view, localized collective action and clientelism constrain the emergence of mass movements, and NGOs play an important role in building these horizontal alliances. Similarly, Middleton (2003) suggests that weak alliances between street traders' organizations in Quito city enabled the Mayor to divide traders' and evict them out of the city centre.

Seligmann (2004) caution against predetermining the process outcome based on the scale of a movement. Further, women traders depend on the male leaders of labour unions to negotiate with the local state (Seligmann 2004; Lazar 2004). They had less of a voice in the union, and this affected their chances of securing a better location (Lazar 2007).

Thus there is disagreement between Tripp, Bayat, and Cross, Etemadi, Appadurai and other studies reviewed in this section about the influence of various strategies – in terms of scale, forms of action and alliances – over the ability of street traders to subvert eviction. Critiques of everyday forms of resistance argue that such tactics are not useful to guarantee stable access for street traders in contemporary times, while proponents note that large scale collective action rarely emerges among street traders, but even so the state has not managed to erase street trading. It is also argued that social movement theories do not reflect the reality of power relations in the contexts where street traders operate (Bayat, 1997; Cross, 1998; Singermen 1995). Seligmann (2004) further cautions that the outcomes of localized collective action and social movements cannot be predetermined. Moreover, there is disagreement about the role of networks both in the

process of occupying places (for example, Macharia 1997), and in subverting eviction (see Appadurai, 2001; Macharia 1997; Seligmann 2004; and Singermen 1995). The available evidence suggests that in the latter case networks have a complex influence over on the process of mobilization and alliance building. Also, with the exception of Appadurai, these studies do not take into account the shifts in the nature of threats outlined above, and, there is a need for new evidence about the effectiveness of strategies and the role of networks as a catalyst or constraining factor.

Another question concerns street traders' engagement in various forms of subversive action and their ability to subvert eviction (Cross 1998a). Olson's (1971) theory suggests that affected individuals may be able to hold on to their resources without engaging in collective action. By contrast, Cross (1998a) argues that there are limited opportunities for free-riding, as street traders negotiate with the state through their organizations. Those who were not part of any organization or members who did not engage in collective action found it difficult to secure places. The relevance of these observations to Bangalore has not been researched before.

Hence, in order to examine the subject fully, this study explores the nature of the threats faced by street traders and the political opportunities they have to subvert them, and it examines the extent of street trader agency: that is, whether and how street traders' strategies influence their ability to tap into these opportunities. It also considers the experience of those who do not engage in any forms of subversive action and the outcome of this.

2.3.6 Conclusion

This section has reviewed studies concerning street traders' strategies for claiming places. It has identified a disagreement about the factors influencing differences between street traders in terms of their ability to claim places, and in particular over the role of H&CNs. There are several aspects to this disagreement: (i) strategies used by street traders to occupy and subvert eviction and the outcome; (ii) the use of networks in their strategies; (iii) the types of network; and (iv) the influence of networks on street traders' decisions to enter fixed-place trading or to locate in particular places in a city, and their ability to subvert contemporary threats.

2.4 A Framework for Conceptualizing Differences

This study argues for an inductive approach to the research questions under consideration. While many studies considered for this review show that opportunities for street traders to claim places in cities are created through clientelism, two broad emphases have been suggested to explain differences between them in their ability to tap into such opportunities: these concern street traders' embeddedness in an organization (Cross 1998a, 2006) and that of their social networks (Singermen 1995 and Seligmann 2001). However, the relevance of either of these frameworks for Bangalore could not be determined before field-work was undertaken, and disagreements remain about street traders' strategies. Therefore this study drew on the grounded theory strategy to develop the conceptual framework presented in this section.

2.4.1 Embeddedness in Organizations and of Social Networks

Evidence in the studies by Cross (1998) and Cross and Pena (2006) suggests that street traders' embeddedness in an organization affect their ability to claim prime places for fixed-place trading. Drawing on 'Resource Mobilization theory' (RMT), Cross (1998a) illustrates that organization is vital for street traders' to utilize the political opportunities created by clientelism. RMT argues that individuals engage in actions through **formal organizations** to secure resources (McCarthy and Zald 1987) and that the role of a leader is central to a group to establish control over actual and potential resources. Although findings in Cross (1998a, 2006) suggests differences between street traders' organizations in their ability to mobilize resources, the focus of his study was not on the factors influencing such differences.

An alternative explanation is that social networks fulfils the roles of an organization (Singermen 1995) and that its embeddedness in household and ethnic community domains is a factor influencing the differences between street traders in their ability to negotiate their claims on places (see Seligmann 2001 and other studies on informal markets reviewed in section in 2.3.2. Consequently, street traders' invest in expanding and maintaining their networks to tap opportunities and to spread their risks. Singermen builds on Scott's (1985, 1987) theory of 'everyday forms of resistance'.

The relevance of either of the two frameworks to explain street traders' phenomenon in Bangalore could not be ascertained prior to the field work for several reasons. One, as the discussion in 2.3.2 and 2.3.3 show there are contextual differences relating to the strategies used by street traders' and their organizational forms ⁴¹ (as shown in section 2.3.2, 2.3.3 and 2.3.4). The limited evidence shows that the poor in Bangalore forge informal coalitions with one another but do not always formalize their relationship (Benjamin and Bhuvaneswari, 2001). Although Singermen's theory emphasises the role of social networks, the use of networks by street traders' in Bangalore and its types, in their processes of claiming places is not known. Two, unlike in the city researched by Cross, traders in Bangalore are not incorporated into the party structures. Singermen's research is on Cairo, which is characterized by an authoritarian political milieu. Inter-city differences in the political contexts can influence variations in the strategies used by street traders' (Bandyopadhyay 2009). Three, it is difficult to infer from Cross's study about the specific ways in which clients' horizontal networks influenced their participation in organizations. For example, a leaders' network portfolio may influence their ability to enrol members in their organization. Moreover, contextual as well as temporal differences relating to the nature of threats and the types or scales of states involved may also affect street traders' opportunities to claim public places. Four, the studies by Cross and Singermen are limited to the experience of street traders in a single ward of a city, usually the city centre ward. Such an approach misses the differences in opportunity structures across different wards of a city which result from the variation in local political and economic process, social groups, and the nature of threats (see Robinson 2000; Benjamin 2000). Further, street traders' engagement in contentious politics suggests that they make use of different types of opportunities in addition to political clientelism.

Finally, due to the lack of information specific to Bangalore, this study employs an inductive approach and adopts a grounded theoretical strategy. In the trajectory of place claims, street traders negotiate occupation during normal times, and evictions represent a specific moment of crisis. Moreover, social networks are embedded in everyday life, an understanding their role necessitates a focus on everyday practices and street traders' relationships. The four themes of disagreements and gaps identified in Section 2.3.6 were used as a framework to guide the field research and their findings are elaborated in chapters five to eight. The following section outlines a conceptual framework developed from these findings.

2.4.2 Embeddedness in Locales and the ability to Tap Locality Specific Political Opportunities

As Cross (1998) argues in relation to the Mexican context, this study too found that despite the attempts by land owners to reclaim their land from street traders, street trading continues to thrive in the case study wards in Bangalore (see chapter 4). However, the processes by which street traders' in Bangalore established their claims on land differs from those found by Cross in Mexico City. These differences relate to the strategies used by street traders, the state and the non-state agents influencing their process and their organizational forms. As shown below, social networks substituted for organizations in Bangalore. Moreover, this study found differences between street traders in Bangalore in terms of their ability to find a place in agglomerations, and to subvert eviction (see chapters 4 and 7). Therefore, this study builds on Singermen's theory on social networks and draws on other concepts developed by Razzaz (1994), Giddens (1985) and Moore (1973) to explain the differences observed between traders' in terms of their ability to claim place for their trade.

This thesis argues that street traders 'embeddedness' in the social-spatial structures of a ward, which is conceptualized as a 'semi-autonomous locales' is useful to infer about street traders' ability to mobilize resources (i.e., networks) as well as draw on them to occupy prime locations and to subvert eviction. The key aspects of the framework shown in figure 2.1 are as follows: (i) plurality of place control relating to both mechanisms and agents (Razzaz, 1994); (ii) social networks as an organizational resource for street traders' political actions (Singermen 1995); (iii) agents embeddedness in the semi-autonomous social fields (Moore 1973) of locales (Giddens 1985; and its influence on network relationship and resource exchange.




Figure 2-1 Conceptual Framework

Patterns of Control in Locales and Street Traders' Claims

There is a 'plurality of control' (Razzaz 1994), in relation to the use of places in everyday life in each ward; controllers include agents embedded in the everyday state (Fuller and Harris 2001), other users, land owners, and state institutions who intervene in land development at certain moments. Their characteristics and their influence differ

across the place and time as illustrated by their role in street traders' process to occupy places and to subvert eviction discussed in Chapters Five and Six. Therefore, as shown in fig.2.1, a distinction is made between controllers, who influence street traders' process in every day henceforth referred to as EDCs ('everyday controllers⁴²') and those that intervene at specific moments through development interventions or DCs, (the development controllers)

Ties with EDCs influence street traders' ability to capture places in their agglomerations in each ward, as can be seen from the discussions in Chapters Five and Seven. Land and property ownership in the places occupied by street traders, and historical and contemporary governance of land, influence the patterns of everyday control in each ward.

The role of EDCs differs during the processes by which agglomeration traders subvert/negotiate everyday conflicts and evictions stemming from urban development pressures. Perceptions of the severity of threat among street traders, together with their relationships and overlap of interests with various controllers or intermediaries in each ward, influences street traders' strategies for subverting the threat of eviction, as can be seen from the discussions in Chapter Six and Section 7.2. Here, the role of DCs is significant, and street traders tap into a variety of ward-specific political opportunities to shift their stance (see Section 7.2). Their tacit accommodation of street trading leads to further negotiations at the ward level about the use of place, between different networks of street traders or between them and intermediaries. Such moments are also used by intermediaries and EDCs, to (re)negotiate terms of support. Further, alliances between street traders' networks, intermediaries and controllers are fluid and differ across the wards, and the boundaries between the role of an intermediary and controllers are sometimes blurred. The relationship between these agents varies in each ward and is a complex bundle of exchanges, conflicts, domination, and subversion as observed by Auyero (2001) in the context of Peronist clientelist networks. A difference in Bangalore from the context studied by Auyero, is that the relationship between networks differ across the case study wards and a clear distinction between patrons and clients is difficult at times as agents (for eg. trader leaders or their political alliances) simultaneously occupy different positions in different networks, which render the fluidity of their power.

A focus at the ward level is useful to map the patterns of *spatial control and relationships* in everyday life. This approach of focussing on patterns of control and controllers at the ward level departs from those in previous studies of street traders, which have a predominant emphasis either on the agency of atomized street traders (Bayat 1997) or on their organization (Cross 1998a,b, Cross and Pena 2006) to negotiate with a unitary state, that is, the local state at the city level (Seligmann 2004; Garcia 2007; Crossa 2009). An underlying assumption is that the state is unitary; the only agent controlling the use and development of place and that their interventions are uniform across a city. Another assumption is that street traders occupy locations with a similar tenure status in each ward and that the dynamics of their spatial conflicts is uniform across the wards.

By contrast, this study has found inter-ward differences in relation to the characteristics of controllers (see also Chapter Four), their role during the two processes (see Chapters Five and Six), the nature of external pressures of urban development, and the factors influencing control patterns. Street traders' spatial conflicts manifest in different places and spaces discursively, and power relationships between the various network nodes also differ in and across the wards. More recent studies have illustrated the role of different levels and spaces on street traders' processes for subverting eviction (Stillerman 2006). However, these overlook temporal variations in the role of the state and non-state agents, in relation to place use and development. Distinction between legal/illegal or formal/informal are of limited value, as the rights and the legitimacy of state and non-state controllers is derived from different sources: cultural practices, and the interaction of historical and contemporary state laws, all of which are acknowledged to different degrees by the modern state. Moreover, place claims including those defined by the state, are, by their very nature, contested (Razzaz 1994).

Strategies⁴³ of negotiating with controllers : Networked Non-Compliance

Street traders' used a variety of strategies to negotiate everyday control and development control in their processes to occupy place or subvert eviction, as shown in Chapters Five and Six. To effectively both negotiate and control a contested resource, in this context a place, a group requires an organization to appropriate, use, and/or exchange the resources amongst themselves (Ostrom 1990). Networks provide the organizational

context for street traders, to negotiate with controllers and intermediaries as well as amongst themselves in their processes of claiming places (see Chapters Five and Six), as found by Singermen (1995) in the Middle Eastern context, and street-trading agglomerations. Therefore, building on the theories of Singermen, 1995 and Razzaz, 1994, it is argued that the lens of networked- non-compliance is useful to conceptualise street traders' strategies for claiming places. Both Singermen and Razzaz developed their concepts to explain political actions to claim resources or land in Middle Eastern cities; this thesis found the relevance of these concepts to explain street traders' phenomenon in a democratic context, i.e., Bangalore.

Differences: Mobilizing Networks to Tap Locality specific opportunities

As shown in Chapter Seven, differences between street traders in their ability to mobilize horizontal and/or vertical networks, affects their ability to tap into a variety of locality specific political opportunities. Such opportunities are created by a variety of processes including strategic location of a ward, political clientelism, perceptions and conventions related to use of public places, everyday trade and politics to negotiate with controllers and intermediaries. The ability to make bonds and connections both horizontally and vertically as well as to draw on these flexibly⁴⁴ influences power relations amongst street traders, and between them and intermediaries and controllers.

Embeddedness in Locales and the Ability to Mobilize Networks

In the literature on informal commerce (Seligmann 2002), differences between agents in their ability to draw on networks are alluded to the role of H&CNs. As shown in chapter 8, findings relating to the types of networks used by agglomeration traders demonstrate that while H&CNs constitute an important political and economic space for mobilizing resources for everyday trade, it is not the only space where they negotiate for their places. This is evidenced by the spaces and places where agglomeration traders negotiate for subverting development threats (Chapter Six) and the types of networks used by agglomeration traders in their processes of capturing places or subverting eviction.

The manner in which *networks* – street traders, intermediaries and controllers – are embedded in socio-spatial structures and relations in each ward influences the interdependencies and transactions among these agents, as shown in Sections 9.2.1–9.2.3. This affects street traders' non-compliance strategies – both their forms of alliances. Inter-ward differences in relation to socio-spatial structures and the manner in which external events impact on them at different moments influences the specific forms of interdependencies in each ward and the differences in the use of H&CNs among agglomeration traders.

Unlike the communitarian notion of a ward or localities, which defines them as bounded places shaped by social relations and in opposition to macro-processes, processes specific to each ward are neither spatially nor temporally totally autonomous. Moreover street-trading and the use and development of places in general are shaped by both socio-spatial structures and relations. These aspects of agglomeration traders' network portfolios determine their ability to mobilize their networks to claim their trading places, as shown in Chapters Seven (Section 1), Eight, and Nine (Section 2).

The framework of *locales* (Giddens 2000) captures the mutual influence of a ward's spatial and social structures and relations. Moreover, agents and wards are a *semi-autonomous social field*; an SASF is a network of *socio-spatial relations* that 'can generate rules, customs and symbols internally, but that... is vulnerable to rules and decisions and other forces emanating from the larger world by which it is surrounded... which can and does affect and invade it' (Moore 1973: 721). It is defined by its '...processual characteristics' (Moore 1973: 722), which can be analysed as densely interconnected, interdependent relationships and exchanges, governed by rules – some of them legal and others not. For example, development threats faced by agglomeration traders stem from the dominant political-economic force in the city and nation at a particular time, as described in Chapter Four. Similarly, interdependencies and exchanges between network nodes – street traders, intermediaries and controllers – are influenced not only by their relationship to one another, but also by their embeddedness in other relationships/fields and therefore competing interests. Moreover, controllers' legitimacy and street traders' strategies to negotiate control draw on both historical and contemporary practices and processes.

Further, Moore (1973) suggests that within a locale there may be several SASFs. For example, street traders in each scale, type or location in a ward may each constitute a field. Formal traders may constitute another field. Many such fields in a locale communicate with one another 'to form complex chains, rather the way social networks of individuals, when attached to each other (form) unending chains. The interdependent articulation of many fields constitutes a basic characteristic of complex societies (Moore 1973: 722). In other words, differences between street traders in their ability to mobilize resources – in this case, networks – and deploy them, can be explained by a focus on their and their networks' embeddedness in an SASF.

2.5 Conclusion

This chapter has reviewed relevant studies in the literature sets on informality as it relates to economy, the anthropology of informal markets, to the politics of land occupation and development. It has shown that despite the visibility of street trade, its dominance, and street traders' conflict with the city in relation to place, there is limited research on the spatial organisation of street trading and its attendant politics. Further, the reviewed evidence has shown that there are differences between street traders in their ability to claim fixed places. There is gap in explaining the factors influencing such differences. This study therefore addresses the question: 'Why are there intra-city differences between street traders in claiming places from their fixed-place trading?

As noted above, this study employs an inductive approach to the research question; the applicability of existing frameworks could not be ascertained prior to fieldwork due to limited research on the phenomenon as seen in Bangalore. As the interest of this research is to explore the role of social networks, the research focuses on the influence of everyday practices and relationships on street traders' processes for claiming places.

The review has also identified a need to explore the role of social networks embedded in H&CN domains (see 2.3) as a factor influencing these differences. In unpacking this question, the focus will be on the strategies used by street traders to find and occupy their places and subsequently, the outcomes of efforts to negotiate or subvert eviction. In this context, the following themes have been identified for further research: (i) the use of networks among street traders in the process of occupying places and subverting eviction

(examined in Chapters Five and Six); (ii) role of networks in influencing differences, specifically as related to the decision of street traders to locate in various types of street trading locations and to their responses to different types of threat (examined in Chapter Seven); and (iii) the embeddedness of networks used by fixed-place street traders (examined in Chapter Eight). Findings of field research indicate the relevance of building on the concepts developed by Singermen (1995), Razzaz (1994) together with Giddens (1985) and Moore (1973), in contexts outside India and in relation to other forms of political process.

3 Research Methodology and Methods

3.1 Introduction

This chapter situates the research process in the context of both the research methodology, defined as ‘a way of thinking about and studying social phenomena’ (Corbin and Strauss 2008: 1), and the research methods, ‘the techniques and procedures used to collect and analyse data’ (Corbin and Strauss 2008: 1). The sections that follow set out the reasons for the choice of research methodology, which in this case is qualitative research informed by social constructivism and a grounded theory strategy, and overview the actual methods used. The final sections consider the validity and reliability of the research findings and issues related to ethics and safety.

This chapter illustrates the iterativeness of the research process, in contrast to the neat, linear descriptions in many other qualitative texts. A number of studies (Ritchie and Spencer 2003; Huberman and Miles 1994; Lincoln and Guba 2000; Denzin and Lincoln 2000; Bauer and Gaskell 2000) have highlighted the ‘messiness’ of qualitative data and the iterativeness of data analysis, although these works also suggest a linear process of a pre-determined data collection strategies followed by data analysis. By contrast, data collection and analysis overlaps in the generation of grounded theories (Strauss and Corbin 1998). As observed by Glaser (1978: 2), generating ‘theory and doing research [are] parts of the same process’ and, the sensitivity of the research topic and the field conditions described in 3.2, resulted in disjunctions and tensions in the process of data collection. Consequently, there was a need for an open-ended approach, developing topic guides to aid data collection as the research proceeded, rather than a pre-planned set of questionnaires. The social constructivist paradigm informing this study implies that theories are co-constructed by the research participants and the researcher. Finally, theories generated by grounded theory are ‘emergent’ middle range theories, which have analytical rather than statistical validity. Their contribution to knowledge is in terms of the conceptual frameworks generated from the data.

3.2 Research Methodology

3.2.1 Qualitative and Quantitative Research

The aim of this research is to conceptualize the role of networks in relation to the phenomenon of intra-city differences between street traders’ ability to chose their

trading places. Its focus is on 'process': the experience and the manner in which social relations shape their experience.

Quantitative research methodology is normally associated with questions related to measurement, such as distribution, frequency and amount, whilst qualitative methods are often associated with that of processes, relationships and discursive practices (Bauer and Gaskell 2000; Denzin and Lincoln 2000; Strauss and Corbin 1998). The latter allows for the construction of knowledge from subjective and multiple realities as well as from multiple representations of reality (Denzin and Lincoln 2000). Further, it takes into account that a researcher may carry his/her own identity baggage into a situation and that this can have an influence on knowledge construction. The nature of this inquiry, focussing on process, practices, events and relationships among street traders, led to the decision to use qualitative methods.

3.2.2 The Research Paradigm: Social Constructivism

There are four paradigms within the qualitative research tradition: positivism, post-positivism, critical theory and constructivism (Lincoln and Guba 2000). This particular study uses the constructivist paradigm, regarding theories and concepts as 'multiple constructions' – 'constructed by the research out of stories that are constructed by research participants... trying to explain or make sense of their stories to themselves' (Corbin and Strauss 2008: 10). It is inductive in nature and draws upon local and specific constructions of reality. Although the research project explores the conceptual gaps identified from the literature review to aid with data collection and analysis, it is not concerned with the verification of hypotheses characteristic of positivist and post positivist approaches. Moreover, it differs from a critical theory approach in that it is underpinned by an assumption that both structures and agency are constituted through discourses and practices of multiple subjects located in different positions (Lincoln and Guba 2000).

3.2.3 Grounded Theory Strategy

This research project draws on the 'grounded theory strategy' developed by Glaser and Strauss (1967, 1968) and subsequently refined by Chamaraz (2001), Corbin and Strauss (2008) and Strauss and Corbin (1990 1998). It regards the world

[as a] complex [phenomenon]... events are the result of multiple factors coming together and interacting in complex and often unanticipated ways. Therefore, any methodology that attempts to understand experience and explain situations will have to be complex... and... experience must be... located within and can't be divorced from the larger events... [Methodology should not] reduce understanding to one... theoretical scheme'.

(Corbin and Strauss 2008: 8)

Thus, this strategy allows for an inductive construction of multiple realities, undergirding the social constructivist paradigm.

The use of grounded theory strategy is suggested for situations where a phenomenon has not been previously explored (Glaser and Strauss 1968). As noted, in Chapter 1, in contrast to the normal sequence of identifying a research question from the literature, the question addressed in this study evolved from field observations. I reviewed the literature during the first year of my PhD to seek examples from field observations, but instead I identified a gap in research about the proposed phenomenon in general, and as regards street traders in Bangalore in particular. Consequently, I decided to adopt a grounded theory strategy.

The essence of grounded theory is 'the generation of concepts from field data and mapping the "plausible relationship" between these concepts to explain the phenomenon' (Strauss and Corbin 1998: 278). Such theories are middle range theories, falling between a 'minor working hypothesis of every day life and the "all inclusive" grand theories' (Glaser and Strauss 1967: 33).

Glaser and Strauss distinguish between two levels of grounded theory; these are the formal and the substantive, based on the degree of abstraction. Substantive theory confines data collection and analysis to one main group; for instance, the process of occupying place by a street trader (Corbin and Strauss 2008). Formal theory, by contrast, evolves after a researcher has developed 'a comparative analysis of many different kinds of substantive cases which fall within the formal area' (Glaser and Strauss 1968: 33). The strength of formal theory depends on comparison in different situations for ensuring theoretical saturation.

Formal theory was generated by this research. This research was undertaken in the city of Bangalore, the capital of the state of Karnataka. Data collection and analysis involved comparing the phenomenon among street traders, trading in three types of perishable

goods (sub-groups) in different locations (situation 1) of a ward (situation 2) and across seven wards (situation 3) of the city.

3.2.4 The Use of Literature in Generating Grounded Theory

In contrast to research studies that seek to test a theory, studies seeking to develop a grounded theory enter into a dialogue with the literature. Corbin and Strauss (2008) list the following ways in which the literature can be used during different stages of the research process; it can be used to

- Enhance sensitivity about a particular phenomenon
- Generate questions for initial observations and interviews
- Suggest areas for theoretical sampling
- Stimulate questions during analysis
- Provide descriptive data, with little interpretation
- Be a source for theoretical comparison, comparing concepts in literature and those developed from the field, either to confirm findings or illustrate the departures.

I turned to the literature repeatedly during data collection and analysis, for a variety of reasons. Disagreements and debates identified in the first stage of my literature review were used as a starting point to ‘generate questions for... interviews’; that is, as topic guides for the first stage of fieldwork (see Appendix 1A). During the course of my field research and writing up, I continuously compared my findings with the patterns found in the literature, both to enhance my ‘sensitivity’ and to ‘stimulate questions’ during analysis and interpretation. Subsequently, I revisited the literature to refine the topic guide for the extended phase of field research. As can be seen from the previous chapter, there were many studies between 2004 and 2009 which consider the spatial process of street trade, and so I had to revisit the literature regularly. I used the framework developed by Kumar (2005) for ‘theoretical comparison’ to aid reflexive thinking about the data and the literature (Appendix 1C: Exhibit 3).

3.3 Research Method: Data Collection and Analysis for Generating Concepts

This section discusses the techniques used for data gathering and analysis. In order to generate a formal theory, this study was designed as a multiple embedded collective case study (Yin 1994). Researchers seeking to develop grounded theory resort to the ‘techniques of ‘theoretical sampling’ and ‘constant comparative analysis’ for generating ‘rich concepts’ from the data and to ensure ‘theoretical saturation’ of a particular concept’ (Glaser and Strauss 1967). Further, in the light of the lack of information available for the topic here under consideration, it was difficult to have a blueprint for data collection and analysis prior to the field research. Hence, following the method used in the literature, the field research was undertaken in two phases (Glaser and Strauss 1968; Strauss and Corbin 1998).

3.3.1 Multiple Embedded Collective Case Studies

The strength of a grounded theory depends upon the richness of the categories adopted and their properties as generated from the data (Strauss and Corbin 1994). Richness can be achieved through the comparison of the same phenomenon in many different situations and/or comparison of dis-similar phenomenon (Glaser and Strauss 1967). Hence, this research project was designed as ‘multiple embedded collective case studies’ (Yin 1994: 52), in order to facilitate the comparison of the phenomenon of street traders’ locations and strategies to occupy places and to subvert eviction.

A case study is defined as ‘...an empirical enquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real life context’ (Yin 1994: 13). Yin argues that in choosing the case study strategy, three criteria need to be taken into consideration. These are: (i) research questions which ask how or why; (ii) events over which the researcher has no control; and (iii) the extent to which the phenomenon is contemporary. The proposed research question fulfilled all three criteria.

Stake (1994, 2000) identifies two types of case studies: the instrumental case and the collective case. An instrumental case study involves an examination of a particular case to ‘...provide insight into an issue or refinement of a theory. The case here is of secondary interest... [and] plays a facilitating role in understanding something else’ (Stake 1994: 237). Even so, the case is often looked at in depth, its context scrutinized

and its ordinary activities detailed in order to understand a particular phenomenon under consideration. The collective case study is the ‘...instrumental study extended to several cases’.

Yin distinguishes four types of case study based on units of analysis: the single holistic case; the multiple holistic case; the single embedded case; and the multiple embedded case. Simply put, a holistic case study has a single unit of analysis and an embedded case study has multiple units. As the purpose of this research project is to theorise intra-city patterns that relate street traders processes of securing various types of location in different wards with differences in their political-economies, it was designed as a ‘multiple embedded collective case study’ (Yin 1994: 52).

The unit of analysis in this study is a ward, defined by the administrative boundaries of the city or local government. As explained in Chapter Four, Bangalore Metropolitan Area is governed by different types of local government (Ruet 2002). Seven wards were chosen for this study; in each ward, as set out below, data collection and analysis concerned the experience of street traders selling three types of perishable goods from different types of location. These wards are: KR Market in the city centre, Basavangudi (BG), JNGR Ninth Block and JNGR Fourth Block wards in the inner periphery, and the wards of HAL, KR Puram and Varathur in the outer periphery.

3.3.2 Theoretical Sampling of Cases

Curtis *et al.* (2000: 1012) note that a ‘simple blueprint for qualitative sampling could not be imagined as each case study requires a specific strategy’. There are three broad approaches to sampling in qualitative research: purposive sampling (Miles and Huberman 1994; Denzin and Lincoln 2000), theoretical sampling (Corbin and Strauss 2008); and corpus construction (Bauer and Gaskell 2000). Glaser and Strauss (1967) advocate theoretical sampling for grounded theory strategies. The three approaches share some similarities. Cases are selected for their conceptual or analytical usefulness rather than statistical validity. A researcher seeks out categories and sites where the process under consideration is most likely to be found (Denzin and Lincoln 2000; Corbin and Strauss 2008). Samples are not wholly pre-specified prior to field research (Curtis *et al.* 2000; Miles and Huberman 1994; Glaser and Strauss 2008). A key difference between

theoretical sampling and other approaches is the former's emphasis on the comparison of concepts rather than the exhaustiveness of sub-groups within a population for ensuring theoretical saturation. Therefore, the emphasis is not on the number of street traders or the coverage of different subgroups but on ensuring 'theoretical saturation' of a particular concept.

Theoretical sampling thus seeks out sites and groups to 'maximise the development of a particular concept in terms of its properties and dimensions, uncover variations and identify relationships between concepts' (Corbin and Strauss 2008: 143). Theoretical saturation is the point where 'no additional data are being found whereby the [researcher] can develop properties of the categories' (Glaser and Strauss 1967: 61). It is a way of triangulation to ensure that no new properties could be identified in relation to a category. As data collection in grounded theories is controlled by the themes emerging from the data, decisions regarding which groups to compare and how many in each group are made during the course of fieldwork (Glaser and Strauss 1968).

Table 3-1 Order of Grounded Theory

Levels of Abstraction	Definition	Theoretical sampling Issues
Formal Theory	Unpacking the process in relation to a street trader	Selection of street traders
Substantive theory 1	Comparison of the process in different situations – locations – within a ward	Selection of sites (location/localities) and categories
Substantive theory 2	Comparison of the phenomenon in similar/different situations across different wards	Selection of wards

Table 3.1 shown in the previous page illustrates the process of theoretical sampling for generating formal theory about the proposed research question.

The manner in which the principles of theoretical sampling were applied in relation to the above three aspects is discussed below.

Selection of Wards

As mentioned above, the experience of street traders in seven wards within the Bangalore Metropolitan Area (BMA) was researched and data collection and analysis was undertaken in two phases, an, exploratory and an extended phase. It included the wards governed by the Bangalore City Corporation and other types of local government as shown in chapter 4.

Prior to the exploratory phase, I chose five wards within the boundaries of Bangalore City Corporation (BCC). I selected these wards, taking into account the differences between them in terms of their political and economic characteristics, the scale of street trade, and the threat to the street trading location. The five wards included a city centre ward – KR Market – and four wards administered by the BCC. KR Market Ward was selected as it was the main trading node of the city. Two wards to the south-west and south of KR Market, one to the north and another to the east were also chosen, taking into account the scale of their street trade as compared to KR Market and the process of land development, which is further discussed in the next chapter. As I explain in Chapter Four, although informal economies dominated in the wards to the west and north west of KR market, the scale of street trade was less and street traders residing at these wards traded/worked at KR Market.

In deciding on the case study wards for exploratory research, I drew on my knowledge of the city, which came from background information collected for two other research projects in Bangalore (Kumar 2001; Benjamin and Bhuvaneswari 1999, 2001), and on interviews with traders and street level politicians in different wards. This was supplemented by field notes that I maintained after the two previous projects had been completed, concerning the events relating to spatial conflicts in the city, such as the eviction of street traders during 2000–1 and personal communication⁴⁵ with researchers in Bangalore. This information was of varying quality and was restricted to the municipal wards in Bangalore (see Chapter Four's section on spatial structure).

During the exploratory study, I realized that the conflict was not restricted to wards within the BCC but also could be seen in the peri-urban wards of the city. Exploratory visits illustrated the scale of street trade in these wards, which are administered by different types of local government and where land occupied by street traders is either owned by non-state institutions or falls under different regulatory regimes. In addition,

these areas are experiencing rapid urbanization and conflicts related to place use and claims, in particular plans for developing an IT or bio-technology corridor. Hence, I included three wards from outside the BCC boundary and four wards within the BCC. I dropped one ward within the BCC boundary as there was no significant variation in the scale or ownership of land occupied by street traders in the wards to the south and the North. The particular ward characteristics and reasons for choosing them are further elaborated in Chapter Four.

As regards the issue of subverting eviction, it was suggested to me⁴⁶ by the review committee that I should select a municipal ward, where street traders faced no threat(s). During my exploratory research, the rapid appraisal of different wards, together with interviews with senior bureaucrats and field level political activists, indicated that almost all wards were affected but there were differences in both the severity and the nature of threats. Thus this study compared the circumstances of street traders facing different types of threat in each ward.

Selection of Location and Street Traders

- *Focus on Street Traders Trading in Perishable Goods*

This study compares the experience of street traders selling perishable goods in the seven wards of the BMA. This form of street trade dominated across the seven wards. Although a comparison of their experience with those trading non-perishable goods (predominantly plastics, textiles and books) would enhance the richness of theoretical comparison, I decided to restrict the data collection and analysis for a number of reasons.

First, the scale of the non-perishable trade differed across the four wards within the BCC limits and was relatively small, in all the wards under consideration. Second, the quality of data depended on the richness and depth of interviews with street traders. In the exploratory research, I explored street traders trading in both perishable and non-perishable goods. However, preliminary visits to the case-study wards indicated that the perishable trade is heterogenous, in terms of products sold, location, and gender. This information was researched from different locations at the place of their trade, and at their residential locations. As described in the section on data collection and analysis, given the sensitivity of this topic, it took considerable amount of time to establish

rapport with street traders and elicit information from them. Moreover, information had to be gathered not only from street traders but from a variety of other agents involved with them in each ward. Further fieldwork involved undertaking data collection and analysis simultaneously, rather than as a linear sequence. Given the limited resources in terms of time and money, the intensity of fieldwork and the danger of spreading it too thin, I decided to limit the study to that of street traders in perishable trade.

- *Positional Mapping for Selection of Location and Street Traders*

In selecting locations and sub-groups of street traders for data collection and subsequently in analysing their relationships, I adapted Whyte's (1955, 1984) technique of positional mapping. It proved to be useful to identify the sites where street traders congregated for their trade and socialized, and so become familiar with their everyday routines and spatial relationships (Seligmann 2005).

Fieldwork in each ward started with mapping the different locations used by street traders, and their patterns of occupying spaces in a location in relation to one another. I used street maps⁴⁷ published by a private GIS company as the base guide to where they traded in a ward, the number in each location, their particular trade, and their patterns of occupying spaces in a location. I subsequently used these maps as a tool to aid data collection.

Street traders trading from a fixed place either agglomerated in one or several places in a ward, or were scattered in different locations. In addition, there were traders who traded itinerantly. The experiences of traders in all three locations were explored; however, decisions about the number of street traders to be interviewed within each location and in each of the three trades (vegetables, fruits and flowers) were based on the principles of theoretical sampling.

The feasibility of developing detailed positional maps varied across the wards. Mapping street traders in four of the seven wards was relatively easy as there was one large agglomeration and between 200–50 traders in it. Mapping the field in detail was difficult at the centre city ward and at the wards in the outer periphery where trading was dense at various locations,. These maps were developed from my observation notes and images away from the field. I refined these maps as I interviewed street traders.

In preparing this map, I ended up visiting different parts of the ward, which in turn helped me trace the key meeting places of local political leaders and street traders in the ward, and the time of the day when they congregated.

3.3.3 Data Collection and Analysis

The Two Phases of Field Research

Corbin and Strauss (2008) advise a strategy of phasing data collection and analysis with a prolonged period away from the field, to aid in refining the data analysis and theory. However, given the cost and time implications, it was not possible to have a prolonged gap between the two phases. The two-phase strategy adopted in this research is a midway option to facilitate incremental development of theory.

Both practical and theoretical considerations influenced the design of field research over the two phases. As noted earlier, gaps in background information in relation to street trading locations, the characteristics of the street trade in the city, and the feasibility of undertaking this research influenced the decision to undertake exploratory research.

The first phase, undertaken between August and October 2003, focused on one ward and explored the relevance of the research question, particularly the role of networks, among street traders at Bangalore. The second, extended, phase of research in six wards, took place between January to October 2004. The time spent in London, between the first and second phase, allowed for reflection on the themes while outside the research context. During my third visit, during June 2006, I revisited the case localities to observe if there had been any changes. It was decided during the major review that data from the exploratory phase would be included in the final analysis, as the analysis is based on comparing cases for 'concepts' rather than the veracity of its 'facts' (Glaser and Strauss 1967).

Introducing the Research

Given the sensitive nature of the phenomenon under study, my concern was to avoid undue fear, becoming a focus of rumours in the field, or raising false hopes among street

traders about my capabilities to help them. I introduced the research as an ‘academic study’, and stressed that my interest was to understand (i) the way they accessed their trading locations; (ii) their relationships not only with each other, and with other economic and political agents in the ward and city; and (iii) their experience and responses to situations of eviction. I also informed them about my inability to participate actively in their struggles, although that the study findings may indirectly support their cause, as it seeks to contribute towards policy discussions on urban land and poverty. I repeatedly clarified my intent in my conversations with street traders during the course of the research and did not pressurize anyone to participate.

Gaining Entry

The richness of the data gathered during fieldwork depended on my access to the field, as well as the willingness of street traders and other agents congregating at case study wards to share their experiences. Long time immersion in the field, in order to identify potential key informants, build rapport with them and to gain their trust, is a strategy advocated in qualitative research texts. As a result of the uncertainty of traders’ situation in terms of eviction, considerable time was spent on establishing contacts and generating ‘guarded trust’ before I could initiate discussions about trading places. A common experience across the case study wards was that street traders were reluctant, particularly in the initial days, to engage in any conversation related to their trading places.

Two factors further complicated the process of gaining entry and establishing rapport and securing the trust among traders. The first was the nature of the inquiry, which concerned a process that violates the law, and second, the need to understand network transactions that are often invisible. When the aspect of location was introduced, traders’ responses were either open confrontation or polite rambling talks about everything other than their trading location. Others questioned the usefulness of this research. Many key informants adopted a ‘wait and watch approach’ in the initial stages of this research.

Further, while I was doing my field research, street traders in different wards faced the threat of eviction. The English-language media almost on a daily basis carried articles about street traders as symptoms of lawlessness and disorder prevailing in the city. These accounts stressed the urgency of reclaiming public places from illegal street

traders. This view dominated among corporate, senior bureaucrats and a section of the middle class. Street traders were aware of the state chief minister's ambitious plan to convert Bangalore into Singapore and viewed their evictions as linked to this project. As I explain further later, I was identified with their opponents, and it was thought I could never understand their situation.

Strategies for contacting street traders and eliciting data had to be varied in each ward depending on the density of street trade and the politics. During the exploratory phase, I used three avenues for contacting street traders trading from a fixed-place and those trading itinerantly. As mentioned earlier, the first few days in Bangalore were spent observing various street trading locations in a ward and recording them in 'positional maps'. This exercise was useful for attracting the attention of street traders who were curious, and they tended to initiate the conversation. My first contact was a female trader Rani, who after a week of interaction allowed me to sit in her trading spot and observe trading routines at her location. Although she refused initially to divulge any information about her counterparts or about how she came to secure her place, regular visits and observation helped me to map her and adjoining traders' networks and to make observations about their relationships. After several weeks of interaction, I realized she was an informal leader of a network of women traders in that location and was respected by male traders. While I was able to access women traders' networks, they were reluctant to introduce me to any of their male counterparts or to their network leaders.

Another point of entry was through an NGO field worker, Manju, with whom I established contact at Rani's trading spot. Street traders at this ward predominantly came from five squatter settlements in the same ward and two other neighbouring wards. Manju was involved in organizing a micro credit programme. Although in the initial stages his colleague used to organize street traders to subvert eviction, they were instructed by their management to desist. Via his colleague he was aware of the sequence of events and also helped me to visit three of the five settlements to establish other contacts with street traders at their residences. Speaking to them at their residences was necessary as many traders feared conflict at their trading location and refused to engage in any conversation there.

In the first settlement where most of the traders resided, Manju introduced me to a squatter leader, Bira. Bira was involved with regularizing squatter land but not with the

issue of street trading locations. His wife traded from a fixed location and was willing to share her experience. Through him, I developed contacts with two other men, Chinna and Dayal, and a woman, Ekka, who organizes chits in the settlement. Street traders – fixed-place and itinerant traders – were their clientele. Contact with itinerant traders was established with their support at the squatter settlement. Bira also introduced me to her male colleague (Feroz) – who helped me to contact three influential male traders at the ward level and to visit two other squatter settlements of street traders. Through these snowballing techniques, I contacted other street traders at this ward.

Besides his work as an NGO activist, Manju helped street traders with filling application forms for accessing land for housing from the state, opening bank accounts, and dealing with the local councillor. His chequered political career included being a ‘street level’ political entrepreneur, or in Manor’s (2000) term an ‘armpit towel politician’, in one of the wards in East Bangalore. He was a *fixer* of deals between clients and lower and mid-level bureaucrats in charge of land registration, and towards the end of 2005 he acted as a middleman for a clique of lawyers working for large developers to identify land under conflict for forced sale. Prior to his NGO experience, he worked as an area leader for an influential state-level political mobilization, the Dalit Sangarsh Samithi (DSS). Because of his various roles he was clued into to the politics on the ground in different wards of the city. He was to become one of my key informants in making sense of street traders’ strategies for occupying land and negotiating with the state and for understanding everyday politics, not only in this ward but also in the centre city ward and in two other wards in the outer periphery of the city.

During the extended phase, there were two key differences in field dynamics, which posed new challenges in gaining access to street traders in different wards. First, the density of street trade was relatively high both at the centre city ward and at the outer periphery, as compared to the ward where I conducted my exploratory research. These were localities where street traders, among other agents, have to be politically agile to survive (Benjamin *et al.* 2001). Therefore preparing the map onsite was difficult. Second, when I returned to Bangalore for the extended phase of this research, conflict between street traders and the state had intensified. Six weeks prior to the fieldwork, all the retail traders and street traders at the city centre ward had been evicted from their shops and trading spots respectively. Although both groups returned to their places, the situation was fluid and the atmosphere was filled with uncertainty and tension. They

were still negotiating with different state agents, and it was not a comfortable milieu for street traders in which to be interviewed about how they secured their location by a stranger whose background they could not verify via their networks.

These circumstances influenced my decision to speak to a range of actors: political activists, field bureaucrats, and traders congregating in the ward, to understand what is going on in a particular ward. Some of them turned out to be my key informants outside street traders' groups during the course of this research.

In the light of context described above, it is difficult to construct a cogent or rational explanation about why various agents in a ward, including street traders, chose to share their experience. The first few weeks were marked by an endless chase of street traders in different locations, and their responses showed their insecurity about losing the field.

Rajendra: '...Someone exactly like you ...came...[and] surveyed us... wrote a report that this street was not clean... the next thing we knew, is we were evicted.

Me: ...this is the first time I am coming here... [One of the wholesale traders] in... told me about you.

Rajendra: No... it is you... you first talk to all the wholesale traders... they too have a problem... then come to us...

(Introductory meeting with street trader leader in KR Market Ward, February 2004)

Beliefs, rumours and assumptions about my role had to be countered almost on a daily basis in each ward. Despite introducing myself as a researcher, they would often confuse me with a bureaucrat or a journalist. However, by serendipity a newspaper article appeared in the vernacular press, highlighting the plight of traders at the KR Market Ward, while the English-language press refused to publish any article taking their side. A group of traders connected to the Union of Retail Traders and Street Traders attributed the article to my efforts and came forward, sharing their experiences of countering eviction. Subsequently, I ended up conversing with them every time I visited the ward. Despite trying my best to convince them that I had nothing to do with the article, and stressing my status as a researcher, perceptions about me varied from one being either a state officer, a journalist, and a social worker. Rumours travel very fast in many wards via various networks. Sightings of me conversing with retail traders led to street traders

in two other agglomerations sharing their experience and also providing introductions to some of their peers.

Street traders in another ward, after checking my background as a student of the London School of Economics (LSE), decided to open up, albeit for a logic of their own. During the first visit the concerned street trader leader had asked for proof of my connections to the LSE. A street trader leader was advised by a political organization, with which I had not established contact at that time, to support my research. The political organization concerned draws on the philosophy of Bhim Rao Ambedkar, who was known to be an LSE alumnus. This was cited as a reason why they trusted me and decided to allow me access to other street traders at the location.

Thus, I gained access through snowballing techniques, contacting street traders and other agents in different wards.

Data Collection Methods

Data for this study was collected through semi-structured interviews (Fontana and Frey 1994), observation, documents and conversations with various agents (Strauss and Corbin 1998). Much of the substantive data, as explained further below, came from conversations and regular interactions with street traders at their trading places and at their homes.

As mentioned earlier I used positional maps to record my observations about street traders' practices and relationships and in particular their networks in each location. During both phases, I spent the first few weeks developing these maps (Whyte 1955, 1984), for which I visited each location several times. This was useful in checking street traders' spatial routines and relationships (Seligmann 2004) and for starting conversations. In subsequent discussions, I often used my map to show them different places, and they would give their views and experiences of the places indicated. Maps also proved to be a useful tool as information related to networks could not be elicited from semi-structured interviews without some understanding of relationships.

Another key source of information was conversations with street traders and other agents congregating at each ward. Access to street traders was uncertain, and interviews were

frequently cancelled, particularly in the city centre ward and the outer periphery. As the fieldwork proceeded, street traders allowed me to hang out in their trading spots. I spent this time listening to their conversations and observing their transactions. For example, in the KR Market Ward, their logic of differentiating between various agglomerations in terms of business opportunity and tenure security was not apparent to me. Observation over a period of time enabled me to understand the differences in the kind of people congregating in different places in a ward, which opened up very different opportunities to forge forward and backward linkages, as shown in Chapter Seven. These connections and interactions are not easily captured by interviews alone. Themes picked up from these observations were then followed up with semi-structured interviews.

Through such interactions and in the process of fixing interviews with various agents, I learnt about the breadth of their networks, their interests in relation to location, and the complex alliances between various agents and places that they traversed as part of their trade. Such conversations were important for piecing together a story or for making sense of events which at first are seemingly unconnected. For example, in fixing an interview with a wholesaler, via whom I tried to contact a group of street traders, my call was routed to Pakistan. In the subsequent conversation, it became apparent, the concerned trader was part of a delegation of the Government of India to Pakistan to promote exports in perishable goods. Another attempt to contact the president of Union of Retail Traders and Street Traders indicated that he was speaking to me from Jordan. Although these diversions could be seen as waste of precious time in the field, in fact these were encounters which gave a good sense of each of these agents' interest in location, their role in conflicts, their connections to various parts of the state, and their alliances with street traders, as well as the manner in which these fed into street traders' processes. Wholesale traders with connections to the Government of India and an interest in the export market supported a group of street traders, but their interest in relation to location varied as compared to other street traders. This difference affected both the forms and terms of their alliances, but they were never spoken about in an interview situation. As noted by Seligmann (2004) concerning Peru, the relationship between street traders and other agents is marked by complex alliances and animosities which can be mapped only through sustained and close interaction. Similarly, conversations over a period of time with retail traders, provided information about how they assembled street traders through their networks for political activity as described in Chapter Six. These interactions were not strictly interviews carried with a precise

checklist, but rather rambling conversations touching upon various subjects, with me asking an interviewee a series of questions seeking to understand how it all worked, and the trader seeking explanations about the technical aspects of planning and law. In these conversations and informal interactions, there was a two way flow of information, and there was a need to monitor the boundaries constantly in order not to get engulfed in the conflict directly.

Given that street traders' networks were dispersed in wards other than the one in which they traded, anthropologists suggest the need for multi-sited research (Herriott and Firestone 1983; Appadurai 1996) or an extensive field research (Seligman 2004) covering places of residence, trade and other places they may travel to in sourcing goods. As far as possible I followed street traders at different wards from where they lived and traded.

Interviews and conversations were conducted predominantly at trading locations, due to traders' everyday schedule for trading and other related business. Trading at the city centre ward started at 5 am and continued until 7 pm, and at the outer periphery it was between 9 am and 9 pm. Although traders finished their business at this time, they continued to hang around in the same ward, making connections or negotiating for their next day's stock. I used the peak trading time for observation and interviewed them during the time immediately after their business or when they were cleaning and arranging their displays.

Where possible, I followed them to their place of residence. Since congregations in the market and conversations are closely observed by other street traders, many traders preferred to discuss power relationships and conflicts away from the market. In the other wards within the BCC boundary, visiting homes and trading locations was easier, as most traders lived and worked in the same ward or in the surrounding wards. However, street traders at the city centre ward and at the outer periphery resided in different wards of the city. A sizeable proportion of street traders at the city centre ward resided at the peripheral wards to the East and the South of the city, and they often travelled long distances and spent much of their waking hours at the wards where they traded. In these wards I followed only a few network leaders and members back to their places of residence. Visits to their residential settlements allowed me to gain a better understanding of the predominant role of household involvement in trade in some wards.

I was also able to meet other traders, who had lost their places during one of the evictions, at these residential settlements and map some of their networks - especially financial and political, and talk to a few organizers.

During both phases of the field research I used a topic guide (Appendix 1A) for interviewing street traders. This was used to steer the conversation. Interviews were conducted in four regional languages: Tamil, Kannada, Telugu and Hindi. Since I was conversant with all of these, I translated them during the field research for reasons explained in the next section. In all, 110 interviews were conducted with street traders and other agents across seven wards.

In almost all wards, interviews with street traders were conducted over three to four sittings. Securing information in one meeting was often difficult due to their trading timetable, and the uncertainty of their everyday life. Even after I managed to strike up a conversation, it often took four or more sittings before they were willing to share their experiences. Bits and pieces of data trickled in after several rounds of conversation with each street trader.

As mentioned earlier, data collection included collecting stories from different agents, directly or indirectly influencing the process. Each of the various agents interviewed could provide varying 'slices' of information that were critical to constructing the story. For example, members of networks, although they know a bit about the dynamics and so were able to reflect on their views and experience, were vague as to the specifics of negotiation processes. They knew the organizers were going to the state at higher levels, but could not fill in the details.

Another issue was to ensure neutrality while dealing with different factions among traders and street traders. As can be inferred seen from the findings presented in Chapters Five and Six, there were several small and large networks among street traders in each ward. Their relationships were highly complex and marked by fluid alliances. I tried to maintain contacts with as many groups as possible and with many leaders. However, most of them lived and watched closely the interactions between different agents in that ward. There were instances where contact with one leader led to other groups expressing their dissent. This made data collection unpredictable.

There were also gendered constraints in eliciting information from male traders in the case study wards. I worked with a male field assistant in conducting these interviews. On occasions, we realized that some of the male trader leaders were not open during joint interviews. In such cases my assistant met with them alone to collect information on agreed topics. I triangulated the information gleaned through this process with my female contacts and with local political agents.

During the exploratory phase, I taped all the interviews and transcribed them verbatim. As far as possible, I tried to record all interviews and conversations during the extended phase. However, as many interviews were conducted at busy markets, not all recording was of good quality, and in some cases street traders were reluctant to be recorded. In such situations I took notes during the interviews and memos as part of my field diary. As data collection and analysis had to be managed simultaneously as the fieldwork proceeded, I noted key parts of the interview and did not transcribe all the interviews verbatim.

Data Analysis During and After Fieldwork

The process of data analysis involved identifying ‘conceptual categories and [their] properties through comparing different parts of data for similarities and differences’, and mapping ‘...relations among the categories and their properties’ (Glaser and Strauss 1967: 35). A category stands by itself as a conceptual element of the theory. A property is an element/dimension of the category.

The various approaches, that is ‘frameworks’ for developing analytical hierarchy (Ritchie and Spencer 2003); ‘laddering of data’ (Miles and Huberman 1994); and analysing data for grounded theories (Corbin and Strauss 2008), suggested for qualitative data analysis the following three stages: data reduction, data displays, and synthesis (Miles and Huberman 1994). In addition, grounded theorists use ‘theoretical comparison’ as an ‘analytical tool to stimulate thinking about properties and dimensions of categories’ (Corbin and Strauss 2008: 65). Another difference of approach in analysis for studies seeking to generate grounded theory is the overlapping of the processes of data collection and analysis. Theoretical sampling together with constant comparison strategies underpinning the generation of grounded theories involves ‘constant...

redesign and reintegrating the concepts, as [the researcher] reviews the material' (Glaser and Strauss 1967: 101). Consequently, data analysis is iterative and the above mentioned three stages overlapped to different degrees with data collection.

The technique used in qualitative research 'to derive and develop concepts from data' is called "coding" (Corbin and Strauss, 2008: 8). Strauss and Corbin (1998) differentiate between open coding and axial coding; open coding is defined as the process of breaking the data and delineating concepts for blocks of data, and at the same time qualifying the concepts through assigning them with properties. Axial coding is the process of comparing cross-cutting concepts within the same piece of data or between different parts of the data. In reality, open and axial coding occur simultaneously.

I started the process of coding on completing the first interview. Data was reviewed for different purposes during the fieldwork and away from the field. Corbin and Strauss (2008) list three questions that can be asked of the data. These are (i) *sensitizing questions*, to understand what is going on and subsequently to develop descriptive accounts; (ii) *practical questions*, for guiding theoretical comparison and sampling; and (iii) *theoretical questions*. In addition, as the flow of information from each informant was both uneven and incremental, data had to be reviewed rapidly almost on a daily basis to develop topic guides for further data collection. As mentioned above, it was difficult to follow a topic guide strictly or complete an interview in one meeting. In reviewing the data, I focused predominantly on the first two questions during the fieldwork, and more on the third aspect away from the field.

While it was relatively easier to tape and transcribe the interviews, and to code line by line, during the exploratory phase, such an approach was not feasible during the extended phase. The exploratory phase involved thirty interviews with willing street traders willing to be interviewed. I followed a pattern of half a day of fieldwork using the rest of the time for transcription. In the extended phase, joint collection and analysis had to be managed across six wards. Although I tried to keep up with the transcription it proved to be hectic. Therefore, I listened to the tape and transcribed key parts of the interview rather than transcribing the whole thing verbatim. As the purpose was to become sensitized about the situation in order to make a decision about theoretical sampling, I reviewed the data (interview) as a 'whole' coded in blocks, rather than line by line (Miles and Huberman 1994; Corbin and Strauss 2008).

In conceptualizing the proposed research phenomenon of differences in traders' ability to secure places, data had to be reduced in terms of the following aspects: (i) process; (ii) social relationships; and (iii) factors driving their decisions related to engagement in trade and politics. For example, in formulating concepts relating to the process of finding fixed places to trade from data, street traders conceptualized their experience as a 'capture' of a place, rather than as achieving 'access', which is the term used in the literature. Thus in developing concepts relating to occupation presented in Chapter Five, I try to retain in English the essence of traders' preferred terms as far as possible. I also sought to discover how they secured information, whether they negotiated, and if so with whom. I then compared similar incidents in different parts of the data to identify other categories relating to this subject. In ensuring theoretical saturation, apart from verifying the exhaustion of a particular category, I triangulated my findings with street traders who work in small groups and with local political activists who were knowledgeable of the phenomenon.

In parallel to this, I constructed a central matrix (Ritchie and Spencer 2003) where each row was assigned to a respondent and each column to a conceptual category in order to be able to compare the themes emerging from different bits of data (see Appendix 1C) and to maintain memos about the emerging concepts.

When I came back to London, the data that I had were thus partial transcripts of interviews, memos, and a central matrix. These provided the preliminary ideas of the conceptual categories emerging from the data, but their properties were not well developed. I reviewed the transcriptions and updated them. Data was reviewed once again separately for the following aspects of experience of occupying places and of subverting eviction, and the role of networks, in order to finalize categories and properties. From these analyses I developed descriptive and analytical accounts with which to explore the research question.

Much of the time in London was devoted to preparing data displays and synthesizing the concepts to answer the research question. I predominantly used the following tools to display the data: matrices of different orders, timelines, and network diagrams (Miles and Huberman 1994). This process took nearly a year longer than anticipated, for two reasons. Matrix that one constructs during different stages of a research project is dependant on one's own conceptual clarity. It is an incremental process, and it becomes

refined as the researcher gains greater clarity of field and so can frame the right questions to understand the phenomenon (Miles and Huberman 1994). In addition, in order to explore intra-city patterns, data displays had to be developed at three levels:(i) street traders; (ii) matrices and event diagrams for different locations at the ward level; and (iii) the assimilation of patterns across different wards for each of the four themes.

In preparing data displays and synthesizing concepts, this study relied on conventional methods, using displays on A3 papers, and with only a minimal use of CADAQ packages. NVIVO proved to be more useful for data management in terms of line-by-line coding and comparing codes. While NVIVO is flexible in terms of changing codes (as compared to NUDIST), constructing matrices and network diagrams for cross analysis or for a central chart including as many themes as possible proved difficult (Miles and Huberman 1994; Ritchie and Spencer 2003). Moreover, I did not have access to NVIVO in the field, when I started coding. Studies seeking to generate grounded theories make use of another software programme, MAXDA, to which I did not have access at the LSE or at the field. Upon returning to London, I spent the initial four months in learning and testing out various packages. As they did not provide any additional advantages I decided to follow the traditional methods of analysis.

Data, Displays and Theoretical Comparison for Synthesizing Concepts

I used the framework developed by Kumar (2005) for interpreting about the ‘in-vivo’ (Strauss and Corbin 1998) concepts and for ‘theoretical’ comparisons. Following Glaser and Strauss (1967), my aim is not to prove or refute any particular theory, but rather to identify variations/similarities in relation to a category and to unpack the reasons for it.

These comparisons indicated the inadequacy of various concepts used in the literature on street traders for explaining the phenomenon observed in Bangalore. Therefore I drew on approaches developed in other related literatures. For example, I drew on the concept of ‘networked non-compliance’ developed by Singermen (1995) and Razzaz (1994) in their contribution to the literatures on political science and urban studies respectively. These concepts were more useful for capturing the heterogeneity of street traders’ strategies, their relationship to the city, and their undergirding by social networks found

in Bangalore, than the paradigms dominant in the literature, in particular organization (Cross 1998) or quiet encroachment (Bayat 1997); this is discussed in Chapter Five.

A final aspect of generating formal theory is to identify a central concept to explain the factors influencing differences between street traders in their ability to draw on networks for help with non-compliant actions (Corbin and Strauss 2008). In this context, field data indicated street traders' relationship with 'place controllers' as a central category. As patterns of place control were specific to each ward, and relationships between various agents were influenced by street traders' embeddings in the ward's socio-spatial processes, I argue for drawing on the perspective of locales (Giddens 1985), defined as a 'semi-autonomous space' (Moore 1973), to make inferences the research question, as set out in Chapter Nine.

Data analysis of the fieldwork from the extended phase was completed by December 2005. Although I started drafting chapters from January 2006, it was not a linear process, as I had constantly to refer back to conceptual categories and properties.

3.4 Validity, Reliability and Generalization

Qualitative data poses challenges for researchers in terms of its validity, reliability and universal application (Denzin and Lincoln 1994). Reliability in this study was established through theoretical saturation of the properties and categories, as well as by triangulating the findings on conceptual categories, with different agents directly or indirectly connected to street traders in each ward. In addition, similar incidents as well as negative experiences were compared. Care was also taken to listen to as many stories as possible from different actors, and to include these in the interpretation. I have also presented my findings and interpretations in academic conferences to obtain feedback from the research community.

A vexed issue in qualitative research relates to the validity of 'generalisability to larger populations' (Silvermen 1997:171). This study claims conceptual or analytical validity, in that the lens of *locales as a semi-autonomous space*' can be used to analyse the influence of socio-spatial relations and processes in different contexts.

3.5 Research Ethics and Safety

A question posed by the major review committee concerned the ethical issues of researching this topic. Specifically, by making public street traders strategies, would this study be harmful in the context of the contest over place? It is essential that the findings from this research does not have this effect. At one level, this concern can be answered by pointing out that the failure to understand the research phenomenon considered in this study has already contributed to the present situation in cities. The lack of accurate information about street traders and their interests in relation to location, as well as assumptions about their alliances, have led to approaches in both policy and theory that have actually accentuated conflicts despite good intentions. First, it has helped multinational actors through their alliances with the state to shape public opinion to justify evicting street traders from their locations. Second, it has enabled the state to close the spaces for manoeuvre that street traders' had with which to claim key locations and localities in the city, or to connect their interests to those of the political agenda. Undertaking such research will contribute to knowledge about the poor and may help street traders to counter this trend in a small way. The problems of unequal access to the research findings can be addressed by ensuring publication and dissemination in the regional languages, after my PhD is completed.

Another ethical issue is that of a researcher's relationship with their key informants. As mentioned above, I declared my motives openly to street traders. I did not pressurize anyone to participate in the research. Given the highly competitive politics in some wards and the timing of this research, which coincided with the conflict, I had to ensure that I maintained neutrality and links with as many groups as possible. In order to maintain confidentiality pseudonyms have been used in this study. It was also a time when state agencies, particularly bureaucrats, had closed in and securing information was difficult. However, I was supported by a senior bureaucrat who helped me with contacts in different state agencies.

Previous experience with research on urban poverty, and in particular with street traders in Bangalore, has shown that public spaces in the case study localities are relatively safe for a female researcher. Further, the places where I conducted interviews were public places brimming with activity. I worked along with a male field assistant – however, this did not relate to the issue of safety. Rather, it was related to issues of gender-related

constraints and he was most helpful in facilitating my interviews with male traders and leaders. I conducted detailed interviews in the residential settlements of hawkers. These were safe, vibrant and openly public spaces where any new visitor (as I was considered to be) is welcomed. Locally elected representatives, field level political activists and street traders volunteered information about individuals and groups involved in local politics. This made it easier for me to assess the safety of interview participants. Also, as stated in the section where I described selection of wards, the study was not pursued where conflict is severe and where street traders themselves feared participating in the research.

4 Differences in Claiming Places for Street trade

4.1 Introduction

This chapter provides a background to the themes analysed in the following four chapters (Five to Eight). It describes the heterogeneous characteristics of street trade in Bangalore, in terms of its social, economic and spatial organization and shows that their trajectories differ across the case study wards. Further, this chapter illustrates the differences between street traders, in terms of the ways in which they chose a location in a place for their trade, and in their ability to subvert the threat of eviction. Studies on street trading in Bangalore are limited. Hence, this chapter draws on primary research undertaken during 1999–2001 and 2003–5, in addition to secondary sources.

4.2 Street Trading in Bangalore

4.2.1 Background

Bangalore, the capital city of the state of Karnataka, is situated in South India (Fig. 4.1). It developed from a small military and trading outpost housing 410 people in the fifteenth century (Srinivas 2001), into a city with a population of around six million in 2001 and a projected 10 million by 2021 (BDA 2005; Price Waterhouse Cooper 2007). Bangalore was the second-fastest growing city in India during the decade 1991–2001, with a population growth rate of 37.7 per cent (Price Waterhouse Cooper 2007). Currently, it is the fifth largest city in the country after Mumbai, Delhi, Kolkatta and Chennai (Dittrich 2007; Shaw and Satish 2007).



Figure 4-1 Map of India

Bangalore is characterized by sharp income divides, as can be seen in Fig. 4.2 (Dittrich 2007).




Figure 4-2 Distribution of Household Incomes in Bangalore

The city is renowned for its globally connected information technology and biotechnology industries (Heitzman 2000; Parthasarathy 2004; Price Waterhouse Coopers 2007; Srinivas 2001), which has earned it the sobriquets of being the 'IT Hub of Asia' and the 'Silicon Valley of India' (BDA 2005; Report of Expert committee 2008).

However, there are a variety of other economies in the city, including large scale public sector enterprises, several small and medium clusters of manufacturing firms, service industries, and trade (Benjamin et al. 1999; Heitzman 1999; Nair 2005; Pani 1985). Many of the latter activities are broadly categorized as belonging to the informal economy: 'While IT based formal sector accounts for 15% of the economy, informal sector contributes to 60–70%' (BDA 2005: 1). Trade is a dominant form of economic activity⁴⁸ in the city (Ravindra 1996), and street trade among the poor (Delphi and Benjamin 2003; NSS 2007).

Based on historical patterns of urbanization, three zones can be differentiated in Bangalore: (i) the city centre(s); (ii) wards surrounding the city centre, referred to in this thesis as inner-periphery wards; and (iii) the peri-urban areas, experiencing rapid urbanization since mid-1990s, or the outer-periphery wards (BDA 2005) (Fig. 4.3). Until 2008, the city centre and inner-peripheral wards were governed by the Bangalore City Corporation (BCC) and the outer-periphery wards by various levels of local government, including the City Municipal Corporations (CMCs), town municipal councils and urban and rural Panchayat (Report of Expert Committee 2008). Between 1991–2007 the physical area of Bangalore under BCC jurisdiction expanded from 6 sq km to 226 sq km, as well as 300 sq. kms outside the city, (Report of Expert committee 2008; BDA 2005).

4.2.2 Spatiality of Street Trade in the City

Street trading is found in all the wards across the above-mentioned three zones. There is no accurate count of street traders in the city, although a survey undertaken by the National Association of Street Vendors of India (NASVI) counted 30000 street traders in Bangalore (Bhowmik 2001; 2007). However, this is likely to be an underestimate, as it did not count all those trading in the wards outside the BCC. Their characteristics and their origin differ in each zone and these are closely related to the history of each ward, as shown in Fig.4.3.




Figure 4-3 The Three Zones of Bangalore

City Centres: KR Market and Shivajinagar (Zone A)

Bangalore developed around two nodes: the KR Market Ward to the west and Shivajinagar and Cantonment wards, to the east (Nair 2005) (Fig. 4.3). KR Market Ward has a dense concentration of street traders. Gist's (1957) account suggests that street trading was prevalent in this ward as early as the 1950s. KR Market is a place where migrants and natives, particularly the poor, congregate due to a variety of employment opportunities in unskilled manual labour or in street trade (Blore 1989; Benjamin et al. 2001; Nair 2005). It is also a point of entry to the city for migrants. Previously known as Bengaluru, KR Market's location along an inland trading route in the late fifteenth century fuelled its development as a trading centre (Srinivas 2001; Nair 2005), and it is now a main node for trading in a variety of perishable and non-perishable goods in the city, both for retail and for wholesale. Street trade developed as an extension of formal trade⁴⁹.

The scale of street trade is smaller at Shivajinagar when compared to KR Market. The dominant employment opportunities for the poor in this ward include a variety of small manufacturing firms, waste reprocessing, construction, and transport carriers. Cantonment, adjoining Shivajinagar, was developed during colonial rule as a residential

area for the rulers and their civil servants. Although the British constructed a market for perishable goods in Shivajinagar, farmers from the wards in East Bangalore predominantly trade at KR Market. At present, high end trading, controlled by national and global chains in the textile, software, electronic and banking businesses, dominate in the wards adjoining Shivajinagar.

Inner-Periphery Wards (Zone B)

KR Market is the distribution node for the variety of products manufactured in the numerous small firms to the west of the city. Wards to the west and northwest of KR Market are predominantly residential and work places for different groups among poor and lower middle income households (Blore 1989), although the north-western wards were once a centre of textile manufacturing (Dittrich 2007; Heitzman 2004; Nair 2005; Srinivas 2001). Employment opportunities in textile mills together with the demand for labour in construction and services in the late 1960s and early 1970s, spurred immigration from the neighbouring states and other districts of Karnataka (Nair 2005). The mills are now closed and many workers have entered the street trade at KR Market and the surrounding wards, among other jobs. Although the state established a wholesale market in the north, the scale of street trading is less there.

Wards to the south of KR Market are known among street traders as potential sites for earning a high income. Many of these wards were developed after Independence under the master planning process, predominantly for residential use, by the City Improvement Trust of the BCC and the Bangalore Development Authority (BDA). High-skilled migrant and native households from middle and higher income groups in public and private sector employment dominate these wards (Nair 2005; Ravindra 1996). Since the 1990s, these wards have been the destination of IT entrepreneurs and their employees both for their business locations and for residence (Heitzman 1999, 2000; Nair 2005).

Demand from ward residents, together with the unskilled labourers moving out of KR Market – voluntarily as well as involuntarily due to eviction of their squatter settlements – catalyzed the development of street trade in these wards. Street traders' agglomeration in the three case study wards viz., BG ward, JNGR Ninth block and JNGR Fourth block are cases in point, discussed further in Section 4.2.4. Until the 1990s, there were no

organized private retail outlets for perishable goods (vegetables, fruit and flowers), and the formal retail trade was predominantly in textiles and other types of non-perishable goods. Although the state made provision for the retail distribution of perishable goods, street trading markets were more popular among residents. Further, until the 1990s there was poor transport connection to the KR Market, which also contributed to the demand for street trading markets.

Local economies and politics in southern wards are changing. Small retail businesses are being replaced by global chains in the textile and food trades. Moreover, private national retail chains and organic producers are entering the trade in perishables, with a clientele drawn from upper and higher middle income young professionals. In addition, there are efforts across these wards to various degrees to mobilize middle-class resident associations around issues of urban planning and governance to different degrees.

Outer-Periphery Wards (Zone C)

Two trends contributed to the evolution and expansion of the street trade in the wards outside BCC jurisdiction, i.e. the outer periphery. First, the eastern wards of Bangalore were a destination for migrants from Tamilnadu (Nair 2005) in the 1960s and 70s, as the construction of large scale public sector units⁵⁰(PSUs) by the Government of India (GOI) encouraged the migration of poor households in the late 1960s and 1970s. Subsequent to the construction of PSUs, street trade was just one of the employment trajectories among this group, but the expansion of their households, together with shrinkage of unskilled manual labour in PSUs, opportunities for occupying vacant land owned by PSUs, and the development of high income residential layouts in surrounding wards, influenced the growth of street trade in some wards. One such market that developed is the street traders' market on the HAL company land, discussed further in Sections 4.2.4 and 4.2.5.

Second, the rapid growth of peri-urban areas since the mid-1990s has encouraged the entry of poor households, natives and migrants, into street trade. Since the 1990s, the state's urban development programmes have been geared towards promoting IT/ITES industries in the outer periphery, particularly to the east and south. This has spurred the development of high-end real estate for residential and commercial properties, and the sale/conversion of agricultural land resulted in many households traditionally in farm

employment shifting to street trade. They occupy the places allotted for weekly markets known as *santhes*, traditionally organized for farmers and members of some trading castes.

Moreover, children of first generation *santhe* traders, though they had college educations found it difficult to find suitable employment in the new economies and had instead entered street trade; opportunities in IT or its associated service industries were often beyond their reach. Further, while youths from poor and lower middle income households found it difficult to compete in the new high-skilled jobs that were emerging, the numerous small-scale industries which once provided employment to unskilled and semi-skilled labourers, are also facing closure, with their land converted into IT parks or high income residential enclaves. Consequently, street trade has become an increasingly significant employment option for poor households, along with employment by private security agencies, or in transport or construction work. In addition, in the late-1990s, street traders who lost their places in other wards moved into *santhes* because of the density of trade at such locations. During my fieldwork, I observed small farmers from surrounding villages trading at the edge of these *santhes*, predominantly selling in small quantities. Farmers transacting large quantities travelled to KR Market.

Santhes are currently popular in 12 wards, predominantly in the outer periphery to the south and the east. Two groups can be differentiated amongst traders at such locations. The first consists of households that have traded inter-generationally in *santhes*, who trade one day in each *santhe* and from three or four *santhes* in a week, referred henceforth as weekly traders. Trading in perishable goods at such locations was once dominated by farmers, and non-perishables by weekly traders. At present, however, many weekly traders have shifted to perishable items and have been joined by a second group, made up of native households previously in farm employment, unskilled market labour and street trade in other wards of the city. Some of them trade on all days of a week in a *santhe*, referred henceforth as daily traders.

Interviews with senior bureaucrats and elected representatives suggest that while the use of land for trade is not in violation of planning laws, a majority of the weekly or daily traders are not considered as *santhe* traders. Although this does not affect their everyday trade, it has an impact on their negotiations with local governments for subverting

development threat. Evolution of street trade at KR Puram and Varthur Wards are examples covered by this study.

Organization of Street Trade in the Case Study Wards

Street traders trading perishable goods specialize in a specific product (vegetables, fruit, or flowers) within their trade. Further, they differentiate between three scales of trade: bulk, referred to henceforth as 'high end'; retail; and small. All three scales of trade were predominant in KR Market Ward and in the three wards at the outer periphery as can be inferred from table 4-1. Retail trade was found across the seven wards but was the dominant scale of trade at the inner periphery.

Table 4-1 Scale of Perishable Trade in the Case study wards

Scale of street trade	Vegetable trade	Fruit trade	Flower trade
Bulk trade (wholesale)	City centre Outer periphery	City centre	City centre One ward in the outer periphery
Retail trade	City centre Inner periphery Outer periphery	City centre Inner periphery Outer periphery	City centre Inner periphery Outer periphery (2 of the 3 wards)
Small	City centre Outer periphery	City centre	City centre One ward in the outer periphery

This differentiation is based on their investment per cycle, modes of transaction,⁵¹ and profits generated, as can be inferred from table 4-2.

Table 4-2 Characteristics of Street traders in the Case Study Wards

Aspects	Bulk Traders	Retail traders	Small traders
Unit of transaction	Varies by trade. [Vegetable: minimum of 5 kg - maximum of 10 kg; Fruit traders in multiples of 100s. Flower: loose in kg.].	Min of 500 kg to less than 5 kg per transaction	‘guddes’ ⁵² – or equivalent of <50 gm
Investment per cycle	Ranges from a minimum of 3000 Rs to a maximum of 5000Rs / cycle.	Three levels of investment: up to 500Rs per day; Between 500–1000Rs per day; and Between 1500–3000Rs per day.	50Rs per day and up to a maximum of 100Rs.
Cycle of Investment	Daily or alternative days.	Daily or on alternate days.	Twice a day or daily.
Profit	Between 250– 400Rs per day after expenses.	Differs by locality. Between 100– 150Rs in the centre city; and between 100 - 250 per day after expenses in other wards	15–50Rs per day.
Use of profit amount	Reinvestment in chit cycle and trade.	Reinvestment, loan repayment and chit / property investment.	Mainly for household expenses. Investment in chit cycle varied.
Clientele	formal retail traders (owning small and medium provision stores); street traders from other wards, restaurants and hotels	Residents/retail customers from different income groups.	Low income groups.
Mode of trading (place/time)	Fixed place from agglomerations and during the first time cycle (before 9 am)	Itinerant and fixed-place.	N/A
Type of fixed-place location	Agglomeration often the first trading cycle.	Location varied by type of product.	Agglomeration and itinerant trade. Variation by type of product.
Which wards	City centre and two wards in the outer periphery.	All seven wards.	City centre and outer periphery.

4.2.3 Migratory, Ethnic and Religious Background

Hindus migrants dominate among men and women street traders across the case study wards. In general, the presence of natives is relatively smaller within the BCC jurisdiction.

Migrants from the North and South Arcot districts of Tamilnadu dominate the KR Market Ward and two wards in the inner periphery (Benjamin et al. 2001; Nair 2005). They are from the Scheduled Castes (SC) or are Gounders, who traditionally worked in agriculture. SC migrants from the North Arcot district dominate the retail trade of vegetables, fruit, and flowers at different agglomerations in the KR Market Ward (L1, L7 and L6; see fig. 4.4), and their counterparts from the Gounder caste are mostly in the bulk trade of vegetables and fruit, and trade from two agglomerations (L2 and L6; see fig. 4.4). Tamil migrant SC caste traders from other regions of Tamilnadu, in particular the Chingelpet district, are in spinach trade (L5 see fig. 4.4) or fruit trade (L4) at the KR Market Ward, and Gounders from the same district in fruit trade (L6). The type of fruit transacted differs between the two groups of migrants. Muslims were found at two agglomerations, L3 and L7 (see fig. 4.4).

Native street traders at the KR Market Ward are from three castes: Thigalas, Devangas and Banjigas. Thigala and Devanga caste traders moved into street trade from agricultural labour or tenancy farming. Next to Tamil migrants, Thigalas dominate street trade at the market ward. Although Thigala caste traders are involved in the three trades, they are renowned for their spinach trade not only in this ward but also across the city. Thigalas in flower trade traded for a limited time during the first trading cycle, while members of the Devangas and Banjigas were traditionally in flower trading, the latter having shifted from itinerant trade in bangles or other non-perishable goods to fixed-place trade in vegetables or flowers. In addition, kannadiga SCs are in flower trade. Muslim street traders were another significant group at KR market and were found at two agglomerations (L3 and L7, see fig. 4.4).

At the casestudy wards in the inner periphery, SC Tamil migrants and Gounders from North Arcot district dominate the vegetable trade at Jayanagar Fourth Block and Jayanagar Ninth Block wards respectively. Tamil migrants from the Vanniyar caste and from Chingelpet district were in fruit trade at both wards, as were men from native

castes, in particular the Gowdas and SCs. Natives dominate street trade at the third ward –Basavangudi - with SC traders dominating vegetable trade and the Lingayat caste, fruit trade. Across the wards, both Tamil migrants and natives, predominantly women and children are in flower trade.

Tamil migrants also trade alongside natives at the HAL ward, while natives are predominant, at the other two case study wards, namely KR Puram and Varathur, in the outer periphery. Tamils at the HAL Ward are from two castes, namely SC and Dalit Christians, and they are in fruit trade and vegetable trade respectively. Lingayat and Gowda natives from Karnataka and migrants from Kerala are also in vegetable trade. Native traders in the remaining two outer-peripheral wards were from two linguistic backgrounds, Telugu and Kannada and from several castes, namely Kumbhars, Banijigas, Shettys, Thigalas, Kurubas, a scheduled tribe, and Scheduled Castes. Of these, Kumbhars, Banijigas and Shettys, traditionally traded in weekly markets and many continue their practice of trading from different places during a week. The other groups previously owned smallholdings or were agricultural labourers. Natives from other castes, Naidu or Gowdas and Tamil migrants and Muslims trade at these wards but are in the minority and have entered trading at their respective agglomerations since 1995.

4.2.4 The Trajectory of Fixed Place Street Trade

Street traders can be classified into those who trade at a fixed place and those who trade itinerantly. The former group includes those who come together at a fixed place, here called agglomeration traders, and those who locate independently, here called scattered location traders. Table 4-3 shows an approximate count of street traders trading at the agglomerations and scattered locations in the case study wards.

These estimates are based on my counts, triangulated with local politicians and traders in each ward. Agglomeration traders are dominant at the KR Market Ward and two wards in the outer periphery. Itinerant trade is not allowed at the former ward and both itinerant and scattered location trade was uncommon at the other two wards. Both forms of trade are prevalent at the three wards in the inner periphery and the HAL Ward in the outer periphery. According to street traders, for every one trader trading from an

agglomeration, between four to five were in itinerant trade in the wards where it was prevalent.

Table 4-3 Two Forms of Fixed Place Trade

Wards	Agglomeration	Scattered Location
Centre city Ward	5000 (normal times) 8000 ⁵³ , (seasonal cycles)	Not applicable
Inner-periphery		
Basavangudi	250	<200
JNGR Ninth Block	150	100–150
JNGR Fourth Block	200	250+
Outer Periphery		
KR Puram	Up to 1000 ⁵⁴ [first and weekly]	40
Varathur	250–300	—
HAL Ward	350–500 ⁵⁵	—

KR Market Ward




Figure 4-4 Street trading agglomerations in KR Market

There are several street-trading agglomerations at the KR Market Ward, which have developed in and around markets for formal wholesale and retail trade. Fig 4.4 shows the eight agglomerations⁵⁶ chosen for this study, of which three are inside (L1 - L3) and five outside the market complexes (L4 – L8).

L1 represents the oldest of these markets constructed in the early 50s known as the KR Market, which is the main node for retail trade in the city. All types and scales of trade in perishable and non-perishable goods were conducted from KR Market until the mid-1970s, when wholesale trade in fruits and vegetables shifted to separate market complexes in the same ward or in the neighbouring wards. One such complex is the Kalasipalayam Vegetable Wholesale Market (KVWM) shown as L2 in fig 4.4, which is located at around 2 Km from the KR Market. Adjacent to L1 are the contiguous agglomerations of fruit traders (L3 and L4). Street traders occupy different places inside and outside ((L5 –L8) these markets. The manner in which street traders occupy places in the eight agglomerations is described in Appendix Two.

There is more than one daily trading cycle in many agglomerations and street traders with a similar type and scale of trade cluster during a particular time cycle. High-end traders predominantly trade during the first cycle of trade (5am – 9am), retail traders in the second (9 am – 7 pm) and third cycles (6pm – 9pm), and small traders during all three cycles.

Inner and Outer Periphery

There was one street trading agglomeration in the wards at the inner periphery and at the outer periphery. Its size was relatively small as compared to those seen at the KR Market Ward and the wards in the outer periphery. Clustering of street traders in different trades was seen in these wards. Trading is conducted during one time cycle at the inner periphery and between two to three time cycles, everyday, at the outer-periphery wards. Flower traders are restricted to a specific time and place in the agglomeration across the case study wards, while retail traders of vegetables dominate the agglomerations in the inner and outer periphery. Fruit traders and vegetable traders traded at both agglomerations and scattered trading locations, while those selling a single variety of

fruit, for example bananas or coconut, or vegetables such as spinach, were predominantly scattered in different locations of the ward.

Street trading agglomeration developed along the main commercial thoroughfares in the three wards at the inner periphery; its evolution can be back to different periods between the late 60s to the mid 70s.

Fig 4.5 illustrates the trajectory of the agglomeration in the BG ward in the inner periphery. Column A describes the development between 1968 and 1980.




Figure 4-5 Street traders' experience with claiming places in Basavangudi (BG) ward

The agglomeration in the BG ward is located along a main thoroughfare known as the GB Road. According to street traders, a group of five labourers from KR Market moved to BG ward for their trade; they occupied a public pathway in front of three vacant plots. As they did not face any opposition from formal traders or plot owners in the ward, they

continued to trade and went onto capture more spaces than what they required on one side of the pavement. They then supported their family members and other networks in the GB road agglomeration in order to build a critical mass at this location.

Subsequently, migrant labourers working in the same ward occupied a public pathway on the opposite side with the support of their employers for their fruit trade. Flower traders are the last group to locate in this agglomeration. A group of young male traders moved in the mid-seventies after losing their trading spaces in the KR market ward and another group of female flower traders, moved in 1999, after losing their places in the KR market ward.

The chronology of events between 1980 and 2005 is shown in columns B – D (fig.4.5). According to a fruit-trader leader, the number of traders increased steadily between the period 1980 – 1995; but decreased after the eviction in 2001 and increased again in 2005; they faced the threat of losing their places altogether on two occasions – one, in the beginning of the 1990 and another, in 1999 / 00.

In the early eighties, the BCC constructed an enclosed market with thirty shops on the GBR road and tried to relocate all street traders. By the time the market was completed, the number of traders in the agglomeration has increased three fold. Traders who did not get a shop continued to trade on the public pathway in front of the market; this affected the business of those inside the market. Moreover, conflicts over shop allocation also strained intra-household relations. Consequently, the relocated traders moved back to the pavement and the market remains unoccupied till today; some traders use their shops to store their merchandise.

There were intermittent raids and eviction organised by the BCC and the traffic police between 1980 – 1999 (columns B and C) but street traders' reclaimed their places following a brief disruption to their trade. Following an eviction in 1990, vegetable and fruit traders formed an association to negotiate with the BCC. They also enlisted the support of retail traders in the same ward who closed their shops for two days in solidarity. Subsequently, their organization disintegrated due to the differences between street traders in vegetable and fruit trade, relating to the size of their agglomeration. Fruit traders agreed with the traffic police to limit their area and allow only seventeen vehicles, each measuring 1.2mx1.5m; however, more than one trader can use a vehicle. This is not acceptable to vegetable traders who continued to encroach on their side of the

pavement. Moreover, few vegetable traders who are also influential leaders in their squatter settlements aligned with other squatter leaders and trade union activists in the north-western and the western wards of Bangalore. They fielded a candidate in the municipal elections in the early nineties from the BG ward, which affected their relationship with the ward's councillor. These past conflicts influenced traders' strategies for subverting evictions in 2000 and thereafter, discussed further in chapters 6 and 7.

The trajectory of street trading agglomeration in JNGR Ninth Block shown in fig 4.6, and its evolution can be traced to the early seventies.




Figure 4-6 Trajectory of street trading agglomeration in JNGR Ninth Block

The growth JNGR Ninth Block street traders' agglomeration is closely related to the history of a resettlement colony in the same ward. Squatter residents evicted in the early seventies from several squatter settlements in the KR Market ward and its surroundings were resettled in South Bangalore wards, one of which is the JNGR Ninth Block. Street trade and the related economies are dominant livelihood options for approximately seven hundred households residing in the JNGR Ninth Block resettlement colony.

Tamil migrant households who dominate in the agglomeration were the first to enter street trade in JNGR Ninth block. In the seventies, many of them, particularly men opted for itinerant trade as very few plot owners have settled in the ward. Women from three families occupied a public pathway very close to their residential settlement (see column A). Male traders travelled as a group to KR Market in private carriers to procure their vegetables. They either sold their leftovers to the three women traders, whose clientele were predominantly the construction labourers working in the ward. As the ward started to develop as a popular middle income and higher income residential neighbourhood, male shifted to fixed place trade at the 29th cross road. The number of traders in the JNGR Ninth block increased to nearly 500 traders between 1980 and 1999 (see columns B and C). As street trade flourished in the ward, other related business such as financing and manufacturing vehicles used by street traders⁵⁷ emerged here, discussed further in chapter 5.

Until the eighties, street traders faced opposition from the residents of an old settlement in the ward, many of whom were and are active members of the Kannada Chaluvali like Sanga (KCS) and have influence in the ward's electoral politics. Traders' relationship with the KCS improved over time, as they constitute a key political constituency in the ward. In fact, KCS lobbied on behalf of street traders following their eviction in 2001. Although street traders reclaimed their place, their numbers decreased to 160 in the agglomeration.

Street traders' accounts suggest that the first generation of agglomeration traders in JNGR Fourth block in the inner periphery traded vegetables on land where there is a shopping complex now. They were relocated by the BDA inside the shopping complex in the mid seventies. Many of them sold or rented their shops to retail traders in other trades and moved to an open courtyard inside the complex and were joined by other street traders selling both perishable and non-perishable goods. They were evicted by


the BCC in the mid nineties; the BCC also landscaped the courtyard to prevent street trading. Consequently, many traders' selling perishable goods moved to the plaza and to the public pathways surrounding the complex. All street traders were evicted as part of an intervention to curb illegal encroachment in the city in 1999-2000. At present, those in the trades of non-perishable goods occupy the walkways inside the complex as well as on a plaza; vegetable and fruit traders are outside the complex. Though vegetable, fruit and flower street traders' reoccupied their places, they were able to do so after nine months and many of them either lost their places or settled for a smaller place.

Street trading agglomerations serve as the dominant nodes for retail distribution of perishable goods at the three wards in the outer periphery included in this study. In each of these wards they started as a small retail market for the food business or for petty trade, and subsequently developed into specialized scales of perishable goods trade. Similar to the situation at the KR Market ward, bulk trade is conducted during the first cycle, followed by retail trade and small trade at other cycles in the KR Puram and HAL wards respectively. Trade is conducted only on one day in a week in the Varathur ward.

The agglomeration in the HAL ward is located on land owned by a public sector unit (PSU), namely the HAL Company. The PSUs are the dominant land owners in their respective wards and hold vast tracts of vacant land⁵⁸ for expansion which have been occupied by street traders and squatters. Fig 4.7 shows the evolution and development of street trading agglomeration on HAL land, which is traced to 1975, where the number of traders there increased from 5 to around 500 between 1975 and 2005.

According to street traders', the first generation of five traders comprising three Tamil migrants and two natives occupied a vacant place inside the HAL's factory complex (column A, fig. 4.7) for their food business. Tamil migrants have previously worked as construction labourers in the HAL company and have ties both with their blue and white collared employees. The two other native traders used to work as farm labourers in the HAL ward and gained their access to the factory with the support of migrants. Initially, the company did not object to street traders on their land; however, they attempted to block traders' entry when the number of traders' increased steadily from five to thirty. The company issued entry passes to its employees but both migrants and native traders secured entry passes from their relatives and friends employed in HAL or purchased it from other employees.

Figure 4-7 Trajectory of street trade in HAL ward



In response to eviction, street traders moved to sixteen different locations on land owned by the HAL between 1979 and 1998 and their numbers steadily increased from 45 in 1981 to nearly 600 in 1996 (see columns B and C, fig 4.7). With the capture of a new location by evicted traders, new traders joined them. As trade flourished in the agglomeration, many blue collared employees of the HAL company entered finance business; small group savings and credit activities flourished in the agglomeration. Farmers and weekly traders from the eastern and south eastern outer peripheral wards started to visit HAL agglomeration everyday to sell their produce between 5 am and 9 am. In the mid nineties, few HAL company employee-financiers partnered with a street trader for bulk trading in vegetables. This marked the beginning of high end trade and the two daily time cycles of trade in the agglomeration (column C, fig 4.7). The present generation of migrant traders are dominantly descendants of the three families, their ex-employees and their neighbourhood ties. At present, street traders' clientele include itinerant traders, formal retail traders, HAL employees⁵⁹, higher and upper middle income residents from the surrounding wards.

Until 1999, the two scales of trade were conducted in different places; bulk trade on a public pathway and retail trade, on HAL land. In 1999, the company shifted retail traders to another location on an agreement that they would construct a market complex for street traders. However, they modified the plan⁶⁰ mid-way into the construction and decided to allot some shops to their employees and sell others to outsiders. The fear of losing their hold on HAL land completely catalyzed street traders' collective action discussed further in chapters six and seven⁶¹. Street traders re-occupied HAL land in 2001. The company abandoned the market project after completing 40 shops, of which twenty are occupied by ex-street traders along with ex-HAL employees; the remaining twenty shops are vacant. Many street traders trade on land contiguous to the shops. The company allows issued licenses to control bulk and retail trade but with very little success. Street trader leaders plan to lobby the company for extension of basic infrastructure facilities.

Street trading agglomerations in the other two wards viz., KR Puram and Varathur in the outer periphery are located on land allotted for santhes owned by the City Municipal Corporation (CMC) and Nagar Panchayats (NPs) respectively. There is no documentary evidence on the history of the santhes or how the practice of state

allocation of land evolved. According to santhe traders and local politicians, land allocation for santhes started during the rule of a Muslim emperor, Tipu Sultan⁶², in the nineteenth century, and has continued since then⁶³.




Figure 4-8 Trajectory of street trade in KR Puram Ward

Fig 4.8 traces the evolution and development of different cycles of trade in KR Puram. According to street traders' and CMC officials, traders used the santhe land only on one day in a week until the seventies. Daily trade started in a small way, with farmers and weekly traders from the neighbouring wards congregating on santhe land between 5 am – 9am (column A). Many small farmers opted to trade in small quantities every day or on alternative days in KR Puram rather than travel to KR Market; poor residents of KR

Puram ward also entered vegetable trade. As small farmers in East Bangalore cultivate some varieties of vegetables and supply in small quantities, first cycle traders started to source some of their stocks from KR Market. Employees of first cycle traders who lived and worked there entered street trade in the second cycle.

In the early eighties (column A), the DSS organized the poor from different wards to occupy vacant land in East Bangalore, including KR Puram santhe. Seizing this opportunity, market labourer-traders erected rudimentary structures for their residence and also, captured land for their friends and relatives. The CMC evicted them in 1983 to reclaim their land to construct a district court and the offices of district administration. However, both traders and squatters re-occupied the santhe, but on a reduced area, as the DSS, the farmers, and the first time cycle traders – are all important electoral constituencies. Following this event, the occupiers consolidated their structures; those with plots along the main thoroughfare constructed temporary sheds for their own business or for renting it out as petty shops. Market labourers occupied the vacant land adjoining the petty shop and traded everyday for a limited time in the early mornings and in the late evenings.

Between 1985 and 1995 (see column B, Fig.4.8), the number of traders in the two cycles increased rapidly and second cycle traders consolidated their business after 1991. The political party - the Janata Dal- elected to office in 1991 evicted both squatter and street traders and resettled them in an outlying village, 12 kms away from the KR Puram ward. However, many market labourer-traders returned back and occupied the place vacated by squatters and supported their networks to enter trade in the agglomeration. Thus, by 1993, the number of traders trading during the second cycle increased from 22 to 165 and more than 500⁶⁴ in the first cycle. Some second cycle traders expanded their business through entering first cycle trade.

Column C lists the key events in the KR Puram agglomeration post 1995. Increase in the number of traders and the concomitant competition for space together with the high real estate value of santhe land generated several conflicts among street traders and between street traders and the CMC. Rumours of eviction of both weekly and daily traders started to circulate since the early 2001. While the CMC's commissioner is willing to find an alternative location for weekly traders, they argue that daily traders' demand for a place is unreasonable as they refuse to move into an enclosed market constructed for

them on santhe land. Daily traders on the other hand contend that they moved out of the market to occupy a smaller area since not all of them can be accommodated; the move inside increased their cost of trade and that the design is faulty. Reduction in the area led to conflicts between vegetable traders and fruit traders. Pressure on daily traders to move inside the complex is increasing and weekly traders are still negotiating for relocation within 5 kms along a public thoroughfare.

Two months before my field work in 2004, a group of youth traders involved in both trading cycles revived an old organization discussed further in chapter 6. They mobilized farmers and traders across different time-cycles, tapping the grievances relating to location and the daily fee levied to trade on santhe land and organized a traffic blockade. The MLA intervened and the santhe land administration was handed over to the youth leaders, who view this as an opportunity to strengthen their ties with the CMC's senior bureaucrats to lobby against the eviction. Although street traders managed to stall the eviction until the end of 2006, the conflict is far from over.

Street traders at the three outer-peripheral wards have connections with counterparts and other agents in trade in different wards of the city. Many of them source their goods from KR Market, and with the exception of HAL, agglomeration traders at the other wards reside in different wards of the city. Weekly traders continue their practice of trading from different places during a week, which enables them to connect with street traders and other agents in other wards of the city.

4.2.5 Difference in Threat and Experiences of Subverting Eviction

Street traders at the case study wards differentiated between two types of threat: conflicts in their everyday routines (here called “everyday conflicts or ECs”), and the possibility of eviction and displacement stemming from mega-urban development projects (here called “development threat or DC”). Street traders at the wards within BCC jurisdiction faced both types of threats, while those outside predominantly faced the latter threat. The characteristics of the state and non-state agents involved in the ECs and development projects differs in each ward, as shown below.

Everyday Regulation of Place

Everyday conflicts include conflicts both with other street traders and with agents of the everyday state (Fuller and Harris 2001), or *de facto* regulators. There were inter and intra-ward differences in regulators' characteristics and their relationship with street traders.

Street traders at the KR Market Ward encounter three types of state agencies in their everyday routines: the field bureaucrats connected to the Bangalore City Corporation (BCC), the traffic police, and, to a lesser extent, the Agricultural Produce Marketing Corporation (APMC), a parastatal accountable to the state government which regulates wholesale trade. The way these agencies relate to street traders at different agglomerations varies.

The APMC attempts to restrict street trading at the three markets (L2, L3 and L4, see Fig. 4.4), as their revenue is based on the volume of trade reported by registered traders and they regard street traders as a conduit for registered traders to avoid taxes. The organisation has taken land on lease and rented out shops at one of the markets (L2). Other properties (land and shops at L3) are owned by the wakf board, which rents it out to predominantly Muslim traders. At the third cluster (L4), wholesale traders from both religions have purchased shops from private landowners over the years. Further, the physical layout of these markets differs. L2 is organized as an independent market complex to monitor the flow of vehicular traffic, and street traders on public spaces are monitored here closely. APMC has limited control over the way semi-public places are used at L3 and L4, and so it does not have much influence over street traders in these areas. Traders control the everyday use of place at both agglomerations.

The BCC, specifically its market division, owns KR Market (L1) and regulates it on a daily basis. The division is headed by a deputy commissioner and it is housed in a different building from the central office of BCC, in an office around one kilometre away from the market. Within L1 itself, there is a field office manned by the municipal bill collectors, sanitary inspectors, and police, who are seconded by the state government to the BCC. These agents differ in their attitudes to street trade and in willingness to accept bribes. In particular, street traders in other agglomerations (L5–L8) are especially targeted by the traffic police, because in these places traders have an impact on the smooth flow of traffic.

The field bureaucrats of the BCC, the Bangalore Development Authority (BDA) and the traffic police are all involved in regulating public places, but their role differs across the three wards in the inner periphery. BDA, the parastatal responsible for city planning, constructed shopping complexes for retail trade as a way of generating income and to organize spaces of commerce, and by 1996 it had transferred the management of several wards to the BCC, including the two considered for this study. However, this transition took considerable time and during the period of this research project, street traders trading from public places inside the shopping complexes in one ward faced eviction by both BCC and the BDA; and outside by the BCC and traffic police. Street traders' engagement with these agents was limited at the other two wards during normal times.

By contrast to the above, street traders at the outer-peripheral wards have relatively more stability during normal times. Land-owners had instituted different mechanisms for everyday surveillance.

Land owned by PSUs is policed by the respective company's real estate department. Some companies have employed private security agencies to prevent squatting on their land, while the HAL Company has issued licences to street traders to control their numbers. Although people without licences trade from this agglomeration at the edges or in an adjoining place, they were less vulnerable to everyday raids or eviction as compared to trading at KR Market.

Local governments allotted a specific type of land – Gomala land or former village commons⁶⁵ – for santhes at the other two outer-peripheral wards. In general, local governments have the power to allocate and regulate the use of land, but the power to initiate land use changes is with the Revenue department and accountable to the state government. Local governments have contracted out the everyday management of santhes to private contractors, referred to henceforth as land managers, through a tendering process. A land manager is authorized to collect a fee from each user, based on their type and volume of products sold, and is obligated to maintain the land and infrastructure. Although the land allotted for santhes is adjoining or within the local governments' complexes and in close proximity to the traffic police, interactions between these agents is limited. Land managers are the defacto everyday regulators of santhes.

The local government broadly specifies the nature and timing of activities allowed on santhes. The land manager collects a fee not on the type of product sold, but according to the area occupied by a trader. Although trading is allowed once a week in theory, it is in fact conducted every day and during different time cycles of trade. There are also contestations between farmers and street traders – weekly and daily – in relation to their right to claim santhes, described in an earlier section.

Transforming Bangalore into Singapore: The Impact on Street Trade

Development threat is driven by the state's vision of transforming Bangalore into a global city. Leaders and senior politicians across the three dominant political parties in the city and state (Congress, Janata Dal and the BJP) support the project of globalizing Bangalore. Many of them own large parcels of land and are embedded in the IT economy (Nair 2005; Prasad 2001). The Janata Dal government initiated policies in 1995 towards restructuring Bangalore in order to attract global investments. This project reached its zenith under the following Congress government, headed by its CEO Chief Minister for Karnataka, SM Krishna. On assuming office, he announced a vision for transforming Bangalore into Singapore (Economic Times 19 March 2000). This was underpinned by a series of projects for urban renewal, such as the re-location of markets, the construction of flyovers and expressways, and city beautification. Implementing these projects involved land acquisition and development under PPP arrangements and was supported by new laws (Benjamin 2007; 2008). Further, landowners such as the HAL company and local governments tapped into this political opportunity to reclaim their land from street traders.

In this project to reform and restructure Bangalore, the chief minister constituted the Bangalore Agenda Task Force, via a government order. It was headed by the CEO of a dominant IT company in Bangalore and was populated by real-estate developers, architects, and venture capitalists (Ghosh 2005; Nair 2005), as well as senior bureaucrats. At one time, the BATF monitored the performance of municipal governments and parastatals rather than their respective councils or board of governors (Ghosh 2005). They were also influential in appointing a French consultancy group to develop Bangalore's 2015 Master Plan and also monitored closely the GIS mapping of the city. Individuals connected to the BATF also had their own charities. Janagraha⁶⁶ –

an organization led by an expatriate venture capitalist – organized the elite and middle class around issues of urban governance and city beautification and, via, another organization, monopolized a micro-credit savings programme for the poor. Although neither Janagraha nor the BATF were directly involved in conflict with street traders, they lobbied for the acceleration of the creation of a mega infrastructure, initiated projects for improving street architecture in the city, and wielded considerable influence over the planning process⁶⁷ – all of which impacted on state’s approach to street trade⁶⁸. Support for Krishna’s plan for globalizing Bangalore came from the then-Central government, headed by the rival Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). The BJP spearheaded the ‘India Shining Campaign’, around this time, to boost India’s image internationally. The urban development portfolio emerged as a prestigious post allocated to senior politicians and bureaucrats, both at the regional and national levels.

A consequence of these programmes and political trends was the city-wide eviction of street traders, among others, during 1999–2000 and subsequently in 2003–04. They affected street traders at the case study wards in several ways. First, street traders at the KR Market Ward were affected by various urban renewal projects, including the re-location of wholesale markets, the renovation of KR Market, traffic re-organization, and the construction of flyovers. Plans for re-locating wholesale markets was initially drafted in 1978, but were initially shelved due to formal traders’ opposition; they eventually agreed after lobbying for infrastructure to be upgraded, and provided that all three trades (flowers, fruit and vegetables) could be accommodated in the same location, but the plans were then abandoned due to the difficulty of finding land to accommodate all the trading clusters, but then eventually revived in 1999, under the mega city programme, when⁶⁹ the state identified three locations in different parts of the city and planned for phased evictions. Another project relates to the renovation of an old market complex known as the KR Market and the construction of an expressway in 1999–2000, as documented in Benjamin and Bhuvaneswari (2001). As shown in Chapter Six, both these projects led to the eviction of street traders, along with formal traders in different agglomerations. Another difference was the characteristics and the role of the state involved in mega city programmes. During the renovation of the old KR Market, the conflict was between the local government and the BCC; and in the other programmes, implemented after 2001, with other agencies. The APMC and the Highway Traffic Department played a dominant role and were closely monitored by the chief minister and urban development minister, as is shown below.

Second, street traders at the inner periphery were affected by city beautification programmes and the removal of 'illegal' encroachments during 1999–2001 and subsequently in 2004–5 at two wards. Although they were under the jurisdiction of the BCC, evictions were carried out by the traffic police under the supervision of the BDA commissioner, who was supported by the chief minister. In 2005, street traders were evicted once again, at one ward following conflict with a new retail chain of shops for perishable goods, and in another as part of an anti-encroachment drive. Although the stated aims were city beautification or ending illegal encroachment, there was a confluence of several other agendas⁷⁰. The Bangalore Development Authority had an interest in recouping its finances through reclaiming land subject to a conflict between occupiers, while the BDA was on the verge of closure (Ravindra et al 1997). Additionally, mega city programmes were funded through grants from the Central Government and from state Government funds, which included the proceeds of land sold by the BDA and public–private partnerships. Traffic police interviewed at these wards attributed their actions to a combination of factors, including the 'fight against corrupt politicians' and 'pressure from the top' (Traffic police, JNGR ward).

Third, across the wards in the outer periphery, the location of IT/ITES industries has resulted in the escalation of real estate prices since 2000. All three agglomerations in KR Puram, Varathur and HAL wards – are in strategic locations along the axes that connect the IT clusters in the Southern wards of Bangalore with East Bangalore, and they command very high real estate prices. Street traders' agglomerations sprawled on vacant lands cover an area ranging from 0.3 acres to slightly more than an acre. At first, the HAL company was opposed to relinquishing any land to street traders, while conflict between street traders and the local state in the other two wards was related to issues of who, where and how many could be accommodated. The commissioner of the CMC at both KR Puram and Varathur, along with some elected representatives, viewed street trade as an 'inefficient use' on high value land. However, there was a grudging acceptance of street trade's importance as a means of livelihood for a significant proportion of the population. At KR Puram Ward, the CMC wanted to re-locate weekly traders to a location in the interior of the ward and to move daily traders into an enclosed market. This was opposed by both groups: weekly traders were concerned about location and the extent of area to be allotted, while daily traders did not want move into the enclosed market as the cost of their trade was likely to go up due to high rents. Also, not all daily traders were allotted a shop, and traders' profits – particularly the bulk traders

trading during the first cycle – are closely related to weekly and daily trade. At Varathur Ward, although the state promised an alternative location, street traders complained that there was no suitable vacant land for accommodating all of them within the vicinity of five km. Further, traders in both wards do not all live in the wards where they work, and thus are not part of the electoral constituency.

Constraints in Negotiating Threats: Differences in Political and Legal Opportunities

Street traders across the case study wards have had limited political space for manoeuvring evictions, due to a confluence of different factors. The nature of urban governance between 1999 and 2005 put urban development under the control of an alliance of chief minister, senior bureaucrats and a section of the economic elite,⁷¹ who orchestrated a campaign in the English media for transforming Bangalore into Singapore, described earlier. They also enjoyed the support of the judiciary, while elected representatives and field bureaucrats were weak. Thus, a key constraint on street traders was one of having ‘influence’ as much as ‘access’ to the different parts of the state or landowners.

The chief minister held the portfolio for urban development during the first half of this period, and although it was subsequently allotted to a senior party politician, the chief minister maintained his hold. He monitored the performance of the BCC and BDA in relation to urban renewal and mega infrastructure programmes almost on a daily basis (Benjamin 2008) and during 1999–2000. Subsequently he extended his support to the citywide eviction drive of street traders, among others.

Decisions relating to the mega city programme were controlled by a clique consisting of the commissioner, deputy commissioner, and mayor, who was often a party appointee in Bangalore within the BCC⁷² and by urban development secretary directly accountable to the Chief Minister. In order to prevent elected representatives, and in particular local politicians, from subverting these schemes,⁷³ a special wing ‘mega city project wing’⁷⁴ was created within the BCC headed by a retired bureaucrat, who reported directly to the commissioner, who reported to the chief minister. Further, councillors’ influence within the standing committees was controlled through the party hierarchy, as a Member of Legislative Council (MLA) who was higher up in the hierarchy oversaw these

meetings⁷⁵. Moreover, these projects were the main source of municipal revenue at that time⁷⁶. Thus, although the rhetoric was that the council and standing committees approved mega city programmes, the influence that councillors or mid-level bureaucrats had over these programmes was minimal. Field bureaucrats were monitored closely almost on a daily basis by senior bureaucrats of the BCC and the Urban Development Department, which squeezed the spaces for ‘politics by stealth’ suggested in Benjamin et al. (2001).

In addition, there was pressure on local governments following a Supreme Court verdict in 1999 concerning the earmarking of land as hawking zones and the issuing of licences, which fed into conflicts relating to eviction. The local government was also under intense pressure by the English-language media to remove street traders.⁷⁷ Consequently, the commissioner of the BCC had limited options for accommodating street traders. The result was regular raids, along with demands for higher bribes from street traders, who became increasingly vulnerable within BCC wards (Benjamin and Bhuvaneswari 2006) in addition to the snowballing of several other conflicts (described in Chapter Six). The local political agents and field bureaucrats with whom street traders had negotiated eviction prior to 1999 had limited influence over the implementation of urban renewal /development programmes at the KR Market Ward and the inner-peripheral wards.

In two wards outside the BCC, although street traders had access to their local governments, this did not translate into influence due to the authoritarian local political milieu. Over the last two decades, political power in two wards (KR Puram and Varathur) was monopolized by two members of the Legislative Council affiliated to different parties; one was a Telugu-speaking Reddy caste politician from Janata Dal, while the other was a trade union leader-turned-party politician from the Congress Party. Both had significant influence within their own parties as the outer-peripheral wards to the east and south are important constituencies dominated by SC and ST caste voters, and competition to secure their votes is high. Irrespective of their political bases, both MLAs control the decisions of the local government, as they have the power to sit in its council proceedings and standing committee meetings. This is overlaid by the increased surveillance of CMCs and Panchayats by the secretary of the Urban Development Department. Moreover, street traders’ relationship with both the MLAs was hostile in one ward and limited in the other.

At the HAL Ward in the outer periphery, legal and political opportunities were further restricted on account of land ownership. Landowners such as the Hindustan Aeronautical Company HAL, like many other PSUs, are the largest landowners in the wards particularly to the southeast and northeast in the outer periphery, and local government and political representatives have limited influence over them. The company asked street traders to move out on the agreement that an enclosed market would be constructed and shops rented out to them. However, once construction started it reversed its decision.

By 1999, many PSU companies, including HAL, were in decline. According to a senior official in the real estate department, the company could not afford to write off the land, which was prime real estate, when HAL was incurring heavy losses and under pressure to privatize. Labour recruitment patterns were also changing as the company moved towards digitizing its production and entering new business areas which required high-skilled employees. There was also opposition from both the real estate director and a section of the trade union, who took the view that HAL resources belong to its employees and not to street traders. Street traders and their union allies also found it impossible to co-opt the real estate director via bribery, as had been the custom with his predecessors. On account of these factors, street traders found it difficult to establish a line of communication with the company.

Influence of Identity Politics on Street Trade

Nair (2005) depicts vividly the intertwining of the politics of identity and place claims in Bangalore. One aspect of this is that since the late 1950s there has been conflict over the claims of Tamil migrants and natives, in particular the Kannadigas. Kannada is the official language of the state, spoken by about 65 per cent of the population. The 1991 census recorded that 35 per cent of Bangalore's population spoke Kannada; followed by 25 per cent Tamil; 19 per cent Urdu, and 17 per cent Telugu. Other languages include Konkani, Tulu, and Kodagu. Migrants from Andhra Pradesh speak both Telugu and Kannada and tend to identify themselves as natives.

Domination of Tamil speakers in some parts of Bangalore catalysed the mobilization of Kannada speakers, who feared losing their language and their rights. Tamil migrants, particularly from the educated class, dominated in the colonial bureaucracy and, post-

Independence, in the PSU management. At another level, they also dominated the trade unions connected to mills in the wards to the northwest of KR Market Ward and the PSU unions in the outer-peripheral wards to the East (Nair 2005).

There are several organizations fighting for the Kannada cause in the city, such as the Kannada Chaluvalike Sanga. Its leader was part of the state government under the Congress government between 1999 and 2004. Kannada activists targeted Muslims (Nair 2007) as well as Tamil migrants, and KR Market traders were affected by Tamil-Kannada riots and the Urdu riots that targeted migrant and Muslim residences and businesses. Although the activities of KCS diminished post- 1982, Kannada sangas are still important sites of political activities at the neighbourhood level and have strong connections to the party politics (Nair 2005).

Caste-based mobilizations are another axis of politics in the city. Each caste group has its own association, and in some cases significant assets. Socially and economically disadvantaged Dalit caste members are mobilized by different groups, including Dalit Sangarsha Samithi (DSS), Dalit Panthers, and Ambedkar associations at the city and state level. The various Dalit groups have actively promoted land invasion among their caste members in different wards, particularly in the outer-peripheral wards to the east. As outlined in the subsequent Chapters Six and Eight, both KCS and DSS have intervened on behalf of street traders in conflict with landowners in different wards.

Besides Gowdas and Lingayats, Telugu speakers from the Reddy caste are also among the large landowners and have significant clout in the local and regional politics in the outer-peripheral wards, particularly to the east of Bangalore and Gowdas. These castes are also dominant in Kannada mobilizations such as the aforementioned KCS (Nair; Srinivas 2001), and along with Kannadiga SC/STs dominate the different levels of state bureaucracy. Their influence is stronger in the wards to the west of KR Market and in a few wards in south Bangalore. Both native and migrant street traders constitute an important voting blocks for various parties.

Members of various minority castes among the Kannada- and Telugu-speaking citizens have relatively less power in mainstream parties as compared to Kannada speakers from Gowdas and Lingayat castes; in particular, these are the Kurubas, Banijigas, Gollars, Thigalas,⁷⁸ Darji, Devengas, Ganigas and Nadius. However, Devangas and Thigalas have

influence in the city and regional politics, while Thigalas, Muslims and SC castes are influential in different wards of the inner periphery.

There are several non-governmental organizations in the city working with squatters, and these started to engage directly in party politics post-1995. During the 1999 election, a state level federation also involved in the National Alliance for the informal sector campaigned for the Janata Dal party. Their involvement with street traders was limited, as can be seen from the discussions in subsequent chapters.

Differences in Subverting Eviction

Episodic conflicts between street traders, everyday regulators, and other users are an ongoing phenomenon in each ward. As Cross (1998) and Seligmann (2004) observe, there is no clear win for either the state or street traders in these conflicts. A trader at the KR Market Ward, for example, on an average, has moved two or three times in the same ward in response to eviction. At the HAL Ward, in the outer periphery, street traders counted sixteen locations from where they have moved in response to eviction by landowners. The story is similar in other wards, as can be inferred from the timelines. However, there is disagreement in the literature⁷⁹ about the ability of street traders to subvert development threats (see also Chapter Two). Findings in Bangalore parallel those of Crossa (2009) to some extent, in that there are inter and intra-ward differences.

There was a consensus among state agents at different levels and landowners that it is difficult to erase street trading completely. According to a deputy commissioner of the BCC:

the National policy for hawking [enacted in 2002], further constrains the state to evict street traders directly. The only way we could prevent street trading is by cutting their support links... shifting the entire trading hierarchy out of the market ward or restricting the places that they can occupy and... limit their numbers...

(Interview with Deputy Commissioner, Market Division, BCC, 12 July 2004)

Consequently, they shifted their strategies to controlling the size of street trading agglomerations, rather than seeking complete erasure.

It is useful to recollect the distinction made by street traders between everyday routine conflicts and development threats. Many traders perceive the evictions stemming from urban development projects since 1999, as 'different' and 'severe', as compared to earlier occasions. From street traders' perspective, although they reclaimed their places in different wards, they were able to do so only after a prolonged period of disruption to their trade. Unlike on previous occasions, there was a gap of between nine months to a year before they could reoccupy their places in the case study wards. Not all traders were able to secure places, and those who did found locations of varying quality.

Inter-ward differences manifested in a number of ways. At the KR Market Ward the density of street trading increased. Prior to 2001, street trading was conducted predominantly from inside KR Market (L1) (Fig. 4.4), or from the pavements in and around it. Traders evicted from these locations along with new traders re-occupied different places in the ward post-2001. During 2005, traders at KR Market Ward and across two wards within the BCC boundary were evicted but managed to stall the process and there was no major reorganization of their places, as on earlier occasions.

The scale of fixed-place trade, particularly at agglomerations, decreased in the inner periphery and densification increased at the outer periphery. Across these wards, there was a reduction in the area that street traders could re-claim for their agglomeration. It reinforced the competition between them to claim prime trading spots in each ward; some traders had to settle for lesser areas and others lost their spaces. The conflict is far from over. Traders who lost their places still congregate for a limited time near the agglomeration, in the hope of consolidating their hold when surveillance decreases. With the reduction in surveillance in 2006, the number of traders has increased at an agglomeration in the inner periphery.

Following the eviction of 2000–1 at the HAL Ward (Fig. 4.7) in the outer periphery, the land owners issued licences to street traders via their organization. However, street traders and the landowner are yet to reach an agreement on the number of licences to be available. Consequently some traders trade at the agglomeration without any licence and are therefore more vulnerable to displacement by the company. At the other two wards in the outer periphery, agglomeration traders managed to hold on to their places until December 2006. However, the state has progressively acquired the land used by street traders, and the land available for street traders has consequently been reduced from

three acres to 0.75 acres at KR Puram, and from 1.2 to 0.5 acres at Varathur. While there has been a reduction in the area, there was an increase in the number of traders competing to locate themselves in these agglomerations. Thus with every eviction and subsequent reoccupation, some traders lost their places and others settled for places of varying quality.

An inter-ward similarity is the differences in the quality of places secured by agglomeration traders. However, there were differences both in a ward as well as between wards in terms of the everyday conflicts and transaction costs associated with raids and bribes. The cost of bribes increased while trade declined at their new locations, in some agglomerations at KR Market Ward and a ward in the inner periphery, although some traders found new opportunities in their reoccupied places at KR Market Ward. Relationships between street traders and other agents continue to be tense at two other wards in the inner periphery,. At the HAL Ward, although traders had licences, there were frequent conflicts between street traders and the company. Another response has been to move to itinerant trade or to re-locate in scattered locations at the wards in the inner and outer periphery

Although some traders in each of the three trade areas lost their places, men and women in flower trading were the dominant losers in many wards. Flowers and a specific type of vegetable trade are banned formally in the KR Market Ward and flower trading was not allowed by other traders at the inner- and outer-peripheral wards. Women in small scale trade were also affected by the conditions related to the use of place imposed by other users at the inner periphery. For example, at one ward, they were allowed to trade from a vehicle but not spread their goods on the ground or use a basket. This meant an additional cost of 80Rs towards renting a vehicle for small traders who have a turnover of less than 200Rs per day.

One trajectory followed by a group of vegetable and flower traders at KR Market Ward was that they secured places in other wards. However, many others – both men and women – found it difficult to find a place in another ward, and these traders settled for a place in their original wards, where they could trade for a restricted time or in a limited area with fewer trading opportunities. For example, men in fruit or vegetable trade who lost their places moved to scattered locations or traded itinerantly, and women in vegetable trade have settled for less attractive places in the inner periphery. In these

areas, limited display space and fewer customers has led to a drop in income. Many of them now have a small scale of trade, and flower traders with close ties to agglomeration traders send their children out to trade for limited periods, as they find it easier to dodge everyday raids easily. A majority of traders could not enter into such arrangements and had to shift their location or lost their livelihoods.

Another trajectory, found predominantly in KR Market Ward, is to shift to unskilled labour. Such an option was not easy for those at the inner periphery. Some of these traders (numbers are difficult to estimate) lost their livelihoods.

4.3 Conclusion

This chapter has illustrated the manner in which historical and contemporary factors specific to each ward influenced the spatial, economic and social organization of street trade in Bangalore. The scale, characteristics and factors influencing the evolution of street trade differ and are related to a ward's economic and land history. Further, there are differences in the ways in which street traders in a similar trade locate in a fixed place for their trade. Another significant aspect is the distinction made by street traders between everyday (routine) conflicts and development threats (see 4.2.5), which reflect the temporal and spatial differences in the types of threat faced by street traders. In the literature, threats faced by street traders are rarely differentiated. While at the outset it seemed difficult to subvert eviction stemming from threats linked to mega urban development projects, some street traders in the case study wards have in fact managed to do it, predominantly, by moving to other locations; however, there are intra-and inter-ward differences in the quality of their new locations. In the following chapters, I explore the factors responsible for these differences.

5 Occupying Places: Location and Networked Non-Compliance

5.1 Introduction

This chapter explores the strategies by which street traders in Bangalore find and occupy places to trade from a fixed location. The literature review identified disagreement about what strategies are used and the role of networks [ref.2.3.3]. However, this study has found that fixed-place traders at Bangalore occupy their places in various ways, for which they predominantly rely on their social networks. These findings indicate that the two dominant theories, of '*organization*' (Cross 1998a) and '*quiet encroachment*' (Bayat 1997, 2000), are inadequate to explain the patterns observed in Bangalore. Therefore, this chapter draws on the lens of networked (Singermen 1995) '*non-compliance*' (Razzaz 1994) to conceptualize street traders' strategies for occupying their places. The following two sections below detail intra- and inter-ward findings about their strategies and their use of networks and the final section considers the implications for theory and further questions arising from this chapter.

5.2 Literature Gaps and Findings

Strategies for occupying land for street trade can be divided into two aspects: securing information about availability of places, and negotiation with other users to occupy the same area (Lund 2002; Nkurunziza 2007). There are disagreements and gaps in relation to these aspects in the reviewed studies (see Sections 2.3.2 and 2.3.3).

One inter-ward similarity was that fixed-place traders occupied their places in the following ways:

- Encroachment without any support
- Capture of a place individually or in groups
- Sharing, rent, lease or purchase
- Inheriting a place

As mentioned in the previous chapter, fixed-place traders traded from agglomerations or were scattered in different places in each ward. Encroachment without support was dominant among those scattered in different locations, while the capture of places, either as a group or individually, was the most frequent pattern among agglomeration traders. Group capture was dominant among agglomeration traders in the following wards: KR Market (city centre) and KR Puram and Varathur in the outer periphery, while individual capture predominated in the three inner-peripheral wards and in the HAL ward in the outer periphery.

There were inter-ward differences in relation to sharing, renting or leasing of places among agglomeration traders. Sharing was found among traders at the KR Market Ward and at K R Puram ward in the outer periphery. Although the renting, leasing or purchasing of trading spaces was found across the seven wards, their forms and scale varied. Inheritance was common among traders at a ward in the inner periphery and in two wards in the outer periphery.

During this process, agglomeration traders engaged with agents of the everyday state (Fuller and Harris 2001; Ferguson and Gupta 2002) and other agents in each ward or outside it, as shown in table 5.1.

Table 5-1 Agents Influencing Street traders Process of Occupying Place

City Centre Ward (KR Market)	Inner periphery	Outer periphery
Mosque Committee Leaders of street traders networks Retail traders Wholesale traders-politicians Financiers Labour unions political entrepreneurs* Field bureaucrats of Bangalore City Corporation Traffic Police	Street traders Retail traders Financiers Residents Political entrepreneur Local or city-level political organizations. Field bureaucrats	Street traders Wholesalers or commission agents Financiers Land owners and their representatives Members of a public sector trade union Political entrepreneurs Local government brokers

* (Cross 1998)

Use of networks differed by location and the daily time cycle of trade. Agglomeration traders, trading during prime trading cycles, predominantly used their networks to secure information and negotiate with other agents in a ward. In addition, networks influenced membership in groups that formed to capture places.

The above findings illustrate that in contrast to Bayat's (1997) theory of quiet encroachment, street traders across the case study wards negotiated their occupation. Further, in contrast to the context studied by Cross (1998a), patterns of negotiation – individual or group – differed across the case study wards. Informal networks provided the organizational context for these negotiations, and there were two levels of negotiation involved in their process of occupying a place, as suggested by Macharia (1997); there were negotiations between a trader and a network-leader, and between network-leaders and other users. Patterns of drawing on networks differed in each ward.

5.3 Strategies to Occupy Place and the Use of Networks

5.3.1 Encroachment without Support

Agglomeration traders who encroached on their places without support were found to be trading at three locations (L1, L7, L8 ref. Fig 4.5) at KR Market Ward and at the two outer-peripheral wards. Bayat (1997) suggests that street-traders' 'spatial knowledge' (Seligmann 2004) and willingness to take risks underpin their ability to encroach on public places. By contrast, the experience of agglomeration traders at the abovementioned wards shows that besides tacit knowledge and willingness to take a risk, existing relationships with other street traders and with other users in the ward also affect their opportunities to find places.

Agglomeration traders at the three locations in KR Market Ward trade during different daily time cycles of trade: the second cycle at L1 and L8, and the first cycle at L7. The former two locations have limited business potential. Although trading opportunities are high during the first cycle, street traders are constrained by the time allowed to trade at L7. Moreover, their strategies as explained below (Box 5.1) resemble the process of organized land invasion documented in the context of housing (Seligmann 2004).

Box 5-1 Group Encroachment in KR Market

Raja, Muthu and Mala are among a group of 25 traders, trading from a secluded location under a flyover (L8) at KR Market Ward. Members of this group reside in a squatter settlement in the neighbouring ward. Raja and Muthu used to work as unskilled labourers for a wholesale trader and M2 as a street trader until a year ago. Mala along with four other women in her network lost her spot during the eviction of 2000. Previously she used to trade near L1 (Fig 4.4). Unlike others from her previous location, her networks could not capture a place at L1. They were joined

by male unskilled labourers like Raja and Muthu who lost their work, when a wholesale market for fruit trade was re-located in the periphery in 2003. Travelling to the new location for work was not feasible as the market was re-located 25 km away from KR Market.

...We occupied [this place]... because it was secluded... This road was made a one way, a year ago ... there are not many pedestrians...others did not want this.... we knew about this place... We come through this road from [our residence] to market everyday ... For all of us the market is our life... our parents worked here...we work now... our children too... Nobody objected to us trading from here... and we continued...

(Interview with traders in L8, Sept 2004)

Street traders first occupied the three locations in 2001. At that time men and women who had lost their previous trading places and those seeking to enter trade after losing their jobs organized into several groups to occupy various places at this ward. Already-existing relationships – at both the place of work and residence – influenced the manner in which individuals aligned horizontally to constitute such groups.

Aspects of the situation in Bangalore that differ from the description given in Bayat's thesis concerning street trade in Tehran are explained by contextual differences in the political milieu. In Tehran, street traders and others tapped into the political opportunities created by the 1979 revolution to encroach quietly and individually on public places. By contrast, KR Market is a ward characterized by dense crowds, a high level of competition for places among street traders and surveillance of public places by both the state and non-state agents. The traffic police know about Raja's group, although they turn a blind eye, as they judge that the traders have no other option. Interestingly, they do not collect bribes from this group, whereas such practices are prevalent in other prime trading agglomerations. Moreover, there are several groups among street traders, all competing with one another to capture/re-capture prime locations. Consequently, street traders find it difficult to encroach on places quietly without tacit/active support of everyday state agents or other users.

Many traders and their families, including Muthu, (discussed in Box 5.1), have been working or trading at the ward for more than one generation and have connections with other agents in the ward. The difference between them, however, is in their ability to enlist support of other street traders or other users in the ward. A trader new to this ward depends on his or her network to secure knowledge about the place and to offset the risk of being displaced by other non-state or state agents. A recurring theme emerging from

the interviews and from conversation with street traders in this ward is the significance of their networks for occupying and holding on their places, as reflected by Laila, a new trader:

...One cannot survive on their own in KR Market. You have to be a dada [leader]... for that reason... people come as a group... If you are a big group, like this ... other traders will be scared of you... otherwise, they will... bully you... about the price you charge... the place... you... sit.

(Interview with Laila, L1, October 2004)

Traders occupying prime trading spots on their own are few. They and their families have worked or traded at this ward for several generations and have extensive connections with economic agents and every day state agents.

Box 5-2 Claims and Connections

Sarasa and her group of five traders sell from a corner at L1 [map]. She lives in an outer-peripheral ward to the south and trades at KR Market (city centre) from 6 am-3 pm. Her grandfather was born in a ward adjoining KR Market and had five sons, all of whom were in vegetable trade. She moved to her present trading place in 2001 and stores part of her merchandise in her uncle's shop. Sarasa supports her residential neighbour Chella, who trades with her husband alongside her in the morning from 9 until 1 pm. Chella sells the remaining vegetables to other street traders after 1 pm, as her place was first occupied by a male trader, Bheema, who is known to Sarasa. Bheema sells cucumbers from 2 pm until late evening. Sarasa informed him and other networks at L1 about her neighbour to avoid any objection. The corporation officials came on the third day after they occupied and asked for money. Sarasa and Chella paid 5Rs to the police and 5Rs to the corporation and continued trading. The corporation officials do not come regularly to collect bribes. Sarasa and Chella have limited interactions with other street-traders at L1. Sarasa buys her merchandise from KR Market and her neighbour sources vegetables from a farm near her residence. Sarasa knows the corporation official and the police. Apparently when she tells them that she has not had a good trade they do not pressurize her for bribes. Leaders do not come to her to collect money.

(Interviews with Sarasa and Chella, L1, June 2004)

Street traders, like other agents claiming their places outside the state's legal framework, draw on different sources: relationships, history and culture⁸⁰. Though traders like Sarasa did not enter into open negotiation with other users, they drew on their historical links in the ward to support new traders and to consolidate their territories. There is also a tacit understanding among users that links place-claims for street trade to one's length of interactions at the ward. In other words, the longer one has traded/worked at a ward, the greater their claims.

Street traders also mutually adjust (Razzaz 1994, 1998) to use the same spot at different times in a day. Further, as can be seen from Box 5.2, traders from different wards of the city travel to KR Market to trade. Their relationship with everyday state agents varies between various networks depending on temporal connections in this ward. The frequency and amount of bribes paid by Sarasa and her networks differ in comparison with other networks, members of which, as shown below, pay an agreed amount daily.

In the wards of the outer periphery, street traders without connections were able to occupy spaces at the edge of the agglomeration. These were spots where not many people congregated or transacted. Subsequently, these traders developed contacts with others at the agglomeration and moved inside to other strategic trading locations, as represented by Chinnamma's experience.

Box 5-3 Incremental Claims in KR Puram in the Outer Periphery

Chinnamma and her husband trade from two places during different daily cycles of trade. In the morning, her husband trades vegetables in bulk, and during the second cycle Chinnamma conducts retail trade. They used to live and trade in a ward adjoining the KR Puram agglomeration in East Bangalore; this agglomeration is located at the intersection of thoroughfares connecting the outlying wards of East Bangalore and KR Market in the city centre. During their travel to KR Market, Chinnamma to learn about the KR Puram agglomeration. One of their acquaintances at KR Market then moved into the squatter settlement adjoining KR Puram agglomeration, and Chinnamma and her husband, initially traded from a rented petty shop in the front of their acquaintance's hut. They bought vegetables from the agglomeration traders during the first time cycle of trade and then sold them to the labourers working in KR Puram agglomeration and passers-by in the late evenings. Over time, a trader from whom they sourced helped them to occupy a place inside the agglomeration during the second cycle of trade. They then developed other contacts and eventually occupied their new place during the first time cycle of trade.

(Interview with Chinnamma, KR Puram Ward, April 2004)

A similar theme in the narratives of street traders at the city centre ward (KR Market) and the wards in the outer periphery is that in both there are references to the quality of spaces secured without the support of other agents. An inter-ward difference among this group of traders is the opportunities for manoeuvring into better-quality places in the same ward. Chinnamma (Box 5.3) was able to re-negotiate and expand her place and trade because, at the time of her entry, the KR Puram agglomeration was expanding. At present, agglomerations in the outer periphery are saturated and spaces for such manoeuvring are scarcer. The high competition for a place is one of the factors

influencing the use of networks for negotiation; this is explored further in Chapter Seven.

Traders in Scattered Locations

Quiet encroachment was a dominant pattern among those trading from scattered locations across the case study wards. However, few traders used their networks to occupy locations near thoroughfares or at the edges of agglomerations. Some had moved to such places after losing their spots in agglomerations (Box 5.4). They thus had networks with other traders but were not able either to enlist their support or compete with them.

Box 5-4 Group capture outside an agglomeration in the outer periphery

I was a leader of street-traders' sangha [at the agglomeration]... but did not agree with the other groups... They [vegetable traders] had the numerical strength... We fruit traders do not ... Coconut traders do not have much interaction with the sangha. We moved out as a group and occupied this space. I know the CMC workers and party activists who gather near the [district administration]. We spoke to the traffic police, the MLA ... before occupying it ... Some traders have moved out of KR Puram ward to other outlying areas ... all traders are from KR Puram and surrounding wards... traders [selling food] are new. We do not know them... they used to come here when the santhe was going on ... some of them are not locals... They are harassed by the police for [trading] here...but they do not collect money from them.

(Interview with Naren, KR Puram, May 2004)

As can be seen from Box 5.4, this leader's local political connections (Seligmann 2004) explained the muted opposition to their occupation of a public pathway from everyday state agents and other users. Those without strong connections in the locality faced frequent raids and harassment by the traffic police.

5.3.2 Capture with the Support of a Network

Street traders draw on informal networks for three reasons in capturing their spaces: (i) to form groups (ii) to secure information about places that could be occupied and (iii) to negotiate with other agents.

Group Formation

Group capture is dominant among street traders at five of the eight agglomerations (L1, L4, L5, and L6, [map 4.4]) in the KR Market Ward. Street traders with already-existing connections organize into several small groups and compete with one another to capture public places, as was also found by Cross (1997) in the context of Mexico. However, there were several differences.

First, the influence of informal networks and the political context in which groups staked their claims are different. As described in Box 5.5, traders captured public places at different locations,⁸¹ following the eviction of 1999–2000. Evicted traders, along with those seeking to enter trade, re-organized into several small groups after the former's efforts to subvert eviction failed. Groups that had emerged to subvert eviction had disintegrated by this time; due to the animosity towards and distrust of old leaders at that time new groups were not mobilized by a leader but rather, spontaneously (Bayat 1997) by street traders and labourers with previously-existing connections. Often, group members selected a representative, referred to henceforth as a network leader, from amongst them to negotiate with other networks of street traders and other agents in the ward. Traders who emerged as network leaders were perceived by others as having extensive connections within the ward and outside.

Box 5-5 Group Capture of KR Market Retail Complex

The KR Retail Market (L1) is one of the various places occupied by street traders at the KR Market Ward. Street traders captured five places at this complex (see photographs): three groups captured the front plaza of the market, while two more groups, along with individual traders, occupied an open space earmarked for future construction, and another captured the courtyard inside the market complex.

Lakkamma is a leader of one of the three large networks at the plaza. Fifty members of her network traded from different places in the ward, thirty more at the plaza, and some others at L5 and L6. Members of her network travel to KR Market from the southern periphery of the city. Her grandparents worked at the market and resided in a neighbourhood adjoining. Her two brothers and her sister's son traded spinach in bulk in the same ward. Adjoining Lakkamma's group is another network of twelve women, who reside in a squatter settlement in the ward. Anita and Bella stated there are no leaders among them, and that they are their own spokespersons. According to Anita,

...My mother and I used to sleep in the old market complex. I found my husband here. He is also a trader... He trades in the other line... but in our families, each one's income is their own... I cannot trust him to provide money for my food... The trader next to me is the wife of a labour union leader. The one who spoke to you is

the sister of another network leader [Kavya, trading at L4]. The person next to her is [Mala]'s sister... Twenty-five people known to me are trading in the market. Family, in this market, means... everyone known to you... relatives, friends and acquaintances.

All twelve of us came through [Kannamma] to the market individually ten years ago... She knew us from when we were children... [Kannamma... could not help] during the eviction in 2000. We formed our own group... Two groups formed... Our group asked [Jacob], a labour union activist] to help us. [Jacob] and his friends spoke to [Murthy], the leader of the [unskilled labourers'] union. [Murthy] did not want to be involved in the beginning, because he did not want to trespass on [Kannamma]... We then decided to pressurize [Kannamma] to talk to [Jacobs] and [Murthy]. It ended in a fight... Now [Kannamma] does not come to us... Her son comes and collect the bribe we agreed to pay... [Jacob] negotiated with [M] to talk to the police and the BCC here. We also made number of request to [MLAs from different parties]... for occupying this place... We pay bribes through [Kannamma]'s son to the BCC police... if you do not have an agreement with them, they will collect what they like and we cannot afford it.

(Interviews with members of two networks at L1, KR Market, Feb – March, 2004)

Between these traders are newcomers like Raji, who are not linked to any network. Raji and her mother reside in the same settlement as Anita. Raji lost her husband and came back to live with her aged mother. Anita's network adjusted and provided a place of one square foot... One corner of the plaza is occupied by, Velu, a male leader, with his group consisting of nine male and female traders. Velu organized his group to occupy this place with the support of Murthy. Velu considers himself to be a leader, but with relatively less power as compared with Murthy, the labour union leader. Velu is a party activist for a regional party, AIADMK, headquartered in the neighbouring state of Tamilnadu. He is the local organizer of the Karnataka wing, and resides in a neighbouring ward to the northwest of KR Market.

A second difference from Mexico relates to the flexible horizontal alliances between different networks; that is, the network coalitions of street traders to capture places at an agglomeration. While Cross found stable organizations in Mexico, alliances in Bangalore are fluid in time and specific to the purpose of capturing a place. After occupying a place, the various networks function independently and monitor their territories closely. When a new trader occupies a place at a later stage, network leaders predominantly negotiate within their network to accommodate them, as in the case of Ravi. Such give-and-take is driven by expectations of similar future reciprocities (Seligmann 2004) between networks. Moreover, each network, either along with their coalition or independently, negotiates through different circuits of non-state agents to agglomerate in a particular place, as shown below.

The use of multiple – horizontal and vertical – networks can be seen in Box 5.6. A group of market labourers moved into street trade and drew on their networks with religious leaders and wholesale trader-employers, to occupy a contested space. Unlike the earlier group, these traders made use of the opportunity in 2000 to enter trade and capture a place.

Box 5-6 Capture of Contested Places Outside a Market Complex

Outside a Market complex in KR Market ward, there is a group of 25 fruit traders occupying a location claimed by an influential mosque in the city and by the state... According to Syed, the leader of this group, traders pay a daily rent of 100Rs per vehicle to the mosque and 25Rs as bribes to different officials. He and some of his network members previously worked as unskilled labourers in a wholesale market in this ward. Other members of this group resided in his settlement. Syed decided to start to trade because he was no longer able to carry heavy load. When the fruit market was shifted to a ward in the periphery, many workers found it difficult to commute, and entered trading. They formed a group under the leadership of Syed, and when the group first decided to occupy this land, Syed spoke to a wholesale shop owner who was also in the mosque committee, to ask him to talk to the Imam. At first, the police harassed the traders; the traders contacted a minister through the Imam, and subsequently, a traffic police officer asked them to provide space for two traders known to him. Syed accommodated these traders and now their relationship with the police is said to be cordial.

(Interviews with Second Cycle Traders at L7, KR Market, July 2004)

A recurring theme among agglomeration traders across the case study wards was that of '*capture*' and '*control of territory*' as a group, which was mediated through social relations. Relationships between the leaders and members of a network, non-state agents and officials is fluid and evolving through everyday interactions, as indicated by Syed's relationship to the traffic police. Some networks of traders (Box 5.6) who were not able to capture a place at KR Market have moved to different wards in the inner and the outer periphery. Traders from such networks often have connections with their counterparts in other wards, who provide them with information and support in establishing connections with other agents at the new location, in order to negotiate their entry.

Box 5-7 Group capture of KR Market Evictees in the Outer Periphery

Naren's network has 23 traders, who have been trading at KR Puram agglomeration for the last 12 years. His parents traded potatoes and onions from a shop front in one of the market complexes at KR Market Ward in the city centre. When the wholesale trade in potatoes and onions shifted from KR Market to another ward, in North Bangalore, his father lost his trading space. The shops vacated by wholesale traders were demolished, but other street traders captured the vacant land before Naren's group could. There were no other suitable locations for their trade at KR Market. A wholesale trader offered to provide a space for his father in a northern ward, but his

father did not want to shift, as the new market did not have much of a clientele. At the wholesale shop, they came to know of a trader trading at KR Puram agglomeration through whom they contacted the land manager. The manager initially showed them a place at the edge; it was a parking space where the group could not display their merchandise. For three months, they traded from their vehicles. Then the manager asked one of the networks, occupying a main place in the agglomeration, to move a little bit and 'adjust', and in return provided Naren's group some space. It was not much but the group could display some items on the ground. In 2002, the highways department acquired a part of the land used by traders to build a road connecting KR Puram Ward with an IT park in a neighbouring ward. N's group once again lost their place. However, the manager organized the clearing of a place earmarked for garbage dumping and allotted it to them. He could provide Naren's group of 12 traders with a place of 15'x10'. Older traders in the group occupied that space, while younger traders such as N sit alongside and display their wares in small quantities. Subsequently Naren rented a place in the same agglomeration which had been captured by a woman from KR Puram [see map]. According to Naren, '*Many traders adjust like this here. It is very hard to get a place here. I knew her after coming to KR Puram.*'

(Interview with Naren (network leader), KR Puram Agglomeration

Although each group competed to control a strategic location within an agglomeration or a ward, there was also a recognition of the need to accommodate 'traders like [them]'. For example, some like Naren's uncle have a place to display and trade, while others, belonging to the same network, use claims hinging on connections to previous occupiers to hang on to a place, a pattern found in other wards. Such adjustments, according to traders, are based on trust and can happen only between traders with close connections. Reasons for this adjustment are discussed in Chapter Seven.

Further, as can be inferred from Naren's experience, street traders' negotiations in relation to their places are never complete, as their claims are contested by several agents: their counterparts, as well as other non-state and state agents. As can be seen from Box 5.7, every time the state reclaims land occupied by street traders and their allies, the traders manage to reclaim new places at the same ward or outside. Their connections in the particular ward or agglomeration influence their bargaining power individually or as a group. The logistics of organizing their everyday trade is another factor that influences the group capture of places at the wards in the outer periphery. A case in point is the experience of weekly traders. Beniappa's narrative, as a third-generation trader and network leader trades in three wards, represents the dominant pattern of 'capturing and controlling territories' among this group.

Box 5-8 Group Capture among Weekly traders

There are nearly 22 groups among weekly traders at KR Puram, and between 10 and –12 at Varathur. In my networks, there are 20 people at KR Puram and five at Varathur. I, like a few others in my network, live at Varathur, but I started to trade at KR Puram, with my parents. In Varathur there must be 14 families who were in *santhe* trade. However, many traders in my network are new to trading. They used to work as agricultural labourers. We... go to other wards as a group. Our situation is different from traders in KR Market Ward. We have to travel to different places... to buy vegetables and to trade... Four tempos [passenger vans] go to KR Puram and KR Market everyday from Varathur. It will drop us there and will pick us up in the evening. When we need to find a place to trade in a ward, we form a group, approach influential traders from other wards, and occupy with their support. A trader told me about the place in Kadugodi. I asked a few traders at KR Puram and my chit group in Varathur, if they are willing to come with me. Sometimes, we learn about the places from the tempo drivers. When you need a place, others have to agree to you sitting there. You cannot go and occupy it, even if the place is vacant.

(Interview with Beniappa, network organizer trading at the agglomerations in the KR Puram and Varathur Wards, May 2004)

As can be seen from box 5.8, aspects of mobility and the need to negotiate with traders and land managers from wards where they are not residents influenced the formation of these groups.

As the name suggests, weekly traders trade from different wards in the outer periphery on each day of the week. On an average, such traders move between three and four wards during the week. A majority of weekly traders often traded and lived in different wards, and they and their network leaders have limited knowledge about the agglomerations in other wards. Further, unlike other locations, these places are managed by a land manager – a private agent appointed by the state. Even if traders have knowledge of a place, their leaders do not have connections with the land managers prior to their move. Thus, a group seeking to locate at *santhe* locations in the outer periphery depend on the support of influential network leaders who are residents at the concerned wards to secure information and to negotiate with the land manager. Further, wards where *santhes* are organized are not connected easily by public transport. Network leaders like Beniappa have diversified into the transport business and negotiate on behalf of their group in other places.

Significantly, weekly traders belonged to different networks in different wards (see Box 5.8). Their groups formed predominantly at the place of their trade. Due to the time rhythms of *santhe* trade, which stretch from 9 am to 9 pm, traders residing from different

wards have opportunities to interact here and forge ties with one another. A trader, upon negotiating entry to one location through one group, joined traders in other groups to find a place in a second or third ward.

At present, as places are saturated, securing membership in such groups some time after they have been formed is said to be difficult. The key persons in a group accommodate only their very close connections after a group has occupied a place. This is because accommodating a new trader means adjustments within the group that involve giving up some space. The key persons have to negotiate with other members in their network for such an adjustment, and they are reluctant to do so. Although daily markets have developed over the last decade at some *santhe* locations, particularly in the eastern and southern outer-peripheral wards like KR Puram, a majority of weekly traders continue their practice of trading from different locations. On the days they are absent from a usual place, their spaces are either left vacant or there are arrangements for them to be rotated within a network. Among daily traders at such wards, the first generation of traders captured their places as a group. Labourers working for first-cycle traders organized as a group and captured places to trade from during the second cycle with the support of their employers and the land manager (see Box 5.9). They then supported their networks to secure trading places here. At present, there are three networks among daily traders at KR Puram, and some non-aligned.

Box 5-9 Evolution of daily hawking at KR Puram

We used to work as labourers in the weekly market and live here... The market grew as some farmers, instead of going to KR Market, started to sell their produce to street traders from KR Puram, who would then sell it to itinerant traders from surrounding wards... there is no retail market for [perishable good] in East Bangalore, other than this one and the HAL market... We came here to work as labourers for first-cycle traders... [Five] of us... spoke to [a first-cycle trade close to land manager] to help us... to trade... after our work... The [land manager] does not care about rules... He needs his collection... He settled the City Municipal Corporation (CMC) people... We do not know what he gives the CMC... from us; he collects the daily rate stipulated for weekly traders... The taluk (district administration) office and the City Municipal Corporation are located next to this *santhe*. The Dalit Sangarsha Samithi activists used to meet at the entrance of these offices every day... At one time, they were supporting Dalits in occupying government land in different parts of Bangalore. They brought around 80–100 families here and asked them to erect huts on the vacant land. They said they would also support us. We started to set up petty shops... [and we put up] wooden stalls. The settlement and the petty shops were evicted... But, we traders came back and re-occupied... Then their relatives came here.... The rest of them purchased their places... and some through the help of [people known to them]. I came to know [Puttanna, a land manager] later... [He] found places for three people... My employer supported sixteen other people.... Everyone here came through

someone... Now there are three groups [at this agglomeration] ...We do fight but we also... help one another...

(Interviews with Rashid and Srinivas, Daily Traders, KR Puram Agglomeration, April 2004)

Networks of daily traders at KR Puram consolidated over time, unlike those of weekly traders or KR Market traders. DSS, a state-level political organization, supported the expansion of daily trade at KR Puram. After the occupation by the first network, DSS mobilized labourers working for first-cycle traders along with squatter dwellers from other wards to appropriate more vacant land for trading. Daily traders' initially supplied the squatter dwellers or traded from the edge of the squatter settlement. Following the eviction of the squatter settlement in 1995, the first daily traders enlisted the support of DSS to re-capture the same place for themselves and some of their networks. The role of DSS and street-level brokers has declined over time, and at present street traders are starting to negotiate directly with network leaders or land managers. Network leaders dominantly support new traders in occupying places at this agglomeration. One of the daily traders' networks has also taken over the management of *santhes* from a private contractor. However, DSS still serves in different ways as an important channel for network leaders and street traders. Network leaders depend on DSS to secure information on government orders/resolutions relating to land, while street traders, with weak connections to network leaders, need DSS for information and/or mediation of sale agreements on trading places.

Networks as Conduits of Information and Negotiation

There are two patterns in relation to the use of networks for securing information and negotiating for the occupation of places among street traders in the case study wards. These are:

- *Use of a Single Network: Direct and Indirect Connections*

Street traders who capture their spaces individually secure information and negotiate for the space through their direct or indirect connections. At the KR Market Ward in the city centre, such traders have connections with wholesale traders and trade predominantly from shop-fronts and mosques' courtyards at different agglomerations. According to a

wholesale trader, each shop-keeper allows four or five traders to trade in front of their shops. Many street traders among this group either do not have direct connections or have only a weak influence over their wholesale trader. Consequently, they negotiate via an intermediary, who is often a street trader or other agent with strong connections to a wholesale trader. The strength of connections between street traders, intermediaries and wholesale traders influences their terms of occupation. Traders who have negotiated via an indirect tie pay a daily rent of 80–150Rs in different market complexes, or a lease amount of 25,000Rs for a space of nine square feet for a period of one year.

A dominant pattern among street traders who capture their spaces individually at the other wards is the way they secure information and negotiate directly through their connections. At the KR Puram ward in the outer periphery, the first generation of daily traders who subsequently emerged as network-leaders negotiated directly on behalf of their members with the land manager. Street traders at the three wards in the inner periphery, and HAL ward in the outer periphery, predominantly secured their information and negotiated via a previous occupier at their agglomeration.

...The typical route is, one of your relatives will show you the places where you can buy and... help you to stand in a place for trading. Initially they will tell you to sell part of their merchandise, provide you with a separate vehicle... You will... be working as a labourer for him. In that, they will not share a profit, but will give you daily wages... Over time, you move up to become their partner... or develop your own contact,... find another place and start your own trade... Traders at this agglomeration have helped... new street traders in getting a vehicle and... set up their stalls... They finance one another...

(Interview with Bombay Trader, a network leader, April 2004)

Network leaders at these agglomerations are often first-generation traders or their descendants. For example, at BG ward in the inner periphery, the first generation of six traders in vegetable trade used to work as labourers at the KR Market Ward. They moved out of KR Market as they could not secure places for their trade there. They occupy public pathways in front of vacant plots, on one side of the road, and over time have consolidated their hold, as they did not face any resistance. They have captured more places more than they need and have allotted some to those with whom they have close connections. Similarly, at another ward, a first-generation trader who diversified into the vehicle business had supported many of his close ties to secure places at their agglomeration. Supporting a new trader fitted into their strategy of expanding their networks, as some traders were also active leaders at their places of residence and

community. Network leaders viewed supporting their networks as an integral part of their reciprocal obligations, linked to their household or community. Such acts formed part of their larger strategies for consolidating power within a household, community, and at their place of trade.

Upon occupying a place, groups consolidate predominantly around a trader who supports their occupation. During my field work, I found three such networks at the agglomeration in the HAL Ward; around nine at the BG Ward and between fifteen to seventeen networks of varying sizes at the JNGR Ninth and Fourth Block wards in the inner periphery.

Few traders with weak connections to another street trader, are able to draw on the support of other residents and formal traders with influence in local politics in their ward. Groups develop around the first occupier depending on their ability to support other traders to find a place or speak on their behalf at the time of eviction.

In our group there are twenty-one of us... I supported six of them. Others did not have anything to do with us before. They all came like us... [They] knew the retail traders near the complex area and asked their permission to set up stalls there. They asked me to be their spokesperson. These people expect a leader to perform two functions: one is to take care of the traffic police, and the second is to make sure no new traders come into the area.

(Interview with Deena, JNGR Fourth Block, November 2003)

These networks were small, stable, close-knit units. Network members socialize primarily with members of their own network, and have, sometimes evolved arrangements for sharing transport expenses, fulfilling an order or dealing with household obligations, as shown in Chapter Eight. This does not mean conflicts are totally absent within these networks, but they are relatively fewer as compared to some networks in KR Market Ward. Drawing on more than one network for securing information and for negotiating with previous occupiers is not common among traders at the wards in the inner periphery. An exception is a group of traders who moved to an inner-peripheral ward after losing their places at KR Market. These traders negotiated with previous occupiers as a group, and used different networks to secure information about a place and for negotiation.

A recent phenomenon (post 2000) is the influence of local political organizations on the way street traders occupy spaces in some wards of the inner periphery. As shown in

Chapters Six and Seven, following their role as an intermediary between street traders and the state when attempts are being made to subvert eviction, these organizations have come to influence street traders' processes for occupying places. One outcome is that although new traders have connections with network leaders, they find it difficult to capture spaces at these agglomerations. This in turn propels the emergence of spaces being rented, leased, and purchased, and these transactions develop between traders with connections to previous occupiers in agglomerations.

- *Multiple Networks: ST – Network Leaders – Intermediaries – Everyday state*

Drawing on two or more networks to secure information and to negotiate with other users is dominant among agglomeration traders at the KR Market Ward in the City Centre and in KR Puram and Varathur in the outer periphery. The characteristic of intermediaries involved in this process varies across the wards, as can be seen from table 5.1.

Traders' group at the city centre ward draw on more than one network for several reasons. First, they predominantly capture their places in groups, and intermediaries play a significant role in the negotiation process between leaders of various networks and the everyday state. Although street traders have links with the agents of the everyday state, they tend to negotiate with them through their vertical connections. This pattern of using networks is driven by perceptions about their influence with everyday state agents. As argued by Bian (2000), the presence of connections does not necessarily translate into influence.

Further, there are two-way flows of information and negotiation (Seligmann 2005) between street traders' networks and their intermediaries. Intermediaries use their influence over network leaders to accommodate their clients, both men and women. In such instances, a new trader in a group consolidates their relationship over time and identifies themselves as part of one of the networks closer to his location.

Another reason for using more than one network relates to street traders' relationships with various intermediaries and their perception of an intermediary's power and influence over other intermediaries and with various levels of state authority. For example, weak connections with both an intermediary at the ward level and state agents have consequences for some networks of street traders who captured their spaces in two

agglomerations in KR Market. Hence, they negotiate through different networks with agents located inside and outside the ward. They negotiate with senior bureaucrats in the local state through their employers - wholesale traders - and with labour leaders, in particular the unskilled labourers' union, through other agents embedded in their trade. This pattern of drawing on a chain of intermediaries is very specific to the city centre ward and KR Puram and Varathur wards where weekly markets are located.

The ability to secure timely information and to organize a group to capture a place quickly affects the quality of places secured by different networks in this ward. Key persons among street traders with extensive networks which included agents in the lower hierarchy of the ward's politics and economy are able to draw on different networks to secure information and to negotiate with the everyday state or land managers at various wards. For example, a network leader at one agglomeration in KR Market Ward secured her information from retail traders but drew on her connections with the labour union leaders to negotiate with everyday state agents. This pattern of use was influenced by the competition between various networks to claim places at that time in this ward and network leaders' differing relationships with various intermediaries.

At the outer periphery, leaders of various networks of weekly traders negotiate with land managers on behalf for their group. As there was no connection with the land manager prior to their occupation, this influenced the decision to draw on multiple networks for negotiation.

I spoke to the manager and helped traders from [two wards] to occupy places in Varathur. Traders from Kadugodi supported our group in occupying places there. The leader, whom I helped at Varathur, helped us to occupy spaces at a third location – Channasandra. It is not that we only help traders who helped in another location... But we do not mix with all in the santhe every day. You do everything with your group. At Varathur, people sit together with their group from the same place. We do so at KR Puram... Now there is no place in any of the santhes... You can get a place only if you know someone really well and... are willing to adjust.

(Interview with Beniappa, May 2004 and December 2005)

Although the first generation of street traders such as Beniappa have strong ties with land managers at different wards, their influence over them is variable. Consequently, network leaders residing outside the wards where the agglomeration is located depend on other network leaders already trading there for information and for influencing the

land manager. As can be inferred from Beniappa's narrative, such transactions are influenced by perceptions of the influence of network leaders and their ability to fulfil similar reciprocities.

5.3.3 Sharing Spaces

At the city centre ward there were two forms of sharing spaces. The dominant one is that of first-cycle traders allowing both those with whom they have close ties as well as new migrants with relatively weak connections to trade from their place during the second cycle. New migrants, having forged ties with a street trader, work and live at these spots. Some high-end street traders see this as an altruistic act on their part to support a migrant without any connections.

Another pattern, less common in the city centre but more prevalent at the outer periphery, is an established trader seeking to expand their trade by entering into partnership with those trying to enter trade.

Box 5-10 Sharing in KR Market

...In my place, I was trading alone. Now I bring goods and have allowed Pani and Sita to sit there and trade... In the market, if you are able to sit in a place, then you have the right to trade from that place... [Pani] and [Sita] also have some rights to use that place as much as I have. I cannot tell them tomorrow to go home. It does not work like that. If you want to move up, you need support... you cannot be a lone operator...

Different types of trade have different timings in KR Market... the same space will be used by different groups... [in] a day. After we finish our orange trade, knife traders will come and sit there. Someday when the knife seller does not come, another fellow who sells [fruit] will come and sell. We know and have an understanding amongst ourselves as to who can come when and sell which product... it is based on trust... it will not work with someone whom you do not know...

(Interview with Kavya, March 2004)

Street traders like Kavya have extensive ties in the ward and the ability to source goods, but not necessarily the finance to employ labour. These arrangements allow traders like her to expand their trade and to consolidate their networks, as well as safeguard their place. New traders like Pani and Sita, because of their limited ties with other agents in the ward, are constrained either to source products on credit or to secure finance for investment or a place, and found such arrangements useful.

Due to the saturation of spaces in street trading agglomerations in many wards, partnerships is one way by which new traders negotiate incrementally for a place. For example, each agglomeration trader is allowed to occupy a space of 1.5mx1m or 1mx1m at KR Market; 1mx2m in the inner periphery; and 1mx1m to a maximum of 1.5mx 2m in the outer peripheral wards. Towards 2005, Pani started to organize chits among some traders at her agglomeration. She was also planning to negotiate with the neighbouring trader for an independent space from which to trade in the second cycle.

Similar to Singermen's (1995) finding concerning Sha'bi residents in Egypt, every trader – man and woman – upon establishing a foothold in a ward invests in building their networks to secure resources and to consolidate their power at the trading location, household, and community. Chits, organizing festivals, and supporting others' efforts to occupy places are common ways of consolidating one's position in their networks. However, such opportunities to expand one's networks differed across the case study wards because of differences in the ward characteristics as shown in Chapter 7.

As echoed in Kavya's narrative (Box 5.10), due to the tacit norms over claims to a place at this ward, leaders prefer to restrict these transactions to their close networks. They believe that any conflicts will be minimal or can be resolved among people who know each other. Moreover, rather than describing Sita as an employee, Kavya described her as a trading partner who 'shares my space', and by implication Kavya has the first claim to the space in times of conflict with the state.

At Varathur and KR Puram in the outer-periphery where sharing was found, agglomeration traders have two options to expand their trade, due to their place/time rhythms of trading at the location and the trading practice of traders. One is to move to daily trade, but this is possible only in wards where weekly markets have developed into daily markets. The other is to find places in other wards where weekly markets are held. Traders with a place agreed to enter into partnerships as a way of sourcing additional finance and also due to the logistics involved in organizing everyday trading.

Now no one is getting a place to trade... at Varathur [and at] KR Puram... Forty years ago, there was no competition for places... [Now] one has to inform the [land manager] and you can sit in any place you want. Now land has become a problem everywhere... In Varathur I trade on my own but did not get any place inside the [agglomeration]. In KR Puram, [Raju] and [I] trade from [Narayan]'s place. We entered into partnership because of the location... It has... nothing to do with money... but to do with place... I can raise money ... run chits here in the colony... Both of us sit in the same spot... We invest in 'sister' [complementary] trades. [N]

has lemon and chillies, and I will sell the remaining vegetables. We share the overall investment and profit.

(Interviews with Muniyan, Varathur and KR Puram Wards. April/May 2009)

As can be inferred from the above text, sharing arrangements between traders are shaped by considerations of space as much as by other economic considerations. That space is a scarce resource is an observation which recurred in the interviews of street traders. Although partnership arrangements involved close networks, there was a guarded trust between these nodes and traders were aware of the possible conflict in future. Such practices were not found at the inner-peripheral ward. The closest was for a trader to allow known persons to occupy spaces immediately, in front of their shops.

5.3.4 Renting, Leasing and Purchasing Spaces

The renting, leasing, and sale of trading spots was prevalent across the seven wards. These practices provided a way for itinerant traders or a new trader to find places in agglomerations, as well as those who had lost their places, whether due to voluntary or involuntary displacement at an agglomeration. Information relating to the availability of spots, and negotiation between the traders involved, was coordinated through networks across the case study wards. Rents paid by traders to occupy shop fronts at KR Market Ward were discussed above. Rents and lease amounts paid by traders at the other six wards are as follows: daily rent for vehicle and space in an agglomeration was about 80Rs per day, and the lease amount was between 40,000Rs and 50,000Rs, for a period of two to three years.

Rent and sale prices differ by location and relations between members of a network at Varathur and KR Puram Wards in the outer periphery. According to a local leader, rent for prime spots measuring 1.5mx3m to 3mx3m range from 150–200Rs per day. For other spots it varies from 50–100Rs per day. Most weekly traders negotiate for a consolidated monthly rent. Sale prices range from a minimum of 10,000 to 15,000Rs at Varathur and between 5,000–50,000Rs at KR Puram.

At the inner periphery, street traders who rent/lease out their vehicle and places in agglomerations, predominantly use this strategy, as with land or residential property, as a way to raise finances to meet emergencies or for investments in chits. Although there

is another group, consisting of vehicle manufacturers who rent out vehicles, they do not involve themselves in negotiations over place. Both groups rent out to those known to them or who have been introduced through their networks. They perceive negotiations through networks as a necessary measure to offset the risk of losing their vehicle or trading spot in an agglomeration.

The need for finance to cope with situations at home or trading loss and conflicts with neighbouring traders are reasons cited by street traders for renting out their trading spaces at the HAL agglomeration in the outer periphery. Despite the relatively inferior quality of some of these places, they are still in demand due to the lack of alternative locations for itinerant traders and new traders to trade from a fixed place.

However, the sale of trading spots was limited in many wards, with the exception of *santhe* locations. This is because as the nature of trade and time cycles in these markets changes, weekly traders who could not shift to a perishable goods trade are selling their spots. Moreover, as vacant land is available adjoining *santhes*, local resident-traders have captured places that are subsequently rented or sold out. At the other wards, due to demand for spaces across these agglomerations, an occupier tends to sell his vehicle along with the place only when they are moving out of the city or as a final option.

A potential buyer and seller prefer to transact among or through networks for the following reason: from the buyer's point of view, it offsets the risks of a seller not fulfilling his obligations. From the sellers' perspective, they prefer to know about their potential buyers, particularly their trading interests, in order to offset competition to their own trade and to avoid conflicts with other established networks in the agglomeration, specifically if a trader occupies part of their place. In such transactions, the seller is obligated to negotiate on behalf of a buyer with other network leaders and a land manager. In short, they have to ensure the buyer's – a new trader's – stability at the agglomeration. A similar contractual obligation has been observed in the land transaction processes related to informal land development for housing (Razzaz 1994; Nkurunziza 2005). It is, though, difficult to estimate the scale of such practices across the case study wards, as such transactions are not easily visible and are confined to close connections. Traders keep transactions related to sale or lease quiet until they are finalized because of the risk of losing their spaces to an external agent or to other powerful network leaders.

Payments of bribes to everyday state agents differ among street traders in and across the case study wards. At the city centre ward, it is common among traders trading at public places (e.g. L1, L4, L5, L6 and L7) who paid between 25 – 40Rs per day to different state and non-state agents. When a group captures a place, they negotiate the amount and route it via the intermediaries. Street traders view it as a way of minimizing uncertainty and the costs associated with erratic raids.

Street traders in one ward in the inner -periphery pay their bribes annually. Street trader leaders negotiate directly with the state agents concerned. Payment of daily or annual bribes is not found in the other two wards or in the three wards across the outer periphery. Although the daily amount collected by the land manager is not strictly within the terms of the contract with the state, street traders perceive it as rent for the place.

5.3.5 Inheritance

Some agglomeration traders have inherited their trading spaces: these are at BG Ward in the inner periphery, and Varathur and KR Puram in the outer periphery. They are the second- or third-generation traders at this location. The place which was captured by the first occupier has been subdivided among descendants and relatives, and the current occupiers have just enough space to spread their wares.

Box 5-11 Inheritance at BG Ward

Mani, a trader-leader and his brother are second-generation traders at the GBR agglomeration in BG ward. He trades here along with his mother and three brothers. His father's place measured 10' x 10', which is now subdivided into three stalls. Nanjappa is one of two traders who sells from a basket measuring 5' x 5' in front of Mani's shop. Nanjappa's mother used to trade in this market but lost her place during an eviction. Mani supported him and his brother in occupying the road in front of their stalls. In contrast to Nanjappa, his other brother Sadappa stores his goods at Mani's stall and roams around the agglomeration for his trade. He could not get any place to display his goods, but old traders allow him to roam around.

Across the case study wards children of first-generation traders are accommodated when they lose their places or further subdivision is not possible in the place held by their household. Traders like Sadappa above are allowed to move around the cluster or to occupy spaces at the edge of an agglomeration.

Inheritance was not found at the other two wards in the inner periphery. In these wards, street trading started in the 1970s and many first generation occupiers have either sold their spaces, or rented or leased to other traders, or managed to capture new places on behalf of their networks. At the HAL Ward in East Bangalore and at the Market Ward, as noted above, traders have recently renegotiated for their places.

5.3.6 Conclusion

This chapter explored the strategies used by street traders for occupying their places in Bangalore. There are two theories (see 2.4) about the strategies of street traders in other contexts: group claims through organization (Cross 1998a), and quiet encroachment (Bayat 1997). Findings summarized in this chapter illustrate the limitation of both theories for explaining the heterogeneous forms and agents associated with strategies in Bangalore. Their processes of negotiation are not only complex, as suggested by Macharia, but the agents involved differ across the case study wards. They enter into negotiation with one another and with the everyday state, as well as with other users in the ward.

The high level of competition for places, and surveillance by other street traders and users, constrains their opportunities for encroaching quietly in the case study wards. They function as a group to stake claims in agglomerations, because of the higher level of competition and to offset the risks of losing their places to other street traders and other non-state agents. By contrast to Cross's thesis, informal networks provide the organizational context of their strategies. Both theories overlook their negotiation with non-state agents.

However, a closer look reveals that their strategies are not simply '*acts of trickery*' or '*defence*' (Bayat, 2000: 546) but are complex negotiated acts. Neither, can street traders' strategies be accurately described as '*every day forms of resistance*' (Scott, 1985) which highlights the ability of poor people to resist their oppressors through actions such as dragging, dissimulation, false compliance arson etc., Rather, street traders' manage to advance their interest and '*cumulatively encroach ... [and] expand their spaces*' (Bayat, 2000:546). Thus, their strategies cannot be equated to protest, resistance or trickery alone but these enable street traders '*not only of protesting governmental rules and*

regulations but also provide relief for members from these rules and regulations' (Razzaz, 1994:12).

The lens of non-compliance (Razzaz 1994) allows us to capture the multiplicity of strategies. It is a way to control contested resources; and most importantly, it is a way of offsetting risks associated with such transactions.⁷ *Neither protests nor deviance are sufficient conditions for non-compliance ... [Such acts] are aimed at providing] relief for members from [state] rules and regulations that cannot be reduced to mere deviance or corruption'*. These entailed negotiations to "apply enough pressure to induce the state to ... change ... elements of governance" and other 'subtle' strategies to pre-empt its rules' (Razzaz 1994:12). The specific forms of non-compliance were influenced by location. In controlling land resources contested by others, a non-compliant group evolves 'institutional arrangement capable of appropriating, using and exchanging the resource within the group itself' (Ostrom 1990). Networks provide the institutional arrangement for deploying their strategies at Bangalore.

Further, this chapter illustrates the role of informal networks in strategies for occupying places. Evidence in relation to this is grounded in anecdotes in the reviewed studies. This chapter shows that the use of networks varies among street traders by location, but is dominant among agglomeration traders. The choice of using either horizontal or vertical networks, or either single or multiple networks, to secure information and for negotiation differs across the wards. In revealing the role of social networks on agents' strategies for claiming places or other resources outside the law, these, findings parallel Singermen (1995) and Nkurunziza (2007).

6 Subverting Eviction: Threat and Networked Non-compliance

6.1 Introduction

This chapter engages with another disagreement in the literature, concerning street-traders' strategies for subverting eviction and the use of networks in their strategies. Drawing on Razzaz (1994) and Singermen (1995), it argues that the lens of 'networked non-compliance' is useful for conceptualising both their strategies for subverting eviction and for occupying places.

There are four sections in this chapter. The following section sets out the disagreements and gaps in the literature and findings from Bangalore. Inter- and intra-ward patterns relating to the strategies of subverting eviction and their implications for theory are considered in the third and fourth sections.

6.2 Disagreements and Findings in the Literature

Disagreements and gaps in the literature in relation to street traders' strategies for subverting eviction are in the following areas: (i) forms and scale of subversive actions; (ii) engagement with the state; and (iii) the use of networks (see Bayat 1997; Tripp 1989; Singermen 1995; Cross 1998; and also Section 2.3.4).

Street traders resort to a range of subversive actions, including 'everyday forms of resistance' (Scott 1985), which are subtle and invisible, and localized collective action such as street protests and/or collective lobbying as suggested by Bayat (1997) and Cross (1998 a, 1998b) respectively (see 2.3.2 and 2.3.4). These findings suggest there is a need to move beyond a homogenous conception of forms of subversive action. Further, in contrast to the dominant emphasis on street traders' relationship with the municipal state in many studies (see 2.3.4) and as suggested by Stillerman (2006), street traders in the case study wards engage simultaneously with everyday state agents and with other levels of the state. Their strategies for this engagement are influenced by three factors: location, everyday relationships in the ward, and perceptions of threat.

Central to both subversive actions and negotiation with the state is the role of networks, consisting of both horizontal and vertical alliances which are drawn on flexibly during different stages of a conflict. Street traders do not always draw on the same networks, particularly vertical networks. There are connections between those in street trading in different wards, but inter-ward alliances for collective action are limited (although there is significant sharing of information).

6.3 Threats, Forms of Subversive Action and the Use of Networks

As shown in Chapter Four, street traders differentiate between everyday conflicts and development threats. Strategies used by agglomeration traders and traders scattered in different location to subvert the two types of threats are discussed below.

6.3.1 Everyday Conflicts and Responses

Traders scattered in different locations face frequent, almost daily, raids by the agents of the everyday state (Fuller and Harris 2001) at two wards – one in the inner periphery and another in the outer periphery. Those operating independently also faced more opposition from non-state agents as compared to those trading in small groups at the edge of agglomerations or at different street corners in the interior parts of the ward. Similar conflicts between agglomeration traders and the everyday state (Fuller and Harris 2001) are prevalent at the KR Market Ward and at a ward in the inner periphery, within the BCC boundary. However, the nature as well as frequency of conflict differs between agglomerations and various locations within an agglomeration as shown in Fig 4.4. Agglomeration traders also face the threat of displacement by their counterparts in the two wards.

Everyday forms of resistance (Scott 1985), particularly dodging and encroaching individually when surveillance is reduced, (Tripp 1997), are predominant among scattered location traders across the different wards. Group actions are limited, an exception being the pattern observed in a ward in the inner periphery. Small groups of street traders located themselves at the same or adjoining street corners organize to

negotiate agreements with agents of the everyday state on bribes and the timings of raids and seizures. They also take turns to spread the risk of loss relating to raids. Traders who are not part of any such group are targeted almost on a daily basis. There are instances where some traders have moved to itinerant trading due to the cost of resisting eviction, as described in Chapter Seven. Group actions were dominant among agglomeration traders.

Among scattered-location traders, there are differences in the way they draw on their networks for their group actions. Groups that form to counter everyday state agents are informal coalitions, and membership is influenced by previously-existing ties and relationships at places of trade and residence. Even though scattered-location traders have ties with agglomeration traders and face similar threats, they lobby the state independently, until such times they perceive a threat as severe. They then draw on their horizontal connections with agglomeration traders in order to enlist the support of political representatives. Alliances between networks are thus fluid. One factor that influences the strength of horizontal alliances at the two locations is traders' conflicting relationships, particularly over the issue of place. A significant proportion of street traders who trade at scattered locations have been displaced from an agglomeration following a conflict with their counterparts.

6.3.2 Evictions associated with Mega-Urban Development Programmes

As with everyday threats, strategies used by scattered-location traders to subvert development threat are predominantly dodging and encroachment (Tripp 1997; Bayat 1997); they are able to encroach after agglomeration traders have recaptured their own places. An inter-ward similarity is that whenever agglomeration traders are evicted, this also affects those trading at scattered locations. During such times, there is increased surveillance of all places in a ward, and no trader is allowed to re-occupy their place.

By contrast, agglomeration traders' forms of subversive action vary according to perceptions of threat; agglomeration traders across the case study wards are affected by different types of mega-urban development programmes and associated real estate dynamics (see Section 4.2.5), and they are often caught unaware as evictions are undertaken without any prior notification, to prevent organized resistance. However,

rumours of imminent eviction relating to development projects circulated well before the actual event in the case study wards.

One similarity across the wards is that agglomeration traders do not resort to overt conflicts in the initial stages. They use a variety of covert strategies in small groups, including foot dragging, evasion, co-option and lobbying (Scott 1985). This then escalates into different forms of localized (i.e. ward level) collective action. Box 6.1 represents a trajectory of responses at the KR Market ward in the city centre; this is a pattern also common to other wards. It underscores the importance of situating their forms of subversive actions in relation to perceptions of threat.

Box 6-1 From Everyday Resistance to Collective Action

Our problems [have] started ever since the [wholesale shops were] shifted out of this ward... When the wholesale shops were shifted, the owners did not tell us anything. They... told us... we... could continue to be here as usual... We... started to go to the [the re-located site] to bring our stock... Trading flourished during the first two weeks... many of us started to sell goods in bulk... Previously, we were retail traders ...Slowly, after a month they [the state agents] started obstructing our trade. They... raid[ed] once a week... then on alternative days, which then progressed to every hour of a day.

... Earlier, whenever the corporation and the traffic police came to our street, we used to pay them as we wished. Before the wholesale shops were shifted, even if we [street traders] did not pay... they never used to trouble us... The police will come occasionally for collection... If you give them 5Rs or some fruits they would take it... there were no regular bribes... no pressure... They used to harass those on the other pavement... But then things changed.

We... would run... [then] come back and reoccupy... They were adamant that we should not trade here... we thought it would end after sometime. This went on for two months. We realized it was not like [previous evictions]... A few powerful wholesale traders pressurized the [parastatal agency] to remove [formal] retail traders from this ward because they were not having any trade in the re-located site... one of the [formal] retail traders, S fought with the wholesalers... At the time of shift... some [wholesale traders]... supported us and the retail traders... but they themselves had no support from their own association...

[One day] the APMC officials parked their vehicles at the entrance to each street and blocked the entrance... Retail traders too could not get to their shops or bring in their merchandise... The APMC [parastatal agency] [municipal officials] and the police were all together in this.

[Salil] and his friends blocked the road... They... trade [at another agglomeration] behind this [street]... we joined the protest... We protested the whole day... When we blocked the road, the MLA and urban development minister came to the ward and intervened with [the parastatal] and things were back to normal...

But problems surfaced once again between the APMC, retail, and wholesale traders and us. The APMC [officials] came... after the protest and told us, that we should

not do any business here. 'The wholesale traders have reported to us. You go and sell ... in... [other wards]... ' We could not trade again regularly for four months...

We tried talking to [the APMC]... We know the [Director]... of APMC... I know the manager... but they told us they cannot help... [as street trading] is not their responsibility... When the APMC came repeatedly and threatened us, [street traders] from this [agglomeration]... spoke to [retail traders at L3... and asked them what we... could do. Before that, we had a meeting in the street... amongst ourselves... [Salil] [formal retail trader] has lot of experience... he was in the [formal wholesale] traders association... he quit during the fight... He said, 'let us all go to all the offices and speak to the officials at all levels... The vidhan sabha, the party... He ... bought in [Dada, a religious leader,]... a well connected man. [Dada] contacted the chief minister and the urban development minister... and pressed our demands... Whenever we had to meet someone go to the various offices, [Dada] would do it for us... There is another association here, where [Palani] and other street traders are. They did not join the roadblock. Before joining [Dada] and [Salil], we asked them if we could join their association... They refused to let us in. That is how we formed our union...

(Interview with Maniamma, street trader network leader, KR Market, March /April 2004)

The above box shows the rambling and discursive nature of street traders' conflict with the state. Immediately after an eviction, street traders dodged and lobbied predominantly with everyday state agents in small groups. During this time, they also used other strategies, including the use of fear tactics, especially verbal assaults, and discourses of cultural rights. Functioning as group in a particular place was important (Seligmann 2005). According to street traders I interviewed, there was a relatively high level of policing at different places within the ward post-1999–2000. Prior to the 1999 evictions, policing waned after a week or ten days, and they could re-occupy their places. Street traders were constrained to 'quietly (re)-encroach' (Bayat 1997, 2004) following the evictions 2000–1 and 2003–4. Even so, they congregated in their respective wards, to identify a specific time and place for reoccupation. Their encroachment was for limited periods, such as particular times in a day or weekends and festival days, when the presence of everyday state agents is minimal. The perception among traders was that, the longer they could hold out, the higher their chances of reoccupation or finding an alternative place.

There were opportunities for dodging and trading for limited periods at this time, but the costs are high and vary across the case study wards. Street traders at the KR Market Ward bore relatively higher costs compared to their counterparts in other wards. There were daily raids targeting small groups or all traders in a location, as well as evictions of all traders in the ward. The frequency and timings of these raids were unpredictable, which constrained street traders' decisions relating to investment in a day or time for

trade. As well as a decline of their trading income, there was also an increase in the bribe amounts demanded (see Benjamin et al. 2006). Hence, most of them tried to negotiate with everyday state agents while simultaneously dodging to secure a stable basis for their trade.

Street traders' perceptions that there was a high possibility that they would lose their place influenced the decision to engage in collective action, as can be seen from Box 6.1. The political and legal constraints faced by street traders in each ward, in negotiating these evictions are described earlier in Section 4.2.4. A recurring theme in the narrative of agglomeration traders in different wards was that their earlier strategies of dodging and encroaching were inadequate for subverting evictions post-1999–2000. Many traders experienced disruption of their trade for a prolonged period, varying from two months to a year. Moreover, street traders in many wards faced difficulties when attempting to negotiate with the higher levels of the state or landowners. These factors catalysed two forms of localized collective action: protests and collective lobbying. Both forms of collective action appeared among agglomeration traders at KR Market Ward and in two wards in the outer periphery. At the other wards, they predominantly engaged in collective lobbying/negotiation. However, as shown below, the organization of their collective actions in the case study wards departed from the theories of Bayat and Cross.

Street Protests to Carve spaces for Negotiation

As can be seen from Box 6.1, and from the narratives of street traders, several factors have eroded the spaces that street traders had for pitching their negotiation: the factors are the timings of eviction; the introduction of new laws to accelerate evictions; and the type of state and non-state agents involved. In addition, street traders now have limited chances of subverting eviction via the courts.⁸² These factors have contributed to their decision to instead engage in street protests.

Street protests emerged on two occasions at the market ward: in 2000–1, prior to my field work for this study,⁸³ and in 2003–4. In the former period, protests were limited to street traders and were organized by a network leader. However, during 2003–4, agglomeration traders at three locations aligned with retail traders for protests and

lobbying. Their conflict was an offshoot of re-location of the wholesale trading markets to three different locations, in the outer periphery of the city (see Chapter Four).

It was sudden... They did not give us any time or reason... The [APMC [officials] came with the police... They parked their vans at the entrance and blocked the [movement] on all... sides... and started seizing our goods... We were trapped ... This place was full of police... We were taken by surprise. We tried to talk to them politely... They would not listen... We [formal retailers and street traders] were not part of the [market] re-location programme... We asked them to allow us to trade here... Then, they declared that [trading] has been de-notified in this area... [and that] none of us could trade in the market from that day... We have not heard of this before... We all earn between 50Rs–500Rs in a day. We need this location... APMC would not listen. That is when I really got angry and... beat the APMC director... We bought street traders, our people, Dada [a religious leader] immediately and blocked the main road and started the protest...

(Interview with Salil, retail-trader secretary, Union of Retail Traders and Street Traders, February 2004)

Disagreements between wholesaler traders and the state over the terms of re-location snowballed into a larger conflict, engulfing retail traders and street traders in different trades. Despite being forcibly shifted, wholesale traders continued their trading at KR Market, and the state government responded with new laws to change land use and to discontinue particular scales and types of trade in some locations at this ward. Subsequently, the regional state Department of Foods and Civil Supplies (DFC), issued an order to change the land use in order to ban trading activities, which was implemented by its parastatal arm – the APMC. These changes were enacted without much publicity and resulted in many formal retail traders in fruit trade losing their legal status overnight. The announcement took many traders by surprise, and during my field work, I found many were either not aware of it or were not clear of its import. The APMC moved in quickly, and with the support of different wings of the police (municipal and traffic) and municipal corporation, evicted all scales and types of traders on the grounds that their occupation of land was illegal. Thus, the state as much street traders resorted to ‘politics by stealth’ (Benjamin 2000) in removing street traders and others. It was not easy even for formal traders to contest this change in law by legal⁸⁴ or political means, let for alone street traders, who were already constrained by their ‘illegal’ status.

One issue faced by evicted traders was that there was an institutional chasm when it came to pitching their negotiations. Retail traders had access to the senior bureaucrats of the APMC, and street traders had connections to with its field officials and bureaucrats. However, APMC refused to negotiate with either group of traders, on the grounds that their mandate was to mediate between the producers – agriculturists, commission agents and wholesale traders – and not retailer traders or street traders on the issue of place⁸⁵. The Bangalore City Corporation, on the other hand, claimed that it was nothing to do with them⁸⁶. This standoff between various groups of traders, and in particular the APMC, was a factor catalyzing street protests at KR Market Ward.

We protested the whole day and blocked the flyover and [a commercial artery]. They [the police] are very scared of riots in the market. The APMC chairman came to the road... Finally, [the MLA] and the Minister visited the area... They did not agree to anything on that day but asked us to go back and said that they would find a solution... Subsequently they asked APMC to allow street trade and retail trade

(Interview with Maniamma, street trader, KR Market Ward)

Another example is the experience of agglomeration traders at the HAL Ward. Conflict between the landowner (the HAL company, see above) and street traders was ongoing, as can be seen from the timeline (4.7). During 2000, the company came to an agreement with street traders that they would construct a place for trade and distribute allotments there. However, pressure from the union and the financial status of PSU influenced the company's decision to reverse its agreement with the street traders:

...we came to know that they were not going to allot us the shops... [Viswam, the current real estate director] would not talk to us... He also increased the security... We blocked the road... closed the access to the [international] airport... that we have... capacity to [block and halt]... the airport... brought [the union minister] to our place... Our intention was not to fight... we need to give and take... The party politicians know this and so does HAL, but there was no choice at that time...

(Interview with John, street trader and network member, August 2004, HAL Market in the Outer periphery)

As described in Chapter Four, HAL had neither the legal nor the political compulsion to negotiate with street traders. In this light, the strategic location of the company along a main thoroughfare which connected the city to the international airport provided an opportunity for traders to disrupt the city's traffic and attract the attention of political agents.

Unlike in the above cases, agglomeration traders at the KR Puram Ward in the outer periphery resorted to protest actions when rumours started about their eviction. They

viewed protests as a way not only to attract the attention of the state, but also to strengthen their ties with bureaucrats. Protests also paved the way for reviving an old organization through which they channelled their lobbying subsequently.

Our sangha protested...We protest[ed] for three days in front of CMC... We did dharna and stopped the tendering process related to land management. Then the commissioner was forced to talk with us... After the talks, he agreed to give us temporary management... Now, we can talk to the commissioner directly... Before, we were dependent on the land manager and the MLA...

(Interview with leaders of street traders' organisation, KR Puram, April 2004)

Bayat attributes exclusion from the state as a catalysing factor for street politics, but does not unpack the institutional processes contributing to exclusion. Further, such a description implies street traders all face similar threats within a city. Rather, as the circumstances faced by traders at the three wards described above illustrate, threats and the difficulty faced in contesting them differ according to the manner in which the state or a land owner intervenes, the characteristics of the particular land owner, and the legal and political opportunities available. Thus the issue is not one of a simplistic exclusion from the state, but of a political milieu that had the effect of 'silencing'⁸⁷ some political agendas. As suggested by Auyero (2006), protests were thus useful weapons in attracting the attention of the state (often the senior policy-makers and politicians), and for winning a seat at the negotiating table, as is argued in Chapter Seven. Such forms of politics emerge in democratic contexts, when affected agents have no or very limited spaces for negotiating eviction through clientelism as have been noted by Shefner (2001) and Gay (2006).

Street traders' are aware that such actions by themselves are not adequate to secure their interests, as seen in John's narrative. Instead, protests paralleled or followed collective negotiation. Their various strategies – protests and negotiation – may seem contradictory, but they served different purposes as shown in Chapter Seven.

Inter-Ward Patterns of Collective Action

The way that agglomeration traders engage in collective protest and negotiation differs by location, trade, and time cycles across the case study wards, even when the threat is similar; this accords with Seligman's (2004) finding. In the market ward, although traders at seven agglomerations faced imminent eviction, only those from four

agglomerations and trading during certain time cycles engaged in street protests and/or collective lobbying. Street traders from another agglomeration trading during the same cycle mobilized under two organizations.

In the inner and outer peripheral wards, with the exception of one ward, agglomeration traders across different time cycles mobilized as one group for collective action; relationship between street traders' networks is a factor influencing these horizontal alliances, as mentioned earlier. The way that organizations were established, as well as their forms, timings, and reasons, differed across the wards. At the KR Market Ward, street traders have formed a union and 're-wholesale traders association'. There were two associations of street traders at BG ward in the inner periphery, and one at all three wards at the outer periphery. At the JNGR Ninth Block and JNGR Fourth Block wards in the inner periphery, street traders' networks forged informal alliances. An inter-ward similarity was that organizations were often formed midway during a conflict. In some wards, street traders registered an organization at the insistence of the landowner or their vertical networks. Unlike in the context of Cross's research, the organization was not involved in the earlier stages of negotiation. Practices around drawing on vertical alliances and their characteristics also differ across the case study wards, as is shown in Figs. 6.1–6.3 in section 6.3.6.

6.3.3 The Influence of Networks on Subversive Actions

It was noted in the previous chapter, there were several networks among agglomeration traders, and an inter-ward similarity was that these networks formed the basic unit of organization for various forms of subversive action. Network leaders led the dodging strategy and lobbying activities. Members of a network organized themselves spatially in such a way that they could circulate information to one another about the movement of state agents.

At KR Market Ward, and at JNGR Fourth Block ward where there was intensive policing, street traders did not display their merchandise, in order to evade confiscation of their goods by field bureaucrats. They remained in the ward with their merchandise tied to their waists, and displayed it only at the time of a potential transaction. In some cases, they depended on the support of their vertical networks – often a formal trader –

to store their goods. Networks of street traders without strong vertical ties store their goods in a less-visible common space.

At the initial stages, the leaders of each network at an agglomeration lobby separately with everyday state agents, via their direct or indirect ties, for two reasons: to avoid ‘visibility’, on account of the competition among various networks of street traders to secure prime locations; and to subvert potential actions by the higher levels of the state and other citizens⁸⁸.

These networks predominantly formed around a leader who supported their occupation and were fairly stable across the case study wards. Everyday interactions both at the place of trade and residence reinforced the solidarity among network members, and these disintegrated only when collective negotiations failed. One example was the disintegration of networks at the KR Market Ward following the eviction of street traders in 2001. Street traders regrouped under new leaders to capture various places, as shown in Chapter Five (see also Fig. 6.1). Conflicts are moments when the entrepreneurial among the traders mobilize their ties to form a new group for capturing places and thereby consolidated their power at a location.

Street traders who had captured their spaces in their respective agglomerations with the support of vertical ties (namely, the political or economic agents in a ward), joined with a street trader network at their location to subvert eviction. Street traders who were not part of a network often found it difficult to resist eviction on their own, as shown in Chapter Seven.

Mobilization for street protests and collective lobbying involves assembling of various networks at an agglomeration rather than individual recruitment of members via their networks, as has been noted by Passy (2003) and Diani and McAdam (2003). Network leaders played an active role in forging alliances horizontally and vertically for collective action.

Assembling Networks for Street Protests and Lobbying

In contrast to Bayat’s thesis, the similarity of a threat and the visibility of protest actions were not sufficient conditions by themselves for ‘spontaneous mobilization for street politics’ at Bangalore. Street protests at Bangalore were co-ordinated by leaders of different networks and organizers. At the city centre ward, protests were led by a

coalition of retail trader's and street traders' networks, all trading at different location. In mobilizing street traders from other agglomerations, the organizers enlisted the support of five network leaders.

... [Salil] works through four people... [Nazeer] came here and told four of us to get other traders for the protest. Me, [Kavya], [and Siraj] from this street asked all the street traders to come with us and went to the protest. I also went and got 'my' street traders at L1 ...

(Interview with Maniyamma, network leader, KR Market agglomeration, L4)

Information about the protest was circulated through the five network leaders, who also ensured their members and other networks in different agglomerations participated in the protest. These networks were subsequently assimilated into the union. The organizers' decision to mobilize through network leaders rather than individual recruitment was influenced by the social relations at this ward.

...in this ward, every one is a self-declared leader... no one, particularly street traders, would trust any leader easily... Also... [due to] their numbers, it is not possible to mobilize each trader individually... [Kavya] and [Maniamma, network leaders] came and asked what we could do to stop eviction... The wholesalers had cheated us and them too... so, I thought 'why not?' I contacted [Dada] because we need an influential personality as a leader. I know [Maniamma] and her husband. [Maniamma]'s husband and [Kavya]'s husband were [leaders of unskilled labourers' groups] in this ward. Many traders were previously unskilled labourers. It would be easier to mobilize them through people known to them. We thought of [Siraj and Raza] as they can mobilize all the Muslim male traders trading at L4.

(Interview with Salil, Secretary, Union of Retail Traders and Street Traders, June 2004)

The high density of street trading at KR Market, the competition between street traders to secure places, and their fluid alliances with other agents, were all constraints on individual mobilization. However, the pattern of assembling networks for collective action enabled organizers to mobilize for protests quickly and without much notice. The protest was followed by the formation of a union, which had a membership of 1800 street traders besides retailer traders. This number did not include all the networks that participated in the protest.

Street traders' views about the organizers (particularly, formal retail traders) differed. Some street traders distrusted them, as retail traders had not supported them on an earlier occasion, in 2001. Retail traders were seen as another avenue for offsetting risk, but not their only channel. However, many members were also suspicious of the organisers'

intention and trusted more their own network leaders; as can be seen from the following narratives:

Kavya: ...We were saying among ourselves that we have to do something... I... told [Salil] about our plight after the protest and asked him if he can give us any idea... [He] asked us if we could form a new union... Then there was... meeting with [Dada], retailers and street traders joined together and discussed... what we could do. [Salil] was the one who got Baba involved. I do not know Baba... [Maniamma] knows him... we trust her...'

Me: Why did (street traders) join the protest when you asked them?

Kavya: They see my transactions in the ward... I am not a leader... involved in regular collection... I am quite talkative... [and] will talk boldly to officers... That is why [Dada] and [Salil] wanted me, [Maniamma] among women, and [Salil] and [Raza] among men. We can bring all the street traders together...

(Interview with Kavya, network leader, KR Market, April 2004)

Me: Why did you join the union?

Sathyia: Because K was there... Most women in this line joined because we know her. She is not a 'leader'.

(Interview with Sathyia, network member, agglomeration L4, KR Market, July 2004)

Street traders have to be politically agile to survive in a highly competitive milieu such as KR Market (Benjamin et al. 2001). Whilst they need networks to offset risk, the relationship between members of a network and between networks was at best one of 'guarded trust', in contrast to the suggestion in the studies by Singermen (1995); Jenkins (2004), that trust is as a natural aspect of network transactions.

In general, the development of alliances between street traders and retail traders is influenced by an assessment of the concerned retail trader's resources compared with those of potential allies. These resources include the trader's network portfolio in and outside the locality, and their influence in party politics. Salil, the main organizer of the retail trader- street traders' union, is a retail trader at present, but he started as a street trader and used to trade from the shop front of a wholesale trader. Prior to aligning with street traders, he was an active member of the wholesale and retail traders association in fruit. In his capacity as an activist and as an office bearer, he had experience in mobilizing traders and managing an association, and he had links to both the political and the bureaucratic agents of the state.

Similarly, network leaders among street traders' are chosen by organizer based on their ability to assemble networks to mobilize street traders in different locations of the ward. This ability is assessed by considering the network portfolio of different street-trader

leaders as well as their relationships at this ward. In addition to mobilizing street traders from their own time cycle, the four network leaders at an agglomeration mobilize street traders' networks from other agglomerations and time cycles of trade. This was possible because many street-traders spend most of their waking hours at this ward, and after their trading cycle they hang around to get their chits, organizing instalment sales and chatting with passers-by, who often include financiers (potential and actual), suppliers from other markets, and security officers. Such face-to-face interaction and everyday transactions influence the relationship between various networks across agglomerations and time cycles of trade.

Another significant feature of street traders' organization in Bangalore is that there is a clear hierarchy, in contrast to Bayat's findings. However, everyday power relations among various members cannot be interpolated from their position in this hierarchy. Dada, who heads the union, is a retail trader at KR Market and a treasurer of the local Congress Party. He also identifies himself as a 'leader of Sufi sect'. As a result, he has extensive connections to senior politicians and bureaucrats. Salil and his youth network view Dada as a figurehead for their organization, as he has the resources that they lacked: connections, influence over leaders of various parties including the chief minister, and the time to meet them. However, the actual work of organizing for protests is done by street traders' network leaders and retail traders. Relationships between Dada, retail traders

Relationships between network leaders and members vary. Kavya, the network leader described above, is best described as a 'bridge tie'. As noted in Chapter Five, Kavya's network occupied its current place (L4) in 2001, after losing previous places in 2000. At that time, she was a conduit for information, not only for her networks but also for other networks at her location. Through her extensive networks at this ward, she was able to secure information quickly and enlist the support of a labour union leader, who mediated between her network and the local state. Thereafter, she limited her activities to her trade and did not interfere in everyday conflicts at this agglomeration. There are a few networks where the relationship was far more authoritarian.

Patterns of mobilizing street traders as networks rather than as individuals for collective action are common in other wards. For example, there are three networks among agglomeration traders at the HAL Ward in the outer periphery (ref.5.3.2). These leaders

mobilize their respective members during protests. In addition, many traders reside in two of the slums at the same ward. Other residents were also mobilized for the protest to show a critical mass.

It is very easy for us to mobilize crowds... If we go and call people from Anandapuram [residential neighbourhood]... all of them will come immediately... The entire Anandapuram is behind us ... so are other residents in the other layouts here [in this ward]... We are the biggest voting bloc... many from Anandapuram work at the HAL

(Interview with John, network member, HAL Agglomeration, September 2004)

Unlike in KR Market Ward, collective action such as protests and lobbying are coordinated and led by a network of agglomeration traders at the wards in the outer periphery. The organizing networks have varying level of connections with other networks of street-traders trading at their locations across different time cycles, although such, connections are usually weak; as also mentioned in Chapter Five, many networks operate autonomously at these agglomerations. Further, relationships between various networks are complex and marked by suspicion and conflicts. Consequently, organizers depend on network leaders to mobilize their members (see Section 5.2). Connections with other agents in the ward or with the outside influence the decision of other networks to mobilize under their leadership. The organizing network is active within their agglomeration in terms of organizing chits and festivals, and in extending support to traders outside their network during times of crisis – it thus has some goodwill from other traders. That alone was inadequate. The perception of other networks that they would not be able to subvert threats on their own influenced the development of these alliances.

From Informal Networks to Organizations

In contrast to Cross's (1997, 2006) findings, street traders' collective actions in Bangalore are coordinated by informal networks. There are two other differences; first, as noted earlier, organization was not a prerequisite for negotiation with the state or with land owners. Moreover, street traders at JNGR Ninth Block and BG wards in the inner periphery did not form an organization to negotiate with the state. Leaders of different networks came together for collective lobbying only when the threat was perceived as severe.

Second, organizations can be viewed as a space of negotiation between various networks at an agglomeration. Although traders are registered as individual members, they engage with the organization through their networks. This is because the complex relationship between networks is marked by conflicts and cooperation. Network leaders are a bridge between street traders and the organizer or external agent, whether political or state. In the process of building power there have been conflicts between different networks. In some wards, such as the HAL Ward, this has culminated in a riot and the eviction of all street traders. The fear of losing the place altogether subsequently led the three networks at this ward to cooperate with one another. However, there is an intense rivalry between members and leaders of different networks.

6.3.4 Localized Action and the Role of Networks

Although agglomeration traders have ties with street traders in other case study wards, they resorted to localized actions at times of threat. For example, street traders at the inner-peripheral wards have extensive ties with those at the city centre (KR Market ward). Weekly traders who constitute a dominant group traded at both Varathur and KR Puram Wards in the outer periphery.

There are two reasons among street traders for not drawing on their ties across wards. One reason reflects their anxiety about place – street traders from other wards might invade their agglomeration. The dominant view was that while they need a group both for their everyday trade and for negotiating with the state or their opponents, they need to limit the size of such groups, in order to neutralize opposition to their occupation. The other reason concerns differences in the nature of the threat – specifically, the type of state power involved in the conflict, which varies not only across wards but also within a ward. However, there are also exchanges of information and knowledge, as suggested by Diani (1995). For example, a network of young traders from Varathur Ward stated that their decision to start an organization was influenced by observing the experience of street traders at KR Puram.

6.3.5 Interests, Network Relationships and Influence on Collective Action

As noted above, there were two mobilizations among agglomeration traders, in KR Market Ward (city centre), and in BG Ward in the inner periphery. Interests in relation to the type of location differ between various networks in the two wards. Further, confirming Mische's (2003), findings street traders' relationships to the different networks in which they are embedded were found in the case study wards to have significant influence on their horizontal alliances.

One organization, the re-wholesale street traders' association, enlisted the support of their vertical connection with a wholesale trader in their negotiation with the APMC. They were negotiating to secure shops at another ward in the outer periphery, in the event of eviction and resettlement. There was pressure on them, both from the wholesale trader concerned and from APMC to limit the membership of their organization. Although the organizer of the re-wholesale street traders' association and the four leaders of street traders' network connected to the union had connections with one another and were from the same residential neighbourhood, the leaders were unable to secure membership. This in part influenced the four network leaders' decision to align with the retail traders.

In contrast to the re-wholesale traders' association, the Union of Retail Traders and Street Traders has its emphasis not on shops or on demarcating individual spaces, but on the right to trade from the ward. They argue that there is a variety of sharing arrangements between various time cycles of trade, and that the strategy of allotting shops would result in exclusion.

We are not asking to give us a shop or allot a place to one trader... Allow us to trade here in this ward... how we adjust in a location is our business. We do not want the APMC or the government to come and interfere on how we [spatially] organize our trading... We only ask to be allowed to trade in [KR Market]... We also know that there is no land in Bangalore... [street traders] are of different kinds. There are those that 50 Rs in a day through to those that invest more than 1000Rs in a day... You want a trader investing between 50Rs and less than 500Rs to sit inside a shop and trade... That is very uneconomical... What the law allows will work out [economically] for a wholesale trader. The APMC might build markets for [a] wholesale trader. He... has large turnover, he will stock, make large investments, pay the rent for the building... For a small retailer, to rent a place is not economical. Think of the 'gudde' [small street trader] trader... he does not need a shop. Even there are others who collect waste items and sell in this market... it makes no sense to give them a shop. What they all need is a location where different types of buyers congregate and do business... not fancy showrooms. If government

gives free shops, there will be demand for 10000 shops. How many of these street traders will be accommodated?

(Interview with Dada, President, Union of Retail Traders and Street Traders, June 2004)

The retail traders' union and the re-wholesale street traders' association negotiated through different circuits, as shown in fig. 6.1 (columns A and B) in section 6.3.6.

Differences in terms of negotiation over location have also influenced the two mobilizations at the BG ward; this relates to a disagreement about limiting the area occupied for agglomeration. There were three broad network coalitions among agglomeration traders, two of which merged into one. Although, on an earlier occasion, the various networks had aligned for subverting eviction (see also Fig. 4.5), this did not happen during the conflict of 2003–4, because the first organization refused to limit the area occupied by its members.

6.3.6 Engagement with the State: Scales⁸⁹, Alliances, and the Use of Networks

The literature reviewed in Chapter Two dominantly emphasises street traders' relationships with the local government. However, this section shows that agglomeration traders in each ward engage with different 'scales' (Brenner 2000) of the state in countering threats from development threat as found by Stillerman (2006) in Chile.

The process of negotiation is discursive and occurs in a variety of social and political spaces. Street traders draw on the support of political agents whose characteristics differ across the case-study wards. Whilst they predominantly draw on the support of local political agents or organizations, there are occasions when they enlist the support of outside agents insofar as their networks made possible. Their role is considered by street traders as significant in terms of establishing connections as well as influencing agents at the highest positions in different parts of the state or connected with the landowner.

Another feature of their negotiation process is the use of multiple networks and the prevalence of more than one circuit of negotiation in each ward. The type of state agent, choice of political allies, and circuits of negotiation are influenced by both the nature of a threat and the networks relationships of street-traders, at ward and state levels.

Shifting alliances and Circuits of Negotiation at KR Market

A significant aspect of street traders' negotiation process during 1999–2000 and post-2001 relates to the shifts in their political alliances.




Figure 6-1 Circuits of negotiation to avert development threat in KR Market Ward

Fig 6.1 is illustration of KR Market street traders' process of subverting development threat in 2004. There are four columns in the figure: A and B shows their vertical alliances and their circuits of engagement with different scales of the state, discussed in this section; columns C and D describe their horizontal alliances and their channels of negotiation with the state, described in an earlier section (see 6.3.5).

In 2004, KR Market street traders allied with retail or wholesale traders and drew on the support of various types of political agents congregating in the ward (column B of Fig 6.1). These included the leaders and members of an unskilled labour union, a religious

leader, a mosque committee, party politicians embedded in different levels of the state; and different levels of traders including wholesale, retail, and other agents connected to trade). By contrast, during an earlier period (1999-2000), they drew on the support of a labour union and engaged with senior bureaucrats and everyday state agents of Bangalore City Corporation (BCC) (Benjamin and Bhuvaneswari 2001). There was no attempt to form an organization at that time.

When asked why they shifted their alliances post-2001, street traders indicate an interest in ‘influencing’ the state as well as ‘accessing the higher levels of the state’. One network leader responded:

None of us really expected that there would this magnitude of problem in the market... it is tactful to do this work through our ‘elders’. Even if you know [the chief minister], when you go along with four others for negotiation, it is better... more influential...

(Interview with Kavya, network organizer, KR Market Ward, June 2004)

[Muniyan, a labour union leader] is ‘local’... I mean... his influence is within this ward... It does not work outside this boundary... That is why we went and asked [Salil, a (retail trader] and [Dada] to help us.

(Interview with Maniamma, network member, KR Market, March 2004)

A point echoed by many street traders that there has been a shift in the nature of the threat to their street trading location, which has had significant impact on their circuits of negotiation with the state and their use of networks.

Traders’ connections in a ward also influence their alliances with one another and the two circuits of negotiation with the state. The Union of Retail Traders and Street Traders co-opted a religious leader affiliated to the Shia branch of Islam and with connections in the Middle East, whose connections to the state is predominantly via the party structures. However, relations between organizers of retail trader and senior bureaucrats of APMC deteriorated following the street protests.

We have seen [Dada] I knew him... He was also trading here... He had a house here... But at that time, he never used to get involved in these issues. Then he became a saint... and moved to Anandapuram. When he moved there, our contacts with him declined... He contacted the MLA from Congress... then the two of them went to the MLA [of another party - the BJP]. Although we know the MLA of congress party, we did not maintain routine contact with him... [The MLA] told us, ‘...retail business will go on in this place... you should not panic... since this elder is with you, it will be resolved’... We also got the Minister for Urban Development, to this place. In two months, we met with all these people. Reddy also said to the APMC officials in front of us, ‘allow the retailers. Stop only the wholesalers’... The

only thing is make sure that the [wholesale traders] do not come here... If that is the case, come and inform us.

(Interview with Maniamma, KR Market Ward)

As decisions related to urban development were controlled by the chief minister, and at that time there were legal constraints due to the banning ('de-notification') of trade, the union sought to lobby the chief minister and urban development minister via party politicians at different levels of hierarchy, as well as the wakf board who owned the land (see columns B and C, fig. 6.1). The religious leaders' direct access to the chief minister was cited as his main strength in this context. The role of elected municipal representatives was minimal, although street traders drew on their support to connect to higher-level state agents or senior politicians in parties that could influence decisions related to land in the state.

In parallel during the course of the conflict, the Union of Retail Traders and Street Traders brokered a deal with the field bureaucrats of the APMC to allow them to trade in return for information about the conduct of wholesale trade although their relationship with senior management of the APMC continued to be hostile.

Negotiation took place in different political and social spaces (column D, fig 6.1). For example, a marriage in the family of a Muslim councillor created a context in which traders could lobby the chief minister of the state. Further, the announcement of regional state elections brought a respite to street traders and other traders at the market ward as evictions got underway; traditionally, both groups were constituents of the party in power at that time, and with the refusal of the party to reverse its policies, some traders saw the elections as an opportunity to bargain with different political parties in exchange for the 'promise of votes'. Various parties began informal negotiations with key leaders and individuals in various communities. Towards the end of my fieldwork in 2005, another circuit of bargaining had emerged between the union, various political parties, and field bureaucrats of the BCC. The field bureaucrats in charge of the mega city programme within the BCC faced with immense pressure to show progress in implementation, approached traders to broker a deal over the conditions under which they would move out of the location.

The re-wholesale trader association negotiated with the APMC through their own networks - for example, their ally - the wholesale traders' leader had strong connections with a senior bureaucrat, the APMC chairman (column D, fig. 6.1). His political

influence at the state and national level can be seen from the fact that he was one of the few traders selected from various parts of India as part of a trading delegation to a neighbouring country, Pakistan. In addition, street traders maintained their own links with mid-level officials of the APMC, who had advised street traders to register their organization as re-wholesalers, so that they could apply for shops in the wholesale market complex.

The point here is that the two competing network coalitions of street traders and their allies tapped into different parts of a state agency. Further, they enlisted the support of agents who they perceived had extensive institutional networks beyond the ward or the local space. Moreover, mosque committee was equally divided, with the allies of two coalitions competing there. A disagreement between the two groups that permeated among different levels of traders was their differing but nuanced interest in relation to location.

Inner Periphery: Alliances and Circuits of Lobbying the Local State

Across the three wards, street traders and their allies engaged with the municipal state, to subvert eviction, but they remained separate. In addition, ways of drawing on the support of a political agent to negotiate with party politicians and bureaucrats of the state differed.

As described in Chapter Four, street traders at the wards in the inner periphery were evicted by the BCC and the traffic police following an order by the Bangalore Development Authority (BDA). Of the two agencies, the traffic police monitored street traders on a daily basis. Street traders' relationship with them was conflictual at BG and JNGR Fourth Block wards. Street traders at the two wards sought to influence the field bureaucrats of the traffic police through a senior party politician (MLA) who was then the state's urban development minister. Although street traders were his main political constituency, their engagement with him differed across the two wards. JNGR Ninth Block traders' drew on the support of a ward-level political organization, the KCS⁹⁰ and the local councillor, while JNGR Fourth Block traders' lobbied directly with the Minister for Urban Development. In this second ward field officials of an NGO

mediated between street traders and the traffic police, for a brief period initially. Although both group of traders secured their places, the stability of their trade differed.

There were two mobilizations among street traders in the third ward. The first organization drew on the support of a state level federated political organization, the DSS, while the other negotiated through the retail traders and the ward's MLA. The DSS engaged directly with the Commissioner of the BCC and the second organization with the field bureaucrats of the BCC and the traffic police.

This pattern of drawing on the support of political organizations, whether located in the ward or outside, is a recent phenomenon. On earlier occasions, street traders at both wards negotiated directly with the field bureaucrats at the ward level once the surveillance by the central office had eased. Interestingly, the KCS had opposed street traders at their ward violently on an earlier occasion and tried to move them out of the locality; this is discussed further in Chapter Nine.

Outer Periphery: Alliances and Circuits of Lobbying the Local State

There was more than one circuit of negotiation between street traders and the respective landowners across the wards in the outer-periphery. One similarity across the three wards was that street traders' political alliances and mediators included agents in the lower levels of the party hierarchy: party political activists, political entrepreneurs not tied to any one party, elected representatives at the municipal level, local and state level elected representatives and other political agents including the trade unions, and identity-based mobilization such as the KCS. They used their organizations as channels for lobbying the state or the landowner. In addition, street traders, particularly leaders of some networks, maintained their contacts with the agencies concerned. Similarly to the BCC wards, the influence of councillors was limited in the outer periphery. In addition, traders at KR Puram had drawn on the support of political organizations such as the DSS on an earlier occasion, although their role during this subsequent conflict was muted. Across the three wards, in responding to the external threat the various networks aligned, but to counter internal competition some street traders' networks tried to maintain independent channel of communication through their networks with the state and political parties.




Figure 6-2 HAL street traders' negotiation process to subvert development threat

HAL street traders' process of engagement with the land owner to avert eviction is in fig 6.2. At the HAL Ward, the power to influence decisions related to land was with the chairman and the director of the real estate department of the HAL company, and so the organization pitched its visible lobbying at this level (column A, fig. 6.2). Opposition to street traders came not only from the senior officials within the company, who were concerned about the value of real estate, but also from some of the company employees, who considered that they themselves had the legitimate right to the land. Due to these factors, traders relied in several ways on their networks with elected representatives, with other trade union leaders, with HAL's manual labourers, and with their clientele among senior officials, shown under alliances in column B in Fig 6.2. These were used

to secure information about the company's actions, and to persuade the senior officials to negotiate, particularly when there was a stalemate and to neutralize the opposition from HAL's labour union. In addition, the organizing network leaders also drew on their ties with party politicians connected to different parties and different levels of the local and central state to influence the chairman of the company, while street traders went beyond political channels by organizing functions at which the chairman presided. These platforms were used to submit their 'requests' and to enlist a public promise from the company.

At the other two wards, the respective local government were the city municipal corporation (CMC) at KR Puram Ward, and the Urban Panchayat at Varathur Ward. Here, the authoritarian local political milieu, and the electoral status of street traders in (see Chapter Four), rendered it difficult to confront the state openly and this influenced their strategy of lobbying via several circuits at these wards. At KR Puram ward, street-traders drew on their ties with both the ruling party and the opposition MLAs and a senior bureaucrat, without aligning openly with any party. Although at the time of the street protests the MLA had intervened and as a compromise handed over the santhe management to street traders' organization, as the conflict proceeded, the bureaucrat's position was not clear. The takeover of the santhe administration by the street traders' association provided traders with a way to build their relationships with other senior bureaucrats, but that alone was not enough to secure timely information about state projects. Thus they also depended on their relationships with councillors and with networks embedded in lower-level bureaucracy and with street politicians. The agglomeration was sandwiched between the city municipal corporation, the district administration, and the land registration office where a variety of street politicians congregate to 'fix' the problems faced by citizens in general. Moreover, in parallel to party circuits, street traders were negotiating with local leaders of Dalit Sangarsh Samithi, known for its guerrilla tactics of land invasion. Their aim was 'to apply pressure' (Razzaz 1994) on the MLA concerned through several interlinking connections, in order to influence the decision of the CMC bureaucrats. These circuits were mostly invisible.

Fig 6.3 illustrates the manner in which street traders' in Varathur ward engaged with the Varathur Urban Panchayat in their process to subvert eviction. The four columns A – D, in the figure shows their engagement with different scales of state, their vertical

alliances, their channels of negotiation, and the alliances between various networks of street traders' found in the agglomeration.




Figure 6-3 Street traders' circuits of engagement with the state(s)

At this ward, there were broadly two circuits of negotiation among agglomeration traders (see column C, Fig. 6.3). One channel was through the organisation and another, via the social networks. As with the above ward – KR Puram - many trading in Varathur reside in other wards. Young male traders residing in Varathur ward mobilized the six large networks (column D) found in this agglomeration and they constituted an organisation. They forged ties with leaders and members of other networks through

organising chits, festivals and welfare programmes. The earlier generation of traders residing in Varathur ward supported traders' networks from other wards to find their places and hence have strong ties with them. However, they are not active in the organization because of their differences with the youth networks, relating to the strategies adopted to subvert eviction. This influenced their decision to maintain their engagement with the state agents through their social networks (column C, figure 6.3). Their actions are driven not by the competition to capture power but by traders' attempts to offset the risks arising from overt alliances in a locality whose political terrain is controlled predominantly by two MLAs. In parallel, street traders who do not have strong ties with the youth leaders also attempted to organise their own group.

Street traders' vertical alliances are listed in Column B and it included agents embedded in different positions and in different party structures as well as state scales. Unlike that situation in KR Puram, the youth network controlling the street traders' organization at Varathur aligned openly with an opposition party. As a result, their relationship with the MLA from the ruling party deteriorated, and so, in order to subvert eviction, street traders also tapped into networks with other politicians from the ruling party, to play on the contradictions between different levels of the state and the competition between party politicians, as Razzaz(1997) and Fernandez-Kelly (2006) have also noted. They also drew on the support of a senior leader linked to the district administration of the ruling party to block decisions relating to eviction at the Urban Panchayat, thus influencing an administrative practice at the district administration and utilizing the power of senior leaders to veto decisions in panchayat meetings. The youth networks also enlisted the support of an opposition party at the local level to secure specific information on the legal status of land and decisions relating to eviction (which in India are often in the form of administrative orders) and to form an organization and secure their support in future panchayat meetings.

6.4 Conclusion and Implications

This chapter contribute towards resolving disagreements and gaps in literature in relation to street traders' strategies for subverting eviction and their use of networks.

Findings on the forms of subversive action that have emerged among street traders illustrate the need to move beyond the polarized debates and homogenous conceptualizations found in the studies reviewed in Chapter Two. In contrast to the theories of Tripp, Bayat, Cross and Macharia, and as suggested by Crossa (2009), street traders' subversive actions can take several forms – including 'everyday forms of resistance', 'protests', or collective lobbying. In their various actions, they draw on their 'spatial routines⁹¹ and relationships' (see also Stillerman 2006; Seligmann 2004). Their strategies for influencing landowners are complex and marked by conflict, compromise, and co-option and lobbying. Despite having connections with street traders across the wards, their organization remains localized at the ward level. This accords with the way the phenomenon of their collective action has been theorized by Bayat (1997) and Cross (1998a), although, the characteristics of organization at Bangalore differ in some other ways. Variations in forms of action are influenced by their perceptions of threat, specifically street traders' judgements about the type of agents involved in each conflict, local politics and their ability to negotiate through their everyday routines and relationships.

This chapter also contributes with new and comprehensive evidence about the manner in which street traders engage with landowners. While in the literature there is an extensive debate on their forms of politics, their processes of negotiation with different types or levels of the state and private land owners has not been examined in detail. In general, the analysis of street traders' and poor households' relationship with the state has remained at the level of local government (see Benjamin 2000); specifically, considering either conflict (Fernandez-Kelly 2006), or relations with elected representatives and agents of the everyday state (see also Chatterjee 2002, 2008; Corbridge 2005). By contrast, findings presented in this chapter illustrate engagement with different parts and levels of the state, and the alliances that they drew on in the process of subverting eviction. These cannot be reduced to any one space or scale, such as the 'local', as Benjamin (2000) suggests in the context of Bangalore. Street traders' engagements with landowners and the state, and their negotiation processes, were discursive and occurred in different political and social spaces and levels⁹². In the case study wards, political alliances differed across place and time. Their engagement with the local or extra-local spaces of the state and their patterns of drawing on alliances were shaped by place/time differences in the nature of a threat, and their relationships with various agents in the city.

In addition, this chapter has provided evidence about the ways in which street traders draw on their informal networks when subverting eviction. These negotiation spaces can be conceptualized as moment[s] in their networks of social (and spatial) relations. As noted earlier, street traders use networks as part of their economic strategies (Singermen 1995; Seligmann 2004; Stillerman 2007), but evidence concerning the use of networks in their political strategies has been limited. This chapter and the previous chapter illustrate the use of networks for forging alliances flexibly – both horizontal and vertical alliances – in their political strategies.

Finally, it is argued that the concept of networked-non-compliance (Singermen 1995; Razzaz 1994) provides an explanation for both aspects associated with the process of claiming places namely occupying places and subverting the threat of eviction. Specifically in the context of this chapter, it allows us to capture the heterogeneity of their strategies for subverting eviction and their institutional underpinnings. However, Razzaz did not explain the factors influencing agents' decision to resort to specific forms of politics, or their fluid and flexible alliances during the negotiation process. Similarly, Singermen does not account for the manner in which network relationships influence their subversive actions. In this light, evidence presented in this chapter underscores the role of street traders' perceptions of threat at different times, and their relationship with different networks on their strategies to subvert eviction.

However, differences among traders regarding the role of networks and the perception of threat when the threat is from mega urban development projects (see Chapter Four and Section 6.3.2 above) need further separate consideration, and will be discussed in the next chapter.

7 Differences: Locating in Agglomerations and the Role of Networks

7.1 Introduction

This chapter illustrates the role of social networks in terms of determining differences between street traders in terms of their ability to claim a place for their trade (see Chapter Two). There are three sections in this chapter. Factors influencing street traders' decision to trade from a fixed place and those that affect their ability to subvert evictions are explored in the following two sections. The concluding section sets out the questions arising from the findings in the case study wards.

7.2 Differences in Occupying Spaces: Literature Gaps and Findings

This section explores the two themes of disagreement outlined in Chapter Two in relation the role of networks as a factor influencing differences between street traders, in terms of their ability to claim places for fixed-place trading. Findings on the two themes of street traders' preferences and factors driving their decisions in relation to location indicate that traders' networks have an influence on where, how and when traders' locate themselves for their trade.

As was shown in Chapter Five, the high level of competition to locate in agglomerations influences the extent to which street traders rely on their networks in capturing their places. Their dominant preference to agglomerate in a particular place is driven by the political-economic advantages arising from 'scale' (see below), as is the case with other types of economic activity (Benjamin 1996; Coe et al. 2007). This enables street traders to develop an identity for their place as a market, which influences their opportunities for building a clientele (Coe et al. 2007) and creating a critical mass of agents with similar interests to negotiate with the state or other agents (Cross and Pena 2006).

Further, street traders differentiate between agglomerations and between various places in an agglomeration in terms of business opportunities and the risk of eviction. Differences between agglomerations in terms of size and location impact on the density and diversity of those who congregate there. Consequently, transaction costs incurred by street traders differ due to varying opportunities for forging forward and backward linkages for street trade and for resisting eviction. This in turn affects their income from

trade and mobility opportunities. Findings from Bangalore concerning the role of place as a factor in opportunities for forging links and increasing income and mobility add to the work of Tetchler (1994).

Moreover, in contrast to Bayat's suggestion, the decision to enter either itinerant trade or to locate in a fixed place is not always voluntary or simply driven by trade. Street traders negotiate both their entry into trade and their location via their networks. However, the experience of itinerant traders in scattered locations suggests that traders' networks are of varying usefulness in finding a place at an agglomeration or holding on to it. Moreover, agglomeration traders' ties with one another and other agents congregating in a ward also influences the quality of places secured for trading.

7.3 Street Traders' Views on Location and Reasons

The dominant preference among street traders selling the three types of perishable goods (vegetables, fruit and flowers) was not only to find a fixed place for their trade but to locate in an agglomeration.

Street traders at the city centre ward differentiate between and within agglomerations in terms of business opportunities and everyday risk of eviction. Four agglomerations were in demand among those in fruit trade, and a further two among vegetable traders. The least preferred agglomerations were that of L7, particularly during the second cycle of trade, L8, and some places at L1. Street traders clustered in five places at L1, of which three were in demand and two were least preferred. In the case-study wards, the least preferred places were locations that street traders secured without the support of their networks.

Among those who could not secure places in an agglomeration, the preference for itinerant trade or for locating in scattered locations varied by trade. Vegetable traders selling assorted vegetables preferred to trade itinerantly, while fruit traders preferred to locate in a fixed place, but the type of products sold at agglomerations and scattered locations differed. Further, unlike agglomeration traders, they found it difficult to resist eviction. Cross and Pena (2006) also notes this. Reasons given for agglomerations and

for differentiating in or between agglomerations indicate comparative advantages in terms of transaction costs and risks, as shown below.

7.3.1 Reasons for Agglomerations

The significance of agglomerating in a place and thereby developing an identity as a 'market' dominated in street traders' explanations.

You need to stand as a group... only then people will recognize it as a market... they will come regularly...

(Interview with Bombay Trader, Network Leader, JNGR Ninth Block, February 2004].

Having an identity as a market, in their view, influenced their opportunities to build a network by ensuring a regular and dense flow of clients to a location. Moreover these agglomerations evolved along busy thoroughfares where they could also access passers-by. A constant flow of clients is critical because it affects traders' ability to command better prices for their products. Prices for a product are not fixed in street trading, but rather vary depending on traders' calculations. Factors considered include the possibility of securing alternative clients, relationships with buyers, their persuasive ability, and the shelf life of a product (Seligmann 2004). The longer a trader can hold out, specifically during the peak trading time cycle, the greater the chances of bargaining for higher prices for their products. At the same time, the low shelf life of perishable goods necessitates that a trader has a rapid turnover. This is reflected in the fluctuations in the price of perishable goods during different times of the day.

The investments per cycle of fixed-place traders and itinerant traders in a similar trade were the same, as can be seen from Table 4.2. However, their ability to command better prices and losses incurred due to wastage differ between traders at the two types of location. A unanimous view across locations was that agglomeration traders were not compelled to sell their products to the first clients that come to them. Although there are other outlets for procuring perishable goods, street trading agglomerations are still popular among different income groups, particularly at the inner-peripheral and outer-peripheral wards. The assured clientele thus provides scope to turn down a transaction when prices offered are too low.

By contrast, several factors compelled itinerant traders to sell to their first customers. These include insecurity over finding another buyer, as well as the relatively rapid

deterioration of products, on account of a trader's mobility; losses incurred on account of wastage was said to be higher in itinerant trading. This affects the prices they can command and their ability to stock and sell. Previously these traders had the option of trading from the edge of agglomerations after moving around in a ward, but with increased surveillance of public and private places in each ward, opportunities for combining different modes of trade have declined. Consequently, they often sell their products at the asking price to retail customers and their unsold goods to small traders in an agglomeration at below their investment, or they distributed them at their place of their residence.

The ability to attract clients differs among agglomeration traders in the three trades. Vegetable traders have assured clients, as compared to those in the other two trades, as reflected below.

...customers do not come every day to this [agglomeration] to purchase fruit... But we invest more than [vegetable traders]... and have to sell it quickly... We need to be near [vegetable sellers]... [for] clients...

(Interview with Narendra, BG Ward, July 2004)

This influences fruit and flower traders' preferences to locate near vegetable traders, either in the same agglomeration or in the same ward.

Fruit, vegetable and flowers are sister trades... one cannot survive without the other. They need to cluster in the same ward to attract different clientele...

(Interview with Sharif Pasha, formal wholesale fruit trader, KR Market, Feb. 2004)

That the three trades are complementary and need to agglomerate together is a view common to not only street traders, but also to formal wholesale traders.

At the KR Market Ward, each street-trading agglomeration is known for specializing in a specific product or scale.

KR Market is centrally located... Formal retail traders, street traders and consumers from other wards... come here... It is also a crowded place... [They] visit only few places, depending on what they need... Each place here is known for a particular trade... We need to choose our trade according... to where we find place.

(Interview with Reddy, fruit trader at L6, KR Market, October 2004)

The evolution of a specialized trade at each agglomeration at this ward was influenced by the historical and contemporary patterns of use at a location. One example of this is

the demand for places among street traders in retail trade at L1, and among fruit trader at L5. L1, as mentioned in Chapter Four, was once a market for wholesale and retail trade in vegetables, but at present formal retail in non-perishable goods dominates here. However, many clients still associate the place with vegetable and flower trades. Similarly, L5, although formal fruit markets have been shifted away from here, is identified as a place where local varieties of seasonal fruit can be found. Place identities also influence the tacit understanding of claims among various networks of street traders to different locations, and so, on account of the site's previous usage, street traders in seasonal fruit are able to claim places during the first cycle. Many entered trade after the formal traders in similar items had been shifted out.

Another advantage of locating in an agglomeration relates to minimizing the transaction costs associated with some trades. For example, while investment by itinerant flower traders varies between 100–200Rs per day, fixed-place traders invest up to 500Rs or above. As can be seen from P's narrative below, location is a factor influencing everyday patterns of investment among some traders.

Everyday [I invest] 200–300Rs for flower trading. I... go to market before 9 am... [and] return by noon... and... finish tying flowers by 4 pm... I pay three of my neighbours for tying one kg each... and the remaining, by myself... If any of them do not finish or... cannot do it, then I have to trade with less quantity... My regular suppliers... [Number] 100–10 households... but more than half of them pay me monthly I will get 100–50Rs... everyday... but I need cash to rotate... If I have a place in the complex, I will easily get a lot of passers-by... [I] do not have to depend on households... [and] can refuse credit... [Agglomeration] traders invest more than what we do... [T]hey are sure of getting clients... I can raise the amount... but without a place... [I] do not want to risk... I now pay two people... [Fixed-place traders] can... tie flowers and trade simultaneously...

(Interview with Puttamma, itinerant flower trader, JNGR Fourth Block, Nov 2003)

Flower traders like Puttamma are part of different chit circuits both at their residences and with others in their ward, and are confident of raising capital. Often, both women and men in retail flower trade manage their business alone, while in many wards the other two trades are predominantly managed by households, (women traders have to manage both their household responsibilities and their trade). Traders from the inner- and outer-peripheral wards, travel to the city centre to buy stocks. Further itinerant traders move around more than one ward for their clients, and on account of the time cycle of trade, many of them in flower trade employ two to three people at their residences to tie flowers. The possibility of combining trade-related activities with an

assured clientele at an agglomeration is suggested as a reason for differences in the levels of investment between traders at the two locations.

Payments of bribes vary between agglomeration traders across the case study wards. Where such practices are found, traders negotiate as a group in order to reduce the risks and costs (Cross and Pena 2006) associated with erratic evictions and the amount demanded. Traders consider that without the strength of a group, negotiation with different agents of the everyday state and their competitors would be difficult, and interviews with senior field bureaucrats reflected a similar concern about having to deal with a large group of street traders after eviction and their potential to cause disruption. Having a critical mass endowed street traders with the bargaining power to negotiate their claims, as Cross and Pena (2006) suggest.

7.3.2 Reasons for Differentiating between Agglomerations

Three factors influence the flow of clients and opportunities for reducing transaction costs associated with procuring materials. These are location, area, and the amount of time allowed for trade, and they differ across the agglomerations.

Location and Opportunities

One inter-ward similarity is that congregations of clients in an agglomeration or at different agglomerations are not uniform, as this depends upon the direction of flows of both pedestrians and traffic (Seligmann 2004). At KR Market Ward, places occupied by small traders are often those with limited space in which to carry out a transaction, such as parking space or a busy thoroughfare. There is thus less competition to occupy these places (see also Chapter Five). Everyday state agents across the case study wards try to alter the flow of traffic and/or time, to dissuade street trading, and at one of the inner-peripheral wards, the traffic police re-located parking spaces to in front of street trading agglomerations to dissuade the gathering of clients. However, such interventions were not uniform, as is indicated by the varying levels of everyday eviction.

Another factor influencing agglomeration traders' opportunities is inter-ward differences in the characteristics of congregations. In the wards, such as KR Market in the city centre and KR Puram in the outer periphery, where the scale of trade varies, many

traders have scaled up their trade over time, drawing on their networks. At KR Market Ward, traders uniquely have the potential to develop linkages not only with markets in Bangalore but also outside the city's boundaries. This is because various agents – financiers, suppliers and transport agents – linked to different trades from different places congregate here. As mentioned in Chapter Four, wholesale and retail formal markets for different types of vegetables, fruit and flowers are located in this ward. Transporters are one of the key agents connecting street traders and clients in different markets (Seligmann 2004; Lazar 2007).

Street traders in bulk trade of fruits or vegetables at KR Market supply retail traders and petty traders outside Bangalore via small transport carriers. Transporters provide them with information about and connections to new markets, and subsequently with help transporting their goods. However, patterns of congregation differed, and so for many traders, negotiating a place for street trade in KR Market, is more about 'location' and 'time' rather than the 'area' or individual claims, as is emphasized by their counterparts in other wards. This impacts not only in terms of immediate transaction costs and income, but also on their mobility opportunities.

Several bulk traders at KR Market and at the outer periphery often started as a small retailer trading goods that were rejected by wholesale trader-employers. Over time, they built their connections and sourced goods on credit from two or three formal wholesale traders and subsequently with agents connected to other markets, and so expanded their trade. The expansion of trade at these wards and state interventions relating to re-location of formal trade opened up spaces for street traders' entry into bulk trade, while the forcible re-location of the formal wholesale fruit trade out of this ward fuelled the evolution of bulk trade among street traders in fruit and vegetables. Another example is the experience of Salil the secretary of the retail and street traders' union. He started as a retail street trader in front of his uncle's shop, and he now trades from a rented shop at L3 (see Fig.4.5); allowing 2 to 3 street traders to occupy spaces in front. Networks thus compensate for capital at these wards for traders with different scales of trade.

Where and when trade takes place influences strategies of everyday investment among new traders with limited or no capital, and strategies of expansion among established traders. For example, both at KR Market and KR Puram, unskilled labourers entering trade with limited capital secure resources on credit or invest incrementally throughout

the day, depending on their network portfolio. I observed that small street traders selling fruit and vegetables in KR Market and with weak ties to wholesale traders would start with a minimal investment, often 50Rs in the morning, and build up to 200Rs in a day. This was not possible for those in other wards, where traders had to invest a larger amount at one time. This was similarly the case for established traders at KR Market, as these traders depend on both credit and cash investments. Such arrangements are difficult for traders in the wards in the inner periphery.

Time and Opportunities

Restrictions on trading times differed between agglomerations in and across case-study wards. At the KR Market Ward, flower traders are one group affected by time restrictions, and they are allowed only during the first cycle of trade. The demand for this trade can be seen from the images below. The number of traders congregating during the first cycle is so high that traders are allowed to stand and trade or to occupy minimal spaces between two retail street traders (See also Appendix 2).

Officially, flower trading is no longer allowed in this ward. However, following local negotiations between street traders, everyday state agents, senior bureaucrats and politicians at the central office of the BCC, it is now tolerated between 5 am and 9 am. Not only has the trade thrived, but other specialized trades such as bouquet trading have also emerged at this ward. However, the time restriction results in street traders often forced to stop their trade during their peak trading time and consequently it affected their everyday income and opportunities to expand their business. A few high-end flower traders rent a room at the same ward to store their stock, and have recently started to repackage flowers for export to markets outside Bangalore. Smaller-scale traders pay a daily rent to this group to store their flowers, or instead they sell their stock to these larger traders, often at a price marginally below their investment.

Area and Opportunities

Area is another factor influencing inter-ward differences in terms of opportunities and risks between agglomeration traders across different wards. It affects the density of street trade in each ward and therefore the relationship between street traders and their suppliers.

Traders from different wards source their products from KR Market Ward. Although the three wards in the outer periphery, are relatively far away when compared to the inner periphery, the density of traders at the agglomerations here mean that traders from KR Market transport merchandise into the area.

.... around 3000 people trade at this agglomeration... Wholesalers from the KR Market Ward supply directly to traders here. They have a large clientele [among street traders] and [hence] supply... directly.

(Interview with Nazeer Ahmed, weekly trader in vegetable, KR Puram, June 2004)

By contrast, traders in the inner periphery ward have to invest time and money in sourcing their goods, which has led to the involvement of household members, particularly among mid-level retail traders. Household involvement in the outer periphery, by contrast, is influenced by the possibility of trading during different time cycles

Further, areas captured by individual traders in the agglomerations at the inner-peripheral wards influence their type of trade and their access to clients. Traders who lose part of their places in an agglomeration tailor their trade according to their new location. One example is the case of a trader who shifted from fruit trade to vegetable trade, which requires less investment and a minimal area for display at an inner peripheral ward. By contrast, at the city centre ward a group of vegetable traders who moved out of the old market complex (L1) to L4, shifted to fruit trading after their move. They found new opportunities at their re-located place.

I was in vegetable trade... We changed to fruit trade after moving to L4. This place is known for fruit... vegetable [clientele] will not come here...

(Interview with Kavya, network leader, L4 KR Market ward, May 2004)

Face-to-face contacts with formal wholesale traders at their re-located place enabled them to develop trust and to organize for sourcing goods on credit. Some traders now alternate between fruit and vegetable trade at their new location.

Unlike in KR Market Ward, traders at inner-peripheral wards have limited opportunities for organizing storage with formal traders, or for sourcing small quantities of goods throughout the day. Their only option was to rent or lease houses for storing and processing their products,⁹³ and only a few traders could afford this.

In the discussions about street trade, the influence of location is either overlooked or anecdotal. However, the above shows the economic and political opportunities of agglomerating in a place for street trade, and the differences between agglomerations in relation to such opportunities. The following section explores disagreements about the role of trade and social networks on street traders' decision to locate in agglomerations.

7.4 Locating in Agglomerations: Influence of Trade and Networks

7.4.1 Experience of Itinerant and Scattered-Location Traders

Constraints in Finding a Place

A dominant pattern in the narratives of itinerant traders and those trading from scattered locations is that their choices are influenced by the constraints they face in finding spaces or in holding on to their spaces at an agglomeration. Networks are one constraining factor. For instance, although itinerant traders have ties with agglomeration traders, they are unable to draw on their support when occupying spaces, despite the fact that they often reside in the same squatter settlements, and that itinerant traders may have migrated to the city with their help and in the past worked for them. When this issue was raised with the agglomeration traders, they pointed out that to accommodate a new trader they have to negotiate with different networks at an agglomeration for 'mutual adjustment' (Razzaz 1994, 1998), and in some cases, the concerned agglomeration traders do not have any influence with their own network leaders, let alone other networks at an agglomeration. Others fear conflicts and/or future reciprocal obligations that could involve the loss of some of their spaces when certain situations arise.

There are also instances where street traders – both men and women – move into itinerant trading, or scattered trading in different places in the same ward, after losing their spaces in an agglomeration. As shown in previous chapters and in Section 7.3, following an eviction street traders enter into negotiations amongst themselves and with the everyday state, but those with weak connections with networks and other agents in the locality are often displaced. Similarly, agglomeration traders who do not function as a group are also vulnerable to repeated raids and seizure of their goods. Their inability to

cope with frequent loss of investment and fines levied by the state led some traders to move to itinerant trading.

Selection of Mode or Location by Choice

The decisions of street traders who voluntarily opt for itinerant trading are driven by several factors, including their patterns of involvement in trade and the characteristics of trade at the agglomerations in their respective wards. Unlike the group of itinerant traders discussed above, these traders combine trade with other work. For example, women in flower trade are also in domestic work; and men combine their vegetable trade with finance at their place of residence. Spinach and greens trade is a dominant type of trade among men, and they invest between 200–500Rs per day as compared to an investment of 1000–5000Rs among those trading mixed vegetables itinerantly or at agglomeration. Both men and women often use their income from trade to invest more in business or to collect chits⁹⁴.

In contrast to Bayat's (1997) suggestion, entry into itinerant trade is thus not always driven by trade-related considerations. As shown earlier, in Puttamma's narrative (above), those depending solely on flower trade for their income prefer to locate in agglomerations. While spinach traders at the inner-peripheral wards opt to trade itinerantly, their counterparts in other wards trade from agglomerations. Traders at the inner-peripheral wards cite the small size of agglomerations and the time-rhythms of trade as reasons for their entry into itinerant trading: spinach trade had to be completed within two to three hours, due to the product's brief shelf life and the number of competing traders. Unlike in the city centre ward and the outer periphery, where the peak trading times extend from 5 am–9 pm, at the agglomeration in the inner-peripheral wards peak trading occurs predominantly in the evenings. In these locations, spinach traders trade in the morning cycle between 6 am–9 am, when there is a low density of clients at the agglomerations concerned.

As can be seen from this section, constraints in finding a place at agglomerations at an appropriate time is a factor driving a trader's entry into itinerant trading at scattered locations, and, as shown above, capturing a place in an agglomeration is closely linked to access to networks

7.4.2 Experience of Agglomeration Traders

Selection of Trade and Location

There are two patterns across the case study wards among agglomeration traders as to how they select their type of trade and location. First, their choice of trade and location is simultaneous and influenced by their networks. Street traders' negotiate for their entry into a trade and place, predominantly through the same networks at the inner and outer peripheral wards. Second, the dominant experience of agglomeration traders in different wards is a continuous cycle of negotiating their claims to a place: staking a new claim, protecting it, and re-negotiating it when evicted (as suggested by Bayat 1997). There were instances of established traders changing their type of trade or altering its scale after their move to a new location, depending on the area and quality of place secured. Moreover, as itinerant trading is not allowed at the KR Market Ward, the decision to enter trade, in some instances, is influenced by the extent to which there is an opportunity to claim a place.

The above patterns challenge Bayat's linear suggestion relating to location and trade. In fact, networks play a large part in determining the type of trade a trader enters, as well as both the locations of places secured and the characteristics of agglomerations. As argued earlier, location in turn also influences decisions relating to type of trade, investments, and opportunity. This, together with fierce competition over places, influences patterns of organization around networks for capturing and/or controlling territories (as shown in Chapter Five).

Quality of Places Secured by Agglomeration Traders

Street traders and their network leaders have an uneven ability to draw on horizontal and vertical networks for capturing different locations within an agglomeration or a ward, and this results in differences in the quality of places secured. This is connected to strength of connections and face-to-face contact between network leaders, street traders and their intermediaries. At the KR Market Ward, street traders have extensive horizontal and vertical ties with one another, albeit of varying strength, and this is different from the situation in other wards. The strength of horizontal ties is influenced by the level of everyday interaction at this ward, as well as face-to-face contact between network nodes at the time of negotiation. These factors influence a trader's ability to

secure membership in different groups. Street traders who are not able to secure membership in these groups, or the support of vertical ties are either unable to secure a place or have to settle for places where trading potential is low and risks are high. Such traders often depend on various political entrepreneurs to capture a place, and in contrast to networks led by street traders, in this situation they are exploited by their leaders.

Moreover, those trading at public places differentiate between agglomerations. The strength of ties and influence between network leaders, economic or political agents who act as intermediaries, and everyday state agents influences the location and time cycle secured by different networks of agglomeration traders (see Fig. 9.1). The various networks occupying different locations draw on the support of various ward-level political and economic agents to negotiate with everyday state agents. These include the unskilled labourers' union, wholesale traders and their associations, and political entrepreneurs (party activists and individuals with connections to party). The quality and timing of information circulated by various intermediaries, and their willingness to intervene with different networks, is influenced by their strength of ties with network leaders, as well as their political influence at the ward level (see Section 5.3).

For example, according to network leaders trading from other agglomerations, street traders at the public place of L1 have several close and inter-linking ties with members and leaders of the labour union and with wholesale trader-politicians. Consequently, they were the first to secure information about that location, which enabled them to capture it before other networks were even aware of it. Similarly, wholesale flower traders embedded in party politics intervened on behalf of street traders in flower and vegetable trade, although their level of intervention on behalf of different networks differed. Networks with close ties to the wholesale traders, were able to secure places within L1, to trade for an extended time, whereas a majority of those with networks in flower trading had to settle for conducting their trade for a limited time only. While their vertical networks, that is, the wholesale traders, allowed them to resist total displacement from the ward, the place and time they were able to secure limited their income.

Another factor influencing differences between leaders in terms of enlisting the support of intermediaries relates to the density and diversity of a leader's network portfolio. Network leaders with weak ties to the union but with a dense and diverse network portfolio are able to draw on different vertical networks with traders and political agents

for securing information and for negotiation. For example, Kavya, a network leader was unable to occupy L1, but she used her relationship with retail traders for information and the union for negotiation in order to occupy another place in the ward (L4: Fig.4.4). Prior to the street traders' move, the place concerned had been occupied by retail traders as a temporary site, until the municipality allotted shops for them in a renovated market complex. The retail traders informed the network leader about when they were due to move out, and advised her to be ready to occupy the spot. After occupying the place, K and her allies enlisted the support of the union to negotiate with everyday state agents.

Union leaders explained their support for the trader by highlighting the significance of Kavya's extensive horizontal networks with street traders and various agents active in the lower levels of political hierarchy of KR Market and the neighbouring ward. The power and influence of network leaders was assessed in the case study wards in terms of their network portfolios. Further, although various political agents at the lower end of the hierarchy – union leaders, political activists and network leaders – compete with one another when building their constituencies, there is also a tacit agreement to extend help to one another during times of crisis. Such acts cannot be explained within a rational framework of costs and benefits, but are influenced by expectations of future political or economic reciprocities.

Relationships between different political agents at this ward influence the labour union's decision whether to intervene on behalf of particular groups of traders with whom they have weak ties. An example of this is the relationship between the union and the networks that captured places with their support at agglomerations such as those at L5 and L6; here, differences manifested in the way the union engaged with various networks after the negotiation. At L1, they did not intervene in the way various networks shared places, or in channelling bribes to the everyday state. By contrast, at agglomerations in L4, L5, and L6 they still act as a conduit for bribes. Although union members had ties with street traders at L7, they did not intervene on behalf of their networks.

One trend among both migrants and natives at KR Market Ward is a move from labour into trade. Street traders with strong ties to various agents in the wholesale trading hierarchy were able to capture shop fronts during different time cycles (see Chapter Five). At the top of the hierarchy are wholesale traders who own or rent their shops,

followed by a chief accountant and a supervisor. Next are the leaders of the unskilled labourers, locally known as maistrs, and finally the labourers working on a permanent or temporary basis (usually around five or six). Shop fronts are usually occupied by maistrs who have entered trade or organised trade for those with whom they have close ties. Traders with weak ties to other agents in the wholesale shop but with strong ties to maistrs can secure a place but their terms of occupation differ: these agents occupy their places during the first time cycle, and trade in bulk in the second cycle. Street traders' trading during the first trading cycle in turn supports the efforts of their employees or close friends by allowing them to occupy their places during the second cycle of trade. This has led to the hierarchical chain of control over semi-public places.

The role of street traders' horizontal networks is dominant at the wards in the inner periphery and the outer periphery. Here, the strength of ties between a trader and a network leader and between different network leaders affect a trader's opportunity to claim a prime location at an agglomeration. As shown in Section 5.3, several small networks occupy places in each agglomeration and closely guard their territories. Street traders who occupy their places individually without the support of networks predominantly do not have any specific place at an agglomeration, or they trade from the edges. They face constraints in displaying their merchandise or are relegated to places where not many clients congregate. Such traders were vulnerable to displacement by other networks in an agglomeration or by other agents in the locality. An example is the situation of several small traders trading on land earmarked for construction in L1. Non-membership in a group stifled their potential chances of securing an alternative place following an eviction, as they were often excluded by other networks from the processes for negotiating eviction.

Particularly since 1999–2000, securing membership in networks has become increasingly difficult for new traders in many wards, even for those with close ties to a network leader. Due to competition between network leaders seeking to consolidate their power, either in local politics and/or within an agglomeration, there have been only a few opportunities. Instead, as places are saturated in many agglomerations and also monitored by other users in some wards, new traders have to settle for spots with limited business potential or go without a stable place for their trade. Moreover, many network leaders limit their activity to a small group.

Post-2000, street traders' vertical networks have also come to influence the everyday use of space in some agglomerations, and this has had a significant influence over inter-network sharing. Power relations between network leaders at the agglomerations, particularly in the wards of the inner periphery and at HAL Ward in the outer periphery, have been shaped by the leaders' role in negotiating the eviction of 1999–2000. These points are discussed further below.

At two other wards in the outer periphery, uneven access to information and weak ties, particularly among weekly traders in the different wards where they trade, has reinforced dependence on other network leaders for information and negotiating access. However, not all network leaders are able to offer support, as calculations of similar future political reciprocities influence the manner in which network leaders extend support to other leaders. Even after a period of interaction at the agglomeration in the outer periphery, relationships between network leaders from other wards and between them and the land manager are relatively weak and limited to specific transactions. Support from network leaders to traders or their networks from other wards when capturing places in an agglomeration is limited in the wards in the inner periphery. An exception is the support provided by a vegetable trade network leader in BG ward agglomeration to the networks of both male and female traders who were expelled from KR Market. Young male traders established contacts with a trader-leader through their youth association in their squatter settlements, discussed further in chapter 8. Here, the particular leaders' role in local politics across different wards of western Bangalore was a significant factor.

As can be seen from the above, the strength of ties between street traders, intermediaries and network leaders influences the quality of places secured by a trader. Power relations between these agents differs in and across the wards and is discussed further below, but in general, as argued by Singermen, these are influenced by their network portfolios. However, a leader or trader's ability to draw on their networks at an appropriate time is variable, and is influenced by options available for exiting alliances and calculations of the extent to which network members would be able to offer reciprocal support.

7.5 Differences in Subverting Threats: Street Traders' Agency and the Role of networks

There is a disagreement in the literature over the extent to which traders' agency helps them to subvert development threats using localized strategies (see Chapter Six), given the recent changes in the political structures at the city level. As with the contexts studied by Cross (1997) and Crossa (2009), localized strategies in general do allow street traders to subvert evictions related to development threats, although, as shown in Chapter Four, there are inter and intra ward differences in their ability to do so. These differences result in some individuals or networks of street traders losing their places or settling for relatively inferior-quality places.

It is difficult to infer from Crossa's (2009) paper about the factors influencing street traders' agency, although Cross (1997) focuses on their organization, which as argued in the last two chapters is related to networks in Bangalore. In countering everyday conflicts, street traders with previously existing ties function as a group to resist attempts at displacement by other street traders or co-option by the agents of the everyday state. Traders in the case study wards without either strong horizontal or vertical ties, by contrast, face the threat of being displaced. Cross (1997) and Crossa (2009), ignore the use multiple strategies by a group of street traders, and the role of higher levels of the state and non-state agents, as discussed in Chapter Six.

In fact, street traders use their agency to tap into different types of locality-specific political opportunities, in order to create or widen their spaces for negotiation. Opportunities tapped by street traders include: clientilistic structures; alliances with political representatives and field bureaucrats connected to the local government⁹⁵; the influence of street traders' intermediaries in local and city politics; social relations at the ward level, and the cost for the state of ensuring compliance, particularly the effect of unrest and disruption on the image of the city. Their ability to draw simultaneously and flexibly on their horizontal and vertical networks, as argued in Section 7.2.2, influences the power relations between street traders' networks and their intermediaries, and so affects patterns of place-sharing between different networks of street traders.

7.5.1 Street traders' Strategies, Political Constraints, and Opportunities

Everyday Forms of Resistance' for Maintaining Pressure on Field Bureaucrats

Street traders perceive their various forms everyday resistance (Scott 1984; Tripp 1997) as necessary in order to apply pressure on field bureaucrats while holding out against the state for a prolonged time. For example, at the KR Market Ward in the city centre, in 2000, all traders were evicted following collective action and subsequent negotiation with the BCC at the level of commissioner (see timeline). However, between the time they were evicted and their reoccupation, various networks continued lobbying and organized regular protest actions in different venues: outside police stations, the parliament, and the MLA's residence. These actions, in the words of a network leader, 'kept their issue alive in the mind of MLA' ⁹⁶ and prevented them from being completely displaced from the ward. Though there was high level of surveillance by the everyday state (Fuller and Harris 2002), they congregated in different places in the ward. The difficulty of ignoring or disrupting this crowd was recalled by a traffic police officer

...big people [senior bureaucrats] do not take into account what happens in this ward... They constructed this flyover to avoid congestion... Traffic still flows below the flyover... not on it... They do not take into account local realities... We face people on the ground... We see these street traders everyday, and know they have no other ways of earning a living... When they come and pressurize us everyday, somehow we have to accommodate them in some ways... for this is their livelihood... some officers take bribes, I do not deny that... but everything cannot be explained by bribes. You have to be here to face the pressure from these groups on a day-to-day basis.

(Interview with Mr. Puttaswamy Gowda, Traffic Supervisor, BCC, July 2004)

As his narrative indicates, there was a certain degree of sympathy and also pressure on field bureaucrats to accommodate street traders. Thus the relationship between street traders and field bureaucrats and their responses cannot be entirely explained by bribery. A similar strategy of pressuring field bureaucrats through everyday lobbying, strikes, and appealing to their generosity, was adopted by street traders in other wards and during subsequent evictions in 2003 and 2005. However, in contrast to Tripp's findings, in this case everyday forms of resistance enabled street traders to maintain pressure in the early stages of the conflict and influenced the allocation of various places at the local level after the regional state indicated a tacit acceptance of street trader's presence. That alone was not enough to influence the higher levels of the state.

Street Protests for Creating/Deepening Spaces for Negotiation

In the light of political constraints, protest actions by traders have proved to be useful weapons⁹⁷ for attracting the attention of different agents embedded in the higher levels of the state, in particular the chief minister, regional urban development minister, and senior bureaucrats and MLA members at KR Market Ward; and the minister for urban development at the centre of HAL Ward. Further, it also catalysed the creation of spaces for negotiating with the state, as until then, the state agencies concerned and the PSU refused to engage with street traders and their allies.

Street traders, particularly leaders of different networks, were aware of the state's fear of damage that riots could inflict on the global image of the city. KR Market Ward, because of its density, has not only a critical mass of voters, but is also a locality affected by communal riots (Nair 2005). The density of actors is not only feared by planners and senior policy makers eager to maintain an image of a well-governed city; it stands as an antithesis of the state's dream of transforming Bangalore into Singapore. Interviews with the leaders of the Union of Retail Traders and Street Traders revealed their plans to play the communal card in the event of any forcible displacement from the ward. On account of these factors, protests led to the chief minister and urban development minister visiting the ward, after which they ordered that eviction be postponed and agreed to negotiate with street traders and retail traders. It is useful to recollect that until then street traders had been constrained to direct their demands to the institutions shown in Box 6.1.

The dynamics of the conflict at KR Market were unpredictable and opened up unexpected spaces for manoeuvring. The two mobilizations among street traders and their allies were directed at different parts and levels of the state, as shown in Chapter Six, and showed differing relationships with state agents. The relationship between the Union of Retail Traders and Street Traders and senior bureaucrats and field officers was initially conflictual, but as the conflict intensified, APMC's field officers forged alliances with the union to prevent wholesale traders returning to KR Market, and in return, APMC would allow retail traders and street traders to trade here. However, many street traders, although they agreed to help APMC officials, in reality never reported wholesale traders, as some of them had trading ties and had secured their places from wholesale traders. Consequently, different scale of traders returned to the ward.

Moreover, APMC and BCC field bureaucrats, under pressure from their managers to achieve their targets relating to mega city programmes, resulted in another alliance, which enabled street traders and others to 'negotiate' the boundaries of law (Razzaz 1994; Santos 2002). The point here is that conflicting pressures on different parts of the state contributed to fluid alliances and complex relationships between the state(s), networks of street traders, and other traders, opening up new spaces for some groups and closing existing spaces for others.

Street traders at HAL Ward blocked the thoroughfare, disrupting the transportation of labourers of the HAL company and the flow of traffic to a variety of global software companies and the international airport. Traders here tapped into the political advantage of the 'location' of this ward in relation to the city; consequently, a central minister and a trade union leader embedded in a Kannada mobilization intervened to influence the managing director of the company to negotiate with street traders.

Similar actions at the KR Market Ward opened up spaces for street traders to strengthen their connections with the senior bureaucrats of the municipality, including direct ties with the commissioner in the midst of an authoritarian local political milieu. In both KR Puram and Varathur Wards in the outer periphery, electoral politics and decision-making at the local government was controlled by two MLAs from different parties. Consequently, the spaces that street traders were able to bargain for via competing clientilistic structures was limited. Further, due to state practices of subcontracting land-management, street traders' connections to the local government was via a land manager, and on an earlier occasion they depended on the manager to negotiate with the local state. Recognizing the limitations of opposing eviction directly, protest was framed in terms of securing the management of the land and was followed by a temporary contract awarded to the CMC to manage the santhe land for the traders' association. This allowed the network of street traders who led the protest to consolidate their constituency at the location for further lobbying of the state, and their everyday interaction in relation to place management also strengthened their ties with state bureaucrats at different levels. In this light, connections with the bureaucrats provided traders with an additional channel to bargain with the local state.

Role of Political Alliances

The characteristics of intermediaries involved in some wards creates political and legal costs to not accommodating street traders, and this has influenced a shift in the stance of landowners and the state. In particular, the involvement of the Dalit Sangarsh Samithi (a state level federation) on behalf of vegetable traders in the BG ward agglomeration in the inner periphery led to the involvement of the chief minister, who made a public statement allowing groups ‘traditionally’ dependent on street trade, such as Dalits involved in shoe repairing, to re-occupy their places. His intervention was prompted by various factors: in particular, Dalits constitute a sizeable proportion of the population, and although the DSS’s public identity is as a movement and a non-party mobilization, it is also a channel for different political parties to mobilize Dalit votes in block⁹⁸. Although there are several splinter groups, DSS leaders act as key brokers for various sub-sections of the Dalit community, and connections between the DSS and party politics are often invisible. In addition, they are feared by the state bureaucrats for their violent and confrontational strategies. The involvement of DSS in this conflict would have meant a high political cost to the party in power were evictions to be continued.

However, not all street traders who enlisted the support of the DSS in this conflict were Dalits. Following the chief minister’s statement, the DSS negotiated directly with the BCC Commissioner on behalf of vegetable and flower traders’ networks at BG ward and re-occupied their previous trading space; fruit traders in the same ward as well as traders in other wards in the inner periphery seized this opportunity to negotiate with field bureaucrats. Some networks drew on the support of their ties within the locality – field bureaucrats and retail traders linked to local politics – to recapture their places. Despite these differences in their circuits of negotiation with the state, competing networks of street traders at this ward recaptured their places. However, on the other hand, not all Dalits were able to draw on the support of the DSS. For example, the DSS refused to support Dalit traders at the KR Market Ward.

Street traders at another ward in the inner periphery tapped into the support of a local organization, the Kannadiga Chaluvalike Sanga (KCS), to persuade the local MLA, who was also the urban development minister, to intervene. For him, street traders were a critical political constituency, although, as migrants, street traders regarded their ties as being not strong enough to influence the MLA directly. Paradoxically, on earlier

occasions migrant traders had been opposed violently by the KCS, and when they moved to the ward in the early 1980s their business had been regularly destroyed. Although this relationship shifted over time, and the KCS became a powerful ally in relation to the MLA, their influence over the MLA was higher when compared to that of Tamil migrant traders. In a paradoxical way, traders also tried to use the licence programme announced by the BCC around that time, with the support of the KCS, to consolidate their position.

The interests of these intermediaries were complex, and driven by a combination of issue-based politics and the consolidation of power over party politicians. This porosity of boundaries in the Indian context between state and society and between movement organizations and party politics, has been highlighted in many studies⁹⁹.

A similar pattern among traders at the KR Market and HAL Wards, as discussed above, is lobbying through several inter-linking ties, and this was seen by street traders as a factor in opening up spaces for negotiation. In the context of HAL Ward, street traders and their network leaders have influence with the local government, are active in squatter politics, and have experience of dealing with the state via their role in regularizing squatter settlements. However, these connections and knowledge were inadequate for lobbying with the company at this time. Although political parties intervened in these negotiations, including a central minister for urban development and the KCS-trade union leader, their influence over the company director was limited. Further, a group within the union was opposed to allocating shops to street traders rather than to employees. Consequently, in addition to influencing the senior management of the company, they had to enlist the support of the trade unions, and most traders believed that the market would be erased from the map as the conflict deepened. Thus the ability of street traders to pressurize the company management via their network links with employees and the trade union was a significant factor in creating spaces of negotiation for street traders. The involvement of a section of the trade union with connections to the Kannada sangas of East Bangalore, threatened to make conflict with the street-traders spill over into the company. Further, according to an ex-real estate officer of the company and current member of the district administration, the political and financial cost and time involved in acquiring land from street traders persuaded the company to restrict the land captured by street traders, rather than attempt to evict them completely.

Playing the State via Networks

In two wards (KR Puram and Varathur) of the outer periphery, in contrast to other wards, there was a grudging acknowledgement that land needed to be allotted to street traders, but a continuing conflict is over location and area. There was thus tension between the state's efforts to disperse agglomeration and the interest of street traders. Therefore, the discourse of the state was not to portray street traders as illegal actors, but rather to label them as belonging to groups that have customary claims to trade in santhes.

Further, the local political milieu in both wards were controlled by the concerned MLA. At Varthur Ward there was competition both between party politicians at different hierarchies of the ruling party, and between parties to capture votes in a highly competitive political milieu, and street traders tapped into these spaces. The Janata Dal government passed a resolution in early 1991¹⁰⁰ to evict traders, which was revived in 2000 as part of the conflict between the organizing networks of street traders and the ruling party. Land occupied by traders was owned by the local panchayat, and its use can be amended only by a directive/order from the district administration, which in this context was the 'Taluk Office and Revenue Department' (responsible for land records and overseeing management at the local level). Traders drew on a senior politician embedded in a higher scale of state to stall the order. Further, the panchayat passed the resolution to evict without having the required quorum, and so traders enlisted the support of a politician embedded in district administration to veto it. Traders also, via a local opposition politician, established contact with the MLA candidate and had the land issue included in his election manifesto. The politician concerned also supported them in setting up their organization.

Similarly, multiple alliances with 'political entrepreneurs' and non-party mobilizations like the DSS has been important for KR Puram traders in averting/delaying eviction. Despite being a strong political constituency, their relationship with the political parties is complex and street traders are aware of the 'double-edged' nature of these alliances. Power relations within the local government mean that they do not have similar spaces to manoeuvre as in other wards. In this light, their alliance with different networks within the DSS is perceived as essential to pressurizing the MLA, as the DSS had been active in land invasions in the outer-peripheral wards,. They also maintain direct links

with the MLA through a variety of channels including local political activists and filed bureaucrats.

The above discussion has shown the extent of street traders' agency when tapping into different types of political opportunities for subverting eviction related to mega urban development programmes. The terms under which street traders can retain their claims in different wards are no doubt imperfect, but they need to be situated in the context of structures of constraints faced by street traders at the city level in negotiating these evictions.

In this section, we have seen how street traders' relationships to their networks affects their ability to capture places in agglomerations. As argued by Macharia, there are two aspects to street traders' process of negotiating evictions related to development threats. The above shows the influence of street traders' strategies and the role of networks in terms of shifting the position of higher levels of the state and landowners. In the situation described, landowners did not have much influence on subsequent negotiations related to inter-network allocation of spaces or between street traders' networks, intermediaries, and everyday agents of the state.

7.5.2 Factors Influencing Differences

Power Relations between Networks

Power relations between various agents play a significant role in inter- and intra-ward differences between street traders in terms of securing a place in agglomerations and the quality of the places secured. This section illustrates the factors that in turn influence power relations between agglomeration traders and their relations with intermediaries and other agents involved. The ability to draw on networks flexibly for forging alliances horizontally or vertically affects the bargaining power between network nodes and the quality of spaces secured by different networks and network members. Two aspects in particular need to be considered: (i) the influence of external intermediaries on inter-network allocations of places in a ward or agglomeration; and (ii) the role of network leaders.

Power Relations: Intermediaries and Network Leaders

The influence of intermediaries on the inter-network allocation of places in an agglomeration or between agglomerations differs across the case study wards. External intermediaries have limited influence at KR Market Ward and the wards in the outer periphery. In the former ward, network leaders' relationships with various intermediaries' affects where they secure places for themselves and their networks, as shown above. However, intermediaries do not have much say over inter-network arrangements for sharing a place. Further, street traders captured various places in the ward following the eviction in 1999–2000, and intermediaries could negotiate for only a few of their clients to be accommodated with the leaders of street traders' networks. At the wards in the outer periphery, the various intermediaries restricted their role to negotiating with landowners and have no influence over everyday patterns of use.

By contrast, external intermediaries – vertical networks – are of significant influence, albeit in different ways over inter-network allocations of place in an agglomeration at the wards of the inner periphery. Unlike in KR Market, relationships with the everyday state post-eviction were not always harmonious. Agglomeration traders were able to occupy the same locations and counter the opposition of the everyday state, through the political influence of their intermediaries. However, their terms of support accentuated inter-network competition over places.

Street traders in BG ward and JNGR Ninth Block ward secured the support of vertical networks – the DSS and the KCS respectively – on the condition that they limit the area of their agglomeration. While street traders' preferred a denser agglomeration for their trade, their intermediaries had conflicting interests. The DSS wanted eventually to prevent trading in public spaces and to move all traders into an enclosed market. Although an earlier attempt to re-locate street traders in this ward had failed and led to conflicts among street traders, the organization was keen to push on with this agenda and was negotiating for allocations of land by the BCC for the construction of a shopping complex. The KCS acknowledges that street traders provide an essential service in their ward and to an extent appreciate the economic logic of agglomeration, although they were also concerned about the aesthetics of their ward and hence keen to limit the agglomeration's size. However, the KCS also had another, contradictory, political agenda, described in Chapter Eight, that land should be given only to Kannadiga people.

For both organizations, the temporary solution is to limit street traders so that services required by ward residents can be met. The DSS had little control over everyday occupation after the negotiation process, and post-2001 the KCS influenced processes of occupation at the JNGR Ninth Block on a daily basis. Consequently, new traders could not encroach without their patronage and those with limited power were expelled, as shown in the next section.

Despite their history of conflict and a partial alignment of interests with their intermediaries, street traders had no other option besides aligning with them. Across the three wards, traders faced the difficulty of entering into negotiations with the state at the beginning of the conflict, and unlike earlier times, elected representatives were reluctant to get involved due to the political milieu and/or street traders' conflictual relationships with local economic or political agents at these wards.

Conflict between intermediaries or their decision to withdraw from the process when the conflict was ongoing also affected street traders' bargaining power at another ward in the inner periphery, JNGR Fourth Block. Street traders negotiated directly with field bureaucrats or via their MLA, and field bureaucrats would demonstrate their power in conflict with the MLA by evicting street traders or constraining their trade. Due to this conflict, the MLA limited his support to just some networks. Meanwhile, an NGO which had supported street traders in their efforts to subvert eviction withdrew support midway into the conflict, complicating traders' ability to enlist the support of their other networks embedded in ward politics. Networks supported by the MLA are less vulnerable to the need to pay out bribes, but field bureaucrats stifled their trade by re-locating parking spaces to in front of their trading spots, to dissuade traders' clients from congregating. Further, although some networks with a weak influence over the MLA negotiated as a group with the field bureaucrats concerned and agreed on the payment of an annual bribe, the terms of accommodation differed.

Across the three wards in the inner periphery, in enlisting the support of intermediaries or co-opting the everyday state, street traders also reduced the area they occupied for their agglomeration. Consequently, some networks, and traders not linked to any network, were displaced or had to settle for less space at the agglomeration. Both men and women traders were affected at these agglomerations. Some street traders adjusted to this by allowing those who had been displaced to roam within spots where client

movement was high or to occupy shop fronts; however, space for such manoeuvring varied at both wards depending on the role of intermediaries in everyday surveillance. Factors influencing the power relations between street traders, intermediaries, and the state are discussed in the following chapters.

Power Relations Between Network Leaders and Between Leaders and Members

Not all network leaders have the same ability to draw on the support of their vertical networks to act as intermediaries or to forge alliances horizontally. This influences the power relations between network leaders and the reasons for cooperating with other competing networks. Its effect over the way places are shared among aligning networks in an agglomeration differs across the case study wards.

As discussed above, arrangements between networks for the sharing of places is limited to the KR Market Ward in the city centre and to two agglomerations in the outer periphery. Although they do not have day-to-day control over the way various networks occupy places in an agglomeration, in KR Market, they could influence inter-network opportunities through their option to align with other networks. Similarly, at the agglomerations in the outer-peripheral wards, because of the competition between several small networks and the different levels of acceptance by other agents in the ward of various networks, inter-network connections are necessary for accommodating other interests and to neutralize their power. Different groups of traders' trade at these agglomerations: these groups include weekly and daily traders, as well as farmers with competing interests in relation to location, trade with daily traders and networks of traders residing in the same ward. Of these, one of the three daily traders' networks have captured the street traders' organization and forged vertical alliances. However, at these agglomerations, weekly traders have numerical superiority and their spatial practice is to control territory in large groups. Both daily traders and farmers are important constituencies of the local MLA and they compete to align with weekly traders in order to consolidate their power at the agglomeration. Similarly, there is competition between various intermediaries – the DSS and field-level political entrepreneurs – to make inroads into the three constituencies. Moreover, given that the history of trading is linked to traditional farmers' markets, the right of daily traders to trade from this place is contested both by other traders and the state. These factors necessitated the networks of

daily traders controlling the organisation to accommodate the interests of other groups. Moreover, the network of daily traders that controls the organization has been embroiled in another conflict over an enclosed market, and thus is at a disadvantage. It is because of this that they organized the mobilization against the land manager and subsequently took control of the santhe management.

Similarly, the organizing networks at Varathur have a hostile relationship at the ward level and need the support of other traders. As everyday relationships influence these alliances, there are possibilities of other network leaders shifting their alliances. This has compelled networks controlling the organization to accommodate the interests of other traders.

Relationships between a trader and a network leader influence the former's ability to secure membership in a network, and the relationship between network leaders affects the chances of a group to secure a place or contest eviction. Relationships between a network member and a leader are often specific to a particular event but vary across networks depending on a trader's horizontal portfolio, and the options available for a network member to change networks for securing a place differs across a ward. Although, in theory, in wards such as KR Market and the two wards in the outer periphery there were relatively more opportunities to switch networks due to the density of street traders with similar interests and variety of agents competing to claim authority, the ability of street traders to play networks differs. Where there are authoritarian relationships and where ties between network members were not strong, such networks are controlled by leaders working directly for political agents. These networks were often constituted by traders excluded from other street trader led networks. This difference affected their bargaining power over network leaders.

In the wards where intermediaries reduce the area that can be claimed by street traders for their agglomerations, network leaders who act as a bridge have an upper hand in inter-network allocation. The countervailing power of other networks depends on the respective leaders' ability to maintain independent ties with other state and non-state agents at some wards. For example, two of the three dominant networks at the HAL Ward and established traders in the outer periphery maintained ties with the landowners to secure a regular flow of information and to counter the actions of organizing networks. Another example is the power relations between networks at the JNGR Ward

in the inner periphery. Network leaders with a greater voice at the agglomeration also had influence with the relevant local politician, and were also active leaders of their community in their place of residence. A strategy among both migrants and natives is to mobilize their community and bargain as a group with elected representatives both for work-related issues and over residential locations.

As Cross (1998) has argued, competition at the lower level opens up spaces for network leaders and members to bargain for a share. Aside from KR Market Ward or the two wards in the outer periphery, where both men and women are active in the lower hierarchy of politics and maintain independent links with the MLA, the connections and influence of many network leaders over external intermediaries is limited. Further, due to the logistics of organizing everyday trade or the trading cycles, many businesses are controlled by households which operate as a clique during these conflicts, so women and men trading alone face the threat of exclusion. In their view, networks with weak connections or a weak voice in an agglomeration and the ward are in a weak position to negotiate, or are excluded completely from the negotiation process with the landowners. Consequently, they have to settle for inferior-quality places or they lose their places.

The Decision to Contest Eviction and its Impact

The decision to contest eviction is thus not always by choice, as suggested in the literature on free riders, but can also arise due to exclusion from dominant networks. Because of the competition for places, organizers in some wards exclude weak networks, and as bargaining for places is patterned via networks in these agglomerations, those who do not participate are more vulnerable to losing their places. Very few traders have strong ties with other users in a locality which would allow them to override other horizontal networks when negotiating for places in an agglomeration.

7.6 Conclusion

This chapter has shown the role of networks as a factor influencing differences between street traders in their ability to claim places for fixed-place trading. It has contributed towards filling the gap in the literature in relation to the influence of location on trade

and the factors influencing street traders' opportunities. Street traders prefer to trade from agglomerations because of the political and economic advantages associated with clustering in a place. Further, they differentiated between agglomerations in terms of two aspects: the location's business potential and the threat of eviction. The location and size of an agglomeration also influence calculations of the advantages and risks of a place. The experience of street traders at different locations shows that networks influence both their entry into a particular type of trade and their opportunities for locating in agglomerations. Further, networks influence agglomeration traders' ability to subvert threats stemming from everyday conflicts and development threats. The process of negotiating eviction stemming from development threats is complex and their strategies involve group actions of various scales to negotiate with landowners or higher levels of the state, as well as intermediaries in a ward. Opportunities for drawing on networks flexibly to forge horizontal and vertical alliances differ among street traders and network leaders, as does the ability to use opportunities. This influences power relations amongst traders and with their intermediaries and the intra- and inter-network allocation of places. In the following chapter, I explore the factors responsible for these differences.

8 Differences Due to the Role of Household and Community Networks?

8.1 Introduction

As was shown in the last chapter, the ability to draw on horizontal and/or vertical networks while attempting to claim places affects traders' chances of locating in an agglomeration and the quality of places secured. There is a disagreement in the studies reviewed in Chapter Two about the role of household and community networks (H&CNs) in influencing such differences. Therefore, this chapter explores how the networks used by agglomeration traders are embedded. This chapter argues that a focus on H&CNs is inadequate for explaining the differences observed in Bangalore.

8.2 Literature Gaps and Findings

Disagreements in the literature in relation to the role of H&CNs are outlined in Section 2.3.1, and they relate to the contrasting influence of economic and political networks and territorial ties. It is recognized that these networks may in practice overlap, and thus the distinction is mainly to aid analysis.

In the *H&CN* context, community is defined as individuals sharing a similar linguistic, migratory, religious, ethnic, caste, or racial background. As mentioned in Chapter Four, language is a main axis, around which claims on resources are contested in the city Bangalore (see Nair 2005). Kannada speakers are seen as natives or the sons of the soil irrespective of their place of origin, while migrants speaking other languages and from other Indian states are non-natives.

Economic and Political Networks (E&PNs) are defined as ties between street traders and other agents outside the H&CN boundary, embedded in trade-related transactions, employment relations, and/or various forms of political action. The latter may include electoral block-voting or everyday politics and other forms of political mobilization.

Territorial Networks encompass street traders' ties with other users in a ward or outside its boundaries, as evolved through everyday acquaintances. They may develop into

economic or political transactions over time, but at the time of negotiating their place claims street traders were not involved in such networks.

Household and Community Networks (H&CNs), are one type of network used by agglomeration traders from different social backgrounds, in their attempts to occupy places and subvert eviction.

The influence of each of these networks and their characteristics vary across the wards and in the processes they make use of. Moreover, the boundaries between different types of networks are blurred in some cases, and membership in a similar ethnic or racial group does not necessarily translate into ability or willingness to support ethnic networks in establishing their claims to a place, in the same way as Nagar and Leitner (1998) suggest.

8.3 Types of Networks Used to Claim Places

8.3.1 Use of Household and Community Networks [H&CNs]

Household and Community Networks are used by both native and migrant agglomeration traders when claiming places at KR Market and in two wards, KR Puram and Varathur, in the outer periphery; it is also a dominant type of network at the three wards of the inner periphery and HAL Ward in the outer periphery.

KR Market

At KR Market, there are some Muslim and Hindu (Devanga and Thigalas castes) native traders who make sole use of H&CNs in relation to both to claiming places and subverting eviction. However, a dominant pattern among natives as well as migrants is to use H&CNs alongside other types of networks.

Muslim traders who draw on H&CNs are predominantly male, trading in fruit or vegetables from shop fronts at two agglomerations (L3 and L1, see fig 4.4) and from a public place at the third. At the former two agglomerations, street traders negotiate directly with their vertical connections (wholesale traders), while horizontal and vertical networks used by traders at the third agglomeration are embedded in different domains, one of which is religion.

The manner in which street traders' vertical networks extend support to traders from their household or community differs, particularly as regards Muslim wholesale traders. At L3, household relations influence negotiations related to place, while at L1 employment relations have this role.

A typical scenario at L3 is as follows. The shops¹⁰¹ are owned or rented by the eldest member of the household. The elder siblings locate at shop fronts and sell in bulk, while younger members, new to trade, occupy public walkways and trade with retail customers. Each of their businesses is separate. Although both Muslim and Hindu men and women work as loaders and helpers in wholesale shops at this agglomeration, they could not negotiate a space to trade here. Wholesale traders in vegetable trade at L1 support their employees, relatives and acquaintances who are co-religionists in entering street trade and occupying shop fronts, but Muslims in wholesale trade at an adjoining agglomeration, L4, supported their migrant Hindu labourers, as is shown below. Reasons for these differences are discussed in the next chapter.

Some labourers connected to fruit trade organize as a group and occupy a public place (L7) with the support of their community networks for retail trade in fruits. At present, there are three networks of street traders at this location – one dominated by Muslim traders and the other two by Hindu traders. Land occupied by these networks is claimed by several institutions, including the mosque, the highways department, and the BCC. The first occupier is a network of Muslim labourers from L3. Due to their regular interaction in the ward, they were aware of the place, but drew on the support of their community networks, including mosque committee members, previous employers, and a mullah, to take occupation. Several small and large mosques dotted this ward, and claims on public places are often contested by the mosque, state and other occupiers – including street traders.

Muslim street traders' networks had weak ties field bureaucrats at the time of their occupation, and network members say there were at first daily raids and seizures by the traffic police initially. However, their relationship with the police improved after a few police officials became their regular clients, and a traffic police officer negotiated with the network leader concerned to accommodate a group of Hindu male traders known to him who had been evicted from another location in the same ward. He also provided

finance for a trader of the second network, on an interest-free basis, to start his own business. In addition, a third network, dominated by Hindu traders in a complementary fruit trade to that of the first network, drew on the support of a leader of the Muslim traders' network, to occupy places. Their ties were forged at the wards where they lived. During the recent eviction, all three networks of street traders aligned to lobby the mosque committee and an influential Muslim minister. Trade-related transaction between members of the three networks was limited and their relationship to field bureaucrats was complex.

Traders from different Hindu castes, Thigalas, Banijigas and Devangas, used their caste networks embedded in wholesale trade and/or the lower circuits of the ward's politics to capture places in different agglomerations. Thigalas trade during different time cycles at four of the eight agglomerations (L1, L5, L6 and L7 [see Fig 4.5]); they captured these places in groups. Banijiga and Devanga traders negotiated individually but secured places at different agglomerations, depending on their relationship with their wholesale trader and politicians in their trade.

In general, Thigalas dominate spinach and greens trading at different scales, both at this ward and in the city; Devangas are known for their flower trading and Banijigas for their vegetable trade. At KR Market and the outer peripheral wards, caste members are active in municipal and regional politics. Thus, Thigala and Devanga street traders have extensive horizontal and vertical networks at KR Market and outside, particularly in the south and eastern wards in the outer periphery. The involvement of traders from these castes in fruit trading and vegetable trade other than spinach and greens is limited. In contrast to Muslim traders, both men and women from these three castes are street traders; while men dominate network leadership of the Banijigas and Devangas, Thigala traders' networks are led by both gender, and men and women from the same household in this caste manage their trade and control their finances independently.

Similar to their Muslim counterparts, caste members connected to wholesale trade act as a bridge between migrants and native traders and the state during negotiations related to place. However, the political and economic power and influence enjoyed by wholesale traders from the three native castes at the ward or city did not mean that street traders from the three native castes could always secure better quality places as compared to migrants, as Babb (2001) and Seligmann (2004) believe to be the case. For example,

networks of Thigala, Devanga and Banjiga street traders in flower trade for a only restricted time at two agglomerations (L7 and L1), and, moreover, migrant and native street traders trade from the same agglomeration. In general, trading or political relations influence the manner in which wholesale traders from different castes, support natives or migrants in occupying different types of places. An example is the support extended by Thigala traders to Tamil migrants rather than members of their own caste to occupy shop fronts at L5. Although Thigala wholesale traders supported members of their own caste to capture public places earmarked for bulk trade at their agglomeration, they only supported their labourers, many of whom are Tamil migrants. Similarly, Thigala and Devanga caste street traders have negotiated their entry into other types of trade (fruit and flower) and place, drawing on their political or economic networks.

Tamil migrants are a dominant group in different scales of street trade, and they entered street trade at this ward after the Thigalas and Muslim traders at KR Market. Currently, they reside at different wards including KR Market, the surrounding wards of West Bangalore (Blore 1989; Nair 2005), and the inner peripheral wards to the South.

Tamil migrants trade in front of wholesale shops and public places at many agglomerations. They draw on more than just their H&CN to secure information about the availability of places and/or to mediate in their negotiations with vertical networks (agents in wholesale trading hierarchy). Similarly, among migrants who traded at public places, H&CNs is just one of the networks used to form groups and to enlist the support of intermediaries for capturing places. Moreover, there are divisions among Tamil migrants based on their caste, place of origin, and place of residence at Bangalore, and patterns of drawing horizontally on their community networks in the processes of occupying places are thus influenced by both their caste and spatial relations.

Use for Subverting Eviction

One similarity among Tamil migrant and native traders from the two religions is the influence of family and community networks on their basic unit of mobilization. The use of H&CNs among network leaders for forging horizontal or vertical alliances with other networks or other traders for street protests and collective lobbying differs among both natives and Tamil migrants, although alliances have emerged across communities, locations and scales of trade. One example is the alliance between a group of Tamil migrants, Thigalas, and Muslim traders. Union of Retail Traders and Street Traders

consists of Tamil migrants, Thigalas, and Muslims in street trading, and Muslim retail traders. Another network of Tamil migrant traders from the same agglomeration, despite their ties with migrants connected to the union, draws on the support of another Muslim wholesale trader to subvert eviction. Moreover, the union also draws on religious networks outside their ward boundaries to lobby different levels of the state (Fig. 6.1), while migrants, Thigalas and Devanga traders in spinach and flowers, draw on the support of their vertical ties from their respective castes. These differences are influenced by perceptions of threat, everyday relationships among network members, and an interest in location, as argued earlier.

Inner Periphery and Outer Periphery

As noted in Chapter Five, several networks occupy places in close proximity at the agglomerations in the three wards of the inner periphery. Street traders of both gender from different Hindu caste groups have predominantly negotiated their occupation individually with the support of their network leaders. These networks have consolidated over time, and their size depends on a leader's ability to claim to places within each agglomeration. Networks leaders among both men and women are often the descendants of first-generation traders at their respective agglomeration. Caste and migratory ties influenced the membership in their networks, but the influence of gender and household is variable.

At these inner- and outer-peripheral wards, there are two types of networks – one dominated by trader households and another by men and women traders, who trade individually at their agglomerations. In the former type of network, the division of labour was such that women conducted the trade while the men organized the purchase of vegetables and the finance for investments. Women's control over the trading capital varied. The involvement of households is more common among vegetable traders than fruit traders.

At the three wards in the inner periphery, male and female networks are distinct, and the influence that these networks have over those dominated by household traders varies by ward. Male traders who do not have the support of their households at a location could

overcome this lack to an extent with their vertical networks. Women by contrast were disadvantaged in this context.

Networks of women traders are dominated by Tamil SC caste migrants from Thiruvannamalai at JNGR Fourth Block in the inner periphery. Many women are also de facto heads of their households or the clan, and are predominantly in vegetable trade. Male traders' networks in vegetable or fruit trading at this ward, include SC caste Tamil migrants from Chenchi district, and Gowda caste natives, in fruit or vegetable trading. At the JNGR Ninth block ward, there were 23 small networks of Tamil migrants and Gounder caste household traders in vegetable trading, and two networks of Vanniyar caste migrants from Chenchi district in fruit trading. The involvement of households varies among Chenchi migrants at both wards. Some of them are single, and they use their migratory connections to enter trade and secure a place. They rely on their household and community back at their native places for trading capital. Natives in street trading are limited at the wards in the inner periphery. The few native traders at these agglomerations do not align with any network for everyday organization of trade.

Natives from the following Hindu castes – SC, Gowdas, and Lingayats, dominate street trading at the BG ward. There were six household networks of SC caste traders and two networks of Gowdas among vegetable traders, as well as a network of Lingayat caste traders in fruit trade. Lingayat caste traders accommodate others from their caste, but only those who are already in street trading or working for a street trader at this ward, and only when a trader moves out and rents or lease their place. Flower traders include both male and female natives and migrants; the native men are predominantly youths from SC caste who trade garlands, while the women have a relatively small scale of trade as compared to men.

Similarly, at the HAL Ward in the outer periphery, of the three network coalitions, two were dominated respectively by Tamil migrant households from SC caste and Dalit Christians; and the third by men and women traders from different castes and religions: Lingayats, Muslims, Tamil SC caste migrants, and Keralites. Even though Tamil migrant traders use migratory and caste ties to employ helpers, they do not support other Tamils' entry into trade or in occupying spaces at this agglomeration; this contrasts with the practice among Tamil migrants in the inner-peripheral wards.

At the other two wards – KR Puram and Varathur - in the outer periphery, the use of household and community networks varies by location among weekly traders from the five traditional trading or landowning castes. At the wards where they reside and trade, caste identity and household relations predominate over spatial relations in terms of the way network leaders accommodate those seeking to find places. Outside their residential wards, these boundaries are blurred, and territorial identity is predominant. For example, there are fourteen Banijiga families who trade at weekly markets in different locations, including in Varathur and KR Puram. At present, these leaders accommodate only very close ties among their household relations at Varathur, although in the past Banijiga network leaders supported networks of Muslim traders from another ward in capturing places there. Moreover, traders from these fourteen families belong to different networks outside Varathur Ward; there are cross-caste alliances with traders at KR Puram, and as well as household, caste, and territorial networks.

Very few networks among weekly traders are led by women or have a female majority. Weekly trading at these agglomerations is traditionally dominated by male traders from the above-mentioned five castes, while women from other caste groups, particularly SCs, Kurubas, and Thigalas, entered trade and secured their places only recently.

Compared with the network of women traders in daily trading, Thigala men and women in weekly trading have limited influence over other network leaders or the land manager at the outer periphery. Their influence here differs from the situation at KR Market discussed above. Thigala caste traders draw on their caste ties with the land manager to negotiate occupation; the type of spaces they secure have disadvantages when compared with the places occupied by weekly traders from other castes or religions. They either traded from the edge of an agglomeration or were allowed to hang around without any fixed place – both of which situations, disrupt their trade; as they are not allowed to display their goods or stock their merchandise. As traders from other castes had captured their place in groups, the land manager, although himself a Thigala, has limited influence to evict them. A few Thigala women who are in prime trading spaces purchased spaces from a previous occupier, who had captured it with the support of a group. This is another example illustrating the complexity of identity-power relations.

Across the six wards, network members have weak ties to other networks in their agglomerations, and very few traders negotiate for their places using vertical networks

from similar castes or outside. Unlike in the inner periphery, at the outer periphery, household or territorial alliances influence the bargaining power of network leaders and members, particularly during conflict and the subsequent inter-network bargaining in relation to the sharing of places.

Use of H&CNs to Subvert Eviction

Similar to the patterns observed in KR Market, H&CNs are just one type of network used by agglomeration traders in processes of subverting eviction. Alliances between networks based on territorial or political relations emerged between leaders from different castes and religions at the time of the street protest and collective action. In addition, during the street protests, street traders at some wards (such as HAL Ward) enlisted the participation of their families or caste members not in trade, to give their demonstration momentum and to block traffic.

There are also inter-ward differences in relation to the embedding of vertical networks used by agglomeration traders to negotiate with the state through the H&CN domain. Ties between a coalition of street traders' networks and agents who act as intermediaries are predominantly embedded in other relations. An exception is the case of BG ward in the inner periphery. Here, the caste of network leader who acted as a link, was a factor influencing street traders' ability to draw on the support of the Dalit Sangarsh Samithi (DSS) as an intermediary. Although the DSS's rhetoric is that it supports only members of a scheduled caste, as shown above, some networks of vegetable and flower traders it had made links with are constituted of members of other castes. According to members of these networks, at the time of negotiating with the state all the traders were asked to provide a written declaration that they are Dalits; they reasoned there was no other option to manoeuvre the state at that time except by the use of a fictitious identity. This strategy to overcome constraints imposed by identity while bargaining for resources has been found in other contexts (Milgram 2001; Sikkink 2001; Fincher and Jacobs 1998). It reinforces the limitations of seeking to explain street traders' ability to draw on their networks solely through a focus on their H&CN relations.

Moreover, at the outer-peripheral wards, H&CNs formed one of the several interlinking horizontal networks used by street traders to negotiate with landowners. Street traders at the HAL ward rely on family and caste networks embedded within the landowner's institution to secure information about the landowner's strategies and to persuade the

owner to negotiate. Family members of two of the three dominant network leaders were employed at the HAL Company, and a few were influential trade union leaders, in which role they had ties with the company management and senior politicians from various parties.

At Varathur ward, Banijiga-caste traders led the collective action and drew on the support politicians of their caste at different levels of the state to subvert eviction. Local politics at this ward is controlled by members of three parties: the BJP, the Congress, and the Janata Dal. During the research period, members of different castes from the Congress Party held office at local, block, and state Legislature levels. At the local level, the relevant politician, from the ST Kuruba tribe, was against the street traders. Although initially Kuruba politicians supported street traders, their open declaration of their support to another party resulted in a fracture. Banijiga traders drew on the support of a politician from their caste embedded in higher levels of the state to block the decision of the local state in relation to evicting street traders.

8.3.2 Use of Economic and Political Networks

Vertical networks, and some of the horizontal networks, used by agglomeration traders to occupy or subvert eviction at KR Market Ward were embedded in economic and/or political relations. The use of similar types of networks is a limited and fairly recent phenomenon at the inner- and outer-peripheral wards. Agglomeration traders in the latter wards use such networks in their process of negotiation with the state to subvert development threats.

KR Market

The use of economic networks to occupy spaces is dominant among migrants and street traders occupying shop-fronts at different agglomerations (See Table 8.1). As shown in Chapter Seven, traders' ties with wholesale traders influences their occupation of such spaces; they are usually claimed by the head labourers or maistrys within the wholesale shop hierarchy, who negotiate for themselves and act as intermediaries for other street traders. This position is controlled by Gounder and Scheduled caste migrants from Thiruvannamalai district in Tamilnadu, at L2; Thigalas and Tamil SC migrant traders

from Thiruvannamalai at L4; Tamil migrants from Chingelpet at L5; and Gounder caste Tamil migrants at L6.

KR Market wholesale traders are drawn from diverse ethnic and religious backgrounds, as can be seen from the above table. Tamil migrants from different regions negotiate

Table 8-1 Social Characteristics of Street traders and Members dominating Wholesale Trade in KR Market

Agglomeration	Caste/religion of street traders trading from shop-fronts	Caste/religion dominating wholesale trading hierarchy
L1	Natives: Devangas, Thigalas, and SC caste; Tamil migrants, Thiruvannamalai – SC caste	Devangas/Banijigas [flower wholesale and retail trade]; Thigalas and Komalas' Shettys. Reddys, Banijigas and Gowdas [vegetable retail and non-perishable goods]
L2	Tamil migrants (Thiruvannamalai and Villupuram) from Gounders (dominant group) and SC (recent entrants; minority)	Muslims and Hindus (Dominant groups: Devangas, Banijigas, Gowdas); Gounder Caste Tamil migrants moved up from street trade.
L3	Muslims	Muslims (wholesale and retail trade in mixed fruits)
L4	Thigalas, Tamil SCs	Gowdas, Thigalas and Muslims; Coorgis
L5	Thigalas and Tamil SCs	Thigalas (traders, accountants, and supervisors)
L6	Reddys (few), Thigalas, Tamil Thiruvannamalai Gounders	Reddys and Vokkaligas in local varieties of seasonal fruits

for their places with Muslim and native Hindu wholesale traders to claim shop-fronts at different agglomerations. Hindu wholesaler traders in vegetables and fruit are predominantly from native agricultural castes: Reddys, Gowdas, Kodavas and Thigalas, and traditional trading castes: Telugu-speaking Balijigas (also known as Banjaras, Banijigas or Gajjalawars) and Gomala Shettys. Reddys and Gowdas who own

agricultural land have entered vegetable or fruit trade, dealing with imported goods as well as local seasonal varieties, including grapes, sappotos, or vegetables. Both castes still continue to hold a large amount of urban land and Reddys are active in real estate development in various parts of the city. Both caste groups have financial power and influence in city politics, and their agricultural labourers are drawn predominantly from Thigalas and their trade-related labourers from migrant and native castes. Devangas, who control the flower trade, and Thigalas, who control the trade of different varieties of spinach, are predominantly small landowners or farm labourers. Similarly, native street traders from the Thigala or Devanga castes depend on economic or political networks with Gowda traders and/or Reddy financiers, to enter fruit and specific types of flower trade as well as to claim places. Although very few Tamil migrants have moved into wholesale or retail trade, they have drawn support from migratory ties to occupy places.

There is not much documentation about the trading history of different ethnic groups in formal wholesale or retail trade. Between the sixteenth century and the late eighteenth century, until the East India company annexed KR Market, it was controlled by different rulers from Hindu and Muslim religion. Traders from different Hindu castes have settled here since the fifteenth century and developed distinct neighbourhoods or 'pettes' (Nair 2005; Srinivas 2002). By the time the Bangalore City Corporation was constituted in 1949, the various pettes had developed into specialized trading clusters that patronized communal festivals, established and maintained public places; and maintained order within each pette (Nair 2005), although they occasionally appealed to the law of the ruling elite. This form of community control continues to influence contemporary patterns of everyday control of place at this ward, as is discussed further in Chapter Nine.

The entry of other castes – Devangas trading in flowers and Thigalas trading in spinach – took place during the British period or post-Independence, and can be traced back to their involvement in horticulture during British rule; Devangas had traditionally been weavers, and entered horticulture and trade with the decline of handlooms in Karnataka, while Thigalas had been small- or medium-sized farmers who owned land surrounding KR Market to the South or agricultural labourers. In the 1980s, Jains from the northern Indian business communities invested in manufacturing or trade at these wards.

Thigalas are said to be the original settlers of the old city of Bengaluru, or the present-day KR Market. They initially cultivated public places and traded there. Another group of Thigalas moved into the city as migrant agricultural labourers from Tamilnadu, taking up tenant farming for Gowda and Reddy farmers or farming on village common land in the wards to the south of KR Market and the eastern wards of Bangalore. Tenant farmers took control of their land with the implementation of land reforms in the late 50s. Thigalas specialized in the cultivation of spinach and greens, which they traded at the KR Market Ward, and with the expansion of spinach trade and the sale of agricultural land due to high real estate prices, Thigala traders now source their goods from other markets. Since the 1970s, spinach trade has been organized as with other types of vegetable or fruit trade, through a hierarchy of actors. They employed migrant labourers from other castes only.

Muslims settled at KR Market and the surrounding wards the seventeenth century (Nair 2004), entering trade at this time. One of the largest and most powerful mosques in the city is located at this ward. Unlike many Hindu wholesale and retail traders, Muslims in a similar scale of trade have moved up over generations from being itinerant traders. Formal traders claim that until the 1970s, Muslims had been a dominant street-trading group.

Wholesalers' practice of supporting their employees' efforts to occupy shop-fronts applies to both migrant and native street traders. Those who negotiate directly with wholesale traders or other agents in their shop trade during the first trading cycle. First cycle street traders, trading in bulk, employ between three to four labourers for loading/unloading their merchandise, sorting, and occasionally running the shops; these can be family members or migrants from different religious backgrounds and without ties in the city. Hindu and Muslim migrants without ties are able to claim place to trade during the second cycle at the city centre ward.

The head labourers among both migrants and natives are predominantly men. Women organizers initially negotiate via their family connections. Upon settling in a place, they develop ties with various agents in the wholesale trading hierarchy and reproduce the pattern of negotiation on behalf of their family, employees or neighbourhood connections.

The use of political networks was dominant among agglomeration traders occupying public spaces in KR Market. As shown in Chapter Seven, migrant and native traders in these wards draw on the support of a variety of local political agents to act as intermediaries in their processes of occupying/reoccupying various places in the ward. These include the labour union, political entrepreneurs (Cross 1998), elected representatives embedded in different levels of the state, and field bureaucrats. As with their relationship to wholesale traders, the various migrant and native networks connected to each of these agents differs.

The unskilled labourers' union is a dominant intermediary at this ward, intervening between migrant and native traders trading at four of the eight agglomerations – L1, L4, L5 and L6 (See Chapter Seven) – and the everyday state. There are several small and big unions/groups linked to predominantly retail trading market complexes in different trades, and the union leaders are predominantly from native castes: Thigalas and Lingayats. In contrast to the union, migrant head labourers control small networks of traders within wholesale shops. The relevant labour union was active among labourers at the KR Market retail market complex [L1], and the current leader, a former head labourer, is from the Lingayat caste. Members of this union include Tamil migrants from Thiruvannamalai district and Thigalas.

Thiruvannamalai migrant traders have several interlinking ties with the union leader and members. These are embedded in political-economic as well as household domains. The network structure of the labour union is a concentric circle, with the leader at the centre and an inner tier of twelve members. Members from street traders' extended households are in this tier, and they also have economic ties with various leaders which over time have developed into political relations. Male migrants from Thiruvannamalai move from the unskilled labouring to street trading, which is supported on occasions by union leaders.

Thigala and Tamil migrants from Chingelpet depend on their economic or socio-political networks to enlist the support of the labour union and to lobby senior bureaucrats in the municipality to capture their places. Their network leaders' ties to the union are predominantly embedded in political relations, and their transaction is limited to the process of securing places. Tamil migrants from Chingelpet, being recent migrants to the city and to this ward, have limited connections. Their strongest ties are predominantly

with Thigala wholesalers and other agents connected to their trade, and although Thigala street traders are an established group in the market, their everyday interactions are at a level which gives them less influence over the labour union. Instead, they depend on caste ties with members of the wholesale labour hierarchy and also among organized labourers in enlisting the support of the labour union. Similarly, a female network leader from the Thigala community negotiates with the labour union leader on behalf of several small networks led by Tamil migrants and native traders at another agglomeration. Despite weak connections with traders or central persons, the labour union's willingness to intervene is explained by expectations of future political reciprocity from network leaders or other political intermediaries; this is discussed further in the next chapter.

Tamil migrant networks that cannot not enlist the support of the labour union, or traders who cannot secure membership in networks with links to the union, negotiate via a variety of agents active in street-level politics at this ward. These include trader leaders, party activists and small financiers who use this opportunity to organize street traders. These agents derive their influence over everyday state agent or wholesalers from connections to political agents vertically and horizontally, and with union leaders at other markets.

Elected representatives are also significant: in particular, Devanga caste members of the state legislature (MLAs) have links with flower trading, and they intervene on behalf of street traders connected to different trades. Tamil migrants residing in KR Market and surrounding wards are a key constituency; differences in the places secured by Devanaga and Tamil traders at L7 and L1, and between Thigala and Tamil traders at L5, as noted above, are explained by economic relations. In general, during the access phase or everyday conflicts, elected representatives at different levels, both councillors and MLAs, intervene only occasionally. Their role during the occupation phase is not as prominent as that of individual wholesale traders or labour union and other street-level political entrepreneurs.

As regards subverting eviction, in 1999–2000, street traders at KR Market Ward had drawn on their political networks directly. However, the use of political and economic networks among traders varies in time. The involvement of wholesalers, who act as their economic network and have supported their efforts to occupy shop-fronts, was not uniform across different agglomerations during the development threat of 2005;

similarly, the labour union that had supported their occupation at different agglomerations post-2002 did not have any influence in their collective action of 2005. Moreover, in subverting development threats, street traders at some agglomerations did not draw on the support of labour unions but aligned with Muslim wholesale and retail traders. These traders drew on other types of networks – spatial or economic – in which their network leaders were embedded, to forging alliances with formal traders and to negotiate with higher levels of the state.

Inner Periphery and Outer Periphery

As compared to KR Market, the use of vertical or horizontal E&PNs to occupy a place was limited across the wards at the inner and outer periphery. Further, their use in relation to the process of occupation and eviction differed between wards. The role of political networks was significant, particularly in processes to subvert development threats, but their characteristics differed between wards. These networks influenced the way street traders occupied their places after the negotiation. Network leaders, who drew on their E&PNs to secure places for themselves or their network members, included both first generation traders and established occupiers from both migrant and native communities.

In the inner periphery, the first generation of network leaders at BG ward to use such networks were Lingayat caste natives in fruit trading, and at another, flower traders from different caste and migratory backgrounds. Lingayat caste network leaders from the Mysore district of Karnataka were the first to migrate to the city, to work for a retail trader. Retail traders at the inner-peripheral wards are predominantly from native upper caste communities including Brahmins, Lingayats, Bangalore Shettys, Reddys, Gowdas and, more recently, Marvaris, who come from a business community from North India. They are also involved in organizing small savings groups or chits of varying sizes, and a few of them provide finance to street traders. The relevant network leader enlisted the support of his employers from Shettys and Gowdas embedded in textile trading and local ward politics, to gain occupation of a public pathway and to finance his fruit business. Subsequently, the leader supported other traders from his caste and region. Another example is the support provided by a Reddy financier to a few flower traders,

predominantly Gowda and SC women, to locate inside a shopping complex in another ward.

The few street traders who purchase their places at different agglomerations draw on their E&PNs for several reasons: to secure information, to mediate negotiations related to sales or leasing, and for the adjudication of future conflicts over place-sharing in the inner periphery. As shown in Section 8.1, a specific regional or caste group among Tamil migrants and natives dominates at each agglomeration in the inner periphery, and the influence of traders and their networks depends on their community's numerical strength at each location. A Gowda caste woman trader, though from a socially higher caste than an SC member or a native, has relatively less influence in agglomerations, which are dominated by migrant or native, Scheduled Caste traders. Further, networks of street traders from the same household or caste act as cliques during conflicts related to place. Therefore, traders from minority communities, who are often not part of any horizontal network at an agglomeration, view the role of vertical networks in the ward's economy and politics as an insurance against being displaced by traders from other dominant communities.

At KR Puram Ward in the outer periphery, the first network of santhe labourers who captured places as a group (see Box 5.9) comprised of Telugu SC women and native Gowda men. They drew on the support of a first cycle Thigala trader to negotiate with the land manager – also, a Thigala – when claiming their places. Weekly traders and first-cycle traders are predominantly Reddys, Banjigas, and Thigala caste Hindus or Muslims, and they reside in the fourteen eastern and southern wards in the outer periphery. Members of landless households and new migrants worked as their labourers, most of whom were Telugu- and Kannada-speaking SCs and Thigalas.

More recently, male migrant traders from the neighbouring states of Andhra Pradesh and Tamilnadu negotiated for places by drawing on trading ties with Gowda network leaders at KR Puram. As noted earlier, native traders dominate at this agglomeration, and migrants from Andhra Pradesh who recently moved directly to KR Puram Ward have found work as labourers for a youth network during the first cycle. Members of this youth network started out as daily traders during the second cycle, and upon securing a place in other time cycles they expanded their trade and began to support Telugu-speaking and Thigala traders. At the time of the field research the network consisted of

fifteen traders for whom Telugu SC/ST youth worked as loaders and bill-collectors. Network leaders and members follow the practice of their previous employers from when they were in first cycle trading, supporting their employees and street trader clients to find places at their agglomeration. While networks led by men in general support their connections across ethnic boundaries, women network leaders restricted their support predominantly to their household members.

Tamil migrants moved to KR Puram from the KR Market Ward. They developed connections with first cycle traders in their role as transport workers for KR Market wholesale traders. Wholesale traders from KR Market supplied the merchandise to KR Puram in the outer periphery, because of the density of weekly and first cycle trade. Transport workers forged ties with traders during such transactions. Most of these relationships are hyphenated; that is, they are embedded in both spatial and economic domains.

In addition, ties between daily traders and the DSS (see Chapter Five) that facilitated the expansion of daily trade are embedded in political relations. The DSS is relatively more active in organizing land invasion among the poor in the eastern outer periphery of Bangalore. Although such help is in theory restricted to SC or Dalit traders, groups enlisting their support often include members of other castes. Similarly, Gowda daily traders enlist the support of Gowda, Kuruba and Dalit networks among street level political entrepreneurs in their negotiations over occupying a santhe location.

Economic ties between network leaders enables a few networks to secure places at the agglomeration in two wards of the inner periphery and an outer peripheral ward. With the expansion of a hawking-based economy at an inner-peripheral ward, some Tamil migrant traders and squatter leaders have diversified into manufacturing vehicles for sale or renting/leasing to street traders, and/or organizing chits and loans to groups. They support their clientele – both migrants and natives – to gain locations in their agglomerations. For example, in JNGR Ninth Block, a leader of a network of Vanniyar caste migrant fruit traders, draws on ties with a migrant Gounder caste trader connected to a vehicle manufacturer. Ties between the two network leaders emerged around transactions related to renting or selling vehicles. As mentioned earlier, although migrants share a similar background, network solidarity among them is bounded by their regional affiliation at their place of origin. Vehicle manufacturers were one of the few

bridges between different regional networks of Tamil migrants. A similar practice was observed at another ward in South Bangalore, not covered by this study; here, a Tamil migrant vehicle manufacturer/lesser is involved with cross-ethnic mediation for the sale of trading spots between native traders and Tamil migrants and Muslims.

Street traders in vehicle manufacturing and finance, because of their connections outside the community, are also key organizers at residential settlements in the city and occasionally back at their native locations. They mediate between migrant networks and Kannada-speaking elected representatives on various issues, including land. Their role is significant because of the politics of nativism: Kannadigas dominate some inner-peripheral wards. On account of this, many Tamil migrants maintain economic and political links and engage actively in electoral politics back in their place of origin, rather than in Bangalore.

Although street traders are connected to different private financiers and chit circuits in the city, the latters' role is limited in terms of supporting traders' efforts to claim places. The use of such networks among women in flower trading in the inner periphery is described earlier.

At KR Puram and Varathur wards in the outer-periphery, two of the three networks are led by women, predominantly SCs or Thigalas among daily and weekly traders, who depend on connections with their land manager-financiers to negotiate for their places. At the third ward, i.e., the HAL ward, male Tamil migrants who work as labourers in street traders' stalls, and itinerant traders from Kerala, secure their places with the support of financial networks. Native caste networks – Gowdas and Lingayats – also control street traders' organization at this ward.

As regards subverting eviction in the context of development, at two wards in the inner periphery political networks act as significant intermediaries for street traders' networks or network coalitions in subverting development threats; at the third ward their use was more limited.

Network leaders of traders at one ward draw on different types of E&PN to subvert eviction; The Lingayat leader draws on his economic networks (which also support efforts at occupying places), while the Dalit leader, representing a coalition of different caste networks at the same ward, enlists the support of his own caste political network,

the DSS. These networks include migrant Tamil flower-traders from the disadvantaged Gounder caste, and male and female Gowda vegetable traders. These castes are above the Dalits, and the relevant Dalit leader established his ties with the DSS via another trader in non-perishable trade at the same ward. This latter trader had been active in the DSS, in regularizing their squatter settlement. Ties between the DSS and other networks are another example of the influence of various types of networks on a process related to claiming places.

The DSS alliance with Dalit / SC traders varies across the case-study wards. While in one ward they support Dalits and other traders from Karnataka, migrant Tamil Dalit traders at KR Market, were unable to enlist the same support around the same time. Here, the DSS restricted their support to a network of native SC castes in shoe trading. Interestingly, the DSS office was located closer to the KR Market Ward, and it was suggested by a network leader at another ward, that both his identity and his role in local politics were factors influencing alliances with the DSS, as discussed more in the next chapter.

At the JNGR Ninth Block ward, Gounder street traders and vehicle entrepreneurs draw on political networks with the KCS (see Chapter Six). The KCS, which supports migrant street traders at this ward, aims to promote the interests of natives or Kannadigas. It is opposed, in theory, to migrant traders appropriating 'Kannada' resources, in particular their land. Many KCS leaders are from upwardly-mobile but traditionally disadvantaged communities; Gowdas and Lingayats are in small business at this ward. They are also the main local level activists for political parties. In the initial years of their re-location, migrants faced violent opposition from Lingayat and Gowda landowners influential in local politics, as noted in Chapter Seven. Over time, KCS office bearers have become a clientele for different migrant networks of agglomeration traders.

Patterns of drawing on more than one political network to act as an intermediary were found at two wards in the outer periphery (see Chapter Six). For example, at Varathur ward, in processes for subverting development threats street traders' network coalitions drew on both their social and political networks to play different levels of the state. The various networks of street traders were led by a network dominated by Balijiga youth traders. These traders, in addition to drawing on the support of elected representatives from their own caste, also drew on the support of elected representatives from ruling and

opposition parties and from Reddy, Gowda and ST Kuruba communities. Reddy politicians from the opposition party supported traders in forming an organization. They also raised this issue at a meeting of the local panchayat office and voted against the Panchayat decision. Similarly, trader leaders controlling the HAL street traders' union draw on the support of politicians from different caste backgrounds: Reddy, Lingayats and the Gowdas (see also Fig. 6.2). Caste is a factor, but not the only one, influencing this alliance. The two other dominant networks of Tamil migrant traders, and their ties to various politicians, were shaped by electoral politics. Trade union members connected to migrant and native traders also influence the negotiation process.

At KR Puram Ward, the network controlling the organization of street traders predominantly negotiates directly and indirectly via their DSS ties with bureaucrats and elected representatives from different caste backgrounds to resolve conflicts with the local state in relation to location. Meanwhile, networks of Gowda and Lingayat trader-financiers negotiate on behalf of their and other migrant networks with the land-owners.

8.3.3 Territorial Networks

Street traders at KR Market Ward in the inner periphery, and two wards in the outer periphery, use territorial networks to occupy spaces and subvert eviction. Spatial relationships are a factor influencing street traders' alliances with horizontal or vertical networks during the processes under consideration.

KR Market

As can be inferred from Fig. 8.1 four broad network coalitions can be identified amongst such traders.

One network is a network of youth traders (Network A) in bouquet trading. This network is dominated by natives from various castes, in particular Reddys, Gowdas, and Thigalas, and their clientele includes retail shop-owners and hotels from different part of the city. This is one of the main markets for bouquets. Male and female SC Tamil migrants trade local varieties of seasonal flowers, alongside Devangas and Thigalas. Ties between bouquet traders, Tamil migrants and Devanga and SC natives from are embedded in spatial relations.

The youth network was the first to enter bouquet trading at this ward. Members of the network forged ties with one another here while working as supervisors at a market for steel which subsequently developed into trading ties. Prior to entering trade, a few members of this youth network financed predominantly Thigala small farmers in the outer-peripheral wards to the east and south of Bangalore, and used to visit these wards frequently for business. Over time, they introduced to their farmer clientele various new varieties of flowers to be used in bouquets. They also entered into an agreement for purchasing the entire stock produced by a farmer. In occupying their place, they negotiated with field bureaucrats with whom they had been acquainted in their previous employment as supervisors. According to one network member, the possibility of occupying space at the market ward, and connections with producers, were factors that influenced their decision to invest in the bouquet business.




Figure 8-1 Networks of Flower Traders (First Daily Time cycle) at KR Market Ward

The youth network acts as a spokesperson for the other three networks in this agglomeration, and their ties with other networks are embedded in different domains, one of which is territorial. There are relatively strong ties between youth networks and

network members and individuals of Network B, who are their clients or from their place of residence. It catalysed the entry of Thigala and Devanga small farmers into the bouquet trade.

Networks C and D were formed of flower traders who had lost their previous trading places during an eviction in 1999–2000. The former consisted of male and female migrant SC Tamil traders selling local varieties of flower, and unlike their counterpart migrant Devanga or Tamil traders at L1, they had limited influence over the Devanga flower wholesaler and the MLAs. They occupy the space adjoining the youth network, with Network D. Connections between migrant Tamil traders and the youth network is via a woman trader who was acquainted with them at this place. Reasons for giving support include: ‘...helping a poor ...one like themselves’. Both male and female Tamil migrants trade in traditional varieties of flowers, and they decided to make links with youth networks on account of their own weak ties with and influence over field bureaucrats.

Members of the third network, D, included natives from Thigala, Devanga, and Gowda castes, but who predominantly reside in the eastern peripheral wards of the city. The group includes both evictees and new traders. Some of them had negotiated directly with everyday state agents and then supported their ethnic, household and territorial connections in occupying spaces alongside them. Although they are the numerical majority, traders in this network do not have a specific place, nor are they allowed to sit in a particular place and trade. They stand close to each other with several small strings of flowers (see also Annex 2; images 16-19).

Both migrant and native street traders in other agglomerations at this ward draw on territorial networks in two ways: as direct or indirect intermediaries for negotiating with everyday state agents and to forge partnerships to share spaces with horizontal networks. As there are dense congregations at the agglomerations at KR Market and in other wards at outer periphery, possibilities for forging such ties are high.

The use of spatial networks during both the process of occupation and subverting eviction differ at KR Market. The various networks of flower traders at L7 and migrant and native traders (see Fig. 8.1) use similar circuits – youth networks and field bureaucrats – to negotiate everyday conflicts.

Spatial networks influence the alliances between horizontal and vertical networks of agglomeration traders across four locations (L4, L5, L6 and L3) for collective action to subvert development threats. These traders use economic or social networks to occupy their spaces, and collective action is organised by Muslim retail fruit traders aligned with street traders from different Hindu castes. Their trading and social ties are predominantly with street traders at one particular agglomeration (L3). Street traders at another agglomeration, specializing in a similar type of fruit trade, have strong trading ties with the wholesale traders who support their occupation. Moreover, traders at L5 and L6 specialize in a different type of fruit trade. Retailer traders' specific connections to these various networks are via four influential street traders' network leaders, based on everyday contacts. These ties were developed because of spatial proximity and everyday acquaintances, over a long period of time.

...I and (Salil) grew up in the same neighbourhood. Our parents used to trade here... We were all playmates... We knew (baba)... he used to be a retailer...

(Interview with Maniamma, KR Market ward, September 2004)

Many street traders, along with their family members and other agents connected to the trading hierarchy, spend most of their time at KR Market, and they socialize after their trading is completed. Tamil migrant traders are thus familiar with retail traders as well as the religious leaders who mediate with various levels of the state (see Fig. 6.3). Ties between the four leaders of street traders' networks and other leaders at their locations were embedded in everyday acquaintances or trading. The four network leaders, unlike political entrepreneurs, were not involved in party politics.

Inner Periphery and Outer Periphery

The use of territorial networks among network members or leaders to negotiate occupation and/or eviction is limited at the inner-peripheral ward. One example is the ties between the leaders of Tamil migrants and natives in flower trading and Kannada traders in vegetable trading. Migrants use their territorial ties to occupy their places and subsequently to subvert eviction, and men in flower trading have forged connections with a relevant vegetable trader leader at the youth clubs in the squatter settlements of West Bangalore. The relevant network leader is connected to a network of squatter leaders who have links to several youth clubs at different wards. Networks of Male

traders located first at the agglomeration. Subsequently, they supported Tamil migrant women traders from their squatter settlement in establishing contacts with the vegetable traders' leader, and lobbied on their behalf. However, men occupy a larger space at this agglomeration and have semi-permanent structures; each of their stalls measures 3' x 4', while women traders mostly trade from baskets or spread their wares on the ground.

Weekly traders at the KR Puram and Varathur Wards in the outer periphery draw on territorial networks to form groups for occupying a place; this means securing information about potential agglomerations for weekly trading, and enlisting the support of intermediaries to establish contact and negotiate with land managers. Weekly traders seeking to expand their trade form groups with traders known to them at their places of trade, and then approach influential network leaders residing in the wards where similar markets are organized. Although there is no hard and fast rule about who can occupy spaces in santhes, the perception is that places are allocated by land managers to known persons only. Very few traders are able to enlist the support individually of an established group and negotiate a space; as such accommodation involves network members losing a part of their space.

Both among weekly and daily traders, information about places available is circulated through spatial networks, in addition to the HEC channels mentioned earlier. The specific parts where they congregate for trade influences their ability to forge ties with other network leaders, who act as intermediaries at the agglomeration where they seek to locate. As with other wards, contracts between the seller and buyer are negotiated through networks known to both parties. Such transactions at present are relatively high, as some of the weekly markets are developing into daily markets.

As regards subverting eviction, spatial ties between network leaders of natives and Tamil migrants from varying castes influences traders' horizontal alliances for collective lobbying at some wards in the inner and outer periphery. As shown earlier, many network leaders predominantly support their H&CNs at the inner periphery to occupy spaces at agglomeration. Traders who are not part of these networks, and who have occupied spaces via economic or political networks, mobilize under the leadership of their spatial connections.

Similarly, ties between the various network leaders of weekly traders and the larger organizing network are embedded in spatial relations at the two wards in the outer

periphery. However, spatial networks used by weekly leaders for gaining occupation of spaces and during threats of eviction differ. At both places, the involvement of youth networks in organizing/leading collective action is a recent phenomenon. Previously, leaders of street traders' networks had negotiated for their places through other ties.

8.4 Conclusion: Implications for Theory

This chapter has illustrated that H&CNs are just one type of network used by both male and female agglomeration traders from different social backgrounds, in their processes of occupying places to trade from and subverting eviction. Street traders also use economic, political or spatial networks. There are inter- and intra-ward differences in relation to the type of networks used, and the characteristics of the agents who constitute each of these four types of networks, and boundaries between the various types of networks are sometimes blurred, as they are embedded in overlapping spaces. While identity is a factor influencing both the ways in which street traders' networks are constituted and the bargaining power of network leaders and members, the specific ways in which it manifests is complex. Findings in this chapter illustrate the limitations of focusing on the role of H&CNs to explain the intra-city differences between street traders in their ability to draw on their networks for claiming their trading places. The next chapter sets out a framework for drawing inferences about this aspect.

9 Embeddings in ‘Locales’ and Ability to Draw on Networks

9.1 Introduction

This chapter shows that a focus on the mutual influence of socio-spatial structures and relations at the ward level – what Giddens (1985) calls locales – is useful for inferring about the factors influencing differences between street traders, in terms of their ability to draw on networks to agglomerate in a place. It elaborates on the conceptual framework outlined in chapter two. It describes the characteristics of controllers and illustrates that the manner in which traders’ are embedded in each locale influences their ability to draw on networks, drawing on the experience of agglomeration traders in Bangalore. In this context, it addresses some of the questions arising from Chapter Eight and discusses the manner in which this approach expands on the theories of Razzaz (1994) and Singermen (1995) in relation to informal political processes.

9.2 Street Traders’ Relationships with Controller

As can be inferred from the discussions in Chapters Four to Six, patterns of control in relation to the use of place and its development is not only pluralistic differed in each ward as well as between the seven wards. Both state and non-state agents, henceforth referred to as EDC¹⁰²s (‘everyday controllers’) and DCs (‘development controllers’), influence the use of place in everyday life and its development in each ward, and street traders negotiate with these controllers either directly or predominantly, through what in this chapter are referred to as ‘intermediaries’: the horizontal or vertical networks in each ward. As shown in Chapter Seven, differences between street traders in terms of mobilizing horizontal and/or vertical networks as well as their bargaining power within these networks, affects their ability to negotiate with controllers and intermediaries when negotiating claims to places in agglomerations.

Interdependencies and reciprocal exchanges between the networks – street traders, intermediaries and controllers – have emerged in each ward; these are catalyzed by the combined influence of processes related to both everyday or routine politics and the electoral politics; these are underpinned by the everyday organization of local economy, particularly trade; density of congregation in each; property ownership of land used by

street traders' and its governance. Relationship between networks takes different forms of clientelism in each ward.

Inter-ward differences in relation to patterns of control and network reciprocities are influenced by an intersection of historical and contemporary processes specific to each ward and the manner in which they intersect with external process. The characteristics and the role of controllers and intermediaries, and the manner in which agents' embeddedness influences their ability to tap various forms of reciprocities, is shown in Sections 9.2.1–9.2.3.

9.2.1 City Centre (KR Market Ward)

Controllers: Characteristics and Role

A variety of agents control the way places are used in everyday life and its development at KR Market Ward, as shown in Fig. 9.1.

As can be inferred from the above figure, broadly, there are three types of everyday state (Fuller and Harris 2001) agencies involved in regulating the everyday use of place at different agglomerations; these are parastatals (the APMC at L2, L4, and L3.); the local governmental (the BCC); and police linked to the traffic police department and municipality (at L1, L4, L5, L6 L7, as shown in Chapter Four). In addition, non-state agents linked to various types and scales of trade – particularly wholesale traders and local political agents – influence the way semi-public and public spaces are controlled at different agglomerations.

Non-state agents derive their power and legitimacy to control the everyday use of place from several sources; these are: tacit norms of user rights and claims underpinned by historical practices of community governance of neighbourhoods or pettes, (see Chapter Four Section 2.5); property ownership and control; and contested claims over places, particularly between the state and non state agents.




Figure 9-1 Everyday forms and development control in KR Market

There is tacit acceptance among everyday state agents and other users of wholesale traders' control over spaces in front of their shops. Such norms also influence the manner in which various networks of street traders adjust/share places in different agglomerations. Although wholesale traders in some type of fruit trading have been shifted out of the ward, previous patterns of use defined the claims of street traders in different trades at that location. This norm influences the adjustments between networks of street traders in fruit trading and spinach trading during different time cycles at L6. Similarly, patterns of property ownership or control influence where wholesale traders from different ethnic groups locate at this ward, and in turn their networks in street trading, as shown in Chapter Eight. Differences in their practices of extending support to

street traders from different ethnic groups influences the patterns of ethnic domination in street traders' agglomerations.

Street traders engage with the various EDCs predominantly when capturing their places at the ward and when subverting everyday conflicts. They predominantly negotiate as a group, via various types of networks, with intermediaries and EDCs. As shown in earlier chapters, horizontal and vertical alliances between networks are influenced by street traders' perception of threat.

As shown in Chapter Six, in subverting development threats, street traders engage with both types of controllers. Development controllers, in the context of KR Market, include higher levels of the state related to urban renewal projects, specifically senior bureaucrats or politicians of the BCC, APMC or regional state and land owners. These agents have influence over decisions relating both to the formulation and implementation of urban renewal programmes vis-à-vis the field bureaucrats connected to these agencies (see Chapter Four). Their control over implementation is a recent phenomenon. Consequently, street traders' engagement has been escalated the level of senior politicians, the chief minister, and the urban development minister, (see Chapter Six and Figs 6.1-6.3). Similar to their strategies of negotiating with EDCs, street traders' and their networks also draw on the support of intermediaries embedded in the ward and outside. Their ties with intermediaries, who intervene at the higher levels of the state, are embedded in a variety of political and spatial networks, besides H&CNs (see Chapter 8).

In general, interdependencies at this ward spurred by trade open up spaces for negotiation between street traders, intermediaries and EDCs. The extent to which street traders are embedded, in the labour hierarchy of trade influences their ability to tap into these spaces; this, together with the economic history of controllers and intermediaries and their strategies for mobilizing resources, influences the differences among agglomeration traders in their use of H&CNs (see Chapter Eight).

Embedding in The Wholesale Trade Labour Hierarchy and Capturing Semi-Public Places

As shown in Section 7.1, semi-public places at various agglomerations are usually occupied by labour leaders connected to wholesale shops and their close connections.

Two aspects influence the power relationships and nature of goods transacted among network members: these are interdependencies related to organizing everyday trade, and the exit options for network members.

Wholesale traders depend on two agents in their labour hierarchy: head labourers or labour leaders, and the accountants they use for their everyday management of trade. Their trading transactions often extend to markets outside Bangalore, and they are often not present at their shops at KR Market, as they invest relatively more time in sourcing goods from the city's periphery or outside Bangalore. Their shops at KR Market are used for storing and sorting their merchandise, repackaging, and transporting to other markets. In addition, street trade is a conduit for the distribution of their goods to the local market.

Consequently, they depend on labour leaders and supervisors to organize repackaging and transportation to other markets. Head labourers are also sent to markets outside Bangalore, to collect dues owed to a wholesaler. As the volume of goods flowing through a wholesale shop and the amount of cash to be collected from other markets are often high, wholesalers appoint for this task labourers of whom they are confident as to their loyalty. The practice among wholesalers is to employ a member from their extended family or an employee who has worked for them inter-generationally as a head labourer or as a supervisor.

Another factor concerns labour leaders' control over other labourers in a shop. Although it is easier in theory for a new migrant to find job at this ward, the practice among wholesale traders is to appoint employees through their head labourers or other agents known to them. Leaders negotiate wages annually on behalf of groups with their respective employers. There is an informal alliance between various labour leaders in different shops for agreeing on minimum wages. The head labourers' control over the other labourers provides them with the capacity to disrupt the working of a wholesale shop.

As noted by Auyero (2006), the loyalty of clients to the hierarchy of patrons is based on the exchange of resources. Therefore, a wholesale trader supports the entry of a leader or his close connections in locating in front of their shops. Labour leaders organize access for their network members to a variety of material goods and to a space for trading,

including. These networks include household relations, employees in first cycle trading, and political clients from their residential neighbourhoods at this ward.

Labour leaders are often active in community politics at the place of their residence in the city, and some migrants back at their place of origin. They maintain ties with elected representatives at different levels, and such support forms part of their wider economic and political strategy. While in the view of the head labourers such support is driven by altruism, the manner in which it enhances their power over their clients cannot be negated.

Power Relations: Structure of Trade, Exit Options

The networks are hierarchical in structure, and the dominant view is that clients in such networks do not have any voice in relation to their patrons and are exploited. By contrast, relationships in such networks – wholesale traders, street traders, and their employees at KR Market – are complex, and characterized by fluid alliances and animosities (Seligman (2004)).

The organization of the trading economy at this ward has a significant influence on network relationships. The density and diversity within wholesale trading, and competition between several players, opens up spaces, though imperfect, for agents in different positions of the hierarchy to contest power relations, to exit relationships with patrons, and to forge or enter a new network, relatively easily, in comparison with other wards. The presence of several wholesale shops at this ward make it easier for a labour leader or his clients to exit a shop and find other employment. Often a head labourer and a supervisor operate as a clique in controlling a trade in rejected goods at a wholesaler's shop. Interviewed wholesale traders said they are aware of this pilferage, but that they ignore it up to a certain level. When tacit norms are crossed, the result is conflicts leading to the severing of relationships.

Similarly, competition between members, labour leaders, and leaders of street traders in forming new or expanding existing networks, renders alliances fluid, even though a network may be dominated by family members. As agents' bargaining power, particularly of those at the lower-end of the political or trading hierarchy, is influenced by their ability to control a group, street traders and labourers invest in building and

expanding networks (Singermen 1995). The exit options created by this competition mean that the power of agents higher up in the hierarchy are eroded, in contrast to network relationships in the wards of the inner periphery. These options are imperfect, but they need to be situated in the wider political context described in Chapter Four.

Cross (1997) similarly found that traders can have a voice and exit options, spurred by competition between several small street traders' organizations; but he overlooks the embedding of street traders and their organizations in the political economy of a ward. The situation described above is very specific to KR Market, on account of its local economic structure. The absence of such options in other wards influences competing networks there among street traders to cooperate in negotiation with controllers, and this affects their bargaining power.

Differences in the Use of H&CNs: Gender and Trading History of Patrons

Differences in the use of H&CNs among agglomeration traders trading from semi-public places are influenced by the gendered practices among leaders of street traders' networks and wholesale traders' reliance on households and communities for resource mobilization. The labour hierarchy of wholesale trading is dominated by men. Both men and women enter street trading and are located in semi-public places with the support of labour leaders and, subsequently, some have emerged as network leaders. Although women's leaders control their trade and finance within their households, very few have direct ties or influence with a wholesale trader and their supervisors. In addition, because of their role in relation to fulfilling household obligations, they extend their support mainly to their household members and only occasionally to their male employees, by allowing them to occupy their spaces during the second cycle of trade. Further, although their male relatives are involved in squatter politics and have connections with political leaders at the Market Ward, women prefer not to be involved overtly in community politics.

Support for traders from outside their household and community ties differs among Muslim and Hindu wholesale traders (see Sections 8.1.1 and 8.1.2). These differences are influenced by variations between wholesale traders in terms of their trading history,

the markets they serve, and, consequently, their interests in location and their strategies for mobilizing resources.

There are two groups among the Muslim traders – a predominantly Shia group is from Bangalore who have been settled in KR Market and the surrounding wards for generations, and a predominantly Ahmadi– group who have migrated from other states, particularly Gujarat, or abroad. The latter group, trading in vegetables or fruit, has relatively easy access to capital, while the former groups, most of who traded from rented premises at an agglomeration (L3), have moved up inter-generationally from street trade to wholesale trade. According to Tamil migrant leaders, Muslims dominated street trading as late as the 1970s, and as shown in Section 8.1, they predominantly support members of their households in entering trade and occupying places. Households were and still are an important site for them from which to mobilize resources and accumulate wealth. Ownership of their properties by the wakf committee (a board to promote the welfare of Muslims) enables this group of traders to locate in close proximity and to control the use of place at one agglomeration and market for a specific type of fruit trading.

Unlike the Shia traders, Ahmadi and Bora Muslim wholesale traders trading from adjoining agglomerations export their products to national and international markets and at the time of the research project were lobbying for cold storage facilities. Local markets are a useful outlet, but not their main outlet. Their major competitors in the wholesale and retail trade of perishable goods in Indian cities are multinational corporations. Ahmadi traders control the traders' association, have close ties with senior bureaucrats of APMC, and are influential with senior politicians from the Congress and the mosque committee. Family members are partners in the business, while their labourers were predominantly Tamil migrants from Thiruvannamalai district who tapped into their labour relations to capture places and enter bulk or retail fruit trading. In addition to location, they are concerned over infrastructure and being part of agglomerations with complementary trades. During 2003–4, differing interests and conflicts between Muslim wholesale traders from the two sects and their relationships with Tamil migrant street leaders influenced their alliances for collective action.

Among Hindus street traders, Thigalas and Devangas depend on ethnic and household resources beyond their neighbourhood links to enter trade and secure a place (See

Section 8.1.1). Wholesale traders from both castes have moved from tenancy farming or agricultural labour to street trading, and moved up the trading hierarchy. The influence in ward politics of both Thigala¹⁰³ and Devanga¹⁰⁴ caste street traders and labour leaders, stems from their numerical strength, intergenerational involvement in trade, and control of labour politics together with their caste members' position in trade and party politics.

Thigala-caste traders are the original residents of Bengaluru. They once dominated in the neighbourhood of 'Thigalerpét' adjoining the present day KR Market (see Srinivas 2001). They used to work as agricultural labourers or tenant farmers on land owned by Gowda caste members, predominantly in the wards to the south, or cultivated common land at the outer periphery in different parts of the city. With the implementation of the Land Reforms Act, in the late 1950s, they were able to take ownership of the land they worked. They built up their capital and political influence over time via trading (Srinivas 2001). A very few moved into KR Market as labourers for Gowda landowners who entered wholesale fruit trade. They subsequently emerged as labour leaders and moved into high-end street trade.

Having secured land and the expansion of their households, Thigala traders who worked as agricultural labourers and tenant farmers moved out of Thigalerpét to different wards in the outer periphery to the south and the east of the city. Many of them, like their Devanga counterparts, currently reside in the outer-peripheral wards to the east and south but still depend on the market for their livelihoods. KR Market serves as a meeting-ground for Thigala and Devanaga communities from different wards of the city, because of their embeddedness in various scales of trade.

Until the mid-1970s, Thigala traders in spinach trading had a relatively small scale of business operation. With the expansion of spinach and greens trading at the market, Thigala traders moved to wholesale trading, and provided employment for Tamil migrant labourers as well as members of their own caste. Although they support efforts by members of their extended households to enter trade or to become employed in relatively higher positions (such as supervisors and accountants) within their wholesale shops, their head labourers are predominantly Tamil migrants from Chingleput district. Similar to other wholesale traders, Thigala traders support migrant labour leaders and their connections by allowing them to occupy the front of their shops and helping them to enter bulk trading. Thigala street traders, by comparison, trade at public places at

agglomerations. Thus, economic relations influence transactions related to place between network members.

Thigala street traders like other traders of their caste also tap into historical connections to certain places, as much as they make active use of their ethnic community networks in staking their claims. The Karaga festival documented by Srinivas (2001, 2005) explains their use of culture to appropriate space. Many street traders from other castes mimic Thigalas around the time of this festival. The ten days of the festival are often used by different networks of street traders seeking to start a new network and earmarking their territory by installing a statue.

Spatial and Social Relations: Place and Time of Congregation and Ties with Wholesalers

Wholesale traders from traditional agricultural castes/tribes such as the Gowdas and Kodavas, who are often large estate owners, or trading castes such as the Banijigas, Shettys and Reddys, all have access to capital. Gowdas and Reddys are still large landowners in many wards of the city and are embedded in different levels of party politics, and Banijigas and Shetty wholesale traders trade at KR Market intergenerationally. Unlike the Thigala caste or Devanga caste traders discussed above, traders from these castes traders are predominantly male. Many Gowda wholesale traders have family members embedded in regional, state, and municipal bureaucracies, which according to Muslim wholesalers enables them to secure shops at different market complexes controlled by the state (through the APMC). These traders employ individuals from different castes and religions as their labourers, including Thigala or Scheduled Caste communities from Karnataka and Tamil migrants, and they support their entry into street trading and finding a place. Their support to labourers is predominantly driven by concerns over loyalty, as described earlier.

Tamil migrants in street trading, both those from Thiruvannamalai district and SCs, have strong ties with Muslim wholesale traders at L4, while Gounder caste migrants have connections with Hindu wholesaler traders in vegetable trading and fruit trading at two agglomerations. At present, these groups of migrants dominate the bulk and retail street trade of vegetables and fruit at KR Market and at other wards in the inner periphery.

Meanwhile, migrants from Chingelpet district in spinach trading have strong ties to Thigala traders. They have relatively limited ties to other migrants or natives in street-trading at KR Market and the city. Many are unmarried temporary migrants who return to their villages during the agricultural season; previously, these migrants worked in small cafes and hotels in KR Market. Their ties were predominantly forged at this ward, and these connections influenced where and when they secured places for street trade.

Migrants' ties with wholesaler traders from different ethnic groups are also influenced both by the time of their move into the city and the ward, as well as by the places where they congregate everyday in the ward. Many Thiruvannamalai migrants in street trading are second- or third-generation traders and have intergenerational ties with Gowda wholesale traders and Muslims. Many live in the squatter settlement within the market or to the west, and they congregate predominantly at KR Market Ward. Gounder migrants who predominate in a squatter settlement in an adjoining ward mostly work for vegetable wholesale traders closer to their settlement. At present, some of them have been resettled in the inner-peripheral wards of South Bangalore, or have moved voluntarily to private subdivisions to the west of KR Market. However, they travel into market everyday for their livelihood and socialize predominantly at that place. Their intergenerational ties at this ward provide them with connections to various lower-level political agents and wholesale traders, as compared to new migrants from Chingelpet district, who moved into trading over the last three decade.

Embedding in the Labour Hierarchy of Retail Trading and Capturing Public Places

Street traders trading from public places draw on political networks beyond their H&CNs, with agents embedded in the lower-level hierarchy of ward politics in order to capture their respective places. Their networks include (i) leaders and activists of the retail market labour union; (ii) lower-level political activists connected to different parties; and (iii) wholesale traders embedded in party politics. They act as intermediaries, particularly between street traders and the agents of the everyday state(s). Street traders' ties to the labour hierarchy of retail trading influences their bargaining power and their ability to draw on the support of political intermediaries.

Retail Trade Labour: The Labour Union and the Everyday State

The labour union is a dominant intermediary which negotiates on behalf of street traders trading from public places at four locations (L1, parts of L4, L5 and L6). Its constituency is relatively large in comparison with 'street level political entrepreneurs' (Cross 1997), and it played a significant role in negotiating with agents of the three types of the everyday state in capturing new places for street trading following the eviction of 2001.

The union intervened at a fairly late stage of the conflict, due to pressure from several interlinking ties of street traders with union members, as mentioned in Chapter Seven. The leader of the relevant labour union states that street traders approached the union for support, but that he was reluctant to become embroiled in the conflict as there were other trader-leaders at this ward. In order to understand why the union intervened, it is useful to focus on the politics of unskilled labour organizations at the market complexes managed by the APMC or the BCC.

Local leaders and state agents claim that there are sixteen groups controlling the unskilled labour contracts at the state-managed market complexes. Unlike the networks of labour leaders in wholesale trading, membership of the sixteen networks is relatively large. Akin to street gangs (Whyte 1955), there is an intense rivalry between the union leaders and aspirants over capturing control of various unions. According to the police, in staking claims to leadership of a union, rivals are often physically eliminated, and this is a problem for maintaining law and order at KR Market. As leaders fear for their safety, they are rarely visible. During the field work, the ritual of establishing contacts included a series of informal interviews and constant shifts of time and place, by members closer to the leaders. The insecure milieu in which these leaders operate is reflected in their network organization, which is a concentric circle (Auyero 1999), with a leader at the centre, a close circle occupying the first tier, and other members located in different tiers.

Another aspect to be considered is that the competitive milieu between union leaders and aspirants also leads to aspirants mobilizing their own groups among labourers and street traders and breaking away from the union. For example, towards the end of the field work, a close first-tier member of the labour union mobilized another group of retail traders, aligned with a local ADMK (a regional party for Tamil migrants) leader to negotiate for places, in exchange for votes, with members of the ruling Congress Party.

At the same time, a street trader leader who could not organize for her clients to secure spaces was ousted. What matters for traders is to be part of different networks and to be able to play them appropriately.

Leaders depend on the loyalty of their first-tier members to survive at this ward. In turn, they are expected to support their clients in terms of bargaining wages from traders and subsequently in capturing places when a labourer enters street trading. Male traders still maintain their contacts with union leaders. Another pattern is that among union members men worked as labourers and women are involved in retail trade. At the time of this study, the union leader was of Kannada origin, and there were various networks of Tamil SC migrant retail traders from Thiruvannamalai, who had strong interlinking ties with the inner circle of union leaders and other union members.

The union also mediate on behalf of Thigala traders, Tamil migrants from Chingelpet district, and on behalf of a section of Muslim traders with whom they do not have strong ties. This was because of close connections between union leaders and other Thigala caste and political entrepreneurs, who act as intermediaries, and between the latter and the relevant migrant and Thigala street traders networks. Many Thigala labour leaders are also employed as supervisors in the wholesale shops owned by their community members and are also connected to lower level political circuits. They are also a dominant group congregating at KR Market, and they control labour politics at the neighbouring wards. While ethnic and household relations influence Thigala caste street traders, Tamil migrant street traders enlist the support of economic relations. The union's support to Thigala entrepreneurs is based on future expectations of support from other intermediaries in times of labour unrest or conflicts over union leadership. Such alliances are useful for the union for mobilizing a critical mass for their protests against the state. Thus labour politics and the embedding of different agents influences the use of more than one type of network on street traders' processes of claiming places.

The strength of direct ties influences the labour union's involvement with various networks after negotiations are completed. In locations where Tamil SC migrants from Thiruvannamalai dominate they are not involved on a day-to-day basis. Although a street-trader leader is a conduit for bribes to agents of the everyday state, union members collect daily bribes from locations used by Gounders from Thiruvannamalai (L6) or Chinglepet (L5), and Thigalas. Thigala traders in both locations often do not pay

bribes, although Chingelpet migrants' fear reprisals were they to stop their bribery of union members or the everyday state.

There were several factors that influence the relationship between everyday state agents, intermediaries and native or migrant street traders. Bribes form one aspect of street traders' and labour leaders' alliances with everyday state. A recurring reference in interviews with traffic police is the density of poor people congregating at KR Market, and the potential conflicts in the locality were their livelihoods to be destroyed. The relevant labour union has a membership of 1500 and alliances with street traders and labour leaders in different trades. Thigala leaders and Devangas both have the critical mass and cultural resources. Further, the customary claim of Thigalas to KR Market is tacitly acknowledged by various groups in the city, and this is reinforced via their annual ritual (see Srinivas 2001). Thus, this alliance has the material and cultural resources to strike the functioning of a ward, which is their strongest weapon (Auyero2006) in dealing with the state(s). There is also a certain degree of sympathy for street traders among field bureaucrats and acknowledgment that plans imposed by senior bureaucrats and planners do not take into account realities on the ground¹⁰⁵. Also, they are the 'ones to face the crowd, most of whom were known to [them]'.

Everyday state agents also tap into the ambiguity of master planning process at the local level, to respond to what they perceive as 'everyday exigencies'. For example, there was some land below an elevated expressway that did not have a clear demarcation of land use and competition to secure this area was high among street traders and different religious group from inside the outside the ward. The groups involved included a wealthy Hindu temple trust from outside the locality, with influence over the chief minister, and the mosque committee, with equal economic and political power both in the ward and in party politics. Given the potential communal rift and past history of communal conflict, the traffic police initially designated it as a parking space and subsequently allowed formal and informal spinach traders to occupy it. The elected representatives were not averse to this arrangement in the light of communal relations and the density of poor in this ward.

The labour union's and street traders' network relationships with various elected representatives are complex. The union maintains ties with all parties but does not get involved in campaigning openly for any party. Although street traders, particularly the

retailers, constitute an important vote bank, they too shift their loyalty between elected representatives¹⁰⁶. According to the MLAs interviewed, it is often difficult to predict the responses of labourers and street traders. An MLA who played a significant role in bringing the municipality to the discussion table to avert eviction in 1999 was voted out in 2002.

Embedding in the Ward and Tapping Political Opportunities

Embeddedness in the ward enables street traders who neither have strong ties to the labour union nor with other agents in the trading hierarchy to tap into the opportunities created by labour union and wholesale traders described earlier.

Street traders, predominantly those with a small scale of trade, and retailers draw individually and as a group on the support of political entrepreneurs or their connections with everyday state agents for gaining their places. Such often self-appointed leaders derive their systemic power from their connections to wholesale traders able to deliver block votes. However, neither the relevant trader nor elected representatives were involved in these negotiations. These relationships are driven by financial incentives and in some cases are exploitative, as compared to networks led by street trader-leaders.

Another example is the alliances of bouquet traders and other types of flower traders (described in Section 8.3), who draw on their spatial relationships with everyday state agents. Migrant and native in bouquet trade, as with some other types of traders, forge horizontal alliances to negotiate with everyday state agents. They were able to occupy their places through negotiation after flower traders supported by Devanga wholesale traders occupied parts of L7 and L1.

Subverting Development Threat: Embeddedness in Ward, City and Ability to draw on networks

As shown in Chapter Seven, migrant and native street traders affected by these evictions in 1999–2000 and during the period covered by this study (2003- 2004) entered into negotiation with the EDCs only when the higher levels of the state were willing to accommodate street traders. During 1999-2000, this conflict was predominantly between

street traders, formal traders, and the BCC. It was at a time when councillors and MLAs, had spaces, though limited, to intervene. The then-deputy mayor of the BCC, a Thigala, played a key role in influencing senior party leaders on behalf of traders.

The situation changed post-2001: the regional state accelerated the implementation of urban development programmes, and the characteristics of state involvement differed. As discussed in Chapter Four, the power to influence urban development programmes was centralized via institutional mechanisms and elected representatives were disciplined within their parties.

Chapter Six showed how perceptions about the severity of threats, differences in interests, and everyday relationships influence alliances between street traders and their vertical networks of wholesale and retail traders. The latter were key intermediaries between street traders and other political intermediaries in negotiating with development controllers (See Fig. 6.1). Vertical alliances between street traders and both the street trader-retail traders union and the re-wholesale street traders association illustrate the influence of interests and network relationships. During the initial stages of the conflict, the fruit wholesale traders association was the dominant interface between formal traders and the state. The association is dominated by Muslim large-scale and exporting wholesale traders. As noted earlier, interests in relation to location are not the same among formal traders with similar scale of trade. For many Muslims in retail trade or Hindu wholesale traders with a relatively scales of operation, KR Market is an important location for reaching the various local markets, and while wholesale traders dependent on export markets prefer to cluster along with complementary trades (flowers and vegetables), they prioritize infrastructure over KR Market. They control the association and agreed to re-locate, despite objections from many of association members. Wholesale traders dominating the association were willing to support street traders with whom they had economic ties, but other street traders were constrained in their negotiations. These factors led to a split in the association, and catalysed the formation of the Union of Retail Traders and Street Traders. The union is constituted by those who predominantly have spatial or H&CN ties with one another, and the re-wholesale association predominantly by those who have economic networks to a wholesale trader.

Street traders, who draw on their spatial networks to join the union, capture their places with the support of their economic networks. Their use of different types of networks is explained by the ways in which their economic and other types of networks were affected by the conflict. Unlike in other wards, street traders and their intermediaries – particularly wholesale traders – have been affected by the implementation of development projects. Wholesale traders' influence in ward or local politics is not uniform; this affects their ability to negotiate threats and/or intervene on behalf of street traders. Wholesale traders in fruit are mostly Hindus, and they have been either forcibly shifted or slated for shifting. Their influence and involvement in ward politics is relatively less as compared to flower or vegetable wholesale traders.

Unlike retail traders and street traders, fruit wholesale traders are unwilling to engage in street politics. Consequently, street traders have to enlist the support of other networks at this ward. As mentioned in Chapter Six, because of the flexibility of alliances and animosities between different agents, network relationships are governed by guarded trust between members. Although migrant street traders are aligned with Muslims, they do not entirely trust them. Hence, they also maintain many networks, to have alternative avenues if one network were to fail.

Not all street traders were able to forge spatial ties with other traders or draw on various types of networks flexibly. This affects their chances of negotiating eviction, as indicated by the experience of street traders at L2. Several factors constrained their participation. One is their relationship with different agents in the ward. Although Thigala traders and Chingelpet migrants at two other locations – L5 and L6 – faced imminent eviction, their weak ties to retail traders in the union, together with their strong community alliances, influenced their decision to not join the union. By contrast, Tamil migrant traders in spinach trading and in retail vegetable trading wanted to join the union but could not do so because of their weak ties in the locality.

Another example is the experience of migrant Tamil Gounder traders at L2, whose responses were patterned by their economic networks. Unlike the wholesale and retail fruit traders in, the vegetable wholesale traders' association is dominated by Hindu caste traders and was reconciled to the inevitability of re-location after losing their legal battle. Migrant Tamil Gounder street traders who captured their places with their support were

neither included in the re-location package nor had the ability to align with street fruit traders.

Places where street traders congregate, and their spatial embeddings in the city, are some of the other factors influencing their ability to forge networks with other users or draw on them. For example, L2 is an enclosed market that is physically cut off from other agglomerations. Many are first-generation migrants who resided in the wards of the inner periphery to the south, unlike Thiruvannamalai migrants, who have intergenerational ties at KR Market and surrounding wards. Their limited ties, both horizontally and vertically, constrain their ability to forge alternative alliances with members of the Union of Retail Traders and Street Traders facing a similar threat. Spatial relationships built over generations and proximity are key influencing factors. Very few upwardly-mobile street traders who could raise capital are negotiating for a wholesale or retail shop in the re-located areas; according to these traders, many street traders will eventually lose their places. Thus the places where street traders congregate affect their network portfolios and their ability to draw on them at appropriate times.

Another example of subverting development is the intervention of Devanga wholesale trader-politicians on behalf of street traders in flower trade who are spatially embedded both at this ward and outside it, and who have potential ripple effects on politics. Native Devanga flower traders and Tamil migrants draw on the support of Devanga wholesale traders embedded in party politics both because of their trading connections and due to electoral politics. Both a BJP and a Congress Party MLA elected from the Banijiga community are embedded in flower trading at this ward. Wholesale flower traders negotiate via their party connections for accommodating street traders in their trade for a limited time, despite the denotification of flower trading here. Unlike the group of traders discussed earlier, street traders' ties with Devanga wholesale traders differ. Many traders from this community are either small traders or secure products from their places of residence and sell them here. Despite not having direct trading or political relationships, wholesale traders intervene due to two reasons. However, as with Thigalas, Devanga caste traders from various wards of East Bangalore congregate at KR market, particularly during the first cycle of trade. Their horizontal ties via their caste and household connect them to different localities, and links between wholesale traders and party politicians point to a ripple effect created by evicting KR market traders, and

affecting communities and block voting, not only at this ward but across different wards, particularly the eastern and southern outer-peripheral wards.

9.2.2 Inner-Peripheral Wards

Controllers: Characteristics and Role

Street traders trade from public spaces: pedestrian pathways and open spaces inside market complexes. They encounter everyday state agencies (Harris and Fuller 2001) in the form of traffic police and the municipal government, who regulate the use of space in the wards at the inner periphery. Leaders of street traders' networks and political organizations that act as intermediaries predominantly control the way spaces are used within each agglomeration. The role of local economic agents and residents is minimal, unlike in the market ward (9.2.1).

Network leaders predominantly control the use of place, as street trading agglomerations developed at a time when the three wards were developing and everyday surveillance was limited. The influence of ward or outside political organizations on everyday life at agglomerations in two wards is more recent, dating post-2000. They are able to control the use of place because of their role as intermediaries between street traders and the state(s) during the eviction of 1999–2000. These organizations engaged with street traders as a group to monitor the extent of area occupied by them, but are not involved in the inter-network sharing of places.

Everyday conflicts between field bureaucrats and agglomeration traders were minimal at these wards, but intensified post-2000 at one ward. As shown in Chapter Six, network leaders act as key intermediaries, and their engagement with elected representatives, either directly or via other political organizations, occurs when they perceive a threat of a constraint in subverting eviction via normal processes. Unlike in other wards, the role of the BCC and field bureaucrats was significant.

Ward politics and everyday relationships influence the interdependencies on their negotiations between street traders, network leaders, and controllers, particularly EDCs, and the influence of H&CNs.

Embeddedness in the Locality and Use of H&CNs for Negotiating with Controllers

The predominant use of H&CNs among migrant and native street traders at the agglomeration in the three wards to negotiate with EDCs – network leaders – was influenced by the weak ties in the locality among first generation of traders and, more recently, by competition over place underpinned by local politics.

The first generation of street traders among migrants and natives in all three wards rallies around their family and ethnic ties to reduce the risk of displacement by other users in the ward. This pattern of relying on H&CNs is similar to the ones observed by Singermen (1995) in Shaabi communities in Egypt and Razzaz (1994) in relation to informal land transaction. The first generation migrants have predominantly worked as unskilled labourers at KR Market. A group of native street traders dominating at BG ward shifted out of KR Market as they could not secure place to start their trade, and another group of natives settled in the city and in the ward with the support of their vertical networks. The moves among Tamil migrants were voluntarily in the case of traders at JNGR Fourth Block and, on account of eviction from their squatter settlements, among traders at JNGR Ninth Block.

At the time of their move, many street traders had only limited ties with other users. Therefore, they relied on their horizontal family and community networks to capture places in small groups. They exploited the limited surveillance of public places at these wards to occupy spaces in front of commercial plots and in this way expanded their clusters. They acquired their spatial knowledge after moving into the ward or via their horizontal networks prior to their move.

Responses to the first generation of street traders differed across the three wards, ranging from violent opposition to their presence at one ward, through to muted resistance by selective groups at the second ward and a laissez faire response at the third ward. Despite their sporadic evictions, street traders re-encroached and used their ties to develop a critical mass at a location for trade and political reasons, as shown in Chapter Seven. The role of household and community relations was reinforced by street traders' strategies of organizing their everyday trade. The subsequent generation of street traders at these agglomerations were either first-time migrants to the city or first generation household/caste relations. Their choice of wards was influenced by their connections in the city, as shown in Chapter Seven.

Due to limited transportation at that time, traders at two wards found it difficult to travel to market everyday. All traders sourced their goods from the city centre ward. New migrants, having weak ties and being unembedded in the locality, also maintained their financial affairs (i.e. their chit circuits) city centre or in their villages. To reduce transport costs they operated as a group, predominantly as members from the same region or extended household. All members of a household participated in the everyday organization of trade due to the logistics of organizing their trade. On occasions, retail traders employed their relatives from the village. Extending support to their employees was seen as part of their mutual obligation, as in other wards.

A similarity among network leaders is that the household and community serve as a locus for building the economic and political power in the locality and obligations fit into these strategies. However, meeting these obligations increasingly depends on the relevant network leader's ability to negotiate with other traders at an agglomeration. The expansion of street trade has created space constraints and thus high competition between network leaders, while the involvement of external intermediaries has made it difficult to encroach on other places in ward. Consequently, the only option to accommodate family members is to make adjustments within the space traders already control. This has also restricted place-related transactions among traders' close ethnic ties, as is evident from patterns of sales and leasing at all three wards. These trends have contributed to the formation of cliques along regional and caste lines at these agglomerations.

Expansion of Trade and the Influence of Economic Networks

In general, the influence of economic networks is limited in the inner periphery. There are fewer opportunities for expansion into other higher levels of trade, as their forward links are predominantly with retail clients. In addition, there are space constraints on horizontal expansion. As detailed in the section on economic networks (Section 8.2.2), with the expansion of street trade, other complementary economies such as the manufacturing of vehicles and finance have developed, and migrant traders with the ability to mobilize finance capital have diversified into these areas. However, such patterns of expansion are possible only for those who can mobilize large sums of money, either via chit or loan, since these are based on one's position in a community. These

trader-manufacturers also support street traders in some wards in occupying their places or negotiating with political agents in the ward.

Such diversification did not happen among network leaders in BG ward or JNGR Fourth Block. Street traders drew on their ties with finance agents, that is retailers, to occupy public spaces. Employment-related reciprocities have opened up opportunities for fruit traders at BG ward and at the JNRG Ninth Block to occupy public spaces here.

Threat and the Role of Political Networks

With the expansion of street trading in each ward over time, the critical mass of street traders at an agglomeration has enabled them to build horizontal and vertical networks via their trade and electoral politics. Agglomeration traders in the three wards draw on their political networks, predominantly in their processes of subverting eviction. These networks are intermediaries between street traders and different levels of the state.

Perceptions of threat influence agglomeration traders' patterns of drawing on their political networks. Prior to 1999, network leaders either negotiated directly with their elected representatives or drew on the support of political agents in lower circuits of politics in each ward. The expansion of street trading opened up different opportunities for the latter agents. At one ward, lower-level political agents found new opportunities for finance and doing business with chits among street traders. At the two other wards, retail traders view street trading as symbiotic with their trading in non-perishable goods. On one occasion they closed their shops to support a street traders' strike. However, with the characteristics of retail trading changing, street traders' ties with local economic agents have declined. New retail owners are not always willing to accommodate street traders in their area, and in 2005 conflict between street traders and a food retail chain resulted in riots at one ward.

The nature of development threats prompt network leaders to enlist the support of other influential political organizations across the three wards. Unlike the street traders at the market ward, Tamil migrant traders live and work in the same ward at JNGR Ninth and Fourth Block, and native traders who were once residents still continue as squatter leaders in GNGR and surrounding wards. Their critical mass at the agglomeration and/or the squatter settlements in two wards enables them to enlist their support. For

example, electoral politics is a factor influencing the support extended by the relevant organizations – the KCS and DSS – to street traders in GNGR and JNGR Ninth Block wards. Electoral politics has also contributed to a shift in the stance of the KCS towards street traders at the latter ward. The KCS (see Chapter Six), which has opposed migrant street traders at JNG Ninth Block ward violently on earlier occasions, has now aligned with street traders, who constituted a key voting block at that ward during 1999–2000. The support of the DSS is based on their assessment of the political clout of the network leader concerned. His role in electoral politics can be seen from the fact that the DSS fielded a candidate for municipal election with the support of trade union and squatter leaders. He is also embedded in grassroots politics in different wards of central and West Bangalore and has links to older trade unions and parties.

Similarly, perceptions of threat influences the use of different horizontal networks. Network leaders' connections and influence in politics at ward level and beyond is not uniform when it comes to enlisting the support of intermediaries. Many leaders' ties with local political agents are predominantly weak. This was a common factor influencing male and female network leaders to mobilize under a leader despite their complex relationships in their everyday life. Relationships between network leaders and members from the same household or community are complex, and marked both by conflicts and cooperation. In some wards, they depend on the oldest member of their community to mediate with agents or organizations external to their group. Another factor is the influence of identity politics at the ward or city level. For example, the identity politics of the DSS influences the alliance between various network organizers at BG ward. Those who were not Dalit assumed a fictitious Dalit identity and mobilized under DSS.

Unlike in KR Market Ward, street traders have limited voice with their respective intermediaries. They rely on their support as opportunities for other forms of trading or related political reciprocities is limited. Neither did they have sufficient density to hold a strike, unlike in the outer periphery. Their key strength is in their votes. However, although they are important as a voting block, that alone was not sufficient to enlist the support of a state MLA during 1999–2000. On account of the involvement of chief minister in removing street traders, elected representatives at the local level were reluctant to intervene immediately. Further, although there is not a perfect alignment of interest, as shown in Chapter Seven, street traders' decision to enlist their support was influenced by a lack of other options for influencing the state at that time.

An exception is the role of a network leader in BG ward, who extended support to networks in different trades and across ethnic boundaries. This was because he had connections and involvement in squatter politics across the western wards of Bangalore. He was building a constituency, and his networks had previously competed in a local election. The relevant network leaders had in the past tried to field a candidate in municipal politics. This event also led to the shifts in their relationship with other political agents in the ward.

9.3 Outer periphery

Controllers: Characteristics and Role

Street trading agglomerations are located on land owned by the respective local states at KR Puram and Varathur Wards, and in a third ward by a public limited company, HAL. Unlike in other wards, street trading agglomeration traders at these wards were sprawled across large tracts of land, which is a factor, alongside economics, has fuelled the expansion of different scales and time cycles of street trade in each of the three wards.

Street traders and their networks exploit ‘inconsistency... ambiguity, or open areas that are normatively indeterminate’ (Razzaz 1994: 11), in capturing such large tracts of land as a response to the actions of development controllers. At KR Puram and Varathur Wards, the respective local governments continue a historical practice of allotting land to a santhe or farmers market. As mentioned in Chapter Four, there is ambiguity about the agents who can trade from such locations. Further, the local state overlooks violations of usage norms in relation to the time cycle of trade. The political dynamics in these wards, characterized by a highly competitive electoral politics, is a factor influencing local government responses. The dense congregations of traders and farmers at santhe locations are key electoral constituencies for different political parties. Having been left out of the new economies, for many of them street trading is an important source of livelihood.

At the HAL Ward, the flexible attitude of the company until the last two decades, together with alliances between street traders and lower- and mid-level employees, allowed traders to capture land incrementally. Street trading here started with a small group of five traders in the food business catering to HAL labourers. They were allowed

to locate within the factory premises because of their prior involvement with the company as construction labourers. The company tried to check encroachment through issuing daily permits to the traders and labourers, while the use of permits by different members of a household and their other networks allowed more street traders to capture land. The expansion of trade also provided new opportunities for HAL employees in finance. Although traders were evicted from the factory premises, they reoccupied other places owned by the company. The company increased surveillance in the 1990s, after having lost land to street traders and squatters, and following the conflict with the street traders in 2000-2001, the HAL Company allotted licences, although the number of licences of dubious authenticity in circulation has increased steadily.

Landowners do not directly control the use of place in the everyday management of places at the three wards; the daily management of santhe locations has been contracted out to a land manager. Many traders, as shown in earlier chapters, engage with them via their network leaders and the HAL Company issues licences to street traders through their organization; agents of the everyday state do not intervene in these wards. Adjustments or transactions within a territory are controlled/adjudicated by the leaders and their members, and, consequently network leaders, their organizations, and land managers have emerged as *de facto* controllers of the way places are used in everyday life.

The role of EDCs differs during street traders' processes of subverting evictions. Conflicts over place are predominantly with landowners at specific moments, and network leaders play a significant role in enlisting the support of intermediaries for negotiating. Land managers outside street traders' networks were not active during the recent conflicts, although on earlier occasions they acted as intermediaries between street traders' networks and the relevant local state authorities.

Across the three wards, one of the networks captured control of the traders' organisation, and at one ward they also managed to secure the tender for land management. Networks that control land management or organization at an agglomeration can influence other network leaders to mobilize under their leadership and enlist the support of their vertical networks to act as intermediaries, as shown in Section 7.2. Power relations between the various networks differ across the outer-peripheral wards. The organizing networks among agglomeration traders have limited influence over other networks at two wards.

Intra-network relationships differ at the third ward – HAL – and are hierarchical and exploitative in one of the three networks.

Interdependencies underpinned by trade and politics at the agglomeration and the ward influence the relationship between street traders, controllers and intermediaries. Street traders' spatial and social embeddedness at the agglomeration influences their use of H&CNs in their engagement with their networks for claiming places, as shown below.

Embedding in Santhe Location and Negotiating Places for Daily trade

As shown in Chapter Four, two groups can be differentiated among weekly and daily agglomeration traders in the santhe location at KR Puram Ward. Daily traders tap into different types of interdependencies to negotiate with various EDCs and intermediaries. Alliances between EDCs – the land manager and network leaders trading during the first cycle – and their labourers has determined the evolution of daily trade at the agglomeration in KR Puram Ward. The EDCs have their own interests in capturing certain types of economic spaces, and so they support the efforts of their economic or spatial networks to capture inter-related yet different places for street trading during the second cycle. Such alliances between first and second cycle traders have not emerged in other wards.

First cycle traders purchase from farmers and sell to itinerant and fixed-place traders, retail traders, and occasionally households. As in the KR Market Ward, they employ between three to four labourers for sorting and cleaning their stock. In addition, there are other unskilled labourers not attached to any shops but involved in transporting farmers' goods. Second cycle traders provide an outlet for their goods. Alliances between the first cycle traders and the land manager are driven by other factors. The land manager depends on the support of first cycle network leaders to secure the management of santhe land. Although the tender is to be allotted to a competitive bidder, land managers at the two wards have controlled the management of the place inter-generationally. Often, first cycle trader is involved in proxy tendering. There is also said to be substantial financial exchange between the traders concerned and the tenderer during such times. In addition, during normal times, both first cycle and second cycle traders draw on the land manager, among other circuits, for their cash flow. Moreover, traders in

both cycles, particularly the second, depend on the support of the land manager to subvert the state in their non-compliance with existing norms.

More recently, local politics has influenced the flexible way in which political or economic and spatial networks are used by traders to enlist the support of intermediaries to capture places. Daily traders and their networks draw on one of their political networks – the Dalit Sangarsh Samithi (DSS) to expand their place or to capture it for their networks. The DSS is active in the outer periphery in organizing land invasions to secure housing for its members, who are not exclusively Dalits. Since many daily traders and labourers live and trade at the santhe location, the DSS has mobilized them along with squatters from other wards to occupy vacant land around the santhe.

One strategy adopted by the DSS is to capture land and to bargain for the construction of permanent units – housing or shops – with the state. This has led to the eviction of squatters and street traders, and the re-location of squatters, to a ward outside the present metropolitan area. In this way, daily traders have recaptured their places by reverting to their economic and spatial networks in first cycle trade or the lower circuits of politics. The influence of the DSS declined among daily traders after this event; daily traders reverted to their alliance with the land manager, and negotiated predominantly for their household ties to capture more places to trade from.

The leaders of daily traders' networks vary in their connections to outside their household and ethnic domains, which in turn determines their strategies and ability to expand their trade; gender differences play an important role here. The expansion of trade and upward mobility of the daily trading hierarchy here and at the HAL Ward (discussed below) involved capturing places in different time cycles of trade. An alliance of youth leaders connected to different networks revived the traders' organization and secured the everyday management of the santhe. They then moved into bulk trading, operating as a cartel, and developed their constituency at the agglomeration and expanded their trade by supporting their economic and political networks. They also supported traders who sourced goods from them. Their networks occupied places predominantly at the edge of santhe locations.

Women leaders who find it difficult to compete with youth networks predominantly restrict their support to their H&CN. Similarly, men who have minimal engagement with any networks at the agglomeration do not extend support to them. They remain as retail

traders, and over time as women network leaders have subdivided their spaces to accommodate their household ties they have had to reduce their scale of trade. Though they are able to secure space during the first cycle, their trade is of a small scale. Unlike in the market, the power of network leaders to negotiate with intermediaries is not related to position in the trading hierarchy, but rather the ability to support place capture.

Although trade is characterized by different scales, trading-related reciprocities is limited at the outer periphery. Many weekly traders source their produce from the KR Market or directly from farmers at the place of trade. Among those with strong ties to the localities, weak interdependency in day-to-day functioning between the various users – farmers and traders – in the santhe location, leads to competition between the two groups in relation to claims over this location.

Embeddedness in Santhe Trade and Capturing Places in Different Wards

Differences between weekly traders in terms of their embeddedness in different wards where they trade influences their reliance on social and spatial networks in their negotiation with EDCs. Unlike other groups of street traders, weekly traders negotiate with EDCs at different places, with whom they have limited ties. They often trade on average at two to three different wards in the city. Therefore, street traders networks from a particular place depend on contacts with traders, particularly network leaders, from other localities for information about the availability of land, the nature of the market, and contact with land managers. Weekly traders occupy a place and negotiate for another place via their connections with other network leaders.

Besides H&CN domains, because of the long hours of trade these traders predominantly socialize at santhe locations. Due to the density of trading in these places, this proximity influences their connections to network leaders from different localities, and relationships are cemented by participation in same chit or economic partnership. Also, their residential location and their trading practices limit their opportunities for strengthening ties with other local political agents. Yet weekly traders who do not reside in the wards that they trade, operate as a group in order to offset the risk of displacement by local traders (see Chapter Five). Thus their location within the santhe affects their network portfolio and therefore the wards in which they can secure places.

Interdependencies between these agents are driven by immediate financial interest and the expectation of future reciprocities; EDCs and the land manager accommodate them as their own incomes are related to the number of traders in each agglomeration. Network leaders, predominantly male, who act as intermediaries extend their support to their spatial, economic and household networks.

Support for their spatial ties is based on an assessment of future similar reciprocities at other wards and the opportunity this opens to consolidate one's influence in a local terrain. The demand for places at santhe locations has peaked during the last two decades. Before then, intermediaries supported network leaders from other wards, as, in their view, they required a critical mass to attract an urban clientele to their markets. These locations subsequently attracted agricultural labourers who had lost their employment and traders in specific types of trade who had been evicted from other wards. The latter group located in these wards due to the density of trade and the kind of clientele congregating in them. However, with saturation of place, intermediaries are constrained to support network of traders. They only occasionally accommodate individual traders, depending on their ability to adjust within the territory they control.

Financial incentives influence an intermediary support to their H&CN or spatial network. The wards where santhes are organized are places with limited transportation. The lack of transport and, more recently, the need to source goods from the city centre ward, has reinforced members of a network to function as a group. This has provided an opportunity for a few network leaders to diversify into the transport business. Women who only recently entered trade depend on their social networks with the land manager or other intermediary to enter trade here. Weekly traders' networks were predominantly male, and from traditional trading communities. The practice is to inherit these spaces, as in the case of other type of property

The structure of many networks among weekly traders is predominantly flat at the santhe locations, in contrast to the hierarchy at KR Market and among daily traders at other wards. The power and influence of land managers over network organizers, particularly among weekly traders, is equally limited to financial transactions with women traders (as shown earlier).

Ethnic Embeddings in Trade, Location and Interdependencies

At the HAL agglomeration, ethnic alliances, alliances in the land owners' institution, and ward politics explain differences in the extent to which EDCs and network leaders support their connections outside the H&CN domain in capturing places.

The three dominant networks, led by migrants and native traders, compete with one another in order to capture both physical place and economic and political spaces at this agglomeration and in their residential area. The influence of leaders at local or regional political level, and bargaining power between networks, is determined by the size and strength of the ties of each network. Tamil migrant network leaders have an advantage, in that their community predominates numerically over native traders at this agglomeration. Tamil migrants are also a predominant group in the various squatter settlements, and some migrant leaders are influential here and within the HAL labour union of migrants – squatters and traders – and rally around their ethnic ties during conflicts over places at the agglomeration and at their residences. For example, during the street protests at this ward, Tamil migrant traders mobilized their community from different settlements to hold a strike at the locality. Migrant traders' networks often act as a clique to displace other traders with relatively weak ties, particularly natives.

The domination of Tamil migrant trader-households at the agglomeration¹⁰⁷ influences the strategies of native Gowda and Lingayat caste trader leaders for supporting members outside their household and ethnic community. Kannada speakers are a minority group at this agglomeration. Their leaders, therefore, need a particular degree of support at the agglomeration to counter the power of migrant leaders, to expand their trade, and to consolidate their influence in local politics.

Differences between EDCs, (network leaders) in their ability to mobilize power at the agglomeration also influences their network reciprocities. Network leaders with limited H&CNs compensated through mobilizing clients by financing capital and organizing places for new traders Both are influenced by their alliances with various agents embedded in the HAL company. Migrant leaders restrict their support to household members, due to a combination of agency and structural constraints. For example, the immediate families of migrants are often large and market trading is the main source of livelihood. Unlike the natives who control the organization, they are not able to appropriate more places or organize for new licenses to accommodate their ties. The

demand for space for retail trade together with household obligations has led migrant traders to restrict their support to their households in capturing spaces.

Trade-based reciprocities did not emerge, for unlike in KR Market or KR Puram, opportunities for increasing the scale of trade are limited. Expanding retail trade involves appropriating more area, as subdivision is no longer possible, but the company (the landowner) has increased surveillance and used licences to limit the space and time for retail and bulk trading. Even household alliances are fluid, with arguments over appropriation of space.

Similar to migrant traders, the first generation of native occupiers supported predominantly those with whom they have ties through household and community when occupying places at these locations. Mid-level Kannada-speaking Lingayat retailers with access to capital diversified into finance business and subsequently into bulk trading. With the expansion of their finance business, alliances emerged between them and with HAL Gowda employees and labour union leaders in similar businesses. This alliance of thirteen traders also controls the organization. The labour union leaders' influence in the company as well as their close connections to a Kannada mobilization are factors influencing their ability to capture the organisation.

At present this alliance is reinforced and driven by a cycle of financing small traders and squatters, organizing chits at the ward, and re-circulating the profit via bulk trade in the same agglomeration, and more recently in real estate. They support migrant traders with weak ties to their own community leaders and traders from other religious/caste/regional backgrounds in their efforts to locate in the agglomeration. Many of these traders were previously in itinerant trading who had sourced goods from them or had worked as labourers for retail traders at the agglomeration. Their trading ties with the leaders or the members of the two dominant migrant networks were weak.

Following the conflict of 2000–1, the company's terms for issuing licenses to street traders via their organization strengthened the organization's role in organizing places for new traders. They extended loans to clients among agglomeration traders against the collateral of their trading licences. They were able to re-appropriate licences from their defaulters, which were then sold to new traders. Although place is saturated now, this network uses the organization as a front for their transaction of licences and places. Often migrant traders with less support from their households hypothecate their licences

to raise finances for various purposes. Whilst these dynamics open up transactions cross ethnic boundaries, they also increase the vulnerability of traders with weak household or community ties or connections in local politics.

Differences in the use of social and spatial networks during the process of subverting eviction are influenced by horizontal and vertical alliances. Land tenure status complicates street traders negotiation with the landowners, and street traders need the support of political agents embedded in different agents of the state or the party hierarchy and also the support of institutions. It is difficult to resolve this problem via ward-level political connections alone, and traders need the support of senior politicians embedded in national politics.

The relative influence and role of Tamil migrants, Lingayat network organizers, and everyday controllers is influenced by their connections to different political organizations in the ward. Lingayat and Gowda traders have established ties in local politics, and within the party-political hierarchy they occupy a position above party activists. Tamil migrant traders have the finance capital to fund political activities during elections, and, in addition, their alliances with Gowda leaders embedded in the trade union and their ties to a Kannadiga mobilization group provides them with an advantage over other migrants when enlisting the support of senior politicians and influencing the land owners. These factors influence migrant and native network leaders to come together to subvert eviction. However, due to competition and mistrust at the agglomeration, they also maintain their own channels of communication with the landowners via their economic and household networks.

9.4 Conclusion

This chapter illustrated how street traders' embeddedness in locales influenced their ability to draw on their networks and their bargaining power in their process to for claiming places. As shown in the earlier sections, the characteristics of the two types of controllers and of intermediaries, their role and their relationship differs in each ward as well as across the case study wards. As we have seen in this chapter, users, through their routine practices, shape the way places are used and these do not necessarily coincide with state practices. Therefore, it is useful to differentiate between everyday controllers

and those that intervene in development at certain moments in a ward's trajectory. Moreover, agents establish their control over places by tapping into various sources – law and user rights established via custom, historical association to a place, and everyday relationships.

Interdependencies and reciprocities have emerged between networks; these are catalysed by historical and contemporary factors related to a ward's every day politics and its electoral politics in each ward, which in turn are influenced by the organization of local economy, particularly trade; density of congregation in a locality; land tenure, conventions related to place as well as perceptions of other groups about traders' claims to land. A confluence of these factors has led to the development of distinctive social and geographical fields.

A focus on the internal workings of the locales illustrates how the agency and structural aspects mutually reinforce each other and influence the 'ordering of geographical and social spaces' (Razzaz 1994, 1998) in specific ways in each ward. Further locales are embedded in a larger geographical and social matrix and their processes are shaped by both external and internal forces. Thus they are neither autonomous nor isolated (Moore 1973: 724). Drawing on Moore (1973) and Giddens (1985), a ward conceptualized as made up of semi-autonomous locales is useful for making inferences about street traders' strategies for claiming places and the factors influencing their ability to draw on various types of networks flexibly. Further, traders' embeddedness in these locales influences their ability to tap various forms of reciprocities, is shown in Sections 9.2.1–9.2.3.

10 Conclusions: Findings and Implications for Theory and Policy

10.1 Introduction

This thesis fills gaps in knowledge in relation to three inter-related themes: the spatiality of street trade, its politics, and differences within it. It investigated the question: ‘Why are there intra-city differences between street traders, in terms of their ability to claim places for their fixed-place trade?’, and examined the role of social networks as an influencing factor.

As described in Chapter One, in contrast to the usual process identifying a research question from the literature review and testing it in the field, the research question for this project evolved from field observations in Bangalore. The purpose of undertaking the literature review was to explore explanations in the literature about the observed phenomenon and to identify themes for further field research. The review found conceptual gaps and disagreements, summarized in Chapter Two.

Studies on street traders in the following literature sets were reviewed: informal economy, urban anthropology, and informal politics. Evidence in these studies suggests that place is a key resource for street traders and an axis of conflict between street traders and the city in different contexts. However, there is a lack of comprehensive explanations, particularly in relation to Bangalore, about where and how street traders prefer to locate for their trading, how places affect their economy, or how they claim their places.

Further, anecdotal evidence in many studies shows that there are differences between street traders in their success at securing places for fixed-place trade. Despite suggestions that street traders’ preferences to locate in different parts of the city – the city centre or the periphery – vary and that contestations over places differ within a city, factors influencing such differences have not been explained. In general, an intra-city focus in the literature on street traders is limited. Many studies on street traders have explored the city centre ward of a city, but studies on street trading in peripheries is limited. Moreover, the review has found disagreements and gaps in relation to the role of social networks embedded in H&CNs, as a factor influencing these differences. This thesis seeks to contribute towards filling these gaps.

In addressing the research question, this study has explored two aspects of the process for claiming places through a focus on micro-level processes of everyday practices and relationships. These two aspects are: finding and occupying a place, and subverting eviction. The following four themes were identified: (i) strategies for occupying places and subverting eviction, and the use of networks in their strategies; (ii) the role of networks in driving street traders' decision to locate in various locations; (iii) the outcome of their process to subvert eviction and underpinning factors; and (iv) the embeddedness of networks used by street traders to claim places. A grounded theory strategy, as advocated by Chamraz (2000), Corbin and Strauss (2008), Glaser and Strauss (1968) and was adopted for this research, as the proposed phenomenon had not been researched in Bangalore previously, and because there is very limited background information about street traders in general and on their trading places. Studies drawing on grounded theory strategy draw on the literature in different ways during different stages of the research, as articulated in Chapter Three. This chapter brings together key findings and their implications for theory and policy.

10.2 Key Findings and Implications for Theory

Chapter Four sets out the manner in which differences manifest spatially between street traders; Chapters Five and Six explore the strategies of street traders to find and occupy places for fixed-place trade and to subvert/negotiate eviction, and the related use of networks in this context.

Findings from Bangalore illustrate the complex and continuous cycles of establishing place claims. As argued by Bayat (1997), it is useful to distinguish between the two phases – finding and occupying places, and, subsequently, subverting eviction, because of the different strategies and agents involved in each phase at Bangalore. However, their strategies cannot be explained using any single dominant theory.

10.2.1 Strategies for Occupying Spaces for Trade: Networked Non-compliance

There are three explanations for traders' strategies for occupying places: quiet encroachment (Bayat 1997, 2000); use of organizations for mobilizing places (Cross

1997a, b; Cross and Pena 2006); and the making of claims via informal networks (Singermen 1995). Findings from Bangalore illustrate the limitations of using any one theory, and there are disagreements relating to the essence of the process and the role of networks (see Sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.2), and each explanation has gaps.

By contrast to Bayat's (1997) and Cross's (1998a) theories, street traders use a variety of strategies to find and to occupy places – including quiet encroachment, and individual and group capture. The role of (formal) organizations is limited during this phase and street traders also enter into negotiation with other agents in a city.

Street traders differentiate between agglomerations and scattered locations. Strategies and the use of networks differ between street traders trading from the two types of location. Agglomeration traders predominantly enter into negotiation with a variety of agents – both everyday state (Fuller and Harris 2001) and non-state – in their strategies to find and occupy places for their fixed-place trade across the case study wards. Both Bayat and Cross overlook the differences in street trading locations and the role of non-state agents. Similarly, Benjamin *et al.* (2001) in their study of urban governance and poverty at Bangalore conceptualize street traders and squatters' strategies for claiming places as one of 'politics by stealth', played out in the local government terrain. However, this does not explain the specifics of the politics or how traders organize claiming places. By contrast, this study has illustrated group and individual strategies of covert and overt politics, besides the development of markets for trading spots. The lens of non-compliance (Razzaz 1994) gives the flexibility to incorporate different strategies.

The Organizational Role of Networks

As argued by Singermen (1995), traders organize their politics and non-compliance through vertical and horizontal networks. Further, discussions in Chapter Five show that street traders' use of networks varies by location. It is dominant among agglomeration traders in their strategies for occupying places, but there are variations in their use, closely related to the level of competition amongst street traders to secure different location. This competition is underpinned by perceptions of opportunities and risks, which is overlooked by the literature's assumption that opportunities and risks in different places are uniform. Although Cross (1998a) alludes to this, his study does not

explore the effect on strategies to occupy places. Further, network transactions – information or negotiation – are not only between dyads or triads but often involve several networks. Chapter Five, however, suggests differences between traders' ability to draw on their networks, and this affects their opportunities to find locations in agglomerations. These findings add to the theories of networked claims and non-compliance developed by Singermen (1995) and Razzaz (1994), by bringing to light respectively the significance of place relations and the role of networks respectively.

As shown in the review, although the role of social networks in the economic organization of informal or street trading is observed in the anthropology of informal markets (see Seligmann 2001, 2005), and alluded to in a few studies on street trading (Macharia 1999), its influence on political processes has not been examined comprehensively. The influence of social networks on the politics and economics of small manufacturing clusters has been demonstrated, particularly in the Indian context (see Cadene and Holmstrom 1998; Benjamin 1996), but their role in the context of street traders is limited. Findings on the role of networks thus also adds to the discussion in the anthropology of informal markets and informal land, and to politics literature.

In addition, these findings show the relevance of these concepts to other related processes and contexts: Razzaz's focuses on the process of informal land development and the conflict between landowners and the state in Jordan; Singermen (1995) has investigated the claims on resources other than public places among informal economic agents in Egypt. Unlike other types of resource claims (money, or evasion of taxes), the process of claiming places is visible and, concomitantly, attracts opposition from different quarters of the city. Because of this, social relations with other agents in the locality influence processes of occupying places.

Spaces of Negotiation: Everyday State, Non-State and Locality

Another key contribution of Chapter Five is the unpacking of street traders' everyday relationship with the state, drawing on the concepts developed by Gupta (1995), Ferguson and Gupta (2002) and Fuller and Harris (2001) about the everyday state. Findings in Chapters Four and Five showed inter- and intra-ward differences between

street traders in their relationships to agents of the everyday state and other agents involved in the everyday management of their trading places.

A further dominant topic in relation to street traders' relationships with local government is centred around the issue of bribes and rent seeking (see Jagnathan 1987; Bhowmik 2005; Anjaria 2006). This study found that while bribes are one aspect of their relationship with the state, this phenomenon is not uniform across the city.

While the studies by Cross (1997), Seligmann (2004) and many other studies reviewed underscore street traders' relationship to the local state, they do not unpack 'where' engagement between street traders and the state occurs. Findings in Chapter Five show that locality – particularly where agents of the everyday state and non-state agents congregate – is a key space of negotiation during this phase. The above patterns reinforce a strand of argument in urban literature (Ismail 2006; Holston 1998), for focusing on 'localities as process' to conceptualize about urban process and state-society relationships.

Strategies for Subverting Eviction: Threat, Relationships and Networked Non-Compliance

Theories about street traders' strategies for subverting eviction emphasise different concepts: Scott's (1985) everyday forms of resistance (Tripp 1997; Singermen 1995), street politics (Bayat 1997; Crossa 2009), and organized action (Cross 1998a; Crossa 2009). These theories disagree over the forms and scale of subversive action and spaces of engagement, particularly with the state.

Findings in relation to forms of subversive action among street traders in Bangalore, summarized in Chapter Six, show that street traders' subversive actions can take several forms, in the same way that Crossa (2009) observes in relation to Mexico City. These include 'everyday forms of resistance', 'street politics', and collective lobbying. These findings depart from the theories of Tripp (1997), Cross (1998a) and Bayat (1997), all of whom emphasise one particular form. This study found that traders resort both to covert and overt action, and on some occasions their small group actions escalate into local level street protests and organized negotiations (this differs from Tripp's findings). Moreover street protests and collective lobbying differ from the forms found by Bayat

(1997), Cross (1998a) and (Cross and Pena, 2006) in their respective contexts. Despite having connections with street traders across the wards, their subversive actions remained localized – at the ward level – as theorized by Bayat (1997) and Cross (1998a). These findings indicate a need to move beyond a polarized or unitary conception of strategies.

Street traders differentiate between everyday conflicts and development threat, and this differentiation is related to the agents involved in each conflict and the assessment of their ability to negotiate through their ‘everyday spatial routines and relationships’ (Stillerman 2006). Threats together with network relationships among street traders in a ward or a location influence their horizontal and vertical alliances and the scale of their subversive actions.

Threat and Spaces/Places of Engagement with Landowners

Analysis of street traders’ relationship with the state has remained at the level of local government (Benjamin 2000; Tripp 1997) and considering their adversarial relationship with the state (Fernandez-Kelly 2006). However, another key conclusion emerging from Chapter Six is that threats influence street traders’ engagement with different levels and of the state and types of authority. As can be seen from Chapters Five and Six, while their engagement is predominantly with the everyday state in occupying places, when subverting development threats they engage with different levels at various geographical and political spaces. Specifically, the process of negotiating with the state in subverting developmental threats is complex, being discursive and occurring in different political spaces – the state, party politics, and social gatherings – at different places. In this context, findings from Bangalore differ from those of Tripp (1997), Cross (1998a), Crossa (2009) and Bayat, and parallel those of Stillerman (2006). In addition, the state is one type of landowner. Thus threats faced by street traders differ both within and across the case study wards, and this helps to explain the use of localised responses.

Role of Networks in the Process of Subverting Eviction

As argued by Singermen, networks provide the flexibility needed by street traders in forging horizontal and vertical alliances for their various forms of resistance and negotiation to subvert eviction. Horizontal mobilization, particularly among agglomeration traders, involves assembling networks that congregate in a trading place, while vertical networks provide an avenue to connect to agents embedded in different political spaces within the ward and outside. Their networks are intermediaries between street traders' networks and the state(s), particularly in subverting development threats. Further, both their horizontal and vertical alliances are fluid and influenced by everyday relationships and threats. This is evidenced by the manner in which networks align for collective action horizontally and draw on their vertical networks at times of occupation and eviction. These findings confirm Singermen's arguments, whose assertions about the role of social networks in relation to subversive actions are grounded in anecdotes.

Street traders' strategies described in Chapters Five and Six are conceptualised as non-compliant 'strategy' rather than as everyday forms of resistance (Tripp 1989), stealth strategies (Benjamin *et. al* 2001), at one end through to 'organised or spontaneous' acts of resistance (Cross 1998a; Bayat 1995). Their subversive strategies are complex and characterized by resistance/conflicts, compromise, and co-option and lobbying. Similarly, their strategies for occupying places involves negotiation with other users in the city. The negotiations involved in claiming places is rarely accounted for in the various conceptualisations of the phenomenon. The lens of 'networked non-compliance' (Singermen 1995; Razzaz 1994) is useful for capturing the heterogeneous characteristics of street traders' strategies to occupy places and subvert eviction. Further, Chapters Five and Six add to theories about this by integrating the aspects of space and scale to the analysis.

10.2.2 Differences in Claiming Places: Role of Networks

Place–Economy Links and the Role of Networks in Occupying Places

Chapter Seven illustrates the role of networks in influencing differences between street traders when occupying places in agglomerations and subverting threats. These findings

contribute towards filling gaps in relation to (i) the influence of place on street trading economy and (ii) the factors driving street traders' decision to locate in different places.

The dominant position within the literature on informal economics is that street trading economic spaces and places are marginal,¹⁰⁸ and that places are containers of economies and not an influencing factor. This is mirrored in policies towards street trading like hawking zones and street traders' markets, which overlook the specific ways in which places affect street trading. By contrast, recent studies have argued for the significance of space and place for the economies such as street trading upon which the poor depend (see Benjamin 2000; Brown 2001). However, as noted in Chapter Two, there is a gap in the literature in relation to street traders' perceptions of location (Anjaria 2005; Brown 2005a, 2005b) and the specific ways in which places influence street trading. Although the political-economic advantages of agglomerations in relation to small manufacturing economies or repair industries have been studied (Benjamin 1996; Cadene and Holmstrom 1998; Shaw and Pandit 2001) factors influencing the agglomeration of street traders have not been explored. Findings in Section 7.1, contribute to the discussion by illustrating the specific manifestations of the influence of place on street trading economies.

This section also maps street traders' perceptions about short- and long-term political-economic advantages of locating in a particular agglomeration or ward. Besides the economic advantages of an agglomeration in terms of knowledge and innovation, they provide street traders with a political resource – a critical mass of supporters – to negotiate with other agents in a ward. Further, findings summarized in Chapter Seven also show relative differences between locations in terms of business opportunities and risks. Such differences are influenced by the nature of those who congregate in a ward and in its various locations. Findings in Chapter Seven add to the discussions related to place-economy links, and further raise questions about the marginality of street trading spaces.

Another significant finding of Chapter Seven relates to the factors driving street traders' decisions about trading locations. It is implied in the studies reviewed that the nature of a trade influences the manner in which street traders located in a place. However, findings from this chapter show that the particular trade and networks were both significant factors. Significantly, findings in Section 7.1 indicate that street traders' assess

differences between locations in terms of opportunities and risks. Their perception influenced the varying levels of competition to secure places seen in different locations and the role of networks, in decisions on trading locations. Further, proximity influenced street traders' everyday relationship and their use of networks in their various acts of non-compliance, described in Chapters Five and Six.

In drawing conclusions about links between place, economy, and the role of networks, this study has focussed on a specific type of trade and scale to formulate research questions, rather than treating street trading as a homogenous category. Findings discussed in Chapter Seven are influenced by the exigencies of trade in perishables, which require a fast turn over and therefore a dense and diverse clientele. Exploratory study has indicated differences in the use of horizontal and vertical networks during the two trading cycles across the case study wards. There is a need for further research into the role of networks in influencing decisions to locate in various types of places among traders in non-perishable goods.

Threats, the Role of Agency, and Networks

Bayat's (1997) account of the cyclical and complex process of claiming places is reinforced by the discussions in Section 7.2 and Chapters Five and Six. As shown in Chapter Two, there is a disagreement in the literature over the role of agency in subverting evictions stemming from contemporary forms of urban development by using localized strategies (see Chapter Six). This study illustrates the role of street traders' agency in subverting such threats. Narratives of street traders indicate that they perceive a shift in the nature of threats and that resisting developmental threats is more difficult than manoeuvring the state via everyday state agents. To shift the stances of higher levels of the state or landowners, street traders tap into locality-specific political opportunities, as described in Section 7.2.2. These findings parallel those of Crossa (2009) in Mexico City and depart from the assertions in many studies which question the role of agency in the light of changes in urban governance and governmentality. Network relationships are a factor influencing agency, as shown in Chapter Six.

As Seligmann (2004) argues, there are no clear winners or losers in these conflicts, Differences between street traders manifest in relation to securing places in

agglomeration and the quality of places secured. However, less attention has been given to factors influencing such differences. Cross (1998a) attributes the differences between competing organizations to their size. On the contrary, in Bangalore, with the exception of KR Market Ward, competing networks cooperate to connect with higher levels of the state or landowners, particularly in subverting development threats.

Power relations between street traders, their network leaders and intermediaries affects traders' ability to secure places in agglomerations. Opportunities for street traders to reoccupy places or claim new places in their respective wards are created by the willingness of higher levels of the state and landowners, while there is another negotiation at the local level. The ability to draw on networks flexibly for forging alliances horizontally or vertically differs between street traders and their networks. This affects their role in processes to subvert eviction, their bargaining power over their networks, and, consequently, the quality of spaces secured by them and their members.

Options available within a ward influence the flexibility with which traders can draw on networks, particularly vertical networks, and the ease with which an alliance can be exited. Local relationships and structures along with outside forces have a significant influence on subverting development threats. Further, in contrast to Klandermas and Olsen's arguments about 'free riding', and similar to Cross's perspective, securing a place on their own is often difficult for many street trades due to competition for places. Very few traders have the network portfolio or ability to draw on the support of other users in a locality. Members' ability to negotiate for a place within a network can be increased by demonstrating support through demonstrating participation in subversive actions.

10.2.3 Differences in Drawing on Networks: Role of Household and Community Networks

This study departs from Singermen (1995) and Seligmann's (2004) thesis about the role of H&CNs¹⁰⁹ as a factor influencing relationships within street traders' networks. Agglomeration traders' ties with network leaders and intermediaries, and between intermediaries and the state or landowners, are embedded in economic, political and spatial domains – as shown in Chapter Eight. Moreover, the use of more than one type of

network is dominant among agglomeration traders in each of their place-claiming processes at the case study wards. There are inter- and intra-ward differences in relation to the type of networks used, and the characteristics of the agents constituting these networks. Boundaries between these domains overlap and are fluid between these categories.

10.2.4 Differences: Embedding in Locales and Drawing on Networks

Fig. 2.1 (see page 52) outlines a conceptual framework with which to infer about the factors influencing reasons for differences between street traders in terms of their ability to draw on networks during their processes of claiming places. It is argued that the production of place – everyday use and development – is controlled by a variety of state and non-state agents in each ward, referred to as ‘place controllers’. Street traders and their networks negotiate with these controllers via intermediaries, and relationships between these influence traders’ ability to locate in agglomerations and their ability to draw on their networks for negotiating eviction.

The characteristics of the controllers and intermediaries involved during each of the two processes differ. Street traders’ relationships with everyday controllers influences their ability to locate in agglomerations, while the nature of the threat influences strategies for subverting eviction and the manner of engagement with development and everyday controllers and networks (see Chapters Six and Seven). The way they are embedded in socio-spatial structures and relations influences their network portfolios with controllers and intermediaries, and the interdependencies that emerge amongst them.

A focus on the social production of place at ward level allows us to observe everyday patterns of control in relation to the use and development of place, as well as street traders’ relationships with other agents. There are both inter- and intra-ward differences in patterns of ‘place use and development control’, with control patterns being influenced by a confluence of historical practices, norms and contemporary laws. Further, the intersection of these two processes is often incomplete. Interdependencies between network nodes – controllers, intermediaries and street traders – are thus driven by an intersection of locality-specific and outside processes. Moreover, structural aspects which have a bearing on street traders’ claims differ across the case study wards,

including as regards land ownership, land development, and local economies, in particular formal trade,.

Findings presented in his thesis highlight the need to focus on socio-spatial relations at a locality. Giddens' (1985) lens of 'locales' captures the mutual influence of socio-spatial structures and relations. As the findings in Chapters Five and Six illustrate, street traders negotiate for places in different spaces and places, and the process is not limited to a locality. Locales are neither totally autonomous nor uniformly shaped in a similar way by macro economic or political process. In other words, locales are 'semi-autonomous social fields' (Moore 1976). Forms of embedding in these SASFs, influence street traders' ability to negotiate with controllers and claim their trading places.

10.2.5 Contributions to Theory

Grounded Analysis of Urban and Everyday Processes

This study brings an understanding of an aspect of urban processes at the micro-level, in particular everyday political processes. The importance of building urban theories from below, based on ethnographic research, has been advocated by many scholars, such as Holston (1998) and Santos and Rodríguez-Garavito (2002) Very few previous studies on Indian cities are focussed on everyday processes and politics.

Contested Processes of Claiming Places

Discussions in Chapters Five to Eight demonstrates the mutual influence of socio-spatial relations and structures on urban processes, specifically in relation to claiming places, and show the significance of particular places for the trading economy. Drawing on the experience of street traders, we can see the complexity and cyclical nature of processes for claiming places, outside the legal framework and existing within the informal economy. This thesis has shown a moment in the cycle of claiming places, and the manner in which socio-spatial relations and structures are affected. However, the analysis of everyday politics in this thesis can be strengthened with further archival and ethnographic research for a better integration of the influence of history and culture on the politics of claiming places. Although these aspects are alluded to in this study, they have not been analysed in depth.

Space/Time Analysis of Street Trading

This thesis has also revealed a slice of the spatial and temporal aspects of the street-trading economy and its relationship to the city. Within literatures on the informal economic and its politics, street traders' political agency and their economy are understood either as de-linked from formal processes, and/ or narrowly within the frame of relations between street traders and the local state, particularly in relation to claiming places. By contrast, this thesis has illustrated the manner in which places are shaped by a variety of state and non-state actors, including street traders and whose role differed across places and time. It provides new evidence about the processes by which street traders occupy places and subvert eviction. It also brings new analysis about street traders' relationship with different levels of the state and with the city in general, illustrating the manner in which local and macro processes intersect and influence the production of places. Further findings from this study illustrate the limitations of explaining street traders' strategies for claiming places, using theories developed in other contexts.

Differences in Cities

As shown in Chapter Two, neither the literatures on urban informal economy nor informal politics have researched in any detail the phenomenon of differences between agents in their ability to claim resources such as places. In developing a conceptual framework – (see Fig. 2.1), this research brings together concepts developed in urban anthropology and sociology.

10.3 Implications for Policy: Urban Poverty, Spatial Governance & Inclusive Cities

Findings of this study have implications for urban policies and development interventions in relation to several aspects: (i) the influence of socio-spatial processes on the political economy of the street trading economy; (ii) the organizational role of networks on street traders' negotiations with the city and their alliances; and (iii) differences between street traders in their ability to draw on their networks. These connect policies towards street trading, urban poverty, and spatial governance with strategies for organizing street traders, which are elaborated below.

10.3.1 Street Traders' Interest in Place and Assumptions in Policy and Development Interventions

There have been two predominant forms of intervention at Bangalore to improve street traders' claims on location: these are the construction of market complexes and, more recently, the allocation of hawking zones. However, the competing interests and visions in relation to location between street traders, decision makers in the state, and a section of civil society mean that there is an underlying tension in both forms of intervention.

Recognizing the significance of street trading as a key livelihood strategy of the poor, the government of India in 2001 enacted the National Policy for Urban Street Vendors (NPUSV). A main plank of this policy is to strengthen street traders' access to and claims on location. Local government is legally obligated to earmark hawking zones and to issue licences to urban vendors. Prior to the NPUSV, local government in the Bangalore Metropolitan Area has attempted to re-locate street traders to enclosed markets. Neither programme has had much success.

There were attempts to move agglomerations into market complexes at the wards in the inner periphery and outer periphery. At both places, street traders moved back onto the street. The construction of market complexes prove to be costly, and are often undertaken on a small scale. In some wards, landowners discontinued such projects on account of their high cost, and this resulted in the exclusion of many traders and conflicts between street traders over the allocation of shops, their size, and the physical layout of the market. From street traders' perspective, moving into such complexes often resulted in a greater cost, due to the high rent. Further, as many traders continued to trade from on-street locations, business inside complexes declined. Despite these failures, street traders' intermediaries in some wards are lobbying the local state for such projects – a point discussed below.

The case study wards chosen for this study fall within the jurisdiction of three types of local government: Bangalore City Corporation (BCC), the City Municipal Corporation (CMC) and Nagar Panchayat (NP). Hawking zones were earmarked within BCC wards but fizzled out after a brief period, and implementation of the NPUSV was reduced to the arbitrary earmarking of hawking zones and licences. The policy's effect was mixed

in the city, but where implemented it was predominantly marked by opposition from street traders.

Although the BCC collected the fee for licences and issued receipts, licences were not issued. Instead, street traders often used their receipts as a proof of their claim to a place and after the first year, the BCC stopped collecting the licence fee. According to officials at the BCC central office, they discontinued it because there were a number of conflicts relating to the identification of street traders and the locations identified as hawking zones.

A main weakness of the NPUSV, as with the earlier interventions, is that it did not take into account street traders' interest in agglomeration at a place for their trade. The manner in which places, through attributes of location and locality, affect street trade is shown in Section 7.1, and is often overlooked by the state(s) in earmarking hawking zones. A dominant assumption among policymakers is that street trading is a marginal economy that can be located at any place, and their interest, particularly for the decision makers within the BCC, is to control street trade through limiting the number of licences issued. In their view, street trading agglomerations are 'eyesores' and a 'cancerous' growth in the city. Acknowledging the difficulty of erasing street trade, they attempt to reduce its visibility, and consequently, they have confined hawking zones to limited areas in the interior parts of a ward.

Another source of conflict in implementing the NPUSV concerns the issuing of licences to individual traders. This threatened to exclude the claims of many traders, particularly in locations such as KR Market and the outer periphery, where there were more than one time cycle of trade in each agglomeration. Street traders have evolved arrangements to share the same place during different time cycles or to share/lease or rent a place, as shown in Chapters Four and Five. However, licences stipulate a minimum space of 1.2 m x 1.5–2 m, whereas in wards with very dense street trading, street traders traded from a much smaller space of 1 m x 1 m or had the right to roam around a place. At KR Market Ward, street traders have argued for collective user rights to a location, although the BCC is determined to issue individual licences only, due to its administrative concerns.

Conflicts relating to licences manifest in a different way at the wards of the inner periphery, where households are involved in the everyday organization of trade. The

BCC's insists on issuing one card/cart/ licence per trader, and in some wards intermediaries insist that the card owner alone should trade from their place, and not household members. This has been rejected by many traders, who argue that they need more than one cart for economic viability and also that trading is a form of household economy, which renders it impractical for the card owner alone to conduct transactions at all times.

As well as these conflicts, fixing the number of street traders is often difficult, even if licences are issued to street traders only in a particular location. For example, at the HAL Ward, where identity cards are issued to street traders, the number of licences has steadily increased from 150 to 540, although with some still trading without an identity card. Further, this has created opportunities for one of the networks to control the allocation process, as shown in Section 7.2, and increased the vulnerability of street traders outside a network.

Although it is too early to assess the manner in which the NPUSV would play out in the wards at the outer periphery, its use to evict street traders within BCC wards suggests a potentially adverse impact. At these wards, the local government authorities have continued a historical practice of allotting a large tract of land to street traders. However, as previously noted, the escalation in real estate prices has given local government a motivation to evict street traders from santhe locations or to restrict their numbers by re-locating some of them in enclosed markets. As with KR Market Ward, there is a possibility that these instruments may be used to de-stabilize the claims of street traders to large tracts of land and thereby constrain their opportunities to agglomerate. Further, although the NPUSV defines urban vendors as those trading in land owned by public agencies and private landowners, in the latter case there are legal constraints to implementing the policy, as can be seen in locations such as the HAL Market.

Political Alliances and Spaces: Contested Visions of Civil society and Street Traders

Another key finding of this study is how street traders use horizontal and vertical alliances to claim places. Their vertical alliances are predominantly with economic or political agents and organizations in each ward, which accords with studies on the alliances of the urban poor to secure resources (Chatterjee 2002; Harris 2006; Corbridge

2005). However, despite these findings, the literature on street traders prioritises the role of NGOs and civil society over such alliances and channels (see, for example, Bhowmik 2005, 2007) and development agencies. Underpinning such studies is the assumption that NGOs and street traders share a common interest, and they overlook contests over places within the domain of civil society.

In fact, the agenda of street traders themselves is rarely addressed by the variety of NGOs working in the city. While there are a few large organizations in Bangalore known for work relating to land for housing for the poor, and which also claim to represent the informal economy, their involvement with street traders, particularly during spatial conflicts, has been limited. There was a brief attempt to mobilize street traders at the city level during 1999–2000 but the organization had declined by the time of the field research for this study, and when it comes to confronting issues concerning land, NGOs have been shown to have limitations. Indeed, NGO agendas have been shown to be influenced by funding than the interests of traders, and conflicts between street traders, NGOs, and the municipal state over hawking zones at the KR Market Ward have been documented. Of the four NGOs who have acted as an interface between street traders and the state under the leadership of NASVI (a national level federation), two declined to be interviewed while the directors of the other two indicated that funding was a key reason for discontinuing their. They had been driven by an agenda of starting micro-credit programmes for street traders.

Thus, NGOs' constituency among street traders is relatively small in the case of the study ward and generally in the city. Their notion of implementing hawking zones was based on the assumption that street traders' claims to 'a place' are stable, while overlooking the specificity of place attributes sought for street trading. NGOs lent support for re-location programmes and for hawking zones in the form implemented by the state; this proved to be counterproductive and in some case, compounded the difficulties faced by street traders in realizing their interests in claiming a location. Further, as the experience of street traders in an inner-periphery ward indicates, NGOs face limitations in supporting street traders or acting as their intermediaries.

Further street traders, particularly in metropolises and large cities like Bangalore, face the risk of the process relating to demarcating hawking zones being captured by elites to control street trading in each ward (see Anjaria 2006 for conflicts over hawking zone in

Mumbai). A parallel phenomenon in Bangalore, as in Mumbai, is the role of Janagraha, a movement spearheaded by a venture capitalist and dominated by residents' associations of the middle/upper class in Bangalore. As well as making vociferous demands concerning hawking zones, the organization plans partnership projects with the municipality. They are one of the groups which dominate a model plan for implementing hawking zones at KR Market, and they have lobbied via a private planning consultancy to have the ward reclassified from mixed land use to a single use. In another location, not covered by this research, Janagraha dominates the municipal plan, in partnership with a residents' association. These associations decide which type of traders are necessary for their ward, and consequently, street traders who are excluded have limited options for channelling their demands.

Both the local government and citizens' organizations like Janagraha tend to use hawking zones to control street trade and to allot locations where there are no congregations. Janagraha's alliances between bureaucrats and higher income citizens raise issues of representation – particularly, how, by whom and in what forms are street traders' interests articulated in cities.

A recurring observation is that contests intrinsic to claims over places arise from differences in interest and vision. However, these conflicts between street traders and NGOs or other competing agents in civil society tend to be drowned out by the clamorous discourses on patron-client ties and the corruption of field bureaucrats. While not negating the prevalence of corruption, as the findings in this research have shown, targeting field bureaucrats and elected representatives alone only shifts the control to higher levels of the state or that part of civil society whose interests conflict with those of street traders. It also weakens the bargaining power of street traders with other agents in a ward. Further, as indicated by the study findings, street traders' political alliances, particularly at the local level, are crucial for their negotiations. The range of options available to them in forging alliances with other agents in the city affects their bargaining power. The issue, therefore, is to enhance the political spaces of street traders and alliances, and not de-link them from their existing alliances due to ideological assumptions. Unless there are structural changes, which are likely to be slow, special care should be taken to ensure that any intervention to support street traders does not harm their interests further (Amis 2001).

Moreover, the NUPSV in its present form does not address the impact of the entry of corporations on street traders' claims to places and on their livelihoods in general. As noted by Bhowmik (2007), there are pressures from national and multinational corporate chains to open up the retail sector for corporate investments and to allocate land. These agents have been lobbying to change land-use laws and property rights, and also to relax real estate taxation. This change of policy is still in the early stages and its impact on street trading, trade in general, and on spatial conflicts, needs to be researched. Without integrating street-trading policy within the wider framework of urban policy, its impact is likely to be limited.'

10.3.2 Disjuncture between the NPUSV and Urban Poverty Reduction Strategies

Although the NPUSV is part of the national government's strategy to reduce urban poverty, it is not integrated into the various urban poverty reduction programmes. In Indian cities, these programmes are financed by the national government and their focus is predominantly on micro-credit projects or housing. While these are important, the failure to address the vulnerability of poor groups to secure their livelihoods, and, more importantly, to establish roots in a city, may affect their ability to escape from poverty or engage in micro-credit programmes.

Not only do they not make provisions for street traders, but their programme goals are also sometimes contradictory. For example, the current strategy for financing poverty programmes, the government's Jawaharlal Nehru Urban Renewal Mission, affects street traders at two levels. Only a minor amount of financing is allotted for housing construction for the urban poor, while a major proportion of the budget is allocated for large infrastructure projects, such as the re-location of the market and physical infrastructure programmes in different wards. These involve the eviction and resettlement of different groups in the city; in 2006, as well as street traders, formal medium and large retail traders were evicted from their legally-owned land, along with residents. The inability of these groups to counter eviction via courts or elected representatives indicates the institutional and legal mechanisms underpinning JNURRM. A critical review of these programmes – covering formulation and implementation mechanisms, specifically institutional arrangements and decision-making processes – is

necessary to include the interests of different groups, particularly vulnerable groups like street traders.

10.3.3 Implications for Spatial Governance

Two concerns arise from the findings of this research in relation to street traders' interest in location and their political alliances in relation to spatial governance.

Goals of Planning and Street Trading Agglomerations

There is a contradiction between street traders' interests in agglomerating in a particular place for their trading and the goals of urban planning. Street trading agglomerations', particularly the larger ones, where there is a high density of congregation at one place, are perceived by urban planners as signs of disorder. In addition, at present, planning goals are biased towards catering to the interests of corporate economies. For example, an interest in agglomerating in a particular place with traders in similar or complementary trades is not limited to street traders but can be seen in all scales and types of trading in perishable goods. This has been a key source of conflict between street traders, formal traders at KR Market, and the state as can be seen in formal traders' re-location out of the ward under the mega-city programmes as described in Chapter Six, and in urban developments funded by JNURRM. Further, in 2005, formal traders who were previously allotted land via master planning were targeted for eviction in different wards within the BCC. When such programmes are implemented, there is very little scope – either via legal avenues or administrative avenues – to contest them, as discussed further below.

According to the Deputy Commissioner of the Bangalore Municipal Corporation, the NUPSV constrains the direct eviction of street traders, and so the BMC feels that the only way to eradicate street trading is by the re-location of the entire trading cluster from city centre wards or by cutting the lifelines of street traders. The assumption is that street traders are 'illegal encroachers' and that 'informal economy' is less significant for the city despite the evidence of the NSS about the increasing proportion of city population depending on it.

Spatial conflicts between street traders and the state are not simply related to exclusion from master planning which can be addressed by ‘inclusion’, as argued by Verma (2002) and Kiswar (2005), and competing interests in relation to places among various economic and social groups in a city cannot be fixed by a technical approach – such as their inclusion in master planning. That urban places are an outcome of contested and political process has been demonstrated in many studies (Holston 1989, 2008). In the contest to claim places, agents draw on different weapons, including customs and rituals, as demonstrated by Srinivas (2001), linguo-nationalism (Nair 2004) and planning. It is in this light that the significance of alliances for street traders discussed earlier is to be understood. De-linking street traders from traditional political and social avenues for securing places alongside changes in planning processes may further constrain their ability to negotiate to occupy places in the city. The significance of street traders’ strategies should be understood this light, particularly their connections and influence in everyday and electoral politics. There is a need to look again at planning practices and to devise ways of devolving planning to the local level. This is not about creating a new mechanism at the local government level or Parastatals, but widening the political spaces of street traders.

Spatial Governmentality and Local Democracy

Another major concern stemming from the discussions of Chapter Six and Seven relates to contemporary forms of ‘spatial governmentality’ and their implications for local democracy. Exclusion of informal economic agents of the poor in general from master planning processes has been noted in many studies (Holston 1989 2006; Sarin 1982; Kiswar 2005; Verma 2002). Master planning is the predominant tool for organizing places for residential use in the city. The BDA, the parastatal in charge of this, is also planning to expand its mandate to implement and finance urban infrastructure projects; it has been opposed to mixed use zones that allow for the development of small economies including trade and street trade in places like KR Market.

Moreover, the role of private consultancies has also increased, resulting in a further shift of planning processes from the public domain. For example, the 2020 master plan for Bangalore was led by an alliance of corporates under the name of the Bangalore Agenda Task Force. In their mandate to oversee the role of the Bangalore Development

Authority, the BATF has identified and appointed a French consultancy group for developing the BDA's master plans. According to a lead consultant of the group concerned, although they had recommended mixed land use for KR Market, their recommendation was opposed by the urban development department. There are also plans for the eviction and re-location of squatter settlements apart from markets. Although the power of the BATF has declined at present, the potential for such alliances to capture planning processes is real. Further, some of the BATF members now hold key positions in the present Congress Party government. The overt bias in planning towards the corporate and the taking control of processes at different levels have significant implications for other citizens, including street traders.

Power Relations in the state and their Impact on Street Traders

Another concern relates to power relations within the local state and between the levels of the state, which have implications for street traders' spaces for manoeuvre (Batley 1997) and negotiation in the city. This is seen in the centralization and opaqueness of decision-making processes related both to policy and implementation in mega city programmes. As can be seen from Chapter Six, this influences street traders' engagement with the higher-level state. Further, the municipal governments are closely monitored; mega city programmes and JNURRM are implemented by different state institutions, and are supported by new laws to acquire land or evict occupiers. These laws are often instituted by the regional state without much publicity. Not only are the local governments bypassed, there is also a process of enclaving mega city programmes in special cells within a municipality. Such cells are insulated from elected representatives and are monitored directly by a commissioner and a senior bureaucrat.

Complaints about 'local vested interests' and 'corrupt locals' are often used by the higher level state to curtail the influence of municipal governments over these programmes. As a token measure of local democracy, municipalities are asked to pass a resolution to implement these programmes'. Such resolutions are extracted under duress in two ways. According to a deputy councillor, decision-making within municipalities is controlled by senior leaders in the party, and an MLA is allowed to participate in the various meetings of municipal sub-committees. MLAs often have a latent power to influence committee decisions. The councillors are also silenced in other ways, by

targeting them via anti-corruption programmes. Further, interviews with legal activists and lawyers at the Supreme Court suggest that the courts have not been favourable to the case of street traders.

A consequence of these changes is that elected representatives face constraints when pushing the interests of their constituencies. This also raises questions about the democratic accountability of the state – in particular, at the local level. It is imperative to document the emerging institutional (structural) and legal frameworks underpinning spatial governance in cities, and there is a need for more ethnographic studies of the state to understand these changes and the emerging state-society relations.

10.3.4 Missing ¹¹⁰the Role of Social Networks in Policy and Practice

This study has illustrated the significance of socio-spatial relations for the street-trading economy and traders' political organization. The role of social networks is overlooked both in the literature and in strategies for organizing street traders. Their vertical ties with other agents in the city are often dismissed as patron-client ties (Singermen 1995), inimical to street traders' interests. However, as argued earlier, these alliances are important for other reasons, not only because of the counter-opposition political milieu at the city.

Similarly, locality constitutes an important political space for street traders, as is evidenced by findings relating to the influence of everyday relationships and embeddedness on street traders' ability to draw on their networks. Street traders rely on the support of other economic and political agents for establishing new claims and in countering opposition. Because of their circumstances, although street traders have networks with one another across localities, their subversive strategies are localized. The importance of locality is underestimated in the literature as well as by movement actors. Further, given the changes in the cities, there is a need for more studies on locality to draw conclusions about urban processes and relationships.

Limitations and Questions: Gendered Impacts

A key theme of this thesis is the need to understand significance of differences. While this thesis has demonstrated the role of socio-spatial networks and relationships in

shaping differences, the role of identity is given only limited consideration. There is a need for further research disaggregating the socio-spatial relationships by gender and migration.

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
Appendix 1

1A TOPIC GUIDE

1.1 STREET TRADERS

Round One (Conversation and Observation)

A. Non-participant Observation



Patterns of occupying places for street trade in each location / ward.

- *Where do they trade?*
- *Do they trade from the same space every day or change place?*
- *Which days of the week do they come for trading here? What do they do on other days?*
- *What happens on days to a traders' space when they do not come?*
- *How much space do they occupy? How do they occupy (who sits next to whom?)*
- *Collection of bribes / tax at the agglomeration?*
- *Who are congregating in the agglomeration? Where do they come from? How do they operate?*

Characteristics of ward economy.

Places of Congregation in each ward and characteristics of agents. (particularly those with influence in local politics in each ward).

Observation Schedule : Place/ Time Rhythms of trade (Example of KR Market Ward)

Place	Time (daily cycle of trade)	Type of trade; Where do they come from? Also, note the name of contact person	Volume of trade, income, and any other information related to trading	Encounters with traffic police or other State agents (raids /frequency and time)
Inside the market complex (L1)	After 10 am in the morning.	Vegetable trade (mixed)		
Inside market complex (L2)	Early morning till 9 o' clock			
On the pavement abutting the market (L7)	Early morning till 9			
On the pavement abutting the market (L4)	After 9 – near the sweet shop in the corner			
Bus stand and opposite roads	Early morning till 9			
Bus stand				
Near mosque		Bouquet traders		

B. Topic Guide for Initial Conversations

B1 Economic and Political Organisation

- Social characteristics of street traders in different location in ward : ethnicity, gender, dominant type of trade.
- Investment patterns of traders selling different types of perishable goods and spatial organisation of their trade.
- How do they secure finance? Where do they purchase their materials? Who are their clientele? Have any of them helped traders to find / occupy a place or fight eviction?
- Presence of organisation (yes / no). If yes, why and how was it started? And what are they current activities? If no, how do they organise?
- Are there any leaders? Who are they and what is their role and relationship to other street traders in an agglomeration or street?
- Street relationship with the local political / economic agents?

B2 Spatial Organisation

- History of street trade at each agglomeration:
 - *How / when did it start?*
 - *Who are the established traders / first generation traders?*
 - *Who are the new traders?*
- Views on different locations and localities in relation to trading potential – what is considered as prime trading spot? Who can access such locations and why? Who is occupying less favourite spots
- Experience in that particular location – particularly, on the state attempts to evict street traders and traders responses and outcome. (with a specific focus on evictions of 1999-2001 and afterwards).
- Street traders' views on finding places in different location in an agglomeration or streets in the ward. How and why?
- Views on hawking zones and licence?
- Knowledge of court cases related to street trade and if so, views on them. Has this influenced their responses in any way.

Round Two Topic Guide for Semi-structured Interviews

1.1 GROUP 1: STREET TRADERS

Respondent Name :

Group (for me to tick) :

**Those with place/ had a place before but lost it/
Tried but Could not access a place**

Date of interview:

Place of interview:

1. General Details

- Can you please tell me who lives in your house and where do they work
- Which is your native place? What language do you speak at home?

2. Occupational history (past, present) and Organisation of trading

- How long have you been in this trade?
- Who else is involved in this trade in your household? And where do they trade?
- Were you doing any other jobs before starting to trade? If so, what? Why did you start to trade?
- How did you start to trade? (please can you tell me as to who gave you the initial idea, how you learn about trade (eg., sourcing goods; organising finance; place) and sourcing clientele; and specifically about locations).

- Can you describe to me in general the following: (a) daily and seasonal patterns of investment in trade and profit earned; (b) about clientele; (d) level of competition between street traders; (e) the ideal place / location in your opinion for this trade.
- Can you please tell me about your daily routine (describe about trading and any other household and economic activities that you undertake).

3. On Street trading Locations (respondents' as well as others in the ward)

- Where /how do you trade? (please can you show me on the map)
- Do you know about other locations (public places) where people locate to trade in this ward? If so, please can you identify those places on this map.
- Please can you tell me, which of these locations you would rank as (a) Highly profitable/ desirable from business point to low; Similarly can you tell me about the degree and nature of risk faced in the different location (b) high risk of eviction to low.
- Can you also explain to me the basis of your ranking in the above map.
- Given the above ranking, how would you assess the location from where you hawk?

Relationship between location, type of and volume of street trade

- Which locations are preferred by street traders in vegetable, fruit and flower trade, in this ward? And why?
- In your opinion, does having a location to trade from a fixed place matter for your trade and why? (for example, space availability and the type of trade that you might have entered into. (also get numerical data in terms of investment, scale, from street traders in different locations)
- If yes move to next question; if no, move to next section
- Where / How do you trade in this ward? (i. fixed place / ii. itinerant)
If the answer is a, move to section D and, b, move to section E.

4. Residential Location and other issues

- Where do you live?
- How many households are in street trade from your settlement? If so what kind of trade and where do they hawk? (Are you willing to introduce them?)
- Are any of your relatives or friends in street trade in Bangalore? If so, what kind of trade and where do they live? Where do they hawk? Can you help me in getting in touch with them?

5. Questions for fixed place traders

Finding and Occupying the Place

- Where do you trade in this ward? Can you show me on this map?

- Can you also tell me who is/are the traders (a) next to you and (b) in this street /location?
- Among those in your street/ plaza/ location, who is the first one to occupy place? Do you know them? How? How did they find / occupy that place?
- Are they related to you? How do hawkers in your location / street know each other? Did you know them before? Are they all from same ethnic/language group? If so how?
- Where do other hawkers come from? How long have they been trading in that location? (questions specific to the interviewee)
- How long have you been trading from that location?
- Why / How did you choose this location?
- How long are you trading in this location? Is this your first location? If not, please tell me about the other locations from where you were trading before? Why did you move?
- How did you find this place? (Who helped you with information and actually occupying it? If so who, in what way? And why?)
- Have you hawked from a fixed place previously for trading? Or have you made any attempt to access a place? What happened?
- In the different places that you have ranked here, who in your opinion have been able to get access? What are the factors that have helped them? What are the factors that you think are constraining your chances to access such locations?

Risks and opportunities

- Do you or street traders known to you (at your location or ward) face any problems for doing your business in that location? If so, can you describe the problems and agents involved?
- In your opinion, has there been any change in the type of problems you face at the trading location? If so what are they and what is your opinion as to why this has happened?
- How do you respond to it?
- How long have you been trading from your present location? Is this your first place? If not, where were you before? And how and why did you move? Retaining the place from where you hawk over the years?
- What do you do when you face the above mentioned problems?
- Do you have any association or sanga? What are the key activities?
- If yes, how and why did you form this sanga?
- Who took the initiative to form this sanga and why?
- Is this sanga affiliated to any political party? What is the official status of it?
- What is your position in this sanga?
- What is your opinion about such Sangas and unions?
- If no, have there been any efforts either amongst hawkers like you or by any other groups like the NGOs for example to form a sanga?
- If you do not have any association, when you face threats, how do you represent your case to the different State institutions?

- Who do you contact among the following (Ngos, party politicians or bureaucrats) when you or other traders face a problem in relation to your trading place? And Why?

6. Questions for itinerant traders

- Why did you chose to trade itinerantly?
- If no did you have a location before? Where? What happened to it?
- In your opinion, how profitable is that location for your business and what do you think are the factors affecting it?
- (Where applicable): If you had a place in locations that you marked as highly desirable or competitive which merchandise will you trade in? How much would you have invested? What in your opinion determines who can access the different locations that you located in the map?

1.2 GROUP 2: LOCAL LEADERS

(Elected representatives, squatter leaders and street level political workers)

- Ward characteristics (demographic, economic)
- How many (what proportion of the ward's population) are in street trade?
- Where / how do street traders trade in this ward? And why? Where do they live?
- What is your view on street trade?
- Can you tell us about how street traders occupy different places in this ward?
- (preferably a timeline of events)
- Who are the people in street trade (social characteristics) and in which types of trade?
- What do other poor people in this ward do for their living?
- Do you know how street traders find places for their trade?
- Do traders have any specific preference in relation to location? Where in your opinion, potential to trade is high and where is it low?
- In these different locations, can you tell us what are the problems hawkers face for trading, specifically with reference to issues of land?
- Can you tell us about any recent attempts to evict street traders and what was the outcome?
- Have they approached you or any other political agents in the ward in relation to occupying land or for avoiding evictions?
- What did you do when this started?
- Do street traders have any association or sanga? If so, what is the name, when was it formed?

- On their role in street traders' process of subverting eviction in 1999 and afterwards.
- Any other issues that you wish to comment.

1.3 GROUP 3: FORMAL WHOSALE TRADERS

- History of fruit / vegetable / flower in KR Market ward.
- How long have you been in this trade and in this ward / place?
- Wholesale traders' economic and social history
- How many wholesale shops are there in this cluster? How many retailers? Which community?
- Can you briefly tell us about the ethnic / caste background of wholesale traders in your trade?
- Relationship between wholesale traders, retail traders and street traders.
- If you find one community dominating, please ask why?
- In your knowledge, when did (this type of trade) start in the market?
- Can you tell us briefly about how many wholesale shops are there now?
- Can you describe the activities that happen in the mandi (wholesale shop or godown) through out a day? How many people are employed in a wholesale shop and in what capacity? Who are they and do they have any connections with street traders? If so, can you explain, in what ways?
- When you started to trade, how many wholesale shops were there? Were there any street traders? If so, how many? What were they selling? Have you observed any changes in street trading in this ward?
- What is your view on street traders?
- Who are in street trade and in which types of trade? And how do they enter trade and occupy places?
- Why do (street traders) cluster together by trade in this ward? How do you manage competition?
- How many street traders are there now? Has their numbers changed?
- Do you know any street traders? How?
- Have there been any attempts to evict street traders? If so, when and what was /were the outcome (s)?


1.4 OTHER TYPES OF LOCAL ECONOMIC AGENTS

- When did you move into this ward?
- Types of economic activities in the ward and where is it concentrated?
- When you started your business, were there any street traders? If so, how many? What were they selling? Have you observed any changes in street trading in this ward?

- What is your view on street traders?
- Who are in street trade and in which types of trade? And how do they enter trade and occupy places?
- Why do (street traders) cluster together by trade in this ward? How do you manage competition?
- How many street traders are there now? Has their numbers changed?
- Do you know any street traders? How?
- Do you know how they find and occupy their place?
- Have there been any attempts to evict street traders? If so, when and what was /were the outcome (s)?

Appendix 1B

Location of Case Study Wards



Legend

- Basavangudi Ward (Inner periphery)
- Jayanagar 4th block (Inner periphery)
- Jayanagar 9th block (Inner periphery)
- HAL ward , Outer periphery (CMC, BMA)
- KR Puram Ward, Outer periphery (CMC, BMA)
- Varathur (Nagara Panchyat, BMA)

KR Market Ward City centre (BCC)

Appendix 2

Spatial Organisation of Street Trade

This section describes the manner in which street traders' occupy places in the agglomerations studied.

KR Market

There are several agglomerations of street traders in KR Market ward, of which eight (see figure below) were considered for this study as mentioned in Chapter 4.




Figure 1 Street trading agglomeration in KR Market

L1 is the oldest market complex constructed in the early 50s known as the KR Market and it is the main node for retail trade in the city. Retail street traders in vegetables, fruits and flowers occupy different places in L1 viz., an inner courtyard, a plaza, open space around the market earmarked for future expansion and parking spaces.

Flower traders, predominantly men from native castes occupy an interior courtyard. Their trade is organised in two cycles; the second cycle traders are seen in image 1 (below). Formal wholesale traders supported their occupation on the condition that they sell only loose flowers in retail. They trade between 9am and until 5pm and their peak trading time is between 11am and 3 pm. Their clientele include street traders, households and formal retail traders from various wards within the BCC jurisdiction.



Image 1 Retail flower traders in the Courtyard in L1

Farmers and high end street traders trade in the courtyard during the first cycle; they occupy spaces on a first cum first basis. As many traders congregate here at that time, each trader is allowed to stand with their basket in front of them. Traders who cannot find a place in the courtyard locate in public pathways and thoroughfares, shown as L7, in the above figure.



Image 2 Street traders in a Plaza in L1

Retail vegetable traders, both men and women trade in the plaza (images 2 and 3) and on vacant land (image 4) below the plaza. Traders' seen in image 2, invest between 150Rs – 500Rs per day and they each have a specific space measuring 1.5mx1.2m. They identified three large traders 'networks here; besides there are also a few small networks of traders' and individuals who do not belong to any network. Female traders lined along one side are members of one of the large networks at this location.




Image 3 A scene of trading in the Plaza just before peak trading Time

Their numbers vary in a day; traders seen in the middle row in the image trade only for a limited time in a day between 3pm and 5pm and do not have a specific place unlike those in the other two rows. Although their horizontal ties are weak at this location, they locate in the plaza with the support of labour leaders or trader-leaders.

Street traders selling onions and potatoes or mixed vegetables (image 4) invest relatively higher amounts as compared to the plaza traders, between 500 -1000Rs in a day and they trade in an open space sandwiched between the plaza and an entrance to the market. Their counterparts who could not find a space here have moved to other wards, discussed further in chapter 5.



Image 4 Street trading below the plaza

Image 5 is a scene of street trading in a parking place in L1, which is one of the three least popular places among street traders; the other two being the second cycle of trade at L7 and L8. Small traders dominate in these places.




Image 5 Street traders in parking spaces in L1




Image 6 Fruit traders in the open space in L1

The above two images (6 and 7) show retail fruit traders and small-scale vegetable traders on vacant land earmarked for future construction in L1. As compared to plaza traders, traders on open space face erratic evictions and their relationship to leaders differ.




Image 7 Another scene of street trading in the open space

All types and scales of trade in perishable and non-perishable goods were conducted from KR Market until the mid-1970s, when wholesale trade in fruits and vegetables shifted to separate market complexes in the same ward or in the neighbouring wards. One such complex is the Kalasipalayam Vegetable Wholesale Market (KVWM) shown as L2 in fig 4.4, which is located at around 2 Km from the KR Market. Street traders selling mixed vegetables in bulk occupy the shop fronts and small traders, the parking spaces here. Their clientele include vegetable traders in L1 and traders from various wards of BCC.

L3 and L4 (fig 4.4) are the agglomerations of fruit traders, who sell fruits imported from markets outside Bangalore, predominantly from North India. Their level of investment is higher in comparison to traders selling local varieties of seasonal fruits in L5.




Image 8 Street traders in L3

Muslim fruit wholesale, retail, and street traders dominate in L3. It is situated on land owned by the Wakf Committee – a state institution set up to protect the interests of Muslims in the city. Shops are organized around a mosque. Street traders congregate in front of shops, public pathways and in front of the mosque (see images 8 and 9).




Image 9 Another view of fruit traders in L3



Image 10 A scene of bulk street trading in L4

Bordering L3 and opposite L1, is the agglomeration L4, which stretches along two perpendicular roads. The two images (10 above and 11 below) are the scenes of street trading towards the end of the first daily time cycle of trade in L4. Bulk traders occupy the front of shops and small traders, the public pathways.




Image 11 Another view of street trade in L4



Image 12 Street trade in the second road in L4

In a perpendicular road, both bulk and small street traders trade on one side of the road (image 12); and fruit traders who combine retail and bulk scale of trade are on the other side (image 13), who occupied the pathway abutting L1 after 2000.



Image 13 Street traders who combine retail and bulk trade in L4



Image 14 Greens trade in L5

L5 (images 14 and 15) is an agglomeration of formal traders and street traders specializing in spinach and other types of greens trade; it is located under an elevated expressway which was completed in 2000.




Image 15 Another view of L5

L5 is an example of the blurred boundaries between the formal/informal and legal/illegal practices in the city. Traders here follow a hierarchy of place use: formal traders operate from their tempos; bulk street traders occupy spaces immediately in front of the tempos and retail & small street traders, in the boundaries. Both formal traders and street traders lost their spaces in L1 when KR Market was renovated in 1999/00.

L6 is an agglomeration of street traders which is situated in a narrow strip of land sandwiched between a fish market and a former seasonal fruits wholesale market.

Towards the end of 2004, the BCC relocated seasonal fruit traders to a new market complex in the city's periphery. Following this event, spinach and seasonal fruit street traders in the trades of captured this place and now trade during different time cycles.

L7 (Fig 4.5) is an agglomeration of flower traders in a public pathway and a main thoroughfare surrounding L1. The following three images (16-18) provide a glimpse of flower trade here during the first time cycle of trade, when predominantly small traders occupy every inch of space. .



Image 16 Flower trade in the first cycle in L7




Image 17 First cycle trade in L7



Image 18 Bouquet trade in first cycle in L7

More recently, KR market ward emerged as a key node for trading different varieties of flowers used in bouquets; bouquet traders (images 18 and 19) trade on a narrow strip of land adjoining a bus-station and a thoroughfare.



Image 19 Another view of Bouquet trade in L7

The scene in L7 after 9 am is in sharp contrast to the early morning activities as can be seen in images 20 and 21 as the surveillance is high; hence, very few traders manage to occupy this place between 9 am and 4pm.



Image 20 A view of L7 after 9 am



Image 21 Another view of L7 after 9 am




Image 22 Street trade in L7 after 4 pm

The scenario changes after 4 pm when several, predominantly small traders in vegetable and fruit trade are found at this location (image 22).



Image 23 Small traders in L8

Small traders (image 23) trade for a limited time in the main and side roads, either before 9 am or from 5 pm and until 9pm in the evening. Their clientele are predominantly low income households working in the same ward.

Inner Periphery

The agglomeration in the BG ward (see fig.2) is located along a main thoroughfare known as the Gandhi Bazaar Road (GBR), which leads to the KR Market ward in the North and to the JNGR 4th and 9th block wards (included in this study) and the IT Parks in the South.

Fig 2 shows the organisation of street trading in the BG ward agglomeration in the inner periphery. Vegetable traders and fruit traders selling a single type of fruit trade on one side of the GBR and traders in mixed fruits and flower trades are on the opposite side.




Figure 2 Organisation of street trading in BG Ward

Vegetable traders' below (image 24) are each allowed to occupy a space of 1.5m x 2m. At the end of the vegetable cluster are a few traders selling bananas (image 25). They are not allowed to trade on the opposite side where mixed fruit traders dominate.



Image 24 Vegetable traders' cluster in BG Ward



Image 25 Traders selling single type of fruits in BG Ward

Mixed-fruit traders (image 26) occupy the shop fronts, one of which is a private retail chain trading perishable goods known as the 'Green and Grains' (G&G). Post 2000,




Image 26 Fruit cluster in BG Ward

large retail chains such as the G&G started to sell perishable goods in Bangalore and other Indian metros. They favour wards in South Bangalore like the BG ward where higher income and upwardly mobile middle class households dominate. Street markets remain popular among these residents. However, conflicts erupted between a group of street traders and G&G in 2005, which resulted in the eviction of all street traders in the ward for a brief period.

The scale of flower trade is relatively large in the GBR agglomeration as compared to others in the inner and the outer periphery. Restrictions on flower trade in the KR Market ward together with the domination of higher income, upper caste Hindu households in BG ward, fuelled the growth of flower trade here. Both male and female flower traders (images 26 -27) reside outside the BG ward, in the KR Market ward and in the wards to its west.



Image 27 Flower Traders in the BG Ward Agglomeration



Image 28 Another View of flower trade in the BG Ward

Male traders (images 28, 29), invest a minimum amount of 500Rs and upto1000 Rs per day in their trade as compared to the dominant pattern of investment of 100 Rs – 200Rs among female traders in the BG ward (image 27) and other wards in the Southern inner periphery. Small flower traders, both men and women congregate in the side roads and many of them occupied their places after the flower traders seen in image 30.




Image 29 At the Entrance to flower cluster in the BG Ward



Image 30 Small Scale flower trade in the BG Ward

Street traders' agglomeration in the second ward, viz., JNGR 9th block is in the ward's main commercial zone and it stretches along three roads viz., the 28th and 29th cross roads and a main perpendicular to the 29th cross.




Figure 3 Organisation of street trade in the JNGR 9th Block Ward

Fig.3 shows the layout of street trading agglomeration in JNGR 9th block. Vegetable traders (no.3 in fig 4.6) occupy the public pathways on both sides of a main road (image 31) and one side, in the 29th cross road (image 32).



Image 31 Vegetable Traders along a main road in the JNGR Ninth Block



Image 32 Vegetable traders at 29th Cross Road in the JNGR Ninth Block



Image 33 Another view of vegetable traders in a cross Road in JNGR Ninth Block

Fruit traders (image 33) cluster together along with vegetable traders in the 29th cross road and small traders (image 34) trade at the edge of the agglomeration.



Image 34 Small traders in the JNGR Ninth Block Agglomeration



Image 35 Flower traders in the JNGR Ninth Block Agglomeration

Few flower traders (image 35) trade in a road perpendicular to 29th cross road. The signpost seen in the picture shows the symbol of the DSS. Although the organization is not active in this ward, their symbol is used by both street traders and squatter residents to establish their claims to a place.

Street traders' agglomeration in the third ward - the JNGR 4th block ward - is located in the public pathways surrounding a commercial complex and the cross roads leading to it where there are numerous retail businesses (see fig 4). The commercial complex is strategically located at the intersection of four roads, opposite an intra-city bus terminus and a mosque and adjacent to a temple.




Figure 4 Organisation of Street Trade in the JNGR Fourth Block Agglomeration

Vegetable and fruit traders, predominantly men congregate in a road near the entrance to the shopping complex (no.1 and 2, fig 4 and images 32 - 35).



Image 36 Fruit Traders' Agglomeration Outside a Shopping Complex in JNGR Fourth Block



Image 37 Fruit and Vegetable traders in the JNCR Fourth Block Ward Agglomeration

The space immediately in front of street traders' stall is allotted for parking (image 37) by the traffic police following a conflict between them and the ward's MLA. The concerned MLA lobbied on behalf of street traders' seen in the picture; however, in 2000, the senior bureaucrats in the traffic police department aligned with BATF, which also influenced the relationship between field bureaucrats, political representatives and traders' in the Fourth Block ward. A traffic police, refused to accommodate a group of street traders who lobbied through the MLA. In response, the MLA enlisted the support of BCC field bureaucrats and paved a drainage on which street traders' set their stalls.



Image 38 Street traders at the entrance to a shopping Complex in the JNCR Fourth Block Ward



Image 39 Another View of fruit and vegetable traders in the JNGR Fourth Block Agglomeration




Image 40 Traders at the Edge of the Shopping Complex in JNGR Fourth Block

Women traders in different trades are in a road perpendicular to the complex (see dark blue coloured blurb no 2, fig 4; image 41).



Image 41 Fruit Traders in the JNGR Fourth Block Agglomeration

Fruit traders also trade in the street corners opposite the shopping complex (see no.4, fig. 4 and image 42) or on their own (image 43).

Image 42 A Fruit trader outside the agglomeration





Image 43 Fruit traders in street corners

Since 1999, the complex is monitored by a private security agency and few flower traders (see no.3, fig 4) and traders selling non-perishable products are allowed inside the complex. Children in flower trade (image 43), roam around the agglomeration

outside the complex and are occasionally allowed to stand in front of a street traders' stall. Their parents used to trade in the agglomeration but lost their places in 2000.



Image 44 Flower traders in JNGR Fourth Block

Outer Periphery

The KR Puram street trading agglomeration is situated on land along a main thoroughfare (see map 3; image 45), which connects the IT parks in the southern and the eastern wards of the city. It is at a distance of approximately 2 km from the residential colony of the Indian Telephone Industries (ITI), which is one of the three large public sector companies in the city. In addition, there are several other residential colonies in and around the KR Puram ward. Residents from these colonies' depend on KR Puram agglomeration for their supply of perishable goods.




Figure 5 Location of KR Puram Agglomeration

Behind the santhe are the office of district land registrar and the district court (image 46) and adjacent to it, are the police station and the office of city municipal corporation (see fig 5), where there is always a dense congregation of different types of agents.



Image 45 Approach to KR Puram Agglomeration

Image 46 District Court behind the Santhe




Image 47 First daily time cycle of trading at KR Puram Agglomeration

There are three distinct cycles of trade at the KR Puram agglomeration. The volume of trade is high on all days of the week during the first time cycle of trade; both traders and farmers predominantly from the north eastern wards in the outer periphery dominate during this time (images 43 and 44). Many itinerant traders in the east and in the north east source their produce from them.



Image 47 A scene of Santhe trade Towards the End of Daily First Time Cycle of Trade

The volume of trade is relatively high on one day in a week during the second cycle, also, described as weekly trading or traders in this thesis (images 47 - 48).



Image 48 Weekly trading in KR Puram Agglomeration



Image 49 A View of weekly Trade in KR Puram after 11 am



Image 50 A scene of Weekly Trade before 11 am in KR Puram

The second cycle daily traders are on the open space in front of an enclosed market (fig 5); vegetable traders (image 51, below) dominate this cycle of trade.



Image 51 Second daily time cycle of trade in KR Puram



Image 52 Street Traders' Association in KR Puram

The banner in image 52 is an announcement of a festival organised by second cycle traders', who also control the KR Puram street traders' organisation. A trader-leader's stall is used to display the items presented to street traders. A coconut trader seen in image 52 is new to the agglomeration and trade in front of the leaders' stall.



Image 53 Flower trade in KR Puram

Bulk and retail flower trade (see image 53), are allowed during the first cycle but restricted to small scale trade, in the second cycle.



Image 54 Fruit traders in KR Puram

Fruit traders in image 54 moved to a public pathway opposite the agglomeration due to a conflict with the vegetable traders.

End Notes

¹ Embeddedness is defined as a degree to which individuals are enmeshed in social networks Grannavotter (1973, 1985). Spatial embeddedness in the context of this study refers to the manner in which individuals and their networks root in a place and are connected to its social process.

² Giddens (1985: 118) introduced the concept of locales as part of his structuration theory, which argues that macro-structures of social relations are interlaced with microstructures of everyday life. He defines 'locales' as "the use of space as settings of interaction, the settings of interactions in turn being essential to specifying its contextuality".

³ As found by Anjaria (2005), the rules of limiting one licence per family and the locations allotted for hawking zones contradicted the way street traders use space for their trade.

⁴ For the history of the conflict over hawking zones in the centre city ward and the role of NASVI in Bangalore, see pp.155-156 and p.167-168, in Benjamin and Bhuvaneswari (2001).

⁵ Since 2004, NASVI is less visible in the city. One of the three local NGOs affiliated to NASVI stated to the author that they had to discontinue their work with street traders due to the lack of funding.

⁶ In the literature, urban informality is conceptualized in relation to two processes that are outside the legal framework, namely the economic process and the spatial process. Roy (2004) definition of urban informality emphasises the second aspect, which is the manifestation of extra-legal process on urban environment.

⁷ Glazer and Strauss (1968) challenged the arbitrary division between 'theory' and 'empirical' research and the separation of field research and data analysis (Chamraz 1995; 2000).

⁸ Social networks are defined as a specific set of linkages among a defined set of persons, with the additional property that the characteristics of these linkages as a whole may be used to interpret the social behaviour of the persons involved [Mitchell 1969].

⁹ See Peattie, (1978) and Nustad, (2004) for debates on the concept of informal sector

¹⁰ In his work, "The Other Path" De Soto argues that informal economic agents prefer to remain outside the purview of the State due to the high costs associated with legality.

¹¹ Some scholars argue that street trade is one of a variety of economic activities, which are enacted in public or private places outside the legal framework and that it is difficult to collate different types of street workers into one category as their needs and interests differ and so also, the social relations underpinning their economies (Brown, 2006; Pratt 2006; Raked and Lloyd-Jones 2002).

¹² Evidence from different cities show that some traders are recognised and they pay a licence fee or use other forms of payment such as daily fee, although the proportion of such traders is relatively small. See also Anjaria 2006; Bandyopadhyay 2009; King 2006; Sesabki 2006.

¹³ Although 'agglomerations' is the preferred term for this study, other terms have been used, such as 'concentrations' (Cross 2001, 2006), 'agglomerations' (Bromley 1978; Coe *et al.* 2007) and 'informal markets' (Seligmann 2001, 2004).

¹⁴ Shrestha (2006) found that tenure security affects traders' income.

¹⁵ See Robinson (2000) argument for conceptualising the heterogeneous processes in cities.

¹⁶ See Keivani and Mattingly (2007) for a discussion on Bangalore's periphery.

¹⁷ Setsabi (2006) has shown how the State's interventions to allocate land to large corporations resulted in the expulsion of street traders from city centre. Similar arguments have been made by Middleton (2003) in Ecuador, where street traders were evicted out of city centre to attract international tourists.

¹⁸ Bhan identifies three components of this shifts in the Indian context which are an altered understanding of poverty based on misrecognition of the poor, changing discourses on the idea of the government rooted in the slow demise of nationalist development state, and the rise of neo-liberal state and an increasing aestheticisation of poverty and city space.

¹⁹ Political participation is defined as an activity that is intended to or has the consequence of affecting either directly or indirectly government action (Hariss, (2005)

²⁰ Fox (2000:153) differentiates between clientelism and citizenship, and defines the former as a relationship based on 'political subordination' and the latter as a status "that is attained when the least privileged gain access to state resources without forfeiting their right to "articulate their interests autonomously".

²¹ Baken (2003:16) notes that patronage is a related concept in anthropology which is defined as informal, small group interactions and was derived from the idea of face to face relationships between network members. Clientelism is a specific form of political patronage and is distinguishable from other non-political forms of patronage. See also Ward 1989:148 for the discussion on non-political patronage.

²² Kaufmann (1974) suggests that the concept of dyadic networks can be extended to conceptualise clientelistic ties as multi-tiered networks. A closely related concept is Burgwal's (1995) 'collective clientelism' which describes how communities enter into an exchange relationship with a patron.

²³ See also Fox (2000) and Gay (2006) whose work shows how electoral competition and clientelism mutually influence one another but the direction is politically contingent. The threat of electoral competition can enhance the choices available to the poor or can create incentives for elites to limit political choices sharply.

²⁴ Gay (2006) differentiates between the two forms of clientelism viz., thick and thin and Fox (2000) suggest a continuum of state-society relations with authoritarian clientelism at one end of the spectrum, semi-clientelism in the middle and citizenship at the opposite end.

²⁵ See Shrestha (2006) whose finding suggests that non-resident traders in Kathmandu were unable to enlist the support elected representatives to stall evictions of their trading places.

²⁶ Cross (1998) definition of organisation is one of a registered membership organisation incorporated into political party structures and differs from the focus in Singermen's study.

²⁷ Razzaz (1994) shows social networks fulfil the two organizational roles among agents involved in informal land development in a Middle Eastern city.

²⁸ Similar suggestions are made by Seligmann (2001); Sharma (2000)

²⁹ Cross describes these leaders as 'political entrepreneurs' to highlight their entrepreneurship capability. They have both political and financial incentives to expand the organization as well as the "quantity and quality" of place they control.

³⁰ Brown (2006) found inter-city differences between street traders' organizations in the cities of Asia and Africa, in terms of their objectives and their ability to negotiate with the State and notes that associations

managed by street traders' are often weak, poorly organised, politicized, and have little history of successful negotiations with the State in comparison to those run by a charity or a non-governmental organization.

³¹ The dictionary meaning of the term subversion refers to a variety of activities which are aimed at frustrating the attempts of the State to overthrowing of the State. These are actions designed to undermine the military, economic, psychological, or political strength or morale of a regime. Insurgency is defined as organized opposition intended to change or overthrow existing authority and the term resistance connotes opposition. As traders' resort to different forms of politics – resistance, confrontation as well as accommodation and their actions are not always organized efforts, the term subversion has been used in this thesis. Recent writings feminism have adopted this term to refer to oppositional actions to patriarchy.

³² Spatial routines are defined as repetitive, everyday activities occurring in locales in facilitating social protest (See also Stillerman (2006:510)).

³³ See also Bhowmik (2003) for a discussion on the history of NASVI <http://www.worldbank.org/urban/symposium2003/docs/papers/bhowmik.pdf>

³⁴ The relaxation of rules by a Supreme Court judge in a land mark case in 1985, to enable the "socially and economically disadvantaged" individuals and groups to seek redressal through the courts marked the beginning of public interest litigations in India. See Rajamani 2007; Ramanathan 2004 for the history of public interest litigations in India

³⁵ See Bhan (2009) and Rajamani (2007) for the type of cases

³⁶ An example was the pressure on Bangalore Municipal Corporation to implement hawking zones despite its opposition by street traders in 2000- 01. The commissioner - the administrative head of the municipality personally oversaw the earmarking of hawking zones due to the court's involvement.

³⁷ Bandyopadhyay (2009) study suggests that street traders simultaneously involve with the filed bureaucrats as well as the elected representatives connected to the regional state.

³⁸ McGee (1976) documented sixteen types of agencies encountered by street traders.

³⁹ See Brenner (2000) for a discussion on scales

⁴⁰ See also Stillerman (2006) whose work shows the influence of 'scales' on street traders' subversive strategies

⁴¹ Bayat argues that theories on social movements such as the RMT or Singermen (1995) theory on social networks are not adequate to explain street traders' political action as they do not form formal organizations or mobilize under a leader as well as do not draw on networks to find and occupy a place.

⁴² The concept of controllers is drawn from the works of Razzaz, (1997); and Seligmann 2004.

⁴³ de Certeau differentiates between strategies and tactics, defining the former as forms of action that are able "to produce, tabulate, and impose these spaces when those operations can take place, whereas tactics can only use, manipulate, and divert these spaces" (1984:30). Further, Round et al (2008:175) notes 'people can be simultaneously operating a range of tactics and strategies'. Therefore, the term strategy is used in this dissertation.

⁴⁴ Bian (1997) notes the difference between having ties and the ability to draw on them at appropriate time – an aspect less focussed in the literatures on social capital and informal politics as argued in this chapter.

⁴⁵ Email communications with Benjamin on 20 October 2002, with Valli on 3 January 2003, and with Asha on 23 April 2003.

⁴⁶ Major Review Committee, Dept. of Social Policy, LSE

⁴⁷ Initially I had contacted the municipality for their official ward map. Due to the time delays involved in obtaining this map and the repeated visits that it demanded, I abandoned this plan.

⁴⁸ Bangalore City Indicator Programme (2000) indicates that trade and commerce accounts for 35.8 per cent of the city's GDP, and provide employment for 26.2 per cent of the work force. It is not clear if informal trade is counted within this estimate.

⁴⁹ Interview with Sadiq Pasha, Fruit Wholesale Trader and Secretary, Wholesale Traders Association, KR Market.

⁵⁰ See Heitzman (2004) for the economic history of Bangalore.

⁵¹ The cycle of investment varies for each trade: vegetable traders invest daily, whereas those in mixed fruit trade and in locations outside KR Market invested on alternative days. However, traders make daily visits to the markets to locate potential opportunities.

⁵² A gudde typically had between three to five and up to a maximum of ten items of a particular vegetable or fruit, or a hand measure of flowers.

⁵³ There is no official count, other than the registers maintained by two hawkers' associations in the ward. These associations include hawkers trading in fruits from locations L3, L4, L5. Their record showed a list of 1500 hawkers trading in the three locations.

⁵⁴ The number of traders varies during different times of day and days of the week, and in addition by season.

⁵⁵ The register maintained by street traders' associations lists 350–500 hawkers, while the register of the land owner gives 225. This variation is due to the fact that a number of traders, including some established traders, trade within the boundaries of HAL Market without licences or using a shared licence. In addition, street traders and farmers trading from this location during the first morning cycle are not counted in either list. Besides, hawkers who otherwise trade itinerantly are allowed to trade from the edge of HAL Market during the end of company shifts.

⁵⁶ The boundaries of an agglomeration particularly on public spaces were defined by street traders according to the patterns of everyday use in the locality.

⁵⁷ See Benjamin and Bhuvaneswari (2001) for the spin offs from street traders relating to the patterns of remittances across rural and urban areas among the resettlers in the 9th block colony.

⁵⁸ The HAL owns 4500 acres of land in the ward.

⁵⁹ Till today, the peak trading times at the agglomeration coincide with the work shifts of the company.

⁶⁰ In an interview with the real estate officer who was in charge at the time of the conflict, stated although there was an oral agreement between street traders and the real estate office, they subsequently faced opposition from within the union and that street traders have no right to occupy the land. Hence, the stress on oral agreement by street traders is not valid.

⁶¹ The airport has since then been shifted to a place in the northern outskirts of the city.

⁶² His regime was known for instituting a number of progressive land laws. It is said that Tipu Sultan's reforms provided the foundation for modern laws on land in the state of Karnataka.

⁶³ Santhe land is marked in the land use plans developed by the CMCs.

⁶⁴ This estimate is based on the tokens issued to traders, by the land managers everyday.

⁶⁵ These were classified as revenue land or gomala (grazing land) during the British rule.

⁶⁶ See the Janagraha website, which lists directions to remove street traders under the good governance programme. Street traders portrayed as illegal citizens: <http://www.koramangala.com/jana/>

⁶⁷ The 2000–10 master plans were prepared by a French consultancy company identified by the BATF. In an interview with the consultants, the outgoing leader of the group at that time mentioned that although the consultant group recommended mixed land use planning and avoiding evictions in KR Market, it was opposed by the urban development department and the Janagraha.

⁶⁸ An example is the Cox market plan for street traders.

⁶⁹ See BMP Report (2000).

⁷⁰ See Leduka (2008) and Hansen (2007) for similar arguments.

⁷¹ Benjamin (2000) suggests a uniform alliance between senior bureaucrats and corporations. By contrast, during the period of fieldwork, senior bureaucrats were divided over the impact of urban development strategies on poverty. These divisions surfaced in heated debates during the preparation of the state Human Development Report (2004), in which I was involved as a researcher. Within the state there was opposition to the aggressive strategies adopted by the Urban Development department with the support of the Chief Minister.

⁷² Interviews with ex-Deputy Mayor BCC, Shataz Khanum, February 2003, and MLA Prakash, KR Market April 2004.

⁷³ Interview with BCC Commissioner Jothi Ramalingam, June 2004.

⁷⁴ Interviews with the BCC Commissioner, Deputy Commissioner and Special Officer of the mega city project, June–July 2004.

⁷⁵ Interview with local councillor, Chamrajpet ward.

⁷⁶ Interview with mayor, (Thigala caste), August 2008.

⁷⁷ The English-language media completely rallied around the BATF. Attempts by retail traders and wholesale traders to put their side of the story in these newspapers were rejected.

⁷⁸ Srinivas (2005) documented the political and economic ascendancy of Thigalas in Bangalore.

⁷⁹ See for example Helga *et al.* arguments on the impacts of neo-liberalism in cities, particularly the poor; and Rajagopal (2004); Bhowmik (2007) writings on street traders and Appadurai (2000).

⁸⁰ See Razzaz (1994) and also Srinivas (2005). Srinivas (2005) work illustrates Thigalas' claims to KR Market based on their historical connections.

⁸¹ This is recorded in a research on urban poverty and governance in Bangalore undertaken by the University of Birmingham between 1999 and 2001. At the time of this research, street traders were predominantly concentrated in one or two places within the ward. Traders had not occupied these places and the number trading from L4 was relatively less.

⁸² Interviews with Lawrence Liang (Alternative Lawyers Forum), October, 2002 and with Muralidhar (Lower Court Judge, New Delhi), November, 2005.

⁸³ See Benjamin and Bhuvaneswari (2001) for details.

⁸⁴ There were other precedents where formal traders and street traders had lost court cases in the High Court of Karnataka over re-location of markets.

⁸⁵ Interview with Shantaram, Director, IAS, APMC, June 2004.

⁸⁶ Interview with Deputy commissioner, BCC, July 2004.

⁸⁷ See also Kate Blackman (2000) for the silencing of debates within an organization.

⁸⁸ This was important for street traders after 2001 due to the mobilization by the middle class and the growing influence of organizations such as Janagraha at the policy-making level. In addition, there were close ties (and embeddedness) between the corporate elites in organizations like Janagraha and BATF, calling for removal of encroachments, regularizing street traders and allowing them to hawk in locations identified by their organizations. While street traders were aware of the resistance, they were not clear where it was coming from.

⁸⁹ See Brenner (2000).

⁹⁰ In the literature these organizations are referred to as movement organizations. In the context of Bangalore, this definition is a somewhat complicated, as they are embedded in different ways in the politics of the city and are also closely connected to party politics.

⁹¹ Definition of spatial routines –influenced by Lefebvre (2000)

⁹² See Stillerman (2006) for similar findings of negotiating with higher levels to respond to threats that they are unable to contest locally. Anthropology of the state calls this 'boundary blurring'.

⁹³ This practice was common among fruit traders selling seasonal fruits with a high profit margin. Both the lease and rent amounts were higher in squatter settlements closer to street trading agglomeration during those months.

⁹⁴ Interviews with chit organizers and traders confirmed this pattern.

⁹⁵ The role of field bureaucrats and elected representatives in reinterpreting policies and thereby changing the overall context is a recurring theme in the anthropology of everyday state and urban poverty. See for example: Appadurai (2002); Benjamin (2000, 2007); Chatterjee (2000, 2007); Corbridge (2005); Fuller and Harris (2002) on India; and Ismail (2006) on the Middle East. These studies illustrate the fracture within the state and the blurred nature of boundaries between state and society which open up spaces in which the powerless can manoeuvre. See also Zhang's (2001) argument on migrants' relationship with the local state for subverting demolitions in China.

⁹⁶ Interview with Maniyamma and Shekar in the city centre ward.

⁹⁷ A similar argument is espoused by Auyero (2006) and Bayat (1997).

⁹⁸ Interview with DSS Secretary, KR Market Ward.

⁹⁹ See Fuller and Harris (2002); Corbridge (2005); Appadurai (1995).

¹⁰⁰ Source: Interviews with Sridhar, Panchayat member and Srinivas, Head, District Headquarters, Varathur

¹⁰¹ The boundaries of formal/informal at L3 were blurred and defined by traders' relationship to the parastatal APMC. Not many formal wholesale traders operating from built premises have registered or cleared their sales taxes owed to APMC, and are identified by APMC as informal traders. For the purpose of this study, I depend on the definition of traders themselves. Those who identify themselves as street traders and not operating from built premises were totally excluded by the APMC.

¹⁰² The concept of controllers is drawn from the works of Razzaz, (1997) and Seligmann (2004).

¹⁰³ Srinivas (2001) illustrates the political claims of Thigala communities to KR Market Ward because of their historical connection and their mobility in trade.

¹⁰⁴ Not much is documented about the Banjigas caste or traders. Interviews with party politicians indicate that they are as influential in local politics and have returned two representatives to the state legislature from the KR Market Ward.

¹⁰⁵ Interview with Rao, Supervisor of BCC and Tax collector, BCC.

¹⁰⁶ Interview with ex-MLA Prakash.

¹⁰⁷ The agglomeration contains a microcosm of Kannadiga insecurity, particularly at the lower levels, about Tamil domination in the city and their strategies for expanding their constituency.

¹⁰⁸ see Roy (2004, 2005, 2009) for a critique of the marginality thesis and the planning process in India.

¹⁰⁹ See also Jenkins 1994.

¹¹⁰ Minority institution set up to protect the interests of Muslims in the country. It is a politically powerful institution and has significant land not only in KR Market but in other wards in Bangalore and outside the city.